

**THE MODERNIZATION POLICIES OF ATATURK AND REZA SHAH:  
A COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS**

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
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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE MODERNIZATION POLICIES OF ATATURK AND REZA SHAH: A COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS**

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This study deals with the question of how the same goals of two charismatic leaders, Ataturk and Reza Shah, towards creating a Western type nation-state by reconstructing the system reveal different outcomes.

Therefore, first of all, the movements through modernization, which were realized during the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Sultanate, and the political/economic restructuring of two Empires at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century have been evaluated. The target is to put forth the developments before Ataturk and Reza Shah. The case of two countries' internally and externally independence after two leaders emerged on the scene and the modernization lines of two leaders within the context of cause-effect relationship has been analyzed.

Westernization goal of the two Middle Eastern countries and thereof Reza Shah's intention in modeling Ataturk's path did not result in the same pattern. Here, it has been observed that the Sunni-Shiite structure is effective in the society and as a result of social reaction, particularly from the mullahs, by putting aside the Republican regime, rather in economic and cultural fields the modernization target was achieved. Reza

Shah's Iran could not reach to a level of contemporary civilization that Ataturk aimed and furthermore caused awakening and institutionalizing of the mullahs against a possible laicist regime. Thus, it was a crucial step on the way towards the Islamic Revolution.





## ÖZ

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Bu çalışma, Atatürk ve Rıza Şah gibi iki karizmatik liderin, sistemi yeniden inşa ederek Batılı anlamda bir ulus-devlet yaratma hedeflerinin nasıl farklı sonuçlara yol açtığı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır.

Bu amaçla, ilk olarak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Kaçar Hanedanlığı döneminde de yaşanan modernleşme yönündeki hareketler ve 18. yy. sonlarında her iki imparatorluğun politik ve ekonomik yapılanması değerlendirilerek, Atatürk ve Rıza Şah dönemleri öncesinde oluşturulan gelişmeler ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. İki liderin sahneye çıkması sonrasında, Türkiye ve İran'ın iç ve dış bağımsızlıklarını kazanmaları ve iki ülke liderinin modernleşme çizgileri neden-sonuç ilişkisi çerçevesinde incelenmiştir.

Her iki Ortadoğu ülkesinin Batılılaşma hedefi ve bu amaçla Rıza Şah'ın Atatürk'ün izlediği yolu model alması her iki ülkede aynı şekilde sonuçlanmamıştır. Burada Sünni-Şii toplumda yapılanmasının etkileri olduğu ve toplumsal reaksiyon (özellikle mollalar) doğrultusunda İran'da Cumhuriyet rejiminden feragat edilerek daha çok ekonomik ve kültürel alanlarda modernleşme hedefinin gerçekleştirilebildiği gözlenmiştir. Rıza Şah İran'ı, sistemde kökten değişiklik yapılmadan devrim niteliğinde politikalar izleyen Atatürk'ün hedeflediği muasır medeniyet seviyesine ulaşamadığı gibi

olası laik bir rejim tehlikesine karşı mollaların uyanmasına ve örgütlenmelerine neden olmuştur ki bu İran'da İslam Devrimi'ne giden yolda önemli bir aşamadır.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The subject of this study is founded on comparative content analysis of the modernization policies of Ataturk and Reza Shah. I have concentrated on two charismatic leaders both striving for the same target: total independence from foreign domination, legitimizing the new legal authority and implementing socio-political and economic modernization policies. The question is that why the endeavors of these two leaders towards reaching contemporary civilization brought about different consequences.

The mode of the analysis comprises both historical, sociological and by all means international relations perspectives.

I have made a literature review and analyzed the subject by comparing two cases within the context of their relativistic nature. Hence, I have mentioned both similarities and differences via a comparative study. As regards bibliography, I had to face with the lack of historical materials concerning the Iran of the early twentieth century. The articles in Internet were limited as well. I have also glanced at newspapers and been informed about the impacts of Reza Shah's visit on Turkish media.

The reason why there is insufficient reading concerning the era of Qajar Dynasty and Reza Shah may be explained with the non-existence of historical works. Within this perspective, the work of Nazimu'l-Islam-i Kirmani, known as "*History of the Awakening of the Iranians*" opened a new era in the writing of Persian history in 1910. Since then, contemporary Iranian historians made historical works, but without

considering the Period of the Qajar Dynasty and even such significant events as the Tobacco Concession, the Constitutional Movement, the coup d'état of 1921. Besides, as Hafez Farmayan stated in his article entitled "*Sources for the study of Iranian history*", Iranian historians have been translating the historical works from European languages for merely more than a decade and they have been further more dealing with modern Europe or ancient Persia. In addition, the period between the History of Awakening (1910) and the outbreak of World War II is considered as strengthening and training period for historians, while Iran has been subjected to two world wars, a change of dynasty and modernization activities. Additionally, the materials concerning the Qajar period are generally memoirs, personal correspondences and official proclamations in general.<sup>1</sup> Historical books on the topic of Reza Shah and years corresponding to the beginning of Pahlavi era in Persian are inadequate. On the other hand, I have various sources relating to the era of Ataturk, so I tried to analyze the issues in balance due to the materials I could obtain.

In this study, units of analysis are Turkey and Iran. It should not be disregarded that these countries are Middle Eastern countries, so both could show similarities as regards their routes and modalities through modernization, i.e., the modernization processes in these countries were initiated by their own governors with referring to the military defeats by the West, whereas in the colonies these movements were launched by the foreign powers dominant in countries. Therefore, in Iran and Turkey, the modernization processes were in defensive character at the beginning, but later by spreading to all areas such as socio-political and economic spheres, the modernization policy has proceeded towards a more rational approach.

Bearing in mind the fact that Turkey and Iran are situated in a geographical location known as the Middle East, I would like to give broad information about the region.

The Middle East, which is a predominantly Muslim region, consists of the area from Morocco through Afghanistan. With the twentieth century rise of nationalisms, the Middle East has become more than a geographical expression whose orientations

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<sup>1</sup> Hafez F. Farmayan, "Sources for the study of Iranian history," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1974), p. 36.

show diversity more than unity and whose inhabitants respond to different loyalties and values in addition to religious loyalties. In particular, since the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of nationalist governments in the world after World War I, the Middle East has become a geographical expression. For instance, in Turkey since Ataturk, the elites began to express their identities with Europe and the West, not with the traditional Islamic heritage. Similarly the Iranians, during Pahlavi Shahs, adapted the values of the West underestimating Islam and the Arabs.<sup>2</sup> However, differently from the Ataturk's approach, Reza Shah did not break up the ties with the ulama taking into account that Shiite belief is the source of the loyalty in Iran.

In fact, loyalty is a crucial concern to ensure and sustain the political legitimacy in the country and guarantees the legitimacy of the political leadership without considering whether totalitarian or democratic and so on. However, the ruler should not touch to the traditional institutions, beliefs or customs that are the basic pillars for ensuring loyalty; otherwise the ruler may not constitute the legitimacy with new institutions. In short, leaders are given support on the grounds and legalize their political legitimacy that they will revive old institutions or create a bright new world.<sup>3</sup>

Dankwart A. Rustow enhances the abovementioned claims and states that:<sup>4</sup>

Political Stability = Legitimacy of institutions + Personal legitimacy of Rulers

Political Legitimacy = Traditional Legitimacy + Rational Legal Legitimacy + Charismatic Legitimacy

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<sup>2</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, "Is there a Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4 (1973), pp. 255-256.

<sup>3</sup> Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis" in Leonard Binder ed., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 143.

<sup>4</sup> Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 157 in Lucian W. Pye ed., "The Legitimacy Crisis", *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 149.

When briefly explained, it could be said that in stable systems, as a result of political socialization process, people accept the legitimacy of particular structures and authorities (rulers), and develop a sense of their national identity. If people have been inappropriately socialized and their confidence to the existing authority diminishes, a legitimacy crisis may arise.<sup>5</sup>

In order to avoid the legitimacy crisis, the authority should respond to the demands of new socialized classes. For instance, if a monarchy is replaced by a republic but with no change in class or popular participation, then there may be a legitimacy crisis. Most coup d'états, which represent the replacement of civilian rule with military rule to ensure authority in the system, occur as a result of legitimacy crisis.<sup>6</sup>

As I have discussed, for the purpose of ensuring legitimacy in the society, there is a necessity of class or popular participation in the system in parallel with the socialization of the society. In fact, the unavoidable outcome of the legitimacy crisis is uprising of the class to regain their interests. Hence, the classes in the society should be taken into consideration within reference to the factors of revolutionary process, because the classes, particularly intellectuals, both affect the system by exporting the modernization/Western influences and are affected by the system through Westernization, and consequently changes occur predominantly in the structure of classes and lead to re-stratification in the society.

In the Middle East, the traditional ruling class consists of six major components: 1) the ruler (Sultan, Shah or Sheikh); 2) the ruling families; 3) tribal nobility; 4) native landlords; 5) high ulama; 6) military elite. There has also been a group of industrialists and businessmen with other upper-class groups.

The ruler and the ruling families had always the sole authority. Besides this, the traditional middle classes, i.e., bureaucracy, bourgeoisie and ulama, have existed for centuries and the military, religious and bureaucratic occupations were effective

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<sup>5</sup> Pye, pp. 135-138.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 136-139.

arenas. The bureaucratic middle class with the ruling class; the clerical middle class with the masses was in closer contact.<sup>7</sup>

Thus far, I have pointed out the geographical expression of the Middle East, its internal dynamics such as classes and diversification of loyalties and values in the Middle Eastern countries. In addition to the internal dynamics of the Middle East, the extent of interaction between the West and the Middle East, and accordingly the Western effect on the Middle East is also of crucial importance in order to be able to assess the revolutionary processes in both Iran and Turkey. The West and the Middle East has historical roots. For several centuries, the Middle East had been under the domination of the Greece and Roma, and absorbed much of their influences. Then, the West was subjected to powerful religious influences emanating from the Middle East.<sup>8</sup> Due to Islam, Ibn Haldun, an Arab sociologist and philosopher of history, claims that the Middle Eastern peoples were patriotic before Westerners were. Their patriotism emerged by the shift of loyalty to the Caliphate as an influence of Islam, particularly understanding of “*Cihad*”, and after contacts with the West they began to learn European type of patriotism in the form of nation-state. Islamic culture penetrated into the east through the Iberian Peninsula and the Danube basin. With the industrial revolution and other subsequent developments in Europe, these similarities began to diminish and the West was identified with modernization, which influenced particularly the third world countries.<sup>9</sup>

Westernization in the Middle East resulted in a widening of the distance between the top and bottom layers of the society. An urban proletariat began to emerge as a result of Westernization. The industrialization created a demand for a labor force and thus a new middle class emerged.

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<sup>7</sup> James A. Bill, “Class Analysis and the dialects of modernization in the Middle East,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3 (1972), pp. 424–429.

<sup>8</sup> Raphael Patai, “The Dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East,” *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter 1955), p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Majid Khadduri, “The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East: An Appraisal,” *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.11, No: 1 (Winter 1957), p. 14.

Towards Westernization, the adoption of Western clothing caused the decline of local clothing industries. Local crafts diminished not only on the account of shrinking of their markets, but also increasing production of cheap imitations of local styles in Europe. The old craft guilds, which were forced out of their professions by the effect of Westernization, had joined the ranks of the urban proletariat or managed to survive the changing conditions. These merchants were the members of the middle class in the larger cities of the Middle East.<sup>10</sup>

I will not give all details of the Western influence on the Middle East, because in this study I will focus on only two Middle Eastern countries and their reaction to Western influence in the sense of modernization in political and socio-economic structures. However, there is one point that I could not underestimate which is democracy. It is a long process to constitute democracy in a country, so I will not discuss here the democratic evolutions of these two countries. Nevertheless, it is important to note that democracy in the West was the outcome of economic and cultural evolution/modernization in all spheres. Therefore, in non-Western countries in order to establish democracy, both economic and cultural development was a prerequisite. In a short time, those countries had to realize these developments to reach the level of 400 years old democracy established in the West.<sup>11</sup> To Reza Davari Ardakani, a philosopher, the West was not just a political entity, but also a way of thinking and a historical practice started in Europe more than 400 years ago.<sup>12</sup>

Towards the transitional period from the traditional society to modern society, democracy aspiration should be postponed. It means that the society should tolerate the autocratic governance for a while. Moreover, participation of individual will in decision-making process is deemed necessary during the transition period.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Patai, pp. 5-12.

<sup>11</sup> Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), pp. 9-10.

<sup>12</sup> Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "The Encounter of Post-Revolutionary Thought in Iran with Hegel, Heidegger and Popper" in ed: Şerif Mardin, *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East* (E. J. Brill, 1994), p. 239.

<sup>13</sup> Köker, pp. 9-10.

In addition, throughout the transition process to democracy, democratic institutions, which were associated with representative government, should be established. Indeed, the transition to democracy depends upon the willingness and ability of the military and bureaucratic elites of Middle Eastern countries to reject their institutional orientations and to decide to replace them with democratic institutions. Moreover, according to I.B. Mayo's book entitled "*An Introduction to Democratic Theory*", democratic institutions have had moderate success in non-European countries only when they have been imposed above.<sup>14</sup>

Within these perspectives, in the introductory chapter I draw the picture of Middle Eastern geography due to the fact that both Turkey and Iran situated in this area. Modernization policies took shape in the Middle Eastern framework and hence similarities transpired between Turkey and Iran, i.e., the way of adapting Western values and presenting Westernization in compliance with the traditional Islamic heritage. Here, I discuss the main characteristics of the Middle Eastern modernization, particularly the Western influence on the Middle East.

In the second chapter, I examine the historical roots of modernization movements. Therefore, for the purpose of better understanding of the modernization movements, I prefer canalizing on the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Dynasty, particularly within the context of socio-political and economic structures in the late 1880s and early 1900s, which were the dates of pre-modernization era.

In this chapter, I argue the awakening of modernization movement in both countries in order to draw attention to the gradual development of relativistic modernization processes. Besides, the influences of French Revolution and the impacts of the West will be evaluated. The subject of whether a need for change emerged as an upshot of external pressure or not, will be clarified. I also briefly discuss the socio-political and economic structures of Ottoman Empire and Qajar Dynasty comparatively.

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<sup>14</sup> Leonard Binder, *Iran -Political Development in a changing society-* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 52-54.



In the third chapter, I concentrate on the modernization policies of Ataturk and Reza Shah as prototypes of the Middle Eastern modernization. In this sense, the themes of freeing Turkey and Iran from political and economic domination; restructuring in political, economic and judicial spheres; social reforms and cultural progress will be evaluated in their relativistic nature.

Furthermore, I give information on Sunni-Shiite tradition for the purpose of clarifying the main fact affecting the outcomes of modernization policies within the context of the clash of religious belief with modernization values and of questioning in what extent Sunni or Shiite belief challenged with Ataturk and Reza Shah.

In the conclusion, I determine how the dynamics changed the paths of two countries, which were originating from two tired Empires and aiming independence from foreign domination and targeting modernization for the purpose of being civilized nation-states.



## CHAPTER II

### A RETROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE QAJAR SULTANATE IN THE LATE 1880s AND EARLY 1900s

In this chapter, I intend to draw a picture on the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Sultanate in the late 1880s and early 1900s of pre-modernization era by discussing their socio-political and economic structures, and awakening of modernization movements in these two Empires.

#### 2.1. Ottoman Empire Before Modernization

##### 2.1.1. The Socio-Political and Economic Structure of the Ottoman Empire

In the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was the absolute ruler and all his subjects were the servants ‘*kul*’. The Sultan was not only the monarch of the Ottoman state but also the Caliph of all Muslims<sup>15</sup>. The power of the Caliphate, since the era of Sultan Selim II (1566-1574), rose up to the level of Holy Sea by the attempt of Abdulhamid II. The religion of the state was Islam. In the 1860s, the religion was considered as a unifying ideology in a way that Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) believed.<sup>16</sup>

According to Halil Inalcık, the Ottoman society was divided into two groups: i) the military whom the Sultan delegated his religious and executive power, officers of the

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<sup>15</sup> Said Amir Arjomand, “Constitutions and the Struggle for political order,” in Şerif Mardin editor, *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1994), p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> Tefik Çavdar, *Osmanlıların Yarı Sömürge Oluşu*, İstanbul, Ant Kitabevi, 1970, pp. 49-50 and see also Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State interaction in Republican Turkey,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28 (1996), p. 233.

court, army, civil servants and ulama ii) the “*reaya*”<sup>17</sup> consisting of all Muslim and non-Muslim people.<sup>18</sup>

The definition of *Ottoman* was understood as the dynasty rather than a nation, i.e. Abbasids, and accepted as the successor of the previous Islamic States. The Ottoman Empire became a geographical expression including all Muslim and non-Muslim nations. Turks were one of them, and until the nineteenth century they were considering themselves firstly as Muslim and their loyalty was primarily to Islam and secondary to the Ottoman dynasty.<sup>19</sup>

To Bernard Lewis, Turks were also the minority in the Empire. Indeed, it is really worthy of note that the name “*Turkey*” was attributed by the Europeans in the 11<sup>th</sup> century. However, the Turks did not adopt it as an official name of the country. On the other hand, the term “*Turk*” was rarely used in the Ottoman Empire, solely for the purpose of identifying the Turkish nomads and the illiterate villagers speaking Turkish in the villages of Anatolia. Besides, Christians and Jews were also allowed to live in the Ottoman Muslim state under their own religious laws. This system in which Muslims and non-Muslims live together, was known as “*millet*”.<sup>20</sup>

Iliya Harik in his article entitled “*The ethnic revolution and political integration in the Middle East*” attributes to Albert Hourani’s notion that different groups in the community predominated in different occupations in the Ottoman Empire, i.e., the chief military and political offices were in the hands Balkan or Anatolian originated Moslems; Arab and Egyptian Muslims played a role in the religious hierarchy;

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<sup>17</sup> Halil İnalçık, “The nature of Traditional Society,” *Readings in Turkish Politics* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları), p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> For further information on the word “*reaya*” see Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1992), p. 59.

<sup>19</sup> Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu*, çev. Metin Kıratlı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, No:8, 2000), p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.1 and see also Iliya F. Harik, “The ethnic revolution and political integration in the Middle East,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3 (1972), p. 307.

meanwhile, Christian Balkans benefited from the system of *devsirme*<sup>21</sup> in which non-Muslims became Turkish and Muslim.<sup>22</sup>

The geographic borders of the Ottoman Empire was too broad to reign, thus some feudal lords emerged on the scene and gained local authority in the Empire. Although the debates concerning the existence of feudalism in the Empire were still going on, Niyazi Berkes claims that the feudalist structure was the foremost constituent in the Empire. Within reference to the dominant feudalist composition, Berkes asserts that a different type of feudalism of the Empire may be called ‘*eastern type despotic empire*’ rather than European feudalism. Berkes pointed out the reason that in the Ottoman Empire the land belonged to the central authority, but some small parts were used by waqfs, which were under the control of the ulama<sup>23</sup> and appointed local authorities known as fief holders “*tımarlı sipahi*”<sup>24</sup> had to plant the land. On the other hand, in Europe there was no central authority and the feudal lords, who were exercising the political power, were controlling the land.<sup>25</sup>

It is here worthy to point out that agriculture was of crucial importance for the Ottoman economy. The majority of Anatolia’s population was employed in the agricultural sector.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, in addition to the land revenues of the Ottoman Empire, the traditional economic structure of the Empire depended on animal husbandry and trade.

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<sup>21</sup> For further information on the word “*devsirme*” see Sina Aksin, *Ana Çizgileriyle Türkiye’nin Yakın Tarihi* (Ankara: İmaj Yayınevi, 1996), p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> Harik, “The ethnic revolution and political integration in the Middle East,” ... pp. 305-306.

<sup>23</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi*, çev. Yasemin Saner Gönen (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), p. 33 and see Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914* (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 25, see also Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978), p. 144.

<sup>24</sup> For further information on “*tımarlı sipahi*” see Kongar, p. 59.

<sup>25</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, p. 144.

<sup>26</sup> Owen, p. 189.

Wars, lack of education, lack of knowledge about the markets, inconvenience in the transportation and domestic insecurity affected the Ottoman economy in a negative way. Indeed, there was no strong domestic merchant class, and moreover trade activities were being exercised by the non-Muslims.<sup>27</sup> Non-agricultural area of production was limited with the activities of craftsmen guilds “*esnaf loncaları*”. All the craftsmen and artisans had to be the members of these organizations. Moreover, these guilds had close ties with the tarikats.<sup>28</sup>

The Ottoman Empire was deprived of adapting the economic developments that the West realized by the Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the competition between Western countries and their imperialistic policies for the purpose of sharing the Ottoman market resulted in granted compromises by the Ottoman Empire. Then, it brought about the foreign take over of the economy and economic bankruptcy.<sup>29</sup>

Meanwhile, emerging European capitalist states were in need of new markets to sell their goods to pre-capitalist countries. The Ottoman Empire seemed available for that aim and the European capitalist states began to penetrate into the Ottoman market. Though, the national industry was not eligible for competing with cheap western products. Therefore, the Empire was forced to make trade agreements and at last became a free trade zone. With the first trade agreement signed with England in 1838, the Empire got into debt. After 1850, loans from the west flew into the Ottoman treasury and were utilized for the modernization movements and the finance of the wars. In addition, some of the Ottoman Sultans used loans for the purpose of building new palaces and financing luxurious living.<sup>30</sup>

Consequently, the Ottoman Empire went bankruptcy, which caused a system of international financial control and led to loss of sovereignty. In 1881, the Ottoman

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>28</sup> *Zurcher*, p. 35 and see also *Kongar*, p. 54.

<sup>29</sup> Mehmet, Özay, “Turkey in crisis: Some contradictions in the Kemalist Development Strategy,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 15 (1983), p. 54.

<sup>30</sup> *Kongar*, p. 256.

Public Debt Administration (PDA) was established and in the course of the financial crisis, three major foreign controlled banks –the Imperial Ottoman, the Deutsche Bank and the National Bank of Turkey- assisted the Ottoman economy. Meanwhile, the Great Britain and France were the powers, which were more interested in the management of Turkey’s finance, so as to safeguard their shares in the Ottoman public debt and for further penetration into the Turkish economy.<sup>31</sup>

On the other hand, fiscal depression strengthened the feudal lords and decentralization in the European provinces of the Empire. In the course of time, the central authority became dependent upon the feudal lords “*ayan*” in terms of soldier and collection of taxes. The incomes of the central treasury decreased and the collection of taxes “*iltizam system*”<sup>32</sup> created problems to the central government. Briefly, before the “*iltizam system*” there were fief holders staying there, planting the land and serving for the sake of the central authority. On the other hand, the tax farmers (*mültezim*) had been solely buying goods from the villagers and paying to the central authority without settling around the land and subsequently lacuna of the authority fortified the position of the feudal lords.

### 2.1.2. Awakening of Modernization Movements:

#### **Tanzimat (1839-76) and the Second Constitutional Era (1908):**

The Westernization movement commenced during Selim III’s era (1789-1808) and fostered by Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Abdulmecid (1839-1861).

On the other hand, Turkey’s early republican era was accepted as the Tanzimat period (1839-76). The Tanzimat reformers initiated the modernization process and claimed that the reforms should be realized in the military organization, judicial

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<sup>31</sup> Owen, pp. 191-192.

<sup>32</sup> For further information on “*iltizam system*” see Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1992).

system, economic structure and education.<sup>33</sup> However, their reforms concerning legal and administrative structures were misunderstood and fulfilled inefficiently.

The field that the Tanzimat reformers succeeded was education. The primary education in Ottoman society was the function of religious authorities until 1869. However, in 1876, the primary schools were placed under the governance of local school boards consisting of the local imam and *muhtar* (the elected head of a village or of a neighborhood within a town or city). The most attractive attempt was that the education opportunities were enhanced for women and a few numbers of girl schools, teacher schools and art schools for them were opened. Since then, Turkish women had the opportunity to go to the secondary schools and at last universities. In 1913, the Provisory Primary Education Law was enforced. Nevertheless, no serious attempt had been seen in terms of compulsory education and moreover, the numbers of the schools were not enough. Moreover, despite all attempts, the religious nature of primary education did not change.<sup>34</sup>

As understood, a dual education system came into existence in the Ottoman Empire. While the primary schools, which were supported by Evkaf (Pious Foundations), were not closed, the modern public school system was instituted between 1869 and the outbreak of the World War I in 1914. Western style schools were established such as a military school (Harbiye), a medical school (Tıbbiye) and a school training public servants (Mülkiye). In August of 1900, Darul-funun, which was later called Istanbul University, was opened. The graduates of these schools would become the new elite, replacing those trained in religious schools (İlmiye). Consequently, intellectuals began to challenge the regime and hereafter they played a fundamental role in the course of modernization process.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Emel Sönmez, "Atatürk and the rights of Turkish women," *The reforms of Atatürk (Essays written to commemorate the 50. Anniversary of the Turkish Republic)* (Istanbul: Publications of the RCD Cultural Institute), p. 38.

<sup>34</sup> M. T. Özelli, "The Evolution of the formal educational system and its relation to economic growth policies in the first Turkish Republic," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1974), p. 83.

<sup>35</sup> Leyla Neyzi, "The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.33, No.3 (August 2001), p. 416

Meanwhile, the intellectuals “*Young Ottomans*” attributed their loyalty to the state with respecting to the Ottoman-Muslim culture. The Young Ottomans “*Yeni Osmanlılar*” such as Namık Kemal, who were the engineers of the Ottoman nationalism, developed the concept of fatherland (*vatan*). To Namık Kemal, all people living within the territory of the Ottoman Empire were the Ottoman citizens.<sup>36</sup>

The aim of those Young Ottomans for the duration of Tanzimat era was to strengthen the central state and weaken the religious establishment, while making reforms in the spheres of civilian and military bureaucracy, education and judiciary. Consequently, the Tanzimat’s secular modernization caused a split between the ulama and bureaucrats. With the inauguration of Tanzimat Charter, the gap between the forces of secularism and Shari’a became apparent, since the charter was not approved and legitimized by the Sheikh-Islam.<sup>37</sup> It is important to note that the high-ranking religious authorities were part of the state cadres and the main source of state’s legitimacy was the Shari’a, but after the Tanzimat reforms, the ulama could solely express themselves with Islam at the folk level.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to secularist attempts, the idea of the rule of law was transferred from Europe to the Ottoman Empire by means of the Rose Garden Decree (*hatt-i şerif of Gülhane*) by Abdulmecid in 1839 and confirmed in the decree of 1856 (*hatt-i humayun*).<sup>39</sup> This development was the product of Mustafa Resid Pasha, who used the word “civilization” for the purpose of representing the West.<sup>40</sup> Meanwhile, the administration of the Empire inefficiently was continuing till Abdulhamid II (1876-

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<sup>36</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, “The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and nationalism,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975), pp. 270-279.

<sup>37</sup> Dora Glidewell Nadolski, “Ottoman and secular civil law,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 8 (1977), p. 521.

<sup>38</sup> Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “Parameters and strategies of Islam-state interaction in Republican Turkey,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28 (1996), pp. 232-233.

<sup>39</sup> Arjomand, p. 15.

<sup>40</sup> Aydın Sayılı, “Batılılaşma Hareketimizde Biliminde yeri ve Atatürk,” *Erdem (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Dergisi)* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, C. 1, No.1 (Ocak) 1985), p. 14.



1909). Abdulhamid II ascended to the throne, in exchange for his promise to establish a constitutional monarchy.<sup>41</sup> The demand towards constitutional governance was the product of the French Revolution, which necessitated the involvement and representation of classes and their rights in the state mechanisms. Throughout the Ottoman history, each initiative was being handled by the State. Moreover, contrary to the formations in the Western Europe, there were no classes, which could be able to insist on their interests.<sup>42</sup> Hence, classes based on secure property rights, which could prosper without fear of having their wealth confiscated by the state, were needed in the Ottoman Empire. That would denote abandoning the Sultan's absolutism.<sup>43</sup> To this end, in 1876, the constitutionalist reformer, Midhat Pasha, prevailed upon Sultan Abdulhamid II to set up a Constitutional Commission to draft a Constitution. Finally, the Constitution of 1876 was adopted and a constitutional monarchy was established. Hence, the First Constitutional Era (I. Meşrutiyet) was declared.<sup>44</sup>

The Constitution systematized its functions according to Western models. After the Constitution has been adopted in 1876, a parliament, consisting of a chamber of elected representatives (*meb'uthan*) and an appointed chamber of notables (*ayan*), was established and shared the Sultan's legislative power. Notwithstanding, the last authority was the Sultan, because parliamentary enactments must be promulgated by the Sultan. He was recognized as the head of the Executive and given extensive powers in the appointment and dismissal of ministers. But the deputies began soon to demand control over the Executive. Bearing in mind the fact that since Selim III, the fate of all Sultans had been decided by the Janissaries, the ulama and the court officials, Abdulhamid II decided to win the ulama to his side and succeeded in

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>42</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, çev. Fatmagül Berktaş (İstanbul: Sistem Ofset Matbaacılık Yayıncılık, 1986), p. 34.

<sup>43</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 24.

<sup>44</sup> *Sayılı*, p. 16.



controlling the bureaucracy.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, the ulama in the Ottoman Empire had not an independent status, since the Sultan had the authority of appointing the Sheyk-ul Islam. The religious issues were being performed under the supervision of the Sultan. Abdulhamid II benefited from his extended authority in the sense of appointing of all bureaucracy, particularly religious officials and declared himself the monarch of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliph of all Muslims. During his reign, Islam was declared the religion of the State.<sup>46</sup>

The reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) was a period of growth and development in the economic and social fields. The economic bankruptcy of 1870s was of crucial concern, which had to be got over. On the other hand, in the area of education some improvements were achieved, i.e., between 1867-1895 increased the number of students in "Rüştiye" four times.

The years of 1877-1878 witnessed to Abdulhamid II's despotism. He established an intelligence police service because of his skeptic character, and reflected his pressure on the Press in particular and censored it.<sup>47</sup>

In 1877, the Parliament was opened. Meanwhile, the Russian War of 1877-78 broke out. After a year, three ministers required defending themselves in the Chamber concerning the charges imposed against them. Abdulhamid II used the advantage of that chaotic atmosphere and suspended the Constitution. The Parliament did not assemble again for 30 years. This even proved that since the beginning he was not satisfied with the constraints on his authority. The closure of the Parliament brought about the end of the Young Ottomans.

Nevertheless, the seeds of the revolution were proliferating in the schools. The first organized opposition group, known as *İttihad-i Osmani*, was established in the

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<sup>45</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, "Transformation of the Ottoman State," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3 (1972), p. 271.

<sup>46</sup> Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, p. 14.

