BECOMING "HETERODOX" AND THE ROLE OF THE DERVISHES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

113962

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

113962

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

JULY 2002

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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
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Supervisor

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ABSTRACT

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July 2002, 141 pages

This thesis is an attempt to analyze the conceptualization of the term "heterodoxy" in the context of the Ottoman state's 13th-16th centuries and to provide an alternative path to follow in this conceptualization. The relationships between the dervish groups and the Ottoman state are discussed with reference to Deleuze and Guattari's conception of "rhizome" and "war machine". The thesis provides a context for the argument that becoming "heterodox" of the dervish groups in the Ottoman state was concomitant with the Ottoman state formation. In this way, two different phases in the Ottoman history - between the 13th and 15th centuries and the 15th and 16th centuries- are traced here in accordance with the changing nature of the relations between the Ottoman state and the dervish groups.

Keywords: Dervishes, rhizome, war machine, becoming heterodox, the state formation process

ÖZ

"HETERODOKS" OLUŞ VE OSMANLI DEVLETİ BAĞLAMINDA DERVİŞLERİN ROLÜ

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Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Necmi Erdoğan

Temmuz 2002, 141 sayfa

Bu çalışma, hem "heterodoksi" teriminin kavramsallaştırılmasını Osmanlı devletinin 13. ve 16. yüzyılları arasındaki bağlamında incelemeye, hem de bu kavramsallaştırmaya alternatif bir yaklaşım geliştirmeye yöneliktir. Burada, Osmanlı devleti ile derviş grupları arasındaki ilişkiler, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin "köksap" ve "savaş makinesi" kavramları ile ilişkili olarak tartışılmaktadır. Çalışma, derviş gruplarının "heterodoks" oluşlarının Osmanlı devlet oluşumu ile birlikte gerçekleştiğini tartışmak için bir zemin sunmaktadır. Böylelikle, Osmanlı tarihi içerisindeki farklı iki evre –13. ve 15. yüzyıllar arası ve 15. ve 16. yüzyıllar- Osmanlı devleti ve derviş grupları arasındaki ilişkilerin değişen doğası etrafında incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dervişler, köksap, savaş makinesi, heterodoks oluş, devlet oluşum süreci

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

May the whole Path now be plain to all!
Love is the law, love under will.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1980s, the term "heterodoxy" became very popular in some academic and journalistic publications. The term has been adopted in order to connote various groups of non-Sunni Islamic mysticism, which have been regarded as opposing to the "central" and "official" values. By the adoption of the term "heterodoxy", these groups have been either exalted or defamed in front of the centralist tendencies of the states. On the other hand, although the term is not a historical term, and it is looking from outside to the historical peculiarities, it has been appropriated in order to rewrite the taken for granted historical "facts" or to explain the events the boundaries of which were historically defined. Such historicity has been revolved around the (re)definition of the relations of the non-Sunni groups with the Islamic states, while the relations have been explained in antithetical terms.

In the context of the history of the Anatalian Seljuks and the Ottoman state, the term has been adopted either to discredit the states' oppressive policies against the dervish groups shaped by the "official" Sunni Islam or to speak ill of the "perverted" dervish groups opposing to the prescriptions of "true" Islam. While doing this, such attempts have brought the previous studies of the scholars under scrutiny. It is with these attempts the studies on both the Ottomans and Anatolian Seljuks and the dervish groups have intersected in many ways. However, this intersection has come on the scene with methodological misconceptions in terms of both the separate histories of the states and the dervish groups and the relations between them bound

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by these histories. In this study, therefore, we aim to delineate these methodological misconceptions in understanding the relations between the dervish groups and the Ottoman state, and to provide an alternative reading by applying to the studies on both the Ottoman history and history of the dervish groups.

1.1 "Heterodox" Dervish Groups in the Ottoman Context: The Classification of the Relevant Literature and Addressing the Problems

For this study, then, it has been aimed to focus upon the nature of the relationships between the Ottoman state and the dervish groups (basically Qalandariyya, Haidariyya, Hurufiyya, and Bektashiyya) and how these relationships transformed between the 13th and the 16th centuries. The period was that of the process of the Ottoman state formation that resulted in the formation of the Ottoman empire. Therefore, the process of transformation of the relationships between the dervish groups and the state was concomitant with the formation of the empire. We will basically argue that the dervish groups did not exist solely as a polar opposite of the Ottoman state. Rather, their relations with the Ottoman state involved various transformations including incorporation, repression, appropriation and abolition of the dervish religiosity. We will assert that the various relations between the Ottoman state and the "segmented" realm could not be explained by pre-determined terms, rather they took place in the word of *becomings* reflecting a "movement". For this, we will apply to the study of Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, to achieve an alternative reading of the relations of the dervish groups with the Ottoman state.

Therefore, we will question the term "Islamic heterodoxy", which has been used to denote various religious groups and sects under Islamic mysticism, often claimed to have opposed to the "official" Islam. Throughout the study, we will basically ask: 1. Was that really an antithetical relation constructed between the "official" Islam and "heterodox" dervish groups? 2. Did the Ottoman state formation process allow any inclusion of the "heterodox" elements before and after its formation?

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While doing this, we will look at the Ottoman history in two periods: the formation of the Ottoman state in the period between the 13th and 15th centuries and the 15th and 16th centuries, during which the ideology of the "classical" age of the empire overwhelmed all public and private relationships. In these two periods, we will observe how the relationships with the dervish groups took place and how they were transformed. While standing against an antithetically conceptualized Islamic "heterodoxy" in relation with the state, we will implore the position of the Ottoman state in relation with the dervish groups both in terms of its inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies. Therefore, we will concentrate on the *transformation of the relations* between the terms, rather than defining them. In other words, we will scrutinize how "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy" in the Ottoman context did *become*, rather than what they mean.

Given the highly heterogeneous and multiple nature of the dervish groups at that age, we will limit the scope of our study in line with Malamatiyya, Qalandariyya, Haidariyya, Bektashiyya, Babaiyya and the Abdals of Rum. We will also consider the elements that were annexed and dissolved into these, such as Hurufiyya and the Ahi corporations. It is not our aim to immerse into the literature covering the discussions on Alevi-Kurdish identity, which have reached to its peak especially after the late 1980s. Moreover, we will not include the order of Mawlaviyya, which has been known with its affinity to the central authority.

Named in general as Islamic heterodoxy, these various groups and sects under Islamic mysticism have been under investigation for a long time, being examined in different periods, under different headings and with different purposes. The discussions in these studies have been mostly the *explanan* of another *explanandum*. In other words, these studies have been part of a variety of interrelated discussions, particularly about Turkishness, Turkification of Asia Minor, Ottomannes, the formation and foundation of the Ottoman empire, and the relations between the state and religion in the Ottoman empire. Therefore, rather than taken as an object of a study, the "Islamic heterodoxy" has been used to explain many other objects. Even in the cases in which the object of the study is the history of the dervish groups itself, it is used as a tool for tracing the roots of Ottomannes and Turkishness. In a similar manner, these discussions have become extensively popular on the axes of Alevi-

Kurdish identity since the late 1980s both in academic and journalistic publications, which are out of the scope of this study. On the other side, there have been studies which have remained under the influence of the attempts that evaluate these groups in terms of centrifugal or centripetal tendencies, even if the object of the study has been the dervish groups themselves. These include both the studies that evaluate these groups as opposed to the conception of orthodox Sunni state explaining all in terms of twofold divisions (such as people vs. state, dominant vs. dominated, etc.) and the attempts that put these groups near the central values in so far as their contribution to the formation and the development of the Ottoman State in military, economic and cultural spheres is concerned.

1.1.1 Dervish groups as *Explanan* of Another *Explanandum*

Such a tendency can be found in the studies that attempt to find roots for the Turkish and Ottoman identity. It is because that the early Ottoman history was closely intermingled with the history of the dervish groups in Asia Minor in the 12th and 13 the centuries, both of which came from different places to this region. Nonetheless, these attempts have been exposed to full of speculations, especially when one considers that the 12th, 13th and the early 14th centuries were poor in terms of authentic written documents and that the historiography of the concerned age was very much limited with legends, hagiographies (*menakibname*)[1] and annalistic chronicles. In this circumstance, the problem turns to an identity problem of the Ottomans either by explaining their religious roots or their ethnological structures. In so far as the ethno-religious origins of the Ottoman identity are concerned, the discussions have been revolved around and reproduced through Köprülü-Wittek axes for a long time. First of all, Köprülü develops his thesis against Gibbons', who maintains that the Ottomans could not be built solely by the Asiatic pagan nomads, rather it was done through their conversion into Islam and their setting out to Islamize their Christian neighbors. According to Gibbons (1968), the Ottomans were not Turks, rather anew race was formed out of the combination of Asiatic blood and

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[1] The term *menkabe* or *menakıb* has been used through the development of the tasavvuf thought. It comes to mean the short stories that narrate the miracles of the saints or saintly Sufis in the history of the tasavvuf movement (Ocak,1997).

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the oldest as well as newest European stock. For him, this European stock was the Byzantium heritage and the Christian influence, to which Ottoman statehood was indebted considerably. Köprülü, on the contrary, studies the early Ottomans in relation with the Turco-Muslim heritage derived from the Central Asia. And Köprülü (1992;1993) elaborates the Ottoman history as the continuation of this general Turkish history having the same ethno-religious backgrounds. On the other side, Wittek (1958) attributes a special role to the basic characteristic of the frontier culture that was shaped by Perso-Islamic elements. Having such a notion of the frontier culture and religion in mind, he defends his *ghaza thesis* as the reason behind the Ottoman ascendancy.

In so far as the ethno-religious structure of the Turks is concerned, Köprülü and Melikoff (1999;1994) assert the significance of the pre-Islamic principles over the Islamic ones, hence of the belief system of the Turks before the adoption of Islam. M. Fuad Köprülü regards the heterodox Anatolian culture of the 13th century as the continuation of the Turkish shamanism that was "externally Islamized" (1972:95).[2] With respect to this, he aims to differentiate the mystical poems written in Turkish from their Arabic and Persian examples and hence, to conceptualize a national literature and culture. Despite the fact that Melikoff does not take "Islamic heterodoxy" as explanan of another explanandum, she takes over the inheritance of Köprülü on that subject matter. Consequently, she holds that although the traditions of the old ancestors of the Turks were transformed after the adoption of Islam and gradually advanced influence of Shiism (after the 16th century), the Turks preserved their traditions, mainly shamanism, the faith of celestial God (*Gök-Tanrı*) and the myth of sun. Similarly, Babinger (1891- 1967) aims to disprove the presupposition that the Ottomans were within the Arab-Islamic circle, that is to say, within the circle of Sunni Islam (2000). Rather, he proposes that the religion of the Turks before the adoption of Islam was under the influence of shamanism and Christianity. For him,

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[2] Devin De Weese (1994) opposes to the conception that the Islamization in the Inner Asia and Central Asia took place externally by applying to the conversion narrative of Baba Tükles who was accepted as a "royal ancestor" and "mythic progenitor" in the popular memory. In other words, he criticizes most of the approaches to Islam in these regions due to their arguing that "light" Islamization was the cardinal feature in these regions, and the conversions failed to have any serious impact on the daily life and consciousness of the people. On the other hand, he holds that religious life in these regions was much richer and more diverse than the label "shamanism" suggests. For more information, look at De Weese, Devin A. (1994) *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde,* University Park, Pa: The Pennsylvania State University.

the Seljuks of the Rumelia region, out of which the Ottoman state emerged, appropriated the Shi Islam, Alevism, and not the Sunni Islam. With this concern, he endeavors to testify the nonexistence of the Arab-Islamic influence with reference to the non-Islamic names of the Ottoman house before Osman (such as Ertuğrul, Gündoğdu, Gündüz Alp, and Sunkur) and to the Christian names during the Seljuks.

Beside the Köprülü–Wittek axes, we should also take into consideration the efforts merging these two different standpoints with different concerns and treating the Anatolian dervish religiosity accordingly. Although standing in diverse camps, İnalcık and Kafadar may be given as examples for these kind of attitudes. İnalcık's attitude differs from Köprülü's in the sense that he rejects the idea that the Ottoman state was a nomadic empire the models of which could be found in the Eurasian steppes (Karpat, 1974). Alternatively, he argues that it was a typical Middle Eastern empire that concerned primarily with the protection of the settled populations under its rule, even if nomadic elements in the Ottoman frontier society played a certain role in the 13th century. However, while rejecting the nomadic elements on the formation of the Ottoman empire, İnalcık (2000a) also puts an emphasis on the continuation of the tradition of Turkish statehood regarding the law and order in the Ottoman state.[3] In regard to Turkish tradition of statehood, he argues that a sovereign's mundane authority based on reason was treated above all the others, including the Islamic religious law (*shariah*). Here, we come across with a twofold argument. For him, while the Ottoman state, as a typical Middle Eastern empire, did not include nomadic elements, it was just the continuation of Turkish statehood experience in terms of enacting and executing law and order within the society. It implies that he attempts to write the history of the Ottoman dynasty without the nomadic dervish religiosity. In other words, the predominance of Turkish customs

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[3] Concentrating on how the Ottoman studies treat the conception of law, Hassan (2001) argues that İnalcık's works represent a "dilemmatic approach" in terms of his conceptualizing the primacy of customary law (*örf*). According to this, the Ottoman studies hover around the primacy of customary law (customs and traditions of the old ancestors) and the Islamic religious law (*shariah*); moreover, they are knotted in the point how the transformation from the customs to shariah took place. With respect to this, İnalcık's works represents a "paradox". Accordingly, while he defends the primacy of customary law, he does not disregard the aura of influence of the Islamic religious law, while accepting the Ottomans as a "typical Middle Eastern empire". For Hassan, the "paradox" of İnalcık lies in his insistence on the execution of the customary law in every respect during the Mehmed the Conqueror, the period in which the empire was bound by the "Sunni" prescriptions of a "typical Middle Eastern empire".

and traditions was only limited with the sultanate's authority based on reason independent from the "outside" influences. Thus, the influence of the traditions of the nomadic dervish religiosity is disregarded.

Kafadar's (1995) contribution is worth to mention in terms of his (re)reading the early Ottoman history in relation with the dervish religiosity of Asia Minor. Accordingly, he criticizes Wittek for his reductionist insistence on the *ghaza* thesis. He, at the same time, notices that the discussions insisting solely on the tribal-nomadic nature of the Ottomans discard the sedentary dispositions annexed into the nomadic culture. On the other hand, he opposes to the exaltation of shamanism of the early Ottomans. For him, such views put any other pre-Islamic or un-Islamic elements under one heading, shamanism, and discount the Islamic elements that should also be taken into consideration. Instead, he argues that *ghaza* is not to be taken as a religious category, but as an irregular raiding activity for livelihood. Kafadar redefines the term rejecting the transcendental character stuck into its conception. On that ground, he takes *ghaza* as a category constantly reconstructed by various historical agents in different times.

It should be underlined that by analyzing the dervish groups in the context of the Ottoman state formation with reference to Deleuze and Guattari's conception of "rhizome", we seem to reproduce the explanation of the dervish groups as *explanan* of another *explanandum*. However, we should underline that our aim is not to elaborate how the Ottoman state formation was achieved. Rather, we endeavor to explain the ways in which the relations between the Ottoman state and the dervish groups transformed between the 13th and 16th centuries.

1.1.2 Explaining Dervish Groups in Terms of Centrifugal or Centripetal Tendencies

For this second part, we want to elaborate the ways in which the dervish groups are treated when these groups are taken specifically as the object of a study. To begin with, the ways of writing the history of the dervish groups in the Ottoman context have been closely bound by different views on how their relationships with the

Ottoman state or with the concept of state were conceptualized, developed and constituted. In this part, therefore, we will examine how the conception of the relations of the dervishes with the state dominates writing the history of the dervish groups.

In the first place, explaining Islamic heterodoxy in terms of centripetal tendencies takes place in two ways: either by inclusion of these elements into the formation and development of the Ottoman central authority and treating them as if they are *interior* to the state *or* by legitimating these elements, which are deemed *exterior* to the state, according to the values of the central authority. In the first case, dervish religiosity of the relevant age is regarded as an indispensable element of the Ottoman state formation and of the sustenance of the central values. They are regarded as indispensable in different senses, be it social, economic, military, cultural or educational. For example, Gündüz (1985) asserts that the dervish orders during the formation and rise of the Ottoman state were the important educational centers that were responsible for raising the necessary public force to the administrative affairs. He also puts the dervish orders in the center of the foundation and protection of the social life. Hence, he maintains their considerable influence in ordering the social life and sustaining the social cohesion during the politic, economic and social crisis of the 13th century. For him, the social cohesion during the time of crisis took place through gathering of various tribes around the dervish orders. Accordingly, the Ottoman emirate unified various segments under its rule and this was achieved through these dervishes that were together with the Ottoman sultans in sustaining the moral unity. On the other hand, they were the major military force during the conquests that facilitated the Ottoman state formation as the boundaries were expanded. According to Barkan (1942), these groups were also responsible for transforming the newly conquered territories to cultural and city centers as a result of the Ottoman settlement policies. In so far as the crisis situation in the 13th century is concerned, extensive roles have been attributed to the Ahi corporations in social as well as in the economic sphere. Similar to Gündüz, Çağatay (1974) evaluates the role of these corporations in terms of their organizing the society due to their extensive influence over the society independent from the tribe-state relationships. In his analysis, their functions included finding jobs for the artisans coming from the East,

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competing against the local Byzantine artisans, regulating production and artisan ethics, aiding to the people in need, etc.

As for the studies legitimating the Ottoman dervish religiosity in accordance with the values of the central authority, but at the same time treating it as if it was exterior to the state, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak's analysis is the best example. When explaining the development of the "heterodox" thought, Ocak (1992) traces Bektashiyya and Alavism back to the Malamatiyya Sufism of Khurasan of the 9th and 10th centuries and to Qalandariyya and Haidariyya of the 13th century Anatalian Seljuks. However, he argues for the dominance of Buddhist and Manichaean cultures instead of shamanism regarding the non-Islamic influences over these mystical groups (2000d). In addition to these, his insistence on the predominance of social, economic and historical influences shaping the *specific* developments of various heterodox groups (1996) brings an exteriority to these groups independent from the state's own development. Nevertheless, while even mentioning the exteriority of these groups, he endeavors to smooth the extremist tendencies within these heterogeneous elements. For example, on the meaning of heterodoxy, Ocak (2000a) rejects the usage of the words heterodox and heretic interchangeably; since for him, heterodoxy does not come to mean being religiously perverted. Rather, it implies politically, socially and theologically being away from the central power or any central tendency. Additionally, regarding the cults emerging around the saints (*awliya*), Ocak (1997:7-8) contends that the reproduction of tales and legends about the saints had the effect of sustaining the norms and values of the society psychologically and socially, as the society behaved respectfully to the cults of these saints with a feeling of fear. On the other hand, even if Ocak (1998) regards the heretic movements (*zendeka* and *ilhad*) as opposed to the religious prescriptions of the official Islam and the state's measures as having taken against these groups or individuals, he explains the religious characteristics of these movements as nurtured by external religious influences, especially by the Persian. Put it differently, when he is dealing specifically with the individuals who were deemed heretic in the Ottoman context, he postulates that they were mostly educated abroad or by the scholars who sowed the seeds of their "heretic" tendencies. Thus, the way he elaborates the heretic movements and individuals leads us to think that Ocak takes these groups or individuals not

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intrinsically heretic. Seemingly, he posits that they became accused for heresy after they started to carry the message as they were influenced by these external factors.

Secondly, we will assess the studies that analyze these groups, groups or individuals within the context of centrifugal tendencies. Here, the elements (social, historical, theological, cultural, etc.) of dervish religiosity have been put in opposition to the conception, basic tenets and the special characteristics of the "orthodox" Sunni state. Supposedly, such a historiography has been carried out through an antithetical relation constructed between the state and people, in other words, between the dominant state's Sunni orthodox Islam and the "free" popular religion. The dichotomous conception between what is heterodox and what belongs to state has been preserved. In other words, the term heterodoxy has been used as comprising vast amount of Islamic mystic groups as opposed to the official Islamic orthodoxy. In this conception, the antithetical relations between heterodoxy and official Islam have been said to have repercussions in political, economic and social spheres. The works of Yıldırım, Zelyut and Çamuroğlu exemplify the antithetical relations of heterodoxy in relation with the state. Identifying the force of the political power in the Ottoman context with the sanctions of the "official" Islam, Yıldırım (2001) aims to interrogate whether there was an inquisition in the Ottoman religio-political life like the one in Catholicism, while presupposing there was. In that respect, he regards that any movement directed against the state was valued as heretic or atheist and the groups involved in these movements were subjected to "mass massacres". Opposing to the official religion's undertakings to get rid of what is outside the *shariah*, he considers this as the problem of grappling with the "official" historiography. Instead, he fends for writing the history of the "ordinary" people, the "oppressed" (*mazlum*), as opposed to the oppressions of the so-called "tolerant" Ottoman state. Likewise, Zelyut (1995) maintains the same dichotomous understanding by analyzing the ways in which the Turks were converted into Islam. The ruling class is said to have preferred Islam more as an ideology than as a religion, and appropriated the "mercantilist Islamic faith" in order to preserve its commercial self-interests. In that context, the formation of the Islamic Ottoman state was carried out according to a "strategy", so that it employed "official" Islam as an ideology, as a tool to maintain its upper-class interests. Therefore, official Islam was

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employed to suppress the oppositions which arose out of the material contradictions. For him, while any grand religion was such a political movement, heterodox Islam was also a political movement oriented towards altering such a way of social life and economic relations. Following this, Zelyut identifies these heterodox groups mostly with the rural sections of the society, hence with Alevism. Identifying these people with the Alevis, he asserts that while the oppressors, who strove for abolishing these groups, were the people within the circle of "official" Sunni Islam, the oppressed and the rebellions against this oppression were the people, Alevis. Following a similar line of reasoning, in the works of Çamuroğlu, the subject matter is taken up as a discourse of liberation against the dominant and thus, the "official". First off, he maintains such an antithetical relation by placing two different conceptions of belief (how orthodoxy believes and how heterodoxy believes) behind two different conceptions of the mundane life. Hence, he makes a comparison between the conciliatory or reactionary universe of the heterodox Islam and the domineering universe of the orthodox Sunni Islam (1999a;1999b;1992). Thence, he takes into consideration the political dimension of heterodox Islam in such a way that he seeks to answer the ways in which the basic tenets and features of heterodox Islam, such as perception of language, time, history, city, God, etc., might have become threatening factors against the exiting political authorities. For example, he makes a comparison between the God that is dreadful, transcendental and prescriptive and the God that is perceived through affection, that is lived within or that lives within. While identifying the latter with the individuals who are against any "power" in this mundane life (either having power or being under it), he imputes the former to the political institutions and the people appropriating these institutional values with the mundane concerns. With these concerns in mind, Çamuroğlu attempts to (re)write the history of the Anatolian Seljuks or the Ottomans, in which the values, beliefs, conception of the universe, appropriation of language and one's own self influenced the political dimension.

1.1.3 The Problems in Studying the Dervish Groups in Relation to the Ottoman State

In the light of this evaluation of the existing literature, we will examine two basic tendencies which are related in many ways with each other: 1. conceiving heterodoxy as a polar opposite of orthodoxy and 2. comprehending social phenomena on the basis of specific characteristics of Islamic beliefs.

The former defines any A through which is not A; that is to say, the terms are defined in terms of each other within the limits of a dualistic discourse. In the Foucauldian conception of discourse, any knowledge is appropriated through the occupation of "hypothetical spaces" (1972)[4]. And also, it is just like how Said (1999) employs this conception (hypothetical space) in order to analyze the discursive split between "the Orient" and "the Occident" such that the knowledge of the Orient is specified within these hypothetical boundaries. In other words, in this perception, the "hypothetical division" between "the Orient" and "the Occident" becomes far from "reality", so the East becomes external to West, both being an ontological and ethical reality. Also, it is depicted *for* the West, when one takes up a position as opposed to the East and speaks of behalf of the East. Likewise, defining A (the A that is either orthodoxy or heterodoxy) via which is not A brings about ontological and epistemological problems, as it attributes a transcendental character to the A defined and abstracts the terms from the very nature of the *relationships*. While the terms are defined in terms of each other, the transformations and relationships within and between the sides are underestimated. That brings about the *mystification* of each term; that is to say, they become absolute, fixed, static, timeless, indivisible, and transcendental realities rather than "movements" bounded by time and space. Moreover, these religiously oriented groups excluded by the state appear to be a

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[4] Accroding to Foucault (1972), knowledge of something is acquired through the occupation of group of hypothetical spaces. These are -as what Said analyses in his review of Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge* and the *Discourse on Language*- the spaces, one of which "might be where one stands in order to speak, another might be where he puts his statement and might be where his statement is either preserved, modified, accumulated and passed on" (Said, 1994:79-80). In other words, the knowledge of the "self" is defined by means of a "hypothetically" preserved, modified, accumulated and passed on knowledge of the "other". Consequently, as stated by Foucault, knowledge is acquired through a "discourse" in the framework of a specific "episteme", that is the boundary around each of these spaces. A discourse, then, can be explained as a dichotomous relationship, in which the antithetical peculiarities of the terms are preserved by a specific "episteme".

homogenous whole. Contrarily, one might argue that each side may comprise the characteristics of the other side. If we explain the relationships between the Ottoman state and the dervish groups by defining heterodoxy (or orthodoxy) with reference to a fixed "other", there is always a danger of underestimating the transformations within and between the sides. This leads to an ahistorical accent, homogenizing the heterogeneous nature of both sides within the boundaries of "hypothetical spaces", and explaining them independent from the very nature of the relations. As an alternative to a *static* discourse about the "other", which leads to *ahistoricism* and homogenization of the terms discussed, in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), Said underlines the necessity of "contrapuntal reading"[5] allowing any culture to be explained in terms of movements within and between the terms:

> Each cultural work is a vision of a movement, and we must juxtapose that vision with the various revisions it later provoked. ...Whereas the whole of a culture is a disjunct one, many important sections of it can be apprehended as working *conrapuntally* together (Said, 1993:67;194).

Hence, studying the relationships between what is deemed "heterodox" and "orthodox" requires a "contrapuntal" reading that allows us to grasp the various relations within and between the terms. The relationships between the terms are not reducible to antithetical conceptions (such as oppressed vs. oppressor, state vs. ordinary people, official orthodoxy vs. free popular religion, high vs. popular Islam etc.). Rather, what we depict as orthodoxy might include heterodox elements or vice versa.

Briefly, the complex relations involve the repression, abolition, appropriation and transformation of the "heterodox" elements by the state, while these elements both exert pressure on the state and being appropriated by it. The necessity of inclusion of these elements bears a great significance when a religion has communal characters, whether heterodox or orthodox. This is as stated by Weber:

> The more a religion acquired the aspects of a "communal religion", the more political circumstances co-operated to

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[5] By the term "contrapuntal reading", Said means reading a text in terms of both what is involved, and not involved. The point is that it must take into account the "processes" of the both sides. Although Said uses the term in order to understand the post-colonial experiences, we may also appropriate it in order to overcome the limitations of a dichotomous conception of heterodoxy.

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lend religious transfiguration to the ethic of the subjugated (1965:224-5).

Secondly, we would like to concentrate on the position that explains social phenomena on the basis of (different kinds of) Islamic beliefs as the basic source of inspiration and makes generalizations about the relationships between the terms in the socio-political sphere. Such a position takes this *causal relationship* (the effects of specific Islamic beliefs on the socio-political and economic spheres) as a reference point. For example, Çamuroğlu asserts that the relationships between the state and the people were determined by the conception of God in Sunni (orthodox) and heterodox Islam (1999a;1999b). Accordingly, God of Sunni Islam is the one whose prescriptions are subordinated to, whereas that of heterodox Islam means love and affection. Therefore, in the political sphere, the official Islam represents the domineering state, while the "people" are either apt to reconcile with or react against it. Nonetheless, such a concept determinant definition of "social" bears an ontological mistake. It abstracts all the social and individual factors from "Islam", while mystifying it beyond the overall social relations. Here, we criticize the assumptions examining the position of the Ottoman center towards the variety of dervish groups as a matter of perception of God, hence, as a matter of reflection of different aspects of God to the social sphere.

For this kind of conception of the relationships between religion and the social sphere, we may say that it carries the traces of Weberian sociology of religion. Accordingly, it considers religion as a basic dynamic of social change and examines the religiously defined conditions out of which the process of change takes place. Although taking religion as a factor of stagnation (not as a dynamic of social change), Ülgener (1991), for example, examines religion and theology as the basic source in shaping the relationships between individual and society within the boundaries of the mentality of the Middle Ages. For him, they were strongly determinant in such a way that the ethic and mentality of the Middle Ages were bound by these religiously and theologically determined *forms of expressions*. He argues that in the Ottoman context, this could be observed under the influence of Islamic mysticism (*tasavvuf*) by which the basic characteristics of the ideal individual in the Ottoman society was shaped. Accordingly, the ideal man was the

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perfect man (*al-Insān al-Kāmil*), who abstained from any relationship with the material world and who was drawn into his/her inner world without any anxiety of future. However, we would like to draw attention to a significant difference between two different conceptions of religion: religion as a *form of expression* within the mentality of the Middle Ages and a *specific* religious attitude determining socio-political and economic relations. For the former, a specific religious attitude is not the *cause* of a specific socio-political and economic sphere. Rather, both of them dissolves and transforms into each other, and both (re)produces the other. However, for the latter, a specific religious attitude determines the basic characteristics of a social structure. This disregards that the state also appropriates and dissolves the values of the subjugated into its rule. When the state appropriates the values of the subjugated, people express their oppositions accordingly. On that subject matter, Weber -even he is regarded as the basic source of inspiration for the causality relationship- examines the anti-political attitude of the mystics as a result of the political circumstances' cooperation with and encompassing the values of the subjugated:

> All these factors (the factors occurred when political circumstances co-operated to lend religious transfiguration to the ethic of the subjugated) removed the ground from under the political and social interests involved in a warlike struggle for power and involved in a social class conflict, thus tending to generate an anti-political rejection of the world and to favor the development of a religious ethic of brotherly love that renounced all violence (parenthesis mine, 1965:225).

Briefly, privileging theological elements over material contradictions (like Çamuroğlu and Ülgener) or the effects of political and socio-economic conditions on the theological elements (as Ocak does) do not suffice in explaining the relations between religion and the social-political sphere. Rather, when religion is taken as a form of expression, both (re)produces each other. This is especially important, if one thinks about that the state deals with appropriation, abolition, transformation and repression of the values, hence forms of expressions of the subjugated.

In the light of these problems of the relevant literature we have addressed, we will attempt to lay out that all the approaches should be taken into consideration in one way or the other. Since we will elaborate the dervish religiosity in the world of

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becomings that take place through "movement", we will observe that there were various relations between the Ottoman state and the dervish groups. It is due to the fact that the relationships within and between the "segments" were not always the same. It is, thence, with these concerns we will concentrate on the *process* of exclusion of the groups of Islamic mysticism from the realm of the state. Moreover, we will look at the transformation process of their relationships -including repression, appropriation and abolition of the dervish religiosity- in the context of the Ottoman empire between the 13th and 16th centuries. It is in that sense we will pay attention to the concept of "heterodoxy" pertaining to the formation of the Ottoman state. We will, then, investigate how the relationships were constructed in different ways between these groups of Islamic mysticism and the Ottoman sultanate during and after the transformation from nomadic to sedentary life. In other words, we will ask how, why and in what contexts Ottomans both came to depict the dervish groups in opposition to the state (especially during the 16th century) and approved their significant roles appropriating their basic values during the state formation.

