

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ETHICS:
PERENNIAL QUESTIONS

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ETHICS: PERENNIAL QUESTIONS

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Ethical approaches trying to define what is to be ethical for public administration are clustered around two rival theoretical frameworks: bureaucratic and democratic ethos. These ethical frameworks are foundational theories mainly because they try to establish universal foundations that help to derive appropriate moral conduct for public administrators. In this regard, the distinction between bureaucratic and democratic paradigms is the reflection of modernist foundational ethical cleavage to public administration. This thesis, however, asserts that an anti-foundational postmodern perspective completely rejecting foundational moral positions can be found and that only such a perspective can move the debate on administrative ethics to its right place. Instead of offering more 'universal' ethical standards, principles and rules, it forces us to ask more significant perennial questions and re-think organization, structure and processes of public administration in a framework which appeals to public administrators' moral responsibility of 'being for the Other'. This thesis also asserts that only anti-foundational perspective can offer an antidote to (administrative) 'ethics in the form of law'.

Keywords: Bureaucratic Ethos, Democratic Ethos, Anti-foundationalism, Postmodern Administrative Ethics.

ÖZ

KAMU YÖNETİMİ VE AHLAK: KÖKLÜ SORULAR

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
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Kamu yönetimi için neyin ahlaki olduğunu tanımlamaya çalışan etik yaklaşımlar birbirine rakip iki kuramsal çerçevenin etrafında kümelenmektedirler: bürokratik etos ve demokratik etos. Bu etik çerçeveler kamu yöneticileri için uygun ahlaki davranışı ortaya çıkarmaya yardımcı olacak nihai temelleri kurmaya çalıştıkları için temel arayıcı kuramlardır. Bu anlamda bürokratik ve demokratik paradigmlar modern temel arayıcı ahlaki yarılmanın kamu yönetimine yansımalarıdır. Oysa bu tez, temel arayıcı moral konumları bütünüyle reddeden temel arayıcı karşıtı postmodern bir yaklaşımın bulunabileceğini ve ancak böyle bir bakış açısının yönetsel ahlak üzerine yürütülen tartışmayı olması gerektiği yere taşıyabileceğini iddia etmektedir. Temel arayıcı karşıtı yaklaşım daha fazla 'evrensel' ahlaki standartlar, ilkeler ve kurallar sunmak yerine bizi çok daha anlamlı köklü soruları sormaya iter ve bizi kamu yöneticilerinin 'Öteki için olmak' şeklindeki ahlaki sorumluluklarına gönderme yapan bir çerçeve içerisinde kamu yönetiminin örgüt, yapı ve süreçlerini yeniden düşünmeye zorlar. Aynı zamanda bu tez yalnızca temel arayıcı karşıtı bakış açısının 'yasa şeklindeki (yönetsel) ahlak' anlayışına gerçek bir çözüm sunabileceğini iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bürokratik Etos, Demokratik Etos, Temel Arayıcı Karşıtı Yaklaşım, Postmodern Yönetsel Ahlak.

To
My parents,
My wife,
My Daughter,

and the memory of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cahit Emre



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INTRODUCTION

It is a general tendency to expect from a study entitled "Public Administration and Ethics" an examination of inappropriate ethical climate and illegitimate conduct in the field. This tendency also usually forces students of public administration to develop a 'dirty hands' approach including investigation of unacceptable behaviors of public administrators and other negative incidents such as corruption, bribe or misusing of public money with their causes and solutions. Of course, there are good reasons for such an approach. Unethical behaviors and acts of public administrators or those who hold positions of authority in governmental bodies undermine citizen trust. Current newspapers, magazines and TV news are sufficient to justify this lack of confidence. Ethical scandals at different levels of government (local or central) contribute to the development of suspicion of those who create public policy and those who carry it out; these scandals are seen as an insult to the intelligence of citizens. Most of the public does not believe that public administration is a particularly ethical profession. It is not an exaggeration to say that almost everyone in public service is portrayed as a self-interested bureaucrat, not an ethical or public-minded professional. It is not a secret that the perception about the ethical state of public administration is, correctly or incorrectly, far from what it should be. All of these erode legitimacy of the field.

This study, however, prefers to follow the other way: it does not directly deal with the issue of 'dirty hands'. Although

'dirty hands' problem is very crucial for public administration, there seems to be little disagreement about that corrupt acts are unethical. The problems of 'dirty hands' are not the problems of defining what is to be ethical in the field. In other words, dealing with describing unethical behaviors does little to develop an ethical perspective for public administration. Thus, the first and general objective of this study is to examine what ethics means for the field of public administration.

Many scholarly writings, on the other hand, indicate that "ethics crises" in public administration is the most important cause of discontent with government and the fragmentation of 'public'. This partially arises from the fact that when reacting to ethical questions many public administrators concentrate upon the least significant aspects of the problem. Nonetheless, the professional literature on governmental ethics tends to come from the field of public administration, though public concern is directed primarily toward bureaucratic ethics and public administration profession. Need to more ethical public administration, in fact, makes "ethics and public administration" debate one of the most important concerns of contemporary public administration theory. Ethics crises and transformations of the twenty first century renew discussions about administrative ethics and "good" public service organizations.

In the search for "honest" and "more ethical" public administration, it is possible to talk about a convergence in the field on two rather broad but influential ethical frameworks: bureaucratic ethos and democratic ethos. These frameworks represent a widely recognized division of thought in administrative ethics. Indeed, it can be argued that public administration today is characterized by a "tug of war" between those two ethical frameworks for the "ethical soul of

the discipline". In this regard, my study --which tries to understand different approaches defining what is to be ethical for public administration-- would directly begin with a chapter which seeks to find out considerable points of these theoretical frameworks. However, in the first chapter, I postpone this duty to the Chapter III and prefer to give philosophical basis of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Because, even after a cursory familiarity with these theoretical frameworks it emerges that we have to understand some philosophical/moral theories in advance if we want to truly understand the very nature of frameworks in the field. Teleology and deontology historically constitute the philosophical basis of two ethical frameworks in contemporary public administration. Besides, it has been a fairly common practice today to associate bureaucratic ethos with teleology and democratic ethos with deontology. Therefore, the first part of Chapter I provides the reader with a context in which two rival moral theories --teleology and deontology--are reviewed.

Although the inner development of my thesis principally requires the examination of philosophical approaches in a separate chapter, there are at the same time additional necessities to look at philosophy. Above all, ethics is one of the important branches of philosophy and finds a proper place in it. Furthermore, we have to learn more about different moral theories affecting our moral understanding. Lastly, the more we deal with academic philosophy (even if it takes place in a small part of a study), the more we can contribute to the overcoming of historical estrangement of philosophy from the field of public administration. Clearly enough, since the general context of the thesis prohibits more extensive philosophical discussion, the argument in the first chapter is confined to the concepts that are directly related with

bureaucratic and democratic ethos and to the premises that are used by these frameworks.

Generally speaking, in Chapter I, I examine the relationship between ethics and public administration in such a way that can help to find out mutual interaction between philosophy and ethics. More importantly, I try to carry out this effort without neglecting the paradigm shift in philosophy. This shift has been effective in both philosophy and social sciences for the last three decades of twentieth century. It indicates very crucial theoretical turn challenging orthodox approaches of contemporary philosophy and ethics and questions all philosophical foundations; thus, it may be called as the rejection of foundational thought or anti-foundationalism. Teleological and deontological approaches, constructing the philosophical basis of bureaucratic and democratic ethos, are foundational moral theories from the perspective of anti-foundational philosophy because they have ultimate foundations, too. These foundations are general or abstract laws, principles, rules or standards. Ethical behaviors and judgments are derived from these foundations. Therefore, in the second part of Chapter I, I try to draw a general theoretical framework and give the content of anti-foundational ethics. I also assert in this part that a proper anti-foundational perspective which can completely reject foundational moral positions can be found. In such a perspective, contrary to the foundational approaches, ethics is ambivalent, non-rational, aporetic, un-universalizable and not foundational. Ethical perspective developed under the heading of anti-foundational ethics constitutes at the same time the basis of our new ethical perspective in the fourth chapter. As a result, the first chapter heavily utilizes from academic philosophy and consists of a new philosophical classification taking paradigm shift in philosophy into account: from foundational ethics towards anti-foundational

ethics. To gain a valuable and new theoretical/philosophical "road map" for public administration ethics constructs the tacit objective of the first chapter, in addition to the explicit objective of defining philosophical foundations of theoretical frameworks.

Although developing a philosophical classification offers important theoretical support to clarify two ethical frameworks in public administration ethics, it is not enough to see the historical and intellectual context of these frameworks. Thus, in the second chapter, public administration ethics literature is reviewed in a retrospective way. This chapter provides a context in which examination of dynamic and vigorous academic thoughts can be carried out and, in this way, historical development of public administration ethics can be seen evidently. Within three periods of administrative ethics (early years, formation years, and as a field of study) I try to focus on the significant milestones in the historical development. I tend to see various views of public administration scholars on administrative ethics and different values suggested in these views as the 'objects' of bureaucratic and democratic ethos categorization. The first objective of the second chapter is therefore to unearth possible theoretical connections between philosophical approaches discussed in the first chapter and the ideas of public administration scholars who also contribute with their approaches to the shaping of ethical frameworks given in the third chapter. On the other hand, to see foundational nature of public administration ethics literature as in the form of a search for solid foundations for administrative morality in the writings of these scholars constitutes the second objective.

After giving a philosophical classification in the first chapter (in order to understand the underlying foundations of

theoretical frameworks), and after reviewing the administrative ethics literature in the second chapter, I examine bureaucratic ethos democratic ethos categorization itself in the third chapter. It consists of two main parts. The first part involves the description of values and standards of ethical frameworks and their intellectual, social, and professional sources of origin. Also, I give a very brief investigation of each ethos's perspective about the working of political system and the place of bureaucrats in that system. Moreover, discussions regarding the possible impacts of bureaucratic and democratic ethos on ethics education and ethical codes in public administration help to the shaping of this part because it is thought that ethical frameworks partly get into contact with daily life of public administrators and with the praxis of public administration through ethical education and codes. In this part, I assert that if we are not wrong to associate bureaucratic ethos with teleology and democratic ethos with deontology, then, it is possible to take one step further and connect bureaucratic and democratic ethos with foundational ethics. Thus, I tend to see the distinction between bureaucratic and democratic paradigm as the reflection of modernist foundational ethics to public administration. According to the perspective developed in my thesis, this distinction also reflects modernist "cleavage" in ethics field.

In the second part, the vast amount of the discussion is devoted to the attempts trying to 'reconcile' or 'transcend' bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Not only theoretical frameworks but also efforts which seek to reconcile or transcend them are generally infected with modernist foundational perspective. Put another way, abovementioned connection between ethical frameworks and foundational ethics is valid for reconciliation and transcending efforts: while reconciliation attempt has epistemological nature,

transcending effort has an ontological perspective. I claim that these efforts either ignore or fail to overcome the foundational character of the dominant ethical frameworks, repeat the mistakes of previous paradigms, and can not refrain from being eclectic.

However, the field needs an anti-foundational perspective (to administrative ethics in general and to the bureaucratic-democratic ethos distinction in particular) moving the historical conflict between ethical frameworks to the periphery and giving a chance to renew our approach to public administration. Such perspective should question all foundations in each ethos and public administration as well. In the last chapter, therefore, I try to develop an anti-foundational perspective for public administration ethics. Firstly, I benefit from the criticism of modernist foundational ethics in public administration and assert that this critique leads us to confront with perennial questions in the field: very structure of modern (public) organizations depending on hierarchy, specialization, division of labor, technical competence and ethical codes cause to incorrigible ethical problems. I suggest, secondly, an anti-foundational ethical perspective that is accepting the understanding of "ethics before ontology" and giving the priority to the Other rather than the self. In this regard, response to the question "What does ethics mean for public administration?" constitutes the basic thesis of my study: if ethics is important and vital for public administration; and, if ethics must be taken seriously --as anti-foundational perspective does-- it means re-thinking and questioning the basic logic and concepts of the field and confrontation of public administrators with perennial questions, rather than thinking on "management of ethics". Only by articulating and embracing this anti-foundational perspective, 21st century may be the beginning of an era of ethics for the field.

CHAPTER I

A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL TAXONOMY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ETHICS: FOUNDATIONAL ETHICS VERSUS ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL ETHICS

In the first chapter --entitled "Applying Philosophy to Moral Questions," examining the relationship between ethics and philosophy-- of his introductory book to ethics, Jon Nuttall (1997: 12) states that ethics is potentially one of the best ways to introduce philosophy. On the other hand, since we can not at least abstain from having opinions on today's certain moral questions, ethical issues concern those people more who are not philosopher than the professional philosophers studying in the other branches of philosophy.

In fact, the idea highlighted in Nuttall's approach is quite straightforward: if you are interested in ethics in one way, you eventually get involved in philosophy in other way. Above all, ethics as one of the central branches of philosophy dates back to the ancient Greek philosophy, especially to Aristotle. Aristotle was the first philosopher who separated ethics from theoretical philosophy (e.g. logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics) and dealt with ethics as a separate philosophical realm in a way that is different from his predecessors. He classified practical philosophy into three: ethics, economics, and politics (Pieper, 1999: 29). Of course, Aristotle is not the only one who has paid attention to ethics. For instance, names of Hume, Kant, Bentham, or Mill can be given as different ethics philosophers.

In modern society, several important changes pioneer the emergence of different moral questions. Some of them are very well known such as the problems caused by scientific developments and the loss of religious faith stemmed from the rise of reason in the age of modernity. Of course, it is possible to lengthen this list with the changes like the rise of our control over death and life --nuclear war threat, for example, as a more direct result of scientific and technological developments; and rapid growth in medical sciences (e.g. in gene technology or human fertility) that have considerable effects on our daily life.

Interestingly, in line with abovementioned changes, ethical perspectives of philosophers have penetrated rather quietly into our moral sensitiveness in the course of time. However, effects of philosophy and moral theory upon our own ethics understandings are generally ignored, or more truly, they are merely experienced, but not thought in a reflexive way. We can expect from moral philosophy, at this point, to help us in answering the changes with which we have faced. It is very clear that need to find appropriate answers to moral questions is as urgent and significant as to deal with philosophical questions (Nuttall; Ibid. 15-26).

Though different ethical theories (e.g. utilitarianism) affect our moral understandings in such a way that we can not consciously aware of this effect, we can unquestionably talk about an (historical) estrangement of philosophy from different branches of (social) sciences. This is certainly the case for public administration as well. If any public administration theorist is able to truly appreciate this, it is Charles J. Fox.¹

¹ It should be stated immediately that Fox (1994: 83) follows traditional/conventional way when he defines philosophy and distinguishes two different meanings of the term. In one

In his important article, entitled "The Use of Philosophy in Administrative Ethics", Fox (1994) thoroughly shows both institutional and "mental" conditions for the estrangement of philosophy from public administration. It seems that the lack of interaction between philosophers and public administrationists at academic level is among the most important reasons for this condition. Although he does not propose a new institutional/organizational configuration -at least in this article- he complains about the current alignment of these two distinct academic fields. Above all, philosophy is regarded normally as one of the branches housed in the humanities; conversely, public administration programs are attached to departments of political science, school of business or schools of management. This "reflect[s] (and help[s] cause) the often false perception of public administration as a (mere?) practical art, a matter of, if not vocational, at best professional training" (p. 84).

He also gives certain examples of this inappropriate --and to some extent unhealthy-- situation at university education level by depending upon the data of various studies. To illustrate, *syllabi* used to teach graduate students -only eleven percent of which are based on philosophical frameworks (Catron and Denhardt, 1998: 10); several *interviews* in which philosophical concepts are never raised even by the interviewees when they describe their ethical dilemmas (Gortner, 1991: 41); and lastly, the *workbooks* on ethics which

sense, philosophy, according to him, refers to "motivational spark energizing all non-trivial and extra-instrumental intellectual endeavor; the love of ideas and how they help explain our lives and the contexts in which they are lived." With this sense, philosophy in fact takes part in between Nuttall's (1997: 12) "having a philosophy" or "philosophy of life" and Fox's second use of the term, philosophy as "a professional academic discipline." As a result of this distinction, Fox uses upper case "P" for philosophy as a

never use the word philosophy reflect some (academic) implications of abovementioned structural (mis)alignment. Fox sees the "Conference on the Study of Government Ethics" held in 1991 as the apex of estrangement of philosophy from public administration. Though the Conference was organized by one of the preeminent ethics writers in public administration field, George H. Fredrickson, under the auspices of the Section on Public Administration Research of American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), papers including philosophical contents were explicitly excluded at the Conference and empirical researches contented the organizers (Fox, op. cit., 101). Regarding the "mental" conditions of the estrangement, he mentions, on the other hand, an "intellectual quasi-incommensurability": not only are the language and problematic of philosophy "daunting" for public administrationists, but philosophy also has had an "arrogant" claim for itself as "the mother of all sciences" since classical times (p. 84).

The strength of Fox's approach to the relationships among ethics, public administration and philosophy, in my opinion, comes from three different but intermingled points. In the first place, he has a philosophical stand that can be seen very rarely among public administration scholars writing on ethical issues. That's why, he is well aware of the estrangement between two fields. Second, the estrangement is occurred in very unfortunate place where the distance between two fields can not be tolerated: in ethics study as a sub-field of public administration. Echoing conventional understanding, Fox emphasizes that philosophy is the place "wherein ethics is thought to properly reside" (p. 85). Third, and more importantly, despite his intellectual proximity with philosophy, Fox's works are never limited with and confined to general orthodox approaches in both philosophy and public

professional academic discipline and lowercase "p" for

administration. In other words, to examine the relationship between ethics and public administration in such a way that helps to find out mutual interaction between philosophy and ethics constitutes an important dimension of his works for the most part. On the other hand, to carry out this theoretical/philosophical effort without neglecting the "paradigm shift in philosophy" forms the second. This paradigm shift is actually what he had in mind when he (1994) wrote:

"[W]hen public administration became serious about ethics, Philosophy(...) was only gingerly approached by its leading intellectuals. And herein lies a great irony. Just at the historical moment (1970s) public administrationists looked to Philosophy for principles appropriate for founding an administrative ethics, cutting edge Philosophers had moved to question all foundations(...); the philosophers were reviewing Aristoteleianism or moving to a postmodern point of view" (p. 85).

In this passage, Fox in fact refers to very crucial theoretical change questioning several orthodoxies in Philosophy, ethics -as a sub-discipline of philosophy- and the sociology of knowledge. To understand this theoretical change (or paradigm shift), it is worth to look briefly at its historical development. In doing so, I will utilize partly from Susan Hekman's work.

Purifying human thought and mind from the obstacles called as "idols" reflects, as Hekman (1999: 15-25) aptly sets out, not only general tendency of Enlightenment but also its general attitude aimed at social sciences. These idols, according to Enlightenment view, would disappear at the dawn of human history and leave their places to the brilliant light of pure reason. The only thing that would be real and definite is the thing that is eternal and beyond history and culture.

"generic philosophy or thoughtfulness" (p.83).

In addition, there were two significant consequences of the enthusiastic program of Enlightenment on social sciences (p.16). First, social sciences sought to discover a common human nature. This endeavor was actually a reflection of a desire to social sciences that aims to arrive at Truth through purifying human thought. Second, we can talk about direct influence on social science methodology. Since social sciences in enlightenment period appeared and grew under the shadow of extraordinary triumphs in natural sciences, the lesson that natural sciences thought to social sciences was very clear. Social sciences could repeat unusual accomplishments of natural sciences providing that the former follow the latter's methods. Then, the only thing that social sciences were supposed to do was just to wait their own Newton! Thus, Enlightenment dictated social sciences a very clear scientific program: To develop a methodology depending upon eternal Truth about human nature purified from historical and cultural prejudices and to follow nomological-deductive method of natural sciences so as to formulate scientific 'laws' regarding human beings. In the accomplishment of this program, sociology of knowledge had a strategic role. It was to find out 'scientific truth' and designated as the basic duty of social sciences. At that point, it can be said that the majority of practitioners in the field approved this role of the sociology of knowledge in social sciences. Besides, sociology of knowledge accepted the definition of science drawn also by Enlightenment project. Therefore, sociologists have defined their objective as distinguishing objective/pure knowledge from subjective one. As positivist social science depends heavily on the distinction between objective and subjective knowledge, this tradition in sociology of knowledge has constituted the essence of modern positivist social science since the early days of Enlightenment.

Moreover, it seems that both positivists and anti-positivists/humanists have not questioned the central theme of Enlightenment: namely, the identification of Truth with "scientific method". The only difference between positivists and anti-positivists is that while both of them accept the dichotomy concerning the nature of knowledge, anti-positivists see only subjective knowledge fit to social sciences without interrogating the basic thesis of Enlightenment which claims that Truth is the unique product of scientific method or that only natural sciences have right to speak about true knowledge (p. 19).

However, the last three decades of twentieth century has witnessed a radical turn in human reason conception of Enlightenment. This radically different kind of criticism has also begun to be effective in both philosophy and social sciences recently. This criticism may be labeled as the rejection of what Rorty (1979) calls "foundational thought". For philosophers who reject the foundational philosophy, the truth, objective knowledge and science understandings of Enlightenment are three points on which both positivists and anti-positivists agree. Truth seeking, from the Enlightenment point of view, was in fact a search for fundamentals or indisputable elements that could be the basis of human existence and knowledge. Anti-foundationalists, in contrast, suggest re-questioning and more radically declining of Enlightenment truth-seeking definitely. The proposal of anti-foundationalist philosophers is to interrogate the relationship between human knowledge and human thought, not to follow up a truth understanding isolated from history and culture. Moreover, they emphasize that strive to formulate a truth isolated from history and culture includes several misunderstandings concerning both the nature of truth and human existence itself.

Anti-foundational philosophy finds resonance in social sciences increasingly and social theorists notice this as well. To Hekman (1999), anti-foundational approach to social sciences means re-definition of the sociology of knowledge and, perhaps more importantly, supplies a new social science project transcending pure dogmatism of positivist-humanist controversy. This approach transcends, at the same time, individualistic paradigm that has been dominating social sciences throughout 20th century (p.22).

On the other hand, as Shelly Kagan (1998) from Yale University aptly shows that in a foundational moral philosophy it is insufficient to theorize about whether or not ethical factors such as the good (whether the individual good or the overall good -consequentialism-) or constrains against doing harm (deontology) possess genuine moral significance. Arguing what grounds or explains the moral significance of those factors must follow this. Thus, questions "concerning the *foundations of normative ethics*" are also answered in foundational theories (p. 189, emphasis mine). However, according to anti-foundational approach, "the quest for a (...) foundational theory is misguided". Because, "nothing grounds, or explains, the moral relevance" of ethical factors due to the fact that normative factors which help us to determine what is good or bad, namely, what is ethical possess "intrinsic moral significance", and there is simply no explanation at all as to why those factors (and not others) do possess moral significance in this way.

Yet, after these explanations an important question remains unanswered: What does anti-foundational philosophy mean for public administration in general and public administration ethics in specific? Obviously, incorporating foundational/anti-foundational distinction into a study examining public administration ethics offers, above all, new

and valuable 'road map' to analyze distinct ethical thoughts. We can reach, in this way, a new taxonomy of ethical views in public administration. Viewed in the light of anti-foundational philosophy, some administrative ethics approaches --searching for, for instance, "universal or quasi-universal rules, standards, or principles by which appropriate behavior may be deduced or judged"-- can be seen as examples of foundational philosophy. Moreover, the point on which many public administrationists and philosophers who support foundational philosophy converge is logical philosophy of and nomothetic explanation in science which, to follow Fox's suitable quotation from Nagel (1961: 547), "seeks to establish abstract general laws for indefinitely repeatable events and processes". Our new taxonomy can offer a new perspective to transcend these nomothetic explanations. As a consequence, we can differentiate between foundational and anti-foundational ethics in public administration as well as in contemporary philosophy.

In this chapter, I will tend to follow abovementioned philosophical taxonomy: foundational ethics vs. anti-foundational ethics. I will further argue that if we want to reach more appropriate, broad, and to possible extent comprehensive theoretical classification for the field of administrative ethics, our taxonomy must include first a distinction between two versions of foundational ethics: *consequentialist/teleological* vs. *deontological*. In my opinion, dividing foundational theories in such a way reflects also the modernist cleavage in ethics very well. Yet, another one must follow this first dichotomy: *foundational ethics* vs. *anti-foundational ethics*.

Thus, this chapter will include two main parts. In the first I will try to provide the reader with a context within which two rival foundational theories, consequentialism and deontology,

are reviewed. Then, some content of anti-foundational theory will be explored in the second part. Due to the fact that the evidences and examples that Fox offered in his article regarding postmodern, anti-foundational public administration ethics are insufficient, I will try to deepen his approach through benefiting from a recent work of Zygmunt Bauman, the preeminent postmodern ethics scholar.

Lastly before examining these two dichotomies, I want to mention why such an examination is specifically important for our study.

(a) First of all, philosophical approaches which we shall see under the heading of foundational ethics in this chapter -- that is, teleology and deontology-- construct at the same time philosophical basis of two ethical-theoretical frameworks in recent public administration literature which we shall see in Chapter III --that is, bureaucratic and democratic ethos. In order to understand the philosophical basis of these theoretical frameworks, we must deal with teleology and deontology.

(b) Secondly, we need a detailed examination of long-standing philosophical contrast between teleology and deontology in order to get a true understanding of theoretical attempt that tries to 'reconcile' bureaucratic and democratic ethos. We will examine this effort in Chapter III.

(c) Thirdly, as we will see again in chapter III, not only 'reconciliation' efforts but also efforts that try to 'transcend' bureaucratic and democratic paradigms discuss basic premises of teleology and deontology.

(d) If we consider these three items together, it can be asserted that many philosophical concepts, premises and approaches directly constitute ethical frameworks in the field

of public administration. Put other way, both ethical frameworks and theoretical positions argue against these frameworks revolve around many philosophical conceptualization and argumentation which we will see in this chapter.

1.1 FOUNDATIONAL ETHICS: TELEOLOGY VS. DEONTOLOGY

How, given a particular set of circumstances, do we determine what is right or wrong? In other words, how do we know the proper course of action? Generally speaking, there have been historically two major -modern- variants of these questions for two hundred or more years. One of them is focusing on the consequences of decisions and then to judge the rightness or wrongness of the decision exclusively by the outcomes it produces. The other is to search for universal moral principles in order to determine moral position of particular case. At the risk of repetition, "in the first approach," as R. Denhardt (1991: 103) emphasizes, "one focuses on the consequences of the action; in the second, one looks for universal rules of conduct". In this section, we will examine the first approach².

1.1.1 THE ETHICS OF CONSEQUENCES: TELEOLOGY

What makes an act morally right or wrong, according to consequentialism, "is its consequences and nothing else" (Benn, 1998: 60). It is obvious that "virtually everyone agrees that the goodness of an act's consequences is at least

² But before doing so, it is worth looking briefly at the usage of teleology, consequentialism, and utilitarianism interchangeably. Teleological -from *telos*, Greek for 'goal' (Davis, 1995: 205)- approach focuses on the consequences, as well. Thus, teleology can also be called as consequentialism. On the other hand, one of the most common forms of ethical deliberation that focuses on the consequences of actions is utilitarianism. It is the most famous consequentialist theory. Therefore, teleology,

one morally relevant normative factor" but of course, there would be some people who want to go further and claim that "goodness of outcome is the only morally relevant factor in determining the status of given act" (Kagan, 1998: 60). We call these somewhat extreme views as consequentialism. Furthermore, if one believes that consequences are not the only thing for right act it is not false to expect from him or her to say that people should perform the act with the best consequences, other things being equal. Such an approach accepts the possibility that there can be other factors or that the best act may not be the one with the best consequences in every circumstances. However, as consequentialists believe, only if consequences count and only if they are morally relevant factors, then, 'other things being equal' loose its meaning and function.

Two points should be crystallized here. First, according to consequentialist perspective, the moral agent is morally required to perform the act with the best consequences. It is not sufficient that an act have "pretty good" consequences. Rather, the agent is required to perform the act with the very best outcome --the optimal act. Second, only performing the optimal act is morally required. That is to say that no other act is morally right (Ibid. 60-61). Besides, considerations related with the motives behind the act, or intrinsic natures of the act are in themselves unimportant for consequentialists. This characteristic of consequentialism puts it in sharp contrast to deontology which -as we shall see briefly in the next section- gives weight to the intentions behind an action. Therefore, Kagan is right when she writes that

consequentialism, and utilitarianism are used interchangeably.

"Consequentialism provides a very simple theory of the right: an act is morally right (or morally permissible) if and only if it produces the best consequences" (Ibid. 61).

However, she is also equally right when she continues her argumentation as follows:

Of course, (...) a claim like this still needs to be supplemented with a theory of the good; only then do we have a fully determinate normative theory" (p. 61).

Adequate 'theory of the good' --what is to count as a good consequence-- is in fact a matter of some controversy in consequentialism. What factors help to determine the goodness of an outcome?

Answer of a utilitarian to this question is very clear, at least, at first glance: the ultimate good is something that most people actually desire, such as happiness or pleasure (Benn, 1998: 61). But of course, even after claiming that the morality is solely a matter of consequences and that happiness or pleasure is the ultimate good, a utilitarian must answer some further questions: (a) "What is the yardstick or criterion in terms of which consequences are measured?" - defining utility-; (b) How the consequences can be measured? - applying the measure-; (c) How much utility is enough? (d) What types of things are to be judged in terms of their consequences? -consequences of what- (Hinman, 1998: 164). The answers of these questions may need to be further explored item-by-item.

Defining Utility. Distinctions in the definition of utility also imply the differences in variants of utilitarianism. For example, utilitarianism can be seen as a combination of consequentialism with *ethical hedonism*. The latter asserts that the only ultimate good is pleasure (Benn, 1998:61). Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) defined utility in terms of pleasure and pain and this position is what is known as

hedonistic utilitarianism (Hinman, 1998: 165). On the other hand, because Bentham's philosophy came under attack as "the pig's philosophy" due to its crude emphasis on sensual, bodily pleasures, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) reformulated the utilitarian position in his famous work *Utilitarianism*, published in 1863 and defined the principle of utility again: actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness rather than pleasure. This position is called *eudaimonistic utilitarianism*. The utility of action is, then, its tendency to produce happiness. Since it tells us to promote "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," it is also known as "the greatest happiness principle" (Benn, 1998: 61). Therefore, we can see utilitarianism as "the result of combining consequentialism with welfarism", as Shelly Kagan does:

"Since consequentialism holds that an act right if and only if it leads to the best consequences, and welfarism holds that the goodness of an outcome is ultimately a matter of the amount of individual well-being, counting everyone equally, it follows that utilitarianism is the view that an act is right if and only if it leads to the greatest total amount of well-being" (1998: 61).

It should be mentioned immediately here that above quotation also reflects a serious controversy about the translation of the word *eudaimonia*. While some writers such as Hinman (1998: 165) translate it as "happiness", others reject that definition. Rather, they tend to translate it as individual well-being -"an overall quality of a human life rather than a type of feeling that occurs during life" (Benn, op. cit., 63). It is clear that Kagan translate the term *eudaimonia* as well-being.

Using pleasure and happiness interchangeably is problematic and there is a significant difference between pleasure and happiness (Hinman, 1998: 165-167). First of all, pleasure is

generally thought to have primarily bodily or sensual character notwithstanding happiness is not tied to body. Second, we can experience pleasure without being happy, and vice versa, as it is clear in the example of "the depressed person who takes to drink gains some transient pleasure from alcohol but is not made happy by it" (Benn, op. cit., 63). Third, we can talk about differences between the duration of pleasure and happiness. The former generally seems to be of shorter duration than the latter; likewise, pleasure is the enjoyable feeling and tied more specifically to duration of some particular activity or feeling than is happiness. Lastly, both pleasure and pain can be included in happiness. A woman giving birth to a child can be a very good example of this situation, which seems very amazing at first glance.

Not surprisingly, Mill was well aware of the difficulties in the definition of utility. That's why, he devoted "considerable space to trying to show(...)that pleasures appear to differ in quality as well as in quantity, can be reconciled with utilitarianism" (Ibid., 64). Mill's effort is very meaningful because to accept the existence of "higher and more elevated" pleasures means to accept at the same time a quantitative difference between pleasures. If we can talk about the 'quantity' of pleasures, we can eventually start to talk about different 'qualities' of pleasures. But, how is accepting a qualitative difference between pleasures consistent with being utilitarian? Because if someone accepts the distinction between bad and good pleasures (a qualitative difference), he or she has to say, simultaneously, according to what criterion of value we are to judge the 'quality' of pleasures. Perhaps at that point it is expected from proponents of a rigid version of utilitarianism to say about the criterion that it is pleasurable character of an act. On the other hand, it is expected from the proponents of more modest version of utilitarianism to propose measuring the

quality of a pleasure in terms of its quantity. Otherwise, second proposal means a departure from the utilitarian doctrine -greatest happiness principle-. Because, if we accept the goodness (or 'richness') of pleasure by measuring its quantity, some serious problems arise. Is it virtually true, for a utilitarian, to judge pleasure in terms of its quality? Because, as Hinman (1998) aptly puts it

"We may want to distinguish between good and bad pleasures, between harmless and harmful ones, but we do not doubt that the bad pleasures are still pleasures(...) The problem with weighing consequences is that it is much easier to weigh pleasure than happiness or ideal goods, yet pleasure is the least suitable standard. *The closer we move toward a suitable standard of utility, the less able we are to subject it to quantification* (emphasis original)" (p. 167).

Problems that we have noted regarding the criteria of utility have required new attempts to redefine the standards of utility in twentieth century. Though "no single candidate has emerged as the sole choice among philosophers for the standard of utility," G. E. Moore's *ideal utilitarianism* tries to redefine it in terms of ideal goods such as freedom, knowledge, and justice; likewise, Kenneth Arrow's *preference utilitarianism* accepts individual preferences as the new standards (Ibid. 167).

To summarize, basic claim of utilitarians is that we ought to do whatever produces the greatest amount of utility. Then, it is expected from a utilitarian that he or she must define the utility. Pleasure (Bentham), happiness (Mill), ideal goods (Moore), and preference satisfaction (Arrow) have been commonly used in the definition of utility historically. In other words, there have been as many different versions of utilitarianism as there have been different definitions of utility. All these theories share the basic consequentialist claim that an act is right if and only if it best promotes the

good, but they differ insofar as they incorporate different theories of the good (Kagan, op. cit., 61).

Applying the Measure. After having emphasized the importance of defining utility it is necessary to turn to second important question of how the consequences (or utility) can be measured. The answer of this question, in terms of utilitarianism, is very significant because it is directly related with the attraction of utilitarianism. Thus, if a failure is experienced when one specify how utility standard is to apply the world in which we live, then, utilitarianism might lose its advantageous element which one choose it over other moral theories. For Hinman (1998), a root metaphor, namely, "the metaphor of scale" that underlies much of utilitarian language about measuring consequences is also one of the things that make utilitarianism attractive:

"The very notion of weighing consequences presupposes that consequences are the kinds of things that can be placed on a scale. This metaphor pervades our everyday discourse about deciding among competing courses of action" (p. 169).

Obviously enough, utilitarians need some way of marking off the units to be measured in order to weigh consequences. How do they mark off units of utility? They sometimes do this by assigning cardinal numbers (one, two, three, etc.) to pleasure and happiness. They use two concepts of *hedons* and *dolors* for units of pleasure (or happiness) and units of displeasure (or suffering), respectively. Here, the former comes from the Greek word for "pleasure" and the latter comes from the Latin word that means "pain". The way of preference utilitarianism, on the contrary, is to assign ordinal (first, second, third, etc.) rankings to things that are relative to one another. Not surprisingly, these ways of marking off the units to be measured rarely seem to be artificial to utilitarians, nor do they accept the existence of any serious problem in this

apparent artificiality. Because, they argue that utilitarianism only tries to refine and formalize the very essence of the things that we do quite naturally in our everyday lives. By referring to hedons and dolors (and sometimes giving relative weight to them), utilitarians in fact seek to capture relative characteristic of our everyday relationships and activities (p. 170).

How Much Utility? Third of the points alluded to earlier in this section was associated with the question of how much utility we are obligated to produce. The answer, historically, has been that the right act is the act that leads to the greatest overall amount of utility -the greatest happiness principle. This overtly dictates that a utilitarian should choose the best action, the one that maximizes utility when he or she compares competing courses of action. Here, too, questions arise. Kagan's (1998) approach may be of some help. According to her, the expression of 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number' can in principle be interpreted in two different ways. In fact, it reminds us that everyone's happiness has to be counted equally; this is unobjectionable. However, sometimes this principle "is thought to mean that "majority rules" or that the right act is the act that benefits the greatest number of people".

"However, this is a mistake. Utilitarianism simply directs us to perform the act that will result in the outcome with the greatest total amount of well-being, and this might well be an outcome that benefits a few individuals a great deal, rather than many individuals very little each" (p. 62).

In my opinion, the significance of this interpretation of the greatest happiness principle is that if we talk about maximization of well-being of few individuals rather than many people, then, this might overshadow 'democratic' nature of the greatest happiness principle and add an elitist character to

it. Hinman (1998), however, has a different perspective. That the utilitarian always tries to produce greatest overall amount of utility is in sharp contrast to Kantian ethics. By usually emphasizing morally forbidden action, Kant's position in particular and deontological ethics in general get a negatively stating character while utilitarian position in particular and consequentialist ethics in general draw positively stating character by not only encouraging but also morally requiring to choose the specific course of action that maximizes utility. It must be acknowledged that 'positively stating' character of utilitarianism makes it much more proactive, positive and even altruistic in the sense that certain sacrifices are required for the greater good. Hinman concludes that

"Thus utilitarianism is an extremely demanding moral doctrine because it demands that we sacrifice our own pleasure, happiness, or preference satisfaction for the greater good -that is, for social utility" (p. 172).

In effect, the last remark is directly concerned with consequentialist element in utilitarianism. No doubt, utilitarianism is the best-known consequentialist theory. But more importantly, this element, as Benn (1998: 70) also mentions, is more worthy of discussion than the hedonist or welfarist element of it due to the fact that many of the objections rose against utilitarianism turn on its acceptance of welfarism or hedonism. In contrast, morality, on this consequentialist approach, significantly eats into your spare time to produce the greater good.

Consequences of What? Now, we concentrate on another important question: what types of things are to be judged in terms of their consequences; that is, the question of consequences of what? Since there are at least two traditional answers of this question -acts and rules-, it leads among consequentialists to

another division, concerning whether or not there is any place for moral rules in consequentialist theory. In other words, the problem is associated with that if and only if, as we have repeatedly emphasized, consequences determine the moral status of any action, so how could rules have any place in a consequentialist theory?

For the most part, utilitarianism accepts that we should look at the consequences of each individual *action* and ask ourselves (for individual act that we are contemplating) whether or not it promotes the good. We call this position as *act utilitarianism*. The other approach, on the other hand, claims that "it is possible both to embrace a consequentialist view of what makes actions right or wrong, and given an important place to moral rules" (Ibid., 72) and suggests that "we ought to act in accordance with those rules that will produce the greatest overall amount of utility for society as a whole" (Hinman, 1998: 183) since keeping certain rules produces better consequences than trying to judge the consequences of each individual action. We call this position as *rule utilitarianism*. Of course, it can be said that each type has relative advantages (and disadvantages) over the other type. Proponents of act utilitarianism, to illustrate, can avoid from the charge of "rule worshipping" (which advocates obedience to rules for their own sake) and deal with exceptions on the merits of the individual case. That makes it a tremendously powerful doctrine. Rule utilitarianism, in contrast, supplies its proponents to avoid important problems usually stemmed from act utilitarianism's sensitivity to particular cases. I think, it is worth looking more closely at relative advantages and disadvantages of act and rule utilitarianism.

Plainly, dealing with individual decisions on a case-by-case basis constitutes basic attraction of act utilitarianism. A

very famous example of this situation can be given in views on lying. Unlike 'rule-oriented morality' such as Kant's which never permits to tell a lie, act utilitarians suggest that one can lie if lying would produce the greatest overall amount of utility as in the case of someone wanted to tell place of innocent Jews running away from the Gestapo. Act utilitarians do not feel bound by the rules -in that case, 'do not lie'. Undoubtedly, they might recommend that we should usually avoid doing the things prohibited in several rules, precisely because they generally produce bad consequences. Put other way, for an act utilitarian "the only thing that can really determine the morality of an act is the consequences of that particular act," not a rule that forbids them (Benn, 1998: 72). However, it is obvious that if, as mentioned earlier, we should ask ourselves *for each individual act* that whether or not it produces the good, then, does this mean that the moral agent will have to be forever calculating the consequences of his or her acts?

The remark signaled in the last question is in fact one of the two important objections generally directed to focusing on acts. In this criticism it is asserted that act utilitarianism is too time-consuming to calculate the consequences of each individual action. But for many utilitarians this is a 'misconceived' objection. Because,

"Consequentialism does not direct people to be forever calculating. What it requires people to do is to perform the act with the best results. Since it is obvious that someone who is forever calculating will not bringing about the best results, such a person is not doing what consequentialism requires" (Kagan, 1998: p. 67).

The second objection, which act utilitarians usually face, is that: it is impossible to know especially long-term consequences of individual actions. As a rule, the response to this objection is to state limitations of our predictive

power. Act utilitarians, besides, connect this difficulty to the very nature of life, not to act utilitarianism, and most of whom believe that

"The proper response to this limitation is not to reject act utilitarianism, but simply to recognize that this is the part of the human condition. *The best that we can do is to try to increase our ability to foresee consequences.* It is unrealistic, however, to hope that we can eliminate uncertainty completely" (Hinman, 1998: 181, emphasis mine).

Clearly, we can not absolutely be certain as to what all the consequences of our act will be. There can be no guarantee for that an act which looks like it will lead to best results overall may turn out badly. Furthermore, it is impossible to say whether any act is morally right or wrong unless any event can stop to have further unforeseen effects as time goes on. However, suggest to increase foreseeing capacity is very controversial. It is not much more different from proposing much water to flood. Some scholars in fact are well aware of the strength of the objection. They, therefore, state that if this is a sound objection it threatens not only consequentialism but also all normative theories. True, this problem is inherited by all theories which agree that goodness of consequences is at least one factor relevant to the moral status of acts; but yet, to me, here is the hub of the matter. Though there are wide-ranging implications of this discussion for consequentialism in particular and foundational ethics in general, suffice it to say that doubts and fears regarding uncertainty are very common and characteristic among many foundational ethics theorists, hence, they see uncertainty, to a large extent, as a 'paralysis'. This fear, in turn, forces them either to search for more solid foundations or to ignore and/or de-emphasize the importance of uncertainty problem. The latter is Kagan's (1998) stance when she writes that

"The point to be emphasized, however, is this: any objection to consequentialism that turns on the uncertainty of the future actually has little or nothing to do with consequentialism per se; it points instead to the need to choose between objective and subjective accounts of rightness, and this choice must be made by every moral theory" (p. 66, emphasis original).

Interestingly, in this quotation there are two different positions -objective and subjective accounts of rightness- that a moral agent can take under uncertainties and risks of life --not just in moral cases, but everywhere. Approving the existence of two different positions against the uncertainty problem inevitably brings about two different conceptions of morality. As also accepted by her, in objective position, morality is conceived as "offering standard" for evaluating acts, on the contrary, it is conceived as a "guide" to decision making in subjective position. The conclusion that she derives from the problem of uncertainty is much more different than a postmodern writer's who believes that uncertainty problem is valid in both so called objective and subjective positions. Irrespective of the position which is employed, "once you have adopted a stance, you are likely to feel that the problem of uncertainty has been adequately answered" (Ibid, p. 66). Although this conclusion deserves further attention, this task will be deferred to the section where the debate of this and other issues are fully developed and postmodern ethics is widely explored. However, it should be said here parenthetically that there is no something wrong, in my opinion, in a 'modest' view that sees predictability - instead of uncertainty- as necessary for living and accepts 'the general predictability of the human as well as the natural world.' The significant problem, here, is that to what extent, can we accommodate predictability to the center of all societal world. Doesn't it mean to open first door to social engineering?

Two objections --a) time consuming nature of calculating the consequences of each individual action, and b) uncertainties experienced when we try to predict consequences-- which are not directed specifically to act utilitarianism but also used against consequentialism should by now be clear.

Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, claims against the deficiencies involved in act utilitarianism that utilitarianism's emphasis on consequences and the standard of utility is, in principle, correct. The problem, however, is stemmed from looking at the consequences of each individual act. We can avoid, according to them, from abuses and injustices contained in act utilitarianism by acting in accordance with those rules that will produce the greatest overall amount of utility for society as a whole, instead of individual acts. In doing so, they insist, they are still genuine consequentialists, not deontologists or 'rule worshippers'. Of course, this perspective can develop certain justifications for rules against the situations that are acceptable in terms of act utilitarianism --for example, telling lies or driving past at red light when the road is clear. It proposes a moral rule not for its own sake. However, the reason is that breaking the rule whenever the consequences seem to be good is most likely to bring about breaking the rule when the consequences are not good.

The advantage of rule utilitarian perspective over its rival is very clear here: any effort to refine moral rules in order to take account all exceptions (sensitivity to particular cases) would, in the end, collapse into (and, be maintained by) another moral rule. Nonetheless, rule utilitarianism is not entirely 'immune' to criticisms indicating that rule utilitarianism violates our commonsense moral expectations about justice. As Hinman skillfully shows rule utilitarianism can also justify, for instance, slavery under some conditions

that satisfy the greatest total amount of utility for society as a whole (Ibid. 184).

Another point that we should immediately state here is that "the act consequentialist," to use Benn's (1998) words, "has the resources to say everything that the rule-consequentialist can correctly say within a consequentialist framework" (p. 74). Because, if the consequences of breaking a particular rule are bad, there can be nothing that an act utilitarian will disagree; existence of a moral rule in that case shows, at the same time, existence of act utilitarian reasons for keeping rule. As a result, the idea of rule becomes irrelevant. If, on the other hand, no harm would result from breaking rule, but we still should keep the rule because adherence to this rule does more good than general non-adherence, an act utilitarian will have the right to say this is no longer a genuinely consequentialist position.

In my opinion, if act utilitarians already say everything that rule utilitarians can say, if this is the case, then, rules, viewed from different angle, would have undeniable consequentialist peculiarities --even if deontologists put the opposite forward. From our point of view developed in this chapter, this implies very crucial point. The moral responsibility is neglected when we either accept the course of action in which to keep rule is taken as a value in itself (and reduced to mere proceduralism as deontologists do) or follow a consequentialist perspective in which only consequences -even if they are produced by following the particular rule- are taken into account. This is a phenomenon shared by all modern ethics theories and it is already clear, at least for utilitarianism, in the discussion associated with act-omission distinction.