<sup>47</sup> Akşin, p. 37.

course of 100<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the French Revolution in 1889. Meanwhile, the intellectuals were under the impression of positivism. Probably with the positivist effect, the name of *İttihad-i Osmani* was changed to *İttihat ve Terakki*, which meant Union and Progress. Despite the pressure of Abdulhamid II, the movement of Young Turks continued to develop between the years of 1902-1906. Ultimately, in 1908, the second constitutional period (ikinci meşrutiyet) was announced and the Sultan submitted. Actually, the climax of the Young Turks' activity was the revolution of 1908. This movement resulted from the combined effort of the Young Turks with the army officers, the town notables and the educated young generation. The Young Turk's era of 1908-18, which was the last phase of the Ottoman Empire, began.<sup>48</sup> In 1908, the Society of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki) was the driving force behind the government and controller in the political sphere of the country.<sup>49</sup>

At the outset, the members of the Society of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), which was established by the Young Turks, forced Sultan Abdulhamid II to restore the Constitution of 1876. In April 1909, religious traditionalist elements attacked the parliament building. Later that month, the Sultan was deposed in favor of his brother and parliamentary government was restored. Afterwards, a new law amended the Constitution of 1876 and thus, the Grand Vezir and the ministers were made responsible to the Parliament. Finally, the Parliament had the right of deposing the Sultan.<sup>50</sup>

In the economic sphere, the Young Turks focused on encouraging domestic merchant and industrial class to establish local banks and develop the industry. During the reign of second constitutional government, ideas of economic liberalism, private enterprise and industrialization were on the agenda. Hence, the industrial schools were built; students were sent to Europe for the education on technical and professional issues. In 1915, the 'Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu' (Law of Reinforcing the

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* , see also Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, pp. 194-207.

<sup>49</sup> Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, p. 16.

<sup>50</sup> Arjomand, pp. 21-22.

Industry) was adopted. Consequently, the idea of state protection on the national economy gained importance.<sup>51</sup>

In the meantime, the World War I broke out, which proved to be a turning point for the entire world, particularly for the Turks. It destroyed the Ottoman Empire similar to the other empires in Central and Eastern Europe. However, in the Turkish case, war liberated the Turks from European control and interference. It left the CUP free to fulfill a reformist program which transformed society in such a radical way that the social foundations of the new nation-state in 1923 have been laid during these years.<sup>52</sup>

It is here worth stressing that the social revolution of the Young Turks alienated all those whose privileges were ensured by the continuation of the old order. Hence, Muslim Turks, Arabs and Albanians protested as much as Christian Greeks, Slavs and Armenians against a more rational and sovereign system.<sup>53</sup> It is interesting to note that the only religious community supported the Young Turks were the Jews. In the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Christian societies accumulated their wealth due to the capitulations. However, their economic interests differed from those of the Turks and Jews. In addition to the economic interests, the Jew, particularly those in Macedonia and West Thrace, had sympathy to Turks because they had fear of what would happen to their societies if the Ottoman territory was invaded by the Greece and Bulgaria. Furthermore, traditionally, the Christian societies oppressed the Jews in the Empire, while the Ottoman Empire guaranteed the justice.<sup>54</sup>

On the other hand, the religious-ethnic communities welcomed the constitution of 1876, because they supposed that the end of absolutism would enhance their own power and influence. However, those reforms in the military organization, judicial system, economic structure and education were not in favor of the religious

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<sup>51</sup> **Karpat**, "Transformation of the Ottoman State," pp. 85-86.

<sup>52</sup> **Ahmad**, *The making of Modern Turkey*, p. 40.

<sup>53</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>54</sup> **Ahmad**, *Itihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, pp. 166-169.

communities on the account of their privileges stemmed from the old rule.<sup>55</sup> That would threaten the privileges of the religious communities, which guaranteed autonomy in cultural and educational affairs under the traditional Millet System.

In addition, the non-Muslims and non-Turkish communities had considered that the new regime would be used as an instrument for reviving and strengthening the empire under the leadership of the largest group, the Turks. Thus, the non-Turkish people were apprehensive concerning centralization and turkification.<sup>56</sup>

The Young Turks tried to achieve their goal in the sense of Ottomanism by the means of negotiations with the communities in the Empire. When this method failed, they preferred dealing with this issue via the mechanisms of the Assembly. In January 1909, the laws were enacted for the purpose of restricting their political and cultural autonomy and commissioning the State with supervising those activities, particularly educational ones. Hence, the State could be able to create an Ottoman identity in schools. In 1912, the Young Turks treated them within a more compromised manner on the eve of the elections.<sup>57</sup>

## **2.2. Qajar Sultanate Before Modernization**

### **2.2.1. The Socio-Political and Economic Structure of the Qajar Sultanate**

The traditional Iranian state had been based on absolutist power structure in which the Shahs had supreme political authority. The structure of authority was patrimonial, similar to that of the Ottoman Empire. This political structure was founded on state-communal property. There was a system known as '*ikta*' and then called '*tuyul*', which is similar to the Ottoman '*fief*' system. In this system, the ruler was granting land assignments to "*tuyuldar*" for the purpose of cultivating the land

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.132-133.

temporarily without any contracts, and taking tax and cavalry in return. The name of the system “*Ikta*” was changed to “*tuyul*” after the establishment of Seljucian Empire. This system continued until the Constitutional Monarchy in 1909. As understood, the ruler was controlling the land and besides, interfering in trade and commerce.<sup>58</sup>

Meanwhile, the landed classes, the mercantile bourgeoisie and the ulama increased their wealth by owning state lands and offices, which were sold by the state for the purpose of receiving money to buy Western arms.<sup>59</sup> Besides selling lands, the government began to give monopolies to provide money for its undertakings, because Persia was aware that in order to stand in a powerful position in the developing world, first of all she would have to improve her military techniques. Then modernization and westernization should have been sought for the material and intellectual benefits.<sup>60</sup>

In the course foreign invasions, feudal land-holdings were established and Iranian political system fluctuated between despotism and feudalism. After a long period of invasions and weaknesses, a strong despotic state was established under the first Shiite dynasty, the Safavids (1501-1722). However, under the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925) the absolutist state structure began to disintegrate.<sup>61</sup> The Qajars emerged with a more formalized and much better controlled ministerial apparatus than formerly.<sup>62</sup>

The Qajars played the role of Islamic rulers, as did the Sunni Ottomans. They established official religious posts and appointed ulama to those occupations. Meanwhile, there was a conflict between the ulama. Some of the ulama declared

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<sup>58</sup> Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran 1962-82* (London&Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>60</sup> A. K. S. Lambton, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980), p. 28.

<sup>61</sup> *Bashiriyeh*, p. 8.

<sup>62</sup> *Binder, Iran -Political Development in a changing society-* ..., p. 103.

their support of the Qajars conditionally to the acceptance of guidance from the general agency of the imam. Others referred monarchical responsibility to God alone.<sup>63</sup>

The ulama was the most respected class in the society and had strong connections with the bazaar by means of religious taxes. The areas of Law and Education were the prerogatives of the ulama. They were opposing Western penetration and secularization of traditional institutions and hence, criticizing the nationalists, who were supporting the separation of religious and state affairs.<sup>64</sup>

During the Qajar rule, the economy was dependent on agriculture and animal husbandry as in the Ottoman case. The craftsmen organizations named '*teskilat-i esnaf*' also existed similar to "*esnaf loncaları*" in the Ottoman Empire. Differently from the Ottomans, the domestic merchant class took part in the economy.<sup>65</sup>

Iran's external trade increased twelve times between 1800 and 1900. The country entered into the world market as a supplier of raw materials. The population doubled over the century and became more urban.<sup>66</sup>

Concerning railway development in the Sultanate, the Anglo-Russian rivalry hardened the railway development. Firstly, Baron de Reuter's scheme for a railroad was stopped by Russian opposition in 1889. Then, the British, like the Russians, decided that Iran with railways might be dangerous to them and therefore, no railways would be built. Indeed, Britain wanted to keep Iran as a buffer state, so she did not permit any activity easing a Russian advance towards India due to Iran's adjacency to India. On the other hand, Russia also did not want southern regions of

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<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>64</sup> Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York: John&Wiley Sons, 1964), pp.19-27 and see also Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran 1962-82* ..., p. 9.

<sup>65</sup> Kemal Milani, *Comparative Study of Turkey and Iran: A socio-political approach (Yüksek Lisans Tezi)*, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 1994, p. 13.

<sup>66</sup> Juan R. I. Cole, "Iranian millenarianism and democratic thought in the 19th century," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24 (1992), p. 17.

Iran to be exposed to British penetration. As a result of Anglo-Russian rivalry on Iranian territory, all transport had to be realized by donkey, mule or camel. In 1888, at last Iran's one navigable river, the Karun in the South, was opened to steam navigation.<sup>67</sup>

The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed to Nasiru'd-Din Shah's rule. He reigned for 50 years without making any major change and his suspicions led the country to a police state. Due to Shah's despotism no criticism regarding administration could be published in the newspapers.<sup>68</sup>

Nevertheless, after his visit to Europe, he proclaimed life and property assurance for his people. However, it was not applicable because of the lack of any other political authority to challenge the jurisdiction of the Shah. After his second visit to Europe in 1879, he established a parliament known as "hamuşan"<sup>69</sup> (silents), where nobody had the right to express any opposition.<sup>70</sup>

Following the reign of Nasiru'd-Din Shah, Muzafferid-din Shah (1896-1907) succeeded to the throne. Throughout his rule, the merchant class was not pleased with the regulations in the economic sphere, particularly as regards the high rate of customs duties. Hence, they launched a rebellion and demanded for the announcement of a Constitution. Meanwhile, the ulama also took part in the demonstrations. Muzafferiddin Shah could not resist the pressures any more and the Constitution was adopted in 1906.<sup>71</sup> The Constitution marked the first step towards the establishment of secular law towards a break with the old system.

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<sup>67</sup> Keddie, "Is there a Middle East," ..., p. 265.

<sup>68</sup> Peter Avery, *Modern Iran* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 114-117 and see also Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran -An Interpretation-* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 6-7.

<sup>69</sup> For further information on "hamuşan", see Ahmet Ağaoglu, "Iran Devrimi: Yeni Türkiye", *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul daily, 15 June 1934.

<sup>70</sup> Milani, p. 32.

<sup>71</sup> Upton, p. 33.



After Muzafferiddin Shah, his son Muhammed Ali Shah (1907-1909) ascended to the throne. During Muhammad Ali Shah's reign, Anglo-Russian Convention, which was signed without any consultation with Persian officials in 1907, divided Iran into three zones without consulting to Iran. Hence, Iran was against the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which included the division of Iran into spheres of influence by Russia and Britain: A Russian zone in the north; a British zone in the southeast and a neutral zone between them.<sup>72</sup> From 1909 until Turkish intervention during the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia controlled Azerbaijan and much of the northern Iran. In fact, the purpose of the agreement was to strengthen the military powers of Britain and Russia against escalating threat from Germany by minimizing the possibility of Anglo-Russian conflict in Persia.<sup>73</sup>

Meanwhile, inside, he was against the reform movements following the constitutional regime, and consequently closed the parliament by bombarding the parliament building. This action led to an uprising, but suppressed by the Russian soldiers temporarily. On June 23, 1908, the Shah inaugurated a reign of terror in all cities against the liberals and constitutionalists. Civil war broke out. A year later, the constitutionalists and nationalists, who were reacting to the Shah's excesses and to Russian intervention, succeeded in deposing the Shah. Then, the ex-Shah reentered Persia from Russian territory and attempted to regain his throne by force, but he was unsuccessful. For the meantime, local control by tribal leaders became widespread. The Bakhtiari leaders, for example, held the premiership as a result of their armed support in favor of the constitutional government. Finally, Muhammed Ali Shah was dethroned in 1909 and the Second Majlis was inaugurated.<sup>74</sup> Henceforth, the last of the Qajars, Ahmed Shah (1909-25), a boy of 12, ascended to the throne.

Ahmed Shah never regained the power of his predecessors. His reign was marked by the shift of power from the authority of their offices and Qajar family to the

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<sup>72</sup> Hafez F. Farmayan, *The Foreign Policy of Iran - A Historical Analysis 559 BC-AD 1971* (Utah: Middle East Center -University of Utah-,1971), p. 21.

<sup>73</sup> Upton, pp. 36-.37 and see also Peter Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 134.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39 and see also Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 130-146.



ministers. In effect, since the constitutional movement, the power of the Qajar Dynasty was diminished by a number of political factors such as opposition of the ulama, the merchants and the intellectuals in the constitutional movement; British support for this movement; the support of non-Qajar tribal leaders and the Qajar created land owners for the constitutional movement; the deposition of Muhammad Ali Shah after his anti-constitutional coup; and above all, the appointment of a child as the last of the Qajars.<sup>75</sup>

In the course of his reign, an American advisor, Morgan Shuster, was hired by the Majlis in order to bring order into the public finance without annual deficits. Shuster could not be successful, because there was an opposition of certain influential Persian elements and Russian government.<sup>76</sup>

At the time of World War I, the Majlis had been dissolved until November 1, 1914. After Ahmed Shah inaugurated the Third Majlis in 1914, neutrality was announced in Iran as an official policy during the World War I. Many Persians feared that if the Allies won the war, the territory would be divided between Russia and Great Britain. At the end of the war, Persia was not only under British protection, but also large amounts of subsidies and bribes were being paid by the British to local officials. In addition, the Anglo-Persian Agreement was signed in Tehran in 1919 at the end of secret negotiations.<sup>77</sup> By this agreement, the provisions of loan; revision of customs tariff; British advisers, who will assist in the principal ministries and of British officers, who will re-organize the gendarmerie and rebuild/equip the army; the construction of a railroad were ensured.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Leonard Binder, "The Cabinet of Iran," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1962), p. 36.

<sup>76</sup> Upton, pp. 39 and see also Banani, p. 33.

<sup>77</sup> Banani, pp. 34-41.

<sup>78</sup> Upton, pp. 37-41.

As understood, Iran was a sphere of interacting common interests of Britain and Russia. In general, since the nineteenth century, Iran's foreign policy may be summarized as follows:<sup>79</sup>

- a) When in a weak position, Iran must maintain a balance among the powers involved in its affairs, in particular the balance of rivalry between Russia and Britain;
- b) Iran must seek to involve a third power whenever its presence can serve to diminish Anglo-Russian pressures;

However, after the Russian revolution of 1905, Iran had suddenly found a vacuum in its foreign affairs. The Bolsheviks repudiated all Tsarist agreements and Russian privileges in Iran. Following Russia's withdrawal from the scene, Britain occupied the entire territory of Iran, and henceforth the principle of balancing the two foreign powers in Iran became unnecessary. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was signed and Iran placed its affairs in British hands.<sup>80</sup>

On the other hand, Iran had relatively a good relationship with the USA. Actually, as early as 1850, Iran began searching alliance among the Western powers and the best choice seemed the USA, because firstly, it had no territorial designs in the East; secondly American business had a great deal of capital for investment; thirdly Iran was interested in buying warships of the USA and hiring American naval advisors; and finally Iran was willing the USA to establish its own naval base in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the attitude of the USA towards Iran was non-intervention and non-involvement. Barely, Iran's efforts resulted in a treaty of friendship with the United States, signed in 1856.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Hafez F. Farmayan, *The Foreign Policy of Iran -A Historical Analysis 559 BC-AD 1971* (Utah: Middle East Center -University of Utah-, 1971), pp. 15-16.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.

Indeed, even twenty years later, when official diplomatic relations were established, the policies of both countries had not changed. The purpose of the USA, meanwhile, was to protect some twenty Americans who belonged to Presbyterian mission in Iran. Iran suggested that if the USA was unwilling to enter in an alliance, then her commercial and technical excellence must be learned which might be useful against Anglo-Russian expansion. Even during the first half of the twentieth century, contacts with the USA were still going on, i.e., American advisers such as Morgan Shuster and Arthur Millspaugh, assisted the Iranian administrators.<sup>82</sup>

Besides the USA, since the Napoleonic era, contacts with Europe had accelerated and Western influence had entered into Iran. To Peter Avery, particularly, the Anglo-Russian competition played the crucial role in the modernization movements in Iran.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, mounting penetration of Iran by the West motivated the reformist period.

On the other hand, by the way of formal educational channels, i.e., the foreigners founded elementary and secondary schools, the Western thought were stirred into Iran. The first French school was founded in Tabriz in 1839 by the Lazzarite mission. In addition, the publication of newspapers and periodicals contributed to the Western influence.<sup>84</sup>

Within this respect, telegraph lines between India and Europe, a Russian and a British bank, a relatively few miles of Russian-built roads and some dock facilities in the north, a British steamship service in the south, the beginnings of British oil exploitation, Belgian horse-drawn trams in Tehran and a few miles of railroad from Tehran to the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim were the important samples of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Western influence.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 3.

<sup>84</sup> T. Cuyler Young, "The Problem Westernization in Modern Iran," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.2, No: 1 (January 1948), p. 50.

<sup>85</sup> Keddie, "Is there a Middle East," ..., p. 265.

### 2.2.2. Awakening of Modernization Movements

The young Iranians, who went to Europe, were impressed with the manifestations of nationalism in the West. The liberalism and nationalist movements, which had spread throughout the world after the French Revolution, had an influence on Iran as well. At the end of the nineteenth century, the impetus of intellectuals' aspirations towards transformation was very great. They were patriotic and mostly anti-clerical. These intellectuals sought constitutional rights and stood for secularization. The social, political and economic developments, which Reza Shah managed in a short time, were accomplished with the support of these younger intellectuals.<sup>86</sup>

Meanwhile, the rise of new nationalism in Iran was a reaction to Russian and Britain penetration in Iran. Other nations either did not have any interest in Iran or Russia and Britain did not allow them.<sup>87</sup>

The need for change in Iran emerged at the commencement in response to the external pressure. Thus, demands on the emancipation from foreign control, integration of different tribal and communal groups into a homogeneous community, social and economic modernization, arose.<sup>88</sup>

The influence of the Russian Revolution of 1905 entered into Iran through the Caucasus. After the failure of their attempt in Russia, some of the leaders of the revolution migrated to Iran, and founded newspapers and agitated for a liberal revolution. Moreover, the reports and interpretations of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and of the Russian revolution of 1905 in the Persian press and in periodicals outside of Iran contributed to the political awakening.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 14-24.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>88</sup> Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's white revolution: A study in political development," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1974), p. 126.

<sup>89</sup> Banani, pp. 9-11.

Indeed, in the course of Russian expansion in the Caucasus in the early nineteenth century, nationalism did not exist in Iran. Any opposition in Iran was religious in nature. The events such as the Anglo-Russian Agreement, which divided Iran into spheres of influence and supported the Shah in revoking the Constitution; the role of Russian-commanded forces in closing of the Majlis; and the ruthless policies of the Russians in dealing with the Constitutionalists in Azerbaijan also awoke nationalistic feeling among the Iranians.<sup>90</sup>

The upheaval of 1917 in Russia also stimulated the political awakening. In fact, this meant a temporary withdrawal of Russia and a free space for Britain. Meanwhile, in 1919, Britain legalized her hegemony by the Anglo-Persian Agreement. This agreement was perceived by Iranians as an instrument, which will be benefited for the sake of British imperialism on Iran. Accordingly, the Bolshevik agents within Persia began to protest British imperialism and the Anglo-Persian Agreement. Free Soviet films were shown and newspapers financed by Russian legation were published indoctrinating the revolutionary aims of Kremlin.<sup>91</sup>

Western influence entered into Iran, but the degree of Westernization was not uniform. Among the merchant class, the influence of the West was less. They lived untouched by Western ideas, but benefited from some material objects of Western manufacture. The peasantry had even less contact with anything from outside. On the other hand, as I have mentioned before, the intellectuals were the most affected Iranians, who meanwhile brought along the Western influence.<sup>92</sup>

The premise pillars of the Westernization/modernization movements in Iran were as follows:

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<sup>90</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>91</sup> Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, *Diplomatic History of Persia 1917-1923* (New York: Russell F. Moore Company Incorporated, 1952), p. 153.

<sup>92</sup> **Banani**, pp. 28-29.

### **2.2.2.1. The Babi-Baha'i Movement**

There was a religious sect called Bahais, the largest religious minority in Iran, which laid in the Babi movement and originated in 1844. The claim of Babism was the fulfillment of Shi'ah messianic expectations. Over time, Babism went far beyond the line of Shi'ah Islam. Indeed, I do not intend to discuss it in all aspects, because examining the Babi-Bahai movement is beyond the limits of this study.

However, it is necessary to point out that this movement played an important role in stimulating modern social reforms. They acted as agents of enlightenment and advocated the emancipation of women, the spread of education and the study of Western languages. In addition, the Bahais had antipathy toward the Qajars.<sup>93</sup>

It is remarkable here to note that in the early 1870s the Young Ottoman expatriates came home from exile. During their exile, they came into contact with the Bahais. Meanwhile, the Bahais were active not only in Iran but also in Turkey. Although the Bahai movement differed from that of the Young Ottomans, their political ideas had been formed at the same time.<sup>94</sup>

European scholars and orientalist began to focus on the progressive principles of the Babi-Bahai movement. There was also an interest in European press. An Italian observer in 1941 commented "in the social field Baha'ism calls for ... the abolition of polygamy, the restriction of divorce and the abolition of veils for women, which were that brought about by Reza Shah".<sup>95</sup>

### **2.2.2.2 Tobacco Concession**

The tobacco protest of 1891-92, which resulted in the annulment of a British monopoly tobacco concession and in the constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, was

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<sup>93</sup> Cole, pp. 3-22 and see also Banani, pp. 25-26.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Banani, pp. 25-26.

supported by the merchants, artisans, the ulama and intellectuals.<sup>96</sup> In 1890, a Tobacco Concession was granted to English Company for the monopoly of the Iran's entire tobacco crop.<sup>97</sup> An English man, Mr. G. F. Talbot was granted full control over the production, sale and export of all tobacco in Persia. All the tobacco was given into the hands of one individual, under the title of monopoly. This concession was valid for a period of fifty years. A representative body of Persian merchants appealed to the Shah against the monopoly. Owing to the absence of an independent Press in Persia at this period, the Persians were not aware of the scope of the Tobacco Monopoly. They did not submit to being obliged to buy from the English the tobacco, which they produced. Hence, they protested the bartering of their rights to foreigners and announced their intention of defending these rights by force.<sup>98</sup>

Actually, penetration of foreigners into Iran was a serious concern of Iranian people. The Tobacco Concession attracted a unified response from the whole nation. Meanwhile, Sayyid Jamalu'd-din Afghani, a political philosopher and a theological reformer, again was on the scene in Iran. Despite, the tendency towards Muslim union for the purpose of resisting the advance of Russia and Britain in those days in Turkey, and Afghani's eminence as a teacher and a polemicist in Egypt, he could not find support in Egypt and Turkey that he was seeking. Consequently, he came back to Persia and took part in the demonstrations against the Tobacco Concession.<sup>99</sup>

A Mujtahid, Hajji Mirza Muhammad Hasan-i Shirazi, who had at that time supreme influence in the religious affairs of Persia, wrote a letter to the Shah to prove that the Concession was contrary to the Qur'an and to the spirit of Islam. Following the letter, the mujtahid issued a *fatwa* making the use of tobacco unlawful in Persia until the Concession is cancelled. The protests of the people triggered. All the tobacco

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<sup>96</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, *Iran -Religion, Politics and Society-* (New Jersey: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1980), p. 151.

<sup>97</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 101.

<sup>98</sup> Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909* (London: Frank Cass&CO. Ltd., 1966), pp. 33-51.

<sup>99</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 97-103.



merchants closed their shops. Meanwhile, the Shah decided to go for a tour in the country to evade the Tobacco question. At the end, he withdrew the Concession; but its consequence was still present: a great loss of prestige to England and gain of prestige to Russia.<sup>100</sup>

Following the accomplishment of protests, the political claims of the mujtahids became powerful in smaller incidents, which formed the background of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. On the other hand, the most important success of the movement was that this was the first concrete example of ulama-bourgeoisie cooperation.<sup>101</sup>

### 2.2.2.3 Constitutional Revolution

The first modern Asian revolution occurred in Iran in 1905. Like the Russian revolution, it produced a constitution. However the Ottoman constitution of 1876 had been a compromise between the ruler and reformist bureaucrats, the Iranian constitution was a complex process that involved a greater number of social forces.<sup>102</sup>

The Persian history from 1900 to 1921 witnessed interplay between the Persian forces attempting to establish constitutional government and the Russian and British governments struggling for the purpose of penetrating into Iran. Among the developments for the duration of those years, the approval of a Constitution was not output of a unified national movement; just of an urban movement led and supported by certain groups in the provincial capitals, but especially in Tehran.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Browne, pp. 52-54 and see also Avery, *Modern Iran*, ...p. 104.

<sup>101</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, "Iran: change in Islam; Islam and change," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 11 (1980), p. 532 and see also ... *Religion and Rebellion in Iran –The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), p. 35.

<sup>102</sup> Arjomand, p. 18.

<sup>103</sup> Upton, p. 36.



Following the Tobacco Concession, the ground was ready for a movement against the Throne and foreigners, and the national alignment with the religious leaders was possible. Constitutionalist and secularist modern intelligentsia began to pose a new challenge to the traditional order. An alliance appeared among the bazaar bourgeoisie, the ulama, the modern intelligentsia, some landed nobles and tribal chiefs. The movement commenced with the protests of merchants and the Ulama against the manipulation of foreign officials in the government. The rule of law and recognition of the people's participation in selecting of ministers were demanded by the mullahs and merchants.<sup>104</sup>

The merchants were supporting this movement on account of their interest towards instituting control over the economic concessions, which were made by the government to the imperialist powers, such as Russia and Britain. On the other hand, the ulama supported the Constitutional movement due to their opposition to Western penetration and secularization of traditional institutions. Moreover, their reaction to Western influence gave the ulama a new position and they emerged as one of the proponents of rising nationalism.<sup>105</sup>

The protests resulted in a Constitution and a Parliamentary *-Majlis-*. The bulk of the first constitutional law was translated from the Belgian Constitution of 1831 and Bulgarian Constitution of 1879. After the Constitution was adopted, division of power was realized. In August 1906, the Shah ordered the election of a Parliament. The legislature bodies were the Senate and a Majlis, however the Senate never convened until 1950. The Parliament achieved the authority in all financial matters, especially granting of concessions to foreign powers. The 1906 Electoral Law gave the right of vote to the Qajar tribe, the ulama, nobles, merchants, landowners and the guilds. Moreover, the Majlis seats were distributed among the same classes. The Armenians, Jews and Zoroastrians had the right to elect their own representatives.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Bashiriyeh, p. 9.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>106</sup> Arjomand, p. 20.

The Majlis began to function firstly by abolishing the *tuyuldar* system and establishing private property on land. Hence, the majority of villages fell under landlord ownership, and peasants became landless sharecroppers. In the 1907-21 periods, while the number of landed Majlis deputies increased, the ulama and guilds lost theirs.<sup>107</sup>

The Constitution of 1906 of Iran determined the duties of the cabinet, Prime Minister and ministers (who are appointed and dismissed by the Shah), but did not aim at arranging the distribution of authority between the Shah and the cabinet. It is understood that their relations remained same as given at the time.<sup>108</sup> Prior to 1906 the Shah had been determining all executive, judicial and legislative policy, but in the urban areas, religious authority, strong guild system and Sufi order had been executing in the name of the Shah.<sup>109</sup>

In the Constitution, Shiite Islam was declared as the official religion of Iran. In addition, the duality of the traditional judiciary system was endorsed as done in the Ottoman Fundamental Law, i.e., the religious courts were recognized along the civil courts.<sup>110</sup>

The Constitutionalism was not the ulama's ideological movement. It was rather a modernist Western-influenced movement launched by the intelligentsia. The ulama did not propose a Majlis and a Constitution. They accepted it solely as a necessary instrument for limiting the power of the Shah. From among the constitutionalist ulama, Sheikh Mohammed Hossein Naini, sought to legitimize limited monarchy and constitutional democracy. Due to the doctrine of *velayat*, Naini claimed that it was difficult to prove who the deputy of the Imam was among the ulama, so the only

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<sup>107</sup> Bashiriyeh, pp. 8-9.

<sup>108</sup> Leonard Binder, "The Cabinet of Iran," ..., pp. 33-35.

<sup>109</sup> A. Reza Arasteh, *Man and Society in Iran* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), p. 112.

<sup>110</sup> Arjomand, p. 21.

option was constitutional government. The ulama also found the adoption of a constitution necessary to safeguard Islam against foreign influence. It was the ulama's nationalist opposition to the West.<sup>111</sup>

Nikki R. Keddie states the approach of the ulama before and after the establishment of any institutional frameworks as follows: "Before 1905, ulama did not argue for constitutions and before Khomeini none of them argued that kings should not exist and ulama should rule Iran directly".<sup>112</sup>

The Constitution of 1906, though not based on the Sharia, institutionalized the relationship between temporal and religious authority. In other words, it marked the beginning of secularization of the state and society. Reza Shah's reforms were the expression of the secular-modernist ideology of the Constitutional Revolution. As a result of the Constitutional Revolution, the separation of religious authority and state came to be realized in practice.<sup>113</sup>

Indeed, the Constitutional Revolution was not only against the autocratic government but also against foreign interference, so the motivation was guided by nationalistic as well as democratic feelings.<sup>114</sup>

### 2.3. Conclusion

Both the Qajar Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire were similar in nature, i.e., eastern type semi-feudal composition with a strong central government; land as the main source of income and property of state; heterogeneous society. Nevertheless, there were some differences, which would later account for some imbalances on the outputs of the modernization movements.

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<sup>111</sup> Bashiriyeh, pp. 56-57.

<sup>112</sup> Keddie, "Iran: change in Islam; Islam and change," .... p. 533.

<sup>113</sup> Bashiriyeh, p. 58.

<sup>114</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*,... pp. 126-128.

At first glance, it was observed that the land under the control of Iran was smaller than that of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Britain, Russia and France aimed to strengthen Iran in order to control Indian trade, while the Western States preferred a dispersed Ottoman Empire rather than a strong one.

During the early nineteenth century, Iran was under political and economic pressure of the West similar to the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, despite some losses of territory, disintegration of Iran was not seen possible, while the Ottoman Empire was going through a process of disintegration. Furthermore, Iran did not have any significant war after the Turkmenchai Treaty signed in 1826, except the borderline dispute with Afghanistan. In contrast, wars were still going on in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>115</sup>

Indeed, the political map of the traditional states of the Ottomans and Persians was not the same. Wars and international interferences caused nationalistic claims to a large extent in the Ottoman Empire rather than in Persia. The Ottoman Empire was dismembered after 1918 and gave rise to seven new states, while Persia did not face such nationalist movements.<sup>116</sup>

Another point was that in Iran local political autonomy existed and no political unity could be ensured rather than tribal confederations, while in the Ottoman Empire central government reigned with respect to the “*Millet*” system and united the nations around the Empire despite the feudal lords. Diverse ethnic identities existed within the framework of the “Millet System”. Loyalty to the Sultan, respect for peace and order were the main demands of the state. Various communities learned to live this kind of political order without feeling a threat to their ethnic identities. Various communities had local autonomy and could manage their community affairs.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Milani, pp. 29-31.