1.2 An Alternative: Deleuze and Guattari's Conception of "Nomadology"

For the reasons mentioned above, hence, we will not ask *what heterodoxy and orthodoxy are*, rather we will try to asses *how they became* encompassing the continuous transformations of the relationships between the state and the heterogeneous dervish religiosity. Therefore, in understanding the variety of these relations, we will not underline the verb "to be". Rather, appropriating Deleuze and Guattari's conception of rhizome will allow us to review the history of the dervish religiosity in relation with the state's:

> The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb "*to be*," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, *and...and...and...* This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb "to be" (italic mine, 1987:25).

Concerning this highly heterogeneous, fluid and unstable formation, we think that Deleuze and Guttari's conception of "nomadology" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) would be suggestive. In their complex analysis, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism*

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and Schizophrenia, the introduction of the concepts like "rhizomatic" and "arborescent" systems, and the comparisons made between them attest to a division between systematic, centralized, hierarchical and unegalitarian systems (arborescent systems) and the remaining realm (rhizomatic systems) "outside" of it. They also show how the relationships between these two realms are established in different ways. Deleuze and Guattari explain the basic characteristics of the rhizomatic systems under these headings: 1. *Principles of connection and heterogeneity*; 2. *Principle of multiplicity*; 3. *Principle of asignifying rupture*; and 4. *Principle of cartography and decalcomania.* Accordingly, rhizomatic systems are heterogeneous in nature and any point of this heterogeneous body can be connected to anything other. The arborescent systems, in other words, the tree is genealogical. When we examine the Ottoman dervish religiosity, we may observe the same axiom. Ottoman dervish religiosity displayed an extensive variety, while having been nurtured by variety of religious aspects (Christianity, Ancient Greek philosophy, Mazdaism, Manicheanism, Buddism, Zoroestarinsim, etc.). This was the reason behind its syncretic nature and its heterogeneity. On the other hand, beside this variety, we might also observe some common themes that connected these diverse elements one way or another (in beliefs and deeds, in the historical actions of these groups, etc.). Yet, genealogical nature of the Ottoman "tree" is much more structured than the rhizomatic dervish religiosity. For example, in the realm of state, the behaviors in religious matters were shaped by a single center covering all the details of the social and individual lives. On the other hands, there were plenty of orders, each of which differentiated from each other (although coming from the same religious ancestors) with slight differences. Therefore, we can also say that rhizomatic systems are known with their *flat multiplicities* with *n* dimension. Rather than showing a unity or uniform composition, a rhizome is composed by assemblages. Moreover, rather than a structured genealogy, a rhizome changes in nature and expands its connections as the new assemblages are included. But then, according to *the principle of asignifying rupture*, these multiplicities have also multiple entryways. In other words, when rhizome is broken, it starts up again on one of its old lines or on the new ones. In so far as *the principle of cartography and decalcomania* is concerned, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the tree logic is based upon tracing; in other words, it is harmonious with any structural or generative model. This genetic axis is such that a

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structure is infinitely reproduced through tracing. All the same, the rhizome is not a tracing, rather it is a map that is open and it connects any point to any other point in all of its dimensions. These three characters can also be observed in the Ottoman dervish religiosity in the sense that it cannot be limited within the boundaries of one social strata. Rather, one may observe different aspects of dervish religiosity from the Ottoman state level to the vagabond nomadic Turcomans. Moreover, even one of the multiplicities within this n dimension, that is to say, one of the groups within the dervish religiosity was banned or abolished by the state, it found a way to keep on its existence with different names or under the roof of a different order as in the case of Hurufiyya that continued under the Bektashiyya order. On the other hand, the entryways to the map of dervish religiosity were not limited with the structured or institutionalized mystical religious orders. Since the mystical way of life was based on subjective experience of an individual and since the orders were formed under the initiative of a sheik, there were many dervish orders, whether institutionalized or not. In other words, it was not something structured and reproduced through organizational tracing, but something diffused regardless of any structural formation.

In so far as the relations between rhizomatic and arborescent systems are concerned, Deleuze and Guattari assert that the One is subtracted from this n dimensional rhizome. It is because that a "power takeover" of an arborescent system takes place through this One. Thus, the state arises out of the rhizomatic relations of n dimension and becomes One. Consequently, we may conclude that the relations between rhizomatic and arborescent systems are the relations between the *One* and *n-1*. The power takeover of the tree system happens in various dimensions of life, such as human psychology, language, religion, history and etc. It is just like the Ottoman State formation in which while the Ottomans were one of the nomadic elements in Asia Minor in the 13th century, it came to exist as the One through the state formation, subtracting itself from other nomadic elements and writing its history.

In the case of religion, Weber (1965) similarly argues that the plurality of local gods (religions), that is to say, the religious plurality of the settled communities transforms when a community expands their territories through conquests. This results in a religious totality. Thereof, strengthening of monotheism and universalism, the One, can be directly linked with the formation of the empires, the

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One on the political level. In other words, the growth of an empire and other comparable social processes in the same direction lead to a regulated subordination of the subjects to a rationalized monotheism of the empires.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the state's constituting and exercising its power are based on how it constructs the relationships with this "segmented"[6] $n-1$. It is the relationships between the n dimension and the *One* that is subtracted from this n. With respect to this, the state does not constitute its power -even a totalitarian state- by the abolition of distinct centers and segments, rather by acting as a "point of resonance" among centers. In other words, it is not a binary opposition constructed between the segmentary structure and the state that determines the relations between the arborescent and rhizomatic systems. Rather, the state acts as a resonator among many power centers, while possessing and imposing its own segmentarity:

> The central State is constituted not by abolition of circular segmentarity but by a cocentricity of distinct circles, or the organization of a resonance among centers. ...This is because the common central point is not where all points melt together, but instead acts as a point of resonance on the horizon, behind all other points. The State is not a point taking all others upon itself, but a resonance chamber for them all (1987:211;224).

In a similar way, we might analyze the Ottoman state formation in relation to the incorporation of the "outside" elements —in which the dervish religiosity constitutes one of the segments- into the tribal nature of the Ottoman emirate. In that sense, we aim to explore how the Ottoman state acted as a "resonator" during the state formation and how it imposed its own segmentarity by ordering and regulation, abolition, appropriation or repression of the dervish groups in relation with the other segmented centers, such as the Safavid encounter that led to repression and abolition of the dervish groups. During the encounter with the Safavid state, which was formed by the nomadic and semi-nomadic "heterodox" Turcomans, these groups, *kizilbashes* (red-heads), were strictly banned by the Ottoman state. Moreover, it was also declared that any massacre against the groups of *kizilbashes* was deemed canonically lawful and who killed them was appraised as either ghazi or a martyr (*şehit*)

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[6] According to Deleuze and Guattari, since it is composed of multiple assemblages, a rhizome is a "segmented" structure.

(Düzdağ, 1983). However, *kizilbaslik* infused extensively into the Bektashiyya order in the 16th century. As a response to this, the Ottoman central authority imposed its own segmentarity, that is to say, the Bektashiyya order was institutionalized by the state under the leadership of Balım Sultan in 1502 (Melikoff, 1999).

In so far as the state's functions in relation to the rhizomatic assemblages are concerned, Deleuze and Guattari examine them in terms of dual functions of the state in relation with the segmented realm (not only abolition of the differences but contraction with them).[7] Accordingly, the state involves the collaboration between terrible vs. ordered, violent vs. contractor, dynamic vs. static, ethical vs. religious, free vs. institutional and regulated, etc.

> We must not forget that these oppositions define complementaries, not incompatibles, and that, viewed in relation to the rest of the world, gods and men alike, this group of divine figures or divine aspects present a common ground (Dumézil, 1988:79).

If we observe this in the case of Ottomans' relations with the nomadic Turcomans groups, we see that they both presided over the correctly executed exchanges and bounded any defaulter. For example, in the early years of the formation, Ottomans' settlement policies concentrated on the nomadic and semi-nomadic "heterodox" Turcomans. Firstly, they settled them to the regions which they wanted to cultivate. However, when some groups of nomads resisted to be settled, they determined and classified these groups as "a source of potential danger". And this took place through harsh taxations (such as the sheep tax or sheepfold tax assessed from the nomads engaged in raising livestock), forced settlements and forced migrations (Linder, 2000).

For Deleuze & Guattari, "between" the dual functions of the state, there exists a "war machine". The war machine is explained as a nomad invention, which is a kind of rhizome, hence as an invention of a pure and immeasurable multiplicity.

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[7] For doing this, Deleuze and Guattari apply to Dumézil's study (1988) who deals with the same thing by applying to the Indo-European myths. Accordingly, Dumézil concentrates on religio-mythical "bipartite representation of sovereignty" and "two different ways of regarding and directing the world". This two-headed nature of sovereignty are represented symbolically through both the opposition and complementarity between magician-king and jurist-priest (or Lupercus & Flamen, Varuna & Mithra, Rajanya & Brahmana, etc.).

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Accordingly, the war machine exists prior to the state's domination. As a rhizomatic system, the war machine also comprises variety of domains (language, religion, war, and etc.). In other words, it "exists in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological invention, in a commercial circuit as well as in a religious creation, *in all flows and currents* that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State" (italic mine, 1987:360). Therefore, just like the state that exists always and everywhere, a war machine may be observed in variety of domains. On that ground, what determines the relations of the war machine with the state apparatus is its "eccentricity", "exteriority", its existence before the law of the state apparatus and its being "outside" it. What Deleuze and Guattari mean with the "exteriority" of the war machine that is "outside" the state and "between" the dual functions of the state apparatus is that the state both appropriates the war machine and stands against it. However, this exteriority does not mean that the war machine is part of the "foreign policy" of the states. Rather, it includes the local bands, margins, minorities as a segmented structure in opposition to the "organs" of the state power. All the same, this exteriority brings about a fact that the state has no war machine of its own, rather it has to appropriate it through variety of ways. As far as the appropriation process is concerned, the state does achieve this either by "encasting" the elements within the war machine or constituting it in accordance with its rules. On the other hand, when the appropriation is not achieved, then, the nomadic elements are barred, inhibited, or banned by the demands and conditions of the state apparatus. Even so, during the formation process that the state does not appear as a sole center of political domination, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, it acts in the centripetal rather than centrifugal wave. Put it differently, it tries to convergence the nomadic elements into its body while not thinking them as a threat to its authority.

> But before appearing (before the complete power takeover of the One), the State already acts in the form of convergent or centripetal wave, *a wave that cancels itself out precisely at the point of convergence marking the inversion of signs or the appearance of the State* (parenthesis mine, 1987:431).

If we are to make the long story short, the relationships of the war machine with the state cannot be explained through pre-determined concepts. It is in such a way that the war machine appears either exterior to the state and directed against it, or

belongs to the state, encasted or possessed by it. It is just like in the relationships between the Ottoman state and the pure and immeasurable multiplicity of the dervish religiosity that the Islamic "heterodoxy" in the Ottoman history (as being one of the segments of the whole rhizome to be incorporated into the Ottoman "tree") existed before the domination of the Ottoman state. There were also many dervish groups during the time of the Anatolian Seljuks (and before), which were later incorporated into the Ottomans. Nonetheless, throughout the formation and thereafter, we may observe that the dervish piety existed both exterior and directed against the state (for example, through the rebellion movements, the Safavid encounter, heretic movements and executions) or encasted and possessed by it (for example, invention of the Ottoman formation myth by applying to the elements of dervish religiosity, appropriating them during the conquests, incorporating the dervish religiosity to the economic relations by the Ahi corporations and to the Ottoman army by Janissaries). On the other hand, it was just as Deleuze and Guattari stress that before appearing as a central political authority, the Ottoman state's relations with the dervish groups were in the form of a centripetal wave. After the state formation was achieved in every respect, the dervish groups were labeled as either heterodox or heretic in relation with the prescriptions of the "official" Islam.

Having all these concerns in mind, in the first chapter of our study, we will review Islamic mysticism (*tasavvuf*) in general and the place of Anatolian dervish religiosity within the tasavvuf thought. In this context, we will briefly give the history of Islamic mysticism (*tasavvuf*), then we will concentrate on the basic doctrinal foundations of the *tasavvuf* thought. We will also briefly analyze the ways in which the dervish religiosity appeared as a potential source of threat to the central political authority and to the central religious values. And lastly, we will discuss the role and position of these dervish groups in Anatolia in the general development of Islamic mysticism. In Chapter II, we will look at the dervish religiosity in the Ottoman context from the standpoint of the Ottoman state formation. We will examine how different approaches to the Ottoman state formation have affected the conceptualization of the dervish religiosity in the Ottoman context. For this reason, we will examine the Ottoman foundation myth and the major approaches to the Ottoman rise; and we will question the *ghaza* thesis and the Ottoman emirate's

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turning into the Ottoman state in line with the tribe-state axis. Chapter III will provide a context for the elaboration of these groups in detail until the 15th century. Together with this, we will concentrate on the term "heterodoxy". Rather than totally disregarding the term, we will investigate the reasons behind the definition of the dervish groups as "heterodox". On the other hand, we will focus on the ways in which the dervish groups are regarded as an element of the state formation according to the dual functions of the Ottoman state. Finally, Chapter IV ties together the Ottoman state and the dervish groups in the context of the "classical" age of the Ottoman empire. We will delineate the dynamics of the transformation of the relationships between the state and the "war machine", the dervish groups, by which the Ottoman state ideology turned against these "heterodox" Islamic beliefs. We will analyze how the groups of dervish religiosity became to be labeled as heterodox, atheist or heretic. Firstly, we will focus upon the event of Sheik Bedreddin as the commencement of the movements of heresy (*zendeka and ilhad*). Then, we will discuss the ways in which the conception of the Ottoman state idea, Ottomannes, Ottoman state ideology and the relations between the state and religion in the Ottoman state affected the relationships. While doing this, we will underline two important factors that led the Ottoman state to act against the dervish groups: the encounter between the Ottoman and Safavid states and the fusion of newly entering elements into the Anatolian dervish religiousity (such as Hurufiyya).

CHAPTER I

ISLAMIC MYSTICISM (TASAVVUF) AND THE PLACE OF ANATOLIAN DERVISH RELIGIOSITY WITHIN THE TASAVVUF THOUGHT

> Someone asked to Ebu Hafs: "whom is a Sûfî?"
> Answer: "A Sûfî never asks whom called Sûfî is."
> (Schimmel, 1982:15)[1]

Becoming heterodox of the dervish groups in Anatolia in relation with the formation of the Ottoman state is a multi-dimensional subject matter to be concentrated on. One dimension of this, basically, is related with the discussions pertaining to religion itself. In other words, before dealing with the socio-cultural, political and economic dimensions of the subject-matter, it is better to delineate its relation with Islam and its development. First of all, these dervish groups can and should be analyzed within the context of the development of Islamic mysticism, *tasavvuf*, in general. However, tasavvuf or Sufism, has had a "heterogeneous" and "multiple" nature. This heterogeneity and multiplicity is, on the other hand, what determines the specific characteristics of the tasavvuf thought and designates its place in relation the with Sunni Islam. It is in the sense that the characteristics of any

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[1] Throughout the study, all the quotations taken from the relevant Turkish sources are to be translated to English.

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dervish lodge, as argued by Kissling (1985), has been shaped and nourished by various primitive or ancient pre-Islamic elements in a given geography. This influence is one of the reasons why the dervish orders and branches within the tasavvuf tradition were mostly incompatible with the Sunni creeds as understood by the "high" Islamic faith. The general doctrine of the tasavvuf thought, the unity of existence (*Wahdād al-wujūd*), also intensifies this incompatibility as uniting with, and dissolving in God is something unthinkable from the point of view of the monotheist religions.

> The contrast between any sort of tassavuf thought and Sunni Islam pertaining to that thought is the result of tasavvuf's being always based on a perception of the universe based on the principle of the unity of existence (*Wahdād al-wujūd*) as opposed to every monotheism which is the product of rational considerations and ways of thinking (Kissling, 1985:58).

It should also be borne in mind that these peculiarities are also which lead tasavvuf to be thought in terms of variety of prejudices, presuppositions, historical, social and cultural entanglements and political concerns.

The debates about tasavvuf take place even on the meaning of the term, Sufi. The commonly accepted opinion is that it comes from the word wool, *sûf* (or *Cemâ-i suf*), and means wearer of wool. In accordance with this, it is also claimed that this symbolizes the ascetic and quietist tendencies in the early tasavvuf thought. However, this argument is also used to prove the Christian background of the tasavvuf thought in the sense that wool has been regarded as a noteworthy element in Nestorian Christian asceticism while a wearer of wool denotes a monk (Baldick, 1992). On the other hand, according to Adabert Merx, it is derived from the Greek word *sophos* (wise) and the Greek *philosophos* (philosopher) becomes *faylasûf* in Arabic. However, this argument has been regarded as philologically incorrect for the sake of the former one (Baldick, 1992). Alternatively, it is maintained that it comes from the word *saffet* meaning purity, or *saff* (or *saff-i evvel*) connoting the first bench of *namaz* or the word *suffa* (or *ashab-i suffa*) referring to the people whom continually sleep in the hall (*sofa*) of a small mosque during the time of Mohammed (Schimmel, 1982). Another argument, maintained especially by the Hebrew experts,

links it with the Hebrew Cabalistic term *Ain Sof* (the absolutely infinite) and supposes that the Jewish mystics (in addition to Cabala and Hasidism) had the same origin with Sufism or a tradition identical with it (Shah, 1969). The consensus seems to be procured on the term *sûf* (wool) connoting humility and morality, which was also approved by the prophet as opposed to showiness. Nonetheless, the same consideration also results in views against the conception of a Sufi in the sense that this symbol depicted through external peculiarities have led to satirizing an outer covering of a Sufi who forgets the inner essence.

Similar to the problem of definition, another problem revolves around finding origins to this hybrid, syncretistic and eclectic structure. The discussions basically elaborate the dominant elements in and the influence over the tasavvuf thought. They involve plenty of religious influences such as from Greek philosophy (especially neo-Platonism), Christianity, Persian religions (Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Mazdaism), Far Eastern religions (Buddhism and Taoism), Judaism and Jewish mystical traditions. In short, it includes anything and everything that this vast geography involves in relation with the development and spread of the tasavvuf thought. For some, Islam, like every other religious doctrines and grand religions, involves an esoteric and inner dimension and hence establishes the foundation of the tasavvuf tradition by which essence rather than form gains priority. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, it is the nature of the development of the tasavvuf thought in such a way that it encompasses the already existing belief systems and thinking patterns of a geography it takes place and it dissolves them in its own structure. On the other hand, any social and historical phenomena cannot be isolated from the socio-cultural background -wars, commerce, migrations, immigrations, and common borders- fusing different cultural formations. Consequently, one should not underestimate the variety of influences over the development of Islam in general. One cannot assume that Islam is an indivisible whole. This is as Ocak mentions:

> Islam, while being adapted to time and space, creates different interpretations, applications and mentalities under the influence of previous cultural structures. That it is called *Islamic faith*. Because of that variability, there is not only one Islamic faith but many Islamic faiths (1996:14-5).

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Related to this, tasavvuf tradition cannot be studied as a single homogenous whole. First of all, tasavvuf is the general name of Islamic mysticism and it is not a single sect, dogmatic system or an order (*tariqah*) (Nicholson, 1975). On the other hand, since the fact that it only makes sense with the nature of "individual mystical experience" (Hodgson, 1974), the huge diversity and many sub-divisions in Islamic mystical tradition have also been prone to re-divisions within themselves. This non-material reason requiring subjective mystical experiences beside the material ones mentioned above brings about a huge diversity and complexity.

Having all these concerns and problems in mind, we aim to concentrate on the development of Islamic mysticism in Anatolia within the general picture of the development of tasavvuf and evaluate it accordingly. First, a brief history of the tasavvuf thought will be given. Then, the basic doctrinal foundations in tasavvuf will be concentrated upon. And lastly, the place of these dervish groups in Anatolia in the general development of Islamic mysticism will be discussed both in time-space axis and in religious terms.

2.1 A Brief History of Islamic Mysticism (Tasavvuf)

The studies on the history of the development of Islamic mysticism gets its share from the conflicting discussions as in the case of the ones on the meaning of the term. In other words, there are various approaches fed by diverse ideological orientations that one may encounter with while dealing with this subject matter. From a sufi point of view, on the other hand, Sufism has existed from the beginning and it has been something penetrated into man's nature since Adam (Khan, 1973). In accordance with this essentialist terms, they were Sufis in all the time in history. For example, they existed even during the time of Christ so that they gave heed to him. There were also many sufis in the time of Mohammed and Mohammed was the first who opened a way for them. All the same, even the sufi point of view cannot omit the period during which Sufism spread to Persia, where they were attacked by the established religions, and hence when it found a way to express itself through poetry and music. The importance of Persia in the historical development of tasavvuf movement lies in the fact that the region lies between Greece, Egypt, Arabia and

India and thus, it was under many diverse influences such as Greek philosophy, Hinduism and Buddhism. Consequently, in Persia, Sufism inherited a great deal from the lore of the past. In short, the Sufi contention that in reality there is only one truth and religion within a great diversity can also be observed in a Sufi's words:

> The Sufi's worship of nature is due to the influence of Zarathustra. His tendency towards sacrifice is the lesson thought by Abraham. His miraculous power is due to the influence of Moses. As one who warns of coming dangers he represents the great warner of the past, Noah. His independence of asceticism shows the influence of Solomon. His sacred music tells us of the song of David. His tendency towards renunciation is learnt from the example Christ gave. The humanity of the Sufi is influenced by the personality of Mohammed. This makes the Sufi the disciple of every master, the follower of every religion, the knower of every aspect of wisdom (Khan, 1973:19).

As we mentioned above, there are other approaches beside tasavvuf's approach to its own history. For example, Köprülü (1987) explains the tasavvuf movement as the natural consequence of the spread and development of Islam in different places of the world and of the entrance of various peoples *(millets)* into the circle of Islam, which they had previously lived on their own cultures and traditions. This spread included Persian religions and civilizations, Jewish influence, Indian civilization (though not directly), Greek culture and philosophy, Christian influence that penetrated into Syria entirely and many others. This diversity led to the spread of Islam through the formation of various sects in different regions and their acquiring a shape accordingly. It was at the same time the decay of the Arabian domination took place when the Sufis increased in number and many dervish lodges were set in different places.

On the other hand, according to Bayat & Jamnia (2000), one cannot come across with the words, tasavvuf or Sufi, in the language of the world of Islam until 150 years after than Mohammed. It was because of the reason that the Islamic religious law *(shariah)* was deemed as the only way to be a good Muslim till then. Although there were also mystics, they neither built up a systematic path or a doctrine to be followed nor joined by people. Rather, they were ascetics who renounced the worldly concerns and lived single-handedly just by worshiping and fasting. It was around the

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years 800-850 AC., these mystics began to defend that there were different paths that could be followed other than these religious prescriptions. The importance of *shariah* (Islamic religious law) was then replaced by *tariqah* (the path) of a sheik. The period until the mid 15th century was the golden ages for tasavvuf which spread through these various orders. On that ground, what can we deduce from Bayat & Jamnia's words is that the history of the tasavvuf movement can be closely linked with the history of the dervish orders (*tariqah*).

Similarly, Gölpınarlı (2000), drawing on the rumors, claims that the words Sufi or tasavvuf came on the scene around the 8th century. Accordingly, tasavvuf started to develop and become institutionalized during the 8th and 9th centuries through the establishment of dervish lodges, appearance of specific customs and practices and springing up a class of people that differentiated form the rest of the society. During this period, Sufis were located especially in Khurasan, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. For him, right after tasavvuf became an occupation and a mystical philosophical system, it can be classified as follows: 1. *theoretical tasavvuf* that has been directly related with the moral principles and rules of conduct based on renunciation; 2. *affectionate-spiritual* tasavvuf that has been based on the principles of love and trance (*cezbe*).

Similar emphasis on the relation between the history of tasavvuf movement and of the dervish lodges can be observed in many sources. According to *DTA* (1976), analysis of the history of the dervish orders (*tariqah*) may give a clue about the history of tasavvuf, since tasavvuf constitutes the origin of these orders while they appeared concomitant with the disclosure of the tasavvuf thought. Also, it is important to note here that denominations and dervish orders differ in this regard. While denominations have been based on *shariah*, resulted from different interpretations of this Law and have appropriated Moslem canonical jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and worshiping as their basic principles, the dervish orders have been based on recollection (*zikr*) and insight (*irfan*) and very much nourished by outside sources that considerably influenced their form, characteristics and essence. Accordingly, all the orders in the world of Islam begun to arise in the 7th century, took shape and developed philosophically in the late 8th century and became institutionalized only in the 9th and 10th centuries. The first orders were established in the regions of Iraq, Iran and Syria. Ancient beliefs and habits, which were incompatible with *shariah*, fused

into these orders by acquiring a different shape. It is because of this reason, these orders have had different peculiarities according to the place they occurred, the traditions their founders were raised.

Theoretically speaking, one may encounter with four approaches to the classification of the history of the tasavvuf movement (*AB*, 1990). The first one classifies the history by dividing it into two periods owing to before (7-13th cc.) and after (14-20th cc.) the establishment of the dervish orders. In the second approach, the history of tasavvuf is divided as formation (7-8th cc.), development (9-14th cc.) and reproduction (from 15th cc. till today) periods. The third approach divides the history on the basis of the noteworthy names that were the touchstones in the general flow of the movement. Accordingly, it can be separated from Mohammed to Cüneyd-i Bağdadi (7-9th cc.), from Bağdadi to Muhyiddin Arabi (10-13th cc) and from Arabi to our days. For the last and the most prevalent approach, the history of tassavuf has been studied through four main periods that are renunciation (*zühd*), tasavvuf, philosophical tasavvuf and the period of orders. The same periodization could also be considered as formation (renunciation), systematization (tasavvuf and philosophical tasavvuf) and reproduction (orders).

During the period of formation, the main attribute of tasavvuf was the effort to realize a pure religious state of existence by breaking off the relations with the material world. During the period of Emevids, the first ascetics headed towards an individual religious life by becoming stranger to the society (*uzlet*) as a result of a reaction against the behaviors of the ruling class who were giving a primary importance to the worldly concerns. This way of life was enriched through the inclusion of elements such as resignation (*tevekkül*), mortification of the flesh (*riyazet ve mücahede*), forbearance (*sabr*), fear of God (*haşyetullah*), love of God (*aşkullah*), avoidance from the sinful and wrong (*vera*), and melancholy (*hüzün*). From the 9th century onwards, tasavvuf entered into a period of systematization in two different directions. The first direction was disregarding the Islamic rules or prone to interpret them subjectively. While interpreting, they developed various theories carrying the influence of ancient Greek, Jewish, Christian, Indian and Persian traditions and beliefs. Such a conception of tasavvuf was subjected to severe criticisms by the Islamic scholars. Some of the Sufis were accused of being

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unbeliever and heretic (*zindiq*), some were exiled, imprisoned or murdered. The second direction that progressed as an opposition to the former one appropriated either the way of balancing the theories of the former direction through counter-theories or reinterpreting them according to the Islamic rules. They considered reason as an important element. The members of the former direction refused them. In relation to these, tasavvuf entered into a period of institutionalization and organization from the mid 12th century on. The new period was shaped according to these different directions and differentiations.

Having all these different approaches in mind, we may summarize that the institutional history of the movement can be closely related to the history of the dervish orders. Nevertheless, the orders have been formed by the subjective will of a spiritual master, and thus reflected diverse historical backgrounds. In so far as the numbers of the orders are concerned, this is as Gölpınarlı asserts, "only God knows their number; besides, there may also emerge some more while we are already counting" (1997:187). Nevertheless, it is still possible to mention some common themes and the doctrinal foundations within this huge diversity, and also to place the dervish culture of Anatolia somewhere within the general development of the movement.

2.2 Basic Doctrinal Foundations

2.2.1 Form vs. Essence

> Sufism is truth without form
> Ibn el-Jelalî (Shah,1969:222)

It is the major theme in the tasavvuf thought that the world perceived through the sensory organs are reckoned as ontologically constituting the lower level of the perception of the universe. It is in the sense that the status of being is deemed hierarchically existing both in itself and in relation with the entire universe. Just as in the case of the emanation theory, the lower levels of existences are decreased through the continuous emanations from the absolute unknowable. Thereof, it

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appears as a major principle for an initiate who walks along the spiritual path (*sāliq*) to know that this emanated decrease from the absolute to the temporal brings about differing degrees of knowing, ascending gradually from the knowledge of the temporal to the absolute. It is in relation with this hierarchical structure that the acquisition of knowledge is divided as *al-'ilm al-zāhir* (knowledge of exoteric, external and apparent) and *al-'ilm al-bātin* (knowledge of esoteric, inner and veiled). In that division, although the knowledge of the external is obtained through ordinary sense perception and the use of reason, it is the esoteric knowledge that gets its share from the higher degrees of qualitative knowledge, as stated by Burckhardt:

> Exotericism stands on the level of formal intelligence which is conditioned by its objects, which are partial and mutually exclusive truths. As for esotericism, it realizes that intelligence which is beyond forms and it alone moves freely in its limitless space and sees how relative truths are delimited (1995:25).

The esoteric knowledge, which requires a different kind of *work* from the use of our ordinary means, also requires the guidance of the ones who are aware of these higher levels of existences. However, it should be bear in mind that although the superiority of esoteric knowledge and of truth behind the apparent take place at the very core of the tasavvuf thought, in general, it does not mean that external is altogether rejected. In other words, it is not as in the case of Hindu mysticism that requires one to close his/her eyes to whatsoever this world involves and to exalt the pure ascetic tendencies. In tasavvuf, this can be observed in the principle of acceptance of all the beautiful names of God (*Asmā-ul-husnā*) among which both *al-Zahīr* and *al-Bātin* are included. The proof of this can be observed in one of the most important fundamentals of Islamic mystic tradition, in which there are four Pillars or Gateways accepted. Each of the four are deemed essentially important, although the importance given to each one may differ in varying degrees according to the methods adopted by different paths. In other words, one can claim that a synthesis rather than a differentiation of the divine knowledge is aimed for with the acceptance of these Four Fundamentals. In the tasavvuf thought, it is believed that each verse comprises quartet of meanings regarding the commentary on Koran. If one glances at them very briefly, they can be specified as follows: 1. *sharī'ah*, the Islamic religious law or orthodox religious law, 2. *tariqah*, the path or teachings and practices of secret

religious (individual) orders, 3. *ma'rifah*, gnosis or the (direct mystical) knowledge that a gnostic (*ārif*) realizes that knowledge, knower and being known are one, 4. *haqīqah*, the immediate experience of essential reality. Birge (1965) explains all the four by giving the idea of "sugar" as an example, which was given to him by a spiritual master (*murshid*). It is the pillar of *sharī'ah* if one goes to dictionary and finds out what sugar is and how it is used; of *tariqah* if one feels its inadequacy and is introduced directly to the practical seeing and handling of sugar; *ma'rifah* if tastes and goes one step further by appreciation of its nature; and lastly *haqīqah* if becomes one with sugar so that he reaches to its essential reality and say that I am sugar.

Therefore, it becomes both the aim and responsibility of a Sufi to see and acquire the meaning behind the hidden. Even so, the practices in order to arrive at the essence of the veiled are as varied as the paths. Besides, they are arranged according to one's standing in and moving along the existence of hierarchies. Theoretically speaking, the path begins with the purification of soul (*al-Nafs*), then continues with the purification of spirit (*al-Rūh*); and both also involves gradually ascending degrees within themselves. As for the soul, they are named in an ascending order as follows: Animal Soul (*al-Nafs al-haywāniyah*), Lower (or Egoistic) Soul (*al-Nafs al-ammārah*), Inspired Soul (*al-Nafs al-mulhamah*), the Soul at Peace (*al-Nafs al-mutma'innah*), the Pleased Soul (*al-Nafs al-rādiyyah*) and Being-Pleased Soul (*al-Nafs al-mardiyyah*). Following this, the degrees that a Sufi reaches during the purification of spirit are enumerated, in the same way, as follows: inner centers of Heart (*qalb*), Spirit (*rūh*), Secret (*sirr*), Secret of the Secret (*sirr al-sirr*), Arcane (*khifā*) and finally the Most Arcane (*akhfā*) (Kılıç, 1996).

