

**ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN ANATOLIA AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC,
1918-1923**

123030

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

123030

BY

NESİM ŐEKER

**T.C. YUKSEKÖĖRETİM KURULU
DOKÜMANTASYON MERKEZİ**


**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY


JANUARY 2002

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences




Prof. Dr. Bahattin Akşit
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Prof. Dr. Seçil Karal Akgün
Head of the Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Prof. Dr. Uygur Kocabaşođlu
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members


Prof. Dr. Uygur Kocabaşođlu

Prof. Dr. Seçil Karal Akgün

Prof. Dr. Özer Ergenç

Assist. Prof. Ceylan Tokluođlu

Assist. Prof. Neşe Özden



ABSTRACT

ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN ANATOLIA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, 1918-1923

ŞEKER, NESİM

Ph. D., Department of History

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Uygur Kocabaşođlu

January 2002, 376 pages

The topic of this dissertation is ethnic conflicts in Anatolia during the last phase of transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic between 1918 and 1923. It deals with historical roots of these conflicts, socio-political circumstances which led their emergence in the aftermath of the First World War, emergence of the Turkish nationalist movement and ethnic military confrontations between 1920 and 1922 in Anatolia. The dissertation attempts to highlight the role of ethnic conflicts in the establishment of the Turkish Republic so as to clarify the basis upon which it was founded in 1923.

Keywords: Anatolia, ethnic conflict, Muslims-Turks, Turkish nationalist movement, Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, Allied Powers.

ÖZ

ANADOLU'DA ETNİK ÇATIŞMALAR VE TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ'NİN KURULUŞU, 1918-1923

ŞEKER, NESİM

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Uygur Kocabaşođlu

Ocak, 2002, 376 sayfa

Bu tezin konusu, Osmanlı İmparatorluđu'ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne geçişin son aşaması olan 1918-1923 yılları arasında Anadolu'da yaşanan etnik çatışmalardır. Tez, ana temalar olarak, söz konusu çatışmaların tarihsel temellerini, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında bu tür çatışmaları ortaya çıkaran sosyo-politik şartları, Türk milliyetçi hareketini ve 1920-1922 yılları arasındaki etnik silahlı çatışmaları ele almaktadır. Bu tez, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşunda etnik çatışmaların rolünü ortaya koymaya ve böylece, 1923'de kurulan Cumhuriyetin kuruluş temellerini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Anadolu, etnik çatışma, Müslümanlar-Türkler, Türk milliyetçi hareketi, Rumlar, Ermeniler, Kürtler, İtilaf Devletleri.



Tümay'a

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Dr. Uygur Kocabaşođlu and Prof. Dr. Seçil Karal Akgün, both members of the Department of History at Middle East Technical University, for reading the earliest and final versions of the text. Their comments and suggestions contributed much in the completion of this dissertation. My sincere gratitude goes to Prof. Dr. Erik Jan Zürcher, Chair of the Turkish Studies at Leiden University in the Netherlands, who worked to provide me deep insight toward the topic. For this end, he was not contented with exhibiting honestly his point of view and directing toward sources but also encouraged me to organize a workshop to discuss my topic with prominent scholars during my stay in Leiden. At this workshop, I found the opportunity to discuss with Prof. Dr. Fikret Adanır, Prof. Dr. Martin van Bruinessen, Dr. Hamit Bozarslan, Dr. Touraj Atabaki, Dr. Taner Akçam and Hilmar Kaiser to whom I indebted much in forming the framework of this study. Thanks goes to them.

I have been to Leiden for nine months to complete this study. This was provided by financial support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA). I thank to the directors of TÜBA and also to the working staff for their very important contribution to this study. Besides that I would like to thank to the staff of the

following: the library of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, library of Turkish-American Association, archives of the General Staff, Institute of the Turkish Revolution and Republic.

There was only a person, Tümay, who felt all troubles of this dissertation. For this and as an expression of my love, I dedicate this study to her.



PREFACE

The author of this study felt the vital importance of ethnic issues in the formation of the Turkish nation-state when he wrote his MA thesis on Turco-Greek exchange of populations. This exchange, which was the first example in history for the resolution of an ethnic conflict through compulsory dislocation of populations, drew his attention to other conflicts in Anatolia during the transition from Empire into nation-state polity in Turkey. He could have considered only a case of such conflicts; however, such method would not be explanatory enough in understanding ethno-religious transformation of Turkey. In addition, considering all major conflicts together would prove the fact that conflicts of this period was not restricted to Muslim-Christian ones. Furthermore, this would shed light on the Turco-Kurdish conflict of the Republican period, which in the last two decades took a form of ethnic conflict that reminds conflicts of the transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic. All these cannot be explained without focusing on the roots of the Turkish Republic and these roots can probably best be traced in ethnic conflicts in Anatolia between 1914-1923.

There are abound materials, published and unpublished, dealing with ethnic issues in the early Twentieth century in Turkey. The most important task was to

evaluate such materials according to their degree of objectivity –I hope I was successful in that- since they are very open to distortion as well as exaggeration of events and numbers. This study was based on foreign and native, published and unpublished, first hand documents and contemporaneous journals such as papers – mostly published in Istanbul. The author of this study worked at the archives of the General Staff (ATASE), the Institute of Turkish Revolution (TITE) and the Republic (BCA). He had the opportunity to see documents of the US Department of State at the Library of Turkish-American Association in Ankara. The British documents was usually followed through published First Series papers of the Foreign Office (BDFP), which was edited by Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury with other contributors. Apart from these, he worked at the library of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, National library, library of Turkish Historical Society, library of International Court of Justice in the Hague (Netherlands) and university libraries such as of the Middle East Technical University, Bilkent University in Ankara; Leiden University and University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|------|
| ABSTRACT | iii |
| ÖZ | iv |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | vi |
| PREFACE | viii |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | x |
| CHAPTER | |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 2. NATIONALITY ISSUES CONFRONTING THE UNIONISTS, 1913-1918 | 16 |
| 2. 1. The Change of Ruling Ideology and the Nationality Question in the Ottoman Empire: From Ottomanism to Turkish Nationalism | 16 |
| 2.2. Turkish Nationalism and the CUP | 18 |
| 2.3. The Contribution of Ziya Gökalp: Basing the State on One Nation | 23 |
| 2. 4. The Resolution of the Nationality Question: The Ethnic Restructuring of Anatolia | 25 |
| 2.4.1. Boycotting the Greeks, 1913-1914 | 26 |

| | |
|---|----|
| 2.4.2. The Land of the Uprooted Peoples: Anatolia During the First World War | 32 |
| 2.4.2.1. The Armenian Question as a Case Study within Ethnic Conflicts in Anatolia | 32 |
| 2.4.2.2. The Settlement of Muslim Refugees: The Kurdish Case | 49 |
| | |
| 3. THE REVIVAL OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN ANATOLIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR | 52 |
| | |
| 3. 1. Laying the Foundations of Conflicts: Socio-Political Circumstances in the Early Armistice Period (November 1918-May 1919) | 54 |
| 3. 1. 1. The Allied Powers, the Greeks and the the Armenians | 54 |
| 3. 1. 2. A Search for Identity: The Ottoman Public between neo-Ottomanism and Turkish Nationalism ... | 63 |
| 3.1.3. The Repatriation of the Greeks and the Armenians | 68 |
| 3.1.4. The Trials of the Unionists | 74 |
| 3.1.5. The Emergence of the Turkish Resistance | 81 |
| 3.1.5.1. Early Turkish Resistance in Kars and Trans-Caucasia: From Muslim Councils to the Provisional National Government of the South- western Caucasus | 83 |
| 3.1.5.2. Turkish Resistance in the Six Provinces | 90 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 3.1.5.2.1. Kurdish Nationalism during the Early Armistice Period | 92 |
| 3.1.5.3. The Formation of the Turkish Resistance at the Black Sea Coast | 97 |
| 3.1.5.4. Turkish Resistance in Izmir | 99 |
| 3.1.6. Ethnic Groups (Greeks, Armenians and Kurds) at the Paris Peace Conference | 103 |
| 3.1.6.1. Territorial Claims of Greece in Anatolia | 104 |
| 3.1.6.2. Armenian Question at the Peace Conference | 107 |
| 3.1.6.3. Claims of the Pontine Greeks | 111 |
| 3.1.6.4. Kurdish Claims | 113 |
| 4. TURKISH NATIONALISTS ON THE SCENE | 118 |
| 4.1. The Landing of the Greek Troops into Izmir and Its Aftermath | 118 |
| 4.2. Turkish Reaction | 124 |
| 4.2.1. Attempts to Organize a United Turkish Nationalist Movement | 128 |
| 4.2.1.1. The Army Takes the Conduct of the Turkish Nationalist Movement | 128 |
| 4.2.1.2. The Attempts of Mustafa Kemal to Incorporate the Kurds into the Turkish Nationalist Movement | 132 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 4.2.1.3. The Unification of the Nationalist Resistance Organizations: The Formation of the Society for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Thrace | 137 |
| 4.2.1.3.1. The Erzurum and Sivas Congresses | 139 |
| 4.2.1.4. Preparing for Armed Conflict in the South: The Formation of the Turkish Nationalist Resistance in Cilicia | 142 |
| 4.2.1.5. The Incorporation of the Turkish Nationalist Resistance in the West into the Society of Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Thrace | 145 |
| 4.3. Turkish Nationalists' Quest for Legitimacy: The 1919 Elections | 151 |
| 4.3.1. The Last Ottoman Parliament | 160 |
| 4.4. The Question of Peace With the Ottoman State | 166 |
| 4.4.1. The Ottoman Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference | 167 |
| 4.4.2. The Formation of Investigation Commissions ... | 170 |
| 4.4.2.1. The King-Crane Commission | 170 |
| 4.4.2.2. The American Military Mission (Harbord Mission) Investigating Anatolia and Trans-Caucasia | 173 |
| 4.4.3. The Shaping of the Peace Treaty with the Ottoman State | 179 |
| 4.4.3.1. The London and san Remo Conferences | |

| | |
|---|------------|
| (February-April 1920): The Conclusion of the Settlement of the Ottoman Lands | 184 |
| 5. TOWARDS THE END: COMPETING NATIONALISMS IN ARMED CONFLICTS, 1920-1922 | 191 |
| 5.1. Turco-Armenian Conflict in Cilicia | 191 |
| 5.1.1. French Quest for Negotiations with the Nationalists | 194 |
| 5.1.2. The Maraş Incident and the French Withdrawal from Cilicia and Vicinity | 196 |
| 5.1.3. Turco-French Negotiations: The End of the Armenian Cause in Cilicia | 208 |
| 5.2. The Turco-Armenian War in the East | 214 |
| 5.2.1. The Turkish Nationalists Appeal for Alliance with the Bolsheviks | 216 |
| 5.2.2. The Turkish Army Attacks the Armenians: The Elimination of the Armenian Cause in the Eastern Provinces | 226 |
| 5.3. Turkish Nationalists and the Kurds: Cooperation and Conflict | 232 |
| 5.3.1. The Koçgiri Rebellion | 238 |
| 5.4. Turco-Greek Conflict | 247 |
| 5.4.1. An Overview of the Situation at the Black Sea Coast in 1919-1920 | 247 |
| 5.4.2. The Greek Army in the Interior of Anatolia ... | 252 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 5.4.3. The Elimination of the Pontus Cause | 257 |
| 5.4.3.1. Early Preparations of the Turkish Nationalists | 257 |
| 5.4.3.2. The Deportation of the Pontine Greeks | 258 |
| 5.4.4. Turco-Greek Conflict in Western Anatolia ... | 265 |
| 5.5. The Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Anatolia: The Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923 | 276 |
| 5.5.1. The Resolution of the Turco-Greek Conflict: The Exchange of Populations between Turkey and Greece | 276 |
| 5.5.2. The Armenian Question at the Lausanne Peace Conference | 282 |
| 5.5.3. The Protection of Minorities and the Kurds | 286 |
| 6. CONCLUSION | 289 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 293 |
| APPENDICES | |
| A. A Memorandum Presented by a Kurdish Delegation to the Acting Commissioner of the United States, 25 March 1919 | 325 |
| B. Telegram of Süreyya Bedirhan to the American Minister of Foreign Affairs | 333 |
| C. Kurdo-Armenian Accord, 20 November 1921 | 334 |
| D. Şerif Paşa's Letter to Clemenceau, 25 November 1919 | 335 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| E. Some Documents on the Cilician Question Exhibiting the Armenian Point of View | 337 |
| F. Boghos Nubar's Letter to John A. Shishmanian | 354 |
| G. Decision of the Council Ministers of Anakara for the Deportation of Greeks from the Black Sea Coast to the Interior, 12 June 1921 | 355 |
| H. Özet | 359 |
| VITA | 375 |



ABBREVIATIONS

A. Ö. A. S.: *Atatürk Özel Arşivinden Seçmeler*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1981-1996.

ATASE: T. C. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi, Ankara.

B. C. A.: Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Ankara.

Department of State: [United States] Records of Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1910-1929, Record Group 59, the American Library, Ankara.

D. B. F. P.: *Documents on British Foreign Policy*. Ed. By Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, et.al First series. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947-1972.

H. T. V. D.: Harp Vesikaları Dergisi. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi.

M. A. Z. C.: *Meclisi Âyan Zabıt Ceridesi*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1990-1991.

M. M. Z. C.: *Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992.

The Paris Peace Conference: *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States The Paris Peace Conference 1919*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942-1947.

T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.: *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Gizli Celse Zabıtları*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985.

T. B. M. M. Z. C.: *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi*. Ankara. T. B. M. M. Matbaası, 1959-1960.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Scholars of Modern Turkish History are very familiar with a particular period known as *Millî Mücadele* (the National Struggle) or *Türk İstiklâl Savaşı* (the Turkish War of Independence) referring to the years between 1918 and 1923. In fact, this period is important as it was the transition period from the empire (Ottoman) into nation-state (Turkish Republic) polity in Turkey. The period signifies the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of nation-states on territories it comprised of. It was, however, the Turkish nation-state which was immediately founded in 1923 on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the study of this period gives substantial clues concerning the developments leading to the foundation of the Turkish Republic. For these and other reasons, this period attracted the attention of many Turkish and foreign historians. Consequently, innumerable studies, dealing with various aspects of this period, have been published.

Most historians dealing with the transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic are in agreement that the founding of the Turkish nation-state was

secured by an independence war fought against the Allied Powers; namely, Great Britain, France and Italy. It is usually claimed that these powers intended to divide ethnically what was left of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War, to create economic and political spheres of influence for their interests. This claim, which may be labeled partition paradigm, stems mainly from the policies of Great Powers pursued toward the Ottoman Empire, since the last quarter of the Nineteenth century. The intention of the Great Powers was materialized in the four Secret Treaties during the First World War. These treaties re-mapped on paper the Ottoman territories by dividing them into the anticipated spheres of influence.¹ As a result, the period after the end of the war, which brought about the occupation of some remaining parts of the Empire by the Allied Powers, claimed to be the products of the secret treaties. In other words, the ambitions of the Great Powers to divide the Ottoman territories continued in the aftermath of the First World War. In order to prevent this, the Turks were organized under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and fought a war of independence against these powers. As this war concluded with the Turkish victory, the official foundation of the Turkish Republic was secured.

This frequently idealized approach to the establishment of the Turkish Republic which is highly influential especially in Turkish historiography, disregards a very

¹Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey A Diplomatic History 1913-1923*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966,) pp. 181-187.

important aspect. This is the role of the nationality issue inherited from the Nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. This pertinent issue is often overlooked as it is reduced to be a creation of Great Powers' politics. As a result, the development of nationalism among the ethnic and national elements of the Empire has been viewed as the production of imperialist powers in order to intervene with the Ottoman internal affairs and the concerning elements have been regarded as the instruments to this end.² Such an approach fails to assess the changing socio-political circumstances which emerged after the end of the First World War. Therefore, the framework suggested by the defenders of the partition paradigm for the study of the transition gives only partial account of the period.

It is not the assertion of the author of this study that the Great Powers did not play a role in the Ottoman affairs, particularly, in the questions emanated from the development of nationalism among the subjects. In this respect, their role cannot be underestimated. The question is whether the pre and after war policies of the Great Powers towards the subjects of the Ottoman Empire can satisfactorily explain the early Twentieth century ethnic and national issues of Turkey, with their impacts on the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The reply is no. For this reason, this study reconsiders the period of transition from the Empire into the Republic in the light of

²For example, Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1993).

foreign and internal developments. It argues that this transition was essentially characterized by ethnic conflicts in which most of ethno-religious and national elements of Anatolia were involved while the international powers were merely actors and that the resolution of these conflicts, in favor of the Muslims-Turks secured the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.³

It should be pointed out that debates on ethnic conflict is still a recent phenomenon. The collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic and the disintegration of Yugoslavia at the end of the Twentieth century; also many other ethno-religious conflicts in several parts of the world, lead social scientists to focus on this issue. The cases they take into consideration for ethnic conflicts are mostly current. However, the existence of this phenomenon can be traced back in history, especially to the early Twentieth century, which marked the fall of empires. Then, “ethnic sentiments have been supported by the diffusion of the doctrine of national self-determination”⁴ which contributed to internal ethnic and religious conflict and war. The case of the Ottoman Empire was not an exception in this respect. Its social, political and economic

³The cases of ethnic conflicts considered through this dissertation was evaluated as resistance to the formation of Turkish nation-state in an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation which is actually one of the exceptional studies in evaluating ethnic issues of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods --together with other forms of opposition to the formation of the Turkish nation-state- through solid theoretical and concrete evidences. Ceylan Tokluoğlu, *The Formation of the Turkish Nation-State and Resistance*, (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1995).

⁴Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p. 4; Richard H. Shultz Jr., “State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis,” EBSCOHOST, item no. 9509071270, p. 4.

situation and feasibility to foreign influence in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, formed the suitable environment for the rise and development of ethnic conflicts in the Empire.

Therefore, the origins of ethnic conflicts of the period between the First World War and the foundation of the Turkish Republic can be traced back to the Nineteenth century when the Ottoman traditional *millet* system, lost its effect and nationalism influenced the Empire's non-Muslims.⁵ When an inclusive Ottoman citizenship which was promoted to integrate all subjects of the Empire proved to be ineffective, the disintegration of the Empire continued, as the seeds of ethnic conflicts were planted. Disintegrating Ottoman Empire was not able to cope with spreading nationalism among its subjects.⁶

⁵It was the *millet* system which had provided the non-Muslim elements with a high degree autonomy in their relations to the Ottoman state with regards to their internal affairs. The dissolution of this system along with the socio-political and cultural transformation of the Ottoman state facilitated the emergence of nationalisms based on ethnic identity in the Ottoman Empire. See Kemal H. Karpat, "Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the post-Ottoman Era," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), (New York: Holmes&Meier Publishers, 1982), pp. 141-169; *idem.*, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1973). The Kurds, a Muslim subject, had also enjoyed a semi-independent, autonomous administration under Kurdish rulers in control of their emirates for hundreds of years, until the nineteenth century. Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*. (London: Zed Books, 1992), p. 136. The administrative reforms aiming at the establishment of the central authority in the provinces resulted in the elimination of the Kurdish emirates. It is usually suggested that the destruction of the emirates caused the emergence of the first political movements among the Kurds which eventually evolve into nationalist movement. Wadie Jwadih, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development*, Ph. D thesis, (Syracuse University, 1960), pp. iv-v.

⁶Contemporaneous authors argue that multiethnic states in general have not managed to integrate ethnic groups. Ethnic and religious groups usually reject inclusive notions of nationalism in which they see threats to their own identity. In consequence, ethnic identity persists as a political force and eventually cause of violent conflict and internal war. Shultz, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Besides the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and spreading nationalism among the Christians, there were other accompanying –and equally important- factors for the rise of ethnic conflicts in Anatolia. To begin with, in the second half of the Nineteenth century, particularly after the Turco-Russian War of 1878, Anatolia hosted hundreds of thousand Muslim refugees from the Caucasus. These refugees did not only change the ethnic, religious and social composition of Anatolia,⁷ but also played a vital role in the intellectual and political development of Muslim/Turkish nationalism. While some leading figures; for example, Yusuf Akçura, systematized the idea of Turkism through his booklet *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Politics),⁸ the massive refugees increased the Muslim population of the Empire. They also secured to provide a popular base for the development of a Muslim/Turkish nationalism, and fortified nationalist feelings among the Muslims.⁹ In addition, the settlement method of these refugees contributed to the rise of ethnic tension, especially in Eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman government in this method favored a policy of dispersing Muslim refugees among the Christian population, among the Armenians in the east and the Greeks in the west, in order to cope with their nationalism.¹⁰

⁷Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 61.

⁸Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991); François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, translated by Alev Er, (İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları, 1986).

⁹David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 10.

¹⁰The number of Muslim refugees arriving Anatolia in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century has been estimated in millions. For the Muslim immigration into Anatolia see Justin McCarthy, *Death and*

Another factor which contributed to the formation of ethnic conflicts in Anatolia was the policies of the Great Powers. Their intervention policy exploiting the nationalist feelings of the Christian subjects, particularly the Armenians, to the point of exerting political influence on Ottoman internal affairs, caused the Ottoman statesmen to perceive their Christian subjects as fifth-column or internal enemy. This perception became dominant when Turkish nationalism rose into political arena following 1913 and especially during the armistice period. As a result, the policies of the Great Powers contributed to the formation of hostilities among Muslims and non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire as well as between the Christians and the State.

Finally, there was economic aspect as a contributory factor to ethnic conflicts in Anatolia. *Tanzimat* reforms had brought about the superiority of non-Muslims in economics while Muslims were generally occupied in administration and military. When the Unionists were determined to change this division of labor in favor of Muslims, especially, after 1913, they attempted to end the economic superiority of the Christian Ottomans, the Greeks and Armenians. In consequence, economic factor accompanied political in directing Muslim reaction towards the Greeks and the Armenians during and after the First World War.

Exile The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922, (New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1995); Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, pp. 60-77; for settlement policy Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi), 1994, pp. 155-159; 173-214; for the population estimations of Anatolia in the concerning period see Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, (New York: New York University Press, 1983).

All above noted factors took ethnic conflicts in Anatolia from their incipient stages to their open forms and, eventually, to the points of no return.¹¹ The last development took place during the First World War when the leading members of the Ottoman government, the Unionists, appealed to “demographic engineering” to resolve nationality issues in the Ottoman Empire. Demographic engineering is an attempt to

“increase the economic and political power of an ethnic group *relative to* others, and the method by which this is achieved entails the increase in the size of one population relative to others.”¹²

The methods of demographic engineering as a means of the resolution of ethnic conflict may vary; for example, “pronatalist” policies, population resettlements, religious and linguistic conversions, immigration policies are amongst the ways of manipulating demographic characteristics of a region or a country by the leaders of ethnic groups. In addition, demographic composition of a region or a country may be changed through assimilation, deportation or boundary alterations.¹³

¹¹I borrowed the stages of an ethnic conflict, which is reasonably applicable to the Ottoman case, from Victor T. Le Vine, a professor of political science at Washington University. He argues that at the incipient stage of ethnic conflicts the parties begin to come forward into the political arena and define the stakes involved. At this stage, conflicts are at manageable levels and parties can abstain the use of violence (Ottoman Empire between 1839-1880’s). The second stage is the open one when the parties are in active, visible contention in institutional or non-institutional arena (Ottoman Empire in 1880’s-1913, particularly the case of the Armenians in 1890’s). The third stage is when the conflicts are out of control. The characteristic of this stage is the escalation of violence (Ottoman Empire in 1914-1922). Victor T. Le Vine, “Conceptualizing ‘Ethnicity’ and ‘Ethnic Conflict’: A Controversy Revisited,” EBSCOHOST, item no. 310379, pp. 10-11.

¹²Milica Zarkovic Bookman, *The Demographic Struggle for Power The Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 1.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 2-3. For an assessment of methods of ethnic conflict resolution see John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict,” in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, edited by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 4-40.

Deportation and settlement policies were actually the principal instruments of the Unionists in resolving ethnicity issues in the Ottoman Empire. By deporting the Christian elements, the Greeks from the Aegean coast in 1914 and the Armenians from Eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916; and by dispersing Muslim refugees including those from the Balkans and the Kurds escaping from the Russian invasion of Eastern Anatolia, among the Turks¹⁴ they aimed to change demographic composition of Anatolia by forming manageable minorities. Needless to say, these developments were accompanied by wide use of violence by all groups involved in ethnic conflicts.

The policy of demographic engineering of the Unionists proved to be effective during the First World War; however, it had not yet been completed when the Ottoman Empire was totally defeated at the end of 1918. In the prevailing situation of the post-war period, the principle of self-determination, which had been already diffused among the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians was supported by the Allied Powers and influenced some of the Muslims, with the Kurds to a less degree. The Greeks and the Armenians demanded secession from the Ottoman Empire and claimed a specific piece of territory in Anatolia. They resorted to violence in order to accomplish the political hegemony of territories claimed; the Greeks in western Anatolia and the Armenians, in Eastern Anatolia and Cilicia. Moreover, they attempted to reverse demographic engineering

¹⁴A recently published study gives an interesting detailed account of the Unionist policy for the resettlement of Muslim refugees. Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913-1918)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

policy of the Unionists through forcing the Muslims to emigrate. They designed to settle the Greeks and Armenians in order to acquire Christian majority in claimed territories. The Muslim-Turkish resistance, which would develop into a unified and organized Turkish nationalist movement, emerged to prevent any cession of territory by the Greeks and the Armenians under the protection of the Allied Powers; it also diverted to preserve the recently acquired demographic structure of Anatolia.

Under these circumstances, the transition period from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic was characterized by ethnic conflicts in Anatolia which were essentially the continuation of the conflicts of the war period. Ethnic groups were in conflict due to their nationalist projects on overlapping territory which was Anatolia. The policy of Allied Powers favoring restructuring of Anatolia on ethnic basis contributed much to these conflicts. The Greek and the Armenian territorial claims were conflicted with those of the Muslim-Turkish especially, the Armenians' clashed with the Kurds' in Eastern Anatolia.

On the other hand, the Turkish nationalists rejected all kinds of territorial demand by ethnic groups rather than the Turks and refused the re-mapping of Anatolia along ethnic basis. In other words, the prevention of the division of Anatolia was the primary objective of the Turkish nationalists. To be successful, they had to struggle with the Greeks and the Armenians, and, if necessary, with the Kurds, more than the Allied Powers which usually remained on diplomatic scene and gave spiritual support and

protection to the Greeks and the Armenians. Actually, the Turkish nationalists had been aware of this fact before they began to organize the nationalist movement. For example, Kâzım Karabekir, who was the main figure in organizing the Turkish resistance in Eastern Anatolia, noted in his memoirs that he told Mustafa Kemal in a meeting in İstanbul that the Allied Powers could not intervene militarily and that the only resolution was to fight with the Armenians and the Greeks; after defeating the Armenians in the east, it would be possible to face the Greeks in the west.¹⁵

Reconsidering the reasons for the emergence of the Turkish nationalist movement and military confrontations between 1919-1922 in Anatolia, it is possible to argue that the *raison d'être* of this movement was the threats coming from the Greeks and the Armenians. As a matter of fact, the local resistance movements which made up the nucleus of the Turkish nationalist movement were initially formed in regions where such threats were obvious. The concentration of military power was respectively in eastern, western and southern Anatolia under Armenian and Greek threats. In addition, the main purpose of the establishment of the exclusive Central Army (Merkez Ordusu) at the end of 1920 was to eliminate the Greek nationalist activities in the Black Sea region.

During the process of its development, the Turkish nationalist movement was Muslim in character. It aimed to unify the Muslims of Anatolia against Christian threat

¹⁵Kâzım Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimizin Esasları*, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995), pp. 39-40.

in the framework of “Muslim nationalism”¹⁶ as it pacified the nationalist elements among the Muslims, particularly the Kurds. Although the nationalist leaders achieved to gain the support of the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia where Kurdo-Armenian conflict had actually continued since the second half of the Nineteenth century, they were seriously opposed to by nationalist Kurds, demanding autonomy and/or independence. When such demands took the form of uprisings against the nationalist movement, the nationalists did not hesitate to resort to arms.

Under the light of these facts, the Turkish nationalist movement was organized to suppress any political claim originated from ethnic nationalism in Anatolia, by means of which the integrity of the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire could be preserved. For this region, the major military confrontations between 1919-1922 took place in southern (Turco-Armenian), eastern (Turco-Armenian), northern (Turco-Pontine Greek) and western Anatolia (Turco-Greek) as well as in the Central where the Kurds rebelled for autonomy. The foundation of independent Turkish nation-state based on popular sovereignty as it was claimed by Mustafa Kemal,¹⁷ the leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, therefore, essentially depended on suppressing “other” nationalisms.

¹⁶“Muslim nationalism” refers to predominant focus on Ottoman Muslim identity in terminology used by the leaders of the Turkish resistance movement. Erik Jan Zürcher, “The vocabulary of Muslim nationalism,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 137 (1999), p. 90 (offprint copy). Zürcher emphasizes that the Turkish resistance movement had in fact a political character rather than religious “but the group identity on which it based itself was defined primarily in religious terms.”

¹⁷Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, vol. I, (İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1961), p. 12.

In accordance with the above presented analytic framework, this study evaluates the last stage of transition period from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic. To reiterate, its main argument is that this transition was characterized by ethnic conflicts in Anatolia in that the struggles of this period took place among the locals with nationalist purposes more than among the imperialists and the anti-imperialist forces. In connection with the previous argument, this study claims that suppressing “other” nationalisms secured the foundation of the Turkish nation-state in 1923. This is well-proved by the demographic composition that Anatolia took at the end of conflicts.

The second chapter of this study deals with the nationality policy of the Unionists after 1913 when Turkish nationalism rose clearly into political arena. It is argued this development was a turning point for the ethnic conflicts in the Ottoman Empire in that, integrative policy of Ottomanism was replaced by exclusive Turkish nationalism. This policy is tested through the Greek and Armenian cases between 1913-1916 as well as by the settlement of Muslim refugees in the Kurdish case during the First World War. These cases exhibit Unionist demographic engineering policy which, by the end of the First World War in 1918, brought ethnic conflicts into point of no return.

Chapter III takes up the socio-political circumstances in the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the end of the war (the end of 1918 and the spring of 1919) with the purpose of presenting the foundations of ethnic conflicts in Anatolia following the-war. During this period, occupation of some parts of Anatolia by the Allied Powers was

accompanied by the idea of restructuring of the Ottoman territories along ethnic basis in accordance with the principle of self-determination as well as by conflicting nationalist claims of ethnic groups seeking the support of the Allied Powers. In addition, benefiting from the occupation of the Allied Powers, the Greeks and the Armenians attempted to reverse the demographic composition of claimed territories by resorting to violence, forcing the Muslims' to emigrate and repatriating their compatriots. Against the nationalist claims and ill-treatments of the Greeks and the Armenians, local Muslim resistance organizations were formed. As a result, ethnic tension which had already existed due to the wartime events caused polarization among Christians and Muslims.

Chapter IV describes the development of Turkish nationalist opposition, rejecting ethnic restructuring of the Ottoman territories, into a unified and organized movement. During this process, the Turkish nationalist leaders followed an integrative policy of unifying all Muslims, particularly the Kurds (since the nationalist Kurds claimed at least autonomy on ethnic basis) regardless of ethnic affiliation, with the purpose of mobilizing them against the Greek and Armenian threats. In consequence, the Turkish nationalist movement was organized in Islamic framework and gained its legitimacy as an Islamic movement as was indicated by the composition of the last Ottoman Parliament which reopened following the 1919 elections.

Chapter V gives ethnic military confrontations in Anatolia between 1920-1922. It exhibits the Turco-Armenian struggles in Cilicia and Trans-Caucasia; the Turco-Greek

conflicts in the north-eastern and western Anatolia and the Turco-Kurdish conflict in the Central Anatolia. Managed to overcome their opponents in these conflicts, eliminating the Armenian and Greek claims and suppressing Kurdish nationalist demands on military field, the Turkish nationalists were invited to peace negotiations which were to be held at Lausanne. The period between military conflicts and the conclusion of peace was the last stage of demographic restructuring of Anatolia on nationalist basis

It should be pointed out that through all chapters foreign developments with regards to the position of the Allied Powers in the formation of the Ottoman peace treaty and, then, with the Turkish nationalists, are considered through changing political circumstances. The observation of the author of this study is that the efforts of the Allied Powers, particularly of Great Britain, though sympathetic to the Greek and Armenian political claims, did not pass beyond oral commitments. For example, they did not take military action for the sake of Christians when they felt that they were threatened by the Turkish nationalists or when the establishment of an Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia was considered. On the contrary, the Allied Powers, particularly France and Italy, searched for the negotiation means with the nationalists as the circumstances required to do so. Besides the position of the Allied Powers in the ethnic conflicts in Anatolia, the relations of the Turkish nationalists with the Bolsheviks were also considered in Chapter V for better evaluation of the Turco-Armenian conflict in Trans-Caucasia, as Great Britain's withdrawal into neutral position in the Turco-Greek conflict was also indicated.

CHAPTER II

NATIONALITY ISSUES CONFRONTING THE UNIONISTS, 1913-1918

2.1. The Change of Ruling Ideology and the Nationality Question in the Ottoman Empire: From Ottomanism to Turkish Nationalism

On the eve of the First World War, the territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire had reached its climax. Following the defeat in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, the Ottoman state lost all its European lands except for a small part in Thrace. The center of gravity of the Empire thus shifted from Europe to Anatolia. Parallel to the disintegration, ethnic conflicts springing from the nationality question (anasır meselesi) of the Nineteenth century Ottoman Empire reached their climax too. It may be argued that the disintegration of the Empire led primarily to the deterioration of relations among the subjects themselves and/or between the subjects and the state. Other factors; such as, the intervention of the Great Powers on behalf of the Christian communities; namely, the Armenians and the Greeks, can also be considered as intensifying the conflicts. There is little doubt that such factors, i.e., the disintegration of the Empire and the intervention of foreign powers, contributed much in making ethnic conflicts inevitable in the later days of the Empire. However, it was the change in the management way of conflicts which diverted them to take a very different form

than the previous periods. The argument in this study, therefore, is that this change in the management of conflicts was due to the change in the ruling ideology; that is, the adoption of Turkish nationalism instead of Ottomanism in facing nationality issues.

Beginning with *Tanzimat*, the Ottoman statesmen followed an integrative and assimilative policy in managing the issues originating from nationalistic movements of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. An inclusive Ottoman citizenship was promoted with the aim of unifying various national, ethnic and religious communities within the framework of the Ottoman Fatherland. This policy had become the basis of the Ottoman reforms since 1839, with the exception of pan-Islamist policy of Sultan Abdülhamit's absolutist reign (1876-1908). The Ottomanist policy was not an end itself but the anticipated device to preserve the integrity of the Empire. It was regarded as a way of preventing secessions and replacing the nationalism(s) of the subjects through the formation of a supra-nationality.

The failure of the Ottomanist policy was apparent particularly following the 1908 Revolution. Ironically, the Revolution was celebrated as the peak point of Ottomanism.¹ The Revolution did not resolve the nationality question; on the contrary, deepened it more. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which was the main organization behind the 1908 Revolution, formally adhered itself to the Ottomanist policy but it was generally opposed by the representatives of ethno-

¹Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, (London: Holmes&Meier Publishers, 1982), p. 401.

religious groups; Muslim and non-Muslim. Behind this opposition was the claim that the CUP was in essence a Turkish organization, acted on behalf of the Turkish nationalist aspirations and focused on enforcing Turcification of the non-Turkish population.² It will be dealt with why and to what extent the CUP was of Turkish character below, but, at this point, it should be stated that the strict opposition which came from ethno-religious groups against the CUP provoked Turkish nationalism by the end of 1908.³

2.2. Turkish Nationalism and the CUP

The nucleus of the CUP, which had appeared in 1889 under the title of Ottoman Union Society (İttihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti), appeared to be Ottomanist. Actually, none of the founders of this society were ethnically Turk.⁴ This society was developed “in a multi-national and multi-ethnic framework,” composed of members

²Kemal H. Karpat, “The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975), pp. 276-299. This argument is also supported by Sina Akşin, who claims that the Turcification of the non-Turks was the main goal of the CUP and the education system was the principle mean to this end. Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987), pp. 103-104. The opposition of the ethnic and religious groups to the CUP has been claimed to be due to the loosing of their privileges that they had inherited from the traditional system under the new regime. For this argument see Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), pp. 157-192.

³On the behavior of ethnic groups during the election campaign in the late 1908, Hüseyin Cahit [Yalçın], a pro-Unionist journalist, wrote that it had been understood that the country was only Fatherland for the Turks. Therefore, the right of dominating the destiny of the country and taking decisions on behalf of it should be at the hands of the Turks. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976), pp. 41-42.

⁴İbrahim Temo was of Albanian origin, Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sükûti were of Kurdish and Mehmed Reşit was of Circassian. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 168.

who reflected national, ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the Ottoman Empire such as Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Bulgarians, Albanians.⁵

Following its first congress in Paris in 1902, when it was split into two factions, the CUP evolved to be a Turkish organization. Until then, it had been under the control of non-Turkish but Muslim intellectuals such as İshak Sükûti, Abdullah Cevdet, who had worked to unify the Muslims of the Empire against the threat of the Armenians and Balkan Christians.⁶ During this period, a group in the CUP, considered itself as Turkish, started to emphasize a single “dominant element (millet-i hakime) of the empire.” Their claim was that the Turkish element was demographically most numerous, therefore, the Turks should dominate and rule.⁷ Hence, the nationalist Turkish faction of the CUP became dominant after 1902 and focus on Turkish nationalism developed within the CUP thereafter. According to Hanioglu, the author of probably the most detailed studies on the CUP between 1889-1908, the CUP’s shift to nationalism was completed in 1906 when it merged with the Ottoman Freedom Society (Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti).⁸ Those supplying the re-proclamation of the Constitution (23 July 1908) were predominantly the nationalist faction of the CUP, composed of the officers of the Third (Macedonian) and Second (Thracian) Army. The majority of these officers were Muslim Turks,⁹

⁵Karpat, “The Memoirs...,” p. 279.

⁶Hanioglu, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 169-170.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 211.

⁹Akşin, *Jön Türkler...*, p. 78.

whose aim was to strengthen the Ottoman state under Turkish nationalist aspirations.¹⁰

The policy of the CUP following the 1908 Revolution was not nationalistic albeit the notion of dominant element was preserved.¹¹ As a matter of fact, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was regarded prior to Turkish nationalism since this could be obtained by Ottoman nationality. Therefore, the CUP promoted an inclusive Ottoman citizenship which was to amalgamate all national, ethnic and religious communities of the Empire under equal citizenship. In spite of this attempt, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire could not be prevented. Secessions continued (for example, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete at the end of 1908) and separatism spread like an epidemic into the non-Turkish Muslim communities (Albanians, Arabs and Kurds). Actually, the centralist policy of the CUP, especially after the suppression of the counter-revolution of 31 March,¹² was incompatible with the interests of ethnic and religious groups, invigorated their nationalism. Administrative centralization was regarded as a means of Turcification by both Muslim and non-Muslim nationalities and seriously disappointed them.¹³ Two years

¹⁰E. J. Zürcher, *Unionist Factor The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), pp. 22-23.

¹¹Hüseyin Cahit [Yalçın], "Millet-i Hakime," *Tanin*, 25 October 1908. He concludes his article by claiming that the dominant nation in the country was the Turks and they would be.

¹²Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 61-62; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 217-218; Akşin, *Jön Türkler...*, p. 145.

¹³As it has already been explained in Chapter I (fn. 4), the policy of administrative centralization was a source of tension between the Ottoman government and the Christian communities. See also Chapter II, fn. 2.

after the Revolution, the situation was observed by the American Consul in Salonica as:

“There are serious forces of discord at work in the Turkish Empire today, and that the New regime will only realize its dreams, if it ever realizes them, after removing obstacles that are built into the very foundations of the State.”¹⁴

In consequence, the Ottomanist policy which became dominant after the 1908 Revolution, seemed to loose its influence following the counter-revolution of 31 March.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the CUP maintained its formal adherence to Ottomanism.¹⁶ The developments between 1910-1913, however, gradually shifted its ideological stand from Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism. The Albanian insurrection which resulted in Albanian independence and the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 convinced the leaders of the CUP that Ottomanism was unrealizable. In the Albanian case, for the first time, a Muslim element had rebelled for independence. The Balkan wars caused floods of Muslim-Turkish refugees into Anatolia, which arose the national feelings of the Turks. Meanwhile, the Great Powers were pressuring for the Armenian reforms in Eastern Anatolia. Their intervention on behalf of the non-Muslim communities continuously left the Ottoman state in difficult position on international arena. Furthermore, the Ottoman Greeks had cooperated with Greece during the Balkan

¹⁴From George Horton to the Secretary of State, Department of State, 867.00/282a-477.

¹⁵Ziya Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, translated by Robert Devereux, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 8.

¹⁶The CUP formally abandoned the policy of the Union of the Peoples (ittihad-ı anasır) in 1916. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vol III, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), p. 295.

wars. In short, the CUP members lost their confidence with both non-Turkish Muslim and Christian nationalities under the Ottoman domination in 1913.

It was under these circumstances that the Unionists unofficially turned to rest the Ottoman state on a foundation of Turkish nationality in Anatolia. In order to obtain the anticipated results, the Turkish element had to be economically fortified and demographically purified. Consequently, the adoption of Turkish nationalism as the government policy led to the nationalization of economic life in favor of the Muslim-Turkish element¹⁷ and ethnic restructuring of Anatolia. With regards to the management of the nationality question, the CUP abandoned the inclusive Ottomanist policy applicable to the Armenians and the Greeks, the only considerable Christian populations left in 1913, replaced it by an exclusive policy of Turkish nationalism. Soon, the rise of Turkish nationalism into political scene turned the nationality question into internal conflict. This was reflected, for example, by the words of Ahmet Emin [Yalman], a contemporaneous journalist:

“So long as the Turks remained indifferent to the [current] of nationalism racial conflicts were confined to an occasional local uprising and massacre. When nationalism gained firm ground among the Turks, incessant and violent conflicts could not be avoided, and such storms were vehement and merciless...”¹⁸

¹⁷Actually, the creation of a national economy and bourgeoisie had been one of the main goals of the CUP following the 1908 Revolution. Nevertheless, the use of this ideal in favor of the Turkish element was after the Turkish nationalism gained a popular base, particularly during the Balkan wars, 1912-1913, and the CUP emerged as the representative of the Turkish cause. Feroz Ahmad, “Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks, 1908-1918,” in *Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1922)*, edited by Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık, (Ankara: Meteksan Matbaası, 1980), pp. 329-350.

¹⁸Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in the World War*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 201.

2.3. The Contribution of Ziya Gökalp: Basing the State on One Nation

The gradual transition from Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism as the governing policy was completed when the CUP was in complete control of the internal situation. During the Balkan wars, the Unionists seized the political power by a *coup d'état* in January 1913 and, in the summer, they were able to discard the entire opposition. The Unionists were much indebted to Ziya Gökalp, the ideologue of the CUP, particularly, after 1910's, in forming a nationalist policy in social and economic spheres. Actually, the Unionists' method in the resolution of the nationality issues during the First World War, was in accord with Gökalp's thinking.

Ziya Gökalp's ideas on nationality issues was in fact a reaction to Ottomanism. He criticized the Ottomanist policy and argued that the *Tanzimat* statesmen, and, later, the Young Turks were insincere in the recognition of the national rights of diverse communities. Actually, they used the ideal of Ottomanism as a cloak for the Turcification of the (Ottoman) state. However, it was the Turks who had suffered most from Ottomanism. The reason lay behind this fact was that the Christians and Jews had occupied economic key positions in commerce, industry and the crafts while the Muslims who formed the ruling element of the Ottoman population remained as peasants, government officials and soldiers. He came to the conclusion that

“while the poor Turks inherited from the Ottoman Empire nothing but a broken sword and an old-fashioned plough, there arose among the non-Muslim communities, which had no part in the Government, a wealthy bourgeoisie with European education. The Muslims produced no such

class possessing the qualifications required of rulers, notably education, initiative and organizing abilities.”¹⁹

Ziya Gökalp was still a defender of a multi-national Ottoman Empire in early 1913; nevertheless, he was of the opinion that the subjects of a single state were not necessarily the members of a single nation. A year later, in 1914, he wrote that “a state can exist only if based on one nation, since men belonging to different nations cannot love the same fatherland”.²⁰ A nation, according to Gökalp, was a society consisting of people who spoke the same language, had the same education and were united in their religious, moral and aesthetic ideals; in short, composed of those who had a common culture and religion.²¹

By 1913, it was clear that the Ottomanist policy could not have built a nation on which the Ottoman state would stand. On the contrary, non-Muslim subjects of the Empire had demonstrated their “disloyalty” to the state. Therefore, they would not be included in the recent understanding of forming a nation. As they were excluded from the definition of nation, they were to be eliminated from economic and social life too. The state would be rested on a loyal nation, which was Turkish exclusively.

¹⁹Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*, (London: Luzac&Company Ltd and the Harvill Press), 1950, pp. 73-74.

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 63.

2.4. The Resolution of the Nationality Question: The Ethnic Restructuring of Anatolia

The initial step for the formation of a loyal nation was the elimination of “disloyal” elements. The Ottoman Greeks and the Ottoman Armenians were to be the target of the nationalist policy of the Unionists, beginning with the Balkan wars. As noted above, these elements were the only considerable Christian groups which left in the Ottoman Empire in 1913. The nationalist policy of the Unionists rested on two grounds, economic and demographic.

In the field of economy, the CUP aimed the formation of a national economy and a national (Muslim-Turkish) bourgeoisie at the expense of the Greeks and the Armenians, who dominated almost all spheres of economic life so as to become “economically independent of internal and external rivals.”²² Traditional division of labor in which the non-Muslim communities were engaged in trade and the Muslim elements, in military and bureaucracy, was to be changed for the benefit of the latter. In other words, economic privileges which had been enjoyed by the non-Muslim communities for a long time, was shifted under the supervision of the Unionist government to be enjoyed by the Muslims-Turks.²³

²²Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p. 335. For the policy of creating a national economy and a national bourgeoisie see Zafer Toprak, *Milli İktisat-Milli Burjuvazi*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995); also Ahmad, “Social and Economic Policy...”

²³Toprak, *ibid.*, p. 5.

Together with the nationalist policy in the economy, the Unionists also followed a policy of demographic engineering,²⁴ with the purpose of changing the demographic composition of Anatolia, that is; ethnic restructuring of Anatolia. This policy was effectively applied during the First World War. It was characterized by mass population transfers, and sometimes other coercive measures. The Unionists intended to secure the *ethnic* majority of the Turkish population in Anatolia and accordingly, prevent local accumulation of other ethnic groups, Muslim and non-Muslim, by restricting their presence not to exceed five-ten per cent on a specified territory.²⁵

2.4.1. Boycotting the Greeks, 1913-1914

The nationalist economic and demographic policy of the CUP was evident in boycotting the Ottoman Greeks in 1913-1914. The boycott started when ethnic tension among the Muslim-Turkish element and the Ottoman Greeks had arose due to the consequences of the Balkan wars. This tension was used by the Unionists to replace the Greek economic enterprises by the Turkish; thereafter, to dislocate a considerable number of Greeks from the Aegean coast. The Muslim immigrants who had escaped from the brutalities of the Balkan states, particularly of Greece, were to be resettled in the same places. The severe attitudes of the Greek government towards

²⁴In the limits of this study, this term refers to the forced population transfers of the Greeks and the Armenians and the resettlement policy of the Muslim immigrants (muhajirs).

²⁵The applications of this policy can be seen in the Armenian and Kurdish cases in the following pages.

Muslims in Macedonia during the Balkan wars caused as previously referred, thousands of Muslim refugees to flood into İstanbul. The Ottoman state protested the Greek massacre of Muslims throughout 1913. The Turkish press provocatively called attention to a possible retaliation against the Ottoman Greeks.²⁶

The arrival of thousands of refugees had arose the national sentiment among the Turks against the Greeks; however, the principal cause of the boycott was the conviction that the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan wars was enabled by the support of the Ottoman Greeks to the Motherland in grants.²⁷ An example to such contributions was the *Averof* battleship, granted to the Greek government by an Ottoman Greek named Averof. This vehicle imprisoned the Ottoman navy to the Marmara sea during the wars and prevented the Ottomans the defense of Salonica as well as Aegean islands.²⁸

Such joined factors as the plight of the Muslim refugees arriving at İstanbul and the conviction that the Ottoman Greeks cooperated with Greece during the Balkan wars stimulated the Turkish reaction toward the prosperous and comfortable Ottoman Greeks in İstanbul and the Aegean region while the Turks were subjected the merciless Greek war policy.²⁹

Under these conditions, the initial step of the CUP was to divert attention to disrupt economically powerful Greeks The boycott campaign of the CUP, therefore,

²⁶Ahmad, "Unionist Relations...", p. 417.

²⁷Toprak, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Nurdoğan Taçalan, *Ege'de Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlarken Hasan Tahsin*, (İstanbul: Aksoy Yayıncılık, 1998), p. 44.

was based on the idea that the Ottoman Greeks dominated the commercial life within the Ottoman territories, that commercial transactions were regulated by the Greeks. Therefore, “the poor, the stupid, the unwary Muslims” financed arms for the Greek state with their own hands. Under such circumstances, the Muslims-Turks should seize the trade and establish factories, companies and banks, thus reach prosperity.³⁰

Actually, the boycott had developed independently of the CUP, and under the initiative of the Muslim-Turkish people as a reaction against Europe. The reason for this way of action was to prevent any European intervention. Meanwhile, the CUP was in campaign to spread the idea that buying and selling would only be done among the Turks and cutting all kind of commercial relations with the Greeks.³¹

The boycott was very influential in İstanbul and, especially, on the Aegean Sea shores, where a sizeable Greek population was found. The boycott had spread even into the Greek groceries in the remotest village of the Ottoman Empire.³² Lists including addresses of the Muslim tradesmen, artisans, working places were published and Muslims were called to participate in trade. Immediately after about five hundred shops were opened by the Muslims in İstanbul.³³

The establishment of a national economy and bourgeoisie was not restricted to the elimination of economic power of the Ottoman Christians. It usually went hand in hand with the forced population movements out of Anatolia. This policy was the

³⁰Toprak, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.

³¹Taçalan, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 46.

³³Toprak, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

requirement of creating an imaginary nation by the Unionists as well as of resettling the Muslim refugees subjected to forced deportation from Macedonia by the Greek state.³⁴ The deportation of the Ottoman Greeks from the Aegean coast was realized within this framework. The Unionist government was behind the scene in the deportation process. However, local CUP branches in western Anatolia and the *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* (Special Organization) openly participated in the organization of the Greek deportation. Their intention was to clear the Aegean region from the Greeks in order to provide settlements for the Muslim-Turkish refugees coming from Serez, Kavala, Salonica and Kosova.³⁵ Besides this “practical” reason behind the deportation of the Greeks, there was also the intention of the Unionists to indicate Greece that the Aegean region, like the rest of all Anatolia, was Turkish territory. In other words, it was seen as a measure to prevent probable annexation of the region into Greece since the Greek population in Anatolia, especially in the Aegean region, felt akin to the Greek state, and, in fact, Greece shared the same feelings of the “unredeemed Greeks”. Their desire was an union with Greece.³⁶

The commander of the Fourth Army in İzmir Pertev [Demirhan], the chief of staff of the same Army Cafer Tayyar [Eğilmez] and responsible secretary (Kâtib-i Mes’ul) of the CUP in İzmir, Mahmut Celâl [Bayar] were charged to carry out the

³⁴Some Muslim-Turkish refugees were placed in jobs under the monopoly of the Greeks. F. Ahmad gives the example of the railway workers on the İzmir-Kasaba line. Ahmad, “Unionist Relations...,” p. 417.

³⁵Taçalan, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

³⁶Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece*, (Paris: Mouton&Co, 1962), p. 31.

deportation of the Greeks.³⁷ There was not an official order for the deportation but psychological and coercive measures were resorted to enforce the Greeks to migrate. For example, the young people were forced to participate in *labor battalions* as the soldiers of the Ottoman Army through recruitment. In general, Greeks on the sea-shore regions where they constituted the majority, were deported. The Greeks of Bergama, Foça, Çeşme and Karaburun were almost entirely deported. Thus, by replacing them with the Muslim immigrants, it would undoubtedly be possible to increase the size of Muslim-Turkish population.³⁸

Soon after the deportation started, more than one hundred thousand Greeks had to emigrate. The American Embassy in İstanbul dispatched to State Department statistics showing the number of Greeks who were regarded by the Turkish authorities as “definitely” deported. It was stated that the statistics were prepared by the Russian Consul General and Embassy dragoman. According to these statistics, 117,000 Greeks were deported from May 28 to June 12, 1914.³⁹ Around the middle of June, Talât Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, went to the Aegean Region for the

³⁷Taçalan, *op. cit.*, p. 52; it seemed that the deportation of Greeks was a part of the nationalization (Turcification) of İzmir. From the unpublished memoirs of Eşref Kuşçubaşı, an important figure of the Special Organization, it can be understood that several measures had been considered to this end at the meetings of the Organization. Quoted in Celâl Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım Milli Mücadele'ye Giriş*, vol. V, (İstanbul. Baha Matbaası, 1967), pp. 1572-1582.

³⁸Taçalan, *ibid.*, p. 52.

³⁹Department of State, 867.00/634. The statistics gives the date of emigration and locality of origin of the deported Greeks with their numbers as in the following: From May 28 to June 9, 1914, 45,000 refugees from Chesmeh; from end of May to beginning of June 14,000 from Karaburun; about June 4, 15,000 from Adramid; on the same day, 7,000 from Burhanieh and Kemer; the next day, 5,000 from Balikesser district; from June 7 to 10, 18,000 from Bergama and Dikeli; and, from June 11 to 12, 13,000 from the district of Phocea. Celâl Bayar suggested that 130,000 Greeks from Bergama, Dikili, Menemen, Foça, Karaburun and Çeşme were deported. *Op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 1568. İlhan Tekeli mentions from about 150,000 Greek refugees, most of them migrated from Urla Peninsula and Ayvalık.

investigation of deportations. On his return, he submitted a report to the Council of Ministers (Meclis-i Vükelâ) stating that emigration had ceased. The reasons for the emigration of the Greeks, he explained, were basically fear and excitement based on unreasonable illusions (esbabı ciddiye ve makuleye müstenit olmayan sırf evham ve hayalâtтан ibaret bulunan havf ve heyecan...)⁴⁰

The refugee problem between the Ottoman state and Greece was resolved by exchange of populations restricted to definite areas. For this purpose, an agreement was concluded between Greece and the Ottoman state before the outset of the First World War. According to the agreement, the exchange would be voluntary and include Greek speaking populations of Turkish Thrace and the the province of Aydın (İzmir, Manisa, Aydın, Denizli, and Muğla) in Anatolia and the Muslim population of Greek Macedonia and Epirus. The exchange was to be realized under the supervision of a mixed commission. The abandoned property of the migrants was to be appraised and liquidated.⁴¹ This agreement could not be implemented; however, due to entrance of the Ottoman state to the First World War. It was going to be revised during the Lausanne peace negotiations in 1923, as will be viewed in Chapter V.

“Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskân Sorunu,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, 50 (1990), p. 60.

⁴⁰Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, vol. II part III, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 254-255.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 261-262; Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), pp. 32-33.

2.4.2. The Land of the Uprooted Peoples: Anatolia During the First World War

George Horton, the American Consul-General in İzmir, wrote in early 1914 that

“There are many who believe that we are living on the crater of a volcano, and that, if race hatred is thus systematically cultivated for some time to come, at last there will be some kind of an eruption.”⁴²

By the entry of the Ottoman state into the War, the volcano was ready to erupt at any moment. In fact, the war presented the Unionists “good” opportunity to implement their nationalist economic policy and also ethnic restructuring of Anatolia. Thus, the war in Anatolia was a scene of uprooted peoples more than anything else. Deportation and reciprocal massacres went hand in hand. Besides the general war among states, there was also an internal war in Anatolia.

2.4.2.1. The Armenian Question as a Case Study within Ethnic Conflicts in Anatolia

There is not any other case than the Armenian Question, which best demonstrates the dimensions of the ethnic conflict in the late Ottoman period in Anatolia. In fact, the events which started with the deportation of the Armenians during the First World War was the eruption point of what Horton called as volcano. The Armenian Question is still a controversial issue which has a dimension beyond

⁴²From George Horton to the Secretary of State, Department of State, 867.00/606

scholarly works and seems to continue to be so for a time that one cannot foresee. It is because of the nature of discussion which has gone on until recent time. Two sides of the debate, the Armenians and the Turks, have not been able to convince each other that their arguments are really true.⁴³ It is not beyond the truth to assert that the question will continue to be an issue of hot debate as long as accusation and counter-accusation of both sides dominate the discussion. Actually, there are many well-qualified studies on the Armenian Question which allow insight evaluation of this issue.⁴⁴

The limit of this study does not allow to analyze the Armenian Question at length. Therefore, this study is limited to the emergence and development of this question with particular reference to the Kurdish dimension of the conflict since the Armeno-Kurdish relations played an important role in the development of the Turkish nationalist movement between 1919-1922. What is important within the

⁴³The center of the arguments is whether the Turkish Government committed a genocide or not during the First World War. While the Armenian thesis tries to prove a calculated genocidal process by the Ottoman Government against the Armenians in Anatolia, which culminated in the events of 1915-1916, the Turkish thesis disapprove this argument and goes a point further by asserting that the Armenians actually massacred the Muslims in Anatolia. For an evaluation of the Turkish and Armenian historiography on the subject see Gwynne Dyer, "Turkish 'Falsifiers' and Armenian 'Deceivers': Historiography and the Armenian Massacres," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 12 (1976), pp. 99-107.

⁴⁴The following studies present different points of view with regards to the Armenian Question: Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995); Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence 1918*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992); Taner Akçam, *İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu İttihat ve Terakki'den Kurtuluş Savaşı'na*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999); Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*, (İstanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988); Kâmuran Gürün, *The Armenian File. The Myth of Innocence Exposed*, (İstanbul: K. Rustem&Bro. And Weidenfeld&Nicholson Ltd 1985); Salahi R. Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians Victims of Great Power Diplomacy*, (London: K. Rustem&Brither, 1987); Mim Kemâl Öke, *Ermeni Sorunu 1914-1923*, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1991).

limits of this study is that the deportation of the Armenians during the First World War was a part of the Unionist policy of ethnic restructuring of Anatolia and provided the Turkish nationalists a base of support in the Eastern Anatolia at the Turco-Armenian war in the post-World War I period.

At the core of the Armenian Question, there was the Armenian reform issue, which was formalized by the Berlin Treaty in 1878, also known as internationalizing the Question.⁴⁵ It was the Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, which transformed the Armenian Question into international arena. An extract from this article giving the sources of the conflict at its outset reads:

“The Sublime Porte [Babiâli] undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the ameliorations and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the [Great] Powers, who will superintend their application.”⁴⁶

This statement clearly shows that the Armenian Question was not restricted merely to the relations between the Armenians and the Ottoman state. It also implies that the roots of the Armenian issue can be traced prior to 1878.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Manoug Joseph Somakian, *Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-1920*, (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), p. 11.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 10. Actually, a similar version of this article had taken place as the 16th article of the Treaty of San Stefano in early 1878. For the Turkish version see Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. VIII, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), p. 132.

⁴⁷Starting the Armenian Question by the Treaty of Berlin is a common characteristic of the Turkish historiography. Similar to other nationality issues in the Ottoman Empire, Turkish historiography inclines to explain the Armenian Question by Great Powers' politics. In other words, it restricts the question into the international aspect and, therefore, fails to deal with its internal dynamics. In consequence, the matrix of its approach appears to be reform-intervention-Great Powers' pressure. It should not be forgotten that one of the intention of the CUP after the 1908 revolution was to prevent intervention of the Great Powers on behalf of the reform demands for subject peoples.

For this argument, it should be emphasized that the most of the Ottoman Armenians were living in the eastern part of Anatolia side by side with the Kurds. The relations among these groups had deteriorated, especially during the second half of the Nineteenth century due to several reasons such as tension arising from religious differences, missionary activities in the region, and economically, well-being of the Armenians who progressed in commerce and backward position of the Kurds who were organized under tribal chieftains at that time. Commerce in the region was almost completely at the hands of the Armenians.⁴⁸ Under these circumstances, the Kurdish chieftains levied taxes on the Armenians which, sometimes, surpassed quite arbitrarily those collected by the Central Government; appropriated as much as they wished from the annual earnings, capital and goods of the Armenians in return of giving protection against other Kurdish tribes.⁴⁹ According to Dadrian, a famous Armenian historian, the issue was structural. What the Armenians came face to face with was

“A subculture of lawlessness and brigandage practiced by marauding Kurdish tribes in cahoots with a stratum of Turkish provincial governors and their subalterns.”⁵⁰

The Armenians, under the initiative of church administration, complained about the pressure coming from the Kurdish chieftains to the Porte in petitions and

⁴⁸Siyamend Othman, “Kurdish Nationalism: Instigators and Historical Influences,” *Armenian Review*, vol. 42, 1/165 (1989), pp. 42-43; Kemal Madhar Ahmad, *Kurdistan During the First World War*, (London: Saqi Books, 1994), p. 146.

⁴⁹Tessa Hoffman, Gerayer Koutcharian, “The History of Armenian-Kurdish Relations in the Ottoman Empire,” *Armenian Review*, vol. 39, no. 4 (1986), pp. 8-9.

⁵⁰Dadrian, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

requests. In such petitions, they presented “numerous encroachments and excesses of the Kurds” as well as Circassians. It has been claimed that five hundred and twenty-nine letters were sent from the Armenian patriarchs to the Sublime Porte to protest the events between 1860 and 1870.⁵¹ In 1876, the Armenians again submitted their complaints, which mainly referred to the exaction to which they had been subjected by fund collectors and to the depredations that they had suffered from the Kurds, to the Porte. They demanded protection of the Ottoman government to little avail.⁵²

In short, the Kurdo-Armenian conflict had already started when the Treaty of Berlin was concluded. It should also be emphasized that the Turco-Armenian conflict, which would develop in the following periods and take a very acute form during the First World War, was essentially a Kurdo-Armenian conflict at its outset.⁵³

As a result of the noted developments, the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin appeared as a remedy to the mal-situation of the Armenians as well as an instrument of the right of intervention of the Great Powers, particularly Russia and Great Britain, on behalf of the protection of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it was under this framework that the Armenian Question would evolve into Turco-Armenian conflict in which some Kurdish chieftains also played a role, mostly as a device of the Ottoman policy.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁵²Somakian, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵³Dadrian, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

The march of events following the Treaty of Berlin did not bring solution to the Armenian Question but, rather, perpetuated it. Actually, during this period; namely, the Hamidian period, the conflict arising from this question deepened due to both the policies of Abdülhamid II and the attempts of the Armenians to keep permanently the question on the international agenda.

Abdülhamid II's reign was a period of reforms aiming at centralization. This point was not surprising as it was inherited from the previous reform movement, i.e. *Tanzimat*. What was surprising and paradoxical with regards to the nationality question was the Sultan's policy to rest the Empire on Muslim foundation. A major goal of this policy was the restoration of the traditional feelings of the Muslims that they were superior to the non-Muslims, a feeling that had been ruined by the *Tanzimat* reforms. Therefore, this policy aimed to restore the Muslim feelings of self-reliance and raise their morale and hopes by means of which the Sultan would be able to "cement his own position as the leader of the Empire's Muslims in the minds of his Ottoman subjects."⁵⁴

On the Armenian side, there was the emergence of political parties by the middle of the 1880's. The first party, the Armenakan Party, was founded in 1885 in Van. The Armenakan Party was not in favor of an independent Armenia, rather it sought for economic and political freedom, that is self-government, within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. After two years, in 1887, the Hunchakian Party,

⁵⁴Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 9, 2(1973), p. 140; Bayram Kodaman, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası*, (Ankara:, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1987), p. 23.

whose aim was complete independence of the Armenians in Anatolia, was founded by seven Russian Armenian students in Geneva. In 1890, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dashnaktsutiun, was founded to strive for economic and political freedom of the Ottoman Armenians.⁵⁵ Although all these parties functioned independently, the common goal of all was acting on behalf of nationalist aspirations of the Ottoman Armenians. They announced themselves in many activities. For example, they were involved in the demonstrations of Kumkapı of Babiâli in İstanbul in 1890 and 1895, in the rebellions of Sassoun in 1894 and Zeitoun in 1895-6 and, finally, in the seizure of the Ottoman Bank in August 1896. All these were the attempts to secure European pressure on the Ottoman government for the implementation of the Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin.⁵⁶

The Kurdo-Armenian relations during the Sultan Abdülhamit II' reign deteriorated more than the previous period due to the Sultan's policy of Eastern Anatolia. He used some Kurdish tribes as a base of support in the region in order to avoid the threats originating from the Russian intrigues in the region, the British strategy favoring an independent Armenia, and the revolutionary activities of the Armenian parties.⁵⁷ This was also one of the ways of keeping the Kurds under the

⁵⁵Somakian, *op. cit.*, p. 16. For a detailed study on the Armenian Revolutionary parties see Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Karal, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, pp. 135-137.

⁵⁶Somakian, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁵⁷Karal, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-144.

supervision of the Central Government.⁵⁸ Under such considerations, the *Hamidiye* Regiments (*Hamidiye Alayları*) was established in 1891.

The driving factors for the establishment of the *Hamidiye* Regiments as claimed by a Turkish researcher was primarily the restoration of the authority of the Central Government in Eastern Anatolia, through the establishment of a new balance of power in which the Government could be influential in the region. The using of Kurdish tribes as military power was anticipated to prevent the Armenian nationalist activities and to establish a balance of power between the Armenians and Muslims (i.e., arming the Muslims to suppress any rebellion of the Armenians). In addition, the security of Eastern Anatolia would be provided against Russian extension and Great Britain's policy. Finally, the *Hamidiye* Regiments were to be the means of securing the Islamic union.⁵⁹ In short, they were formed "as a means of making it more rewarding for the Kurds to be loyal to the Sultan and as the most effective way to police the Eastern Anatolia."⁶⁰

In conformity with the goals of their establishment, the *Hamidiye* Regiments were involved in the suppression of the uprising of Armenians in Sasun (Bitlis) in 1894. The uprising was suppressed severely. The Kurdish tribes which were involved in the suppression benefited in looting and seizing of the Armenian property. The suppression of the Sasun uprising was followed by operations against the Armenians

⁵⁸Duguid, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-145; Bruinessen, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁵⁹Kodaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31.

⁶⁰Bruinessen, *op. cit.*, p. 185-186.

in other provinces such as Erzurum, Van, Harput Sivas and Diyarbakir through 1895-96.

The Armenian Reform Question once again registered under these circumstances. Finally, a text of an agreement which had appeared firstly on 22 October 1895, was published as an official decree on 11 November 1896. The 28th Article of the reform decree forbade the members of the *Hamidiye* Regiments to bear arms and uniforms outside training. The reform decree, however, was not put into effect. The reform question was to come the fore again, and for the last time, in 1913.⁶¹

Confronted with the severe measures of the Ottoman Government with the participation of some Kurdish tribes to prevent fulfilling their nationalist goals with the support of Russia and Britain, the Ottoman Armenians, especially the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dashanktsutium, collaborated with the Young Turks to overthrow the despotic regime of Abdülhamit II. This collaboration also continued after 1908, despite the Adana Incident (1909) in which the Armenians suffered much.⁶² In early September 1909, the CUP and Dashnaktsutium came to an agreement and signed a five-point circular. According to this document, they would work together to put the Constitution into effect and to consolidate progress in the country, to act with united resolution against any possible reactionary movement. In addition,

⁶¹Gürün, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-166.

⁶²The Adana Incident of 1909 is only one of the issues of controversy regarding the Armenian Question. For different viewpoints of the Incident see Mehmed Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları ve Anılarım*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986); Vahakn Dadrian, "The Circumstances Surrounding the 1909 Adana Holocaust," *The Armenian Review*, vol. 41, 4/164 (1988), pp. 1-16.

they would work to prevent the assumptions in public that Armenians aimed towards independence. Moreover, they agreed that they were in common understanding to extend privileges to the provinces. Finally, warned by the counter-revolution of 31 March and the Adana Incident, they agreed to work hand-in-hand to bring into effect the agreed points.⁶³

Following the 1908 Revolution, the Kurdo-Armenian relations were stabilized in comparison to the previous period. The Hamidieh regiments were dissolved after the Revolution.⁶⁴ However, there was an enduring issue which was hard to be solved. This was the agrarian question. Actually, it was the essential source of the conflict between the Armenians and the Kurds.⁶⁵ During the events of 1894-1896, many Armenians felt obliged to migrate. Their lands were mostly seized by the Kurds. Following the 1908 Revolution, the emigrants who returned found their lands occupied. They demanded the recovery of their situation from the Government. In early 1909, Hilmi Pasha's Cabinet decided to send a Commission of Inquiry to settle the land question between the Armenians and the Kurds. The deputies of Eastern Anatolia, who were representing the landlords, strongly opposed against this decision and prevented its implementation.⁶⁶ In February 1912, Said Pasha's Cabinet again brought the question to forth and allotted one hundred-thousand Turkish Liras

⁶³Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. 836-837, Somakian, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁶⁴Bruinessen, *op. cit.*, p. 189. Bruinessen points out that the *Hamidiye* Regiments were soon revived as militias, and they fought during the Balkan Wars, on the eastern front during the First World War, and the Turkish National Struggle. *ibid.*

⁶⁵Department of State 867.00/465; Somakian, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Hofmann and Koutcharian, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁶⁶Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996), pp. 354-355; Ahmad, "Unionist Relations....", p. 420.

for the resettlement of the question. With the decision of the Cabinet the Armenians who had found themselves dispossessed of their land were to be re-established. Removed Kurds were to be given financial compensation.⁶⁷

Such measures did not end the conflict. By September 1912, tension arose in the region. It was reported to the US Department of State that since September (1912), the complaints of the Armenians had been received in Constantinople with increasing frequency.⁶⁸ The number of crimes in the provinces of Van and Bitlis, for the months of August and September 1912, as noted by Somakian, had increased by 50 per cent.⁶⁹

The inability to settle the Kurdo-Armenian conflict in Eastern Anatolia, the conviction of the Armenian nationalist leaders to involve the Great Powers in the reform question in a suitable conjuncture, and the intrigues of Russia to exploit the situation to have control of the region⁷⁰ led to the Armenian 'Reform' Question to come forth by 1913. The reform Act was concluded on February 8, 1914 but remained only as an unimplemented historical document due to Ottoman participation in the First World War.

When the Ottoman state entered into the First World War, Turkish nationalism had already been adopted as the ruling ideology. There is little reason to

⁶⁷Ahmad, *ibid.*, p. 423.

⁶⁸Department of State, 867.00/465.

⁶⁹Somakian, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁷⁰Involvement in the Armenian Question was the principle means of Russia to reach its goal of controlling the Eastern Anatolia. The region was important for Russia since it constitutes a route from the Caucasus to the Mediterranean Sea. Russia followed the policy of playing the Armenians against the

doubt that nationalist aspirations of the Unionists, being clear in the formation of a national economy, a national bourgeoisie and a “loyal nation” as a base of the state, caused the Armenian deportation with other actual factors beginning in 1915. Leaving aside other aspects, this study argues that the deportation of the Armenians was compatible with the idea of ethnic restructuring of Anatolia. The Unionist’s concern in deporting the Armenians was territorial more than ideological since they were in the conviction that Anatolia was populated overwhelmingly by the Muslims-Turks. It was the core territory of the Turks and if the Ottoman state was to be maintained, it was necessary to preserve this territory as the Turkish homeland.

The focus on Anatolia had actually started during Abdülhamit II’s period in coincidence with the cultural-linguistic development of the Turkish nationalism. According to David Kushner, an authority on the rise of the Turkish nationalism, the concept of Turkish Anatolia started in this period:

“One of the most important factors of this development was the spread of separatist and nationalist ideas among the Armenian and Greek population. Therefore, the challenge of non-Turkish elements in Anatolia was to be one force drawing attention of the Turkists, who were mostly men of letters and scholars, to its Turkist character.”

Finally, Kushner concludes that Anatolia had come to be closely identified with the concept of a Turkish homeland by the end of the Hamidian period.⁷¹

On the eve of the First World War, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, reached to a point that Anatolia seemed as the heart of the Empire. This was a major

Kurds and *vice versa* to maintain its position as intervening force. For an evaluation of Russian policy on Armenians and Kurds of Eastern Anatolia see Somakian, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-57.

⁷¹David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908*, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), pp. 51-54.

force in drawing the Unionists to eliminate any threat towards Anatolia. For the time being, that is in the aftermath of the Balkan wars, the Unionists were convinced that such a threat was to come from the separatist non-Turkish elements which menaced the integrity of the Ottoman Empire secretly or openly.⁷²

As we have seen, the operations against the Greeks of İstanbul and the Aegean coast had already been held immediately after the Balkan wars. The major target was the Armenians during the First World War. At the start of the war, the Armenian nationalists were convinced that their chance to achieve the establishment of an Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia laid in a Russian victory. Russian propaganda among the Armenians also encouraged these aspirations. The Unionists had made a last attempt before the outset of the War to convince the Armenian leaders to side with the Ottoman state against Russia. To this end, the CUP delegates and the leaders of Dashnaksutiun met in Erzurum. The CUP promised the Armenians an autonomous state including Russian Armenia and several sandjaks of Van, Erzurum and Bitlis provinces in return of their assistance against Russia.⁷³ The Armenians stated that they wanted to remain neutral,⁷⁴ however, the concluding decision of the meeting, probable consequence of which was to act with Russia, displayed their inclination to stand against the CUP. This decision read:

⁷²Bayar, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 1573.

⁷³Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, pp. 41-42; Somakian, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73. Uras argues that this was the claims of the Dashnaks and "there are no records and documents to prove these claims." *Op. cit.*, p. 842.

⁷⁴Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 314.

“The Dashnaksutiun Congress, bearing in mind the contradictory economic, social, and administrative policy implemented for a long time by the Government of Union and Progress in regard to Christian communities, and especially to the Armenians, has decided to remain in opposition to the Government of Union and Progress, to criticize its political programme, and to engage in a fierce struggle against it and its organization.”⁷⁵

Following the entrance of the Ottoman state into the First World War, a considerable number of Armenians joined the Russian army. While some deserted the Ottoman army, a guerrilla activity behind the Ottoman lines also started. The decision for the deportation of the entire Armenian population from the Eastern Anatolia was taken under these circumstances by the Ottoman cabinet.

The Unionist government, as soon Ottoman entry to the war, took measures to keep the Armenian nationalists under its supervision. On September 6, 1914, it instructed the provincial governors, where there were a sizeable Armenian population, by a coded circular “to keep the activities of the leaders of the Armenian political parties under constant supervision.”⁷⁶ On 24 April 1915, the Ministry of Interior ordered the closing down of the Armenian committee centers, the seizing of their documents, and the arresting of their leaders. The number of those arrested was 235 according to Gürün.⁷⁷ However, Uras gives a number of 2,345 arrested Armenians only in İstanbul.⁷⁸

⁷⁵Gürün, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁷⁸Esat Uras states that “in İstanbul out of an Armenian population of 77,735 only 2,345 soldiers who were accused of having participated in the rebellion were arrested.” *Op. cit.*, p. 872.

