

**THE IDEOLOGY OF ISLAMISM IN THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH
MODERNIZATION ADVENTURE**

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE IDEOLOGY OF ISLAMISM IN THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH MODERNIZATION ADVENTURE

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This study is an attempt to take into account the ideology of Islamism in relation to socio-economic and political context of the Ottoman society in the nineteenth century within which it emerged. Such an analysis enables to assess Islamism on a more solid ground beyond conservatism, fundamentalism, or *irtica*. In line with the understanding of 'positive ideology', Islamism was regarded as constituting the standpoint of subjectivity and the restructuring the society at every societal level. Islamism and its discourse can be seen as being shaped by the socio-economic context of modernization process of the Ottoman-Turkish society. Throughout this dissertation, it was claimed that Islamism has both influences and being influenced from the occurrences of socio-economic transformation.

The rise of Islamism was not a reform in Islamic texts that aims to return to authentic tradition but a response of people and intellectuals to the failures of the modernization attempts of the Third World where the Muslim population were disposed, oppressed or upset. This study also aimed at demonstrating that Islamism is a trajectory of Third World modernization that provides a destructive socio-economic condition for the dissemination of Islamism.

Within this scope Islamism was conceived with a special reference to Young-Ottomans movement both as an instrument of adaptation, a self-preservation and opposition to a certain type of modernization, that is, westernization. Young Ottomans looked for a new form of power for the sake of 'hybrid' Islamic principles without challenging the dominant power relations of modernization.

Lastly, this thesis also critically analyzed some of the existing *reductionist* approaches in which Islamism is treated like traditional Islam where it is perceived with its religious rather than its political content.

Keywords: Ideology, Islam, Islamism, Young-Ottomans, Modernization, Fundamentalism, Conservatism

ÖZ

OSMANLI-TÜRK MODERNLEŞME SERÜVENİNDE İSLAMCILIK İDEOLOJİSİ

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Bu çalışma, İslamcılık ideolojisini içinde doğduğu on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Osmanlı toplumunun sosyo-ekonomik ve politik koşulları ile ilişkilendirerek açıklamaya çalışan bir girişimdir. İslamcılığın sosyo-ekonomik ve diğer toplumsal düzeyler açısından böyle bir analizi, İslamcılığı muhafazakarlık, fundamentalizm, ve irtica gibi kategorilerin ötesinde daha somut temeller üzerinden değerlendirmeyi mümkün kılar.

İslamcılığa, 'pozitif ideoloji' anlayışı ekseninde, toplumsallığın her düzeyinde özneliği oluşturan ve (Müslüman) toplumu yeniden kuran bir ideoloji olarak yaklaşıldı. İslamcılık ve onun söyleminin Osmanlı-Türk toplumunun modernleşme sürecinin koşulları tarafından şekillendirildiğine dikkat çekildi. Bu çalışma boyunca,

İslamcılığın hem modernleşmenin yarattığı sosyo-ekonomik dönüşüm koşullarından etkilendiği ve hem de o koşulları etkilediği ileri sürüldü.

İslamcılığın doğuşu, otantik geleneğe dönmeyi amaçlayan bir yenilenme değil, aksine üçüncü dünyadaki başarısız modernleşme girişimlerine karşı alt-üst olan ve yoksullaşan Müslüman insanların ve entelektüellerin verdiği bir yanıtı. Bu çalışma, İslamcılığı aynı zamanda onun yayılması için yıkıcı sosyo-ekonomik koşullar yaratan üçüncü dünya modernleşmesinin bir trajedisi olduğunu göstermeyi amaçladı.

Bu çerçevede İslamcılık, hem belirli bir tip modernleşmeye yani batılılaşmaya karşı olan; bu anlamda modernleşmeye direnen, hem de modernleşmeye ayak uydurmaya çalışan Yeni-Osmanlı hareketine referansla anlaşılmaya çalışıldı. Yeni-Osmanlılar modernleşmenin hakim iktidar ilişkilerine dokunmaksızın 'melez' İslami değerler adına yeni bir iktidar şekli aradılar.

Son olarak, bu tez İslamcılığı politikadan daha çok din açısından algılayarak onu adeta geleneksel İslam olarak değerlendiren bazı indirgemeci yaklaşımları eleştirel olarak analiz etti.

Anahtar kelimeler: İdeoloji, İslam, İslamcılık, Yeni-Osmanlılar, Modernleşme, Fundamentalizm, Muhafazakarlık



TO MY FATHER

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The precise object of the study is not religion of Islam assumed to provide subject for a certain kind of 'cognitive map' in order to understand the world and place itself in it. The study regards Islamism within terms of political dimension, as total attempt in order to restructure and transform society. This is the first point at which Islamist discourse becomes fully political, going beyond its diffuse pietistic and ethical imperatives. Since, it is here that the elements in the Islamist repertoire are rendered elements in a specific notion of history, in a specific notion of society and in a specific notion of political action. Namely, the discussion throughout the present study is inspired by a consideration of Islamism as a political ideology rather than as a religious movement.

While the present thesis is an attempt to comprehend the ideology of Islamism throughout the Ottoman-Turkish modernization adventure, it has, however, no claim to capture the modernization process in full complexity. The attempt of the study, therefore, is firstly to suggest a (preliminary) methodological framework so as to assess the ideology of Islamism. The text, at the same time, will critically analyze the limited (reductionist) approaches towards Islamism.

The underlying objective of this study can be formulated as follows: To situate the ideology of Islamism into its proper historical context and to evaluate its political

contexts with an alternative methodological framework. Islamism is seen here as being shaped by the socio-economic context of Ottoman society. Islamism, this study postulates, is better understood by placing it in its socio-historical conjuncture. The rise of Islamist ideology in Ottoman society approximately in the middle of the nineteenth century can not be separated from capitalist development in the territory which intensified the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim populations in terms of material interests. In this context Muslim populations started to couch often their demands for order in moralistic and religious terminology.

In explaining the rise of Islamism in terms of socio-economic context of modernization (capitalist development), my claim is that it is a product of the contradictions of third world modernization and represents a modern reaction of specific form of modernization experienced by the Ottoman society. In examining the rise of Islamism, this study also, takes into account Islamism by referring the experience of Young Ottomans. As a matter of fact, Islamist discourses about fundamentals of (present) society are understood by examining how they shape and are shaped by their socio-economic and political setting.

In explaining discourse and political role of modern Islamism, the analysis integrates Islamism into the methodological framework by proposing a concept of positive ideology without hinting a necessary negative connotation. An alternative methodology will be proposed since the popular accountings for Islamism are found to be unsatisfactory. In chapter one, firstly an attempt will be made to criticize the method of negative ideology and then to elaborate, what is called 'positive ideology'. All discussions throughout this chapter are informed by a consideration of Islamism as a negative ideology that involves beliefs in people's heads, primarily beliefs that are

false, mystified or misconstrued. In a pejorative sense, the ideology of Islamism is seen as a decisive problem that is the inversion in thought, which conceals the real nature of things. As such, as will be seen in the following chapter, a central tenet of negative ideology as a false consciousness is a distorting veil that hangs over the eyes of people with an illusion.

In an effort my claim in analyzing Islamism as a positive ideology that perceptions of Islamism as a totally false consciousness or as inverted ideas that serve the purpose to reproduce the present (capitalist) society's contradictory structural conditions should be avoided. Islamism entails to be assessed seriously under an approach different from the negative methodology, which is also a reductionist path for the study of any ideology.

From the proposed point of view, Islamism is regarded as relatively coherent political ideology that have discourse about fundamentals of (present) society to focus on the problems of social issues. Henceforth, Islamism is considered not as a disguise but as an unveiling; that is to say that having an analysis of Islamism on the basis of a positive ideology concept, the dissertation rejects any consideration of the Islamist form of political expression in terms of entirely false consciousness. Thus, it regards Islamism as neither mystification nor Occidentalism but as revelation.

As to its positive content, it can be "true", quite accurate in that this framework enables us to interpret Islamism as an action-oriented set of political beliefs and discourses that serve meaning to its subjects. To the extent, those signs, which Islamist ideology has, are radically determined by socio-historical conditions of society. The final intend of the chapter one is to point out that Islamism could be considered as an

ideology that proposes new fundamental principles, which organize behavior frame of choices, constitute a worldview and are considered to be the means of achieving the goal.

Chapter three previously addresses Islamism as a comprehensive reconsideration of modernization since it has fundamental claims and also solutions for the present societies problems by referring, to some extent, to ‘hybrid’ Islamic principles contaminated by Western ideals. Therefore, the fact that Islamism will be necessarily studied within comprehensive political and ideological aspects should not come as a surprise to anyone. In this perspective it will be asserted that since its rising time in the middle of nineteenth century, and throughout the Republican era, the ideology of Islamism is indeed heavily impregnated with Western notions and in seeking alternative modernization project it adopted a mixture of modern and Islamic values.

Viewing Islamism as a comprehensive reconsideration of modernization, the thesis is in opposition to the conventional approaches that treat Islamism as a premodern ideology, a remnant of underdevelopment desiring to return to an imagined past. Quite the contrary, I will try to demonstrate that Islamism never presents a “return” to the traditionalist Utopia despite of its inspiration of some religious values throughout the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. Modern Islamist ideology does not represent a ‘going back’ to any situation that existed in the past or to any ideology that was formulated in the past. For the outlook of the perspective of the dissertation what defines the ideology of Islamism is not the call for a return to the literal reading of a ‘holy text’, but the combination of this appeal with an intervention in the building political discourse organization for the taking, and retention of political power. Re-

latedly, the ideology of Islamism is informed by contemporary social and political problems.

The next step in chapter two will reckon that Islamism concentrates, from the beginning to the present, on 'articulating' itself well in line with modernization process through its modernizing project in order to seek alternative to dependent modernization. The claim that the crux of Islamism is aspect of an articulation ideology could be based on its ideological aspects that spring from its suggestion of an alternative legitimation for modernization or capitalist development. In turn, except for being contaminated with Western values, capitalist development, for Islamism, can be an adjustable process. Yet, it still needs to be reformulated according to Islam.

As an alternative modernizing movement based on Islamic interpretation of modernization beyond Western character, Islamism also wants to reconstruct fundamentals of society by means of a unique modernization paradigm based on the grounds of Islamic values. Islamic articulation ideology could best be formulated as follows: Capitalist development would be a conventional process provided that it is applied for the sake of Islamic civilization. Since aspiring for wealth in this world does not necessarily mean placing Islamist concerns in a position of secondary (or less) importance. Here, it is regarded that wealth is created for the sake of rebuilding the Islamic civilization. While Islamism became an alternative modernization project, which is not opposed to economic and technological development (and hence to capitalist relations of production), it is a rival to merely products of values and beliefs of Westernization, i.e., a certain kind of modernization.

The latent proposition of this chapter is that it suggest that the ideology of Islamism should be approached beyond such a duality concepts of reformism/conservatism; progressivism/regressivism; modernist/traditionalist. This would result in picturing Islamism exclusively within terms of conservatism, traditionalist or regressiveness. The main concern of the chapter, on the contrary is to take Islamism both as an alternative modernizing movement with a desire to capture modernization by adjusting it to Islamic values and as a political ideology about fundamentals of the present society. In the light of this thesis' framework, Young Ottomans' experience of Islamism will be briefly mentioned at last with an underlying assumption that Young Ottomans attempted to coalesce Ottoman's institutions with the Western correspondence of them by inspiring the Western ideals allows us to asses the ideology of Islamism as an alternative articulation attempt to modernization. What is proposed in the Chapter three is to study Islamism in relation to integrative modernization paradigm.

While in chapter four it is pointed out that Islamism could not be examined without modernization attempts in Ottoman-Turkish society, it is my intention at this point to discuss at length an approach distinctive from some scholars to the study of modernization. Throughout the chapter three in fact throughout the thesis modernization is understood fundamentally as capitalist development, that is, it starts from the economic infrastructure and associated with relations of production, forces of production, technology and so on. Here, I shall try to reconsider some scholars' analysis, in which they partially approach modernization as a series of reformation within superstructure (i.e., *changing habitus*, reform in laws, education, military organization, and administrative form, dressing and like those). Also, it can be seen possible to say

that they tend to start modernization with *Tanzimat* or Selim III's military reforms as a state-centered processes from top to down.

From the perspective of alternative modernization aspect, Ottoman-Turkish experience should be studied together with the transformations of Ottoman's internal structure of economy and its correspondent politics and culture. This goes back to the middle of the sixteenth century when the slow disintegration of the state's land system, which was basic to both economic and social organization, occurred. This attempt is much more concerned with socio-economic transformation of modernization, which enables the dawn of series superstructure reforms. Such an attempt is based on both internal (territorial) and external historical transformations (Western impact) on the structure of the society not forgetting that the reforms were embodied within the socio-economic transformation and the relationships between social classes long before the *Tanzimat* or Selim III period. In other words, the chapter mentioned above focused on understanding *socio-economic factors* that had an impact on the shape and the effect of many of the reform policies.

The second step in chapter four aims at resituating Ottoman-Turkish modernization into its specific historical context by adopting an integralist perspective. Beyond internalist and externalist analysis for the study of social development, this perspective is necessary to capture dynamism of the Ottoman-Turkish experience of modernization. The underlying failure of internal and external view on social development can be summarized as a form of one-dimensional analysis. When suggesting integralist analysis the attempt means caring about both internal and external development "together".

Differentiating itself from the internal view inspired from Orientalistic, Eurocentric and dependency theory, the dissertation shall pay attention to some detail of dynamic internal transformation in socio-economic structure of the Ottoman Empire. To some extent, it also should concentrate on external impact on the external impacts on society, which accelerated this process.

Some scholars with an internalist view argue that the history of the Ottoman (Middle East) exhibits frequent state interventions coups d'etat, military take-over. Nonetheless, they argue that there have been no genuine and radical revolutions producing fundamental changes in social structure. Indeed, from their views, which are the representative of the classical Orientalist position, the orient (Islam) has no history.

The externalist view on the contrary concentrates on solely external context of a society by handling the internal features of the society as an outcome of causes that are situated only to analyze the spontaneous internal growth of capitalism.

The Orientalist problematic however is not amenable to empirical objections because, once the analysis of Middle East (Ottoman Islamic society) has been formulated in terms of essentialism, the decline follows automatically from a contaminated essence.

By adopting integralist way and engaging critically with internalist and externalist views, the study suggest that it should be avoided from over simplifications particularly in making contrasts between occident and orient, between a dynamic West and a stagnant East, by neglecting the specificity of social structures and economic processes which took place historically in the Ottoman society. On the other hand, the

analysis of capitalist development cannot be conducted in terms of static comparison between religious essences.

Looking to Ottoman's social structure from a more comprehensive analysis, it seems possible to point out that the relations of the *ayans* with the bureaucratic order and the conflicting group ideologies between them formed the central dynamic of the internal transformation, which occurred in Ottoman society in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In addition, both groups were subjected to external impacts in varying degrees.

With an integrative modernization perception the chapter underlines that the Ottoman land system was thus dismantled by an internal process of class struggle between bureaucrats landlords and merchants. This process was also reinforced by the effect of economic changes in the external environment resulting from the consolidation of capitalism as a world economy.

In the final step, an attempt has been made to elaborate the ideology of Islamism by examining the experience of Young Ottomans that historically matured as a result of conjuncture of the detrimental socio-economic transformation, which caused Muslim population to be dislocated. Now, we know that the Turkish Muslim peasant, who were not undergone in to revolutionary social change, was isolated from the world as a relic of the past and pushed down in the social scale by a relatively more prosperous Christian populations.

In the duration of this social change process unable to grasp the social position into which they were pushed to use religion (Islam) as a basis of group solidarity, Turkish Muslim peasants began to be represented by Ottoman political elite. Briefly, capital-

ist development and its consequences, which led to social dislocations of Muslim population, together with the Western influences in the territory eventually, compelled to put Islam at the center stage of politics. Here, it should be noted that the arguments about the stationary nature of the society also ignore the readiness of local peasant communities to respond to new market forces.

Young Ottomans representing (provincial) Middle class grew in such an environment. Their class basis based on the middle class though, they relatively represented dislocated Muslim population and their Islamic protest consciousness.

Young Ottoman's Islamism is not confined to traditional-minded intelligentsia but that it constitutes a large number of professionals, including many who had received Western education. Being member of the middle class they could express new views of the reforms by articulating "hybrid" Islamic principle and modern ideals intensively about administration and organization of society.

Their wish to see the rise of Muslim middle class and their will to protect and support Muslim merchants shaped their Islamist discourse. Here it should be mentioned that the intellectuals' ideology of Islamism agreed with a certain kind of modernization that works for Islamic society. Their underlying goal was that a full articulation of Western liberal politics and Islamic principles would spell progress for saving and recognizing (modernizing) Ottoman State and society.

The chapter five will critically review the existing reductionist approaches of Islamism in which Islamism is treated like traditional Islam, that is, perceiving Islamism as aspects of religiosity rather than politics. The conventional approaches treat Islamism as a premodern ideology a remnant of underdevelopment bound to disappear with

industrialization and social development. The reductionist portrayal of Islamism, which is put in equal as a preindustrial defensive culture that, could not be an agent of change. In short, all reductionist interpretations of Islamism actually compartmentalize Islamism and modernization in two separate parts without assuming any transition.

The first step in chapter five will be more concerned with the standard framework assuming Islamism essentially a rival of modernization or modernizing regime. For this precise reason, Islamism as a segment of regressive/conservative movement is mainly conceived within terms of traditionalist plea because of the appeal of its Islamic themes and discourses. Here, there would be a risk to equate the ideology of Islamism, which is about fundamentals of society in political sphere with the religion of Islam about theological issues. Furthermore, Islam is totally emphasized as a regressive/conservative concept incapable of generating an autonomous process of social change process. From this perspective, while Islam is seen to broadly refer to a traditional relic and is blamed for being major impediment to modernization, modernization is deeply corresponded with the Western societies. However, one of the argument that thesis underlines the absurdity of naïve contrast between one homogeneous entity (the Christian West) and another uniform entity or essence (Islamic Asia). Hence, it will be necessary to pay regard to the specificity of a given society and its unique socio-economic conditions.

Contaminated with Orientalist/Eurocentric ideas, some writers concerned about the subject think that Islamism cannot provide the basis for modernization of any society since it has neither a vision nor a program for the future as a result of its inspiration of the golden past. Besides, Islamism, from this point of view, could not be agent of

change or become the agent of modern political order. Further, modernization is implemented despite of Islamism.

Instead of handling Islamism by applying the progressive/regressive dichotomy as Kemalist paradigm did with a deep inspiration from Enlightenment, the dissertation, on the other hand perceives Islamism as a comprehensive reconsideration of modernization both by proposing an alternative modernization framework for the sake of Islamic civilization in political sphere and by attempting to restructure the (Muslim) society on the grounds of “hybrid” Islamic principles contaminated by “modern” ideals.

Next, the chapter will focus on another reductionist accounting, which assumes Islamism as a cultural response to modern state, a modernizing regime or modernization progress. From this standpoint Islamic resurgence is explained association with cultural entity. Islamism is seen as an outcome of alienated attempts of modernizing state. Modernization process is seriously separated from the ideology of Islamism; further Islamism alienated from modernization is primarily a political rival to modernizing regimes.

From this perspective, Islamism is emerged under circumstances of meaninglessness, since the fact that modern state implemented very radical secularist politics without submitting a social ethos any sense or meaning inspired by Western culture, which is assumed thoroughly alien to Islamic values. Here, modernization is reduced to secularism and second that secularism is specifically emerged under the effect of Western societies. More importantly, this reductionist view presuppose that modernization should submit a meaning/social ethos to people, in which they feel themselves as

fully participating members and find solutions how to live. Moreover, regarding this approach, modernization fails because modernizing state is culturally alienated from the society. By implication, Islamism is regarded as the reassertion of Muslim society vis a vis alienated state. Such a reductionism envisages that modern societies should be culturally homogeneous. It also assumes that Islamic society is already a homogeneous entity.

