

**FROM OPINIONS TO IMAGES:
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF AFFECTS**

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
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
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ABSTRACT

FROM OPINIONS TO IMAGES: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF AFFECTS

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This thesis is intending to show the possibility of a marriage between social sciences and documentary filmmaking, which can only be possible through the critique of what we may call “sociology of opinions”, not only restrained in mainstream practice of social research, but also expanding into the textual-interpretative dimensions of human sciences, creating, in our belief, a major epistemological problem: sociology tending to become a doxology, i.e., an “opinion of opinions”. There is also another aspect of such a marriage, notably the power of the audio-visual media in the life-experience of modernity, creating a need for a theoretical discussion which is lacking in the actual theories of film. We are thus inclined to show critically what we may call as the “decline of social types” in the parallel evolution of social sciences and of the cinema. We are trying to define the possible marriage between social science and documentary as a tentative “sociology of affects”. The sociology of affects requires the early Tardean critique against Durkheim and his followers, of the “textual” epistemology inherent in the sociology of opinions, and an exposition of the Spinozist doctrine of affects against that of psychoanalysis. We define social-types as part of the wealth of sociological imagination, which is not something “in-itself”, but rather “for” the domain of life-experience to which it is devoted.

Documentary filmmakers, who have been aware of the power of the medium they use have already developed a rather naïve ethics in their own domain –and this is what is lacking in the practice of social sciences. To avoid such a naiveté, however, we need nothing more a theoretical vigilance which can be present in social sciences. We find the ultimate possibility of establishing such a visual-textual “sociology of affects” in the Vertovian praxis of the kino-eye and in the actual video-philosophy of Jean-Lac Godard, who intends to reshape videography as a “thinking-machine”.

Keywords:

Public opinion, epistemology, social research, social-types, affects, opinion, documentary film, cinema, psychoanalysis, kino-eye, kino-pravda, video-philosophy.

ÖZ

KANAATLERDEN İMAJLARA: DUYGULAR SOSYOLOJİSİNE DOĞRU

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Bu inceleme toplumsal bilimlerle belgesel filmcilik arasında mümkün bir birleşmenin boyutlarını tartışıyor. Bunun ön şartlarından birinin halihazırdaki “kanaatlar sosyolojisinin” bir eleştirisi olması gerektiğine inanıyoruz. Bu yalnızca sıradan toplumsal araştırma pratiğine yönelik bir eleştiri değil, yorumcu-epistemolojik tarza ve toplumbilimsel yaklaşımların “metin” ve “kanaat” etrafındaki epistemolojik düğümleşmesine yönelik bir eleştiridir. Toplumsal bilimlerin evrimleri içinde “sosyal-tipler” yaratma yetilerini gitgide yitirmiş ve dev bir kanaatlar yığına ve tasnifine dönüşmüş görünüyorlar. Buna karşın edebiyat ile sinema bu yetiye daha uzun süre sahip çıkmış gibi. Özellikle belgesel sinemanın sosyal bilimlerden analiz edilecek bir şey olmaktan çok, bir analiz aracı olabileceği fikri, en temelinde “toplumsal tipler” konusu tartışılırken açığa çıkabilir. “Toplumsal tipler”in bu aşınmasının modern dünyanın dayattığı bir durum mu olduğu tartışması açık bırakılmalı, bu meyanda sosyal bilimlerle henüz teorik bakımdan oldukça naif bir etığe sahip olan belgesel filmciliğin işbirliği beklenmelidir. Bu işbirliğine “duygular sosyolojisi” adını veriyoruz ve imajlar. Metinler ve düşünceler alanında çok-boyutlu bir “sosyolojik muhayyile” olarak işlevi gerektiğini düşünüyoruz. Spinoza’nın “duygular öğretisi” bu noktada bizim için merkezi bir öneme sahip: duygular sosyolojisi kendi başına bir epistemik alan olmaktan çok, adanmış olduğu alanda bir praksis oluşturmaya

çabalamalı. Bu praksişi nihai olarak Dziga Vertov'un sinegöz ve sine-hakikat yaklaşımında, çağdaş video alanında ise Jean-Luc Godard'ın videoyu bir "düşünme cihazına" dönüştürmeyi amaçlayan yaklaşımlarında görüyoruz.



To Deniz Dülgerođlu



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Once questioned about the founders of structural anthropology on an occasion, Claude Lévi-Strauss who forged the term itself, answered they were Caduveo villagers. Again, when Félix Guattari proposed that the analyzed people in the psychoanalytic treatment should be paid, and no less than the analyst, since they are investing or "putting to work" their unconscious productions, this was not only a mere mockery. The "first structuralists" were really Caduveo villagers, and psychoanalysis, as we will discuss later in a chapter, could never be established without the quite clever "participation" of an intelligent hysteric girl, Anna O., from the beginnings of Freud's studies. We don't hesitate to take these affirmations as our point of departure in this thesis which will be a research into the possibility of what we call "sociology of affects", instead of the mainstream "sociology of opinions".

Our program will begin with a critique of what we may call the "sociology of opinions", nowadays far distant from its founder, Gabriel Tarde's vision. Today, academically set values of social sciences (and sociology in particular) make out of them a huge "doxology" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991), a collection, filtering, interpretation and archiving of opinions, which are defined by a general state of universal variation. There still exists a profound epistemological problem: sociology tends to become an actual "opinion of opinions", i.e., an opinion among others which could be interpreted by a Nineteenth century human scientist as a

quite insolid basis for a science, pretending to establish its "objectivity". Marx was telling us that one should never ask a culture, an age or a people what they think about themselves in order to understand what they are. Our primary concern, hence, will be to question what lies in this methodological trajectory and metamorphosis since the Nineteenth century, when human sciences were first established. This transformation, let us put it frankly, is characterized by the gradual disappearance of a typically affective entity, often present in the works of early sociologists, the "social types".

The term was expressly forged by Georg Simmel who was capable to illuminate a lot of social types in his extraordinary work into the conditions and landscapes of modern life: the Poor, the Jew, the Stranger, the Worker... No sociologist of this early epoch could have done something without passing through a creation of social (or what could be poorly called, socio-psychological) types --the "Protestant" for Max Weber, the "Lumpen-Proletariat" for Marx, the "Bourgeois" for Sombart, the "Consumer" for Veblen... If there is something which defines this creation of these social types, it is nothing but the remarkable capacity of early social scientists to make of them "analytical" entities, coinciding with their "becoming-events". Everything passes as if one could speak, for instance, about "social classes" only when one is also capable to "visualize" them with their traits, characteristics and "formulas". Hence, as shown by Rosa Luxemburg, we can talk about "class" in two senses: the first, as an abstract category for economic and political analysis, and the second, as concrete groups, communities of people, both objectified and subjectified by capitalist relationships of production,

We should then inquire into the conditions of the disappearance of social types in today's sociology, asking whether this disparition is something "endemic" in today's "global" conditions of life or merely an inability of academized social sciences to create "social types" (To the best of my knowledge, the last prominent "creator" of social types was C. Wright Mills, with his "white collar" and "power elite").

That our study should pass through literature and cinema is absolutely essential in our analysis, since not only the sociology but also the novel of Nineteenth century and the cinema of the Twentieth were creators of social types. Starting with Balzac's types, we can arrive at the Idiot of Dostoyevsky; and, cinema, even when it is merely burlesque, presented us Charlot as the "Migrant", something nothing less than a social type.

Our first thesis for the possibility of a "sociology of affects" is that the creation of social types and landscapes is essential to any renovative effort in sociology. We do not mean by this that this should simply be the "landscape" of the late Nineteenth-century Europe since it is already past and our landscapes and milieux are now quite different. We are only insisting upon the strong connections between "affects" and the possibility to visualize them in concrete life-situations. This is why we will pretend to go beyond simply illustrative "visual sociology", to reach what we may call the "documentary". The sociology of opinions generally distrusts the "visual", forcing it to obey the "text" and "commentary", and pretends to be the only analytical power capable of studying this huge world of "images" which is co-extensive with modernity since the invention of photography.

Not only for methodological but also for pedagogic purposes, we are intending to put a sociology of affects in parallel to "documentary" filming, the former lacking "images" and the latter, generally speaking, some theoretical awareness. This is pedagogically important since everyone can observe how each new generation "thinks" with images more than with "texts", and how powerful are today's technologies of images.

As we learn from Spinoza, images never cease to create and represent affects. We should not wait for Hegel in order to understand how images and passions overwhelmed entire historical periods. A long history of iconography involves

political acts such as "iconoclasm", and no social event could pass without inscribing "images". As Nietzsche put it, the typical reaction of people to an innovator, a scientist for example, is something like "show it to us in images". Imagination, a faculty so long treated with varying degrees of contempt, tends to become necessary for creation in modern times. This also means that the "image of thinking" also has been transformed. For the Ancient Greeks and up to Medieval times, "thinking" was the reflection in our poor mind of "ideas", somewhere immutably located in the Heavens. In modern times, "thinking" is a human activity, at least since the cogito of Descartes, and it generally operates as a power which enters into collective circuits, transgressing cerebral boundaries of the Subject, stimulating, inciting, pulsating other ideas, constituting social events.

We know that the Ancient Greek opposition between *doxa* (opinion) and *episteme* (knowledge) can and should no longer be revived. Knowledge tends to become more and more "pragmatic", and this is not without its risks. The actual difficulty of properly drawing a clear-cut line between "knowledge" and "information" is a characteristic of our times, and we can no longer revive such old distinctions unless they serve for thoughtful stimulation of ideas and of the new. It is necessary, then, that we pass from Spinoza's philosophy, a philosophy of the future, we think, rather than a philosophy of the past, especially in order to reformulate this modern "image of thinking". This is because, for Spinoza at least, thinking and knowing were nothing but affections of a body-mind continuum, suggesting that they were also social and historical.

Thus, our thesis will summarily proceed as follows:

- (1) Sociology tends to become a "sociology of opinions", a collection, filtering and summarizing of opinions which are the most unstable social eventualities. This imposes a fundamental epistemological problem, namely an "opinion" (not "knowledge", nor even "information") of opinions". Journalism and video-archives can do this much more easily, and are already doing it better.

- (2) We are suggesting a "sociology of affects" which, we believe was already present in the insightful and "illuminative" (Walter Benjamin) period of the birth of human sciences, coupled with the creation of "social types" (Georg Simmel). Either the modern conditions of life or an endemic incapacity of the way in which social sciences are practised in today's academic settings and conceptions or both make the characterization of "social types" as affective entities difficult. Thus we can no longer do the same like the so-called "founding-fathers", but only rely upon their work --here Simmel and Tarde in particular-- in order to get clues for having "social insights" into social phenomena.
- (3) This sociology of affects should be a twofold experience: first an encounter with the cinema, especially though not exclusively with the "documentary film" and with Spinoza's profound understanding of human affects, and secondly, of the role of passions and images in social life.
- (4) The encounter with cinema presupposes an observation: until recently, sociology, semiology and history of arts could pretend to "analyze" the cinema as an ambiguous, obscure sphere of aesthetic culture. Now, as Reda Bensmaia once put it, it is the cinema which tends to become capable of "analyzing" everything, including sociology. This is not a radically new phenomenon or a turning point (Bensmaia, 2002). Cinematography is not a text, but it is a way of analyzing social phenomena (Vertov), of making visible the invisible (Jean-Luc Godard).
- (5) Social sciences today are much more habituated to the manipulation of texts ("readings", intertextuality, dialogism, structuralism, deconstruction, hermeneutics, etc.,). These are quite powerful "tools", and we can never oppose but only use them mercifully. Yet, the shadow of "opinion"

contaminates these intentions, transforming them into an almost plethoric accumulation of a ceaseless continuum of interpretations. Even when one criticizes the "positivistic method," a Derrida reader and interpreter today, in (especially the American) academy, works know under the assumption of a "positivism of texts and readings". *Verstehen* approach, too, in spite of its many successes, never ceases to be an "opinion of opinions," this time taken in their uniqueness, and not in their supposed universality.

- (6) We will suggest instead an "archival" mode of sociological presentation which includes the visual, the sonorous, the text as signs, and aiming at developing in the combined domains of sociology and the documentary film (not a mere "collaboration" or "illustrative help") a "montage-thought" which we believe was inherent in cinematography and not in the textual mode of representation. We hope that this will have many important consequences for pedagogical practices as well. Perhaps the most important book of sociology ever written, the *Sociological Imagination* of C. Wright Mills should be rewritten, this time taking into consideration not only the "opinions", but the concrete life experiences visualized as "affects".
- (7) Last but not the least, everything which happen today in the domain of life-experiences, wars passing into images (the TV), the rapid explosion of the means of communication (all the way up to the Internet), show that we are now in a phase of transition into an age of "images", no longer restricted to the "representational images" (graphics, painting, iconography) nor merely to "technical-images" (of Vilém Flusser, for example) which are that of photography and cinema. We are inscribed now to a kind of new image, with video and electronic images which we would like to call "thought-images" which were immaterial in the past, becoming only now somehow materialized as substitutes for what we used to call in the past "knowledge" or "information." This is merely the place where our thesis will leave the reader, hopefully, with certain "thought-images."

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS OPINION?

2.1 Pascal's Bet

When in Seventeenth century Blaise Pascal, mathematician, physicist and pietist religious man asked "does God exist?", he was not certainly trying to collect the answers of the people all around, whether they believe or not to God. Nor he was interested in knowing whether God really existed or not, since this was only a question of heart, not of knowledge. The God he believed in was certainly the God of the Judaeo-Christian religion, the One who commanded to Abraham to kill his son, the one who has been incarnated, transformed into Man through the body of Christ.

Or, when one today poses such a problem, it is a matter of learning, to get informations about "opinions", as in a TV pannel or public debate, as part of our society of spectacle, which is more essentially tending to become a "society of opinions". We are far from the conditions of Pascal's time, since he was not yet interested with what people were thinking of themselves or of God's existence¹: what people think (generally in a foolish way) was absolutely nothing for him,

¹ In a democracy, no one cares about my views; while in a repressive (totalitarian?) society each of my statements is checked for political correctness . This is as a way which, once recalled by Slavoj Zizek almost as a burning theme, that we are taken seriously --our opinions, products and ideas-- only in "totalitarian" societies. Hence democracy itself tends to become totalitarian as Zizek and Agamben have tried to show (Zizek 1991; Agamben, 1997)

good mathematician and the inventor of the calculus of probabilities. He was rather interested in the "thinking-existence" of man.²

Yet, today our social scientists are pretending to understand something about what happens in the social life, and are capable in our quasi-liberal age to put questions like "do you believe in God?" in their questionnaires in a similar way as in television programmes, showmen are easily putting such questions, having on their right the believers and their left the non-believers. Such an experience became possible through a historical process of laicization, having precisely those important moments when Nietzsche screamed "God is dead!", and Heidegger asked "are we still capable to a God?". Thus, we can perform a study of religion and religious life, no longer with reference to "truth", but rather with reference to "opinions".

At first sight, everything was different for Pascal. For him there were at least two kinds of "truth", truths of heart and truths of reason. What he intended to do was by no means opposing them to each other, but rather combining their respective ways of thinking. But how to combine them, since he was sure that through his heart, he believed to his God, beyond any reasonable doubt? Yet, Pascal is a mathematician who invented the mathematical rules of probability as a rational means for creating second orders of precision, and he will use it in order to convince both himself and his opponents (Atheists, Dominicans or Jesuits) not to the existence of God (this is impossible, since belief in God is a gift of God, not something to be reached through reasoning), but to the misery and failure of the one who doesn't "bet" for His existence. Thus, one has to use mathematical rules which are obviously gifts of God, but also which show our finitude in this infinite universe while we are sure at least that we are only "reeds", but "thinking reeds". As Pascal's applies his calculus of probabilities to his main question, "does God exist?", there are two possible answers: betting to His existence (believer's, ultimately Abraham's position), and betting to His non-existence (atheist's

² "Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapor, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him, the universe knows nothing of this..." (our translation) (Pascal, *Pensées*, 324)

position). To this, the posterity of existentialism (especially Soren Kierkegaard) will add a third choice, which is in fact a non-choice, of not betting at all (the worse situation of the skepticist). Hence, in accordance to the calculation of probabilities and chances, it appears that if one bets for the existence of God and He exists, one will gain his salvation only by sacrificing one's finite and miserable existence³ i.e. devotion to God... If one bets for His existence and He doesn't exist, one will lose nothing more than his miserable life for infinity. Finally, if one bets for His non-existence and He exists, the loss will be the eternal salvation accompanied by a miserable, finite life; and if He doesn't exist, one will gain nothing more than this worldly life. Hence, everything shows that it is of your interest to bet for the existence of God⁴.

Nadine Gordimer was able to show how "opinion" was detached from "truths", where the probability of correspondence was still possible in the times of Pascal:

In the beginning was the Word. The Word was with God, signified God's Word, the word that was Creation. But over the centuries of human culture the word has taken on other meanings, secular as well as religious. To have the word has come to be synonymous with ultimate authority, with prestige, with awesome, sometimes dangerous persuasion, to have Prime Time, a TV talk show, to have the gift of the gab as well as that of speaking in tongues. The word flies through space, it is bounced from satellites, now nearer than it has ever been to the heaven from which it was believed to have come. But its most significant transformation occurred for me and

³ "Qu'on s'imagine un nombre d'hommes dans les chaînes, et tous condamnés à la mort, dont les uns étant chaque jour égorgés à la vue des autres, ceux qui restent voient leur propre condition dans celle de leurs semblables, et, se regardant les uns et les autres avec douleur et sans espérance, attendent à leur tour. C'est l'image de la condition des hommes." (Pascal, *Pensées*, 199-434) which reads as follows, describing the miserable "existence" of human beings in this world: we have people condemned to death, and they are killed one by one, strangled before the eyes of the others, the remaining ones after each execution must have to see their "condition" in the fate of their "others". And they are envisaging each other with pain and there is no hope. They are all waiting their turn. "This is the image of the human condition", according to Pascal, an image which could evidently be compared with Plato's famous allegory of the cave, in his Republic. But this is also relevant to Bergson's account for "religion" and "morality" --"La religion est une réaction défensive de la nature contre la représentation, par l'intelligence, de l'inévitabilité de la mort (Henri Bergson, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* [in *Oeuvres*, PUF 1970, p. 1086]): here, "religion is a defence of Nature against the representation, provided by the intellect, of death..."

⁴ Pascal's Wager: it is rational to believe in God since: "If God does not exist," he argued, "one will lose nothing by believing in him, while if he does exist, one will lose everything by not believing." It makes sense to cover Pascal's bet... If we win, we win eternity. If we lose, we lose nothing.

my kind long ago, when it was first scratched on a stone tablet or traced on papyrus, when it materialized from sound to spectacle, from being heard to being read as a series of signs, and then a script; and travelled through time from parchment to Gutenberg. For this is the genesis story of the writer. It is the story that wrote her or him into being. (Gordimer, 1991:1).

The "power of the word" was nothing but this detachment from its status as the agent of "conservation" of ideas, concepts, sounds, to reach a state where it tends to become "creation", a creation of opinions, or literature. The way in which Gordimer is critical about the "capture" of language by TV talk shows, arguments, backed by "electoral campaigns" emitted through satellites, walking towards a new kind of God and existence. The word tends to become a measure, a calculus⁵.

Through all these calculations and "scales of argumentation", as the semantician Ducrot would call it (Ducrot, 1980), we may observe the birth of a way of philosophizing, which is that of the Existentialism, whether atheist or Christian, up to Sartre's understanding of the "necessity to choose". In our modern world, it seems that this choice, whether it is for "existence of God" or any other issue -- including freedom-- is not marked by a necessity but only by an arbitrary involvement of subjects. For the sentiment of seriousness and of necessity, we need philosophy and not exactly common sense and public opinion⁶.

"Pascal's bet" also shows us the extent of our distance from the beginnings of modernity, at least from a philosophical perspective. Betting today is part of a general regime in which judgments and choices are universally circulating,

⁵ Gordimer outlines the "doxological" and performative nature of writing, as a problem of existence, and this existence is for others, which she sees as the "humankind": "The writer is of service to humankind only insofar as the writer uses the word even against his or her own loyalties, trusts the state of being, as it is revealed, to hold somewhere in its complexity filaments of the cord of truth, able to be bound together, here and there, in art: trusts the state of being to yield somewhere fragmentary phrases of truth, which is the final word of words, never changed by our stumbling efforts to spell it out and write it down, never changed by lies, by semantic sophistry, by the dirtying of the word for the purposes of racism, sexism, prejudice, domination, the glorification of destruction, the curses and the praise-songs." (Gordimer, 1991:3)

⁶ It is useful to recall Baudrillard's almost defeatist account for "hyperreality" in which "existence" remains below universe (Maniquis, 1983: 263; 282n4) "Les Strategies fatales" of Baudrillard is nothing but a Pascalian account of the "possible" and the "probable" in

generally taking the form of images, shows, debates, political confrontations of ideas, and everything passing through TV's. Opinions, even when they are about such an important thing as the existence of God can easily circulate and, while being restrained in many kinds of totalitarian regimes which are not less based on the circulation of opinions and overt lies, "the" opinion is what creates individuals and social groups by the single movement of their expression. Our parliamentary democracies are nothing more than a "public opinion research", once contested by Friedrich Pollack, the Frankfurt School sociologist, since it is now almost impossible to understand the difference of our "electoral systems" from a simple "research into public opinion" (Pollock, 1976). One can also add to this situation the very problematic question of opinion polls in political issues, since the so called "voting behaviour" could easily be infiltrated in our "statistically" defined and organized societies, and there are those who hope, with the use of devices like the Internet, that the political system could be controlled by the electorate through the continuous variations of opinions and campaigns.

2.2 The Concept of Opinion, Ancient and Modern

When the Ancient Greeks were talking "about" opinions, they tended become "philosophers", a new person, since every person was entitled to have opinions. Hence, the Greek polis excluded those who suspend their opinions and judgments, and the resulting "crime", that is, non-participation in public affairs either by ways of neutrality or escapism (the *apragmosyne*)⁷ was punished by the heaviest punishment, the exile⁸. Foucault was interpreting Ancient Greece as a "society of

social consciousness --there is connection between "opinional" Pascal's bet, or "wager" with "postmodern signs" and "hyperreality".

⁷ For a detailed observation of the "apragmosyne" as "one's own affair" see Carter (1986) Press, New York. 1986. USD 58.00.

⁸ We know that exile was the heaviest sentence, something more than death, since Socrates preferred death to the escape; unless a kind of cosmopolitanism (yet to come with Alexander, destroying the grounds of the "polis", in order to establish the "imperium" in Roman sense) was conceived and accepted, the polis was assumed to behave as a

spectacle" --while not in our manners-- ut they were in fact societies of opinions in their own way and under their own social conditions. Something essential for them seems to be their opposition between the *episteme* (wrongly translated as "knowledge", since it had a narrower meaning than its translation) and *doxa* (again, wrongly translated as "opinion", since it had a larger meaning than its translation). Commentators of Plato or Aristotle, as well as the historians of Antiquity have interpreted this opposition as the point of departure of rational philosophizing, the ascendance from the sensible to the intelligible, from illusion to knowledge. Or, the studies of Jean-Pierre Vernant and Marcel Detienne show us that this opposition "knowledge-opinion" was not quite simple, since there were many "discourses" oriented towards to the heart of the polis, and no one could claim at the beginning to be more than a mere "pretender" --these were the discourses of the Old Man from the Orient (the sage or wise man), the rhapsod or myth-teller (the Poet), the philosopher (who loves wisdom, without being exactly the "wise), and the sophist, who was exactly the "man of opinions". For knowing the existence of a continuous struggle among these "pretenders", it is sufficient to read the Socratic dialogues of Plato (Vernant, 1977; Detienne, 1986).

The confrontation of opinions was essential to the Greek polis, since it was believed that the truth will unmask itself only through such a confrontation. In other words, it was an essential procedure through which "truths", involving the *episteme* could only arise out of the *doxa* in which it was concealed. It could be accurate to treat the classical Greece as a "society of opinions" with some important reserves. Certainly these societies was those of *Logos*, the "common word", of unanimity restored at every public issue. But they feared much from the abusive powers of the orators, their abuse of language, that they felt they should "discipline" it, they should create even a "science of speech" (as in the *Rhetorics* and *Poetics* of Aristotle) to be publicly deployed as a general project of *Paideia*, the life-long education of the citizen, starting from adolescence.

"community" (the "*koine*") and as a "limitation", since Aristotle in his *Politics* was able to measure the exact and adequate number of citizens even for non-ideal city-states (Aristotle, *Politics*)

Hence, everything shows that the "opinion" was not something to be simply eliminated in the Greek way of prudence. We know that their "juridical system" was contaminated by an obsession with rhetorics and well-speaking, rather than well-established laws. The Greek *polis*, which is a "society against state" in the terminology of Pierre Clastres, did everything to control the "speech" it once freed, to put it at a distance from the speakers, imposing "equality" amongst them⁹ (Clastres, 1974) This means that, while a "society against state", the Greek city was not denuded of power relations which are to be decoded from the struggles around opinions. Due to the "larger sense" of the *doxa*, the Greek city was a "political" entity.

It is interesting to observe that the relationship of the Greeks with their language could be one of the most controversial aspects of our problems here. Language was really a *Logos* for them; that is, something more than what is expressed or communicated in the speech of a person. Even more than a "house of being" --as interpreted by Heidegger--, we dwelled in language only insofar as it was the Greek language, the *Logos*. The poet Pindarus was talking about a "language of Gods", capable to "name the beings" with their proper names¹⁰. In Plato's dialogues, a problem never ceases to arise, up to the point of absurdity: what are the "correct" names of things? It is as if names had to belong to things, rather than to human language. The result has been the almost perfect "logocentrism" of the Greek, since any other language was only defined as something which is

⁹ a word more adequate than "equality" is "isonomia", meaning equal distance from the point of arrival or departure, which is the same. Hence there comes the Greek ideal of the "medium" --the power is just put in the middle of pretenders, when a legendary king leaves authority to the people... this is the definition of the "isonomia". Anaximander has been the founder of the idea of the "middle" (to meson), through which he was capable to reformulate the notion of the infinite as a "dynamic entity": The "apeiron" means "unbounded", that is, something capable to decenter everything, evading any kind of centralization.

¹⁰ For some commentators, and not without philologically justified reason, this "language of Gods" was no more than the ancient Phrygian, tending to disappear in Western Anatolia in the times of Pindarus. We can also approve the ongoing speculation about the Oriental origin of most of Greek gods. But nevertheless, gods spoke in Greek language, at least in the concrete language of Homer and Hesiod.

incapable to be understood --the "varvaros", the barbaros, is nothing more than those whose speech cannot be understood by Greeks. We should wait for the "opening" of the Greek polis, the emergence of trade and the sparking of new philosophical sects, essentially the Stoicians who were strangers and bilinguals, in order to have a radical transformation of such a vision of language¹¹. They were "cosmopolitans" right there, in their language and their understanding of it, while teaching non-interference into "political affairs". It should be interesting to note that this teaching is not in contradiction with the political involvement of the late Stoic philosophers --as we know that one of the last ones was the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero, or Seneca, the greatest political orators of Rome... There was no contradiction, since one can observe an important transformation in everything which bears important in political affairs --language freed from the boundaries of "intelligibility", tending to become pure speech and expression, the destruction of the closed community of language, the polis, to give way to the imperial order of multitudes and cosmopolitanism, and more importantly, something which could act as "verb" rather than "name" (as in Pindarus, or in Epicurus, their contemporary and rival), as a "command" rather than a pure "rhetorics", as something in which we are born (the *Logos*)¹².

At a moment, the Western civilization came to join the Judaic world, in that, language suddenly left the level of expressing opinions, to gain the higher, infinitely supreme dimension of the Verb. Everything is understood as the Command or decree of God, and no other possible word could be in circulation, with the exception of human speech which is nothing but a faint echoe of the

¹¹ Stoicians were the ones who invented the first "philosophy of language", since they coincide with an epoch when language could be assumed something like as trade, up to know denied by the Greek philosophy as "non-philosophical" activity. Or something is "exchanged", now, within language, just like commodities, and Stoicians called this as "semeion", the sign, corresponding to the money-sign of the commerce. (Kristeva, Bréhier, Deleuze & Guattari)...

¹² While the Stoic notion of Logos is directly derived from the Heraclitean one, we believe that in them it had a completely new sense, belonging to language, and only language as "speech acts", rather than to the profound order of the "phusis". It becomes necessary to note how the word Logos was used for everything in Ancient Greece --reason, measure, justice, language, speech, everything... (see Castoriadis, 1972)

Logos. This language was absolute, physically dense (the Verb becoming Flesh) and its grammar was nothing but the way in which any philosophical-theological démarche should follow. Language was the cosmic order which defines correspondences, possibilities and haecceities, and a new science of interpretations (hermeneutics) was born at every level of intellectual activity (Foucault, 1977; Deleuze & Guattari, 1980). Human opinions were no longer the words in which truths were hidden, to be extracted by dialectics, but only illusions, compared with the supreme order of the divine Command. The opinion was re-defined as obedience to the "dogma" --a "doxographical order"...

This is why Seventeenth century philosophers and in particular Pascal were the masters of an essential revolution: they just begun with questioning the nature of the Command, the voice of Scriptures, in order to free language to become "expressive", rather than a mere representation of the divine command. This was the task, we will see, of Spinoza in his *Tractatus Theologicus Politicus*. The new conception of opinion, developed by Spinoza, was nothing but a "necessary illusion" which is, nevertheless, a necessary point of departure for attaining rational and intuitive thinking, the "adequate ideas" and the "knowledge of essences", including ours. It is characteristic that Spinoza uses the word "opinion" as synonymous with "imagination" (*imaginatio*). It is nothing but our faculty to think with "images", which are both ideas and affections of external things in some parts of our body (senses), whose causes largely escape us since they can endure while this causes disappeared. The devalorization of "mere opinion" continued, but with a new definition: opinions are nothing but truths about ourselves, concerning our bodily affections in the world, which are not comprising the knowledge of relations and of the causes. Spinoza never believed to what we today are calling "falsity", since there are never false ideas but only opinions that are mutilated by our life-conditions and partial illusions relative to our incapacity to think. Hence, Spinozism has never been an absolute rejection of

the "opinion" (*imaginatio*) but rather a search into capacities inherent in it, to reach higher levels of thought¹³.

Our modern times assume that opinions are not parts of any knowledge, but rather that they are an ambiguous collection of ideas, feelings, knowledges, informations and emotions. When Karl Mannheim, the founder of a "sociology of language" -- rather than the "sociology of knowledge" (*Erkenntnissoziologie*), as it has been generally assumed-- renewed the question of opinions, everything was in the context of modernity: the press, the culture of images, news, political pamphlets in circulation, state bureaucracies operating through reports, campaigns, cases and polls into public opinion. Yet he was capable to ask a fundamental question beyond all these fluctuating and chaotic flows: what forces us to believe that such a column in a newspaper, such a speech of a leader of a political party, such a text or discourse are "conservative" or "revolutionary", "progressist" or "reactionary"? With this question, we are already in the heart of a sociology of opinions, which will gradually lose the radical nature of this fundamental question. It is possible to use Occam's Razor, claiming that what is progressist or reactionary are not texts in themselves, but the people who uttered or written them, hoping to benefit from the constant fluctuation of opinions. Surely, we don't believe to the existence of "texts-in-themselves", just like that there are no "images-in-themselves", without "intentions" or "subjects" who wrote, uttered and represented them. However, in modernity, opinions and their expression have gained a different amplitude which did not exist in pre-modern societies: they no longer belong to the domain of "knowledge" (and unlike the Greek understanding, they are incapable to express a "truth" which they disclosed). As Foucault once remarked, when a journal asked a question to its readers in Eighteenth century, this was a "real question", that is, whose answer was yet unknown. And the famous "Answer to the Question of What is Enlightenment" was written by Kant in *Berliner Monatschrift*. When such

¹³ No one could deny the importance of this Spinozist conception of "necessary illusion" when we see it at work in Althusser's and Pierre Macherey's theories of "ideology". Or we believe that their "Spinozism" could not be perfected unless we reach a genuine understanding --and a corresponding taking into serious-- of the world of images and opinions.

questions, including "does God exist?" are asked today, in journals, reviews or television panels (not more than in "sociological polls", without any requirement of "answer". The journalist or researcher asking such a question is no longer interested in the true answer, even if he or she doesn't exactly know the truth. Or, the answers would have the role of a mere "confirmation", if not "justification" of the actual problems that are put into the agenda by the media. An important philosopher of "communications", Jürgen Habermas should remind that what are at stake in today's mass communications is not, and can never be "truth-values" or even "truth-claims", but only opinion-claims and arguments, obeying to quite different rules of production than those of scientific wisdom or aspirations of everyday life conditions alike. Communication has never been "systematically-distorted", since distortion is already its essence, without ever appealing to the notion of "disinformation".

Again, one can have some difficulties to understand why there is such a word today as "public opinion", since, we already learn from the Greeks that "opinion" is always something "public", belonging to the speech in the agora, and is nothing before it has been expressed and publicly spoken. And, following the effective dissolution of the City-State, the *koinoneia*, the Roman *res publicum* has never been separable from the public discourse, which is nothing less than the individual claims to truth, in cases, tribunals, forums and assemblies. Yet in modern times, we have the concept of the "public opinion", as if there could be something as an "opinion" which is not --or not yet-- "public".

A second, rather "modern" reappraisal of the opposition between "knowledge" and "opinion" comes from Popper and Popperians, for whom, science, simply is not knowledge. Knowledge is, and should always be *doxa*, not *episteme*, since the latter is not justifiable in its very Platonic origin, so that Popper is never interested (and not without being critical about "epistemic" traditions in his work *Open Society and its Enemies*) in epistemological issues, opening the way for an understanding of "knowledge" as a kind of the despotism of the intelligibles.

Evidently, Popper's approach belongs to a kind of doxology, which already pretends to constitute a "logic of scientific wisdom", which relies upon the empirical principles of a "scientism". There is no doubt that his "scienticism" and his logical presuppositions (the 'falsification' theory) led him to denounce an entire philosophical tradition, from Plato to Marx, evidently passing from Hegel's idealism.

In the "logical" context, however, the word "*doxa*" or "opinion" seem to refer to a set of Ancient Greek ideas and notions belonging to the neighbourhood of "*episteme*" (knowledge). Seemingly both terms refer to ideas which can objectively be true or false, but with a clear and important difference: there is no such thing as "false knowledge" since falsity denies the very existence of knowledge. This self-contradictory character of "false knowledge" is, in a way preserved in the work of Spinoza, who already seem to denounce the paradigm of "certitude" developed by his pseudo-predecessor Descartes. We will expose Spinoza's vision of "knowledge" and "opinion" in next chapters, while for now, it seems to be sufficient to state that there is a radical rupture inaugurated by Spinoza in the context of the opinions, as "necessary illusions".

The classical understanding therefore imposes us the determination of an opinion as a statement which can be either true or false. But this refers us back to Pascal's theorems of probability....Blaise Pascal, almost four hundred years ago, urged us with his question "does God exist?" We can understand that he was not interested in the answer of the problem. He knew that faith to God was a gift of the God Himself. Nor he was interested in the opinions of others, upon which, as we generally do today, we can base our polls, TV panels and shows. He was not trying to define a sphere of "clear and distinct" knowledge of God and of His existence, since no definition of God could be available to the intellect of a finite, ultimately finite being, as man... And he was no longer believing in the worth of any proof of the existence of God --the Anselmian "ontological" proof, or other metaphysical proofs...

Neither interested in the "opinions" of the people about the existence of God, nor in the intelligibility of this existence (the logic of proofs), Pascal could be treated almost as a nihilist, or an ultimate skeptic, while his Pietism obviously prevents him from all dangers of this sort. His God necessarily existed and He was nothing but the God who revealed himself through Bible and the entirety of Christian civilization. But, when he posed such a question as "God does exist?", Pascal seems to interrogate something beyond the "existence" of God, since an Atheist or Skeptic could never be convinced in the existence of God, without having the grace coming from Him. And this question, which is not effectively about the existence of God, is about man, whose conditions of existence condemn him to an infinite misery and finitude. The famous Pascal's Bet works now as follows: if you bet to the existence of God and God really exists you will gain your eternal salvation. If he doesn't exist, you will lose only your finite existence, nothing more. If you bet to the non-existence of God and He really exists, you will lose your salvation, and finally, if He doesn't exist, you are nothing but a miserable being who have passed his life in denying something in which he never believed. This means in short that Pascal compares the situations of the one who dares to bet in the existence of God and the one who bets to His non-existence, rather than being really interested in the existence of God Himself.

2.3 Opinion as a Problem of Social Sciences

One can define an entire domain of sociology where the questions of opinion dominate the social scientific research, transforming this discipline into a huge "doxology" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1990:243), serving to create filtered agglomerates of opinions, judgments, answers to prevailing questions which have lost their weight, altogether transformed into sets of information. The television with its "news", "panels", "shows", the documentary films in general proceed similarly --to learn about people asking their opinions about their life, environment and public issues. Friedrich Pollack in his classical article "Empirical

Research into Public Opinion" (Pollack, 1974:68-91) observes the presuppositions of the mainstream sociology as practiced in the "Welfare America": that everyone is interested in answering whenever a question is posed, while this is quite illusory since there is the effectivity of the question itself, creating a fundamental bias -- one is led to "choose" an item among the pre-given answers that has been put into agenda, and this is almost "at any rate". Secondly, one has to recall Bergson in terms of his famous "questioning of questions": it belongs to the depths of our language that we accord the criteria of truth and falsity only to the answers, and not to the questions or problems themselves. When we face a question, we already suppose that there must be a "true" answer to it. It is essential, therefore, to re-define the task of philosophy as according the values of true or false to the questions and problems themselves. This questioning of questions seems to be in rupture with the Kantian way of talking about "true questions" and "false questions". One may recall now Marx who said that every historical epoch poses only those problems it is able to solve. Opinions seem to be the outcome or function of the act of questioning, setting problems, issues, agendas, interrogations and pursuits.

One major epistemological problem of actual social sciences emerges from the problem of opinions: What would be, from a formal viewpoint, the epistemological character of social sciences if their methods would force them to become "opinion of opinions", a mere opinion among many others, in variance with a certain axiology? Today we are far from the birth of social sciences in Nineteenth century where a certain "ontology" was still relevant in Comte, in Spencer, up to Durkheim. Marx could urge us about the absurdity of trying to know what a society or historical epoch "is" by asking people what they think they are. If mainstream sociology today tends to become a doxology, even the most anti-positivistic tendencies as critical schools, deconstruction, post-colonial studies derived from the continental philosophies (French philosophy and German critical school) also belong to a similar horizon: hermeneutics or "understanding", as well as "textuality" also share the same and common doxological character with what they attempt to criticize. For what means "understanding" but a

fundamental belief that people understand themselves better than everyone else? The problem was posed twice, first by Nietzsche when he warns us about the "decadence" of a sociology, notably Spencer's, necessarily sharing the character of a "decadent society" and secondly by Heidegger engaged in the critique of the notion of "hermeneutic circle" in Husserlian phenomenology.

Whatever the "decadence" of such a Nineteenth century "scientism", the epistemological ambiguity in the foundation of social sciences has never failed to give its fruits: from Marx's critique of political economy to Weber's ceaseless creation of "ideal types" as figures for "understanding" a new epistemic subject was born, which could not be reduced to mere doxology that occupies so much social scientific practice today. The "founders" of social (or human) sciences were able to create, to invent what Georg Simmel was calling as "social" or "psychological types". In Marx, not only the Proletariat but also the Intellectual, the Lumpen-Proletariat, the Petty Bourgeoisie were typical, incarnating their social positions in a class society. This means that they both could be considered as classes and concrete human beings, constituting social bodies having a variety of characters. This was the way in which Weber considered "the Protestant" or the "Puritan", Veblen considered the "Leisure Class", Sombart discussed the psychology of the Bourgeois. At the extreme, French sociologists were even able to consider the fundamentally amorphous "masses" or "crowds" as socio-psychological types, as exemplified in the works of Gustave Le Bon. Le Play designed perhaps the largest empirical inquiry into the life of the "working people" in Europe. At any rate, the extreme case was Georg Simmel who worked through the creation of "socio-psychological types", the series of the Migrant, the Poor, the Stranger, the Jew, being at the same time the one who coined the term.

It is clear that the "realist" and "naturalist" novel was able to create "socio-psychological types" for a long time before social sciences: from Balzac on, we have the Bovarisme of the realist novel, and Nana is no one but a social type in Zola. We have the Idiot of Dostoyevsky, and the Russian novel never failed to

operate through the creation of types --the "public employees" of Gogol, the "Nihilist" of Turgenev... Realist novel was bringing something quite different from the Romantic "individual" which resounds somehow like an "ideal", an expressive individuality, culminating in the super-historical Great Man of Hegel: a socio-psychological type is always in variance from what we may call as "individual", the prominent bourgeois ideal and abstraction. Everyone acknowledged the existence of "classes" in Nineteenth century, and it is interesting to note how Marx insists on the fact that he never created the concept of class which was forged especially by French bourgeois historians like Thierry and Guizot. A social type, whether in "historiography", "literature" or "sociology" cannot be reduced to a "class" or to the general and abstract notion of "individual". It is almost in a "halfway" towards these entities: they are evidently "individuals", and "members of a class", if not outcasts at all from a certain viewpoint, but what matters is that they belong to a kind of "singularity". They are not "individuals" or "categories" but rather "constructs" of societies themselves, living a concrete life, having traits, affects and ideas. According to Simmel, the task of sociology is to transform these "traits" through which a social type is recognized to a "social form", or rather a unique formula. Hence the formula of the Stranger (or Outsider) can be given as the one who don't come today and will leave tomorrow, but as the one who comes today and may not leave tomorrow. Similarly, there is no Poor before being invested as "poor" by a given, concrete society, transforming its existence into a problem, then striving to solve it, by charity organizations, churches, humanitarian campaigns.

It is quite important to distinguish "socio-psychological types" from "conceptual personae" invoked by Deleuze and Guattari: from Platonic dialogues on, we always have conceptual persons, Socrates himself, the Sophist, the Idiot (not Dostoyevsky's but Descartes'), Zarathustra, the Priest, the Other... Conceptual persons are needed in constituting subjects responsible for ideas, while this is not necessary for socio-psychological types, who don't need to be expressive of philosophical notions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991).

Another important question is whether psychoanalysis also worked through socio-psychological types. In its Freudian version, the fundamental distinction between the psychotic and neurotic seem to forge an insightful typification. But who is typified here but the "patient", a socially and psychologically "affected" individual, answering to therapy or not, as the sole Freudian criterion for such a distinction? From a Simmelian viewpoint, a Patient could be seen as a "socio-psychological type" only insofar as it is subjected to a socio-historical institutionalization such as the the "clinic" and Foucault did nothing more than this in his history of madness --the mad becoming patient.

Hence, a socio-psychological type can never be seen without a corresponding landscape, a milieu, an environment. This environment is social, since the nature is not a creator of types, that can be generated only by society. Hence it becomes hard to define the traditional and rural conditions of life with reference to social types: the Peasant is a social type only with reference to an urban, modern life to which he tends to become perceptible, as a migrant or possible migrant or as an outsider. We should remember what Spinoza meant when he argued that "Nature never creates nations, casts or classes, it only creates individuals..." It is certain that socio-psychological types are events of modernity.

Now, our main concern in this thesis will be the gradual demise of "social types" through the evolution and academization of social sciences. The birth of the "sociology of opinions" in the hands of a Gabriel Tarde at the end of Nineteenth century was determined by the affective nature of opinions, their contagions and productivity --to create and repeat the "new", constitutive of new social forms, forces and institutions. In other words, social types in their interactive individuality are essentially "affected" and "affective". They generate certain feelings in themselves and others. They are traversed by what we like to call as a "sociology of affects" rather than that of "opinions" which are nothing but affects among many others.

Hence, we should epistemologically discredit and criticize a series of assumptions through which human sciences are traditionally or actually are condemned as if these were "Platonic" ideas: that of "personality", that of "society", that of "individual". The first notion has long been the fundamental assumption of a psychology claiming to investigate the "depths" of human essence. And when Tarde's major opponent Durkheim was trying to create a methodological framework to determine the domain of sociology, he sent individuality to the realm of psychology, keeping the *sui generis* status of the "social" as a fact (*fait social*). In other words, Durkheim has tried to make out of a methodological distinction an ontological, if not real distinction: a social fact is defined as what not only goes beyond the individual, but begins just there, where individuality ceases to be, and a sanction begins. Social facts defy anything individually and subjectively identified, as division of labour, the notions of the sacred and profane, defining out of them an objective, ontological entity called as society.

Beyond all the merits of Durkheim and his followers in shaping sociology as a modern discipline, such a methodological perversion seems to be the point of departure of what we call demise of social types. In the debate Durkheim-Tarde the first has become the winner, leaving the latter to us to re-discover his merits, especially in our key issue here, i.e. substituting a sociology of affects for the sociology of opinions. That social types are affective goes by itself, but what to think about their disappearance from the domain of human or social sciences? Whether such a disappearance is the outcome of the social conditions developed throughout the Twentieth century is an open question, but not only social sciences but literature and cinema too seem today to cease operating through creating social or psychological types. Social types as events of modernity have seemingly lost their classical characteristics and moods, to reappear only in the works of Charles Wright Mills, as "white collar" and "power elite". Talking more about "opinions" and "masses" (the theses on the so-called "mass society") modern social sciences tend to work on "general" or "generic" concepts, quite distant from

the aesthetic character of the description of social and psychological types: "identity" and its "crisis", "plurality" and "pluralisms", "relativity" and "perspectivism" are some of these key notions today, never going beyond the major epistemological problem of social sciences today: to remain as the "opinion of opinions".

We are merely attempting here, in our thesis, to remind the importance of social types in the past of social sciences, basically with reference to the works of Simmel and Tarde (the latter known as the founder of the "sociology of opinions" in a quite different sense with today's) with their "insightful" originality. This is both a criticism of mainstream sociology and its epistemological presumptions. This critical distance will be kept from the categories of what we would like to call "juridico-legal" ways of thinking, today fashionable especially in Europe after the dominant works of German thinkers like Karl Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas.

Pascal was no longer interested in the opinions of the people. He was retired to the *Cour*, as a pietist, leaving his "mathematical-scientific" research behind, to join the mystic experience of surrender to God and of Theodycée. He accounts for his blissful experience induced by meditation. This was no longer a contemplation of the world, which could no longer give anything but suffering and painful daily life, stupid enough to shape the making of the new science and art, but rather of the internal life, of the interior of this feeble and powerless subject before his God, the infinite and omnipotent.

God has no image, even when He says that he created man in accordance to His own image. For a long time this was interpreted in religious hermeneutics as purely a metaphor. And if God, having no image cannot be grasped through imagination, He cannot be grasped by our cognition either: we have no concept of God, nor we do know something about Him, about the selection he will impose on us, about destiny and its enigmas. We are only charged to believe. We must chose

Him and His order, the Command. Pascal is clear about everything: a Command is something to be obeyed, not to investigate about. Such an attitude, however, is quite different from that of ordinary believers who obey the Commandments for generally "this-worldly" reasons or conditions: fear from death and of the possibility of the Last Judgment, or lack of liberty due to the strict observation of traditions in managing daily life, at once disabling the operation of "opinions" and controlling the community's life patterns. All these can constitute almost a second nature that determines the choice. Or, a tradition well formulated by Tertullianus consists not only in making obedience a strict minimum for the believer, but especially in the unconditionality he attributes to the idea of choice. "I believe since it is absurd" is somehow self-evident and a pseudo-rational premise here, since if it was not absurd the belief would be totally non-sense. Really, people are believing to what they don't know and understand, rather than to what they knew.

The novelty of Pascal is that he suggests the idea of "choice" in a totally new form. The alternatives are a limited number, a number which is finite, but one has first to "choose choosing" before one makes a choice in concrete terms. This is the primary point of interest in Pascal's "betting". And this is the non-philosophical (rather, theosophical) way through which he tries to go beyond "mere opinion".

It should now be repeated that the Greeks have opposed the *doxa* (opinion) and the *episteme* (loosely translated as knowledge). Their model was that of dialectics in its pre-Kantian sense, the "old" dialectics, in which everything happens in the context of a reunion and conversation, in which everyone tends to become a pretender --the model of Symposium. As Marcel Detienne argues, the Greeks were quite interested in the powers of speech, its persuasive and rhetorical force (Detienne, 1982). The Greek polis has ever been a society of speech, an oral society. But they also feared from this power and strived always to control it, to develop measures of controlling its abuses, institutionalizing the speech. Jean-Pierre Vernant shows how, in Ancient Greece, many "speeches" were opposing each other in the heart of the city: there was the "*muthos*" of Poet, the "*sophia*" of

the Oriental Old Wiseman, the "*episteme*" of the Philosopher, and the "*doxa*" of the Sophist. (Vernant, 1988:26-49) This did not mean that everyone shared the part of each other, in the sense that as if they were in a constant state of "ideal conversation".

2.4 Opinion in its Psychological Standing

In this part of our study, a general discussion of the extrapolated notions of opinion and affect will become the main outline of a series of theses on the development of modern societies on the global scene. "Opinion societies" mean modern societies as they are founded upon the manipulations and controls of opinions which are always in a state of constant flux and variation. The domain of mass media studies in the framework of social sciences today seems today anchored on the idea of opinion. Theories of ideology (Marxist ones or others), cultural studies and political sociology today seem to coincide or coexist with the idea of opinions and their manipulation through social structures of modern societies. Methodologically, our suggestion will become, however, to replace the paradigms of the "sociology of opinions" with a tentative "sociology of affects", since our belief is that this "affective consideration" is what social sciences have lost during their academic evolution. This lost is evident in the elimination of affective "social types" (in Simmelian sense) as both insightful methods and everyday realities, yet not without having analytical value and function in the early epochs of social sciences. The production of social types was characteristic of these early phases, from Marx to Weber, from Simmel to Adorno. As social sciences became more inclined today to serve as a filter of opinions in constant variation, the demise of the social type became characteristic once one worked through distinctive concepts applied to masses. Yet, last examples of social types in sociology have been the genial creations of a Charles Wright Mills in fifties, with his notions of "Power Elite" and "White Collars".

Our aim here is not to mourn for the “social types” as devices of understanding used by early sociologists. But it is difficult to fail noticing how far the conceptual and methodological arsenal of actual sociology has since been impoverished: in the past, when Marx used the notion of “proletarian” or “capitalist”, these were not only analytically designating social classes or organic units, but also affective social types, with feelings, characteristic emotions, traditions, and variant cultures. The sociologists of the time always worked through creating social types: the Protestant or Puritan in Max Weber, the “bourgeois” in Werner Sombart, the “leisure class” in Thorstein Veblen. But in the early times of human sciences no one was more creative than Georg Simmel in the production of these affective social types: the Stranger, the “blazé”, the Jew... Even the psychoanalysis of Freud had to refer to social types –the “neurotic”, the “hysteric” are social types insofar as laymen can understand what they mean without knowing one word in psychology.

One of the most important reasons of the elimination of social types lies back in Durkheim’s methodological efforts to distinguish the domain of sociology from other human sciences –psychology, ethnology and history. His definition of “social fact” is meant to designate what is something beyond the individual, beyond the subjective or emotional motives. Society appears here as a *sui generis* objectivity, as a fact in itself. Nothing could be more harmful than such an attempt for the sociologist’s creativity in social types. In the early periods of its academisation, with Robert E. Park and his Chicago School, the social types were imported from Europe (under the influence of Simmel). But the eclectic nature of their methods (a kind of ruthless positivism transforming the Chicago City into a laboratory) invited the Durkheimian concepts. Such a migration of ideas can only be conceived in parallel to real migration of people from Europe to the New World, not only of sociologists or sociological theories, but also of social types – the case of “The Hobo” of Nels Anderson is characteristic. But the Durkheimian danger has prevailed, to undermine the capacity of the institutionalized sociology to create notions flexible enough to constitute and survey the new social types.

The Grand Theories conceptualized by Robert K. Merton, and exemplified by the case of Talcott Parsons seem to have completely eliminated the social type. This is the accomplishment of the Durkheimian vices: the detachment of norms and values from the concrete life of the individuals, putting the frame of analysis at the maximal level of nations or society at large. Thus, sociology appears as an attempt to derive individualities out of the integration of values and the persistence of norms, people seeming to flow and variate in an ocean which is historical society. This is where sociology coincides with the notion of opinion: the “sociology of opinions” today is the questioning of social groups about what they think of themselves, their life and public issues. This is just the opposite of the Nineteenth century’s attempt for creating an objective science of humanity and of its history at large: Marx, for instance, was saying that in order to understand a society, you should ask the deeds of the concrete people in it, rather than asking to them what are they thinking about themselves. Again, the constant reference of the early sociologists to social types was opening sociology into the realm of history, to construct genealogies of these types or classes. Asking for opinions evidently can reveal something of the individuals surveyed. But one can scarcely believe that this can by itself reconstitute the ontic social situation, since, as Pollack observes, the polls are biased in such a way that no mathematical-statistical instruments could be able to refine (Pollack, 1976). It is always as if one poses a question to someone, and the second believes now he has to have an idea or opinion about the issue. Or, this may not be the case, since, in the fragmented modern life, with an extremely high level of division of labour, no one could be able to represent a global opinion –this is, moreover, contrary to the very idea of opinion, as we will see in the next chapter. We are here in the trap of language revealed by the philosopher Henri Bergson: to have only been posed a question, one is always inclined to locate the values of truth and falsity in the answer, even in the case of the most absurd, stupid questions. Bergsonian philosophy was, in this respect, an attempt to create a philosophical art of creating and posing “true” questions. In the domain of opinions, however, this is impossible, since the emphasis here is put on the free-floating opposition of opinions. A similar point

has been made by Michel Foucault, who, considering the famous text by Kant “Answer To the Question of Enlightenment”, distinguishes between the early modern opinion and the actual one as in Eighteenth century, a review could pose to its readers those questions whose answers are not yet known, while in a public opinion poll today, it is assumed that everyone knows the answers.

There is also the problem of the “transparency” of the opinion to social forms and structures, again constituting an invulnerable paradox: in modern democracies, one should note how public opinion polls coincide with representative elections, and how the development of modern technologies of communication will tend – before a more or less close future—to make the polls and surveys transparent to electoral practices. An election is a performative research into opinions in a given area (referendums or elections). The polls over tastes and judgements too are attempts to discern what is valuable and what is not. A sociology axed upon research into public opinion is nothing but an opinion qualitatively similar to any other, particular opinion. In other words, it is “a huge agglomerate of opinions” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991). Hence, such a practice of sociology provides us only with information about opinions and particularities. Sociology seems thereby to renounce the Nineteenth century idea of an objective study of the society.

However, modern societies are –nonetheless objectively-- defined by a large accumulation of opinions, which are made the primary subject-matter of social and human sciences today. One should note that the idea of opinion, so long despised by classical philosophies –a mere “*doxa*”, opposed by the “*episteme*”, meaning knowledge since the Ancient Greece—gained importance and relevance in the development of modernity, and, alongside the development of modern representative democracies, opinion tended to become the yardstick of the “public”, as the modern concept of “public opinion” was forged towards the end of the Nineteenth century. Whether the term “public” is a mere useless addition to the word “opinion” or not is not at all evident, since every opinion is somehow

public: it is impossible to have opinion without expressing it. This is the case even as earlier as Plato's philosophy: the opinion is the appearance, as just it appears in the public debates, while it is always individually expressed. The knowledge can be something "hidden", on the sky, in the world of "ideas", but opinion is something always "public" (koinon) while possibly comprising the truth of knowledge. Yet it is not difficult to oppose the modern meaning of opinion to the ancient ones. For a long time, opinion was being treated by the thinkers and philosophers as the ultimate source, or even being of the error and falsity. This is determined by the very nature of the concept, the "doxa" as pure figment, or something expressed in one's speech. Still today, an opinion—in a TV show, a conference or a panel—is nothing but something which has to be opposed, but the modern form of opinion is not challenged by the knowledge, but just by another opinion. This distinction is to be treated as only relative: when the ancient philosopher opposed his "knowledge" against the opinions cultivated by the eminent "doxologists" of the time (the Sophists opposed by Socrates), he was doing so in order to extract truth out of opinions (of himself and of others in a public debate). This means that since the Ancient Greece, opinions opposed opinions, and this was exactly the political representation of the free citizens in public issues. This domain of human public experience survived partially through some modern ideas, especially in the classical period in terms of the empirical concept of "common sense", but this is precisely something different from our understanding of today's idea of opinion. At present, no one can be blamed for his opinion, as it is still opposed to others. Opinion has lost its value as a point of departure in attaining the truth. The truth, on the other hand, seems to be reduced to a formless agglomerate of opinions, in the public, to be extracted and formulated by specific devices of research, i.e. the "research into public opinion". Today's privileged areas of sociological research are nothing but "communications, media studies, and the domain of culture". Throughout this thesis, I will try to show how such a transformation can be conceived, with direct references to some domains of actuality, of modern culture.

Ultimately, an opinion is what transforms an individual into a master and subject of his thought, as a member of a group. The term “member” should be emphasised here, since there are never individual opinions, even when a single person expresses it. Opinion is a performative way of becoming a subject as a member of a group, even if the group consists in a single real individual. One of the best paradigmatic models of how opinion operates is given by Deleuze and Guattari: there is an Ancient Greek round table at stake (the *Symposium*) and some cheese is served. One of the invited persons says “this cheese is pollute and disgusting!”. Other people on the table oppose him: “this is the best of the Rochefort cheese, you are the one who is corrupted!” So, every judgement in the realm of opinions is accompanied by another judgement, this time attributed to the one who expressed the first one. Gilles-Gaston Granger calls this a “generic subject”.

We are inclined to believe that actually, sociology in particular and human sciences in general are suffering from the impossibility of a declining lost paradigm –the “social type” as such, whose last apparition we saw in fifties by the “white collar”, forged by C. W. Mills—and an inability to get rid itself of being axed on the “opinion”. The conditions of sociology in particular forces it today to become a huge agglomerate of opinions, a pure doxological entity, constituted by an average filtration of opinions. Epistemologically, this means that social sciences tend to become a series of opinions about opinions. Its process of academization, during early twenties through the works of the social scientists of the Chicago School, in particular, is marked by the domination of the two American journals –the *American Journal of Sociology*, and the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, published by the University of Chicago since 1937, which we believe is the first "interdisciplinary" engagement in the history of social sciences, already in an era when Durkheim wanted to clarify the boundaries defining the zones of social sciences (especially differentiating between psychology and sociology). Whether public or private, opinion is constituted as the principal subject matter of sociology. And today, social sciences tend to become more and more inclined to rely upon the notions of subjectivity based on opinion. Contrary to the classical manner of considering the realm of the social as an objective entity, as in

Nineteenth century (positivism and Marxism), social scientists today seem to develop conceptual devices or a self-referentiality which tends to constitute a kind of "positivism of the text", or a kind of discursive-interpretative strategy of "reading".