Obviously, two different positions can be developed against the injustices common for both act and rule utilitarianism: rejection or modification of utilitarianism. Some philosophers such as John Rawls and Samuel Scheffler follow the latter and try to modify utilitarianism by arguing that

“[W]e need to set up limits on the range of possible rules that could be adopted, limits that would be determined by considerations of justice, by consensual agreements, by human rights, and the like. Within these limits, utilitarian justifications of particular rules would be permitted, but no justification that violated those limits would be allowed” (Hinman, 1998: 185).

Besides, Rawls goes a step further and tries to justify the existence of certain types of *practices* relevant to utilitarian considerations, even though utilitarianism may not provide a basis for acts within that practice. In doing so, he tries to combine both utilitarian and deontological (Kantian) perspectives. But alas, to what extent we can count the position of Rawls as utilitarian is debatable.

To summarize, we have examined up to now an important version of foundational ethics in this section: teleology. According to this view, what makes an act morally right or wrong is its consequences and nothing else. Although ethics of consequences claims that the morality is a matter of consequences, there are several important points that need to be enlightened: the definition of utility, measuring of consequences, necessary amount of utility, and type of things to be judged in terms of their consequences. Firstly, pleasure, happiness, ideal goods, and preference satisfaction are used as common criteria in the definition of utility. Secondly, consequentialism uses either cardinal or ordinal numbers to weigh and measure consequences. Thirdly, the greatest happiness principle has historically been the answer to the question “how much utility is enough?” Lastly, acts and rules are two traditional things that can be

judged in terms of their consequences. They lead to an important division in consequentialist theory: act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.

We will now move on to the other version of foundational ethics: deontology. The first task in the next section will be to mention some points of contrast between teleology and deontology. Then, we will briefly see Kant's moral philosophy since deontology and Kant emphasize the importance of moral duty.

1.1.2 THE ETHICS OF DUTY: DEONTOLOGY

Through the discussion in the previous section we have explained that consequentialism has a very simple theory of right. There is one and only one factor that has moral importance in determining the status of an act: the goodness of that act's consequences. As we have also seen, consequentialists accept some secondary rules that will produce the greatest overall amount of utility for society as a whole and provide helpful guidance in moral deliberation, instead of individual acts. Of course, there is no much problem in accepting that goodness of consequences can be one of the intrinsically relevant factors. But, is the goodness of outcomes the only factor with intrinsic importance?

In effect, answer of the question puts consequentialism in sharp contrast to deontology. Like most people, deontologists are dissatisfied with determination of an act's moral worth by looking its (good) consequences. Since this dissatisfaction has formed the basis of deontological claims and the characterization of deontological views is often a contrastive one, drawing attention to some specific points of contrast between deontological and consequentialist theories is very suitable to begin to understand deontological views. Furthermore, "deontology is the theory of moral obligation,

and, by connotation, encompasses moral theories that emphasize rights and duties", so "deontological theories are those moral theories of vaguely Kantian stripe" (Stelzig, 1998: 903).

In this section, we will firstly see some specific points of contrast between deontological and consequential theories briefly; then, examine Kant's ethics in terms of three pillars on which his ethics rests: duty, universalizability, and respect.

1.1.2.a Deontology Generally: Some Points Of Contrast

The term deontology comes from the Greek *deon*, meaning 'duty' or 'that which is proper' or 'what ought to be' (Davis, 1995: 205; Stelzig, 1998: 934). In this use of the term, deontology can be contrasted to consequentialism/teleology (as we have explained in the last section, from *telos*, Greek for 'goal'). However, this is not always so. For instance, when Jeremy Bentham, one of utilitarianism's founders, used the word in 1814, deontology was referring to the marshaling of self-interested reasons for agents to act for the general good and, Bentham's "technique of deontology" according to Postema (1992), "is to mobilize reasons of private (...) interest already available to the agent" (p. 88). Obviously enough, utilitarian account of deontology, which accepts each person's interest that coincides with moral obligation or duty, is quite different from modern use.

Most of modern-day deontologists, however, focus much attention on rights. Following John Rawls, many deontologists believe in 'the priority of right over the good'. This is the first point of contrast between deontology and teleology. John Rawls (1971) writes in his influential book, "A Theory of Justice", that

"The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good(...)The structure of an ethical theory is, then, largely determined by how it defines and connects these two basic notions(...)The simplest way of relating them is taken by teleological theories: the good is defined independently from the right, and the right is defined as that which maximizes the good" (p. 30).

The idea behind this passage is clear: teleological/consequentialist/utilitarian theories start with a theory of good, and then "define" the right in terms of it. The right act is simply that act which leads to the best results. For teleological views, then, the good is prior to the right³. On the other hand, a deontological theory is defined by Rawls by contrast with teleological theories as

"one that either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good" (p. 30).⁴

³ For Rawls, there are various teleological views. They are different from each other according to their definitions of the good. If the good is taken as the realization of human excellence in various forms of culture, then, teleological theory is labeled as "perfectionism"; if it is taken as pleasure, we label teleological theory as "hedonism", lastly, in "eudaimonistic" teleological theories the good is defined as happiness (Hünler, 1997: 33).

⁴ In elsewhere, Rawls emphasizes that the priority of the right over the good is a conception of "Kantian Constructivism" (see, Rawls, 1980). By doing so, he explicitly accepts Kantian moral character of his theory of justice (at least, in his "A Theory of Justice"). After the first half of eighties, Rawls moved away from his theorization seeing justice as "fairness" and --in essence-- as a moral theory to new theoretical position. In this new position, "justice as fairness" is political -not physical- and in the realm of political philosophy. For a brief history of this theoretical turn in Rawls, see Hünler (1997) and Rawls's several studies (1985, 1987 and 1988) written at the second half of eighties. 1993 study of Rawls, "Political Liberalism", seems as if the corollary of this theoretical change.

Deontologists --in contrast to consequentialists-- believe that the right can not be simply defined in terms of the good or reduced to the good. In fact, they believe that there is no clear and specific relation between doing right and doing good; the right has some content independent of the good, and is in this sense 'prior' to it. Nancy Ann Davis (1995: 206), for example, quotes Fried as saying that

"The goodness of the ultimate consequences does not guarantee the rightness of the actions which produced them. The two realms are not only distinct for the deontologists, but the right is prior to the good" (Fried, 1978: 9).

If there is no relation between doing right and doing good, and the goodness of the consequences does not guarantee the rightness of an act, what does this mean specifically for a moral theory? In principle, at least, this means two interrelated things. First, this means that a given act might be morally forbidden even though it has the best results -- that is, the existence of moral constraints. Thus, secondly, this means that 'doing harm' appears as another normative factor beyond the goodness of an act's outcome in determining the moral status of that act if there are moral constraints.

Deontology recognizes a constraint against doing harm. That is to say, some acts are morally off-limits; they are forbidden. There is a prohibition which rules out performing some acts and especially doing harm, even if the results would be good. We call these prohibitions variously as rules, laws, deontological constraints, limitations, proscriptions, or norms. They are particular requirements to refrain from doing the "things-that-can-be-known-before-the fact-to-be-wrong". Therefore, to act rightly, agents must first of all refrain from doing the things that can be known to be morally wrong (Davis, 1995: 206). Here another point of contrast between consequentialism and deontology becomes apparent: while the

former leaves no room for moral constraints because it holds that whatever act will lead to the best consequences is always permissible, the latter accepts additional normative factors that generate constraints beyond the goodness of results.

Deontologists, unlike consequentialists, do not accept impartial consideration of the interests of others. What does this mean? A standard explanation can help to make the point clear⁵: deontologists refrain from harming one innocent person even if this would prevent the deaths of (say five) other innocent people. This obviously shows that the interests of the six do not count, or at least do not count equally. If the given interests of six people counted equally, then it would be permissible for us to do thing that saves the five and harms the one. Furthermore, deontologists believe that not only are we forbidden to harm the one to decrease the number of deaths, we are also forbidden to harm the one to decrease the number of killings by agents whose motivations and character are no worse morally than ours. Here it is clear that deontological views forbid harm doing by us and others. However, these theories assign more weight to our own avoidance of wrongdoing that we do than to the prevention of wrongdoing by others. Put other way, deontological views not only assign more weight to our avoidance of wrongdoing (to the interests and even lives of other agents) but also require that avoiding from wrongdoing does not translate into an obligation or a permission to minimize the wrongdoing of

⁵A somewhat condensed version of this explanation is known as "Trolley Problem". It is as follows: "Suppose that, a trolley is careening out of control down a steep hill. Just past a near fork in the track are five people who all will be killed if the trolley continues its present course. A passer-by observes that throwing the switch will divert the trolley down a spur truck and thereby save the lives of the five people on the track. However, doing so will kill the one person who is standing on the spur" (Stelzig, 1998: 929).

others. To illustrate, I can not say a lie in order to deceive a man intending to kill innocent people even if lying preserves other's lives (Davis, 1998: 207).

Lastly, there are two further respects in which deontological views depart from consequentialist theories. It is argued that deontological theories assess an act in terms of its intrinsic character in contrast to consequentialism assessing the moral worth of an act in terms of its effects. Likewise, it is sometimes believed that there exist absolute rules in deontological views.

1.1.2.b Kant's Ethics

As we noted at the start of this section, deontological theories are those moral theories of a Kantian stripe because both deontological theories and Kant emphasize importance of moral obligation and duties⁶. In essence, Kant's moral philosophy rests on three central insights. One of these insights attributes important role on *duty* in moral life. Moreover, for this philosophy, an action has moral worth if it is done for the sake of duty and its maxim can be willed as a *universal law*. Duty and universalizability state the conditions for a morally good action. In addition to these insights, Kant develops a third claim which suggests treating humanity as an end itself and never merely as a means to an end (Hinman, 1998: 210). To further explore these issues, it is necessary to look briefly at theoretical background of Kant's ethics. One of the short and insightful discussions of the matter is by Onora O'Neill (1995).

⁶Although present-day deontologists, as we have emphasized earlier, focus on rights, duties are often taken to be correlative with rights. It is clear that in theories holding that rights and duties are correlative, one may give an account of rights and then defines duties by reference to rights or may define rights in terms of an account of duties.

Kant's moral philosophy can be found in his writings of the 1780s and 1790s⁷. But it is a truism to say that Kant's masterpiece is the "Critique of Pure Reason" (1781) because the fundamental moves, which determine the shape of these writings, are discussed in it. O'Neill (1995) calls the context developed in this book as the 'critical philosophy' (p. 175). According to this philosophy, claims about any transcendent reality can not be vindicated, so our thinking has to be undertaken from a human standpoint. Kant criticizes most of the metaphysical claims of rationalists and their supposed proofs of the existence of God. In this regard, critical philosophy is critical in a negative sense. The implication of this claim in turn is very clear: the knowledge claims must be about reality that can be experienced by us. It is this knowledge claim that we can vindicate. For Kant, we live in a natural world of spatially and temporally extended objects and we can know a priori that these objects are causally connected. He, however, insists that knowable natural world does not only contain causal order, on the contrary, we have free will as agents and as moral beings in this world. How, then, are free will and natural causality compatible? The answer, according to Kant, lays in the fact that human's capacity to act autonomously -freedom- is not taken to be an aspect of the natural world. In other words, causality and

⁷ They involve "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" (1785), "Critique of Practical Reason" (1787), which is the second of his three major Critiques, "The Metaphysics of Morals" (1797), and "Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone" (1793). The most fundamental ideas on ethics are found in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Here, the central themes of his whole ethical approach are introduced and summarized so effectively. Two parts of the Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, "The Metaphysical Elements of Justice and The Doctrine of Virtue, are published separately. Hinman (1998: 240-242) provides a long list including Kant's works, several introductions of his ethical thought and important studies of Kant's contemporary followers.

freedom apply in separate domains; knowledge and our cognitive capacity are restricted to the former and the morality to the latter (Ibid. 176). As Tony Smith (1991) aptly points out when he discuss the role of ethics in social theory

"The concept of transcendental freedom (rational autonomy) is the starting point of Kant's entire practical philosophy. Freedom has a first, merely negative, sense in which agents are viewed as freed from the strict necessity of causal determination. Agents are free in a second, positive, sense insofar as they follow the moral law" (p. 114, emphasis original).

Before discussing what constructs the moral law in Kantian ethics, it should be mentioned lastly that Kant's resolution of the problem of freedom and determinism is the most controversial and fundamental feature of his moral philosophy.

What constructs, then, the basis of the moral law? More specifically, which action, in Kant, is the morally better action? As Hinman (1998: 211) mentions, an act's moral worth, in Kant's philosophy, depends on the reason for which it is done. People should act according to 'duty'. Yet, it is not enough that the act is done just because it is right thing to do; it must also be done for the sake of duty. Acting for the sake of duty, however, is only one side to the (moral) story. To understand where morality begins we should also look another side. To determine moral correctness of an action we must act at the same time according to the universalizable principles (or we must reject non-universalizable ones). These two pillars --duty and universalizability-- state the conditions for morally good action (but not enough for a complete moral law). This in turn implies that the construction of duty and the principle of universalizability are interrelated and equally important concepts in determination of the moral worth of an act.

As O'Neill (1995: 176-177) notes, Kant in fact asks only one rather minimal question: "What fundamental problems could be adopted by a plurality of agents without assuming *anything* specific about the agent's desires or the social relations?" Kant developed his answer to this question without reference to any supposedly objective account of good for man. Nor does he base his position on subjective conceptions of the good or commonly shared moral beliefs. As in his metaphysics, so in his ethics, he neither introduces claims about a moral reality that transcends our experience nor assigns moral weight to actual beliefs. What does such an account of right action mean for a moral theory? It is obvious that Kant's aim was not merely to produce a moral theory that was internally consistent and which accorded with as many ordinary practical institutions as possible. It also put morality on an entirely rational foundation. Kant tries to discover the a priori basis of morality (Benn, 1998: 92). Clearly, in Kant's philosophy, a *moral foundation* is found out. Yet, this foundation lies in reason alone, independent of contingent human consensus or 'telos' at which the foundation morality aims. In other terms, his central move was to construct the principles of ethics according to *rational procedures*. Kant believes that the principle of ethics, which depends on practical rationality, can be discovered a priori. What is this principle? Kant calls this principle as Categorical Imperative (or, more generally, the Moral Law) and formulates it in several ways. It is imperative because it tells us to do something, gives a command; it is categorical because it is unconditional. The opposite of categorical imperative would be a conditional imperative. The initial formulation of the categorical imperative is known as the *formula of universal law*; and, in its best known version it runs: 'Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law' (O'Neill, 1995: 177). A 'maxim' here is a subjective

principle on which I act. The test for a maxim, then, is whether people could consistently will that everyone adopt this maxim as a guide in their actions. Then it would pass the test of universalizability. Bernard Rosen (1993) summarizes Kant's views as follows

"1. Consequences (ends attained by actions) are not the determinants of moral obligation. 2. The moral worth of an action (that it is right or the fulfillment of an obligation) is a function of the direct rule (principle of volition or maxim) from which the action is performed. 3. The direct moral rule must be chosen independently of any desire to achieve an end, or even from any desire regarding the rule itself. 4. The indirect moral rule that determines the direct moral rules can not have any particular actions or moral rules described within it. 5. The form of the indirect moral rule is, as stated by Kant, "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a *universal* moral law" (emphasis added) (p. 153).

Obviously enough, the moral worth of the direct (moral) rule depends fundamentally upon the universalizability of that rule because the direct rule, or in other words, principle which a moral agent takes as a basis for his or her action "should fit as a principle into a possible enactment of universal law" (Chandler, 1994: 150).

Kant produces several examples showing how the categorical imperative and the principle of acting for the sake of duty might be implied. In one of these examples, given in the "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," Kant offers example of a neighborhood grocery store in which the grocer knows almost all of the customers. It is clear that if those customers know one another, and if there is a competing grocery store, then it is clearly in the grocer's self-interest to be honest. However, there are plenty of situations (to give a present-day example, e.g. a gift shop on a highway that the customers rarely return) in which the motive of self-

interest can not be counted on to require the right action. In situations such as this, according to Kant, if we are not acting for the sake of duty, we will not perform the morally correct action. Kant's position in this example is important from two aspects. First, Kant focuses on duty as the moral standard, not on self-interest. Secondly, Kant rejects the claim that the world will be a better place if everyone acts in terms of his or her own self-interest (rejects, in other words, non-universalizable principle of self-interest). These two aspects also serve to contrast Kant to the ethical egoist.

In the second example, Kant discusses the situation of the person who refuses the temptation to commit suicide even though his life is filled with disappointments and misery. To Kant, when such a refusal is motivated by duty, not by other considerations, it has moral worth. Clearly enough, refusal of suicide is a matter of weighing consequences. "Good utilitarians," as Hinman (1998) expresses, "must imagine what the course of the world would be like if they killed themselves and what the course of the world would be like if they continued to live. Which of these alternatives produces the greater good?" (p. 213).

The final and, according to some, the most powerful and defensible example relates to lying. This example specifically shows how categorical imperative might be applied. As we have seen, the moral agents shall not be able to will their maxim as a universal law, if they can not also will the consequences of everyone following it. Then, moral agents are wondering whether to tell a lie, they must ask themselves whether they could will that the principle involved can be willed as a universal law. Kant thinks it can not be, because agent's maxim, as soon as it is made a universal law, it will be bound to annul itself (cf. O'Neill, 1995: 177).

It is usually argued that Kant's examples are unconvincing. But, what is philosophically important here is Kant's method: in spite of reference to consequences, it is in no way a consequentialist approach. Although it may appear that way at first, it says that if we imagine the consequences, we can not consistently will that everyone adopt this maxim. It is therefore important, as Benn (1998) warns, "to separate Kant's formula of universal law from another, familiar appeals with a superficial resemblance to it" (p. 93).

Though critics assert that there are some difficulties surrounding the articulation and application of Kant's categorical imperative and others argue that acting for the sake of duty is sometimes absurd, harsh, and extensively rigorous, Kant seems to be correct in his basic insight that we can not arbitrarily make an exception of ourselves; if something is wrong for other people, it is also wrong for us to do so. In fact, the last point has a very crucial implication that takes us to the very heart of Kant's moral philosophy --to another way of stating the categorical imperative, known as the *formula of the end in itself*.

This second formulation of the categorical imperative is represented in the "Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals" as: "act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (O'Neill, 1995: 178). It is obvious that this is a second-order principle involving constraint on the maxims we adopt. Yet, through this constraint, the formula of the end in itself actually demands us that we should respect other's capacities to act instead of trying to check that all could adopt the same maxims. The last point, of course, can be seen as a point that deteriorates the principle of universalizability. But in fact it also shows how two formulations (which tell, in the first version, that we

should act in such a way that we could will that everybody else should act likewise and stress, in the second version, that we must always treat others as ends) are related when we think them together. The claim here is that creatures that are ends in themselves derive this status from their rationality. What we respect in other people, for Kant, is their ability to reason and, on the basis of their reason, to choose the act in particular ways. Since the reason is the source and motive of morality, treating a person as a mere means is to subvert rationality and ability to formulate and follow the categorical imperative within him or her. But more importantly, to will as a universal law that rational beings should be treated as mere means is also to will that I should be treated as such. This puts me in the position of rationally willing the destruction of my own capacity of rational deliberation. The maxim thus annuls itself. In other terms, treating people as mere means can not pass the universalizability test (Benn, 1998: 96). As O'Neill (1995) notes, in Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" to be autonomous or to have free will "is no matter of willfulness or independence from others or from social conventions; it is to have the mode of self-control that takes account of other's like moral status. To be Kantianly autonomous is to act morally" (p. 179)⁸.

⁸ In effect, the issue of free will is the most important problem in Kant's theory. Kant maintains on the one hand that morality implies freedom, he asserts on the other hand that human beings are the part of the empirical world which is governed by causal laws. This is a complex problem but we need not concern ourselves with those here. Suffice it to say that Kant's answer depends on two standpoints: the first is the *phenomenal* world, the natural world of cause and effect, the world which is presented to us in sensory experience. The second is *noumenal* world, a mysterious world of "things-in-themselves," of which we can have no experience. We are both phenomenal and noumenal beings. Therefore, when we do our duty, we are acting with noumenal freedom, with actions not causally explained but rationally justified (see also, Benn, 1998: 97-101).

To sum up, in this section we have dealt with deontology as another moral theory. Also, we have examined some points of contrast between consequentialism/teleology/utilitarianism and deontology. Contrast in the definition of the relationship between the right and the good is the first of five points of contrast. The right has the priority over the good in deontology. Second, deontology accepts moral constraints (against doing harm) as additional normative factors beyond the goodness of consequences. Then, unlike teleology, deontology does not accept the impartial consideration of the interests of the others. Fourth, an act is assessed in deontology in terms of its intrinsic character. Finally, deontology depends on the existence of absolute rules. After having emphasized these points of contrast, we have seen some features of Kant's moral philosophy. His ethic rests on three pillars: duty, universalizability, and respect.

Before starting to examine anti-foundational approach, an important point must be emphasized. Teleology and deontology are foundational moral theories because they, like nomothetic science, try to establish general and abstract laws, principles or standards which help to deduce the appropriate moral judgments and behaviors located in the flow of actual life.

Now, we can turn our attention to the anti-foundational approach and postmodern ethics which completely rejects foundational moral positions. The context of such postmodern ethics that has anti-foundational character is articulated in Bauman's (1993) "Postmodern Ethics". Although space prohibits a comprehensive analysis in this study, I will first seek to examine Bauman's critique of 'morality in modern perspective'. In the second, I will try to explore briefly what Bauman's postmodern approach to ethics involves.

1.2 ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL ETHICS

1.2.1 Morality in Modern Perspective: Bauman's Critique

Born in Poland, Zygmunt Bauman (1920-) taught sociology in a number of universities before he became Professor of Sociology at Leeds University in 1970. Some of his books consist of "Modernity and Holocaust" (1989), "Modernity and Ambivalence" (1991), "Intimations of Postmodernity" (1992), "Life in Fragments" (1995), and "Postmodernity and Its Discontents" (1997). So, as some scholars state, he deserves to be called as the theorist of postmodernism (Best, 1998: 311).

Postmodernism, for Bauman, is not a situation in which "anything goes". Before starting to analyze his theorizing, this is very crucial point. Several modern writers often assault "anything goes" relativism of many postmodern writings. Postmodern approach, according to these criticisms, is associated with the 'celebration of the demise of the ethical', of the substitution of esthetics for ethics, and of the 'ultimate emancipation' that follows. It is asserted that postmodern believes that ethics is one of the typically modern constraints and that the place of ethics is the dustbin of history. As indicated in John Rotfork's (1995) awarded essay which tries to answer some of the charges made against postmodernism, that

"[T]he conservatives(...)see postmodernists as threats; as iconoclasts, anarchists, juveniles, or - at least- as irreverent. The tacit demand is that they must take seriously the traditional vocabulary of ethics or forfeit the right to speak publicly. The modernist fear that their enemies are trivializing a great and serious tradition that should be revered" (p. 20).

To Bauman (1993), such an interpretation of postmodern 'revolution' in ethics is "contentious and by no means the only one possible" (p. 2). Gilles Lipovetsky, for instance,

suggests in his interpretation that we have finally entered a post-deontic epoch where our conduct has been freed from the last vestiges of oppressive 'infinite duties', 'commandments' and 'absolute obligations'. Bauman, however, asserts, "the possibility of radically novel understanding of moral phenomena has been opened" (p. 2). Contrary to 'everything goes' relativism of certain postmodern writers and the popular opinion, this possibility "does not reveal the relativism of morality" (p. 14, emphasis original). Instead, Bauman urges

"[T]he chances of 'moralization' of social life may - -who knows?-be enhanced. It remains to be seen whether the time of postmodernity will go down in history as the twilight, or the renaissance, of morality" (p. 3).

The postmodern approach to ethics does not reject the moral concerns which individuals in the modern world have in their minds. However, it rejects the coercive response to ethical issues by normative regulations of any central authority in political practice and the philosophical search for absolutes, universals and foundations in the theory. Though the great issues of ethics have lost nothing of their topicality, they need to be seen and dealt with in a novel way. Before examining this 'novel way' an important question should be answered: What was the wrong with modernity?

In modernity, for Bauman, as long as the world became secular, individuals lost their belief in religious dogma because their lives increasingly fragmented to the degree that any authority vision provided by a religion could never be satisfactory for all aspects of an individual's life. At that point, the state attempted to create a comprehensive moral code and imposed it upon individuals. According to Bauman,

"(...)modern legislators and modern thinkers alike felt that morality, rather than being a 'natural trait' of human life, is something that needs to be

designed and injected into human conduct; and this is why they tried to compose and impose an all comprehensive, unitary ethics -that is, cohesive code of moral rules which could be taught and forced to obey(...)" (p. 6).

Besides, this moral code is 'man-made' and hence 'all rational human beings' can embrace and obey it. On the other hand, even after the 'rational arrangement of human cohabitation' through a unitary ethics and moral code, individuals would need to be prevented from using their freedom to wrong and to be enforced to do right thing since they have 'untoward and potentially heinous impulses'. The motive behind those viewing society 'from the top', those responsible for the 'running of society' --in other words, the motive behind philosophers and rulers-- was to bring about a condition of minds free from contradictions and irresolvable situations. More to the point, under the conditions of modern life, human instinct needs to be subject to rationally designed enforcement (Best, 1998: 317).

Unsurprisingly, this brought about an 'aporetic situation'⁹ in which "autonomy of rational individuals and heteronomy of rational management [of morality] could not do without each other; but they could not cohabit peacefully, either" (p. 7). Universality and foundation, according to Bauman, provided a radical solution for this aporetic situation in cooperation with modern legislative practice in the modern age. As we shall turn to the criticizing of universalizability and foundationalism where the debate on these issues are fully developed by Bauman, we still continue to examine his effort in which he tries to make the sources of moral power --which in modern ethical philosophy and political practice were hidden from sight-- visible and to understand the reasons for

⁹ Bauman identifies 'aporia' as "a contradiction that can not be overcome, one that results in a conflict that can not be resolved" (p. 8).

their past invisibility. This is very significant task for Bauman since it means above all the 'tearing off the mask of illusions'; the recognition of certain pretences as false and certain objectives as neither attainable nor, for that matter, desirable.

Looked from Bauman's critical discourse on modernity it seems that modern philosophers targeted on the reduction of pluralism of rules and "chasing away moral ambivalence". The most important reason was that the moral choices appear to men and women living under conditions of modernity "intrinsically and irreparably ambivalent" with this pluralism (p. 21).

However, at the beginning, breaking the 'mould of tradition', the coming of pluralism and its emancipatory effect was greeted by the thinking, debating and writing minority with joy. The new feeling of freedom was "intoxicating" mainly because man, not god, was being put at the center of the universe by modern elites. But, not all humans were equally endowed: only the 'chosen few' celebrated the freedom (p. 23). More importantly, the self-enlightened elite of modernity, Bauman explains, saw the masses as an object of rule and care. Clearly, in practice, it was the position of political leadership and implied the true role of administration, in its broadest sense of the term. More to the point, these elites or, to use Bauman's term, *les philosophes* were always bound to speak of firm and unshakable foundations of morality binding all human beings and of universals. Foundations had to be based solely on the 'nature of Man'. The philosophers first de-legitimized clerical authority and second filled the void thus created by the enlightened spokesman of the universal. As a result, these two constituted the modern revolution: "it was the task of the enlightened elite to reveal to the nations the foundations on which morality is to be built, to 'instruct the nations' in these principles of moral conduct" (p. 25).

However, the idea of morality grounded in the 'nature of Man' would ironically be dangerous to philosophers' spiritual leadership and all but make their services redundant. Put other way, morality, on the one hand, had to be grounded in the 'nature of Man'; but, this formulation, on the other hand, could have exposed the danger for the steering role of philosophers. What would be, then, a conceivable solution to this quandary? First of all, it had to be accepted that "human nature exists at present solely *in potentia*; as a possibility not-yet-born, awaiting a midwife to let it out" (p. 26). Once the idea was accepted, it was legitimizing the role of the enlighteners as ethical legislators and 'moral guardians'. Bauman believes that the two most important implications of modern ethical quandary were first to expropriation of moral judgment and second its replacement with ethical code. Even though the justification for being moral is individualistic and autonomous, moral behavior in reality can be secured only by the heteronomous force of Law. (p. 28). The last point, to Bauman, is the hub of the matter when we think about morality vs. law dialectics. The surrender of individual freedom to the heteronomously set standards and consignment of the right to decide what is good to socially approved agencies and to their 'verdicts' means in fact "to replace morality with legal code, and to shape ethics after the pattern of Law" (p. 29). Needless to say, individual responsibility, viewed in this light, is the responsibility for following the socially endorsed, ethical-legal rules. That is what Bauman had in mind when he wrote

"What the philosophical and sociological models of 'universal human condition' strove (in vain) to overcome in theory was the practical duality of moral standings [i.e. individual autonomy and heteronomy of ethical code] in modern society, itself an instrument and the reflection of domination. In modern society, some individuals are freer than others: some are more dependant than other" (p. 29).

1.2.2 Postmodern Ethics: Anti-Foundational, Not Universal

After having seen Bauman's critique of morality in modern perspective, the next question to be asked is that: What does postmodern approach to ethics involve? Bauman says that there are seven 'marks of moral condition' when looked from a postmodern perspective. They will be given brief attention in this part.

To begin with, postmodern individuals, Bauman suggests, are morally ambivalent. Ambivalence takes place at the heart of the 'primary scene' of human face-to-face. The argument here is that given the primary structure of human togetherness, a non-ambivalent morality is an existential impossibility. Since the moral conduct can not be guaranteed, we need to learn how to live without such guarantees.

"The moral self moves, feels and acts in the context of ambivalence and is shot through with uncertainty. Hence, the ambiguity-free moral situation has solely a utopian existence of the perhaps indispensable horizon and stimulus for a moral self, but not a realistic target of ethical practice" (Bauman, 1993: 10).

Secondly, moral phenomena are inherently 'non-rational'. They do not fit the 'means-end' scheme. They are moral only if they precede the consideration of purpose and the calculation of gains and losses; and can not be explained in terms of utility they render to the moral subject. Besides, moral phenomena can not be represented as rule-guided, either because they are not regular, repetitive, monotonous, and predictable (p. 11). This mark clearly shows that Bauman apparently deny both utilitarian and Kantian considerations simultaneously when he seeks to avoid rational, foundational and universal ethics.

Thirdly, morality, Bauman argues, is "incurably aporetic" and few choices are unambiguously good. We have to live with

ambivalence; no choice that we make can be defined as objectively good or bad. Even the moral impulse to care for another person can lead to immoral consequences of destroying their independence (Best, 1998: 318).

Fourth mark indicates that morality is not universalizable. However, the assertion 'morality is not universalizable' does not mean, for Bauman, a situation which necessarily endorse moral relativism. Again, he argues against relativistic and in the end, nihilistic view of morality. Content of this mark means, in Bauman's perspective, to oppose a concrete version of moral universalism which tries to smother the differences and, above all, to eliminate all 'wild' -autonomous and uncontrolled- sources of moral judgment.

As we have seen, in modern thought 'universalization of morality' means the substitution of heteronomous ethical values for the autonomous responsibility of the 'moral self'. Overall effect of universalization, for Bauman (1993), is the silencing of moral impulse (p. 12). That's why, a separate chapter in his "Postmodern Ethics" is devoted the "elusive universality". In it Bauman tries to explain why morality is "un-universalizable". Since the space prohibits me a comprehensive examination in this paper, it is possible to mention briefly that Kant's categorical imperative, as suggestive of universalism, can set out solely the sufficient condition for moral behavior --not the necessary condition for moral command-- because it insists on the universality of moral rules. However, universality of rules means, for Bauman, but not mutual exchangeability of moral subjects. In this account, the categorical imperative may make certain conduct a moral duty, but it, at the same time "absolves conscience for falling to follow many a crucial moral impulse" (p. 51). Bauman is very clear about universals when he examines the "solitude of the moral subject":

"No universal standards, then. No looking over one's shoulders, to take a glimpse of what other people 'like me' do. No listening to what they say they do or ought to be doing(...)We do look and listen, but it does not help" (p. 53).

To add fuel to the fire, Bauman asserts that only rules can be universal. In this way, he also rejects the positions supporting specifically one variant of utilitarianism -rule utilitarianism- and universalizability test of Kant's ethics which we have seen in the previous section. Heteronomous and externally dictated idea of duty is under attack in Bauman's perspective;

"One may legislate universal, rule-dictated *duties*, but moral *responsibility* exists solely in interpellating the individual and being carried individually(...)The morality of the moral subject does not, therefore, have the character of a rule. One may say that the moral is what *resists* codification, formalization, socialization, universalization" (p. 54, emphasis original).

Fifth, morality is and is bound to remain irrational from the perspective of the 'rational order' because it firstly "managed to recast as inferior and doomed all those forms of life which did not harness their own pains to the chariot of Reason" and, secondly, "obtained a safe conduct for the pains it was about to inflict itself" (p. 226). With these two achievements, rationality in modern society obtained "the confidence and the courage to proceed". However, "rule-governed" morality in modern conditions, according to Bauman, is open to "cruelty which presented itself as a superior ethics" (p. 226) because of the fact that "superior morality is always the morality of the superior" (p. 228) and that "the story of progress is told by the victors" (p. 226). But, how does the rationality and progress achieve this? The main reason is that rationality allows us to 'make sense' out of a string of events. 'Making sense' is obtained through

"presenting temporal succession as 'development', as a passage from inferior to superior states, as a chain in which each link is a means (a necessary condition or a cause) for one that comes after, and in which the later states reveal retrospectively the meaning of those which preceded them" (p. 226).

Bauman continues:

"The time-space conjured up by modern memory is linear and vertical, not cyclical and horizontal. In this time-space, 'before' means 'lower' and 'inferior'. Also, 'inferior' means 'outdated' --a relic or a hiccup of the past, a convict in a death cell awaiting execution, a zombie, an illegitimate squatter in the house of the present" (p.226).

Unsurprisingly, Bauman is well aware of that that argument radically threatens rational social order of any kind. That's why, he maintains "for every social totality bent on uniformity and the soliciting of the disciplined, coordinated action, (...) the autonomy of the moral self is a scandal" (p.13). He rejects the social management of morality once again.

Sixthly and highly germane to the argument that we have tried to developed in this chapter; there is no 'foundation' for moral responsibility for Bauman. Rather, moral responsibility is the "first reality of the self" and a starting point -not product- of society. Bauman added that the moral self is also a self with no foundation. It in fact has its moral impulse as the ground on which we stand. Yet, moral impulse can hardly be considered to be worthy of the name of the foundation by philosophers mainly because it is subjective, elusive and erratic (p. 62).

If there is no foundation for morality, it is clear that one significant question remains unanswered: "How possible in the absence of foundations?" But this question, according to Bauman, makes no sense when addressed to morality. Because, such a question not only calls morality to justify itself but

also demands morality to show the certificate of its origin. However, in addition to its ultimate and non-determined presence, morality has no excuse, and precedes the emergence of socially administrated context. Bauman urges that there is no self before the moral self (p. 13). In essence, Bauman's approach to morality, as Mark Mason (1997) also states, is a Levinasian stripe. We should act morally by the demands of a particular situation in which we are involved at a Levinasian "face to face" level. Such "face to face" interaction moves us to take responsibility for our actions. The influence of Emmanuel Levinas's moral philosophy on the construction of Bauman's postmodern ethics can be seen especially when he asserts the idea of the 'morality before ontology'. Bauman follows Levinas who comments on Cain's answer question 'Am I my brother's keeper?' to God's challenge 'Where is your brother?' Bauman quotes Levinas as saying that

"One should not treat Cain's response as a mockery of God (...) Cain's response is sincere. Only the ethical is absent here; the answer is solely from ontology; I am I and he is he. We are beings ontologically separate" (p. 70).

Like Levinas, Bauman maintains that ontology is the territory without morality, and whoever starts from ontology does not embark on founding morality. On the contrary, morality is given because of the fact that "ethics comes before ontology". First philosophy is an ethics; "being for" is before "being with", and moral relationship comes before being (p. 71), so morality has no ground and no foundation.

Seventhly, the postmodern perspective on moral phenomena, according to Bauman, "does not reveal the relativism of morality". On the contrary, "it is the ethical codes which are plagued with relativism" (p.14). The relativity of these codes (and of moral practices they recommend) is the outcome of the politically promoted parochiality of that code that pretend to

be universal, not from the 'un-codified' moral condition and moral conduct. In reality, moral parochialism under the mask of promoting "universal ethics" is practiced in modern societies. Moreover, with the presence of supposedly universal ethical codes, globalization of political powers is actually aimed. Regarding moral relativism, a postmodern perspective, however, does not necessarily have to be trapped with "hot-heated 'everything goes' triumphalism of certain postmodernist writers" (p. 14). Nor must it call for a 'nothing we can do about it' disarmament against the variety of ethical codes. But rather, it exposes that there is an incongruity between any power-assisted ethical code and the infinitely complex condition of the moral self and reveals that the idea that society is the ultimate author and the sole trustworthy guardian of morality is false. Then, the question to be answered is that: Is there any place, in Bauman's postmodern theory, for ethical 'universalizability'? The answer is affirmative, but in different meaning of the term:

"The humankind-wide moral unity is thinkable, if at all, not as the end product of globalizing the domain of political powers with ethical pretensions, but as the utopian horizon of deconstructing the 'without us the deluge' claims of nation-states, nations-in-search-of-the-state, traditional communities, and communities-in-search-of-a-tradition, tribes, neo-tribes, as well as their appointed and self-appointed spokesmen and prophets (...)" (pp. 14-15).

To summarize, through the discussion in this section we have seen that in his anti-foundational postmodern ethics approach, Bauman does not accept the 'anything goes' relativism. But he equally rejects the coercive respond to ethical issues by normative regulations of any central authority. These regulations, for Bauman, are made in political practices as well as in philosophical approaches searching for universals and foundations. That's why, state has attempted to create moral code. It is rational and man-made for all rational human

beings. It also prevents 'rational' individuals to use their impulses and instincts. Such code has caused to the heteronomy of rational management of morality. More importantly, since this code is run by modern elites, the idea of 'rational morality' of ordinary people is ironically seen dangerous to the leadership of the self-enlightened elite of modernity -- "chosen few"--. According to Bauman, what these elites do is to expropriate moral judgment and replace it with ethical code. Replacement of morality with legal code by modern legislators and modern thinkers through universal foundations is the basic characteristics of modern ethical thought. However, as indicated in Bauman's perspective, ethics is ambivalent, non-rational, aporetic, irrational -from the perspective of rational order- un-universalizable and not foundational.

At the end of chapter, following points can be summarized.

(a) Large amount of moral philosophy has overwhelmingly a foundational character in modern age.

(b) Historically, foundational philosophy reveals itself out through two dominant ethical theories: teleology and deontology. I tend to label the cleavage created by teleology and deontology as 'modernist ethical cleavage'. The implications of foundational theories on theoretical frameworks (and on the efforts that try to reconcile and transcend them) will be discussed in Chapter III.

(c) Although there have been historical criticisms directed to both teleology and deontology even by their proponents, much more radical criticism has been appeared: anti-foundationalism. The latter claims that teleology and deontology, which are allegedly contradicting each other, can be united under one basic rubric: search for foundations, principles, rules, and standards for morality.

(d) As a result, it can be asserted that if we want to examine public administration ethics, we *first* have to deal with teleology and deontology in order to understand modern ethical cleavage, and *second* have to see which ethical notions and premises anti-foundational philosophy involve. These are the goals which Chapter I tries to accomplish. In Chapter II, I will review the literature of public administration ethics. The implications of anti-foundational approach on public administration ethics will be argued in Chapter IV.



CHAPTER II

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ETHICS LITERATURE IN RETROSPECT

Historical developments of ethical inquiries in the field of public administration can be viewed from two different perspectives. In one of them, ethics might be approached as "a topic of sustained interest". How long public administration ethics has been of concern to practitioners and scholars is controversial in this perspective. While it has been suggested that ethics has been a topic of concern since the founding era of the United States (Richardson and Nigro, 1987), it has been proposed elsewhere --even by same scholars-- that ethics has been concerned since the founding of Public Administrative Review (PAR) (Richardson and Nigro, 1990).

Ethics is examined, on the other hand, as "the study of administrative ethics". By the study of administrative ethics, Cooper (1994: 3) meant "a systematic and developmental treatment of the subject". He adds that at least three criteria can be assumed to learn whether "a study of administrative ethics" exists: first, "the existence of a group of scholars with a sustained interest in the subject, at least some of whom identify themselves as specialists"; second, "a consistent flow of published materials in books, leading journals, and conference sessions devoted to the advancement of theory," and; lastly, "the establishment of academic courses in university professional education programs" (p. 3). After reviewing the literature of

administrative ethics since the late nineteenth century as it has contributed to the development of field of study within public administration he concludes that "although there have been numerous articles dealing with administrative ethics in some way(...)one does not find anything approximating" (Ibid., 3), the treatment of the *study* of administrative ethics predating the 1970s. For present purposes, I put aside the debate on whether public administration ethics has been a topic of sustained interest or a field of study. Instead, I tend to focus on the literature first to show the significant milestones in the development of public administration ethics, and second to mark the reflections of philosophical approaches examined in the previous chapter.

But before doing so, I want to mention why such a historical/retrospective perspective to administrative ethics literature is important:

(a) First of all, as we shall see in Chapter III, ethical frameworks (bureaucratic and democratic ethos) in public administration do not mean in fact an 'invention' or 'innovation' in the field. This means that what theoretical frameworks try to do is only to categorize and classify historical --or existing-- ethical discussions and particular/general approaches in the field. Although they can not be labeled as 'grand theories', they exactly offer us a 'middle theories' for studying administrative ethics. In this regard, before seeing the categorization itself, it would be better to develop a familiarity with the 'objects' of such categorization. Views and debates of different public administration scholars over administrative ethics in this chapter can be seen as the 'objects' of a future --bureaucratic and democratic ethos--categorization. On the other hand, theoretical frameworks of bureaucratic and democratic ethos in Chapter III necessitate studying of 'concrete' data

regardless of being 'for or against' these frameworks. It seems that such like data can be obtained only from an examination which has a historical perspective.

(b) In the previous chapter, in Chapter I, we saw both the foundational philosophy which involves the distinction between teleology and deontology anti-foundational philosophy that rejects all the basis and foundations on which teleology and deontology depend. Teleology and deontology are the moral theories that lay behind the bureaucratic and democratic ethos which we shall see in Chapter III. Therefore, in my opinion, through a historical/retrospective perspective it is quite easy to see possible associations between philosophical approaches given in Chapter I, and the writings of individual public administration scholars who also shape with their approaches ethical frameworks given in Chapter III.

(c) As we have also seen, anti-foundational philosophy blames other theories with searching for solid foundations for morality. In my opinion, through the historical perspective developed in this chapter, we can trace back the possible projections of this search and foundational ethics in public administration ethics literature. Outcome of such perspective can validate the claims of anti-foundational approach to ethics. To me, this is not a small accomplishment. After these remarks, we can turn our attention to the historical development of administrative ethics.

2.1 EARLY YEARS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

2.1.a Wilson and Politics-Administration Dichotomy

Woodrow Wilson's "Study of Administration" (1887) is generally accepted as a classic milestone in the professionalization process of public administration. However, Dorman B. Eaton's (1880) study, entitled "Civil Service In Great Britain: A

History of Abuses and Reforms and Their Bearing Upon American Politics," examining the British civil service with United States application in mind, can be seen as a different (and perhaps more appropriate -at least for administrative ethics studies-) point of origin, although Van Riper (1983) sees Eaton's work as a more convenient beginning for "our modern system of public employment" (p. 482). For Eaton, merit criteria based on character and competence is a progress towards "justice and liberty" (Ibid, p. 357). Furthermore, according to him

"[T]he long practice of making merchandise of public authority(...)had vitiated and benumbed the moral sense of the English nation on the subject, so that reform had become tenfold more difficult; just as the moral sense of this nation [the U.S] has, from like causes, become blunted to the immorality of levying assessments and bestowing office for mere partisan purposes" (Eaton, 1880: 23-24).

However, it can be asserted that Wilson's essay "heralded the beginning of the Age of Management, in which the issue of recruitment received less attention than the development of technique" (Dworkin and Simmon, 1972: 6, cited in Skidmore, 1995: 29).

In this regard, Bruce Jennings (1991) added that

"The transformation of the civil service from a system based on partisanship and patronage to one based on merit and objective qualification was, in Wilson's view, but a "moral preparation" for the improvement of the organization and methods: it established the basis in law for an ethics of public service but did not create the conceptual or organizational foundations for that ethics" (p. 69).

Establishment of *professional autonomy* through professional neutrality and the preservation of *democratic accountability* were, in the course of Wilson's discussion, two ideas that have proved to be pivotal in the subsequent development of

professional ethics in public administration. Wilson's argument centered on the need for a distinction between politics and administration designed to allow administration its own distinctive sphere within which it can profit, literally, from the cultivation of businesslike methods. Because, Wilson believed that American business administration was based on laissez-faire markets, in which the ultimate value of efficiency found a comfortable lodging. As Wright and McConkie (1998) note

"[W]ilson urged public administration to follow the lead of business administration and get out of policy-making trap. Efficiency was the magical cure. Because the "market" set the value parameters, business administrators could ignore sticky value problems and concentrate on administrative efficiency" (pp: 6-7).

To Wilson, policy (or value) issues were the proper task of politics and political debate. He concluded for the role of public administration that it should center on the efficiency of implementation.

"[A]dministration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices(...)Public administration is the detailed and systematic execution of public law(...)The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative(...) [T]he administrator should have a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work. He is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument. The distinction is between general plans and special means" (Wilson, [1887] 1978: 13-14, second emphasis is mine).

It may be easily inferred from this long quotation about the specific ethical role of administrators that public administration profession had to have civil servants who neither made policy nor evaluated its morality. It is clear that the politics/administration dichotomy was designed to

free public administrators from the responsibility of making moral determinations. They were to be "value-neutral" (Wright and McConkie, op.cit. 10) and had a practice grounded in "a body of specialized knowledge and expertise" (Jennings, op. cit., 69). Consequently, Wilson drew a distinction between "a distinct, semi-corporate body" of bureaucrats withdrawn from "the common political life of the people" on the one hand, and "a corps of civil servants prepared by a special schooling and drill, after appointment, into a perfected organization with hierarchy and characteristic discipline" (Wilson, [1887] 1978: 13-14).

