WORKERS IN THE SMALL INDUSTRY: EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL SPACE AND PATTERNS OF CLASS FORMATION

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ABSTRACT

WORKERS IN THE SMALL INDUSTRY:
EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL SPACE AND PATTERNS OF CLASS FORMATION

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This dissertation attempts to develop a sociological analysis of the workers in the small industry. Workers of the small-scale industrial enterprises have been constantly excluded not only from public debates and organization attempts of labor unions but also from academic research and writings. As a result, our knowledge about this group of workers, their conditions of work, their social, cultural, political and ideological characteristics, their perception of the other segments of the working class have been very limited. This study aims to examine these issues through the case study of workers in OSTİM, one of the small industrial estates in Ankara.

The study first aims to provide a general sociological-demographical portrait of the workers. Given the lack of social research particularly focused on this area, the dominant popular and academic imagery of the small industry explicitly or implicitly attributes certain distinctive sociological characteristics to the wage employees in the small industry. This study challenges such taken for granted assumptions. Although the comparable data on other segments of the working class are very limited, the findings of this research show that these workers in general do not significantly differ from the organized segments of the working class in terms of their demographic and social characteristics such as age, education, household structure, the length of urban and wage labor experience. They are mostly second-generation workers and the labor force in their households predominantly consists of wage earners. Therefore, semi-proletarianization, strong rural ties, being in the earlier phases of migration, etc., are not defining properties of these workers.

The ground where the conditions of the workers in the small industry actually differ from those of other working class segments is the sphere of production. Working conditions, wages, labor organization and shop-floor level labor relations in the small industrial establishments are considerably different from those in large-scale factories, and almost all these differences reflect unfavorable circumstances for the workers. Technology and the level of division of labor are typically low in labor-

intensive manufacturing units; the workers are in most cases under direct control by the employer or manager; the low level of worker concentration is a major obstacle in the development of collective labor organizations and labor relations are still dominated by various forms of paternalism despite the latter's declining role in the sphere outside of work. These conditions do not allow class conflict to be constructed in overt forms, which instead is experienced under individual, latent and embryonic forms. The relatively disadvantaged positions of small employers due to fierce competition and sub-contracting relations further blur social class relations, and hence workers' references of social conflict tend to shift from the realm of workplace relations to a wider societal context.

The second aim of the study is to develop a critical analysis of the elements of workers' social consciousness that were shaped with references to this wider context. The comparisons with the limited available data on other segments of working class demonstrate that workers in the small industry are culturally more conservative and religious, and are more on the right of the political spectrum. The specific conditions of the workplaces and industry may be emphasized as the principal framework for explaining those patterns of behaviors and consciousness concerning labor relations at shop-floor level. However, in explaining the differences in social consciousness grounded on a wider societal context the specificities of the world of small industry do not provide a satisfactory framework. For while the common positions within the social relations of production are reconfigured along with an inner differentiation in the sphere of production, they are also subjected to different historical, cultural, and spatial dynamics in the sphere of reproduction. In this wider and relational context, the decisive problem seems to be the absence of strong interaction/communication between small industry workers and the other segments and strata of the working class at large as well as the hegemonic sections of working class politics and culture in particular. One of the implications of this line of argument is that the weakness of working class communication cannot be explained solely on the side of the workers in the small industry, but it is also deeply related to the historical-cultural dynamics in the formation of hegemonic sections/organizations of the working class.

In addition to exploring the characteristics of the workers in the small industry as a whole, this study also investigates the indicators of occupational stratification among the workers themselves with a particular focus on the differences between blue-collar and white-collar workers. The findings suggest that there exist significant differences between these two groups with respect to such aspects as education, age, social background, shop-floor level labor relations, income level, etc. This fragmentation is reflected in their political, ideological and cultural views and practices and their perceptions of each other. While the white-collars appear as culturally and politically less conservative than the blue-collars, they are relatively more inclined to sectional feelings as against a comprehensive and unitary working class image, on the other. These tendencies, however, are observed among a smaller group of clerical and technical workers employed in the small manufacturing establishments. Thus, to what extent these tendencies are also valid for those employed in the areas where white-collar employment is predominant is a question that needs further comparative research and is beyond the scope of this study.

Keywords: small industry, working class, segmentation and fragmentation, class/social consciousness.

ÖZ

KÜÇÜK SANAYİ İŞÇİLERİ:
İSTİHDAM, TOPLUMSAL UZAM VE SINIF OLUŞUMU ÖRÜNTÜLERİ

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Bu tez küçük sanayi işçilerine yönelik bir sosyolojik çözümleme girişimidir. Küçük sanayi işletmelerinde çalışan işçiler işçi örgütlenmelerinin, kamusal tartışmaların ve akademik araştırmaların dışında kalmış bir konudur. Bu nedenle, bu işçilerin çalışma koşulları, toplumsal, kültürel, siyasal ve ideolojik karakteristikleri, işçi sınıfının diğer katmanlarına yönelik algıları hakkında bilgilerimiz son derece sınırlıdır. Çalışma bu konuları Ankara OSTİM küçük sanayi sitesindeki işçilere yönelik bir alan araştırmasının bulgularından hareketle incelemeyi ve tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Çalışmanın ilk amacı küçük sanayi işçilerinin genel bir sosyolojik-demografik portresini ortaya koymaktır. Buradaki çözümlemeler, bu alana yönelik toplumsal araştırmaların yokluğu koşullarında popüler ve akademik imgelemin küçük sanayi işçilerine açık ya da örtük olarak atfettiği sosyolojik karakteristiklerin ne ölçüde geçerli olduğu sorusunu aydınlatmaya yöneliktir. Yeterli karşılaştırma verisi olmamasına rağmen, çalışmanın bulguları küçük sanayi işçilerinin yaş, eğitim, hane yapısı, kent ve ücretli emek deneyimi gibi demografik ve toplumsal karakteristikleri bakımından işçi sınıfının örgütlü katmanlarından önemli bir farklılık göstermediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Büyük bir kısmı ikinci kuşak ücretlidirler ve ağırlıkla ücretli çalışanlardan oluşan hanelerde yaşamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, yarı-proleterleşme, yeni göçetmiş olma, güçlü kırsal bağlantılar vb. küçük sanayi işçilerinin tanımlayıcı özellikleri değildirler.

Buna karşılık, işçi sınıfının bu katmanının içinde bulunduğu koşulların asıl farklılaştığı yer üretim ve istihdam alanıdır. Ortalama işçi sayısının çok düşük olduğu küçük işletmelerde çalışma koşulları, ücretler, örgütlenme ve işyeri düzeyinde emek ilişkileri büyük ölçekli fabrikalardan çok farklıdır ve bu farklılıkların hemen hepsi küçük sanayi işçileri açısından olumsuz koşulları yansıtır. Emek-yoğun küçük imalat birimlerinde teknoloji ve işbölümü gelişmemiştir; işçiler çoğu durumda işyeri sahibinin ya da yöneticinin doğrudan denetimi altında çalışırlar; düşük işçi yoğunlaşması işçilerin örgütlenme kapasitesinin gelişimi önünde büyük bir engel

oluşturur; kollektif işçi örgütlenmesi yoktur ve emek ilişkilerinde artık iş-dışı uzantıları çok zayıflamış olsa da paternalist örüntüler egemenliğini sürdürmektedir. Bu koşullar, işyeri düzeyinde sınıf çatışmasının açık formlarla üretilmesine imkan vermemekte, çatışma ancak emek sürecinde çoğu zaman bireysel, gizil ve embriyonik formlarda yaşanmaktadır. Küçük sanayi işletmelerinin hakim çalışma tarzını oluşturan alt-sözleşme ilişkileri ve istikrarsız bir piyasanın varlığı karşısında bu işyerlerindeki işverenlerin göreli dezavantajlı konumları da toplumsal sınıf ilişkilerini daha bulanık bir hale sokmakta, işçilerin toplumsal çatışma referansları işyeri dışındaki daha geniş bir toplumsal bağlama kaymaktadır.

Çalışma ikinci olarak, işçilerinin bu geniş bağlama referansla şekillenen toplumsal bilinç ögelerinin eleştirel bir çözümlemesini yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. İşçi sınıfının başka katmanlarına yönelik sınırlı bilgilerden hareketle yapılan karşılaştırmalar, küçük sanayi işçilerinin belirgin bir şekilde kültürel olarak daha muhafazakar ve dindar olduklarını ve politik olarak daha sağda konumlandıklarını göstermektedir. İşyeri düzeyindeki emek ilişkilerine dair davranış ve bilinç örüntülerinin başlıca açıklayıcı çerçevelerinden biri olarak bizatihi küçük işyeri ve küçük sanayi koşullarının özgüllükleri vurgulanabilir. Ancak daha geniş bir bağlama oturan toplumsal bilinç farklılıklarının açıklanmasında bu çalışma küçük sanayi dünyasının özgül koşullarını yeterli görmemektedir. Zira toplumsal üretim ilişkileri içindeki ortak konumlar bir yandan üretim/istihdam alanında bir iç farklılaşmaya uğrayarak biçimlenirken, diğer yandan da yeniden-üretim alanındaki farklı tarihsel, kültürel ve mekansal dinamiklere maruz kalmaktadırlar. Bu geniş ve ilişkisel bir düzlemde, sorun küçük sanayi işçilerinin, hem işçi sınıfının diğer katmanlarıyla hem de özel olarak işçi sınıfı siyaseti ve kültürünün hegemonik kesimleriyle iletişiminin zayıf olmasıdır. Bu çalışmanın imalarından biri, zayıf sınıf-içi iletişimin sadece küçük sanayi işçileri cephesinden açıklanamayacağı, işçi sınıfının hegemonik kesimlerinin/örgütlerinin tarihsel-kültürel oluşum dinamikleri ile de bağlantılı olduğudur.

Çalışma bir bütün olarak küçük sanayi işçilerinin işçi sınıfının diğer katmanlarından farklılıklarını keşfetmeyi amaçlarken, diğer yandan da bizatihi küçük sanayi işçileri içindeki mesleki katmanlaşmanın göstergelerini de incelemekte, özel olarak mavi yakalı işçiler ile beyaz yakalı işçiler arasındaki farklılıklar üzerinde durmaktadır. Bulgular, eğitim, yaş, sosyal köken, işyeri düzeyinde emek ilişkileri vb. açılardan bu iki grup arasında ciddi farklılıklar olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu farklılıklar siyasal, kültürel ve ideolojik düzlemelere de yansımaktadır. Beyaz yakalılar bir yandan politik ve kültürel olarak mavi yakalılardan daha az muhafazakar bir profil sunarken, diğer yandan da kapsayıcı ve birleştirici bir işçi sınıfı imgesi aleyhine görece daha kesimsel bir hissiyata sahiptirler. Buradaki eğilimler küçük imalat sanayii birimlerinde çalışan az sayıdaki büro işçileri ve teknik elemanlara aittir ve bu eğilimlerin geniş beyaz yakalı istihdam alanlarındaki çalışanlar için ne ölçüde geçerli olduğu sorusu bu çalışmanın sınırları dışındadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: küçük sanayi, işçi sınıfı, katmanlaşma ve parçalanma, sınıf bilinci/toplumsal bilinç.

To My Mother

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study was born out of my suspicions about and dissatisfaction with a particular imagery of working class in Turkey. My observation is that both in academic and popular domains the dominant working class imagery is limited to the organized segments of working class. Until recently, the same imagery was mainly limited to blue-collar workers. However, as the civil servants started organizing widely, they were also tended to be included in this mainstream working class categorization. Yet, still, both the popular and academic conceptions of the working class have continued to be limited with its 'organized' segments. I believe this limitation is mainly due to the hidden assumption that industrial wage labor will be concentrated in large enterprises. Hence, the common attitude has been to ignore workers in small enterprises. This attitude is also accompanied by several other assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that labor relations in small enterprises still carry predominantly pre-capitalist characteristics; the workers in these enterprises represent an immature form of wage labor; they are semi-proletarians; they have been only recently introduced to wage labor; they are recent migrants and have strong rural bonds, and so on. In accordance with these assumptions of popular and academic conceptions, the studies on working class have been primarily limited to its organized sections.

My suspicions regarding these common ideas stimulated me to conduct a preliminary study particularly on wage employment in small industrial enterprises. This study showed me two things. First, there is no evidence that the share of small enterprises in industrial employment is decreasing in time. On the contrary, there is a tendency in the average enterprise size to decline. Furthermore, the proportion of

wage laborers in the workforce of small enterprises is significantly high and continues to increase. Secondly, small industrial enterprises have been concentrating in small industrial estates and organized industrial districts, which also mean an increasing integration of small industrial establishments into the large industry. These observations invalidate some of the taken for granted assumptions regarding small industrial employment. However, studies on workers in small industrial enterprises are still rare in Turkey and our knowledge about the workers themselves in these enterprises is hardly sufficient. Given these reasons, I decided to conduct my fieldwork research in OSTİM, one of the small industrial estates in Ankara.

1.1. Industrial Context in Ankara

According to the 1997 General Population Census, the population of Ankara urban metropolitan area is around 3 million. For the year 2002, this number can be estimated to be around 3.5 million. In 1945, when the statistics of distribution according to economic activity branches in the cities was first published, urban population in Ankara was around 226 thousand, and about 44 percent of the population was employed in income-generating activities (Türel 1987: 25). Between 1955 and 1965, the city's status and functions as a capital city carried a determining weight in the economic activities and employment patterns in Ankara, and the city was not an attracting pole for industry (Akçura 1971).[1] In the 1980s, parallel to the general urban population trends, the rate of working population in the city declined to 26 percent (Türel 1987: 25). The main reasons for this trend can be shown as the change in the demographic characteristics of the population towards accommodating greater number of groups at non-working age, increase in the proportion of women in urban population and increase in unemployment.

By 1990, the employment rate in manufacture and electricity, gas and water production in Ankara constituted 17 percent of non-agricultural employment, whereas the share of 'community, social service, and personal services', of which government employees constitute the largest groups, within non-agricultural

[1] Akçura, Tuğrul (1971) *Ankara: A Monographic Analysis about Turkey's Capital* Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi; cited in Türel 1987: 25.

employment is 42 percent. Furthermore, more than two-third of workers in manufacturing industry are employed in small enterprises with less than ten workers and/or unregistered enterprises. About half of formal (registered) employment in manufacturing industry is concentrated in 'fabricated metal' sector. (http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/ISTATIS/ ESG/06ANKARA/ANKARA.HTM).

The traditional industries in Ankara were mainly limited to textile and leather industries. These have disappeared in time. In the beginning of the 20th century industrial production was very limited. During this period, in the city there were only 4 flour factories, 9 tile factories and 7 oil mills. All of them were characteristically small workshops. In 1921 Eskişehir arms manufactory was relocated in Ankara and these establishments constituted the basis for the later growing arms industry. Development of employment and industrial activities in Ankara is closely related with its establishment as a capital city after the Republican period (Tekeli 1991; Yıldırım 2001). Since it is the center of public administrative organizations, employment in the public sector has had an important weight in the urban employment. The city's becoming of capital generated new demands for buildings parallel to the population increase and the growing need for government offices. Together with the construction activities sub-industries related to construction, infrastructure and electricity services had also begun to develop. "After then, respectively, rocket industry, ammunition factory, food industry, cement factory, gas production, timber yards, textile factories, and print houses with their increasing numbers had begun to function" (Yıldırım 2001: 3).

In 1954, there were only 9 factories and around 90 industrial production units all in the size of a workshop. The majority of them were producing food and drink and the rest were functioning predominantly in metal and timber industries and repairing (Yıldırım 2001: 4; Bademli 1987a: 50). In the following period, although employment in 'community, social service, and personal services' closely related to the functions of capital city had shown a relative decline in comparison to population growth, it constituted the largest group (39 %) in the total employment. The second largest employment area was wholesale and retail commerce and hotel and restaurant related services (19 %). During this period the rate of employment in this group had almost doubled. It is very probable that this category of employment contains

informal activities at increasing rates. Although during the same period employment in manufacturing industry had also shown a small increase and rose from 16 percent to 19 percent, this rate is lower than the capital cities in other developing and developed countries. In addition, employment rate in both manufacturing industry, wholesale and retail commerce, and hotel and restaurant related services is lower in Ankara than the urban average in Turkey in general (Türel 1987: 26-28). It is estimated that the dominant characteristic of manufacturing industry is mainly catering to local market and that production for national and international markets is limited (Bademli 1987a).

We can talk about three different dynamics in the development of industry in Ankara. First, starting from early years of republic up to the 1980s, there have been significant public investments. These are mainly concentrated in military industry, construction industry as a result of urban population growth, and urban infrastructure-related areas such as electricity, gas and water etc. Second, there are relatively large private investments that started to develop in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the dominancy of public sector in industry still continued. Yet we also see that the governments started to support private investments rather than being the direct investor. Practices and policies directed towards this aim such as credit and job allocations and creation of external economies for large private industrial enterprises have contributed to the development of small industrial units (Bademli 1987a: 51).

In other words, the third dynamic is towards an increase in small-scale industrial enterprises. "Establishment of small industrial estates or support for entrepreneurs gathered to establish industrial estates, credits allocated through Halk Bank, overlooked illegal employment and loose taxing policies" (Bademli 1987a: 51) during this period can be regarded as policies to support small industrial enterprises. These small manufacturing establishments in Ankara were concentrated in diverse areas such as auto-parts manufacturing, metal works, wielding, steel products, stove manufacturing, construction machinery, agriculture machinery, furniture etc. Small manufacturing units, through cooperatives, have begun to concentrate in small industrial estates. Until the 1980s, these small industrial estates had been located in the surrounding areas of the city center, *Ulus*, and then tended to gradually shift

away toward northwestern direction –with the exception of *Siteler* where furniture-manufacturing units are concentrated (Tekeli 1991: 58).

According to Bademli (1987a: 51), small industrial estates present several advantages. First of all, these estates, established usually outside of the city, rescue small-scale production units from negative external economies of the city center. In addition, they give public administration the ability to reorganize central areas and control land prices in those areas. Finally, concentration of industrial units in one place also eases the control functions.

1.2. OSTİM Industrial Estate

Ortadoğu Sanayi ve Ticaret Merkezi (the Middle-Eastern Industrial and Commercial Center – hereafter OSTİM) is one of these industrial estates located in the northwest part of Ankara and has been functioning for about twenty years. OSTİM has two specific characteristics. First, it represents one of the most important industrial centers in Ankara, a city with relatively low industrial employment. Second, it is a 'small industrial district' mainly composed of small enterprises.

OSTİM is one of the second-generation examples of this line of small industrial estates, which tended to be located relatively far from the city center. The earlier attempts to found an industrial estate construction cooperative were made mainly by auto mechanics and foundries, but also included those from various other occupations. In the later period, the road of auto mechanics and foundries was separated and each established its own cooperative. The former headed towards *Güvercinlik*, while the latter towards today's *Batıkent*. The 'Ankara Small Industrial Estate Construction Cooperative' (*Sınırlı Sorumlu Ankara Küçük Sanayi Sitesi Yapı Kooperatifi*) was founded in 1967. The Cooperative started to buy plots from the dwellers of *Yuva*, *Macun* and *Ergazi* villages. Landowners' reluctance to sell their plot due to expectation of higher prices delayed this process of buying. At the end, 3 thousand acres were bought. After they spent a considerable amount of time with legal procedures to start the project, they obtained construction permission for 720 acres of the land. In 1974 they started the construction of the estate (Toptaş 1996: 13-25).

The estate began to function in the mid-1980s through different stages, while the expansion work was still continuing in 1998. In 1998, OSTİM was among one of the largest 'Small Industrial Estates' financed by the private sector in Turkey. In the following years, OSTİM acquired the status of 'organized industrial zone' (OIZ),[2] the cooperative was abolished and replaced by the OIZ management. In the past years, several cooperative partners affiliated with companies functioning in industrial investments, sector-based foreign trade, communication and advertisement services and radio-television broadcasting were established. At the present moment, Vocational Training Center, various official and voluntary organizations to support small enterprises and provide vocational training are operating in the area.

In 1998, there were around 2500 industrial enterprises and 30 thousand employees. Approximately two third of the total number of enterprises and employment was divided into various branches of metal industry. Although there is no exact data, based on the estimates of OSTİM management and a few case studies, the number of workers per enterprise appears to be between 9 and 12 (Değirmenci and Mendeş 1998; http://www.ostim.com.tr).[3] However, this average does not imply a homogenous structure in terms of firms' sizes. On the contrary, the firms located in OSTİM show tremendous differences ranging from firms employing 2-3 workers to the ones with around 100 employees. Even though we do not have reliable information about the profile of labor force in this estate such as to what extent family labor and self-employed are widespread, limited surveys and official estimates on the number of employees imply that wage labor is the dominant form of labor force even in very small enterprises.

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[2] The history of legal regulations and initiatives regarding Small Industrial Estates (SIE) and Organized Industrial Zones (OIZ) together with government support policies for small and medium scale industrial enterprises date back to the late 1950s. Government has provided OIZs and SIEs with various credits based on different and changing regulations in time. According to data from the Ministry of Industry, in January 2000 the total number of small industrial estates in Turkey was 306 where 72.850 small enterprises were located and 437.000 workers were employed. In the same year, the number of completed organized industrial zone was 48 and in these areas in 3.383 factories 271.000 workers were employed (http://www.sanayi.gov.tr). For the history of SIEs and OIZs, and for general information on the government support policies for small industrialists, see Buldam et al. 1982; Bayazıt 1995; Ege et al. 1995.

[3] Suğur (1997a) for the year 1992 gives this number as 6-7 workers.

It seems that historically the industrial production in OSTİM comes from a past where artisan production was dominant. Probably most of the enterprises were artisan production units at their early establishment stage and became small capitalist enterprises as they started to employ of wage labor in time. Nevertheless, there are some findings showing that their history does not date back very far. According to a study undertaken in 1985, when the estate partly started to operate, 89 percent of the enterprises were already in business before they moved into OSTİM. Yet, the majority of (84 %) of the enterprises were established only after 1970 (Tekeli 1991: 81).

OSTİM can be regarded among those examples called 'vertically disintegrated industrial complexes' in the literature on industrial geography. According to Scott (1986: 224) there are two main types of these complexes:

> Two major configurations of such complexes are easily recognizable. On the one side, we find complexes built up on the basis of large-scale central industries (such as car assembly) tightly surrounded by innumerable smaller input producers and subcontractors. On the other side, we also frequently find complexes that are composed virtually entirely of small-specialized producers without any central dominant role. ... The growth of these districts is ... reinforced by the provision of many additional externalities in the guise of publicly supplied infrastructures and local government services. They are finally secured in place by the multifaceted labor markets in the local area.

OSTİM, among these, carries the characteristics of the second type. Here, we rarely encounter with the firms that (i) produce directly for the market, (ii) realize all the main phases of the production process, and (iii) have low dependency to outside labor. Instead, the majority are the firms that realize one or several intermediate phases of the production process. The existing technological levels of these firms are very low and their capacities for investment in new technologies are very weak. The division of labor is not developed and control over labor depends on direct control techniques. Massey and Meegan (1982) have observed that the typical method used for increasing production in these firms is 'intensification', that is, increasing productivity of labor without major new investment or substantial reorganization of production technique.

1.3. Fieldwork and Overview of Dissertation

This study is mainly interested in wage employees in OSTİM. Rather than attempting to conduct an industry-based research, the study focuses on the workers themselves in this industrial district who are considered as a particular segment of working class. This particularity can be defined from different angles: for instance, spatially, as a workforce within small workplaces and/or as an important component of division of labor in manufacturing industry. The study aims to shed some light on types and patterns of segmentation within workforce based on observations made about workers in general. In other words, what are the main characteristics of OSTİM workers that differentiate them from other segments of working class for whom we have comparable data? At the same time, the study also explores internal fragmentation of this working class segment through examining various variables such as age, education, social origins and backgrounds, household structure etc. Beside these factors, I systematically use two categorical distinctions in the following analyses. First is the distinction between small and large enterprises. Even though OSTİM is predominantly composed of small enterprises, enterprises in general display significant differences in terms of size. This distinction is mainly used in the analyses of the issues at workplace level. Secondly, intra-class stratification among blue-collars, white-collars, unskilled service workers, and professional employees is used as an important variable in the analysis. The findings about the effects of this stratification will provide us with the possibility of making interpretation about to what extent a general axis of fragmentation within working class is present and effective in the workforce of small industrial areas.

I wanted this study to represent an encompassing profile of the workers in OSTİM. Due to absence of sufficient data on small industrial workers, a problem I have mentioned earlier, it was neither possible nor meaningful to establish prior particular problematics and limit the focus of the study around them. For this reason, I have preferred to use survey-type interviews as a principal research technique to cover a larger sample rather than in-depth interviews and observation that are adequate for smaller samples. For these same reasons, the questionnaire used in the survey was also constructed in a way to collect as much information as possible. I

remember being criticized for using such an extensive questionnaire. However, it was necessary for the reasons I mentioned. Another option could have been conducting an enterprise research based on extensive observation and in-depth interviews. Yet, my aim was not an analysis focusing particularly on labor process and shop floor relations, and such methodology would be more appropriate for that kind of objective. In short, my aim has been to collect as much and as detailed information as I can on workers of small industry through the case of OSTİM.

The research data consist of three components. The first component is made up of 300 hundred structured interviews. At initial stages, I designed a factory & workshop sample stratified according to the number of employees. However, I encountered difficulties with persuading many of the employers or managers to give permission for interviews in the workplaces. Moreover, some of the establishments were already closed down at the time of survey. Therefore, it was not possible to do all interviews at previously selected firms in the sample: about half of the interviews were conducted at the firms within the original sample, and other half at the firms that were contacted by a snow-ball technique, with the references given by the employers & managers of the former group. Within the total of 300 interviews, 13 were eliminated from the data for the reasons of reliability issues. Another 10 cases belonging to the employees who were close relatives of the employers were also eliminated. Therefore, 277 interviews conducted in 45 firms constituted the database for the analysis. Secondly, in addition to this survey of structured interviews, I also conducted in-depth interviews with 11 workers selected with respect to typical characteristics of age, education, origin, and family structure. Thirdly, I did semi-structured interviews with 8 employees, as complementary to the above data and other observations.

Because of the lack of empirical studies on small industry workers, the questions in the interview forms did not focus on specific issues and pre-given problematics, but were rather directed to gather information on a relatively extensive range. The data can be argued to provide relevant information on the general characteristics and inner differentiation of the 'small industry' or 'peripheral' workers concerning the patterns of migration, urbanization and household reproduction, labor market mobility, and political and social consciousness. I will make some comparisons between the findings

of my research and some other empirical studies that are still too rare. This comparison will enable me to derive some conclusions on the characteristics both specific to the peripheral workers and common to the other segments of working class in Turkey.

In the following chapter, I engage in a theoretical debate in order to clarify the concept of working class this study has adopted. This debate mainly tries to establish an alternative approach to the problem of 'boundaries of working class' through reconsidering the issues of new middle class and semi-proletarianization. Consequently, this study (i) adopts a 'wider' definition of working class and (ii) calls for directing our attention to the problem of fragmentation within the working class. Lastly, in this chapter, I present a review of the fragmentation dynamics within working class in Turkey and briefly discuss some of the approaches to class structure and stratification. In the third chapter, I discuss research findings at individual level to provide some insights on the socio-demographic profile of OSTİM workers. This discussion mainly includes age, education, migration, social background and labor market experiences. In the fourth chapter, I examine labor market experiences of these workers at the shop floor level. This chapter includes observations and analyses of the characteristics of small manufacturing enterprises, their workforce, working conditions and workplace relations with comparisons between 'smaller' and 'larger' firms in OSTİM. Particular conditions of the small industry in general severely limit the possibilities of collective organization among the workers. The impact of these particular conditions are so evident that to fully account the complexity of the basis of OSTİM workers' social consciousness, the necessity to tie the observations in the production sphere with those in the reproduction areas as well as with the larger socio-cultural context cannot be overemphasized. Chapter Five aims at precisely doing this by analyzing the various aspects of households that the workers live in. In this chapter, I analyze some household characteristics concerning family structure, household labor force, income and consumption, spatial mobility, dwelling and housing. In Chapter Six, based on the observations and findings gathered from all of these levels, I explore some elements of what I call 'social consciousness' of workers and their political preferences. This exploration also focuses on variations of social consciousness and political preferences among workers and attempts to explain the content and sources of these variations.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALIZING WORKING CLASS: THE QUESTIONS OF BOUNDARIES AND FRAGMENTATION

The transformation of class structure and the changing paths of class formation have been one of the main concerns of analyses on class for a long time. In this respect, some of the questions that face studies on class are not 'new.' In the following section, I will discuss these issues through various themes. This discussion does not aim to derive conceptual tools, in the narrow sense, for this study. Rather, my aim is to construct a theoretical framework for the analysis of class dynamics in general and working class in particular. This needs a clarification of the very concept of working class together with its structural boundaries, fragmentation and dynamics.

My discussion on these themes will be focused on mainly two issues. The first is concerned with the question of 'middle classes', which has been one of the fundamental concerns of class analyses and is mainly related to complex nature of class structures in advanced capitalist formations. Secondly, I would like to address the phenomenon of semi-proletarianization mainly observed in peripheral social formations. These two issues, the phenomena of middle classes and semi-proletarianization, can be located on the very same ground within the Marxist theory of class. In other words, these issues refer to a prolonging concern in Marxism to determine the boundaries of working class on both sides (that is, the thresholds of both semi-proletarianization and de-proletarianization) and examine the dynamics in relation to permeability of these boundaries. Before I advance on this issue further, let me first examine the current theoretical position of class analyses from the perspective of the question of middle class.

2.1. Class Analysis: A Critical Reassessment

The analysis of class structure is primarily focused on locating people into certain distinctive categories. The criteria used for class boundaries and thus for determining individuals' places are principally related to the kind of economic activity the person engages in. An important dimension of this analytical approach refers to the occupational structure. However, on the one hand, occupational structure in advanced industrial capitalist societies is too complex and heterogeneous. On the other hand, it demonstrates a rapid and persistent change in the face of technological and organizational developments that bring about new occupations together with the disappearance of others. These features of occupational structure make it extremely difficult to determine class boundaries. The use of the term 'middle classes', one of the most controversial concepts, seems to have been closely related with this complexity, if not an easy and unsatisfactory terminological solution for categorization.

The issue of middle class has remained controversial in Marxist class analysis that defines social classes in terms of the relation to (ownership of) the means of production. The anticipation of the traditional Marxists, and indeed of Marx's himself, that social classes will be more and more polarized into two opposite classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, has not taken place. Poulantzas (1975), one of the pioneers in 'new middle class' debates, discussed this problem based on a distinction between productive and unproductive labor. What he meant is the material commodity production that creates surplus value. Moving on from this distinction, he argued that not all wage earners and salaried can be counted as working class. While wages of some of them function as the price for labor-power, the others' (unproductive) labor is exchanged for revenue. By bringing forth ideological and political reasons as well, he regards the latter category as the 'new petty bourgeoisie'. This argument has been basically rejected by (a) accepting the fact that capitalist commodification has penetrated into service jobs besides material production and (b) referring to Marx's concept of 'collective laborer' in the first volume of *Capital*:

> The product ceases to be the direct product of the individual, and becomes a social product, produced in common by a collective labourer, *i.e.*, by a combination of workmen, each of whom takes only a part, greater or less, in the manipulation of the subject of their labour. As the co-operative character of the labour-process becomes more and more marked, so, as a necessary consequence, does our notion of productive labour, and of its agent the productive labourer, become extended. In order to labour productively, it is no longer necessary for you to do manual work yourself; enough, if you are an organ of the collective labourer, and perform one of its subordinate functions (MEIA 2001).

Carchedi (1977) has further developed this concept of 'collective laborer' and generated the following argument: collective production, independently from the capitalist nature of production process necessitates certain 'coordination' functions and the salaried, who perform these functions, are also parts of the collective worker. However, the capitalist nature of the production process, apart from coordination, also requires a second control function. This 'surveillance' mechanism, as Carchedi calls it, is the control and suppression of labor according to the needs of capital's valorization process. This relationship is not the function of production but of capital and those who perform these functions cannot be seen as part of collective worker. Although Meiksins and Smith (1996) mainly concur with this approach, they offer two criticisms. First is related with a 'relational' question: in a hierarchically organized labor process the workers cannot differentiate between whether the control is 'coordination' or 'surveillance' originated and always see control as enforced on to them. In addition, these functions in reality are very complex and those functions that look like coordination can be shaped by the necessities of valorization process. Secondly, the dynamics of the labor process creating a need for intermediate workers also produce a dynamic tension at the ground where these workers function and interact with other workers and. Hence, the class position of these workers cannot be determined a priori. Depending on the nature of relations among the intermediate workers themselves, other workers and employers we may encounter with different outcomes in practice. These two critiques by Meiksins and Smith are significant in terms of emphasizing the significance of politics, ideology and practice in the realm of social relations as others previously have pointed out (Poulantzas 1975; Hunt 1977). Nevertheless, no class theory can ignore the material boundaries of class practice. For this reason, 'capital functions,' defined by Carchedi, will in great part

determine the basis of the relationship those wage segments performing these functions will enter with other wage groups and capital in practice. There is no reason to think that the possibility for pro-labor and pro-capital practices to emerge from this basis has an equal probability. A more productive contribution would be to emphasize the dynamic character of the coordination and surveillance functions to be re-defined and re-established contextually and historically. [1]

In his early works, E.O. Wright (1976), one of the most outstanding figures of Neo-Marxist class analysis, provided a new and different argument. He proposed the concept of 'domination' as a criterion in addition to that of the ownership of the means of production. Accordingly, the middle positions in class structure were defined and termed as 'contradictory class locations' as they are wage earners as well as dominators in the work process. Later, Wright has changed his theoretical position. Wright's new attempt (1985; 1989) has been to combine various and even transformed segments of middle classes into a single analytical perspective that left out the criterion of 'domination' in favor of a comprehensive and coherent criterion of 'multiple forms of exploitation.'[2] Inspired by the works of Roemer (1982), the three forms of exploitation are conceptualized as 'capitalist exploitation based on unequal control over the means of production'; 'bureaucratic or organizational exploitation based on unequal control over organizational assets'; and 'skill or credential exploitation based on unequal control over scarce skills.' Based on these

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[1] In these debates, an additional argument came from Braverman (1974). Braverman argued that the developments in production and labor organization techniques have transformed the material conditions of white collar and service workers, who are typically accepted as unproductive, deskilled and subjected them to similar relations of subordination and domination as the 'productive workers'. There has been abundant evidence that supports this argument. However, this debate is not relevant for a theoretical discussion about the boundaries of working class. Because the conception is again mainly based on 'labor process' and carries in itself the logical conclusion that in the case of a reverse transformation in labor process 'unproductive' workers would not belong to the working class. Braverman's propositions about historical tendencies constitute a fertile ground not for understanding the boundaries of working class but rather its intra-segmentation dynamics. For a critique of labor process theoreticians, who, following Braverman, attribute the key role to the production process in shaping working class consciousness, see Tanner et al. (1992). The authors argue that even in the cases of very similar workplaces and labor process conditions we can encounter with very different consciousness forms.

[2] While substituting the criterion of 'exploitation' for that of 'domination', Wright has argued that "exploitation is an 'interest-generating' concept, [while the concept of domination] weakens the linkage between analysis of class locations and the analysis of objective interests" (1989: 6).

categories, Wright has developed a map of occupational categories that includes 12 distinct occupational locations. Three of these categories are distinguished as owners and exploiters of the assets in the means of production: bourgeoisie, small employers, and petty bourgeoisie. These categories are also exploiters in terms of both organization assets and skill/credential assets (except petty bourgeoisie being exploited in terms of organization assets). The category of proletarian is defined as those exploited along all these three dimensions of exploitation. The remaining groups of wage earners constitute the middle class locations that are subjected to capitalist exploitation but are also exploiters through bureaucratic & organizational and/or skill & credential mechanisms of exploitation (Wright, 1989: 5-8).[3]

Wright's middle classes can be simply described as '*wage employees but not proletarians.*' If we put it without referring to his multiple exploitation mechanisms, Wright has a notion of a 'typical proletarian' who (i) does not own or control the means of production and (ii) is subjected to exploitation through wage labor. Accordingly, middle class positions (without considering the variations among themselves) could be differentiated through a comparison with the typical proletarian position. However, this notion of typical proletarian itself needs to be problematized. We know that Marx himself used this concept in various references (such as expropriation, wage-labor and exploitation, political class). Nevertheless, still, we may say that in various theoretical and popular terminologies the concept of proletarian refers to the individuals 'who are expropriated and survive on their labor-power.' Here, I would like to argue that this definition is problematic. It is problematic in terms of both of the components of the proposition. We know that in Marxist studies the question of expropriation is mainly discussed through 'ownership of means of production.' These studies emphasize the process of direct producers' loss of ownership over the means of production and distinguish the bourgeoisie according to its ownership of the means of production. Furthermore, a common view in these studies is that ownership forms *outside* of means of production are not related with/relevant to the class dynamics of capitalist society. While this view

[3] These groups are as follows: expert managers, expert supervisors, expert non-managers, semi-credentialed managers, semi-credentialed supervisors, semi-credentialed workers, uncredentialed managers, and uncredentialed supervisors.

holds true for the bourgeoisie, it is wrong for the proletarian. I believe the following proposition would be a more appropriate definition of the proletariat than the one above: 'those who do not have ownership and/or control over the means of *production and subsistence* and *have to* sell their labor-power to survive.'

This definition has important implications. First of all, it invites us to think the conditions of individuals who *have to* sell their labor-power but *deprived of* opportunities to do so. This issue is rather related with the class formations in peripheral countries and will be discussed further in the following sections. Secondly, the definition put forward above implies that *deprivation* from the ownership of means of production is *not* a sufficient criterion for being a proletarian. In addition to this criterion there has to be a level of expropriation to the extent that selling one's own labor-power becomes a *necessity*. Thus, we may talk about commodification and, consequently, exploitation of labor-power *only* in such situation. Undoubtedly it is a troublesome work to differentiate those members of the middle class who have a certain amount of actual or potential wealth/property income that they *don't have to* work. However, theoretically it is a more appropriate method to employ, as it refers to the actual material bases of class positions. On the other hand, the situation for those members of the middle class who participate in the ownership or control over the means of production is clearer. They should be counted as outside of working class. Two important points should be emphasized: first, in spite of their formal position as a wage employee the income these individuals get from their wages is either secondary to their income from their property/wealth or their wages actually reflects not the equivalence of their labor-power but the capitalist function they serve, i.e., control over capitalist relations of production. The second point is related to the issue of determining the degree of control they exercise in capitalist relations of production. Here, by 'capitalist control' I refer to participation in macro decision-making processes such as production, marketing, finance etc. in the capitalist enterprises. In this respect, performing control and regulation functions over the rest of the workers in labor process is not a sufficient criterion to be regarded as outside of working class. It is true that these roles put the workers in problematic positions and this situation, in many cases, creates certain dynamics of segmentation within working class. However, so far as

they are not included in the strategic decision making processes and/or becoming prosperous to the extent that they are no longer in necessity to work as wage employee, they are still parts of working class. These two conditions, i.e., *not* being in *necessity* to work for wage and *participation* in capitalist control of relations of production, probably can be observed together in many cases.

If I may sum up my argument differently: in term of those members of middle class who participate in capitalist control and/or have an amount of wealth/property income that they do not have to work for wage, we cannot talk about a 'contradictory' class location or exploitation of labor-power. These individuals are not proletarians or they have been de-proletarianized[4] in time. On the other hand, there is no sufficient reason to differentiate those wage earners that do not carry these characteristics and locate them into 'contradictory' positions. Organizational and credential assets, in the end, refer to unequal distributions of skills among individuals. Such gradual inequalities could as well be observed among the wage laborers included in Wright's category of 'working class.' It is for this reason that the 'new middle class' theories have been criticized for employing an oversimplified notion of traditional working class. In other words, they ignore the fact that even before the expansion of white-collar groups there have been skill, authority and material differences within working class. Although it is legitimate to ask whether some groups belong to working class, the argument that they constitute a separate (middle) class is mainly based on negative premises and cannot show the coherent foundations necessary for existence of a class. In any case, drawing class boundaries based on skill differences is doomed to be an arbitrary attempt. How much skill level separates some wage employees from working class and admits them to the ranks of middle class? There is no objective answer to this question (Meiksins 1988; Meiksins and Smith 1996).

For this reason, Wrights' 'multiple exploitation' approach complicates the situation more than it is needed. Wright's a quarter century's work has shifted the

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[4] The concept of 'de-proletarianization' has been primarily used to describe the breaking away from regular wage employment due to informalization and expansion of non-standard employment forms in the Third World countries (Roberts 1990). However, here, I borrow this concept to refer to those segments at the higher levels of wage employment that are becoming prosperous and are taking part in the capitalist regulation.

attention from the question of 'intra-class' divisions to 'class locations' so far as it has reasserted the significance of the structural dimension on the subject of class and made contributions on this subject. The divisions of working class into different segments in terms of labor process, skill, work conditions etc., reasons for the political, ideological (and cultural) differences between them and the levels these differences are reproduced still constitute a dynamic area of research. However, being 'intra-class' divisions, the main dissimilarity of these internal differentiations from class differences is that they are open to change. The decline in white-collars skills and earnings in time is a typical example.

The 'relational' dimension that Wright has argued his class analysis is based on is another point of debate. It seems that Wright, through multiple exploitation mechanisms, constructs 'relationality' between different class positions and in the production sphere. On the other hand, the condition of 'being *have to* sell labor-power' that I emphasized here constructs the relationship between capital and (potential) labor-power seller *before* they come into contact in the process of production. Of course, the movement of this relationship into the labor process, i.e., its actually taking place in the labor process has determining effects on class relations. It is also the ground where class conflict becomes the most visible. However, this does not change the fact that the relationship is established prior to this process, which has been persistently neglected by studies on labor process. Furthermore, we also need to remember that there are studies in which this relationship is constructed in a wider context and in more holistic manner than this study claims. For instance, Negri (1996), through Marx's concepts of 'formal and real subsumption of labor', has argued that in the post-fordist era capitalism has entered into a period of total 'subsumption' of society. My aim is not to discuss this argument here. Suffice to note its resemblance with the issue of '*proletarians but not wage-employees*' that I will discuss below in relation to class formations in peripheral countries.

2.2. Peripheral Class Formations and the Question of Semi-proletarianization

Uneven development of capitalism has always been accepted to be the major and permanent factor that dynamically reproduce and transform the nature of working class fragmentation. The dynamics of uneven development not only impose serious effects on the structure of production and employment through the periodical accumulation crises of capitalism all around the world, but also creates various lines of segmentation in the various spheres of social reproduction of labor, that is households, neighborhoods, cities and countries (Baghci 2000).

The effects of uneven development have not only diversified and differentiated the condition of working classes between countries, but have also created striking contrasts particularly within Third World countries. During the period between World War II and the mid-1970s, generally accepted as the Golden Era of Capitalism, there had been significant increases in wages, decreases in work hours and enlargement of social security rights in the North America and West European countries. We also observe similar developments in Third World countries majority of which employed import substitution economic policies during this period. However, in most of these countries the segments of working class that benefited from wage increases, health and social security supports had been largely and primarily limited with the workers in the state enterprises.

Differentiation within working class and the transformation dynamics of this differentiation can be observed at two main levels: (i) the changes in demographic composition of the working class (particularly sex, race and ethnicity), (ii) the changes in occupational structure and organization of work in relation with the development dynamics of capitalism (Meiksins 1998: 29). The proportion of women and ethnic groups, whose participation in wage employment has been previously limited relatively, in working class is increasing. However, employment forms, the work and occupation branches that these groups are concentrated in etc., are, at the same time, strengthening and diversifying the already existing fragmentation dynamics in working class. Furthermore, the shift from manufacturing industry towards services in the general composition of employment has been observed for sometime now. The service sector in itself displays a highly diverse character. Both

in service and industrial employment non-standard employment forms[5] (part-time, contract work, temporary contracts, etc.) are increasing and the area of 'contingent employment' is growing. The expansion of small-scale enterprises and subcontracting relations is accompanying this process and is creating new forms of self-employment.[6]

In addition to employment forms and working conditions, the intra working class divisions in the Third World are caused by other factors as well such as religion, race and region. A low and limited level of contact between different working class groups caused by this 'fragmentation and dispersion' (Haworth 1984)[7] is a typical characteristic in most of the cases. The main force behind urbanization in the 19th century Europe, where working class movement displayed a tremendous peak, was primarily the rural proletarians. In other words, those who migrated to the cities already had an agrarian proletarian background. On the other hand, the migration in its peak period of the second half of the 20th century in the rest of the world was mainly of peasant origin. These rural migrants had very limited wage labor experiences and were mainly socialized in semi-feudal production relations or small production environments (Lloyd 1982; Roberts 1990). This situation creates significant cultural effects in these newly proletarianized migrants' adaptation to urban context. Furthermore, while the limited availability of formal employment

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[5] Nonstandard employment forms and related employment relations, in reality, are not very recent in developed countries. We may even argue that 'standard' forms, both in terms of history and extent, have been limited: "There have always been work arrangements that did not fit the model of full-time work, and history is replete with examples of peripheral labor forces and flexible labor markets in which work is unstable and temporary ... The efficiencies associated with organizing work in standard, hierarchical employment relations and internal labor markets in the post–World War II period may have been more of an historical irregularity than is the use of nonstandard employment relations" (Kalleberg 2000: 342).

[6] Rieser (1999: 191) establishes a moderate decrease in the share of the wage employees in the total employment figure in Italy during the 1990s. However, he also points that there is a more complex process behind this figure. While the 'old' self-employed groups (such as retail traders) are declining, the expanding 'new' "self-employment of the second generation" is in direct relation of dependency with capital and, in this respect, is not that different from wage labor. Furthermore, the expansion in diversified employment forms can also be observed in the same workplace. Hence, both core workers with relatively stable employment relations and workers under various temporary employment forms do co-exist in the same workplace and, in some cases, even do the same or similar works.

[7] Haworth, N. (1984) 'Proletarianisation in the world order: The Peruvian experience' in B. Munslow and H. Finch (eds.) *Proletarianisation in the Third World.* London: Coom Helm; cited in Munck 1988: 88.

opportunities structurally forces the migrants to informal activities, it also strengthens the proletarians' aspirations for self-employment.

In Third World countries the economy is generally incapable to accommodate the labor force displaced from land in full-time wage employment. In these countries we do not observe the classical pattern of labor being transferred from primary sector to secondary and from there to tertiary sector. A large section of labor force directly goes to the tertiary sector made of commercial and personal services. Such 'tertiarization' is a typical phenomenon of underdevelopment. Even in the manufacturing sector, we see that the majority of workers are self-employed, family workers or informal wageworkers. This situation can be evaluated as a process that slows down proletarianization.

Lloyd (1982: 50) points out that urban working class in the Third World, during the process of post-1950s de-colonization and industrialization, forms a tripartite structure. The first group consists of wage earners in the large industrial and commercial enterprises. The second group is the employees in the public sector with a relatively high employment security. The last group is the informal sector. This last section displays a very complex structure in terms of labor forms. It consists of self employed, family workers and wage laborers whose status is almost uncertain in terms of stability. There are other significant characteristics in Lloyd's portrait of employment structure in the Third World as well. Employment in the public sector is relatively large. While employment in manufacturing industry is relatively narrow, employment in service sector is large because of the early phases of urbanization.

The studies on class dynamics in the Third World countries stress that urban economy, urban class structure and proletarianization processes in these societies have different characteristics than those in Western Europe and North America. While some of these studies focus on the patterns of 'semi-proletarianization' (Wallerstein 1983), others emphasize the prevalence of informal employment in the peripheral countries (Portes 1985; Castells and Portes 1989; Roberts 1995). The former approach, focusing on households as unit of analysis rather than individual workers, highlights the fact that income through wage labor is not the only or the main source of livelihood in these households. Wallerstein (1983) calls this 'semi-proletarianization' and argues that the existence of non-wage income enables wages

to be stabilized at a lower level than necessary for survival and reproduction. In other words, exploitation in semi-proletarianized households is higher than the fully proletarianized households. Furthermore, full proletarianization in the core counties is only possible because of semi-proletarianization in the periphery.

Despite the fact that formal and informal employment in Third World countries appear to be independent from each other, in reality they have been fed from common dynamics. During the periods of economic growth and industrial expansion a relatively larger segment of labor force were employed in the formal sector and improvements were made in wages. On the other hand, this tendency was slowing down when economy was insufficient in the face of an enlarging urban labor force. In the post-1970s, during the periods when in most of the Third World countries economic stagnation and decline were taking place, employment in the formal sector declined tremendously and unemployed workers ran for the informal sector. The result, then, was a decrease in both enterprise earnings and wages in the informal sector due to increase in the number of workers in the small enterprises, over concentration in the self-employed activities, and increasing competition (Portes 1989; Portes and Schauffler 1993).

Informal sector activities are generally characterized as insecure jobs with low and unstable wages, with no regulation in terms of employment, wages, and safety conditions. In reality, informal sector includes wide range of categories from self-employed to workers in the small-scale enterprises and family labor. The ability to make profit in this sector depends on avoiding from costs that legal regulations would bring about, such as social security payments, health and safety standards in the workplace etc. In its 'classical form', the informal sector provides goods and services primarily to low-income groups. Low profit level generally does not allow a possibility of capital accumulation. The formal sector, in contrast, does not enter into these areas due to high risk and low return. Rather, it provides relatively sophisticated and luxurious products to middle and high-income groups (Roberts 1995: 117-121). These different product and labor combinations in each sector and relations between the two sectors have also important implications for class structures.

Portes (1985) defines three dividing lines in class structures in Latin American countries: the control over means of production (profit-gainers and wage earners), the control over labor-power (those with managerial power and others), payment types (those with stable job and income, and those casually employed). Social classes that emerge from these structures are as follows: (1) 'the elite', owning large industry and service enterprises; (2) bureaucratic-technical class (highly educated strata employed in public and private sectors in managerial & administrative positions); (3) formal workers; (4) informal workers (compared to the workers in informal sector, the workers in formal sector show higher degrees of employment and social security, are relatively more educated and earn more), and (5) informal petty bourgeoisie/small-scale entrepreneurs (low profit and primarily low and labor-intensive technologies. Roberts (1995: 141) adds to Portes' classifications a sixth category, namely lower 'non-manual workers' who are mainly composed of semi-professional white-collar employees. The social prestige and wages of this group – although the wage difference is not very big and shows declining trend– are higher than manual workers. Roberts considers them as the 'lower middle-class group', and provides four main reasons to treat them as a distinct social stratum, say, from skilled working class in formal economy. According to him, they have higher education level, which not only affects their occupations but also their chance of relatively upward social mobility. Furthermore, their working conditions are better and they have higher social security than the manual workers as a whole. Finally, the employment in the state is an important distinguishing characteristic of this stratum.[8]

It would be misleading to think that class structures in all Third World countries are dominated by a common semi-proletarianization pattern. Particularly newly industrializing Asian countries display different examples. The rapid proletarianization in these countries was accompanied by a rapid increase in industrial wage employment due to post-1960 export-oriented industrialization. For instance, the transformation in employment in South Korea generally displays similarity with the development in the Western Europe. The only and significant

[8] Munck (1987: 129) asserts that the structural heterogeneity of Latin American working classes does not necessarily cause a political split in the labor movement. There is no evidence proving that the privileged sections of the working class are more conservative.

exception to this similarity is that the source of urban proletariat in South Korea came mainly from rural small producers. In the Western Europe, in contrast, the early generation of urban proletariat consisted mainly of agricultural and industrial proletariat emerged in the earlier periods of expropriation in rural areas. In South Korea, during this period of industrialization, the increase in urban wage employment primarily was the result of rural migration. In this same period, the state kept grain prices relatively lower than the market prices. This policy not only lowered the wages of urban wage laborers but also increased migration from rural areas. The peasants did not have much chance to participate in wage employment in addition to their agricultural incomes, as the rural industry in South Korea was weak. Apart from this difference that has significant effects on the class behaviors of urban proletariat, it seems that the transformation of wage labor in these countries has squeezed the processes that were expanded in a larger continuum in the Western Europe to a very short period of time. According to Koo (1990: 673), while the rapid increase in the blue-collar employment resembles the early pattern, both the increase in white-collar wage employment and feminization of clerical and partly of blue-collar jobs in South Korea resemble the late pattern in Western Europe.

This situation in Far Asian countries such as Korea constitutes a striking contrast with that of South American countries. Curiously, in the former, we see a decrease in the informal sector. While in Korea in 1960 more than three-fourth of those working in manufacturing industry were employed in enterprises employing 5 or fewer workers, this proportion in the early 1980s decreased to one-fifth. In the Latin American countries, in contrast, the informal economy preserved its place. According to Koo (1990: 674), two reasons account for this low employment figure in informal sector in South Korea: the absence of a powerful working class movement and of legal labor security practices. In these conditions, from the perspective of employers, there is no reason to escape from both wage labor employment in general and formal wage labor employment in particular. Furthermore, in this situation wages are primarily determined by the market factors

rather than institutions (state and unions) and we do not observe significant wage differences between core and peripheral industries.[9]

Let's turn back to the issue of informal employment in Latin American context. The proportional magnitude of informal employment in class structure forces Portes (1985) to use a looser concept of 'working class.' In so doing, Portes includes the self-employed and family workers in what he calls 'informal working class.' Munck (1988) opposes Lloyd (1982) who too employs a definition of working class that includes self-employed, artisan, and peasants and argues that these groups may well be labeled as 'laboring classes', but should be kept outside of the working class.' I believe this is an appropriate point as those who employ such definition of working class at the same time complain about the over variation in their own categorization. However, Munck's[10] approach too, displays a tendency of excluding those who are 'dispossessed of means of production' but *do not* have the possibility to sell their labor-power and, hence, does not solve the problem.