2.5 The Notion of the Point of View

Marx's reminder "one thinks differently in a peasant's hut than in a palace" should be taken in its concrete and literal sense: the formula can be interpreted as one of the possible sources of a Marxist theory of "ideology", but to be engaged in the development of such a theoretical perspective is not our primary purpose here -- we think that the Marxist debates on "ideology" that occupied two decades ago (Althusser, his followers and opponents) the philosophical scene are today futile to be repeated, while we are not declaring a new "end of ideology". We say that Marx's formula tells something about "thought", about "thinking", rather than ideology. The "material" character attributed by Althusser to the ideology was largely depending upon the institutionalized positions of ideology (in general) in the context of specific devices he called as ideological state apparatus. This could lead to an apparent situation that everything in this world could belong to the domain of ideology --not only family, mass communications, trade-unions, justice, NGO's, schools, universities and political parties, but also the entire world of daily life experiences. Yet, we still think that Marx's insistence is on the fact of "thought" (if thinking is a fact, in the Spinozist sense of the term: "Man thinks"), rather than ideology. In order to find Marx's understanding of "ideology", one has to reverse the formula: if a peasant in his hut comes to think like in a palace, we will say that he is in ideology, that his "thought" is not justified in itself. This means that thinking is not a "universal" activity but a conditioned, devoted and engaged position in the world. To think is to have a point of view, but not an indifferent, haphazardly chosen one. Marx could also say that a peasant in his hut is differently affected than an aristocrat in the palace, if we adopt a Spinozist terminology. Thought, if reduced to "consciousness" alone, as in the case of the

Existentialist philosophies (Sartre, Jaspers and Mounier) tends to be formulated rather as a matter of "choice", assuming the freedom of the will as its condition. There is nothing of this kind in Marx who was aware that the peasant, if he thinks "differently", is not free to choose his point of view. And this "difference" is never generic but always specified in the domain of social world: there is nothing like "to think differently" in itself; one always thinks differently from another one, who again is thinking "differently" and so on, to encompass the entire social world. One can think like a peasant as a member of a class, or as a child of the traditions, mores, habits and appropriated morality. This is not necessarily what is meant by Marx, since we reduce thinking in this case to the opinion, conditioned in a world of social transformations, fluctuations and unconscious choices. To be a member of a class can be an attribution, creating the peasant as a "social type" among many others, yet one can fail to acquire the point of view determined by the peasant life as it is. One should assume that there are as many points of view as there are individuals. Again we have the Spinozist formula to interpret such a determination of the plurality of points of view: Nature doesn't create nations, classes or casts, it only creates individuals. This does not mean that nations, classes, families and other social groups are fictive, or that they don't exist, it means rather that one has to be an active participant to be a member of any or more of these human groupings, that these groupings are to be historically and genetically constituted.

One question that raises itself up here is how to conceive such a notion of the point of view. Strictly speaking, the notion of point of view has nothing to do with the "opinion" and the ordinary notion of relativism. Marx never conceded that the "class point of view" was ever a specific opinion among others, as it was represented by a "pionneering" cast of socialist intellectuals; the class viewpoint, as it has been repeated by Lenin leads to a kind of "truth", which has to be interpreted as the "constructive power" of the socialist life. The only difference between this "constructivist" understanding of truth and the older, traditional, or "scientistic" truth regimes (as in the religion) is that it is not pre-established, covered up by the long traditions, dogmas and rules. The constructivist

understanding of truth neither conceives it necessarily as something to be arrived at, before stopping. The fact that the cluster of Marx's thought never encountered the Nietzschean one should be rethought: Nietzsche has been the one who profoundly understood that "truth" could be the "deepest lie", the one one fails to reach in "digging" the reality. In Marx, the same sense is given to "truth" only insofar as it is conceived in the context of a "historical process", which is implicit in Nietzschean viewpoint. The truth in this sense can create the affect of "to-be-at-home" (as a Hegelian category, formulated as the fact of Western philosophy: we are together in the house of the Greeks), and an understanding through which one has to stop and relax, after attaining a truth.

To have a point of view is the essential foundation of the modern philosophy, since Descartes. It is also the implicit philosophical basis of modern institutions -- revolutions, democracy, society of opinion, freedom of thought and human rights. Since the Renaissance, it has also been the driving force in arts, literature and especially in sciences. In this part of our thesis, we will try to expand the determinations of this "modern" idea of point of view, together with its political, social and aesthetic determinations.

Today, we are appealed by our contemporaries, from the West and the "East", to recognize the "great sin" of a great French philosopher of the Seventeenth century, René Descartes: the Cartesian worldview is severely criticized by the philosophers, sociologists, scholars of every kind, as the responsible of the "subjectivity" of the conscious being, the mind-body dualism (and through this, of all kinds of dualisms) and of the "cerebrality" of Western metaphysical thought. Some of these criticisms, without being pretentious about the "overcoming of metaphysics" are obviously well-established. Yet everyone seems to admit that Descartes was precisely the founder of modern thought, in which the Enlightenment, the Kantian "critique", and the modern philosophies of every kind evolved. We will take now the exact point of reversal that occurred in Descartes' thought, the coup de force implied in his invention of the Cogito.

The Aristotelian Scholastic and the Platonic revival during the Renaissance have developed in the domain of an Ancient image of thought. To think was to "appropriate" an Idea, through speculation or the capture of the "hidden" forms behind "appearances", as if these ideas or forms were located in the Heavens; living in the appearances, one was in the opinion only, and to think was an activity of speculation, of definition, of categorizing species and genera. It is evident that the "return back of thought" onto itself, the Socratic moment was only a relative movement, which in fact fortified the regime of truth, expanding it into human, political and moral affairs; while the Ionians, restraining themselves to the utterance of singled out moral premises in their philosophy, developed the rational project of inquiry into the Nature of everything.

The Platonic-Aristotelian mode of thought, and its continuation in Medieval theology and Scholasticism, operates somehow as a device or method of thinking as one is deprived of every affects, emotions, illusions and even tradition. Until now, there is nothing that distinguishes the meditation practice of Descartes and an Ancient philosopher or a Scholastic. They are of the kind of those philosophers who over-valuated the method (the logic or analytic) with respect to the content (ascertained as knowledge or "scientia"). Everything happens when Descartes raises up his formulation of the Cogito ("I think, therefore I am") at the level of the "definition of man". The Aristotelian "classical" definition of man, as animal rationale was relying upon a classical mode of definition --one had to take the universe "animals", and then pass into the particular "man", distinguishing this sub-group by a "differentia specifica" (specific difference), which is in this case "to be rational". Everything passed, in accordance to the Aristotelian formal logic of syllogism, as a movement from genera to species in the general deductive context. Or, what is there something as a "definition" in the case of Descartes' *cogito* --I think, therefore I am? This is not only a new definition of man, but a totally new definition of the definition itself, at least implicit in the *Méditations* of Descartes. One should go further into the complete formula of the Cogito: I doubt,

therefore I think, so I am, therefore I am a thinking thing. Against his "theologist" or "materialist" critiques, Descartes seems to be in anger, especially in his letter to Arnauld: I know that there can be my body who thinks in me; what matters is that I can "doubt" about this; that some kind of power in me can lead me to doubt about such a reality: this is exactly what Descartes calls as "thinking" (*penser*). One can even say that he has been the inventor of "thinking", while for the Ancients, with the exception of the Stoicians, thinking was generally the "internal thought", the "dianoia" through which one necessarily encounters the idea through replicating its models, as it is the case implied by Plato's Menon. There was an external relationship between the "idea" and the "internal thought", and the latter was not reducible to the former, nor the former to the latter. Thinking meant to be impregnated by an idea, which belongs to the Divine order, out there, in the heavens, and the world of appearances in which we ordinarily live is only a distorted image of the world of eternal forms or ideas. It is clear that Descartes is at the threshold of moving from the understanding of "thinking" as a replica or simulation of ideas towards a modern image of thought: in his *Principes de la philosophie*, to the question "what is thinking?", he answers by expanding thinking towards a new domain: "thinking is not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling (*sentir*)" (Descartes, *Principes de la philosophie, Oeuvres*, p. 95) This means that an "affective" dimension is introduced in the classical notion of thinking. But what is much more important is that Descartes is now capable to develop a new image of thinking, thinking as a human activity: "but once I kept myself secure from the fact that, at the moment when I wished to think that everything is false, it was necessary that me, who was thinking it, be something..." (*Discours de la méthode*, Part 4) Descartes clearly rejects to contend himself in affirming, in the classical manner, that man is a reasonable animal, since this time, one has to pass to the notion of the animal, and to the question "what is reasonable", with a series of infinitely recursive questions (see *Méditations*, p.109) His deduction is not that of a derivation, but a clear involution when he passes from "doubting" to "thinking", and from "thinking" to "being"; that if I doubt, this involves that I think, and that I think is equally involving that I am.

This relationship of "involution" is another image of "thinking". When a Scholastic was defining man, the concepts he uses are not intrinsically related to each other; the notion of man can be thought without necessarily referring to the notions of animal, and of reason; moreover, each of these notions could be found in different individual minds, or in the same individual mind differently, at different times. This is the case of the Cogito in Saint Augustine, where the identity of the "*Ego Cogito*" is raised up to the dimension of time, to his Odyssey from Paganism to Catholic belief. Descartes is replacing this image with a new one, in which the identity is reduced to the simple certainty "I = I" on the one hand, and the thinking is raised up to the actuality of an act. It is as if "thinking" begins to have a "speed", infinite in the case of the formulation of the *Cogito*, but which is determined as the necessary passage from one thought to another, from one affect to another. This is nothing but the invention of "subjectivity".

This is a singular moment in the history of thought: it has many presuppositions and implications --and these implications are not only "philosophical", but also moral, social and political. For the first time, thinking has acquired a new mode of being, i.e. to be the image of a human activity or, if we take it further, human action. Having a speed, it has also a trajectory, a "*démarche*" in the Althusserian sense, and thereby, one can raise obstacles up its road. As the philosophical invention of subjectivity cannot be separated from the creation of the "modern subject" --in the "juridico-legal" sense of the word-- man, as a thinking being can affirm his "being" in the existence only when these obstacles before his thinking activity are removed or destroyed. Without the passage from the Ancient image of thinking to the Cartesian one, one is not capable to "claim" rights of thinking and expression. It is evident that in the past too the expression of ideas, and human thinking in general were persecuted and censored by the authorities --the State, the Church and the like. It is true that people were always persecuted and massacred for their ideas. But the modern claim to "freedom of thought" and its avatars --freedom of conscience, human rights, freedom of expression-- would be

impossible unless modern societies have implanted this new image of thinking as an action. The Cartesian *coup de force*, which is performed in the language of philosophy finds a corresponding series of social transformations, expanding in the clusters of time and geography which we call as the West, through which new "freedoms" are invented, and a new "society", which we call the "society of opinion" is formed.

The "point of view" can now be instituted outside the Cartesian understanding of subjectivity, but, this is true, always in the domain opened up by the "coup de force" executed by Descartes. His follower and major "rationalist" opposant, Baruch Spinoza still appraises reason and thinking as an act of the mind; the best political regime is the one (democracy), which persecutes less this action of thinking. But what is characteristic in Spinoza is the way in which he includes the principle of the Cogito: an almost indifferent proposition in the second book of his Ethics says "Man thinks". This is not certainly the "tone" of Descartes, who was dedicated to the task of formulating his ideas as soon as possible (Leibniz accuses him for attaining the consequences of his thoughts too quickly). In the "tone" of Spinoza, the fact that "man thinks" one can discern another point of view than the Cogito of Descartes. Thinking is nothing but "to have ideas", as Spinoza abstains to define "thought" in his work, while daring to define everything in due order "more geometrico". Descartes is the one who cries: "I think", "I am a thing that thinks", while Spinoza coldly puts the fact that man thinks, without substantializing the act of thinking. Thinking, to have ideas is nothing but an affection of human body, encountering external things. There is no room to say that "I am a thinking thing", since thought is only a mode, that is an affection and at the same time, a general notion whose substantialization could destroy the unity of the substance: we are calling thinking every affect which passes in us, while every affect is dedicated or devoted to singularities in the world. There is no thinking in general, but thought truly is a human action, that produces one's mind. Another moment comes with Kant, who criticizes Descartes for having too quickly deriving out conclusions, as Leibniz has done before him: one needs the Cogito as a receptacle in which the acts of analysis and especially synthesis are

performed by the faculty of knowledge, but there is no room in saying that "I am a thinking thing", simply the notion of "thing" is not yet "explained". According to Kant, to move from "I think" to "I am" is justified, but from "I am" to "I am a thinking thing" is not legitimate. This Cartesian attitude, Kant calls as "material idealism", in which one declares the spatiality of the objects without us as either doubtful or undemonstrable; Descartes thereby admits "the undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion (*assertio*), to wit, 'I am.'" (CPR) What Kant means is that Descartes, while recognizing that human thought is a non-spatial thing, reduces everything to a possible doubt we feel about the spatiality and corporeality of ourselves; or everything is still to be determined and explained:

The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary being. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained- because in this case the major premiss, "Everything, which thinks, exists," must precede- but the two propositions are identical. The proposition, "I think," expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that perception (proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposition); but it precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of perception by means of the categories in relation to time (CPR)

This is not a purely philosophical criticism of a metaphysical theme if we try to get into the new path Kant is now able to convey the action of thinking: once deduced from the experience, the "I think" is not sufficiently determined, remaining merely as an empirical, non-methodic intuition. One can understand how Kant too is intending to give a coup de force to the philosophical reflection: This *coup de force* will be on the same basis we have tried to expose concerning Descartes: it will lead to the deepest logic of the Enlightenment, with all its newly emerging institutions; and we know that the most important "institution" of the Enlightenment has been the "reason" or what the philosophers of the time were calling as "reason". And in Kant, reason is reported to a legislative faculty, acquiring an almost juridico-legal definition: there is nothing but reason to judge

everything; but to judge everything, it has first to judge itself. This is a somehow strange argument, since the idea of the "critique" (Kant calls his philosophy as "kritische", critical), that is, the Kantian highest philosophy itself will be derived out of it.

Hence, the Cogito institutes itself, in contrast to the purely "cognitivist" aims of Descartes, and partially of Kant, at the level of social structures, and this is not the lesser part of the process of modernity. Of this process, I will now take into account only a few dimensions, notably, the institution in modern juridico-legal forms of a Subject which becomes the holder of not only his "thoughts" and "opinions", but also of his affects.

2.5.1 The Juridical Institution of the Subject

A promise determined the kind of religious obedience practised in the Judaeo-Christian culture: this was based on the priority of the "moral-magical" bonds between divinity and his people over any other relationship, especially the relations of property. This means that in these civilizations, the God rather "promised" a land to his people. This was different in the relationship of Greeks to their gods, while I don't believe like Michel Foucault that this was exactly what made them an inherently "political" civilization (Foucault, 1986). I am neither intending to seek in the case of the "Oriental" empires and theocratic regimes the semiosis of a non-political form or theme of power, which was called by Foucault as "pastoral power", since Foucault himself stresses that this theme remained, perhaps until the emergence of modern structures of power, as a mere theme or idea through which power relationships are ideally conceived by these civilizations. There are many reasons to believe that a conceptualization of power, insofar as it is generalized among the people can be "inscribed" through historical processes into the functioning of political and social institutions. We can ask why Foucault did not seek the same relationships between "discourse" and "power" in the case of these Oriental societies, just as he sought in modern societies from the

classical period on. We can leave such a discussion to another dimension of debate.

Yet, the discourse of the Cogito did not remain purely philosophical in the classical period: we have already implied that it lies at the source, as a presupposition at least, of what is called as "freedom of expression". As thinking in itself tends to become a human activity, there might be external --and only external-- obstacles that came to inhibit, persecute it. This was naturally a "universal" problem for the philosophy of the classical period --some were persecuted as Giordano Bruno and partially Baruch Spinoza, who was not able to publish his most important books. This was also the conditions of the "double-philosophy" of Leibniz and probably Malebranche, who expressed their philosophies at two discernable levels, one for the "learned" and one for the "ordinary" people. This is evident, since some problems which exist in the former register do not appear in the second, and some "aporias" in the second are passed without any reference in the former. We don't here merely referring to an old and long tradition of "esoteric" doctrine. Esotericism, with its deeply mystic and religious character belongs to a different order than the Seventeenth century rationalism. We can only speak about a kind of compromise with the authorities, having similar reasons for avoiding the emergence of the anger of the notables (the priests, the Church and the politicians) who needed the general "ignorance" of masses.

The philosophical problems faced by the new Cogito were not evidently "juridical" at first, while its process of expression created a new atmosphere in the world of legal norms, which cannot be reduced to Foucault's analyses about the transformations in penitential structures in the Classical period. It is true that we can also test the emergence of a new kind of power, invested not only in the domain of law and justice, but everywhere, permeating the entire life-experience of modernity. But there was also the development of a new form of "opinion", in whose image one can see, in crystallized form, the embryonic development of the

modern societies of opinion. What will become, when we transpose the Cogito into the domain of "opinion", making indiscernable all former distinctions between opinion and knowledge?

First, opinion is already framed in a continuity with knowledge in Spinoza's philosophy; and the argument through "common sense" was already fully validated in the Anglo-Saxon empiricisms of Hume and Locke. This was a new mode of continuity between opinion to knowledge and other cognitive-affective faculties --imagination, sensibility, *aisthesis*... Secondly, the development of the societies of opinion had its early roots in the Seventeenth and especially Eighteenth centuries, with the development of quasi-private, non-academic philosophical circles (even a solitary figure like Spinoza had a circle of friends, expanding from his country, Holland to Germany, France, and England); and the Eighteenth century, especially in France was marked during the century of Lumières by the emergence of various "clubs" of ideas, like the early period of the Jacobine Club. These were places where communications of ideas and their fermentation occurred. It seems that the Cartesian Cogito was implanted in these non-institutional milieus as their deepest structure: their claim was a right to think, and to "realize" the content of their thoughts, whatever they are. Thirdly, there were the first examples of independent press and publishers' houses, in constant interaction with the abovementioned milieus, tending to become their material basis of production and circulation of ideas.

2.5.2 *Jurisprudentia*

Today, the philosophy of law can be opposed by a new thought, an "outsider" thought in the manner of Foucault, which is that of jurisprudence: the opinion about law has always been distant (as it is generally unable to comprehend it deeply) from the philosophy of law, whose deepest philosophical models in modernity were given by German philosophers like Kant and especially Hegel. In

Hegel, Right (*Rechts*) tends to become almost the Idea, and the philosophy of right comprises everything, from phenomenology of the spirit to the realization of the reason. As the philosophical reflection was a question of "ought", rather than a reflection upon the actuality, the idealist philosophies of right (the *Rechtsphilosophie*) were inclined to define the principles of right everywhere they can touch: the invention of the inalienable human rights and freedoms, the definition of the "logic" of procedures, the philosophical conventions through which the law codes are defined. In much more refined forms, a brand of today's "universalist" philosophies, like in Habermas and Niklas Luhmann have developed a new *Rechtsphilosophie* which is not lacking these early resources, but applying them to the actual conditions.

Every philosopher had to do with affairs of law and rights. To learn something about law has always been a source of good wisdom and a fruitful matter for reflection for philosophers, from the Ancient Greece to the present times. But we can distinguish a philosophical thread through which, the idealization of the law has been tried to be overcome, if not attacked. This is the "jurisprudential" thread, beginning with the Sophists. A Sophist, it was diagnosed by Platonists, works out and feeds the opinion, rather than truth --as they tend to "relativize" everything, creating "situations", or in modern philosophical terminology, "language games". He performs "as ifs", simulations and pseudo-conceptual arguments. But it is true that they overwhelmed the established opinions of the people, and their work could not be considered, even within the framework of the Socratic-Platonic thought, as merely destructive, since destroying the opinion was generally admitted by philosophers almost as an initiation to philosophy. To persuade in rhetorics, according to Aristotle for instance, is an act of undoing the opinion. And what matters is about to learn about the art of persuasion, as it was the case with the great orators, and Sophists who were the lawyers of the time. This was, in Ancient Greece, a singularly different semiotic-performative model of speech and language, which was inscribed within the folds of the political city. We will show later, in the context of the "social types" of the Ancient world, that the most "modern" figures of Antiquity were the Sophists: for them, philosophy, or

thinking in general was a preparation for the art of persuasion, for the capacity to argue. The endless recursive patterns of philosophical counter-arguments in the Sophist dialogue of Plato show that even the philosopher could do nothing outside "argumentation" or the "working through opinions". Against Sophists, even Socrates turns out to become a Sophist. This was a deep rupture in the trajectory of ideal dialectics.

Although they are matters of opinion, negotiation and argumentation have a quite natural "positivity" which is absent in "thinking". What can be a genuine distinction, after all, between "thinking", a procedure of knowledge and "arguing" about opinions or negotiating them? One can simply say that you have only an opinion, while he possessed the truth. What does it mean, than what he believes to the truth of his opinion. Opinion, on its logical foundations, seems to be a horizon for every "apparition" of a thought or idea. Certainly, this horizon must not be the ultimate one, since the Greeks were believing in general to the Heracleitean premise, that "truth conceals itself". This is a manner for predicting the Nietzschean theme, which reads "truth is the deepest lie; one digs and finds not the deepest item", so one calls it "truth". It is not ultimate, but it is the limit which repeats itself at every stage of argumentation, as a basis of a self-reference: opposing opinion and true knowledge has a difficulty --if something is opinion, it is open to "error", but a knowledge should be communicated as an opinion first.

2.6 The Dimensions of the Critique of Language

What we can mean by a "critique" of language? Is it possible that someone criticizes something outside language, even in everyday life? Most ordinarily, when we criticize someone, we generally criticize one's behaviour, temperament, attitudes, deeds or actions, and this means that we are still at the level of language, assuming like Derrida that these critiquable elements are nothing but contexts, and therefore can be assumed as texts. Or, can we mean by this a criticism of

linguistic theory, of which many theoreticians were and are still successful today? This is a more prudent assertion and it can already be conceived as many circumstances which assured the evolution of linguistics, pragmatics, and philosophies of language. And thus every critique, also being a linguistic, pragmatic or philosophical event (that is, a "language") should necessarily be a critique of language. As it is convenient to note how Plato invented philosophy already as a critique of language, since it was born into language (the logos) and ought to be perpetuated by language itself, at least through an idealistic-realistic manner up to the more developed philosophies like Hegel's. Never trying to reduce philosophy into a linguistic manifestation, we may conserve, at least for a while and temporarily, the Hegelian context in which everything which appears in philosophy, art and culture, and also in science and technology is language and nothing but language. So, the critique too should necessarily work through and upon language.

The idealistic motives in such an idea of the "critique of language" can already be seen in the early idea of the Logos, as the pre-philosophical material of the Ancient Greek thinking. That Logos governs the universe and Being, that it is what is Common to All etc., are already the fundamental affirmations of a Heraclitus, a pre-philosopher, or "officially" to borrow the language of the historians of philosophy, a pre-Socratic philosopher (yet he could not be a "philosopher, simply because the word "philo-sophia" and the corresponding institution was invented later by Plato, not even by Socrates). And the first important critique of language is brought forth by Plato, as one of the core arguments of his ultimate "political" work, alongside the critique of opinions: it is not a critique of language, but of some ways in which it is politically or poetically used. If language was common to all (which is evident) it should be rendered in its use to the Common, to the *koinoneia*. The political significance of such a critique is already manifest in the famous Platonic criticism of the poets and artists, with respect to the "common" of the ideal city. Among the many ways of reading such famous passages of the Republic, there is at least one which can account for such a debate by defining it as an attempt to criticize language as such, while such a

criticism necessarily occurs only through language. There is still another evidence --that the Saussurean foundation of language (as distinguished from speech) is already present in Plato's dialogues. The unique controversial point in such an assertion is that there is a single word in Ancient Greece to mean both language and speech, and this word is the Logos. Or, as explained by Castoriadis, the word Logos is not merely Speech-Language, but also Reason-Cause, Principle-Measure etc. Therefore it means "everything" --and thus, it is quite open to treachery and anachronisms of a Heideggerian search for "origins" (Castoriadis, 1972). Or, that Logos can mean everything is clear in itself, in the very primordial possibility of defining language. We simply think that what a Greek understands of this "universality" of the Logos was, in an ordinary sense, that language can call, name and attribute everything. In other words, Logos is co-extensive with the Cosmos, as its necessary "cultural" and "intellectual" component. We are opposing Castoriadis only at this point: that Logos means as many things as possible has also a "meaning", in the sense that for the Greek philosophy in general, Logos is entitled to "call" everything in the Cosmos. So, Pindaros was talking about a "language of Gods", probably referring to an old Anatolian language whose rules still prevailed in the dialects of the time (perhaps the Phrygian), and which was capable to "call things with their 'true names'". There is no doubt that even the act of criticism (in the sense of critical thinking) in its oldest sense is assumed as a "logocentric" phenomenon.

Therefore, the Logos is everywhere ruling only insofar as it can "name" everything. This earliest insight has been re-affirmed by Nietzsche in his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of Greeks: it was ruling since everything named was possessed, or participating into an open whole, truly called later by Heidegger as the primordial meaning of *a-letheia*, the uncovering of the oblivious. Yet Nietzsche, as a more culturally-oriented thinker than the purely philosophical Heidegger, is able to formulate the limits of such a "universe", retaining the philological elements intact and almost as imaginative dimensions: affirmation was an act of faith, but still remaining as an act of language, of telling the truth, a veridiction. One has give, in addition to one's speech, signs about the very truth of

one's speech: acts of confidence, of conviction, of belief. At any rate, these are pre-linguistic phenomena: they are either gestures or presuppositions --that is, deeds or acts warranting the truth of the arguments. Logos argues before its acts of "naming", and even this "naming" is an argument: there is a sublime moment when one can no longer excavate the volume of the world and calls the level one reached as the "truth". Names are therefore always "true". If someone names something, there is no more something to be argued.

Or language not only "names" but also "suggests", "proposes", "judges", "teaches", "criticizes" --it is a purely pragmatic potentiality. Even naming is a speech act, as the famous theory of names developed by Saul Kripke would show. Socrates was deranged of the Sophists and of rhetoricians since they were using the Logos as part of a kind of "business", teaching for money (see Kripke, 1972). One should understand that what Socrates has attempted to criticize in Sophists was not simply they taught for money in exchange, but that they taught the "use of language" in exchange of money. They were almost "linguistic impostors", "language abusers". They were continuously postponing the act of "naming" --a procedure for the indetermination in language: their procedure was that of a continuous argumentation, of pleading, and of an agonizing Logos.

2.6.1 Communications: The Story of a Model

There is an interdisciplinary "discipline" today, which calls itself "communication studies". It is impregnated by at least two tendencies, first the theories of communication, and second, by what we may call "philosophies" or "pragmatics" of communication. The former has its starting point in the tiny "cybernetic" engineering affair, since the Second World War (the so-called Shannon & Weaver model of communications); the latter is broadly articulated in the domain of "critical" philosophies of Karl-Otto Apel and especially Jürgen Habermas. In this part of our study, we will be now engaged in the criticism of this model of

communication; first, the model itself, and later, its unquestioned admission as a fundamental philosophical concept.

The Shannon & Weaver model of "communications", as we noted above, belongs to the domain of engineering, and finds its provocative tenure in terms of its "scientific" nature and its availability in the technological world vision. It tells us something like that: there is an encoder and a decoder as partners of any communication --the one who sends the message, and the other who receives it. By the same token, we learn that there is a "message" which is send and receieved, no matter what is its content. This message is send through a trajectory, which is open to the hazards of the environment (this is the "entropic" phenomenon). This means that the environment, the "path" through which the message is sent is both a "medium" which connects, but also which provides obstacles. The environment is the ambiant world itself. One last element should be added, and it is called as "language". It is nothing but here a system of codification, a code, which is applied to the matter of the message. The content of the message is coded by a given language, known by both of the parties, so that one encodes it, and the second deciphers it.

Last but not least, there remains still an indetermied element, which is presupposed in the entire exposition of the phenomenon of communication: this is the "content" of the message. This "content" should be left "indetermied" for evident scientific reasons: a modern science, to become "modern", should describe and define only the "forms" or "structures", rather than the "contents", and this is the scientific claim to universality. This is what makes Shannon & Weaver's model "scientific"¹⁴. There is no room to fill the "content", since the

¹⁴ Claude E. Shannon, whose initial ideas appeared in the article "The Mathematical Theory of Communication" in the *Bell System Technical Journal* (1948). In its broadest sense, information is interpreted to include the messages occurring in any of the standard communications media, such as telegraphy, radio, or television, and the signals involved in electronic computers, servomechanism systems, and other data-processing devices. The theory is even applied to the signals appearing in the nerve networks of humans and other animals. The signals or messages do not have to be meaningful in any ordinary sense.

model is designed to be filled with any "content". For the engineer, or the cybernetician, the content is said to be "information". This information belongs to the material order, and constitutes the "content" as such, but thereby, the difficulty (the recursive pattern of indetermination) shifts only. This time one may ask "what is information" --as we are today acquainted with such notions as "society of information", "revolution of information", while no one really knows what information is?

What were the initial applications of such a model, which is generally called as "transmission theory of communications"? I will take two examples, first from the sociologist of "mass communications" Lasswell, and of an important linguist and poetician, Roman Jakobson. Both have determined the mainstream theoretical approaches to their subject-matter, while uncritically adopting this general model of communications, almost transforming it to a kind of hidden "ideology".

Lasswell is one of the first sociologists who theorized about mass communication. His epoch is that of questioning the "power" of the mass media, the early times of television and the full strength of radio and the press in general political affairs. His awareness of his task was not quite difficult to understand, since it simply relied upon asking "who communicates"? Evidently, in every act of communication, there must be someone who communicates, but this is not sufficient: without an audience, a message would be nothing. Hence, Lasswell goes on to describe the parties of communication as concrete agencies, instead of "notions" or "words" involved in the abstract model of transmission. What Lasswell calls as "control analysis" is the answer to the question Who? For instance "who owns this newspaper?", "what are their aims?", "what are their political allegiances?", "do they attempt to set the editorial policy?", "does the fact that they are a republican account for the newspaper's repeated attacks on the Royal Family?", "are they subject to any kind of legal constraints?", "how does the editor decide what to put in the paper?"... (Lasswell, 1998) These series of questions are concrete, but nevertheless determined by an obvious claim to

"objectivity" --an empirical analysis into "opinion" passes through the empirical questioning of "intentions" and matters of "property owning".

For Lasswell, the second subject of any "communicational" analysis should be the message itself: The sociological transposition now requires to include the analysis of the "content" of the message, which is assumed by Lasswell as a kind of "representation". It answers this time to the questions How? For instance "how women are represented in "boulevard" newspapers and tabloids?", "how black people are represented in the films or TV programmes?". It should be noted that the majority of "sociological" researches today are constrained in this domain of inquiry. The limitation of the "content" analysis often to the mere counting the of number of occurrences .? Content research will often be a matter of counting the number of occurrences of a particular representation, generally by comparing the results with "official" statistics --assumed to be somehow an objective criterion.

Then, there comes the channel which is supposed to carry the message. What can be the sociological transposition of such a "material-physical" medium like "air waves" which carry our speech to the others, or an electric cable transmitting beats or digits? Here, the approach of Lasswell turns out to be a "practical" question --what channels should be used, without pitfalls as trying to communicate by phone with a deaf person etc. What are the relative superiorities and adequacies of various media for the appropriate transmission of a given message? At most, some questions concerning the "attraction" of media for particular purposes --does it appeal to the audience? Is such or such medium appropriate for our message? We can easily observe that Lasswell, as one of the first researchers in the domain of mass media analysis, is in fact too much attached to the "practical" purposes rather than "analysis" proper.

Accordingly, the "audience research" becomes the most important part of the analysis of such a practical approach, and today, professional broadcasters after all are using the figures of rating and similar data, just like the advertisers, to promote

their "commodity", which is, for the time being, condensed into the "message". As we don't communicate in a vacuum, in an empty space, there should be a "society" to which we have to communicate our messages, while this same society can also play the role of an obstacle for the propagation of our messages. In communicating, we are supposed to have some "interests" or purposes --we normally communicate in order to achieve something. As Lasswell was concerned not with interpersonal communication, but with the effects of the mass media, he did not pay attention to modes of communication which are far from being "intended", as in the case of everyday interpersonal relationships. This is the larger context of the question of "effects", passing from "practical" questions to "pragmatic" ones. How the audience is affected by the messages? Are these effects approximating the intended ones?

Or pragmatics transposes everything within the domain of the "practical" purposes: Lasswell, as many others in the practical researches in public opinion and mass communications, fails to recognize the complexity of the pragmatism in terms of language. Pragmatics, which was initiated by two great American philosophers as Charles Sanders Peirce and especially Austin, seems to us a radically opposed to the simplistic "practical" inquiry. In his work "How To Do Things With Words?" "to have an opinion about" is fundamentally a performative speech act with illocutionary power.

2.7 Social Types: For a Sociology of Affects

The birth of sociology is inseparable from the capacity of describing, or even inventing "social types". This term has first been used by Herbert Spencer, who has tried to describe, rather obscurely, the types of societies in accordance to their degree of complexity in terms of their structures. This is not exactly what we mean here by "social types", since in the evolutionary approach of Spencer, the theme of evolution is so predominant that it is no longer possible to conceive

types of societies outside his conventional movement of development from the "less compound" to the "more compound". Spencer, however, had a second criterion for classifying types of societies, which is, this time, according to their internal configuration. When he distinguishes between the militant and industrial societies, the evolutionary schematism still prevails, but now, it is possible to conceive the presence of "militant" attitudes in the developed industrial societies. Spencer was himself so determined to apply everywhere his evolutionary and progressive schemes that the blunder was inevitable in applying such a criterion into concrete cases. In Spencer's conception, the types of social structure depend on the relation of a society to other societies in its significant environment. There is an inevitable empirical-historical observation that societies of different types can coexist. Hence, he goes on to define situations in which peaceful relationships correspond to those internal structures which are "weak" or "liberal" in nature, while "militant" attitudes correspond to austere and authoritarian social structures. The internal structure of a society is now determined not as a function of the degree of evolution, but rather on the state of conflict and alliance among neighbouring societies.

Spencer never tried to define an individualized "social type" in terms of his distinction between the "militant" and "industrial" societies. He became rather one of the founders of a long-term political convention, which led social thinkers and politicians to believe in the necessity of an exact correspondence between liberalism with light industries, and to the idea that societies with heavy industries required rather authoritarian regimes --an idea which prevails even in such figures like Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch. Spencer's distinction will empirically collapse under the Weimar Germany, and especially in terms of the social types described by Ernst Jünger, "Der Arbeiter". Spencer was unable to conceive the landscape offered by "militant" and "industrial" societies, for he lacked a concrete definition of "militant" or "industrial" behaviour attributing their characteristics to concrete "social types". The industrious "Protestant" of Weber was not yet conceived, even in spite of Marx and Engels who observed some historical relationships between Protestantism and capitalism, as it was not yet the era that

sociologists knew how to create social types as bundles of characteristic social relationships in the concrete landscape of societies. Wandering about the logic of his distinction between militant and industrial societies, however, Spencer encounters the germs of an idea of an obviously hidden "social type" --the soldier and his "compulsory" behaviour:

The trait characterizing the militant structure throughout is that its units are coerced into their various combined actions. As the soldier's will is so suspended that he becomes in everything the agent of his officer's will, so is he will of the citizen in all transactions, private and public, overruled by that of the government. The cooperation by which the life of the militant society is maintained is compulsory cooperation . . . just as in the individual organism the outer organs are completely subject to the chief nervous center.

The industrial society too defines a character, which can obviously be attributed to a "social type", which remains not defined in Spencer's system: this is a society of "voluntary cooperation" and the self-restraint of the individuals, whereby one is able to perceive the prehistory of the themes of Max Weber:

(The industrial society) is characterized throughout by the same individual freedom which every commercial transaction implies. The cooperation by which the multiform activities of the society are carried on becomes a voluntary cooperation. And while the developed sustaining system which give to a social organism the industrial type acquires for itself, like the developed sustaining system of an animal, a regulating apparatus of a diffused and uncentralized kind, it tends also to decentralize the primary regulating apparatus by making it derive from numerous classes its disputed powers.

One can recognize here the "raison d'être" of the emergence of the sociology in Nineteenth century: a new class, without officially recognized ornaments is born - and not only it is the proletariat, but also a life-world which flows from any method to conceive of what is happening. The problem of "industry", especially

following the process of the so-called Industrial Revolution in England, became soon central to anything which can be defined as sociological discourse.

Spencer is also able to characterise his distinction with reference to the concrete historical transformations, nearly at the turn of the century. The militant character is once more introduced within the setting of an industrial society, which ought to be defined by a kind of liberalism and democratic mood, with decentralized State, and cooperation through division of labour:

If we contrast the period from 1815 to 1850 with the period from 1850 to the present time, we cannot fail to see that all along with increased armaments, more frequent conflicts, and revived military sentiment, there has been a spread of compulsory regulations. . . . The freedom of individuals has been in many ways actually diminished And undeniably this is a return towards the coercive discipline which pervades the whole social life where the militant type is pre-eminent.

While the "freedoms" conceived by Spencer are nothing but the freedoms of the industrial societies, defined in bourgeois rights of free investment and liberal economy, he certainly grasped an essential "fin-de-siècle" transformation in the heart of modern society --a "peaceful" and "industrious" beginning, through the entire set of conflicts during the Nineteenth century, is now tending to create a "militant" structure, with decreasing freedom, centralization of the authority and possibly, a strict disciplinary society.

It would be interesting to note how the Nineteenth century literature and philosophy was much more efficient in characterizing "social types" and their ambient environment, with much more accurate descriptions and capacity to individualize them. Everything seems to begin with the great figure of Balzac, inheriting from the classical literature not the "tragedies" of Racine and Corneille, but the ridiculized or "pop" types of Beaumarchais or Molière. The beginnings of sociology was so permeated by the ideas of a "positive science" that the first great

founders like Comte and Spencer aimed at attaining "generalizations" or "laws", rather than concrete, individualized descriptions. Literature, on the other hand, creating the long prose writing, that is the novel, was now capable to express landscapes and social types much more accurately than any sociological description: thus, as Dostoyevsky and Turgenyev in Russia were capable to introduce those vivid and exemplary social types as the Idiot, the Nihilist, the Father of Family, and the series of descriptive events alongside; Dickens was able to situate his quasi-tragic types in the hearth of the modern industrial landscape of the city; and Emile Zola, with his "naturalism", could create the atmosphere with all the environmental details, and the figures of characters almost like "spiritual automates" in his zone of writing. Everything shows that "social types" are first the invention of literature, before becoming a means of expression of social and human sciences.

In order to create a social type, one needs imagination and capacity to be affected, rather than systematic knowledge about the issues and events. This does not mean that there is nothing systematic in the presentation of social types: Max Weber, and especially Georg Simmel have been capable to systematize and formalize the philosophy of social types in such a "scientific" way that their analyses can be returned back to the domain of arts and literature more vividly than ever. In order to create social types, one should be able to coordinate imagination, understanding of affects, and knowledge of facts as a bundle of a complex set of relationships. To borrow the term "actor" from the domain of arts has been a genial turn in social sciences: but there are also those social types which can fail to act, whose actions are suspended, or worse, are "interpreted" by others. Now, we will try to develop a series of themes in order to clarify the impact of the creation of social types in human sciences.

1. A social type can be visualized and understood by everyone, as it must be part of one's life world or more concretely, social environment. Literature and more visually cinema can easily accomplish this task --to make their

characters representative of social relationships, conflicts, causes and events. This is hard in social sciences, since the "scientific vision" requires generalization, and the creation of a "cumulative indexicality" of any of the themes appearing in their discourse. If we believe to the old (Hegelian) saying that science is that of the "general" and art the task of giving the "general" through the "particular", the powers of imagination are necessary in the observation and creation of social types. Or a portrayed individual does not necessarily become a social type (as in arts and literature). From the "L'Avare" of Molière to the "Père Grandet" of Balzac, we have an entire set of important social transformations, revolutions, a period of Enlightenment, and the development of a rural capitalism which explain the emergence of Father Grandet as a pure social type. He necessarily becomes the representative of a set of "rural" social relationships in the Napoleonic era. His conservatism is that of a kind of future, imagined by him as the survival of his self in the familial values of the posterity. Now, one can develop out of his example an understanding of a set of social phenomena, as conservatism, the decay of provincial values and life worlds and a criminality of conscience reaching the threshold of psychologically abnormal behaviour.

2. A social type has a kind of "this-ness". One can see them out in the corner of the street, a poor, a Mendicant, a Stranger, a Homeless... Its "indexical" value, however, should also be expressed in the context of a theoretical, or particularly analytical reflection. The social type is determined in-between the *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*, between streets and books. It is a connection between the subject and the object, between the academic discipline and life, between imagination and knowledge. The "sociological imagination" of Charles Wright Mills is nothing but the construction of this bridge: it is not a sociology for the sociologists, but for the ordinary people, the laymen, the passer-by... His concept of "power elite" is nothing but the expansion of the everyday "awareness" of the masses, in front of three sectors of elites, military, political and economic, whereby the sociological expression of something which cannot be directly observed neither by masses nor by

social scientists, who are nothing but another social type, the "academic white-collars". (Mills, 1951) This is what makes Mills one of the last great inventor of social types, to express the presence and the nature of the "white collar", as different from the blue collar industrial worker. The larger proletarianization of the masses and the capture of a greater variety of work by advanced industrial capitalism not only creates a new social type, the office bureaucracy of the private sector, which has nothing to do with revolutionary ideas, but whose very appearance is part of the revolution of life.

3. A social type should be analytically significant, besides its everyday existence: the proletariat for instance has in the work of Marx and Engels a twofold role --it is the "real", politically defined social class, and a part of an abstracted network of capitalist relations of production, which is an analytic-theoretical device to explain capitalist social relationships. Such a double conception of the working class is expressed more succinctly in the works of the Marxist Rosa Luxemburg, who warned about different levels of abstraction involved here, in the Marxist definition of social classes. There can be a set of correspondences, but at the same time a series of differences and disjunctions between these two concepts of the class, the one determined in accordance of the place of the class in the capitalist relations of production, and the other being largely determined by the rule of multiplicities, networks of old and new traditional patterns of solidarity, --or occasionally, conflict, as in the case of the emergence of social-democratic schism and the birth of fascism--; it is evident that the first is defined in accordance to the principles of political economy, and the second is defined as a "social type".
4. A social type is "affective". It has something of the "real", psychological person, whatever the level of abstraction and generalization in its presentation. This is another aspect of a social type which makes its literary apprehension more efficient. But it has also defined a quite creative zone of sociological and philosophical writing --notably Simmel's powerful insights, impressions and

the "illuminations" of Walter Benjamin. The French style on the other hand concentrates on a more systematic and cartesian definition of social types: the "affective" crowds of Gustave Le Bon are no less "social types" than the Poor or the Stranger of Simmel. The fin-de-siècle popular debates on the problem of "intellectuals" --occasionally through the Dreyfus Affair-- constitutes a frame of reference for such a conception of social type. At any rate, a social type is determined by its "affects", to be described as a set or constellation of affective, emotional relationships. The intellectual in France was quite different than the Russian "intelligentsia", as a loosely defined social cast in Tzarist period. The loose definition of the French intellectuals was due to their detachment from professional, artistic or academic activities. It is defined in terms of the intellectuals' "engagement" as a public force, of the "enlightened" actors of socio-political intervention into social affairs. The intellectual represents "himself", not a class nor a social movement, and this is what makes out of him a participant of a new social movement, that of "des intellectuels". They are people branded between the requirements of theory and practice, akin to a particularly European reflection for the need of coining the new term "praxis", which, in Germany will become a central concept in Marxist works of Karl Korsch, Karl Mannheim and Gyorgy Lukacs. These intellectuals were affected by the "most powerful of affects", which is the "engaged knowledge" (Nietzsche) while belonging to a decadent society.

5. Sometimes the affects are so deeply institutionalized in a historical period that one can no longer be able to discern the social type against the social environment or milieu in which he is involved. These milieus can be "general", as the urban landscapes of the flâneur (Poe, Baudelaire) or particular, as the one expressed in the closed atmospheres of Proust. The Turkish national novel after the republican era is impregnated by the presence of a well-institutionalized "social types", the soldier-bureaucrat or the Ittihat idealists, somehow described in opposite patterns of appreciation, depending on the political opinions of the authors. The "institutional" character of some social types are evident in the case of Mannheim, attaching them to the

doctrinary sets of behaviour, ranging between "ideology" and "utopia", between "progressivism" and "conservatism". Again, Weber's description of the "ideal type" of bureaucracy can never be conceived without the conventional presence of an institutionalized social type. While one stresses the "impersonality" of bureaucratic relationships, these relationships are not possible without the presence of a new kind of social actors, the public employees who are implicit social types, obeying to the inherent principles of rationalisation. Impersonality and disenchantment of the world, these two Weberian themes are not possible without pre-supposing the corresponding social types who will play the role of theoretically explanatory powers while they can remain "hidden".

6. For Simmel, one of the greatest creators of the panoplia of social types, a social type is always constituted by the society. The poor, for instance is not defined by his own presence, and there are no social groups or classes "in themselves". The social types, even when they are not "institutionalized", are always captured in a network of social relationships and investments of power (to adopt a concept of Michel Foucault).

the fact that someone is poor does not mean that he belongs to the specific social category of the 'poor' It is only from the moment that [the poor] are assisted . . . that they become part of a group characterized by poverty. This group does not remain united by interaction among its members, but by the collective attitude which society as a whole adopts toward it.. Poverty cannot be defined in itself as a quantitative state, but only in terms of the social reaction resulting from a specific situation. . . . Poverty is a unique sociological phenomenon: a number of individuals who, out of a purely individual fate, occupy a specific organic position within the whole; but this position is not determined by this fate and condition, but rather by the fact that others . . . attempt to correct this condition.

The "visionary" character of the "social type", described here by Simmel, has another aspect through which a social type gains its value and significance. If poverty is a "unique" social phenomenon, this is not only the case of the poor, but uniqueness is present in every social type, the blazé, the stranger, the Jew... Thus, a social type assumes for its possibility or existence the capacity to be transformed into an object by a specific type of society, thus becoming a part of it. We can say that they are created by "points of view", rather than by established conventions, or by their sudden emergence. A Simmelian social type is always something codified. Again, a Stranger is not the one "who arrives today and will leave tomorrow". He is the one who comes today and will not probably leave tomorrow. This means that a social type should be determined by the viewpoint of someone, if you want an average member of a society. This is what makes the literature and cinema (the art of subjective viewpoints) much more capable than simply "sociological" descriptive language to make visible the social types.

7. A social type is "modern". This is the case even when one is able to make the history of social types: in the writings of Ancient philosophy, there are rather "conceptual types", to borrow a term by Deleuze and Guattari: the Sophist, the Outsider, the Myth-teller are conceptual, rather than "affective" or institutionalized types in Platonic dialogues. A social type is defined by "traits" or characters, rather than a "point of view". The positions of conceptual personae, on the other hand are defined in the context of an established normativity of a given "point of view", which enables the type to judge, to talk and to conceptualize, just as the reader should do. Classical philosophical writing could not pass without "dialogues" through which arguments are approved by the parties. Deleuze and Guattari were able to argue about the internal connection of the Idiot of Descartes in the Seventeenth century and the Idiot of Dostoyevsky in Nineteenth century. Yet they failed to consider the fact that the latter appeared as a "social type", while preserving the nature of a conceptual person. The Idiot (Simplicius) was used by

Descartes as the one who approves or fails to understand a philosophical argument, a common sense man who converses with the argumentators like the philosopher and his possibly theologian opponent. The Idiot of Dostoyevsky, on the other hand, exactly does the same thing, "approving" or "failing to understand" philosophical arguments, but he is described utterly as a flesh and bone spiritual automate, as a character living in a concrete historical period and a concrete time: as maintained by Deleuze and Guattari, he is the Idiot who wanted to undo what has been gained by the Idiot of Descartes, during his conversation with the philosopher. Certainly, the Dostoyevskian Idiot is the one who wanted the "absurd", faith rather than knowledge, superstition or occultism rather than religion, blind activism rather than theory, but he is also the representative of a brand of real persons, visiting European countries to learn natural sciences, Hegel and socialism as "positive" sciences, and while returning back, they can understand that "this was not the essential problem". This is characteristic of some Turkish and nowadays African intellectuals who returned back to their country with "ideals" of "development" while the so-called "Developmental Studies" in the advanced capitalist countries are in a complete state of collapse.

8. More than being a bundle of affects, a social type should be an "image". This is quite obvious since we have already said that a social type should first be "seen" by the society before being designed to be a representation or object of preoccupation. The Egyptians made images as hieroglyphic entities, destined to become ornaments or elements of the grace of kings and gods. The Ancient Greeks were prone to depict "ideal" or "formal" personae, as sculptures. The entire Middle Ages and the Oriental or Islamic iconography passed with the pictorial depiction of the "divine", the order and its ornamental expressions, which nevertheless can be opposed by a more creative popular imagery, expressed in iconographies of popular classes, peasants, and religious sects. The Classical and Romantic art in Europe never ceased to revive and reproduce the "divine" themes in various, surely secular contexts: not social types as such but persons, who are part of the representation by painting, of

the lights and patterns of the art. Everything seems to begin with two inventions: the photography functioning through "traces" of the real time passing; and a new convention of post-romantic painters to draw studies, instead of drafts destined to complete the preparatory stage of making the complete work. These studies, like photographs and not without being influenced by this new invention, were instantaneous moments of things, drawn without accomplishment of all traits, as time always passes. The instant photography and Impressionism in painting were together capable to picture out the entire landscape of modern life: the social types could be part of this landscape. Evidently the figure of a "dancer" of Dégas is not by itself a "social type", but we can argue about the urban landscapes and environments in which social types are involved --the dance-studios, the cafés, the train stations... There is an entire photographic iconography, if not documentation of the ordinary life which accumulates during the Nineteenth century: portraits, ceremonials, moments of life, and post-cards depicting, towards the end of the century, not only European or American scenes, but also the exotic countries. The social functions of photography, early in nineteenth century were evident: it impregnated the power of the press, the sole medium of the public opinion with its effect of reality and "news". The still photograph was capable to capture life, as it is at a certain moment at any place. The "image" character of the social type is revealed in painting also --especially the impressionists who have depicted moments of life in train stations, streets, coffee-houses and the like.

9. The birth of the "cinematographic" image has been much more powerful in reproducing the visibility of social types in the ordinary life. As a powerful means of communication, cinema soon assumed the function of a "document-in-itself", like photography. But more than photography, whose distance from real life is evident, having a motionless layout, cinematography amplifies the "trace" character of the cinematic signs, and provide them with an "illusion of movement". The first films, whatever their "magic" apparition in theater-halls, were rendering the traces of ordinary events. And a panoplia of social types

has ever been present in cinematography --not only through "stylized" types of the burlesque as the Charlot of Chaplin, but also with the representation of the ordinary street life.

Tarde seems to be the most profound sociologist of the opinion. Yet, he realized that opinion is not something remote from the complex networks of social relationships, that are both historically determinant of the "present" state, and as he goes into the critique of the Durkheimian conceptualization of the "division of sociology", he tends to become more and more aware that the "politics" should essentially be integrated into the domain of sociological research. This is, according to Tarde, a failure in Durkheim and his antecedents, like Fustel de Coulanges (the author of *La Cité Antique*) and Loria --they failed to understand that an essential subdivision of sociology must be the political sociology and the study of politics and of opinions. In his book "Political Sociology" (Tarde 1901) Tarde is engaged in comparing the "divisions" of political economy with those of the political science in order to be able to reveal two essential relationships in their connection: the wealth (*richesse*) and power. If the subject-matter of the political economy is wealth, the subject-matter of the political science should evidently be the power. He introduces the analogy between the human organism and the political power: the political power is to a human group what the conscious will is to the human brain (see also Tarde, 1898, 1895, 1897).

Two centuries of the politics of opinion in the Western world (notably in Europe and Northern America) succeeded in developing an image of "politics" characteristic of the modern world. This image defines politics as opposed to the private domain of familial, everyday and commonplace relationships. The mediation and representation, shaping the "modern" institutions in which the political life is deployed tend to become essential attributes of such a distinction -- or sometimes "opposition" between the private and the public. In my thesis, through the critique of the doctrines of the "public sphere", I will try to

conceptualize a domain of politics which is not defined by its opposition to the private life, to the everydayness of the experience. Sociology has long been instituted on a general programme of research into public opinion¹⁵; this is an epistemological preference, which transforms the sociological practice into a huge accumulation of opinions, trying to distill the varieties of fluctuating opinions of the people. The social reveals itself to sociology through opinions, and correspondingly, such a method and epistemological presupposition involves the risk to create a sociology which is nothing but an opinion of opinions, an academic model of doxology.

As the researches into public opinion gained importance in defining the domain of social sciences since the beginning of Twentieth century, there was a growing interest in sociology towards the subject of "masses", "crowds" and their "individualizations". The sociology of the "founding fathers" (to borrow an almost untenable expression of some scholars who have tried to write "official" histories of the sociology, notably L. Coser) (Coser, L; 1967) was in fact the art to extract concrete "social types" out of the amorphous crowds and masses of people in the modern urban (and partially rural) space. The image of the "ascetic" protestant or the puritan served Weber as an expressive figure when he inquired into the birth of the "spirit" of capitalism; the flâneur, through Poe, Baudelaire and Walter Benjamin was nothing but the social type situated in between the lines of social processes of the fragmented life-patterns of modernity; Werner Sombart, Karl Troeltsch and Thorstein Veblen were capable to discern clusters of social relationships through the elucidation of the various traits of a psychological-social character, the Bourgeois. Social types with capital letters --the Jew, the Stranger, the Poor were the expressive unities of the "formal" sociology of Georg Simmel, who has been the major and genuine theoretician of "social types". And in French sociology, from Le Bon to Gabriel Tarde, we can observe how far the crowds and

¹⁵ In his article "Research into Public Opinion" Pollock covers the two assumptions of the public opinion pools, which define not only the world of "research" but the epistemological crisis of the mainstream social sciences: first, once a "public opinion" question is posed, the respondent feels himself in the necessity to answer it, while he has no judgement on the

masses themselves can be treated as "social types". The early times of social sciences were inseparable from the capacity of these scholars to create and visualize "social types". Even the "political economy" of Marx is not deprived of social types --the image of the Lumpenproletariat as a social category, as different from the proletarianized masses.

The creation of social types depended on the ability of the early sociologists to emphasize in their works the importance of the "particulars" which are significant both for their theoretical purpose and for the ongoing social life as such. A social type is in fact a bundle of social relationships, raised up to the context of sociological analysis, while remaining in the field of "visibility" in actual life. This means that a social type, when properly defined and formulated, lives a twofold life --it first serves to the "analytical" theorization of the social scientist, but it also "appears" in the public domain, in the streets, in coffee houses, in social, economic, political, cultural activities; a social type is the thread through which the layman can understand sociology, the path defined by Charles Wright Mills as "sociological imagination", while it cannot be reduced to an attempt to vulgarization, nor to be given simply as an "example".

Through the first chapters of my thesis, I have tried to show the importance of this "second", non-analytic aspect of social types, which constitutes the "affective" side of the sociology. The key concept in defining a social type is the presence of a social formula that corresponds to each of them --the Poor in Simmel is not defined by one's income or even the degree of poverty, or of one's opinion or acknowledgement of oneself as "poor"; the Poor "appears" only when a given community takes some people as an object, creating institutions to cope with its presence, to develop social practices and judgements about it, to manipulate its environment. This is the way in which one of the last genial creators of "historical" social types, Michel Foucault is able to find the formula of the modern

issue; secondly, this is nothing but the uncritical assumption of the sociological analysis, in the American academy. (see Pollock, 1976)

criminal subject --the "dangerous individual"¹⁶. This is also a way to distinguish between real social types and those pseudo-social types: actually, the present sociology of opinions, treating societies as "phases of agglomerations of social interactions" continues to be dependent on "social types". These social types, I will say they are in fact "pseudo", since they are defined as "identities", as outcomes of a membership to a recognized "social group", as members of a sub-culture. When a sociologist goes into a field-research among the members of trade-unions, his "subjects" are not real social types, unless one is able to discern a singularity out of the identities revealed in the research. Similarly, the "yuppie" is not a social type insofar as it appears as a social category of the professional economic life in the "post-modern" age; it can only been a social type when a particular bundle of social relationships can be attributed, in concreto, to the description of such a social category.

The notion of "identity", one of the central concepts in actual practice of sociology is eroding the capacity of social sciences to create social types. Ethnic and religious groups, each absorbed supposedly by an identity (or rather within a supposed "identity crisis") are not yet social types; the Muslim, or the Turk in Europe, the Puerto Rican or the Black "rapper" in United States, the Inuit tribal communities are not yet "social types" while we can include them to the general category of "migrants". Identity is a category of the opinion, of political labeling, rather than a heuristic concept in defining a social type. It presupposes the mild democratic or liberal conceptualization of modern Western societies (and academies) to render the opinion with the highest referential value. Similarly, party membership or affiliation, to be the partizan of a cult, to be a member of a generation (cultures of rock, of cinema cults etc.) are not in themselves criteria for creating social types. In order to create social types corresponding to these categories, social science should produce a "flesh-and-bone" individuation which can operate at the level of the "visible", certainly not in television, but in the

¹⁶ see Michel Foucault (1994)

everyday life at large. This is, I believe, one of the major failures of social sciences today.

Social sciences are not the sole creators of "social types": we have many of them as represented in literature, especially the novel, and more concretely and visibly, in cinema and theater. I will try to show, in the last parts of my essay, how a plenty of social types have been created in the Nineteenth century literature, on the background of the developing capitalist and urban landscape (from Balzac to Zola, from Austen to Chekhov), and how, in the domain of cinema, throughout the Twentieth century, the representations of "social types" abounded, especially in the early periods of its development. This is the key to our particular interest in the "documentary" work of the Soviet cinematographer Dziga Vertov, whose cinematography is a genuine sociological reflection embedded into a visual poetics. One might even say that the arts tend sometimes to be more capable than social sciences in the creation and reproduction of social types, as one is no less able to "think" through them than in philosophy and science. This capacity is obviously due to the fact that direct, non-textual and un-mediated presentation of life is under the capacity of art, which, as Hegel puts it, can grasp the "universal" taking departure from the "particular". Yet, this Hegelian (or Lukacsian) notion can also be criticized, since the characteristic of the novel may not be the "presentation of the individual representative of his epoch" but rather the apparitions of "social types" in everyday life. In this sense, there is a concrete connection between artistic representation and the everyday life, and correspondingly, every sociology (political, historical, cultural, economic etc.) is (or should be) a sociology of everyday life.