Moreover, Wilson believed that public administration needed not only public administrators with specialized knowledge and expertise to establish neutrality, hence, autonomy but also a body of subordinate and accountable professionals with a sense of ethical responsibility finely tuned to the values and processes of democracy to preserve also democratic accountability. According to Wilson, the distinction between politics and administration served well the first end. There were three ways to maintain democratic accountability of civil service (Jennings, op. cit., 70-71). Politics/administration dichotomy itself, above all, is one of the important ways because should the distinction be ensured appropriately and should administrative practices focus only on the instrumental means of pursuing politically determined ends, public administration preserves democratic accountability. Second was to combine democratic responsibility with the personnel self-interest of civil servants in an organizational structure. Third was the development and internalization of a higher sense of conscience, honor and integrity as a part of the professional self-identity and the professional ethics by public administrators. The last point was hidden in the following passage that Wilson wrote:

"The question for us is, who shall our series of governments within governments be so administrated that it shall always be in the interest of the public officer to serve, not his superior alone but the community also, with the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of his conscience? How shall such service be made to his commonest interests by contributing abundantly to his sustenance, to his dearest interests by furthering his ambition, and to his highest interests by advancing his honor and establishing his character?" (Wilson, op. cit., 16-17).

It was this two-folded characteristic (establishment of professional autonomy on the one hand, and preservation of democratic responsibility on the other) that politics/administration dichotomy tries to construct has been criticized by several scholars in terms of, at least, two different but interrelated aspects. According to them, distinction between politics and administration means a turning away from (a) (American) constitution in specific and constitutionalism in general and; (b) founding thought which should be basis for (American) public administration.

To begin with, we will briefly see some criticisms of the writers who believe that politics-administration dichotomy is not suitable for constitutional scrutiny. For these writers, Wilson's essay and the distinction made by him have been seen as one of the significant theoretical roots of a "tendency to gloss over constitutionalism(...)and which has helped to shape an approach to administrative education that gives the study of constitutional practice a very marginal role" (Maletz, 1991: 375):

"The recent rebirth of concern for education in professional ethics generally and ethics in public administration in particular also reveals a tendency to approach the issues in a way that is still a critique of the ideological emperor on the basis of what might be called an ethic of constitutional government" (Ibid., p. 374).

In a sense Maletz (1991) arrives at a different conclusion by following a very similar way to Jennings's. More importantly and highly germane to our present subject, Maletz contends that turning away from constitutionalism is not accidental. This turning away can be shown in Wilson's classic essay since Wilson's argument relied on the criticism of 19th century American democracy. Wilson, for Maletz, did not merely call attention to an existing distinction that has been overlooked. On the contrary, he "tried to create the distinction within an American governmental outlook that is too comprehensively democratic or populist in tune" (Ibid., 375). To do so, Wilson undertook a critique of democracy in America.

According to Maletz's (1991) interpretation, Wilson believed that popular controls are too intrusive and that the public is too distrustful of expertise when he was trying to develop a distinct public administration profession. In this context, he signs two features of Wilson's critique. Firstly, Wilson's critique suggested that "fundamental authority issues can be resolved in relatively final ways, after which a more technical era of governmental issues dawns in the form of administrative problems (p. 376). Although fundamental questions of authority and sovereignty are the truly central questions of politics and precede administrative problems in importance, Wilson insisted that these questions can eventually be settled in a relatively final way for all practical purpose. Once a people settled the issue of who should rule, the proper attention could be paid to administrative problems and their more competent resolution. However, sometimes this closure was (and still is) difficult to reach. Wilson was very clear when he stated that if administrative development becomes the focus of attention of populist American democracy, an obsession with popular control through legislative oversight and freedom for political criticism could become obstructive.

Second aspect of Wilson's critique, according to Maletz, was directly related with the effective control of civil servants. It is clear that Wilson admitted both the effect of administrative issues on constitutional authority and the need for a focus beyond the managerial craft that even thoroughly skilled and effective administrators must have. Maletz argues here that even though Wilson mentioned very cautiously that the proper distribution of authority and that claims for the suitable discretionary authority to be vested in professional administration are directly concerned with the understanding of administration, this argument "might suggest to an ordinary American populist certain dangers, especially to those who notice Wilson's explicit readiness to adopt European, even Prussian, models". Because Wilson anticipated objections of 'strict' democrats, he proposed a "distinct, semi-corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of a progressive, free-spirited people, and with he arts narrowed to the meanness of a bigoted officialism" to prevent an "offensive official class" or an "illiberal officialism" (p. 377). Undoubtedly, this is not merely a question about 'external control' over administrators. But rather, it is a question concerning their hearts and spirit that will animate them and their work. Furthermore. it is associated with the ultimate ends which administrators serve. Though Wilson wanted a public administration profession in the United States, unlike in Prussia, sensitive to public opinion at all points and loyalty of public administrators to something beyond professional managerial norms, there is significant defect in Wilson's position. This was the too fluid, populist and amorphous concept of public opinion that failed to draw a distinction between constitution and more fluctuating opinions and positions. In fact, as Maletz (1991) continues to explain

"a simple maxim of loyalty to public opinion can not adequately serve the purpose that Wilson intended:

the simultaneous critique of intrusive populism and the creation of visible loyalty to something higher than professional expertise. Wilson's wording unwittingly sacrificed the first aspect and carelessly endorsed the overly democratic tendency he had earlier criticized. But his recognition of the need for some set of administrative loyalties outside those of the professional corps indicates a genuine need. That need can be addressed if we turn to the constitution and constitutionalism(...)as an act by which the public authoritatively establishes norms, practices and a certain outlook on the spirit and tone of government" (p: 377).

After having emphasized the criticism of Wilsonian politics/administration dichotomy in terms of whether it is suitable for constitutional democracy, we can turn to the debate on the founding perspective on public administration. To do so, it is necessary to look more closely at two general but different commentaries regarding key aspects of the founder's perspective on public service, both of which may legitimately claim support in founding perspective.

One of these commentaries emphasizes that the founders' hope was that the constitutional system would encourage the emergence of a "natural aristocracy" of educated and virtuous citizens dedicated to public service and the preservation of the republic. The other line of reasoning, on the other hand, urges that the founders intended to rely primarily on constitutional and other mechanisms for "channeling" and "checking" self-interest (including that of public administrators) (Richardson and Nigro, 1991: 277). This also reflects a tension surfaced at an important question: "Must public administrators be exceptionally virtuous in order to carry out political functions or can they have no special or elevated character traits of public officials?" --a tension between two characterization of public administrator: the disinterested administrator on the one hand, and the self-

interested administrator on the other-- Now, we concentrate on the context within which this tension develops.

It is believed in one of the characterizations --the disinterested administrator-- that public administrators should be committed to democracy and regime values and be held accountable to elevated standards of "noblesse oblige" or benevolence. Because, as Hart (1984) clearly emphasizes, "the founders(...)believed that the success of the system would depend upon the virtue of citizens and honor of its public servants. [Therefore,] an essential characteristic of the honorable bureaucrat is a devotion to noblesse oblige the moral nobility" (p. 118). Hart's this interpretation, for Richardson and Nigro (op. cit. 278), highlights the Founders' desire for representatives who would be truly disinterested and men and women capable of rising above private interests in order to identify the public interest and to seek the common good. Since many of the founders held concerns that the common man may not fulfill the idealistic view of man and were far from opposed to the cultivation of virtuous administrator ideal, they developed a government philosophy based ideally on ethical character of the individual governors and a government structures preventing bad character from dominating. Wright and McConkie (1988) title this discourse of administrative ethics as "Organizational Ethics of Good Character"¹⁰ (p. 4).

¹⁰ In the introductory chapter of "Papers on the Ethics of Administration," edited by N. Dale Wright, the authors state the other discourses of administrative ethics as "Organizational Ethics of God's Order" in which 'monarchs,' rulers and kings were given legitimacy to the exercise of power for the maintenance of social order; (after the emergence of "Organizational Ethics of Good Character" of Founder's, with a relatively brief life span of less than a century) "Ethics of Empirical Order," brought about by societal changes and the acceptance of the science of the period, wherein the value questions of organizational life became answerable by the scientific method, and, lastly; since the years following Korean War, "Organizational Ethics

Some elements of 'good character' are defined by Burns (1983) as follows:

"They [founders] wanted virtue in both leaders and citizens. By virtue they meant at the least good character and civic concern; at the most a heroic love for the public good, a devotion to justice, a willingness to sacrifice comfort and riches for the public weal, an elevation of the soul" (p. 62).

According to the first line of reasoning which believe in disinterested administrator founding fathers of American administration system such as Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Hamilton agreed, despite the differences, on the need for virtue, personal integrity, and "fitness of character" as higher standards. Besides, their approach placed administration in the hand of gentry, that is, the educated and the wealthy. The first era of constitutional government in the U.S., therefore, has known as an era of "Government by

of Social Unrest" which concerns with the social responsibility of organizations and attempts to create organizational systems that would either create good people or control the excesses of bad people. This book is important because of the fact that it is a collection of essays written by a group of scholars met at Brigham Young University in the spring of 1987. The writers had been invited to write a paper about his or her particular interest in the area of organizational ethics. It should be immediately stated that that discussion, looked from one angle, reflects a search for a theoretical framework, and, looked from another angle, a search for non-ambivalent, non-aporetic, universal and well-founded ethical code. But, it seems that the consequence of conference justifies Bauman's assertion: that ethical foundations are elusive. For example, Wright and McConkie conclude, "The evolution of the discussion gave rise to a comment by one of the participants that "we don't even agree on a common set of values upon which our organizational ethics can be based. To begin a work on administrative ethics without some definition of the substance of the term would suggest (...) that we know not of what we speak. To attempt some definition would only confirm the suspicion. It may well be that the single most significant aspect of this collection of essays is not in what is said but in what is left unsaid" (Ibid, 1-2; emphasis mine).

Gentlemen" (Skidmore, 1995: 29). Given an opportunity to establish an administrative structure as well as the criteria of selection and standards of behavior of public servants, George Washington, for instance, resolved ethical dilemma of undue influence by different value system upon public administrators by arguing that the primary criterion for service was "fitness of character."¹¹ Similarly, Madison wanted to see the clashing interests of factions neutralize each other, allowing virtuous men to step in and promote the public good (Richardson and Nigro, 1991: 280). Consequently, for those who see "the disinterested administrator" characterization fit to the governmental organization, it was in this context that American public administration was born. Good government in this perspective was clearly the result of the moral character of those who governed.

Furthermore, directly regarding the distinction between politics and administration urged by Wilson, this line of thinking stresses that the founders did not think politics could or should be separate from administration because of the fact that in a Federalist system, all parts of the government became rulers and representatives of the people at the same time. Seeing public administrators "as a special class in society not affected by ordinary human weakness produced a doctrine that effectively removed the bureaucrat from scholarly scrutiny" (Miewald, 1984: 27-28). The most important effect of later efforts, which try to conceptually separate administration from politics, was to remove questions of

¹¹ In this regard, Leonard D. White wrote in his 1948 study, "The Federalists: A study in Administrative History" that "fitness did not mean to him [Washington] technical competence (except in legal and very few scientific appointments) nor can it be said that in Washington's time technical competence was recognized generally as a prerequisite for selection" (p. 259). Instead, fitness meant for founders personal integrity and standing in the community.

character and ethics from the mainstream in the field. For example, Federalist perspective on public administration was rejected by Andrew Jackson in the USA, and the proponents of Jacksonian democracy in favor of rotation in office when he assumed the presidency in 1829. The result was the 'spoils system' in the next few decades and the governmental reform movements due to vanishing of all ethical standards in late 1800s.

Broadly speaking, second commentary about the role of founding fathers in the establishment of a discipline's ethical identity concludes that the founders never intended to base the American regime on citizen virtue and the honor of its administrators. For scholars who share this view, writings of founders show that "there were profound reservations about the extent of which Americans could be expected to rise above self-interest" and that the founders were too realistic in assuming that "selfish passions and interest are usually stronger than public ones -for individuals as well as groups" (Richardson and Nigro, 1991: 281). A regime based on human nature as it was, not as founders might wish it to be necessitated eventually supervision and controlling of public administration. In this regime, administrative and bureaucratic theory focused necessarily on the issues of hierarchy-authority, accountability-responsibility, and political-management control systems. Constitutional separation of powers; statutory, structural and procedural checks on the exercise of executive power and administrative discretion; judicial review; legislative oversight; and open administrative rule-making procedures have all mirrored, according to scholars with second interpretation of founding thought, founders' refusal to rely on fitness of character of the disinterested public administrator who has love for the public good, benevolence and willingness to sacrifice comfort (p. 283).

As I have expressed, two different interpretations of founding perspective on public administration and the tension between the disinterested public administrator and the self-interested one thus, the implied tension between external and internal controls over public servant. Interestingly, Richardson and Nigro utilize from Tocqueville's commentary on the American doctrine to determine their last position against these tensions. Tocqueville's view is worth quoting.

"[W]hen the world was under the control of a few rich and powerful men, they liked to entertain a sublime conception of the duties of man. It gratified them to make out that it is glorious thing to forget oneself and that one should do good without self-interest, as God himself does. That was the official doctrine of morality at the time" (Richardson and Nigro, 1991: 283).

After getting a theoretical base from Tocqueville, they conclude

"[T]he apparently contradictory nature of the founders' thought on this issue may be resolved if it is understood that they sought to establish conditions under which disinterested or morally elevated administration could emerge, but not at the expense of republican government, democratic values, or the "realistic" definition of human nature that underpins the constitution (...) [Therefore,] for American public administration, the implications are clear: Whatever excellences of character are asked of the administrator, or asked by the administrator of the citizen, must rest squarely on the regime's *foundation*" (Richardson and Nigro, 1991: 284-285, emphasis added).

To sum up, we have seen that Wilsonian distinction between politics and administration is pivotal in the subsequent discussion of professional ethics in public administration. We have also seen that the politics-administration dichotomy was two-folded: to establish professional autonomy, on the one hand, through professional neutrality and to maintain democratic accountability, on the other hand, through

subordinate and accountable professionals. However, the dichotomy, for some, means turning away from Constitutionalism or (American) founding thought. Yet, the writers who believe that Wilsonian distinction is turning away from founding thought contradict about the key aspects of the founders' perspective. This differentiation also reflects the tension between the conceptualizations of 'disinterested' and 'self-interested' public administrator as well as between the external and internal controls.

In my opinion, a series of essentially irreconcilable statements in Wilson's essay --stemmed from its dual characteristic trying to establish professional autonomy and preserve democratic responsibility simultaneously through politics/administration dichotomy-- can be read, in this regard, as a reflection of two conflicting versions of founding thought. Obviously enough, both those who advocate the turning back to founding perspective (regardless of its different versions on condition that public administration depends upon the regime's foundation and values) and those who propose to restore constitutionalism and ethic of constitutional government criticize Wilsonian dichotomy. For Maletz (1991) the problem with Wilson's essay generally and the idea of seperability in particular is that unlike in Constitution, there is a lack of distinct and useful public standards in ethical matters in Wilson's approach. Thus Wilson failed to make "loyalty to public opinion" a part of the real study of administration. However, for Richardson and Nigro (1991), the problem with the adaptation of such separation -- which the authors of the constitution did not make-- is that current treatments of administrative ethics trying to separate administration from politics either explicitly or implicitly are at "the risk of being trivial or blindly undermining the founders' accomplishment" (p. 376).

In fact, such like criticisms are not new. Dwight Waldo, the preeminent historian of public administration in America, criticized Wilsonian distinction and the value-neutral characterization of public administrators about fifty years ago. In his classic, "The Administrative State" (1948), he pointed out that the "secular spirit" of the politics/administration dichotomy

"advance[s] from the old belief that the problem of good government is the problem of moral men that they [Wilson, etc.] arrived at the opposite position: that morality is irrelevant, that proper institutions and expert personnel are determining. The new amorality became almost a requisite for professional respect" (p. 23).

However, if the founders' approach to public administration as a political enterprise had been followed by Wilson --and by his pupils as well--, questions regarding the character of public administrators could not easily have been treated as secondary issues (p. 97-100).

It must be acknowledged that Wilson himself had some ethical concerns in his essay. This is evident at his democratically responsible and responsive profession of public administration typology. But later, so much of the nuance and the richness of Wilson's original ethical concerns disappeared in public administration literature, especially in the writings of scientific management scholars. It is a truism to say that in the middle of the 20th century, public administration was far closer to German and French bureaucracies that Wilson warned against at first (Jennings, 1991: 72).

From now on, we will turn to the scientific management scholars' contributions in terms of administrative ethics. Yet, before doing so, we should look at a radically different approach regarding the relevance of the founding perspective on public administration. This is the argument developed in O.

C. McSwite's somewhat new study, "Legitimacy in Public Administration: A Discourse Analysis".

It should be noted, first of all, that the position of McSwite can be labeled as postmodern perspective because it denies that any line of discourse should be regarded as holding a meta-theoretical position from which it can state the truth. Thus, for McSwite, Federalist assumptions and views indicate such like 'meta-theoretical position' for public administration.

More importantly, Federalist line of thinking has produced, even required, a 'legitimacy crisis' resulting from a paradigm emphasis on 'Men of Reason' who value science and pursue a separation between the political and the administratively technical. The political background of the current legitimacy crisis in (American) public administration, according to the authors, can be traced to the abandonment of the "Articles of Confederation" and its replacement with Federalist principles and structures. McSwite is not contented from common mythology surrounding the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. This 'cabal-like secrecy' surrounding the Constitution and the Federalist perspective became the basis for the 'mis-founding' of the field of public administration. As Whicker (1998) mentions that McSwite believes that the practical consequence of the Federalist victory has been to abandon the anti-Federalist notions of the connected and interconnected 'peaceful kingdom' and to render public life as "autistic," with citizens unable to relate to each other directly in a meaningful way. As the field was intellectually trapped into Federalist thinking, anti-Federalist pragmatism, which could have cast public administrators in a central and legitimate role because their authority rested on social and political cooperation, was never given full and fair consideration as a model for public administration. "Autistic" public life, in

turn, requires that decisions be made by technically competent, intellectually cool men of Reason and hence, arises the ongoing legitimacy crisis of integrating cool-minded, technically competent, detached administrators into a democratic government. The Federalist perspective requires that such men, and the crisis they propel, exist (Ibid. p.260).

Critiquing the Federalist perspective as one of elitism and limited participation, McSwite ponders what would have happened if 'the road not taken' (anti-Federalist pragmatism), in fact, had been. They trace the emergence of the road not taken back to the turbulent years of the US under the Articles of Confederation and add that this road has an alternative ethos for public administration. This ethos would view governance as the creation of "peaceable kingdom" where citizens see civic discussion as grounded in human relationships with each other with resultant conversations based on a shared context. Once a shared context is achieved, McSwite argues, priorities will be clear, decisions can be made, and the actions can be taken, all based on a process of human interaction and founded on relationships and connections.

It seems that legitimacy crisis or perennial dilemma of public administration (in America) lies historically at the difficulty of fitting administration into democratic government or, in other words, --to use Richardson and Nigro's language --at the difficulty of reconciliation "disinterested or morally elevated administration with democratic values and scrutinize". In this context, McSwite bases the legitimacy crisis in (American) public administration upon the distinction between federalist elitism, which represents the installation of officials who would govern through the counsel of experts, and anti-Federalist communitarianism with an

underlying assumption that every avenue for the expression of the popular will should be opened. Furthermore, a solution to the field's legitimacy problem, for McSwite, is to adopt a model for public administration grounded in the works of pragmatists (e.g. Mary Parker Follet) who emphasize pragmatic collaboration of administrators with citizens. Obviously enough, the argument employed by McSwite seems radically different from the authors' perspective which I have examined up to now. Although some writes such as Richardson and Nigro (1991), Hart (1983, 1984), and Maletz (1991) suggest to return to the founders' (federalist) perspective, ethic of constitutional ethic and regime values in order to provide a solid foundation on which to base any effort to define or to prescribe the ethical duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the public servants, McSwite strongly criticizes elitism and limited participation of Federalist perspective, the "mis-founding" the public administration and "autistic" public life stemmed from this mis-founding. Instead, by using "pragmatism is postmodern" argument, the authors try to examine how the field of public administration passes "Beyond Reason" --title of Chapter 7 in the same volume -- through a series of topics, including sex and gender and the relation of both to a "reasonable" comprehension of reality, a critique of mathematics as a way of defining reality, and how we can make a world without reason.

After shortly reviewing a radical charge to Federalist perspective's relevance to the field of public administration, now, we can turn our attention to the works of scientific management scholars.

2.1.b Scientific Management: Obedience to Superiors and Efficiency as the Basic Good

Shortly after Wilson's "The Study of Administration" (1887) Frank Goodnow published his 'classical' and field-founding

book, "Politics and Administration: A Study in Government" in 1900. This book, popularizing and carried forward Wilson's ideas, became one of the basic textbooks of public administration expressing uncompromisingly the distinction between politics and administration that Wilson had suggested. Harmoniously with the developing "scientific management" of the time, (Wilson and later) Goodnow argued that the 'science' of administration was needed in administering the Constitution (Wright and McConkie, 1988: 10). However, as Skidmore (1995) properly shows, "Wilson had desired a civil service that was professional and could exercise some judgment as to how to serve both superiors and the community," on the contrary, Goodnow and many later administrative theorist "sought to achieve professionalism for civil servants by denying them any exercise of moral judgment" (p. 10).

By the strong contribution of Goodnow, conservative paradigm of public administration was definitely emerged: politics and administration were distinctly separate. While the political function is expressing the will of the state, the administrative function is dealing with 'scientific,' technical, and commercial activities involved in governance (Whicker, 1998: 263). These ideas prove that politics/administration dichotomy fairly thickened in Goodnow's influential work. He and other proponents of the distinction purchased professional autonomy for public administrators at the price of extreme moral passivity. Nevertheless, this is not to say that Goodnow offers direct treatment of administrative ethics and there are entries in the index for terms such as "ethics," "morality," or "public interest". "Responsibility" was the only concept employed from which one might infer an administrative ethics. It is clear in Goodnow's treatment of the problem of the 'political boss' that public administrators are responsible only for the execution of policy determined by elected officials. Besides,

there was no recognition of the unavoidable discretionary power of administrators in the modern state and the policy-making role that necessarily follows. Controlling of a merit-based civil service system above through a 'reasonable concentration and centralization' of authority, according to him, constraints administrative action and makes government more ethical and responsible.

Consequently, simple obedience to superiors became the foundation that Goodnow (and others) provided for an ethics of administration. Bruce Jennings (1991: 69-73) calls this 'classical ethical frame in public administration as "ethics of authoritative obedience"'. He writes

"Obedience to superior constitutional authority became the regulative, authoritative cornerstone of administrative ethics. Obedience not out of prudence, or careerism, or self-interest but out of principled moral commitment was the central ethical frame that both shaped the internal life of public bureaucracies and served to legitimate the considerable de facto power that administrators exercised" (p. 71).

Undoubtedly, this sort of morality for public administrators radically differs from the Federalists' notion of morality relying on prudence and from anti-Federalists' conceptualization depending upon self-interest.

It can be said that Wilson and Goodnow set the intellectual tone for a very subtle movement away from the 'ethical constructs' the Founding Fathers so deliberately sought to include in both the Constitution and the system of government that flowed from it. Moreover, dominance of obedience as a matter of principle brought about the disappearance of the subtle complexities of Wilson's ideas --such as concern for 'ethics' as in the form of combination of democratic responsibility with the personal self-interest of civil servants or the internalization of higher sense of honor,

integrity, and conscience. As a result, attention turned to the development of administrative theory as a science, as reflected in the works of William F. Willoughby, Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, and Herbert Simon.

For example, Willoughby's 1927 work, "The Principle of Public Administration", continued the general tendency starting with Wilson and Goodnow. In this book, civil service merit system was viewed as a moral structure that would lead to ethical public administration. Ethics was not considered as an individual professional skill involving a discrete body of knowledge and analytic techniques in Willoughby. Rather, it was the product of organization and personnel theory and certain scientifically grounded arrangements, procedures and rules. Focusing on efficiency and the quest for scientific principles of administration, as the means of achieving it were so clear in his work. He saw loyalty, esprit de corps, and willingness to work as essential to efficiency. However, it was so clear that by demanding "equal opportunities to all citizens to enter government service, equal pay to all employees doing work requiring the same degree of intelligence and capacity, equal opportunities for advancement, equally favorable work conditions, and equal participation in retirement allowances," (p. 230) he once again was describing system traits and the requisites of organizational efficiency (Cooper, 1994: 5).

In a like manner but more directly, Luther Gulick wrote in the final chapter of the "Papers on the Science of Administration", edited by Gulick and Urwick (1937) that

"In the science of administration whether public or private, the basic 'good' is efficiency. The fundamental objective of the science of administration is the accomplishment of the work in hand with the least expenditure of man-power and

materials. Efficiency is thus axiom number one in the value scale of administration" (p. 192).

Unquestionably, this statement also fairly reflects how scientific management writers perceive the role of subjective values in management thought: in short, Gulick and his colleagues sought to develop 'scientific' principles of administration.

On the other hand, though Gulick wrote this final chapter -- stressing the efficiency as axiom number one in 1937-- he had earlier publicly acknowledged the beginning of the collapse of politics/administration dichotomy. In his 1933 article, entitled "Politics and Administration and the New Deal", published at The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, he accepted the obvious fact administrators did indeed create policy, and thus, they were involved in politics (p. 55-56). What he failed to do was to discuss where these policy-making administrators received their ethical instruction.

In fact, 1930s saw several 'blows' to the idea of a value-free public administration and what Cooper (1995: 5) calls "stress cracks in the dominant consensus" regarding the distinction between the politics and administration. To illustrate, John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White and Marshall E. Dimock published their collection, "The Frontiers of Public Administration" in 1936. In the opening chapter of this volume, "The Meaning and Scope of Public Administration (pp. 1-12)", Dimock cautioned against "going to far in the formal separation between politics and administration" (p. 3). Moreover, indicating that researchers soon discover "the important differences in place, time, local tradition, and objective which need to be given their full weight" (p. 4), he subtly called the possibility of a science of administration and the universalizability claim of modern 'scientific' public administration into question. By

this way, he was giving early but weak signals of 'communitarian' philosophy in the field.

John Gaus used the term "inner check" which he had borrowed from debates in the literary journals of his time in a chapter in which he discussed "The Responsibility of Public Administration" (pp. 26-44). This term consisted of obligation acknowledged by individual public administrators "due to the standards and ideals" of their profession (pp. 39-40). This conceptualization of responsibility is more close to modern government than accountability to elected officials.

Interestingly, one of the most devastating attacks to organizational efficiency came from Dimock in the same volume, a year before Gulick suggested efficiency as the basic good for public or private organizations. As he stated in the concluding chapter of the volume, "The Criteria and Objectives of Public Administration" (pp. 116-133), efficiency was the central value of progressive public administration. The highest compliment for a government in the United States, according to him, is to suggest that it is efficient. He added, "it is no exaggeration to say that, particularly in the last fifty years, American citizens have developed an attribute toward the term 'efficiency' which is nothing short of worshipful" (p. 116). The next step for Dimock was to begin to question why values are important to public administration and set out the desirability of a broader administrative philosophy involving "the virtue of loyalty, as well as honesty, enthusiasm, humility, and all other attributes of character and conduct which contribute to effective and satisfying service" (p. 132).

Regarding the Gaus and Dimock's contribution, Cooper (1994) writes, that "[their works] reflect a gradual but certain tectonic shift in administrative thought which made it almost

inevitable that ethics would receive major attention sooner or later" (p. 6). The most evident consequences of this "tectonic shift" in fact is started to be seen in the years came shortly after World War II and in the new period started with a debate between Carl J. Friedrich and Herman Finer. Many political scientists had served in governmental agencies during the war. They returned to their classrooms with a whole new set of ideas. They rejected the myths of value neutrality in public administration since they had got the actual experience of administration, which was "good news" about the ethical scene in the field. The "bad news", on the other hand, was that some disturbing new problems regarding organizational ethics came to the fore due to the fact that "the values so eloquently expressed by the Founders had been battered almost beyond repair by the blows of "scientific method" and "cultural relativism"" (Wright and McConkie, 1988:11).

Unlike Cooper's (1994) classification in which the late 1930s through the 1960s are properly examined as a second period coming after the early years of public administration and forming the foundation for a field of study focusing on administrative ethics -that's why, Gaus, White, and Dimock's volume is included in this period-- I tend to date the second period from the lively debate between Friedrich and Finer. I, furthermore, have an additional reason to do so. In my opinion, Friedrich-Finer debate coincides with an important step for public administration in general and forming of administrative ethics in particular. The year 1940 indicates the beginning of the publication of Public Administration Review (PAR). Ethics has received sustained attention since the inception of PAR. As the journal of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), PAR'S treatment of administrative ethics has influenced several generations of students and practitioners. Well-informed discussions of PAR'S treatment of administrative ethics are by Nigro and Richardson

(1990) in their "Between Citizen and Administrator: Administrative Ethics and PAR" and, in part, by Cooper's (1994) work. But before doing so, Weber's ideas deserve attention here.

2.1.c Max Weber

While, at the turn of the century, Frederick Taylor's techniques of scientific management was popularizing the approach of the "efficiency expert", from the Continent was coming the influence of the sociologist Max Weber, who stressed the nature of the bureaucracy and emphasized hierarchical structure and chain of command. What had appeared in the middle of 20th century, as I have mentioned earlier, was something far closer to German and French bureaucracies that Wilson warned against than to what Wilson himself envisioned as a democratically responsible and responsive profession of public administration. Interestingly, the warning regarding the relationships between bureaucrats and elected officials came not only from Wilson but also from Weber. Now, we look at the ideas of Weber about the nature of the relationship between politics and administration.

While "Weber's senior colleagues in the *Verein fur Sozialpolitick* (an academic association for the study of social policy) sang consistently the praises of the German and Austrian bureaucracies and endowed them with superior status and special emotional mystique," Weber insisted that bureaucracy is not a disinterested force but one that often reflects particular class-based interests and that as a separate power group in society (Felts and Jos, 1996: 23).

In fact, Weber's well-known conception of the technically efficient bureaucracy --that can, in principle, be made to work for any interest that can control it-- was developed in opposition to a more conservative view of his time. This view

was portraying the bureaucracy as a neutral force that stood above particular competing interests embodying the universal interest of society as a whole. He explicitly rejects the hope that bureaucracy might cultivate a special connection to the public interest, one that provides special legitimacy in the eyes of public. Of course, this is not to say that Weber was not careful to praise the competence and devotion to duty of the administrator. But it is to say that he did not confuse his ideal type with the reality of the German administrative apparatus. Weber strongly believes that bureaucracy is not a mere tool and that it can have a decisive impact on politics and society. Besides, he was finding this fact so troubling. Therefore, he argued consistently that true leadership could only come from the outside of administration (Weber, 1998: 290-330). He saw bureaucracy's influence as a dangerous usurpation of the elected official's role as well. Inasmuch as he considered bureaucracy's performance in conducting of German foreign policy as 'disastrous', he asserted that bureaucrats are particularly ill suited to public leadership. In this regard, Weber completes the picture that puts the public administrator's role out the arena of politics. He concedes that individual bureaucrats may perhaps potentially be capable of leadership but the conventions and the internal peculiarities of the bureaucratic hierarchy severely impede the career opportunities of precisely such talents. Felts and Jos (1996: 24) quotes Weber as saying that

"Countless experience, which everybody can make all about him, teach that the quality which best guarantees promotion is a measure of pliancy toward the apparatus, the degree of the subordinate's convenience for his superior. The selection is, on the average, certainly not of born leaders" (Weber, 1968: 1449).

Weber's account of bureaucratic deference does not depend solely on organizational structure but on recognizing the

importance of expertise in bureaucracy and modern world. Bureaucracy demands a good deal of technical know-how, and educational institutions, responding to this need, "are dominated by the need for the kind of 'education' which is bred by the system of specialized examinations or tests of expertise" (Weber, 1998: 319). Although in the feudal, theocratic and patrimonial power structures of the past, education sought to produce the 'cultivated man', today education is oriented towards the training of specialists (p. 322). Once employed in organizations, Weber writes, the professional bureaucrat "is chained to his activity in his entire economic and ideological existence(...)in the great majority of cases he is only small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march" (p. 311).

On the other hand, professional or administrative expertise and the deference it is often accorded emerge consistently as the most essential aspect of Weber's larger account of both the strength and weakness of bureaucracy because his account depends upon a societal analysis of the bureaucrats' standing vis-à-vis politicians and other state institutions:

"The power position of fully developed bureaucracy is always great, under normal conditions overtowering. The political "master" always finds himself, vis-à-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing the expert. This holds whether the "master", whom the bureaucracy serves, is the "people" equipped with the weapons of legislative initiative, referendum and the right to remove officials; or a parliament(...)or aristocratic collegiate body, (...)or a popularly elected president or an "absolute" or "constitutional" hereditary monarch" (Weber, 1998: 314-315).

Looked from this perspective, Weber's analysis shows, depending on how we view the process of becoming an expert or acquiring expertise, a possible process of co-optation. But

looked from another perspective and highly germane to public administration ethics discussion, his analysis suggests how administration is usually able to resist new political mandates without entering explicitly the debate over substantive values. The term dilettante denotes the idea of amateur and, in this regard, the characteristic relationship between politics and administration is more one of deference than challenge. When expertise has the charismatic stamp of office, or officialdom, it becomes particularly potent. Felts and Jos (1996) summarize that situation as follows.

"-Expertise is acquired through a progressive exchange of broad based knowledge for progressively specific knowledge. This result is a narrowing of one's focus. Experts become unwilling to relinquish control in their own areas of expertise and are less and less likely to recognize the limits of that expertise.

-Expertise itself creates a pattern of deference among experts. Acquiring expertise entails precisely that(...)Experts will more readily acknowledge their own limits when they are confronted with one having (or claiming expertise) in another area.

-Expertise leads to a more or less patrimonial attitude towards non-experts. The non-expert simply does not understand but, in principal, can (if one but has the discipline and perseverance to do so). Thus, expertise can claim to be non-aristocratic while being so" (p. 29).

It is easily understandable from this characteristic of relationship between expertise and office that bureaucratic domination entails more than just an organizational form. So long as the debate between bureaucrats and politicians becomes based on expertise, it ceases to be a normative exchange and becomes an arena confined to instrumental rationality. The result is that political debate (read the determination of arbitrarily given ends and values) takes on the qualities of a spectacle in which administrative (read technical, instrumental) means are determined. Instrumental rationality overwhelms substantive consideration of value choices in the modern world. When the debate between bureaucracy and politics

is conducted in a vocabulary that reflects instrumental rationality, executive-legislative-administrative exchanges are cast in terms of a competition among experts. In such a situation administrators may well resist both executive and legislative mandates not so much because they have a desire for power. While executive and legislative responses are predictable; that is, they have resorted to micro-management techniques, responses of administrators to external control is much more institutional because of the fact that they have day-to-day knowledge and can not see clearly why they should follow legislative or executive experts rather than their own. Analogously, it might be said that the way of preventing the debate occurring on a plane of instrumental rationality and of new appeals to substantively different values is to shift the debate to an entirely new plane, where the instrumentalities do not lie at the hub of the matter (Ibid. 26-27).

In Weber's analysis, instrumental rationality is all but inevitable because expertise and technical rationality could sustain social order and legitimate authority even in the face of inherently subjective and arbitrary ultimate ends, regardless of substantive consideration of value considerations. More importantly, the hope connected with sustaining of social order and legitimacy finds its most systematic and sophisticated expression in Weber's work. Bureaucracy represents the principal bulwark against the forces of unreason in modern times because it is the most important locus of rational means (Jennings, 1991: 73), but if we try to move outside the boundaries of expertise, then we are faced with the dilemma of considering the implications of the imbued 'charisma of office'. Bureaucracy, in the end, suggests a validation of expert-based knowledge and power that transcends bureaucratic organizations. Then, it begins to speak to the very possibility of substantial value

determination in a charismatic sense (Felts and Jos, 1996: 30).

On the other hand, Jennings (1991) states, "nothing stands between the prophet and engineer". And he adds that in a nice reversal of tradition, for Weber it is the latter, not the former who will deliver us, if only into an iron cage" (p.73). Felts and Jos (1996), however, see Weber's iron cage "not a distant worst case scenario but a contemporary reality" (p. 30). They conclude

"[M]uch of the current rhetoric focusing on the administrative state, and the charge that it has failed to sustain a satisfactory system of values, appears to echo many of the central concerns expressed by Weber. At a various points in his career and in various ways, Weber hinted clearly that there would be a spiritual (read "value") failure of modernity as it seemed more and more to be expressed by the administrative state(...)" (p. 22).

So viewed, ethical issues in public administration and failure of the field to pursue appropriate normative ends are directly related with the very legitimacy of the administrative state. However, a Weberian analysis -an analysis focusing on his account of the rise of bureaucratic forms of authority and the dynamics of political efforts to control it- of the contemporary challenge to the administrative state obviously shows that bureaucracy can not "articulate and defend substantive values properly or wisely" and that "administrators (notwithstanding their considerable talents) are an especially threatening participant in struggles over the ends of the state" (p. 22).

Consequently, it can be said that a conceptualization of public administration as a discipline in its early years, relying on explicit distinction between politics and administration on the one hand, and the specialized knowledge, scientific expertise and instrumental (technical) rationality

on the other, has become a Trojan horse. It has concealed a thousand hostile elements since the establishment years of the field. After giving Weber's ideas briefly, we can continue our review and turn forming years of administrative ethics.

2.2 FORMING OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ETHICS: 1940-1960s

2.2.a 1940s: Increasing Discretion and Rejection of Neutrality

As I have stated earlier, my tendency regarding the specification of a beginning for the second period in development of administrative ethics is that the change may be dated from a debate between Friedrich and Finer and to the inauguration of PAR. Friedrich-Finer debate, like publication of PAR, was a very critical turning point in ethics discussions because, as Dwight Waldo emphasizes, it was "occasioned by the discipline's growing realization that the politics-administration dichotomy was neither an accurate description of nor a prescription for the conduct of administrative duties" (quoted in Wall (1991: 136)).

In 1941, in the first volume of PAR, Herman Finer published an essay. In this essay, he was continuing his debate with Carl Friedrich over the concept administrative responsibility that should be applied in a democracy. Finer's essay was a milestone in PAR because it opened the door continuing series of commentaries on the nature of the public administrator's responsibilities.

In fact, the debate between Friedrich and Finer started in 1935. The former stressed the inadequacy of external controls to maintain responsible administrative conduct in modern complex organizations and called for the 'inner check' in his "Problems of the American Public Service" in 1935, the latter, on the contrary, emphasized the weakness of internal controls in the face of human propensity for rationalization and

reaffirmed the necessity for political control of administrators through laws, rules, and sanctions in an article in *Political Science Quarterly*, titled "Better Government Personnel" in 1936. The debate was inflamed by the inception of PAR. In his 1941 essay, Finer expressed little sympathy for Friedrich's concept of responsibility as a largely subjective matter involving the individual's sense of duty and obligation, intellectual integrity, and loyalty to professional standards. He urged, in contrast, a definition centering on "an arrangement of correction and punishment" (p. 335). Patently, Finer tried to find out some ethical guides or frames of reference which public administrators should look to for assistance in determining how best to assure that democratic government and popular sovereignty are preserved in the context of an inevitably powerful administrative state. Herman Finer indicated primary obligations and other external means in order to cultivate strong political institutions and assure responsiveness and accountability. He asserted

"Never was the political responsibility of officials so momentous a necessity as in our own era. Moral responsibility is likely to operate in direct proportion to the strictness and efficiency of political responsibility(...)While professional standards, duty to public, and pursuit of technological efficiency are factors in sound administrative operation, they are but ingredients(...)and they require public and political control and direction(...)Thus political responsibility is the major concern of those who work for healthy relationships between the officials and the public, and moral responsibility, although a valuable conception and institutional form, is minor and subsidiary" (p. 350).

On the other hand, in 1940, R. G. Tugwell's article, "Implementing the General Interest," focused on the notion of "the general interest" as a central criterion for evaluating the planning commission of the City of New York. At an earlier time "efficiency" would have been a more likely candidate.

governance" (1991; 23-24, italics original). Now we can return to the discussion regarding the nature of ethical codes.

Ralph Chandler (1983) states that there are three important "virtues of codes:" objectivism, community and courage. He thought these three principles, first, describe existence of the "external transcendent values"; second, indicate a situation in which moral behavior is not seen only as a matter of personal preferences but is perceived as "community judgment"; and third identify "the idea that codes can promote courageous behavior". In this regard, ethical code of ICMA is criticized since it does not meet the first characteristic - objectivism- in Chandler's description. on the other hand, it is asserted that ASPA's code has more missing points in terms of all three characteristics.

Of course, criticisms directed to the ethical codes are not merely confined to whether they have important 'virtues' or not. For some, these codes 'trivialize' ethical behavior and reduce it to simply staying out of trouble. Others believe that they are simply irrelevant and fail to intellectually challenge and inspire those for whom they are written (Streib, 1987:16). It is important to note that these criticisms have also a historical background. For instance, in 1976, Wakefield was talking about vague and general nature of ethical codes with their tendency to dwell on proscribed rather than prescribed behavior and their inability to answer specific behavioral questions (p: 663). As we saw in Chapter I, she suggested public interest as the unifying moral imperative for public servants.

Nevertheless, existence of effective and successful ethical codes is an undeniable fact in modern world. One and perhaps the most popular one of these codes is in the field of medicine. Some public administration scholars argue -even with

However, Tugwell went on to prescribe an obligation to represent the public interest: "This implementing, for once, of a general interest rather than of special interests is the most significant feature of the Commission's activity" (p. 33). It seems that Tugwell assumed a sufficient general agreement about the meaning of the concept to make it useful. Yet it can be asserted there was no real conceptual or theoretical development, only general application.

In a specific chapter authored by Fritz Morstein Marx (1940) in "Public Management in the New Democracy," also edited by Marx, one can see a synthesis of the Friedrich-Finer debate. Although Marx accepted legislative control as necessary as a foundation for responsible conduct he tried to show and underline to move beyond legislative control. His view is a good example of deontological approach in public administration and deserves to quote:

"The heart of administrative responsibility is a *unified conception of duty*, molded by ideological and professional precepts; a firm determination on the part of the official to sacrifice personal preference to the execution of legislative policy and to infuse his energies and his creative impulse into his task; a wakeful consciousness of the deference he owes to the people and its vital interests. Administrative responsibility emanates from an attitude of true service. In the shaping of this attitude, the ethical outlook of the official is only one, though a very important, factor" (p. 251, emphasis mine).

By 1942, a respond to Finer's line of reasoning came from David Levitan. He joined the growing chorus against too firm and precise a notion of the neutrality of public administrators. Although he did not question in fact that public servants should be responsive to their superiors, he asserted that the requirement of administrative loyalty to the citizenry and a devotion to democracy. This meant, according to him, a "change of emphasis" and a "renewed devotion to

political ideals and concepts" (p. 318). He advocated education in citizenship and democratic tradition for the entire civil service because "a civil servant in a democracy can not properly discharge his duties and responsibilities unless he has a firm appreciation of the meaning of democracy, of the dignity of the citizen, and of the concept of being a servant of the people" (p. 319). Public administrators, in this sense, were obligated to political commitments. Levitan emphasized that the "the complete doctrine of neutrality is an anachronism and a fiction which well may be discarded" (p. 320) thus, he challenged Finer's idea that professional norms and the individual's definition of his or her moral responsibilities should be secondary elements of a theory of administrative responsibility. Instead, he required that administrators were obliged not to be instruments of policies with which they had fundamental differences. Interestingly, this was so important and at the heart of administrative responsibility in a democracy "even at the expense of resigning from the public service" (p. 323).

In a like manner, Lynton Caldwell (1943) rejected a "value-neutral" public administration through an analysis of the administrative thought of Thomas Jefferson. He found in Jefferson an understanding of the responsibility of the administrator to the constitution as having priority over their accountability to the legislature. To address the problematic nature of the emerging administrative state for democratic control he, like Levitan, reminded public administrators of their obligation: "Jefferson's thought on administration thus constitutes a perennial directive to ambitious public servants never to forget that they are indeed the servants of the people and not their master" (p.253). If public administrators follow this directive, there is nothing to fear from the expanding role of administration in the contemporary state.

Although the first half of the 1940s did not see any systematic development of a study of administrative ethics, one of the outstanding exceptions was the work of Wayne A. R. Leys. He (1943) argued in his "Ethics and Administrative Discretion" that administrative discretion is not merely the result of legislative vagueness, but a positive necessity in modern industrial society. He expanded on this theme by asserting the need for "wisdom" in the exercise of discretionary power. Such like wisdom was, according to him, "one of the safeguards that stand between us and tyrannical or disorderly handling of our most vital interests" (p. 10). He called for greater attention to ethics, but he was not particularly interested in codes of ethics. Besides, "moralizing about the power of sin", as ethical codes try to do, was relatively unproductive because of the fact that while they tend to "prescribe standards for the administrator's own conduct," they said little about the "standards which an administrator ought to prescribe for *other people*" (p.11). He then concerned with administrative decisions that affect others such as citizens, departments, corporations, and subordinates. He labeled these decisions as "policy decisions" which we now generally refer to them as administrative decisions as opposed to decisions concerning policy proposals, implementation, or interpretation. Therefore, policy decisions as identified by Leys may be only discrete decisions in the case of one's administrative work.

In his later book, "Ethics and Social Policy," Leys (1944) discussed ethics in terms of making good public policy decisions. Even though custom is often accepted as a substitute for thinking through the problems of public policy that confront us, in his view custom is seen as inappropriate or misleading when administrators face with new areas in which public policy decisions make (Denhardt, 1988: 5). He further pointed out that our ancestors did not leave us with customs

that could provide all the necessary guidance in addressing moral problems, but they did leave us with "arts and sciences which tell us how we may go about the business of thinking for ourselves" (Leys, 1944: 12).

Leys proposed a threefold and complex typology of situations where discretion must be used and he tried to show how ethical principles might provide applicable guidelines in each case:

"We shall distinguish three classes of discretionary powers: 1) technical discretion, which is freedom in prescribing the rule but not the criterion or end of action; 2) discretion in prescribing the rule of action and also in clarifying a vague criterion -this is the authorization of social planning; 3) discretion in prescribing the rule of action where the criterion of action is *ambiguous* because it is in dispute -this amounts to an instruction to the official use his ingenuity in political mediation" (p. 18, emphasis original).

Ley's essay was explicitly to apply the philosophical study of ethics to the administrative process (Nigro and Richardson, 1990: 625). A similarity between the philosopher and the administrator constructs a philosophical foundation for administrative ethics in Leys' (1943) work. It was the administrator's need to move from general legislation to particular actions, as well as from specific deeds to the general principle which informs them that connected him or her to the philosopher's focus on how one links general standards of conduct to specific standards. In this regard, administrators might employ two approaches to philosophical ethics. One of them is duty to certain values and principles and the other is utilitarian concern for the consequences of one's acts. As we analyzed in detail in Chapter II, these are known in philosophical terms as "teleological" and "deontological" approaches to ethics and base the philosophical foundations of "bureaucratic" and "democratic" ethos. Leys (1943), furthermore, observed that ethical

reasoning was not static and required continuous and permanent searching:

"The sort of ethics which may improve administrative decisions is concerned with the discovery of standards for right action rather than with the exhortation to do what has already been declared right" (p. 11).