It is for sure that this conception of the universe that exists through the hierarchies of existences and the conception of man as the prototype of this universe bring about a very well developed tradition of symbolism. The logic behind this can be explicated with the fact that since the realms that a Sufi tries to *understand* are beyond our ordinary sense perception and the limits of our discursive thinking, they can only be revealed through the symbols. For instance, the concept of infinity is such that neither our five senses nor our ordinary minds can immerse into its deep meaning; consequently, it is only through the effects of these symbolic meanings, the essence of infinity might be attained to. The extension of this logic could be found in

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the symbolism of the letters in the alphabet, each of which is regarded as reflecting one of the attributes of God. Thereof, it is deemed essential to immerse into the essence of a single letter, in order to understand both God and Koran.

> The most of the contemplative activities of the Sufis have been inclined towards the first letter of the Arabic alphabet, *elif*. ...Corresponding to one numerologically, *elif* has been a divine letter, which stands alone but at the same time active. To know *elif*, for Sufis, has been to know the divine unity and aloneness; one, who recollects this letter, does not necessitate to recollect the others. In the letter *elif*, all the creation has been compromised (Schimmel, 1982:353).

2.2.2 The Concept of Love and the Importance of Heart over Mind

> Gnosis and Love are spiritually identical:
> they teach the same truths in different languages (Nicholson, 1975:101).

> If you had knew the secrets of life,
> You would have solved the secrets of death.
> Today you have mind but know nothing,
> What will you know tomorrow without your mind?
> Hayyam (Gener, 1995:87)

It is the conception of spiritual love (*al-mahabbah*) that overwhelms the tasavvuf literature. This dominance of spiritual love, *Agape*, can be closely connected with the conception of spirit that emanates from the absolute and descend to the lower level of existences, hence linked to the essence of the existences. As mentioned, since the essence beyond form requires more than sense perception and discursive thought, the concept of love comes into being as a major mean for arriving at the knowledge beyond form; hence it has been accepted as a secretive word. However, one should at the same time bear in mind that since the spirit is used identically with intellect, it is not the case that love is in a constant battle with the intellect with absolute terms. Rather, we may consider that there are different levels of intellect. Put it differently, spirit or intellect, *nous*, while descending from the First Intelligence, looses its degree of perfection; and when its comes down to the lower levels of existences, its

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characteristics combine with the characteristics of them. For example, since it is the descended form, *aql-ı cüz* divides rather than unites as one attributes its characteristics to the limits of discursive thought. In short, one should be careful about the misunderstanding that *aql* in tasavvuf thought acts as if it was a composite whole, which is aimed to be totally replaced by *love* instead. On the contrary, it is important to consider that intellect operates more than one level that cannot be reduced to each other.

The major confusion in this subject matter arises due to the fact that although in modern thought all the functions and characteristics of conscious, unconscious, intellect, reason, etc. are located in mind that has a superiority over other organs of the body, in the tasavvuf thought, as being part of the medieval thought in general, intellect lies in the heart. The heart is deemed as the center of man, the microcosms, while the discursive reasoning settles in mind. Therefore, gnosis[2], the divine knowledge reached by heart and at heart with the priority of divine love, is also an intellectual attainment of the heart rather than mind, when it is not considered in modern terms:

> ... [t]rue knowledge or gnosis in no way implies an emphasis on the mind: its organ is the heart, the secret and ungraspable center of man's being, and the radiations of knowledge penetrate into the whole sphere of the soul. A Sufi who has realized utterly 'impersonal' knowledge may non the less make use of the language of love and reject all doctrinal dialectic; in such a case the intoxication are beyond forms and outstrip all thought (Burckhardt, 1995:32).

Consequently, we should be careful about the fact that even if there was a battle among the faculties of mankind, their settlements would not be considered as in the case of modern thought and hence, they could not be conceived with its categories. What is more, the heart, as the center of mankind, also carries the peculiarity that there are Four Fundamentals (Gateways) of Reality, each of which is termed differently. In other words, although it has a priority over mind, it gets its share from the levels of reality at the same time. The same four aspects of the heart can be enumerated as follows: one related with Islam (*sadr*); one with belief and faith

(*qalb*); third with gnosis (*fuad* or *gönül*); and lastly as the seat of the Unity (*lubb*, the most inner part of the heart) (Schimmel, 1982). This leads us to reach a conclusion that the heart, as in the case of the intellect, may operate in more than one way. In so far as the ultimate aim of a Sufi is concerned, it is the truth (*haqiqah*), which is hidden and should be sought in the heart of the faithful. At the same time, it is also the point in human beings to which the divine intellect emanates. As for the concept of love, knowledge of God, therefore, cannot be separated from the love of God. It is because of the fact that it is only the *love* that acts to unite subject and object; and that is the gnosis (*ma'rifah*) through which knowledge, knower and being known are united:

> It is the unity of God (*tawhīd*), which transforms oppositions into a unity. What sets *tawhīd* into action is love; *tawhīd* is the principle of love. ...Love (then) opens up the door of another epistemology (Çamuroğlu, 1999:48).

The same principle behind this conception of heart over mind can also be observed in the priority given to the universal self over the individual one in relation with the same reason that 'I' divides rather than unites. In the tasavvuf thought, it is one of the basic beliefs and objectives that the universal self is found when the individual self is lost. In that sense, the endeavor of a Sufi may be likened to a battle, for the possession of the heart, between the individual self or the soul (*nafs*) and the spirit that procures the connection with the universe. In this battle, it is the aim and responsibility of a Sufi to stay at the center of the heart, at the intersection point of these two forces, and to work for the victory of the spirit over the soul in order to arrive at the higher degrees of the intellect. On the other hand, this requires a subjection of the individual will to the Divine Will, while this sacrifice to God, on the Altar of a Sufi's heart, brings about to obey and honor not only superiors but also the inferiors. Yet, this victory should not be confused with the total annihilation of the aspects of the soul, since the fact that when they are educated properly, they become a very powerful source of energy for the great work of a Sufi. It is because of this reason that the major responsibility of a neophyte is to train the lower desires of the individual self, *nafs* that corresponds to the animal soul.

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[2] Gnosis is a Greek word which means a "religious knowledge" or "insight". It is particularly associated with the deliverance or redemption of man precisely from the earthly existence through "insight" with a supramundane realm of freedom (Rudolph, 1987).

In so far as this training is concerned, the ways of managing this process show a great variety according to the chosen path (*tariqah*) among many and hence, to the chosen method by one's spiritual mentor (*murshid*). This is because of the fact that not the way of training but the *object* of these training is aimed at with these various deeds. And this is why a Sufi shows a great obedience to his/her *murshid* in this path, even the *murshid* is deemed at fault. In general, nevertheless, one cannot ignore the importance of intentional hunger (various ways of fasting), sleeplessness and speechlessness in order to tame the desires of the "animal soul". These deeds also vary when a Sufi aims at attacking to the "egoistic soul" by submitting himself/herself to the service of people in various ways. With all these deeds, it is believed that when one place himself/herself at the center of his/her heart (at the intersection point of *al-nafs* and *al-rūh*) by returning from *al-nafs* with a considerable effort, one becomes ready to climb up the stairs of the ladder of the spirit (*al-rūh*) and to immense into the deepest points of the heart.

2.2.3 The Conception of Unity

> Before the world came into being in the hidden secret of Non-existence
> I was alone with Reality in his oneness.
> He created the world because then
> I formed the picture of Him, I was the designer
> Şin (Birge, 1965:122).

The concept and conception of unity is one of the best examples that can be given in order to prove that tasavvuf has been extensively based on "individual mystical experience" (Hodgson, 1974). It is one of the major topics that leads to sharp divisions and fervent discussions between and among the schools or important names within the tasavvuf tradition. They have been about the nature of unification between man and the essential reality, the unity of existence and the nature of the relationship between this unity and God (For example, whether this unity is achieved with God or with the reflection of God). Accordingly, the ways of unification may range from co-mixture (*imtizaj*) and being identical (*ittihād*) with God or from infusion of the divine spirit to man (*hulūl*) to passing away in the essence (*waqfāt*) (Brown, 1968). This

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variety in terms, while each of which is indicating slightly different kinds of experiences, may be proliferated; all the same, in each and every case one can run into the ultimate aim of a Sufi: to arrive at the essence within, which is a gateway for unification howsoever it has been conceptualized.

In so far as the unity of existence is concerned, it is the Essence which is one in reality, although it seems diverse in its aspects. Therefore, a Sufi may attain to the essential unity of the universe as a universal or perfect man (*al-Insān al-kāmil*) through arriving at his/her own essential reality (*haqīqah*) residing in one's heart. It is materialized just after one has realized all different levels of Existence. Thus, this unity is reached at the highest point of one's climbing up the stairs of the ladder of the spirit (*al-rūh*). It happens when one immerses into the deepest point of the heart, which is beyond the secret of the secrets (*sirr al-asrār*). These highest stages are also leveled according to the nature of the relationship established with this absolute Essence. In relation with this, for example, the highest stages of the spiritual objective, passing away in the divine essence, cannot be equated with Nirvana in Hindu mysticism. Although both in *fanā* (extinction of individuality) and Nirvana passing away of individuality in the essential reality is implied, in Sufic mystical tradition it is complemented by two more levels. *Fanā* is followed by *fanā al-fanā* (extinction of extinction of individuality or passing away of passing away) as a prelude to *baqā* (subsistence, duration, continuance or abiding in this essential reality, in God) (Nicholson, 1975). In this last state, total reintegration in and with this essential reality is achieved. Thusly, the very well known utterance of Hallac, *Ene al-Haqq* (I am the Truth), appears as the ultimate objective of a Sufi, which is to become one with the *haqīqah*. In that sense, it is much better to explain this expression in relation with the integration with/in the Spirit or Essence of the absolute unknown rather than with proclaiming oneself as God and hence with insulting God's existence. It is because of this reason, in the tasavvuf thought, the unity with God is revealed by the word *Haqq* rather than *Allah*. If we are to summarize what has been said in this part so far, it can be said that the absolute unknown, which can be comprehended only through crossing certain degrees, is one and God. Although it is the only Essential Reality, everything including the universe emanates constantly from Him. What is under consideration is the fact that the

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universe exists through continuous emanations from this absolute. Therefore, the perfect man (al-*Insān al-Kāmil)*, who has reached at the essence, comprises in himself each and every degree descending from this absolute to the lowest level of existences.

As we have mentioned above, the heterogeneous nature of the tasavvuf thought might be observed in different conceptions of unity. Here, we would like to draw attention to the difference between the doctrine of *Wahdād al-Wujūd* (unity of the existence) and *Wahdat al-Mawcut* (unity of the existent). It is in the sense that the doctrine of *Wahdād al-Wujūd* has been presumed to be representing the orthodox wing of Islamic mysticism, while *Wahdat al-Mawcut* is identified with heresy (Çamuroğlu, 1992). Their difference arises on the basis of the conception of universe in relation with God's existence. Accordingly, the doctrine of *Wahdād al-Wujūd* regards the universe as finite and contingent, while *Wahdat al-Mawcut* takes it into consideration as infinite and necessary. For the former, God and the universe are not identical in such a way that the universe is only the manifestation (*tecelli*) of God. God is the absolute unknown and only its existence is necessary. Therefore, the unity is only essential; it is not that of the manifested. For the latter, the universe is identified with God; therefore, God is regarded as the sum of the beings in the universe. Each and every being we see is considered as a part of God; hence, the unity is not essential. With these peculiarities, the doctrine of *Wahdat al-Mawcut* has been conceived as representing the materialist wing of Islamic mysticism and the followers of the doctrine were accused of heresy (Ocak, 1998). However, there has not been a clear-cut boundary by which the doctrines of *Wahdād al-Wujūd* and *Wahdat al-Mawcut* are identified with orthodoxy and heterodoxy respectively. The doctrine of *Wahdād al-wujūd* has also been subjected to severe criticisms by many Islamic scholars due to its conception of unity.

2.3 Traces of the Tension between Tasavvuf and State (Religion)

We have mentioned above that the relationships between mystical groups and state are not purely determined by the antithetical relationships. They do not relate to each other only by means of opposition; rather, they compromise as well as oppose to

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each other. However, it is better to underline the points of tension between (Islamic) mysticism and (Islamic) state, which lead some scholars to grasp this relationship with purely antithetical terms.

First of all, we would like the question the concept of Islamic religious law *(shariah)* as an important source of tension. In the Islamic states, the most characteristic activity has been the study of the Islamic religious law. And thus, the Islamic states have made no distinction between law and religion. The Islamic religious law has been such that its commands and prescriptions have covered all aspects of public and private realms, and it has been seen as an all-embracing legal system. For that reason, Islamic orthodoxy has developed according to this basic need, which is the codification of the law as the chief activity of the Muslim scholars. The *ulema* (the learned) and the *fuqaha* (the lawyers), the scholars and custodians of the law acquired social and religious prestige in the Islamic societies by explicating the Islamic religious law (Williams, 1962).[3]

Sufism, in general, has been disapproved by the *ulema* as well as the strict orthodoxy in Islamic states. This has various reasons. Theologically, the sufi notion of the primacy of esotericism has been in clash with the primacy of the codified Islamic religious law and the role of *ulema* accordingly. While for a Sufi, esotericism has been the true method and the true reality, the *ulema* has been strict in the exoteric and manifest knowledge of what is written in the Koran. Moreover, the Sufi primacy of heart over mind has tended to scorn the book learning and along with it, *shariah* and its custodians. By that primacy, they implicitly rejected the authority of the Islamic scholars. It is because of the fact that in tasavvuf, each and every individual has been seen as the upholder of the Divine truth to be arrived by the subjective experience of the heart. Beside these, Sufi doctrine of the unity of the existence has exalted the belief that everything is He, while the orthodoxy has insisted on the

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[3] As we will underline in the last chapter, there has been four accepted schools whose precepts dictate how one interprets the Islamic religious law. These were Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali schools. In the Ottoman context, Hanafiyya was appropriated for the affairs of the state and society. While this school has given importance to reasoning or exercise of judgement *(ijtihad)* and to a consensus of the opinion of the judges *(ijma)*, these peculiarities allowed *shariah* to be interpreted through reasoning and judgement according to states' needs. It is important for us in terms of how the Ottoman state conceptualized religion in determining the relations between the sultanate and the subjects, hence between the state and "heterodox" dervish groups.

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transcendence of God. Parallel to this, the doctrine of unity has had a tendency to blur all the hierarchies and lines between the Muslim and the others, which has been seen potentially dangerous in the Islamic states.

> For the orthodox, the mystic's unitarianism blurred all meaningful lines between the Islamic community and the spiritual 'outside'. It was this dichotomy that gave the community its shape and ultimately its worldly purpose. Without the order that the definitions of the sacred law imposed upon human activity, could the believer know who was missionary and what the mission? (Zilfi, 1988:38).

Politically, on the other hand, Islamic scholars were concerned about the mystics proved ability to mobilize the masses. This ability to mobilize the masses was a challenge for most of the central authorities with respect to their right to rule on religious as well as political grounds (Zilfi, 1988). Since mystical religion makes priesthood and the whole apparatus of "monopoly-controlled sacraments" unnecessary, any mobilized actions of the masses by the sheiks (heads of the Muslim religious orders) were seen as a threat to their priestly organization (Ling, 1980). Therefore, for the religious scholars in the Ottoman context, the monopoly-controlled religious prescriptions were the means of social control against the uncontrolled mass. On that ground, theological and philosophical arguments of the *ulema* were produced in order to discredit the mystics' ability of mobilizing the mass movements, and these have often proved very persuasive.

On the other hand, the quality of the relations that the dervishes established with the universe and God affected the one with the material world. This had also repercussions on how they considered themselves in the presence of a political domination. Accordingly, they rejected man's subordination to anything in this world. This was directly related to how they conceptualized being in possession of worldly goods. In general, the basic aim of a dervish was being away from worldly possession only in his/her mentality. At the extreme cases, it led to total renunciation from the worldly concerns. In some cases, this withdrawal included all the religious and ethical norms of a society and caused to socially "deviant" behaviors. Also, they did attach importance to affection (*muhabbet*), not being a servant of God (*kulluk*). On that ground, being a servant of a political authority became totally unacceptable for them (Çamuroğlu, 1999b). However, the heterogeneous nature of dervish

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religiosity was also felt on the conception of political authority. As we will see in the Ottoman case, there were many Islamic mystics (*mutasavvıf*) who worked for the sultanate.

2.4 The Dervish Culture of Anatolia before the Ottoman Emirate

Tasavvuf came to the scene as a renunciationary and ascetic movement and then, it started to become systematized during the 8th-9th centuries. In so far as the 11th-12th centuries are concerned, it was institutionalized and became part of the socio-cultural life. This period of institutionalization included the spread and development of the dervish lodges. Here, one can see that the spread of dervish culture in Asia Minor and the reflections of it on the formation of the Ottoman state were concomitant with this period of institutionalization of the dervish lodges in the general history of the tasavvuf movement. On the other hand, one may also assert that its institutionalization in Asia Minor was fed from various multi-centered sources. First of all, the period under consideration was related with the Islamization of the Turcoman masses which were nomadic in origin and which migrated to Asia Minor. Thus, they carried the pre-Islamic beliefs and traditions with them in addition to the ones of where they immigrated. On that ground, we may conclude that the culture of the new immigrants of Asia Minor also penetrated into the already existing Anatolian culture; and hence, we argue that Anatolian dervish culture was multi-centered and syncretic, in other words rhizomatic in origin.

Although we are going to touch upon it with more detail in the following chapters, it is possible to discuss some of the general features of the tasavvuf movement in Asia Minor. First of all, not all the dervish groups or Islamic mystical groups should be evaluated under the same title. There were, for example, moderate and Sunni mysticism of the Baghdad School represented best by Ghazali, warrior-dervish groups as in the case of *ghazi* culture, mystical tendencies of the craftsmen corporations, *Ahis*, all of which should be treated separately. Furthermore, one should also bear in mind that the Sufi movement in Anatolia took different shapes in big cities composed of many elements and under the strong influence of Arab and Persian culture and in the nomadic groups closely bound by ethnic traditions. In

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addition to this, the 13th century may not be considered as an exception in so far as the reactions towards the abuse of institutional religion and towards the people using the external symbols of a Sufi as an outer covering and making their living by that way are concerned. It may be the reason behind Yunus Emre's saying: "I am a Sufi using his rosary continually among the people / My tongue utters gnosis but my heart never consents (Tatcı, 1997:560). Having all these diversity and complexity in mind, the dervish culture of the nomadic masses will be given a quick glance in this part.

Köprülü (1935) classifies this current of dervish groups under the general title, *abdals*. For the sake of simplicity, the help of the same term will be resorted to in order to distinguish them from other groups of the tasavvuf movement. They have been mostly known as the vagabond dervish groups and they came to scene as Abdals of Rum (*Abdalan-ı Rūm*) in Anatolia and Rumelia in the period under consideration. Basically, the term has been used to denote the members of the Qalandariyya and Haidariyya orders between the 12th and 14th centuries. Concomitantly, the words *Qalandar, Haidari, Abdal, Ishiq* and *Torlak* seem to be used interchangeably in the 15th century Ottoman sources.

Basically, the orders mentioned above have been grounded on the Malamatiyya order of Khurasan in their origin. Gölpınarlı (2000), on the other hand, evaluates Malamatiyya as an ideology (or a theory) within the tasavvuf thought. But he regards it as a reaction to the Sufis who abused their positions within society as the Sufism was institutionalized. Accordingly, they believed that thought (*fikr*) rather than recollection (*zikr*) was required in order to be reunited with God. Additionaly, they reacted to the dervish lodge life and Sufis' being separate from the rest of the society by their clothes and finery, customs and specific terminologies. In short, the members of Malamatiyya opposed to the situation that the masters of tasavvuf became a distinct class of people, which they regarded themselves as wises as opposed to the common people and that the political power took charge of these Sufis. Thereof, they chose to conceal and scorn themselves or to demonstrate themselves imperfect. He also evaluates *futuwwa* (brotherhood in the Ahi corporations) as the development and materialization of this ideology in an organizational structure spread among the artisans and craftsmen. Similarly, Ocak (1992) traces the Malamayiyya movement back to the tradesmen class of the

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Abbasid Empire. And he defines Qalandariyya of the 13th century roughly as "a tasavvuf movement, which does not consider the world worthy of regard while opposing to the law and order of a society in which it existed and which reveals this point of view in everyday life and actions" (1992:5).

The special features of these segments, which are depicted mostly through their outer appearances both in the works of Karamustafa (1994) and Ocak (1992), display slight differences. Their faiths, on the other hand, are presumed to be limited with the following principles: adopting a manner against this world, society in which they live, and cultural codes and structures; the belief of unification (*tawhid*) that considers God reachable through human effort; worshiping while resisting to worldly pleasures and tendency of renunciation (*zühd*); appropriation of the principles of divine Love and trance (*cezbe*) as opposed to getting out of the prohibitions with the afraid of God (*takva*); pure obedience to the Divine Will; repudiating this world and consenting to the fate accordingly (*tevekkül*); believing metempsychosis and denial of the hereafter. Yet, their outer appearances and deviant behaviors are stressed on much more intensely. They can be enumerated as follows: shaving all bodily and facial hair or fourfold-shave (*char-darb*) including hair, mustache, beard and eyebrow; poverty; mendicancy and itinerancy; homeless wandering; celibacy and self-mortification; social deviance as the ultimate measure of true renunciation; anarchist and antinomian practices like nudity or improper clothing; use of hallucinogens and intoxicants (cannabis, hashish); singing and dancing; renunciation of society through outrageous social deviance; bodily mortification; seclusion; sleep-deprivation and self-cauterization; sexual libertinism (sodomy and zoophilism). All the same, the same sources also mention the fact that this dervish-religiosity should not be evaluated through the two-tiered model of religion that is divided as "high" and "low" Islam in the sense that this religious formation also welcomed the recruitment from both middle or high strata.

> There are serious problems with this "two-tiered model of religion. The assumption of an unbridgeable separation between high, normative and low, antinomian religion serves to obscure rather than clarify the true nature of the deviant dervish groups and the process of their emergence in the aftermath of the Mongol invasion. While it may conceivably serve as a heuristic purpose in other contexts, in the case of the dervish groups of the Later Middle Period the creation of

a catch-all category of popular or low religion only confound the researcher" (Karamustafa, 1994:9).

However, it is commonly stated that although there were Qalandars of the higher strata, this wing of the movement did not last much due to both its complicated theoretical structure and the period of civil turmoil and internal struggles that took place after the Mongol invasion. Rather, the popular Qalandariyya movement spread all over Anatolia during the early 14th century, especially over the frontier regions. Moreover, the groups of people called *Abdals of Rum* were part of this popular Qalandariyya movement (Ocak, 1992).

In so far as the origins of Abdalan-ı Rum, the "heterodox" dervishes of Anatolia, are concerned, the conventional tendency mentions partly Yasawiyya and partly Qalandariyya orders in order to classify them easily. Although Köprülü, in his earlier works argues for the orthodox nature of the Yasawiyya order, later he (1992) connects the order's rites to the old Turkish shamanism and considers this order completely heterodox when it was established. Köprülü (1987) also regards this order as the first sufi order founded by and spread among the Turks, which also undertook the role of spreading out the Islam without the Persian and Arabic influence. Conversely, for him, the Qalandariyya order was important in relation with the spread of Persian influence over the Anatolian Turks after the Mongol invasion during which many scholars and artisans run away from Turkistan, Iran and Kharezm and settled within the borders of Anatolian Seljuks.

On the other hand, one cannot underestimate the aura of influence of the well-known non-Turcoman figures of the tasavvuf movement who came from various places and settled in Anatolia during the 13th century (Bardakçı, 1998). Some of these Sufis carried the Malamatiyya understanding from Iran and Khurasan, some the Iraqi influence regarding the mortification of the animal soul and struggle with the flesh, and some the conception of "the unity of existences" (*Wahdād al-wujūd)* and tasavvuf philosophy of Andalusia and North Africa. In short, the dervish culture of Asia Minor during the later middle period was heterogeneous, fluid, syncretic and diverse.

CHAPTER II

THE OTTOMAN STATE FORMATION AND THE DERVISH GROUPS OF ASIA MINOR

The Ottoman state's foundation problem intermingles with the one about the dervish groups in the 13th and 14th centuries of Asia Minor in many ways. For this reason, in order to understand the relations of these groups with the Ottoman state and the transformations of these relations, the problem of the formation period has a great significance. However, beside the problems in searching for these groups of the concerned age, the discussions on the Ottoman state formation period carries its own difficulties. The most primary of these has been the fact that the discussions have been walked back and forth the specific problems and questions due to lack of empirical data and that most of them were of legendary quality. Putting differently, it has been the common theme in the studies on the Ottoman state formation that the Ottoman history started to be written in the 15th century. And the basic characteristic of these documents was that they were mostly based on legends (*menkıbe*). Parallel with this, in the panel discussion about the formation of the Ottoman State (held in Metu in the 19th of March in 1999), Suraiya Faroqhi (2000) finishes her speech by stating that the discussions on the formation of the Ottoman state have been exposed to turning within a *vicious circle* unless empirical grounds are strengthened. In this part of the study, we aim to tackle this "vicious circle" with the question that what kinds of questions have been continuously asked for revealing the formation problem such that they have been regarded as the reasons for this circle. Consequently, we will underline these questions and different approaches to the problem of formation

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in relation with the dervish groups of Asia Minor. It should be bear in mind that in this study, we do not aim to resolve the existing formation problem, but aim to mention the existing paradoxes in the studies on the Ottoman formation and the ways in which the dervish question has been affected accordingly. With these objectives, in this chapter, we will deal with three basic questions: the foundation myth of the Ottomans, *ghaza* thesis and the transition process of the Ottoman emirate toward the Ottoman state in line with the tribe-state axis.

3.1 The Ottoman Foundation Myth

> Osman Ghazi prayed to God, and shed a few tears. He felt sleepy. He lied down, and fell asleep. There was a holy sheik among the friends of Osman Ghazi. He had performed many miracles. All the people believed in him. He was known as a dervish; but he was a dervish at heart. He was wealthy, he had plenty of worldly goods, food, and flock of sheep. His house was frequented by many people. Osman Ghazi also visited this dervish occasionally.
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> Once in his sleep, Osman Ghazi dreamed of a moon arising from the sheik's heart, and sinking in his own breast. As soon as the moon reached into Osman Ghazi's heart, a tree sprouted out from his stomach. The tree overshadowed the world. There were mountains in its shadow. There were streams at the foot of every mountain. Some drunk from these running waters, some watered their gardens, and some built fountains.
>
> Osman Ghazi woke up, went, and related his dream to the sheik. Then, the sheik replied: "Osman, my son! Congratulations, God bestowed a sultanate on you and your descendants. May it be blessed. And my daughter shall be your wife (Aşıkpaşazade, 1970:10-11).

Concerning the Ottoman state formation and its origins, the legends play an overwhelming role. In other words, the history of the Ottoman formation has been primarily based on legends. In so far as the most popular and relatively older of these legends are concerned, Ashikpashazade history is worth to consider here. According to the narrative, as mentioned above, (illiterate, warrior and nomadic) Osman has a

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friendship with Sheik Edebali. Although he falls in love with his daughter Malkhatun, Sheik refuses Osman. Later on, Osman (or Ertugrul) has a dream of a moon rising from the Sheik's heart and setting in his own bosom and a tree sprouting from his own stomach which overshadows all over the world. As soon as Osman relates his dream to the Sheik, Edebali interprets the dream in a way that the moon signifies Malkhatun who is going to get married to Osman, while the tree coming to mean the sovereignty of the coming generations arising from both.

Eliade (2001) approaches to the myths not as fictions, but rather as the products of "still living" and "extremely complex" cultural traditions. Looking from this perspective, he regards them as the least defective and most comprehensive sacred stories which always narrate a story of a creation and which appear as the models of all rituals and meaningful human actions of a given society. They explain the origin; hence, some of them may include cosmogony by which the universe is symbolically recreated. Knowing the roots enables someone to know all the events that would be taking place in the future, while returning to the roots prepares a new birth. Knowing and revealing the origin brings forth meaning and reality to the object discussed; and this essence is tied to a history preserving its existence through historiography. All these lead us to the Ottoman historiography. In other words, these legends, when considered in relation with the attempts tying the formation of the "great" empires to the divine myths, can be regarded as the indicators of an empire ideology. In other words, what gives "reality" to these myths may be explained in terms of the influence they had over vast numbers of people. Put it differently, they reflect what the empire ideology wanted people to believe and how it wanted to project itself for the present and future motives of its subjects. It is because of this reason, Ortaylı (2000:11) refers them as "a prose" relating to a historical reality, which was written due to political concerns or just for the sake of a literary style.

If the founder myth of the Ottomans is to be interpreted with reference to Eliade, it can be argued that the living dream of Osman, as a model for the coming generations, reminds us the claim for a divine power in the origin. In other words, since the foundation was based on a divine consent, it gives meaning and reality to the Ottomans sovereignty. On the one hand, changing attitude of Edebali toward Osman is worth to consider here. It is in the sense that although the Sheik refuses

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him at first, the moon arisen from the Sheik's heart toward Osman's leads to some kind of approval. On the other hand, the Sheik is depicted as a dervish in heart who is also the possessor of the worldly goods and who has a significant influence around; and this indicates some kind of difference between the depiction of a dervish who was in collaboration with the Ottoman family and the other vagabond dervish groups. In other words, in so far as the relations between the Ottoman family and the heterodox groups are concerned, the Ottoman house of rule was selective to some extent in determining which dervish groups were influential in the foundation (even in the Ashikpashazade history that attributes considerable roles to these groups) regarding the 15th century Ottoman ideology and historiography.

When we think it in relation with the Ottoman state ideology of the concerned age, the Ashikpashazade history, as a "reality" of the period, has a great significance. With respect to the role and importance of the dervish groups in Ashikpashazade's history, Ocak's (2000c) comments are worth to mention. For him, Ashikpashazade was one of the members of an important dervish family (the line of Baba Ilyas), which had been older than the Ottoman dynasty, leading the uprisings against the Anatolian Seljuks (Babai uprisings). Because of this reason, he adopted a manner which was both the adherent of the state and exaggerating the role of the dervishes. Following this, Ocak argues that this manner might have arisen due to his inferiority complex in the Ottoman context. On the other hand, İnalcık (2000b) proposes the necessity of reading the Ashikpashazade history in the light of the polemic character of the text, because it was written during the reign of Bayezid II. Accordingly, the background of the Ashikpashazade history can be summarized as a reaction of Bayezid II to the previous politics of Mehmed the Conqueror, who attempted to extend the state control. During these attempts, all the real estates and pious foundations (*waqfs*) of the powerful families were regulated, confiscated in the name of state treasury and re-distributed to military as *timar* lands. This was in order to break the power and influence of the Muslim scholars (*ulema*) and especially of the ex-"aristocratic" landowner families. Due to the tension between these elites and the state arising as a result of the radical measures of taxations and savings on land, the reign of Bayezid II attempted to exalt the ideal image of a ghazi-sultan. İnalcık (2000c) also argues that the 15th century Ottoman historiography was a product of

the formation of the empire. Moreover, the Ottoman historiography written during the reign of Bayezid II was the expression of being an universal Islamic Empire. In addition to this, most of the collected works about the general history of the Ottomans were the result of Bayezid's direct request to make the public opinion to be in his favor and the reply of the Muslim scholars (*ulema*) of the age.