One major dimension of my research is directed towards the "affective" character of social types: a social type is either familiar or unfamiliar, communicated or excluded, but there is always a bundle of affects that characterizes its presence. We can even say that a social type is made visible only insofar as one is able to present it as a bundle of affects, internal and external. This perspective consists in

the philosophical part of our study, proliferating the early modern discussion of affects given by the Seventeenth century rationalist philosopher Benedict de Spinoza, as he developed a total, and comprehensive treatment of "affects", the role of emotions, passions and sentiments in individual and social life and in the processes of socialization. This is now an attempt to develop a concept of a "sociology of affects", replacing the "sociology of opinions". Sociologists like Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde and Georg Simmel were able to understand the importance of the "affects" in social life --even when the shaping of social forms and structures are involved. Georg Simmel is no less concerned with the affective patterns in the creation of social types, since his sociological descriptions are generally tending to be fragmented "impressions" in everyday life, here and there, felt by the sociologist before being reported to a deeper insight and analysis. This is nothing but the reasons of the "actuality" of sociology, its difference from history or the so-called political science. There is a general misunderstanding in conceiving why Simmel and his various followers, like the scholars of Frankfurt School or Walter Benjamin, escaped from systematization; they were not in fact avoiding systematic treatment; this was nothing but their way to capture the modern reality, which was based on the fragmentation of social life. The Spinozist definition of affects, such as Love, Hate, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hope, Fear etc., is to be referred as the unique foundation of the constitutive role of affects in the deployment of social relationships. His major "rationalism" is echoed in the "minor" ones of the early Twentieth century, seeking the motives lying behind social reality --the utopianism and messianism is G. Scholem and Ernst Bloch, the philosophy of sentiments in Renouvier and Henri Bergson. An important dimension of describing a social type passes from treating it as a "bundle of affects", rather than a composite of opinions. Our examples here are still in the domain of cinematography and literature, as affective types can be directly visualized in artistic presentation; but only a sociology capable to be axed on concrete affects (individual and social) can render the basis for the reproduction of social types.

Last but not least, we suggest a methodological perspective here, for the possibility of a sociology of affects. Affects are "seen" better than they are expressed through writing or even description, and there is no room to exclude the entire domain of "documentary" cinematography from the disciplines of social sciences. We believe that the cinematic means of presentation are no less "thoughtful" than the actual practice of social research and perhaps they are natural "media" for the so-called "oral history" than any external statistical or observational treatment. The "concept" can reveal itself in cinema and video, and this is not necessarily limited to the domain of the "documentary", pretending to be the direct "image" of the real. One can even say that the "stage films", when they are truly examples of real cinematographic authorship, can be able to analyze and synthesize social relationships much more profoundly than actual sociological researches. A great cinematographer like Sergey M. Eisenstein is known to intend the "filming" of the *Das Kapital* of Marx, an ultimate project which is destined to accomplish the marriage of philosophy, science and art in a total domain of expressivity.

The doctrines of public sphere tend to split human life experience into two parts -- the public and the private; only a sociology of affects could be able to create the image of a society in which such distinctions in political, economic and cultural life are relativized or consumed. The best examples of this are given in the Third World cinema today, introducing new "affective" types, together with a modern "ontology" of the image itself. One part of our study will be destined to such an ontology of the image, and its place in the sociological treatment of these "opinion societies" in which we are to live. As affects are always generated by images --the concrete Spinozist "affection" of the bodies, individual and social alike-- the importance of this ontology in the political life and its sociological treatment will be revealed. Socially, each new generation tends to become more bounded by the images with the development of audio-visual techniques in education, in entertainment, and in the entirety of everyday experience; modern politics and community practices are much more depending on images, their reproduction and manipulation. And the societies of opinion are nothing but societies of the image,

of the spectacle (Debord), and of control, virtuality, monitoring and "interception" (Deleuze, Virilio). Thus, the "politics of the image" becomes an essential field of reference that will be our last preoccupation.

2.7.1 The "Friend" as a Social Type

We begin by conceptualizing three ways of human relationship: the first finds its example in neighbourhood; it is not "free" insofar as one, for so long a history of residence, is generally unable to choose his neighbour, being a "physical-spatial" relationship. The corresponding "human" experience is religion, with its rituals, territorial markings, myths and traditions, and the slogan "Love thy neighbour as yourself". The second finds its best example in family life, is no more "free", while in modern times, couples are said to be bounded "freely", through love; it is no less "physical-spatial" in its nature and tends to be the investment of more or less "traditional" and "secular" powers, tending to become one of the major issues of governmental interventions. We can continue to find out other examples of relationship, while we can conceive of only one (third) type of human relationship which does not presuppose the necessity of "spatial-physical" proximity. This is called "friendship", the only mode of social relationship which is not necessarily resulting in "obligatory" ties or bondages. Physical proximity is not a presupposition in friendship, but only an outcome. And it is defined more as a matter of "perception" rather than "responsibility", "obligation", or even "sincerity". It can be constituted between anyone and anyone, without reference to sex, geography or physical neighbourhood while religious, familial and even civil (citizenship) ties are always "forced", presupposing a membership or identity. One can be a member of a community (religious, sectarian, cultural, sub-cultural), of a family, of a City, or of a State (citizenship) but one can never say that he is a member of a "friendship". We will say that friendship is the "natural" kind of relationship in the Spinozist sense, as this philosopher is the one who reminds us

that "nature does not produce nations, states, casts, but only individuals" (Spinoza, *Corr. L XIII*)^{*}.

Social sciences have been dominantly interested in the first kind of relationships -- we have sociologies of religion, of neighbourhood, of "public opinion", of small groups, of family, of social classes and stratification, of politics and of economic relationships; or since Gabriel Tarde, the "wildest" founding father of sociology, we can hardly find a genuine sociology of friendship. It has been rather the task of philosophy (and only rarely) to invest energies in the elaboration of the concept of friendship: a contemporary philosopher like Derrida indexed his "politics of friendship" in the motive of "love" (*philia*), a genuine and essentially philosophical theme (Derrida, J. 1997). From Aristotle on, passing through Cicero, *philia* is the essence of everything "philosophical"; philo-sophy is nothing more than "love of wisdom" (one should add "not wisdom itself") and every human activity can be evaluated within the perspective of love; thus for the Ancient Greeks, the carpenter is the one who "loves" wood, the baker the one who "loves" bread, the Politician the one who "loves" men (*phil-anthropos*), just as the philosopher loved wisdom. Yet there are at least two conceptual ruptures in the very notion of the *philia*: it is not sufficient to distinguish *philia* and the "agape", the sensual love, since *philia* is no less a human affect, a passion. This means that there is always an extrapolation --the lover and the beloved, while both can be the case for a single individual. From Aristotle to Cicero, a question then haunted any philosophical reflection on love and friendship: which is the best, to love or to be loved? There is a unique answer --to love is better, since one is "active" and to be loved is always in the mercy of the other. Thus, as an ethical-moral premise, one should strive to love, rather than to be loved and friendship is nothing but the outcome of this effort (Derrida, J. 1997:35; Cicero, *De Amic.* #41).

* The Classical Texts are given with abbreviations, the whole form given in a list at the end of the work.

The Aristotelian doctrine of friendship tends to refer rather to a "civic" domain, so far is friendship a moral and political theme. This is why the natural place for the discussion of friendship has been the Nicomachean Ethics, where affects and human passions too are evaluated by Aristotle. Here, the philosopher develops the notion of a "genuine", "true" or "perfect" kind of friendship. Or the degree of this "perfection" naturally depends on the "quality" of the friends one has. For Aristotle, one loves the true friend for his own sake, requiring a true, disinterested love. Then, according to Aristotle, "true friendship" is to love the other for what he is essentially, the virtue being central to a good man's character. The criterion of the highest kind of friendship hence becomes the "sameness", the "equality" of the friends. Virtuous men are almost naturally attracted to one another precisely by friendship.

Here the true friend should also remain as another self, while one has to make one's fortunes his own, to share them, keeping the other still as "another self", his pleasures and pains known as if they were ours. This is termed by Aristotle as sharing "a single soul"; and a true friend is a "second self". Sharing their excellence, true friends develop a kind of similarities, a likeness of desires and aversions, a common share of pleasures, pains, fortunes and misfortunes. Friendship is to know the circumstances of the other's life. And a true friend really acts as a mirror --as friendship enables self-knowledge by giving us a context for action, as well as access to the friend's perspective on our actions: my friend is another 'me', and in observing his virtue I can see and acknowledge my own.

Friendship is good since true friends make one another good. This is not, however that friendship involves a "shaping of behaviour" or temper, through the interaction among the friends; there is more, since the good involved in friendship is almost "canonical" in the work of Aristotle. Through this "mirror" of friendship, one is able to increase his self-knowledge of his own virtues, and feels pride about this. It is interesting how Aristotle here makes the analogy with the love of parent

for child: friendship, acting as a mirror, also functions as a process of production. It operates through the love for whom one has produced.

This means that true friends share a common history. Friendship is necessarily "particular", a relationship with a specific person, and not a love, at a distance, for any "excellent" people. Friends are particulars or singles. This means that friendship is a matter of "devotion" in the Aristotelian context, whereby it requires a more or less long experience --a long "history" is needed as friends. This does not mean that Aristotle's thematization of friendship is completely "harmonic" and without a kind of inherent tension: one needs such a long history of experiencing friendship in order to be sure about the friend's excellence and perfection.

Aristotle's (or generally the Antique) conception of friendship, as opposed to the modern understanding, is defined by a sameness, univocity, and similarity. Friends are similar, and any difference among friends is a source of dissent, therefore a kind of failure of perfection in friendship, while in modern conceptions, including Spinoza's, friendship involves the respect for the singularity, the uniqueness of the good of the friend. The question is to understand how in Ancient times, one can be able to conceive a single canon of the quality of friendship. Evidently, this is one of the reasons why one cannot conceive of "individuality" in Ancient Greece; the Antique man has no conception of a singular, unique set of affects for each individual --this is an invention of the Seventeenth century rationalist philosophy (Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz). In the Aristotelian understanding, if I differ in any way from my friend, especially in terms of idealities in ethical life, this should serve as a warning signal to bring myself into line: this means that my friend is probably not my equal in perfection and virtue.

Evidently, Aristotle also thinks realistically, that there can be differences among perfect friends, as the circumstances of life do necessarily differ, when reported to the social world. Everyone is living his virtuous life according to his life

experience and situation. But, in Aristotle, these differences are not constitutive of the essence of true friendship. And if differences are signaling a non-ethical situation, friendship bonds are thereby endangered.

What Aristotle calls "civic friendship" is defined as the "political" form of a perfect friendship, and everything is transposed in the domain of political life, and to the problematic of a good constitution:

friendship seems to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity (*homonoia*) seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality. (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*1243 a)

Reported to the domain of political justice, friendship is intended to be made the base of the justice in the city-state, where only the "same" and the "equals" (it should rather be said that equality should be based on sameness) are involved in perfect friendship. This gives once more to Aristotle the opportunity to exclude the minors, the slaves and the women from friendship, just as in official politics they are excluded. There is a characteristic approach of Aristotle which runs as follows: minors, children, slaves and women are not free not with respect to the conditions socially imposed by the Polis, but they are so by the very fact of their "nature". There is always, however, a sentiment of ambiguity I always felt in reading Aristotle: he seems to make a circular, and not "essential" argument about this nature, for the simple reason that the minor, the child will become one day an adult, a slave could be relieved and so on. Only the gendered bias essentially prevails: the women are absolutely excluded from perfect friendship, but this is not so much "absolute" in the possibility of friendship as such. One can have an imperfect friendship with women, since there are so many "differences" between men and women (differences of nature, of sex, biological in kind) that we are captured in our argument by many reasons for the destruction of friendship.

Hence, at the level of the affects, Aristotle seems to distinguish between two kinds of love, the one which may be called as "*agape*" (a personal love for a being different from us) and "*philia*", a love functioning through identification and union with another who is supposed to be the "same". The main criterion of such a distinction is not the opposition between sexes, but the "affective" character of the first, as opposed to the "ideational", conceptual character of the second. In other words, the *agape* is defined as a love which can occur between two persons who are different, while *philia* occurs between similar persons. The problem is rather in conceiving the nature of the "gender bias" of Aristotle: one could not remove or correct this bias by simply modifying Aristotle's observations about the lack of "rationality" in women, since the description and codes of femininity involved in his entire work. A friendship based on *philia* is possible, but improbable given the conditions of the essential differences of nature between men and women (see Allen, 1985; Spelman, 1983).

It is interesting to note how the Aristotelian ethics of friendship incited the Medieval Christian philosophers in re-defining love and friendship, by radically distinguishing them: Saint Thomas Aquinas refers to Aristotle's distinction between Love (*Amor*) which is a passion (*pathos*) and Friendship, which is a habit (*habitus, ethos*). But the entire track of arguments by Aristotle are now devoted to demonstrate that concupiscence, that is, libidinal, shiny love is not in fact love, but simply an appetite of the desire: there are no two kinds of love, the one of concupiscence and the other of friendship, since an "ethos", a habit like friendship does not belong to the division of a passion. (Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theo. I-II*, 26, Objection 1) And Aquinas continues by assuming that concupiscence, the sexual passion is in the domain of the same division with love, since both are passions, different in their nature and functioning.

Moreover, Aquinas recalls the three Aristotelian kinds of friendship: one can be a friend for "usefulness" (friendship serves), for "pleasure" and for "goodness" --

friendship is enjoyed or, on the contrary, serves the perfection of the self; and the enjoyed friendship is never without a mixture of carnal love, of sensible passion. (Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theo. I-II*, 26, Objection 3) This means that "concupiscence" should never be contrasted, or reported to the same plane with, friendship. In spite of the apparent "logical" error committed by Aquinas here (now a "mixture" comes to be imposed, while there is no room to see in "enjoyment" a mixture of concupiscence), everything shows how could be the reproduction of an Aristotelian, "pagan" theme in the context of a theology. Aquinas wants to remove from Love any impurity and possibility of mixtures in order to define an essential concept: the Love of God. In following chapters we will see how Spinoza takes the same concept quite literally, at the level of active emotions derived out of passions, but for the moment, it is sufficient to note how the "essentialism" blundered the entire domain of affective relations by over-valoring the "ideal" ones: the politics of Aquinas is defined in the ideal city of God, not in the "real" constitutional Polis of Aristotle. His conception of friendship is not affective and is not political, while he is able to redefine a theocratic wisdom of politics in his perspective.

Hence, in his replies to the abovementioned objections, Aquinas restricts himself to a pseudo-Aristotelian perspective, through which he elucidates his point: love is divided into two kinds, friendship and lust, but it is divided into two, the love of friendship and love of lust; which means that in loving in the context of friendship one makes different things than when in love for lust and enjoyment. In this perspective, a friend is defined not outside the affairs of desire, but within it: a friend is the one for whom we wish what we wish for ourselves. And when friendship becomes one of the "enjoyment", Aquinas seems to preserve the original Aristotelian viewpoint that friendship is a matter of common, shared story, a process of habituation:

When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to

his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship. (Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theo. I-II*, 26, Reply to Objection 3)

Hence, as a "social type", and from Aristotle to Cicero, from him to Thomas Aquinas, the Friend is an ideal personage that is conceived as the determinant of a relationship with oneself: a mirror, but at the same time an active participant to a common history which we experience. But one should also admit that the Friend is defined as a "conceptual person", in the sense used by Deleuze and Guattari (1991): as a conceptual person, the Friend serves to a basic and fundamental making of a wisdom, of virtue and perfection. The affective side of friendship is reported not to the passions (of love, of appetites or pleasures) but rather to an "ideal" context in which the sameness and similarity, including common aims are involved. Hence, it is difficult to admit this conceptual person as a "social type", since it is not defined as an affective bundle of relationships and interactions.

Yet, the philosophers of the Antiquity and of the Medieval era are able to make us think by inciting us to reflect upon our relationships of friendship. One should discern an ideal, perfect and true friendship among other kinds of friendship, based on enjoyment, pleasure, delight, usefulness and in a broader sense, an interested kind of social relationship. In the world of ideals of Antiquity, this is not, and should not be a "real" person. An entire system of ideational exclusion is at work in the Aristotelian discussion of friendship --one will exclude the minors, the slaves and the women, since they are defined by a "difference", which will be reflected in the domain of friendship as a dissent and disharmony. Certainly love is recognized as an affect, a "pathos" by these Antique philosophers, but it intervenes as a mixture of relationships to the habit, which is now the friendship -- it is either heterogeneous, since the love as an affect can be concupiscence and lust (serving to usefulness) or a purest love (which can, in Aquinas in particular, tend to be the nucleus for a quasi-mystic "love of God") or, when homogeneous, belongs to the order of habits (ethos). The first case is relevant for ordinary

thinking in Ancient Greece, as it appears, for instance in Aeschines, referring to the "pathological" nature of the friendship between Achilles and Patroclus in Homeric texts. (Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 133), or in terms of the ability of someone to recognize who is a "true friend":

But, I think, so long as the boy is not his own master and is as yet unable to discern who is a genuine friend, and who is not, the law teaches the lover self-control, and makes him defer the words of friendship till the other is older and has reached years of discretion; but to follow after the boy and to watch over him the lawgiver regarded as the best possible safeguard and protection for chastity (...) and so it was that those benefactors of the state, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, men pre-eminent for their virtues, were so nurtured by that chaste and lawful love--or call it by some other name than love if you like--and so disciplined, that when we hear men praising what they did, we feel that words are inadequate to the eulogy of their deeds. (Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 139)

The ability to distinguish who is a perfect friend and who is not seems to be a matter of maturity and perfection itself. Already in the *Alcibiades* dialogue of Plato, there is a central problem with friendship, which will still remain as the main problem with Aristotle: how a friendship could be established between a man and a woman, given the fact that the woman "understands" about woolmaking, while a man has no idea about it? The woman in Platonic sense is here the woolmaker, then she loves wool, while this is not the case with the man, who knows nothing about woolmaking. Is it a reason for the impossibility of friendship between man and woman?

One additional Antique problem, this time appearing in the *On Friendship* of Cicero, should be taken into account: the only question (whether a woman or a minor could be a true friend) is not "who can become a friend" but also the one of the "rarity". A friend is "rare", and everyone cannot be a friend: "And I am not now speaking of the friendships of ordinary folk, or of ordinary people --although, even these are a source of pleasure and profit --but of true and perfect friendship, the kind that was possessed by those few men who have gained names for

themselves as friends." (Cicero, *De Amic.* 12-1) While it is true that "the few number" is not here referring to a qualification of friendship, as Derrida puts it (Derrida, 1998), rarity is nevertheless a condition, an empirical condition of the economy of friendship. Hence, the real exclusion from friendship comes to be a "majority", only a few being capable to become true friends. Woman and the minors as such are certainly a part of this majority, if they are taken as an indefinite number of people. This is an example where a non-qualificatory trait -- the number, the few, the rarity-- becomes a determinant factor of a human relationship.

Everything seems to be transformed, suddenly, into a kind of counter-argument to the "free" nature of friendship --expressly in Aristotle: "There is no stable friendship with confidence, but confidence needs time. One must than make trial, as Theognis says 'You cannot know the mind of man or woman till you have tried them as you might cattle'" (Aristotle, *Eud. Eth.* 3#) This reversal makes any individual "friend" a source of constant suspicion, and a subject to a constant trial. A friendship is subject to time, not for the sake of "perpetuity", but just because it should obey to the test of the time, which is something very different:

The primary friendship then is not found towards many, for it is hard to test many men, for one would have to live with each. Nor should one choose a friend like a garment. Yet in all things it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two alternatives; and if one has used the worse garment for a long time and not the better, the better is to be chosen, but not in place of an old friend, one of whom you do not know whether he is better. For a friend is not to be had without trial or in a single day, but there is need of time and so 'the bushel of salt' has become proverbial." (Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.*, 7, 1243b)

Hence, to choose a friend becomes by the same token to exclude others who are here an indefinite number of people. One should ask, is there any sociological possibility to define such a kind of relationship. Georg Simmel, as a modern

thinker par excellence, talks about "dyadic" relationships, which is quite distinct in nature from triadic ones or moresomes: in a dyadic relationship, the elimination of one of the terms immediately dissolves the existence of the other (a bi-polar relationship). (Simmel, 1907) But, the "few", the "rarity" is not reduced to a dyadic kind of relationship, for the Greeks were known as aware of the social and political importance of friendship groups and brotherhoods. Anyway, the determination of "rarity", of "few" number is not the positive side of friendship -- family too is a kind of relationship instituted among the few, while the Greek culture of "privacy" and the attribution of the "economy" to the "oikos" (household) diverts the preoccupation with sexual division of labour and the management of the "household slaves" as a familial affair. What institutes a family is nothing in fact than a strategy of alliances and filiations which is played by clans and families, through the exchange of women. There is a majority, then, in any familial bond, while the clan is only symbolically represented in the concrete, actual family in a household. The "few" of the friendship is something quite different: it refers objectively to the conditions in which friendship requires an indefinite time to be tested, since no one knows what is inside the mind of the other. This means that there is a tension in friendship, and the community instituted through friendship --two or more persons-- differs in this manner from all other kinds of relationships: neighbourhood, family, and even brotherhood. The religious community, is nothing but the entirety of the human environment of the Polis, constituting simultaneously what we may call the political community, since, as Claude Lefort would show, religion in Ancient Greece is the one where the individual is introduced through rituals to the social group, while some of the Oriental religions were following a different model, in which religious activity is based on isolation from every social bonds, family, community and even "friends". (Lefort, 1972)

2.7.2 Modernity, Community and Friendship

Friendship, as we have seen, belongs to the domain of ethical pedagogy, becoming a major philosophical theme, especially in Ancient Greece and Rome. Its philosophical nature does not allow us to proceed in finding in friendship a kind of "social type", since for the Greeks, friendship appears something to be outside the actual "social" life and experience. It is defined by rarity, by the "few", rather than a positive integration to the social life, and no "types" could be assigned for ideal, "true" friendship.

We know that friendship relations in modern life belong rather to the domain of individualism: a friendship can be instituted between any individuals, even at a distance. Modern individuality and life experience seems to be so made that it becomes impossible to have "free" time to test for long the friendship, to become one's "equal", a member of a relationship of sameness and identity. One is no longer capable to determine "a few", which merits the right to "perfect friendship". Friends tend to become "couples", usually from the same sex (since otherwise the relationship would be called differently) and one is not tempted, a priori, by the idea that friendship would be impossible between men and women, between adult and child.

A modern theme in friendship is that of "fidelity" or "responsibility". These themes are reported even to the level of highest philosophy, in Kant where the "duty" becomes a matter of "categorical imperative". One has duties in a friendship, and the time is no longer required to test the "perfection" of a friendship, but rather becomes immanent to friendship's temporality: friendship must "endure" in time: this is not a time of testing, but rather a kind of solitary involvement in time --a friend's fidelity tends to define everything, with all egoistic argumentation it is supposed to involve.

Fidelity is not, however, a determinant of modern understanding of friendship, for it is also present, much more profoundly, in other kinds of social relationships -- especially marital life, community, religious bonds etc. The second reason has been genially stated by Gilles Deleuze, who maintains that friendship is not a matter of fidelity, but rather of perception. After all, there is something "common" among friends --but what is it, really? Do they have to share everything, the same language, the same habits and tastes? Deleuze's point is that there is a pre-language, rather than common ideas: "there are people that one can never understand or speak to even on the simplest matters, and other with whom one might disagree completely, but can understand deeply and profoundly even in the most abstract things, based on this indeterminate basis that is so mysterious." (Deleuze, 1981) But this is exactly what enables us to create out of the Friend a "social type", since through the involvement of "perception", one can invoke "affective" elements into the affair. Deleuze forwards the hypothesis that friendship is something which can occur perceptively, at a preconscious level -- through an apparent charm, "a perception of charm, i.e. in a gesture, a thought, even before the thought is signifying, a modesty, a charm that goes to the roots of perception, to the vital roots, and this constitutes a friendship." (Deleuze, 1981) One can never admit someone as a friend when he had seen a small disgusting trait, through, say a phrase uttered which provokes an "indelible impression about that person, no matter what he/she can ever do."

The same is for charm, only opposite, the indelible effect of charm as a question of perception, perceiving someone who suits us, who teaches us something, opens us, awakens us, emits signs, and we become sensitive to that emission of signs, one receives them or not, but one can become open to them. And then one can spend time with someone else saying things that are absolutely unimportant. (Deleuze, 1981)

This is why modern literature and other narrative arts are filled with types of passionate friendships, sometimes enduring in full tranquillity (like in Beckett's *Mercier and Camier*), sometimes appearing with a common involvement into some "strange" affair --like the *Bouvard and Pecuchet* of Stendhal. The modern

image of friendship is that of a sometimes "extraordinary" couple, tied by enthusiasm, passion and affectivity. In Ancient times, the philosopher was a friend of wisdom --as Deleuze puts it, this denotes "someone tending toward wisdom without being wise, with a number of pretendents functioning in a rivalry of free men in all domains, with eloquence, trials that they pursue." (Deleuze, 1981) This logic of "pretention" involved in the very "milieu" where the philosophical community becomes possible already involves the "rivalry". Modern philosophy, on the other hand, while continuing to pursue this kind of antique rivalry, produces a new "type" of philosophical wisdom, based on engagement. From Pascal to Kierkegaard, it defines a new mode of philosophizing: one is "engaged" --as a religious tie, or even like a marital relationship-- to something, and there is a co-development of philosophical reflection --certainly a "minor" one-- following the thread of daily anecdotes, passions and corresponding symbolic orders. Engagement can be "broken", as in the case of Kierkegaard, but this is not the end, the terminal point of the affair of friendship: one is able now to "distrust" a friend, broke with someone the engagement, and friendship becomes once more a matter of time. But this time is inherent to friendship, rather than being a time in which the perfection of the wisdom is tested.

2.8 Towards a New "Sociological Imagination"

When C. Wright Mills wrote his *Sociological Imagination*, the sociology was already "academically established", in United States, and tending to invade European academies: this was towards the end of Sartre's domination in France, and his critics was gaining space in their struggle against Existentialism --Lévi-Strauss with his "structural anthropology" and Jacques Lacan with his "re-reading" of Freud. In Germany, however, the Frankfurt School was still dominating the seriously intellectual life and theory, with major works of Adorno, Pollock and Horkheimer. Heidegger was still silent, not only since he was not permitted to teach, after the war, by the French authorities, but also there was nothing more for him to ask --to himself-- a question like "are we still capable to

God?" Everything in the intellectual climates of the world, when they resist against the "new-imperialism" of United States and the Cold-War, tended to evaluate the very notion of "opinion" and "imagination". Sartre wrote his *L'imaginaire*, and his opponent Merleau-Ponty questioned the conditions of "visibility", of making oneself visible the world in his two books *Phénoménologie de la perception* and *Visible et invisible*. The Anglo-Saxon "analytic philosophy" was still questioning the question of "opinion" which they relate generally to "belief". And this was also the birth of "television", the essential apparatus of filtering, interpreting, exhibiting and expressing opinions as "images".

The formulation of "mass society" had its evident roots in Ancient Greece, and notably in the apparent elitism of Presocratics --revealed in Heraclitus, who denounced the "nomos" of his co-citizens of Ephesus: they relied on their "divergent" opinions, rather than on the "common to all", which is Logos or Reason. And neither Plato nor Aristotle had an intensive care for democratic values, as they always denounced the "fluctuating opinions" of the mob. Machiavelli and Spinoza reveal themselves in this instance as rather ambiguous figures, since they were able to load positive values to masses (the "multitudo" of Spinoza) while denying them a correctly rational attitude. And the Enlightenment was at the same time the age of "disciplining" masses, ultimately with Napoleonic state apparatus, as if the dominant powers disliked mass behaviour, and the newborn sociology was intending to understand "mass behaviour" to predict its explosions, emotions, and wishes (the "positivism" of Auguste Comte, the "sociology of crowds" developed by Gustave Le Bon, and the "utopian socialisms" of Fourier, Owen, and Saint-Simon...

However, posing the question of "masses" or "crowds" is also posing the question of the "individual". Without defining the "individual" it was impossible to define the "mass" or the "crowd" behaving differently. This is a question that haunted the birth of French sociology from Le Bon to Durkheim. Le Bon intended to show the "leveling" function of the "crowd-event" (since crowds generally seem to gather

together in "events", revolts, revolutions, opinions, denunciations of "public enemies"). He believed that in a crowd, a professor could be reduced to the intellectually primitive level of a lumpen-proletarian. A new "individualism" was born out of the generay "fear of masses".

This "mass experience", which we have to discuss later, is reversed in the works of C. Wright Mills: the mass is no longer something that revolts, causes problems, and puts in danger the publicly established order. The publicly established order is nothing but the basis of a mass society, consisting of individuals incapable to manage their lives independently, and thus acting merely as "supports" of the power relationships. Mills was able to show the "mass" attitude as something both peaceful, securitarian and "dangerous". The "sociological imagination" is nothing more than an attempt to make sense of life meaningfully for the "individual" in mass... It is certainly "imagination", but not something which could be reduced to mere "opinion". It appears at the moment when an individual becomes capable to visualize (not properly "understands"), or "imagine" the coincidence of his or her biography with the so-called "public" or "objective" problems. Hence, Mills was attempting to "democratize" sociology, taking it from the hands of the "Grand Theoreticians" of the Academy (Talcott Parsons and even the "medium-range" theories of Robert K. Merton), and we think that his early death prevented him to develop his instigation to suggest an institutional framework for his "sociological imagination".

And the word "imagination" in Mills, we feel that it directly corresponds to what Hegel meant when he urges for a "pedagogy of concepts", or Jean-Luc Godard for a "pedagogy of images" in the age of television, all referring back to the all-covering Paideia of Greeks. Imagination now tends to signify a kind of "awareness", which should not be expressed as a mere "philosophical text" by some philosopher, sociologist, or scientist. If Mills denounces the "mass society", it is for finding out the individual in the mass", to address to him, in a society where he is reduced to a statistical number or to a holder of "opinions". One has to

detach the term of "pedagogy" from its academic, scholarly and class-based contexts.

Hence, Mills first attempts to show that there is no possibility for a sociologist (who corresponds in his "academy" to the "white collar worker" in other places) to reach the level to observe how "decisions are made" by the "power elite". If he was capable to write a book on the "power elite", this was not a study through "knowledge", but through "imagination", which is necessary to be able to denounce the established order. The three general "orders" of the power elite, however, were already present everywhere --the military, the political, and industrial... This "everywhere" presupposes an "agenda" where "truth" escapes us, the masses, to which also belong the "academician". Mills' is not a "conspiracy theory" as we understand today, since he really believes that sociology is still possible and that it is almost a "laboratory science". Truly, sociology can "positively" work as if societies themselves are "laboratories", and there is nothing to be troubled about this "indignity". Mills in fact reveals us that his "sociological imagination" should do a laboratory work, not in the sense that one is able to construct a laboratory-observation of social affairs, but in the sense that we are already living in "laboratories" constructed by the political powers and the regimes of commandment.

2.8.1 Can Documentary Film Work as A Laboratory?

A visual, auditive or audio-visual material used in a social research project can never be seen as a mere "supplement", like an illustration which comes to the aid of a scientific observation, whatever its nature is defined: textual interpretation, empirical research, sometimes issued from participant observation... This is because visual and auditive experiences are not less "thoughtful" than philosophical, social-scientific, or anthropological investments of human thinking. They are based on much more sophisticated, much more modern "thinking

machines" than texts (to which we are always reduced in communication processes), corresponding to our age, which are the cinema, video and today electronic interactive media, and which seem to outreach, in actual culture, the mere textual means and "cerebrality" of academic thinking. There is a simple reason for this: each new generation tends to become more audio-visually oriented, rather than remaining as "readers": they are no longer receiving "images" and "sounds" merely as "things" (something to be interpreted or contextualized, expecting commentaries) or as "supplements", "illustrations".

Or the ways in which the audio-visual experience entered into the domain of education is not merely insufficient, but already harmful: as Paul Virilio's works show us, the "audio-visual" has been developed mainly as part of military technologies, as part of a "logistics of warfare" (Virilio, 1991). It could be shown that one of the "fathers" of the audio-visual was Dr. Goebbels, elaborating the Nazi propaganda machine.

It is essential now to re-appropriate the "vision" and "hearing" as fundamental human life-experiences. These are not today reduced to what the ancients were calling as senses, the five naked senses of the human being: they are something more, as they have been able to create "machines", or "extensions" to increase the powers to see and hear. We are not envisaging them as a pure tools to create and reproduce "mass media" events --a photography could sometimes give much more information than pages of writing.

Discussing "opinions" and "affects", we have already witnessed that the notion of "social types" is in a constant decay. We are not attempting to revive it. However, this decay is symptomatic for the "event" of our times: we have universally developed quite "wrong" audio-visual apparatuses: the television and partially the Internet, the latter remaining still as an "open" question, since it is difficult to foresee what it will become in future. The decay of social types is today corresponding to the creation of pseudo-social types: the yuppie, the rocker, the

hacker, while we have in fact only at home a new generation which almost "autistically" surfs on the web, or just watches television in due times.

For television is said to be a "time-machine": it governs and orders time, fragments it in accordance to the exigencies of work and leisure time, it re-ordinates and re-creates time. That the greatest part of world population lacks the Internet now is not an objection to what we say: with the already planned technological integration of the Internet with television the situation will change in a close future. The projects like the Highways of Communication in United States, and with Bengemann Report in Europe are motivating today such an integration.

However, when we have said that our societies were that of "opinion" is commensurable with what Deleuze called as "societies of control": you are "free", at least at the level of "opinion" but you are still controlled. And this control is largely audio-visual (monitoring life), in contrast to the "writing" and "discourse" of the Foucauldian "disciplinary societies", which are in the process of being at least "liberally" questioned.

This "questioning" would remain "liberal", that is, remaining at the level of denouncing "disciplinary" structures and claiming "rights" of a future citizenry, of free flows of information in the highways. Everything seems to be arranged to avoid the mistakes of "disciplines": the Napoleonic universal systems of "schooling", "hospitalizing", "academizing", "employing", and the Freudian system of "child-breeding" are, today in decay and it seems that no one knows what should be the substitute for them.

It is for us clear that disciplines, academic or everyday, were systems of "discrimination" and "analysis": and the "image" today is partially serving to them. Schooling can teach language, mathematics, physics, not warning us about

that they are merely "rules" or "laws", as an over-all government over life-experiences. We have already seen that a mathematical rule is a way in which one has to learn how to solve an equation. There is no such thing as "rules of the game" or even "language games" (Wittgenstein) which could witness about a subject's freedom, like Hannah Arendt once believed in: every "rule" rules, and it just appears as a command... Even the solution of a naive problem in mathematics is taught according to such commands as "you add x to y, and then..."

"Child-breeding" also is passing through every sphere of the "post-modern" life -- not only that one has to learn some "practical knowledge" from the book of Dr. Benjamin Spock, or from daily journals, but also that it becomes a "freeing" which is always under control. If Freud "freed" childish sexual (or other, like the game of Little Hans, for us having nothing to do with "sex") games, this was in order to be able to observe them in his own "scientific" methods. The evolution of sciences is such that they seem first to "observe" (Aristotle), than "experiment", but in order to do this, one should first to "hunt" or "capture" things, and then to "experiment" on them under laboratory conditions.

One major question of Mills' "sociological imagination" is already an answer: the "mass society" tends to become something like a laboratory, where "grand theories" are called to make observations and even experiments --the major touchstones of the development of "academic" sociology were the serial studies on Middletown, about the engineering of an "electoral campaign" and especially Gunnar Myrdal's "military research" on the American Soldier¹⁷.

¹⁷ A ruthless kind of pragmatism, almost denying the existence of some immanent problems is invoked by Myrdal when he declares that: "It has become recognized that the most promising field for research is the "no man's land" between the traditional disciplines. There is one concept which the economist or the sociologist can keep blurred, namely the concept of "economics" or "sociology"; for it can never be a premise for a rational inference. In reality, what exists are merely problems to be solved, theoretical or practical; and the rational way of attacking them is to use the methods which are most adequate for solving each particular problem."

It is evident that a social scientist cannot by himself or herself create a "social laboratory" --otherwise huge cabinets of doctors of sociology should be constructed, inviting families, tribes, social groups, even classes and some "pratico-inerte" material with existential problems. Or this "laboratory" is already established: once by the "societies of discipline" made visible by Foucault (1975), then the "mass society" of Mills. The latter is evidently a pseudo-society, a project which will never be accomplished, since we have already learned from Gabriel Tarde that masses have to be composed by individuals. Mills shows that a sociologist here is nothing more and assistant of a "power elite" (a non-social "type") and that he or she belongs to the order of "white-collars", that is as "supports" but not the "holders" of power in Foucault's terminology.

Everything in Foucault seems to start with an excellent image: *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* of Magritte, which is a painting showing us a pipe simply, and where, below the image of the pipe, the sentence "this is not a pipe" is written. Foucault interprets this paradox involving both the visible and the speakable (language) in a little book, which we believe is the grain of his entire work: detaching what one could see from what is written (present in the discourse) (Foucault, 1994: I, 232). In his archaeologies of language, of social sciences, of madness, of criminality (to which he was always capable to find out corresponding "social types": the madman, the erotomane, the "dangerous individual", and so forth...) and of "work", Foucault seems to visualize the entire social experience in the model of a painting in move, with its historical "ruptures" and analytical consequences which yet remain to be interpreted.

2.9. Godard's New Image

We believe that Jean-Luc Godard has been able, from now on, to invent truly a "new image". This is a video-image, generated for TV, but never reducible to it. It is the accomplishment of, seemingly 25 years of work, since when Godard has

began to produce his first “video-images” –exactly taking departure from the Pravda, Cinéma-Vérité and especially from the works of the Dziga Vertov Group (*Groupe Dziga Vertov*) movements of the times, if not from his “Maoist” inspirations towards a hopeful perspective of “cultural revolution”. His recent *Histoire(s) du cinéma* now, in its turn, can be a point of departure for our own perspectives today, as we are concerned in using videography as an archival element, to reconstitute a method both of affection and vision. Before entering to this conclusive phase of our thesis –(beyond this there must be the video) it could be useful to envisage how this neo-Vertovian possibility has been developed, in time, through the works of Godard.

In the exposition of the “groupe Dziga-Vertov” (“Sur les films du groupe” –an anonymous publication in *Cahiers du Cinéma*, No 240: Juillet Aout 1972) the Godardian formula “making political films politically” has been uttered, to our knowledge, for the first time. This formula reminds us that “no one can easily make ‘political’ films –as the so-called “Pariscope” tradition. But one should go beyond “political film” (even Elia Kazan, John Ford made “political films”, the former evidently from an extreme-rightist perspective), and ask the question of making “political films politically”. This formula has a clear Brechtian reference, the *Verfremdungseffekt*, which is an effect of critical distantiation which denaturalizes the events which are part of the narratives of the bourgeois cinema. Godard maintains in his film *Tout va bien* that these narrative events are attempts for “forcing to laugh a crying one, and making cry a laughing one”: it is evident that the narration of the classical dramatic cinema is to force the spectator “to laugh with the one, out there on screen” to laugh together, and the same thing for the crying one (same text, p. 5). This is not a burlesque kind of estrangement, in the manner of the “action cinema” where actions and situations are redefined in the narrative structures in an opposite way to the “realistic” film, as Deleuze describes it (Deleuze, 1982). In a classical realist film narrative, actions are in fact reactions to a situation, to a milieu, to an environment, just like classical sociology, if not the pseudo-psychology of American behaviourism have generally used as a model (the same thing in the first documentaries of Flaherty,

Nanook in duel with a wild nature). In a way, our Anonymous” author claims the Brechtian aspect of the works of the Groupe Dziga-Vertov in not only as a “continuation” of Brecht’s “critical” instance, but as a qualitatively different revival of it, “to struggle for the awakening of the critical eye in the spectator”.

This recalls us also what has happened in Soviet cinema, in the the triple opposition between Vertov, Eisenstein and the Stalinist regime: both Vertov and Eisenstein were calling for the “new international language” of the cinematography, but in quite different ways, before both being screwed under Zhdanovism: this is also the way in which one can conceive “how Lenin not only said things quite different than what Bismarck said... but also how he said these things ‘differently’” (op. cit.).

The second Godardian moment can be formulated as “putting everything in a film” (“*mettre tout dans un film*”), which is, we believe, essential in the way in which Godard, since 1975, has married video, considerably reducing the number of his cinema works: *The Histoire(s) du cinéma* seems to take its point of departure in a non-nostalgic supposition that “cinema was unsuccessful” (Jean-Luc Godard himself seems to assume this bad success when interviewed by Serge Daney: see *Cahiers du Cinéma*, No 513:49). Evidently one tries to make a history only after a decline of something: or we know that cinematography still still alive, and this is exactly essential the problem now –“things getting worse, both in cinema and in philosophy” would say Deleuze (1994:1). The fact that cinema was still alive already imposes a problem of the past, of history which is not, to be sure a Hegelian one: the problem is revealed by serge Daney, when he recalls that “Vertov was shown something which has been lived” –a past for us, but the videos of Vertov are still available, while this “something which has been lived has disappeared”. (op. cit., 49) This was not paradoxical for a Hegelian way of recalling History –the history of nations, of classes, of wars, of great events. This is not still paradoxical for a Fernand Braudel, putting into series the sediments of the “history” of capitalism in a set of huge works. But in a way, there is an

essential paradox in the history of cinema, since the “visible” has already been passed away, while the image is still available.

We have seen that cinema presupposes a technology (of engineering, of trains, of photography, of scientific revolution and, as Virilio would say, of warfare): Godard sees in this technological background the basis of a culture which traversed the cinema which invented, in its turn “television”. He maintains that:

Cinema is an art, and science too, is an art. This is what I am saying in *Histoire(s) du cinéma*. In XIX't century, the technique was born, in an operatory (opérateur) sense, and not in an artistic sense (not at the level of the movement of a small horloger produced in Jura, but with one hundred and twelve millions of Swatch). Or Flaubert says to us that this birth of technique (telecommunications, semaphors) is simultaneous with the birth of idiots, that of Madame Bovary...” (translation mine, U.B..) (Godard, op. cit: 49)

Godard seems to assume what once was revealed by Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger, especially in the latter's questioning of “technology”, tending to become a “culture”, rather than remaining purely a “scientific-art”. We have already tried to depict this “scientific” genealogy in previous chapters. And the only objection we make to Godard can be his argument that cinema begot television, since we believe, on the contrary in that television as a culture evolved out of what Heidegger once observed in his *Question Concerning Technology*: modern technology does not produce as in the past “shoes” to fit the feet of a peasant woman, it produces “energy”, it produces “plastic”, it produces “electricity”, it produces “urban heating” and so forth, as fully amorphous things. It is essential to remind that such a state of affairs is evident, today in the manipulation of opinions, in the “use of pleasures” (transposing the Foucauldian sense of the word, in the Second Volume of his *History of Sexuality*), and especially in the “videosphere” of the images in the televisual and digitized world.

CHAPTER III

WHAT IS AN AFFECT?

3.1 Statement of the Thesis

A sociology of affects is that of "feeling" and "intuition": this means that it already belongs to the order of the "practical knowledge" (*phronesis*) of Aristotle. Or we don't believe that Aristotle could now help us much (nor Freud, as we will see in the following section) as the "practical" now is by no means guided by "knowledge" but only by information and opinions. Feelings can be governed by the press and television programmes, but intuition can never be governed: it is the way in which one is capable to detach oneself from the exigencies of the public opinion --the Super-Ego of Freud, but also the representation of "images" which no longer belong to "social types", but rather to the domain of "image making" (in this sense advertizing can claim "transcendental images", the images that can work out the public at the level of perception).

We have already been acquainted with the notions surrounding the concept we have used in the previous chapter: --the opinion which is in a double identity with "imagination" (Spinoza) and with "affects". Or affects have a broader meaning, since they are lived-experiences, rather than re-formulations of them. Opinion presupposes something: this is nothing but "affect" in the sense that an opinion or judgment already reflects an affective situation, rather than a "knowledge" in the classical sense of the term.

In this chapter, then we should enter into a domain where we have here two fundamental examples in considering "affects": the first is psychoanalysis, mainly as it is developed by Freud, and the second, which will use as the foundation of the critique of the former, is Spinoza's doctrine of "affectus" (emotions) developed in the Third Book of Ethics. The outcome of this presentation will be, we hope, a possibility in discussing the images of "social types" as "affective entities", no longer as "types" which remain in pure intelligibility. A sociologist should be able to "feel", "to be affected" by the social types he or she is assigned to contact. Hence our first thesis is: one can and should develop a method of active imagination.

There are concepts like "empathy", "identification", "inter-subjectivity", "Verstehen", "understanding" widely used in social sciences, in psychology, in cultural studies and psychoanalysis as "methodological terms", as if they were a matter of "method" but not of life itself. But this "methodology" still rests upon the presuppositions of a sociology of opinions, which we have stated in the previous chapter. Sociology, if it will correspond to Mills' "sociological imagination" has to use all these notions with precaution:

"Empathy" is not a "method" as Nilüfer Göle once stated, when she was questioned about her "adherence" to the "Islamist" circles she was supposed to study¹⁸. It just "happens" and is the major motive of "friendship", "sympathy" and ultimately, of "love". Like "sympathy" it requires a kind of distance, but also a kind of "closeness": it is the distance not from the "enemy" or the "object of study" (generally transformed to a relationship of enmity when we pass, after interviews, questionnaires and the like are administered, when there comes the time

¹⁸ First, her "inquisitors" were wrong, since "empathy" is not "love" or "sympathy" --it differs from them, in that it is a kind of "wonder" not yet sustained by a positive or negative emotion. It is a kind of attention, which can later be transformed into "love" or "hate". This was an oral transmission when Nilüfer Göle was supposed to present her work on Islam and women, that happened in İletişim Kitabevi. (Its date we cannot remember exactly).

to "interpret" and "understand"). Or this "enmity" is not yet simple "hatred", since it is occasionally manipulated by the distance one has with one's objects of study. A long time has already passed after the interview and the first "romantic" sentiments are now removed.

The word "empathy" is not a part of our Spinozist dictionary: or it can always be interpreted with the Cartesian and Spinozist term *admiratio* which is rendered as "wonder": a state of the psyche which appears when one is not yet living a sentiment, but which is somehow different from "indifference" or "neutrality". It is a kind of "attention", or of "first perception" which awakes in our psyche a kind of "interest" to be satisfied not as a consumption, but as a reciprocal apperception.

In social sciences, we are already acquainted with a series of methodological terms, concerning research techniques and there there are no a lesser degree of subtlety and savagery than there are in mass media: the "participant observation" is one of them. Once we adhere to a social group, once we "participate", the anthropologist or ethnographer will think that his prize will be high in getting informations. Mills questions the foundation of such a belief: "participation" already changes the nature of the thing to be "observed". Malinowski wrote his books on Trobrianders only when he is back, to the place (the "academy") which he left some years ago with many mental disturbances: this means that Trobrianders have "cured" him and that the "social anthropology" he founded was nothing but his treatment.

At any rate, rather than "empathy" we have here, in "participant observation" a misuse of the term "participation": for Plato there were three kinds of "participation" and only one kind of observation (that of the eternal "ideas"). The first was simply the material, natural participation: in a cocktail there are "participants", to some degree, to constitute a whole, which is a combination of parts. The second was somehow "demonic", as if one "participates" to a "possession", which is in fact nothing but a participation in itself: possession has always been a state calling for the "purge" either as the order's urges against

witchcraft, in the Middle Ages, or as the psychiatric or medical urge for "saving" the individual against the dangerous and contaminating "disease" to which he "participates".

Then there comes the third meaning of "participation": one participates, only by "being", to an "idea". This is quite difficult to understand today, since we are quite remote from Platonic world of ideas, while somewhere, as parts of our Unconscious, they still survive in us. This is not yet the Cartesian "Being = Thinking" equation; one can "participate" only to a "model" derived out of an "Idea", of which it is nothing but a "copy". Empathy is something which just appears there, at the moment when an Idea is modeled (taking "form", in Aristotle's terminology) --it is simply the way in which things can represent other things, so on to infinity. In the Platonic world, however, this "imitation" viewed as "participation" is judged and affirmed only in a Platonic way: we do not have a two-dimensional world as in the "mind-body" duality of the Cartesians, but still a three-dimensional one. If there is a "participation", there should necessarily be two terms: the "participant" and the "participated". For the participant we have no problems, since it is "free" in participating everywhere within its power: "participation" for Plato is a kind of violence: if one can participate, one can also be detached and it makes harm to the whole. Losing the members of a party or a schism in a movement, as well as the political, historical and geographical scissions (which we call as "nations" today) or detachments are taken as a "violence" and in real life, everything like this is practiced through violence -- revolts, so-called revolutions, warfare, genocides...

Thus "empathy" corresponds to a kind of participation in the third type: a participation which is, however honoured and honourable, corresponding to what Plato was calling as the "divine share" --the *theia moira*, which is especially needed for leaders to become philosophers (if philosophers cannot be leaders): the use of the word "moira" (belonging to the context of "fates" (moirai) comprising "necessity" (ananke) mythologically fabulated in the end of the Republic --the

"myth of Er" (*Republic*, X, 617c-e). This also corresponds to the "divine inspiration" of Socrates occurring at the end of the *Meno* (*Meno*, 99e and 100b). It is said here that this was lying at the source of what we may call as "true opinion". Evidently politicians are said to lack knowledge, insofar as they are not philosophers --so they needed evidently a divine inspiration to share Justice, like the "vision" of the seer.

The uses of the word "empathy" as if it refers almost to a methodological tool, and not an "affective state" tends to become harmful since one can use it anywhere, loosely and without any clear consequence. This comes from the idea that "social sciences" are both "knowledge" but also something relying on "empathetic" relationships. When one talks about "participant observation" he raises a series of "ethical problems" hidden behind the barriers of the "science" practised there, an observation but not experimentation. As we will see in the next chapter, concerning "documentary image", such an ethical question is posed --perhaps in a quite naive way, but yet, it is posed generally by documentarians. A social researcher never poses such questions as "how our presence dissolves or modifies the relationships and interactions involved here" without embedding it into a simple problem of method, or of "metis" and subtle arrangements of statistical techniques, trying to measure what is called as the "bias". In the case of a documentarist, however, the problem remains sharper and felt already as a burning experience, just because audio-visual media seem to be more powerful than private, often confidential oral or textual transmissions. This is the main reason for which we are trying to impose a merge of the "theoretical" interrogations of social sciences with what we may call as "documentary" techniques.

3.2 The *Affekt*: A Freudian Discharge

Psychoanalysis takes departure from "affective states". Whether these states are "excesses" or "diseases" is not a point of consideration here. Freud seems to deny the role of some philosophers of "affects", like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer -- who seems already to develop a totally coherent theory of the "unconscious" in his *The World as Will and Representation*-- in the entire process through which he invented and developed psychoanalysis and the corresponding concepts: the Unconscious, the Pulsion, the Ego, and the Will (for a detailed critique of this attitude see Derrida: 1980: 232-3) He rather recognizes his "scientific" precursors: Pinel who liberated the madmen from L'Hopital Général, following the French Revolution¹⁹, Charcot for whom he worked as an assistant in La Salpêtrière notably about hysteria, and especially Breuer to whom he delegates the merit of the "true inventor of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1982). We cannot say that the hysteric (mythically attributed to women during Nineteenth century) can be accepted as a "socio-psychological type", while common language often pejoratively use them in this way, still today, and still for women, the collective work of Freud and Breuer proves clinically that this malady was universal, disturbing men as women. Freud recalls in his first essays on hysteria (Freud, 1982) that during Middle Ages hysteria was not recognized --evidently-- as an illness, but as a devilish "possession". And during Nineteenth century, opinions were quite in variance with each other: for some, since there were singularly variant symptoms, attributable to each patient, while not to any organic trouble, it was nothing more a "simulation", a pseudo-disease and even somehow due to "suggestions", and never a "real" disease. Evidently today's psychiatry sees in hysteria a psychosomatic disease. (Freud, 1984) Charcot and Janet, on the contrary, as forerunners of Freud, have shown that hysteria was a "real illness" whose origins "they" and "especially" the diseased person, simply "don't know" --which is the first statement of the "unconscious" (*l'inconscient*) in psychiatric and medical literature. It should be noted that Freud adopted first such a meaning of the

¹⁹ This event is described by Foucault in his *L'histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, (1972)

"unconscious" (*unbewusste* as an adjective), before "substantializing" it in his later works, as *The Unconscious (Unbewusstsein)* (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).

But yet, it should be remarked that not only the patient, but also the the psychiatrists and psychologists were ignoramuses about the origins, the "real causes" of the malady: everything passed as if the paralyzed arm was "really" insensible and one could burn it without any sense on the part of the patient (Freud, 1924). The first interpretation of Charcot and Janet, later approved by Freud was that everything seems to prove that the patient "abstracted" a part of his or her body, while there is no simulation at all, which proves, especially for Freud that he or she "no longer wants his or her arm" (Freud, 1924). Only under hypnosis the symptoms disappeared by suggestion, but only temporarily, since they reappeared. Charcot was using the technique of hypnosis which relies on suggestions which urge the patient that symptoms will disappear when he or she will reawake.

We had to wait for Breuer, who presented one of his patients, Anna O. who is, as we said above "a very intelligent young girl" to Freud, telling him that he believed to find out a new method of "cure": this new method required a "collaboration", if not "participation" of the patient to the process of treatment (and this intelligent girl was capable to do this). This "empirical" method was exactly fitting the paradigms of the late Nineteenth century medicine (so, it was "scientific" enough) described by Michel Foucault --a "pure" empiricism, a "meticulous reading of symptoms", "visualization of signs" and a "map of the body" (Foucault, 1963) The process of the treatment was adequately imprevisible and almost improvised: a nervous cough, quite insistent, just like her inability to speak her mother tongue (they were talking only in English), an occasional paralysis of her three arms and especially the presence of two quite different states of mind --that of a dissipated child and of an extremely clever young girl. These were the two distinct states of consciousness that Anna O. was able to pass from one to another, while only temporarily, from the abnormal to the normal by a kind of "auto-hypnosis". All

these complicated linguistic and somatic troubles (today we say "psychosomatic", a quite Spinozist notion which we owe to Jacob von Uexküll (1986), that disappeared when she was re-awakened, unfortunately always for a short period before they repeat again. Breuer's technique was based on repeating the words she uttered during her sleep when she was awake: especially concerning a last and decisively fatal symptom, her hydrophobia... In her altered state of consciousness, whenever she wanted to drink water, her state of mind was suddenly changing. During these periods of change, when Breuer repeated her the words she uttered under hypnosis, the "patient" just began to recite her dreams, that is, images of her past, while it is always difficult to recall dreams properly. But this was an "insistence" and she was telling nothing more than dreams. This is called later, in psychoanalytic vocabulary, as "affective externalization", or catharsis, or the Aristotelian "purgatory of soul". The only condition for the definitive extinction of a symptom was that an affective burst of feelings, for instance an exaggerated anger, or hate (an affective state) expressed during hypnosis: so, Anna awakens from hypnosis, only after her exaggerated manifestation of anger against a dog she saw, during her childhood, drinking water from a cup, just at a moment when Breuer gave her a cup of water and she was drinking (Freud, 1923).

What can one deduce from such a story? That she was blocked at the moment she failed to show her anger against the "small dog" of her dad. Psychoanalysis will explain later that her "affective charge" was not expressed at the due moment, for reasons of politeness (today we could also say "for political reasons", which are not so much distant of the former), and now, this charge which repeats itself as symptoms can be forgotten, since it bursted under hypnosis. Psychoanalysis in its early beginnings, discovers "affects" (*Affekt*) as an inseparable part of its understanding of what is "unconscious" (*unbewusste* as an adjective).

It is important to note that a revelation of a past memory is not sufficient for the cure: if this past memory is not accompanied by an actual affective state, in this case the "anger" of Anna O., it could not be "forgotten" at all. The reader can now

be incapable to discern the familiar meanings of the words, especially that of "forgetting". Can one say that Anna O. "forgets" something which was never revealed to her consciousness, being the "cause" of her disease? Breuer and Freud seem to say us that "forgetting" (the oblivium) can be used in two senses: Anna O. forgets the event that was a trauma for her since she was unable to express the corresponding appropriate "affect" --the anger, for reasons of politeness. Or her altered states of mind "remember" it, always and as a neurotic obsession, and unconsciously. Now it comes that she is capable to "forget" this trouble completely, once the "problem" and the "affect" required encountered each other once again, in recollection or hypnosis.

This means that symptoms appear whenever the patient was unable to express normally an affect. The cure cannot work unless it is not accompanied by these affects. Affective experiences remain as psychic traumas which are, according to Freud, always determined by "scenes" --as the scene of the small dog, drinking from the "humane" cup of water... (Freud, 1926) A trauma seems always to be a residual, a remnant, a remanence of a past, but concrete event. And traumas have to be the remnants of the disturbing, troubling "interval" between an idea and the corresponding "affect", or emotion in ordinary language.

But what happens when such trauma happen to "social bodies", families, tribes, nations and to the world on a global scale? Unless we assume the existence of an all-powerful State or Government for instance, we cannot be able to figure out these traumas of the past --certainly Revolutions, wars or even insignificant events which once disturbed the public opinion. No one could "cure" such a trauma without having enough power to create a state of "oblivium", which remains contrary to what we call, at least since Hegel "historical consciousness". There will always be concrete individuals --"classes" for Marx for instance-- that will remember that the "cure" itself was a trauma, as always happens in concrete historical experience. We are acquainted with the classical idea (even adopted at least partially by Gramsci) stating that "society" is passive (the civil society) while

"political classes" are active. Such a dualism is not supported even by Hegel, who takes his point of departure from the "unconscious" of the history, especially with his doctrine of "subtlety of reason".

And Freud will not retard in asking the "real" question, out of these observations which he made together with Breuer: everything shows that such "medical" problems are not as much "singular", "unique" and "empirical" as they seem. They are always part of our ordinary life, common to all --the first time Freud faces the world of the "social", but as we will try to show, in a quite inadequate manner. In all these *actes manqués* (the French word for ordinary *oblivia*, the instant forgetting of names, of acts to be accomplished and the like) something of this fundamental, primordial "remembrance" is at work, he thinks. But this is still the "social" for "each", not in itself (Durkheim could never believe in a "collective unconscious", an idea later developed by Freud's friend --and later enemy-- Carl Gustav Jung). In other words, if Freud was able to take seriously such events as "dreams" and *actes manqués*, they were still revealing a self, or an individual which is radically different from a collectivity of individuals. While in exact opposition of Durkheim (an opposition which is never expressed), who wanted to eliminate everything "psychological" from his sociology, Freud was able to conceive the "social-for-each" and not as a superior, *sui generis* entity.

Freud's interest in wits (cf. Freud, 1926), *actes manqués* and especially dreams is part of late Nineteenth century's wisdom to take so far incomprehensible, superstitiously understood, or simply trivial things seriously into account: the first attempt came from E. B. Tylor, who has tried to extract a social structure and a logic of culture merely from "kinship terms" of American Indian tribes (Tylor, Lévi-Strauss, 1949). Then Frazer came with his huge *Golden Bough*, to compile the mythologies of far distant societies and cultures (Frazer, 1922). Hence, now Freud comes and takes seriously the wits (*Witz* in German), the trivial things of social life, including dreams.