On the other hand, the thesis will try to understand the problem of Islamism with a distinctively alternative framework. Islamism, which is not exclusively cultural but also economic and political, could best be tackled in political struggle rather than cultural one.

CHAPTER II

LIMITS OF THE METHODOLOGY OF NEGATIVE IDEOLOGY

In this chapter, I will try to formulate the ideology of Islamism not in terms of faith or religiosity but as a political ideology. Though Islamism is often regarded as a form of traditional Islam, this study considers Islamism as something profoundly different from traditional Islam that seeks to instruct people how to live in accord with god's will. In contrast, Islamism aspires to restructure/recreate the society on the grounds of Islamic principles. The former underlines individuals and emphasizes personal credo, but the latter refers to communities and political ideology. Of course, there is an obvious relationship between Islam and Islamism but this relationship cannot solely be studied by reference to an Islamic essence.

Islamism indicates a complete and radical transformation of faith/religiosity to ideology, which implies this phenomenon, is an "ism" comparable to other ideologies in the political sphere. It can be argued that Islamism began to compete not only with other religions but also with secular ideologies. In other words, being another radical utopian scheme, Islamism offers a way to control the state, run society and socially reconstruct the people's everyday life. Thereby, Islamism can, speak of functionalist terms be seen as 'the use of Islam to social and/or political ends' (Euben, 1997:643) to put it differently, "Islamism seeks to construct Islam (in the singular) as the 'master signifier ' of political order" (Sayyid, 1995: 17).

This study aims to demonstrate the emergence of Islamism as a political project and examine it within the concept of 'positive' ideology. That is to say, Islamism, like the

other ideologies, has some reservation and claims about fundamentals of society/politics in political sphere; Islamic propositions of the ideology comprise positive perception with the present social matters. It can be, then, asserted that, Islamism is firstly an all-encompassing ideology that would restructure society and radicalize the polity.

The present dissertation basically approaches ideology within terms of a decisive move away from the problem of mere falsity of ideological beliefs. Ideology will not compulsorily imply a particular content such as falseness, miscognition, and imaginary as opposed to real character nor will it assume any necessary degree of elaboration and coherence. Rather, it will refer to that aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their life as conscious actors in a world; 'ideology is the medium through which, consciousness and meaningfulness operate' (Abercrombie, Hill, Turner, 1983:60).

As one of the Tunisia's leading Islamist scholar Rashid Ghannoushi underlines the main characteristics of the ideology of Islamism as follows:

Islamism is the sum total of intellectual social, economic, cultural and political activities which spring from the comprehensive Islamic viewpoint, in order to support them theory and apply them in practice in all spheres of life with the objective of establishing a new political entity (Takeyh 2001:97)

When studying Islamist aspect of political ideology, I will also try to draw the genealogy of the concept of ideology in its evolution from pejorative (negative) to affirmative (positive) connotations by concentrating on Marx and some other theoreticians' view about the methodology of negative ideology in order to show how inadequate it is to analyze the ideology of Islamism or any other political ideologies. This study tries to develop a new framework and ideological concept so as to understand

Islamism without implying a necessary negative content and assuming it as a closed entity.

By 'negative ideology', I mean, as it can be seen from early texts of Marx, especially in 'The German Ideology', a central tenet of ideology as false consciousness is a distorting veil that hangs over the eyes of people with an illusion. In this pejorative understanding of ideology, the concept is perceived, as a decisive problem is the inversion in thought that covers up the real nature of things and refracts the present matters of society.

To the extent to which the methodology of the ideology of Islamism is interpreted regressive/fundamentalist (let me say in Turkish *irtica*) movement refracts the present social problem/issues by proposing a return to religiosity or faith, which hangs over the eyes of people with a total illusion. Islamist movements are considered as regressive merely by virtue of their utilization of religious language in their discourses. Being labeled as a backward ideology and a container of false consciousness, "Islamism serves, according to Salwa, the sense of worldview harking back to the essential varieties of faith" (Salwa, 1998:201). In addition, this approach puts Islamism in superstructural sphere by evaluating it with aspects of religiosity, superstitious, or secularism terms.

However, Islamism is a kind of ideology aiming to reformulate and regulate modernity by claiming the relevance of the Islamic principles to politics and its appropriateness with Islamic identity and values to address pressing social issues. Accordingly, "Islamism is not merely concerned with religion as a superstructural fact per se, it is, in fact, an ideology and political reflection of classes' harmony" (Kongar

1999:56). For this reason, this study tries to avoid as much as possible to use labeling regressive/*irticai* or negative ideology concept/ in fact Islamism appears to be an ideology and A political movement that adamantly pursue a variety of strategies aimed at the Islamization of social and political arenas and appropriation of the public sphere which rests upon Islamic beliefs (not traditional) and institutions. Furthermore, being as an ideology and political project, Islamism is permanently stamped with the imprint of modernity and capitalism. Intosh (1998:22) correctly emphasizes the rigidity of political and ideological characteristics of Islamism as follows:

In analyzing Islamism as a political phenomenon it is necessary to focus on three distinct, but inter-related elements: the socio-economic conditions that provide the fertile soil within which such an ideology and political movement can take hold and win popular support, the social classes and strata that are bearers of this ideology and the cadre and leadership of this movement; the class content of this socio-political phenomenon.

Islamism as a political ideology provides individuals an (Islamic) identity for placing themselves in their everyday lives. In other words, "Islamist are the people who use language of Islamic metaphors to think through their political destinies, those whose see in Islam the political future" (Sayyid 1995:17)

Regarding Islamism as a positive ideology, namely, worldview of (Islamic) political actors should not be related to false consciousness or inverted ideas serving the reproduction of the present social contradictory conditions. From this point of view, Islamism becomes a political discourse that attempts to center Islam within the political order related with present social issues. Thereby, as long as Islamism provides (Muslim) people a vast large degree meaning and devices for interpreting world/society in their social life, it could not be evaluated within terms of religiosity

or faith. It seems to be more useful to characterize Islamism, in its mainstream formulation, as a broad project of the political mobilization of Islam. In effect, “to be viable in the long term ideology, Islamism must have a somewhat realistic assessment of the actual situation and must be able to call forth a high degree of political and moral commitment” (Shepard, 1987:322)

In the early writing of Marx, the concept of ideology was eminently examined in negative terms, which means a form of false consciousness or necessary deception, which distorts men’s understanding of social reality:

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. –real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on retina does from their physical life-process (Marx, 1974:20)

As can be seen from the passage, ideology is conceived as a set of beliefs concealing the real nature of things. As far as ‘the German Ideology’ is concerned, ideology is a category preventing our relations with reality. This (negative) methodological approach, which focused on the ability of ideology to conceal or distort the real world by neglecting the fact, *could also be a tool for challenging the existing social order.*

With regard to the above methodological framework, any ideology becomes a form of distortion, which conceals contradictions in (capitalist) contemporary society. By implication, “since for the Marxian approach ideology was an illusion disguising the material interests of social classes, the function of ideology was assessed negatively” (emphasis added, Giddens, 1971: 220-221). Besides, ideology has the precise func-

tion of hiding the real contradictions and of reconstituting on an imaginary level which is a relatively coherent discourse serving the worldview of agent's experience.

Concerning the pejorative understanding of ideology, it can be seen that "there has been a convenient dogmatic retention at some levels, of ideology as 'false consciousness'. This has often prevented the more specific analysis of operative distinctions of 'true' and 'false' consciousness at the practical level" (Williams, 1977: 68).

From the view of the theoretical premise of this study, Islamism like any other ideology needs to be analyzed radically different from the methodology of negative ideology, which is too reductionist path for the study of any ideology. Actually, the problem, here, should not be formulated in terms of how Islamism as an ideology possesses Islamic propositions which produce/provide false consciousness for the people preventing them to solve their real social issues, or, the fact that what kind of Islamic propositions do necessarily function for masking exploitation. Rather, it should be answered in specific why the ideology of Islamism is a hegemonic, if so, which 'truth' elements does Islamism have. Furthermore, there is a more crucial point in here that there should be an immediate answer to the fundamental question about which 'truth' discourses does Islamism have.

For this precise reason, it can be argued that 'an ideology, i.e, Islamism, is thus, not necessarily be 'false', as to its positive content, it can be 'true' or quite accurate, since what really matters is not asserted content as such, but, the way this content is related to the subjective position implied by its own process of enunciation' (Zizek, quoted in Wright & Wright, 1991:61)

Zizek (ibid. 60) quick-wittedly points out this issue, in that, 'ideology must be disengaged from the 'representationalist' problematic: ideology has nothing to do with 'illusion', with a mistaken, distorted representation of its social content. To put it succinctly, a political standpoint can be quite accurate (true) as to its objective content, yet entirely ideological; and, vice versa. The idea that a political standpoint giving its social content can prove totally wrong, yet there is absolutely nothing 'ideological' about it.

This study considers Islamism as both an alternatives modernizing movement and a political ideology about the fundamentals of society. The ideology of Islamism is not a movement about a religion per se but about society and politics. From this point of view it can be said that Islamism as a political ideology is a relatively coherent, set of empirical and normative beliefs focusing on the problems of human nature, the process of history and socio-political arrangements of (present) social issues. To put it differently, Islamism does not fulfill the functions in supernatural, religious practices and dogmas. Thus, the propositions or discourses of Islamism is much more concerned about social, economic and political terms as opposed to spiritual norms and values.

It seems that the issue concerning (positive) political ideology, Islamism presents politically inspired solutions to the contemporary problems (created by uneven modernization). Furthermore, Islamism cannot be simply related to false consciousness, but to a capability for specific orientations of people and a particular political movement. Because ideologies are subject to a specific form political constructions, political questionings and challenges to contemporary problems. As a result, it is vital to comprehend to what extent or in what circumstances the content of Islamism

is more than illusory beliefs or false consciousness. In sum, envisaging Islamism apart from the methodology of negative ideology leads us to put it in the terrain of politics in which Islamic meaning and discourses are produced with reference to its *worldview*.

The present dissertation basically approaches ideology within the terms of a decisive move away from the problem of mere falsity of ideological beliefs. Ideology cannot necessarily imply a particular content (falseness, miscognition, imaginary as opposed to real character) nor can it assume any necessary degree of elaboration and coherence. Rather, it will refer to that aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their life as conscious actors in a world that make sense to them. To put it differently, “ideology is the medium through which this consciousness and meaningfulness operate” (Abercrombie, Hill, Turner, 1983:60).

The implication of such a positive understanding of ideology entails the neutralization of the concept so as to account for different class interest and ideology be converted into a ‘worldview’. As a consequence of the new approach, “ideology reverts to a specific and practical dimension: the complicated process within which men ‘become’ (are) conscious of their interests and conflicts. Thus, categorical shortcut to an (abstract) distinction true and false conscious is then effectively abandoned as in all practice it has to be” (Williams, 1977:68).

After convincingly demonstrating the incompetence of the category of negative ideology, which pays little attention to, that ideology could make sense to some social groups or classes. Ideology can bring forth a perspective and political ideas to masses instead of masking social contradictions. Thus, Islamism is the brand of positive ide-

ology, which claims to recreate a true (Islamic) society, not only due to imposition of the *şeriat* (or religiosity as false consciousness) but through establishing Islamic society and the state via political action in struggle with the other ideologies. Hence, Islamism is one of the political ideologies, which should be integrated into all aspects of society (politics, law, economy, social justice, foreign policy, and the like). It is also as one of the driving forces of political transition. Above all, “what needs to be constantly kept in mind is the realization that Islamism is a political phenomenon which does not occur in a vacuum but is very much an aspect of modernization process formulated by socio-economic and cultural changes” (Karam 1997:16).

The famous passage of ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’ has sometimes been hailed as the moment in which Marx moved towards a broader positive conception of ideology:

Then begins an era of social revolution with the change of economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should a way be made between material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and *the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic –in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out* just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we do not judge of such a period of transformations by its own consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life (Marx, 1970:23).

In this representation above, ideology changes from a system of illusory beliefs-false ideas or false consciousness into a system of beliefs and characteristic of a certain class. It can be observed that positive perception of ideology pertains to an expression of the ‘worldview’ of a class. One can defend and promote interests of his/her class derived from the opinions, theories and attitudes formed within an ideology.

Such a context, ideology such as Islamism, liberalism, Marxism etc., becomes a terrain on which men can develop into consciousness of their social positions. The im-

pressive passage explicitly demonstrates that “ideology is the terrain on which determinate social groups become consciousness of their own social being, their own strength, their own tasks, their own becoming” (Forgacs, 1985:196)

Actually, the positive connotations of the concept of ideology in the Marxist discussions reach its high point with Gramsci. Being far from a negative ideology refused in his theory of ideology, Gramsci declares the negative concept of ideology as too ‘reductionist’ and listed the steps to this error as follows:

In the methodology of negative ideology (i) ideology is identified as distinct from the structure and it is asserted that it is not ideology that changes the structures but vice versa; (ii) it is asserted that a given political solution is ‘ideological’, i.e., that it is insufficient for changing the structure, although it thinks that it can do so; it is asserted that it is useless, stupid, etc.; (iii) One then passes to the assertion that every ideology is ‘pure’ appearance, useless, stupid, etc. (Ibid., 199).

What is important in Gramsci’s thought is that “ideology is a specific ‘system of ideas’ or conception of the world that implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and all manifestations of individual and collective life” (Gramsci, 1971:328). As a matter of fact, ideology for Gramsci, is more than a conception of the world or a system of ideas; it also has to do with a capacity to inspire concrete attitudes and give orientation for such actions. As a corollary, ‘it means a set of beliefs which coheres and inspires a specific group or class, the pursuit of political interests judged to be desirable” (Eagleton, 1991:44).

Inspired from the similar (positive) approach, Clammer (1995:68) points out that “Islamist movement can be considered as modern ideological movement in the sense that they propose new fundamental principles which organize behavior, frame of choices, constitute worldview and are considered to be the means of achieving...the goal”. Relatively speaking, Islamism is a coherent ideology, a broad strategy and a

set of political preferences. Such an explanation underlines that “Islamism provides the one and only solution to all questions in this world, from public policy to private conduct. It is an ideology, a complete system of belief about the organization of the state, the society and world” (Kramer, 1996:433).

In his more detailed analysis, Gramsci propounds a distinction between organic ideologies and arbitrary ideologies. Organic ideologies are necessary to a given structure, the latter are individual speculations. “Having made this distinction, Gramsci concentrated on the analysis of organic ideologies. In this way the disposed of the negative concept and expanded the positive conception” (Larrain, 1991:79). An organic ideology should be capable of ‘organizing’ human masses, should be able to translate itself into specific orientations for actions. From the ‘organic’ perspective, it is clear that for Gramsci (1971:377), “ideology is precisely the terrain on which men move acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc”.

Similarly, according to Althusser’s opinion, ideology is not merely an illusory representation of reality. Thus, it is a characteristic feature of ideology that constructs a set of norms and behaviors: “all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects” (McLellan, 1995:29). By implication, Islamism is regarded as a constituting (Muslim) subjectivity and the reassertion of (Muslim) society. In relation to that “Islamist is one who uses Islam in contemporary political practice to achieve or exercise power in such a way as to prioritize her /his version of Islam at the expense of any other political ideology and in a manner which tends to be exclusionary” (Noorhaidi, 2001:12).

In a sense, the definition of Islamism in regard to political ideology tries to build a political sphere for a true society in accordance with the mixtures of Islamic values. Islamism could be regarded, as Sayyid put it, in terms of political project and the notion of 'political' is not limited to a project, which aims merely at seizing state power. Rather, the political is also a process involves the moment of institution of social. Thus, it can be argued that Islamism can then be understood such an ideology, shaped as much by its own hybrid Islamic discourse, postulates and political struggles as by socio-economic conditions in the modernized world. In the process of ideologization of Islam and reinvention of (Islamic) tradition provides people the imagination, realization and reconstruction of a society in its own image. In other words, it is in and by the ideology of Islamism with which people could gain identity, symbols, concepts and ability to act on politics at different societal levels.

Such a consideration by adopting itself to a positive methodology proposes, "ideology qualify people for conscious social action of gradual or revolutionary change" (Therborn, 1999:vii). Now, being away from viewing ideology as a manipulative way, which considers ideology in terms of a pure illusion and serves to maintain relations of domination, the methodology of positive ideology is more concerned with *producing meanings of ideology*. In this regard, ideology could be seen as a *constitutive meaning production process* from a given perspective to put it more precisely, ideology is a mechanism with which one can organize/constitute his/her social settings through the use of a wide range of apparatus.

As far as Callinicos (1989:136) is concerned, one implication of the using positive ideology is to push Marxism in the direction of the philosophy of language. Thereby,

the study of ideologies must involve an analysis of system of meaning and signs through which they are expressed.

As a system of meaning, ideology is, actually, not a meaning in the service of the power, which serves to sustain relations of the dominant but, rather is a set of meanings to shape people, organize human masses and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. In this context, as given above, ideology can only perform function and construct itself through words and signs. For the reason that, as Thompson (1990:9) rightly points out that:

As individuals we are immersed in sets of social relations and we are constantly involved in commenting upon them, in representing them to ourselves and others, in enacting, reacting and transforming them through actions, symbols and words. The symbolic forms through which stands opposed to what is real: rather they are partially constitutive of what, in our societies, 'is real'.

Like any ideological phenomena, Islamism is symbolically meaningful in so far as it serves, in particular historical circumstances, to establish its agents' worldview. It can be argued that "Islamism cannot be understood except as an ideology, shaped as much by its own hybrid Islamic discourse, postulates and political demands as by the circumstances of (political struggles) in the modern world (Bruce, 1998: 22).

It should be noted that the ideology of Islamism constructs develops and transforms itself for ideological struggle in the sphere of politics by using the system of language. Here, the system of language, as Pecheux says, 'is the common base of differentiated discourse process'. That is to say that, Islamism translates symbols and terms in order to provide its agents' the ability of action on different societal levels' (Malik 1998:27). It means at the same time that Islamist ideology sets up its discourse in challenging with other ideologies' discourses. In so far as "Islamism is a

political discourse and, as such, is akin to other political discourses such as socialism or liberalism. While no one would question that political discourses such as socialism include many varieties and many differences, it is still possible and valid to speak of socialism; it should be similarly possible to speak of Islamism” (Sayyid, 1995:17). Those who promote Islamist’s discourse describe themselves as Islamists see their identity and political objectives (through adaptation to modernization) as defined exclusively by their socio-political credo in relation with the rest of the ideologies. This process involves competition and contest over interpretation of symbols and control of institutions because symbols are an integral part of (Islamist) politics. They express the values and are constitutive of a political community. Another words, since hegemony functions through discourse, Islamism often attempts to produce a counter-discourse by criticizing modernization experience offering alternatives to it.

This is the Voloshinov who first interpreted ideology as the process of production of meanings through signs. When viewed from this angle, “Voloshinov uses ‘ideological’ to describe the process of the taken as the dimension of social experience in which meanings and values are produced” (Williams, 1977:70). Eagleton explicitly puts forward the transformation of the concept of ideology as follows:

There is a third way between thinking of ideology as disembodied ideas on the one hand, and as nothing but a matter of certain behavior patterns on the other. This is to regard ideology as a discursive or semiotic phenomenon. And this at once emphasizes its materiality (since signs are material entities) and preserves the sense that it is essentially concerned with meanings talk of signs and discourses are inherently social and practical whereas terms like ‘consciousness’ are residues of an idealist tradition of thought. It may help to view ideology less a particular set of discourses than as a particular set of effects within discourses (Eagleton, 1991:194).