Then, the decision of deportation was followed. Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Supreme Military Commander, sent a message to the Ministry of Interior on 26 May 1915. The message conveyed the previous verbal agreement to send the Armenians from the provinces of Eastern Anatolia, Zeitun, and the areas densely populated by the Armenians, to the south of the province of Diyarbekir, to the Euphrates valley, to the vicinity of Urfa and Süleymaniye. A set of instructions regarding the resettlement of the Armenians to prevent rebellions by them came later. These instructions suggested that the Armenians should not exceed ten per cent of the tribal and Muslim population in the settlement places, that there should be no more than 50 Armenian houses in villages where the Armenians were to be installed, and, finally, restrict them from changing their residence for any reason.⁷⁹ It was upon this message that the Temporary Law for the deportation of the Armenians (in application) was adopted on May 27, 1915. However, it should be pointed out that long before the application of the law, the deportation of the Armenians had already begun in some places such as Dört Yol (March 2, 1915) and Ayıntab (in April 1915).⁸⁰

The Temporary Law did not refer to the Armenians but to the measures to be adopted by the military authorities for all activities who were against the Government in wartime. Nevertheless, the final decision, which was taken by the Council of Ministers three days later, referred to the Armenians.⁸¹ Although the law was

⁷⁹Gürün, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁸⁰T. C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915-1920)*, (Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Genel Arşivler Müdürlüğü, 1994), doc. nos. 2, 6, pp. 20, 23.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

temporary and, in that, might have principally accepted the repatriation of the deportees as the conditions would improve, the statements laying beneath the decision text of the Council of Ministers demonstrated the intention to keep them in places where they would be settled, if they could.

The decision of the Council of Ministers of May 30, 1915 had mainly two aspects. First, it was the transfer of the Armenians to the allotted local dwellings (mahall-i mürettebe-i iskâniyye). The second was related to the abandoned property of the Armenians and settlement of refugees in vacated areas. The decision stated that

“Possessions and belongings left behind will be returned to them [the Armenians] in appropriate way. After the value of the possessions and immovable property belonging to the transferred emigrants has been calculated and registered, it will be distributed to the immigrants [muhâcirîn]. Immovable properties such as warehouses, factories, shops, orange groves, vineyards, olive groves, orchards, which would remain outside the specialized sphere of the immigrants, will be sold at auction, or will be leased, and their value will be deposited in financial offices for safe-keeping to be paid to their owners.”⁸²

Although the decision, seemingly at least, guaranteed the preservation of the abandoned properties of the Armenians, it did not consider that the relocated Armenians would return and resettle in their native places. This is clear from the decision for the settlement of refugees and tribes (muhâcir ve aşâ’îr) into the evacuated villages and the distribution of some of their properties to the newcomers.⁸³ In other words, the decision suggested to liquidate the property of the deported Armenians, which made definitely clear that the law, in application, would

⁸²Gürün, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁸³T. C. Başbakanlık Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı...*, p. 31. The relating part of the decision in Turkish transliteration states that “...Tahliye edilen köylere muhâcir ve aşâ’îr iskâniyla emlak ve arâzinin kıymeti takdir edilerek kendilerine tevzi’i ve tahliye edilen şuhûr ve kasabâda ka’in olup

not be temporary. By settling the immigrants into vacant villages, towns, and quarters, the intention of the Ottoman government was basically to change the ethnic structure of densely Armenian populated areas, since the procedure in settling the deportees stipulated that they would only form ten per cent of the Muslim population in settlement areas.⁸⁴

The deportation process was directed by the Special Organization and implemented by brigands under the auspices of the Organization. The brigands which were involved in the deportation and mal-treatment of the Armenians were formed by prisoners, some Kurdish tribes and immigrants from Caucasia and Rumelia.⁸⁵ The management of the abandoned property was specified to the General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants (Aşa'ir ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi).⁸⁶ Hundreds and thousands of losses during the deportation is a generally known fact. This was the moment when the conflict was totally out of control. In consequence, the Greek and Armenian cases between 1913-1916 proves that deportation was the basic instrument of the ethnic restructuring policy of the Ottoman government.

nakledilen ahâlîye â'id emvâl-i gayr-i menkûlenin tahrîr ve tesbît-i cins ve kıymet ve mikdârından sonra muhâcirîne tevzî'i..." Also see *ibid.*, doc. no. 51, pp. 53-54; 52, p. 54.

⁸⁴"Ermenilerin iskân edilecekleri bölgenin genişletilerek, Müslüman nüfusun % 10'u nisbetinde iskâni," 5 July 1915, *Ibid.*, doc. nos. 62, 63, pp. 61-62.

⁸⁵Akçam, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-233.

⁸⁶For an evaluation of policy on the abandoned property of the Armenians see Hilmar Kaiser, "The 'So-Called' Armenian Abandoned Property," unpublished paper presented to the international workshop on "Ethnic Conflict and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," Leiden, 17 May 2000.

2.4.2.2. The Settlement of the Muslim Refugees: The Kurdish Case

The Unionist policy of ethnic restructuring of Anatolia was not confined to the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians. There were thousands of Muslim refugees who had migrated from the Balkans during the First World War. Similarly, following the Russian occupation of Eastern Anatolia, Kurdish people, escaped from the revenge of the Armenian volunteers, had to leave their inhabitances. In the resettlement of the Muslim refugees, the Unionist government was usually keen on scattering them among the Turkish population. In other words, ethnic identity preceded religious identity in the resettlement process. Therefore, the Unionist government attempted to blend the Muslim refugees in small quantity among the Turkish majority.⁸⁷ Here, we will shortly deal with the Kurdish case as an example to the resettlement of Muslim refugees.

In the spring of 1919, there were about 600,000 Kurdish refugees dispersed to various places (Ankara, Sivas, Kastamonu, Urfa, Canik, Karesi, Kayseri, Maraş and Niğde) in Anatolia.⁸⁸ In appearance, the migration of the Kurds was due to the Russian occupation of Eastern Anatolia in early 1916. There are some arguments, however, claiming that the Kurds were also subjected to a systematic deportation similar to the Armenians. For example, David McDowall, a contemporary author, claims that:

⁸⁷For the resettlement of Muslim refugees by the CUP see Dündar, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-173.

⁸⁸*İkdam*, 12 May 1919. "Memalik-i müstevliye ahalisinden olup mahal-i muhtelifede iskân edilmiş olan altı yüz bini mütecaviz Kürt muhacirlerinin..." According to another source, there were about 400,000 in February 1919; "Kürt Muhacirlerinden Ne Kalmış," *Jin*, no. 11 (15 February 1335 (1919)).

“it is a grim irony that the Kurds participated in the destruction of the Armenian people unaware of Young Turk plans for themselves.”⁸⁹

Süreyya Bedirhan, a prominent Kurdish nationalist leader, mentioned about 700,000 Kurds who had been deported during the First World War.⁹⁰

As a matter of fact, in 1913, the CUP had included in its political program the resettlement of tribes, mostly Kurdish.⁹¹ For the resettlement of tribes and Muslim refugees, the General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants was founded as a unit of the Ministry of Interior on March 8, 1916.⁹² Although some tribes had been moved prior to the foundation of this general Directorate, mass relocation of the Kurds took place following the Russian invasion of Eastern Anatolia. As the Kurds left their homes, the Unionist government was in thought of resettling them in the western provinces in accordance with ethnic restructuring policy.

After its foundation, the General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants sent a set of instructions to the provinces and districts (Ankara, Konya, Hüdavendigâr, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Niğde and Kütahya), where the Kurds would be settled, indicating methods to be employed in the resettlement of the Kurds. It suggested

⁸⁹David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 105; the same argument had been previously claimed by Jwadih, *op.cit.*, pp. 368-369.

⁹⁰Süreyya Bedirhan, *Kürt Davası ve Hoybun*, (İstanbul: Med Yayınları, 1994), pp. 37-38. This is a translation of the booklet, which was published in 1928 in Philadelphia under the title of *The Case of Kurdistan Against Turkey* by the Kurdish Independence Committee. The argument of the deportation of the Kurds has been based, together with the booklet of Bedirhan, on Bletch Chirguh's book, *La Question Kurde. Ses Origines et ses Causes*, 1930 and the journal of *Kurdistan*, published in the early Armistice period (1918-1919) in İstanbul by the *Kurdistan Te'ali Cemiyeti*. Both sources were unavailable for the author of this study.

⁹¹Tunaya, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 144.

⁹²Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

scattering of the refugees in the Turkish villages, while the chiefs and religious dignitaries of the Kurds were to be settled in towns and cities, apart from their adherents. The Kurdish refugees were to be disconnected with their traditional leaders. Furthermore, the number of the Kurds would not exceed five per cent of the total native inhabitants in Turkish villages.⁹³

The resettlement of the Kurdish refugees was maintained through 1917. Following the Russian withdrawal from Eastern Anatolia, most of them demanded to return to their homes, but they were not allowed.⁹⁴ Following the Armistice of Moudros, radically changed circumstances opened the way for the repatriation of the Kurdish refugees as well as the deported Greeks and Armenians. A commission including the ministers of the Interior and Finance, the chief of the Council of State and the Director of Immigrants was formed for the resettlement of 600,000 Kurdish refugees.⁹⁵ For this purpose, TL. 500,000 was allocated including transportation and resettlement expenditures.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the repatriation of the Greeks and Armenians could only be realized in the occupied places. In non-occupied regions, they confronted a fierce resistance of the Muslims due to political and economic reasons.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-144; 147-148. Also see Malmısaniş, *Yüzyılımızın Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliđi ve Abdullah Cevdet*, (Uppsala: Jina Nû yayınları, 1986), pp. 64-69.

⁹⁴ Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁹⁵ *İkdam*, 12 May 1919.

⁹⁶ *İkdam*, 15 May 1919.

CHAPTER III

THE REVIVAL OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN ANATOLIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The defeat in the First World War brought about the end of the Ottoman Empire; however, did not bring a resolution to ethnic issues in Anatolia. The experiences of the First World War, i.e., forced transfer of populations and reciprocal massacres, increased the hostility between the Christian communities and the Muslims. By the signing of the Armistice of Moudros on October 30, 1918, the possibility of restoring the relations between these groups, especially in the prevailing wartime memoirs and under radically changed socio-political circumstances had weakened further.

Apart from unfortunate incidents of the past, the territorial spoils of the Ottoman Empire also diverted the hostility into conflict in the post-World War period. Nationalistic sentiments within the ethnic groups, Christian and Muslim, was the driving factor behind the territorial claims of each. Actually, nationalism was the *à la mode* of the day. Under the new circumstances, this concept was supported by the widespread diffusion of the principle of self-determination which was supposed to be the official principle in the settlement of the territorial questions of the Ottoman Empire. However, the territorial claims of ethnic groups in Anatolia generally

conflicted with each other. Therefore, the fulfillment of territorial claims was the most important issue for the representatives of ethnic groups during the peace negotiations, and population statistics was the essential mean to justify their claims.¹

Accordingly each ethnic group had begun to propagate majority in terms of population for the demanded territory as soon as the armistice treaty was concluded with the Ottoman Empire. Besides publishing population estimates and presenting them to the “peace makers”, the Allied Powers, ethnic groups resorted to eliminate the “other” in order to secure their majority in the claimed areas. Forced migration and reciprocal massacres; in other words, demographic engineering, were at work again.

Contrary to the war years, at the end of 1918 and in early 1919, the Greeks and the Armenians, taking the advantage of the occupation of the Allied Powers, attempted to realize their nationalist ambitions in Anatolia. Defeated in the war, the Turks seemed to be in a defensive position, but at about the same, time they were laying the foundations of the Turkish nationalist movement, among other objectives, to preserve the demographic and territorial *status quo* that had emerged following the conclusion of the First World War. To achieve this aim, they sought the cooperation of the Kurds, one of the most numerous Muslim groups who were threatened by the

¹For the population of the late Ottoman Empire and evaluations see Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*; Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*; Meir Zamir, “Population Statistics of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and 1919,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1 (January 1991), pp. 85-106; Levon Marashlian, “Population Statistics on Ottoman Armenians in the Context of Turkish Historiography,” *The Armenian Review*, vol. 40, no. 4-160 (Winter 1987), pp. 1-59.

Armenian claims in the east. The Kurds, at least some of them, took up seriously the principle of self-determination.

In the light of these facts, it can be argued that the post-war Anatolia was an arena where competing nationalisms revived ethnic conflicts under the changed socio-political circumstances. For this reason, the following are the socio-political developments which arose ethnic tension in the armistice period in Anatolia.

3.1. Laying the Foundations of Conflicts: Socio-Political Circumstances in the Early Armistice Period (November 1918-May 1919)

3.1.1. The Allied Powers, the Greeks and the Armenians

It was the collapse of the Bulgarian Army in September 1918 which convinced the Ottoman statesmen that the war was lost for them. Similar to the other defeated powers, they were in no condition except for seeking for armistice with the Allied Powers in October. Finally, the Armistice of Moudros was concluded at the end of October 1918 after several negotiations.² The exercise of the Armistice terms, besides the occupation of the Straits, the demobilization of the Ottoman Army and the control of all communication channels, stipulated the right of the Allies to occupy any strategic point in case of an arising situation which might be a threat to their

²For the background story of the Armistice see Gwynne Dyer, "The Turkish Armistice of 1918: 1- The Turkish Decision for a separate Peace, Autumn 1918; 2- A Lost Opportunity: The Armistice Negotiations of Moudros," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8 (1972), pp. 143-178, 313-348; Selâhattin Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar I*, (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1977), pp. 1-31. Ali Türkgeldi, *Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi*, (Ankara: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1948), pp. 23-73.

security (7th Article) and the right of the occupation of the six ‘Armenian provinces’ (Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Harput, Sivas, and Diyarbakır) in case of disorder (24th Article).³

The occupations of the Allies began immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice. Initially, Musul (3 November), İskenderun, the Cilicia region including Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, and the Taurus tunnels (November-December), and the Straits’ zone including İstanbul (6-13 November) were occupied by the British and French forces.⁴ Occupations in the aftermath were comprised of Ayıntab, Maraş and Urfa in the South; Samsun, Merzifon and the three vilayets (Kars, Ardahan, and Batum) in the north-east; Antalya, Fethiye, Marmaris, Bodrum and İzmir in the West in early 1919.

The Allied occupations were welcomed by the Christian minorities, especially in the cities where remained considerable number of Greeks and Armenians such as İstanbul and İzmir. In the first place, these minorities conceived the occupying powers as “saviors” from the Turkish cruelty. Secondly, the occupying powers were the most powerful instrument in the realization of their political objectives. Under the control of the Allied military and political authorities in the occupied zones, the Greek and Armenian nationalists saw also freedom of activity. Finally, the occupations of the Allied Powers were regarded as the guarantee for the repatriation

³The full text is provided in Dyer, *ibid.*, pp. 340-341.

⁴T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk İstiklâl Harbi I Mondros Mütarekesi ve Tatbikatı*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1999), various pages. For the list of the occupied places see Şerafettin Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, vol. I, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), pp. 74-75.

of the deported Greeks and Armenians which might secure the restoration of demographic conditions *ante bellum*. In fact, this was a preliminary step to increase the size of their ethnic populations within the claimed territories.

The approach of the Allied Powers regarding the expectations of the Christian minorities was encouraging at the beginning. As a matter of fact, witnessing the nationalist policy of the Unionists during the First World War, they had been convinced that the subject nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be “saved”. On December 8, 1916, they publicly announced “setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks.”⁵ Through 1917 and 1918, the political spokesmen of the Allied Powers frequently made statements on “freeing” subject peoples of Ottoman Empire; Arabs, Jews, Armenians, and providing them self-government. For example, on November 6, 1917, Arthur J. Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, stated in the House of Commons that the intention of Britain was to liberate those peoples whose progress had been hindered by the Ottomans and “who would flourish as a separate governmental organism.”⁶

At the same time, the Armenian and Greek leaders knocked the doors of the Great Powers for support in fulfilling their nationalist aspirations. Boghos Nubar Pasha, the political spokesman of the Ottoman Armenians, communicated the claims

⁵“Balfour Note to the President Wilson,” cited in H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. VI, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 23.

⁶Similarly, David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, stated on January 5, 1918, that Britain would not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish empire in the homelands of the Turkish race but Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine were entitled to a recognition of their separate national condition. Cited in Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, p. 248. For the French, Italian and American statements see *ibid.*, pp. 250-254.

of the Armenians in Anatolia to the President of the United States as early as May 1917:

“The Armenians ought not to be left under Turkish domination after the last massacres and deportations... There is no other possible solution but the release of Armenians from the Turkish yoke... We find ourselves in presence of one solution only which realizes the national aspirations of the Armenians, viz. (i.e.) the constitution of an autonomous Armenia, composed exclusively of the Armenian territories of the Ottoman Empire... Our autonomous Armenia has only to do with the Turkish portion of the regions inhabited by Armenians. This autonomous Armenia would include the six Turkish provinces of Erzeroum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir, Mamouretul-Aziz and Sivas, as well as Cilicia, with the ports of Mersina and Alexandretta on the Mediterranean Sea, and the port of Trebizond on the Black Sea, which are the necessary outlets allowing Armenians to develop their country both commercially and economically, and to live their national life. The autonomous Armenia thus constituted would be under the Protectorate of the Powers...”⁷

The Allied Powers, in fact, were favoring the establishment of an Armenian state extending into Eastern Anatolia, speaking for the early armistice period. In early December 1918, the establishment of an independent Armenia was debated at a session of the British Cabinet. The foremost consideration of the Cabinet was setting a barrier against the Pan-Turanist threat. Lord Curzon emphasized the necessity of having an independent Armenia. For his proposal, he stated three reasons. The first was providing a national home for the dispersed Armenians. Secondly, an Armenian state would be a fortification against the irredentist (Pan-Turanian) ambitions of the Turks. Finally, an independent Armenia would form an effective impediment against the expansion of any foreign power (Russia) into the Middle East direction.⁸

⁷Department of State, 867.4016/364

⁸Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923*, (London: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 144-145.

In November, Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, began his travel in Western Europe to initiate the Greek campaign to provide a support for the Greek claims at the Peace Conference.⁹ In fact, before this campaign, he had sent a memorandum to Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister presenting his point of view in regard to the territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire (November 2). He stated that

“...It would be neither just nor politic that the Powers should concern themselves with the Arabs, the Syrians and the Armenians and neglect the future of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire... They [the Greeks] are as numerous as the Armenians, and have been the victims of the same kind of maltreatment, while an enormous number of them have been exterminated... The settlement of the future of the Greek portion of the Western part of Asia Minor by its annexation to Greece is the sole method by which Greece would be able appreciably to extend her territories... If Greece is unable to develop in the direction of Asia Minor, she will have to look for an extension of her frontiers in the direction of Thrace, which would carry her as far as the Black Sea...”¹⁰

The territorial claims of the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians were synchronically publicized in the European press. The claims of the Greeks on Thrace, İstanbul and Western Anatolia, and of the Armenians on Cilicia and Eastern Anatolia were published in the *Times*¹¹ before the commencement of the Paris Peace Conference and reached the capital of the Ottoman Empire without delay. The Turkish side was bewildered. A Turkish daily defined the territorial claims of the Greeks and Armenians as “strange desires in our body.” It stated that İstanbul, İzmir,

⁹Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹⁰David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1938), pp. 1228-1229.

¹¹Sina Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Millî Mücadele*, vol. I, (İstanbul: Cem yayınları, 1992), pp. 97-98.

even Konya was considered to be too much for the Turks. There was a mention of (Armenian) Cilicia. In addition, the areas densely populated by the Kurds were intended to have a form and a color of *Armenianism*. In order to realize these ambitions, deportation and massacres (of the wartime period) were so exaggerated that each page of turns out to be a novel.¹²

Thus, when the Allied fleet arrived at İstanbul on November 13, tension among the Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic groups was high. In addition, the desire of secession among the Greeks and the Armenians was at peak. Therefore, the arrival of the Allied military forces at İstanbul brought about great excitement among these communities, especially the Greeks, which was followed by demonstrations rejecting the Ottoman sovereignty.¹³ On this occasion, the Turkish press invited the Greeks and Armenians to remain calm and preserve harmony with the Turks on the principles of equality and brotherhood.¹⁴ In addition, the necessity of reconstituting

¹²"Hakikat, Hep Hakikat, Yalnız Hakikat," *İkdam*, 13 December 1918. It reads as follows in the original: "...Fakat içimizde garip garip emeller zuhur etti. İstanbul, İzmir, hatta Konya Türklere çok görülüyor; bir Kilikya'dan bahsediliyor; Kürtlerle mali yerler Ermenilik şekli ve rengi verilmek isteniliyor... Şu emellerin tervici için 'tehcir' ve 'taktıl' vak'aları da o kadar mübalağa ediliyor ki her sayfası bir roman halini alıyor..."

¹³*Türk İstiklâl Harbi I*, pp. 180, 182. The sentiments of the Greeks in the city were reflected in the panegyric welcome which they accorded to the Allied fleet when it entered the Bosphorus on 13 November 1918. An author on the Greeks of İstanbul described the situation in the following words: "The non-Muslim sectors of the city were bedecked with flags and a *feu de joie* flashed in every street. The Greek battleship *Averoff*, a member of the Allied fleet, provoked the unbounded enthusiasm of the Greek and Armenian population. Five thousand such Constantinopolitans were estimated to have visited *Averoff* during its first fortnight in İstanbul harbor. The Greek representative in İstanbul John Alexandropoulos and naval commander Kakoulidis, as well as the Greek sailors, who started patrolling sections of the city, were treated as liberators by the Ottoman Christians in general. Meanwhile, Greek-Armenian cooperation had acquired a mass basis among the Constantinopolitan Christians immediately after World War I." Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of İstanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-197*, (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), pp. 57-58.

¹⁴Celâl Nuri [İleri], "Rumlar ve Siyaset-i Cezriye," *İleri*, 21 November 1918; "Ermeniler ve Cezri Siyaset," *İleri*, 23 November 1918.

the Ottoman state in order to improve the relations among the ethnic and religious elements was frequently repeated.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the behavior of the Greeks after the signing of the Armistice which caused hatred among the Turks was defined as betrayal to the Ottoman state.¹⁶

Actually, by the end 1918, the Greeks of İstanbul started to work energetically towards unification with Greece. In their activities, they were usually guided by the Ecumenical Patriarchate which spiritually, politically and socially embraced the Ottoman Greeks. The Patriarchate defined its mission as the realization of the *megali idea* under the conviction that time had come by the defeat of the Ottoman state in the First World War.¹⁷

In the first place, the patriarchal authorities replaced Patriarch Germanos V [Kavakopoulos], who was accused of cooperating with the Unionists during the war, by a nationalist, Dorotheos Mammelis, the archbishop of Bursa, as *locum tenens* (temporary substitute) Patriarch on October 28, 1918.¹⁸ A new patriarchal council was elected. The new council supported the Greek irredentism through the “Central

¹⁵Ahmet Emin [Yalman], “Sulh Hazırlığı I-II,” *Vakit*, 21-22 November 1918.

¹⁶“Mütareke ve Rumlar,” *İkdam*, 25 November 1918.

¹⁷Alexandris, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55. For the political activities of the Phanar Patriarchate in the Armistice Period see Adnan Sofuoğlu, *Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri*, (İstanbul: Turan Yayıncılık, 1996), pp. 44-64.

¹⁸Alexandris, *ibid.*, p. 55. Gotthard Jaeschke, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri*, translated by Cemal Köprülü, (Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 51. As soon as he was elected as the *locum tenens* of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Dorotheos communicated a memorandum to the consideration of the Paris peace Conference. In this memorandum, he evaluated the policy of the Unionists since 1908 against the Greeks, accusing them to have a destruction policy against them. Finally, he set the claims of the Greeks on Thrace, the coasts of Asia Minor, Mediterranean, of Marmara as well as of the Black Sea where he argued that the majority of population was Greek. “The Unredeemed Greeks Before the Peace Conference,” Paris, 1919, *General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931*, 185.5135/8.

Committee of Unredeemed Greeks”, a national committee which worked to promote the nationalist aspirations of the Ottoman Greeks.¹⁹

On January 21, 1919, the Greek Patriarchate of Phanar abolished the teaching of Turkish in Greek schools and provided the adoption of Greek as the instruction language. On March 9, the acting Patriarch officially cut all kinds of relations between the Greek Patriarchate and the Ottoman state and exempted the Greek subjects from all responsibilities to the Ottoman state.²⁰ A week later, the Patriarchal council took the resolution for unification with Greece.²¹ The resolution was recited in all İstanbul churches and followed by the demonstrations of the Greeks in İstanbul. Thereupon, the Ottoman government demanded the Muslim element to remain calm²² while some journalists cried for the awakening of the Muslim-Turkish elements who were considered as the actual masters of the country, in response to the demonstrations of the Greeks.²³

From March 1919 onwards, the Greek Patriarchate rejected direct communication with the Ottoman government and the Ottoman Greeks refused

¹⁹Alexandris, *ibid.*, p. 56; Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic The Turkish War of National Liberation*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), pp. 151-152.

²⁰Gotthard Jaeschke, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolijisi*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), p. 20.

²¹*İkdam*, 19 March 1919. The resolution stated that “the Greeks of Constantinople and the neighbourhood assembled today in their churches ... and proclaimed their unshakable wish to obtain complete national re-establishment. They regard Union with the mother-country Greece as the only firm basis for natural development in the future ... and entrust the Ecumenical Patriarchate, their supreme national authority, with the task of transmitting the present resolution to the representatives of England, France, the United States, Italy and Greece at the Peace Conference.”Alexandris, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

²²*Yenigün, Vakit, Sabah*, 19 March 1919; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 20 March 1919.

²³Ebu’z-Ziyâzade [Velid Ebuuzziya], “Rumların Tezahüratı Karşısında,” *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 18 March 1919.

Ottoman citizenship and adopted that of mainland Greece. The Patriarchate assumed a unilateral control on the Greek community and coordinated the relations between İstanbul and Athens.²⁴

The Greek nationalist activities were not confined, however, to those of the Greek Patriarchate and Venizelos. The Greeks of the Black Sea coast were in a quest for founding an independent Pontus state. Early preparations to this end had begun in 1917.²⁵ Following the conclusion of the Moudros armistice, a national committee was formed with the purpose of reviving the Trabzon Pontus state at the Black Sea coast. The committee was located in Marseilles, France, where it convened its second congress on November 2, 1918. At this congress, C. G. Constantinidis, the son of ex-Mayor of Giresun,²⁶ was elected as the representative of the committee. In his memorandum to the Allied Powers in November 1918, he demanded their support for the revival of the ancient Trabzon Empire and the foundation of an autonomous republic stretching from Caucasia and Batum in the east to Armenia in the south and to Sinop in the west on the principles of justice and self-determination.²⁷

To this effort, the Pontus Society, which had its origins among the Greek students of the American College in Merzifon in 1904, was re-activated under the name of *Kordus* as a branch of the *Etnik-i Eteryas* Society. *Kordus* soon established

²⁴Alexandris, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²⁵Stefanos Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," in *Milliyetler ve Sınırlar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), pp. 367-368.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 367.

²⁷"Trabzon İmparatorluğu İhya Teşebbüsü," *Vakit*, 6 December 1918; Jaeschke, *İngiliz Belgeleri*, pp. 56-57.

cells in many cities along the Black Sea coast. In order to propagandize the independence of the Pontus state, it began issuing the paper, *Pontus*, at the beginning of March 1919.²⁸ About this time, the activities of the Greek bands were also intensive in the districts of the Black Sea coast.²⁹ More important still, however, was the attempt of the Greeks to increase the amount of Greek population at the Black Sea coast, particularly in Trabzon. For this purpose, Greek emigrants in large numbers were brought from South Russia together with the deported Greeks³⁰ for settlement in Trabzon, Samsun and other coastal cities.³¹

3.1.2. A Search for Identity: The Ottoman Public between neo-Ottomanism and Turkish Nationalism

Upon the demands of the Greeks and Armenians for independence or annexation, their demonstrations and activities in this direction and, in some cases, their excesses against the Muslim population following the occupations of the Allied

²⁸Sabahattin Özel, *Millî Mücadelede Trabzon*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 39.

²⁹Jaeschke, *İngiliz Belgeleri*, p. 103. Yerasimos noted that the Greek brigand chiefs were convened at the Samsun bishopric in the second half of April 1919. They decided to form organizations in Samsun, Bafra, Çarşamba, Ünye, Fatsa, Tokat, Niksar, Merzifon, Havza, Erbaa, Ladik, Amasya and Vezirköprü. *Op. cit.*, p. 373.

³⁰During the First World War, between November 1916 and February 1917, approximately 40,000 Greeks were deported from Tirebolu, Samsun and Giresun to the interior of Anatolia while some fled to the South Russia. Yerasimos, *ibid.*, pp. 362-365.

³¹“Report of Commanding Officer of U. S. S. Olympia upon visit to Black Sea ports...,” Department of State, 867.00/963. The local Turkish officials resisted to the return of many Greek refugees to Trabzon since they saw it as a part of the policy of the Greeks to bring on to the Pontus region as many Greeks as possible in order to claim that the population was overwhelmingly Greek. For this reason, they only permitted the Greeks who could prove that they had resided in Trabzon and adjoining districts prior or during the First World War. Department of State, 867.00/923.

Powers,³² the Ottoman government (Damat Ferit's cabinet) attempted to recover the inter-communal relations by sending *Heyet-i Nasîha* (Committee of Advice) composed of distinguished Muslims and non-Muslims into Anatolia and Rumelia in the April of 1919.³³ As a matter of fact, two such committees formed started touring around mid-April. The mission lasted a month and did not bring any decisive result. This attempt can probably be considered as the last effort of the Ottoman state in vitalizing Ottomanism, no doubt to secure good terms of peace and to prevent the partition of the Ottoman territories. As a matter of fact, there had been a neo-Ottomanist current among the Ottoman-Turkish intellectuals who saw the Turcification policy of the Unionists as the main cause of the alienation of the Greeks and the Armenians from the Ottoman state,³⁴ since the beginning of the Armistice period. They argued that the militant policy of Turkism led to regrettable events and that the past could be cleaned and the future could be built,³⁵ in other words, the reconciliation of the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples could be secured in the framework of a unified fatherland.

³²For example, when some parts of the Cilicia region (Dört Yol, Mersin and Adana) was occupied by the French troops involving Armenian volunteers in December 1918, the Muslim population was subjected to the harassment of Armenians aiming at revenge of the events of the First World War. ATASE 4/101; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi I*, 91-92.

³³Statement of Mehmet Ali, the Minister of Interior, *Memleket*, 18 April 1919; cited in Zeki Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1993), p. 209; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Millî Mücadele Başlarken*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959), p. 64; Mevlüt Çelebi, "İzmir'in İşgalinden Önce Şehzâde Abdürrahim Başkanlığında Anadolu'ya Gönderilen Nasihat Heyeti: 16 Nisan-18 Mayıs 1919," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. VI, no. 18 (July 1990), 562-564. As soon as the establishment of his cabinet, Damat Ferit issued a declaration to the provinces and districts (March 8) drawing the attention of the local officials to work for the restoration of Ottomanism. "Makam-ı Sadaretin Mühim Bir Tamimi," *Sabah*, 9 March 1919.

³⁴For example, Ref'i Cevat, "Osmanlılık ve Mesuliyete Teşrik," *Alemdar*, 18 January 1919.

³⁵Ahmet Emin [Yalman], "Sulh Hazırlığı I-II," *Vakit*, 21-22 November 1918.

In support of this argument, for example, *İkdam*, a daily liberal paper, asserted that nationality was of two kinds. The first was *milliyet-i amme* or *milliyet-i resmiye* (common or official nationality), which in this case was Ottoman. This kind of nationality was above race, language, religion and ethnicity and was composed of those who were the inhabitants of the country and loyal to the Sultan. There was also *milliyet-i hususiye* (private nationality) such as Turkish, Hellenic and Armenian. The above mentioned two kinds of nationalities should be in harmony with each other.³⁶ Upon the territorial claims of the Greeks and Armenians and their demands for secession, it was stated that the division of the *mülk-i müstereke* (common territory) would not be beneficial to any group. The reconciliation of the Ottoman elements should be provided by a government which would protect the interests of all groups.³⁷ In sum, the foundation of neo-Ottomanism might be profitable for the Turks as well as the non-Muslims.³⁸

While the Ottoman government was attempting to re-conciliate ethnic and religious elements of the Empire and some intellectuals were publicizing neo-Ottomanism as a means of reconciliation, a contrary argument was developed among the Muslim-Turkish nationalists. This argument focused on the necessity of providing Turkish unity. In fact, this was a response to Ottoman Greek and Armenian collaboration against the Turkish rule³⁹ and demands for secession under protection

³⁶“Osmanlılıkta Anasır ve Milliyet Mesa’ili,” *İkdam*, 17 October 1918.

³⁷M. R., “Telif-i Anasır,” *İleri*, 30 April 1919.

³⁸Tekin Alp, “Yeni Osmanlılık,” *Büyük Mecmua*, no. 2 (March 1919).

³⁹Ebu’z-Ziyazâde, “Onlar İttihad Ederken,” *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 24 January 1919.

of the Allied Powers. Therefore, the search for a Turkish unity began to be publicized in early 1919 when the attitudes of the Greeks and Armenians towards the Allied Powers and the Ottoman state had crystallized and the apprehension of the Unionists, who were regarded as the defenders of the Turkish nationalist cause, due to war crimes (entrance into the war with the Axis Powers and the deportation and maltreatment of the Armenians) was intensified.

The arguments of Yunus Nadi [Abalıođlu, the chief-editor of *Yenigün*, can serve as an example in search for Turkish unity. He reiterated that the Turkish nation should be united and a motherland front be formed against internal and external blows which aimed to destroy Turkish national existence.⁴⁰ More important than pursuing the crimes and murders committed during the First World War, according to Yunus Nadi, was the protection of national existence which was in jeopardy. For this reason, the Turkish unity was a must.⁴¹ Actually, he argued, the only element that sincerely demanded the maintenance of the Ottoman sultanate was the Turkish-Muslim.⁴²

Yunus Nadi asserted that it was only Turkism (Turkish nationalism) that could save the state under present circumstances. Since the Turks comprised the

⁴⁰Yunus Nadi, "Türk Birliđi," *Yenigün*, 22 January 1919.

⁴¹Yunus Nadi, "Birleşme Meselesi," *Yenigün*, 26 January 1919; "Varlığımızın Müdafaası," *Yenigün*, 27 January 1919.

⁴²Yunus Nadi, "Türk Birliđi İçin," *Yenigün*, 10 February 1919. "...Fakat biz gayrimüslim vatandaşlarımızın ekseriyet-i azimesinin bu saniyede memleketin mevcudiyetine taraftar deđil, düşman olduğunu ve mevcudiyeti düşünmek vazifesinin ancak Türk ve Müslüman unsuruna kaldığını anlayarak hayallere kapılmadan kendimizi vikaye etmeliyiz (korumalıyız)... Avrupa haritası milliyet esasına göre tanzim edilirken Türk milletine düşen vazife kendinden başka hiçbir istinadgâhı olmadığını hatırlamak ve istikbâl karşısında son saniyede olsun bir ittihad zemini bulmaktır. Ahmet Emin [Yalman], "Milliyetperverlik Siyasi Bir Moda mıdır?," *Vakit*, 10 February 1919.

majority in the country, their position in protecting the (Ottoman) state was important, as it had been in the past.⁴³ He emphasized that all ethnic groups in the country such as the Greeks and the Armenians, had become nationalists and, the whole world actually had become nationalist. Turkism only remained behind in this regard. Since Turkism represented approximately ten-million Turkish people within the Ottoman territories it should work and be united to protect its rights,⁴⁴ in other words, as pointed out in another daily paper, the Turks should follow a national policy and form the Turkish unity in order to protect their existence among belligerent nations which wanted to annihilate them.⁴⁵

In the light of these facts, it can be claimed that in early 1919, polarization among the Christian communities and Muslims-Turks was fortified due to the occupations of the Allied Powers and the political objectives of the Greeks and the Armenians which caused a reaction among the Turkish and Kurdish population.⁴⁶ There were, however, other coincidental factors for this polarization, such as the repatriation of the deported Greeks and Armenians and the trial of the Unionists. While the former factor was regarded by the Turks-Muslims as the promotion of the political objectives of the Greeks and the Armenians, the latter turned to be the

⁴³Yunus Nadi, "Millî Vahdete Doğru," *Yenigün*, 30 January 1919.

⁴⁴Yunus Nadi, "Türklük ve Milliyetçilik," *Yenigün*, 5 February 1919.

⁴⁵"Millî Siyaset Türklük Meselesi," *İkdam*, 22 February 1919.

⁴⁶For example, the notables of Van publicized their objections against the extension of the boundaries of Armenia into the Van Lake. *Sabah*, 14 March 1919.

conviction of the Turks/Muslims on the whole,⁴⁷ and, thus, stimulated the development of Turkish nationalist movement.

3.1.3. The Repatriation of the Greeks and the Armenians

The most complicated issues following the signing of the Armistice were, perhaps, the repatriation of the deported Greeks and Armenians to their native shelters and the restoration of their abandoned properties. Although both issues were among the priorities of the Ottoman governments during the early armistice period and also at the agenda of the Allied Powers,⁴⁸ they were never completed. To begin with, the repatriation of the Christian elements was partially provided in the occupied portions of the Ottoman Empire; for instance, in Western Anatolia and Cilicia, i.e. Adana and its vicinity. Since the Muslim immigrants coming from the Balkans and Caucasus had been settled in lieu of the Greeks and the Armenians, and the abandoned property had been already seized, pillaged or nationalized by the Muslims,⁴⁹ the repatriation process would add further trouble to inter-communal relations.

⁴⁷In his evaluation, Taner Akçam, argues that there were three reasons for the punishment of the Turks by the Allies: Partitioning Anatolia, conflict of cultures, and the Armenian massacres. *Op. cit.*, pp. 329-340.

⁴⁸Besides pressuring the Ottoman statesmen for the repatriation of the Greeks and the Armenians and restitution of their properties, the British High Commissioner-ship established a separate department entitled Armenian and Greek Section (AGS). This section was particularly interested in rescuing the Armenian and Greek women and children who had been converted to Islam during the First World War. Sir Robert Graves, *Storm Centres of the Near East Personal Memories 1879-1929*, (London: London: Hutchinson&Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 1933), pp. 323-324. Graves became the chief of the department in the summer of 1919.

⁴⁹Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 32.

Besides this economic aspect of the repatriation question, there was also the political side. Hovannisian, the author of the *Republic of Armenia*, correctly states that “repatriation was inseparable from the goal of an independent Armenia.”⁵⁰ Similarly, it was a requirement for the fulfillment of the Greek nationalist aspirations in Anatolia. On the other hand, the repatriation question gave stimulus to the formation of the Turkish/Muslim resistance primarily in the parts where the Greek and Armenian threat of annexation or cession existed.

By the signing of the Moudros armistice, the resettlement process of the war refugees had already started. Actually, the Ottoman Council of State had decided for the restricted settlement of the deported Greeks, Armenians and Arabs on April 10, 1918. The decision allowed the return of the refugees over sixty years of age and in need of help to their homes.⁵¹ The decision for unrestricted resettlement of the deported Greeks and Armenians, however, was taken later, following the formal defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, on October 18, 1918.⁵² The decision was followed by instructions to the provincial and district authorities to take the necessary measures, to provide food supplies and to cover the requirements of refugees.⁵³

⁵⁰Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. II, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), p. 43.

⁵¹İbrahim Ethem Atnur, “Osmanlı Hükümetleri ve Tehcir Edilen Rum ve Ermenilerin Yeniden İskânı Meselesi,” *Atatürk Yolu*, vol. 4, no. 14 (November 1994), pp. 121-122. It has been also argued that the Ottoman government had began the systematic settlement of the Armenian, Jewish, Turkish and Arabic refugees as early as the late of March 1918. Stanford J. Shaw, “Resettlement of Refugees in Anatolia, 1918-1923,” *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 58.

⁵²T. C. Başbakanlık, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, doc. nos. 214, 215, pp. 182-184.

⁵³*Ibid.*, pp. 176-178, doc. nos. 210-211; pp. 180-183, doc. nos. 213-214.

On October 19, reading the program of his cabinet in the Ottoman Parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan), Ahmet İzzet Pasha stated that decision regarding the gradual resettlement of the Ottoman citizens, who had been deported under the war circumstances and necessities, was taken and was being practiced. He maintained that movable and immovable properties of the refugees would be restored and that they would be reimbursed for properties sold.⁵⁴ On November 21, 1918, he submitted a memorandum to the presidency of the Parliament requesting the immediate discussion of the two temporary laws of May 27, 1915 and of September 26, 1915, for the military for activities against the Government during the war, and the regulation of the property, debts, credit, and balances of the deported persons.⁵⁵

The Temporary Law for military measures was cancelled on the 4th of November after a short debate at the Parliament.⁵⁶ Thereafter, a commission under the presidency of Yusuf Kemal Bey, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice, was formed in order to prepare a new law to arrange the restoration of the abandoned property in early December.⁵⁷ Tevfik Pasha cabinet, which was formed on November 11, 1918, announced that non-Muslim officers who had been dismissed from their offices, could apply to the Ministry of Interior for re-employment as a part of the repatriation.⁵⁸

⁵⁴*M. M. Z. C.*, 19 October 1918.

⁵⁵*Ibid*, 24 October 1918

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 4 November 1918; *Düstur*, II/XI, p. 51.

⁵⁷*Sabah*, 1, 2, 4 December 1918. The law would be enacted on January 8, 1920. *Düstur*, II/II, pp. 553-561.

⁵⁸*İkdam*, 24 December 1918. All of the announced names had been dismissed from bureaucratic offices such as district governor-ship.

At the start of November 1918, it was stated that 10,601 Greeks and Armenians returned.⁵⁹ By the end of the year, under the initiative of the Government, 19,695 Greeks and 23,420 Armenians had been repatriated.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, Mustafa Reşit Pasha, the Minister of the Exterior, had commented on the repatriation of the refugees in November 1918 claiming that it was extremely satisfactory to resettle so many refugees under hard conditions, indicating particularly the difficulties in transportation, supplies of food and lack of shelters. As to the application of resettlement, besides the difficult conditions, however, there was increasing local resistance. Calthorpe, the British High-Commissioner, reported the obstructions of the Turkish officials, especially, against the repatriation of the Armenians.⁶¹ Similar argument was also noted by the American Consul General in Salonica who stated:

“...Encouraged by the [Moudros] Armistice, and the declaration of the Ottoman Government that the deported are now free to return to their homes, many of these [Armenian] people ... are now setting out to return to their old homes. They are to be found all along the roads, in general without money, food, shelter, or clothing; and are therefore easy victims to death and disease. Their condition is made still worse by the fact that although the Central Government has apparently changed its attitude toward them, nevertheless the attitude of local officials with whom they come in vital daily contact, has not changed...

⁵⁹Memorandum from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Exterior, 1 November 1918. T. C. Başbakanlık, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, doc. no. 212, pp. 179-180. According to this memorandum 3,160 Armenians and 136 Greeks arrived at Sivas; 2,721 Armenians to Ma'mûretül-Aziz; 456 Greeks and 271 Armenians to Canik [Samsun]. About 1,083 Armenians and Greeks were waiting in İstanbul to move to their original places. Armenians and Greeks who were deported from Karesi and Bursa also returned in November. *Sabah*, 13 November 1918.

⁶⁰Statement of the Minister of Exterior, Mustafa Reşit Pasha. *M. M. Z. C.*, 21 December 1918. At the beginning of March 1919, the number of the repatriated Greeks and Armenians was between 100,000 and 230,000. *İkdam*, 1 March 1919; *Sabah*, 12 March 1919. However, such numbers conflicted with another in most cases. For example, another daily stated that between November 1918 and April 27, 1919, 2,182 Greeks and 7,285 Armenians were repatriated. *İkdam*, 2 May 1919.

⁶¹ Jaeschke, *İngiliz Belgeleri*, p. 37. In fact, many officials who had Unionist background and a role in the Armenian deportation were still at their post.

Those of the deported who reach their homes at last, are finding them either in ruins as a result of general plunder, or else they are occupied by Moslem refugees from European Turkey, the Caucasus, or elsewhere. The latter refuse to give up the homes they occupy, and the Moslem officials naturally support the Moslem occupants rather than the Armenian newcomers, who were the former owners. Thus the Armenians find themselves on the streets of their own villages, surrounded by hostile people and officials, and without means of work or support..."⁶²

As a matter of fact, the Ottoman officials did not disregard the role of the repatriation in the possible cession or annexation of any territory. Their consideration was, therefore, to prevent the concentration of the Christian refugees on a particular territory. For example, the Ottoman government did not allow the repatriation of the Armenians into Eastern Anatolia since it was scarcely populated due to the deportation of Armenians and the evacuation of Muslims following the Russian invasion. In case of resettlement of the Armenians into this region, the Muslims would possibly appear as minority if a plebiscite was held.⁶³

In consequence, the deported Armenians and Greeks⁶⁴ were able to return under the protection of the occupation powers. For example, the Armenians who had

⁶²From George Horton to the Secretary of State, "Memorandum Concerning Condition of Deported Armenians in Asia Minor," 16 December 1918, Department of State, 867.4016/398. This was also the situation in Trabzon. According to Ralph Chesbrough's, the American Consul, report, "the Turkish authorities are placing all possible obstacles in the path of Allied control officers to prevent the repatriation of Armenians and the restitution of their property..." Department of State, 867.00/923. Similarly, the Armenians who returned to Geyve and demanded the restitution of their homes complained the district governor to the Ottoman government due to his reluctance for the evacuation of such homes and his mal-treatment of the Armenians. *Sabah*, 21 November 1918.

⁶³Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 32.

⁶⁴The Greeks who had emigrated from western Anatolia into Greece and the Aegean islands were able to return following the Greek occupation of İzmir. In fact, Nurettin Pasha, the commander of the 17th Army (situated in the province of Aydın) and also the acting governor, did not permit the return of the Greeks who had resided at the Aegean islands. ATASE 2/2/80. Nurettin Pasha was appointed as the governor of the province of Aydın on January 20, 1919. As the commander and governor of the province, he worked up to the fortification of the Turkish resistance in İzmir. He was retained from his position in March 1919. Thereafter, he would join the Turkish nationalist movement and would play a

been dispersed into Syria and Trans-Caucasia, were only repatriated in the Cilicia region where there were British and French occupations at the outset of the armistice period. The French were particularly involved in the resettlement of the Armenians. By the spring of 1919, they resettled 36,319 Armenians to their homes.⁶⁵ At the end of 1919, there were approximately 120,000 Armenians resettled in Haçin (Saimbeyli), Dörtyol, Osmaniye, Misis (Kozan), Tarsus and Mersin, still some, waiting to return to Eastern Anatolia.⁶⁶

The Armenians in Trans-Caucasia who expected to be resettled in Eastern Anatolia, however, had to remain where they were. This was because the Turkish nationalists had never lost the control of almost the whole region following the signing of the Moudros armistice.⁶⁷ For this reason, the resettlement of the Armenian refugees was contingent upon the establishment of the Allied Powers in the region. The British, as we will see, intervened in the situation there for a short period in early 1919. They occupied Kars (12-13 April 1919) and transferred the administration to the Armenians resettling approximately 50,000 Armenians among 500,000 refugees

major role in the suppression of the nationalist activities of the Kurds in Koçkiri and of the Greeks at the Black Sea coast as we will see in the following chapters. Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 169-174; Jaeschke, *Kronoloji*, p. 14.

⁶⁵From J. B. Jackson (American Consul in Aleppo) to Secretary of State, 31 May 1919, Department of State, 867.00/897. The numbers and destinations were 2,518 to Constantinople, 65 to Smyrna, 234 to Konya, 10,056 to Adana, 663 to Mersin, 368 to Tarsus, 309 to Osmaniye, 691 to Sis, 1,518 to Haçin, 1,022 to Dörtyol, 150 to Ekbez, 690 to Hasanbeyli, 4,221 to Ayıntab, 4,825 to Maraş, 491 to Kilis, 499 to Antakya, 1,097 to Alexandretta (İskenderun), 29 to Beylan (Belen?), 247 to Islahiye, 165 to Hamidiye, 386 to Kars Bazar, 31 to Birecik, 44 to Kessab, 1,027 to Aleppo, 1382 to Urfa, 78 to Mardin, and 3,513 to unknown localities. It is clear that most of these places were under French or British control by that time.

⁶⁶É. Brémond, *La Cilicie in 1919-1920*, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1921), pp. 11-12; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi I*, p. 103.

⁶⁷Department of State, 867.00/897.

in a month.⁶⁸ In fact, Great Britain as well as the United States, which had well-disposed toward the Armenian cause, were unwilling to enter into economic and military commitments for the repatriation of the Armenians. By the summer of 1919, they were aware of the fact that without such commitments the repatriation of the Armenians could not be realized but they could not venture for this.⁶⁹

3.1.4. The Trials of the Unionists

There were several reasons for the trial of the Unionists following the conclusion of the Moudros armistice. The two basic reasons were the entry of the Ottoman state into the First World War on the side of the Axis Powers and the nationalistic policy of the CUP during the War. Both causes materialized with internal and external pressures (from the anti-Unionists; for example, the Party of Freedom and Accord, and the Allied Powers, especially Great Britain) upon the Ottoman governments to condemn the Unionists held responsible. For this reason, undoubtedly responsible for Ottoman entry into the war as well as in the maltreatment of the Armenians, some leading Unionist figures fled immediately after the

⁶⁸James L. Barton, *Story of Near East Relief (1915-1930)*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), pp. 121-123; Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. I, pp. 215-222.

⁶⁹Britain and United States were contended with the preparations of plans for the repatriation of the Armenians. Two plans of this kind were prepared, Ussher and Morgenthau-Hoover Proposals, after the middle of 1919 but none of them were implemented. Hovannisian, *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 40-61; Somakian, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-214.

conclusion of the Armistice, on November 1,⁷⁰ while some others were engaged in underground activities in İstanbul.

During the War, the Allied Powers had jointly declared that those responsible for the Armenian persecutions would be convicted. Their declaration stated that

“in view of these crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly ... that they will hold personally responsible ... all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.”⁷¹

In the early days of the armistice period, when the peace terms were rumored, it became clear that not only the Unionists were going to be punished but also the Ottoman state. What was meant by the punishment of the state was its territorial restructuring on ethnic basis since, according to the Allied Powers, it was no longer entitled to rule its subject peoples. In fact, this was compatible with the objectives of the Allies with regards to the establishment of economic and political spheres of influence on the basis of the secret agreements of 1915-1917.⁷² At the same time, it

⁷⁰They were Talât, Enver, Cemâl Pashas, Dr. Nazım and Bahattin Şakir. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, p.72, also dn. 23.

⁷¹Dadrian, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

⁷²Four treaties were signed among the Allied Powers over division of the Ottoman territories into sphere of influences between 1915-1917. The first treaty was Constantinople agreement of 1915 by which France and Britain recognized rights of Russia to occupy parts of Eastern Anatolia, Constantinople and the Straits. Following this, the Allies signed Treaty of London with Italy. They assured Italy ‘obtaining a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia (Antalya).’ Sykes-Picot agreement, which was concluded in May 1916, arranged Franco-British spheres of influences in the Middle East in that France obtained right of annexation of coastal regions of Syria with an extended zone of influence in the interior while Britain was recognized to annex lower Mesopotamia with a similar zone of influence. Last treaty, Saint Jean de Maurienne agreement (1917), redefined Italy’s zone of influence in Asia Minor. Paul C. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sévres The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), pp. 5-7. See also Henry H. Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 21-32 and Howard, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-187.

was consistent with Wilson's twelfth point of the fourteen points regarding the resolution of the national problems of the Ottoman Empire on the principle of self-determination which read:

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development...”⁷³

Therefore, closely connected to the peace settlement, there was a widespread campaign in the Ottoman parliament and public which attributed the war crimes, specially the deportation and persecution of the Armenians, strictly to the Unionists claiming that the Turkish-Muslim people was innocent. For example, during the debate on the program of Ahmet İzzet cabinet, Mehmet Emin, deputy of Trabzon, criticized the program on the basis that it did not consider investigating the responsible for atrocities, murders and persecutions committed during the War. He maintained that the responsibility of all these were, first, attributed to the CUP, and, second, to the Turkish nation. The nation was innocent and should be exonerated before history. ⁷⁴ Celâl, the ex-governor of Halep during the deportation of the Armenians, argued that the Unionists aimed at the destruction of the Armenians, and

⁷³Laurance Evans, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 76.

⁷⁴*M. M. Z. C.*, 19 October 1918, pp. 32-33. Similar arguments took place during the debate on the program of Tevfik Pasha cabinet, *ibid.*, 18 November 1918, pp. 136-166.

they did; but the Turks-Muslims were not involved.⁷⁵

The trial of the Unionists did fall on the agenda of the Ottoman Parliament by a motion submitted by Fuat, the deputy of Divaniye, on October 28, 1918. It suggested the sending of the two wartime cabinets, of Sait Halim Pasha and of Talât Pasha, to the High Court of Justice (Divân-ı Ali). Fuat stated ten reasons to his motion. Amongst these were the Ottoman entry into the war, political abuses, economic crimes, and deportations and persecutions.⁷⁶ The motion was accepted in the Parliament and an investigation committee, the Fifth Committee (Beşinci Şube), which was composed of Turks (in majority), Arabs, Greeks and Armenians, was formed. The Committee began its work on November 6, and completed its investigations approximately a month later.⁷⁷ Before submitting any report to the Parliament, however, Vahdettin, the Sultan, dissolved the legislative body on December 21.

⁷⁵“Ermeni Vekayi ve Esbab ve Tesirleri, I-III,” *Vakit*, 10-13 December 1918. In 1919, the National Congress (Millî Kongre) which was mostly composed of the members of the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı), of the National Society for Instruction and Education (Millî Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti), of the Renovation Party (Teceddüt Fırkası), of the Ottoman Liberal People’s Party (Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası) published a booklet in English to publicize the Turkish point of view with regards to the Armenian issue. Rather than mentioning the responsibility of the Unionists (the members of the Society were mostly former Unionists), it focused on the activities of the Armenian committees and their misdeeds. In that, this booklet can be considered as the early version of the Turkish thesis on the Armenian Question. *The Turco-Armenian Question The Turkish Point of View* published by the National Congress of Turkey, (Constantinople, 1919).

⁷⁶*M. M. Z. C.*, 4 November 1918, p. 103. Also see Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, *İttihat-Terakki'nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması (1918-1919)*, (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1998), pp. 52-53; Akçam, *op. cit.*, 410-411; Dadrian, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

⁷⁷For the minutes of the investigation see Kocahanoğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 55-495. From November 9 to December 19, 1918, the Fifth Committee interrogated 13 ministers and two Şeyhülislams. Namely, they were Said Halim, Çürüksulu Mahmut, İbrahim Bey, Ahmet Şükrü, Ahmet Nesimi [Sayman], Halil [Menteşe], Cavid Bey, Ali Münif, Mustafa Şeref, İsmail Canbulat, Haşim Bey, Kara Kemal, and, two Şeyhülislams Hayri and Musa Kâzım. Enver, Talat and Cemal Pashas could not be interrogated due to their flight in early November.

Meanwhile, Tevfik Pasha cabinet had formed a commission to investigate Armenian deportation and massacres (tehcir ve taktil) on November 23 under the chairmanship of Mazhar Müfit [Kansu], the ex-governor of Bitlis. Called *Tetkik-i Seyyat Komisyonu* (Commission for the Investigation of Evils), the Commission simultaneously functioned with the Parliamentary investigation.⁷⁸ In addition to this Commission, the Council of Ministers decided to send investigation committees into provinces, where transgressions and enmities (tecavüzet ve ta'addiyat) took place during the deportation of the Greeks and Armenians.⁷⁹ Ten investigation committees were formed, each to investigate a region.⁸⁰ Both the Commission of *Tetkik-i Seyyat* and the investigation committees were vested with broad powers such as the summoning of witnesses, arrest and detention.⁸¹ They forwarded their findings to the Martial Courts (Divan-ı Harb-i Örfî) where the Unionists were to be judged by February 1919.

Decision regarding the trial of accused at the martial courts had been taken by the Council of Ministers on December 14, 1918.⁸² On this decision, the first martial court was formed in İstanbul and was followed by the courts at Çatalca, İzmit, İzmir,

⁷⁸Sarıhan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 38; Dadrian, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-321.

⁷⁹T. C. Başbakanlık, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, doc. no. 219, pp.188-189.

⁸⁰Ten regions were arranged as in the following: 1- Provinces of Ankara and Kastamonu, and Bolu sandjak, 2- Province of Trabzon and *liva* of Samsun, 3- Provinces of Hüdavendigar and Edirne, and Çatalca sandjak, 4- Province of Aydın and Çanakkale and Karesi sandjaks, 5- Province of Konya and Eskişehir, Karahisar, and Kütahya sandjaks, 6- Province of Sivas and Kayseri and Burgaz sandjaks, 7- Provinces of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis, 8- Provinces of Diyarbakir and Mamuretü'l-Aziz, 9- Province of Adana and Maraş sandjak, 10- Urfa, Zor, Ayıntab sandjaks. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, p. 188; *İkdam*, 15 December 1918. Before that an investigation committee had been already sent to İzmit. *İkdam*, 8 December 1918.

⁸¹Akçam, *op. cit.*, pp. 427-428; Dadrian, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

⁸²*Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, doc. no. 220, pp. 189-191.

Ayıntab, Bursa, Van, Bayezit and Samsun. The trials in regions not under martial law were to be carried out by existing penal courts.⁸³

The arrest of the Unionists in mass started at the end of January 1919. Although there had been already preparations to arrest them⁸⁴ and some complaints had arose that most of the war criminals were wandering about freely, it was the flight of Dr. Reşid, ex-governor of Diyarbekir, who was kept in prison for his misdeeds during the Armenian deportation, on January 25, 1919,⁸⁵ that stimulated the arrest of the Unionists. Approximately thirty Unionists were arrested on 29/30 January in the first place.⁸⁶ This development was not unexpected since there was an intensive pressure on the Ottoman governments to arrest the Unionists since the beginning of the armistice period. Behind the arrest of the Unionists at the end of January 1919, however, there was not only their wartime crimes but also their activities which indicated that they did not give up their struggle.⁸⁷

Actually, in November 1918, the Unionists had began to organize the Muslims in İstanbul through a secret organization, *Karakol*, (Guard), initiation of

⁸³ Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. I., p. 311.

⁸⁴ Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, pp. 149-152.

⁸⁵ *Sürgünden İntihara Dr. Reşid Bey'in Hatıraları*, (İzmir, 1992), pp. 53-56. In these pages, Dr. Reşid explains his escape in details. He managed to escape from prison; however, was not able to leave İstanbul. When he was almost captured by police, he committed suicide on 6 February.

⁸⁶ Among them were Hüseyin Cahit [Yalçın], Rahmi (ex-governor of İzmir), Kara Kemal, Emanuel Karasu, Mithat Şükrü [Bleda] (General Secretary of the CUP), Hüseyin Kazım [Kadri], Tefik Rüştü [Aras], İsmail Canbulat, and Ziya Gökalp. *Yenigün*, 1 February 1919; Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 153. The complete list of the arrested Unionists on January 30 appeared at *General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace 1918-1931*, 867.00/73.

⁸⁷ Yunus Nadi, "Tevkifata Dair," *Yenigün*, 1 February 1919.

which went to the end of the October 1918.⁸⁸ The branches of the organization in İstanbul distributed arms to Muslims and formed intelligence network.⁸⁹ In addition, the Karakol organization evacuated the former Unionists, who were under the threat of arrest, from İstanbul to Anatolia⁹⁰ where they were to build up a resistance movement. By the words of Halide Edip [Adivar], a distinguished figure of the Turkish nationalist struggle:

“...A large number of youths -mostly officers- were going to disperse throughout Anatolia to instil[l] this purpose, this simple doctrine of the simple Nationalist Turk: Turkey to be free in those districts in which the Turk is in an incontestable majority. This was a preparation of the public in case that the partition of Turkey took place which was already more or less threatened by the Allies...”⁹¹

Thus, the activities of *Karakol* were observed as early as November 1918 by the Allied representatives as well as the foreign observers.⁹² Nevertheless, it continued to smuggle arms and men into Anatolia throughout 1919. Therefore, the mass arrest of the Unionists at the end of January 1919 was partly due to the activities of Karakol organization. Their arrest continued and accelerated after the establishment of Damat Ferit Pasha’s cabinet on March 4. In fact, Damat Ferit was a strict anti-Unionist who worked for the disappearance of the Unionists from political scene.⁹³

⁸⁸Hüsâmettin Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1996), pp. 204-205; Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Millî Mücadele Yıllarında Kuruluşlar*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 4. The foundation of the Karakol organization seemed to be a direct consequence of the arrest of the Unionists following the conclusion of the armistice due to the deportation and persecutions of the Armenians.

⁸⁹Bilge Criss, *İşgal Altında İstanbul, 1919-1923*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), p. 157.

⁹⁰Zürcher, *Unionist Factor*, p. 82.

⁹¹Halide Edib [Adivar], *The Turkish Ordeal*, (New York: The Century Co, 1928), p. 21.

⁹²Criss, *op. cit.*, p. 157; Zürcher, *Unionist Factor*, p. 87-88.

⁹³Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 197.

In the meantime, the first trial of the Unionists had began at the İstanbul Martial Court (February 5). In the first place, Kemal, the Acting Governor of Boğazlıyan district in Yozgat,⁹⁴ Mehmet Tevfik the ex-gendarme commander of Ankara, and Feyyaz, the ex-director of pious foundations (evkaf müdürü) in Yozgat, were tried.⁹⁵ In consequence, Kemal was condemned to capital punishment on 9 April. The following day, he was executed. Kemal's funeral became the scene of a large-scale nationalist demonstration of the Turks, led primarily by the university students, officers and soldiers.⁹⁶ Thereafter, even the anti-Unionist press began to stress that the Greeks and the Armenians should also be tried since they had committed similar crimes with the Unionists. Particularly the Armenians had persecuted hundreds of thousands of Muslim in the east.⁹⁷

3.1.5. The Emergence of the Turkish Resistance

Intimately connected to the above mentioned developments, (occupations, political objectives of the Greeks and the Armenians, repatriation and the trial of the Unionists) was the concurrent development of the Turkish resistance in the provinces, especially, where there was the threat of cession or annexation by Greeks

⁹⁴Mücellidoğlu Ali Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol. III, (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968-1969), pp. 1156-1171.

⁹⁵*İkdam*, 6 February 1919.

⁹⁶Shaw, *From Empire To Republic*, vol. I, pp. 322-323; Annette Höss, "The Trial of Perpetrators by the Turkish Military Tribunals: The Case of Yozgat," in *The Armenian Genocide History, Politics, Ethics*, Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 219.

⁹⁷"Tehcir Davaları," *Sabah*, 11 April 1919; Ref'i Cevat [Ulunay], "Mes'uliyet Neden Yalnız Bize Tahmil Olunsun?," *Alemdar*, 26 April 1919.

and Armenians. Ironically, the earlier resistance movements were led by the ex-Unionists, who were still the most organized power in Anatolia. The state apparatus was still in the control of the Unionists following the conclusion of the armistice. They manned the bureaucracy, the police and, especially the military. In addition, the local branches of the CUP were the dominant political forces in the provinces.⁹⁸ Thus, the most influential resistance organizations emerged in the Eastern and Western Anatolia, and at the Black Sea coast, in most cases, under the initiative of local notables and governors who were backed by the Turkish army for the preservation of the rights of Turkish-Muslim population on the principle of self-determination.⁹⁹

⁹⁸E. J. Zürcher, *Unionist Factor*, p. 71.

⁹⁹One of the earliest resistance organizations (Society for the Defense of Thrace-Paşaeli) was founded in Thrace (December 2, 1918) with the purposes of providing the integrity of the Western and Eastern Thrace and proving the Allied Powers that Thrace was genuinely Turkish. In the same manner with other Defense of Rights Societies in Anatolia, it summoned congresses (Lüleburgaz and Edirne between March-May 1920) and decided for armed struggle, specifically after the Peace Conference granted Thrace to Greece. Nevertheless, in the light of available data, it can be claimed that a well-organized and coordinated Turkish resistance did not develop in Thrace, probably, due to its geographical position which did not allow the transfer of war material, of arms and ammunition into there (İstanbul and the Straits were under the control of the Allied Powers since the beginning of the armistice period). Consequently, the inclusion of Eastern Thrace to the borders of the Turkish Republic was not a result of a fierce struggle between the Greeks and Turks (in comparison to the Turco-Armenian conflict in Cilicia and Eastern Anatolia, and Turco-Greek conflict in Western Anatolia) but of the defeat of Greece in Western Anatolia by the Turkish army. For the resistance activities in Thrace see Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da Milli Mücadele*, II vols., (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992); Zekâi Güner, *Trakya-Paşaeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1 Aralık 1918-13 Mayıs 1920)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi,) 1998; Kâmil Erdeha, *Milli Mücadelede Vilayetler ve Valiler*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1975), pp. 419-452.

3.1.5.1. Early Turkish Resistance in Kars and Trans-Caucasia: From Muslim Councils to the Provisional National Government of the South-western Caucasus

As early as 21 October 1918, Ahmet İzzet Pasha demanded the Ottoman divisions to withdraw from the places in Trans-Caucasia under their control except for those which had been restored to the Ottoman state by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (Kars, Ardahan and Batum).¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, the 11th Article of the Moudros Armistice required the “immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Trans-Caucasia to behind the pre-war frontier.” It was also stipulated that “the remainder [areas] to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.”¹⁰¹ In other words, the three provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, known also as *Elviye-i Selase*, would be evacuated by the Ottoman troops if the Allied Powers deemed necessary.

The demand for their evacuation came in November.¹⁰² Nevertheless, the evacuation of Kars by the Ottoman troops was delayed by Yakub Şevki Pasha, the commander of the 9th Army, for about two months. During this period, a provisional government, *Kars İslâm Şûrası* (Muslim Council of Kars), was set up by the Turkish-Muslim local landowners, lawyers, school-teachers, etc. on the basis of

¹⁰⁰These provinces had been lost to Russia as a result of the Ottoman-Russia War in 1877-1878 but recovered into the Ottoman territory by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, March 3, 1918. Yusuf H. Bayur, *op. cit.*, vol. III/IV, p. 136; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi I*, p. 221.

¹⁰¹Dyer, “The Turkish Armistice,” p. 340.

¹⁰²ATASE, 1/52, 10 November 1918.

Wilson's twelfth-point.¹⁰³ Its establishment was led by Hilmi [Uran], who was there as the Inspector of the Ministry of Interior, and Fahreddin [Erdoğan], the Mayor of Kars, with the support of Yakub Şevki Pasha, who during the gradual withdrawal of the Ottoman Army from the Caucasus, left the Council arms and ammunition, and also officers to strengthen the resistance.¹⁰⁴ The Council aimed at defending the three provinces against Georgian and Armenian expansion as well as preventing the separation of the Muslims living in Trans-Caucasia from the Ottoman state.¹⁰⁵

Actually, for these purposes, Temporary Government of Akhaltsikh (Ahıska Hükûmet-i Muvakkatası) had been established on October 29 to defend Akhaltsikh, in the north of Kars, against the Georgians. Subsequently, the Turkish Government of Aras was founded on 3 November, with Iğdir as the center, to defend the territory around Aras against the Armenians. Both governments were founded under the initiative of Yakub Cemil Pasha.¹⁰⁶ At the end of November 1918, the Muslim Council of Kars summoned a congress with the participation of the two governments. At this congress, the governments of Akhaltsikh and Aras merged with the Muslim Council of Kars,¹⁰⁷ and, all together formed the National Council (Millî Şura).

¹⁰³W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p. 497.

¹⁰⁴Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım*, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), pp. 109-110; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi I*, p. 241; Sabahattin Selek, *Anadolu İhtilâli I*, (İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları, 1987), p. 185; Ahmet Ender Gökdemir, *Cenûb-i Garbî Kafkas Hükûmeti*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1998), p. 63.

¹⁰⁵Gökdemir, *ibid.*, pp. 65-66, 71.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 35-62.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 70.

Cihangirođlu İbrahim [Aydın], a CUP leader from Kars, became the president of the Council.¹⁰⁸

At the end of the congress, the leading members of the National Council decided to establish a National Council army, which was expected to be supported by the retreating Turkish Army towards the Bayezıt-Eleşkirt-Pasin-Narman frontiers. An oath was also taken to protect the boundaries of the National Council against the Armenians at the edges of Arapçayı and Aras, and the Georgians at the edge of Kur and Acara front. Finally, it was stated that the National Council was a part of the Ottoman State and loyal to the Islamic Caliphate, that it observed the Turkish flag and executed judicial and administrative tasks according to the Turkish legislation.¹⁰⁹

The National Council, thereafter, summoned two congresses in early 1919 (January 3-5 and 7) at Ardahan. These congresses were summoned following the occupation of Batum by the British troops (24 December), of Akhaltsikh by the Georgians and of Ahilkelek, by the Armenians. Therefore, at the first congress on 3-5 January 1919, the most important decision was the prevention of the implementation of the Armistice terms.¹¹⁰ Two days later, the second congress took a decision for a more extensive one to be summoned at Kars to provide the establishment of the Provisional National Government of the Southwestern Caucasus (*Cenûb-i Gârbi*

¹⁰⁸Zürcher, *Unionist Factor*, p. 90.

¹⁰⁹Gökdemir, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹¹⁰The leading members of the Congress were Halid Bey, the commander of the 3rd Division, Dr. Hakki Cenap, Dr. Abidin [Ağacikođlu], Dr. Fuat Sabit, Filibeli Hilmi, Arif, Köseođlu Cafer [Erçikan], and Hamiřođlu Rasim [Acar], then the Mayor of Ardahan, who mostly were former Unionists. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

Kafkas Hükûmet-i Muvakata-i Milliyesi). Also, a military organization was to be founded to prevent the entry of the Armenians and the Georgians into the Motherland.¹¹¹

In the meantime, arrangements regarding the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from Kars were being made. Supervised by Major General G. T. Forestier-Walker, the ranking Allied officer in western Trans-Caucasia until March 1919, these arrangements favored the settlement of Armenian political administration in the province of Kars. To this effort, Forestier-Walker met on January 6 with Tigranian, the Foreign Minister of the Armenian Republic, revealed his plans including placement of the Kars region under the British military control, but authorizing Armenia to appoint the civil officials. Next day, on January 7, he communicated to Yakub Şevki Pasha his directives related to the Turkish evacuation of Kars.

The directives stated that necessary officials for the administration of the Province of Kars would be provided by the Armenian government and Armenian officials acting under the English military governor would handle the railway and telegraph lines from Alexandropol to Kars.¹¹² On January 8, General Forestier-Walker concluded the final arrangement with Tigranian with regards to the Armenian administrative role in Kars. According to this, all civil officials were to be appointed by the Armenian government. The Armenian officials were to be prepared for departure on January 12, that they were to take the control of railway and telegraph

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹¹²Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. I, pp. 202-203; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi I*, pp. 237-238.

lines as far as the city of Kars on January 15, and, of the railway from Kars to Sarıkamış and the Turkish frontier after the evacuation of Ottoman troops completed. The central administration of Kars would pass exclusively to Armenian civil officials. The Muslims would participate in the administration of various municipal councils in proportion to their numbers prior to the Turkish occupation. It was also stated that the Armenian army was allowed to constitute a gendarmerie, limited in size, and would advance gradually as the Turkish forces withdrew in order to maintain law and order in Kars.¹¹³

The Provisional National Government of the Southwestern Caucasus was established after such developments to provide a united resistance against Armenian and Georgian rule. The Government was established on 17-18 January 1919 at the Congress of Kars at which more than a hundred delegates from the Three Provinces were represented. Cihangiroğlu İbrahim [Aydın] was elected as the provisional president in order to coordinate the activities of Muslim councils from Batum to Ordubad.¹¹⁴ Soon after, the Government worked to acquire the official recognition of the American, French and British Presidents, the Allied High-Commissioners in İstanbul and, finally, of the Paris Peace Conference. To this end, İbrahim Bey sent a letter on behalf of all Muslims of the Southwestern Caucasus (Kars, Ardahan, Olti, Kağızman, Batum, Iğdir, Nahçıvan et.) to all above mentioned “referees”. He argued that there were no Armenians in the Southern Caucasus and the imposition of

¹¹³Hovannisian, *ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 205; Gökdemir, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-92; Zürcher, *Unionist Factor*, p. 90.

Armenian officials upon the Muslim population by the intrigues of Great Britain caused deep resentment and strong opposition among the Muslims. He maintained that the British authorities in Batum had promised that only Imperial troops would enter Kars; however, there had been an attempt to set up Armenian rule in the province. Furthermore, the British were intriguing to establish Armenian rule on a land where “there is not one single Armenian”. Finally, he stated that further efforts to impose Armenian sovereignty before the Peace Conference reached a final settlement, would inspire the Muslims to take arms to defend themselves to the last man on the basis of Wilsonian principles.¹¹⁵

Throughout February and March 1919, the Provisional Government was influential in the region. Supported by the still-mobilized Turkish divisions beyond the border, it worked to get rid of all external supervision, i.e., that of the British commanders. Muslim bands were formed and attacked the British staff, stole weapons and mobilized the youth of the Province of Kars. A British staff officer observed in the middle of March that “the shura is completely out of hand and cannot be compelled to obey British orders unless the British garrison in Kars is much increased.”¹¹⁶

The resolution of the British military governor-ship was to overthrow the Provisional Government by occupying Kars on April 12-13. Subsequently, Kars was declared to be a part of the Armenian Republic. The Armenian troops which assumed

¹¹⁵Hovannisian, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 205-206.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 212.

the command of Kars began to persecute and force the Muslims to migrate from the region.¹¹⁷ On this occasion, the resisting Turkish-Muslim bands took refuge in secure places (for example, in the *Allahuekber* mountains and Oltu) where they prepared for armed struggle with the aid of the Turkish army centered in Erzurum. Rawlinson, the British Lieutenant-Colonel who was in charge of the application of the armistice in Caucasia, explained the situation by then:

“In Kars Province itself the immediate result of the announcement of its proposed Armenian future was the organization of all the Tartar population throughout the district into more or less military bands, supported and armed by the Turks, now officially considered to have retired behind their pre-war Russian frontier.”¹¹⁸

While a strong resistance had already formed against the Armenian rule, British withdrawal from Caucasia, which would create a serious handicap to the Armenian administration in Kars, began. In fact, Lloyd George cabinet had decided for the withdrawal of the Imperial troops from the region in March 1919, in order to concentrate all available military power upon İstanbul and the Straits, utmost vital strategic points for British interests.¹¹⁹ Thus, by the end of August 1919, all British forces had been withdrawn from Caucasus despite the implorations of the Armenian leaders, who were aware of the fact that they could not confront an attack by the Tartars and Turks due to insufficient military power, especially, arms and

¹¹⁷A. Rawlinson, *Adventures in the Near East 1918-1922*, (London: Andrew Melrose, 1923), pp., 196, 227; Allen and Muratoff, *op. cit.*, p. 498; Nassibian, *op. cit.*, p. 163; T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslar'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezâlimi, 1919*, vol. II, (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1995), pp. 14, 21, 26-34, ff.

¹¹⁸Rawlinson, *ibid.*, p.157.