> The edited works written during the reign of Bayezid did not only put forward an opposition directed against the politics of Mehmed the Conqueror. Beside this, the consciousness of having formed an universal Islamic empire required the re-evaluation of the Ottoman history during the race for superiority with the Memlukids and the states of Iran in the East. ...As for the Ottoman sultans, they were exhibited as the frontier region ghazis of the Islamic world (İnalcık, 2000c:115).

Therefore, the provision of the divine character of the formation through the images of the leaders or prominent figures of the group of dervishes may be explained both in terms of their acceptability in the eyes of the people and the general political structure of the concerned age. Beside the role of Islam as an universal ideology, the myths including the attempts to tie the Osman's dynasty to the legends of Suleymanshah and Oghuz Turks are also worth to mention. This may be considered in relation with the necessity to a establish domination over the Turcoman tribes (Gallotta, 2000). Considering the drive behind this writing and re-evaluating the history of the pre-Ottoman past, these attempts aiming at both making the history of the Anatolian Seljuks as legendary as possible and at tracing the Osman's dynasty back to the same roots explain how the house of rule tried to expand its reign in the eyes of different tribes by using the already legitimized position of the Seljuks.

Using Islam and the pre-Ottoman past in the legends as an extension of the empire ideology bring forth the question on how the Ottoman state achieved to sustain the integrity of many diverse elements included during the state's expansion and its becoming a major power of the time. This question becomes especially significant as the territories expanded through the conquests and various diverse powers were included into the emirate. Beside the conquests, continuation of the migratory movements after the Seljuks intensifies the importance of the question of how the

Ottomans dealt with various diverse elements. Thus, in the following part, first the major approaches, then the relatively recent ones fed by these major ones regarding how the Ottoman emirate turned out to be an empire will be touched upon.

3.2 Major Approaches to the Ottoman Rise

3.2.1 Gibbons – Köprülü - Wittek

As Hassan (2001) mentions, the debates about the emergence of the Ottomanism - Ottoman Emirate – Ottoman State have been focalized around and amplified upon the Wittek-Köprülü discussions for a long time (nearly seventy years). These have comprehended the approaches in line with the clan-tribe ties and the ghaza thesis. Before specifically dealing with the Wittek-Köprülü discussion, it is important to underline Gibbons' thesis in the sense that Köprülü also built up his thesis as a reply to Gibbons'.

According to Gibbons (1968), successful enterprise of the Ottomans could not be built solely by the Asiatic pagan nomads; rather it was done through their conversion into Islam and their setting out to Islamize their Christian neighbors. On the other hand, the Turks solely could not form the Osmanlis. Rather, they formed the new race, that is Osmanlis, through the combination of various elements living in the northwestern corner of Asia Minor. Accordingly, for him, they were "the people unique in history through the blending of wild Asiatic blood with the oldest as well newest European stock" (1968:51). As a proof for this, Gibbons upholds that there appeared a sudden and inconceivable population increase toward the end of the Orhan's reign, which could not be explained only through the inclusion of the nomadic Turcomans. In that context, he maintains that inclusion of the pre-Ottoman elements may be deemed inevitable:

> Before the end of Orkhan's reign the nucleus of Asiatic adventurers which had gathered around Osman in the village of Sugut had grown to half a million. It could not have been by the flocking in of nomads from the East. Orkhan was cut

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off from contact with the Asiatic hinterland. His rivals of Karaman, Satalia, Aïdin, and Sarukhan would have attracted adventurers from the outside before himself. Orkhan formed his nation out of the elements on the ground (Gibbons, 1968:63).

Although Gibbons develops this thesis in order to demonstrate that the Ottoman state administration was the result of Byzatium heritage and there was a great deal of Christian influence in the state formation, his thesis is important at some points beside its ideological background. It is in relation with the fact that the period of state formation and centralization cannot be explained solely by the elimination and annihilation of the local powers. To that end, total annihilation of the pre-Ottoman structures seems meaningless in this context. Put it differently, the period of state formation and centralization contained both the inclusive and exclusive policies just as Deleuze and Guattari assert.

Köprülü, as a response to Gibbons, exalts the Turco-Moslem heritage derived form the Central Asia and Middle East. While he continuously sustains the need for ethnographical studies in order to analyze the history of Anatolia and endeavors to establish the ethnical and tribal origins of the Ottomans in relation with the formation of the empire, he first of all criticizes the most widely favored views in the European circles of his age. Accordingly, Köprülü (1992) stands against Gibbons with respect to his basic thesis about the founding of the Ottoman state. At first, he criticizes Gibbons' attempt to explain the establishment of the Ottoman state only by religion, as if it was the only factor, which underestimates the complexity of historical reality. Then, he objects to the consideration that Ottomans were an independent race composed of Greeks and Turcoman tribes of four hundred tents, which formed the nucleus of a great state. Rather, he argues for that the Ottoman history should be analyzed within the general context of the Turkish history, hence as the continuation of the history of the Anatolian Seljuks. In regard to this, he sustains that Ottomans were just the one among the other Oghuz Turks who went to Anaolia during the Seljuk period and who ethnically belonged to the Qayi tribe (not Qay).[1]

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[1] For more information on the Köprülü's attempts to prove that Ottomans were from the Qayi branch of Oghuz Turks and the related discussions, see also Köprülü, M. Fuad (1999) *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.

> ...[i]t is obvious how meaningless it is to regard the Ottoman sultanate as originating from a large tribal migration that possessed special ethnic qualities, and it is clear that no change came about in ethnic {*kavmi*}and linguistic features of Anatolia as a result of the formation of the Ottoman state (1993:27).

The discussions on whether the Ottomans came from the Qayi branch of the Oghuz Turks that came to Asia Minor with the first Seljuk conquerors is related with another discussion, that is "timing of their arrival". According to Hassan (2001), the discussion on whether they arrived earlier or later has been closely related with whether they were semi-nomadics, who had statehood experience and who were trained within the Seljuk circles (at least settled by them) or the ones who were nomadic tribes, who did not have any statehood experience. However, despite his insistence on Qayi tribe, Köprülü regards such discussions as insignificant points for understanding the founding of the Ottoman Empire. Köprülü does not assume that Ottomans were a new ethnic and political entity distinct from the Seljuk sultanates and other Anatolian emirates; hence, they were not outside the Seljuk state experience.

> ...[i]t was a new *synthesis*, a new historical composite which arose from the political and social evolution of the Anatolian Turks in the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries (Köprülü, 1992: 117).

Wittek's thesis (1958) carries a great significance in the sense that it has the major longest-term influence over the modern explanations on the early periods of the Ottoman history. On the other hand, he emphasizes the religious motivation as the root cause of the Ottoman power; therefore, he puts the Ottoman struggle against the Christian neighbors as the principal factor.

In relation with the history of Turkish Asia Minor up to Ottomans, Wittek depicts the picture of the situation since the battle of Mantzikert, by which many Turkish bands flooded into Asia Minor. He regards this not as a political and military action but rather as a "spontaneous work of elements only loosely connected with the Seljuk state" (1958:16). Having established as a result of the Oghuz migration movement from Turkestan into the new region, the Seljuk state was the result of appropriation of and submitting to the already existing traditions of the conquered territories. In

that sense, it was fashioned according to a Perso-Islamic manner. It was also valid for the frontier districts in the sense that frontier regions can be thought as a mixed borderland civilization. Following this, Wittek differentiates the frontier and hinterland cultures in many ways. First of all, frontier regions existing between Byzantium and Islam brought about special military organizations on both side of the districts. In this continuous war situation, booty was the principal economic basis of life; and it also produced "warrior clans, faithfully devoted to their chiefs and aspiring to the greatest possible independence, fully conscious of their own importance in their relations with the government" (1958:18). Further accentuated by racial, religious and ethnic differences, the hinterland and frontier cultures were in conflict in administrative (such as detesting taxation), religious (due to their welcoming the heresies) and military matters. Regarding the Turks as the main representative of the military class having the purpose of fighting with the infidels and heretics and having the hope of booty since the earlier days of Islam (already in the 9th century), Wittek elaborates this Turkish element as the incorporation of this warrior class to the Seljuks but as an autonomous group and independent tribes loosely connected to the dynasty. As this relatively peaceful situation was spoiled during and after the reign of Aleaddin Kaiqobad, together with the economic and social decay and the problem of legitimization and preserving the dignity, the growing discontent led to influential religious and social revolts broke out among the Turcomans such as in the case of Babai revolts. On the other hand, during the immigrations of the steadily increasing numbers of people, holy men, sheiks and the dervishes also came from Iran and Turkestan. Thence, the Osman's emirate, which was just one of the other Turkish ghazi principalities dividing the Seljuk territory, appeared in that context and reflected its major peculiarities accordingly. So, the Ottomans started as a ghazi emirate of the march warriors, and then became an empire. For Wittek, ghazi traditions were the special institutions and regulations. These were giving an internal stability to the organizations that acknowledged *futuwwa*, that was "a canon of rules by means of which the virtuous life, as understood by Islam with its mystical inclination, might be lived" (158:38). It was a moral guide existing in the number of Islamic corporations (such as the Ahis), in which the artisans and merchants had a military potentiality. As in the Christian knighthood, mutual fidelity, special ceremonies, ethical obligations and sheiks as the

senior of the ghazi organizations played an important part. Therefore, he assumes that the Ottoman state was a ghazi state which was "a body which aimed at military conquest. The chief had the allegiance of his followers in return for the obligation to provide them with the means of livelihood, which meant the acquisition of booty" (1958:40). While he incorporates two fundamental elements of the ghazi tradition to the state, that is "the conversion of Islam and the absorption of indigenous elements" (1958:49), he also puts the tenacious resistance towards the Byzantines as an imperative against the enemy. On the other hand, for him, the situation that the other Anatolian emirates were also the organizations based on ghaza constituted a suitable environment in which the Ottomans could easily expand.

Moreover, Wittek (1943) also argues that since the beginning, there were two separate but equally important inclinations among the Ottomans: ghazi and Muslim inclinations. The Muslim religious functionaries and scholars were existing since the beginning of the formation, and the proof of this could be observed in the establishment of various religious colleges (*medrese*) even just after the early conquests. However, Wittek puts this Muslim inclination in opposition to the ghaza in the sense that while these tolerant administrative cadres were proposing peaceful measures towards the non-Muslims (such as taxation rather than conversion), the ghazis were much more fanatic against the "infidels". Although these two different inclinations were balancing each other, they were later on (especially after the battle of Ankara) the major source of tension.

Another important point about Wittek's analysis is that he develops his ghaza thesis with reference to the sources under the direct influence of this phase of Ottoman historiography. Thus, he remains directly influenced by Ashikpashazade history and its ideological background and merges this influence with the political conjuncture of his age. In this work, in which the most attractive components of the romantic Austria-German nationalism was perfectly applied on the Ottoman Empire, the most important success was its addressing different camps of thought (Imber, 2000).

> While the Turkish nationalists were examining Wittek's ghazis, that is to say his holy warriors, as a symbol of Turk-Islam heroism, the other nationalists and Crusader historians

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were able to consider them as a manifestation of "Turkish yoke" or "Turkish trouble (2000:59).

Kafadar (1995), among others, regards both Köprülü and Wittek as the textbooks of orthodoxy with respect to the European and Turkish historiography. And the dilemma between them, as mentioned above, has overwhelmed the discussions on the Ottoman foundation for a long time. However, Kafadar maintains that despite the fact that Wittek's work was aimed to be a critique of Köprülü, they have some points in common. These were the necessity of studying the Ottoman state against the background of centuries of warfare, studying the cultural transformations, acculturation and settlement of Moslems and Turks in the medieval Anatolia and the necessity of distinguishing the hinterland regions from the frontier ones in terms of both social and cultural structures. For him, the basic argument between them is whether tribal characteristic of the Ottomans played a significant role in the rise of the empire. While Köprülü insists on the validity of the Qayi identity and the importance of the ethnic origin with an essentialist point of view shaped under Durkheimian tradition of nationhood, Wittek concentrates on the ghaza milieu and its ethos rather than the tribal associations of the early Ottomans. And this is the reason why Kafadar accuses Wittek of his reductionist insistence on the ghaza thesis and its hindering new lively debates, searches and ideas.

3.2.2 Some Alternatives

As mentioned earlier, the discussions on the Ottoman state formation and the turning of the Ottoman emirate to be the Ottoman empire have been overwhelmingly fed by, constructed upon and developed through these major names. Therefore, the basic lines of arguments for the formation of the Ottoman state have been revolved around these major themes: ethnic origins, ghaza ethos, and state formation from the tribal-nomadic characters. In each theme, the circle has been turned around the major arguments of the names mentioned above. Even the new alternatives have been introduced, especially when the importance of anthropological studies were pointed out, the departure point became these major lines of arguments (especially in between the ghaza ethos and the (nomadic/semi-nomadic) tribe – state axis).

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As an "alternative" theory, Rudi Paul Linder (2000), one of the most important critics of Wittek and his ghaza thesis with his anthropological approach on tribes, mentions the inclusionary nature of tribalism despite the exclusionary nature of the ghaza ideology. In addition to this, he views a tribe not as a closed group based on consanguineous ties rather as a political organism, membership of which is defined by the shared interests. In other words, while he mentions the importance of shared concerns rather than kinship ties in order to understand the sudden and rapid population growth of various tribes, Linder (1982) emphasizes that genealogy was rearranged and a lineage was discovered to reinforce a kind of unity by including fictional blood ties into these shared interests. Thus, the ideology of kinship can be regarded as a need to symbolically emphasize the tribal unity as the tribe grew. Consequently, the ghaza thesis is refuted in relation with this approach to the ideology of kinship. And the most important proof for this dismissal is the thesis' incompatibility with the behaviors of the early Ottomans with their Christian subjects and neighbors. In relation with this nomadic character and the nature of the ties that sustained unity among these nomads, Linder argues that they were the warriors of shamanism, not of Islam, until the settlement process was gradually achieved.

However, for Kafadar (1995), there is a problem with this use of shamanism that assumes it as lumping all the pre-Islamic Turkic beliefs survived. It is in the sense that it discards also the sedentary dispositions annexed into the nomadic culture. He sustains that it is just like the reverse: if the Sunni point of view is purely ideological, how one can explain the inclusion of "un-Islamic" legends in their narratives. In that sense, he opposes to the arguments that the actions of the ghazis were shaped by untarnished Islam or they were seen as a potential troublemaker from the viewpoint of the settled life. With respect to this, Kafadar argues against the definition of a ghazi as the fervor for the holy war. As a consequence, according to Kafadar, ghaza was not something synonymous with jihad or holy war. He pays attention to ghaza less as a religious category than jihad. It is in the sense that it included fighting for someone and/or for livelihood as an irregular raiding activity. Ghaza was not something solely oriented against the Christian neighbors living in the frontier regions. Accordingly, the most important thing in ghaza can be considered as its inclusion of religious syncretism and militancy, adventurism and idealism at the

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same time. For him, although the Ottomans never totally became ghazis, the concept of ghaza never disappeared from the ideology of the Ottoman state.[2] Kafadar lays stress on various transformations of the conception of ghaza and its construction by different historical agents in different times resulting to discrepancies for the appropriation of the past accomplishments.

When the formation of the Ottoman state is viewed not as an independent event, but rather as the continuation of the migratory and emirate movements after the Seljuks and the inclusion of diverse powers through the conquests, we may assert that the Ottomans were the sum of many diverse elements, such as ghazis, alps, Turcoman chieftains, Ahis, non-Muslim raider chiefs, etc. Hence, when we think the dervish groups not as a special category independent from this mixed structure rather as one of the many, the question becomes how this relation was established between the Ottoman family and the newly included segments. Here, we come to the point that the state proceeds by making very diverse points resonate together, as Deleuze and Guattari say:

> It is a phenomenon of *intraconsistency*. It [the state] makes the points resonate together, points that are not necessarily already town-poles but very diverse points of order, geographic ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities. It makes the town resonate with the countryside (1987:433).

For example, Karen Barkey (1994) argues that the Ottoman state centralization period should be counted differently from the Western European precedents that ensued throughout the 17th and the 18th centuries. For her, this difference came from the particular style of the Ottoman leaders in order to achieve the state centralization. It was done mostly through bargained incorporations rather than rebellions, struggles and coercion as in the case of the Western examples. It is also what Kafadar touches

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[2] According to İnalcık (1980), the ghaza idelogy was the basic characteristics of the frontier cultures, by which a groups of principal participants, horsemen and companions (*ghazi* or *nökör*), were gathered around a tribal leader, and which required dissolving of the kinship ties. For him, this model could also be found in the Inner and Central Asian Turkish tribes. Similarly, Togan (1999) emphasizes that both the Timurids and the Ottomans followed a state formation model by which people of diverse background participated in the central administrations. For more information on the similarities as well as differences between the Timurid and Ottoman state formations on the basis of inclusive policies of both, look at Togan, İsenbike (1999) "Türkler'de Devlet Oluşum Modelleri: Osmanlılar'da ve Timurlular'da" in *Prof. Dr. İsmail Aka Armağanı*, İzmir: Beta Yayınevi, pp. 71-84.

upon that the Ottoman state builders manipulated a constantly shifting matrix of alliances and tensions with other socio-political forces. As he asserts similar to Deleuze and Guattari: "This was a process consisting of a series of carefully selected exclusions as well as inclusions, improvisations as well as continuities" (Kafadar, 1995:121). For Barkey, these bargains and dealings during the transformation from a nomadic family to a established house of rule were established between different regional elites and the Ottoman house of rule. Therefrom, the relations between the subjects and the house of rule were carried on through these elites. From this, we may deduce that the period of state centralization was the gradual diminishing power and autonomy of these regional elites, as Barkey states:

> During thing this transformation, which lasted approximately from the fourteenth to sixteenth century, the Ottoman house of rule managed to shape a variety of internal forces to its own will, sometimes by offering deals, sometimes by forcing migration, and at other times through sheer coercion. Whatever the means employed, the end result was to tie all potential regional elites and potential corporate entities strictly and solely to the state without allowing them the freedom of autonomous organization (1994:26).

As an alternative view, Werner (1986) opens up the discussion on these bargains with a Marxist perspective. On that ground, the nomadic life had already contained feudal and unequal relationships.[3] This "nomadic aristocracy", while using the favors of the house of rulers through these bargains, subjected themselves to the sultans. For him, when the settled life was achieved, it was possible to talk about a "feudal land aristocracy" of the members of the Ottoman dynastic family, Turcoman chieftains and military chiefs, hence, talk about the transformation of "military democracy" of the nomadic tribes to a class dominance. With respect to this, the struggle was for controlling these dispersed power centers of the geography. But that was not peculiar to the Ottoman state and could be observed in the other emirates.

On the contrary, Divitçioğlu (1996), while searching for the characteristics of nomadic life in the concept of "segmented society", explains the constructed relation

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[3] However, despite Werner is an important figure in explaining this incorporation process of diverse elements into the Ottoman family with Marxist understanding of history, his terminology, including such terms as feudalism, military democracy, etc., should be read with caution in the sense that it is another discussion topic whether these concepts existed or not in the Seljuks and in the Ottoman context.

between the house of rulers and the gradually included elements "outside" the Ottoman house in terms of principle of "moral equality" in which political power belonged to no one. In other words, it was the absence of political power, of a system of presidency, and of ownership relations:

> ...[i]n those societies the political balance and stability have been transferred neither to the chief of the society nor to institutions or judiciary. In other words, there is not any superior political, administrative and judicial power in order to put force into practice. Instead of these, the potential mechanism of resorting to brute force, which is owned by different segments having the authority of using against each other, guarantees the balance of powers in the society (1996:24).

In this view, since the roots of the Ottomans and the elements "outside" the Ottoman house lied in the semi-nomadic structures, absence of surplus product brought about getting the necessary goods through fighting "all together" in a conciliatory way (this view also differs from the ghaza thesis). On the other hand, absence of political power paved way to the nomadic empires. However, according to him, the relationships between the nomadic empire and the segments were established like a patron-client relationship. Although the dominance and protection of the "new" chief were accepted, the principle of moral equality was not harmed in any way whatsoever. On that ground, we may again apply to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) think about on that subject matter. Accordingly, before appearing as "the State", it acts in the way of convergent and centripetal tendencies. During the period until the power takeover of a state takes place, the diffuse nature of the segmented structure prevents a chief from becoming one. It is similar to what Divitçioğlu asserts by "moral equality" resulting to lack of political power by guaranteeing balance of powers, by which the established collective mechanisms warded a leader off from acquiring a political power. Furthermore, it is under the scope of the policies of the One during the process of appearing as the One to incorporate the "outside segments" through bargains and conciliations.

Linder (2000), on the contrary, endeavors to explain the ongoing discussion by having recourse to the peculiarities of the twofold division between settled and nomadic life. According to him, the transformation into a settled society during the

time of Orhan required bureaucratization, settled politics and military organizations. Right after this transformation, Ottoman house of rule attempted to make the nomads settled by designating the migrants' roads (with the aim of making their movements as routine as possible), various taxes and fines. These were in order to control a "potential source of danger". Staying silent on how this transformation was materialized by very much concentrating upon the settled versus nomadic dilemma, Linder explains how the relationships between the Ottoman family and the "outside" elements were with oppositional terms.

In so far as the conception of tribe is concerned, Kafadar (1995) on the other hand, defends the impossibility to say anything for the earlier days of the tribe due to the fact that writing of their histories was actually motivated by the problem of identity, when they entered into a competition with various Torco-Moslem and Christian rivals. As for the factors enabling Ottomans to do better than the others, he maintains that there cannot be a single answer like singularly emphasizing the ghaza thesis or the location of the Osman's emirate. He takes social and political configuration as something more complex and ever changing, while the power shared gradually consecrated in the hands of the administration serving to the dynasty. For him, ascendancy of the Ottoman emirate relied very much on the complicated relationships that the Ottoman state builders manipulated. This manipulation included constantly shifting matrix of alliances with a series of carefully selected exclusions and inclusions, improvisations and continuities. In these complexities, one thing certain for Kafadar is that under Osman's leadership, the tribe enjoyed a fundamental upswing in military and political terms so that it took his name and that the first major transformation in the self identity of the Ottomans happened during the time of Osman.

On the other hand, the complexity and variety of the elements were a potential challenge to their control when the ghazi warriors were in centrifugal tendencies. These tendencies were also used by the other power centers within the region. This was followed by the centralist tendencies of the Ottomans in the administrative matters and in building the sophisticated structures of governing with the help of the powerful families, such as of Çandarlis. Kafadar refutes taking this problem as the struggle between nomadic and the settled life. Rather, he considers sedentarization as

just one of the aspects of this transformation from which nomads, one of the various social forces, were negatively affected. He regards this rather as the coalition of forces, then, the process of exclusion, marginalization and subjection of some of these elements.

> In other words, it was a history of shifting alliances and conflicts among various social forces which themselves were undergoing rapid transformation while constantly negotiating their position within the polity (Kafadar, 1995:140).

3.2.3 Tribe–State Axis and the Ottoman Context

The problem of tribe is generally thought with a related problem, that is state formation. However, answering what a tribe is an issue that has been remained unsolved. In other words, although tribe and tribalism are anthropological terms, even anthropologists have not came to an agreement on the meaning of the terms (Tibi, 1990). The dichotomous understanding, which is very much indebted to Weberian ideal types and which puts tribe in opposition to state, seems to ease the works of social scientists. According to this ideal type, tribe is regarded as a stateless, segmentary social group characterized by a myth of common lineage and bound together by linear loyalties. If we are to read it from the reverse, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also oppose to the view that primitive, segmentary societies are societies without a state due to the lack of distinct organs of power and the degree of economic development.

Historically, it is impossible to find such a pure conception of tribe. This impossibility can also be felt in the debates regarding the oppositional understanding between the nomadic nature of tribes and the settled lives. With regard to this, Cahen (1968) emphasizes the fact that all the nomads cannot be put into the same category. For example, in the context of Seljuks and Turks, there were different types of nomads such as who traveled long distances, the owners of two-humped camels adopted to withstand cold winters and the owners of sheep or other livestock requiring only local movements for pasture, or those combining these both types. Moreover, one may consider that these differences had a considerable influence also

over the later process of settlements. Hence, nomadic economy could not be regarded totally as a plunderer economy or its relationship with sedentary economy could not be explainable solely by oppositional terms. On the contrary, it may be possible to talk about a some kind of cooperation among themselves in accordance with the geographical limitations.

In the context in which the pre-Ottoman and settled elements lived with the semi-nomadic/nomadic ones and both side contained many diversities within, the Ottoman state formation cannot be built on the concept of annihilation and exclusion of these diverse elements as the settled life was achieved. In other words, it was a twin process of both inclusion and exclusion, incorporation and annihilation of both the pre-Ottoman settled structures and semi-nomadic/nomadic elements. Also, these incorporations should not be treated only within the abode of Islam. As for the incorporations of various "outside" elements into the control of the Ottoman family, one should also take into consideration the agreements made with the non-Muslim communities.[4]

Therefore, the Ottoman state formation was strongly related with the question of how to manage and control these different elements (both settled and nomadic). On the other hand, since the fact that this formation was a process rather than a single stroke, both the economic and ideological collaborations were subjected to different transformations according to the phases of this development. In other words, the Ottoman state formation was related with how the Ottoman house of rule sustained a gradually centralized system amidst (many) local centers which had a considerable authority over the people whom they influence. Pertaining to the economic concerns over the land in connection with the attempts to balance the existing local powers, the *timar* system may be considered as one of the tools to achieve this authority. As argued by İnalcık:

> In general, the period of transition consisted of first tightening the bonds of vassalage by eliminating local

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[4] For this, Ghazi Evrenos Bey (a non-Muslim raider chief who was later converted to Islam) and his family can be given as an example both in terms of his contributions to the conquests and of the given concessions by the Osman's dynasty like getting the share of the occupied lands or the tax exemptions. For more information: Gallotta, A. (2000) "Oğuz Efsanesi ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin Kökenleri: Bir İnceleme" in *Osmanlı Beyliği: 1300-1389* (ed.by Zachariadou, Elizabeth A.), İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, pp. 41-61 (trans. by Gül Çağalı, İsmail Yerguz, Tülin Altınova).

dynasties and refractory elements, and then replacing all the remnants of the pre-Ottoman administrative apparatus with the *timar* system, the basic building block of Ottoman provincial administration (1999a:14).

However, despite the fact that the *timar* system was a tool to establish this gradually centralized authority, it was not done by totally eliminating the local powers. Rather, bargaining and collaborations played an important role, as we have mentioned above. This can be observed especially during the period of the emirate, when the systematic military was not established yet. During this period, the dervish groups were included as part of the strategies of the Ottoman expansion. They undertook auxiliary roles during the conquests in return for the opportunities guaranteed for them. As mentioned by Barkan (1942), these groups, beside their roles during the conquests, were settled in the newly conquered places according to the politics of property and expansion. They were involved in the transformation of these places into city centers and cultural centers. These policies are especially important, especially one realizes that while previously these places were geographically negative environments (muddy places, swamps, etc.), later on agriculture and stock raising were improved and the new facilities (bakery, caravansary, etc) were established near these villages. On the other hand, their settlement in the places such as mountain passes and communication routes enables one to think that they submitted their assistance for the politics of inspection during the formation process of the central authority.

In so far as the relation between tribe-state axis and the development of the Islamic perspective as a state ideology is concerned, one should bear in mind that the development process of a tribe to expand its territories requires an attitude overriding ethnic and political boundaries in an environment in which a diversity of local elements can be observed (Tibi, 1990). It is in the sense that these local segmentary communities also brought about local religions as well as local sentiments and attitudes. Therefore, this process may also be thought together with the process of transformation from local religious attitudes to a more universal one. Islam, as a universal religion, may be regarded as a glue during this transformation process of such segmented societies in which the local voices should be properly balanced. However, pure and single Islamization need to be questioned here. In so far as the

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inclusion of the Islamic elements to these political formations is concerned, various ways may be numbered:

> The social incarnation of Islam stretches along a kind of spectrum, ranging from a scholarly, puritanical, egalitarian theology at the one end to an anthropolatrous, ecstatic, hierarchical folk religion at the other. Either form can make a significant contribution to tribal-state or quasi-state formation" (Gellner, 1990:119).

In that context, choosing which Islam would be included may be closely related to the nature of divergent elements that a tribe would include during the time of expansion. In other words, one should consider with which element a tribe would be in collaboration and bargaining according to the different phases of the transformation. Therefore, one may conclude that Islam, an ideology of the state, was prone to pass through different phases. In the case of the Ottoman state's relations with the dervish groups, for example, the peaceful relations between the dervish segments and the Ottoman center turned to an opposite direction after the claim of being an universal Islamic empire was strengthened during the wars with the Safavids.

The overwhelming role of the different sections of the society in this mixed structure can be best exemplified with the analysis of the period of civil strife among the contending Ottoman princes for the sultanate between 1403 and 1413 (*Devr-i Fetret* or *Fasıla-i Saltanat*). It is in the sense that the period can not simply be regarded as the struggle for the sultanate after the collapse of the empire of the Bayezid I, following the battle of Ankara against the troops of Timur. Rather, it was the struggle of each prince for incorporating these different sections and powers of society and the division of society accordingly. In this period, while the clashing interests of these different sections led to breaking up the political and social movements and tendencies which later turned into a kind of conflict, what the princes were seeking for was the opportunity to ally with the emirates and other strong social powers within the society. For example, Suleyman got the support of the important families like Chandarlis or Evrenos and allied with Christian neighbors in Thrace, while Mehmed I leaned his back on the help of the influential people whom had just been converted to Islam. On the other hand, Musa was the one to

whom the ghazis and "heterodox" people of the borderland emirates supported (Balivet, 2000).

It is because of this reason İnalcık (1999b) argues that the year of the formation of the Ottoman Empire should be consented at some point during the reign of Bayezid I (1389-1402) in the late 14th century, not as 1299. He talks about two periods of emperorships. According to him, while the first Ottoman Empire was formed during the period of Bayezid I and then collapsed following the battle of Ankara, the second Ottoman Empire started with the conquest of Istanbul during the period of Mehmed the Conqueror:

> The first Ottoman Empire was formed during the period of Yildirim Bayezid near the time of the late 14th century. The contemporary western sources called him the *imperatorum Turcorum*. Bayezid involved in a significant initiative in order to conquer Istanbul. The first imperial period fell down with the blow of Timur. The second imperial period started with the conquest of Istanbul. Mehmed the Conqueror was the sultan whom established the Ottoman Empire in every respect (1999b:32-3).

It is in that sense the relations before and after the interim period should not be treated in the same way. Although the Ottoman sultanate faced with the reestablishment of the dynastic families and subject states' proclaiming their freedom in the Balkans after the defeat of the battle of Ankara in 1402, when the empire reformed during Mehmed the Conqueror, the situation was no longer the same. In other words, it was the turning point in the history of the state formation, during which the relations with the elements (including the dervish groups) outside the family changed considerably as the central authority had a priority over these.

Briefly, the fact that Ottoman state formation was a process brings about different combinations of older and newer structures in different periods of time according to the historical conjuncture. It is in the sense that it is not possible to construct a static relationship between the Ottoman family and any of these elements "outside" the family. The relations established with the dervish groups were not outside this scope. Consequently, while the relations were transformed as the state formation was achieved, the relations with and definition of the dervish groups by the state were also subjected to the same changes. In the coming chapter, we will endeavor to

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analyze who these groups were and the ways in which they were in opposition or in collaboration with the Ottoman state. Moreover, we will elaborate the points behind their "becoming heterodox" by concentrating on both sides of the term.

CHAPTER III

DEFINING THE DERVISH GROUPS AS "HETERODOX" AND/OR AN ELEMENT OF STATE FORMATION UNTIL THE 15TH CENTURY ?