He further asserted that the "classical methods of ethics," that is teleology and deontology, should be helpful with all three forms -- technical discretion, discretion in social planning, and discretion in reconciling political conflict. Teleology and deontology would be useful in "testing the compatibility" of "technically defined rules with a settled criterion," clarifying and articulating the vague criteria which may be inherent in social planning, and in "rationalizing debate where the criteria are in dispute" (p.23) The realm of technical discretion may safely be turned over the judgments of "experts" or specialists, whereas the others imposed "vital differences in the kind of choices which the administration has to make" (Idem). It can be asserted that delineating more precisely those areas of discretion within which public administrators may be responsible for more than just technical or instrumental choices was the most important and practical effect of Ley's argument. In this respect, Nigro and Richardson (1990) write

"Leys [asserted] that the ethical content of public administration included far more than a commitment to instrumental rationality, efficiency, and neutral competence. [He] argued that public administration is often a value-laden enterprise which required the exercise of conscience and moral judgment(..)He set forth the outlines of an ethical "methodology" or frame of reference designed to balance *public administration's early emphasis on means as opposed to ends*" (p. 625, emphasis added).

Consequently, several important characteristics of his work can be enumerated here. First of all, his works represent the

earliest explicit treatments of ethics. Second, he challenged the Wilsonian distinction between politics and administration as well. But he did that by clearly linking the fact of administrative discretion with the need for greater attention to professional ethics. Third and related with previous one, his work is very relevant for the present-day administrator in light of the significant role played by administrators in the policy making process despite the fact that his work has not been figured as prominently in administrative ethics research as it might have been. Fourth, Leys used philosophy as the primary focus of study. His work is a good example of how philosophy can be an important and necessary addition to both ethics scholarship and ethical practice. More importantly and highly germane to the topic of our study, it must be acknowledged that he was well aware of the teleological and deontological approaches to ethics since he benefited from philosophy in his works. His works, therefore, can be seen an important theoretical step towards the conceptual clarification and crystallization of two ethical frameworks in public administration literature which we shall view in detail in Chapter III --bureaucratic and democratic ethos.

In 1943, like Leys who sought to balance earlier emphasis on means as opposed to ends in public administration, Levitan urged, in his "Political Ends and Administrative Means," that (American) public administration had to resist dangerous tendency to stress techniques and "universal principles" at the expense of broader, more basic democratic values. Administrative systems and procedures, in his view, could not be separated from political values and institutions because "a system of government can not be considered as a democratic system(...)if it is not accompanied by administrative machinery for the realization of the principles" (p. 355). In addition to the administrative machinery which has democratic spirit and ideology and respect for the dignity of man,

Levitan attributes a critical role to the public administrators. They must follow democratic principles in and through administrative organizations and structures, and "have a high degree of democratic consciousness among the administrative hierarchy" (p. 357) in order to protect the citizen from administrative authoritarianism and arbitrariness.

In the second half of the 1940's, specifically in the immediate aftermath of World War II, there were little real advances towards administrative ethics as a field of study. Although, in his article, "Toward Better Public Administration," Paul Appleby (1947), for example, set forth a political frame of reference and advanced a set of derived ethical obligations for public administrators such as to participate in "the criterion of opportunity for the fructification of moral ends" (p.95), to support democratic values, to be responsive to the citizenry (p. 99) and to focus on the public interest, his additions to the literature can be seen more contribution to the development of a political theory for public administration than to the study of ethics. He wrote

"[P]ublic administration properly has a political character from which we must not turn away(...)It is not merely "management" as ordinarily treated in technical terms, or "administration" as ordinarily treated with only a slightly broader meaning. It is public leadership of public affairs directly responsible for executive action" (p. 95).

In the closing year of the 1940s, an important call for attention to administrative ethics and a new impetus toward its development came from Fritz Morstein Marx's (1949) "Administrative Ethics and the Rule of Law". Marx's work was the second exception to the tendency that did not have a systematic approach to administrative ethics. Cooper (1994: 9) praises his effort to outline an ethical theory for public

administration. He stresses that Marx began to his outline accepting that the highest task of public administration is to serve as an effective instrument in attaining the purposes of the political order. But, was not this simply a revival of the politics-administration dichotomy? The Cooper's answer is no. Marx (1949) had a broader and deeper recognition of "administrative morality(...)acquiring its inner logic from the political ideology which the machinery of government is expected to translate into social reality" (p. 127). In this context, the core of administrative ethics lies in the ideas that nourish the political system. For Marx, the morals of public management are inseparable from the equalitarian conception of popular government embedded in the American tradition.

In my opinion, Marx's approach is very crucial progress in the development of public administration ethics, if for no other reason than its heralding arguments for regime values, founding thought and citizenship put forth later during the last three decades of the twentieth century. As we shall in Chapter III, values discussed in these arguments construct the 'content values' of democratic ethos. Through grounding administrative ethics in democratic political theory, Marx's approach differs from Ley's earlier emphasis on philosophy as the principle normative source for the field, and the New Public Administration's preoccupation with one particular philosophical ethic, that is Rawlsian social equity, another content value of democratic ethos. Furthermore, as Denhardt (1988) shows when she discuss the tension between the 'content and process dimensions' to ethics -a tension which can be visible, for example, in a conflict between the acceptance of a process of accountability and defining rules (content) to compel administrators (p. 14)- Marx (1949) maintained that "infinitely more important than compelling administrative officials to live up to minutely defined requirements of

control is their acceptance of ethical obligation to account to themselves and to the *public* for the public character of their actions" (pp. 1134-1135). If we think this statement by Marx with his view asserting "ways of stimulating civic participation in public management" as a "corollary of the ethical derivative-that administrative officials are bound by duty to promote the healthy growth of a free society (p. 1131), it is not too wrong to talk about that Marx has, at the same time, the earliest communitarian emphasis in public administration ethics literature.

To sum up, 1940s saw the suggestion of internal controls to maintain responsible administrative conduct. The general interest, loyalty to the citizenry, devotion to democracy and democratic values and conception of duty were central criteria of 1940s, instead of efficiency. Old consensus about the value-neutral role of public administrators was strongly rejected. Moreover, increasing administrative discretion was accepted as a positive necessity in modern society.

On the other hand, Wallace Sayre (1951) was concluding in his article, reviewing the role of values at the end of the first decade of PAR's publication, that the 1940s ended "with a more complex set of administrative values than that with which it began" (p. 2). Although neutral competence, efficiency and executive management were the dominant values and constituted "orthodoxy" of public administration at the beginning of the decade, by 1951, "heterodoxy" was the norm:

"The quest for a science of public administration divorced from all values(...)continues to attract the energies of some students; others seek a theory of public administration in which values are seen as the indispensable essence" (p. 3).

It should be said here parenthetically that from the perspective, which I try to develop in this study, the

conflict admitted by Sayre, means historically crystallization of the distinction between bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Besides, Sayre's following statement further supports our view and indicates a change started to be experienced in 1940s.

"[T]he basic search in the study of administration is more for a theory of government than for a science of administration. The inclusion of public administration within a theory of government brings into the range of emphasis other important values(...)Among them the new emphasis upon purposes as the value which gives clearest meaning to the machinery of administration can hardly be exaggerated in its future significance" (p. 9).

2.2.b 1950s: Codes of Ethics and Return to Neutral Competence

In the 1950s, attention turned to an examination of a variety of external controls over the exercise of administrative discretion. To illustrate, in Money Penny (1953) and Wood's (1955) articles the emphasis was directly on external controls pertinent to Herman Finer's earlier arguments. In 1953, major parts of a code of ethics for public officials were reprinted in PAR. This code was developed by a citizen's commission in Arlington County, Virginia and chaired by Fritz Morstein Marx. The citizen's commission (1953) declared the purpose of the code as to help officials and citizens alike come to a better judgment about what is right and what is wrong ethically in the exercise of public functions (p. 120). Furthermore, to strive for efficiency, to respect and be responsive to legal authority and to heed the commands of morality were identified as three basic responsibilities of public administrator (p. 121). Though prescriptions broadly stated in this code included what have now become standard topics such as official's obligation to accept responsibility for their actions, disclosure, and conflicts of loyalty and interest, the code was an important turning point in PAR's treatment of ethics because it was the first time the journal saw fit to

signal a need to 'educate' public administrators, officials and citizens with regard to basic objective standards of conduct (Nigro and Richardson, 1990: 627).

Similarly, Phillip Moneyppenny (1953) presented an argument for developing a code of ethics for public administration and referred to some efforts underway by a U. S. Senate committee. Importantly, he was well aware of two crucial points. One of them was the conflict between personal standards of conduct and ethical codes as potential sources of control. The other was a need to implement codes of ethics which involved making them a part of the normative systems of working groups and to make them functional control devices as opposed to "pious declaration[s]" (p. 185). He acknowledged the necessity for internalization of external controls, but such like "conversion", in his approach, was through a heavily external control orientation by management rather than a cultivation of internal professional standards and ethics.

"The sanctions of a code are less escapable. A code may have definite *consequences* attached to it as a private standard may not. It presents more clearly differentiated alternatives by which a choice may be made. And it will not be surprising if, after a period of acting according to externally imposed *consequences*, the standard of action becomes an internal one as well -a habit of action which it takes considerable effort to displace" (p. 187, emphasis mine).

In my opinion, it is evident, to use the philosophical jargon developed in Chapter II, that code of ethics theoretically framed by Moneyppenny had a consequentialist character. Obviously, public administrators, in his view, should have had an ethical code through which they can internalize definite but externally imposed 'consequences' as ethical standard of their actions.

In a like manner, Robert C. Wood (1955) urged more mechanistic control orientation in the hands of superiors and advocated a highly legalistic definition of ethics in his article, entitled "Ethics in Government as a Problem of Executive Management". His article, like Moneypeny's, in fact was in response to corruption within several federal agencies, involving the Internal Revenue Service. He wanted public executives to develop the staff resources needed to protect the integrity of the public service and to increase public confidence in government. These resources would be "the systematic employment of administrative investigatory facilities," in other words, "staff devices that provide an executive with information about the personal conduct of his employees" (p. 3). Not surprisingly, Arthur Flemming (1953) was proclaiming two years ago before Wood's article that a "return" to a dominant ethic of neutral competence and redrawing of once sharp line between politics and administration was a necessity. He wrote

"The career civil servant, or the employee who desires to become a career civil servant, must do everything within his power to insure that every policy the newly elected representatives of the people desire to put into effect is administrated in an effective and expeditious manner, whether he believes in it or not. A career civil servant who can not bring himself to do this should have the courage to leave the career civil service" (p. 77).

To me, appeal for a return to old dichotomy and value-neutral public servants reflects the fact that the fear of authoritarian and fascist political leadership embodied in Nazi Germany of 1940s was overcome in 1950s. Furthermore, in the American political conjuncture of the period, Flemming's article, as Nigro and Richardson (1990) point out, was trying to neutralize federal civil service vastly expanded and empowered during last twenty years on the one hand, and revitalize bureaucratic values deeply rooted in the

intellectual traditions of American public administration (p. 628).

However, at the same year, while Flemming was suggesting a return to pre-war old consensus, Hurst R. Anderson, president of The American University, was delivering a speech to the Society for Personnel Administration on the topic of "Ethical Values in Administration". This speech later was published in January 1954 volume of PAR. Anderson discussed "ten values" upon which a society operates, consisting of the significance in the individual human personality, common consent as a basis for social action, and devotion to truth (Anderson, 1954: 4). In this speech, he tried to sign the "relationship between ethical *principles or assumptions* upon which we all live and work and the problem of administration" (p. 1, emphasis mine). Significantly, his work implies a much broader scope of what is ethically relevant for public servants since all administrative decisions are based on some implicit, often unexamined assumptions or decision standards. He concluded that if public administration can identify these assumptions and determine standards, it can "agree upon(...)the *foundation* upon which to construct a philosophy and technique of administration" which is ethical (p. 3, emphasis mine). As remembered, Leys (1944) earlier showed ethics as one of the fields which serves as "sources of doubt". However, unlike Leys, Anderson's approach to administrative ethics specifies 'core values'. It must be accepted that this might provide more adequate (ethical) guidance for administration. Further, Anderson differs from Leys at one more point: ethical questions, in the former, are important not only in those intended to formulate public policy but also in all administrative decisions. Anderson sees ethics as the assumptions that guide the lives and work of all of us:

"I don't see how it is possible for the individual who is an administrator in this period to divorce the technique of administration from a fundamental philosophy of personal and social life. You can do it in a superficial sense, but every time you make a decision about an administrative problem, or any time you seek to resolve an administrative tension, you have to resolve it in terms of some assumptions that lie at the heart of what we may call a philosophy of personal and social living" (p. 2).

To sum up, in the fifties, external control over the exercise of administrative discretion was at the focus of attention. Ethical codes were the potential sources of such control. Definition of ethics in this mechanistic control was highly legalistic. Also, return to ethic of neutrality and re-drawing of the sharp line between politics and administration were suggested.

2.2.c 1960s: Re-emergence of the Themes of 1940s

The 1960s were not characterized by intense interest in public administration ethics. Yet, a number of articles, reviews, commentaries and books deal with the subject. For instance, Robert Golembiewski's (1962) article treated organization "as a moral problem". His later book "Men, Management, and Morality" (1965) expanded the same issue. Golembiewski's concern was the relationship between ethics and the organizational context. The "traditional theory of organization" had "one way" authority, detailed supervision, and respect only for the physiological properties of individuals and routinized work at the lowest level (1965: 60). In order to remove the traditional theory he tried to incorporate new organization ethics. For Golembiewski, "organizing has been considered a technical problem" in the traditional theory of organization. However, "the neglect of organization as moral problem can not be condoned" since "the man-to-man relations implied in patterns of organization have more than a technical aspect" (1962: 51).

But for new public administration ethics, Golembiewski turned neither to the Western philosophical tradition (as Leys did) nor the American political heritage (as Morstein Marx did). Instead, he turned to the religion generally, and "Judeo-Christian values," emphasizing the worth of individual and the development of human potential specifically. To him, these values can be moral touchstones for organizational leadership and relations among organizational members because of the fact that they were compatible with participative management and organizational designs leading to high levels of productivity (1965: 60). In fact, Golembiewski's works indicate a significant turning point for organization theory and administrative ethics reciprocally. On the one hand, his works contributed to the explicit acceptance of the influence of the organization in administrative ethics. By this way, frame of reference and interest areas for administrative ethics were expanded. On the other hand, his work contributed to the acknowledging (and development) of moral importance of organizational context in organization theory.

The distinction made by Golembiewski among the concepts of conduct, ethics, and morals is another contribution to administrative ethics literature:

"Conduct" refers simply to the observed behavior of individuals or groups of individuals. "Ethics", in turn, refers to the contemporary standards at any point in time in terms of which men evaluate their conduct and that of men about them. "Morals", finally, refers to *absolute standards that exist beyond time, standards of the good and the true*" (1965: 61, emphasis mine).

Two important points should be underlined here since one of the important issues in administrative ethics is directly related with the question of whether being ethical means discovering the content or substance of values (identification of standards) or questioning the ethical standards as a

necessary part of ethical action. First, although "ethics" is the contemporary standard of right conduct, this passage implies that it may change with time as a better understanding of moral standards becomes evident. Secondly, ethical standards, at any given time, can be known while absolute standards might not be known. Thirdly and more importantly from our point of view in this study, Golembiewski's approach apparently describes and symbolizes a search for universal standards (as well as, rules and principles) by which appropriate ethical conduct of public servants may be deduced or judged. Clearly enough, such a theoretical effort exemplifies a foundational perspective in public administration ethics.

Some articles published in 1960s were signaling in fact a return to old themes introduced during the 1940s. For example, in a book review essay written by Herbert J. Storing (1964), it is proposed that there are linkages between the concepts of the public interest, duty, and responsibility and administrative character. In addition to the linkages between these (as we shall see later, democratic ethos) values, he advocated that the highest calling of the public administrator, rather than merely to follow, public opinion. For Storing, such leadership went well beyond technical matters to issues concerning the public interest. Moreover, some normative standards (of bureaucratic ethos in their essence) such as technical competence and majority opinion that construct the basis of public administration education were criticized by Storing. His comments deserve to quote

"The education of the public servant is most deficient in its most important respect, and this includes not only his formal education but all of the instruction and advice aimed at him by the various representatives of the discipline of administration(...). He is thought to look to two standards: *technical competence* and *popular will*,

beyond these he has no business to venture --and there are no *higher standards* anyway. Yet it is where these standards are unavailable, or contradictory, or insufficient that he meets his most difficult and highest tests" (p. 46, emphasis mine).

Nearly echoing deontological notion of 'higher order moral principles or rules', Storing added that the conventions of American public life tend to draw civil servant back from his highest public duties rather than to guide him toward them. Technical competence and popular will cannot serve as highest duties for public administrators. Nor do ethical codes can be part of solution. To resolve the problem the interaction between social norms and the content of public administration education must be recognized.

"Ethics and the Public Service" was the title of Stephan K. Bailey's 1964 article and he advanced, in it, Friedrich's earlier emphasis on the internal controls. Additionally, he examined three essential mental attitudes and necessary moral qualities for ethical conduct, and an explicit theory of personnel ethics in the public service. A capacity to recognize moral ambiguity, contextual forces --and sometimes-- paradoxical consequences of administrative procedures and practices were Bailey's essential mental attitudes (p.235-239). To obtain ethical behavior, however, they were prerequisites but not sufficient. According to him, these attitudes must be supported by the moral qualities or "operating values": optimism, courage, and fairness tempered by charity (p. 240).

2.3 ETHICS AS A FIELD OF STUDY: 1970 to the PRESENT

2.3.a New Public Administration (NPA) and Social Equity

In one of its important proponent's terms (Hart, 1974: 3), the "faction of the discipline known as the "New Public Administration"" represented a new environment for public administration in the early seventies. This environment was also reflecting important change in American society which finds its examples in the civil right movement, the war for poverty, the nuclear balance of terror and the Vietnam War. Most public administration writers accept that these social events stimulated the questioning of old duties and obligations of public administrators and brought about emergence of new interpretations of both the responsibilities of administrators and values among those administrators. There was a sharp decline in public confidence in government as well. More importantly, serious erosion in public administration's legitimacy and questioning of the administration's capacity accompanied this decline. As one of the New Public Administration (NPA) scholars emphasized that new approach to normative theory in public administration "must accommodate the values and motives of individual public administrators to theories of administrative responsibility" (Harmon, 1971: 179). Thus, attention turned to changing old normative framework and to find a new one. As a result, NPA implies crucial and discernable works on public administration ethics in the beginning of 1970s.

Scott and Hart's (1973) article, "Administrative Crisis: The Neglect of Metaphysical Speculation," was the first essay in this stream. As understood from the title, the authors' chief goal was to describe the outlines of 'administrative metaphysic'. Obviously, this means a charge to positivist assumptions that lay behind much public administration and

organizational research. Positivism with an obsession with means as opposed to ends and an emphasis on studying only that which is observable had resulted in an administrative crisis and turn away from moral discourse. Yet, "administration had not reluctantly turned away from moral discourse" (Scott and Hart, 1973: 417). In effect, research had diminished to mere "puzzle solving" and organizational incentives had rewarded puzzle solving over metaphysical speculation. The "reification" of organizations in the language of administrative theory and practice allowed the administrative elites who control organizations and dominate the lives of workers to remain hidden and to escape being held accountable for the value judgments they routinely made. In addition to the criticisms of the positivist assumptions in the field, Scott and Hart addressed a somewhat modernized version of previous criticisms of the norms of neutral competence and instrumentalism. They believed that administrative discretion and power should be accompanied by an obligation to clarify and examine underlying values and that public administrators should have a metaphysical direction.

In 1974, a "Symposium on Social Equity and Public Administration" was published in PAR. In it, John Rawls' (1971) concept of social equity was the central theme. Although there were six articles on administrative ethics, two of them directly contributed to the development of public administration ethics most of all. They were David K. Hart's (1974) "Social Equity, Justice, and the Equitable Administrator" and Michael Harmon's (1974) "Social Equity and Organizational Man: Motivation and Organizational Democracy". Hart (1974) argued that existing ethical framework of impartial administration "has now outlived its usefulness" (p.4). He did not call for detached, scholarly criticism of ethical theories. Instead, he saw it necessary to advocate a specific alternative to replace immediately the outdated

impartial administration paradigm in which public confidence had deteriorated. Social equity, usually of the sort advocated by John Rawls (1971), could serve, Hart explained, as a basic operational guideline and a foundation for public administration ethics. Since he believed that "a theory of social equity must be derived from a carefully explicated ethical paradigm" to realize the potential for the replacement of old impartial administration paradigm and that Rawls' "A Theory of Justice" provides just the "carefully explicated ethical paradigm" (p. 4), he tried to draw out of Rawls' "two principles of justice"¹² what he considered to be an imperative for organizational democracy. For Hart, public administrators using their irreducible discretion should be proactive to promote social equity. To accomplish this purpose they have to redress the balance of power that exist in civil society which favors the wealthy, the articulate and the well-organized within the core of the state. This means that they should take the part of the poor, the inarticulate and the unorganized. This can be seen an ethical response to the worst effects of interest group liberalism, as well. Then, Hart

¹² Rawls writes regarding "the final formulation of the principles of justice" that: "...I now wish to give the final statement of the two principles of justice for institutions. For the sake of completeness, I shall give a full statement including earlier formulations. *First principle.* Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. *Second principle.* Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity... *General conception.* All social primary goods --liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-- are to be distributed equally unless an equal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored". See, James P. Sterba's (2000) edition, "Ethics: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives".

asserted some different areas under the subheading, "Code of Conduct for the Equitable Administrator," in which the principle of social equity could be developed in public administration. In this regard, Rawls's theory of justice would (a) allow clear and unambiguous ethical guidelines, (b) establish a "duty and obligation" to serve less advantaged, (c) eliminate civil rights violations by organizations, (d) "provide means to resolve ethical impasses," and lastly; (e) "provide a professional code for public administration that would require social equity" (pp. 9-10). He, more specifically, connected Rawls' position to a concept of administrative *noblesse oblige* (p. 8). Hart developed this concept later in his 1984 study published in PAR. It should be remembered here that

"Rawls's position is classically neo-Kantian in its belief that right behavior can be deduced from a theoretical formula. In this case the formula is developed from an "original position," of disembodied, ahistorical, acultural minds reasoning together in a totally disinterested way(...) Disinterested minds, Rawls argues, would conclude that equal distribution of societal goods should obtain unless inequalities benefit that last advantaged. Thus, we act ethically if our actions can be constructed as beneficial to the least advantaged. From such principles, Hart believes that a moral code of obligation can be developed for public servants" (Fox, 1994: 90).

In my opinion, it is also obvious from this long passage that specificity and applicability of the Rawlsian concept of social equity to the practice of administration constructs its strength. It is not an exaggeration to say that introducing this notion implies the first real move beyond vague arguments for the public interest or common good possessing little operational value and that it provided evidence of the practical importance of administrative ethics and built confidence in the possibility of developing it as a field of study, hence increased the legitimacy of the field. But alas,

even a "metaphysical speculation" such as ethics could have not been emphasized as a field of study (and could not have the ability to help the development of field's legitimacy) unless it got a "puzzle solving" character in addition to specificity and applicability. Ironically, in the study of Hart, who lamented elsewhere from instrumentality and "puzzle solving" in public administration, ethics can find a place in the field only if the notion of social equity gets an operational character. Another study clearly stating that social equity can become the touchstone for administrative ethics was Michael Harmon's (1974) article. He expressed, briefly, that Rawlsian "justice as fairness" principle could be seen to "imply a normative commitment to organizational democracy" (p. 14). "If social equity is to be elevated to a central position among the values of the discipline," he urged, "a serious rethinking is required about the manner in which 'responsible' choices of administrators are defined and about the appropriate structure of distribution of power within public organizations" (p. 17).

In 1974, two articles responding to Watergate scandal were published. Main theme of Dwight Waldo's "Reflections on Public Morality" was to expose the relationship between public and private morality, whereas George Graham's "Ethical Guidelines for Public Administrators: Observation on Rules of the Game" was to draw out the generally accepted norms --"rules of the game"-- for administrative conduct, reflecting an ethic rooted in the nature of bureaucratic responsibility. Despite the similarity stemmed from criticizing the series of scandals, these two articles employed considerably conflicting positions. On the one hand, while observing that "self-conscious public administration in its early decades avoided problems of morality" and that "the problem to be solved was seen as a technical-scientific one: the efficient realization of ends given by agents outside the administrative sphere" (p.

275, emphasis added), Waldo (1974) called to develop "something in the nature of a concept of *public interest*" (p. 281, emphasis added). On the other hand, Graham (1974) was erecting a stone wall of institutional responsibilities across the path being taken by the Rawlsian with his "ethical guidelines" including a mix of code-like prescriptions and instructions to honor the "rules of the game" when using administrative discretion;

"All administrators are(...)obligated to use their power in good faith in the public interest(...) No public officials or administrator, high or low, owns the government, his organization, or his office. The government belongs to the public, and the administrator's role is that of a trustee, not a proprietor, in the use of his authority" (Graham, 1974: 92).

Nicholas Henry's 1975 book, "Public Administration and Public Affairs" described changing administrative role and its impact on administrative ethics. Henry proposed that morality was not a central concern if public administrators were perceived as mere executors or implementors of policies and had no role in policy making. "Morality," Henry asserted, "after all, necessitates ethical choice, and, (...)ethical choice simply was not a function of the functionaries" (p. 33). According to Henry, involvement of public administrators into the public policy making profoundly affect the role of morality in administrative life;

"Now the public administrator was forced to make decisions not on the comfortable bases of *efficiency, economy, and administrative principles*, but on the more agonizing criteria of moral choices as well(...) Public administrationists became increasingly cognizant of the disquieting notion that a sense of ethics -- *a sense of the public interest* -- was a genuine need in the practice of public administration" (Henry, 1975: 33-34, emphasis added).

Henry was also so clear about what is needed for the public administrator. He further continued

“What is needed for the public administrator is a simple and operational conceptualization of the public interest that permits him to *make a moral choice on the basis of rational thinking*” (p. 40, emphasis added).

As Denhardt argues, while discussing the impact of NPA on administrative ethics, John Rawls’s “justice as fairness” principles provide the necessary framework for this “simple and operational conceptualization” of and decision making in the public interest instead of administrative responsibility or accountability on the one hand; and of “radical humanism” placing human beings as the most important end in all bureaucratic decisions on the other hand (pp. 11-12). It is also clear that instead of some core ‘conventional’ values (of bureaucratic ethos) in public administration such as efficiency and economy, the public interest (as we shall see, the most important democratic ethos value) was found as more suitable *ethical standard* for public administration practice. In other words, the transition from old values and *principles* to the notion of public interest symbolizes the replacement of bureaucratic ethos with democratic one. But in that case ethics was clearly reduced or confined to the sense of the public interest.

Then, what is the importance of the New Public Administration movement on public administration ethics? It is not an exaggeration to say that this short-lived movement contributed to the emergence of a ‘field of study’ focusing on administrative ethics in addition to the above transition because, as Cooper (1994) mentions, “it represented the first coalescing of a group of scholars around a commonly shared ethical concept -social equity- usually based on the work of John Rawls” (p. 13). However, whether or not this transition

means a radical turn in the history of public administration ethics and to which extent we can equalize the "sense of ethics" with the "sense of the public interest" will be explored in depth in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that, as we saw in Chapter I, from the perspective of Zygmunt Bauman, (who sets out that morality has no foundation in the form of principle, rules and standards and it is bound to remain irrational) the public interest as a new standard -- that is, as a new foundation-- which permits bureaucrats to make a moral choice on the basis *rational thinking* does not mean a 'true' or 'radical' change in public administration ethics.

On the other hand, Denhardt discusses an important point - especially from our point of view in the study- and further asks whether or not NPA scholars were attempting to "discern a new set external controls or values which would be uniformly practiced by public administrators". According to Denhardt, this is not entirely clear:

"On the one hand, there is a rejection of past values such as absolute impartiality which were intended to be uniformly practiced by administrators, and there is some discussion of a replacement for those outmoded practices. But on the other hand, there is at least an *implied* tolerance for individuality among administrators, as reflected in the calls of these same scholars for more open and tolerant organizations, and increased administrative discretion" (Ibid. 12, emphasis original).

In my opinion, two things should be underlined in Denhardt's interpretation: first, 'rejection' of past values, once again, reflects the replacement of old values with new ones. Seeking for standards for moral conduct, however, remains the same; the only thing that happened was the renewal of 'outmoded' standards and principles with the new standard of the public interest. But, it must be acknowledged that this 'rejection' promotes more ethical public administration since it does not

depends on an interested ethical approach like utilitarianism. It can be said that Rawlsian notion of social equity helped the development of more refined conceptualization of public interest. Both public interest and social equity served as deontological and 'higher order' moral values which not determined by the consequences of an action. Secondly and more importantly, 'individuality' mentioned in Denhardt's passage in the form of differences at definitions and interpretations of ethical standard(s) by bureaucrats (i.e. unavoidable result of increased administrative discretion) is in fact implicit confession of Bauman's idea that 'morality is not universalizable' by NPA scholars. Put other way, accepting inevitably 'individuality' in administrative ethics means accepting at the same time inevitably the existence of individual differences among bureaucrats and the existence of the autonomous moral judgments born and also fed from these differences (even they sometimes might be against 'new' standards). However, like other scholars those who write by 'modern mind', NPA scholars were not keen to accept evaluation of ethical standards by 'individual' administrator -by moral self- and "they were reluctant," as Denhardt (1998: 12) also emphasizes, "to leave such concepts as "social equity" solely to the interpretation of individuals. I think this implies once again what Bauman (1993) calls as expropriation of the moral capacity of moral selves (p. 129).

Consequently, NPA movement suggested that social equity should have a place in the role obligations of public administrators. This suggestion was further discussed and generally accepted through later conference papers, book chapters and journal articles. Nonetheless, social equity was not sustained as the central value for the field. But it has taken its place among other ethical principles.

2.3.b John Rohr and Regime Values

In 1976, while John A. Rohr recognized the contributions of the NPA in his article on "The Study of Ethics in the P.A. Curriculum", he found himself "somewhat at odds with dominant trends" in NPA literature because of the fact that the principal academic foundations of the NPA came from political philosophy and humanistic psychology. Thus, he did not believe that "they [political philosophy and humanistic psychology] provide a satisfactory foundation for a course in ethics" (Rohr, 1998: 20, emphasis original)¹³.

Even though Rohr sympathized with David Hart's (1974) call for "a new tradition of administrative philosophy", he was less persuaded by his suggestion that John Rawls's theory of justice serves as the philosophic foundations of ethic courses and as guidelines for administrators in making ethical decisions. He criticizes the curriculum revision with new courses which reflect the "rigor of the philosophic tradition" because he believes that "to settle for a smattering of political philosophy as part of a course in ethics would not be fair either to the students or to philosophy" (p. 20). In other words, for Rohr, accepting Rawls's principles of justice as a starting point in administrative ethics requires from students to have more than just smattering of philosophy which is included in the typical public administration curriculum and involves far more time and study than can be reasonably included in the curriculum of a professional course of study. On the other hand, he concludes that humanistic psychology "necessarily focuses upon the individual as a person rather

¹³ In 1998, Rohr published a book bringing together his twenty essays that he has written between 1973 and 1998, entitled "Public Service, Ethics and Constitutional Practice". It includes the article appeared in PAR's 1976 volume. I benefit from the reprinted version instead of original article.

than upon that individual's chosen career" (pp. 20-21). For this reason, he asserts that we must look elsewhere for the foundation of a course in ethics. In fact, his suggestion for this foundation is not ambiguous. He advocates focusing on "regime values" of the American political tradition. He writes that

"As an alternative to political philosophy and humanistic psychology, I would suggest that since students of public administration aspire to positions of leadership within the bureaucracy of a particular regime, the values of that regime are the most suitable starting point for their ethical reflections" (pp.21-22).

Where, then, does a public administrator find the "regime values"? According to Rohr, they are to be found particularly in the U.S. Constitution, "writings and speeches of outstanding statesmen, in major Supreme Court opinions, in scholarly interpretations of American history, and even in the rhetoric of standard Fourth of July oratory" (p. 23). To Rohr, if one is content to identify some values instead of attempting to provide an exhaustive list, *freedom, property, and equality* can be identified as values of American people. American regime values include, but not limited to them. Since Rohr is well aware of an objection which claims that generalities like freedom, property, and equality are accepted mainly because they mean nothing, he states that the task of infusing "regime values" with "meaning suitable for reflection" is more difficult than simply naming some American values. He, nevertheless, urges that "they carry some normative weight for American bureaucrats precisely because they are values of the American people" (p. 24).

Then, how do general values of the regime become sufficiently specific in order to have a practical effect on bureaucratic decision-making? Rohr reasoned that students as well as practitioners might gain insight into regime values by

studying major Supreme Court decisions in a disciplined and systematic manner that will invite them to develop their understanding of what these values mean. Four characteristics, to Rohr, make Supreme Court decisions particularly suitable for ethical reflection on the American values; they are (1) institutional, (2) dialectic, (3) concrete, and (4) pertinent (pp. 25-28).

In 1978, Rohr described three possible approaches to training administrators in the process of making ethical decisions in his book "Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on law and Values". In it he developed further the themes originally set forth by him in his 1976 PAR article. Rohr labels first approach as "the high road". It is "high" due to the fact that it requires the most of those who are to be ethical, both in terms of training and incorporating ethics into every action and decision they make (Rohr, 1978: 55). As his basic concerns are that administrators truly understand the foundations on which their ethical standards are based, and be able to independently apply the standards. He criticizes this approach mainly because public administrators would not be able to apply philosophical approaches to administrative decisions. Secondly, he explains the "low road" approach to administrative ethics that "addresses ethical issues almost exclusively in terms of adherence to agency rules" (p. 52). Rohr also criticizes this approach since it is "hopelessly [a] negative approach to public service" (p. 54). The "low road" is not but the internalization of the rules of organization by public administrators and symbolizes the epitome of public servants whose ability to make decisions and to act goes no further than what is explicitly included in organization policy and within the realm of his or her job description. Additionally, the "low road" is in fact what Fox (1994) calls "ethics of authoritative command" borrowing from Bruce Jennings (1991). Rohr proposes what he considers to be a

"middle road" on which is reasonable to expect of the professional public administrator and public administration program. According to Rohr's "middle road", the responsiveness of bureaucrats to the citizens of the nation is ensured through *self-enforced ethical standards*. The question Rohr responds to deals with how bureaucrats can and should go about discovering what the values of citizens are. For Rohr, values are "beliefs, passions, and principles that have been held for several generations by overwhelming majority of American people" (p. 65). Also, he added that "bureaucrats have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution that brought this regime into being and continues to state symbolically its spirit and meaning" (p. 67). As a result, the Constitution is the source to which administrators can look for a list of regime values, which should reflect and illuminate the public interest.

Rohr's project has legitimized the administrative state and administrative discretion by appealing to the American Constitution and its various interpretations. Internalization of the principles of the Constitution that is the founding of the regime is the consequence of his work for ethics. This is clearly very much opposed to the ethics of authoritative command (and utilitarian/teleological/consequentialist thinking). Fox (1994) indicates Rohr's argument in relation to ethics as follows:

"Public servants, elected, politically appointed, or appointed by merit take an *oath of office* to support the Constitution(...).

The *founding* of(...)regime which the Constitution embodies may be regarded as(...)transcendent first principle(...).

The Constitution is very much more important than any ephemeral electoral coalition.

Administrators owe allegiance then, to the Constitution, not necessarily the incumbent political administration of the day" (p. 91, emphasis in the original).

The result of Rohr's this carefully argued position is a foundational/deontological ethics based on the regime values. As we showed in Chapter I, in Kant's philosophy, a *moral foundation* is found out. Yet, this foundation lies in reason alone, independent of contingent human consensus or 'telos' at which the foundation of morality aims. Besides, Kant believes that the principle of ethics that depends on practical rationality can be discovered a priori. He labels this principle as Categorical Imperative or Moral Law. The initial formulation of the categorical imperative is known as the *formula of universal law*. First principle in Rohr's approach is (that is, the founding of regime) the 'maxim', a subjective principle on which public administrators act (or, as stated again in Chapter I, "direct rule" Bernard Rosen (1993)). Similar to the Kant's formula of universal law, the test for a maxim is whether people could consistently will that all adopt this maxim as a guide in their actions. Otherwise, it would not pass the test of universalizability. In Rohr's argumentation, the founding of regime passes the universalizability test since bureaucrats in their moral conduct can use it as a guide. However, the transcendent first principle of Rohr can be viewed as "vanishing referent" from an anti-foundational perspective because, like other ultimate foundational principles, this founding principle tends, "like mirages, to vanish the closer one approaches them" (Fox, 1994: 86). It is supposed that public administrators who internalize these norms will be ethical.

Fox criticizes Rohr's approach. It is intellectually compelling because of its two aspects. First, Fox (1994) asserts that privileging the Constitution is a "proximate standard beyond which one rarely ventures; to say that something is unconstitutional is a checkmate squelch" because especially in the American context the Constitution is powerful almost self-sustaining symbol of legitimacy and very

few arguments lead to questioning the Constitution itself (p. 91). Second, "the Constitution stands as if it were natural law" in Rohr's reasoning (p. 92, emphasis in the original). The Constitution like natural law serves as an ultimate principle underlying all legal differences, and the infallible means of reducing those differences to unity. It is just like that because it was written when it was at the height of the enlightenment when confidence in the power of reason was at its apex.

Similarly to Rohr, Lynton Caldwell's attention was American constitutional tradition in his 1976 article entitled, "Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Heritage of American Public Administration". He proposed that in the Constitution, premises constituting "the moral imperatives of American public life" (p.481) amount to a "civic religion" which is "rooted in ethical and theological concepts that became current in the 17th and 18th centuries" (p. 481). Also, in 1976 Susan Wakefield noted Rohr's suggestion for a curriculum based on regime values. But, another significant point came to fore in her article. The point was that she located the source of an ethical public service in the moral education of the administrator. According to Wakefield, Walter Lippman's definition of public interest (i.e. choices made with rational thought, disinterest, and benevolence) could serve as the "unifying moral imperative" for public servants (Wakefield, 1976: 664). For Wakefield, instilling these qualities was the responsibility of professional education in the field. Ironically, she criticized bureaucratic tendency to take refuge in the collective responsibility of the organization. Her suggestion was that "administrators must feel *personally responsible* and must be held individually accountable by law and the public for their conduct if the public interest is to be upheld, corruption forestalled, and democratic government preserved" (p.14, emphasis mine). Wakefield ended her

commentary with a call for systematic education designed to "strengthen *internal commitments* to moral government" because this was "the first line of defense against unethical behavior" (p. 666, emphasis added). In my opinion, herein lies an irony. As we saw in Chapter I when we examined Bauman's anti-foundational ethics, "moral responsibility exists solely in interpellating the individual and being carried individually" (Bauman, 1993: 54). However, it can not be "secured by the heteronomous force of Law" (p. 28). Besides, the idea of "society's [read 'public' in Wakefield's case] pretence to be the ultimate author and the sole trustworthy guardian of morality" is false. True, "to strengthen internal commitment", or --in Bauman's term-- "moral impulse" is the only way to obtain morality and "the first line of defense against unethical behavior". Yet, "when concepts, standards and rules enter the stage, moral impulse makes an exit". In that case, "ethics is made in the likeness of Law, not the moral urge" (Bauman, 1993: 61).

On the other hand, in 1976, an important development became apparent. It was the establishment of the first Professional Standards and Ethics Committee by American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). Unsurprisingly, writing a code of ethics was its first charge. But, since the committee was divided on the importance of codes, it ultimately decided to prepare a book entitled, "Professional Standards and Ethics: A Workbook for Public Administrators" instead of to work on a code of ethics. It must be acknowledged that the establishment of the committee may have been important to the development of ethics as a field of study in public administration. Too, it was an important step in the search for foundations (rules, principles, standards) for public administration ethics in 70s.

In the early 1980s, there was public alienation and lessening in citizen confidence and trust to bureaucracy. The main trend of the period was that government (the bureaucracy) was the problem. The legitimacy of administrative discretion came under heavy fire. As Robin Theobald (1997) states in an *Administration & Society* essay that

“old-style professionalism came increasingly to be viewed with suspicion, synonymous with vested interests and the exploitation of credentialism for monopoly purposes and, in some general sense, lying at the heart of the problem of rigid and inflexible bureaucracies unresponsive to the public they were supposed to serve” (p. 490).

Public administrators could no longer be relied upon the safeguard of the public interest. So, ethics increasingly became a matter of conflict between legality and loyalty to executive policy. As Nigro and Richardson (1990) mention, some public administrators (e.g. the Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management) “went before ASPA and announced that a politics-administration dichotomy was needed, and that administrative theory and ethics should recognize that necessity” (p. 631).

The response to new anti-state, anti-bureaucracy atmosphere began with Gregory D. Foster’s article, “Law, Morality, and the Public Servant” (1981). He criticized legally and organizationally oriented administrative ethics. The relationship between law and ethics was his central concern and he also criticized over reliance on the mechanisms of ethics legislation that began to proliferate at every level of government during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Familiar to Bauman’s argumentation regarding the nature of law and ethics and indicated in Chapter I, Foster maintained that the law does not do much to help administrators act morally because it “foster a particular way of looking at and responding to situations that is essentially amoral nature...Instead, all

things are viewed as legal or illegal" (p. 29). In his terms, the law did not lead to justice, because only "truly moral decisions can result in justice" (p. 30). In short, he reasoned that preoccupation with legality tend to erode moral reflection and destroy the ability to deal with ethical questions. Again, in a way that reminds the Bauman's "conception of "moral impulse", Foster stated that efforts to ensure ethical behavior through more laws were misplaced because they limited the discretion needed to make truly moral decisions.

Similarly, William G. Scott (1982) criticized the ethical orthodoxy of administration and exposed the elitist nature of Chester Barnard's theory of administration. According to Scott, Barnard was a good example of a general tendency to treat ethical questions in an organizational frame of reference where individual responsibility is at once masked by and "subordinated to the collective enterprise" (p. 199).

Criticism of conventional thinking by Foster and Scott was also expanded by George H. Frederickson (1982) in his article entitled, "The recovery of Civism in Public Administration". He lamented the distance that had developed between public administrators and the citizenry. He called for to "recover" a civic virtue as a central value in public administration. Though, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, Levitan (1942), Appleby (1947, 1949), and Marx (1949) began to connect the obligations of public servants to democratic political theory (and some content values of democratic ethos that will be categorized in the next chapter was emerged) in 1940s, Frederickson's article was heralding the citizenship movement which did not become a major focus until the middle of 1980s. According to him, public administration needed, intellectually as well as practically, to reestablish its role in support of effective *citizenship* (another content value of democratic

ethos). Moreover, public administration education needed to stress the *highest obligations and responsibilities of citizenship*, not merely a set of specialized managerial instruments (e.g. efficiency, expertise, competence etc.) in order to help accomplishment of this goal.

Frederickson continued to deal with democratic theory and citizenship during 1983. He organized a conference on the same subject, a "National Conference on Citizenship and Public Service". Eleven papers were presented on the implications of the citizenship role for the practice of public administration. They were subsequently published in a special issue of PAR (1984), "Citizenship and Public Administration". Of these eleven papers, four articles in particular focused on administrative ethics. These were Chandler's (1984) "The Public Administrator as Representative Citizen: A New Role for the New Century", Cooper's (1984) "Citizenship and Professionalism in Public Administration", Gawthrop's (1984) "Civis, Civitas, and Civilitas: A New Focus for the Year 2000" and Hart's (1984) "The Virtuous Citizen, the Honorable Bureaucrat, and 'Public' Administration".

In the mid-1980s, on the other hand, the term virtue began to enter the vocabulary of public administration ethics. It has since become one of the major themes and has generally been understood as synonymous with "character". In fact there have been four names all signifying the same general orientation and common discourse: communitarianism, neo-Aristotelian, character ethics, or virtue ethics. Although no one in public administration has adopted or advocated virtue ethics in the pure sense of the term, Frederickson and Hart's (1985) article, "The Public Service and the Patriotism of Benevolence" can be viewed as the first example to appear in the literature. They shifted focus from reasoning about ethical principles to the personal character traits that would

presumably incline one to do right thing. The authors were no longer reasoning on ethical reasoning (or ethical principles) because the Constitution already provided such principles. In this regard, in my opinion, Hart's (1984) and Frederickson and Hart's (1985) articles have a place somewhere in between citizenship movement and virtue ethics. For example, Hart suggests that

"The ideal [of the authors of the Constitution] was for a pluralistic society, governed more by qualities of *citizen character*, rather than by public rules. Thus the most important attribute of public servants was to be a heightened *quality of character*. This may seem idealistic, and thus unrealistic. But that is not so. We have the knowledge necessary to achieve such moral nobility --all that is now required is the will to do it" (p. 118, emphasis added).

It is obvious in the passage that Hart clearly advocates the quality of character in addition to the emphasis on the role of the citizen, and the obligations of public administrators as citizens themselves, which spread to rest of the article. Similarly, in Frederickson and Hart's article, on the one hand, "benevolence" was proposed as the specific character trait of public administrators (through defining it as "the extensive and non-instrumental love of others" (p. 547)):

"[W]e define the primary moral obligation of the public service in this notion as the patriotism of benevolence: *an extensive love of all people within our political boundaries and the imperative that they must be protected in all of the basic rights granted to them by the enabling documents (...)*" (p. 549, emphasis in the original).

They define accepting regime values as the most important ethical obligation of public servants as citizens and hence they have a place in citizenship movement on the other hand

"[P]ublic servants must be both moral philosophers and moral activists, which would require: first, an understanding of, and belief in, the American regime

values; and second, a sense of extensive benevolence for the people of the nation. From that, the primary duty of public servants is to be *guardians* and *guarantors* of the regime values for the American public" (p. 551, emphasis in the original).