One of the essential early works of Freud is the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, generally taking into account what we call as *actes manqués*. These acts are not the characteristic of the "ill", but especially and predominantly of "normal" people. Again, the "two states of mind" of Anna O. reveals itself in these situations: the cause of an *acte manqué* (a lapsus, lost things, something insistently forgotten, like a name or act to be accomplished) is, according to Freud, an intention missed for another one. A sexual intention of a man can reveal itself in the word he uttered as "*begleitdigen*", having no meaning in German. Or this is the combination of two words having meaning in this language --"*begleiten*" can be translated as "accompanying" (intentionally and consciously, the young man wants to accompany the young girl to her home), and "*beleidigen*", meaning injury, or lack of respect in German. Freud believes that such a lapsus is not a trivial thing which would remain as ordinarily meaningless: no organic cause as fatigue could be assigned to them, since --as the word "*begleitdigen*"-- some kind of "meaning" is already present there, though as a linguistic recomposition of two words. In parallel to Freud, one has to recall the study of "laughing" presented by one of his contemporaries, Henri Bergson: he evokes a kind of "laughing" (*le rire*) which is nothing more than a self-defence in a situation one finds oneself shameful, in order to avoid the laughs and other kinds of reactions of others, in society (Bergson, 1988)

Hence, *actes manqués* are really "acts", always a characteristic of "normal" people, where two intentions disturb each other, the one generally approved, the other always repressed. There is nothing "unintended" in these acts. Freud interprets this "struggle" of the two intentions as their "compromise" at a middle point, and one intention is already called as "repressed", the other as "intended" or "conscious" (Freud, 1981). Everything passes as if there were "opinions" in struggle within the soul of a single person. The examples of self-contradictory terms, firmly established in languages --especially in German-- have already attracted some important philosophers, like Hegel commenting on the opposite meanings present in a single word, or like Schelling to whom Freud himself refers in terms of the "opposite meanings" in his important article *Das Unheimliche*

(Freud, 1981)... Perhaps this struggle will continue in the works of those contemporaries of Freud, as Joyce, as the first systematic user of *mots valises*, or composite words whose sense don't yet exist, but are to be created only through their utterance.

But this compromise between two opposite intentions, according to Freud, is also a contamination --a word contaminating the other and also the opposite... This "contamination" Freud prefers to call as "condensation" which explains everything in terms of a metaphor. In other words, the two words contaminating each other, since they are not deprived of affects attached to them (so they have a power of contagion), suddenly appear as combined (Freud, 1981).

This event is nothing but for Freud a quasi-repression of an intention filled with an affect: it appears but in a transformed manner. But the only way to explain this, is nothing but a situation where the event appears intempestively: there is no lapsus but in a social context (to which Freud generally seems to fail to pay attention), but everything depends on the condition that the subject feels that such an intention would be indecent, injuring or incongruous... The discourse, always already present there, as Lacan would like to say, while suppressed, will intend to be manifested, disavow itself, also satisfying the censorship.

Evidently all kinds of lapsuses could not be so easily interpreted: to the extent that they are more or less "repressed", they become more or less difficult to interpret, and more or less "symptomatic". At any rate, the essential condition of a lapsus is always the repression of an enunciation which could be felt by the subject as somehow indecent, or injuring, or again, intolerable. Or, suppressed in the discourse, the repressed tendency manifests itself contrary to the will of the speaker, contaminating his or her discourse. It appears that sometimes it can modify the manifest, "intended" or avowed tendency or it can altogether take its place. Hence the resulting lapsus is somehow answering to what censorship expected from the subject (that the young man in our example, after all, did not

surely uttered the injurious word). There is an entire logic of these "*portemanteau*" words which contaminates, not only psychoanalysis, but the entire avant-garde culture of Western Europe in the beginnings of Twentieth century, if not coming from the Jabberwocky of Lewis Carroll, at least appearing as an essential "literary" argument in the works of James Joyce (see Deleuze, 1969).

An *acte manqué*, further, is nothing but a compromise between two antagonistic intentions which tend to be expressed together, while this common expression remains "impossible" (at least, in the "linear" nature of language) without a mutual concession. At any occasion and very often, Freud stresses that the unconscious tendency sufficiently resists to analysis that the person analyzed (the "patient" for Freud, a "Subject" for Lacanians) tend to deny an value to it. Later Freud will reveal this "resistance" in his *Interpretation of Dreams*:

"There are many people who do not seem to find it easy to adopt the required attitude toward the apparently "freely rising" ideas, and to renounce the criticism which is otherwise applied to them. The "undesired ideas" habitually evoke the most violent resistance, which seeks to prevent them from coming to the surface." (Freud, 1926)

This "negation" or rather "de-negation" is a quite important mechanism, which we will take into account in the following chapter (Freud, 1925). For the time, as a passage from a purely therapeutic operation, we should pass to the "interpretation of dreams", probably the most important work of Freud in the road on which he is led to the "invention" of the Unconscious.

The way in which Freud introduces his *Traumdeutung*, at the eve of Twentieth century is quite pretentious, as he claims that the "interpretation of dreams is the royal road to the knowledge of the Unconscious in psychic life". Now, *unbewusste* tends to become *Unbewusstsein*, almost like a substance, if not an essence. If Freud's studies in hysteria and on the "psychopathology of everyday life" still

remain in the "empirical" (that is, appropriate to the epistemology of the medicine and other "natural sciences") through this "royal road" Freud will tend now to create almost a new domain of existence, tending to destroy the very notion of "consciousness", if we understand from this a purely active force of human beings upon their life, at will (Freud, 1926). And the "dreams" have already proved their "symptomatic" value during his works on the case of Anna O., as we have mentioned above.

However, the "importance" of dreams for Freud seems to reveal itself in terms of his therapeutic engagement in "neuroses": if it is true that neuroses revealed the importance of dreams, the study of dreams (empirical and case by case) gave him the key to the Unconscious. Occasionally, Freud was about to leave the "hypnosis" as an ancestral technique (which was, he says, difficult to manipulate) to move into a new method of treatment, based on "free associations", having the patient lying on a divan, the hand of the analyst on his head, and expected to speak, to utter words freely. No matter if nothing comes, as the analyst insists: that something should necessarily come... This insistence would be continued until some "thoughts" emerge to be uttered, generally in a manner as if the patient could say: "I was able to say this just from the beginning, but I didn't think that they were at all important for you". For Freud, this non-importance or triviality assigned by the subject to a "thought" was symptomatic, and the free-association method was now based on a relief, once the "symptom-thought" was found. The analyst now urged the patient for freely uttering every idea that comes, and what happens now is "characteristic": the patients, almost unanimously begun to recite their dreams --and these nocturnal accounts were interpreted by Freud just in the same status as other symptoms (Freud, 1926). It could be interesting now to comment on Freud's understanding of "spontaneity", which is conditioned by this "freedom of opinions" or relief. Why this spontaneous and recurrent tendency to account for "dreams", in the patients? According to Freud, the dream is not a useless aspect or phenomenon of psychic activity --if it is a "phenomenon", really in the Kantian sense if you want, it is as such a fully "meaningful" apparition, whose apparent absurdity and inhorence disappears at the moment when we are

engaged in an appropriately "scientific" method. A dream is meaningful as it expresses -always- a wish, an unconscious desire, also suggesting its spontaneous and immediate satisfaction. What remains to the waking time are only the remembered "manifest content" of the dream, as opposed to the material which will be delivered at the end of analysis (its "unconscious" meaning), are said to be "latent ideas". Or, it should be observed --and this is the important point, to question the "status" of the Unconscious-- that these "latent ideas" are never outside the "manifest content" of the dream. They are always embedded in it and they constitute the "meaning" of the dream itself, as every semiotician would say, since meaning cannot exist without the sign which expresses it. There is no a relation of anteriority-posteriority between "latent" ideas and "manifest" content, except for the sake of commodity of presentation (Freud,1926).

Hence one could say that the process of transformation of the latent ideas to the manifest content can be the fundamental activity of dream --the *Traumarbeit* (the "dreamwork") in Freudian terminology. And the analysis of dreams is nothing but to take the reverse road, moving from the manifest content to latent ideas, or "signs". Freud notes that if children have only "clair and distinct" dreams (one would be indebted to this Cartesian, therefore "childish" idea) since they lacked the "depth", and for them dreaming is simply transforming their wishes into "images". One could say that children are naturally "naturalists". Their dreams are simple acts or movements, like falling, flying, or any daily action. Or the "depth" intervenes in the adult, with an entire life-story, expressed in the great gap of proportion between latent ideas and the manifest content. Hence dream is nothing but a "repressed desire", which remains hidden to us (Freud, 1926).

What will be important for our purpose in the next chapter, concerning the world of images and particularly the cinema, is the way in which Freud will expand his interpretations to "awakened dreams", which he interprets not so much distant from the domain of artistic creation, as he quotes Schiller's letter to Korner:

The reason for your complaint lies, it seems to me, in the constraint which your intellect imposes upon your imagination. Here I will make an observation, and illustrate it by an allegory. Apparently it is not good- and indeed it hinders the creative work of the mind- if the intellect examines too closely the ideas already pouring in, as it were, at the gates. Regarded in isolation, an idea may be quite insignificant, and venturesome in the extreme, but it may acquire importance from an idea which follows it; perhaps, in a certain collocation with other ideas, which may seem equally absurd, it may be capable of furnishing a very serviceable link. The intellect cannot judge all these ideas unless it can retain them until it has considered them in connection with these other ideas. In the case of a creative mind, it seems to me, the intellect has withdrawn its watchers from the gates, and the ideas rush in pell-mell, and only then does it review and inspect the multitude. You worthy critics, or whatever you may call yourselves, are ashamed or afraid of the momentary and passing madness which is found in all real creators, the longer or shorter duration of which distinguishes the thinking artist from the dreamer. Hence your complaints of unfruitfulness, for you reject too soon and discriminate too severely. (letter of December 1, 1788, quoted in Freud,1926).

We will see how Schiller could claim to belong to the Romantic German followers of Spinozism (as Goethe and Schelling) and the place given to him by Freud is of critical importance. From the notion of "dream" Freud and his followers will never cease to apply psychoanalytic notions to the domain of arts: Freud to Leonardo, Rollo May to arts in general, up to Gaston Bachelard's "psychoanalysis of imagination", which seems to us somehow quite distant from the Freudian one (Freud, 1926; Bachelard, 1970)

It is interesting to note how dreams are connected to a kind of "tekhne" by Freud, and how the fundamental functions of dreams will be described almost in "technological" terms --as *Traumarbeit*, the work of the dream. Two small comments about such a reference will be necessary, the first referring to the domain of philosophy, and evidently to Heidegger who commented on the notion of "tekhne" with reference to technology, ancient and "modern", artistic and "industrial", perhaps under the influence of the early work of his friend Ernst Jünger --*Der Arbeiter*. *Arbeit* is what linked creativity to an aesthetic experience,

and can also be said for "dreams", not only to human beings (*Arbeiter*). As Heidegger, referring back to Greek metaphysics attributes the role of "revealing" to technology --"bringing forth the being"-- Freud uses the term *Traumarbeit* never like a metaphor, and this is the work of the dream, exactly (Heidegger, Jünger). At a second, critical moment, the anti-psychoanalytic device sketched later by Deleuze and Guattari in their *L'Anti-Oedipe* against Freudianism will be their opposition of a "constructivist" model of "factory", rather than of the Freudian model they interpret as of the "theater", of family *mise-en-scènes*, and of Oedipus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972)... We are inclined, as we will see, to share this second position.

Freud distinguishes between two "techniques", both operating in collaboration, as "condensation" and "displacement" --later rendered by Lacan in "linguistic" terminology respectively as "metaphor" and "metonymy" (Lacan, 1973). Condensation is the one of the "primitive elements", as latent, hidden ideas are always much more numerous than the manifest, expressed content. It reveals the "composite" appearance of the persons and objects that are "seen" in a dream, and this explains why any element in a dream "signifies" a lot of latent ideas. Through condensation, a lot of elements are "subsumed" in a single element (Freud, 1926).

Displacement, rendered by Lacan's terminology as a metonymic process is the reversal or "exchange" of values that are present on the scene of the theater of the Unconscious: this means that something extremely important in a hidden, latent thought in a dream tends to become quite "useless" or "trivial" in the manifest content, and vice versa, a quite trivial multitude of elements in the latent context reveals itself as something quite important to the subject. This "metonymic" process will be exactly what will drive Freud to his "theory of sexuality", since it enables the analyst to declare some elements as "trivial", the others as "important", the "important" depending on the state of the "theoretical position" of Freud at a given moment. Hence, Deleuze will object to Freud and his follower Melanie Klein their "abuse" of the metonymic process: a multitude of signs and

symptoms are reduced to the Oidipal element --"this is your mother; this is your father"-- for restoring the Little Hans for instance to his "family romance" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972)

The concept of "metonymy" seems also be seriously abused, later on, by those "linguistically" and "psychoanalytically" oriented theoreticians of cinema, and evidently by Christian Metz, but also some feminists like Laura Mulway, for whom every element in cinematography --naturally an ordered multitude "mounted" by the filmmaker-- should (and could) be reduced either to a "voyeurism", to a "male gaze" or to any psychoanalytic content. Deleuze denounces this only partially, simply stating that cinema could not be reduced to the vocabularies of psychoanalysis and of linguistics (Metz 1993; Mulvey 1989; Deleuze, 1985)

Freud also seems to depict a third *Traumarbeit*, following condensation and displacement, which seems to be an intermediary "work" between the former two instances: this is the "symbolization", consisting in replacing things, personae and situations with analogical representations, as it happens with playing with words. The Unconscious (Unbewusstsein), through this new concept, really passes from the "adjective"(unbewusste) to a "substance", expressed now as if it is a power which is already there, and not something yet to be created. Or it seems that according to Freud "symbolizing" is the first job of dream, since only through it the *Traumarbeit* will be able to provide the "raw material" for the other functions, the condensation and displacement, as well as the entire *mise-en-scène* of the theater of the Unconscious (Freud, 1926).

But why dreams are operating in such a tortuous manner, and why "adult" dreams cannot work with Cartesian, "clear and distinct" ideas, affects and images just like children's dreams? Freud explains this referring again to his notion of "repressed desires" which are repressed by "morality", which could not appear to consciousness as they are in themselves. We will see in the next chapter that there

is a strong Kantian element here. These repressed desires, according to Freud, can appear to consciousness only during sleep, when moral censorship is active in a lesser degree. And since censorship is still "active" (there cannot be such thing as a "passive" censorship) these intolerable ideas or affects (wishes) should disguise themselves --"symbolization". This explains both the tortuous nature of our adult dreams and why we easily forget --since we have to-- our dreams when we awake. This is expressed, according to Freud in "cauchemars" in which we are pushed to awake suddenly, generally in a very bad state which will be replaced soon by a sentiment of relief --these are merely too "clear and distinct" ideas and thoughts, which, in a way, escaped censorship. Cauchemars are moments of Angst, that come to be insupportable (Freud, 1926). Everything that passes on the scenery of the Unconscious seem to happen in an atmosphere associated either with a "repressive State", a "policing" function of censorship, or in a Kafkaesque theater, where anything "clear or distinct" (according to Cartesian logic) is insupportable or intolerable --whether it is a vision, an image, a wish, a desire, a thought... The Unconscious, when "substantialized" as a State affair (and Oedipus was a king, as we will see later) tends to become a devilish "return of the repressed" (Das Unheimliche), once familiar to us, and which should not come again (Freud, 1926).

Why Freud refers to a notion like "censorship", which is clearly a quasi-bureaucratic, quasi-repressive State function still in the modern times in which he lives. We can give some detailed informations about the times when he wrote Traumdeutung (1899) and the times in which he developed his later theories, distinguishing now between "camps" in a constant struggle, espionage, and matters of "war and peace" --the "topics" of the Unconscious-Consciousness (the first, dualist "topic") and of Id-Ego-Superego (the "second topic") which is that of "compromise" and "diplomacy" between these opposing forces. We could even recall that his emphasis on "censorship" belongs to Traumdeutung, to a "peaceful epoch" when, however, class struggles, revolutionary and anarchist movements, and evidently a police state with strong censorship were the rule. It was almost an epoch of "emergency State", transforming peace into a discipline. Later, as we

will see, the First World War explodes and the models of Freud tend to explain everything --not to wait his "disturbances of civilization"-- in terms of warfare, first as the "dynamic topic" of Unconscious and Consciousness in a constant war-in-fronts, and later of Id-Ego-Superego transforming human psyche into a map where tactics and strategies are always at work.

3.2.1 Affects and Social Types

What is the real work of censorship? Actes manqués and the lapsuses already reveal the social nature (politeness, eloquence, and the "civilizing process") of the forces involved in Freud's *fin-de-siècle*. This is a society of socio-psychological types, as some of them are described by Simmel, and these types are generally the Poor (people in need, and socially recognized in this way), the Mediator (quite akin to "censors" or "judges" acting as public agents), the Jew (and Freud himself was coming from an Atheist Jewish family, to which he seems to return back in his last work before dying, *Moses and Monotheism*), the Stranger (acting both as a Mediator, since he is distant from "familial sentiments" of the common, and as a source of danger, the Other coming to dissolve our relationships). Jacques Donzelot was able to describe the essential family function in that epoch as a "policing": the family, especially the "proletarian family" whose children were already in the streets (unlike their "bourgeois" counterparts who were, on the contrary, inclosed to the family setting at home and in gardens, schools, to be prepared to the business life to come). Yet the proletarian, ordinary family was now functioning in this era of industrialization and urbanization, as a function of "policing" and of "censorship". They betrayed their children, who didn't go to school in a modern epoch where there is obligatory schooling, or to work if they are working. The family was no longer the traditional atmosphere of "peace", a place where one can seek asylum, but only for not going to the other "asylum" (Donzelot, 1977). Everything was happening in the way the work of Michel Foucault has reminded us: the family, the school, the hospital, the military service, and especially the work in factory, whose institutional difference from a prison we

fail to recognize, were enclosures both in space and time. Hence a kind of censorship was present everywhere, just waiting for the final war (Foucault, 1966; 1972).

Or censorship and repression according to Freud seem to us as a quite distant "inventions" highly detached from all these social problems, unless we are able to locate his writings that marked the development of his theory of the unconscious within these transformations in family, in industry (the coming Taylorism and Fordism), in prisons and in the army --all these Foucauldian "disciplinary apparatuses". Censorship and repression, as highly Freudian notions had already their "social" counterparts, which are not merely avatars of a deep Unconscious, but quite complex social strategies developed since the end of French Revolution. These are Napoleonic institutions, which "institutionalized" the family (Code of Napoleon, especially regulating modern marriage and family relations), the new, disciplined army, the obligatory schooling system, the "asylum" transformed by Pinel into a medical observation and treatment laboratory, the clinic both as discourse and institution, relying on "case by case" empirical observation and experiment on diseases, and the prison system which remained for a while as a source of pride for a less crude "punishment" compared with the corporeal one of the ancien régime (Foucault, 1969).

Dissolving everything into dreams, that is a familial, short-range setting, Freud is nevertheless able to use the "socio-political" terms in his work: censorship and repression, but he tries to derive them out of his "therapeutic" or "psychiatric" work. The "first topic" he develops during the years awaiting for the First World War: the notion of repression already defines a "conflict", which will be enacted on a field of war (just to remember the *Kampfplatz* of Kant, as the philosophical domain), where opposing forces are expanded as strategical camps --since the word "topos" in Greek means "territory", or "place"). At first, this appears in Freud to be an attempt to present the problem, but not a "real" distinction of camps or territories. He seems never to refer to organically defined "places" for

the localization of these forces and thus, any attempt to try to find a place for these opposing forces in the brain would fail, since there are no "physical-organic supports" (Freud, 1923).

The First Topic presents the confrontation Conscious/Preconscious against the Unconscious: the conscious are actually present in our mind, and the preconscious can always be recalled by the memory, if I pay attention to something. The unconscious on the other hand consists in the psychic contents which are impossible to be called to consciousness. We learn now that the Unconscious is something clearly substantial, a set of forces and of repressed wishes, and in the opposite camp, there is our consciousness --a Cogito, whether it be Cartesian or not-- which somehow feels the coming of the elements of the Unconscious as a threat, more or less in depth or violent, to the extent of the nature of the desire "repressed" there. This threat already puts the existence and safety of consciousness (the actual part of our psyche) into danger. Freud again refers to the Angst whenever an idea coming from the Unconscious to become "clear and distinct". The symptom of this Angst can be viewed in the powers of repressing it, of denying it (*Verneinung*). (Freud, 1925)

Between the Ego and the Unconscious there is the censorship, possessing at least two main aspects: it is assigned to impede consciousness to go towards the Unconscious, as in cases when we try to interpret our dreams by themselves, without going properly to a psychoanalyst, to pay him. In this case the censorship repels the consciousness and this is called as "resistance". If inversely the unconscious elements, wishes, desires tend to invade consciousness, they will be sent back to their place by the agency called as censorship: this is called as "repression" (*Verdrangung*). And in order to understand more easily this phenomenon of "repression", one should understand it with reference to what Freud will call as the Pleasure Principle, which is obviously in plain and free work in the infant, but mediated in the adult. In accordance to this "principle", any psychic activity aims at pleasure and tends to avoid everything unpleasurable,

reminding us Spinoza's famous doctrine of the Conatus, with which we will see later some strict differences. In Freud, the necessities of adaptation into the "real" conditions of life partially suspends the Pleasure Principle: one has to tolerate unpleasure, in order to continue in its existence, and one has to know to face obstacles. To the principle governing this tolerance Freud gives the name Reality Principle: a principle which is not a straightforward attack on the Pleasure Principle, but, on the contrary, helps it to reach victory in a rather tortuous way.

To Freud it seems evident that in the domain of needs linked to the conservation of life, the instauration of the Reality Principle to a satisfactory degree is necessary and not subject to "repression", nor "resistance"; and due to this principle real satisfactions are not ignored for the sake of imaginary satisfactions. Evidently, for the time being vital urgency does not exist simply in sexual matters: the satisfaction of such desires are associated to the representation of punishments and religions have profoundly developed the image of Hell, as the ultimate punishment). Due to the Pleasure Principle, such representations are rejected (sent to the Unconscious) and thus remain unsatisfied. This is why Freud wants to link the entire domain of "sexual life" to an imaginary life: since all unconscious contents consist in unsatisfied desires, they constantly try to reach consciousness, lying as a source of dreams, *actes manqués* and neuroses.

Or there is also a more complex "topic" (known as the Second Topic) which has been developed later by Freud: everything reminds us that it is as if Freud faced again the problem of the Ego (the Cartesian Cogito and its status) --for not everything which happens in the "I" are revealed to our conscious: this is exactly the process of "repression". A second point of interest was now, for Freud, the process of the "identification" which is primarily with respect to the models provided by the parents. Hence there is a Super-Ego and one part of it corresponds to a "model" image, formed already during infancy, with respect to which the subject will constitute the values of self-estimation. This part of the Super-Ego in infancy is formed for "having right" to self-love (the fundamental problem of

Narcissism), and is called by Freud as Ideal-Ego (which seems to be, today, as the fundamental thematic debated not only by psychoanalysts, but also validated and questioned in the entire domain of social sciences --the cinema analysis, post-colonial and feminist theories and so forth).

The problem with Narcissism as "self-love" (a primary *Affekt*, according to Freud, the earliest passion of infancy) is that it cannot be satisfied without conditions or obstacles: at the moment when we internalize the "rules" and "interdictions" (parental education), self-love should fulfill the conditions necessary to merit parental love (the love of the Other). The infant loves himself or herself, but just in the same way that his or her parents are loving him or her. This is a kind of "judgment of others" according to which one will judge himself, as if in a Kantian tribunal. Everything shows that the "imaginary life" of infancy imposes a set of values wherewith the Ideal-Ego is constituted as an entire system of interdictions and moral judgments, constitutive of the Super-Ego. Hence we have more than two, that is three instances (or agencies) in the Second Topic: the Id (Das Es), the Ego (the 'I') and the Super-Ego...

The Id should not be confused with Unconscious itself, since there are unconscious aspects of the other instances too. Freud expressly uses such an impersonal word in order to show the unknown and unmasterable nature of the forces involved "there"... This Id (or "there", or again "it..." as it is expressed in the famous formula "Wo es war, soll Ich werden" --where It was, I ought be there...) resembles to the Unconscious, to which it corresponds through Freud's movement from the First Topic to the Second Topic: like the Unconscious, it ignores negation, contradiction, and even time and space, as the desires in it never perish. It is utmostly amoral, ignoring all kinds of moral restraints and judgments --in a Nietzschean way, it is "beyond good and evil". Or, this does not mean that it is merely a chaos, since it is said to follow the so-called Pleasure Principle. As we will see, it is the part which is attached to the body, with its reserve of impulses -- it is the reserve of the "libido" (the "I desire"). It is essential to note how the

Cartesian principle of Cogito is now transformed to an "I desire", to a Libido, but only as the immoral, and always escaping part of the psyche.

Then comes the "control" function, the Super-Ego of internalized constraints and interdictions --it is supposed to control both the Ego and the Id...That Freud attaches its formation to the "decline of the Oidipus complex" is evident, since one should accept that he could not marry his mother. With this decline, Freud assumes that the child accomplished his or her Super-Ego: the Ego-Ideal (which is a part of it) is not simply an "identification" with the parents --it is an identification with their Super-Ego (which Lacan will partly identify with what he calls as the "symbolic order") (Lacan, 1973) Our morality is nothing but that of our parents²⁰. What we forbid to ourselves are things they forbade to themselves. And thoroughly, the Super-Ego "controls" the exigencies of the Id --it denies the repressed desires to reach consciousness; but it also controls the exigencies of the Ego: it denies the desires which are not adequate to the Ego-Ideal and repress them. This function of control responds then to the exigencies of three things -- that of the Id, that of the Ego and that of "reality". Logically, only those desires which fit both to Id, the Ego and "reality" at the same time are allowed to be realized. Otherwise Angst, Shame, or Neurosis, if not Psychosis will appear. This means that this controller is at the same time a conciliator, like a diplomate.

Last but not least, we have the Ego, which is nothing but our "apparent" personality, already and always inscribed in the reality, and which is almost like an interface of contact with the outside world. The real mediator and conciliator (the essential diplomat) is, in fact the Ego --he is never a constant contradictory force to the Id, but it is rather the agency which is responsible in realizing the desires of the Id. It corresponds in a government to the "executive power".

²⁰ There is a beautiful of Ernst Jünger in his *Der Glazerne Bienen* (Glass Bees) where he deplores all these "grand moral theories" of all these philosophers --once more, after

It is evident that in Freud only the Ego can take into account the exigencies of reality, as a "politician" of "real politics", as it should never attract the reactions of the Super-Ego –it has to act in such a manner that it will not lose Super-Ego's love or risk to be punished by it. Evidently such a relationship between the Ego and the Super-Ego remains unknown to the subject, who is only capable to have a presentiment of it, with a certain kind of Angst (say, anxiety) and sometimes, sentiments of culpability. According to Freud, this sentiment of anxiety is a symptom of a tension between the Ego and the Super-Ego and of the fear of the Ego from being punished by the Super-Ego when the desires forbidden by it were realized by its complicity. Hence, the status of the Ego appears as a kind of "diplomacy" and "arbitration" among various sets of "interests", and in the so-called "rationalization" of desires.

And when the Ego feels itself threatened by a danger it can react in two different manners: first it can react with escape –under the conduct of the Pleasure Principle we are always led to try to escape any displeasurable effect. Or, if the danger is external, we can escape "really"; but if it is internal (like an impulse, or pulsion which wishes to be realized while its object is forbidden) then, we repress it. There is in repression something which can be compared to escape, hence, through repression we are not aware of the desire itself. The rational evaluation of a danger and of obstacles which are associated to a determination which is not less rational about the means to escape them. Freud supposes that the Reality Principle has to be successful in imposing its supremacy, but this mastery is evidently always relative and it is imposed mainly and often when confronted with external dangers. One of the roles of psychoanalytic therapy is to reinforce the primacy of the second mode of "reaction-formation" of the Ego, over the first one.

Spinoza and Nietzsche denounced them, each in their own context: "I would prefer a solid family morality to them..." (Jünger, 1988).

One could say that this “topographic” exposition could never be sufficient, without determining the fundamental causal chains involved in the Unconscious processes: thus, Freud passes into talking about “forces”, “impulses”, and “pulsions” corresponding to a kind of “dynamics”. The major question now is to take into account the nature of the forces that operate in these different instances (or agencies) in our psychic life. These dynamic forces are described by Freud under the name of *Trieb* (from “*treiben*”, which means “to push”), which can be translated as “impulse” or “pulsions” –and *Trieb* should never be confused with what we normally call as “instinct” (unfortunately many commentators fail to envisage the importance of the difference between “pulsion” and “instinct”). Pulsion is never a hereditary, preformed behaviour which would have been a characteristic of a species. It is a dynamic process which “pushes” having its sources in a “localized” corporeal excitement or stimulation. It is led towards a certain form of activity in order to realize a discharge of tension. This discharge (a kind of “catharsis”, again) is the aim, or the “telos” of a tension, and is always obtained with the help of an object. The infant for instance suffers from an excitation of buccal mucus (which is the “source” of a tension) and is urged to seek the maternal breast, if not his fingers (the object), in order to reduce the degree of excitation in his mouth by licking: (Freud really believes that “licking” his finger or maternal milk is really a “corporeal” aim for the infant). At any rate, the source of a pulsion is somatic (that is, “physical”) and from physical to the “telos”, the dynamic movement, according to Freud is psycho-somatic, but also constitutive of the boundaries between the corporeal and the psychic life.

3.3 Spinoza versus Freudianism: towards a social science of Affects

Spinoza makes a clear distinction between “ideas” and “affects”: an idea is something that represents something, what Spinoza calls its “ideatum”, which is its object. If there is in the mind something which stands for, which represents, or accounts for something --an “object”, this is called as an idea. An affect (wrongly translated into English as “emotion”, especially in the Elwes Translation) is an

event of the mind (which is nothing more than a body, in contrast to Cartesianism, and with respect to the doctrine of body-mind parallelism of Spinoza) which, on the contrary, represents nothing: it can be "determined" by an idea, but it represents nothing about this idea, nor about its object. This means that an affect (*affectus*) is only a "mode of thinking" (ideas are belonging to another type of "modes of thinking") where the mind passes to a greater or lesser power to think, the body to a greater or lesser power to act, and these are the same. In other words, "emotions", or affects (*affectus*) are the degrees of perfection of an individual, the ways through which it fulfills its individual, singular "essence".

This creates for us a field of discussion in which life is put into a single "plane of consistency" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980) where anything can be considered as individual: a society (a *socius*), its environment, the Nature are "individuals" according to a *principium individuationis*, whereby individuals exist, and can be known, fundamentally and totally, according to the rationalist rule stating that "the order of things and the order of ideas are same" (Matheron, 1972:18). This means that Spinoza's philosophy is not one which denies the existence of the "individual", and does not refer to a principle of "community" or "supreme being" in which individuals are epiphenomena, or mere appearances (like in Platonism), whose ideas are merely depending on our misconception of the totality or God. And every "single" individual (in Spinozism every individual is single, not only in its existence, but also in its essence) is composed by other individuals, organisms, cells, and so on to infinity. These infinitely small individuals (*corpora simplicissima*) can only be discerned through their modes of "rest and movement" (their "latitudes and amplitudes" according to Deleuze).

Spinoza urges us that we fail to know our bodies themselves, since our body is in a constant interaction with other bodies, human beings, things, landscapes, milieus and objects. This means that we are always individuals within individuals, altogether forming superior individuals or "collectivities". A society is part of Nature, insofar as it is a particular individual within it. And everything which

happens to an individual in such an environment is mainly called as "modifications" (*affectio*) of the body. Everything that happens (the event) are "occurrences" (*occursus*), bodily actions and reactions, and from the standpoint of an individual, which can be modified in several modes, according to its degree of complexity (and human individuals are quite complex bodies, as are societies composed of them). This is, as the reader could easily understand, is a quite different vision of "society" (this is rather the "socius") compared to Durkheim's, who sees "society" as representative of God (or literally the contrary), as an entity *sui generis*. The *sui generis* for Spinoza can be said only of the totality, the total individual, Nature or God (*Deus sive Natura*), and not of an individual, obviously depending on all other individuals in the world. This is the way in which Tarde was able, for instance, to refer to a philosopher like Leibniz (who followed Spinoza in many respects) in his opposition to Durkheim.

One should not confound Spinoza's "*affectus*" and "*affectio*" (Deleuze, 1968; 1970) An *affectio* is said for a body, insofar as it affected in a number of modes, and is revealed always as "images", which are defined as remanences that can endure, if not removed by other images, denying their existence. An *affectus*, on the other hand, is the "passive" state of the mind-body continuum, whereby one passes from a lesser to greater, or greater to lesser degree of power to act and modified in several manners. This is like Simmel's description of the "modern", urbanized, metropolitan life conditions, where the individual is "bombarded" by unbearably numberless stimulations, losing his gestures (Agamben, 1993), or having them controlled by the chaos of milieus and landscapes, as in Georg Simmel. An emotion or affect is the state in which one passes from one situation to another, under the influences and effects of other things, which are theoretically "infinite" in their number, if the totality is said to be infinite.

Or, an affect is always said to be "determined" by an "idea", and now, we have to discuss what an idea is, for Spinoza, still preserving the Medieval definitions of idea. Spinoza defines idea first with its "objective reality", which meant for the

Medieval Scholasticism he still follows "something that exists insofar as it represents an object" (*ideatum*). This is called as an idea's "objective reality". One should remember that the Medieval way of thinking means our modern "subjective" when saying "objective" and vice versa. And this is the definitive definition of an "idea": if there is no object, the idea cannot exist. Ideas can be perfect only insofar as they fit their objects. What is original in Spinoza, however, is the way in which he defines a second "reality", a second level of the existence of ideas. This he calls as the "formal" reality (or perfection) of ideas, which is really an invention of Spinoza: since we can form "ideas of ideas", since we can take them as "objects", they have also a formal existence in our mind. I can form ideas of ideas, since I have always an idea about the fact that I have an idea, so on, to infinity, if we have infinite time. I have an idea of a "fly" and I have an idea of "God", infinitely more than the idea of a simple fly, since I experience the idea of God as objectively expressing an infinitely great --and absolute-- existence, while the idea of the fly is infinitely small with respect to it.

And this is the way in which ideas, in their formal existence, can determine affects. Spinoza has a profound understanding of human mind, so that he doesn't believe that our intellect only operates through "indifferent" ideas: our bodies and minds are functioning in such a way that we cannot be neutral or indifferent about what happens to us, and even seeing something which we can realize that he is our friend or enemy, just seeing him in the street is already an idea. And we cannot experience this idea without experiencing an emotion, or affect. We are really "automates" (*automata*), just as would say Descartes, while he distinguished between the body and the mind, but we are "spiritual automata" (*automaton spiritualis*). I have ideas when I read a poem, when I am before a beautiful landscape, or just walking in the street, seeing people... And these ideas always determine in me a state of mind in which I am affected in this or that way. This is a logic of "continuous variation", formally expressed by Deleuze (1994).

Affections were "imprints" or "traces" of things upon a part of our body --an image can be a sound, a voice, a word, or a vision, even a dream, which will wait for Freud's *Traumdeutung* as the first attempt to take it seriously. In other words, while they are not identical with them, they correspond necessarily to ideas in us. An idea is not something we have, or which we can recall at ease. The memory is not a power, and it depends on ideas, not just the contrary. But what is important for our purpose here is that an idea never appears without "determining" an affect, that is we are initially "spiritual automates" even when we simply walk in the street.

This explains why Spinoza carefully distinguishes between "affections" and "affects" on the one hand, and between "images" and "ideas" on the other. These are the elements of the structure of our intellect, both conscious and unconscious. Images seem to be first entities, as they are nothing more than the "traces" of real affections of our bodies --visions, dreams, real encounters with things... Spinoza, in its early work *Tractatio de Emendatione Intellectus* (TEI) purges the very probable domain in which we encounter images: one has to be able to apprehend (Heidegger's *Ereignis*?) images as ideas:

"[42] (1) Further, from what has just been said - namely, that an idea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the world of reality, - it is evident that, in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source of other ideas."
(Spinoza, TEI, 42-1)

This total image of the nature would express, in his later and essential work, the *Ethics*, the "third kind of knowledge" (we would like to prefer to use the word "knowing"), that is the apprehension of the totality, which serves to the increase in the body-mind's powers to be affected. It is quite evident that in his treatment of "affects" Spinoza was already able to anticipate Leibnizean logic of calculus, in which everything will be expressed no longer in "geometric" (the modo

geometrico of Spinoza) but in differential terms. An affect in Spinoza is a differential, a "difference" as one would like to say today). It is only a passage, not a state or a "molar" domain of affectivity. We believe today that our affective states (emotions or passions) like love, hate, contempt, sympathy, hope, care, and the like are belonging to our "institutions" --family, politics, everyday life, aesthetic and moral life-experiences. This is true only insofar as we are capable to understand them in a Spinozist manner: an affect is a passage, that is, a derivation from other affects.

When we watch TV, we are seeing nothing more than a box, something lesser than cinematographic screen, in the motion theater where images and sounds are leading us everywhere they want (Godard). The box simulates life, but in a lesser manner, whose "resemblances" to our image of our body is in a lesser degree. And it has now almost to play the role of the God, an unnatural or artificial one, since the images are almost a "bombing" of minds, virtually having nothing to do with the possibilities of thinking. This is a new form of "power" which is not necessarily "political" in the narrower sense of the word. And again Spinoza can give us some clues about such a power on affects and images.

The Spinozist distinction between "potentia" and the "potestas", the power-to-do and the power which is "transferred" to the sovereignty (apparently a Hobbesian theme) is not an ontological determination. In fact, only the potentia, the power to do and to act exists, and the potestas, the sovereign power exists not in itself, but in the former. In other words, the potestas is nothing but the separation of the human beings, treated as masses (the vulgus) by Spinoza, from their power to act. The negative connotation of the term Potestas, identified not with a positive ability but with a presupposition of authority is the key Spinozist concept in treating the sources of "opinion". But what it means, a "separation" from his power to act? Clearly, Spinoza rejects the Hobbesian theme of the "transfer": nothing, as a power to act, nothing can be really transferred to a sovereign -- whether it be constituted as a Commonwealth or as a Leviathan-- without at the

same time "instituting" or "constructing" it as a power to do. Unlike Hobbes, Spinoza seems to evoke the irreducibility of the power-to-act, in every domain of life, to a presupposed agency of a social contract. Like Machiavelli, on the other hand, he is aware of the fact that the sovereign, or the State can appropriate the usage of the collective power, and that this can be a real appropriation. Spinoza's concern with the "subjective" connotation of power appears as early as in his unfinished Treatise on the Amendment of Understanding (TEI): he refers to the separation of the mind from its power to think, when it invested --quite normally-- too much of its energies to those "highest" goods like "riches, fame and pleasures of sense" --"with these three the mind is so absorbed that it has little power to reflect". (TEI, #3) But the "power-to-reflect", the primary task of any philosopher (and Spinoza aims to be a philosopher, now), tends to become the principle of the purpose of his Treatise:

(1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. (2) In order to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own powers and the nature which I wish to perfect. (TEI, # 18)

Thereby, the Spinozist project becomes an attempt to discover and nourish the singular power of the mind which would be enjoyed by the philosopher, with two important apparent consequences: there are quasi-subjective causes which tend to separate the mind from its powers to think; and (this is the reason why we use the term -quasi) there are "external" forces that can manipulate, amplify and are nourished by these internal tendencies towards fame, sense pleasures, and vanity. These external forces belong seemingly to the power as potestas, to the State or any other kind of theocratic and political powers. Truly, Spinoza is singled out to be the first, and perhaps unique "democratic" philosopher, given the traditional rejection of the philosophers, since Plato, that is oriented against the "rule of

masses". But one should remember that this "democratism" is nothing but the claim of Spinoza for not having, practically, the obstacles of the political powers before his "power-to-think". Does it mean that for Spinoza, democracy is the best regime only insofar as it is the "best of the bad ones"? Certainly not, but we will see the implications of Spinoza's understanding of democracy later, in due order.

Spinoza's main concern with the notion of power, thereby is attached to the power of the mind, of the understanding, but yet, this power to understand (the intellect) should still be repaired. The Spinozist initial point is that state of daily life in which there are too much experiences (multiplex), an excess of affections of the body and of the mind, while men are generally inclined to select only essential ones (essential for himself, subjectively). He observes that "in proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less." (TEI #58:3) It is crucial to note that Spinoza uses the term power (capacity) in an ambiguous way --to create fictive ideas, unconnected with real things does belong to the power of the mind. This means that erring is not a "negation" in itself, but it is a function of the human mind.

3.3.1 The Importance of Anecdotes in Philosophical Affects

There are purely "philosophical affects" of great philosophers, which is the combined work of three qualities of every philosopher, succinctly evoked and described by Nietzsche at the end of Nineteenth century: these are humility, chastity and poverty. However, unlike traditional (religious) and moral characters well structured and inherent in moral ideals and traditions, these qualities operate in a quite different manner as a grandiloquent style of life of philosophers. They rather constitute a shield for the philosopher, protecting it as he is more solitary in it, while always adapting himself to ongoing life. These are not traditional or

religious moral characters but metaphysical devices by which the philosopher constitutes himself and his philosophy. In other words, they generate a very particular “philosophical” will of power, rather than being merely a set of adopted ascetic practices or moral rules. It is through them the philosopher shields himself from the attacks and blows, from persecutions and oppressions coming from his opponents) philosophers and others, theologians, despots, oppressors, persecutors, and the like). If they attack him, they know that they are attacking a poor person, who is chaste and living in humility, but who is yet most powerful than all. The powers of thought as a style of life are now coming from a pseudo-powerlessness inherent in the act of thinking. Like Spinoza, it comes that a philosopher only asks for “toleration”, involved in the famous legend of Diogenes the Cynic about the story with Alexander the Great. Spinoza’s entire “political philosophy” (if there are any, we have to repeat) is relinquished from a basic presupposition: the best political regime is the one which impedes and tolerates best the philosophical (i.e. non-dogmatic) thinking –hence it is “democracy”, which makes Spinoza the “democratic philosopher” par excellence. Clearly, Spinoza does not believe that a regime or State would be necessary for a philosopher (as a man living under the guidance of his reason) since no state power or authority relies on totally reasonable principles (every state requires obedience and the communication of passions, in a set of relationships between the state and its subjects).

In the Third Book of his *Ethics*, Spinoza is engaged in a strange series of definitions, axioms, postulates, propositions and proofs, as in the case of his entire work, but this time about the most oscillating and unbalanced thing in the world: human affects and emotions.

The essential starting point of Spinoza is his doctrine of the “conatus”, stated as “everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being.” (*Ethica*, III, P.6) *Unaquequae res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur...* One important question is why this “perseveration” is put in terms of a

“conatus”, a strife or an “endeavour”, if metaphysics is generally inclined to believe in the total harmony of the world, in terms of the relationships of the world with its transcendent creator, or in terms of the relationships between and among the parts and the whole? Truly, Spinoza in his proof openly states that: “individual things are modes whereby the attributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner.” They are adequate to the power of God, since they all are expressing it in their own determinate way, and there is nothing in them whereby they can be destroyed (which can take their existence). However, if there is nothing in them that can take away their existence, this does not mean that they are opposed to the “external things” which can do this in their specific manner, again all being determined by God to exist.

Spinoza distinguishes between sets of emotions –the “primary ones”, those emotions which are internally or externally determined which refer to pleasure and pain, and those emotions specifically related to the “desire”, which is, according to Spinoza, the “essence of man”.

The twentieth century, like any previous one, but with a little more amply was determined on the one hand by catastrophic wars, violence and terror, and by an exemplary and extraordinary general will to restore and keep peace. No century made peace its concrete and ultimate ideal, yet no century has been capable to make such destructive and almost apocalyptic warfare. It has been penetrated by two great planetary wars, expected a third one as a constant threat, and occasionally conceiving it as its catastrophic end or horizon. Yet, what is most characteristic for today’s world is the extremely useless and fictive nature of all those organizations, international or not, to keep peace intact. It is as if we are under the constant pressure of adopting always the “best of the worse” between these two poles of the realm of political activity. It might be that the last 20-25 years will not be only remembered in future as a period of huge blows given to the gigantic political powers (the extinction of Bandung process, the collapse of Soviet Union), but also, more sociologically, as a period during which the sphere

of political activity has been considerably and indefinitely narrowed. Or, again, in the course of the last twenty years, if the movements baptised at that time as “new social movements” like ecologism, feminism, or “people’s initiatives” have seen their space of movement so much narrowed and constrained, we have to observe the reasons of such a crisis not only in the “weakness” of thoughts and ideas which constituted the building of these movements, but also in the consequences of some global formations that emerged since mid-seventies. If this “crisis” is new,

3.3.2 The Societies of Discipline and Control

That capitalism stinks, we owe the first examples of this idea to the "conservatists" assisting to its birth and development -i.e. to the nobility whose value-systems are experienced to erode if not destroyed, since the end of the Baroque epoch in Europe. We owe the utopic criticism to a figure like Thomas More, its "comedic" critique to Molière's "Bourgeois Gentilhomme", and its political critique to Babeuf and his *Enragés* during the French revolution. Let alone the actual one, fin-de-siècles are remembered to have induced a state of mental and symbolic crisis, a regeneration of millennial ideas and opinions, and even a shift in the ways of seeing. If the year 1900 as a threshold framed utopian or futurist themes both in philosophy and popular minds, the previous turn was determined by the ideas of Enlightenment and of their "conservative" opponents. Without a strong sense, philosophically or popularly, on the notions and feelings of time, such symbolic turning points would have no reference but a purely arbitrary one, perhaps constrained in the mental make-up of the Christian world. Or, on the contrary, these symbolic turns are today having a significant role in the synchronization of international opinion, like the religious feasts in the world of Islam in particular. But, every significant turning point in the history of Western civilization seems to have been a revolutionary in the minds of people, if not having a "real" revolutionary outcome, a new consideration of public issues, a more or less critical and important shift in the Weltanschauung, the emergence of

futuristic utopias. At least, this has been the case of the previous one, at the threshold of the Twentieth century. Whether questioning the past, the present or the future, any serious reconsideration of time in popular terms can also lead to the development of serious themes in philosophies, sciences and arts. Taking the example of the end of Eighteenth century, following the serious events of the French Revolution and the birth of United States, and on the eve of Napoleonic expansion, we can see that a series of profound philosophies of time have been introduced in the European thinking: it was the invention of the time-form of thought as in the case of Kant, or of a philosophy of history, as in the case of his critical follower Hegel. These ideas were not only revolutionary in themselves, since they can clearly claim to be like Copernican revolutions, but they were also somehow attached to revolutionary movements, usually at a "philosophical distance", but nevertheless in a clear and concrete manner. Hence, we have one of the prominent texts by Kant, his Answer to the Question 'What is Enlightenment?', many times commented by today's philosophers like Foucault, Habermas and Jean-François Lyotard. It develops the consequences of Kant's new conception of the time in a more practical manner: as an assertion or expression of a philosopher's opinion of his time and life world as he is a participant of it. Foucault comments on the occasion on a very profound comparison that manifests how the idea of opinion has been transformed since the age of the Enlightenment: had a review issued a question to its lecturers in Eighteenth century, it was posing a question whose answer was not pre-given, a "real" question if you want. Or, today such questions are seemingly issued always at the level of opinions.

Spinoza's philosophy is "practical" in the sense used by Gilles Deleuze: it is a trajectory through which one becomes capable to question everything that belongs to our nature, which is not a "kingdom within a kingdom". It is practical since it largely consists in a pragmatics of affects and passions. Obviously one may discern in Spinoza one of the oldest ideas, which aims at controlling the passions of the spirit in order to reach perfection and ethical life. We have major systems like Aristotle's ethics and Stoicism, which methodically perfected the theme, vividly describing the power of passions and the pretended ways to control or

inhibit them. We can observe that Spinoza's programme of ethics radically differs from every moral philosophy up to his time, and probably up to our times. Spinoza develops a unique theory of affects, and the way he describes them is profoundly different from any other treatment of affects and emotions.

Aristotle and Scholasticism preserved one of the oldest moral and ethical premises, which is a calling for "moderation". In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we can find a typical treatment of to find the "medium", and in *Magna Moralia*, Aristotle develops the theme of "mastery". Any moral investigation, or any investigation into moral affairs should pass through this theme: "how to become master of everything which counts" --one's life experience, language, political and familial involvement, i.e. one's every life experience should be considered through the criterion of this "mastery". As Lacan observed, this logic of the "Ananke" also postulates the "class nature" of the ethical project --"mastery" is used in two senses: the mastery over one's passions, and a morality for the "master". These two dimensions, ethical and political, are inseparable from each other in Aristotle and his followers. The moral perspective follows the religious forms, and the Greek case is one of the typical examples of a kind of religion which lies between Oriental religions and the great monotheisms: the moral life in Oriental religious systems is based on leaving everything "secular" behind, the family, the community, the everyday life, the affairs, the class (or rather, the "caste") --a system of "isolation" and solitary meditation. In Greece, however, in spite of the recognition of such a system (the Orphism and other "isolationist" cults), the religion appears as a socially integrative force: through ritual practices one becomes a member of the community. Rituals and religious practices belong to the order of everyday affairs --this is the social basis of pagan religions. Theoretically, every social and individual practice of everyday life is performed accompanied by a religious ritual --periodic or occasional sacrifices,

3.3.3 The Problem of Romanticism and the Passionate Life

One of the major affirmations of the "affective" world is Romanticism. However, there are too much cliché arguments about the nature of such an affirmation of the individual, its problematic opposition of the objective world. We can at least distinguish two kinds of romanticism, the German and the British (the French were too much absorbed in the new religion of Revolution, followed by Napoleonic wars, that they were incapable to raise up the romantic phenomenon with the exception of a conservative reaction advocated by figures like Joseph de Maistre and De Bonald): The German Romanticism I propose to call as "major Romanticism" and the British one the "minor". These variants correspond to two different kinds of affirming and articulating the affective world of the individual -- the German romantics in poetry and philosophy, and the British in the modern romantic novel developed interestingly by the first women writers like Bronte and Jane Austen.

The German Romanticism cannot be identified with the *Sturm und Drang* movement, or even with Fichte's "subjective individualism" while its birthplace can be located there --there is rather a decisive determination of Romanticism, formulated by Novalis who is able to say: which great event of the history, whatever its distance in time and space, which revolution, which war, whose pain or happiness is not at the same time "my personal problem". This is the way in which the Romantic intends to appropriate history and time --absorbing the "event" into his individuality, into his "personal", "private" world.

There is in Spinoza, in some of his letters, an allusion to the idea of "automaton", the automate, which clearly derives from the Cartesian vision of animal body, including the human. What remains unclear, however is the way in which Spinoza poses the problem of body-machine, given the fact that he opposed the mind-body dualism which lies at the core of Descartes' philosophy. Again there is the

evidence that neither Descartes nor Spinoza could be subsumed to the "mechanistic materialism" as precursors which will be developed one century later, in La Mettrie's famous essay *L'Homme-machine*.

Is it not the case, however, when a modern sociologist like Georg Simmel was reviving the idea of the automate with respect to the spirit --"the soul is not able to perceive but the difference of its present movement and stimulation from the ones of the one moment before (...) Our soul responds like an automate to any change in external conditions, and tends to become like those machines destined to keep productivity stable." (Simmel, s. 67)

And when the Soviet avant-garde filmmaker Dziga Vertov expressed his dislike to film "human beings" but rather the life of machines, his futurism was not a praise to machinism and automation of life, but rather to find what tends to become affectively important in the machinic rhythms of the modern world. His automate is an apparatus, the camera, which should be able to show what remains invisible to human eyes, through a visual poetry.

These parallels are centered around the idea of automate, and today one is no longer to protest in the name of a lost spiritualism against the insights which is brought forth by this long-term idea in Western philosophy, even when we keep aside the magicians of automates in Chinese and Arabic civilizations.

The clue of the importance of this idea is given directly by Spinoza --not only an automate, but we are "spiritual" automates. This attribute "spiritual" cannot be easily derived from Spinoza's monism, so that it could remain a metaphor to describe one of the aspects of human behaviour. Spinoza effectively inserts the notion in the parts of his Ethics where he is concerned with the being of ideas, images, perceptions and affects (emotions). These are expressly the way in which Spinoza deals with "ideas" as he understands them --in order to expose what an

idea is, he needs to develop a doctrine of body (Deleuze would say he will propose body as a model to philosophy), through a series of lemmas and propositions.

3.3.4 The Gesture

One of the aspects of modern life is the gradual elimination of pure rituals and gestures, so to speak we might say that we are losing our gestures. This cannot be explained only with the "modernization" and "routinization" of religious life, nor by a gradual eradication of uprooted old, traditional affects. If there is something positive in such a process, it comes to be a radical shaking of our understanding of movement. In the sublunary world, there is always something aberrant in movement, whether of human beings while they are supposed to be intentional, or of animals, supposedly instinctive, and even, again, of clouds in the sky, waves in the ocean, leaves of trees moved by the wind. Scientific spirit tries to conceive these movement in terms of their regularity, through the laws governing them, whatever complex they are. Or the sublunary motions have always something which escapes the rules and rhythms imposed to them. After all, how many meaningfully basic gestures could be ascribed to human physiology, for instance by Leroi-Gourhan, the anthropologist of evolution? Even when he deals with what he calls "functional aesthetics", basic human gestures are anchored to a series of natural movement, inscribed in senses and bodily mechanisms --tools are used with some basic sequences of movements, predominantly adapting themselves to the position of hands, governing other positions of organs. These simple movements, we have to repeat, are gestures only when they are performed in sequences defined by rhythms --piercing, apprehension, friction and the like. However, Leroi-Gourhan's major contribution is to show how "functional aesthetics" as an idea could explain the parallel evolution of "formed" tools with human evolution as such. The evolution of the tools and the human evolution are just one and the same process. When functional, human gestures are said to be

adapted not only to the nature of the environment, but also to the bodily mechanics of movement.

The classical conception of the sublunary movement was the Ancient Greek interpretation in which movement was perceived in accordance to the regular movements of heavenly bodies. The sun, the moon and stars are moving in a cyclical way, which is associated with the idea of perfection. These movements were evidently periodic, and so were the changes of seasons. However, it appears that sublunary movements were also interpreted in accordance to such a model: in the Aristotelian conception of movement, any motion could be reported to transcendent forms, the poses, conceived as privileged moments. The movement is the passage from one pose to another, just as one, at first in rest, sitting, comes to standing position. The substantialization of these privileged moments was an attempt to avoid the aberrant character of sublunary movements, which sometimes seem inobedient to the circular regularity of celestial movements.

3.4 *Ignoramus*: The Not to Know of Psychoanalysis

The adventurous relationship of mankind with the fundamental psychoanalytic notion of the "unconscious" can be reflected in the clearest form through the question --was there an unconscious before Freud? One can think that this problem could be considered in the context of Claude Lévi-Strauss' answer to the question --who are your predecessors?-- asked about "the first structuralists": he had the courage to answer --"Caduveo natives"... One can even add a further question to this: "how an unconscious thought could be possible?" --an astonishing question by the most ordinary common sense opinion... Here, we will not try to ask the same question but we will critically consider the notion of Unconscious, since it relates to our problematization of the opinion, through various sections and sequences of the analytic literature. We will try to pose the question of this "not-to-know" about thoughtful processes. Or this very question led us to an active

force which is necessarily conceived by the Western "cerebral thinking" -- depicted by Joseph Needham-- as both its "end" and "treshold" before action. This "not-to-know" was distinguished from the unconscious in that it did not appear as something to be unveiled or discovered. In this manner, it rather appeared as an active stimulant, as an increase in mind's active, creative and productive powers in every domains of life. The "unconscious" aspect of this not-to-know comes from its status which does not refer to an "already existing" presence --a status of ready-made. Its status does not come from a Heideggerian *Vorhandenheit*, presence-towards-the-hand, nor from an "unknown" out there, waiting for our discovery. It remains as something to be produced, formed and fabricated. It has to be created in the domain of a transvaluating activity, since there are no pre-established norms and values of creation. Briefly speaking, this "not-to-know" is not simply an ignorance. It is the necessity to act that appears at the limits of consciousness qua consciousness, knowledge qua knowledge, speech qua speech. Beyond, one can only act or react. One of its mportant aspects can be said to be shown in Marx's famous words: "philosophers have hitherto contented themselves in interpreting the world, or what is important now is to change it" . In short, ignorance as "not-to-know" is not a state that preceded the acquirement of knowledge, but which succeed it: it is succeeded by action.

Hence, we have now to reproduce a Spinozist notion of the unconscious, against the psychoanalytic unconscious. The "not-to-know" is no longer the unexplainable nor the unknown. Nor is it an "inability" or "failure". On the contrary, it is an active force that produces and reproduces the "new", new experiences and desires. In this perspective, what was determined by the psychoanalysis as a "lack", while the unconscious could never be marked by "negativity", does not correspond to the content of the not-to-know.

Thereby, we need now to invert a series of psychoanalytical arguments and reflections, including the contents of some categories of psychoanalytic literature. We begin by recalling the "discoveries" of psychoanalysis which we were hitherto

indepted to applaud: the Oedipus complex, Desire, Instinct and Repression... Or it seems that the Oedipus complex is like a *Zwangsneurose*, an *idée-fixe* that locked in the entire psychoanalytic theory, practice and its sustaining culture and sub-culture. This is what condemns psychoanalysis, in spite of its obvious "revolutionary" beginnings, to a familial milieu and environment, where an aberrant and assimilating normalization process is relinquished within the therapeutic practice. The worst thing in psychoanalysis is its general confusion between therapy and normalization. It is evident that a "complex" always contains by definition a "forcing", even a "necessity". But psychoanalysis will still continue to esteem the "solution" of the Oedipus complex. Its main goal will tend to become the formation of an "adult" individual to be regained by the family milieu even when it often assumes a role of "help" or "assistance". It becomes today more and more difficult to distinguish between the aims of institutionalized psychiatry (a bio-political practice) and those of psychoanalysis (a scientific world-view).

An this famous and strange assumption of the "castration complex" alongside the Oidipus functions within psychoanalysis as a Trojan Horse, while proving that psychoanalytic theory and its metapsychology fails to develop a proper idea of the body, by marking human desire with anthropomorphic and sexist values. From its perspective, desire is nothing more than a manner of tending towards a lack, a deprivation or absence. It is merely an emptiness. Thus its aim or finality is satisfaction, conceived as the absence of desire. In order to prove this, psychoanalysis refers to the categories of "phantasm" and of the "imaginary", which are supposed to obey to the totalized Rule of the Law, which is nothing but the abstraction of Power and Authority (sometimes refined as the Name of Father, as in Lacanians). This means that, as if in a higher dimension, the Law is symbolically determined --as language-- and this Law organizes the boundaries, as Lacan would like to say, between language and imagination. The Rule of the Phallus and such implicatory categories like The Name of the Father are used as a network for capturing the "reality" on the one hand, and the symbolic/imaginary on the other, and this network in fact consists in a larger semantic domain, which

is not fully explored by the psychoanalytical theory, including that of the Lacanians. There is at least one fundamental question which is not answered: practically, what to do with these categories? One fails to ask what to do with language (pragmatics), with sexuality (ethics), with labour (economics and politics) and with desire in general.