¹¹⁹Bülent Gökay, *A Clash of Empires Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), pp. 60-61.

ammunition.¹²⁰ Thereafter, full administration of Kars, civil and military, passed into the Republic of Armenia. In order to assure its sovereignty in this region, however, the newly formed Republic had to defeat the Turkish-Muslim resistance.

3.1.5.2. Turkish Resistance in the Six Provinces

Moving from Kars westward and southward, there were the six provinces (vilayât-ı sitte); namely, Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Mamuretü'l-aziz (Elazığ) and Sivas. These provinces had been populated by the Kurds, Turks and Armenians prior to the First World War. At the end of the War, there remained only the Muslim elements due to the Armenian deportation. However, considering the pre-war population, the Armenian authorities claimed the six provinces to form the Turkish Armenia. Turkish resistance was primarily founded to vanquish the Armenian claims over the six provinces by providing the unity of the Kurds and Turks. The Kurdish nationalist activities were intensified in Diyarbekir and Mamuretü'l-aziz, however, for an independent or autonomous Kurdistan including the six provinces, formed a considerable handicap to this end. For this reason, ethnic rivalry in the six provinces was three-fold.

The establishment of the Society for the Defense of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces (Vilâyat-ı Şarkiye Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) in December 1918 can be attributed to the above mentioned framework. The initiative for the foundation of this organization came from Süleyman Nazif, a well-known poet and *Hoca* Raif

¹²⁰Nassibian, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-173.

[Dinç], a Unionist deputy of Erzurum.¹²¹ Several ex-governors and deputies joined the Organization.¹²² The purposes of the Society were to counter adverse propaganda regarding the Armenian deportations during the First World War, to prove to the World that the majority of population in the six provinces was Muslim and, finally, that the Armenians were in minority, even before the outset of the War. In order to propagate these claims, the Society decided to publish two newspapers in İstanbul; *Hadisat* (The Events), to be edited by Suleyman Nazif, and *Le Pays*, to be published in French.¹²³

The establishment of the Society for the Defense of the National Rights in the Eastern Provinces was publicized on December 4 in *Hadisat*. It was stated that a committee was established by esteemed personalities in order to protect national rights of the Turks and Kurds which were dominant elements (unsur-ı galip) in the Eastern Provinces. It was maintained that the Turks and the Kurds formed an overwhelming majority (ekseriyet-i kahire) in the provinces of Erzurum, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Sivas, Mamuretü'l-Aziz and Van. It was argued that Islamic bond had completely removed racial and linguistic (ırk ve lisân) conflicts. It was further

¹²¹Şerafettin Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 127; Zürcher, *Unionist Factor*, p. 91.

¹²²Amongst them were Nedim, ex-governor of Bitlis and chief of the Organization, Ismail Hakki, ex-governor of Beirut, Feyzî, deputy of Diyarbakir, and Rasim, deputy of Sivas. Cevat Dursunoğlu, *Millî Mücadelede Erzurum*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000), p. 30.

¹²³*Ibid.*, p. 32; Haluk Selvi, *Millî Mücadele'de Erzurum (1918-1923)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000), pp. 51-52; Bayram Sakallı, *Millî Mücadele'nin Sosyal Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1997), p. 159.

claimed that no one could be expected among the inhabitants of these provinces to wish and, in fact, could anticipate secession from the Ottoman being.¹²⁴

3.1.5.2.1. Kurdish Nationalism during the Early Armistice Period

Although the statement strongly pinpointed the unity of the Turks and the Kurds within the six provinces, the leading members of the Society were aware of the fact there was a serious challenge for providing a unity between these two elements. This challenge was coming from Kurdish nationalists, who were in search of autonomy or independence of the Kurds, for self-determination. For this purpose, the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Te'ali Cemiyeti) had been founded following the conclusion of the Moudros armistice. Kâzım Karabekir, who would play a very important role in the formation of the Turkish resistance in Erzurum, observed the Kurdish nationalist activities before his departure from İstanbul. On his arrival to Erzurum in the April of 1919 as the General Commander of the 15th Army Corps, he came to the conclusion that what they (the Turkish nationalists) should beware of was the current of Kurdism.¹²⁵

Kurdish nationalism, actually, was not a recent phenomenon at the end of 1918. Contemporary authors argue that its origins can be traced back to the end of the Nineteenth century, to the Sheikh Ubaydallah's uprising in the 1880's. They also

¹²⁴ *Hadisat*, 4 December 1918.

¹²⁵ Kâzım Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*, vol. I, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995), p. 119.

particularly refer to the Armenian Question as a stimulator of the development of Kurdish nationalism.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, modern Kurdish nationalism began following the 1908 Revolution, when Kurdish political and cultural parties and associations were founded.¹²⁷ In short, at the beginning of the armistice period, the Kurdish nationalism was at a point that it could disturb the Ottoman government, and, later, the leaders of the Turkish nationalist movement as becoming part of the Allied intrigues, despite the fact that it was still restricted to notables and students in İstanbul and “could not lead a mass movement.”¹²⁸

Following the conclusion of the Moudros armistice, Kurdish nationalist were

¹²⁶Sheikh Ubaydallah’s attempt to unite and establish independent Kurdistan and the creation of a Kurdish League on behalf of this purpose in 1880’s is the first stage of Kurdish nationalism. Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), pp. 1-7. Behind the Sheikh’s attempt to unite the Kurds was ‘fear of Armenian ascendancy in Kurdistan.’ Jwadih, *op. cit.*, p. 231. For Sheikh Ubeydullah’s movement see *Ibid.*, pp. 212-289; Celîle Celîl, *1880 Şeyh Ubeydullah Nehri Kürt Ayaklanması*, (İstanbul: Pêri Yayınları, 1998); McDowall, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-59. In the Hamidian period, the first Kurdish newspaper, *Kurdistan*, was published by two Bedir Khan brothers, Mikdad Mithat and Abdurrahman, in 1898 in Cairo. The newspaper ‘distinguished itself as being an opposition journal with a Kurdish perspective... *Kurdistan*, while working within the framework of Ottomanism on certain levels, spoke from clearly nationally-oriented perspective.’ Janet Klein, *Claiming the Nation: The Origins and Nature of Kurdish Nationalist Discourse A Study of the Kurdish Press in the Ottoman Empire*, unpublished MA thesis, (Princeton, 1996), pp. 20-27.

¹²⁷Siyamend Othman, “Kurdish Nationalism: Instigators and Historical Influences,” *Armenian Review*, vol. 42, no. 1/165 (Spring 1989), p. 48. The first Kurdish nationalist organization, Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress (Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti), also called Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teâli ve Terakki Cemiyeti), was founded in the summer of 1908 by the “Kurds of prominent families who occupied official positions in the Empire and were influenced by the nationalist ideologies originating from Europe”. Bruinessen, *op. cit.*, p. 275; Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 28; Jwadih, *op. cit.*, p. 297. It was closed down in 1909 due to the Law of Associations, which forbade the formation of political associations bearing the name of ethnic or national groups. In 1911, the Hope Society of Kurdish Students (Kürd Talebe Hevî Cemiyeti) was established by the Kurdish students. Kadri Cemil Paşa (Zinar Silopî), *Doza Kürdistan (Kürdistan Davası) Kürt Milletinin 60 Yıllık Esaretten Kurtuluş Savaşı Hatıraları*, (Ankara: Öz-Ge Yayınları, 1991), p. 34. They published a journal, *Rojî Kürd*, (Kurdish Day) to disseminate their ideas. Klein, *ibid.*, p. 31. The activities of the Society and the publication of the journal ended with the outbreak of the First World War.

¹²⁸Bruinessen, *ibid.*, p. 276.

reactivated under the banner of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, which was the continuation of the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress of 1908.¹²⁹ The members of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan were from a wider spectrum in comparison to the Society for Mutual Aid and Progress in that it extended its influence among Kurdish tribes in the provinces while the Society for Mutual Aid and Progress had confined mainly to educated and urban notables.¹³⁰ Accordingly, the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan established branches in densely Kurdish populated areas such as in Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Harput and Dersim.¹³¹ For this reason, the Society for Defense of National Rights of the Eastern Anatolia had to compete with the Kurdish nationalists to provide the Islamic unity in the region and to get the support of the Kurdish tribal chieftains.

The Society for the Rise of Kurdistan was, like its predecessor, engaged in publication affairs. It published two journals, *Jîn* (Life)¹³² and *Kürdistan*. Both journals acted as forums through which the situation of Kurds was evaluated.¹³³ The articles in *Jîn* was not restricted to current political evaluations, but also dealt with the Kurdish history, literature and language as well as the plight of Kurdish refugees and the situation of the Kurdish women. Amongst the most evaluated political issues

¹²⁹Foundation of the Society was on 17 December 1918. However, this date is disputable. Probably, foundation date of the Society goes earlier, to following conclusion of the Armistice. Its leader was Seyyid Abdülkadir, the son of Sheikh Ubeydullah. İsmail Göldaş, *Kürdistan Teâli Cemiyeti*, (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1991), pp. 12-13.

¹³⁰Bruinessen, *op. cit.*, 278; Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹³¹M. Emîn Bozarşlan, in his introduction to *Jîn*, vol. I, p. 115.

¹³²*Jîn* was reprinted by Mehmet Emin Bozarşlan in Turkish and Kurdish transliterations in 1985 in five volumes. Obtaining these volumes was due to generosity of Prof. Martin van Bruinessen of Utrecht University. Thanks goes to him.

¹³³Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

was the Wilsonian principles, particularly, the principle of self-determination.¹³⁴ It advocated, for this reason, that the [Kurdish representatives should appear before the [Paris] Peace Conference endeavoring to raise and develop (teâli ve tekâmül) the national strength (kuva-i millîye) of Kurdistan.¹³⁵ It was argued that in accordance with the principle of self-determination, Kurdistan should be left to the Kurds. An article in *Jîn* stated that

“We, the Kurds, have not felt the necessity for separation from the Turkish rule, i.e. Ottoman community. Now, we see that Wilson says ‘non-Turks will not be ruled by the Ottomans.’ Our territory is called Kurdistan. There is no Turk except for 2-3 officials. The Kurds are the majority of the population. The Armenians form less than 5 per cent; others only 2 per cent. Therefore, the only nation existing there is the Kurdish. Hence, Kurdistan is the right of none other but the Kurds.”¹³⁶

The establishment of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan and rumoring of demands for an autonomous or independent Kurdistan alarmed the leaders of the Society for the Defense of National Rights of Eastern Anatolia as early as December 1918. They were anxious that the activities of the Kurdish Society would demolish the unity of the Eastern provinces.¹³⁷ For this reason, some of its members decided to meet with *Seyyid Abdülkadir*, the president of the Kurdish Society. At the meeting, *Süleyman Nazif* explained *Abdülkadir* that there was evil ambitions on the Eastern provinces and that the Armenians were coveting on this part of the Motherland. He maintained that Muslim sovereignty in this region was possible only by the unity of

¹³⁴M. E. Bozarslan, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.

¹³⁵Kâmran Alî Bedirhan, “Kürdistan İçin,” *Jîn*, 20 November 1918.

¹³⁶Abdurrahman Rahmi, “Şimdiki Durumumuz,” *Jîn*, 25 December 1918. The quoted part is originally in Kurdish. It was translated by M. E. Bozarslan in his introduction, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹³⁷Dursunoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

the Muslim population. The Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, he claimed, would divide the Kurds and the Turks whereas the Society for the Defense of National Rights of Eastern Anatolia would unite, without racial separation, all the population of the Eastern provinces. The approach of the Kurdish representatives to these verdicts were not affirmative.¹³⁸

In the spring of 1919, a branch of the Society for the Defense of National Rights of Eastern Provinces was established in Erzurum by *Hoca* Raif and *Dursunbeyzade* Cevat [Dursunoğlu], who had gone back to Erzurum in December. This branch was registered to Erzurum governorship on March 10 although its activities had started earlier. At the beginning of April, the Society decided to hold a provincial congress.¹³⁹ The congress was summoned on June 17, following the occupation of İzmir by the Greek troops, when the idea of defense had spread into the remotest corner of the Erzurum province. Therefore, 21 members from all districts of the province joined the congress.¹⁴⁰ Two reports, one was secret, were submitted to the Congress. In the secret report, the Armenian claims as well as the autonomy of Kurdistan was evaluated. It was pointed that the congress had accepted the principle of self-determination; however, the Armenian claims on the Eastern provinces were contradictory with this principle. Regarding the autonomy of Kurdistan, the report stated that it was not possible to separate the Turks from the Kurds. This region, i.e., Eastern Anatolia, would continue to be an integral part of the Ottoman state.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

¹³⁹Selvi, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

¹⁴⁰Dursunoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

In order to prevent Armenian sovereignty over the Eastern Anatolia, the congress decided to establish a cooperative defense with other provinces (Van, Bitlis, Elaziz, Diyarbakir, Sivas and Trabzon) which were under the threat of occupation. It was also decided to summon a congress in Erzurum with the participation of the above mentioned provinces. An appeal was to be sent to these provinces to this effort.¹⁴¹ Finally, the congress decided to eliminate the idea of emigration from the region, to defend the region to the last point in case of any Armenian attack and, as a precaution, to arm the Muslim peasantry in a guard organization.¹⁴²

3.1.5.3. The Formation of the Turkish Resistance at the Black Sea Coast

The center of the Turkish resistance at the Black Sea coast was the province of Trabzon including the districts of Rize, Giresun, Ordu and Gümüşhane, where the Greeks intended the establishment of a Greek state of Pontus. In fact, Trabzon was also claimed by the Armenian authorities as the exit port of the Great Armenia. Therefore, it was a bone of contention among the Turks, Greeks and Armenians. While the Greek and Armenian leaders were forcing the diplomatic channels to obtain the sovereignty of Trabzon, the Turks were laying the foundations of an armed struggle, designed to gain supremacy in the province.

To this end, the Turkish population of Trabzon was organized under umbrella

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 68-69. For the report see Bekir Sıtkı Baykal (ed.), *Erzurum Kongresi ile İlgili Belgeler*, (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1969), pp. 40-52.

¹⁴²Dursunoğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 70-72.

of the Society for the Preservation of Rights in Trabzon (Trabzon Muhafaza-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) which was officially established on February 10, 1919. Its president was *Barutçuzâde* Faik Ahmet [Barutçu], an ex-Unionist who was the Mayor of Trabzon. His son and namesake, Faik Ahmet Bey was the editor of its public voice, the journal named *İstikbâl* (The Future). The publication of this journal had begun on December 10, 1918 in order to counter adverse propaganda of the Greeks and Armenians.¹⁴³ In the same manner with other Defense of Rights Societies, the organization in Trabzon aimed at proving the Allied Powers that the overwhelming majority in the province of Trabzon was Muslim and Turkish. Basing this claim on historical documents and population statistics, the leaders of the Society argued that neither the Greeks nor the Armenians could claim any right on Trabzon in case the Wilsonian principles were applied. In order to defend their arguments, at the first congress of the Society (February 23) they, although in vain, decided to send representatives to the Paris Peace Conference.¹⁴⁴

Besides gathering factual evidences and proofs to prove that Trabzon was the right of Turks, the Society in Trabzon attempted to form armed militia as early as January 1919. In Trabzon, such militia were organized by Ali Rıza, the regiment commander of the province, and *Barutçuzâde* Ahmet Efendi while similar organizations in Giresun, for example, were led by *Topal* (Lame) Osman, who was a famous guerilla leader and frequently demanded by the Allied High-Commissioners

¹⁴³Özel, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 63-65.

to be judged due to his involvement in the atrocities committed against the Greeks and the Armenians during the First World War.¹⁴⁵

Some families, who had local influence in the province of Trabzon, supported the militia and armed the people so as to contribute the extension of the armed organization. For instance, *Serdaroğulları* in Akçaabat; *Tuzcu* and *Mataracaoğulları* around Rize and Hopa; *Sarioğulları* and *Çakıroğulları* in Of were the families who supported the militia forces.¹⁴⁶ Militia were also supported by sailors, who were originally from the Black Sea coast but working in İstanbul. They committed robberies to purchase arms and ammunition, and, sent them to Trabzon where they were received and distributed by a similar organization *Kayıkçılar* (Boastmen). Besides arming the militia, the boast-men in Trabzon organized boycotts along the Black Sea coast against the Greek ships and also refused to carry the Greek refugees from Russia.¹⁴⁷

3.1.5.4. Turkish Resistance in İzmir

The threat of annexation of İzmir to Greece was conceivable as early as the signing of the Moudros armistice. On the arrival of the British monitor, on November 6, 1918, at the Port of İzmir, the Greeks of İzmir, excited and joyful, began to work

¹⁴⁵For this reason, Osman Aga took the mountains as his shelter with his followers. He will appear on the scene during the operations against the Greeks of Pontus and the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion in Koçkiri by the Turkish nationalist forces in 1921-1922. Ömer Sami Çoşar, *Osman Aga 'Topal Osman'*, (İstanbul (?): Harman Yayınları, 1971), pp. 9-12, ff.

¹⁴⁶Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 202.

¹⁴⁷Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 940.

for the annexation of the city to Greece.¹⁴⁸ At the same time, a number of Turkish notables and officials, mostly ex-Unionists, (*Moralızade* Halit and Nail [Moralı], *Menemenlizade* Muvaffak, the inspector of Treasury, Hüseyin Latif, retired major, Naci, the second director of the Ottoman National Bank (İtibar-ı Millî) in İzmir, and Abdurrahman Sami, retired major, viewing the delightful meeting of the British monitor and the Greeks from the balcony and observing the rejoicing of this encounter, decided to establish a society to defend İzmir against the Greeks.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the Society for the Defense of Rights of İzmir (İzmir Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti), which later became the Society for the Defense of Ottoman Rights was established in İzmir.

Until the occupation of İzmir by the Greek troops in May 1919, the Defense of Rights Society in İzmir confined its activities to scientific researches such as in history, population statistics, which would support the argument that İzmir was an inseparable part of the Turkish homeland.¹⁵⁰ Accordingly, it aimed influencing the Allied decision concerning the destiny of İzmir.¹⁵¹ The Society, in the meantime, had a meeting with the support of *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth) on March 13, and a regional congress between March 17-19.

At the end of the demonstrative meeting of March 13, a memorandum was submitted to the representatives of the Allied Powers in İzmir. In this memorandum,

¹⁴⁸ İlhan Tekeli-Selim İlkin, *Ege'deki Sivil Direnişten Kurtuluş Savaşı'na Geçerken Uşak Heyet-i Merkeziyesi ve İbrahim [Tahtakılıç] Bey*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), pp. 58-60.

¹⁴⁹ Taçalan, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-109.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

¹⁵¹ Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

it was claimed that no foreign sovereignty was acceptable in the province of [Aydın]. The majority of the population, it was argued, was Turkish and the Turks owned much of the movable and immovable property in the district of İzmir.¹⁵² Hundred sixty-five delegates from İzmir, Aydın, Denizli, Muğla, Manisa and Balıkesir attended the congress of March 17-19. The congress decided to send a memorandum similar to the one previously presented in İzmir to the Allied representatives in Paris via the Allied High-Commissioners in İstanbul.¹⁵³ Following the occupation of İzmir on May 15, some of the members of the Society maintained their activities in İstanbul while some moved to the interior and joined the local resistance organizations of Western Anatolia.¹⁵⁴

Before concluding formation of local Turkish resistances, it should be pointed out that in Cilicia, where a fierce Turco-Armenian struggle would be witnessed in 1920, a Turkish/Muslim resistance had not emerged, looking from the outset of the armistice period. It is true that some of the ex-deputies and notables of the province of Adana founded the Society for Defense of Rights of Adana (Adana Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, also called Kilikyalılar Cemiyeti) following the occupation of Adana (December 5) by the French troops, composed of more Armenians than the

¹⁵²Taçalan, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, pp. 140-143.

¹⁵⁴Society for the Defense of Ottoman Rights in Manisa (January 23, 1919) and Society for the Defense of National Rights in Edremit, Burhaniye and Its Vicinity (March 4, 1919) had been already established. Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

French.¹⁵⁵ The purposes of this society was not different than the others (proving that the majority of population was Turkish and appealing to the Allied Powers for the application of Wilsonian principles). Contrary to previously mentioned societies, the founders of the Society for the Defense of Rights in Adana did not establish organic ties with the province of Adana. As a result, there was no other resistance except for the instant one in this region¹⁵⁶ until the nationalist Congress of Sivas (4-11 September 1919) decided to organize.¹⁵⁷ In fact, following the French occupation, most of the Muslims-Turks of Cilicia migrated to the interior (*Ulukışla, Konya, Kayseri, Karaman*) to escape from Armenian brutalities to revenge the persecutions of the First World War. The Armenian participation in the occupations and the repatriation of those deported was seen as the first step towards establishment of an Armenian administration under French protection.¹⁵⁸ This perception grew stronger following the French take over of the military administration of the region from the British by November 1, 1919.¹⁵⁹ At about the same time, the Turkish nationalists were organizing to defeat the French and expel the Armenians from Cilicia, as we will see in the following chapters.

¹⁵⁵*Türk İstiklâl Harbi I*, p. 92. Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 28; Kemal Çelik, *Millî Mücadele'de Adana ve Havalisi (1918-1922)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), p. 128-129; Sakallı, *op. cit.*, p. 220

¹⁵⁶For instance, initial resistance was held against the Armenians attacking villages in *Dört Yol* in December 1918. This resistance has been claimed to be the outset of the Turkish War of Independence. Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Millî Kurtuluş Tarihi 1838'den 1995'e*, vol. III, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1996), p. 1267. See also Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 220.

¹⁵⁷Avcıoğlu, *ibid.*, p. 1273.

¹⁵⁸Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 217.

¹⁵⁹ Cilicia was administered by a group of French officers led by Colonel E. Brémond under the direct orders of the British General Allenby since early 1919. Brémond, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

3.1.6. Ethnic Groups (Greeks, Armenians and Kurds) at the Paris Peace Conference

While tension was gradually increasing among ethno-religious groups in Anatolia, the representatives of the Allied Powers gathered in Paris for the formulation of peace treaties with the defeated powers; Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. The leaders of the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds were there too, in order to reaffirm their territorial claims in Anatolia and submit their formal proposals according to the Wilson's twelfth-point.

It has been pointed out that the Allied Powers had already declared to liberate the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire and grant them national recognition, had yet clearly defined, before the conclusion of the First World War. They were also in agreement on the establishment of an Armenian state. In other words, ethnicity was to be the cornerstone of the Allied resolution in reshaping Ottoman territories. To this effort, Britain and France, on November 9, 1918, issued a joint-declaration by which they repeated their war commitments regarding the resolution of the nationality question in the Ottoman Empire. According to this declaration, the two Entente Powers was to assure:

“the complete and final emancipation of all these peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples of themselves. To realize this, France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving, and to recognize those governments immediately after they effectively established...”¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Cumming, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

Therefore, the outline of the resolution of the nationality question in the Ottoman Empire was already apparent when the Peace Conference summoned with only the details, i.e., frontiers, left to agree upon.

The Peace Conference began its work on January 18, 1919. The Supreme Council of the Conference (Council of Four) adopted the following resolution concerning the territorial resettlement of the Ottoman Empire (January 30):

“...the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia and Kurdistan,¹⁶¹ Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.”¹⁶²

3.1.6.1. Territorial Claims of Greece in Anatolia

The Greek claims in Anatolia were submitted by Eleutherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, to the Paris Peace Conference. Venizelos, on February 3-4, appeared before the Council of Ten to explain and justify claims of Greece. Actually, he had already publicized his views regarding the Turkish settlement and claims of Greece by a memorandum sent to Lloyd George in early November 1918. At the end of the year, he also distributed to the delegations of the Allied Powers a memorandum entitled *Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919*.¹⁶³ Exposition of

¹⁶¹It should be pointed out that the separation of Kurdistan from the Ottoman Empire was a recent development. This decision was the favor of Britain, whose interest laid in creating a buffer between Armenia and Mesopotamia so as to prevent the Ottoman state to retain control in the region. This would also give Britain a firmer hold on Mosul. Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Cumming, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹⁶²Helmreich, *ibid.*, pp. 26-27; Cumming, *ibid.*, p. 72; Gidney, *op. cit.*, p. 80

¹⁶³Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 72. This memorandum was published in 1918 in English and French. A revised translation from the French original was published for the American-Hellenic Society by Oxford University Press American Branch. It is this copy which would be used in this study.

Venizelos before the Council of Ten was based on this study.¹⁶⁴ According to this, territorial claims of Greece included territories in the Balkan Peninsula, Thrace, Constantinople, Asia Minor and the Aegean Islands.¹⁶⁵

In the Balkan Peninsula, the question was Northern Epirus, which is outside the limits of this study. Regarding Thrace, Venizelos evaluated Greco-Bulgarian conflict for this region. While he explained why Western Thrace should not be left to Bulgaria, he proposed the annexation of both Western and Eastern Thrace to Greece.¹⁶⁶ For Constantinople, he argued that the natural solution after the suppression of the Ottoman reign was to adjudge Constantinople and its vicinity to Greece, while the freedom of the Straits would be secured by international guarantees. However, if the League of Nations was established, Constantinople and the Straits should form an international state, with a sufficient hinterland, under the protection of this League.¹⁶⁷

In Western Anatolia, Venizelos claimed a territory which would be comprised of the Aegean Islands, a part of the province of Bursa and all of the province of Aydin, with the exception of the district of Denizli. In this territory, he asserted that there were 1,188,359 Greeks and 1,042,050 Muslims. Venizelos' claims over these

¹⁶⁴Venizelos's statements before the Council of Ten can be followed in *The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. III, pp. 856-875.

¹⁶⁵Eleutherios Venizelos, *Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919 A Memorandum Dealing with the Rights of Greece*, (New York, 1919).

¹⁶⁶The frontiers would "start from the summit of Koula (Kouhlar Dag) on the present Greco-Bulgarian northeastern frontier, thence following the course of Arda down to its confluence with the Maritza and then along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1913 to the northeast of Kirkkilise, as far as Cape Iniada." *Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919*, p. 6.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 19.

territories was based not only on statistical data proving the Greek majority but also on the assertion that it “geographically and historically formed a specially distinct and a separate region.”¹⁶⁸ Having distinct geographical characteristics from the Central Asia Minor, the western part had been in close relations with Greece throughout history and, in fact, had been enhanced by Greek civilization. For this reason, Western Asia Minor belonged to Greece more than to the Asiatic hinterland. As to the north-east of Anatolia, where the Pontus state was to be established, Venizelos argued that the [six]Armenian provinces with Russian Armenia should form an independent state under the mandatory of the League of Nations. The province of Trabzon, the center of a probable Pontus state with its 350,000 Greek population, should constitute a part of the Armenian state. The same was valid for the province of Adana, which comprised 70,000 Greeks.¹⁶⁹

With regards to the Greeks outside of Western Asia Minor, which would remain under the Turkish domination, Venizelos proposed a voluntary exchange of populations among the Greeks inhabiting in the Turkish territory and the Muslims inhabiting in the “Greek” Asia Minor as a resolution of the final peace settlement. Thus, in the course of a few years, according to Venizelos, the people living within the boundaries of the Turkish state would be composed exclusively of Muslims, while the Greeks would become overwhelming in the “Greek” Asia Minor.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22; *The Paris Peace Conference III*, p. 869-870.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20; *The Paris Peace Conference III*, pp. 872-873.

¹⁷⁰ *The Paris Peace Conference III*, p. 872.

After Venizelos' exposition, the Council of Ten decided to form an expert committee to co-ordinate all the facts. This committee would be composed of the representatives of the United States of America, of Britain, of France and of Italy and would be charged "to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement." The Conference would decide upon the reports of this committee.¹⁷¹

3.1.6.2. Armenian Question at the Peace Conference

At the outset of the Peace Conference, there were two Armenian delegations to display the Armenian claims. The one officially recognized by the Allies was the Armenian National delegation, led by Boghos Nubar Pasha, who represented the Turkish Armenians. The second delegation, led by Avetis Aharonian, represented the Republic of Armenia. The two delegations were united on February 24 and formed the "All-Armenia Delegation" (Délégation de l'Arménie Intégrale), which was led by Boghos Nubar.¹⁷²

The united Armenian delegation appeared before the Supreme Council on February 26. It presented the Armenian case by a Memorandum titled *The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference*.¹⁷³ In this memorandum, initially, A.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 875.

¹⁷² Gidney, *op. cit.*, p. 85. There were some forty independent Armenian delegations in addition to these two main delegations at the Peace Conference, which lobbied intensely. Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 48

¹⁷³ The text of Memorandum is available in the *General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace 1918-1919*, 185.5136/12; the text was reprinted in the *Armenian Review*, vol. 27, 3-107 (Autumn 1974), pp. 227-259. For the statements of representatives of the Armenian case see *The Paris Peace Conference IV*, pp. 147-157.

Aharonian and Boghos Nubar explained their devotion to the Allies during the First World War. Boghos Nubar claimed that it was this devotion which was one of the reasons for the massacres and deportations of the Armenians. He added:

“If to the victims of massacres and deportations, be added our losses on the field of battle, it will appear that the tribute of life paid by Armenia is heavier than that of any other belligerent nation.. Armenia has earned her independence by the arms and the blood of her children.”¹⁷⁴

Therefore, “the War of Peoples, followed by the Peace of Peoples, must [necessarily] give Armenia her complete Independence.”¹⁷⁵ Regarding territorial delimitation of the Armenian State, Aharonian and Boghos Nubar claimed that independent Armenia should include:

1. The seven vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Diyarbekir, Harput, Sivas, Erzurum and Trabzon, excluding the regions situated beyond the South of Tigris and to the West of the line between Ordu-Sivas;
2. The four Cilician sandjaks, i.e., Maraş, Kozan (Sis), Cebel-i Bereket and Adana with Alexandretta (İskenderun);
3. The territory of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus including also the province of Kars, with the exception of the region to the north of Ardahan.¹⁷⁶

With regards to their territorial claims in Eastern Anatolia, the Armenian delegation pointed out that the Kurds, comprised of sedentary and nomadic elements, inhabited in region called Kurdistan, situated in the south of Diyarbekir and Van

¹⁷⁴*The Paris Peace Conference IV*, p. 152.

¹⁷⁵*The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference*, p. 3.

¹⁷⁶*The Paris Peace Conference IV*, p. 153; *The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference*, p. 5.

(Hakkari). It was possible to detach these territories from the Armenian State. The Kurds, who would remain in the territories of Armenia, would live under the protection of the Armenian laws.

As to the province of Trabzon, the representatives of Armenia recognized that the Greek population was higher here but the port of Trabzon was the only important outlet for the whole of Upper Armenia on the Black Sea. Hence a part of this province should be attached to Armenia. The Greek inhabitants would be respected for their religion and language by the Armenian administration under a rule of brotherhood and equal justice.¹⁷⁷

For Cilicia, the Armenian delegation argued that, geographically, historically and ethnically, it was an integral part of Armenia and was its natural outlet in the Mediterranean. If the Armenians were deprived of Cilicia, and separated from the natural ports of Mersin and Yumurtalık (Ayas), they would be

“condemned to languish in the mountains, without intercourse with the Mediterranean world, without the power to breathe, and, Armenia would thus be deprived of her lungs. Her life and future are on the Mediterranean.”¹⁷⁸

The territorial claims of the Armenian delegation was followed by a program which aimed at liberation from Turkish yoke, assurance of the joint protection of the Allied Powers to prevent any aggression against Armenia from outside and also the

¹⁷⁷*The Paris Peace Conference IV*, p. 153; *The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference*, pp. 4-6.

¹⁷⁸*The Paris Peace Conference IV*, pp. 153-154; *The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference*, pp. 5-6.

acquisition of a temporary guidance by one of the Powers in the form of mandate in order to administer and organize Armenia.¹⁷⁹ In the first place, the program stipulated the recognition of an independent Armenian state, including of seven provinces, of Cilicia and the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus. Its boundaries was to be determined by boundary-fixing missions composed of delegates from the guarantor powers as well as Armenian commissioners. Secondly, thus constituted Armenian state would be placed under the protection of the Allied Powers and the United States or under the League of Nations. Additionally suggested that a special mandate should be given by the Peace Conference to one of the Powers to lend the necessary assistance to Armenia during a period of transition (the Armenian delegation should be consulted about the choice of mandatory power.) Moreover, for making good the damages of all kinds suffered by the Armenians through massacres, deportations, spoliation and devastation of Armenia, an indemnity should be fixed by the Peace Conference. Finally, the assisting power would be responsible:

a. To oblige the Turkish, Tartar, and other authorities who still occupy these territories to evacuate them.

b. To carry out the general disarmament of the population.

c. To expel and to punish those who have participated in the massacres, done violence to the population, taken part in plunders or benefited from the spoils of the victims.

d. To drive out of the country the elements of disturbance and disorder; and to expel the nomadic tribes.

e. To send away the mouhadjirs, Mussulman colonists, imple[me]nted under the Hamidian rule and that of the Young Turks.

¹⁷⁹Statement of Boghos Nubar Pasha, *The Paris Peace Conference IV*, p. 156.

f. Lastly to have all necessary steps taken everywhere, in Armenia and outlying districts, for the return to their former Christian Faith of all women, young girls, children and others converted by force to Islamism or kept active in Harems...”

As concluding remarks, the program stated that Turkey should undertake the restoration of the movable and immovable Armenian properties as well as churches, schools, monasteries which had been taken from the Armenian community during the First World War with fair indemnity.¹⁸⁰

From the beginning, the Allied Powers were unwilling to make any specific commitment on the Armenian claims. Paradoxically, all had been pledged to the general concept of an Armenian state. None of them, however, desired for direct involvement in the establishment and support of an Armenian state. It was because, the creation of such a state would necessitate a great deal of political, military and economic commitments, for which they were reluctant. For this reason, the Allies would fervently work for an American commitment to undertake the Armenian mandate.¹⁸¹

3.1.6.3. Claims of the Pontine Greeks

The establishment of an independent Pontus state which would hold all the Greeks inhabited along the Black Sea coast had been decided at a conference summoned in Athens in October 1917. In this respect, two congresses were held in

¹⁸⁰*The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference*, pp. 7-8; Gidney, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

¹⁸¹Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

Marseilles in February and November 1918.¹⁸² Following the last congress, a memorandum was communicated to the Allied Powers exposing the territorial claims of the Greeks in Pontus.¹⁸³ This memorandum was received by the Foreign Office on December 2 and registered by Arnold Toynbee, then working at the Foreign Section of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference, with an annotation, which stated that the statistics and boundaries were imaginary. Pontus, he added, would be dependent to Armenia.¹⁸⁴ Actually, the Allied Powers, particularly Britain, favored annexing the east of Giresun-Sivas-Mersin line, including Trabzon, claimed to be the center of a Pontus State, to Armenia.¹⁸⁵ Likewise, Venizelos, in his statement to the Peace Conference, argued that he was not in favor of the establishment of a Pontus State and, the province of Trabzon should form a part of the Armenian State.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, in early 1919, it was not prophecy to argue that the Pontus cause would not be supported by the Allied Powers.

Whether aware of this fact or not, the representative of the Pontus region, Chrysanthos, the metropolitan of Trabzon, submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference on behalf of the “unredeemed Greeks”.¹⁸⁷ He claimed that in the Pontus region which included the province of Trabzon, some parts of the province of Sivas

¹⁸²Meanwhile, Central Unity of Pontus (Pontus Merkez Birliđi) was founded in Krasnodar in October 1918. Yerasimos, “Pontus Meselesi,” pp. 367-368.

¹⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 381; “Trabzon İmparatorluđu İhya Teşebbüsü,” *Vakit*, 6 December 1918.

¹⁸⁴Jaeschke, *İngiliz Belgeleri*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁸⁵Memorandum of the British Cabinet, February 7, 1919, cited in Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. I, p. 270.

¹⁸⁶*The Paris Peace Conference III*, pp. 872-873.

¹⁸⁷*La Question du Pont-Euxin* Memoire soumis à la Conférence de la Paix par S. E. Mgr Chrysanthos, 2 Mai 1919. For the Turkish version of this memorandum see *Pontus Meselesi*, ed. by Yılmaz Kurt, (Ankara: TBMM Yayınları, 1995), pp. 107-110.

(the districts of Karahisar and Amasya) and a small portion of the province of Kastamonu (Sinop), there were more than 600,000 Pontine Greeks. In addition, 250,000 Greeks who had migrated to Southern Russia and Caucasia awaiting repatriation, should be added to the above number. On the other hand, there were 836,000 Muslims, comprised of Turks and ethnically non-Turks from Sürmene, Of and Caucasia, and 78,000 Armenians. Furthermore, some of Muslim groups were actually Greeks converted to Islam following the Ottoman conquest. He maintained that the Greeks proved their ability to administer during and after the Russian invasion of this region. On these basis, the Pontus region should definitely be independent Greek state, should comprise of the whole province of Trabzon and the districts of Samsun, Sinop, Amasya, and Karahisar. Chrysanthos, finally, remarked that he was willful to strengthen relations with Armenia on the condition of complete independence of the two states.¹⁸⁸

3.1.6.4. Kurdish Claims

The Kurds were represented by Şerif Paşa, the ex-Ottoman Ambassador to Sweden. Initially, he had been chosen as a delegate, fully authorized to act on behalf of the Ottoman state at the Peace Conference, to safeguard the rights and claims of the Muslim people by the Ottoman Liberal Party (Hürriyetperveran Fırkası) in

¹⁸⁸*La Question du Pont-Euxin*, 1-6; Kurt, *ibid.*, pp. 107-110; Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 594.

Geneva.¹⁸⁹ Soon after, however, he appeared as the president of the Kurdish Delegation to the Peace Conference.¹⁹⁰ It may be argued that Şerif Pasha's turn to represent the Kurds rather than Muslims was due to the widespread sympathy shown to the Armenian claims at the expense of Kurdish territories during peace negotiations. In fact, Kurdish nationalist effort was spent mainly to demonstrate the Allied Powers that historically, ethnologically and statistically, the territories in the Eastern Anatolia which were claimed to be Armenian, actually, belonged to the Kurds. Therefore, in his explanations to the Peace Conference, Şerif Pasha set his demands against "imperialistic claims of Armenia."¹⁹¹ Similarly, Seyyid Abdülkadir, a member of the Ottoman Senate (Meclis-i Ayan) and the leader of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, stated in a memorandum submitted to Lewis Heck, the Acting Commissioner of the United States in İstanbul, that "the Kurds constituted grand majority in Kurdistan and, in any part, they exceeded 25 per cent of the total population."¹⁹² Süreyya Bedirkhan, General Secretary of the Committee for Kurdish Independence in Cairo, sent a telegram to the American Ministry of Foreign Affairs and protested "the decision of the Armenian Congress who presume to include for themselves the historic patrimony of the Kurds."¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ *İkdam*, 21 January 1919, cited in Sarihan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 104; *General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace 1918-1919*, 867.00/56.

¹⁹⁰ *Yenigün*, 21 March 1919.

¹⁹¹ "Notes on the Claims of Kurds," 6 February 1919, *General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace 1918-1919*, 185.5133/2; "Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People," 22 March 1919, *ibid.*, 185.5133/3

¹⁹² *General Records of American Mission to Negotiate Peace*, 28 March 1919, 867.00/83.

¹⁹³ *General Records of American Mission to Negotiate Peace*, 8 February 1919, 867.00/82.

Şerif Pasha drew the frontiers of Turkish Kurdistan from “Ziven in the north, on the Caucasian frontier, to Erzerum, Erzindjan, Kemah, Arabkir, Behismi, and Divick in the West; following the line Haran, the Sindjihar Hills, Tel Asfar, Erbil, Kerkuk, Suleimanie, Akk-el-man, Sinna in the South; extended into Ravandiz, Bash-Kale, Vizir-Kale, that is, the Persian frontier as far as Mount Ararat in the East.”¹⁹⁴ After explaining how these parts belonged to the Kurds, he concluded that in conformity with the Wilsonian Principles “everything pleads in favor of the Kurds for the creation of a Kurd [ish] state, entirely free and independent.” He asked the Peace Conference to appoint an international commission in order to determine its frontiers in accordance with the principle of nationality.¹⁹⁵

The representatives of the Ottoman state were to appear before the Peace Conference in June 1919. Nevertheless, soon after the opening of the Conference, the Ottoman government stated its point of view regarding the territorial resettlement of the Ottoman state by a memorandum submitted to the High Commissioners of the Allied Powers. In this memorandum, the Ottoman government refused all claims of Greece on Thrace, İstanbul, the provinces of Aydin and Hüdavendigâr, and claimed that the overwhelming Muslim majority of these parts of the Ottoman Empire had been indicated by the foreign statistics.¹⁹⁶

Regarding the resettlement in the six provinces, it was argued that the Muslims, who were the amalgamation of the Turks and the Kurds, had formed 79 per

¹⁹⁴“Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd [ish] People,” p. 1.

¹⁹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁹⁶“Hükümetimizin Sulh Konferansına Gönderdiği Mühim Muhtıra,” *Sabah*, 3 March 1919.

cent of the total population while the Armenians did only 16,5 per cent (according to the pre-War statistics).

For this reason, the establishment of a Great Armenia extending from the Caucasus into Cilicia could not be taken into consideration. Instead, the Ottoman government proposed two resolutions to be considered. The first was the acknowledgement of the Ottoman sovereignty in the six provinces. In this case, the minority (in the six provinces, i.e., the Armenians) would be granted the right of free development. In addition, those Armenians who had inhabited in the six provinces before the War would be allowed to resettle there. Secondly, the borders of the Armenian Republic could be extended as much as to include all the Armenian refugees in Caucasia and Zor. If this resolution was accepted, the Muslims in the territory of the Armenian Republic, would be resettled in the Ottoman provinces.¹⁹⁷

In the light of the above presented socio-political circumstances, it may be argued that ethnic tension was the prevailing situation in the post-War Anatolia. As a matter of fact, the nationality policy of the Unionists during the First World War had already created such a tension; however, following the signing of the Moudros Armistice, it evolved into polarization due to the conflicting territorial claims of ethnic groups in Anatolia, secession demands and excesses of the Christian minorities and the internal and external pressure for the trial of the Unionists, who were advocators of the Turkish nationalist cause.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.* There is no clear statement in this memorandum regarding the direction of the extension of the Armenian Republic.

By the time that İzmir was occupied by the Greek troops, all actors of the ethnic conflicts in Anatolia, as far as this study is concerned, had emerged. The occupation of İzmir (May 15, 1919) was, in fact, the point at which ethnic tension reached its climax. Ironically, the most benefited from this development were the Turkish nationalists, who rejected any territorial claim in Anatolia but of the Turkish-Muslim element. The landing of Greek troops into İzmir became, by the definition of a British commander, Heathcote-Smith, the key of the Turkish nationalist movement in that it stimulated the resistance movements to evolve into a more organized, coordinated and unified nationalist movement throughout 1919.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸Smith reported A. Calthorpe, the High Commissioner of Britain in İstanbul, the emergence of the Turkish nationalist movement in the following words: "The real fear of being massacred by Greeks and Armenians -adroitly fanned- the actual loss of an indefinite and growing slice of Turkey together with and around the capital city of Asia Minor, the rumors of a coming Pontine Republic and an independent Armenia, and the conviction that the Greeks slipped into Smyrna thanks to the Allies (so that henceforth they are told to suspect a Greek or Armenian army lurking behind each Allied force landed) the cumulative effect of all these facts and fears produces an atmosphere that for a National Defense Movement is almost ideal. Bilâl N. Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), p. 60.

CHAPTER IV

TURKISH NATIONALISTS ON THE SCENE

4.1. The Landing of the Greek Troops into İzmir and Its Aftermath

If there was a development that made armed conflict inevitable among the rivaling ethnic groups in Anatolia in the post-World War I period, it probably was the occupation of İzmir with much bloodshed by the Greek troops in May 1919. It was because İzmir's occupation alarmed all Turkish resistance organizations in regions exposed the possibility of an occupation by the Greeks and the Armenians. This provided the Turkish nationalists ample causes to incite and organize the Muslim people for armed resistance against the concrete threats.

The occupation of İzmir was received by the Turkish public as an initial step for further partition of Anatolia by the Allies (this was natural because the desire of Greece to annex İzmir had already been known), despite the fact that the decision reflected dislike of Britain and France toward the extension of Italian occupation in Western Anatolia. Italy, being deprived of the Adriatic ports of Fiume and Trieste, at the same time, not allowed to occupy the region, reserved previously for it (by the secret treaties of 1915-1917), started to land its troops in Anatolia by the end of March 1919. As an initial step, they entered Antalya on March 28 and rapidly

advanced into Kuşadası, Fethiye, Bodrum, and Marmaris.¹ The aggressive attitude of Italy, which created “a menace to peace, even in the middle of conference of Peace”² caused the Allies, fearing an Italian control over Western Anatolia, to have a quick decision on the destiny of İzmir.

In consequence, the immediate consideration of the Allied Powers on behalf of their decision for the occupation of İzmir by Greece seems to have been preventing Italy from gaining the control of İzmir region.³ This solution was especially favorable to Britain since Greece was considered to be the agent of British interests in the Mediterranean.⁴ Under such circumstances, decision for the Greek occupation of İzmir was taken on May 6, when the Italian representatives were absent from the Peace Conference due to the mentioned disagreement on the Adriatic ports.⁵

For a more thorough look at the occupation, a reference should be made to the fact that as early as March 14, 1919, Lewis Heck, the Acting Commissioner of the United States in İstanbul, sent a message to the Department of State in which he related the objections of the non-Greek foreign residents of the city to a probable Greek landing to İzmir. This message conveyed that handing the region to Greece would mean there would be no trade and development opportunities for any others but the Greek. In addition, the Greek government had never administered reasonably.

¹Turan, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 75.

²The statement of Woodrow Wilson, see Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 95;

³Evans, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

⁴Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁵Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1922,) pp. 77-78.

More important was the possibility of a second Macedonian problem with the Turks. As a result of such a probable landing, the Turks would lose the Greek properties they had taken possession of, and would also be compelled to retreat further into Asia Minor. The message signified that, in this case, rather than withdrawing as they should, they would resist to any Greek attempt to assume control. On the other hand, the Greek refugees who had a well-justified grievance for their enforced departure and loss of nearly all their movable and immovable properties, were desirous of returning to the mainland from Greece and from the Islands. If they came in large numbers and armed, there would certainly be some unfortunate incidents.⁶

The presumptions of this message did become actual facts at once by the Greek landing into İzmir and the following occupations. Actually, the occupation would inevitably lead to clashes between the two groups since it necessitated the extension of the occupation zone and the imposition of harsh measures against any kind of resistance. Accordingly, the occupation was to be followed by the repatriation of the deported Greeks from the Aegean Islands as well as the settlement of the people of the mainland into the occupied zones with the purpose of obtaining the majority of population in Western Anatolia.⁷

Consequently, approximately 2,000 Turks were killed in İzmir and its vicinity within forty-eight hours after the occupation. Robbing and looting went hand in hand

⁶Department of State, 867.00/860

⁷Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 21; Engin Berber, "Kurtuluşun Sonra İzmir'de Yunan İşgal Dönemine Tepkiler," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. III, no. 8 (March 1987), pp. 448-449.

with killing.⁸ Similar violations were repeated as the Greek occupation extended into Menemen (May 21), Manisa (May 26), and Turgutlu (May 29) in east of İzmir; towards south, to Aydın on May 27, and, in the north to Ayvalık on 29. The Greek atrocities and mistreatment was exhibited by the report of the *Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Its Adjacent Territories*, formed by the decision of Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference on July 18, 1919.⁹

⁸T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk İstiklâl Harbi III/ Batı Cephesi*, (Ankara: Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Yayınları, 1994), p. 44; Evans, op. cit., p. 180.

⁹D. B. F. P., vol. I, p. 142. The complete text of the report in French form can be found in B. D. F. P., vol. II, pp. 237-258. Its English version takes place in the *Paris Peace Conference*, vol. IX, pp. 44-73. It has been also recently reproduced by Çağrı Erhan in *Greek Occupation of İzmir and Adjoining Territories*, (Ankara: Strategic Research Center, 1999), pp. 51-81. Actually, many evidences (reports, memoirs and studies) have been published on the Greek atrocities and mistreatment during the occupation of İzmir and its vicinity. The report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry has a particular significance in this regard since it confirmed what had happened immediately after the Greek occupation through the eyes of the Allied representatives. This Commission composed of United States of America, Britain, France and Italy's representatives. Its report was submitted to the Supreme Council on October 14, 1919. It was written in three parts. In the first part, there was a detailed account of the events conducted following the occupation of İzmir, which were verified through the inquiry between August 12 and October 6, 1919. In the second part, the responsibilities were established. The Commission openly stated that the responsibility for events in Smyrna and its vicinity following the Greek occupation was that of the Greek government. Finally, the Commission presented its conclusions and recommendations. According to these, the occupation of Smyrna, which in principle was to store order, had actually a complete determination of annexation. For this reason, if the purpose of the occupation was to maintain order, it should not be done by the Greeks but the Allied troops. The occupation of the Greeks should not continue unless the peace Conference was resolved the complete and definite annexation of the country to Greece. However, that annexation would be contrary to the principle which respected national rights since the Turkish population dominated the Greek population except for Smyrna itself and Ayvalı[k]. In addition, the Commission felt the necessity to point out that the Turkish national sentiment, which had already demonstrated its resistance, would not accept this annexation. Under these conditions, the Commission recommended for relieving of the Greek troops by smaller contingents of Allied troops as soon as possible. It stated that if the Greek troops took part in the occupation, they should be distributed in the occupied region in order to avoid their confrontation with the Turkish national forces. In case of their replacement by those of the Allied Powers, the Turkish government was to be asked to reorganize the gendarmerie under the command of inter-allied officers. Thereafter, the same government should restore the civilian administration in the region. Thus, the leaders of the Turkish national movement would be deprived of any motive for armed resistance.

Before the occupations extended, Venizelos had ordered military authorities to arm the local Greeks and to resettle 300,000 Greek refugees on behalf of the decision of the Allied Commission. Furthermore, he gave instruction for the occupation of Aydın as soon as possible before Italy took action.¹⁰ Thus, thousands of Greeks from Greece and the Aegean Islands followed the advancement of the Greek Army. Houses were occupied and the Muslim inhabitants were forced to evacuate dwellings. Atrocities and mistreatments were committed against the Muslims, usually by Greek brigands, as the Armenians did in Cilicia in the early Armistice period. Under these circumstances Muslims in masses moved to the interior, into more secure areas.¹¹

Consequently, 80,000-120,000 people were estimated to emigrate under the pressure of Greek troops.¹² This situation alarmed the Ottoman Ministry of War. The minister sent a télégram to military units within the region to prohibit the migration of the Muslims.¹³ He also warned the Government about the probable consequences of such a migration. On this occasion, the Council of Ministers decided to charge the ministers of War and Interior to take preventive measures on the emigration of the

¹⁰*Türk İstiklâl Harbi III*, pp. 64-65; Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 24; Engin Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar: İzmir 1918-1922*, (Ankara: Ayraç Yayınları, 1997), p. 227.

¹¹Resisting the occupying powers was not a general tendency, speaking for the outset of the Greek occupations; Muslim-Turkish population preferred to migrate Nevertheless, in some towns, the Greeks were confronted with fierce resistance, for example, were able to occupy Ödemiş after a long struggle while they had to evacuate Bergama as a result of the resistance of the Turkish forces. Berber, *ibid.*, p. 229.

¹²Cengiz Orhonlu, "Yunan İşgalinin Meydana Getirdiği Göç ve Yunanlıların Yaptıkları 'Tehcir'in Sonuçları Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler,' *Bellekten*, vol. XXXVII, no. 148 (October 1973), p. 488; Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar...*, p. 235.

¹³*İkdam*, 28 May 1919.

Turks-Muslims from Western Anatolia (June 1) in order to prevent the formation of Greek majority.¹⁴

Thereupon, the Ministry of Interior forbid the emigration of Muslims of Western Anatolia and demanded local authorities not to permit their departure.¹⁵ This measure proved to be ineffective, however. At the end of September, there were about 120-130,000 Muslims who were out of the Greek occupied territories. The Ottoman government formed a committee called *İ'ade Heyeti* (Restitution Committee) in order to resettle them. One section of this committee was charged to look upon the north region of İzmir including Manisa, Menemen, Soma, Bergama, and Balıkesir. Another one was to follow the South region, beginning from Manisa to Denizli, Nazilli, Söke, Çine, and Koçarlı.¹⁶

While the Greek troops, regular and irregular, were forcing the Muslim population to migrate, followed a systematic settlement policy. Although the intention was to install about 300,000 Greeks as it has been stated above, only about 100,000 were settled until December 1920. These were settled into the places where a great number of Greeks had been deported by the Unionists in 1914; for instance, Çeşme, Bergama, Karaburun, Foça and Ayvalık.¹⁷

¹⁴Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 123-124. The emigration of the Muslim people from the Greek occupied places and its attendant consequences made the headlines in the Turkish press. It was frequently stated that the emigration of the Muslims would serve to the political ambitions of Greece in that the evacuated places were to be filled by the Greek refugees. The Ottoman government, for this reason, should be vigilant since Greece would also settle Greeks who were not native of the region in order to demonstrate that the majority of population was Greek in case of a plebiscite. "Rum Muhacirleri I-II," *Sabah*, 11-12 June 1919; *İkdam*, 12 June 1919.

¹⁵*İkdam*, 15 June 1919.

¹⁶*İkdam*, 30 September 1919.

¹⁷Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar...*, pp. 321-322; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

4.2. Turkish Reaction

The news concerning the occupation of İzmir and atrocities committed by the Greeks disseminated to every corner of Anatolia. It was followed by public reaction, especially in places under Greek and Armenian threats. Initial reactions were in form of protesting the Allies by sending telegrams to the Allied representatives in İstanbul and the Ottoman government. Subsequently, meetings were held in several provinces and districts; and, immense demonstrations were organized in İstanbul.¹⁸ At the same time, many political parties and Societies for Defense of Rights came together and submitted a memorandum to the representatives of the Allies in which they claimed that the occupation of İzmir was the violation of the Armistice terms and Wilsonian Principles. It was also stated that the Turkish nation was determined to protect its national unity and existence. Finally, the memorandum demanded from the Allies to determine the national destiny of the Turks according to the Wilsonian Principles.¹⁹

The Ottoman government, led by *Damat* Ferit Pasha, used diplomatic means to state its objection to the occupation of İzmir. *Damat* Ferit submitted a memorandum to Richard Webb, the British Assistant High Commissioner in İstanbul, on the evening of the occupation, in which he claimed that his government did not oppose an Allied occupation but could not approve the Greek occupation.²⁰ On May 20, he cabled the Paris Peace Conference and requested the Allies to end the

¹⁸Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 87-90; for demonstrations in İstanbul see Kemal Arıburnu, *Millî Mücadelede İstanbul Mitingleri*, (Ankara: Yeni Desen Matbaası, 1975).

¹⁹Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 273.

²⁰Jaeschke, *İngiliz Belgeleri*, p. 81.

Greek occupation and declare that Anatolia and Thrace would remain Ottoman except for the territory in which an “extensive autonomous Armenia” would be recognized.²¹ He also added that replacement of the Greek troops by the Allied soldiers would be accepted with pleasure.²² Meanwhile, as a part of the reaction, the Ministry of Interior stopped the apprehension of the Unionists (May 18) and, subsequently, postponed their trials (May 19). Moreover, on May 21, twenty-three nationalists who had not an organic connection to the CUP were released from prison.²³ The immediate effect of the public protests and of the diplomatic attempts of the government was the stimulation of the invitation of the Ottoman delegation to the Peace Conference to defend the Ottoman cause. On June 3, *Damat Ferit Pasha*, then the Prime Minister and *Tevfik Pasha*, the ex-prime Minister, were appointed as delegates to represent the Ottoman State at the Paris Peace Conference.²⁴

The occupation of İzmir caused, however, more than mass demonstrations and diplomatic attempts to voice the Turkish cause. It led to armed resistance against the Greek claims in Western Anatolia, Thrace and at the Black Sea shores, and also against the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. As such menaces were more clarified by this occupation, the early resistance organizations turned from solely being organs of propaganda into a mobilized armed action in those regions.

²¹On March 30, 1919, *Damat Ferit* had proposed to the British High Commissioner the submission of the Ottoman State to Britain alone. At the same time, he approved the establishment of an independent or autonomous Armenia on the desire of Britain with accordance with other Allied Powers. B. D. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 753-755.

²²*Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 304.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 272, 309.

²⁴*Gökbilgin, op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 120-121.

These developments did not occur overnight. To begin with, in İzmir, as soon as hearsay regarding the occupation of İzmir was spread, the founders of Society for Defense of Ottoman Rights, the members of the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı) and some intellectuals collaborated for immediate resistance. They converted the formerly established Committee for Defense of the Motherland²⁵ into the Rejection of Annexation National Committee.²⁶ A selected committee among this group visited the governor, İzzet Pasha, to learn his possible attitude in case of occupation. Discontented with his response, they decided to inaugurate an armed resistance in the interior (since an armed resistance in İzmir would cause massacre by the Greeks), to release all prisoners and to arm the people. In addition, they agreed to send a selected committee to ask the representatives of the Allied Powers in İzmir to exclude the Greeks from occupation.²⁷ Thereafter, the Rejection of Annexation National Committee issued a circular inviting İzmir's dwellers to the meeting at the Jewish cemetery in order to demonstrate their will against Greek annexation.²⁸

The occupation of İzmir found similar repercussions in Eastern Anatolia where the Armenian threat was alive. As soon as the news of the occupation reached Erzurum, members of the Society for Defense of Rights decided to hold a meeting.

²⁵This committee was secretly established in the framework of the Society for Defense of Ottoman Rights in İzmir in March 1919. Its founders were a mixture of notables, military and ex-deputies, such as Moralizade Halit and Nail, Faik, lieutenant colonel, Mehmet Arif, ex-commandant in İzmir and Hulusi Beg, ex-deputy of Karahisar. Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

²⁷Taçalan, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

²⁸TİTE, 14/7/7; *ibid.*, pp. 166-167; Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 72; Bilge Umar, *İzmir'de Yunanlıların Son Günleri*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974), p. 103.

(May 18), where it was pointed out that undoubtedly a similar destiny (i.e., occupation of İzmir) was awaiting them. In order to prevent this, people of this region should be vigilant against the Armenians who were awaiting such an opportunity.²⁹ Finally, the occupation of İzmir was protested by telegrams sent to the Ottoman Sultan, the government, and the representatives of the Allies in İstanbul.³⁰ These telegrams sent to the Prime Ministry protested *Damat Ferit Pasha's* memorandum to the Allies regarding the establishment of an extensive autonomous Armenia in Eastern Anatolia. They conveyed that an Armenian autonomy in this region was by no means acceptable.³¹ In June (17-21), the Society for Defense of Rights in Eastern Anatolia held a provincial congress which debated the measures to be taken for an organized armed resistance.

As a result, a set of instructions were prepared in order to arm the Muslims, particularly villagers, in a guard organization. According to these instructions, the male population would be divided into three in every village and quarter: as those who were born between 1300-1310 (1884-1894) would form the mobile forces (*Seyyar kuvvet*); those whose birthdays were between 1285-1300 (1869-1884) would be organized as stationary forces (*Sabit kuvvet*). Finally, those who were born between 1310-1315 (1894-1899) would join the army. Every village or quarter would form a mobile association (*Seyyar dernek*). Each association was to have four phratries (*oymak*) and each phratry would have four sub-division (*oba*), with ten men

²⁹Dursunoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 67; A. Ö. A. S., vol. I, pp. 1-8.

³¹A. Ö. A. S., vol. I, pp. 5-8; 12-14..

in each. Thus formed associations would have also a sub-division of horsemen. The well to do would provide their arms while others were to be armed by the Society for Defense of Rights.³²

In the north-east, a similar decision for armed resistance against the Greeks and Armenians was taken at the Congress of the Society for Defense of National Rights in Trabzon, which was convened soon after the occupation of İzmir (May 22). Furthermore, it was decided to hold a much wider congress at which all Eastern provinces would be represented in order to form a united defense against Greek and Armenian forces.³³ For this purpose, telegrams were to be exchanged with the Erzurum branch of the Society for Defense of Rights in Eastern Anatolia. The Erzurum Congress would be convened in July to this effect.

4.2.1. Attempts to Organize a United Turkish Nationalist Movement

4.2.1.1. The Army Takes the Conduct of the Turkish Nationalist Movement

Until the Greek landing into İzmir and its vicinity, the nucleus of the Turkish nationalist movement that had been initiated within the Societies for Defense of Rights was led by provincial notables, religious dignitaries and intellectuals, who were backed and supported by the remnants of the Ottoman Army.³⁴ The sequent

³²Dursunoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

³³Özel, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-72.

³⁴The Yakup Şevki's, the commander of the Ninth Army, activities were a case in example. He handed the Three Provinces to the newly established National Council in Kars instead of the British army and handed over the stocks of arms and ammunition to this government. Selek, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 183-188.

events following the occupation of İzmir brought about the leadership of the high-ranking commanders in organizing a centralized-armed resistance.³⁵ This process was initiated from the east, where sizeable Ottoman military forces were concentrated. This region was almost free of Allied troops and secure against any attack due to the British evacuation of Caucasus in August 1919. Only a small garrison which would be withdrawn in the autumn of 1919, had remained in Samsun and Merzifon. Therefore, the opponents of the Turkish nationalists in this region were actually Armenians and Pontine Greeks.

Mustafa Kemal, who would lead the organization of a united Turkish nationalist movement, landed at Samsun when the general situation was offering for a strong resistance. At the end of April, he had been appointed as the General Inspector of the Ninth Army with extensive scope of authority. The purposes of his appointment were basically restoring internal order, disarming population and dispersing national councils (*şura*), which were alleged to recruit soldiers and were protected by the army.³⁶

Besides being the inspector of the Ninth Army, Mustafa Kemal was authorized to command the territories of the 3rd and 15th Army Corps, including the

³⁵For an evaluation of leadership of the army and not any other group in the Turkish National Struggle see Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics*, vol. XI, no. 4 (July 1959), pp. 519-526.

³⁶Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 80; Jaeschke, *İngiliz Belgeleri*, p. 102. Some historians give a different account of the appointment of Mustafa Kemal stating that Mustafa Kemal had been invited to the Ministry of War where Şakir Paşa, the Minister of War, had submitted him a file on the situation in the Pontus region: (The Minister asked Mustafa Kemal to work on this file). The Minister of War and the Prime Minister decided to send Mustafa Kemal to this region for the close examination of the events, particularly the attacks that being made on Greeks. Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 228, dn. 23; Akşin,

provinces of Sivas, Van, Trabzon and Erzurum, and the districts of Samsun and Erzincan. Additionally, the governors and commanders of neighboring provinces and districts (Diyarbakır, Bitlis, Mamuretü'l-Aziz, Ankara and Kastamonu) had to take into consideration the orders of the inspectorate. Soon after, the authority of Mustafa Kemal was extended to include the districts of Kayseri and Maraş.³⁷ Thus, whether accidentally or not, his authority covered almost entire regions under Armenian and Greek threats in the east and south-east as well as provinces where the Kurdish nationalists were active in agitating the people for an independent Kurdistan.

Mustafa Kemal, following his arrival at Samsun, worked to reinforce the nationalist resistance against the activities of the Greek and Armenian brigands. He sent detailed information to the Ottoman government concerning the attacks of Greek brigands on the Muslim villages. He pointed out that their activities were political and the Muslims did not retaliate, except for small and non-political cases, against the Greeks.³⁸ He also reported British activities in the region violating the terms of the Armistice.³⁹ For this reason, he sought authorization to fortify gendarmerie units at the district of Canik (Samsun) and reinforce the 15th Army Corps in Erzurum against the Armenian attacks from the east.⁴⁰ The Ministry of War, on May 26,

İstanbul Hükümetleri, vol. I, pp. 279-280. Both studies refer to Falih Rıfkı Atay's book entitled *Atatürk'ün Bana Anlattıkları*, (İstanbul, 1955).

³⁷Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 79-81; Akşin, *ibid.*, pp. 281-282; Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 669.

³⁸H. T. V. D., no. 45 (September 1963), doc. no. 1051; no. 4 (June 1953), doc. no. 64.

³⁹H. T. V. D., no. 4 (June 1953), doc. nos. 68, 69.

⁴⁰H. T. V. D., no. 4 (June 1953), doc. nos. 71, 77.

allowed him to reinforce the 15th Army Corps by enrolling demobilized soldiers.⁴¹ Likewise, the Grand Vizier ordered Mustafa Kemal to enlarge gendarmerie forces in Samsun “by enrolling new volunteers to carry out their national duty.”⁴²

Mustafa Kemal’s activities, however, were not confined to the reinforcement of the military front. On May 24, he moved to the interior, to Havza, where he began to agitate the people on the pretext of occupation of İzmir and Manisa. On May 28, he instructed all provincial and district governors to arrange heated protest meetings, to send effective telegrams to the representatives of the Allies and the Sublime Porte to condemn the Allied occupations. Mustafa Kemal, specifically pointed out the necessity to avoid from attacks, demonstrations or displays of hostility against the non-Muslims.⁴³ The next day, he sent a telegram to the 3rd, 15th and 20th Army Commanders stating that Samsun and Trabzon would meet the same fate as İzmir and Manisa did, which was occupation. It was not unlikely that the Armenian fancy [to establish a great Armenia] would be materialized. Mustafa Kemal also argued that the foreign occupation would probably take two forms in Eastern provinces. On the one side, the Greek population along the Black Sea coast, with the support of the Greek brigands, would rebel and declare a Republic. In this case, resistance against the Greeks would be held by gendarmerie and military forces. On the other side, foreign troops would be landed at the (Black Sea) coast and, probably, move inland following a Greek rebellion. For this reason, it was necessary to make all

⁴¹H. T. V. D., no. 4 (June 1953), doc. no. 78.

⁴²Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 664.

⁴³Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], *Nutuk*, vol. I, (İstanbul: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1961), pp. 22-23.

preparations including the transfer of all available arms into the interior and the increase of existing troops. On this occasion, Kâzım Karabekir, the commander of the 15th Army Corps, noted that such preparations had already been initiated in the east.⁴⁴

4.2.1.2. The Attempts of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Incorporate the Kurds into the Turkish Nationalist Movement

While the Turkish nationalist resistance was organized, Mustafa Kemal swiftly acted to acquire the support of the Kurds in the east to form a collaborated resistance against the Armenian threat. To provide this, he corresponded with some of the Kurdish tribal chieftains requesting their support against the Armenians. He also resorted to Kurdish landowners, tribal chieftains, and religious dignitaries and sent them several letters in which he explained the Armenian threat and stressed the brotherhood of the two races, the Turks and the Kurds.⁴⁵ Actually, these sections of the Kurdish population had been in conflict with the Armenians since the second half of the Nineteenth century (see Chapter II). Therefore, it was not surprising for the

⁴⁴Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 148-150.

⁴⁵Mustafa Kemal's first contact with the Kurds was in 1916 when he was appointed as the commander of the 16th Army Corps in Diyarbakir. During one year in Diyarbakir, he was in close touch with the Kurdish notables, tribal chieftains and religious dignitaries to whom he wrote "special letters" in the summer of 1919 to incorporate them into the nationalist movement. Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk*, vol. I, p. 81; Andrew Mango, "Atatürk and the Kurds," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4 (October 1999-Special Issue Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic), pp. 1-2; Abdurrahman Arslan, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a Mustafa Kemal ve Kürtler (1919-1923)*, (Istanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1991), p. 15.

Turkish nationalists to search for a coalition with the Kurds against the establishment of a Great Armenia, which would comprise the six provinces where there was a sizeable Kurdish population.

Mustafa Kemal had initially asked for a report of the situation from Ahmet Cevdet, the acting commander of the 13th Army situated in Diyarbekir, on May 23. Four days later, Ahmet Cevdet replied with a detailed report on the activities of the Kurdish tribes and of the British in the region. He also wrote that the club of the Entente (the Party of Freedom and Accord) in Diyarbekir was acting in accordance with the policy of the Ottoman government while the Kurdish club (a branch of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan) was working for Kurdish independence. He added that disagreement between these two groups increased too much in those days.⁴⁶ On May 29, Mustafa Kemal informed the General Staff of the existing conditions, stating that hostility increased between the Kurdish club, which was active for independent Kurdistan and other groups, which favored the Ottoman government. Mustafa Kemal maintained that he had already sent coded telegrams to several Kurdish chiefs, who possessed local influence in Kurdistan and whom he had established good relations during the First World War.⁴⁷ Actually, he had written to four Kurdish tribal leaders a day before (May 28) from Havza, expressing that the salvation of the nation and the assurance of its independence was strictly dependent upon convincing the world that

⁴⁶In the Turkish transcription of the document, the word, which is in original document *ihtilâf*, wrongly written as *itilâf* which significantly changes the meaning. A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. I, pp. 3, 7. This mistake deceives some scholars; for example, A. Mango who writes "the Kurdish club in Diyarbekir was co-operating increasingly with the club of the Ottoman Party Concord and Freedom.." *ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴⁷A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 5, pp. 18-19; H. T. V. D., no. 5 (September 1953), doc. no. 90.

internal order was maintained and everyone was united with complete obedience to the [Ottoman] state for the preservation of “rights and independence.” Finally, he stated that he was sure of them (to whom he sent letters) that they would use all their influence and efforts in this regard.⁴⁸

Mustafa Kemal sent a similar explanatory letter to Kâmil, former deputy and a member of the Kurdish club in Diyarbekir, explaining the importance of maintenance the order to prevent the cession of the Eastern provinces to the Armenians or any foreign administration. He further reminded that increasing hostility between the Kurdish club and the Turks would cause grave consequences for brothers-in-race (iki ırk kardeş). He concluded by asking Kâmil to recommend the Kurdish club to work for national unity for the sake of safety of the country (selâmet-i memleket).⁴⁹

A letter from Mustafa Kemal was also sent to Kasım Bey, a provincial notable from the renowned Cemil Paşazâde family, active in the Kurdish club.⁵⁰ In this letter, Mustafa Kemal revealed his disapproval on independent Kurdistan under British protection since such an idea was promoted by the British in favor of Armenia. He referred to the true fraternity between the Kurds and Turks and argued that they were inseparable. According to Mustafa Kemal, the sacred duty of their existence (farîza-i vücûdanemiz) necessitated that Kurds, Turks and all Muslim

⁴⁸From Mustafa Kemal to Hatip, Mehmet, Sadık Beys, Ali Ağa, Cemil Çeto Bey in the province of Diyarbekir and Musa Beg in the province of Bitlis; A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 2, pp. 9-11.

⁴⁹A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 3, pp. 12-15; Mango, *ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵⁰From Ahmet Cevdet, the acting commander of the 13th Army, to the Inspectorate of the 9th Army, 27 May 1919, A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 1, p. 7.

elements should work as one body and one soul (yek-vücut ve yek dil olarak) to defend their independence and prevent the partition of the Motherland. Mustafa Kemal further stressed that he was in favor of presenting all Kurds with total rights and privileges as well as prosperity and progress in order to secure their devotion on the condition that the integrity of the Ottoman State would be preserved.⁵¹

While Mustafa Kemal was corresponding with the Kurdish notables to form a united front against the Armenians, the Kurdish club in Diyarbakir was closed down. On June 14, Cevdet wrote to the Inspectorate of the 9th Army that two notables (Sadık Bey and Ali Ağa) from Silvan had expressed their gratitude for closing down the Kurdish club and were ready to “serve and devote themselves as a sheep for sacrifice for the complete independence of the [Ottoman] State and the nation.”⁵² Connectedly, Mustafa Kemal cabled Kâzım Karabekir from Amasya to inform him that the Kurdish club in Diyarbakir had been closed down since it aimed the formation of a Kurdistan under the British incitement. He stated that he was determined to unite the entire nation at a common cause by grasping the Kurds fraternally and demonstrate this alliance to the world through Societies for Defense of Rights.⁵³ He related this to Cafer Tayyar [Eğilmez], the commander of the 1st Army corps in Edirne, and Reşit Paşa, the governor of Sivas, as the Kurds joined

⁵¹A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, 11 June 1919, doc. no. 11, pp. 31-34.

⁵²A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 10, pp. 29-30.

⁵³A. Ö. A. S., vol IV, 16 June 1919, doc. no. 13, pp. 40-44; Karabekir, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 176-177; Mango, op. cit., p. 7.

with the Turks.⁵⁴ On June 23, he wrote to Cevat Pasha [Çobanlı], the chief of the General Staff, that the important telegrams he had received from Diyarbekir and Mamuretülaziz demonstrated that the idea of independent Kurdistan under the British protection had been diminished.⁵⁵ Thus, the strategy of incorporating the Kurds in the East into the Turkish nationalist resistance seemed to be successful by the summer of 1919 but not entirely as the developments would prove.

Meanwhile, Cevat Pasha had written to the Prime Ministry, attaching two telegrams by Ahmet Cevdet dealing with activities for independent Kurdistan⁵⁶ which also deliberating the measures to leave Kurdish propaganda obsolete and ineffective in the six Provinces.⁵⁷ This issue was debated at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on June 18. In order to prevent the British intrigues over the Kurds so as to secure the order in the Eastern Provinces and to regain the Kurdish tribal leaders to the government side, the Council of Ministers decided to reward tribal chiefs with medals and titles and also to send capable officers to the region. In addition, a committee was to be formed in order to pursue internal and foreign provocation to separate the Eastern provinces from the Ottoman State. This

⁵⁴A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, 18 June 1919, doc. no. 16, pp. 52-55; Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 19-21; From Mustafa Kemal to Reşit Paşa, 22 June 1919, TİTE, 17/12/12.

⁵⁵A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 17, pp. 56-57.

⁵⁶From Cevdet to the Ministry of War, doc. no. 130 (30 May 1919), H. T. V. D., no. 6 (December 1953) and doc. no. 100 (9/10 June 1919), H. T. V. D., no. 5 (September 1953).

⁵⁷From the General Staff to the Prime Ministry, 14 June 1919, H. T. V. D., doc. no. 131, no. 6 (December 1953).

committee was also to get in touch with important Kurdish personalities, particularly in İstanbul, to guide and warn them (irşad ve ikaz eylemek) in this regard.⁵⁸

4.2.1.3. The Unification of the Nationalist Resistance Organizations: The Formation of the Society for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Thrace

In order to form a centralized nationalist movement, the unification of all societies for Defense of Rights and societies of Rejection of Annexation in Anatolia and Rumelia was equally important for the Turkish nationalist leaders besides incorporating the Kurds into the nationalist resistance against the threat of Armenia and show to the world that the Kurds also joined their forces under the cover of Defense of Rights. For this purpose, Mustafa Kemal wrote to Cafer Tayyar in Edirne on June 18 stating that it had been decided to establish a strong Central Committee (Heyet-i Merkeziye) to be composed of the members of Societies for Defense of Rights and Societies for Rejection and Annexation. He asked him to send one or two delegates to join the prospected meeting in Sivas.⁵⁹ Next day, Mustafa Kemal, Rauf

⁵⁸The members of the committee were *Haydarîzâde* İbrahim Efendi, ex-Sheik-ul-Islam, *Abuk* Ahmet Pasha, the ex-Minister of War and Avni Pasha, the Minister of Marine. Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 133-136; Akşin, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 383-384. This committee came together with the leading members of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan such as Seyyid Abdülkadir, Mevlanzâde Rıfat, Emin Ali Bedirhan on July 10, 1919. The Ottoman committee complained about the activities of the Kurdish Society in the provinces aiming at independence while the Kurdish leaders accused *Damat* Ferit Pasha of sacrificing Kurdistan in favor of Armenia. The members of the Kurdish Society claimed autonomy for Kurdistan which was a favorable sanction for the Ottoman committee. There was not, however, a formal accord between the two parties. At the end of the meeting, a promise was given to appoint a Kurdish governor and some officials to Kurdistan by the Ottoman committee. B. D. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 695-696; the Turkish translation and more detailed version of this meeting can be found in Ahmet Mesut, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Kürdistan 1918-1958*, (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1992), pp. 75-77.