Pincoff's (1986) "Quandaries and Virtues" made a frontal attack on the preoccupation of ethicist with reasoning about principles to resolve ethical quandaries. His argument focusing on character as a more reliable way of assuring ethical conduct gave impetus to interest in virtue ethics. Nevertheless, in the field of public administration, the pride of place for a virtue ethics goes to some works of Cooper (1987, 1991). In "Hierarchy, Virtue, and the Practice of Public Administration: A Perspective for Normative Ethics" (1987) he advocated a theoretical framework for a "normative ethics which would be most appropriate for public administration and, more specifically, the code of ethics of" the ASPA (p. 320). From our point of view in this thesis, it is important to note that Cooper, unlike Mark Lilla (1981), did not approach bureaucratic and democratic ethos assumptions as mutually exclusive options. Instead, he found himself more in agreement with William Frenkana's view that an ethic of virtue is necessary to support different courses of conduct. Thus, he suggested a "complete normative ethic" for public administration involving: (a) an understanding of appropriate *ethical principles*, (b) an identification of *virtues* which are supportive of those principles, and (c) analytical techniques which may be employed in specific situations to interpret the principles (p. 321).

Additionally, in 1989, Hart stated in "A Partnership in Virtue Among All Citizens: The Public Service and Civic Humanism" that founding thought can be understood "through the virtue-centered paradigm of civic humanism, with its attendant 'ethics of character'" (p. 101). Also, he examined the

implications of the civic humanist tradition for an administrative ethic of virtue.

Dennis Thompson (1985) critically examined two traditional arguments. The first, the ethic of neutrality, effectively accepts that administrators should be neutral servants of their superiors because they have no legitimate right to dissent from official policy. The second, the ethic of structure, suggests that the object of moral life should be the organization as a whole and that no one administrator should be held morally responsible for actions of the whole when his or her conduct is only a part of the whole (p. 559). Thompson refuted these two arguments and concluded that even when public servants are confronted with the stark realities of the ethics of organizational life, administrative ethics is possible and can be realistically achieved (Ventriss, 1994: 211).

After having reviewed public administration literature in a retrospective (but of course not comprehensive) perspective, and after our long journey in this chapter, three crucial points can be stated:

(a) The content of literature examined in this chapter clearly --and even literally-- shows (and thus validates) that basic claim of anti-foundational philosophy is also valid for public administration ethics. In line with the general tendency in moral philosophy in modern age, history of administrative ethics is the history of search for foundations. Put other way, public administration ethics is not an exception for moral philosophy in modern age --the situation which this chapter, Chapter II, tries to show.

(b) The most significant indicator of the situation stated in the last item is the emphasis of public administration

scholars on universal administrative rules, standards, and principles -even sometimes literally;

(c) As a result, I assert that if we want to examine public administration ethics, we *first* have to see possible reflections of such a search for universals in the writings of individual administrative ethics scholars -writings of these scholars also construct the background of ethical frameworks which will be shown in the next chapter-- and *second* have to examine anti-foundational, postmodern ethics in order to think about probable implications of it to public administration ethics. In the next chapter, we will see bureaucratic ethos democratic ethos categorization itself and several attempts that try to transcend these frameworks.

CHAPTER III

BUREAUCRATIC AND DEMOCRATIC ETHOS: TWO MAJOR THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ETHICS

As we have seen in Chapter II, ethical issues have been debated theoretically/academically for several decades in public administration. Parallel to these discussions, on the other hand, there has always been a need to propose a theoretical ethical framework due to vast amount of various theoretical approaches to ethical issues and abundance of values in the field. In fact, looked from one angle, this is very understandable expectation. One of the main reasons for this situation is chaotic nature of ethical 'state of the discipline.' At just the beginning of 1980's, Dwight Waldo, for instance, explained the state of moral and ethical behavior in public administration as 'chaotic' (Waldo, 1980). After six years later Waldo, John Rohr (1986: 53) stated at a major conference that "the diversity in the ethics field(...)comes close to chaos". When we came to 1991, Kathryn Denhardt was writing that "the field is marked by diversity bordering on chaos, a lack of clarity about what ethics in public administration means, and ambivalence about what teaching or approaching a subject with such a lack of coherence". As declared by Denhardt (1988) elsewhere "to supply focus, definition, background and a common frame of reference for the research and practice of ethical administration" necessitates a theoretical framework on which the ethics of public administration can be based. She also adds that ethical framework is very important in the development of clear understandings in regard with the *moral*

principles of the profession, because *ethics is the study, application and critique of moral principles*. When we look from the foundational perspective, she seems to be right in her search for theoretical framework from which the theory and practice of public administration ethics can be guided. However looked from another angle, from the perspective of anti-foundational ethics, need to propose a theoretical framework indicates at the same time search for foundations and universals in administrative ethics.

An article published at the very beginning of eighties when the search for ethical framework(s) intensified brought a nomenclature and proposed two paradigms or frameworks to the agenda of academic public administration, and of those who seek to define these frameworks appropriately: bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Mark Lilla's (1980) article, entitled "Ethos, Ethics, and Public Service" did not take considerable attention except at some articles related the issue of ethics education in public service. The article and classification made by him for two ethical frameworks (bureaucratic and democratic ethos) are started to be referred more frequently by nineties.¹⁴ With the contribution of this article, already implicitly used historical/theoretical approaches became visible in public administration literature. It is interesting to note that even some scholars who attempt to draw theoretical framework(s) in their studies have not used Lilla's bureaucratic and democratic ethos dichotomy till nineties.

An article, however, written in 1991, emphasized and reminded the significance of the distinction. With the Darrel Pugh's (1991) work, I argue, these two ethoses were started to be

¹³ The term ethos can be defined as "generalized moral patterns" (Hejka-Ekins, 1988) or "the system of values

discussed not only as conceptual tools that have merely pedagogical values but also as two important paradigms that have deeper meanings concerned with the contemporary (ethical) identity of public administration. By the impetus of this study, further articles using this dichotomy have started to have a place in public administration literature. Analysis of the last half century of public administration to identify dominant frameworks that drive ethical standards suggests: bureaucratic and democratic ethoses for the field. Different scholars also share this view. As one scholar aptly puts, the most important reason is that this dichotomy is sufficiently broad to fit with many of the ethical "understandings and approaches cited by several writers" and "it is not inconsistent with them" (Goss, 1996).

In this chapter, we are going to analyze these two frameworks, and then, extend our search by reviewing the influence of these ethical frameworks, first, on ethical codes that have been derived from these frameworks and, second, on public administration education. We start with describing each ethos in terms of its values (standards). Then, we will define their intellectual, social, and professional sources of origin. It should be mentioned that views of public administration scholars over administrative ethics in Chapter II mainly constitute the intellectual source of origin of both bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Later, their methodology and relationship with (and approach to) the working of democratic political system will be examined by depending heavily on Pugh's important work.¹⁵ Again, teleology and

pertaining to the good within the discipline of public administration" (Woller and Patterson, 1997).

¹⁵ It must be stated that both bureaucratic and democratic ethos can be seen as key value sources or "value sets" of decision making in public administration (see, for instance, VanWart (1996) for such an approach). On the other hand, values that constitute these "value sets" and their

desirability have received much attention in the recent literature of public administration. While Goss (1996), Hejka-Ekins (1988), Lilla (1981), Pugh (1991), Woller (1998), Woller and Patterson (1997), divide them as bureaucratic and democratic ethos. However, many scholars have identified different value sets for public administrators. Brown (1986) suggests truthfulness, tolerance, fidelity to law, rhetorical ability, and virtues of management-intelligence and open-mindedness. Cooper classified four sources in 1982 -individual attributes, organization structure, organization culture, and societal expectations. However, he urged in 1987 benevolence, courage, rationality, fair-mindedness, prudence, respect for law, honesty, self discipline, civility, trustworthiness, respect for colleagues, responsibility for the practices, and independence. He later (1990) suggests responsibility is the key attribute of public administrators, and even later (1991) states that civic virtue is the central character trait for public administrators. He adds public spiritedness, prudence, and substantive rationality as corollary virtues as well in the same study. Although Dobel identifies prudence or prudential judgment in his 1988 study, he adds regime accountability and personal responsibility to these values in 1990. While Frederickson and Hart (1985) mention patriotism and benevolence, Frederickson (1989) enumerates efficiency, expediency, economy, order and predictability as public administration values. Denhardt (1988) suggests honor, benevolence, and justice as the moral foundation of public administration. Willbern (1984) stress six levels of morality: basic honesty and conformity to law, conflict of interest, service orientation and procedural fairness, ethics of democratic responsibility, ethics of public policy determination, and ethics of compromise and social integration. Goodsell (1989) identifies values like equality, justice, honesty, fairness and the protection of individual rights. Sullivan urges justice, dignity, fellowship, and social interdependence. Worthley and Grumet (1983) note the rule of law, accountability, efficiency, responsiveness, competence, objectivity and fairness. Guy (1991) suggests CHAPELFIRZ to stand for caring, honesty, accountability, promise keeping, pursuit of excellence, loyalty, fairness, integrity, respect for others, and responsible citizenship. After scanning these approximately sixty values, I think, need for developing a framework seems to be more understandable. I employ, in this study, the bureaucratic and democratic ethos dichotomy because it has potential of giving general picture of administrative ethics debates in academic field as well as of daily practices of public administrators without

deontology briefly examined in Chapter I constitutes the philosophical foundation and methodology of two ethoses.

3.1 REFLECTIONS OF MODERNIST ETHICAL CLEAVAGE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: BUREAUCRATIC AND DEMOCRATIC ETHOS

3.1.a Bureaucratic Ethos: Values, Sources of Origin and Methodology

It has been a general method to start the definition of each ethos with examining what Pugh (1991) calls "content values" or "standards". He defines content values of bureaucratic ethos by following five pervasive values: efficiency, efficacy, expertise, loyalty, and accountability. These concepts and "their inclusions as positive behavioral norms for public administrators," according to him, "have remained viable in both theory and practice"¹⁶ (p. 10).

On the other hand, Pugh and some other scholars writing on bureaucratic and democratic ethos dichotomy share a common point of view that bureaucratic ethos has determined the general character of public administration. The intellectual origin of this ethos is well known among the students of the field. This origin has fed from mainly three basic sources that we comprehensively examined in Chapter II: a) Wilsonian dichotomy of politics and administration, b) Weberian model of bureaucracy, and c) scientific management theory. While Weberian bureaucracy articulated the rational principles

solely focusing on singular values, but not fully neglecting them.

¹⁶ There has been, nonetheless, no total consensus on what exactly constitutes the content values of bureaucratic (and, as we will see later, democratic) ethos. Although Pugh accepts abovementioned values as standards of bureaucratic ethos, Lilla (1980) and Hejka-Ekins (1988) suggest competence instead of efficacy in Pugh's formulation with others. However, Goss (1996) emphasizes (and empirically tests) trustworthiness, predictability, impartiality, economy, and competence as underlying values of bureaucratic

underlying this ethos to the public organizations, politics/administration dichotomy created the rationalization in the field "to adopt the bureaucratic ethos as behavioral norms in a political context". Also, the function of scientific management in the development of this ethos was very crucial. It made "the utility of efficiency as a moral imperative" for the field. The works of Goodnow, Willoughby and Gulick can be added to this list. They conciliated "the salience of bureaucratic ethos with the study of comparative administrative issues and the application of rationalism to public administration" (Pugh, 1991). Against these three intellectual sources of bureaucratic ethos, Woller and Patterson (1997) give a different trilogy, if not completely original. According to them, while Weber's formation of ideal-type of bureaucracy provided the "organizational context" of bureaucratic ethos, Wilson and Goodnow's emphasis on politics/administration distinction provided "political context." On the other hand, Simon with his distinction between facts and values provided "epistemological context" of the bureaucratic ethos. Moreover, for them, scientific management replaced the "tradition and convention with scientific decision-making principles" (p. 106). They state the considerable implications of intellectual origins of bureaucratic ethos on the role and responsibilities of public administrators as follows.

"(1) ultimate values or ends can not be determined by rational analysis [of individual bureaucrats] (...); (2) scientific knowledge and techniques are to determine the most efficient and effective means (...); (3) the justification of means is logically different from the justification of ends; (4) administrative action is to be judged solely by the value-free criteria of efficiency and effectiveness; (5) public administrators (...) seek to provide the technical means for accomplishing the

ethos after comprehensive review of public administration literature.

ends handed down through the appropriate bureaucratic channels (...) and, (6) as long as public administrators strive to implement the public's will in such a manner, the bureaucracy retains its legitimacy in democratic society" (Ibid., 106).

After giving its intellectual origins, Pugh classifies 'social origins' of bureaucratic ethos into four groups: social Christianity, the progressive political movement, the scientific management movement, and the social science movement.

Despite this somewhat 'ethnocentric' approach used by Pugh, we must take Social Christianity movement (and other social origins) into account because they have considerable influences on the development of bureaucratic ethos along with intellectual origins that we examined in Chapter II. The importance of Social Christianity movement, for instance, in terms of our study, comes from two basic facts: firstly and practically, delineating this movement shows the historical 'development stages' of bureaucratic ethos and helps us to understand it more truly; secondly, it implies need to pay attention to the possible theoretical interactions between several (religious) doctrines and development of administrative ethical approaches. In its essence, social Christianity movement justified social change of American society in terms of Christian doctrine. To reach 'heavenly city on earth', instrumental rationality and bureaucratic tools were supported by this movement. Its rhetoric was very influential on public administration's definition on 'good life' and morality since reform of social institutions was supplied as the key for "personal moral salvation" (Pugh, 1991).

Other 'social origins' have much more 'universal' reputation in the advance of bureaucratic ethos. Progressive political movement, for instance, played an important role in the

general recognition of bureaucratic principles such as efficiency, efficacy, expertise and hierarchy in the period of public planning. It tried to develop a system inspired from 'market system' model of decision making grounded in modern science and technology. On the one hand, the age of industrialization required the centralization of power "to gain control of widening scope of public affairs", on the other hand, expertise took an important place to obtain and manipulate information.

Scientific management movement accepted rational principles of organization and they placed economic activities on a 'scientific' ground. At that point, new 'philosophy' of scientific management also embraced efficiency, hierarchy and expertise.

The last social origin of bureaucratic ethos is the 'social science movement'. Some American intellectuals such as Charles E. Merriam and Wesley C. Mitchell tried to develop a social science through "objective instrument of social observation and analytical techniques". 'A science of government' was very important and attractive purpose for these intellectuals. Values of bureaucratic ethos had a good place in this new science and its methodologies because they could give way to "quantification and empirical verification" (Ibid, 12-13).

Two points regarding the social origins enumerated by Pugh should be underlined here. The first important point is related with the Pugh's choice of social origins - the problem of properness of the social origins to the 'reality'. To what extent, are social origins of bureaucratic ethos chosen appropriately? This is a problem related directly with American administrative history, and to find the answer to this question exceeds intend of this study. However, for present purposes, the second point is much more important. As

also stated by Pugh, social origins of bureaucratic (and democratic ethos) are directly connected with the "American cultural context". It is clear that social means, for Pugh, American. The most important thing here, regardless of what bureaucratic ethos is involved in and in which social origin, that bureaucratic (and as we will see later democratic) ethos has taken root in the American history and society. Nevertheless, whether we call them as 'universal' or not, the values of bureaucratic ethos have been accepted almost all over the world, at least, as generally applicable, if not completely universal. It is true that social origins that produce these values belong to America, but the values themselves no longer belong to America. Thus, social origins specific to American society should be dealt with, at least, for practical and technical purposes. Further, it is significant to recognize that there are sometimes explicit but mostly implicit conceptual linkages and interactions between various ethical administrative approaches and general values, cultural formations (even religious doctrines) of a society. Looked from one angle, from Pugh's point of view, nothing is more natural than to explain the historical and social origins of ethical frameworks asserted as one of the most important ethical paradigms of the American administrative history. So viewed, we can not find, I believe, anything odd in his perspective. However, looked from another angle, very important problem lies at that point: Why 'other' and different cultures do not have their own ethical administrative values and perspectives developed by themselves (and, perhaps, for themselves)? Has it to be a 'compulsory duty' or a significant perspective that every 'other' cultures should have? By this way, it is possible to identify and then investigate different social origins for each different culture and society. At first glance, such questions, perhaps, can be seen as naive. My own judgment, however, is that these

questions are directly concerned with the administrative ethics issues of different societies. The answer to these questions also reveals the existence of some related philosophical and theoretical 'problematiques': universalizability of ethical values; dominance or hegemony of Western (or American) values; likelihood to develop 'native' ethical approaches for 'local' administrative issues, etc. Fortunately, 'ethnocentrism' of Pugh is not at 'unbearable' level; he does not assert the impacts of these social origins as completely universal, rather, he is aware of their "cross-cultural" character (Pugh, 1991: 11).

After stating intellectual and social origins of bureaucratic ethos, Pugh gives Civil Service Assembly, Municipal Reform League, Society for the Advancement of Management, and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs as public administration associations that embrace basic principles and values of bureaucratic ethos and its instrumental approach. He calls them as "professional stream of public administration".

The last point should be addressed here is related with the methodology of bureaucratic ethos. Pugh sees the methodology of an ethos as the "systematic process by which the framework ensures its continuity and consistency" (p. 13). Bureaucratic paradigm ensures its continuity and consistency by benefiting from two processes: utilitarianism and instrumentalism. These two processes are employed in the methodology of bureaucratic ethos as the "criteria for action." The best example of this methodological approach, for Pugh, can be found in Herbert Simon's (1947) work Administrative Behavior.

In terms of our study, there is an important point here. In Chapter I, we investigated the relationship between philosophy and administrative ethics and tried to give a philosophical taxonomy. Teleological and deontological understandings were

stated under the title of foundational ethics. Both of these moral theories construct the foundation and methodology of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. There are wide-range implications for the connection between moral theories (teleology and deontology) and theoretical frameworks (bureaucratic and democratic ethos). Now we can continue our analysis with the other ethos, because

"the evolution of bureaucratic ethos has had a tremendous influence on public administration, perhaps the dominant influence(...)the impact of this attitude has been tempered to a degree by the existence of more broadly based framework." (Pugh, 1991: 14)

"The more broadly based framework" emphasized is the democratic ethos. Some of the features of democratic ethos will be discussed in the section that follows.

3.1.b Democratic Ethos: Values, Sources of Origin and Methodology

Eclectic, broadly based, ambiguous, patchworklike_ those are the words most commonly heard regarding the democratic ethos. It must be acknowledged that the most important problem concerning the definition of democratic ethos is its less precise, and to some extent, 'idealistic' character. It is not an exaggeration to say that giving precise definition of democratic ethos is as difficult as defining the democracy itself. Despite the imprecise aspects of democratic ethos, however, principal mentality which lies behind it carries on its presence.

Generally, a different way is followed to explain democratic ethos values than those of bureaucratic ethos values. In the former, definition of each value is tried to be provided. Bureaucratic ethos values (such as 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', 'expertise' and 'hierarchy') are accepted, as almost, as taken for granted. Eclectic character of democratic paradigm, perhaps, makes such a different approach necessary.

On the other hand, there is another significant point which has to be mentioned regarding the democratic ethos values: unlike its bureaucratic counterpart, democratic paradigm has not only historical but also relatively recent entries by public administration scholars that contribute to the development of its intellectual origin.

Content values of democratic ethos are public interest, social equity (Scott and Hart, 1973; Hart, 1974; Harmon, 1974), regime values (Rohr, 1976 and 1978; Wakefield, 1976; Richardson and Nigro, 1987 and 1991) and citizenship (Frederickson, 1982; Chandler 1984; Gawthrop, 1984; Hart 1984; Cooper, 1984 and 1991). Moreover, as we have also seen in Chapter II, the works of Morestein Marx (1940 and 1949), Levitan (1942 and 1943) and Leys (1943 and 1944)--suggesting loyalty to the citizenry, devotion to democracy and democratic principles in 1940s-- and the studies of Golembiewski (1962), Storing (1964) and Bailey (1964) contributed to the development of democratic ethos and constituted its intellectual origin.

Although he accepts the ambiguity in defining the content values of democratic ethos he still defines citizenship as "the ideal of a citizenry informed about government and active in its operation," (p. 15) public interest -using Walter Lippman's words --as "what men would choose if they saw early, thought rationally, and acted disinterestedly and benevolently", and social equity --using David Hart's (1974) words-- as "the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men" (p. 15-16). Obviously, these definitions themselves need to be re-defined in terms of their contents and they can be seen as merely personal choices not as 'agreed-on' concepts; because they can not hide historical antagonisms, conflicts, and debates over the definition of them. Although

basic feature in the definitions of democratic ethos values is their ambiguous, vague, and unclear characteristics, this does not decrease the value of democratic ethos's influence on the rhetoric of public administration, if not merely on the practice of it.

On the other hand, social origins of democratic ethos consist of political institutions such as courts and political movements such as 'rural populism and progressivism', the 'urban reform movements' and the 'American civil rights movement'. Several organizations consisting governmental research bureaus, educational institutions, for example, University of Chicago, and associations such as the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) has contributed to the development of democratic ethos professionally.

Lastly, Pugh (1991) says regarding the methodology of this ethos:

"Its method is deductive (reasoning from a general truth to a particular instance of that truth), dialectical (whereby questions and their answers lead to their logical conclusion), and deontological (where the rightness or wrongness of a moral action is determined by referencing formal rules of conduct rather than the action's results or consequences). Thus, the frameworks require a thorough grounding in history and political philosophy" (p. 17).

This quotation deserves much more scrutinizing. When he states that the democratic ethos relates with political theory and that methodology of this ethos is deontological he seems to be completely right. However, the relationship between political theory and ethical framework can not only be confined to one of the paradigms --to democratic ethos. Thus, in his article, there are two missing points in Pugh's article.

Above all, whereas bureaucratic ethos seems to have, to a certain extent, its prescriptions and propositions for the tension between bureaucracy and politics since it accepts the politics/administration dichotomy in advance, this does not mean bureaucratic ethos is silent for political theory at all. Avoiding from incorporating the bureaucratic ethos to political theory via politics/administration dichotomy means in fact, having directly a political perspective and ethical stance against the politics.

Secondly, in addition to the abovementioned shortcoming, the relationship between the democratic ethos and political theory is not mentioned in the article. We will attempt to examine this sort of relation in the following section.

3.1.c Two Ethical Frameworks and Relationships with Democratic Political System

If we put the problem concerning the nature of the interaction between ethical paradigms and political theory in the form of a question that tries to inquiry both the role and place of public administration in a democracy or the interaction between democratic system and bureaucratic values, we are concerned, in my opinion, with the heart of the problem.

At that point, in my opinion, it is possible to talk about two separate aspects of ethical frameworks identified by different scholars. One of these aspects is related to the views of each ethos in regard to the working of democratic system and politics. The other is more directly connected with the relevancy of the values. In the second aspect, the questions are: what values are relevant to public administrators and what is good (or bad) for public administration? In this regard, different set of values for each ethos has to be exposed with those of the understandings concerning the democratic political system simultaneously.

Generally speaking, according to bureaucratic ethos, the role of public administrator in a democratic government is much bounded. Because, it presumes that there is a direct line of communication from the people to their elected representatives, to bureau heads, and then down the hierarchical ladder to those responsible for administrating and implementing public policies. In this view, enforcing the laws and implementing the policies enacted by the people's democratically elected representatives in an efficient and effective manner are seen as moral imperative. Yet, here, the ethical predispositions of public administrators previous to formation of 'public will' as a moral imperative are not considered. Instead, they are, in a democracy, both legally and morally bound to enforce and implement laws and public policies. The process to the formation, and then, implementation of the public will is assumed to be clear and 'working'. What's more, through direct elections and elected representative sovereign people 'speak'. Once they have spoken, there is no room for public administrators to re-evaluate the will of people by his or her moral understandings. If this is the case, where does bureaucratic ethos depend upon its legitimacy? It is clear that the legitimacy of bureaucratic ethos comes from the view of the people's sovereignty. From this point of view, administrative legitimacy has been equated to meritocracy, professionalism, expertise, and efficiency.

On the other hand, according to democratic ethos representative model of democracy does not work in the manner that we can label it truly democratic and it can not serve as an ethical guide for public administrators. Unlike the bureaucratic ethos that acquiesces morally neutral public administrators in the democratic 'circle' in which formation (through elections), enforcement (through legislation) and more importantly, from our point of consideration,

implementation (by bureaucracy) of public will are being seen possible, democratic ethos rejects the 'direct line of communication' from the people to bureaucracy. Thus, according to democratic framework, an ethos based merely on hierarchical control and the obedience to political superiors lacks credibility due to important shortcomings and problems involved in the determination of bureaucratic duties and objectives. Furthermore, most of the existent problems arise from this vision of democratic process.

As we have seen in Chapter II, when we came to the end of 1960's and early years of 1970's, criticisms of bureaucratic ethos were sharpened especially by the impetus of the works of neo-Kantian liberal philosopher John Rawls (1971), *A Theory of Justice*. As we have also seen, Rawls' 'theory of justice as fairness' was not teleological but rather, deontological in nature, and the concept of right was, in principle, prior to the concept of good in his argumentation (Rawls, *Ibid.*, 396; cf. Hünler, 1997: 72-90). In this respect, the New Public Administration (NPA) movement whose writers based their works heavily on Rawls's theory of justice can be seen as one of the examples of systematic attacks on bureaucratic ethos. Although value-neutral bureaucracies might be efficient and effective, NPA writers argued, they were not legitimate since they were inhumane, unresponsive and democratically unaccountable. Furthermore, there was a meaningful fear of NPA writers that: public administration operating within the bureaucratic value system was being used, or could too easily be used, as a tool of oppression. For preeminent NPA scholars such as Frederickson (1974; 1980; and 1990), Harmon (1981), Hart (1974) and Marini (1974), social equity was the basic principle. In addition to, and along with NPA writers, various scholars later criticized and also attacked on many of the bureaucratic values underlying bureaucratic ethos, if not all of them. Overhead democracy, moral neutrality and hierarchical

control were among these values. Adams et.al. (1990) argue that the values of bureaucratic ethos bring forth "contextless and placeless practice" since public administration working within the limits of this value system neglects the "meaningful engagement with the larger ethical concerns of society. That is to say, professionalism fed and nurtured by rationalism led inexorably to "a naked public square" (p. 225)¹⁷.

Democratic ethos, however, suggests that bureaucrats have their 'ethical space' (Fox, 1989) and "they can not be value-neutral servants of the public so admired by the bureaucratic ethos". Instead, it accepts that there has been increasing administrative discretion of public administrators, and that they must base their decisions on some alternative value set, composed of certain higher moral principles embedded in the notion of democratic government. Though there is a sharp contrast between the two ethos about the "primary ethical

¹⁷ We have seen the criticism of rationalism at the discussions about postmodernism and public administration. The statements of Cynthia O. McSwite (1996), one of the preeminent figures of postmodern (American) public administration, deserve to quote: "No matter how plausible the postmodern viewpoint might become, however, what is relevance to public administration. In our view, postmodernism is opening the door for the reentry of American pragmatism into the discourse of public administration. This door could probably not be opened by any means less radical than an approach like postmodernism. Pragmatism was the original foundation of American public administration, but it was quickly eclipsed by rationalism, the exemplar statement of which is the work of Herbert Simon (1947). In our opinion this was the gravest conceptual error the field of public administration has made. Postmodernism provides the pry bar for cracking the hermetic enclosure that rationalism has constructed around itself and that has made it appear so resistant to effective critique in both the academic and the popular mind" (p. 215-216). Clearly, regardless of whether "the reentry of American pragmatism into the discourse of public administration" is desirable, it can be asserted that the architecture of "epistemological

responsibility" of public administrators, this does not mean that supporters of bureaucratic ethos does not accept the ethical responsibility of bureaucrats against the public will or they dispute the ethical requirement for efficient and effective administration,

"They are, nonetheless, more inclined to see the excessive attention paid to instrumental rationality as a threat to administrative and democratic legitimacy, and they seek to place bureaucratic values- such as efficiency, effectiveness, hierarchical accountability, technical expertise and scientific rationality- in their proper perspective by de-emphasizing them relative to core democratic values" (Woller and Patterson, 1997: 104).

Consequently, if we roughly take ethics as the determination of what are good and bad (in our case, for public administration,) according to bureaucratic ethos; then, the 'good and bad' for public bureaucrats are determined through political process. On the other hand, it is the existence of 'higher moral orders' that identifies the manner that bureaucrats should behave in democratic ethos.

So far, we have tried to show what values and standards of bureaucratic and democratic ethos comprise and which intellectual, social, and professional origins support these paradigms. Additionally, it was the political perspective of the frameworks that lied at the focus of our concern. But if there is a "tug of war" between the frameworks, it may not be erroneous to ask a question like that: Then, which is the winner of the 'war'? In my opinion, this question is very crucial and meaningful from two points. The first important point is that it is connected with how the paradigms that we have tried to explore at the theoretical level affect the daily life of public administrators at the practical level. And, the second important point is that above question is

context" of bureaucratic ethos built by Simon is under direct assault by some postmodern writers.

concerned with meaning of the frameworks on the 'praxis' of public administration. Of course, some related questions can be added: which ethos is dominant in public administration or, in other words, what is the main concern of public administration profession regarding the ethical frameworks? Two crucial themes should be elaborated here in order to find possible answers to these questions. One of them regards with the ethics education in public administration. The second theme is the impact of two administrative ethics frameworks on code(s) of ethics in the field. Needless to say, these themes should be directly dealt with in terms of their connections to bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Discussions revolving around the abovementioned questions and problems accompanying them, in my opinion, help us to open significant doors to new analyses. In this way, we can come into contact with further perspectives. These issues will be discussed in the following section.

3.1.d Ethical Frameworks and 'Praxis' Of Public Administration: Ethics Education and Ethical Codes

In the literature, there have been several articles investigating the ethics education in public administration. However, April Hejka-Ekin's (1988) article, entitled Teaching Ethics in Public Administration, is very suitable from our point of consideration because it is a basic study in which the relationship between the ethical frameworks and ethics education constitute main part, if not all. That is, it can be seen as the first study that incorporates bureaucratic and democratic ethos with ethics education in public administration. This article also reveals current implications (of two ethical paradigms which were enunciated at first by Lilla, then, were moved to the agenda of public administration approximately a decade ago by Pugh) on the 'academy' of public administration.

She starts her article by underlining very important point and by indicating general character of public administration: the history of public administration is being characterized by what she calls 'vacillation' problem. The 'vacillation' is directly related with whether giving a normative character to public administration or not. The main reason of this problem is that what is being normative has been suppressed by the bureaucratic paradigm and its accompanying conceptualization concerning the discrepancy between fact and value (p. 885).

Normative character of public administration has been largely discussed from the early years of public administration as a discipline --through either emphasizing its importance or mainly demanding withdrawal of it. Nonetheless, studies that attach importance to normative aspect of the field have not been placed within the mainstream approaches. The major reason is the politics administration dichotomy permeated all the body of public administration. It must be acknowledged that public administrators are merely seen as 'functionaries' in the every stage of political process according to the general bureaucratic perspective. To be truly 'servant' of public, it is expected from public administrator that he or she must give up his/her value judgments and be value-neutral in every step of the determination of public policies. In fact, this is the problem of all modern formal organizations, not only public bureaucracies. It also reflects the obvious effects of Newtonian mechanistic world-view, empiricist-positivist scientific understanding treating the members of organizations as mechanic, value-free and almost released from his or her humane character. In every organization, both public and private, it has been required that people must leave their values off at the door of their worksites, offices, bureaus, and organizations. The history of organizations is, in principle, the history of the accommodation of objectives and values of organizational members to those of organization. How

has this purpose been realized historically in organization? The major way to accomplish this purpose has been to establish hierarchical echelons and central command-and-control system structurally; maintain discipline and punishment emotionally; and build differentiated payment systems economically. Contrary to general assumptions, personnel values by which the members of all sorts of organization continue to exist as 'living human beings' can not be 'taken off' as the bureaucratic ethos supposes. Although bureaucratic paradigm does not expect from the members of organization to change entirely their ethical values and predispositions, it wants them to 'ignore' their own value judgments sometimes for the sake of 'organizational aims' organizationally, sometimes for the sake of 'public will' politically, and sometimes for the sake of 'the greatest good for the greatest number' philosophically. It is this approach that has given to the public administration its value-neutral tone and identity since the end of 1800's to the years that follow the World War II.

But, there is a decline of this understanding. Primary role in the decline belongs to the development of 'discretionary authority' of public administrators. The term 'discretionary authority' is very crucial for Hejka-Ekins because it also signifies changes in the patterns of conventional ethics understandings through recognition of the increase in discretionary power of bureaucrats. Acceptance of this power, actually, indicates one of the most important milestones in the historical development of public administration ethics discussions. Because,

"[T]he acknowledgement of the bureaucrat's discretionary power has become the pivotal justification for the consideration of public service ethics" (Hejka-Ekins, 1998: 885).

What's more, above stated 'vacillation' is, at the same time, the case for "the ethics instruction in professional education programs as well." Examination of various 'guidelines' in public administration and policy programs at several American universities, for instance, shows a gap between words and deeds as to the administrative ethics education. In addition, there are serious confusions and uncertainties concerning what a 'good' curriculum must comprise due to the abundance of approaches. Thus, although Hejka-Ekins' general position is for democratic ethos she attempts to explore "what is actually taught in graduate schools of public management" (p. 885).

To accomplish this purpose she conducted a survey. It was revealed in this survey that sixty-six NASPAA schools had administrative ethics course in the period between 1985-87. 31.4 % of these schools indicated that they offered a separate ethics course. She compares the results of her study with those of Fleishman and Payne (1978) and Worthley and Grumet (1980). In Hejka-Ekins' study, 200 NASPAA schools were contacted and surveyed if an administrative ethics course had been taught. However, in the other two studies, more ethics courses were stated. While in 1978 43.3 % of NASPAA schools were offering a separate ethics course, in 1980, less than one quarter (21.1) of them were offering separate ethics course in their curriculum. As also pointed out by her, more ethics courses were taught in the post-Watergate era, and "there actually seems to be a decline in teaching ethics as a separate course since the renewed interest in ethics surfaced in the mid-1970s."¹⁸ Furthermore, it is important to note that

¹⁸ These figures show once again that Watergate scandal is very influential even in the academic public administration in the United States. In fact, what we may call as 'negative incidents' in public administration practice (such as government scandals, corruption, "gross neglect of duties, the solicitation of bribes, misappropriation of public funds" (Theobald, 1997: 490) and undesirable behavior of

"most courses had been incorporated into the curriculum since 1974 due to persistent efforts of one or more individuals who were able to convince the faculty of the need" (p. 886).

At the focus of survey there are three issues of debate. Firstly, Hejka-Ekins tries to examine considerations of ethics instructors concerned with what the goals of ethics education should be. At that point, two significant approaches to the goal of the teaching of administrative ethics are mentioned: in the one part, some scholars stress that the goal of ethics education should be 'to improve the moral cognitive capacities,' the others argue that the fundamental goal should be 'to cultivate moral character and moral conduct' of them. Although most of the scholars support the former idea, there have been considerable criticisms. They consist for instance that improving the moral cognitive capacities of students only make them to be more sophisticated in their rationalizing, but it does not prepare them to take their roles as public service professionals in a democratic society (Lilla, 1981: 4-7). What ethical standards ought to ground the content of an administrative ethics course and what kind of ethical

bureaucrats) have contributed to the development of public administration ethics. For instance, with the influence of these 'negative incidents' various schools of public administration and public policy have introduced courses in ethics, as reflected in the survey of Hejka-Ekins; huge volume of text for the field have been published, some professional codes of ethics have been promulgated or reissued; and governments have enacted ethics laws. However, 'negative incidents' continue to occur. An important point should be underlined here. The point to be made is that to confine, in my opinion, the discussions over public administration ethics merely to how these negative aspects can be removed runs equally serious risk of neglecting deeper conceptual and theoretical points. Of course, trying to find out the deeper reasons of every event can be perceived, sometimes, as fruitless endeavor in the way for the solution of problems. It is expected particularly from academic public administration to assess ethical problems in terms of these two axes.

decision-making process ethics instructors should use to help cultivate the moral judgement of their students? These questions are related with other two points examined in the survey. Bureaucratic and democratic ethos are candidates for ethical standards grounding ethics course. Ethical decision-making processes emphasizing either utilitarian or deontological framework (or some combination of the two) are two candidates for cultivation of the moral judgments of students. No doubt, these three points can not be imagined as distinct from each other: preferences affecting the goal of ethics education are also directly influential in the preferences determining the usage of existent ethos of public administration, and deontological and utilitarian types of ethical decision making models. Therefore, these three issues constitute the basis of Hejka-Ekins' survey and we will analyze them.

From the answers given to the questions regarding what ethics instructors consider about the goals of ethics education, it is emerged that

"[E]thics teachers are more concerned with improving the moral judgment of their students than affecting their character or conduct." (Hejka-Ekins, 1988: 887)

'The five top goals' --developing an awareness of the ethical issues in the field; developing analytic skills in ethical decision making; building an attitude for moral obligation and personal responsibility; stimulating moral imagination, and lastly helping students to recognize the discretionary power of the administrator's role-- constitute different dimensions of improving the moral cognitive capacities and judgment of the students. Although significant percentage (32.1 %) of ethics instructors accept to affect both moral judgment and moral conduct of public administration students as primary

goal of ethics courses, the largest part of them (42.9 %) considers it to be the development of moral judgment.

As we have mentioned, the second important question in the survey is directly related with the two ethoses of public administration: which ethos should be exposed to the students? At that point, Hejka-Ekins accepts the dichotomy of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. But, according to her, there are four issues emerging, which we ought to delineate in the debate concerning these two ethoses, their ethical standards and the content of ethics courses.

In one of these four issues, we must try to investigate the ethos that ethics instructors believe best characterizes public administration. The answers given to the related survey question -asking to teachers 'what ethos they believe best characterizes the field'- show that nearly one-third of instructors (29.1 %) believe the dominance of bureaucratic ethos in the field. Interestingly, less than one-fourth (23.6%) considers that both ethoses are dominant in the field. From our point of view, an important point should be underlined here immediately. The point is that although the percentage of 'alternative ethoses (18.2 %) --such as the 'conscience ethos' or the 'technocratic ethos'-- rates higher than the democratic ethos (16.4 %), it is obvious that more than four-fifth (81.8 %) of ethics instructors believe either the bureaucratic ethos or the democratic ethos (or both of them) as significant. Furthermore, these numbers also show "while some teachers of ethics consider the Democratic Ethos also as important to the field, more believe the Bureaucratic Ethos continues to characterize public administration" (p. 888). A somewhat similar conclusion can be obtained from the answers given to the question regarding 'which ethos ethics teachers stress to their students'. It is reported in the article that most of ethics teachers (72 %) emphasize both the

bureaucratic and democratic ethos, though 20.8 % of them focus on 'alternative ethos.' As also pointed out by her;

"This is interesting because it indicates that even though instructors are fairly mixed with in what they perceive to be the dominant ethos of the field, they are clear that students need to be exposed to both ethos." (Hejka-Ekins, 1988: 888)

One of the very interesting parts of article includes the answers given to the questions regarding which ethical standards represent bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Hejka-Ekins chooses *efficiency, expertise, accountability, competence, and loyalty* as the representative values of bureaucratic ethos. Though efficiency emerges to be the top ethical value, which reflects the bureaucratic ethos (23.1 %), the others rank closely (19.4 %, 18.7 %, 18.7 %, and 17.9 %, respectively). Regarding four ethical standards of the democratic ethos --regime (or constitutional) values, public interest, social equity, and citizenship-- there seems to be 'more variation of opinions.' Regime values have the highest rate (28.3 %) and they are followed by public interest (25.2 %), social equity (19.2 %) and citizenship (16.2 %). The difference between percentages illustrates the variation of thoughts as to values of democratic ethos as well. Consequently, according to the answers of respondents, efficiency can be considered as the representative of bureaucratic ethos and regime values do the same in the other side.

Lastly, she tries to uncover "which standards these teachers stress in their administrative ethics courses, and how they rate their importance" (p. 888). Surprisingly, ethics instructors see public interest, social equity and regime values (16.9 %, 15.9%, and 14.6 %, respectively) as the most important ethical values in public administration. It is surprising because, as indicated earlier, they also believe

that the bureaucratic ethos dominates the field. In my opinion, not only does this support her conclusion that ethics teachers are more supportive of democratic ethos than the bureaucratic counterpart but this also shows the difference between 'what is' and 'what ought to be' in the public administration ethics education particularly, and in the public administration field generally. Of course, the 'difference' between the two can be considered, for instance, as 'motivating' optimistically, or as a gap which can not be filled --depending upon the one's perspective.

The last point in the threefold investigation of Hejka-Ekins' survey is related with the ethical decision-making. In this regard, both teleological and deontological decision-making steps are combined by ethics teachers in their courses (60 %). However, 15 % of them use a deontological frame of reference while only 7 % stress a utilitarian framework philosophically. This means that most of the ethics instructors

"[s]tress with their students both the duty to uphold moral principles at stake in a conflict and the probable consequences as significant factors in arriving at a decision." (Ibid, 889)

To sum up, findings of the study show that improving the moral judgment of public administration students is the basic goal of ethics teachers. Further and more important in terms of our study, it is believed that bureaucratic ethos best characterizes public administration. But, the teachers emphasize both ethoses in ethics courses. Efficiency and regime values are in the forefront of the bureaucratic and democratic ethos. In other words, efficiency and regime values principally represent bureaucratic and democratic ethos respectively. However, public interest is considered as the most important ethical standard among all public administration ethics values. Finally, teleological and

deontological methods are used together by most of the ethics instructors.

Hejka-Ekins' study clearly shows that, today, both ethical frameworks --bureaucratic and democratic-- examined in our study are mostly utilized in academic world. Instructors, in that field, think that bureaucratic ethos is dominant. Of course, it should be noted this merely is the perceived understandings of ethics teachers and does not prove alone the dominance of the bureaucratic ethos against its counterpart -- democratic ethos-- but rather it reflects only the 'assumptions', and to say language of survey, 'beliefs' of ethics teachers. Additional to the beliefs of ethics teachers there are further evidences which prove the dominance of bureaucratic ethos. Therefore, we should look at the other domain that we can trace the dominance of bureaucratic paradigm. It is the realm of ethical codes.

In public administration, it is possible to talk about two salient, famous and determining codes of ethics: The International City Management Association (ICMA) code and the ethical code of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). In public service delivering, if bureaucratic and democratic frameworks represent the major ethical approaches to administrative ethics, then, it is not surprising that

"they should have had an influence on the development of ethical codes that deal directly with the practice of public administration(...) What these codes contain in terms of standards and how the standards relate to either the bureaucratic ethos or its democratic alternative became essential parts of understandings the field's current ethical bearing" (Pugh, 1988: 17).

The ICMA code was adopted firstly in 1924 and has been amended five times (International City Management Association, 1987a). ASPA approved its code of ethics in 1984, exactly sixty years

later than the ICMA code, after a long deliberation period. In this ten-year deliberation period --from 1974 to 1984-- there have been serious discussions over the code. Furthermore, the struggle to adopt a code of ethics met with considerable resistance from those in the organization who felt that (a) public administration was too diverse an enterprise for a code, (b) such a code was not enforceable, and (c) codes were "too preachy" (Chandler, 1984: 33). While ethical code of the ICMA consists of three broad categories of behavior -personal honesty, politics, and professional conduct - in its twelve principles, twelve articles of ASPA's code of ethics contain two behavioral categories -personal honesty and professional conduct - since it avoids political issues. "The ICMA also has established rules of procedure to provide a reasonable process for investigating and determining whether members have violated its code" (International City Management Association, 1987b), whereas, the ethical code of ASPA "lacks any formal, published rules of procedure to ensure code enforcement. No mechanism exists for accusing member of violating the code, determining his or her culpability, and finally employing sanctions" (Pugh, 1988: 23).

In addition to these differences between two professional ethical codes there seems to be much more crucial point especially in terms of our perspective here. It is that both they share the same substance, bureaucratic ethos. As Chandler (1983:34) stated "these codes seem more content to deal with behavioral criteria that address issues of efficiency, economy, and administrative principles than to agonize over criteria of morality such as justice, equity, and the public interest". According to some scholars, not only the dominance of bureaucratic ethos over these codes of ethics but also reason of this condition is clear: the politics/administration dichotomy, and 'instrumental rationality' that nourishes this dichotomy. For some writers, in public administration

administration dichotomy appears to be alive and well," (Chandler, 1983:34); but, this time "the mythology [of the dichotomy] is used to embrace the very real construct of Weberian social theory known as zwekrational, or instrumental rationality" (Pugh, 1988: 23). Instrumental rationality involved in bureaucratic ethos legitimizes "the conversion of the good into the functional [instrumental] and the ethical into the a-ethical" (Ventriss, 1990: 779). Instrumental rationality and bureaucratic ethos that relies on the politics-administration dichotomy are synonymous. Moreover, "bureaucratic mind-set" sees avoiding morality as moral, which has had important place in the moral reasoning of many public administrators.

In contrast to instrumental rationality stands 'substantive rationality' or 'classical reasoning,' synonymous with democratic ethos. Substantive rationality "enables the individual to distinguish between good and evil, false and genuine knowledge, and accordingly, to order one's personal and social life" (Ramos, 1981: 4-5). At that point, we can ask: What are the consequences of instrumental rationality? According to Ramos, the dominance of instrumental rationality in modern bureaucratic organizations causes to continuous distortion of the moral behavior of the individual and hides an important point that bureaucratic organizations are historically recent institutional inventions "required by the imperative of capital accumulation and the enhancement of processing capabilities characteristic of the market system" (Ibid., 105). Consequently, Pugh summarizes the views of Ramos in two sentences and concludes that "bureaucratic ethos has a strong overtone that substitutes for - not complements - democratic ethos" and it "*is the consequence of modern capitalism not that of republican, constitutional self-*

governance" (1991; 23-24, italics original). Now we can return to the discussion regarding the nature of ethical codes.

Ralph Chandler (1983) states that there are three important "virtues of codes:" objectivism, community and courage. He thought these three principles, first, describe existence of the "external transcendent values"; second, indicate a situation in which moral behavior is not seen only as a matter of personal preferences but is perceived as "community judgment"; and third identify "the idea that codes can promote courageous behavior". In this regard, ethical code of ICMA is criticized since it does not meet the first characteristic - objectivism- in Chandler's description. on the other hand, it is asserted that ASPA's code has more missing points in terms of all three characteristics.

Of course, criticisms directed to the ethical codes are not merely confined to whether they have important 'virtues' or not. For some, these codes 'trivialize' ethical behavior and reduce it to simply staying out of trouble. Others believe that they are simply irrelevant and fail to intellectually challenge and inspire those for whom they are written (Streib, 1987:16). It is important to note that these criticisms have also a historical background. For instance, in 1976, Wakefield was talking about vague and general nature of ethical codes

prescribed behavior and their inability to answer specific

a little envy- that ethical code in the field of medicine have enhanced "the image and prestige of medical doctors" and that they have served "to inspire professional conduct and improve the integrity of peer and patient relationships" (Pugh, 1991: 28; Streib, 1987: 17). It is interesting to note that if we take 'integrity' as in the first meaning of the term, 'wholeness or completeness' -of the relationship between the doctors and patients- not in the second meaning as 'honesty and uprightness', it will become evident that the community "virtue" in Chandler's trilogy is developed in ethical codes in the field of medicine.