<sup>116</sup> Harik, pp. 307-309.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 305.

On the other hand, Iran's mountainous topography encouraged the expansion of tribal nomadism. Meanwhile, it has been estimated that half of the Iran's population consisted of those tribes at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Similarly, under the Qajars, tribal autonomy was maintained. Relations among the communities were compartmentalized in the sense that entering into one relationship, such as trade, did not mean entering into other relationships like intermarrying.<sup>118</sup>

The Iranians preferred a strong authoritarian rule similar to Ottomans and believed that the reason why the foreigners especially the more advanced European, American or Japanese foreigners respected was that they had a strong political authority. Hence, Iran should have a strong political authority and also to Iranians strong authority would bring along the necessity of a strong leader, who was capable of forcing his rules on others. Therefore, the strong leader would emerge as a strong monarch, traditionally the Shah.<sup>119</sup>

In Iran, members of the Shah's family ruled major subdivisions. Both the Safavids and Qajars made efforts to establish centralized bureaucracy, but they never approached to the level of nineteenth century Ottomans.

During the Qajar Dynasty, modernized military and bureaucracy were the major targets. Tribes were the most important elements of Iran's military forces, whereas the Ottomans built up a centralized military force and a non-tribal feudal cavalry. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire's military units such as *nezam-i cedid* (new order) became the inspiration for Qajars. In fact, the early success of civilian protest in the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 was realized on account of non-existence of a regular military force, except the small Russian-officered Cossack

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<sup>118</sup> Keddie, "Is there a Middle East," ..., pp. 259-261.

<sup>119</sup> Norman Jacobs, *The Sociology of Development -Iran as an Asian case study-* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), pp. 20-24.

Brigade. Conversely, the Young Turk movement of 1908 depended on a relatively strong army, while instituting a constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>120</sup>

The dates of 1876 in Turkey and 1906 in Iran marked the beginning of constitutionalism.<sup>121</sup> The bureaucrats and constitutionalists of 1870s and 1900s were united in fighting against unlimited executive power and establishing a constitutional state in place of traditional monarchy. The ministerial responsibility both in Qajar Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire marked the distribution of power between the monarch and the elected representatives of the people and also the transition from patrimonial authority to impersonal bureaucracy.<sup>122</sup>

In both countries, the parliaments acted as the agency for the political integration of civil society into the government. In neither country, constitutionalism resulted in modernization through the state, as the reformist bureaucrats had hoped. Especially in Iran, the legal provisions of the Shari'a were again incorporated into Iran's legal codes.<sup>123</sup>

In nineteenth century Iran, there was no clearly defined hierarchy of officials below the minister, and the ulama were much more powerful than their Ottoman counterparts, because of the location of their leadership outside the borders of Iran and the weak, decentralized nature of the Iranian government. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, the government did not seriously control waqfs. The ulama had the control over the law courts and education contrasting to Turkey. There were almost no secular schools before 1896 in Iran. On the contrary, the Ottoman Empire had a growing network of Western style schools.<sup>124</sup> In addition, the first Qajar effort for the

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<sup>120</sup> Camron Michael Amin, "Propoganda and Remembrance," *The Journal of the Society for Iranian Studies*, Vol. 32, No.3 (September 1999), pp. 363 and see also Keddie, "Is there a Middle East,"... p. 262.

<sup>121</sup> Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* ..., p. 10.

<sup>122</sup> Arjomand, p. 44.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>124</sup> Keddie, "Is there a Middle East,"..., pp. 262-263.

establishment of technical school, the Dar-ul Funun, was inspired from the Ottoman schools. Besides, Iran's attempts at administrative reform known as the *tanzimat-e hasaneh*, modeled on reform efforts of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>125</sup>

Despite these differences, there was a common point between two countries, i.e., the constitutional movements of 1908-1914 periods were relatively successful and the revolts showed that European hegemony could be called in question.<sup>126</sup>



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<sup>125</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>126</sup> Maxime Rodinson, "The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam," in eds. Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth, *The Legacy of Islam* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 56.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **ATATURK AND REZA SHAH: NATION-BUILDING THROUGH MODERNIZATION**

#### **3.1. Turkey and the Rise of Ataturk: From Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey**

In this chapter, I will focus mainly on the awakened national consciousness and process of revolution-modernization towards the revival of a new sovereign nation-state independent from foreign influence.

##### **3.1.1. Freeing Turkey from Political and Economic Domination**

During the late eighties, the nationalist movements arose in the world as a consequence of the French Revolution. Hence, the Turks had also to deal with those explosive forces of nationalism. The Serbs were the first people under the Ottomans who adopted nationalism. Afterwards, the Greeks followed them and won their independence in 1829. Meanwhile, the Turks tried to suppress one national movement after another. Finally, they too adopted nationalism, waged their own struggle towards sovereignty and established a national state of their own.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was in a chaotic situation, because of internal dynamics such as governance. The people were gathering around the secret national organizations which motivated the movements against the Sultanate, who was ruling under coordination of the foreign powers. Mustafa Kemal emerged on the

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<sup>1</sup> Ahmad, The making of Modern Turkey, p. 24.



scene at this time, and took the post of stimulating national consciousness to the nation and leading these national movements, which will later result in the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

It is deemed necessary here to give some information about Ataturk's life. Mustafa Kemal was born in Salonika in 1881. The month and day are not known. The centenary year began on 19 May, because Ataturk, when asked about his birthday, decided that 19 May would be the most appropriate date. That was the day on which he had arrived in Anatolia to initiate the War of Liberation. At the age of 11, he entered the local military school. Then, he went to the Monastery Military Academy and in 1899 to the War College in Istanbul. Meanwhile, the Empire was falling apart, particularly Mustafa Kemal's native Macedonia. He was even in those days opposing to the foreign penetration in the Empire and exchanging views with his friends at school. <sup>2</sup>

In his boyhood, he spent all his time talking about how the autocracy of the Sultan might be overthrown. After being graduated, he was arrested for plotting against Abdulhamid and posted to Syria. When he was back to Salonika in 1907, he took part in the Society for Union and Progress (CUP –generally termed in English-). But he never rose inside of this organization because of his plain speaking and dislike of Enver Pasha and the other pro-German officers. Moreover, he was always against the militarist structure of the CUP. <sup>3</sup>

### **Towards the reign:**

The CUP sent Ataturk to solve the problems in Tripolitania. He restored order and returned. When he was back, he insisted on sending the soldiers outside the CUP, but it was rejected. After a while, attempts to assassinate him were seen. During the

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<sup>2</sup> Geoffrey Lewis, "Ataturk and His Republic," *Princeton Near East Paper (No: 33)* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1982), pp. 1-3 and see also Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in my time* (Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press: Norman, 1956), p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey Lewis, p. 4.

outbreak of World War I, he was a military attaché in Sofia. As a result of his request for further active position, he was appointed to the Nineteenth Division as Commander. Despite the fact that, at first Enver Pasha, Minister of War and married to Sultan's niece, refused it. At that time Enver Pasha remarked, "If you make that man a Pasha he will demand to be Sultan, and if you make him Sultan he will demand to be God". Nevertheless, he was appointed and served in Russian and Syrian fronts. To the Turkish soldiers he was their only hero.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, the situation in Anatolia was chaotic. The Allies had been making secret agreements for the purpose of dissolving Anatolia. The Christian and Arab provinces had been lost. Enver Pasha and the other CUP leaders fled to Germany. Mustafa Kemal resigned his post as inspector general of the army, and was engaged in revolt against Sultan and the allied powers. On May 1919, he landed in Samsun and made contacts to the commanders of the army units. In Erzurum, he took part in the convention of "National People's Congress" and was elected president of it. Then, in Sivas, another congress was held to draft the National Pact, which declared the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire. Henceforth, the National People's Congress seemed as de facto revolutionary government of all unoccupied Turkey. The Congress was moved to Ankara and new free elections for a Parliament were held. The National Pact was ratified by the new Parliament in January 1920.<sup>5</sup>

Though the Sultan's government sentenced Mustafa Kemal to death, he continued his struggle, which was both against the Sultan's forces and the foreign invaders. On September 13, 1921 the Greek armies were driven back from the Sakarya River. Finally, on October 20, 1921 France signed an agreement and recognized the Assembly as a sovereign government. A year later, an armistice was signed between France, Britain, Italy and the government of Grand National Assembly.<sup>6</sup> At Lausanne, there was no doubt concerning the independence of the Turkish state after

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>5</sup> Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in my time* (Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press: Norman, 1956), pp. 86-90.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey Lewis, p. 10.

the defeat of the Greek invasion. Then the Assembly voted to abolish the Sultanate, and the last Sultan Vahideddin escaped from Istanbul on a British warship. Ankara was declared the capital and on October 29, 1923 the Republic was proclaimed with Mustafa Kemal as its president.<sup>7</sup>

### 3.1.2. Restructuring in Political, Economic and Judicial Spheres

Before the founding of Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey was a poor and backward country ruled by feudal divine right. The imperialist threat and the sabotage from the religious forces at home blocked the political progress of the country.<sup>8</sup>

The Turkish Republic was established in 1923 upon the seeds of a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire, which was later reduced to the area of Anatolia. Hence, national consciousness and a modern nation state should be achieved by cutting ties with the Ottoman past. National rhetoric should be focused on "Turkishness" identified with the Turkish language, geography and ancient history of Anatolia.<sup>9</sup>

To this end, Ataturk began to carry out reforms in many fields. These reforms were not only of bourgeois nationalism but also of bourgeois democracy. The revolutionary tasks of Ataturk were not only to oppose the imperialism and to safeguard the political independence, but also to establish a modern bourgeois Republic.<sup>10</sup>

In this sense, in Turkey, the multi-national autocratic empire was disbanded in favor of a much smaller national republic. For the Kemalists, the republican form of

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<sup>7</sup> Roderic H. Davison, "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 7, No:3 (Summer 1953), p. 330.

<sup>8</sup> Zhu Kerou, "On Ataturk's Reforms," *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı - Tebliğler-* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C.II, Kasım 1981), p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Neyzi, p. 417.

<sup>10</sup> Kerou, p. 2.

government meant the transfer of sovereignty from the Sultan to the nation. On the other hand, their aim was to secure secularism within a homogeneous, uni-ethnic (Turkish), uni-linguistic (Turkish), uni-sectarian (Sunni) entity. Accordingly, the individuals would imagine themselves as part of a nation.<sup>11</sup>

As Samuel Huntington analyzed, "First, political modernization involves the rationalization of authority by replacing of a large number of traditional, religious, familial and ethnic political authority". Within this perspective, on November 1, 1922 Mustafa Kemal abolished the Sultanate. Due to Mustafa Kemal's abolition of the Sultanate and retention of the Caliphate as a spiritual office in November 1922, several Islamicists rejected the perception of the Caliphate as a spiritual office, and claimed that it should not be likened to the Holy See.<sup>12</sup>

After the disappearance of the Sultanate, all the other institutions of the old order and foreigners, the ulama remained "the only power in Turkish society to be able to challenge the leadership of the new regime".<sup>13</sup> At the beginning, Mustafa Kemal was aware of their potential threats and hence careful not to offend too much to the ulama, a number of who were deputies in the Assembly, so as to preserve national unity. In fact, fifteen percent of the first Assembly was religious men, imams, muftis and medrese teachers, while another fifteen percent consisted of soldiers. In 1930, he publicly stated his view regarding religion with these words: "Religion is a relationship between God and man, into which professional middlemen can not be allowed. Such merchants of religion have deceived our simple and innocent people. It is they that you and I should fight against". As a pillar of his policy towards religion for the purpose of not losing the support of the traditional society, on September 14, 1921, the Assembly prohibited the sale or use of alcoholic drinks.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Arjomand, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> Detlev H. Khalid, "A study of Ataturk's Laicism in the light of Muslim History," **The Reforms of Ataturk (Essays written to commemorate the 50. Anniversary of the Turkish Republic)** (İstanbul: Publications of the RCD Cultural Institute), p. 54.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>14</sup> Geoffrey Lewis, pp. 12-16.

However Islam constituted a threat against Kemalist Westernization, it was a unifying instrument to gather the local Anatolian notables, religious leaders and the peasantry during the War of National Independence (1919-1922).<sup>15</sup> Finally, Atatürk arrived at a conclusion that the shell in which Turks had preserved Islam constituted an obstacle to progress. Therefore, on March 3, 1924 the government abolished the Caliphate.<sup>16</sup> In brief explanation, the Caliphate was defined by Islam and in the classical caliphate, government was the religious institution and there is no other. Like the Sultanate, the Caliphate was universal. In addition, the main distinction was that the former monarchical and the latter prophetic. The Caliph reigned but did not rule; the Sultan did both.<sup>17</sup>

For a long time, the Caliphate was under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. The declaration of a Republic put the Caliphate on the agenda. Meanwhile, the people were against the abolishment of the Sultanate and the foundation of the Republic, and hence supported the symbolic Caliph Abdulmecid to take over the legislative power. Nonetheless, the abolishment of the Caliphate was speed up and realized on March 3, 1924. While abolishing the Caliphate, Atatürk took the support of the army as Reza Shah did. Indeed, the abolishment of Caliphate was envisaged so as to eradicate the Ottoman Empire entirely and additionally, on the account of laicism, this institution could not continue to exist.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, while the office of Shaykh-ul Islam (the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire) and the shari'a courts were abrogated, secular

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<sup>15</sup> Davison, p. 342.

<sup>16</sup> Khalid, p. 66 and for further information on the abolishment of caliphate see Hasan Türker, "Basında Hanedan-ı Hilafet Tartışmaları ve Hilafetin Kaldırılması," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, C. III, No. 8 (İzmir 1999), pp. 67-91.

<sup>17</sup> Rodinson, pp. 158-172.

<sup>18</sup> Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Türk İnkılabının temel taşı laiklik," *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı - Tebliğler-* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C.II, Kasım 1981), pp. 18-19.

courts were founded. Besides, the dervish orders were prohibited and moreover, their numerous lodges (tekke's), and of the mausolea (turbe's) of traditional Muslim heroes and saints were closed. Serious revolts occurred after the abolition of Sufi tarikats, i.e. Şeyh Sait uprising (an ethnic Kurdish rebellion) in the east in 1925 and afterwards Menemen uprising in 1930, where Nakşibendis attacked and killed a schoolteacher.<sup>19</sup>

In 1924, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was established under the control of the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for the purpose of controlling religious life, the certification and payment of prayer leaders, provincial muftis and mosque custodians. All imams and muftis were required to hold a government license. Briefly, Islam was institutionalized in the form of a government agency and the new government policy maintained the Ottoman pattern in the sense of including ulama within the state.<sup>20</sup>

The Grand National Assembly assumed the authority over the execution of the shari'ah by the enactment of the qanun. The Republican Constitution of 1924 was adopted and in April 1928, Article 2 was amended to disestablish Islam as the religion of the Turkish State. In February 1937, the same article was amended again to incorporate the six ideological principles of Republican People's Party, declaring the Turkish state "republican, nationalist, populist, statist (etatist), secular and revolutionist".<sup>21</sup>

These six arrows on which the state policies have been based, were as follows:

The principles of Kamalism, which framed the Turkish Revolution, were republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, etatism and revolutionism. *Republicanism* was a turning point in the Turkish history, because all Turkish states

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<sup>19</sup> Khalid, p. 66.

<sup>20</sup> Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in secular Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 1951), p. 269.

<sup>21</sup> Arjomand, p. 26.

throughout their history had been dynasties and identified with their founders, but the new Turkish State was founded on his own land as a Republic and identified with the nation. Indeed, Republicanism arose as a reaction to the Sultanate. As remembered, in the Ottoman Empire, the legislative power belonged to the members of the Ottoman family, not to the representatives of the nation.

On the other hand, the second principle *Nationalism* in the Empire first spread among the non-Muslims as a consequence of the waves of the French Revolution. Ottomanism, which was seeking a homogenous Ottoman society, could not succeed in avoiding the spread of these ideas among the non-Muslims. Following the Erzurum Congress in 1919, when the boundaries were accepted, the independence war, which resulted in the foundation of the Republic of Turkey by replacing the Ottoman institutions, was launched.<sup>22</sup>

Nationalism in Ataturk's own words was as follows: "The Turkish people constituent of the Turkish Republic are the Turkish nation" and "Happy whoever calls him/herself a Turk".

Sadiq Gill reiterates the above-mentioned phrase and says that the people who speak Turkish, who are brought up with Turkish culture, share Turkish ideals and who live in Turkish soil are Turks.<sup>23</sup>

The third principle, which was *Populism*, was the governance of the people with the people for the people. Indeed, previously, the term "reaya" was used to define the majority of the Ottomans, who were working as farmers, whereas used later only to describe non-Muslims. With the Turkish revolution the word 'People' gained a political meaning and people became a source of democratic rights.

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<sup>22</sup> Sadiq A. Gill, "The principles of Kamalism," *Journal of Asian Civilizations*, Vol. XXII, No.2 (December 1999), pp. 100-103.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.



The fourth principle, *Etatism*, was the state participation in economy.<sup>24</sup> Until Tanzimat, the Ottoman economy had based on agriculture. Turkish people had no knowledge concerning the economy and even if so, they had no capital to become an actor of the economic affairs. To this end, economic structure of the country had to be reviewed. In 1931 etatism was promulgated. Henceforth, mines, forests, canals, railroads, transportation firms, banks and utilities would be performed by the state or regional administrations. Indeed, etatism was not solely limited to the economic sphere, but also social, ethical and national beneficial functions it had. For instance, workers should have justice and greater prosperity through equitable distribution of income.

The fifth principle, *Revolutionism*<sup>25</sup>, guaranteed the permanency of the other principles. Ataturk defined the Turkish revolution as:<sup>26</sup>

“We obtain inspirations not from the skies, but directly from life. What draws us along our path is the country we live in, the Turkish nation from which we originated, and the conclusion we have reached from the history of nations, filled as it is with disasters and sorrow”.

The last principle, *Secularization* in Turkey appeared with Tanzimat, which was the beginning of transitional period from the arbitrary governance towards Constitutional regime.<sup>27</sup> Before the foundation of the Republic, Ataturk did not want to use the word “secularism” for not disturbing the people, and said that no individual’s conscience could be guided by another.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> M. Rauf İnan, "Gazi'nin (Atatürk'ün) Halkçılık ülküsü, Halkevleri ve sonrası," *Bellekten* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Cilt:LII, No. 204 (Kasım) 1988), pp. 869-879.

<sup>25</sup> Instead of the word “revolutionism”, Donald Everett Webster uses “reformerism” in his book called *The Turkey of Ataturk -Social Press in Turkish Reformation* – (Philadelphia: The American Academy of political and social science, 1939), p. 171.

<sup>26</sup> Gill, pp. 106-109.

<sup>27</sup> Turhan Feyzioğlu, p. 11.

<sup>28</sup> Gill, p. 108.



Niyazi Berkes claims that Turkish laicism was not engaged in the separation of state and religious authority. The main concern was to forestall conspiratorial Islamism.<sup>29</sup>

Nadolski formulizes the secularization process and categorizes as follows:<sup>30</sup>

- Supplementation of the Shari'a
- Reform (Tanzimat and Mecelle)
- Change (abrogation of the capitulatory system)
- Complete secular change in civil law (adoption of the Swiss Civil Code)

On the basis of these four steps, we could claim that secularization progress of Ataturk's efforts within the Context of Nadolski's formulation was accomplished.

Besides secularization, the transition to democracy must also be achieved by constitutional engineering, and in accordance man-made law was deemed necessary for instituting democracy.<sup>31</sup> To this end, after Ataturk abolished the Caliphate in 1924, the question of civil law and penal code was taken into consideration. The Criminal Code (based on Italian Criminal Code) was enacted in 1926. Ataturk spent his two years from 1924 to 1926 for the purpose of persuading the nation and the Istanbul Faculty of Law concerning the importance of adopting a Western Civil Code. The Minister of Justice was in favor of the Swiss Civil Code as opposed to French and German codes, because he had studied law in Switzerland. Hence, the complete Swiss Civil Code was translated into Turkish and accepted by the Grand National Assembly in 1926. This meant the abandonment of the dual court system, religious and secular; and final abrogation of the remaining parts of the capitulatory system.<sup>32</sup> In 1917, the Shari'a law courts had been placed under the jurisdiction of the civil Ministry of Justice. Since 1926, Turkish legislation had ignored the

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<sup>29</sup> Khalid, p. 64.

<sup>30</sup> Nadolski, p. 517.

<sup>31</sup> Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East ...*, p. 7.

<sup>32</sup> Nadolski, p. 527.

shari'a.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, it was Turkey's dream to abolish the capitulatory system of 1914 by official de facto pronouncements and the Treaty of Lausanne. This was also realized by the abolishment of the mixed court system, which gave non-Muslims special privileges.

After 1926, the Faculties of Law at Istanbul and Ankara Universities trained judges and lawyers in the knowledge of Swiss civil law, because their style and training was different than that of legists of Switzerland.<sup>34</sup>

With the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, the process of secularization of civil law in Turkey was in part realized; especially Family Law was completely changed by the Swiss Civil Code.<sup>35</sup> In addition, in the new Civil Code, marriageable age and legislation concerning the unlawful and unregistered marriages were integrated. Each married party was considered sui juris in the matter of divorce. However, the new Swiss Code was met with the reaction of the masses at first. The villagers were disregarding the provision on marriageable age and registration of their marriages in the official municipality, but later they had adopted.<sup>36</sup>

After the progress of the constitutional restructuring, a platform, in which these laws would be performed, was deemed necessary. Therefore, within respect to the internal restructuring of the political system, Atatürk intended to pass through a multi-party democratic regime. However, this adventure failed, because the two experiences in 1924 Terakkiperver Republican Party and in 1930 Free Republican Party, showed that the system and society was not yet ready to absorb the multi-party democracy.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Reed, pp. 267-269.

<sup>34</sup> Nadolski, p. 536.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 518.

<sup>36</sup> Nadolski, pp. 530-537.

<sup>37</sup> Leyla Kırkpınar, "Cumhuriyet ve Kadın," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, C. III, No. 8 (İzmir 1999), p. 108.

### 3.1.2.1. Economy Policy:

In 1923, the Turkish Republic was founded in an economic vacuum because of the lack of capital, skilled manpower, infrastructure and trade.<sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, non-Turkish ethnic groups had lost their economic power following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, particularly, manufacturing industry went into a decline due to the competition of foreign products and the disappearance of enterprises of Greeks and other minorities. On the other hand, the foreign capitalist control of the Turkish economy was terminated under the treaty of Lausanne.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the capitulations were gradually cancelled. When the Ottoman Empire had announced the abrogation of the capitulations, France, Great Britain and the United States had refused to accept this dictum and claimed that the capitulations were established by treaties. They had tried to reinstitute the capitulatory system by the means of the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. Nevertheless, the last attempt for abrogating the system came with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924. France and Great Britain accepted, while the United States did not accept till 1927.<sup>40</sup>

Ataturk gave due attention to the economic development as much as political restructuring including both agricultural development and industrialization.<sup>41</sup> Mustafa Kemal and his ministers did not define a clear ideology regarding economic development. The aim was to reach to the level of developed countries.<sup>42</sup>

While radical reforms altered the institutions of the republic, the Kemalists knew that such reforms would be incomplete unless they were backed by a revolution in the

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<sup>38</sup> Mehmet Özey, "Turkey in crisis: Some contradictions in the Kemalist Development Strategy," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 15 (1983), p. 51.

<sup>39</sup> Frederic C. Shorter, "The population of Turkey after the War of Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 17 (1985), p. 433.

<sup>40</sup> Nadolski, pp. 525-526.

<sup>41</sup> Özey, p. 51.

<sup>42</sup> Özelli, p. 86.

economic sphere. Within this context, Izmir Congress was held in 1923. The Congress was dominated by the newly organized Turkish National Trade Association, which was more interested in free enterprise than state intervention. In the 1920s, Kemalist development strategy aimed free enterprise and the economic legislation was designed to encourage it. Meanwhile, banking was the main source of capital for the private sector. To this end, 28 private banks were established.<sup>43</sup> In 1924, Is Bank was established in order to organize and finance private business undertakings. The Agricultural Bank, established in 1899, was strengthened to provide credit to farmers. In 1925, a purely state bank –the Industrial and Mining Bank of Turkey- was set up to finance and manage state owned industrial establishments. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry in 1927 and the Foreign Trade Regulation Law of 1929 were enacted.<sup>44</sup>

On the other hand, the Great Depression of 1929 affected Turkey, particularly the agricultural sector contributing 40 to 50 percent of net national product.<sup>45</sup> The agricultural crisis emphasized the lack of industrial development and the dependence as a raw materials producer on the more industrialized countries.<sup>46</sup> Due to Turkey's dependence on agricultural products, its market was limited, so a rapid shift to direct state participation occurred in 1930s.<sup>47</sup> In 1931, for the purpose of solving the agricultural problems, the Congress of Agriculture was held; the problems of villagers were discussed and at last the issues were presented to the government.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Mustafa Türkeş, "A Patriotic Leftist Development –Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 33 (2001), p. 93.

<sup>44</sup> Özay, pp. 50-51

<sup>45</sup> Özelli, p. 85 and see also Owen, p. 191

<sup>46</sup> Robert W. Kerwin, "Private enterprise in Turkish Industrial Development," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (winter 1951), p. 22.

<sup>47</sup> Özelli, p. 85.

<sup>48</sup> Türkan Çetin, "Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında köy sorununa bakış: Köy Kanunu'nun çıkarılması," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, C. II, No. 4-5 (İzmir 1994-1995), p. 215.

Following the Great Depression, etatist economic policy was adopted. Meanwhile, etatism was the policy applied in many Third World countries and conceived as a homegrown strategy to meet the challenges of nation building rather than a universalistic ideology. It was a development strategy, which was influenced ideologically by the Soviet Union. In 1933, Russia provided US \$18 million to Turkey without interest to be repaid in terms of Turkish products. Moreover, Russia agreed to extend technical assistance in order to launch the five-year planning capability in Turkey. However, it did not mean that the Turkish government embraced Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and in effect Ataturk precisely dissociated himself from the attempt to identify *etatism* with socialism.<sup>49</sup>

According to the etatist economic policy, private enterprises should continue to be a fundamental actor of Turkey's economic structure, but the state should play an active role in industrial investment. Actually, the transition to etatism in the 1930s was realized through a gradual process.<sup>50</sup> Within the context of etatist policy, private industry was protected by tariff barriers and encouraged by government gifts of land, tax and customs exemptions, and reductions in transport rates.<sup>51</sup>

A temporary revival in economy had seen due to tariff protection (prevented before 1929 by the Lausanne Treaty). Modern manufacturing was emerging under the impetus of a state industrial policy (etatism). The first modern textile mills were opened in 1925 and by 1938 they took over most of the internal market.<sup>52</sup> Sumerbank was created in 1933 as a combined state bank and holding company. It took over the factories run by the Bank for Industry and Mining, and moreover financed new industrial enterprises to be set up within the context of the first five-

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<sup>49</sup> Özay, pp. 49-52 and see also Özelli, p. 86.

<sup>50</sup> Türkes, "A Patriotic Leftist Development –Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement,"...pp. 93 and for further information on etatist economic policy of Turkey see also Bilsay Kuruç, "Ekonomide 1930'lar ve 1980'ler," *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı - Tebliğler-* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C. II, Kasım 1981), pp. 1-7.

<sup>51</sup> Kerwin, p. 22.

<sup>52</sup> Shorter, p. 433.

year plan of industrialization under a policy of *etatism* – direct state participation in economic activity from 1934 to 1939.<sup>53</sup>

As understood, Atatürk's reforms served for the political economic interests by the means of etatist policies, and therefore the reforms were also beneficial to the workers and peasants. For instance, the abolition of the tithe was a reform in the economic field and raised the economic status of the peasants. Consequently, Turkey adopted the measures to transform the rural economy into capitalism.<sup>54</sup>

However, Turkey did not carry out a land reform and land was still in the hands of feudal lords.<sup>55</sup> During the Tanzimat period in 1867, the foreigners had the right to own property, but with the land law of 1910 this right was granted to Turkish corporate entities. The new Swiss Civil Code called for a land register, which meant that the land owned by state and held as tenants by the villagers would be privately owned, subject to registering them.<sup>56</sup>

Within the respect of land registration, this would bring about also the ownership of land through registration and with such procedure the villager became the legal owner of that ground.<sup>57</sup> However, on the account of strong opposition of the feudal landlord class, the Parliament did not approve the act of the land reform by 1945. Meanwhile, the government of the Turkish Republic submitted Labour Act in 1925 and 1929, but it was not approved by the Assembly. In 1936, Turkey finally promulgated Labour Act, which was delayed for many years.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Özay, p. 52.

<sup>54</sup> Kerou, p. 4.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>56</sup> Nadolski, p. 531.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 531-537.

<sup>58</sup> Kerou, pp. 5-6.

Indeed, etatist policy as a development model should be evaluated in the sense of what etatism brought about to Turkey. Here, I would briefly like to discuss this point.

From 1932 to 1934, the journal *Kadro* was published by a group of patriotic leftist intellectuals in Turkey. *Kadro* focused on interpreting the Turkish Revolution and proposing a development strategy. One of those intellectuals, Ahmet Ağaoğlu accepts *Kadro*'s proposal in which the state intervention in establishing infrastructure and industries is envisaged. In this proposal, state intervention is proposed whenever the private sector is unable to do. Both Ağaoğlu and *Kadro* agreed that private sector was not enough strong for the industrialization so the state should take an active role in the economy.<sup>59</sup>

On the other hand, according to Mehmet Ozay, etatism did not accelerate the rate of aggregate economic growth. The etatist industrialization program was financed heavily from domestic sources through taxation and forced savings. Moreover, this strategy has widened the economic and political distance between the rural masses and the elite, because etatism caused a non-competitive, closed economy dominated by state monopolies that were badly managed and overstaffed.<sup>60</sup>

American observers also began to criticize Turkish *etatism*.<sup>61</sup> Statistics and commerce reports on American trade pointed out the decline in trade with Turkey after 1920, because the Turks opted for etatism instead of foreign investment. Actually, between 1919 and 1920, the USA was enjoying the lion's share of trade with Turkey, when American exports to Turkey approximated \$ 67 million. In 1921, the share of American trade in Turkish markets declined and to overcome the

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<sup>59</sup> Türkeş, "A Patriotic Leftist Development –Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the *Kadro* (Cadre) Movement," ..., pp. 94-95.

<sup>60</sup> Özay, p. 53.