⁵⁹Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, vol. III, doc. no. 19, pp. 910-911.

[Orbay], ex-Minister of the Navy, Ali Fuat [Cebesoy], commander of the 20th Army Corps in Ankara, and Refet [Bele], commander of the 3rd Army Corps at Sivas, met in Amasya where they held intensive meetings which resulted in the Amasya Circular (Amasya Tamimi) on June 21/22. Also called the manifesto of the Turkish nationalist movement, this declaration was circulated to all civil and military authorities in Anatolia. It stressed that the integrity of the Motherland and independence of the nation was in danger, that the Central Government (in İstanbul) was unable to carry its responsibilities and that only the will of the nation would save her independence. In order to reconsider the situation of the nation and announce to the world her rights, a National Committee (Heyet-i Milliye), free from all kinds of influence and control, would be established. For this purpose, a national congress was to be convened in Sivas. Each *liva* from all the provinces should send three delegates who possessed the confidence of the nation as soon as possible.⁶⁰ The delegates elected for the Sivas Congress were to join the Erzurum Congress which had already been decided by the Erzurum branch of the Society for Defense of Rights in the Eastern provinces and the Society for the Preservation of National Rights in Trabzon.⁶¹

⁶⁰Mustafa Kemal, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 50-51; vol. III, doc. no. 26, pp. 915-916.

⁶¹Mahmut Golođlu, *Erzurum Kongresi*, (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), pp. 52-54; Karabekir op. cit., vol. I, pp. 156-160.

4.2.1.3.1. The Erzurum and Sivas Congresses

When Mustafa Kemal, joined by Rauf, moved from Amasya to Erzurum the preparations of the Erzurum Congress were going on under the auspices of Kâzım Karabekir. The Congress convened on July 23 and ended after fourteen days work. Over fifty delegates most of whom were from the Provinces of Erzurum and Trabzon participated at the Congress. From the provinces of Kurdish majority such as Bitlis and Van, only 5 delegates joined the Congress.⁶² The provinces of Diyarbakir and Mamüretülaziz, where the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan was very active, were not represented at all.⁶³

The Congress adjourned on August 7 and issued a proclamation, which set the basic principles of the Turkish nationalist movement.⁶⁴ In the preface, it was stated that the Congress was convened to protect the “holy existence” of the Eastern provinces upon the occupation of İzmir, Antalya and Adana, of the Greek atrocities in the Province of Aydın; of the Armenian massacres extending into the Caucasian boundaries of the Ottoman State; of the preparations to realize the fancy of a Pontus State at the Black Sea coast and of bringing the Greek immigrants in crowds from the

⁶²Two of them were retired Ottoman officials, other two were religious men and the fifth was a trader and farmer. For the complete list of the delegates see *ibid.*, pp. 78-80; Dursunoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-107.

⁶³Some sources claim that the participation of delegates from Mamüretülaziz, Mardin and Diyarbakir were prevented by local governors. Ali Galip, Governor of Mamuretülaziz, was an example in case. *Dursunoğlu*, *ibid.*, p. 107; Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 690, dn. 101. Contrary to this claim, Goloğlu claims that it was the supporters of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan who prevented any election of delegates from Mamüretülaziz and hindered the delegates who had been elected in Diyarbakir from going to Erzurum. Goloğlu, *Sivas Kongresi*, (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1969), p. 120; Mango, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁶⁴The full text of the proclamation is available in Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 286-289; Dursunoğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 153-165; Goloğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 109-111.

Russian shores to this effort. For the protection of the Eastern provinces against “treacherous perils”, the Congress of Erzurum reached ten conclusions.

According to these, the province of Trabzon, the sandjak of Canik (Samsun) (claimed for a Pontus State), and the Eastern Provinces, Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Mamuretülaziz, Van and Bitlis (claimed for Armenia), together with independent *livas* in this area were an inseparable whole. All Islamic elements living in this area were genuine brothers inspired with the sentiment of reciprocal sacrifice and respected each other’s racial and social conditions. Since all kinds of occupations and interventions would be held the intention of formation of Greek and Armenian states, the principle of a united defense and resistance was accepted. It was also stated that the territorial integrity within the Armistice lines as well as those inhabited by (our) genuine brothers, of the same religion and race (as ourselves), which was indivisible, i.e. Muslim majority, should be provided. Besides stating such territorial demands, the decisions also included that the national forces were in charge of protecting the integrity of the Ottoman Motherland, the Sultanate and the Caliphate and assuring national independence. In addition, migration was prohibited to Turks, probably, to prevent over representation of the occupied areas by the Greeks and Armenians.

Erzurum Congress took a decision to replace the Society for Defense of National Rights in the Eastern Provinces with the Society for Defense of Rights in Eastern Anatolia (Şarkî Anadolu Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti).⁶⁵ All Muslims were

⁶⁵“Şarkî Anadolu (Vilâyeti) Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti,” *Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi*, vol. I, no. 2 (August 1941), pp. 81-90.

accepted as natural members of this Society. The Congress also elected an executive Representatives Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) as executive authority equipped with extraordinary authorization to maintain the existence and permanence of the national organization and unite all societies established for the same goal. Presided by Mustafa Kemal, the committee was composed of nine delegates, two to represent the Kurds although there was no clear statement in this regard. This suggestion, however, may be supported with the fact that none of these elected representatives (Sadullah Efendi, ex-deputy of Bitlis and Hacı Musa of Mutki, Kurdish tribal leader to whom Mustafa Kemal wrote after landing into Samsun to provide support) joined the Erzurum Congress nor did they serve in the Committee.⁶⁶ Actually, incorporating the Kurds into the resistance movement was a long lasting issue for the nationalists and it would continue to be so. It may be for this reason that Mustafa Kemal communicated the decisions of the Erzurum Congress to several Kurdish notables such as Şeyh Abdülbaki Küfrevi of Bitlis, Şeyh Mahmut Efendi, Abdurrahman Agha of Şırnak, Cemil Çeto of Garzan immediately after its conclusion.⁶⁷

The next station in effort to unite the Turkish nationalist movement was Sivas. The Sivas Congress was held between 4-11th September with fewer participants (although wider areas were represented) compared to the Erzurum Congress.⁶⁸ The Congress reaffirmed the resolutions of the Erzurum Congress with

⁶⁶Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 67.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, vol. III, doc. nos. 46-53, pp. 937-945; A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. nos. 21-22, pp. 65-70.

⁶⁸It seems to be that 38 delegates joined the Congress. For the list of attending delegates see Goloğlu, *Sivas Kongresi*, pp. 73-74.

slight modifications including establishment of the *Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Society for the Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia) instead of the Society for the Defense of Rights in Eastern Anatolia.⁶⁹ The purpose of this modification was the establishment of a central society which would unite all Defense of Rights societies in Anatolia and Rumelia representing the entire nation. Likewise, the Representatives Committee established at Erzurum to represent the Eastern provinces, thenceforth, was to represent all the Motherland. In other words, it was to function as the executive organ of the nationalist movement.

4.2.1.4. Preparing for Armed Conflict in the South: The Formation of the Turkish Nationalist Resistance in Cilicia

Amongst the resolutions of the Sivas Congress was a secret set of instructions regarding the armament of national organization and the formation of national forces (millî müfrezeler) in the south, against the Armenian threat in Cilicia. These instructions were issued under the title of ‘Supplement to the Regulations of the Defense of Rights Organization (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Teşkilâtı Nizamnamesine Lahikadır).⁷⁰ Along with the proposals of this supplement, the Representative Committee attempted to form a national organization in the South where resistance, comparing to the east and west, was feeble. To this end, a set of regulations concerning the course to be followed by the 3rd, 12, 13 and 20th Army Corps,

⁶⁹Faik Reşit Unat, “Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetinin Kuruluşuna Ait Vesikalar,” *Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi*, vol. I, no. 1 (June 1941), pp. 3-9.

⁷⁰Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 278; vol. III, doc. no. 188, pp. 1143-1145; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Batı Cephesi*, vol. II part II, pp. 26-27.

responsible for organizing the resistance in (the province of) Adana, and (the districts of Ayıntab, Maraş and Urfa) were sent.

Initially, the general situation in southern provinces and districts was summarized in the document. According to this document, next, it was indicated that the Armenians began to well-establish themselves under the British and French protection due to evacuation of [the Ottoman troops] from mentioned province and the districts. Isolated attempts of the Muslims to resist could not produce efficient results. In consequence, “an urgent and concentrated Armenian danger” (mühim ve mütekasif bir Ermenilik tehlikesi) emerged in Cilicia. This danger was aggravated by the employment of the Armenian divisions under foreign uniforms and the political, social and economic pressure, through moral and material excesses, of these divisions to force the Muslims to migrate from the region so as to replace them with the Armenians coming from various parts of the Ottoman Empire, especially from Diyarbakir, Kurdistan, Aleppo and Syria into this region.⁷¹ In order to overcome this danger and, finally, to expel the enemy from this region, the occupied territories of Cilicia were divided into three operational districts. The first district, which was to be

⁷¹ATASE, 270/196, 27 November 1919. At this time, the İstanbul government sent a note to the American High Commission complaining about the Armenian immigration into Cilicia and warning about probable grave consequences of this immigration. The note read “...The Armenian immigration from Syria and Palestine to Adana in order to form there a majority to the detriment of the Moslems continues in a systematic manner... The Armenians of certain Vilayets of Anatolia, such as Sivas, Caserea [Kayseri], Nigde and Konia are also encouraged to immigration by agents of propaganda who leave their homes in small and large groups taking with them their goods and families in order to establish themselves in the vilayets of Adana... It appears from reports received that all these facts have as a result provocation of regrettable incidents that if prompt and efficient measures are not adopted this region will soon be the scene of grave events...” “A Note from the Sublime Porte to the American High Commission,” 18 November 1919, Department of State, 867.00/1076.

dependent to the 20th Army Corps (Ankara) and local Defense of Rights societies, composed of Mersin-Iskenderun-Osmaniye-Sis-Bahçecik-Devellu (Develi) line. The second district would start from Devellu-Sis-Iskenderun line. It would include Kilis-Ayıntab and extend to the east as far as Birecik-Samat-Hüsn-i Mensur. This district would be depended on the 3rd Army Corps in Sivas and also local Defense of Rights societies. Finally, the third district would include eastern parts of the second district and was to be attended by the 13th Army Corps in Diyarbakir and, again, by local Defense of Rights societies. National forces were to be formed in all these districts and also national organizations were to be established in the Muslim villages and towns.

Following the arrangement of the districts of operation, there were the application methods (suret-i tatbik), of which the Representatives Committee ordered absolute obedience to in the reserved districts. According to these:

1. Migration was prohibited,
2. Immovable property, i.e. land, would be sold only to the Muslims; no opportunity would be given to foreigners and Christians to possess land,
3. Each Muslim would be responsible to support materially and physically the national cause,
4. Importance would be given for the establishment of schools by appointing teachers serving to the national cause,
5. A fierce boycott would be executed against the non-Muslim elements; buying and selling would be carried out only among Muslims,
6. Those who betrayed the national cause would be presumed guilty,
- 7- Employment of the Muslims in gendarmerie and police organizations, and forest, village and market guard-ships would be provided...⁷²

⁷²ATASE, 270/196, 27 November 1919.

Following these rules, the preparations for the establishment of a national army in the province of Adana and the districts of Ayıntab, Maraş and Urfa was arranged. This army would be secret and unite the Muslim people around the temples of Islam (ma'abid-i İslam). *Kılıç* (Sword) Ali was charged with the formation of the national organization in Ayıntab and Maraş, and Major Kemal and Captain Osman Tufan [Doğu] with that of Adana and its vicinity. In Urfa, Ali Saib [Ursavaş] would perform the same duty.⁷³ Thus, the southeastern front of the Turkish nationalist resistance emerged under the complete initiative of the Society for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia.

4.2.1.5. The Incorporation of the Turkish Nationalist Resistance in the West into the Society of Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Thrace

At the end of the Sivas Congress, the Turkish nationalist resistance which had began on local basis was, at least nominally, unified and centralized. There was still the problem of participation since both congresses (Erzurum and Sivas) were convened with unexpectedly low number of delegates. In addition, nationalist Kurds were still a handicap, proved by the fact that some members of Bedirhan family, one of whom was the local governor of Malatya, joined their forces with the *Damat Ferit*

⁷³Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, vol. I p. 278; Ali Saib [Ursavaş], *Kilikya Faciaları ve Urfa'nın Kurtuluş Mücadeleleri*, (Ankara: Matbaa'ı Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1924), p. 59; Avcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 1274.

Pasha government in an anti-nationalist plot to suppress the Sivas Congress.⁷⁴ More important still was the situation in the West. Although the Sivas Congress united all Defense of Rights societies under one command, the nationalist resistance in the west was going on independent of the east.

In response to the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia, armed resistance in this region was primarily formed under the initiative of local militia forces. These resisting forces were supported by the Societies for Defense of Rights and Societies for Rejection of Annexation which spread to many places facing the threat of Greek occupation following the landing of Greek troops into İzmir. In consequence, by the middle of June 1919, centers of resistance in Western Anatolia were clarified as Balıkesir, Alaşehir and Nazilli. The fronts of resistance against the Greek penetration were formed under the direction of these centers.⁷⁵

It was the occupation of Ayvalık on May 29 which accelerated the resistance movement, particularly in Balıkesir where several congresses were held in order to organize and fortify the resistance. The first congress of this kind was convened between 28 June-12 July 1919 with the participation of delegates from Ayvalık, Soma, Akhisar and other districts of Balıkesir. A Central Committee (Heyet-i Merkeziye), similar to the one at Sivas, was established at the end of the Congress.

⁷⁴This event is known as *Ali Galip Hadisesi* (Ali Galip Incident). Ali Galip was appointed as Governor of Sivas soon before convention of the Sivas Congress. By the commands of the *Damat Ferit* Pasha Government he attempted to suppress the congress with the support of the *Bedirhans* whose purpose was the establishment of a Kurdish state under the British protection. This incident is explained in details in main reference books of the Turkish National Struggle. For example, see Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-137; Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 435 ff.

⁷⁵Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 114. For the details of the formation of the fronts see *ibid.*, pp. 114-168.

Hacim Muhittin [Çarıklı] was elected to its chair. The Congress dealt with preparations for armed resistance such as recruitment of soldiers from districts and the supply of the resisting powers with equipment.⁷⁶ Finally, it decided for summoning a congress on July 30 with the participation of two notables (eşraf ve muteberân) from each district.⁷⁷

Consequently, the Second Balıkesir Congress was convened between July 26-30 simultaneously with the Erzurum Congress, however, without any connection. Forty-eight delegates, predominantly notables, joined the Congress. Twenty-nine resolutions were issued. The aim of the Congress was stated as the salvation of the Motherland (boundaries was not pointed out). The title of Balıkesir Rejection of Annexation Committee was changed into Balıkesir National Movement and Rejection of Annexation (Harekât-ı Milliye ve Redd-i İlhak). A general mobilization was declared as long as resistance against the Greeks continued and was decided not to negotiate with the Greeks. The struggle would continue until the Greeks retreated from all corners of the country. The Congress also adopted several measures regarding the administration, coordination and the equipment of the armed resistance.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Kâzım Özalp, *op. cit.*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p. 38; Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 275.

⁷⁷Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁷⁸Şerafettin Turan (ed.), *Balıkesir ve Alaşehir Kongreleri ve Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı'nın Kuvayı Millîye Hatıraları (1919-1920)*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1967), pp. 112-115. See also Özalp, *op. cit.*, vol. II pp. 43-48; Tekeli-İlkin, *ibid.*, pp. 172-179.

In the August of 1919, two congresses, Nazilli (6-9 August) and Alaşehir (16-25 August), were convened in the west. While the former congress remained isolated and demarcated its activities into a small area (Denizli and Muğla districts, and those parts of Aydın *liva* where there was no occupation), the latter extended its scope to unite the resistance movement in the Western Anatolia. For this reason, the Alaşehir Congress may be regarded as a turning point in the nationalist resistance in the west.

The Alaşehir Congress was convened with the participation of over forty delegates representing Societies for Rejection of Annexation from various districts covering large sections of Western Anatolia. The resolutions of the Congress focused on integrating, coordinating and organizing the resistance in the west, and also on drawing the lines of the policy to be followed in relations to the İstanbul government and Allied Powers.⁷⁹ For the first purpose, it was decided the establishment of a General Commandership (Umum Kumandanlık) in order to unite the resistance on various fronts under one commander, decided to be *Kara Vasıf*, an Unionist and one of the founders of the *Karakol* organization. In addition, a decision was taken for the formation of a Committee of Directors (encümen-i müdirân) to coordinate political decisions of the resistance movement. This committee was to be formed by a member of each central committees of Balıkesir, Nazilli and Alaşehir.

With regards to the relations with the İstanbul government, the delegates of the Alaşehir Congress agreed to send telegrams to the Sultan, the Prime Minister,

⁷⁹For the details of the resolutions of the Alaşehir Congress and the list of delegates Turan (ed.), *ibid.*, pp. 205-208; Tekeli-İlkin, *ibid.*, pp. 184-208; Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 281-287; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Batı Cephesi*, vol. II part I, pp. 171-174.

General George Milne, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, and the Allied representatives in İstanbul. In these telegrams, they expressed their obedience to the Sultan and explained that the main purpose of their meetings was to dismiss the Greeks from Western Anatolia. They stated that until this aim was accomplished, their struggle would continue. They presented in details the Greek atrocities to General Milne and the Allied representatives and stated that they were still willing to believe that Wilson's twelfth point would be applied.⁸⁰

While the resistance movement in the west was developing into a centralized action, it did not have a noticeable connection with the resistance in the east which was led by Mustafa Kemal. Meanwhile, the Sivas Congress was convened and took decisions that were also related to the resistance movement in the west. For example, Mustafa Kemal wrote to Ali Fuat [Cebeşoy] that the Congress agreed to appoint him as the General Commander of National Forces in Western Anatolia. This appointment conflicted with the resolution of the Alaşehir Congress since *Kara Vasif* had been appointed to the same position. Moreover, the third article of the declaration of the Sivas Congress stated that in case of intervention or occupation of any part of the Ottoman lands, particularly with the intention of establishing Armenian and Greek states, united defense and resistance would be held in Aydın, Manisa and Balıkesir fronts too. From these points and Sivas resolution which collaborated all Defense of Rights societies under a single organization (Society for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia), it was clear that the eastern part of the

⁸⁰Turan (ed.), *ibid.*, pp. 209-221.

nationalist movement intended to incorporate the resistance movement in the west over which some leading members of the western front were reluctant, by the autumn of 1919.⁸¹ The persistence of Sivas, however, continued and, even, caused occasional tensions between the two centers of resistance. When the Balıkesir Rejection of Annexation Society requested an over all delegation for a prospected congress on October 20, Mustafa Kemal wrote to Bekir Sami [Günsav], the Commander of the 56th Division in Bursa, to communicate to the authorities still unaware of the Sivas resolutions that it was no longer necessary to act on behalf of National forces.⁸² Hence, the 4th Balıkesir Congress was postponed and the Balıkesir Central Committee decided to send a delegate carrying an explanatory letter addressed to the Representatives Committee containing the cause for their semi-independence to Sivas. The Representatives Committee responded that recruiting and organizing soldiers on behalf of Rejection of Annexation Society was contrary to the regulations adopted by the Sivas Congress.⁸³ Thereafter, the Committee sought Hacim Muhittin's assistance for the expected collaboration, according to the principles of the Sivas Congress.⁸⁴ As a result, the 4th Balıkesir Congress, which convened between November 19-21, took a further step and decided to start the process of incorporation into the Society for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia. The

⁸¹Tekeli-İlkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-216; Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 288-289.

⁸²*Türk İstiklâl Harbi Batı Cephesi*, vol. II part II, p. 39.

⁸³Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, *Heyet-i Temsiliye Kararları*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), p. 23.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 40.

Congress adopted the title of Defense of Rights so that it turned to be a branch of the central organization in Sivas.⁸⁵

4. 3. Turkish Nationalists' Quest for Legitimacy: The 1919 Elections

As it can be seen from the above explanations, the Turkish nationalist resistance was essentially initiated and developed against the partition of the Ottoman territories within the Armistice lines by Greeks and Armenians under the protection of the Allied Powers. Towards the end of 1919, Turkish nationalists managed to have the control of most parts of Anatolia where the Armenian and Greek threats were alive. During this process, the Turkish nationalist movement grew to such an extent that it became a challenging power to the İstanbul government which the nationalist leaders accused of yielding the Motherland to minorities and foreign powers. In July 1919, especially after the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal from his official duties coinciding with his resignation, the nationalist resistance and the İstanbul government became opponents. While the nationalist resistance began to take decisions independently of İstanbul and working to extend its power to large sections of Anatolia, the İstanbul government worked to suppress it. It can even be argued that there were two governments after the Sivas Congress; one was ruling Anatolia and led by the nationalists and the other, serving in İstanbul with almost no influence over Anatolia. The nationalist government, however, was not legitimate neither for

⁸⁵Özalp, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 75.

İstanbul nor for the Allied Powers. Therefore, the nationalists, in order to legitimize their actions, spent a good portion of their efforts to re-enact the Ottoman Parliament which had been dissolved in December 1918 by Sultan Vahdettin and secure its support for the nationalist cause. This was also a way that they could gain legitimacy and leave the İstanbul government totally inefficient.

The issue of elections for a new Parliament had been under close consideration since the beginning of January 1919. On January 2, Tevfik Pasha cabinet announced the possibility of holding elections within four months following the conclusion of peace negotiations. Thereafter, the succeeding cabinet, led by *Damat Ferit Pasha*, decided to hold the elections on March 22, after passing a new electoral law based on proportional representation aiming for the participation of the non-Muslim communities in the elections.⁸⁶ The occupation of İzmir by the Greek troops, however, compelled electoral affairs to pause for a while. On July 27, *Damat Ferit's* third cabinet finally decided to hold elections and notified the provinces in this regard.⁸⁷ Soon after, the Councils of the Greek Patriarchate declared that they would not participate in the general elections under any circumstances.⁸⁸ The Armenians also decided in the same manner. As the non-participation stance of the

⁸⁶The İstanbul Government was in the opinion that representation of non-Muslim communities in the Parliament would have a positive influence on the Paris Peace Conference in settling the Ottoman affairs otherwise, undoubtedly would have negative effect. Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 328-329.

⁸⁷*Sabah*, 28 July 1919.

⁸⁸*Sabah*, 8 August 1919. Akşin, in reference to *Alemdar*, points out that the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates had declared in early June not to participate in the elections. *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. I, p. 331.

Greeks and Armenians became clear and the Jews were still debating on their participation, the İstanbul Government became hesitated upon performing the elections.⁸⁹ While one source of this hesitation was the boycott of the non-Muslims, another was the Turkish nationalist resistance, looked upon as Unionist by *Damat Ferit's* government as well as the foreign representatives. Both were convinced that elections held under present circumstances, would result in an overwhelming nationalist majority. Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner in İstanbul, observed the situation well. In his communication to Earl Curzon (July 23, 1919), Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, he stated his opinion which had been also shared by the French High Commissioner:

“Under present circumstances elections were impracticable and even dangerous... Any (?election)s at present time even if speciously presented as necessary for the purpose of ratifying Peace Treaty ... could not be anything but a farce and could only tend to strengthen Committee party [the CUP] which most Nationalist Turks are to-day viewing with increasing sympathy owing to (events) at Smyrna...”⁹⁰

The nationalists, on the other hand, strongly demanded elections without delay. At the Sivas Congress, they decided to work for the realization of this purpose as soon as possible.⁹¹ On September 13, the day after the congress was concluded, Mustafa Kemal communicated instructions to the branches of the army and societies for Defense of Rights, provinces and districts to make preparations for the

⁸⁹Ali Kemal, the Minister of the Interior, stated four reasons not to hold the elections. The first was the Unionists' participation which meant that the elections would not be held freely so that the new Parliament would not be the true representative of the nation; the second was that in some parts of the country elections could not be held since they were under occupation; thirdly, the non-Muslims were inclined to boycott the elections. This would overshadow legitimacy of the elections. Finally, destiny of some provinces was still unknown. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 332-333.

⁹⁰B. D. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 696-697

⁹¹Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 241.

elections.⁹² In the early days of October, the nationalists overthrew the *Damat Ferit* Pasha's anti-nationalist cabinet and replaced it by one sympathetic to the nationalist movement, Ali Rıza Pasha's cabinet. As soon as it was formed, the new cabinet decided to hold elections.

The nationalists based their election strategy on two points: First, being in control of most parts of Anatolia, they would try to guarantee election of those who were loyal to the principles of Defense of Rights so as to assure the superiority of their faction in the Parliament. The societies for Defense of Rights and the army would closely follow up the candidates. For this purpose, the Representatives Committee notified the provinces, districts and commander-ships that loyalty to the principles of Defense of Rights should be sought for candidates, and those elected were preferably expected to be the nominees of the Committee.⁹³

In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal sent a coded telegram to the governors of Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and Harput (November 6, 1919) asking them to explain the present circumstances to the Kurdish notables and landowners. He also demanded the governors to ask the Kurdish notables and landowners to send telegrams to the [İstanbul] government and the Allied representatives stating that they united with the national forces, that they would by no means separate from the

⁹²Mustafa Kemal, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 142-143.

⁹³Baykal, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19. The necessity of the formation of a pro-nationalist assembly was publicized through the nationalist press. According to the nationalist point of view, the supremacy of conservatism and anti-nationalism in the elections should be prevented. For example, Nebizâde Ahmet Hamdi, "İntihabatta Milliyetçilik," *Türk Dünyası*, 16 October 1919. Further, it was argued that the Turks should be unified in order to leave ineffective the Christian collaboration, especially in İzmir and İstanbul, in case of their participation in the elections. *Vakit*, 18 October 1919.

Ottoman community, that they shared loyalty to the Caliphate and, finally, that they condemned the separatist attitude of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan.⁹⁴ On this occasion, many Kurdish tribal chieftains sent messages conveying their support to Sivas.⁹⁵

The second part of the nationalist strategy for the elections was to prove ineffective the detrimental propaganda of the Party of Freedom and Accord (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi), the main opposition party, and of the Greek and Armenian communities, claiming that the nationalist movement was in fact Unionist.⁹⁶ The Armenian Patriarch and the Acting Greek Patriarch appealed to the Allied High Commissioners on October 17 to explain the threats Christians faced by the Turkish nationalist movement, claimed to be “nothing more or less than” the CUP.⁹⁷ Meanwhile, Greek papers reflecting rumors about disorder in Anatolia, made the situation of the Christians increasingly critical.⁹⁸ On this occasion, Mustafa Kemal’s

⁹⁴A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 47, pp. 154-155.

⁹⁵A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. no. 51, pp. 162-165.

⁹⁶This became an issue of hot debate between the nationalist and anti-nationalist press as the Turkish nationalist movement became stronger in Anatolia. While the anti-nationalists viewed the Turkish nationalist movement as a new pattern of Unionism (yeni usul İttihatçılık), the nationalists strictly objected the identification of Turkish nationalism with Unionism. The former argument was defended, for instance, by Ref'i Cevat [Ulunay], “Türk Birliği Maskesi,” *Alemdar*, 7 August 1919; idem, “Turancılar ve Türkler Ama Hakiki Türkler,” *Alemdar*, 20 September 1919. The latter argument was defended by many journalists; for instance, Ahmet Emin [Yalman], “Türk Milliyetperverliği,” *Vakit*, 18 August 1919; idem, “Milliyetperverliğin Hududu,” *Vakit*, 17 September 1919; Hüseyin Ragıp, “Milliyetperverlik İttihatçılık mıdır?” *İfham*, 16 September 1919.

⁹⁷From Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, 19 October 1919, D. B. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 827-828; *Sabah*, 19 October 1919. The Patriarchs also submitted a memorandum addressed to the President of the Peace Conference explaining the grave situation of the Christians. Department of State, 867.00/1001.

⁹⁸“Anadolu’da Aşayış Meselesi,” *Yenigün*, 19 October 1919. This article denied the news of *Neologos*, the Greek paper issued in İstanbul, which claimed that the nationalists threatened the Christians in Anatolia. Admiral Bristol’s comment on the situation of the Christians in Anatolia is noteworthy. He wrote “...It becomes more and more evident all the time that the real condition of affairs in the old

letter rejecting any pressure of the nationalists on the Christians were published in the press.⁹⁹

Subsequently, the Central Committee of the Turkish nationalist organization decided to ask Cemal Pasha, the Minister of War, to disclaim officially that the nationalist movement was of a Unionist character. Furthermore, the nationalist leaders asked him to change the directors of press and news agencies allowing them to be in control of communication channels in order to neutralize propaganda of the opposition groups which claimed that they were subjected to pressure by the Defense of Rights organizations.¹⁰⁰

The complaints of the opposition party, the Party of Freedom and Accord, was debated at the meeting of the representatives of the İstanbul government with the

Ottoman Empire and in the Caucasus is befuddled by one-sided reports and reports that are written for the sake of propaganda. This is most evident by the reports that constantly appear in our papers at home, setting forth the crimes committed against Armenians and Greeks. These reports give one side of the story. These reports have cried 'massacre' so long and so often that the words have become sickening. These reports are not false, but they do not tell the whole truth and they are in some cases exaggerated. There is no question of the horrible experiences and suffering of the Armenians and Greeks at the hands of the Turks and Kurds in the past. There is no doubt that if an opportunity occurred again the conditions would be repeated. But, on the top of this come the acts of the Armenians in reprisal and the acts of the Greeks in Smyrna in reprisal... Throughout the whole of Turkey constant reports are being received of murders, of brigandage and of disorders... Investigation proves that the majority of outrages are committed by the Turks, but there are many outrages committed by all races. The majority of the people are Turks; therefore, where all the races are very much alike, it is natural that the Turks should commit the majority of outrages. The Turkish reports never reach the press; whereas, the Armenian and Greek reports are printed all over America with big headlines. Whereas these reports that are printed are exaggerated and do not represent except one side of the case, any reports from a Turkish source would be equally bad..." From United States High Commissioner to the Secretary of State, "Report for the week ending 24 November 1919," Department of State, 867.00/1063.

⁹⁹In addition, Mustafa Kemal stated that the nationalists did not force the Armenians to emigrate as claimed by the Armenian Patriarch, Zaven, and the order in Anatolia was better ever than it had been. "Teşkilât-ı Milliye ve Gayrimüslimler," *Yenigün, Sabah, Vakit*, 22 October 1919; Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 99-100.

¹⁰⁰Baykal, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

nationalist leaders in Amasya between 20-22 October. They agreed on the issue that the elections would be held freely. Also, they decided that all kinds of measures would be taken to prevent the participation of the Unionists, particularly, those who had been involved with the ill-treatment of the Armenians during their deportation.¹⁰¹

The complaints of the Party of Freedom and Accord, however, did not cease. On October 28, Sadık Bey, the head of the Party, submitted a memorandum to the İstanbul Government stating that the essence of the nationalist movement was Unionist and their chiefs interfered in the elections in every corner of Anatolia under the title of Representatives of the Nationalist Forces (Kuvay-ı Mîlliye Mümessilleri) implicitly accusing the Ali Rıza Pasha government of backing them. Sadık Bey concluded that his party could not take part in the elections under the present circumstances.¹⁰²

At the beginning of November, G. Bie Ravndal, the American Commissioner in İstanbul, shortly summarized the situation to the Department of State:

“The Greek and Armenian communities have decided to refrain from participating in the elections. So have the Jews and the Kurds, and also the Entente Libérale Party. The Peace and Prosperity is inclined to abstain also, but has not definitely decided as yet. This leaves the field free to the Nationalists...”¹⁰³

¹⁰¹Faik Reşit Unat, “Amasya Protokolleri,” *Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi*, Yeni Seri, vol. I, no. 3 (March 1961), p. 363; Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 107-108.

¹⁰²*Sabah*, 30 October 1919; Hamdi Atamer, “Millî Mücadele Başlangıcında Hürriyet ve İtilâf Partisi,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no. 60 (September 1972), pp. 4-9; Bilâl N. Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 200-205. Similar complaints of the Party of Freedom and Accord had been submitted to the Ottoman government asking for necessary measures to be taken in order to hold the elections in safety. *Sabah*, 15 October 1919.

¹⁰³Department of State, 867.00/1039.

The elections were held in December according to the previous legal procedures, that is, as double-stage indirect election, according to the principle of proportional representation.¹⁰⁴ The nationalists were in full control of the elections. Even in occupied areas where elections were banned by the occupation forces such as the Greeks (İzmir and its vicinity) and the French (Cilicia), they managed to elect deputies for the Parliament.¹⁰⁵ A report by Captain P. Hadkinson, a Relief Officer, who sojourned two months during the elections in the province of Bursa and district of Balıkesir may give a general idea on how the elections were executed. He stated that he witnessed in a town that out of 500 voters, 410 abstained from voting, and:

“The Mayor, an ex-Committee of Union and Progress member, in charge of the urns, completed the number by inserting an equal number of votes in favor of a member of his party.”

He continued that

“Wherever I passed through it is the same old story, pressure is brought to bear on the Christian element, as well as on the uneducated lower classes, to vote for persons favored by local authorities.”¹⁰⁶

The elections concluded in the full victory of the nationalists in Anatolia and İstanbul. The Allied Powers and anti-nationalist opposition observed that the results largely announced an old Unionist victory.¹⁰⁷ In reaction, Lütfi Fikri [Düşünsel], a

¹⁰⁴Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Devrim Hareketleri İçinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1981), p. 182, dn. 3; for details of the election system see Hasan Kayalı, “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27 (1995), pp. 265-286.

¹⁰⁵Tunaya, *ibid.*, p. 185; Zeki Arıkan, “1919 Seçimleri ve İzmir,” *Ata Dergisi*, no. VII (1997), pp. 122-123.

¹⁰⁶From Vice-Admiral Sir de J. Robeck to Earl Curzon, 28 November 1919, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 240.

¹⁰⁷Department of State, 867.00/1057. The result of the elections was announced as the great victory of the Unionists in *The Times*, 2 January 1919, cited in Jaeschke, *Kronoloji*, vol. I, p. 83.

liberal, who was elected from İstanbul, resigned immediately.¹⁰⁸ Among the non-Muslims, only a Jew, Mişon Ventura, was elected from İstanbul.¹⁰⁹ Thus, for the first time in its history, the Ottoman Parliament did not include Greek and Armenian deputies.¹¹⁰ In other words, the Ottoman Parliament was Islamized with a single exception. Focusing on this peculiarity of the Parliament, Lütfi Fikri claimed that such a parliament which lacked the representation of the Christian communities could not survive and, in fact, should not.¹¹¹ He was proven right since the Parliament lasted approximately three months. This was not due to lack of non-Muslims, however, but *de jure* occupation of İstanbul on March 16, 1920.¹¹²

The non-participation of the Greeks and Armenians, and the Jews to an extent, in the elections was interpreted as another sign of their disintegration wish.¹¹³

Ahmet Emin [Yalman], a contemporaneous pro-nationalist journalist, stated that the

¹⁰⁸Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. II, pp. 207-208.

¹⁰⁹There was disagreement among the Jews on participation in the elections. Vice-chief *Rabbi* in İstanbul did not favor participation of the Jewish community while the chief-*Rabbi*, who was then at Paris, did. In consequence, a Jewish National Committee for the Elections (Musevi Millî İntihap Komitesi) was established. The Committee nominated two candidates; Mişon Ventura from İstanbul and Avram Galanti from İzmir. Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. II, p. 184.

¹¹⁰Before the elections, the Ottoman non-Muslim communities were represented in proportion to their numerical status, in most cases, by negotiating with the Unionists. In 1914, when the previous elections had been executed, there were 26 Greek, 14 Armenian, 4 Jewish and 10 Slavic deputies in the Ottoman Parliament. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 155.

¹¹¹“Hıristiyansız Meclis-i Mebusan,” *Sabah*, 21 November 1919.

¹¹²Mustafa Kemal had explained his opinion regarding the convention of the last Ottoman Parliament in Anatolia to his high-ranking staff and the Ali Rıza Pasha’s Cabinet on several occasions. The İstanbul Government, however, did not favor this idea. It was the occupation of İstanbul which provided realization of Mustafa Kemal’s will in this regard. As the nationalists moved the Parliament to Ankara, the İstanbul Government remained entirely inefficient. In other words, the legislative power was shifted from İstanbul to Ankara. For detailed information on “where should the Parliament meet?” see Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 111-121; Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. II, pp. 49-61.

¹¹³Before the elections started, the non-participation of the Greeks and the Armenians was severely criticized as they exhibited their separatist wills. Yunus Nadi, “Türkler ve Gayrimüslimler I-II,” *Yeniğün*, 17-18 October 1919. “İntihabatta Gayrimüslimler,” *İkdam*, 19 October 1919.

boycott of the elections by the Greeks and Armenians, and also, by the Party of Freedom and Accord displayed their effort to discredit the elections within the country and abroad. Such attitude simply meant abandoning of Ottomanism.¹¹⁴ Actually, by the time the elections were held, an irrecoverable hostility had risen between the Christian communities and the nationalists. As a matter of fact, the nationalist resistance had emerged to disclaim Greek and Armenian aspirations over the Ottoman lands. Therefore, the nationalist movement had developed in the framework of a Muslim resistance. The non-Muslim exclusion was proven by the fact that membership to the Society of Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia, the core organization of the nationalist movement after the Sivas Congress, had been limited to Muslims. More so, by the autumn of 1919, a widespread boycott to disconnect all links with the non-Muslims had been organized. In the light of these facts, there is little reason to believe that the nationalist and islamic composition of the Ottoman Parliament would have been different, had the non-Muslim communities participated in the elections. In consequence, it may even be argued that non-Muslims' boycott of the elections only facilitated the task of the nationalists.

4.3.1. The Last Ottoman Parliament

The 1919 elections on the one hand were resulted in ending the political representation of the non-Muslim communities and legitimizing the Turkish nationalist cause on the other. The nationalists did manage to form the majority in the

¹¹⁴Ahmet Emin [Yalman], "Adem-i İştirakin Manası," *Vakit*, 13 December 1919.

last Ottoman Parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan)¹¹⁵ and claimed to be the sole and true representatives of the national will. The nationalist majority in the Parliament worked for laying the foundations of a new state on nationalist basis once it disabled the authority of the İstanbul Government and excluded the non-Muslims from legislation process.¹¹⁶

The first meeting of the Parliament was on January 12, 1920 with 72 deputies.¹¹⁷ The nationalist majority in the Parliament established a group called *Felâh-ı Vatan* (Salvation of the Motherland) with the aim of legitimizing the decisions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses by a parliamentary recognition.¹¹⁸ This was realized by the adoption of *Misâk-ı Millî* (National Pact), the official statement of the goals of the Turkish nationalist movement. It included provisions regarding territorial integrity of the remaining parts of the Empire holding Ottoman Muslim majority; a plebiscite for the three geographical areas, i.e. the Arab lands, the three provinces (Batum, Kars and Ardahan) and Western Thrace; providing the security of the capital, İstanbul, and the Sea of Marmara. Conditions concerning the Straits were to be discussed with interested countries. It affirmed that the rights of minorities would be taken up in accordance with the treaties concluded between the Allies and defeated countries. Finally, the National Pact claimed complete

¹¹⁵168 deputies were elected at the end of the elections. For their list see Mahmut Goloğlu, *Üçüncü Meşrutiyet 1920*, (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1970), pp. 295-303.

¹¹⁶Tunaya, *Devrim Hareketleri İçinde*, pp. 181-182.

¹¹⁷Fahri Çoker, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi Millî Mücadele ve T. B. M. M. I. Dönem 1919-1923*, vol. I, (Ankara: TBMM Vakfı Yayınları, 1994), p. 24.

¹¹⁸Tunaya, *Devrim Hareketleri İçinde*, pp. 187-188.

independence in economic, financial and judicial affairs. This Pact was recited in the Parliament and a decision was taken for a public declaration on February 17, 1920.¹¹⁹

The core organization of the Turkish nationalist movement in Anatolia and its local branches influenced the proceedings of the Parliament through several telegrams pertaining to total rejection of occupations. Among these were also telegrams protesting the Kurdo-Armenian agreement claiming the secession of the Kurds from the Ottoman State. This agreement had been concluded on November 20 by Şerif Pasha, the representative of the Kurdish Society at the Paris Peace Conference, along with the Armenian delegation in Paris. According to this agreement, both nations, the Armenians and Kurds, had the same interests and aims which were freedom and independence. Therefore, they were

“entirely in accord to ask the Peace Conference for the constitution, according to the principles of nationality, of an independent unified Armenia and of an independent Kurdistan”

boundaries of which to be drawn by the Peace Conference.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹M. M. Z. C. *İçtimâ-i Fevkalâde*, vol. I (12 January-18 March 1920), pp. 143-146.

¹²⁰General Records of the American Mission to Negotiate Peace 1918-1931, 185.5133/7. Earl Curzon to Admiral J. De Robeck, 10 December 1919, D. B. F. P., vol. IV, p. 928. Following the conclusion of the agreement with the Armenian delegation, Şerif Pasha asked the support of Clemenceu, the French President, for its realization. General Records of the American Mission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931, 185.5133/9. Although Şerif Pasha defended the Kurdish nationalist claims by concluding an accord with the Armenian representatives, the thought behind this was to prevent the establishment of a Great Armenia extending into the Eastern Provinces where the Kurdish population had a considerable majority. This was what Şerif Pasha had told to Reşit Pasha, the ex-Minister of Interior, on the occasion of abandoning the position as the Ottoman representative to the Peace Conference in favor of defending the Kurdish cause. “Reşit Beyefendinin Beyanâtı,” *İkdam*, 3 August 1919. Şerif Pasha expressed the same point of view in a letter to *Le Matin* on March 5, 1920. “Şerif Paşa: Kürt-Ermeni İtilafı Hakkındaki Teşebbüse Dair İzahat Veriyor,” *İkdam*, 21 March 1920; Hovannisian confirms Şerif Pasha’s maneuver as to the documents at the Foreign Office. *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. II, pp. 444-446.

The news of the agreement soon reached Anatolia. Initial reactions came from the Kurdish tribal chieftains. In a telegram to the Representative Committee, they stated that they would by no means be dismembered from the Ottoman community and protested Şerif Pasha and the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, which manifested its ill-will (izhar-ı fesâd) in this regard.¹²¹

Similar telegrams of protest continued after the opening of the Ottoman Parliament.¹²² Signed by the Kurdish tribal chieftains and religious dignitaries and read in the Parliament, these telegrams emphasized the unity of the Turks and Kurds, rejected the separation of the Kurds from the Ottoman and Islamic community and protested Şerif Pasha for concluding an agreement with the Armenians. It was pointed out that Şerif Pasha could not represent the Kurds.¹²³ Mustafa Kemal thanked some of Kurdish tribal chieftains for the telegrams they had sent to the İstanbul government and Allied representatives to express their support of the national cause.¹²⁴

In the meantime, a motion was made to the Presidency of the Parliament

¹²¹A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. nos. 55, 56, 58, pp. 174-176; 177-180; 184-187. Besides that the attention of the government was called to close down the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan. *Yenigün*, 26 February 1919. The telegrams of the Kurdish chieftains rejecting secession from the Ottoman state had been sent earlier to the İstanbul government. "Kürtlerin Sadakati," *Yenigün*, 6 January 1920; "Kürdistan Ahvali," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 10 January 1920.

¹²²A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. nos. 62-67, pp. 196-216.

¹²³Such telegrams were sent from Erzincan, Diyarbakir, Siverek, Derik, Elaziz and Midyat. *M. M. Z. C.*, vol. I, pp. 208-213, 300-301, 324. Similar telegrams were also sent to the Senate from Diyarbakir, Erzurum and Siverek. *M. A. Z. C.*, vol. I (12 January-5 April 1920), pp. 172-174. At TİTE, 25/112/112 there is the protest telegram of the local notables in Silvan. Such telegrams were also issued in the Turkish Press under the title of "Kürtler ve Osmanlılık." For instance, *Vakit*, 22 February 1920; *İkdam*, 26 February 1920.

¹²⁴A. Ö. A. S., vol. IV, doc. nos. 60-61, pp. 191-195.

demanding the dismissal of Seyyit Abdülkadir, the chief of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, from the membership of the Senate on account of his statement to *Journal d'Orient*. In his statement, following the Kurdo-Armenian agreement, Abdülkadir had claimed that Şerif Pasha was a member of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan which had a national character. Therefore, he could act as the representative of the Kurds. Abdülkadir concluded that the Society requested autonomy for the six provinces inhabited by the Kurds.¹²⁵ Upon this statement, a group of deputies led by Celalettin Arif, deputy of Erzurum, made a motion asking the Parliament that if Abdülkadir's statement was true, he should be expelled from the Senate for striving for the disintegration of the Motherland. After several hearings, a decision was taken to send the motion to the Senate.

On this occasion, Seyyid Abdülkadir sent a telegram to the Senate asking a secret session for personal explanation of the occurrences. (şahsı hakkında vaki istinatın esbabı). Thereupon, the Senate decided to hold a secret session.¹²⁶ What was spoken there is still unknown; however, Abdülkadir made a motion to the Senate following the session. He rejected having made a statement to the *Journal d'Orient* and stated that he was ready to resign from the Senate if it would be beneficial for the country.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ *M. M. Z. C.*, vol. I, pp. 301-302; "Kürtler ve Osmanlılık," *İkdam*, 27 February 1920. The Turkish nationalist press opposed Seyyid Abdülkadir's argument by claiming that the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan was unknown in Kurdistan; therefore, the authority given to Şerif Pasha by the Society made no sense. In addition, neither Terif Pasha nor the Kurdish Society had not the right of representing the Kurds. "Kürtler," *Yenigün*, 24 February 1920.

¹²⁶ *M. A. Z. C.*, vol. I, pp. 176-178.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

The *de jure* occupation of İstanbul on March 16, 1920 ended the activities of the last Ottoman Parliament and opened the way for the Anatolian. The next day of the occupation, Mustafa Kemal, acting on behalf of the Representative Committee contacted the governors of the provinces and commanders and, two days later, he circulated the decision for immediate elections, to be followed by the convening of an assembly possessing extra-ordinary power in Ankara. This parliament was to include the deputies elected in the 1919 elections as well as those would be elected through the new election. The non-Muslims would not be allowed to participate.¹²⁸

The Ankara Parliament was opened on April 23, with, approximately, 92 deputies from the İstanbul Parliament and 232 new deputies elected by the local branches of the Defense of Rights organizations. In addition, 14 deputies joined from Malta, the exile place of the Unionists.¹²⁹ In the Ankara Parliament, not surprisingly, the Society for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Thrace was the dominant group. The deputies were mostly from bureaucracy and military, the two leading forces of the nationalist resistance (about 50 per cent). Some of the rest were occupied with free enterprise (i.e. traders and farmers). Some others were religious dignitaries and Kurdish tribal chieftains.¹³⁰

¹²⁸Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 1168. Decision regarding non-participation of the non-Muslims appeared as the fourth article of the cipher written by Mustafa Kemal to Kâzım Karabekir on March 17. Interesting enough, this clause did not appear in the circular written two days later. We have no idea whether it disappeared as a result of disagreement among the nationalists, or was only a part of their tactics. The latter argument seems to be more probable than the former.

¹²⁹Tunaya, *Devrim Hareketleri İçinde*, p. 212. It should be noted that there are confusing numbers about how many deputies were in the Ankara Parliament. For a recent evaluation see Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet İkinci Grup*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), pp. 85-108.

¹³⁰Tunaya, *ibid.*, pp. 212-213.

Thus, by the spring of 1920, the Turkish nationalist movement took a united and centralized character on military and political spheres. By then, it had largely incorporated the Kurds for a common resistance. The Kurdish nationalist activities, though isolated and weakened, continued to be an issue for the Turkish nationalist movement.

4.4. The Question of Peace with the Ottoman State

The territorial settlement of the remaining Ottoman lands was one of the most complex issues that the Allied Powers spent much effort to conclude. As a matter of fact, it has been generally accepted that a form of mandate would be imposed as an instrument of resettlement in the early months of the Paris Peace Conference.¹³¹ There was no agreement, however, among the Allied Powers whether a single or more mandates would be imposed on the Ottoman territories. The question of which country(ies) would be the mandatory power in case of having several mandate areas became a matter of long dispute as well.

¹³¹A concrete plan for the mandate issue had come from Jan Smuts, a delegate from South Africa, in the late 1918. According to this plan, 'the deceased empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman would be placed under the mandatory control of a single power which would be responsible to the League of Nations for its actions. Annexation would be forbidden. The mandatory power was to follow an open-door policy in respect of economic development and trade. Finally, the areas under mandatory control would be independent. In conformity with this plan, Kurdistan, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and the Arab lands were to be separated from the Ottoman Empire and put under a mandate. Mandates were to be of three kinds, A, B, and C according to the their economic and political stages of development. The territories of the Ottoman Empire was to be placed under the category A since 'they had reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of a mandatory power.' Helmreich, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

After the middle of May 1919, a single American mandate over Anatolia appeared to be a favorable idea for the Allies. For this purpose, Lloyd George presented a scheme to Clemenceau and Wilson on May 21. This scheme suggested an American mandate over Constantinople and the Straits, Armenia and Cilicia, and a 'light' mandate over all of Anatolia. In case America rejected this 'light' mandate over Anatolia, there would be no mandate there. The Turks in Anatolia would be left to govern themselves. In this case, they were to be under indirect supervision of America holding the mandate of Constantinople and Armenia, and France, holding Syria. In response, Wilson stated that America could not take Anatolia under her mandate since there was no American interest or investment there. Accepting Armenian and, perhaps, Constantinople mandate was possible. A final decision in this regard, however, could not be taken until the American Senate submitted approval. Finally, debates on the conclusion of the peace treaty with the Ottoman State was to set aside the vote of the suggested mandates by the American Senate.¹³²

4.4.1. The Ottoman Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

While the settlement of the Ottoman territories were still being discussed, the Ottoman delegation headed by *Damat Ferit Pasha*, then the Ottoman Prime Minister, was granted permission to submit their views before the Peace Conference on June 17, 1919. In his statement to the Council of Ten, the Ottoman Prime Minister claimed that entrance of the Ottoman State into the First World War and the

¹³²*Ibid.*, pp. 116-125.

atrocities committed against the Armenians and Greeks were the work of the leaders of the CUP. In this regard, the Ottoman people did not incur any share of responsibility. He maintained that the CUP did not only persecute the Christians but also the Muslims. Under the light of these facts, he requested the Conference, on behalf of the Ottoman People, to end the occupation of the Ottoman territories. He also asked for maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*.¹³³

The statement of *Damat Ferit* to the Conference was followed by a *Memorandum Concerning the New Organization of the Ottoman Empire*, which was submitted to the Peace Conference on June 23. This memorandum stated that the Ottoman government would not accept the dismemberment of the Empire or its division under different mandates. Claiming that the Ottoman People demanded unity and independence, this memorandum set forth what the Ottoman government would accept with regards to territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire. According to the memorandum, (Eastern and Western) Thrace was to be a part of the Ottoman State by returning to the boundaries of the 1878 Congress of Berlin. In Asia Minor, the Ottoman northern territories would be bounded by the Black Sea, on the East by the Turco-Russian and Turco-Persian frontiers as they were before the war and would include the provinces of Mosul and Diyarbekir on the south. Regarding Armenia, the Ottoman government would consent to discuss *ad referendum* the frontier line which was to separate the Armenian Republic from the Ottoman State if the Allied Powers

¹³³*The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 509-512.

recognized the new Armenian Republic. Moreover, the Ottoman government would provide the Armenians, who wished to establish themselves in the Armenian Republic with all facilities. The Arab provinces including Syria, Palestine, the Hedjaz, etc. would remain as the integral part of the Ottoman Empire with an extensive degree of administrative autonomy. Finally, it was stated that the Ottoman Government was willing to enter into negotiations with Great Britain to define clearly the political status of Egypt and of Cyprus.¹³⁴

The reply of the Allied representatives was extremely disappointing for the Ottoman delegation. They rejected the claims that the Turkish people was not responsible for the atrocities committed against the Armenians and Greeks during the war and the necessity for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire pointing out that a nation should be judged by the government it was ruled. They maintained that they did not accept that the Turks had the capacity to rule over alien races. For this reason, they concluded that

“since Turkey deliberately attacked the Entente Powers and been defeated, she has thrown up upon the victors the heavy duty of determining the destiny of the various populations in her heterogeneous Empire. This duty the Council of the Principal and Allied Powers desire to carry out, as far as may be in accordance with the wishes and permanent interests of the populations themselves...”¹³⁵

From this reply of the Allied Powers, it was clear that territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire would be realized in conformity with the mandate principle, for

¹³⁴*The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. VI, pp. 691-694; D. B. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 647-651.

¹³⁵“*Answer to Turkish Delegates*,” 23 June 1919, D. B. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 645-647; *The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. VI, pp. 689-690.

which they had agreed as early as January 30, 1919, but what kind of a mandate? This was the question to be resolved.

4.4.2. The Formation of Investigation Commissions:

4.4.2.1. The King-Crane Commission

The Council of Four, on March 20, 1919, on President Wilson's suggestion, had agreed to form an Inter-Allied Commission which composed of equal representation of the French, the British, the Italian and the Americans to investigate the territories to be separated from the Ottoman state.¹³⁶ Five days later, a set of instructions were accepted for the Commissioners of the Peace Conference who would make inquiries in the certain parts of the Ottoman Empire which were to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of the governments acting as mandatory.¹³⁷

It was stated that the aim of the Conference was to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas, including Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries in the east of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia and Cilicia, and probably some additional areas in Anatolia, and to put the development of the peoples of these areas

¹³⁶Harry N. Howard, *An American Inquiry in the Middle East The King-Crane Commission*, (Beirut: Khayats, 1963, pp. 32-33.

¹³⁷*The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. XII, p. 745.

under the guidance of mandatory powers. The Conference, therefore, asked the Commissioners to visit these regions to make familiar themselves as much as possible with the state of opinion there with regards to

“the social, racial, and economic conditions, a knowledge of which might serve to guide the judgment of the Conference, and to form a definite opinion of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates which will be most likely to promote the order, peace, and development of those peoples and countries.”¹³⁸

Although it was agreed that the Commission of Inquiry would include representatives from each of the Allied Powers, the members present were from the United States: Henry C. King, the President of Oberlin [Ohio] College and Charles R. Crane, Treasurer of the American Committee for Armenians and Syrian Relief. Hence, the report submitted after the inquiry, known as ‘King-Crane’ Report,¹³⁹ was of the American Section of the Inter-Allied Commission.

The American Section of the Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey left Paris at the end of May 1919 and arrived at Jaffa, Palestine, to start inquiries, on June 10. After investigating Palestine and Syria for twenty-one days (June 10-July 21),¹⁴⁰ the Commission departed for İstanbul to hold interviews for the non-Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire. There, the members of the Commission, held a series of interviews with representative groups, political parties and associations, and individuals from various ethnic and religious communities (Turks,

¹³⁸*The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. XII, pp. 745-747.

¹³⁹The full text of the report can be found in *ibid.*, pp. 751-863.

¹⁴⁰For the reports upon Syria including Palestine, see, *The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. XII, pp. 751-799; Howard, *The King-Crane Commission*, pp. 87-154.

Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Kurds)¹⁴¹ in order to form an opinion on the territorial division and assignment of mandates.

The report of the King-Crane Commission, at last, recommended the followings in the settlement of the non-Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire:

“1. The formation, under a Mandatory, of an Armenian State, completely separated from Turkey. Cilicia should not be separated from Anatolia at present,

2. The similar formation, under a Mandatory, of an International Constantinopolitan State, completely separated from Turkey,

3. The appointment of a Mandatory for the continued Turkish State, in line with the apparent wishes of the majority of the Turkish people; the major terms of the Mandate to be defined by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations, and further adjustments to be arranged between the Mandatory and Turkey.

4. No independent territory be set off for the Greeks; though local autonomy be granted to that portion of the sanjak of Smyrna which has a decided majority of Greeks, but under general mandate for Turkey.

5. That a commission or commissions on boundaries in Asia Minor be appointed to study on the ground and to exactly define the boundaries of the states named in the first three recommendations, and precise limits of any locally autonomous area in Smyrna. The definition of the boundaries of the Turkish State would require the study and definition of the northern boundaries of Syria and Mesopotamia as well, with special reference to allowing to the Kurds a measure of autonomy under close mandatory rule, possibly in connection with Mesopotamia, and with the clear understanding that the rights of the Syrians, Chaldean, and Nestorian Christian minorities in this whole region shall be carefully guarded,

¹⁴¹*Sabah*, 2-3, 5 August 1919; *İkdam*, 2, 5 August 1919. The Turkish interviewees (the leaders of political parties and intellectuals) usually focused on the preservation of the national existence of Turkey in accordance with the Wilsonian principles, rejected an Armenian state extended into the six provinces and favored a solution by which the rights of all nationalities would be guaranteed. The Greek representatives were in agreement for the salvation of the Ottoman Greeks from the ‘Turkish yoke’. While the Armenians favored a mandate as the best solution for the Eastern provinces, the Kurdish representatives demanded the establishment of a Kurdish government in the districts where the Kurds formed the majority of population. They stated that they recognized an Armenian state but outside the Kurdish territory. For the details see Howard, *ibid.*, pp. 163-185. The Turkish point of view, particularly, on Armenia was publicized through the Ottoman press. For example, Ahmet Emin [Yalman], “Ermeni Meselesi,” *Vakit*, 1 August 1919; “Ermenistan Meselesi,” *İkdam*, 2 August 1919; Halide Edip [Adivar], “Amerika Tahkik Heyeti,” *Vakit*, 4 August 1919.

6. A general single mandate for the whole of Asia Minor (not assigned to Mesopotamia or Syria) to include under it the mandate for Armenia, the mandate for the Constantinopolitan State, and the mandate for the continued Turkish State, each with a governor of its own to ensure full attention to its particular interests, besides a governor-general over the whole,

7. That the United States of America be asked to take this general mandate together with its inclusive mandate for the Armenian State, the Constantinopolitan State, and the continued Turkish State.”¹⁴²

The report of the King-Crane Commission was presented to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris on August 28. It was not considered, however, by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and made only unofficially available to the British, French and Italian delegations. Thus, it did not play a role in the emergence of the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴³

4.4.2.2. The American Military Mission (Harbord Mission) Investigating Anatolia and Trans-Caucasia

The inconsideration of the report of the King-Crane Commission was due to the reluctance of the United States to involve in the suggested mandates than the contents of the report itself. The same was also true for the report of the American Military Mission to Armenia which was appointed on August 13, 1919 to serve under the direction of General James G. Harbord in order to “investigate and report on

¹⁴²*The Paris Peace Conference*, vol. XII, pp. 841-842.

¹⁴³Howard, *The King-Crane Commission.*, p. 220; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

political, military, geographical, administrative, economic and other considerations involved in possible American interests and responsibilities” in the Near East.¹⁴⁴

The American Military Mission spent thirty days in Asia Minor (September-November 1919) and Transcaucasia.¹⁴⁵ The representatives of every sovereign Government in these regions as well as individual Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Tartars, Georgians, Russians, Persians, Jews, Arabs, British, and French were meticulously interviewed. The commission also listened to the views of the several educational, religious and benevolent organizations supported by the United States. The commission’s report was completed in the middle of October. The first part of this report was on the history and present situation of the Armenian people. The second dealt with the political conditions and held suggestions for readjustment while the third was allotted to the conditions and problems involved in a mandate. The report concluded by listing considerations for and against the undertaking of a mandate (by the United States).¹⁴⁶

The report of the Harbord mission stated that “even before the war the Armenians were far from being the majority in the region claimed as Turkish Armenia” and “there are probably 270,000 Armenians to-day”. It indicated that about

¹⁴⁴Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, *Conditions in the Near East Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 3. For a study of the Harbord’s Mission see Seçil Akgün, *General Harbord’un Anadolu Gezisi ve (Ermeni Meselesi’ne Dair) Raporu*, (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1981).

¹⁴⁵James Harbord wrote his observations during his travel in Turkey and Trans-Caucasia in three articles, the titles of which were “Investigating Turkey and Trans-Caucasia,” “Mustapha Kemal Pasha and His Party” and “The New Nations of Trans-Caucasia,” *World’s Work*, no. 1-3 (May-July 1920).

¹⁴⁶Harbord, *Report of the American Military Mission*, p. 4.

75,000 had been repatriated from Syria and Mesopotamia while some were returning from other regions. In the Transcaucasus, it was estimated that, there were 300,000 refugees from Turkish Armenia who were in desperate conditions.¹⁴⁷ Stating that “there is much to show that, left to themselves, the Turk and the Armenian” had been able to “live together in peace”, and they did not witness that the Armenians who had returned to their homes were in danger of their lives, the report correctly observed that

“the events at Smyrna have undoubtedly cheapened every Christian life in Turkey, the landing of the Greeks there being looked upon by the Turks as deliberate violation by the Allies of the terms of their armistice and the probable forerunner of further unwarranted aggression.”¹⁴⁸

In seeking a political solution for the existing problems in the Transcaucasia and Asia Minor, General Harbord’s mission, similar to the King-Crane’s Commission, favored a single mandate which was also to include Constantinople with its hinterland of Roumelia by the same power. The explanation was “if separate powers exercised such mandate the inevitable jealousies, hatreds, exaggerated separatist tendencies, and economic difficulties would compel failure.” Therefore, a single mandatory for the Turkish Empire and the Transcaucasia was suggested as the most economic solution.¹⁴⁹

The report of the Harbord Mission also claimed that many distinguished Turks as well as the Turkish nationalists favored a single, preferably American

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

mandate, through which territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would be preserved. The concerning part of the report read:

“A party of distinguished Turks ... stated that as between the independence of Turkey as it existed in 1914, and a mandate for the Empire given to the United States they greatly preferred the latter, and believed that they spoke for the educated classes of all Turkey. It has been very evident to this mission that Turkey would not object to a single disinterested power taking a mandate for her territory as outlined in the armistice with the Allies... The aim of the Nationalist, or National Defense Party, as its adherents style it, as stated by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, its head, is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Empire under a mandatory of a single disinterested power, preferably America.”¹⁵⁰

With regards to the incorporation of the Turkish territory, i.e., the Eastern provinces claimed by the Armenians, the Harbord Mission saw no wisdom, “no matter what the aspirations of the Armenians.” It was because the events of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the unrest caused by the activities and propaganda of certain European powers had excessively disturbed the Turkish people since the Armistice. The mission, therefore, feared that an announcement from Paris at this time “of an intention to carve from Turkey a State of Armenia” would be the signal for massacres of Christians throughout the whole country. The report claimed that it was very unwise to invite trouble which may be avoided by a single mandatory administration under which the Turks and Armenians would be neighbors rather than rivals.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. As a matter of fact, American mandate had become a very popular idea among the Ottoman intellectuals, especially after the occupation of İzmir. Many representatives of political parties, associations, and prominent journalists during King-Crane Commission’s stay in İstanbul, also explained their views in favor of American mandate. Regarding the nationalists, a lively debate took place during the Sivas Congress on probability of a mandate of the United States. There was not agreement among themselves in this regard. While some of the nationalists favored it, Mustafa Kemal stood against any kind of mandate.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 17.

At the conclusion part of the report, the Harbord Mission did not submit recommendations for an acceptance of a mandate in the Near East by the United States; instead, stated arguments for and against American acceptance of it. The arguments favored American mandate in the Near East pointed out that the United States, as one of the major founders of the League of Nations, was morally bound to accept the obligations and responsibilities of a mandatory. It continued by indicating that America was already spending millions to safeguard peoples in Turkey and Transcaucasia. If it had a control, it could perform this more efficiently. In addition, America was the only hope of the Armenians. An American mandate would definitely stop further massacres of Armenians and other Christians. It stated that such an application would give justice to the Turks, Kurds, Greeks, and other peoples; that if the United States did not take a responsibility in this region, it was probable that international jealousies would result in the continuation of the "unspeakable misrule of the Turk." Finally, it concluded by underlining that it would be better to spend "millions for a mandate than billions for future wars."

The counter arguments of the Harbord Mission for an American mandate in the Near East stressed that the United States had prior and nearer obligations, and ample responsibilities at home. It stated that having such a mandate would weaken the United States position relative to Monroe doctrine. Moreover, the United States had not any responsibility for the political, social, or economic conditions prevailing in this region. The termination of massacres or securing security and justice in this region might be performed by another mandatory power, particularly Great Britain.

In case of accepting responsibility, the United States “would be put to great expense, involving probably an increase of the Army and Navy.”¹⁵²

Thus by the fall of 1919, two reports had been submitted to the political authorities of the United States for reconsideration of a mandate in the Near East. At about the same time, however, the interest of the United States at the mandate issue, and even concerning the peace settlement in the Near East, seemed to have been fallen due to several reasons. This fact was proved when the American representatives in Paris made a final attempt to assure American participation in the settlement.

Towards the end of November 1919, the American Commission to Negotiate Peace prepared a memorandum which insisted on the requirement of “a definite Turkish policy” for the United States. This memorandum took it for granted that the United States would join the League of Nations when the American Congress met in December 1919 and participated in the negotiations of the Turkish Treaty. For this reason, the United States was expected to determine its policy regarding the resolution of the Turkish question before the negotiations started. Then, the American representatives at the Peace Conference would have known from the very start the general lines of the American policy regarding the settlement of the Ottoman treaty. To this effect, the United States was to decide:

“1. How far it will adopt the recommendations of the Crane-King and Harbord Reports as to the lines on which the Ottoman Empire should be divided;

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, pp. 25-28.

2. Whether the so-called 'secret' agreements made by other Powers for the partition of Turkey are to be recognized by the United States;
3. If these agreements are not recognized, whether the United States will be prepared to provide money or troops in order that the territorial and political plans provided for in these agreements may not be carried out;
4. Whether the United States will be prepared to cooperate in the international control of such portions of Turkey as are not placed under any mandate."¹⁵³

In summary, this memorandum asked the United States whether it was going to participate in the territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire and have a responsibility as a mandatory. This was the question which would alter the course of events in terms of the territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire and all issues, particularly the Armenian, connected therewith. The appeal of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace was not replied which meant the unofficial withdrawal of the United States from the Peace negotiations. Thereupon, the American delegation left Paris in early December 1919.¹⁵⁴

4.4.3. The Shaping of the Peace Treaty with the Ottoman State

As a matter of fact, both Britain and France had been aware of the fact that the American Senate would not favor of accepting any kind of mandate over the Ottoman territories since the summer of 1919. On August 1919, Balfour, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, who was in Paris, stated to Earl Curzon that the probability of

¹⁵³King Papers: American Commission to Negotiate Peace. *Memorandum on the Policy of the United States Relative to the Treaty with Turkey*. Paris, November 26, 1919; cited in Howard, *The King-Crane Commission*, pp. 281-284.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 285.

accepting mandate for any part of former Turkish Empire by the American Congress and Senate was diminishing.¹⁵⁵ A week later, the Washington correspondent of the *London Times* pointed out that none in Washington believed that the American Senate would authorize for taking over mandates in Asia Minor.¹⁵⁶ On the basis of this verdict, Stéphen Pichon, the Foreign Minister of France, had proposed Curzon, the Foreign Secretary of Britain since October 24, to initiate private British-French discussions regarding the territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire. When they met in November in London, Pichon argued that America had disappeared from the scene as a factor in the settlement of the Near East, and all chance of an American mandate for any portion of the Ottoman Empire had vanished. There were only two parties, Great Britain and France, whose interests should be considered and reconciled. For this reason, conversations between them must take place and “an understanding must be arrived at, before the Peace Conference addressed itself to the Turkish question.” Curzon agreed to these arguments and a decision was taken to commence the discussions in December.¹⁵⁷

In the first meeting of the British and French Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs in London on December 11, the decision was taken to abandon the mandate system for Asia Minor, it was agreed however, this decision would exclude the Arab parts, and that the question of the Ottoman Empire should be dealt with as a

¹⁵⁵D. B. F. P., vol. IV, p. 734.

¹⁵⁶*The Times*, 26 August 1919; cited in Gidney, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

¹⁵⁷Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

whole in the manner which seemed best.¹⁵⁸ What would be done with regions which had been considered to be separated from the Ottoman Empire and put under a mandatory such as Armenia and Kurdistan? The question was especially important for the Armenians, hundreds of thousands of whom were living in desperate conditions in Caucasia and waiting for repatriation, and the Republic of Armenia, survival of which was dependent, as the Allies were also aware of, to the foreign protection.

Great Britain and France, however, were not inclined to have at any kind of responsibility for Armenia as the position of United States had become clear in this regard. Actually, both powers, perhaps for this reason, had insisted on American mandate in this region. The British government, aware of the fact that an Armenian mandate would cost much money and manpower, decided to withdraw its troops from Caucasia in order not to confront a *fait accompli*. As a result, by the end of September 1919, there weren't British troops left in the Caucasus except for a garrison in Batum.¹⁵⁹

Following the decision of abandonment of any kind of mandate for Asia Minor, Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, expressed his opinion regarding Armenia to Lloyd George admitting that

“The Armenians were a dangerous people to get mixed up with. They required a great deal of money, and gave very little satisfaction. He was in favor of letting them have a republic, or whatever else they wanted. France was unwilling to spend any money in Armenia.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸D. B. F. P., vol. II, pp. 727-728.

¹⁵⁹Helmreich, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.

¹⁶⁰D. B. F. P., vol. II, p. 734.

At the same time, the idea of a Great Armenia, stretching from Trabzon to Cilicia, was accepted as unreal.¹⁶¹ The Armenian State, on the formation of which Britain and France agreed, could extend in the west to include only the town of Erzerum. The actual frontiers would be decided later by an expert Allied Commission.¹⁶²

With regards to Kurdistan, the British and French governments decided to leave the discussion of the question for the time being; they agreed on some general propositions which might be followed for a final decision. These propositions included that no mandate, whether English or French, or Anglo-French, was possible or desirable for Kurdistan as a whole, except for the “more settled areas in Southern Kurdistan” where Turkish rule would be totally discontinued. In addition, the Kurds were to be asked whether they would form a single state or “a number of small loosely knit areas.” They also in agreement that it was the time and non-interference of the Turks which would show what they were capable of. Finally, the Kurds would not have formally appointed British or French advisers.¹⁶³

The decision to abandon mandate in Anatolia also brought about the questioning of the Greek existence in İzmir. Clemenceau confessed to Lloyd George that a mistake had been made in allowing Greece to land troops in İzmir and that the

¹⁶¹“La réalité et la logique laissent loin le rêve mégalomane d’une grande Arménie allant de Trébizonde à Alexandrette.” D. B. F. P., vol. IV, p. 955. Clemenceau stated on December 11 that: “In discussing the question from a Turkish point of view, he felt he ought not to include Cilicia as part of Syria, since the Turks did not admit that it was part of Syria.” D. B. F. P., vol. II, p. 727. At this time, France had begun to find ways of agreement with the Turkish nationalist movement for evacuation of Cilicia. Helmreich, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

¹⁶²D. B. F. P., vol. IV, p. 962.

¹⁶³*Ibid*, p. 967.

Greeks would have to submit the idea that they could no longer hold it against the Turks. Some arrangement, he added, might be made about İzmir.¹⁶⁴ What was more interesting in this regard was the British attitude. In the comments of Political Section of the British Peace Delegation to the M. Berthelot's Note, the chief secretary of political and commercial affairs at the *Quai d'Orsay*, it was stated that the İzmir problem would no doubt have been simplified had the Greek occupation of the İzmir area had not been sanctioned by the Supreme Council at a date long before the final Turkish settlement. As a new consideration, the British delegation suggested that İzmir be left under nominal Turkish sovereignty with a *vali* chosen with the permission of the powers and in acting in council. The council would be composed of the representatives of the principal Allied (and Associated) Powers with adequate and proportional representation of Greek and Turkish interests. While such a resolution would reduce the Turkish sovereignty to "an agreeable fiction", it would also provide formal safeguards for the non-Turkish elements.¹⁶⁵

Taking these facts into consideration, it is possible to claim that the Allied Powers, Britain and France, started to change mind on the territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire by the end of 1919. Abandoning their commitments to the Armenians they also started questioning the Greek existence in İzmir. In addition, they put off the Kurdistan issue like the Armenian one. At this time, the formulation of the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, however, had not been concluded yet.

¹⁶⁴D. B. F. P., vol. II, p. 733.

¹⁶⁵D. B. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 950-951.

Since the Allies had concluded most of the peace treaties with the defeated powers,¹⁶⁶ except for the Ottoman Empire, they could reserve their meetings for the Turkish settlement in the first half of 1920.

4.4.3.1. The London and San Remo Conferences (February-April 1920): The Conclusion of the Settlement of the Ottoman Lands

Discussions on settlement of the Ottoman territories continued at the London (February-March) and San Remo Conferences (April) in 1920. At both meetings, the Allies dealt with the settlement regarding Thrace partially under Greek occupation and İzmir as well as Armenia and Kurdistan issues.

There were no disagreements concerning Thrace. The Allies in early days of the London Conference decided for a Greek annexation of Thrace (Western and Eastern).¹⁶⁷ The draft articles on the future of İzmir were composed after long debates. France favored entire Greek withdrawal from this region while Britain insisted on maintaining Greek existence in a delineated zone. In other words, the Greeks would withdraw from the Aydin region back to the southern boundary of İzmir district. The Turkish flag was to be retained as the “sole evidence of Turkish suzerainty.” A Greek garrison and Greek administration would be prevalent in the region. A local assembly, which would represent the Greek and Turkish population

¹⁶⁶The concluded treaties in 1919 were the Versailles Treaty with Germany on June 28; the Saint-Germain Treaty with Austria on September 10; and, the Neuilly Treaty with Bulgaria on November 27.

¹⁶⁷Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

was to be formed. This assembly would have the right to apply to the League of Nations for the incorporation of the area into Greece after two years.¹⁶⁸

Opposition to the decision of leaving İzmir under Greek sovereignty came from the High Commissioners of the Allies in İstanbul, particularly the British. J. M. De Robeck, who wrote a letter to Curzon pointing out the proposed cession of all Thrace up to the Çatalca lines and of Smyrna to Greece was the violation of the principle of self-determination. He continued:

“The Muslims in this area would not accept the Greek annexation especially after the sample of Greek methods which they have had since the Greek occupation of Smyrna, which is clear by the very existence of the nationalist movement in Asia Minor... If the provisional Greek occupation of Smyrna has been, as it undoubtedly has, the canker of in the Near Eastern situation since last May, how much more so will definite annexation be the canker for years to come, the constant irritant which will perpetuate bloodshed in Asia Minor probably for generations?... The terms are such that no Turk, Committee of Union and Progress or pro-*Entente* can very well accept. The Supreme Council, thus, are prepared for a resumption of general warfare; they are prepared to do violence to their own declared and cherished principles; they are prepared to perpetuate bloodshed indefinitely in the Near East; and for what? To maintain Mr. Veniselos in power in Greece... I cannot help wondering if the game is worth the candle... M. Veniselos's deserts *vis-à-vis* the *Entente* are great; but is it wise to run the almost certain risk of plunging Asia in blood in order to reward Greece according to the deserts of M. Veniselos?...”¹⁶⁹

Decision regarding İzmir, however, did not change. The resolutions adopted finally, took place in the peace treaty with minor changes.