In the previous chapter, we have summarized the discussion on the incorporation of the "outside" elements into the tribal nature of the Ottoman emirate as such that the dervish groups during the formation of the Ottoman center were the piece of the whole puzzle when we approach them by the terms of tribe-state axis. For such a view, the role and position of the dervishes during the formation of the Ottoman state in the general Ottoman historiography should not be overemphasized for the loss of other sections of this mixed structure in. This is argued by Ocak (2000c) that the role of the dervishes has been set forth overmuch in the modern Ottoman historiography in Turkey following the influences of Köprülü. Nonetheless, approaches like Ocak's should not ignore the religious characteristics of the Ottoman state. Because, this may also lead us to reach the dilemma between the tribal explanations of Köprülü and Wittek's ghaza ethos, which brings "either/or" perspective as mentioned by Hassan (2001). On the contrary, as argued by Hassan (2001) and Kafadar (1995), this formation was a complex process so that either of them should be counted equally and separately. In other words, both tribe-state axis and the ghaza ethos should be taken into consideration in this formation respectively. Following this perspective, incorporation of the dervish religiosity cannot simply be treated as if it was just one of many ordinary elements outside the Ottoman family. On the other hand, the role of dervish groups in the formation process cannot be solely limited

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with the ghaza ethos since it seems to have spread out to different segments of people through various channels such as Ahi corporations, the influence of the cults emerging around the saints, hagiographies, etc.

Being part of both popular culture and the Ottoman state formation, the dervish groups, with reference to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), seem to take place "between" the Ottoman center and the people. The same groups have also been labeled as "heterodox" and/or "heretic" regarding the nature of the relations constructed and reconstructed between the Ottoman state and these groups. The term "heterodox" has been used in general to connote a conflict with the *generally* accepted religious beliefs, ways of life and doctrines. However, in so far as the insufficiency of a dichotomous understanding is concerned, such a term makes the subject matter much more complicated and opens up new discussions. It is in the sense that the description of the basic characteristic of these "heterodox" groups as if they were a major threat to the central values due to their religious peculiarities knots the subject matter at this point, while they were also undertaking undeniable roles in the social, economic and military spheres during the formation of the Ottoman state. One of the basic reasons behind this knot is explained and pointed out by Kafadar (1995) considerably well in relation with the frontier narratives of the medieval Anatolia. Accordingly, since the written documents were scarce until the 15th century, it was only the hagiographies and warrior epics that may give a clue about the problem. With respect to this, the hagiographies and the warrior epics seem to be interrelated and sometimes undistinguishable types of narratives. And this is the reason behind the indistinguishably between the warriors (ghazis) and the dervishes. This leads to a fundamental problem in a discussion revolved around the term "heterodoxy" such that the various different parts of dervish religiosity are treated as if they were a unified whole. To that end, we will argue that these groups were heterogeneous in nature like a "rhizome". Yet, this heterogeneity was not only relevant for the difference between the warriors and dervishes. Otherwise stated, we can observe the heterogeneous character of the dervish religiosity in the socio-political and economic formations of the concerned age, ranging from the lowest to the highest strata.

By the appropriation of the term "heterodoxy", various dervish groups are put under one general title, and they are treated as if they were a unified whole. This

leads one to consider the term in terms of dichotomies. These dichotomies may be orthodoxy versus heterodoxy, Sunni versus Shi, high versus low Islam, state versus popular, elite versus popular and so on. What is more, the terms are interchangeably used according to the corresponding sides of the dichotomy. This attitude ignores the heterogeneous nature of each side, especially the side of "heterodoxy" that stands fluid and mobile in relation with the state's attempt to be stable and constructed. Contrarily, Kafadar (1995) analyzes this complexity within the peculiar nature and characteristics of the frontier regions, *Rumi*, the lands of the Eastern Rome. The complexity arose due to its being an ethno-religious mosaic. Furthermore, this mosaic enriched after the arrival of Turkish speaking communities and of the ancestors of Osman with the second wave of Turkish migrations from the Central Asia in the early 13th century. This region was a special peninsula due to its unstable, fluid and mobile nature, which continued until the Ottomans established a unitary rule in the latter part of the 15th century. And the formation of a unitary rule in this unstable frontier region was achieved by the Ottomans' ability to form a sufficient ruling class, ability of institutionalizing their political forces, constructing a coalition of forces and reconstructing it as it changed shape. Briefly, Kafadar maintains that it is difficult to distinguish "heterodoxy" from "orthodoxy" in these frontier regions due to their special characteristics. Also, he stands against identification of heterodoxy with Shi Islam due to the Safavid influence of the 16th century. Rather, he argues:

> The religious picture of Anatolia in the 13th and 14th centuries appears much more complex than the neat categorization of a simple Sunni-Shi'i dichotomy would allow. ...On the other hand, it seems equally misleading to see "heterodoxy" in any act or sign of belief which runs counter to the established norms of a learned orthodoxy. ...Maybe the religious history of Anatolian and Balkan Muslims living in the frontier areas of the period from the 11th to 15th centuries should be conceptualized in part in terms of a "metadoxy", a state of being beyond doxies, a combination of being doxy-naive and not being doxy-minded, as well as the absence of a state that was interested in rigorously defining and strictly enforcing an orthodoxy (1995:77).

Parallel to this, what we would like to elaborate is that after the 15th century, the "doxy-minded" elements were included in the Ottoman state through the state

formation. But before the 15th century, the prevalence of the Ali symbol and related common beliefs and ways of life made the dervish religiosity of the concerned age vulnerable to the political concerns on Alavism and Shi Islam and caused them to be explained through the construction of dichotomous terms. Consequently, although the time period that the study concentrates on does cover the period in which Alavism did not appear as a "problem", these dervish groups have been regarded as "extremely Shi" by Barnes (1992:32) or "extremely Alavi" by Birge (1965:34) as a result of this understanding. Melikoff (1999) refuses to acknowledge the use of the term Alavi for the dervish groups before the Safavid encounter, since the term connotes the descendants from the ancestors of Ali. Moreover, she also strongly resists to a tendency by which these dervish groups have been considered as Shi. We agree with Melikoff's argument that the conflict between Shi and Sunni Islam started with the Ottoman-Safavid encounter in the early 16th century:

> Besides, it is not meaningful to talk about Sunni and Shi Islam in a period in which an incongruity between them was not known yet. The conflict between Sunni and Shi Islam would appear on the scene only with the start of the Ottoman-Safavid War, that is to say, in the early 16th century. ...Nevertheless, these beliefs were related with the traditions of the ancestors and the effects of the other religions, not with the Shi Islam. The relations with the Shi Islam, on the other hand, were much more later (Melikoff, 1999:106;151).

As we have indicated in the introductory chapter, this type of explanation dividing the subject matter into two opposite camps underestimates their peculiarities that was penetrated into each other and leads to the reproduction of an Orientalist discourse at the micro level. In addition to this, the reproduction of an Orientalist discourse goes hand in hand with putting the essence of a religious factor at the center of an explanation of a socio-political phenomena. Being aware of this potential reproduction, it is better to listen carefully what Kafadar points out in this regard:

> In Turkey, there is a comprehension of orthodoxy and heterodoxy reached through an understanding molded by the Ottoman intellectuals and scholars (*ulema*), but still defined as if they were the objects outside the history. Here, a congruency with the Orientalist approach can be discussed. ...Both orthodoxy and heterodoxy are the units that have been defined differently in time and the borders of which have been transformed accordingly. Consequently, it is required

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not to accept an orthodoxy and a heterodoxy which is not relative and which is outside the scope of the history (1999:70).

In parallel to Kafadar, we will endeavor to underline the different definitions and changeable borders of the terms (also the related terms, such as ghaza) in the following pages. Additionally, we want to clarify that the thing appearing to be a dilemma at the first sight that these groups were both part of the process of state formation and of the resistances and oppositions against the state was not a simple contradiction. We are arguing that these dual manners should be focused upon while being aware of these different definitions and changing borders of the terms. In the following pages, therefore, we aim to point out why there has been a tendency to label these groups as "heterodox" in many ways, while trying to explain the ways in which they have been deemed essential to the formation of the Ottoman state. While doing this, there would be an opportunity for us also to study who these groups were and the ways in which they were seen as a potential danger by the Ottoman state.

4.1 Why "Heterodoxy"?

Although there have been attempts by most of the scholars *not* to evaluate all the dervish groups of the concerned age under the same title, the term heterodox (not always heretic)[1] may seem to stick to these groups while classifying them according to their different peculiarities. For example, Werner (1986) categorizes three major Sufi groups in the late 13th century Asia Minor: first, the moderate and Sunni mysticism of the Baghdad School represented best by Ghazali; second, the "heretic" tendencies among the ghazis; and the third, the mystical tendencies of the craftsmen corporations, which were more orthodox than the second one, but less monotheist and intellectual than the first one. Ocak (2000c), on the other hand, makes a classification not in terms of religious tendencies, but rather in terms of the

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[1] For example, Ocak (2000a) uses the conception of "being a Turcoman Muslim" instead of "being heterodox". In relation with this, he stands against the attitude that uses the words "heretic" and "heterodox" interchangeably. For him, rather than being perverted, "heterodoxy" implies politically, socially and theologically being away from the central political power or from any central tendency. However, while taking into consideration of Ocak's interpretation of "heterodoxy", one should also pay attention to his effort to evaluate these groups in terms of centripetal tendencies, as mentioned in the introductory chapter.

implications of the settled life. With respect to this, the only dervish group that had a considerable role in the formation of the Ottoman state was the Abdals of Rum (*Abdalan-i Rum*). According to him, none of the written sources mention the role of the Kâdiri, Rifai or Mawlavi dervishes, who were also quite influential in Asia Minor since the Seljuks. For Ocak, this might be due to the reason that they got used to the opportunities of the settled life, when they are compared with more adventurous Abdals, who involved in the process of conquests due to their struggle to make a living. In addition to this, Köprülü (1992) sorts out these socially different groups with reference to the Ashikpashazade history as follows: first, Ghazis and Alps; second, Ahis; third, the Sisters of Rum (*Bajiyan-i Rum*); and fourth; the Abdals of Rum (*Abdalan-i Rum*). Köprülü uses the term Alp as a title from the pre-Islamic past given to the princes, having the meaning of hero and warlike. Then again, he uses much more specific and a narrower term ghazi to mean a certain social group in the army or in the large cities. For him, they appeared on the scene due to the weakness of the governments and the frequent need of the commanders for finding mercenary soldiers used against foreign and domestic enemies. Ahis, on the other hand, were so widespread in Anatolia. They were found not only in the cities, but also in the villages and on the marches. Also, they had contacts with the organization of the Alps and they infiltrated into it. Moreover, Ahis played a major role in the founding of the Ottoman state and in the establishment of Janissaries. For him, the term Sisters of Rum (*Bajiyan-i Rum*) has been used to connote the wing of women among the dervishes, although there have been discussions on their existence. These will be touched upon later; yet, the important thing at this point is that even though there have been attempts to make such classifications, there has also been a similar tendency to unite these groups under the general term "heterodoxy". Therefore, in this part, we will analyze the driving motives behind the usage of the term, while trying to glance at who these groups were.

4.1.1 The Legacy of the Babai Revolts

The legacy of the Babai revolts may be an important factor behind the characterization of these dervish groups as "heterodox". It is in the sense that the leaders of the Babai revolts, Baba Ilyas and Baba Ishak, and some segments involved in these rebellious movements have been regarded as sharing common religious and historical roots with the heterogeneous dervish religiosity of Asia Minor. This understanding is especially stressed, when the discussions are on the historical personality of Haji Baktash, hence, on the roots of the Bektashiyya order. It is due to the reason that the order has been deemed essential during the formation, when it is considered with its close relations with the Janissary troops. According to the Ashikpashazade history, which has been used as a reference point for this linkage, Haji Bektash and his brother Mintash, who came to Asia Minor from Khurasan, were the disciples of Baba Ilyas. While Ocak (1992) argues that Haji Bektash was a sheik of the Qaladariyya order, he at the same time mentions that both the Qalandariyya order and Baba Ilyas shared the legacy of the common religious ancestors. What is more, according to some scholars, the father-in-law of Osman Ghazi was the sheik of the Vefaiyya order of the Babai dervishes, and consequently, Haji Bektash had relationships with Osman. Briefly, one way or another scholars have aptly mentioned the close relations between the dervish groups during the formation of the Ottoman empire and the leaders of and the people who carried out the Babai revolts. Before glancing at the special features of these revolts and how it was carried out, it is better to examine who these groups were and what the connection was between these groups and the dervishes of the early Ottoman age.

According to Ocak (2000b), the concept of heterodoxy, Alavism and Bektashiyya developed upon and moved along the inheritance of the Abdals of Rum, while the Abdals of Rum were built upon the Babai movement. The leaders of the Babai movement, Ilyas and Ishak, on the other hand, were the Vefai dervishes. On the other hand, Ocak (1992) relates the Vefaiyya current (like the Haidariyya) to the Qalandariyya movement, and holds that the Babai revolt in 1240 was carried out by the former popular segments of Qalandars. For Ocak, the Qalandariyya order was one of the earliest groups of Sufism that constituted the oppositional wing of the classical tasavvuf thought. It acquired different names and displayed different

characteristics in different time periods and places. Moreover, he mentions that although the Qalandariyya movement and related non-Sunni groups (such as Yeseviyya, Vefaiyya and especially Haydariyya) arrived at Anatolia after the Mongol invasion, they showed a dual structure. On the one hand, there were Qalandars of the lower stratum, who were ignorant, illiterate, nihilist, immoral and disrespectful to the social and religious codes with a derisive manner. On the other hand, there were the well known personalities, who were the masters of theology in addition to their deep mystical experiences. He also argues that the Qalandariyya movement of the higher strata, which came to Anatolia from Iraq and Iran, did not last too long due to its complicated structure of thought and the period of civil turmoil that took place after the Mongol invasion. Therefore, it was the popular Qalandariyya movement that spread all over Anatolia during the early 14th century, especially over the frontier regions, one of which the Ottoman emirate was settled on.[2] On the other hand, the Qalandariyya order was in many ways the continuation of the Malamatiyya order, through which the Islamic faith was penetrated among the Turks. Gölpınarlı (2000) evaluates Malamatiyya as an ideology (or a theory) within the tasavvuf though, but which appeared as a reaction against the Sufis of the higher strata. For him, the members of the Malamatiyya order believed that thought (*fikr*) rather than recollection (*zikr*) was required in order to be united with God. With this basic concern, they opposed to the dervish lodge life and Sufis' being separate from the rest of the society by their clothes and finery, customs and a specific terminology. In short, they opposed to the situation that the masters of tasavvuf became a distinct class of people and begun to consider themselves as wises different from the common people. For them, these sufis were acting on behalf of the existing political power; and hence, this intensified the opposition of the Malamatiyya movement against this distinct class of people. Thereof, they chose to conceal and scorn themselves or to demonstrate themselves imperfect. Linguistically speaking, the word *malamet* also comes to mean the same thing; that is to say, it means condemnation, scorn and vilification. Having such a concern, they deemed

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[2]In relation with this continuity, Ocak regards the Abdals of Rum, the warriors of non-Sunni movement that were active in the Ottoman conquests, as nothing more than being part of this popular Qalanadariyya movement. He preserves that the popular Qalandariyya movement passed to the early Ottoman era under the title of Abdals of Rum (*Abdalan-ı Rum*). For him, almost all the Abdals of Rum, though not expressing a membership to a single order, were tied to Baba Ilyas or traditions of his disciples.

indispensable to embrace the people; hence, they resisted to the rituals and institutionalized ceremonies and practices of the Sufi orders that led to a differentiation from the people. The resistance of the Malamatiyya movement, for this reason, is also indicative of the different tendencies within the tasavvuf thought, one of which is approaching to an "arborescent system", the other to a "rhizomatic system".

On the other hand, Köprülü (1993) holds an ethno-religious rather than a single religious continuity between the Turcoman babas who involved in the Babai uprisings and the heterodox orders of the early Ottoman era. According to him, these Turcoman babas, who existed in the 13th century Anatolia and who came from the Central Asia, Khwarazm and Khurasan were mostly belonging to Yasawiyya and Malamatiyya brotherhoods, and they represented the old traditions. While he evaluates the Babai rebellion as the first religio-political movement initiated in Anatolia, he regards these Turcoman clans as the "only vigorous element that could carry out a religious or political movement against the multi-factional armies of the Seljuk emperors, who followed a policy of pursuing the form of Sunnism that was the official creed of the state in Anatolia" (1993:11). Köprülü asserts that most of them came from lower classes and they had strong extremist Alavi tendencies, while the babas spreading extremist Shi doctrines and esoteric (*bātinī*) ideas among the Turcoman clans. Additionally, he considers the moral influence on the "extremist Alavi" or "heterodox" Turcoman babas as "nothing but an outwardly Islamized continuation of the old Turkish shamans" (1992:51). In regard to this, he upholds that the first Ottoman rulers were also nothing more than these Turcoman chiefs, who were too illiterate and simple to understand the subtleties of religious questions. And it is only after the Ottoman emirate sufficiently expanded and developed, the Hanafī theologians, who slowly arrived from the major cities, gradually acquired great importance, while the political significance of the Ahis and Turcoman babas were slowly diminishing. Köprülü traces the origins of the Abdals of Rum, the "heterodox" dervishes of Asia Minor, back to both Yasawiyya and Qalandariyya orders. Notwithstanding Köprülü sustains the orthodox nature of the Yasawiyya order in his previous studies, in his later works, such as *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire* (1992), he endeavors to correct his previous statement. He holds that some of

the rites of the order were related to the old Turkish shamanism and this order was completely heterodox at the time it was established. As for Qalandariyya, he maintains that this order was originated in the Khurasan school or in the group simply called Malamatiyya. These groups that were usually composed of itinerants and vagabonds had no understanding of high philosophical concepts or religious experiences; and then, they were associated with "poorly understood pantheism" and the "extremist Shi tendencies". He relates the Turcoman babas involved in the Babai uprising to these extremist groups without any doubt. However, he argues that the first Ottoman rulers had a very positive attitude towards these heterodox dervishes. On the other hand, he considers that the Bektashiyya order was like the similar heterodox orders that were the extensions of Babaiyya. Yet, he does not attribute any special importance to Bektashiyya. To that end, for Köprülü (1987), Bektashiyya, which was Batiniyya in origin, had heretic and atheist (*zindiq*) tendencies from the beginning and it came into existence by the mixture of Babaiyya, Akhis and Abdals.

In so far as the causes behind the Babai uprising are concerned, there have been many opinions put forward by different scholars. As to the factors behind the movement, one can also realize that these factors could be regarded as the reasons behind the evaluation of these groups as "heterodox". Because of this reason, in the following sections elaborating why these groups have been unified under one general title "heterodoxy", we will explain them as if we are explaining the reasons behind the Babai revolts.[3]

Despite scholars seem to have agreed upon the economic depressions, spoiling of the existing land regime and worsening of the socio-economic situation concomitant with the acceleration of the population increase as the major causes of the Babai revolt, their approaches to the nature of the relations between the people that rebelled and the people against whom they rebelled vary considerably. For example, Ocak (2000a) concentrates on the deepened diametrical opposition between the nomadic Turcomans and the people who moved to a settled life, while arguing against an

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[3] Needless to say, we *do not* intent to argue that the tendencies behind labeling the dervish groups as "heterodox" arise due to this revolt. Rather, this kind of sectioning arises due to the difficulties for classification of such a subject matter in which the sub-titles are very much intermingled into each other.

understanding that the revolts were undertook by "heterodox Islam" against the "Sunni orthodoxy":

> First of all, this uprising was in one way, a politically oriented social revolt against the center and it was, by no means, a religious war undertook by heterodox Islam against the Sunni Islam. The clearest evidence of this is that the revolt only considered the Seljuk administration as a target, not the Sunni people. ...Besides, it should not be forgotten that the Babai revolt was a classical social conflict between the settled and nomadic groups and consequently, it displayed the characteristics of a rebellion, a social protest movement, of the latter against the former (Ocak, 2000b:137).

On the other hand, Çamuroğlu (1999b) tries to comprehend this diametrical opposition on the basis of the beliefs of these groups. Put it differently, he tries to analyze the movement in relation with the beliefs, faiths and the ways of live brought about by religious factors. He, then, compares the conciliatory and/or oppositionary universe of heterodox Islam with the domineering universe of orthodox Sunni Islam. In addition to these, some scholars mention the changing hands of the political power as an important factor. For this perspective, Ahis rather than Turcoman chiefs were the prominent figures and organizers of the rebellion movement due to their loosing the political power at hand. Therefore, the legacy of the Ahi corporations inherited from the Babai revolts could be another factor in being pushed away of the dervish religiosity from the Ottoman center. Ahi corporations, yet, were both an important factor in the formation process of the Ottoman state and the element of threat against the Ottoman authority due to its social and political power among the people.

4.1.2 Nomad vs. Settled Life

It is the nomadic characteristics of the dervish groups in the early Ottoman era that draws one's attention to the heterodox nature of them. These characteristics of the dervish groups which have lead them to be labeled as heterodox also owe very much to the pre-Ottoman structure, the struggle of the nomadic Turcomans with the Anatolian Seljuks' government. Owing very much to the works of Köprülü, the religiosity of the dervish groups of the early Ottoman era has been identified with the

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ways of life of the nomadic or semi-nomadic Turcoman tribes. The dichotomy has been constructed between these Turcoman tribes who were unwilling to come to an agreement with the central administrations and these administrations that looked them on with scorn, forced them to settle or targeted to discipline them. In regard to such a dichotomy, the Turcoman groups have been depicted as the ones who felt like "undesired citizens" within their own territories and within the borders of their own state (Ocak, 2000a). Accordingly, the division between the settled (settled peasantry, urban life, etc.) and nomadic lives was felt on the level of their religious beliefs. It is in the sense that the static, stable, regulatory and commanding Sunni Islam that was based of the Islamic religious law (*shariah*) was put forth against the freeing, syncretic, mobile and fluid heterodox Islam.

Ocak (2000a) considers that nomadic and semi-nomadic Turcomans were the major groups of people that actively participated in the Babai rebellion, so that the rebellion was carried out mostly by them in addition to some villagers (who were badly affected by the economic crisis) and some dissatisfied groups (such as the unemployed people in the cities and plunderers, who were badly affected by the social-political and economic conditions of the age). Besides, he sustains that the groups that organized the revolts, executed the propaganda phase and conducted the other groups were primarily these heterodox sheiks. The other factor that relates the nomadic life to the heterodox current of Islam, as again argued by Ocak (1997), has been the presumption that most of the saints, who opened up dervish lodges since the 15th century during which the lands of Rumelia were becoming part of the Ottomans, were the tribal chiefs, who were coming to settle with *their* tribes. These saints were different from their contemporaries, which lived in towns, by the titles such as *baba*, *dede* and *pir*. Briefly, there has been a consensus on the opinion that the heterodox groups of Islam were not only belonged to the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. Yet, the general agreement on the assumption that the majority of these groups were part of a tribe life has been another factor behind labeling these groups as

"heterodox" due to the settled versus nomadic life dichotomy.[4] Limited only with the conception of a "nomad" that is bound by physical movements, Linder (2000) looks at the tension between the Ottoman center and the nomadic Turcomans. The tensions arose due to the Ottoman policies to control and discipline the nomadic groups and to surpass them when they resisted. These policies involved determining and classification of the nomadic groups that were seen as "a source of potential danger", harsh taxations (such as the sheep tax or sheepfold tax assessed from the nomads engaged in raising livestock), forced settlements and forced migrations. Parallel to this, Barkan (1942) examines in detail that these groups were settled by the Ottoman center onto the newly conquered territories, especially to the regions which were geographically desolate (such as muddy, swampy and mountainous environments). Also, he argues that such policies of the Ottomans on the newly conquered territories were activated in order to cultivate these regions and make them city centers and cultural centers. Linder's and Barkan's approaches address two different attitude of the Ottomans' in relation with their settlement policies orienting the nomadic Turcomans: the one regarding the nomads something to be either disciplined or eliminated, the other treating them as an element of the formation of the Ottoman state. Hence, this leads us to consider again that the relations between the nomadic and settled life are not explicable through antithetical relationships, since the state undertook all the appropriation, abolition, incorporation, regulation and repression of the "war machine".

4.1.3 Their Beliefs and Ways of Life

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, we oppose to the views defining orthodoxy and heterodoxy only in religious terms, which elaborate the reflections of these definitions on the socio-political and economic spheres (as if they are static

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[4] When we think of the term "nomad" in relation with Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) conception of "rhizome", we should take into consideration that term "nomad" is not purely a physical category defining a physical movement. Put it differently, since there is a nucleus of the rhizomatic systems in every aspect of life (such as in mind, writing, speech, and language), the "nomad" is not bound by a physical movement. It defines a broader type of movement and a "nomad" may also be found within the settled life. And, this makes the dichotomy constructed between the settled vs. nomadic life inadequate to elaborate the derives behind the term "heterodoxy".

concepts regardless of time and space boundaries). Nevertheless, understanding the ways in which the beliefs and ways of life of these groups have been regarded as a potential danger to the existing political authorities may lead us to grasp *why* these groups have been labeled as "heterodox". On that ground, Reha Çamuroğlu, who gives priority to the political dimension of esoteric Islam, is a best example in so far as his endeavors to seek the reflections of esoteric understanding of Islam to the political realm are concerned. In other words, he searches for how the basic tenets and features of heterodox Islam (such as perception of language, time, God, etc.) might have threatened the exiting political authorities and how they transgressed the existing values and norms of the societies they were living in. In relation with this, he draws a line of confrontation between the Gods of the individuals and of the powerful people and institutions. Concomitantly, he considers upon how the notion of power has been identified with the notion of God. While doing this, Çamuroğlu (1992) evaluates the esoteric doctrines as deconstructing and reconstructing the meaning of letters and words (hence the language) and their attempts to interpret the sacred words differently (*tevil*) as an attempt to abolish the constructed meanings. For him, the constructed meanings arise through the development of a city. It is because of the reason that he sees the development of a city identical with development of the act of writing. Accordingly, both takes place during the process when any political power is formed. Hence, he regards the act of writing as a mean to ease up the political domination. With respect to this, the dichotomy between city and countryside is the end result of this process. It is since the fact that cities are the founder elements of the civilizations and these civilization are in need of symbolic Gods in order to sustain the "truculent universe" of any domination. In this symbolic structure, everything is hierarchical, and the symbolic God is prior to and at the crown of everything, since the God is comprehended as the creator by himself and the symbol of unity apart. Moreover, such a God exists concealed behind the veil of an ungraspable mystery (which brings about a feeling of fear to be obeyed). He (the all-seer and all-hearer) is the giver of law and order, while avenging anything contrary to his loyalty. According to Çamuroğlu, "heterodoxy", on the other hand, rejects such a conception of God, while rejecting the story of creation. Rather, as mentioned in the first chapter, "heterodoxy" maintains an understanding of

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emanation from the First Essence, to which a Sufi may attain, since s/he carries the same essence within.

Similarly, in a discussion revolved around the conception of time, Çamuroğlu (1999a) puts the "linear conception of time" of the monotheist grand religions in opposition to the "circular conception of time" of the mythos and esoteric understanding. In this context, comprehension of "historical time" is also the result of the establishments of civilizations and political domination, since any hierarchical domination requires a "linear conception of time". In this regard, it is confronted with the "sacred present time", because in the "present time", one lives away from a "speculative future" shaped by a worldly authority of the grand religions. A "speculative feature" and the "linear conception of time" of the monotheist religions work through the invention of concepts like the next world, the day of judgement, heaven and hell. These are in order to legitimize the position of a political domination and a monotheist religion bound by this domination. However, in the "present time", namely in the "perpetual moment" (an-ı dâim) of a heterodox dervish, any legitimacy attempt of the "universe of domination" would collapse. It is the "perpetual moment" warding off the influence of the otherworldly conceptions that are the means of a political domination. On the other hand, the conception of "perpetual moment" works through the conception of love, and love gets rid of any dichotomy between the subject and object completely in "the moment". Obviously, this unity eliminates the discriminative tendencies of a domination, by which the Omniscient and the Omnipotent are transcended from any object under its being. Briefly, identifying the God of monotheist religions with the domineering universe of any political authority, Çamuroğlu, argues that the conception of love resulting to a comprehension of "perpetual moment" and "cyclical understanding" is "another epistemology" of liberation allowing one to be free of anything and everything political.[5]

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[5] For more information on the repercussions of the "cyclical understanding" of dervishes on the Islamic construction of femininity and its destructuring "Women in Islam" in the Bektashi and Mawlawi thought look at Bilgin (Şafak), Elif (1996), *Destructuring "Women in Islam" Within the Context of Bektashi and Mawlawi Thought*, unpublished master thesis, METU-The Graduate School of Social Sciences: Ankara.

On the other hand, the conception of the nature of the relationships between the self of a dervish and the environment that surrounds herself/himself has effects on the conceptualization of the term "heterodoxy". In such a conception of the relationship between micro and macro universes, there is not an independent universe outside the self of a dervish. Thus, everything is regarded as part of one truth (*haqiqah*), the truth that a dervish is embraced by and that s/he also carries in his/her heart. It is because of this kind of relationships constructed between the macro and micro universes love gets rid of any dichotomy between the subject and object. On that ground, beholding (*nazar*) of a dervish becomes a divine action, when this was under the Will of a Divine Love, while eliminating the differences between the subject and object. By such an action, either manifestation (*tezahür*) of a dervish or God (according to the different views and beliefs) is beheld and all the dichotomies are rejected. It is due to the reason that the thing beheld has the same essence with a dervish who beholds. Consequently, such a conception of the universe brings about an understanding that everything (mountain, stone, flower, insect, etc.) in the universe has an alive spirit in relation with the same essence and truth. Additionally, the traditions and ceremonies in the dervish lodges such as kissing the spoon, table, etc. at the dinner table, affection with every animate and inanimate objects, the ability to appear in the form of other objects (for example, Haji Bektash's coming to Asia Minor in the shape of a pigeon)[6] are the reflections of such a point of view. According to this, these relations that stem from the conception of love are seen as the reason behind the dervishes' ignoring the social and material hierarchies. In other words, since the feeling of fear does not determine the relationships between the subject and object, one cannot observe any superior-inferior relationships in the physical universe. Therefore, a dervish does not respect the socially constructed hierarchies, while s/he is not regarding herself/himself the servant of anyone who is also a servant of God. In short, such a point of view considers the dervishes as conflicting with a central authority, which leads the dervish groups to be labeled as "heterodox". On the other hand, some extremist cases of this kind of conception of the physical universe intensifies such a labeling. In that case, the dervish religiosity completely disregarded the social life. Karamustafa

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[6] For more information about the different aspects of a dervish life in the dervish lodges, look at Lifchez Raymond (1992) (ed.), *The Dervish Lodge*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

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(1994) explains that extremely ascetic, otherworldly, seclusive and renunciatory tendencies within the dervish piety might have resulted to strange behaviors in the eyes of the people and to the definition of the dervish piety as queer, deviant, weird and out of humanity.[7] In short, all these characteristics of dervish religiosity may lead these groups to be labeled as heterodox in different circumstances no matter how extremist they are.

4.1.4 The Legacy of the Ahi Corporations

Gölpınarlı (1992), while explaining the Malamatiyya order as the ancestors of the non-Sunni orders of the pre-Ottoman and early Ottoman era, regards *futuwwa* as the development and materialization of the "Malamatiyya ideology" in an organizational structure, which took place among the artisans and craftsmen.[8]

> Basically, Malamatiyya and *futuwwa* are the same things. While one of them represents an ideology, the other spreads this ideology over the people and organizes them. ...The difference of the experts of *futtuwwa* from the Islamic mystics lies in their rejection of recollection (*zikr*), the dervish lodges (*tekke*) and the features of clothes and finery and in their not departing from the people. However, more important difference than this is their organizing the experts of artisans and craftsmen. (2000:172;179).