By implication, “the analysis of ideology requires us to investigate the social contexts within which symbolic forms are employed and deployed; and is so now, the meaning mobilized by symbolic forms in ‘specific contexts’ “ (Thompson, 1990:18). Having said these, it should be noted that the study of ideology entails to search the ways in which meaning is constructed and conveyed by symbolic forms of various kinds, from everyday linguistic utterances to complex discourses and texts. Voloshinov underlines the prerequisites about the analysis of ideology:

(i) Ideology may not be divorced from the material reality of sign (i.e., by locating it in the ‘consciousness’ or other vague and allusive regions), (ii) The sign may not be divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse (seeing that sign is a part of organized social intercourse and can not exist, as such, outside it, reverting to a mere physical artifact); (iii) Communication and the forms of communication may not be divorced from material basis.

Accordingly, ideology, for Voloshinov, basically refers to the process whereby meaning or ‘value’ is determined by the natural and social worlds. Henceforth, “ideology is ‘material’, not only because all possible forms of human action and cognition are embodied in some kind of semiotic signs (e.g. words, gestures, facial expressions, and so on), but because such signs elicit real effects in society” (Gardiner, 1992:13).

In his semiotic theory of ideology, Voloshinov boldly quotes that “without signs there is no ideology”. From this perspective, the domain of signs and the realm of ideology coexist in a sense that: “consciousness arise only in the material embodiment of signifiers, and since these signifiers are in themselves material, they are not just ‘reflections of reality’, but an integral part of it” (Voloshinov, 1986:23). In effect, neither ideology can be divorced from sign, nor can it be isolated from the concrete forms of social intercourse. Thus, the sign ‘lives’ within social life and these forms of intercourse should be related to the material basis of social life. It can be

said that since “social and physical life is inevitably reflected through the prism of class struggle, a given *sign* community *is constituted by contradictory and social interests*” (Gardiner, 1992:16).

It should be pointed out that though different ideologies may use the ‘same’ sign system, given signs are in fact subject to divergent ideological accents depending on *the specific context of their usage*. Voloshinov forces us to think, along with Pecheux, that every sign gains its unique meaning within the ideological struggles of divergent class/group’s social positions. To the extent that sign becomes an arena of class struggle. The fact that seeing sign as a social phenomenon pushes Voloshinov to propose a notion of ‘*multi-accentuality*’ of sign. By *multi-accentuality* it should be understood that beyond being a sole word, signs have different emphases; for this reason different meanings in different contexts and inflections. The extent to which meaning emerges in social contexts embodied within different social classes or groups. Further, because various classes will use one and the same language, as a result of this differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign.¹

As is given above, every sign possessed by Islamism becomes an Islamic accents in struggling with other ideologies in regard to social conditions. It seems possible to assert that the ideology of Islamism and its discourse should be understood by examining how they shape and are shaped by other ideological positions such as Eurocentrism, Kemalism, liberalism and the like within socio-economic and political settings.

¹ Therefore there is no consensual or uniform value and fix meaning or neutral sign in terms of any social groups and their ideologies.

² It should be noted that in the same direction considering “struggle over the sign “ perspective, Pecheux underlines that “words” “expressions” and “propositions” etc., have not got sense by themselves but receive their sense form the discursive formations (namely) in terms of those who possess them within which they are produced. The sense of words is therefore determined by the ideological positions of those who use them.

Having related those with materiality of ideology kept in mind, it can be said that all ideologies are placed in the social and historical conjuncture. That is to say, an *ideology and its discourse should be understood by examining how they shape and are shaped* by social and economic environment.

As to the aim of this study I will then look at ways in which ideology of Islamism and its various discourses shape and are shaped by developments and transformations in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. To put it differently, “while Islamism appears to be an ideology and political discourse that is adamantly opposed to modernity, and which seeks to reinvigorate traditional Islamic beliefs and institutions, it is very much the product of the destruction of the (Islamic) Third World” (Intosh, 1998:17). Henceforth, both as ideology and political discourse, Islamism is irrevocably stamped with the imprint of modernity and capitalism.

Pointing a relation between ideology and social conditions, such a methodology explains the emergence of the ideology of Islamism and its discourse within terms of capitalist modernization in which the political history of Islamism is embedded.

Politics is, to some extent, a field of contestation in which struggle takes place through words, signs and symbols. Yet, as we know, as Voloshinov implied, every sign is a construct among socially organized persons in the process of interaction. Therefore, the forms of signs are subject to struggles of politically organized individuals within the existing conditions. This explanation presupposes that the discourse of ideology is shaped or limited by sociality, that is, material processes and conditions. Because it is sociality in which ideologies develop and constitute them,

'only that which has acquired social value can enter the world of ideology, take shape, and establish itself there'.

To sum up, it can be said that all the forms of discourses and of ideology in which discursive processes is inscribed are shaped by certain sociality and its historical, political and economic order. Besides, since sign is a social entity, discursive process is thus inscribed by political struggle.

Focusing on relationship between discourse which gains its meaning in particular historical circumstances and social conditions, it can be vital to note that "the basis what Islamist discourse stands for: that is the solution and by implication is the 'only' and 'best' solution-presumably to modern day problems ranging from *economic insecurity and political instability*" (Noorhaidi, 2000: 14). That most crucial element for an analysis of Islamism, as argued above, should include the process of capitalist modernization, social class formation and social conditions of Third World. Islamism from this point of view, is an expression or manifestation of Third World modernization in determining historical, economic and cultural conditions.

More importantly, Islamism is as will be seen in more detail later on, trajectory of Third World modernization and capitalism in the third world provides a socio-economic condition for the dissemination of Islamism. For instance, discourses of Islamism have been shaped and articulated by social grievances of the masses, the dispossessed poor, petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia.

It is thus important to understand the rise of the ideology of Islamism in the Ottoman-Turkish society in the context of the following factors:

(i) the disintegration of the Ottoman empire as a multi-plot, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious empire; (ii) the rise of European imperialism in the Ottoman provinces as a formidable political, economic and cultural movement; (iii) the profound social and economic transformation in the Ottoman empire during that time period (Abu-Rabi, 2000:99).

Consequently, one might suggest that the ideology of Islamism and its discourse should be mainly contextualized in the modernization process of the Ottoman-Turkish society. For instance, those oppressed people who are adversely subordinated to modernization's implementations/orientations began to find a shelter in an ideology that would reaffirm their well being through moral propositions. By implication, Islamism becomes an ideology against the West's politic and economic hegemony and cultural centrism. Its discourses have reactionary propositions to the economic exclusion of the Muslim masses from the benefits of the economy.

Furthermore, the ideology of Islamism, in its manifold expression, provides a security those who are excluded and oppressed by the threat of so called western form of modernization. On the other hand, it also tries to justify itself through a hybrid form of modernization. It is an irony and dilemma of Islamist ideology that this kind of hybrid project is compatible with western form of modernization.

In addition to that Islamism attempts to provide an efficient and viable tools for those who are dissatisfied about political and socio-economic transformations. In fact, this should not be seen, as "false consciousness" on the part of the dispossessed people. In this regard, Islamism is neither a reformist movement in religiosity nor an alternative project for cultural insurgence emerged against socio-political and economic transformations. Rather it is an integration into a hybrid form of modernization, which combines Islamic and western ideas.

CHAPTER THREE

APPROACHING ISLAMISM WITH AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I shall initially assert that Islamism is a modern ideology that began initially to emerge in Otoman Empire (approximately in the middle of the nineteenth century) and developed throughout the Republican era. Islamist ideology is heavily impregnated with Western modern notions. Moreover, in the process of Ottoman-Turkish modernization adventure, Islamism never presents a 'return' to its traditionalist form despite of its inspiration from some religious values. Here, I will point out to some modern characteristics of Islamism and then try to explain their formation throughout Ottoman-Turkish modernization processes.

Then, it will be discussed that Islamism is also as an alternative articulation ideology towards modernization process. From this point of view, Islamism is a product of the contradictions of Third World Modernization, and represents modern reaction to the specific form of "dependent" modernization experienced by the Islamic Third world. It can be claimed that Islamism is deeply opposite to Western type of modernization, which refers to a set of beliefs and values, which one identified with Western culture and secularism. Apart from affected by Western values, capitalist modernization, from the point of Islamism, can be an adjustable process only needs to be incorporated with Islamist principles. The history of the ideology of Islamism as a modern is, indeed, a process of seeking alternative modernization project referring mixture of

modern and Islamic values. Islamism, in turn, concentrates from the beginning to the present, on “articulating” itself with the modernization process within an alternative framework. So it can be put forward from above that Islamism is an alternative articulation ideology towards a form of dependent modernization.

3.1. ISLAMISM: A COMPREHENSIVE RECONSIDERATION OF MODERNIZING REGIME

Some scholars think that Islamism necessarily occurs “on the soil of traditional cultures or cultures where people perceive and claim that they simply inherit a worldview and way of life (Martin, 1992:18). Some argue that we are witnessing a proliferation of particularistic, religious oriented political identities (Jurgensmeyer, 1993, quoted in Atasoy, 1996). This is clearly expressed in the view, which regards the Islamic revival as ‘ a tradition opposition to the modernization process’ (Atasoy, 1996). Here, Islamic societies are usually linked with lacking individual freedom, civil rights and industrialization and so on due to adopting themselves too much on Islamic identity and values. That is to say, “Islam is a pre-industrial defensive culture, while the modern Western European is scientifically and technologically based industrial culture” (Tibi 1988: 24).

The underlying assumption of this approach is essentially about the regressiveness of the ideology of Islamism, impropriating with modernization. Mostly, the ideology of Islamism/Islamist movements is explained in terms of resistance to modernization and such is often pathologized. Thus “Islamism appears to be a pathological reaction to the disintegration of modern community and represents returning of tradition and loss of meaning” (Latour 1991: 76). In these terms Islamism is often misunderstood

as a reactive rebellion against modernization. Thus “Islamism versus modernity” arguments obscure the way in which Islamic text is subject to adaptation and modernization.

In a similar vein the emergency of the ideology of Islamism is conceived as an outcome of undifferentiated society, the absence of economical difference and absence of pluralist society (Yücekök 1983:27). From this point of view, the most important issue is that Islamism could only emerge as an ideology, as a consequence of undifferentiated structure of society (ibid 1983:28). By attributing a universal status to modernization, this position does not allow for various conditions of possibility and complex processes of its construction; nor the possibility of its transformation.

What defines the ideology of Islamism is not on its own the call for a return the literal reading of holy text, but the combination of this appeal with ‘an intervention in the political system’, ‘a mobilization of populations’ and the building of an organization for the taking, and retention of political power. To the extent, Islamism, as a modern ideology, addresses contemporary social and political problems.

“Islamism is not a traditionalist relic, nor does it original from a backward-looking, premodernist position” (Gülalp, 1990:24). For the precise reason, “Islamism’s goal is not to return to some distant, traditional past but get inspiration from Islam to address contemporary problems (Sivan, 1990:68,72). From this perspective, Islamic politics is not a traditionalist rejection of modernity but a project for coping with it that constitutes an alternative form of modernism.

Gülalp (Ibid., 24) underlines the similar modern characteristics of both past and present Islamism, that is, “the role that Islamism is playing in the current period is not

different from the role it played in the nineteenth century. In both cases, Islam is transformed into an ideology to address contemporary social and political problems. In neither case does it represent a desire to turn the clock back. Although there is an ideological reference to the desire to return the 'golden age' of the past, the golden age, however real or imaginary, represent an utopia to be in the *future* through political struggle". Islamism is actually about reconstruction of Muslim society here and now by adopting itself modern setting of political apparatus.

Islamism, henceforth, is more concerned about (reconstruction) Islam or Muslim society for the present instead of past duration by the virtue of modern political setting. So, in this context, '*shura* becomes democracy, or, parliamentary democracy, *tajdid* (renewal) *Islah* (reform) *ijdi had* (reasoning) and *harakiyya* (dynamism) in a modern setting. Although the leaders and ideologues of Islamist movements present their ideas in the way of a restoration of a pure, unsullied and authentic form of religion, they actually seek to "revitalize and re-Islamize modern Muslim societies' to create a new society rather than the old one" (Beinin, Stork, 1997:3).

Indeed, the relationship between Islamism and its modern characteristic is highly complex one. For instance, "while the Islamists and their opponents claim that their ideology is anti-enlightenment and reject modernity the analysis of their ideas suggest that the verdict is far more mixed that, in some sense, Islamism is 'a mixture', 'a hybrid of modernity'" (Halliday, 1995:416,417). In terms of the modern qualities of it, I shall claim that Islamism has serious attitudes in order to transform traditional text in to a modern concept.

Islamism should not be considered as a religious category but rather conceived as associated with political ideology and movement. Belonging to sphere of politics, Islamism can be only understood, in fact, if it is evaluated within social levels, such as, economics, culture, politics, law, etc., as a whole. Islamism cannot be analyzed by reducing it one of those levels. Yet, Islamism becomes a dynamic category in relation with those symmetrical levels. Roy (1996:37,38) explicitly demonstrates that:

Islamism adopt the classical vision of Islam as a complete and universal system, one, therefore, that does not have to 'modernize' or adopt. But it applies this model to a 'modern' object: to society, or more exactly, to a society defined in modern terms (that is, one in which the distinction among social, political, and economic authorities is recognized). Whether the Islamist ideal aims to bring these different segments of society together to recreate the unity of the original community or whether it views history as decadence and not as an agent of modernity, the Islamists make modern society the focus of their actions, a society of which they themselves are products. Consequently one finds an important body of literature concerning social problems (*ijtima*, the social) and economics (*iqtisad*, the economy)...

As far as the study is concerned, Islamism must be perceived as a modern ideology, which has reservations about 'present society'. Of course, Islamism rationalizes the reordering of a society on the some ideological grounds such as revitalization of Islamic civilization by emphasizing imaged past as a blue-print for the future, and by asserting the primacy of connecting moral principles with political, economic and social ones. From this point of view it is far clear that Islamism is actually about reconstructing of "present Muslim society", on some ideological grounds. What Esposito (Abu-Rabi, 1994) has to say is illuminating as well. "Despite stereotypes of (Muslim) activists as fanatics who wish to call for the transformation of society not through a blind return seventh-century medina but a response to the present". Therefore, Islamism does not seek to reproduce the past but to (re) construct present society through a process of Islamic reform in which the principles of Islam are applied to contemporary needs.

Actually, it can be emphasized “Islamic resurgence is undoubtedly a modern phenomenon, the product, to large extent of modern conditions which ironically enable it to be use Islamic symbols to face the new situation” (Ibid. 13). Furthermore, it can be claimed that Islamic proposition is more interested in present society instead of past traditional one.

It is possible to argue that what is significantly distinguished in political sphere as a transforming practice. It, then, produces Islamic politics for the fundamentals of society. Now, it can be seen that Islamism is certainly not a theological ideology with an aim of transferring past Islamic tradition or legacy to the present. Islamism has gained its highly complex ideological position not by means of theological affiliation within traditional Islamic activists but by the help of dialogue with the other ideologies. Regarding this point of view, while opponents of traditional Islam was the other religions and their subjects, Islamism challenges with other ideologies existing in social struggles arena. In this sense, “the rivals of Islamism are other secular ideologies addressing the same problems but not other religions” (Türköne, 1994:29).

On the other hand, Islamism broke of from Islamic tradition by, in particular, articulating it. “The Islamic tradition has been transformed into a radical ideology, a program of action, and a competing paradigm in the ideological and intellectual landscape of contemporary Muslim world” (Abu-Rabi, 1994:9). As a consequence of this process, “Islamism has undoubtedly shown a great ability to utilize and depend on a complex Islamic tradition, and has thus competed with secular and westernized trends, especially in translation its notions of the Islamic tradition in a popularly manageable way, thus securing the support of the masses” (Ibid. 7). In addition, it can be thoroughly said that the resurgence of Islamism is at least in some of its as-

pects, a utilization of tones and symbols that have deep roots within the Islamic tradition.

Needless to say, Islamism, as a result, not confined into traditionally minded intelligentsia, but that a large number of professionals including those who received Western education. In other words, "Islamism represents a deviance from Islamic tradition for two reasons: First, under Islamism, Islam is interpreted by intellectuals or politicians who are usually products of secular education and who are familiar with the secular ideologies. Second, Islamist interpretation of religion is in social, economic and political terms rather than spiritual norms and values. Islamism is not a movement about Islam but about society and politics" (Çınar, 1998:14,15).

Put it differently, impressing the expansions of Western ideology and its institutions, Islamism, as a political-ideological movement tries to "cope with the challenge of Westernization and the inability of traditional Islam. Political Islam (Islamism) to be sure has become a dominant idiom, but first this is a 'modern' development" (Narfissi, 1998:116).

Türköne (1993:26) distinguishes "Islamism from traditional Islam in the sense that it is the change in the religion's way of legitimizing itself as a result of the process of acculturation under the influence of the west. In Islamist ideology, Islam becomes a world-view in the form of Western ideologies. Again, he concentrates on distinguishing the differences between Islamism and traditional Islam in two following points: the first is the emergence of Islamism via producing ideology in an environment where there was no differentiation as was present in the west, and the second is the appearance of religion as an ideology". For instance, despite using Islamic terminol-

ogy when creating Islamic values and discourses in their attempts, Young Ottomans can be placed in the nineteenth century's philosophy but not in Islamic traditional philosophy.

By using the metaphor, which Çakır (1997) called in his seminal book, it can be envisaged that when 'sacred verse' (*ayet*) transforms into slogan, at the precise moment Islamic tradition radically changes into the ideology of Islamism.

It seems to possible to say that Islamism partially articulates traditional values but Islamism does not only bear the marks of its previous interpretations, it also bears the marks of its current articulations in different discourses. Thus, the content of Islamism is provided by the contestation between the past and the present re-interpretations. For example, nineteenth century philosophy of progresivity (*terakki*) becomes main element of Young Ottomans' Islamism. This point successfully exemplifiers that Islamism never hesitates absorbing the other ideologies' elements if it is functional to reconstruct Islamic society. As far as Türköne (1993:48) is concerned "Islamist ideology is a kind of modernizing ideology. In the nineteenth century, progresivity and demands of democratization were main elements of the Islamist ideology". He goes further; he exaggeratedly hailed Young Ottomans as a revolutionary and democratic intellectual movement in the duration of Ottoman modernization.

On the other hand, Islamism, which pursuits to find solutions to the problems created by the modern west and disseminated as objective values is primarily a new synthetic attempt. "Each of these attempts to construct Islam also involves confronting and adopting to other interpretations of Islam. It is not that Islamism simply articulates Islam, but that their articulation already includes both other articulations and traces

of Islam's presence in other discursive configurations. The Islamist project revolves around gathering the ways Islam operates in the different discourses and unifying them by using Islam as rather a master signifier" (Sayyid, 1997:47).

As a consequence, "while Islamism, on the one hand, tended to defend a reform in Islam –which is distinguished by its ideological formation shape traditional Islam, and offered an anti- Western conception of progress and project of society" (Çiftçi, 1996:12).

3.2. ISLAMISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE ARTICULATION IDEOLOGY

The complete study of emergence and development of Islamism as a political ideology needs to be analyzed within historical, social, cultural and economical relationships as a whole. Islamism, as we know, was only possible to arise in a world or atmosphere of Ottoman modernization. In fact, modern political Islamism is a product of 19th century's modernization process. For the precise reason, Islamism should be placed in/considered with 19th century's modernization attempts. In other words, the ideology of Islamism is deeply embedded in conditions of Ottoman's dependent modernization attempts.