We can confer this situation by reversing the definition we used in the discussion of middle classes earlier, i.e., 'individuals, expropriated in such a degree that they *have to* but *could not* find possibility to sell their labor-power.' In other words, they are 'already proletarianized but not yet wage laborers.' Indeed, the experiences of peripheral countries can be defined as the inadequacy of absorbing the flows of proletarianized (in the sense of expropriated) and semi-proletarianized individuals in urban areas into formal wage employment. The important question

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[9] Koo (1990), in the same place, points to the fact that the share of large enterprises employing 500 and more workers has significantly declined with the expansion of subcontracting. However, the enterprises with an increasing share in employment are not the very small enterprises with possible petty commodity production characteristics but predominantly capitalist enterprises with 20 or more workers. Turner et al. (1991) draw a different picture for Hong Kong and put more emphasis on to the intra-divisions of wage labor. According to them, one-fifth of the Hong Kong working class consists of a privileged section that includes public employees, white-collars of large firms, supervisors and workers with special manual skills. In contrast, one-third of the working class is characterized as underprivileged. These are the workers employed in small manufacturing enterprises that work under low employment security and poor working conditions, are less paid, highly mobile and with low levels of education and skills. Furthermore, this polarization shows a tendency of sharpening as the majority of middle groups switch to the privileged section.

[10] Munck, at the same time, opposes to limiting working class to those manual workers producing surplus value. He accepts a wider definition of working class that includes all of those that "sell labor power in exchange for wage and are not owners of means of production."

here, for our discussion is, to what extent and in which contexts do informal activities, which are mainly occupied by the (recent) migrants due to their inabilities to find formal wage employment, create permanent positions? In this process, we can talk about a 'de-proletarianization' phenomenon for those who have filled permanent self-employed or small employer positions. However, for the majority of population in informal economy this situation is not applicable. They constantly swing between informal wage employment, unemployment, and self-employed positions. Therefore, in this cycle neither an absolute proletarianization (both expropriated and permanently selling labor-power) nor de-proletarianization is possible and, in principle, not probable either. This proposition is not only valid for individuals but is applicable for households as well. Once again, this leads us to think that an approach that solely focuses on a narrow definition of working class limited with those who permanently sell their labor-power as a form of relationship with capital is inadequate.

To what extent there exists a stable division between informal and formal employment areas is also debatable. Although a sharp division between these two was argued in the previous periods, such argument is becoming increasingly challenged. First, informal sector is not independent from the general capitalist organization of the economy. Secondly, the findings showing that the movement between these two areas is limited, i.e., these two are sharply divided in terms of workers movements, are rare. On the contrary, the widespread movement between wage employment positions in the formal sector and various positions (wage employee, self-employed, family worker) is among the typical characteristics of the Third World cities.

Portes et al. (1994: 8), argues that the significant increase in unemployment during the economic crisis of 1980s proved the dualistic theories wrong which proposed that informal sector in Latin American countries will play a role in encompassing the surplus labor. On the contrary, Portes (1989) observes a significant increase in unemployment and decrease in real wages and concludes that in the Third World too mass unemployment can take place. He also shows that while there is a certain increase in the informal employment, a significant part of it comes from decentralized informalization of employment in the formal sector.

Furthermore, the widespread informalization processes such as downward pressures on wages in formal sector, decrease in labor protections, expansion of part-time and low security jobs, outworking, the emergence of new non-standard forms of employment etc., both in peripheral countries and advanced capitalist countries since the 1970s, make such divisions between formal and informal sector meaningless. We have been witnessing an integration of various forms and relationships of increasing economic activities within capitalist production and distribution networks at global and domestic levels. This picture is accompanied by a process whereby the number of dispossessed laborers is rising. Yet they are increasingly divided in terms of labor markets, work conditions, and work forms. It is very much possible that this division will deepen differences in reproduction areas as well. Structural class analyses provide a framework that requires the interrogation of these issues but it is not sufficient. There is a need for research on various dimensions of fragmentation within the working class as well as their effects. This necessity also requires that we go beyond the production and employment areas. Indeed, the same workers who work under very similar conditions of production and employment can display very different characteristics in terms of education levels, social backgrounds, conditions and relations in the reproduction areas.

2.3. Turkey: An Overview of Working Class Fragmentation

One of the first conclusions that an attentive look at the demographic base of the 20th century Turkish class structure will draw probably would be the relatively slow motion of the movement of rural population to and employment in urban areas. This would be an observation despite the fact that 'rural migration' to cities has been on the agenda of the country for half a century now. The serious problems that this process has created in urban society and space (such as squatter housing, increase in unemployment and informal activities, integration of migrant groups and political implications of all these) has resulted in a large collection of social research for sometime now (Karpat 1976; Kartal 1983; Keleş 1983; Kıray 1984; Şenyapılı 1978; 1981). Seen predominantly as the necessary troubles of modernization process up until the 1980s, the problems of migration and of migrants are re-making their

appearances on the country's agenda through different and exclusionary codes and frames as a result of transformations in social stratification dynamics in the post-1980s. In any case, we seldom encounter studies that draw our attention to the fact that migration to urban areas in Turkey has been moving slowly in comparison to its examples in the Western Europe. According to Koç (2001), among the significant reasons for this 'delayed expropriation' are the support for small agricultural producers by the international capital and finance institutions during the Cold War, the need for voting power of small producers by the political parties, and the sufficiency of economic resources to support this group in various ways. There are also studies that, among these factors, draw our attention to populist policies (Boratav 1983) and 'peasant coalition' character of the regime (Keyder 1990) that enabled an increase in real income for peasants together with the urban wage segments during the period of import substitution development policies.

As these studies also point out, rural migration to cities has a critical relationship to capital accumulation processes. First of all, if expropriation, the main reason for migration, both as a process and as an outcome is essentially a resource and capital transformation, a slow-pace ownership polarization in agriculture would mean that agricultural prices are not subjected to a resource transfer into other sectors of the economy. At the same time, this would mean that there is a slow process of transfer and centralization in agricultural property. Although the researchers generally express doubts as to the reliability of available data, most of them agree upon the fact that agriculture in Turkey is still dominated by small family enterprises. In addition, the dominant tendency in agriculture in Turkey is fragmentation not concentration (Akçay 1999; Köymen and Öztürkcan 1999). According to Akçay's calculations, in 1980 the majority (82 %) of agricultural enterprises were small enterprises working on less than 100 acres of land. These enterprises covered around 42 percent of the total arable land (1999: 116). This structure has not shown a significant change in time. According to another calculation, while small-scale agricultural enterprises cultivating less than 200 acres of land covered 58 percent of

the total arable land in 1950, this proportion increased to 63 percent in 1991 (Köymen and Öztürkcan 1999: 94).[11]

Secondly, capital accumulation process needs to create employment areas that would encompass the masses flowing to the cities. From this perspective, government supports and subsidies for small agricultural producers cannot be explained solely through political parties' pragmatist behavior of preserving their own vote basis. The insufficient capital accumulation in itself makes a certain degree of control of rural exodus to cities a necessity. Of course, this control and regulation could only be within the limits of economic and political 'possibilities.' In an economy, where import substitution policies came to an end since the late 1970s in accordance with the world economic crisis, these possibilities are continuously decreasing. As a result of the deepening debt crisis in state budget, the agricultural price supports are in an actual trend of decline. With the new legal regulations, related with the IMF program, put into practice after the February 2001 crisis, subsidies and various protection measurements have been stopped for certain. Within this context, we may certainly expect that agricultural production will be subjected to competition and transnational capital accumulation dynamics at increasing degrees. Hence, it is possible that higher levels of expropriation in agriculture and concomitant increase in migration to cities will take place. On the other hand, in terms of the other side of the capital accumulation process, i.e., the employment possibilities in the cities, the situation is not very clear. The stability program put into practice, after the 10 percent shrinking in the economy during the year of 2001, does not target a rapid economic expansion but a slow pace, small proportional and sustainable economic growth. These conditions point to an era where the urban social strata will also be reconfigured.

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[11] Akçay, to explain this tendency for fragmentation in agricultural land ownership, proposes an alternative argument, though not discussed in detail, that petty commodity production in agriculture is a production form integral to capitalism. According to this argument, in addition to the natural differences of agricultural production from that of industrial one, the inheritance law that constantly fragments the ownership, the development of petty commodity production as a dominant political ideology etc., in a phase where production techniques have been standardized the productivity levels between small and large enterprises almost diminish. Given this situation, it can be claimed that small enterprises in agriculture, which are more flexible with regards to crises and more adequate for controlling and transferring surplus labor, is the choice of capitalism (1999: 129-30).

Table 2.1 Distribution of employment by status (1988-1999) (%)

	Employment in Turkey		*Urban Employment*	
	1988	1999	1988	1999
Regular employee	32.5	34.6	59.5	59.3
Casual employee	7.4	9.4	8.6	11.6
Employer	3.4	5.0	6.5	8.7
Self employed	24.8	23.6	19.3	15.1
Unpaid family worker	31.9	27.4	6.1	5.3

	Urban Non-agricultural Employment		*Urban Manufacturing Employment*	
	1988	1999	1988	1999
Regular employee	62.7	62.0	71.3	73.8
Casual employee	8.1	11.5	5.0	5.6
Employer	6.7	9.0	8.4	9.2
Self employed	18.3	13.8	11.2	7.8
Unpaid family worker	4.2	3.7	4.1	3.6

Source: DİE 2001c.

According to some basic macro employment indicators for the past 10 years, although there has been a certain decline, agricultural employment (42%) continued to sustain its weight in Turkey in general. The labor force uprooted from agricultural employment during this period, both in Turkey at large and urban areas in particular, rather than industry has been directed to services and construction sectors (the share of these sectors in Turkey at large have increased from 37 percent to 41 percent, in urban areas from 64 percent to 67 percent). In fact, the share of industrial employment in urban areas has declined from 30 percent to 28 percent (DİE 2001c).

In the same period, the share of wageworkers in employment has also increased. It reached to almost half (44%) of the total employment in Turkey in general and three-fourth of the total employment (71%) in urban areas. In 1999, the rate of wageworkers in both urban industrial employment in general and urban manufacturing sector employment in particular was around 80 percent. In contrast, the share of self-employed and unpaid family workers has declined. The sum of these two was less than 10 percent by 1999. During this period, the segments that shrank the most in Turkey in general are unpaid family workers and the self-employed in urban areas. These two indicators point to proletarianization processes of unpaid

family workers uprooted from rural agricultural activities and of the urban self-employed.[12]

2.3.1. Some observations on the dynamics of fragmentation among wage employees

Wage employment is not homogenous in terms of many of its characteristics. Furthermore, while some of the existing differentiation dynamics are deepening, some other new dynamics are also articulated. The expansion of seasonal jobs that the semi-proletarians in agricultural sector work and especially of the temporary jobs in construction sector, of non-standard working forms, subcontracting and out-working jobs along the more traditional forms of informal employment, child labor employment both in its formal and informal forms, and the joining of some newly industrializing Anatolian cities to industrial division of labor constitute some of the main dynamics of this process. In addition, there are also some observations that contract-work, one of the non-standard employment forms, have emerged.[13]

A large part of the wage earners in Turkey is employed in public sector. This fact constitutes one of the fragmentation dynamics of working class. It also displays some overlapping with other axes of division (for instance, enterprise size and sector base). Furthermore, there are also significant divisions within wage employees of the public sector. The main reason for this division is the existence of three different employment statuses. The largest group is the civil servants (*devlet memuru*), close to around two million, whose employment status is determined by the Civil Servants Code. While this group of salaried government employees predominantly consists of white-collar office workers, there are also service and (a small number of) blue-collar workers employed with the same status. The second largest group consists of state

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[12] The change in the rate of wageworkers in Turkey in general during this 10 years period shows that the trends in the preceding 20 years period have been continuing. Between 1970 and 1990 the proportion of wageworkers in the total employment in Turkey in general increased from 28 percent to 39 percent. This increase was due to a decrease in the number of self-employed (from 27 % to 22 %) and particularly of rural unpaid family workers (from 45 % to 38 %) (DİE 2001a).

[13] According to Koç (2001), these kinds of practices were employed in *Karabük Iron and Steel Factory* in 1985 but were ended due to the objections afterwards. Today, in some enterprises such as Motorways General Directorate (*Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü*) there are some practices of contract work.

workers in state enterprises[14] belonging to the same employment status with that of wageworkers and private sector. These workers are predominantly blue-collars but there are white-collars and service workers employed with the same status here as well. The most distinctive characteristic of state workers, whose number was around 700 thousand by the year 1999, is that they constitute the section in which union organization and collective bargaining is the strongest and most common. The third group of employees in the public sector consists of those employed in accordance with a specific regulation that provides higher wages than ordinary civil servants. The employment conditions of this group, whose number is around 250 thousand, are regulated by a special decree. These employees have neither the right for job security provided to civil servants nor the right to organization and collective bargaining provided to state workers (DİE 2001a; 2001c).

Between these three groups of workers, who are sometimes employed in the same workplace and actually do the same work in some of the public enterprises, there are tremendous differences in terms of job security, wage levels and rights to organize. There are two dynamics of transformation at work. Firstly, the number of public workers, who earn significantly more than the civil servants due to their collective bargaining rights, has been declining as a result of slowing down of the employment of new workers and the compulsory retirement policies that came to agenda recently. This process, at the same time, results in a decline of union organization among wage groups as a whole. The work and wage conditions of the civil servants, who allegedly formed a 'labor aristocracy' till the 1950s (Koç 2001), have been steadily deteriorating after this period. The struggle of this group to gain unionization rights, since the late 1980s, seems to be entered into a stabilization process with a special decree accepted in 2001. Until now, there was not an explicit ban on unionization of civil servants. However, there was not a legal regulation either. This new law grants the right to unionize for the civil servants but not with the rights for collective bargaining and strike. Instead, it suggests some collective meetings and consultation mechanisms at the level of confederation. This new

[14] As observed by Kalaycıoğlu the legal status differences between state employees as 'civil servant-state worker' even exist at the level of the same enterprises and this differentiation functions as a means for labor control (1995: 101-101; 113-14; 202-203).

regulation has not satisfied civil servants whose only hope to increase their wage levels have been gaining the right to unionize. In addition, this regulation will deepen the status divisions among the employees in the public sector as well as among the wage laborers as a whole.

Among the wage earner groups, female employment is low in general. However, it shows certain tendency to expend. In 1999, the proportion of women in urban non-agricultural employment was 17 percent. Among urban wage employees, this rate was slightly higher with more than 20 percent. In the area of formal wage employment women mostly work as civil servants. Female workers constitute more than one-fourth of the total civil servants. However, the majority of women concentrate in informal activities. For instance, among the workers with social security, the main indicator of formal wage employment other than the civil servants, the proportion of women is only 15 percent (DİE 2001a; 2001c). The typical examples of unregistered female employment areas are (i) trade and services (ii) house works, and (iii) the outworking system that showed an increase mainly in textile-garment sector. While the number of wageworker women in out-working system in 1991 was around 33 thousands, in 1994 it increased 4.2 times and reached to 140 thousands. By the year 1999, the number of home-workers amounted to some 247 thousands. More than four-fifth of these workers are women and an overwhelming majority of them (87%) work in manufacturing sector (Erdoğdu 1999; DİE 2001a).

The figures that we have examined until now point to a common dynamic of fragmentation between wage laborers: between workers who benefit from minimum legal protection and those without any protection and are working in informal sectors and activities. In the statistics of 1999, the total number of wageworkers is given as 9.6 million. On the other hand, the total number of workers registered to Social Security Organization and of civil servants registered to Retirement Fund (*Emekli Sandığı*) is 7.05 million. This information means that at least 2.5 million workers are informal employees (DİE 2001a; 2001c). However, since the statistical data are insufficient in covering the total wage employment, we may argue that this number in reality is much higher. According to Koç (2001), the number of wageworkers informally employed should be around 4.5 million. In addition, the statistical

information shows that the proportion of causal workers among wage earners is increasing (see Table 2.1 above).

It seems that a number of points of debate related to unregistered employment will gain more significance. First of all, the fact that unregistered employment shows a tendency to expand is a commonly accepted observation.[15] Secondly, the question of unregistered employment has been a prominent subject among the studies on informal sector. Here, too, we encounter with the difficulty that constitutes the main problem of informal sector concept: varying and conflicting employment statuses of the people engaged in informal activities.[16] The informal sector that has been usually associated with the self-employed and family labor in the past debates, as I have previously indicated, has been rapidly expanding and increasingly becoming an area of wage laborers. A third problem is related with the questions of 'to which sectors and areas of activity and through which dynamics' that employment in this area has been expanding, whether we call it informal or unregistered.[17]

The few studies on this area have shown that subcontracting and outworking mechanisms play a primary role in the increase of informal activities in general and informal wage employment in particular. According to a research on the structure and labor force of shoe production in İstanbul, Gedikpaşa, the subcontracting relations are constructed in two ways – at the level of trading and of production. At the level of trade, subcontracting relationship indicates work and capital dependency

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[15] According to Keyder (1989), structural transformations following the crisis in the late 1970s can overall be regarded as an attempt to 'informalize' the economy. This process, in fact, demonstrated that informal sector has never been an exceptional, secondary segment of the economy and employment and produced a permanent dynamic in the formation of working class. This 'informalization' process has reached to such an extent that made such distinctions nearly almost inadequate.

[16] Even among the market traders, the typical and classical example of informal sector, there are significant class differences. For a study on dynamics of class-based conflict and cooperation in this area, see Varcin (1996).

[17] According to findings of a fieldwork in İstanbul Alibeyköy neighborhood that measured urban informal employment, 49 percent of the total workers were informal employees. 59 percent of the informal employment is made of female workforce. The distribution of informal employment according to employment status of labor is 64 percent wageworkers and 5 percent family workers. The areas of activity cover a very large spectrum such as family worker, home-work, clothing workers, factory workers, construction workers, apprentice, driver and other employees (furniture workers, service sector workers, cleaning workers, daily workers, goldsmith workers, glass workers and similar workshop workers etc.) (Özar, 1996:522-527).

of producers, who are without operating capital and capital enough to control the fluctuations in the market, to manufacturer traders who take on a manufacturing role and organize production from outside. At the level of production, subcontracting relations are established with the producers, who lost their control over production process due to their dependency on piece-rate work and who produce with labor-intensive technology, and the parent company. This parent firm determines the value, amount and time of piece-rate work. In such cases, it is common to use family and child labor. The job stability is low both among these groups and wage employees. The payments are made according to work rhythm on daily, weakly or monthly bases. In some cases, wee also see payment based on piece-rate (Güler-Müftüoğlu, 2000).

Subcontracting and out-working are common in metal industry, textile industry, automobile industry, and furniture industry. According to a study on İstanbul ready-made clothing industry, around 40 percent of the enterprises does subcontracting work. Some of the firms, except design and cut, can subcontract all other work. While the firms are located nearby the newly constructed *gecekondu* areas where plenty and cheap labor exists, the workshops that do subcontracting work are located in *gecekondu* areas. The main source of the labor force in the clothing sector comes from primary school graduate women and youth (63%). In order to reach cheap labor force, outworking also takes place. Almost half of the firms practice outworking system. Among the workers, those who work at home earn the least income. The majority of others earn slightly higher incomes than the minimum wage. More than half of the workers do not have social security (Eraydın, 1999: 134-137).

Some of the early theoretical attempts in conceptualizing the dynamics of informal sector in Turkey have suggested several differentiation strategies such as 'marginal sector' and 'core-periphery-marginal' segments. The core jobs are the jobs that do large-scale and capital intensive production, are integrated and employ large numbers of engineer and technician. In these enterprises, unionized, high-wage, and high-skilled workers do the work. Here, we also see high job stability. The 'peripheral' jobs are the small, irregular, instable and less specialized and less organized jobs mainly in the areas of repair and spare-parts production that emerged

in parallel to industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. Mainly workers who are unorganized and low waged, without security and with high employment turnover do these periphery works. Marginal jobs are related to early phases of urban and economic spheres. In general, they are made of short-term and temporary jobs such as street vending, market trading, porting, and daily working (Şenyapılı, 1994).

Such explanations and classifications need to be reexamined in the light of new differentiation dynamics in the area of employment. On the other hand, we also see that migration and urban space themes integral to these studies are taken up by some of the new studies on urban stratification. We may argue that a group of studies on 'spatial and social stratification' have emerged out of this line. Examples of such studies are Erder (1995; 1996), Işık (1996), and Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001) According to Erder, there appears to be a division between 'winners and losers' within the peripheral population in the cities. While the first group has successfully integrated itself into housing and labor markets, the remaining continues to occupy a marginal space mainly consisting of the 'new urban poor.'[18] Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001) argue that, until the recent years, migrants have had chances to overcome poverty through urban land rents mainly by transferring their own poor positions to the new comers. However, they assert, this sort of rotational mode of poverty seems to come to an end as the options of land rents have become more and more limited. Thus, spatial segmentation is likely to show sharper and more consolidated characteristics of income and wealth polarization than before.

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[18] Community solidarity seems to be rising among the so-called 'new urban poor.' It seems that there are two interrelated tendencies: diversification within the *gecekondu* areas and their population, on the one hand, and a sharpening distinction between central and peripheral areas of the cities on the other, which is said to be resulted in the phenomenon of suburbanization. According to Ayata (1996), several factors have caused differentiation within and rise of communitarian tendencies among the urban groups: ethnic and religious heterogeneity; destabilizing labor market and rising competition; a perception of moral corruption towards the inner city, and, weakness of public realm. While Ayata talks also about political factors that may carry the diversification into conflict, he also underlines this important point: the young people from periphery engaging in violent actions have lost their hope for vertical mobility through education, and "their reference point is not in the rural life of the past which they had never known, but in the urban society together with its difficulties, attraction, and many aspects of inequality" (1996: 22). In comparing the cases of Denizli and Istanbul, Işık (1996), too, emphasizes the dynamics of dissociation of the *gecekondu* population from the city in Istanbul together with a range of integration dynamics. Like Ayata, he implies that this phenomenon is related to the 'emerging relations' caused by the globalization process, in which certain groups can engage and the peripheral population cannot.

2.3.2. Analytical approaches to class and stratification

Among the studies on social classes and stratification, class structure analysis seems to have rarely been conducted in Turkey. Here I would like to discuss several analytically oriented approaches. The first one is developed by Kalaycıoğlu and others (Kalaycıoğlu et al. 1998; Tüzün 2000), which is an attempt to develop a stratification index applicable to surveys and social research. The second one has been employed by Güvenç (2000a; 2000b) in the studies of urban spatial segregation. The last two examples have been developed by Koç (1989; 1991) whose works show a wide range of variety including the issues of trade union movement, collective bargaining economics and economic policies, labor history and proletarianization and by Boratav (1991; 1995) whose original field is political economy.

Kalaycıoğlu et al. (1998) have developed a gradual stratification index. This model is a composition of the following variables with varying degrees of weight: (1a) it accepts 'form and status of employment' as one of the classifying criteria and rejects classifications based on occupations because of their limited explanatory capacity; (1b) it incorporates form and status of employment of all working members in the household and rejects the stratification analyses based on head of the household; (2) it incorporates the average education level of individuals at the age of 15 and over (education level affects the income and consumption patterns of the head of the household and his/her spouse and the level of income and consumption affects the education levels of second generation); (3) it takes into account the selected items the household owns which are relatively difficult to acquire; (4) it incorporates the neighborhood and house ownership (the price of land depending on the area and home ownership). The authors argue that each of these four variables plays significant roles in differentiations among individuals and households. Yet each of them independently does not have sufficient explanatory power (Kalaycıoğlu et al. 1998: 129). Given this, they propose VERİ socioeconomic status index as an integrated measurement system that incorporates all of these variables by giving each of them a different point. This index has been tested in 1995 in various researches. As a gradual stratification model, this index includes upper, upper-middle, middle and lower-middle segments.

The same authors both analyze the issues of representation, comprehensiveness and universality of a quantitative index and discuss the ways to articulate it with the findings of qualitative researches. The latter discussion is based on in-depth interviews conducted with the heads of households and spouses in 23 families located in 'middle' socioeconomic level in a previous study done by using the above-mentioned index. The qualitative research aims to determine the issues such as family history, networks of social and cultural relations, political attitudes, income, savings and consumptions patterns that could not be covered by quantitative research. From this study, the authors conclude that: (1) although there are extensive common characteristics in terms of material conditions, lifestyles and social relations within a status group determined by quantitative researches, there are also examples that differ from these common characteristics; (2) the existence of widespread common characteristics is not enough; to reach the conclusion that these characteristics 'distinguish' a certain status group or segment we need to make comparative studies involving other groups; (3) qualitative research shows that (a) the conditions prior to migration, the method and type of migration, and the timing of migration, and (b) the networks of family relations constitute "the primary factors in determining the lower and upper thresholds in the socio-economic scale the families will reach to and explaining the differences between them (1998: 132). The latecomers from villagers to urban areas are typically situated in lower socio-economic strata than the previous-comers. The authors find out that behind the quantitative socioeconomic indicators defining the 'middle strata' there exists important role of family relations. In majority of cases, even for the 'nuclear' families there exist various 'pooling' mechanisms where both income and spending are shared with parents and other relatives. Family networks primarily include social capital transfer that provides information in labor market and possibilities for job finding. Family networks, at the same time, produce a paternalist cultural political formation. The role of father in transferring social capital and protection and distribution functions in the reproduction of family, in return, necessitates respect and submission and support for his social role and political attitudes.

Among the variables of this stratification model, Kalaycıoğlu et al. (1998) divide 'form and status of employment' into four different groups: (a) employees:

divided into two sub-groups between those employing 6 or more workers and those employing 5 and less workers; (b) self employed: this group includes self employed professionals and artisans; (c) wage employees: managers, non-manual employees and manual workers; (d) farmers: divided into two sub-groups between those who employ 2 and more workers and those depending on non-wage family labor or employing 1 worker at most. In addition to these main categories, additional categories constitute 'retirees' and unemployed and housewife households (the latter category is based on the assumption that unemployed and housewives can only play significant roles when they are the head of household).

This approach proposed by Kalaycıoğlu et al. (1998), in principle, is not class-analytical in nature. As I mentioned above, it aims to develop a multi-variable stratification model. I will not discuss the nature of the model here. However, I would like to deal with several points. First, the variables other than the form and status of employment, that is, education, property holding, and consumption capacity, may well be integrated into an attempt to explore the dynamics of fragmentation among the working class. Second point concerns the grading strategy used for the category of 'form and status of employment'. In the model, while 9-10 point is given to managers, 8 points is given to employees hiring 5 workers at most. This grading system, I believe creates both a theoretical and practical problem. The authors explain this situation by pointing to the 'underdeveloped management organization' in the latter. This approach makes the distinction developed by the authors in terms of 'form and status of employment' insignificant and substitutes the 'characteristics of workplace' for employment relations. Furthermore, not only they do not discuss what kind of status differentiation the existence of management organization would make, but we can also argue that the existence of management organization in the position of 'managers' among civil servants, in most of the cases, gives them only a figural position and does not create much of a real status difference in practice.

Güvenç (2000a; 2000b) in a series of research analyzing the relationship between spatial segregation and various social variables such as workplace, employment status, income level and geographic origin in Istanbul and several other large cities has used the concept of 'flexible/unorganized workers' that better

describes emergent trends instead of the concept of 'informal.' In these studies, Güvenç has developed an analytical schema that considers both employment statuses of individuals and different characteristics of job/workplace:

(a1) flexible/unorganized (wage employees and the self employed in labor/skill intensive industries),
(a2) organized/regular (wage employees in capital intensive industries and waged and salaried employees in public sector),
(a3) white-collar workers in central business area (white-collar and service workers in central business areas, and owners and employees of service and sales businesses),
(b1) industry and commerce (employers and the self employed in industry, wholesale trade, and retail trade businesses that require large capital),
(b2) employers, self employed and employees in small manufacturing and sale units,
(b3) peripheral employment (self employed, employers and workers in industries concentrated in metropolitan periphery such as agriculture, fishery, storage, military etc.),
(b4) those working in health, entertainment, culture, civil society organizations and services specialized in catering to the central business area.

In this categorization the employment cluster in group (a) is the area where wage earners are concentrated the most. In contrast, in group (b) employees and self-employed individuals are more common. Flexible/unorganized workers constitute more than two-third of the group (a) which covers 88 percent of the sample. Flexible/unorganized jobs (a1) typically do not have connection with any social security institution, do not involve any contracts and are with no security provisions. The weight of organized/regular wage laborers (a2) in capital-intensive industries and public sector that Güvenç (2000b) describes as unionized/organized/Fordist in total employment is only 1/6 of the flexible/unorganized workers.[19] The group of white-collar workers employed in sales, finance, insurance, transportation, and various service jobs (a3) constitutes 17 percent of the total employment.

[19] Based on two findings that (i) flexible employment is six times larger than regular/organized employment from, and (ii) those who worked in flexible employment has lower education levels, Güvenç (2000b) concludes that the possibilities for a vertical movement from flexible/irregular to regular/organized employment areas are limited.

Güvenç's studies show that there are significant differences between these groups in terms of education, home-ownership, origin and settlement patterns. This finding can be interpreted as a proof that the above schema represents a meaningful classification of social groups based on employment/workplace. Particularly, the categorization of 'flexible & unorganized', 'regular & organized' and 'white-collar & service workers' given in Güvenç's schema, in principle, is very meaningful and functional in analyzing fragmentation of working class in Turkey. However, this classification needs to be refined with two points. First, 'white collars' who are employed in private sector office jobs, and 'service workers' which consists of both those who work in stable services in workplace and those who work in sales, marketing etc. jobs and have to be mobile due to the nature of job, need to be distinguished from each other. Secondly, both the civil servants and workers employed in state enterprises currently included in 'regular/ organized' category need to be categorized separately because the working conditions of these groups significantly differ both from each other and from the other groups.

Güvenç's studies are directed towards analyzing urban spatial segregation and do not attempt to develop a 'social class' analysis based on the two criteria (employment status and differentiating characteristics of job/workplace) that the above classification is developed from. However, based on Bourdieu's argument that groups positioned in different social spaces also display different dispositions, it tends to substitute social grouping dynamics based on spatial segregation with the concepts of social class.

> The differences and similarities between patterns of positioning of status-income groups will determine their perception of other groups outside of their own world. It will be inevitable for other groups who do not have distinguishing patterns (positioning) of dispersion to have similar images for outside groups. In other words, to have distinguishing dispersion characteristics requires social strata to see other groups from very different angles. ... Hence, the groups positioned differently in metropolitan scale will look at the world from different angles, will not have similar representations; to put it differently, they will live in different worlds in the same world (Güvenç 1998: 118).

There is no doubt that different spatial positioning practices have significant effects on social groups' perception of themselves, the outside world and each other. However, such an argument will be insufficient and unqualified so far as the nature

and content of the particular relationship between the groups' different spatial positioning practices, on the one hand, and their varying perceptions, on the other hand. More importantly, such an argument has the risk of falling into an error of treating patterns of spatial positioning as the constitutive element of social group formation. Spatial positioning of social groups at the same time is the reason, effect and product of different social practices determined by these groups varying economic, cultural and symbolic capacity and repertoires. Bourdieu himself argues in *Distinction* (1984) that economic and cultural levels are mutually constitutive elements of social group formation. That is, class distinctions at the socio-economic level produce cultural and symbolic distinctions, which in turn reproduce class structure. While this approach underlines the role of the cultural in the reproduction and legitimization of class distinctions, it does not reject the argument that sources of class distinctions are generated at the level of the economic.[20] As a matter of fact, Güvenç's findings on spatial segregation based on socio-economic status in Istanbul and other cities (the highest dissimilarity coefficient is between wage employees and employers) indicate that the dominant factor producing and reproducing spatial segregation is social class.

The studies by Koç on the class structure in Turkey focus on (i) general indicators of the volume of wage earners and (ii) within the limits of available data, the process of expropriation through generations. Having criticized those who relate the concept of working class to specific characteristics and legal status of work, he asserts that the concept of working class is identified at a general base of wage earners. He starts from the criterion of freeing from ownership, and discuss the issue of surplus-value production and the question of productive vs. unproductive labor, which have always been debated in the Marxist class studies. This point is important because Koç, at the first phase, is insistent on the distinction between a loose concept of poor classes and that of working class defined at the base of surplus value exploitation: "becoming a worker is not due to his poverty, but due to that he is

[20] It has been argued that the relationship between the economic and the social in Bourdieu's concept of class is not consistent and that it carries a tautological character. For instance, according to Gartman (1991: 436) while Bourdieu, on the one hand, explains variations in culture and life-style with class position, he defines class position through uneven distribution of cultural capital (together with economic capital) on the other.

exploited by the capitalists" (1989: 210). Therefore, working class does not cover all wage earners, but those who work in material commodity production where production and exploitation of surplus value can be realized. He rejects the distinction between mental and manual labor. Given the complexity of production process, those who take place in collective production process but do not use physical labor should be considered within the working class since they contribute to the material production by being a part of what Marx called 'collective worker.' Collective organization of production and the division of labor have expanded beyond the workplace. Those who are working in activities, which supply energy, project and planning services, row material, maintenance and equipment, transporting, etc., constitute an integral part of commodity production. Yet, there appears another question: Is it enough to take place within the collective production process for being considered as worker? Koç offers an additional distinction. Certain segments of those who do not work in direct production constitute a part of technical organization of production, but some others (such as accountants, those working in marketing, advertisement, etc.) are needless for technical organization of production, but required for the capitalist organization of production; so, they are not part of the working class.

Now, what is the class position of those wage earners who do not, directly or indirectly, take place within productive activities? The answer offered by Koç seems problematic. He provides two arguments. First, these wage earners, as a matter of fact, consider themselves as working class and engage in class organizations. Secondly, although they are not subjected to surplus value exploitation, they are exploited by the distribution mechanisms of the market. Moreover, when employees reduce workers' wages they do not make distinction between productive and unproductive ones. Hence, Koç concludes, "the long term class interests of nonproductive wage earners are identical with that of productive wage earners" (1989: 216). Here, it seems that Koç moves away from the criterion of surplus value production and refers to market mechanisms, which seems to be inspired by Wright's unequal distribution of credential assets that causes a specific kind of exploitation among wage earners. Consequently, his notion of working class contradicts with his rejection of the category of poverty. It is, therefore, the loose concept of wage

earners in conjunction with decreasing wages that enable him to call civil servants a part of the working class. According to Koç, civil servants had constituted the labor aristocracy, but then lost their privileges and proletarianized in their consciousness.[21]

Another Marxist class analysis in Turkey is attempted by Boratav (1991; 1995) who has extended the framework of his studies from rural to the urban classes. He seems to have paid more attention than Koç to the inner stratification of the working class as well as the bourgeoisie. As a political economist, Boratav has long been preoccupied with the analysis of rural class structure since the 1970s. From the end of the 1980s, he attempted to apply a revised version of his analytical scheme to urban classes. In addition to investigating the effects of economic policies and the adjustment strategies of households, Boratav (1991; 1995) tries to develop an analytical framework for urban socio-economic structure and discusses the data on various issues: socio-economic differentiation among social classes and groups, variations in levels of education, degree of urbanization, social mobility, living standards and life styles, and their ideological and political implications. Together with the specific concern on analyzing the findings of two successive field studies conducted in 1988 and 1991, Boratav (1991; 1995) uses two different categorizations of inner segments of the working class. In the first one, the inner groups consist of (i) industrial proletariat, (ii) unskilled workers, (iii) white-collars, and (iv) retirees. While this analytical scheme seems to have been determined by the concern of studying the effects of economic policies employed in the 1980s, the later categorization rather shows an attempt to generate a structural-analytical framework. Here the group of wage earners consists of (a1) high-skilled educated employees, (a2) white-collars, (a3) unskilled service workers, and (a4) blue-collars (working in direct production).[22] Having adopted a classical Marxist theory of conflicting classes,

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[21] From a historical perspective, Koç examines inner segmentation of working class according to (i) labor aristocracy of the initial period of the Republic, (ii) variations between public and private sector workers, (iii) differing conditions of those working in monopolistic-foreign enterprises, and (iv) differentiation within public sector workers resulted from partisan employment by parliamentary politics. According to Koç, by the 1980s, all these variations have tended to become homogenized. Moreover, Koç asserts, religious, ethnic, and regional segmentation within the working class have weakened.

[22] Boratav, in addition to these four groups, includes 'unemployed' and 'retiree.' However, these are not structural-analytic but rather situational categories.

his approach relies on the essential criterion of the mechanism of surplus appropriation. This, as is known, produces two main classes, (a) the working class and (b) the bourgeoisie. This analysis of 'economic classes' is expanded into the inner divisions of the main classes, the so-called sub-groups, which again are analyzed in terms of economic relations, i.e., the processes of redistribution of surplus. Boratav divides the capitalist class into two main groups: as (b1) small bourgeoisie/employers (employing one or two workers permanently) and medium-big bourgeoisie/employers (employing three or more workers permanently). As a third category, he mentions the 'middle strata.' These strata, depending on social formation, take different positions between or around the main social classes, and they maintain their existence thanks to surplus transfer through market mechanism and/or by the state. He defines (c) self-employed (small shopkeepers and artisans + those working in marginal/informal jobs + self-employed professionals) as the major categories of the in-between strata.

Unlike Koç, Boratav, both in defining the boundaries of working class and in distinguishing its inner segments, does not enter into the productive-unproductive labor debate. However, while he points out that these four groups within 'wage labor class' are determined by the processes of redistribution of surplus product/value, the three groups outside of the classical blue-collars exist implicitly as parts of surplus production in his analysis. In addition, he does not discuss the nature of mechanisms of 'redistribution.' Therefore, whether these mechanisms determine the structural boundaries of the working class or they play roles in its internal divisions/differentiations is not very clear in his analysis. For example, different from his previous analysis, while he distinguishes 'high-skilled educated employees' – resembling Wright's notion of 'contradictory class locations'– from white-collar groups, it becomes clear that the main distinguishing factor of these two from each other is difference in their income levels. We may argue that there is a redistribution mechanism that causes an unequal distribution of surplus between these two groups. However, what distinguishes other employee groups is, still, unclear. This leads us to a conclusion that the distinguishing criterion in defining 'social class' categories or coalitions proposed by Boratav, based on economic classes, is not simply composed of redistribution. In his analysis (1995: 6-7), the *urban working class in its narrow*

definition, consists of blue-collar + unskilled service workers + unemployed; *the working class in its widest definition* includes all employed groups + unemployed + retirees (wage/salaried groups of present, past and near future); *the coalition of 'popular classes'* is composed of unemployed + blue-collars + unskilled service workers + white-collars + self-employed.

The determining criterion whether to include especially the white-collar in these combinations probably is not simply the income level. It is at the same time and perhaps primarily related with the employment status and differences in work process. Furthermore, it refers to different cultural formations of the white-collars. However, whatever criteria are used, Boratav's model of internal fragmentation of working class provides a valid framework for those societies like Turkey where, despite various axes of working class differentiations, there are no high levels of 'structural' differentiation.[23] In the following chapters, I will use a similar schema. In defining differentiations of working class, I accept the main distinguishing factors of the blue-collars, the white-collars, the unskilled service workers and professional employees from each other as (i) differences in work process, and (ii) differences in

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[23] Boratav's schema has been operationalized by Aktaş (2001) together with Wright's model of class locations based on multiple exploitation relations and Goldthorpe's occupational class model in a comparative analysis of class attitudes. Aktaş (2001), in this analysis, makes two revisions of Boratav's model: First, among 'professional employee' positions, excluding those with credential and organizational assets (supervisors/chiefs) in Wright's model, he includes the rest into the white-collar category. Second, he argues (ibid: 224) that "even though they seem to occupy a middle position between the blue-collars and the white-collars in terms of attitude and deprivation" the unskilled service workers "are closer to the world of the white-collars in terms of class culture and privileges" (While Aktaş did not provide any evidence for this argument, his study shows that these workers take place between white- and blue-collars: their anti-business attitudes are stronger than white-collars but weaker than blue-collars). Therefore, he places the unskilled service workers within the white-collar category. According to the results of the author's analysis of 'attitude scale', Boratav's model reflects different class attitudes in higher degrees than other two models. The findings show that while anti-liberalism and pro-social state attitudes are the highest among the blue-collar workers and peasants/farmers, white-collars, small bourgeoisie and managerial chiefs, respectively, display a 'middle class' profile, growing distant from these groups.

It has been argued that Boratav's class schema is based on occupation and that it resembles Goldthorpe's occupational classes (Kalaycıoğlu et al. 1998; Aktaş 2001). Since I have been inspired by Boratav's class schema in this study, I would like to emphasize two points to clarify the subject. First, starting from occupation and work qualities in the classification of empirical data, in most cases, is a practical necessity and cannot be considered as an evidence for a class typology to be theoretically based simply on occupational characteristics. Secondly, in this study the differences in occupations or employment statutes are not used as a variable differentiating social classes but as one of the dynamics of internal stratification of a class (working class) defined through social relations of production.

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education and skill formations. The different characteristics of work process and its impacts on labor relations result in differentiations in class experiences of these groups. In addition, different characteristics of work create such differences in education and skill formations among these groups that do not only result in income differences but at the same time, in wider social context, lead to cultural differences.

In this study, I adopt a modified version of Boratav's analytical frame. Before explaining the extent of and the reasons for these modifications, the reader should note that the sample of the present study consists *only of wage earners*. Other categories referred to are former class positions of the workers and those of their fathers. The first modification is related to the category of employer. I did not see a need to differentiate between 'small' and 'medium/big' employers, since the category of employers appeared as a rather small group in any case. Secondly, for operational reasons (basically, being a small portion of the sample), Boratav combined 'self-employed professionals' with the group of 'artisan & informal.' Since this category did not exist in any household, on the one hand, and appeared to have a rather significant attraction in workers' aspirations, on the other, I preferred to leave it as a separate category. Thirdly, I did not use the category of 'pensioner retiree' that mainly refers to the present situation of some fathers. According to the information on their previous jobs, these people were placed at appropriate locations (by the same procedure, I omitted the category of 'unemployed', which also applies to the other members of the household). Those fathers retired from *SSK* (Social Insurance Organization) and *Emekli Sandığı* (Pensioner Fund, for civil servants), for whom sufficient information were not available, were placed into an additional category: 'employee: position unknown.' Lastly, the category of 'blue-collar worker', in my study, has a larger coverage. While Boratav limited this category to those who 'work in direct material production', I believe that those employees working in transportation and loading & unloading of goods, and those working in repairing & maintenance are indispensable to the process of collective production. In addition, the degree of specialization and division of labor is so low in small/medium scale workplaces that most of the employees, who perform certain tasks of controlling and coordinating the production process, at the same time, do work in manufacturing. The same situation also applies to those workers, mainly apprentices,

who are in the process of learning the job, on the one hand, and, frequently do service work as well as manufacturing, on the other. All these workers were counted as blue-collars. And, finally, since the present study did not focus on a detailed investigation of the proletarianization processes of families with rural origin, I did not need to differentiate between various groups of farmers and peasants and regarded a single group of 'farmers & peasants' as sufficient. The modified version of the class positions, then, is as follows:

(1) *wage employee: position unknown.*
(2) *unskilled service worker:* those working in various service works with lower level of skill and education; in the sample, mainly those who work in food preparation, cleaning, cafeteria and personal services such as driver.
(3) *blue-collar worker:* those working in manufacturing, repair & maintenance, construction, transportation of goods, loading & unloading, and those who both work in and have responsibilities for controlling and coordinating such tasks at the same time.
(4) *white-collar worker:* clerical and technical workers such as teachers, officers, nurses; mainly secretaries, accounting personnel, technicians within the sample.
(5) *professional employee:* managerial and technical professionals with high level of education and skill assets; mainly managers and engineers within the sample.
(6) *self-employed professional:* such as physician, accountant, lawyer, who do not employ wage labor on a regular base.
(7) *employer:* owners of manufacturing, trade, and service workplaces that employ wage labor.
(8) *artisan & informal:* artisans, small shop-keepers, and those working in self-employed informal activities.
(9) *farmer & peasant.*

The characteristics of the data that this study is based on provide us with limited information that would enable us to differentiate workers' occupational status beyond their class positions. As in accordance with the general composition of the workforce in OSTİM, those employees other than blue-collar workers (that is unskilled service workers, white-collars, and professional employees) are represented in very low proportions. Hence, I did not develop a further occupational categorization for these groups. We may divide blue-collar workers along two levels. The first division is between unskilled production workers and others. Unskilled production workers are mainly very young apprentices. The rest of the blue-collar

workers (skilled & semi-skilled production workers), however, do not give a definite idea as to their skill levels. Yet, this division clearly differentiates them from unskilled production workers. The second level of distinction is according to the industrial branches. Table 2.2 clearly reflects the weight of metal industry.

Table 2.2 Sample distribution by class position and occupation

	N	%
UNSKILLED & CASUAL SERVICE WORKERS	9	3.3
BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS		
Unskilled production workers	20	7.2
Skilled & semi-skilled production workers	207	75.0
Metal	*158*	*57.2*
Plastic & rubber	*21*	*7.6*
Insulated glass products	*17*	*6.2*
Glassware	*6*	*2.2*
Paint	*5*	*1.8*
WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS		
Technical & clerical workers	28	10.1
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES		
Managerial & technical professionals	12	4.3
Total	276	100.0

In this analytical framework, the term 'class position' is not used exclusively to define different social classes. This term at the same time identifies different groups *within the working class.* Among these working class strata, in comparative analyses I will mainly focus on differences between blue-collar and white-collar workers. I will only occasionally address to findings related to the other groups, which constitute small portions in the sample: unskilled service workers and professional employees. As I have mentioned earlier while discussing Wright's class schema, among the members of this group, the exclusion of those who, in significant degrees, are part of capitalist control and/or those who do not need to work as they have actual or potential property income from working class will theoretically be more meaningful. However, the fieldwork does not provide detailed information on the degrees of capitalist control functions these professionals assume, nor on the level of their economic wealth. So their actual class positions are empirically indefinite. For this reason, they will be assumed as a 'sub-group' within the working class and they

will occasionally be referred to as a control group in the following analyses. For the case of unskilled service workers, we should keep in mind that many characteristics of this small group in an area of industrial employment may not reflect those that would be observed in the larger service-based activities.

CHAPTER 3

THE WORKERS: SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF WAGE LABOR IN THE SMALL INDUSTRY

3.1. Demographic Profile: Age, Sex, and Education

Concordant with Turkey's young population structure in general, urban labor force shows a relatively young demographic profile. In 1999, 58 percent of urban labor force, 56 percent of urban non-agricultural employment, 66 percent of urban manufacturing industry employment, and 60 percent of urban wage earners were under the age of 35 (DİE 2001b; DİE 2001c). The labor force in OSTİM, in accordance with these general indicators, displays a highly young profile. The average age of the workers in the sample is 29. Two third of them are under the age of 35 and almost the half are under 25. White-collar workers (average age 26.4) are younger than blue-collar workers (average age 29.2). While more than 60 percent of the former is below age 25, this proportion is 37 percent for the latter.[1] When we look at the sample in terms of occupational groups, technical & clerical workers and managerial & technical professionals are younger than the skilled and semi-skilled production workers. The youngest are the relatively less educated unskilled production workers who, we may assume to be, started to work at early ages. The oldest group is low educated unskilled and causal workers. Among the skilled and semi-skilled production workers those in plastic & rubber industry appear to be older

[1] In their research on OSTİM workers, Değirmenci and Mendeş (1998) found similar and even lower results. The average age of workers is 28.7 and the proportion of those workers over the age of 35 is only 17 percent. In any case, we may conclude that among urban labor force groups the average age of OSTİM workers is relatively low. For instance, the average age of the unionized metal workers (33) in İstanbul is higher than OSTİM workers (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999).

than others. The youngest group consists of those working in glass products manufacturing with higher levels of education.

Female workers constitute 9 percent of the sample. Yet, for OSTİM in general this proportion is not representative. Based on field observations and interviews, we may say that the proportion of female workers is actually lower than this. We may estimate that two-third of female employees in OSTİM are typically high school graduate white-collar office workers. The rest one-third are unskilled service workers whose typical tasks consist of cafeteria, food preparation and cleaning works. Those women who work in clerical jobs are younger and more educated than men.

I will return to the issue of female employment later in the context of wage earners in the households. Yet, I would like to add one point regarding female workers in OSTİM. OSTİM is a place prominently 'without woman.' Some of the workers interviewed openly complained about not seeing any women around. On the other hand, as occasionally mentioned in the monthly bulletin published by the estate directory, some of the employers who encountered with difficulties in finding female employees for office jobs stated that women do not want to work in OSTİM because assaults by men are common. It is an obvious fact that in this industrial area a general sexist atmosphere against women prevails. However, we may argue that this situation is as much as the reason for as it is the result of the low rate of female employment. Also we should remind that, as in other places, the dependency of employment on a sexist division of labor in general is a much more significant factor. In other words, an increase in the number of women working in this area and their concentration in office jobs as is the current case would not decrease the presence of sexism in division of labor. For, in an industrial zone such as OSTİM, 'office' is a physically isolated place. In this study, I encountered only few female blue-collar workers who work in production. These women in OSTİM represent exceptional cases. Almost all of them were high school graduates young women from poor households. The workplace experiences of these women indicate that male sexism creates serious problems for them, yet these problems decline in time:

> When we started [to work] here, especially because we were the first woman workers, we had a lot of difficulties and we still do in some degrees. Men had some problems of adjusting and they still do. They had difficulties in accepting us. In a workplace where there had been only male workers for long years, we

were more important in the eyes of the employer. He has placed us to a different [better] status. Whenever they [male workers] noticed this, they would get angry with us, [and would say] you are privileged [favored]. Also they have to pay more attention to their talk since we are women. Sometimes they apologized from us because of what they unintentionally said. [They would say] 'We are not used to it. Try to understand.' Of course, it is not as it used to be at the beginning. They also got used to it in time.(*) (*lathe operator, 19 years old*)

3.1.1. Education and vocational training

Average educational level of the labor force in OSTİM is relatively high. More than 40 percent of the workers acquired degrees from high schools or higher educational institutions (universities or colleges). This rate is a little higher than the average of those with the same educational level among urban labor force and urban non-agricultural employment (37%). Compared to the labor force in urban manufacturing industry and urban wage employment (24% and 31% respectively), on the other hand, we see a significantly higher average level of education (DİE 2001b; DİE 2001c).[2]

Age appears to be the most important factor affecting the education level. Young workers are significantly better educated than the others. While within the most populated age bracket of 25-34 the proportion of those who have at least a high school diploma is 32 percent, within the second largest group of 20-24 this proportion is 70 percent, and for those at the age of 35 and over it is around 22-23 percent. When the age increases the number of those with the lowest educational levels (primary school graduates and those with no formal education) also increases significantly and steadily: 10 percent within 20-24 years and 47 percent for age group of 35-44 years. Among the members of the youngest group (13-19 years), for

(*) *Buraya başlarken, hele bir de ilk bayanlar olduğumuz için bayağı bir zorluk çektik, hala da çekiyoruz. Erkeklerde bir uyuşamamazlik vardı, hala da var, bizi kabul etmekte zorlandılar. Bunca yıl sadece erkeklerin olduğu bir işyerinde, biz işverenin gözünde daha bir önemliydik, bizi daha bir ayrı yerde tutuyordu. Onlar da bunu farkettikçe bize çok kızıyorlardı, siz torpillisiniz diye. Bir de kadın olduğumuz için konuşmalarına daha bir dikkat etmek zorunda kalıyorlar. Bazen ellerinde olmadan söyledikleri için özür dilerlerdi: alışık değiliz, anlamaya çalışın diye. Ama tabii artık ilk baştaki kadar değil. Onlar da zamanla alıştılar.*

[2] Statistics show that between 1988 and 1998, the proportion of individuals with high school and higher educational levels within urban employment in Turkey have increased significantly: within this same period the proportion of those who completed high schools or higher education institutions in urban non-agricultural employment increased from 27 percent to 37 percent, in urban manufacturing industry employment from 16 percent to 24 percent, and among urban wage workers from 27 percent to 31 percent (DİE 2001c).

whom university education is not applicable due to their age limit, the rate of high school graduates is nearly 50 percent. The other half is made up of those youngest workers who joined to workforce market after the middle school or earlier.

We find a high correlation between level of education and place of birth: those who were born in rural areas (villages) are the least educated than the others. More than half of those who were born in metropolitan & urban centers attended high schools or higher educational institutions. On the other hand, only 25 percent of those who were born in village had high school education, and more than half are at most primary school graduates. In addition there are also differences in educational levels in terms of regional origins. The Ankara born group, including those who were born in villages and towns near Ankara, is significantly better educated than the second largest group of Central Anatolian migrants: While 45 percent of Ankara born individuals have at least high school diploma, this proportion for the Central Anatolian group is 30 percent.

Given their occupational requirements, white-collars are significantly more educated than blue-collars: while 68 percent of the blue-collars do not have a high school degree, 71 percent of the white-collars are high school graduates, the rest of them being college graduates. All of the managerial & technical professionals are university graduates. Educational profiles of the workers' spouses reflect similar patterns: only 25 percent of the married white-collars' spouses do not have high school education, whereas this figure is 87 percent for the married blue-collars' spouses. In general, the group with the lowest education is unskilled & casual service workers: almost the entire group is either primary school graduate or middle school dropout. Unskilled production workers follow service workers with lower educational profile. Almost one-third of unskilled production workers are primary school graduates and only one-fourth of them have attended high schools. Among skilled & semi-skilled production workers, metal and glass product workers have more education than paint and plastic & rubber workers. In the former group two third has more than primary school and one-third has high school and higher education.

Table 3.1 Educational level by class position (%)

	unskilled service worker	*blue-collar worker*	*white-collar worker*	*professional employee*	*TOTAL*
Literate without any diploma	11.1	1.3	--	--	1.4
Primary school graduate	55.6	38.1	--	--	33.0
Junior high school dropout	22.2	9.7	--	--	8.7
Junior high school graduate	11.1	15.9	--	--	13.4
High school dropout	--	3.1	--	--	2.5
High school graduate	--	30.1	64.3	--	31.2
College/university drop-out	--	0.4	7.1	--	1.1
College/university graduate	--	1.3	28.6	100.0	8.7

Among the group of high school and higher graduates only, a two-third completed technical high schools.[3] Blue-collar high school graduates are more likely to have a technical high school degree (71 percent) than those of white-collars (55 percent). It should also be noted that there are significant degrees of drop out: 10 percent of blue-collars had dropped their secondary school education, and 3 percent dropped out from high school. The highest rates of dropping out are observed among unskilled service workers (22 percent) and within the age group of 25-34 (16 percent). We may interpret this situation roughly as an indication of higher rates of drop out during the 1980s.