Neglecting practical necessities, psychoanalytic theory and culture tend to reproduce in many various ways the bondage of the weak individual to the socio-economic and familial orders, and thereby the fatalistic logic of slavery in general. Even in its most radical and critical avatars (as in Lacan and his followers, the French feminism and the academic post-colonialist literature) psychoanalysis or any other theoretical "cultures" under its influence, what matters is only describe this bondage by means of a weak "critical" inlook. Yet, in accordance to an elegant formula by Adorno, "criticism" in general is already bounded by the power and extension of what it intends to criticize, and it is a "weak thinking", since it is already proportional to what it attempts to criticize. This is just because, even from a critical perspective, to reconstruct, to interpret, to "understand" or even to "deconstruct" purely symbolic orders can never be sufficient in themselves. In other words, with simple critical attitudes one cannot constitute the logic of the action, that of the "*ignoramus*". Everything which is achieved by "criticism" is to develop, upon theoretical and critical foundations, a blind spot, a constant postponing of a contact with the non-discursive domain (the other or the non-discursive). Criticism, whether psychoanalytic or Marxist (or at least those adopting them as a method for discussion) is always in a double-bind with what it tends to criticize. When the so-called deconstruction is bound up to "structures" it intends to dissolve, and "intertextuality" to the "texts" it is intending to criticize, their critique will certainly depend upon a superoir, almost enigmatic order of a norm, of a rule or law. They thus belong to the same order or dimension. Or these "fates" should communicate with different and other orders, systems or regimes, to create contaminations, expansions instead of syntheses, propounding an active plurality of relationships --between "collective" and

"individual", between "female" and "male", between "major" and "minor", between the "exploiter" and "exploited", between the West and the East, etc.,

Such an exclusion of "reality" in psychoanalysis has created so many harms in contemporary human thinking that we are not here entitled to cite them one by one. But the most important of these harmful effects is the failure to understand that the "real" should be created, produced. This is even true for the production of the symbolic and the imaginary. The cinematographic apparatus was aware of this necessity, more than psychoanalysis: there is an unconscious, but this unconscious appears only when it creates, not remaining as pure interpretation. We should wait for a "creation" of the unconscious, and this creation should be its major work. This recall of "production" is not coextensive with the moderated attempts for establishing a fusion or marriage between psychoanalysis and Marxism. To our belief, it is impossible, if not futile, to establish such a union as if a complementarity was possible, simply by adding what one neglected from the other side. Such a "marriage" could only be possible when one is capable to introduce production into the unconscious and the non-teleological desire into the real relationships of production. And in Freudian psychoanalysis, what essentially lacks is precisely such a conception of desire.

Psychoanalysis has prepared its end (both theoretically and practically) already in its early beginnings, when he conceived desire as a lack, or absence. Theoretically, it first faced to risk its fundamental concepts, like Oedipus, castration, narcissistic self (or "subjectivity"), and themes like Pleasure Principle and Reality Principle. First and foremost, we are today capable to talk about pre-Oedipal and post-Oedipal societies or cultures. The uprising of an even single individual among those maddened by civilization (Nietzsche, Artaud?) can show that the possible should not be left to the lamenting thinking that defines the possible by its boundaries and limitations. These cultures can operate both at the individual levels ("madness" and psychosis) and in collective, social dimensions ("primitive" societies, the East, perversity and "sub-cultures"). It is sufficient to

attempt at a psychoanalysis of religious sects and communities today, rather than those of the individuals or of terrorist organizations. At every instance when the fog of ideological phantasies and of blindness is removed one can see that "group phantasies" tend to become much more important than individual "perversions" and phantasies. And, already at the level of the individuals, phantasies are mainly belonging to a kind of act of creation, especially in artistic-aesthetic domain. We can develop the fundamental thesis of Gabriel Tarde, to suggest that the individual phantasy is the creation of the real, an intercerebral movement towards the creation of the new, whatever its kind --a dream, imagination, or work of art. Yet, an individual does not exist, in opposition to a collectivity. It exists as "individuals", but the latter is not, as Durkheim believes, a society sui generis. There are merely "individuals" and the "individual" as such does not exist, and it is merely a pure abstraction. Even Oidipus appears as one of the worst described misunderstandings, or a phantasy of Dr. Freud. There are people who remarked how Freud was cordially faithful to the Oidipus myth, which he fails to interpret adequately. This belief was perhaps lacking even in Ancient Greeks. While it was bound to a tragedy, Freud's conception of Oidipus has never been "tragic", since it purported to reproduce the familial conditions of an age and geography, which was anachronistically different from those of the Greeks. The result was what Deleuze and Guattari have described: an imperialism and colonialism of the Oidipus, intended to be "universal".

Today, the privileged notions in psychoanalysis tend to become "narcissism" and "ego ideals". They have at least a more clarified technical "detail" in their description and they more adequately conserve in themselves the entire empirical domain of psychoanalytic specialization. Or, the hopes linked to these concepts in reforming or even "revolutionizing" the psychoanalysis are still more futile, as they were already aborted conceptions if not distorted ones. Psychoanalysis continues to admit narcissism as a "primordial state". Thus, its apparition in any individual appears as a case of "regression", an immaturity in relationships with the world. In the writings of Freud, narcissism constitutes the foundational unconscious "resistance" against the attempts for the therapy. It is the resisting

unconscious force against the transfer. But in this perspective, narcissism tends to be first "individualized" and then is reflected to the proper domain it belongs, to the historical-societal level. This is truly an extremely long *détour*. One could admit that subjectivity is not a "datum", an "already-given", since it is "produced" by institutions like religion, family or "disciplinary societies" or by mass communications and information systems, or, more deeply, by economic and social structures. This means that psychoanalysis leaves such notions as narcissism or "phantasm" without real content and correspondence.

Truly speaking, nothing is absent in psychoanalytical theory as the "body", as already in Freud, psychoanalysis replaces the body with incorporeal substances or phenomena like the "ego-ideal" or the "imago" (especially in Lacan). One can already feel how any discussion about this "primordial self" could ultimately destroy the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis: at least such a discussion has precisely been the one which led Deleuze and Guattari (but first and foremost the "theater of cruelty" of Antonin Artaud) towards the notion of "body without organs". This is because the "narcissism" in psychoanalysis is not chronologically a "prior" state, but rather a state to come, belonging to an indeterminate future. It is part of an autism in which, as if in the Doppler Effect in astrophysics, the individuals are falling apart from each other, with an ever increasing distance. Sociologically, such an autism is helped by the technological developments at work, probably leading the cockoon generations towards such a kind of autism, under the banners of what has now been called as "information society".

One can still acknowledge once more a fundamental merit of psychoanalysis: that it has invented the unconscious... Or this success has subsequently been lost or caducised. The unconscious is not something like a cuneiform tablet to be deciphered, a divine scripture to be interpreted and especially an "obscure world". It should first be evacuated from every such Platonic representations and thereby re-conceptualized as an active, creative *ignoramus* in the service of knowledge, art and philosophy and recalled to be reshaped by them. Or, a series of prejudices and

shortcoming of the psychoanalysis create major theoretical and practical obstacles against such a re-interpretation. These obstacles, or rather aporias are belonging primarily to the order of neglected, distorted or repressed human experiences. These experiences make it difficult to create human "living arts": the art of love, of death and of telling the truth, in short, the fundamental art of the ignoramus and its work.

Our first question is then: is it possible to "love" through psychoanalysis? A rather bizarre question, but it reflects the limits of the practical, experiential merits of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Recalling sexuality at a determinate moment, psychoanalysis has nevertheless tried to manage a passage from its valuable "family romance" to a "love romance". But this has been in correspondence with a dislocation: among these "romantic" references, there happens the emergence of some problematic areas of interest for psychoanalysis --especially in literature and art criticism. What is intended by psychoanalysis (an analysis of the psyche and a technique for therapy) comes now to expand beyond its limits. Today semiotic and cultural studies are suffering from this psychoanalytical imperialism. Or one should ask whether analytical categories could ever penetrate the "depths" of such areas, since it is impossible to ascertain whether there are really such "depths" at stake. Are we believing in the complexity of a literary personage in the novel in the same manner with the complexity of a real individual? And psychoanalysis would now like to turn towards the psychic life that it assumes to belong to the "artistic creator", with a rather fraudulent coup de force. This is evident in Freud's studies of Dostoyevsky and Leonardo da Vinci. Or the "creator" is still more, thereby, isolated from his or her real conditions of life (his essential "biography"), condemned to the Oidipal triangle, to a kind of decisive familial romance, to the so-called reaction of sublimation. The only critical point is whether there really exist such a "creative genius", which still today, remains without a proper concept. Does a writer like Proust really needs to be "psychoanalytically" interpreted in order to develop his themes of "love romance" to carry everything out of a familial context, to reach the domain of mundane societal life experiences? And if one claims that analytical categories could penetrate deeper truths which are

unconsciously present in literature, in art or in cinema, we can reply saying that there are no such deeper levels in a text, a painting or film, simply because they still remain as artefacts. This is the simplest truth we can reach. Hence, psychoanalysis will turn towards, with a fraudulent slide, to the *psukhe* of the artistic "creator", as in the case of Freud's studies about Leonardo da Vinci or Dostoyevsky. And even so, that the "creator" here still has to be assimilated into the Oidipal circle, or rather triangle to lose everything which belongs to the concrete field of the artist's reality and work. And one can suggest that the work is essential, before the psychic state of the artist, and the process of "sublimation" is nothing more than a "passage" or "occasion" for creativity. Thus the Proustian "love romance" which would lead us out of the family would never need psychoanalysis in order to be interpreted. It is both an analytics of love and an expression of the virtuality, which we call as life-experience. Freud's fin-de-siècle cabinet is not a better place than Proust's language to develop the analysis of the affective, and even of the cognitive life. This is because psychoanalysis tends to reduce love relations to pure psychic facts or events, which should express deeper levels of the psyche, to the "sexual" and "erotic" experiences, which are supposed to be hidden, to be repressed in whatever depths of the human life. Finally, while it had to begin with the interpretation of dreams (the *Traumdeutung*, which is accepted by psychoanalysts as a "royal road" towards the unconscious), no practical purposes, with the exception of therapy are intended, and psychoanalysis could never help us in becoming able to "see our own dreams". Dreaming, we believe, is a creative instance of the mind, even when it could be open to the possibilities of psychoanalytical analysis.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT IS AN IMAGE?

4.1 Affects and Images

When the psychoanalyst Krafft-Ebing coined the term “sodomasochism” at the beginning of Twentieth century for denoting a set of phenomena referring to perversions, he was certainly in total confusion about the complexity of human life and, specifically, about what we propose, here in this thesis, to develop only as series of themes and figures. His assumption was something like “whenever there is a sadist, a masochist comes to fit him” and “whenever there is a masochist, a sadist comes to enjoy...” His master Freud, too, was convinced of the fact of a “parallelism” between two attitudes, the perverse desire of being invested alternatively in them. Psychoanalysts were seemingly relying upon their “rational” analysis and their strict observation of the two psychological types, i.e. two types of “personality” meeting each other at least theoretically. But this means that they overlooked an entire domain of concrete situations in which this set of phenomena were in turn invested: another “rationality” through which the instruments of torture are manufactured and sold, even on the Internet sex sites today, as if a “democratism” of desire was at rule. The masters of psychoanalysis were also unable to read reliably the authors they referred to in each case, namely, Marquis de Sade and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. They were unaware of the fact that, while both were referring to a “scenery of desire and pleasure”, they had quite different viewpoints in these matters. The language of Marquis de Sade, declared

by some as the “greatest writer in French language,” was involved in a “block of abyss”; he was the one who wrote for not to do²¹... A Freudian can see here a kind of “sublimation” of a perverse desire, but for our present purpose one should rather invoke a literal device, an entire literary apparatus which has been invested by Sade in the domain of a “political economy” of desire. This was the age of the “political economies” of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and of the constitution of the modern Subject by Descartes and Kant. Hence, there is a “politics” and an “economy” here. On the register of “politics”, Sade was able to envelop a blind spot in the *cogito*, the “I think”, as opposed to the body and its passions, as the ultimate philosophical accomplishment of Christian morality. He was able to say “if you are positing a thought, an ‘I think’, a Will and a morality which altogether ‘disowns’ the body, its world of pleasures and pains, its ‘desires’, then ‘I can enjoy what you have disowned’... and no one could impede my right to do this... The body becoming the object of Will, one could easily go further, to appropriate it at will, privately or collectively (the old idea of collectivisation of women). Sade pushed the pure idea of *cogito* further and further so that it turned against its inventors: he adopted a vigorous “objective” language in describing the infamous scenes of torture and pleasure, a purely descriptive language taking the suffering bodies as objects. It is true, he wrote through “affects”, but these were the affects of a visual lexicon, of a pornography of the visual, of the flesh under torture and the claim of violent death (Sade, 1801).

The writing of Sacher-Masoch, on the other hand, is registered to a language of subjectivity, the body is no longer an object, and the scene is no longer visual: everything turns out to be an experimentation of the self, of the powers of one’s body, through a series of “contracts” made vigorously with the mistress, who profits in turn by experiencing her own powers. It is far from evident that a masochist subject “enjoys” being tortured or suffering, as the popular idea goes, no less than a sadist “enjoys” the suffering of the other. Masochism is putting one’s body to the service of the other, but in order to do this, the masochist should

²¹ Cf. Beauvoir, S. de, (1972) and Le Brun (1986).

make an experiment to discover the limits of the transgression, while every transgression is by itself an excess over some limits.

Everything happens as if the psychoanalysts (Krafft-Ebing, Freud and Havelock Ellis the liberal in matters of perversion) are totally neglecting the matter and the basis of Sade's and Sacher-Masoch's writing, notably how far they were written in the language of affects, just like Spinoza's *Ethica*. In this sense, Foucault is right when he refers in his *L'histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* to the "calm and cold language" of Sade: is he trying, like Spinoza in his *Ethica*, to explain the "nature of human affects and emotions just like figures, lines, planes and volumes?" Are there any equivalencies between his writings and the "politics" of Machiavelli who was searching the basis of his notion of political power in the affections of the body politic? Clearly, Sade believes and shows how man is a prisoner of the "theatre of his body". He says "theatre" since he is in ultimate dissent with an apparently similar attitude in Christianity: "the body as the prison of soul". The body, or the extension, becomes a spectacle when, in parallel, one is able to recognise how "the true happiness of man is in his imagination". (Sade, 1801) Everything is designed to show how, in this spectacle of horrors, we are unable to change the way in which our organs are affecting each other, no more than we are able to change the laws governing our feelings.

We said that Sade's was a "political economy": the birth of the political economy, through the works of the contemporaries of Sade, Adam Smith and David Ricardo later, was not far from a new kind of interrogating the sources of happiness and of pleasures. And the libertinage claimed by Sade (he was insisting that he was not a monster, nor a criminal, but only a libertine) is something which has its costs. The "normal", "orderly" and "familial" life of pleasure was based on the foundational assumption that the pleasure was the direct outcome of normal sexual act. It was nothing but a by-product, a surplus of normal sexual intercourse. What distinguishes the perversion is nothing but the sole fact that, here, the pleasure should be a costly outcome of a search for its own sake, and that it should be paid: this is why one has to invest for pleasure –mistresses, castles, instruments and guardians... There is an entire political economy of libertinage, just like the

investment of capital in manufactures, and the "multiple pervert" is becoming the "bourgeois" of the "libidinal economic order". This situation perfectly fits to what George Bataille's conception of "dépense" referred: the transgression appears when an affect like pleasure is put outside the circle of "exchanges", as an end in itself and not as the "natural" outcome, almost a by-product of the only morally approved norm of mating.

Out of the context, we should derive two purposes that should interest us in our study: the first is to observe how the play of affects in social life is generally misinterpreted by the social sciences, and in this case, by psychoanalysis; secondly, everything in these sado-masochistic experiences has to do with images and visions. Each can generate its own pornographic images, through various mediums --literature, cinema, pornography--; yet, there are two different kinds of images, two different, but not opposite visions. It is easy to recall the fluctuating and accidental world of "fantasies", but without the solid images through which these fantasies are connected, the word explains nothing. The elements of pornography are so solid when their content is expressed in images that everyone is able to perceive and understand them at first sight. We have an entire cinematography of pornographic images, for instance, from the case of a Robert Bresson, a good Catholic filmmaker, to the most direct and explicit case of the *Salo* of Pier Paolo Pasolini. There is an entire regime of vision of erotomaniac value involved in the sight of a coquette girl praying with somehow ironic gesture, suddenly finding herself under rain. She utters a pornographic sigh "Oh!", which has seemingly nothing to do with the context (Bresson is able to effect an alternative usage of sounds in his cinematography) but everything is accomplished within the image. The metaphor is so powerful that it not only contents itself in signifying the story in the film --the girl is a non-believing *Résistante*, temporarily forced to take asylum in a monastery where she enacted some relations with a nun, not without a sexual attraction, who is engaged in her passionate mission to solve the heart of her host. Incited to pray, through the famous Pascalian motto, "on your knees, pray, you will certainly believe", the girl is doing her "ironic" experiment, when suddenly, the rain pours. But the image of Bresson is like a crystal through which we can see the entire Christian problem of faith: with drops

of water on her cheeks, the great passion related to the fecundation by God of the virgin, a passage of centuries of religious history and experience in one second, in one image. Bresson is far ahead than any sociologist of his time in formulating the nature of faith.

Similarly, Klossowski, the famous pornographer-painter, makes the reverse in his literature: a movement from pornographic image to a theology of the soul. Through a series of novels, paintings, philosophical essays, Pierre Klossowski is able to develop a model of “identity” and “disruption of identity”. In his historical novel *Le Baphomet*, he transforms the historical legend of the Templar Knights into a myth “with a Baroque sumptuousness” (Blanchot, 1972). This is a tragi-comic situation of the eternal return, when applied to “real” individuals, to real living beings, while they are fictive characters. They are “assimilated into cycles of metempsychosis” and everything passes in an chaotic atmosphere of the beyond. Jacques de Molay, the legendary Grand Master of Templars is haunted by the soul of the Saint Theresa, while meditating in his cellar. After his first awe diminished, as must be the rule, he complains that his vigilant task in this world is rendered more and more difficult by a situation in which “there are too many called, and only a few elected” in these times of great disturbance –both in his order and the world: wars, plagues and crimes... “What thinks our Lord about this?” A number of always varying births is a given, and it appears that all these souls are pillaged by each other in a state of total chaos once they left their bodies behind. As each new century the Day of Judgement is postponed, “the most ancient souls are haunting the most recent ones, and through mixtures by affinities” they can suppress in each other their responsibility “and hence, two or three of them, mutually complicated” constitute a non-dissolvable whole haunting his castle.

Instead of consoling him, the soul of Saint Theresa undertakes a despairing speech to his tremendous astonishment: O, Grand Master of Templars! She haunted him not to trouble his confidence in his and his brothers’ divine mission. But yet a “cycle of events” occurred beyond this world. And this mission is not only difficult, but impossible: the number of the elected is closed. This means that, by this time, the human race has changed its substance. “It is no longer damnable nor

can be sanctified.” (Klossowski, 1965: 171). His discernment is thus troubled by such an infinite burst of chaotic, unidentifiable mixtures of souls –the damned ones inextricably mixed with the most wise. “The weight of the expired ones is so grave that it disturbs the equilibrium of the economy of spheres.” A prodigious amount of spirits are turning onto itself in vain: and what is more, they are not only infiltrating into amalgams two or three but five, six or more of them are striving to enter into a single uterus to reach the embryo to exert their power of discharging their anterior sins and to restore their virtue. This is an exuberant, tumultuous nature. And it appears that even she, as a saint is among these chaotic *turba* of souls. As appealed by a young theologian many times to haunt his cupid nights long after her death, she entered into a series of bodies, or shared a body with five, six other souls.

There is a profound understanding of religious sentiments here --a Spinozist insight into the "sources" of religious feelings that one needs the assumption that God, and a Day of Judgement should exist in order to maintain the integrity of the soul, the individuality of the self, and the preservation of personality, even after death. A Dostoyevskian theme is evidently present: if God doesn't exist, everything would be permitted. Beyond the anthropomorphic essence of monotheistic religions, there are many circles of "centrisms", the ethno- and even the ego-centrism of the self, to keep one's responsibility intact. God is the ultimate horizon that makes possible the sentiment of the self and of identity. Since, if he doesn't exist, one should certainly invent it.

There is one of the oldest theological problems here: Klossowski faces once more the Nietzschean problematic (or challenge) "God is dead!". Nietzsche, to whom he dedicates an entire book entitled *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux* (Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle) pronounced this as a "news", rather than an opinion or declaration. In the domain of religious sentiments, a central theme or motivation is present: the presence of the self requires its responsibility, and its perseverance could be possible only through the assumption of the presence of God, as the master of immutable order of the world. Hence, Klossowski can interpret the Turin period of Nietzsche not in terms of his incidental "madness", but as a logical

consequence of his entire philosophical position: "I am all personal nouns of history!", Nietzsche wrote to Jacob Burckhardt, which means that after the death of God, there is no longer a "self" or any identity. As Klossowski puts it, individuality can be conceived as a presupposition of an order and identity of the Self with the Self, over space and time. Or, in another possible conception of individuality, one can define a constant variation of the element of individuality through all possible circles of an undetermined zone, as a trajectory of the self and consciousness as a center of indetermination. (Klossowski, 1969: 102-105) This defines an excess in the individuality, expressed in time and, occasionally, in the space of Klossowski's writing --he adopts in *Le Baphomet* a style revealing the "breathes", their occasional concentrations and ramifications, a language of rumours, as Foucault puts it (Foucault, Preface to Klossowski's *Le Baphomet*). The breathes like the oscillations of non-substantial particles. Only "images", rather than words (even when they could be illuminated by words in literature) can afford such oscillations and zones of indetermination. The entire modern literature turns out to become a critique of the notions of individuality and identity.

To do the best, one could attempt, instead of writing a thesis like this, to film the Baphomet of Klossowski, and this could be the best definition of "montage-thought", where distances disappear, and things so close are detached from each other. This could be the proper magic of the cinema, but we rather believe that the cinema is capable to do more than fiction and narration, acting out through pure images. The purity of the image is its strength and, here, in the cinema, it is detached from words and even actions. Laura Mulvey has tried to show the sadistic-voyeuristic appeal of the cinema, but only in "second rate" films, not in the films of the great "auteurs" of the cinema. This is an error inherent in the entire film criticism and theory, be it based on the narrative, linguistic, feminist or psychoanalytical theories.

4.1.1 Imagination and the Power to Imagine: The Theme of the Excess

Nature is the landscape of the "excess", one of the worst sins for human beings. One faces such a landscape in *The Waves* of Virginia Woolf, with the image of ocean's waves biting the beach since the time immemorial; a new image of eternity, an introduction of the cosmic into the literature. Woolf needs to write through images, rather than words and signifiers; the waves are defined as intensities, or rhythms expressed in her unprecedented "modern" style. A woman should write differently, not in the order of the traditional literature, which she is quite able to do since literature can be accommodated to the body, its form and structure (Woolf, 1932). This "excess" belongs to Nature, with a controversial position before dominant religious feelings: the expansion of multiplicities defying the crude conception of individuality occurs in the image of rain, which is not destined to preserve man in the world. The world is no longer the land which has been "promised" to man by his Lord. From the standpoint of mankind, the Nature is expressed as an "excess". If today we are able to talk about the "excesses" over nature, we, the mankind are responsible, it is due to the operations of our modernity, the entire transformation of the city landscape, but also to a function inherent in modern literature: the excess of the form, of the rhythm over the content. One writes, composes, or films with the predominance of the "form", and the form could be filled with any content, while it is not necessary to fill it. The classical writing relies upon a form which more or less strictly defines how the content will fill it. In modern literature, on the other hand, the form is not to be filled; it is not necessary to fill it with this or that content, while it has evidently a content by definition. The modernism can never do without a degree of formalism, while *Formalism* as a current is nothing but a particular extremist interpretation of it. This is simply the essence of the modern cinema which relies upon a kind of formalism that remains only "stylistic", as in the case of Bresson who formally denies the coincidence between the hearing and seeing (and not seeing). We may also talk about the extravagant formalism of Tarkovsky in his colloquial, quite personalistic films: one doesn't need to see in order to understand, and this happens especially when one sees things one is incapable of

understanding. And this is not simply the effect of the so-called "off-screen" (the French *hors-champs* is a better term); it is rather the way in which cinema formally becomes capable to create images whose meanings are at each time different from what it is visible in them. But this is also the "transcendental" element of the image, since nothing appears "outside" it and its sounding. Sokurov's "photographic" cinema is an example: everything is in the image but to see it one requires almost a state of trance which is already afforded by the quite slow rhythm of the film. During the agony of the mother (in Sokurov's *Mother and Son*), a single movement of the eyes of the dying mother comes with a spectatular violence. This is why images are necessarily "affective" in the Spinozist sense of the world. In each of them, the whole universe is present, it is already there.

Spinoza's conception of "image" is classical, as it has nothing to do with our preoccupations here with the place of images in modern life. Yet, the way in which he attaches images to their causes and relates them to the power of affects and emotions is unique in the history of philosophy. The role of the images in his analysis of affects and emotions, especially in the case of "love" and "hatred" is also unique in the powerful insight involved in his *Ethica*: Love is the capacity of the mind to "imagine" the things which are not present. Hate, on the other hand, is likely to be more a matter of "memory". While the explicit definitions of Love and Hatred he gives in the Third Book of *Ethica* are so intimately connected to each other as there is a single definition for both, i.e. Love as pleasure accompanied with the image of an external cause, and Hate as pain accompanied again with the image of an external cause. One should also be aware of a profound difference between these two emotions. It is evident that even animals, as relatively simply organized beings, are capable to have pleasure and pain as the two fundamental poles of emotions, defined as the increase and decrease in the power to act and in the degree of perfection. But this does not mean that they can have these more complex affects of Love and Hate. These emotions can be under the capacity of highly organized individuals, of quite complex organisms. Surely Love is nothing but a pleasure, i.e. a passage from a lower degree of perfection to a higher degree, and Hate is the opposite. But they involve such complex phenomena as memory

and imagination, a capacity to produce images and remembrances so that probably only human beings and higher individuals (crowds, societies etc.) are capable of being affected by them. The exact definitions of Love and Hate have to be given now, for the sake of precision: "*Amor est laetitia, concomitante idea causae externae*" (Love is Pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause) and "*odium est tristitia, concomitante idea causae externae*" (Hate is Sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause). Spinoza clearly uses the term "idea", but there are no ideas without images, which are defined as the traces of the affections of the bodies by other bodies, essentially comprising both of them. As human beings, we have minds (*mens*) complex enough to be capable to form the images in a complex structure; and these images can be in a constant variation: a peasant, will say Spinoza, seeing a trace of horsenail will associate with it the images of cultivation, of the harvest while a soldier who sees the same horsenail trace will think of war chariots and the like. But the images are never neutral as it seems. They are perspectivistic and, moreover, they engender "affects" in our souls. This means that we are "unique" individuals, and everyone is affected by passions in his own way in a series of encounters with his environment. Everything in the Spinozist doctrine of Love and Hate depends on the capacity of "preserving the images".

Is it possible to interpret this in the way that for Spinoza there are two kinds of "images" --the one which can be conceived as "memory images" and the second as "imagined images"? For the moment, we have to be precise: the connection between Love and the conservation of images is more evident --due to the principle of strife for the preservation of the self (*conatus* transposed into the human life), we tend by necessity to prolong as much as possible an enjoyable stimulation that affects us. But this stimulation is related to the more or less confused image of the object that affects our body, since our affections involve not only the parts of our body which are excited, but also that of the external object. Suppose that the object disappears and the image of this object is preserved in us for a period of time. There is also a second possibility: an accidental association can arouse in us of the image of a since long disappeared thing. The corresponding joy will survive in us for an indefinite period of time.

But the corresponding image does not function in the same way: the image can be distorted by other images encountered since an image of a past thing is never more vivid than the image of a present thing. We have many present images which exclude the presence of the image of the thing which in the past affected us with joy. This means that the joy due to the image of the past object will also decrease. But a decrease of joy is nothing but a sadness, which attacks our *conatus* and will strive now to revive the enjoyable image. Our desire now is invested in the image of this object, a kind of Freudian *cathexis* of the libidinal energy, and this will be an almost unconditional attachment. Such a positive polarisation is called by Spinoza as Love.

If Love is related to the capacity to imagine, Hate is attached in the same way to the Memory. If we are affected by a painful image, our *conatus* resists it as we tend to eliminate it. This means that we are striving to restore our state before the apparition of the painful object in our life. But this previous state was characterised by the presence of another set of images in us, constituting another ensemble of relationships of our body with the world. In this relationship, the object of this painful image was excluded, was not actually present. Resisting against the image of the painful object can then be equated with the strife of our *conatus* in reviving as much as possible the number of the images of this older state. But, to be capable of doing this, it is necessary that some traces (images) of these old things be present in us; otherwise, our striving would be nothing but a blind "anxiety". Hence, we are led to create for ourselves a world constituted by these old, probably not actually existing images, which is nothing for Spinoza than the negative pole, i.e. the Hate. Our Memory is called so vividly to keep the present thing, the image of the painful object at a distance.

Now, we should invoke the precision of the word "external cause" (or external object as it is) involved in the Spinozist definition of Love and Hate. The externality of an object can only be defined with reference to the Memory. The tautology involved in Spinoza's assertions that the one who loves will tend to preserve the loved object and that the one who hates will strive to destroy the object is not in fact a tautology, and has to be well argued: a more or less

large part of philosophical discourses, since Plato and Aristotle can be defined as a "metaphysics of love". Human history is full of "appeals" to love, and Christianity sometimes offers itself as the "religion of love". These metaphysical systems often attach themselves to the idea of Will, and ultimately, as in the case of *Metaphysics of Love* of Arthur Schopenhauer, to the idea of the "primacy" of the Will. The metaphysics of love generally served two purposes: the moralisation of the affective life and the institution of "freedom" as a presupposition of any moral behaviour. Against this metaphysics, the position of Spinoza is quite harsh and clear: if a falling stone had consciousness, it would believe it fell by its own will, freely. Spinoza not only rejects the idea of free will, but also that passions, feelings, emotions, affects (these terms, from Spinozistic viewpoint, are interchangeable) could ever never been "willed". Love is not something simply to be called upon, while religions are involved in "callings" to love, "love thy neighbour," "love thy neighbour," etc. as the central commandment of Christianity. This is approved by Spinoza on the basis of its utility. Otherwise, it does not belong to the order of Reason, but to the management of human passions and violence by the state and religion. One cannot command love to anyone; one can only fall into love, practice love, and he is not free in this love affair. As we have tried to account for in the previous chapters, the affective state is bound up with images, evidently in the sense used by Spinoza. While Spinoza doesn't have something to say about arts in his *Ethica*, with the exception of certain arguments in favour of their "utility" for the well-being of the mind, he occasionally takes into account the problem of "religious images", the image of the God as part of perennial superstition, wrongly replacing "true religion". Strong passions have always been one of the central themes of every artistic or literary tradition, popular or "classical", throughout modernity. These passions are no longer "tragic" in the proper Ancient Greek sense of the term; rather they are "imaginative", based upon a new conception of imagination which arose with modernity.

We believe that love is a wisdom; but it can nevertheless deteriorate to become (or transformed into) jealousy or even hate, which is its contrary. This is the most influential cinematographic story in the ordinary "romance-film," and the way in

which Spinoza presents the dialectics of love largely corresponds to what we call today the "melodrama". What is the melodrama after all? It is a large scene where everything is represented not unlike a panorama: everything is there, all of the elements of the drama, just like in a musical coda. The melodrama in Nineteenth century was constituted by a simple play with rudimentary *mise-en-scène*, and which gives at a precise moment the entirety of the narrative and spectacular elements of the play. This was the way in which dramatic cinema has established itself, due to its formidable and almost "natural" capacity to give entire scenes of life, which are evidently (and most probably) the worst way to represent life.

This melodramatic element corresponds to what we have tried to demonstrate in the previous chapter on the "affect" of love, according to Spinoza. The problem arises with a *ménage-à-trois*, when the affair of love and hate corresponds to a jealousy in which they take different roles as sentiments. The beloved is lost for one and one is now able to contest his or her presence with the other. This is a quite simple mode of storytelling. But it is universal and belongs even to the most complex mythologies and primordial literatures of the world.

That Spinoza's consideration of love and hate (and jealousy) is "melodramatic" is by no means a misnomer: it is the way in which all these things are happening in real life situations. And the cinema and literature could not avoid such feelings: dirty jealous lover and the "bartered" bride, a "go-between" as in the well-known film by Joseph Losey. The melodrama is the literary articulation of love.

4.2 The Images of Everyday Life

Every sociology is a sociology of everyday life, in the sense that once one describes a social type, it is the type's social environment that matters. When a sociologist is engaged in studying the past, there is still a moment related to everyday life. The more one penetrates the everydayness, the more one's study becomes "sociological" rather than historical. The Simmelian apprehension of the affective images was unprecedented in its vitality and depth; yet another figure like Walter Benjamin followed it, again on the project of understanding the

modernity as the apparition of images and details. His interest in bringing the objects of everyday life into the domain of philosophy was still the key to his method after his conversion to Marxism. Ernst Bloch writes of him:

Benjamin had the quality which was so extraordinarily lacking in Lukács. He had a unique eye precisely for the important detail, for that which lies by the wayside, for the fresh element, which breaks open in thinking and in the world, for an unusual and unschematic disconnected singularity which doesn't fit any preconceived purpose, and which therefore earns a completely private attention that turns one inward. (Ernst Bloch, 1997: 17)

Such an inwardness constitutes the background of Benjamin's ability to capture the details of everyday life not only with reference to social types, but also to such things as photography and the items of the mass culture. This is also the way in which Benjamin conceptualizes the impact of modern images, their "microscopic" functionality and their many-sidedness:

The thing ... must not be grasped as a mere instantiation of some universal essence; instead, thought must deploy a whole cluster of stubbornly specific concepts which in Cubist style refract the object in myriad directions or penetrate it from a range of diffuse angles. In this way, the phenomenal sphere is itself persuaded to yield up a kind of noumenal truth, as the microscopic gaze estranges the everyday into the remarkable. (Eagleton, 1990:328)

An image is never one-sided; it cannot be reduced to a mere "surface", but we have to apprehend it in all its refractions, patterns and dimensions. While we are "selective" beings, as an image never shows us all its facets and relationships we have to "select" actively (this is at first rather a matter of perception) and images tend to become in-depth "ideas", as exemplified in a profound observation by Walter Benjamin:

Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars. This means, in the first place, that they are neither their concepts nor their laws. It is the function of concepts to group phenomena together, and the division which is

brought about within them thanks to the distinguishing power of the intellect is all the more significant in that it brings about two things at a single stroke: the salvation of the phenomena and the representation of ideas." (Benjamin, 1977: 34)

Metaphors are the means by which the oneness of the world is poetically brought about. What is so hard to understand about Benjamin is that without being a poet he thought poetically and therefore was wound to regard the metaphor as the greatest gift of language, (Arendt, 1982:164.) and the allegory is to language what ruins are to things. (Benjamin, 1977:178ff.) It gives power to memory and creates the "horizon" wherein transcendence becomes possible.

Allegory is always a symptom that, in a certain respect the Subject-object distance has been sublated (aufgehoben), that the object-world has been transformed in its signification, that it was been worked through by the subject . . . Thus we approach the essence of allegory only then when we recognize it as a possibility which lies in the depths of the essence of language. (Benjamin, 1977:77)

All these not only are figures of image or figures to be derived through an act of imagination, but rather the ways in which in our ordinary lives we are experiencing most of the literary, semiotic and linguistic phenomena which belongs also to the domain of "high arts". Even the most "popular" arts, photography and cinema in particular, have to be structured on the model of "high arts" while their technical dimensions and their organization is far from traditional artistic means and techniques which are generally based upon tradition, habitus, subjectivity and artfulness.

Yet the figurative elements of popular arts also belong to the traditional clichés of the so-called "high-art", and Eisenstein was remarkably tracing the roots of cinema in to the melodrama: even a film like *Potemkin* that reveals one of the most striking and universal historical moments adopted a "melodramatic style" (Eisenstein, 1991: 182). That *Potemkin* was a melodrama was also the idea of Dziga Vertov who contested the dramatic use of cinematography: one of the most remarkable polemics in cinema arose in the face of Eisenstein's *October*, in which

Lenin was played by a "worker" (and not even a "professional" actor) while in cinema he is converted into an "actor". Or, Vertov thinks, there were many real "footages" of Lenin, in order to avoid such a dramatic element. This primordial debate in Soviet Union, --not only related to cinema but also to the Bolshevik, avant-garde literature and poetry, since Mayakovsky, Meyerhold and Sklovsky among many others intervened into the debate, from differing standpoints-- has been the major questioning of the cinematographic art, the "seventh" one. This was for the ultimate distinction between the images of everyday reality (the documentary) and the dramatic simulacra of dramatised reality (fiction-film).

The image may not belong necessarily to what we may call "everyday life." They can be ordinary images, of a monarch or of a childbirth or, again, of a sudden death. All these belong to the everyday life but they are no longer regular or ordinary. Childbirth is part of the everyday life of the hospital from the viewpoint of the gynaecologist, but not for the family. The cinema has to consider all these varieties and variations of viewpoints. These "particular" moments don't need to be "extraordinary" either, since they are irregular moments amongst regular, ordinary ones. Metaphors and allegories, emphasized by Benjamin are nevertheless part of the imagery of the everyday life. This is why Vertov was capable of using the most complex montage and shooting techniques in order to "catch life as-it-is" (*zhizn' kak ona 'iest*). But as life is "caught unawares" in the cinema, usually and inescapably giving place to hazards and unpredictable events, one should refer to the powers of the "imagination" in order to be capable to develop a multiplicity of points of view. It is in this sense that we need a "monadology" of the cinema.

4.3 Modern Imagination

What has been the status of imagination through the history of ideas and, more particularly, in philosophy? A general observation might be that imagination has long been undervalued, while its existence was affirmed, in the early history of philosophy, from Ancient Greece to the pre-modern classical philosophies. Not

only imagination but also its deeds and products (images and feelings attached to them) are undervalued, especially since Platonic texts.

Another general observation is that the development of modern philosophy ascribed a new importance to imagination, for instance the "imaginary" (*l'imaginaire*) of Jean-Paul Sartre as a substrate for innovation or, as in the case of Ruyer, as a golden path to utopia. One can now discern the power of images in the modern world, the continuous bombarding of individuals by artificial, representative or "technical" images, an image of a world where imagining tends to become much more difficult than in the past. One can easily observe that only in modern times we are able to observe the importance of imagination which was devalued in the past.

Philosophers devalued imagination by interpreting it as one's blind belief into one's desires. If one takes his desires to be "real", one is said to imagine. From ordinary thought to most complex philosophy, such a conception is valid. A privileged place thereby was also assigned to imagination, at least implicitly, since without imagination, we would be incapable of accessing the invisible if reality is something visible. The philosopher who had enough courage to overvalue imagination, Sartre was able to see in imagination the faculty to negate reality as it is imposed upon us.

Plato, in his Republic (*Politeia*), is the one who most clearly devalued imagination which he certainly does not conceive as a faculty. Imagination offers nothing but a degraded image of reality, and to this extent, what it makes visible is somehow nonexistent. Therefore, imagination is the principal source of error. This pattern of judgement survived until the 'Classical Age' whose *epistemes* were described by Foucault (Foucault, 1966), in the Essays of Montaigne, in the *Pensées* of Pascal (where it is depicted as a network of errance and falsity) and even as a model of madness in Malebranches. Hence, for metaphysics what is proper to imagination is to distance us from the real.

Alternatively, this means that the entirety of this traditional-classical cultural context was relying upon the premise of adapting oneself continually to reality, to

real life, in a kind of traditional conformism. Imagination must have then a kind of power, a negative one since it is not a faculty but a kind of infirmity. Philosophers were thus able to distinguish between two modes of imagination, one substituting itself for reality (which may be called as "reproductive" imagination) and the one which distances us from reality, producing chimeras and vain images (the so-called "creative" imagination).

Such a negative understanding of imagination could only be changed with the apparition of the idea of progress, or rather the quasi-idolatric belief in progress, as a change in the general cultural context. The outcome is the positive value assigned to imagination which is also revealed in philosophy (imagination is recognized as a "faculty of reason" in Kant). Not without relation to the idea of *Les Lumières*, of Enlightenment, conformisms to the order ceasing to be dominant, reality appears as something which appeals to change, together with the articulation of great projects of society, political, scientific and industrial revolutions. At any rate, imagination of such a political-cultural context was excited, often to the extreme --from Romanticism to Surrealism one could even observe a calling for imagination in the famous Eleventh thesis of Marx, "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it."²² A similar implicit reference to the faculty of imagination reappears in Freud, who, opposing to the "principle of reality" a "principle of pleasure", recognizes the force of desire at work in dreams, and also in the essence of culture. At the end of the Nineteenth century, dreams and utopia tend to become serious forces.

When we try to see imagination at work, we can observe one of the outcomes of such a cultural valorisation. Liberated from "conformist" ideas, contemporary thought was able to conceive the positive role of imagination, characterizing it as a way of access to the new, as an innovative force. Imagination becomes a path which defines the opening of man to the new, since every project passes through

²² This is the last among Marx' "Theses on Feuerbach," Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965): p.653.

imagination. As Ruyer puts it, imagination can now be defined as a power of utopia, and without imagination there could be no scientific research, no artistic creation.

Surely, this is not without a close relation with the "positivist" spirit once defined by Auguste Comte. A scientific theory, before that a justified, sustained explanation, is remembered as first being a hypothesis, defined as an "imagined explanation". Charles Sanders Peirce in philosophy (of sciences) recalls a "desiring man" who "burns to know" and "whose first effort will be to imagine what reality could be." We have exactly an echo in Einstein's words: "imagination is more important than knowledge." The domain of art, too, is impregnated with positive ideas about imagination, as Delacroix redefines art as a product of an inventive activity, referring as its source to the imagination of the artist, "opening new ways to beauty".

It was not difficult to recognize this increasing value assigned to imaginative powers of man, until the two great world wars exploded, seriously hurting the cultural context of such a positive conception of imagination. A major Twentieth century historian and philosopher of science, Gaston Bachelard still invokes imagination as a function of the "irreal", recognizing it as present "in the human psyche as the experience itself of opening, the experience of the new". Bachelard denounces the psychological researches dissecting imagination as a plain power of novelty... For Bachelard, there is an essential "etymological" error in these researches that consists in taking imagination as "the faculty of forming images" while it should rather be understood as the faculty to "distort images" presented by the perception.

"...it is effectively the faculty which liberates us from primary images, which transforms images. If images were not changed, without the unexpected union of images, there is no imagination, there is no imaginative action. If a present image will not force us to think an absent image, if an occasional image will not determine a prodigious number of aberrant images, there is no imagination. There are only perceptions, familiar memories, habituations to colours and forms. The fundamental

word that corresponds to imagination is not image, it is the imaginary (*l'imaginaire*). It is through the imaginary that imagination becomes essentially open, evasive. In human psyche, it is the experience of openness..." (Bachelard, 1970:32)

Bachelard individualizes images as the "givens" of perception, as it has been the rule for any rationalist philosophy since Spinoza and Leibniz, but he insists on the existence of an essential faculty of mind, which, as we have seen, he calls the "imaginary". An image which leaves its imaginary principle and "becomes frozen in a definitive form, gradually begins to assume the characters of the present perception." It will soon serve to act, rather than to dream or speak. In other words, if an image is or becomes stable and fixed, imagination is blocked. It becomes an imagination without images. This is the proof that an image of the imaginary is always something more than itself.

What is interesting about Bachelard's doctrine of the imagery is that imagination reappears once more as an active power of the intellect, which is an active agent even in dreams and discoveries --who could claim that a discovery would be the case when the image of the thing produced pre-existed? Hence, Bachelard tends to repeat, in his own terms and in accordance with his own interests the profound Bergsonian question of the "new": how would something new be possible? (Bachelard, 1970:7-8) Here, we join the mentioned Tardean and Bergsonian philosophy, in spite of Bachelard's hostility against Bergsonism.

However, one should ask the same question at the level of a monadology of everyday life. The "something new" should appear in the ordinary life and nowhere else. When a new "visibility" appeared with the first microscope invented by Leeuwenhoek, his friend and neighbour, the famous painter Vermeer felt himself in full distress. This was not the way in which one sees things, Vermeer most likely thought, and in a small drop of water pullulated millions of animalcules. This was really another point of view, no longer directed towards the macroscopic world of Galileo and Newton, but towards an inside which is no longer mechanical but organic. This "something new" is expressed in Vermeer's paintings too: small changes in the angle of sun are creating immense effects in

the same landscape (his *The View of Delft*). Or in these two paintings, distant by five years, the same landscape and persons do appear, under the sun or not. This is no longer the "voyeurism" of Sade which is based on a *mise-en-scène*, but a kind of virtuality accompanying modern, post-Renaissance painting in its search for images. This search for images was quite cinematographic since it attempted to create a comparison between two different moments. Cézanne, just like Vermeer, painted the "moments" of an apple, in its own duration (*durée*), but also under different angles of sunlight.

4.3.1 The *Nature-Morte*

Stijlleven, or "standing life" (*nature-morte* in French and "still-life" in English) is a painting which has its roots in the *memento-mori* of the late Medieval era: a *memento mori* means a protest of the painter, generally coming from a humble class of artisans, against the wealth of those of whom he was entitled to make a portrait. Foucault's analysis of Velasquez's *Las Meninas* is perhaps too much imaginative, but it tells something about the idea: in the early beginnings, at the back of the canvas one painted a skull, reminding that after all death will come and the wealth is now nothing. Later, the skull is introduced into the image, as in Holbein's *Ambassadors*. There was a post-Renaissance tradition in which no wealth and welfare could be represented without a skull in decay. This lies at the roots of the Seventeenth-century Flemish art of painting called *Stijlleven*, which meant the view of a breakfast, without human beings. This is the total objectification of the object, as if one should wait the intervention of a human hand, as in the case of early still-lives. As in cinematography, there is an "off-screen" (*hors-champs*) in these paintings, and this *hors-champs* has been promoted by Cézanne, the great painter of still-lives, to the degree of the "place of the viewer".

It is possible to take two series of images, in traditional still-lives: a semiotic scale is represented in which poverty versus wealth are offered in such a manner that in the one some important elements are absent. This is the time when the "skull" of *memento mori* disappears, and boredom, misery and poverty enter into still-life

paintings. The *hors-champs* did not disappear, it was always there, but it is no longer occupied by a "voyeur" but rather by a "thinker". Celebrating the still-life paintings of Cézanne, one can declare that "with a carrot, one can make a revolution". A still-life waits for the people to intervene and to react. This is the way in which Van Gogh and Cézanne painted all these "peasant" house corners where a mainstream and routine life is supposed to go on, with the decay of the rural, as has been lived in the post-counter-revolutionary France. One feels the need to interfere into the image, to touch it, and bring it back from its decay, and this is still more a futile attempt.

It could be interesting that the *nature-morte* (still-life) and *memento mori* (remember the death) have been the first interests of the newborn photography, almost tending to become the main culture of Daguerrotypes. And this is not without its reasons: there were technical reasons, which lay in the being of "technical images." There were "ideological reasons" which were rather cultural since they belonged to the order of Protestant phantasms of the dead (and of keeping the dead alive). After all, the *memento mori* and the still-life are still surviving genres, either in television or newsreels, i.e. no longer in the form of art, but in the form of information.

4.4 The Problem of Technical Images and the Document Character

We are now interested in the realm of what Vilém Flusser, called the "technical images", in opposition to "representational" images. While we feel distant from his purely "phenomenological" approach, it seems that Flusser's problematization of the technical image as something "readable", "recordable" and open to transfers and reproduction processes can be fruitful, especially for our questioning of the "document". The technical image is not only a "document", but it has the possibility of "documenting", of reproducing other documents by recording them in their *hic et nunc*, in their presence and their historicity. The camera is a "documenting machine" since it purely records and belongs to the domain of optics and chemistry. It is the achievement of a long history of two centuries of modern mechanics, optics and chemistry --the end of the eighteenth and the

entirety of the nineteenth centuries. The camera tends also to become a "thinking machine", since with cinematography it achieves a kind of mobility, tending to become another sort of vision, another kind of point of view. These arguments do not mean that a painter failed to have a point of view. Points of view are important, especially in the comparative studies of painting. Comparing the Chinese and European painting traditions could be quite efficacious in posing the problem of "point of view" in painting. Yet the "document-character" of the technical image is something quite different, as the points of view are automatic and don't need the presence of an author who has to figure out or represent the image on a canvas or something else.

Now, we will try to encounter this "document-character" of the technical images, in the conditions of changing Flusser's phenomenological perspective concerning their nature and cultural role in modern societies. Certainly there is an "experiential", and therefore "phenomenological" entry into such problems imposed by the technical images, and an entire "existential" problem is revealed at the ontic level, by the question of technology (just to remember Heidegger) in the particularity of the audio-visual world of the technical images. Truly speaking, the word "technical" does not fit the deeper meaning intended by Flusser, just because there is always a technical element in human image-making, already in early traits of graphic behaviour --marking, piercing and painting--, as has been shown by André Leroi-Gourhan. Flusser rather tries to reveal the "trace" character of the technical images and this character truly corresponds to a totally different psychology of human imagination. To this psychology we are now seemingly totally adapted, and today everything that surrounds us is simulated through technical images (there is the thesis of a "videosphere", proposed by Régis Debray). This new psychology of recorded images also suggests a new aesthetics, no longer of pure graphism, but also the automatism of the device --camera, print and projection technologies, not to mention the televisual transmission (see Leroi-Gourhan, 1964).

It could be interesting to note how this new aesthetics, at least in the everyday experience seems to "destroy" the traditional conceptions of art, the aesthetics of

the beautiful, of the sublime and has a controvertial position vis-à-vis the Hegelian aesthetics which declared "the end of art" and the "beginning of the age of aesthetics". As we will see, there is a quite interesting turn with the coincidence of Hegel's death and the approximate date of the birth of photography, and this latter has something to suggest about the destination of Hegel's "age of aesthetics".

Our aim here, to conclude, is to attempt a classification of images, not merely alongside the phenomenological logic of Flusser but to go further, in order to develop a methodology of the documentation, not reduced to a mere illustration for social research, but elevated at the level of its "documentary" concerns --the idea of "pure film" as a semiotic, sociological, philosophical research. Corresponding to the "power" of images in everyday life, we have to confront this abusive power with the powers of thinking and imagining, and we believe that this could be the basis for a "sociology of affects", as we have attempted to put it at the beginnings of our critical study.

It could be interesting to note that the theories of photography in general (from Walter Benjamin to Roland Barthes's semiology of the photographic images) are sharing the inertia of the medium and of the apparatus on which they are intending to discuss: the photography as the frozen moment, an *instantané*. Flusser's "phenomenology" of photography, as we have seen, sent him to an apparatus, whose dynamism is limited to what we may call "capture", like an arachnoid species, and to an apparatus which is the camera. André Bazin's important essay on the "ontology of the photographic image" too, sends his reflections towards photography as a defense mechanism against "death" (the "mummy complex" as he calls it) and to a kind of morbid catalepsis --a death mask... We can also invoke the major criticisms of its opponents to "structuralism": taking signs and linguistic codes as "dead" symbolic forms, rather than seeing in language a "living" entity in movement (especially Bakhtin, against Saussurean linguistics, and the so-called "post-structuralists). Cinema theories, on the other hand, are largely having a "dynamism" in common with their object, from Rudolf Arnheim to Gilles Deleuze, and are co-extensive with the history of cinema. Early theories of cinema

were part of a popular debate, especially in European countries, among those who were asking themselves whether this new “art” really merits such a name –being simply a mechanical reproduction of moving objects. With the "mediology" and the "videosphere" of Debray, with the "video-philosophy" suggested by Maurizio Lazzarato, and especially with Jean-Luc Godard's televisual and videographic works, we feel today far distant from these early naive observations which reduced the entire domain of technical images to a mere mechanical reproduction of the movement. In this context, one of the earliest cinema-philosophers, André Bazin could write: “The camera creates an image of the world through a mechanical process. Freed from the confines of time and space, the photograph is an instrumental imprint, an automatic tracing, that directly reproduces and reinvigorates reality.” (Bazin, 1990) And the cinema tends to become an "added", supplementary reality (*plus de réalité*, according to Bazin), and today, with interactive images and the general sphere of the audio-visual, the idea of "mechanical reproduction" has been totally eroded.

4.5 The Ontology of the Image

While an ontology can be developed as a last stage of philosophical analysis --the way in which Hegel ontologizes his phenomenology in his post-Jena philosophy, in the *Science of Logic*; or Heidegger shifts from phenomenology to ontology, we have many reasons to place it at the beginning: first, the image imposes the problem of "existence" at a primordial level: man can be said as mediated by the figure or, if you wish, the "face" (Levinas) of the Other. Moreover, still in this "existential" perspective, the image can be said to be the most "immediate" human experience, e.g.. the "imagery" (*l'imaginaire*) of Sartre (Sartre, 1960). Every systematic philosophy of modern times encountered the problem of the primacy of the image over any other mental product, while generally the latter are sketched as "superior forms" of mental activity. Perceptive apprehension or "apperception", before becoming transcendental, is maintained as the primary and the only contact of man with the outside, especially in Kant. There is no clear-cut distinction between "ideas" and "images" in the classical empiricists like Hume, Locke and

Berkeley. Even in rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, the image is that enigmatic, but contestable faculty of the mental apparatus, the sole possibility of contacting world in everyday life. Nietzsche was observing how ordinary-popular knowledge asked from the scientist and the philosopher, first, the "image" of his invention or discovery. In many systematic philosophies, imagination is evaluated as one of the faculties of reason (Kant) while it remains, from the standpoint of rationalism, the source of error, confusion, ideology. Everything shows that for classical philosophies, the image occupies an ambiguous zone of primary experience.

Secondly, we have to become aware that the image is today more efficient in organizing human mental activities. Each new generation becoming more adapted to think through images than text and reading. In the sense used by Hegel who invoked a "pedagogy of the concept", we are today in need of anticipating a pedagogy of the image. Even the pre-history of the palaeolithic image (the cave-paintings of Lascaux) forces us to think about their pedagogic function; as the origins of writing usually lead us to pictograms and ideograms before alphabetic structures.

Speaking about an ontology of the image, however, we must have been in a strange condition in order to attribute the image to an ontically defined outside, into the objects. To the degree that we talk about the experiencing of images (imagination) we remain in the domain of phenomenology, while in shifting into an ontology, a metaphysical operation seems to be necessary: the images are outside... As we will see, this operation has been explained by the two great philosophers of the twentieth century, Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, though for different purposes and anticipations. Heidegger wanted to overcome metaphysics on his path from phenomenology to ontology. In his ontology, the image was no longer present, he wanted "the thing", *Das Ding*, and the process itself of the Thought of Being. Bergson, on the other hand, developed a theory of the image, concretely defying one by one the metaphysical problems related to the play of images. In Heidegger we are living in a world of "world pictures", while, in Bergson, everything is attributed to a total image of creative thought in a non-

teleological evolution. Everything is image; images are not objects of consciousness that represent the objects in the world, for the simple reason that, at a certain level of analysis, consciousness, memory and reason are nothing but images, even the brain is an image.

Heidegger, like every phenomenologist, needed to mediate his thought through the image. The world created in Van Gogh's "peasant shoes", or the character of "tables" in the scientific (scientistic?) imagery. This is not unusual among phenomenologists. Merleau-Ponty is unable to outline his argument about "ordinary" perception without referring to the more particular domain of perceiving a work of art, as he passes through Cézanne. While Heidegger transcends the phenomenology through a stronger reference to poetry and the experience of "dwelling in language", poetry and literature in general never ceases to operate through "images", which is no less than in plastic arts.

To arrive at a somewhat strange ontology of image developed by Bergson (well appraised by Gilles Deleuze in his book on cinema), we should first pass the steps of the metaphysics of the image. Central position will evidently be given to two philosophers --Plato and Spinoza, as two great metaphysical conventions of the possibility of conceiving the image in itself. But this is no longer our purpose here, leaving it to a further study. The only thing we want to stress here is that such a metaphysics of the image has always been an ontology and not a "phenomenology" of the light. From Goethe's famous essay on colours, light still remains the ontological basis of every painting, every view and every projection. Thus it could be fruitful to discuss the Platonic relevance of this "metaphysics".

4.5.1 The Metaphysics of Light

We have two series of images which both are part of the life in the "polis". The first, generated through the private life, constitutes what archaeologists are referring to as "ancient iconography" (popular images of figurations), myths, popularly known scenes, wars, things for remembrance. The second, belongs to the highest arts of the space, architecture and sculpture, these Apollonian sources

of dreaming, shaping the harmonic space of the Agora. In between, there is nothing but small, popular, quasi-aesthetic objects for rituals, even just for fun. We can agree with the general assumption once announced by Michel Foucault, that the Greeks were a "society of spectacle". We can also agree with another idea that Ancient *polis* was a "society of speech and opinion" (Vernant and Marcel Detienne). There is no incompatibility between these two points of view, in so far as we equate the image and opinion. The images of the spectacle, of the ritual and the tragedy are coordinated with the signs of language, with the spoken reality. However, there are many reasons to believe that this society of spectacles or of speech and oratory was also a society that has tried to control the spectacle and speech. These were almost something to fear the excesses: language and oratory, as well as the spectacles, could influence people to act through abused fashions. Language and spectacle could lye.

It is in this atmosphere that the greatest philosophers of Antiquity, notably Plato and Aristotle, have opposed the domain of "opinions", contesting the free-floating language of the sophists and orators, to give speech and aesthetic objects a kind of discipline and pedagogy. As the *doxa* is issued from the public speech, illusions flourish, according to Plato, from the visible, or sensible side of things. The philosopher opposes to the "sensible" his new invention, the "intelligible", whose superiority is not one of degree but of kind. While there are correspondences or "analogies" between the world of the sensible and that of intelligible, this difference of kind places the intelligible beyond a frontier, or horizon, tending to be figured out as the heavenly, perhaps Divine zone of immutable "ideas". The metaphysics of light, in its earliest Platonic version, enters the scene just at this moment, while probably being issued from older generations of mysticism or more concretely, Oriental "sun worship" traditions. It is redefined by Plato as a "principle", leading to an ontology: we have evidently the "sensible light", making the things visible --ontic things as the Sun, Moon, or any other source of light. But light has also an "ontological" existence, as a principle, as the uncreated and immutable one: light as God. It is in this sense that ideas can exist, inherently illuminated by this light as principle, or impregnated by it as it was in the Neo-Platonist version.

The Platonic model seems to be contested, while essentially being adopted by Plotinos, known as the Neo-Platonist, and his follower Porphyrius. Their critique is issued against the Platonic doctrine of light and "participation": Plato seems to conceive "participation" in three senses --the first, material-physical kind of participation, the second, daemonic or seductive participation, and the third, the spiritual one. In the first case, two or more things participate into a composition, like parties to the state, classes or more appropriately groups of citizens into the constitution of the Polis, or substances into composite drinks. In the second, I participate to a mixture through being seduced, or "possessed" by a daemonic power, as in the case of Orphic or Dionysiac intoxication experience and communities; thirdly, and apparently in the highest form, I participate to the Idea, through imitating its model, as a Demiurgos or an artisan, as a thinker in theoretic life, belonging to the community of philosophers and of the enlightened. It is important to note the formal and methodological character of these Platonic themes, so that they can be applied to a wide variety of phenomena, including a fundamental Greek conception of community as association: through participation "communities" are generated, as any human group (the demos in the first, the mystic or religious assemblages in the second, and the political foundation of the "ideal" city in the third.