The Allies, as it was clear from the discussion in December, were not eager for the Armenian aspirations as they were for the Greeks. They (Britain, France and Italy) formally recognized the Armenian independence in January 1919,¹⁷⁰ but none

¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 267-268.

¹⁶⁹D. B. F. P., vol. XIII, pp. 17-19.

¹⁷⁰Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 286, n. 16.

of them intended to commit itself to military or financial support. They decided to place the independent Armenia, which was presumed to include the Independent Republic of Erivan and portions of the adjacent Turkish provinces¹⁷¹ (Muş, Van, Bitlis, and Erzurum) excluding Trabzon and Erzincan¹⁷² under the protection of the League of Nations although the League's view was not affirmative.¹⁷³

Accordingly the League's response stating that it did not possess neither military means nor financial sources to assist the Armenians currently, guided the Allied Powers to reconsider the Armenian issue at San Remo in April 1920. As noted above, they were unwilling to extend military or financial aid to the Armenians. They decided to ask the United States for securing financial support to Armenia. Regarding the military commitment, which was absolutely necessary to enforce the Armenian settlement since much of the territory allotted to Armenia previously was under the control of the Turkish nationalists, they agreed to remain in the places they had occupied, i.e., in the capital, coastal areas, not advancing into the interior. They also were in award to equip an Armenian military force by means of which Armenia would defend itself.¹⁷⁴ What the decision meant under current circumstances was leaving the Armenians with the Turkish nationalists to settle their accounts among themselves.

Along with the decision not to enter into military and political commitments,

¹⁷¹D. B. F. P., vol. VII, p. 98.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 280.

¹⁷³Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 294-296.

the Allies also reconsidered the territory Armenia would include. The focus of the question was whether Erzurum would go to Armenia or remain under the possession of the Turks. After long discussions, it was decided to ask the United States for the mandate of Armenia. In case the proposal was declined, the President of the United States would be asked to arbitrate on the boundaries of Armenia and, Turkey. Armenia and the Allies was to accept the president's definitive decision concerning the provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis.¹⁷⁵ The inclusion of Cilicia by Armenia had been abandoned.¹⁷⁶

Once this solution was reached, the Supreme Council extended this proposal to President Wilson on April 27. The President took the proposal to the Senate on May 24. His proposal was rejected in the Senate on June 1.¹⁷⁷ Thereafter, he replied the Supreme Council that he would accept to draw the boundaries of Armenia. He performed this task in the late November of 1920, when the question was almost resolved on military field.

The Kurdistan issue was also resolved during the discussions at San Remo. As it may be remembered, the Allies had already abandoned the mandate issue for Kurdistan. They also agreed at the London Conference that Kurdistan should be independent, either as a single state or as a federation of autonomous states.¹⁷⁸ At the San Remo Conference, it was decided to leave Kurdistan under Turkish sovereignty

¹⁷⁵D. B. F. P., vol. VIII, pp. 156-158; 177-178.

¹⁷⁶Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

¹⁷⁷Akgün, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-158.

¹⁷⁸D. B. F. P., vol. VII, p. 159.

with a degree of local autonomy. A commission appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments would draft, within six months following the application of the peace treaty, a scheme of local autonomy for the “predominantly Kurdish areas, east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia, north of the northern frontiers of Syria, and Mesopotamia.” The Kurds would have the right to resort to the League of Nations to acquire full independence in a year following the signature of the treaty.¹⁷⁹ Thus, Great Britain, persistent on separation of the Kurdish populated areas from the Ottoman Empire, gave up its position in this regard. She would no longer be involved in Kurdish affairs except for the province of Mosul.¹⁸⁰ By words of Lord Curzon:

“It would seem that the Kurds felt that they could not maintain their existence without the backing of a Great Power. They would willingly have British protection, and they would doubtless accept French protection. But if neither France nor Great Britain undertook the task -and he hoped neither would- they appeared to think it might be better to leave them under the protection of the Turks. The country had grown accustomed to Turkish rule, and it was difficult to separate it from Turkey unless some alternative protector could be discovered...”¹⁸¹

As a result of the discussions on the territorial settlement of the Ottoman Empire from December 1919 and through February-April 1920, the clauses of the final treaty appeared. The treaty was signed on August 10, 1920, at Sévres.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹D. B. F. P., vol. VIII, pp. 44-45.

¹⁸⁰Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹⁸¹D. B. F. P., vol. VIII, p. 43.

¹⁸²The clauses 62-64 of the Sévres Treaty dealt with Kurdistan; 65-83 with Smyrna and 88-93 with Armenia. These clauses stipulated the enforcement of the draft proposals for the settlement in İzmir, Kurdistan and Armenia which were presented above. For the complete text of the clauses of the Treaty see Treaty Series No. 11 (1920), *Treaty of Peace With Turkey*. Signed at Sévres, August 10, 1920. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office), 1920.

The Sévres Treaty appeared when the Turkish nationalist movement had consolidated its power through all parts of Anatolia and, had even formed an independent government in Ankara. In addition, the Turkish nationalists had initiated an armed struggle in the region considered to be the parts of the Greater Armenia, i.e., Cilicia. As will be observed in the following chapter, they managed to drive out the French in the region, negotiated with them, secured French withdrawal thus cleared out the idea of Greater Armenia in early 1920. Under these circumstances, therefore, the question was whether the clauses of the Sévres Treaty could be applicable. If they were to be applied, it was clear that some kind of military action against the nationalists would be required¹⁸³ for which the Allies were reluctant. As a matter of fact, the Allies had clearly stated during their discussions that they could not take any military commitment in the case of Armenia. This fact was well-known by the Turkish nationalists to whom the territorial settlement of the peace treaty was not acceptable. Therefore, aware of the fact that they should settle their matters by arms, as they had already done in Cilicia and eliminated the Armenian claims over this region, they started to prepare themselves for military action against the Greeks

¹⁸³As early as October 10, 1919, Admiral Robeck reported to Earl Curzon that "there can be little doubt that an army of occupation would now be needed to impose terms which would have been regarded as merciful in the hours of ruin and dejection following the Armistice..."D. B. F. P., vol. IV, p. 806. Similar argument was reported by C. Van H. Engert, who had been sent on a special mission to Cilicia and Syria. He had the conviction that "...unless the French and Italians are willing to make the necessary sacrifices for the maintenance of law and order in the spheres of influence they rightly or wrongly claim, and unless the powers are ready to back Greek occupation of Smyrna, Armenian independence, and other decisions of Paris with large forces, not so much for actual fighting but to prevent resistance, it would be infinitely better if they withdraw voluntarily before the Turks and Arabs drive them out and discredit Western influence forever..." From Engert to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1920, Department of State, 867.00/1127; Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

and Armenians to eliminate finally the Armenian claims in the east and the Greek claims in the west. In the meantime, they would hold operations against the Pontine Greeks, whose claims were not taken into serious consideration at the Peace Conference and also against the Alevite Kurds who demanded regional autonomy from the Ankara government in Central Anatolia. Nevertheless, before dealing with these, it is necessary to refer to the Cilician affairs, which was the first phase in armed ethnic conflict.



CHAPTER V

TOWARDS THE END: COMPETING NATIONALISMS IN ARMED CONFLICTS, 1920-1922

5.1. Turco-Armenian Conflict in Cilicia

The Cilicia region had been claimed as a part of the Greater Armenia by the Armenian delegation to the Peace Conference in early 1919. Following the occupation of the French and British troops of the region soon after the conclusion of the Moudros Armistice, the existing hostility between the Armenians and Muslims deepened. This was mainly due to the repatriation of the Armenian deportees claiming their movable and immovable goods in the Muslim hands since the First World War as well as the brutalities of the Armenians against the Muslim population. Reciprocally, the employment of the local Armenians in administrative positions following the occupation disturbed the Ottoman officials and native Muslims. In addition, local Muslims considered the repatriation of the Armenians and their employment in administration, although in lesser positions, as a step toward the establishment of the Armenian rule in Cilicia.

It has already been explained that the Muslim resistance, compared to the east and west, remained weak in this region. Resistance organizations had not been established until the pre-mentioned decision of the Representatives Committee at the

Sivas Congress. Simultaneously with the decision of the Representatives Committee to organize and fortify national organizations in Cilicia (the province of Adana, Ayıntab, Maraş and Urfa) against the Armenian threat, two of the Allied Powers, France and Britain reached to an agreement relating to the future of the region. This agreement (signed on September 15) stipulated the withdrawal of the British troops from Syria and Cilicia, to be replaced by French troops, beginning on November 1, 1919.¹ In other words, Adana, Maraş, Ayıntab and Urfa were to be occupied by the French.

Thereupon, the British troops evacuated Cilicia at the end of October; as the French troops occupied Urfa, Maraş and Ayıntab.² Adana was already under French control. The occupying powers, under the supervision of French commanders, were mostly Armenians.³ Precisely, 80 per cent of the French troops which replaced the British in Urfa, Ayıntab and Maraş, were the members of the Armenian Legion (Légion Arménienne),⁴ which consisted of four battalions of 4,368 soldiers and 66 officers. In addition to these, local Armenians joined the French as volunteers.

¹"Aide-Mémoire in regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia pending the Decision in regard to Mandates," D. B. F. P., vol. I, pp. 700-701; Brémond, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

²Selek, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 323.

³"...Best information that French occupy; Marash about 4,000 troops; Ourfa about 400; and Aintab about 1,700. These troops composed large majority of black colonials and Armenians..." From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 10 February 1920, 867.00/1111.

⁴ATASE, 270/143, 10 November 1335 (1919). This legion had been formed by the Armenian volunteers and fought on the side of the Allied Powers during the First World War. For the activities of this formation in Cilicia see Stanford J. Shaw, "The Armenian Legion and Its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia," in *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, ed. by Türkaya Ataöv, (Ankara: The Turkish Historical Society, 2001), pp. 155-206.

Consequently, Muslims protested the French occupation of Cilicia by cabling Paris.⁵ These telegrams were of uniform character and the signatories were usually the members of local Defense of Rights societies. According to J. De Robeck, the list of the telegrams

“shows how widespread are the ramifications of the national movement organisation, and how untiring are the efforts of its organisers to popularise the idea of resistance to any decision at the Peace Conference tending to the dismemberment of the territory which remained under direct Turkish administration at the time of the armistice.”⁶

However, rather than the telegrams, Robeck gave priority to the “violent pronouncement” issued in the form of a telegram to the Turkish Press Association by the leaders of the Turkish nationalist movement on November 12. Some parts of this read:

“The localities of Aintab, Marash, and Ourfa, which were occupied by the English, contrary to the provisions of the armistice and were recently evacuated, have now again been occupied by the French. The Entente Powers therefore by no means renounce their plan of depriving our nation of these parts of our country, and they are carrying out their schemes on the ground apparently that this occupation is provisional and preventive, without awaiting the decisions of the conference... The acts of these Powers are inhuman and such as to be an offence against justice and right... The massacres, oppression, and atrocities and the policy of extermination carried out in the vilayet of Aidin, which was given to the Greeks to occupy with a view to opening the way to a division of Turkey, are identical with those perpetrated in the localities of Marash, Ourfa, and Aintab, dependencies of the vilayet of Adana, which the French have occupied, using the Armenians as their instrument... We wish to advise the Powers of the Entente that our whole nation, in the widest sense of the word, is united in this legitimate and sublime decision, a continuation of this inhuman policy which the Entente Powers, deaf to the legitimate voice of our nation, are following may entail fatal

⁵There were 81 telegrams coming from all over parts of Anatolia. The list of telegrams takes place in D. B. F. P., vol. IV, pp. 536-537; Department of State, 867.00/1137.

⁶Admiral Sir J. De Robeck to Earl Curzon, 19 November 1919, D. B.F. P., vol. IV, p. 536.

consequences, not only for a few countries, but also possibly for the two hemispheres...⁷

Likewise, many meetings reminding the protests of the occupation of İzmir were held to protest the French occupation of Cilicia.⁸ Actually, the French occupation of Cilicia participated by Armenians increased tension to a high degree between the Turkish nationalists on the one hand, and the Armenians and the French, their “protectors”, on the other, in the fall of 1919 just as the Greek occupation of İzmir had done between the Turks and Greeks in May 1919.⁹

5.1.1. French Quest for Negotiations With the Nationalists

Soon after the occupation of the Cilicia; however, France displayed will to negotiate with the Turkish nationalists and evacuate the region upon the fulfillment of asserted conditions. A message in this respect was conveyed to Mustafa Kemal by Georges Picot, former High Commissioner for Syria and Armenia. As a matter of fact, Picot, on return to France, stopped at Sivas to meet Mustafa Kemal on December 8, 1919. At this meeting, he told Mustafa Kemal that the French occupation of the Cilicia was temporary and acknowledged him that France was willing to withdraw its troops from the region if both sides agreed on the following

⁷D. B. F. P., vol. IV, p. 538; Baykal, *op. cit.*, p. 53; Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 224-225. The irritation of the Turkish nationalist leader at the French occupation of Cilicia and the enlistment of Armenians with the French troops was also reflected in the intelligence reports. Department of State, 867.00/1085.

⁸For the protest meetings see Yaşar Akbıyık, *Millî Mücadelede Güney Cephesi Maraş*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi), 1999, pp. 87-110.

⁹“A new condition has arisen in Turkey by reason of the French occupation of Syria and Cilicia. This condition is similar to the one that was caused by the Greek occupation of Smyrna. The use by the French of Armenian soldiers and the arming of Armenians brought about an uprising of the local

points: Initially requested was that France would have the right of supervising local administration and also the protection of minorities in Cilicia; secondly, police was to be reorganized under the French supervision; and, finally requested was Franco-Turkish economic collaboration equipping France with economic concessions in the region.¹⁰ Mustafa Kemal opposed all but the reorganization of police under the French supervision. With regards to the administrative supervision, he could concede that French consuls would have a special interest and influence in the region; but, for all these, France should guarantee the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire by a unilateral agreement for which France could not agree.¹¹ They compromised, however, on the points that the nationalist forces would abstain from attacking the French troops in Maraş, Ayıntab, Urfa and Adana as long as the Armenians did not provoke them. Moreover, the French would allow the nationalists to establish Defense of Rights organizations in the region. On January 7, 1920, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to Kâzım Karabekir, informing him about his conversation with Georges Picot. He stated that:

He [G. Picot] requested from us that no rebellion [should] occur against the French, while we continued with establishing our national organization in Adana, Urfa, Marash and Antep. We told him we would take steps to ensure that the Muslim community did not commit any aggression as long as the Armenians did not provoke them, but that the responsibility would be theirs, should they provide any reason for it. It is very important that this detailed request be confidential. Based on the above discussion, we are convinced that the French consider an action in favor of Turkey in the east, for their interest. Georges Picot's intention was to gather definite information about the national point of view when he went to Paris.

population..." From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 23 February 1920, Department of State, 867.00/1118; 867.00/1129.

¹⁰Statement of Mustafa Kemal on 24 April 1920, *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. I, pp. 5-6; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, p. 183; Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 218-219.

¹¹Helmreich, *ibid.*, p. 183.

Consequently it is necessary to make efforts with even greater ardor for the development of our national organization in the occupied areas and that any armed attacks are prevented until further notice...¹²

Following his conversation with Georges Picot, Mustafa Kemal ordered the commander of the Cilicia region and the religious dignitary in Urfa not to attack the French unless they caused for an action.¹³ At the same time, he demanded them to consolidate and widen the national organization.¹⁴

While the French were questing to negotiate with the nationalists without the knowledge of Britain and Italy, Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, began to develop a pro-Turkish stand in regard to the resolution in Cilicia. He stated that Cilicia, as he felt, was not a part of Syria since the Turks did not admit it as such.¹⁵ France explained its intention as maintaining control over the forts in the Taurus which was a historical defense (line) of Syria but, at the same time, to find a formula to settle the Cilicia issue. France was willing to remain in this region under a nominal Turkish sovereignty.

5.1.2. The Maraş Incident and the French Withdrawal from Cilicia and Vicinity

Apart from the external developments regarding Cilicia, there were the internal ones, which were characterized as the extension of Turkish nationalist organizations, aiming at expelling the French and Armenians from the region. The

¹²Kâzım Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*, (İstanbul, 1969), p. 381; cited in Gürün, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-278.

¹³Baykal, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73, 75.

¹⁴Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 219.

¹⁵D. B. F. P., vol. II, p. 727.

decision of the nationalists for the formation of the nationalist organizations in Cilicia and its vicinity was followed by a set of regulations dealing with the steps to be followed in the formation of the nationalist organizations. Disturbed by the French occupation, and, more, by the Armenian involvement in the occupation, intensive activities occurred in Cilicia and its vicinity to organize Muslim armed resistance by the fall of 1919.¹⁶ As a result, one of the most effective nationalist organizations was formed around Maraş, where the tension rose immediately after the arrival of the French forces.

Maraş was one of the most heavily Armenian populated districts (it was argued to have approximately 27,000 Armenians) in the Cilicia region in the late 1919.¹⁷ The arrival of the French forces which included a battalion of the Armenian Legion (about 400 soldiers) and the welcome of native Armenians of the occupying forces apparently increased the existing tension in the city. Two days after the French occupation, the leading members of the Muslim population sent a telegram to the commander of the French forces at Ayıntab stating that the Muslims did not object to a French occupation but the majority of the French troops were Armenian not French. These Armenians who were natives of the region had demonstrated nothing but hatred for the Muslim population since their arrival.¹⁸ The Muslim unrest increased

¹⁶A correspondence from Adana stated the intensive activities of nationalist bands in Adana, Maraş and Urfa in early December 1919. "Les bandes nationalistes turques en Cilicie," *Le Temps*, 7 December 1919.

¹⁷"The 22 Days of Marash: Papers on the Defense of the City Against Turkish Forces Jan.-Feb., 1920," *The Armenian Review*, vol. 30, no. 4-120 (Winter 1977-1978), p. 392.

¹⁸Stanley E. Kerr, *The Lions of Marash Personal Experiences With American Near East Relief, 1919-1922*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1973), pp. 62-63.

with the arrival of French Colonel Pierre André, who had been charged with the administration of the sandjak of Maraş,¹⁹ on November 24, 1919. Some contradicting witnesses claim that,²⁰ he replaced the Ottoman flag with that of the French, causing a riot among the Muslims. A group of Muslims climbed to the citadel, attacked the guards on duty, tore down the French flag, replacing it with the Ottoman. On this occasion, André asked Lieutenant Colonel Flye Sainte-Marie, the commander of Ayıntab, for military reinforcements. Instead of sending reinforcements, the Lieutenant Colonel called André to Ayıntab. On November 30, he departed for Ayıntab, never to return.²¹

The so-called 'Flag Incident' was, in fact, the catalyst of the armed conflict in Maraş.²² Within two days after this event, the leading Muslims of Maraş met secretly to discuss the strategy to be followed. They decided for the establishment of Maraş Defense of Rights Society so as to be prepared for armed conflict. They also decided to divide the city into ten quarters, in each, a branch of organization as well as local military and supply committees were to be established. For the establishment of similar organizations, some people were sent to the villages around Maraş. Arms and ammunition which usually were provided from local Ottoman gendarmerie depots by the support of the Acting district governor, Cevdet and other necessary supplies would be stored in mosques and private homes.²³

¹⁹Brémond, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Kerr, *ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁰Akbıyık, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-145; Kerr, *ibid.*, 69-71; Brémond, *ibid.*, 33-34.

²¹Kerr, *ibid.*, p. 71.

²²"The 22 Days of Marash", p. 389.

²³Akbıyık, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-169.

On the other hand, local Armenians warned the French about the preparations on Muslim part as they also prepared for a highly probable conflict. The French recruited some of the Armenians as volunteers and armed them. These volunteers were divided into seven groups and designated to various quarters of the city to defend the Christian population.²⁴

Preparations for an armed conflict on the Turkish and Franco-Armenian sides were the forerunner of what would happen in Maraş beginning with January 21, 1920. The first armed conflict, however, started outside Maraş earlier (December 21) and continued, at intervals, until the Turkish nationalists besieged the city for 22 days.²⁵ In the beginning of January, the Turkish nationalists in Maraş started to warn the French that they would attack them from all sides if they did not withdraw from all Cilicia at once.²⁶ The French, on the other hand, transferred their forces in Ayıntap into Maraş and concentrated there. Led by *Kılıç* Ali's band, the nationalist forces attacked frequently the French forces to prevent their arrival in Maraş. Events in the first half of January demonstrated that, sooner or later, a clash between the nationalist forces and the French was inevitable and that Maraş would be the center of conflict in Cilicia.

On January 20, General Quérette, the commander of the French forces, delivered an ultimatum to the local governor and demanding him to abandon his post

²⁴Kerr, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

²⁵For the details see *Türk İstiklâl Harbi IV Güney Cephesi*, pp. 81-87.

²⁶Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 894.

and surrender the citadel within 24 hours.²⁷ Next day, he invited Muslim local officials and leading members of Maraş in his headquarters. Amongst them were Cevdet, the acting district governor, Arslan, the Chief of Police and also chairman of the Defense of Rights organization in Maraş, İsmail Hakkı, the commander of gendarmerie, and several of the religious leaders, all assumed to be involved in nationalist activities against the French.²⁸ As soon as they met, the French general sent his forces to seize the specified dominant posts. Then, he accused them of being involved in attacking French convoys. Refusing the general's claim, the Muslim representatives complained that the French had violated the terms of the Armistice and the Armenian troops, taking the advantage in French uniforms, were harming the Muslim population. At the end of the meeting, Quérette decided to keep six of the Muslims, including the Acting district governor and the commander of gendarmerie, for further discussion while he sent the others. Meanwhile, he announced that he was going to take over the civil administration of Maraş.²⁹ As the leading members of the city left the General's headquarters, shooting could be heard from all quarters of the city. Thus the insurrection of the Turkish nationalist forces started in Maraş. They blockaded the city until February 11 when the French evacuation started.³⁰ During this blockade, both the Muslim and the Armenian populations suffered much, and the

²⁷"The 22 Days of Marash...", *The Armenian Review*, vol. 31, no. 4-124 (April, 1979), p. 403.

²⁸Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

²⁹Kerr, *ibid.*, p. 96; Akbiyık, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200; Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 899.

³⁰ From Engert (Beirut) to the Secretary of State, 20 February 1920, Department of State, 867.00/1122.

city was devastated. In other words, massacres and devastation went hand in hand.³¹ The situation in the city was desperate and a reign of terror in which hundreds of men, women and children were massacred daily, was dominant.³² The conflict at Maraş, which lasted three weeks, resulted in

“considerable losses by the French troops and several thousand Turks with probably about 10,000 Armenians killed. Armenians and Turks were also killed in surrounding villages. Women and children as well as males, both Turks and Armenians, have been killed. It seems now reliably established that the Turks, during the fighting, had their usual brutal instincts aroused and resorted to massacres of Armenians...”³³

The state of war in Maraş found widespread repercussions in Europe. Early correspondences stated that sixteen-thousand Armenians out of twenty-thousand were killed by the nationalists.³⁴ Actually, these numbers were declared by the Armenian Patriarchate in İstanbul.³⁵ Thus the Armenian situation in Cilicia was publicized in Europe, the Armenian religious leaders moved to London and Paris in order to secure an Allies' move against the nationalists. M. Zaven, the Armenian Patriarch of İstanbul, appealed to the Archbishop of Canterbury to place before the British public “the agony of the Armenians.” He also requested “to raise his powerful

³¹For the story of the 22 Days see Kerr, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-185; “The 22 Days of Marash,” III parts, *The Armenian Review*, vols. 30-31, nos. 120, 121, 124, pp. 383-397; 47-69; 402-417; Akbiyik, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-234.

³²From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 14 February 1920, 867.00/1112.

³³From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 23 March 1920, 867.00/1179; From the Near East Relief Secretary to the Secretary of State, 30 March 1920, 867.00/1187.

³⁴“The Marash Massacres,” *The Times*, 2 March 1920; “The Marash Slaughter Turkish Endeavour to Hide the Truth,” *The Times*, 8 March 1920; “Les massacres d’Armeniens en Cilicie,” *Le Temps*, 10 March 1920.

³⁵At the end of February, the Armenian Patriarch sent a telegram to Boghos Nubar who was in Paris stating that the French troops evacuated Maraş on the 9th February. On this occasion, three thousand Armenians made their first exit on the following day and were massacred. One thousand and five hundred others succeeded in reaching Islahiye, but a great number were frozen. In consequence, out of

voice with the object of terminating once and for all the massacres and persecutions of the Armenians.”³⁶ Similarly, Sahak II, the Catholicos of the Armenians in Cilicia, went to Paris to expose the critical situation of the Armenians in Cilicia to the French Government and the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference.³⁷ While Europe was stirring up, however, on 11 March 1920, the correspondent of *Le Temps* of Adana pointed out that the number of the Armenian victims had been considerably exaggerated and mortality did not exceed four-five thousands.³⁸

On February 28, the Supreme Council began to consider the situation in Cilicia under the light of telegrams published in *The Times* as well as those received from the British representatives in the Middle East and İstanbul, which pointed out the sufferings of the Armenians caused by the nationalists.³⁹ It discussed the reported massacres of the Armenians and measures to be taken to deal with the situation. In this regard, two plans of action were debated. The first was a political action in İstanbul since the opinion of the Allied representatives was that the Turkish Government (İstanbul) was responsible for the massacres of the Armenians. Secondly, it was pointed out that a local action, which aimed to reduce the size of the Armenians and “coloured” soldiers among the French troops, was to be taken. At last, the Allied representatives decided to ask the recommendations of their High-

the twenty thousand Armenians remaining in Maraş sixteen thousand were massacred. *The Times*, 28 February 1920; *Le Temps*, 5 March 1920.

³⁶“Patriarch’s Appeal to Primate Agony of a People,” *The Times*, 1 March 1920; *Le Temps*, 1 March 1920.

³⁷“Les massacres d’Arméniens,” *Le Temps*, 28 March 1920.

³⁸“La situation en Cilicie,” *Le Temps*, 17 March 1920.

³⁹D. B. F. P., vol. VII, pp. 291-292.

Commissioners in İstanbul stating that the Supreme Council was of opinion of “some drastic measures”. These measures could extend to occupation of the (Ottoman) War Office or some important Government buildings as well as the detainment of some ministers; as the Minister of War, since they were held primarily responsible for the Armenian sufferings. For this reason, the High-Commissioners should consult each other and without delay reach a final decision as to the steps to be followed.⁴⁰

Thereupon, the Allied High Commissioners met on March 3 and 4 but could not reach an agreement. Therefore, the proposal sent from İstanbul was agreed by the British and French High Commissioners. This proposal was not based upon the events in Cilicia but upon the imposition of the coming peace terms on the Ottoman Government. In other words, it considered the events in Cilicia inseparable from the imposition of the peace treaty. The British and French High Commissioners argued that armed resistance formed by all sections of the Turkish nationalist movement and the portions of Muslim population swayed by it would prevent the application of “drastic peace terms”. Additionally, they stated that such resistance would form a grave danger to the Christians in the interior of Anatolia. Because of these reasons, if the Allies were determined to impose a drastic peace, they should “forestall and so diminish resistance” through, fortifying of their position in İstanbul which could be materialized by a definite occupation of the city.⁴¹ The Supreme Council expressed that its opinion was to occupy İstanbul until the Turkish Government accepted the

⁴⁰ D. B. F. P., vol. VII, pp. 293-306.

⁴¹ From Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, 5 March 1920, D. B. F. P., vol. XIII, pp. 9-10.

terms of the Peace Treaty was executed.⁴² At about the same time, the Ottoman Parliament sent a letter (March 6) to the Peace Conference requesting a prompt investigation of the Cilician events by an independent commission.⁴³ This was an ineffective attempt to retain the Allied Powers from *de jure* occupation of İstanbul on March 16.

In the meantime, while the French commanders were debating on the withdrawal of their forces from Maraş (9 February), the nationalist forces in Urfa attacked the French forces. Here, Ali Saib, ex-gendarmerie commander at Deyr-i Zor, who had been assigned by Mustafa Kemal to establish national organization and organize a revolt,⁴⁴ led the struggle. As soon as he arrived in Urfa (December 29), he contacted the leading members of the Muslim community, i.e., district governors, high-ranking military staff, notables and tribal chieftains, and chaired the Defense of Rights Society at Urfa.⁴⁵ He sent letters to the Kurdish and Arab tribes asking them to unite against the French and Armenians as he also promised them booty in case of their success in the struggle.⁴⁶ Focusing on the Armenian danger under the French

⁴²“Draft Telegram to the British High Commissioner,” 5 March 1920, D. B. F. P., vol. XIII, pp. 421-422; Department of State, 867.01/12.

⁴³ Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri*, vol. II, p. 373. According to a correspondence of *Reuter*, the Ottoman parliament appealed to America to send a commission to investigate the Maraş incidents and general conditions in Anatolia. *The Times*, 8 March 1920.

⁴⁴Ali Saib, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁴⁵İsmail Özçelik, *Milli Mücadele'de Güney Cephesi Urfa*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992), pp. 169-170.

⁴⁶Ali Saib, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61; Hüseyin Bayaz, *Antep Savunması Günlüğü*, (İstanbul, 1994), pp. 49-50; cited in Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. II, p. 898.

protection (January 7, 1920), he sent a set of instructions stating the strategy to be followed during the action.⁴⁷

On securing collaboration of the tribes, Ali Saib, on February 7, delivered an ultimatum to the French commander in Urfa demanding the withdrawal of the French forces.⁴⁸ He also sent a message to the Armenian leaders ensuring them safety for their neutrality.⁴⁹ However, the negative French response led the nationalists to attack on February 9. The struggle in Urfa lasted two months and resulted in the withdrawal of the French.

While tranquility was stored in Maraş and Urfa following the French evacuation, the conditions grew worse in the vicinity of Adana and Ayıntab where the Turkish nationalists had also demanded French withdrawal. The nationalist forces besieged Haçin (Saimbeyli),⁵⁰ one of the exceptional places that the Armenians made up the majority, by the end of March 1920, as they disconnected its communications.⁵¹ The fighting in Haçin, not interfered by the French, was strictly between the Turkish nationalists and the native Armenians. It lasted eight months and concluded by the seizure of the town by the Turkish nationalists.⁵² Only about five-

⁴⁷“Kürt Aşa’ir ve Rü’esasına Beyanname,” Ali Saib, *ibid.*, pp. 63-66. In the text of the author the date appears mistakenly 7 December 36. The correct that is 7 January 1920.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 86-87; Özçelik, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.

⁴⁹Ursavaş, *ibid.*, p. 89.

⁵⁰Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, it became *Saimbeyli*. Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 229, dn. 108.

⁵¹From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 31 March 1920, 867.00/1191.

⁵²“...Hadjin is being besieged by Turks and five days ago was making a desperate resistance. French are not sending assistance but have proposed to facilitate transfer of Armenian population to Erivan according to a letter from Armenian Union of Cilicia... Armenians are beginning to believe that the French desire them to leave Cilicia...” From George Horton to the Secretary of State, 31 March 1920, 867.00/1193.

hundred, approximately of ten thousand Armenian population, were able to escape.⁵³

During the same time span, the nationalists had began attacking Ayıntab.⁵⁴ There, the Armenians, suffering much from the French collaboration in Maraş, preferred to withdraw to the Armenian quarters, and set barricades for self-defense.⁵⁵ On the other hand, the district governor of Ayıntab attempted to negotiate with the Armenians requesting to join with the Muslims in asking the French withdrawal. He promised them life security, but they rejected.⁵⁶

After a two months fight, the nationalists and the French came to an agreement for a cease-fire which, beginning from 28/29 May, would last twenty days. During the cease-fire, the French troops left Pozantı and Sis (Kozan) with their arms and ammunitions. Also, during the first ten days, Ayıntab was to be completely evacuated. War prisoners were to be exchanged.⁵⁷ Actually, this agreement was more than a cease-fire, as a matter of fact, be considered as a further step in the Franco-Turkish negotiations, started in December 1919, for eventual settlement. In both cases, the French, disregarding the protection of the non-Muslims, especially the Armenians whose fate was unconditionally depended upon them, demonstrated their intention to withdraw.⁵⁸ As a result, the Turco-French agreement for cease-fire

⁵³Brémond, *op. cit.*, p. 46; for the details of the Turkish siege see Çelik, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-243.

⁵⁴Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 221; Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 215.

⁵⁵Kerr, *ibid.*, p. 219.

⁵⁶Tansel, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 210-211; Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 215; Kerr, *ibid.*, p. 219.

⁵⁷Department of State, 867.00/1319; Çelik, *op. cit.*, appendix 12e; Kasım Ener, *Çukurova Kurtuluş Savaşında Adana Cephesi*, (Ankara: San Matbaası, 1970), p. 130.

⁵⁸ The hearsay on the French withdrawal was widely spread in June 1920. Curzon was informed that the French were about to withdraw from Cilicia, and they had advised the Armenians to come to terms with the Turks. From Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby, 2 June 1920, D. B. F. P., vol. XIII, p. 78. Likewise, the British High Commissioner informed Curzon that General Gouraud, the French High

alarmed the non-Muslims and made them feel that the French would evacuate sooner or later. This was a fact which did not escape from the observation of the American Consul at Beirut:

“All my information confirms my former reports that French [are]endeavoring [to] establish an accord with the Turks and that in carrying out a civilizing policy involved the Armenians in certain section, such as Aintab will perforce be sacrificed.”⁵⁹

What enforced the opinion of the American Consul in this respect was a copy of the communication dispatched to the Secretary of State by his colleague at Aleppo which read:

“...Since the Armistice went into effect between the French and Turks in Cilicia conditions have been rapidly growing from bad to worse as far as the Christians concerned. On May 30th the French commander at Aintab, Colonel Abadie called the representatives of the Armenian National Union and other notables, and told them that there could not be two Governments, one of the Armenians and one of the Turks, and recommended that the Armenian notables and the leaders of the Armenian defense should leave the city, as he was afraid that later on the Turks would court-martial and shoot them. He said that if all of the Armenians desired to leave he would provide 45 carriages for transport (of 15,000 persons, their baggage and personal belongings). They asked where he would take them, and he replied to Killis, and when he was asked from Killis where, he did not know. This offer was worse than the Turks did to the Armenians when the latter were allowed to sell their goods and take something with them, whereas in the present case everything must be left behind...”⁶⁰

The French withdrew their troops from Pozantı, Sis (Kozan) and the center of Ayıntab as the terms of the cease-fire stipulated. As a matter of fact, the conflict did not stop at Ayıntab as the Armenians went on defending their quarters against the

Commissioner in Syria and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Levant, sent envoy to Mustafa Kemal stating him that the French did not intend to retain Cilicia and he did not wish to continue to fight. From Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, 4 June 1920, D. B. F. P., vol. XIII, p. 81.

⁵⁹From Colby to the Department of State, 16 June 1920, 867.00/1286.

⁶⁰From J. B. Jackson to the Secretary of State, 7 June 1920, 867.00/1315.

nationalists.⁶¹ Surviving Armenians of the evacuated places such as Maraş and Urfa had withdrawn with the French and concentrated in Adana. Likewise, following the cease-fire agreement 7,500 Armenian refugees arrived in Adana from Sis (Kozan).⁶² By then, Adana and its hinterland, Tarsus and Mersin, had become the center of conflict.

The cease-fire ended in Adana on June 18 and was prolonged in Ayıntab into July 29. Clashes in Adana between the Muslims and Armenians, however, did not wait the end of the cease-fire.⁶³ The situation got worse in early July and the French commander had to declare martial law in the city. This was exploited by the Armenians to attack the Muslims. As a result, about 40,000 Muslims left the city fearing a probable massacre.⁶⁴ The leading members of the Armenian community, together with other Christian communities in Adana had a further step and declared the establishment of the Republic of Christian Cilicia under the French protectorate, for which the latter did not give approval.⁶⁵

5.1.3. Turco-French Negotiations: The End of the Armenian Cause in Cilicia

Contrary to Christian communities, particularly the Armenians, longing for

⁶¹Brémond, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁶³Ener, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-135.

⁶⁴Brémond, *op. cit.*, p. 61-62.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 66; Turan, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 218-219; from Bristol to the Secretary of State, 2 September 1920, Department of State, 867.01/60.

Cilicia; the French still nourished the idea of negotiating with the nationalists. DeFrance, the French High Commissioner, on September 10, even suggested dismissal of Ferit Pasha from the Prime Ministry, joined the suggestion of evacuating Cilicia in order to secure the negotiation with the nationalists.⁶⁶ Just a week before, Colonel Brémond, the Chief of Administrative Control in Cilicia, who was disliked by the nationalists and accused of being pro-Armenian, had left his position to the Commandant Hassler.⁶⁷ Several reports had been received by the High Commissioner of the United States stressing that Cilicia was going to be evacuated by the French. Following the evacuation, the report read:

“The Armenians will be given safe conduct out of Cilicia if they desire to go, or else they will have to take their chances with the Turks after the French retire. It will be remembered that the Armenians have gradually evacuated or fled from their homes in Cilicia to Adana, Tarsus and Mersina. A large number of Turks have fled from these cities since the Armenians arrived there, and the Armenians will be driven out of the Turkish houses, of course, and it is doubtful whether they will be allowed to return to their old homes in other places. It is easy to imagine what is going to happen in Cilicia when the French evacuate. This is another horrible evidence of the arrangements for peace that the Allies and Greece are making in Turkey.”⁶⁸

The attempts of the French Government to negotiate with the Turkish nationalists continued through 1921. Aristide Briand, the French Prime Minister, and Bekir Sami [Kunduh], the representative of the nationalist Government at the peace negotiations held in London in the spring of 1921 even reached an agreement. This

⁶⁶Bige Yavuz, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Döneminde Türk-Fransız İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), pp. 100-101.

⁶⁷Ener, *op. cit.*, p. 190; Brémond, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁶⁸“Report of Operations For Week Ending 26 September 1920,” From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 11 October 1920, 867.00/1353.

was rejected by the nationalist leaders but negotiations between two parties for a final agreement did not cease. After several negotiations during the summer of 1921, the Treaty of Ankara was signed in October.⁶⁹

This treaty was concluded between the French and the Turks; however, the most affected was the Armenians since the evacuation of Cilicia by the French meant emigration for them. Actually, by the time that the Treaty of Ankara was signed, there remained no possibility to live under Turkish sovereignty although the rights of minorities in Turkey had already been accepted.

In consequence, with the news of French evacuation, panic stricken Cilician Armenians, fearing Turkish revenge, started vast emigration before the French left.⁷⁰ with the fear Turkish revenge. In order to prevent the panic and immigration of the Christians, in general, and, the Armenians, in particular, Hamid Bey, recently appointed as the Acting governor of Cilicia, Muhittin Pasha, the military commander of Adana region, and, Franklin-Bouillon, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs of France, issued a joint-proclamation assuring safety for Armenians during the Turkish take over in November 1921:

“...France and the Ankara Government, equally desirous to have the rights of minorities respected, have decreed a series of guarantees in the Ankara treaty. But even before these guarantees were published, a methodical campaign was organized by the enemies of peace to throw the Christian populations into alarm and force them to leave Cilicia... Both Governments ... have resolved to make a new effort to reassure the

⁶⁹For the story of the negotiations see Yavuz, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-148; for the terms of the agreement see İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları (1920-1945)*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), pp. 50-52; *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. XIV, pp. 24-27.

⁷⁰*Türk İstiklâl Harbi IV*, p. 254.

populations and destroy the effect of this detestable campaign of agitation..."⁷¹

The proclamation also stated that a general amnesty would be declared, that there would be no immediate conscription into the army, and that a Franco-Turkish commission had been formed to guard the evacuated property. However, by the time of the proclamation approximately 20,000 Christians had already left Cilicia.⁷² This indicated that no matter what kind of promise, wherever it come from, could stop the Armenians and other Christians from leaving Cilicia.

While the final preparations for the evacuation of Cilicia by the French were going on, two Armenian delegates, Avedis Aharonian, the representative of the Armenian Republic at the Peace Conference, and Gabriel Noradounghian (Noradukyan), an Ottoman Armenian, went to England and France to meet the British and French authorities to request the renouncement of the Treaty of Ankara, to end French evacuation of Cilicia. What they were told, however, disappointed them. Briand explained to them that the French were forced to withdraw since French resources did not permit to maintain a costly army in the East. He also added that

⁷¹"Kilikya Ahalisine Neşredilen Beyanname," *Vakit, Sabah*, 16 December 1921. The original French text is in the Department of State, 867.00/1474; the English text is given by Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. III/2, pp. 1422-1423.

⁷²From Bristol to the Secretary of State, January 6 1922, 867.00/1477. According to the first eye witness of the evacuation, on November 24, there were about 40,000 fleeing Armenians concentrated in Mersin. About 15,000 had already left. Clair Price, "Present Turkish Rule in Cilicia," *Current History*, 16 (May 1922), p. 219. J. B. Jackson, the American Consul in Aleppo, reported that there were 55,000 Armenians in Aleppo departed from places passed into the control of the Turkish nationalists in November 1922. Department of State, 867.4016/794.

their fear of massacres in Cilicia was groundless since the Turks were “not fools to organize massacres under the present circumstances.”⁷³

In the meantime, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, issued a general amnesty on December 5, as was stipulated by the terms of the treaty signed with France.⁷⁴ On the same day, Mustafa Kemal, now, Acting⁷⁵ Prime Minister, invited the inhabitants of the regions of Adana, Urfa, and Ayıntab, to serenity. He stressed that a complete amnesty had been proclaimed to wipe out the brunt of the past incidents. He was convinced that

“a people that had shown himself capable of keeping its calm and dignity in view of considerable events and extraordinary incidents could realize the necessity to form reciprocal affection among all [groups]without distinction of race or religion.”⁷⁶

Both the joined Turco-French proclamation and that of the Turkish nationalist leader did not find response among the Armenians according to the observations of R. S. Stewart, an official of the Vacuum Oil Company, on a business trip in Cilicia. He extended a report of his observations to P. Kaabensue, U. S. Consul in Charge in

⁷³Aharonian, “From Sardarapat to Sévres and Lausanne,” *Armenian Review*, vol. XVII, no. 4-68 (Winter 1964), p. 53; cited in., Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. III/2, p. 1425.

⁷⁴*Düstur*, III/2, p. 188.

⁷⁵During the first phase of the Grand National Assembly, since the Ottoman [İstanbul] cabinet continued to exist, a decision was taken to refer to the ministers in the GNA as *vekil*, meaning “acting” instead of *nazır*, that is, “minister” in order to prevent the objection of the pro-Ottoman Sultanate members. Hereafter, “Acting” will not appear for ministers of the Ankara Government.

⁷⁶In the original text it reads: “Şimdiye kadar birçok ahval-ı fevkalade ve vekafi’i mühimme karşısında vakar ve sükunetini muhafaza kabiliyetini göstermiş olan halkın bu defa da bu lüzumu takdir ederek hangi din ve unsura mensup olursa olsun beyinlerinde muhabbet-i müteakabile tesis eyleyeceğine ve mütehalif akıl ve mantık hiçbir hal ve harekette bulunmayacağına kani’im.” “Mustafa Kemal Paşa Hazretlerinin Adana Halkına Beyannamesi,” *İkdam*, 8 December 1921. The French version is in the Department of State, 867.00/1474; the English in Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. III/II, pp. 1426-1427.

Beirut. In his report, Stewart presented the military, political, commercial and moral state of affairs in Cilicia, some parts of which read:

“...The effect upon the Christian population of the French withdrawal has been sensational in the extreme. Since the first announcement of the Bouillon agreement, emigration has been proceeding through the port of Mersina on a vast scale. Estimates of the number of inhabitants who have left in this manner range between 40,000 and 60,000; made up in the main of the Armenian population of Adana, Tarsus and Mersina. The impelling motive in the instance of the Armenians is of course absolute distrust of Turkish intentions in this regard... The psychological reaction to the situation varies according to race and belief, and is highly dramatic. Official proclamations issued jointly by the French and the Turks have done little to inspire general confidence. The hereditary fear under which the Armenian labors is intensified by the consciousness of having recently indulged in a certain amount of retaliation. Christians in general, while less impressed with the possibility of wholesale massacre, experience a sense of betrayal. All expectation of eventual release from Turkish mastery being decisively cut off, they appear to feel that continued stay in Cilicia offers no attractions...”⁷⁷

The French completed civil and military evacuation at the beginning of January 1922, and left their arms and ammunitions to the nationalists for further struggle with the Greeks.⁷⁸

Viewing the aftermath, the conflicts in Cilicia, particularly in Maraş and Urfa, were the first major conflicts of the Turkish nationalist movement. They resulted in the French evacuation of the districts on the one hand, and the elimination of the Armenians most of whom had been repatriated after the Armistice on the other, particularly from Maraş. Undoubtedly, the Turkish nationalist forces besieged Maraş

⁷⁷Department of State, 5 January 1922 [the date of the report is 19 December 1921], 867.00/1475. As it was asserted by *Le Temps*, approximately fifty thousand Armenians left Cilicia while about four thousand remained until early January 1922. Cited in *Vakit*, 11 January 1922. In February, Yusuf Kemal, the Foreign Minister, stated that about five-six thousand Armenians remained in Cilicia. *Vakit*, 20 February 1922.

⁷⁸Yavuz, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-159.

to enforce French evacuation, in which they were successful. The presence of the French forces including more Armenians than the French, however, was exploited by the nationalists in order to rise the public sentiment among the Muslims by consolidating the fear that Cilicia was going to be ruled by the Armenians. The occupation of Cilicia by the French forces was an instrument to this end. As a result, the involvement of the Armenians under French uniforms during the occupation and its aftermath strained the relations among the native population, i.e. Muslims and Armenians. Furthermore, the Armenians became the main target of the Turkish nationalists during the 22 days of the siege. In other words, as cited before, the conflict in Maraş, more specifically in Cilicia, was, essentially, between the nationalists and the Armenians.⁷⁹

5.2. The Turco-Armenian War in the East

While the Turkish nationalists eliminated the claims of the Armenians over Cilicia by re-handling Maraş and Urfa, and negotiated with the French for the

⁷⁹The statement of Mustafa Kemal at a secret session of the Grand National Assembly gives the essence of the conflict in Cilicia. Mustafa Kemal addressed that "...Buradan (Kilikya'dan) bahsederken elviyei selâse diyebileceğimiz Ayıntap, Maraş, Urfayı nazardan geçirebiliriz. Efendiler; her yerde olduğu gibi, burayı da mütarekename ahkâmı hilâfına itilâf kuvvetleri girdiler. Bilâhirc aralarında bir itilâf yapıldı ve İngilizler çekildi, Kilikyayı ve Antep, Maraş, Urfayı bütün Suriye ile beraber Fransızlara bıraktı ve Fransızlar burayı işgal ettiler... Fransızlar burayı işgal ettikten sonra çok mütecasir davrandılar ve ahaliî islâmiyeye karşı çok fena hareketlerde bulundular ve bu hareketleri Fransız üniforması altında ermenilere tevdi ettiler. Denebilir ki her ne sebeple olursa olsun bu memlekette ermenilerle milletimiz arasında bir takım kanlı vakayı cereyan etmiştir. Bu iki milletin birbirine ve bilhassa ermenilerin milletimize karşı kuvvetli buuz ve adâvetleri vardır. Binaenaleyh ermenileri bize taslit etmek, ahaliî islâmiyeye taslit etmek, bittabi gayet yanlış hareketti. Çünkü ermenilerin gayesi -bilhassa himaye ve sıyanet görüldükten sonra- Kilikyada, Antep, Maraşa, Urfada, her nerede bulurlarsa ahaliî islâmiyeyi imha etmektir..." *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, 1 May 1920, vol. I, p. 7.

complete evacuation of the region, they also concentrated their power to eliminate the Armenian claims in the East, especially after the signing of the Treaty of Sévres. Preparations to this end had already started. It may be remembered that Turco-Armenian relations had entered into a new phase in April 1919 when the British dissolved the Provisional National Government of the Southwestern Caucasus, which had been formed to defend the Muslim cause, as it resisted the Armenian and Georgian claims in the Caucasus. Following its dissolution, the administration of the Kars region was handed to Armenians as it was expected that it would become a part of the Armenian Republic, against which a strong opposition was laid by the Muslims.

The excesses of the Armenian bands in places evacuated by the Ottoman troops and in the Kars region against the Muslims following the Armistice,⁸⁰ along with the demands of the nationalists to retrieve the three provinces (Kars, Ardahan and Batum) recovered by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 and, of course, to prevent the extension of the boundaries of the Armenian Republic into the West, to annex the six provinces, had sown the seeds of the conflict between the Turkish nationalists and the Armenians in the Southwestern Caucasus in early 1919. The withdrawal of British troops from Caucasia in May 1919 and from Batum in the summer of 1920⁸¹ and increasing Bolshevik influence in the region which had

⁸⁰Allen and Paul Muratoff, *op. cit.*, p. 498.

⁸¹Gökay, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

common aims with the nationalists rather than the Armenians,⁸² left Armenia alone and vulnerable to attacks of the nationalists who were militarily better organized.

5.2.1. The Turkish Nationalists Appeal for Alliance with the Bolsheviks

In order to eliminate the Armenian claims upon eastern Anatolia, the Turkish nationalists sought for an alliance with the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus. The initial contacts to establish a united front in the Caucasus started in the fall of 1919 and increased following the official occupation of İstanbul in March 1920. Mustafa Kemal sent the first official letter to Moscow after the occupation of the Ottoman capital (26 April) pointing out the

“Turkish support to the Bolsheviks’ campaign in the Caucasus’ and stressing that the ‘Turkish Government accepts the responsibility ... of compelling Georgia ... and Azerbaijan ... to enter into union with Soviet Russia ... and [we are] ready to undertake military operations against the expansionist Armenia.”⁸³

Early in 1920, it was clear that the Turkish nationalists would take military

⁸²The common interest of the Bolsheviks and the Turkish nationalists lied in the opposition against the policy of the Allied Powers, particularly Britain, in Asia Minor. The anxiety of an anti-Bolshevik attack by Britain caused the Bolsheviks to approach the Turkish nationalists: “The Bolshevik leadership believed that Greek operations were directly controlled by the British Empire and Greek expansion in Asia Minor was thus regarded as a threat to the Soviet regime. A powerful Greece extending into Asia Minor could have blocked Soviet access to the Mediterranean in the long term. The frontiers of the Greek expansion, according to the Bolsheviks, would not necessarily stop only at the Western Anatolia. In Moscow’s eyes there was a danger that the Greeks would ‘try to create the Great Armenian-Byzantine state’ in eastern and northern Anatolia which ‘could serve as a gable to hold on the fire of imperialism’ on the borders of Soviet Russia. In the light of these developments it was natural for the Bolshevik regime to try to establish close contacts with those elements in Turkey who were opposed to the Allied scheme in their native lands.” Gökay, *ibid.*, p. 64. See also Somakian, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁸³The letter of Mustafa Kemal takes place at the Soviet Archives. Gökay, *ibid.*, pp. 79-80; Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, p. 139. The Turkish version is in Stefanos Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri, 1917-1923*, (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2000), p. 223.

action against Armenia; however, the timing of the action was important as much as the action itself. At that time, there was a disagreement between Mustafa Kemal, then the president of the Grand National Assembly, and Kâzım Karabekir, the commander of the XVth Army Corps centered at Erzurum, where the nationalist forces concentrated against Armenian threat. On April 26, Karabekir, intending an immediate action against Armenia, wrote to the presidency of the National Assembly that preparations to attack on Armenians would be completed in two weeks. He presented a scheme of the military action and stressed that it was absolutely necessary to come into contact with the Bolsheviks as soon as possible. Finally, he requested urgent permission by the National Assembly to operate independently not to lose this last vital opportunity for the survival of the Motherland.⁸⁴ Mustafa Kemal replied the same day stating that, in the first place, any decision to start military action belonged to the Assembly. Then, he extended parliamentary approval to establish direct contact with the Bolshevik Russia. He continued that Turkish army would attack the imperialist Armenia and force the Azerbaijan Government to accept the Bolshevik rule if their forces provided Bolshevized Georgia and assumed anti-British position. He concluded by suggesting that Russia should supply the nationalist forces with money, arms and ammunition, medical goods, etc. “for the common struggle against imperialism.”⁸⁵

⁸⁴Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 1417-1421; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 87.

⁸⁵Karabekir, *ibid.*, pp. 1423-1425; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 88.

Kâzım Karabekir's request for the permission to act independent of Ankara, however, was ignored. On several occasions, he repeated his suggestion for the formation of the "Commandership of the Eastern Front" and he be granted the title of the "Supreme Commander" to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly.⁸⁶ Mustafa Kemal's reply on May 6 extremely disappointed him. The leader of the nationalist movement stressed that the Council of Ministers (Vekiller⁸⁷ Meclisi) had discussed the destruction of the Armenian Government, which was merely a device of imperialism and concluded that Turkey was not in a position to challenge the Allies until the Peace Conference decided about her. He also stated that more important still was that the partnership of Turkey with the Bolsheviks should be crystallized and their assistance provided. In addition, he argued that the Armenian events had aroused all of the Christian world against Turkey; if the nationalist forces tried to crush the Armenian Government, which would be regarded as a renewed Armenian massacre, this would turn the sympathizers of the nationalist movement, specifically America, against it. Therefore, for the time being, the nationalist forces should avoid open attacks against Armenia. Instead, they should secretly assist the militias of the Muslim councils (şura) in the three provinces.⁸⁸

Disappointed by Mustafa Kemal's suggestion to avoid an open and official military campaign, Karabekir wrote his counter arguments to Mustafa Kemal favoring an immediate action against Armenia. In addition, he warned him about

⁸⁶Karabekir, *ibid.*, p. 1427, 1499-1500.

⁸⁷See fn. 75.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 1502-1503; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 89.

Kurdism. He pointed out that the Kurds seemed to be obedient to the national cause due to the events and operations in the East. The strongest knot that bounded them to the nationalists was the expansion and invasion of Armenia. If the nationalist forces stopped wherever they were and Armenia was Bolshevized, it would be impossible to stop the approaching evils on a large scale in the region.⁸⁹ On May 10 and 12, Mustafa Kemal wrote to Karabekir that the National Assembly did not favor a military operation beyond the Turkish frontiers before a definite agreement was reached with the Bolsheviks. He pointed out that an attack on Armenia would be regarded declaration of war by the Allies and that they would take active counter measures. Since there was not a definite agreement between the nationalists and the Bolsheviks, there was no guarantee for them the latter would assist.⁹⁰

Securing the military and financial aid of the Bolsheviks was of utmost importance for the nationalist policy in preventing the imposition of the Allied scheme in the East, which proposed the extension of the Erevan Government into the Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, following the opening of the Grand National Assembly and of Mustafa Kemal's first letter to the Bolshevik leader, a nationalist delegation was formed to be sent to Moscow for direct negotiations with the Bolsheviks (May 5). This delegation included Bekir Sami, the Foreign Minister, and Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşek], the Minister of Economic Affairs.⁹¹ While the delegation was on route

⁸⁹Karabekir, *ibid.*, pp. 1518-1526; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, pp. 89-90.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 1544-1547; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, pp. 90-91.

⁹¹Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, *Vatan Hizmetinde*, (İstanbul: Bahar Matbaası, 1967), p. 146; Salahi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*, vol. II, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), pp. 8-9; Selek, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 136-137.

to Moscow, Chicherin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, responded to Mustafa Kemal's letter of April 26. The letter was brought by a courier first to Trabzon on June 14. In the meantime, Kâzım Karabekir's intensive demands to begin military operations against the Armenians had been accepted by Ankara.⁹²

On June 6, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegraph to Karabekir stating that the Council of Ministers approved the advance of the army as far as Sarıkamış and the invasion of the three provinces. Since details in this regard would reach him soon, for the moment, Karabekir was suggested to refrain from political activities and should only deal with military preparations.⁹³ The next day, Mustafa Kemal announced in the Assembly that the Executives Committee would use its authority to recover the three provinces due to the atrocities committed by the Armenians against Muslims beyond the frontiers.⁹⁴ Karabekir stressing the atrocities committed against the Muslims and showing the Armenians as the main target immediately announced mobilization.⁹⁵

While the preparations were going on for an attack and, even, the date to start the operation had been determined (June 23), The Ankara Government had the contents of Chicherin's letter. In the letter, Chicherin stated that Soviet Russia was ready to support the Turkish nationalist movement but instead of approving the invasion of Armenia by the nationalists, he proposed to act as mediator for settlement

⁹²Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 1615-1717, 1631-1639; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 91-92.

⁹³Karabekir, *ibid.*, pp. 1647-1648; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 92.

⁹⁴Selek, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 368.

⁹⁵*Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, pp. 93-94.

of boundaries among Turkey, Armenia and Persia according to the principle of self-determination after the repatriation of all refugees completed.⁹⁶ It was also stated that a mission would depart from Moscow on June 10 for Anatolia in order to negotiate with the Ankara Government, delivering 60,000 rifles, 112 light machine guns, 10 heavy cannons, and two million liras, half in gold, as the initial support; that Turkey should not take military action against the Armenians in view of the external relations of both Russia and Turkey and that it was possible to secure the borders that Turkey claimed by peaceful means.⁹⁷ Although reluctantly,⁹⁸ Mustafa Kemal wrote to Chicherin that Turkey was ready to accept the Soviet mediation.⁹⁹ In consequence, the military operation in the east would be postponed until Moscow-Ankara relations were formalized.

Under these circumstances that the Turkish commission headed by Bekir Sami arrived in Moscow on July 19 to negotiate with the Bolsheviks.¹⁰⁰ The negotiations between two parties was concluded by a draft agreement on August 24. Besides some general points on Russian and Turkish alliance, both parties agreed wholeheartedly to attempt to reestablish immediate means of transportation between

⁹⁶Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda...*, pp. 228-229; Sonyel, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 6; Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 1661-1662.

⁹⁷This part seemed to be a separate communication brought by the same courier see Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, p. 151; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 103.

⁹⁸Sonyel, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 7.

⁹⁹"Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan G. V. Çiçerin'e," 20 June 1920, Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda...*, pp. 230-231; Sonyel, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰Tengirşek, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

Russia and Turkey for the flow of men and material.¹⁰¹ This article was related to the policy to be followed against the Armenian Republic since it was the sole obstacle preventing the transfer of Russian material support to Anatolia.

There was disagreement, however, on how to treat Armenia. As noted above, the Bolsheviks in earlier correspondences had proposed the Turkish nationalists to mediate between Armenia and Ankara for the resolution of the Armenian Question. This issue came forth following the signing of the draft treaty. On August 26, Bekir Sami wrote to Chicherin reaffirming that Turkey accepted the Soviet mediation in the resettlement of the borders with Persia and Armenia. At the same time, he complained that the Armenian Government was relying on the “ultra-imperialistic treaty (of Sévres) and on American arbitration” and that it rejected the Soviet mediation.¹⁰² Thereafter, Bekir Sami and Chicherin held a long discussion on the Armenian issue on August 28.

Chicherin argued that the borders as defined in the National Pact were subjected to objection (*duçar-ı itiraz*) and they were in need of correction on ethnic basis. He continued that the border lines claimed by the National Pact conflicted with the principle of self-determination, that some parts of Van and Bitlis should be given to Armenia. Bekir Sami responded that he was not authorized to debate or accept any changes in the National Pact. He maintained that there were not Armenian provinces

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, pp. 178-180; Statement of Ahmet Muhtar, 11 October 1920, *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. I, pp. 150-153; Explanation of Yusuf Kemal at the Grand National Assembly, 16 October 1920, *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. I, pp. 158-173.

¹⁰²Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, p. 160.

in his country and the Armenians had intermingled with the Muslims throughout the Ottoman Empire. In addition, they did not form even a third of the population in any province. Therefore, leaving one or two provinces of the Ottoman Empire to the Armenians would violate the rights of Muslim majority and meant sacrificing the rights of majority to minority, which also contravened with the Bolsheviki's own principles.¹⁰³

The debate continued by Chicherin's claims to secure some parts of Van and Bitlis to the Armenians, and that the Soviet aid to the nationalists was based on this principle. He added that Halil [Kut] and Cemal Pashas had accepted this principle.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, he insisted that the Armenians would be resettled in places granted to them. Bekir Sami replied that he had no previous hint that the Soviet support was based on the Armenian issue. The Turkish people had been struggling against the Allied plans to grant territory to the Greeks and the Armenians. If they learned that an allied Government was following the same policy, then, they would ask what benefit was in the Soviet-Turkish treaty since there seemed to be no difference between the Allies and the Soviet Russia in regard of partitioning Turkey. He also added that Halil and Cemal Pashas had not the right of speaking on behalf of the Turkish nation.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³Tengirşek, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁰⁴Early negotiations of the nationalists with the Bolsheviki's was provided by the former Unionists, who fled from the country due to the Allied policies against the Unionists. Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda*, pp. 106-110; Richard G. Hovannisian, "Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4 (1973), pp. 129-147.

¹⁰⁵Tengirşek, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

Chicherin pointed out that the Russian demand was a small Armenia in accordance with its population; however, the Allies were attempting to establish Great Armenia extending into Sivas. Bekir Sami refusing this, stated that the nationalists could only allow the repatriation of those Armenians who had been Ottoman subjects, to their place of origin; that non-Ottoman Armenians would not be permitted to settle in the country. Nevertheless, Turkey would assure the Armenians in the country all kind of guarantees enjoyed by the minority groups in the most liberal states. Yet, according to Bekir Sami, Chicherin insisted on the fulfillment of his claims. He insisted on independent Armenia including some parts in Turkey. Thereupon, Bekir Sami claimed that the survival of an independent Armenia including the province of Van or Bitlis was impossible. Furthermore, the existence of such a state clashed with the interests of both Turkey and Russia. Bekir Sami further argued that if Chicherin's suggestion was adopted, there would emerge a small Armenia in every province of the Ottoman Empire. As Chicherin insisted that the ratification of the Soviet-Turkish treaty was definitely dependent to this issue, Bekir Sami stated that he had no authority to discuss the contents and he should submit it to the National Assembly. Since this process would take a or two months, there should not be held back the Soviet aid. Chicherin assured that the promised assistance would be sent and that his Government would be satisfied by small parts in Van and Bitlis for Armenia.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 168-169. The Bolshevik demand for some land in eastern Anatolia for Armenia was debated at the Grand National Assembly on 17 October and was strongly rejected. When the Bolsheviks came to agreement with the Turkish nationalists in March 1921, there was no longer the

Bekir Sami, in his report to the Grand National Assembly, after narrating his conversation with Chicherin added his evaluations. What was interesting more than his evaluations was his implication that the nationalists should consider an alternative to the Soviet aid. He also recommended that if the National Assembly agreed to determine the boundaries with Armenia through the investigation of a mixed commission (as had been proposed by Chicherin), the Government should immediately move large numbers of tribesmen and other people from Diyarbekir, Urfa, Mardin and other places to Van and Bitlis, even if temporarily, to fill the empty villages and towns, and to show that the Muslims formed overwhelming majority in comparison to the Armenians in these regions.¹⁰⁷

Following the debate on the resolution of the Armenian Question, the Turkish delegation sent Yusuf Kemal back to Anatolia with the draft treaty; Bekir Sami's report on his conversation with Chicherin; and with a million gold rubles, and arms and ammunition.¹⁰⁸ To these, Yusuf Kemal, in his memoirs, added what Lenin had said to the Turkish delegation regarding the Armenian Question.¹⁰⁹ He claimed that Lenin told the Turkish delegation that the Armeno-Soviet agreement¹¹⁰ was a mistake and this mistake would be corrected. He even said that "if we cannot correct it, you

question of including some territory in the east to Armenia since the boundaries had been determined on military field. For the debate at the Grand National Assembly see *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. I, pp. 176-187.

¹⁰⁷Tengirşek, *ibid.*, p. 170.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 181.

¹⁰⁹The Turkish delegation met with Lenin on 13 August. Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda...*, p. 161.

¹¹⁰This agreement was concluded on August 10. By this treaty the Bolsheviks accepted the sovereignty and independence of Armenia and also allowed Armenia to keep the railway line between Shakhtakhti and Julfa under its control to which the Turkish delegation objected. Somakian, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-226; Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, p. 159; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 144.

will.”¹¹¹ Bearing in mind Lenin’s words, Yusuf Kemal arrived in Trabzon on September 15, where he communicated with Mustafa Kemal and Kâzım Karabekir; emphasizing Lenin’s verdict he expressed his conviction that Russia would not intervene in case of Turkish attack against Armenia.¹¹²

5.2.2. The Turkish Army Attacks the Armenians: The Elimination of the Armenian Cause in the Eastern Provinces

Thus by the September of 1920, political and military circumstances in the South Caucasus reached a point of allowing a nationalist offensive against Armenia: The Allied troops had been withdrawn from Batum in July, therefore, there was no Allied forces to intervene on behalf of Armenia. In addition, the Turkish nationalists had concluded a draft treaty with the Bolsheviks securing political and military support while the Armeno-Soviet relations were deteriorating due to the resistance of the Armenians to the Sovietization of their Republic. Furthermore, the difficulties of the Bolsheviks at the Polish front fortified Yusuf Kemal’s impression on Bolshevik neutrality upon a nationalist attack on Armenia.¹¹³ Besides these factors which convinced the nationalists that the time had come to attack Armenia was the signing of the Sévres Treaty which, according to the arbitration of the American President, Wilson, clearly stipulated the extension of Armenian boundaries into eastern Anatolia. This made the nationalist anxious about the six provinces. Therefore, a

¹¹¹Tengirşek, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 178, 187.

¹¹³*Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, pp. 155-156.

nationalist victory in the east would end the most important obstacle for the arrival of the Bolshevik support as it would destroy the Armenian claims on eastern Anatolia. Another practical benefit of such a victory would be the concentration of the nationalist forces against the Greeks in the west.¹¹⁴

As a result, military operations against the Armenians started at the beginning of September from the Oltu-Peniak (Penek) district. The initial attack of the Turkish armed forces resulted in the Armenian retreat from Oltu toward Merdenek on September 13. The next target was Kars, left under the Armenian rule by the British in 1919. To this end, on September 20,¹¹⁵ two days after Mustafa Kemal received the terms of the Turco-Soviet treaty from Yusuf Kemal, he communicated to Kâzım Karabekir the decision of the National Assembly, which authorized him to advance toward Kars.¹¹⁶ Initially, Mustafa Kemal stated that the military operation would be extended into the Kağızman-Novoselim-Merdenek, and, if possible, still further to the east. The primary objective was to destroy the Armenian armed forces.¹¹⁷ Karabekir, revealing his plan, replied on September 24 that the operation would start on the 27th.¹¹⁸

The operation of the Turkish forces including regulars and irregulars, i.e., tribal regiments, began on September 28. The Turkish forces advanced easily and

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 155; Gökyay, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, pp. 180-181.

¹¹⁵*Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 156.

¹¹⁶Tengirşek, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-182.

¹¹⁷*Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 156; Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 1860.

¹¹⁸*Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 157.

recaptured Sarıkamış and its environs in two days, consequently surrounded Kars.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Armenians confronted another trouble which left them between the Turkish forces on the one hand and the Bolsheviks on the other.

This unfavorable situation of the Armenians was due to the order of the Bolshevik commander at Baku on September 27 to begin operations against Armenia as soon as possible. Two days later, Legran, the Soviet plenipotentiary at Erevan, submitted an ultimatum to the Armenian Government to renounce the power in favor of the pro-Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee. This was followed by the advancement of the Bolshevik forces from Azerbaijan into Erevan.¹²⁰ While the Armenian Government sought a way to negotiate with the Bolsheviks and a draft treaty was concluded between two,¹²¹ the Turkish forces, on October 30, seized Kars, the most important citadel at the Armenian hands. On November 2, Kâzım Karabekir issued a declaration to the Armenian inhabitants of Kars pointing out that it was the Dashnaks who were responsible for the tragedy that the Armenians had suffered. The purposes of the nationalists was to liberate the Muslim and Armenians from the Dashnak yoke, and to encourage the composition of an Armenian Government favorable to Turkey. The Armenians should be confident about justice that the Turkish Government would appropriate; although it would severely deal with those who causing disorder and threatening the security of the army such as traitors, spies, and all who housed the Armenian officers or soldiers. Arrested traitors and spies

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 161-178.

¹²⁰Gökay, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹²¹Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, pp. 226-234.

would be subjected to capital punishment with their protectors. Finally, the Armenians were invited to surrender all kind of weapons in forty-eight hours.¹²²

The civilian Armenian population, however, withdrew with the military towards Alexandropol (Gümrü). On the demand of truce by the Armenian Commander at Alexandropol, Kâzım Karabekir agreed on certain conditions including the Armenian evacuation of Alexandropol by at least 15 kilometers to the east of the Arpaçay River.¹²³ Following the agreement for a truce, Hamazasp Ohandjanian, the Armenian Prime Minister, sent a telegraph to Ahmet Muhtar [Cilli], then the Foreign Minister of the Ankara Government, suggesting the commence of peace negotiations, preferably at Alexandropol (November 8).¹²⁴ Thereupon, Ahmet Muhtar communicated Ankara Government's terms for peace to the Armenian Government. Amongst these were the settlement of the Turco-Armenian boundaries on the ground of statistics and plebiscite. The population of all disputed territories would be invited to decide their political future in accordance with the principle of self-determination which had been proclaimed by the Bolsheviks and President Wilson. The plebiscite was to be conducted as soon as possible. Furthermore, Turkey accepted the return of all deported Armenians during the First World War into their homes and undertook to grant them the rights of minorities as enjoyed in the most

¹²²H. T. V. D., no. 49 (September 1964), doc. no. 1145.

¹²³*Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, p. 223; The statement of İsmet Pasha, the Chief of General Staff, 9 November 1920, *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. V, pp. 335-336.

¹²⁴“Hariciye Vekâleti Vekili Muhtar Beyin, Ermeni Cumhuriyeti ile Cereyan Eden Muhaberatı Siyasiye ve Sulh Şartları Hakkında Beyanâtı,” *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, 9 November 1920, vol. V, pp. 338; Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, p. 274.

civilized countries. Finally, Turkey requested from Armenia future guarantees for the security of Turkey.¹²⁵ The Armenian Government refused the terms of the Ankara Government. On this occasion, Turco-Armenian military struggle began again on November 11 and concluded with total capitulation of the Armenians in a week.¹²⁶

As a result, the conference for the settlement of the Turco-Armenian question began on November 25. The Armenian delegation, initially, put forth territorial demands including Bayazıt, Van and Muş with an outlet to the Black Sea within the Armenian Republic, and denounced their claims to Diyarbakır, Bitlis, Erzurum, and other parts to the west. Kâzım Karabekir, the spokesman of the Turkish Government, did not allow an open door for discussion on boundaries; he requested Armenian denouncement of the Treaty of Sévres as the pre-condition for further negotiations.¹²⁷ As a matter of fact, the Armenian delegation was not in condition of bargaining since they were the defeated side and had ended their hopes from the implementation of the Treaty of Sévres by the Allied Powers. Hoping to secure enough territory from Turkey, the Armenian delegation declared on November 27 that

“In view of the fact that the vital interests of Turkey are violated and threatened by the Treaty of Sévres and that the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey recognizes and respects the freedom and independence of the Republic of Armenia and is indicating its readiness to extend real guarantees for Armenia’s well-being and economic development, and desiring to turn a new page in the mutual relations of the two states and to establish long-lasting, friendly relations between Turkey and Armenia, the peace delegation on instruction of the

¹²⁵*T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. V, pp. 338-339; Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 1888-1890; Hovannisian, *ibid.*, p. 276-277.

¹²⁶Statement of Ahmet Muhtar Pasha, 18 November 1920, *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. V, pp. 419-420; Karabekir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 1892-1893.

¹²⁷Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, pp. 362-363.

[Armenian] Government is announcing, on the suggestion of Turkey, that it is disavowing the Treaty of Sévres."¹²⁸

The following day, the Armenian delegation brought the boundary issue into question again. In the memorandum sent to Karabekir, they repeated former territorial demands (see above) adding repatriation of 800,000 Armenian refugees. Furthermore, they argued that the Armenians were satisfied with less than half of the territory granted by the Treaty of Sévres, and, currently, the opportunity of resolving the Armenian question was at the initiative of the Grand National Assembly. Turkey could resolve this question for the benefit of both sides.¹²⁹

The boundary proposal of the Armenian delegation was astounding for Karabekir. On November 29, he met with Khatisian, the head of the Armenian delegation, pointed out that Armenia was alone and abandoned. He maintained that the void speeches in the League of Nations had no sense, that the Allied Powers did not hear the voice of the Armenians, and Russia would soon attempt to reabsorb all of the Caucasus. Under such circumstances, Armenia could only survive with the support and protection of Turkey under a meaningful territorial settlement. He also added that the Armenians had a small population and the land they possessed in the Russian territory was enough for them. Therefore, the negotiations should be concluded immediately, otherwise, the Turkish army was ready to move into Erevan.¹³⁰ The final agreement came on December 2. The Armenian delegation

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 368-369.

accepted all terms imposed by Kâzım Karabekir.¹³¹ That same day, Armenia was proclaimed to be an independent Soviet Socialist Republic. In other words, it was Sovietized.¹³²

5.3. Turkish Nationalists and the Kurds: Cooperation and Conflict

The attempt of the Turkish nationalists to incorporate the Kurds into the struggle against the seizure of any territory in the Eastern and South-eastern of Anatolia by the Armenians or Allied Powers seemed to be influential by the end of 1919. As it has been explained in the previous chapters, Mustafa Kemal sent many telegrams and letters to the Kurdish notables, tribal chieftains and religious dignitaries to gain their support against the Armenian threat in the East. On the other hand, the nationalist leaders spent efforts to repress the Kurdish nationalist activities, particularly those of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, in the Kurdish provinces, perceived as British intrigue. It was also noted that the Kurdish league in Diyarbakir, which was probably the most active one, was closed down in June 1919 by the nationalist commander of the province to this effect. In addition, the nationalists with little difficulty, mobilized the pro-Ottoman Kurds against nationalist Kurds who were believed to be financed by Britain. As a result, by the end of 1919, a considerable number of Kurdish tribes and notables who had local influence among the Kurds

¹³¹For the complete text of the agreement see *Türk İstiklâl Harbi Doğu Cephesi*, pp. 319-322; Soysal, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23; *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. VI, pp. 199-202.