<sup>61</sup> Kerwin, pp. 23-24.



downward trend, Bristol urged businessmen to expand the American marketplace by seeking new opportunities in the Middle East.<sup>62</sup>

### **3.1.2.2. Foreign Policy:**

The Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923 established the international status and boundaries of the new state. Furthermore, it provided the basis for the creation of the climate of peace and stability needed by the country.

The Turkish foreign policy based on “Peace at home, peace in world” principle since the foundation of Republic of Turkey. Turkey hitherto benefited from this policy in the international arena.

It can be claimed that 1920s and 1930s were the dates that pacifist policy had been followed. Despite the fact that the liberation struggle had been waged against major European powers, she proceeded to establish good relations and cooperation with the West, and based her political and legal systems on modern, secular models. Better relations with Greece after the “Megalo Idea” was given up by Greece; better contacts with the Balkan states, Italy and even Great Britain easing settlement of dispute on Musul; a moderate atmosphere with France had been ensured. The existing friendship constituted with the Moscow Agreement of 1921 and the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of 1925 was carried on in the same pacifist atmosphere. Furthermore, in 1932 Turkey did not loose the chance to be involved in the League of Nations. From 1937 on, much attention is shown to German-Turkish relations. Hitler’s Germany became Turkey’s most important market for agricultural produce, and close commercial and credit relations between Turkey and Germany seriously concerned the British.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Thomas A. Bryson, “Admiral Mark L. Bristol -An Open Door Diplomat in Turkey-” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1974), pp. 464-465.

<sup>63</sup> Akşin, pp. 191-192.



Until the World War II, the main factor affecting the Turkish foreign policy was her strategic position of being neighbour of powerful countries around. She lies at a strategic "crossroads" where two continents, Europe and Asia meet, and also where cultures and civilizations come together. This unique position gives her European, Balkan, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Caucasian and Asian identities all at the same time. It has exerted a strong influence on her foreign policy choices and has necessitated a multi-dimensional foreign policy. To this end, he adopted a policy through a realistic and forethought manner. Henceforth, Turkey had to deal with both the powerful states of Europe and the ongoing problems after the Treaty of Lausanne.

For the duration of the post-Lausanne era, the focus of the new Republic was on internal structuring. Externally, efforts were directed at resolving the problems left over from the Lausanne negotiations, particularly the Ottoman debt and border issues. In the mid-1930s, as the international environment was rapidly deteriorating, Turkey endeavored to form a security belt on its western and eastern borders. She played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Entente (Turkey, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia) in 1934, and the Saadabad Pact (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan) in 1937. The Montreux Convention, reinstating her sovereignty over the strategic Turkish Straits, and regulating navigation through them, was signed in 1936.<sup>64</sup>

The main aim of Turkey was to preserve the sovereignty and the territorial integrity within the international status quo. The struggle in the world of 1930s-40s was between the revisionists and the conservatives, which Turkey took part in. Nevertheless, the traditional pacifist policy of Ataturk prevented Turkey from involving in the World War II.

Meanwhile, World War II brought an upsurge in Middle Eastern Communism. The main reasons were the emergence of the Soviet Union as one of the two great world

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.

powers and the downfall of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. During this time, Communist parties made progress in the Middle East, even in Turkey.<sup>65</sup>

However, despite the period of a general fear of the spread of Communism on the account of the victory of the Red Army and the missionary activities of Comintern in Asia and Europe, Mustafa Kemal and his followers were not attracted to Communism. They were struggling for a national war, not for a class war. For a short time, Mustafa Kemal tolerated a small amount Communist propaganda under control and indeed in 1918, the Socialist-Communist Party was set up in Turkey.<sup>66</sup> By 1922, the Turkish Communist Party launched demonstrations against Turkish government. After a while, Kemal's government suppressed Communism within its territories. Meanwhile, Ismet Inonu signed a Straits Convention, though the Russians opposed to that Convention which was allowing the passage of Western warships through the Straits and into the Black Sea.<sup>67</sup>

### 3.1.3. Social Reforms and Cultural Progress

Ataturk's reforms were based on the totality of culture and civilization. He aimed to finalize the clash of the East and West, and create entirely contemporary and civilized society.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, the goals of these reforms are both *modernization* and *civilization*. In a speech delivered on September 1925 Ataturk said:<sup>69</sup> "The aim of the

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<sup>65</sup> Walter Z. Laqueur, "The Appeal of Communism in the Middle East," **The Middle East Journal**, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter 1955), p. 17.

<sup>66</sup> Davison, p. 337 and see also Hayit Baymirza, "Bazı Sovyet kaynaklarının Atatürk hakkındaki düşünceleri," **Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı -Tebliğler-** (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C.II, Kasım 1981), p. 8.

<sup>67</sup> **Ibid.**, pp. 337-338.

<sup>68</sup> Sabri Çakır, "Atatürk'ün Kültür ve Bilim Anlayışı," **Fırat Üniversitesi Dergisi (Sosyal Bilimler)** (C. 5, No.1, 1991), p. 91.

<sup>69</sup> Salim Neysari, "A Comparison of the activities related to the language and writing reforms in Turkey and Iran during the time of Ataturk and Reza Shah," **The Reforms of Ataturk (Essays written to commemorate the 50. Anniversary of the Turkish Republic)** (İstanbul: Publications of the RCD Cultural Institute), p. 43.

revolutionary measures we have been and are taking, is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society which is entirely modern and civilized...”

His modernization efforts were fulfilled from top to down due to lack of individual consciousness for restructuring the society. After the establishment of the Republic he claimed that institutionalization from down to top was the most long-lasting one. Within this perspective, education was needed for the ‘from down to top’ development.<sup>70</sup> In the recent years, educational institutions of developing countries have attracted the attention of social scientists as the prime movers of structural changes. They argue that the obstacle to economic development is lack of qualified manpower rather than scarcity of natural resources and capital.<sup>71</sup>

Ataturk was also aware of the importance of the education for the purpose of modernizing the society at first in mind. To this end, he declared himself the teacher of the Turks to lead this modernization movement and stimulate to the population.<sup>72</sup> Even at the time of the Turkish War of Independence, he bolstered the ‘Education Congress’ for the purpose of determining the education policy, which would be followed afterwards.<sup>73</sup> G. Lenczowski concluded, “The secret of Kemal’s success may largely be attributed to the strict enforcement of educational reform”.<sup>74</sup>

During the first years of the Republic, foreign advisers came and elaborated an action plan towards educational modernization.<sup>75</sup> As a consequence of these educational

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<sup>70</sup> Yusuf Tatar, “Atatürk’ün başarısında düşünce yapısının önemi,” *Fırat Üniversitesi Dergisi (Sosyal Bilimler)* (C. 5, No.1, 1991), p. 377.

<sup>71</sup> Özelli, p. 77.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>73</sup> Rıfat Özdemir, “Atatürk’ün Milli Eğitim Politikası,” *Fırat Üniversitesi Dergisi (Sosyal Bilimler)*, 5 (1), p. 348.

<sup>74</sup> Özelli, p. 82.

<sup>75</sup> Aslan Kaynaradağ, “Eğitimle ilgili Üç Rapor ve Atatürk İş Üniversitesi,” *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı -Tebliğler-* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C. II, Kasım 1981), p. 1.

reforms, the literacy level rose from 8% in 1928 to over 20% in 1935. In Istanbul, 75% of girls attended primary school according to the data of 1929-30.<sup>76</sup>

Within the perspective of educational modernization program, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues initially replaced the Ottoman Islamic State with a secular republic. He offered the unification of the education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*) and with the first Constitution of the Turkish Republic, all education was placed under the supervision of the state and declared compulsory primary education for all Turks.<sup>77</sup> In the country, henceforth there would be a single type secular education.

With the Law of Unification of Education on 3 March 1924, the medreses were abolished and other religious schools as well as funds used by the Evkaf (Pious Foundations) were taken over by the Ministry of Education.<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, the Ministries of *Şer'iyeye* (canonical legality) and *Evkaf* (estates in mortmain / Waqf) were separated and their name was changed to (in order): Department of Religious Affairs and Department of Waqf. In addition, the authority of the Department was restricted when compared to that of the Ministry. For instance, the minister of *Şer'iyeye* was responsible for specifying both education policy and Turkish foreign policy, but the head officer of the Department of Religious Affairs do not even have the right to specify the religion policy.<sup>79</sup>

On the other hand, the military schools were placed under the Ministry of Defense with the Laws No.637 and No.789. Even private schools were placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. There was a need for an immediate allocation of resources for training new teachers. Before foundation of the Republic, any commercial education was in the hands of the minorities. With the proclamation

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<sup>76</sup> Tekelioğlu, p. 94 and see also Shorter, p. 435.

<sup>77</sup> Özelli, p. 78 and see also Osman Feyzoğlu, " Atatürk'ün Eğitim, Kültür ve İnsan Anlayışı," *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı -Tebliğler-* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C. II, Kasım 1981), p. 6.

<sup>78</sup> Özelli, p. 79.

<sup>79</sup> Akşin, pp. 166-167.

of the Republic, commercial and vocational schools were placed under the newly created General Directorate of Higher and Vocational Education of the Ministry of Education. In 1933, the Under-secretariat of Vocational and Technical Education was created under the Ministry of Education.<sup>80</sup>

In terms of Cultural Revolution, in 1931, People's Houses<sup>81</sup> (Community Center), which were attached to RPP (Republican People's Party), were established while Mason Lodges were closed. People's Houses were engaged in 9 fields: 1) Language, literature, history 2) Fine Arts 3) Representation 4) Sports 5) Social aid 6) People's classrooms and courses 7) Library and publish 8) Rural Development 9) Museum and exhibition.<sup>82</sup> The People's Houses (Halkevleri) provided free education to adults, however, during the Ottomans rule, free primary education remained on paper.<sup>83</sup>

Till Ataturk's era, there were faculties but not unified under the frame of one university. In Istanbul, a university (Darul-funun) had been established. However, Swedish expert evaluated the conditions in this university and found inefficient. Besides, due to Darulfunun's attitude towards reforms and lack of development in terms of scientific studies within the Darulfunun, Ataturk closed the University in 1933, and instead Istanbul University was set up.<sup>84</sup> Subsequently, the autonomy of Universities was abolished, and they were put under the control of the Ministry of Education till 1946.<sup>85</sup> The number of Universities gradually increased, i.e., in

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<sup>80</sup> Özelli, pp. 80-87.

<sup>81</sup> For further information on Halkevleri (People's Houses) see İnan, "Gazi'nin (Atatürk'ün) Halkçılık ülküsü... pp. 891-911 and also Yaşar Akyol, "Türkiye'de Halkevleri'ne ilişkin çalışmalar ve değerlendirmeler üzerine," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, C. II, No. 6-7 (İzmir 1997), pp. 131-139.

<sup>82</sup> Akşin, pp. 182-183.

<sup>83</sup> Tekelioğlu, p. 94 and see also Özelli, p. 79.

<sup>84</sup> Akşin, pp. 186-187.

<sup>85</sup> Ali Güler, "Atatürk ve sonrası Üniversite Reformları," *Fırat Üniversitesi Dergisi (Sosyal Bilimler)*, C. 3, No. 1, 1989, pp. 181-188; Ali Arslan, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi İstanbul Darülfünunu'nda öğretim üyesi olmanın şartları ve ilmi yetersizlik dolayısıyla görevden alınma," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* No. 12, 1982, pp. 161-171 and see also Aslan Tufan Yazman, *Atatürk'le Beraber Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1922-1938)* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1969), p. 307.

Ankara the Faculty of Law was established in 1925. Furthermore, 142 German professors were invited and they studied in several fields in Turkish universities. These professors were paid more than twice of Turkish lecturers' salaries.<sup>86</sup>

Towards the unification of education in 1924, the Turkish government required that history, geography and civics must be taught only by Turks from Turkish textbooks. Indeed, the Nationalists' aim was not destroying the American schools, solely supervising their curriculum. Besides, the new tax laws threatened the continuation of American institutions, hence the Turkish authorities exempted them from tax.<sup>87</sup>

Despite the fact that by 1939, only three of 450 American schools and one of 9 hospitals were left in Turkey, American assistance to Turkey continued. Robert College launched a special program to train skilled workmen serving for the public interest. In addition, the personnel of Robert College were active as consultants to Turkish authorities in drafting plans for electric lighting, water supply and sewerage systems. Members of colleges translated European works; American and Turkish educators were exchanged; Turkish officials visited Robert College to study its teaching methods.<sup>88</sup>

Within the context of educational reforms, Atatürk also focused on the elaboration of the Alphabet and set up a commission to decide how the Latin letters could be applied to Turkish. On August 9, 1928 he introduced the new alphabet and went on tour with his blackboard. At that time, about ninety-one percent of the population was illiterate.<sup>89</sup> In 1929, the "Millet Mektepleri" was established by the Law, for the

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<sup>86</sup> Muazzez Çığ, "Atatürk ve Türkiye'de çivi yazıları bilimin başlaması," *Erdem (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Dergisi)* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, C.1, No.1 Ocak 1985), p. 285.

<sup>87</sup> Robert L. Daniel, "The United States and the Turkish Republic before World War II: The Cultural Dimension," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.21, No:1 (Winter 1967), pp. 55-56.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 56-60.

<sup>89</sup> Osman Feyzoğlu, pp. 6-7.

purpose of disseminating the new Alphabet. From now on, no source will be published with Arabic letters.<sup>90</sup>

Throughout the history, many Anatolian princes and Ottoman Sultans had required that Turkish should be used instead of Persian and urged the writers to use the everyday language of the people. After the middle of 15<sup>th</sup> century until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the divan poets substituted the Arabic and Persian equivalents of these words and avoided more Turkish ones. The existing language was Ottoman Turkish, which was different from Turkish. The mid-19<sup>th</sup> century modernists, the Tanzimat writers, published the first Turkish private newspaper and introduced from the French many new literary kinds. They also wrote the first Turkish play. Tanzimat writers were followed by Servet-i Funun school.<sup>91</sup>

Şemseddin Sami, the lexicographer, encyclopaedist, journalist, explained that the word Turkish, which was used generally to mean “the coarse speech of illiterate Anatolian peasants”, was the language spoken by a whole nation stretching from the Adriatic to the frontiers of China. On the other hand, Ottoman was only the name of a dynasty like the Habsbourgs and could not be applied to a language. In 1911, Omer Seyfettin and his friends in the Salonika literary review -Genç Kalemler- inaugurated the first organized linguistic movement. Ziya Gökalp, the emerging leader of cultural nationalism, had joined the movement. Within ten years, this movement became very popular and republished their works in this reformed Turkish, which was called Yeni Lisan.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Zeynep Korkmaz, "Türk dilinin tarihi ve akışı içinde Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi," *A.Ü. Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları No.147* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), p. 47 and also see pp. 32-78 for further information on language reform.

<sup>91</sup> Fahir İz, "Atatürk and Turkish Language Reform," *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı -Tebliğler-* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C. II, Kasım 1981), pp. 5-6.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.



In 1932, the Turkish Linguistic Society was established as a consequence of Ataturk's efforts. After that, the language reform was sustained under the guidance of Ataturk, which was as follows:<sup>93</sup>

- Old Turkish words replaced by Arabic and Persian loan words should be collected and published;
- Turkish words used locally, which are not known in standard written Turkish should be collected and published;
- New words should be created from Turkish roots, using Turkish suffixes;
- Scientific terminology should be based on Turkish.

There were some easing circumstances in terms of adapting Turkish Alphabet at the time of Ataturk. One of the reasons was that the Arab Alphabet was not suitable for Turkish. It was very rich for its consonants and poor for its semivowels, but Turkish was the opposite. Besides, nationalism was important in terms of this reform. They preferred Turkish with own alphabet.<sup>94</sup> Consequently, the loss of communication between the folk and intellectual due to the different languages was compensated with the new common language. To Aksin, they could create an original one without sorting Arab and Persian words, but the decision of being a European state might be effective.<sup>95</sup> In fact, by the adoption of Latin alphabet, modernization and discarding foreign cultural influences were considered together.<sup>96</sup>

Ataturk also gave due attention to the study of Turkish history. In 1931, Turkish History Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu-TTK) was founded.<sup>97</sup> Ataturk benefited from the archaeology in history studies. In order to educate history and archaeology scientists, he sent students abroad for education. In addition, by Ataturk's order, the

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<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>94</sup> Aksin, pp. 178-179.

<sup>95</sup> Osman Feyzoğlu, p. 8.

<sup>96</sup> Neysari, p. 44.

<sup>97</sup> Aksin, pp. 184-185.



Minister of Education sent a letter advising the students abroad to concentrate on ex-Anatolia civilizations.<sup>98</sup> His further contribution on history was that he edited some chapters of history books prepared for the secondary and high schools. Then, in 1936, he established the Faculty of Language and History.<sup>99</sup>

Ataturk established Turkish Language Society and Turkish History Society in an independent status, so the government could not intervene to these two institutions. It is worth stressing here that Ataturk bequeathed that after his death, his income would be given to these institutions.<sup>100</sup>

Ataturk had told "*Nations are many, but civilization is one*". He considered that the status of the women was also important in the sense of the universal civilization. His approach to the family life showed that he was in support of equal rights of partners and as well obligations. Despite his unsatisfactory marriage, for the purpose of showing his respect to women and being a model for men, Ataturk made public appearances with his wife. Furthermore, he invited women in official receptions, and introduced ballroom dancing at state and diplomatic functions.<sup>101</sup>

According to Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, the greatest impact of development on woman's status was seen in Turkey. In the male-dominant Turkish society, reflecting the Middle Eastern culture, improvements in woman's status were achieved with socio-economic developments.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Recep Yıldırım, "Atatürk'ten Günümüze Eskiçağ Tarihi ve Arkeoloji Çalışmaları," **Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi**, C. II, No. 4-5 (İzmir 1994-1995), pp. 34-36.

<sup>99</sup> Zeki Arıkan, "Atatürk ve Tarih," **Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi**, C. II, No. 6-7 (İzmir 1997), p. 19

<sup>100</sup> Akşin, pp. 184-185.

<sup>101</sup> Diane G. Sunar, "Ataturk's Reforms and the emancipation of women," in Ergün Toğrol editor, **The Ataturk Conference Series** (İstanbul, Boğaziçi University -The Institute for Ataturk's principles and the history of Turkish Renovation-, November-1988), pp. 6-8.

<sup>102</sup> Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, "Status of women in Turkey: Cross-cultural perspectives," **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, 18 (1986), p. 491.

Ataturk had also tried to develop his country in terms of dressing such as hat, because he wanted his people to look like Europeans. He wore a hat and became a model for them. In 1925, a law called "*Hat Law*" was enacted. The officials had to wear hats instead of *fez*. This reform was not easy, because a hat was indicating a man's religion, even social status and job. When a man died, his cap was put on his coffin. If that man had money, the gravestone would be shaped like his cap. A hat had a non-Muslim style. In 1924, the attempts to ban the veil have been started in Turkey.<sup>103</sup> The first concrete step was endorsed by the Ministry of Education. On January 15, 1924, a declaration, in which the teachers with their veils on were not allowed to enter lessons, was sent to schools. As the institutionalization of the new regime was accomplished, the context of these attempts was extended. Furthermore, on April 3, 1924, a legal regulation was made concerning the official dressing of the judges and the members of the Justice. Henceforth, local administrations launched some attempts regarding the dressing of the women. In the 1930s, the number of women, who are educated and had professional career, increased. Accordingly, women gave up wearing veils.<sup>104</sup> The Geoffrey Lewis claims that Ataturk did not abolish the veil and adds "Good soldier that he was, he knew that you should never give an order which you know won't be obeyed". Meanwhile, in 1928, King Amanullah of Afghanistan visited Turkey and after he went home, he tried to realize Kemal's secularist policy in his country. It was reported that Amanullah's men were tearing the veils off. However, may be thereof, by May 1929 he was deposed.<sup>105</sup>

In 1923, the Turkish population was short of males, particularly owing to wars. Because of Turkey's high mortality rates of the 1920s and 1930s, women needed to bear on nearly four children to achieve population replacement. Moreover, women were already working in agriculture prior to the 1920s. The 1935 census shows that almost the same number of women worked as men. When the woman's husband is a farmer, then she is classified as an agricultural worker, if not some other occupation

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<sup>103</sup> Akşin, pp. 174-175.

<sup>104</sup> Kemal Yakut, "Tek Parti Doneminde Pece ve Carsaf," *Tarih ve Toplum*, C: 37, No: 220 (Nisan 2002), pp. 26-31.

<sup>105</sup> Geoffrey Lewis, pp. 18-19.

is reported. As understood, women were working extensively in agriculture. After the independence, there was an increase of women' employment outside the agricultural sector. In Istanbul, the Islamic Association for Employment of Ottoman women was established in 1914 to create employment for women.<sup>106</sup>

In Turkey's War of Independence (1919-1923) Turkish Women founded their own units. On 21 March 1923 in Konya, Ataturk said:<sup>107</sup>

“The Turkish woman has always performed her own social obligations side by side with her husband. Our women have always been equal to their husbands in sharing their responsibilities in the struggle of life, in agricultural activities, in supporting the family at home and outside financially...”

Ataturk's wife, Latife Hanim, during their marriage stood behind him and symbolized the modern and civilized woman in Turkey. Moreover, it is interesting to note concerning the Turkish women that the first beauty contest was arranged in 1929 in Turkey. In fact, the most important development was realized through the laws, which would create a civilized woman identity.<sup>108</sup> The Civil Code of 1926 prohibited polygamy, which had been guaranteed by the Sharia laws in the Ottoman Empire, and gave women the right of demanding divorce equally with men and having equal pay for equal work. Also they were given equal rights of property tenure and independence of inheritance. In 1930 women obtained the right to vote and to be candidates in municipal elections.<sup>109</sup> Then, in 1934, the women were given the right to vote and be candidate in elections for the Assembly; 18 were elected in 1935, while French women did not have the vote until 1945 and Swiss women not until 1971.<sup>110</sup> John Stuart Mill in his book *On Liberty* says ‘If you want to know the

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<sup>106</sup> Kırkpınar, pp. 96-97 and see also Shorter, pp. 422-431.

<sup>107</sup> Sönmez, “Atatürk and the rights of Turkish women,” ..., p. 39.

<sup>108</sup> Kırkpınar, pp. 97-101.

<sup>109</sup> Sönmez, pp. 40-41.

<sup>110</sup> Geoffrey Lewis, p. 19 and see also Müberra Işıksoluğu, “Atatürk, İnsan Hakları ve Kadın,” Fırat Üniversitesi Dergisi (Sosyal Bilimler), C. 5, No. 1, 1991, pp. 278-279.

*level of civilization in any country, you must immediately consider the place of women in that society*'.<sup>111</sup>

In the 1930s, Hitler was in power and he systemized the status of women within the slogan of '3 K' (Kinder, Kirche, Kuche) which placed women in the middle of Child, Church and Kitchen. Ataturk did not want to be seen in the same line with these European dictators and was aware of that the citizens should take part actively in the democratic system.<sup>112</sup>

Within the context of social and cultural reforms, Ataturk gave due attention to arts. He had been appreciating Montesquieu's words on arts: "*The revolutions are incomplete, if revolution is not made in arts*". The first Association of Woman Artists of the world was founded in Turkey. This shows the range of importance given by Ataturk on Arts.<sup>113</sup> He intended to reconstruct Turkish art with universal values. Within this context, music was an essential instrument, because its language was universal and possesses universal values.<sup>114</sup>

In this sense, Ziya Gökalp, the leading ideologue, categorized existing Turkish music as Eastern, Western and Folk. To him, the music of the elite during the republican era was Byzantine, known as Eastern, and this music should be replaced with folk music to create a national music for the Turks. Moreover, according to Gökalp musical reforms should be modeled on Western music and its harmony.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Sönmez, p. 41.

<sup>112</sup> Kırkpınar, p. 108.

<sup>113</sup> Rauf İnan, "Ekin (Kültür) Alanında Atatürk Devrimi (Devrimin En Büyük Atılımı ve Başarısı)," **Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı -Tebliğler-** (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C. II, Kasım 1981), pp. 14-15 and for further information on Ataturk's approach on arts see Saim Sakaoğlu, "Atatürk'ün Türk sanatına verdiği değer," **Erdem (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Dergisi)** (Ankara, TTK Basımevi, C. 4, No. 10, Ocak 1988), pp. 1-30.

<sup>114</sup> Hasan Ersel, "Atatürk'ün siyasal programında müzik," **Toplumsal Tarih**, C.13, No.74 (Şubat 2000), p. 7.

<sup>115</sup> Orhan Tekelioğlu, "Modernizing Reforms and Turkish Music in the 1930s," **Turkish Studies (A Frank Cass Journal)**, Vol.2, No.1 (Spring 2001), p. 94.

Ataturk had been sharing the same feelings with Gökalp and he focused on modernization in Turkish music. One of the positive attempts of Ataturk regarding music was inviting Bela Bartok, Hungarian composer, for the purpose of benefiting from his evaluations on the folkloric music. Secondly, the education of Classical Western music was encouraged. Meanwhile, State Conservatoire was established. Talent students were sent to Europe and composition of operas was encouraged. For instance, Ataturk ordered the opera called “Özsoy”, which was composed as due regards to the visit of Reza Shah to Turkey. His aim was to show Reza Shah that his country was able to present an opera at the level of a civilized nation. As a theme of this opera, he required that the Turkish-Iranian friendship should be articulated.<sup>116</sup>

The Place Symphony Orchestra (Saray Senfoni Orkestrasi), the only musical institution performing polyphonic music in the Ottoman era, was abolished in 1924. It can be supposed that the nationalist feelings caused its closure. Then the new orchestra, the Presidential Music Band, was established. Monophonic music education was banned in public and private schools in 1927. I think, this was executed for the purpose of replacing it with the polyphonic music.<sup>117</sup> For this reason, the education of Classical Turkish music and in 1934, for a while, broadcast of this music was forbidden.<sup>118</sup> In 1926 religious lodges were abolished and after 1930s *tekke*<sup>119</sup> musicians began to secularize their music. In 1928, Mustafa Kemal made his first public assessment on Turkish music: “ We have just heard music of the civilized world, and the people, who gave a reaction to the murmuring known as Eastern music, immediately came to life”<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Ersel, pp. 7-10.

<sup>117</sup> Tekelioğlu, p. 95.

<sup>118</sup> Ersel, p. 7.

<sup>119</sup> For further information on “tekke” see Tekelioğlu, p. 95.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

We could witness his interest in polyphonic music after having read Andrew Mango's book known as "*Ataturk*". It was stated in his book that:

"When Ataturk was a military attaché in Sofia, he went to an opera and asked whether the members of orchestra were Bulgarian. After he learned that they were, he murmured 'I understood now, why the Bulgaria was victorious during the Balkan War'." <sup>121</sup>

Some measures were adopted in terms of polyphonic music such as:<sup>122</sup>

- Formal education in Western polyphonic music in conservatoires with foreign experts and instructors and sending some students abroad for training;
- Free concerts of symphony orchestras and broadcast of Western polyphonic music on radio;
- In People's Houses free music courses;
- At State Balls, examples of Western dance music such as tangos and waltzes;
- In schools' curriculum, Western musical history and its composers.

However, most Turkish listeners preferred popular songs composed by *tekke* musicians rather than polyphonic music, or listened to Arab radio stations. The cultural elite had failed to develop a harmony of popular music accepted by a broad range of people.

In fact, Westernization in all fields as well as in music was executed from above, sometimes in an authoritarian way. As a result of the reactions to the new policy on music, the folk tunes were harmonized using the methods of Western music to make polyphonic. At the Cultural Revolution, *Nota* –Music Magazine- was published in 1930. In the spirit of the East-West synthesis, new structures were invented such as a

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<sup>121</sup> Ersel, p. 10.

<sup>122</sup> Tekelioğlu, p. 96.

new *makam* called *Nihavent-Tango*, which was traditional *Nihavent* modality fused with the Western tango.<sup>123</sup>

In addition to these cultural reforms, it is here worth stressing the first modern census, adoption of international calendar and time, etc. In 1927, the first modern census was held under the direction of a Belgian statistician. It was one of the first important social documents appeared after the proclamation of the Republic. In 1923, the estimated population of Turkey was 13,2 million; in 1927 the census counted 13,6 million.<sup>124</sup>

The international time and calendar (1925); the international numbering system (1928); the international unit of measurement (1931) was adapted. The last of the major reforms on social and cultural fields was the declaration of Saturday afternoon and Sunday as official holidays and the adoption of the Law of Surname in 1934.<sup>125</sup> Mustafa Kemal took his surname '*Ataturk*' after the Law. Henceforth, the women were called as Mrs. and men as Mr., and the word '*pasha*' was replaced with '*general*'.<sup>126</sup>

## **3.2. Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule**

### **3.2.1. Freeing Iran from Political and Economic Domination**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the country was economically poor, technologically backward, politically disunited and internationally a victim of power politics. During World War I, the central government adopted a neutral position. Inside, regional and tribal forces, and the presence of British troops were threatening the legitimacy of the government. Actually, the timing was not in favor of Reza Shah

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<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 98-106.

<sup>124</sup> *Shorter*, pp. 417-420.

<sup>125</sup> *Geoffrey Lewis*, p. 19 and see also *Yazman*, pp. 326-332.

<sup>126</sup> *Osman Feyzoğlu*, pp. 10-11 and see also *Yazman*, pp. 311-313.



to emerge on the scene due to developments in internal and external arena, but he had to lead the country towards independence.<sup>127</sup>

About the early life of Reza Khan, little is known, even concerning the date of his birth exactly, because there was no registration of vital statistics in Iran until 1931. He was born in the Caspian Sea province of Mazanderan in 1878.<sup>128</sup> Reza Shah's mother was Azerbaijani Turk and his father was Persian. Reza Khan never received an adequate formal education and began a military career at an early age. He attained a position of command in the Cossack Brigade.<sup>129</sup>

Reza Khan was strong-willed, impatient, quick tempered and uncouth. He was apathetic to religion and antagonistic toward the clergy, but he knew how to play upon the religious emotions of the people. He was intelligent, hard working, and ruthless with a powerful memory and high degree of self-confidence. He had insufficient formal education but had experience in military organization and leadership. He was not democratic in attitude, but there was an element of populism.<sup>130</sup> Reza Khan knew no foreign languages, but he learned a little Russian and Turkic in the course of his service.<sup>131</sup> Husrev Gerede, ambassador of Turkey in Iran during those years, in his Memoirs wrote that Reza Shah, who did know no languages and no education, had foresight and brilliant intelligence. To Gerede, he was reluctant and not so much had a dialogue with foreigners, even during the national festivals of Muslims, none of the Ambassadors of Muslim countries had a tradition to visit the Place.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Homayoun Katouzian, "Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926," *International of Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10 (1979), p. 533.

<sup>128</sup> **Banani**, p. 39.

<sup>129</sup> Emre Bayır, "Fars Milliyetçiliğinin Gelişi ve Güney Azerbaycan Milli Direniş Hareketi," *Avrasya Dosyası*, C. V, No.3 (Sonbahar 1999), p. 110.