It is a truism that during their historical developments ethical codes have not had a completely negative image in the field of public administration for the most part. Nor do the members of the field have welcomed these codes since they have important 'technical' shortcomings and deficiencies. For instance, whether these codes have an effective and strong impact on the moral behavior of public administrator (in other words, the problem of applicability) is one of the main issues of debate. Analogously, it is also directly related with whether or not these codes can be successful at establishing appropriate enforcement mechanisms which increase the applicability of codes and ensure compliance to the members.

In fact, these issues are directly related with whether the content of ethics courses or ethical codes is prepared properly. That is, it is an issue in which 'technical aspects' come to the forefront. Understood in this way, professional ethical codes and their enforcement mechanisms deserve serious investigation. However, problems that we have faced in the adaptation of a code do not have merely 'technical aspect'. On the contrary, these problems reflect ironically very substantial matter in the designation of a code: they carry a powerful ideological message defining the ideal and what is

good or bad in the field. Therefore, existence and nature of ethical codes possess an importance transcending 'technical aspects', as we saw in the discussion of postmodern ethics at the last section of Chapter I.

In my opinion, the debate over the 'utility of ethical codes' or over whether ethical codes, laws, or all kinds of legal and administrative regulations have their enforcement mechanisms a) has an epistemological character on the one hand, that is, it is related with if a successful code --as in the field of medicine- can be established or not; b) has an ontological character denoting the problematical substance and nature of ethics that deny the existence of ethical codes on the other hand; hence, c) its epistemological importance, occupies relatively small place in the ethical mapping of public administration terrain.

Where does an ethical framework become visible? Obviously enough, it is reasonable to think that at the practical level an ethical framework -regardless of its bureaucratic or democratic nature- is reified in an ethical code or in a law. The spirit of ethical framework principally determines the spirit of code or law. At the theoretical level, an ethical framework becomes visible in what I might call as "soft data" such as several articles, books and oral or written argumentation about the ethical state of discipline. Codes of ethics and/or legal-administrative regulations are "hard data" because -bureaucratic or democratic- *theoretical* frameworks find, at least, a chance to be binding only at that level.

This section ends up with the above mentioned discussions here. I have tried to find out the 'winner' of the 'tug of war' between bureaucratic and democratic ethos on the praxis of public administration. It is appeared that we can talk about a clear dominance of bureaucratic ethos at least in two

realms of the field: ethics education and professional ethical codes. In the next section, I will seek to explore attempts that try to transcend bureaucratic ethos-democratic ethos dichotomy.

3.2 ATTEMPTS TO TRANSCEND MODERNIST CLEAVAGE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ETHICS

Gary M. Woller from Brigham Young University gives one of the well-informed discussions of transcending modernist ethical cleavage in public administration in his recently published two articles. The title of his (also chronologically) first article (with Patterson) is "Public Administration Ethics: A Postmodern Perspective". It was published in *American Behavioral Scientist*, in 1997. They try, as understood clearly from the title, to bring a postmodern approach to administrative ethics. The additional importance of this article, from our point of study, is that the authors develop this perspective in the context of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Second article of Woller, entitled "Toward a Reconciliation of the Bureaucratic and Democratic Ethos" was published in another respected journal of the field, *Administration and Society*, in 1998. In the second article Woller mentions the reconciliation problematique of two ethoses and reasons, despite of the literature, that reconciliation effort is not unreasonable expectation. In his two articles, Woller re-examines teleological and deontological characteristics of bureaucratic and democratic paradigms, and develops new understandings. Starting with his second work, we will give attention to the issue of transcending ethical frameworks in public administration. But before doing so, we should concentrate on the philosophical backgrounds of ethical frameworks once again.

In Chapter I, we saw a philosophical taxonomy in which 'foundational' ethics is distinguished from 'anti-foundational' ethics. As I have repeatedly emphasized, the

former is based on the search for universal or quasi-universal principles for ethical behavior (Fox, 1994; Hekman, 1998; Rorty, 1979). Teleology and deontology, in this taxonomy, were indicated as two important examples of foundational ethics. Again, at the very beginning of this chapter, when we defined bureaucratic and democratic ethos with their historical origins, it was stated that teleology and deontology constitute the very foundation and methodology of bureaucratic and democratic ethos and that while bureaucratic ethos uses teleological approach, democratic ethos utilizes deontological approach.

It should be stated that the issue of 'philosophical foundations of ethical frameworks' stays at the 'crossroads' of closely interrelated issues. Figuratively speaking, some crucial points signify some sort of 'theoretical crossroads'. Different theoretical roads which come together at this 'crossroads' take you, at the same time, to the new insights, perspectives and 'problematiques.' In addition, the road that you choose is also very influential in the future direction (and 'flow') of the 'text.' It determines the way through which this text is going to progress. To me, the issue of 'philosophical foundations of ethical frameworks' can be seen as very good example of such 'theoretical crossroads'. One of the roads that meet at this crossroads will convey us to the 'reconciliation problem' of bureaucratic and democratic ethos in the following parts of this study. In other words, to know which ethos is being affected from which moral theory makes it possible to examine the reconciliation problem of the ethical frameworks. This discussion is conducted mainly through the investigation of philosophical background that each ethos has. 'Reconciliation problem' is also straightly concerned with the arguments of postmodern approach to administrative ethics. Interestingly, either problem is examined by placing teleology and deontology dichotomy at the center of the subject matter.

Therefore, we must possess the knowledge of what utilitarianism/deontology distinction means for the dominant ethical paradigms in the field. Now, we can turn to examine briefly relationship of ethical frameworks -bureaucratic and democratic ethos- to the teleological/deontological ethics distinction in the philosophy; that is, philosophical backgrounds of ethical paradigms.

3.2.1 Foundations Of Bureaucratic And Democratic Ethoses: Revisiting The Philosophical Distinction

For many writers, during the past two hundred years or more no other distinction has been so important, well-known and long standing for western ethical theory than the contrast between teleology and deontology (Frankena, 1963; MacIntyre, 1984; Nagel, 1986). For example, Robert Nozick (1984: 494) says that all of substantive ethics has been fitted or poured into these two powerful and appealing molds.

"Most developments in ethics have placed themselves in one of these two camps, and philosophers have repeatedly called attention to this modern tension in ethical theory. Not surprisingly, then, most ethical theories in public administration have likewise fallen under one of these two ethical frameworks" (emphasis added) (Woller and Patterson, 1997: 108).

It is generally accepted by various writers that teleology and deontology are underlying foundations of bureaucratic and democratic ethos, respectively, in other words, they can be seen as equivalents of bureaucratic and democratic ethos in philosophy¹⁹ (see, e.g., Brady and Woller, 1996; Chandler,

¹⁹ At that point, we should take into account a caution: "Arguing that the bureaucratic and democratic ethoses fall under the teleological and deontological frameworks, respectively, is not to argue that these two ethoses necessarily have been directly informed by philosophy. Because public administration ethics generally is not directly informed by philosophy, it becomes necessary after the fact to place theoretical developments in the field into those ethical categories that would appear to be the most

1994; Fox, 1994; Frederickson, 1993; Harmon, 1995; Pugh, 1991; D. Thompson, 1987; Woller, 1998). If we want to remind roughly what teleology and deontology consist of, we should repeat basically that teleology is an ethic of consequence and deontology, on the other hand, is an ethic of duty.

To understand the relationship of philosophical approaches to these administrative ethos, we can look at, for instance, what teleologists and deontologists have values in hand as criteria to moral conduct or which values of bureaucratic and democratic ethos can be categorized under the title of teleological or deontological thinking.

Principally, in teleological approach, determination of what is morally right or wrong is itself a non-moral value. Ultimate criterion "is to the comparative amount of benefit produced or expected to be produced," that is, the ultimate reference is the goodness or badness of the consequences of the decision. The next question, then, should be that if 'consequences' are non-moral goods, how can we -or public administrators, in our case- describe them appropriately? Although 'consequences' can mean sometimes "such results as the attainment of pleasure, or fulfillment of, or the acquisition of knowledge, or of power, and so forth",

"In the context of public administration teleologists often have in mind such values as the achievement of public policy goals (such as better health care, education, or environmental quality), the satisfaction of citizen preferences, or the acquisition and maintenance of organizational or even personal power (Pops, 1994: 157).

In other words, in teleological reasoning one looks beyond any given act itself and evaluates whether this act is moral or

appropriate. This approach enjoys widespread legitimacy within the discipline, as numerous writers have used the

not according to criterion in which only acts promoting one's purposes are accepted to be moral, whereas acts impeding these purposes are accepted to be immoral.

In the case of public administration, teleological reasoning and quantitative approaches, which accompany this thinking especially in the assessment of consequences, have contributed to the development of various 'scientific' approaches to decision making. Such applications and value system involved in these applications attracted administrative scientists and reformers mainly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, administrative scientists and reformers 'enthusiastically' incorporated this thinking system into their ethos. Common point for such methods was teleological reasoning with emphasis on administrative efficiency and effectiveness through establishing organizational hierarchies (Brady and Woller, 1996: 309).

Moreover, "the teleological view is best captured by the philosophy of utilitarianism, which is a branch of teleological reasoning" in the particular administrative context (Woller and Patterson, 1997: 108). Fleishman and Payne (1980: 52) share this view arguing that "the formulations of the greatest good for the greatest number have long been the 'lingua franca' of normative discourse" in public administration. Obviously, in their daily practices, public administrators use so called "judgments of utility" inevitably "regarding everything from resource allocations, hiring or firing, or the prospects for one's personal career to impacts on local, state, national and even international issues" (Brady and Woller, 1996: 309).

teleological and deontological frameworks to analyze administrative ethics." (Woller and Patterson, 1997: 115)

Consequently, teleologists and --in the same manner with them-- advocates of bureaucratic ethos in public administration share some common values and use similar thinking mode. The ultimate reference point for both of them is a non-moral value: the goodness or the badness of the consequences (of any decision), determined according to, for the most part, what will bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Bureaucratic ethos's dependence on this non-moral value as a part of its 'morality' can be observed, at the same time, through ethos's perspective about the relationship between public administration and politics, which we have also mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

According to bureaucratic ethos and utilitarianism, being moral requires maximizing utility and arriving at "common good" (Clark, 1986: 9) through accepting no pre-existing moral order, no agreed-on moral principles to act as guides to human behavior. However, in a society, people have to make decisions about what constitutes the good and individuals must "decide their own definitions of happiness,"

"Absent any established understanding of human happiness, such decisions in a democracy are to be rightly decided by the people, who are solely responsible for determining the public interest through the democratic process. The role of the administrator within this context is to carry out the legitimated directives of the people, as handed down by their elected representatives through the bureaucratic hierarchy" (Woller and Patterson, 1997: 108).

Thus, by approving for public administrators being non-moral or value-neutral in public policy choices, -at least, in theoretical level- bureaucratic ethos leaves the determination of what is good or bad for the society to the democratic process.

Contrary to teleological/utilitarian thinking that employs a non-moral criterion to apply decisions about the good and the bad, deontological perspective have certain 'higher order moral principles'. According to deontologists, we can deduce 'lower order moral principles and rules' and our moral duty by applying this sort of principles. They do not look at 'consequences' of any given act, but rather consider the act itself as duty irrespective of its consequences. In this sense,

"the democratic ethos is generally considered to be deontological because its approach to administrative ethics is to ground administrative behavior in certain higher order democratic, or constitutional, principles. These core democratic values are not instrumental in nature, as are the bureaucratic values, but are considered to be binding in a moral sense, regardless of their imputed consequences" (Ibid, 109).

Therefore, such democratic ethos values as public interest, social equity, citizenship, and regime, or constitutional values are considered under the category of deontological ethics values.

As a result, it is extensively acknowledged that teleology and deontology are underlying foundations of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. One trying to understand whether an ethos has teleological or deontological approach in its -- philosophical-- reasoning, he or she should look, above all, at the way in which each ethos grounds its thinking base. Employing such an approach reveals that bureaucratic ethos has teleological reasoning due to the fact that it assumes no preexisting moral principles in order to guide administrative behavior except those of 'democratically' determined 'bureaucratic' orders. On the contrary, democratic ethos has deontological reasoning because it accepts the existence of 'higher moral order' -and still, 'democratic'- principles,

embedded in the notion of democratic government, preceding the 'bureaucratic' values, binding the formulation of administrative behavior and, at the same time, moral conduct of all public administrators.

After reviewing the relationship between cleavage in modern ethic philosophy, which we gave its detailed examination in Chapter II, and the reflection of this modernist cleft as in the form of bureaucratic and democratic ethos in public administration ethic, we should stop here, in my opinion, and underline some important points.

Obviously enough, to be unaware of these two important philosophical approaches that lie behind our ethical paradigms can amount to very serious philosophical and intellectual 'myopia' for those interested in administrative ethics. On the other hand, equalizing teleological reasoning solely with bureaucratic ethos and deontological reasoning with democratic ethos is troublesome; besides, it might give rise to dangerous misunderstandings through several overgeneralizations. Employing such a reductionism in a perspective carries heavy risks of ignoring common points that bureaucratic and democratic ethos share in terms of teleological and deontological reasoning. Either ethos is not wholly informed by either utilitarianism or deontology. It is important to see as stated by Woller (1998) "both utilitarian and deontological influences can be found in each ethos, such as the bureaucratic ethos's emphasis on duty, law, and rules and the democratic ethos's emphasis on democratic outcomes, such as (...)perceived fair outcomes" (p. 91).

Regarding the role of public administrators, bureaucratic and democratic ethos are not mutually exclusive, because

"supporters of the democratic ethos, for example, do not dispute that public administrators have an

ethical duty to carry out the public will, nor do they dispute the ethical requirement for efficient and effective administration. They are more inclined, however, to see the excessive attention paid to each as threat to administrative and democratic legitimacy(...)" (Woller, 1998: 87)

Since either ethos is not guided solely by a single moral imperative and they share common attributes about the ethical responsibility of administrators, the similarity is also valid for the supporters of bureaucratic ethos;

"[They] will generally concede that no clear direct line of communication exists from the people through their elected representatives and on down the bureaucracy, nor do they all deny that democratic governance imposes certain a priori moral obligations on administrative conduct. However, they do tend to be wary of the possibility of bureaucratic "overfeasance" (Finer, 1941) and the image of unelected bureaucrats making policy by invoking their own notions of higher-order moral principles" (Ibid. 87)

As a result, it can be said that accepting the existence of some shared views between teleology and deontology, thus between bureaucratic and democratic ethos, (or alternatively to accept them as 'antagonistic' in nature) reflect actually a crucial point in reconciliation problem of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. In the next two sections, we will turn to discussions where the debate on transcending modern ethical cleavage in public administration is fully developed.

3.2.2 An Epistemological Reconciliation Effort

As we noted at the beginning of this section, well-informed discussion of the reconciliation issue is given in Woller's recently published article, "Toward a Reconciliation of the Bureaucratic and Democratic Ethos" (1998). Woller's analysis in this article starts with indicating that reconciliation of two dominant paradigms in public administration, despite general tendency in literature, is not an 'unreasonable

expectation'. This statement is very important because, as mentioned before, although each ethos is motivated by different ethical foundations -teleology and deontology- they make reconciliation of two ethoses difficult in very fundamental way. However, there can be found, for Woller, some shared 'attributes' and 'ethical prescriptions' of two ethos in order to open a new way to reconcile them. If such sort of common attributes and prescriptions did not exist, only then reconciliation would be an unreasonable expectation. He tries to demonstrate how this can be achieved. His method, in principle, is very clear: reconciliation of bureaucratic and democratic ethos requires, at the same time, reconciliation of their respective ethical foundations.

Woller recognizes the lack of any resolution regarding the debate between teleology and deontology as well. He quoted, for instance, Pugh's following paragraph as an example of those who reject the reconciliation of bureaucratic and democratic ethos

"After all, the two are so different. Bureaucratic ethos is teleological, employs instrumental rationality and is predicated on the values of capitalism and a market society. Democratic ethos, in contrast, is deontological, is based on substantive rationality, and emanates from classical values of the state and higher law" (Pugh, 1991: 26, also cited in Woller, 1998: 88).

But Woller is not so pessimistic like Pugh and argues that utilitarianism and deontology are not inherently antagonistic, as often believed. He is well aware of the importance of modern cleavage between teleology and deontology and this awareness constitutes the basis of his reconciliation attempt on the basis of the notion of universalizability.

"A basis for the reconciliation of utilitarianism and deontology, and hence the bureaucratic and democratic ethos, can be found in each ethos's approach to the

principle of the universalizability of ethical rules"
(Ibid. 88).

The next step, then, is to be a search for administrative context of the principle of universalizability. Interestingly, according to Woller, an old and very controversial concept of public administration, public interest, constitutes the basis for the reconciliation of the bureaucratic and democratic ethoses because each ethos's approach to public interest supplies at the same time an administrative context for the principle of universalizability. He, therefore, tries to show how bureaucratic and democratic ethos can be reconciled "by placing the principle of universalizability in the administrative context of public interest". But, before this, he firstly attempts to 'recast' each ethos in terms of its orientation toward rules and principle of universalizability. To accomplish this purpose, he heavily benefits from the works of F. Neil Brady (1985) (especially in recasting deontology) and Jonathan Harrison (1968) and John Rohr (1968) (in recasting utilitarianism).

Woller starts his 'recasting' with deontology and further attempts to demonstrate why it is not false to relate deontology with the principle of universalizability. He quotes Brady's following statements (1985) to show an important characteristic of deontologists

"[Deontologists can be characterized as] oriented primarily to the past - as it appears in language, tradition, and precedent, [in] the cultural heritage as established by law; [and in assessment of] the relevance and adequacy of the store of knowledge to the issue at hand" (p. 569).

Woller urges that Kant's 'categorical imperative' can be the best example of the point emphasized by Brady because categorical imperative stresses one should act in the way that he or she would will all others to act in the same situation.

At that point, the requirements of universalizability and deontologists' inclinations to generalize their findings to similar situations coincide with each other: since basic requirement of universalizability is the ultimate discovery of the rules capturing the "ethical essence" of particular situations, hence, the identification of the situations to which the rule would apply can be possible, generalized findings of deontologists to apply similar situations "are accumulated and eventually come to be reflected in the established values, language, traditions, and rules of society" (Woller, op. cit., 92).

Woller's emphasis on the relationship between the principle of universalizability and deontology is partially appropriate. It corresponds, for the most part, conventional philosophical conceptualizations regarding deontology and its classical orientation towards rules and principle of universalizability. As we have seen, the principle of universalizability constitutes the very kernel of Kantian and deontological understandings and grounds all sort of categorical imperatives. For this reason it can be asserted that Woller's approach can not be considered as completely new since it fails to 'recast' how we think about deontology. It can be seen only as a 'restatement' or repetition of old argumentations associated with deontology.

In Woller's recasting effort, discussions concerned with the recasting of utilitarianism are much more complex than those of recasting deontology mainly because utilitarianism, by its definition, rejects the existence of a priori moral rules and their ethical essences. To overcome this problem, Woller uses a specific version of utilitarianism. In his argumentation, he does not use "classic" or "extreme" utilitarian positions. In the former, evaluations of actions by a decision-maker (in order to make a decision as to what will produce the best

situation at each point of decision) and then to perform that action are very important. By contrast, in the latter, ethical uniqueness of each situation comes to the forefront and both the moral force of rules and the principle of universalization are rejected (p. 93).

To sum up, Woller rejects, to use philosophical jargon developed in Chapter I, "act utilitarianism" and employs another version: "rule utilitarianism". According to rule utilitarianism, as we have also seen in Chapter I, the best result can be attained through following certain rules. For Woller, there is very practical reason of that situation: we need some rules because most of us are "neither very philosophical nor very good at empirical calculations". Existences of rules that can be seen as 'recorded past decisions' help us to make "quicker and more accurate decisions that are in accordance with utilitarian principles" (pp. 93-94). Clearly, Woller echoes two objections directed to the act utilitarianism: it is too time-consuming to calculate the consequences of individual act and when we try to predict consequences we experience serious uncertainties. These objections were broadly examined in Chapter I.

On the other hand, Woller continues similar line of thinking which he uses when he 'recast' deontology once again: there is a probability in both utilitarian and deontological decision making processes that past decisions can become a "rule". When they become 'rule' this means that we begin to take the first step in the way for their 'universalization'. For both decision making process, the golden key is found in the word of 'rule'. There is also a basic tension between uniqueness of particular situations and generalizability of the decision that made this particular situation. For deontological approach, to find a theoretical connection is not difficult at all since the moral worth of action already depends upon its

capacity to have universal applicability. For utilitarian approach on the other hand, Woller tries to transcend the tension by employing rule utilitarianism, and by universalizing the specific utilitarian calculations as 'rules'. In other words, as understood from the discussion we have explained, Woller simply tries to show the likelihood of ethical rules, hence, the principle of universalizability in utilitarian approach.

After opening a possibility for ethical universalization through arguing the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism (and, taking the part of latter) he points out the contribution of "rule-based system of utilitarian ethics" by depending upon the views of Harrison (1968). In so doing, he extensively discusses what Harrison calls "a modified form of utilitarianism". In this conceptualization Harrison classified the actions into two categories: "just actions" and "benevolent actions". In just actions, there is a utility only if the general application of the rule is possible. Unlike, benevolent actions are the actions which do not fall under this class. The key point again is the universalizability in the 'modified' form of utilitarianism, because "for any principle to deserve to be called a moral principle, it must be such that this end is harmoniously and coherently realized by its universal application" (Woller, 1998: 95). Furthermore, just actions would "produce good consequences so long as the performance of [them] is the rule rather than the exception," on the contrary, benevolent actions "themselves produce good consequences and would produce good consequences whether anybody else performed benevolent actions or not" (Harrison, 1968: 79-80). The distinction between classical utilitarianism and its modified form is very important due to permissible actions in classical utilitarianism might not be permissible in the modified form of it. In this way, Woller tries to

refine his rule utilitarian approach and reach universalizable rules in utilitarian character.

In his article, he finds second support for universalizable utilitarian rules in John Rawls (1968). In this argumentation, certain generalizable rules are not subject to situation-specific calculations of costs and benefits. To reach universalizable rules we should differentiate, according to Rawls, between 'practice' and 'particular action' places in that practice. While he thinks practice "as a system of rules to be applied and enforced," a particular action is an action that falls under these rules. Rawls also argues that whereas "utilitarian arguments are appropriate with regard to questions about practices," they are not suitable with regard to the "application of particular rules to particular cases" (Rawls, 1968: 106, cited in Woller, 1998: 89).

What Woller calls 'rules of practice' or 'practice rules,' in fact, can be seen as "rules of the game" because practice rules "are not to help one make decisions according to some higher ethical principle(...)" (Woller, op. cit., 96) whereas they are "more or less basic to the understanding of the practice" (Rawls, op. cit., 129).

Promising can be a good example to see the implications of abovementioned conceptual distinction. Promises are clear cases of practices; therefore, the acts that fall under this practice are not subject to classic utilitarian principles. If someone tries to justify the breaking of a promise by stating that it were to have the best 'consequences' for all we should respond, according to Rawls, by asking a question that "Do you really know what it means to say 'I promise'?" Consequently, practice rules also constitute different set of universalizable rules

"[T]he underlying principle is the same: Certain universalizable rules exist that are not subject to situation-specific considerations of relative merit. Ethical behavior, therefore, require adherence to these rules" (Woller, 1998: 97).

After stating the debate between utilitarian and deontological ethics, and after showing how the principle of universalizability of ethical rules can be derived from both utilitarian and deontological approaches by benefiting from the works of Brady, Harrison and Rawls, Woller tries to show how the universalizability can also be used to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic ethos in the context of public interest.

To accomplish this aim, Woller puts forward two prerequisites. One of them is related with the philosophical ground of newly emerging theoretical framework suggested by Woller. He states that 'new ethical framework' accepts that people might have both utilitarian and deontological perspectives, in other words, that "people are neither wholly utilitarian nor wholly deontological in their ethical outlooks."²⁰ As we have mentioned before, there are several common points shared by the supporters of both utilitarian and deontological perspectives. However, it is much more important in his argumentation that neither utilitarianism nor deontology can not be treated as a "standard of conduct" alone. Second prerequisite is 'principled commitment to the public interest' because public interest is the most important and fundamental

²⁰ Here, Woller (1998) notes "years of study of human behavior" defining at least two aspects of human character. One of them is related with "a sense of duty to principle, a sense of right and wrong, or a sense that certain principles exist, or ought to exist, that transcend considerations of costs and benefits," and the other one "takes the outcomes of actions seriously." But it is interesting to note he does not refer any single study of human behavior revealing utilitarian and deontological parts of human character (p. 97).

attribute that both ethos share. For Woller, "it is in this context of the public interest that the ethos can be reconciled" (Ibid, 1998: 97-98).

Before starting to examine the new context of the public interest in which two ethoses can be reconciled, I should underline two significant points regarding the prerequisites pointed out by Woller. The first important point is directly concerned with the philosophical distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. In my opinion, when we consider Woller's views regarding the common points between utilitarian and deontological reasoning, --which can be seen for instance in the fact that bureaucratic and democratic ethos contain elements from each of these two ethical frameworks-- we attentively should take into account the caution urged by Pops:

"Although it is possible (and even logical) to think of a consequence as including the attainment of a *moral* value (such as keeping promises, being fair, or insuring broad participation), we conventionally think about the act of serving moral values as performing duties or observing principles, not seeking consequences. To do otherwise would virtually destroy the distinction drawn in philosophy between teleology and deontology" (*italics in the original*) (Pops, 1994: 157).

Reconciliation of bureaucratic and democratic ethos on the basis of reconciliation of utilitarianism and deontology carries, as mentioned by Pops, some theoretical drawbacks such as the degeneration of philosophical and historical dichotomy between utilitarianism and deontology if we attempt to find out 'utility of duties'.

Second important point is that Woller interestingly attempts to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic ethos in the concept of public interest. The notion of public interest is one (and perhaps the most important) of the democratic ethos values.

The reconciliation is realized in fact at the domain of democratic ethos.

After shortly indicating some important points regarding the two prerequisites indicated by Woller we stop here and attempt to reveal out each ethos's conceptualization of public interest. How does each ethical framework define the public interest? Bureaucratic ethos, for Woller, defines the public interest at the most basic level as the efficient and effective execution of popular will as it is expressed by the people's elected representatives. In bureaucratic ethos, therefore public interest means "principled commitment to popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy" (p. 98). This implies the utilitarian-grounded understanding of the concept. On the other hand, "public interest is generally defined by a set of deontologically-grounded ethical duties" in democratic ethos (p. 98).

In other words, public interest is obtained in bureaucratic paradigm when "efficient and effective execution of popular will" become universally applicable. On the other side, since democratic ethos values are derived from higher-order deontologically-grounded moral principles, and since they are already universally applicable, they can be regarded as for public interest. Obviously, here two concepts -the principle of universalizability and public interest- replace each other in this sense of the terms.

However, there is very important problem in each ethos's conceptualization of public interest. It is that "each ethos is troubled by what it sees as the logical implications of the other ethos." He justifies his view by giving the opposite outlooks of the advocates of each ethos. For Woller,

"Supporters of the bureaucratic ethos are troubled by the prospect that, in adhering to their own

understanding of core democratic values, administrators will fail to give due weight to the public will [and they] believe the public interest prohibits what Herman Finer (1941) calls "overfeasance," which occurs when "a duty is undertaken beyond what law and custom oblige or empower" (p.338)" Indeed, from this perspective, administrative activism is seen as a threat to democracy and the public will(...)" (Ibid., 98).

He also gives the views of those who see administrative activism as negative phenomenon: it can be seen as a "new despotism" (Finer, 1941: 340), and "a brazen attempt to steal popular sovereignty" (V. Thompson, 1975: 66). He continues;

"In a like manner, supporters of democratic ethos are troubled by the prospect of a public bureaucracy in which instrumentality, administrative efficiency, and the value-free implementation of externally determined objectives are the primary normative standard of administrative conduct" (Ibid, 99).

He gives Nazi Germany as the most sobering and widely noted example of this (bureaucratic) ethical foundation because in that case value-free and "morally numbed" bureaucrats "efficiently, obediently, and in a value-free manner" took a role in the extermination of "an entire race of people."

After stating bureaucratic and democratic ethos' view of public interest, he concentrates on what the new conception the public interest would be in new (reconciled) ethical framework. According to him, outcomes of the new public interest can be summarized in following five items. The first two items are as follows;

"1. Certain a priori moral principles, or core democratic values do exist that are not to subject utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits. The public interest, moreover, requires that administrators adhere always to these principles. 2. As a general rule, public interest requires that administrative acts must take outcomes into account. This is not to say that decisions must always be based on outcomes, as a rule, be considered as a

primary decision criterion. In those situations in which principle wins out over outcomes, administrators are, nonetheless, still required to justify their decisions to the public" (Ibid, 99).

In these two items, in my opinion, it is very clear, as I mentioned earlier regarding the "recasting" utilitarianism and deontology, that not only does he attempt heavily to modify (perhaps, we can say 'redress') classical utilitarian perspectives in public administration field (as reflected in the first item) but he also tries to annex a consequentialist perspective, although in a much more weak manner, to the most important deontological principle --public interest.

There are some important problems in his definition of public interest. The first problem as I have seen it appears as follows. As I have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, bureaucratic and democratic ethos can be seen from two different perspectives and examined by underlining simultaneously their two separate aspects. On one side, each ethos can be investigated in terms of its content values or standards, but on the other hand, it can be examined in terms of its approach to politics in general and to politics-administration dichotomy in particular. However, in Woller's new conception of public interest we can see only one side of this distinction, that is, political. Moreover, the mere reason for each ethos's trouble with its counterpart is not only due to competing ethos's political implications. But rather, in addition to each ethos's approach to politics and to the place of bureaucracy in a democratic government, each ethos prefers different value set as its standards or content values. Not only two ethoses have different values for day-to-day practices of public administrators but also they follow different paths when they give priorities for values. However, in his new conception of public interest he uses only 'political' implications of each competing ethos as a threat

to public interest conceptualization of other ethos. This can be seen in his several examples, which criticize each ethos in terms of its political failures, and unsuccessful outcomes that are assumed that they are resulted from the relevant ethos's approach to politics. At that point, Woller 'breaks off' the concept of public interest from its very content and theoretically 'enlarges' borders of the most important content value of democratic ethos. To make this argument and justify his position, he uses merely the political perspective of bureaucratic ethos and supposes, as advocates of this ethos do the same, that bureaucratic ethos works well politically, hence, that the public interest can be obtained from this perspective. In other words, he believes that if the mentality of bureaucratic ethos can be followed generally and its approach to politics/administration dichotomy can be protected, in that case, the most important value and purpose of democratic ethos can be attained. However, it is interesting to read following sentences

"Characteristic of most attempts to reconcile the bureaucratic ethos with democratic ethos is the overriding presumption that the people are sovereign -that public policies and their implementation are to be based, if only primarily as an ideal, on the will of people."

These sentences are not quoted from a writer who criticizes other scholars' reconciliation effort of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. On the contrary, Woller (with Patterson) wrote this paragraph in 1997, only one year ago from the second article that we have examined in this section. As indicated in this previous criticism by him, one of the basic problems in any reconciliation effort is to presume that people are sovereign. However, Woller strongly trusts --in the second study-- on the obtaining of public interest through 'the efficient and effective execution of the popular will'. Moreover, for Woller, appearing of public interest is mainly

based --to say his word, 'ideally'-- upon the reflection of popular will on the adaptation and implementation of public policies. But, exactly at that point, there are serious problems endangering both the reflection of the will of people and truly formation of public interest. A reconciliation effort supported by such 'false' assumption that people are sovereign (as also drawn theoretically in bureaucratic ethos) is risky in advance, and generally tries

"to pursue the "best" attributes of each ethos within an administrative environment in which administrators possess discretion but at the same time deal with the reality of a hierarchical chain of authority with institutionally recognized leaders and followers" (Woller and Patterson, 1997: 105).

Now, let's continue our analysis. In title three we read;

"3. Tradition and cultural heritage carry moral significance and as such deserve administrative respect. To the extent that tradition and cultural heritage come to be reflected in the laws of society and the rules, codes of conduct, codes of ethics, or oaths of office of the administrative profession, they exert a moral claim on administrative behavior; and the public interest requires their general adherence" (Woller, op. cit., 99).

It is clear that every profession should pay serious attention to the 'tradition' and 'cultural heritage' that is embedded in the structure of society. This point is very crucial when we compare administrative (and, of course, other) systems and understandings of different countries which have significantly different 'traditions' and 'cultural heritage' in almost all spheres of life. In moral philosophy, there have been vast amount of studies emphasizing the need to take into account of 'cultural relativism' while approaching to ethical issues. It should be added, however, and also underlined here that there are not only different cultures of different societies, but

also relatively 'neighboring' but yet distinct 'traditions' and 'cultural heritages' stemmed and fed from either utilitarian or deontological understandings in the same culture. Put other way, we can talk about simultaneous existence of utilitarian or deontological traditions in the same society at different points in time. It is true that distinct 'traditions' and 'cultural heritages' come to be reflected in the laws of society, codes of ethics of its various professions and so forth; however yet we should ask: 'Which 'tradition' and/or 'cultural heritage'? That is the crucial point.

In Woller's (1998) article, tradition, cultural heritage and "store of knowledge" are characterized as if they are merely sings and instances of deontological reasoning (especially by utilizing from the study of Brady (1985)). When he states that the new conceptualization and recasting of deontology contribute the old one through recognizing the role of the store of knowledge, he is absolutely right. But, he equally falls into error when he reduces this role merely to deontological reasoning. In fact, using 'rule utilitarianism' (not its 'extreme' or 'classical' version, that is act utilitarianism) in the argumentation can be seen as implicit justification of utilitarian tradition. Woller misses the existence of utilitarian-based ethical codes. For example, in the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, we explained that the 'winner' of the tug of war between bureaucratic and democratic ethos on ethical codes has been (and still is) the bureaucratic ethos.

Last two items are as follows;

"4. The public interest requires that administrators distinguish between benevolent and just actions. Right acts are not limited to those that produce good outcomes on a case-by-case basis. The contribution of an action to promoting other social goods must be

considered, and rules that fall under the just action category are to be obeyed. 5. Acts falling under certain practices are not subject to classic utilitarian considerations. The public interest requires strict adherence to such practice rules" (Ibid. 99-100)

Modification of utilitarianism by means of the principle of universalizability, in my opinion, is tried to be sophisticated in these items. As I have repeatedly emphasized, Woller uses just action and practice rules to attain universalizable rules in utilitarian character. Yet, there are several inconsistencies in his argumentation. Above all, there are serious shortcomings in Woller's approach because it depends basically on 'modified form of utilitarianism' --rule utilitarianism. The most important point for public administrators in this version of utilitarianism is that they must follow the actions which are generally performed. However, the modified form can not give public administrators any criterion for such a situation in which a moral agent (i.e. public administrator) knows whether an action is generally practiced or not. Thus, s(he) is to be obliged to turn back inevitably to the 'unmodified' form of utilitarianism. In other words, public administrator's duty is to follow a type of rule which would only produce good consequences if it were generally practiced; but if the rule is not being generally followed and, if public administrator is aware of this fact, then, no general good will result from having followed the rule. Consequently s(he) has no duty to do so.

Furthermore, how a moral agent would determine whether the action (or the rule) is generally practiced? Is it epistemologically possible in every situation to determine that the rule is universally applicable and is being generally practiced? What are the 'acceptable' extents of such generalization? In a controversial situation in which moral

agent (public administrator) judges that the rule is not being universally performed, how should s(he) behave? More importantly, does understanding that the rule is generally practiced logically prove or justify that this action is to be ethical? Take, for example, the opaque concept of lying. In what manner, should a public administrator behave in a situation where lying comes close to being a universal role as showed in a survey in which 91 percent of 2000 randomly selected people recently admitted that they lied regularly at work and at home (Bonczek, 1992: 75-76). Once again, determination of what is right or wrong, that is, of what is ethical is left to the act utilitarian approach once again. As we saw in Chapter I, the basic problem in the act and rule utilitarian positions is that if and only if consequences determine the moral status of any act, so, how rules could have any place in a utilitarian theory. In other words, act utilitarian approach --which denies universal moral rules--, has the resources to say everything that the rule utilitarian approach can say within a utilitarian framework. In this regard, Woller's new conceptualization of the public interest is genuinely (act) utilitarian position although he employs just action and practice rules to obtain universalizable rule. But it is evident that it is in no way a deontological (or even rule utilitarian) approach.

On the other hand, the most fundamental problem of 'practice rules' is that practice rules are not stable and static. Also, there has been an ongoing debate on the practice rules (or, rule of the game) of public administration. In Woller's argumentation practice rules are not to help public administrators according to some higher ethical principles. Rather they are rules which are more or less basic to the understanding of the practice. Public administrator who wants to perform an act that falls under the practice of public administration, according to this view, must follow the rules

of public administration that define the practice itself because particular actions of public administrator are not subject to "situation-specific calculations of costs and benefits". That the practice view of Rawls implies somewhat different understanding of utilitarianism can be true, but such a view only means a return to the old approaches to the public administration ethics suggested by bureaucratic ethos especially in the beginning years of the field. It seems that 'practice rule' approach accepts a public administration practice which is merely open to the utilitarian calculations by ignoring deontological perspective because it also argues that utilitarianism and utilitarian calculations might be appropriate for the practice of public administration, but not for the specific jobs of public administrator. In other words, although utilitarian calculations can be accepted only for the "rule of the game" (of public administration), they are not to be suitable for particular applications of public officials whose job it is to administer them in their day-to-day life.

The history of public administration has showed that there is continuing dispute to change the existing nature of the practice of public administration. Woller does not recognize the likelihood of that public administration practice itself is (at least, theoretically can be) subject to deontological (and/or other) perspectives. To repeat again, the fundamental problem is directly related with how public administration practice must be defined and designed and with whether it can be described according to utilitarian or deontological (or both) views or not. In Woller's conceptualization, 'new' public interest recommends public administrators to obey to the practice rules of public administration determined according to modified form of utilitarianism, not to classical act utilitarian approaches. Unless we define a coalesce on the rules and values of public administration from the beginning, what guarantees that the 'color' of the practice rules of

public administration will not be utilitarian-dominated, even if we accept, as Woller does, that public administration practice can be primarily perceived around the 'new' concept of public interest --approving the existence of "certain a priori moral principles, or democratic values" and taking outcomes into account? It seems that such a 'new' conceptualization of the concept of public interest means that we return to the beginning, and that it resolves the historical tension between utilitarian and deontological perspectives in favor of bureaucratic ethos, not democratic one. What public administrator must do when a priori moral rules and democratic values are in conflict with the rules of public administration practice open to utilitarian calculations is not clear. How can views of someone who argues that even the rule of the game for public administration practice must be changed and interpreted according to new (perhaps, deontological or another) perspective be logically falsified?

What are the contributions of new framework to the old ones? For Woller, the contribution of new ethical framework to the democratic ethos is that taking outcomes into account becomes an ethical duty in the new framework. It adds a new dimension to the issue of "administrative overfeasance" of democratic paradigm. This means that public administrators must demonstrate "how an action will benefit society overall" (p. 100). He also mentions that the most important shortcoming of democratic ethos emerges when it appeals to higher order moral principles (such as social equity and justice) because it does not try to demonstrate why it chooses that principle or value among other competing principles and values. Even after public administrators prefer principles to outcomes, their responsibility does not finish. They also must be "open and honest" in showing the reasons of "value trade-offs and why

they chose as they did". As a result, they can be "prepared at all times to stand before the people" (Woller, 1998: 100).

He is, however, aware of the very fundamental problem of this perspective and he asks the most crucial and expected question: Does demonstrating that a principle-based act of overfeasance is to the overall benefit of society necessarily make the action ethical? The answer to this question is, according to him, that: "only if we are operating under the modified form of utilitarianism" (Ibid, 100). But what if we are operating under the unmodified form of utilitarianism? What should public administrators do? It is obvious that in such situation the issue becomes very problematical and, to use his words, "less clear". There is, nevertheless, a solution for the problem and, that is to ask, "What would happen if all administrators behaved in a like manner?"

On the other hand, for Woller, the contribution of new ethical framework to the bureaucratic ethos is the recognition and acceptance of certain a priori moral principles "valued for their own sake regardless of their imputed consequences". Moreover, it is not erroneous to expect from public administrators to behave in accordance with these principles. This deontological insight to bureaucratic ethos supplies public administrators with a "moral intuition" or a "moral sense." With this moral intuition they can distinguish right from wrong in a bureaucratic environment. But again, there are serious insufficiencies even in this approach. First of all, moral sense of public administrators may lead to otherwise morally unacceptable actions. We can rightly ask at this point, as also aptly asked by Chandler (1994): "Do good people do bad things? Do bad people do good things? Do good people do good things for bad reasons? Do bad people do bad things for good reasons?" (p. 150). When looked from this angle, the stress of bureaucratic ethos to obey to the public will is

understandable. However, when looked from opposite side, from democratic perspective, such narrow approach to administrative ethics as effective and efficient implementation of public will also can easily be used to justify otherwise morally unacceptable actions of public administrators. Figuratively speaking, the issue of establishing moral standards for bureaucrats moves like a 'ping-pong ball' between the two ethical frameworks. According to him, in a situation in which public administrator's moral sense (or moral intuition) is insufficient, we can turn to the "net of social custom found in society's traditions, laws, values and cultural heritage" which provides public administrators with 'objectivity' in the decision-making process, because society's "net of custom" can be framed as universalizable rules in, for instance, some professional ethical codes or administrative rules and regulations.

To sum up, we have seen that Woller's study attempts to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic ethos by recasting the historic and ongoing debate between utilitarian and deontological ethics. In doing so, it tries to show how the universalizability principle of ethical rules derived from ethical frameworks can be used to reconcile two ethoses in the context of the public interest. However, his article can be seen as an example of eclectic approaches to administrative ethics because it generally tries to temper with the excesses to which each of the two ethoses may be prone and thereby create a bridge between the two.

The best way to criticize Woller's reconciliation effort is, perhaps, to turn to the criticisms in Woller's first article - written only a year before the article that we have examined - and to use these criticisms against the approach that he employed in the reconciliation effort. Utilizing from the criticisms directed by Woller to the eclectic reconciliation

efforts, we can argue that 'new' ethical framework and conception of public interest draw a picture of administrative environment in which public administrators on the one hand possess administrative discretion and moral sense. Also, they recognize the existence of certain higher order moral principles. On the other hand, they deal with 'consequences' and take outcomes into account. Such an eclectic approach which attempts to recast utilitarian and deontological understandings, however, "does not necessarily leave the discipline better off" (Woller and Patterson, 1997: 105). Because, it only takes the best attributes of each ethos and, more importantly, "repeats the mistakes of approaches" that bureaucratic and democratic ethos "seek to ameliorate" (Ibid., p. 105). One of the important mistakes of Woller's eclectic approach is that it also seeks to ground its arguments in foundational (universal or quasi-universal) principles, as most modern approaches to ethical philosophy do (p. 105).

If so, we must turn our attention to search for an alternative perspective. Can we talk about the likelihood of alternative perspective to bureaucratic and democratic ethos in particular, and to the public administration ethics in general? Interestingly, (perhaps, ironically) Woller argued in his 1997 article (with Patterson) that their study "takes a postmodern approach to administrative ethics in that it develops an alternative to the foundationalist approach of modern ethical thought" (p. 105). In the next section, we will see this approach.

3.2.3 From Epistemology to Ontology: a Dialogic Approach to Bureaucratic and Democratic Ethos

American Behavioral Scientist published in 1997 (September) a special issue: public administration and postmodernism. From different backgrounds and interests, the contributors of the seminar presented various perspectives, and addressed the

issue of postmodernism in public administration. The editor and one of the contributors of the seminar was Gary M. Woller. He and Kelly D. Patterson (1997) reassessed bureaucratic and democratic ethos from a postmodern, or from what they call a "dialogic" perspective. They argued that the main objective of a postmodern approach to administrative ethics is and must be to discover the hidden assumptions underlying traditional approaches, and to create the possibility for an entirely new understanding of public administration in addition to the ethical responsibilities of public administrators. This point is very crucial because, as we shall understand from the following argumentation, the authors relate the matter of administrative ethics to the matter of public administration field's identity. They, in this respect, suggest not only to deal with epistemological approaches such as trying to show reconcilability (or, irreconcilability) of two dominant ethical frameworks but also to develop several ontological insights into public administration ethics.

Woller and Patterson contrast their perspectives with the perspective of preceding (and also prevailing) approaches. To show the distances, they utilize from a classification in which attempts to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic ethos are divided into three strategies. Before looking at each strategy we should mention that none of these studies indicated in this classification by Woller and Patterson has been directly developed for the examination of the reconciliation of two ethoses. Instead, they solely imply the intellectual efforts towards rethinking and revisiting of the theme that lies at the very heart of the discussion between bureaucratic and democratic ethos: that is, the role of the public administrator in the "ethics of authoritative command" in the early years of public administration. These strategies have been developed because of "the implausibility of the orthodox paradigm as well as the bureaucratic realities that

that paradigm is no longer capable of legitimizing" not because of the necessity of reconciliation (Fox, 1994: 87-89).

Now, we can turn our attention to the strategies. The first strategy can be labeled as 'obedience to authoritative command as ideal'. It holds out the model of overhead democracy/authoritative command "as an ideal and to behave, to the extent possible, as if it were true, while simultaneously recognizing its limitations and their implications" (p. 109). Despite the limitations and serious problems in the orthodox model, obedience is still the most important principle to determine what is good or bad in this strategy. The second strategy is to promote a dual system and combines the notions of external and internal ethical accountability. Fox (1994: 89) labels it as "redundancy gambit". Public administration, in this strategy, is expected to follow external organizational dictates faithfully until and unless their implementation would offend his or her ethical principles and the conscience of the administrator. It is important to note that internal ethical principles as in the form of "auxiliary system of personal or professional ethics" are typically deontologically grounded. The third approach is to reconstitute the relationship between public administration and the sovereign people. It may be called as the "revitalizing citizenship". This strategy calls for proactive public administrators to establish direct and intimate links between administrators and citizens diminishing reliance on the hierarchy of overhead democracy. According to this approach, revitalizing citizenship makes democracy "a living and potent force in the lives of citizenry" (p.109).

Woller and Patterson (1997) separate their works from these modernist/foundationalist approaches to administrative ethics because modern administrative ethics, they argue, has the illusion of orthodox model of public administration. The main

characteristic of their "non-modernistic or postmodernistic" approach, however, is its ontological and "dialogic" perspective to administrative ethics contrary to foundational approaches. They explain dialogic approach as follows.