¹³²Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. IV, p. 387; Somakian, *op. cit.*, 238; Gökay, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

declared their support for the Turkish nationalists. Amongst these were *Milli* tribe in the south and the *Jalali* and *Haydaranlı* tribes in the east where the Armenian or Allied threat was the greatest.¹³³

The support of most of the Kurdish notables and tribal chieftains to the nationalists became clearer when the news of the Boghos Nubar Pasha-Şerif Paşa's Accord was reached (see Chapter IV). On this occasion, many of them denounced the Accord and condemned Şerif Pasha, claiming that he did not represent the Kurds. They also sent innumerable telegrams to Paris and London rejecting the idea of an independent Kurdish state in the name of Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood in the framework of Islamic religion.¹³⁴ The cooperation of the Turkish nationalists and the Kurds was best reflected in the composition of the Grand National Assembly which met in Ankara on April 23, 1920. Unlike the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the last Ottoman Parliament where the Kurds had been represented nominally, at the Ankara Assembly, they were represented by a considerable number of deputies, who were mostly tribal chieftains and religious dignitaries. Interestingly, the day following the opening of the Grand National Assembly, came the news of Şerif

¹³³ McDowall, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹³⁴ The Boghos Nubar-Şerif Pasha's Accord also displayed the split in the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan and demonstrated how the Kurdish nationalist movement was fragile. Disagreements between the two factions, Seyyid Abdülkadir and Bedirxhanies, resulted in the withdrawal of the latter from the Society. The faction of Bedirxhanies established their own 'Kurdish Social League. Focusing on the longstanding rivalry between Seyyid Abdülkadir and Bedirxhanies, McDowall asserted that there were personal as well as principle issues which caused the formal split in the Society for Kurdish Elevation. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134. Actually, Seyyid Abdülkadir was known by defending a limited Kurdish autonomy in the Ottoman framework, i.e., under the Sultanate and Chaliphate for the sake of Islam. On the contrary, the Bedirxhanies defended an independent Kurdish state.' Hamit Bozarslan, "The Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From the Tacit Contract to the Rebellion

Pasha's resignation from his position as the Kurdish representative at the Paris Peace Conference.¹³⁵

Apart from the suppression of the Kurdish nationalist activities and the quest for alliance with the Kurdish traditional leaders, Mustafa Kemal as well as the İstanbul Government recognized the Kurds as a separate identity in the Islamic-Ottoman framework, probably, in order to isolate the Kurdish nationalists. For example, the meeting of the nationalist leaders and the representatives of the İstanbul Government at Amasya on 20-22 October was concluded by the signing of five protocols with two additions, which were secret. One of the secret protocols demonstrated that both parts were recognized an autonomous Kurdistan in the future state.¹³⁶

This kind of recognition was repeatedly stated by Mustafa Kemal. In one of his preliminary speeches before the Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal stressed the Islamic character of the boundaries claimed by the Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas and defined these boundaries, within the Armistice lines, to be national rather than military. He stated that

“...Do not assume that there is only one kind of Muslim nation within this boundary. There are Turks, Circassians and various Islamic elements. This is the boundary of brother nations who are living together and whose aims are completely united. There is a great principle which determines this boundary: All privileges relating to the specific environment, traditions and race of each Islamic element living within the boundaries of the Motherland have been accepted and approved reciprocally and in all sincerity. Naturally, there are no details and explanations in this regard

(1919-1925), unpublished paper submitted to the International Workshop on “Ethnic Conflict and the Founding of the Turkish Republic,” Leiden, 17 May 2000, p. 5.

¹³⁵ *Peyam-ı Sabah*, 24 April 1920; cited in Sarıhan, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 7.

¹³⁶ Unat, “Amasya Protokolleri,” p. 361.

since it is not the time for details and explanations. God willing, after saving our existence it will be settled and solved among brothers. For this reason, it has not been detailed...”¹³⁷

In the same manner, he emphasized that there were various ethnic groups in Turkey and all of them formed the nation. On May 1, he pointed out that

“The composition of this magnificent [Grand National] Assembly is not only Turks, or Circassians or Kurds. It is a sincere gathering of all Islamic elements. There are Turks and Kurds. We do not separate them. But while we are busy to defend and protect, of course, the nation is not one element. There are various bonded Muslim elements. Every Muslim element which makes this entity are citizens. They respect each other, they have every kind of right, racial, social and geographical. We repeated this over and over again. We admit this honestly. Our interests are mutual. The unity we are trying to create is not only Turkish or Circassian. It is a composition of one Muslim element.”¹³⁸

As a matter of fact, these words were not different from the proclamations of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses which focused on Islamic unity aiming at incorporating the Kurds into the nationalist struggle.

Similarly, the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan, which was recognized by Mustafa Kemal and the İstanbul Government during the Amasya meetings in October 1919, was kept alive in 1920. While the debates on the Law of Fundamental Organization (Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu-the Constitution) was taking place, Mustafa Kemal sent a set of instructions to Nihat Paşa [Anılmış], who had been appointed as the commander of the El-Cezire Front.¹³⁹ These instructions mainly focused on the

¹³⁷T. B. M. M. Z. C., 24 April 1920, vol. I, pp. 16-17.

¹³⁸*Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. I, (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1945), pp. 70-71.

¹³⁹This front was organized on June 26, 1920. It was to include the area between the borders of Iran and Euphrates where the Kurdish population formed the majority and the Kurdish nationalist activities was intensive. Namely, the Elcezire front was to engage with internal security and military operations in the districts of Musul, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Mamuretülaziz, Urfa and Hakkari with its headquarters at Diyarbakir. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol. III/I, p. 997, dn. 133 and p. 1117.

necessity to establish local administrations all over the country and explained the method regarding the Kurds which are noteworthy as a whole:

“1. The gradual establishment of local administrations in which popular masses would be directly and efficiently involved in the whole country and on large scale is required by our internal policy. In the areas populated by the Kurds, we favor a gradual establishment of local administration as it is required by our internal policy as well as external.

2. The right of nations to determine their fates by themselves is a principle that has been world widely accepted. We have also accepted this principle. It is expected that the Kurds have completed the organizations of their local administration, and that their leaders and notables have been won over by us in the name of this objective; therefore, when they manifest their votes, they should declare their wish to live under the administration the Grand National Assembly since they are already the masters of their own fates. The command of Elcezire front is responsible for directing all work in Kurdistan in conformity with the policy based on this objective.

3. The general lines of the accepted policy include the objectives of raising the permanent hostility of the Kurds against the French in Kurdistan and the British on the border with Iraq by armed skirmishes so as to prevent any negotiation between the Kurds and foreigners, preparing the means of the establishment of local administrations gradually and thus providing the cordial devotion of the Kurds for us, and consolidating the devotion of the Kurdish leaders by appointing them to civil and military posts.

4. The internal policy of Kurdistan will be coordinated and administered by the commandership of Elcezire front. With regards to the matter, the front command will correspond with the presidency of the Grand National Assembly. Leading civil officials will recourse on the matter to the front command since the latter will regulate and coordinate the line of conduct of provincial authorities.

5. The commandership of the Elcezire shall propose to the Government administrative, judicial or financial changes and reforms if it deems necessary.”¹⁴⁰

To recap, the Turkish nationalists obtained the support of the Kurds to a great extent into their struggle through emphasizing the Armenian threat in the East, using

¹⁴⁰T. B. M. M. G. C. Z., vol. III, p. 551. The English version of the text can be found in Mango, *op. cit.*, p. 13. The author of this study benefited from this version in translating the text.

Islam, with its sacred institutions, i.e., Sultanate and Caliphate, as unifying factors between the Turks and the Kurds as well as the recognition of a Kurdish autonomy in the future state. In this respect, the weakness of the Kurdish nationalist movement also played a role as it facilitated the task of the nationalists. Nevertheless, the Turkish nationalists confronted with resistance, led by some Kurdish tribal chieftains who regarded the authority of the Ankara Government as a menace to their existence. Among these were Cemil Çeto who extended his support against the Armenians following Mustafa Kemal's letter in the summer of 1919. Cemil Çeto, in May 1920, resorted to arms against the nationalist forces around Garzan region with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state. He was unsuccessful and surrendered to the nationalists in June.¹⁴¹ Another example was the revolt of the leading members of the *Milli* tribe who had similarly declared its support to Mustafa Kemal. They rebelled against the nationalist forces around Urfa, from June until September, when they were finally suppressed by the nationalist forces.¹⁴² The most serious conflict between the nationalist forces and the Kurds, however, can be seen in the case of the *Koçgiri* rebellion, called after the tribe which played a vital role, in the Dersim region, and more effectively, around Sivas and Erzincan.

¹⁴¹*Türk İstiklâl Harbi VI, İç Ayaklanmalar (1919-1921)*, pp. 135-136.

¹⁴²*Ibid*, pp. 134-135.

5.3.1. The Koçgiri Rebellion

The Koçgiri rebellion broke out in the region where Mustafa Kemal's appeal for a Muslim unity against the Christian threat, i.e., Armenian, did not find an affirmative reply. On the contrary, Kurdish nationalist sentiment joined with religious identity (Dersim region was overwhelmingly populated by the Alevis)¹⁴³ formed a serious threat to the nationalist forces while they were waging war on two fronts, with the Armenians in the east and the Greeks in the west.

The origins of the Koçgiri rebellion goes back to the beginning of the Armistice period when the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan was founded with the purpose of defending Kurdish social, political and cultural rights according to Wilson's Fourteen Points. According to the account of Nuri Dersimi, a veterinarian who was a member of the Society and engaged in the formation of organizations in Dersim, he and *Koçgirili* Mustafapaşazade participated in a meeting of the Society led by Seyyid Abdülkadir immediately after the signing of the Mudros Armistice. At the end of the meeting, it was decided to send some young people to the eastern provinces to organize the people in accordance with the purposes of the Kurdish Society. For this purpose, Dersimi and a major who was originally from Dersim,

¹⁴³ Ali Kemali (the governor of Erzincan), *Erzincan Tarihi, Coğrafi, İctimai, Etnoğrafi, İdari, İhsai Tetkikat Tecrübesi*, (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası 1932), p. 151; for the evaluation of the Koçgiri rebellion within the context of geographic, ethnic and religious identity see Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Les Kurdes Alévis Face au Nationalisme Turc Kémaliste L'alévité du Dersim et son rôle dans le premier soulèvement kurde contre Mustafa Kemal (Koçkiri, 1919-1921)," *Les Annales de L'Autre Islam*, no. 5 (1998), pp. 7-19; for the interrelation between religious and ethnic identities among the Kurds in general see Martin van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000); Erdal Gezik, *Dinsel, Etnik ve Politik Sorunlar Bağlamında Alevi Kürtler*, (Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2000).

were to go establish connections among the Alevite tribes of Dersim, Sivas and Koçgiri.¹⁴⁴

Thereupon, Dersimi left İstanbul and arrived in Sivas with a formal duty, as the veterinarian of the Sivas tribes. Here, he contacted the leading members of the Koçgiri tribe, Alişan and his brother Haydar. They opened the branches of the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan in the districts and registered tribal chieftains as its members. Moreover, they issued a journal, *Jepin*, to propagate Kurdish independence. Meanwhile, Alişer, the secretary of the Society's branch at Ümraniye, was engaged in the organization of Dersim.¹⁴⁵

Such activities did not escape from the eyes of the Turkish nationalists. Mustafa Kemal wanted to meet the Kurdish activists of Koçgiri when he arrived at Sivas for the national congress. On his invitation, Alişan, the chief of the Koçgiri tribe, came to meet with Mustafa Kemal for a talk. When Mustafa Kemal asked him their purposes, he replied that their main intention was to establish an autonomous Kurdistan on the basis of Wilson's principles on territories with Kurdish majority. Mustafa Kemal's reply was that Wilson's principles had been deteriorated. He proposed Alişan to cooperate with the nationalists as the representatives of Dersim.

¹⁴⁴Dersimi mentions about the disappointment of younger members of the Society from Seyyid Abdülkadir's point of view regarding Kurdistan. He noted that Abdülkadir, above all, was concerned about preventing Armenian seizure of Kurdistan and a defender of an autonomous Kurdistan in the Ottoman framework, a motive he and young members opposed. This demonstrates that the split around 'autonomy' and 'independence' in the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan Elevation goes back to its establishment date, long before it was formalized in early 1920. Nuri Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1997), pp. 133-134; idem, *Hatıratım*, (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1997), p. 97; *Koçgiri Halk Hareketi, 1919-1921*, (Ankara: Komal Yayınevi, 1975), p. 36.

¹⁴⁵Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, p. 135; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi İç Ayaklanmalar*, p. 153.

He also added that it had been promised to him at the Erzurum Congress that all Kurdistan would support him.¹⁴⁶ It seemed that Alişan was not convinced by the words of Mustafa Kemal as the course of events proved.¹⁴⁷

At the beginning of January 1920, a meeting was held with the participation of the Kurdish tribes in Sivas. The meeting was concluded with the decision of armed struggle to obtain the independence of Kurdistan including Diyarbakir, Van, Bitlis, Elaziz, Dersim-Koçgiri.¹⁴⁸ In the summer, the Kurdish activists started to attack the Turkish ammunition convoys and police stations and seized munitions.¹⁴⁹ They held the control of the region between Sivas and Erzincan.¹⁵⁰ On this occasion, the Ankara Government appointed Alişan as acting governor of Refahiye, and Haydar, his brother, as Mayor of Ümraniye (both districts were on the Sivas-Erzincan road) with the hope of preventing unrest in the region.¹⁵¹ Such appointments were ineffective; however, Alişan used his formal position to rally more tribes in the rebellion against the nationalist Government. In November, he met with Kurdish tribe leaders in Hozat

¹⁴⁶Dersimi, *ibid.*, pp. 135-136; *Hatıratım*, p. 98; Robert Olson, "The Koçgiri Kurdish Rebellion in 1921 and the Draft Law for a Proposed Autonomy of Kurdistan," *Oriente Moderno*, VIII (LXIX), no. 1-6 (1989), pp. 41-42.

¹⁴⁷The belief was that Mustafa Kemal gained some Kurds to his side by offering jobs and bribing. As a result, he caused the emergence of a schism among the Kurdish tribes. In order to draw the Kurds to the nationalist side, some Kurds were elected as deputy to the Grand National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal asked Alişan and the leading members of Dersim and Koçgiri to join in the Assembly. A considerable number of influential Kurds became members of the Assembly; however, Alişan and his staff continued to organize the Dersim region for struggle. Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, pp. 137-138; *Koçgiri Halk Hareketi*, p. 40.

¹⁴⁸Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, p. 139. Independence and autonomy seem to be used as synonym in the memoirs of Dersimi. Therefore, independence refers to autonomy in this case.

¹⁴⁹Ali Kemali, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-156.

¹⁵⁰Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, pp. 139-140.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 140; Mustafa Balcıoğlu, *Belgelerle Milli Mücadele Sırasında Anadolu'da Ayaklanmalar ve Merkez Ordusu*, (Ankara: Yükseköğretim Kurulu Matbaası, 1991), p. 121.

(Tunceli) which affirmed their support for Kurdish independence with regular units containing 45,000 men.¹⁵² Following this, they addressed a declaration to the Ankara Government on November 15 demanding:

- “1. The Government of Mustafa Kemal should explain whether or not it accepted the autonomy of Kurdistan as agreed by the İstanbul Government.
2. The Government of Mustafa Kemal should immediately declare its point of view regarding the autonomy of Kurdistan.
3. The Kurdish prisoners in Elaziz, Malatya, Sivas and Erzincan should be released immediately.
4. All Turkish officers should be withdrawn from areas with Kurdish majority.
5. The Turkish military units sent to the Koçkiri region should be withdrawn immediately.”¹⁵³

Three days later, Hasan Hayri Bey, deputy of Dersim, made a motion to Adnan [Adıvar], the Minister of Interior, the situation in Dersim. In his reply, Dr. Adnan stated that there was no question of Kurdism and Turkism in Dersim but only some plundering led by Alişer was going on. He stressed that Alişer’s main purpose was not only plundering but also he was propagating for independence of Kurdistan.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the Acting Minister of Interior did not mention the political demands of Alişan and his followers which had been communicated to the Ankara Government a few days ago.

In consequence, the Ankara Government did not send a written reply; instead,

¹⁵²Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, p. 140-141.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 141-142; Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 43; McDowall, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

¹⁵⁴“Dersim Mebusu Hasan Hayri Beyle Rüfekasının, Dersim Ahvaline Dair Dahiliye ve Maliye Vekâletlerinden İstizah Takriri ve Dahiliye Vekâleti Vekili Dr. Adnan Beyle Maliye Vekili Ferit Beyin Cevabı,” 18 November 1920, *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. V, p. 430.

a Committee of Advice (Heyet-i Nasiha) which communicated that the demands of Kurdistan would be accepted. This commission was driven away; however, since the mission was seen as a tactic of the Ankara Government to gain time. Subsequently, the Kurdish tribal chiefs of western Dersim sent a telegram to the Ankara Government (November 25) stating that, as stipulated by the Treaty of Sévres, an independent Kurdistan should be established in the provinces of Diyarbekir, Elaziz, Van and Bitlis. If this was not realized, they would secure this right by armed action.¹⁵⁵

The approaching winter was not suitable for armed action due to climatic conditions of the Dersim region. Therefore, the Kurdish leaders delayed their action until the spring of 1921 when the snow would melt. The program to be implemented firstly included the proclamation of Kurdish independence in the Dersim region. This was to be followed by raising the Kurdish flag at Hozat. Finally, the Kurdish nationalist forces would advance to Sivas from Erzincan, Elaziz and Malatya and they would demand from the Ankara Government the recognition of Kurdish independence.¹⁵⁶

In the meantime, the Ankara Government was busy with concentrating military troops around Sivas as it sent messages to the rebellious Kurds through the Governor of Elaziz, stating that representatives were coming from all parts of Kurdistan to Ankara, and that the Ankara Government respected the Kurdish

¹⁵⁵Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, p. 142.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 143; Olson, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44; Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

demands. At the same time, some leading members of the Kurds from Dersim were appointed as Dersim deputies for the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Mustafa Kemal also proposed Alişan to come to Ankara as a deputy; however, if he did not want this position, that he could be appointed to a high government position in Sivas. A Kurdish district governor was also to be appointed to the Dersim region in conformity with the demands of the deputies of Dersim. Alişan responded that he was not in a position to leave Dersim. A more interesting reply came from Seyyid Rıza, who was a religious leader and had the administrative control in the Dersim region. In a telegram to Mustafa Kemal, he asserted that the members of the Grand National Assembly who had been appointed from Dersim could by no means represent the region, that Dersim was demanding Kurdish rule, and that if this desire, was officially recognized by the Ankara Government, Kurdistan would cooperate with Ankara in a confederative form.¹⁵⁷ As a matter of fact, the Kurdish nationalists were in thought that the Ankara Government was trying to gain time.

Early clashes between the Kurds and the nationalist forces started in January 1921; however, a complete break out came in early March in Ümraniye. By mid February, a Turkish regiment had arrived at Ümraniye. It was followed by wide spreading rumors that the “Turks were going to massacre the Kurds like the Armenians”.¹⁵⁸ On March 6, the Kurds besieged Ümraniye and, after one day clash they raised the Kurdish flag in the district. According to Dersimi, a nationalist

¹⁵⁷Dersimi, *ibid.*, p. 143-145.

¹⁵⁸*Türk İstiklâl Harbi İç Ayaklanmalar*, pp. 153-154; Ali Kemali, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

commander was executed by the decision of the Kurdish Military Court Martial.¹⁵⁹ However, the accounts of the General Staff claimed that this commander was killed during the clashes.¹⁶⁰ The Kurds eventually seized the town with used weapons including machine guns, horses and mules.

The Kurdish rebellion rapidly expanded soon after. On March 8, Kemah was captured by the Kurds. Kangal-Koçhisar-Divriği-Zara-Refahiye-Kuruçay and Kemah districts were at the hands of the Kurdish nationalists by March 11, when the leading Kurdish tribal chieftains cabled the Ankara Government demanding the establishment of a province including the occupied districts (Koçkiri, Divriği, Refahiye, Kuruçay and Kemah) of Kurdish majority, and the appointment of a native Kurdish governor with Kurdish administrative officials.¹⁶¹ The Ankara Government responded by sending a commission led by Şefik Bitlisi, the Chief of Court of Appeal in Sivas and himself a Kurd, to settle the matter peacefully.¹⁶² Bitlisi met with the leading Kurds and requested the attacks against the nationalist forces to cease until a conclusion was reached. The Kurds seemed to accept this. Actually, both sides needed time at this point. While Nurettin Pasha, the commander of the Central

¹⁵⁹Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, p. 152.

¹⁶⁰*Türk İstiklâl Harbi İç Ayaklanmalar*, p. 154; also Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁶¹Ali Kemali, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164; Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, pp. 153-155. Upon the recent developments in Sivas, several telegrams refusing that there was a Kurdish question and rejecting the separation of the Kurds from the Government of the Grand National Assembly were sent to Ankara by local notables and tribal chieftains in the east. *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. IX, pp. 132-133, 214, 280-281.

¹⁶²Dersimi, *ibid.*, p. 154-155; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi İç Ayaklanmalar*, pp. 155-156; Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

Army,¹⁶³ prepared his troops to suppress the Kurdish rebellion, the Kurds were trying to gain the time to get the support of additional forces that would come from Dersim.

Following the rebellion, the Ankara Government declared martial law on March 10 in the province of Elazığ and the districts of Erzincan, Divriği and Zara¹⁶⁴ and on 22 in Sivas¹⁶⁵ in order to take the region under control. At the end of March, travelling was prohibited from the rebellion region with the aims of preventing the spread of rebellion and also arrival of any support to the Kurdish rebels.¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile, Nurettin Pasha concentrated the military forces under his command in Sivas, Elaziz and Erzincan. In addition, the Giresun regiment, headed by *Topal Osman* advanced from the north-east of the rebellion region, Refahiye. Thus, by the beginning of April, the nationalist forces entirely isolated the rebellion.

The military operation of the Turkish army against the Kurds started on the 3rd of April, and soon crushed the rebels. The harshness of Nurettin Pasha and, especially, the *Topal Osman*'s regiment caused panic among the inhabitants of

¹⁶³The Central Army was founded 9 December 1920. The main purpose of its establishment was to take action against the nationalist activities of the Pontine Greeks along the Black Sea coast. The activity zone of the Central Army was delineated with the province of Sivas and the districts of Canik (Samsun), Sinop, Amasya, Tokat, Çorum and Yozgat with its headquarter at Amasya. Nurettin Pasha was appointed as the commander of this army with extensive authority including the right of giving orders to civilian governors. B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 9 December 1920, decision no: 407 and 30 January 1921, decision no: 624. During the Koçgiri rebellion, he was charged with the suppression of the rebellion with extra-ordinary power by the decision of Executive Council of Ministers (İcra Vekilleri Heyeti). He moved the headquarters of the Central Army into Ümraniye, where the Kurdish rebellion was broke out. The activity zone of the Army was extended to include Karahisar-ı Şarki, Erzincan, Dersim and Elazığ. B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 13 March 1921, decision no: 733; *Türk İstiklâl Harbi İç Ayaklanmalar*, pp. 145, 156.

¹⁶⁴Düstur, III/2, pp. 4-5.

¹⁶⁵B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, decision no. 765.

¹⁶⁶Balcıoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, p. 159. One of the reasons behind the prohibition of traveling, particularly to İstanbul, from the region was to prevent the spread of exaggerated account of the rebellion. ATASE, 2460/78, 30 March 1921.

Koçgiri villages who left their homes for mountains in order to survive. Many villages were burned and abandoned property and animals were confiscated. According to Ebubekir Hazım [Tepeyran], then the Governor of Sivas, 132 villages were destroyed in Ümraniye and Zara, as if they were “enemy fortification”. In addition, people were killed in hundreds; all their property, crops and animals were looted, and these who escaped into the mountains were condemned to death.¹⁶⁷

Nureddin Pasha’s rigidity during the suppression of the Koçgiri rebellion came forth on the agenda of the Grand National Assembly in August 1921. The commander of the Central Army was heavily criticized by İsmail Şükrü, deputy of Karahisarışarki, claiming that the atrocities committed at Koçgiri were similar to those committed by the Greeks in the western Anatolia. He demanded an investigation of the Koçgiri incident and the execution of Nureddin Pasha for his unlawful activities; such as issuing declarations on behalf of the Assembly.¹⁶⁸ Emin Bey, deputy of Erzincan, defined the attitude of the Central Army at Ümraniye as unacceptable even for the barbarians in Africa. He also added that the atrocities committed against the people of Dersim had not been applied to the Armenians.¹⁶⁹

As a result, the Assembly debated the issue in secret sessions¹⁷⁰ and decided to send

¹⁶⁷Ebubekir Hazım Tepeyran, *Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları*, (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1982), p. 75. Tepeyran mentions that an opportunity had appeared to settle the matter peacefully following the parley of Şefik Bitlisi with the leading Kurds. The reaction of Nurettin Pasha was negative, however. Tepeyran claims that the commander of the Central Army told to the commission led by Bitlisi that “many soldiers were gathered and I came here. [It is not possible to leave] without doing something.” *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

¹⁶⁸*T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, 11 August 1921, vol. II, pp. 204-206.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 4 October 1921, p. 270.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 3-5 October 1921, pp. 248-256, 262-270, 272-280.

an investigation committee to the rebellion region.¹⁷¹ At the same time, some deputies demanded dismissal of Nurettin Pasha from the command of the Central Army and his trial.¹⁷² This demand was based not only on his mistreatments and illegal activities in the Koçgiri Incident but also the arbitrary and severe measures he performed during the Greek deportation from Samsun.¹⁷³ As a matter of fact, the Central Army had been principally established to destroy the nationalist activities of the Greeks at the Black Sea coast. Having eliminated the Armenian threat in the east and suppressed the nationalist rebellion of Koçkiri, the Turkish nationalists found the opportunity to deal more effectively with the Pontine Greeks and also the Greek army in the west by the summer of 1921. This will be dealt in the coming sub-chapter.

5.4. Turco-Greek Conflict

5.4.1. An Overview of the Situation at the Black Sea Coast in 1919-1920

The decision of the Paris Peace Conference regarding the claims of the Pontus Greeks was taken in early 1920. Actually, the intention of establishing a Pontus state at the Black Sea coast as it had been stated by the memorandum of Chrysanthos, the Metropolitan of Trabzon, was not seriously considered by the Allied representatives. The metropolitan of Trabzon spent diplomatic efforts in Paris through 1919¹⁷⁴;

¹⁷¹*T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, 6 October 1921, vol. XIII, pp. 99-100, 103, 109. The decision was taken upon the common protocol (mazbata) of a mixed council formed by members from the councils of Justice, National defense and Interior. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

¹⁷²*T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, 3-5, 29 October 1921, vol. II, pp. 248-287, 403-409.

¹⁷³The accusation against Nurettin Pasha regarding the deportation of the Greeks from Samsun was also to be examined by the investigation committee sent to Koçgiri. *Ibid.*, 22 November 1921, p. 442.

¹⁷⁴Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," pp. 384-391.

however, there were mainly two reasons weakening the possibility of convincing the Allies for the establishment of a Pontus state. First, the boundaries claimed by Chrysanthos for the Pontus Greek state clashed with the boundaries of Armenia. In 1919, the Allied representatives were in thinking of granting some territory at the Black Sea coast to Armenia; such as Trabzon, which was claimed to be the center of the Pontus state. Secondly, population within territory claimed by the Pontus delegation was predominantly Muslim. For these reasons, Berthelot, the French representative, defined the claim of forming an independent Pontus state along the Black Sea as a "ridiculous one" at the London Conference of 1920.¹⁷⁵ On February 22, the Conference decided not to consider the matter anymore, since there were 1,830,000 Muslims against 312,000 Greeks in the mentioned territory.¹⁷⁶

On the other hand, the nationalist activities of the Greeks in the Black Sea region had been closely observed by Mustafa Kemal following his appointment as the General Inspector of the Ninth Army in May 1919. On May 22, he sent two reports to the Ministry of Interior and one to the General Staff in which he stated that the Greek bands led by Germanos, the Metropolitan of Samsun, was undoubtedly were engaged in political activities. According to his reports, there were about forty Greek bands mostly around Samsun.¹⁷⁷ He also added that there were less Muslim

¹⁷⁵D. B. F. P. , VII, p. 84.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 582.

¹⁷⁷"Mustafa Kemal'in Samsun'dan Gönderdiği İki Mühim Rapor," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. XIII, no. 14 (November 1968), pp. 5-9; HTVD, no. 4 (June 1953), doc. no. 69. On June 5, he sent a similar report from Havza. He stated that although the Greeks formed the minority of the population, they were engaged in political activities in Amasya and Tokat too. There were twenty-one Greek bands in Amasya and five in Erbaa and Niksar. H. T. V. D., no. 4 (June 1953), doc. no. 64.

bands to defend Muslim villages against the Greek attacks. Coincidentally, Hurst, the British Captain at Samsun, wrote to Calthorpe that the principle source of trouble in the region was the Laz bands. He stated his opinion that if the Laz bands were attacked and their members killed or scattered, the brigandage problem in the region would be approximately solved.¹⁷⁸

It can be understood from the reports of Mustafa Kemal and Captain Hurst that brigands were the main source of tension between the Muslims and the Greeks at the Black Sea coast. According to the former, the Muslim bands had not political aim and acted for defensive purposes while the British Captain held the opinion that “a definite movement against the Greeks was being organized and would have been let loose as soon as it was obvious that Smyrna was irrecoverable.”¹⁷⁹ Based on a long report sent by Hurst,¹⁸⁰ Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner, summarized the situation in Samsun and its vicinity to Earl Curzon on June 21 in the following words:

“The state of affairs in the province of Samsoun is far from satisfactory. In normal times, before the war, brigandage was rife; in these abnormal times, since the armistice, it has become worse, and just recently owing to events at Smyrna and elsewhere, it would appear that advantage is being taken by interested persons to utilise the local forces of disorder to serve their political and nationalist ends.”¹⁸¹

In another report sent by Ian Smith, British Lieutenant Colonel who visited Samsun, Merzifon, Amasya and Havza in early July, it was stated that both Turkish

¹⁷⁸Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 15-23.

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 14.

and Greek civilians were armed and feared each other. Smith continued that the removal of Mustafa Kemal and Refet Bey [Bele], then the Commander of the Third Army corps, would do much to restore confidence amongst the Christians while the removal of the orthodox bishop of Samsun, Germanos, was most desirable. According to Smith, Germanos was the head of propaganda which was carried out for the Pontus state. He was in control of the organization of the Greek bands which had been established for political purposes throughout the district and there was no limit to his ambitions as a *Helenist*.¹⁸² The removal of the bishop of Samsun, Germanos in breaking up the influence of the Greek bands was also shared by Mustafa Kemal.¹⁸³

In the spring of 1919, the Turkish nationalist movement was not a unified and consolidated action yet. Therefore, nationalist effort mostly concentrated on uniting various national defense organizations under a central administration. This was what was performed at the Sivas Congress in September 1919. A week after the Congress, the last British troops at Merzifon, at the Black Sea coast, were withdrawn. This left the Greeks in the Black Sea region alone with the Turkish resistance groups. There was not, however, organized operation against the Greek bands besides arming the Muslim population. An exception was the activities of *Topal Osman*'s band. He was in control of Giresun district and took the governor and all officials under his

¹⁸²From A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon, 27 July 1919, *ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

¹⁸³Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

command.¹⁸⁴ His band started to sweep the Greek bands in Giresun by the spring of 1919.¹⁸⁵

In the meantime, the nationalists stopped repatriation of refugees, especially into the interior.¹⁸⁶ In addition, indirect but effective measures were taken by the Muslims which caused the Greeks and the Armenians to leave the region. Amongst such measures was organizing the boycott aiming to prevent the Christians from obtain their living.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, the repatriated Greeks and Armenians were not allowed to repossess their properties which they had abandoned during the First World War.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, it was the fear of further persecutions and lack of security which caused some of the Christians to leave the region in 1919. In the following year, their departure was completely prohibited by the newly established nationalist Government anxious to prevent all threats to security and order.¹⁸⁹

Brigandage prevailed in the Black Sea region through 1920 too. Loosely

¹⁸⁴From Captain Perring to Sir J. De Robeck, 13 October 1919, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 234. Perring wrote his observations to the British High Commissioner following a visit of the coastal towns of Ünye, Fatsa, Ordu, Giresun, Trabzon, Rize, and Batum.

¹⁸⁵Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," p. 394.

¹⁸⁶"Notes on the Nationalist Movement in the Samsoun Area," From J. De Robeck to Earl Curzon, 28 October 1919, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 178-182.

¹⁸⁷In December 1919, an American official wrote that "except for business discrimination, Greeks are well-treated," Department of State, 867.00/1394.

¹⁸⁸From Captain Perring to J. de Robeck, 29 October 1919, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 231-232. "No Christian dares to venture from the town to visit his plantations, and he is therefore compelled to make a contract with a Turk for the harvesting of the crop; on the understanding that 50 per cent of the crop handed to the proprietor. The Turk simply harvests the crop and sells it for his own account, refusing to deliver the 50 per cent, or any proportion to the Christian. In cases where Christian has obtained the possession of his land, and has cultivated his crop, the Turk prevents his marketing same, either by continuous threats, and so compelling him to abandon his property, or by attacking him on the way to or from market."

¹⁸⁹From the American Consul in Charge at Samsoun to the Secretary of State, 29 July 1920, Department of State, 867.00/1336.

organized Greek bands were operating for the nationalist end. Their expectation was an Allied intervention which did not seem apparent. On the other hand, the representatives of the Pontus cause were enforcing diplomatic channels for the Pontus state; nevertheless, they understood in early 1920 that the Allies did not favor such a formation and were satisfied with a Pontus administrative unit within the framework of the Turkish state.¹⁹⁰ On the part of the nationalist Government of Ankara, things were more complex due to local uprisings aimed to crush the nationalist movement. More important still in the summer of 1920 was the advance of the Greek army into the interior of Anatolia. Under such circumstances, military power was insufficient to meet the Pontus case. As a result, the military operation of the Turkish nationalists against the Pontine Greeks was not held until the end of 1920, when the Central Army was established. During this period, the only noticeable activities against the Greeks came from *Topal Osman's* band engaged in the elimination of the Greek notables of Giresun.

5.4.2. The Greek Army in the Interior of Anatolia

The advancement of the Greek army into the interior of Anatolia in the summer of 1920 was related to the Peace Treaty which would be imposed on the Ottoman Empire as well as to the expansionist ambition of Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister. As the terms of the Peace Treaty with the Ottoman State were clarified at San Remo Conference (April 1920), Lloyd George, the British Prime

¹⁹⁰Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," p. 408.

Minister, summoned Venizelos in London on June 14. He told him that the Allies were not in a position to support Greece in the imposition of the treaty and asked Venizelos whether Greece provide its imposition if rejected. What made the British Prime Minister anxious was the victory of the Turkish nationalist forces in the İzmit region over the anti-nationalist İstanbul forces supported by the British. In consequence, the Straits, which were the most vital issue for the Allies, were threatened by the nationalists.¹⁹¹ In order to reinforce the military power around the Straits, Venizelos was asked to reserve a Greek division in return for permission to advance into the interior of Anatolia.¹⁹² On June 21, the Supreme Council decided that the Greeks were to lend one division to General Milne, the commander of the British Army at the Black Sea, to reinforce the Allied forces around Constantinople. In return, the Greek forces were authorized for “concerted action in the Smyrna area.”¹⁹³ Venizelos used this opportunity to extend the Greek influence over the territory covering the entire Edremit Gulf to establish a federal state including Pontus and Armenia.¹⁹⁴

On June 22, the Greek army, without confronting any resistance, started to advance. It occupied Bursa on July 8 and Edirne on the 26. While the Greek army was preparing for further advancement toward Eskişehir and Afyon Karahisar, the Treaty of Sévres was signed. The Turkish nationalists, however, immediately

¹⁹¹From Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, 17 June 1920, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 137.

¹⁹²Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-125.

¹⁹³“British Secretary’s Draft Notes of a Conference Held at the Villa Belle, Boulogne,” 21 June 1920, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 153.

¹⁹⁴Yerasimos, “Pontus Meselesi,” p. 409.

disavowed the treaty. Soon after, they started military operation against the Armenians in the east. Upon these developments, Venizelos sent a telegram to Lloyd George on October 5, explaining his point of view regarding the situation in Anatolia. After expressing anxiety over the nationalist movement in Turkey, he proposed a new campaign as the “only radical remedy”, designed for complete destruction of the nationalist forces around Ankara and Pontus. This campaign, according to Venizelos, would have two consequences:

“1. Driving the Turks out of Constantinople which would form, together with the zone of the Straits, a separate state the existence of which would constitute a unique efficacious guarantee of the liberty of the Straits.

2. Constitution of a separate state at the Pontus with the Greeks that have remained there and those who having emigrated to escape from the Turkish persecutions during the last 50 years are dispersed in the South of Russia and whose total number amounts to 800,000. This state collaborating with Armenia and Georgia would form a solid barrier against Islamism and eventually against Russian imperialism...”¹⁹⁵

Venizelos insisted that the Greek forces were sufficient to ensure a complete victory; however,

“For political and financial reasons the Hellenic Government would be unable to assume the exclusive initiative and responsibility thereof as in June last. They would nevertheless be ready to collaborate with all their forces with England if she were willing to take such an initiative in order to arrive at the aforesaid objects and if she were willing to give Greece the necessary financial assistance to that effect.”¹⁹⁶

Finally, he asked for an urgent decision since winter was approaching and a campaign would be impossible.

¹⁹⁵D. B. F. P. , vol. XIII, pp. 157-158.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 157.

Before the consideration of Venizelos' letter by the British Government, Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of Imperial General Staff of Britain, asked Venizelos for details. The letter was then considered at a meeting of the British Cabinet on October 12. It was stated that Venizelos' proposal was not to the French and Italian Governments at all.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the Cabinet delayed further consideration of the question until Venizelos' explanation arrived. The Greek Prime Minister sent two telegrams on October 12 and 16 in which he stated that the Greeks could occupy Eskişehir and Afyon Kara Hisar in ten days and advance into Ankara in three weeks. At the same time, Pontus could also be occupied. He asked for military support of the British troops under General Milne's command and also for equipment and money (an average of 3 million British pounds). Finally, if his solution was not accepted by the Allies, he suggested the establishment of an inter-allied commission for the reorganization of the Turkish army and gendarmerie as stipulated by the Treaty of Sévres.¹⁹⁸ A month passed with no response to Venizelos' proposition. On November 14, Venizelos fell from power and was replaced by the Royalists. This internal development in Greece caused the Allies' hesitation, particularly of Britain, against the new Government and thus was to the benefit of the Turkish nationalists.

There were other factors besides the downfall of Venizelos which caused the British authorities to change their mind on Near Eastern policy; thereby, Turkey. Amongst these was the Bolshevik factor which was the most important. The defeat of

¹⁹⁷Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 349-350.

¹⁹⁸Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-134.

the White Army by the Bolsheviks and the surrender of Armenia to the Bolsheviks following the Turkish defeat in the east left Britain without any ally in the Caucasus region. These factors led the British reconsideration of their position against the Turkish nationalist movement. They were aware of the fact that the nationalists were concerned about securing arms and ammunition from the Bolsheviks but they did not favor a Bolshevik penetration into Anatolia. For this reason, it was essential not to throw the nationalists into the arms of the Bolsheviks. The consideration was that the territorial terms of the Treaty of Sévres regarding Smyrna, the province of Kars and probably of Thrace would be revised in order to break the connection between the nationalists and Bolsheviks as Turkey would become as a buffer state between the Entente Powers and Soviet Russia. It was also assumed that this would discard the principal causes of unrest throughout the British dominions in Egypt, Mesopotamia and India. ¹⁹⁹ With this opinion in mind, the Allies discontinued their financial support to Greece upon the return of the King Constantine in lieu of Venizelos.²⁰⁰

In consequence, the changing political circumstances in Greece led to favorable international situation for the Turkish nationalists while they were engaged in war with the Armenians in the east. By the end of November, they were able to defeat the Armenians and eliminated the Armenian threat. What the nationalists had to divert seriously their attention to was the Greek advancement into the interior of Anatolia as well as the nationalist Greek movement at the Black Sea coast.

¹⁹⁹“Note on the Military Situation Created by Recent Events in Russia, Caucasia, Turkey and Greece,” War Office, 22 November 1920, D. B. F. P., vol. XIII, pp. 183-189.

²⁰⁰Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.

5.4.3. The Elimination of the Pontus Cause

5.4.3.1. Early Preparations of the Turkish Nationalists

Early signs of a military operation against the Pontine Greeks came in late 1920. In November, seventy-two non-Ottoman citizen Greeks were expatriated from Samsun.²⁰¹ At the same time, the governor of the district prohibited the Greek journals. In addition, the military division in the region collected all arms from the Greeks as it compelled the younger Greeks to conscript.²⁰² The most important step, however, was taken by the establishment of the Central Army on December 9 to suppress Pontus nationalist activities. Two divisions, the 5th and 15th, of the abolished 3rd Army, was specifically reserved with a mounted division to this army. Its operation area covered the province of Sivas and the districts of Canik, Sinop, Amasya, Tokat, Çorum and Yozgad where the Pontine Greek activists were influential.²⁰³

Following its establishment, the Central Army had to delay its operation in the Pontus region due to the advancement of the Greek army and the unexpected Kurdish rebellion at Koçgiri. Nevertheless, Nurettin Pasha, the commander of the Central Army, demanded from all governors and commanders in the Pontus region to prepare the lists of suspicious non-Muslims as an initial step.²⁰⁴ Several lists were

²⁰¹Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," p. 415.

²⁰²Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 78-79.

²⁰³B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 9 December 1920, decision no: 407.

²⁰⁴Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

sent from Amasya, Sivas, Çorum, Canik (Samsun), Tokat and Yozgat containing the names of non-Muslims who were not loyal to the nationalist cause and susceptible to rise at the first occasion against the Ankara Government.²⁰⁵

In early February of 1921, the arrest of the Greeks commenced. On February 4, seventy-two Greek notables from Samsun and 11 from Bafra were arrested.²⁰⁶ In addition, such places as metropolitan centers and schools, which were thought to be the centers of Greek nationalist activities, were raided and searched. As a consequence of the search at the American College in Merzifon, which was determined to be a nationalist center, the school was closed down and its American staff, except two, were expatriated by the order of the Ministry of Interior.²⁰⁷ A further measure that was applied by the Central Army was the conscription of the Greeks into army. The conscripted Greeks were sent to labor battalions.²⁰⁸

5.4.3.2. The Deportation of the Pontine Greeks

Towards the summer of 1921, following the suppression of the Koçgiri rebellion, the Central Army increased its operation in the Pontus region. The command of the Central Army regarded the Greek deportation from the Black Sea coast as the most effective means in dealing with the Pontus question. As a result, the

²⁰⁵ATASE, 2476/2, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 24, 27, 28, 31, 37, 38.

²⁰⁶Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," p. 417. The decision was taken a day before by the command of the Central Army and the Independence Court at Amasya. *Türk İstiklâl Harbi İç Ayaklanmalar*, p. 148;

Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²⁰⁷Kurt, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

²⁰⁸Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

decision for the deportation of the Greeks of Samsun and its vicinity came in May. Upon the suggestion of the district governor,²⁰⁹ Nurettin Pasha, the commander of the Central Army, asked to the General Staff and Ministries of National Defense and Interior whether it was suitable to deport the Greeks of Samsun.²¹⁰ Before having a reply, on May 22, the local authorities attempted to send the Greeks who were originally from Kayseri to their native district. This attempt was confronted with resistance by the Greek women who held a demonstration before the governor's residence and also by the Muslim notables. On this occasion, deportation was delayed to the following day.²¹¹ On 24, the Minister of Interior notified Nurettin Pasha that it was appropriate to send the Greeks, Armenians and other foreigners in Samsun to their birth places.²¹²

The march of events in early June brought about the deportation of all Greeks at the Black Sea region. On June 7, Colonel Sariyannis, the deputy Chief of Greek General Staff, proposed Harold Lamb, the British Consul in İzmir, to hold an effective blockade on the Black Sea ports, Sinop, Inebolu and Samsun. It was because arms and ammunitions from Russia were transported to the nationalists across these ports. In order to prevent it, a blockade was absolutely necessary. The Greek Colonel also asked for the British help in carrying out this blockade.²¹³ The reply of the Foreign Office was not affirmative with the opinion that such a blockade

²⁰⁹ ATASE, 2465/1.

²¹⁰ ATASE 2465/1/2.

²¹¹ Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," p. 419; Balcioğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.

²¹² ATASE 2465/1/3; 1/4.

²¹³ From H. Lamb to Earl Curzon, 7 June 1921, D. B. F. P. , vol. XVII, pp. 221-222.

was politically dangerous and strategically useless.²¹⁴ Nevertheless, a Greek cruiser bombed the Inebolu port on June 9.

On this occasion, Nurettin Pasha demanded from the Government the deportation of all Greeks to the interior on the same day. Thereupon, the Council of Ministers decided to drive all Greeks aged between 15-50 from the coastal districts into the interior.²¹⁵ Fevzi [Çakmak], the Chief of General Staff, informed Nurettin Pasha of the development next day, demanding to take necessary measures.²¹⁶ The decision officially and with the approval of the Grand National Assembly was sent on June 16.²¹⁷ On July 3, the Council of Ministers declared all districts at the Black Sea coast as war zone beginning with June 12.²¹⁸

²¹⁴“Memorandum by Mr. Osborne on Blockade of Nationalist Black Sea ports,” 9 June 1921, *ibid.*, pp. 228-230.

²¹⁵B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 12 June 1921, decision no: 941. Although the decision of the deportation of the Greeks was taken upon the bombardment of Inebolu, there were some other accompanying reasons for the decision. According to the report of an American official who visited Ankara between 13-28 September 1921, the deportation of the Greeks, in the point of view of the Turkish nationalists, was necessary due to the following facts: “Osmanli Greeks and Armenians were discovered in large numbers fighting with the Greek army. Greeks and other *chete* bands along the Black Sea were continually harassing the nationalist lines of communications. These bands were necessarily fed by the neighboring villages and in order to cut off the source of food supply villages were destroyed and the population driven away...” H. C. Jaquith, “Report of Visit to Angora,” 18 November 1921, Department of State, 867.4016/433. On a motion by Süleyman Sırrı, the deputy of İzmit, Ali Fethi [Okyar], the Minister of Interior, explained the reasons for the deportation of the Greeks in the same manner. *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, 5, 29 December 1921, vol. XV, pp. 33, 238-241; Ahmet Emin, “Dahiliye Vekili Fethi Beyle Mülakat,” *Vakit*, 5 January 1922. Yusuf Kemal gave the same explanation to Bristol. “Conversation with Youssouf Kemal Bey, Kemalist Minister of Foreign Affairs,” 22 February 1922, Department of State, 867.00/1497. The deportation decision excluded the Greeks who were the citizens of other countries, for instance, Russia, Italy and France. B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 29 June 1921, decision no: 979.

²¹⁶Kurt, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

²¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 405. The Executive Committee of Ministers authorized the military command (in this case, Nureddin Pasha) in the execution of deportation of the Greeks. B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 2 July 1921, decision no: 1012.

²¹⁸B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, decision no: 1014.

As soon as the decision for the deportation of Greeks was received, the arrest of Greek men in Samsun, Bafra and Alaçam began. On June 17, the first convoy departed from Samsun. Within a week, it was followed with about ten convoys (each was formed by 500-700 persons). Most of the early deportees, however, could not reach their destinations due to the attacks of bands.²¹⁹ The deportation process had a new dimension in July. On July 12, Nurettin Pasha ordered Greek women and children to accompany the males.²²⁰ This decision was protested by Muslim notables. They sent telegrams to the Grand National Assembly and the Ministry of Interior requesting to stop the deportation.²²¹ In July and August, the deportation slowed down. This was not due to the protests but the advancement of the Greek Army in the Central Anatolia.

On July 10, the Greek army moved forward with the objective of occupying the railway line connecting Eskişehir and Afyon Karahisar. Thereupon, most of the nationalist forces in the Pontus region were called to the western front, even *Topal Osman* whose band had severe operations against the Greek bands as well as the civilian Greeks and Armenians. Before he left for the western front, he raided Merzifon, looted the district and killed lots of Greek and Armenians between July 23 and 31.²²²

²¹⁹The famous *Topal Osman*'s band was very active at this time. Yerasimos, *Pontus Meselesi*, pp. 420-421.

²²⁰Kurt, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-401.

²²¹Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," p. 422.

²²²From George E. White, the President of the Anatolia College in Marsovan to the Department of State, 18 November 1921, Department of State, 867.4016/440; Donald M. Hosford, "Recent Conditions and Events in Northern Anatolia Particularly in Marsovan," 6 December 1921, Department

The deportation of the Greeks gained momentum again following the stop of the Greek advancement, at least temporarily, in the Western front. In September, all Greeks were driven out.²²³ Thus, approximately sixty thousand Greeks had been deported by November 1921 to Harput, Elaziz, Maraş, etc.²²⁴ What remained were the Greek bands operating against the nationalists against which military operations would be increased. By then, a fierce fight took place between the Greek bands and the Turkish regular troops. Meanwhile, the Independence Tribunals, equipped with extraordinary authority, had begun to operate.²²⁵ The Samsun Independence Court, which was located in Amasya, tried the Pontus case. From August to October, 177 peoples (174 Greeks and 3 Muslims) were condemned to capital punishment due to their betrayal to the Ankara Government.²²⁶

While the military operations of the Central Army was continuing, the excessive attitudes of Nurettin Pasha, in Koçkiri and Pontus cases, became an issue of long and lively debates at the Grand National Assembly. It was pointed out that he

of State 867.4016/441. Hosford was the Esquire of the Near East Relief and stayed in Merzifon from 12 December 1919 until 5 October 1921. According to his account, the Osman Aga's band came to Merzifon on 23 July and cleaned out the town in less than a week.

²²³From J. B. Jackson, the American Consul in Aleppo, to the Department of State, 25 July 1922, Department of State, 867.4016/618. Actually, by early October, all Greek males had already been deported from the Black Sea coast. Department of State, 867.00/1500. The British High Commissioner asked the Ankara Government through Hamid Bey, the head of the Turkish Red Crescent, to allow the transfer of about ten thousand Greek female and children by ship but there was no permission by the Executive Committee. B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 23 November 1921, decision no: 1203.

²²⁴From Samsun, 27,955; Amasya, 14,000; Sivas, 1448; Ordu, 4,910; Tokat, 1000; Çorum, 571; Sinop, 550, and Giresun, 8500. Balcıoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

²²⁵The Independence Tribunals were, firstly, established in September 1920 and operated until their abolition in February 1921. In August, they were re-established. Ergun Aybars, *İstiklâl Mahkemeleri*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1975).

²²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 173: The list of the Greeks who were executed was reported by Charles W. Fowle, the Foreign Secretary of the Near East Relief, to the Secretary of State, Department of State,

was accused of using his authority illicitly in the suppression of the Koçgiri rebellion. With regards to the Pontus case, similar accusations took place. Besides that, he was indicted for the restricting of travelling rights of 56 Muslim notables, who opposed to the deportations, particularly of women and children. Nurettin Pasha, as stated at the Assembly, forcefully held these men in Samsun.²²⁷ These led to the resignation of Nurettin Pasha from the command of the Central Army on November 3.²²⁸ Thereafter, the Assembly decided to put him on trial according to the inquiry, which would be held by the Investigation Committee of Koçkiri.²²⁹ Before the Committee had submitted its report, it was decided that the trial should wait for further inquiry.²³⁰ This decision was followed by the abolishment of the Central Army in February.²³¹ The military struggle against the Pontus nationalists was to be maintained under the control of the Ministry of Interior by then.²³²

As soon as the task of dealing with the Pontus bands passed to the Ministry of Interior, Fethi Bey [Okyar], the Minister of Interior, issued a declaration calling the Greek insurgents at the mountains to surrender within a week to avoid further bloodshed.²³³ No response was taken, and, the fierce struggle between two nationalist

867.4016/432. According to the list, the executed Greeks were mostly men of prominence such as physicians, lawyers and merchants.

²²⁷*T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. II, 5. 10. 1337 (1921), pp. 280-287; 29. 10. 1337 (1921), pp. 403-409.

²²⁸*Ibid.*, 22 November 1921, p. 434.

²²⁹*Ibid.*, 22 November 1921, p. 442.

²³⁰*Ibid.*, 17, 19 January 1338 (1922), p. 630, 632-633. The issue of Nurettin Pasha's trial was abolished entirely by this decision.

²³¹Balcıoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-263.

²³²After a short period of retirement, Nurettin Pasha was appointed as the commander of the First Army of the western front. Necati Fahri Taş, *Nureddin Paşa ve Tarihi Gerçekler*, (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1997), p. 148.

²³³*Yeniğün*, 14 February 1922; Department of State 867.00/1501.

camps continued. The Greek bands continued to operate in the region. Incited by the mal-treatments committed by them against the Muslim population two Tokat deputies, by a motion, accused the Minister of Interior of being ineffective and slow in dealing with the Greek bands.²³⁴ Another group with Ali Şükrü, deputy of Trabzon as the spokesman, delivered a motion touching upon similar points. They, in addition, asked the Minister of Interior to explain why he allowed some Greek families, who were really dangerous, to leave for İstanbul during the Greek deportation.²³⁵ The reply of the Minister was interesting in that it gave the official account of the operations in the Black Sea region. He initially pointed out that the military operation was still continuing and maintained that until 15 May 1922, 16,928 Greeks were captured, dead or alive. His assumption was that there were 800-1,000 Greek brigands, who were active.²³⁶ At this point, objections arose. For example, Emin Bey, deputy of Canik (Samsun), claimed that the number of the deported Greeks was half of the total, which was approximately ninety-three thousand. The remaining Greeks equipped with six thousands arms were still at the mountains.²³⁷

It was clear from the course of the debate that the Turkish nationalists had not completely eliminated the Greek activists. Actually, nationalist Greek brigands,

²³⁴“Tokad Mebusu Rifat ve Hamdi beylerin Pontus meselesine dair Dahiliye Vekâletinden istizah takriri,” *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, 18 May 1922, vol. XX, pp. 67-68.

²³⁵“Trabzon Mebusu Ali Şükrü bey ve rüfekasının Pontus meselesi ve Trabzon Müdafaai Hukuk Cemiyetine dair Dahiliye Vekilinden istizah takriri,” *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. III, 18 May 1922, pp. 362-364.

²³⁶*Ibid.*, 10 June 1922, pp. 372-374. For the complete debate see *ibid.*, pp. 368-412.

²³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 400.

sheltered at the mountains, maintained their existence in the Black Sea region even after the final defeat of the Greek army from Anatolia. For this reason, the Ankara Government decided for additional military measures to deal with the Greek activists in September 1922.²³⁸ In consequence, the remaining Greeks would finally evacuate the region following the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece.²³⁹

5.4.4. Turco-Greek Conflict in Western Anatolia

It has already been remarked that the Greek and Cuacasian developments and the resistance of the Turkish nationalists led the Allies to reconsider the terms of the Sévres Treaty by the end of 1920. Consequently, the Allied powers invited Greece and the Ankara Government as well as İstanbul for negotiations in London for the revision of the treaty. A conference was met between February 21 and March 11 and adjourned without any decisive conclusion.²⁴⁰ The Greek delegation, which represented the new Government, displayed its desire to maintain the Greek troops in Anatolia in order to impose the Treaty of Sévres by force upon the nationalists. This was a demonstration of the Greek representatives to prove the Allies, particularly Britain, that Venizelos' foreign policy would not be changed as regards Asia Minor.

²³⁸B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 5 September 1922, decision no: 1809 and 12 September 1922, decision no: 1835.

²³⁹Yerasimos, "Pontus Meselesi," p. 423.

²⁴⁰The Turkish delegation insisted upon the complete withdrawal of the Greek forces from İzmir while the Greek delegation proposed an autonomous structure under Greek administration. At last, the Allied Powers decided the question to an international commission to be appointed by Turkey and Greece for which both sides principally agreed. For the minutes of the London negotiations regarding the settlement in İzmir see D. B. F. P., vol. XV, pp. 168-203.

Therefore, they expected that Britain would provide Greece with financial support which was discontinued following the change of regime.

Soon after the end of London negotiations, the Greek army launched attacks from two fronts. After several clashes, the Turkish army reversed the Greeks at *Inönü*. This reversal caused the turn of the Greek troops to the Muslim civilians which they suspected to shelter the Turkish nationalist irregulars. However, the worst was the atrocities committed by the Greek and Armenian bands at Yalova-Gemlik peninsula from March through May, 1921. The report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry (dated 23 May 1921), appointed to investigate the destruction and evacuation of Muslim villages in the Yalova-Gemlik peninsula and, later, in Izmid region between March and May stated that

“...A distinct and regular method appears to have been followed in the destruction of villages, group by group, for the last two months, which destruction has even reached the neighborhood of the Greek headquarters. The members of the Commission consider that, in the part of the kazas of Yalova and Guemlek occupied by the Greek army, there is a systematic plan of destruction of Turkish villages and extinction of the Moslem population. This plan is being carried out by Greek and Armenian bands, which appear to operate under Greek instructions and sometimes even with the assistance of detachments of regular troops. This destruction of villages and the disappearance of the Moslem population consequent thereon doubtless has its object to guard the flanks and rear of the Greek army against any possible attack by the population in the event of an early offensive, and perhaps even to create in this region a political situation favorable to the Greek Government.”²⁴¹

Following the reversal of the Greek Army, the Allied Powers clarified their position against Greece. They decided to remain strictly neutral in the Turco-Greek

²⁴¹Cited in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-284 ff. Some details of the atrocities committed against the Muslim population in Yalova, Gemlik and Izmit was published in English and French by the Ministry of Interior in 1921 under the title of *Greek Atrocities in Turkey*, (Constantinople: Imprimerie Ahmed Ihsan, 1921). Toynbee himself narrates the situation of Yalova basing on his first-eye observation. *Ibid.*, pp. 299-311.

war.²⁴² Moreover, the British were to cut off entirely the supply of war materials to Greece and were not to allow the use of Constantinople as a naval base by the Greek army.²⁴³

While unfavorable developments were taking place as regards the position of the Greek army in Anatolia, the Turkish nationalists were preparing for further struggle. Amongst these preparations was the measure of securing the rear of the army, which meant deporting suspicious elements from the war zone. An order by İsmet [İnönü] to the governor of Ertuğrul (Bilecik) on May 1 stated that there should remain no non-Muslim males and females in Ertuğrul.²⁴⁴ From another correspondence of İsmet Pasha, however, it can be understood that the deportation of the non-Muslims from the area of the Western front had been ordered in early 1921, probably in April following the Greek reversal at İnönü. On May 9, İsmet Pasha asked the Ministry of Interior for approval to send the remaining non-Muslims to Hozat and Elaziz fronts.²⁴⁵ Thereupon, the Council of Ministers debated the question and decided for the deportation of Christians aged between 18 and 50 in the western and southern front into the provinces of Sivas and Elâziz.²⁴⁶ From May 21 until the

²⁴²From Earl Curzon to Lord Granville (Athens), 16 April 1921, D. B. F. P., vol. XVII, p. 130.

²⁴³From H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon, 22 April and 9 May 1921, *ibid.*, pp. 148-149, 174.

²⁴⁴ATASE 1215/2.

²⁴⁵ATASE 1215/2,3.

²⁴⁶B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 11 May 1921, decision no: 839. This decision was also to be applied to the Christians of Muğla, Aydın, Burdur, Antalya and Silifke. B. C. A., 28 June 1921, decision no: 979. Actually, the Executive Committee of Ministers had already decided to dislocate the Greek and Armenian males between 20 and 40 ages from Bolu, Geyve, Ertuğrul, Eskişehir, Kütahya, Afyonkarahisar, Denizli, Burdur and Isparta. B. C. A., Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları, 15 September 1920, decision no: 215 and 9 February 1921, decision no: 657.

beginning of June, approximately 5,049 Greeks and 29 Armenians were deported from Eskişehir, Ereğli (Konya), Sivas and Konya.²⁴⁷

In July, the Greek army began to advance again. It captured Kütahya on July 17 and Eskişehir two days later. Thereafter, the destination of the Greek troops became Ankara.²⁴⁸ They moved by the middle of August from Eskişehir towards Ankara and had their first contact with the Turkish army approximately a week later. This was followed by a fierce struggle between two armies at the edges of the *Sakarya* River. By September 11, the Greeks were no longer in a condition to continue with fighting, therefore, they had to retreat toward Eskişehir, to the positions they had a month ago. The retreat of their forces was the beginning of end for the Greeks since the Allies, particularly Britain, were convinced that the imposition of the terms of Sévres upon Ankara Government through the Greeks was not possible. It was after the Turkish nationalists' victory that France concluded the pre-mentioned agreement with the Ankara Government.

Defeated in Central Anatolia by the Turkish army, schism which had appeared following the change of regime in Athens, deepened among the Greeks and even extended into the army. While the head of the Royalist Government was seeking for material and financial support in Britain,²⁴⁹ the Venizelist camp was occupied in materialization of the establishment of an autonomous Greek zone which would be defended by a volunteer army in the west of Anatolia. In fact, they were

²⁴⁷ATASE 1215/11.

²⁴⁸For the details see Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-234.

²⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 251-252.

organized to this purpose since the downfall of Venizelos in November 1920 with the assumption that the Greek Government would betray the Greek populations of Asia Minor and evacuate it. Their organization was *Amyra*, National Defense Movement, which had been formed in İstanbul by the Venizelists. It included army officers, who had resigned or deserted from the army. It was supported by the Greek bourgeoisie of İstanbul and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Similar organization was established by the middle class Greeks of İzmir in October 1921 in connection with İstanbul.²⁵⁰

The National Defense movement of the Greeks in İstanbul and İzmir worked essentially to prevent the evacuation of the Greek army from Anatolia, which was seriously considered by the Allies and the Greek Government following the defeat of *Sakarya* as well as to create an Ionian state in Anatolia. Focusing on the point that the evacuation of the Greek army would be a disaster for the Christian populations, it contacted with Stergiadis, the Greek High Commissioner in İzmir, and, General Papoulas, the Commander in Chief of the Greek army in Anatolia, to lead the separatist movement.²⁵¹ Although the former seemed to favor principally the proposals of the movement,²⁵² he did not accept. The latter was interested in the matter; however, he resigned in May 1922 and left the movement without any choice.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 237-239.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

²⁵² "A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch," 16 January 1922, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 183-184 Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Kurtuluş Davası Günlerinde İngiliz İstihbarat Servisi'nin Türkiye'deki Eylemleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), pp. 229-230.

²⁵³ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-254, 261-265.

Upon these developments, Greta Britain warned the Greek Government that “such a movement [creating an Ionian State in Anatolia] would be viewed by His Majesty’s Government with the greatest disappointment and displeasure and could only have disastrous results.”²⁵⁴ Meanwhile, except for Lloyd George, most of the British high-ranking staff, preferred a rapprochement with the Ankara Government as the only power that Britain could rely on in the Near East for the maintenance of its influence. For example, Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner in Iraq, as early as September 28, 1921, had proposed his Government to reach an agreement with Mustafa Kemal for the British interest in Iraq as early.²⁵⁵ Similarly, Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to secure British interests in Mesopotamia, suggested the cabinet to consider the establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey.²⁵⁶ In short, what Britain insisted upon by the spring of 1922, before the final Turco-Greek clashes, was a diplomatic settlement.²⁵⁷

Towards the summer of 1922, the Turkish side seemed to be in more favorable position compared to the Greeks with regards to military, morale and internal political stability. The concentration of the Turkish nationalists was on fortifying the western front and preparing for a final attack in the summer.²⁵⁸ On the

²⁵⁴The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens), 31 March 1922, D. B. F. P., vol. XVII, p. 769.

²⁵⁵Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 671-672.

²⁵⁶Memorandum by Mr. W. S. Churchill to the British Cabinet, 26 September 1921, *ibid.*, pp. 665-667.

²⁵⁷Actually, there were some preparations to this effect. At the end of July 1922, Charles Townshend, British Major General, prepared a long memorandum on the conditions which the Turkish nationalists may accept for an honorable peace in respect to the British interests, particularly in India. His immediate suggestion was the evacuation of İzmir and all occupied territories in Anatolia, which would be restored to Turkey. *Ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 381-388.

²⁵⁸Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol., III/2, pp. 1644-1645.

Greek side, things became more complex with the change of the Government in May, which only complicated the matters. The command of the Greek army, thereafter, was held by a devout royalist, who was decided upon handling İzmir and Thrace. On the other hand, lacking material and financial support, the Greek army in Anatolia had weakened considerably. It was also morally desperate and its existence in Anatolia was even questioned by the soldiers.²⁵⁹

Admitting that the Allied Powers refrained from imposing a peace settlement upon the Turkish nationalists, the Greeks decided to provide it with a settlement by unilateral actions by the beginning of July. To this end, King Constantine, Stergiadis, the High Commissioner in İzmir and Hatzianestis, the new commander of the Greek Expeditionary forces in Anatolia and Thrace, met on June 29 in Athens. While the commander proposed the evacuation of Anatolia in order to defend İzmir and its vicinity properly, the High Commissioner objected since a withdrawal would leave thousands of “unredeemed Greeks” to the mercy of the Turkish nationalists as well as encourage the expansion of their resistance. Accordingly, marching into İstanbul in order to provide Allied intervention was proposed but rejected by the King.²⁶⁰ No decision was taken in this meeting; however, by the middle of July the rumors of the invasion of İstanbul by the Greeks spread. Actually, Hatzianestis transferred considerable number of the Greek troops from the Anatolian front to Thrace as soon

²⁵⁹Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-276.

²⁶⁰Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 28 June 1922, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 294, 296; Evans, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-368; Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, vol., III/2, p. 1646.

as he arrived in Anatolia.²⁶¹ On July 28, 1922, the Greek Government informed the Allied Powers that it was going to occupy İstanbul on the ground that there was not other way to secure peace.²⁶² Next day, Britain warned Greece that the Allies would resist to any violation of the neutral zones of Constantinople and the Straits.²⁶³ Facing with serious opposition of the Allied Powers, the Greeks had to back down in a short time.

While the attention focused on İstanbul, Stergiadis reorganized the Greek occupation zone in the framework of the establishment of an autonomous Hellenic state with the collaboration of all inhabitants, Muslim and non-Muslim, as had been decided by the Greek cabinet on July 12.²⁶⁴ The purpose of this reorganization, as explained by the Greek Foreign Minister to the British Minister in Athens, was to provide the Christian population to survive a Greek evacuation.²⁶⁵ On July 31, Stergiadis proclaimed the establishment of the Ionian autonomous state within the territory under Greek occupation at a public meeting. Emphasizing local patriotic sentiments should supersede racial and religious differences, he stated that the position of the Sultan as Caliph would continue and he would retain his influence all over the Islamic world.²⁶⁶ This attempt of Greece disappointed the Allies. They

²⁶¹ Sonyel, *Türk...*, vol. II, p. 259; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 277; Shaw, *ibid.*, pp. 1646-1647.

²⁶²From Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Earl of Balfour, 29 July 1922, D. B. F. P., vol. XVII, pp. 900-901; Smith, *ibid.*, p. 278; Shaw, *ibid.*, p. 1649-1651.

²⁶³From Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour, 31 July 1922, D. B. F. P., *ibid.*, pp. 908-909.

²⁶⁴Umar, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-255.

²⁶⁵From Mr. Lindley to the Earl of Balfour, 14 July 1922, D. B. F. P., vol. XVII, p. 885.

²⁶⁶Umar, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-253; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 281; Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, III/2, pp. 1654-1657.

warned the Greek Government by a *Note verbale* that the establishment of a permanent regime in Asia Minor was dependent on the final peace settlement between the Allies and Turkey.²⁶⁷

By August, the Turkish nationalists were working for preparations to provide a complete withdrawal of the Greeks from Anatolia. As a last minute effort to provide peace, Ali Fethi [Okyar] went to London but the report he sent was one of disappointment. He stated that Lloyd George and Lord Curzon were still demanding the imposition of a disagreeable treaty to the Ankara Government, and unless the Greek army was definitely defeated, Britain would prevent the signature of a suitable peace treaty. He concluded that there was no remedy except resorting to arms.²⁶⁸

Under these circumstances, the Turkish army launched a massive offense beginning on August 26. The Greek army was in no position but to retreat in the following days. On August 31, Mustafa Kemal proclaimed the victory of the Turks. Two days later, the Foreign Minister of Greece appealed to the British Ambassador in Athens to secure an armistice on the basis of immediate evacuation of Asia Minor.²⁶⁹ In the meantime, a panic started among the civilian Greeks. Those who were able, retreated with the Greek troops. As the Turkish nationalist forces advanced steadily, the tension in İzmir increased. Thousands of refugees were

²⁶⁷From Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 15 August 1922, D. B. F. P., vol. XVII, pp. 925-927.

²⁶⁸*Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. I, pp. 241-242; "The Kemalist Offensive: Fethi Bey's Report to Angora," A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, 16 September 1922, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 421-422.

²⁶⁹From Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 2 September 1922, Şimşir, *ibid.*, pp. 374-375.

pouring into the city together with the Greek soldiers with the hope of saving their lives.

The end of the Greek existence in Anatolia and the current situation of the Greeks could probably be explained best by the words of Chrysostom, the Metropolitan Archbishop in İzmir:

“The great moment for a great gesture by you [Venizelos] has come. Hellenism in Asia Minor, the Greek state and the entire Greek Nation are descending now to a Hell from which no power will be able to raise them up and save them...”²⁷⁰

The entrance of the Turkish army into İzmir under the command of Nurettin Pasha on September 9 was a catastrophe for the Greek and Armenian peoples who no longer could flee. The Turkish civilians and troops found the opportunity to revenge as the Greeks had done following the occupation of İzmir in 1919.²⁷¹ Thereafter, the Allied admirals and consuls came together to discuss the relief of Greek refugees in İzmir. They decided that an immediate action should be taken in order to save approximately two-hundred thousand refugees from starvation and massacre. For this, an appeal was to be sent to their Governments to ask the Greek Government to send ships to İzmir to provide the evacuation of these refugees. In addition, the Italian admiral was to call on Mustafa Kemal to obtain his assent for allowing Greek ships to embark the refugees from the İzmir harbor. If he allowed, the Allied Powers

²⁷⁰From Chrysostom to Venizelos, 7 September 1922; cited in Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

²⁷¹*Ibid.*, pp. 306-307. The lynching of Chrysostom, the Metropolitan Archbishop and a devout nationalist, was a case in example. Following his leaving from the meeting with Nurettin Pasha, he was delivered to the Muslim crowd to be judged by the latter. Then, “they seized the Archbishop and manhandled him to the shop of Ismael, a Levantine barber. Here Chrysostom was dressed in a white barber’s coat. The crowd began to strike and revile him. Knives were drawn, and the mob closed in. Before he died, the Archbishop was horribly mutilated.” *Ibid.*, p. 308.

would also provide necessary shipment.²⁷² Mustafa Kemal permitted the transport of the refugees except men between 18 and 36 into Greek ships until September 30.²⁷³ As a result, according to a report of the Foreign Office, five-hundred thousand Greek refugees reached Greece during September and October.²⁷⁴ It was also pointed out that the entire population of Eastern Thrace had migrated to the Greek territory.²⁷⁵

In the meantime, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara convened immediately after the defeat of the Greek army to abolish the decree of the İstanbul Government which had cancelled the Temporary Law on the liquidation of property of the deported and the regulations connected thereunto during the First World War.²⁷⁶ This decree, issued on 8 January 1920, stipulated the restoration of the property in possession of the Treasury and of the Ministry of Foundations to the actual owners. In case of necessity, the Ottoman Government conceded to pay indemnity.²⁷⁷ At this point, Hasan Fehmi [Ataç], the Minister of Finance, warned the deputies and explained the need for immediate nullification of the decree, before the

²⁷²From Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty, received 17 September 1922, Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 427-428.

²⁷³From Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty, 18 September 1922, *ibid.*, p. 437.

²⁷⁴“Memorandum by Mr. Rendel [a second secretary in the Eastern Department of Foreign Office] on the Situation of the Refugees in Greece,” 17 November 1922, D. B. F. P., vol. XVIII, pp. 285-286.

²⁷⁵The Allied Powers accepted the restoration of the Eastern Thrace to Turkey by the Mudanya Convention signed on October 11. The evacuation of the Greeks of this territory gained momentum following this Convention. It was estimated that approximately two-hundred and fifty thousand Greeks left since the signing of the Mudanya Convention. From Bristol to the Department of State, 24 October 1922, Department of State, 867.4016/707a. “Trakya’dan Hicret,” *Vakit*, 13 October 1922; “Trakya Rumlarının Hicreti,” *Vakit*, *İkdam*, 18 October 1922.

²⁷⁶This law was enacted on 26 September 1915. It simply required the liquidation of properties, debts and credits left by the deported persons by courts, the transfer of their immovable properties to the Ministry of Foundations and the Treasury and the sell off movable properties at auction. Gürün., *op. cit.*, p. 209.

²⁷⁷Düstur, II/11, pp. 553-561.

beginning of peace negotiations; otherwise, the Government would have to pay indemnity as long as the decree was in force.²⁷⁸ The deputies took into consideration the warnings of the Minister and accepted his proposal with absolute majority.²⁷⁹

5.5. The Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Anatolia: The Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923

Following the defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia, the Allied representatives asked the Ankara Government to send a representative authorized to negotiate and conclude the final treaty of peace between Turkey, Greece and the Allied Powers.²⁸⁰ The reply of the Ankara Government was debated at the Grand National Assembly. The invitation of the Allied Powers for final peace was accepted.²⁸¹ The peace conference which was supposed to resolve long-lasting nationality conflicts in the Ottoman Empire as well as other issues began on November 20, 1922, in Lausanne, Switzerland.

5.5.1. The Resolution of the Turco-Greek Conflict: The Exchange of Populations between Turkey and Greece

When the Lausanne Peace Conference started to work, most of the Greek

²⁷⁸“8 Kanunîsâni 1336 tarihli karnamenin ref'i hakkında lâyihai kanuniye,” 14 September 1922, *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. III, pp. 768-769.

²⁷⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 780-781; *Düstur*, III/3, p. 127. The Grand National Assembly had already enacted a law regarding abandoned property in places recovered from enemy occupation. This law stipulated the sell off abandoned movable property at auction and the transfer of immovable property and seeded fields to financial office. “Memaliki müstahlâsadan firar veya gaybubet eden ahalinin emvali menkule ve gayrimenkulelerinin idaresi hakkında Kanun,” 20 April 1922, *T. B. M. M. Z. C.*, vol. XIX, pp. 303-321; *Vakit*, 1 May 1922.

²⁸⁰Şimşir, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 525-527.

²⁸¹“Düveli Mütelifeye Verilecek Cevabi Nota,” 4 October 1922, *T. B. M. M. G. C. Z.*, vol. III, pp. 860-872.

population in Anatolia had already left. Remaining Greeks, particularly those of İstanbul, were gradually leaving.²⁸² On the other hand, in November, there were several reports addressed to Bristol, claiming that the remaining Greeks of Samsun were compelled to depart and, in fact, the intention of the Ankara Government was to evacuate entire Christian population from Anatolia.²⁸³ On this occasion, the American and Allied High Commissioners addressed *note verbale* to Hamid Bey, the head of the Turkish Red Crescent, pointing out that forced evacuation of the Greeks and Armenians would create serious difficulty in reaching a solution at the Peace Conference. They asked him to bring this point urgently to the knowledge of the Grand National Assembly and to express their wish to cancel any decisions taken to this end, at least, until the future of Christian populations could be discussed at the Peace Conference. The reply of the Ankara Government, as read by Hamid Bey to Bristol, stated that no order of expulsion of Christians was issued by the Ankara Government but since they had wished to leave for a long time, they were only given a month to depart.²⁸⁴ Although Bristol had come to the conclusion that the Christians were leaving voluntarily,²⁸⁵ a few days later, he wrote that the current information he received developed the conviction that the Nationalist Government wished to get rid of entire Greek and Armenian population of Anatolia and Constantinople. In his own

²⁸²H. Rumbold, the British High Commissioner, reported that three-thousand Greeks were leaving İstanbul daily. D. B. F. P., vol. XVIII, p. 286.

²⁸³From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 4, 7 November 1922, Department of State, 867.4016/720, 726; from J. B. Jackson to the Secretary of State, 28 November 1922, 867.4016/794.