<sup>130</sup> **Katouzian**, p. .543.

<sup>131</sup> **Upton**, p. 50.

<sup>132</sup> Hüsrev Gerede Rıdvanbeyoğlu, *Siyasi Hatıralarım-I* (İstanbul: Vakıt Basımevi, 1952), pp. 68-225.



According to the view of British authorities in Tehran, Reza Khan appeared as a nationalist leader, but was not ready for western-style parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, according to the Soviet embassy in Iran, he was a bourgeois nationalist leader confronting reactionary feudals and their religious feudals.<sup>133</sup> In fact, the Soviet sources defined Atatürk as bourgeoisie nationalist leader similar to Reza Shah, because the Independence War of Turkey did not involve the whole nation, and the power of the war originated solely from the revolutionary villagers.<sup>134</sup>

### *Towards the reign:*

Before his reign, Iran witnessed the outbreak of local rebellions in Gilan, Azerbaijan and Khorasan. Among these rebellions, the most serious anti-governmental and nationalist movement before the coup was the revolt in the Caspian province of Gilan in 1917. Mirza Kuchik Khan led this movement for more democratic rule and his followers were known as *Jangalis* (forest dwellers), because they operated in the wooded area of Gilan.<sup>135</sup> It was a neither a separatist nor a bourgeois nationalist nor a Communist revolution. The target was solely recovering the country from foreign imperial domination and domestic administrative corruption.<sup>136</sup>

The Russian Bolsheviks also supported and involved in the movement. In May 1920, the Soviet troops entered the Caspian port of Enzeli. In addition, they facilitated a coalition between Kuchik and Azerbaijani Marxist revolutionaries, and a revolutionary republic was established in Gilan. In July 1920, the Communist Party of Iran was formed in Enzeli. Moreover, the Persian-Russian Treaty of 1921 was

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<sup>133</sup> Katouzian, p. 540.

<sup>134</sup> Baymirza Hayit, "Bazı Sovyet kaynaklarının Atatürk hakkındaki düşünceleri," *Uluslararası Atatürk Konferansı -Tebliğler-* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, C.II, Kasım 1981), pp. 1-3.

<sup>135</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 81.

<sup>136</sup> Katouzian, p. 534.

concluded and signed in Moscow.<sup>137</sup> By this Treaty, all outstanding debts, concessions, extraterritorial rights and special privileges were cancelled and in addition, reservation in favor of Soviet government was inserted which provided the right to introduce troops into Persia under certain conditions. Following these developments, British troops were withdrawn from Khorasan, and the payment of the British subsidies and advances ceased.<sup>138</sup> After a while, the British forces left Persia entirely, and the central Iranian army began to advance in the provincial republic. However, the expected march of Gilan revolutionaries on Tehran was not realized. Moreover, the Russian personnel and technical advisers were withdrawn from the province. Finally, On the account of ideological and moral implications of these events, the Gilan coalition collapsed and the two factions of the revolution engaged in a civil war among themselves. The Jangalis were routed and the revolutionary leaders were killed.<sup>139</sup>

At this time, a national movement emerged on the scene. The leader of this movement, Sayyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, was trusting to the Cossacks Division established by Russia. Indeed, Sayyid Zia was aware of the need of military support. On the night of February 20, 1921, the Cossacks and Sayyid Zia entered Tehran. Large number of arrests took place. However, within a week, Sayyid Zia had formed a Cabinet and Reza Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, had been given the title of Sardar Sepah.<sup>140</sup>

After the coup d'etat, some criticisms on Sayyid Zia started, i.e., he was accused of being a British sympathizer. I. G. Edmonds in his book claims that it could be true because he had been a British agent for years.<sup>141</sup> Furthermore, Britain was somehow involved in the coup and pleased by the revolution, because they had seen it as an

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<sup>137</sup> **Ibid.**, pp. 534-536.

<sup>138</sup> **Upton**, pp. 42-43.

<sup>139</sup> **Katouzian**, p. 536.

<sup>140</sup> **Upton**, pp. 44-45.

<sup>141</sup> I. G. Edmonds, **The Shah of Iran: The Man and His Life** (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson Limited, 1976), pp. 79-80.

alternative route towards realizing the 1919 Agreement for the aim of political stabilization in Iran.<sup>142</sup>

Within three months, the oppositions arose against him, because of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, which was interpreted as a British protectorate providing administrative and economic control over Iran.<sup>143</sup> The Treaty was granting loan by Britain to Persia. Besides, the British military and civil advisers were employed for the purpose of contributing to the reorganization of the Persian army and state administration.<sup>144</sup>

Reza Khan was disturbed by Zia's intention to seek British officers to train the army. Due to the oppositions against the Treaty, Sayyid Zia declared the annulment of the Anglo-Persian Treaty.<sup>145</sup> In fact, Tabatabai's government did not last long. After three months, Sayyid Zia resigned on May 25, 1921 and left for Baghdad. During Tabatabai's era, there were five different cabinets, three prime ministers and Reza Khan always as the war minister.<sup>146</sup>

Actually, Reza Khan's primary goal was to remove Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabataba'i, therefore, he required the support of ulama by exploiting Sayyid Ziya's connection with the British and friendship with non-Muslim elements, particularly with Armenians. Moreover, a journalist supporter of Reza Khan wrote that Sayyid Ziya's newspaper 'Ra'ad' was supported by the Armenians. Finally, a meeting was held in Tehran's Shah Mosque and generated support from bazaar merchants and religious community in favor of Reza Khan, who seemed as the only person capable of

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<sup>142</sup> Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran in seven volumes from Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 219 and see also Edmonds, p. 79.

<sup>143</sup> Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 87.

<sup>144</sup> Katouzian, pp. 536-537.

<sup>145</sup> Upton, p. 46.

<sup>146</sup> Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Iran -Royalty, Religion and Revolution* (Australia: Ma'rifat Publishing House, 1980), p. 218.

establishing order and security; resisting against foreign influence and colonialism. As a result, Reza Khan ousted his rival in May 1921.<sup>147</sup>

On October 28, 1923 Ahmed Shah agreed to appoint Reza Khan prime minister. Accordingly, he became Prime Minister and War Minister at the same time. In 1924, he wrote in a long statement that he was following a policy different from previous rulers and promised to serve for the majesty of Islam while preserving the independence of the nation. He declared those people opposing his policy as enemies.<sup>148</sup>

In fact, before Reza Khan became Prime Minister, he tightened his command over professional army and gained popularity.<sup>149</sup> His main objective was to reinstitute the authority of the central government throughout the country, and to provide the necessary funds for the army. He commanded the troops, which finally routed the Janglis in Gilan and began to put down tribal and regional rebellions. Therefore, by 1924, Reza Khan's public prestige was high and the Shah's correspondingly low.<sup>150</sup>

Meanwhile, Reza Khan was aware of both the weakness of Ahmed Shah and the opposition to republicanism in the Majlis and clergy outside, for these reasons he preferred circuitous road rather than moving directly to the throne. In the summer of 1924, the republicans gathered in the bazaar and asked for a strike but the bazaar leaders rejected it. Then, in one of the sessions of the Majlis, Sayyid Hasan Mudarris was slapped by a republican. Conservatives interpreted this incident as a reaction of a republican regime toward religion. Mudarris and his faction formed a coalition with the anti-republican faction and they declared that an attack on the institution of

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<sup>147</sup> Mohammad H. Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State relations in Iran: 1921-1941," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19 (1987), pp. 415-416.

<sup>148</sup> Rizvi, p. 218.

<sup>149</sup> Katouzian, p. 539.

<sup>150</sup> Upton, pp. 48-50.

monarchy was an attack on the holy Shari'a, and republicanism as a step toward Bolshevism.<sup>151</sup>

Henceforth, the bazaar and stores were closed. The demonstrators gathered in Parliament Square. When the ulama announced that republicanism was against Islam, some bazaar merchants, who did not know the meaning of either of a constitutional monarchy or of republicanism, turned against republicanism.<sup>152</sup> On the other hand, strong opposition against ulama triggered after the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey. At last, Reza Khan accepted that the nation opposed republicanism, and decided to respect to the will of the nation, but declared that he could no longer work with Ahmed Shah.<sup>153</sup>

Meanwhile, the leading ulama of Tehran and the religious authorities of Qum were not in silence and declared:<sup>154</sup>

“Representation for a republic which was not suitable for the country had been made, and when the Prime Minister came to Qum, we demanded that he stop his agitation and send a proclamation to all towns.”

During this time, Ahmed Shah –the last Qajar monarch- was in Europe and did not care about the events in Iran. After the declaration of religious authorities, Reza Khan resigned from political activity and early in the year withdrew to a village near Tehran. After the visit of sixty deputies, he returned to Tehran and was granted dictatorial powers by a Majlis. In the meantime, the Shah was still in Europe.<sup>155</sup>

Initially, he tried to achieve the support of some of religious authorities. At this time, Ayatollahs Abul-Hasan Isfahani and Muhammad Husayn Na'ini, who were expelled

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<sup>151</sup> Faghfoory, pp. 416-422.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., p. 417.

<sup>153</sup> Upton, p. 48.

<sup>154</sup> Faghfoory, p. 418.

<sup>155</sup> Upton, p. 51.

from Iraq by the British because of their opposition to the British mandate. When they came to Qum, the struggle between Qajar Court and Reza Khan to attract the ayatollahs had been going on. Isfahani and Na'ini supported Reza Khan. Na'ini declared Reza Khan's government as legitimate. After he won Na'ini's and Isfahani's friendship, he turned to appeasing the religious community at home. In the Cossack mosque of Tehran, Reza Khan stressed his devotion to Imam Hussein and his cause to win further sympathy from the populace. On the tenth day of Muharram (the day of Hussein's martyrdom), he marched to the bazaar to participate in the public mourning. Along with these maneuvers, Reza Khan began to propagate the army's role in providing order and security. Many leading ulama urged their followers to assist the army in completing these projects.<sup>156</sup>

Nowadays, the newspaper "*Panir*" reported that Reza Khan had sent a warning to the Majlis and asked the deputies to choose between him and Ahmed Shah. As it was heard, Ahmed Shah instructed the Majlis to elect a new prime minister. However, the religious community, who had remained loyal to Ahmed Shah, was now in favor of Reza Khan, because meanwhile Reza Khan's friends distributed the portrait of Ahmed Shah in Paris, wearing a European straw hat and accompanying a group of French women. Furthermore, the merchants of Tabriz threatened the Majlis that they would separate Azerbaijan from Iran unless the Majlis replaced Ahmed Shah with Reza Khan. In addition, army units dispatched telegrams to the Majlis demanding Reza Khan's return. At the end, the Majlis promised to cooperate with him.

In the Military College, Azerbaijanis demanded the removal of telegraph censorship to get an official permission to publish telegraphs in favor of Reza Khan. The following day, the telegram censorship was removed. In the Majlis, the talks concerning the removal of Ahmed Shah and abolishment of the Qajar dynasty spread everywhere and Reza Khan was praised for having prevented the spread of anti-Islamic republicanism.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Faghfoory, pp. 419-420.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 420-421.

Through the fourth session of the national assembly (1923-1925), it became clear that Reza Khan was willing for a complete take-over. In mid-October 1925, the National Assembly demanded the abolition of the Qajar Dynasty and the temporary transfer of royal title to the prime minister, until a constituent assembly had ratified the decision.<sup>158</sup> When the elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, Reza Khan was certain concerning the ulama's support.<sup>159</sup> Consequently, Reza Khan abolished the titles and took the family name of Pahlavi, which was the name of a language used before in Iran. "*Pahlavi*" was preferred due to the fact that if the new dynasty had a pre-Islamic name, it would satisfy the society and evoke the ancient golden days of Persia.<sup>160</sup> It is worth here stressing that the adoption of surname was the only reform that Reza Shah made before Atatürk.<sup>161</sup>

Under the influence of the mullahs and Reza Khan's friends, he was proclaimed as the new shah and the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925.

At first glance, Reza Shah's object was perceived as the independence of Iran. Indeed, he was not a nationalist in the sense of that of nineteenth century Europe. He wanted Iran to be as in times of the great Persian monarchies, not as a second-class independent country. After independence, he aimed to develop the state in both socio-political and economic spheres and uplifting the morale of the nation, but not annexing foreign lands. Moreover, he never preferred foreign loans. He knew what Iran needed and did not consult anyone on any subject, because his objectives were clear to him:

- independence from foreign influence either political, economic or cultural;
- expansion of Persian culture;

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<sup>158</sup> Katouzian, pp. 547-550.

<sup>159</sup> Faghfoory, p. 423.

<sup>160</sup> Avery, Modern Iran, p. 267.

<sup>161</sup> Pierre Oberling, "Atatürk ve Rıza Şah," çev. Hasan Mert (*Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, C. XII, 1997), p. 210.



- economic self-sufficiency;
- extension of education;
- democratization of all institutions;
- modernization of the administration;
- emancipation of women;
- social justice;
- moral regeneration of the nation.<sup>162</sup>

### 3.2.2. Restructuring in Political, Economic and Judicial Spheres

Strong, autocratic, centralized control; glorification of the past; depreciation of foreigners were the predominant characteristics of the Iran of Reza Shah.<sup>163</sup>

Reza Shah overthrew the sultanate as Ataturk did, but rejected the demand for a republic, because of ulama's resistance to it.

I would like to discuss here the ulama-state relations so as to clarify the reasons for the preferred type of the legitimacy.

#### **The Ulama-State relations:**

In the nineteenth century, the opposition had concentrated on two areas: anti-imperialism and anti-Qajar dynasty. The anti-imperialist opposition resulted from the penetration of foreign, non-Muslim countries into Iran. In terms of anti-imperialism, the traditional role of ulama as upholders of religious values served for the territorial integrity of the *Dar ul-Islam vis-a-vis the Dar ul-Harb*.<sup>164</sup> Indeed, in Iran, there was no infrastructure to facilitate the imports, no trained manpower to be employed in

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<sup>162</sup> Hassan Arfa, *Under Five Shahs* (London: R. & R. Clark Limited, 1964), pp. 279-280.

<sup>163</sup> **Banani**, p. 147.

<sup>164</sup> Willem M. Floor, "The Revolutionary character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 12 (1980), p. 502.



new factories and no high technology. Instead, only foreign workers and technicians existed, so the Mullahs blamed foreigners for everything and this resulted in xenophobia.<sup>165</sup>

On the other hand, the anti-tyrannical opposition led by the ulama was less traditional. This kind of opposition was aimed at acquiring more political influence or total political control.<sup>166</sup>

**a) The first period 1921-1925:**

Reza Khan pursued a policy of alliance with the ulama from 1923 till 1925, while the competition between the ruling monarch, Ahmed Shah, and Reza Khan in order to gain the confidence of both ulama and the British, was going on. The religious leadership led by Isfahani and Naini tried to persuade the Shah and the Prime Minister to conduct *jihad* against Britain. While Ahmed Shah was trying to trigger the ulama's fears of Kemalism, Reza Khan visited Qum and met with Isfahani and Naini. After that, these religious leaders sent a telegram to the ulama of Tehran.<sup>167</sup>

.....when His Excellency, the Prime Minister... came to Qumm... to say goodbye ( to the exiled mujtahids), we requested the elimination of this rubric (of republicanism), the abolition of the above-mentioned expressed ideas and the proclamation of this to the whole country. He has accepted this. May God grant that all people appreciate the extent of this act and give full thanks for this concern.

Reza Khan responded:

“It has become clear from experience that the leaders of the government must never oppose or contradict the ideas of the public..... On the other hand, since my only personal aim and method from the beginning has been and is to preserve and guard

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<sup>165</sup> Tülümen, p. 138

<sup>166</sup> Floor, p. 502

<sup>167</sup> Shahrugh Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relation in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 28-30

the majesty of Islam and the independence of Iran, and fully to watch over the interests of this country and nation, assuming anyone who opposes this method to be an enemy of the country.... And we ultimately saw it necessary to advise the public to halt the (use of) the term, republic. Rather, everyone should spend his efforts to eliminate the impediments to the reforms and progress of the country. ... It is for this reason that I advise all patriots of this sacred aim to avoid calls for a republic and to unite efforts with me to achieve the supreme objective upon which we agreed”.

The influence of the ulama increased among the society enormously, due to Reza Khan's obedient attitude toward them and their resistance to the establishment of a republic. Reza Khan assured the support of the ulama, because he promised to consult them in state affairs and gave up his intention for the establishment of a republic. In fact, he followed the traditional policy of dividing and bribing influential religious leaders. After the Constitutional Revolution, the ulama were back into power.<sup>168</sup>

Nevertheless, the first challenge to Reza Shah came from Sayyid Hassan Mudarris in the Majlis. In 1924, the leading oppositional alim, Mudarris, started an ulama-sponsored campaign against Reza Khan for his proposal of a republic. The ulama identified this with the secularist policies of Ataturk.<sup>169</sup> After the arrest of Mudarris, clerical opposition came to an end. According to one report, all madrasas of Tehran, Mashhad and Isfahan were closed down by the government. The state-controlled examination eliminated the mullahs who had failed to meet the new standards. Government propaganda became successful against the ulama, even the buses refused to carry the mullahs, in addition to prostitutes. Those mullahs, who had greater courage, began to work for underground resistance. The majority adopted a wait and see attitude.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Faghfoory, p. 414.

<sup>169</sup> Keddie, "Iran: change in Islam; Islam and change," ..., p. 532.

<sup>170</sup> Faghfoory, pp. 427-428.

## b) The second period 1925-1927

After the accession of Reza Shah to the throne in 1925, he was aware that his position was insecure as long as the ulama remained powerful. His position was unsettled and he was still too weak, so he could not take any measure against them. Thus, he honored the ulama during religious festivals and made pilgrimages to the Holy Shi'i shrines for the purpose of showing his loyalty to Islam. Moreover, he refrained from the enforcement of the newly ratified conscription law, which called on members of the religious community to serve in the military.

During 1925 and 1927, the ulama hoped that with the establishment of order they could ask for a share of power and regain some of the privileges they had lost after the Constitutional Revolution. Reza Shah also needed the ulama to consolidate his power. The first year of Reza Shah passed without any conflict with the ulama.<sup>171</sup> Meanwhile, in 1925 and 1932, the commercial codes were enacted to secularize contracts and modernize business activities.<sup>172</sup> The new Commercial Code of 1925 recognized joint-stock companies and reduced the ulama's influence in commercial matters, while on the contrary religious law had forbidden trade of some goods by Muslims and left commercial rulings to the ulama.<sup>173</sup>

Nevertheless, uncertainty dominated the prospective ulama-state relations; the power was in the hands of the state. Reza Shah was aware of that any direct assault on the ulama's prerogatives would not serve his modernization objectives. The government hoped to picture the ulama as agents of reaction, and moreover opponents of reform and progress.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 424.

<sup>172</sup> *Banani*, p. 118.

<sup>173</sup> *Keddie*, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 95.

<sup>174</sup> *Faghfoory*, p. 426.

### c) The third period:

Since 1927, the modernization movement accelerated, and military, fiscal, judicial, educational reforms eliminated the ulama from central position. Military officers, bureaucrats, lawyers, teachers, modern-educated intelligentsia took place of them and the ulama began to resist the challenge to their power. Furthermore, modernization and secularization accompanied by a criticism of Islam, especially of Shi'ism and religious authorities dissatisfied the ulama.<sup>175</sup>

The first major clash occurred between Reza Shah and the clergy in 1927 following the introduction of a compulsory military law. The law exempted graduates of foreign and national institutions of higher education and students of religious schools. The latter's exemption was contingent to their full-time involvement in the profession, successful completion of their studies and obtaining permission for independent judgment in the interpretation of the Shari'a. These developments disturbed the ulama, while they were declaring that they performed a holy duty and had to be exempted from military service. Though the conflict was peacefully resolved, this incident marked the end of friendship between the ulama and Reza Shah.<sup>176</sup>

In the following years, the influence of the ulama was undermined. Many of the Shah's measures were consciously designed to break the power of the religious hierarchy. His educational reforms ended the ulama's near monopoly on education. For the purpose of limiting further power of the ulama, he undertook a codification of the law that created a body of control of the religious establishment. He excluded the ulama from judgeships and created a system of secular courts.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 427.

<sup>176</sup> Faghfoory, pp. 425-426.

<sup>177</sup> Edmonds, pp. 123-124.

In Shi'ah Islam, there were two systems of law, the shari'ah and the urf. The Shari'ah courts had jurisdiction in matters related to personal status and civil law while the urf courts in matters pertaining to the state. By the Constitution –the Fundamental Law of 1906 and its Supplement of 1907- the necessity of civil courts and a secular legal system was concluded.

In 1924 and 1926, experimental commercial and penal codes were introduced; the old Ministry of Justice was dissolved; new personnel whom received European education took over the administration of the new Ministry of Justice from religious officials. New Civil Code was translated from French Civil Code and in 1939 was adopted by the Majlis. This code commenced the period of the secularization of the Shari'ah. In 1936, a law as regards the reorganization of the judiciary system and the employment of judges entered into force. The Penal Code was revised by benefiting from the penal code of Fascist Italy and approved in 1940. From 1922 until 1939 French and Italian professors were engaged to teach at the Faculty of the University of Tehran. Despite these developments, throughout the secularization process, the specific shari'ah reservations remained unchanged, but they were ignored.<sup>178</sup>

Furthermore, towards secularization, it was tried to make it impossible for the ulama to sit as judges in the courts of law. By the Law in 1931, only the state courts and the office of the Attorney General could approve the referral of a case to a religious tribunal.<sup>179</sup> The status of the shari'ah courts was defined as special courts. No cases could be referred to a shari'ah court without authorization of state courts and the Attorney General. The area of these courts was limited and included only disputes concerning marriage and divorce, and appointment of trustees and guardians. For example, the punishment of theft with cutting off an arm was replaced with light prison terms. Furthermore, in 1932, the Majlis enacted a law on registration of documents and property which cancelled the monopoly of the Shari'ah courts by the means of requiring that the registration must be carried out in secular state courts.

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<sup>178</sup> Banani, pp. 68-76.

<sup>179</sup> Akhavi, p. 39.

Therefore, marriages and divorces had to be registered in civil bureaus otherwise they were not recognized.<sup>180</sup>

Moreover, the Ulama's constitutional right of appointing a parliamentary commission to supervise legislation was denied. The state even intervened in the licensing of graduates of religious seminaries.<sup>181</sup> In 1934, the Shah issued a decree on secularizing the waqf (religious endowments) property. Consequently, the state extended its hold over pious endowment lands and the ulama lost their resource of wealth and power.<sup>182</sup>

Despite Reza Shah's attempts to destroy the institutional power of the ulama and to weaken their power, the influence of the mullahs among the peasants remained strong, because many reforms did not touch the foundations of the smaller towns and the villages outside the circle of modernization. The ulama, who were driven into the background, easily controlled them and enhanced their power due to effective opposition to state policies such as female education, the emancipation of women.<sup>183</sup>

Nevertheless, the American diplomat and author James Rives Childs, who came Iran in the mid-thirties, was impressed by Reza Shah's accomplishments in undermining the influence of the ulama and by the degree of secularization.<sup>184</sup> Actually, the fact that merely after 1941, religious-political organizations such as Fidayan-i Islam could be founded. Accordingly, it might give an idea on the oppressive and dictatorial nature of the regime's victory over the ulama before the end of Reza Shah's reign.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Banani, pp. 72-81.

<sup>181</sup> Bashiriyeh, p. 10.

<sup>182</sup> A. Reza Arasteh, *Man and Society in Iran* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), p. 104.

<sup>183</sup> Upton, p. 71 and see also Faghfoory, p. 428.

<sup>184</sup> Banani, p. 148.

<sup>185</sup> Faghfoory, p. 428.

Reza Shah tried to fulfil the same policy of Ataturk, but only succeeded in the de facto secularization of public authority, whereas Ataturk disestablished Islam in 1928.<sup>186</sup>

After I have discussed the ulama-state relationship, I will concentrate on Reza Shah's reign of Iran.

A military authoritarian regime in Iran emerged in the 1920s. In the course of Reza Shah's authoritarian regime (1925-41), his aim was to centralize the state and secularize the society. Even before he became shah, Reza Khan had taken steps to create a strong central government and to extend government control over the country.<sup>187</sup> In those days, regional leaders tended to move towards sovereignty by defeating other regional forces. In 1921, there were three potential unifiers of Iran: Kuchik Khan in Gilan; patriotic Gendarmerie officer, Muhammed Taqi Khan; Cossack officer, Reza Khan. Other regional leaders were not as patriotic as Kuchik Khan, Taqi Khan and Reza Khan. These leaders organized a program against the ruling class and foreign influence. By 1917 Kuchik Khan launched a rebellion of the Jangalis in Gilan against the Government and British influence, and finally his authority in Gilan was recognised. In the summer of 1919 the movement of Kuchik Khan was defeated by the Iranian Cossacks, and afterwards he decided to find new allies such as Russian revolutionaries. Accordingly, the Soviet Republic of Gilan was declared. In June 1921, Kuchik Khan with his Bolshevik allies marched on Tehran. However, a combined force of Jangalis and Russians were defeated by the Iranian Cossacks, and Gilan was retaken. Kuchik Khan fled for the last time. Reza Khan succeeded over one of his potential rivals. Meanwhile, Reza Khan was familiar with the separatist movement in Gilan and Azerbaijan, because he had been fighting against them under Cossack Division. The Azerbaijan separatist movement was also short-lived.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Arjomand, p. 43.

<sup>187</sup> Bashiriyeh, p. 10.

<sup>188</sup> Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 212-218.



In Reza Shah's Iran, with due regard to the social organization of production, the social structure was composed of the landed and tribal nobility, the high Ulama, the emerging upper bourgeoisie, the bazaar national and petty bourgeoisie, the rising salaried new petty bourgeoisie, the working class and the peasantry.<sup>189</sup> The traditionalists who sought only minor improvements in the present set-up were petty retailers, guildsmen, ulama, rural and small town landed gentry and some of the larger landowners. The nationalists who desired revolutionary change were the clerks, teachers, government employed and technical personnel, and some of the big business, high government and top army people.<sup>190</sup> Nationalism found support when related to religion. The aristocratic landowners ruled, and the powerful shi'ah ulama controlled and manipulated public opinion.<sup>191</sup>

After the Revolution, four ideologies emerged which were supported by those classes: liberal conservatism, democracy, non-liberal religious fundamentalism and popular socialism. Liberalism was the ideology of the landed and merchant class advocating a strong parliamentary system but no major social changes. The majority of the ulama advocated liberal constitutionalism. The constitutionalist ulama such as Tabatabai, Khorasani and Naini accepted the legitimacy of a secular constitutional state. On the other hand, the fundamentalist ulama called for the adoption of Islamic Law rather than a Western constitution. The bazaar petty bourgeoisie was close to the ulama and supported their liberalism and traditionalism. Meanwhile, students and intelligentsia constituted the backbone of the Iranian Communist movement.<sup>192</sup>

Demographically, Iran may be seen as two concentric circles, the area Persian-speaking Iranians and the larger outer area encompassed by diversified minorities such as the Kurds Afghans, Baluchis, Pathans and Tajiks.<sup>193</sup> Nomadic tribes,

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<sup>189</sup> **Bashiriyeh**, p. 11.

<sup>190</sup> **Binder**, Iran -Political Development in a changing society, p. 176.

<sup>191</sup> **Banani**, p. 146.

<sup>192</sup> **Bashiriyeh**, p. 11



especially the Kurds, the Lurs and the Qashqa'is made up the largest proportion of this population. As may be considered, after the end of the First World War, there was no internal security in Iran because of the tribal rebellions.<sup>194</sup>

Reza Shah's tribal policy was based on pacification and disarmament. The policy of settlement implemented during the 1930s was called *takhtaqapu* (wooden-door).<sup>195</sup> The task of pacification and settlement of these tribes were more difficult than breaking the armed resistance of them. This was realized by the prevention of seasonal migrations, the construction of mud huts to replace the tents and distribution of state lands and free seed to encourage agriculture.<sup>196</sup> The tribes of Iran were heterogeneous, so the impacts of Reza Shah's policies on tribes varied.<sup>197</sup> Reza Shah played off one tribe against another and subjected them to taxation and conscription. The 1926 Military Conscription Law included their young men and weakened their manpower. Reza Shah was successful in removing the conflict between the tribes and the rest of the nation.<sup>198</sup> Finally, the lawless tribes had been disarmed and brought to order. A few tribal chiefs were allowed to live in their houses in Tehran, but under police supervision. They could not go farther 20 miles from the town without authorization. Others had their estates exchanged with estates in other provinces.<sup>199</sup>

The Conscription Law also weakened the authority and prestige of the Iranian religious institution, because by this law those among the ulama whom it felt were acting against the regime, would be sent to military service. The Military

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<sup>193</sup> Binder, *Iran -Political Development in a changing society*, p. 160.

<sup>194</sup> Banani, p. 127.

<sup>195</sup> Richard Tapper, *Frontier nomads of Iran: A Political and social history of the Shahsevan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 283.

<sup>196</sup> Banani, p. 128.

<sup>197</sup> Tapper, p. 294.

<sup>198</sup> Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran in seven volumes from Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, p. 226.

<sup>199</sup> Arfa, p. 287.

Conscription Law was passed when the Reza Khan had concluded concordat with the religious leaders, particularly with Ayatullah Naini.<sup>200</sup>

Reza Shah benefited the army as an instrument for civil reform and internal security. On February 15, 1936, a new law for the reorganization of the armed forces was enacted. It established new Persian names for their ranks. Under the old military training law, judges of the shari'ah courts, ulama, students of theological schools and the clergy of Zoroastrian, Christian and Jewish faiths had been exempted from military service. However, the new law made all clergy subject to two years compulsory active duty.<sup>201</sup>

On the other hand, in order to create an army strong enough, more money was needed. Foreign assistance, particularly American Financial Mission under Dr. Millspaugh supported the army. Moreover, the oil royalties provided foreign exchange for military equipment. By 1941, a Westernized army could be mobilized.<sup>202</sup>

By 1921, there was a large scale of political and tribal revolt in the provinces. Therefore, the reform and reorganization of the army had been ignored. The only effective forces were independent detachments such as Swedish-trained gendarmerie, Russian-led Cossack Brigade and South Persia Rifles. In addition, there were provincial and tribal levies, the palace guards and the gendarmerie. The provincial and tribal units were commanded by princes of the Qajar policy and tribal chieftains. There was a Ministry of War, but there was no effective centralization of power, no training programs and no uniforms among the tribal units. The tribal forces only took part in military service, when it meant some gain for them. The government played off the tribes one against another to neutralize their power. In the sense of an armed

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<sup>200</sup> Shahrugh Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relation in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 37.

<sup>201</sup> Banani, p. 56.