In the Ahi organizations, which were previously the *futuwwa* organizations, all the behaviors of the individuals within a society were aimed to be shaped according to the higher religious and ethical ideals, while this aim did not only concentrate upon the professional relations. These ideals, on the other hand, were nourished by the

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[7] In addition to this, according to Karamustafa, the extremist wings of the dervish piety had an inclination not to document how they lived; hence, this brings about their being written outside the dervish religiosity. Not as a generalization but as an inclination, this may lead their being written just when they did something deviant from the rules and norms of the society. And this may be another factor what these groups have a tendency to be labeled as heterodox.

[8] *Futuwwa* was the general name of the artisan and tradesmen organizations in the Islamic states of the Middle ages, which were based of the principles of Islamic mysticism and Malamatiyya. The people in *futuwwa* were the members of Sufi sects and they appeared in the second Islamic century in Baghdad. In Asia Minor, the same occupational organizational structure was named as Ahi corporations. It comes from the root word *fata* (youth and chivalry man) to indicate a person with noble qualities. Therefore, the word *futuwwa* is a composite of such virtues as generosity, munificence, modesty, chastity, trustworthiness, loyalty, mercifulness, knowledge, humility, and piety. And the same ideals were also carried into the Ahi corporations.

tasavvuf thought, which did not disregard the people and the mundane life. As in the case of the spiritual hierarchies in the orders and the training procedures according to these hierarchies, in the Ahi corporations, the works were carried through master, experienced apprentice worker and apprentice relationships. In addition to this, they all together joined into the dervish lodges in which lessons on religion, ethic, science, music, calligraphy and literature were given. According to these higher ideals, an Ahi should be generous and hospitable. Thence, the mutual support both among themselves and towards the people can be considered as one of the basic characteristics of these corporations. On the other hand, they had latent control mechanisms among themselves to sustain these ideals (İrmiş, 1998). Basically, Ahi corporations (as a different category from the Abdals of Rum and ghazis) is a best example on how the dervish religiosity existed in towns and among craftsmen as an important power center within the society and how they have been at the same time labeled as "heterodox".

In regard to how the Ahi corporations were established in Asia Minor, Çağatay (1974) mentions two broad migratory movements differing from each other. The first one, more arbitrary and disperse migratory movements until the Mongol threat, might be that of the more adventurous warrior masses with the quality and excitement of the act of bravery and that of the migrant masses seeking better conditions (such as better climate, pastures and sheltered places). Nevertheless, the second one, the indispensable movements due to the Mongol's assault, was that of the wealthier and occupied classes of craftsmen and tradesmen as much as of the nomadic people. And it was the people in the second migratory movement who deemed necessary to organize both the people and themselves. Thus, the Ahi corporations were formed with the aims of:

> Finding jobs for the artisans coming from the East, from the major and civilized Turkish cities of Asia, competing against the local Byzantine artisans, maintaining the quality of the goods produced in order to get firmly established in this new environment, regulating production according to the needs, setting the artisan ethics among the artisans, transforming the Turkish people into an economically independent condition, aiding in every respect to the people in need, fighting beside the armed forces in the time of the foreign attacks... (Çağatay, 1974:95).

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We can assume that these organizations were considered as having considerable roles in the society since the period of Seljuks. It is especially at the times when the central authority lost control and when the Ahi corporations organized the society accordingly. Then, we may view them as important power centers independent from the tribe-state relationships. Parallel to this, according to some scholars, they were very influential among people such that they were also capable of organizing society against the state and independent from the state. For them, they were the reason behind the Babai uprising, since they organized the people against the state. And it was because of the reason that their political authority was shaken in the later periods of the Anatolian Seljuks. For example, according to Mikail Bayram (1979), most of the Babai uprisings were organized and conducted by the Ahis. In regard to this, during the period of Anatolian Seljuks, Ahis and Turcomans, who shared similar ways of life and thinking manners, were also sharing the same occupations and dispositions, while claiming similar religious and political understandings. Nonetheless, the changing political power structure and hence the changing attitude towards these Ahis in a hostile way led them to organize against the political authority. These hostile attitudes covered the arrest of an Ahi leader Ahi Evren Şeyh Nasirü'd-Din Mahmud el-Hoyi, the events of oppression, torments and murders against the Ahis, and the exile of some Turcoman tribes of Kharezm. Approaching it with an economic perspective, Özkırımlı (1975) explicates the same transformation of the political power. First of all, he maintains that in order to understand the root causes of the Babai uprising, it is not enough just simply to say that it was due the civic turmoil arose out of the Mongol raids and the assaults of the Eyyubids and Kharezmshahs. Alternatively, examining the social disorder resulted from the lack of foresight of the Seljuk sultans and emirs and from the dissatisfied Turcomans who were distressed by the financial straits does not mean anything by its own. Mainly, the already existing division (due to the land regime) between the subjects and the military-administrative classes became clearly evident after the Turcomans of Kharezm were received to central-administrative posts. Briefly, the land regime (*ikta*) was the reason behind that fact that the ultimate political power was not concentrated in the hands of the sultan, but it was in the hands of the members of the council of the state (*divan*) and those in the ranks of the state related to this council. However, after receiving the Turcomans of Kharezm to the central-administrative

posts, the ranks of the state were split into two. In short, this foreign element together with the Turcomans became an active political force and this situation led to a division between the new elements and the members of the council composed of native chiefs.

> In other words, the state was captured by the new owners of the land regime (*ikta*). That Alaaddin Keykubad gave the most fertile lands (*ikta*) to the chieftains of Kharezm is important more in the sense that a sovereign ruling class was replaced by another ruling class than in the sense that the lion's share was lost (Özkırımlı, 1975:37).

It was at that time Ahis and Turcomans got support of the central authority. Nevertheless, after the death of Keykubad, the Turcomans of Kharezm were removed from the central posts. Concomitantly, the peasants and nomadic Turcomans were oppressed and the economic difficulties they faced increased the gap between the settled ones and the nomads.

The legacy of the Ahi corporations in the Ottoman context can be analyzed in terms of their having considerable roles in the organization of the society outside the state. Because of this reason, they owned this social and political power only until the late 15th century when the Ottoman state strongly established its authority. Their political roles were felt especially during the period of civil strife among the contending Ottoman princes for the sultanate between 1403 and 1413 (*Devr-i Fetret* or *Fasıla-i Saltanat*). In that period, they undertook governmental roles and prevented the civil turmoil in the regions where the state got weak. However, after the 15th century, they carried their importance only in the economic sphere and existed only as the official organization of the tradesmen and craftsmen.

4.2 Dervish Groups as an Element of the State Formation

In the light of these factors behind why the dervish religiosity has been labeled as "heterodox", we can assert that heterodoxy is a relative term. In other words, it is not possible to find a "heterodoxy" standing on its own. On the other hand, it is an ethic term, not a historical term, and it looks from outside to historical questions.

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Therefore, it is methodologically incorrect to start with *what heterodoxy is*, while examining the dervish religiosity of the concerned age. It is because of the reason that the term has been defined and redefined according to different historical, social, political and economic conditions. The Ahi corporations, which were also bounded by the same religious and ethical tenets of the dervish religiosity, is the best example to prove that the term "heterodoxy" does not only cover socially and politically weak classes in a given society. Briefly, we have seen that such terming represents an attitude of a central authority in order to suppress the groups, which were also elements of the state formation; and this suppression occurred when the state grasped them as a potential threat against its power. In other words, we may consider the conception of heterodoxy as being shaped through the development of the state structure rather than as an individual term standing on its own. In short, "heterodoxy" has been defined and re-defined concomitant with the development process of the state and with the ways of constructing its power and authority among people. Therefrom, the thing that seems to one as a dilemma at the first sight that these groups were both part of the state formation process and the ones that the state aimed to suppress does not appear as a simple dilemma. Accordingly, we should also understand them as an element of the state formation in order to understand the relative nature of "heterodoxy" as a "war machine". Moreover, understanding relativity of the term may also lead us to reconcile the approaches on the formation of the Ottoman state divided into two: the tribe-state axis and the ghaza ideology.

Togan (1994) holds that "horizontal" relationships were determining the relations of the age in the sense that people irrespective of their ethnic background, creed and language were included into the Ottoman emirate. In these inclusive policies, ghazis joined by dervishes were the "partners" (*ortak*) of the ruling group. In so far as the positive environment and relationships between the dervish groups and the Ottoman family are concerned, the assistance of the dervish groups in the state formation can be related mostly to their involving in the Ottoman conquests and their being rewarded accordingly. In other words, the major importance of the dervish groups in the Ottoman state formation arose due to the military concerns of the Ottoman emirate. It is in the sense that the groups undertook the role of auxiliary forces during the period of conquests. For example, as stated by Ocak (1992), Abdal Musa and

Geyikli Baba participated in the conquest of Bursa; Geyikli Baba conquered the region called Kızıl Kilise by his own; Abdal Murad became the subject matter of the *menakıbnames* (the letters of the legends) due to his heroic behaviors in these conquests; as a reward, the Ottoman emirs donated some of the conquered lands to these dervish groups in order to make them settled, etc. Furthermore, as discussed in the same source, Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıl Deli) and Seyyid Rüstem engaged in the conquests near the Rumelia region during the period of Bayezid I; they had important roles in the conquest of Dimetoka and around; and then, they settled in these regions that they had conquered, while establishing their own dervish lodges there. In addition to these, during the conquest of Istanbul, the dervish groups of the Qalandariyya order joined into the conquests and they were assigned the monastery of Akatalepos after the conquest. As stated by Melikoff (1999), the brother of Sheikh Edebali, Ahi Şemseddin and his son Ahi Hasan were in the conquest of Bursa. Moreover, the charter of a waqf (*vakfiye*) of Murad I is so important for the scope of this study in the sense that it, for the first time, stated the fact that Murad I was an Ahi (Öz, 1941).[9] In relation with this, the charter of waqf of Ghazi Orhan Bey is important for us in the sense that in this document, Orhan devoted some regions after the conquests to the wretched and helpless people and dervishes as well as to the Islamic scholars (*ehl-i ilm*) in order to house and feed the poor (Uzunçarşılı, 1941).

The assistance of the dervishes during the Ottoman conquests is strongly related with another subject that is the organic relations between the Baktashiyya order and the Janisarry corps during the early Ottoman era. This view arises due to the reliance on the symbolic role of Haji Bektash as predominant figure in Janisaries. Moreover, it is also assumed that among Janissaries, there were prayers and ceremonies for the name of Haji Bektash. However, these views display a great controversy due to the different discussions on the historical personality of Haji Bektash.[10] For example, Köprülü (1961), in his article on Bektashiyya in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, refutes the role of Bektash as a spiritual master during the formation of the Janissary corps. Similarly, in his article on Abdal Musa, Köprülü (1973) refutes the idea that the headdress of Janissaries was dressed in by Haji Bektash himself as a symbolic

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[9] The importance of this also lies in the fact that the sultan's signature was caught for the first time with this charter.

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approval. Köprülü, evaluating these interpretations within the framework and dynamics of the Ottoman historiography, maintains that:

> The tales about that Haji Bektash had a role of a spiritual patron saint and of a protector in the relations with the early Ottoman sultans and in the formation of the Janissaries cannot be counted as historical facts, while they took shape later in the 15th century. It is also understood that the rumors about his envisaging the Ottoman family's future sultanate and his girding on Osman Ghazi of the sword or a crown came to the scene after Bektashiyya acquired an influential position within the empire (1961:461).

Melikoff (1994;1999) argues that Haji Bektash neither formed an order nor had a disciple; rather, it was Abdal Musa who established the Bektashiyya order. Köprülü (1973), on the other hand, explains Abdal Musa as a saint having lived and became famous in the 15th century. Accordingly, he is known as a disciple of Kaygusuz Abdal, who belonged to the Qalandariyya order. If we accept what Melikoff asserts in relation with Köprülü's explanations, Bektashiyya, in this context, may be regarded as the *continuation* of the same dervish religiosity (under a different title) of the pre-Ottoman period. In other words, we may agree with that it came into existence by the mixture of Babaiyaa, Akhis and Abdals (hence Qalandariyya, Haidariyya and Malamatiyya), and later on it was overwhelmingly affected by Hurufiyya. Therefore, Janissary-Bektashi relations can be considered in the general context of the military assistance of the Abdals to the early Ottoman sultans without attributing a special role to the historical personality of Haji Bektash. In relation with the assistance of the dervish groups in the spread of the Ottoman power, Ocak (1980) also states that these groups can be elaborated in terms of their considerable roles in the movements of conversions of the non-Muslims to the faith of Islam. Also, the existing sources of the age do not talk about these conversions as the mass movements; rather, they narrate them as the conversions of the people in the upper stratum of the society. Despite this, for Ocak, the aura of influence of these people in the high ranks cannot be disregarded. What is more striking for Ocak is the fact that the stories of the conversions are not encountered with in the *menakıbnames* written within the Sunni circles (excluding the Mawlaviyya orders of dervishes). In

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[10] For more information on these controversial interpretations, look at Melikoff (1999,1994) and Ocak (1992).

other words, it is through these "heterodox" groups the movements of conversions seem to have taken place. Moreover, escaping of the Christians from the heavy tax burdens of the Byzantines and the religious constraints of the Church of Byzantium against the "heterodox" Christians cannot be underestimated behind these conversions. However, the syncretic nature of the belief system of the dervish religiosity internalizing and harmonizing the various local elements within its own structure should also be counted in beside the constraints of the Byzantines. Hasluck (1995), on the other hand, argues that during the expansion of the Bektashiyya order, this new belief system occupied the place of the previous one (the one of the Christian subjects). This occurred as a disadvantage for Christianity, since it took place through the acceptance of the "new God" by the older one or through the process of unification of each religious traditions. In this process, foreign places of pilgrimage had an important role. For him, Bektashiyya seized the pilgrimage places of various tribes and other orders' sacred places. As for the Christian churches and the graves of the Christian saints, members of the Bektashiyya order not only claimed to be the owner of them but also, in these places of worship, they gave a warm welcome to the Christians.

> The privileges that Bektahiyya granted to Christianity and Christianity granted to Bektashiyya seem to balance each other at the first sight. The Christian churches were appropriating the made-up stories of Bektashis and welcoming the Bektashi pilgrims. In return for this; the Bektashi orders were appropriating the made-up Christian stories and welcoming the Christian pilgrims. However, the equality in appearance is only surface. The real aim of the Bektashis was to dissolve Christianity into Bektashiyya, not to unify Bektashiyya and Christianity (Hasluck, 1995:90).[11]

On the other hand, the influence of the dervish religiosity upon the popular culture leads some to argue that they were also to sustain order within society. Ocak (1997) argues that the cults emerging around the saints (*awliya*) had social and psychological dimensions, and they were in relation with the norms and values of the

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[11] In so far as the scope of our study is concerned, it is better to evaluate this situation by the term syncretism that the frontier borderland culture allowed, not in terms of advantage-disadvantage relationships between the elements of this heterogeneous structure. However, this syncretism also lead us to think that the Ottoman state might have used the inclusionary nature of the dervish religiosity during the expansion of its territories.

society in which a saint (*wali*) had lived. For him, these "undead dead" people were identified with various religious, moral, social and cultural values and norms of a society, while accumulating them in their personality. Accordingly, the people behaved respectfully (mixed with a feeling of fear) towards the cults of these saints. Having Ocak's approach in explaining these dervish groups in terms of centripetal tendencies in mind (as discussed in the first chapter), we may say that the Ottoman center might have used the influence of the prominent figures of dervish religiosity over the people for its own sake.

> It is observed, at least believed, that the saints that are subjects of the cults are the representatives of social, religious and moral values of a society (entirely or partly) in which they lived. This society identifies the value under consideration with the saint whom it regards as sacred. Here, only the saints, who carry the qualifications that serve to this identification or the saints accepted as the carrier of such qualifications, are considered as the subject matter of the cults. Now, the saint is not an ordinary man anymore for this society; rather s/he becomes whole of the values that the society believes by her/his very self (Ocak, 1997:7).

Concisely, in the previous pages we have tried to elaborate the ways in which the dervish piety has been labeled as "heterodox". While doing this, we have avoided to define what heterodoxy (or orthodoxy) is and to ask whether there exists any "heterodoxy" or not. Accordingly, we have not only concentrated on the works examining the dervish groups in terms of centrifugal tendencies, but also the centripetal tendencies that underline them as an element of the state formation. We, therefore, have defended that it is the totality of these relationships that allows one to understand how the dervish groups have been defined and re-defined concomitant with the development of the central authority. Hence, we may conclude that it is not a dilemma that these groups have been both labeled as heterodox and regarded as an element of the state formation. However, the relative nature of the term may lead the scholars to interpret the situation by taking into consideration the one side of this peculiarity. In other words, examining the dervish groups only as an element of the state formation may lead one to analyze the situation in terms of their inclinations towards the central values, while the non-centralist approaches may consider them as an ultimate source for oppositions against the state.

Until now on, the definition of the relations between the state and the dervish groups have tried to be analyzed in the context of the Ottoman state formation period. Since heterodoxy is a relative term, that is to say these relations transformed according to the time-space boundaries, the situation during the state formation and after the state was established its authority could not be the same. Hence, in the following chapter, we will endeavor to analyze the ways in which the relations were transformed concomitant with the establishment of the Ottoman state.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSFORMATION OF THE RELATIONS IN THE 15TH AND 16TH CENTURIES

> The Problem: According to *shariah*, what is required for a man who utters, God Forbid, I had not feared God?
>
> The Answer: He is through and through an infidel; if he does not become a Muslim, he is murdered
>
> Ebusuud Efendi (Düzdağ, 1983:114).

At the end of the Chapter II, we have noted the significance of the strife among the contending princess between 1403 and 1413 (*Devr-i Fetret* or *Fasıla-i Saltanat*). This has been addressed in order to evaluate how important the ways to incorporate different sections of the society were for the Ottoman emirate in the way to form an empire. In other words, it was this incorporation period that gave a way to the centralization of the Ottoman sultanate, hence to the formation of the Ottoman state. In regard to this, what İnalcık (1999b) thinks has also been underlined. For him, there were two imperial periods, the second of which starting with the conquest of Istanbul was the exact establishment of the Ottoman empire in every respect. Similarly, İnalcık (1958) also argues that this interregnum was characterized by pulling into pieces of the empire and the civil strife, and it lasted until 1422, and not 1413. In addition, in his book *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar I* (1995), he maintains that the struggle among the contending princess for ascending the throne came to an end only with the conquest of Istanbul. In this respect, for the early years of Mehmed the Conqueror, the uprisings of Janissaries, exertions of the chieftain (*bey*) of the Qaramanoghlu emirate to regain the pre-conquered territories, and

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Orhan's (the other contending prince) struggle for ascending the throne in the Rumelia region are worth to mention here. Understandably, the ascending princess' struggle for the throne should be considered in relation with the split of the empire among centrifugal tendencies. And this is indicative of the nature of the centralization process.

Evidently, as these different sections' interests had a tendency to clash with each other and as the princess sought ways for alliances with these clashing interests, this situation led to breaking up the socio-political movements. These movements later turned into a kind of conflict, until the central authority was in every respect constituted. It is because of this reason, İnalcık (1958) puts the movement of Sheik Bedreddin of 1416 at the very center of this interregnum period. It is in the sense that the prince Musa supported (and was supported by) the ghazis, "heterodox" people and nomadic Turcomans of the borderland emirates. And he appointed Bedreddin as the chief justice (*kadiasker*) for his own concerns. This division within the empire also reflected the dissatisfaction between the centralizing center and the nomads and Turcomans in the borderland regions. Looking from this perspective, uprising of Sheik Bedreddin should not be counted as an independent even against the central authority, which was carried out by the "heterodox" people of the Rumelian lands under the leadership of Bedreddin. Having taken place just before the Ottoman central authority was established, the event of Bedreddin should be thought concomitant with the pulling into pieces of the empire.

On the other hand, Ocak (1998) lays stress on the event of Sheik Bedreddin as the point of departure of atheism and heresy (*zendaka and ilhad*) among both the Islamic scholars and the other Sufi circles, which were labeled and punished by the Ottoman central authority. He considers Sheik Bedreddin as the first atheist and heretic (*zindiq and mülhid*) of the Ottoman history. It is now appropriate to examine how the notion of *zindiq* and *mulhid* developed with respect to the state-religion relationships in Islam. According to *Encyclopedia of Islam*, these terms denoted the infidel people who appropriated beliefs against the Islamic law, but at the same time who gave the impression that they were Muslim (Topaloğlu, 1986). Accordingly, such terms appeared at the very center of Islamic criminal law by which these infidels were punished. In the early days of Islam, these words were used to define people who

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followed dualistic religious principles, materialistic beliefs that warranted the eternity of time and matter, ancient pre-Islamic beliefs (such as Mazdaism and Manichaeism) and esoteric doctrines. Later on, their scope was extended. While at first, they were employed as a tool for imputation against the converse opinions during the debates, later on they were used to denote people who did not put the Islamic prescriptions (even one of them) into practice.

The event of Sheik Bedreddin is worth to stress on in many ways for the sake of this study. First of all, it is the indicator of the importance of the ways to incorporate the clashing interests of the different segments of the society (big land owners, prominent Christian feudal lords converted into Islam, eminent families, Turcoman nomads, etc.). Beside the movement's oppositional character against the centralizing authority, the religious discourse appropriated to gather large numbers of people is significant in relation with the formation of the Ottoman state ideology. Additionally, the defenders of the similar religious groups, which appropriated the tenets of "heterodox" Islam as their religious discourse, were accused and punished following the event. Briefly, it is fairly suggestive in regard to how the different opinions at odds with that ideology were treated. Concentrating on the event of Sheik Bedreddin also warns us against a pure dichotomous understanding that puts "orthodox" state against the "heterodox" common people. It is in the sense that the personality of Sheik Bedreddin as a high official in the Ottoman state shows us the dual structure of heterodox Islam, which cannot be limited with the religious beliefs of the common people. In short, the event of Sheik Bedreddin is considerably important for understanding how the Ottoman state ideology turned against the "heterodox" Islamic beliefs or how the dervish religiosity became "heterodox" and/or heretic as the Ottoman state was gradually established.

This chapter, hence, aims to delineate the dynamics of this transformation process. Keeping in mind that it was a complex process that cannot be reduced to a single factor, we will analyze how the groups of dervishes, which previously involved in the formation period, became to be labeled as "heterodox", atheist or heretic. On that ground, firstly the event of Sheik Bedreddin will be focused upon as the commencement of the movements of *zindiq* and *mülhid*. Then, it is going to be questioned the ways in which the Ottoman state, Ottomannes, and the relations

between state and religion in the Ottoman state were established, and hence, what the different dimensions of the Ottoman state ideology were. While doing this, two important factors, the encounter between the Ottoman and Safavid states and the fusion of newly entering elements into the Anatolian dervish religiosity (such as Hurufiyya) will be touched upon as the factors having a role in shaping the Ottoman state ideology. We will also focus upon the newly entering elements within the context of Ottoman-Safavid encounter. Given the complexity of the subject matter, we do not aim to offer a detailed analysis of the so-called "classical" age. In that sense, it is unavoidable that there would be some gaps in being taken into consideration of the subject matter.

5.1 The Movement of Sheik Bedreddin and Thereafter

Bedredddin is an important figure in the Ottoman history, since he has been known as the leader and organizer of a popular revolt in the Rumelia region during the early years of Mehmed I's reign (after the interregnum period). Although the exact date that Bedreddin rebelled is recorded as 1416, insurrections took place one after another in the region. It is because of this reason that Bedreddin has been predicated as the leader and organizer of a "popular" movement. During these revolts, he gathered large numbers of people around his mystic personality, which constituted a major threat against the centralizing authority. These were basically the peasants, dervishes, "heterodox" people and nomadic Turcomans of the frontier regions and the Christian feudal lords, whose lands were sequestered by the state. It is assumed that the discourse he employed for gathering these huge amounts of people had a mystical character. Accordingly, he believed that everything (except the women) that a person owned should be shared equally among the people. Beside this collective ownership, he also argued that there was not any difference between Christianity and Islam and that one cannot have any superiority over the other (Balivet, 2000).

As mentioned earlier, this movement has attracted attention of many scholarly or political interests for many years due to its various dimensions and its openness to different interpretations. Therefore, it has constituted a pretty controversial subject

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matter of the Ottoman history, and as the time passed, it has been re-interpreted again and again according to the related cleavages. The different interpretations may be summed up as follows: a movement that was the vanguard of a class struggle against the central authority; a popular revolt of the peasants and nomads; an opposition against the sultanate within the state; a defender of collective ownership or the equal distribution of properties; a religious movement to unite Islam and Christianity with its supra-religions characteristics or with its messianic character, etc. It has also become important in the left discourse, while the rebellion of the common people against the state has been exalted. In so far as the scope of the study is concerned, we will evaluate the movement with respect to its weight as a turning point in the process of becoming "heterodox" and/or heretic of the dervish religiosity in the context of the Ottoman state. And by this process, we mean the ways in which the mutual opposition between the central authority and the dervish groups came into the ground.

Bedreddin's historical personality bears a significance, since his versatile personality has led to different interpretations. First of all, he was the son of a Muslim father, who was the *kadi* (judge) of Simavna (later appointed as the *kadi* of Edirne) and who was assumed to be descended from the line of Alaaddin Keykubad, the ruler of the Anatolian Seljuks. His mother was a Christian of a Greek origin converted into Islam and the daughter of a Christian feudal lord. Whether or not his lineage from his father side was made up to sustain the legitimacy of his personality in the eyes of the Ottoman sultanate (by his grandchild who wrote his life), the important thing to mention is that he descended from a family that followed the tradition of Muslim canonical jurisprudence (*fiqh*), in other words, from the tradition of more "orthodox" wing of Islam. In so far as her mother is concerned, her influence has been the subject matter of many discussions in relation with Bedreddin's supra-religious doctrine, especially when his Christian wife and daughter-in-law are considered in these discussions. Coming from and having educated in religious and other matters at first in such a family, he was educated on logic, *fiqh*, and astronomy in Konia and on *fiqh* and various Islamic sciences in Cairo. He also attended to the meetings and discussions with the prominent figures of *ulema* (scholars of the holy law) in Timurs' palace in Tebriz, and he achieved a great success during the

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discussions. During his journeys for his education, he also met with the Sheik Huseyin-i Ahlati, from whom he took the philosophical formation in Islamic mysticism and he was influenced remarkably in the religious matters. When Ahlati wanted him to go to Tebriz, Bedreddin also got in touch with the Hurufiyya circles and found an opportunity to strengthen his views on Islam in this region, in which the tradition of Hallac-ı Mansur and his pantheist philosophy played a predominant role. With this educational and religious formation, when he decided to return to Asia Minor (while refusing the post of Sheik Ahlati after his demise), he met with Chelebi Musa, one of the princes of the Ottoman sultanate who reigned in Edirne at that time. And Musa offered him the position of the chief judge (*kadiasker*)[1] of the army under his reign, by which he started his new carrier (Ocak, 1998).

As we have mentioned above, the carrier of Bedreddin in the Ottoman state should be evaluated within the general framework of the process of the Ottoman state centralization. It is in the sense that the interregnum period, which is characterized by the struggle of princes to ascend the throne, is indicative of the fact that the Ottoman sultanate was the combination of diverse forces. Also, the ways to incorporate them were so much important for achieving centralization. It was also the time during which Bedreddin was appointed as *kadiasker*. The period signifies the "segmented" nature of the empire, among which the state acted as a "resonator". For instance, in that period, the prince Suleyman was the representative of the central authority, and this authority was established on Thrace with a much more Rumelian outlook. His reign was backed up by the senior families like Chandarlis and he was in alliance with the Christian neighbors. On the other hand, Mehmed I was much more influential in Anatolia, and he had the support of powerful names of the region, who newly converted into Islam (such as the Albanian Bayezid Pasha). Moreover, he was propping the religious orthodoxy (the existing *ulema* officials). When Musa is taken into consideration, he supported and was supported by the ghazis and "heterodox" people of the frontier emirates of the Rumelia region. Besides, he got the support of the older families such as Mihaloghlus who appropriated the ideology of the

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[1] In so far as the hierarchical structure of the *ulema* (scholars of the holy law) is concerned, it is to be noted that the two chief judges (*kadiasker*) of the army (one was of Rumelia, the other of Anatolia) stood just below the post of the Sheik al-Islam (Grand Mufti), who was at the summit of the *ulema* pyramid. Bedreddin's appointment as the chief judge in the Rumelia region clearly indicates his crucial position in the state level.

Bektashiyya order (Balivet, 2000). Obviously, in such a condition, the assignment of Bedreddin to the position of the *kadiasker* by Musa should be evaluated much more carefully, in so far as the nature and scope of his influence on the region where Musa established his reign are concerned. First, Bedreddin was known as the son of a ghazi from the line of Seljuks and as a person who had important connections with the Mihaloglu family. Therefore, his aura of influence in the Rumelia region was an indispensable element for the reign of Musa. On the other hand, his mystical character would have attracted the attention of Musa, who endeavored to convene the Turcomans and "heterodox" elements of the borderland emirates under his reign. Balivet (2000) holds that these Turcomans and heterodox elements were against any urban and settled central authority. Albeit Musa's attempt to use Bedreddin's mystical influence in his own favor, they did not approve Bedreddin's prominence as a sheik at first. They accused him of his service to the notables of the central authority. In time, they accepted him as a sheik. The first response of these segments against Bedreddin should be evaluated in detail. It is because of the reason that it reflects the Turcomans' attitude against any element of the central authority. Other than this, when one scrutinizes much more carefully, versatile personality of Bedreddin in between the nomadic, Turcoman and heterodox elements, older and richer families, landlords and the centralizing authority is significant. As one can see, the historical personality of Bedreddin involved many differing characters in the sense that he was a high bureaucrat in the state, a high scholar of *fiqh* according to the needs of Islamic orthodoxy, and at the same time an Islamic mystic of the "heterodox" current of Islam. The religious doctrine he followed was also identified with the materialist current of Islam, with respect to the influence of pantheist philosophy of Hurufiyya thought in terms of the doctrine of *Wahdat al-Mawcut* (unity of the existent). This many-sidedness is an important clue for us to conceive heterodoxy beyond the boundaries of dichotomies.

> In that period, both a scholar and an orthodox sufi types might be gathered in the same individual, and the individual might comply with a popular dervish type who was able to attract the masses. ...He (Bedreddin) could unify the esteem of a scholar educated in the religious colleges (*medrese*) in Anatolia and Egypt, the influence of a man who came from the line of Seljuks, and the impact of a strict sufi and the

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miracles of the nomadic babas under his personality (Balivet, 2000:53;67).

The "revolutionary" personality of Bedreddin came on the scene following the days after Chelebi Musa was defeated by Mehmed I, and killed. At that time, Bedreddin was exiled to Iznik like the others who were arrested and exiled due to their service to Musa.[2] While Borkluce Mustafa revolted in Karaburun in the name of Bedreddin, Bedreddin achieved to escape from Iznik, and then, he took refuge in the Isfendigaroghlu emirate as a person against the Ottoman state. On the other hand, the movements of rebellions proceeded during the early years of Mehmed I who captured the throne. As time passed, they continued through Torlak Kemal and Borkluce Mustafa thereafter, who have been said to revolt in the name of Bedreddin too. In this part, it is not going to be discussed how these revolts took place by these two figures and to what extent Bedreddin commanded the revolts and the propaganda phase that took place after 1416. Rather, it is appropriate to clarify what the essential characteristic of these revolts were and what happened after them in so far as the opposition of the Ottoman authority is concerned.