Plotinus opposes Plato in each of these themes: he profoundly conceives the element of "violence" in such a Platonic conception of participation. In the first theme of participation for instance, when one of the elements is retired, the whole, that is the community collapses. Even in the second and the third, the relationship of the part to the whole remains dyadic. Such a Platonic conception of the community and participation can be expected to survive in the modern forms and conceptions of integrity, identification and community. Hence, Georg Simmel is able to trace a particular "dyadic" form of social relationship or "association" (*Gesellschaft*). As one of the parties is removed, as the couple in a family, the unit disappears. It comes that there is a Marxist tradition in which class antagonisms are defined in a dyadic form: if one of the classes disappear, the other, the opposite one too is abolished together with the society in which they are defined. This is exactly the element of Platonism which is attacked by Plotinus, who, in

turn, proposes a model of "gift". Here, the whole, called as the One or the Principle (*arkhai*) has a character of being "imparticipable"; when an element or part is removed, there is something which remains in the whole, which is eternal. The One, in this early dialectic akin to the Hegelian one, lost anything which could harm its unity and integrity. When one talks about a "principle", it is known that there is something in it which remain intact when what is ordered by the principle is broken.

However, if "light" is a principle, one already faces the problem of the most developed imaging technologies --photographic, cinematographic, videographic and digital ones, which are all "writings of the light". In all these media, everything is made by light, whether digitalized or not, and it should be clear that all these domains are now reading a metaphysics.

One of the most important metaphysical question is to ask: to whom are belonging images? This is not purely a matter of "property" or "ownership", while today's capitalist order seems to determine it in such a manner. If taken by a photographer or a filmmaker (this is the critical case of Vertov's understanding of the "documentary") my image does no longer belong to me. Is it something worth of an ethical concern, as most of the documentary filmmakers could --rather naively- accept? Are writing about a person and shooting him or her with camera identical? Metaphysically this turns out to be a question of life and death: one should ask whether one's own "image" belongs to oneself, or to the "seer" who sees it. We believe that such a question should be kept open, without any solution, in order to keep alive the metaphysical importance of the issue.

Imagination for Spinoza was certainly the source of all errors. Hence one is able to conceive how he identifies imagination with opinion, as opposed to adequate ideas. Surely, every mind constitutes images of external bodies as the mind's body is somehow modified by them. But this is only the source or error but not the error itself. He expresses it as follows:

(...) to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we

will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. (Spinoza, E, II, P. XVII, *Scholium*)

This is a quite important conceptualisation of imagination, as an image in itself is never an error, nor can it thus be conceived as a pure and ephemeral substitute for a reality. And when we continue by identifying opinion with imagination (unlike Kant, imagination (*imaginatio*) cannot be conceived as a faculty of the reason, but as an outcome of sensible materiality), it appears that Spinoza does not purely oppose knowledge to opinion. We have already seen how complex was the opposition knowledge-opinion in Ancient Greeks. Yet, Spinoza further complicates the issue by identifying the level of opinion with what he calls “first kind of knowledge”. This is not an error but only a kind of knowledge only through affections of one’s body by external bodies. And this first kind of knowledge is termed “inadequate”, insofar as it is the knowledge of the effects and not a knowledge by the causes. Hence, opinion is not something pertaining to the error...

But if imagination is possible, our images are "metaphysically" and almost necessarily belonging to the others. If I am in the visual field of someone, I belong to him or her, and this is not a contract or an exchange, since I can be visible without seeing the eye which gazes at me. This is not a matter of a "copyright" of images, but rather of the ethics of being visible, corresponding to the desire of "seeing", which should not be contaminated by a "voyeurism". And this has been the way in which Vertov has developed one of his major principles: "life caught unawares". It is part of the ethico-political aspect of the documentary filmmaking which is not without some important theoretical connotations.

4.6 The Cinema as an Affective Model of the World

Cinema was born in parallel to the constitution of the modern landscape, the metropolis, and is deeply anchored in it as a life-world (or rather the dream-world) of modern life. According to Deleuze, it was an answer to the late nineteenth century crisis in the psychology of perception, in terms of the perception of motion, before becoming an evident part of our urban landscape, before determining the modern “society of spectacle”. He posits and challenges this old idea of illusion, since cinematography has been the tool to show to human beings that their ordinary perceptions (images, paintings, photography, and real theatrical or natural movement) could be reproduced by mere technological means (Deleuze, 1985:231). The case of the cinema is important here for our purpose, since as early as its birth, it was considered as an example, or even the accomplishment of an “illusion”, that is, an inherently unconscious operation of opinion. Yet, it further established its own illusory world, somehow dream-like, correlated with a society of opinions, consisting in its amorphous audience. Today, we can be aware of the fact that cinematography, unlike the classical arts of spectacle –the theatre, dramatic arts and the opera—has a global audience, a kind of mass society adhering to its spectacle. From its early beginnings, cinema tended to become an ambiguous process, since it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish its aesthetic-artistic aspect from its role of superficial, popular entertainment. Cinema had to become the “seventh art”, not only through the Hollywoodian dreamworld, but also by the political-economic design of the “first socialist state”, the Soviet Union, in early twenties. It was nothing less than an industry of entertainment for some, while being the tool of representing the reality (the earliest idea of documentary film) much more directly than any other medium. Today, the first aspect seems to be victorious, but only on the basis of criteria of constitution of opinions and their imperialistic expansion: actually, in every country, and besides television, national film boards and registries, “golden globes”, circles of critics, reviewers, gossip columnists, film tabloids, Internet databases of films, ad department stores, having in common the unique task to create and re-create interminable discourses about films, tracing genealogies of

authors, o images and genres. Literature, the oldest of arts, was not able to develop such a great number of literary genres in all its history, as it is the case in cinema: the thriller, the science-fiction, the documentary, the Western, the romantic drama, the musical comedy, the neo-realism, the romantic adaptation, the avant-garde. And we have just to remember that everything passed during one hundred years.

It should be noted here that in cinema, like in music, a kind of “democracy” is prevailing. There we see new genres and new audiences, “fans” to be constituted as groups of opinion and taste, who are imitated by their films and who imitate their films in their actual life. The judgements of taste, as in every context of modernity (and as we have seen, even since the Ancient Greece) are able to establish differential norms and identities, a variety of tastes whose overall judge could only be democratic, since everyone has to live for his own account, and has to get his maximal pleasure of his choices. At any rate, we can admit that a theoretically numberless societies of opinion and taste are generated and reproduced in the world of cinematography.

However, the cultures of cinema are differently affected than the communities of music by some primordial challenges, which can only be explained by philosophy and sociology. A musical community, jazz, rock, rap or metal, is not forced to rely upon a kind of “principle of reality”, while in cinema, even in the case of the most avant-garde or fictional product, a problem of realism and irrealism is always involved. The old question of what reality is and how can it be represented is now mediated through a technical possibility to touch upon, to represent or to explain the reality by means no one in history ever heard about: the image of the movement.

Is it necessary now to recall Heidegger, who made a sharp distinction between the ancient technics and modern technology? Technology is not technological insofar as it is now able to produce some mysterious entities: the energy, the plastic, the electricity... Urban landscapes are produced, just as plantations of power. Now, it comes that cinema and especially television are producing the “image” in almost

the same way. In the past, just as a peasant is able to produce “something”, very concrete, for the usage of a demander, who is the ultimate judge of what is produced, the image was produced as a meaningful entity, finished in time and space, by the masters like Phidias, Leonardo or Rembrandt... Or, in television today, the image is rather something like a constant flux, ephemeral, yet reproducible at every instance. Once in movement, the image outweighs the old spectacle, the arts of time, to reach the absolute limit of representation. The experience of life is exhausted within it, as it has no longer the capacity to answer the questions “for whom” and “for what”...

We have not, unlike Heidegger, to lament from the fact that cinema and television today are producing the “image”: what matters is rather how the images of the Image are acted upon, produced and reproduced. One can, just like the Situationists, severely criticize the “societies of spectacle”, without losing the thread to the present, to actuality. One has to ask “how to do with that”, instead of lamenting or tracing nostalgic threads. Soberly, we should ask what, today, an Image is, and how it can be made meaningful and functional for life. We should think that the ultimate task of any serious cinematographer, since the early beginnings of movie-films can be summarized in this respect: how to produce images which not only incite thinking, but which think by themselves? Such a question leads us back to the genial Spinozistic perspective to recognize the validity and the domain of fictional and narrative experience, which is part of life, and which constitutes the adaptability of man to this world. Certainly, one aspect of the image is its objectivity in Spinoza. (The Caliban example, cited in his Letter to Jarig Jelles). But this is an objectivity of its material, which is the objective memory. This approximately corresponds to Bergson’s distinction between the two kinds of memory.

The case of the perception of movement becomes important both in cinema – psycho-physiologically—and in terms of the apprehension of the memory, since all concrete perception is directed both to the present and the past, and in that case, the part of “pure perception” in it is not considerable since every act of

perceiving is immediately covered and influenced by the contribution of memory.

Bergson puts his point as follows:

Not only, by its memory of former experience, does this consciousness retain the past better and better, so as to organize it with the present in a newer and richer decision; but, living with an intenser life, contracting, by its memory of the immediate experience, a growing number of external moments in its present duration, it becomes more capable of creating acts of which the inner indetermination, spread over as large a multiplicity of the moments of matter as you please, will pass the more easily through the meshes of necessity. Thus, whether we consider it in time or space, freedom always seems to have its roots deep in necessity and to be intimately organized with it. Spirit borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds and restores them to matter in the form of movements which it has stamped with its own freedom." (Bergson, 1896: MM248-249).

How the blunder of pure perception occurs, the empirical example given by Le Roy is excellent, while it is given on a verbal, but not visual ground: the subject is able to write the word "tumult" correctly. However, when writing, someone calls out in his ear ("during the short time the light is turned on) another word of different meaning, say "railway". It is very probable that the subject will read something like "tunnel", through association. What is interesting in this scene is that there is a graphical (that is visual) similarity in the outlines of the words "tumult" and "tunnel", while they are connected semantically only through a process of recollection of memory.

All these experimental ideas mean that not only the images or ourselves, but also the ways in which we perceive the images of the outside can be and certainly are manipulated. The name of such a manipulation can be given: it is the "televisual image", a unilateral manipulation of "happenings" as images. News, shows and TV panels, all kinds of "facts" of opinion occur on this register.

4.6.1 The Popular Experience of Cinematographic Image

The birth of the cinematographic image was first being marked by strong emotions that we might call “popular” –a kind of funny experience of the audiences in earliest films, at the sight of a train moving into a station (first film by Lumière, “*L’arrivée du train à la Gare La Ciotat*”), a child playing in the garden and the like. These emotions of fun were marked evidently by the effect of “first sight” of motion pictures, a kind of wonder and shock, operating together with an illusion of reality. The cinema and its audience, in their early stages, were seemingly unequipped with strong passions of dramatic effects, or poetic values. Nor there were wonders of exotic countries (the documentary will appear soon, but not during this first “simple” stage). The inventors of cinematography, Edison and Dickson in United States who were the inventors of the film-pellicule and Lumières in France, the inventors of the “cinematograph” were not believing in early times to a probable artistic or scientific value of their inventions. Yet, as early as 1904, this new invention was intercepted by both capitalistic enterprise and military organizations. This is a period of 10 years, until the beginning of the First World War, that the cinematographic apparatus was deployed as part of national military strategies, with all its components: the lighting of the terrain of battle and enemy forces, a representation and “*cadrage*” of their strength and movement... The battlefield in modern times is conceived as a dynamic field of movement, just as in the classical cinema, with great directors behaving like “dictators” and “autocrats” of the cinema’s spectacle. The parallelism of the military strategy and of the cinematographic apparatus has been rigorously questioned by the French philosopher Paul Virilio in his *Guerre et cinéma* (War and Cinema): “War is cinema, and cinema is war”... (Virilio, 1991: 26).

Virilio, throughout his analyses of such a parallelism, is able to conceive that his formula that identifies war with cinema is not an accident or a pure importation of a technology (cinema in this case) into the domain of warfare technology: cinema in itself was a “logistics of representation”. It should be noted that the invention of photography too anticipated the direct representation of movement in the battlefield, and at the exact moment when Edward Muybridge, the inventor of

sequence photography of movement (the flight of a bird, a horse running) was a battlefield photographer in late nineteenth century. One should note here that Muybridge's job was quite different than the paintings of American "war painters" of the Civil War --it was strategic and tactical in essence.

Not only the warfare but also some anticipation of "art" was already present in cinema, even when most of the intellectuals of the time condemned it as a mere "mechanical reproduction of the movement". Yet the theme of anticipation is important, since modernity seems to be the life-world of anticipations: Hegel, the first great anticipator of modernity, anticipated the solution of the "master-slave dialectics" in the Prussian State, seemingly affected by his sight of working carpenters out his window in Jena University, while the canons of Napoléon hurled around the city: these were the two major powers and experiences of life in its historic evolution --warfare (the value of the Master) and work (the value of the Slave). Later, Marx is able to show how anticipation works throughout the tentative development of capitalist relations of production: the primitive "putting-out" system the simple manufacture anticipating in its turn the complex manufacture, all anticipating the great capitalist factory organization. Modernity is really defined by anticipations, which cannot be reduced to causal chains operating through time and history. They are rather "openings", or possibilities which are actualized or repressed by the historical flux of events. The two great philosophers of the "Openness", Heidegger and Bergson were also great anticipators, while they tended to define the Open in quite different manners and purposes: in Heidegger, life anticipates death, the techne the modern actualization of planetary technology, the metaphysics the modern nihilism. Bergson, on the contrary, relates the Openness to the question of the New. He is not in search of origins, since there is no room to attribute any "beginning" to the time conceived as duration (*la durée*). In questioning the possibility of the creation of the New, one cannot simply invoke causal chains deployed in a measurable process of time, since causality requires the division of an abstract time into immobile moments. What is New never appears in time, since the duration is exactly the movement of the Open. Then, it is true that modern life can be characterized by an unrelented

course towards an indefinite future, in which every “moment” can be understood as a “*jetszeit*” in the sense used by Walter Benjamin.

Again, we can discern the momentum of anticipation in photography. The first photographs (beyond the “Daguerrotype”) of Niepce were long-posed ones, with a still-standing camera obscura, but anticipating the shortening of the duration of the exposure, before being able to take portraits in a few minutes, and later, before being capable to take instantaneous still-shots. This was the moment, in mid-nineteenth century, that the photographic camera was able to shot a passer-by in the street, or depicting urban landscapes as stills. The Barthesian “punctum” too was enabled through this moment.

Yet, this was not the accomplishment of the anticipations of photography, since we can trace a variety of genealogies interacting in modern times: first, it was true that, according to Virilio, there is an anticipation of the rigorous depiction of reality in photography and cinematography, all integrated into a “logistics of representation” worthy for warfare technologies. But, a more complex series of anticipations in the aesthetic and the scientific spheres should be first established: it was evident that the invention of photography has moved the art of painting into new ways of creation. This happened in the domain of classical or romantic painting, which were deployed in the aim of “resemblance” to reality. We have not to believe necessarily to André Bazin, one of the world’s major theoreticians of cinema, who says that this was an “obsession” of classical-romanting painting, which was destroyed by the emergence of photography. (Bazin, 1990). One should not exaggerate the causal chains in such a history, since the relationships between painting, photography and cinema in the nineteenth century were far more complex: Aumont is able to conceive in a minor event in the history of painting the anticipation of the cinema. This is the moment when the draft painting was replaced by “*études*”, in which, unlike the drafts supposed to give the pre-establishment of the final composition for a classical painter, the modern painter begins to make “studies”, unfinished drafts that are depicting unique moments of drawn objects –a moment in a landscape, a passage of the moment of an apple, as in famous paintings of Cézanne. These studies, however, should not

be characterized only by their spontaneous or momentous nature, but rather by their “unfinished” postures: they anticipated the inclusion of the movement into the image, by distorting the contours and thereby avoiding the exact resemblance of the representation to its object. The importance of these “studies” in defining one of the characters of modern life –which might be called the valorisation of the “affects of the moment”-- is far more evident than their role in the birth of cinematographic language, which remains always related more to the images in movement (motion pictures) rather than images representing the movement. Yet without tracing back the manifestations of the modern representations of the world as far as possible, we can easily fail to cover the nature of modernity, and this new form of “magic” called cinema...

Another important aspect of modernity comes to be a kind of “visual” style not only in literature, but also in the philosophical writing –the kind of synoptic writing adopted by Kierkegaard for example, proceeding through drafts, synopsis of stories, anecdotes, lists of arguments, bits and fragments. The same can be observed in the case of Georg Simmel, so that his pupil Gyorgy Lukacs was calling him the founder of a kind of “impressionistic sociology”. The cinematographic anticipation is here evident, as Simmel’ descriptions of some “social types” were adequately reflected in even the most superficial and popular genres of movie images: the figures of his Stranger in Western traditions of Billy Wilder or Hawks, the hiding “grand-bourgeois” in the Citizen Kane of Orson Welles, the Jew in Joseph Losey’s Mr. Klein.

4.6.2 How Can an Image Lye? Magritte and Foucault

How Foucault was capable, since Spinoza, to formulate a new character for what, in the Western world, one calls "power"? First, he developed a new image of power. This image reveals itself in one of Foucault's texts, which is apparently not dealing with his issue of power --his commentary on Magritte's *ceci n'est pas une pipe*. Questioning the domain of language, the art of Magritte, and of the "image", Foucault seems to pass them away, and enters into the blueprint of his analytics of power: everything passes in the discourse of the executors of power just in the

same way in "this is not a pipe" of Magritte --the judge who condemns says "this is not a prison, since we are not punishing, we are trying to restore him to the moral order; we are educating him, we are healing him..." This "this is not a prison" is part of the modern discourse of jurisprudence, but also the manner in which the modern societies of discipline emerged. The thesis of his book *Surveiller et punir: la naissance de la prison* is evident --we can call the society which emerges in the beginnings of nineteenth century as a "society of discipline". These disciplines are invested in what we may call Napoleonic institutions, prisons, hospitals, schools, military barracks and factories but also in specialized discourses --psychiatry, clinic, psychology and even sociology-- all pretending to be "scientific". What is essential of disciplines is that they cannot be "localized" in some specific institutions, as functions deriving out there, but that they are capable to invade the entire life of modern societies, during Nineteenth century. There is no discrepancy between their "physical"-"historical" reality and the discourses that accompanied them, since the discourses proliferating around their "positivity" are in themselves contradictory: Foucault wanted to show the internal "hypocrisy" of these discourses: "this is not a pipe" belongs to the domain of the discourse of art; to the world of images and to what a philosopher like Maurice Blanchot formulated as "speaking is not seeing"; or "this is not a prison" uttered by the policeman, the judge or the guardian belongs to a similar order of discourse --accordingly, one can never be sure when everyone talks about his institution in a similar manner --is a hospital really a "therapeutic" milieu, whose function is "healing"? Is the factory system really different from a prison, especially during the culminating process of the industrial revolution? In short, every institution seems to repeat each other through circular arguments which betray the "hypocrisy" --perhaps one of the fundamental "aporias" of modernity. Deleuze is right when he sees the essential point of Foucault not in his description of the disciplinary institutions but rather how all these institutions are permeated by an intricate investment of power; but this is true only to some extent --since Foucault was also aware of the fact that these disciplinary institutions were criticized just from (perhaps even before) their birth. It is true that Foucault's analyses are strictly oriented towards the "classical" period and its achievement in modernity, notably

to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. But what is essential is not the period of their birth (since we are talking about rather a process) but a specific system of operation: what are the factors that imply a superficial family resemblance among them? The importance is attributed to the functionality which characterizes the disciplinary societies as a linear capture of life: there, life is captured, and their specific form is "confinement". Modern individuality passes through a series of segments in which every individual is confined. Each of them have their specific rules, configurations and experiences, but this does not prevent them to repeat each other in terms of their implicit presuppositions: every segment seems to reject the preceding one: in the school we are told "you are no longer in family", and when in military service, you are told "you are no longer in the school". Foucault's essential question seems to be posed in terms of affects and life-experiences: how it comes that modern institutions are repeating each other so manifestly, while denying such a repetition in each step? How it comes that the entirety of modern life is distributed in such a manner that different life experiences like madness, criminality, learning, making sex, speaking and working, up to disease and death are caught in institutions which are resembling each other? Here in this thesis, the reasons of our interest in Foucault's work appears exactly in this point: societies of opinion are doubling what Foucault and Deleuze were calling as "disciplinary societies" --they are societies in which the legitimation and justification of these disciplinary measures are tentatively performed.

The role of the affects in the work of Foucault is evident: he is able to reconstruct the social types corresponding to each stage of his analysis: the mad can never be seen as a "social type" in itself, up to the end of the classical period. It belongs to the order of the "same"; as he is not objectified with the exception of his appearance of non-reason. Socially, he is still part of the society, and perhaps with attributed magico-religious references, during the Medieval era and the Renaissance. He comes to assume the intricate role of the Other of reason, the impossibility of reasoning in the Classical Age. Even the period of "Great Confinement", up to the liberation of the mad people from their chains by Pinel, in the beginning of Nineteenth century, is not the time of a social type, simply for

they are confined, out of visibility. The social type of the madman appears only from the moment that he is confined following an investigation into the society, an investigation which encountered and accompanied the process of medicalization of his madness. What Foucault neglects in his own way is the "opinional" nature of the modern understanding of madness, as an individuated disturbance.

This "opinion" of the masses, necessary for the social creation of the social type is much more manifestly analyzed by Foucault in his treatment of a time of crisis, when the emerging prison system was not at first popularly justified in the juridical system and the criminal law. This means that prisons are erected, expanding over territories, in the interstices of urban areas, while they were remaining unjustified in the domain of criminal justice. Foucault gives examples of these early reactions, which cannot be interpreted as "reformist" approaches. The jurists of the revolutionary times were not intending to bring the prison system to the core of the criminal justice. We don't know yet to what extent Foucault's argument that the prison system developed outside the area of the criminal justice before imposing itself in this domain is historically true. But this is the logical consequence of Foucault's way of thinking in which "partiality" is involved in both of its two senses --assuming a particular "point of view" on the "present", and not the "past" (in this sense Foucault is not a historian but a philosopher); and seeing the things, like the "ideal types" of Weber, with a logic of exaggeration of some points, to make visible what lies at the background or rather "underground" --this is what Foucault was calling "eventalization", creating "events" out of the material, out of the archive.

The "lying image" appears just there, where Foucault was capable to understand what happens in one of Rossellini's films, the Europe 1951, where a bourgeois woman for the first time sees workers in the factory, and screaming "I believed they were prisoners". The magics of the image works in such a manner: one no longer compares two images but just sees the one in the other. Like the "*énoncé*"s of Foucault, images are rare, they have to be extracted from the clichés in which they are buried --and this is a creation of ideas. And rarity is their own fashion to

appear. This is why we need their derivation through extraction from clichés. Now, Magritte presents his work *ceci n'est pas une pipe* as a cliché which belongs to the realm of scholarly education and instruction: one of the variants is painted on a blackboard!

4.7 The Power of Images

We have lived two centuries of photography, one century of cinema, fifty years of television, and two decades of digital images. We can rely upon the common characteristic of all these images --they are technical "images", if we borrow the word of Vilém Flusser. As technical images, they are produced by means of "generation", and not "production", as painting and other graphic arts. We say that they are generated, and not produced with respect to the "objectivity" of the apparatus which brought them forward, and this is why a photographic camera, a cinematograph, a TV receptor, a computer are not "means of production", but rather apparatus. An apparatus is distinguished from a "tool", or even from a "machine" by its character of "objectivity": the producer of the technical images, unlike a painter, works as the operator of a programme, inherent in the device, whether it is a photcamera, a cinematograph, video camera or a computer. Flusser profoundly characterizes the photographic image as a texture of writing whose historical emergence marked the end of the traditional world of images -- where images were seen, writings were read; now it comes that images are technically registered, and the polarization of the image and writing was abolished. Now, one can no longer be said to "see" a photograph, but rather "reads" it. This explains how technical images have created a new psychology of the image, of memory, of movement. This also explains why they refer to an "apparatus", rather than a tool --the photcamera... This is because an apparatus is defined by a material complex, or organization plus a scientific theory. In this respect, it approaches the case of the new machines of Industrial Revolution --the engine and the thermodynamics, which is not an extension of human body and energy, but rather something that works through its programme. The idea of programme here is essential, since we should remember that the programme is

virtually inherent in the physical device, defining it as an apparatus and not as a mere tool. Such a virtual inherence infinitely increases the "information" rate of the device, as a single needle is said to be much less informed than a house, or a desktop computer, not in its essence, but with respect to the simplicity of its production per unit. Hence one can understand one of the characters of modern capitalism: capitalism defines apparatus more than the means of production today: social work tends to be modulated through the apparatus of corporations, now leaving the industries to the Third World, and concentrating finances at the centers of the apparatus, which are occupied in programming, rather than "real", "material" production. And, looking at the extreme cases, which are nevertheless normalized today, one can understand a profound observation of William Burroughs in his *Naked Lunch*; it is about the junk dealer, who cannot be said to sell a product to his customer, but to sell his customer to the product. How this can be? It should be noted that the junkie is the one who is much more transformed than the product which transforms him. And the dealer does not "inform" his product, he does not ameliorate it, or even produce it... His contribution to the nature of his product is nothing. The junk can be said to be a minimally "informed" product, while the rate of decline it induces to its consumer is high. This is why modern capitalism needs in its margins the drug market, actually reaching huge amounts of money investment.

No less than drugs, increasing the creation of the imaginary on an individual basis, the collective means of enunciation of images, the photography (the press), the motion-picture (Hollywood's dream world) and especially television are working in the same way described by Burroughs. They are indefinitely generated by the apparatus: this is nothing but their mass production and reproduction. How can one be able to sketch out a sociology of "mass media", without first assuming and appropriating their mode of operation?

4.8 The Problematization of the "Document"

The naive documentary character of earliest films was based on the identity of the shots and projection. If there is a line from Lumière to Vertov, and thereby to the

documentary film as such, nowadays largely apprehended by the televisual apparatus, such a line had some important ruptures during one hundred years of history of cinema. The beginnings was characterized by fixed camera, and the union of the projection with shooting. Formally, this is the definitive character of the early stage of cinema, where elements of fiction and narrative could not be used in fixed camera setting and the shortness of the film-pellicule, about 8 seconds in earliest times of the cinematograph. Cinema registered and documented movements, a train entering the railway station, people walking in streets, or working in their workshops. The documentary character of the earliest films was almost "natural", if to use such a word would be adequate. In this sense, the cinematograph belonged to the genealogy of the photography, to which movement seems to be added, and the cinematographer had a strictly defined viewpoint determining the ordinary "framing", which was also assumed to be the viewpoint of the spectators. The essential rupture comes with the moving camera, introducing relative movements, and the apprehension of the camera into transport vehicles --the "vehicular" camera strictly defines the emancipation of the viewpoint, and the non-identification with the eye of the public. A camera mounted on a train, on a street car can create abberations of the movement, and even a disorientation of framing, sometimes assuming a human eye, expanding its possibilities, sometimes leaving it behind to pretend to become almost a variable, cosmic, or artificial eye. It is essential here to recall some early themes of the phenomenology of perception, a project historically co-extensive with cinema.

Beginning with Husserl's studies of "intentionality", the phenomenology of the end of nineteenth century was a general effort to transform --if not to revolutionize-- the ordinary psychological assumptions about consciousness. The formula "every consciousness is consciousness of something", today an almost banal identifier of phenomenological proceeding, was an essential and direct attack to the earlier psychology. As one of the consequences of Kantian philosophy, such a motto recalls the need for intentionality and orientation of conscious experience. This means that if there is nothing to be conscious about, there would be no consciousness. Consciousness is not something, like a faculty of mind, preexist the things to which the subject is oriented, interested. This

became a motto of the phenomenology, from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, relating the conscious experience to the primacy of perception, or as in the philosophies of existence, via Heidegger to Sartre, who were showing the orientation of the *Dasein* into "this world"...

This principle in fact attacks a particular dimension of the earlier psychological understanding, which extrapolates the mental images we have in consciousness and the things which are outside the mind. Outside, we only have bodies, things, in motion or rest, and inside, as part of the *Umwelt*, we have images, concepts and ideas of these things. Consciousness is thereby substantialized, as a faculty proper, which could therefore be conceptualized as an empty form, while it individually exists. With Husserl, the character of this emptiness changes: this emptiness is not formal, but depends on the primacy of the intentionality --i.e. whenever something is "intended" in experience, consciousness arises.

It is known that modern Western thought was aware of the philosophical importance of "empty forms", at least since Kant. The emptiness of form is almost a characteristic of modernity: the universality of morality was possible only when the categorical imperative was formulated as an empty form, enabling the subject to fill it with any adequate content --a moral rule or "duty". This means that ethical universality and necessity no longer relies upon the selection of "good" moral rules of the past and present, since the "good" itself is nothing but the outcome of the judgment that defines "duty". The imperative hence should be categorical --i.e. should apply to all possible empirical moral rules or expressions of conduct. Hence it defines an a priori as an empty form, assumed to be valid everywhere and every time --necessity and universality.

Such an understanding of the "empty form" as necessary and universal should not be confused with the empiricist assumption of a *tabula rasa*, which has rather an ideational character. *Tabula rasa* does not define an a priori, and thereby belongs to the order of the classical assumptions of psychology. Continental rationalism and the critical philosophy of Kant never assumed a *tabula rasa* which is susceptible to be filled with pure experience. Phenomenology thereby is able to

reproduce the notions of experience of the continental rationalism. Belief, intention, orientation, thrownness in the world, and experience itself are phenomena, rather than the content of human mental activity.

This is why phenomenology challenges the position of the ordinary psychology, emphasizing the "orientation" of consciousness. But, there remained an essential problem: if consciousness is always oriented, this means that it could also be "dis"-oriented, distorted: consciousness, as in the Freudian conception (and there is an interaction between psychoanalysis and phenomenology exactly at this point), has also to be characterized as an errance. There is an important text by Freud, *On A Weltanschauung*, which is able to show the variety of the errance of the conscious experience. The sublunar world, as it is directly experienced is not the world depicted and described by the science. One of them must err --but which one? A critical answer comes, characteristically from Husserl, in his prominent work *Krisis der Wissenschaft*: the European science errs, since it tries to make adequate his world and concepts to the givens of everyday experience. Or, there is a long history of science, since the Renaissance, where the main classical sciences --astronomy, geometry, mathematics, physics and chemistry, whether they are said exact or not-- have shown how their discoveries contradicted the ordinary imagery, making visible what is invisible in the sublunar world.

Now, we have to formulate our question about phenomenology: why cinematography has long been a particularly important domain of experience to be studied by phenomenologists. Deleuze and Guattari have pointed about the question why phenomenology has always been interested to pass from the world of art when it argued about any of its concepts: Merleau-Ponty striving behind Cézanne, Freud behind Leonardo da Vinci, Heidegger behind Van Gogh and poetry? Even when they dealt with the most ordinary, everyday experience --for instance ordinary perception-- a phenomenologist always feels the necessity to refer to art, visual, auditory or poetical: "Phenomenology is forced to transform itself to a phenomenology of art, since the immanence of the lived experience in a transcendental subject needs to be expressed in transcendent functions which are

not determined in general experience, but which passed through the here and now of the lived experience itself, incarnating there by constituting living sensations." (Deleuze & Guattari 1992: 168) This is the way in which Mikel Dufrenne is forced to create an entire analytical system to restore perceptive and affective a priori that would serve as conditions of the sensation with respect to the relation between human body and the world. (Dufrenne, 1953).

The phenomenological project could not pass over cinematography, and its possible deployment in the world of art. But what is the status of cinematography among the arts, while assuming just from its early beginnings a rather ambiguous position --entertainment industry or art proper? The strict documentary character of the film, following the traces of photography --that one knows that the image moving there belonged to something present there and now-- could make impossible to restore cinema in the domain of art. The authors of this discovery, Lumière and Edison were not believing in the "future" of their invention, nor to its possible scientific and artistic use. Photographic and cinematographic images belonged more to the domain of opinion, rather than art. Photography was servile to the press during an era where public opinion expanded to cover the entirety of the world, and the earlier exotic images of Lumière filmmakers were only of general public interest. Or, phenomenology knew well that art is something quite different from opinion, since it assumes a character of transcendence within any particularity and singularity it creates. Hence, there were no so much reasons for a phenomenologist to be interested in this trivial experience, which is not yet at a point where great authors of cinema perfected the cinematographic language.

Yet we have many phenomenologists, notably Rudolf Arnheim, trying to develop a great phenomenology of the cinematic-visual perception. He cites "20 Good Reasons Why Film is Art". We don't know whether the reasons he enumerated are really good or not, but his theory of film has been one of the most important beginnings of the film philosophies of the future. Arnheim seems to be representative of the new psychological research into visual arts, considering the phenomenology of perception as a general theoretical framework. We have said that the phenomenology, since Husserl, challenged the classical division between

cognition and perception. Arnheim assumes this critical standpoint which opposes the actual attitude of Western civilization that disdains perception because it is not assumed to involve thought --a thoughtless perception against a thought which is destroyed when referring to the perceivable manifold of appearances... But such a valorization of perception is it sufficient to constitute the "artistic" character of cinematography? Among the contemporaries of Arnheim, there has always been the great artists of the time who disdained cinematography as a powerful device which will destroy the very notion of art and literature. Even Virginia Woolf wrote an interesting essay against cinema as early as 1927, criminalizing any attempt of transposing the works of literature into cinema. What she laments is not the lower quality of adaptations, but the very idea of cinematographic narrative assuming the form of fiction. What she insists upon is exactly a critique of cinema which reduced a full fledged literary personality (a social or psychological "type" if you want) into a uni-dimensional character of no artistic interest --a perceptive "copy" of Anna Karenina on the screen... The early disdain towards cinematography was almost a rule for the artists and many intellectuals, who were not able perhaps to foresee its "brilliant" future. Hence, there was a difficulty and almost a "burden of proof" for the task assumed by Arnheim: why cinema is capable to be constituted as a form of art?

A major early criticism, generalized among intellectuals of the time was that cinematography could not be an art since it reproduced reality by purely mechanical means. This is particularly a point to which we have to attribute some importance, since it refers to the "naive" and "natural" documentary character of the cinematographic image. It will tend to become obsolete in time, since the evolution of the cinematography, the perfection of cinematographic language through stylistics of framing and montage will soon dismantle the idea of pure mechanical reproduction. Such a criticism would rather belong to an epoch where mechanical reproduction of reality was bounded by the limitations of a fixed camera, virtually assuming the eye of the spectator during projection. There are many reasons to believe that during this period, filmmakers recorded the images of life within the context of passivity of screening the film. The cameraman

assumed the eye of the public. The aim was hence to represent reality mechanically on the screen.

Or, it should also be observed that varying interests of the earliest filmmakers and spectators (the public) have defined already a genealogy of the cinema in future. Characteristically, the audience (the cinematographic community) preferred in this epoch the "natural" documentary character of this new invention. This is evident for the fate of Lumière's "cinématographe" and the device invented by Edison and Dickson. Edison's invention of moving recorded images was designed for a single spectator at a time, and the films were already subjected to a kind of simple montage --a dancing woman and the like. In other words, some theses of Arnheim about "why film is art?" were already inherent in Edison's device. But the American public was not so much interested in the "mechanical reproduction" of a dancing girl. The fate of Lumière's device was far more a history of success. The reason was not that the cinématographe was technically more expansive and imperialistic to have a larger access to the public --the salon and theater halls... In early Lumière films, there was something more, in comparison with Edison's invention: the vision of the movement in everyday life, without any representation by a painter, and in opposition to the still image of photography. The public of the old continent was partially habituated in theatrical representations through projection: we can trace back an entire genealogy of projection techniques of moving images --the *Diorama* of Daguerre, put into performance in 1822, where the spectator is placed in an immobile location within a constructed series of decors, seeing the spectacle of light and emissions of rays, transformed even by some chemical components which creates a total spectacle. And we had the Panorama of the imperial spectacles --this time the spectator is moving as the vision changes, accounting for a stand up of images. Walter Benjamin is right in seeing in the Panorama the prehistoric accumulation of cinematographic spectators, an audience formed around already moving images and their irresistible attraction. (in Leutrat, *** :12). What was essential for the cinema was already present in this experience: what was in movement was not only the spectator, walking in a museum or gallery, but the apparatus of the spectacle itself. And, towards the end of century, Emile Reynaud perfected his projection

techniques for moving theater, his praxinoscope and visual theater, which amounted to be the earliest animation films. Then, what can explain the huge public interest towards Lumière's invention, functioning as photogrammes creating an illusion of movement, and which tells nothing, no stories, nor fictions but nothing but ordinary moving things on screen?

Even when we have not to approximate the idea which sees in cinematography a synthesis of movement and photographic image, we should trace back another genealogical line towards photography. When we have talked about the modern categories of images, we have observed, together with Flusser, an important psychological factor introduced by the technical images: the passage from the "posing image" to "still image", with instantaneity, one was now able to perform a shooting of photographs of a moving creature as sequences. This was called "chronophotography" by Marey and later Edouard Muybridge. Their interest was quasi-scientific: to dissect the movement in sequences of equidistant still images, in order to analyse the mysteries of sublunar movements. Already the still image created a new kind of perception, a stand-still of a frozen moment of moving things, an experience of a paralytic immobile creature. The gallop of a horse was dissected by Muybridge, at least to show how Géricault was right in painting a horse whose legs are captured at a moment when none of them touched the ground. Muybridge himself was interested in projecting these sequences into a screen, making the prehistory of cinema, but this was not something that would serve serious scientific purposes. The science of kinetics was already knowing everything about movement, and after the invention of cinematography, Marey did not see the interest of recapitulating and showing the movement once dissected and analyzed: why, after showing what movement is through analysis, to show the movement itself, seemingly as part of our illusion due to our natural perceptive apparatus? This is the evidence of the absence of any scientific (therefore technological) interest in the beginnings of cinema.

There is a prehistory of cinema, but it is rather difficult to ascertain the true genealogy of the cinema. First there are at least three inventors, Lumière in France inventing the "cinématographe", Edison-Dickson in United States inventing the

"kinetoscope", and Messter in Germany, inventing the so-called bioscope (*Bioskop*)... For our purposes here, cinema is not merely another domain, which belongs to the technological order of our modern times, but an impure invention, derived out of a plurality of actual inventions, applications and ideas, and coinciding with a certain state of arts and sciences. It has also been an "event" corresponding to a total transformation in the "ways of seeing", to borrow a term from John Berger, and also in the forms of perception.

In this genealogy, it is somehow useless to invoke the oldest forms of depiction of movement in graphic arts, from cave paintings of Lascaux to Bayeux tapestry, or from old Chinese shadow theater to the camera obscura or any Arabic-European projection techniques. It is known that human beings have always been capable to represent movements and actions graphically, through morphological distortions. And Lascaux cave paintings, which belong to an enigmatic art 20 thousands year ago have still something to do about the development of visual representation techniques. Or, they do not belong to the "realistic" vision, as it was generally believed at the beginnings of Twentieth century. Even Lukacs erroneously attributes a "primitive", perhaps primordial "materialism" and "realism" to these cave paintings. Or they are by no means realistic, as Leroi-Gourhan reveals the symbolic and paedagogic nature of these pictures, which are without frames: they are series of animal figures, grouped in a syntactic system and depending on a lost tradition, which opposes every claim to "realism". And the Bayeux tapestry in Medieval times only "tells stories", events and facts, yet having nothing to do with any kind of "realism". Realism, which is essential to every primordial genealogical fact about "technical images" has never been a naive, primitive event in aesthetic dimension. If we have to talk about the prehistory of cinema, we certainly confront its "opposite", the "still photography". It could be interesting to note that even the most developed phenomenological approaches --that of Flusser for instance, where cinema belongs to photography, as the first "technical image". Or, motion is essential for cinematography, and its character of "technical" image should nevertheless be treated in a different perspective. In this sense, even the train is already a vision machine in movement (as described in an early poem by Victor Hugo), because it is just an alteration of vision, of perception, in a similar

way with the telescope or microscope --but here, the device works for itself and in itself...

Or, we have many reasons in not believing that cinematography is a synthesis of image (photogrammes) and movement. Almost naively, Arnheim writes that film is art since its images are moving there. This sounds naive, but if we refer it back to the Kantian phenomenology, everything about the aesthetic apprehension of these moving images creates a series of great aporias. In Kant's construction of the architectonics of faculties of mind --which forged the modern notion of phenomenon not as an "appearance" but as "apparition"-- a moment comes when the act of perceiving tends to become a sequential process of apprehension of parts. The intellect should apprehend something (a house, a landscape) through a "reading" of its parts, but passing to the next part, the previous one must be remembered, or in Kantian terminology "apprehended" in combination with the next part. The difficulty is in answering the question what is the nature of the apprehension of the previous part in the second and in the third in which both are combined --an almost never ending synthesis of mental images... The last image must be "integral", covering all its parts... Kant seems already to be aware of what today's psychology of perception was calling as Gestalt. But he also insists upon the necessity to have a common measure, a unit through which the visible is perceived. In other words, we have to have mental frames, almost like empty imagos, to be applied a priori to the apperceived things. And, this is what he calls the experience of the sublime, there are moments this frame can no longer be applied to what we perceive. If the beautiful comes from the harmony among parts of a whole, the two modes of sublime, the mathematical and dynamic, are determined by the a priori inability to attribute categories to the manifold of existence. This is the vision of an ocean during the tempest, the dynamic sublime, or the movements of celestial bodies, as mathematic sublime.

It should now be observed that the delight of the first cinematographic reproductions of movement belonged to the level of Kantian sublime, insofar as the sentiment of fear experienced by the first spectators of *La Gare Ciotat* must be one of a movement escaping and transcending the frame --a train comes... The

entire paradigm of Arnheim about cinematographic phenomenology of perception lies in such a Kantian context: as an instrument which is able to show in two-dimensions a movement, which must necessarily happen in a space of three-dimensions, the cinematographe is able to take photogrammes from a particular point of view, with objects of apparent size. Arnheim cites as one of the factors of cinema as the possibility of a kind of bizarre absence --one is able to create an effect of absence of space-time continuum.

4.8.1 An Opposition: Edison-Dickson versus Lumière

Here once more we have to refer to a sociological approach, about the birth of cinematography. We have at least three inventions --the *cinématographe* of Lumière brothers, the kinetoscope of Dickson, introduced by Edison, and the Bioskop of Messter. We leave the third to the historians of cinematographic technology and now, we have to direct our attention to the first two inventions, which approximately occurred in the same years of the *fin-de-siècle*. The continental perspective is clear: Lumière's *cinématographe* has tended to become the almost "official", in other words, sociological beginning of the cinema as a culture. From its beginnings it has been public, documentary, and "story-telling"... Later, in spite of the unbelief of its inventors, it will become the purest "popular entertainment industry". Certainly, Lumière never believed in the future of his invention: he has been the "grand master" of the sect, of which the members can be cited by everyone. Yet no one can claim that the precursors and inventors of cinema were truly believing into any artistic or scientific interest of it.

One is generally inclined to oppose as the two founders of the cinema on the basis of the opposition between the documentary character of the "views" of Lumière and Méliès first "fiction" cinema. It is legitimate to determine the validity of these two lines, not as an opposition, but rather as two aspects of the cinema. If there is really an opposition in cinema, we believe, it belongs to a different order, opposing the two inventors of motion pictures --Lumière's *cinématographe* and Edison's-Dickson's *kinetoscope*. The former too is used to be an entertainment, but it always remains as a relatively public device, due to the projection. The latter on

the other hand, is certainly capable to project documentaries, but its presence is not public, but private, since it operates on the basis of a camera obscura in which the film is seen by an ocular. It is evident that Lumière's *cinématographe* has been the winner, through the expansion of projection salons. Yet, as Bonitzer puts it, "as every history, the history of cinema has been the history of schisms and divisions, of dehiscences, of ruptures which affected the art of filmmaking, which transformed it and created it as such. This is a history full of noise and furor (not only on the screen, but also behind it), of brute polemics, of victims and corpses". (Bonitzer, 1995:13) And we really believe that the success story of Lumière Brothers should be now relativised: it seems to us that television, which has declared its domination over cinema (at the level of culture industry) exactly belongs to the genealogy of Edison-Dickson's kinoscope, with the privacy of the "seeing", open to the voyeurism of the video. Evidently the pornographic genre ever existed in the culture of the cinema, but it was in fact contrary to its nature, which is based on "private" documentary shooting and "public" projection before an audience. Lumière's had already a "care" for the camera and the phase of "shooting" their views: in the first films already this care appears: not to disturb the passers-by on the streets, a carefully elaborated "framing", at a distance, and an adaequation of the camera to the projection. The cinematography was born as a public device, rather than a private one.

However today we witness the "particularization" and the "privatization" of the viewing, through television and the Internet. One should ask is it now that the audio-visual media accomplish their task in order to become a pure "popular entertainment industry"... In one sense, yes, and it will continue as such. But in another sense, it is a domain of authorship and artistic value, a kind of intellectual, or rather immaterial labour in the sense used by Toni Negri and his friends, a learning of images and from images as in the case of the "paedagogy of images" of Jean-Luc Godard.

What happens, then, in an image? The image-document taken as an exception (this is almost an impossible task), as Serge Daney put it: "fiction is to locate oneself to the center of the world in order to tell a story. The documentary is to go

to the extreme borders of the world for not having to tell any story. Or, just as there are insects in fossilized rocks, there is fiction in documentary and document in fiction, because the camera records everything which is present before it." (Daney, 1983) Is it so simple, we may ask, since there is someone, the Cameraman who is supposed the movements of the camera at will. Yet, as Bazin would say: "Cinema can tell everything but cannot show everything... Or under the conditions of reference to the abstraction possibilities of the cinematographic language, the image will never gain a documentary value..." (Bazin, 1990:34) And Godard, today nearly "documentarist" would add that: "here, the video shows much more than it tells as stories; it always presents a documentary character as an abstraction of cinema: so the video is the abstraction of the cinematographic image..." (Godard, in an interview-film called JLG/JLG) And this "ordinarily" document-character is open to what Deleuze calls "time-image", this time with video, a quite different medium than the cinematography. The "character" of the time-image is almost inherent, in this sense in the videographic image (a point which Deleuze notably fails to observe in his excellent work on cinema). As one of the founders of video-art, Nam June Paik observes, "Video Art imitates nature. But this mimesis doesn't depend on the vision or the material of the nature but on the structure of its internal time..."

The praise or anticipation for the video-image is also apparent in some "independent" cinematographers, as in Francis Ford Coppola: "Now the sole hope are 8 mm video cameras. From now on, people who could never make films under ordinary circumstances will begin to make films. Suddenly a fat girl from Ohio will become a new Mozart and will make a superb film with her father's small camera. And by now professionalism in the world of film will be eliminated for ever."

Almost ironically, Godard is able to remark upon the internality of the "private" concerns in the culture (or pseudo-culture) of the cinema: "a couple who don't share the same viewpoint towards cinema will soon be separated. One can love rap and hate Beethoven, as the other does the opposite. But if one loves Spielberg's cinema and the other hates it, one day they will necessarily be

separated, because cinema is still the representation of the world." And more seriously Godard considers the only possible justification of privacy in cinema -- not the privacy of the audience, often opened to the capitalist exploitation of popular imagery, but the "privacy" of the filmmaker, of the imagemaker, as the only legitimate means of expression in any pedagogy of images:

"I exist as images, rather than as a real being because I made nothing in my life but images. And when I told that cinema is more important than life, this was in fact an objection made to me by my fellows: you are not interested in sports, with cuisine... I was replying: I am interested in filming a dinner, and this is important for me. And since there are some things which are passing over there in life, this means that me too I am someone who represents life. And this is not a life which exists. When Rimbaud said 'the real life is somewhere else' this is no longer simply a word --this 'somewhere else' is precisely the beautiful life itself. Cinema is present within the means of communication --not somewhere else..."
(Jean-Luc Godard)

4.8.2 The World of Yılmaz Güney

In order to understand the unique place occupied by Yılmaz Güney in the short history of Turkish cinema, one should recall what has been, and how it continued to be the so-called Yeşilçam, parodically comparable to the Hollywood. Turkey had its stars, producers and even schools, especially those derived out of Muhsin Ertuğrul's theater. The Turkish cinema was ill of its fundamental theatrical element. It had its own sub-cultures and genres, not so much different from some third-world cinemas, as Egypt, India and Iran. It has been a mainstream cinema with genres like melodrama, comedy and even musicals, not to mention some authorial punctuations with filmmakers like Lütfü Akad, Metin Erksan, Atıf Yılmaz among many others. These authors were able to avoid the clichés for a while, or rather to suspend them at moments, to introduce a kind of "social realism" into Turkish cinema, but they failed to create a new, "national" cinematography, to join in sixties a kind of "Third Cinema", in the example of Latin Americans. Yılmaz

Güney has been the one who suddenly broke up the official and traditional system of cinema in Turkey.

Turkish cinema, especially the so-called "Yeşilçam" was intending the entertainment of an illiterate audience, as the films were produced and distributed in such a manner that open cinema halls expanded, especially during fifties and sixties in many towns and villages. Such a kind of dissemination, however, implied a proliferation of some genres specific to Turkey. Or, these genres belonged to the logic of the authorship and that of the geography: many melodramatic films, having their own narratives and languages, belonged to the only metropolitan place of Turkey, Istanbul, making capable some authors, like Akad and Erksan, to produce village films, impregnated by sentiments of authenticity and a kind of social realism. Yılmaz Güney's early films, some of them belonging to these authors (as in the case of "The Law of Borders" = *Hudutların Kanunu* by Lütfü Akad), were not distant from the collective clichés of the Yeşilçam, but earned so much popularity that the figure of Güney in act has been a heroic simulation of the disintegrating social order of tribalism, especially in Kurdish regions (one should remember that Yılmaz Güney was a Kurd, from the Çukurova region, in clear capitalistic expansion of industrial agriculture, with all its harms). He soon became a kind of popular hero, within the Yeşilçam tradition, and even his unauthorial private life soon become a controversial political issue. Adana and Çukurova in general was the place of birth of many Turkish literary figures, like Orhan Kemal and Yaşar Kemal, whose place in Turkish literature was incontestable, and it is known that the artistic career of Güney was at the beginning literary, as a narrator of stories and later, scriptwriter.

Or even the worst kind of "social realism" required images, which lacked in the prominent examples of the films by Erksan and Akad: in *Kuyu* or *Sevmek Zamanı*, the images of Erksan were rather extravagant, depleted and they took the form of cinematographic clichés, bounded by the rules of Yeşilçam narrative. The rule of the illiterate spectator prevailed, but not having been transformed, as the experiments made by these authors were commercial failures, and they have even been criticized by the left-wing critiques as "distant from social realities". One can

consider how these criticisms impregnated Güney's later films, like *Umut*, *Sürü* and *Yol*.

It is now time to remind how these Yeşilçam clichés were born, out of a cinema simulating the worst kind of Hollywood classical cinema with unsofisticated and very poor means. In its early stages, Turkish cinema was incapable to get rid of theatrical dramatism, especially in the early films of Muhsin Ertuğrul, himself coming from a family order of theatral art, and who is considered as the founder of Turkish national theater. Such a consideration is true only when we fail to recognize that in late Ottoman era, there were strong theatrical traditions of Armenians, Greeks and Jews, alongside with the authentic-popular traditions of representation from Turkish Anatolians. Or, at least, it is true that the Kemalist regime recognized in Muhsin Ertuğrul's tradition its own "official" cinema, distant from social realities which can be controversial, and close to those which were intended to restore the national unity, and corresponding ideological premises. Ertuğrul's films were direct simulations of the worst kind of dramatic entertainment, inattentive to the problems of the filmic language, representation and thematization.

The task of these films was relative to the Hollywoodian pragmatics for creating stars, but without any serious filmic investigation, and the reaction came accordingly, not intending to create a necessary avant-garde, but rather using the prevailing elements to tell "other" kinds of stories, that of the villages and of the poor.

However, one should accept that the Yeşilçam traditions are still something to be deciphered, with its own narrative values and a kind of ethos which still remains as the backbone of Turkish cinema. Poor in their filmographic content, they are powerful in creating popular images. While we cannot think that any of the great authors seriously considered the problems of filmic images, those of framing or even of montage, they did admirable works to create their popular films: out of the social realism village films, Erksan was capable to disperse the traditional images of Yeşilçam into the fragmentary episodes of a road story, narrating the

violence of a peasant love and that of the possible emancipation of a peasant woman, killing her husband in a symbolically attractive way. Almost close to "socialist realism", the *Law of the Borders* by Lütfü Akad (with Yılmaz Güney as script-writer and principal actor) recreates the filmic clichés of framing in Yeşilçam cinema, but telling a quite different story: images really exist, as they were shoot at the place and not in the decors, which was quite important since the Yeşilçam tradition even used some frames of Istanbul (Rumelihisarı landscapes or other now touristic places) as the fundamental decor of a loving relationship, or of separation etc. The documentary element thus is introduced into Turkish films --as a village is itself a village, not a frame or landscape to be used as a background for explicating a certain affective state.

Already in his early popular films, Güney was capable to impose on the authors some anti-clichés: the miserable but honourable hero of the film is about to leave the prison. Normally, Yeşilçam storytelling shows this plan-sequence frontally, framing the lonely ex-prisoner in front, the camera located in the street to where he will step in soon. Or there is someone who waits him, a problematic beloved, or friends or even enemies etc. Güney has been the first one to frame the leaving prisoner from behind, from the inside of the prison, as if the outside is no longer the place where the narrative goes on, but a space outside, the place of uncertainty, perhaps the place of a possible suffering and death. Güney will be later capable to make a film totally inside the prison (*The Wall = Duvar*) but only after discovering the "outside" as a prison par excellence in his *Yol* (*The Road*).

In cinematographic pragmatics, there is no need to frame the moment of relief from prison in order to tell the story of a prisoner. One can simply show him outside, in free life and thereby seek the continuity of the theme. Or, the world of Yılmaz Güney has grids --internal or external, psychological or social and ultimately political. Deleuze is right in opposing Güney's political cinema to the classical political cinema: the private life serving as an illumination, as a means of gaining consciousness as it was the case of the traditional political cinema, in the *Grapes of Wrath* of Ford or the *Mother* of Pudovkin is no longer valid --and the prison serves as the outside, as the place of memories, dreams and reflections,

rather than a place of deprivation. It is evident that Güney, who lived in prisons in many episodes of his real life was capable to see what is the prison and the outside, and he knows the ultimate relations between them. In classical political cinema, militantism was essential --either "communist" for the *Mother* of Pudovkin (adapted from Gorky's novel) or "communitarian" for *the Grapes of Wrath* of Ford (adapted from the novel of Steinbeck)-- and it tends to preserve the boundaries between the inside and outside, the private and the public, the old and the new. Whatever the complications needed for telling the story of a gaining of consciousness (ultimately a class consciousness) the private life or the psychology of the personage serves him or her as a means of transition, of passing a threshold, of transgressing the limits. So one needs "political subjects" in order to make a "political film": great historical events, wars, complicities, revolutions... To this corresponds the agit-prop of the revolutionary Soviet cinema, and the political criticism involved in the films of Capra, Welles and Wyler. Now, in the films of Güney, the element of "agitation" is present in its fullest strength, but not obeying to the same model: the inside is the same with the outside in *Yol*, and the private is the same with the public. The "old", traditional order is still coextensive with the modernized life in *Sürü* (The Herd), and the free countryside or the metropolis is already a prison in *Yol* (The Road). And there is an entire world of dreams, of suffering, of misery inside the prison in *Duvar* (The Wall). The prison is no longer what it is intended to be: as Foucault comes and says, it is nothing but the replication or the ideal model of the modern society, which, unlike the traditional one, tends to create a machinery of discipline and control.

Hence, the modern society seen from the framings of Güney is not different from the oppressive models it resembles to use at extreme cases, a hellish prison both of minds and souls, a device of transformations --the feudal oppression of the minors, of women, of children, of the poor peasants thereby transformed into a concrete oppression of a despotic state and the film tends to become a comparison of the symbol with reality, of the abstract, agitative idea (misconceived by many as pure "ideology") with the manifest image. This is evident in Güney's *Umut* (The Hope) where a dried up tree and soil manifests itself as the symbol which should hopelessly provide the treasure to be sought for by the hero of the film, as

the insupportable continuation of misery and discrimination. Güney was hence capable to make his films "political" and even "agitative" without any overt political theme, simply through everyday life.

It is interesting to note that when Güney made a film which coincided with his leftist political ideas, as in *Arkadaş* (The Friend) the film has been generally criticized as the worst of his films, as slogans and images manifestly corresponded to each other, creating the political effect at the level of discourse. Nevertheless, ideas were still already there in this film, but as reported through manifest images, requiring cinematographic treatments which were much more powerful in the "communist" works of Dziga Vertov group and especially of Jean-Luc Godard in France. The film thus manages the transformation of the feudal, quasi-maffiatic hero into a revolutionary figure, a theme which is part of the pedagogic assemblages created by Godard, but which retains the clichés of the mainstream Yeşilçam cinema. And the revolutionary figure still preserves the old, feudal values such as honour, self-humiliation and a descent tenure.

In Güney's films, there is a type of "minor" politics responding to the requirements of the filmic image, where the effects of classical realism are preserved: a talkative film with distressed, depressed and symbolic images, as it was in the case of the dead horse in his *Yol*, which is sketched as a non-symbolic break up in parallel with agonizing woman. While in general she is able to decipher the ethnological elements present in Yılmaz Güney's films, Asuman Suner, we believe, wrongly attributes such a parallelism to the "traditional" silencing of women in a Third World country (Suner, 1998). On the contrary, it is the test of Nature through which the powers of the woman are assessed and measured --a power concomitant to a mute resistance.

This is because Güney's films, just as the ethnological films in expansion in the Third World were not that of action but that of suspense, or, as Deleuze puts it, that of "transe", following the model of the Latin American cinema. While Turkey is a country whose political structures and militant aspirations are quite different from Latin American countries (a Muslim country first of all), the "political" is

inflected and intense as a motive. It is just like the ambient nature which surrounds and suspends every possibility of action, in opposition to the classical political cinema. The problem is not that even such a kind of "classical politics" was not present in Turkey (politics can only be "official", or in the case of "opposition", only moderate or oblique in Yeşilçam cinema) but rather that it is disseminated alongside Güney's films as pure virtuality, as the films eventually reacted as illocutionary acts: most of them were banned by the political power, while the element of political criticism was not manifest but only implied.

Political film or agitation? Traditionally, the "political" film generally accounted for political events, that of history or great events --revolutions, political complicities and class struggles. Or, more subtly, it is present in the "eyes of the camera", in the ways in which a film is made "politically", according to a formula of Jean-Luc Godard. It could be unjust to dismiss the "political propaganda" nature of these films, aiming at a "pedagogy of images", and it is difficult to find out such a "clear" political understanding in Güney's films. These are not films about or even "for" gaining consciousness, but rather films to be affected --that of agitation, rather than propaganda. But their "socialist realistic" attitude --largely impregnated by the Italian neo-realismo-- avoid the totalitarian-automate character of the Nazi films... Such a kind of awareness is about the political character inherent in the reality, and we are not intending to say here, following Bazin, that the film can be considered as "realer than reality".