<sup>202</sup> Upton, p. 53.

support, the palace guards were full time soldiers and the Shah's main weapon against rebellious princes which made up the core of the Qajar forces. On the other hand, the Persian Cossack Brigade was created in 1879 and organized by Russian officers. In the revolutionary days of 1905-11, it played an important role. After the Russian Revolution, Iranians took over the command of it. Reza Shah came into prominence through the ranks of this Brigade. On the other side, the South Persia Rifles was organized in 1916 by the British officer Sir Percy Sykes, but disbanded by Reza Shah in 1921. In addition, the gendarmerie was created by the new government after the deposition of Muhammad Ali Shah (1906-9) with the help of Swedish commanders. The new army was composed of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the gendarmerie.<sup>203</sup>

The new dynasty was based on expanded and reorganized army and a new bureaucracy. Reza Shah dissolved all independent military units and created the first unified and uniformed national army. The army held the dominant position in all Iranian communities throughout the reign of Reza Shah.<sup>204</sup> Then the second task '*creation of officer corps*' was accomplished. The posts of hereditary officers and Qajar princes were cancelled. Swedish-trained officers of the gendarmerie and Reza Shah's former officers from the Cossack Brigade were given positions.<sup>205</sup> Under Reza Shah, the army's officer corps was a central part of the nation's social elite; officers filled many positions in the civilian administration. Joining the army meant a path to upward mobility.<sup>206</sup> On the other hand, he did not replace the ex-officers by younger ones, who were more educated, on the contrary he gave them key posts in the newly organized army. By this way, their loyalty was supported by personal interest, but some of the younger officers with more education thought that the higher posts should be given to them. This led to revolts such as that of Major Lahoty in Tabriz in February in 1922, Colonel Puladin in 1926. On account of this, the Shah

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<sup>203</sup> Banani, pp. 37-54.

<sup>204</sup> Upton, p. 54.

<sup>205</sup> Banani, p. 54.

<sup>206</sup> H. E. Chehabi, "The Pahlavi period," *The Journal of the Society for Iranian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3-4 (Summer / Fall 1998), p. 497.

utilized them for instructional jobs and kept the older uneducated officers in the key places. Consequently, he kept the army completely loyal.<sup>207</sup>

On the other hand, Reza Shah was determined to keep the army from foreign political influence, though foreign advisers were hired because of the necessity of Western assistance. At that time, France had the best army in the world and in 1922 the Majlis sent sixty candidates to French military academies.<sup>208</sup>

Despite all these reforms in the socio-political sphere, the absence of any doctrine or platform based on the national interest resulted in the evolution of dictatorship by Reza Shah.<sup>209</sup>

On February 14, 1925, the fifth Majlis passed the following Act,<sup>210</sup>

“The Majlis recognizes the supreme command of the country’s defense and security forces as the special domain of Reza Khan Sardar Sepah. He shall exercise his command with complete authority, within the frame of the Constitution and the laws of the land. This command may not be removed without the approval of the Majlis”.

Hence, by the Act, he achieved the supreme authority over the institutions and individuals. His authoritarian regime, the first regime in the context of the new social formation motivated by the Constitutional Revolution, led to some certain negative results in the sense of the rights given by the Constitution.<sup>211</sup> After a while, the

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<sup>207</sup> Arfa, pp. 282-283.

<sup>208</sup> Banani, p. 55.

<sup>209</sup> Avery, Modern Iran, p. 272.

<sup>210</sup> Banani, p. 43.

<sup>211</sup> Bashiriyeh, p.10.

Majlis and the press were tightly controlled. Political parties and trade unions had been suppressed.<sup>212</sup>

Actually, the history of political parties of Iran is short. After the assembly of the second Majlis, the supporters of the government in that body were called “*moderates*”, and the minority called themselves “*democrats*”. These groups existed only during the Majlis sessions about 36 months between 1910 and 1922.<sup>213</sup> From about 1928, there were no longer any personalities identified with the democrats and the minority, because in 1927, Reza Shah banned the political parties and ordered the arrest of the politicians.<sup>214</sup> By the end of 1928, Reza Shah had destroyed the independence of the Majlis and by the end of 1933 removed any source of disagreement from the Cabinet except for the Minister of War. He was well in establishing a system of secret police.<sup>215</sup>

As the 1920s turned into 1930s, Reza Shah lost the support of the older generation of the intelligentsia. Leftist groups were most active in the society. Reza Shah feared about the spread of communism from the universities into the army. Iranian students, who were under the influence of Iranian and German communist parties in Europe, began to demand the release of all political prisoners and the establishment of a republic. They had been calling Reza Shah as a tool of British imperialism. Also in Iran, protests took place at the Medical College in 1934, at the Teachers’ College in 1936 and at the faculty of Tehran University in 1937.<sup>216</sup>

There were also reactions against the Shah within the army. As a result of this, the Shah tried to purify the army from political activity. Money was used as a tool to control the army, because throughout the Reza Shah period, the Ministry of War’s

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<sup>212</sup> Stephanie Cronin, “The Politics of Radicalism within the Iranian Army: The Jahansuz Group of 1939,” *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 32, No.1 (Winter 1999), p. 7.

<sup>213</sup> Binder, Iran -Political Development in a changing society-, p. 202.

<sup>214</sup> Bayır, p. 111.

<sup>215</sup> Upton, p. 58.

<sup>216</sup> Cronin, pp. 7-20.

budget was higher than that of any other government department.<sup>217</sup> Opposition to his regime came also from the landlord group. This group found themselves subject to a Shah who treated with disrespect and abolished their titles. The other group was the clergy, because the replacement of religious law by Western codes represented a threat to the Shi doctrine as the dominant social force. Furthermore, the government refused to exempt theological students from military service and removed ecclesiastical control on general education.<sup>218</sup>

On the other hand, Reza Shah left no room for any other man or other group with the evolution of his nation, which could constitute a threat to the succession of Reza's dynasty. Reza Shah was not the only person acting dominantly in Persia.<sup>219</sup> Three men, Firuz Mirza, Ali Akbar Davar and Abdul Hoseyn Timurtash, provided the prestige of the new regime. The first and last were accused of bribery, arrested and murdered if not by Reza Shah personally, with his approval. The second committed suicide. All had been Majlis deputies and effective supporters of Reza Khan when he was Prime Minister. Firuz Mirza was Minister of Justice in Reza Khan's last Cabinet and then Minister of Finance till his arrest. Ali Akbar Davar was the Minister of Justice and then same as Firuz Mirza, Minister of Finance in different periods. Timurtash was Minister of Court. To Davar, they should focus on the reorganization of the Ministry of Justice and the compilation, introduction of new codes, laws and regulations. To Firuz Mirza and Timurtash, they should focus on the preliminary steps, which made it possible for Iran to reestablish its independence by the abolition of capitulations in 1928. Reza Shah's Court Minister, Abdul Hossein Khan Teymourash, had brought Reza to the throne and until 1932 was the powerful personality next to the Shah.<sup>220</sup> The close collaboration between the two men had been both advantageous and disadvantageous for Reza Shah. First of all, Teymourash was effective in passing a law in the Majlis providing the security and

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<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>218</sup> Upton, pp. 56-57.

<sup>219</sup> Miron Rezun, "Reza Shah's Court Minister: Teymourash," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 12 (1980), p. 120.

<sup>220</sup> Upton, pp. 58-59.

defence forces to pass under the control of Reza Khan. In 1925 Teymourdash again supported Reza Khan legalizing the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty. Furthermore, under Reza Shah's dictatorship, the deputies of the Parliament were not the members of political parties. To overcome this issue, Teymourdash founded the Iran-i No, New Iran, party in July 1927. The party's program included the principles of loyalty to the Shah and devotion to the progress.<sup>221</sup>

The Foreign Ministry of Persia was subject to the authority of Teymourdash and he, as Court Minister, was only superseded by Reza Shah. He was representing Persia's interests abroad. According to Teymourdash, Persia was dependent on Great Britain, particularly regarding Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Imperial Bank. He was in favor of a strong government party, which could oppose to the British presence and eliminate of its influence from the country. Because of his coherence with Russia since his youth, he was sympathetic to a proletarian revolutionary movement and the new established order in Russia following the October Revolution. However, when Turkey and Afghanistan had concluded a treaty of friendship and economic cooperation on 25 May 1928, Teymourdash considered this treaty as a threat to Persian interests.<sup>222</sup>

Meanwhile, Teymourdash's power disturbed Reza Shah because of both his own position and that of the Crown Prince, Mohammed Reza. Between the spring of 1931 and December 1932, the Court Minister was dismissed from his duties. He was declared as a scapegoat and ended his life in prison.<sup>223</sup> The fall and fate of Timurtash had serious consequences. One was that the modernization and expansion of Iranian economy was slowed down. Social contacts with Westerners that Timurtash had encouraged cut down sharply. The Shah became more sensitive and suspicious in his perception of Westerners.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Rezun, p. 121.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., pp. 122-125.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., pp. 127-134.

<sup>224</sup> Upton, p. 60.



Henceforth, Reza Shah was both admired and hated. In 1931, the Majlis enacted a bill to deal with individuals advocating foreign ideology and moreover, prison terms for those advocating forcible overthrow of the order were defined.<sup>225</sup> After Reza Shah's abdication, more than 1250 political prisoners were released. Moreover, personal estates of the Shah, which were acquired by confiscation, were transferred to the State and then by a law the return of these estates to their former owners were provided. Special courts were established to supervise this procedure.<sup>226</sup>

### **3.1.2.1 Economy Policy:**

New model of economic institutionalization in Iran was semi-industrialized and commercialized system. Like her neighboring Middle Eastern countries, Iran's economy was based on agriculture.<sup>227</sup> Ninety percent of the Iranian population was employed in agriculture.<sup>228</sup> The early government of Reza Shah was aware of the importance of land reform, but no development had been achieved. In the late 1930s, industrialization, control of foreign trade and construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway motivated the government to pay attention to the agricultural sector. Long distances and poor connections with towns were the main obstacles regarding the mechanization of agriculture. Cultural obstacles were more complex. However the urban Iranian was interested in Western technology, the rural has not shown the same reaction. In practice, benefits of modernization, change and economic growth did not reach the peasant.<sup>229</sup>

Most peasants were illiterate, generally loyal to Shah and respectful of religion, so they were affected by the ulama. On the other hand, Reza Shah did nothing to

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<sup>225</sup> Donald N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 98.

<sup>226</sup> Cronin, p. 23.

<sup>227</sup> Faghfoory, p. 414.

<sup>228</sup> Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 111.

<sup>229</sup> Banani, pp. 119-127.



improve the conditions of peasants, even the obligations brought to them were greater than before in terms of taxes and military services.<sup>230</sup> Furthermore, the 1928 Civil Code was not in favor of the peasants because it included no articles to protect peasants and on the contrary, it strengthened the power of landlords, because any village in the possession of one man for 30 years became his property. Land ownership in Iran grew under the impact of a Western demand for cash crops.<sup>231</sup> On the other hand, there was no land law in Iran like Ottoman land law until 1920s.<sup>232</sup> Neither Reza Shah nor his predecessors had perceived socio-economic modernization in basic terms such as the distribution of land amongst the peasantry.<sup>233</sup> The Land Development Plan of November 16, 1937 was elaborated to encourage agricultural development, but directed by the landlords.<sup>234</sup> Despite the disadvantages of Reza Shah's policy on peasants, they were admiring Reza Shah, because with the advent of Reza Shah the peasants were freed for the first time from the pillaging, raping and destruction of tribesmen. In the second place, the pressures and exactions upon them were gradual and were exercised not by the Shah himself, by his minions.<sup>235</sup>

Arfa claims that Reza Shah wanted to regenerate the village life and organize the agricultural work by better methods. For instance, the foundation of agricultural college in Karaj in 1929 and an institute for veterinarian research, production of serums in 1939 introduced modern agricultural methods.<sup>236</sup> Actually, a Five-Year Plan for agriculture was launched in 1940, but it was interrupted by the war.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> **Binder**, *Iran -Political Development in a changing society-*, p. 168.

<sup>231</sup> **Keddie**, *Roots of Revolution...*, p. 96.

<sup>232</sup> **Keddie**, "Is there a Middle East," ..., p. 265.

<sup>233</sup> **Ramazani**, p. 127.

<sup>234</sup> **Banani**, p. 122.

<sup>235</sup> **Upton**, p. 70.

<sup>236</sup> **Arfa**, pp. 282-283 and see also **Banani**, p. 124.

<sup>237</sup> **Keddie**, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 105.

For the development of national industry, Reza Khan decided to transform local industry, which was ruined by the competition of cheap manufactured goods from abroad, into an entity protected by tariff controls.<sup>238</sup> From the beginning of the sixteenth century, European influence entered into Iran with foreign trade. Industrial revolution and economic imperialism accelerated the importation of foreign goods. From 1919 to 1929 was a period of continuing free trade and then from 1930 to 1940 was marked by governmental controls. Especially, Russia's proximity and capacity to import Iranian goods made Russia Iran's natural trade partner. The privilege of Russia was denied in 1930 and Iran established her own state foreign trade monopoly.<sup>239</sup> It became more difficult for foreign enterprises to access the Iranian market because of the state monopoly. For instance, British carpet importers had been affected by the state monopoly system.<sup>240</sup>

By the Act of 1930, the foreign exchange control was established in 1930. The old unit of currency called the *kran*, was changed into the *rial* based on silver in March 1932. Private currency dealings were illegal.<sup>241</sup> The statist, neo-mercantilist policies of Turkey were adopted in Iran. In 1937, an independent Ministry of Commerce was created. As a result of foreign trade controls, agricultural exports increased parallel to the overvaluation of the *rial* and bilateral trade with soft currencies, and also the prices increased. The Golden Standard Act was passed in 1930, but its implementation was postponed. The depreciation of the *rial* continued, which started owing to the continuous postwar decline of the price of the silver and unfavorable balance of payment.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>238</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 235.

<sup>239</sup> Banani, pp. 129-130.

<sup>240</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 325.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 242.

<sup>242</sup> Banani, pp. 118-131.

In 1931, Iran established its own foreign trade monopoly.<sup>243</sup> The Bank Melli was established in 1927 and became a state commercial bank.<sup>244</sup> All banks in Iran were foreign concessions until the foundation of the Bank Melli in 1937.<sup>245</sup> After the establishment of National Bank, export and import quotas were brought under government control.<sup>246</sup> In order to reduce dependence on import of manufactured goods, especially of Russian textiles, textile factories were opened.<sup>247</sup> Manufacturing was limited only with rug and silk weaving.<sup>248</sup> The silk industry's decline had begun in 1864 because of disease among the silk worms and had not received attention until Reza Shah's era.<sup>249</sup>

A State Tobacco Monopoly was formed to control the manufacture and distribution of cigarettes and cigars. Besides tobacco; textiles, sugar, cement, matches and import and distribution of motor vehicles were put under the control of Government. When merchants wanted to export, they should have a license and deposit their gains in foreign currency in the National Bank. The subsidy of students training abroad, purchase of military equipment, or material required by the State Railway was provided by these revenues.<sup>250</sup>

Iran's political weakness eased foreign tariff dictation. The free trade had started since the Treaty of Turkomanchai in 1828, but the new leader brought a new challenge and took in hand the refining of sugar, the production of tea and the improvement of the tobacco products. By 1936 a tea-drying factory had been

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<sup>243</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 241.

<sup>244</sup> Rizvi, p. 228.

<sup>245</sup> Banani, p. 118.

<sup>246</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 241.

<sup>247</sup> Rizvi, p. 227.

<sup>248</sup> Banani, p. 137.

<sup>249</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 238.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.

established. In March 1939 an Act was passed forcing all officers and government officials to buy only locally manufactured goods.<sup>251</sup> For instance, however the climate and soil conditions were suitable for growing sugar beets, before the time of Reza Shah no attempt was made to produce sugar locally.<sup>252</sup>

In 1930, an Agricultural Bank was founded to provide low-interest, long-term credit for farmers. Later a Forestry School was opened and the Agricultural College was expanded. A plan published in 1936, for the regional storage and distribution of grain, marked the beginning of decentralization and the building up of the regional economy.<sup>253</sup>

The center of government has few opportunities to reach to the small towns and villages. For instance, in order to go to Khorasan (the northeast of Iran) or Khuzestan (the southwest province of Iran), they should have to pass through the territories of neighborhood countries. Reza Shah realized the necessity of the transportation network, because of his travels through the country.<sup>254</sup> The construction of a Trans-Iranian Railway was the major project, but there were problems in Iran's ability to finance it. Therefore, in 1925, government monopoly was established on imports of tea and sugar in order to finance the railroad construction with the funds achieved by monopoly tariffs on tea and sugar, however this kind of financing method was inflationary.<sup>255</sup> In order to avoid being seen as influenced by foreign power, Iranian government selected firms from a wide range of nations. Therefore, the draft operations were carried by American and German firms, but the construction was accomplished by Scandinavians.<sup>256</sup> The railroad did not connect the Gulf with the

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<sup>251</sup> **Ibid.**, pp. 242-243.

<sup>252</sup> **Banani**, p. 139.

<sup>253</sup> **Avery**, *Modern Iran*, p. 243.

<sup>254</sup> Humayun Aryamihr, **Babam Büyük Rıza Şah**, çev. Ali Genceli (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kütüphanesi), 1977, p. 27.

<sup>255</sup> **Banani**, p. 133.

<sup>256</sup> **Avery**, *Modern Iran*, p. 303.

Caspian's most populous ports. It bypassed some of the country's most active economic centers, because of possible Russian or British invasions.<sup>257</sup> The north-south route of trans-Iranian railway assisted military mobilization and the army's access to the main centers of ethnic and tribal rebellion. Construction of the railway started in 1927 and was completed in 1938.<sup>258</sup> During the World War II Russia benefited from the Trans-Iranian railway for allied war materials.<sup>259</sup>

Another accomplishment was realized in water transport, the construction of Caspian port of Pahlavi (Enzeli) by a German firm in 1940. Air transportation was realized early in Iran in 1926. Postal communications were regularized with the aid of Belgian experts in 1923.<sup>260</sup> Telegraph, telephone and radio communications expanded under government auspices. In 1931, the Iranian State Telegraph took over all the material that belonged to the Eastern Telegraph Department and Indo-European Telegraph Company and it started to operate the international lines. By 1941, dial phones were in operation in Tehran.<sup>261</sup> Nevertheless, the state activity in the economic affairs of Iran could not be identified as socialism, because the social implications of a socialist system were lacking. The best description could be state capitalism.<sup>262</sup> To Wilber, despite the fact that the profits of the monopolies and income from taxes contributed the funds for the establishment of state-owned industry, large sums of money, farmland and forest came into Reza Shah's hands.<sup>263</sup> The petroleum industry was the most important industry in Iran. Thus, owing to the lack of communications, at the beginning of his reign it was still cheaper for the

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<sup>257</sup> Banani, p. 134.

<sup>258</sup> Cronin, p. 16.

<sup>259</sup> Avery, *The Cambridge History*, p. 230.

<sup>260</sup> Banani, pp. 135-136.

<sup>261</sup> Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 100.

<sup>262</sup> Banani, p. 138.

<sup>263</sup> Wilber, p. 100.

northern part of the country to import oil from Russia than to bring it from Iranian oil producing areas in the south.<sup>264</sup>

The first concession on oil was granted to an Austrian William Knox D'Arcy in 1901 except the northern provinces of Iran. The D'Arcy concession, which came under the control of the British government during the First World War, made Iran one of the major oil producing countries of the world. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company gave the oil industry an extraterritorial aspect.<sup>265</sup> Until the reign of Reza Shah, the Anglo-Persian Company, which was formed in 1909, had been paying royalties to the government and the local Bakhtiari leaders for protecting its workers. Disputes started between them in 1915. Owing to the international depression, the 1931-32 royalties dropped and Iran began to accuse the company of unfair practices in calculating annual royalty. In November 1932 Reza Shah cancelled the concession and this promoted his prestige in the country. Britain referred the problem to the Council of the League of Nations, as a result a new contract was signed in 1933 for 60 years.<sup>266</sup>

Outside the concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, several contracts were signed, however none reached the working stage. The government policy regarding the ownership of mineral rights was indefinite until 1939 when the Act adopted by the Majlis regulated the classification of all minerals. After this Act, a contract was signed with a Dutch exploration and mining company.<sup>267</sup>

Only cement factory was insufficient to meet Iran's needs and Iran was dependent on the West for heavy industry. Because of lacking plants for iron and steel production, Iran continued to depend on Germany and Czechoslovakia for the supply of heavy

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<sup>264</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 239.

<sup>265</sup> Banani, p. 141.

<sup>266</sup> Rizvi, p. 228.

<sup>267</sup> Banani, p. 143.

machinery.<sup>268</sup> During the last two years of Reza Shah, the priority was given to establishing an iron foundry and a steel mill for the railroad and construction operations. However, the steel foundry which German experts were building for him was left incomplete at the time of his abdication in 1941.<sup>269</sup>

### 3.1.2.2. Foreign policy:

In the First World War Persia was neutral, but became theatre of war because of the occupation of the country by Britain and Russia.<sup>270</sup>

After the Westernizing efforts of Reza Shah and the spread of education, the Soviet policy became effective in Iran. Students and intelligentsia constituted the backbone of the Iranian Communist movement in the years that followed.<sup>271</sup> Reza Shah, at the very outset of his rule, had to face the threat of militant Communism imported into Iran. The Soviets attempted to set up a separatist Communist government in the province of Gilan, but it was unsuccessful. In 1921, the Soviet-Iranian Treaty was concluded and the Soviets withdrew their troops from Iranian territory. The treaty was negotiated by Iranian representatives in Moscow while Reza Khan, not yet fully in power, was personally commanding military operations against the northern rebels and their Soviet allies. The Treaty authorized the entry of Soviet troops into Iranian territory.<sup>272</sup> However, in general, Iran's relations with the Soviet Bloc were unfriendly and full with suspicion.

The second power that the Shah faced was Great Britain. Britain had assigned great importance to the strategic situation of Iran, because of the closeness of her to Britain's colonies. Also, after the cancellation of the Agreement of 1919 between

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<sup>268</sup> Rizvi, p. 227.

<sup>269</sup> Banani, p. 140.

<sup>270</sup> Mohamed Heikal, *Iran: The Untold Story* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), p. 30.

<sup>271</sup> Banani, p. 12.

<sup>272</sup> Binder, *Iran -Political Development...*, pp. 320-332.



Iran and Britain by Ahmed Shah, Britain changed its policy and began to support the establishment of centralized government in Iran. The Britain revolved around oil, the concession for which was held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Relations between Great Britain and Iran differed from those between Iran and Russia. While Britain exercised imperial control in India, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, her interest in Iran focused largely on the preservation of such economic advantages as she or her citizens had achieved in that country. Britain could be counted upon as providing a counterbalance to the Soviets' actual or potential aggressive designs. This did not diminish Britain's economic self-interest.<sup>273</sup>

Iran's nearer neighbors were also cause for concern. Generally, Iranians disliked Arabs and suspected Arab nationalism. For instance, Iraq was of serious concern because of ethnic, linguistic and religious character of population. Iraq was also an oil competitor and a constitutional monarchy. Besides, Iran remained suspicious of Egyptian aims in the Persian Gulf, in Bahrain and in Kuwait. Egyptian control of the Suez Canal and possible extension of its control over some of the oil resources of the area was also disturbing. Afghans were Persian speaking, but were Sunnis, so nationalist Iranians felt a kinship for Afghanistan. On the other hand, there were border disputes between Iran and Afghanistan. The relations between Iran and Pakistan were balanced. Thus, road and rail connections with Pakistan remained poor or non-existent.<sup>274</sup>

Both Iran and Turkey in the 1920s established anti-imperialist, modernist and nationalist new regimes and their relations interactively developed. They had some problems, particularly due to Iranian policy towards rebel Kurds of Turkish neighbourhood. Turkey recognized Iran and in 1926, the Agreement of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed between Turkey and Iran for the purpose of developing future relations and solving existing problems. Furthermore, Iran was suspicious about the Turco-Russian relations after the agreement of friendship

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<sup>273</sup> Bayır, p. 110.

<sup>274</sup> Binder, Iran -Political Development..., pp. 330-331.



between these two countries and she considered that the agreement was made in order to create problem in Azerbaijan of Iran. Also, Azerbaijani nationalists in Turkey were a great concern for Iran. On the other hand, for Turkey, Kurdish problem was the major one. After Shaykh Said rebellion of 1925 in Turkey, the relations were tensed.<sup>275</sup> In 1927, the Turkish army entered Iran to capture Kurdish rebels, but the Kurds seized them. The Turkish government recalled its ambassador from Tehran. At the end negotiations were renewed and the crisis was over. In 1932 the border agreement was signed, and afterwards further questions relating to public health, postal and telegraph communications were settled.<sup>276</sup>

In the spring of 1934, Reza Shah decided to accept the invitation by Ataturk to visit Turkey. Actually, Reza Shah was seeking recognition for his country on equal terms with other nations. The only foreign country he visited until 1941 was Turkey. He hoped a rapprochement with Turkey and thought that it would counterbalance the opposing pressures of Great Britain and Russia.<sup>277</sup> The Shah was also seeking a military alliance, even he proposed Marshal Fevzi Çakmak to be the General Staff Commander of both countries, however not realized.<sup>278</sup> Reza Shah was welcomed by Ataturk. The Shah was pleased of Turkish hospitality and, one night for the Shah's honor, a play called "Özsoy" was composed and shown due to Ataturk's order to express Turkish-Iranian brotherhood.<sup>279</sup> The experience of both sides developed positively. Ataturk and Reza Shah were affected from each other, particularly Ataturk had the chance of representing his reforms on Western type restructuring of Turkey which was an Oriental and Middle Eastern country as much as Iran. On the other hand, Reza Shah witnessed Ataturk's modernization efforts and followed the same path when returned Iran. Moreover, the visit of the Iranian Reformer was

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<sup>275</sup> Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-İran İlişkileri 1926-1938," *Avrasya Dosyası*, C. V, No. 3 (Sonbahar 1999), pp. 148-150.

<sup>276</sup> Tschanguiz H. Pahlavan, "Turkish-Iranian Relations (An Iranian View)," **Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East** (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press), p. 72.

<sup>277</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 317.

<sup>278</sup> Oberling, p. 169.

<sup>279</sup> Rıdvanbeyoğlu, p. 287.

beneficial in the sense of gaining an ally. In fact, the two rulers were alike in their ideals, in their extraordinary strong character and authority.

In the course of 1934 during his visit, the relations between Iran and Afghanistan deteriorated on account of Afghan bands into Iranian territory certain claims of the Afghans on a border region. The frontier had not been clearly defined. As a result of Afghan claims on Iranian territory, the Shah proposed to the Afghans to refer the frontier question to the arbitration of Ataturk. The Afghans had sympathy for the Turks because they were also Sunni Muslims like themselves. They accepted this proposal. Ataturk delegated General Fahreddin Altay, inspector of the first Turkish Army, to act as arbitrator and preside over the mixed Iran-Afghan Commission. This was also the result of the rapprochement occurred between Ataturk and Reza Shah.<sup>280</sup>

In his pursuit of his policies aiming at safeguarding of national independence and security, Reza Shah was ready to cooperate with the neighboring states, which were anxious to safeguard their integrity against possible Soviet expansion and subversion. To this end, Iran entered, in 1937, into a regional alliance known as the Saadabat Pact, the other signatories were Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time of Reza Shah's visit, Turkey and Iran both perceived a threat from Communist influence abroad. To them, communism could destroy the relations with the West. Therefore, both countries were supporting the Saadabat Pact for the regional cooperation.<sup>281</sup> However, World War II and the occupation of Iran by Allied Powers showed that the agreement was not effective in a crisis.<sup>282</sup>

During World War II, Iran was a neutral country. Britain believed that Reza Shah had German sympathies, while Stalin was not worried about him. On the other hand, Churchill launched an argument that German forces in Greece were threatening

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<sup>280</sup> Arfa, p. 253.

<sup>281</sup> Mehmed Saray, "Atatürk ve Türk Dünyası," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* No. 12, 1982, pp. 456-458.

<sup>282</sup> Pahlavan, p. 71.

Turkey and it would be easy for Hitler to strike suddenly through Turkey to invade north Iran.<sup>283</sup>

Despite Iran's neutrality, in the southwest British forces were deployed to protect the oil and in the north Russian forces had to be reinforced against a Turkish invasion of Azerbaijan and to hold the Caucasus where the oil-fields of Baku were situated. Churchill's concern was more on Germany capturing the Iranian oil fields rather than an attack on Russia through the Caspian Sea. British troops had occupied Iraq on Iran's eastern border to prevent that country's oil from falling into German hands. Consequently, Iran's neutrality had been violated. At the end of the War, Iran was not allowed representation at the Peace Conference.<sup>284</sup>

The campaign against Iran began with the demand of Russia that Reza Shah should expel all German nationals. The Iranian dictator agreed but took no direct action, even informed the German ambassador regarding this demand. Reza Shah ignored the demand and Stalin sent more notes. During these developments, there was a set up in anti-Iranian propoganda in London.

Not unlike his constitutionalist predecessors of the period preceding World War I, Reza Shah was inclined to look for a friendly third force that would help Iran free herself from Soviet and British influence. The United States seemed the best counterweight to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, indeed it had no history of colonialism,<sup>285</sup> as the Iranians understood this concept. Thus he repeated the experiment of 1911 when an American expert, Morgan Shuster, had been brought to Iran to reorganize Persian finance by inviting in the early 1920s another American, Dr. Arthur Chester Millspaugh, to assist in the reorganization of the Iranian treasury. In 1940 the Iranian trade with America had doubled, because of concession for oil in northeastern Iran in 1937 granted to the American Amiranian Company. Owing to

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<sup>283</sup> Edmonds, pp. 10-11.

<sup>284</sup> Avery, Modern Iran, p. 182.

<sup>285</sup> Avery, The Cambridge..., p. 240.

transportation difficulties and remoteness from markets, this concession was abandoned the next year.<sup>286</sup>

The antipathy towards Russia and Britain resulted in favor of the Germans. Moreover, even Germany had no history of imperial intervention in the Middle East and had been a rival to Great Britain and the Soviet Union since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Additionally, Germany was the most important trading partner of Iran. During World War II, Nazi ideology was spreading and Germans declared Iran a pure Aryan country. After some years a German, Dr. Kurt Lindenblatt, was appointed governor of the national bank, while numerous German technicians were invited to advise Iran in developing her industry and communications. Although these contacts with the United States and Germany respectively did not represent a movement toward political or military alliance, nevertheless they were conceived by the Shah and his ministers as a material factor in reducing Iran's dependence upon her two powerful imperial neighbors.<sup>287</sup>

In 1941, Iran declared its neutrality in the Russo-German conflict. On the same day, Iran received its first note from the Soviet Union and then reduced the number of Germans in Iran. On July 19 and August 16, two strongly worded joint Anglo-Soviet notes came.<sup>288</sup> Meanwhile, at the outbreak of war, many people hoped for a German victory. But finally the defeat of Germany ended the growth of influence in Iran. On August 25<sup>th</sup> the British and Soviet troops invaded Iran. A new government took office and an agreement was signed which placed the communication systems under Anglo-Soviet control. On September 16, 1941, Reza Shah abdicated and his son took the oath as Shah.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 320.