Foremost, it should be underlined that the crowd of people that constituted the base of the movements was first his disciples, then Turcomans, nomads, the "heterodox" people having affinity for Hurufiyya and Qalandariyya and lastly, the pervious Christian feudal land owners whose lands were sequestered after Mehmed I ascended to the throne. It was these different groups of people that suffered from the newly centralizing authority or lost their prerogatives accordingly (for example, the Christian ex-landowners). In that sense, it is not enough to define the event simply as a peasant revolt, popular revolt or the revolt that defended collective ownership. Therefore, it is appropriate to study the event well in relation with the consequences of the centralization process and in the light of the responses against this process from different segments of the society. The event signifies much more complicated relationships independent from Bedreddin's historical personality. In other words, even though Bedreddin was hanged at the end, the events did not come to an end, in

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[2] The triumph of Mehmed I over the other contending princes can be evaluated as the triumph of a person who supported the religious orthodoxy. Because of that, the severity of the following torments against the heterodoxy elements within the Ottoman realm might have intensified due to Mehmed I's personality in that context, beside the general evolvement of the center-periphery relations.

so far as the relations between the central authority and the advocators of Bedreddin are concerned. We may argue that the relations between the central authority -embodied with Mehmed I's ascendance to the throne and carried through the following sultans- and these groups of people were very much re-shaped after the event.

After Bedreddin was hanged, the disciples and adherents of Bedreddin could not escape from the pressures of the Ottoman central authority. They were accused, inquired, punished, and sentenced to death. The situation that resulted with the mutual opposition of each side exceedingly intensified especially in the 16th century. One of the basic reasons behind these oppositions may be elucidated by their affinity for and (for some) involvement in the Hurufiyya and Safavid circles. Above all, these two factors (as considered in relation with each other) may be regarded as the major element of threat against the Ottoman state authority in the 16th century due to the Ottoman-Safavid encounter. On the other hand, in so far as the religious doctrines and disciples of Bedreddin are concerned, one can easily follow Bedreddin's affinity for the doctrine of Hurufiyya from his major work, *Varidat*. As both Ocak (1998) and Balivet (2000) expounds, this work may be weighed as a pure example and the continuation of the Hurufiyya thought with its materialistic and pantheistic philosophy albeit its non-originality.[3] For example, in *Varidat*, he construed that God was nothing more than the universe itself; the doomsday was no way going to come true; the universe was not going to vanish or the soul also did vanish as the body have vanished with death. For that reason, the adherents of Bedreddin could not escape from the accusation of infidelity time an again. It is evident in legal opinions (*fetva*) of Sheik al-Islam (Grand Mufti) Ebussud Efendi, who was the Sheik al-Islam of the age during Suleyman the Lawgiver and Selim II in the 16th century

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[3] Gölpınarlı (1966) refutes the idea that *Varidat* was written under the strong influence of the doctrines Hurufiyya. For him, not any subject, which can be traced to Hurufiyya, can be found. On the contrary, talking about even an intimation of this order was implausible. Ocak, on the other hand, avers that the scope of the influence of Hurufiyya can not be weighed through only questioning the presence of the numbers. Rather, the materialistic philosophy it employed suffices to account Bedreddin's major work under the influence of this order. For more information on what Bedreddin protested, Batiniyya (esoterism) and on *Varidat* itself, look at Gölpınarlı, A. (1966) *Simavna Kadısı Şeyh Bedreddin*, İstanbul: Eti Yayınları.

and who left his mark on the ideology of the central authority.[4] With respect to this, Bedreddin's disciples were known as infidels and should be treated accordingly (Düzdağ, 1983). According to the *fetva*:

> The Problem: What should be done, in accordance with the Islamic religious law, to a person who utters that a person would be an infidel, if s/he does not say that Skeik Bedreddin –the owner of *Varidat*- is infidel and if s/he does not curse him?

> The Answer: Actually, it is required to say that the people who are the disciples of him are infidel. However, as in the case of other infidels, a person who does not mention and curse them does not become an infidel by his/her own (1983:241).

The movement of Bedreddin designates a great deal about the discussions on heterodoxy-orthodoxy dichotomy, which should not be evaluated and explained solely in religious terms. Understandably, the event shows us that such a dichotomy was very much shaped by the process of state formation and centralization. And it was sharpened due to a religious terminology of Bedreddin and his advocators, which led to a cleavage line between them. This reminds us that the thing defined as "heterodoxy" did not have endemic clear-cut boundaries, even though it was composed of the segments of society that were, in general, exterior to or excluded by the state. Briefly, the movement proves us that "heterodoxy" may at the same time, on the whole, exist within the state. If we are to give a reference to what Deleuze & Guattari say on the multiple nature of a "rhizome":

> If it is true that it is of the essence of the map or rhizome to have multiple entryways, then it is plausible that one could even enter them through the tracings or the root-tree, assuming the necessary precautions are taken (1987:14).

At that point, we may say a few words about Mawlaviyya. It is in the sense that despite the order has been put in opposition to the popular dervish movements named as "heterodox", we cannot talk about an homogenous order of Mawlavis. According

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[4] Sheik al-Islam Ebusuud Efendi deserves a great attention in understanding the official ideology of the Ottoman state in its "classical age". This crucial figure of the Ottoman history has been known basically through the legal opinions (*fetva*) that he issued during Suleyman the Lawgiver and Selim II (from 1545 to 1574). As the pure representative of the Sunni Islam, his *fetvas* covered wide range of topics from public to private realms. Importantly, his *fetvas* were also extremely pivotal for understanding how official ideology treated the heterodox and heretic groups of Islam.

to the commonly accepted understanding, the "aristocratic" and "urban" order of the Mawlavis was cultivated by the ruling institutions and the *ulema* (Goodwin, 1994). Moreover, in this cultivation, the "Sunni" outlook of the Mawlavis played a predominant role. It is because of the reason that "Sunni and orthodox Mawlavis" were the balancing element in the Ottoman society against the "heterodox" popular dervishes which had a tendency to Shi Islam. However, as Gölpınarlı (1983) analyses, there were two different wings within the order of Mawlavis. These were the wing represented by Şems-i Tebrizi (one of the spiritual mentors of Mawlana) and the other represented by the son of Mawlana, Sultan Veled. Accordingly, the wing of Şems was very much fed by the doctrines of Malamatiyya and Qalandariyya, since Şems was a dervish of Qalandars. On the other hand, the wing of Sultan Veled, who has been regarded as the official founder of the order by systematizing all the rituals and ceremonies, represented a more Sunni outlook. It is because of the reason that this wing is considered as acknowledging all the prescriptions of "official" *shariah* (Islamic religious law). Nonetheless, as a scholar *within* the order of Mawlavis, Gölpınarlı talks about an indisputable influence of Malamatiyya, Qalanadariyya and Hurufiyya. At that point, he also mentions the ways in which the order of Mawlavis had similarities with the one of Bektashis. Consequently, the dichotomy relating Mawlaviyya to the "orthodox" state, while Bektashiyya to the "heterodox" common people needs to be questioned. Therefore, none of the sides of the dichotomy could be treated as a homogenous whole and both may include the elements of the "other".

Similarly, as implied by Ocak (1998), one may observe that high Islamic scholars of the state cadres (like Molla Lutfi, Molla Kabız, Hakim Ishak, Nadajli Sarı Abdurrahman Efendi, Lari Mehmed Efendi) were also subjected to accusation of being *zindiq* and *mülhid* and they were hanged accordingly. For example, Molla Lütfi was a salient personality in the *ulema* hierarchy during the time of Mehmed the Conqueror and a preeminent professor (*muderris*) during the time of Bayezid II. This scholar, however, attracted the attention of his scholarly rivals in a negative way due to his conceitedness, humiliating manners and sharpness against the other scholars. For that reason, the rival scholars of the *ulema* denounced him on the pretexts that he was *zindiq* and *mülhid* provoking common people to heresy. With respect to his

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execution, his affinity for rational and philosophical interpretations and the quotations of the major philosophers rather than the religious prescriptions of the *shariah* played a predominant role. Although he did not have any connection with non-Sunni (or Sunni) orders, his giving priority to reason rather than belief facilitated his accusation as a *zindiq* and *mulhid*. On the other hand, another essential figure of the *ulema*, Molla Kabız was executed with the same accusation during the time of Suleyman the Lawgiver. According to the assertions, he was protesting and affirming the superiority of Christ over Muhammad by giving references to the verses in the Koran. Importantly, he was endeavoring to disseminate his opinions over the common people (Yıldırım, 2001). In addition to that, in the 17th century, *muderris* Sarı Abdurrahman Efendi as a well educated scholar in the *ulema* hierarchy was sentenced to death during the time of Mehmed III due to his rejection of the existence of heaven and hell and the doomsday. Although he did not reject the existence of God, his denial of the other world caused him to be labeled as *zindiq*.

In order to understand that the term "heterodoxy" is not limited with the state vs. people dichotomy, the Bayramiyya order can be given as an example. According to this, the order was divided into two totally opposite wings after the demise of its founder, Haji Bayrami Veli (Gölpınarlı, 1986a). Although the first wing, represented by Aqshemseddin, was known through its warmth and sympathy towards the close relatives of Muhammed (*ehli- beyt*) and its defending the classic Sunni Islam, the second one, represented by Omer Dede, developed according to the principles of Malamatiyya. At the same time, the second wing is also important for the subject matter, since the disciples showed a great homage to and interpreted the doctrines of Sheik Bedreddin (Gölpınarlı, 1992). This situation carries a great importance because of the reason that this wing of Bayramiyya was also buffeted by the central authority like the others. In regard to this, Ismail Maşuki (Oğlan Şeyh) as an important figure of the Malamatiyya camp of the Bayramiyya order deserves a special attention here. In the 16th century, he came from Aksaray to Istanbul in his early adulthood as a sheik of the Bayrammiyya order. After his arrival to Istanbul, he succeeded in gathering huge amounts of people around his mystic personality, in addition to his influence in the rural settings where he came from. The urban social base of the adherents of this young sheik was composed especially of artisans and merchants,

then of soldiers, bureaucrats, poets and men of letters. However, the pantheistic and materialistic philosophy (*Wahdat al-Mavcut*) he employed caused him to be accused as *zindiq* and to be executed afterwards (together with his disciples). Some of the views that were supposed to be of Ismail Maşuki can be summarized as follows: every human being is God by his/her own, since God can be beheld in every form; it is required to worship to a God which is manifest; nothing is unlawful (*haram*), if one behaves like a human being; anything and everything done to meet the necessities of human body do come to mean worshipping to God; who makes human is human his/herself; the prescriptions of Islam are not required for the true Muslim in heart; there are not such things like doomsday; when a person dies, the soul reincarnates, etc. (Ocak, 1998; Yıldırım, 2001). Moreover, after his and his disciples' executions, the adherents of Maşuki could not be totally eliminated. It is because of the reason that he had convened huge amounts of people around his mystic personality. Briefly, his aura of influence in the urban settings of the Ottoman empire as well as the rural ones clearly demonstrates that the term heterodoxy cannot be solely explained through rural vs. urban dichotomy.

5.2 The Ottoman State: Religion and Ideology

Up to now, we have discussed that the groups representing Anatolian dervish religiosity that previously took part in the formation of the Ottoman state became to be labeled as "heterodox" or even heretic and atheist. Above all, we have continuously mentioned that the relations between the Ottoman state and these groups should not be reduced to a simple dichotomy, which disregards the nature of the transformations that the relations between the Ottoman "state" and heterodox "war machine" were exposed to. Since we have defended the necessity of elaborating the changing attitudes of both sides, now it is proper to clarify the ways in which the Ottoman state ideology became.

In general, the period that represented the Ottoman state ideology best is assumed as the one known as the "classical" age. Consequently, this period is generally defined as the evident representative of Ottoman state-society relationships. Nonetheless, the continuous transformation does assume that the characteristics of

the so-called "classical age" is only a point in the Ottoman history. As argued by Peirce (1993) Ottoman values and institutions were under constant transformation that cannot be frozen in a time:

> One problematic outcome of this interpretation of the so-called classical period is that the institutional arrangements that obtained in the "heyday" of this period are generally regarded as the exemplary institutions of the Ottoman polity. ...This view ignores the constant evolution that Ottoman institutions underwent. There is no one moment in the history of the Ottoman state and society that can be frozen and labeled as the classical empire (1993:155).

Therefore, we will take the "heyday" period *not* as the representative of the whole peculiarities of the empire, but rather as an important point in this transformation to underline the values that were aimed to be conserved.

With regard to this, this period could be characterized by shifting emphasis on the images of the Ottoman sovereignty and dynasty. In that period, the sovereignty of the Ottoman sultanate was exalted above all the elements of the state and society. Because of this reason, all the military, religious and provincial institutional arrangements, hierarchies and the system of values were re-shaped and re-constructed according to this basic priority. While the image of the Ottoman sultan was depicted as the most majestic of the Islamic world, the sultanate became much more sedentary and secluded. At that time, the notion that the Ottoman sultanate is invisible, but permanent and exists everywhere was extensively mentioned. Predictably, this paved way for a priority given especially to the religious and military institutions and to their developments in the following years. This priority became essential especially with the claims to be an Islamic empire in both east and west. This institutionalization, on the other hand, took shape according the basic principle, that is the permanent and absolute sovereignty of the Ottoman sultanate.

The role of Islam concerning the state's absolute authority in the Ottoman context can be best observed in the enacting and enforcement of the laws, rules and regulations. In regard to this, although the Islamic religious law (*sheriah*) determined the basis of the regulations and relations and its superiority was commonly accepted, the sultan's own will and authority was weighed above all these laws. In other words,

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the sovereign was the owner of the authority of enacting laws before the prescriptions of the Islamic law (İnalcık, 2000a). İnalcık articulates this from the perspective that this was the continuation of Turkish state tradition by which the sovereign's authority based on reason was considered above all things. All the same, the Islamic law ideologically might also be used to legitimize the sovereign's authority. Because, the Islamic scholars, who were entitled to examine whether the laws of the sovereign were in accordance with the Islamic laws, were also under sultan's authority, and the sultan was responsible to no one (even to the representatives of the divine authority) but God. The sultan was consented as receiving his will from no one but God, and the laws he enacted were considered as for the benefit of the people he reigned (even they might be in clash with the Islamic laws)[5]:

> The sentences passed by the sultan were put into practice by being considered as *sine qua non* for the well-being of Muslims, even sometimes they were not seen in accordance with the Islamic religious law (*shariah*). ...In other words, the principle of well-being of Islam and the common people (*istislah* with Islamic terminology) was accepted as a principle which validated an independent political authority and its power to enact laws. (İnalcık, 2000a:41;42).

However, the principle of well-being of the common people is something that should be questioned much more carefully. It is in the sense that happiness and prosperity of the common people were interpreted as indispensable and necessary for the welfare of the sovereign. It was because of the reason that the common people were the ones from whom the taxes were collected. Moreover, it was also assumed that if the common people were prosperous, the military was regarded to be in welfare too through the taxations. And if the military was in a good condition, the basic element to sustain the permanence of the sultanate was met. Hence, the basic principle was that in order to sustain the power of the country, more soldiers and army were needed. Similarly, the procedures followed during the Ottoman conquests and how they solved the problem of settlement in the newly conquered territories might give some clues about the Ottoman state philosophy, in so far as the comparable position

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[5] In the Ottoman context, the sultan's mundane and independent authority to enact laws were always defended. In order to signify this, the term *Din ü Devlet* (religion and state) became indispensable element of the Ottoman state ideology.

of the subjects in relation with the military class is concerned. According to İnalcık (2000d), all the subjects and lands were deemed belonging to the sultan, while the sultan was the state by himself. This absolute authority worked with an administration and military force, that were purely "personal instruments" of the sultan. The class of people, known as military (askeri) was including the bureaucrats employed in the administrative cadres and their families as well as the military officials. In this circumstances, this class was a separate and different group of people over the common people, the subjects. On the other hand, they were subjected to distinct and exceptional laws enacted by the sultan himself. Following this, the social position of the subjects (reaya) was determined by the sultan in such a way that the change in that position was possible only it was certified by him. In short, such a division between the military class and the subjects and the special position of the military class over the subjects may lead us to return to the previous discussion that the well-being of the people was for the well-being of the sultanate. Briefly, it seems to us that the principle of the welfare of the common people was only functional; in other words, its was only for the sustenance of the sovereignty of the sultanate.

On the other hand, if we take into consideration that the advocates of the "classical age" consider Mehmed the Conqueror as the one who established the empire after the conquest of Istanbul, concentrating on the laws he enacted with his absolute authority requires a special attention. The reign of Mehmed II has been appraised as a turning point, in so far as the exaltation of the notion of a sovereign empire is concerned. He enacted laws that were only based on his absolute authority, and abolished the powerful figures within the state (such as the vizier Chandarli Halil Pasha). Moreover, he appointed all the viziers (except the one) among the people coming from the slaves (kul) (İnalcık, 1958). While Mehmed II's "imperial project" started with establishment of Istanbul as the new capital city, the transfer of the capital city from Edirne to Istanbul after the peace was restored may be viewed strikingly meaningful. It is in the sense that it represents, as Kafadar (1995) argues, the superiority of the idea of state and its implications. The implications were such that with the ascendancy of "kul-based administration", the elements of the frontier regions (such as ghazis) never played a significant role. On the other hand, the

rebellions in the former capital cities of the empire (such as the one that Duzmece Mustafa organized in Edirne) may symbolically indicate the oppositions against Istanbul-based absolute authority.

We may talk about an order in which everything was for the sake and preeminence of the sultanate. With respect to this, it can also be assumed that religion was for and under the authority of the sultanate. This point evidently leads us to a discussion on Islamic orthodoxy. Since we have accounted for the Ottoman centralization as a process of transformation, strengthening of Islamic orthodoxy as the core element of this transformation deserves a special attention.

With the term Islamic orthodoxy, we mean a highly institutionalized religious strata under the authority of the sultanate, whose aim was to elaborate and carry out the Islamic religious law (*shariah*). Since the concept of *shariah* is extensively broad in scope covering all the public and private realms, submission to the will of God was primarily seen as a submission to an all-embracing legal system. By these needs, there has been basically developed four accepted schools – Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali- whose precepts dictate how one interprets the law. This, of course, brought about a highly institutionalized and strong religious class in order to inspect how validly the organization of the public and private realms was achieved according to the necessities of *shariah* (Williams, 1962).

In the Ottoman context, Hanafiyya was appropriated for the affairs of the state and society. The most important characteristic of this school can be spelled out as its giving importance to reasoning or exercise of judgement (*ijtihad*) and to a consensus of the opinion of the judges (*ijma*). With these peculiarities, this school found an opportunity to spread out in the regions in which the tradition of statehood was so strong (such as the Abbasids) (DTA, 1976). It is in the sense that the preeminence of a state allowed *shariah* to be interpreted through reasoning and judgement according to its needs. On the other hand, this peculiarity also caused to a primacy given to the Islamic scholars, the men of the learned of *shariah* (*ulema*), who were uniquely trained in the religious colleges (*medrese*). *Ulema*'s remarkable role as the carriers of the Islamic religious law and its special relations with the throne were also gradually established concomitant with the Ottoman centralization.

As already mentioned in the previous chapters, it was not only the vagabond dervish groups who migrated to Asia Minor during the time of Anatolian Seljuks and the early Ottomans. There were also large group of Islamic scholars who escaped from the Mongol's assault. Kafadar (1995) asserts that although they were not as sophisticated as the actual *ulema* in terms of their educational background and administrative expertise, they enjoyed the support of early Ottoman chiefs and warriors in return for their religious service. In other words, the incorporation of the elements outside the Ottoman family during the route to centralization did not exclude these scholars, as it did not exclude the dervishes and ghazis. On the other hand, it is clearly evident that the early Ottomans incorporated the influence and enjoyed the support of the old and well-known Chandarli family, who were from the *ulema* background and who nearly monopolized the top juridical and administrative posts from mid-fourteenth to mid-fifteenth century. Moreover, according to Gökbilgin (1986), *ulema* was supported since the earlier days of the Ottomans and this support was activated through the establishment of various religious colleges (*medrese*), mosques, religious, social and scholarly foundations and Koran schools (*mekteb*) by the sultans and viziers in the lands conquered.

In the early years of the Ottomans, *ulema* was also backed as in the case of the dervish groups. However, in the 16th century, it became the backbone of the central Ottoman authority. According to Karen Barkey (1994), while the Ottoman house of rule managing to incorporate variety of internal forces, it also attributed a great role to *ulema*. This happened in order to form a countercurrent against the Sufi orders, since the fact that these orders were the most potentially organized force in society. Therefore, it was required neutralize them. In that sense, *ulema*'s becoming the backbone of the Ottoman central authority should be considered in relation with the Ottoman endeavor to tie all the regional authorities solely to the state without allowing their autonomy. In regard to this, Mehmed the Conqueror's attempt to abolish any powerful authorities within the state (especially the Chandarlis) and appoint all the viziers among the slaves (*kul*) may be understood considering the Ottoman preeminence. At the extreme edge of this kind of interpretation, Zelyut (1995) maintains that the Ottoman state was not formed and developed fortuitously. On the contrary, it was "strategically" proceeded; and this strategy had been known

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previously through the experiences of the grand Islamic empires. Just after the formation was succeeded, the ruling class took up the situation, lopped off and eliminated any fortuitous elements. In this environment, religion was considered as the best vehicle in solving the affairs of the state. For this reason, the Hanafiyya school was received on the state level. Because, it hindered the formation of an independent religious class and made this class the civil servants of the state, hence made the religion a tool for the state. When *ulema* gained priority in the Ottoman state, the functions of the dervish lodges were turned over to mosques, of the sheiks to imams and of the nomadic (and peasant) warriors to mercenary soldiers. In relation with the "strategically formed" Ottoman state, Zelyut also argues that the counter reactions were at most during the empire's most powerful and influential epoch.

> The official religious strata, which did not have any role and power during the formation of the state, developed and became powerful concomitant with the state, and its power reached to its peak in the 16th century. Depending on this development and their becoming powerful, the ease granted to the heterodox groups became outdated. Thus, the periods that the official religious strata and the state were most powerful was concurrent with the periods in which counter thoughts were so strong (1995:61).

In fact, we cannot be so sure about whether the Ottoman centralization was realized according to a strategy. Instead, we may maintain that the Ottoman house of rule collaborated with different groups in different time periods. Evidently, the groups that suited its own interests were the ones which could reinforce its own authority (without claiming any autonomy) best. Therefore, the Ottoman centralization may also be regarded as the transformation of the elements to be incorporated with.

In a similar way, the ghaza ideology was subjected to similar transformations as the empire ideology was developed in the late 15th century and the early 16th centuries. During that time, Ottomans attempted to present themselves as the sole representative of *true* Sunni Islam. This transformation was required in the sense that although the ghaza ideology was the major driving force behind the conquests and expansions toward the Balkans in the early years of the Ottomans, it proved insufficient when the conquests and expansions took place in the east against the

previously through the experiences of the grand Islamic empires. Just after the formation was succeeded, the ruling class took up the situation, lopped off and eliminated any fortuitous elements. In this environment, religion was considered as the best vehicle in solving the affairs of the state. For this reason, the Hanafiyya school was received on the state level. Because, it hindered the formation of an independent religious class and made this class the civil servants of the state, hence made the religion a tool for the state. When *ulema* gained priority in the Ottoman state, the functions of the dervish lodges were turned over to mosques, of the sheiks to imams and of the nomadic (and peasant) warriors to mercenary soldiers. In relation with the "strategically formed" Ottoman state, Zelyut also argues that the counter reactions were at most during the empire's most powerful and influential epoch.

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Muslim states or emirates. In other words, as Faroqhi (1990) demonstrates, this transformation arose due to the problem of legitimacy. This necessity was due to the Ottoman eastern expansion at first, but it intensified during the Ottoman-Safavid encounter. As it is going to be examined in the following section, the Safavid state asserted that they came from the ancestors of Muhammad. On the contrary, the Ottomans were lacking in this kind of assertions (only claiming their descent from the ancient Turkish khans of the Central Asia, in particular, the legendary Oghuz Khan), and this necessitated the extension of the scope of the ghaza ideology:

> Contrary to the Safavids that were the sovereigns of the 16th century Iran, Ottomans never claimed that they were coming from the ancestors of prophet Muhammad. Because of that reason, they were deprived of an important element of religious legitimacy. Moreover, these sultans were not the sovereigns of the most important lands of Islam until 1517 (Faroqhi, 1990:81).

On the other hand, as Zilfi (1988) asserts, this lack led the Ottomans to show extreme honor and respect to *ulema*. To that end, *ulema*'s performance in the name of Islam made the Ottomans dynasty legitimized despite their "plebian-blooded pedigree". Therefore, Ottomans attempted to show themselves as the true representatives of Sunni Islam, and the conception of ghaza was extended to include the Safavids and related Muslim segments which were considered as a threat to the Ottoman central authority. For such an extension, the scope of ghaza was re-defined. Consequently, it included any religious element that seemed to be in relation with the formation and development of the Safavid state, in which Hurufiyya, Bedrediniyya, Anatolian Turcomans, and the *kizilbashes* (red-heads) can be counted. Similarly, it was declared by Ebusuud Efendi that any massacre against the groups of *kizilbashes* was deemed canonically lawful and who murdered them was appraised as either ghazi or a martyr (*şehit*) (Düzdağ, 1983). Briefly, the struggle was conspicuously important in determining that the terms of ideological discourse became exclusively religious with a new cleavage between the Sunnism of the Ottomans and the Shi'ism of their major rivals. For that reason, the Ottoman *ulema*'s approval of war against the heretics may be pronounced as an additional justification against the Shi Safavids.

The Sunni Islam and *shariah* played an overwhelming role in shaping the relationships between the sultanate and his neighbors as well as the sultanate and his

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subjects. However, this role was such that it worked for and under the absolute central authority. On the other hand, it was re-shaped and re-produced for and by it. In such a condition, even indirectly talking about or behaving against such a religious understanding might be deemed equal to defaming the central authority rather than defaming the essence of the religion itself.

5.3 The Encounter between the Ottoman and Safavid States and the Inclusion of the Newcomers to the Anatolian Dervish Religiosity

We have already mentioned that in the 16th century, one of the major threats against the Ottoman absolute authority arose due to the emergence of the new Safavid state in the east. When the struggle was undertook against the Safavid state, such an external struggle became part of the internal politics and helped a great deal in the shaping of the internal affairs. First of all, the Safavid state was a dynasty from a Turcoman origin, and it became a state while it was previously an order (*tariqah*). And this dynasty took its legitimacy from its being based on Shi doctrines as the official religion of the state and its claiming that they came from the ancestors of the prophet Muhammad. Hence, the Turcoman element that formed the basis of the Safavid state and the religious formation of that state can be tersely expressed as the elements of threat against the Ottoman absolute authority.

According to Sümer (1999), the geographical and ethnic origins of the people who founded the Safavid state can be considered as one of the most important problems touching its history. It is in the sense that the Anatolian Turcomans who were nomadic and peasant in origin were the most important element in the formation and the development of the Safavid state. In so far as the brief history of the state is concerned, it was at first an order located in Ardabil. According to the known sources, Sheik Djunayd was a member of a leading family of the Safavid order in that region, who came to Anatolia in the middle of the 15th century. Djunayd success lied in the fact that large number of people from the Turcoman peasants and tribesmen became his disciples (*mürids*). After his death, his son Haydar succeeded his father as the head of the Safavid order, during which the greatest part of its

members lived in and fed by the Anatolia region. Following this, Ismail (son of Haydar), by taking the support of the Turcoman tribes of Anatolia, established his sultanate in 1501 as the number and scope of the disciples expanded. On the other hand, this sultanate accepted Shi Islam as its official religion. During his imposing extreme Shi Islam on the population of Iran, he also did not avoid from the massacres against the people who opposed to the ideology of the new state. These were especially against the Sunnis and the Sunni Turks.

The main military base and social support in strengthening the power of Ismail was composed of first his disciples, then mainly the groups of peasants and tribes located in the eastern and southeastern part of Anatolia (such as Rumlus from Sivas, Tokat and Amasya; Ustadjalu from the Sivas region; Varsak from the mountainous area of the Çukurova region, etc.) On the other side, the formation of the new state led to intensive population movements from these regions. Moreover, even after the state was established, the population movements continued during the development of the state, in so far as the propaganda phase of the Safavid state in order to expand its boundaries within the Ottoman realm is concerned:

> The migrations occurred during the formation of the Safavid state were so intensive and continuous that they are not comparable with any other migrations. Moreover, the Safavid state was nurtured by Anatolia –in terms of human force- for a long time, even after its was formed. Therefore, the Ottomans and Safavids, which became the cruel enemies of each other, were jointly benefited from this country approximately a century (Sümer, 1999:5).

Therefore, the encounter between the states was more than a religious matter. With respect to this, in the 16th century, these Anatolian Turcoman segments were called *kizilbashes* (red-heads) to be distinguished from other Shi Islamic groups of the Persian region. On the other hand, these massive population movements led to joining of the new elements into the Anatolian dervish religiosity. This came on the scene especially with the politics of obtaining the support of the Turcomans who had an inclination to Shi Islam. This, of course, resulted to the politics of control, suppression and abolition of the dervish orders, which were regarded as having affinity for the Shi doctrines. In these years, as a result of the wars directed against the Shi Safavid state, Shi Islam was prohibited in the Ottoman circles. Parallel to

this, murdering any *kizilbash* (red-head) was accounted as canonically lawful (*helal*) according to *shariah*. On the other hand, the Safavid influence infiltrated into the Ottoman society endeavored to draw any non-Sunni elements to its own side. Moreover, according to what Barnes (1992) mentions, the Chaldiran war, which took place in 1514, was realized in order to put an end to the dream of the Safavid state.

In the light of these developments and the developments that the Ottoman society underwent through the expansion of its boundaries, the Anatolian dervish religiosity was subjected to inclusion of the new elements. According to Melikoff's classification, these new influences (especially on the order of Bektashiyya) may be classified as "1. The influence of the Ahi corporations, 2. Hurufiyya, 3. The Shi Islam of the heterodox *kizilbashes*, 4. Persians and Kurds from the east and the Christianity from the west" (1994:209). For the scope of this study and this section, the second and third one (*kizilbashes* and Hurufiyya) require a special attention to be mentioned.

As we have already underlined, the *kizilbash* ideology arisen from the influence of the Safavid order over the Turcoman peasants and tribes. And the religious movement of the Safavid order later took shape in a state and turned into a ghazi movement on their own side. With the participation of the similar segments of the Anatolian abdals and ghazis, this movement became a major threat against the Ottoman central authority. Gölpınarlı (1986b), in his article in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, upholds that the *kizilbash* ideology can not be equated with Bektashiyya. While Bektashiyya was an order in which everyone was allowed to enter, *kizilbaslik* was not an order or a religious sect, rather it was a system of beliefs based on customs and traditions. On that ground, it required one to be descended from the lineage of a *kizilbash* in order to be involved in that ideology. On the other hand, the customs and traditions they followed clearly point out that they demonstrated a great affiliation with the Safavid dynasty. Predictably, the name *kizilbash* also signified this affiliation. It is because of the fact that the Anatolian Turcomans, who backed the Safavid dynasty as the disciplines of its sheik, were dressed a red coronet by Sheik Haydar. On the other hand, the negative narratives against these segments were produced in regard to this symbolic affinity:

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> After the red coronet was accepted, the groups, which
> followed the Safevid sheiks, were called *kizilbashes* (red-
> heads), and many false imputations were made up against
> these groups. And this name, *kizilbash*, was used by the
> opponents of these groups in order to slander them. In
> response to this, many stories were made up by *kizilbashes*
> about the sacredness of the red dress and coronet (Gölpınarlı,
> 1986b:789).