For, what is politics, after all? This is evidently a more difficult question than "what is cinema", since the latter is clearly a technological-artistic event, having a recent history, whose authors and actors are known, and which is used generally for representational purposes. Or one kind of politics has always been a representation in itself, whether it belongs to the democratic clusters of Ancient Greece (the polis) or to the historical domain of struggles for power, or rather, through power. Hence politics is a generality, and according to Foucault's formula, one is no longer capable to oppose political life to the private one, since the political element is already contained in the second, and "state"-modeled politics remains purely representational, even in Ancient Greece.

Or cinema too has many dimensions --political, ideological, cultural and economic... It can tell us "political" stories, and its birth was nevertheless determined by the political interests of state powers and social classes: an art of mass entertainment for the bourgeoisie, but at the same time, as Dziga Vertov was formulating, an "opium of the people" in its dramatic-representational manners. Lenin was the first political leader of twentieth century to recall the cinema as the primary art, and Dr. Goebbels, the chief-propaganda leader of Nazism called to "emulate" it, although he was not so much willing to make political motives a subject matter for films to be produced by German filmmakers. Really, what Dr. Goebbels asks from German cinema producers was to propound the empty, dramatic, melodramatic films --to tell people stories... He intended a film of embellishment, that of the "opium". This is why if Siegfried Kracauer sought the roots of Nazi's aesthetics in German Expressionist films, the reasons are evident -- simply, since with the exception of some propaganda films by Leni Riefenstahl, all great filmmakers were in exile in the Third Reich period, and no serious films were yet available.

Political cinema, properly speaking appears, however, at the very roots of cinema: a piece like Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* has been shot in many countries in this or that manner --and it served as a model to tell the history of the emergence of a nation (Gance's *Napoléon*, as a saga of the Revolution, and in Turkey, many films on the "birth-of-a -nation" model were shot, relentlessly). And already in his *Intolerance*, Griffith was able to tell at least four stories in a trans-historical political motive --the injustice and the intolerance throughout history, from Babylon to nineteenth century United States, painted with the colours of liberal politics. Up to the films of Frank Capra, idealizing the tensions between the individual and community, the classical Hollywood cinema constituted a classical model to see from the cinematographic point of view the public and communitarian domains of activity. Hence, if not a pure genre (since political issues can also serve as a background), classical political film remained thematic, i.e. political only insofar as it told stories about political and public issues. And the continuation of politics was already possible and already there: the war film (in the sense of the continuation of politics with different means, according to the

classical formulation of Clausewitz) soon became a film genre apart, to live its peak during the Second World War American propaganda cinema especially for the recruitment of voluntary troops...

Yet the political was immanent in Soviet film. Not to be seen merely as a political propaganda, and in spite of Lenin's alleged formula to give priority to cinema among other arts, revolutionary Soviet film tended to become the eminent form of artistic avant-garde, with many filmographic inventions and experiments. The works of Kuleshov, Pudovkin, Eisenstein, Dovzhenko and Vertov have been the most thorough and decisive explorations of the filmic means and expressions, a real conquest of the images and they were capable to develop their theoretical accounts of cinematography. Even in the context of the agitprop, Vertov's newsreels remained "poetical" and as quite complex masterpieces of filmic expression and of montage. And the films of Eisenstein proved to be almost the birthplace of the conquest of the cinematography, with extraordinary attempts of the author to give theoretical accounts into film-analysis. This grandiose filmic experience belonged at the same time to a developed artistic milieu: Russian formalism, constructivism and futurism, as well as the general communist movement inflected in the domain of arts. Yet, many of these movement pretended to be warriors of the communist case, as soon as they have been gathered together as circles like *LEF* and Bakhtin's Leningrad School of Aesthetics. Constructivism, to where belonged at first Dziga Vertov and his Kinoki movement did never pretended to be an artistic current, but rather to become a transformation of the art, a destructive force to bring art at the level of socialized work and to the appreciation levels of the proletarian masses. *LEF* on the other hand seemed to pretend to become a pure avant-garde, with the New Language of the New Man which has been declared to be born by the Bolsheviks. This was not simply a new model of modernism, since every Revolution till now had to be started by some kind of declaration --and this declarations, taking the official forms of "universal human rights", or "the new cult of reason" etc. Were in fact parts of a wider "declaration", that about the "new man", liberal in United States, revolutionary in the old continent. The Soviet avant-garde belonged to the second axis, continental, Jacobinist, but aesthetically aware in their fullest.

An artist, a poet, a filmmaker has the chances to be aware of the fact that his task is nothing but creating new sensations and perceptions of the world --that is, according to a Hegelian aesthetics, a matter of the "particularity". He or she has to do with "images" and he or she addresses to sensations, attempting to provide new points of view, new domains of reality. This belongs to a formula of Paul Klee, who urged that any new artistic development asks such a burning question: "what is this art still waiting for a people to come?" This is not purely a matter of appreciation. It is rather the problem already formulated by Nietzsche who poses one of the most fundamental questions of art: how the author of a work could reach the level of his work? Are the authors capable to reach the level and power of their works? And clearly, there are two means to achieve this --to let the work into the domain of collective intra-cerebral domain of variations and innovations, or to produce works under the futile name of "art work", based on imitation, tradition and repetition. One should then pose the question whether Constructivism for instance was an attempt to remove such a basis of repetition, which is something quite different from Benjamin's concept of "mechanical reproduction". Its intended task was to destroy the bourgeois ways of perceiving the world and society in particular, which could transform the entirety of human experience to liberate the forces inherent in such an experience. This was not a matter of rights or of restrained politics: aesthetics belongs to the everyday life, as particular objects brought by art into visibility are taken from the stream of such an ordinary life. At this level the famous Nietzschean question arises in a new vein: there is a parallelism between asking the question "what is the value of values" and the question "what is the reality of the real".

4.9 The Logic of the Documentary

Our present problem is how André Leroi-Gourhan in the first volume of his *Geste et parole* (Gesture and Speech) realized that the audio-visual revolution, this "beyond" of writing consists in fact in the passage from silent to sound cinema. Taking our point of departure from this argument, we should try to use it in terms of the question of our alleged passage from cinematography to videography. How

a video-philosophy, formulated by Maurizio Lazzarato and Angela Melitopoulos could be installed on the basis of a "videographic revolution" which is something quite different from the pure "informational revolution". Why Leroi-Gourhan has placed the line of demarcation between silent and sound cinema (and its "televisual-videographic" beyond) is an open question, while in his works this opening remains canceled: there is a passage "beyond" writing, and an integration of the sound (including language) with the image, as they are the common elements of audio-visual and today, of the multimedia techniques of information. This passage reduces the play of a margin of "imagination" conserved for the individual, and almost ultimately tends to suppress it when reaching the level of the complete "virtual reality". The question is, then, whether the videography constitutes a turning point in the same manner with the "audio-visual revolution" of Leroi-Gourhan.

The essential problem was that there always existed between writing and reality a certain margin opened for personal interpretation, giving place to the imagination. This was still conserved in the phonograph, the real recording of the sound, since one fails to recognize the face of the speaking person and the music is the most playful art for the imagination. The same margin existed for the photographic recording of images: one's imagination always goes further towards a beyond, which belongs to the context of the image rather than its form, the image itself. In other words, the photographic image does not "realize" itself in reality, since it is a still or a pause and serves to imagination a margin for interpretation. This interpretation has been categorized by Roland Barthes as the "punctum" and "studium". Or in the audio-visual integration, there are no "stills on images" and every image and sound are moving in time, if not time is moving in them and through them. And as reality is always in time, providing to it its forms and continuous changes, and there is a continuity, described by Leroi-Gourhan in the filmic and audio-visual process. As images are succeeding each other (and also speeches and sounds), the sound cinema reconstructs the element of time and its rhythms and this succession is already anticipated by its ordinary audience. It is essential to note that the audio-visual ends up with the unity of the "acousmatic"

sound of radio --that is, a category of sound Chion terms to denote the sound one hears "without seeing the cause" (Chion 1993:32).

There is, as we understand from Chion's conception of acousmatic sound, a parallelism with the way in which He further explains for film, 'Radio, phonograph, and telephone, all which transmit sounds without showing their emitter, are acousmatic media by definition.' (Chion 1993:.71). Acousmatic sound is a useful term to import into radio drama for sound events which are heard by the play characters, and of course by the listener, but not 'seen'.

We can infer from this one still more important issue: sound cinema's integration of the visual and auditive media, has introduced a "supplementary resemblance to reality" --and we can nevertheless derive a similar thesis out of the works of André Bazin, with his description of the evolution of the cinematographic language as tendency towards "plus de réalité" (surplus of reality). After all he was the one who has tried to solve the problem of the relationship of cinematography with "reality"(then a "surplus of reality"). This surplus is certainly not the "realistic" element but rather the aesthetic-artistic element provided by the cinema, since, when he refers to the works of Italian Neorealists, Bazin in fact sees in this enlarging realism an aesthetic criterion that defines a place to Neorealismo a distinct place from classical realism (see Bazin, 1990).

In film, sound and image work together, sometimes synchronizing, sometimes in counterpoint, and sound is claimed to add the vital third dimension to the screen's flatness. Sound helps to extend off-screen space and so 'widen' the frame; and with the technological advances achieved in the early 1930s, sound reinforces the reality-effect of characters moving in their spaces. But whereas sight and sound work simultaneously in film, radio is confined to sound alone, the blind medium. The recorded human voice is not fleshed out, radio does not share in film's 'surplus of reality' and it is even less the 'presence of an absence'. Radio plays must speak for themselves and create their own sound spaces specific to the medium, uniquely differing from the representation of time and space in plays in other media. Dialogue

and the radio drama *diegesis* impose a linear and 'real' time, which may have little or no elasticity.

One can try to understand such an argument in this way: the sound cinema (not limited to the "speakies", as we will see later) has created a "surplus of resemblance to reality" by uniting the visual and auditive media --and one can derive out a similar pattern of arguments from the works of André Bazin. After all, he was to author who maintained that the evolution of the cinema has been towards this "surplus of reality", trying to demonstrate it by the achievements of Italian Neorealism. Or, the audio-visual integration (largely depending upon the technological inventions in recording and transmission) has brought such a new apparatus by itself, that Bazin seems to neglect it, at the expense of his analyses about the "device". This integration was nothing less than the invention of "television" --or of the video, while the two are ideologically oriented towards different roads.

It could be pretentious to attempt to develop our study into the "empirical" reality of the world of television, at least from our standpoint which is not determined to perform an empirical research into this audio-visual realm in its ideological examples; or we believe that this reality has never been, as it has been alleged by some liberal comments, that television "can measure the pulse of the society" or of the public opinion. It is evident that the television reflects and transmits many events, ideas, agendas and the like, and it creates a social memory functioning directly through the audio-visual systems --or one should also "measure the pulse of TV"... In other words the televisual apparatus not only gives echoes and representations, informations, it produces "reality" by forming it. This is not even a reproduction, since in the televisual activity, even when we refrain from talking, like Baudrillard about a "hyperreality" which replaces reality itself, there is at least a "part" of reality which is "consumed" by television. It is insufficient to say that television "produces" reality (of its own), one should also add that when television manipulates or reflects opinions, it is by the same token producing them as "opinions". A moderate term used by mass communications researchers to approach such a fact has been "putting into agenda", which still remains a weak

concept. As Godard explains, cinema already began by "putting into agenda" --it was almost serving like an index, or inventory of images, just because in cinema, as Virginia Woolf once wrote, there was an iconographic simplification of literature, poetry, novel, and theater.

4.10 About the Ambiguity of the Medium

It could be interesting to note that the birth of photography, invented as the "héliographe" of Nicéphore Niepce coincides with the death of the Great German philosopher Hegel., to whom we owe an interesting foundational thesis on the history of arts and aesthetics. This thesis is a little bizarre and ambiguous, in spite of its Hegelian clarity, and it is the continuation of the entire Hegelian system of philosophy. Hegel declares that the age of art has been achieved, this is the end, and we have now to enter into the age of aesthetics. Already in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, he develops his theses on this "end of art", which corresponds to the dialectical achievement of history. Since everything is, according to Hegel, the achievement of self-consciousness, always in three formal stages, or rather the dialectical self-development of the Idea, so is the case of the art. Certainly there is a "history of art" which is elevated at a philosophical certitude in Hegel, and this development is both historical and evolutionary. Although we are here quite distant from Hegel's dialectical conventions, there seems that there is a historically important question about "modernity" which should pass through the bizarre and idealistic assertions of Hegel. This is the very ambiguous nature of everything "modern", as Hegel declares that now "it is time to..."

The evolution of the universe, for Hegel, is the panlogical paradigm which should be assumed to govern history. The evolution of arts is also part of this panlogic history, and obeys to the same dialectical roots as history in general. However, art is unlike thinking or philosophy, since it is developed through the particular, not the universal. As Kant would say, though art is disinterested, it is still obeying to the general rules of historical development.

And what is this historical development? Hegel invokes the earliest form of art, the "symbolical" stage of art, when the disinterestedness was not yet fully developed. Art and religion largely coincided, and a divine gigantism prevailed (Egyptian pyramids, Greek temples...) Or everything was reduced to ornamental, symbolic figurations --the small, traditional artisanship, as in the Indian, Chinese, Arab Orient, but also in Europe. Hegel's reasons can easily be understood since the major and dominant branches of art in this first epoch were architecture and sculpture. According to Hegel, architecture and sculpture with their three-dimensional, "topographic" allure is closer to the Nature (alienated in the Nature, in the extension and matter) and though they possess gigantic formations like pyramids, they obey to the rules of symbolic ornamentations. Thus, the ornament and its symbolic repetition constitutes only a façade, a superficiality and is part of tradition, rather than reasoning. According to Hegel's formula, this is a stage when self-consciousness is religious, closed onto itself, and functioning through a formal self-realization of consciousness as merged with nature (alienation).

Then comes the second stage, dominated by painting: one can see how one of the three dimensions has gone, and painting is basically two-dimensional. Other branches too tend to develop, but fundamentally under the guidance of painting, from Middle Ages up to the Renaissance and the Baroque. This two-dimensionality means that the role of consciousness increases, since an abstraction and an avoidance of pure symbolism occurs. It is certainly more difficult to "understand" a picture than a sculpture, and even the knowledge of symbols has been transformed: later, Johann Huizinga will describe how there was a late medieval struggle between the Church and popular religion of the masses, the later endangering the authority of the Church not by their lack of faith, but their overdose of faith into images and icons. It was as if the religion was "crystallized into images", and this was nothing but the waning of the middle ages.

To return to Hegel's aesthetics, the third and last stage comes when music and poetry dominate: this is certainly the Romantic epoch, when the intimate friends of Hegel the Philosopher were poets like Goethe, Hölderlin and Lessing, and great

musicians like Mozart and Beethoven. The consciousness or the Spirit functioning through the "particular" is here in its highest possible level and power. Music is not "dimensional", it is fully abstract, disinterested and pure. And in poetry, everything is reduced to pure consciousness, to the language in which peoples and individuals are born. This is the ultimate stage of the art, almost its "end" or "telos". One could even say that this was nothing more than Hegel's courtesy to his poet friends.

Yet Hegel is rather concerned, when talking about the "end of the history of art" (history, according to Hegel, is ending everywhere, as it is achieved in the Prussian state where Hegel is living, and the age of philosophy starts with Hegel), with a question: in what sense the art, as the realm of the particular, should pass into the universal and the general? When he declares the birth of an age of aesthetics and the end of the history of art, he assumes that the universality will reign from now on, and it is nothing less than a philosophical concept. Hence, philosophy is something beyond art, for the latter has always remained as the realm of the particulars --things, perceptions, singular objects, events etc. It is difficult that art "thinks", since it cannot generalize, universalize. It depicts something particular, and the entirety of the Idea is only revealed in art as a "part". Thus, the "age of aesthetics" to come is not a higher stage of the history of art, but the lower stage of the age of philosophy, declares Hegel. Aesthetics is philosophical, rather than artistic.

Throughout our comment on Hegelian aesthetics, a burning question is always alive. Hegel declares the age of aesthetics, but we are today, almost two hundred years later, in such a historical position that we can question what has really happened in this Age of Aesthetics. The subtlety of history has perhaps marked Hegel's death with the invention of photography, a totally new aesthetic experience, and approximately one and half century later, we are watching television. Thus, such questions, to be interpreted from Hegel's perspective would soon arise? Is photography a picture, a sculpture or architecture? A rather strange question haunts the historians of photography: why photography waited for the beginnings of Nineteenth century (1830's) in order to be invented, while the

chemical photographic recording was already known by the alchemists just as the camera obscura, which has been used since Middle Ages by the painters.

At any rate, modern art introduced not only "ambiguous materials", but also ambiguous "ideas", as in the case of Impressionism and Expressionism, Surrealism and Dadaism. Even the poetry returns back to a Symbolism, which is certainly not the same with what Hegel sees in Antique art. The "age of the aesthetics" is rather a swerving, an oscillation and opposition of ideas and currents and schools in a constant struggle against each other and this is the very definition of the "modern". Recursively, we may conceive the enigma in this perspective: up to the time when Hegel declared the death of the history of art, artistic currents were defined as "historical periods" (Renaissance, Baroque, Classicism, Romantism), and from now onwards, the "history" tends to become ambiguous, with the coexistence of many struggling currents and "schools". This was the milieu in which cinematography was born.

4.11 The Concept of Pathos: Cinema and Affects

That Eisenstein insists on the importance of the notion of "pathos", of "ecstasy" (which is clearly part of the Hollywood --and Griffithian-- cinematography, which dissolved in a world of dreams) could be taken as a self-contradiction for a Soviet materialist filmmaker and artist. He tends to define pathos as "being besides oneself", an extatic state whose classical forms in Griffithian cinema he criticizes, claming to develop its whole conception as the idea of "organic unity" and "teleology". He claims the conception of "modern dialectics", coming from Hegel and opposed to the Ancient Greek dialectics. Yet, there is no ambiguity in his understanding of dialectics: from Hegel up to Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason (*Critique de la raison dialéctique*), the idea that there is a dialectics of Nature (provoked by certain texts by Marx and especially the unfinished work of Friedrich Engels, compiled as *Dialectics of Nature*) is denounced, and Eisenstein seems to belong to this tradition: Nature is not dialectical and every dialectics is historical. Dialectics are the laws of thinking and of historical development, and in the case of Eisenstein, it gives us the general laws of "artistic composition".

The problem now only shifts to another controversial stage: where is now Nature? Clearly, as a filmmaker, Eisenstein should now that unlike "theatre" Nature is everywhere present in cinema, as André Bazin later will insist upon (Bazin,1990:143) One can show human beings and their acts only in a landscape, constituting an environment or milieu --a desert or a forest, if not the artificial urban environment. Even Sartre shows how, in opposition to theatre, the movement goes in cinema from Nature to the eyes, irreducible to the "theatrical contract" between actors and spectators. The cinematographic image is already Nature.

Hence, in order to solve this problem, Eisenstein tends to develop his quite difficult concept of "non-indifferent nature". "Let us assume we are to present grief on the screen. There is no such thing as grief 'in general'. Grief is concrete, thematic." (Eisenstein, 1992) These words clearly approach Eisenstein to "phenomenologists" for whom, in the age of the birth of cinema, have developed their new psychology, according to which no empty consciousness existed: every consciousness is consciousness of something, according to the famous formula of Edmund Husserl. And if an artistic composition is nothing but a transfer enacted among at least two conscious persons, having sentiments, ideas, thoughts, it appears simply that "(grief) ... has a vehicle when a character is grieving; it has a consumer when sorrow is presented, so that the viewer also grieves." (Eisenstein, 1992)

Yet the Spinozist element about a kind of "automatism of affects" (the *automaton spiritualis*) is evidently introduced into his analyses: "The enemy's grief after suffering defeat evokes joy in the viewer, who identifies himself with the victor..." (Eisenstein, 1992:54) Or this element is still expressed in its simplest form, and we have quite complex issue which should be derived from it: the cinema "viewer" is not simply a child, an a set of complex intellectual and affective network of relations are already at work in the cinematographic automate.

Cinema was born in parallel to the constitution of the modern landscape, the metropolis, and is deeply anchored in it as a life-world (or rather the dream-world)

of modern life. According to Deleuze, it was an answer to the late nineteenth century crisis in the psychology of perception, in terms of the perception of motion, before becoming an evident part of our urban landscape, before determining the modern “society of spectacle”. He posits and challenges this old idea of illusion, since cinematography has been the tool to show to human beings that their ordinary perceptions (images, paintings, photography, and real theatrical or natural movement) could be reproduced by mere technological means. The case of the cinema is important here for our purpose, since as early as its birth, it was considered as an example, or even the accomplishment of an “illusion”, that is, an inherently unconscious operation of opinion. Yet, it further established its own illusory world, somehow dream-like, correlated with a society of opinions, consisting in its amorphous audience. Today, we can be aware of the fact that cinematography, unlike the classical arts of spectacle—the theatre, dramatic arts and the opera—has a global audience, a kind of mass society adhering to its spectacle. From its early beginnings, cinema tended to become an ambiguous process, since it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish its aesthetic-artistic aspect from its role of superficial, popular entertainment. Cinema had to become the “seventh art”, not only through the Hollywoodian dreamworld, but also by the political-economic design of the “first socialist state”, the Soviet Union, in early twenties. It was nothing less than an industry of entertainment for some, while being the tool of representing the reality (the earliest idea of documentary film) much more directly than any other medium. Today, the first aspect seems to be victorious, but only on the basis of criteria of constitution of opinions and their imperialistic expansion: actually, in every country, and besides television, national film boards and registries, “golden globes”, circles of critics, reviewers, gossip columnists, film tabloids, Internet databases of films, and department stores, having in common the unique task to create and re-create interminable discourses about films, tracing genealogies of authors, of images and genres. Literature, the oldest of arts, was not able to develop such a great number of literary genres in all its history, as it is the case in cinema: the thriller, the science-fiction, the documentary, the Western, the romantic drama, the musical

comedy, the neo-realism, the romantic adaptation, the avant-garde. And we have just to remember that everything passed during one hundred years.

It should be noted here that in cinema, like in music, a kind of “democracy” is prevailing. There we see new genres and new audiences, “fans” to be constituted as groups of opinion and taste, who are imitated by their films and who imitate their films in their actual life. The judgements of taste, as in every context of modernity (and as we have seen, even since the Ancient Greece) are able to establish differential norms and identities, a variety of tastes whose overall judge could only be democratic, since everyone has to live for his own account, and has to get his maximal pleasure of his choices. At any rate, we can admit that a theoretically numberless societies of opinion and taste are generated and reproduced in the world of cinematography.

However, the cultures of cinema are differently affected than the communities of music by some primordial challenges, which can only be explained by philosophy and sociology. A musical community, jazz, rock, rap or metal, is not forced to rely upon a kind of “principle of reality”, while in cinema, even in the case of the most avant-garde or fictional product, a problem of realism and irrealism is always involved. The old question of what reality is and how can it be represented is now mediated through a technical possibility to touch upon, to represent or to explain the reality by means no one in history ever heard about: the image of the movement...

Is it necessary now to recall Heidegger, who made a sharp distinction between the ancient technics and modern technology? Technology is not technological insofar as it is now able to produce some mysterious entities: the energy, the plastic, the electricity... Urban landscapes are produced, just as plantations of power. Now, it comes that cinema and especially television are producing the “image” in almost the same way. In the past, just as a peasant is able to produce “something”, very concrete, for the usage of a demander, who is the ultimate judge of what is produced, the image was produced as a meaningful entity, finished in time and space, by the masters like Phidias, Leonardo or Rembrandt... Or, in television

today, the image is rather something like a constant flux, ephemeral, yet reproducible at every instance. Once in movement, the image outweighs the old spectacle, the arts of time, to reach the absolute limit of representation. The experience of life is exhausted within it, as it has no longer the capacity to answer the questions “for whom” and “for what”...

We have not, unlike Heidegger, to lament from the fact that cinema and television today, are producing the "image": what matters is rather how the images of the Image are being acted upon, produced and reproduced. One can, just like situationists, severely criticize the “societies of spectacle”, without losing the thread to the present, to actuality. One has to ask “how to do with that”, instead of lamenting or tracing nostalgic threads. Soberly, we should ask what, today, an Image is, and how it can be made meaningful and functional for life. We should think that the ultimate task of any serious cinematographer, since the early beginnings of movie-films can be summarized in this respect: how to produce images which not only incite thinking, but which think by themselves? Such a question leads us back to the genial Spinozistic perspective to recognize the validity and the domain of fictional and narrative experience, which is part of life, and which constitutes the adaptability of man to this world. Certainly, one aspect of the image is its objectivity in Spinoza. (The Caliban example). But this is an objectivity of its material, which is the objective memory. This approximately corresponds to Bergson’s distinction between two kinds of memory.

The case of the perception of movement becomes important both in cinema – psycho-physiologically—and in terms of the apprehension of the memory, since all concrete perception is directed both to the present and the past, and in that case, the part of “pure perception” in it is not considerable since every act of perceiving is immediately covered and influenced by the contribution of memory. Bergson puts his point as follows:

Not only, by its memory of former experience, does this consciousness retain the past better and better, so as to organize it with the present in a newer and richer decision; but, living with an intenser life, contracting, by its memory of the immediate experience, a growing number of

external moments in its present duration, it becomes more capable of creating acts of which the inner indetermination, spread over as large a multiplicity of the moments of matter as you please, will pass the more easily through the meshes of necessity. Thus, whether we consider it in time or space, freedom always seems to have its roots deep in necessity and to be intimately organized with it. Spirit borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds and restores them to matter in the form of movements which it has stamped with its own freedom." (MM248-249).

How the blunder of pure perception occurs, the empirical example given by Le Roy is excellent, while it is given on a verbal, but not visual ground: the subject is able to write the word "tumult" correctly. However, when writing, someone calls out in his ear ("during the short time the light is turned on) another word of different meaning, say "railway". It is very probable that the subject will read something like "tunnel", through association. What is interesting in this scene is that there is a graphical (that is visual) similarity in the outlines of the words "tumult" and "tunnel", while they are connected semantically only through a process of recollection of memory.

4.12 The Problems of the Documentary Image

We have stated that the "documentary" becomes really a documentary whenever it goes beyond mere "document" --documents in themselves may as well be archived from the viewpoint of state, of bureaucracy, of capitalist enterprise (the "book-keeping" several times reappearing in Weber's account for the birth of capitalism, almost like the ultimate document), of academic works, especially historians and sociologists, and of documentary filmmakers-- but this classification or archiving is nothing less a montage, constitutive of a viewpoint, presupposing a logic which belongs to a pragmatic reasoning and to its assumptions. It seems to be merely a technique, but Foucault is able to show us how "classification" assumes an epistemic order of vision and reading, that is "historical a prioris" of the discourse. Here, in our attempt to put into parallel the "theoretical" powers of social sciences

(which are considerably --and unfortunately-- lost during the development of "academization" and the emergence of the "sociology of opinions") and the "imaginative" powers of documentary filmmaking (and here, again, surrendered to a "society of opinions"), to merge them into a proposal for a "visual sociology" will be tested again.

It is time now to discuss whether our objectives formulated since the beginning of our thesis have been realized or not, and to what extent they are realized or realizable. To ask whether "social types" irremediably withered away, not only in social sciences based on a doxology now, but also in other domains, as in literature and cinema:--our answer was not that social types withered away, or "objectively" disappeared: they are still ready at least in "history", as Michel Foucault was capable to recreate them in his conceptions like the "dangerous individual", who was really a "social type" during Nineteenth century, and it remains still as both an "analytical tool" and an "event" in understanding the modern life conditions, or rather the life conditions in a cluster of life-experiences in modern times. When we ask whether historians in general are still capable to create social types, however, we have to answer negatively, with ultimately rare exceptions, like Georges Duby and all those "private" historians --including the so called "oral history"... Without a relation or a "bond" to an upper or lower level of individuality (psychic and social), a social type cannot be created or made visible. Sociological imagination cannot operate without such a "social bond" since, as Simmel could say, a socio-psychological type cannot be "sociologically" described without first being viewed, labelled, "named" as such by a considerable number of interactive social levels, discourses, milieus, environments --a field of a quite complex social interaction.

Secondly, we have maintained that one could not return back to the Simmel's (or any other creator of social types, generally those who are cited among the "founding fathers") conception of social types, since they were part of an experience having a socio-aesthetic character. They revealed themselves in gestures and repetitions, and they were both "visible" and "affective" --as the "lover" tended to become somehow a "social type" in the very context of late

Nineteenth century. A melodramatic or morbid environment was involved in the "lover"s milieu, sometimes representing him as a "dandy", but also a "suffering" (that is "affective") being. We have seen that this theme was essential to the literature at the end of the Nineteenth century. This was not only concerning the "high literature" of the great Naturalist, or Realist novelists --or the "Russian novel" which we had to take apart-- but also of the "popular" literature and general culture: the main formula is everywhere the same --in Gogol and repetitive melodramas--, and can be stated as follows: a lover is essentially a sufferer, for the simple reason that one did not love when he or she was loved, and loves now, when he or she failed to "return love" --an essential delay, which reads in the beautiful melodramas of Vincente Minelli.

Is this withering away or the demise of social types in present times, we have asked, is an "objective" state, happening "really" in today's modern and post-modern "social conditions". Any "direct" or "objective" answer seemed to us as an essentially ambiguous statement, since in the societies of opinion where we are living, we could never be able to say that "something" exists without already being questioned, represented, rendered as a "simulacrum". We have, however, kept our distance from the dangers of Baudrillard's or Kristeva's theses that "reality" itself withered away, that without being represented in medias, the Gulf War did not happen --simply for the reasons that a lot of people simply died, and children are still continuing to die, from hunger and very bad health conditions-- and only the aesthetically sustainable "Minelli Effect" could explain this "reality principle": when a real being (especially the "human", but also even an "object" or "thing") is "captured" in the dream, in the plans, in the ideas, in the media, in the mythologies of another one, it will either decay or be destroyed (and often this is an apocalyptic state of self-destruction) under the forces of this simple dream. Freud taught us to take dreams seriously; but this was for him for the kind of dreams that one lives. But at least Deleuze, his opponent, is capable to show that "to be captured by another's dream, means nothing less than a catastrophe" (again the Minelli Effect in contradistinction to "Fellini Effect").

Hence Edward Curtis's work, on Head Hunters and his entire "photographic world" of the "dying culture" of American Indians was a Western Dream, but it was capable to destroy, if not suffocate or decay an entire "culture". Edward Said tries at least --throughout his "sociology" of texts and interpretations of Orientalist literature-- to detect somehow the effects of Orientalism on the "Orient", comprising those who were dreamed about, but nevertheless were living "there".

But sometimes the West can be a "dream" for the East. One should ask: it is evident that the Orient was a dream or "ideological theme" of a Western, Eurocentric discourse, searching to legitimize itself as a "progress" or as a "terminated" and therefore "open" life. But it is also true that the West was, for a long time and still today, a dream of the East: it was nothing but this for the Idiot of Dostoyevsky, or Young Turks, and if the West and its social, cultural, economic and political manners are considered in Third World countries --with somehow a "resistence" of masses and traditions, at any rate shadowed by "official ideologies"-- as an "objective" to reach, the West remains there either as a "model" or as a "dreamworld", which is, from our viewpoint, just the same things.

The main problem is that one can never be capable to escape simply the dreams of the others. It is unlikely that all these dramatic philosophies of the Other (Levinas, Martin Buber and so forth) could serve such a function which could "awaken" the Other from its dream. Today dreams are substantialized --they have institutions, like cinema, television and "public opinion" (or at any rate, "languages" institutionalized in various contexts)-- and they are almost "engineered", "distributed" and "disseminated" (Derrida). Dreaming makes money --astrology is essential to any serious journal which doesn't consider itself as "traditional". But dreaming is not our essential question here, which is the question asking how to emancipate from Other's dream. The simple mean seems "to be clear and distinct" and not in Cartesian manner. In his film *Underground* (a quite "popular film" as would say Slavoj Zizek), Emir Kusturica creates a dream-like world behind which we have the images of a naive and robust Balkan fighter, in a rather blasphemous --but still naive-- cooperation with an essential "conspirator", who will become

almost his persecutor in future. He is able to show the two-sided "vampirism" of such a collaboration --the one naive and in Kusturica's eyes "acceptable", the other subtle, and almost somehow like a "radical evil". Or this is nothing but the evil of the dream --and the film, in due course, should evidently pass as a dream, with all kinds of archetypes, Fellini Effects, nostalgic scenes, symposia, balads of traditions, an entire filmic system of collages which tend to be axiomatic about ex-Yugoslavian conditions: having a country which no longer exists in substance, Kusturica still claims to be a Yugoslavian, only through a dream dreamed by the Other, which is nothing but the Europe. Or in his film there emerges, fundamentally and in a primordial way, a kind of "primitivism", which was contested by Slavoj Zizek: that the Balkan is nothing but the primordial place of "suffering", of "vampirism" (according to the "muthos"), of "violence" and of the "continuous war of each one against everyone".

Or this is a lie, and cannot be whispered openly to European ears, but can only be shown. Kusturica's lies could be accepted by the Europe only in the "artistic form" --the audio-visual world of "dreams". Hence Kusturica, in his entire hi(story) is able to utter his "performative sentences" only two times: "this is a country which existed once upon a time"... and... "we cannot say that this is a real war when brothers don't strangle their brothers"... If we didn't know that Yugoslavia itself was a country of "dreams" --evidently quite different from what we call as "American Dream", which was a European disease according to Heidegger-- Kusturica's film could mean something to us. And as he shows it, it was not a "dreamland" like "Hollywood" or "Disneyland" which took part in the American model of dreams. It is that of a conspiracy (he is against the Titoist regime of course), of "lies", but also that of a "dreamer", trying to find "images"...

And once he choose the images of Bosnians (he seems to hate them, while he is a Bosnian --and having nothing to say or show about his birthplace, Vukovar, bombarded first by Croatians, then by Serbians, waiting to be bombarded by Bosnians themselves, after all...) applauding the coming of Nazi troops, he becomes capable to "lie" at the level of a "document": we --historically-- know that Bosnians, Serbians, and Croatians alike, conspired with the coming Hitlerian

regime. But there were also those who resisted, sometimes Serbian (the resistant's leader Tito), sometimes Croatian, and sometimes Bosnians or Macedonians... This means that the "use" of the "documentary" quotations in Kusturica's film are nothing more than an "aesthetic alibi" for lying, or transforming and distorting real historical events. While we believe into the "artist's freedom", lying should not be contaminated by a kind of "truth-experience" or the "document"... Our last thesis already proves this: it is not that "documents" can lie (this is a banal fact everywhere when documents are provided in "official" registers, like the Nazi documents faced by Lanzmann during his researches for shooting *Shoah*) but that an audio-visually documented scene (or "footage"), in a fiction-film, can be used only in a perspective which should not be ethically conspiring with the demands of the fiction, but still with the demands of reality, that is, the context in which it was shoot.

4.13 Lanzmann's *Shoah* and its Implications for the Doctrine of Kino Eye

Lanzmann's terrible interview-film about Holocaust imposes us many problems, and we are now haunted once more by Pascal's wager's problem of "existence". Adorno once was urging us: "is it possible still to write poetry after Auschwitz?". And Blanchot, asks again: "How to say: did Auschwitz happen?". We have philosophers to distinguish between levels of existence --the ontic and the ontologic-- but still unable to account for what happened there; and we have obviously nothing like a "sociology of extermination camp", we have no "proofs", no "documents" (everything seems to be suppressed by the Nazis, when going to their defeat), we have practically nothing. And the film we still watch in horror, while we hear already at the beginning of the film the voice of a survivor from Chelmno, in Poland, where the first gas extermination camps was erected: "One can no speak about it. Nobody could represent himself what happened here. This is impossible. And nobody could be able to understand this."

How this film "works", than --while it could "represent" nothing? Shoah (which means "disaster") is a film successfully composed on a true "nothingness", a nothing which is no less powerful than Sartre's, if not Heidegger's. This is almost

an "obsessional" camera, turning around a blind spot, around a series of invisibilities of "absences" --absence of the "images, as proofs of existence; absence of words, since no one can speak about "what just happened there", absence of "documents" since they are effaced; absence of archives; absence of "witnesses"... We really believe that Lanzmann was able to create a new kind of "imaginary" shadowed by the grandiose "pratico-inerte" of what remained from these extermination camps --images of now emptied places, innocent forests (similar to Heidegger's), faces of oblivion, confusion and horror (especially that of the old railroad worker, on a train entering through the gate of Treblinka). We have nothing more than the confused accounts of "witnesses", often "off voice" with a shoulder camera which is in search blindly what is no longer visible --so on to infinity...

All questions relating to "images" suddenly reappear, and seem now no longer as purely "theoretical" problems, but also a fundamentally ethical series of questions: what is the Kinopravda? What is filming the "real"? What is "fiction"? What is a mise-en-scène? How can one film death, and give its account, in a morality based on responsibility? Blanchot was already stating that "out there, the invisible already became the visible". The terrible question is the fact that Jews were condemned to death simply for being Jew, and camps were simply modern "machines" of extermination and once asked again by the Italian political theorist, in his excellent work which tries to measure the close "interval" between totalitarianism and what we call as democracy, we are facing the archaic figure of the homo sacer.

Homo sacer is nothing but the one who, condemned to death, could not be "ritually" executed. Not a "social type", but anyone undefined by the "rituals of law" and the Sovereign power can judge him and condemn him, without being able to kill him. But the major monstrous appearance of the homo sacer is that if someone kills him, he is not tried for this murder. Agamben is able to read through this an entire tradition of "sovereignty" where passages from totalitarianisms to democracies (would like to say pseudo-democracy?) and evidently, vice versa, and a logic of sovereignty capable to "delegate"

responsibilities to a community (or "civil society") consisting in a mass of "homo sacers". In Lanzmann's film, there is a scene where the wife of a Nazi teacher, asked about how many Jews were exterminated there, hesitates between the numbers 40,000 and 400,000 --"all I can say, it was a number beginning by ...4". Everything seems to be horribly reduced to numbers --and there is the horror when we hear a witness uttering "Germans forced us to unbury 240,000 corpses in order to burn them". The film's obsession turns around this very particular "lapsus" based on numbers --no longer a mysticism of numbers, but operating in transforming numbers into "images" and therefore, qualities... The main problem seems to "incarnate the number". This number could only be treated by the film, which becomes a "document in itself", somehow beyond documentary. Social sciences also deal with numbers, in order to quantify --mere statistics-- opinions and numbers just in the way governments and state bureaucracies --as well as capitalism-- needed "numbers". Shoah's obsession of numbers is in order to give them a new character, a quality, a quantum power: the difference between the two moments of hesitation of the woman is expressed in the great gap between two numbers --and here, quantities are tending to become images or qualities.

What is an obsession? Shoah and the "written" or "oral" accounts Lanzmann gave of his experiences about the film are quite controversial and have been denounced many times: he was first "obsessed" with his "film", the Ultimate Film as he calls it, since it is about the Holocaust, the major "event" in history which remains without "documents" or even "traces"²³. But it is certain that Lanzmann wanted that his film becomes really "the last word" par excellence --and he even says that

²³ Alain Finkielraut, a Jew like Lanzmann retorks: "Claude Lanzmann considers himself as the exclusive commissioner of the Extermination, attempting to invent a new definition of Antisemitism: the Antisemitic is the one who does not pay his devotions to his *Film Unique*". This auto-idolatry is grotesque and disgusting..." ("Le cas Lanzmann", *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 31 janvier 1991, p. 118). And Tzvetan Todorov the linguist estimates that "Shoah, a film on hatred, is made by means of hatred and teaches hatred" (*Face à l'extrême*, Seuil, 1991, p. 255). There are evidences that the Shoah was financed by Menahem Begin's government, and Lanzmann, an assimilated French Jew, has previously made a film apologizing Israel's politics (and even the military ways) against Palestinians. We believe that all these debates about the film are parts of "opinion" and somehow of "private opinions", and we prefer to try to go into what happens in this film.

if he had to find a "real document" proving what has happened in an extermination camp, "he would destroy it at that moment."

We have already talked about an "obsessional camera", a tempting way of creating images of the invisible, of the nothingness, of complete negation... It seems that Lanzmann made his nine-hour long film with implicit ideological presuppositions: that only the Jew was the victim --while we know that the workers, peasants, tziganes of so many countries were, at the same token, were exterminated by the Nazis. And this was also the age when Israel (which seemingly financed and promoted the film) is the oppressor of Palestinians. We are in a position where we can share, once again, our Spinozist formula --talking or thinking about the "bad" is bad, talking or thinking about hate is hate... This is the way in which Lanzmann needs something almost like the Kantian "sublime", capable to create "positive" affects out of "negative" ones. The "unnameable", "the unaccountable", "the invisible" are to be present in his film. And the name of the film, "the shoah" is akin to, and perhaps copied by Kusturica in his popular action film --the "underground"...

This essential ambiguity, causing many "political" and "idological" debates over Shoah --we believe-- should be our point of departure in discussing the "powers of visibility", as we have postulated that Lanzmann's film was betraying not only the pathetic force of the "time-image" as described by Deleuze as a kind of image which shows no longer an action, against a situation revealing itself as a challenge to the actor, but constitutes pure sounds and images of life, left to go into time, passing or revealed (the memory-images)... Lanzmann seemingly forced his interlocutors to a "humanistic" and "existential" ideal: they were indebted to the world infinitely, to account for their "existential experiences"²⁴, and this debt was that of responsibility to speak, for the benefit of "humanity" or "potentially" of Israel. This debt to speak, however is imposed --obsessionally-- not only to the victims, the survivors, but also, indiscriminately to the old Nazis and old polish

²⁴ Lanzmann was a journalist and one of the editors of the review *Les Temps Modernes* of Sartre and his fellows.

peasants, but also to the old Nazis, like the wife of the Nazi teacher. Lanzmann wildly insists to call his interlocutors to speak, of which they are not capable-- this is nothing less than an Existentialist film, a torture, an obsessive and often paranoid investigation and claims...The *pratico-inerte* is present everywhere, not only in the discourse, but also in the now empty spaces of Treblinka and Birkenau. The Kantian "sublime" of the image creates horror, rather than "understanding" and Lanzmann seems to expect that a miraculous dialectics starts to work, suddenly...

Or the "sublime" is nothing but an "idea". It is the incommensurable, which cannot be imagined (outside our powers to imagine), and as Heidegger commented, it gives a "noo-shock" to us, to reveal that even "understanding" could not be the cure. Understanding (*Verstand*) for Kant was a faculty needing "concepts", and proves to be incapable to "conceptualize", putting into "categories" and surrenders to the world of "ideas", provided only by the faculty of *Vernunft*, the Reason itself.

Of this "sublime" the cinema has a long historical experience: already in documentary filmmaking, Flaherty has given an excellent example with his *Nanook of the North*. But this is still a "mathematical sublime" revealing itself in the "situation" given as a hostile environment (a huge and unlimited "whiteness" of nature) a milieu, where the Inuit "socius" is represented (a *mise-en-scène*, as we understand it) by a single individual, named and tending to become an "actor" in a documentary. Vertov had reasons in urging that the documentary don't need "names" --like *Nanook*, since all esquimos are living in that way, in their social and collective life experiences-- and "persons", but only "life as it is". (Vertov, 1992) And Deleuze had reasons in rendering Flaherty's "merits to him" at least partially: Flaherty's films are constituted by two "ideologies": if the first is Hollywoodian, the second belongs to the Anglo-Saxon way of viewing history (especially Toynbee, but later by Pitirim Sorokin...) (Deleuze, 1983:267) As the classical Hollywood film, from Griffith on, imposes us a regime of images mainly based on the presentation of "situations" --social, natural, dreamful and so forth-- against which we have an "individualized" hero should react, and whose actions

are creating small changes in the previously given situation: for instance, there is the reappearance of Simmel's Stranger as "mediator" and "judge" in classical Westerns --one coming from the wild, and with his savage soul, enters into a community in which he appears not as someone "who comes today and will leave tomorrow, but just as the one who comes today and will not leave tomorrow". The American "community" is nothing but, here, than a pure community of "good" or "evil", of "peace" or of a Hobbesian "war of all against all". And the Stranger appears here either as a "mediator" or "intruder": he will restore peace, the "home sweet home" strategy of the community, or will erect the community against its enemies, appearing wildly as an external threat --Indians or the outlaws. Nanook is not far from such a fiction (the Western), but it is quite remote from Simmel's Stranger. He is in a duel with such a strong and imposing "Nature" that his life-world appears not just as an actor who changes the situation, his milieu or environment.

4.14 Recapitulation of the Theory of Images

In our attempt to classify images, the first principle had been Flusser's distinction between "technical" and "representational" images. This was, however, a quite broad categorization, capable only to reveal at most the reasons of a probable "fascination" of popular masses facing them (photography, cinema) for the first time. Bazin, on the other hand, on a similar line, has tried to base his philosophy of cinema in contradistinction with an "ontology of photography" --a kind of memento mori and a religious logic of "survival through images and effigies". Peirce the logician and semiotician gave a much more detailed account of a possible classification of images: when the optical character of some signs was "intentional", one could call them as "opsigns" (Deleuze) capable to convey meanings without the help of "language" as a totally symbolic medium. In this Peircean sense we are today living almost in an "imagosphere", where everything passes into images and "recording". This is almost the state of "panimagism" which I would like to attribute to what Bergson and thereafter Deleuze were seeing in the notion of the image.

For Bergson matter is an image, and it perceives --similarly for Vertov, the fundamental task of the newborn cinema was to "translate" perceptions (percepts) into things themselves, and this is a total attempt to abolish the Kantian-phenomenological distinction between things-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear-to-us (phenomena). Montage for Vertov was part of the classification of images, and what matters are not images themselves, but the apperceptive link, almost the empty space which ties at least two images. This is his theory of "intervals", which is defined not as the distance separating two entities or events, but their "neighbourhood" and bind which measures up their "closeness". Thus he was capable to link through images and intervals two distant things in the same sequence --the metropolitan and the nomadic, death and birth, labour and entertainment, as exemplified in his film *Man With The Movie Camera*. In his Enthusiasm, one is capable to understand how, through the work of intervals, images are accumulative --as they accumulate in order to create intensive powers and emotions --a revolution is being made.

Eisenstein has been the one who, throughout his polemics with Vertov and his Kino-Eyes, understood the play of such an accumulation of images --first and most simply at the level of associations, secondly at the level of what he calls as the "pathetic", the Hegelian transformation of accumulative, quantitative process into a "leap", a moment when the accumulated images of hope are transformed into images of victory, the images of misery into images of revolution, the images of pain into those of anger, and therefrom leaping into revolutionary joy and enthusiasm. Vertov's and Eisenstein's classification of images were, to say the truth, quite different, but they amount to the same revolutionary parlance. As most of the early filmmakers (those of the "image-movement" of Deleuze), these Soviet cinematographers were believing in the world of "actions", not individual as in the case of Griffith and classical Hollywood cinema, not just a psychological landscape as it was the case with German Expressionist cinema, but just as a wisdom integrated into the image, faces, events, facts and realities. Actions were always collective (the One necessarily becoming More, following Eisenstein's dialectical rule), and Eisenstein criticizes Griffith while finding in him the founding father of his own cinematographic doctrine based on the powers of the

montage: Griffith (and the classical Hollywood cinema with its genres and "non-social" types) is an empiricist, the ideas and oppositions having their own value in themselves --there are the poor and the rich, woman and man, young and adult, white and black, the individual and the community, and they are empirical, factual givens, entering into a dialectical relationship in a classical, almost Platonic manner. This is because for Platonism a man is a man, but not a father at the same time --it has to be reported to another idea, that of the "father" (good father) in order to become effectively a model or type of father. The traits which create and reproduce the "typical is here nonetheless "empirical", since they are "givens": one fails to understand in Griffith's films in what manners poverty is related to exploiters, ever getting richer through others' poverty, and the depth psychology in fact never existed for the early cinema, as we had to wait the Shakespearean and Nietzschean style of Orson Welles.

Deleuze seem to say that there was a crisis of the classical cinema at a point when life unsupported the image which is intended to represent it. The image of the action was now unbelievably futile, and the logical-perceptive and sensori-motor link between images (actions against situations and vice-versa) was no longer evident and somehow, they failed to correspond to actual reality. In old, revolutionary cinema, the "shocking" percepts were evidently working: they had their own place in the social life, in the Americanism and its individualistic-communal value systems, in European political setting --the Weimar in Germany and the *Front Populaire* in France-- again, the "Americanism" in the sense used by Heidegger (that Americanism is an European illness) and there, one believed to the effectivity of actions. Now, in the Europe ruined by the war, Rossellini no longer believes into "actions", but rather to "testimonies", to "witnesses", to the strangled voice of the victims of war, terror, and poverty. Deleuze does not sufficiently develop this "socio-pathetic" influence of the events on cinema. In the post-war period, everything is in crisis: there are no longer German cinematographers (they have all migrated to United States), and as Godard was saying, since the French failed to make real "resistance" with the exception of communist militants, they failed to valorize the imaginative-cinematographic values

of witnessing. Only the Italians, known as neo-realists had made real attempts to film what is "ordinary" about the ruinous post-war period.

Deleuze calls these new images "direct images of time", instead of the time given as an indirect functions of movements and articulations of shots. His distinction between the movement-image and time-image is genial, since it is "logical" rather than "historical". Or, Deleuze is searching the motives of the development of time-image only within cinematography and the new subjects to be shot by the modern cinema (neo-realismo, Welles, American Independent Cinema, and the continental cinema with Nouvelle Vague and the New German cinema). Yet we believe there are some important social changes which are still concomitant with the evolution of the time-image. First we have to notice how the post-war political life was reconstituted on the basis of a mourning for the victims, in a ruined landscape where people no longer believe in their capacities to act and transform the world with their actions. And this, in their pure revolutionary periods, also prevailed in the Third World cinema, as in the case declared in the famous Solanas manifesto for the "Third Cinema". It seems that for the first time, human action and individuated activity (even in its collective manners" has begun to be in a general crisis and this, not only in the cinema. This is why the time-image tends to become important for our purposes, which are mainly based upon a marriage between social sciences and documentary filmmaking.

It is evident that the crisis of the movement-image occurred just in the heart of documentary filmmaking too, while Deleuze observes it only generally and especially in the domain of cinematography at large. Or this is a general unbelief into action and to the powers of "thinking", which is the "modern case" of the societies of opinion in general. The "old cinema" was believing into human actions and intentionality. This was "empiricist" and "individualistic" in the case of Griffith (in accordance to the criticisms made by Eisenstein against him), or "dialectical" and "collective" in the Soviet cinema. Only the somnambulist values cherished by German Expressionist cinema (I am not sure whether there is any other example than *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*) could transfer such individualistic belief into a surface psychologism and mood. Thus, from a

sociological viewpoint, the classical Hollywood cinema is based mainly on community-situations to be transformed by the actions of human agents, who are mainly individuals or detached persons: there is always a space of tension determining social relationships. Soviet cinema on the other hand took generally the "collectivity", the "mass" as the subject of action, as in the films of Eisenstein. Even in his later films, those historical "sagas" like Alexandre Nevsky and Ivan Grozny, the hero is not the "person" or any individual, but a collective in which these great historical sovereigns were caught, as if in a network of historically transcending situations and relationships. This is far more interesting in the case of Vertov, who even rejects filming "human beings", preferring to use his intervals as detached from the machine-life, the electrified zone declared by Lenin (electrifikatsia) and out of which the "new man" will be declared. Vertov even believes that human beings are not interesting for filming, they are unworthy face to the electrified-constructivist life, in which they can serve only as part of their networks. It is almost the ideal which was declared in the context of "desiring machines" in the Anti-Oidipus of Deleuze and Guattari. We should now see in detail what has just happened in the Soviet cinema, at least until the Stalinist period and thereafter, with eminent "modern" filmmakers of the "time-image", as Parajanov, Tarkovsky and particularly Sokurov.

We should start with the way in which Eisenstein is engaged into a critique of the founding father of the montage, David Wark Griffith. His criticisms are not only to be found in his writings and papers, but rather in his own films, the Strike, October and Potemkin... Eisenstein seems to believe to the "truth" of the cinema as an art of masses. For Griffith and the logic of grand productions in Hollywood too the idea prevails: it is an art for masses. Or these are evidently "different" masses and are imagined in quite different forms, obeying, however to the rules of Deleuze's movement-image. The "masses" or "communities" of Griffith were empirically given, as if they were already there, passive both as audience and representation. Under revolutionary conditions, on the other hand, Eisenstein believes to the ideological reality of masses, their collective actions and reactions. The strength of the image comes from the active presence of crowds, of the proletarian masses in unified act. This unification is dialectically ordered, with

every kinds of elements which have subtly been invented by Potter and Griffith -- the alternate montage with moments of suspense and tension, a logic of the duel between the good and bad, good and evil, individual and community, man and woman, and the like. Contradictions are particularistic and empirical, failing to show the deeper causal networks of dialectical relationships. It is the montage-thought of the bourgeois ideology. Eisenstein, on his own part, on the other hand further develops the idea of automaton spiritualis: the film is this powerful medium which can strike the brains of masses and give them a sentiment of will to act. And if his understanding of dialectics is strictly Hegelian (there is only a dialectics of history and of human consciousness, and not a dialectics of the Nature), his "*tekhnē*" of mounting his "cine-fist" (as opposed to the "cine-eye" of Vertovians) still relies upon Kantian aesthetics: there is a constant and relentless move from the image to the affect, and from the affect to thought (ideas), and this is exactly the way in which the Kantian sublime operates. Everything is almost caught up in a Spinozist divine Nature, and ideas are following each other not only from the standpoint of logic, but also according to the rules of the chaining of affects. The "Fist" works as the "*pathos*" (this is the term he uses himself), and the pathetic is the definition of cinema par excellence. As in Kant's experience of the sublime, the psychological motive of the abyss of thought appears in the now futile attempt to "measure the measureless", to measure the incommensurability of being (Spinoza) and history (Hegel). Kant suggests that whenever our schemes of imagination fail to work in measuring the affects of a landscape, of a whatever-phenomenon, the mind is forced to create Ideas (*Ideen*) in order to cope with it. These are not "representations" (*Darstellungen*) but "presentations" (*Vorstellungen*). Contrary to Spinoza, in Kant ideas are presentations, or gifts, as they are given by the conflict of faculties --Reason, Understanding and Imagination. And this is exactly the cinematographic conflict imagined by Eisenstein --without conflicts no ideas could arise in the minds of masses and multiplicities. And Hegel replaces the role of the Kantian sublime with his idea of history: only history is capable of the dialectical movement, as it should develop the Idea in the mind's attempt to measure the unmeasurable by ordinary schemes. What is transcendental is History, since it contradictorily appears to us as an

illogical series of events and phenomena, while it is never like that, as it finds rationally its own trajectory, by using individuals with the ruse of reason. Such a transcendentalism is almost aesthetically founded in the doctrine of Eisenstein: the movement from the image to the affect leads the spectators to thinking, to produce ideas and the logical consequence of this process is the production of ideas in minds through montage-thoughts.

This is the way in which Eisenstein confronts the problem of the "power of images". The power of the image has to pass from the pathos, the dramatic emotional moment of explosion, or of a passage from one passion to another, from sadness to anger, from misery to hope, from repression to revolution. The pathos presupposes an accumulation of images and emotions, growing according to the dialectical rule of evolution and growth, and this accumulation is founded on montage. There is an example Eisenstein gives throughout his *Nonindifferent Nature*: he compares his films *Potemkin* and *The Old and the New* (or *General Line*) --the first was capable to use "powerful images" of the ship, whose canons are in themselves creating emotions of fear and suspense, condensed as a revolutionary hope. These image almost automatically create emotions and affects in spectators, since they are almost like "images-in-themselves", without the need for an emotive supplement or signifying procedure. Affectively, they belong to the automatism of the mind, at least with the help of what is called as Kuleshov's Effect.

It should be noted that the ordinary textbooks are recognizing what happens in a Kuleshov Effect in a wrong way, connecting it to mere association of ideas. In this superficial conception, the Kuleshov Effect is reduced to an operation in the mind through associations of ideas produced by the sensible images in connection, constitutive of a film-language. So, the best examples to be given are mostly and primarily a face "without expressions" connected to another image of a scene, a helpless child, a funeral ceremony, or a scene of entertainment (it could be a face watching TV etc.). And in all these various connections, spectators are attributing different expressions to the same face. Or we believe that the mechanism of the Kuleshov Effect is much more deeper, and almost neurological: it is exemplified

in an experiment in which a feeling of vertigo which will not occur in the sight of an empty moving landscape, an abyss shot from the top, will occur in the spectators when coupled with an image of a person at the edge. Or a sentiment of vertigo is fundamentally a physiological-neurological state of the brain, and this event has never been distant from the cinematographic experience. Hence, we should be aware of the fact that depth physiology is somehow more relevant to cinema, compared to a depth psychology.

Eisenstein seems to be aware of this from the first chapters of his essay on Pathos in his *Nonindifferent Nature*: he argues, quite simply and as if in a Spinozist method, that there are no emotions or feelings "in general" --every feeling, every affect or sentiment, every emotion is and should be presented as a concrete situation. There is no anger in general, without something which creates this sentiment. And sadness is turned to be a joy, face to the sight of the enemy who has been defeated. This is the fundamental Spinozistic derivation of affects from each other, and ultimately, from desire, sorrow and joy... The necessary concreteness of the image is essential here, and Eisenstein's Hegelian-fashioned dialectics leads him to develop a rather bizarre concept like "non-indifferent nature": it is that, in cinematography and through montage, the nature is not without passions and emotions --there is a sad sunlight in the fog, with the empty landscape of the docks of Odessa port in strike, during the morning, which "mourns" for the victim. The white unusually turns out to be a mark of terror in *Alexandre Nevsky* while the black becomes friendly, in the sight of the men of the soil, the Russian peasants led by the Prince Nevsky. The filmic representation of milieus and environments is by no means an "inaffective" or "signifying" event, it is rather a deep facticity of sentiments and of the passionate life. And this is nothing less than the great magic of the cinema and its almost automotical attraction on the spectators.

Or sometimes it is difficult to use such an automatism of feelings and affects: this is the case of the *Old and New*, used to offer the images of rural transformation in Soviet Union. This is no longer the time of revolution but the period of the "peaceful construction of socialism", the introduction of agronomic machinery

and the propaganda for the establishment of cooperations. None of the "images-in-themselves" were strong enough, unlike the "canons of Potemkin" --"how the tranquil peasant life could provide such powerful images" asks Eisenstein. We have only images of a milk-cream machine, incomparable to the images of canons and soldier's massacres of people. Only montage, and purely montage could be capable to create the affective images required for the appeal for cooperation. We have images of a young girl, tentatively used to introduce the milk-separator to the peasants. And the richer and more "traditionalistic" peasants are ironical about the new invention, while more helpless ones are gazing the machine with hopeful, or awesome eyes, and the like. Hence, Eisenstein was capable to create one of the most pulsating image-sequences of the entire history of cinematography: the suspense is extreme with the accumulation of faces and the insisting close-ups of the milk-separator and the fearful face of the young propaganda-girl. Or what is the significance of this plan-sequence if it did or did not work? This is not a matter of life or death, evidently, but it is nevertheless something more, only at the intellectual, economic, historical viewpoints. The indirect image of the time which is entitled now not simply to "pass" but to be "accumulated", gives us the context of the complex set of relations during the rural transformation of Soviet Russia. Or, images should tell more in cinema and the way in which Eisenstein solves this problem is wonderful: at the end of the suspense, the scene waiting for if it did work or not, the closed-up milk-separator explodes with all kinds of sparks, a white liquid splashing to the face of the young girl, and that's almost an orgy, an erotic and pornographic element suddenly entering into the screen, with all its imaginative powers. This is one of the most powerful metaphors in the history of cinema. The orgiastic element was merely connoted, would say film semiologists, but we believe that this is rather a pure metaphoric power capable to signify not through analogies but rather through a "lacking image", an image which is absent which can only be conceived, not seen: it is the impregnation of the soil, the birth of Dionysus, and a kind of divine eroticism (see Eisenstein, 1987).