²⁸⁴The Ankara Government allowed the non-Muslims to leave the country without restriction of time in December. B. C. A., 14 December 1922, decision no: 2082.

²⁸⁵From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 15 November 1922, Department of State, 867.4016/732.

words, the Ankara Government would like to have this as a *fait accompli* or at least well underway before the question of minorities arises at the conference.”²⁸⁶

Whether related to above noted developments or not, the resolution of the refugee question between Turkey and Greece came forth in the early days of the Peace Conference. It should be pointed out that the resolution to this question was essentially political. In this respect, it was one of the major instruments in ending the Turco-Greek conflict.

On December 1, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who was assigned to handle the question of relief for the refugees of the Turco-Greek conflict by the League of Nations,²⁸⁷ made a statement as regards the resolution of the refugee problem which was exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece. Basing his proposal on the negotiations he previously carried out in Athens and İstanbul and the fact that the two related sides favored such a solution, Nansen, for the economic benefits of two countries, recommended the fulfillment of this exchange as soon as possible, preferably in three months. He pointed out that the Allied Powers were in accord on the issue, and he was aware of the fact that there were many political questions to be resolved before the conclusion of an agreement on exchange of populations; for instance, whether the exchange would be voluntary or compulsory; the regions that the exchange would include.²⁸⁸ Actually, there was a consensus among the related

²⁸⁶From Bristol to the Secretary of State, 19 November 1922, Department of State, 867.4016/741.

²⁸⁷Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 335.

²⁸⁸*Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, translated by Seha L. Meray, set I, vol. I, part I. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), pp. 118-122.

powers on the exchange of populations but Dr. Nansen's questions, particularly the second, were the points at which disagreement ensued. İsmet Pasha, the head of the Turkish delegation, stated his opinion that such an exchange should cover all the Greek population of Turkey (without pointing out that the exchange was to be voluntary or compulsory) while Venizelos, the representative of Greece, favored a voluntary exchange or either was if the Greeks of İstanbul were excluded. At last, on the formation of a sub-commission to discuss the question of exchange of populations was agreed²⁸⁹

The sub-commission for exchange of populations began to work immediately; however, the debates of the Commission are not available since the meetings prior to 11 January 1923 were not recorded. Nevertheless, we get some hints of the debates through the conventions of the Military and Territorial Commission on the protection of minorities in Turkey. From the continuing debates, it is understood that the Turkish and Greek delegations had agreed on compulsory exchange of their populations. Actually, a compulsory exchange was Dr. Nansen's proposal.²⁹⁰ Nevertheless, Venizelos declared that Greece was ready to abandon the idea of compulsory exchange in favor of voluntary one on the conditions that Turkey would

²⁸⁹*Ibid.* pp. 124-130. İsmet Pasha defined the exclusion of the Greeks of İstanbul from exchange of populations as the most difficult point. Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları*, vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990), p. 169.

²⁹⁰*Lozan Konferansı*, p. 213. H. Rumbold, ex-British High Commissioner and, now, a member of the British delegation, explained that the Allied High Commissioners had met when the Greek population departed in mass for a solution to the refugee problem. Dr. Nansen, who had been in İstanbul at that time, attended this meeting. The proposal for an exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece came from him. The High Commissioners decided to leave the question to the negotiations at the Peace Conference. On this occasion, Dr. Nansen appealed to Hamid Bey, the representative of the

not force the Greek population of Anatolia to emigrate, that Turkey would allow the return of Greeks who had left to Greece, that the Greeks of the Eastern Thrace would be allowed to return gradually as soon as peace was secured. In addition, the Greeks of İstanbul would continue to stay there and those left would be allowed to return. Finally, Greek Government would not take any measure to force the Turks who inhabited in Greece to leave. At the same time, it would accept to give the same guarantees that Turkey would grant to the Greeks in Turkey for their intellectual and moral development.²⁹¹ İsmet Pasha replied that he was astonished by Venizelos' words since they were contrary to he had previously said. He argued that this issue was being considered by the sub-commission according to Venizelos' wishes and warnings. Therefore, the Turkish delegation was in the opinion that there should not be interruption in the work of sub-commission in this regard.²⁹² At last, the Turkish representatives rejected the exchange to be voluntary at the debates of the sub-commission.²⁹³

Another point of disagreement was the exclusion of the Greeks of İstanbul from the exchange of populations. At the convention of December 12, İsmet Pasha told that the Turkish delegation had accepted the demand of Greeks to remain in İstanbul.²⁹⁴ However, the Turkish delegation demanded the removal of the Greek

Ankara Government in İstanbul, who told him that such an exchange could be accepted if it became compulsory. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

²⁹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 226-227.

²⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 229.

²⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 323.

²⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 206. Rauf bey, the Prime Minister of Ankara Government, had already sent a telegram to İsmet Pasha stating that the Greeks of İstanbul could be allowed to remain on the condition that they

Patriarchate for this concession.²⁹⁵ As a result, the sub-commission could not reach to a conclusion and it found no other way except for assigning this issue to the Military and Territorial Commission according M. Montagna, the head of the sub-commission.²⁹⁶

The Commission considered the matter on January 10 following the submission of the report on exchange of populations by Montagna to Lord Curzon.²⁹⁷ This report exhibited the demand of the Allied Powers as well as America for keeping the Greek Patriarchate in İstanbul. However, the Turkish delegation officially demanded its removal on December 4 since it had always involved in politics. They believed that the Patriarchate, if not removed, would continue to involve in politics and this would lead for new disturbances.²⁹⁸ As a resolution, Lord Curzon argued that the restriction or ending of the political rights of the Patriarchate was possible. On this basis, he suggested in the name of the Allied Powers the maintenance of the Patriarchate in İstanbul as a religious institution canceling its political and administrative authority.²⁹⁹ İsmet Pasha argued that he accepted the official words and guarantees of the Allied and Greek representatives as promissory

would not demand privileges. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları*, vol. I, p. 176. The exclusion of the Greeks of İstanbul from exchange of populations was disliked by the nationalist press. For example, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* gave the concerning news under the title of “İstanbul Rumları Defolup Gitmiyorlar mı?” 13 December 1922.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 214. Rıza Nur represented the Turkish claims at the sub-commission for exchange of populations. In his memoirs, he wrote that he forwarded the removal of Patriarchate for bargaining. *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, (4th edition), (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1999), pp. 133-135.

²⁹⁶ *Lozan Konferansı*, p. 323.

²⁹⁷ The report was submitted on January 8. *Ibid.*, pp. 334-342.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 338-342.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 325-326.

note in this regard.³⁰⁰ As a result, the most important obstacle before the agreement on exchange of populations was removed. What remained were the details to be worked by the sub-commission. The convention for exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was signed on January 30, 1923.³⁰¹

5.5.2. The Armenian Question at the Lausanne Peace Conference

The Armenian issue came forth the agenda of the Lausanne Peace Conference on the Allies' request for a legitimized Armenian homeland. During this particular discussion, the spokesman of the Allied Powers was Lord Curzon. Curzon argued that most of the Armenians in Anatolia were deported and accordingly, vanished. The Armenian population of the Eastern Anatolia was almost entirely destroyed while those of Cilicia evacuated by the French withdrawal. At present, most of these Armenians were in Alexandretta, Aleppo, Beirut and Syria. Some of them were dispersed into Caucasia, Russia and Persia. Curzon expressed that he would be glad to hear something from the Turkish delegation on guarantees allowing the Armenians to return in the first place. Next, he stated that it was natural for a people who had an attractive history and so strong national sentiment to reside at their homes. It may be argued that the Armenians had a homeland in Erevan but this was too crowded and poor. Moreover, most of the Armenians hated the existing regime there. In short, Turkey should find a homeland for Armenians in its Asiatic part whether in the

³⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 332.

³⁰¹For the minutes of the sub-commission from 16 January 1923 onwards see *ibid.*, set I, vol. I, part II, pp. 314-386. For the text of the convention see *ibid.*, set II, vol. II, pp. 82-88.

north-eastern provinces or in the south-east of Cilicia.³⁰² In his long declaration, İsmet Pasha simply pointed out that minorities which would remain in Turkey after the exchange of populations with Greece should be contented with the protection granted them by the Turkish laws.³⁰³ At the next convention (13 December), he further clarified his point as regard the Armenian homeland. According to İsmet Pasha, reserving a part of the Turkish territory for Armenians was a new attempt for the partition of Turkey. There was no territory in the eastern provinces or in Cilicia, both overwhelmingly Turkish, to be separated from Turkey.³⁰⁴ Thereafter, the Armenian issue was debated by reciprocal statements of Lord Curzon and İsmet Pasha without any decisive conclusion.³⁰⁵ The sub-commission for the protection of minorities was going to consider the matter.

The consideration of an Armenian national home at the sub-commission led to the emergence of tension among the delegates. When the head of the commission stated his opinion in favor of debating this issue at the meeting of December 15, Rıza Nur, the representative of the Turkish delegation at the commission, rejected immediately. He stated that the Turkish delegation did not accept to discuss such an issue.³⁰⁶ During the convention of the sub-commission on January 6, 1923, the Armenian issue was brought up once again. Montagna explained that the Allied Powers were demanding only a local regime which would allow the Armenians to

³⁰²*Lozan Barış Konferansı*, set I, vol. I, part I, p. 184.

³⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 200; Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları*, vol. I, pp. 210-211.

³⁰⁴*Lozan Konferansı*, p. 212.

³⁰⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 215-216; 221, 224.

³⁰⁶*Lozan Barış Konferansı*, set I, vol. I, part II, p. 156.

maintain their ancient traditions without disturbing the integrity of the Turkish state. The Armenian homeland would only serve to gather in one region Armenians scattered all over the world. He pointed out that the allied Powers were in agreement to keep this issue off from the peace negotiations. What they requested from Turkey was only to investigate the question in cooperation with the League of Nations. H. Rumbold followed Montagna and made similar statement but, in vain. The reaction of Rıza Nur was unexpectedly sharp: After he stated the Allied Powers had the right to act on behalf of the Armenians since they used them as political devices against Turkey and caused the disasters that the Armenians had confronted, he withdrew the Turkish delegation from the convention.³⁰⁷ The debate on an Armenian national home, therefore, came to an end at the sub-commission. This issue was shortly considered by the Military and Territorial Commission upon the submission of the report by the head of the sub-commission for the minorities in Turkey (9 January 1923). İsmet Pasha again rejected the Allies' proposal in this regard and he concluded that the debate of such an issue, for the Turkish delegation, was impossible.³⁰⁸ Thereupon, Lord Curzon contented with expressing his hope that the Turkish delegation would not insist on its attitude in this regard.³⁰⁹

The question of Armenian refugees was debated at the second phase of the Lausanne Peace Conference (April-July 1923). Actually, the Ankara Government had considered the issue earlier. Its intention was an exchange of population between the

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 280; *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, pp. 118-120.

³⁰⁸ *Lozan Konferansı*, set I, vol. I, part I, p. 298.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

Armenians in Turkey and the Turks in Armenia.³¹⁰ However, there was no other party to be dealt with by the Turkish delegation at the Peace Conference.³¹¹ When the question of the Armenian refugees was mentioned together with the Armenian national home, İsmet Pasha wrote to Ankara that the return of the refugees would be the hardest issue in dealing with the Armenian Question.³¹² The reply of the Ankara Government was short: We could not allow the return of the Armenian refugees.³¹³

At the convention of May 19, 1923, H. Rumbold asked İsmet Pasha whether it was true or not that the return of the Armenians and Greeks who had left following the Turkish victory and were not included in the exchange of populations, was prohibited by the Turkish authorities. İsmet Pasha stated that he could reply after consulting the Government.³¹⁴ Thereupon, he asked the Prime Minister for instructions in this regard stating his anxiety about the instigation of the return of the Armenians.³¹⁵ The reply of the Ankara Government stated that the demand for the return of the Armenians and Greeks was a direct intervention to the internal affairs, therefore, it was strictly opposed.³¹⁶ On June 4, this issue was debated again. The demand of the Allied representatives for the return of the Armenians was partly accepted by the Turkish delegation. İsmet Pasha stated those who would not cause

³¹⁰From Hüseyin Rauf to İsmet Pasha, 28 November 1922, Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları*, vol. I, p. 143; 4 December 1922, *ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

³¹¹İsmet Pasha argued that it was not convenient to discuss this question neither with Armenia nor with Russia since it would rise new issues regarding the eastern frontiers as well as the Straits. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³¹²*Ibid.*, p. 220.

³¹³*Ibid.*, p. 232.

³¹⁴*Lozan Konferansı*, set II, vol. I, part I, pp. 120-122.

³¹⁵Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları*, vol. II, p. 324.

³¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 337.

(political) trouble would be allowed to return; however, Turkish Government would not accept the return of those departed *en masse*. It was because the return of, for instance, a hundred-thousand Armenians was directly related to the security of the State. Therefore, the Turkish delegation did not want to investigate the return of the Armenians *en masse*.³¹⁷ At the last days of the Peace Conference, the Allied representatives made a last attempt for the return of the Armenians but İsmet Pasha repeated his previous arguments and concluded that Turkey could not accept any engagement in this respect.³¹⁸ This meant the fall of the Armenian Question for the time being.

5.5.3. The Protection of Minorities and the Kurds

As a result, emigration from Anatolia had become the ultimate resolution for the most of the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians. The situation of the Greeks and Armenians as well as other Christian communities (Assyrians and Chaldeans) who were allowed to remain in Turkey was considered by a sub-commission of Minorities' affairs. This commission debated the terms of minority protection in Turkey and worked to reconcile various point of views in this regard. At this juncture, the commission had to deal with clarifying the meaning of "minority" in case of Turkey, which was probably the most critical point, especially, for the Turkish delegation.

³¹⁷*Lozan Konferansı*, set II, vol. I, part I, pp. 156-161.

³¹⁸Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları*, vol. II, p. 581.

The need of defining who was considered minority in Turkey stemmed originally from Rıza Nur's objection to the second article of the draft treaty presented by the Allied delegations. According to this article, the Turkish Government took the responsibility for securing the life and liberty -including freedom of travel- of all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race and religion.³¹⁹ Rıza Nur objected that there were only religious minorities in Turkey but not racial minorities.³²⁰ Therefore, the Turkish delegation did not accept the protection of racial or linguistic minorities. On this occasion, Montagna claimed that the existence of racial minorities [in Turkey] was a fact. Rıza Nur replied that there were only the Turks and the Kurds in Turkey. The Kurds were in opinion that their destiny was common with that of the Turks. They did not wish to benefit from minority rights.³²¹ At the next convention (18 December), the Turkish delegation presented its draft on minority protection. They proposed the use of "non-Muslim minorities" for the point of disagreement³²² and requested the application of the second article only to minorities not to all inhabitants of Turkey. Rıza Nur repeated that there were no Muslim minorities in Turkey, that the Kurds were cordially

³¹⁹"Müttefik Temsilci Heyetlerince Sunulan Azınlıkların Korunmasına İlişkin Tasarı," 15 December 1922, *Lozan Konferansı*, set I, vol. I, part II, p. 161.

³²⁰In his memoirs, Rıza Nur gives the clues for his objection. The original text read: "Frenkler bizde ekalliyet diye üç nevi biliyorlar: **Irkça ekalliyet, dilce ekalliyet, dince ekalliyet.** Bu bizim için gayet vahim bir şey, büyük bir tehlike. Aleyhimize olunca şu adamlar ne derin ve ne iyi düşünüyorlar... Irk tabiri ile Çerkez, Abaza, Boşnak, Kürt, ilh... yi Rum ve Ermeni'nin yanına koyacaklar. Dil tabiri ile Müslüman olup başka dil konuşanları da ekalliyet yapacaklar. **Yani bizi hallaç pamuğu gibi dağıtıp atacaklar.** Bu taksimi işittiğim vakit tüylerim ürperdi. Kollarım sanki birer kazık oldu. Bilekleri sıvadım. Bütün kuvvetimi bu tabirleri kaldırmaya verdim. **Pek uğraştım. Pek müşkilât ile fakat kaldırdım.** *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

³²¹*Lozan Konferansı*, pp. 152-153.

³²²*Ibid.*, p. 165.

dependent on the Turks and that they did not need special protection.³²³ In the following conventions, Rumbold, the British delegate, stated that if the Turkish delegation accepted the term “all inhabitants of Turkey” instead of “minorities” in the second article, he would accept the term of “non-Muslim” minorities in other articles.³²⁴ The parties agreed at this point and minority protection was restricted to non-Muslims.³²⁵ The negotiations on the minority protection in Turkey was completed on 11 January 1923 when the sub-commission presented its final work.³²⁶



³²³*Ibid.*, p. 171-174. Actually, Rıza Nur's claims regarding the unity of the Turks and the Kurds was similar to those of Bekir Sami who had represented the Ankara Government at the London Conference in February-March 1921. When Lord Curzon asked Bekir Sami his view's on the articles of the Treaty of Sévres regarding the Kurds, he replied that “the populations of Kurdistan possessed complete representation in the Grand National Assembly, since each sanjak, which had been taken as the electoral unit, elected five Deputies. The Kurds were thus fully represented at Angora, and, since Bekir Sami himself held a mandate from the Angora Assembly, he could himself claim legitimately to represent the Kurds as well as the Turks. Moreover, the Kurds had always proclaimed that they constituted an indivisible whole with Turkey: the two races were united by a common feeling, a common culture and a common religion... All they [the Kurds] desired to live together with the Turks like brothers...,” D. B. F. P., vol. XV, pp. 213-214.

³²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 205.

³²⁵Lord Curzon claimed that this was one of the most important concessions that the commission gave to Turkey. *Ibid.*, set I, vol. I, part I, pp. 301-302.

³²⁶“Azınlıklar Alt-Komisyonusunca Uygun Bulunan Azınlıkların Korunmasına İlişkin Maddeler,” 11 January 1923, *ibid.*, set I, vol. I, part II, pp. 292-294. The agreement was signed on January 30 with slight differences. *Ibid.*, set II, vol. II, pp. 10-13.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic was officially completed with the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on July 24, 1923. This treaty demonstrated the “victory” of the Muslim-Turkish element in ethnic conflicts as it provided the recognition of the territorial integrity of the Muslim populated areas (excluding Arab lands and Musul), remaining of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, which was the basic purpose of the Turkish nationalist movement. As a matter of fact, the Muslims-Turks, in the beginning of these struggles, were in a more advantageous position since the Ottoman state apparatus, the most organized power in Anatolia, was under their control. Bureaucracy and military, the standard bearer of Turkish nationalism, were manned by them.

More important still was that the Lausanne Peace Treaty formally concluded demographic restructuring of Anatolia in favor of Muslim-Turkish element. It may be remembered that “demographic engineering” was the predominant method in Anatolia, during 1914-1922, pursued by all actors of ethnic-conflicts to eliminate “other”s’ claims, whether political or economic. This method had been effectively applied by the Unionists during the First World War, especially, in the case of

Armenian deportation. In the following period, “demographic struggle for power” continued among ethno-religious groups. While the Greeks and Armenians attempted to reverse this Unionist policy in their favor, the Muslims-Turks resisted as they, in general, prevented the repatriation of Christian refugees, particularly, in non-occupied parts of Anatolia. In consequence, the method of demographic engineering was also approved as the most favorable solution for “long peace” to ethnic conflicts in Anatolia during the Lausanne peace negotiations. This was best demonstrated in the resolution of Turco-Greek conflict in the compulsory exchange of populations. As this exchange was fulfilled, almost all Christians of Anatolia were discarded.

Observing such resolution from the points of view of the founders of the Turkish Republic, it can be argued that a Muslim homogeneity in Anatolia was preferable for political as well as economic reasons. Nevertheless, the resolution of ethnic issues through demographic engineering during the transition from empire into nation-state is significant not only for explaining factual events prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, but also for understanding the formation of Turkish nationalism. As a matter of fact, the applications of this period, whether social, political or economic, were the initial tests of Turkish nationalism. In this respect, they played a substantial role in the transformation of a Muslim state into a Turkish one as well as of Muslim identification, into Turkish.

The ‘success’ of this transformation undoubtedly depended on suppressing “other” nationalisms, bearing any political or territorial claim in Anatolia. Although the main rivals in this respect were the Christian groups, nationalism of the Kurds

was among those to be suppressed. However, the methods employed were different. The Christians were excluded from the projected Turkish nation-state through forced migration while the Kurds were regarded as an integral part through 'practical' Muslim unity. It should be pointed out that the promotion of Muslim unity was a characteristic of the transition period and was replaced by Turkish unity following the establishment of the Turkish nation-state.

In this connection, it can be argued that initial tests of the Turkish nationalism (between 1914-1922) in following a demographic engineering policy and suppressing "other" nationalisms to base the State on Turkish foundation became the guides of the founders of the Turkish Republic in building Turkish national identity. This favored culturally and linguistically a homogenous Turkish society in a central administrative system. In order to achieve this, the founders of the Republic resorted to the methods of the transition period in the case of the Kurds in 1920-1930's.

In conclusion, this study tried to highlight the role of ethnic conflict during the transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic. Therefore, it focused on internal conflicts among Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Kurds between the end of 1918 and the middle of 1923. Although each case had distinct characteristics, the common denominator of these conflicts was being fought for national self-determination and relevantly, for nation-state formation. National was defined in ethno-religious lines throughout these conflicts.

In this connection, this study emphasized the role of the Allied Powers to be simply a part; contrary to the dominant approach which asserts that this transition

was completed after a war given by the Turks against the Allied Powers. As it was demonstrated throughout this study, various nationalist claims clashed over Anatolia in which the Turkish suppressed the rest. Therefore, the suppression of “other” nationalist claims opened the way for the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In this regard, the Turkish nation-state had one of its origins in ethnic conflict. It should be pointed out that the Turco-Armenian and Turco-Greek conflicts were more fundamental and more concrete than that of the Turco-Kurdish conflict. Nevertheless, Turco-Kurdish conflict took an open character, as the Muslim unity diminished by the foundation of the Turkish nation-state on nationalist and secular basis.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Archive Material

1. Unpublished

a. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi (ATASE), *Türk İstiklal Harbi*.

File/Dossier/Fihrist no:

1034/70-A/1, 2, 4.

1215/307 A-3/1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 22.

1313/12-a-5/3.

1879/3-9/3, 4, 5.

2460/18-7/9, 28, 33, 73, 78, 106.

2461/23/1, 15, 27.

2465/4-26/1, 2, 3, 5, 8.

2468/14-A/1, 2, 3, 9, 30, 31, 32, 35, 40, 59, 60, 64.

2476/4/2, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 37,

38.

Dossier (Kutu)/Folder (Gömlek)/Fihrist no:

1/17/17.

2/2/80.

4/101.

5/76.

6/85/28.

8/82.

15/5.

15/23.

19/79.

270/196.

b. General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931.

Rolls: 407-409, 536-537.

c. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları.

Decision no:

32, 61, 68, 77, 101, 213, 215, 228, 264, 407, 453, 494, 822,

554, 562, 624, 632, 655, 657, 733, 744, 765, 825, 924, 941,

979, 993, 1003, 1012, 1014, 1028, 1177, 1203, 1214, 1229,

1608, 1648, 1745, 1809, 1824, 1835, 2082, 2180, 3974, 15293.

d. Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü (TİTE) Arşivi.

Dossier/Folder/Fihrist no:

14/7/7.

15/21/21.

17/12/12.

17/57/57.

18/93/93.

18/94/94.

19/10/10.

19/18/18.

20/21/21.

23/39/39.

25/112/112.

e. U. S. Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1910-1929.

Record Group 59, Rolls: 4-12 (Political Affairs), 21 (Political Affairs), 46-47 (Social Matters [Race Problems]).

2. Published

Bidwell, Robin (ed.), *British Documents on Foreign Affairs Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, Volume I (The End of the War, 1918-1920), Volume 2 (The Allies Take Control, 1920-1921), Volume 3 (The Turkish Revival, 1921-1923), University Publications of America.

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, ed. by Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, et.al First Series vols. I, II, IV, VII, VIII, XIII, XV, XVII, XVIII, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947-1972.

Erhan, Çağrı (ed.), *American Documents on Greek Occupation of Anatolia*, Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 1999.

Great Britain Foreign Office Historical Section, *Anatolia*, London: Stationary Office, 1920.

Harbord, James G., *Conditions in the Near East Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920.

Lozan Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler, 3rd edition, translated by Seha L. Meray, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001.

Medlicott, W. N., Douglas Dakin, Lambert M. E. (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, First Series Volume XIII, XVII, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1963, 1970.

Moseley, George Van Horn, *Mandatory Over Armenia, Report Made to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, United States Army, Chief of the American Military Mission, on the Problem of Mandatory Over Armenia*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919: The Paris Peace Conference, several volumes, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942-1947.

Şimşir, Bilâl, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk* 4 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984-1992.

Şimşir, Bilâl N., *Lozan Telgrafları*, 2 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990, 1994.

T.C. Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı (ed.), *Atatürk Özel Arşivinden Seçmeler*, 4 volumes, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1981-1996.

Treaty Series No. 11 (1920) Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Sévres, August 10, 1920, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920.

B. Articles

Ahmad, Feroz, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, vol. 1, pp. 401-434, London: Holmes&Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982.

Ahmad, Feroz, "Vanguard of A Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks 1908-1918," in *Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1922)*, pp. 329-350, ed. by Osman Okyar and Halil İnalçık, Ankara: Meteksan Matbaası, 1980.

Akçam, Taner, "Ulusal Kimliğimizin Oluşumu Üzerine Bazı Tezler," *Birikim*, 33 (January 1992), pp., 20-23.

Akçam, Taner, "Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılında Sevr ve Lozan'ın Başka Tarihi," *Birikim*, 115 (November 1998), pp. 91-106.

Akgün, Seçil, "Ana Hatlarıyla General Moseley Raporu: Türkiye'de Amerikan Mandası," *Bellekten*, vol. XLVIII, no: 189-190 (January-April 1984), pp. 95-108.

Ali, Othman, "The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 33, No. 3, July 1997, pp. 521-534.

Arıkan, Zeki, "1919 Seçimleri ve İzmir," *Ata Dergisi*, no: VII (1997), pp. 105-127.

Aspaturian, Vernon V., "Armenia in the World Arena, 1914-1921," *Armenian Review*, vol. 46, no: 1-4/181-184 (Spring-Winter 1993), pp. 119-142.

Atnur, İbrahim Ethem, "Osmanlı Hükümetleri ve Tehcir Edilen Rum ve Ermenilerin İşkânı Meselesi," *Atatürk Yolu*, vol. IV, no. 14 (November 1994), pp. 121-139.

Atamer, Hamdi, "Millî Mücadele Başlangıcında Hürriyet ve İtilâf Partisi," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no. 60 (September 1972).

Attrep, Abe, "A State of Wretchedness and Impotence: A British View of Istanbul and Turkey, 1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 9 (1978), pp. 1-9.

Aybars, Ergün, "Millî Mücadele'de İngiliz Basını," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. IV, no. 12 (July 1988), pp. 603-636.

Berber, Engin, "Kurtuluştan Sonra İzmir'de Yunan İşgal Dönemine Tepkiler," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. III, no. 8 (March 1987), pp. 443-460.

Berberian, Hourii, "The Delegation of Integral Armenia: From Greater Armenia to Lesser Armenia," *Armenian Review*, vol. 44, no. 3-175 (Autumn 1991), pp. 39-64.

Bilgen, Deniz, "Wilson İlkelerine Türk Kamuoyunun Tepkisi ve Bunun Amerika Basınına Yansıması," *Atatürk Yolu*, vol. 5, no. 18 (November 1996), pp. 123-130.

Blacher, Michael, "From the Tip of the Tongue to the Back of the Mind: The United States and the Armenian Question, 1917-20," *Armenian Review*, vol. 44, no. 3-175 (Autumn 1991), pp. 1-21.

Bora, Tanıl, "İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği," *Toplum ve Bilim*, 71 (Winter 1996), pp. 168-194.

Bryson, Thomas A., "John Sharp Williams: An Advocate for the Armenian Mandate, 1919-1920," *Armenian Review*, No: 26 (Autumn 1973), pp. 23-42.

Bryson, Thomas A., "Mark Lambert Bristol, U. S. Navy, Admiral-Diplomat: His Influence on the Armenian Mandate Question," *Armenian Review*, vol. 21, no: 4-84 (Winter 1968), pp. 3-22.

Bryson, Thomas A., "Woodrow Wilson and the Armenian Mandate: A Reassessment," *The Armenian Review*, vol. 21, no. 3-83 (Autumn 1968), pp. 10-29.

Can, Bilmez B., "Amerikan Basınında Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı (1918-1923)," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 92 (August 2001), pp. 18-25.

Cardashian, Vahan, "A 1921 Memorandum to the President on Armenia," *the Armenian Review*, vol. 26, no. 2-102 (Summer 1973), pp. 46-63.

Clogg, Richard, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, vol. 1, pp. 185-207, London: Holmes&Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982.

Criss, Nur Bilge, "Atatürk's Movement at its Start: The Views of the Outsiders (1919-1921)," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. VI, no. 17 (March 1990), pp. 345-376.

Cruickshank, A. A., "The Young Turk Challenge in Postwar Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, 22 (1968), pp. 17-28.

Cutsem, W. E. Van, "Anatolia 1920," *Army Quarterly&Defence Journal*, No: 92 (July 1966), pp. 175-185.

Çelebi, Mevlüt, "İzmir'in İşgalinden Önce Şehzade Abdürrahim Başkanlığında Anadolu'ya Gönderilen Nasihat Heyeti (Anadolu Heyet-i Nasîhası): 16 Nisan-18 Mayıs 1919," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. VI, no. 18 (July 1990), pp. 561-589.

Dadrian, Vahakn N., "The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23 (1991), pp. 549-576.

Demirel, Yücel, "Mübadele Dosyası," *Tarih ve Toplum*, 123-126 (March-June 1994), pp. 54-58, 54-57, 49-52, 56-59.

Duguid, Stephen, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 1973), pp. 139-155.

Duran, Tülay (ed.), "Millî Mücadelede İstanbul Hükümetinin İlk Tahkik Heyeti, Kongreler ve Erzurum Mebusu Ziya Bey'in Çalışmaları," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no. 57 (June 1972), pp. 7-16.

Dündar, Fuat, "İttihat ve Terakî'nin Etnisite Araştırmaları," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 91 (July 2001), pp. 43-50.

Dyer, Gwynne, "Turkish *Falsifiers* and Armenian *Deceivers*: Historiography and the Armenian Massacres," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 12, (January 1976), pp. 99-107.

Dyer, Gwynne, "The Turkish Armistice of 1918: 1- The Turkish Decision for a Separate Peace, Autumn 1918," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8 (1972), pp. 143-178; "The Turkish Armistice of 1918: 2- A Last Opportunity: The Armistice Negotiations of Moudros," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8 (1972), pp. 313-348.

Dyer, Gwynne, "The Origins of the 'Nationalist' Group of Officers in Turkey 1908-18," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 8, no. 4 (October 1973), pp. 121-164.

Edmonds, C. J., "Kurdish Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 6, no: 1 (1976), pp. 87-107.

Finney, Patrick B., "'An Evil for All Concerned': Great Britain and Minority Protection after 1919," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 30, no. 3 (July 1995), pp. 533-551.

Gülalp, Haldun, "Capitalism and the Modern Nation-State: Rethinking the Creation of the Turkish Republic," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, vol. 7, no: 2 (June 1994), pp. 155-176.

Gürkan, Celil, "The Army as a Significant Factor in the Period of 1919 to 1923, and the Interaction between Military and Political Developments," *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*, pp. 181-207. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988.

Harbord, James G., "Investigating Turkey and Trans-Caucasia I," *World's Work*, vol. XL, no: 1 (May 1920), pp. 35-47.

Harbord, James G., "The New Nations of Trans-Caucasia," *World's Work*, vol. XL, no: 3 (July 1920), pp. 271-280.

Harbord, James G., "Mustapha Kemal Pasha and His Party," *World's Work*, vol. XL, no: 2 (June 1920), pp. 176-193.

Hofmann, Tessa and Koutcharian, Gerayer, "The History of Armenian-Kurdish Relations in the Ottoman Empire," *Armenian Review*, vol. 39, no. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-45.

Hovannisian, Richard G., "The Allies and Armenia, 1915-1918," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 3, (January 1968), pp. 145-168.

Hovannisian, Richard G., "Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4 (1973), pp. 129-147.

Jensen, Peter Kincaid, "The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10 (1979), pp. 553-565.

Karaca, İclâl, "1919 Yılı Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Osmanlılık Fikri Üzerine Değişik Görüşler," *Atatürk Yolu*, vol. 2, no. 7 (May 1991), pp. 539-550.

Karpat, Kemal H., "The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975), pp. 276-299.

Kazgan, Gülten, "Millî Türk devletinin Kuruluşu ve Göçler," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, no: 1-4, (October 1970-September 1971), pp. 311-331.

Kent, Marian, "British Policy, International Diplomacy and the Turkish Revolution," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol. 3, no: 2 (Winter 1985-1986), pp. 33-51.

Kırzioğlu, M. Fahrettin, "Yayınlanmamış Belgelerle Erzurum Kongresinin İlk Günü," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no. 35 (August 1970), pp. 4-33.

Kısıklı, Emine, "Millî Mücadele Başlangıcında, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Millî Hareketi, İttihat ve Terakki Faaliyetlerinden Uzak Tutma Teşebbüsleri," *Atatürk Yolu*, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 1990), pp. 109-127.

Kieser, Hans-Lukas, "Les Kurdes Alévis Face au Nationalisme Turc Kémaliste," *Les Annales de L'Autre Islam*, no. 5 (1998), pp. 1-25.

Kitromilides, Paschalis M., "Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 26, no: 1 (1990), pp. 3-17.

Köstüklü, Nuri, "Millî Mücadele'de Denizli, Isparta, Burdur ve Çevresindeki Azınlıkların Tutum ve Davranışları," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. V, no. 15 (July 1989), pp. 665-690.

Kürşat, Cengiz, "T.B.M. Meclisinde Lozan Murahhas Hey'etine Verilen Talimatlar," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no. 34 (July 1970), pp. 12-32.

Levene, Mark, "Creating a Modern 'Zone of Genocide': The Impact of Nation-and State-Formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878-1923," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 12, no. 3 (Winter 1998), pp. 393-433.

Lust-Okar, Ellen Marie, "Failure of Collaboration: Armenian Refugees in Syria," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 32, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 53-68.

Lybyer, Albert Howe, "Turkey under the Armistice," *The Journal of International Relations*, vol. 12, no: 4 (April 1922), pp. 447-473.

Malkasian, Mark, "The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause in the United States, 1918-1927," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 16 (1984), pp. 349-365.

Mango, Andrew, "Atatürk and the Kurds," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 35, no: 4 (October 1999), pp. 3-25.

Marashlian, Levon, "The London and San Remo Conferences and the Armenian Settlement: the Belated Decisions February-April, 1920 I-II," *The Armenian Review*, vol. 30, no. 3-119 (Autumn 1977), pp. 227-255; no. 4-120 (Winter 1977-78), pp. 398-414.

Marashlian, Levon, "Population Statistics on Ottoman Armenians in the Context of Turkish Historiography," *The Armenian Review*, vol. 40, no. 4-160 (Winter 1987), pp. 1-59.

McCarthy, Justin, "Muslim Refugees in Turkey: The Balkan wars, World War I and The Turkish War of Independence," in *Humanist and Scholar Essays in Honor of Andreas Tietze*, ed. by. Heath W. Lowry and Donald Quataert, Washington: The Institute of Turkish Studies, 1993.

McCarthy, Justin, "Foundations of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic Change," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. XIX, no: 2 (1983), pp. 139-151.

"Mustafa Kemal'in Samsun'dan Gönderdiği İki Mühim Rapor," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. 3, no. 14 (November 1968), pp. 5-9.

Olson, Robert, "The Koçgiri Kurdish Rebellion in 1921 and the Draft Law For a Proposed Autonomy of Kurdistan," *Oriente Moderno*, Nuova Serie, Anno VIII (LXIX), no. 1-6 (1989), pp. 41-56.

Olson, Robert, "A Second Time Around: British Policy Toward the Kurds (1921-1922)," *Die Welt Des Islams*, XXVII (1987), pp. 91-102.

Orhonlu, Cengiz, "Yunan İşgalinin Meydana Getirdiği Göç ve Yunanlıların Yaptıkları *Tehcir*'in Sonuçları Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler," *Bellekten*, vol. XXXVII, no: 148 (October 1973), pp. 485-495.

Othman, Siyamend, "Kurdish Nationalism: Instigators and Historical Influences," *The Armenian Review*, vol. 42, no. 1-165 (Spring 1989), pp. 39-59.

Ökte, Ertuğrul Zekâi, "Yunanistanın İstanbulda Kurduğu Gizli İhtilâl Cemiyeti 'Kordos,'" *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no. 40 (January 1971), pp. 20-23.

Özgül, Vatan, "İttihat Terakki ve Balaban Aşireti," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 96 (December 2001), pp. 38-42.

Öztoprak, İzzet, "Adana ve Çevresinde Müdafaa-i Hukuk Çalışmaları," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. VIII, no. 22 (November 1991), pp. 117-139.

Pallis, A. A., "The Exchange of Populations in the Balkans," *The Nineteenth Century and After*, volume XLVII, no. 576 (February 1925), pp. 376-383.

Petropulos, John A., "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations: Greek-Turkish Peacemaking, 1922-1930," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, pp. 135-160, Basic Blackwell, 1976.

Price, Clair, "Present Turkish Rule in Cilicia," *Current History*, No: 16 (May 1922), pp. 216-220.

Reid, James, "The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman and Turkish Historiography," *Armenian Review*, vol. 37, no: 1-145 (Spring 1984), pp. 22-40.

Rustow, Dankwart A., "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics*, vol. XI, no: 4 (July 1959), pp. 513-552.

Saba, Paul, "The Armenian National Question," in *Power and Stability in the Middle East*, ed. by Berch Berberoglu, pp. 173-201, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989.

Sarımay, Yusuf et.al., *Pontus Meselesi ve Yunanistan'ın Politikası (Makaleler)*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999.

Saydam, Abdullah, "Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Trabzon'a Yönelik Ermeni-Rum Tehdidi," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. VI, no. 17 (March 1990), pp. 421-434.

Sertoğlu, Mithat, "Tarihimizde İlk Millî Kongre," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. IV, no. 21, pp. 3-8.

Sertoğlu, Mithat, "Saltanat Şûrası ve Millî Şûra Hazırlıkları I-II," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. IV, no. 22-23, pp. 28-40, 49-58.

Shaw, Stanford J., "Ottoman population Movements During the Last Years of the Empire, 1885-1914: Some preliminary Remarks," *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, volume I (1980), pp. 191-205.

Shaw, Stanford J., "Resettlement of Refugees in Anatolia, 1918-1923," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, volume 22, Number 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 58-90.

Sonyel, Salahi R., "The Secret Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1919 in the Light of British Foreign Office Documents," *Bellekten*, vol. XXXIV, July 1970, No. 135, 451-462.

Şakiroğlu, Mahmut H., "Lozan Konferansı Sırasında Kabul Edilen Ahali Değişimine Ait Tarihi Notlar," in *Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985, pp. 227-238.

Şaşmaz, Musa, "Distortion of Population Data for National Causes by the Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries," *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XVII (1997), pp. 137-147.

Tekeli, İlhan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu," *Toplum ve Bilim*, 50 (Summer 1990), pp. 49-71.

Tekeli, İlhan and İlkin, Selim, "Kurtuluş Savaşında Talat Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal'in Mektuplaşmaları," *Bellekten*, vol. XLIV, no. 174 (April 1980), pp. 301-345.

Tesal, Ö. Dürrü, "Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin Geçmişinden Bir Örnek: Azınlıkların Mübadelesi," *Tarih ve Toplum*, 53 (May 1988), pp. 302-308.

“The ‘Armenian Papers’ of the Conferences of San Remo I-II-III,” *The Armenian Review*, vol. 32, no. 3-127 (September 1979), pp. 321-335; no. 4-128 (December 1979), pp. 419-437; vol. 33, no. 1-129 (March 1980), pp. 75-88.

“The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference A Memorandum Presented Officially by the Representatives of Armenia to the Peace Conference at Versailles on February 26, 1919,” *the Armenian Review*, vol. 37, no. 3-107 (Autumn 1974), pp. 227-259.

“The Brémond Mission: Cilicia in 1919-1920 I-II,” *The Armenian Review*, vol. 29, no. 4-116 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 339-372; vol. 30, no. 1-117 (Spring 1977), pp. 34-72.

“The 22 Days of Marash: Papers on the Defense of the City Against Turkish Forces Jan.-Feb., 1920 I-II-III,” *The Armenian Review*, vol. 30, no. 4-120 (Winter 1977-78), pp. 383-397; vol. 31, no. 1-121 (Spring 1978), pp. 47-69; vol. 31, no.4-124 (April 1979), pp. 402-417.

“The Treaty of Sevres: An Analysis,” *The Armenian Review*, vol. 23, no. 3-91 (Autumn, 1970), pp. 8-26.

Unat, Faik Reşit, “Amasya Protokolleri,” *Tarih Vesikaları*, Yeni seri, vol. I, no: 3(18) (March 1964), pp. 359-365.

Ülkütaşır, Türkân, “Mondros Mütarekesinin Sarsıntıları ve Karşı Direnişler,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. IV, no. 23, pp. 37-48.

Ward, Alan J., “World War I and the Tragedy of Armenian Self-Determination,” *The Armenian Review*, vol. 31, no. 4-124 (April 1979), pp. 339-361.

Yeğen, Mesut, “The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity,” in *Turkey Identity, Democracy, Politics*, Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), London: Frank Cass, 1996.

Yerasimos, Stefanos, “Pontus Meselesi,” in *Milliyetler ve Sınırlar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995.

Zamir, Meir, “Population Statistics of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and 1919,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1 (January 1991), pp. 85-106.

Zimova, Nada, *The Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations After World War I and Its Impact on Turkey*, Prague: L’Institut de L’Histoire Checoslavaque et mondiale, 1989.

Zürcher, Erik Jan, "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 137 (1999), pp. 81-92.

C. Books

Ahmad, Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, London: Routledge, 1993.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.

Ahmad, Kemal Madhar, *Kurdistan During the First World War*, translated by Ali Maher İbrahim, London: Saqi Bools, 1994.

Akbıyık, Yaşar, *Millî Mücadelede Güney Cephesi Maraş*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999.

Akçam, Taner, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995.

Akçam, Taner, *İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999.

Akçura, Yusuf, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Akçura, Yusuf, *Türkçülüğün Tarihi*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998.

Akgün, Seçil, *General Harbord'un Anadolu Gezisi ve (Ermeni Meselesi'ne Dair) Raporu Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlangıcında*, İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1981.

Akpınar, Alişan, *Osmanlı Devletinde Aşiret Mektebi*, İstanbul: Göçebe Yayınları, 1997.

Akşin, Sina, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987.

Akşin, Sina, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*, 2 volumes, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992.

Akyüz, Yahya, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Fransız Kamuoyu 1919-1922*, Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1975.

Alexandris, Alexis, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992.

Allen, W. E. D, Muratoff, Paul, *Caucasian Battlefields A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 18128-1921*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

Arslan, Abdurrahman, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a Mustafa Kemal ve Kürtler (1919-1923)*, İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1991.

Ataöv, Türkkaya (ed.), *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, Ankara, the Turkish Historical Society, 2001.

Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1945.

Avcıoğlu, Doğan, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi 1383den 1995e*, vol. 3, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1996.

Aybars, Ergun, *İstiklal Mahkemeleri*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1975.

Ayni, Mehmed Ali, *Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: Marifet Basımevi, 1943.

Aytar, Osman, *Hamidiye Alaylarından Köy Koruculuğuna*, İstanbul: Medya Güneşi Yayınları, 1992.

Balcıoğlu, Mustafa, *Belgelerle Milli Mücadele Sırasında Anadolu'da Ayaklanmalar ve Merkez Ordusu*, Ankara: Yükseköğretim Kurulu Matbaası, 1991.

Barkey, Karen, Hagen Mark Von (eds.), *After Empire Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.

Baykal, Bekir Sıtkı, *Heyet-i Temsiliye Kararları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989.

Baykal, Bekir Sıtkı (ed.), *Erzurum Kongresi ile İlgili Belgeler*, Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1969.

Bayrak, Mehmet, *Kürtler ve Ulusal-Demokratik Mücadeleleri*, Ankara: Öz-Ge Yayınları, 1993.

Bedirhan, Prens Süreyya, *Kürt Davası ve Hoybun*, trans. by Dîlara Zîrek, İstanbul: Med Yayınları, 1994.

Bennett, G. H., *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-1924*, London: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

- Berber, Engin, *Sancılı Yıllar: İzmir 1918-1922*, Ankara: Ayraç Yayınevi, 1997.
- Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.
- Bisbee, Eleanor, *The New Turks Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956.
- Black Book The Tragedy of Pontus 1914-1922*, Athens: 1922.
- Bookman, Milica Zarkovic, *The Demographic Struggle For Power The Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World*, London: Frank Cass, 1997.
- Bozdemir, Mevlüt, *Türk Ordusunun Tarihsel Kaynakları*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982.
- Braude, Benjamin, Lewis, Bernard (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, New York: Holmes&Meier Publishers. Inc., 1982.
- Bruinessen, Martin van, *Agha, Shaikh and State The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, London: Zed Books Ltd, 1992.
- Bruinessen, Martin van, *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995.
- Bruinessen, Martin van, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevîlik Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999.
- Celil, Celilê, *1880 Şeyh Ubeydullah Nehri Kürt Ayaklanması*, translated by M. Aras, İstanbul: Pêrî Yayınları, 1998.
- Cemiyet-i Akvam ve Türkiye'de Ermeni ve Rumlar*, İstanbul: Matba'a-i Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1336 (1920).
- Chrysanthos, S. E., *La Question du Pont-Euxin Memoire soumis à la Conférence de la Paix*, 2 Mai 1919.
- Claude, Inis L., *National Minorities An International Problem*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1955.
- Criss, Nur Bilge, *İşgal Altında İstanbul 1918-1923*, 2nd edition, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994.

Cumming, Henry H., *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East The Decline of French Influence*, London: Oxford University Press, 1938.

Çapa, Mesut, *Pontus Meselesi*, Trabzon: Serander Yayınları, 2001.

Çavdar, Tevfik, *Milli Mücadele Başlarken Sayılarla "...Vaziyet ve Manzara-i Umumiye"*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1971.

Çelik, Kemal, *Millî Mücadele'de Adana ve Havalisi (1918-1922)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999.

Çoker, Fahri, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi Millî Mücadele ve T.B.M.M. Birinci Dönem 1919-1923*, 3 volumes, Ankara: TBMM Vakfı Yayınları, 1994-1995.

Çoşar, Ömer Sami, *Osman Aga "Topal Osman"*, İstanbul: Harman Yayınları, 1971.

Dadrian, Vahakn N., *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995.

Demirel, Ahmet, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet İkinci Grup*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994.

Duru, Orhan, *Amerikan Gizli Belgeleriyle Türkiye'nin Kurtuluş Yılları*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1978.

Dündar, Fuat, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001.

Economides, D., *The Pontus and the Right Claims of Its Greek Population*. Constantinople: 1920.

Erdeha, Kamil, *Milli Mücadelede Vilayetler ve Valiler*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1975.

Ergil, Doğu, *Milli Mücadelenin Sosyal Tarihi*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1981.

Erhan, Çağrı, *Greek Occupation of İzmir and Adjoining Territories*, Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 1999.

Esengin, Kenan, *Kürtçülük Sorunu*, İstanbul: Su Yayınları, 1976.

Esengin, Kenan, *Milli Mücadelede Hıyanet Yarışı*, Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1969.

Evans, Laurance, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.

Georgeon, François, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları, 1986.

Gezik, Erdal, *Dinsel, Etnik ve Politik Sorunlar Bağlamında Alevi Kürtler*, Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2000.

Gidney, James B., *A Mandate for Armenia*, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1967.

Goloğlu, Mahmut, *Erzurum Kongresi, Sivas Kongresi, Üçüncü Meşrutiyet (1920), Cumhuriyete Doğru (1921-1922), Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (1923)*, Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968-1971.

Gökalp, Ziya, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, Ankara: Serdengeçti Neşriyatı, 1960.

Gökalp, Ziya, *Principles of Turkism*, trans. by Robert Devereux, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968.

Gökay, Bülent, *A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918-1923*, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997.

Gökbilgin, Tayyib, *Milli Mücadele Başlarken*, 2 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959, 1965.

Gökdemir, Ahmet Ender, *Cenûb-i Garbî Kafkas Hükûmeti*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1998.

Göldaş, İsmail. *Lozan 'Biz Türkler ve Kürtler'*, İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2000.

Göldaş, İsmail, *Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti*, İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1991.

Görgülü, İsmet, *On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1993.

Güler, Ali, *Osmanlı Devletinde Azınlıklar*, İstanbul: Turan Yayıncılık, 1997.

Güler, Ali, *Türkiye'deki Gayrimüslimler*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1996.

Güner, Zekâî, *Trakya-Paşaeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1 Aralık 1918-13 Mayıs 1920)*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1998.

Güneş, İhsan, *Birinci TBMM'nin Düşünce Yapısı (1920-1923)*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1997.

Gürün, Kamuran, *The Armenian File The Myth of Innocence Exposed*, London: K. Rustem&Bro. And Weidenfeld&Nicholson Ltd, 1985.

Halaçoğlu, Ahmet, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri (1912-1913)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994.

Hale, William, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, London: Routledge, 1994.

Hanioglu, M. Şükrü, *Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981.

Hanioglu, M. Şükrü, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Haspolat, Mehmet Emin, *The Role of the Military in the Modernization of Turkey*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, New York University, 1974.

Helmreich, Paul C., *From Paris to Sévres The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974.

Heyd, Uriel, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*, London: Luzac&Company Ltd and The Harvill Press Ltd, 1950.

Horowitz, Donald L., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.

House, Edward M. and Seymour, Charles (eds.), *What Really Happened at Paris The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919*, London: Hodder&Stoughton, 1921.

Hovannisian, Richard G., *Armenia on the Road to Independence 1918*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.

Hovannisian, Richard G., *The Republic of Armenia*, 4 volumes, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971-1996.

Hovannisian, Richard G (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide History, Politics, Ethics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Howard, Harry N., *An American Inquiry in the Middle East The King-Crane Commission*, Beirut: Khayats, 1963.

Howard, Harry N., *The Partition of Turkey*, New York: Howard Fertig, 1966.

İğdemir, Uluğ, *Sivas Kongresi Tutanakları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1969.

İpek, Nedim, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994.

Jackh, Ernest, *The Rising Crescent*, New York: Farrar&Rinehart, Inc., 1944.

Jaeschke, Gotthard, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolijisi*, 2 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989.

Jaeschke, Gotthard, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Jwaideh, Wadie, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University, 1960.

Kansu, Aykut, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997.

Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, volumes, VIII, IX. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983, 1996.

Karpat, Kemal, *An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1973.

Karpat, Kemal H., *Ottoman Population 1830-1914 Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

Kayalı, Hasan, *Arab and Young Turks Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Kemali, Ali, *Erzincan Tarihî, Coğrafî, İctimaî, Etnoğrafî, İdarî, İhsaî Tetkikat Tecrübesi*, İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1932.

Kerman, Zeynep, *Belçika Temsilciliği Vesikalarına Göre Millî Mücadele*, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982.

Kerr, Stanley E., *The Lions of Marash*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1973.

Kili, Suna, Gözübüyük Şeref, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri*, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985.

Kirişçi, Kemal and Winrow, Gareth M., *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, London: Frank Cass, 1997.

Klein, Janet, *Claiming the Nation: The Origins and Nature of Kurdish Nationalist Discourse A Study of the Kurdish Press in the Ottoman Empire*, unpublished MA Thesis, Princeton University, 1996.

Kocahanoğlu, Osman Selim, *İttihat-Terakki'nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması (1918-1919)*, İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1998.

Koçgiri Halk Hareketi, Ankara: Komal, 1975.

Kodaman, Bayram, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası*, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1987.

Kohn, Hans, *A History of Nationalism in the East*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929.

Köstüklü, Nuri, *Millî Mücadele'de Denizli, Isparta ve Burdur Sancakları*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999.

Kurubaş, Erol, *Başlangıçtan 1960'a Değın Kürt Sorununun Uluslararası Boyutu*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1997.

Kushner, David, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908*, London: Frank Cass, 1977.

Kutlay, Naci, *Kürt Kimliği Oluşum Süreci*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1997.

Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer, *Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978.

Ladas, Stephen P., *The Exchange of Minorities Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Macfie, A. L., *The End of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1923*, London: Longman, 1998.

Malmîsanij, *Yüzyılımızın Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliği ve Dr. Abdullah Cevdet*, Uppsala: Jina Nû Yayınları, 1986.

McCarthy, Justin, *Muslims and Minorities The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York: New York University Press, 1983.

McCarthy, Justin, *Death and Exile The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922*, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1995.

McDowall, David, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1996.

Melson, Robert, *Revolution and Genocide*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Mesut, Ahmet, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Kürdistan 1918-1958*, İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1992.

Mumcu, Uğur, *Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması 1919-1925, 25th edition*, Ankara: Uğur Mumcu Araştırmacı Gazetecilik Vakfı, 1999.

Nalbandian, Louise, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963.

Nassibian, Akaby, *Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.

Nisan, Mordechai, *Minorities in the Middle East*, London: McFarland&Company, Inc., Publishers, 1991.

Noel, Edward W. C., *Kürdistan 1919 Binbaşı Noel'in Günlüğü*, Translated by Bülent Birer. İstanbul: Avesta, 1999.

Nur, Rıza, *Topal Osman Olayı*, İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1993.

Olson, Robert, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989.

Oran, Baskın, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

Öğün, Süleyman Seyfi, *Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995.

Öke, Mim Kemal, *Ermeni Sorunu 1914-1923*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Öke, Mim Kemal, *Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926*, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1992.

Öke, Mim Kemal, *İngiliz Ajanı Binbaşı E. W. C. Noel'in "Kürdistan Misyonu" (1919)*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1992.

Öz, Baki, *Belgelerle Koçkiri Olayı*, İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1999.

Özbudun, Ergun, *1921 Anayasası*, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1992.

Özel, Sabahattin, *Milli Mücadelede Trabzon*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Pallis, A. A., *Greece's Anatolian Venture and After*, London, 1937.

Pears, Sir Edwin, *Turkey and Its People*, London: Methuen&Co. Ltd., 1912.

Pentzopoulos, Dimitri, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece*, Paris: Mouton&Co, 1962.

Perinçek, Doğu, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Kürt Politikası*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999.

Pontus Meselesi, Yılmaz Kurt (ed.), Ankara: T. B. M. M. Basımevi, 1995.

Poulton, Hugh, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, London: Hurst&Company, 1997.

Psomiades, Harry J., *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase*, Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968.

Sakallı, Bayram, *Milli Mücadelenin Sosyal Tarihi Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1997.

Sarihan, Zeki, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü*, 4 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1993-1996.

Selek, Sabahattin, *Anadolu İhtilali*, 2 volumes, İstanbul: Kastaş A. Ş. Yayınları, 1987.

Selvi, Haluk, *Millî Mücadele'de Erzurum (1918-1923)*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Shaw, Stanford J., *From Empire to Republic The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923 A Documentary Study*, 6 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000.

Smith, Elaine Diana, *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919-1923)*, Washington: Judd&Detweiler, Inc., 1959.

Smith, Anthony D., *National Identity*, Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 1991.

Smith, Anthony D. (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992.

Smith, Michael Llewellyn, *Ionian Vision Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998.

Sofuoğlu, Adnan, *Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri*, İstanbul: Turan Yayıncılık, 1996.

Sofuoğlu, Adnan, *Kuva-yı Milli Döneminde Kuzeybatı Anadolu 1919-1921*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1994.

Somakian, Manoug Joseph, *Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-1920*, London: Tauris Academic Studies I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995.

Sonyel, Salâhi R., *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1993.

Sonyel, Salahi R., *The Ottoman Armenians Victims of Greater Diplomacy*, London:: K. Rustem&Brother, 1987.

Sonyel, Salahi R., *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*, 2 volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1973, 1986.

Sonyel, Salahi R., *Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923 Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1975.

Sonyel Salâhi R., *Atatürk-The Founder of Modern Turkey*, Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1989.

Soysal, İsmail, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları, vol. I, (1920-1945)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989.

[Söylemezoğlu], Galip Kemali, *Assassinat d'un Peuple*, Romae: Imprimerie Riccardo Garroni, 1921.

Steinhaus, Kurt, *Atatürk Devrimi Sosyolojisi*, translated by. M. Akkaş, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995.

Şadillili, Vedat, *Türkiye'de Kürçülük Hareketleri ve İsyanlar*, Ankara: Kon Yayınları, 1980.

Şen, Serdar, *Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Modernizm*, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1996.

Şener, Cemal, *Topal Osman Olayı*, İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1994.

Şimşir, Bilâl, *Malta Sürgünleri*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976.

Taçalan, Nurdoğan, *Ege'de Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlarken Hasan Tahsin*, İstanbul: Aksoy Yayıncılık, 1998.

Tanör, Bülent, *Türkiye'de Yerel Kongre İktidarları (1918-1920)*, İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1992.

Tanör, Bülent, *Kurtuluş Üzerine 10 Konferans*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995.

Tanör, Bülent, *Türkiye'de Kongre İktidarları (1918-1920)*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998.

Tansel, Selâhattin, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar*, 2nd edition, 4 volumes. Ankara: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1977.

Tarzian, Mary M., *The Armenian Minority Problem 1914-1934*, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992.

Taş, Necati Fahri, *Nureddin Paşa ve Tarihi Gerçekler*, İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1997.

T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, volume IV (Güney Cephesi), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1966.

T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, volume VI (İç Ayaklanmalar), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1964, 1974.

T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, volume III (Doğu Cephesi), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995.

T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, volume I (Mondros Mütarekesi ve Tatbikati), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1999.

Tekeli, İlhan, İlkin Selim, *Ege'deki Sivil Direnişten Kurtuluş Savaşı'na Geçerken Uşak Heyet-i Merkeziyesi ve İbrahim (Tahtakılıç) Bey*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989.

Temperley, H. W. V. (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, volumes V-VI, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Tevetoğlu, Fethi, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Timur, Taner, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993.

Tokluoğlu, Ceylan, *The Formation of the Turkish Nation-State and Resistance*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Ottawa: Carleton University, 1995.

Toprak, Zafer, *Milli İktisat-Milli Burjuvazi*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

Toynbee, Arnold J., *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, London, Constable and Company Ltd, 1922.

Tunaya, Tarık Z., *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, III volumes, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998-2000.

Tunaya, Tarık Z., *Devrim Hareketleri İçinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1981.

Tunay, Mete, *T. C.'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992.

Tunay, Mete, *Cihat ve Tehcir*, İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1991.

Turan, Şerafettin, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, volumes: I-II, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991, 1992.

The Turco-Armenian Question The Turkish Point of View, published by The National Congress of Turkey, Constantinople: 1919.

Türkgeldi, Ali Fuat, *Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi*, Ankara: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1948.

Ulagay, Osman, *Amerikan Basınında Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı*, İstanbul: Yelken Matbaası, 1974.

Umar, Bilge, *İzmir'de Yunanlıların Son Günleri*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974.

Uras, Esat, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*, İstanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988.

[Ursavaş], Ali Saib, *Kilikya Faciaları Urfa'nın Kurtuluş Mücadeleleri*, Ankara: Matbaa'ı Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1340 (1924).

Venizelos, Eleutherios, *Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919 A Memorandum Dealing with the Rights of Greece*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1919.

Volkan, Vamık D., Itzkowitz Norman, *Turks and Greeks Neighbours in Conflict*, England: The Eothen Press, 1994.

Yalman, Ahmet Emin, *Turkey in the World War*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.

Yavuz, Bige, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Döneminde Türk-Fransız İlişkileri Fransız Arşiv Belgeleri Açısından 1919-1922*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994.

Yazıcı, Nuri, *Millî Mücadelede (Canik Sancağı'nda) Pontosçu Faaliyetler (1918-1922)*, Ankara: 1989.

Yeğen, Mesut, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999.

Yerasimos, Stefanos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1917-1923)*, 2nd edition, İstanbul, Boyut Kitapları, 2000.

Yıldız, Ahmet, "*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene*" *Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938)*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001.

Yıldız, Hasan, *XX. Yüzyıl Başlarında Kürt Siyaseti ve Modernizm*, İstanbul: Nüjen Yayınları, 1996.

Yıldız, Hasan, *Fransız Belgeleriyle Sevr-Lozan-Musul Üçgeninde Kürdistan*, Köln: Hêvîya Gel Yayınları, 1990.

Zürcher, Eric Jan, *The Unionist Factor The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984.

D. Memoirs

Adıvar, Halide Edip, *The Turkish Ordeal*, New York, The Century Co, 1928.

Arikoğlu, Damar, *Hatıralarım*, İstanbul: Tan Gazetesi ve Matbaası, 1961.

Armstrong, Harold, *Turkey in Travail The Birth of a New Nation*, London: John Lane the Bodley Head Limited, 1925.

Asaf, Mehmet, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları ve Anılarım*, ed. by İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986.

Atatürk, M. Kemal, *Nutuk*, III volumes, İstanbul: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1969.

Atay, Falih Rıfkı, *Çankaya*, İstanbul, Kırıl Matbaası, 1984.

Barton, James L., *Story of the Near East Relief (1915-1930) An Interpretation*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930.

Bayar, Celâl, *Ben de Yazdım*, VIII volumes, İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965-1972.

Brémond, E., *La Cilicie en 1919-1920*, (Extrait de la *Revue des Etudes Arméniennes*, 1921), Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1921.

- Dersimi, Nuri, *Hatıratım*, İstanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 1997.
- Dersimi, Nuri, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim*, İstanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 1997.
- Dursunoğlu, Cevat, *Millî Mücadelede Erzurum*, Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000.
- Cebesoy, Ali Fuat, *Millî Mücadele Hatıraları*, İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2000.
- Ekrem Cemil Paşa, *Muhtasar Hayatım*, Ankara: Beybun Yayınları, 1992.
- Ener, Kasım, *Çukurova Kurtuluş Savaşında Adana Cephesi*, Ankara: San Matbaası, 1970.
- Ertürk, Hüsametdin, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, edited by Samih Nafiz Tansu, İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1996.
- Frunze, M. V., *Frunze'nin Türkiye Anıları*, translated by Ahmet Ekeş, İstanbul: Düşün Yayıncılık, 1996.
- George, David Lloyd, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1938.
- Graves, Sir Robert, *Storm Centres of the Near East Personal Memories 1879-1929*, London: Hutchinson&Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1933.
- Kadri, Hüseyin Kazım, *Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e Hatıralarım*, edited by İsmail Kara, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.
- Kadri Cemil Paşa (Zinar Silopî), *Doza Kurdistan (Kürdistan Davası)*, ed. by Mehmet Bayrak, Ankara: Öz-Ge Yayınları, 1991.
- Karabekir, Kazım, *Ermeni Dosyası*, İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995.
- Karabekir, Kazım, *İstiklal Harbimizin Esasları*, İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995.
- Karabekir, Kazım, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, V volumes, İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995.
- Karabekir, Kazım, *Kürt Meselesi*, İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994.
- Mehmetefendioğlu, Ahmet (ed.), *Sürgünden İntihara Dr. Reşit Bey'in Hatıraları*, İzmir, 1992.
- Memoirs of Halide Edib*, New York: Arno Press, 1972.

Mevlânzâde Rıfat, *Türkiye İnkılâbının İcyüzü*, Metin Hasırcı (ed.), İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 1993.

Nur, Dr. Rıza, *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, 4th edition, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1999.

Öge, Ali Rıza, *Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Bir Polis Şefinin Gerçek Anıları*, Bursa: Günlük Ticaret Gazetesi Tesisleri, 1982.

Öktem, Haydar Rüştü, *Mütareke ve İşgal Anıları*, edited by Zeki Arıkan, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Özalp, Kazım, *Milli Mücadele*, II volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988-1989.

Rawlinson, A., *Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1922*, London: Andrew Melrose, 1923.

Refik, Ahmet, *İki Komite İki Kıtıl*, Hamide Koyukan (ed.), Ankara: Kebikeç Yayınları, 1994.

Tengirşek, Yusuf Kemal, *Vatan Hizmetinde*, İstanbul: Bahar Matbaası, 1967.

Tepeyran, Ebubekir Hazım, *Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları*, İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1982.

Turan, Şerafettin (ed.), *Balıkesir ve Alaşehir Kongreleri ve Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı'nın Kuvayı Millîye Hatıraları (1919-1920)*, Ankara: Ankara Üniveristesi Basımevi, 1967.

Uran, Hilmi, *Hâtıralarım*, Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959.

Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit, *Siyasal Anılar*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976.

E. General References

Düstur, Tertib-i Sâni, Üçüncü Tertib.

Meclis-i Âyan Zabıt Ceridesi, volume 1, Devre: 3, İçtima Senesi: 5, Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1990.

Meclis-i Âyan Zabıt Ceridesi, volume 1, Devre: 4, İçtima Senesi: 1, Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1991.

Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, volume 1, Devre: 3, İçtima Senesi: 5, Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992.

Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, volume 1, Devre: 4, İçtima Senesi: 1. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992

Meray, Seha L., Olcay Osman, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Çöküş Belgeleri*, Ankara: A. Ü. S. B. F. Yayınları, 1977.

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Gizli Celse Zabıtları, devre I, IV volumes, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985.

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi, devre I, volumes 1-15, 18-21, 23-26, Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, various dates.

F. Periodicals

1. Newspapers

Alemdar (1 January 1919-22 June 1921).

Hadisat (November 1918-June 1919).

Hakimiyet-i Milliye (10 January 1920-31 January 1923).

İfham (27 July 1919-6 March 1920).

İkdam (12 April 1915-31 December 1923).

İleri (November 1918-June 1921).

Le Temps. (1919-1920)

Peyam-ı Sabah (1 January 1920-7 November 1922).

Sabah (31 November 1918-31 December 1919).

Tasvir-i Efkar (1 November 1918-21 June 1921).

Tanin (14 October 1922-31 January 1923).

The Times. (1920)

Türk Dünyası (22 August 1919-24 December 1919).

Vakit (Muvakkit) (31 October 1918-31 January 1923).

Yenigün (Anadolu'da Yenigün) (5 September 1918-31 January 1923).

2. Journals

Armenian Review (1948-1993)

Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi (1984-2000)

Atatürk Yolu (1988-1996)

Bellekten (1970-1985)

Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi (1967-1973)

Birikim (1991-2001)

Büyük Mecmua (1919)

Holocaust and Genocide Studies (1987-1998)

Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi (later *Askeri Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi*) (1953-1968)

International Journal of Middle East Studies (1975-2000)

Jîn (1918-1919)

Middle Eastern Studies (1975-1999)

Tarih ve Toplum (1986-2001)

Toplum ve Bilim (1984-2001)

Toplumsal Tarih (1994-2001)



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Constantinople, March 31, 1919.

110000

*Copies for American Embassy
Paris*

no. 103

*70
160*


*Gen. Rec. of the
Amer. Mission
to Negotiate
Peace, 1918-1931 (Boll 537)*

FILE
T. T. M.

801.00/83

F. W. 867.100159

200



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

FILE
24 APR 1919

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit herewith for the information of the Department a copy of a memorandum which was presented to me on March 28th by a Kurd delegation who claimed to represent the great mass of the Kurd nation in Turkey and to voice their aspirations.

In the course of the conversation with the delegation it appeared that they lay claim to such the same regions in Eastern Asia Minor as those claimed by the Armenians. In reply to an inquiry the President of the delegation stated that the Kurds desired to obtain

Independence from Turkish rule and that Sherif Pasha who is partially a Kurd by race is now the representative of their cause in Paris.

With respect to rival Armenian claims they declared that the great mass of the Kurds had always got along well with the Armenians and that ethnologically the two races were from the same parent stock, the Kurds having become Moslems and the Armenians having adopted a Christian faith. Although admitting that some element of the Kurds had participated in the massacres, they claimed that these massacres could in no sense be attributed to the Kurds as a whole, since in that event there would have been massacres only in the regions inhabited by Kurds, while in reality many of the worst atrocities had occurred where there was no Kurd population. They therefore placed the entire blame for the massacres on the former government.

The Kurds are a fairly numerous but very slightly known race. They have as yet not come into direct contact with modern civilization, but are not lacking in intelligence and aptitude for development. One of the finest samples of their elder men is the present President of the Council of State Sheikh Abdulkadir, who was exiled by Abdul-Hamid. Another wellknown modern leader and younger man is Mur Rezak, a Kurd who fought on the side of the Russians during the war. Although cruel and treacherous, it is possible that under more favorable circumstances the Kurds can be developed into a fairly law abiding and industrious element of the population in Eastern Asia Minor.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Signed
Lewis Heck

A true copy of
the original

Special Agent in Charge

CORRECTION

Constantinople, le 25 Mars 1919.

Monsieur le Président,

Monsieur le Président des Etats Unis d'Amérique en posant ses très nobles principes pour la conclusion de la paix générale a voulu réaliser les théories scientifiques que les sociologues du dernier siècle ont conçu pour entretenir en bons termes les différentes nations.

Malgré les pertes irréparables que l'humanité entière a subi, le monde souffrant s'estime pourtant soulagé grâce à l'application de ces principes sages.

En vertu de l'application des principes wilsoniens les diverses nations qui ont été opprimées sous le joug des gouvernements usurpateurs ont enfin la fin des souffrances incalculables que la guerre générale leur a causées et, contre laquelle, elles n'ont pu, faute de moyens, exprimer leurs protestations. De ce grand fait, les nations émancipées pourront mettre en oeuvre leur faculté de libre développement.

Je me souviens sûrs et certains que la Conférence de la Paix de Paris appliquera les principes wilsoniens d'une façon équitable à toutes les nations sans distinction de race ni de religion. A l'heure où l'on cherche à rendre l'humanité entière prospère et heureuse sur la base des nationalités, on ne laissera certainement pas, sous le joug anéantissant de "l'homme blanc" une nation qui a une existence historique et une culture assez civilisée. Cette nation est la nation kurde, douée des meilleures vertus qui sont innées en elle, possédant une certaine civilisation ancienne et moderne, en grande partie, cette vaste région de la Turquie qu'on appelle le "Nordistan" ainsi que ses environs.

Malgré les divers changements des états, les nombreuses émigrations des différentes nations de l'Asie, les Kurdes ont toujours su conserver leur patrie ancestrale.

Avant d'entamer la question au point de vue scientifique, il faut d'abord examiner si les kurdes sont réellement dignes d'avoir une place parmi les nations qui dirigeront leur sort à leur gré d'après les principes de nationalité.

Ainsi que nous allons l'exposer en détail, les kurdes ont droit à être reconnus comme une nationalité indépendante et maîtresse de ses destinées.

Les kurdes peuvent, d'abord, réclamer ce droit d'existence en s'appuyant sur l'ensemble des bases de la paix à conclure; d'autre part, les déclarations de Lord Horclief, ministre Britannique, relative à la destinée de la Turquie et des divers états arabes déjà constitués au sein de l'Empire Ottoman justifient et militent même en faveur de notre manière de voir.

Nous nous permettons de citer textuellement l'article IX des XIII articles par lesquels Lord Horclief a fixé, en résumé, les conditions de la paix:

"On supprimera, dans la mesure du possible, la souveraineté turque sur les non turcs. La distribution des nations peuplant l'Empire Ottoman est tellement compliquée que la solution, en détail, de cette question est difficile. Toutefois, les turcs sont vraiment incapables de gouverner. Le malheur

malheur épouvantable de l'humanité a été augmenté par l'assistance que les puissances centrales ont donné aux turcs, de sorte qu'on ne peut accepter aucune exception à cette formule."

Si l'on prend en considération cette noble et généreuse formule, suivant le premier paragraphe de cet article, on doit donner une fin à la souveraineté turque au Kurdistan et les kurdes émancipés n'auront plus à souffrir sous le plus terrible et le plus intolérable des asservissements. D'ailleurs la question de complexité des distributions du peuple dans l'empire n'existe pas au Kurdistan, par le fait que les non kurdes forment une minorité très manifeste.

Une fois la question un peu éclaircie par ce court exposé, nous nous permettrons de l'étudier un peu plus à fond.

Il nous semble que les réponses claires et convaincantes données aux questions suivantes suffisent assez pour faire rendre justice à la cause kurde.

- 1.-Y-a-t-il une nation kurde dans l'histoire?
- 2.-Si cette nation existe, quelle région peuple-t-elle?
- 3.-La date où les kurdes ont partagé leur destinée avec celle des turcs, les causes et les facteurs politiques, sociaux et religieux de cette association.
- 4.-Jusqu'à quel point les kurdes ont été soumis, jusqu'à nos jours aux lois ottomanes.
- 5.-La politique d'anéantissements des turcs.
- 6.-Les kurdes peuvent-ils, suivant les principes de Monsieur Wilson être souverains uniques de leur destinée, en formant majorité dans la contrée où ils habitent en état de concentration?
- 7.-Peut-on montrer une carte du Kurdistan indivisible peuplé par les Kurdes?
- 8.-Les nouvelles idées conçues après cette guerre, rapport des kurdes avec ces idées.

L'HISTOIRE KURDE.

L'étude détaillée de l'histoire kurde est en dehors du cadre que nous nous sommes proposé. Pourtant, afin de faire ressortir une fois de plus le droit des kurdes nous avons cru nécessaire de faire ici un court aperçu de cette histoire.

Les kurdes font partie des nations qui ont existé dans les temps les plus reculés. Hérodote, Xénophon, Takidés, le docteur Sebldj célèbre assyrien de l'Université de Cambridge, l'historien français Albert Mallat, Hammer, Jones Mall, etc. traitent en détail des kurdes dans leurs ouvrages.

Les kurdes sont des peuples de l'ancienne Perse, les historiens de l'Occident et de l'Orient sont d'accord à ce sujet. L'Ancienne Perse s'étendait à l'est aux rivières Seyhouh, Tchéyhouh, à l'ouest aux rivières Tigris, Euphrate et de là jusqu'à la Méditerranée, au Nord à la mer Caspienne et au Caucase et au Sud au golfe Persique.

D'après les historiens européens et musulmans les kurdes s'établirent tout d'abord dans la sphère du mont Elboudi, là où s'arrêta l'arche de Noé. De là ils gagnèrent la mer Noire, la Méditerranée et la mer d'Azov.

600 ans avant Jésus Christ le commandant hellène Xénophon dans son expédition dit avoir rencontré à Diarbékir, à Harpout, à Van, les Cardaces. En linguistique, les mots Cardaces, Cardaci, Gardu, Kurde ont la même signification. Cela est dû à la modification, avec le temps du dialecte.

En étudiant les gouvernements de Babylone, d'Assyrie, de Médée et d'Asschékacion, nous trouvons des rapports historiques et de race avec ces gouvernements. Il s'en suit, naturellement, que les kurdes sont des peuples anciens de cette région.

Les kurdes partagés entre les Chaldéens, les Assyriens, les Mèdes et les Persans ont conservé leur nationalité inaltérable en vertu de leur culture, de leur conscience nationale et ils la conservent avec la même intégrité même actuellement.

Parlons, un peu, maintenant, des nations qui ont une certaine relation avec nous.