However, the *kizilbash* ideology infused extensively into the Bektashiyya order in the 16th century albeit their differences. Obviously, this led the members of the Bektashiyya order to be exposed to same anger directed against *kizilbashes*. The salient figure of this opposition, Pir Sultan Abdal should be remembered here. As an important poet of the Bektashiyya order, Pir Sultan wrote many poems exalting the name of the sheik (Tahmasp) of the Safavid state during the reign of Suleyman the Lawgiver. On the other side, he became the leader of a rebellion against the Ottoman state. Due to his oppositions, he was executed in Sivas. What is more striking is the fact that this minstrel became a folk hero after his execution, and his sacredness became as legendary as of the saints.

On the other hand, Hurufiyya, according to Gölpınarlı (1989), was based on Batıniyya in the sense that the numbers and letters were deemed having esoteric and occult meanings beyond their ordinary perception. Therefore, they needed to be evaluated through an exegetical process. With respect to this, manifestation of the existence was accepted as taking place through the sounds. In other words, the sounds symbolized through the letters were accepted as the reflection of the hidden universe onto the manifest one. And the totality of all these sounds were reckoned as the essence of God, as if the sum of all beings in the universe made up God. On the other hand, all these letters were also existing in man's body. To that end, the essence of the divine prescriptions could be found in man as well. Rather than actually conforming to these prescriptions, understanding their essence in man was the backbone of the Hurrufiyya doctrine. This system of beliefs, which was Persian in origin, was at the same time the combination of Sunni and Shi doctrines, in so far as its system of worshiping is concerned. On the other hand, the adherents of this religious doctrine were exposed to strong persecutions and pressures in the late 14th and 15th centuries due to the expansion of Sunni politics of the Mamlukids. For

example, the order's founder Fazlullah Estrabadi was arrested, imprisoned and then killed by the son of Timur in 1394; another representative of the order, Nesimi, was similarly killed by the Memlukid sultan in Aleppo in 1418; there were the politics of pressure and annihilation against the members of this order between the years 1376-1386 in these regions, etc. It has been generally accepted that these pressures against the members of Hurufiyya led them to migrate to Asia Minor, in which the dervish religiosity was known as relatively free. As Gölpınarlı addresses:

> The Hurufis, which were removed from Iran, considered the lands of Anatolia and Rumelia as a shelter, and they migrated to these regions (1989:27).

Therefore, with the inclusion of the new elements, one may take into account the inclusion of Shi elements into the Anatolian dervish religiosity. This inclusion was felt especially in the order of Bektashiyya, which was regarded as the continuation of Qalandariyya and Malamatiyya. In these circumstances, according to Melikoff (1999), the Bektashiyya order was officially bound to the central authority, and institutionalized under the state monopoly and control in 1502. Moreover, it was the year that the Safavid state established Shi Islam as its official religion. When one considers the Shi element as a potential threat, the institutionalization of the Bektashiyya order makes much more sense. This institutionalization was achieved under the leadership of a Bektashi, named Balım Sultan, who made certain innovations and gave permanent form and content to the practices of the order. With these innovations, rites of initiations and some other ceremonies were systematized, and they were differentiated from that of the *kizilbashes* or of the village groups who continued their similar beliefs and practices (Birge, 1965). On the other hand, what happened after the institutionalization of the Bektashiyya order gives us a clue about the scope of this threat. First of all, while the Bektashiyya order was divided into two, as the one under the state control in the urban centers and the one in the rural districts[6] where the state control was less than the first one, the influence of the outside elements did not come to an end. Contrary to these politics of control, the

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[6] Melikoff names this segment of Bektashiyya, which preserved its presence in the rural districts of Anatolia, the Shi Islam of the Turcomans or *kizilbashlik*, Köprülü (1987), on the other hand, regards it as pastoral Bektashiyya or Alavism. If one pays heed to what Melikoff defines, the Ottoman opposition against the Bektashiyya order in the 16th century makes much more sense in relation with the Safavid state, whose base was composed of these Turcomans.

order was made to close in 1516 by Sultan Selim until it was re-opened in 1531. On the other hand, although the order was re-opened during that reign, the donations given to this order by state was brought to a stop. Anyhow, complete suppression of the order took place in the year 1551. What is striking here is that the donations for the order were activated in the 18th century, in the period during which the Ottoman-Safavid encounter totally came to an end.

If we remember Deleuze and Guattari's assertion on the "war machine" that it is "exterior" to the state, but not part of the state's "foreign policy", explaining the ways in which the Ottoman-Safavid encounter became the internal politics of the Ottomans state gains an importance. It is in the sense that various internal affairs were the resultant of this struggle, including the splits within the court. For example, during the period of Sultan Selim, when the most hostile measures were taken against *kizilbashes*, the encounter resulted in the struggle of princess for ascending the throne. Clearly, his brother, prince Ahmet, donned the red cap of *kizilbashes* during the encounter. Therefore, when Selim disposed of his brother, it was due to a "political necessity", rather than a simple division between Sunni and Shi Islam (Goodwin, 1994). On the other hand, that some groups within Bektashiyya were deserting to Sheik Ismail was a serious affair in terms of internal politics. It is because of the reason that there was a latent sense of brotherhood between Bektashiyya and Janissaries. According to Goodwin (1994), their relationships were officially recognized in the late 16th century. As a result of the official recognition of their union, a Bektashi symbol, double axe (*teber*), became the insignia of the one of the Janissary companies (*orta*), and the dervishes started to receive donations from the corps. On the other hand, while Janissaries were received in the Bektashi orders, the dervishes were also accepted to the Janissary corps.[7] However, it was the same Janissaries who involved in the suppression of *kizilbashes* which were infused into Bektashiyya. Besides, they involved in the movement of overturning the cauldrons, assaulting the citizens, robbing the shops and assassinations against the sultans. In

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[7] Goodwin asserts welcoming people whosoever wished to join the corps -instead of Christian levies- was one of the reason behind the decline of Janissaries. On the other hand, overturning the cauldrons of janissaries was very much related with Bektashiyya. It is because of the reason that both in Bektashiyya and Janissaries, the kitchen had a symbolic meaning. In the case of Janissaries, the titles and emblems were taken from the kitchens. Similarly, kettles and bows were so important in the dervish movements.

that case, we may say that we cannot comprehend the role of Janissaries with the pre-determined terms as in the case of dervish religiosity.

Prior to the official recognition of the union between the Bektashis and Janissaries, we may also talk about an affinity of the Christian subjects to Bektashiyya, among whom the Janissary corps were levied. It was due to the syncretic nature of Bektashiyya and its conception of unity. However, in so far as the annihilation of the *kizilbash* and Shi influences (which was penetrated into Bektashiyya) by the Janissary corps is concerned, the affinity of Janissaries needs to be questioned. Goodwin (1994) argues that when the official recognition took place, Janissaries were married with their old enemies, Ahis, through the channel of Bektashiyya. It was because of the reason that Janissaries helped to suppress the Ahi brotherhood. However, as we know, there was a mythic affinity accepted between the Ahis and Janissaries. On the other hand, he also talks about a division between Janissaries related to Malamatiyya and Bektashiyya. Accordingly, Malamatiyya was regarded as a "rival path" of Bektashiyya, and *sipahis* (horsemen) adopted the Malamatiyya path. Nonetheless, we know that Bektashiyya was the continuation of Malamatiyya in many ways. On that ground, what we may only assert is that there cannot be clear-cut boundaries between the "rhizomatic assemblages". In other words, the relationships between both Bektashiyya and Malamatiyya or Janissaires and Ahi corporations might transform in time-space axes. Moreover, since a rhizome is heterogeneous in nature, which is always determined by "movement", the elements within this heterogeneous system are aptly conflicting or cooperating with each other according to their position towards the state.

In so far as the nature of Bektashiyya in that period is concerned, Melikoff asserts that the term Bektashi was also identified with Batiniyya (esoteric) and Rafiziyya (heretic) in the official documents. On the other hand, Ahmet Refik (1932) alleges that the religious structure of the age may be rated as divided into two camps, Bektashiyya and Rafiziyya. Concomitant with the division between Bektashiyya under state control and Bektashiyya of the Anatolian Turcomans that opposed to the state control, the division made by Ahmet Refik is fairly meaningful. According to this, he asserts that while Bektashiyya was approved by the Ottoman state and its religious leaders were respected extensively, Rafiziyya could not find any

opportunity to develop; on the contrary, it was suppressed in a bloody way. It was because of the reason that Rafiziyyya was considered together with the antagonism against the Persians, that is to say, the Safavids:

> In Turkey, two sorts of mentality, which were secretively fused into each other, were enduring: Bektashiyya and Rafiziyya. Bektashiyya had nothing in common with *kizilbashes* (red-heads). ...Rafiziyya, on the other hand, was not able to get rid of the Persian influence. Rafiziyya was a religious weapon in the hands of the Iranian sheiks in order to destroy the Ottomans. The Turks were striving in order to oppress Rafiziyya in the Turkish lands. This was in order to mitigate this weapon and to save the eastern provinces from the Persian invasion. Bektashiyya, however, became like a military center under the control of the Ottomans (Ahmet Refik, 1932:24-25)

Ahmet Refik's argument needs to be questioned in the sense that Bektashiyya cannot be grasped as if it was a homogenous whole and as if it was solely in a complementary situation with the values of the central authority. However, it also carries an importance due to its indicating two opposite tendencies within the Anatolian dervish religiosity in the 16th century. Now, we may also argue that since there was a wing within the dervish groups that was against the Ottoman authority and under the Safavid influence, the rest of the dervishes might be under strict investigation and control.

On the other hand, the rebellion movements under the Safavid influence in the following years do indicate us that this opposition was not one-sided. The Ottoman history of the age was full of examples concerning the oppositional attitudes of these "heterodox and heretic" groups in the light of these developments. These may be related to the Safavid influence one way or another, apart from their being under suppressions by the Ottoman state. The *Shah Kulu* revolt (while the Shah representing Sheik Ismail) during the reign of Bayezid II, the *Qalandaroghlu* revolt in which twenty or thirty thousand Qalandars, dervishes and abdals were assumed to have revolted in the years 1526 and 1527, the destruction of Bursa in 1607 by a Qalandar[8], the assassination attempt against Bayezid II during his military expedition

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[8] Destruction of Bursa by a Qalandar is symbolically consequential considering the fact that the conquest of Bursa in the early years of the Ottomans was succeeded through the support of the dervish segments of the Qalandariyya order under the authority of the Ottoman house of rule (Ocak, 1992).

to Albania by a Qalandariyya dervish, another similar attempt in 1579 toward the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and various espionage endeavors of the dervish groups are pivotal to underline in the light of the formation and development of the Safavid state (Ocak, 1992). On the other hand, the revolt and then the massacre of Nur Ali in the region of Karahisar and Niksar as a reaction to Selim I's accession to the throne (*cülus*), of Sheik Celal[9] in the Tokat region, and the revolts of Baba Zünnun and Şüğlün oğlu Koca in the Bozok region are some of the examples to the similar events of the age (Ahmet Refik, 1932). If we are to examine some of these uprisings, it is better to start with the *Shah Kulu revolt*. As the leader of the adherents of the Safavid state in the Teke region, Shah Kulu was preaching against the Ottoman domination and declaring that Sheik Ismail was the incarnation of God. Under his leadership, the rebels defeated the viceroy (*beglerbeg*) of Anatolia, plundered Kutahya and then advanced towards Bursa in 1511. In the same year, a battle took place between Janissaries under the leadership of Ottoman grand vizier and Shah Kulu (together with his adherents). It is important to note that the struggle among the contending princes for ascending the throne (again) and the inequalities in the collection and distribution of the *timars* (fiefs) paved way for the increase in the numbers of the adherents of Shah Kulu. The events did not come to an and after the revolt since the fact that it was just a point during the whole Safavid-Ottoman encounter. It can be said that the Shah Kulu revolt played a predominant factor behind the Chaldiran war directed against the Safavids (Parry, 1976). On the other hand, *the revolt of Qalandaroghlu* took place during the early years of the reign of Suleyman the Lawgiver, which has been presumed to be carried out by the Bektashi dervishes in the Karamania province. It has been assumed that there were twenty to thirty thousand of dervishes, abdals, Qalandars and the others in this revolt. And these segments rebelled due to the financial straits that came on the scene during the reign of Suleyman. These economic difficulties have been regarded as the major cause behind how Qalandaroghlu achieved to muster too many people around his mystic personality. However, if one observes the regions in which Qalandaroglu gathered his adherents, they were clearly the ones from which the basic social and

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[9] The rebellion of Sheik Celal bears a great significance in the sense that he was the person who gave his name to the series of movements of rebellions against the Ottoman authority (Jalali rebellions) which lasted for years during the late 16th and the early 17th centuries.

military support for the Safavid state were provided (for example, the Zulkadiroghlus). Predictably, this uprising was also counteracted in a bloody way by the support of Janissaries[10] (Birge, 1965; Melikoff, 1999).

Briefly, from all these events started with the movement of Bedreddin and continued through the formation and development of the Safavid state, we can conclude that the reference point for all these oppositions was the sustenance, conservation and expansion of the Ottoman absolute authority. On the other hand, since the religion was the basic *form of expression* in the Ottoman social life of the middle ages, the religious discourse, then, became the basic element of sovereignty. Moreover, any opposition coming on the scene with the religious claims was regarded as a threat against the sovereignty of the central authority. However, we can argue that these oppositions can not be explained only in religious terms. It is because of the reason that during these rebellions, there was a problem of having control over the elements "outside" the Ottoman imperial house. Since this control involved both the incorporation and annihilation of the "outside" elements, we may argue that the relations between "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy" were not purely antithetical. Both were heterogeneous, and as we have discussed, "orthodoxy" involved "heterodoxy" and vice versa.

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[10] According to the interpretations, the use of Janissaries in order to counteract to the rebellion has a symbolic meaning. Since it has been assumed traditionally that Janissaries was formed by taking the consent of the Bektashiyya order, this counteracting was in order to demonstrate that the symbolic ties between Janissaries and Bektashiyya was no longer existent in that period.

CONCLUSIONS

De Certeau (1992) states that "heresy" presents the "doctrinal legibility of a social conflict", and it shows how ideological and social structures mesh. Put it differently, he takes this conflict as part of a historical process, which shows how a societal division and an ideological production are codetermined. With respect to this ideological division, the "excluded element" is always "relative" to which it is required to oblige. In this particular study, we have stressed the relative nature of "heterodoxy" in relation with the formation of the Ottoman center. Moreover, we have evaluated the social conflict between the dervish groups and the Ottoman state and the term "heterodoxy" as part of a historical process the boundaries of which transform with respect to the ideological and social structures.

Throughout the study, we have underlined that the relationships between the Ottoman state and the "heterodox" dervish religiosity are not purely antithetical. Since it is the *relationships* and not solely the individual terms of the so-called dichotomy that we have inquired, we have not taken them as static homogeneous wholes. We have stated that the development of the Ottoman state necessitated both inclusion and exclusion, appropriation and annihilation, transformation and regulation, hence incorporation and suppression of the elements of the dervish religiosity. In order to clarify this, we have investigated the approaches to the Ottoman state formation in relation with the dervish groups. We have concentrated on the dervish groups both as "heterodox" and an element of state formation.

In the first chapter, we have dealt with the tradition of Islamic mysticism (*tasavvuf*). Accordingly, we have evaluated what tasavvuf means

and then, concentrated on the brief history of Islamic mysticism. After underlining the commonly accepted doctrinal foundations of tasavvuf, we have questioned the ways in which these doctrinal foundations were a *potential* source of tension against the Ottoman political authority. Lastly, we have evaluated the dervish culture of Anatolia before the Ottoman emirate as the continuation of the general tradition of the tasavvuf thought. We have basically concluded that the tasavvuf movement has been heterogeneous, syncretic and fluid in which Anatolian dervish religiosity played a significant role in the institutionalization of various dervish orders.

Basically, tasavvuf tradition cannot be studied as a single homogenous whole. Since tasavvuf is the general name of Islamic mysticism, it is not a single sect, dogmatic system or an order (*tariqah*). Rather, it has always been "rhizomatic" in such a way that its heterogeneity has not allowed a consensus even on the meaning and history of the term. On the other hand, the history of the tasavvuf movement could be closely linked with the history of the dervish orders (*tariqah*). Since "individual mystical experience" has been determining the path of a sufi, the formation of the dervish orders was also based on the subjective will of a spiritual master (*sheik*). This non-material reason requiring individual experiences beside the material ones was also another factor in this huge diversity and complexity of the tasavvuf thought. However, this "subjective", "ineffable", "extraordinarily personal experience" of Sufism cannot be paradox in so far as its becoming the a basis for social life and historically decisive is concerned in the middle ages. This is as Hodgson (1974) mentions that the Sufis had also a populist outlook, and Sufis succeeded in combining a "spiritual elitism" with a "social populism". And this was the basic reason behind the nature of the relationships constructed between the state and the Sufi orders despite the fact that Sufism was a vast complex of theories and practices.

Asia Minor, on the other hand, played a significant role in the period of institutionalization of the dervish lodges, hence, in the general history of the tasavvuf movement. Since this institutionalization in Asia Minor was also fed from various multi-centered sources, not all the dervish groups or Islamic mystical groups should be evaluated under the same title. All these have led us to think that the huge diversity and many sub-divisions within the Islamic mystical tradition have also been

prone to re-divisions within themselves. And heterogeneous, fluid and syncretic nature of the dervish religiosity of Asia Minor during the later middle period was also felt in different conceptions of universe, God, unity, material world and political authority.

As to the dervish religiosity from the standpoint of the Ottoman state formation, in Chapter II, we have aimed to tackle with the commonly asked questions by which the discussions on the formation of the Ottoman state have ended up with turning within a "vicious circle" (Faroqhi, 2000). Since legends played a predominant role in the history of the Ottoman state formation, we have concentrated upon the nature of the myths. Then, we have examined how different approaches to the Ottoman state formation have affected the conceptualization of the dervish religiosity. We have discussed the major approaches revolved around the tribal-ethnical explanations of Köprülü and Wittek's ghaza thesis and then, elaborated some alternatives. Lastly, we have brought the transformation of the Ottoman emirate to Ottoman state under scrutiny and we have remarked how the dervish religiosity took place in this transformation.

With reference to Eliade (2001), the legends might be considered in relation with the attempts tying the formation of the "great" empires to the divine myths, not as fictitious narratives. Since the myths were taking place not before the 15th century in the Ottoman context, they can be treated from the standpoint of the 15th century Ottoman state and historiography. As İnalcık (2000b) states, the 15th century Ottoman historiography manifested itself as a conscious consequence of having formed an empire, and the myths reflected what the empire ideology wanted people to believe and how it wanted to project itself for the present and future motives of its subjects. As to the Ottoman formation, the provision of the divine consent through the images of the leaders or prominent figures of the group of dervishes may be explained both in terms of their acceptability in the eyes of the people and of the general political structure of the concerned age.

The Ottoman state formation was strongly related with how they managed to control different "segmented "elements (both settled and nomadic) and how they aimed to sustain a gradually centralized system amidst (many) local centers which

had a considerable authority over people. In such a context, the Ottoman state formation was not only the annihilation and exclusion of these diverse elements as the settled life was achieved. In other words, it was a twin process of both inclusion and exclusion, incorporation with and annihilation of both the pre-Ottoman settled structures and semi-nomadic/nomadic elements as underlined by Kafadar (1995). The relations established with the dervish groups were not outside the scope of controlling this segmented structure. However, incorporation of the dervish religiosity cannot be reduced as if its was just one of any ordinary elements outside the Ottoman family. It is because of the reason that the religious character of the Ottoman state should not be disregarded. On the other hand, dervish religiosity as a factor in the formation process cannot be solely limited with the ghaza ethos. Therefore, both tribe-state axis and the ghaza ethos should be taken into consideration in this formation without ignoring one of them. This is what Hassan (2001) argues that the dilemma between the tribal explanations of Köprülü and Wittek's ghaza ethos brings "either/or" perspective, and what Hassan (2001) and Kafadar (1995) maintains that this formation was a complex process so that either of them should be counted equally and separately. Moreover, it is not possible to construct a static relationship between the Ottoman family and any of these elements outside the family. Consequently, while the relations were transformed as the state formation was achieved, the relations with and the definition of the dervish groups by the state were also subjected to the same changes accordingly.

In Chapter III, we have dwelled separately on the dervish groups until the 15th century and concentrated on the term "heterodoxy". Rather than totally disregarding the term, we have attempted to find the reasons why these dervish groups have been considered as "heterodox". For this, we have provided four main reasons: 1. The legacy of the Babai revolts; 2. Nomad versus settled life; 3. The beliefs and ways of live; and 4. The legacy of the Ahi corporations. While elaborating all these, we have also investigated the history and the specific characteristics of the orders (basically Qalandariyya, Malamatiyya and Bektashiyya) and their extensions in the pre-Ottoman and the Ottoman socio-political and cultural life (such as Ahi coproprations and Babais) in detail. Moreover, we have focused on the ways in which the dervish groups have been regarded as an element of the state formation. For these, we have

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seized them as an element of the conquests through ghazis, of the socio-economic life through the Ahi corporations, and of the sustenance of the "values" of the society through *menakibnames* (hagiographies).

We can assert that heterodoxy is a relative term as De Certeau (1992) states for heresy. In other words, it is not possible to find a "heterodoxy" as an individual term standing on its own. It is because of the reason that the term is defined and re-defined according to different historical, social, political and economic conditions. Therefore, the thing that seems to one as a dilemma at the first sight that these groups have been both labeled as heterodox and regarded as an element of state formation does not appear as a simple dilemma It is parallel to what Kafadar (1995) asserts that both orthodoxy and heterodoxy are the units that have been defined differently in time and the borders of which have been transformed accordingly.

The dervish groups in Asia Minor, as Ocak (1992;2000b) maintains, seem to be the continuation of the Qalandariyya and Malamatiyya orders, one of the earliest groups of Sufism that constituted the oppositional wing of the classical tasavvuf thought. The legacy of these orders and the nomadic characteristics of the dervish groups in the early Ottoman era lead them to be labeled as heterodox. Also, the pre-Ottoman structure, the struggle of the nomadic Turcomans with the Anatolian Seljuks' government, draws one's attention to the heterodox nature of these groups. However, we should also understand them as an element of the state formation. These groups had considerable roles in the conquests, socio-economic and cultural formations in the early Ottoman era. Moreover, the Ahi corporations had considerable roles in the organization of the society outside the state. Accordingly, in order to understand the relative nature of the term "heterodoxy", the "war machine", we should look at how the dervish groups were defined and re-defined concomitant with the development of the central authority.

Finally, we have provided the dynamics of the transformation of the relationships between the Ottoman central authority and the dervish groups in the 15th and 16th centuries. This is as Yurtaydın (1997) argues that although in the early years of the Ottoman formation, the sultans adopted a policy which both supported the "*medrese-based*" Sunni Islam and "*tariqah-* based" non-Sunni creeds, later on Sunni

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understanding was appropriated by the Ottoman state in such a way that non-Sunni opinions and currents aimed to be excluded from the Ottoman state and society by various means. In regard to this transformation, while the "*medrese*-based" Sunni Islam determined the policies of the Ottoman state against the dervish groups, appropriation of the *Fahreddin Râzî school* in the teachings of the *medreses* reflected the nature of these policies. Accordingly, as stated by Uludağ (1991), this school was based on a tradition of Aristotelian Islamic theology (*kelam*), and it opposed to the tasavvuf tradition and sufis.

Also, we have attempted to address the peculiar events by which the Ottoman state ideology turned against these "heterodox" Islamic beliefs. First of all, we have focused upon the event of Sheik Bedreddin as the commencement of the movements of atheism and heresy (*zendeka and ilhad*) as Ocak (1998) does. This was the route which have brought us to the discussion on the Ottoman state idea. On that ground, we have discussed the ways in which the Ottoman state, Ottomannes, Ottoman state ideology and the relations between the state and religion in the Ottoman state were established. Precisely, we have endeavored to grasp how the accusations took place under the formation of the central state. While doing this, we have underlined two important factors having a role in shaping the Ottoman state ideology against the dervish groups: the encounter between the Ottoman and Safavid states and the fusion of newly entering elements into the Anatolian dervish religiosity (such as Hurufiyya).

The movement of Bedreddin indicates a great deal about the discussions on heterodoxy-orthodoxy dichotomy, which should not be evaluated and explained solely in religious terms. First of all, it is the indicator of the importance of the ways to incorporate the clashing interests of different segments of the society as argues by Balivet (2000). Also, it shows us that the thing defined as heterodoxy did not have endemic clear-cut boundaries, even though it was composed of the segments of society that were, in general, exterior to or excluded by the state. Briefly, the movement proves us that "heterodoxy" may at the same time, on the whole, exist in the state as Ocak (1998) shows with specific examples. Understandably, the event indicates that such a dichotomy was very much shaped by the process of the state formation and centralization.

In the early years of the Ottomans, *ulema* was backed by the Ottoman house of rule as in the case of the dervish groups. However, in the 16th century it became the backbone of the central Ottoman authority. Therefore, we may also maintain that the Ottoman house of rule collaborated with different groups in different time periods as held by Kafadar (1995). Evidently, the groups that suited its own interests were the ones which could reinforce its own authority (without claiming any autonomy) best. To that end, Ottoman centralization may also be regarded as the transformation of the elements to be incorporated with.

For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the "war machine" is "exterior" to the state, but this does not mean it is part of the state's "foreign policy". Accordingly, all the events started with the movement of Bedreddin and continued through the formation and development of the Safavid state had an influence on the sustenance, conservation and expansion of the Ottoman absolute authority. Because of this reason, the religious discourse constituted the basic element of sovereignty and transformed accordingly. Concomitantly, the scope of ghaza was re-defined when the "war machine" was perceived to be in opposition with the Ottoman absolute authority. And in this re-definition, the dervish groups of Asia Minor were negatively affected.

In this study, we have questioned two basic tendencies in analyzing the dervish religiosity during the early and "classical" ages of the Ottoman empire. These were first, conceiving heterodoxy as a polar opposite of orthodoxy and second, comprehending social phenomena on the basis of specific characteristics of Islamic beliefs.

The former conceives the dervish groups as opposed to the "orthodox" "Sunni" state. Here, the twofold division between state and the people is said to cover all aspects of the social life. In this dichotomous conception of the relations of "heterodoxy" with the Ottoman state, the different aspects of social life corresponding to the one side of the dichotomy are also reduced to each other. Nonetheless, the implication of this conception bears a danger in itself in the sense that the terms are defined in terms of each other within the limits of a dualistic discourse. It is Foucault's (1972) "hypothetical space" that underestimates the

transformation within and between the sides. Such a conception defines the terms with clear-cut boundaries as if they were homogenous wholes. Furthermore, as an extension of this underestimation, the terms are continuously (re)defined with reference to the "other". This brings about the "mystification" of each term and then, the ignorance of the *relationships* both within and between the sides, which are conditioned by historical, socio-cultural, economic and political factors. For example, in the Alavism discussions that have appeared after the late eighties, the basic premises are operative both in the context of the (pre)Ottoman socio-political life and in today's Turkey. Therefore, we have tried to mention the transformations of the sides both reciprocally and within themselves. Besides, rather than a pure opposition, we have observed that there were also contractual relationships between the terms. Therefore, our main aim has been to ask how heterodoxy and orthodoxy did *become*, rather than what they mean.

Secondly, comprehending social phenomena on the basis of specific characteristics of Islamic beliefs makes our picture much more complicated. Such a position concentrates on the effects of the peculiarities of Islam on the socio-political and economic spheres. It makes generalizations about the socio-political sphere by means of the construction of *causal relationships*. In that sense, types of Islam and different conceptions of God are regarded as the single causes of material contradictions. However, this concept determinant definition of "social" abstracts all the social and individual factors from "Islam", while mystifying it beyond the overall social relations. Therefore, we have had a critical attitude on such a conception that explains the relationships between the Ottoman center and the dervish groups in terms of perception of God and religion. We have taken Islam not as a *cause* but as a *form of expression* of the middle ages, by which both a specific religious attitude and the socio-political sphere dissolves and transforms into each other, and both (re)produces the other.

We, rather, suggest that any Islam (both "heterodoxy" and "orthodoxy") is not a homogenous and static whole. On the contrary, we consider them as dynamic and heterogeneous like Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) "rhizome" so that they transform both in themselves and in relation with the other formations. However, we argue that the realm of the state has a considerable effort "to be", the One, absolute, and

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uniform, although it is not purely so. It is in that sense, the attempt to explain the One in its becoming seems more appropriate, when one considers the multiplicity of "n-1". It is at that time their "becomings" do not allow as to depict their relationships in a timeless and unchangeable manner.

At that point, it is better to clarify some limitations that the study has been subjected to and to point out the ways in which the study could be more suggestive in studying the dervish groups in relation with the Ottoman state. First of all, the topic we have inquired, the dervish groups of Asia Minor during the 13th and 16th centuries, covers a wide range of religious groups that cannot be reduced to each other. In this huge diversity, particular beliefs, customs and traditions differentiated any order from the rest. Beside the topic's socio-political dimension, the specific beliefs and ways of live of the dervishes made the relations of these groups with the Ottoman state much more complex. In order to be aware of these peculiarities and different dimensions of their lives, one is required to be involved in the orders. Some "sacred" knowledge and particular customs have been revealed only for the ones that were initiated in these religious formations. Therefore, the relevant literature at hand, with which the study has been limited, has led to a superficiality by which the complexity of these relations has been reduced to some extent.

Secondly, studying such a subject matter with the relevant literature causes a reduction of diverse aspects of Islamic mysticism to a pure theoretical level. However, one fundamental of the tasavvuf thought is that tasavvuf has been based on the subjective mystical experience. This peculiarity of tasavvuf creates a vast ocean, in which our study is not even a drop. Since the study disregards the subjective experiences within the tasavvuf thought, it is prone to include some superficial generalizations arising from personal considerations, although it is opposed to.

In this study, we have concentrated on the dervish religiosity of the concerned age on the basis of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of nomadology. Appropriating the concepts like "rhizomatic" and "arborescent" systems, we have tried to analyze the grounds on which these concepts could be applicable for the relationships between the "heterodox" dervish groups of Asia Minor and the Ottoman state. We have avoided to make generalizations about the Ottoman state structure and philosophy on

the basis of these concepts. It is due to the fact that a generalization about the Ottoman state's relations with the "whole rhizome" and a deduction about the Ottoman statehood on that ground require a detailed analysis of the various "segments" that were in relation with the Ottoman state. We may say that Deleuze and Guattari's conception of nomadology seems to be applicable for the relations between the "rhizomatic" dervish groups and the Ottoman "tree". However, to speak with broader terms necessitates the studies of this sort for different "segments" under the Ottoman house of rule.

Lastly, we have continuously laid stress on the necessity of analyzing the various transformations to which both the Ottoman state and the dervish groups as well as the relations between them were exposed. However, the scope of our study has limited us to explore the transformations of the relations after the 16th century. When indicating that the Ottoman state formation was a process, we have not presumed that the transformation did come to an end right after the Ottoman state idea was strongly characterized in the 16th century. Rather, we have assumed that the transformation of the relations should also be taken into consideration after the 16th century. Given the fact that our study has been lacking in the transformations after the 16th century, we may conclude that the studies inquiring the changes in the relations (after the 16th century) between the Ottoman state and the dervish groups would be helpful in comprehending the "movement" within and between them.

To sum up, the relationships between the Ottoman state and various dervish groups could not be explainable with the pre-determined concepts. The dervish religiosity in the Ottoman context was one of the rhizomatic multiplicities that was composed of heterogeneous terms. It was not the polar opposite of the Ottoman domination and its basic values. Since the various relations between the Ottoman state and the "segmented" realm took place in the word of *becomings*, they involved various transformations including incorporation, repression, appropriation and abolition of the dervish religiosity.

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