At this point, I will suggest, like Gülalp, that Islamism is not a traditionalist plea to return to a premodern era. Quite the contrary, "it is a product of the *contradictions* of Third World modernization and present modern reaction to the specific form of modernization experienced by the Islamic Third World" (Gülalp, 1992:15). As a movement of reaction rather than protest, Islamism presents religiously inspired solutions to the contemporary problems created by uneven modernization. Contrary to its

reputation, Islamism is not a way back; as a contemporary ideology it offers not a meaning to return to old-fashioned way of life but a way of navigating the shoals of modernization.

Islamism, if it is interpreted in terms of a Turkish experience came into existence as an outcome of Ottoman modernization process, namely, an articulation process of capitalism. Furthermore Islamism took shape with the problems of the economical social and cultural conditions of Ottoman society. As long as it is demanded to capture Islamism, firstly, it should be examined with the conditions of Ottoman's dependent modernization process. To the extent, "evaluating Islamism without consideration of historical, national and concrete conditions is primarily theoretical and practical failure" (Demirer, 1997:67). Briefly, Islamism can be defined a other system of beliefs which like any system of belief in the final analysis is a reflection of socio-economic process and struggles. It means that ideologies are covers for deeper structural interests.

The first possible fixation about Ottoman's Islamism experience is that Islamism became visible as a form of salvation/integration ideology on account of social upsetting in the duration of dependent modernization. As a matter of fact, "Khoury claims that social paradoxes embedded in economical sphere in the process of expansion of Islam led to the politization of Islam" (Ibid. 65).

As will be elaborated in more detail later on it can be emphasized that Islamism is an alternative modernizing movement and its ideological aspects spring from its offer of an alternative legitimating for modernization/capitalization. Keddie quick-wittedly points out that Islamism as an alternative nationalism and an alternative legitimating

of capitalist rationality has in its imagination a particular model of societal integration, ideals of common good and common values. To put it differently, “many different and even contradictory interests in terms of the Islamist idiom. In this respect it has replaced nationalism and socialism/Marxism, which played a similar role in earlier decades. As such, it does not represent a unitary ideology or world-view, but expresses many different ones” (Zubadia, 1995:182,183).

Islamism can mainly be seen a product of the contradictions of Third World modernization. “If modernization broadly refers to the process of social change identified as rationalization by Weber and as ‘capitalist development’ by Marx and ‘modernism’ refer to set of beliefs and values identified with Enlightenment though, relentless pursuit of progress and control of nature for human liberation” (Harvey, 1989:120-133).

By differentiating ‘modernization’, that is, capitalist development and ‘modernism’ it can be asserted that Islamism or radical Islamic politics is not directly a traditionalist rejection of modernization but a project for coping with ‘modernism’. Yet, Islamism, of course, has some critical aspects associated with modernity since it constitutes or produces a kind of modernism. Nevertheless, Islamism could not be simply understood as a traditional rejection of modernization. Indeed, briefly Islamism refuses not modernization but its specific kin of products. Thereby, Islamism opposes a certain type of modernization, which has been perceived as a synonymous with Westernization in the Islamic countries. So it is possible, from this point of view, to confirm it as a modernizing ideology to build alternative modernization based on Islamic principles.

Actually, there wouldn't emerge any matters for Islamism if the modernization were implemented in accordance with Islamic principles. Alternatively, here, modernization is justified in terms of the contribution of the revitalization of the Islamic civilization. Islamism intellectuals seem to assert that while 'west' wants to achieve modernization for the sake of Western rationality', then Islamic Third World should articulate itself (alternative) modernization process relying on Islamism justification. Accordingly, that means seeking of wealth is for the sake of revitalization of Islamic civilization.

Islam, indeed, has never been a world rejecting religion. The issue is not being either a this-worldly Muslim or a 'monkish' pious one. Rather "the crucial thing in being this-worldly is conscious. In these circumstances, for examples, aspiring for wealth in this world is not necessarily relegating Islamic concern to a secondary place, if wealth is to be created for the sake of re-building the Islamic civilization" (Çınar, 1998, 22).

It can be formulated as follows: As long as it is implemented for the sake of Islamic civilization, modernization/capitalism would be a conventional process, or, modernization/capitalism can be maintained if it works for Islamic rationality. More than a reaction against the modernization of Muslim societies, Islamism is a product of this process. Thus, Islamism can be considered both as a resistance and an adaptation to the modernization process.

As a consequence, as an alternative modernizing movement based on Islamic interpretation, it also has a modernizing perspective beyond Western character. I have deliberately used the word 'alternative' to demonstrate that it also wants to reconstruct fundamentals of society within unique modernization paradigm regarding

struct fundamentals of society within unique modernization paradigm regarding Islamic values. However, when doing these attempts, Islamism is endlessly embedded modernization process and its Western notions. That is the main point to take Islamism both as an alternative modernizing movement and a political movement about fundamentals of (present) society.

In this regard, "Islamic radicalism is not opposed to modernization but to ideology of modernism (Munson, 1988:107). As far as this study is concerned, it is assumed that it rejects modernism, it highly occurs in cultural level such as identity politics. "No doubt Islamists have always criticized the values of modernism' in terms of 'moral decadence', 'idolatry', 'materialism', and so on" (Sivan, 1990:68). To this end, while Islamism became an alternative modernization project not as opposed to economical and technological development regarding capitalist society but as a rival to merely product of values and beliefs of Enlightenment. Accordingly, it possesses a kind of challenging standpoint with modernism in cultural sphere. The way Islamism rejects modernization, which thoroughly means such a capitalist development of society is certainly not the case. Quite the contrary, Islamism seems too highly voluntary, being conscious about underdevelopment to capture modernization on the grounds of Islamic civilization.

It can be easily seen from above, I do not share some 'intellectuals' common reactions, which generally do not approach Islamism as an alternative modernization project. Those intellectuals take Islamism with the help of duality paradigm of Enlightenment. As a matter of fact, Islamism is approached those duality concepts, reformist/conservatist, progresivits/regresivist, modernist/traditionalist and so on. As consequence the 19th century and present form of Islamism is conceived only a prod-

uct of such an approaching, Islamism is pictured conservatist, regresivist, traditionalist on the one side, and modernist, reformist and secularist on the other. Why Islamism is trying to adopt itself to modernization in its' Islamic form, it should not be conceived as a dichotomy of progresivity and regressivity

Islamism, can be seen partially a desire to address Islamic value within whole of society and also a desire to capture modernization within the terms of an Islamic belief system and its political ideology. In this context, the ideology is not an anti-modernist or traditionalist plea to return pre-modern society.

To put it more concretely, Keddie (1988), for instance, pithily underlines that “the most important previous experience was the Islamic reformism of the late 19th century which served to ‘legitimize’ the adoption of Western institutions through a reinterpretation of Islam”.

As to Ottoman's experience of Islamism, it can easily be observed Young Ottoman's basic motivation was an attempt to coalescing Ottoman's institutions with the Western correspondence of them by subjecting to Islam a certain kind of reformation. To the extent, Young Ottoman's attempts to articulate Ottoman institutions with Western type within Islamic interpretation allow us to evaluate the ideology as an alternative articulation of modernization attempt.

Al-Azmeh (1993:79) rightly points out “it has long been realized that Islamism/Islamic revivalism is heavily impregnated with Western notions” (1993:79). For instance, it is well known that the highlight of European thought were becoming quite familiar in Istanbul and elsewhere from the early part of the nineteenth century and that they contributed to the formation of Young ottomans. What is demonstrated

is that these ideas were very much of in the air and their genesis in an area of great cultural political and ideological proximity –Young Ottoman thought-.

In the Ottoman Empire, the nineteenth-century reforms of the Ottoman state were a response to the Western European challenge through recognition of the latter's technological and organizational superiority. The Young Ottomans although critical of secularism of the *Tanzimat*, welcomed "*the adoption of the institutions of the modern state on the basis of the Western model*" (Mardin, 1992:17). As the first *intelligentsia* in Ottoman history, the Young Ottomans contributed to the ideological legitimating of Ottoman Westernization/capitalism/modernization.

It is noteworthy to point out that Young Ottomans attempted to justify the modernization of the state within terms of the principles of Islam. For example, "the basis for such institutions and the parliament public opinion', 'equality before law' and others, was discovered in Islamic texts" (Karpas, 1972:276). To put it differently, Young Ottoman's Islamism was an alternative modernization attempt to adopt Ottoman's institutions with the impact of the Western modernization model. Naturally, it can be said that they had reservations about the form of modernization in regards to Islamic principles; yet, it does not mean refusal or avoidance totally from it. Even, it can be claimed that Islamism served the interests of modernization Young Ottomans seem to assert that one does not have to Westernize in order to modernize. The ideology of Young Ottomans was against the process of modernization conceiving it as 'transferring the culture of the culturally degenerated West' and rejected what it considered as social and cultural degeneration. Basically their Islamism is in opposition not directly to modernization/capitalization but to Westernization.

Indeed, by rejecting Western culture, Young Ottomans does not mean, refusing all developments associated with the West. Utilizing the material aspects of Western civilization is something that Islamists have always enthusiastically favored. Accordingly, Young Ottomans precisely open to the utilization of Western technology and its development model in order to reconstruct the Ottoman's Muslim.

To the extent, they hoped to combine the two by accepting European methods of agreement, social organization and economic activity without the underlying Western philosophy and by simultaneously implement Islamic ideals and ideas. Or alternatively, "if Western political ideas were to be adopted, it would be assumed they were nothing more than Islamic ideas. The contents were to be Islamic, and it was sufficient to cloth them in European forms in order to modernize Ottoman state and society" (Moten, 1996:29). By doing this, Young Ottomans, in fact, wanted to resolve the dichotomy between Islamic principles and contemporary reality. It can be said from third modernization attempts' point of view, the full of restoration of Islamic principles would spell progress for saving and recognizing or modernizing Ottoman state and society.

Furthermore, Young Ottomans thought that Islam would be capable of saving and modernizing Ottoman society by implementing Islamic principles. Here, Islamism is conceived not only as a form associated with saving the patient Ottoman but also in relation with modernizing Ottoman society. Salvation consisted not in imitating the West, but in making the Ottoman State strong through an Islamic revival. Basing themselves on certain assumptions, the Islamist advocated a modern state founded on the political principles of Islam.

Their assumptions were: first (and this was their basic theme), *Islam was not against progress*, hence the scientific and technological achievements of the west had to be rapidly adopted and used for the strengthening of the Ottoman empire; next, Islam had not been affected by the moral and social crisis of Europe... and the last (though this was actually their fundamental assumption), Islam alone was capable of saving the Ottoman empire and, through it all the Muslim and the World (Ibid., 41).

By the way, the fact that Young Ottoman's movement is not only reduced the ideology of Islamism is crucial. Most intellectuals' thought was inspired by the other (Western) ideals or ideas and they had highly eclectic mode of thinking. Those intellectuals' world-view can be traced as follows: Ottomanism, populism, democracy, liberalism and paradoxically even secularism. Here, we should aware that the intellectual modernization process of Young Ottomans is highly complex and collage. There are several political ideals or ideologies to affect their Islamist ideology.

For instance, Namık Kemal who was deeply influenced by Rousseau and especially Montesquieu adopted the principal concepts of European political thought but was at pains to find them all in Islamic law. Similarly, the thought of Ali Suavi, Ziya Paşa, Hayreddin Paşa, Şinasi and others can be analyzed in terms of their eclectically form. This must, however, remain outside the scope of this chapter.

On the other hand, it can be underlined that Islamism played a chief role to articulate the Islamic World to the West. Islamism presents religiously inspired solutions to the contemporary problems created by uneven modernization. What is significant Islamism especially when seen in the context of modernization is that, aside from being a sociological and cultural fact, it has emerged as an ideological solution to dependent modernization. Keddie (1997:60), clearly demonstrates that Islamism is more developed in Islamic countries experienced Westernist reformism rather than those which do not live any Westernist reformist experience. The important result of the impact

of Western ideals supported by the Ottoman elite was directly, related with the proliferation of the Young Ottomans' ideological movement.

Reacting to Westernization and its various cultural and political form and experience, the Islamic movement aimed, from its very inception at finding the 'Islamic solution' to the problems of alienation, education, economic organization and social justice in society. Next, it proposed an Islamic education system whose goal was to create the Muslim individual, the Muslim house, the Muslim nation and the Muslim government (a kind of Islamisation of the society) third, it created an economic infrastructure based on Islamic principles to solve social injustice (Abu-Rabi, 1994:11)

Conclusively, I have tired, here, to reveal how Islamism (of course, experience by Ottoman society) become a unique modernization project having some sui generis character when challenging the west in order to 'save' and reconstruct Ottoman society with patriotistic manner. It seems to defend Islamic principles so as to save and modernize the society though it shapes alternative modernizing project by articulating itself modernization process in Islamic way.

CHAPTER FOUR

OTTOMAN-TURKISH MODERNIZATION ADVENTURE AND ISLAMISM

4.1. MODERNIZATION BUT FROM WHICH PERSPECTIVE?

It seems beyond doubt that the Ottoman Empire had gone through a serious internal transformation and peripherilization vis-a-vis West since the sixteenth century. This present chapter mainly tries to develop an integrative approach to modernization in order to capture the course Ottoman-Turkish modernization. To differ us from the most studies about the modernization of the Ottoman-Turkish society only concerning about the nature and volume of the outside stimuli, namely, European impact, in this study modernization is addressed in more detail about the “internal structural transformations” of the society. To some extent, it seems possible to underline that modernization could become apparent with its internal socio-economical backwardness and the socio-economic structures were subject to transformation through the impact of internal forces long before massive European effect accelerated this transformation.

Then, it is the intention of this study that, at this time to discuss at limited length an alternative approach needs to be developed on the study of modernization process in Ottoman-Turkish society. Here, I shall initially try to understand their analysis, in which the majority of the literature approach modernization as a series of reformation in superstructural spheres (i.e., reforms in laws, education, *changing habits*

military organization, and life style, dressing and like those). Also, they tend to start modernization from *Tanzimat* or Selim III's reforms, as a state-centered process from top to down. Based on this argument it could be possible to say that "the studies on Turkish modernization that starts from the renovation of Ottoman phase to the Kemalist era and the recent contemporary developments generally give priority the spheres of law, institutions and politics" (Kandiyoti, 1997:204).

Alternatively, the present study is based on following assumption: modernization of the Ottoman-Turkish society could be also studied integrative way without neglecting both socio-economic transformations together its material determinants on social formations like the relationship of production, class positions, occupation and changing patterns of cultural elements in the whole superstructural sphere. .

By modernization I mean 'capitalist development' in broader sense. That is to say, I will prefer explaining it associated with perpetual expansion of market relations and also freedom of entrepreneurship and naturally aspects of 'private property'. To the extent, the concept of modernization should be understood as a process of economic, social and cultural transformations on the ground of market society. It implies speeding up process of change towards the capitalist development, which can be witnessed, from the sixteenth century to the present. "Polanyi in 'Great Transformation' noted how exceptional the modern era is in the way that economics and market are made sacrosanct. This raises the issue of how such a society is legitimized" ((Eatwell&Wright, 1999:289). In addition, it seems possible to say that modernization accelerates to differentiate society regarding their material interests.

Also, it should be underlined that the nature of the capitalist development, that is, modernization inherently has uneven and contradictory characteristic. To the extent, it can be claimed that modernization is not simply both linear and consistent but highly complex process including paradoxical elements. "The general trend of much contemporary Marxism and sociology is to stress the uneven contradictory nature of capitalist development, the continuities rather than between feudalism and capitalism the conservation rather than dissolution effect of the capitalist mode of production and "the prevalence of 'archaic' institutions and labor forms in colonial capitalism in dependent, peripheral societies" (Turner, 1984:157).

In Berman's modernization theory, it can be observed that modernization is not linear or stable process but radically changeable dynamic course of activities including ebbs and flows. "To be modern is to live a life of paradox and contradiction" (Berman, 1988:15). In the usage adopted here 'modernization' refers to Berman's general images, which summarize the various transformations of life attendant upon the rise of market society and the nation state.

Henceforth, to bear in mind that modernization fundamentally emerges from the economical infrastructure, Ottoman-Turkish modernization process should be studied along with the transformations of Ottoman's economic structure and its correspondent politics and culture beginning with the middle of the sixteenth century with the beginning of dismantling in the state land system which was vital to both economic and social formation. Having recognizing its socio-economical backwardness, "a new understanding of Ottoman-Turkish society and its modernization adventure could be achieved by analyzing in the greatest possible detail the internal structural transformation of this society the emergence of social groups (classes), their interre-

lations and their impact on cultural and government” (Karpaz, 1968:70). In a sense it can be claimed that the experience of modernization had a deep socio-economical background in the Ottoman era, but not merely, as a form of series of reforms which were implemented by the state in the superstructural sphere being highly influenced by European pressure, externally.

Accordingly, the perspective implies that *Tanzimat* had an intensive historical condition/context on the grounds of transformation in the socio-economical structures of the Ottoman Empire. The history of the socio-economical transformation causing modernization will be mentioned later.

Most studies on the modernization of the Ottoman Turkish society (or the Middle East) deal with the nature and intensity of outside stimuli, that is to say European impact and much less with the forces within the society which conditioned the response to these stimuli.

In studying Ottoman-Turkish social development, most studies focus on a set of reforms, brought about by the challenge from external forces, namely the West. Generally these reforms are originated with Selim III and *Tanzimat* with its intensified form. From this point of view change comes from above by the agency of the government. In other words, this view tends to neglect modernization from below through social and economic transformation of the population. On the contrary, they consider modernization as a large scale change in the superstructural sphere involving the modernization of administration, laws, education, life style, social life, clothing, music and like those.

Far from approaching modernization as an outcome of socio-economic transformations, Zürcher (1993:47,48) alleges that in his seminal book titled, 'Turkey, A Modern History' that "the reforms were the result of a *"deliberate"* political choice at the top. They were on the presumption on the part of the sultan and a number of his leading servants that the state had to be saved through the adoption of European methods". He goes further: "The reform policies were never the result of popular pressure and therefore lacked a secure basis in Ottoman society". In this framework, modernization can be formulated in these terms, which is, at the same, a subtitle of Mardin's article² as follows: "modernization as the Westernization of the bureaucrat".

Here it is clear that Zürcher stress on the importance of deliberate political choice/option, which put the modernization in practice rather than seeing it, associated with changes in structural composition of society. In this context, modernization is reduced to a level of political authorities' deliberate decision-making process to put into practice. Also, at this point, modernization is bound up with political reservations of the authority, instead of handing it as an outcome of the structure transformation.

Also, explicitly or implicitly modernization is read solely as a kind of Westernization. It is often assumed that West is to be understood as a coherent unit symbolizing a specific course of development. Moreover, "the question of Westernization in Turkey dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century when Ottoman statesmen initiated a series of Westernizing reforms which, they thought would save the Empire from its apparent decline" (Toprak, 1993:238). Similarly, Lewis regarded Ottoman

² See "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics" in (1975) Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background & Present Problems, by (ed.) Akarlı, E. & Ben-Dor, G. (İstanbul:

reforms, “the passing of the empire; and the establishment of the secular republic as having liberated the Turks from a burden that had kept them from taking their deserved place on the side of the West”. When he interprets the Ottoman-Turkish modernization experience exclusively as an aspect of Westernization, they, as far as this study is concerned, fail to grasp the history in its full complexity.

Some of Western social scientists and those of Turkish social scientists focusing on social change, they generally attribute modernization in the minds of outward appearance of people, dressing daily life habits, and cleanliness of street, etc. Briefly these types of activities compare ideal type of its Western correspondence. So, western type activities became synonymous with modernization. Bernard Lewis, classic “The Emergence of Modern Turkey” provides a good example of this kind of writing, in which historical detail is presented but then forced into what W. Mills described as a ‘trans-historical strait-jacket’ “in order to support a limited number of generalization about Turkey, Turks, Islam and modernization. An ardent support of Ottoman-Turkish reform, Lewis began by emphasizing the ‘deeper affinities’ between the demarcations ideals of Western society and Turkish culture” (Kasaba, Bozdoğan, 1997:6). Halliday (1995:201) points out that Lewis in his books, gives primacy to what can be termed within different theoretical frameworks ideology, discourse or political culture.