OSTİM workers are better-educated compare to their fathers. However, at the same time, there is a manifest correlation between differentiation in their education levels and their fathers' education. In general, the parents of those who are younger and have relatively higher levels of education also are more educated. The parents of white-collar workers are more educated than the parents of blue-collars. 43 percent of the white-collars' fathers completed at least secondary school, whereas 85 percent of the fathers of blue-collars had, at most, primary education and 27 percent of them with no formal education at all. This differentiation also applies to the case of mothers. Overall, however, mothers are definitely less educated than fathers are: 24 percent of fathers and 43 percent of mothers had no formal education.

[3] The figure is almost same among İstanbul metal workers for whom the rate of high school and higher graduates is 51 percent (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999). Akşit et al. (2000), in their study on high school students in Ankara, show that the majority of students in vocational high schools are the children of the fathers from lower sections of working class.

We also see that socio-economic status of fathers have a significant effect on children's education. Accordingly, those with the lowest education among the workers are those whose fathers are unskilled service workers and peasant/farmer. An overwhelming majority (50-59 percent) of these groups with unskilled and peasant fathers have at most a primary school education. On the other hand, among the fathers within the larger segments of the urban social strata (except unskilled service workers), to have their children more educated appears to be a common orientation: like the majority of children of the white-collar fathers (51 percent), significant proportions of the children of blue-collar (49 percent) and artisan & informal (48 percent) fathers, too, have at least high school degrees.[4]

Among OSTİM workers the rate of those who, in one way or another, had some kind of vocational training is quite high. One-third of blue-collar workers and almost two-third of white-collar workers have had various vocational training either before they started to work or at the very first stages of their working life. However, we need to explain why vocational training among white-collar is more prevalent than it is among blue-collars. A large proportion of such training experiences of white-collar workers actually come from short-term and voluntary programs related to accounting, secretariat, computer use etc. The vocational training of blue-collar workers, on the other hand, takes place in a more apparent 'institutional' context of industrial labor force training. This institutional context is made up of two systems. The first one is the already-mentioned technical high schools. These schools also offer on-job training programs as a complementary component. I have already mentioned that more than one third of blue-collar workers have high school education and most of these are technical high school graduates. They constitute one part of blue-collar workers with vocational training experiences. The second one is apprenticeship (*çıraklık*), which also functions as a system of labor recruitment. A significant percent of blue-collar workers (15) either already had an education in Apprenticeship Training Center (*Çıraklık Eğitim Merkezi*) or they are still continuing to their education in this center while they are employed in their current workplace as apprentice. Among semi-skilled & skilled metal workers both technical high school

[4] See Buchmann & Hannum (2001) for a review of the studies concerning the role of formal education on social stratification in developing countries.

and apprenticeship experiences are commonly observed. Among the workers in other industrial branches such as plastic & rubber, paint, and glass products, and among unskilled production workers as a whole, apprenticeship is common, but vocational high school education is not.

According to the Law of Apprenticeship and Vocational Training those apprentices between the age bracket of 14 and 19 employed in an enterprise could acquire 'apprentice student' status through a contract made between workplace, apprentice (or the family) and Apprenticeship Training Center under the authority of the Ministry of National Education. For 3 years, once in a week apprentice students go to the Apprenticeship Training Center for 'theoretical education.' Five days work at their workplaces constitutes their 'practical education.' The law that aims to develop vocational training system and to regulate the employment of apprentices, in its present form, creates a legal cheap labor regime for the employers: according to the law, it is allowed to employ apprentices with 30 percent of minimum wage that applies to their age. In addition, the social security pensions of the apprentices are paid by Apprenticeship Training Center at the rate of 50 percent of minimum wage appropriate to their age. According to the statistics by the Ministry of Education, in 1999-2000 academic period, 218.576 apprentice students were registered at 330 Apprenticeship Training Centers in Turkey (http://www.meb.gov.tr). The name of these centers was changed into 'Vocational Training Center' in July 2001.

There are examples indicating that entering into industrial work at lower ages as an apprentice, along with the economic conditions of the family, is also related to particular socialization processes. One of them is Ümit, who is only 13. His family migrated to Ankara from a village in Çorum four years ago. His father works as a taxi driver. The taxi, however, "does not belong to him." Ümit is working at the same workplace with his one-year-older brother. Since he has not completed the age of 14, he was accepted to the Apprenticeship Training Center as 'candidate student.' He goes to the center once in a week: "I wanted to continue my education after I finished the primary school. But then I changed my mind. My friends in the neighborhood said 'Working is much better.' They too work in OSTİM and *Siteler*. ... I do not think I will be able to open my own shop [in the future] ... it seems I will continue

like this." Ümit, in the future, is planning to attend Vocational-Technical Training Center (*Mesleki-Teknik Eğitim Merkezi: METEM*) that has "drilling machines."

3.2. Migration, Urbanization, and Social Class Background

Geographical origins of the workers consist overwhelmingly of Ankara in particular and the surrounding region of Central Anatolia in general. 30 percent of the workers in the sample declared their place of origin as Ankara. 'Place of origin' (*memleket*: 'hometown') in ordinary language may refer to the birthplace of the former generations, as well as the respondent's own. As for the birthplaces of the respondents, we observe following tendencies. The proportion of those who were born in metropolitan & urban areas among white-collar workers (57 percent) is significantly higher than those among blue-collar workers (31 percent). In addition, one interesting fact is the significantly low numbers of workers who were born in small and medium sized cities and towns compare to the high numbers of those who were born in villages.[5] While the largest group of blue-collar workers (48 percent) was village-born, those with village origin constitute the second largest group of white-collar (28 percent).[6] After the first largest group of workers (54 percent) who were born in Ankara, the same tendency is more strongly observed among the second largest group (27 percent) that consists of those who were born in five central Anatolian provinces (with respect to higher percentages: *Yozgat*, *Çorum*, *Çankırı*, *Kırşehir*, *Kırıkkale*).[7] More than 70 percent of the migrants from those provinces are

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[5] This situation differs from the last 20 years' domestic migration patterns in Turkey. According to Peker (1996), while in previous periods migration from rural areas was a dominant pattern, in later periods, migration from city to city due to differentiation in living standards have become predominant.

[6] Boratav (1995), in his study on older generations (household heads) conducted in 1991 in İstanbul, found the proportion of village-born blue-collar workers (46 percent) to be a little less than those of white-collar workers (52 percent) among the wage earners. According to Boratav, the existence of high numbers of those from outside of metropolitan areas (83 percent) and particularly those from villages (45 percent) is due to the price shock experienced during the1980s (Boratav 1995: 17).

[7] Değirmenci & Mendeş (1998) found that 82 percent of OSTİM workers were born in Central Anatolian provinces (including Ankara). Geographical origins of İstanbul metal workers present a strictly different pattern: only 28 percent of the workers themselves or their parents migrated

village born; the rest were born in small- and medium-sized towns and cities. Among those who are from Ankara, 61 percent was born in metropolitan-urban area, and nearly 30 percent were born in villages near Ankara.[8]

Table 3.2 Place of birth by class position (%)

	unskilled service worker	*blue-collar worker*	*white-collar worker*	*professional employee*	*TOTAL*
Ankara metropolitan area	22.2	31.4	57.1	41.7	34.1
Medium- and small-sized cities	11.1	4.0	7.1	8.3	4.7
Small towns	--	16.4	7.1	25.0	15.6
Villages	66.7	48.2	28.6	25.0	45.7

More than one-third of the workers were born in Ankara (35 percent), and another one-third (38 percent) has been living in Ankara for at least 10 years ('Ankara' here refers specifically to the metropolitan area). These figures imply that the majority of those people, who were born outside, migrated to Ankara in their childhood with parents. Accordingly, 64 percent of the migrants came to Ankara before they were fifteen. Moreover, 45 percent migrated for their parents' intention to find a job. While this group can be labeled as 'children of migrants' or 'second generation migrant workers', there is also a group of first generation migrants with an important volume: 39 percent of migrants migrated to Ankara at their younger

from the surrounding region of Marmara, the rest covering the migrants from almost all of the regions across the country (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999).

[8] In those above-mentioned Central Anatolian provinces per capita income is less than the average of Turkey. Those are also among the provinces showing net out-migration patterns during 1980-1990. Yamak and Yamak (1999), when they conducted a regression analysis on the relationship between migration and income distribution in Turkey, found that regional income disparity has a determining effect on domestic migration. Yet they concluded that this outcome is more related to the high-income levels in net migration receiving areas than the low-income levels in the out-migration areas. Of course, a migration analysis based on 'regional' income differentials covering both urban and rural areas would not particularly apply to the case of 'rural' migration to the cities. In this context, we may argue that for those poorer rural groups the 'push' effects of the village may play a higher role than the 'pull' effects of the cities (Boratav 1991: 76). For studies that use ecological theory and emphasize rural push and urban pull effects in explaining structural determinants of urbanization in Third World and political economic studies that approach the issue through the patterns of capitalist system's penetration into these countries in the context of the world system, see London (1987).

ages without their parents.[9] These are mostly composed of those workers who migrated at their 14-24 ages to find a job and consequently whose educational level is comparatively low because of their entry into the urban labor market at the early period of their life.[10] The proportion of 'first generation migration' is significantly higher among blue-collar workers (43 percent) than among white-collars (23 percent). In addition, another 23 percent of the white-collar migrants came to Ankara for educational purposes, while this is the case for only 7 percent of the blue-collar migrants.

The typical examples of migration from rural-to-urban suggest the inadequacy of agricultural household economy:

> We had come to Ankara when I was two or so. My father, of course came here for work. He had seven brothers and sisters. The land was not sufficient. My father and his brothers, that is, those who were married came here, to Ankara. Almost all of them are here right now. There are only one or two persons, my uncles, stayed in the village. My father was a night watchman. He had a work accident and died when I was 12. One of my brothers is doing his military service right now. Two of my sisters are married. My other brother will go for his military service. I am the eldest in the family. There were two elder brothers before me but they had died before I was born. Otherwise, we were going to be seven brothers and sisters.(*) (*lathe worker, 27 years old*)

In other examples, we encounter with earlier experiences of 'seasonal migration' as common tendency for seeking jobs outside of the rural economy:

> When we came to Ankara from village, I was three. We have been living in Ankara for 20 years. My parents, my elder sister, my brothers, and me, we are seven all together. My sister got married. (...) My father, before we came to Ankara, was working in construction sites outside the village, in addition to

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[9] First generation migrants appear to be higher among İstanbul metal workers: 63 percent migrated to find a job and 28 percent migrated together with their parents (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999).

[10] This situation becomes apparent in education differentiation: the education level of those who left their place of birth to find a job is significantly lower than those who left with their families; in the same vein, those who migrated between the ages of 15 and 24 (especially between 15-19 ages) are significantly less educated than those who migrated in other ages.

(*) *İki yaşında falan Ankara'ya gelmişiz. Babam çalışmak için gelmiş tabii. Köyde sekiz kardeştiler. Tarla da yetmez olmuş tabii. Babam ve kardeşleri, evlenen bu tarafa gelmiş işte, Ankara'ya. Hepsi burada hemen hemen. Köyde bir-iki kişi var, amcalarım. Babam bekçiydi. İş kazası geçirdi, ben 12 yaşındayken, vefat etti. Kardeşimin biri askerde şu anda. İki kızkardeşim evlendi. Birisi de askere gidecek. En büyükleri benim. İki tane varmış benim büyüğüm, ölmüş. Yoksa, yedi kardeş olacaktık biz de.*

farming etc. So were my uncles. We came and settled here. Thanks to my mother's brother, my uncle's political networks, my father found a job in the municipality. He is still working there. He is janitor-head. He is going to retire in next April.(*) (*lathe worker, 29 years old*)

With respect to two parameters –to be born and have been living for at least ten years in Ankara–, white-collars seem to be the most urbanized group. 56 percent of the white-collars and 33 percent of the blue-collars were born in Ankara. The least urbanized group is unskilled service workers, only 13 percent of which were born in Ankara. A majority of these workers migrated to Ankara when they were at least twenty-five years old, that is, when they had limited access to the opportunities of education and skill acquisition in the city.

There is a non-urbanized (in terms of residence) group of workers that approaches to 10 percent of the sample who are still living in the villages near Ankara (these villages are *Sirkeli* and *Akyurt* in *Çubuk* district, *Yakacık* and *Memluk* in *Yenimahalle* district, and *Ayboğaz* in *Gölbaşı* district). Exceptional cases among this group are comprised of those who were born in other places, but have preferred to live in these places after their migration to Ankara. However, the typical members of this group come from those who were born and continue to live in the same place. They constitute a specific worker typology. In the absence of a better term, I propose to call them 'semi-urban & semi-proletarian workers.'[11] They are not seasonal

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(*) *Köyden Ankara'ya geldiğimizde ben üç yaşındaydım. 20-21 senedir de Ankara'dayız. Annem-babam, ben, ablam ve kardeşlerim, 7 nüfus. Ablam evlendi. (...) Babam gurbette inşaatlarda falan çalışıyordu gelmeden önce, tarla işleri filan yanında. Amcalarım da öyle. Buraya geldik yerleştik. Babamı annemin abisi, dayım, siyasi çevrelerinden dolayı işe soktu, belediyede bir yere, orada çalışıyor hala. Orada şu anda odacıbaşı. Emekliliği bu sene nisan ayında dolıyor*

[11] We might have called this group as 'peasant workers', yet this concept would blur their distinct status as it echoes agricultural proletariat. My intuition is that it is not an exceptional or a rare phenomenon particularly in large metropolitan areas. A friend of mine has observed the presence of such phenomena in the northern rural part of Istanbul where it was common for at least one member of the family to commute to the city for wage work or perform nonagricultural wage jobs in places near village such as gated, suburban communities. Similar cases in Indonesia are reported by Hull (1994: 5): "There are indeed many, usually small, manufacturing enterprises in rural areas. Some of these are really suburban settings taking advantage of cheap labor costs combined with easy access to markets. (...) Some workers live in villages and bicycle or bus to work each day in cities. Their peripheral homes provide them with links to agrarian style communities, but they are nonetheless divorced from agricultural enterprise, except perhaps for a small garden." Kalaycıoğlu (1995: 172-3) has encountered with another example from Turkey among factory workers in Bolu. For the reasons of cheaper accommodation and proximity, these workers continued to live in their villages. These villages are very near to the city and in a short

workers. They work as regular wage earners during the whole year. At the same time, we see that the household economy of these workers still continue to be tied on rural petty-production. Although the workers themselves had broken off from agricultural activities in the village that the rest of the family members continue to perform, their bonds with the agricultural ownership endure. Depending on the degree of increases in the household population and decreases in agricultural income, in some cases, wage labor carries the aim of supporting the currently suffering household economy. Yet, in other cases, it indicates a preparation period towards a transition to wage-based household economy.[12]

Petrusewicz (1987) discusses an example, in some respects similar to this phenomenon, in her study on Latin American *latifondo* agricultural workers. She defines this case of wage labor as 'wage-earners, but not proletarians.' Petrusewicz argues that these workers could not be called proletarian since their labor-power has not been commodified yet. As a support to her argument, she presents two reasons: (i) the wages do not constitute their main source of means of subsistence, and (ii) in cases where wage is the main source of subsistence, it is paid in non-monetary forms. For our case of semi-urbanized workers, we do not know the proportion of non-wage income in the total household budget, but we are able to argue that their wages do not constitute the 'only' means of subsistence. In the present condition, despite the problem of commuting, due to the continuity of agricultural income support in some degrees and the low cost of reproduction of labor in the villages they reside mowing out to the center is not a feasible choice. These conditions also enable them to work for relatively low wage levels. On the other hand, one significant observation is that almost half of these workers are not the first generation of wageworkers in their household. Their fathers are either still working as wage laborers or are retired from wage jobs. This situation can be interpreted as that, even in the cases where wage

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time turned into cheap suburbs of the city. For most of the villages in OSTIM example the trend of becoming such suburbs seems a remote possibility.

[12] According to Boratav (1995: 73), in certain economic conditions where agricultural household economy is negatively affected, as a natural tendency, some parts of household labor goes to outside of family enterprise and/or non-agricultural areas. These areas are: (i) nonagricultural activities in the village, (ii) wage labor in the village, (iii) seasonal/temporary labor outside the village, and (iv) temporary or permanent urban economy. It is very possible that in the early phases of the process of going out of family enterprise the 'semi-urban workers' in our example might have followed especially the third path.

labor is the main source of subsistence, the tendency to migrate to the city center is low. As such this situation points to a worker typology that is far away from urban reproduction areas and that has a very limited communication with the other segments of working class.

Another set of variables reflects the levels of migrants' ongoing linkages with their rural origins. Only 7 percent of the workers have in their places of origin some rural lands as their own property. This figure by itself, however, does not tell us so much about the degree of actual ties with rural origins or the level of active involvement in rural activities. First, another 49 percent of the workers' parents continue to hold some rural land properties. Moreover, 16 percent of the workers in the sample declared that they themselves and/or their spouse & children spent some time for some kind of farming activities in their lands. In addition to this, 15 percent obtain crop revenues or rents from their lands; 12 percent acquire only some support of food from relatives living in their places of origin, which is most prevalent (33 percent) among unskilled service workers. We can, therefore, loosely estimate that a range between 15 and 30 percent of workers still engage in rural activities in various manners. With respect to the rural land ownership there is no considerable differentiation between blue- and white-collars. But those white-collars (7 percent) who spent some time for land activities are less than half of those blue-collars (17 percent). Apparently, ongoing rural linkages do not exceed 20 percent of white-collars.

Land ownership by themselves or their families, as can be expected, is quite high (almost all of them) among the 'semi-urban & semi-proletarian workers', mentioned above. In addition, almost half of these workers do participate in agricultural activities during summer holidays and weekends and earn income from these activities. In terms of other workers, we do not observe a significant relationship between land ownership and duration of residence in Ankara. Yet, except those who have lived in Ankara for quite a long time, as the duration of residence decreases, the time spent in agricultural activities, the proportion of those who earn income from these activities and those who earn rent income from their agricultural property (even if they do not participate in agricultural activities) increase. For instance, while, among individuals who have lived in Ankara for a

period of 21-30 years, the proportion of those who earn agricultural income (product income or rent) is around 9 percent, this proportion for those who have lived in Ankara less than 5 years is 30 percent.[13]

Rural bonds include two-sided practices observed together in most of the cases, Migrants reception of income from their properties in the village or food support from their relatives constitutes the typical patterns. This bond, in principle, functions to subsidize urban reproduction. In contrast, the transfer of urban income and labor to the village from time to time is possible to be less typical. Such pattern symbolizes stronger rural bonds particular to seasonal or early phases of migration or is more common in the examples where the distance between village and the city is short.[14]

3.2.1. Intergenerational social mobility: Consolidation of wage labor (1)

More than 60 percent of the workers are at least second-generation wage earners.[15] Their fathers belong to the general group of 'wage earners' with varied occupational positions. The second largest group of fathers is 'farmers' with 24 percent followed by self-employed persons ('artisan & informal') with 11 percent. There are no workers with 'self-employed professional' fathers and the group of 'professional employee' fathers appears as a marginal source of intergenerational social mobility with 2 percent. As seen in Table 3.3, there is a striking difference between the intergenerational mobility patterns of white- and blue-collars. Probably because of their longer urban origin, white-collars have more wage labor background with 72 percent than blue-collars with 59 percent; 25 percent of the blue-collars' fathers are

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[13] Rural land ownership among OSTİM workers is apparently higher than İstanbul metal workers (37 percent), while other patterns of rural linkages are not so different: about 10 percent receive income and about 20 percent receive food support (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999). According to Boratav's (1995: 18) findings, the proportion of land ownership among wage earner household heads in various job branches in Istanbul is between 35-45 percent. In addition, surprisingly, the number of workers who earn income from land is quite larger among wage professionals and white-collar workers (16-23 percent) than it is among blue-collar and unskilled workers (9-10 percent).

[14] Kalaycıoğlu (1995) points to the typically 'mutual' character of rural bonds: in exchange for subsidiary income coming from the village in cash or in kind the worker in the city provides the new comers with shelter and help in the labor market.

[15] 56 percent among İstanbul metal workers (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999). Another figure reflects the situation of organized metal workers in Gebze: less than one-third of the workers' fathers were wage earners (Yıldırım 1996).

farmers, while only 4 percent of the white-collars' fathers are so. For unskilled service workers the situation is strictly different: fathers of the majority (56 percent) are farmers.[16]

Table 3.3 Inter-generational social mobility: Fathers' class positions (%)

	unskilled service worker	*blue-collar worker*	*white-collar worker*	*professional employee*	TOTAL
wage employee: exact position unknown	--	21.5	29.6	8.3	21.0
unskilled & casual service worker	--	9.6	3.7	--	8.2
blue-collar worker	22.2	14.6	18.5	33.3	16.1
white-collar worker	11.1	13.2	22.2	8.3	13.9
professional employee	--	0.9	7.4	8.3	1.9
employer	11.1	4.6	3.7	--	4.5
artisan & informal	--	10.5	11.1	16.7	10.5
farmer & peasant	55.6	25.1	3.7	25.0	24.0

Based on the age groups, we observe a marked tendency in intergenerational mobility toward wage laborers. Accordingly, as the age increases, the ratio of those whose fathers are wage earners tends to show a steady and sharp decrease. For instance, while the fathers of 80 percent of those between 20-24 ages are wage laborers, the same ratio for the fathers of those between 45-64 ages drops to 18 percent. The tendency is in opposite direction in the case of second most populated group of fathers (farmers and artisans). In the age group of 13-19, we face a different situation falling outside of this general intergenerational class mobility pattern. The proportion of working class fathers for these workers, which constitute the youngest age group in the sample, is 64 percent, which is highly below than that of 20-24 ages group. However, the fathers of these young workers belong to urban class positions

[16] Boratav (1995: 26) found similar trends in his survey on households in Istanbul. Except for unskilled service workers who come predominantly from farmer/peasant family backgrounds, other groups display a strong internal class reproduction. For instance, the majority of blue-collar workers come from blue-collar family backgrounds. Boratav (1995: 28) in the same study also notes two different patterns in inter-generational horizontal (geographical) and vertical mobility. The first path is from agricultural labor to urban informal/marginal statuses and from here to small, and medium & large employer positions. The second path is from farmer/peasant to urban wage labor positions and from here to wage professional and, finally, to medium & large employer status. In these paths, the third phases are not very common. They rather represent the possible vertical mobility paths of later generations. Our example, although limited to wage statuses in terms of current positions, clearly shows a pattern that falls in to the second category.

rather than being part of rural class structure, with 16 percent artisans and 10 percent employers. We might consider this situation as the reflection of a conjuncture in which the economic position of the artisan and small-employer fathers of these workers have been deteriorating; otherwise they could have been able to support and promote their sons' mobility toward non-wage occupational categories.

We may draw attention to couple of significant trends provided that the observations here are based on retrospective findings and hence do not sufficiently represent the full range of social mobilization from fathers to sons. First, the majority of workers are second-generation wage earners. This situation indicates that chances for upward *class mobility* in working class households are weak and class positions are highly stabilized. In other words, we see a certain trend towards the consolidation of wage labor. Secondly, in the previous phases of this consolidation, i.e., the transition from peasant/farmer fathers to urban wage laborer kids, there is a striking polarization: village originated kids predominantly go either to unskilled and blue-collar wage laborer positions or professional employee positions. In contrast, transition to white-collar position is very limited. This situation implies a significant income differentiation among peasant/farmer fathers. In other words, a segment of farmers with larger economic capital can afford the cost of university education that will carry their kids to professional jobs. Thirdly, in general, the process of consolidation of wage labor is accompanied by both upward mobility and stabilization dynamics *among* the strata of wage employees. The fact that we can encounter with professional employees with blue-collar fathers indicates a certain degree of upward mobility. Yet the fact that the majority of white-collar workers' fathers are white-collars indicates the existence of stabilization. This situation of white-collars may signal a high degree of 'familial socialization' (Western 1994) among white-collar households, through which, father's and/or other household members' class position can influence children's occupational and educational preferences.

3.3. Workers in the Labor Market: Class, Occupation, and Unemployment

In this section, I examine the main indicators of OSTİM workers' experiences in labor market and look at common as well as differing trends in this process. This analysis essentially aims to shed some light on the workers' past experiences. For this reason, I leave out various aspects of presents conditions such as their jobs, skills and experience, division of labor, internal labor market dynamics, and labor relations in the current workplace, which I will explore in some detail in the next chapter. Here I am mainly concerned with adventures of workers in the labor market, in general, rather than generating an industry-specific approach. Even though the data at hand do not allow us to take on detailed ethnographic accounts of the experiences of workers in the labor market, we have some valuable information to analyze such central themes such as their class and occupational mobility, unemployment experiences and mechanisms of coping with unemployment, and the role of networks in finding jobs etc. In the following analyses, I aim to show to what extent those factors such as education, age and socio-economic status have differential impacts on the workers' labor market experiences.

As I pointed out earlier, we are encountered with a highly young group of laborers in general. When we take this aspect into account, we observe a display of significantly high labor market mobility of these workers. In general, the workers have so far changed average of 3.11 jobs, a number that does not include their current jobs. 17 percent of the workers, who constitute relatively the youngest ones in the group, did not change any job and the present job is their first employment. When this group is left outside, we naturally see a high rate of labor turnover (3.8 jobs). 42 percent of workers changed at least three jobs before their present jobs.[17] As can be expected, there are important differences in labor turnover rates in terms of age differentials: The number of the job change increases to 4.7 for the 35 years old

[17] Değirmenci and Mendeş (1998) in their study on OSTİM workers find similar results about labor turnover with 3.7 jobs on average. According to this study, the ratio of those workers who changed at least three jobs is 45 percent. When compared with general employment characteristics in Ankara, the frequency of labor turnover in OSTİM is significantly high. For instance, in their study on the households and residential dynamics in Ankara, Ayata and Ayata (2000) point out that more than half of the population so far has not changed their jobs. One of the main reasons of this is the significant share of civil servants in urban employment in Ankara.

and older workers. Nevertheless, the frequency of changing job for the youngest age group (13-19) is still significantly high considering their relatively short period of labor market experience: these young workers have so far changed 2 jobs, on average.

Certainly, parallel increase in age and frequency of changing jobs is not surprising and it does not tell us much in itself. If there were a negative correlation between age and frequency of changing job, this would demand considering the possibility of instability and deterioration in labor market conditions in time. In other words, this picture does not suggest that the older the workers get the more they have a tendency to change job. It only means that the older workers change their jobs more than younger workers due to their longer work history. However, another indicator about job stability shows a trend associated with the increase in age: while average length of stay in the same job for the youngest age group is around one year, the duration in the same job steadily increases as the age increases and it reaches to 4 years for 35 years old and older workers. We may consider this increasing job stability as related with work experience in time. Another possible factor is marriage that might be limiting the tendencies of voluntary job mobility. The education level does not seem to have an impact on the degree of job stability. We do not see a marked trend associated with neither the relationship between education level and frequency of changing job, nor a relationship between education and length of stay in the same job. Based on a comparison between primary school and high school graduates, which constitute two largest groups in the sample, we can advance the following observation. The primary school graduates in terms of both frequency of changing jobs and duration in the same job is two times higher than high school graduates. This again leads us to the same conclusion. The job stability is essentially associated not with education but with experience.

Differences in class positions and occupational groups are in conformity with the above observations regarding age and education. For instance, the frequency of job changing for the least educated and oldest unskilled workers (3.1) is higher than white-collar workers (2.3), but the average length of stay in the same job of this group (4.3 years) is also much more longer than that of white-collar workers (1 year). Similarly, the average length of stay in the same job (3.2 years) for the blue-collar

workers, who are older and less educated than the white-collars, is higher than the white-collar workers in general. Certainly, all these do not amount to say that there are no other factors playing a role in job stability other than age. There are some differentiations that can be observed among blue-collar workers with close age groups in terms of educational levels and industrial branches. For example, although there are not much age differences among metal and plastics-rubber workers, the average length of stay in the same job is markedly higher for the former group than the latter.

3.3.1. Class and occupational mobility: Consolidation of wage labor (2)

To what extent this generally high rate of job turnover is related with class and occupational mobility for these workers? The information regarding this question can give us a general picture about vertical mobility in itself. It can as well give us an idea about whether high rates of labor turnover stems mainly from negative conditions in labor market or from opportunities of occupational and class-based vertical mobility.

Table 3.4 presents a summary that reflects the mobility between class positions. It compares workers' present class positions and their *known oldest class positions*. In this comparison, those workers who have not changed their jobs, i.e., the workers who are still working in their first jobs at the present moment, are excluded.

Table 3.4 Intra-generational social mobility: Previous class positions (%)

	unskilled service worker	*blue-collar worker*	*white-collar worker*	*professional employee*	TOTAL
unskilled & casual service worker	33.3	16.5	17.6	11.1	17.0
blue-collar worker	55.6	73.4	5.9	11.1	65.0
white-collar worker	--	0.5	64.7	33.3	6.7
professional employee	--	--	--	44.4	1.8
employer	--	0.5	5.9	--	0.9
artisan & informal	11.1	6.9	5.9	--	6.7
farmer & peasant	--	2.1	--	--	1.8

This table, in general, shows that the mobility in the labor market does not make much difference in terms of workers' class positions. In other words, (if we assume a hierarchy of wage earner positions mowing upwards from unskilled service worker to professional employee) upward mobility among different strata of the wage earners is not very common. From this perspective, we may say that, for all groups, except unskilled service workers, the dominant pattern is 'inward mobility.' We need, however, to further underline some tendencies that a closer examination would provide.

First, although they constitute a small group in the sample, vertical mobility experience of some of the unskilled service workers presents an interesting picture. Surprisingly, more than half of the unskilled service workers were previously located in blue-collar positions. We may assume that this situation is either an indication of an exceptional downward mobility or is a result of their short-term experience as unskilled production workers.

The second, and more significant, observation is that unskilled service worker position occupies a significant place in the past of both blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. In other words, some of the unskilled service workers have shown upward mobility and passed into blue-collar or white-collar positions. If we keep in mind that white-collar workers constitute a small group in the sample, this situation indicates a significant tendency in terms of blue-collar workers' class mobility.

Unskilled service worker backgrounds among those relatively more educated blue-collars in most cases are related with employment experiences in labor market at younger ages:

> I got my education at Industrial-Vocational high school in the field of lathe. In the meantime, I worked in several jobs. I have been working since I was in primary school. I sold water, did shoe shining and worked in janitorial jobs, in a printing company, in dentist clinic for a week etc. As you see, there was no job left that I have not done! My elder brother, who just finished his military service, had also worked in a dentist clinic. Now he works in a packaging factory at the entrance of OSTİM. When I returned from the military service, after one month of unemployment, I started working here, thanks to my neighbor's help. He is also working in a welding company in OSTİM. He knew the foreman and boss of this company. He asked them for a job for me, and thankfully they did not return his request. I have been working here for more than two years now. I am kneader here. There is a machine what we call *valf*

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DOKÜMANTASYON MERKEZİ

> with two cylinders, one turns slowly and other rapidly. In this machine we process raw rubber into dough by adding some additives. Later, this dough becomes plaque.(*) (*rubber worker, 23 years old*)

However, among those workers who did not get education beyond primary school or dropped out from junior high schools, starting their job career as unskilled blue-collar workers is a much more common pattern:

> I started working after I finished primary school at the *Büyük Sanayi*. My father put me there as an apprentice. When my father died, I stayed in this job. Until I left for the military service, I worked there. For 8 years. When I returned from the military, I continued to work there for 1.5 or 2 years. I was working on cogged-lathe... Then, I started working here. I have been here for almost 7 years. Similarly, I am working on cogged-lathe: gearbox cog, machine cog. I am adjusting machines. We open cog in materials that come as unprocessed.(**) (*lathe worker 29 years old*)

Despite these two examples, we may draw two important conclusions from the fact that the majority of blue-collar workers' previous positions were also blue-collar. First, the high rate of labor turnover we observed above does not function as an effect that changes workers' class positions. Secondly, this trend points to the transformation of dominant patterns in long-term consolidation patterns of blue-collar wage labor. To put it differently, this reflects a change in the composition of urban proletariat. The group of workers that is composed of relatively unskilled migrant laborers and of those who entered industrial jobs only after working

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(*) *Endüstri Meslek Lisesi torna bölümünde okudum. Bu arada çok işte çalıştım, ilkokuldan beri çalışıyorum. Su sattım, ayakkabı boyacılığı yaptım, temizlik şirketlerinde filan çalıştım, matbaada çalıştım, diş doktorunun yanına girdim bir hafta falan orada çalıştım, çalışmadığım iş kalmadı yani. Benden iki yaş küçük kardeşim, askerden yeni gelen, o da daha önce bir dişçinin yanında çalışmıştı, şimdi OSTİM'in girişinde bir fabrikada çalışıyor, paketleme işyerinde. Askerden dönünce, bir ay boş gezdikten sonra bir tanıdığın, komşunun sayesinde buraya başladım. O da burda OSTİM'de kaynak üzerine başka bir şirkette çalışıyor. Buranın ustabaşını ve patronu tanıyor. Rica etti kendilerine, sağolsun onlar da kırmadılar. İki seneden fazladır buradayım. Burada hamurcuyum. Valf dediğimiz bir makina var, çift merdaneli, biri hızlı biri yavaş döner. Orada kauçuk hammaddesini belli bir kıvama getiririz, içine katkı maddelerini katarak hamur haline getiririz. Sonra bir plaka haline gelir.*

(**) *İlkokulu bitirdikten sonra işe başladım, Büyük Sanayide. Askere gidene kadar oradaydım, hep aynı yerde. 8 sene. Askerden geldikten sonra da 1,5-2 sene daha orada çalıştım. Yine böyle dişli üzerine çalışıyordum, dişli, torna... Tanıdık değildi, babam bırakmıştı oraya çırak olarak. Ondan sonra babam vefat edince orada kaldık. Sonra buraya girdim, 7 seneye yakın oldu. Burada da dişli üzerine.. dişli-torna. Şanzıman dişlisi, makina dişlisi. Ben makinaları ayarlıyorum, dolu olarak gelen malzemenin biz dişini açıyoruz.*

sometime in unskilled service jobs are being replaced by workers who are relatively better educated and enter into labor markets directly through semi-skilled blue-collar jobs. Without doubt, this trend is related with a conjuncture in which migration from rural to urban has been relatively stabilized. An increase in migration may reverse the pattern.

Third, although self-employed positions in the past of OSTİM workers has a marginal place, we may say that the information in the table points to a certain dynamic in terms of a transition from artisanal & informal activities to wage labor positions that transforms urban stratification.

According to the above table, around three-fourth of blue-collar workers were previously in blue-collar positions. However, the table does not give much information about 'occupational mobility' that could include both vertical and horizontal mobility patterns. In order to advance on some observations on this issue, we need to have a look at the second table. Table 3.5 compares the past job experiences of the two large blue-collar occupational groups. Here, too, we will be looking at *the known oldest jobs* of the workers and excluding those who are still working in their first jobs.

Table 3.5 Occupational mobility: Previous occupations of metal and plastic & rubber workers

Metal workers		*Plastic & rubber workers*
--	< unskilled & casual: service >	47.1%
--	< plastic & rubber >	11.8%
47.2%	< metal >	11.8%
17.3%	< unskilled production: metal >	--
10.2%	< other production >	11.8%
10.2%	< unskilled & casual: service >	--
6.3%	< wood furniture >	5.9%
--	< unskilled production: plastic & rubber >	5.9%
8.8%	< other >	5.7%

We observe striking differences between metal workers and plastic & rubber workers. First of all, we can say that metal workers, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the workforce in OSTİM, show high levels of occupational stability. Almost half of them have previously worked in same metal sector and in skilled & semi-skilled jobs. The situation among plastic & rubber

workers, in contrast, is totally different. Almost half of these workers have previously had unskilled & casual service jobs and the rate of those who come from the same occupation is very low (12 percent). We may argue that this situation is related to employment of low skilled workers in plastic & rubber sector and, hence, the transition from unskilled jobs to this sector is relatively easier.[18] This fact is strikingly reflected in the lower numbers in this sector of those who come from unskilled production worker category –the majority of whom come from apprentices –compare to those among metal workers. In other words, the trend of vertical mobility within the same occupation (from unskilled to semi-skilled& skilled positions) among metal workers is more common. The second significant indicator in terms of occupational mobility comes from other occupational branches. Here, above all, without making any differentiation between present occupation categories, we observe that the cases of transition from other occupational groups are quite low (16-17 percent). In addition, we should note that, among previous blue-collar occupations, the most common are wood furniture jobs in *Siteler*, another small & medium industry center similar to OSTİM. This means one of the major points of destiny in terms of OSTİM workers' 'geographical' mobility in labor market, apart from OSTİM, is *Siteler* located in the eastern part of the city. The most common previous jobs outside of OSTİM, after furniture, are construction, and auto mechanics where child labor employment is very common.

3.3.2. Unemployment and the role of social networks in the labor market

Given the unstable nature of the labor market conditions in OSTİM, unemployment experiences of the workers appears to be relatively rare, with relatively shorter durations. Two third of workers have never experienced unemployment. Among the rest, 11 percent have had their latest experience of unemployment in the past year and 25 percent have had the same experience in the last five-year. That means three quarters of unemployment experiences were older than five years. 60 percent of unemployment experiences lasted at most 3 months and 28 percent lasted at most one

[18] We may add two observations that would support this assumption: Both the average length of stay in work and wage levels in their current workplace of plastic& rubber workers are lower than the metal workers.

month. We can mention several factors that may play a role in this situation. First, the relatively young profile of the workforce can be a factor. Secondly, it is possible that the times spent in temporary & irregular jobs and unemployment experiences lasted only for short periods of time have not been mentioned. These two together may have played in bringing the level of unemployment experiences down than it is expected. The third factor that caused unemployment periods to be relatively short is related to specific characteristics of OSTİM as a local labor market. The high rate of job turnover is also related to employment characteristics of enterprises in OSTİM. In other words, in these enterprises labor turnover is high. The instable nature of personnel volume in these enterprises stems from the irregular character of the subcontracting relations and/or from the fluctuating demand in market. Yet, if there is no permanent economic crisis, it does not mean that unemployment is common. In other words, those workers who are laid off from this firm because of a decrease in business could easily find another job in another firm that has a new subcontract order and needs to increase the number of workers. This situation is particularly relevant for skilled & semi-skilled blue-collar workers. Hence, in this group, the number of those who experienced unemployment is significantly lower than the number of white-collar and unskilled service workers. The unemployment duration of blue-collar workers is also shorter than white-collar workers as well as unskilled workers. While for 80 percent of blue-collar workers' unemployment duration is 6 months at most, for almost half of the other groups it is more than 6 months. In another study (Boratav 1995), a similar tendency has been observed among wage groups in İstanbul: The shortest average duration of employment is among blue-collar workers and the longest is among white-collar workers.

More than half of those who had been unemployed in the past, during this process received support from various social networks they are engaged like their families, relatives, and friends. The second important mechanism of survival during the period of unemployment is casual work (21 percent worked in temporary & irregular jobs) and spouses' entry into job market in marginal degrees. The third mechanism is to mobilize family's savings (16 percent). In terms of survival mechanisms used during the period of unemployment, there are significant differences between blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. The

overwhelming majority of white-collar workers survive through the help they get from their families. The majority of white-collar workers are young women and men who still live with their parents. Compared to blue-collar workers, savings has much less significance in the livelihood strategies of these white-collar workers.

The function of official employment organizations in labor recruitment is known to be very limited in Turkey. The information on how OSTİM workers have found and have been placed in their current jobs shows that the number of those who have been placed in a job through official employment institution is only marginal. In contrast, network-like structures at the level of personal relations have significant weight in performing this function in labor market. Almost 60 percent of the workers have used these kinds of networks, i.e., help from their families and friends, in finding their current jobs. Two points should be emphasized in relation to this fact. First, we need to be skeptical about any conclusion that the common use of these networks is particular to OSTİM or similar other small industrial centers. Such conclusion needs to be tested in different local labor markets and to be compared to other employment areas. For instance, the usage of these networks at a similar rate was noted among unionized metal workers in İstanbul where we observe a larger geographical context and larger sized enterprises (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999). A rather different case has been observed among unionized factory workers at Bolu: 21 percent of the workers had been placed in their current jobs by the official Labor Employment Office and another 24 percent by direct application (Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 160).

Second, the existence of these networks is not illuminating in itself. Particularly, we need to ask whether these networks mobilize relations prior to labor market that already exist or are predominantly created and reproduced through contact and communication channels within labor market. An answer to this question would help us to determine both the dynamics of labor markets functioning and communication patterns of different worker groups. Other data at hand give us some idea about the role of *hemşehri* (fellow countrymen) networks, perhaps the most dominant form of those relations constructed before the contacts in the labor market. One-third of blue-collar workers in OSTİM have *hemşehri*s working in other workplaces. Similarly, one-third of the workers have relatives who work in other

workplaces. For the case of *hemşehris*, however, again, we do not have information that would allow us to inquire to what extent these relations are outside of and prior to market relations and constitute a pre-given network of relationships. In any case, however, either they are pre-given or 'discovered', *hemşehri* (and relatives) bonds have significant impact on the social relations at the level of workplace.

Yet, there are also a significant proportion of workers who have found their current jobs by direct personal application (around 1/3). This method, which requires a certain amount of familiarity to OSTİM labor market and job experience, is more common among the higher age groups. This fact could also be interpreted as complementary information to the above-mentioned observation that the majority of workers experience a rather short-term unemployment and those workers who are laid off from or left their jobs could find new ones relatively easily.

3.4. Summary and Conclusion

OSTİM labor force is primarily made of considerably young workers. Educational levels of these workers are also higher than that of urban labor force groups in Turkey. The white-collars, those with urban origin, and those with younger age profile are more educated. On the other hand, low education is also one of the characteristics of apprentices at younger ages. A considerable number of blue-collars with high school education graduated from vocational schools. This fact shows that a significant group of families, who want their children to join labor market at earlier ages, attributes importance to vocational education. Workers, in general, are better educated than their fathers. However, the differences in their fathers' education levels also play a role in differences between education levels of the children.

The majority of workers are migrants who came to Ankara with their families at their earlier ages. The main reason for migration is to find a job in urban labor market. Those with village origin constitute the majority among workers. The number of those who migrated from small and medium sized cities and towns is quite low. The geographical origin essentially is from the surrounding region of Central Anatolia region. The number of those who came from other regions is very limited. In addition, among the workers, we encounter with a distinct typology of

workers who did not migrate but still continue to live in the villages nearby Ankara. Rural ties show a tendency to weaken/decline depending on the length of post-migration period. The majority of workers who migrated at earlier ages are the second-generation wage laborers. However, still, the second largest group is the children of peasants/farmers.

Despite their young profile, workers display a high level of mobility in labor market. While the rate of job turnover is very high, the duration of work in the same job is very low. Job stability seems to increase as the age increases. Furthermore, we do not observe a relationship between high labor mobility and education level. In most of the cases, job mobility does not mean class mobility. Among the blue-collars there are significant numbers of those who are transferred from unskilled service jobs. Yet this tendency is not typical and is only relevant for relatively older workers, and for those with high school degree, who worked in temporary service jobs during their periods of education. Despite the high rate of job turnover, we rarely encounter with those blue-collars who came from other occupations. Those who start the same occupation as apprentices constitute one of the typical characteristics of this group.

The following chapter aims to make some observations and analyses regarding the working conditions, division of labor and control in the labor process, wages, and labor relations at the shop floor level in the OSTİM enterprises. However, before we go into this subject, we need to be reminded of one significant issue: around two-third of blue-collar workers and more than three-fourth of white-collar workers have spent at least half of their work life, without interruption, in OSTİM. This means that the above-discussed experiences of workers have been lived, in most part, 'inside' the OSTİM labor market. In this respect, OSTİM appears as a spatially segmented labor market which provides these workers with certain elements of economic and cultural capital, on the one hand, and confines them into particular labor market behaviors, social networks, and specific characteristics of labor relations, on the other. 23 years old rubber worker describes this situation as follows:

> The chances of those who work in OSTİM to find a job elsewhere is too low almost zero percent. If he wants to have a change [he could find a job] at *GİMAT* wholesalers at most, he can't go too far I mean [*GİMAT* is a wholesaler center very nearby OSTİM]. ... Of course there are jobs in other places too, but there is no favor. Those who have favor are already leaving. Here, in this kind

> of places, only those low lives work, people with low income, with nobody, who could barely survive with his family and barely takes care of his children. [But] people work here for bread winning, however it is dirty, even if it is cleaning the toilet, job is not important.(*)

These kinds of complaints are particularly very common among young workers. In some cases, they also reflect a feeling of cultural marginalization. I will return to this subject in the following chapters.

(*) *OSTİM'de çalışanların başka yerde iş bulma şansı çok düşük, hemen hemen yüzde sıfır. Değişiklik isterse ancak Gimat'ta toptancılarda, o kadar da dışına çıkamaz yani. ... Başka yerlerde de işler var tabii, ama torpil yok. Torpili olan zaten gidiyor, garibanlar maribanlar da burda çalışıyor, böyle yerlerde, geliri düşük insanlar, kimsesiz olan, ailesiyle beraber ancak geçinen, çoluk çocuğuna ancak bakabilenler. [Ama] millet burada ekmek parası için çalışıyor, ne kadar pis olursa olsun, isterse lağım temizleme olsun, iş önemli değil.*

CHAPTER 4

INDUSTRIAL DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE CONDITION OF WORKERS IN SMALL CAPITALIST WORKSHOPS

The studies on small-scale enterprises that emerged within the past several decades have mostly focused on the role these enterprises play in economic development (Little et al. 1987). Although there has been an emphasis on the tendency of small-scale enterprises and various self-employment forms to increase during the periods of recession in the advanced capitalist economies (Gerry 1985; Bogenhold and Staber 1991), the literature on small enterprises is predominantly concerned with developing countries. The emergence of a renewed tendency of industrial units in developed countries to downsize after a long period of enlargement and the concomitant interest of academic disciplines such as economy, business and sociology in this issue are mainly the result of the economic crisis of the 1970s.

During the 19th century and the first three quarters of the 20th century, the average plant size in developed countries had shown a lasting increase. In this process, production technologies and organization based on mass production and Fordist regulation systems, that enabled mass consumption, played a decisive role. By the late 1960s, this trend tended to be reversed and the share of small-scale firms in production and employment began to increase. Until very recently, the expectation that, following the 19th and 20th centuries industrialization path in developed countries, the small scale enterprises would be eliminated by larger and more efficient firms was common in the developing countries. However, the failure of the most of developing countries to industrialize and the economic crisis in developed countries after the 1970s together with the persisting tendency of small-scale enterprises to survive brought this issue back into the agenda of policy makers and

researchers. During the 1970s and 1980s, the emphasis was on the employment generating capacity of the small-scale businesses. In the 1990s, this emphasis shifted to the 'technological dynamism' and the 'entrepreneurial spirit' attributed to these enterprises (Taymaz 1997).

The first attempts to account for the increasing share of small enterprises in the economy and employment structure of developed countries after the 1970s have predominantly emphasized the relationship between changing dynamics of consumer demand and the strategies of firms. It has been argued that both the quantitative fluctuation and qualitative variation in consumer demand resulted in an unstable and uncertain environment for large firms. The outcome of this process has been an increase in the number of small-scale enterprises with their higher ability to adapt to changing dynamics of markets due to their flexible production systems and/or an increase in the decentralization attempts by the existing large firms (Piore and Sabel 1984). The fragmentation in the consumer markets together with the uncertainty as the consequences of declining growth rates have made relatively small-scale units that practice flexible production technologies and organizational forms more attractive for firms. In addition, the increasing competition as a result of developments in transportation, information and communication technologies and the growing global economic integration have pushed the manufacturing firms to specialize in 'core business areas' where their chances of competition is higher. This tendency for specialization takes three different forms: decentralization, subcontracting, and outsourcing (Taymaz 1997: 16).

The nature of the relationship between large and small-scale enterprises is one of the significant research areas that emerged out of these developments. Including but not limited to subcontracting, license and patent agreements, investment and R&D support, this wide range of relationships will affect the accumulation, production and working conditions in small-scale enterprises. Hence, there is a pressing need to focus on the degree and various forms of integration between small-scale and large-scale firms, particularly when the limited scope of existing analyses is considered. Most of the studies explain the rising share of small-scale enterprises in the economy based on the analyses at the level of firms and lack a sector-based examination of the responses to the crisis. Yet, the increasing integration among

analyses of small-scale enterprises, including the theory of flexible specialization, generally have the risk of attributing these enterprises some 'inherent' characteristics that are essentially different than the large industrial firms. Furthermore, this risk makes it difficult to examine small-scale firms within an integrated division of labor with large-scale enterprises. However, such an analysis is significant as within the process of an increasing transfer of some functions of large-scale enterprises to small-scale ones the division of labor between the two increases, and both indirect (actual division of labor) and direct (subcontracting) complementary relationships enlarge (Bulmuş et al. 1990). As a result, the 'sector-based' production cost decreases, while the level of profit increases. Small firms, which are characterized by subcontracted production, use of cheap labor, and lack of sophisticated machinery, provide "core firms with the means of increasing profits, and gives the industrial structure an added degree of flexibility" (Solinas 1988: 283). Some studies (Murray 1983; Holmes 1986) also emphasized a deliberate subcontracting strategy by large firms in order to fragment and reduce the organizational power of labor. Some others, however, such as Sook Lee (1993) in the case of Korean automotive industry, have noticed that the nature and consequences of subcontracting relation may vary from industry to industry and according to subcontracting levels. A similar problem is observed in the industrial relations literature on small-scale enterprises. In these studies we simultaneously witness praises to working conditions and labor relations in these enterprises, a methodological essentialism, and, most of the times, an apparent empirical contradiction at the very same time. The analyses that utterly condemn these conditions in the small-scale enterprises yet also suffer from a hidden problem. The implicit assumption that the dreadful working conditions, despotic control, etc. in these enterprises is an autonomous phenomenon neglects the 'relational' character (in relation to the general organization of economy and large-scale firms) of this phenomenon.

Within the context of an increasing global integration in the world economy, we may argue that small-scale enterprises in both developing and developed

countries carry similar characteristics and are subject to similar dynamics. However, as shown by the studies of informal sector, it is also a fact that the small-scale enterprises in Third World have a different past that has been fed by particular dynamics. The rapid pace of migration and urbanization in these countries, in the conditions of a shortage in the formal employment areas, has provided a large area of informal activities that encompassed small service and industrial units (Bromley and Gerry 1979; Sethuraman 1981). During this period, the subject of wage employment small-scale enterprises in Turkey was overshadowed by the questions of informal sector and petty commodity production. There are few studies that analyzed and discussed these questions in relation to both capitalist development dynamics in general, and the dynamics of growth in small-scale enterprises and their relationship to large-scale firms in particular, based on fieldworks in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (van Velzen 1977; Ayata 1987; 1991; Aktar 1990). These, however, have not been developed by new studies that examine the nature of change in the dynamics and industrial division of labor in this area. Here, my aim is not to enter into a discussion of the characteristics of small-scale industrial enterprises in various sectors in Turkey. Nor I will discuss the variation of the status of these small-scale firms in the general organization of the industrial production. In the following sections, first, I will give some macro figures related to the small-scale industrial employment patterns in Turkey. Then, I will discuss the characteristics of small-scale industrial establishments particularly based on the enterprises at OSTIM.

4.1. Small Industrial Establishments in Turkey: An Overview

According to Taymaz (1997: 34-36), during the period between 1963 and 1992, in terms of scale and employment patterns, we observe two main tendencies in the manufacturing sector in Turkey: (i) in the total employment structure the share of wage workers has increased from 66 percent to 83 percent; (ii) there has been a slow but a steady decrease in the share of large-scale (100 and + employees) and micro-scale (1-9 employees) enterprises in the total employment structure, i.e., employment has been concentrating in small- and medium-scale enterprises. Furthermore, the new firms that entered into manufacturing sector have shown a tendency to be smaller in

size in comparison to the average of existing firms. On the other hand, in terms of average plant size (based on the number of employees) there are significant differences among different sectors of manufacturing industry and between private and public sectors. For instance, in 1992, the average plant size in public manufacturing industry was 8 times larger than the private one. In the same period, in the manufacturing industry, in all sectors and sizes, including the micro enterprises, the share of wage earners has increased steadily (Taymaz 1997: 53).

The information presented below in Table 4.1, regarding the period between 1993 and 1999, in most part, concurs with the preceding tendencies. Although there is a small decrease in the share of small enterprises in the employment structure of urban manufacturing industry, there is an increase in the contribution of small enterprises to the urban wage employment in general and in the number of wage workers in these enterprises in particular. This tendency indicates that the increase in the share of small- and medium-scale enterprises in the employment structure is concomitant with a structural change in the labor employment. In other words, while the share of self-employed and family labor is declining, the use of wage labor in these enterprises is increasing.

Table 4.1 Indicators of urban employment by scale of enterprises (%)

		1-9 employees	*10-24 employees*	*25 + employees*	
Urban employment	1993	52.1	14.2	33.7	
	1999	52.1	14.3	33.6	
Urban non-agricultural employment	1993	50.6	14.5	34.9	
	1999	50.1	14.8	35.1	
Urban manufacturing employment	1993	40.8	17.6	41.6	
	1999	38.4	17.8	43.8	
Urban wage workers	1993	31.9	19.3	48.8	
	1999	35.2	18.3	46.5	
					(Total)
Urban wage workers as percentage of total employees	1993	41.6	92.1	98.3	(67.9)
	1999	48.8	90.3	98.3	(70.9)

Source: DİE 2001c.

89 percent of those small-scale enterprises employing 1-9 workers and 75 percent of employment in these enterprises are concentrated in the sectors of food-

beverage-tobacco, 'wearing apparel excluding knitted products, forestry products and furniture, and fabricated metal products (Köse and Öncü 1998: 149). Economic analysis based recent studies on small enterprises in Turkey have pointed out the low technological levels and labor-intensive production organizations, low productivity levels, dependency on extensive subcontracting relations, low wage levels, and poor working conditions as the main characteristics of these enterprises (Köse and Öncü 1998; Eser and Eser 1995; Bulmuş et al. 1990; Taymaz 1997).