"A dialogic inquiry avoids the rigid categorization of human activities that often flows from such foundational approaches. Beginning with Martin Heidegger and continuing to this day, such inquiries take seriously the self understanding of subjects and are cognizant of the presuppositions made to even begin such an inquiry" (Ibid.,105).

Obviously, two important points come into the forefront in this quotation: a) the question of the nature of understanding, and; b) the presuppositions that may condition understanding. For the authors, even though a dialogic raises the "specter of relativism", it must not fall into the trap of modernist/foundationalist sense of safety and security in theoretical conceptualization. "Because public administration as a discipline and a technique is the connection between politics and governance," they argue, "it must not neglect the rich variety of experience and history" (p. 110).

Then, what is wrong, according to them, with the earlier attempts to reconcile the claims of bureaucratic and democratic ethos? At that point, they note

"[previous modernist attempts] initially ask the wrong questions. Their concern is with the discovery of solid foundations on which to base a science or at least the practice of public administration. But what if "it is impossible to suppress every "subjective" determinate of understanding?" (Hoy, 1982, p. 4). What if the confidence in foundations shared by both bureaucratic and democratic ethics is misplaced? The search for reconciliation fails to address these deeper issues" (Ibid. 110).

Here, it is very important to note that they do not propose invalidity of examples of reconciliation efforts or of some authors who have placed in this effort. On the contrary, they

point out in their approach that these attempts themselves to reconcile these competing paradigms might be void. Because, suchlike efforts hinder the questions about more important issues: understanding and explanation. According to Woller and Patterson, ontology, however, constitutes a "starting point" to investigate these questions. Moreover, ontological approach moves the historical disputes and conflicts between bureaucratic and democratic paradigm to the periphery and helps us, at the same time, to renew our approach to public administration. As a result, the thing we have to do is not only to discuss whether these two ethoses can be reconciled or not, but rather, to rise questions about the likelihood of human understanding because search for either teleological or deontological "immovable or indubitable foundations" is, at least, fruitless due to these foundations are "always just beyond our grasp" (p. 110).

Then, the next question to be asked is that: What are the new insights that an ontological perspective introduces to public administration? The main contribution of ontological perspective, above all, is that it can help us to reveal out the foundational claims made by both bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Ultimate objective of both ethoses is to provide a unified or common set of values in order to guide the day-to-day practices of public administrators. Furthermore, the most important foundational claim of these two ethoses is their trust on the existence of a core values. Both ethoses try to discover this core:

"In the case of bureaucratic ethos, the science of technical administration forms the core(...)Its language is the language of science. Conversely, the democratic ethos places values such as equity, justice, or benevolent its core. Abandoning the solid foundation of mathematics for the sand of political philosophers, those who practice the democratic ethos believe that democratic values can guide the operation of public administration apparatus. The

language of moral philosophy, not language of science, makes it seem like a humane alternative to the starkness of bureaucratic ethics" (Ibid. 112).

Against the foundationalism inherent in bureaucratic and democratic ethos as in the form of seeking unified or common set of values and assuming a core in these values, the authors utilize the work of Jacques Derrida (1978), *Writing and Difference*, and from his deconstructive reading. Using Derrida's critique of "the metaphysics of presence", they criticize "structured or centered discourse". They argue that structured or centered discourses use a fixed origin "as an organizing principle to structure or limit the play of discursive activity". What's more, such a principle "transcends the structure itself, standing outside as the underlying truth" (p. 112). Both bureaucratic and democratic ethos can be seen as instances of this structured discourse because, for example, bureaucratic paradigm has bureaucratic efficiency as fixed origin. Likewise, democratic ethos has "democratic" ethics as organizing principle of its discourse. These fixed origins limit the "play of discursive activity" in each ethos.

What constitutes the basis of foundationalism in philosophy (in general and in public administration in particular)? For philosophy, Derrida tries to answer this question by interrogating the nature of language with deconstructive method. As it is well known, the idea of deconstruction is explored and advocated by Derrida to show illusions involved in the everyday understanding of language. One of these illusions is to suppose that language is transparent. However, according to Derrida, there is no world of *signified* -what is represented by the signifier- independent of the *signifier* -a world, a symbol or a representation-. "The signified", in everyday understanding of language, "holds the privileged position as the absolute reality or truth to which the

signifier refers" (p. 112). However, both alleged transparency of the signifier and representation of the truth have been invaded. Derrida calls this 'invasion' as "the universal problematic". It shows that a word (or 'a symbol as a signifier') signifies only another word or symbol, the signified. The signified, however, is the signifier of yet another word or symbol ad infinitum. This situation blurs the distinction between the signifier and signified. Regarding the implications of 'universal problematic' on public administration Woller and Patterson write

"[This] is displayed in public administration at a less abstract level because public administration helps to form, to shape, and to create the world that it is supposed to rationally and technically administrate. Public administration is a very part of the social phenomenon that it is helping to create and shape" (p. 113).

The implications of Derrida's views on public administration (ethics) are limited only with above quotation in Woller and Patterson's article. However, the method of Derrida can be used for both the deconstruction of public interest --the most important concept of 'democratic ethics'-- and the deconstruction of efficiency --symbol of bureaucratic ethos--. But I want to continue my analysis on the condition that I later turn again to this important issue.

After stating that the main contribution of ontology is that it helps to understand the foundational claims of bureaucratic and democratic ethos (and after utilizing Derridian deconstructive reading against this foundationalism) Woller and Patterson seek to indicate other contributions that ontology introduces to public administration: ontological perspective opens new areas of criticism for bureaucratic and democratic paradigms. First of all, they seem to have passed over several important points. Bureaucratic ethos, for example, needs to take into account the relatedness and the

situatedness of human existence. Otherwise, the nature of social action cannot be understood. Intentional actions of social actors take place within a complex cultural and historical context. If public administration does not try to understand the characteristics of the relationships between the cultural/historical contexts and intentions of social actors, creation and control of social action can not be expected from public administration.

Moreover, ontology helps bureaucratic ethos to see the ways and methods in which the world is disclosed. An ontological perspectives unveils a "will to mastery" involved in technology likewise in administration. It is obvious for the students of public administration that the best marriage of technology and administration in the field is scientific administration. It is a species of technological. Not only does modern (scientific) administration leads to social phenomena, but it also includes an understanding in which humankind is being seen as a "standing reserve" for technology. Modern administration that "gathers man into ordering," reduces into a resource to be ordered, and uses "according to the expediency of efficiency" (p.111).

On the other hand, instrumentality and objectivity claims -- stemmed from the 'science' of technical administration and the "solid foundations of mathematics"-- of bureaucratic ethos are regarded as two basic drawbacks by democratic paradigm. In democratic ethos, in contrast, the relative effectiveness of public administration practices is judged by using higher-order moral values. This also needs 'objectivity' claim to legitimize the core of 'democratic' values such as public interest or justice. In this sense, like the objectivity of bureaucratic ethos, objectivity of democratic ethos carries similar problems. In democratic ethos, objectivity is needed, for instance, to legitimize a particular interpretation of the

Constitution. The authors direct their criticisms to the Constitutionalist school of public administration and mainly to the views of John Rohr. Foundationalist character in this - Constitutional- approach is clear: the advocates of the democratic ethos (constitutionalists in that case) presuppose the existence of 'constitutional essence' or a 'core' in constitutional values. However, it is very obvious that there must be a "univocal and a-temporal constitutional discourse" in order to discover such an essence or core. The authors reject this possibility because of the fact that "the text of the Constitution and the context of its ratification debates present no unitary voice. Rather each interlocutor speaks from a distinct background of experiences and understandings projected into the future through aspirations and ideals" (p.111). Therefore, interpretation of Constitution is not an easy and uni-dimensional endeavor and it is only possible by considering the temporality and 'contextualness' of human being. Individuals change across time, besides, there is no single value and priority dominating all other competing and opposing values and priorities even in a single value. In this regard, static conception of the political is not possible, but rather, we witness the unfolding of political self-understanding through new experiences, inclinations and decisions. The period of constitution building, thus, does not provide a sure foundation, rather

"[it] involves multiple sources of ambiguity that open an array of possible readings, which are appropriated not from an a-temporal vantage point but according to the context of functional relationships in which a crises occurs, thereby providing the backward glance at the constitution for guidance. However, when this backward glance occurs, the cultural, regional, and ideological situatedness of the questioner who seeks to bring our constitutional heritage to bear on the practice of public administration is not left behind or somehow suspended indefinitely" (p.112).

Later, Woller and Patterson direct their criticisms in the light of ontological perspective to the science itself: there are serious epistemological problems in modern scientific inquiry and methods. These problems can be recognized only with the assistance of ontological perspectives, and by this way, we can find a chance to interrogate the very grounds of science as well as scientific administration. What's more, ontological insights not only open the door to criticize the epistemological claims of social sciences, but they also reveal "cracks and discontinuities" in the truth claims of the scientific method itself.

In my opinion, if we compare with Woller's previous study (1998) which we have analyzed before, it is clear that the fundamental problem for the authors in present article is not the uncertainty about the values and standards which, for example, can be a part of socializing new members into the profession of public administration, or not to unite around only a single theoretical framework by reconciling of old ones. They are in search of a third, postmodern approach to public administration ethics. In this time, however, the search goes directly parallel to the identity (and legitimacy) crisis of public administration, even with the likelihood of the existence of public administration field itself. Ethical problem in the field of public administration, viewed in this perspective, is not only connected with failing to agree on and articulate the central values of the field, but more fundamentally also with the shortcomings included in foundational approaches to public administration ethics and with the limitations of field's own method. Theoretical frameworks and methods used in the construction of these frameworks are themselves products of a particular approach to society and its regulation.

Can such a perspective be seen as a reflection of postmodern relativism or postmodern nihilism to public administration and its ethical state? They, in fact, try to refrain falling into a kind of methodological nihilism through somewhat new approach, inspiring again from Derrida. This approach can allow us to revitalize an old term (in this case, public administration ethics) that has been 'overturned' from within, through the extraction of an attribute of the term that has been suppressed and the elaboration of the name under this reserved conceptualization. Hermeneutics provide good starting point for such an approach.²¹ The main contribution of such an approach is discovering of temporality and historicity in ethical discussions: bureaucratic and democratic ethos are "simply distinctive manifestations of interaction between the individual and society that occurs within a particular social and historical context" (p. 114).

Interestingly, although Woller and Patterson do not directly refer to, their suggestion as to the extraction of 'suppressed' attributes of old term remind us very important concept of Lyotard, one of the another leading figures of postmodernism: *differend*. 'Sign' in postmodern thought, for Lyotard, is in the situation of 'presentation' rather than

²¹For an interesting article arguing whether hermeneutics provides a useful framework for the study and practice of public administration, see Balfour and Mesaros (1994) from the University of Akron. Hermeneutics is defined in this article as an attempt to clarify the meaning of texts and the meaning of any human action that can be treated as a text. Thus, text includes the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, organizational charts, professional Code of Ethics, etc. The authors believe that natural science model emphasizing on researcher objectivity, instrumentalism, prediction and control is far more obscure and inappropriate for the study of social phenomena than hermeneutics. What's more and highly germane to our study is that they suggest that hermeneutics rejects both positivist claims about researcher objectivity and the relativism of those who focus only on the subjectivity of social actors (p. 559).

'representation.' The semiotic of presentation requires the differend. By means of differend, the place of a word in an expression or text can be determined. Differend is 'unthinkable,' 'undeclared,' 'unpresentable' and even 'nihil'; it is the explanation of 'unexplainable' that wriggles due to being inexpressible within the madness of modern culture. However, like the nihil of Heidegger, the borders and limits of the differend of Lyotard are designated. 'Unpresantabler,' to use his term, is Auschwitz or the differend of many silent mistreated; differend reveals itself in a time when we encounter with a street vagrant in New York harbor or when a child dies from violation. Postmodernism, in fact, can be read as an attempt to find out new presentations for differend (*unpresentable*) that constitutes the ultimate borders of "logocentric" universe (Göka, 1993: 52). In this regard, it can be asserted that revitalization and re-appropriation of old term (modern public administration ethics) in a postmodern condition may be possible only through the presentation (not representation) of suppressed attributes, the presentation of unpresentable (values, cultures, way of life etc.) in public administration and trying to find out new ways for presentation to (ethical) differend, suppressed by and in the language of bureaucratic and democratic ethos in public administration.

What are the possible advantages of hermeneutical paradigm over the foundational approaches employed by modernist bureaucratic and democratic ethical frameworks? The answer of the writers is as follows. Firstly, a hermeneutical approach refrains from the probable dangers of instrumental rationality and stops to see public square as 'naked' --a serious and strong criticism directed to the public understanding of bureaucratic ethos. Secondly, one of the crucial contributions of this approach is reflexivity. Public administrators have to possess reflexivity notion to understand their intentional

activities as well as those of social actors. Because, using static categories in such effort is inherently fraught with ambiguity. It is the dialogical and interpretive inquiry that public administrators need to understand public administration ethics. Lastly, there are important epistemological and methodological contradictions between scientific approach and hermeneutic paradigm. The former is inductive in the sense that it views "data as a possible instance of a general law," in contrast, the latter is deductive, and namely, it approaches meaningful phenomena as individualizations of a general meaning-context. This also means for public administrators that

"the individual is not abstracted out of the context by appeals to a scientific high ground (bureaucratic) or by interpretation of founding documents that are rigid and ahistorical" (p.114).

To summarize, through the discussion in this section we have seen that Woller and Patterson re-assess bureaucratic and democratic ethos from different (dialogic/ontological) perspective. They distinguished their works from previous foundational modernist approaches because they believe that both theoretical frameworks (two ethos) and efforts to reconcile them ask the wrong question and try to discover solid foundations for ethics. However, ontology can be a good starting point to develop a new perspective. Then, Woller and Patterson, seek to indicate main contributions of ontology to public administration ethics. They state that ontological perspective, above all, helps us to understand the foundational claims of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. To overcome this foundationalism, they suggest Derrida's ontological approach and deconstructive reading. Furthermore, they propose that ontological perspective opens new areas of criticism for bureaucratic and democratic paradigms. For instance, ontology reveals "will to mastery" involved in

technology and discontinuities and cracks in truth claims of the scientific method itself. On the other hand, it shows that while science of technical administration and solid foundations of mathematics basis the objectivity claims of bureaucratic ethos, higher-order moral values and essence (or core) of these values ground the objectivity claims of democratic ethos. After stating the new insights that ontological perspective introduces to public administration ethics, they suggest hermeneutical methodology for ethical discussions to avoid postmodern nihilism of ontological perspective.

In my opinion, there are some serious problems in Woller and Patterson's approach. True, ontological approach can provide crucial insights to see foundational claims of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. But an important point is missed in their assessment: moral responsibility of public administrators. Their primary focus is on the 'process' -- discursive activity. In their approach, problems limiting the 'play of discursive activity' are solved by means of the understanding of the nature of understanding. More importantly still, in Woller and Patterson's study, ontological perspective is proposed to understand the cultural and historical context of public administration. However, the authors suggest understanding of this context to create and control the social action. Although I accept the significant contributions of ontological perspective to recognize foundational claims of theoretical frameworks, I do not share their view regarding the controlling of the social action. Because, I believe that such an understanding leads eventually to the views which is similar to ideas of self-enlightened elites of modernity in an implicit way: people are the objects of rule and care.

Perhaps we can stop and end this chapter here. But I prefer to do otherwise and continue our analysis associated with the bureaucratic and democratic ethos in the following parts. In the first, I will return to an issue raised earlier: how can a Derridian method be employed for the deconstruction of efficiency and public interest --top values of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. In the second, I will seek to examine Brent Wall's study including a meaningful charge to the ethical theories in public administration.

3.2.4 Deconstructing the Symbols of Ethical Frameworks: Efficiency and Public Interest "Under Erasure"

In the previous discussion, after reviewing the views of Derrida on the relation between signifier and signified, Woller and Patterson discussed the implications of his views on public administration in a short paragraph. However, the idea of deconstruction can play pivotal role in the deconstruction of important bureaucratic and democratic ethos values. Also, the concept of public interest has place in several postmodern public administration debates. At this point, we have firstly to re-focus on the deconstructive method.

In fact, in order to understand the nature of deconstruction, we must try to understand central premises in Derrida's philosophy. Derrida accepts that meaning in language is 'synchronic' or produced by the system of oppositions that define its constituent words. The meaning of a word can be knowable only by knowing other words that are different from the word. We can talk about an "infinitely sliding scale of meanings" in this understanding because words (as signifiers) mean other words (as signifiers) that mean other words, and so on infinitely (McSwite, 1996: 212). It is clear that the system of language in Saussurean linguistics is a closed system of signs, and meaning in this system emerges from the

differences between elements of the system. To stop "infinite sliding of meaning," another word that is considered as standing outside the system must be inserted into the system. Moreover, the last signifier because of its place and role in the system is in its 'superordinate' position metaphysically. The name of superordinate signifier changes through history: God, Scientific Truth, The Good, and The Self etc. This signifier obtains and maintains its metaphysical superior position by excluding and marginalizing its opposite, the inferior term: The Devil, Superstition, The Bad, Hitler etc. (Ibid, 212). In Derridian understanding, all the word can be seen as a text whether these texts be written documents, institutional practices, or events that occur in a given culture. What Derrida reveals through his approach is that the existence of the superior signifier depends upon the text and vice versa. He argues that all sorts of text rely on binary oppositions like true-false, private-public, politician-civil servant, good-evil, masculine-feminine etc. He wishes to break down these oppositions, and perhaps, to reverse the polarity. For Derrida, the superior term is, in fact, subordinate because the text and the superior signifier reside in the same system and the text itself produced by this system is purely self-referential.

Take, for instance, the concept of efficiency first and put this symbolic concept of bureaucratic ethos "under erasure." For this purpose David John Farmer (1997), from Virginia Commonwealth University, can help us. He argues, for instance, that "liberating public administration thinking from entrapment in the efficiency metaphor, with the binary opposition of efficient-inefficient" will be an important benefit can be obtained from deconstructive method. Obviously, seeing efficiency as a viable and ultimate goal is a "narrative element" and a modernist metaphor in the field of public administration. Despite relative decline of this

metaphor, this modernist narrative has answered the ethical question of "what is good for the field?" since the beginning of public administration. Farmer suggests a three-step deconstruction showing that "a transparent notion of efficiency is neither available nor a notion for all contexts" (p.18).

The first step now is to show the socially constructed -not given- character of efficiency since it does not imply inevitable feature of any possible world. The signifier efficiency, to use Derridian terms, does not choose simply several features of reality, but rather, reality itself is created by efficiency, signifier. In this sense, signified -reality- can not be thought separate from the signifier -efficiency-.

In the second step, "the culture-specific and modernist character of the efficiency concept" is to be revealed since efficiency has been directly historically related with "the secularization [and] materialization of the protestant conscience" (Waldo; 1984: 187, cited in Farmer, 1997: 18)) and several modernist features such as the worldview popularized Descartes and Newton, the rise of capitalism, the Weberian bureaucracy and the industrial revolution. He also goes farther in his evaluation of the place of efficiency in modernist thought. He states that efficiency -along with and in addition to abovementioned features- plays very important role in the process of social control. Moreover, it is suitable for the spirit and objectives of capitalism. Capitalism values economic and administrative efficiency due to the fact that it can be characterized as the accumulation of wealth and use of profit rationally, even for more profit. However, it can false to assume that the importance of efficiency will continue. Because, above all, efficiency is embedded in cultural context, and more crucially, social and

cultural context in postmodern condition does not emphasize "productivist" or other type of control. In such a context, therefore, efficiency does not have a privileged position. Strive for more and more production, hence, for economic and administrative efficiency is fundamental and central characteristic of modernity, not premodernity or postmodernity (Ibid, 19).

In the third step, we recognize that the opposition between efficient and inefficient is ambiguous. This comes from "perverseness" of the concept of efficiency. Efficiency is perverse since it does not guarantee a just outcome; the results can be unjust as well. In its very nature, efficiency is a criterion because it is a normatively and socially constructed, not objectively. Viewed in this light, for instance, "is demand-side waste like unemployment, real waste" in an economy? Or, on the supply side, can not we see "excessive executive compensation, governmental tax breaks and bailouts, the expenditure of resources on unproductive mergers, environmental degradation as part of the manufacturing process, the making of dangerous but profitable products, worker injuries" as the examples of inefficiency in the private sector? (p. 19).

"The social construction and ambiguity of efficiency (and waste) is illustrated by recalling that the extent of efficiency (waste) is a function of difficulty of attaining the output (...). The government is responsible for the health and prosperity of the entire economy; even the largest private corporation, by contrast, is responsible only for its own profit. It is no wonder that because of the social construction, private sector activities appear more efficient" (p.19)

Now we can turn our second task. In view of Derrida's approach, how can we put the public interest, the most important concept of democratic ethos, 'under erasure'? In fact, a special but yet changing importance has been

attributed to the concept of the public interest throughout its history (see, e.g. McSwain, 1997: 201-207). In the period of rapid industrial revolution, for example, public administration responded the different groups of society and their special interest through approaches clustered around the concept of public interest. This period generally called as 'progressive era' in the field. In the following years, on the contrary, the emphasis on public administration was no longer to the public interest; it was for the 'rational' model of public administration. There was no place for the old concept in rational administrative techniques which make the consideration of public interest unnecessary and matter only the 'ends' and value-free 'facts'. Experiences of World War II, later, strengthened the idea of public interest.

These changes in the acceptance (and rejection) of the public interest can be examined in the light of Derridian linguistics. Deconstructive reading, as we mentioned, rejects the superior term, the primary word on which the text depends. When the privileged place of superordinate signifier is denied, all meaning within the text begins to shift or to change. Different argumentations (either for or against) to the public interest can be read as the examples of the texts which have such superior word or signifier. A new version of superior term emerges due to changes in social conditions. Although in the beginning years of the field --the progressive movement era-- and later in the war period, the public interest constructed the superior term, in the years following the war --when systematization reached its climax-- the superior term was the "system equilibrium". A deconstructive reading denies all varieties of superior terms used in the different epochs of public administration -e.g. public interest, efficiency and rationality, if they are superior place in a text. In this regard, the public interest as a superordinate term has been used, as McSwain (1997) points

out, "as a device for controlling the actions of participants in the process of governance" (p.217). Also it has been thought that unethical acts of public administrators can be prohibited by devotions to the principle of public interest. In such an understanding the public interest represents "Truth with a capital T and moral Good with a capital G," a situation which inevitably leads to factionalism because different interests push their own versions of Truth and Good. Deconstructive reading of a text, however, tells us that

"[T]here would be no capital T Truth as a central reference point. Instead, all the parties to a situation [e.g. ethical] would be seen as holding multiple, partial, and momentary truths. These truths would have to be put together in a tentative pattern through a group process grounded in authentic communication(...)The only protection against error would be the iterative, experimental nature of the process itself" (Ibid, 217).

On the other hand, the authors of the Blacksburg Manifesto stated the mistakes of the rationalist approach and argued for a more contingent view of the public interest (see, Goodsell (1990 and Wamsley (1990)). However, Marshall and Choudhury (1997) criticize binary oppositions in the concept of public interest which are emanated from the contrast between rationalists and the writers of the Manifesto who deny the views of formers accepting the public interest as invalid and hollow. These binary oppositions emerged in the definition of the term include efficiency, certainty, science, facts, objectivity on the one hand (in rationalist side) and reflection, contingency, social process, values and subjectivity on the other (in the Manifesto side). The former dominated the latter by marginalizing its values in the rise of modernism. What the writers of the Manifesto do is only to substitute opposite and marginalized terms for the new definition of the public interest. A Derridian perspective, however, would suggest that both sides of the binary

oppositions are self-referential since each of them claims "univocal status" and, besides, has an "overarching external referent" like rationality or "the sound wisdom and institutional knowledge of public administrators" (p. 128). Marshall and Choudhury propose that postmodern condition of postmodern public administration, namely, "role ambiguity" for public administrators (shown in the institutional context of the field and the "proliferation of meaning regarding the public interest", --in other words, the fractured experiences of the public and ambiguity of meaning that public administrators confront-- affect negatively the distinctiveness that public administration historically symbolizes. Understood in an integrionist view as Manifesto did, the public interest rarely can escape from the modernist instrumental techniques of (public) administration such as need surveys, policy analysis and expert system. Nor does it find any resonance in the fractured constitution of the public. What we must do is free up the dialogue of public administration from modernist (rationalists) and high-modernist (the Manifesto) approaches, and to develop a "compositional," not integrative, form for the meaning of public interest. Furthermore, the field must make different interests and identities inclusive of administrative decision through postmodern strategies of observation and dialogue (e.g. deconstruction, ethnography, and discourse analysis) (p. 129).

3.2.5 Contribution to the Criticism of Democratic Ethos: Brent Wall

An impressive theoretical charge to public administration ethics theories comes from Brent Wall (1991). In his work, entitled "Assessing Ethics Theories from a Democratic Viewpoint" and published as a separate chapter in Bowman's (1991) work, Wall criticizes ethical theories that we have

labeled under the title democratic ethos in this study. His work, in my opinion, helps us to ask important question: is democratic ethos really democratic?

Interesting point in his study is that he does not associate morality with democracy indirectly. But rather, he connects morality with democracy and vice versa. Wall takes Friedrich-Finer debate as starting point to conduct a literature review of ethics theories. According to him, this debate reflects "a key turning point in the normative self-conscious of the field" (p. 136). Important views of writers who construct the intellectual basis of bureaucratic ethos remain at the outside of Wall's moral and democratic evaluation in advance since classical period of public administration is excluded in the study. Among the ethical theories and names of several authors --which is over twenty-- only Finer's approach is one that we can take as an advocate of bureaucratic ethos. For Wall, public administration ethics theories --which can be overwhelmingly classified in those of democratic ethos-- are not consistent with neither democratic nor moral ideals because

"Democracy, whatever else it may mean, is self-determination; it is the empowerment of others to make their own decisions; it is the absence of coercion. To advocate noncoerciveness is to advance(...)the moral point of view [as well](...) In short, democracy has to be a moral point of view. A democratic political regime in which people are coerced or self-interested may be many things, but it can not be democratic or moral" (Wall, 1991: 135-136).

It is clear from this passage that Wall uses two broad, ambiguous and even nebulous terms -morality and democracy- in a different context. He does not mention all characteristics of the terms, however, as stated in his recent study (see, Bowman and Wall, 1997: 274), he uses morality as a term referring to "an orientation that emphasizing the doing of

acts not for one's sake but for the sake of another" and democracy as a term referring, in this context, to "open dialogue in which vies are freely exchanged and votes taken".

For our purposes in this chapter we do not give an extensive and detailed analysis of Wall's method. Nonetheless, a brief review is necessary to understand from where Wall's criticisms originate. The ultimate purpose of Wall is to develop a "cognitive map" including the examination of a) premises (or units of normative description) and, b) type of legitimation of premises (or level of normative analysis) of ethical theories which can be seen from the beginning of Friedrich-Finer debate. In this attempt, title (a) is related with the question of "What is the basis of ethical decisions?" He tries to answer to this question by depending upon the theoretical/philosophical distinction examined by two preeminent writers from the field of organization sociology, Burrell and Morgan (1979): ontology and epistemology. Each component of this distinction in fact includes a 'versus' schematization: idealist vs. realist (assumptions of ethical theories) in ontology part and; objectivity vs. subjectivity in epistemology part. On the other hand, type of legitimation of ethical premises, --that is, title (b)-- is determined by answering the question to "What kind of politics warrants the bases of ethical decisions?" Such effort requires the examination of traditional, modern, and postmodern cultural contexts. It seems that there are consequently four types of validity or truth claims and four sources of legitimation: a) traditional ethics, which is idealist and objectivist; and aristocratically legitimated --the ethics of insight and secular revelation; b) modern ethics, which is realist and objectivist; and legitimated by organizational elites --the ethics of individuals or organizations; c) postmodern ethics, which is realist and subjectivist; and legitimated by non-coercive discourse and consensual agreements --the ethics of

critical dialogue; and lastly, d) axial (from the Greek axioma meaning worthy) ethics, which is idealist and subjectivists; and legitimated by the polity (Wall, 1991: 137-138).

In his 1991 study, Wall stated that none of the ethical theories examined falls into axial ethics. Similarly, in his 1997 study, published in *Administration & Society*, he argued again (with Bowman) that there exists no axial theory in public administration literature. But, this time, he suggests the tenure of Surgeon General C. Everett Koop from the U.S. Public Health Service (1981-1989) as epitome of axial ethics.

Before starting to examine Wall's remarks, some important points should be underlined immediately. First, Wall employs several categories derived from philosophical taxonomies, not from Philosophical ethics (see footnote 1 in Chapter I in this volume for the meaning of the distinction between uppercase P and lowercase p for the word philosophy). By contrast, he borrows from 'philosophical and sociological approaches' used by Burrell and Morgan. Second and highly related with the first one, as we shall see, Wall's classification equalizes morality with idealistic (ontological) premises and democracy (in its present context) with subjective (epistemological) states implicitly, if not explicitly. Such an approach, --using idealistic ontology and subjective epistemology-- however, hides the very 'foundational' character of ethical theories. Although he uses a supposedly philosophical classification, the point that he cannot succeed to see is that foundationalism is the most important character that renders all (democratic ethos in his examination) theories undemocratic and immoral although Wall does not use the term --foundationalism.

Despite aforementioned shortcomings, the importance of Wall's (1991) study in general and his classification in particular

is that although this study does not refer and employ high-level Philosophical categorization and this unfortunately restricts the strength of the approach, it directs important criticisms to what we can call 'intra-ethos' deficiencies of democratic ethos, and contains serious (early) cautions²² which a postmodern approaches to public administration (ethics) can utilize.

As we stated, Wall uses a fourfold classification so that he can assess ethical administrative theories: *traditional, modernist, postmodernist* and *axial*.

Under the *traditional type* (idealist, objectivist, and aristocratically legitimated ethics of insight), he attacks on constitutionalist components of democratic ethos --and those writers who advocate a return to constitutional and traditional regime values. First, traditionalist approach, according to him, is, in a word, authoritarian because "there is no reasoned dialogue among peers to determine the nature and scope of regime values". However, in a democracy "values are enactments, not discoveries". Second, trying to find an "accepted" philosophical system and to draw the borders of "true values" has failed from Plato to present. He underscores people's extra-philosophical and irrational aspects such as "taste" and "feel":

"There is no Archimedean perspective that can be used to adjudicate contending claims. To anchor public administration to this sunken enterprise is to invite endless disputation" (Ibid. 140).

²² We use 'early' as a prefix here because of the fact that Wall gives Harmon's (1989) later work as an exemplar of postmodern (ethics) approach in 1991. This can be approved to some extent for that year since postmodern public administration ethics discussions was insufficient, if not nonexistent. However, in his 1997 study, Wall gives again Harmon's older study with Mayer (1986) as only example of postmodern theories and ignores other cumulatively augmented postmodern approaches in the field.

In my opinion, one important point which Wall can not see when he distinguishes his traditionalist type from the others is that if administrative discretion rises, public administrators can turn their faces to different sources in order to find probable *foundations* for moral conduct. As we see later, constitutional or regime values are not the values that only traditionalists' camp in Wall's classification accepts as true objective ideals. But yet, modernist theories in his classification that have supposedly different philosophical backgrounds can turn to these values to inform ethical decision making in public administration.

Modernist ethics (realist, objectivist ethics legitimated by organizational elites, the ethics of organization) has some various sub-types which I incline to see them as different versions of democratic ethos and tactics that try to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic paradigms. *Individual subtype* of modernist ethics holds that a person makes judgments according to self-referential, not social, standards. It can be seen, for example, as a "redundancy gambit" that tries to promote an internal system for public administrators together with previous external system. To Wall, it is not possible to believe that persons --public administrators-- can discover moral truth in their consciences. Such an approach underestimates political and moral socialization that construct this awareness. By this criticism, he interestingly gets very close to communitarian views. Furthermore, this subtype of modernist ethics lacks of democratic process since ethical individualism uses normative laws that have no place in democratic attitude. Moral theory must not confuse "the locus of decision making (the individual) with its content (societal norms)" as individual subtype did. Otherwise, it can turn to a "monologue with the self". But, "democracy is dialogue in the community" and "individual ethics must stand the test of group decision making" (p. 141). The second

subtype of modernist ethics is *professional subtype*. It accepts that when norms conflict, professional standards can be used to decide what to do. It seems, at first glance, that this subtype symbolizes bureaucratic ethos in our classification in this study. However, in my opinion, it is another version of democratic ethos applying to higher order moral values. Because, as also recognized by Wall, advocates of this subtype "justify professional interests by linking them to *democratic values*" for the most part (emphasized added, p. 142). The most important problem of this subtype lies exactly at that point because seeing professional interests of public administrators as if they reflect democratic values can lead to "autocratic and self-serving" public administration. Thirdly, Wall uses the *bureaucratic subtype* to mention the sum of views which do not accept any duty for public administrators except to obey political superiors. Interestingly, this sentence can be taken as an exact definition of bureaucratic ethos. However, after giving this definition he adds that even in this type (in bureaucratic subtype of modernist ethics) "constitutional regime values should be guiding principles for administrators" and "at times administrators must go beyond simple adherence to bureaucratic rules" (p. 142-143). In my opinion, the bureaucratic modernist subtype in Wall's classification can be considered similar to bureaucratic ethos, but, when it asserts constitutional and regime values as the basis of administrative discretion it becomes similar to again democratic ethos in our study. In essence, bureaucratic subtype does not mean a new subtype of modernist ethics which is different from the traditionalist approach. Applying higher order moral values in this type means that we reach the same point from different ways. Therefore, the criticism of bureaucratic subtype by Wall turns (and adds some other points) once again to assessment and criticism of the morality

of regime values as done in the criticisms when he examines traditionalist ethics. These criticisms emerge at two points: a) need to interpretation of regime values, and; b) the relationship between regime values and regime power. Regarding the first one, Wall says

"Regime values are meaningless unless they are interpreted. What these values are thought to mean in a culture(...)is not thoroughly critiqued(...) Without such criticism, we do not if we are affirming a democratic consensus or merely reproducing the values that we have been socialized to accept" (p. 143).

Some important concepts such as individualism and freedom are constructed and interpreted by large institutions that constitute power domain and fitted to the purposes of these institutions:

"For example, an individual is one who consumes (...) [A]ll references to regime values should be accompanied by an analysis of regime power" (p. 143).

The last and fourth subtype of modernist ethics is *democratic ethics*. Ironically, he gives a fairly good definition of bureaucratic ethos that we have tried to define throughout this chapter. In democratic ethics, referencing to the values held by the people makes the ultimate warrant for administrative action. These values are objectified in hierarchies with votes.

Afterwards, Wall examines *postmodern ethics*. It should be immediately stated that he is not very sympathetic to postmodern ethical perspectives. The reason is that although postmodern perspective aims to attain an interactive and critical discourse in which coercion is minimized, individuals and groups represent their own interests in this discourse. This is unacceptable for a democratic ethical theory. Because, as we can easily understand from Harmon's (1989) work, ethical

is merely reduced to 'process' in postmodern approach. He quotes following sentence from Harmon: "the good...is...a matter of the character of social relations through which end or purposes are revealed" p. 149).

However, focusing only noncoercive and 'communicative' action of postmodern experience, to Wall, has many shortcomings. First, the most important danger of postmodern discourse is the likelihood of manipulation of this discourse by elites. Second is relativism and nihilism stemmed from interested dialogue involved in postmodern discourse. Because of this interested dialogue, third, there is lack of morality. And, fourth, the specter of modern regimes concealed in discourse. As Foucault (1980: 86, cited in Wall) stated, the "success" of modern regimes "is proportional to [their] ability to hide [their] own mechanisms". In this regard, Wall concludes

"In short, the relativism and the contentiousness of the postmodern is so unstable that it may regress to an easier authoritarianism. The thirst for order and knowledge, for an Archimedean point that anchors the oscillations of Foucault's pendulum, is the intractable problem of postmodernism" (Wall, Ibid. 143).

Lastly, the axial theory, in Wall's classification, is based on subjective epistemology and idealist ontology that receives its support from the people. It includes moral democratic values and objective virtues fostering public regarding behavior. It is moral because it is based on disinterestedness, other-regardingness, and collective self-determination; it is democratic because all are invited to participate. It does not seek to make some political or ideological point; instead, it attempts to elevate the nature of public life. People are not shown that democracy and morality are good; rather they are invited to see for themselves. Democracy and morality go hand in hand; the former summarizes the dialogical and the latter the disinterestedness

tests of a democratic morality. In short, axial perspective is a democratic morality because it goes beyond self-interestedness and coerciveness. Yet, none of the ethics theories surveyed, according to Wall (1991), advocate axial ethics since it is an ideal and limiting type in our times (p. 147).

Consequently, it can be said that Wall's charge to ethical theories show that claims of democratic ethos are not genuinely democratic ones because none of these theories simultaneously support a democratic perspective and the moral point of view. Most of them, as he aptly puts, "recode the needs of organizational power regimes in myths that mask their coerciveness" (p. 150). One of these myths is about ethical code in organization, but, "the ethical code that can provide certain guidance for practitioners in all judgment contexts has never been written because it can not be written" (Bauman and Wall, 1997: 273). The next chapter is devoted a new, anti-foundational perspective for public administration ethics.

CHAPTER IV

ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS: THINKING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ETHICS OR RE-THINKING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?

As we have seen through the discussions in Chapter II and III, the literature on public administration ethics, two ethical frameworks that have been singled out and attempts to transcend these frameworks have been mostly foundational. Because, all ethical thought in public administration (as in the other fields of modernity) has been constructed by the search for universal administrative rules, standards, and principles by which public administrators can deduce and define their appropriate moral conduct. Therefore, we can unite these approaches under one basic rubric: foundationalism. On the other hand, in the last section of Chapter I, we briefly espoused anti-foundational ethics as an alternative to foundational perspective. Here the question is that: is the anti-foundational ethics more credible to public administration ethics as well? If ethics is to be taken seriously, my respond to this question is clearly affirmative.

In this chapter, I will seek to indicate some implications of anti-foundational ethics on public administration. In doing so, I draw heavily on Bauman's postmodern perspective developed in his several works (1989, 1993, and 1995) to analyze and criticize some ethical inconsistencies, problems and difficulties inherit in the structure of modern organizations depending on hierarchy, specialization, division

of labor, technical competence and moral codes. I believe that Bauman's perspective does offer very significant insights for a beginning point for scholars and practitioners who want to find a place in the development of anti-foundational public administration ethics.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the part one, I try to outline the critique of modernist foundational moral perspective in public administration. In the part two, I argue that anti-foundational ethics for public administration requires interrogating the identity and existence of the field of public administration.

4.1 THE CRITIQUE OF MODERNIST FOUNDATIONAL ETHICS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONFRONTATIONS WITH PERENNIAL QUESTIONS

4.1.a Reason, Civilizing Process, and Moral Enlighteners

Although modernity has faced many criticisms in recent years, few of them have been quite as disturbing and radical as those leveled by Zygmunt Bauman. In Bauman, critique of reason is fundamental to the critique of modernity. I believe that critique of reason is also vital to criticize modernist foundational public administration ethics. On the other hand, bureaucracy is the prime institutional carrier of what Bauman terms the "civilizing process" of modernity. According to Bauman, the civilizing process is the process of the self-assertion of the modern elite in the modernizing state. In this process, like other fields of life, morality is constructed on the basis of Law by elites and there is an ethical code constituted beyond morality by commands and prohibitions. To be ethical, in this reasoning, means to learn to memorize and follow rules.

In the Enlightenment, it was assumed that everything participated in some grand rational scheme to which all thought had access. The void left by moral supervision of the

religion can and ought to be filled with a set of rational rules and that reason can do what belief was doing no more (Bauman, 1993: 6). By this way, it was thought that men could regulate their mutual relationships in a more rational manner, and individuals were to be spared uncertainty in rationally organized society in which Reason, and only Reason, rules. According to modern thinking, the 'messiness' of the human world is but a temporary and repairable state. It will be replaced by the orderly and systematic rule of reason.

However, in modern times, as we saw in Chapter I, though reason is a shared human property, some humans are more equal than others in the case of particular equality since few people are endowed with more direct access to reason which is un-beclouded by narrow interests. Put other way, there is only freedom of the chosen few. In that sense, modernity was not only the time of pluralism and emancipation, it was also the time of the 'great schism': on one side, there were (self-civilizing) elites (philosophers and rulers) with awesome human abilities, on the other, there were the "coarse and uncouth" masses, which resulted in a more or less permanent break between two sections of society (p. 23). More importantly, in practice, the self-enlightened elites of modernity saw the masses as an object of rule and care (p. 24). Since freedom of self-constitution for the masses was claimed in the name of reason, the task of modern philosophy was to argue this claim in terms of universal human capacity, not sectarian terms.

As we have also seen, according to these elites, laying firm and unshakeable universal foundations of morality that bind all human beings --people of all social status and of all nations and races-- was necessity and the possibility. Under the conditions of moral life, morality had to be founded by elites in a way that engaged every human qua human being (p.

25). Furthermore, the foundations on which morality is to be built had to be revealed and the principles of moral conduct had to be instructed the nations by les philosophes because these foundations and universal principles explained why people should abide by the principles disclosed to them by their teachers. 'Doing good' by this way can be shown as good for those who did it, and it can be desired by everyone for the benefits it brings in this world. For a person who desires a good life 'doing good' had to justify itself as the rational choice (p. 27). This was the duty of elites. So viewed, morality is something that needs to be designed and injected into human conduct rather than being a natural trait of human life. That's why, elites tried to compose and impose comprehensive and unitary ethics.

Masses had to submit to the moral enlighteners and accept their teachings because they have interest and self-love. Self-love is not guaranteed unless it is enlightened. Indeed, people must be told what their true interests are (p. 27). Philosophers should, therefore, find out what sort of behavior reason would dictate to the reasonable person and communicate their findings to those who cannot find them on their own. As a result, a cohesive code of moral rules that could be thought and forced to obey emerged. It can be thought and forced to obey because it is man-made and hence *all rational human beings* can embrace and obey it. This means in fact that the findings of philosophers come to the others in the form of Law, not a rule inherent in their own choices. This rule prompts the choice from outside. The masses must obey the rules after the pattern of submission to an overwhelming external force although reason is every person's property. The heteronomous force of Law can only secure the actuality of moral behavior (p. 28).

In fact, the surrender of individual freedom to the heteronomously set standards means replacing morality with legal code and shaping ethics after the pattern of Law. Moral code tries to prevent individuals from using their freedom to do wrong and to enforce to do the right things because in moral code it is believed that individuals have "untoward" and "potentially heinous" impulses despite the rational arrangement of human cohabitation. This clearly reflects the mistrust the autonomous moral subject whose autonomy is grounded in something other than internalization of principles which have right to speak for every(rational)body (p. 66). Moral code asserts that only a conduct monitored by principles may be recognized as moral, and that necessary foundations for such principles must be revealed and demonstrated. Foundation building in ethical codes proclaims the non-existence or insufficiency of any other grounds on which moral choices and moral acts may be based. In short, foundational approach in ethics searches for solid foundations of ethical behavior in moral codes and distrusts autonomous moral self and autonomous moral judgment. Instead, since reason is postulated as a universal human attribute there are reason-dictated rules and rule-guided reason (p. 67).

4.1.b Emotions, Moral Codes, and Rules

Feelings and affections have no moral significance in modern ethics and moral codes because they are a priori unstable, changeable and fickle. Following the emotions was defined as un-freedom and consequently the dependence of action on feelings was exchanged for its dependence on reason. Reason is, by definition, rule-guided; acting reasonably means following certain rules. Most ethical arguments, by this way, invalidate emotions as morally potent factors and assume that a person can be a moral person only he or she follows the reason and the decisions it dictates.

According to Kant, virtue, for example, was the ability to stand up to one's emotive inclinations and to neutralize or reject them in the name of reason. Reason had to be unemotional as emotions were unreasonable (p. 67). Morality was placed in that un-feeling dominion of reason. Reason, as we have also seen in Chapter I, was appointed as the sole faculty relevant to moral evaluation of action in Kantian ethics. This pre-empted the questions of morality as rule-governed and rules as heteronomous. However, after the lodging moral sentiments in formal or formalizable rules, the balance between reason and rules shifted constantly to the side of rules. Similarly, moral conduct, in the deontological conception of morality, was identified with the government by the rules, and the good was defined as the question whether the rules have been followed faithfully or not. Unlike consequentialist ethics in which one need to find out whether or not the consequences of the act were good, it was enough to know whether the acting was in agreement with the rules prescribed for that sort of action in deontological approach. Criteria of morality, in deontology, are reduced to proceduralism through separating the means from the ends, goodness of behavior from the goodness of its outcome, the question morality from the question of doing good. It is clear that for a deontologist the moral conscience of the actor is the out of court. In other words, deontological ethics strikes the question of 'doing good' out of the moral agenda altogether since it emphasizes procedure rather than motives and effects. Additionally, deontology replaces morality with the question of discipline. What is the problem with moral proceduralism? The root problem here is that though proceduralism does a lot for the subordination of the moral agent to the external legislating agency, it does little or nothing for the increase of the sum total of good. So, in the final account it disarms the forces of moral resistance to

immoral commands. As has been pointed out in Chapter I telling lie is accepted immoral even in the case of Nazis escaping from Gestapo (pp. 68-69).

Consequently, the moral person has been freed from the bonds of autonomous emotions but put in the harness of heteronomous rules. The disbelief in the self's moral capacity because of his or her unstable and changeable emotions brings about the denial of the self's right to moral judgment. Heteronomy of rules takes the place of autonomy of the moral self, which enforces and obtains obedience. However, as long as reason is embodied in the power-assisted laws of society it can not help the self to be moral; it only helps the self to survive in a world that has no room for morality. Bauman (1993) writes

"The modern dream of the happiness-legislating reason has brought bitter fruits. The greatest crimes *against* humanity (and *by* humanity) have been perpetrated in the name of the rule of reason, of better order, and greater happiness" (p. 238).

[M]oral issues can not be 'resolved', nor the moral life of humanity guaranteed, by the calculating and legislative efforts of reason. Morality is not safe in the hands of reason, though this is exactly what spokesmen of reason promise. Reason can not help the moral self without depriving the self of what makes the self moral [: that moral urge] (...). Thus, morality can be 'rationalized' only at the cost of self-denial and self-attrition" (pp. 247-248, emphasis in the original).