In Lerner’s ‘The Passing of Traditional Society’ with similar mode of Western writing, Turkey’s apparently successful adoption of Western norms, styles and institutions, most conspicuously in education, law, social life, clothing, music, architecture and the arts, was portrayed as testimony the viability of the project of modernity even

in an overwhelmingly Muslim country” (Bozdoğan, 1997:8). In those writers’s view, consequently, modernization is equated with absolute westernization. They also assume that the gradual replacement of religion by westernization was inevitable, irreversible and desirable.

These standard considerations about modernization have also another latent assumption: the state directs and puts institutional reform in practice. It can be said, here, that the agency of all institutional reforms barely can be a state authority impacted by Western culture. The standard approach treats modernization by means of top-down formulations. On the other hand, the top-down formulations of reform and the state-centered analysis of the reform process absolutely neglect prosperous socio-economic structure and its agency, social groups that directly or indirectly interested in practicing any society into modernization process. The state-centered analysis, further, ignores the socio-economic pressures upon the government to change society into modernization.

Clearly being influenced by Gibb and Bowen’s version of the tradition that “the state was overdeveloped in relation to intervening institution (civil society) Mardin and Inalcik treat society as a dichotomy between *askeri* and *reaya*” (Turner, 1984:73). Mardin (1983:141), as it can be simply envisaged, sees reformation or modernization of the Ottoman-Turkish society within the state-centered perspective and hails the Ottoman official as a reformer. Let me put his words as follows:

...it is only the context of the ideology of Ottoman officials, which gave priority to the preservation of the state above all other concerns that we can understand how they could become sponsors of Westernization in the Ottoman Empire. For the policy of reforms that they “inaugurated” in the late 1830s (*Tanzimat*) amounted exactly to that.

From those authors' point of view social development or modernization of the Ottoman Turkish society bases on three underlying assumptions: one is that modernization means a series of reform in superstructural sphere. Secondly, it considerably connotes Westernization because of serious influenced of West, externally. The statesmen carry out the last but not least; reform or bureaucrats with deliberate, that is, conscious political choice. It should be also noted here that it is placed initially in Selim III's period and later *Tanzimat* era.

On the other hand, these assumptions such an emphasis lead us to ignore that these reforms embodied the historical, social and economical transformation in society and changes the relationships between social groups long before *Tanzimat* or Selim III period. That is to say, at the same time, "directly or indirectly *social forces* had an impact on the shape and effectiveness of many of the reform policies even if that impact is not always recognized" (Finkel, Sirman, 1990:30). According to Karpas (1968:84), "the transformation is an essentially internal social process which begins originally without government interference. State intervention occurs at an advanced stage of transformation and is basically an effort to give a new direction to the process of change according to the state's own concepts. The *Tanzimat* has been widely interpreted, according to the student's orientation as the beginning of modernization, the dawn of secularism, the formal acceptance of western superiority, the final breakdown of the oriental way of life and the like. The *Tanzimat* was a little of everything but essentially a search for solutions to internal conflicts, which embodied and shaped by socio-economic transformation of the Ottoman society.

Consequently, it will be asserted that *Tanzimat*, which is hailed the crux of modernization, is actually the final point of matured socio-economic transformation having

deeply rooted in historical background. To put it differently, modernization or capitalist development attempts in Ottoman Turkish society partially mark that there was a natural manifestation of social, economical, cultural maturation. Needless to say, there was also external pressure dated back changing the trade roads and port cities. In addition, advanced technology, an economic system relying increasingly upon industry, new techniques of government and study culminating in military power constituted the backbone of the external challenge. Similarly, the search for autonomy in the provinces and a series of conflicting demands covered made up the internal challenge of the Ottoman State.

Those challenges, which led to speed up engendering a complex, set of economical, social, cultural and political activities forced to the Ottoman state transform by centralizing and modernizing itself. To the extent, Polanyi tries to explain the modernity, which can be summarized as the following process: “As society develops in size, it itself as the centralized state grows on one side, and decentralized economy on the other” (Glassman, 1984:61)

Finally, instead of locking modernization in *Tanzimat* as the beginning of modernization, the dawn of series superstructural reforms and the final breakdown of the oriental way of life, that, is, westernization, our treatment of the modernization should be based on historical transformation both internal in the territory and external western impact on the structure of the society. “We need to remember the universal tenet of modernization as a world historical process. The wandering and deepening of the market society, the protective impulses of human beings and the assertion of human and civil rights are all aspects of modernization” (Kasaba, 1997:23).

4.2. BEYOND THE LIMITS OF INTERNALIST AND EXTERNALIST PERSPECTIVES: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE HISTORICAL APPROACH

It must be clear from above that of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization experience is based on historical transformation in socio-economic and then also political formation of the society by means of both “internal dynamism” and external dynamism from western imperialist impact. In a sense, it can be explicitly said that internal stimuli and also external challenges on the structure of the Ottoman society led to accelerate the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. It should be immediately noted that Islamism was a product of these dual processes experienced by the Ottoman society widely in the middle of the nineteenth century. That is to say, the search for autonomy in the provinces a series of conflicting demands for order and security and regulatory action, on account of social dislocations of various social groups couched often in moralistic and religious terminology, made up Islamism as a political device. Secondly, in the context of the nineteenth century it seems realistic with bold observation that capitalist development of West and its imperial/colonial conquest created the Islamic resurgence, the Ottoman society experienced.

One way or another, the problem of Islamic sensitivity resurgent engendered by this complex development. Needless to say, emerging Islamism approximately in the middle of the nineteenth century indicates that it should be considered with the modernization attempts of the Ottoman state, which can be dated back long before *Tanzimat*. The relationship between modernization process and Islamism will be discussed in the next step.

Now, I will try to reveal how the “integralist” perspective is relevant in order to grasp dynamism of the Ottoman modernization by examining internal and external sociology of development as a form of one-dimensional analysis.

When suggesting the concept of the “integralist” I mean caring about both internal and external development as a whole, which effected dynamism of the Ottoman society. Then, I shall focus on the some detail of internal transformation and also to some external impact on the society.

Inspired from Orientalistic and Eurocentric analysis of the Middle East and Ottoman society, ‘the internal perspective’ considerably concentrates on the valves and institutions of internal structure of the society. “It emphasizes the organizational patterns characteristics of a given society, focusing our attention on cultural peculiarities and discontinuities between societies rather than inter- societal continuities” (Fletcher, 1985:37). When analyzing the Ottoman, Middle East society, internalist sociologists imagine characteristics of oriental societies are products of internal genetic features. The auspices of the internalist theoretical framework, social development are explained by exclusively internal structure of a given Middle East society. Within the internalist perspective, sociologists concentrate on institutions of the *internal structure* of a society, which is, for the purpose of treated as an isolated societal unit. The explanations for the growth or stagnation of an economy are consequently couched in terms of “personal beliefs”, “family structures”, “patterns of inheritance” and so on (Turner, 1984:76). In so far as social development or modernization is formulated in terms of such abstractions.

By using cultural-reductionist paradigm, non-European societies are negatively envisaged vis-à-vis the west. "At root, the west was universal, rational and secular, while the orient wallowed in particularism, tradition, despotism and religious obscurantism" (Bromley, 1994:10). To the extent, "Weber's explanation of economic stagnation in terms of religious values in Islam is a typical example of an internalist theory, since it pay no attention to the peculiarities of the global situation of Islamicate societies" (Turner, 1984:42). Namely, the economic stagnation of the middle east, relatively European society, is seen as a product of internal cultural features of the society rather than associated with or, consequence of western domination and penetration.

Ascribing a unity, autonomy and primacy to religion and with Weber's sociology, with the religion-based civilization aspect, has attributed special features of Islamic Middle East and genetic cultural peculiarities in blocking the (capitalist) development of the orient. In short, "the essence of the internalist (orientalist) view is the ineradicable distinction between Western superior and oriental inferiority" (Al-Azmeh, 1993:350).

From this point of view, Ottoman State and the whole Middle East is perceived as a stagnant, stable territory in its religious-based interpretation. For the most part, Islam is seen as 'blocking' modernization, that is, capitalist development. As Shroeder's own words (quoted in Narfissi, 1998:108): 'whereas in Weber's studies of other religions the religious or cultural sphere is autonomous from the economic and political spheres, "Islam is different... because the spheres of religion and politics are interconnected or put it differently, not cultural but political change, -or in this case stability-, was the primacy obstacle".'

Consequently, Ottoman Empire and the Middle East are analyzed by the use of series abstractions as follows: firstly with respect to having uniformity of belief and Islamic tradition, which resulted from the absence of class distinction secondly, the arbitrary power of despotic ruler, or, patrimonial despotism and finally the absence of private property. Indeed, Ottoman society is portrayed as having patrimonial economic and political culture, which explains the absence of a capitalist spirit of rational law and independent cities. To the extent, Islam is blamed for impeding to capitalist development. Since Islam is conceived lacking capitalist spirit, rational law and private property.

On the other hand the thesis about economic stagnation in Ottoman state because of its Islamic value is factually misleading. However we can only understand why these values and motives were present by analyzing the socio-economic conditions (patrimonial dominance and prebendal feudalism). Furthermore, “a number of scholars have concluded that the rigidity of Islamic law and its prohibition of usury never really, interfered with commerce (The main problem in commercial life was the threat that patrimonial rulers would seize property and goods to pay off their troops)” (Turner, 1984: 39). Also, the most radical criticism of the Weberian Islam-based explanation did by Rodinson in his book, *Islam and Capitalism*. Here, Rodinson underlines that far from discouraging economic involvement, Islam provides an explicit legitimization of trade and commerce: “Economic activity, the search for profit, trade and consequently, production for the market are looked upon with no less favor by Muslim tradition than by Koran itself” (Rodinson, 1973:16). In the last instance, it can be said that Islam is primarily urban commercial, literate.

Thus, the internalist approach underlines these assumptions related with the Ottoman/Middle East society as follows: First that it shared the Orientalist view of the superiority of West over the Rest. Second that focusing on special features of internal structure of the Ottoman society on the ground of reductionist view related with religion, culture, habits, the internalist approach neglect the dynamism of the society in all spheres. Moreover, it discards or downplays the role of colonialism/imperialism/semi-colonialism in blocking the development of the Orient and Ottoman society. Finally that the reductionist religion-based civilization understanding ascribed a unity, autonomy and primacy to religion and cultural values rather than socio-economic relations.

The externalist view (dependency theory), by contrast, concentrates on the external (international) context of a society instead of internal characteristics. Studying with this theory (A. G. Frank, Cardoso, Furtado), the intellectuals pay little attention when analyzing Third world colonized countries attempt to analyze the because of the spontaneous growth of capitalism as irrelevant to the question of the effects of capitalism colonialism on the periphery of the world capitalism.

To put it more acutely, the internal features of the society are treated as an outcome of causes, which are, situated only the external process. That is to say, as Melotti (quoted in Turner, 1984:80) observes in relation to Frank's model of capitalist underdevelopment, Frank completely "overlooks the internal structures" of the individual currently underdeveloped countries and tends to reduce the process of underdevelopment to a mere mechanistic concomitant of the development of capitalism".

As far as I am concerned, the externalist paradigm ultimately, sharing the classical modernization theory's developmentalist unilinear assumptions, envisages modernisation from western experience "Dependency theory argues that the (western) replication was being blocked by the imperialism of the developed countries" (Gülalp, 1988:18).

To avoid these two one-dimensional approaches when studying the experience of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization, my aim is providing an adequate explanation of the process in terms of capitalist development, which could be examined through aspects of both internal features of the Ottoman society (i.e., local socio-economical transformations) and its relation with international (external) conditions.

By adopting *integralist standpoint*, to put it more precisely, my claim is that the internal structure of the Ottoman society would not be a mere effect of external economic conditions and the analysis of the internal structure may include evidence on the class structure, mode of production and also ideological structure (including religion and moral values). When analysing modernization of Ottoman-Turkish society we should recognize that there is no straightjacket history. That is to say Ottoman-Turkish society had its own characteristic when they experienced development. Ultimately, "Ottoman-Turkish modernization had many uncertainties, occasional reversal and periodic shifts in its speed and priorities" (Kasaba, 1997:20). So it should be studied with its own specific experience of the process, via an integralist view.

It seems possible to assert that although the nature of Ottoman society changed less comparatively than European society in the same period, it did transform. There were substantial changes in the relationship between different social groups in economic

activities, and in the function of state. Karpat obviously reveals this process as follows:

“From the very start it is necessary to recognize the essential fact that the Balkan and the Middle East societies, and their socio-cultural-economic structure in the Ottoman era, were subject to transformation through the impact of internal forces long before massive European accelerated this transformation. Already by the end of the sixteenth centuries that is, almost during the height of its power the Ottoman Empire faced serious, *social dislocation* as indicated by Hasan Kafi Bosnevi (Akhisar) (1544-1616) in his *usul al-hikem finizam al-alem*, and later, in 1630, by Koçi Bey in his *Risale* (Karpat, 1972:243).

Internally, the structural changes which prepared the modernization of the territory can be summarized as follows: By the end of the 16th century due to the economic and technological change, Ottoman society faced with disintegration of the growing use of firearms which led to the neglect of the Sipahi in charge of state lands led eventually to a new tax system and finally to the rise of the *ayan* or local lords.

As Karpat points out in the discussion, “when the Ottoman Empire is viewed as a political system rather than as a religious model, the traditional division of society in to four groups-the men of the sword, the men of the pen, the merchants, and the mass of food producers-acquires fundamental importance” (Polk, Chambers, 1968:3). Of these four groups, two played the major role in the empire; the men of sword, who provided the political element at the top and the food producers, who supplied the social and economic base. Fundamental to their organization is the control of land, which was the key to the social and political framework of the empire.

The disintegration of *timar* system (approximately at the middle of the 16th century) was accompanied by economic social and political crisis, which affected detrimentally the source of the state revenue and imperiled the economic status of the bureaucracy itself. Turner (1984:39) explicitly underlines that “with the decline of the

sipahi (that is, *timar* system), the peasantry were at the mercy of the growing class of *multezims* (tax-farmers). As the *sipahi*, peasantry and merchants declined with the failure of the ruling institutions local magnates (*Ayan*) and small dynasts (Derebeyis) arose to terrorize the provinces”.

Henceforth, the structural changes come after the declining the tax *timar* system. *Ayan* or notables gradually assumed the tax collect. Land became the economic foundation of the *ayan* and of new social order that developed under them.

To the extent, it can be mentioned that the relations of the *ayans* with the bureaucratic order and their conflicting group ideologies formed the central dynamics of the internal transformation, which occurred in the Ottoman Empire.

Indeed, the conflict between *ayan* and bureaucrats led to emergence of a new socio-economic order. “This new order represented first by the *ayan* and later by a variety of entrepreneurial, agrarian and commercial groups in the nineteenth century, put forth a series of demands: “the *ayan* demanded a new rational, legal system capable of meeting the needs of the differentiated system in which they activated” (Karpas, 1968:71,72)

It can be seen from above, the deepening struggle, in turn, between the ruling institutions and the *ayans* or new provincial elite, stemmed not from cultural or religious differences but from group conflict caused by different economic and political interests. That was the one of the key internal factors, which compelled the government to initiate far-reaching measure in order to assert its own supremacy.

Furthermore, while the Ottoman land system was, thus, dismantled by an internal process of class struggle between bureaucrats, landlords and merchants but this process was reinforced also by the effect of economic changes in the external environment resulting from the consolidation of capitalism as a world economy. Bromley (1994) emphasizes this process “Riven by this basic contradiction, the internal composition of the empire was further transformed by a number of external changes. The re-routing of trade from the East, as the Portuguese, Dutch, French and English pushed the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, undermined much of the Ottoman maritime trade”. Consequently new commercial sea routes started a new process, which cut the international transit trade running traditionally the control of Ottoman State revenue. Also, the revenues of the state already reduced by the retention of rising shares of the surplus by local magnates (*ayan*).

To put it more succinctly, In the Ottoman empire, “the internal crisis of land system resulting in a feudalisation of social relationship was reinforced by external economic pressures of world trade which also undermined the authority of the central state apparatus in relation to local landlords” (Turner, 1984:81). Similarly, this predatory appropriation served to undermine the authority of the state, and with it the productivity of land system. Moreover, European manufactured import destroyed the system of guild production and rural crafts. Thus, there emerged the endemic revenue crisis in the Ottoman State, which was no longer able to control peripheral regions. The paralysis of state power provided conditions for the rise of independent lords in Anatolia and local notables in Rumelia (*ayans*).

Further aggravating the decline of the state revenue was increasing need for income brought about by the challenge for external forces. A new style of military organization required increasing taxes. In order to increase revenue to deal with the fiscal crisis, the state was forced to increase taxation and this produced further discontent, social dislocation and also political disaffection.

There was another new factor; the rapid growth of trade throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries due particularly to the western need for agricultural production gave the *ayan* a new scope. Polk and Chambers (1968:5) underline that naturally, "the *ayan* sought to regularize and secure the gains which had come to them by accretion during the eighteenth century. They sought to extend the concept of *private property* and in this they were joined by the bureaucracy, which saw in private property a more efficient system for the production of revenue, upon which the bureaucracy itself depended". Hence forth, it can be said the notion of increased private control over property occupied a large place in the *Tanzimat* edict and led to the introduction of the new land law of 1858.

Another words, the commercialization of the Ottoman agrarian system was, in addition, not a peculiar feature of a decadent *timar* system, but a process, which was common to a variety of social agrarian systems under the impact of the nineteenth century capitalism. We know that the dominance of the capitalist mode of production does not automatically/immediately result in the destruction of precapitalist modes of production in general terms. Even, it will be claimed, "when capitalist relations of production were inserted in to underdeveloped societies, they typically had the paradoxical effect of conserving and reinforcing archaic pre-capitalist forms of labour organization and general social relations" (Turner, 1984:84). If accordance with inte-

gralist view, it should be noted that the analysis of modernization or capitalist development of Ottoman Turkish society can not be conducted in terms of static, stagnant comparisons between the abstract features of society, i.e.-religious essence.

It seems that the socio-economic evolution and differentiated social stratification entailed to the need for differentiated social order. Demands of new social groups forced the bureaucracy to understand and to meet the challenge of new conditions. In the history of Ottoman modernization, “a bureaucracy may not be intellectually attuned to understand and to meet the challenge of new conditions in the spirit of the engendering forces. If this challenge comes out, as it did in the Ottoman Empire, in the form of various demands by a new social groups, and if the administration is not capable of meeting them, then it may soon lose its objective character and degenerate in to a power struggle” (Karpas, 1968:71).

Faced with various socio-economic transformations, the government was compelled to initiate far-reaching prevention so as to establish its own supremacy. These measures culminated eventually in the adoption of a modern form of centralization which was the major political force of modernization through this idea, it should be reminded that Polanyi’s explanation about paradox of modernity that as society develops in size, technological power and complexity, it tend to eliminate itself as the centralized state grows on one side, and the decentralized economy on the other.

Keeping all history of socio- economic transformation, finally, the changes in the nature of Ottoman society can not be understood without a reference to the internal context and external constraints, in particular, the development of a global capitalist economy centered on the western Europe in the 16th century. It may be said the

change in the land regime barely marked the transformation of the economic system and emerging new social forces, which generated the internal need for modernization. The new land regime allowed the new social order to follow its own laws of evolution. It can be simply observed the new land regime gradually but definitively undermined the old traditional system. It became slowly inoperative with its social context. Although there was a resistance about changing the old system, the process accelerated by European effects. The new social order entailed liberal, individualistic economic currents stemming from the protean structure of the Ottoman society at the end of the process.