PAÏS CHALDÉE. - Cet état fut établi par Nemrod en 2640 a.J. qui bâtit Babel et en fit sa capitale. Nemrod étendit son pays jusqu'à Alep et Tassarab, il fit construire des canaux. C'est pendant son règne que les bases de la cosmographie furent posées. Plus tard, en 1270 a. J. les Assyriens succédèrent aux Chaldéens et finalement, ce pays fut conquis par Cyrus souverain de Perse en 526.

Les Assyriens profitant de l'extension des Mèdes attaquèrent ces derniers et leur enlevèrent l'indépendance. Mais en 759 a.J. le chef des Mèdes (Erbassia) s'étant allié avec le chef des Babyloniens (Riasis) battit les Assyriens et Astog, fils de Gunayad devint chef des Mèdes. C'est alors que Dikran, roi Arménien au Caucase voulant envahir le Kurdistan, fut battu par les Mèdes. Après cette défaite, Dikran voulant se venger et étendre son royaume provoqua Cyrus, roi des Persans, puis allié avec lui tomba sur la Médée. Astog s'opposant énergiquement aux attaques de ses ennemis alliés les repoussa. Dikran vaincu fut obligé de se retirer sur Eriyan, tandis que Cyrus faisant la paix avec le brave souverain de Médée épousa sa fille. C'est donc depuis 2,500 ans que date la visée ambitieuse des Arméniens sur le Kurdistan.

Les encyclopédistes reconnaissent les Assyriens comme les pères des Kurdes de l'ancienne Perse tandis qu'Albert Mallat dit: "Les kurdes sont les Assyriens de notre siècle."

La langue

La langue kurde étant de "Pehlévien" contient des mots assyriens et grecs. Les Kurdes se sont servis de l'écriture cunéiforme au 1^{er} siècle avant J.-C. dans les royaumes de Médie et d'Assyrie. Sur les plaines à l'ouest de l'Irak (Séleucie), près des monts Elu Qucul dans le sud-est de la montagne et près de la ville de Djolan ou d'Amjed de Sulayman on a découvert des écrits cunéiformes. Tout ce qui a été découvert se rapporte à la question. Avant tout à leur par les Turcs et par les Arabes le Grand, les Kurdes acceptèrent la religion musulmane après la guerre d'Assyrie.

Bien que les Kurdes aient montré une certaine sympathie pour les Arabes, ils ont toujours conservé leur nationalité. Plus tard, vers 950 ils ont constitué Diarbêkir le gouvernement kurde qui servit.

Entre autres grands souverains que les Kurdes se glorifient d'avoir eus, nous pouvons citer le célèbre sultan Selaheddine Youkbi qui étendit son empire en Syrie, en Irak, en Égypte, en Iran et en Asie Mineure.

En 1135 le sultan Selaheddine Youkbi fut envahi par les Seljoukides mais ils ne réussirent pas à leur enlever leur indépendance.

Après les entretiens, le nouveau gouvernement turc enthousiasmé par les succès et l'impulsion de l'expansion, d'une part et, le Gouvernement perse, d'autre part, menaçaient les petits États kurdes. N'ayant pas eu le temps nécessaire pour former une nation kurde, ils devaient nécessairement se décider pour l'un ou pour l'autre. Les Kurdes qui étaient attachés à leur religion préférèrent les Turcs qui pratiquaient le même culte (Sunisme). D'ailleurs, le défit du Shah de Perse au 11^{ème} siècle par le sultan Selaheddine Youkbi contribua beaucoup à leur prendre cette décision. Sur la proposition de Mirza de Bitlis, le Sultan et Selaheddine Youkbi annexa le Kurdistan à son empire à la condition que les Kurdes conserveraient leur autonomie administrative et ne fourniraient seulement que des troupes auxiliaires pendant les guerres. Par ce fait la Turquie et le Kurdistan ont un passé commun. Mais les Kurdes ayant été toujours l'objet d'une oppression continuelle de la part des Turcs, furent obligés de se révolter et l'histoire ottomane nous en a donné de nombreuses preuves.

Les derniers dirigeants du gouvernement "Union et Progrès" n'ont fait que continuer cette politique d'annexionnisme. Nous possédons tous les documents relatifs à l'attentat dirigé contre notre brave nation. Ainsi, pour empêcher les émigrants Kurdes après la dernière catastrophe dans les vilayets habités par les Turcs, le sublime porte-voix l'adresse des gouvernements a dit ainsi : "Par le fait que nous ne laisserons plus les émigrants Kurdes rentrer dans leur pays après la guerre, il faut les faire partir dans divers vilayets turcs à raison de 500 de ces derniers".

Malgré leur sentiment national, les Kurdes n'ont pu constituer une nation nationale sous le joug des Turcs. Cependant, ils ont vécu autonomes pendant le règne du Sultan Abdul Hamid. La dernière principauté autonome kurde n'est tombée, il y a 70 ans. Néanmoins, les lois ottomanes ne sont pas encore appliquées dans certaines parties du Kurdistan.

Nous n'aurions le ferme espoir que vous voudrez bien prendre en considération notre situation très critique et qu'il nous sera permis, en vue de nos principes adoptés, d'être le souverain maître de nos destinées dans la mesure que la Ligue des Nations a établie pour les nations de l'Empire Ottoman.

UNE ANCIENNE RELATION HISTORIQUE.

Si l'on étudie l'histoire ancienne, on constate que les Anglais et les Kurdes sont de la même origine. Les Anglais sont Ariens européens, tandis que les Kurdes sont Ariens asiatiques. Ces derniers sont restés dans le pays de leurs ancêtres, tandis que les Anglais ont émigré jusque dans l'ouest de l'Europe, aux îles Britanniques. Les Celtes qui ont abandonné l'ancienne Perse pour

pour aller s'établir en Écosse, en Angleterre, se sont plus tard, réunis avec les Gallois, les Saxons, les Hanovriens, de même race, pour former cette grande et noble nation anglaise.

La patrie ancestrale des Kurdes ne comprend pas seulement cette partie du Kurdistan située à l'Est de l'Empire Ottoman mais elle s'étend un peu plus loin au delà de la frontière turque.

La carte du Kurdistan commence au nord de la partie septentrionale du Mont Ararat, où les frontières turque, russe et persane se joignent pour descendre vers le sud en suivant la frontière turco-persane et s'étend d'un côté jusqu'aux provinces de Bayazid, Van, Hêkari, Nevandouz, Mossoul, Erzurum, Hamidine et, de l'autre côté à Erzeroum, Erzindjan, Bitlis, Mouche, Harpout, Diarbekir, Hârdine Al-Bezirc, Siverek, Surfa, Tel-el-Ain, Sindjar et, vers la Perse, aux provinces de Beylan, Bazindran, Semnan, Medaïn, Tabidjan, Kerman-shah, Ahah, Lorstan, Khosistan et Sisistan.

La répartition naturelle des Kurdes pendant l'Empire Ottoman n'était pas comparable à celle des autres nationalités nous avons indiqué leur distribution suivant les noms des tribus. Pour éviter tout malentendu avec la dénomination des Tribus, nous nous permettons d'expliquer ce fait en tant qu'il concerne les Kurdes.

Le kurde n'est jamais nomade, il est toujours une nation. Si l'on demande à un kurde ce qu'il est, il répond invariablement "Je suis kurde". Au Kurdistan, les tribus prennent leurs noms de ceux des familles des tribus les plus anciens. Une tribu porte donc le nom de l'ascendance des membres de cette tribu.

Population. Les Kurdes constituent la grande majorité de la population de Kurdistan. Après eux viennent les Arméniens. Nous saisissons l'occasion pour nous permettre d'attirer l'attention du Congrès de la Paix sur le mémoire que le Gouvernement Ottoman a remis, dernièrement, aux puissances de l'Entente.

Dans ce mémoire, continuant sa politique de turquisation, le Gouvernement Ottoman a négligé les Kurdes pour créer une majorité turque sous le nom de musulmans. Inadvisé en réalité les quelques Turcs qui se trouvent au Kurdistan sont ou fonctionnaires, ou habitent une partie des grandes villes et ne constituent au fond, qu'à peine le 5% des Kurdes.

Les Arméniens du Kurdistan ne sont pas non plus en masse. Ils s'occupent de commerce et demeurent, par conséquent, dans les villes et aux environs de certaines villes. La propriété ainsi que les propriétés rurales sont presque exclusivement en possession des Kurdes. Le centre d'activité des Arméniens est circonscrit dans les villes et autour des grandes routes. Au point de vue de la population, nul part ils ne dépassent la limite de 25%. Le professeur anglais Jones Hall qui a voyagé dans les vilayets de l'Anatolie Orientale a écrit, à son retour: "Je n'ai pu non seulement pas rencontrer une Arménie, mais même une majorité arménienne".

Le général russe Masloff dans ses études sur cette partie du continent a trouvé les Arméniens dans la proportion de 1 Arménien pour 6 Kurdes.

Dans les statistiques officielles russes, les plus favorables pour les Arméniens on lit 30-32%. Ils n'ont, par conséquent, aucun argument en leur faveur.

Il ressort des études faites pendant la création des régiments Kurdes, dits "Anatoliens" 25 ans auparavant, que la population kurde était évaluée de 4 à 5 millions d'âmes. Il s'ensuit que le nombre des Kurdes en Turquie dépasse déjà 4 à 5 millions.

Il appert des considérations précédentes que les Kurdes qui ont un passé et une culture historiques vivent aujourd'hui dans leur pays sans pouvoir utiliser leur langue ni leur droit politique pour se développer parallèlement avec leurs contemporains.

La fertilité

La fertilité de notre pays est connue depuis très longtemps. Jadis, la Mesopotamie était le grenier du monde. Les étrangers qui ont voyagé dans cette contrée sont unanimes à confirmer cette vérité historique. L'abondance des mines non découvertes est mise largement en évidence par l'étude du projet du chemin de fer de Bagdad.

Le pays au sein duquel peuvent vivre plus de 5 millions d'âmes en toute prospérité et à la seule condition de posséder un port de mer dans la Méditerranée, peut être, très bien érigé en un état, en vertu des principes émis par Monsieur Wilson et qui furent adoptés par l'univers entier.

L'idée d'indépendance n'est pas récente chez les Kurdes. Possédant un grand nombre d'hommes d'état, d'administrateurs, de savants, de révolutionnaires et d'industriels capables de gouverner le pays, ils ont toujours tenté de se sauver de l'oppression de la Turquie. Si, après l'assistance, ils n'ont pas trouvé leur émancipation du joug ottoman c'est qu'ils ont une pleine confiance en leur droit. Consciente de sa force et de son droit la nation kurde n'a voulu susciter aucune difficulté à l'arrangement équitable que les grandes puissances alliées et associées se sont proposé de faire.

Malgré toutes sortes d'oppressions et de séductions, les Kurdes ont su maintenir leur particularité et méritent donc pour la richesse de leur sol, la concentration de leur population leur passé historique, leurs vertus guerrières, leur caractère chevaleresque et leur capacité administrative à constituer un état libre au Kurdistan.

Si nous nous les Kurdes, ayons une profonde vénération une vive sympathie et un grand attachement pour les puissances et nations alliées et associées, nous vous serions extrêmement reconnaissants, Monsieur le Président, si vous vouliez bien désigner l'Angleterre que nous connaissons de près et désirons pour la façon admirable et idéale avec laquelle elle administre les territoires anglais voisins de notre pays, pour qu'elle veuille bien nous prêter sa très précieuse aide et son haut concours jusqu'à ce que nous puissions prouver au monde que nous sommes capables de nous gouverner nous mêmes.

Nous vous en remercions bien vivement d'avance et vous présentons Monsieur le Président, les assurances les plus réitérées de notre plus haute considération.

LE COMITÉ NATIONAL DU KURDISTAN EN LA LIGNE

LE PRÉSIDENT DU KURDISTAN

Sénateur:

(Signé) S. Abdulkadir.

APPENDIX B

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE TREATY

HBW

INDEX BUREAU
2 FEB 1919
Rec'd
A.M. MISSION

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CAIRO
FROM
Undated.

Rec'd, February 8, 1919,
9:30 a.m.

American Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Hotel Crillon, Paris.

In the name of five million Kurds, we protest against the decision of the Armenian Congress who presume to include for themselves the historic patrimony of the Kurds. We claim the right to national existence as an act of justice and humanity.

General Secretary of the Committee for
Kurd Independence:

SUREYA PEDIR KHAN

PARIS PEACE COMMISSION
867.00/82

84 MAR 1919

APPENDIX C

Gen. Rec. of
the American Mission
to Negotiate Peace
1918-1931

AAA

TRANSLATION BUREAU
No. 1099

Paris, November 20, 1919.

From: Representatives of the Armenian and Kurd Nations
To: M. Clemenceau.

We the undersigned, representatives of the Armenian and Kurd nations, have the honor to inform the Peace Conference that our two nations, both Arian, have the same interests and aims, that is their freedom and independence--especially for the Armenians, their release from the cruel domination of the Turkish Government, and in general, as well for the Armenians as for the Kurds, the deliverance from the yoke of the Committee of Union and Progress, whose official and secret governments have been so fatal to both. We are therefore entirely in accord to ask the Peace Conference for the constitution, according to the principles of nationality, of an independent unified Armenia and of an independent Kurdistan, with the assistance of a Great Power, appointed after having heard the wishes of our respective nations, to accord its technical and economic assistance during the period of reconstruction.

As regards the attribution of contested territories mentioned in our respective memorandums successively presented to the Peace Conference, and the definite delimitation of the frontiers of the two future States, we formally declare that we shall abide by the decisions of the Peace Conference, persuaded in advance that its decision will be based on justice and right.

Furthermore, we confirm our complete accord to respect the legitimate rights of Minorities in both States.

Please accept, etc.....

For Kurdistan

For Armenia

CHERIF
President of the Kurd
Delegation to the Peace
Conference.

BOGHOS NUBAR
President of the Armenian
National Delegation.

DR. H. OHANJANIAN.
President of the
Armenian Republic Delegation
of the Armenian Republic to
the Peace Conference.

185.513817

APPENDIX D

TRANSLATION BUREAU
NO. 2048

Paris, November 25, 1919.

9
Gen. Placc of the
Amer. Mission
II

13

From: General CHERIF PACHA, President of the Kurd Delegation to the Peace Conference.

To: President CLEMENCEAU

The delay in the conclusion of peace with the Ottoman Empire has given the un-
hoped-for chance to the Committee of Union and Progress to again seize the power in
Turkey by creating the most serious obstacles to an equitable settlement of Eastern
affairs.

The Governments which have succeeded each other since the Armistice at Constan-
tinople, composed of the debris of the Committee of the Union and Progress and of the
Opposition, the principal leaders of the latter having been prevented from returning to
their country in time, have done more harm to poor Turkey than those who brought it
before the abyss by the half measures which they took.

All nationalities composing the Ottoman Empire had a right to expect the same
treatment as the other peoples composing the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, the
declarations of the Allies to make a peace of justice and right allowed the Orient
the same right to set forth their claims on nationalities there.

On behalf of the Kurd Nation, I have the honor to ask the Supreme Council of the
Peace Conference, with the last energy which we get from the legitimacy of our national
claims, to examine seriously the Kurd question which is the basis, I can say so without
presumption, of the essential conditions for assuring peace and tranquility in Asia Minor.

It would be a most serious error to consider Kurdistan as a ground for speculation
in trying to divide it into two financial zones, and to occupy it militarily. The shed-
ding of blood which would follow would be the fatal consequence of a new lack of diplo-
matic foresight.

Kurdistan is indivisible and must form but a single independent state in the tech-
nical and economic organization in which it is desired to submit it to the mandates of a

185.5138/9
CONFERENCE

It is the equitable solution and the worthiest of the victors who have made the greatest sacrifices for the peace of right and justice. Furthermore, that is what the Kurd Nation has a right to expect from the sentiments of wisdom and equity of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

There is an Armenian minority in Kurdistan. Properly speaking, this question can be solved much more easily than one is tempted to believe.

We Kurds do not want to encroach upon the rights of anyone in whatever way.

The Armenians, as well as the Turks, Arabs, Nestorians and others, who would remain, because of their minority, incapable of forming an administrative agglomeration, would find the most perfect harmony in the Kurd State and the rights of each would be rigorously respected.

The surest and most equitable means of solving the Kurd and Armenian claims would be to create an International Commission to delimit the boundaries of countries where today we form, and have formed for centuries, the greatest majority of the population.

We have full and entire confidence in the decision to be taken by the International Commission above mentioned, persuaded in advance that its decision will be arrived at on the basis of the principle of nationalities, of justice and of right.

As it appears from the collective declaration which we ~~have~~ addressed to the Peace Conference on the 20th instant, a cordial understanding has happily been established under the auspices of their respective representatives at Paris, between the Armenian and Kurd Nations. To maintain and strengthen this harmony, we hope that the Peace Conference will promptly settle our claims in conformity with the legitimate aspirations and the rights of each.

Please accept, etc.....

APPENDIX E*

CILICIA & THE WAR of 1914-1918



(B)

(This letter was written at the request of Senator Victor Berard, a member of the French Senate, who was interested in the fate of Cilicia and was read before the Senate.)

7 Avenue du President Wilson
Paris
December 10, 1920

My dear Mr. Berard:

About to return to my home in California, allow me to address to you the letter that I have promised you about events in Cilicia at the close of my four years under the flage of France.

The period of my enlistment ended on the 5th of June, 1920, and I was passing through Adana on June 8th with my military papers authorizing my return home. Colonel Bremond sent for me and persuaded me by appealing to my loyalty to France, to my patriotism, etc. to remain at least another three months to organize and "put some order" into the ranks of Armenians who were under arms in Adana. At the close of his words, he said: "I place all of my resources at your disposal, and I count on you to organize this in a military and solid manner".

My three months engagement came to a close on the 10th day of September. On the 13th, I sent in the report of my three months' activities to Gen. Dufieux. One copy of this report has already been presented to you. It gives an idea of the extent of my work.

Having sent this report to the general through military channels, I continued my work awaiting his orders. On the 21st

*I would like to thank to Seçil Karal Akgün who gave these and the following document me for use.

of September, I received a "note" asking me to appear before Commandant Tomy Martin, governor of the city and the sandjak of Adana. He questioned me on the contents of my report to the general, fixing certain dates. He asked me for details of my own life. He complimented me upon the perfection of the map I had drawn and which was attached to my report. Then suddenly he arose and placed me in the hands of Captain Chevilliard, notifying me that I was under arrest!

Although I submitted, I asked for the reason. He declared: "There are no reasons. You have done nothing. This is the order of the general and you must leave immediately. This is politics, mon vieux, and you must quietly surrender and get out of Cilicia!"

I told him nothing would please me better, but I begged him kindly to let me arrange my things, pack my grip, get my overcoat, etc. He abruptly refused this saying, "Your presence here excites the Turks. Our policy demands that we win the friendship of the Turks. We shall carry out our treaty, and that obliges us to return the administration to the Turks, consequently you must leave immediately."

I asked him if all this would require that an officer who had served France for four years of war should be expelled as a common criminal? In reply, Captain Chevilliard took me by the arm and, escorted by gendarmes, I was taken, in company with the eleven members of the Union Nationale Armenienne who were also under arrest, to a shed where we were imprisoned surrounded





-3-

by a section of Mohamedan Algerians with bayonets fixed.

During all of this time, as always, I wore my French uniform.

A Turkish officer, who had just arrived from Constantinople, approached me and said (in English) with remarkable politeness, that he had been instructed by the French Commandant to keep an eye on me and assist my departure.

I immediately sent a note to General Dufieux: "I beg of you to hear me for two minutes. I am sure that the gentility of a high officer of France will not refuse this to me".

It was flatly refused.

Escorted by a section of soldiers (Mohamedan Algerians) they ordered us all to ride in three trucks and we left the shack in the presence of a group of Turks who had been invited to witness our departure.

The distance between Adana and Karatache by ordinary auto is covered in about five hours. But this trip by way of the trucks lasted three days on account of the rain and the mud bogging down the trucks. We were all drenched, some of the members of the U. N. A. were in white and were forced to spend two nights in a stable and under canvass. On the second day we caught up with the disarmed Hadgin Volunteers.

THE HADGIN VOLUNTEERS

For some ten weeks the Armenian community of Adana had made most earnest efforts and great sacrifices to get together

and equip a detachment to go to the relief of Hadgin, besieged by the Kemalists. Permission had been obtained from French authorities and from General Dufieux and from Col. Bremond.

I had been busy since September 1st with this detachment to get some sort of discipline and order into it, to select leaders and some subs. There were about 450 men. Each day we received news of the activities of the Kemalists who knew of the existence of Armenian Volunteers located about twelve kilometers from Adana. Instead of attacking Hadgin they had taken up a position 20 kilometers north of Adana, dug out some trenches and awaited us.

The Volunteers were armed, equipped, fed and clothed by the Armenian community under the direction of the Union Nationale which had already spent between 80,000 and 100,000 Turkish paper liras. Provisions for eight days were distributed to these Volunteers on the morning of the 22nd of September. Eighty mounted soldiers (the horses also had been purchased by the U. N. A.) well armed and carrying 800 cartridges apiece were ready to accompany them.

On the morning of the 22nd, they were surrounded by a strong French column of more than 2,000 men including some cavalry Six canon (75's) and many machine guns were mounted on the heights surrounding the Armenians and pointed at them. Then an officer appeared and in the name of General Dufieux demanded the immediate surrender and the disarming of the Volunteers.

The leader of the Armenians (himself an Armenian) was a veteran of the Legion Armennienne who had seen service through four wars and was well known for his devotion and loyalty to France.



-5-

He sent to "attention!" before the French Commandant and exclaimed: "Mon Commandant, we consider ourselves a part of the French army in Cilicia, for I have done everything by French military orders. If you had determined to disarm us, all you had to do was to send us an ordinary gendarme and a note".

He assembled his men and formed the square. Arms, munitions, horses and provisions were surrendered, and, escorted by the cavalry, these unfortunate heroes set out with their blankets for Karatache as prisoners of war!

The Kemalists were immediately informed that the Armenians had been disarmed and a few days later they made their attack on Hadgin. You were at that time notified of the superb resistance of the people of Hadgin for sixteen days and the fall of Hadgin and the massacre that followed.

We followed that sad procession of "prisoners" to Karatache. They made us ride the horses taken away from the detachment that was thus expelled from Cilicia by being placed upon small sailboats, at least one of which sank between Karatache and Beyrout.

SENT TO ALEXANDRETTA

The very same evening of our arrival (at Karatache) they placed us on board a French hospital ship. We were refused any beds. We spent the night on deck. In the morning I noticed some of my former officer comrades promenading the deck. I went to the cook and asked for a cup of coffee. I had had nothing for

some twenty hours. I was told: "You are undesirables expelled from Cilicia. No coffee!"

Dr. Salibyan (a graduate of the Medical School at Bellevue, New York) and Mr. Achikian (a prominent Armenian land owner and of ancient lineage in Cilicia) were sitting together on a bench. A French Captain of infantry came to sit down on the same bench. He exclaimed, "See here. You two don't even move from your seats? Be gone, be gone! You disgust me!" ("Vo us me degoutez!") Go sit down on the floor yonder and don't stay near me!" Silently they moved away.

*As for myself, not having any military papers at all, no passport and nothing to identify me, I appeared before the Colonel Governor of Alexandretta and requested him to advise me what I should do. After a few days, he sent me to Beyruth to General Gouroud's 2me Bureau. Here they wanted to know why I had left Cilicia! After certain investigations on their part, they finally discovered my record as an officer in the Legion, and I was given papers authorizing my return to the U. S. at the expense of the War Department.

While waiting at Beyruth, I met the American liaison officer attached to General Gouroud. He had received orders to find me because my parents had appealed to our Secretary of State at Washington for news about me. Since the month of March last, they had had no letters from me nor I from them, although they had written several letters to me and I had mailed many letters from Cilicia to my aged father and mother in California.





Today at the American Embassy (at Paris), they showed me the reply received from General Gouroud to the Embassy's demand for news of me. Here is the wording of it: "Lieutenant Shishmanian is in very good health and commands the Volunteers at Adana as Inspecteur des Groupements Armeniens".

This reply is dated November 13th. I had already been expelled from Adana on the 22nd of September.

Veillez agreez etc etc.

SHISHMANIAN

*Explanation in later statement.

Added note by J. S.: On the third page of the first part of this letter, I neglected to say that I told the Turkish officer I was an American citizen, and since it was apparent the French whose uniform I wore did not mean to give me protection, I demanded to be taken to the nearest American consul. A French guard then replaced the Turk.

TRANSLATION BY JOHN A. SHISHMANIAN

CILICIA & THE WAR of 1914-1918

(The following is a translation of a statement prepared by the Delegation Nationale Armenienne, at Paris, and signed by its President, Boghos Nubar.)

Paris December 9, 1920.

NOTES:

On the circumstances and conditions under which the "Legion d'Orient" was created in 1916.

We deem it useful to recall the circumstances under which an accord was brought about between the French Government and the Delegation Nationale Armenienne in October, 1916, on the subject of Armenian Volunteers and to give certain details of the commitment on the part of the French Government.

In 1916, certain conferences took place between the quai d'Orsay and the Delegation Nationale Armenienne. I was then called to London and after my conferences with Mr. Georges Picot and Sir Mark Sykes, who in the name of their respective governments had negotiated the Accord of 1916 relative to the fate of Turkey in Asia, I had a last meeting with them on October 27 at the Embassy of France, where the conditions upon which the Delegation Nationale Armenienne undertook to furnish Volunteers for an expedition into Cilicia were settled.

It was at a most critical period of the war, and the Allies could not think of withdrawing any of their forces on the Western front to be sent to the East; that is why Mr. Georges Picot had been instructed to call for Volunteers against the



Turks. Need I state that we hastened to offer this additional cooperation to the Allies? I say "additional" because since the outbreak of the war the Armenians had never ceased to fight at the side of the Allies.

During the interview, Mr. Georges Picot brought out the necessity to the Armenians of acquiring a new realization of their national aspirations. I replied: "They are ready to do that". And I added, however, that the Volunteers would not offer themselves in really effective numbers unless they were assured of being enlisted against their ancient enemy, to liberate their native soil. Armenian Volunteers who were residents of France, had already been fighting for two years on the Western front; but under these present circumstances it seemed that those of our (Armenian) other communities would not willingly enlist elsewhere than in Cilicia.

Mr. Picot agreed with this and declared himself in accord with my position. He only asked in order to avoid any misunderstandings, if an expedition into Syria or on the coast of Smyrna, or even in the Balkans, undertaken for the purpose of defeating the Turks, would be considered in harmony with our plans. I replied that the object being to liberate Armenia, a landing carried out for strategical reasons in Syria or in Asia Minor, would surely satisfy our demands; but as to the Balkans, this would be doubtful.

Mr. Picot agreed and added that his question had no other motive than to define the issue and avoid all misunder-



standings. This point having been clarified, I added that to allow me to support with greater energy a call for Volunteers and to obtain better results, I should be placed in a position to give assurances that at the end of the War, France would include Cilicia within the boundaries outlined in the 1916 Accord of the Allies; would create an autonomous Armenia to permit the race to reconstruct itself and for Armenian nationality to develop under the protection of France.

Mr. Picot then authorized me to give that assurance.

Consequently, it was agreed that I send a dispatch to my son in Egypt, where many Armenian refugees were eagerly awaiting the call to enlist, instructing him to take all the necessary steps in order to encourage enlistments advising the Volunteers that I had received formal assurances from the French Government that after the victory of the Allies, the aspirations of the Armenian people would receive full satisfaction in Cilicia.

It was thereupon decided in brief:

- 1- That the Volunteers would be utilized exclusively as a landing party in Asia Minor for the purpose of fighting their traditional enemies and to free their native soil.
- 2- That France promised -- after an Allied victory -- to give autonomy to Cilicia placed under her protection.
- 3- That the following telegram addressed to my son in Egypt, be sent in code by way of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was done that same day:

"October 27, 1916

"Arakel Bey Nubar, Cairo

Referring to my letter of October 6, on the question of Volunteers. Having since then, received formal assurances that upon an Allied victory, our national aspirations shall be satisfied, I direct you to take the necessary steps to encourage



and facilitate the enlisting of the greatest number of Volunteers possible, with such precautionary measures as are indicated in my said letter, and all other precautions that may be deemed necessary. Shall return to Paris this week."

NUBAR



Such were the commitments on both sides.

The Armenians, relying upon the promise to free Cilicia, their homeland, responded to the appeal in large numbers, and the Government of the Republic (French) sent a Commission to Egypt under the direction of M. le Commandant Romieu to organize the corps of Volunteers that would be assembled and drilled on the island of Cyprus.

This Commission arrived at Cairo in November, 1916, and made contact with all the Armenian groups, and thus was created La Legion d'Orient later renamed La Legion Armenienne, because it was almost exclusively made up of Armenians. Commandant Romieu addressing himself to prominent Armenians confirmed to them this London Agreement and allowed them to read a letter from Mr. Briand the President of the Conseil des Ministres, declaring that he was in complete accord with the Delegation Nationale Armenienne.

And the Commandant declared in these words:

1- That the constitution of the Legion d'Orient had as its main object to give to the Armenians the freedom of Cilicia and thus to create for them a new a realization of their national aspirations.

2- That the Armenian Legionnaires would fight against the Turks and only in Cilicia.

3- That the Legion Armenienne would form a nucleus of the future Armenian army.

As soon as organized, the Legion d'Orient took part under the flag of France and the command of French officers in

the Palestine Campaign, where it formed the largest part of the French contingent. It fought valiantly and its leaders paid tribute to its bravery. It was cited in the Orders of the French Expeditionary Corps (1) and Field Marshall Lord Allenby, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, has testified to their valor and to their splendid military bearing (2).

As to Cilicia, the commitments recited herein were carried out from November, 1918, to December, 1919, lands of Syria and Cilicia entrusted to the administration of Mr. Georges Picot, officially were known as "le Commissariat General de la France en Armenie".

During this entire period, I received official communications concerning Cilicia, which came from the "Service Administratif en Armenie" and from the "Colonel, Administrateur en Chef en Armenie".

(1) "The Commanding Officer of the French Detachment under whose command the Armenians fought, has brought to light the endurance and the spirit of the Armenian soldiers, whose loyalty to the Allies never faltered":

(2) Dated October 12, 1918:

"Delegation Nationale Armenienne, Paris. My sincere thanks to you and to Armenians for your kind telegram of congratulations. I am proud of having had a group of Armenians under my command. They fought brilliantly and had a great share in the victory."

ALLENBY

Allenby



Finally by official permission, upon orders of the High Commissioner, Mr. Georges Picot, 208,000 Armenians, refugees in Syria, Palestine and Egypt, were returned to Cilicia -- "Into their homeland" said the French authorities.

The Armenians therefore have carefully carried out their commitments.

Nevertheless, the treaty of Sevres, signed by France, leaves the greater portion of Cilicia under Ottoman sovereignty, while it presents autonomy to the Kurds (Article 62) who made war against the Allies and who with the Turks had participated in massacring Armenians who were the allies of France. The Kurds to whom France had made no promises. Those who loyally supported the cause of the Allies are sacrificed, while those who fought the allies are favored.

And yet, we could even be content today by obtaining an autonomous administration in Cilicia under Turkish sovereignty and French control. This autonomous administration could be accomplished through diplomatic channels. It would require nothing more than an irade from the Sultan.

The Delegation Nationale Armenienne hopes that the government of the Republic will be pleased to make its decision, which while preserving the interests of France will also permit her to keep her promises and attain the modest satisfaction of our demands. Otherwise, it means the abandonment of those whom France herself brought back into Cilicia and whose brothers fought at her side against the Turks.

The President
Delegation Nationale Armenienne
BOGHOS NUBAR



(Memorandum dated December 1st, 1920, sent to the French Government by the Delegation Nationale Armenienne on the Cilician Question.)



PRESENT STATUS OF THE CILICIAN QUESTION.

At a time when the fate of Cilicia is about to be decided it is necessary briefly to recall some facts, and to call attention to the solution which the Delegation Nationale Armenienne submits to the Government of France, a solution which, while taking into consideration the present and the obligations of the Treaty of Sevres would also satisfy the very modest prayers of the Armenians of Cilicia by protecting also the interests of France.

In October, 1916, following an accord concluded between the Allies regarding the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, the French Government declared to the Delegation Nationale Armenienne, that the Armenians should earn the liberation of their country by furnishing volunteers for an expedition into Asia Minor.

This demand may be explained by the fact that the Western front was then passing through one of its most alarming moments of the War, one in which the Allies, especially France, could not send even the weakest sort of a detachment to the East.

The President of the Delegation Nationale Armenienne eagerly accepted the proposition that was put to him, in exchange for which he obtained from the French Government a solemn promise to grant—after the War—the widest possible autonomy under French protection to the Armenian territories which, according to the 1915 Accord, would come into the French zone of influence.

Immediate arrangements were made, an appeal was sent out by the President of the Delegation to Armenians who, armed with the hope of freeing Cilicia, their homeland, rushed from all sides to enlist. Thus was created the Legion d'Orient, later named Legion Armenienne, for it was made up almost exclusively of Armenians. Under the command of French officers and French staffs, the Legion took part in the Palestine-Syria campaign. It fought valiantly and its French leaders as well



as Field Marshal Allenby, Comaander-in-Chief of the Expedition, rendered official tribute to its tenacity and bravery.

But these are not the only military services that the Armenians have given to the Allies. From the very outbreak of the World War, refusing to accept the offer of the Turks, who promised them independence if they would join them in order to allow the Ottoman troops to reach the Transcaucasus to raise the Turanian population, and they did not hesitate to align themselves with the Allies. And in continuing the War for nearly a whole year on the Caucasian front, after the collapse of Russia, the Armenian Volunteers, under their own leaders, prevented the German forces from obtaining oil, as has been declared by General Ludendorff himself, who states that this was one of the causes of the inferiority of the German army and its notably feeble resistance

On the other hand, by their action, the Armenian Volunteers held in the Caucasus, important Turkish forces and prevented them from fighting elsewhere.* They thus came to the assistance indirectly but very effectively, of the allied troops fighting in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, and later in the Salonica campaign, the victorious outcome of which unquestionably was one of the most powerful causes that led to the defeat of the Central Powers.

Nevertheless, in spite of her promise, the Treaty of Sevres abandons that largest part of Cilicia to the Turks, while it takes from them the region of Smyrna and of Thrace. The Armenians of Cilicia, to whom this freedom was promised and who fought against the Turks in order to obtain it, therefore see themselves once more returned to the domination of their ancient oppressors.

But recent events in Greece have modified the situation. The new direction of Greek politics at the fall of Mr. Venizelos brings up the question again. We do not ask for a revision of the Treaty of Sevres, but whether it is revised or not, it seems at the least that negotiations will break open from which diplomacy could take advantage, if it wishes, to come to the aid of Armenians in order

* (Footnote by John A. Shishmanian) It was said, at the time, that an army of one million Turks was prevented from being sent to the Western front. J.A.S.

to realize in Cilicia their very modest prayer and at the same time protect French interests.

The Armenians, considering what has already been done, and the signing by France of the Treaty of Sevres, no longer ask for the liberation of Cilicia, but while submitting to Ottoman sovereignty, they simply demand that the Christian population not be abandoned to the administration of Turks whom the Allies themselves have recognized to be incapable of governing non-Turkish peoples, and as they declared first in the letter of Mr. Clemenceau to the Ottoman Delegation that came to the Peace Conference in Paris and later in the declaration that was issued at the Conference at Spa.

The only solution then, is to grant to these peoples an autonomous Christian administration under French protection, with a mixed gendarmerie under French command into which may be introduced other national elements. This gendarmerie could be organized within a short time and its finances assured out of the resources of the country itself as soon as pacified.

We repeat that this solution which alone will make life possible to the Christian people of Cilicia would offer to France certain advantages which may be summed up as follows:

- 1:- It can be brought about by diplomacy alone without affecting the Treaty of Sevres. And France is able to do it readily, since Cilicia, under the Tripartite Accord is part of the French zone of influence, and because of this same "Accord" she need not withdraw her troops until the execution of the Treaty is effectually assured.
- 2:- It would call for no further sacrifice either of men or money.
- 3:- It would avoid all international difficulties, for it would not affect either the letter or the spirit of the Treaty of Sevres. The autonomous Christian administration could be brought about by a simple irade of the Sultan.



- 4:- It would perpetuate the peace of the northern region of Syria and establish security on the Syrian boundary.
- 5:- It would permit France to evacuate Cilicia by means of its mixed gendarmerie as above mentioned.
- 6:- It would make more real the privileges of an economic, commercial and agricultural order in this region which is richer than any of the other regions placed under her mandate.

As to the 250,000 Christians of Cilicia whose official and traditional guardian is France, and who have returned to Cilicia under her own encouragement, they could by this solution enjoy a real security, no longer subject to vexations, injustices and the arbitrariness of an administration that has more than proved its incapacity to rule over non-Turk races and whose sad memory has not yet been effaced.

THE PRESIDENT
Delegation Nationale Armenienne
BOGHOS NUBAR

THIS TRANSLATION WAS DONE BY JOHN A. SHISHMANIAN, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SENT NO REPLY TO THIS MEMORANDUM.



APPENDIX F

*Délégation Nationale
Arménienne*

22, Avenue du Président Wilson

Téléphone: Paris, 39755

*Bureau Télégraphique:
Délégation - Paris*

Paris, le December 23th 1920

My dear Shishmanian,

Before you leave Paris, I want to tell you how much pleased I have been to meet you again in Paris. I knew your distinguished military services in France and in Cilicia and especially the glorious part which you had taken in the battle of Arara, but I can now better appreciate the important role you played in the education of the military spirit of our countrymen in Adana, and particularly in the training of the "Groupements Arméniens", which have done such excellent work in Adana.

Besides, I am pleased to point out the very appreciable services which you rendered to the Armenian National Delegation during your short sojourn in Paris by supplying us with documental and highly interesting reports on events which had happened in Cilicia and of which both the French Government and ourselves had such an imperfect knowledge.

I therefore express once again my best thanks and appreciation for your work.

Believe me, Dear Shishmanian,

Very sincerely yours.

Stephane Hurbas



APPENDIX G



Kararname

| | |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| Karar No. | 941 |
| Eski Defter | C. No. 13 S. No. 176 |

Ahiren Yunan donanmasının karadenizde inkişaf eden fa'aliyeti ve İneboluyu bombarduman etmesi hasebiyle Samsun'a bir ihraç ihtimali tezayüt etmiş olduğundan sahildeki onbeş yaşından elli yaşına kadar eli silâh tutan len rumların Dahile sevkleri merkez ordusu kumandanlığının işarına matuf Erkâni Harbiyei Umumiye Vekâletinin 9.6.37 tarihli ve 5046 numaralı tezkeresi üzerine İcra Vekilleri Heyetinin 12.6.37 tarihindeki içtimasında karar-gir olmuştur.

12.6.337

İcra Vekilleri Heyeti Reisi ve
Müdafaai Millîye Vekili
Fevzi

Şer'îye Vekili
Fehmi

Adliye Vekili
Refik Şevket

Bahiliye Vekili
Ata

Hariciye Vekili
Yusuf Kemâl

Erkâni Harbiyei Umumiye Vekâleti Vekili
Fevzi

Sıhhiye ve Muaveneti İçtimaiye Vekili
Dr.Refik

İktisat Vekili
Mahmut Celâl

Nafia Vekili
Ömer Lütfi

Maarif Vekili
Hamdullah Suphi

Maliye Vekili
Hasan Hüsnü

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi
M.Kemâl

DEVLET ARŞİMLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

تاریخ: ۲۲۷ / ۲ / ۴

تورکیا بویوک ملت مجلسی

اجرا وکیللری هیئت ریاستی
تلم مخصوص مدبری

سابقہ میں واضحہ ایک مرتبہ رقم لکھنا

عدد

تعداد

۹۹۱

۲

۴۵۰

۱- ذرا من اور بہت تازہ کچھ باتوں پر اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ
دو تریا کو ایک وقت پر لیا گیا ہے۔ اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ
معدت سے ایک بار لکھا گیا ہے۔ اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ
سابقہ میں، یا مفید، ایک بار لکھا گیا ہے۔ اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ

۲- سابقہ میں، یا مفید، ایک بار لکھا گیا ہے۔ اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ
سابقہ میں، یا مفید، ایک بار لکھا گیا ہے۔ اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ
سابقہ میں، یا مفید، ایک بار لکھا گیا ہے۔ اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ
سابقہ میں، یا مفید، ایک بار لکھا گیا ہے۔ اس وقت سے کہ وہ ایک دفعہ

۱۲

جواباً بلکہ جن اور ان جواب، اولیٰ ہی مراد ہے اور یہ تو سوسہ ہندو میں دیا اولیٰ ہے۔

2

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

تورکيا بويونک ملت مجلسي

اجرا و کيللری هياتی وياتی

قلم مخصوص يدورنى

عدد

تداوه

آقره

۲۲۷ / ۱ / ۷۶

نه

را حید و طاقه

۷۵۶

این قلم مخصوص به انادوسیه مورد ۱۶۷۶ و ۱۶۷۷ تا تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره
تاریخ ۱۶۷۶ تا ۱۶۷۷ قدره

۲۱

لازمه
۷۶

جوانا یازله جن اورانه حواله اولدورمور ایتمک تاریخ و نوسورونک در جوجا اولدور.

5

APPENDIX H

ÖZET

Millî Mücadele, Modern Türkiye tarihinin üzerinde en fazla yazılan dönemidir demek yanlış olmaz. Gerçekte, bu dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne geçişin son aşaması olduğundan ötürü yerli ve yabancı birçok araştırmacının ilgisini çekmiştir. Bu dönemin incelenmesi, bir yandan, imparatorluktan ulus-devlete geçişle ilgili genel bir karşılaştırma (buna benzer geçişlerin olduğu, mesela, Rus ve Avusturya-Macaristan imparatorluklarıyla) yapma olanağı sağlarken, diğer taraftan da, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluş temellerini açığa çıkarmak için oldukça önemli ipuçları vermektedir.

Söz konusu dönem üzerinde çalışan araştırmacıların üzerinde anlaştıkları bir konu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İtilâf Devletleri'ne (Büyük Britanya, Fransa ve İtalya) karşı verilen silahlı ve diplomatik bir savaş sonucu kurulduğudur. Bu argümana göre, İtilâf Devletleri, Birinci Dünya Savaşı bitiminde, ekonomik ve siyasi çıkarları doğrultusunda, Orta Doğu ve Kafkaslar'da nüfuz alanları oluşturmak için, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan kalan toprakları etnik temelde yeniden şekillendirerek parçalamak istediler. Bu görüşün temel dayanağı, aslında, Büyük Devletlerin 19.

yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na karşı izlemiş oldukları, İmparatorluğun bütünlüğünü hedef alan politikalarıdır. Bu politikalar, somut olarak, 1915-1917 yılları arasında imzalanan, İmparatorluğu nüfuz alanlarına göre kağıt üzerinde şekillendiren Gizli Antlaşmalarla ortaya konmuştur. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın bitişiyle birlikte Anadolu'nun çeşitli kısımlarının işgali bu antlaşmaların uzantısı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, Büyük Devletlerin Osmanlı topraklarını bölme amaçları savaş sonrası dönemde devam etmiş, bunu önlemek için Türkler, Mustafa Kemal'in liderliğinde bir Bağımsızlık Savaşı vermiştir. Savaş Türklerin zaferiyle sonuçlandığında, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşu sağlanabilmiştir.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşuna yönelik, idealize edilmiş ve, özellikle, Modern Türkiye tarihinde oldukça etkili olan bu bakış açısı önemli bir faktörü – yeterince- dikkate almamaktadır. Bu da 19. yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan tevarüs etmiş “Milliyetler Meselesi”dir. Bu mesele genellikle ihmal edilmiştir çünkü Büyük Devletlerin yarattığı bir politika aracı olarak görülmüştür. Bunun bir sonucu, Osmanlı toplumunu oluşturan etnik, dinsel ve millî unsurlar arasında gelişen milliyetçilik akımının Osmanlı devletinin içişlerine müdahale etmek için emperyalist devletler tarafından üretildiği ve milliyetçilik akımının etkisi altında kalan grupların bu amaca araç olduklarının ileri sürülmesi olmuştur.

Büyük devletlerin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda milliyetçilik akımının, özellikle, Hıristiyan cemaatler arasında etkili olmasında önemli bir rol oynadıkları göz ardı edilemez. Ancak, bu tür etkinin Osmanlı devletinin erken 20. yüzyılda

karşılaştığı etnik, dinsel ve millî temel taşıyan sorunlarını yeterince açıklayıp açıklayamadığı ve bu tür sorunların Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşu üzerindeki etkisini esaslı bir şekilde saptayıp saptayamadığı tartışılması gereken sorulardır. Bu çalışma, bu tür soruları cevaplandırmak için bir çerçeve sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Argümanı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminde milliyetçilik akımının etkisiyle karşılaşılan sorunların, aslında, Anadolu'da yaşayan etnik, dinsel ve millî grupların arasında yaşanan etnik çatışmalar olduğudur. Bu çatışmalarda, uluslararası güçlerin rolü daha çok “tarafli bir seyirci” görünümündedir. Söz konusu çatışmaların, Müslüman-Türk tarafının lehine sonuçlanması, sonuç olarak, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 1923'de olduğu şekliyle (sınırlarıyla ve nüfus yapısıyla) kurulmasını sağlamıştır.

Anadolu'da etnik çatışmalar yoğun olarak imparatorluktan ulus-devlete geçiş sürecinde yani 1914-1923 yılları arasında şiddetli bir şekilde yaşanmıştır. Bununla birlikte, bu tür çatışmaları bu dönemde ortaya çıkaran nedenleri 19. yüzyılda görebiliriz. Bu nedenlerden birincisi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun siyasi ve ekonomik çözülmesine paralel olarak toplum yapısının çözülmesidir. Bu dönemde, millet sistemi çerçevesinde örgütlenmiş Hıristiyan cemaatler, milliyetçilik akımının etkisiyle, ulus kimliğine yönelmişlerdir. İmparatorluğu “parçalayıcı” bu tür eğilimlere karşı, Osmanlı yöneticileri, toplumu oluşturan bütün unsurları kapsayan bir Osmanlı vatandaşlığını birleştirici bir kimlik yaratmaya çalıştıklarında amaçlarına ulaşamadılar. Osmanlı vatandaşlığı projesinin başarısızlığı 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında birçok deneyimle kanıtlandığında ve imparatorluğun unsurları arasında

yayılan milliyetçilik akımını önleyemediği ortaya çıktığında, 20. yüzyılın Anadolu'sunda yaşanacak etnik çatışmaların temelleri de görülebiliyordu.

Osmanlı devletinin çözülmesi ve Hıristiyan topluluklar arasında milliyetçilik akımının kök salması dışında, bu çatışmaları ortaya çıkararak nedenler arasında 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren, özellikle, 1877-1878'deki Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'ndan sonra, Anadolu'ya yoğun bir Müslüman göçünün yaşanması eklenmelidir. Müslüman göçmenler, Anadolu'nun etnik, dinsel ve sosyal bileşiminin değişmesinde çok önemli bir faktör olmalarının yanı sıra, Türk milliyetçiliğinin fikrîsel ve siyasî gelişiminde de etkili oldular. Yusuf Akçura gibi bir entelektüel yazdığı *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* makalesiyle Türkçülük fikrini sistemleştirirken, yoğun Müslüman göçleri İmparatorluğun Müslüman nüfusunu önemli bir oranda arttırmışlardır. Ayrıca, göçmenler, Müslümanlar arasında milliyetçilik duygularının güçlenmesine yol açarlarken, Müslüman-Türk milliyetçiliğinin kitlesel bir temel edinmesini de sağladılar. Buna ek olarak, Müslüman nüfusun iskânında izlenen yol, Anadolu'da, özellikle, Doğu tarafında, etnik gerilimin artmasında etkili oldu çünkü Osmanlı devleti, Müslüman göçmenleri Hıristiyan nüfus arasında, doğuda Ermeniler ve batıda Rumlar arasında serpiştirmeyi, böylelikle milliyetçiliklerini dizginlemeyi ve nüfus oranlarını azaltmayı, uygun gördü.

İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete geçerken şiddetli çatışmaların ortaya çıkmasında etken olan diğer bir faktör, Büyük Devletlerin Osmanlı devletine yönelik politikalarıydı. Hıristiyan unsurların milliyetçi duygularını –özellikle Ermenilerin- İmparatorluğun içişlerine müdahale aracı olarak kullanma politikaları, Osmanlı

devlet yöneticilerinin Hıristiyan uyruklarını “Beşinci kol” veya “iç düşman” olarak algılamalarına yol açtı. Bu algı, özellikle 1913’den sonra, Türk milliyetçiliğinin siyasi arenaya çıkışını takiben ve Mütareke döneminde egemen olmuştu. Sonuç olarak, Büyük Devletlerin bu tür politikaları, hem Müslümanlar ve Hıristiyanlar, hem de Osmanlı devleti ile Hıristiyan uyrukları arasında bir tür düşmanlığın oluşumuna ve zaman içinde artmasına yol açmıştır.

Son olarak, Anadolu’da yaşanan etnik çatışmalara yol açan ekonomik faktörden bahsedilmelidir. Tanzimat döneminde yapılan reformların, ekonomik alanda Hıristiyan azınlıkların üstünlüğüne yol açtığı, genel olarak, bilinen bir gerçektir. Buna karşılık, Müslümanlar idare ve askeri işlerle uğraşmışlardır. Bu işbölümü, 1910’lu yıllarda, İttihatçılar tarafından değiştirilmek istenmiş, diğer bir deyişle, ekonomik alandaki Hıristiyan üstünlüğü sona erdirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu durum, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında, Müslüman tepkisinin Rum ve Ermenilere karşı yönlendirilmesinde siyasi faktör yanında ekonomik faktörün eşlik etmesine yol açmıştır.

Yukarıda bahsedilen faktörler, Anadolu’da görülen etnik çatışmaları başlangıç noktasından (siyaset unsurlarının ortaya çıktığı nokta) alıp açık çatışmaya (unsurların amaçları doğrultusunda eylemde buldukları dönem) ve en sonunda dönüşü olmayan bir noktaya (şiddetli çatışma dönemi) getirmiştir. Son aşama, İttihatçıların, İmparatorluğun milliyetler meselesini çözmek için “demografi mühendisliği”ne başvurdukları sırada ortaya çıktı. Demografi mühendisliği bir etnik grubun

diğerlerine karşı ekonomik ve siyasi gücünü arttırma çabası ve bunu gerçekleştirmek için nüfus oranını diğerlerine karşı arttırma girişimi olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

Herhangi bir etnik çatışmayı bir grup lehine sonuçlandırmak yönünde izlenen demografi mühendisliği yöntemleri çeşitlidir. Örneğin, ekonomik ve siyasi gücünün artması istenen grubun nüfusunu çoğaltmak için doğuma yönelik politikalar bir yöntemdir. Ayrıca, diğer grubun veya grupların nüfus oranını azaltmak için nüfus transferleri, din ve dil değiştirmeleri, asimilasyon ve tehcir izlenen yöntemler arasındadır.

İttihatçıların, İmparatorluğun milliyetler meselesini çözmeye kullandıkları demografi mühendisliği yöntemleri tehcir ve iskândı. 1914'de Ege kıyılarından Rum nüfusu Yunanistan'a göç etmeye zorlarken; 1915-16'da Ermenileri Doğu Anadolu'dan tehcir ederken; Balkanlar'dan göç etmek zorunda kalmış Müslüman göçmenleri ve Doğu Anadolu'yu işgal eden Rus ordusundan kaçan Kürtleri Türkleri arasına serpiştirme politikası izlerken amaçları Anadolu'nun nüfus yapısını Türkler değiştirmek ve, böylece, "yönetilebilir azınlıklar" oluşturmaktı.

İttihatçıların demografi mühendisliği amaçlı politikaları Birinci Dünya savaşı sırasında oldukça etkiliydi ancak savaşın sonunda, yani 1918'in sonlarında, tamamlanabilmiş değildi. Savaş sonrası egemen olan ortamda, hali hazırda Osmanlı Rum ve Ermenileri arasında yayılmış olan "self-determinasyon" ilkesi, Osmanlı topraklarının yeniden şekillenmesinde galip güçlerin başvuracağı ilke olarak kabul edilmiş ve bu ilke bazı Müslüman unsurları; örneğin, Kürtleri, etkilemeye başlamıştı. Rumlar ve Ermeniler Osmanlı devletinden ayrılmak ve Anadolu'da, belirli bir toprak

parçasını kendi devletleri için istiyorlardı. İstenilen toprak parçalarının elde edilmesi için, Rumlar Batı Anadolu'da ve Ermeniler Kilikya bölgesinde, şiddete başvurdular ve İttihatçıların demografi mühendisliği politikasını, Müslümanları göçe zorlamak suretiyle, tersine çevirmek istediler. Boşaltılan yerlere de, Hıristiyan nüfusun çoğunluğunu sağlamak amacıyla, Rum ve Ermenileri yerleştirmeyi planladılar. Bu durum diğer faktörlerle birlikte; örneğin, tehcir edilen Rum ve Ermenilerin geri dönmesi ve İttihatçıların savaş suçlusu olarak yargılanması, merkezi ve örgütlü milliyetçi bir harekete dönüşecek olan Müslüman-Türk direnişinin ortaya çıkmasına esas nedeni teşkil etti Böylece, 1918'in sonları ve 1919'un başlarında neredeyse tüm Anadolu ve Trakya'ya yayılan, özellikle Rum ve Ermeni tehdidinin görüldüğü yerlerde, Müdafaa-i Hukuk cemiyetlerinin varlığı söz konusudur.

Bununla birlikte, savaş sonrası dönemdeki etnik çatışmaların dönüm noktası İzmir'in Yunan ordusu tarafından işgali olmuştur. Bu işgal, Anadolu'daki Müslüman-Türk bütün Müdafaa-i Hukuk cemiyetlerini alarma geçirmiş ve silahlı mücadele hazırlıklarını hızlandırmıştır. Aynı zamanda, Türk milliyetçilerine somut işgal tehditleri karşısında, 1919 yılı boyunca, Müslümanları örgütlemek ve harekete geçirmek için somut gerekçeleri sağlamıştır.

Milliyetçi hareketin liderleri, farklı etnik grupların Anadolu'da toprak taleplerini tamamen reddediyordu. Diğer bir deyişle, Anadolu'nun etnik temelde yeniden şekillenmesini yani bölünmesini kabul etmiyorlardı. Hareket bu ret üzerine inşa edildi ve hedefe ulaşmak için Müslüman kimliğini ön plana çıkaran bir milliyetçilik anlayışı benimsedi. Bu, bir taraftan, Hilafet ve Saltanata bağlı unsurları

harekete dahil etmeye yararken, öte yandan, Müslüman gruplar arasında milliyetçi tarafların etkisiz kılınmasını sağladı. Ayrıca, Doğu Anadolu'da Ermeni tehlikesine karşı Kürtlerin milliyetçi harekete desteğini kazandı. Doğu Anadolu'da bir Ermenilik tehlikesi, gerçekte, milliyetçi hareketin üzerine en fazla vurduğu noktaydı zira o bölgedeki Kürt ve Ermeni unsurlar 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren açık bir çatışma içindeydiler. Bundan ötürü, böyle bir vurgu, Kürtlerin milliyetçi hareket tarafına çekilmesinde kolaylaştırıcı bir faktör oldu.

Bunlara ek olarak, 1919 yılında milliyetçi hareketin karşılaştığı önemli bir sorun meşruiyet sorunu olmuştur. Bu sorun, esas olarak, milliyetçi hareketin merkezi devlete yani İstanbul hükümetine karşıt bir tavır almasından dolayı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu meşruiyet sorunu güçlendiren bir nokta ise milliyetçi hareketin İttihatçılıkla özdeşleştirilmesidir. Gerek milliyetçi hareket karşıtı olanlar gerekse yabancı ülke temsilcileri ve yabancı basın bu hareketi İttihatçıların beslediği ve ideolojik olarak İttihatçılığın bir devamı olarak tanımlamakta hemfikirdiler. Milliyetçi hareketin liderleri her ne kadar bu tür iddiaların doğru olmadığını ifade ettiyseler de, karşılaşmış oldukları meşruiyet sorununun başka türlü aşılması gerektiğini düşünüyorlardı. Bu nedenle, 1918'de Padişah iradesiyle kapatılmış olan Osmanlı Meclis-i Mebusan'ın yeniden açılması, bunun için de seçimlerin yapılması, konusunda ısrarlı davrandılar. Zira, Meclis-i Mebusan'da oluşacak milliyetçi bir çoğunluk hem hareketin meşruiyetine yönelik kaygıları ortadan kaldıracak hem de milliyetçilerin İtilaf Devletleri karşısında, İstanbul Hükümetlerinin yapamadığı, pazarlık için elini güçlendirecekti. Bunun yanında, yasma gücünü ellerinde

bulundurarak, milliyetçi liderler istedikleri kararları meşru bir zeminde çıkartabileceklerdi. Bunun somut bir örneği, Meclis-i Mebusan'ın 12 Ocak 1920'da açılmasından kısa bir süre sonra, milliyetçi hareketin programı niteliğini taşıyan Misâk-ı Millî'nin kabul edilmesidir.

Bunlardan ötürü, 1919'un sonlarında yapılan genel seçimler milliyetçiler için büyük önem taşıyordu. Milliyetçiler bu seçimleri kazanmak için ellerinden geleni yaptılar ve Meclis'de kendi çoğunluklarını oluşturacak bir sayıyı buldular. Böylece, 1919 seçimleri milliyetçilerin meşruiyet kaygılarını gidermiştir. Bunun yanında, bu seçimler imparatorluk'tan ulus-devlete geçiş açısından oldukça önemli –ama bugüne kadar pek bahsedilmemiş- bir sonuç getirmiştir. Bu da, imparatorluğun gayrimüslim unsurlarının siyasi temsil hakkını bitirmiş olmasıdır.

Bu sonuç, tesadüfi değildi. Mütarekenin ilk günlerinden itibaren Osmanlı devletinden ayrılmak isteyen Rum ve Ermenilerin dinsel temsilcileri bu seçimlere katılmayacaklarını ilan etmişlerdi. Buna karşılık, Yahudiler arasında bu noktada görüş ayrılığı belirmiş, sonuçta bu cemaat kısmen seçimlere katılmıştır. Bu duruma rağmen, 1919 seçimlerinde mebus olmaya hak kazanan tek gayrimüslim Yahudi Mişon Ventura olmuştur. Gerçekte, milliyetçi hareket Müslüman bir çerçevede gelişmiş, Sivas Kongresi'nde bütün yerel müdafaa-i hukuk cemiyetlerini tek bir çatı altında toplayan Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti (ARMHC) sadece Müslümanları üyeliğe kabul etmişti. Sonuç olarak da, 1919 seçimleri, bir istisnaıyla, tamamı Müslüman olan mebuslardan teşekkül etmiş olan bir Meclis ortaya çıkarmıştır.

Böylece, 1920 yılına gelindiğinde, milliyetçi hareket hem örgütlenme hem de meşruiyet açısından konumunu sağlamlaştırmıştı. Bir taraftan, farklı Müslüman etnik grupları –bu çalışma açısından Kürtleri- mücadeleye katmış, diğer bir taraftan, bu grupların temsilcilerini meşru Meclis-i Mebusan çatısı altında toplamıştı. Bu toplanma, Ankara’da 23 Nisan 1920’de kurulacak Büyük Millet Meclisi’nde daha somut ve niceliksel olarak, daha fazla oranda görülecekti.

1920 yılının başlangıcından 1922’nin sonlarına kadar Anadolu’da hakim durum silahlı çatışma unsuru olmuştur. Bu dönemde, Türk milliyetçileri Anadolu’yu “bölücü” unsur olarak gördükleri gruplara karşı silahlı mücadele verirken, aynı zamanda, 1923’de kurulacak ulus-devletin temellerini atıyorlardı. Ancak bu kuruluşun gerçekleştirilebilmesi, kati bir surette, yapılan silahlı mücadelelerden baskın çıkmayı gerektiriyordu. Bu tür çatışmaların ilk örneği güneyde Kilikya denilen (esas olarak Adana ve hinterlandını kapsayan ancak Antep, Maraş ve Urfa’yı da kapsadığı varsayılan) bölgede ortaya çıktı. Burada çatışan taraflar Türk milliyetçileri ve bölgeyi, Eylül 1919’da Büyük Britanya ile yapılan antlaşma sonucunda, işgal etme hakkını elde eden Fransız güçleri arasındaydı. Ancak, Fransız askerlerinin yaklaşık yüzde sekseni Ermeni gönüllülerinden ve yerli Ermenilerden oluşuyordu. Bölge Müslümanlarının ve milliyetçilerin işgale asıl itirazları bu noktada yatıyordu. Zira, işgalde ve daha sonra yönetimde Ermenilerin söz sahibi olmaları, bu bölgenin Ermenistan devletinin bir parçası haline getirilmeye çalışıldığı izlenimini veriyordu. Gerçekte, 1919’un Şubat ayında Paris Barış Konferansı’na Anadolu’daki toprak

taleplerini ileten Ermeni delegasyonu Kilikya'nın Ermenistan için vazgeçilmez bir bölge olduğunu ileri sürmüştü.

Bölgede artan Ermeni tehlikesi karşısında, milliyetçi hareketin liderleri Eylül 1919'da toplanan Sivas Kongresi'nin son gününde burada millî teşkilatı kurmak ve güçlendirmek için karar aldılar. Çünkü bu bölgede, 1918'in sonlarından itibaren Anadolu'nun diğer taraflarında ortaya çıkan müdafaa-i hukuk örgütlenmeleri ve milis teşkilatları pek etkili olmamıştı. Bunların örgütlenmesi hareketin liderliğine bağlıydı. Bu doğrultuda, Sivas Kongresi'nde alınan karardan sonra Mustafa Kemal çeşitli isimleri Adana, Antep ve Urfa'da teşkilat kurmak ve Müslüman nüfusu silahlı mücadeleye hazırlamakla görevlendirdi.

Bölgedeki ilk ve amansız çatışmalar Maraş bölgesinde görüldü. Ocak 1920 yılının 20'sine doğru Maraş merkezi milliyetçi kuvvetler tarafından 9 Şubat'a kadar sürecek bir kuşatmaya tabi tutuldu. Bu süre içinde, oldukça kanlı çarpışmalar görüldü. Çarpışmalardaki zayıf daha çok Müslümanlar ve Ermeniler arasından çıktı. En sonunda, Fransızlar Maraş'tan çekilme kararı aldılar. Bu karar, gerek kamuoyuna gerekse yabancı ülkelerin temsilcilerine, milliyetçilerin bir zaferi olarak yansdı. Gerçekte, Maraş çarpışmaları milliyetçilerin ilk ciddi zaferiydi. Bunun üzerine, Osmanlı devletiyle yapılacak barış antlaşması hazırlıklarını yürüten Büyük Devletlerin temsilcileri, ortaya çıkacak barış antlaşmasının uygulanıp uygulanamayacağı konusunda, kafalarında, ciddi soru işaretleri ortaya çıktı. Bunu sağlamak için Osmanlı devletine gözdağı vermeyi kararlaştırdılar. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, Maraş'ta Ermenilere yönelik uygulanan şiddeti bahane ederek

İstanbul'un resmen işgaline karar verdiler. Bu arada, Maraş'ı kontrolleri altına aldıktan sonra, milliyetçi güçler Urfa ve Antep'ten Fransızların çekilmesi için saldırılara başladılar. Urfa'daki çatışmalar sonucu Fransızlar buradan da çekildiler. Antep'ten çekilmeleri ise milliyetçilerle yaptıkları antlaşma sonrasında olmuştur.

Fransızların milliyetçilerle antlaşmak için yaptıkları girişimler 1919 yılı sonlarına uzanmaktadır. Aslında, Fransızlar Kilikya bölgesinde kalmak istemediklerini –bazı şartlar karşılığında- milliyetçilere çeşitli zamanlarda ifade etmişlerdi. İki tarafın antlaşması Ekim 1921'i buldu. Bu antlaşmanın en fazla etkilediği taraf Ermeniler olmuştur çünkü Fransızların çekilmeleriyle birlikte bölgede yaşamlarını devam ettirmenin pek mümkün olmadığını görmüşlerdi. Kalmaları yönünde Fransızların ve milliyetçi yetkililerin telkinleri işe yaramadı. 1921 sonlarında ve 1922 başında pek çok sayıda, yaklaşık 60,000 Ermeni, göç etmeyi tercih etti. Dolayısıyla, Kilikya bölgesinde bir Ermeni yönetimi söz konusu olmaktan çıktı.

Milliyetçilerin Fransızları Maraş ve Urfa'yı boşaltmaya mecbur etmelerinden sonra Osmanlı devletiyle yapılacak barış antlaşmasının koşulları ortaya çıktı ve antlaşma 10 Ağustos 1920'de imzalandı. Sevr Antlaşması olarak bilinen antlaşma Türk milliyetçileri için kabulü zor şartlar içeriyordu. Bu antlaşmaya göre, Doğu Anadolu'nun bir kesiminin Ermeni Cumhuriyeti'ne bırakılması söz konusuydu. Ayrıca, Anadolu'nun batısında Yunan yönetiminin varlığı devam ettiriliyor, bunun yanında, özerk veya bağımsız bir Kürdistan devletinden bahsediliyordu. Milliyetçiler için, bütün bunlar, tek bir anlama geliyordu. Bu talepleri çürütmek için savaşmak. Bu

savaş, antlaşmayı ortaya çıkaran Büyük Devletlerle yapılmayacaktı. Çünkü onlara savaşacak durumda değillerdi. Hesap milliyetçilerle Anadolu'da toprak talebinde bulunan ve bunu barış antlaşmasıyla kısmen sağlayan gruplar arasında kesilecekti.

Barış Antlaşmasının imzalanmasından sonraki ilk hesaplaşma Doğu'da Ermeni taleplerini sona erdirmeye yönelik Türk-Ermeni savaşı olmuştur. Bu savaşta başarılı olmak için milliyetçiler, Bolşeviklerle temas kurdular ve onların desteğini aradılar. Bolşevikler milliyetçi hareketi anti-emperyalist bir hareket olarak görüyorlardı. Ayrıca, Kafkasların güvenliğini sağlamaları ve dolayısıyla oradan gelecek tehditleri etkisiz kılmaları, büyük bir ölçüde, milliyetçilerle ortak hareket etmekten geçiyordu. İdeolojik ve stratejik nedenlerden ötürü milliyetçilere maddi ve manevi destek verdiler. Bu desteği garanti altına aldıktan sonra milliyetçiler, 1920 yılının sonbaharında Ermenilere karşı harekete geçtiler ve kısa bir sürede Kars'tan geri çekilmelerini sağladılar. Ermeni devletinin yöneticileri bu durum karşısında barış istediler. Barış antlaşması 2 Aralık 1920'de, Ermeni Cumhuriyetinin Bolşevikleştirildiği ve böylece varlığını yitirdiği gün, Gümrü'de imzalandı.

Bundan sonra milliyetçilerin temel amacı Batı Anadolu'dan Yunan ordusunu çıkarmaktı. Aynı zamanda, Kuzey Anadolu'da, Karadeniz kıyılarında bağımsız bir cumhuriyet kurmak isteyen Pontus milliyetçilerini etkisiz kılmaları şarttı. Bu amaçla, 9 Aralık 1920'de, sadece Pontus işlerini görmek üzere Merkez Ordusu'nu kurdular ve kumandanlığına Nurettin Paşa'yı geçirdiler. Ancak Pontus milliyetçileriyle mücadele etmeye başlamadan, 1921 Mart'ında, İç Anadolu'da, Sivas civarında

bölgesel özerklik elde etmeyi amaçlayan bir Kürt ayaklanmasıyla karşı karşıya geldiler.

Koçkiri aşiretinin ön ayak olduğu ayaklanmayı bastırmak için milliyetçiler bir taraftan uzlaşmaya çalıştılar; diğer bir taraftan, bu süreçte askeri hazırlıklarını bitirdiler. Ayaklanmanın bastırılmasında askeri yöntemler baskın oldu. Ayaklanmanın bastırılması sırasında uygulanan şiddet ve Nurettin Paşa'nın yetkilerini aşarak yaptığı işler, Büyük Millet Meclis'nde şikayet konusu oldu ve Paşa'nın yargılanması yönünde talepler dile getirildi. Bu talepler, aynı zamanda, Pontus milliyetçilerine karşı Nurettin Paşa'nın yürüttüğü operasyonlarda kullandığı yöntemlerle de ilgiliydi. Bundan dolayı, iki ayrı durumda ortaya çıkan benzerliklerden ötürü, Nurettin Paşa 1921 sonlarında Meclis gündemini epey işgal etti ve Merkez Ordusu kumandanlığından alındı.

Koçkiri ayaklanması bastırıldıktan sonra Merkez Ordusu kumandanlığı dikkatini Karadeniz kıyılarında etkin olan Pontus çetelerine kaydırды. Bunları etkisiz kılmak için, kendilerine lojistik destek sağladıklarına inanılan önemli şehir ve kazalardaki Rum nüfusun dahile nakli için karar alındı. Bu karar, 1921'in Haziran ve Ağustos ayları arasında etkili bir şekilde uygulandı. Sonbaharda ise Batı Anadolu'da Yunan ordusunun ilerlemesi nedeniyle etkisi azaldı. Alınan tehcir önlemine rağmen, bölgede, Pontus çetelerinin etkisi kırılmadı. Bunlar, 1922'nin sonlarına kadar, Yunan ordusunun Batı Anadolu'yu boşaltmaya mecbur olduğu ve Türkiye-Yunanistan arasında imzalanan nüfus değişimi antlaşmasına kadar varlıklarını sürdürdüler.

Yukarıda kısaca belirtildiği gibi, Türk milliyetçileri Pontus milliyetçileriyle uğraştıkları bir sırada Yunan ordusu Batı Anadolu bulunduğu yerden hareket ederek, Bursa ve Edirne'yi işgal etmiş ve İç Anadolu'ya doğru hareket etmişti. 1921'de Yunan ordusu ile milliyetçi ordu arasında önemli çarpışmalar olmuş fakat her iki taraf da yeterli sonucu alamamıştı. 1922 yılı büyük çarpışma için hazırlıklarla geçti. Bu arada, Büyük Devletler Sevr Antlaşmasının değiştirilmesi için, milliyetçi temsilcilerin de hazır bulunduğu görüşmeler düzenlediler ancak bunlardan bir sonuç alınamadı. Nihai çözüm bir Türk-Yunan savaşıyla gerçekleşecekti. 1922 yazında Türk ordusunun durumu daha iyi bir vaziyetteydi zira Yunan ordusu moral olarak çökmüş durumdaydı. Ayrıca, Yunanistan içinde son zamanlarda görülen siyasi bölünmeler orduda da kendisini hissettiriyordu. Yunan ordusu için, Anadolu'da sonun başlangıcı, Ağustos sonlarında milliyetçi ordunun saldırısıyla başladı. Yaklaşık iki hafta boyunca, Yunan ordusu sürekli çekilmek zorunda kaldı ve en son İzmir'de, denizin başladığı yerde, durmak zorunda kaldı. Bu geri çekilme sırasında sivil Rum nüfusu orduya eşlik etti. Yunan ordusu mensupları ve sivil nüfusun kaçabileni Yunanistan'a kaçtı, geri kalanları milliyetçilerin merhametine sığındı.

Yunan ordusunun bozguna uğraması ve Batı Anadolu'dan çekilmesi Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Anadolu'da yaşanan etnik çatışmaların da noktalandığı anlamına geliyordu. Bu çatışmaların her birinde Türk milliyetçileri baskın çıkmıştı. Sıra milliyetçilerin zaferlerini Lozan'da yapılacak barış antlaşması görüşmelerinde tescil ettirmelerine gelmişti. Görüşmeler Kasım 1922'de başladı ve Temmuz 1923'de sonuçlandı.

Görüşmelerin ilk döneminde, Anadolu'da 1919-1922 arasında yaşanan etnik çatışmaların çözümlenmesi, Konferans gündeminin önemli bir bölümünü oluşturdu. Türk-Yunan çatışmasının tarihte ilk kez görülen bir şekilde çözümlenmesi kararlaştırıldı: Zorunlu nüfus değişimi. Bu doğrultudaki antlaşma 30 Ocak 1923'de Türk ve Yunan yetkilileri tarafından imzalandı. Türk-Ermeni çatışması konusunda ön plana çıkan şey, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında ve daha sonraki dönemde göç etmek zorunda kalmış Ermeniler için, Doğu Anadolu'da veya Kilikya'da, bir ulusal yurt sağlanmasıydı. Türk delegasyonu buna şiddetle karşı çıktı ve sonuçta bu konu zamana bırakıldı. Son olarak da, Türkiye'de kalmaya devam edecek azınlıklar konusunda tartışmalar oldu ve azınlıklar kapsamına Kürtlerin alınması gerekliliği, İtilaf Devletleri sözcüleri tarafından dile getirildi. Ancak, bu da, Türk delegasyonu tarafından kabul görmedi. Azınlık tanımı Gayrimüslim unsurlarla sınırlandırıldı.

Sonuç olarak, 1918'de Mondros Mütarekesiyle başlayıp 1923 yılında Lozan Antlaşması'yla biten süreç, Anadolu'da etnik çatışmaların yoğunlukta olduğu bir dönemdi. Bu çatışmalar farklı gruplar arasında olmuştur ve her bir çatışma – nedenleri, oluşumları ve sonuçları açısından- farklılıklar göstermiştir. Ortak özellikleri ise bunların her birinin birer etnik çatışma örneği olmasıdır. Bu çatışmaların Türk unsuru tarafından kazanılmış olması Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasını sağlayan en önemli faktörlerden biridir. Bununla bağlantılı olarak, 1923'de kurulan Türk ulus-devletinin üzerine kurulduğu temellerden biri bu etnik çatışma temeli olmuştur.

VITA

Nesim Şeker was born in Samandağ, Hatay on March 2, 1971. He received his BA degree in History from Middle East Technical University, Ankara, in July 1993 and MA degree from Uludağ University, Bursa, in December 1995. He worked at Uludağ University as research assistant and instructor between 1993 and 1996. Since 1997, he has been a graduate assistant in the Department of History at Middle East Technical University. In the meantime, he has been to Leiden University in the Netherlands as Honorary Fellow between September 1999 and June 2000. His main areas of interest are socio-political history of Modern Turkey, nationalism and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, aspects of transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic, ethnic issues in the early Twentieth century of Turkey and history of institutions.

His publications included *SEKA Tarihi: Türkiye Selüloz ve Kâğıt Fabrikalarının Tarihsel Gelişimi* written together with Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, Aydan Bulutgil, Fahrettin Çiloğlu and İlker Evrim Binbaş in 1996; *Türkiye İş Bankası Tarihi* with Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, Sinan Sönmez, Güven Sak, Murat Uluğtekin, Funda Erkal and Özgür Gökmen in 2001; “Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü ve Cumhuriyet Tarihi

Öğretimi İçindeki Yeri, 1942-1980” with Seçil Akgün; “Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi ve Bir Kent: Bursa”. His forthcoming studies are “The General Elections of 1919 in Turkey,” in *Disrupting and Reshaping: Early Stages of Nation-building in the Balkans*, M. Dogo and G. Franzinetti (eds.) and “Mütareke Dönemi Türk Basımında Milliyetler Meselesi.”