In 1994, the productivity level of workforce in the enterprises employing 1-9 workers was 26 percent of the average in the private manufacturing industry (Köse and Öncü 1998: 156). According to calculations of Bulmuş et al (1990: 54), if we assume the labor productivity (value added per worker) is 100 in the enterprises with 50+ workers, this percentage in the enterprises with 10-49 workers is 41 and in the enterprises with 1-9 workers is around 24. The same study shows that an increase in the size of an enterprise results in an increase in both the labor productivity coefficient (value added/employment) and capital productivity coefficient (value added/turnover capacity). In other words, in the Turkish manufacturing industry there is a continuing problem of a low scale.[1]

Based on a study of four 'Anatolian industrial cities', Köse and Öncü (1998) have found that subcontracting relations among the small-scale enterprises operating in textile (48 percent) and metal products (39 percent) sectors are common. According to the results of another study on enterprises in manufacturing industry,

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[1] Eser and Eser (1995: 39) draw our attention to a similar problem but also warn us against the comparisons based on value added productivity: "Value added is a pricing factor and there are risks in calculating added value with fix prices based on only one deflator, that draws from prices of total product (output). If there are changes in input-output price structure in the economy, [we need to use] deflators that reflect each of these changes." By expanding on this economist sensitivity to changing relative prices in time, we may add the following: A comparison between small and large-scale enterprises based on average physical commodity production (such comparison, of course, could only be made between enterprises that are producing 'same' products with similar quality) would show that in a 'typical' (with low capital and technology) small enterprise productivity is definitely much lesser than a large one. However, if we conduct such a comparison based on value added, there is a possibility that the difference will be much higher. The prices, i.e., value added, even in a given time, in a small manufacturing market where competition is high, would stay in a much lower margin than the product prices of larger firms. In fact, actual conditions reflect this most of the time. Large firms meet the needed intermediary products for the possible lowest price from a pool of small suppliers where competition is high. In this situation, the comparisons based on value added would show the difference in productivity levels much higher than it actually is.

around 2/3 of large firms obtain inputs from small industrial units. More than half of these firms place orders to the certain firms that they have chosen before. Other methods that are utilized are respectively getting offer from different firms, subcontracting to certain firms, and obtaining directly from the market (Ege et al. 1995: 116).

The question of integration between large-scale and small and medium-scale enterprises has also drawn the attention of policy makers in Turkey. The need for 'traditional' small industrial enterprises to become sub-industry in terms of their product preferences and production technologies and increasing integration between main industry and sub-industry has been frequently emphasized. This way, it is argued, while large firms could decrease the unit cost by obtaining some of the intermediate goods from small enterprises rather than engaging in additional investments, small enterprises in turn could lessen the problems that they face such as in finance, marketing and demand shortage through their permanent engagements with large firms (DPT 1989: 148-149).[2]

One of the reasons for the call to governments to support small and medium-scale enterprises has been pointed out as their ability to create employment due to their labor-intensive character. In addition to that, other positive functions and characteristics of these enterprises are enumerated as follows: these enterprises are less sensitive to economic fluctuations; they play a positive role in decreasing regional economic and social disparities; they help the expansion of industrial property in society; they are more prone to technological and occupational education (DPT 1989: 187). Each and all these features and functions are, of course, subject to debate and are dependent on the structural characteristics, economic division of labor surrounding them, the scale and content of the legal regulation and control, and similar other conditions. Particularly, the scholarly view regarding the capacity of these firms to resist market fluctuations is on the contrary: these firms seem to be

[2] Among the reasons of the government programs to support small and medium size industrial enterprises are increasing employment, establishing productivity in resource allocation, encouraging cooperation among small enterprises as well as between small and large enterprises, hence developing supply markets that provide inputs to the large industry (Buldam et al. 1982: 8-12). The aim of 'developing integration' between large and small-scale enterprises is also stated in the law of *KOSGEB* (Small and Medium-Sized Industry Development Administration).

more susceptible to fluctuations in input and product markets (see, for instance, Buldam et al. 1982: 10). Encountered with negative developments in markets (such as increasing prices in input markets and decreasing demand in product markets) most of the times small firms do not have the choice of turning into their stocks as they do not usually have the ability to work with stock due to their limited working capital and market relations. Although they have the advantage of laying off workers much easily than large firms can, bankruptcy among small firms has been more common. In relation to this, the net potential of these firms to create employment is also contested. In most cases, new jobs emerge not a as a result of an increase in employment rate of the existing firms but due to opening of new small firms. However, since the rate of bankruptcy and closing among these enterprises is high, the net employment generating potential must also be much smaller than it is argued for (Ekin 1993: 15).

4.1.1. Small and medium sized manufacturing enterprises at OSTİM

Classifications of enterprise scales show a rather great variety.[3] Although in some cases measurements based on the amount and composition of capital are used, the primary and most commonly used criterion is the number of employees. Whereas in most cases this criterion includes only 'wage workers, it is also possible to encounter with treatments that include 'non-wage employees.' Furthermore, there could be different classification systems based on sectors such as in industrial and service sectors. The State Institute of Statistics in Turkey, up until 1985, for instance, has classified enterprises with 1-9 employees as 'small', 10-19 as 'medium', and 20+ as 'large.' Starting with *1985 Census of Industry and Business Establishments* this classification was replaced with another one that scaled enterprises as following: 1-9 employees as 'micro', 10-24 employees as 'small', 25-99 employees 'medium' and 100+ as 'large.'[4]

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[3] For different classification systems used by different institutions in Turkey see Buldan et al. (1982); Eser and Eser (1995); Ege at al. (1995); DPT (1989).

[4] Müftüoğlu (1994), suggests that the enterprises with no wage employees and those with 1-4 workers should be classified as a distinct group, which display a considerable concentration.

Since the main purpose of this study is not to develop a detailed analysis of the enterprise dynamics in OSTIM, it is not based on a sample that represents the actual average enterprise size and variations in this average. Rather, this study aims to examine the firms in OSTIM that functions as a region of 'small and medium scale enterprises' in terms of both common and differentiated characteristics of the workforce, work conditions and labor relations. For this reason, here, I preferred to develop a classification that would allow me to engage in a comparative analysis between smaller and larger firms *within* the OSTİM industrial estate.

Table 4.2 Distribution of workers by occupations and scale of enterprises

	Small Firms (3-19 workers)	*Large Firms (20-75 workers)*	*Total N*	*Total %*
Unskilled & casual service workers	77.8	22.2	9	3.3
Unskilled production workers	71.4	28.6	21	7.6
Skilled & semi-skilled production workers	54.9	45.1	207	75.0
Metal	*58.9*	*41.1*	*158*	*57.2*
Plastic & rubber	*47.6*	*52.4*	*21*	*7.6*
Insulated glass products	--	*100.0*	*17*	*6.2*
Glassware	*100.0*	--	*6*	*2.2*
Paint	*100.0*	--	*5*	*1.8*
Technical & clerical workers	42.9	57.1	28	10.1
Managerial & technical professionals	25.0	75.0	12	4.3
Total N	(150)	(126)	(276)	--
Total %	54.3	45.7	--	--
Average number of workers	10.1	40.3	--	--

In developing this classification one of the options was to separate the enterprises, sometimes called as 'micro establishments' in the studies and statistics on small industry, that employ 1-9 workers. However, based on my observations during the fieldwork, I did not prefer to use this option. The threshold of 10 workers was not a practically stable one: Many among the enterprises employing 1-9 workers had employed more than 10 workers until couple of months ago and it was very much possible that the number of their workers would again rise to the same level in several months later. Hence, I decided to use a different criterion that would reflect more closely the changing employment structure in these enterprises. I differentiated enterprises employing less than 20 workers according to their relatively 'high employment size instability' and developed a binary classificatory system that I use

below. This classification is similar to the OECD classification that differentiates firms with 1-19 employees as 'very small', 20-99 employees as 'small' (DPT 1989). Furthermore, the classification to be used here is not based on the number of 'employees' as is the case in some studies and statistics but on the number of 'wage-workers' employed in the firm. For the sake of terminological simplicity, I defined firms with 3-19 employees as 'small' and those with 20-75 employees as 'large', which applies only to the enterprises in OSTIM.

It is clear that, any size classification among industrial enterprises according to the number of workers or employees is bound to be random. Furthermore, depending on the research problematic, such classification may carry the risk of hiding possibly more significant factors of differentiation among firms – such as the technological level, market relations and subcontracting, and competition capacity. For instance, Bulmuş et al. (1990: 15) have drawn our attention to the possibility of quantitative classifications to hide structural differences and enumerated several 'qualitative' characteristics common to small enterprises: labor-intensive production organization based on a low level capital and technological capacity; close and personal interaction between business owner, workers and customers; difficulty in reaching to modern capital and credit markets; and high numbers of production units in the market. The classification developed by Rainnie (1989) with regards to small enterprises that takes into account both the characteristics of production markets and dependency relations among firms provides an extensive framework. The firm typologies developed by Rainnie are as follows:

> (1) Dependent small firms: These complement and service the activities of larger firms (e.g. through subcontracting). Their viability depends on the level of activity and the 'make or buy' decisions of these large 'patrons.' Such a situation places effective control in the hands of the large enterprise, a control that extends not only over financial matters but also over the organization of the labor process, e.g., by forcing the minimization of wage costs and the implementation of flexible working.
>
> (2) Competitive independent small firms: These compete with large firms by intense exploitation of labor and of (often antiquated) equipment. Even here, however, the rules of existence are laid down, if possibly unwittingly and unintentionally, by the large firm. In terms of industrial relations the result is, more often than not, hyper-exploitation of labor.
>
> (3) Old independent small firms: These operate in niches of demand unlikely ever to be touched by large capital. This will often entail a hand-to-

mouth existence, scraping around for a living. It is almost this and the latter type of small business that sweatshops are likely to be found.

(4) New independent small firms: Small firms operating in (often founding and developing) specialized markets, but remaining open to the potentially fatal attentions of large firms. In other words, small firms which, within a very wide reading of the term, conduct the product and market research which large firms then step in and develop (Rainnie 1989: 85).

Among these groups, the category of 'dependent small firms' provides a valid description in terms of the majority of small firms in OSTİM.[5] The firms in OSTİM (i) do not operate in the area of consumer products, and (ii) the majority of them does not produce end products and run through subcontracting relations. However, the issue of 'dependency relations', often mentioned together with subcontracting relations, need to be further discussed.

We may argue that subcontracting relations in OSTİM are mainly based on a structural division of labor. A significant proportion of large firms engage in production for the construction sector, tourism investments, electronic and work machinery sector outside of OSTİM, or produce directly for the market. Some of the production is regularly subcontracted to the small firms in OSTİM. The relationship with small firms is regular yet there are no mutual dependency relations. Rather there is a pool of firms that business is conducted on a regular basis. Although a certain level of rotation among these firms is concerned, each time bidding is held to take advantage of competition between them. In some extreme forms of this practice, the status of subcontracting company is almost reduced to an 'internal subcontractor':

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[5] A classification among small industrial enterprises in Turkey may be done first by differentiating between those enterprises that produce end products directly to the market and those that do not. This differentiation provides a significant reference with regards to the form enterprises are articulated to capitalist economic division of labor. Statistics on small manufacturing industry in Turkey do not provide sufficient information on this issue. Those enterprises that produce end products to the market may fall into Rainnie's category of 'old independent small firms' and possibly specialize in consumer products. In periods of economic crisis and declining levels of income, the increase, primarily, in the numbers of vendors selling toys, cloths, small household items and food products do not only show an increase in informal 'self-employed' economic activities but also the enlargement of the market of those firms that produce such products. To these firms the function attributed to informal sector in terms of "lowering the cost of labor power reproduction in the formal sector" may as well apply. However, if the supply market, probably mostly consisting of small firms, producing these low quality and cheap products is also continuously increasing, then the situation is not limited to decreasing the cost of labor power reproduction in formal sector. In such situations, we may argue that, the outcome is the emergence of parallel markets, signaling new forms of stratification in production as well as consumption sites.

the project and raw material are provided by the large firm, while only work-benches and workers of the small firm are used in exchange for a certain amount of money.

Small firms engage in business not only with large firms in OSTİM but also with those outside OSTİM on the basis of order or subcontracting. Furthermore, there is a significant amount of subcontracting relations among the small firms themselves. Sometimes, small firms can transfer some parts of their own business to another small firm.[6] However, this phenomenon does not indicate a systematic network of division of labor and is observed only in the cases when there is a timing pressure to finish the order and the workbenches and workers of the firm are insufficient.

Suğur (1994: 130), in his study on small enterprises employing 1-9 workers in OSTİM in the early 1990s, reaches into a decisive conclusion: price competition among small-scale enterprises in OSTİM is fierce. While this situation decreases the profit margins of small firms to the minimum level, it helps the parent company to sustain its own profit margin. This situation does not support foresights by the flexible specialization literature that the geographical and sector-based proximity will lead to the development of vertical division of labor and cooperation among small firms.

By emphasizing that there is a flexible production structure in small enterprises to meet the requirements of various subcontracting order not due to advanced technology but rather due to a 'labor-intensive flexibility' based on the employment of low paid qualified workers, Suğur (1994; 1997a) determines subcontracting as the main problem in OSTİM:

> It is the form of subcontract work that harms most of small firms' capital accumulation in OSTİM since the most of small firms have failed to get

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[6] In 1992 "fifty seven per cent of small employers [who had no more than ten employees] at OSTİM reported doing subcontract work for larger companies; 38 per cent reported doing subcontract work for a mixture of larger and other small firms; only five per cent reported exclusively subcontracting for other smaller firms" (Nichols and Sugur 1996). According to another study conducted in 1979, almost 94 percent of the metal and iron manufacturing enterprises in Ankara did not engage any subcontracting relations neither as subcontractor nor as parent firm (Ersoy, M. (1982) *A Critique of Modernization and Dependency Schools in Urban Industrial Sector*. PhD. Thesis. Ankara: Middle East Technical University; cited in Tekeli 1991: 89). These figures together might be commented as an indication of a rapid process of integration within the metal industry, both vertical and horizontal.

> contracts from the first dealers. (...) Subcontracting work between large and small firms in OSTİM has resulted in conflict among small firms rather than co-operation. As the majority of small firms (95 per cent) have great difficulties in gaining access to contract work directly from the first dealers (i.e. through actions) and thus they have to work on the basis of subcontracting from large firms. As a result, the strength of large firms on price setting makes small firms subject to the conditions laid down by large firms (Suğur 1997a: 95).

Hence, the main target of the small firms working with low profit margins and subcontracts is to be able to 'independently produce directly for the market.' Yet they fail to do so because of their insufficient working capital (Suğur 1994: 130).

There is a need to be cautious about this evaluation on several points. First, in reality, the production of end products for direct supply to the market for the small firms, in most of the branches of metal sector, is not a practically possible option. Second, subcontracting is not always a form of subordinate relationship. As Solinas (1988) observed in Italian knitwear industry there may exist both 'small subordinate subcontracting firms with poor technology' and 'small non-subordinate firms with good technology' (as well as those producing prototypes). Third, although the overwhelming majority of small firms work with low levels of profit margin, all of them do not share the same situation in terms of the stability of subcontracting relations. Hence, in the absence of an option to produce for the market, subcontracting relations for many small firms mean a stable market guaranteed at various degrees. Forth, in a market where subcontracting is so widespread, subcontracting has become a structural characteristic of industrial division of labor and could not be considered as 'incidental.' It is very much possible that the main motivation behind the entrance of new small firms into the market (at least in the beginning) is the prospects to do subcontracting. While this situation establishes the fact that, in OSTIM or anywhere else where subcontracting is a commonplace, small firms cannot realize capital accumulation and develop their technological capacities due to hegemony of large firms in the market, it also problematizes the assumptions of a categorical interest conflict (Suğur 1994; Sugur 1997a) between small and large firms. Although the existence of unequal subcontracting relations between small and

large firms is 'factually' true,[7] it is almost impossible to see both types of firms, particularly the small ones, as external to this 'relationship.' Small firms, as a principle, are born into this relationship.

In addition, it is also generally true that subcontracting relations force firms to low profit margins and seriously limit their ability to grow. However, this does not mean that there are no examples of growth among small enterprises. On the contrary, in another study, based on the findings of the same research, Suğur (1997b: 112) shows that despite all these difficulties more than half of the small enterprises with employees of 1-10 in OSTIM grew in past three years in terms of number of workers and machinery. Furthermore, in more than ¼ of these enterprises this growth also included the shop size. It is very much possible that these experiences of growth have not changed the proportion of subcontracting in relation to the total amount of business that these firms receive. In fact, it may very well be the case that this proportion has increased. In other words, while subcontracting relations place small firms in a certain division of labor and produces conditions that make difficult for them to get out of these relations (i.e., to become firms that do independent production), it is also through these relations that a certain capacity expansion becomes necessary and possible.[8]

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[7] Ayata (1991: 132) has criticized those approaches that see subcontracting as a relationship of exploitation and hence the owners of small firms as proletarians that earn a little more than the ordinary ones. According to him, these approaches do not differentiate between subcontracting and putting-out. In the system of putting-out the artisan is a semi-proletarian out-worker. The owner of a subsidiary or a dependent firm, in contrast, is apparently a capitalist employer with regards to his/her workers. The fact that his relationship with the parent firm is unequal does not change this situation. Despite this relationship the dependent firm too realizes capital accumulation. Hence there is always a potential for small firms to grow into large labor-intensive firms. For a contrary view see Çelebi (1983).

[8] According to some employers in OSTİM, although this 'mediocre' growth signifies a structural phenomenon, it also produces a kind of 'mediocre entrepreneurial behavior': Subcontracting as an obstacle to growth in time also creates a routine appeal. While the profits remain low for a technological leap, they often create quite a large picture when invested in personal wealth and prosperity. In the same study, Suğur (1997b) draws our attention to the fact that the growth potential of small firms is, in addition to the position of firm in market relations, closely related to the owners' socio-economic background. Owners with urban origins and higher levels of education show a larger potential to grow. See Nichols and Sugur (1996) and Sugur (1997b) for further details on the sociological profile of small employers at OSTİM.

4.2. Workforce, Working Conditions and Division of Labor

One of the significant differences between small and large firms is that the workers in large firms have higher levels of education: 40 percent of the workers employed in small firms is at most primary school graduates, while 33 percent has high school or university level of education. In contrast, more than half of the workers in large firms have education equivalent to high school or more. This difference for the case of skilled and semi-skilled metal workers is particularly evident: While more than half of the workers in large enterprises are high schools graduates or have higher levels of education, this proportion is lower than ¼ among the metal workers. Small enterprises seem to attribute more significance to job experience than education.

Relatively high labor force turnover is known as one of the common characteristics of small enterprises (Taymaz 1997). For instance, according to the results of manufacturing industry enterprises surveys conducted by the İstanbul Chamber of Industry in 1992 and 1993, in the first quarter of both years the turnover rate in enterprises employing 1-20 workers is around 14-15 percent. In other words, in a period of three months, 15 workers out of hundred were either laid off or left, and were replaced by new workers. This rate in the firms employing 21-100 workers is between 8-10 percent, i.e., markedly lower than the small firms (İSO 1992; İSO 1993).

As the survey that was conducted for this study, in principle, did not aim to diagnose enterprise characteristics in an extensive range, it does not provide data directly on the turnover rates on an establishment base. Yet, various data collected about workers provide us with an opportunity to establish some tendencies in the enterprises that they work. In general, the data on the periods of employment in present work show that average rate of labor turnover in OSTİM is significantly higher than other comparable cases: 17 percent of the workers had been working at their present workplace for six months at most, and 40 percent for, at most, one year. The latter figure has been found as 34 percent in Değirmenci and Mendeş (1998). Duration in the present jobs is much longer for İstanbul metal workers: 67 percent have been working at their present jobs for more than five years (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999).

This data support the relationship between the rate of labor turnover and enterprise size that we emphasized above. Workers in larger enterprises have longer and more stable employment periods: While the proportion of workers that have stayed in their current jobs more than a year reaches to 70 percent in large enterprises, this proportion in small enterprises is only little higher than 50 percent. In addition, in the enterprises that direct information was obtained about through observations and interviews with employers, the same differentiation was observed: in large enterprises the number of workers that left their jobs within the last year was very low. In contrast, in small enterprises around 25-50 percent of workers has changed. In a small enterprise with only 3 workers, for instance, all of the workers have changed within the last year. The high level of labor turnover that is observed in small enterprises, in most cases, takes the shape of declining number of workers. Hence, in all of these enterprises the rate of capacity utilization has declined to the level of 60 percent. In such situations, it might be even the case that all workers are laid off except an experienced group of 'core workers.'[9] Large firms too experience some levels of decrease in their rates of capacity utilization. However, in contrast to small firms, these enterprises have a chance to manufacture standard products for stock for certain periods of time and hence maintain the level of employment volume. In the conditions where the dependency on subcontracting is determining, production in small firms in principle is based on just-in-time system (Sugur 1997a: 92).

In the previous chapter, where I have examined the mobility of workers in the labor market, I have emphasized that high level frequency of job change and the duration of employment in the same job do not seem to be related with education but

[9] The primary reason for high levels of labor turnover is firms' tendency to lay off workers in accordance with the fluctuations in their businesses. In addition, the tendency among workers to switch to better jobs due to the poor working conditions is also relatively high. For employers, on the other hand, workers' tendency to quit is due to the absence of a 'work ethic.' Furthermore, they argue that low levels of employment stability among workers deprive them from taking advantage of promotion. However, in OSTİM, promotion-based practices related to both wage and in kind payments are not very common. The majority of workers (89 %) have not experienced any change in their responsibilities that might, in principle, be counted as promotion in their current workplace. Despite a very low possibility, those workers who experienced a vertical mobility in their workplace mainly come from those with longer history in the enterprise, age group of 25-34, with an education of middle school or more and those who work in large firms.

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rather with age. While the frequency of job change tended to increase among older workers as a natural effect of long work-life, the average job period also tended to be longer. We observe the same tendency in the employment periods in their current workplaces as well as: the average working period for age group 20-24 is 1.8 year. This average systematically increases as the age group increases, and, in turn, reaches to 6 year for age group of 34-45. As it can be expected, the lowest average working period is among the youngest unskilled production workers.

In addition, the situation regarding the average working periods of skilled & semi-skilled production workers and technical & clerical workers differ from the tendencies they experienced in their previous jobs. White-collar workers, who experienced short-term employments in their previous jobs, seem to enjoy higher employment stability in their current jobs than the blue-collar workers. In the absence of additional and more detailed data, and based on an assumption that the employment patterns of white-collar workers show a voluntary mobility character, we may venture to interpret this situation as a decline in white-collar workers' expectation to find better jobs and, as a result, a decline in their mobility tendencies.

Although we may say that in large firms in metal processing sector the division of labor in labor process is more developed, we do not observe any significant differences between large and small enterprises in terms of skill and specialization.[10] In both groups, the workforce of the enterprise mainly shows a dual structure. Except a minority of skilled and experienced workers, the majority performs low-skilled jobs.[11] This situation is also reflected in the process of hiring policies. Prospective employees are not evaluated on the basis of their specific skills or experience. On the contrary, the employee is expected to easily acquire the necessary skills after he/she

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[10] Solinas (1988:287) has observed a considerable amount of mobility between small and large enterprises and home-based work in his work on Italian knitwear industry. This mobility is not one-sided and does not present a regular pattern. I have already mentioned OSTİM workers jobs outside of OSTİM. The findings about this subject indicate that there is no mobility between OSTİM jobs and those large factories outside. We do not have a direct quantitative data about the mobility between small and large enterprises in this region. However, the findings about skill compositions show that skill is not an obstacle in front of such mobility. In-depth interviews with employers also support this conclusion.

[11] This dual structure, rather than being a firm based conscious recruitment strategy, is a result of labor market and the general characteristics of production organization in small and large firms in OSTIM. For the distinction between temporary workers-permanent workers employed as a strategy to exercise control over labor by the large automotive factories, see Parlak (1996).

starts the job.[12] The only difference that needs to be highlighted is the proportionally high numbers of 'core' experienced and skilled workers (foremen and skilled masters) in total workforce of small firms. As a result of the relatively low levels of division of labor and the flexible skill formation forced by the subcontracting relations (Sugur 1997a: 93), the scope of the basic responsibilities of these workers in small enterprises is clearly larger.[13] However, the existence of a proportionally larger number of unskilled and semi-skilled workers in large firms does not mean that the division of labor in these enterprises is more rigid. On the contrary, while 46 percent of workers employed in small enterprises reported that they are frequently or occasionally addressed to the tasks other than their main responsibilities, this proportion reaches to 72 percent in large firms. In other words, the workers in large firms substitute each other in higher rates than those in small firms. Furthermore, this higher rate of substitution in large firms is not due to the higher skill levels of the workers employed but rather is an outcome of the actual pace of production, i.e., the replacement takes place between simple tasks. On the other hand, we also see attempts for flexible organization of labor process among large enterprises, though in small numbers: primarily employing vocational high school graduates, these enterprises subject their workers to regular rotations to help them learn different tasks in different phases of labor process. However, the examples where these attempts are supported by new flexible automation technologies are limited.[14]

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[12] In addition to the fact that there is no significant difference between large and small firms in terms of the skill levels they require in new recruitments, both type of firms primarily and overwhelmingly prefer to employ those individuals familiar with the existing employees.

[13] The workers' own statements regarding the level of experience needed for their job also support this interpretation: 39 percent of workers in large firms and 61 percent of workers in small firms think that their job requires at least a year long experience. Solinas (1988: 284-85) argues that in an industry where production organization is highly flexible skill formation cannot be looked for only in the relationship between the operator and the machine and emphasizes that the ability to use many different machines and capacity to produce products with different qualities are significant. The small enterprises work larger variety of material and products than the large enterprises and their production process is shorter and varied. Hence, in these firms, the process of learning is shorter and more encompassing. We need to draw attention to one point: In small enterprises acquiring single skills takes shorter time and is faster due to faster production activities. However, since the responsibility range of especially skilled workers is larger, to acquire this entire repertoire is extended into a larger time scale.

[14] Değirmenci (1998) has observed that in most cases the utilization of flexible automation technologies by itself is not enough to change work organization. Such a transformation is also

Are there significant differences between small and large firms in terms of wages and other work conditions? As I mentioned earlier, the data at hand is primarily based on a worker sample and is not designed to analyze enterprise characteristics. For this reason, for instance, we do not have any information on the employment rates of non-wage employees. If we exclude non-wage family workers, besides the formal and regular wage labor employment, we may talk about the existence of two main employment and payment systems both of which are observed at very marginal levels. The first of these systems can be called as 'informal subcontracting.' In this system, a certain job of a firm is taken by a group of workers who are not employees of that firm (in fact they are not employed by any firm) for a certain period of time. The workers group has a leader who conducts the subcontracting agreement with the firm. Yet we cannot still talk about this group as a 'firm' since it is very much possible that they gathered together only temporarily. With this characteristic, the 'informal subcontracting' system constitutes a different example than the typical inter-firm subcontracting relations. The workers' group is paid a certain amount of money for the whole job. This payment, however, may be realized in installments. In other words, from the start to the end of the job, the worker is paid in varying intervals.

Informal subcontracting enables the main firm to escape from the cost of employing new workers in a situation of short but a busy period. This practice seems to be more common among large enterprises as the tendency among small firms to practice short-term & temporary and unregistered employment strategies is already high that they do not need to engage in such methods.[15] Although informal subcontracting looks similar in form to outworking, the former differs from the latter at least in two respects. Informal subcontracting does not have permanency that we

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dependent on the size of enterprise, the social relations at the workplace, the characteristics of the product, and macro institutional structures.

[15] This system appears to be similar to what Edwards (1979: 32) called 'inside contract' system: "The capitalist provided the machinery, plant, and raw materials necessary. The sub-entrepreneurs [who might be former or present employees of the entrepreneur] sometimes earned wages but more often survived on the profits or losses of the subcontract; they themselves hired employees and set them to work." In the cases of 'informal subcontracting' in OSTİM, however, there was no wage relation between subcontracting workers and their leader. They shared the money paid for the subcontracted work, the skilled leader getting a relatively larger amount than the others did.

observe in outworking. Furthermore, the work is done by utilizing the means of production of the main company. Informal subcontracting cannot also be seen as a version of piece-rate wage system. In the examples where piece-rate wage system is applied, the workers are principally employees of the firm. Among the workers in the OSTIM sample of this study, there is no worker remunerated on piece-rate wage system. However, as an example of atypical payment systems there are workers paid on weekly or daily basis. They constitute only a very small portion (5 percent). Yet the fact that all of them are employed in small firms is a meaningful indicator. What is worth attention in the case of this group is that they do not in fact represent an informal or non-standard form of employment. These workers are not without social security[16] and/or inexperienced but mainly skilled and semi-skilled metal workers. Thus, this practice is not an exception from the common practice monthly wage system. It rather stems from the role of those experienced workers in production process and/or represents an advantage that they obtain through their personal relations with the enterprise owner.

Statistical survey data for the years of 1997 and 1998 show significant differences between weekly working hours (actual working hours including overtime hours) in public (41-42 hours) and private manufacturing enterprises (44-45 hours). However, no such difference exists between those establishments covered directly or indirectly by collective bargaining agreements and those others. In 1997, hourly wages in public enterprises were 17-18 percent higher than those in private enterprises. According to data for the first half of 1999 this difference approaches to 70 percent. The key difference between enterprises that are covered by collective bargaining and those that are not appears in hourly wages (hourly gross wage for actual working hours excluding overtime payment): The hourly wages in the manufacturing firms subjected to collective bargaining are in public sector 86 percent and in private sector 84 percent more than the others. The second difference is observed in the composition of earnings: for instance, while in those private manufacturing enterprises covered by collective bargaining 15 percent of gross

[16] 5 percent of the workers within the sample still work without social security. This proportion probably is much less than the actual rate. Yet we may add one more observation to this finding that concurs with the general trend: almost all of the workers without security are employed in small enterprises.

earnings come from bonuses and premiums, in enterprises not covered by collective bargaining this proportion is lower than 7 percent. This rate increases as the enterprise size increases. Furthermore, although there is no considerable difference in terms of weekly working hours between different sizes of enterprises, hourly wages vary significantly: if we accept hourly wage as 100 in enterprises employing 10-49 workers, in 1997 this rate is 108 in enterprises with 50-99 employees, 163 in enterprises with 100-499 employees and 221 in enterprises with 500+ employees (DİE 2001a; DİE 2001e).[17]

Do we observe a significant difference between large and small enterprises in terms of average wage levels?[18] Before answering this question a general look at the picture about wages is required. In the period of October- November of 1998, when this study was conducted, OSTİM workers in general earned $267 per month. This amount was around 2.3 times more than the net minimum wage then. To expand on this issue, we may add the following indicators: Overwhelming majority (85 percent)

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[17] According to another study (Bulmuş et al. 1990: 63), while the average wages in manufacturing enterprises with 50+ employees was 100, in 1985, this proportion was 44 in enterprises with 10-49 employees and 33 in enterprises with 1-9 workers. Tunalı and Ercan (1997) have tried to find data to support the hypothesis of segmented labor market between small (1-9 employee) and large (10+ employee) enterprises in DİE 1988 October Household Labor Force Survey results. According to this study, 57 percent of wage laborer in small firms and 16 percent in large firms do not have social security. Those who work in large enterprises earn 27 percent more than those in small firms. Authors note that if the comparison were done on the basis of gross wages the difference would have been much larger (1997: 98). The weekly working hours in small firms are higher than those in larger firms. Yet the hours that this group works in a month and in a year are lesser (1997: 99). Tunalı and Ercan argue that in order to prove the existence of segmentation, these differences must also be shown between individuals with the same observed characteristics. Some of the basic observed characteristics are as follows: the average age is 29.2 in small firms and 31.5 in large ones. The average education period in small firms is 4.7 year and 6.4 year in large ones. The average duration of employment in the firm in small enterprises is 7 year and 8.5 year in large ones. These indicators mean that the productivity levels of those individuals working in large enterprises are higher (1997: 100), which makes difficult to talk about the existence of a segmented labor market.

[18] In 1992, in private manufacturing industry, the average wage in enterprises with 100-199 employees was 2.2 higher than those small firms with 10-24 employees and in enterprises with 500 and more employees it was 3.8 higher. In addition, the average in public sector is 2.2 higher than the average of private sector (Taymaz 1997: 64; Table 4.3). According to Taymaz, the wage differential between small and large firms is due to several reasons: disorganized labor; increase in wage rate based on seniority and the low rate of average employment duration in small and medium size enterprises; the ability of large firms to transfer part of their excessive profit to workers that they gain from their monopolistic power in markets; assuming that large enterprises use capital intensive technologies, payment of higher wages to workers to escape from the risks such as shirking etc. that would decrease the profitability of high-cost capital.

of OSTİM workers' monthly earnings is less than the total of 3 minimum wages. Another significant group (40 percent) of workers' monthly earnings is less than the total of 2 minimum wages. There is no significant difference between large enterprises ($260) and small enterprises ($276) regarding monthly earnings. When we look at the earnings of skilled & semi-skilled metal workers who constitute the majority of work force, there is no difference between small and large enterprises in terms of wages ($260). However, we need to take into account that 'average' values may be insufficient to reflect the actual table of wage scales. For instance, while $300 wage level constitutes the upper threshold in both types of firms (both in large and small firms ¾ of workers are under this threshold), the situation in lower threshold is different: Only 5 percent of the workers in large firms earn less than $150, whereas this proportion in small firms approaches to 15 percent.[19] As expected, unskilled production workers earn the lowest wages (average $167) while the managerial and technical professionals constitute the highest paid group with an average monthly salary of $525. White-collar technical and clerical workers earn 23 percent more than the blue-collar skilled and semi-skilled production workers. Leaving university-graduate professionals out, education level overall does not have a significant impact on wage differentiation among workers. The most important factor in wage differentiation is workers' age, which is also related with seniority or the length of employment in the company. Both factors, that is, an increase in age and the length of employment in the company has a positive impact on the increase of wage level of the workers. Again, when we consider the wage levels of skilled and semi-skilled metal workers, we observe following marked difference: Those who are 35 years old or older earn almost twice as much as those workers who are 19 years old or younger; similarly, those who have been working in the same company for more than 5 years get on average 25 percent more wage than those with less than one year employment in the same company.[20]

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[19] The proportion of those workers looking for a second job is higher (12 percent) in small enterprises than those in large enterprises (5 percent). This difference is an outcome of relatively low wages as well higher job instability and short-term job contracts in small enterprises.

[20] In terms of payment increases we do not observe a systematic difference between large and small enterprises. Generally increases are made in 6 month-intervals with a variation observed between increases made in equal proportions and those based on performance, marital status and

Non-wage benefits are practiced more in larger firms than the small ones.[21] There are several types of such benefits commonly used by the companies: these are lunch (generally provided within the workplace but occasionally workers are paid monthly allowance of around $30); additional transportation assistance (usually between $20-30, but some companies, instead of paying money, provide transportation service to their workers); bonuses, 'coal money' once a year, and food assistance a few times a year (generally during religious days). The most common practice among these, however, is lunch benefits: it covers more than three fourth of the workers. We can add the following observation regarding the question of wages: more than one fourth of the workers have complained that they frequently or sometimes get their wages behind schedule. Interestingly, contrary to the general assumption, delays in monthly wage payments are more common in larger firms than the small ones.

There is no significant differentiation in average daily and weekly work hours in relation to firm sizes. In general, employees work on average more than 8.5 hours a day, or 49 hours a week. In a similar vein, there is no marked difference between large and small enterprises in terms of paid overtime policy: about three fourth of workers time to time work overtime with payment; however, overtime is carried out more frequently in larger firms. Furthermore, the overtime appears to be particularly common phenomenon among blue-collar production workers than the technical and clerical staffs. Only one fourth of technical and clerical workers do overtime. However, we face a different picture when unpaid overtime work is considered. More than 10 percent of the workers point out that they have to do overtime without any payment received in return. Unpaid overtime work is relatively more common in smaller firms than larger enterprises. In addition to this, compared to the production workers, unpaid overtime work appears to be more widespread among managerial &

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number of children. However, there is a tendency among large firms to switch into new payment systems based on job evaluations and consequently new increase policies based on this system.

[21] According to Taymaz's findings (1997: 65; Table 4.4), the proportion of extra payments in addition to base wage increases as the size of the enterprises increases: this proportion is 5 percent in those firms with 10-24 workers, 12 percent in those 100-199 workers, and 35 percent in those 500 and more workers. In addition, there is a significant difference between the average of private industry (17 percent) and that of public industry (36 percent). This last difference must be mainly related to collective bargaining order.

technical professionals and technical & clerical workers. It is possible to argue that this situation implies a different relationship, a different form of articulation/commitment of the white-collars to the owner/management of the company than that of blue-collars. Indeed, these groups, i.e., the white-collars, when they need excused absence (usually without deducting from their wages), are treated more flexibly for their unpaid sacrifice, that is, their overtime work without payment. For instance, while only 40 percent of the skilled and semi-skilled workers are granted these types of excused absence without any deduction from the wages, this rate for technical and clerical workers is more than two third. These findings once again invite us to think that the dividing line between the white-collars and the blue-collars is also related to different patterns of employment relations in the workplace. Another finding on this subject calls us to question the assumption that relationships in small workplaces are more friendly and humane: The rate of the workers who could both obtain excused absence in general and get these absences without any reductions from the wages in particular is much higher in large enterprises than that in the small-scale enterprises.

More than one forth of all workers reported that they have experienced at least workplace accident and occupation related illnesses.[22] In terms of the conditions of workers' health and workplace security the situation in small enterprises seems to be worse than large ones. However, it does not seem plausible to make a comparison based on company size since the reported accidents and illnesses may have not been experienced only (or caused by the conditions) in the current workplace but also in previous ones. Yet the number of manufacturing workers who complain about bad working conditions (unhealthy working conditions, noise, dust, smoke, cold, etc.) in large and small enterprises is almost equal. This subject in general is the main problem that the workers complain the most. Heavy and long working hours and/or low wages is the second most complained problem and apparently is more common among small enterprises.

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[22] This proportion probably shows the existing situation lower than it really is as there was a common reluctance to answer this question and the number of those who did not answer it was very much high. For instance, Değirmenci and Mendeş (1998) reported this proportion as 40 percent.

In small manufacturing industry, in many cases, it is difficult to distinguish 'technical' division of labor from 'managerial' division of labor in the production process. As a general trend regarding this subject, we may say that as the production size gets larger and production process more complex managerial functions tend to be formally separated from production functions and are clearly defined. However, still, when the manufacturing process in its narrow meaning is at issue, this distinction could never be established as a clear-cut divide. To put it the other way around, in small firms (i) division of labor is relatively less complex, and (ii) skill and authority are relatively more intertwined. The table (4.3) below shows the firm size based on distribution of hierarchical positions that reflect this intertwinedness, which to a certain extent reflects some traditional characteristics.

Table 4.3 Blue-collar workers' status in the workplace (%)

	Small Firms	*Large Firms*	*Total*
Foreman & workshop chief	14.1	8.1	11.5
Skilled master & section chief	13.3	31.3	21.1
Journeyman	12.5	7.1	10.1
Ordinary worker without any status	53.9	51.5	52.9
Apprentice	6.3	2.0	4.4

Through this table we can make several observations. First, the existence of proportionally higher numbers of apprentice hiring in small companies reflects, in principle, small firms' preference for low-cost labor. That is, the phenomenon of high rates of apprentice employment in small firms does not necessarily mean an actual continuation of traditional labor relations. For instance, we do not observe a common tendency among apprentices to continue to work in the same workplace for a long time, learning the job, and being promoted to higher status, as was the case in traditional venture. Secondly, the fact that the category of 'ordinary worker' (not always in the sense of 'unskilled' but rather without any status attributes) constitutes more than half of the employment structure indicates the decline of the number of traditional categories, inherited from artisanal mode of production, such as apprentices and journeymen that signify both skill/experience and hierarchical positioning at the same time. This tendency is not surprising considering the fact that these enterprises are not artisanal but capitalist production units. The situation is also

concordant with the previously mentioned observation that in small firms' skilled workers (foremen in this case) occupies a proportionally larger place. It can also be interpreted as an indication of the fact that as the size of the enterprise becomes bigger the lower and higher categories of the traditional skill and authority hierarchy are gradually disappearing. Lastly, in relation to these observations, we may argue that the expansion of intermediate positions is an indication of relative development of vertical division of labor. In this sense, as expected, intermediate positions occupy a large place in large enterprises (section chief) than they do in small firms (skilled master).

Table 4.4 Supervision and control in the labor process (%)

	White-collar Workers	*Blue-collar Workers*		
		Small Firms	*Small Firms*	*Total*
1 Higher-level authorities	82.6	48.6	25.3	38.3
2 Intermediate-level authorities	8.7	38.5	48.3	42.9
3 Lower-level authorities	8.7	12.8	26.4	18.9

1: Owner, general director, or factory manager. *2*: Workshop chief or foreman. *3*: Section chief or skilled master.

The information on regulation of labor process also supports the above interpretation. According to the Table 4.4, around half of the responsibilities taken by workers in small firms are supervised and controlled directly by the highest authority (in small firms, most of the time, this corresponds to the owner of enterprise).[23] In contrast, as the firm size gets larger, intermediate and lower authorities begin to do the most of the regulation and control functions. This table also compares the positions of white and blue-collar workers in terms of control and supervision, and shows a striking difference between these two groups: as different from the blue-collar workers, the overwhelming majority of white-collar workers are directly controlled and supervised by higher authorities. As I indicated above, this fact shows a different type of articulation and relation of authority between white-collar workers and the management. Nevertheless, we need to emphasize the fact that this is a

[23] We encounter with those enterprise owners (who have a technical education in most cases) who are engaged in the control and regulation of manufacturing process in large firms as well. However, the enterprise owners who work directly in manufacturing themselves are only seen in very small ones that have only couple of wageworkers.

phenomenon we observed in an industrial area constituted by medium and small-size enterprises and where white-collar workers are a minority. Hence, it could not be generalized to labor relations in the areas where white-collar employment is dominant.

4.2.1. The position and role of skilled workers

The existence of workers that are still mentioned traditional artisan labels in OSTİM does not mean that these enterprises are artisan units. These 'traditional' categories of labor force indicate a skill and authority relationship specific to artisan production: apprentice – journeyman – (master) craftsman. In an artisan unit, master craftsman is the owner of the enterprise that at the same time represents a typical target of vertical mobility. Although these positions may continue to formally exist in small capitalist industry enterprises, as a result of the disappearance of the social basis of these relations their specific content as well as the mobility pattern fades away (see van Velzen 1977 and Ayata 1991). For the traditional apprentice-journeyman and craftsman mechanism to function, the production in the enterprise needs to be limited to artisan boundaries and the market needs to be favorable for artisan ins and outs. Only a very small number of enterprises in OSTİM can be seen to confirm these characteristics (even the average number of workers is around 10). Hence, apprentice and journeyman positions in OSTİM are transitional forms of unskilled and semi-skilled labor force. On the other hand, for these traditional categories to exist in the real sense, they need to be supported by mechanisms of classical paternalism and traditional protectionism in labor relations.

However, labor force characteristics in these small industrial enterprises also do not resemble those in large fordist enterprises. This situation is particularly relevant for those skilled workers still referred to with artisan labels (master, senior master or foreman). For this reason, we need to look at the position of these skilled workers in OSTİM more closely.

If we live aside professional managers and engineers rarely employed in small enterprises, duration of employment for foremen/workshop chiefs and skilled masters/section chiefs working in both smaller and larger firms in their present job is longer than the other workers. A similar differentiation can also be observed in terms

of wage levels: these groups are located in the upper scales of wage lather. They earn 57 percent and 26 percent more than those closest to their wage scale. As can be expected, their autonomy in workplace is also higher than the other groups and/or they are supervised and controlled directly by either employers or top-level managers. At the same time, they have much stronger personal relations with employers and top-level managers than the others: 97 percent of foremen/workshop chiefs and 73 percent of skilled masters/section chiefs voice their personal demands directly to employer or top-manager.

The status of these skilled and/or higher authority-owning workers does not show any systematic differences between small and large firms located in OSTİM. For instance, there is almost no difference between firms in terms of wage levels. In contrast, as can be expected, close informal relations with employer or top-managers in small firms are much stronger. The average working hours in large firms is longer. Of course, these average indicators do not even show some of the structural characteristics, even if they are weak. These positions show a tendency for gradual variations even among 'small' firms OSTİM. In reality, foremen/senior master and skilled master statuses in 'small' enterprises are earned through experience. Furthermore, these workers tend to be older and less educated than the workshop chiefs and section chiefs employed in large firms. Also, senior master and skilled master positions generally do not reflect a systematic hierarchy. In most of the cases, it would be more appropriate to see all of these categories under one group of 'skilled masters.' The typical characteristics of these masters are as following: (i) direct participation in production with their higher skills (ii) representing an open and de facto authority position in controlling labor process and workplace relations due to their skills, experience and their positions as the 'second man' closest to the employer. In contrast, in large firms, these positions show a tendency of gradual transformation in two respects: (a) the positions of senior master (*ustabaşı*) and master (*usta*) gradually become formally separated from each other and (b) particularly senior master becomes labeled as section chief or workshop chief and gets distanced from direct production and gradually performs more of coordination and control functions. A similar tendency with some lower degrees can also be observed for skilled masters transforming into section chief. They also come to be

recruited more often among those with higher education. As I have emphasized before, if we consider that even 'large' firms in OSTİM employ hundred workers at most, these differentiations should be seen as relative and gradual. In any case, we can argue that these workers draw a different labor profile than their counterparts in large fordist firms in terms of their higher and varied skill levels and their higher levels of engagement in direct production.

However, their relatively advantageous position in wage labor does not mean that these workers carry traditional artisan characteristics. What is at stake here is a group of 'skilled workers' particular to labor-intensive flexible production conditions of small capitalist enterprises wherein the division of labor is not highly refined. They represent a regular and established wage labor experience than those semi-skilled and unskilled workers with high labor turnover. Considered from this perspective, it is not surprising to see that they have the highest rate (40 percent) of aspiring professional wage employee positions for their kids than all of the other groups. Similarly, despite their position as the closest sections to the employer and management, they see 'worker-boss' distinction as the most relevant category of social differentiation (rated first in the scale) and more than all of the other groups (26 percent) (These issues will be discussed further in detail in coming chapters). These findings show that the idea of an upward intergenerational mobility among the ladders of wage employee positions and a certain degree of engagement into wage labor relation have been more deeply established in their social imagination.

4.3. Workplace Relations

To what extend working relations in small firms carry different characteristics is a subject of debate since the publication of Schumacher's (1974) *Small is Beautiful.* Schumacher's argument that small scale is much closer to human nature and that employment relations in small working units have a potential of being more humane and harmonious has been criticized by Rainnie (1989) among others. Rainnie (1989) has argued that Schumacher's account has totally ignored negative characteristics of these enterprises based on oppressive and autocratic work relations and extensive working hours in unhealthy and insecure workplace conditions. The debate on this

issue still continues in two polarized opposite camps reflected in concepts such as 'small is beautiful' and 'bleak house' or 'black hole.' Empirical studies, on the other hand, draw our attention to the fact that small enterprises, as a whole, do not constitute a homogenous entity (Wilkinson 1999; Dundon and Grugulis 1999). Although the 'outcomes' that this debate produces is controversial, the ground on which the social relations in small enterprises take place has two 'factual' characteristics: the absence or weakness of formal mechanisms and unionization at the shop floor level. Although the informal nature of relations seems to be the very outcome of small size of enterprise, in most of the cases, it appears to be a method of labor control consciously chosen by the business owners and which they are not easily willing to let go of unless the growth tendency of the enterprise forces them to do so (Matlay 1999).

The differences observed between large and small enterprises in terms of division of labor and regulation of labor process are also, to some degree, reflected at the individual and collective levels of labor relations. In fact, the degree of formalization and institutionalization for enterprises in OSTİM, in general, is quite low. At the same time, it seems that the social division of labor displays much more informal characteristics than the technical division of labor in the labor process. However, still, we observe significant relative differences between small and large enterprises. Table 4.5 gives us two levels through which we can trace these differences. First, we will look at to which authorities the workers direct their problems and demands that are personal in nature, such as holiday/leave, illness, and advance-payments.

As we can observe from the table, the level of institutionalization in these enterprises is quite low. In both small and large enterprises these problems and demands are directly addressed to high-level authorities. Yet, still, the use of this method is more common in small firms than in large ones. In large firms, more than half of the workers direct their individual demands and problems to intermediate and low-level authorities. In small firms, in contrast, only a quarter of workers go to intermediate-level authorities and in such enterprises low-level authorities almost do not have any role in these matters. This situation is related to the limited existence of low and intermediate authorities in small firms. Yet even in cases where these

authorities formally do exist, most of the time, they have no function in personnel relations and decisions are directly made by higher authorities (in small firms, most of the time, the owner of the enterprise).[24]

Table 4.5 Workplace relations: Individual and collective issues

	White-collar Workers	*Blue-collar Workers*		
		Small Firms	*Large Firms*	*Total*
A: To whom are individual problems and demands conveyed?				
A1 higher-level authorities	96.4	74.2	46.9	62.3
A2 intermediate-level authorities	3.6	25.0	37.5	30.5
A3 lower-level authorities	0.0	0.8	15.6	7.3
B: How are the common problems and demands conveyed to the employer/management?				
B1	12.0	8.6	1.1	5.3
B2	16.0	16.4	23.7	19.6
B3	4.0	1.7	16.1	8.1
B4	16.0	3.4	10.8	6.7
B5	52.0	69.9	48.3	60.3

A1: Owner, general director, or factory manager. *A2*: Workshop chief or foreman. *A3*: Section chief or skilled master. *B1*: Meetings with the employer or the high level authorities either collectively or through representatives. *B2*: Meetings with foreman or workshop chief either collectively or through representatives. *B3*: Meetings with the skilled master or section chief either collectively or through representatives *B4*: Communicated at the meetings that are organized by the management and attended by employer. *B5*: These issues are never discussed among workers or despite they are occasionally discussed they never result in an actual initiative; management has no regulation regarding such issues.

When workers' collective problems and demands are at stake, the situation becomes much more complicated. The first thing we need to emphasize here is that in OSTİM, union organization[25] and collective bargaining mechanism do not exist at

[24] The 'informal' character of the relations in small enterprises does not mean that these relations are warmer and more harmonious or more 'humane' (Ekin 1993: 62). On the contrary, in small enterprises behaviors that the workers describe as 'not being treated as a human' (*insanca muamele görmemek*) are more common. In large enterprises, employees support the process of formalizing the work relations at the very same time with the techniques of establishing close and warm humanly relations (through morale meetings, small travels, respectful treatment in individual contacts etc.).

[25] Recent studies on working relations in non-union enterprises have come up with some interesting conclusions. For instance, according to Benson's (2000) findings based on Australian firms, who interrogated whether the increasingly accepted 'human relations management' techniques function as an alternative 'voice mechanism' to union for workers, voice mechanisms

all either in small or large enterprises. In addition, examples of various collective actions organized by the workers themselves are very limited. The majority of workers (70 percent in small firms and 60 percent in large firms) do not benefit from any bilateral or unilateral regulations regarding wages, working hours, and workplace conditions. In these circumstances, even if the workers may discuss their common problems and demands among themselves, they cannot find the channels to convey these demands to the employer. Hence, they are confined into the conditions of labor market, on the one hand, and the oppressive or paternalist labor relations at the workplace, on the other. Only a very small portion of workers could interact with the employee or high-level authorities either collectively or through representatives. Interestingly, these seldom examples take place not in large but small firms. Both in small and large firms the common practice is to direct these demands to intermediate-level authorities either collectively or through representatives.

The relatively small size of the workplace and the positioning of all workers within the close distance of foreman or enterprise owner enable not only the work process but also the workers themselves to be directly observed and regulated. Hence, we may argue that physical conditions in the workplace constitute one of the conditions that make paternalist labor relations possible. In addition, there are other particular conditions that make paternalist relations sustainable. First and foremost is the existence of relations of 'pre-work' kinship and familiarity/friendship. Second is the existence of pre-work bonds among workers themselves that also constitutes an obstacle in front of the development of collective identity. For instance, at least 1/5

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outside of unions do not constitute an alternative to union mechanisms. On the contrary, these kinds of mechanisms are more frequently observed in unionized workplaces and show a tendency to increase depending on the effectiveness of the union. This tendency is valid for workers' individual and collective actions and bargains as well as management-sponsored mechanisms (such as formal meetings, employee surveys, quality circles, joint consultative committees, representatives, etc.). Benson (2000: 458) explains this situation as follows:

> It may be the case that a number of voice mechanisms such as employee-management committees, consultative mechanisms and procedural arrangements function more effectively where a collective consciousness exists and identifiable employee representatives are present. On the other hand, the higher frequency of voice mechanisms in union workplaces may represent a managerial strategy aimed at reducing the influence of unions and 'recapturing' employees.

of the workers have a relative in working (as a worker) in the same workplace.[26] While these conditions produce a structure that ebbs and flows between direct oppression and paternalist practices, they also lead to discriminatory practices and favoritism.

In addition, in large firms we observe two different characteristics. First, lower-level managers play a significant role concerning workers' collective problems and demands. Secondly, another method that we encounter in large firms is the discussion of these issues in the meetings organized by the management and either the owner or high-level managers attend. Such practices likewise the others, which do not have any presence in small firms, are far from representing any collective negotiation and bargaining characteristics. Rather, they function as channels through which demands are communicated. On the other hand, these practices do not show a homogenous structure on firm basis. In other words, in the same firm we can see different practices for different group of workers. In general, unskilled service workers and unskilled manufacturing workers are the most disadvantaged ones. In relatively larger firms we may also observe differences between departments.

Keeping in mind that we are making an observation limited to enterprises in OSTİM, we may argue that shop floor level labor relations in larger firms are relatively more institutionalized and formalized. One of the two observations supporting this argument is the higher proportion of official workplace meetings observed in large enterprises. Secondly, in large firms, organizational functions are distributed to low and intermediate-level positions at higher degrees than the small ones. However, still, these relative differences should not be exaggerated. Whatever the enterprise size, all of the workers in OSTİM are without any collective organization and bargaining institutions and mechanisms.