In an ultimate analysis, the fundamental change of the Selim III's military reforms, Mahmut II's centralization attempts, the *Tanzimat* edicts with favouring a liberal economy, the Land Code (1858) supporting modernizing measure of the land, all can be seen total outcome of the history of socio-economic transformation in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization experience. The social and economic womb of modernization can be traced back from the middle of the sixteenth century. In other words, the 19th century which can be defined as a revolutionary century intensively embedded and owed its change to the development of economy and society by means of both internal context and external stimuli, long before at that time. To the extent, the fact that interpreting *Tanzimat* merely with respect to external conditions is far from convincing.

4.3. OTTOMAN'S ISLAMISM EXPERIENCE: YOUNG OTTOMANS

Let us cast a glance at the intellectual and educational treasurers of the world. In the last two centuries, the product of this knowledge has been a thousand times superior to that of ancient times in content of truth as well as in quantity... Those who worked to wrest moral and material advantages by applying knowledge to external (physical) oc-

currences discovered steam and electricity. Two instrumentalities as productive of beautiful work as the spirit and as quick-moving as imagination were thus created to render service to humanity. It is due to steam that man like magicians walk over the sea and fly over the earth. It is due to electrical power that man, as if endowed with supernatural powers, is able to save both from time and space. It is due to steam that in countries in a population of twenty-five to thirty million, fifty to sixty million horsepower of steel and copper are unceasingly engaged in satisfying our pleasures and our need. It is due to electricity that a sick man on this end of the world is able to save his life using the skills of a doctor on the other end of the globe. Natural gas appeared and the comfort of humanity was further increased...Engineering has reached the zenith of expectations: through it, continents are separated, sea are united, plots of earth are located in the midst of vast oceans and water found in sandy wastes. Economics has given rise to the division of Labor. A mediocre artisan is, in his field, ten times as able as ancient master craftsman... Commerce has found an extraordinary welcome. Men richer than a thousand companies establish companies more powerful than states...When will we start taking example? We do not have a single factory. How are arts [and crafts] to prosper in our country? We have not been able to establish a single joint-stock company. Is this the way to advance trade? Is there a single Ottoman Bank in existence? How do we propose to go about creating wealth? N. Kemal (quoted in, Mardin, 1962:405-406)

It can be initially emphasized that the emergency conditions of the ideology of Islamism historically matured, as a result of conjuncture of the detrimental socio-economic transformation causing Muslim population is dislocated. The rise of Islamist ideology itself in Ottoman society approximately in the middle of the nineteenth century would be inexplicable without (pre) capitalist development in the territory, which intensified the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim population associated with material interest. Well, the socio-economic transformations led to changes in occupation, in ownership patterns, income levels and cultural-political values among Muslim population.

To the extent, Muslim population started to couch often their demands for order, security in moralistic and religious terminology. "Actually this development was a by-product of Western technological, economic and intellectual forces with reflected themselves upon everyday life in society in the form of expanded trade, change in land tenure and intensified communication" (Karpas, 1972:276).

Also, Islamist sensitivity stemmed from a series of European interventions at peak in the beginning of the nineteenth century. "When European colonial power extended their rule into the Islamic Mediterranean world in the nineteenth century this prior history helped shape the character of the resulting encounter, definitively categorizing Islamic resistance to the colonial state" (Burke, 1998: 490). All we know that after the middle of the nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire was gradually subjected to a policy of semi-colonialism. This situation, as far as I am concerned, is essential to understand the economical and international dimensions acquired gradually by Ottoman society.

The fact that Islamism as an ideology stemmed from the nineteenth century's atmosphere indicates that it should be considered together with intensive modernization attempts during this period. It is possible to say Islamic response was principally product of conditions of "dependent modernization process". To put it differently, it can be claimed that modernization or capitalist development with series social dislocations among Muslim population and Western influence in the territory essentially compelled to put Islam at the center stage in politics. Additionally, what accelerating the Islamic protest inclination is that the Christian population controlled a large part of the land after the Ottoman State had lost it on account of successive battles. "Most of historicists accept that after losing *Kırım* and a part of Ottoman lands handed by Christian population firstly Islam became a means of political uprising and political ideology" (Timur, 1994a: 32).

How did Islam / Muslim society react to these challenges during the nineteenth century? Indeed, it should be mentioned Young Ottoman that their ideology of Islamism grew in such an environment. Although their class basis based on the (provincial)

middle class, my claim is that they partially represented Muslim populations upset and their Islamic protest consciousness.

Here, it will be briefly discussed their class background in that the economic foundations of a Turkish-Muslim middle class can be embedded in the emerging (primitive) Ottoman capitalist system and further consolidate because of the growing commercial relations with Europe and some reformation in economic organization with changing law system. For instance, “the liberalization of transfer of state lands to individuals through amendments to the land code of 1858 and the regulations of economic relations through a European system of codes and courts, coupled with a “liberal” economic policy of *laissez-faire*, increased economic activity and consolidated further the emerging primitive off capitalist system” (Karpat, 1972: 260).

It should be noted that middle class of the Ottoman society may be placed in the dissolution of the Ottoman economic formation to the *ayan*s, and to the government’s preparation to try every measure likely to increase material wealth in the hope of augmenting the state revenue. The rise of this middle class, whose power rested, in landownership rather than commercial enterprises, had far-reaching effects. Karpat asserts that new (capitalist system) provided the bases for a new patterns of social stratification’s among the Muslim population, gave birth to a new group of communal leaders formed of *ulema* families, small merchants, landlords and eventually generated an intellectual stratum of its own.

Young Ottomans, to some extent, stemmed from this class composition as a membership of the middle class could at times express new views of the world and reforms. “They tried to reconcile the ideology of Islam with science and technology of

Western ideology not surprising that since they were a membership of petty bourgeoisie” (Timur, 1994b: 103). That was the class composition of Young Ottoman’s intellectuals. Through overwhelmed by the bureaucratic class, these intellectuals constituted underclass of bureaucracy submitted series reforms with a crucial aim of “saving the state”.

Young Ottomans who can be seen the agents of the Islamist ideology constituted a highly elaborated political and intellectual movement from the middle of the nineteenth century. Essentially their basic motivation was to save the empire from disintegration on the grounds of “hybrid” Islamic principles. More importantly, it should be pointed out that these intellectuals’ discourse about “saving the state” was precisely determined their “petty bourgeoisie” class positions. It could be possible to say that their discourses were also accompanied by a desire to replace the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by the Muslim elements of the population. Keddie points out this issue as follows:

Through the late 19th century Kemal’s writings were nearly all in a liberal and local national vein with a strong dose of Islamic modernism. Partly an outgrowth of Islamic modernism, modernists such as Kemal responded to a new value of Western imperialist conquest by appealing to Muslim unity (Keddie, 1994: 484).

The Young Ottomans, on the other hand, believed that Ottoman society could achieve development, strength or independence only by imitating modernization with getting rid of its Westernized extremism. To do so only Islamic injunctions were to be reinterpreted to make them more adjustable to Western liberalism on matters ranging from parliaments to economics.

From such points of view Young Ottoman’s Islamism is an outcome of negation of shoals of modernization as well as a response the modernization as a colonial en-

croachment. Besides, the recent evolution of their Islamic ideology is also a rejection of both folk-religious (traditional Islam) and colonialism (modernization coming from the West). Henceforth, the historical process of the ideology of Islamism can be regarded as a course of resistance and adaptation to the modernization.

An average analysis of the nineteenth century's Islamism could recognize that Young Ottoman's Islamic principles were highly influenced by Western ideas. Young Ottomans never focused their attention on reforming Islam like Abduh and Afghani in Egypt in completely philosophical and theological level to defeat/supersede Western idea(l)s. Their Islamism may not be a moment for a Renaissance of Muslim culture. As far as Moten (1996:44) is concerned, Afghani saw in the unity of the Muslims of the world, which he strenuously propagated, the absolute guarantee of Islamic survival in face of the rise of Christianity and Western imperialism, which were largely considered two sides of the same evil. Even pan-Islamism of Afghani and Abduh's limited political activity among Egyptian nationalist directed against to expansionist policy of the West and their main concern was to reform religious of Islam, as it can be observed as follows:

Both Abduh and Afghani focused on the necessity of creating a vibrant Muslim nation as a valid response to Western domination. They emphasized the need for the development of a new Muslim human grounded in moral and spiritual foundations of faith and the need to create a renewed Islamic society to be actualized through economic and social development (Haddad, 1996:79).

On the other hand, Young Ottomans, rather, were interested in "re-constructing" the Muslim society and especially state institutions with their hybrid Islamic principles. They reinnovated Islamic principle in order to accord the Ottoman State with Western liberalism by re injecting hybrid principles into foundations of the state. According to this view, "Islamism or Islamic awakening is the development of a mixture of

different civilizations and a movement of unification led by intellectuals, many of whom were educated in the West and influenced by its intellectual culture” (Sabet, 2002:893). Suggesting a constitutional order and representative institutions inspired from Montesquieu’s divisions of functions within ruling institutions. These endeavors of Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa seriously served institutional adaptation to the West and political socialization of the Muslim society. These attempts, as it can be observed, were radically different from religious reformation.

Now, it should be emphasized that the ideology of Islamism, emerged with Young Ottomans, was not a desire to go back the “golden age”. They were whom Berkes called “utopian Islamists” concerned about very fundamental principles to (re) organize the (present) state and society with the help of the light of collage Islamic principles. In spite of the fact that it can be exclusively understood as a response to dependent modernization, the historical role of Islamism can not be reduced to a simple pattern of resisting and subverting the modernization or Westernization process. Actually as a politico-ideological movement embracing Islamic values, “the Young Ottomans represented a wide spectrum of ideas, ranging from constitutional liberalism and modernist Islam to proto-Turkism the genesis of radical Turkish nationalism and socialism” (Ortaylı, 1987:213). In effect, the Young Ottomans, while setting a high value on the social morality of Islam, they were trying to justify the adaptation of Western institutions in Islamic terms.

That is to say Young Ottomans’ Islamism simply was not a total critique of dependent modernization but also these intellectuals had an alternative modernization perspective by adopting hybrid Islamic principles. “The Islamist faction within the

Young Ottomans, without denying the superiority of European methods in administration, technology and science, ascribed the decline of the empire to its deviation from the Sharia and its resorting to the secular reforms of the *Tanzimat*. They ultimately intended to strengthen the Ottoman State through an Islamic revival” (Sakalioğlu, 1996:233).

In this regard, it should be noted that the ideology of Islamism (at least the Young Ottoman’s case) was not a traditionalist plea to return the past golden age, that is, *asri saadet*. It was also absolutely not holy war doctrine. It is important to keep in mind at this juncture that “the Young Ottomans had little in common with the more reactionary groups who thought of Islamic Union in terms of preparation for a splendid holy war to end all holy war” (Mardin, 1962:61). From the middle of the nineteenth century until after World War II the main intellectual trend in the Muslim world was Islamic reformism, not militancy. Reformism centered in different areas and classes, especially the urban intellectuals and new middle class. (Keddie, 1998: 484). These intellectuals thought that it was possible to modernize without giving up the Islamic foundations of belief. Accordingly, “the correct solution was to modernize the technological apparatus but to keep Islam as the central value-building core of Ottoman society” (Mardin, 1983:141).

Henceforth, it can be easily asserted that the ideology of Islamism is in line with modernization if it works for a true Islamic society. As a certain kind of ‘society engineering’, the full restoration of Islamic principles would spell progress for saving and reorganising/modernizing Ottoman state and society. In a sense, putting the words radical way, Islamism can be conceived as an alternative modernization pro-

ject both to supersede the imperial (Western) penetration and to rebuild Ottoman society by means of hybrid Islamic values.

We know that the superiority of the West in military, economic and indeed political terms was realized by Muslim merchant's, ambassador's, scholars, statesmen and above all generals whose armies were defeated throughout the nineteenth century in various encounters with their Western counterparts. "The more far-sighted among these including many, religious figures thereby became *modernizer* determined to evaluate Western institutions, precisely in order to increase the power of the Ottoman state and avoid further humiliation and subordination" (Narfissi, 1998:99). From this precise reason Islamism was partially a response to an external military and cultural threat; "it was an attempt to answer a feeling of inferiority and frustration resulting from Western colonialism" (Turner, 1984:40). One of the possible propositions about the stimuli of Islamist emergency as a political phenomenon is that when confronting the West with its superiority almost every level, if inspired from Shayegan's term, Islamic societies experienced cultural schizophrenia, predatory of conscious.

However, Islamic societies (Ottoman Empire) not only experienced cultural schizophrenia but they also were subjected economical schizophrenia. It seems realistic to start from the bald observation that "capitalist development and imperialist conquest have created Islamism (Islamic resurgence) we are experiencing. Like it or not, the problems facing us are those engendered by this development" (Amin, 1990:183). Therefore, Islamism besides being religiously motivated ideological movement, came into being as a response to the crisis of Ottoman society as a result of encroachment of modernization.

Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha seem to have argued that the culture of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic civilization on which it was built, were far superior to those of the West. Hence, they believe that the right course was to adopt the technology of the West but keep Ottoman/Islamic civilization. However, “whereas the Westerners argued that technology and civilization went together the Islamist were in favour of separating the two” (Toprak, 1993:238). Here, it could be mentioned Young Ottoman’s “selective” mode of thought about modernization had some problems, e.g. technological reductionism. From the technological reductionist viewpoint of Young Ottomans, modernization is justified extremely in terms of technological development and it is separated from its development conditions.

On the other hand, correlation between the rise of the intelligentsia and of ideology and their dependence on communication, both as a means of political socialization and of mass indoctrination, began to emerge as the new dimension of Ottoman modernization after 1860. (Karpat, 1972:261)

Young Ottoman can be described as the forerunners of the modern intelligentsia were the first Muslims to attempt to form an ideology for (re) structuring Ottoman society and the state institutions Western ideas were tried to be justified on the basis of Islamic principles. Nevertheless, their ideas were, in fact, not mono-bloc as already mentioned before. They disseminated in various discussions about administration, economics, politics and so on.

Namık Kemal, with patriotic feeling, was in favour of expanding and nationalizing economic activity but without tolerating Christian populations. Wishing to raise Muslim middle class shaped his economic discourse. “Namık Kemal in his articles

on economy spoke always about [the need for] Muslim Bank, Muslim Corporations and about protecting and supporting the Muslim merchants” (Karpas, 1972:264). Consequently, it can be said that his ultimate target on economic development was to inaugurate the Muslim businessmen and the Ottoman-Muslim enterprises. His discourse about reorganization of economy chiefly meant demanding for developed Muslim property rights. From this perspective it is clear that “his writings were nearly all in a liberal and local nationalist vein, with a strong desire of modernism” (Keddie, 1998:484) and of hostility to Christian populations. Kemal continuously wanted the state to apply a certain kind of policy and measures to replace the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by the Muslim one.

One could argue that Kemal was in favor of expanding and “nationalizing” national economic activity but without undue favor to the Christian minorities (Karpas, 1972:26). Now, It is more explicit that according to Kemal capitalist development of the Ottoman society was not preclusion if it was implemented for the sake of the Islamic civilization. That is to say, major target of his criticism was foreign (Christian) interference and their privileges in the economy and the other spheres. Here it should be pointed out that these policies were intensified under the reign of Young Turks (1908-1918) and finally accomplished by the beginning of the Kemalist regime.

As can be seen from above, this point was also source for Young Ottoman’s and especially Kemal’s discourse about fatherland (*vatan*). Kemal can be seen as the first “nationalist” Islamic intellectual who gave inspiration to successive intellectuals by highlighting the semantic development of the terms patria (*vatan*) and nation (millet). In addition to his emphasis on “saving the state” and desiring to overlap Western ideas and Islamic values, the emphasis on these terms specifically a unity of nation

(it is necessary to construct national market in relation to capitalist development) indicates also their “petty bourgeoisie” class composition. This use of nationalism was devised in accordance with the Western approach, concept and usage of ideology, except that Islamic values were substituted for Christian ones.

Indeed, it can be pointed out that “their patriotism and nationalism and their desire for constitutional and administrative changes in the spirit of the European liberalism were closely linked with their love for Islam and their belief that all was best in Europe, politically and socially, was contained in Islam” (Moten, 1996:37). However, Young Ottomans’ thought heavily embedded in Western cosmology. “They studied Western ideas and institutions and were equipped to employ their knowledge to advocate both a different approach and different goals for Ottoman reform” (Bogle, 1996:34).

Their legitimization of Islamic principles meant never “Islamic reformation” but reformation of the present society. Therefore Islamic principles were applied to reconstruct the “present” society and the state. Salvation of the “present society” was justified for the sake of Islam. According to Young Ottoman intellectuals, the *Şeriat* lays down precise rules for ensuring man’s welfare in the state and society, and that it reserves the right to modify them in accordance with the needs of the age.

This certainly indicates that the ideology of Islamism is about the present society by applying this-worldly discourse. More importantly though animated by religious zeal and a strong Islamic consciousness, Young Ottoman’s utopian, romantic, reactionary or idealistic thoughts deeply belong to present Ottoman society, that is, fighting against their present-this-worldly problems of society. For instance, their discourse

about reconstructing the society revolves around the “reform” concept but not “tecdid” notion of Islamic theology. Henceforth, discourses of Young Ottoman’s Islamism linked to the historical and social condition prevailing in the Ottoman Empire rather than to a desire to restore pure Islam. Ultimately, their discourses centered essentially on the restructuring of the Muslim society and state institutions.

It is important to keep in mind at this juncture that playing a vital role in introducing some notions of modern political culture, Young Ottomans made use of the ideology of Islamism. In the modern sense as means of mass mobilization and identification basis, this express as ideas in their newspapers, pamphlets, plays and other publications. Their basic goal can be formulated as the creation of a (new) Muslim identity for Ottoman subjects and loyalty to its government. In this context, ideology of Islamism served constructing the coherence of a proper Muslim identity.

As to their constitutionalism concept, “they assiduously advocated constitutionalism as the only remedy to eliminate arbitrary government and save the government” (Bogle, 1996:34). They can be considered “liberal” in the sense that they radically criticize the absolute powers of sultan and his bureaucrats on individual rights through centralization. However, Young Ottomans’ desire of constitutionalism was not as an outcome of their political ideas, like need of centralization. The need and place for a parliament were determined not by culture but by functional necessities stemming from a diversified social structure and a differentiated political system. “The search for a viable balance between central authority and local power was a pressing problem born not political idealism but of recognition of middle class power” (Karpav, 1972:268).

The economic conflicts between these groups, consequently, overrode any attempt at unification by the Ottoman State. Last but not least, this conflict was born out of economic and social differences that could not easily be superseded by a unity of culture. To the extent, Young Ottomans could not provide lasting solutions to the conflict between the rising propertied middle class and their own status, bureaucracy, intelligentsia.

All these above keeping in mind, it can be asserted that since their class position was “petty bourgeoisie” they tried to reconcile Western (capitalist) ideas especially on polity, economy and technology with Islamic principles by emphasizing “saving the state” and ultimately proposing “a unity of nation in Islamic way”. These propositions about fundamentals of (present) Ottoman society motivated to emerge a modern Islamist ideology started to be experienced from the middle of the nineteenth century. After this voluminous attempt intending to strengthen the Ottoman State and society through “modern” interpretation of Islam. Another words, “Islamism, not surprisingly during the reign of Abdulhamit the state again attempted to use (1876-1909) Islam as a unifying ideology. If only to rally the remaining Muslim population behind it” (Sakallıoğlu, 1996:233). However, Pan-Islamism as a political formula proved futile to save the empire because of the ineffectiveness of its mobilizing power against intensive nationalistic ideologies in the territory.