<sup>287</sup> Keddie, *Roots of ...*, p. 110.

<sup>288</sup> Upton, p. 63.

<sup>289</sup> Binder, *Iran*, p. 326.

Reza Shah left Iran and went to Bombay, and then transferred to Johannesburg, where he died on 26<sup>th</sup> July 1944. It is said that before leaving the country, he filled a case with Persian soil. The effect of the Russo-British intervention in 1941 in Iran signalled the end of Reza Shah's program of reforms and his totalitarian regime.<sup>290</sup>

Indeed, after Reza Shah took the throne as a kind of Iranian Ataturk, he destroyed tradition – the traditional monarchy, the privileges of the aristocracy and the prerogatives of the ulama- and built a new Iran. The new policy of Iran was integral nationalism, centralized, disciplined and near totalitarian.<sup>291</sup>

In terms of his self-sufficiency policy, he ordered to open factories, which would be good also for the morale of the nation to see that Iran could have industries. It was for the same reason that the Shah began to build public buildings like the Police Headquarters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the War Ministry, the Tehran Railway Station, the National Bank, the Ministry of Justice, the University. He considered that it contributed to raise the prestige of the State and to impress on the people that Iran was again a powerful nation, as it had been in the past. It was also claimed that most of the fabrics belonged to Reza Shah or he was one of the partners.<sup>292</sup>

According to Arfa, the disarmament and the control over the tribes prevented trouble and assured the supremacy of the State. If war had not come, his rule would continue till the natural conclusion and the Crown Prince would have succeeded his father in a normal way.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 330-342.

<sup>291</sup> Binder, *Iran...*, p. 87.

<sup>292</sup> Bayır, p. 111.

<sup>293</sup> Arfa, p. 284.

Lambton describes Reza Shah of Iran in these words:<sup>294</sup> “Reza Shah was the price Persia had to pay for undue delay in making the political and social adjustments which were implied in her incorporation as a national state into Western society...”.

### 3.2.3. Social Reforms and Cultural Progress

The period from Reza Shah’s return from Ankara was marked by some developments in social and cultural areas.<sup>295</sup>

Reza Shah saw an instrument of imposing uniformity on the youth of nation for the purpose of instituting an integrated modern nation.<sup>296</sup> Actually, we cannot underestimate the early educational changes, such as the Dar-ul Funun (Polytechnical school), which was established in 1851. It was the first Iranian academic unit that was not administered by the Shiite ulama. Moreover, the Ministry of Science, the forerunner of the Ministry of Education, was established. In addition, the School of Political Science was founded to train diplomats. Therefore, it could be claimed that the educational reforms had its roots since the nineteenth century.<sup>297</sup>

During the era of Reza Shah, compulsory education was launched. The secondary schools were modeled on the French lycee system.<sup>298</sup> Religious teaching gave way to state schools.<sup>299</sup> Nevertheless, the old Qoranic schools continued to exist, where the *mullahs* were teaching. Accordingly, they were run with money from pious donations. Till here as discussed, Reza Shah did not try to suppress religion, but he succeeded in preventing the *mullahs* from interfering in or opposing to reforms.<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Avery, *The Cambridge...*, p. 243.

<sup>295</sup> Upton, p. 62.

<sup>296</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 279.

<sup>297</sup> Akhavi, p. 32.

<sup>298</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 272-276.

<sup>299</sup> Wilber, p. 99.

<sup>300</sup> Arfa, p. 293.

Meanwhile, Higher Teachers Training Colleges with separate divisions for men and women were established in 1918. A professional school for girls had been established after the Shah had seen the Ismet Pasha's Girls' School in Ankara, where domestic arts were taught.<sup>301</sup> 1500 evening classes for adults were opened in all parts of the country.<sup>302</sup> In 1935, coeducation was introduced for children up to the age of ten.<sup>303</sup>

In the mid-nineteenth century, Western-type schools had been opened by foreign missionaries. Large number of men was educated and therefore they played vital role in Reza Shah's Westernizing campaigns. The most crucial need was qualified teachers, for this reason, in 1911 students were sent to Europe to study pedagogy. Nevertheless, the students sent to Europe before 1921 were solely the sons of the ruling class. The students, when they returned, brought a revolution mostly into the fields of cultural traditions, social relations and personal habits.<sup>304</sup> Nevertheless, as Elwell Sutton mentioned, during Reza Shah when students came back from education abroad, they preferred marrying with the daughters of high-class families rather than bringing foreign wives. The latter started following the weakening of the old system of family life.<sup>305</sup>

Besides the growing number of new state schools, there were a limited number of private schools, which were run by religious minorities such as Zoroastrians, Jews, Armenians and Christian missionaries.<sup>306</sup> The best elementary and secondary schools were still run by missionaries and minorities.<sup>307</sup> Reza Shah's eldest daughters and

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<sup>301</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 291.

<sup>302</sup> **Banani**, p. 103.

<sup>303</sup> **Chehabi**, p. 498.

<sup>304</sup> **Banani**, pp. 89-102.

<sup>305</sup> **Avery**, *Modern Iran*, p. 295.

<sup>306</sup> **Banani**, p. 94.

<sup>307</sup> Camron Michael Amin, "Propoganda and Remembrance," *The Journal of the Society for Iranian Studies*, Vol. 32, No.3 (September 1999), p. 366.



his eldest son went also to the Tehran Baha'i school. The government were subsidizing these schools. However, gradually, they were put under the control of the Ministry of Education and became entirely uniform.<sup>308</sup> The ratification of a bill on authorizing the creation of Higher Council of Education in 1921 gave the signals of the centralization of educational affairs.<sup>309</sup> Meanwhile, the first polytechnic school in Iran was founded in 1922 in Tehran by German technicians with the subsidies of Iranian government, later changed into an Iran-German Industrial School.<sup>310</sup>

Before 1928, there were no uniform official textbooks, so the Ministry of Education began to prepare and publish textbooks<sup>311</sup> and provided a standardized curriculum. Then, the Ministry of Education took in hand the regulation of American and British missionaries and in 1940 they became state secondary schools, staffed with Iranian teachers.<sup>312</sup> At these schools, bible instruction was forbidden.<sup>313</sup> By 1940, all foreign schools except German school were closed or nationalized. In fact, the matter had two dimensions: one was controlling foreign schools at home: the other was controlling Iranian students overseas. If an Iranian student studying abroad stepped out of line, he would receive a warning from the nearest Iranian legation.<sup>314</sup>

The University of Tehran was founded as a relatively autonomous institution in 1935. After the abdication Reza Shah, the Majlis removed the University from the control of the Ministry of Education and made it entirely independent.<sup>315</sup>

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<sup>308</sup> Banani, p. 96 and see p. 24 for further information concerning Baha'i.

<sup>309</sup> Akhavi, p. 35.

<sup>310</sup> Banani, pp. 97-99.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>312</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 277.

<sup>313</sup> Banani, p. 96.

<sup>314</sup> Amin, p. 370.

<sup>315</sup> Banani, pp. 97-99.

The illiterate percentage dropped from % 90 in early 1920s to less than % 80 in the late 1930s. As a consequence of the Compulsory Conscription Law, during two years of military service, literary classes were conducted.<sup>316</sup> The universal military training contributed to the rise of literacy, the urbanization of young rural and tribal population and breakdown of provincial isolation. Furthermore, when they returned to their villages, they brought the influences of West with them such as their Western type of clothing.<sup>317</sup>

Meanwhile, Reza Shah gave importance to physical education for boys and girls. Sports stadium was constructed and races took place twice a year in Tehran, once a year in the Turkoman steppe and once or twice a year in different provincial towns.<sup>318</sup>

In the field of public health, the Pasteur Institut modeled on the Institut de Pasteur in Paris which was created under Reza Shah reign. In 1927 and in 1930 the government introduced exact procedure and high standards for the licensing of physicians. Most Iranian doctors were trained abroad. In 1940, the Ministry of Health was created. The Reza Shahi Hospital in Mashad was established and operated by German doctors as a model municipal hospital. Charitable organizations were all products of the Pahlavi regime.<sup>319</sup>

In the meantime, secularization and westernization went together. Marriage and divorce registers were established and henceforth, by the Law of 14 August 1931 women had right to initiate divorce proceedings. Furthermore, non-Muslim

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<sup>316</sup> Kerou, p. 3.

<sup>317</sup> Banani, pp. 55-56.

<sup>318</sup> Arfa, p. 291.

<sup>319</sup> Banani, pp. 64-66.

foreigners were permitted to visit the mosques of the country and dervishes were forbidden to appear in towns.<sup>320</sup>

After Reza Shah's visit to Turkey, as a result of the influence of Ataturk's reforms, teachers and schoolgirls were not allowed to appear veiled and army officers were forbidden to be seen in the company of a veiled woman. Reza Shah imposed European dress on the population. In 1936, the veil was officially abolished for all women, and men would wear European hats or caps. The Shah removed his cap on entering the Majlis. Moreover, the use of titles was abolished.<sup>321</sup> In order to prevent any delay for wearing Western clothes, the government imported European style clothes and sold them cheaper. Women were encouraged to appear in public with their husbands.<sup>322</sup> During the festival organized by the Ministry of Education, Reza Shah was accompanied by his mother and sisters without their veils on.<sup>323</sup>

During 1935 it was estimated that 4000 women in a population of 300,000 were leaving off their veil. In 1935 Women's Culture Center was founded with the Shah's daughters as its patron. On June 28, 1935 the Prime Minister gave an historic tea party and the high officials had been obliged to bring their wives there.<sup>324</sup> The wives of Iranian members of Parliament started to attend some activities unveiled. Moreover, women of the Pahlavi Royal House started to visit orphanages and attend Women's Society's functions as European and Japanese noblewomen do. To emphasize the morality of unveiling, the regime insisted that the prostitutes remain unveiled.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> Wilber, p. 99 and see also Avery, Modern Iran, p. 290.

<sup>321</sup> Upton, p. 62.

<sup>322</sup> Arasteh, p. 105.

<sup>323</sup> Aryamihir, p. 40.

<sup>324</sup> Avery, Modern Iran, p. 291.

<sup>325</sup> Amin, pp. 361-362.

On the other hand, following the rising against Amanullah in Afghanistan, reforms on dressing resulted in a rebellion. Public appearances of ladies of high position and the rule of younger men with new-fashioned dress continued, while men from poor classes had continued to wear shirts without collars and disregard daily shavings. By 1936 the mullahs had already abandoned the turban and started to wear western-style suit to become notaries for not losing their ex-positions, because by the Law of 17<sup>th</sup> March 1932 the documents on property transactions and other matters would be dealt by state secular courts and lawyers. By the end of 1936, Iran was legally emancipated from religion. In the same year, the Shah had appeared with the Queen and his two elder daughters unveiled in European dress. Shops were not allowed to serve veiled women customers, and moreover, ladies with veil were not allowed to walk in the streets or use public transport. On the other hand, some old ladies never went out again until after 1941.<sup>326</sup>

Nevertheless, to Nikki R. Keddie the law on unveiling remained in the books and was not enforced after Reza Shah's abdication in 1941. Polygamy up to four regular wives and any number of temporary wives continued to be religious law.<sup>327</sup>

Besides westernization in physical appearance, there were some changes in cultural instruments such as music. Elwell Sutton said, 'The attitude of the Iranian government was that music could be an instrument of both propaganda and popular education'. Within this context, the Radio Station was opened in Tehran in 1940 and broadcasting was formally introduced. Before, broadcasts had been heard from Berlin and Ankara for half a decade. Furthermore, an Opera House was built in Tehran as in Baghdad and Ankara.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 292.

<sup>327</sup> Keddie, *Iran -Religion, Politics and Society-...*, p. 155.

<sup>328</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 287-306.

Then, the Academy of Music and the Academy of Fine Arts were founded. They followed different path from each other. Academy of Fine Arts focused on Persian arts and crafts, while Academy of Music was affected by Western influence.<sup>329</sup>

As regards language, one of the pillars of the cultural instruments, the first governmental attempt to replace foreign words with Persian origins was made by the Ministry of War in 1924. Here, also, a special committee composed of 6 Army officers and 4 representatives of the Ministry of Education was charged by the Ministry of War to coin Persian words instead of foreign terms. The term “foreign” in Iran applied to the “European” originated words, while in Turkey the emphasis was on removing Arabic and Persian words.<sup>330</sup>

Besides the Ministry of War’s language committee, there were other governmental institutions, journals and independent writers who were using pure Persian and replacing the foreign ones.<sup>331</sup> During the session of the fifth Majlis, the Arabic and Turkish names for the months of the year were changed to the ex-Persian equivalents. The Iranian Solar Year was adopted in place of the Arabic Lunar Year.<sup>332</sup> From December 1934, the government informed foreign governments on their national disposition to use of “Iran” rather than “Persia” in official correspondence.<sup>333</sup>

During the summer 1928 when Ataturk was propagating the new Latin alphabet, an Iranian scholar advocated the adoption of the Latin script for Persian. The example of Turkey was supported, but there was a suspicion regarding the prohibition of the Arabic alphabet, because of the link between the script and religion. In Iran, within a month a decree was approved by the Council of Ministers on 19 May 1935 for the

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<sup>329</sup> Banani, p. 98.

<sup>330</sup> Neysari, pp. 45-47.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>332</sup> Avery, Modern Iran, p. 275.

<sup>333</sup> Upton, p. 62.

establishment of the Iranian Language Academy *-Farhangestan-*. In 1936, the Latin equivalents, which were usually written above shops alongside the Persian letters, were erased by the government order. In 1937, the use of French on the Iranian postage stamps was abandoned.<sup>334</sup>

The Persian Academy (*Farhangestan*) was founded in 1935 and its counterpart the Turkish Language Society had been founded in 1932. After the Shah's visit to Turkey, he charged into the language battle. At dinner with his officers, the Commander-in-Chief addressed them for the first time as *afsaran-e* man, using the new word *afsar* "officer" in place of Arabic one. The Persian purist movement as a whole and the *Farhangestan* in particular were less successful than their Turkish counterparts. Atatürk personally initiated the Turkish Language Society as an arm of his modernizing policies. Reza Shah was less concerned with the inauguration and proceedings of *Farhangestan*. The Shah was impressed by his observation of language reform in Turkey and personally set up the military relexification commission that preceded the *Farhangestan*. The nature of the language reform organizations and their methods reflected different approach in the two countries. The Turkish purists and many members of the TDK were influenced by the purist movement in Germany. Membership of the TDK was more broadly based, open to any adult Turk with an interest in his language. By contrast, the *Farhangestan* was modeled on the *Académie française* and not open to all Iranians. The TDK took practical steps to enlist active public participation, a whole range of dictionaries including the Turkish Encyclopedia were published and updated. No such efforts had been seen in the *Farhangestan*. The glossaries they produced were not widely distributed and public feedback was not sought. No dictionary was published.<sup>335</sup>

A united Persian identity was an important fact. For this reason, Reza Shah established the Institution of Development of Thinking (*Düşünceyi Geliştirme Kurumu*). The aim was to ignore the cultural differences and create a national

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<sup>334</sup> Neysari, pp. 46-47.

<sup>335</sup> John R. Perry, "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 17 (1985), pp. 301-309.

identity. Its counterpart was established in Turkey, which was called Turkish History Society.<sup>336</sup>

Since the Constitutional Period in 1906, the necessity for registration and a census had been realized and during Reza Shah's reign the population was estimated as 10 million in 1922.<sup>337</sup>

Freedom of speech and of the press was not present and the government set up an office for guiding public opinion.<sup>338</sup>

Arfa emphasizes that all these reforms could be seen very little today, but they had been created from a limited government budget without any outside help.<sup>339</sup>

#### 3.2.4. Sunni-Shiite Tradition

Before the conclusion, I prefer discussing the Sunni-Shi Islam traditions in two Empires in order to analyze the impacts of religious beliefs on modernization. Between Persia and Ottoman, later Iran and Turkey, the main difference has focused on the religion. There were two schools of an Islamic religion: Persian Shi'ism and Ottoman Sunnism.<sup>340</sup>

In Sunnite Ottoman tradition, Yavuz Sultan Selim took the "caliph" and the ulama became politically powerless. However, education and law were still under their control. Nevertheless, the ulama was subject to the authority of the Sultan and cooperated with the government against changes in the society.<sup>341</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> Bayır, p. 10.

<sup>337</sup> Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 232.

<sup>338</sup> Wilber, p. 101.

<sup>339</sup> Arfa, p. 293.

<sup>340</sup> Keddie, "Is there a Middle East," ..., p. 258.

<sup>341</sup> Berkes, pp. 24-26.



When Ataturk came to power, Islamic ideas were suppressed by westernization and secularism. From the beginning, Kemalism manifested a modern cosmology derived from the Enlightenment. The major aim was to secure secularism within a homogeneous, uni-ethnic (Turkish), uni-linguistic (Turkish), uni-sectarian (Sunni) entity. As a result, the individuals would imagine themselves as part of a nation.<sup>342</sup> In this sense, Niyazi Berkes states that Mustafa Kemal wanted to Turkify Islam not for the sake of Turkish nationalism but rather Turkify Islam for the sake of religious enlightenment.<sup>343</sup>

Ataturk's statements concerning the "revival of the Islamic religion" are perceived as eyewash. Meanwhile, he refrained from pandering to public sentiments and did not declare his decision to abolish the Caliphate for a long time until the opportune moment.<sup>344</sup>

However Islam constituted a threat against Kemalist Westernization, it was used as a unifying instrument to gather the local Anatolian notables, religious leaders and the peasantry during the War of National Independence (1919-1922).<sup>345</sup> After the foundation of the Republic, the provision of secularism was inserted in the Constitution and the Islamic understanding of the state, in which Islam was conceived as a church-state and the political structure of Islamic society was theocratic, was abolished without touching to the folk Islam.<sup>346</sup>

On the other hand, in Shiite tradition, the understanding of church-state correlation dominated the society and theocracy was accepted as legitimate. In fact, according to Shiite belief, all temporal power was illegitimate and legitimate authority belonged

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<sup>342</sup> Sakalhoğlu, p. 234.

<sup>343</sup> Khalid, p. 61.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid.

<sup>345</sup> Sakalhoğlu, p. 235.

<sup>346</sup> Banani, p. 15.

to Imams from the line of Ali (the first Shiite Imam). Within the context of Shi'a belief, all of the Imams, including the Prophet, had been martyred by poisoning. The Twelfth Imam went to occultation due to threats against his life from the ruler of the time.<sup>347</sup> In this regard, the ulama were considered as general agency of the last absent Imam (Mahdi).<sup>348</sup> Therefore, they believed that the last lost Imam Mehdi would return one day and during his absence Shiite believers had to obey the rules of religious authority. A Mullah of supreme authority was the head of state.<sup>349</sup>

Historically, the Shahs were more powerful than the Shi'i Ulama. The Safavids (1501-1737), the first Shiite rulers of Iran, declared themselves kings as well as descendants of the Imams. Unlike the Safavids, the Qajars (1796-1925) had no claim to direct religious authority and under their rule, religious and political powers became separated.<sup>350</sup>

In Shiite tradition, a clerical system, in which the ulama accumulated their wealth from religious taxes, has existed as in Christianity, whereas in Sunnite tradition there is no such a class within the sense of stratification of the society. Furthermore, the ulama have been sharing the political authority with the ruler due to their autonomous structure, which was economically independent and had long-lasting traditions.

In addition, the hierarchy of the Ottoman ulama was not alike with strict hierarchy of Iranian ulama. The Ottoman religious institution was heterogeneous unlike its Shi'ite counterpart and the authority of the Shaykh al-Islam was much more limited than that of the Shi'ite religious leaders of Iran.<sup>351</sup> In Iran, the ulama were stronger, more

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<sup>347</sup> Hasan Onat, *Shi'ism in the Twentieth Century and the Islamic Revolution of Iran* (Ankara: Research Foundation for Public Services, 1996), p. 47.

<sup>348</sup> Bashiriyeh, p. 8.

<sup>349</sup> Turgut Tülümen, "The future of Turkish-Iranian Relations," *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies*, İstanbul, Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBİV), 1988-1995 Yılıığı, p. 136.

<sup>350</sup> Bashiriyeh, p. 55.

<sup>351</sup> Arjomand, pp. 42-43.

influential and wealthier class than their Ottoman counterparts and they had an independent power until World War I. On the contrary, in the course of nineteenth century, the power of the Ottoman ulama declined. The nationalist and anti-autocratic role of the Iranian ulama distinguished from the Ottoman counterparts.<sup>352</sup>

It is worth stressing that many of the Iranian ulama led the 1891 movement against a British tobacco monopoly and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. The role of the ulama in Iran in the Tobacco Protest of 1891-92 and in the Constitutional Revolution has made scholars more aware of the political importance of the Shi'i ulama than their Sunni counterparts.<sup>353</sup>

The League of Nations published a report in 1925 evaluating the difficulties at the beginning of Reza Shah's reign. It was mentioned that the beliefs of the people and the teachings of the religious instructors or mullahs had effect on both the characters of the people and preventing the introduction of the reforms. As analyzed, many of the customs of the people were interpretations of the Koran, hence the impact of religion on society at high level could be considered.<sup>354</sup>

Nevertheless, for the duration of Reza Shah's rule, the political role of the ulama was diminished to some level and relative achievements were realized to suppress the ulama.

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<sup>352</sup> Keddie, "Is there a Middle East," ..., p. 259.

<sup>353</sup> Keddie, "Iran: change in Islam; Islam and change," ..., p. 531.

<sup>354</sup> Banani, p. 63.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MODERNIZATION MODELS

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed to the rise of two countries through a break with the old system and a transformation by the modernization movements. The international chaotic atmosphere on account of rising of nationalism/nationalist movements, the World War I, mitigated the business of two leaders “Ataturk and Reza Shah”. In fact, the two countries had the same fate of precluding the obscurity in the sense of their further evolutions as much as they got closer to their goals such as opposing the imperialism and safeguarding the political independence. Within this perspective, the modernization policies were of secondary concern.

As known, after the First World War, both Iran and Turkey had lost independence and been nearly destroyed. Therefore, we found them in history pages while they were seeking total independence and benefiting from the advantages of the postwar turbulences.

Following their conquest of sovereignty and independence from the foreign domination in the 1920s, the leaders of these two countries turned their way to instituting the political authority and modernizing the political, economic and socio-cultural mechanisms. Within this context, Reza Shah of Iran in many ways resembled to Mustafa Kemal of Turkey. Indeed, the similarities in character of Ataturk and Reza Shah and circumstances, which they had to face with, could not be disregarded. It is here worth stressing that both of them had military backgrounds, and were pragmatic and fast in realizing their decisions. Moreover, both aimed at

transforming their traditional multi-communal societies into modern nation-states. Both associated modernization with Westernization and the past with administrative inefficiency, tribal anarchy, clerical authority and social heterogeneity. Both hoped to build sovereign states independent from foreign powers. Both tried to emancipate women from religion. Finally, both faced with the dual task of instituting Western type of system while preserving religion.

In addition, both rose to power mainly with the assistance of the military, and knew that social, cultural and economic reforms could not be achieved without political absolutism, particularly without fulfilling revolutionary reforms from top to down. In this sense, the revolutionary movements towards Westernization may be considered as if it brought about non-democratic outputs. However, every revolution is democratic insofar as it eliminates the hegemonic/privileged class and their privileges. Within this perspective, the following regime is a dictatorship, in which the laws are regulated to protect the revolution and preclude the possible counter-revolutions.

In many ways, Ataturk and Reza Shah may be declared dictators, who are fulfilling revolutionary reforms from top to down. However, their paths towards protecting the revolution and precluding any possible counter-revolution differed from each other. Hence, Ataturk maintained the legitimacy of his political authority in the society while Reza Shah never ensured again the legitimacy of which he had achieved in the first years of Pahlavi regime. Reza Shah did not permit any opposition to his authority. Moreover, Reza Shah killed the opposing politicians. The Iranian aristocracy was also the victim of the Shah's policy. Hence, Reza Shah gradually lost civilian support and ruled without the assistance of an organized political party. In addition, his policy favored the persistence of the foreign influence inside while internal stability could not be achieved. Finally, in 1941, Iran was occupied by the Allied powers and Reza Shah left the country. Meanwhile, the religious men found a vacuum in political authority and began to move against the aristocracy governing Iran. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal attracted the enthusiastic backing of the intelligentsia into the Republican Party and invited people to express her views,

which would broaden their horizon of thought and provide participation for the individual.

As regards the political legitimacy of the rulers, loyalty to the authority is an important pillar for the permanency of authority. I have discussed the formulation of Dankwart A. Rustow concerning the political stability in Chapter II. He claims that the sum of legitimacy of institutions and legitimacy of rulers is equal to the political stability. It means that legitimacy of rulers and institutions together makes sense in the sense of political stability. If we draw a picture on the cases of Ataturk and Reza Shah by the means of the formulation, we could conclude that Ataturk ensured political stability in the country, and guaranteed the legitimacy of the institutions, while replacing old with new, in addition to the legitimacy of his political authority. Meanwhile, he did not intervene in religion at first while gradually abolishing the Caliphate. Bearing in mind the fact that religion is an important traditional constituent affecting the loyalty of the society, Ataturk and Reza Shah did not fulfill strict regulations concerning religion. To this end, Ataturk advocated that the revolution was of crucial concern for the sake of nation in the name of nation, and succeeded in creating nation consciousness while not touching to Islamic belief of the folk. However, the institutional existence of the religion was finalized such as abolishing the Caliphate. Hence, his legitimacy continued insofar as he responded to the demands of the population. On the contrary, Reza Shah even could not be able to make any fundamental change concerning religion taking into account the Shiite belief, which was deeply rooted inside the Iranian society.

Furthermore, in Iran, legitimacy of institutions was difficult to ensure on account of the dominance of Shiite belief in the society and the opposition of the ulama, so he abandoned in establishing a republic. On the other hand, Reza Shah ensured institutional legitimacy by creating a monarchy. After his abdication, his son Muhammad Reza Shah tried to maintain the permanency of his institutions for a while. As the legitimacy of Muhammad Reza Shah as a ruler and inherited institutions were inquired, the power of the religious institutions strengthened.

In fact, Reza Shah did not initiate reforms as radical as Ataturk made. Within this sense, a question may arise: If Reza Shah did fulfill radical reforms, would he be able to maintain his political legitimacy or would it accelerate his end. Ataturk ventured this possibility and created a new state, which was Republic, while he got rid of the Islamic Ottoman past and abolished the Sultanate and Caliphate. He succeeded in complete break with the past. However, whether it was possible for the Iranian case or not, is a subject of another study.

Indeed, Reza Shah was not brave in the sense of establishing a Republic firstly on account of the ulama who have really a great influence on the Iranian society. The ulama were rejecting the possibility of a Republic, because they would lose their power and have to share their rights with the nation. Besides, the Iranians were disturbed by the developments in Turkey such as the abolishment of the Caliphate, and worried about the future of the hegemonic influence of the Shiite belief. Furthermore, he thought that a Republic would weaken his power and preferred monarchy, taking into consideration that monarchy had deep roots in Persian history. Consequently, Reza Shah's Iran got rid of Qajar Dynasty but could not establish a Republic in Iran.

For the duration of reforms, two leaders set up a target for the purpose of promoting the approval of the reforms by the society. Within this context, Reza Shah focused on the historical past of Iran. It was not the Islamic past, which was idolized, but the glories of pre-Islamic Iran and moreover the idealization of Zarathustrianism, which was exercised before Islam. In Zarathustrianism, the ulama had the right to collect religious tax, which was known as "*homs*" (khums) in Shiism. Hence, the power of the ulama was dependent on these taxes.<sup>352</sup> It is worth stressing that the most significant difference between the Shiite ulama and their Sunni counterparts was the religious tax system, which provided ulama independent status from the central administration. While Reza Shah was in power, the ulama were still economically independent and accordingly powerful. However, Ataturk never had to compete with

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<sup>352</sup> Milani, pp. 82-84



any religious authority, because they had ever been under the supervision of the State.

As I have mentioned, Reza Shah idolized pre-Islamic Iran and promoted a revived consciousness of ancient Achaemenian glory, while Ataturk was willing to burn the bridges with the past. Reza Shah tried to create unified nation consciousness, therefore he emphasized the golden days of the imperial era to gather people around loyalty. For instance, the traditional symbols of the ex-empires like “tiger” and “sun” was printed on the Iranian flag. However, the heterogeneous structure composed of different ethnic structures in Iran was a challenging issue towards unification. Nevertheless, xenophobia contributed to the unification of all Iranians behind the new regime. On the other hand, the “Millet System” of the Ottoman Empire despite the variety of minorities created a kind of unification in the Empire.

As may be understood after having read the thesis, in terms of political, economic, judicial and cultural reforms, Reza Shah tried to follow Ataturk, but not in one-to-one correspondence and moreover, reforms were mainly incomplete. For instance, following the foundation of *Farhangestan*, though he tried to purify Persian language, he could not change the Alphabet. Furthermore, he diminished the power of the mullahs, but failed to create a secular state.

Though I have pointed out the main distinctions between Sunni and Shiite belief in Chapter III in details, I would like to reiterate that the religious structure in Iran was different from that of Turkey. The Shiite ulama were more powerful than the Sunni ulama of Turkey, who had lost their administrative and economic autonomies in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Consequently, the ruler of Iran should take due consideration the religious domination in public life and in governance. Indeed, according to Shiite belief, the Ulama were considered as general agency of the last absent Imam (Mehdi). They believed that the last lost Imam Mehdi would return one day, and during his absence Shiite believers had to obey the rules of religious authority. A Mullah of supreme authority was the head of state.

It is here worth stressing that geographical location of two countries were important in the sense of penetration of Westernization into countries. Despite the fact that both were Middle Eastern Countries, Iran was harder for Western countries to reach than Turkey. Moreover, Ataturk had better relations with the West rather than Reza Shah. Additionally, the Shiite ulama did not accept the Westernization/modernization models in their country as much as their counterparts did.

In fact, Turkey succeeded in stabilizing the system and guiding it towards conventionalism. Iran is also a country in which the same goals were sought, but without a sharp break in the system legitimacy. For this reason, I have concentrated on the fact how the same goal by making same reforms resulted in different paths through modernization policies of both leaders.

Within the context of the term “revolution”, the paths of two leaders differed. As known, the movement of the bourgeoisie in France in 1789 was defined as a transformation in the socio-political and economic structures of the society in a radical and sudden way, which was a “revolution”. In my opinion, a sharp break in the system did not occur in Iran similar to Turkey.