Eisenstein is normally using metonymic tropes in his films: this is his conception of what he calls as "montage of attractions", derived out of his earlier experience

in theater. Attractions are analogies which appeal to the cognition, to the intellect, rather than purely to sensibility. Only the mind's eyes could see them and their intentionality, since there is no room for a comparison between the massacre of strikers and the scene where a cow is strangled. This is really something more than pure banality, not forgetting how the Eisensteinian principles of montage are today usually employed by advertisers.

4.15.1 Montage, Bricolage, Invention

In the lexicon of cinematography, there are a series of technical terms which refer to a set of economic relationships --the film is a "production" and it is produced by somehow individual but also collective "producers". Finally the film is a "product", which, as Marx says owes its "mystical" character to the detachment of the product from the process of production. One can object that it is the same for every product, emerging as a commodity or being transformed into a commodity in the market, and that this is not a character specific to cinematographic commodities in an age of absolute and total commodification. However, in a sense, "commodification" is not the same for all --for cinematographic or aesthetic "production" in general seems naturally "appear" in a quasi-mystical character, which is commonly shared by any other commodity, but still in a quite different way. In other words, the mystical character fits to the object of art far more than a simple commodity in general, if not valued by the culture differently. A film or a piece of painting is not the same with a pin or a dish, packaged potatoes or a car.

In the lexicon of the cinema, a series of terms are corresponding to a series of economic terms: film is a production, it has a copyright and a seller (therefore buyers); it has a producer who owns it, and the final product can never escape from becoming a commodity and entering the circulation process. In other words, it tends to have this "mystical" character which has been described by Marx in the Third Volume of *Das Kapital* --and this character appears as the ultimate effect of the detachment of the product from the process of production, as it is the case for every commodified product. This is a point where Marx has progressed from his position in the famous chapter of the First Volume of *Das Kapital*, "The Fetishism

of Commodities". At that point, Marx seems to understand that the process of labour mainly "re-produces", rather than "producing". And *Das Kapital* is a work which needs to be retrospectively read and interpreted from the standpoint of "reproduction". Althusser and the other authors of *Reading Capital (Lire le capital)* were aware of this necessity, but we are not sure whether they were able to derive out of this awareness its full consequences.

The "mystical" character by nature is never distant from the cinematographic products. After all, this product is a work of art, or the character of artwork is attributed to it. These cultural and motivational values attributed to it reveal it as a "creation" rather than a mere "product". In its process of commodification, the work of art is integrated into a realm of re-production, which could be analyzed only by a new set of concepts. Evidently, it has a producer who will introduce it into market, but here, neither the process of production, nor the process of circulation and distribution has the character of a product for consumption. A painting and a dish can be introduced in the same way into the sphere of circulation in the market; or societies are interpreting such a process of circulation and marketing in various and different cultural ways. In the case of the products of collective memory (antiquaries or products of artisans) this cultural attitude is evident and affirms itself, almost wrongly, in any "cultural theory", as proposed in Anglo-Saxon countries, since the end of Nineteenth century. These theories have wrongly reduced every human product and institution under the title of "cultural artefact", as in the case of the anthropologist Tylor. Or, this reduction or unification coincides with the risk of neglecting the importance of the differences of nature among various products. In spite of its "ambiguous" nature, the cinematography among many others enters into the process of circulation as a work of art, if not belonging to the rubbish of popular entertainment.

In short, we have still to take as our point of departure the way in which Marx has tried to explain the process of "re-production": and already, the paths to be taken in such an analysis have already been studied in particular by the members of the Frankfurt School, and more technically, in the studies of Joseph Schumpeter, as part of their respective political economy. Both have been on the trajectory of

privileging "production" over "re-production", while they were somehow aware of the fact that the second should analytically come first. For our purposes here, it is evident that a film requires an investment. But what kind of investment is it? A novel-writer can become a novel-writer only insofar as he or she writes novels. Or no one can interfere into it, or create obstacles before he writes the novel --paper and pen, a little patience and imagination, time and labour are sufficient. Or a film can never be produced without making a serious investment. That is, unlike a literary work, it cannot be produced without it. In earlier stages of cinema, the script-writing already tended to become a literary device apart; and we can remember how Arthur Honegger wrote a piece of music for a non-existing film. This is the very core of cinema's fundamental and also foundational "ambiguity" - -the history of cinema is full with victims, scripts without success, aborted projects and corresponding tragedies, while it is hardly tragic in itself. Or, no one of these projects could be realized without opposing the circle of "re-production", since it has always to create a difference in order to gain a culturally recognizable value. In its essence, Gabriel Tarde appears as the unique scholar who attempted to analyze such a "psycho-social" problem, that is, the broad cultural meaning of the processes of production and of reproduction. We have to remember how Tarde was insistently trying to substitute a broader frame of (or "variants" of) "economic psychology" to the narrow, economistic and reduced field of classical political economy. And without such a psychology, we believe it is impossible to recognize how a cultural product should distinguish itself from whatever commodity.

One of the practical theses of Tarde refers to the repetitive, therefore "boring" aspect of labour in general. This "boring" nature of work was already contested by early Marx and his followers, under the title of "alienation". Or in Tarde, the boring character of the process of labour is not diminished to the consequences of "alienation". This character necessarily belongs to the process of production in general. Labour, in its ordinary sense, only re-produces, since it is nothing more than an issue of "imitation". This does not mean that "imitation" is not a fundamental concept of Tarde's philosophy: it is readily its hard core, since everything, every human activity is always open to imitation, and without

imitation, nothing could survive in the realm of life. Without becoming taken as habitus, before its expansion and routinization, the labour process is never a part of invention or creation, which could ultimately satisfy the needs of innovative life. And if we talk about the "habitus" of labour, learned from the antecedents, father-mother and masters, this means that we have to do with a kind of artisanship, not merely of "labour". The modern industrial-capitalist, or the so-called "post-industrial" milieu, on the other hand, we can understand how the re-production is essential, since the system fundamentally works through a pre-programming of the re-production (as it is the case, today, in many sectors of advanced economy). The "product design" for mass-production tends today to become essential. And in such a context, that is, within such a circle of surplus-production, the worker is in fact losing "what he could never gain". In other words, the loss, or the debt is presupposed in the process in which the worker loses. And the teleological nature attributed to labour by Hegel and later Lukacs is not independent from such a perspective. This is the necessary ontology of labour and from our standpoint (and Tarde's), it is presupposed by any ontic categories. What is a priori is re-production, not production, since the latter should be reserved to innovation and creation (and not necessarily the "artistic" or "mental" one). In other words, re-production is always prior to production.

This means that production should always be a part of innovation. According to Tarde, this "new" can always be a coincidence, or encounter of two series of imitations on "reproductions". For instance, the historical event which we call as "the invention of photography", is the encounter between a tradition of camera obscura, and the discovery of a chemical reaction of some substances to the light, which belongs to a long past, before Niepce's invention of his *héliographe*. And such events of invention, before being expanded, can be historically and culturally imperceptible. After all, Nicéphore Niepce was not motivated with a "superior" care for his invention --he was simply a bad painter, and was trying to prepare a device to help his son, an equally bad painter. And the cinema was nothing more than the reunion of his invention with the capacities of the human perception of movement. In these inventions, no supreme scientific or artistic motives were present, but still, they were something beyond mere circumstance or hazard.

The element of encounters and of the hazard is present already in the earliest cinema --Lumière's "views"-- and through them, the montage-thought is capable a pathetic significance, that already belongs to the document-character of these earliest images. Was this not a strict problem of the early "thinking" cinema, once exposed in theoretical clarity by Sergey M. Eisenstein? He recalls that they have no problems of creating the "pathos" (extacy of emotions) in *Battleship Potemkin*, as the key images transforming the growth and dialectical accumulation of emotions (grief) to a dialectical leap (revolutionary anger) were already powerful in themselves --and visually expressed in the canons of the battleship; or when asked to do a quasi-propaganda film about "peasant life" to be transformed into a "socialist collective" during a period of "peaceful construction of socialism". This was to be a film of "calling" --when it was still "peaceful", that is before "collectivization"--, the years "which saw the birth of the collective farm system and mighty state farms" in the age of "building socialism". Or, Eisenstein continues:

At the same time, the theme of industrialization of agriculture could not be appealing in itself. One must keep in mind that in those years the imagery of industry was one of the most popular with the artists of our generation (...) and this, no doubt, is because priority was given to the "pathos of the machine", rather than to the social analysis of those profound pcesses, which our villages experienced in their transition to forms of collective farm economy (...) It was our film *The Old and the New* (with a variant title, *The General Line*, 1926-9), which acquired its fame by heralding the "pathos of the milk separator". (Eisenstein, 1987: 39)

The "numbers" already appear there, in this film, not as symbols or even signs but as pure "images", as part of an extatic arousal, when "milk separator" "works"... Clearly Eisenstein takes departure from an "Old" age (a "past") when agrarian life is still this "life in nature" (in whose "dialectics", unlike Vertov, Eisenstein the Hegelian never believed), a peaceful, but oppressed under the exigencies of semi-feudal regimes, with the "*pratico inerte*" of dependency upon nature, the seasons and seeming to be condemned to the "inertia", so well assumed by Marx. And the

image to be used as the "sign" of the Pathos, of the sudden "leap" as part of the socialist "calling" was nothing more than that of a simple "milk separator". And one should evidently concede that this is not an image "powerful" in itself, compared with the "canons in act of *Bronenosets Potiomkin*"... And the solution he finds to this problem is nothing less than a montage-thought, transforming the "attentive", "ironic", "hopeful" (and as general states of "wonder") faces of peasants (and of the young militant girl responsible for introducing the "progressist" machine to them) into a cascade of orgiastic, seminal images.

4.16 The Kino-Glaz of Vertov and its Implications for the Documentary

In the context of Russian revolutionary process there appears the movement of *Kinoki*, whose motives are defined by the Soviet filmmaker Dziga Vertov. The idea of a collectivity of Kinoks relies upon a contestation against the capitalist production of images and representations, seemingly tending to transform the aesthetic desires of masses into an entertainment technology, or if you want, into what Adorno baptised as "culture industry". As Maurizio Lazzarato argues, the movement of Kinoks can be seen as a political project of a "war machine" against the ideological frames of the bourgeois world vision. In more than one sense, the ideas of Vertov outline a further dimension of thought than Guy Debord's "situationist" attitude of sixties, which relied upon the denunciation of the "societies of spectacle". We can even say that Vertov's position is still more actual today than Debord's critique of the spectacle. (see Lazzarato, 1998).

Vertov develops a materialist conception of a movement against spectacle --it is more appropriate to attack the "machinery of the spectacle" rather than its outcomes, rather than its ideological effects. Like in a Spinozist proposition, one has to attack the "causes" rather than effects. The Situationist position, on the hand, limits itself to the critique of the spectacle in which its proponents are deploying such themes as "the separation or detachment of reality in the dimension of representation". Can we still believe to the old Marxist interpretation that the world is represented upside down in the image? The argument of Vertov is that a mere discovery that in image and representation, the "immediately lived

experience is alienated" is not sufficient to relieve us from the magic world of images and representations. As today Virilio noted, we need a Foucauldian and severe genealogy of the cinematographic apparatus in itself. Vertov's slogan here seems to be ruthless: "Neither the scene, nor the spectacle, nor representation -- there is only a machine."

It is evident that such a machine, as defined by Vertov, is immediately and simultaneously semiotic, technological, collective-social and aesthetic, while it cannot be reduced to any of them. To attack "the visible world organized by capitalism", one has to take into consideration all these dimensions as if they are inextricably related. Throughout twentieth century, the complexity of this apparatus seemed to lead to partial critiques --aesthetic, politic, economic or social-- which remain inefficient. With the development of ultra-modern technologies of representation and manipulation of images --video and digital image processing-- the entirety of these old and incompatible critical viewpoints are nowadays revived. Even Jean-Luc Godard's temporary "Dziga Vertov Group" in seventies, which directly refers to the Vertovian experience of "seeing" seems to be inefficient and quite shadowy.

Vertov interpreted the Russian Revolution not only as the political destruction of power in Russia, simultaneously with the destruction of capitalist institutions, but also as the disintegration of "man" and of "his world". In this context, the seventh art, the cinema was taken as the "machinic" expression of somehow "external forces" which could cooperate with man's internal forces or faculties: seeing, feeling, being affected, perceiving, thinking... These external forces were at first sight technological inventions of capitalism, adapted to the interests of the bourgeois world. Their pure expressions are revealed in the control of Time (including labour-time and the time of entertainment and leisure) and of virtuality (the strength of images) embedded in machines of vision. These cinematographic machines are capable to "crystallize time" (Deleuze, 1985:321) Or, the camera by itself liberates perception from its bound to human body. The Kino-Glaz (the Cine-Eye) is a machinic eye that is able to reveal as visible a new matter and new affections just moving into a relentlessly circulating motion, into the uninterrupted

movement of things and bodies. Hence, the earliest forms of the cinematographic images were already capable to shake the tenacity and the stability of the world, while at the beginning, the possibilities of cinema were not fully actualized. The cine-eye, within the becomings of things, is able to inject into the images not only the movement but also the time. Thus it can capture intensity and the non-corporeal element in bodies. The aberrant movements of the camera and of the montage can lead us to a direct experience of a non-human time, of a pure time, and of variations of speeds.

As Deleuze puts it, this is nothing but the "de-territorialization" of objects in their becomings in the world, which now became unstable (the moment of Revolution). This is the possibility of capturing the virtuality of such a deterritorialized world -- it is as if cinema envied a new body and a new thought. It can be observed that every individual is transformed into perceptive, visual and cognitive "mutants". Vertov conceives this situation in parallel to the transformation of the individuals in factories, as they are irremediably impregnated by mechanic and thermodynamic machines. Thereby, the "man" understands that he is not thinking with his consciousness, but through machines. This is evidently "good" or "bad", but there is also a "beyond": At the early stages of cinema's adventure, a new kind of rationalism was to be invented, not without direct reference to Spinoza's and Leibniz's "major rationalism": one has to re-define a conception of "spiritual", that is, "non-corporeal automate" (automaton spiritualis). This is a new way of sequential thought --a visual one. It is capable to concatenate the images "beyond" or "below" consciousness. The new rationalism of the Kinoks is revealed in a new kind of realism of images, which is conceived as a field of experience in the domain of class struggles.

It has long been said that capitalism is forming a new kind of "visible" whose subject (the 'I see') is no longer a psychological subject. This means that the social form of this visibility cannot be reduced to the spectators. Vertov anticipates a new, collective and plural subject which transcends the "naive and zealous client" of dark cine-halls. The 'I see' of the Kinoglaz is on the contrary a singularization of the collective body of the proletariat in the process of its formation. There is no

room in observing in this position of Vertov an ideological reference: this is a paradigm of agencies which are both aesthetic and productive. His motto is "factory instead of theatre" --and a "cyborg" of collective worker, a co-dependency of man and machine...

Vertov does not believe that the traditional aesthetic positions and arts could be able to decipher the "visible": literary, dramatic or graphical techniques are not adapted to the crystallization of time and to its reproduction. This machine is the cinematographic one... Hence, such a mutation of the class point of view makes it necessary not to "close" the cinema onto itself --one has to grasp the "temporal" specificity and the immediately social nature of these machines. In fact, the filmmaker, the producer and the spectators are more or less consciously cooperating in the reproduction and persistence of their roles. Each are developing by themselves the functions of subjectivation and bondage inherent in the cinematographic apparatus. To this, one should also add the "mass character" of the cinema, which in itself has to be integrated into the cinematographic communication through the process of film production.

According to Vertov, to close the cinema onto itself is to sacrifice a new and different mode of production to the established "commercial" and "artistic" forms. "There is nothing in common between the actual cinema that is conceived as a commercial activity, or of the cinema conceived as a branch of art and what we are doing." (Vertov, 1992)

Through the rejection of cinema as commerce and cinema as art, Vertov clearly aims to destroy cinema in its own domain, since cinema is nothing but a capitalist machine of production of the visible, of the perception and of thought. The mere utterance of the order-word "long live class viewpoint" does not refer to a more moral, more political, more aesthetic vision of world, but to another corporeal, technological and verbal agency, through which all cinematographic functions will be re-organized. There is a difference of nature between the aesthetic and commercial dimensions and the new dimension of Vertovian cinema, which doesn't claim any production of a content, whether social, political or economic.

Vertov was aware of the fact that the class struggles of the fin-de-siècle, which coincided with the invention of cinema have engendered new ways of perceiving and thinking in the world. However, the "virtual" parties of these struggles were still trapped in the framework of "spectator-filmmaker" relationship in the context of representation. What was the function of cine-drama after all? With its actors, scenarists, studios, script-writers it was serving to the reduction of the new modes of expression and the collective body (engendered by the world-revolution) to the form of spectatorship. Vertov was evidently unaware of the capacity and the future of this mutant and generic "collective body" of this industrial proletariat, but he knew something very well: that the cinematographic sensibility was one of the highest political problems.

Hence, the strategy of Vertov's Kinoks aims at the internal destruction of the division of labour imposed by the technological machinery of the cinema. According to Vertov, the cinema can do two things: it can serve what our eyes "which can only badly see" with images our consciousness demanded; or it can be engaged in the "conquest of the chaos" of visual phenomena filling the world and the space by means of the camera which is free from the rhythms and motions of our bodies. The second option is the Kinoglaz: "I am Cine-Eye, A mechanic eye. I, the machine, I show you the world in the way only I can see it. I am now totally liberated from human inertia. I am within uninterrupted movement... Liberating myself from the passage of 16-17 pictures at one second, from the frames of space and time, I bring together every point of the universe I recorded..." (Vertov, 1992) This idea of absolute, pure film of the camera and montage is not far from being impregnated by a secondary idea of the Kinoks, who were involved to stress and develop the "accidents" of shooting process: speed-shots, microscopic shots, moving-camera shots, the most extraordinary or aberrant shots --the entirety of the cine-eye can be defined as a system of "visual clinamen" which is capable, through montage, to reveal us time: "Cine-Eye is the microscope and telescope of Time..." (Vertov, 1992)

Vertov had then many reasons to denounce the use of pre-scripts and scenarios. These are working within the cinematographic division of labour as normative

agencies which are destined to neutralize the entire span of incidents in the film-process. Trying to fix everything, the script freezes the entire dimension of the hazards coming from the contact of the camera with reality at large: this is the definition of Cine-Truth, the *Kinopravda* --"Kinopravda doesn't force life to happen in accordance with a scenario of an author, it observes and records life as it is; it derives conclusions only afterwards..." (Vertov, 1992:64) Scenario (or the script) is the invention of single persons or single groups of people, it is not our probable meeting with a world we don't yet recognize: "Not from the work to the material, we move from the material to the cinematographic work --thereby, the Kinoks are attacking the last --and the most solid-- rempart of the artistic cinematography, of the literary scenario..." (Vertov, 1992)

In addition, in this doctrine of Cine-Truth (*kinopravda*), the representation of an event by a filmmaker is only of secondary importance compared with the actualization of the "real time" of ongoing life. If the camera is the machine-eye which enables us to enter into uninterrupted movement, into the uninterrupted variations of the flux of things, the montage should not obey to the demands of human perception and prejudices. There is a psychology of the eye and the fetishism of language in the Nietzschean sense. Through this, some basic needs and demands of the spectators are supplied and satisfied by the entertainment technology of cinema. Or, through montage, one aims at the "organization of the visible world" --while respecting the temporality constructing the world: "There has been many experiments in these fields. One should say there are a few successful attempts. There are montage-tables resembling a system of musical notation, akin to the analyses of rhythms and intervals..."

Through such a Constructivist methodology, the movement of the Kinoks prefer the factories, trains and boats, rather than the salons of projection --the "electrical opium of cinema halls": "I am guiding a cine-wagon, we give a spectacle in a lost station..." We can trace two series --the series of modern transportation which translate us in space, and a parallel series of expression of a travel in time through assembling the cine-eye to these means of transport. This is similar to Kafka's wish --to have telephones mounted on planes and other means of transport. This is

a new perception of the world, "deciphering" an unknown world by new means and modes.

The function of the cine-eye is to see and make us to see: "it opens eyes, enlightens the gaze...", because we are yet those unable to see. The cine-eye gives us the possibility of joining a movement or image at a given point of the universe, with another movement or image at another point. These images or movements are not commensurable from the viewpoint of the human eye, which is unable to see them in its finitude of prejudices: "Cine-Eye is the capacity to see the processes of life in any temporal sequence which remains invisible to the human eye..." (Vertov, 1992:73) The cine-eye should extract the "resulting vector of the essential movement" which is yet unknown, out of the chaos of movements --thus it relates to the "daily life and its organization".

The realization of Vertov's project cannot reproduce the division of labour in cinema. Vertov suggests a process of production which develops in six "series". Only the first "series" seems to be accomplished through the works of the Kinoks, the other stages remaining tentative, before the oppressions of the Stalinist regime have begun. This serie is called "life through improvisation"...

"In this serie, the camera prudently enters into life, selecting a certain little vulnerable point, and it is directed in the visual milieu it deployed. Through following series, with the augmentation of the number of cameras, the space placed under observation gets larger. The juxtaposition of different places of the earth and of different pieces of life forces us to discover the visible world. Each series add clarity to the comprehension of reality. Millions of workers, having reconquered the vision are putting doubt on the necessity of sustaining the bourgeois structure of the world."

Here, the same visual material passes into a more profound analysis and into a reorganization to enlighten the relationships of the treated subjects, using every technical means at disposal, including the formal technics of the cinema. For Vertov, "the fabric of events" reconquer the "cine-observers" who produce "cine-observations" and "cine-analyses" in the context of a poetic cinema. It appears

that cinema has long abandoned such a possibility, and we had to wait until Jean-Luc Godard who invoked that "cinema should not limit itself to tell the history, but should make the History visible..." Today it is possible to see the same anticipation in the works of a few video-artists.

The entire polemic of Vertov with the Hollywoodian ideology (and with some differences, with Eisenstein) is organized alongside the "revolutionary" necessity to relieve the cinema from images and representation. The critical idea that the "image is the reification of the visible" holds true in Vertov, but he is able to transcend it: the visible is not reduced to images and movements. The true genetic element of the visible is called by Vertov as the "interval". We can see more than images and movements, if we are situated in the dimension of the intervals. An interval is "in between" the images, just like rhythms and aberrant movements. "The school of cine-eye expects that the film should be built on 'intervals', that is, on the movement between the images... The intervals (passages from a movement to another) but never movements themselves are constituting the materials and the elements of the art of movement..." (Vertov,1992:31)

The theory of intervals is the core of the Vertovian philosophy: an interval is a "suture", a shift, a blank or a transfer: it is not a satisfaction of the prejudices of our eyes, all too human eyes. It is the "background", the pure blank of the totality, never defined by the images themselves --it is a pure flux of the screen... The interval which cannot be reduced to images and movements is their source or origin. It is something like the absolute eternal attributes of Spinoza. Within the domain of the visible, the interval cannot be reduced to any discursive or figurative entity.

The "major rationalism" of Spinoza and the minor rationalism (intuition as a method) of Bergson can now be seen a keys to the understanding of the notion of "interval". In Spinoza, one should go beyond pure images, beyond the knowledge of the first kind which is inadequate, beyond the notions of affections. The knowledge of an attribute (thought or extension) is to grasp through the eyes of the intellect the plane upon which every idea, every object are concatenated --

visible only to a mental eye. Bergson too, through his intuitive method, wanted to go beyond the mere representation of things, the representation of the objects through their images, which appear to the consciousness as "immobile sections" of becomings and interrupted processes --the movement and duration...

The Kinoglaz tends to become, through the doctrine of intervals, a machine of contraction-detention of the time. One should say that the time can be crystallized through being made visible: "The mechanic eye of the camera leaves itself to be attracted or guided by the movements and that opens the way of its own movement or of its own oscillation. It experiences the tracking of the time, it dismembers the movement or absorbs time in itself... The cine-eye is the concentration and decomposition of the time..." (Vertov, 1992)

It is crucial here to compare Vertov's viewpoint with the Situationist positions (especially Debord): they affirm that "the totality of the life of our societies announces itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles." And if the spectacle is "the capital to the degree of accumulation that it tends to become a spectacle", one should nevertheless go beyond the image as a commodity. Marx was already aware of the role of the crystallization of time in the process of the enigmatic capitalist relationship constructed between time (of labour in this instance) and subjectivity --the commodification of the time as labour-time into capital... The cinematography and the philosophy of Vertov shows us another aspect of "crystallization of time" --the invention of another type of machine which is capable to encounter the mechanic and thermodynamic machines; a machine capable to reproduce the time of perception, of sensibility and of thought.

It is essential to admit that the cinema practically shows that thought can be beyond consciousness just as images can go beyond pure, natural perception of human beings. Man has lost the certainty that he was the producer of the images and his thoughts. In the epoch of the decomposition of "man" and of his world, what is at stake is therefore the "power to think" (remember Spinoza), the image of thought and its process of creation. The "visual thought" of the cine-eye leads to an automatized production of images, corresponding to the "spiritual automate"

that we are --it agitates the "circles of ideas" in our memory, and opens the possibility to make thoughts "fall directly from the screen to the brain of the spectator..." What is central to Vertovian cinema is not therefore representation, nor mediation: "the thoughts should directly flourish on the screen, without the trick of speech. This is a living contact with the screen, a transmission from brain to brain... Each of us penetrate into a circle of ideas which agitates in us our own consciousness..." (Vertov, 1992:211)

There is a general affirmation, praised especially by structuralists and semioticians of cinema today, that "cinema is a language"... But Vertov shows that it is not at all a narrative language, but just a "visual one": this visual language can be opposed to the spoken language, or to the literary language, since it is deployed in the network of a complexity of forces and signs agitating the production of thought. It is evident that in his documentary *film Tri Pesne o Lenine* (Three Songs on Lenin) Vertov does not pass through words and narration. He deliberately tries to adopt other ways to capture the interaction between the sound and the image, "with the resulting vector of multiple channels" in his words: "here by the sound, there by the image, or in the inter-title; here by the internal framing of the movement, there by the stroke of darkness to the light; and sometimes with noise..." His method is to pass by "subterranean paths sometimes leaving some sentences or words to reach the surface". (Vertov, 1992)

Vertov says "only some sentences", some bits of words coming to the "surface". It is important to note that what he denounces here is the entire "imperialistic" signifying regime which imposes the fetishism of subject and object on the production of thought. When their primacy is destroyed, the words written or spoken in a film can be reorganized in a system of rhythms and counter-points. The cine-eye is producing another image of thought.

Guy Debord insists that "the spectacle is a social relationship mediatized through images..." (Debord, 1978) This also means that the forces captured, manipulated and exploited by the spectacle are the same forces that are capable to constitute social relationships in another fashion. Situationists are denouncing the "cine-

sensation" while Vertov, transcending the mere critique of the spectacle, endeavours to liberate the forces captured in it to reorganize them in another way. He interprets the "cine-sensation" as the totality of the forces of seeing, feeling and thinking --it is not the one-way domination by the spectacle. These forces are expressed, by means of the cinema, by their machinic nature and by their appropriation by a collective. Vertov introduces the concept of "cine-bound" which is a "visual and auditive bound of class between the proletarians of every nations..." Without seeing through intervals, how a community of sensations and class bounds could be thought of among the proletarians of distant nations? Hence, the cine-eye should be defined as "an appropriated space of a visual bound between the people of the entire world" and founded on an uninterrupted exchange of the facts that are seen by each --"cine-documents" which have to be opposed to the mainly commercial exchange (characteristic of the entertainment culture of capitalism) of cine-theatral representations and spectacles.

Vertov envisages the passage from "cine-sensation" to "cine-bound" as a simultaneously ethical and political process which will lead to the organization and constitution of social body, destined to compose and augment the creativity of multitudes through these "machines to see, to feel and to think.." The ethics of Vertov is not concerned with the individual responsibility of the film-director before the images and the public, but is rather concerned in the encounter, the composition, the augmentation of the power to be affected and to affect of bodies through cine-sensation and cine-bind. The constitutive force of the cine-bind is somehow an oscillation, it is a telematic one as it can work through distances. It endures in the actual debates about the possibilities of the new technologies of information and communication.

The non-human perception endowed by the cine-eye thus refers us to a kind of Nietzschean "overman", or to the "new man" of the revolution. Vertov does not pay any attention to the kind of "communist humanism" of his contemporaries like Charles Chaplin and Sergey M. Eisenstein. In Vertov, there is nothing which opposes man and the machines: man already assumed the "second nature" given to him by capitalism and this is an irreversible reality, and it is the condition of the

"transcending the man". The "cine-eye", the "radio-ear" and the "tele-eye" today, if not the "brain-computer" of our times are deployments of hybrid machines by which the collective subject of revolution can see, speak, hear and think. One can invoke the machinic body, a cyborg of vision, of perception and of thought which can be expressed as such, without delegating to anyone the task of producing the visible and the sensible. This means to oppose to the technological and financial (capitalist) concentration of the cinema a micro-politics of the cine-eye that implies a socialization of the cinematographic know-how and the miniaturization of the technology. In this sense, Vertov anticipates today's video technologies: "We no longer need immense workshops, grandiose decors, nor those "grandiose" film directors, "great artists" and sensational photogenic women; we need rather 1) rapid means of transport; 2) high-sensitivity films; 3) ultra-light hand cameras; 5) an ultra-rapid team of cine-reporters; 6) an army of observer-kinoks..." (Vertov, 1992:47)

The organization scheme to be given to the Kinoks will distinguish between "observer-kinoks", "operator kinoks", "constructor-kinoks", "editor-kinoks" (including women), and "lab-technician kinoks". The main project is to implant the cine-work in the komsomols and in pioneer organizations to provide "our knowledge and technical experience to the sure hands of the ascending working youth" (Vertov, 1992:23) In this context, the "mass character" of the cinema should not be limited only to the diffusion-distribution of films and to their reception by the audience; it should also involve the imperatives of "production", since otherwise, the power of expression would necessarily become "expropriated". Vertov anticipates what Godard was invoking: "we need a pedagogy of the image"...

Vertov's denial of the "cine-drama" is the necessary outcome of his critique of the concentration and control of the means of production and redistribution by the capitalist industry of cinema. From this point of view, the Soviet regime was doing nothing but to reproduce the organization of work it attempted to criticize at this epoch, propagating through entertainment films and dramatic works. The "leftist" engaged cinema too is opposed by a "micro-politics" which is the sole

way to put the possibility of not becoming the subject of films at the disposal of Soviet workers. Eisenstein's cinema, for instance was admitting the masses as the formal, but not real subject of cinematography. Masses should become not the subject of the films but of the entire process of the production of the visible and the sensible.

Hence, Vertov is singled out as the only author to think cinema and organize it not as an "art of masses" but as a mass activity, as a constitutive activity, as a collective work. This was already hidden, implicit in the technological apparition of the cinema, and now is evaluated by Vertov as a constructive force. You can easily think about today's post-fordist accumulation through computers and networks deploying a new kind of intellectual and affective activity. Vertov denies that he is working like an "artist" but pretends to become a relay in the network of correspondents throughout the entire Soviet Union. He is working within a flux which cannot be reduced to any frame of division of labour, which cannot be controled. Such a conception of work denounces any reference to the distinction between "manual" and "intellectual" labour. Thus, is eliminates the figure of the "artist", of author or intellectual... It should be said that, therefore, the work of the Kinoks cannot be simply considered as an artistic work. Its machinic and collective form and character objectively and subjectively connects this work to the labour in general: "the cells of red kinoks must be considered as a factory among others, where the raw material furnished by the observer-kinoks is transformed into future cine-works." (Vertov, 1992:451) What Vertov aims at is the acknowledgement and establishment of universality and generality of the creative work: "the present film constitutes the raid and the challenge of the cameras to reality and prepares the theme of creative work on the background of class contradictions and daily life." (Vertov, 1992:33)

Walter Benjamin too, occasionally referring to Vertov, was aware that the "cine-bind" could be used as a paradigm in the socialization of creative work: "This passage of the creation from one single author or from a group of persons to the mass creation will lead also to accelerate the crash of the bourgeois artistic cinema

and of its attributes: the actor, the fable script and the costly toys like decors, and the grand-priest, the director..." (Benjamin, 1992)

It should also be noted that the position of Vertov has nothing to do with the anti-intellectualist and populist vision of a "proletarian artist" (the proletarian filmmaker as the follower of the proletarian writer). What is affirmed here is the fact that the agencies that are capable to open unknown territories beyond the author and the artist, of becomings implying the virtualities of other aesthetic, social and productive paradigms.

We have already stressed how Vertov anticipates the video, if not the television which remains today agenced unilaterally --a movement of images going from the screen to the viewer. The technological apparatus of cinema was effectively used by him in the path of such an anticipation --an anticipation of a "tele-emission of images and sounds": "From the point of view of the human eye, I have no reasons to show myself among those, for example, who are present in this hall. However, in the space of the cine-eye, I can make a montage of myself, not only as sitting near you, but better, in different places of the world. It would be ridiculous to place before the cine-eye those obstacles like walls or distance. Anticipating the television, one should understand that through montage, this 'vision at a distance' becomes possible." Hence the television is according to Vertov not only a technological device more appropriate to the "circulating eye", but also an apparatus more convenient to the social and collective dimensions of the production of life, which has already been introduced by capitalism as a presupposition: "the procedure of the radio-transmission of the images that comes to be invented in our epoch could help us reaching what is essential more and more... To establish a visual bind of class (the cine-eye) in parallel to an auditive one (radio-ear) between the proletarians of all countries, on the platform of a communist deciphering of the world."

That the cinema is something "artistic" and television "cultural" in our times is irrelevant to the position of Vertov, since in his time, the technology of television was not yet invented, and we can easily say that it could be otherwise: under

capitalist conditions the television is only one way of the realization of the tele-diffusion, tele-emission of images and sounds, as a uni-lateral machine for the manipulation of opinions, which was not evidently the mode anticipated by Vertov. He is not a "futurist" of machines, a fetishist of technologies, fascinated by the imperialism of the technology and of the cult of science. Vertov always believed to the priority of the social and collective machine over technological machine: "even in the domain of technique, we should only partly do with what is called artistic cinema, since the exercise of the tasks we adopt here suggests another conception of the technique." (Vertov, 1992:124) This reference to "another conception of technique" is here essential, since Vertov's "war machine of Kinoglaz" has been crushed under the Soviet regime in thirties, which adopted the cine-drama in the mode of Eisenstein as "socialist realism", penetrated by the Hollywoodian commercial mentalities and structures. The movement of the Kinoks remains significant not in their persecution by the regime and the evident victory of the Hollywood cinema as an entertainment industry, but in their power to anticipate new technologies and agencies of social communication and their attempt to create a new conception of technology. This does not mean that they were fetishists of technology; nor they are the holders of a Heideggerian viewpoint on technology as a "catastrophic experience". They were aware of the fact that machines were not only external things to the man --men and their collectivities could also be conceived as machinic assemblages.

It is evident that the Nazi aesthetics, revealed in the works of Leni Riefenstahl had somehow all motives to imitate the experience of the cine-eye, under the form of the great Nazi spectacle of power, under the guidance of Dr. Goebbels: "make me a film like..." Or, the Nazi regime of truth was far distant from any understanding of the Kinopravda. Riefenstahl was asked to organize a great scene of Nazi demonstration, in Nurnberg or during the 36 Olympic Games, and not to build a collective cine-eye capable to call the masses into creative cinematic labour. It was pure propaganda, a totalitarian society of spectacle, "the one of Germans". Jean-Pierre Faye (Faye, 1972) is able to discern the "totalitarian language" of the Nazis as the one which makes what it said, as different from the language of Italian fascism, which was employed to justify the deeds afterwards: in Leni

Riefenstahl's film "*The Triumph of the Will*", there is no cine-eye, since the dramatization of the event comes first, before shooting and editing. Riefenstahl is seemingly the one who produced images not as a discovery or contact with truth. She was expected to compose the entire "mise-en-scène", as the primary author of the ceremony, transforming life into a grandiose decor.

Yet, as Godard puts it, it is impossible to see, in the work of videographic "comparison" (as he did in his *Histoire(s) du cinéma*), the "same smile in the faces of Soviet worker girls and the German youth, represented in these films. This distance or interval is what we mean by the "power of the image", sometimes "transcendental", but sometimes indiscernible from its own "reality" --a reality which could trace the trajectory of a new "sociology of affects" through the means of "documentary" filmmaking.



CONCLUSION

Our study has been based upon the critique of the mainstream "sociology of opinions" which determined the methods of social research on the basis of the assumptions of "societies of opinion". Leaving aside the old epistemological argument about "knowledge", sociology becomes a huge work of collecting, filtering, and classifying opinions, which are constantly changing and oscillating. This situation is really a condition of "scientific" claims, and communications today tend to become the major model for the social sciences. It is believed that "information societies" in which we are supposed to live require and justify such a model which has been developed since the early beginnings of the academization of social sciences, a period during which the ability and imaginative-affective make up of early founders of social sciences (Tarde, Weber, Simmel and even Durkheim) has been eroded. This is the demise of "social types" the last examples of which are hardly seen in the works of certain historians, and an array of micro-sociologists or critiques, like Charles Wright Mills and, occasionally, Michel Foucault. A further tendency arises today in the "textualization" of the sociological work and criticism. It is no longer based on the life experience, except for mild phenomenological observations and arguments, but rather on the interplay of texts and contexts, paving the way for such contemporary approaches as semiology, cultural studies, post-colonial studies, cultural criticism, deconstruction and even hermeneutics. The last method too is nothing more than a "sociology of opinions," attempting to derive out its purposes from the "intentions" behind texts and words, if not the actual deeds. We are today far from Marx's early tenet: you cannot try to understand a people or an age by asking them

what they are thinking about themselves.

Evidently, we do not oppose these attempts to recover the domain of opinions, texts, and cultural artifacts: *we are rather suggesting an "affective sociology", a sociology of affects* which would be capable to enlarge the methodological toolkit of social research and of humanities at large. Taking opinion as a kind of "affective state" which arises with modernity, we are reminded of the work of Tarde who has been the founder of what we would today call as "sociology of opinions". The "monadological" work of Tarde and his criticisms directed against Durkheimian conception of *sui generis* society has been an essential starting point for our debate. This is mainly due to Tarde's foundational micro-sociology which has later been interpreted by American sociologists as "social psychology" (a misnomer). Also lying at the roots of Foucauldian conception of "power", Tarde's "microphysics of the social" is founded on a fundamental premise: the small is more complex than the big, the individual is much more complex than the society --so there is no room for opposing the two as did Durkheim, his followers and the structuralists, even if one is not to say something about mainstream sociology of opinions.

Thus, we try to develop a tentative critique of the notion of opinion, from the standpoints of Ancient philosophy --the opposition they made between *episteme* and *doxa* -- and from the standpoint of modern societies whose political institutions largely depend on the control and manipulation of opinions (today's parliamentary democracies are "societies of opinion").

Our main interrogation is about the way in which opinion societies coincide, in both historical and logical contexts, with what Burroughs labelled as "societies and control" and what Guy Debord, the Situationist, was calling, "societies of spectacle". As our purpose was to establish a "marriage" between social sciences and documentary film making, each having their own merits, it became essential to reconstruct the connections between these concepts. This should pass through a critique of the societies of opinion with respect to their ontological reality, a point hinted at also by F. Jameson (Jameson, 1990). In other words, we had to question

whether the social sciences, conceived under the title of a "sociology of opinions" really coincide with the historical development of the societies of opinion or whether the methods guiding and restraining the actual practice of social sciences to become "opinion of opinions" is a methodological failure and has to be corrected and criticized.

We believe that the keyword here should be "social types" and why the creation of "social type" is no longer within the capacity of social sciences, save for some lucky exceptions. For Simmel, "social types" (in contradistinction to Weber's "ideal types") are mainly analytical tools to conceive, including the powers of intuition, concrete social formations and events. This means that a social type has a "figure", and a "formula" which can be visualized for the imagination of the laymen, and is constituted by a bundle of traits, characters, and affects which are mainly attributed to them by the community in which they are and have to live: The Stranger, The Poor, The Jew are examples of "social types," only as being recognized by the community as such. Early social sciences and their founders were capable of creating such social types This has been a fundamental characteristic of their individual work: Simmel has a veritable gallery, and Marx invented the "Lumpen-Proletariat", Weber the "Protestant" with his "ethos" being constitutive of the "spirit of capitalism", Sombart the "bourgeois" whose formula is the "first man detached or freed from the conditions and rhythms of the Nature". One can add to this list the "flâneur" of Walter Benjamin, the "conservatist" of Karl Mannheim and "Der Arbeiter" of Ernst Jünger.

Yet we find that the creation of social types is not restrained to the domain of social sciences. Since Balzac, the novel was particularly capable of creating them, not lacking concrete elaborations and formulations. Modern literature means the creation of social types rather than "individuals", as Lukacs would like to put it. As a rule, we maintain that a social type should have a "formula" and one can find such formulas in the Nineteenth century novel, from Stendhal to Dostoyevsky's Idiot. Moreover, the birth of cinema has given us more "visualized" accounts of social types, while it is difficult, as in the novel, to depict them outside their

almost caricatural presence on the screen. There corresponds to this capacity to create social types major "genres" of cinema and the novel: the polar, the film of war, gangster films, family or love romances, and especially the Burlesque genre with its gags. Under the caricaturized figure of Charlot, Charles Chaplin was capable to "formulate" the eminent social types of his epoch: The Migrant, the "flâneur", the poor, and so forth... Dr. Mabuse of Murnau is a social type in transformation, throughout his fantastic move from Germany to United States... Bertolt Brecht was capable to "formulate" Hitler as Al Capone in his Arturo Ui. This means that "affects" and "traits" are much more easily presented (or "represented" if you will) by cinematography, and this urges us, even at this level, to suggest a marriage between the documentary filmmaking and social-scientific research.

Finally, there arises the inevitable question: Is it only the failure of social sciences today to lose their ability to create social types (for this is really a "creation", since it needs a "formula")? The question is a burning one: we have to ask it in this manner, and then ask: Is modern society the one in which social types either disappear or are dissolved in the peregrinations of the mass culture? We are by no means nostalgic about "social types"; yet we can also observe that they have deserted today the domains of the cinema and the novel (as in their post-modern variations). However, one should further ask: Is the prevailing "journalistic" language of mainstream social sciences and in the postmodern popular novel as well as in the ordinary cinema capable of creating social types in depth? These critical questions should be further developed and elaborated beyond the limited scope of our purpose here. We can only suggest at this point that the disparition of social types is not only the event which happened in social sciences but also in the domains of those such other representative practices as cinema, theater, literature and even psychoanalysis. Today we cannot say that "yuppies" or "hackers" are "social types", because they lack the essential "formula", or their formula is given only in the journalistic language if not by governments and administrations. Today everything appears either as singularities or trends, and the former aspect is still the one which could be capable to revive the theme and the idea of social

types.

Thus, in the second chapter on "affects", we have intended to go deeper into the domain of affective traits, and here it was only Spinoza who could have helped us with his rational and no less empirical doctrine of affects, passions, and emotions. This could be made only through a critique of psychoanalysis, which seems unjustifiably to monopolize today the analysis of the person, even the "juridical" one, as the case of the Lacanians proves. This critique is mainly concerned with the absence of any analytical consideration in psychoanalysis, except for what they call "therapy." Psychoanalysis doesn't serve to dream, to love, or to act; it only restores life in the Oedipal triangle of familialism, as Deleuze and Guattari have convincingly shown. We believe that the analysis of affects could tell more about all these practical issues which are essentially ethical and political. This is why we needed to develop the notion of "ignoramus", and the notion of the "ignorant", instead of contending ourselves with the psychoanalytical theme of the "Unconscious". We have tried to develop a Spinozist conception of the unconscious which cannot be conveniently reduced to a quasi-mystic internality of the Id (*Es*).

Positively speaking, such an "Unconscious" is something to be produced and assembled. It is a creation *** rather than a given, an already-there. It does not lie in the depths of the psyche but at the surface, while it is difficult to see it thoroughly. It has to be constructed at a socio-political level rather than on a personal, individual *** basis. Economically, it is an investment of desire rather than a constant search for satisfaction. Our critique of psychoanalysis tries to reach the point where Spinoza (and occasionally Tarde) elaborates on the passionate life not only at the level of the individual but rather on a "plane of consistency" where societies and individuals are thrown, and we believe that, for Spinoza, societies too are either enjoying or suffering from affects, emotions and passions.

This is against the "cerebrality" of the Cartesian architecture of the mind which is otherwise a great revolution. The revolution of the cogito is the one which brought

"thinking" to the situation of a human activity, hence paving the way for the claims of "rights of thoughts, opinions, and conscience". Our option, however, is the Leibnizean, Spinozist and Kantian critiques of Descartes: the first is the development of the theme of the "point of view" which was required in our last chapter about the "ways of seeing" and of "making visible"; the second that of the "emancipatory" nature of ideas; and finally, there is the Kantian search for the "creation" of a world based on subjectivity.

We believe that a sociology of affects cannot be founded without the help of these three fundamental philosophical considerations. Spinoza was aware of the fact that everything was a play between the "power to act" (*potentia*) and the "sovereign power" (*potestas*); the former being the way in which we enjoy life, production and creation of pleasures, and the latter was the way in which we are detached from our power to act in sadness, fear, terror etc.. A regime, even a social-democratic one (and especially social democracies) are those which absorb individuality into a fictive "potestas" which proposes to solve the problems in the name of the people which is supposed to be "innocent" and which has to be "governed": governing turns out to become a "service" and we believe, it is the position of the "potestas" itself which creates these "problems-to-be-solved" themselves, while people do have the potentiality to be free and to govern themselves. This is the fundamental Spinozist definition of democracy that he has declared as the "most powerful political regime", in contradistinction with any liberal definition of democracy.

Spinoza was able to define the passionate life at every possible level, ranging from individuals to groups, from collectivities to classes, from nations to the societies at large. He was aware of the fact that "nations" too had affections, ideas, symbols, superstitions. He believed that "individuality" is plural, subject to *fluctuatio animi*, just as societies, defined itself as a "body". Thus, the best political regime (democracy) is established when the maximum joy for all is enjoyed and Spinoza seems to be reluctant about those regimes which are based upon fear and terror and even upon hope (as in the case of "utopianism").

Yet there remains an architectural problem to be solved, in the context of Spinoza's doctrine of affects and images. This has been our point of departure in suggesting the "realm" of image (or "imagination") as the basis of our proposition for a possible "sociology of affects". We needed an excursus into "documentary" film and the cinema in general, alongside some contemporary techniques of recording and modifying what we call "thought-images". Our observations are going in this direction: we have the entire realm of document-images and their archive which lacks a proper theoretical discussion, but at least equipped with an ethical concern due to the power of images they use as a medium of expression. Social sciences on the other hand seemingly are lacking such an ethical constraint, but have developed a theoretical-methodological toolkit which can play the role of an opening insight. The documentary is lacking what the social sciences were able to develop in their own, textualized and academized domain. Hence we were forced to suggest a marriage between social sciences and the possibilities of "images", of audio-visual techniques, and of the powers of the "document-image". Cinema is no longer something to be semiologically, sociologically, or psychoanalytically analyzed: it had, from its earliest times (for instance Vertov) to analyze social facts and their rather "invisible" associations, articulations and events. The cinema and the video today are destined to make visible the invisible, a bundle of relationships selected and mounted to constitute "ideas". The eminent danger of the world of images is not its power and domination over every domain of life. The real danger has been the television, unilaterally transforming images into clichés and repetitions, as part of its "management of time" (as once argued by Maurizio Lazzarato). However, television in itself (as well as other technologies of digital communication) would still continue to be the most developed means of expression (multi-media and digital recording). Language, images, visions and music are all present there and they constitute not only the actual "societies of spectacle" (Debord) but also the a videosphere (Debray). Television has been a "doubling" or rather "duplication" of images as everything passes through it --photography, film, painting, speech and conversation and any kind of document. It is in itself a society of opinions. We believe that what is

essential is to liberate images from their ordinary televisual form, which amounts to be like clichés.

Our archive is hence audio-visual and relies upon not only a collection or classification of opinions, but of images and affects. Like the *énoncé's* of Michel Foucault we believe, they are rare, and rarity is their mode of presence itself. Clichés and opinions are everywhere, they surround us as a sphere but they are viewed by people as either "senseless" or as something to look and envision indifferently. This is the "rise of non-importance", as Castoriadis argued. Only through a criticism of television, but also combatting it by its own means one could develop a "neo-Vertovian" sensibility to affects, to images, and in the saying of Deleuze, to "affection-images".



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TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Sosyoloji ve genel olarak sosyal bilimler, özellikle akademik evrimleri boyunca gittikçe bir "kanaatlar sosyolojisi" karakteri kazanmaya meylettiler. Yani aslında en değişken toplumsal olgulardan olan kanaatların bir koleksiyonu, bir filtrelenmesi ve bir özetlenmesi olarak kendi pratiklerini biçimlendirdiler. Bu durum genel olarak beşeri bilimleri önemli bir epistemolojik problemle karşı karşıya bırakmaktadır: kaantların kanaati olmak, ya da daha doğrusu kanaatlar ile bilgi arasındaki en klasik ayrım karşısında birincisine yönelmek. Böylece en azından olağan bilim olarak sosyoloji bir enformasyon ya da "bilme" türü olmaktan çok, insanlara kendi dünyaları, yaşamları ve amaçları, istekleri ve ihtiyaçları konusunda ne düşündüklerini soran bir araştırma teknolojisi olarak kendini sınırlandırma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıyadır. Oysa gazeteciliğin ve genel olarak enformasyon medyasının, giderek devletin istihbarat aygıtlarının bu pratiği çok daha yetkin ve edimsel bir tarzda yürütebileceği rahatlıkla söylenebilir.

Kanaatlar sosyolojisi adını verdiğimiz bu eğilimin karşısına "duygular sosyolojisi" dediğimiz bir öneriyle çıkmayı planlıyoruz. Walter Benjamin gibi birisinin ya da Georg Simmel'in düşünce ve "aydınlanma/aydınlatma" ritimlerini paylaşmayı umabilecek, özellikle de toplumsal tipleri birtakım afektif (duygusal) varolma halleriyle açığa çıkarmaya çalışacak bir sosyal bilim günümüzde hangi koşullarda mümkündür ve hangi türden saiklerle inşa edilebilir? Günümüzün olağan akademik ortamında sosyal bilimler esas olarak şu soruyu ortaya atmanın ötesine pek geçemiyorlar: insanlara yöneltilen kanaat soruları (pozitivizm ve düz ampirisizm),

durumun sosyal bilim arařtırmalarında artık genelgeçer bir hale gelmiř olmasındır. Kanaatların kararsız olma, kolay ya da zor, ama yine de "deęiřebilir" ve dolayısıyla "manipüle edilebilir" olma özellięi onları "düşünme" adını verebileceğimiz insan faaliyetinden doğa bakımından farklı kılmaktadır. Kanaatların eksenine yerleřtikleri ölçüde sosyal bilimler düşünmekten çok, kanaatların kanaatı olmakla kalmak eğilimindedirler. Böylece kanaatlar bir "düzleştirme mantığıyla" çalışırlar: mesela bir insanın kendi varoluř kořulları hakkındaki kanaati bu kořulların tespitinden daha derin bir realiteymiř gibi görünecektir. Belki sosyal bilimlerin genel tavrının bir "demokratizasyonu" diye alkıřlanabilecek olan böyle bir bakıř açısı aslında çok önemli bir sorunu gözardı etmektedir: bir insanı en iyi tanıyanın yine kendisi olacağına dair temel bir önyargı...

Oysa insanı toplumsal bir varlık olarak tanıyanlar daha çok onun sürekli etkileřim içinde olduęu sosyal dünyası ve "ötekilerdir". Hiç deęilse onu "adlandırırılar" ve insanlığı "sosyal tipler" halinde etiketlendirmekten bir an olsun geri durmazlar. Hermenötik geleneęe yaslanan sosyal bilim bile "anlamayı" birinin kendi hakkındaki tasavvuruna eř düşen bir tasavvura sahip olmak olarak tanımlamakla aslında "kanaatlar sosyolojisinin" sözkonusu epistemolojik tuzağına düşmektedir. Ondokuzuncu yüzyılda sosyal bilimlerin oluřum ařamasında en can alıcı unsur olan "sosyal tipler yaratma" yetisi bu çerçevede sosyal bilimler pratięini giderek terketmektedir. Kategoriler artık Kant'ın istedięi gibi "evrensel" ve "zorunlu"durlar, ancak Kant'ın asla istemeyeceęi bir şekilde artık belli tiplere ancak "bol gelen kavramlar" halinde uygulanabilirler. Bu durum moderniteye özgü toplumsal tiplerin yitip gittikleri ve toplumun tipolojik olarak düzleřtięi bir toplumsal yapıya mı delalet ediyor, yoksa bizzat sosyal bilimler bu yeteneklerini yitirdiler, bu apayrı ve burada cevap bulmaya çalışmayacağımız bir sorudur. Biliyoruz ki toplumsal tipleri sadece sosyal bilimlere ve Simmel'in toplumsal tipler galerisine borçlu deęiliz; edebiyat, sonra da sinema toplumsal tipler üretip durdular ve artık, en az sosyal bilimler kadar, bu yetilerini kaybetme eğilimindedirler.

Doğrudan doğruya toplumsal tipler üstünde durmasa bile, duygular sosyolojisi ikili bir deneyim olmalıdır: birincisi bizi edebiyata, özellikle romana doğru taşırken ikincisi bizi sinemaya götürür --özellikle de bugün dar bir terimle "belgesel" adını verdiğimiz film tipine. Ancak üçüncü ve daha temel nitelikli bir boyut da elbette Spinoza'nın son derecede derin "duygular teorisi" olacaktır. Tabii ki her şey toplumsal hayat içinde imajların, kanaatların ve düşüncelerin aslında bir etkilenmeler ve duygulanmalar süreci içinde anlam kazanabileceği fikrine götürüyor bizi.

Sinemanın dünyasıyla karşılaştığımız andan itibaren temel bir gözlemde bulunmaktan da kaçınamayız: sosyoloji, göstergebilim, sanat tarihi hatta psikanaliz sinemayı "analiz" etmeye cesaret eden temel insan bilimleri olarak kendilerini sundular. Ancak bu sinemanın da bizzat "analiz" edebileceği fikrinin belli bir oranda horgörülmesi demektir. Tıpkı Simmel'in ünlü toplumsal tiplerinden "yabancı" kategorisinin doğrudan Western filmin ana tematiklerinden birisi olması gibi. Üstelik sinema, Dziga Vertov'un ona yüklediği daha ilginç bir işleve de sahip olabilir: görünmeyeni görülebilir kılmak. Sonuçta günümüzün pedagojisi metinden çok görsel-işitsel malzeme üzerine dayanma eğilimindedir. Başka bir deyişle, genel bir gözlem insanoğlunun giderek daha az okuduğunu, daha çok "seyrettiğini" ve bunu ne yazık ki popüler bir eğlenti sinemasıyla ve televizyonla gerçekleştirmek zorunda kaldığını gösterebilir. Metinler ve kanaatlar arasında kaldıkça sosyal bilimler günümüzün yaşam koşullarının çok önemli bir boyutundan kendilerini yoksun bırakmış gibiler. Görselliğin taşıyabileceği enformasyon miktarından.

Oldukça dikkat çekici bir nokta, sosyal bilimlerde etkin olan bir "felsefi-teorik" sorgunun belgesel adını verdiğimiz (ama zorunlu olarak belgesel ile sınırlı kalmaması gereken) bir filmografi alanında pek bulunmaması, buna karşın, belgesel filmcilerin, genellikle kullandıkları görsel-işitsel ortamın enformatik gücü yüzünden edinmiş göründükleri biraz da naif bir etik sorgulamanın sosyal bilimlerin pratiğinde pek ender olarak görünmesidir. Bu durum "duygular sosyolojisinin" "belgesel" film ortamıyla "duyguların imajlarını oluşturmaya" çabalayacak sosyal bilim ortamının bir barışmasını, bir evliliğini imliyor gibidir. Gerçekten de, diyelim ki "yoksulluk"

üstüne bir araştırmada bir kamera yoksulluğun "imajlarını" tespit ederek kurgulayabilir ve bunu "çevreyi", "mekanı" ve "zamanı" görüntü haline getirerek yapar. Bu imajların tasnifine, yani "düşünülmesine" sinemanın pek erken bir dönemden beri taktığı bir ad var: montaj. Jean-Luc Godard montajın modern hayatın esası olduğunu söylüyordu: hayatımız, kentlerimiz, sınai üretimimiz, edebiyatımız, her şey modern hayatta ve ileri kapitalizmde montajdan başka bir şey değildir. Ama montaj en saf haliyle sinemada bulunur. Yani onun esası ve özüdür. Oysa ki sinema kendi özü olan montajı, başka bir deyişle modern dünyayı kavrayabilme konusundaki biricik ve temel şansını televizyon yararına çoktandır terketmiştir.

Böylece montaj sinemanın ötesinde daha derin bir mefhum olarak düşünölmeli. Montaj, yalnızca filmde değil, her alanda modernliğin (ya da diyelim modernlik sonrasında) temel düşünme biçimi ve tarzıdır. Başka bir deyişle, nasıl sosyal bilimci araştırma verilerinin tasnifi yapıyor, ilişkilerini oluşturuyor ve birtakım sonuçlara varıyorsa filmci de montaj aracılığıyla varoluşun bir imajını oluşturacaktır. Bu noktada sanat ile bilim arasındaki ayrımın keskinliği ortadan kalkarak her ikisi eş titreşime sokulabilir. Bu tezdeki amacımız da zaten bu eş titreşimin bir tür projelendirme önerisinden ibaret. Bir duygular sosyolojisi ağırlıkla "imajlar üretebilme" kapasitesine tekabül etmektedir. Bunu Simmel dönemine ve onun toplumsal tiplerine dönüş olarak düşünemeyiz, ancak sosyal hayatın imajlarının tasnifi metinsel araçlarla yeterince yapılamayacağından sosyal bilimlerle görser işitsel araçların bir evliliği esaslı bir önem kazanıyor. Henüz sığ bir alanda seyrettiği gözlemlenebilecek olan "anlatısal tarih" açılımlardan yalnızca biri olabilir. Ancak bunun da ötesine geçerek hayatın akışının genel bir görsel-işitsel tasnifinin montaja yani düşünme sürecine her an açık bir "duygular alanı" haline dönüştürölmesi, başlangıçta mutlak olarak bölük pörçük kalsa bile temel bir önerme olarak ortaya atılabilir.

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