CHAPTER V

REDUCTIONIST APPROACHES TOWARDS ISLAMISM

5.1. ENLIGHTENMENT, ORIENTALISM AND EUROCENTRISM ALLIANCE: ISLAMISM AS A CONSERVATIVE/REGRESSIVE REACTION TO MODERNIZATION

This perspective abruptly divides modernization and Islamism in two separate parts without any transition. Islam is blamed for being a major impediment to progress. For this precise reason, Islamism (Political Islam) as a segment of regressive/conservative movement is conceived within terms of traditionalist relic due to the appeal of its Islamic themes and discourses. Islamist movements are totally envisaged merely in their incapability of generating an autonomous serial changing process.

The classical modernization theory analyzes social change within a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. From this point of view, while the concept of tradition broadly refers to nonwestern, namely, modernization is equated with Western societies. In this case, modernization theory is deeply contaminated by Eurocentric and naturally Orientalistic assumption in which traditional societies (non-western) were perceived as very restrictive and limited, whereas modern societies were seen as much more expansive, progressive and adaptable to a widening range of internal and external environments.

One the fact that the thesis certainly presupposes as if there is a blockage between Islam and modernity which is crucial for indicating the modernization theory's every essentialist Orientalistic mode of thinking. Since, it considers Islam/Muslim society purely 'sui generis', that is, authentic and modernity is external to it. At the same time, this essentialist view reproduces and studies with dualistic philosophy of Enlightenment by adopting some 'slash' categories, West/East Christian/Islam, modernity/tradition, etc.

On the other hand, the underlying assumption of this approach is essentially about the regressiveness and conservation of Islam, inappropriating with modernization. That is to say, "Islam is a pre-industrial defensive culture, while the 'modern Western European' is scientifically and technologically based on industrial culture" (Tibi, 1988:24). Islamic societies are perceived and linked with lacking individual freedom, civil rights, and industrialization and so on due to adopting themselves with Islamic identity and values. Accordingly, considering putting in the opposition to all those individuals or institutions that advocate Enlightenment or modernizing regime Islamism is approached as the wave and the banner of secularism and modernization.

Influenced by this paradigm the most of the "modernists" approach Islamism as a regressive/conservative movement, which desire to return to glory past and thus reject (present) modernity. This argument, more importantly, regards Islam as a proof of anti-modernity, which assumes that Islamism, could no be an agent of modernization. The ideology of Islamism, in this perspective, is the regressive defense mechanism in political sphere so as to hinder Muslim societies to accord and culture modernization process. To this approach, the problem also lies within the civilization boundaries between decadent Islam and superior West can be traced back to the ori-

gin of the civilization. The discourse of modernization theory is both Universalist and relativist. (Islamic) Third world people are told to emulate west, while at the same time are also described as inherently incapable of succeeding (Gülalp, 1998:18).

Islamist movements/Islamism resist the modernization because of its stick to the religion of Islam, the values and the institutions. Consequently, in this perspective, it is now clear that Islamism can not provide the basis for a modernization of any society since, in the end, they have neither a vision nor a program for the future because of their inspiration of the golden past. Also, neither Islam could be an agent of change; nor it could become the basis of a modern political order (Vatikiotis, cited in Çınar, 1998:77).

Specifically this approach radically asserts that since modernization is absolutely alienated and external to Islamism, as long as modernization is implemented, its agents could not be regarded as an Islamist. Therefore it can be said, "if modernization is to take place, it will take place in spite of Islamism" (Çınar, 48). Therefore, Islamism becomes thoroughly unfriend, rival and even enemy of the modernity in essentialist / antagonist manner.

The compromising Orientalist, Eurocentric and Enlightenment view develop two crucial assumptions:

The process of modernization tends to follow relatively similar patterns in the economic and political and other intuitional spheres, and once the institutional kernels of a modern system are established in anyone of these areas they lead to similar, irreversible structural and organizational developments in all spheres and to sustained growth in the common evolutionary direction (Eisenstadt, 1984:5)

From this understanding modernization is simply regarded both linear smooth and consistent instead of complex and contradictory process including paradoxical elements. For instance, assuming that once a society become more and more developed and industrialize, it would become also relatively more similar and produce a certain kind of pattern. Furthermore, behind this position there are history notions of Islamic culture and the West, which postulate unchanging cultural essences for both. At the same time by giving priority to the universal status of modernization, this position does not allow for various conditions of possibility and / or complex processes of its construction; nor possibility of its transformation. According to this view, “a (commonality of ideas and beliefs) characterizes the various manifestations of Islam across time and space” (Atasoy, 1996:11).

It can be easily observed above, the concept of modernization is identified within terms of finite and distinct set of pattern variables. To put it more concretely, as far as the modernization theory is concerned, modernization is (has to be) by definition a ‘secular’; claiming that the higher modernization is occurred, the more secular patterns of behavior more likely to emerge.

Henceforth, providing that in accordance with the predictions of modernization theory, we would simply expect that Islamism, as a regressive/conservative traditionalist plea, gradually lost their effectiveness in political sphere on account of social and economic change development. From this perspective “modernists foresee that with the advent of modernization, the political significance of religion will decrease traditional religious institutions will weaken religious control over society and culture will diminish” (Tür Kavli, 2001:62). Since there is a belief in modernist thinking that economic and social development will accelerate secularization process and increas-

ingly undermine religious-motivated behavior in public sphere and political bases of Islamist movements.

It should be noted that I have also reservations about essentialist understanding of modernization, which reduce modernization into superstructural reforms eventually led to 'secularism'. Within this framework modernization emerges within its sharp form, desancralization. Of course, modernization cause to change some patterns of behavior but that is not to say there would be sharp correlation between modernization and secularization. Modernization is much more complex process through base-structure and superstructure.

For this reason 'further economic development, the foundation of support for the Islamism would collapse', thesis requires an explanation in the case of Turkey. For example, how can the rise of Islamism be explained in political sphere with its total volume from the 1950s by adopting this assumption? On the contrary some modernist authors on Islamism in Turkey continuously insisted its decline. According to Alkan, for instance, the National Salvation Party (NSP) represented 'a stagnant socio-political force' opposed to the 'general trend of secularization in Turkish political life (Alkan, 1984:99-100). Likewise, Toprak argues that the Islamic forces in Turkey 'draw their strength form economic groups at the margins of a rapidly growing industry: the development of the Turkish economy on the other hand, is not in a direction that would lead to an increase in the number or size of such groups. Hence ... a mass political movement based on religious appeals has little chance of success in "modern" Turkey (Toprak, 1981:230).

Insisting the development of capitalism, Yücekök also expect the ideology of Islamism on its way to a decline. "This would occur because capitalism automatically dissolves the traditional world and society becomes more materialistic and secular than previously traditional one" (Yücekök, 1983:51). However capitalism itself has some contradictions in that it would conserve tradition and also religion if they favour free market economy. As we know Third world countries gradually entered in to capitalism, while they preserve some of traditionalist and religious values.

Consequently predictions of modernization theory about purification of Islamism have largely failed when we focus on in the course of modernization of Turkey. Quite the contrary, when the Turkey experienced modernization its wild form of capitalism, Islamism began to rise as a hegemonic ideology. However, the emergency of Islamism should not be understood as a regressive opposition to modernization but articulate itself as an alternative modernization process.

Explicitly, the modernization theory highly caricaturized the portrayal of Islamism as a mere regressive movement that could not be a agent of change and conservative movements, rejecting modernity. "Islamist movements are considered as conservative, regressive solely by virtue of their utilization of religious language in their discourses, whereas, Islamism is a kind of movement aiming to reformulate and regulate modernity by claiming the relevance of the Islamic principles to politics and by appropriate Islamic identity and values to address pressing social issue". (Gülalp, 1992)

The very fundamental Orientalist interpretation handling Islamism in opposition to modernization gives little attention that it could be another alternative modernization

project by adopting itself articulation of modernization process for the sake of Islamic civilization. Islamic resurgence with its modern ideology for in various areas has clearly been proven that it is not simply disaffection with social change brought about by transplantation of certain aspects of modernization. In other words, Islamism could be an agent of change by articulating Islamic principles and capitalist values. When these words being written, a new religious-motivated party has been built AK (Justice and Development Party) party and its leader called him “liberal - conservative” seems to become very popular and hegemonic.

5.2. ISLAMISM AS A CULTURAL RESPONSE TO MODERNIZATION

The arguments about Islamism as a cultural identity response to modernization can be articulated in conservative Islamist discourse are developed in relation with response to the secularism. One of the main objectives of the argumentation is to establish that Islamism emerges because the Turkish state implemented very radical secularist politics inspired by Western driven modernization, which is considerable to be alien to Islamic values.

According to this approach “Islamism exploded on the scene at a moment when the Middle East was undergoing a profound (cultural) identity crisis” (Takeyh, 2001: 97). In this context of arguments, ‘it is the quest for the cultural authenticity of Middle Eastern societies that leads to the revival of Islamist discourse in society. The desire to be independent and to get rid of all the symbols of the West and Western colonization seems to be the explanation given for the growth of Islamist movement” (Larzeg, 1998:48) From the perspective of such an explanation underdevelopment and imperialism become ”cultural invasion”, the Third world becomes the ‘Islamic

World', liberation and independence becomes cultural authenticity" (Al-Azmeh, quoted in Rodenbeck, 1998:178).

For the reductionist approach the first one perceives in Islamism the sign of the persistence of Muslim societies, hence see Islam traditional theocentric conception. The second is that which considers the return to Islam as a recuperation of cultural identity, or perhaps of authenticity obstructed by the political / cultural alienation caused by modernizing state.

Islamism is mostly argued that it is "a reaction to cultural erosion, manifested in what Marx called "timeworn" disguises" (Fisher 1982:101). Fisher quotes with approval, Barrington Moore:

...19th century religious conflict and fanaticism are qualitatively different. They resemble more closely the well-known phenomena of 'nativism'. In many parts of the world, when an established culture was beginning to erode, threatening some of population, people have responded by reaffirming the traditional way of life with increasing and frantic vigour" (Ibid, 107).

From this point of view, Islamism occurs as a consequence of further modernization and it becomes an expression of discontent about the cultural alienation of the modernizing state from the Muslim society. The generation of modernization practices and philosophy in to Muslim societies dominated by modernizing state is conceived as a destructive fact for the Muslim identities. As a corollary, Islamism is coded a nativist response to inclusion in a modernization and its secularized process.

It can be seen from above one that modernization is reduced to secularism and second that secularism in terms that render this, which is specific to the Western experience. To most salient feature, here, is the polemical confrontation over the definitions of secularism, the religious state society.

It can be clearly understood from the claim that “secular” state is culturally alienated from the society and therefore cannot integrate people into its assumption that Islam in some way has to be integrated in to the modernizing ideology of the modern state. This is because it is assumed that successful modernization requires a meaning, and must be culturally homogeneous.

Islam could step in to resolve the (political) problem of cultural alienation of the modernizing state from the society and erosion of indigenous cultural values due to Westernization, by attempting to replace the modernist project in a reactionist manner. In this respect, Islam steps in not a psychological religious but as a political movement challenging the secularized modernizing social and political forces.

According to this view, as modernization began to disturb the traditional institutions and processes of the Turkish modernization, secularizing social project would weaken the strength of Islam. Since Islam, as the principal repository of most cultural elements considered ‘traditional’ in the Turkish society, was seen as being in opposition to scientific rationality, technological progress and even to socio-economic development.

No doubt that the cultural essentialist approach mentioned above put Islam in total rejection of modernization and the revival of Islamic identity and visibility of the ideology of Islamism are interpreted as a reversal of this culturally alienated process through secularization politics.

Furthermore, one of the most serious weaknesses in this perspective is cultural identity crisis. In short, Islamic resurgence is principally a movement of response to cultural crisis. H. Ali İbrahim (Abu-Rabi 1994:21) writes, Islamic resurgence is princi-

pally a movement of cultural crisis and that it is the result of a deep psychological, social, political and civilizational crisis. Inspired from Marxist terminology, it can be said that Islamism is a self-conscious effort to deal with cultural crisis.

Islamism in this view is the last defense, as a cultural response to the process of modernization that contemporary Muslim society resort to in order to transcend internal destruction, loss of identical autonomy, inner unity. Islamism is also thought as a bridge for social / cultural gaps or problems caused by the modern secular state: "In most cases, Islamism is a conscious attempt to contain all contradictions by bypassing them, and is a response to foreign hegemony as well as the failure of the modernizing state internally (Abu-Rabi, 1994:29).

Here, it can be explicitly observed that it is assumed that there is no transition between Islamism and modernization in the cultural sphere. Implicitly, there is an assumption about existing a *suigeneris* Muslim identity / society which is totally alien to modern values. Islamism versus modernity arguments obscures the way in which Islamic texts are subject to adaptation to modernization.

The approach which perceives the emergence of the ideology of Islamism as a problem of cultural identity proposes the solution by emphasizing the authentic Muslim identity and Islamic values. However, the approach neglects other dimensions of modernization, which could be destructive effects on the people/society by oppressing, upsetting, conquering them. For instance, "capitalist development which its complex form and culture of advanced industrial societies, has a direct bearing on the emergence of Islamic resurgence initially at least as a movement of the oppressed" (Amin, 1990:183).

If we focus on solely on the cultural aspects of the modernizing-secular regime, the resolution of the above problem would likely to be Cultural/Islamic unification of the state and society, which is precisely what Islamists claim. However, the resolution of the problem of cultural alienation a concept of homogenous society is employed. In this case, as far as I am concerned, societies at all levels of economy, politics, etc. will be disregarded expect cultural alienation from the modern state.

To put it differently, I believe that the problem of Islamism is not exclusively cultural but economic, political issue could best resolved by political struggle rather than cultural ones.

As already known that Islamist movements stress not their invocation of tradition or of a return to the past in a cultural way but their contemporarily and modernity: there were responses to problems experienced in these societies in the contemporary world not only in the sphere of cultural alienation but also corrupt states, mass unemployment, chaotic urbanization, a sense of external denomination spurious democratic systems (Halliday, 1996:27-39). Thus, it is right to argue that Islamism is not as a response exclusively in terms of cultural alienation's in the form of cultural identity but it deeply embedded in the other experiences of modernization process in all spheres.

It should be noted here that there is no mechanic relationship between secular modernization attempts and cultural response to it in an Islamic way. That is to say, if we bear in mind the fact-secular regimes, the problem of modernization failure turns out to be a question of other spheres like politics, economics rather than cultural alienation.

Besides, the assumption that Islamic cultural response in a consistent and homogenous for in terms of providing authentic meaning to overlap modernization and society without any paradoxes is absolutely weak and misleading. Otherwise, we might consider Islamist movements as the “true” representatives of society.

To put it succinctly, from this perspective modernization fails because the modernizing state is culturally alienated from the society and can not legitimize its own modernization drive by implication, Islamism could be regarded as the reservation of Muslim society vis-à-vis the alienated state. What is assumed in this perspective is that modern societies are culturally homogenous entities, and modernization should provide a proper Islamic understanding to people.

For the present thesis starting point for studying past and current Islamism is not to accept it merely in the framework of cultural response to modernization. Rather, the study concerning the ideology of Islamism centered it in actual political, economic, structural and technological situations. Faced with these contemporary issues the ideology of Islamism struggle in intellectual political and ideological sphere. The cultural alienation thesis, on the other hand, hands the problem by using cultural terms such as identity, alienation that is more concerned modernism not directly modernization. Furthermore, cultural responses, which functions with the notions of ‘cultural absolutism’, reduce the revival of islamism into a fantasy of an essence of authenticity. In this context, Al-Azmeh is surely right when pointing out “there is no essence to Islamism”. In other words, when Islamist articulate their identities, they do so by using different kind of resources, which are not completely intrinsic to the Islamic culture.

If we take a position with anti-reductionist approach then Islamism is nothing more than a construct produced by a variety of articulatory practices. Since “the identity comes from their articulation, and not from their essences” (Sayyid, 1998:378). Given a conclusion, it should be kept in mind that Islamism is less about cultural identity but more with power politics.

5.3. ISLAMISM AS FUNDAMENTALISM

Few concepts have been so intensively and widely discussed in social science literature as that of “fundamentalism”. Much of the reassertion of religion in politics and society has been subsumed under the term “Islamic fundamentalism”. All those who call for a return to foundational beliefs of fundamentals of religion are generally coded/labeled as fundamentalist. The interpretation of fundamentalism tends to reduce the complexity of Islamism into an artificially coherent form of religion-Islam.

In scholarly as well as ordinary usage, “the term has come to refer to any one who insists that all aspects of life, including the social and political should conform to a set of secret scriptures believed to be inerrant and immutable” (Munson, 1988:15). It is in this sense that some intellectuals can speak of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world mostly in pejorative way. Thus, all forms of Islamist movements are reduced to fundamentalist, which is regarded to be a return to the golden age and replicate the past. In a strict sense, for this perspective, “fundamentalism could include all practicing Muslims, who accept the Quran as the literal word of God and *sunnah* (example of) the prophet Muhammed as a normative model for living” (Esposito 1995:17).

Characterizing the Islamic movement or the ideology of Islamism that advocate strictly Islamic states and societies as fundamentalist poses as a number of problems. Accordingly, some intellectuals fear that Islamic resurgence is the most ominous threat of all fundamentalisms. “Some even speak of a “new cold war” with Islamic fundamentalism” (Larson, 1998:11)

For instance, “Huntington alleges that Islamic fundamentalism precipitates violent international conflicts, and he does not make any distinctions between Islam and faith or Islamist ideologies and Islamic fundamentalism” (Kazemzadeh, 1998:52). Therefore, Islamic fundamentalism represents the major threat to western interests in the post-cold war period and this view which studies with the scope of ‘Islamic Threat’ in recent years has placed the focus of the Post-Cold war politics on the cultural clash Western and Islamic civilization.

For the reductionist regard “fundamentalism, thus, appears to be a pathological reaction to the disintegration of community, rupture of tradition, loss of meaning, provoking a return of repressed (Latour, 1991:74).

As far as I am concerned, the term fundamentalism is incapable of grasping the empirical reality of Islamism. As a matter of fact, western scholars have used the term Islamic fundamentalism in the past two decades. However, “Islamic revivalism” or “Islamic activism” are deep-root and can trace back too period long before in the Muslim world. “Islam possess a long tradition of revival and reform which includes notions of political and social activism” (Esposito, 1995:80)

More importantly, the term fundamentalism in the hands of reductionist perspective, in fact, is thoroughly pejorative and non-discerning term putting all Islamic move-

ments into a single basket. The image of fundamentalism is also outcome of Christian presuppositions and western stereotypes, as well as implying monolithic threat (by assuming Islamism as a unique category) that does not exist in reality. As a result, the reductionist usage of fundamentalism concept doesn't allow us to make any comparison between Islamic movements.

Sayyid (1995:16) underlines his refutation of the fundamentalism concept as follows: "My criticism of fundamentalism is based on impossibility of using it as the ground upon which is to carry out a proper comparison among, for example, Likud, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hitbollah and so on". To the extent, the reductionist scholars do not make any distinctions between Islam as a faith or Islamism as a political ideology or Islamic radicalism as extremism. In short, it can be easily said that fundamentalism is generally not used as an analytical category but mostly popular statements.

Besides, the notion of fundamentalism becomes more inaccurate and prevents us from the pursuit of scientific enquiry. In fact, it fails to express the extent of Islamic movements. Since, the ideologies of Islamism are not unique in the Islamic world. The reductionist view of fundamentalist paradigm perceives Islamist movements as comprised of clearly defined and unchanging principles is not feasible inexplicable to the critical study of Islamism. On the other hand, "the term fundamentalism is a misnomer. It is too broad-detonating eighteenth century Wahhabism, Islamic opposition in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Syria, the Algerian FIS and so on" (Ray 1999:205). Therefore, it cannot be applied to all Islamic movements, since they are all regarded by definition as fundamentalists is quite wrong.