In these conditions, for two reasons, it would be a mistake to think that as the size of the firms gets larger paternalist regulation/control would cease to exist. First, the enterprises that we classified as 'large' in our OSTİM sample are firms that employ at most 75 workers that are generally accepted as medium and small-size

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[26] Kalaycıoğlu (1995) underlines another factor for the existence of paternalist relations she observed in factories employing more than 300 workers: supervisors and skilled masters mostly are previous small workshop owners.

enterprises. Hence, the physical conditions that enable and sustain paternalist relations continue to exist. Second, although we observe that 'pre-work' bonds in large enterprises are less effective and oppressive practices and favoritism are relatively rare, a paternalist ground that is reproduced at the level of workplace relations (through practices such as workplace meetings, travels and picnics organized by the management) still exists. In any case, one of the conditions for the sustainability of this paternalist regulation regime in a peripheral industrial area like OSTİM is to take the employment volume below a potential upper threshold. We cannot give a number as to how many workers constitutes this threshold. Yet, we may conclude that the overwhelming majority of the enterprises are far away from this threshold.

4.4. Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempted to provide some observations on the characteristics of workforce, working conditions and labor relations at the workplace level in OSTİM. These observations point to the existence of both common and differing characteristics between small and large enterprises. First of all, the labor force in large enterprises represents a relatively young, more educated and less experienced profile. Yet, in terms of the composition of workforce there are no significant differences between large and small enterprises. Low-skilled workers constitute the majority of workforce. In addition, in hiring processes low-skilled workers are commonly preferred and informal methods based on acquaintances of existing workers are deployed. The most noticeable difference is that experienced and skilled workers in small enterprises constitute a higher proportion in the workforce.

The average wage level in small and large enterprises is very close to each other. However, we encounter with those with very low wages in absolute terms in smaller firms more frequently. The main reason for this is that apprentice employment is more common in those enterprises. Extra-wage payments are also more common in large firms. Among workers, age dependent experience appears to be the most significant factor for wage differentials.

Technical and social division of labor in the production process appears to be relatively more complex in large-scale enterprises than small enterprises. Supervision of labor process and control functions in some respects is transferred to middle and lower rank authorities. On the other hand, due to the specificity of the sector itself, the supervision and control of clerical and technical workers, who constitute small portion of the total workforce, are much easier and direct, carried out by the owners or the upper authorities. Besides, mutual sacrifice between this group and management (overtime work without payment and in return high tolerance in granting excused absence) are more widespread. This situation points to a significant differentiation between blue-collars and white-collars in their relationships with the management of the firm.

Although the absence of formal mechanisms in workplace relations both at individual and collective levels is a dominant pattern in all enterprises, there are some relative differences. At the individual level of relationships, the owner or foreman has an undisputable weight in small workplaces; whereas in large enterprises these matters are relegated to middle and lower rank authorities. Like individual level, paternalism mixed with arbitrariness, favoritism and protectionism, which are also dominant characteristics of the relationships at the collective level in small workplaces, leaves itself to relatively more formal relationships in the larger enterprises. However, this does not surpass the limits of paternalism beyond a decrease in arbitrariness and favoritism.

The characteristics of division of labor among firms in OSTIM, together with my discussions in this chapter have several important implications for further studies. First of all, in analyzing dynamics of capital accumulation in 'peripheral industry' such as OSTİM, the studies focusing on individual firms or entrepreneurs will certainly provide valuable information in understanding nature of differentiation in this area. Yet, these studies at the same time should be accompanied with a political economy that focuses on articulations of peripheral firms among themselves as well as with large-scale industry, and dynamics of capital accumulation processes integrated at the sectoral levels. Only such a perspective can shed some light on the content of general industrial division of labor in which peripheral industry participates.

The second problem is related with the question of where to look for social class relations as well as class conflict when periphery workers do not show any capacity of collective organization neither at the level of workplace nor at the level of industry. As very general observations, we may argue that the common problems of OSTİM workers at the workplace level are low wages and overwork in poor working conditions. In contrast, we may summarize the complaints of employers typically as 'lazy workers.' For both parties the final solution for these complaints are 'quitting the job' and 'laying off the worker.' Given the lack of organized labor relations in the small capitalist workshops, I will venture to argue that class struggle in peripheral industry is hidden in the political economy of surplus production and is squeezed in that fissure. This argument is partly related to the process of 'integrated capital accumulation' process I noted above. OSTİM workers have a direct knowledge that, against fierce conditions of competition in the market, their enterprises function through low profit margins and subcontracting relations. They also somehow feel that some parts of their unpaid labor do not stay in their own enterprises. This knowledge and feeling, to certain extent, complicates class relations at the enterprise level. However, still, capitalist surplus production constitutes the basis of social division of labor in the enterprise. And this very process is not independent from hidden forms of class struggle. I believe a quotation from Edwards' classical work, *Contested Terrain*, will help to explain this point further:

> Any worker who, once on the job, refuses to work or even works less than the eager job-seeking unemployed person will be simply fired. Individual resistance by a worker, if it is detected, is easily dealt with, so long as a replacement is standing by in the unemployment line. Meaningful conflict arises, then, with regard to groups of workers or an employer's or an entire industry's workforce. *The amount of labor that can be extracted from the purchased labor power depends on the workforce's willingness to perform useful work and the enterprise's ability to compel or evoke such work* (Edwards 1979: 12f, italics added).

We may think that by workers' resistance, Edwards, here, refers to open or hidden organizations. Yet, we need take into account the hidden unorganized forms of resistance. The choices of an enterprise to increase capital accumulation are as follows: (i) decrease wages, (ii) increase working hours to increase absolute surplus, and (iii) make a technological change that would increase relative surplus. In the

conditions where the minimum level of wages is determined in the market and maximum level of working hours are legally and socially restricted, the only way for those small enterprises with limited resources for technological investment is (iv) to intensify labor. This constitutes the main arena of open and hidden conflicts between capital and labor. Even in conditions where the workers do not have the capacity/possibility to organize and there exists a short-term possibility to be laid off, the intensity of work is determined by this struggle. In the long-term, the amount that capital could extract from labor-power is limited at a certain level. These conditions where class conflict becomes restricted at the level of intensification of labor also point to a capitalist production environment in which control mechanisms over labor make only limited use of bureaucratic and technical means of control and are stuck within the boundaries of simple control, hence the process of transition from formal to real subordination of labor is very slow. Finally, we need to tie our observation in the production sphere to analyses related to re-production areas as well as to wider social-cultural context. I will attempt to do these, in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 5

THE HOUSEHOLDS AND URBAN SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will, first, examine indicators related to household sizes of OSTİM workers. In addition, I will look at the workers' family structure as well as differentiation in family structure between different worker groups. I examine, in detail, household employment profile, and interpret the data on the extent and identities of those family members who are engaged in income-generating activities. I also discuss the relationship between these indicators and household welfare levels and explore the possible factors that household welfare differentiation is related to. Lastly, I consider some structural and behavioral patterns related to various aspects of urban life such as consumption and saving, and homeownership and residence.

5.1. Size, Composition, and Class Profile

Although we do not have extensive comparative data specifically on the size patterns of the working class families in Turkey, the average family structure of OSTİM workers appear to have relatively few members.[1] More than half of the households are medium-size (three or four family members). Almost 60 percent are composed of

[1] Average family population is 4.30 (total population is 1183 in 275 households), and average number of children is 2.09. These figures appear as 4.1 people and 2 children among the families of İstanbul metal workers (Özuğurlu & Erten 1999). Household Income Distribution Survey in 1994 (DİE 2001d) found average number of household size, in urban areas of Turkey, as 4.24 people, while it is 4.71 for rural households. These survey results, however, do not reflect differences in household sizes with respect to class characteristics of the households. On the other hand, the size differences observed between urban and rural households in Turkey do not constitute a universal trend. For instance, de Vos (1993), in his study where he analyzed data from six different Latin American countries, in contrast to propositions of modernization approach, found that there is no significant differentiation between rural and urban households in terms of size.

up to four people. As observed in some Latin American countries (de Vos 1993), the households of professional employees and clerical workers tend to be less extended than those of manufacturing and service workers. Apparently large families are more prevalent among blue-collars than white-collars. This difference in family size is even stronger between unskilled service workers and professional employees, a comparison that may be considered to reflect the variation between lowest and highest income groups of the sample. This pattern is conforming to the monthly wage of the workers interviewed: as the wage of the workers increases, their families tend to be smaller in size.

Table 5.1 Family structure by class position (%)

	unskilled service worker	*blue-collar worker*	*white-collar worker*	*professional employee*	*TOTAL*
Interviewee alone	--	0.9	7.1	8.3	1.8
Interviewee and friends	--	0.4	7.1	16.7	2.2
Nuclear family with no children	--	3.1	3.6	--	2.9
Nuclear family	66.7	73.8	64.3	50.0	71.3
Extended family	22.2	14.2	10.7	16.7	14.2
Large extended family	11.1	7.6	7.1	8.3	7.6

These figures on household size of OSTİM workers need to be analyzed together with the family structure.[2] In order to identify basic sociological characteristics of the households, I employed the classical typologies of 'nuclear family' and 'extended family.' However, I needed a further categorization in order to explore more detailed variations. Therefore, I created two sub-categories for each typology: 'nuclear family with no children', and 'nuclear family' of couples with children. 'Extended family' is intended to categorize those families that include persons of more than two generations: grandparents and grandchildren living together with the typical members of nuclear family (parents and children). I needed to distinguish a second category of extended family, because 'extended family' in the

[2] While processing the data on household members, I adopted the following classification method: (a) if the worker interviewed is not married and continues to live with his/her parents, s/he was categorized as "child" within nuclear or extended families, and (b) if s/he is married (with children or not), living with his/her parents at least one of whom is currently involved in any income generating activities, then s/he was regarded as "married child" within extended families.

former sense reflects only a vertical pattern of family extension. Therefore, 'large extended family', which is more likely to reflect 'multiple family household' (de Vos 1987) characteristics, covers a horizontal extension of the household population as well: brothers & sisters (including their spouses & children) of the principal couple. This category also may or may not hold vertically extended characteristics.

As the information on family size suggests, the majority (71 percent) of the workers live in standard nuclear families (couples with children). Most of the workers interviewed are either fathers (or mothers in marginal degrees) or unmarried boys (or girls with a small minority) in nuclear families.[3] Only 22 percent of the households are extended families. 'Large extended-family' is even less common with 8 percent. Of the nuclear families, 69 percent consist of at most four people. Figures on the numbers of children are consistent with this finding: 67 percent of nuclear families have at most two children. There appears a slight difference between family patterns of white-collars and of blue-collars: extended families were likely to be relatively more widespread among blue-collars (22 percent) than white-collars (18 percent).

The households of textile workers in the cases of Brazil and Argentina studied by Acero (1991) appear to have both similar and different size patterns. In general, size patterns of the households in Turkey seems closer to average family population in Brazil (4.13 people) than that of Argentina (3.9 people). Two-third of the families in Brazilian case and 70 percent of those in Argentinean case consist of up to four members. Acero points out that these figures reflect relatively smaller family sizes in comparison to working-class households in low-income countries. Among the Argentinean families, however, small family (one or two persons) seems to be more common: while large-size families (more than four members) are slightly more

[3] 60 percent of the workers interviewed are married. Değirmenci and Mendeş (1998) found the same amount of marriage among OSTİM workers. Blue-collars are much more likely to be married (65 percent) than white-collars (27 percent) who are younger. This means most of the white-collars live with their parents. Although information on marriage age was not included in data, if we consider the average age among workers, we may conclude that average marriage age is quite low: 24 percent of the workers in the age group of 20-24 and 84 percent of those between 25-34 years old are married. On the other hand, probably because of the relatively low age profile, OSTİM workers appear to be less likely to be married compared to İstanbul metal workers (85 percent) and urban labor force (70 percent) (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999; DİE 2001b).

widespread in the OSTİM case (40 percent) than Brazil (34 percent), this type of family is the least common in Argentina (30 percent) (Acero 1991: 68-72, 185-187).

Household compositions are also similar with Brazilian and Argentinean cases: around three quarters of the Brazilian and Argentinean households appear as nuclear families. There are, however, some differences with respect to the least and the most diversified household forms. Extended and large extended families are the most observed in Turkey (22 percent) and the least observed in Brazil (13 percent). Small nuclear families (couples with no children), on the other hand, are the least common in Turkey (3 percent) and the most common in Argentina (10 percent) (Acero 1991: 68-70, 185-187).

In general, OSTİM workers belong to families that are highly homogenous with respect to class positions of the family members. For as much as 90 percent of the families, there are no family members currently engaged in non-wage activities, which means that it would be appropriate to call these households as 'working class families.' Moreover, working family members of a considerable majority (57 percent) of households consist only of blue-collar worker(s). The second group (16 percent) of families represents the widest type of intra-family cross-class composition: the workforce of these families is made up of both white-collar and blue-collar wageworkers. And the third group (11 percent) covers those families whose working members are composed of both blue-collar and unskilled service workers. As the number of household population extends, as the number of working people increases, and as the employment profile of the household becomes more heterogeneous, the more heterogeneous is the intra-family cross-class profile. While the rate of 'blue-collar only' families is as high as 71 percent of medium size households (3-4 family member), this rate falls down to 42 percent among large size households (5-6 family members). The same tendency can also be observed in line with both the extension (keep in mind that there is only one working household member in 85 percent of these 'blue-collar only' families) and diversification of working household members. In both cases, blue-collar and unskilled service workers (and other members with wage and non-wage occupations, in marginal degrees) come to occupy a wider place within family workforce.

5.2. Employment and Household Income

We can, now, go on to analyze some employment and income characteristics among OSTİM workers' households. In this analysis, my main aim is, firstly, to examine the essential reasons for the income and employment differentiation among households. My second aim is to inquire to what extent there is a relationship between employment and household welfare. Income inequality between households and individuals is, of course, a multi-leveled and complex issue related primarily with the labor and income earnings distribution dynamics, size patterns of the households, sector based and regional dynamics as well as extra-labor earnings (Mamalakis 1996). Any study on income differentiation needs to take these multiple factors into account. Yet, here I am interested in a relatively small sample group of workers and will restrict my analysis to income inequality, household size and household employment characteristics.

We can begin with some general findings. OSTİM workers' households survive on an average $500 monthly income. Yet this average amount hides serious income differences. In fact, the income of more than two-third of households is below this amount. Compared to blue-collars' households, the households of white-collar workers have 80 percent more income on average. When we consider not only the workers interviewed themselves but also the class position of other family members, we observe more striking income differentiation patterns. There is 2.5 times income difference between those households in which there are professional employees that bring income to family in addition to other wage earners, and those households with only blue-collar workers who contribute to family income. On the other hand, as expected, the average household income increases as the household size increases.[4]

The average household income, of course, does not constitute a sufficient indicator of household welfare levels, as the per capita income would differ depending on the number of household members. The patterns related to this

[4] These patterns of income differentiation among households are also observed in monthly spending amount of households. The average amount of spending for white-collar workers is around 70 percent more than the blue-collars' households. Similarly, those families with professional employees have 2.5 times more monthly expenses than the families with only blue-collar workers.

indicator show contradicting tendencies compared to average household income differentiation patterns. The most significant among these tendencies is the decrease in per capita income as the household size increases. In addition, we do not see a stable differentiation pattern in per capita income depending on the number of income earners in the household: the per capita income in those families with two and three working members is 1.5 times larger than those families with one person working which constitutes more than half of the sample. However, when the number of working family members further increases, this trend is reversed and per capita income decreases.

Before discussing this, seemingly, contradictory tendency in per capita income, let us look at some observations on the employment characteristics of the households. Among the households of OSTİM workers, the number of household members engaging in any kind of income generating activity appears to be relatively high. There are 450 income providers among 1,140 people at 266 households. Average number of income providers per household is 1.69 persons, and the average household employment rate[5] is 0.41, which appears to be rather higher than the employment rates for overall Turkey (0.34) and for urban areas (0.28).[6]

The data on Brazil and Argentina, provided by Acero (1991: 72, 190), indicates significant differences compared to Turkey. In comparison with these two cases of other countries, the number of income providers in OSTİM case appears to be rather

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[5] This term indicates the rate of the number of income providers to the household population. The "income providers" in households are not exclusively employed people. Among 41 households (15 percent of the sample) there are also pensioned retirees.

[6] These rates were calculated from the data provided in DİE (2001b), where labor force participation rate is given as 49 percent for Turkey in general and 41 percent for urban areas. In calculating labor force participation rate, the State Institute of Statistics uses this formula: the rate of labor force (employed, underemployed and unemployed people) to the non-institutional civilian population (12 years old and over). My data do not provide such information to calculate average labor force participation rate for the households at hand. So, keeping in mind that the number of employed people is always lower than labor force, I prefer to make comparisons in terms of what I called "employment rate." This figure will enable us to make a more appropriate comparison between the employment figures of the households of OSTİM workers and those of general population. In another source based on the 1994 Household Income Distribution Survey (DİE 2001d), the number of average employed people among urban households is given as 1.35 and household employment rate as 0.32. However, with respect to "income providers", these rates appear rather closer to those for the OSTİM households: 1.65 and 0.39.

low. While nearly half (49 percent)[7] of the households in OSTİM case have two or more family members contributing to household budget, the rate of those families is 85 percent in Brazil, and 65 percent in Argentina. The order of percentages is also same for the households where more than two family members contribute to the household economy: 17 percent for Turkey, and 40 percent for Brazil, 28 percent for Argentina. These figures, taken together, show that the least employment density is seen among Turkish families, and the most among Brazilian families.[8]

White-collars' households have more employed household members compared to the households of the blue-collar workers: while there is at most one working family member among more than half of the families of blue-collars, there are at least two working people among 60 percent of the families of white-collars. In confirmation with this trend, household employment rate is noticeably lower for blue-collars' families (0.40) than for white-collars' families (0.53). The most probable reason for this difference is the variation in terms of the size and characteristics of household population. Average population is higher for blue-collars' families (4.36 persons) than for white-collars' families (3.93 persons). Overwhelming majority (71.4 percent) of the white-collar interviewees are unmarried children who continue to live with their parents, whereas nearly two-third (65 percent) of the blue-collar interviewees are married and most of them have children at little ages. As a matter of fact, 69 percent of the blue-collars' families have at least one child at 0-12 ages, while 71 percent of the white-collars' families do

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[7] Compare with one person working at 87 percent of the households of İstanbul metal workers (Özuğurlu & Erten 1999). We may accept this situation as the indication of relatively high-income levels of İstanbul metal workers.

[8] Acero explains the smaller number of members contributing to the economic subsistence of the households in Argentina than those in Brazil by the fact that "textile wage in the sample tend to be higher in Argentina than Brazil", which is also applied to the general contexts of these two countries: "Brazilian textile workers earned, on average, US$120 monthly, a little more than two minimum wages, while the Argentineans earned US$200 (December- 1987)." At that time, monthly minimum wage was US$56 in Argentina and US$57 in Brazil (Acero 1991: 73, 188, 292). At the time of my survey the legal monthly minimum wage in Turkey (as the money paid, after tax and social insurance reductions) corresponded to US$114, and the average monthly wage of OSTİM workers was US$267 (As of the end of March 2002, net minimum wage for those above the age 15 is $121 and for those below16 $104). Despite the variation of the purchasing power parities these numbers for different countries and periods may conceal, these figures might imply a possible and partial explanation of the apparently smallest number of working family members in the Turkish case.

not have any child at those ages. These aspects explain the relatively higher proportion of family members out of employment among blue-collars' families. This last issue is also seen in the figures on interviewees' level of participation in household income. While nearly half of the blue-collars' wages constitute the entire household income, only 12 percent of the white-collars' wages do so.

As might be expected, absolute numbers of working family members show a tendency to rise in line with an increase in household population. There are at least two working family members in one-third of the medium-size (3-4 people) households and in two-thirds of the large-size (5-6 people) households. However, in terms of the household employment rates (rate of the number of working household members to household population) there is no significant difference between medium and large households: this rate is 0.41 for the former and 0.37 for the latter. Employment rate does not differ according family structure either. While the absolute number of working people increases with the move from nuclear to extended families, the rates of household employment are 0.39 and 0.41, displaying only a marginal degree of difference. On the other hand, household employment rate seems to be positively correlated to the wage level of the workers interviewed. The higher is the wage of the workers, the smaller is the number of working people in their household: while only one person appears to be employed among 76 percent of the families of highest wage group, this rate steadily and sharply falls down throughout the decreasing wage levels (57, 50, and 26 percent, respectively). The exact tendency is also indicated by household employment rates: 0.37 in highest wage group, and 0.56 in lowest wage group.

5.2.1. Household employment profile: Children and women

In order to reach a proper employment profile of the households, we also need to explore the identities of the working household members. In nearly half (45 percent) of the households, the husband appears as the only person who engages in any income generating activity. The second largest category of the working family members is the group of unmarried children who continue to live with their parents. Children take place within the labor force of the one-third of the households. As the size of the families extend, children's contribution to the household economy tends

to increase, and this tendency is more apparent among the families of the white-collar interviewees. 27 percent of the blue-collars' families and 36 percent of the white-collars' families have at least one working child within the 13-21 years age group. The frequency of the households that have working children is twice as much in larger & extended families than in smaller & nuclear families. In the three quarters of households, working family population is constituted either by husband only or by husband and unmarried children. When we move to more extended and larger families, together with the increasing number of working people, other household members have a rising share within the working population making the overall number of working family members rise. In most of the cases, these people, other than the husband and unmarried children, living in extended families are: father & mother of the principle couple, married children, siblings of husband & wife, and their spouses.

It is undoubtedly a rare phenomenon for wives to have a job. Those families where the wife (woman of the principle couple) is engaged in any income generating occupation do not exceed 10 percent of the whole sample of the households. The highest ratio of employed wives is seen among small nuclear families of couples with no children. However, women's employment is relatively more frequent among extended families than among standard nuclear families. Moreover, employed wives are much more prevalent among the families of white-collars (19 percent) than those of blue-collars' (5 percent). This point, indeed, invites us to deal with the gender dimension of the household employment profile. The ratio of the families where any workingwoman exists is also significantly low. As I pointed above, supplementary income-earners, in most of the cases, are the children. The lower level of women's participation in the household labor force is not only because of the cultural bias against wife's working outside, but also because of the employers' preference for unmarried women. As Roberts (1995: 165) points out, "the situation is similar to that described in Lamphere (1987)[9] for immigrants in New England in the early part of

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[9] Lamphere, L. (1987) *From Working Daughters to Working Mothers: Immigrant Women in a New England Industrial Community*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Roberts, in the same study, points out that in Latin American urban households gender and generational conflicts have a particular characteristic. Husbands resist to the idea of their wives working outside and instead want their sons and daughters to work. Working children, on the other hand, demand more

this century when it is 'working daughters' not 'working mothers' who provide the contributions to family income."

Of each five families, four do not have women engaged in any income generating activities. There are, however, tendencies parallel to the case of the wives. Except the small nuclear families, families with larger sizes and more extended characteristics, and families of the white-collars tend to have more working female members than the smaller and nuclear families and families of the blue-collars do. For more than two-third of the larger & extended families, and for more than half of the white-collars' families, there is at least one woman engaged in income generating activities. Besides, it is observed that employed women are more frequent among the families of the workers who were born in metropolitan & urban areas than the families of others.

We also see a positive correlation between the number of workingwomen and the household income levels. If we think that income level is an outcome of employment level, this fact may sound tautological. Yet, still, it is a common observation that women's employment level increases as does the household income and education levels as well individual woman's education (Ayata and Ayata 2000: 153).[10] According to Boratav (1995), in İstanbul in 1991, we encounter with working

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control (for personal consumption) over their earnings. I did not encounter examples of a similar conflict among working children in OSTİM. We may say that the absence of this conflict is a sign of a powerful paternalist control in the family. We should, however, also keep in mind that, looked at from the perspective of common family relations in Turkey, in tandem with the classical nature of paternalist relations, this control is not 'without a price.' One such typical price is the payment of an overwhelming portion of children's wedding expenses by the family. For other studies that emphasize the nature of family both as an arena of conflict and cooperation see Gonzales de la Rocha (2001); Gonzales de la Rocha & Gantt (1995).

[10] Statistics show that the rate of women's participation in employment in urban areas in Turkey is very low. 1999 DİE findings show that not only in industrial employment but also in non-agricultural employment, in general, the share of women is between 15 and 20 percent. However, we observe a general increase in women's employment rates in urban non-agricultural employment during the period of 1988-1999 (14 percent and 17 percent). Similarly, the share of women's employment increased from 16 percent in 1988 to 20 percent in 1999. The rate of urban women's participation in labor force is 17 percent while men's participation is 66 percent. Based on the same data, the rate of urban women's participation to labor force tends to steadily increase as education level increases (such relationship is not observed for men): while labor force participation rate among primary school graduate women is 11 percent, this rate rises to 70 percent among university graduate women. In addition, when we exclude a very small group of divorced and widow women in women labor force, participation in labor force among single women is much higher (24 percent) than among married women (14 percent). The tendency among men is reverse: among singles 45 percent and among married 79 percent (DİE 2001b; DİE

women in households of white-collar workers and professional employees more frequently than we do in the other groups. However, what is at stake in this positive relation between education and income and women's employment is 'formal' employment. Boratav, also talks about two different women's work. The first is 'income generating' and the second is 'subsistence' work. These examples, in contrast to formal employment, are informal forms of work that show characteristics specific to low income households: 17 percent of urban women do production for market at their homes. 87 percent, outside of necessary daily work such as food, cleaning etc., do non-income generating works which would, however, count as 'production for family' such as preparing tomato paste, growing vegetables and chickens, and sewing (1995: 64-67). Kalaycıoğlu (1995: 162) notes the examples of income generating home activities of the wives of factory workers in Bolu like "agricultural work on their own small piece of land or garden, picking potatoes as a part of time job, tailoring or knitting to sell." Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger (1998) point to another problem in women's contribution to household economy. The earnings of women working in domestic services, an area where female labor is becoming increasingly concentrated, make up almost half of the household income. However, even women themselves see their earnings as 'supplementary income' in household economy. In reality too, since women's income is spend for daily needs and does not contribute to long term investments such as house purchasing, their income is not seen as significant.

One example of how economic difficulties, education and urban experience permanently shatter cultural conservatism regarding women's employment is Emine, who is 19 years old and one of the first female manufacturing workers in OSTİM. Her family migrated to Ankara from Erzurum when she was 3 years old. She lives with her parents and her four siblings. Her mother and two younger siblings are currently students:

2001c). Studies on women wage labor in Turkey share the common observation that women wage earners concentrate in low-skilled jobs in services and manufacturing. They are generally excluded from management-related positions and those in capital- and technology-intensive activities. In many cases they are far from decision-making positions (Ecevit 1998; Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger 1998; Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç 2000).

> My father is working in *Siteler* as a porter, doing loading and unloading for wage. My elder brother is doing his military service. This is actually why I am working, because, since my brother went to the military, it would have been difficult for us to survive only on the money my father gets. My family, however, is not thinking to take me off from my work when my brother comes back from military. Because we are currently renting, and you can't keep on moving from here to there and we want to buy a house in the future. ... In the past, my family was also thinking that 'women should not work.' It is not the same for two years or so. Also, the daughters of our relatives and many people started work. As they started to work, even they are primary school graduates while I graduated from high school, it would have looked awkward if I did not work. When our teachers found us a job, I went and asked my family. And they said, 'if your teacher found it, then go, you went to school for this.'(*)

Some aspects of the variation of employment characteristics among families can be summarized as fallows: with the move from smaller & nuclear to larger & extended families, the composition of the working population becomes more heterogeneous. The issue here is not the increasing number of the working household members, but different kind of family members who participate in the household workforce. For instance, for 55 percent of the standard nuclear families composed of husband, wife, and children, the family workforce consists only of husbands. The rate of those extended families where family workforce includes members other than the typical nuclear family members (husband, wife, and children) rises to 55 percent. Moreover, 71 percent of the 'large' extended families have working people other than members of a typical extended family (husband, wife, children, father & mother, married children & spouses). This means that household population extension (in kind) results in a more heterogeneous workforce in rising degrees.

(*) *Babam Siteler'de çalışıyor, hamallık yapıyor, yükleme boşaltma işleri [ücretli]. Abim askerde. Zaten o yüzden ben çalışıyorum, abim askere gidince babamın tek başına aldığı parayla biraz zor geçineceğimiz için. Ama ailem, abim askerden döndüğü zaman beni işten almayı düşünmüyor. Çünkü şu anda kiradayız, devamlı oradan oraya taşınmak da olmuyor. İleride bir ev almayı düşünüyoruz. ... Önceleri benim ailem de 'kadın çalışmamalı' diye düşünürdü, fakat son bir-iki yıldır öyle değil. Bir de akrabalarımızın kızları da, çoğu kişi çalışmaya başladı. Onlar da çalışmaya başlayınca, bir de onlar ilkokul mezunu, ben liseyi bitirdim, çalışmasam şimdi tuhaf kaçacak. Öğretmenlerimiz iş bulunca ben de sordum aileme fikirlerini, madem öğretmeniniz buldu, gidin, bunun için okumuşsunuz, dediler.*

5.2.2. Employment and household income: A reassessment

I have already pointed out that while average household income grows as the size of household increases, the per capita income does not show such a trend.[11] To put it another way, 'per capita income', as the most significant indicator of household welfare, does not increase as the household size grows. Rather, it tends to decrease. One major reason that comes to mind immediately is a possible decrease in the number of income providers in household in proportion to the increase in the size of household. However, there is not much differentiation in household employment rate between medium households (0.41) and large households (0.37). The findings point out to another, second important explanatory factor, that is, the income of the working members in the household. As the size of household grows, the average income per working member decreases. Most importantly, per capita income for working members also decreases as the number of employed members in the household increases. The difference between those households with one income provider and those with four or more reaches to as much as two times.[12] We can summarize this phenomenon as follows: In the large households, majority of the income providers are employed in low paid jobs and each additional employed member's marginal contribution to household income tends to be smaller. In addition, if there is a need for low marginal contribution of additional workers, this

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[11] In the analysis of income differentiation between families another method is to examine other variables (such as household population, the number of family members who are working & income-earners, the number of those who are working & income-earners, per capita household income, and household income based per working & income-generating person) in relation to household income. From this perspective, when we look at the findings of DİE (2001d) 1994 Household Income Distribution Survey based on household/income groups divided into 20 percent segments, the results are as follows: when we move from 25 percent household group with the lowest income to the highest one, all of the above indicators tend to increase. This general tendency, with several small deviations, is also relevant for the households of the OSTİM workers. Yet, such an analysis does not only carry a tautological character but is also limited to showing the ways of finding out the forms of welfare differentiation rather than providing an explanation for the underlying reasons for it.

[12] In an original socio-economic status index based on employment, education, consumption and residence areas and home ownership, we observe a reverse tendency. According to this index called *VERİ Socio-economic Status Index*, when we move from low segments to higher ones, the proportion of income earners in household increases rapidly. In parallel to this, we also see that the number of both wage earners and self-employed increases. Yet, what is peculiar to the high segments is the predominance of self-employed. In addition, except the low segment, the size of the household decreases as we move toward the higher segments (Tüzün 2000).

means that in these households, i.e., households with relatively high number of employed members as well as a relatively large population, the average earnings of the other members are also relatively low. In other words, increasing employment, despite its low marginal contribution, is a necessary reproduction strategy in these households.[13] Such tendencies have increased due to economically impoverishing effects of post-1980s neo-liberal structural adjustment policies. To these effects, the households have responded with strategies such as expanding the size of household and increasing the number of family members who are able to work, decreasing consumption, increasing the non-wage family labor, increasing the entrance into labor force, and intensifying work (Gonzales de la Rocha and Gantt 1995; Roberts 1995). As Roberts (1995: 164) pointed out in the context of Latin American countries, the existence of more than one income provider does not constitute a basis for accumulation and social mobility for the majority of working class households. Such a possibility is only valid for managerial and technical professionals'

[13] Another possible factor that contributes to this situation might be other sources of income from urban (house & shop rent) and agricultural (product & rent) rents that are observed to be the main source of extra-employment income. There is nearly a 10 percent household group that appropriates urban rents, and another around 15 percent household group that gets product and rent income from agricultural property. These two groups almost never overlap with each other. In other words, we can talk about a nearly 25 percent household group that has extra-employment income. This might cause a situation where per capita household income for these households increases due to this additional resources and household income per worker income provider looks higher than it actually is. However, in order to conclude that this situation is one of the reasons for lower levels of per capita income in the large households, we need to show that extra-employment earnings are more often observed in the small households. Yet the findings shows that such income, although not in terms of amount and but in terms of frequency, does not display any significant differentiation between large and small households (14 percent of medium households (3-4) earn land income and 9 percent of them earn rent; in large households (5-6) this is respectively 15 percent and 12 percent). Hence, these extra-employment earnings can only partly explain the higher welfare level in relatively small households. On the other hand, these two sub-segments show totally reverse household characteristics. The average income of those households that earn house & shop rents is 25 percent more than the others, and per capita household income (because the average household size is smaller than the others) is 35 percent higher. In those households with agricultural earnings, the average size of household is larger than the others and both average household income and per capita household income are around 8-11 percent lower than the others. In both of these groups household employment rate is higher than the others. In this case, we may conclude that those with agricultural earnings constitute a poorer category, since neither the additional agricultural earnings nor the relatively higher rates of household employment help them reach the average welfare level. Finally, low-paid employment in this group is probably more common. In this group, the number of those who were born in Ankara and has been living in Ankara more than ten years (47 percent) is significantly lower than the others (76 percent). This group, in other words, is made up of relatively new migrants.

households. In these households not only average income is already quite high and spouses (wives) are more likely to work but also the size of the household is relatively small.

Table 5.2 enables us to examine household population, employment and income in different household cross-class combinations. Here, the household types mainly show what combinations of class and occupational categories are present within the household, but do not provide information about the weight of each category.[14] Nevertheless, we can make some conclusions based on the information in the table.

Table 5.2 Indicators of household population, employment and income by household class profile: Means

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
Total	4.30	0.41	100	100
A Blue-collar worker(s) only	3.94	0.32	72	96
B Wage-earners	4.62	0.52	130	108
B1 *Unskilled & casual service workers* (+ blue-collars)	5.21	0.49	77	68
B2 *White-collar workers* (+ blue-collars)	4.25	0.55	142	109
B3 *Professional employees* (+ unskilled/blue-collars/white-collars)	4.46	0.47	209	186
C Wage and non-wage occupations	5.27	0.52	130	103
C1 *Employers* (+ unskilled/blue-collars/white-collars)	4.20	0.59	277	190
C2 *Artisan & informal* + unskilled/white-collars	5.53	0.50	105	94
C3 *Farmers & peasants* + unskilled/blue-collars/white-collars	5.50	0.51	70	51

(1): household population. *(2)*: rate of income providers to the household population. *(3)*: per capita household income ($129=100). *(4)*: household income per income provider ($314=100).

First of all, the information in the table indicates the existence of marked per capita income differences in those households reflecting different class profiles but similar employment rates. The figures also lead us to conclude that these differences are associated with differentials among the levels of household income per income provider. For instance, although the household employment rates (0.49-0.51) for

[14] How to determine class status of 'households' is one of the oldest questions in studies on class. Traditionally the class status of the 'head of the household' was used as a criterion but this has been criticized by feminist studies for ignoring the class status of wives who are increasingly participating in employment (Roberts and Marshall 1995). The present study accepts a categorization that reflects the heterogeneity of individual class positions of household members as a more appropriate method.

unskilled (B1), artisan & informal (C2) and farmer & peasant (C3) groups are almost the same, the per capita income in connection with the change in household income per income provider differs in a significant manner. The striking point is that although these three household groups are most crowded households and at the same time have higher household employment rates above the general average, they have the lowest income per working family members. This point confirms our previous conclusion above regarding the fact that in large households expanding workforce is predominantly concentrated in low-paid unskilled jobs. However, still, despite its low marginal contribution, increasing the number of income generating household members constitutes an indispensable part of their survival strategies. Because in any case increasing the total income of the *household* and hence satisfaction of common household needs at higher levels are the ultimate target.

The information on average income indicators in the table reflects some tendencies among the wage earners. The table indirectly shows a steady increasing trend in income levels from unskilled workers to blue-collars, from white-collars to professional employees. In addition, the average income for agricultural employment is probably lower than all urban employment categories. Furthermore, we can add that among the urban non-wage employment categories, the earnings for the artisan & informal activities are generally lower than the average urban wage employment but probably higher than that of unskilled service workers.

5.3. The Households and Urban Life

In this section, I will examine some aspects of urban live of the OSTIM workers and their households. In order to shed some light on reproduction patterns of these households, I will specifically look at saving tendencies and possibilities, indebtedness, some consumption indicators, consumption-based urban spatial mobility, residential characteristics, and homeownership with some housing characteristics.

5.3.1. Savings and consumption

About half of the households (47 percent) are somewhat able to make savings. We clearly observe an increasing saving tendency depending on income level of households: As the household income level decreases, the rate of households that are able to make savings also decreases; this rate drops to 29 percent for the lowest income group. Furthermore, while the rate of ability to make saving is the lowest (22 percent) among unskilled service workers' households, this rate shows a gradual increase as we move from the blue-collars to white-collars and professionals' households respectively. However, it must be noted that these are general observations about the households that able to make savings and do not give any information about the proportion of savings in household budgets. Based on the comparison of information about the household income and expenditure, we can argue that average rate of savings in the household budget is less than one tenth (8 percent) of the household income. Certainly, this rate shows significant differences depending on the household income levels. While the rate of savings reaches to 20 percent of household budget in the upper income groups, this rate gets closer to zero for lower-middle income groups, and for lower income groups, monthly budgets even give deficit.

However, we should also note that information on savings here does not contain information about the prevalence and amount of 'net savings.' Indeed, more than half of the households (even about half of those households which are able to make savings) are indebted. In this context, unskilled service workers' households constitute the largest indebted group with 89 percent, while the rate of indebtedness for the blue-collar and the white-collar households is close to average. Among the households of professional employees this rate drops to 25 percent. Generally speaking, as the income level of the households decreases, the indebtedness rate tends to increase. Among the reasons for indebtedness, the purchase of household items with credit constitutes the most important reason. Two-third of indebted households are generally indebted to the stores where they purchased household items on installment basis. Most of these household items are mainly durable consumer goods, small household products (especially kitchen wares) and clothing goods. In recent years, these types of goods have widely been marketed by the

companies/stores on credit-sale basis and this purchasing option has become widespread among wage earners. Second most important reason of indebtedness is the purchase of house/apartment or depositing lump-sum money to enter into cooperatives to buy a house/apartment.[15] This type of indebtedness is relatively much higher in upper income groups. An overwhelming majority gets loans from their relatives and friends for this purpose and only about one-fifth of these households use bank credits. It seems that the intention to own a house/apartment is one of the major reasons for saving tendencies. One-third of households with capacity to make savings have reported that they used their savings for purchasing real estate or for the entry to housing cooperatives. 10 percent of these households directed their savings to buy cars, which are considered as saving/investment instruments. The remaining overwhelming majority keeps their savings in the forms of gold or foreign currency. Among those with a capacity to save, only a very small percent of saving-holders (5 percent) invested their savings in stock market or interest-yielding bank accounts.

There is another indicator that we can use to measure the welfare levels of households: durable consumer goods and household items that family own. However, an evaluation of ownership of each household item would not give us a sufficient idea about the welfare level of household. Instead, an examination of entire repertoire of household items will provide us with a more meaningful picture. To determine the repertoire of goods in the household, I use the following technique: I ordered the household items from the most frequent one (color TV set) to the least one (satellite antenna or cable TV). Then, following this ordering, I established gradually expanding combinations of household items. The following table shows percentages of households that own different combinations of these items by the income levels of households.

The table indicates that only a small segment of working class households in our sample have all the goods that a standard middle class family possesses. At the same time, the table also shows a positive correlation between the extending combinations of household items and the rising levels of household income. The

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[15] İstanbul metal workers have much less tendency for saving (19 percent), and higher tendency to be indebted (75 percent). Among the households that are indebted, 24 percent were indebted for house, and 48 percent for credit purchasing (Özuğurlu & Erten 1999).

combination of household items tends to expand as the families' income increase. For instance, while the rate of possessing the combination 'E', which can be treated as average threshold, reaches to two-third in high-income groups, this rate for low-income groups is below 20 percent. The rate of households with this combination (that is, the combination 'E') in general is very close to that in the blue-collars' households (43 percent). These rates for white-collar' and professional employees' households markedly increase (61 and 68 percent respectively), whereas the same rate for unskilled service workers' households remains around 11 percent.[16]

Table 5.3 Ownership of durable consumer goods & home appliances as extending combinations by level of household income as no. of minimum wage (%)

	low: up to 2 MW (US$228 maximum)	*lower medium: 2-3 MW (US$342 maximum)*	*upper medium: 3-5 MW (US$570 maximum)*	*high: 5+ MW (more than US$570)*	*Total*
(A)	67.9	89.4	89.6	92.3	88.1
(B)	50.0	75.3	83.1	85.9	78.0
(C)	28.6	64.7	76.6	78.2	68.3
(D)	25.0	51.8	74.0	76.9	62.7
(E)	17.9	30.6	49.4	66.7	45.1
(F)	3.6	7.1	13.0	38.5	17.5
(G)	--	1.2	1.3	23.1	7.5
(H)	--	1.2	1.3	12.8	4.5
(I)	--	--	--	7.7	2.2

(A): color TV [99.3] + vacuum cleaner [88.6]. (B): a + phone line [86.1]. (C): b + owen [83.2]. (D): c + automatic washing machine [81.0]. (E): d + music player [58.2]. (F): e + car [24.2]. (G): f + automated dishwasher [21.2]. (H): g + video [14.3]. (I): h + satellite antenna or cable TV line [12.6].

5.3.2. Consumption and use of urban space

To what extent and what type of a relationship is there between shopping places and income levels of households? In order to gain some perspective on this subject, I will

[16] Boratav (1995: 79-80) emphasizes the possibility for an argument that "the ownership of durable consumer products, for all classes, is determined by a powerful trend of general of increase that would not be reversed in negative conjunctures." He also argues that a possible future outcome of this trend is a fair decrease in differences between social groups on the basis of ownership of durable consumer goods that was seen as a 'necessity in terms of social norms' and was a common phenomenon in the past periods. For those outside of these products, we still observe class based differences both in terms of consumption preferences and consumption levels, i.e., the extent and quality of the goods.

look at what types of places the households do their shopping for foodstuffs and cleaning materials. The small grocery stores and markets in the neighborhood (58 percent) and large super markets (20 percent) appear to be two main categories where most of the households do their shopping. It is difficult to make a general statement about which of these two are cheaper but we can argue that since the large super markets are places where large amounts of shopping is done, the sum of money spent is usually high and cars become essential for this type of shopping pattern. For this reason, it is plausible to think that only a small segment of low-income groups can afford shopping at these types of big markets. Indeed, the rate of households in our sample shopping at these types of stores shows a steady and abrupt decline as we move from the higher income groups (37 percent) to lower income groups (4 percent). Not surprisingly, those who do shopping at small grocery stores in the neighborhood represent an inverse tendency in relation to their income levels. Put differently, as the income level of a household decreases, it is more likely that the grocery stores in the neighborhood will be a choice of shopping place. In addition to these observations, we should also mention a third category of shopping place that carries an important weight in buying foodstuff and cleaning materials: market places and wholesale traders located in the neighborhood, the most important distinguishing feature of which is being much cheaper than other shopping places. These shopping places are preferred more frequently by lower income groups (19 percent) than high-income households (9 percent). The differentiation in patterns of shopping places according to income levels is also relevant in the context of household class profile that, in general, reflects differentiation in income levels as well. Accordingly, those households primarily consisting unskilled service workers and/or blue-collar workers tend to prefer small grocery stores and markets in the neighborhood than large stores more often than those households with professional employees, white-collar workers and employers.

An analysis of behaviors related to shopping for clothing, a second category of shopping items, will enable to us to test the relationship between preference for shopping place and household income level. Since this kind of shopping requires relatively extensive mobility across spaces, it will also give us clues about the differentiation of spatial mobility between households. In shopping for clothing, too,

we observe an apparent differentiation based on income levels. This type of shopping is done at mainly two types of places: 'garment stores' and 'vendor/street seller/market place/cheap garment stores' (*işporta / seyyar satıcı / pazar / ucuz giyim fuarı*) group. Although the category of 'store' shows a tremendous variation in terms of product quality and price in itself, it is also a fact that the shopping places in the second category, compared to stores, generally sell cheaper products. In the sample, almost three-fourth of households do their shopping at stores. In addition, the households that do shopping at places in the second category show a significant differentiation based on income levels: while more than two-third of those in low income groups shop at these cheap places, this rate decreases steadily as we move upwards and drops to 14 percent for the highest income group. As a simpler indicator we may add the following: the average per capita income for households shopping at stores is around 60 percent higher than the others. Shopping for clothing, as I mentioned above, has an additional dimension to it in that it reflects mobility across urban space. We encounter with two primary areas that this type of shopping, other than the neighborhoods the households reside in, takes place: *Ulus* (*Ulus & Samanpazarı*) and *Kızılay*. These places are the two main business centers where commercial businesses are concentrated in Ankara. Other entertainment and urban facilities are also located in and around these centers. In addition, we should also add that the shopping centers in *Kızılay* present a relatively more modern appearance and follow fashion more closely in their merchandises. In contrast, *Ulus* and its surrounding constitute the old city center historically and the stores in these areas sell relatively cheaper goods.[17] The first observation that we can make regarding shopping based mobility patterns of the households to these two places is as follows: a significant proportion of households (28 percent) do their clothing shopping in their own neighborhoods. As the income level of the household increases so does the tendency to shop at places outside of the neighborhood. The two centers, *Ulus* (44

[17] "The 'modern' and 'traditional' city centers in Ankara ...do not display a pattern of articulation or penetration. Extensive line of public buildings in between Kızılay and Ulus areas distances rather than merges these central business areas. Decision centers, prestige commerce and elite services are located in Kızılay area. In contrast, Ulus central area seems to be specialized in commerce and service functions catering to low-income groups and rural area, and wholesale and storage" (Bademli 1987b: 157).

percent) and *Kızılay* (18 percent), where outside neighborhood shopping is done, depending on the household income level, appear to two rival places of shopping that substitute each other. Indeed, so much that while the ratio of those who go to *Ulus* decreases as the income level increases, the ratio of those who are headed to *Kızılay* increases. The general situation is that while *Ulus*, doubtlessly, functions as the city center for the overwhelming majority of the households, *Kızılay* stays as a place of common use mainly among high-income groups. The shopping mobility figures directed to *Kızılay* supports this argument. While almost half of those in high-income groups (44 percent) prefer shopping for clothing at *Kızılay*, this ratio in low and middle-income groups is only 4-14 percent.

It can be a more plausible approach to examine shopping-based mobility through individuals rather than households, since shopping for dressing, compared with shopping for foodstuff and cleaning products, belongs more to an area of individual based preferences and behavior. When we approach the issue from this perspective, we encounter with the following picture of different worker groups' shopping-based spatial mobility patterns. Movement outside the neighborhood in general and to *Kızılay* in particular is more frequently observed among young workers. The group with the lowest mobility is the unskilled service workers with the highest average age. Two third of this group do their shopping in their own neighborhood. The most common shopping place for blue-collars is *Ulus*, a place they use more often (41 percent) than their own neighborhood (30 percent). The tendency of white-collars, who constitute the youngest segment, to go to outside of their neighborhoods and to concentrate in Kızılay is much higher compared to unskilled and blue-collar groups. In this group, more than two third prefers places outside of their neighborhoods and more than half prefers shopping in *Kızılay*. However, still, we should not forget that the household income level has a clear impact on the shopping-based mobility in the city. The average per capita income for those households that do their shopping for dressing in their neighborhoods and in *Ulus* is less than half of the average of others that prefer *Kızılay* for this kind of shopping. Hence, for the majority of workers *Kızılay*, both as place for shopping and entertainment/time-spending activities, is more 'expensive' than *Ulus*. Some workers expressed this situation as 'what business do we have in Kızılay?' (*Kızılay'da bizim*

ne işimiz var?). On the other hand, as I will show in the following sections, it is very possible that the relative distance between dwelling areas and *Ulus* and *Kızılay* also play a role in the preferences for shopping places. As I will return to this subject later, let me conclude with the following note. The restrictions on spatial mobility also point to one of the seldom-examined limits of interaction between different segments of working class.

5.3.3. Neighborhood

Although residential areas of OSTİM workers display a picture of 'dispersion' in urban space, particular patterns are discernible. When we look at in terms of proximity to workplace, those who live in the west of OSTİM (*Batıkent*) and in its east neighbor (*Demetevler*) constitute, in one respect, the most advantaged group in the sample. The former area, where 20 percent of the OSTİM workers reside in, is a new and planned residential area made up of apartment blocks and detached and semi-detached (duplex), typically two-story houses (with a small garden) that has been gradually opened to residence in the past 20 years. This area could be characterized as a place of residence mainly for wage earners with low-middle income levels. The area that I shortly named as '*Demetevler*', where 13 percent of the workers live, differs from the former both in terms of physical and sociological characteristics. This area consists of high-rise apartment blocks with serious infrastructure problems that developed rapidly mainly throughout 1970s and 1980s. Compared to former area, in terms of income groups and social classes, this area displays a more heterogeneous character. Both in terms of geographical position and because of current building structure (high-rise blocks), this area has almost reached its limits of extension. Another characteristic of *Demetevler* is that it is not predominantly a residential area like *Batıkent*. *Demetevler* has a network of commerce that provides shopping, entertainment and other urban facilities. With this characteristic, it appears as a sub-center that can accommodate almost all of the refreshment time.

Around another 20 percent of OSTİM workers are dispersed into other three areas in the city that partly share similar characteristics with *Demetevler*. *Keçiören*, among them, is the closest one to Demetevler example both in terms of the physical

characteristics and the sociological profile of the residents. The most significant difference between the two is that *Keçiören* area is at a longer distance to both the city center and OSTİM and/or the transportation is more difficult and time consuming. *Çankaya*, which is the closest to city center, could be described as a place where the high-income groups reside and from where reaching to urban facilities are much easier. Some of the neighborhoods that belong to *Altındağ* district, which I characterized as 'inner periphery' in the table, are among the closest to the city. However, these neighborhoods at the same time include the oldest *gecekondu* areas in the city some of which turned into places of decay.

Table 5.4 Dwelling areas by class position (%)

	unskilled service worker	*blue-collar worker*	*white-collar worker*	*professional employee*	*Total*	*N*
A Outer Periphery	22.2	49.3	28.6	25.0	45.3	125
A1 Outer Periphery-1	*22.2*	*32.6*	*25.0*	*16.7*	*30.8*	*85*
A2 Outer Periphery-2	--	*7.0*	*3.6*	*8.3*	*6.5*	*18*
A3 Outer Periphery-3	--	*9.7*	--	--	*8.0*	*22*
B1 Batıkent	11.1	18.5	32.1	41.7	20.7	57
B2 Demetevler	33.3	11.9	21.4	8.3	13.4	37
C1 Keçiören	11.1	10.6	3.6	--	9.4	26
C2 Çankaya	11.1	4.0	10.7	25.0	5.8	16
D1 Inner Periphery	11.1	4.4	3.6	--	4.3	12
D2 Other	--	1.3	--	--	1.1	3
					100.0	276

B1: including three cases from Eryaman, Elvankent and Konutkent. B2: Karşıyaka, Demetevler and Yenimahalle. C1: Central neighborhoods in the district of Keçiören (Etlik and Keçiören). C2: Central neighborhoods in the district of Çankaya. See the text for additional information on other residential areas.

The category 'Other' covers three extreme cases (three workers interviewed). One of them has been working and living for a rather long period (23 years) in Ankara but his family continues to live in another city, Bartın. Other two were seasonal workers from Kütahya, had no home in Ankara and lived in their workplaces.

In terms of a poor-middle-rich classification that is used in an unpublished study by the State Institute of Statistics, these areas that we have considered up to now display the following profiles: *Batıkent*, with a very high degree of homogeneity, mainly hosts middle and lower-middle income groups. Both *Çankaya* and *Keçiören* display a very high degree of heterogeneity with middle-poor-rich groups represented (respectively ordered according to proportional weight).

Demetevler, with a lower degree of heterogeneity, is made of middle and poor groups (again ordered with respect to proportional weight). *Altındağ*, in contrast to others, is a homogenous place where mainly poor groups reside.

In these residential areas slightly more than half of OSTİM workers live. For the nearly rest of the half (45 percent), we need to examine the situation separately since these workers live in the residential areas that I called the 'outer periphery.' In order to determine different characteristic within the 'outer periphery', it would also be useful to divide it into three sub-groups. The first part of this periphery consists of the east (*Kayaş, Mamak, Abidinpaşa*), northeast (the outer neighborhoods in *Altındağ* and *Keçiören* district) and northern sides (*Şentepe, Ayvalı*) of the city. The largest group (31 percent) of workers lives in these areas. They display a very homogenous character in terms of the income levels of the residents –nearly almost all are poor groups. Secondly, these areas, which literally draw the physical outer limits of the city, constitute the areas of expansion of the city. Yet differently from the west and south areas of the city, new residential areas in here are mainly *gecekondus* illegally constructed in a short time and without basic services such as electricity and water at least in their earlier periods. We may argue that new migrants to the city mainly settle in this outer sphere. These areas, at the same time, are the farthest to both city center and OSTİM. The second part of the outer periphery includes three different residential areas in the south and southwest sides of the city (*Sincan, Etimesgut, Gölbaşı*). These towns have been incorporated to the zone of metropolitan municipality as a result of the city's expansion in the past 15 years. Hence, these areas, where predominantly poor and partly middle-income social groups live, in spite of a certain growth tendency, are not in principal new residential places. The neighboring villages make up the third part where the above-mentioned, 'semi-urban' workers live. These workers commute to OSTİM by a service vehicle rented together with those employed in the same or different enterprises.[18]

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[18] The geographical characteristics of the dwelling areas many of the workers live in imply that the time spent for transportation to the work is rather long for the majority of the workers (except those living in *Batıkent* and *Demetevler*). For some of the workers the total period of working hours and transportation exceeds thirteen hours per day. Değirmenci & Mendeş (1998) estimated the rate of workers living in dwelling areas far from OSTİM as 71 percent, which reduces the period of social reproduction time and thus raises safety risks for the working period, and has a negative impact on social activities outside the work. This feature is common among the Third

Categorization of these residential areas both in terms of their distance to city center and OSTİM and indecisive income level indicators, of course, does not mean that the residents in these areas display a sharp homogeneity both in terms of class position and income level. Also, we do not have a sample that represents the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents of these areas to conclude our observations. Nevertheless, this grouping enables us to make some observations about the patterns that OSTİM workers display with regards to residential spatial differentiation. First, we observe that around half (49 percent) of the blue-collar workers live in outer periphery. In contrast, the rate of white-collar workers who reside in the same area is far less (29 percent). More than half (54 percent) of white-collar workers and 30 percent of blue-collar workers live in *Batıkent* and *Demetevler* both very near to their workplace, OSTİM. The two large residential areas that follow them display a striking differentiation. Within *Keçiören* and *Çankaya* districts that host around 15 percent of blue-collars and white-collars, we see that blue-collar workers concentrate predominantly in *Keçiören*, while white-collar workers do so in *Çankaya*.