Modernity has created two big institutions to accomplish the dominance of morality through following rules: bureaucracy and business. The civilizing process refers to the structured ways in which the desiderata of rationality are emancipated from the interference by ethical norms or moral inhibitions. So, a modern bureaucracy functions as "a moral sleeping pill" since the essence of bureaucratic structure and process dissociates instrumental rational criteria from moral evaluations of the ends they serve. However, the dissociation in modern bureaucracy is itself premised upon two parallel processes:

the meticulous functional division of labor on the one hand, and the substitution of technical for moral responsibility on the other (Bauman, 1989: 98).

4.1.c Division of Labor and Floating of Responsibility in Organization

Bauman conceptualizes the essence of moral relationships in terms of proximity as we saw in Chapter I. Therefore, it is not surprising that Bauman views the separation and distance characteristic of the bureaucratic division of labor as crucial elements in the silencing of morality. In the division of labor, expertise and functions almost every job involves many people, each one of whom performs a small part of the overall task. The problem here is that the quantity of people involved to the job is so huge that no one can reasonably and convincingly claim or be charged with the responsibility for the end result. In other words, responsibility for the outcome becomes "floating" or rather, the guilt is spread so thinly through the division of labor (Bauman, 1993: 18). Bureaucratic division is functional because it is not just the lack of direct personal experience of the actual execution of a task to which successive commands contribute their share, but also the lack of similarity between the task at hand and the task of office as a whole (one is not a miniature version, or icon, of the other), which distances the contributor from the job performed by the bureaucracy of which he is part.

In fact, bureaucratic division is but a specific reflection of our life work. The latter, similar to bureaucracy, is split into many little tasks, each performed in a different place, among different people, at different times. Our presence in society is as fragmentary as the tasks themselves and we merely appear in a role. Although we are irreplaceable as individuals, we are replaceable as players of our many roles.

In bureaucracy, responsibility rests with the role, not with the person who performs it because nothing much would change if the particular role-performer opted out. Role is merely the work clothes we put on for the duration of the job and then take off again when the day shift is over... Again, responsibility is floating (p. 19). Moral awareness and responsibility is dissolved when a complete process is split into small tasks and those tasks are in turn separated from each other. By concentrating on their own individual tasks, each bureaucrat is able to avoid overall moral responsibility for the outcome to which their own efforts ultimately contribute.

On the other hand, bureaucratic division is directly related with the question of organization because every organization aims the production, division, re-production and perpetuation of certain arrangements of organizational roles and identities. In its ideal objective if not in practice, organization means assigning roles and identities to teach every member of organization in order to accomplish predetermined goals by division of labor and function. In this regard it can be said that modern organizations are the vehicles of classification, differentiation (as in the 'departmentalization'). In modern organizations, what is classified and differentiated are not explicit roles of members, but rather varying degrees of freedom of movement between these roles, in other words, freedom to choose between roles.

The most orderly organization is the organization in which individuals' motivations are deprived of the actions of the members; one in which what the members of organization think and feel matter no more --because whatever their thoughts and emotions are, the outcome is not affected. If organizational order is rest on following a uniform ethical code in the form

of rules, principles and standards by the members, measures are to be taken to reduce or eliminate the impact of members' personal, unpredictable, changeable moral impulses. Keeping order in organization means keeping organization and the relationships (that is, social interactions) of its members structured. Epistemologically structure means predictability; ontologically it means relative repetitiousness, monotony of events. In hierarchically structured and 'departmentalized' organization for example probabilities are not randomly distributed and some events are more likely to happen than others. It is in this sense that organization is structured; it is an island of regularity in the sea of randomness, for this reason we call it *structured* (p. 123).

Moreover, all organization, big or small, global or local, public or private, subjects the conduct of its members to either *instrumental* or *procedural* criteria of evaluation. Perhaps more importantly, it de-legalizes and forces out all other criteria. For Bauman, "bureaucracy is the mechanism through which instrumental rationality is promoted to a predominant position within modern society to the detriment or exclusion of alternative (moral) criteria of action" (du Gay, 1999: 577). Among these criteria, the most important one is moral drive of its members. Moral drive, however, is the source of autonomous behavior and, hence, it is unpredictable and 'inimical' to order from the organizational point of view. There is, therefore, an organizational respond to such moral autonomy. It is the heteronomy of instrumental and procedural rationalities (Bauman, 1993: 124). Organizational goals, interests and Law (for instance, in the form of managerial/administrative fiats and regulations) displace and replace autonomy of moral behavior of organizational member. Put other way, the members of organization are expected to justify their conduct by *reason* as defined either by predetermined and approved organizational goals or by the

rules of organizational behavior. Only such like actions of the members are accepted as organizationally suitable, that is rational, actions. Furthermore, organizationally justified actions serve as the defining property of actors as organizational members. Actions that fail to meet criteria of organizational goal-pursuit or procedural discipline are declared non-organizational, irrational and private (Bauman, 1993: 154). Socialization of member into organization (through several organizational devices such as division of labor, job specification and job description etc.) includes inevitably the privatization of morality.

It should be immediately mentioned that as we have seen in Chapter II and III in detail, some public administration scholars under deontological views and democratic ethos affirm increasing degrees of administrative discretion. According to them, if the 'good' could not be trusted to the mechanisms of representative democracy and/or hierarchical administration, it can be instilled in career bureaucrats. Public administrators with administrative discretion and democratic ethos values (e.g. social equity, public interest or regime values) are thought as better than neutral functionaries. Again, since ethical public administration is not, for the proponents of this view, the moral output of the representative democratic accountability loop, it can be issued from public administrators' following rules which are logically deduced from self-validating higher order moral rules instead of consequences. As we have also seen, some members of democratic ethos school rebelled against the merely external controls presupposed by bureaucratic ethos. They took side with Friedrich in the Friedrich/Finer dispute and thought that they were giving respect to autonomous individuals by substituting internal controls for external ones. However, from the standpoint of Bauman's postmodern perspective, the substitution was not but a slight modification, marginal

incremental change. So viewed, there was only a shift from material external behavioral controls and commands to 'ideal external behavioral controls'; that is, in reality, internalization of external thought and the privatization of morality. As long as the heteronomy of instrumental and procedural rationalities continues to exist and organizational socialization is designed according to these rationalities in public administration, the substitution of bureaucratic ethos (consequentialism) with democratic one (deontology) will continue to mean only replacing of masters for public administrators: from obedience to political masters in bureaucratic paradigm to obedience to supposedly universal ethical principles and rules in democratic ethos. Both bureaucratic and democratic ethoses share a foundational form since they have several "vanishing referents" such as "the people" or self-justifying principles. Neither bureaucratic ethos nor its democratic counterpart denies the privatization of morality through approval of 'rational' and organizationally justified actions and hence expropriation of the moral judgment of organizational members.

4.1.d Adiaphorization of Moral Impulse In Organization: Three Arrangements

Since it is generally thought that moral impulse of organizational members has disruptive and deregulating effect, all organizations try to neutralize this impulse. To accomplish this purpose, there are several organizational arrangements.

In the first of these arrangements a distance, not proximity between the two poles of action (between the 'doing' and the 'suffering') is assured (Bauman, 1993: 125). Those who are on the receiving end of action are held beyond the reach of the actor's moral impulse. In fact, this is caused by the magnitude of our powers in modern age (Bauman, 1993: 17).

In organization, the member finds himself or herself in a situation in which responsibility is shifted away from the member. He or she acts out someone else's wishes and can be described as the authority's agent. In this situation, the members of organization seldom have the chance to consider intentions that their own contributions serve and less often face the consequences of their actions (p. 156). More importantly, if they faced them, they would hardly conceive of them as the consequences of their deeds (p. 126). Members of organization will probably not perceive their own job as morally important because of the presence of an indefinite number of 'intermediary men' between the member and the ultimate consequences of action. When compared with all other jobs that add their share to the final result, individual job of the member is small and insignificant. The organization can be defined as 'a machine to keep moral responsibility afloat' (p. 126). Since every member's contribution to the final effect is too partial, responsibility belongs to no one in particular. It is consequently difficult for an ordinary member of organization to see how his or her actions contributed to causing misery through their remote effects.

Furthermore, in organizations, though it is removed at a safe distance, the moral capacity of the member is not been extinguished altogether. It is channeled to more convenient direction in organization --towards the action of other members. Moral capacity of the members of organization, by this way, is prevented from interfering with the overall goal and the outcome of organizational effort. Yet, it is deployed in the service of the efficiency of this very organizational effort. In this new place of moral capacity, loyalty to the other members of organization (one of the content values of bureaucratic ethos) or to the 'mates' becomes the main measure of moral propriety.

Indirect and far-away consequences of co-operative organizational action are removed at a safe distance. Although what members of organization and other people do may have profound, far-reaching and long-lasting consequences, they can not directly see or predict the consequences of our actions with precision. There is a big distance between the actions and their outcomes both in time and space. Organizational decisions, actions and policies have several serious 'side-effects' and 'unanticipated consequences' though the members intended good purposes before the decision, action and policy (Bauman, 1993: 17). This can lead to disasters and sufferings which neither we nor anybody else in the organization wished. The scale of consequences of our actions might be bigger than moral imagination that we have. Unfortunately, we can not overcome the problems stemmed from this distance by using our innate, ordinary powers of perception. Nor can we measure the quality of our actions by a full inventory of their consequences. It is clear that the distance jeopardizes the rational decision making process; not only 'inputs' but also 'outputs' of decision making are not exactly been known in the process any longer. Also, the distance makes our tested and trustworthy ethical rules which we have inherited from the past impotent. Even if we follow these rules and even if every one do the same, we can not decide whether disastrous consequences will be avoid or not because harmful consequences of human actions are unintentional and in some cases they may not be effective within the lifespans of those affected, but during those of their children. The hub of the matter is that modern ethical tools (e.g. ethical codes) have not been made to measure of our present powers.

In the second arrangement, 'others' are exempted from the class of potential objects of moral responsibility. For Bauman, this is equivalent to 'de-humanization' (p. 127). In

this arrangement, the capacity of moral subjects at the receiving end of action is denied. Besides, they are disallowed from a moral challenge against the intentions and effects of the action. Objects of our organizational decisions and actions are not in the domain of our moral protection; they are perceived as strangers that have no moral demand. Again, the limiting impact of 'moral responsibility for the Other' is rendered ineffective.

The third arrangement destroys the object of action as a potentially moral self. The objects are dissembled into traits and the collection of parts and attributes. Actions are then targeted on specific traits of persons rather than person themselves. The traits of object are only statistically processed units of computation (as in the philosophical reductionism of logical positivism). The impact of organizational action narrowly targeted on human objects as 'total selves' is left out of vision. The only 'whole persons' are the members' colleagues, mates and other members of organization (p. 127).

What are the effects of these arrangements? Above all, large degree of emancipation from the constraints imposed by human moral impulses is secured through these arrangements (p. 128). More importantly still, only by this emancipation, organization can set organizational goals and purposes which a moral self would not be able to fulfill; purposeful organizational action (not the action conducted by autonomous moral self with the autonomous moral responsibility) becomes possible only in the framework of organization. This is obvious, for instance, in classical politics/administration dichotomy in bureaucratic organizations. While the political demands which typically arise within democratic states can only be met by large-scale bureaucratic administration, the politician and the bureaucrat, as continually pointed out in

classical public administration (and bureaucratic ethos) literature, occupy different orders of life which are subject to different laws. Proponents of the dichotomy (and hence the bureaucratic ethos) insist that the true public administrator should not engage in politics. He or she should carry out the duties of his office without anger and prejudice. It is thought that politician's actions are subject to a quite different principle of responsibility, which is opposed to that of public administrator. Even if superior wants from public administrator the execution of an instruction which public administrator conceives as wrong or mistaken, public administrator's responsibility and honor requires carrying out that instruction since the responsibility belongs to the man issuing it. It is not the task or duty of public administrator to join in 'political conflict' (read one of the battlegrounds of ambivalent and aporetic morality) on the basis his 'convictions' (read autonomous moral urges on which moral responsibility stands). In the classical literature, engaging in politics is often perceived as disturbing because it is thought that bureaucracy with neutral competence has passed many tests wherever it was required to demonstrate its sense of duty, its objectivity and its ability to solve 'technical' problems, whereas it has failed wherever it dealt with political questions. This is emancipation from moral responsibility. However, it is interestingly supposed that without this discipline the whole bureaucratic administrative apparatus would disintegrate. Three arrangements make the organization orderly, structured, regular and predictable. Within organizational space only rational calculation (not non-rational, uncontrolled moral impulse) orients the organizational action.

The most important thing we should not miss here is that although the organization does not promote immoral behavior or support evil through these arrangements, it does not promote

good either. Organization simply makes organizational action morally *adiaphoric*, that is, 'morally indifferent'. *Adiaphoric* actions are those which ethical authorities do not feel it necessary to take a stand (Bauman, 1993: 30). *Adiaphorization* collides with moral impulse. When organizational action becomes *adiaphoric* it becomes neither good nor evil. Action is measurable by either technical (purpose-oriented or procedural), but not by moral criteria. Organization renders 'moral responsibility for the Other' ineffective. In this regard, it is interesting to note that at the threshold of modern age, organization was first perceived as a matter of design and rational improvement, but later, this quality of organization was theorized as the 'immortality of Man' that transcends the mortality of individual men and women in an organization. Consequently it can be said that the 'ethics' of organization morally *adiaphorize* organizational action through abovementioned arrangements.

Lastly, it is clear that the heteronomy of organizational action is one of the evident effects of these arrangements (p. 128). This is especially obvious when the action is conducted in the formalized, hierarchical framework of an organization. However, when the organizational commands come in the form of advice given by 'experts', heteronomous character of action is less visible. From the perspective of anti-foundational un-universalizable ethics, experts are the persons who act in the roles which have been socially (and rationally) given the authority to pronounce 'true', 'effective' and 'trustworthy', hence 'binding' statements. More importantly, advices of experts who have no power to coerce are 'purchased' by the 'customer'. In this situation, heteronomous character is more difficult to see (or not visible at all). It should be stated that the advice of experts is in fact the product of someone else's definition of the client's situation, someone else's criteria of distinguishing right from wrong, proper from

improper. The advice of experts, in this regard, emancipates the action from the moral responsibility of the members of organization and submits it to the heteronomously controlled standards and instrumental effectiveness.

4.1.e Technical Responsibility and Technology

As we have seen, division of labor is one of two parallel processes to dissociate instrumental rational criteria from moral evaluations of the ends they serve. The second process of de-moralizing tendencies through separation and distantiation is closely related the first one: the substitution of technical for moral responsibility. The latter would not have been possible without the division of labor and separation of tasks.

For Bauman, since technical responsibility 'forgets' that the action to which it is oriented is a means to a goal over and above itself, it differs from moral responsibility. This forgetting is directly related with location within functional division of labor 'where outer connections of action are effectively removed from the field of vision' (Bauman, 1989: 101). Bureaucrats are free, according to Bauman, to concentrate on the 'good' --i.e. technically proficient-- performance of the job at hand once they are inserted within a complex functional differentiation of labor, and hence distanced from the ultimate outcomes to which their conduct contributes.

The only forms of judgment appropriate to those actions are ones intrinsic to it, since the bureaucrat's actions appear to him/her as ends in themselves. At that point, we should focus much more on technology and the relationship between technology and means-ends distinction.

Above all, technology has become a closed system. From the perspective of technology the rest of the world is environment for technical treatment and 'problems' resulting from its misuses and insufficiencies are considered as demands for more of itself: the more problems are created by technology, the more technology is needed. It is thought that only technology can 'improve on' technology. That there is no exist from this closed system is, according to Bauman, fully and truly unsolvable problem raised by technological advance. The existence of technological capacities problematize aspects of the world which would not otherwise be seen as problems (that is, wrong state of affairs needing to be altered for the better) --not the problems themselves-- calls for more technology. Since technology becomes a closed system, it does not need legitimation any more; it has its own legitimation and justification (Bauman, 1993: 186).

On the other hand, technological resources legitimize their consequences and thus make their use 'imperative' regardless of the results. In other words, the very availability of usable (but now underemployed) technological resources calls their application. If something can be done, it should and will. It is the means that justify end. The outcomes are worthy because the availability of means depending upon technological know-how is there (p. 188). Means justify any end which the means can produce. It can be said that 'technological fix' does not refer to the assembly of available means and resources of action, but to the unconditionality of the commandment 'to do something'. Not to do things that one can specify, but to increase the capacity of doing whatever man can do constructs the very nature of modern progress. Technological fix, in this regard, is the announcement of sovereignty of means over ends in addition to the declaration of independence of means from ends. Most commonly accepted definitions of technology accept that

technology has something to do with 'reaching the goals'. However, Bauman agrees with the idea of Jacques Ellul believing that a technique assures a result known in advance; technique is nothing more than means and ensemble of means. More importantly and highly germane to our subject in this thesis, Bauman quotes Herber Schadelbach as saying that "it is not true that political decisions are made before technologists are ordered to worry about means...Political ends are very often determined by technological information concerning the technical feasibility of realizing these ends" (Bauman, 1993: 187).

There is liberation of means from ends at the heart of the modernity. Ends are perceived as 'constraints'. To be liberated, means must be in excess of ends. The doers must be able to do more than the ends. This 'excess' infuses the modern world with its unique feeling of freedom, makes modernity as an interrupted succession of new beginnings (p. 190). Industrial revolution in modernity has faced the shift from the ends to means as the prime motivator of human concerns and action. Moreover, the manipulability of the individuals who are now liberated from prior assignments and definitions renders the world of things and humans ready and suitable to technological treatment. Similarly, since only isolated, unbound and free-moving individuals could be subjected to the process of systematization, unification and clarification in which technique could be successful, the dissolution of natural groups and 'social taboos', and atomization of the social compound into such like individuals are decisive conditions for technique. Also, it is significant from our point of consideration that technological revolution makes human fit for technological treatment. Division of labor and specialization are two important methods to make humans suitable for technological treatment in organization. However, it is obvious that technological revolution would not be

possible if human resources were not liberated to produce the excess of tools and instruments in the massive-scale. Put other way, division of labor and specialization would not be possible if the modern mind were not ready to produce excess of tools (p. 193).

In pressing his case against the technology, Bauman generally draws upon the ideas of Max Weber for support. Like Weber, Bauman believes that the world as conjured up by technology is a 'dis-encharned' world' -a world without meaning of its own, because without 'intent', 'purpose', and 'destination' (1993: 193). In such a world, 'natural necessity' is a crime since the 'what is' has no authority over 'what ought to be'. The spirit of technological revolution has produced the operative definition of being which prohibits the use of value-related terms.

For Bauman, miraculous powers of technology come from what Bauman (1993: 194) calls "the stratagem of close focusing". In this strategy, a 'problem' is cut out from its multiple connections with other realities. Therefore, a problem becomes a task. However, the realities with which problem is connected are left out of account. They melt into the indifferent backdrop of action. Technological action is so effective each time because of the deliberate condensation of close focusing and voluntary forgetting about the rest. If technological action tried to spread its attention more widely and if it took account of all multiple aspects of the task at hand, it would not be technology, as we know it. Technique aimed at 'totality', says Bauman, is an oxymoron--contradiction in terms. Technological action always substitutes an order for what is perceived as disorder; but it is always a local order that is produced at the end of technological action. From the perspective of technology, totality is what has not been taken into account because it views the world as a collection of

fragments. Technology selects one fragment for close focusing despite the fact that the overall result is local order and global disorder.

The primary bone of contention is that technology disassembles the moral self through dividing/fragmenting/atomizing (p. 196). The division of expertise is the product of this dividing capacity. Technological know-how appears to single humans in the form of experts or expert-written manuals. Each consists of the specific advice how to deal with the problem in focus. In fact advices have an important message: that the world is subdivided into problems. Each technological instruction promotes itself, and the world in which instruction is given in a fashion specific to technology.

In the world subdivided into problems, one can raise an objection against an expert advice or use one expert advice against another. But, one can not direct a challenge to technology which would not be technological itself and would not cause to more technology and further reinforcement of technological rule (p. 197). Patently, in terms of morality, technology means fragmentation. Since the moral self can not survive after fragmentation, the most obvious victim of technology is, among others, the moral self. In the world of technology mapped by objectives and excess of tools to accomplish them quickly, there is room for entrepreneur or hedonist, but not for the moral subject. The moral self who neglects rational calculation and dislikes 'practical' uses is an alien in the universe of technology. Technologically fragmented self is only a carrier of one of the many 'problems' in his or her life; this self does not see and act upon the Other as person, the world as totality. As a result, it can be said that division of labor and technological outlook in organizations cooperate to keep the totality of moral actor (that is, individual bureaucrat and other members

of organization) and of the world (which is perceived by organization as 'environment') out of focus. They substitute efficiency standards (or at least problem-focused search for efficiency) for ethical norms, and technical procedures for moral responsibility.

4.2 TOWARDS NEW ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: FROM ONTOLOGY TO 'ETHICS BEFORE ONTOLOGY'

Can the criticisms and thoughts discussed thus far lead to a radically novel understanding of public administration ethics? What sort of characteristics can be the characteristics of this novel understanding of administrative ethics? To answer these questions, I will again draw heavily on Zygmunt Bauman's work, *Postmodern Ethics*, for theoretical support. To explore new perspective and to open a possibility in order to understand moral phenomena in public administration, it is necessary to turn Bauman's work where the debate on anti-foundational ethics has been fully developed. As we noted at the last section of Chapter I, Bauman also asserts seven marks of moral condition from the postmodern perspective. These seven marks in my opinion may be of some help in establishing new ethical perspective for public administration ethics.

All in all, unlike modern ethics, priority --which once assigned to the self-- is given to the Other in anti-foundational ethics. In this regard, public administrator is responsible for the Other without waiting for the reciprocity. On the other hand, it should be remembered that morality is aporetic. As we have also stated in Chapter I, there are few choices that are unambiguously good. That's why, the field of responsibility can also be the realm of cruelty since to escape from responsibility may be the strongest tendency in the state of unlimited responsibility. In reality, every moral responsibility can lead to immoral consequences. For instance, when taken to its extreme the moral responsibility or moral

impulse for the Other can lead to the destruction of the autonomy of the Other, or domination and oppression. Men who believed that their actions were justified and that they acted according to the demands of moral responsibility have historically carried out many brutalities. This becomes even more evident when we focus our attention on the relationship between Nazi regime and some parts of bureaucracy. But yet, public administrator should strive to enlarge the limits of moral responsibility without having regard to this ambiguity because the moral self is born and acts only in the context of ambivalence and uncertainty. Therefore, we can conclude that for a moral public administrator the non-aporetic and ambiguity-free moral situation is a utopian existence, not a realistic target. Instead, moral responsibility, which guides the administrator, must be behind what has been and can be done; that is, uncertainty and ambiguity should always accompany moral public administrator.

Similarly, public administrator as human is morally ambivalent. As ambivalence lies at the heart of the morality, all organizational arrangements, rationally defined and articulated rules and duties, and professional ethical codes are ineffective in removing this ambivalence. No ethical code can be seen as suitable for the essentially ambivalent condition of morality when we think of the primary structure of collectivities and human togetherness. Therefore, moral conduct of public administrator cannot be guaranteed by 'better designed' ethical codes due to this characteristic of morality. Perhaps, it should be realized that public administration as a field needs to learn how to live without such guarantees, and that a perfect public administrator --as well as a perfect (public) organization and a perfect administrative system in a perfect society-- is not possible.

Moral phenomena are inherently non-rational. They can be moral only if they come before the consideration of purpose and the calculation of gains and losses. They do not fit the means-ends scheme. Moral phenomena cannot be explained in terms of their 'utility' or service that they give to moral self (or organization, or goals which that organization attempts to realize). This is a contradictory situation for public administration because rationality is essential element for organizations and their administration.

Organization is structured and established in order to accomplish pre-determined goals. The very definition of organization implies that organization is planned to be rational to achieve these specific goals. It is expected from organization to accomplish its objective through deliberate activities and measures which are introduced for achieving rationality in its design and operations. Moral phenomena in organization, however, are not regular, repetitive, monotonous, predictable and in a specific order. Thus, these phenomena are not (and can not be) rule-guided and can not be exhausted by any ethical code. In organization, public or private, proper and improper actions are defined previously and rationally. It is thought that these definitions provide clear-cut rules for public administrator to choose between proper and improper. Definitions leave no 'grey area' for administrators. In this way it is assumed that at least one choice can be rationally good if the administrator becomes rational as well. Yet, such an assumption misses the question of what is really moral in organization. Additionally, morality shifts from the field of personal autonomy of individual public administrator into the field of power-supported, rational heteronomy of organizational rules, standards, and principles. The moral self of public administrator can not be developed any longer by responsibility in that case. But rather, learnable and

rational organizational rules silence and paralyze moral responsibility of administrator. Responsibility of public administrator to the Other and to the moral self-conscience is substituted by responsibility for the 'legislators and guardians of the organizational code of ethics'.

A specific and rational order has to be set up in organization; yet, morality is irrational from the perspective of this rational order. For every organizational collectivity which tries to accomplish pre-determined goals through structured, disciplined and coordinated actions of its members in a planned way, autonomous moral self of the members is unacceptable situation. Since each organization has prescribed ends to carry out, and the accomplishment of these specific ends necessitates structuration and planning of the relationships among the members of organization (through for instance, departmentalization, job specification and description, hierarchical levels and determination of authority relationships etc.), and the individuals who are going to contribute to organization have to be selected on the basis of activities and qualifications necessary for goal accomplishment, it is asserted that acting of each member according to his/her moral responsibility and moral impulse will cause to chaos within the organization. Morality depending on the autonomous moral self of the members of organization is seen among the reasons of chaos or 'anarchy' inside 'ordered' organization. On the other hand, organization is proclaimed as the 'perfect' arrangement of human cohabitation which reason can do. However, moral impulse of the individual in organization is used and exploited, rather than merely suppressed or outlawed, in organization because it is accepted as one of the main resources in the administration of organizational arrangements. It supplies the 'raw material' of sociality and commitment to others in organization. In this regard, what neoclassical theory of organization (and

accompanying human relations movement was to succeed can be seen as the recognition of the impacts of human action and the importance of 'individual impulse and sense' on the sociality of organization. It is not an exaggeration to say that by the introduction of the concept of "informal organization", the neo-classical school in fact accepted this 'moral side' of individual members in order to tame, harness and exploit it in the direction of commitment to all other members in organization and of the accomplishment of specific organizational goals. Since the neo-classical school also believed that human behavior disrupts all organizational plans, researches were conducted to discover the causes of such disruptions; and various remedies such as the better communication and participation were suggested. Thus, autonomous moral self and moral impetus of individuals in organization were cultivated without giving a chance to a free development and growth, and kept in the desired shape.

As we noted at Chapter III, Gary Woller's attempts to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic ethos depends heavily on the principle of universalizability. However, anti-foundational ethics implies for public administration that morality is not universalizable. Ethical universality is directly related with the existence of rules, standards, and principles. Yet, when general or potentially generalizable rules, principles and standards enter the stage moral impulse -the most important and perhaps the unique soil of moral responsibility- of public administrator exists; ethical reasoning instead takes its place. In such situation, ethics is made in the likeness of Law, not the moral impulse. As we have also seen, 'ethics in the form of Law' only substitutes heteronomous, enforced-from-outside ethical rules, standards, and principles for the autonomous moral responsibility of public administrator (as the retrospective examination of the public administration ethics literature in Chapter II shows).

Such effort incapacitates, even destructs, the moral self of the administrator. Besides, ethics in the form of rules, standards, and principles silences moral impulse and channels moral capacities of administrators to organizationally rational, efficient, but immoral purposes. In other words, search for ethical rules and coherent moral code in fact attempts to substitute heteronomous ethical duty for autonomous moral responsibility of public administrator.

Ethical universality rejects the indispensable and defining characteristics of morality: one-sidedness --not reciprocity-- and a relation that can not be reversed. Morality, on the contrary, necessitates unequal relationship if it has to survive as morality. In fact, this inequality, this not-asking-for-reciprocation, this indifference to the 'balancing up' of gains and loses --and as Brent Wall rightly states in his critique of public administration ethics theories-- this disinterest in mutuality make the attitude of public administrator ethical. Ethics is not 'being with' another because 'being-with' is symmetrical and open to reciprocity. However, ethics is 'being-for' and non-symmetrical. I am for the Other whether or not the Other is for me, and 'I-for-you' does not demand 'you-for-me'. Relation of the moral self is not reversible, and more importantly, the reciprocation is but an accident. As Bauman (1993: 50) pithily expressed it, "in a moral relationship, all the 'duties' and 'rules' (...) are addressed solely to me, bind only me (...) When addressed to me responsibility is moral. It may well lose its moral content completely the moment I try to turn it around to bind the Other".

In Chapter I, we saw a formulation known as *the formula of the end itself*, which have an important place in Kant's moral philosophy. It states that "act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any

other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end". It also suggests acting according to the 'moral law inside me'. It is obvious that abovementioned radicalism regarding the relationship between I and other may give justice to Kant's formula of the end itself as a "concern for the Other for the Other's sake", and as a respect for the other as a free subject and the 'end in itself'. On the other hand, it can be analogously asserted that in public (and of course private) organizations as social collectivities established for accomplishing specific goals and objectivities for which all members are 'rationally' and 'efficiently' structured for balancing up gains or loses in accomplishing their objectives, public administrators are merely 'being-with' other members of organization and 'environment' outside the organization. His or her relations with the Other is symmetrical in organization which is governed by ethical codes including universal, generalizable --or at least potentially generalizable-- ethical rules and standards. Yet, very nature of ethics requires from public administrator to be 'being-for' the Other.

Insisting on the universalizability of rules and the mutual exchangeability of moral subjects, as in Gary Woller's reconciliation effort that we saw in Chapter III, can make certain --universalizable-- act a moral duty for individual public administrator --hence can state sufficient condition of his/her moral behavior--, but it says nothing about acting according to moral responsibility and impulse --hence can not state necessary condition of morality--. Also, unlike Woller's argumentation, there can be no universal ethical standards that public administrator can follow because all of these standards are vanishing in the flow of daily life. Public administrator with moral responsibility can not look over his/her shoulders to see what other people, other public administrators like him/her do. He/she can not enjoy a clear

conscience at the end of the day by acquitting himself/herself for not doing anything else that other public administrators like him/her would not do. For public administrator with moral responsibility, only rules can be universal. Professional ethical codes may dictate 'universal' rules and duties, but moral responsibility of administrators is carried individually. Rule-dictated organizational 'duties' render public administrators similar cogs of the bureaucratic machine, only moral responsibility makes them individuals. Only organizational duties and rules can be common denominators, not moral responsibilities. Therefore, the morality of the moral public administrator does not have a character of a rule. In reality, morality --not ethics in the form of law-- rejects codification, formalization, and universalization. Morality is not universalizable because if it does not possess purposefulness, reciprocity, and contractuality --three attributes which imply calculability of action. It is clear that calculability of action presupposes action that is the outcome of rational decision-making. If public administrator selects means properly and uses them adequately and efficiently, it is asserted that he/she is rational in terms of means and ends. Public administrator's rational action is rational because it is impersonal and rule-guided. However, since morality and moral responsibility are not calculable, moral public administrator can not follow 'rational' rules when moral responsibility conflicts these rules. Although rational rules are impersonal, the message of morality is virtually personal and it appeals to the responsibility of public administrator. In this regard, against Woller's argumentation, which attempts to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic ethos and to reach a new theoretical framework through universalizability of ethical rules, it can be asserted that universal rules only tell public administrators what to do and when, they never tell

them where their duty and moral responsibility start and where they end. When there are no rules, this means that public administrator can not gain reassurance for his/her acts by following the rules and standards. In this situation, public administrator is alone as a moral person even if he/she is always with others as a social person in an organization. Thus, as in the organizational collectivities, 'being-with' others can be regulated according to the principle of universalizability or by codifiable universal rules, but, how can ethics, 'being-for' the Other be regulated? --Of course, not. 'Being-with' is the field of ontology; however, 'ontology is the territory without morality'.

On the other hand, though there has been a long search for the solid foundations for moral rules and moral conduct, morality (moral self with moral responsibility) has no foundation. It has, therefore, no cause, no excuse, and no determining factor. Search for foundations of morality means at the same time calling morality to justify itself. Yet, morality does not have to justify itself in terms of something other than itself. Bauman(1993) says that "saints are saints because they do not hide behind the Law's broad shoulders (...) This does not mean that in order to be moral one must be a saint. It does not mean either that moral choices are always, daily, matters of life and death (...) But it does mean that morality, to be effective in non-heroic, mundane-life, must be cut out to the heroic size of the saints; or rather, hold the saintliness of the saints for its only horizon" (p. 81). In the case of public administration, that has confronted the field is that, to what extent, can public administrator hold the saintliness of the saints for his/her only horizon?

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

What can we conclude from the thoughts discussed thus far? Perhaps it is useful to remember major points of discussion and milestones in our long journey before coming to a conclusion.

Ethical approaches in public administration are clustered around two major frameworks: bureaucratic ethos and democratic ethos. Even after a cursory familiarity with these frameworks it is appeared that they can be seen as equivalents of two moral philosophies --teleology and deontology-- in public administration ethics. Therefore, a philosophical investigation gets a priority over other tasks in a study that examines ethical approaches since teleology and deontology are underlying philosophical foundations of these frameworks. Thus, I tried to develop a philosophical perspective in Chapter I. But, in doing so, I also sought to take the paradigm shift in philosophy into account. Although no other distinction has been so important, well-known and long-standing for ethical theory than the contrast between teleology and deontology during the past two hundred years, a radical criticism has begun to be effective in philosophy for the last three decades of twentieth century: rejection of foundational thought or anti-foundationalism. This paradigm

shift requires a philosophical assessment, including, first, a distinction between teleology and deontology --two versions of foundational ethics--, and second, a dichotomy between foundational ethics and anti-foundational ethics. Thus, Chapter I included two main parts.

In the first, two rival foundational theories --teleology and deontology-- were reviewed. According to teleological approach what makes an act morally right and wrong is its consequences --and nothing else. We saw in teleological approach that pleasure, happiness, ideal goods, and preference satisfaction are generally used as common criteria in the definition of utility; ordinal or cardinal numbers are used to measure consequences; the greatest happiness principle is the historical answer of the question of how much utility is enough; and finally act and rules are two traditional things that can be judged in terms of their outcomes. On the other hand, deontology accepts moral constraints as additional normative factors beyond the goodness of consequences. Unlike teleology, it depends upon absolute rules. Existence of moral constraints and absolute rules necessitates understanding of Kant's moral philosophy. Kantian ethics rests on three features: duty, universalizability, and respect. An action, in Kantian and deontological approach, has moral worth if it is done for the sake of duty and its maxim can be willed as a universal law. Third pillar, respect, suggests treating humanity as an end itself and never merely as a means to an end. Discussions in the first part clearly show that teleology and deontology are foundational moral theories because they, like nomothetic science, try to establish general and abstract laws, principles, rules or standards which help to deduce the appropriate moral judgments and behaviors located daily flow of actual life, hence, they can not be considered as separate from the truth-seeking of Enlightenment.

Then, some content of anti-foundational theory was explored in the second part. In this regard, Bauman's anti-foundational postmodern ethics understanding was examined. Through the discussion we have seen that Bauman equally rejects both the 'anything goes' relativism of postmodernism and the coercive response to ethical issues by normative regulations of any central authority. While teleological and deontological approaches' search for universals and foundations is philosophical response to ethical issues, moral code created by modern state is a regulation in political practice. This man-made rational moral code supported by universal foundations also prevents the 'rational' human beings to use their 'irrational', 'uncontrollable', 'heinous' impulses and instincts. The outcome of such moral code, however, is not but the heteronomy of 'rational management' of morality. What's more, the idea of rational morality of ordinary people is ironically dangerous to the leadership of the moral enlighteners since moral code is run by these elites in modernity. What these elites do is only to expropriate moral judgment and replace it with ethical code. Replacement of morality with legal code by modern legislators and philosophers by means of universal foundations is the basic characteristic of modern foundational ethical thought. However, from anti-foundational perspective, ethics is ambivalent, non-rational, aporetic, irrational, un-universalizable, and not foundational.

In Chapter II, public administration ethics literature was reviewed in order to see the significant milestones in the development of administrative ethics and to mark the possible reflections of philosophical approaches examined in the previous chapter. Such a retrospective review is important because both bureaucratic and democratic ethos merely categorize and classify historical ethical discussions in the field. It would be better to have a familiarity with the

'objects' of this categorization before seeing the categorization itself. Regardless of being 'for or against', concrete data involved in the public administration literature should have been studied.

During this review, we have seen that Wilsonian distinction between politics and administration, which is framed in the early years of the field, is pivotal in the subsequent discussion of professional ethics in public administration. The aim of this dichotomy was in fact two-folded: to establish professional autonomy and to maintain democratic accountability. However, for some writers, the dichotomy means turning away from constitutionalism or republican foundational thought. Later, efficiency became the basic good for the scientific management. Obedience to superiors accompanied this view because Max Weber emphasized the importance of hierarchical structure and chain of command in bureaucracies. In the period, starting with Friedrich-Finer debate in the beginning of forties, and ending with late sixties, public administration ethics was formed. While forties saw increase in the emphasis on administrative discretion and value-laden character of the field in addition to the rejection of old consensus about the ethics of neutrality, fifties produced much more attention for 'codes of ethics' and return to the neutral competence for public administrators. However, sixties were characterized by the re-emergence of the themes of forties. On the other hand, ethics has emerged as a field of study in public administration in the period from seventies to the present. Social equity of New Public Administration, John Rohr's 'regime values' and the citizenship movement came to the forefront in this period.

Content of the literature reviewed in these periods evidently shows that the basic claim of anti-foundational philosophy is valid for public administration ethics as well. In line with

the general tendency in modern moral philosophy, history of administrative ethics is the history of search for solid foundations for administrative ethics. The most significant indicator of this situation is overt -even sometimes literally-- emphasis of public administration scholars on universal moral rules, standards, and principles for public administrators.

After giving a philosophical classification to understand the underlying foundations of theoretical frameworks in Chapter I and reviewing the public administration ethics literature including the 'objects' of theoretical frameworks in Chapter II, bureaucratic and democratic ethos were analyzed in Chapter III. They were described in terms of their values and standards. While efficiency, efficacy, expertise, loyalty, and accountability were defined as the content values bureaucratic ethos, public interest, social equity, regime values, and citizenship were described as the content values of democratic ethos. Then, intellectual, social and professional sources of these ethoses were emphasized. In terms of our study, it is important to note that different views of various public administration scholars on administrative ethics examined in Chapter II mainly constitute the intellectual source of origin of both ethoses. Additionally, teleology and deontology construct the methodology of these ethoses. Existence of bureaucratic and democratic dichotomy in public administration requires taking second step and asking an important question: Is there a tug of war between two ethoses, and if there is, which is the winner? This is concerned with the influence of frameworks on the praxis of public administration. In this sense, two crucial themes were elaborated in the study: ethics education and ethical codes. It was appeared that ethical frameworks and their values are mostly utilized in academic world for ethics education. It is also believed that bureaucratic ethos best characterizes public administration.

Similarly, in the realm of ethical codes, it is possible to talk about the dominance of bureaucratic ethos. Although the debate in this realm is generally over the utility of ethical codes and whether they have appropriate enforcement mechanisms, it occupies relatively small place in the ethical mapping of public administration terrain because the nature of ethics denies codification.

Since philosophical foundations and intellectual sources of theoretical frameworks were investigated in Chapter I and II, vast amount of the discussion in Chapter III was devoted to the attempts trying to transcend these frameworks. One of them seeks to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic ethos by recasting historical and ongoing debate between utilitarian and deontological ethics. It tries to show how universalizable ethical rules can be used to reconcile two ethoses in the context of public interest. It is, nevertheless, good example of eclectic approaches because it only epistemologically tries to temper with the excesses of each ethos and to create a bridge between the two. In much sounder attempt, however, bureaucratic and democratic ethoses are reassessed from different (dialogical/ontological) perspective. Ontology is the starting point of this perspective, and in terms of our study, importance of it comes from the fact that ontology partially helps to understand the foundational essence of theoretical frameworks. However, despite of its meaningful contributions, ontological perspective possesses some crucial shortcomings. It primarily focuses on the process --discursive activity, hence, it is 'dialogical'. Thus, the moral responsibility of public administrator and the question of morality are out of concern. Moreover, understanding of cultural and historical context of public administration is proposed in this view to create and control the social action. Such suggestions implicitly lead to the understanding and seeing people as the objects of rule and care. In the

following parts of Chapter III, Derridian method was employed for the deconstruction of top values of bureaucratic and democratic ethos. In this way, foundational characteristics of efficiency and public interest were revealed once again.

Discussions in Chapter III obviously show that not only theoretical frameworks but also attempts to transcend these frameworks are usually fed from foundational ethics. Therefore, in the last chapter, I sought to give significant implications of Bauman's anti-foundational perspective to public administration ethics. It started with the critique of modernist foundational ethics in public administration. Through the discussion we have seen that modern bureaucracy is the prime institutional carrier of civilizing process of modernity. In this process, reason grounds the rules of ethical codes and their foundation-building efforts since it is, by definition, rule-guided. However, the result after this process is the morality constructed on the basis of law and the expropriation of moral judgment. On the other hand, dissociation of rational criteria of bureaucracy from moral evaluations is premised upon two parallel processes in modern bureaucracy: division of labor and substitution of technical for moral responsibility.

Division of labor is crucial element in the silencing of morality because responsibility for the organizational outcome floats through division of labor. Bureaucratic division is closely associated with the problem of organization because moral impulses of the members are neutralized by means of various organizational arrangements. They render organizational action morally adiphoric, that is morally indifferent. On the other hand, the substitution of technical for moral responsibility is the second process with demoralizing tendencies. In essence, technology as a closed system the liberation of means from ends and its power comes

from its 'close focusing' on 'problems'. In this way, the moral self is dissembled.

Lastly, I sought to indicate a new ethical perspective for public administration inspired from Bauman's anti-foundational postmodern ethics perspective. In it, public administrator is responsible for the Other without waiting for the reciprocity since priority, unlike foundational ethics, is given to the Other. At first glance, such a strong responsibility can be seen destructive in terms of the moral autonomy of the Other. However, anti-foundational perspective does not reject this ambivalent and aporetic nature of ethics. Thus, continuous uncertainty about ethical issues calling for public administrator to do more accompanies him/her. That's why, no ethical code is possible and suitable for the ambivalent condition of morality. Perhaps the most disturbing implication of the new perspective is its emphasis on non-rationality due to the fact that rationality is essential for public administration. New perspective denies rational heteronomy of organizational and professional rules, standards, and principles. It rejects the universalizability of rules and standards because morality is not universalizable. In this regard, there are no universal ethical standards that public administrators can follow. Similarly, morality has no foundation although there has been a long search for solid ethical foundations for moral conduct in the history of public administration.

As a result, ethical perspective developed in this study is much more different from the other foundational ethical perspectives in public administration ethics. In my approach, I accept Bauman's definition of ethics: ethics has no foundation to justify itself other than itself; it is given, before ontology and freedom. In other words, like Bauman, I take ethics seriously. Besides, I believe that if ethics is

studied in the field of public administration, it should be taken seriously. In this perspective, morality and moral phenomena are not even necessarily epistemological and/or ontological, but they come before ontology. Obviously, so understood, ethics consists of serious problems for public administration. Because, the field of public administration is the field of ontology, whereas, the realm of ethics is before ontology and freedom. In this sense, anti-foundational ethical perspective does not simply offer more information about how we can 'manage' ethics better or about how we can deal with 'dirty hands' problem in the field, it questions the basic logic of most public administration philosophy by interrogating the important concepts and principles of it such as structure, hierarchy, division of labor, departmentalization, rationality, organization and the existence of moral codes. I believe that if ethics is important and if it must be taken seriously in public administration at the same time, we should not only consider 'ethics in public administration' but also re-think public administration itself. Only if it is understood in this sense, ethics can allow academics and practitioners to confront with perennial questions of the field --in the field: Do we really want to live in an ethical public administration world? What is the meaning and role of organization in such ethical world? If we take ethics seriously, are we ready, in this case, to follow our moral responsibility in organization even if our organizational responsibilities contradict with our moral responsibility? To what extent, does the moral responsibility of public administrator have a priority over other responsibilities?

Of course, these are troubling questions because they seem to undermine many traditional understandings of public administration. Major implication of anti-foundational ethics for public administrators is that by means of this perspective

the field is being asked to re-think its organization, structure and relationships in a framework which appeals to public administrator's responsibility of 'being for the Other'. The organizational, administrative, and moral dilemmas created by this new perspective are perhaps not solved simply by more administration. If the anti-foundational ethical perspective have any importance to public administration it is not because it introduces new ethical principles, standards or rules by which public administrators can define appropriate moral conduct, but because it allows them to ask more important perennial questions about the nature and structure of public administration (that is, big questions about the existence and identity of the field) than the ones posed by foundational ethical perspective. In this regard, the main contribution of the thesis is that neither new 'universal' moral principles, standards and rules (i.e. new foundations) nor an ethical code for public administrators is suggested. I strongly believe that trusting the moral strength of universal foundations means to replace morality with legal code and to shape ethics after the pattern of law. This, in turn, leads to the surrendering of moral responsibility of public administrators to the heteronomously set moral foundations. However, the only thing that I suggest is that instead of searching for solid foundations, public administrators have to develop and follow their moral responsibility (of being for the Other). Only completely un-heteronomous moral responsibility of public administrators, not 'universal' ethical foundations, has a chance to make public administration more ethical. Therefore, it is necessary for public administration to interrogate its basic concepts and assumptions over and over again, instead of re-define universal ethical foundations that administrative ethics literature has historically defined as 'principles of administrative ethics'. I also suggest that Bauman's anti-

foundational ethical perspective gives theoretical background in which abovementioned interrogation can appropriately be conducted.

If public administration ethics can be considered from an anti-foundational --ethics before ontology-- perspective rather than a foundational epistemological/ontological one, it can offer an antidote to (administrative) 'ethics in the form of law'. Moreover, the world that an anti-foundational ethical perspective implies is perhaps not a world in which classical administrative policies and implementation strategies for ethical matters are developed. Instead, it may be a world in which we simply start to rethink how we can free the moral impulse of public administrators. On the other hand, because, from the anti-foundational perspective, technological 'problems' --which problematize aspects of the world that would not otherwise be seen as problems and do not see the world as totality-- are not the exact issue, new perspective threatens the rational problem-solving nature of public administration. It suggests considering new possibilities beyond rational problem solving since the real administrative questions are ethical ones beyond the rational problem solving. Once again, major implication of the new perspective is that most of the assumptions made in the field about how public administration works are distorted in the light anti-foundational perspective, the only perspective that takes ethics seriously. In this regard, new perspective does offer a breaking point for the identity of public administration. However, ironically, the appropriate question in that point can be whether it is still possible, in the light of this new perspective, to pursue public administration in its classical sense?

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