Huntington's view of the "clash of civilization" has reinforced the intellectuals to see all Islamist movements as fundamentalism, as an anti-modern return to the past rather than the projection of an alternative Islamic vision for society in political sphere. "The fundamentalist inspiration stems from an idealized or mythical view of the past; and action is then aimed at the re-creation of a golden-age. This may, in turn, engender conservatism and obscurantism. Here, fundamentalism is once again coded as a position of archaic resistant to the forces of progress and is often linked to the claim that fundamentalism and modernization are incommensurable (Burrell, 1989:6). However, Beinin and Stork (1997:67) assert, "The interpretation of fundamentalism is absolutely wrong. Since it does not represent returning the past and fundamentals of the society. On the contrary, Islamism is an answer to the challenge of the Third world's unsuccessful modernization attempts".

On the other hand, the assertion of reviving Islamist movements implicit it in the notion of fundamentalism is questionable because in the past too, the traditions were not unitary. They rather approximate to their contemporary representation. Accordingly, it can be claimed that "radical Islamic movements that derive their rationale from a supposed 'return to the past' are not necessarily anti-modern so much as an expression of modernist nostalgia for a world of tradition, which is, in many ways, its own construct" (Ray, 1999:201).

Needless to say, contrary to the opposite claims, fundamentalism is not specific to Islam/Muslims. "If Islamism is still considered as a fundamentalist (political) movement on the basis of its claims about the fundamentals of society, many secular/modern counterparts (equivalents) of Islamism such as nationalism, which also is about the fundamentals of the society as well, must be considered fundamentalist as

well” (Çinar, 1998:14). As such, fundamentalism is not peculiarity of modernizing Muslim societies. It is visible in both the West and the rest. Thereby, every ideology has ‘fundamentalistic’ inclination because they describe themselves as the reaffirmation of foundational principles and efforts so as to reshape society in terms of reaffirmed fundamentals. This understanding emphasizes the this-worldly orientation of such endeavor; therefore, fundamentalism could not be defined by, in Weber’s terms, an otherworldly orientation in which salvation requires withdrawal from the world affairs. However, Islamisms, which are mostly coded as fundamentalism, are movements in which salvation is possible only through participation in this world. To put it more precisely they move within the institution of this world or the present society. Implicitly, “Islamic (fundamentalist) and political thought is part of a transcultural and multivocal reassessment of the value and relationship to modernity” (Euben, 1997:431). This reassessment should be understood as an aspect of negotiation of modernization that entails preservation, transformation or abolishing it in some aspects. It can be said that if the category of fundamentalism becomes simply a description of strongly held beliefs, then it is clear those even the most radical democrats or liberals have a fundamentalist core. Also, I feel the reductionist term fundamentalism is misleading and thus fails to express the full range of the ideology of Islamism and as have seen the previous chapters throughout in this study, Islamism is perceived as mainly a political phenomena and the term Islamism is preferable in this respect. In other words, in the process of re-narration and re-imagining of the past and present, hybrid ideas and identities are formed of which I have suggested the ideology of Islamism is an example.

On the other hand, the dissertation's refutation of the term 'fundamentalism' does not mean that Islamism is not conservative. The concept of conservatism implies the maintenance of an institutionalized politics. Islamism as a quasi-conservative movement works within the established social order and promotes hierarchical and patriarchal values that reinforces the status quo. In so far as Islamism works within the existing institutions to Islamize society in order to bring about social transformation, that is, a project of construction of the society. Nevertheless, it has some differences from conservatism that sees politics as a means of rescuing (preserving) society from crisis. It has much more similarity with *neo-conservatism*, which is a mode of being both modern and traditional or, to put it another words, neither precisely modern nor traditional. To the extent that "neo-conservatism accepts the need for modern technology, but is likely to be more selective than the modern types in appropriating it, and likely to give it less symbolic, as distinct form functional, value (Shepard, 1987:319). On the other hand, unlike conservatism, Islamism believes that ideas *re-shape* the society and hence wants its ideas to shape the society.

5.4. ISLAMISM AS AN OUTCOME OF MEANING(LESS)NESS PROBLEM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Some interpretations of the revival of the ideology of Islamism/Islamic movements in the Turkish society explain this tremendous revival as regard the failures of modernization by connecting a problematical relation between modernization and Islamism.

In this context, this reductionist view asserts that since the modernizing state fails to submit social ethos to its people in relation to meaning of life in the process of mod-

ernization, the ideology of Islamism emerges in greater resistance. The underlying assumption of this approach is that “secular modernizing state fails to give core values associated with the ultimate meaning of life in the process of modernization” (Mardin 1986:155-156).

From this perspective modernizing regimes are culturally alienated and stayed far from the values of periphery, they could not provide a social ethos that appeals to the hearts as well as the mind of people.

Since studying ‘center-periphery dichotomy’ with special reference to religion, Mardin seems to contemplate that Islamism revitalized as a consequence of further modernization (secularization, which comes from centralized social engineering tasks.) Thus, Islam became an expression of discontent about the alienation of the state from the (Muslim) society:

“Western influence after the *Tanzimat* had considerable impact on the social relations and the life of the governmental elite but it left the culture of local notables and peasants of the periphery largely untouched. Although the distinction between official and folk Islam had been an important part of the cultural divide between the two. This link was broken when increasing dissatisfaction the religious authorities with the secularist trend led many of them to condemn the center while speaking out in favour of the traditional culture of the ‘people’ whose unorthodox Islamic beliefs and practices they had opposed. In the new cultural divide between center and periphery, orthodox Islam found itself on the side of the periphery” (Leder, quoted in Mardin 1986:150).

It can be simply observed that the model of center-periphery is thoroughly composed of religious-based accounting regardless any considerations about social, ethnic, economic, etc., compositions. Because focusing only on the dimension of religiosity by considering the center as secularized and the periphery as a religious one, the center periphery paradigm took precedence politico-cultural over socio-economic issues in the agenda of the State by neglecting the heterogeneity of the periphery. By the way, it is possible to say that the center-periphery paradigm (at least in this form) is not

enough to study any contradictions between the center and periphery (society) about other social issues. However, the basis of distinctions between center and the periphery would be studied in other variables as well. Thus, “the religious institution was on the border line between center and the periphery. During modernization, and because of the secularizing policies of the center, it was increasingly identified with the periphery” (Gibb and Bowen quoted in Akarlı&Ben-Dor, 1975:10-11). For the precise reason, Islam, in turn, is envisaged at the age of the society, and only center is secularized in the process of modernization attempts.

Modernization fails because it could not disseminate/consolidate any social ethos which is expected to replace Islam at the edge of the society, that is, it could not legitimate its own rationality. Therefore, there appears a disjunction between the people and the political center. People ask questions to which Islamic answer seems more convincing.

From the aspect of this reductionist view, Islam provides people a set of meaning for organizing their social and personal life. Here, the role of Islam is defined as a ‘reality construction’. In other words, “there is an objective side to the influence of Islam, which is extremely powerful although difficult to analyze, and this is its ability to marshal a rich store of symbols and way of thinking about society” (Mardin 1986:156).

As it can be explicitly recognized that having been deeply influenced both Durkheimian version of religion concept and Weberian mode of thinking about meaning, this perspective tries to explain the (new) visibility of Islamic revival by referring its ‘cohesive force’ and ‘moral authority’ and/or ‘group solidarity’ aspects. The ap-

proach actually emerges from Weberian view to religion, which functions religious as a meaning to mass.

What is assessed within the framework (of meaning provision) is the modernizing ideology in questions for example Kemalism rather than Islamism. For instance, “Kemalism (modernizing regime) neither had an extensive explanation of how social justice was to be achieved nor did it provide a more general ethical underpinning of society by drawing its social principles out of a credible ideology” (Mardin 1986:158).

Here, modernization is measured within terms of whether it serves meaning / social ethos to the people. Furthermore, successfulness or unsuccessfulness of modernization is simply essentialized meaning (less) ness problem and its consolidation in the society as though all modernizing ideology had to provide meaning to the people to achieve successful establishment.

In addition, Heper underlines that because of the process of Kemalist secularization, the non-religious dimension of people’s life have become increasingly less satisfied; they must have felt the need to complement it with ethical principles that could not be derived from Kemalism.

To the extent, inspired from Weberian approach to religion, which functions religion as a meaning to mass, modernization, in this picture... “Carries with it a conception of a relatively autonomous individual...[who] requires a society in which he feels like a full participation member, whose goals he shares and can meaningfully contribute to and the success of a modernizing society is partly dependent on its success in the field of a meaning and motivation” (Bellah, 1991:73). It can be said that the argu-

mentation limits modernization only whether it establishes/constructs social ethos or not and also it becomes quasi-meaning providing service. Consequently, the approach assumes that modernization/modernizing regimes should provide a set of meaning to the people with which they fully feel participating members and find solutions how to make a proper living.

As a result of the claim mentioned above, it is possible to conclude that Kemalism could not perform as the metaphysical function of a religion, i.e. It provides a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with the ultimate problems in their everyday life. From this perspective while Islam could serve “a social ethos that appeals to the heart as well as the mind of people” (Yavuz, 1997:63), Kemalism fails to do so.

More importantly it can be explicitly observed that here the revival of Islamic sensitiveness is reduced to a specific/limited function of Islam in the Turkish society and further; one aspect of the (new) visibility of Islamic movements is explained by a reversal of the Turkish modernization process which has failed to attain the needs of symbolic meaning word of the Turkish (that is Muslim!) society... Such a revival of Islamic movements counters the destructive tendencies of modernization. Indeed, Islam is constructed, within this perspective, as an ethic meaning-provider is neither political nor ideological entity. Here, “a functional definition of religion is employed and religion, therefore is equated with the political ideologies performing the same function of ‘meaning provision’ (Çınar 1998:54). Thereby, Islamic modernization becomes possible and it can be taken as a soft ideology, which is considered, provide a meaning to life could challenge the current order of the center and becomes closer to the society.

On the other hand, the approach has one more seriously latent reductionist proposition those Islamist movements as the 'true' representatives of society. Because Islam is contemplated as a greater source of values complementing the inadequacy of people/society with the ethical principals/'cognitive map' that has not be provided by Kemalism. Now, Islam could be modernist, but this time it challenges to the state's version of modernization on the grounds of Islamic civilization. In this context, it can be recognized that Islam could step in two different ways as a response to the failure of modernizing ideology to provide a meaning. Firstly, Islam could 'softly' step into redress the balance broken by the overmaterialization and over rationalization of the life by providing a stable refuge. Hence, it has been suggested "psychological and cultural dimensions of the recent visibility of Islam are the most masses from the austerity of modernization" (Heper, 1981:363). Here, a functional definition of religion is employed and religion, therefore, is equated with the political ideologies performing the same function of 'meaning provision'.

Given the conclusion that modernization assumption does not any longer provide a feasible basis for social meaning and people's survival. By contrary Islamism does represent an essential attempt to resolve how to live in a fair world.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Modernization still remains problematic in our present sociality. The argument of this dissertation is that the ideology of Islamism could best be comprehended in relation to socio-economic and political context of the Ottoman sociality in the nineteenth century within which it emerged. A critical analysis of the modernization process is crucial in this regard. By studying the modernization transformation in the Ottoman-Turkish society, one could see the emergency of the Islamist ideology as an important dynamism. An analysis of Islamism in terms of socio-economic conditions and other societal levels could successfully enable us to assess Islamism on more solid grounds beyond conservatism, fundamentalism or *irtica*.

It is possible to say that Islamism is an ideological phenomenon, which does not take place in a vacuum of supernatural religiosity or superstructural sphere. On the contrary, it is very much an aspect of courses of events in modernization process formulated by socio-economic and cultural changes.

On the other hand, in the nineteenth century, Islamism was not a monolithic ideology but rather a complex one within the terms of political activity, forms of / modes of discourse and philosophy. Thus, it is necessary to elaborate the heterogeneity and variety of Islamism in relation to other factors such as the form of state, classes, ethnic groups and so forth. It can be argued that there could be various forms of Islamism in relation to social context. There are also a wide range of use of violent appa-

tus in reconstructing a proper society by virtue of Islamic prepositions in the political sphere.

As far as this is concerned, as a unique path in theory of ideology, Voloshinov's understanding of ideology is the original and core point which does not merely confine ideology in "discourse sphere" nor does perceive ideology as a mechanic reflection of the base structure. In the new definition of ideology, Voloshinov envisages ideology as at the level of signs in the struggle of antagonistic social interests. In addition to that, his materialist theory of ideology rejects the idea of subjectivity (possessed conscious) as the source or origin of discourse. Accordingly, the brand of investigation in Voloshinov's and Pecheux's studies "has opened up a new dimension in a theory of ideology traditionally concerned with consciousness rather than linguistic performance 'ideas' rather than social interaction" (Eagleton, 1991: 196)

The difficulty about ideology is that we have to distinguish three common version of the concept, which are all common in Marxist writings. One is that ideology is conceived as a system of beliefs characterized a 'particular class or group'. In relation to the latter, ideology is envisaged as a system of illusory beliefs-false ideas or false consciousness with pejorative sense, which mask the interests of capitalist class. The last but not least, ideology is the general process of producing meaning and ideas.

In the positive methodology, ideology is not regarded as a tool serving the interest of those in power and to sustain dominant relations but rather as a concept, which belongs to various social groups or classes' worldviews. Finally, it should be noted that ideology is essentially a mechanism, which constructs, 'solves' and 'disperse' our relations with the social reality rather than refracting and distorting it.

As a set of meanings, ideology serves to qualify people to construct or change the sociality. Therefore, it can be said that a study of ideology should involve an analysis of the systems of meanings and signs through which they are expressed. Further, the sign for Voloshinov is always an area of struggle between multiple and intersecting which reflect wider social conflict. To the extent that “the persistence of divergent social interests in class-divided societies guarantees a general struggle of accents in each semantic domain (Gardiner 1992:15).

Once it is understood as an aspect of positive ideology, the ideology of Islamism, like any other ideological positions, should be considered that its functions are conditioned by social surroundings. Hence, Islamist discourse is thoroughly determined by socio-historical conditions of sociality. This framework enables us to interpret the fact that ideology of Islamism and its discourse can be seen as being shaped by the socio-economic context of modernization process of the Ottoman-Turkish society. In effect, Islamism does have a shape and has both influences and being influenced from the occurrences of particular social transformation.

Through such an explanation the ideology of Islamism is dealt with as part of the general process of socio-economic and cultural transformation in the nineteenth century (which is a cumulative of the long period) of the Ottoman Empire. During the course of the nineteenth century, Islamic revivalism/Islamism became the instrument of adaptation as much as a self-preservation and opposition to a certain type of modernization, that is, Westernization. In this sense that I have attempted to show how the features of Islamism, first as object of political discourse and as political actors was intimately bound up with the changing nature of sociality of the Ottoman Turkish. Hence, this study sees Islamist experiences of Ottoman society in the nineteenth

century not as an expression of a revivalist tradition in Islam but the outcome of the process of modernization attempts, which comprised of internal and external dynamics of socio-economic sphere. By implication, because of the transformations in the Ottoman society, which could date back to pre-*tanzimat* period, Islamism became an important political and ideological force.

It has been partially analyzed that 'the first stage' of Islamism throughout the Ottoman –Turkish modernization in the duration of Young Ottomans was formed by a number of socio-economic, political and cultural factors. It would be important to note that the fact that the rise of Islamism was not a reform in Islamic text by emphasizing a return to some true or 'authentic' tradition but a response at the level of peoples as much as intellectuals to the failures of Third World's modernizing attempts in which Muslim populations were 'dispossessed', 'oppressed' or 'overcome'. Islamism became the ideological weapon of the opposition, which perceived these shifts in state structure as the penetration of alien, western economic and political conquest and hegemony in the modernization process have engendered correlative conditions of counter ideology.

Young Ottomans, indeed, looked for a new form of power for the sake of Islamic principles without challenging dominant power relations in modernization (capitalism). They failed to change the ruling system, which maintains existing power relations. They aimed to bring Islamization from the private to the public sphere, without challenging capitalist modernization. It seems possible to claim that Young Ottomans' Islamism had a deliberate intention to restructure the society with a more Islamic flavor by negation shoals of modernization without touching market values, and the other so called western values.

In the case of Young Ottomans, due to the marriage between Islam and the West, Islamism has two faces as Janus, namely conservatism and liberalism. The philosophy of Young Ottomans could be defined as a certain kind of “integrationism”¹, that is, adapting or modernizing tradition, which continues to be articulated in Islamic symbols and terms. In this regard, the resurgence of Islamism could be possible by means of a utilization of symbols that have roots within Islamic tradition. In a similar vein, the past provides a reserve of reference and symbol for the present. Nevertheless, it is difficult to regard Islamism as a movement for a renaissance of Muslim culture/Islamic tradition.

It is possible to say that studies in the last two decades about Ottoman-Turkish modernization have mainly concentrated on micro² analyses of the society. Relationally, they seem to have interpreted modernization as a quasi-changed habitus at the level of superstructure or cultural sphere by, to some extent, neglecting the material determination of this process.

Although Mardin (2001:3) warns us that “when analyzing the course of modernization and social change, it should be regarded both the effect of material determinants and the effect of (changing patterns of) ‘perception’”, he has mainly studied categories of ‘perception’, ‘understanding’ (verstehen) in order to analyze social development and transformation rather than the elements of material aspect. From this point of view, it seems to possible to contend that *Tanzimat* has been hailed as crux or origin of modernization and this is considered as an aspect of changing/changed pat-

¹ I borrowed this term from Malik, J. (1998)

² See for the debates on the distinctions of macro- microanalysis, Mardin, Ş, “Some Thoughts on the Turkish Contemporary Social Sciences” in Bozdoğan, S. and Kasaba, R. 1997 *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: Washington Press).

terns of perception and conception. This approach is to some extent, an outcome of our reflexivity towards modernization as follows: “the fact that we look at ourselves through the way they (the West) look at us and this has been a factor that determined our modernization since *Tanzimat* “(Mardin, 2001:44).

Though the emergency / revivalism of Islamism is mostly named as an axial mode of cultural identity discourse and ‘authenticity’ or as a moral probity, it has been pointed out that its historical practice has demonstrated the problems of modernization to the present and the future. Islamism does not provide a solution to the cultural identity, however it is much more concerned with power politics. Identity is a very complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced for one dimension, in fact fixing it whether in a restricted view of Islam or culture, or ethnicity is one of the major problems in our contemporary society.

Thereby, authentication involves a reference to present social events. Furthermore, ‘naming is not an innocent activity, but lies at the very heart of ideology, one of whose principal mechanism is the operation of classificatory tokens that determine the memberships of sociopolitical groups (Al-Azmeh, 1997: 50). This operation also entails exclusions and inclusions, placements and displacements. Therefore it can be concluded that it has become impossible to speak with a reference to Western notion or present social categories.

Accordingly, no one could be more resolute on the Islamism whose connectional vehicles and roots lie in religious context or superstructural pool. This study has preferred the categories of ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamists’ rather than ‘fundamentalism’, ‘*ir-tica*’, and ‘fundamentalist’ in order to refer to those Muslims who adopt.

Anything, actually, can emerge from the Pandora's box except that struggles by "words" for the purpose of political power to remake society in accordance with its own image. One of the main arguments of the thesis is that it is wrong to regard that modernization and Islamism engage in a deadly struggle with each other by ignoring the impact of internal and external factors of modernization that created the social and economic environment in which Islamism operated.



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