Table 5.5 Residential concentration by level of household income as no. of minimum wage

low: up to 2 MW (US$228 maximum)	*lower medium: 2-3 MW (US$342 maximum)*	*upper medium: 3-5 MW (US$570 maximum)*	*high: 5+ MW (more than US$570)*
Outer Periphery (50.0%)	Outer Periphery (56.5%)	Outer Periphery (46.8%)	Batıkent (35.9%) Outer Periphery (26.9%)
Keçiören (17.9%) Inner Periphery (10.7%)	Demetevler (17.6%) Keçiören (11.8%)	Batıkent (24.7%) Demetevler (11.7%)	Çankaya (14.1%)

The distribution to different residential areas also shows some regular tendencies according to household income levels. Among those households with lower and lower-medium income levels there is no significant differentiation in the

World cities where low-income populations are dispersed throughout the city, and where the distance between settlements and work is often considerable, because most workers have not choice over where they work (Roberts 1995: 178).

ratio of those who live in outer periphery. Yet, as we move up to upper-medium and high-income households the ratio of those who reside in these areas decrease significantly. In any case, the outer periphery is the place where three-fourth of households (excluding those in the high income group) are concentrated the most. The outer periphery is also the second place of residence for the highest income level households. In this case, we may think that outer periphery is a common place that cuts across the residential patterns of OSTİM workers and that we need to search for household income based differentiation by looking at residential concentration in other areas. The table below shows the three areas (including the outer periphery) that different income level households tend to concentrate the most, together with the rates of concentration. This table gives us the general tendency of the relationship between income level and place of residence. Accordingly, if we leave the outer periphery aside, the typical places of residence for households with the lowest income are *Keçiören* and *Altındağ* (inner periphery), while the typical places of residence for high-income households are *Batıkent* and *Çankaya*. It appears that *Demetevler* functions as a transition zone for medium-income households. When we look at the average per capita income for the households, we see supporting tendencies. The average per capita household income in *Demetevler* is slightly lower than the sample average. In contrast, only in *Batıkent* and *Çankaya* average per capita household income rises one and a half times above the general average. On the other hand, the average income stays at significantly lower levels for the others.[19]

All of this can be interpreted, in general, as the household welfare level having a centrifugal effect on the place of residence. Yet, we should also keep in mind that this effect does not solely determine the place of residence. There may be other factors at work. First of all, in the choice of the 'initial' place of residence current

[19] The findings we discussed so far regarding the spatial distribution of OSTİM workers can be summarized as follows: the low-income majority is concentrated in the north/northeast periphery, high-income workers in the south and the most poor in the core periphery. These general tendencies confirm to Güvenç's (2001: 18) findings: "Ankara in 1990 presents a picture of a divided city on the axes of employment status and income level where low-income wage employees and self employed are concentrated in the north, the poor in the center and the wealthy in the south. ... The railway that cuts across the city along east and west direction separates the high consumption islands in the south from the poor area in the north." In addition, the areas where the wealthy is concentrated in the south are like islands separated from the nearby neighborhoods where the low-income groups are concentrated with roads and other topographical barriers.

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household members might not have any determining role. They may be living in a place they were born and raised. Secondly, in the case of migration dependent change in the place of residence, the choice of place, in most of the cases, in addition to the criteria of being affordable, is also affected by the actual and potential solidarity opportunities. It is a well-established fact that those who migrate from the same regions tend to concentrate in the same residential areas in the city.[20] This tendency increases the heterogeneity of the residences in these areas in terms of their socioeconomic positions. In addition, as Roberts (1995: 175) has noted, "even people with stable, relatively well-paying jobs may prefer to settle in informal settlements because such housing allows them to save income for alternative investments." On the other hand, class heterogeneity is a rather strict and more important criterion than income level, since living "in mixed neighborhoods, next to other groups in the society ... made it difficult to identify socially or politically with distinct working class culture" (Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 164-65).

Güvenç (1999; 2001) in his 'relational space analysis' has reached the following results. When considered on the basis of home ownership, the only income level indicator provided by the Census data, the migration history creates a sharp differentiation. 67 per cent of those household heads that came to the big cities before 1985 have at least one house. In contrast, among those who came recently, 66 percent are not homeowners. In general, origin is the main dynamic that affects the urban spatial distribution of those who only own the house they currently reside in and those who are not homeowner. An overwhelming majority of these groups show a tendency for spatial concentration based on common origin, places where there are relatively a small number of people with different regional origin. The rest could have not succeeded in doing this and is dispersed in areas that show a heterogeneous character both in terms of origin and income level. On the other hand, in the residential place preferences of the 'wealthy' (those who own at least two houses)

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[20] We may note one of the findings that would support this argument: Almost two third of the households have at least three relative households and more than three fourth of the households have at least three *hemşehri* (fellow countrymen) households in the same neighborhood they reside. The highest levels of relative and *hemşehri* concentration are observed in *Keçiören* and among those households located in the outskirts of the city, and the least concentration is observed among the households that live in *Çankaya*. For space related social relations and solidarity networks in these areas see Ayata (1988b) and Güneş-Ayata (1991).

migrants, rather than origin, income plays the determining role. These groups prefer to live in places heterogeneous in terms of origin.[21]

Similar observations also apply for Ankara. However, in Ankara two striking particularities draw our attention. First, as findings of OSTİM research also indicate, the majority of Ankara's population has migrated from neighboring cities. According to Güvenç, who calls them as 'region originated' (*yöre kökenliler*), origin plays a higher role in the patterns of spatial distribution of this groups than it does for people from other cities. The effect of origin is so strong that among the wealthy of 'region originated' groups the tendency to spatially integrate with similar income groups is very low. He points to the existence of a spatial segregation in the city along the lines of natives (neighboring periphery originated) and far-originated (from farther regions). Both of these categories also tend to be divided within themselves to spaces dominated by those who own only the house they currently reside in, on the one hand, and those who own more than one house, on the other. This situation indicates that, for Ankara, geographical origin and income level function as two separate dynamics of spatial differentiation. Secondly, in Ankara, different than all other large cities, there is a striking spatial integration between the wealthy (who owns more than one house) wage earners and those wage earners with no property (with no house-ownership). Güvenç interprets this situation as a temporary pattern resulting from intermediate phases of settlement improvement plans in particular areas and expects it to disappear in time. Furthermore, Güvenç finds out that, in Ankara, for the bureaucrats, employment status is a more significant criterion of differentiation than income is. Residential dynamics in metropolises also overlap with the spatial

[21] Based on the same database, Güvenç (2000a; 2000b), also examines the workplace-status based dynamics of spatial differentiation. According to his findings, the main contrast in such spatial differentiation in İstanbul is between those with employee-intensive work status and those with self employed- and employer-intensive work status. Güvenç argues that rather than being incidental and local, this contrast has a general and structural character. In addition, there is also a differentiation within the employee-intensive groups' residential characteristics: (i) wage earners in skill/labor-intensive jobs (ii) organized labor force in capital-intensive industries, and (iii) white-collar service workers tend to concentrate in different areas. Among the employee-intensive groups, the highest degree of spatial segregation is observed between organized & regular employees and the white-collar employees working in central business areas. The location of workplace plays a secondary determining role in these groups' dispersion and concentration dynamics.

distribution of employment. However, in commerce and service jobs origin based heterogeneity is up front (Güvenç 1999: 335-348; 2001: 17-20).[22]

In any case, we can argue that spatial segregation in large cities, rather than being based on regional origin, ethnicity and religion, is increasingly becoming a social class based phenomenon. Ayata and Ayata (2000), in their Ankara study, concur with this observation and draw our attention to the significant cultural differences that this trend is producing. According to them, among the new middle class neighborhoods in the outskirts of the city the level of class homogeneity is much higher. In these areas the overwhelming majority is middle and upper-middle class highly educated professionals. In contrast, the majority of white-collar and small entrepreneurs constituting the lower-middle class concentrate in apartment areas with construction license, while lower classes made up of wage or non-wage manual laborers reside in *gecekondu* areas.

5.3.4. Housing

We may now turn to a second dimension related to residential characteristics: ownership status and physical characteristics. These two are at the same time indirect indicators of welfare level and household reproduction strategies. We may say that particularly homeownership, i.e., to be freed from having to pay rent for residence, occupies a preeminent place among the survival strategies of both wage earners and other lower and middle segments (Boratav 1995: 50). Among OSTİM workers we encounter with a situation that concurs with this tendency. Among the workers interviewed more than half (56 percent) live in their own residences. A small group

[22] Güvenç (2001: 21) has also found some tendencies for labor market segregation accompanying the residential segregation in Ankara. These trends show the existence of some significant concentration along origin and income level. Accordingly, in "public, local and personal services, wood/packaging, furniture, foundry, cement and similar industrial branches" that do not require high levels of education and experience "native and region originated low income individuals are represented in high numbers." In addition, region originated wealthy constitute the majority in a significant portion of central business areas such as housing, clothing, transportation and retail commerce. In contrast, region originated individuals are not represented in high numbers in public employment areas such as education, security, defense. Instead these areas accommodate larger numbers of far-region originated individuals. Furthermore, far-region originated individuals are also divided among themselves. East originated individuals constitute the majority in those areas that do not require education or experience such as domestic services and construction. Similar tendencies, interpreted as the 'consolidation of differentiation in social geography' through migration, are also observed in Istanbul (Güvenç 2000b).

either lives in a place owned by their relatives without paying any rent or in public housing with or without paying any rent. Another household group, which constitutes more than one-third of the sample, lives in rented places.[23]

The ratio of homeownership among the households of white-collars (64 percent) is a little higher than the households of blue-collars (56 percent).[24] However, we need to consider homeownership as a fact related not only with preferences and economic performances of those workers interviewed but also of the other household members or rather the class profile of the household in general. When we make a comparison between the two largest groups in the sample, we observe the following: among the households where income generating members are made of only blue-collar workers (in most cases only one income providing family member) the proportion of home ownership (46 percent) is lower than those house households with only white-collar workers or white-collar + blue-collar workers (80 percent). This situation makes us think that there is a relationship between homeownership and household welfare level. Indeed, we observe a strong presence of such relationship. As the household income level increases homeownership also shows a tendency of steady increase: in the lowest income group one-third of households are homeowners, whereas in the highest income group this rate is more than two-third of the households. In another study, Güvenç (2000b) has found that home-ownership among different employment groups consisting predominantly of wage earners (possibly these groups also show a tremendous internal income differentiations) shows significant differences. Accordingly, flexible/unorganized workers are predominantly do not own house/apartment or they only own the house/apartment they live in. Those who work in organized/regular jobs and those in service jobs in the central business areas are typically tenants but they also own one house/apartment. White collars, on the other hand, predominantly own at least two houses or rent despite they own a house.

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[23] The ratio of those who own the apartment or house they live in among İstanbul metal workers is almost same: 54 percent (Özuğurlu & Erten 1999). Ranis (1995), in his study on a sample of workers employed in various branches of industry and white-collar jobs in Argentina, finds that almost three fourth of the workers are homeowners and relates this situation to the 'home-centered' character of the culture in this country.

[24] Boratav (1995) have found in İstanbul that urban land ownership, rent income and homeownership among white-collar household heads is lower than the other groups.

Homeownership also displays some peculiar characteristics in terms of the residential areas we discussed earlier. First, in the outer periphery, where the majority of almost all groups are concentrated, the rate of home ownership is higher than the general average. Second, the sub-group from the surrounding villages of the periphery and *Batıkent* appear to be the areas we observe homeownership most. We may argue that this situation stems from the particular characteristics of these two residential areas. In the villages, in fact, homeownership is a typical characteristic of agricultural household. *Batıkent*, on the other hand, is a residential area built, in the last 20 years, by the cooperatives with mostly wage earner members. It is very possible that a large part of homeowners still live in their own houses. I have mentioned above that, in general, low-income household groups tend to concentrate in *Keçiören* and *Altındağ* and high-income households in *Batıkent* and *Çankaya*. A similar tendency is observed in terms of homeownership as well. The proportion of homeownership within the first group (39-46 percent) is significantly lower than the second group (56-67 percent).

On the other hand, without considering home ownership, we can also expect a tendency for physical conditions of the residences to differ depending on the income levels of the households. Residence type is the only indicator we have concerning this issue. Around half of the workers in apartments, more than one-third in *gecekondus*, and the rest live in houses with gardens (detached and semi-detached houses).[25] We may say that among these, especially *gecekondu* gives a strong clue about the low residence quality. Such residences are a common phenomenon appeared during the process of migration to cities in Turkey that are, in most cases, illegally built on public lands. In addition to displaying a very low building quality and interior comfort, *gecekondus* reach basic infrastructure services such as electricity, water and sewage in time and, in most of the cases, at insufficient quality.[26] Similarly, achieving a legal status takes time. Hence, around one-third of

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[25] The ratio of those who live in *gecekondu* appears to be quite small among İstanbul metal workers (5 percent). However, Özuğurlu & Erten (1999) pointed out, this does not mean an improvement in the housing quality, as nearly 80 percent of the houses & apartments do not have central heating system.

[26] As Roberts (1995: 158) have emphasized for many Latin American countries, in poor areas like this, generally the roads are in bad condition and water and sewage systems do not exist or

gecekondus that the OSTİM workers live in are not still legally registered and have encountered with the danger of being torn down by the municipality. As the quotation below from an interview with one of the workers, who still lives in a rented *gecekondu*, shows, living in a *gecekondu* is a frightening undertaking:

> We see on television, people whose *gecekondu* has been torn down are crying, whining. One feels one's own heart is being torn apart; we can also fall into the same situation. I have lived in a similar situation for four-five months. Each and every day, they would come to tear my house down. I was coming to here (work), but I was not able to work since my mind was there (at home). I was thinking what my mother was doing, my father too. What could my siblings do? If they torn it down, how could they rescue the furniture? At the end, they torn it down and we moved into another *gecekondu* on one street farther. We could not find a house. There is no apartment cheaper than 60-70 million. My father was earning 45 million and I was getting 30 million then. If we pay that rent, what are we going to survive on? We did not have any choice. We had to go to *gecekondu.* If they tear this down too, we will move into another.(*) (*bench operator, 22 years old*)

The distribution of residence types according to residential areas concurs with the general characteristics of these areas. For instance, the ratio of those living in *gecekondu* is significantly high (73-85 percent) in the largest group of outer periphery (i.e., neighborhoods in the north and east skirts of the city) and in *Altındağ*, which can be described as 'inner periphery.' In contrast, there are almost no *gecekondu* residents in *Batıkent*. The number of *gecekondu* residents in other parts of the city is quite lower than the average. We can state that apartments compared to *gecekondus* generally have a better residence quality and *gecekondus*, compared to apartments, are the places of residence for low-income groups. As a matter of fact, when we move from low-income groups to higher ones the number of those

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are not sufficient. Health and education services are, too, both insufficient and in poor quality. On the other hand, communal attempts to improve such services do become a determining factor for community identity at the same time transforming and reconstructing regional origin based communal identity. In other words, these communities do not exist in themselves but are 'constructed' (Ayata and Ayata 2000).

(*) *Televizyonda görüyoruz, ağlıyor sızlıyor gecekonduları yıkılan insanlar. İnsanın içi parçalanıyor, aynı duruma biz de gelebiliriz. Ben dört-beş ay o durumda yaşadım. Her gün kepçe gelip benim evin çatısına dayandı. Buraya geliyordum, aklım orada çalışamıyordum, annem ne yaptı acaba, babam da işte. Kardeşlerim ne yapabilir ki? Yıksalar ne yapacak, eşyaları nasıl kurtaracak? Sonunda yıktılar, biz de bir üst sokaktaki başka bir gecekondıya taşındık. Ev bulamadık, 60-70 milyondan aşağı daire yok. O zaman babam 45 milyon ben 30 milyon alıyordum. Bu kirayı versek ne yiyip içeceğiz? Mecburen gecekondıya gitmek zorundaydık. Bunu da yıkarlarsa bir başkasına taşınacağız.*

households living in such residences decreases. Similarly, the per capita income in the households living in an apartment is one and a half times higher than those living in *gecekondu.* In those *gecekondus* without a legal title, per capita income is even lower. In addition, the ratio of those blue-collars residing in a *gecekondu* is almost two times larger (42) than the white-collar ones.[27] On the other hand, it is very much possible that the building quality in apartments would differ tremendously both in terms of places of settlement and depending on income levels of different households. For instance, in *Batıkent*, where there is a concentration of relatively planned buildings, the residence quality would probably be much higher than the others.[28]

5.4. Summary and Conclusion

The average population of the households OSTİM workers live in is relatively low. This is mainly because the workers are quite young and the majority of them are members of nuclear families at their earlier phases. The number of income providing members in the households is low in general. One of the reasons for this is the presence of a cultural value against women's working outside. In general, the number of women working in the households is very low and those who work mainly come from single young daughters. The second reason is the high numbers of households that are at the early stage of the process of expanding. In these households, the children are very young and the only breadwinner is the husband. On the other hand, in large families the supplementary earners are, in most of the cases, the young male children.

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[27] We do not observe any significant relationship between homeownership and residence type. In other words, both for the groups residing in *gecekondu* and those living in an apartment, the rate of those who own the house they live in is close to the general average. This figure can be read as an indication of a change in the previously observed common situation that characterized *gecekondu* areas. We may be witnessing a transformation where the ownership of *gecekondus* is transferred to different households that rents rather than resides in them whereas, in previous periods, *gecekondu* areas were essentially composed of families who built and lived in them.

[28] In addition to the construction quality, the differences in residence sizes could be another indicator of differentiation. Hence, Ayata and Ayata (2000: 154-155), in Ankara, have found significant differences in residence sizes in different residential areas with different income levels. Ownership of a larger residence (as well as certain styles of interior decoration and furniture use) is seen as one of the significant symbols of upwards-social mobility.

A significant group of households has non-wage incomes. These mainly come from urban rents and rural property income. However, in the overwhelming majority of the households the income providing individuals consist only of the wage earners. Income differentiation between households depends mainly on the level of earnings from employment. The household income rises as the number of income-generating individuals increases. However, since the size of the household is also large in these households, these contributions do not increase per capita income. In addition, those who contribute to income in the household other than the husband, in most of the cases, work in low paid jobs. Despite the appearance, 'family-wage' economy,[29] where only one worker secures the living of the rest of the family, is not relevant for the majority of these households. As a matter of fact, in the very early phases children join to household labor force as supplementary earners.

The majority of households live in peripheral districts of the city. Depending on income levels we observe a residential differentiation at significant levels. Low levels of income, the distance of residential areas to the city center, long and hard workday, and the long distance between places of work and residence limit workers' mobility in urban space.

[29] Tilly, L. and J.W. Scott (1978) *Women, Work, Family*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston (cited in Roberts 1995: 163).

CHAPTER 6

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The issue of 'consciousness' occupies a significant place among the subjects that the studies on working class have been concerned with. Two aspects of this issue have become focus of a rich debate since Marx himself. The first is related with the question of whether consciousness can be seen as a constitutive element of social classes. The second aspect is concerned with the questions such as 'What is class consciousness?' and 'How to identify and distinguish it?'[1] Marx's definition of working class, whether he saw it as a structure or as a social group with a unique consciousness formation, has been subject of intense and long debates within the Marxist literature itself. Marx, in some of his writings, in *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, for instance, where he describes peasants as 'potatoes in a sack', relates class with the existence of a collective political consciousness. On the other hand, the distinction between 'class in itself' and 'class for itself' in *The Poverty of Philosophy* makes us think that Marx's class concept does not necessarily require existence of a unique form of class-consciousness (MEIA 2001).

In general, the implication of this distinction has not been very productive in social research. The concepts of 'class in itself' and 'class for itself' have been seen as two 'moments' that follow each other in working class movement. However, this distinction, in principle, is an analytical one. Like in any other social class, in every segment of working class we can observe the simultaneous existence of characteristics related to these two forms of consciousness. Furthermore, the weight

[1] Another theme of this debate is the question of 'spontaneous consciousness' that runs through the distinction between organized workers' union consciousness and political (socialist) consciousness. See Hyman (1975) for this debate.

of these forms in the consciousness of the very same workers may change in time. In other words, there is no irreversible path that goes from 'class in itself' to 'class for itself.' By emphasizing the existence of a dialectical interaction between these two forms of consciousness, Mann (1973: 13) argued that four elements should be included for a comprehensive concept of class consciousness: (i) a certain class identification, definition of oneself as working class together with other workers, (ii) identification of an opposite class, (iii) class totality, accepting that the first two elements are in existence as a relational totality which determines both one's total situation and the whole society, (iv) the conception of an alternative society for which class struggle is to be mobilized. According to Mann, "True revolutionary consciousness is the combination of all four [of these elements] and obviously a rare occurrence." The debate on the complex nature of working class consciousness goes back to the Thompsonian approaches that emphasize the cultural dimension of class, on the one hand, and to the studies that point to the problematic relationship between 'class structure' and 'class formation' (Przeworski 1987), on the other. In contrast to some over-culturalist interpretations, Thompson (1968), in principle, accepts class experience to be primarily determined by the relations of production. Yet his interest is focused on the contexts where these experiences are culturally expressed and interpreted. According to Thompson, "Class consciousness is the way in which these [class] experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class consciousness is not" (Thompson 1968: 10).[2]

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[2] However, still, the theoretical problem here is Thompson's placement of general material level (relations of production) and consciousness level (culture) into two separate categorical ends. This approach does not consider the fact the categorically the same material determination relations (i.e., relations of production) can show very different configurations, and tries to explain the differences at the level of consciousness only in cultural sphere. However, contextual variations at the level of *same* relations of production will differentiate the underlying material experiences *before* the cultural formation of consciousness. In other words, these experiences are not only subjected to a general determination at the level of relations of production but are also subjected to variations. If this is the case, then the formation of consciousness has to be examined not only in the cultural sphere but also in material conditions that produce different experiences. As Munck (1988: 98) correctly stated: "Adapting Thompson's more fluid, less deterministic conception by no means solves all our problems. ... [W]hile there is a co-determination of agency and necessity in the making of the working class, it does so only under conditions and within the objective coordinates created by capital." These conditions and coordinates cannot be reduced to the overall characteristics of capitalism, but includes the actual forms that they take in various

As much as the question of how to approach it theoretically, empirical measurement of class-consciousness has also been a problem in this area. In addition to those who advocate the necessity of historical and ethnographic approaches (Burawoy 1987; Fantasia 1995), the need for comprehensive survey methods and comparative approaches has also been emphasized (Brooks 1994). On the other hand, not only are there few studies on class-consciousness in Third World countries but they also do employ loose conceptual sets and themes in different economic, cultural and political contexts. The studies on working class formation, outside of West Europe and North America (Roberts 1995; Ranis 1991a; 1991b; 1995), by taking into account the processes of relatively late proletarianization and urbanization as well, expand their focus on class consciousness and class culture to such issues as citizenship, civil rights, property, family life and religion.[3] This perspective advocates the need to approach workers not only as dependent producers but also as consumers, citizens, family and community members etc. In such studies, the interrogations of class-consciousness, rather than a narrow concept of 'class consciousness', are based on a notion of 'social consciousness', a notion that I also will be using here. My employment of this concept is based on an argument that consciousness formation could never be interpreted uni-dimensionally and understood independently from their social, economic and cultural contexts.[4] For

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contexts. In that sense, Katznelson (1986) seems to be more sensitive to this issue, who disitinguishes the level of the general structure of capitalism and that of the broad actual patterns of economic development, before the levels of formed groups and collective action in the formation of working class.

[3] For a study on rural workers that is concerned with the question of social integration, see Şeker (1986).

[4] According to Chakrabarty (1998: 26-27), being satisfied with establishing the fact that different elements (ethnic, class, religion etc.) co-exist in workers' consciousness can be a legitimate position for empiricist approaches. However, Marxist approaches cannot be satisfied with this proof or even with the efforts to theorize this multi-element consciousness. They have to examine the transformation dynamics of this consciousness into 'class consciousness'. I have to confess that Chakrabarty's criticism of empiricism to a certain extend also applies to the present study as well. There are several reasons for this. First, the pile of class and class-consciousness studies in Turkey that would constitute a ground for this project is very insufficient. Secondly, not only theoretically oriented research on class formation but also sociological/demographical empirical studies on small industry workers are still almost non-existing. Thus, as I have emphasized before, to a certain extent out of necessity, my primary target has been to develop a research framework to capture an encompassing picture of current situation. However, still, within this framework, I hope that the following analyses about the ways class and other consciousness

instance, Ranis (1995: 175) draws our attention to the fact that Argentinean workers' passion for house, car, and home furniture are not simply acts of giving in to consumerist ideology. They can be seen, at the same time, as experiences of autonomy, mobility and freedom. Similarly, it is not surprising that, against the cosmopolitan oligarchy that occupied a dominant place in the current configuration of power, the Argentinean workers movement preferred to follow an anti-elitist lead and supported Peronism rather than the anti-capitalist left.

In this study, I primarily use survey data and support it with observation and in-depth interviews. My aim is not an interrogation of a working class consciousness in its limited sense. I believe such an attempt would be a futile endeavor especially in a context where collective labor organizations are non-existent.[5] Rather than looking for a specific form of consciousness form, the method I prefer could be described as a 'topographical' exploration over the social consciousness of workers. The interface of social consciousness consists of various elements that are not necessarily consistent with each other. Among these elements, I will primarily focus on those related to social distinction and distance. This approach is partly similar to the 'working class images of society' perspective followed by Lockwood (1989) and Goldthorpe et al. (1968). In other words, my main concern is to identify the axes of social differentiation and the dominant terminologies through which OSTİM workers and different groups among them see both themselves and other sections of society. However, different than the above-mentioned studies, my purpose is not to develop categories of class imagery that are different from each other yet consistent within themselves. Rather, my aim is, first, to interrogate to what extent class and intra-class distinctions are related to one another. Secondly, I want to distinguish between a 'loose/wider' class imagery and those which have more sectional emphasis. These analyses resemble the connection Bourdieu (1984) develops between objective structures and subjective perceptions through the concept of *habitus*. However, I should emphasize two important differences. First, the analyses here are constructed

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elements are configured in workers' social consciousness and which factors and how they effect this variation will provide some clues on the issue of formation of class consciousness.

[5] In her study, Kalaycıoğlu (1995) argues that the history of Turkish working class is too short to develop a class consciousness as we know it and prefers to examine various perceptions, evaluations, aspirations and opinions of workers in a wider social context.

through different patterns of subjective perceptions of the social by different working class groups rather than through aesthetic tastes and consumption preferences as does Bourdieu. Secondly, these patterns of perception can be regarded as dispositions created by structural conditions as interpreted by Bourdieu. Yet I do not argue that these patterns create a *second level of structural determination* as does the habitus. While the members of different groups in working class distinguished through objective factors (such as age, sex, origin, sector etc.) can carry perceptions and behaviors that reproduce their own and other groups' distinct dispositions, they also carry the potential to reconfigure the groups' differences in different ways with varying degrees. In other words, the positions of groups along the relational social space do not only reproduce these groups but, in principle, can also lead to new formations that transform existing group divisions.

6.1. Peripheral Labor: The Medium of a Worldview

Our sample consists of a segment of working class whose urban wage labor experience, both in terms of intergenerational and intra-generational mobility patterns, is relatively short in general. Furthermore, the majority of this group of workers, who started to work in the past 10 years, has joined a particular segment of working class that is positioned in a relatively disadvantaged section of industry and has done so during a period where the conditions for wage labor have been deteriorating. Hence, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of these workers (three-fourth) want their children to be self-employed rather than workers (even if the wage is high). This means that the workers' objection to wage labor is not limited to low level of wages but also incorporates the very position of wage labor itself.[6] In other words, we can talk about the existence of a certain level of

[6] This situation can also be observed in the commonness of the idea of establishing one's own business among workers. Half of the blue-collar workers have this idea (in another study this tendency is reported to be much less (28 percent) (Değirmenci and Mendeş 1998)). However, these ideas do not reflect actual plans and possibilities. More than half of these ideas are longings that could only be realized if certain conditions are met (such as "if I find money"). Still, in another half, there is no expectation of preparation or support in this regard. Furthermore, only half of those who think of establishing a business think of opening a manufacturing place that hires wage labor (mostly in their own occupational area). The rest wants to establish small

resistance to becoming wageworkers. This situation is partly related with the existence of relatively limited levels of wage labor experience within intergenerational social mobility patterns. Hence, the number of those who want their children to be self-employed is much less among white-collar workers with a stronger wage labor background than the blue-collar workers. However, still, socioeconomic background in itself can only partially explain the opposition to wage labor. The actual content of this opposition is also related to the way workers perceive the social formation they live in as well as their direct experiences in the labor market. The alternatives that the workers desire the most for their children's future are 'professional employee' and 'self-employed professional.' Yet, in the workers' and their fathers' past the former is only marginal and the latter does not exist at all. This situation shows that workers do not only envy educated occupations that deliver high income within the existing class and status stratification of the society they live, but they also long for autonomy. Furthermore, for workers, low job security, among other negative conditions in the labor market they move in, is the most significant one. This means that these workers (although they do not experience high-levels of and long-term unemployment) frequently have to go into labor market and sell their labor. Of course, labor-power of these workers is a commodity. Yet, with each experience of being laid off and the need to look for a new job the worker feels it once again. Hence, opposition to wage labor at the same time means an opposition to commodification of labor. This situation is a typical fact of modern capitalism and can be observed not only among newly proletarianized groups but also among workers with relatively longer wage labor background through various hidden or open behavioral patterns. The fact that job security constitutes one of the primary axes of organized labor movements is the indication of this situation.

In addition to a relatively recent entrance into and unequal articulation with urban society, unfavorable conditions in the employment area (workplace and sector) also have various direct and indirect effects on workers' cultural formation. The

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service and sale businesses by themselves. In Boratav's study (1995: 64), the actual tendency and possibilities in the direction of transition among wage-salaried groups in İstanbul to self-employed positions are found to be very low (2 percent). Kalaycıoğlu (1995) argues that self-employed background is the determining factor behind these sorts of aspirations. In other words, it expected that in second and third generation this tendency will decline.

circumstances created by unorganized character of the labor (low wages, poor working conditions, lack of job security, illegal employment without social protection, etc.) in turn (together with the small size of the enterprise and low numbers of workers) play a direct role in limiting workers' capacity to organize. For employers, it is always possible to find other workers who would accept working for market wages at any time and replace them with the existing ones. There are other factors, too, that limit workers' tendency to organize. First of all, given the irregular rhythm of work due to subcontracts or orders that the firms get from relatively larger ones, workers think that struggling for permanent rights for wage and employment at the level of workplace is impossible to win. Secondly, and in relation to the first, whatever their feelings are for their employers in the workplace, workers have a hidden opinion as to the peripheral character of enterprises in OSTİM. And this feeling creates a permanent hopelessness. Workers express this feeling as follows: "The minimum wage is determined by big bosses like Sabancı, not small bosses from here." This feeling of marginality creates a particular social distance to other segments of working class, unionized workers,[7] and civil servants that I will examine

[7] According to January 2002 statistics of the Ministry of Work the rate of unionized workers is 58 percent (http://www.calisma.gov.tr). This rate is too high for two reasons. First, the total number of workers includes only registered workers (4.564.164). At least the same amount of illegal wage laborers and public servants are excluded. According to 1999 labor force data of the State Institute of Statistics (DİE 2001c), the number of those regular and causal wageworkers is above 9.5 million (for around 2 million public servants (DİE 2001a) in 2001 and for other wage workers in a different legal regulation, a limited right to unionize without collective bargaining and strike rights was given). Secondly, the number of union member workers (2.648.927) is also much higher than the actual number. The legal regulation regarding unions in Turkey requires those unions that have to organize at the industrial basis to register at least 10 percent of the workers in the industry to be able to have the right for collective bargaining. This condition has created a hidden relationship of clientalism between governments and unions. The high numbers of union membership appeared in the official statistics is one of the areas that this relationship has been taking place. In Turkey, collective contracts that unions are part of, as a rule, are limited to two years. The data provided by the DIE regarding the number of workers who benefit from contracts can give a more realist estimation about the number of union member workers (DİE 2001a). In the years of 1997 and 1998 the number of workers who benefited from collective contracts is slightly higher than 1 million. More than three-fourth of them work in public sector. It is very possible that this rate has fallen down in time. For the beginnings of 1990, Ekin (1993: 53) states that: "when we consider collective bargaining processes in addition to organization, the number of workers who are subject to collective bargaining get even lower, covering large enterprises in manufacturing industry, mining, large state economic enterprises, and banks, insurance companies and similar enterprises in service sector are included. (...) In other words and with a simple calculation, in Turkey, 10 percent of the total labor force is organized, 8 percent of them participate in collective bargaining and 6 percent benefit from the right to strike."

below. This peripheral feeling also includes a sense of 'spatial isolation' among the young workers. It also shows that working in OSTİM as an industrial worker is still perceived as 'low social status.' A young worker expresses these feelings as follows:

> Of course everybody wants to work in the city center. We do not see anybody here. Once we enter here we do not get out until it is 6 pm. Only we go out once during lunch break, [and then] we play football here for 15-20 minutes, that's it. The man in Kızılay is in carousel, I do not know, there is movement, somebody comes and goes ... women-girls, this and that... there is a movement over there, that is attractive. Nothing more. There is one more thing. In the past I was so humiliated to say that 'I am going to OSTİM'... 'Where are you working?' 'At OSTİM' 'Hmmm...' In the mornings I get into minibus, I hand over the money. [The driver asks me] where [I am going]? When I say OSTİM you should see the people. [They] look down [on you], [they] resent [you] ... you can sense these kinds of things. Since the subway has arrived to OSTİM, what do people do, do you know? 'Where are you going to get off?' 'At the subway.' Nobody says 'I will get off at OSTİM.' Me too... I look at the passengers in *dolmuş*, if there are acquaintances too, where are we going to get off? Everybody goes to Ulus and Kızılay or whatever... 'Where are you going to get off? : At the subway!' That is the situation. You also feel embarrassed. There is a situation, for instance, well ... it is not more for me because I have been at OSTİM for 7-8 years now. But for a new beginning person ... 'where are you working at?' He does not want to say, he is embarrassed to say 'I am working at OSTİM.' Why? Because of the response he gets from the other.(*) (*plastic worker, 23 years old*)

OSTİM workers generally live in the households where relative poverty is dominant and survive mainly on wage income[8] and women's unpaid domestic labor. Yet, they

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(*) *Kent merkezinde çalışmayı herkes istiyor. Biz burada, kimseyi görmüyoruz. Biz buraya bir gireriz, akşam 6 olana kadar buradan çıkmayız. Ancak öğlen paydosunda bir çıkarız, şurada 15-20 dakika bir top oynarız, o yani. Kızılay'daki adam curcuna'nın içinde, ne bileyim, hareket var, gelen-giden... karısı-kızı, bilmem nesi, carti-curtu... orada bir hareket var, o hareket cekiyor. Başka bir şey değil. Bir de şöyle bir şey var: bir zamanlar öyle bir sıkılıyordum ki 'OSTİM'e gidiyorum' demeye... nerede çalışıyorsun? OSTİM'de. Haaa... Dolmuşa biniyorum sabahleyin, para uzatıyorum, neresi: OSTİM deyince millet nasıl böyle yani... Küçük görme, yani bir horlama... bu sezinleniyor, yani. Şimdi artık OSTİM göbeğe metro geldi,millet n'apıyor biliyor musunuz? Nerede ineceksin? 'Metroda ineceğim.' OSTİM'de ineceğim demiyorlar. Ben de... Şimdi bakıyorum dolmuşun durumuna, tanıdık falan da var, ulan nerede ineceğiz? Millet Ulus'a, Kızılay'a gidiyor, yok bilmem nereye gidiyor... nerde ineceksin: metro'da ineceğim! İşte böyle, insan sıkılıyor bir de. Bir ortam oluyor, mesela, gerçi şimdi benim için değil, ben 7-8 senedir OSTİM'deyim zaten, yeni başlayan bir insan... nerde çalışıyorsun? Söylemek istemiyor, OSTİM'de çalışıyorum demeye utanıyor. Niye? Karşısından aldığı tepkiden dolayı.*

[8] I have already talked about extra-employment earnings made of primarily urban rent and agricultural rent and/or income. Apart from these, another source for additional earnings come from supplementary jobs. One out of ten workers do supplementary jobs. However, the frequency of these jobs is very low (in the weekends or time to time) and they tremendously vary ranging from street vending and various service jobs to working at other manufacturing workplaces.

see their families relatively among the 'lucky' and their income level expectations are very modest. More than three-fourth of them see their families' income level as 'middle (*orta halli*). For around two-third of them, the income level they long for is less than two times of what they currently earn. Unemployment is the primary thing that they relate with poverty and destitute. This situation, at the same time, is one of the significant factors that mediate labor-capital relations at the level of workplace. A state of mind that sees unemployment as the primary reason of poverty creates a sympathy for their employers because of their 'job generating/creating' roles. Furthermore, the fact that employers do business by employing workers despite the existence of a possibility to 'earn money from money', which is considered as a common and dominant trend in the Turkish economy for a long time now, reinforces this sympathy. The workers describe this particular function/role of small employers as 'opening the gate to bread' (*ekmek kapısı açmak*), a phrase that reflects how in workers' perception small entrepreneurs are endowed with a certain moral quality and their role is directly tied to workers' very own survival. This situation reminds us, once more, that workers' consciousness forms are not independent from the social conditions they live in. More particularly, these consciousness forms are determined by the configuration of these social conditions at a certain historical conjuncture.

The absence of an organized class culture does not mean that the bonds between class members will be weak in every condition. However, for OSTİM workers, such bonds, too, seem to be very weak. The examples where workers spend time together, have a chat or play football during the workday, breaks and meal times are very rare. The main reason for this is said to be the busy work rhythm. More importantly, friendship outside of workplace is also very limited among workers. The two reasons workers use to explain this situation is the undesirability of being together with 'someone that you spend your entire day' and the distance between their place of residence and that of their workplace friends. In addition, tiredness of a workday itself seriously limits not only their tendency to spend time outside of work

with their fellow workers, but also their extra-work activities in general.[9] Hence, extra-work time is mainly spend by watching TV, for married couples as visits to relative households and for single men in the neighborhood coffeehouses (*kahvehane*) and playing football games on carpet grounds (*halısaha*).

Together with the absence of the possibilities for production- and class-based collective organization, the weakness of outside work relations among workers points to a dramatic separation between the spheres of production and reproduction. However, this does not mean that the life outside of work is strongly substituted by other relations. The information gathered by in-depth interviews point to a highly poor area of reproduction, and deprivation from relations of solidarity and processes of identity formation. Kinship, *hemşehri* (fellow countrymen), and neighborhood-based relationships are not as common as they are thought to be and, in most of the cases, they are limited to small networks. Hence, the weakness of class-consciousness does not mean that other extra-class identities are powerful instead.

OSTİM workers primarily think of themselves as belonging to urban society and do not have nostalgia of returning back to their homeland (*memleket*) in the short or lung run. Nonetheless, primarily the blue-collar majority, likewise in the sphere of production and employment, in the area of urban reproduction as well carries a life that is highly isolated economically, culturally, and spatially. Furthermore, this isolation also exists as a subjective perception. Of course, the distance to the activities of modern urban life, which, in fact, could be treated as belonging to typical 'middle class' lifestyle, has a cultural aspect to it, i.e., such activities (for instance cinema, and theatre, consumption of various services of spare-time sector etc.) are learned and as such require a certain cultural and symbolic formation (education, relationship and familiarity with popular culture and contact with urban groups that carry these characteristics in relatively more quantity):

> Of course, since you do not have many educated people around you, you hang out with people from your own circle, you can't hang out with them, either because you do not know them or because you cannot get in among

[9] The fact that reproduction areas in OSTİM are both separated from other employment areas and scattered around distant areas of the city has certain significance. In small city contexts where these two overlap, it has been observed that workers spend more time with their workmates and other workers than they do with their relatives in their leisure times (Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 148).

> them...When you are educated it makes a lot of difference. I have a sister for instance, [who is] high school graduate –since I could not go to school I helped my three siblings to finish high school– when we get together there is much difference between who is educated and who is not. For instance, when I talk to somebody at some place, I am not able to talk sometimes... yet she says what needs to be said. I mean in this sense. May be there is also some differences in the way you think, when you are educated. Is it culture? I do not know, but there is something missing, because we could not go to school.(*) (*lathe worker, 28 years old*)

Nevertheless, for the majority of working class families the determining factor appears to be economic, as the same worker states:

> Sometimes we to go to cinema, but we quit now since [the number of] children became three. Economic situation does not allow for certain things as well. Minibus is now 150 000 Liras. I have come to this age and for the first time I was able to go to ocean once. It was two years ago; I went to Mersin. We went to the facilities of Ministry of Interior with the help of one of my sister in law's acquaintance. If our economic situation was better, we would like to go all the time, every summer. (**)[10]

Before I finish this section, both as a complementary component to the social and cultural profile I have tried to draw here and as a preparation to the discussion of political party preferences that I will address in the next section, I would like to consider the findings regarding workers' newspaper reading tendencies and preferences. First of all, we need to draw attention to two points. An overwhelming

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(*) *Tabii okumuş insan da senin çevrende çok fazla olmadığı için, sen kendi çevrenle muhatap oluyorsun, onlarla muhatap olamıyorsun, tanımadığın için veya içlerine giremediğin için... Okumakla çok şey farkeder. Benim bir kızkardeşim var mesela, lise mezunu, ben okuyamadığım için üç tane kardeşime liseyi okuttum, yanyana geldiğimiz zaman bir okumuşla okumamış arasında bazı şeyler çok değişiyor. Mesela bir yerde birileriyle konuşurken, konuşamıyorum bazı... ama o veriyor cevabını. O açıdan diyorum, yani. Veya biraz da düşünce farklılığı oluyor, okuduğun zaman. Kültür mü artık, ne bileyim, bir şey eksikliği var yani, okumadığımız için.*

(**) *Bazen sinemaya gideriz ama, çocuklar üç olduğu için bu sıra bıraktık. Maddi durum da elvermiyor tabii bazı şeylere. Dolmuş olmuş şu anda 150 bin lira. Bu yaşa geldik, ilk kez bir kere denize gitmek kısmet oldu. İki sene önceydi, Mersin'e gittim. Orada bir yengem var da, onun bir tanıdığı aracılığıyla İçişleri Bakanlığının tesislerine gitmiştik. Maddi durum olsa, her zaman gitmek ister insan, her yaz.*

[10] Within the last year, 16 percent of the blue-collars did not take a vacation. 22 percent of the blue-collars spent their vacation period at their places of origin, which may be regarded as an indicator of ongoing relations with pre-migration, possibly rural, origins. Moreover, only 12 percent of the blue-collars spent their vacation time at some holiday centers and other cities. White-collars, on the other hand, show much more 'urban' patterns with regard to their vacation attitudes: 39.3 percent spent their time at holiday centers, and only 7 percent at their places of origin.

majority of workers at most reads newspapers several times in a week. The number of those who do not read newspapers or do so rarely is not ignorable either (one-fourth). Secondly, in terms of those who read newspapers in various degrees, the data at hand do not reflect the workers' newspaper 'buying' tendencies. In fact, newspaper reading takes place mostly in the coffeehouses and partly in the workplaces. For this reason, we need to keep in mind that the conclusions we will draw from newspaper reading activities of workers are dependent on practices that are (i) experienced in varying frequencies and, generally, in rare occasions and (ii) determined by not direct preferences but rather by the outside factors. When we look at from within these preliminary conditions we observe the following: In general, the mainstream liberal newspapers constitute the most preferred and followed newspapers. Among the defining characteristics of these newspapers we may count are the absence of an open political identity/line, light and superficial news-reporting regarding the national and world agenda, and, in general, though in varying degrees, the larger amount of place given to popular themes (especially to those popular figures such as singers, TV stars and models). Although, in fact, there are two other groups of newspapers, those specifically defined by these characteristics, which can be classified as 'magazine & boulevard newspapers', and those that primarily focus on football and magazine news, we are concerned here only with the distinction between mainstream newspapers and those with a definitive political inclination. The latter can be divided into three sub-groups: nationalist, conservative and leftist. When we start our assessment based on a comparison between the two main groups, i.e., between mainstream and politically inclined newspapers, firstly, we find a striking difference between blue-collar workers and white-collar ones. While less than half of the blue-collars prefer to read mainstream newspapers first, an overwhelming majority (85 percent) of white-collars do so. One of the possible reasons for this difference could be that white-collar workers are relatively younger than blue-collars and hence they are much more interested in popular culture products presented in the mainstream media. As a matter of fact, the average age of those who prefer mainstream newspapers (28) significantly differ from those who prefer politically inclined newspapers. The average age of those who prefer magazine oriented newspapers (24) is much lower than the others. On the other hand, around half of the

blue-collar workers prefer politically inclined newspapers first and a significant amount of them (14 percent) primarily prefers sport newspapers (a tendency almost absent among white-collars). In other words, preference for politically inclined newspapers is much higher among blue-collar workers than white-collar ones. However, we should emphasize the significance of age as an intervening factor for both groups. Accordingly, preference for newspapers other than the politically inclined ones is higher for groups at a younger age.[11] Also, a closer observation shows that while white-collar youngsters primarily direct their popular & magazine oriented newspaper preferences to mainstream newspapers, among blue-collars these preferences are directed more towards the magazine-boulevard and sport newspapers. Among white-collar workers, 8 percent prefers the leftist and 4 percent prefers the nationalist-conservative newspapers. In this group, there is none who prefers the Islamist newspapers. In contrast, among blue-collar workers, the rate of those who prefer politically inclined newspapers in general and those who prefer each politically inclined newspaper is much higher than the white-collars. Among blue-collars, 15 percent prefers the leftist, 10 percent the nationalist-conservative and 8 percent the Islamist newspapers.

6.2. Political Party Preferences

With regards to political preferences of OSTİM workers, we may draw several comparative conclusions from the table below. First, the distribution of leftist and rightist political preferences among OSTİM workers does not show a major differentiation either from the general Turkey or Ankara results in 1999 National elections. However, compared to organized İstanbul metal workers, we also see that rightist-conservative tendencies are much more common among OSTİM workers. Secondly, the distribution of rightist and leftist preferences among OSTİM workers themselves presents a totally different pattern than the other examples. While in all other examples Democratic Left Party (DSP: *Demokratik Sol Parti*) got much higher

[11] A similar situation is also observed in TV channel preferences. The average age of those who prefer to watch the TV channels that we can classify as mainstream, based on similar criteria we used for newspapers, is (28.3) lower than those who watch news channels and politically-inclined channels (31-33.5).

support than Republican People's Party (CHP: *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), the two mainstream leftist parties, the situation in OSTİM is reverse.

The distribution in the rightist side shows tendencies that are more similar to each other. In all groups, while True Path Party (DYP: *Doğru Yol Partisi*) is the least preferred party, Nationalist Action Party (MHP: *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*) is the most preferred one. However, there is still a significant difference. Compared with the other examples, the preference for the MHP is much more common among OSTİM workers. In sum, two characteristics that differentiate OSTİM workers from the general political picture in Turkey are the first and the second political party preferences: the MHP in the right spectrum and the CHP in the left spectrum. In other words, among OSTİM workers these parties get a much stronger support than they did nationwide.

Table 6.1 Political party preferences: OSTİM workers, İstanbul metal workers and April 1999 General Election Results

			April 1999 General Election		
	Ankara 1998 (1)	*İstanbul 1999 (2)*	*Turkey*	*Ankara*	*İstanbul*
ANAP	11.2	7.4	13.2	10.8	15.8
CHP	22.9	11.0	8.7	13.1	9.6
DSP	9.4	45.7	22.2	23.1	30.2
DYP	3.6	3.0	12.0	7.3	5.4
RP (FP)	15.3	11.9	15.4	17.1	21.3
MHP	31.7	12.9	18.0	21.6	10.1
Other	5.9	8.1	10.5	6.7	7.6

(1) OSTİM workers before the elections. The answers as 'no idea', 'will not vote' and 'under the age limit' are eliminated. (2) İstanbul metal workers before the elections (Özuğurlu and Erten 1999).

In what follows, I will try to analyze OSTİM workers' preferences by specifically focusing on this differentiation point. I want to discuss this issue, i.e., the political preferences in general and the significantly high MHP and CHP partisanship in particular, at two interrelated levels. My first question is to what extent these kind of political preferences are consistent in time. The second question I would like to address is through which factors we can explain these preferences or which factors we can see them to be related with.

Table 6.2 shows the parties that the workers voted in the 1991 and 1995 elections together with the parties that they plan to vote in the fall 1998. We can discern several significant clues from this table regarding the two questions we asked above. First, the preferences for various parties show different consistency levels in time. For instance, the preferences for the center left parties have a high consistency level. During the period we are examining, the vote rates of the CHP –including former Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP: *Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*)– and the DSP do not show a significant differentiation. A similar situation is relevant for the center right DYP. In contrast, the condition of Motherland Party (ANAP: *Anavatan Partisi*) shows small changes in time. It increased in 1995 and started to decline in 1998 again. A similar situation is also observed for Welfare Party (RP: *Refah Partisi*).[12] In accordance with the recent trends, the votes of this party increased in 1995 and started to decrease in 1998.

Table 6.2 Political party preferences: Tendencies of change in time

	1991		*1995*		*1998*	
ANAP	7.6	(20.4)	10.5	(18.9)	6.9	(11.2)
CHP (& SHP)	13.0	(34.9)	13.7	(24.6)	14.1	(22.9)
DSP	4.0	(10.7)	5.4	(9.7)	5.8	(9.4)
DYP	2.9	(7.8)	2.2	(4.0)	2.2	(3.6)
RP (FP)	5.1	(13.7)	10.5	(18.9)	9.4	(15.3)
MHP	4.7	(12.6)	11.9	(21.4)	19.5	(31.7)
Other	--	--	1.4	(2.5)	3.6	(5.9)
(A)	5.4		8.7		23.5	
(B)	57.4		35.7		7.9	
(C)	--		--		7.2	

(A) did not vote /do not plan to vote & will or did vote empty/invalid/will vote (B) did not vote due to age / will not vote: this row also includes unknown cases but mainly reflects those who are not at the voting age at the time of elections. (C) undecided & do not have an idea. The columns in parentheses reflect the values reached at by subtracting these three categories from the general distribution.

[12] Welfare Party (RP) was closed in February 1998 by the Supreme Court and later reestablished under the name of Virtue Party (FP: *Fazilet Partisi*). However, when the fieldwork was done in the fall 1998, it was still talked about as RP rather than as FP in popular terminology. For this reason, I also preferred to keep this party as RP in this study. In addition, before this study was completed, FP was also banned in 2001. The movement was divided establishing two different parties, Felicity Party (SP: *Saadet Partisi*) and Justice and Development Party (AKP: *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*).

Furthermore, the table shows that there has not been any significant changes in the right and left voting preferences after 1995 and but that there has been serious changes in the distribution of votes to rightist parties since 1991. The most striking of these changes is the rapid increase in the votes for the MHP and it's becoming the first party with a clear difference in 1998.

How can we explain this situation? I believe the first explanation is related with age. As I have emphasized several times in the preceding sections, the average age of OSTİM workers is quite low. As a matter of fact, as we see in the table, more than half of the workers did not vote in the 1991 elections because they were below voting age. This rate is a little lower in the 1995 elections and drops under 10 percent in the 1998 elections. Hence, the steady increase in the MHP's votes is in parallel with the increase in the number of those who gained right to vote. 35 to 40 percent of those who were not at the age of voting in 1991 and in 1995 plan to vote for the MHP in the 1998 elections. In other words, the MHP supporters primarily come from youngsters and the lowest (25.9) average age is observed among the MHP supporters. The rate of those who support the CHP, in parallel to the increase in the group of those at the age of voting among workers, shows a rapid decrease after 1991 and a slow one after 1995. However, there is no significant change in the number of CHP supporters in the general voters group. The tendency of young to turn to the MHP can also be clearly observed in terms of age groups. Among workers within the age group of 20-24, the amount of support for the MHP (26 percent) is significantly higher than the general average. It reaches to two times higher (36 percent) within the age group of 13-19. For workers at the age of 35 and older, this rate drops to significantly lower levels than the average (6-10 percent). The CHP, in return, get its lowest support (9 percent) from the age group of 13-19 who supports the MHP the most. In a similar vein, the MHP supporters also show a significant differentiation patterns according to education level. The highest rate of support (27-29 percent) for this party comes from middle school graduates and middle school dropouts. The situation at stake here is not a relationship between political preferences and the level of schooling (being educated in the ordinary meaning of the word). Rather we are talking about the MHP orientation of a young generation, who could not continue their education and had to join labor market.

There is no doubt that MHP partisanship should be related with other social and environmental factors. These factors generally could be described as migration, urbanization experience and geographical origin. The indicators related to these factors make us think that outside-Ankara-origins play a certain role in the MHP partisanship. First of all, it seems possible to talk about a differentiation based on urban and rural character of the place of birth. While for those who were born in urban centers and metropolises (province centers and Ankara) the rate of voting for the MHP is slightly lower than the general average (17-18 percent), it surpasses the average among those who were born in small towns and villages (23-25 percent). The CHP, on the other hand, gets higher support from those who were born in urban centers and metropolises. For instance, while the support for the MHP from Ankara and metropolitan born workers is slightly lower than the average (16 percent), this rate goes up to 36-37 percent among town and village born workers. Again, while there is no supporter of the CHP among those who were born in villages and continue to live there, the number of the MHP supporters is more than half. In addition, this situation is related as much with the continuation of the MHP partisanship known to be particular to certain geographical centers, after migration, as it is with the pre-urban cultural-political values. For instance, the two groups, among whom the MHP partisanship is the most common, are those who were born in Yozgat and Çorum (36-33 % respectively) (these two provinces are, at the same, time the first two birthplaces of workers who were born outside of Ankara). In addition, these two provinces are the second and third places where MHP got its most votes in the 1999 general elections, after the province of Osmaniye.[13] Furthermore, among the migrants those with the lowest urban experience are the MHP supporters. The average period that this group has been in Ankara is 12.8 years. The closest group is RP supporters with 14.8 years. The farthest group is DSP voters with 24.1 years. For CHP voters, it is 18.2 years.

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[13] In the 1987 and 1991 national elections' analysis Özcan (2000) concurs that the place of birth has a significant effect on voting behaviors and interprets this situation as the continuing role of early & childhood political socialization determined by the "affiliation of the family and dominant political tendencies in the area of residence." Özcan draws our attention to insufficiency of those Western theories that use realistic behavioral assumptions to explain political preferences in explaining voting behaviors in the Third World countries.

It is also possible that the other members of the workers' family have an effect on their political party preferences. While the MHP preferences of workers who live in wage families is close to the general average, the preferences of those workers who live in families with individuals belonging to other wage and non-wage class positions is significantly higher than the average (27 percent). However, the same tendency is also relevant for the CHP. The support for this party, too, is much higher in the households with a heterogeneous class profile. The workers present a more striking contrast in terms of their own class positions and their preferences for the MHP and the CHP. Among blue-collar workers those who support the MHP is relatively close to the general average (24 percent). This rate is very low among white-collar workers (4 percent). Among the unskilled workers, however, it is the highest (38 percent). The CHP, on the other hand, gets very low support from unskilled and blue-collar workers. Among white-collar workers, in contrast, the CHP gets its highest support. The political party preferences of these groups during the period of 1991-1998 show different patterns. For the blue-collars the tendency towards the MHP is primarily relevant with the joining of above-mentioned young workers. While blue-collar workers, whose age profile changed rapidly, were predominantly voting for SHP (CHP) in 1991, in 1995 their votes are divided with almost same proportions between the ANAP, the CHP, the RP, and the MHP. In 1998 they start to incline towards the MHP. The only characteristic that looks stable in this group is the continuing very low level of preference for the DSP and the DYP. The political preferences of unskilled workers are similar to blue-collar workers. However, the number of those who were not at the age of voting in the 1991 and 1995 elections is quite low among unskilled workers who are the oldest group. In this respect, the switch from center to the MHP is related more with the older workers who have changed their political preferences in time rather than the young workers in the group. The majority of white-collars are made of young workers who reached the age of voting in 1995. However, an unchanging preference for the center left (CHP) is a common characteristic of both young and relatively old white-collar workers.

If we do a general comparison between blue-collar and white-collar workers, the preference for left parties among white-collars is two times higher (42 percent)

than blue-collars (21 percent).[14] I have mentioned above that politically inclined newspapers in general and leftist newspapers in particular are preferred among blue-collars at a higher rate. These two contradicting indicators invite us not to take the differences in political preferences as given but to evaluate the differentiation in the elements of political culture and social consciousness at their ground. In the following section, I will try to find out some clues related to this question and discuss whether being a left party supporter, in every condition, means a sign of 'working class-based' social consciousness.

6.3. Distinction and Distance: Axes of Perceptions of the Social World

Although political party preferences are important indicators in understanding social consciousness of workers, they are not sufficient by themselves. To enhance our understanding further on this subject, we need to examine some other indicators as well. For this purpose, in the following paragraphs, I advance an analysis at three levels. First, I look at how and which terms are used by workers in defining social differentiation. Second, I examine which social groups the workers see themselves closest. These two analyses, rather than focusing on subjective perceptions along certain axis of social differentiation, revolve around a question of which codes and categories (social, economic, political, cultural and religious etc.) are seen most important in social distinctions among social groups. The categories and codes in this analysis are derived from my preliminary fieldwork where I did not give any categories but left questions related to perception of social differences open-ended. I did not prefer to ask the question, 'Are there social classes in Turkey?' as done in some surveys. Such a question may be appropriate and may work un-problematically in those social contexts where terms like 'class' and 'working class' in everyday vocabulary would take a direct, unmediated meaning, divorced from all space and context-bounded connotations. However, considering the cultural context in Turkey, where large segments of working class are mainly alien to the notion of organized

[14] The difference between white-collars and blue-collars in terms of political preferences presents a general pattern. For instance, in Ranis's research (1991b: 141) too number of white-collar workers who identify themselves left political position three times higher than the blue-collars who do so.

class culture, such a question carries a high risk of 'leading/directing.' This is valid for OSTIM workers as well. Such a question is either perceived as a didactic imposition and results in responses such as "Of course, there are [classes]" or leads to reactive answers as it usually provokes a sense of ideological propaganda. For this reason, I have avoided such an imposition and instead have aimed to develop some clues about the nature of social consciousness of workers by drawing on their own subjective terminologies. Finally, I will use the workers' responses to the pre-constructed statements on economic, political, cultural and religious issues in the questionnaire as a way to further the analysis here.[15]

We can sum up the workers' responses to the question of "What is the most important distinction in our society?" around five themes: class-based ('workers vs. bosses'), welfare-based ('rich vs. poor'), political ('rightist vs. leftist'), religious ('Muslims vs. seculars'), and religious sects ('Sunnite vs. *Alevi*'). Other distinctions (urban vs. rural, urban residential separation, education and ethnic based divisions) do not constitute important place in the responses. The fact that the distinction between Turks and Kurds has been the least mentioned one among others could be taken as an indication of the fact that among OSTİM workers, the Kurdish question, which has been at the center of political and military agenda for last two decades, is not perceived as a subject of ethnic segmentation. Nevertheless, we should also take into account the marginal presence of Kurdish migrants among OSTİM workers interviewed (and probably in their neighborhoods as well). Therefore, this figure does not give us a sufficient (or general) idea about what kinds of attitudes would emerge if there were an ethnic heterogeneity in labor market and residential areas.

Among the five axes of social divisions that we have pointed out above, those divisions based on religious sects (11 percent) and political affinity (11 percent) are the least important, or mentioned ones. There are no significant differentiations in terms of age and education among those who emphasize the religious sects as the most important line of distinction but this emphasis is markedly high among those who were born in certain provinces (Yozgat, Kırıkkale, Sivas, Kayseri) and those with village-origin. However, the interesting point on this score is that the time spent

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[15] The propositions that I used in the questionnaire form to measure attitudes are largely borrowed from Boratav (1995).

in urban centers does not have a weakening impact on the role of geographical origin in social consciousnesses of the migrants. We can consider this fact as the continuing importance of religious sectarian identities in the migrants' urban lives. However, the survey on which this study is based on does not provide information about workers' ties to such religious sectarian communities.

Similarly, the emphasis on the political distinction (right vs. left) does not display significant differences according to the respondents' education levels. However, we face with a different pattern in term of age differences. This distinction appears to be much higher (22-26 percent) among the oldest workers (45 years old and above) and the youngest workers (between 13-19 years old) than the other age groups. In the context of the de-politicization process of the post-1980 and the liberalist rhetoric articulated with this process, which argues that 'the right-left distinction' has lost its meaning, we may assume that the elder workers acquired their political consciousness during their youth period. However, for the case of young workers, we also face with a new phenomenon of politicization. This tendency is not restricted to the MHP-oriented young workers butt also higher than the average among young workers oriented toward the CHP and the RP. In addition, the primacy given to the right-left distinction is lower among those workers who were born in medium-size cities and towns, whereas it is relatively high at the two poles, among workers with metropolitan and village origins.

The second important distinction, 'Muslims vs. seculars' distinction (17 percent), does not also show a marked differentiation according to age and education levels of the workers. This distinction appears to be much widespread among migrant workers, particularly among those recently migrated. In contrast to the political distinction that was emphasized more by the workers with metropolitan and village origins, the religion-secularism distinction is much higher among those coming from medium-size cities and towns. Therefore, in the context of relationship between pre-migration social context and the stress on religion-secularism distinction, we can argue that religious conservatism is carried to the cities from small cities and towns rather than the villages. In addition, if we consider that secularist or religious orientations reflect shared sentiments among family members, we may note the following observation: Religious or anti-secularist orientation is higher among

workers (30 percent) who live in the households with heterogeneous class profiles than only blue-collar (16 percent) and wage earner (19 percent) households.

It must be noted that 'Muslim-secular' distinction, in reality, is not simply religious in its character. It is primarily related with the question of religion and secularism whose origins date back to the early republican period even though it has become much visible since the beginnings of the 1990s. This question, with its political, economic and cultural dimensions, has become a widespread and complex social problem after the Islamist-oriented RP's coming into power in 1995. When I was doing this fieldwork at the end of 1998, the RP-led coalition government was already ended in 1997 with the help of military wing of the political apparatus. But the tension has not softened yet as it is today.[16] This process has created a polarization along 'Muslim-secular' axis. I will not analyze this polarization in detail here, but I would like to stress an important point. Except for those political activists and economic actors on both sides, how should we read the perceptions of ordinary people that stand at the two sides of this polarization? The lay individuals at the secularist camp perceive the strengthening of Islamist tendencies in political and non-political arenas as a political and cultural threat to the secularist way of life. In contrast, other individuals on the Islamic camp mainly complain about a cultural

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[16] While I was discussing the political party preferences above, I have only focused on the most preferred two parties (the MHP and the CHP) since they differed significantly from the general Turkey trends. I have excluded the third party, the RP, the primary party that represents religious sensibilities in the political arena that attracted the most votes. Indeed, the support for the RP is surprisingly lower than expected among OSTİM workers whose religious sensibilities as well as opposition to 'interest & earning money from money' overlap with the RP's discourse. Considered within this context, among workers, who, on the one hand, experience the negative conditions of a peripheral labor market and, on the other, explain these conditions through external references (state authorities and big bosses), we do not encounter with a search for, either secular or religious, an alternative economic-social system. However, I would like to share a marginal example of such an alternative, which does not have a widespread circulation among workers and does not have such priority either and which I my self encountered for the first time. Told to me by an older worker, the idea of '*Örgünöz*' resembles petty bourgeois egalitarianism observed among the anarchists of the 19th century. This idea sees the main problem of the world in the existence of 'capital' but it objects not to capital but to 'giving profit share to capital.' According to this idea, in fact, Islam too does not recognize any value other than the labor. This profit opposition criticizes mainstream Islamists for their 'interest opposition' hypocrisy. It advocates that investor capital should also not be given any profit share but only wage proportional to its contribution to labor. The '*Örgünöz*' system, again, similar to some anarchist trends, proposes a federalist organization for independent producers. It opposes to the idea of sharing 'based on not labor but need' proposed by communists project on the basis that it would undercut individual competition and hence development.

exclusion against the religiosity but they also, in various and ambiguous degrees, carry a demand of regulating public life in accordance with religious norms and values.

It will be misleading to see attitudes against secularism as almost always unmediated by political and cultural opposition. For instance, the question of headscarf/ turban, which continues to be at the center of political agenda and was fueled by the recent ban on turban among female university students, is combined with male-dominant sexism that is produced in articulation with secular cultural climate and manifests itself against religious (turbaned) women. The stereotypical images that circulate in everyday life are mainly related with this patriarchal tendency. In other words, although the secularist culture seemingly advocates women's participation in public life more than religious circles, when it comes to women with religious identity in public life, it displays sexist attitudes in the name of secularist requirements. The experience of one of the women workers in OSTİM provides a striking example for this paradoxical situation and is worth quoting at some length:

> Before I covered [put on a headscarf] myself, I would see someone [with a headscarf] and observe how the others would look at her, how they see her, since it is not easy to wear this. I would see a covered woman, she is making jokes with a male friend or friends and I would see condemning looks in the eyes of those who are watching her. There is such a limitation, if you are covered you cannot laugh, talk, you have to be serious on the street... if she is covered, if she is with a headscarf, then she has to accept all these! This is the idea. ... Because, for a woman with a headscarf there comes a limitation, it exists in our society as well. When a woman in headscarf talks to a man, 'look, she is with headscarf, she is talking [to a man].' When you are walking with your friends, if you are relaxed a little bit, if you laugh, 'look, she is with headscarf, how could she behave like this?' I have seen this many times. There is discrimination, you see. ... I have put on headscarf after starting to work here. I have seen so many criticisms: 'you are the future generation of modern young girls; a modern young girl must not be with a headscarf.' Our cook told me that. They resisted to me a lot. They tried hard to make me take it off. ... When I first put on headscarf, they pressured me as 'you have put on a headscarf but there is no change in you, one with a headscarf should be more mannered.' I said, I am what I am, if you accept me, you accept me like this. ... I will wear this headscarf, and will stay as I am, nobody will change me. Though reluctantly, they had to accept.(*) (*lathe operator, 19 years old*)

(*) *Ben kapanmadan önce görürdüm birini, bir de çevresindekilerin ona bakışlarına bakardım, acaba onu nasıl görüyorlar, çünkü bunu örtmek kolay bir şey değil. Bakardım örtülü bir bayan,*

On the other hand, the opposition to secularism is also fed by a general conservative culture that surrounds it. Although there are specific conditions in big cities that maintain such an opposition, this is more powerfully observed among those coming from rural origins. For instance, among those who think that religion is repressed in political arena, such opinion is more widespread among people who were born in towns and villages than those who were born in the cities and metropolitan centers. The same tendency can also be observed among these social groups' attitudes toward the issues of compulsory religious education in schools and their opposition to women's participation[17] to workforce, which can be considered as the indication of a similar conservatism associated with religion. In all three aspects of conservatism (the opposition to secularism, favoring compulsory religious education and being against women's participation to workforce), two axes of differentiations are worth paying attention. First, such conservative elements/values tend to weaken as the education level increases. Second, on all three points there is a clear differentiation

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yanında erkek arkadaşı veya arkadaşlarıyla şakalaşıyordur, onu seyreden insanlarda böyle çok ayıplayan bakışlar görürdüm. Öyle bir sınırlama var ki, kapalı bir insan gülemez, konuşamaz, yolda ciddi olmalı... madem ki kapalı, başörtüyü örtmüş, bunları kabul etmek zorunda! Yani düşünce bu. ... Çünkü şöyle bir şey, başörtüsü örten bir kişiye bir sınırlama geliyor, toplumumuzda da var. Başörtülü bir hanım bir erkekle konuşurken, "a, başörtülü, konuşuyor" oluyor. Yolda arkadaşlarınla giderken hafif biraz lakayıt olsan, gülsen, "aa, başörtülü, nasıl böyle davranır?" Ben bunu çok gördüm. Ayrım yapılıyor yani. ... Ben başörtüsünü burada çalışmaya başladıktan sonra takmaya başladım. Çok tepki gördüm, bayağı bir zorluk çektim: "siz geleceğin çağdaş genç kızlarısınız, çağdaş genç kız başörtülü olmamalı." Aşçımız demişti. Bana çok direndiler. Açtırmak için çok çalıştılar. ... Ben ilk başörtüyü örttüğümde, 'sen başını örttün ama sende hiçbir değişiklik yok, başörtüyü örten biraz ağır olmalı' bu baskıyı çok yaptılar. Ben benim dedim, beni kabul eden böyle etsin. Ben hem bu başörtüyü takacağım, hem de ben olarak kalacağım, kimse beni değiştiremeyecek. Onlar da mecburen kabul ettiler.

[17] Figures for the overall sample: 34.9 percent "Yes", 43.9 percent "No, if not necessary", 21.3 percent "No." Compare to the responses by İstanbul metal workers: 53 percent "Yes", 39 percent "No, if not necessary", 8 percent "No" (Özuğurlu & Erten 1999). One may regard this conditionality as unimportant and conclude that 68.8 percent of the blue-collars object to women's working. This conditionality, however, has a specific content: first, when the workers emphasize such a necessity, they often refer to the situations in which the husband is either unemployed or physically not able to work. This is related to a certain element in workers' social consciousness, which is highly sensitive to the people who are deprived of income generating employment opportunities. Within this context, secondly, it is a common opinion that in the conditions where many husbands are unemployed, the existence of working couples is an indicator of inequality among households. Therefore, it is no doubt that blue-collars are much more conservative on the issues of sexual division of labor than the white-collars are, but this conservatism is a complex one mediated by some sort of socio-economic concerns. As an additional point, the issue here is specifically related to wives, and they express less unwillingness to their daughters' working outside.

between the white-collars and the blue-collars. Such conservative tendencies are weaker among white-collar workers with their more urban, educated and young profiles than blue-collar workers.

We have not yet touched upon the other two categories of distinction that were given importance by the workers in their perception of axes of social distinction: 'rich vs. poor', and 'workers vs. bosses' which occupy the third place in the ranking of social distinctions. I would like to discuss these two in relation to each other in some detail. With regard to the emphasis put on these two distinctions, there is no significant differentiation among workers according to their age and education levels. Within the current political configuration, the perception of 'workers vs. boss' distinction appears to be much higher among those workers (28 percent) who plan voting for the CHP than those who consider voting for the MHP (4 percent). Among the pro-MHP workers, the emphasis on 'the poor vs. the rich' distinction is significantly high (34).

The most repeated 'rich-poor' distinction by the workers, or in its less common form of 'rich - middle (*orta-halli*) - poor' distinction, is peculiar to small urban contexts and it signifies an extension of traditional cultural perception of social inequality (Akşit 1985). This type of traditional perception of inequality among the workers would be expected to weaken in favor of a conception of an inequality between wage labor and capital. In this context, for instance, the fact that among those workers who have been living in Ankara for a short period of time (1-5 years) and those still living in Ankara's villages the emphasis on 'the rich-poor' distinction is much higher (30 and 54 percents respectively) than the emphasis on 'worker-boss' distinction (7 and 0 percents) supports the idea that transformation of consciousness in that direction is related with the process of urban wage labor experience. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that this is not a simple and straightforward process. This transformation may occur at different levels of intensity and pace depending on the forms and length of wage labor experiences and the role played by households and other socio-spatial processes in the process of adaptation to the urban life. As an indication of this complex process, for instance, the emphasis on the 'rich-poor' distinction among those born in metropolitan areas is not less than those coming from small towns and villages. On the contrary, it is slightly higher.

Therefore, we should also expect the content/meaning of traditional 'rich-poor' distinction to change within this complex process. One of the possible areas of this change in meaning can be seen in the perception of quality of public services. Here, the low quality of public services is perceived not as a class problem or inadequateness of social security system but as treatment of the poor as worthless:

> There is strong discrimination between rich and poor. That is, a person in a good condition, how should I put it, gets more respect, better treatment, that person could have all the work get done wherever he goes, it is all solved immediately. It is not like this when a poor person goes. Sometimes my mother goes to social security hospital for a month and could not get well, whereas the rich could go to the private hospital and get well in one or tow days.(*) (*lathe operator, 24 years old*)

Such social consciousness has breathed the urban atmosphere and sees regular and equal public services as a citizenship right. However, it also feels that the poor do not benefit from these rights equally and that it is deprived of cultural and symbolic capital to defend these rights at the local levels:

> Previously, we had had sent my second son to another middle school. The teacher had pressured us as 'this [he] would not be schooled, take this.' After than the kid did not want to go to school. There have been incidents of making those who does their homework to slit on the face of others who do not. We talked to the principal; he did not pay any attention. We took him from that school and put into another. Now he is doing much better.(**) (*lathe operator, 30 years old*)

The possible direction of this transformation can be a modification in the conception of traditional inequality peculiar to rural and small city contexts to reflect the range of social stratification in large cities.[18] In other words, what we observe here as the

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(*) *Zengin-fakir çok ayırdediliyor. Yani durumu iyi olan kişi daha bir, nasıl desem saygı görüyor, itibar görüyor, her yere gittiği zaman istediği işi yaptırabiliyor, anında olabiliyor. Fakir insan gittiği zaman böyle değil. Benim annem bir ay sigortaya gidip gelip iyileşemediği oluyor, zengin insan özel hastaneye gidip de iki gün içinde sapasağlam çıktığı oluyor.*

(**) *Ortanca oğlanı daha önce başka bir okula göndermiştik, öğretmen biraz baskı yaptı, bu okumaz, alın bunu diye. Ondan sonra çocuk okula gitmek istemedi biraz. Ders yapamıyor diye sınıfta kaldırıp çalışanlara yüzüne tükürtme olayı falan olmuş. Müdüre falan söyledik, müdür hiç ilgilenmedi. Okuldan aldık sonra, başka bir okula verdik. Şu anda iyi yani, bayağı bir düzeldi.*

[18] Ayata (1988a) shows how in a small town, where artisanal production is still widespread, social distinction is constructed at a level of two interrelated categories, economic power (wealth) and social status (prestige). In the constructions of social inequality in the context of large cities,

'rich-poor' distinction does not refer to a relatively few wealthy (and high-income) *individuals* in traditional social settings, but to differentiated high-income (and wealthy) *groups* within the range of urban social stratification. However, this conception does not make a systematic distinction among these social groups and it is also subject to influences of urban economic and cultural stratifications. I define this situation as 'stratification-based consciousness of social inequality' in order to distinguish it from both traditional cultural and 'class-based' perceptions of social inequality. This conceptualization will also help us in understanding the differentiation between blue-collars and white-collars. The 'rich-poor' distinction, which reflects the stratification-based consciousness of inequality, is more widespread among the white-collars (36 percent) who have longer urban experience and stronger wage labor background than the blue-collar workers. In addition, the 'worker-boss' distinction as the indicator of class-based consciousness of social inequality is much stronger among the blue-collar (18 percent) than the white-collars (12 percent).

Furthermore, it should be noted that there is prevalence of certain 'sectional consciousness' not only among the white-collars but also among the blue-collars. Such mode of consciousness, what we might call as 'occupational-social consciousness', can particularly be seen in the perception of 'distance' these two groups have about each other. The white-collars see the civil servants, which constitute the typical group of the white-collars, as the closest group to themselves and the workers (the blue-collar workers) come as the second category (17 percent). For the blue-collars, while the workers are considered as the closest group to themselves, the civil servants come as the third group (9 percent) after the peasants.

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the category that we can more explicitly observe the trace of traditional continuities probably is prestige more than wealth. However, we many think that, as in the rich-poor perception, the perception of 'prestige' too will be reshaped, and its references will change within the context of post-migration socio-economic geography. Hence both the content of these two categories and the relationship between them carry a dynamic characteristic. In this context, we may argue that among the newly migrated groups in the city economic reproduction is more important. However, we may expect that the search for status & prestige in urban society will take on more significance in time. The findings regarding the 'high-income vs. prestige' expectations OSTİM workers for their children's future supports this proposition. In every case, wealth is seen to be more significant than prestige. However, as the times workers spend in the city increases, the number of those who values prestige more than wealth in their children's futures increases steadily. Also, among 'semi-urban & semi-proletarian' workers, who are with the least level of integration to urban society, this rate is than all of the other groups.

The case of the white-collars clearly represents a white-collar sectional consciousness. In the case of the blue-collars, on the other hand, in addition to the 'sectional consciousness', seeing the civil servants as privileged groups in terms of working conditions and job security plays a significant role in their perceptions of 'social distance':

> The situation of civil servants is different than ours. They are permanent. They have a certain job. They do not have any employment anxiety. It is not like that for the workers here. They may have security but it is not same with being a civil servant. It does not go till the end [retirement], once it starts. The life of civil servants is more regular. He goes to work at a certain time, comes back at a certain time. OSTİM workers cannot be like that. When there is job to do, he has to stay for overtime. It is not the same for them. If there is no work, they just stay idle, without doing any work. Even if there is too much work, when the time is up they go home.(*) (*lathe operator, 24 years old*)

> Actually there are a lot of differences between civil servants and us, but it depends. There is not much difference in terms of wage. But there are also favored civil servants. When you see these, of course, you feel angry. He does not have experience; he does not have knowledge, the man, civil servant, is primary school graduate, and earns more than I do. Then I get angry. But if you say civil servants, in general, the ones without a favor, their situation is known.(**) (*machine operator, 21 years old*)

> I do get angry. Why do I get angry? In the evening, I watch the news; the civil servants have revolted. They all have got these plea cards; we want a raise and whatever. When we go to a public office, they are all sitting at the table... and then look at my workload here, too ... where is the justice in here? I say to myself... Then...I also criticize myself: if you had gone to school, you would also have come to a certain position. It does not have anything to do with schooling –then I say to myself. You did not have a man [to support/favor you] or they had arrived to world before you did. I think these too. I look at them, the men sits, and has a paper in his hand, signs it, and then, he of course does not know our situation here, he shouts as my wage is low. So, what shall we do here? I think too, if I cannot earn here more than he does over there... I am thinking, what this man does until evening. He puts forty signatures. I do forty signatures in 15 minutes. You can't imagine me here for 8 hours ...these days

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(*) *Devlet memurlarının durumu bizden farklı. Onlar daimi. Belli bir işleri var. İş korkuları olmaz, ama buradaki işçilerin öyle değil, belki sigortalı ama işte memuriyet gibi değil, başladığı zaman sonuna kadar gitmez. Memurların yaşamları da daha düzenlidir, belli bir saatte gidip belli bir saatte gelir. OSTİM işçisi öyle olamaz ki. İş olduğu zaman mecburen mesaiye kalır. Onlarda öyle değil, iş yoksa boş boş otururlar, iş çoksa da saati doldurup evlerine giderler.*

(**) *Memurlarla aramızda aslında çok fark yok, ama yerine göre var. Fazla fazla maaş farklılığı yok. Fakat bir de torpilli memurlar var işte. Bunları görünce insanın zoruna gidiyor hakkaten. Deneyimi yok, bilgisi yok, ilkokul mezunu adam, memur, üstelik benden çok daha maaş alıyor. O zaman zoruma gidiyor, ama memur dediğiniz zaman genelde alırsanız, torpilsiz olan kesimleri, durumları ortada.*

are our easy days, we do not have work. [We are working] just not to stay idle ...i.e., we are working for nothing ...when there is work I cannot come here and sit for two minutes. I eat my food in 10 minutes in hurry and then continue. When I see my working and their working, of course you revolt. But, still, I do not place the blame on them. My problem is with the system. Why should I resent them; my father is also a civil servant.(*) (*plastic worker, 22 years old*)

However, still, in any case, OSTIM workers see 'civil servants' and 'peasants' as the two important social groups (after workers) closest to themselves. The differentiations in their perception of distance toward these two groups are associated with other factors. Especially, the sentiment towards peasants seems to be related with the length of urban experience. Indeed, as the length of stay in city gets shorter, the perceived proximity towards the peasants increases, and among those workers who are still living in Ankara's villages, this rate reaches to the highest (33 percent). In addition, although an increase in the educational level does not have much impact on the perception of closeness to the peasant, it has an impact of reinforcing the sense of closeness to wage labor groups in general and the civil servants in particular. Furthermore, the level of homogeneity of wage labor households plays a significant role in the perception of distance. For instance, the sympathy toward civil servants among those workers from households composed of only blue-collars (actually, in overwhelming majority of these households, there is only one person working) is much lower (7 percent) than the other workers coming from households with different wage compositions (15 percent).

(*) *Ben şimdi kızıyorum. Neye kızıyorum? Akşam haberleri açıyorum, memurlar isyan etmiş. Almışlar ellerine pankartları, bizim maaşımıza zam, bilmem ne falan. Bir devlet dairesine gidiyoruz, oturuyorlar masanın başında... ben şimdi burada kendi çalışmama bakıyorum, bir de... adalet bunun neresinde? diyorum kendi kendime. Sonra... özeleştiri de yapıyorum: onun gibi okusaydın, sen de bir yerleri kazansaydın. Okumayla da alakası yok –öyle diyorum ondan sonra. Adamın yokmuş senin diyorum veya onlar senden daha önce gelmişler dünyaya. Bunları da düşünüyorum. Şimdi bakıyorum, adam oturmuş oraya, almış eline bir kağıdı, bir imza atıyor, ondan sonra, bizim buradaki halimizi bilmiyor tabii, maaşım az diye bağırıyor. E, biz n`apalım burada? Ben de düşünüyorum, ulan madem sen burda ondan daha çok kazanamıyorsun... Düşünüyorum bu adam akşama kadar ne yapar? Kırk tane imza atar. Kırk tane imzayı atıyorum, 15 dakika. Ben burada sekiz saat, var ya... bugünler rahat günlerimiz, şu anda işimiz yok. Öyle, boş durmayalım (diye)... boşa çalışıyoruz yani... iş olduğu zaman ben buraya gelip iki dakika oturamıyorum. Yemeği 10 dakikada alelacele yiyorum, ondan sonra devam. Şimdi ben bu çalışmamla onların o çalışmasını gördükten sonra, illa ki isyan ediyor insan. Ama ben kusuru onlarda bulmuyorum yine de. Benim sıkıntım sistemde zaten. Benim onunla ne alıp veremediğim olsun, benim babam da memur.*

Blue-collar workers also have less sympathy towards civil servants' struggle for the right to unionize, which has been on their agenda for sometime. The number of those who opposes granting the right to unionize to civil servants among blue-collars (26 percent) is two times higher than white-collar workers. I have mentioned above that this situation stems from blue-collars' perception of civil servants as privileged. This perception among OSTİM blue-collar workers is not only limited to civil servants but also includes workers employed in the state owned enterprises. In this regard, while more than half of the blue-collar workers (54 percent) support the idea of privatizing these enterprises, only one-third of white-collar workers do so. The issue here is not job security and working conditions as is the case in civil servants, but the high wages and, more significantly, the subject of 'favor.' However, these issues are also addressed by white-collars as well. What, then, is the reason for the higher numbers of white-collar workers opposing the idea of privatization? The only finding is related to the level of education. The number of individuals opposing privatization is higher among those with high school or higher education than the others. Hence, if we frame this finding, we have to conclude that the attitude towards privatization does not arise from a comparison between their own conditions with that of state workers. Rather, this attitude is related with 'being concerned or not.' Hence, educated white-collars are more concerned than the less educated ones.[19] However, the fact that white-collars are more sensitive towards privatization of state enterprises does not mean that they are more statist and less liberal.

On the contrary, the number of those who think that (i) liberal market will worsen the condition of the majority of population, as well as that (ii) the government and the parliament have to play a stronger role in solving the problems of workers is less than the blue-collars. Here too, white-collars and those with more education show a tendency to be less statist and more liberal with regards to both of these matters.

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[19] In this respect, more than half of OSTİM workers are "indifferent" to privatization. If we read this indifference from the other around, we can make the following argument: among other things, opposition to privatization is related with "organized" class culture and, as an outcome of this, with the possibilities of imagining what kind of problems privatization could create for workers employed in the state enterprises. Such an imagination, for instance, is much stronger among the organized İstanbul metal workers and 80 percent of these workers oppose to privatization (Özuğurlu & Erten 1999).

Lastly, in this chapter, I would like to present some comparative findings about workers employed in large and small firms in OSTİM. These findings demonstrate that even in the context of small capitalist production some tendencies of differentiation can be observed between firms.

A striking majority of workers employed small firms (80 percent) compared to those employed in large firms aspire their sons to be self-employed. A larger number of these same workers (21 percent) see 'worker-boss' distinction as important than do the workers in large firms (11 percent). Furthermore, while both of these groups see 'workers' as the closest social groups to themselves, the second closest group for small firm workers are 'peasants' (13 percent) and for large firm workers 'civil servants' (18 percent). Another striking difference between these two groups is that small firm workers show stronger tendency (57 percent) to support for privatization of state enterprises than do the large firm workers (47 percent). However, while both groups predominantly see governments as the primary responsible actors in economic problems (inflation), the number of those who see merchants and industrialists responsible in small firms (11 percent) is quite smaller than those in large firms do (24 percent).

Are there any systematic differences between these social groups in terms of their social background? Only significant difference seems to be the fact that the workers in large firms have higher rates of urban backgrounds while those in small firms have higher rates of small town backgrounds. However, when looked at in terms of migrants in both groups, the workers in small firms have been living in Ankara longer than those in large firms. The indicators about rural bonds also show that either there is almost no difference or such bonds are weaker among small firm workers. Furthermore, there are no significant differences between these two groups in terms of fathers' class background: although we observe a clearly higher rural socio-economic background among small firm workers, almost 60 percent of workers' fathers in both types of firms are positioned in various urban wage labor statuses. Similarly, household compositions of workers in both groups do not significantly differ from each other. All of this implies that the source of differences in workers' social consciousness should be searched in social relations at the levels of workplace and labor market rather than the social context outside of work. It

seems that social relations in small firms give more impetus for aspirations for self-employment. The 'social distance' these workers display towards the other segments of working class is much longer. In most of the cases, their category of capitalist class (the 'bosses'-*patronlar*) excludes their own employers and refers big industrialists and traders

6.4. Summary and Conclusion

The statistical and survey data that would enable us to compare political and cultural profile of OSTİM workers with the other segments of Turkish working class are not sufficient. The same problem exists also for a comparison between working class segments and other social class and strata. We may make some comparisons indirectly for the above-mentioned political party preferences. The data show that the left and right preferences among OSTİM workers do not differ much from the distribution in Turkey in general. However, the right tendencies among OSTİM workers are slightly higher than Ankara and İstanbul voters. Similarly, when we compare them to a different segment of the working class, OSTİM workers' tendencies to vote for the right appear to be higher than organized metal workers in İstanbul. Furthermore, a comparison of our findings to the data from studies primarily concerned with organized workers (Yıldırım 1995, 1996; Boratav 1991; 1995; Özuğurlu and Erten 1999) supports a tendency of differentiation in a similar direction. The same studies show that among OSTİM workers opposition to economic liberalism is slightly lower and conservative tendencies regarding the issues of religion and woman is slightly more common. According to the findings of Boratav (1995: 104), among wage earners the strongest right attitudes regarding liberalism and social state and the strongest conservative tendencies on the issues of religion and woman are found within the enterprises employing 1-20 workers. Similar findings are gathered in other countries as well. According to Lee (1997), for instance, in South Korea the anti-business tendencies within non-core & marginalized sections of the working class are much weaker than the organized core workers in large enterprises.

Needless to say, political, ideological and cultural positions that the workers take is a complex phenomenon that is simultaneously in relation with many factors. I have tried to point out some of the major factors in my preceding discussion. Here, by distinguishing three groups with which most of these factors co-vary, I will try to sum up some of the previously discussed indicators in Table 6.3. These three groups are, respectively, 'white-collars', 'blue-collars', and 'semi-urbanized workers' which constitute a particular group in the sample that I have mentioned before. The workers in this last group, in fact, belong to the blue-collars. But they also differ from the general profile of blue-collars with respect to several characteristics.

Table 6.3 Political preferences and axes of social distinction and distance: A synopsis

	white-collars	**blue-collars**	**semi-urbanized blue-collars**
political party preferences	high concentration (more than half) in the central left (CHP) and support for the other parties except ANAP is very low	the majority (more than one-third) is pro-MHP, however, concentration is low; the rest of the votes are distributed among the right (ANAP & RP) and the left parties (CHP & DSP)	high concentration in MHP (90%)
social distinction terms	are expressed in the 'rich-poor' terms in high rates (36%); class terms ('workers-bosses') are relatively low (12%)	no significant concentration; the most common is the 'rich-poor' distinction (25%); class terms ('workers-bosses') is more common than white-collars (18%)	highly (55%) expressed with the 'rich-poor' distinction and in religious ('muslim-secular') terms
social class/strata proximity	the spectrum of groups they see closer to themselves is large; different than blue-collars and semi-urbanized workers in the first rank comes 'civil servants' and the feeling of closeness to 'self-employed professionals' and 'small shop keepers' is significantly high (13% and 9%)	after 'workers' (64%) the closest groups are 'civil servants' (9%) and peasants (9%)	after 'workers' (67%) the only group they see close to themselves is 'peasants' (33%)

Table 6.3 Political preferences and axes of social distinction and distance: A synopsis (Continued)

	white-collars	blue-collars	semi-urbanized blue-collars
uncomfortable with the current secular character of the political system	much lower for the white-collars (29%) than the other groups	no significant difference between the blue-collars (65%) and semi-urbanized workers (67%)	
support for compulsory religious education	the lowest among the white-collars (29%)	there is also big difference between blue-collar workers (58%) and semi-urbanized workers (81%)	
attitudes towards women's working outside	the lowest among the white-collars (18%)	there is also big difference between the blue-collars (76%) and semi-urbanized workers (94%)	
discriminatory attitudes towards the future jobs of female and male children	among white-collars there is no significant difference in terms of girls and boys	'self-employment' highly attributed to boys is much lower for girls	
	['wage positions aspired for the children': in all three groups, for boys 'professional employee' (physician, engineer) positions; for girls the typical 'white-collar' jobs (teacher, nurse) are relatively more pronounced. This differentiation is more explicit among blue-collar and semi-urbanized workers]		
views regarding statism and liberal market policies	blue-collar (67%) and semi-urbanized (65%) workers support statist social and economic policies more than white-collars (50%).		
	similarly, opposition to liberal economy is slightly higher among blue-collar (67%) and semi-urbanized workers (71%) than white-collar workers (61%).		
views regarding employment in the public sector	opposition to civil servants' right to unionize (26%) and support for privatization of state enterprises (54%) is two times higher among blue-collar workers than the white-collars. semi-urbanized workers are closer to white-collar workers on these issues.		

In terms of the characteristics that I take as a basis here, there is a hierarchical differentiation between white-collars, blue-collars and semi-urbanized workers. Blue-collars are situated at the middle of this hierarchy. Accordingly, white-collars are the youngest, the most educated, the most urbanized –both in terms of place of birth (metropolitan & city vs. town & village) and period of residence in Ankara–, and the ones whose intergenerational social mobility patterns carry the highest rate of wage labor characteristics. Semi-urbanized workers, on the other hand, except age, are situated at the other end of the scale in terms of all of these aspects. We may add to these differentiation elements the household class compositions as well. Semi-urbanized workers constitute the group with the highest heterogeneity of cross-class profiles. In other words, we see higher ratios of combination of wage and non-wage

individuals in the households. On the other hand, the households of blue-collar workers, both in terms of non-wage individuals and wage individuals, are more homogenous than the households of white-collars. As I previously pointed out, the existence of only one working person in the majority of blue-collar households is the primary reason of this situation.

Table 6.3 shows the possibility that some elements of social consciousness could display significant variations between different working class groups. For instance, the fact that semi-urbanized workers show a more conservative attitude on the issue of religion and woman is an indication of the role urban experience. Of course, it is not sufficient to explain urban experience through the duration of time spent in the city or with being born in the city. For many workers, who have been living in the urban 'space' for a long time, the modern urban values are, in reality, things difficult to reach due to their insufficient economic capacities and low cultural and symbolic capital. In addition, the 'semi-urban' workers that constitute a unique case in our sample are, in fact, spatially outside of the city. This situation clearly keeps them in a condition surrounded by traditional rural culture. However, conservatism is not the only and determining factor of social consciousness, and does not necessarily have to be in harmony with other factors. Hence, while there are sharp differences between white-collar and semi-urbanized workers in terms of political party preferences, for instance, we do not observe any significant difference in terms of support for social state policies and opposition to economic liberalism.

On the other hand, a comparison between blue-collars and white-collars that make up the largest two groups in the sample yield to two important conclusions. First, here too, we see the existence of differentiation in the elements of social consciousness that do not conform to each other. Secondly, despite the particular employment characteristics in OSTİM, the general picture of the differentiation between blue-collar and white-collar workers reflects a model of this differentiation that is frequently emphasized in the literature on working class. The class position of white-collar workers, who have been categorized as the 'new middle class' in the literature for a long time, has become more controversial since Mills' (1979) assertion of a 'status panic' within this group due to tendencies of de-skilling, and the studies on labor process, income levels, mobility patterns, ideology, consciousness

and political preferences have continued (Lockwood 1989; Goldthorpe et al. 1968; Braverman 1974; Aranowitz 1973: Poulantzas 1975; Meiksins and Smith 1996).

If we leave aside the arguments and conclusions that these studies have reached in terms of class structure and the transformation tendencies of the status of white-collar workers within this structure, it is a commonly accepted fact that white-collar workers present a different profile from blue-collar workers in terms of political preferences, lifestyle, and ideological orientations. Moreover, it is also accepted that this differentiation is not uni-dimensional but a complex one. The findings of this study, too, present indicators that establish this fact. Blue-collars are more liable to be on the right in terms of political preferences and cultural conservatism. However, they are situated in a less right position when they give higher support for statist social and economic policies and less support for liberal market economy.[20] Similar contradictory combinations have been documented in other studies too. For instance, Boratav (1995: 104)[21] points specific patterns of attitudes that bring together economic anti-liberalism, on the one hand, and cultural and religious conservatism, on the other. According to this combination of attitudes, industrial workers, in comparison to other wage groups, are more on the left in terms of their support to anti-liberal economic policies and more on the right in terms of religion-woman issues. Conversely, professional employees and medium-big bourgeoisie appear to be more liberalist in economic issues and less conservative in the issues of women and religion. The axes that determine these differentiations are not limited to religious conservatism and liberalism. They extend to different behavioral patterns as well. In his study on Argentinean workers, Ranis (1995: 115) concludes that while white-collars are expressing more protesting attitudes at individual levels towards authority

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[20] Aktaş (2001) in his analysis of a scale to differentiate between rightist and leftists tendencies based on a comprehensive data set, finds that white-collar workers are significantly father to leftist values than the blue-collar workers. For an analysis of intra-differentiation dynamics and consequent ideological formations of engineers, who are among the professional segments that are commonly differentiated from the large white-collar groups see Köse and Öncü (2000).

[21] In the same study, based on findings that mostly concur with the ones at hand, Boratav states that "Traditional 'left' values are relatively more accepted primarily by elderly, provincial, children of peasants or lesser educated children of those high-skilled groups, and wage workers of public and private sectors. ... A Turkey with younger generations, with a population predominantly born in the city and better educated, and with a decreasing public sector and industry seems a more fertile place for 'rising values' to grow" (Boratav 1995: 105).

relations at work than the blue-collars appear to do, they have less willingness to collective organization and action against these issues. On the contrary, blue-collars have more tendency to "accepting the rules of the game set up in the factory or enterprise", while they are more likely "to take militant stands by way of strikes concerning wages and working conditions."[22] These kinds of comparisons usually are based on wageworkers working in areas where employment of blue-collars and white-collars is separated. The findings of this study, on the other hand, come from a place where blue-collars and a small number of white-collars work together. However, despite this difference, the findings of this study, too, reflect the typical differentiation pattern between these groups.

I would like to emphasize several points as I conclude this chapter. First, as I have previously discussed to a certain extent, the differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers in terms of value and attitude do not constitute a sufficient theoretical ground to argue that they, in fact, are two 'different' classes. Secondly, if one of the criteria to distinguish these two groups is the difference in labor processes, the second is, certainly, education. For this reason, the division between these two groups carries certainly a 'cultural' character. Similar differentiations are not only observed in these two groups of working class, but could be observed in some other segments as well. However, still, the difference between these two groups is the sharpest and the most rooted one.

[22] Contradicting tendencies are not only observed among different groups. The same group could have contradictory positions regarding various themes: "[Argentinean workers] are centrist in their support of a liberal-capitalist economy, left in their espousal of markedly better income distribution for workers, and right in the defense of their communities and neighborhoods" (Ranis 1991a).

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This study has explored and analyzed the conditions of a sample of unorganized small industry workers in Turkey. My aim in this dissertation has not been to provide an analysis of a whole process of working class formation. In that respect, this study does not aim to prove that small industry workers constitute a 'class.' Such an attempt would have required a historical analysis of both proletarianization processes of the workers and the development of the industrial complex they work in, as well as a comprehensive theoretical discussion. Furthermore, it would have also required taking into account a wider historical/social background into our analysis. Instead, I have contended myself with drawing a general theoretical framework on working class and tried to discover some of the characteristics of the working class segment under consideration. I hope that the findings here will provide useful starting points for upcoming studies on class formation among small industry workers in Turkey that take into account a wider social and historical context.

As required by the main problematic of this study, I have employed a situational approach and used a research method that is descriptive in nature and more appropriate to this kind of analysis. The main question of the study is concerned not only with the 'structural' characteristics of the unorganized workers in the peripheral industry but also with differences at ideological and cultural levels as well as the possible reasons for such variations. Furthermore, this research problematic also extends to the question of to what extent the patterns of fragmentation among peripheral workers themselves reflect those of the working class in general. Here, I would like to discuss the results and further implications of the study at these two levels: (i) specific characteristics of the wage labor and

patterns of working class formation in the small industry, and (ii) internal segmentation among the small industry workers themselves. The first question that this study has focused on is as follows: Without considering the internal differences, what kind of characteristics social, cultural and political formation of peripheral workers as a whole carries and to what extent they differ from the other segments of the working class? Despite the scarcity of comparative data, I believe the following observations will provide us a general image of small industry workers.

The sociological profile of the workers in the small industry reflects typical characteristics of a working class group which is significantly young, more educated than expected, and, more importantly, whose positions within the social relations of production as wage-earners are highly stabilized. These workers appear to be younger and more educated than the general average of urban labor force groups in Turkey. With respect to the levels of education, there are two important tendencies both of which reflect certain aspects of their engagement into urban labor market: while their fathers' level of education is one of the factors affecting their educational levels, workers are generally better educated than their fathers, and higher education for many workers means graduating from vocational schools.

The majority of workers are migrants who came to Ankara with their families at their earlier ages. The main reason for migration of the families is to find a job in urban labor market. Those with village origin constitute the majority among the migrants while the number of those who migrated from small and medium sized cities and towns is quite low. The geographical origin essentially is from the surrounding region of Central Anatolia. Despite the overwhelming rural background, however, the majority of the workers are second-generation wage laborers. This situation clearly indicates that chances for upward class mobility in these working class households are rather weak and their class compositions are being consolidated. The process of consolidation may involve varying patterns with respect to the conditions at the earlier phases of migration: village originated kids predominantly go either to unskilled and blue-collar wage jobs or professional employee positions. In contrast, transition to white-collar position is very limited. This situation implies a significant income differentiation among the first-generation wage-earners who were peasants/farmers before. In other words, a segment of first-generation migrants with

larger economic capital can afford the cost of university education that will carry their kids to professional jobs. The process of consolidation of wage labor is also accompanied by both upward mobility and stabilization dynamics among the strata of wage employees. While the cases of professional employees with blue-collar fathers indicate a certain degree of upward mobility, the fact that the majority of white-collar workers' fathers are white-collars points to a high degree of inter-generational continuity.

Despite their young profile, workers in the small industry display a high level of job mobility in labor market. Due to the instable conditions in the small industry, the rate of job turnover is very high and the duration of work in the same job is very low. Job stability in the small manufacturing establishments is essentially related to age and seniority, but not to the level of education. Despite the high level of job turnover, however, occupational mobility for industrial workers is not typical, that is, job changes are experienced within the same occupational branch. More importantly, in most of the cases, job mobility does not mean class mobility. In fact, wage-worker positions are highly stabilized. For the blue-collars in particular, labor market mobility does not function as an effect that changes their class positions within the working class: the majority of blue-collar workers' previous positions were also blue-collar. This situation points to the transformation of dominant patterns in long-term consolidation patterns of blue-collar wage labor: the group of workers that is composed of relatively unskilled migrant laborers and of those who entered industrial jobs only after working sometime in unskilled service jobs are being replaced by workers who are relatively better educated and enter into labor markets directly through semi-skilled blue-collar jobs.

OSTİM workers live in relatively small households many of which are nuclear families at their earlier stages of the process of expanding. Accordingly, the number of income providers is quite low. In many households, the children are very young and the only breadwinner is the husband. In larger families, the supplementary earners are, in most of the cases, the young male children. The presence of cultural values against women's working outside constitutes another reason behind the low numbers of income providers. In general, the number of women working in the

households is very low and those who work mainly come from single young daughters.

Although a significant portion of the households receives additional income from their rural and urban properties, in the overwhelming majority of these households the income providing individuals consist only of the wage-earners. Among these working class families, level of earnings from wage jobs appears as the main factor affecting household income differentials. In addition, those who contribute to income in the household other than the husband, in most of the cases, work in low paid jobs. Despite the appearance, 'family-wage' economy, where only one worker secures the living of the rest of the family, is not relevant for the majority of these households. As a matter of fact, in the very early phases children join to household labor force as supplementary earners.

These difficulties in household subsistence are accompanied by unfavorable consequences of residential conditions. The majority of households live in peripheral districts of the city. Low levels of income, the distance of residential areas to the city center, long and hard workday, and the long distance between places of work and residence constitute a set of serious limitations to the workers' spare time activities and mobility in urban space.

In OSTİM which appears as a typical example of spatially segmented labor market where the workers have spent most part of their working life, workplaces display particular characteristics of small manufacturing units. Within the context of small industry, however, there are also smaller and larger sized firms. Both common and differing characteristics between small and large enterprises are observed. First, the average wage level, which is generally lower than large industry, in small and large enterprises is very close to each other. However, we encounter with those with very low wages in absolute terms in smaller firms more frequently. The main reason for this is that apprentice employment is more common in those enterprises. Extra-wage payments are also more common in large firms. Among workers, age dependent experience and seniority appear to be the most significant factors for wage differentials.

The labor force in large enterprises represents a relatively young, more educated and less experienced profile. Yet, in terms of the composition of workforce

there are no significant differences between large and small enterprises. Low-skilled workers constitute the majority of workforce in both small and large firms. The most noticeable difference, however, is that experienced and skilled workers in small enterprises constitute a higher proportion in the workforce. In general, labor force characteristics in the small industrial enterprises do not resemble those in large fordist enterprises. This situation is particularly relevant for those skilled workers still referred to with artisan labels (master, senior master or foreman). However, their relatively advantageous position among others does not mean that these workers carry traditional artisan characteristics. What is at stake here is a group of skilled workers particular to labor-intensive flexible production conditions of small capitalist enterprises wherein the division of labor is not highly refined. They represent a regular and established wage labor experience than those semi-skilled and unskilled workers with high rates of labor turnover.

The positions of these skilled and/or higher authority-owning workers show a tendency for gradual variations even among the firms in the small industry itself. In reality, foreman/senior master and skilled master statuses in 'small' enterprises are earned through experience. Furthermore, these workers tend to be older and less educated than the counterparts (workshop chiefs and section chiefs) employed in large firms. Also, senior master and skilled master positions generally do not reflect a systematic hierarchy. In most of the cases, it would be more appropriate to see both categories under one group of 'skilled masters.' They are typically involved in direct production and assume an open and de facto authority in controlling labor process and workplace relations due to their skills, experience and their positions as the 'second man' closest to the employer. In larger firms, on the other hand, the positions of senior master (*ustabaşı*) and master (*usta*) gradually become formally separated from each other, and being labeled as section chief or workshop chief they get relatively distanced from direct production and gradually perform more of coordination and control functions. They also come to be recruited more often among those with higher education.

We should take into consideration that even 'large' firms in OSTİM employ hundred workers at most, so that these variations should be seen as relative and gradual. Under these limits, technical and social division of labor tend to be

relatively more complex in larger firms, and supervision and control functions in the labor process are slightly relegated to the middle and lower level positions. Although the absence of formal mechanisms in workplace relations both at individual and collective levels is the dominant pattern in all enterprises, there are some relative differences. At the individual level of relationships, the owner or foreman has an undisputable weight in small workplaces; whereas in large enterprises these matters are relegated to middle and lower rank authorities. Like individual level, paternalism mixed with arbitrariness, favoritism and protectionism also dominates the relationships at the collective level in small workplaces, but leaves itself to relatively more formal relationships in the larger enterprises. However, this does not surpass the limits of paternalism beyond a decrease in arbitrariness and favoritism.

Under these conditions, there are several obstacles to collective labor organization. The first one is the above mentioned paternalist nature of relations which is particularly related to the existence of kinship and *hemşehri* ties between workers and employers as well as those among the workers themselves. Secondly, low level of worker concentration in the workplaces appears as a physical obstacle to organized labor relations. The third factor comes from the very nature of the small industry. OSTİM workers have a direct knowledge that, against fierce conditions of competition in the market, their enterprises function through low profit margins and subcontracting relations. They also somehow feel that some parts of their unpaid labor do not stay in their own enterprises. This knowledge and feeling, to a certain extent, complicates class relations at the enterprise level.

The studies focusing on individual firms or entrepreneurs in the small industry will certainly provide valuable information in understanding the nature of this area. Yet, these studies at the same time should be accompanied with a political economy that focuses on articulations of peripheral firms among themselves as well as with large-scale industry, and dynamics of capital accumulation processes integrated at the sectoral levels. Only such a perspective can shed some light on the content of the general industrial division of labor in which peripheral industry participates, and show that small industries where unorganized working class is dominant are not 'autonomous' areas. The studies on the political economy of wages in Turkey generally make the following observation: One of the reasons for organized working

class' inability to preserve their gains in the long run is the existence of a large segment of unorganized labor. This observation is primarily correct. However, in spite of a risk of mechanical interpretation, we may also argue for the existence of an inverse relationship. In other words, the relative advantages of the organized working class segments are also possible because a large segment is deprived of them.

Despite the specific conditions, however, capitalist surplus production constitutes the basis of social division of labor in the small manufacturing enterprises. And this very process is not independent from hidden forms of class struggle. In general, we may argue that workers in the small industry do not so much suffer from alienation due to the relatively low levels of fragmentation in the work process. On the other hand, low wages and overwork in poor working conditions constitute the most common problems of the workers. In contrast, we may summarize the typical complaints of employers as 'lazy workers.' For both parties the final solution for these problems are 'quitting the job' and 'laying off the worker.' Under these conditions, class struggle in peripheral industry is hidden in the political economy of surplus production and is squeezed in that fissure. Those small enterprises willing to increase capital accumulation have certain limitations. Minimum level of wages is determined in the market and maximum levels of working hours are legally and socially restricted. Small enterprises also suffer from limited resources for technological investment. In these circumstances, the only option is to intensive use of labor. This constitutes the main arena of open and hidden conflicts between capital and labor. Even in conditions where the workers do not have the capacity/possibility to organize and there exists a short-term possibility to be laid off, the intensity of work is determined by this struggle. In the long-term, the amount that capital could extract from labor-power is limited at a certain level. These conditions where class conflict becomes restricted at the level of intensification of labor also point to a capitalist production environment in which control mechanisms over labor make only limited use of bureaucratic and technical means of control and are stuck within the boundaries of simple control, hence the process of transition from formal to real subordination of labor is very slow.

To sum up, the average socio-demographic profile of the OSTİM workers does not significantly differ from the other segments of the working class in Turkey.

OSTİM workers are not significantly with lower levels of education. A significant majority of them are second-generation wage-earners. Their rural ties are not markedly stronger than the other groups. Similar observations can be made with regards to household characteristics. In terms of household population, family structure and the characteristics of household employment we observe a picture quite similar to the average characteristics of urban households. The workers' class positions are highly consolidated and they live in highly stabilized and homogenized working class families. Thus, being in the earlier phases of migration and proletarianization cannot be seen as the defining property of these workers.

Limited comparisons with other segments of the working class, on the other hand, suggest that OSTİM workers display a profile that is culturally more conservative and more religious. They are politically more on the right and are farther from an easily identifiable working class culture. What are the reasons for this situation? The discussion in the last chapter of this study identifies a tendency that cultural and political conservatism is inversely related with the length of urban experience or the strength of the urban background, wage labor experience in the previous generations, and educational level. However, as I have emphasized above, small industry workers as a whole do not display significant differences with respect to these aspects. Hence, we may argue that socio-demographic factors can be used as an explanatory framework for the differences in social consciousness among the working class individuals. However, these factors are insufficient in explaining the variation of working class cultural-political formation at the sectoral-spatial levels.

The sphere of production and employment with its surrounding labor market characteristics constitutes the ground where the conditions of the workers in the small industry actually differ from those of other working class segments. Working conditions, wages, labor organization and shop-floor level labor relations in the small industrial establishments are considerably different from those in large-scale factories, and almost all these differences reflect unfavorable circumstances for the workers. Technology and the level of division of labor are typically low in labor-intensive manufacturing units; the workers are in most cases under direct control by the employer or manager; the low level of worker concentration is a major obstacle in the development of collective labor organizations and labor relations are still

dominated by various forms of paternalism despite the latter's declining role in the sphere outside of work. These conditions do not allow class conflict to be constructed in overt forms, which instead is experienced under individual, latent and embryonic forms. While fierce competition among firms at the level of industry strengthens oppressive attitudes towards labor organization, the relatively disadvantaged positions of small employers due to sub-contracting relations further blur social class relations, and hence workers' references of social conflict tend to shift from the realm of workplace relations to a wider societal context.

The specific conditions of the workplaces and industry may be emphasized as the principal framework for explaining those patterns of behaviors and consciousness concerning labor relations at shop-floor level. However, in explaining the differences in social consciousness grounded on a wider societal context the specificities of the world of small industry do not provide a satisfactory framework. For while the common positions within the social relations of production are reconfigured along with an inner differentiation in the sphere of production, they are also subjected to different historical, cultural, and spatial dynamics in the sphere of reproduction. In this wider and relational context, the decisive problem seems to be the absence of strong interaction/communication between small industry workers and the other segments and strata of the working class at large as well as the hegemonic sections of working class politics and culture in particular. As far as we can observe, since their organizational capacities are limited by the structural conditions, intra-class communication performance of the small industry workers is very low. The peripheral conditions in the employment area at the same time make their cultural and symbolic capitals in the reproduction spheres very low, hence limiting their ability to participate in the popular production of social identity and values. However, the weakness of working class communication cannot be explained solely on the side of the workers in the small industry. The dominant 'working class imagination' that exists in the surrounding social-political context has a more determining role in this problem. This imagination is limited primarily to the organized segments of the working class, which also applies to the self-image and prevailing organizational culture of these segments themselves. Therefore, we may argue that the question of communication is also deeply related to the historical-

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cultural dynamics in the formation of hegemonic sections/organizations of the working class. In this regard, the lack of union movement in small industry areas cannot be explained only with the difficulties of organizing in small enterprises. At the same time, there are characteristics in the very cultural-political nature of the union movement that make it difficult for the movement to come into contact with the workers in the periphery. If one of these particular characteristics is a limited image of working class, the other is the 'collective bargaining rationale' that the organizational tradition of the union movement has created. This rationale produces some optimization criteria that limit the scope of collective organization. Moreover, it results in shaping the organizational culture around 'narrow' union problems. As a result of the separation of the organized and unorganized sections, this division of working class in the production area extends into the reproduction spheres as well. Hence, in addition to given difficulties of union organization in small industrial enterprises, we may make the following observation: Communication between and among organized and unorganized segments of the working class is a matter of cultural affinity as much as it is a question of organizational performance/strategy.

While the study tries to explore the general characteristics of wage labor in the small industry together with the patterns of cultural and political formation, it also examines the indicators of the occupational segmentation among the small industry workers themselves, with a particular focus on the differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers. The findings of the research study suggest that these two groups of workers tend to significantly differ from each other with respect to education, age, social background, and labor relations at the workplace. Before dealing with this second issue, I believe it is necessary to put a remainder note regarding the classification of 'structural positions within the working class' that I have used in every phase of this study. These positions mainly consist of (i) unskilled service workers, (ii) blue-collars, (iii) white-collars, and (iv) professional employees. These positions in general could be defined through systematic differentiations along three aspects: labor process, education level and income. To these, we may add 'social status' as the total effect of them all. As mentioned in the beginnings of the study, I have left unskilled service workers and professional employees outside of my analysis in most of the cases due to their low level of representation in the

sample. Thus, I have primarily focused on the comparisons between blue and white-collar workers. On the other hand, I have already noted the empirical ambiguity regarding the actual class position of the professional employees.

Due to the dominance of manufacturing activities, white-collars constitute a rather small part of employment in OSTİM. Compare to the case of the blue-collars, supervision and control of the white-collars are simpler and performed in a more direct manner by the employer or managers. Their relations with the employer or managers are easier and mutually more flexible, typically manifesting itself in relatively more common experiences of unpaid overtime work, and, in turn, more tolerant attitudes by the management in the cases of excused absence. These conditions produce different forms of commitment to the owner/management. White-collar workers, who are already in a different position due to the nature of work they do, differ from blue-collars on several points that seem critically important. First, white-collars are more educated. Secondly, they have longer urban backgrounds than blue-collars. Finally, wage labor background in their previous generations is more common. To these we may add two other points of difference that do not seem accidental: the younger age profile of white-collars and a relatively higher average income level.

As a result of the total and complex effects of all these factors white-collar workers also show significant differences in terms of their cultural and political formation. Cultural conservatism among white-collar workers is much lower and their political preferences for the left are more common. However, I would like to draw attention to two points regarding white-collars. First, weaker conservative tendencies and stronger pro-left political preferences among white-collars do not mean that 'working class' identity in their social consciousness exists as a stronger element. On the contrary, although white-collar workers are more familiar with the cultural terminology and rhetoric of urban social stratification as well as a leftist vocabulary, they are relatively farther from a unitary working class feeling. Among the members of this group, the elements of 'sectional consciousness' implying the social status that they attribute to themselves is stronger. A similar sectional emphasis also does exist among blue-collar workers although at a much weaker level. More importantly, we need to draw attention to the fact that the differences of

perception and attitude between these two groups to some extent are constructed in a relational manner. In other words, both blue-collars and white-collars, at the same time, are each other's references for identity construction. This situation has a specific dimension in terms of the particular conditions in the small industry. Both groups of the workers share the same place of employment and directly observe the differences in working conditions and forms of relations with the employers. Hence, secondly, white-collar workers' tendencies to separate themselves from blue-collars might be much stronger due to these particular conditions. For this reason, to what extent those white-collar workers working in a small industrial area such as OSTİM and constituting proportionally a small section of the workforce reflect the general characteristics of this group is debatable. To clarify this point, these findings need to be compared with the data from the sectors where white-collar employment is predominant.

However, we can still point to a general tendency. Blue-collar and white-collar workers display different patterns of class formation to the extent that their social relation with capital differs and is subject to different historical and cultural mediations. While white-collar workers in those historical/cultural contexts where a modernist middle class ideology is dominant see blue-collars as groups with lower social status, blue-collars in return see them as 'well-offs' despite of an ambiguous 'labor' discourse. This social differentiation is further supported with income differences for the advantage of white-collars. Furthermore, this differentiation also creates enduring cultural codes so that despite the process of sharp de-skilling and impoverishment of white-collars for several decades the cooperation at the level of union organizations between these two groups is neither transformed into a common sensibility nor has extended beyond various forms of temporary organizational coalitions.

The studies on the working class in Turkey are still far from constituting a rich area in terms of quantity as well as established research questions. We may even say that on this subject there is only one line of research that has a definite subject of inquiry: the studies that have examined the development of union movement and the social security policies from a particular perspective that may be labeled as 'social policy' studies. We observe that these studies have been declining in parallel with the

weakening of the union movement in the 1980s. Furthermore, a discipline that we may call 'industrial relations system analysis' has not emerged which probably could have been only from this research tradition. Such expectation might seem anachronistic in today's conjuncture where non-standard forms of employment are becoming widespread, union organization is declining and work relations are increasingly becoming regulated by 'human resources management' mechanisms. However, this state of affairs still does not mean that labor relations in Turkey could not be analyzed from a 'system' framework. Such studies would make significant contributions in illuminating the structural/institutional context of the divisions within the working class.

A stronger contribution could be expected from historical and sociological studies. However, the majority of the studies interested in the history of working class is mostly limited to union movement and does not go beyond a kind of chronicle-documentary approach. Furthermore, these studies typically ignore uneven development of the working class and are based on the assumption of a holistic and linear working class formation. As to the recently emerging 'theoretical' and 'empirical' studies on working class formation in Turkey, they signal a danger of neglecting structural dynamics in the name of bringing forth 'human subject and agency relations.' The sociological studies that emphasize the 'subject' at empirical level and the more theoretical approaches that stress the notion of 'primacy of agency' share a common neglect of attempting to generate combined analyses of class agency and structural capacities. Given the lack of social research particularly focused on workers in the small manufacturing enterprises, I would like the present study to be regarded as an attempt to develop a framework for further investigation of both two dimensions of working class formation in the small industry.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:

QUESTIONNAIRE

Starting Hours: .. ..

- **Who else are living in your house with you that you are sharing your income and expenses with? Could you give us information about their educational status, and their jobs *if they are engaged in any permanent or temporary income generating work in or outside of home?***
  ⇒ *First determine and check the family members then proceed to the next questions.*
  ⇒ *If the **spouse** is not currently employed but previously was, ask the latest job.*
  ⇒ *Please take a note of whether **children** are continuing to school and the type of school they are attending/attended after primary education (middle and high school:* 'regular' / 'imam-hatip' / 'vocational'; *university & college: the name of school and department).*

		Age	Sex	Educational Status	Employment
( )	Spouse				
( )	1st Child				
( )	2nd Child				
( )	3rd Child				
( )	4th Child				
( )	5th Child				
( )	Father	*---will be asked in Q. 10---*			
( )	Mother				
( )					
( )					
( )					
( )					

1. **Sex?**
   1 ( ) male 2 ( ) female

2. **Educational Status?**
   1 ( ) illiterate 4 ( ) middle school 7 ( ) high school dropout
   2 ( ) literate 5 ( ) middle school dropout 8 ( ) college/university graduate
   3 ( ) primary school 6 ( ) high school 9 ( ) college/university dropout

3. **If continued education after primary school, type of middle school, high school, university?** (*middle & high:* 'regular' / 'imam-hatip' / 'vocational'*; university & college: please take a note of full name of school and department)*
   Middle school: ..... High school: .....
   College/University: .....

4. **Marital Status?**
   1 ( ) single 2 ( ) married 3 ( ) divorced 4 ( ) widow

5. **Date of Birth?** (*Age*) ....

6. **Hometown?** Province: ..... District: ..... Village: .....

7. **Place of Birth?** Province: ..... District: ..... Village: .....
   (*If Place of Birth is Ankara metropolitan area, pass on to Question 10. For those born outside, please continue*)

8. **How old were you when you left your place of birth?** ...

9. **What was the reason for leaving your place of birth?**
   .....

10. **Can you please tell us about your parents' education and occupation?** (*Please take note of the job/occupation, whether it is wage labor, if not ask whether the person is employing any wage worker. If the parents are not alive or retired, please ask their last employment and retirement status:* Social Insurance Institution, Civil Servants' Retirement Fund, or Retirement Fund for the Self-Employed)

	Education	Occupation (Present/Past)	
Father	.....	.....	... ...
Mother	.....	.....	... ...

11. **Do you, your spouse or your parents own any land in your village/town?**
    1 ( ) yes (belongs to him/her or spouse) 3 ( ) no → *pass on to Q. 15*
    2 ( ) yes (belongs to parents)

12. **How many acres?** ...

13. **Do you, your spouse or your children spend some time working on this land?**
    1 ( ) yes ( ) no

14. **Do you earn any cash or collect product from this land?**
    1 ( ) product income 4 ( ) cereals-vegetable-fruits for family use
    2 ( ) sharing income 5 ( ) no
    3 ( ) rent income

15. **How long have been living in Ankara?** ....

16. **Where do you live?** District: ..... Neighborhood: .....

17. **Do you own or rent the house you are currently living in?**
    1 ( ) owner 2 ( ) belongs to relatives, does not pay any rent 3 ( ) tenant

18. Type of house?

1 ( ) *gecekondu* (without title deed)
2 ( ) *gecekondu* (with title deed)
3 ( ) apartment flat
4 ( ) house
5 ( ) attached-two storey
6 ( ) attached-three storey
7 ( ) other.....

19. Do you or your spouse own any real estate in Ankara such as plot, or rented house/apartment or store?

1 ( ) plot/land 2 ( ) house/apartment 3 ( ) store 4 ( ) no

20. Since you have started earning income, how have you been managing your savings?

1 ( ) bought/built a house/joined a cooperative
2 ( ) bought plot/land
3 ( ) bought car
4 ( ) bought gold
5 ( ) bought foreign currency
6 ( ) invested in bank/repo
7 ( ) invested in bonds/shares
8 ( ) other .....
9 ( ) no savings

21. Do you have any debts? If any, could you explain why?

1 ( ) bought/built a house/joined a cooperative
2 ( ) bought land/plot
3 ( ) bought car
4 ( ) wedding/circumcision ceremony
5 ( ) to make ends meet
6 ( ) bought furniture in installment
7 ( ) shopping on credit from grocery store
8 ( ) other.....
9 ( ) no debt → *Pass on to Q. 23!*

22. Who did you borrow from/who are you indebted to?

1 ( ) relatives/friends (no interest)
2 ( ) relatives/friends (foreign currency & gold)
3 ( ) pawn broker
4 ( ) bank
5 ( ) company/boss
6 ( ) credit payment to store
7 ( ) debt to grocery store
8 ( ) other .....

23. Which of the following furniture do you own?

1 ( ) colored TV
2 ( ) video
3 ( ) audio
4 ( ) automatic washing machine
5 ( ) dishwasher
6 ( ) vacuum cleaner
7 ( ) electricity owen
8 ( ) telephone
9 ( ) satellite/cable TV
10 ( ) automobile

24. Which districts of the city and what kind of stores do you go to shop for food and cleaning products? How often?

....

25. Which districts of the city and what kind of stores do you go to shop for clothing?

....

26. When you add up all earnings of your family members (wage/salary, income from self-employment, rent, income from second job/extra works, etc.) what is your monthly average household income? .....

27. When you add up all your household expenses including personal needs (food, clothing, school, rent, utilities, telephone, installment payments and other daily expenses), what is your average monthly expenses? .....

28. How much income would a family like yours would need to lead a comfortable life? .....

29. How do you see your family's economic status?

1 ( ) rich 2 ( ) well-to-do/of middle income 3 ( ) poor

30. What kind of future you prefer/imagine for your children who are still in school? Do you want them to work in a job with a good income or to establish their own business? What kind of job/occupation?

A. Boy(s) ....

B. Girl(s) ....

31. What is *more important* for you in terms of your children's future jobs/occupations: high-income or status/respect?

1 ( ) high-income 2 ( ) status/respect

32. How many jobs have you changed since you started working to earn money?

.....

33. What kind jobs have you worked in since you started working to earn money? Could you please tell us the jobs you worked in and the work you did, starting with your latest employment? (*Please ask the previous 5 jobs/employment before the last one and take note of places other than Ankara*)

Workplace	Duration of work	Status in workplace	Description of job and position

34. When was the last time you were unemployed? ....

(*If the person has never been unemployed, take a note and pass on to Q. 37*)

35. How long have you stayed unemployed the last time? ....

36. How did you survive during the period of unemployment? (*Check on multiple choices, if needed*)

1 ( ) family members (mother-father-siblings)
2 ( ) help from relatives/friends
3 ( ) borrowed money from relatives/friends
4 ( ) survived on rent income
5 ( ) used savings
6 ( ) sold furniture from home
7 ( ) sold gold, jewelry
8 ( ) sold real-estate (house, plot, land)
9 ( ) worked in temporary jobs
10 ( ) his wife worked
11 ( ) his children worked
12 ( ) other (*explain*) .....

37. Do you have social security?

1 ( ) yes → how many years? (*Since the first job*) ..... 2 ( ) no

38. Did you have any apprenticeship training or any occupational training, internship etc.? (*Explain in detail*)

.....

39. How and with whose help did you get your current job? (*Indicate the position of intermediary person*)

.....

40. How long have you been working in this workplace and in OSTİM?
In this workplace .... In OSTİM ....

41. What is your position in this workplace?
1 ( ) foreman & workshop chief 3 ( ) journeyman 5 ( ) apprentice
2 ( ) skilled master & section chief 4 ( ) ordinary worker without any status

42. What kind of work do you do in this workplace? (*Describe his/her work in detail*)
.....

43. How many years have you been doing the same work in this workplace? ....

44. How long, do you think, would it take to learn the work you are doing?
(*week/month/year*) .....

45. Do you ever do any work other than your main responsibility in this workplace?
1 ( ) often 2 ( ) sometimes 3 ( ) no

46. Who does supervise and control your work?
1 ( ) owner/general director/factory manager 3 ( ) skilled master & section chief
2 ( ) foreman & workshop chief

47. How often?
1 ( ) always 2 ( ) sometimes 3 ( ) when the job is done

48. Type of payment?
1 ( ) monthly 3 ( ) daily 5 ( ) when the job is done
2 ( ) weekly 4 ( ) piece-rate

49. What is the amount of your monthly wage/salary? .....

50. Do you have any extra-wage earnings or benefits in your workplace? What/How?
(*bonus/premium payments/ food / clothing / transportation / coal/fuel etc. –Please indicate the type and, if possible, the amount*)
.....

51. Do you ever experience any problems or delays in your payment schedule?
1 ( ) sometimes 2 ( ) often 3 ( ) no

52. How many hours do you work, daily and weekly, on average?
Daily: ..... Weekly: .....

53. Do you do paid overtime?
1 ( ) sometimes 2 ( ) often 3 ( ) no

54. Do you do unpaid overtime?
1 ( ) sometimes 2 ( ) often 3 ( ) no

55. Can you take a leave from your job whenever you need it besides your annual paid holiday time?
1 ( ) yes → in what conditions? ..... 2 ( ) no

56. Are these absences deducted from your wage? .....

57. What is *the most important* problem/complaint you have regarding the working conditions in your workplace?
.....

58. In this workplace or in previous ones, have you ever experienced any job accident or occupational health problems?
.....

59. How do you communicate your *personal* problems/demands (leave, wage increase, advance payments) to your employer?

1 ( ) directly talks to the employer
2 ( ) talks to foreman & workshop chief
3 ( ) talks to skilled master & section chief

60. Do you sometime talk with your friends in your workplace about your *common* problems/demands such as wages and working conditions? How do you communicate these demands to your employer?

1 ( ) never talk about these things
2 ( ) sometimes talk but leave it there
3 ( ) elect a representative
4 ( ) talk to foreman & workshop chief
5 ( ) talk to skilled master & section chief
6 ( ) in the meetings organized by the employer/managers

61. Do you have any plans to establish your own business in the near future or sometime in the future?

1 ( ) yes → when? ..... 2 ( ) no → *Pass on to Q. 64.*

62. What kind of business are you planning to establish? (*Take detailed information: in the same or different work branch; commerce, grocery store; is he going to work by himself –or employ somebody else?*)

.....

63. Do you have any preparation for this business? Do you have anybody that can help or support you? How?.....

64. Are you looking for another job?

1 ( ) yes 2 ( ) no

65. Besides your current job, do you work in a second job or do other works to earn additional income?

1 ( ) almost everyday after the work hours
2 ( ) in the weekends
3 ( ) in annual holidays and leaves
4 ( ) occasionally
5 ( ) no→ *Pass on to Q. 68.*

66. Can you talk about these supplementary jobs/works? What kinds of work do you do?

.....

67. What is your monthly earning from this/these job(s)? .....

68. Do you have any relatives and fellow countrymen in this workplace and any other workplaces in OSTİM? How many?

	In the same workplace	OSTİM
Relative	...	...
Fellow countryman	...	...

69. During breaks or after work hours, do you spend time with other workers from your workplace or other nearby workplaces in OSTİM's cafes, restaurants etc?

1 ( ) often 2 ( ) sometime 3 ( ) seldom/never

70. In your spare time, who do you meet with most of the time, where and what do you do? (*Please ask to explain the content of their relationship and the job of his friends*)

.....
.....

71. What do you talk about when you are together with these persons?
.....

72. Do you have any relatives and fellow countryman in your neighborhood? How many households? Relative ... Fellow countryman ...

73. How did you spend your leaves/holidays during the last year?
.....

74. How often do you read newspapers?
1 ( ) everyday
2 ( ) couple of days in a week
3 ( ) only one day/weekend
4 ( ) sometimes
5 ( ) seldom/never

75. What are the names of the three newspapers you prefer to read the most?
..... / ..... / .....

76. What are the three TV channels you prefer to watch the most?
..... / ..... / .....

77. What are the three TV programs you watch the most? (*Type or name of the programs*)
..... / ..... / .....

78. Can you tell us the name of three singers you like to listen the most?
..... / ..... / .....

79. In the last (1994) local elections, which party's candidate did you vote for? .....

80. In the last (1995) national elections, which party did you vote for? .....

81. In the 1991 national elections, which party did you vote for? .....

82. If there were national elections today, which party would you vote for?
..... → Why? .....

83. Are you a member of any political party or association (such as fellow countrymen associations)?
1 ( ) yes → .....
2 ( ) no

84. Which of the following divisions, you think, is more important in Turkey today? (*Three choices at most: rank according to significance as 1-2-3*)
1 ( ) worker-boss
2 ( ) urban-peasant
3 ( ) rich-poor
4 ( ) uneducated -educated
5 ( ) muslim-secular
6 ( ) rightist-leftist
7 ( ) sunni-alevi
8 ( ) turk-kurd
9 ( ) gecekondu dwellers-others
10 ( ) civil-military
11 ( ) other .....

85. Which of the following social groups you feel are the closest and the farthest to yourself? (*The closest / the farthest: ask separately. Three choices at most: rank according to significance as 1-2-3 / 6-5-4*)
1 ( ) civil servants
2 ( ) small artisans
3 ( ) small enterprise owners
4 ( ) 'big bosses'
5 ( ) peasants
6 ( ) self employed professionals (doctor, lawyer etc.)
7 ( ) workers
8 ( ) unemployed
9 ( ) street vendors
10 ( ) other.....

86. I will read you different views about various issues now. Could you tell me which of the views you feel closest to?

A. To solve the economic and social problems of laboring classes, the role of the government and the national assembly ...
1 ( ) should be increased.
2 ( ) should be decreased.

B. Free market would make the majority's situation ...
1 ( ) better.
2 ( ) worse.

C. State enterprises ...
1 ( ) should be privatized.
2 ( ) should not be privatized.

D. The reason for inflation is ...
1 ( ) workers and civil servants who demand more wages/salary.
2 ( ) traders and industrialists who increase prices.
3 ( ) economic policies of the government.

E. Religious education in schools ...
1 ( ) should be mandatory.
2 ( ) should not be mandatory.

F. Women ...
1 ( ) should work.
2 ( ) should not work unless necessary.
3 ( ) should not work.

G. Union rights for civil servants ...
1 ( ) should be granted.
2 ( ) should not be granted.

H. In Turkey, religion in political life is ...
1 ( ) influential more than it is needed.
2 ( ) suppressed.

Time of completion:

Interviewer's note:

APPENDIX B:

TURKISH SUMMARY
(TÜRKÇE ÖZET)

Bu çalışma küçük sanayi işçilerine yönelik, görgül verilere dayanan sosyolojik bir inceleme sunmaktadır. Türkiye'de küçük sanayi işletmelerine dair iktisat ve işletme yönelimli belirli bir literatür birikimi mevcutsa da, doğrudan doğruya bu işletmelerde çalışan işçilere yönelik toplumsal araştırmalar yok denecek kadar azdır. Bu durum genel olarak işçi sınıfına yönelik araştırmaların yokluğu kadar sanayileşmeye dair modernleşmeci bir bakış açısının toplumsal bilimlerde yaygın ve baskın olmasından kaynaklanır. Bu bakış açısı, basitçe, kapitalistleşme sürecinin pre-kapitalist üretim ve istihdam biçimlerini tasfiye edeceğini öngörmekle kalmaz, ücretli istihdamın büyük ölçekli birimlerde toplanacağını da öngörür. Böylece, küçük kapitalist üretim birimlerindeki ücretli işçiler de ortadan kalkma sürecinde olan geçici bir toplumsal grup olarak görülmekte ve akademik araştırmalara konu edilmemektedir. Dolayısıyla, küçük sanayi işçilerinin çalışma koşulları, toplumsal, kültürel, siyasal ve ideolojik karakteristikleri, işçi sınıfının diğer katmanlarına yönelik algıları hakkında bilgilerimiz son derece sınırlıdır. Bu bilgilerin yokluğuna, hem akademik hem de popüler düzlemde bazı sınanmamış kanaatler eşlik etmektedir: küçük işyerlerine emek ilişkileri esasen pre-kapitalist bir karakter taşımaktadır; bu işçiler ücretli emeğin erken evrelerindeki yarı-proleter ücretlilerdir; yeni göçmenlerdir ve kırsal bağlantıları güçlüdür, vb.

Tez çalışması bu türden yaygın görüşlere yönelik bir kuşkudan doğmuştur. Türkiye'deki sınai istihdamın yapısına ilişkin istatistik veriler ve araştırmalar yaygın kanaatleri ve beklentileri yanlışlayan iki önemli noktaya işaret etmektedir. Birincisi, küçük sanayi işletmelerinin istihdamdaki payının azaldığını gösteren hiçbir kanıt

yoktur. Aksine, sanayide ortalama işletme ölçeği sürekli bir küçülme eğilimi sergilemektedir. Ayrıca, küçük sanayi işletmelerinde ücretli çalışanların payı da sanıldığından çok daha yüksektir diğer çalışma biçimlerinin (kendi hesabına çalışanlar ve ücretsiz aile işçileri) aleyhine artmaktadır. İkinci olarak, küçük sanayi birimleri küçük sanayi siteleri ve organize sanayi bölgelerinde toplanma eğilimi sergilemektedirler. Bu tespitler çerçevesinde tez çalışmasına yönelik alan araştırması için Ankara'daki OSTİM sanayi sitesi seçilmiştir. Alan araştırmasının sağladığı veriler esas olarak işçilerle yapılan yüzyüze görüşmelerden oluşmaktadır. Bu görüşmelerden derlenen niceliksel verilerin yanında, ayrıca az sayıda işçi ve işyeri sahibi ile yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler ve doğrudan gözlemler çalışmanın başlıca veri kaynaklarını oluşturmaktadır.

Küçük sanayi işçilerinin üretim ve yeniden-üretim alanlarındaki toplumsal oluşum karakteristiklerine yönelik bir incelemeye girişmeden önce, işçi sınıfı kavramının sınırları ile işçi sınıfı içindeki katmanlaşma ve parçalanma üzerine bir tartışma gerekli görülmüştür. Burada yürütülen tartışma, üretim ve geçim araçlarından yoksun olma ve bu nedenle emek-gücünü satmak zorunda kalma kriterine bağlı olarak işçi sınıfının geniş bir tanımını benimsemekte ve fakat işçi sınıfının muhtelif eksenlerde parçalanmış ve katmanlaşmış olduğu vurgusunu ön plana çıkarmaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışmanın konusunu oluşturan küçük sanayi işçilerine işçi sınıfının bir katmanı olarak yaklaşılmaktadır. Kuramsal tartışmalarla başlayan aynı bölümde Türkiye'de işçi sınıfının çeşitli eksenlerdeki parçalanma ve katmanlaşma eğilimleri üzerinde durulmakta ve hem genel olarak sınıf ve tabakalaşma hem de özel olarak işçi sınıfı içindeki ayrışmalara yönelik bazı çözümleyici yaklaşımlar eleştirel bir süzgeçle gözden geçirilmektedir.

Çalışmanın ilk amacı küçük sanayi işçilerinin genel bir sosyolojik-demografik portresini ortaya koymaktır. Buradaki çözümlemeler, bu alana yönelik toplumsal araştırmaların yokluğu koşullarında popüler ve akademik imgelemin küçük sanayi işçilerine örtük olarak atfettiği sosyolojik karakteristiklerin ne ölçüde geçerli olduğu sorusunu aydınlatmaya yöneliktir. İkinci olarak, işyeri düzleminde işçilerin içinde bulunduğu koşullar incelenmektedir. Son olarak işçilerin siyasal, kültürel ve ideolojik formasyonlarına dair bilgiler çok katmanlı bir toplumsal bilinç kavramı etrafında tartışılmaktadır.

T.C. YÜKSEKÖĞRETİM KURULU
DOKÜMANTASYON MERKEZİ

***

OSTİM işgücü genel olarak hayli genç işçilerden oluşmaktadır. Eğitim düzeyleri de Türkiye'deki kentsel işgücü gruplarından yüksektir. Beyaz yakalılar, kent kökenliler ve gençler daha eğitimlidirler. Fakat düşük eğitim aynı zamanda küçük yaştaki çırakların da karakteristiklerinden biridir. Lise eğitimi alan mavi yakalı işçiler arasında dikkat çekici bir kısmı meslek okullarından mezun olmuşlardır. Bu durum çocuklarını görece erken yaşta işgücü piyasasına sokmak isteyen ailelerin önemli bir bölümünün aynı zamanda mesleğe yönelik bir eğitimi de önemsediğini gösterir. İşçiler genel olarak babalarından daha uzun süren bir eğitim almışlardır. Ancak babaların farklı eğitim düzeyleri çocuklarının eğitim düzeylerini de farklılaştıran bir rol oynamaktadır.

İşçilerin büyük çoğunluğu küçük yaşlarda aileleriyle birlikte Ankara'ya gelen göçmenlerden oluşmaktadır. Göçün başlıca nedeni kent işgücü piyasasında iş bulmaktır. Göçmenler arasında köy kökenliler çoğunluktadır, küçük ve orta boy kent ve kasabalardan göçenler hayli düşük düzeylerdedir. Coğrafi köken esas olarak Ankara'yı çevreleyen Orta Anadolu bölgesidir. Başka bölgelerden göç çok sınırlıdır. Ayrıca, kente göçmemiş, halen Ankara'nın yakın köylerinde yaşamaya devam eden özgül işçi tiplerine rastlanmaktadır. Kırsal bağlantılar göçmenlik sonrası geçen süreye bağlı olarak azalma eğilimi göstermektedir. Küçük yaşlarda göçe bağlı olarak işçilerin büyük bir kısmı ikinci kuşak ücretlidirler. Bu durum, işçi sınıfı hanelerinin kuşaklar-arası süreçlerinde yukarı doğru sınıf değiştirme şanslarının zayıf olduğuna ve hanelerin sınıf karakteristiklerinin konsolide oluşuna işaret eder. Öte yandan, bu konsolidasyon süreci kırdan kente göçle bağlantılı farklı örüntüler de sergilemektedir. Çiftçi/köylü babalardan ücretli çocuklara uzanan süreçte varılan ücretli sınıf konumları göç öncesi koşulların rol oynadığı belirli bir kutuplaşmaya işaret eder: Çiftçi/köylü babaların çocukları çok sınırlı ölçülerde beyaz yakalı işçi konumlarına yerleşirken, ağırlıkla ya vasıfsız ve mavi yakalı konumlara ya da ücretli profesyonel konumlara geçmektedirler. Yani bu babaların yüksek ekonomik sermaye sahibi bir kısmı çocuklarının yüksek eğitimlerini finanse edebilmekte ve onları ücretli tabakalar içinde üst konumlara taşıyabilmektedir. Ücretli emeğin konsolidasyon sürecine ayrıca kentsel ücretli tabakaların kendi içindeki stabilizasyon ve yukarı doğru hareketlilik dinamikleri eşlik etmektedir. Mavi yakalı babalardan

ücretli profesyonel çocuklara geçişi yansıtan örnekler büyük ölçüde sınıf-içi sayılabilecek bir dikey hareketliliği temsil etmektedir. Buna karşılık özellikle beyaz yakalılar arasında yüksek derecede bir kuşaklar-arası süreklilik gözlenmektedir.

Genç yaş profiline rağmen işçiler işgücü piyasasında yüksek dereceli bir akışkanlık sergilemektedirler. İş değiştirme oranı yüksektir ve işte kalma süreleri kısadır. Yaş artışına bağlı olarak iş istikrarı da artmaktadır. Yüksek işgücü devri ile eğitim düzeyi arasında bir ilişki gözlenmemektedir. Mavi yakalılar arasında önemli sayılabilecek oranda vasıfsız işlerden geçiş yapanlar vardır ancak bu eğilim tipik değildir ve görece yaşlı işçiler için geçerlidir. Yüksek iş değiştirme sıklığına rağmen mavi yakalılar arasında başka mesleklerden gelenler nadirdir ve bu grubun tipik karakteristiklerinden birini aynı mesleğe çırak olarak başlayanlar oluşturur.

Yüksek işgücü devri çoğu durumda sınıfsal bir hareketlilik anlamına gelmez. Genel olarak sınıf değiştirme imkanları sınırlıdır. Ayrıca, özellikle mavi yakalıların eski konumlarının yine büyük çoğunlukla mavi yakalı olmasından, iki önemli sonuç çıkarabiliriz: Birincisi, yüksek işgücü devri işçilerin sınıf-içi konumları değiştiren bir etki de yaratmamaktadır. İkincisi, bu durum mavi yakalı ücretli emeğin uzun dönemli konsolidasyon sürecindeki baskın kalıpların dönüşümüne işaret eder. Başka bir deyişle, kentsel proletaryanın kompozisyonunda bir değişimi yansıtır: görece daha vasıfsız göçmen emekçilerden oluşan ve endüstriyel işlere ancak bir süre vasıfsız hizmet işlerinde çalıştıktan sonra girebilen işçilerin yerini, daha eğitimli ve emek piyasasına doğrudan yarı-vasıflı mavi yakalı işlerle giren işçiler almaktadır. Şüphesiz bu durum, kırdan kente göç hızının görece stabilize olduğu bir konjonktürle bağlantılıdır. Göç hızındaki bir ivme bu tabloyu tersine çevirebilir.

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OSTİM işçilerinin yaşadıkları hanelerin ortalama nüfusu göreli olarak düşüktür. Bunun başlıca sebebini işçilerin genç bir yaş profiline sahip olmaları ve bunların büyük bir bölümünün de erken evrelerdeki çekirdek ailelere mensup olmalarıdır. Hanelerde gelir getiren üyelerin sayısı genel olarak azdır. Bu durumun nedenlerinden birini, kadınların dışarıda çalışmalarına karşı kültürel iklim oluşturur: genel olarak hanelerde çalışan kadınların sayısı çok düşüktür ve bunlar esas olarak ailelerdeki evli olmayan genç kızlardır. İkinci neden, yine, genişleme süreçlerinin

erken evrelerindeki ailelerin yaygınlığıdır. Bu ailelerde çocuklar çok küçük yaşlardadır ve gelir getiren tek hane üyesi kocadır. Buna karşılık sayıca geniş ailelerde, ilave gelir getirenler çoğunlukla genç erkek çocuklardan oluşur.

Hanelerin dikkate değer bir kısmının ücret-dışı gelirleri vardır. Bunlar esas olarak kentsel rantlardan ve kırsal mülk gelirlerinden oluşur. Yine de, hanelerin ezici bir çoğunluğunda gelir getirenler sadece ücretlilerden ibarettir ve haneler arasındaki gelir farklılaşması esas olarak istihdam gelirlerinin düzeyine bağlıdır. Hanelerde gelir getirenlerin sayısı arttıkça hane geliri de artar, ancak bu hanelerin nüfusu da kalabalık olduğundan bu katkılar kişi başına geliri artırmaz. Dahası, kocadan sonra haneye ilave gelir getirenler çoğunlukla düşük kazançlı işlerde çalışmaktadırlar. Biçimsel olarak öyle görünse bile, tek bir ücretli çalışanın gelirinin ailenin bütününün geçimini sağlayabildiği 'aile ücreti' ekonomisi bu hanelerin çoğunluğu açısından geçerli değildir. Zira mümkün olan en erken evrede çocuklar ek gelir getirenler olarak hane işgücüne katılmaktadır.

Hanelerin büyük bir kısmı kentin çevre semtlerinde yaşamaktadırlar. Ancak gelir düzeyine göre yerleşim yeri farklılıkları anlamlı boyutlardadır. Düşük gelir düzeyi, yerleşim yerlerinin kent merkezine uzaklığı, uzun ve yorucu iş günü, işyerinin konut bölgesine uzak olması, işçilerin kentsel mekandaki hareketliliklerini kısıtlamaktadır.

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İşçilerin, çalışma yaşamlarının çok büyük bir kısmını içinde geçirdiği, tipik bir mekansal olarak parçalanmış işgücü piyasası görünümündeki OSTİM'de, işletmeler arasında hem ortak hem de farklılaşan özellikler gözlenmektedir. İlk olarak, ortalama ücret düzeyi küçük ve büyük işletmelerde birbirine çok yakındır. Ancak mutlak olarak çok düşük ücret alanlara küçük işletmelerde daha çok rastlanmaktadır. Bu durumun başlıca nedeni bu işletmelerde çırak istihdamının daha yaygın olmasıdır. Ayrıca, ücret-dışı ödemeler de büyük firmalarda daha yaygındır. Yaşa bağlı deneyim ve kıdem, işçiler arasındaki ücret farklılaşmasında en önemli faktör olarak belirmektedir.

Büyük işletmelerdeki işgücü, göreli olarak daha genç, daha eğitimli ve daha az deneyimli bir profil sunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, işgücünün bileşimi açısından

büyük firmalar ile küçük firmalar arasında ciddi bir farklılaşma yoktur. İşgücünün çoğunluğu düşük vasıflı işçilerden oluşmaktadır. Ayrıca, işgücü temininde de yaygın bir şekilde düşük vasıflı işçiler tercih edilmekte ve öncelikle mevcut işçilerin tanıdıklarına dayanan enformel yöntemler kullanılmaktadır. Dikkat çekici en büyük farklılık, deneyimli & vasıflı işçilerin küçük işletmelerin işgücü içinde görece daha yüksek bir oranı oluşturmasıdır. Emek-yoğun küçük işletmelerde işgücü karakteristikleri büyük fordist işletmelerdekine de benzemez. Bu durum özellikle, kapitalist üretim ilişkileri ortamında zanaatkar dönemin yaftalarıyla (usta ve ustabaşı) anılmaya devam eden vasıflı işçiler için geçerlidir. Ücretli emek içindeki görece avantajlı konumları bu işçilerin geleneksel zanaatkar özellikler taşıdıkları anlamına da gelmez. Burada sözkonusu olan, işbölümünün fazla gelişmediği küçük kapitalist işletmelerin emek-yoğun esnek üretim koşullarına özgü bir vasıflı ücretli emek kategorisidir. Aynı işyerindeki işgücü devri yüksek diğer yarı-vasıflı ve vasıfsız işçilerden daha düzenli ve yerleşik bir ücretli emek deneyimini temsil ederler.

Bu yüksek vasıf ve otorite sahibi çalışanların durumları OSTİM'deki büyük ve küçük ölçekli firmalar arasında sistematik bir farklılaşma göstermez. Örneğin ücretler konusunda büyük ve küçük firmalar arasında neredeyse hiç fark yok gibidir. Buna karşılık işverenle ya da üst yönetim kademeleriyle yakın enformel ilişkiler beklenebileceği gibi küçük firmalarda çok daha güçlüdür. İşyerindeki ortalama çalışma süreleri büyük firmalarda daha uzundur. Kuşkusuz bu ortalama göstergeler, bazı yapısal karakteristikleri, çok güçlü olmasalar bile, yansıtmazlar. OSTİM'deki 'küçük' işletmeler arasında dahi, bu konumlar tedrici bir farklılaşma eğilimini ortaya koyar. Gerçekte, küçük işletmelerdeki usta ve ustabaşı esas olarak deneyimle edinilen konumlardır ve bunların örneğin eğitim düzeyleri büyük firmalardaki atölye şefleri ya da kısım şeflerinden genellikle daha düşüktür ve daha yaşlıdırlar. Ayrıca, ustabaşı ve usta konumları genellikle sistematik bir ayrımı yansıtmaz, çoğu durumda bunların hepsini tek bir 'vasıflı & kıdemli usta' grubu olarak görmek daha isabetli olacaktır. Bu ustaların tipik özellikleri (i) yüksek becerileri ile doğrudan üretimin içinde olmaları, ve (ii) hem beceri ve deneyimleri hem de kimi durumlarda işverene en yakın 'ikinci adam' konumları ile aynı zamanda emek süreci ve işyeri ilişkilerinin denetiminde açık ve fili bir otorite konumunu temsil etmeleridir. Buna karşılık, büyük işyerlerinde bu konumlar iki açıdan tedrici bir dönüşüm eğilimi gösterir: (a)

ustabaşı ve usta pozisyonları giderek formel olarak birbirinden ayrışır, ve (b) özellikle ustabaşı, formel olarak kısım şefi ya da atölye şefi sıfatıyla anılmaya, doğrudan üretimden uzaklaşmaya ve giderek daha fazla koordinasyon ve denetim işlevleri yerine getirmeye başlar. Benzer bir eğilim daha düşük derecelerde, kısım şefine dönüşmeye başlayan ustalar için de geçerlidir ve bunlar giderek formel eğitim düzeyi görece daha yüksek olanlar arasından seçilirler.

Ancak unutmamak gerekir ki, OSTİM'deki 'büyük' işletmelerin dahi en fazla yüz işçi çalıştırdığını dikkate aldığımızda bunlar göreli ve tedrici farklılaşmalardır. Bu sınırlar içinde, üretim sürecindeki teknik ve toplumsal işbölümü, büyük işletmelerde görece daha karmaşıklaşma eğilimi göstermekte, emek sürecinin gözetimi ve denetimi işlevleri belirli ölçülerde orta ve alt kademe otoritelere devredilmektedir. Öte yandan, sektörün bir özelliği olarak işgücü içinde düşük bir oranı oluşturan beyaz yakalı işçiler açısından gözetim ve denetim çok daha dolaysız ve basittir; doğrudan işyeri sahibi ya da üst otoritelerce yerine getirilmektedir. Ayrıca bu grup ile yönetim arasındaki karşılıklı esnek davranışlar (ücretsiz fazla mesai ve buna karşılık mazeret izni gibi durumlarda daha yüksek bir hoşgörü) daha yaygındır. Bu durum, yönetimle ilişkiler bakımından mavi yakalılar ile beyaz yakalılar arasında dikkat çekici bir farklılaşmaya işaret eder.

Emek ilişkilerinin bireysel ve kollektif düzeylerinde formel mekanizmaların yokluğu, bütün işletmeler için hakim tabloyu oluşturmakta, ancak bazı göreli farklılıklar gözlenmektedir. Bireysel ilişkiler düzleminde, küçük işyerlerinde işyeri sahibinin ya da ustabaşının tartışmasız bir ağırlığı vardır; buna karşılık büyük işletmelerde bu tür konular görece daha yüksek ölçüde orta ve alt kademelere aktarılmıştır. Küçük işyerlerinde, bireysel düzlemde olduğu gibi kollektif ilişkiler düzlemine de hakim olan keyfilik-kayırmacılık-korumacılık karışımı paternalizm, büyük işletmelerde yerini göreli olarak formelleşen ilişkilere bırakır, ancak keyfilik ve kayırmacılığın azaldığı bir paternalizmin sınırlarını aşmaz.

OSTİM'deki işletmeler arası işbölümünün karakteristikleri ile birlikte bu bölümdeki tartışmaların, başka araştırmaları davet eden birkaç iması vardır. İlk olarak, OSTİM gibi bir küçük sanayi işletmeleri diyarında sermaye birikimi dinamiklerinin araştırılmasında tekil firmalar ya da girişimciler üzerinde odaklanan çalışmalar kuşkusuz bu alanın farklılaşmış doğası hakkında önemli bilgiler

sağlayacaktır. Ne var ki, bu çalışmaların aynı zamanda, hem küçük firmaların kendi aralarındaki hem de bunlarla büyük ölçekli sanayi arasındaki eklemlenme tarzlarına odaklanan, sektörel düzeyde entegre olmuş sermaye birikimi süreçlerini araştıran bir politik iktisatla desteklenmesi gerekir. Böyle bir perspektif, küçük sanayinin kendisini çevreleyen nasıl bir işbölümünün parçası olduğunu aydınlatabilir.

İkinci sorun, çevre işçilerinin ne işyeri ne de endüstri düzeyinde hiçbir kollektif örgütlenme kapasitesi sergilemedikleri bir bağlamda, sınıf çatışmasını nerede arayacağımız sorusuyla ilgilidir. OSTİM işçilerinin işyeri düzeyindeki yaygın sorunlarının düşük ücretler ve kötü işyeri koşullarında aşırı çalışma olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Buna karşılık işverenlerin tipik şikayetleri ise 'tembel işçiler' olarak özetlenebilir. Her iki taraf için bu rahatsızlıkların nihai çözüm yolları ise terk ve işten çıkarmadır. Bu koşullarda, küçük sanayide sınıf çatışmasının artı-değer üretiminin politik iktisadında gizli olduğunu ve o yarıkta sıkıştığını ileri sürebiliriz. Bu argüman, kısmen yukarıda işaret ettiğim 'entegre sermaye birikimi' süreci ile ilişkilidir: OSTİM işçileri, piyasadaki çetin rekabet koşulları karşısında işletmelerinin düşük kar marjları ve alt-sözleşme ilişkileri ile çalıştığı bilgisine dolaysız bir şekilde sahiptirler ve ödenmemiş emeklerinin karşılığının bir kısmının kendi işletmelerinde kalmadığını da bir şekilde hissetmektedirler. Bu bilgi ve hissiyat işletme düzeyindeki sınıf ilişkilerini bir ölçüde bulandırır. Ancak işletmedeki toplumsal işbölümünün temelini yine de kapitalist artı-değer üretimi oluşturur ve bizatihi bu süreç sınıf mücadelesinin gizil formlarından bağımsız değildir. İşletmenin, sermaye birikimini artırmak için seçenekleri şunlardır: (1) ücretleri düşürmek, (2) mutlak artı-değeri artırmak için çalışma sürelerini artırmak, ve (3) göreli artı-değeri artıracak bir teknolojik değişme yapmak. Ücretlerin alt sınırının piyasada belirlendiği ve çalışma sürelerinin yasal ve toplumsal bir üst sınırının mevcut olduğu koşullarda, teknolojik yatırım yapma imkanları sınırlı olan küçük işletmelerde tek yol (4) çalışmanın yoğunlaştırılmasıdır. Bu da sermaye ile emek arasındaki açık ve gizil çatışmaların başlıca alanını oluşturur ve işçiler arasında örgütlenme imkanlarının olmadığı koşullarda dahi, kısa dönemdeki işten çıkarma imkanlarına rağmen, çalışmanın yoğunluk derecesi bu mücadele tarafından belirlenir; sermayenin emek-gücünden elde edebileceği emek miktarı uzun dönemde belirli bir vasata gelir dayanır. Sınıf çatışmasının çalışmanın yoğunlaştırılması noktasına sıkıştığı bu koşullar aynı

zamanda emek üzerindeki denetim mekanizmalarının bürokratik ve teknik denetim araçlarını ancak sınırlı ölçüde içerdiği ve esas olarak basit denetim sınırlarında kaldığı, 'emeğin biçimsel tabiiyeti'nden 'gerçek tabiiyetine' geçiş sürecinin çok yavaş seyrettiği bir kapitalist üretim ortamına işaret eder.

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Özetle, OSTİM işçilerinin birey ve hane düzlemindeki profili kendi içinde ciddi farklılaşmalar taşımakta ise de, bir bütün olarak, Türkiye'deki ücretli tabakaların genel profilinden anlamlı bir demografik-sosyolojik farklılık sunmaz. Yeterli karşılaştırma verisi olmamasına rağmen, çalışmanın bulguları göstermektedir ki küçük sanayi işçilerinin ücretli emek dışındaki istihdam biçimleriyle ve kırsal toplumsal oluşumlarla bağları zannedildiğinden çok daha zayıftır. Aksine, büyük bir kısmı ikinci kuşak ücretlidirler ve ağırlıkla ücretli çalışanlardan oluşan hanelerde yaşamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, yarı-proleterleşme, yeni göçetmiş olma, güçlü kırsal bağlantılar vb. küçük sanayi işçilerinin tanımlayıcı özellikleri değildirler.

Buna karşılık, işçi sınıfının bu katmanının içinde bulunduğu koşulların asıl farklılaştığı yer üretim ve istihdam alanıdır. Ortalama işçi sayısının çok düşük olduğu küçük işletmelerde çalışma koşulları, ücretler, örgütlenme ve işyeri düzeyinde emek ilişkileri büyük ölçekli fabrikalardan çok farklıdır ve bu farklılıkların hemen hepsi küçük sanayi işçileri açısından olumsuz koşulları yansıtır. Emek-yoğun küçük imalat birimlerinde teknoloji ve işbölümü gelişmemiştir; işçiler çoğu durumda işyeri sahibinin ya da yöneticinin doğrudan denetimi altında çalışırlar; düşük işçi yoğunlaşması işçilerin örgütlenme kapasitesinin gelişimi önünde büyük bir engel oluşturur; kollektif işçi örgütlenmesi yoktur ve emek ilişkilerinde artık iş-dışı uzantıları çok zayıflamış olsa da paternalist örüntüler egemenliğini sürdürmektedir. Bu koşullar, işyeri düzeyinde sınıf çatışmasının açık formlarla üretilmesine imkan vermemekte, çatışma ancak emek sürecinde çoğu zaman bireysel, gizil ve embriyonik formlarda yaşanmaktadır. Küçük sanayi işletmelerinin hakim çalışma tarzını oluşturan alt-sözleşme ilişkileri ve istikrarsız bir piyasanın varlığı karşısında bu işyerlerindeki işverenlerin göreli dezavantajlı konumları da toplumsal sınıf ilişkilerini daha bulanık bir hale sokmakta, işçilerin toplumsal çatışma referansları işyeri dışındaki daha geniş bir toplumsal bağlama kaymaktadır.

Çalışma, işçilerinin bu geniş bağlama referansla şekillenen toplumsal bilinç ögelerinin eleştirel bir çözümlemesini yapmaktadır. İşçi sınıfının başka katmanlarına yönelik sınırlı bilgilerden hareketle yapılan karşılaştırmalar, küçük sanayi işçilerinin belirgin bir şekilde kültürel olarak daha muhafazakar ve dindar olduklarını ve politik olarak daha sağda konumlandıklarını göstermektedir. İşyeri düzeyindeki emek ilişkilerine dair davranış ve bilinç örüntülerinin başlıca açıklayıcı çerçevelerinden biri olarak bizatihi küçük işyeri ve küçük sanayi koşullarının özgüllükleri vurgulanabilir. Ancak daha geniş bir bağlama oturan toplumsal bilinç farklılıklarının açıklanmasında bu çalışma küçük sanayi dünyasının özgül koşullarını yeterli görmemektedir. Zira toplumsal üretim ilişkileri içindeki ortak konumlar bir yandan üretim/istihdam alanında bir iç farklılaşmaya uğrayarak biçimlenirken, diğer yandan da yeniden-üretim alanındaki farklı tarihsel, kültürel ve mekansal dinamiklere maruz kalmaktadırlar. Bu geniş ve ilişkisel bir düzlemde, sorun küçük sanayi işçilerinin, hem işçi sınıfının diğer katmanlarıyla hem de özel olarak işçi sınıfı siyaseti ve kültürünün hegemonik kesimleriyle iletişiminin zayıf olmasıdır. Bu çalışmanın imalarından biri, zayıf sınıf-içi iletişimin sadece küçük sanayi işçileri cephesinden açıklanamayacağı, işçi sınıfının hegemonik kesimlerinin/örgütlerinin tarihsel-kültürel oluşum dinamikleri ile de bağlantılı olduğudur.

Çalışma bir bütün olarak küçük sanayi işçilerinin işçi sınıfının diğer katmanlarından farklılıklarını keşfetmeyi amaçlarken, diğer yandan da bizatihi küçük sanayi işçileri içindeki mesleki katmanlaşmanın göstergelerini de incelemekte, özel olarak mavi yakalı işçiler ile beyaz yakalı işçiler arasındaki farklılıklar üzerinde durmaktadır. Bulgular, eğitim, yaş, sosyal köken, işyeri düzeyinde emek ilişkileri vb. açılardan bu iki grup arasında ciddi farklılıklar olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu farklılıklar siyasal, kültürel ve ideolojik düzlemelere de yansımaktadır. Beyaz yakalılar bir yandan politik ve kültürel olarak mavi yakalılardan daha az muhafazakar bir profil sunarken, diğer yandan da kapsayıcı ve birleştirici bir işçi sınıfı imgesi aleyhine görece daha kesimsel bir hissiyata sahiptirler. Buradaki eğilimler küçük imalat sanayii birimlerinde çalışan az sayıdaki büro işçileri ve teknik elemanlara aittir ve bu eğilimlerin geniş beyaz yakalı istihdam alanlarındaki çalışanlar için ne ölçüde geçerli olduğu sorusu bu çalışmanın sınırları dışındadır.

VITA

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