Within this perspective, we may claim that the Turkish revolution denoted the transition from theocratic state to nation state and from the understanding of “Ummet” (religious community) to nation consciousness. Furthermore, it rescued the Turkish society from being medieval type of agricultural society.

In this regard, the first stage on the way of revolution was the victory over the will of imperialist states, which defined the Turkish issue as “Eastern Problem” and invaded Anatolia for the purpose of sharing the territory after having killed the “Ill Man”. Secondly, Ataturk aimed at eliminating the Ottoman state and its institutions and finally replacing them with the contemporary institutions of the new Republic. After having become sovereign and nation-state, Ataturk advocated the Contemporary Western Civilization without discriminating between nations whether English or French. They would be considered Western Civilization, insofar as their national

cultures were universalized. In effect, the West was neither solely economy nor science and technology and should be perceived as a totality in compliance with its parts.

Mohammed Faghfoory claims that in Iran, evolution or revolution was being considered after the eruption of increasing penetration of the world capitalist system into the country. Then, the degree of central authority and control increased. The process had transformed much of urban Iran into a relatively modern society.<sup>353</sup> However, I believe that a complete break with the past did not occur in Iran, so it is difficult to evaluate the movement as revolution, solely be defined as modernization movement. As we remember, Reza Shah idolized the glories of pre-Islamic Iran and could not establish a Republic, rather preferred monarchy; in practice undermined religion, while the constitutional provisions claiming Shi'a Islam as the official state religion and the Shah as Defender of the Faith were never changed and so on.

In Amin Banani's book "The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941", he lists the reasons why Reza Shah's movement could not be evaluated as a revolution, such as:<sup>354</sup>

- i. The changes were affected with the support and approval of majority of Iranians;
- ii. The events in Iran were overshadowed by a revolution in Russia and radical upheaval in Turkey.

Furthermore, to me, one reason is that the tradition could not be replaced with its contemporary counterpart. It should rather learn to live along with the traditions in the society.

On the other hand, taking into consideration the first point above, one important fact should not be ignored that the success of a nationalistic rise is correlated with the

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<sup>353</sup> Mohammed H. Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State relations in Iran: 1921-1941," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19 (1987), pp.413

<sup>354</sup> Amin, Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1961, pp.44

politicization of the masses and the derivation of political legitimacy from the will of nations. The traditional ruler must make concessions to the bureaucracy, the military and the new commercial classes or dominant classes in the society. Within this perspective, Turkish Revolution was performed by the coalition of classes against the Ottoman oligarchy and foreign domination.

In respect to the second point above, I do not believe that the Russian and Turkish revolutions overshadowed the movement in Iran. For instance, the French revolution affected the intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire and the movement of Young Turks, and finally led to the Turkish Revolution. Hence, the Ottoman state had always been perceived as the castle of the Eastern World in the West and the movement of Young Turks towards Constitutional Monarchy signified the ability of the East in terms of self-governance without foreign assistance. Furthermore, the modernization policies of Reza Shah modeled on Turkish Revolution.

Professor Ann K. S. Lambton in her article in 1944, points out that Reza Shah's modernization was too quick, so synthesis of West and Iran could not be achieved. Much of old was removed, but less of new was put in its place.<sup>355</sup>

On the other hand, the ideological formation of a revolution should also not be ignored, while evaluating revolutionary processes. The lack of ideology was criticized by Iranian intellectuals. Reza Shah was accused of proceeding rapidly and ignoring an ideological foundation. In this regard, Amin Banani claims that Reza Shah's movements lacked organized, deliberate media of expression and defined, formulated, publicized ideology. Unlike Kemal Ataturk, he wrote no article, made no public utterances, and left no political testament, which could be considered as ideological core of his revolution. The writer says, "We could not speak of an ideology called Pahlavism as we did of Kemalism".<sup>356</sup>

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<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.151

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.44

In addition to lack of ideological base, Reza Shah could not be able to perform his reformist ideas as he wished. Shiite belief and accordingly the power of the ulama blocked his progress. Hence, Reza Shah preferred to align with the ulama. I think he decided that popular support could only be won if the aims of the movement were expressed in terms of Islam. The nation consciousness could not be achieved in the society and Islam emerged as a unifier.

In no Muslim countries was it possible to let go of Islam in the way Mustafa Kemal and Turkish nationalists did following the foundation of the republic. Though the political aspects of the religious institutionalization were removed in Iran during the reign of Reza Shah, Shiism continued to be the official religion of the state and in public life Islamic tradition was still dominant.

In fact, Reza Shah disrupted traditional Persian/Iranian society. Meanwhile, the ulama found a vacuum in the political arena and played the card presented by the Shiite belief, which gave rise to Islamic revolution some fifty years later.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX-A**

#### **THE COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF REFORMS OF ATATURK AND REZA SHAH**

- The end of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1922; the end of the Qajar Sultanate in 1925;
- The adoption of the Republic in Turkey in 1923; the adoption of the monarchy in Iran in 1925 and in 1935 the word “Iran” was adopted as the official name of the country;
- In 1923, Turkey lifted the capitulations; Iran in 1928;
- In 1924 closing of the medrese’s, establishment of a unified, secular, state system of education and the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924; in Iran no development similar to that of Turkey;
- The Shari’a courts were abolished in Turkey and secular courts were founded in 1924; in Iran in 1926 the Shari’a courts were abolished and secular courts were established in 1932;
- The prohibition of the dervish orders and the closing of their numerous lodges (tekke’s), and of the mausoleum (turbe’s) of traditional Muslim heroes and saints in 1925 in Turkey; no similar development in Iran;


- In 1925, the attempts to ban the veil have been started in Turkey; in Iran, the first attempts were made in 1928, but the ban on veil was cancelled in 1941 when Reza Shah was dethroned;
- The shift to Western legal codes (foreshadowed in some of the legislation of the Tanzimat and Young Turk periods) and adoption of Turkish Civil Law in 1926; Reza Shah's Civil Law's first part was issued in 1928;
- Ataturk's Criminal Code (based on Italian Criminal Code) was enacted in 1926; Reza Shah's draft of Criminal Code (affected by Italian Criminal Code) was also enacted same year;
- In 1926, Ataturk's Hat Law was enacted; in 1928 in Iran Pahlavi peaked cap (*Külâh-ı Pehlevî*) was made compulsory and in 1934 the "hat" took the place of the Pahlavi cap;
- In 1927, the first modern census of Turkey held under the direction of a Belgian statistician; in Iran in 1956 the first national census was held;
- In 1928, the change to Latin characters and end of Islam as the state religion; in Iran Persian alphabet was preferred, and Shiite Islam was declared the official religion;
- In 1928, the Western international calendar and system of weights and measures were adopted; in Iran Islamic calendar is used.
- In 1929 in Turkey, the end of the instruction of Arabic and Persian in elementary and secondary public schools; in Iran since the language of the Qur'an and Islamic texts and teachings is Arabic, it is taught in all classes of secondary schools and in all areas of study;

- In the years 1930-1935, the granting of the right to vote and to hold public office to women in Turkey; in 1963 those rights were given to women in Iran;
- In 1932, Turkish Language Society was established; in Iran, Farhangestan was founded in 1935;
- In 1933, the Laws for opening of the Preachers and Prayer-leaders Schools (Hatip ve Imam Mektepleri) and of the Faculty of Divinity in Istanbul University were enacted, however, the number of Preachers and Prayer-leaders Schools decreased till 1930 and entirely closed that year; in 1935 the Faculty of Divinity was opened in Iran and the existence of religious schools sustained within the context of dual education system;
- In 1935, the Law of Surname was embraced in Turkey, moreover “Mr. and Mrs.” was adopted instead of military rank and titles; in Iran the adoption of Surname was firstly realized in 1925 by the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty, when Reza Khan took the surname of Pahlavi.

**APPENDIX-B**  
**PHOTOGRAPHS**



*Reza Khan 1917. From humble beginnings this colonel from the Cossack brigade was already one of the top Iranian military commanders by his early forties.*



Reza Khan as Minister of War. He was the real power in Iran following the British-inspired 1921 coup which removed the government in Tehran






Reza Shah Pahlavi





Reza Shah Pahlavi, photograph of an oil painting in  
Golistan Palace, Tehran



Reza Shah the Great, father of the present Shah, shortly before his death in  
1944



PRESIDENT ATATURK (1938)



Ataturk at the time of the adoption of the new Turkish Alphabet teaching the letters to the people (1928)



Ataturk training his people for the war of Independence



In the world the existence, value right and freedom, and independence possessed by every people is proportional to its deeds.


To go forward and succeed on the way of civilization is a vital condition.

K. Ataturk

**Ataturk with his life Latife Hanım**




The Civil Laws of all existing civilized states in the world are very close to one another. Our nation and our government in the idea and conception of justice, is inferior to no civilized people. History perhaps bears witness to our high level in this respect. Therefore it is not permissible that our existing legal code should be inferior to the collected laws of civilized nations as a whole.




Reza Shah at Ankara Railway Station







Reza Shah departing from Samsun



Reza Shah at Kars




Reza Shah at Ankara




Yavuz, armored ship, which brought Reza Shah from Trabzon to Samsun






Reza Shah on the deck of Yavuz



Reza Shah at Ankara Institute of Agriculture




Ataturk and Reza Shah at Manisa



APPENDIX-C

THE CEREMONY PROGRAMME PREPARED FOR REZA SHAH'S VISIT



**İran Şehinşahi**  
**Haşmetlû Reza Şah Pehlevî Hazretlerinin**  
**teşrifleri münasebetile yapılacak**  
**merasime ait programdır.**

**Gürcübulak - Trabzon**

Haşmetlû Reza Şah Pehlevî Hazretleri Türkiye'ye Tebriz-Makû tarikile gelecekler ve hududumuzu Gürcübulak kapısından mürur buyuracaklardır.

Şah Hazretleri ve maiyetleri erkânı 9 Haziran 1934 gecesini İran arazisi dahilinde kâin Makû'da geçirecekler ve 10 Haziran günü erkenden mezkûr şehirden hareketle aynı gün saat 9 raddelerinde hududumuza muvasalat etmiş bulunacaklardır.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tahran Büyük Elçisi Rıdavan-beyoğlu Hüsrev Beyefendi Şah Hazretlerine seyahatları esnasında refakat edecektir.

Haşmetlû Reza Pehlevî Hazretleri, hudutta, Reiscümhur Hazretleri tarafından mihmandarlıklarına tayin buyurulan Birinci Ordu Müfettişi Birinci Ferik Fahrettin ve Üçüncü Ordu Müfettişi Birinci Ferik Ali Sait Paşalar Hazretleri; Dokuzuncu Kolordu Kumandanı Ferik Abdurrahman Nafiz Paşa, Bayazıt Valisi İmadettin Bey, Bayazıt Mevki Kumandanı Liva Kemal Paşa, Hariciye Vakâleti Üçüncü Daire Şefi Kemal, Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Mehmet Ali, Emniyet Müdürü Kâmil, Riyaseticümhur Yaverlerinden Yüzbaşı Cevdet ve Protokol Dairesinden Orta Elçilik

Müsteşarı Şefkati Nuri Beyler tarafından istikbal edileceklerdir. İran Büyük Elçisi Sadık Han Sadık Hazretleri Şah Hazretlerini istikbal etmek üzere Makû'ya azimet edecektir.

Şah Hazretleri hududu teşriflerinde 21 top atımı ile ve bir ihtiram kıtası tarafından selâmlanacaklar ve kıtaya refakat eden bando İran ve Türk marşlarını çalacaktır. İstikbalde bulunan zevat Fahrettin Paşa tarafından Şah Hazretlerine takdim edilecektir. Hududun münasip bir mahalline kurulacak olan çadırlarda bir müddet istirahat buyurduktan sonra Şah Hazretleri ve erkânı maiyetleri Bayazıt müteveccihen hareket edeceklerdir.

Gürcübulaktan Trabzona, Bayazıt - Iğdır - Kağızman - Kars - Horasan - Erzurum - Bayburt - Gümüşhane tarikile beş merhalede muvasalat olunacaktır; şöyle ki: birinci merhale Gürcübulak - Iğdır ikinci merhale Iğdır - Kars; üçüncü merhale Kars - Erzurum; dördüncü merhale Erzurum - Gümüşhane; beşinci merhale Gümüşhane - Trabzon olacaktır.

Şah Hazretleri yürüyüşün ilk gününe tesadüf eden 10 haziran öğle yemeğini Bayazıt'ta, akşam yemeğini Iğdır'da; 11 haziran öğle yemeğini Kağızman'da, akşam yemeğini Kars'ta; 12 haziran öğle yemeğini Horasanda, akşam yemeğini Erzurum'da; 13 haziran öğle yemeğini Bayburt'ta, akşam yemeğini Gümüşhane'de; 14 haziran öğle yemeğini Trabzon'da ve akşam yemeğini Yavuz'da tenavül buyuracaklardır.

Trabzon'da Şah Hazretleri, Hariciye Vekili Dr. Tefik Rüştü ve Riyaseticümhur Umumî Kâtibi Beyefendiler tarafından istikbal edilecekler ve öğle yemeğini müteakip saat 15,30 da Yavuz zırhlı kruvazörüne rakip olacaklardır. Kruvazör saat 16 da Samsuna müteveccihen Trabzon limanından hareket ve 15 haziran sabahı saat 8 de Samsuna muvasalat eyliyecektir.

Şah Hazretleri, Gürcübulak-Trabzon güzergâhında, hudutta yapılan merasimden maada, karada, Erzurum'da ve Kars'ta 21 atım top merasim atışı ile ve Bayazıt'ta, Iğdır'da, Kağızman'da, Kars'ta, Erzurum'da, Bayburt'ta, Trabzon ve Samsun'da azimet ve müfarekatlarında ihtiram kıtaları tarafından selâmlanacaklardır. Kolordu Kumandanları ve Valiler Müşarünileyh Hazretlerini mıntaka ve Vilâyet hududundan istikbal ve kendilerine muntakaları ve Vilâyetleri hududunun müntehasına kadar refakat edeceklerdir. Şah Hazretleri, misafir edilecekleri Vilâyet ve Kaza merkezlerinde Vilâyet, Kaza ve Cümhuriyet Halk Fırkası erkânı ve memurın tarafından istikbal ve teşyi olunacaklardır.

— II —

Trabzon - Samsun - Ankara

Şah Hazretleri Trabzon'dan Samsuna azimet etmek üzere Yavuz Zırhlı kruvazörüne rakip olacaklardır. Yavuz Zafer sisteminde iki torpido muhribi refakat edecektir.

Hariciye Vekili Doktor Tevfik Rüştü Beyefendile Riyaseticümhur Umumî Kâtibi Beyefendi Şah Hazretlerini Trabzon'da istikbal edecekler ve kendileriyle birlikte Yavuz rakip olacaklardır. Vekil Beyefendiye Filo kumandanı da refakat edecektir. Şah Hazretleri Yavuz Zırhlı kruvazörünü teşrif buyururken sefaini harbiye tarafından 21 pare selâm topu endahtı suretile selâmlanacaklardır. Bu merasim esnasında harp gemilerinin mürettebatı küpeşteye dizilmek suretile rasimei selâmi ifa edecekierdir. Şah Hazretlerinin kruvazöre rükûplarını müteakip kruvazörün grandî direğine Zatı Şehinşahiye mahsus sancak çekilecek ve geminin muzıkası evvelâ İnan marşını ve müteakiben İstiklâl marşını çalacaktır.

Şah Hazretleri Trabzon'a azimet ve limandan müfarekatleri esnasında bir askerî kıta tarafından selâmlana-

caklardır. Liman kumandanı da dahil olmak üzere istikbalde hazır bulunan zevat teşyide de hazır bulunacaklardır.

Mecidiye kruvazörü ile Tinas Tepe sisteminde iki muhrip Samsun liman methalinden üç mil mesafede Şah Hazretlerinin rakip buldukları Yavuz Zırhlı kruvazörünün vüruduna intizar edecekler ve kruvazör önlerinden geçerken 21 pare top atmak suretile rasime selâmı ifa edeceklerdir. Samsun Valisi, Jandarma, Merkez ve Liman Kumandanları, Emniyet Müdürü, Cümhuriyet Halk Fırkası Erkânı, Cemiyeti Belediye azası kruvazöre çıkarak Şah Hazretlerine beyanı hoşamediyi ifa edeceklerdir.

Şah Hazretleri karaya çıkmak üzere motöre rakip oldukları zaman Yavuzun bandosu tarafından İran marşı çalınacak ve sefaini harbiye tarafından top endahtı suretile selâmlanacaktır. Şah Hazretlerinin karaya çıkacağı mahalde resmi selâmı ifa etmek üzere bir askerî kıta bulunacaktır. Şah Hazretleri ve maiyetleri doğruca istasyona geçeceklerdir.

İstasyonda Şah Hazretleri rukûplarına tahsis edilmiş bulunan hususî katara rakip olacaklardır. Şehinşah Hazretleri istasyonda, Devlet Demiryolları Umum Müdürü tarafından istikbal edilecektir. İstikbalde hazır bulunan zevat teşyide de hazır bulunacak ve askerî ihtiram merasimi ifa kılınacaktır.

İşbu güzergâh üzerinde Kolordu Kumandanları ve Valiler kemafissabık Şah Hazretlerini mıntaka ve Vilâyetleri hududundan istikbal edeceklerdir.

### — III —

#### Ankara'ya muvaselat

#### 16 Haziran Cumartesi :

İstasyon dahilinde, ihtiram merasimini ifa edecek kıtaatı askerîye ile bir bando muzika ahzi mevki edecektir.

Şah Hazretlerinin istikbal merasimine iştirak buyuracak ve evvelce Protokol Dairesi tarafından davetiyeleri irsal kılınacak Erkânı Hükûmet saat 12,45 de istasyonu teşrif buyuracaklar ve Protokol memurları tarafından istikbal edilerek davetiyelere lefedilen krokide tesbit edilen yerlere isal buyurulacaklardır. İstikbal merasimine iştirak buyuracak Erkânı Hükûmet berveçhi atidir:

Reisicümhur Hazretlerinin sağ taraflarında Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi Paşa Hazretleri, Başvekil Paşa Hazretleri, İcra Vekilleri Heyeti Azaları, Büyük Millet Meclisi Reis Vekilleri, Cümhuriyet Halk Fırkası Umumî Kâtibi Beyefendiler; sol taraflarında Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisi Paşa Hazretleri, Âli Askerî Şûra Azaları, Büyük Erkânıharbiye İkinci Reisi, Askerî Temyiz Mahkemesi Birinci ve İkinci Reisleri, Milli Müdafaa Vekâleti Umum Müsteşarı ve Kara, Hava ve Deniz Müsteşarları, Umum Jandarma Kumandanı, Ankara Mevki Kumandanı ve Askerî Protokol Şefi ahzi mevki edeceklerdir. Reisicümhur Hazretlerinin arkalarında Baş Yaverleri, Hususî Kâlem Müdürleri, Muhafız Alay Kumandanı, Yaverleri bulunacaktır.

Selâm resmini ifa edecek olan kıtaatın sol tarafında, İran Sefareti erkânî ve sıra ile Temyiz Mahkemesi Reisi, Şurayı Devlet Reisi, Divanı Muhasebat Reisi, Başvekâlet Müsteşarı, Hariciye Vekâleti Umumî Kâtibi, ve Vekâlet sırasile Vekâlet Müsteşarları ve Emniyet Umum Müdürü Beyefendiler ahzi mevki edeceklerdir.

Trenin vürudundan beş dakika evvel Reisicümhur Hazretleri maiyetlerinde Baş Yaverleri, Hususî Kalem Müdürleri, Muhafız Alayı Kumandanı, Yaverleri bulunduğu halde istasyonu teşrif buyuracaklardır. Reisicümhur Hazretleri istasyonu teşriflerinde kıtaat tarafından selâmlanacaklar ve müzika istiklâl marşını çalacaktır. Reisicümhur Hazretleri Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi Paşa Hazretleriyle Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisi Paşa Hazretlerinin aralarında

ve ileride bulunacaklardır İstasyon meydanı suvari kıtaatı ile ihata edilecektir. İstasyonun mahrecinde Ankara Vali ve Belediye Reisi, Belediye Cemiyetinden müntehap bir heyet Reiscümhur Hazretleriyle misafirlerin teşriflerine intizar edeceklerdir. Meydanın ortasına darülfunun talebesile Ankara Kız ve Erkek Liseleri talebesi dizilecektir.

Şah Hazretlerinin ikametgâhlarına kadar olan yolun iki tarafına asker dizilecektir. Ahali askerinin gerisinde bulunacaktır.

Şah Hazretlerini hamil olan tren tam saat 13,05 de gayet yavaş olarak istasyona girecek ve Şah Hazretlerinin buldukları salonlu vagon, Reiscümhur Hazretlerinin intizar buyurmakta oldukları noktada tevakkuf edecektir.

Şah Hazretleri Reiscümhur Hazretleriyle müsafaha ettikten sonra imayeleri erkânını Reiscümhur Hazretlerine takdim buyuracaktır. Müteakiben Reiscümhur Hazretleri refakatlarında bulunan zevatı Şah Hazretlerine takdim buyuracaklardır.

Bu esnada muayyen mevkiden se'âm topu atılacaktır. Rasime-i takdimin hitamında ve muzıkanın evvelâ İran sonra İstiklâl marşlarını çalması esnasında Şah Hazretleri, Reiscümhur Hazretleriyle ilerleyerek resmi selâmı ifa eden kıtaatın ve istikbale gelen diğer zevatın önünden geçerek istasyondan çıkacaklardır. Her iki Devlet Reisini, Şah Hazretlerinin maiyetlerinde bulunan zevat, Dr. Tefik Rüştü Beyefendi, İran Sefiri Sadık Han Sadık, Tahran Büyük Elçisi Hüsrev Beyefendi, mihamdar Paşalar, Riyaseticümhur Umumî Kâtibi Baş Yaver, Hususî Kalem Müdürü Beyefendiler ve Yaver Beyler takip edeceklerdir.

Bu müddet zarfında Erkânı Hükümet yerlerinde kalacaklardır. İstasyon haricinde Şah Hazretleri Ankara Vali ve Belediye Reisi, Muavinleri, Merkez Kumandanı, Emniyet Müdürü ve Belediye Cemiyetinden müntehap zevat tarafından istikbal edilecekler ve Vali ve Belediye



Reisi tarafından kısa bir nutuk irat edilerek beyanı hoşamedî olunacaktır.

Müteakiben mahalli mahsusunda intizarda bulunan otomobiller sıra ile ilerliyeceklerdir. Reiscümhur Hazretleri sağlarında Şah Hazretleri olduğu halde otomobile bineceklerdir. Her iki Devlet Reisinin rükûplarına mahsus otomobilin ön tarafının sağ cihetine Şah Hazretlerinin ve sol cihetine Reiscümhur Hazretlerinin filâmaları talik olunacaktır. En önde atlı olarak Merkez Kumandanı bulunmak üzere her iki Devlet Reisinin rakip buldukları otomobilin ön, yan ve arkasında mizraklı süvari müfrezeleri bulunacaktır.

Diğer Erkân ise matbu listelerde irae edildiği üzere kendilerine tahsis edilen otomobillere bineceklerdir.

Reiscümhur Hazretleri Şah Hazretlerini ikametkâhı şehinşahiye tahsis edilen Halk Evine isal buyuracaklardır. Her iki Devlet Reisinin Halk Evini teşriflerinde, Evin önünde cephe almış olan bir ihtiram kıtası tarafından selâmlanacaklar ve bu ihtiram kıtasına refakat eden bando tarafından evvelâ İran marşı ve müteakiben İstiklâl marşı çalınacaktır. Şah Hazretleri otomobilden iner inmez Dairenin üzerine Şah Hazretlerinin zati sancakları çekilecektir.

Reiscümhur Hazretleri, misafirlerini Dairelerine isal buyurduktan sonra köşklarine avdet buyuracaklardır.

Şah Hazretleri bir müddet istirahat buyurduktan sonra saat 15.30 da Reiscümhur Hazretlerini köşklarine azimetle iadei ziyaret buyuracaklardır. Şah Hazretlerinin refakatlarında maiyetleri erkânı, İran Sefiri Sadık Han Sadık ve Mihmandarları bulunacaktır. Şah Hazretleriyle refakatlarında bulunan zevatın rakip buldukları otomobillerin önünde, yanında ve arkasında mizraklı süvari müfrezeleri bulunacaktır. Şah Hazretleri saat 15,45 de Reiscümhur Hazretlerinin köşklarine muvasalat buyura-

caklar ve teşriflerinde köşkün methaline dizilmiş bulunan ihtiram kıtası tarafından selâmlanacaklardır. Şah Hazretlerinin otomobilleri muntazır kıta tarafından müşahede edilir edilmez, kıtaya refakat eden muzıka İran marşını çalacaktır.

Şah Hazretleri, Protokol Şefi, Muhafız Alayı Kumandanı ve Yaverler tarafından otomobilden indirilecek ve Başvekil Paşa Hazretleri, Hariciye Vekili ve Tahran Büyük Elçisi Beyfendiler ve maiyetleri erkânile intizar etmekte olan Reiscümhur Hazretlerine mülâki olacaklardır. Şah Hazretleri bir müddet Reiscümhur Hazretleri ile görüştükten sonra diğer bir salonda bekliyen maiyet erkânı da Reiscümhur Hazretlerinin buldukları salona isal olunarak Reiscümhur Hazretlerine takdim olunacaklardır.

Müteakıben, Şah Hazretleri Dairelerini teşrif buyurmak üzere Reiscümhur Hazretlerinin nezdlerinden müfarekat buyuracaklardır. Teşyi merasimi istikbal merasiminin aynı olacaktır.

Saat 18,15 de Şah Hazretleri ikametgâhlarında Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi ile Başvekil ve Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisi Paşalar Hazeratını, Vekil Beyfendilerin ve Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Umumî Kâtibi Beyfendinin ziyaretlerini kabul buyuracaklardır.

Saat 20,45 de Reiscümhur Hazretleri tarafından köşklerinde Şah Hazretlerinin şereflerine bir ziyafet ita kılınacaktır. Bu ziyafete Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi, Başvekil ve Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisi Paşalar Hazeratı, İcra Vekilleri Heyeti Azası, Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Umumî Kâtibi, Askerî ve Mülkî Hükümet Erkânı hazır bulunacaktır. Bu vesile ile Reiscümhur Hazretleri tarafından bir nutuk irat buyurulacak ve işbu nutka Şah Hazretleri tarafından mukabele olunacaktır.

## İkinci gün

### 17 Haziran Pazar :

Saat 11 de Şah Hazretleri ikametgâhlarında ecnebi Misyon Şellerini toplu bir halde kabul buyuracaklardır. Süfera büyük üniforma, üniforması olmıyanlar frak giyecek ve nişan takılacaktır. Büyük Elçiler, Elçiler ve Maslâhatgüzarlar kıdem sırasile bir yarım daire teşkil edeceklerdir. Şah Hazretleri refakatlarında İran Sefiri Sadık Han bulunduğu halde maiyetleri erkânile birlikte merasim salonunu taşrif buyuracaklardır. İran Sefiri Sadık Han Sedık Süferayı sıra ile ve birer birer Şah Hazretlerine takdim edecektir.

Saat 13,30 da Şah Hazretlerine Başvekil Hazretleri tarafından köşklerinde hususî bir öğle yemeği verilecektir. Şah Hazretlerinin azimet ve avdetlerinde askerî merasim yapılmıyacaktır. Yalnız otomobillere kemafissabık mizraklı suvari müfrezeleri refakat edecektir.

Yemeği müteakip saat 16 da Reiscümhur Hazretleri Şah Hazretleriyle birlikte geçit resmini temaşa buyurmak üzere koşu mahalline taşrif buyuracaklardır, Otomobile bermutat suvari müfrezeleri refakat edecektir. Koşu mahallinin methalinde intizar eden ihtiram kıtası tarafından rasimeî selâm ifa olunacak ve muzıka İran ve İstiklâl marşlarını çalacaktır.

Reiscümhur Hazretleriyle Şah Hazretleri, refakatlarında Büyük Erkânıharbiye Reisi Paşa Hazretleri bulunduğu halde geçit resmine iştirak edecek olan kıtaatı teftiş buyuracaklar ve müteakıben Şah Hazretlerini hususî tribünlerine isal buyurarak geçit resminin başlamasını emir buyuracaklardır. Geçit resmine askerî kıtaat ve Gazi ve İsmet Paşa Enstitüleri talebeleri, Musikî Muallim Mekk-

tebi talebesi, Ankara Kız ve Erkek liseleri talebesi ve bunlara ait izciler iştirak edecektir.

Geçit resmine medu bulunan zevat Kordiplomatik Azası da dahil bulunmak üzere saat 15,45 de kendilerine tahsis edilen tribünleri işgal etmiş bulunacaklardır. Geçit resminin hitamında Şah Hazretleri Reiscümhur Hazretleriyle otomobillere rakip olarak ikametgâhlarını teşrif buyuracaklardır. Reiscümhur Hazretleri bir müddet Şah Hazretleriyle mülâki olacaklar ve köşklerine avdet buyuracaklardır.

Saat 20,45 de Hariciye Vekili Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Beyefendi tarafından Şah Hazretleri şerefine Ankara Palas Otelinde bir ziyafet ita edilecektir. Bu ziyafete ecnebi Süfera refikalarile birlikte medu bulunacaklardır. Ziyafeti saat 22,15 de başlayacak olan bir kabul resmi takip edecektir.

### Üçüncü gün

#### 18 Haziran Pazartesi :

Saat 11 de Ankara Vali ve Belediye Reisile Cemiyeti Belediye tarafından müntehap bir Heyet Şah Hazretlerini ziyaretle arzı tazimat edeceklerdir.

Saat 13,30 da Şah Hazretlerine Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi Paşa Hazretleri tarafından hususî bir öğle yemeği ita buyurulacaktır. Şah Hazretlerinin azimet ve avdetlerinde askerî merasim yapılmıyacaktır. Yalnız otomobillere mutat veçhile mizraklı süvari müfrezelele refakat edecektir.

Saat 17 de Büyük Ekrkâmharbiye Reisi Paşa Hazretleri tarafından Şah Hazretlerinin şereflerine Ordu Evinde bir çay ziyafeti ita edilecektir. Bu çaya Erkân ve Ümerayı Askeriye medu bulunacaklardır. Şah Hazretlerinin Ordu Evini teşriflerinde bir ihtiram kıtası tarafından selâmlanacaklar ve muzıka İran marşını çalacaktır.

Saat 20,45 de Haşmetlü Reza Şah Pehlevî Hazretleri tarafından Reiscümhur Hazretlerinin şerefine İran Sefarethanesinde bir ziyafet ita buyurulacaktır. Bu ziyafeti saat 22,15 de başlayan bir kabul resmi takip edecektir.

## Dördüncü gün

### 19 Haziran Salı:

Şah Hazretleri tensip buyuracakları saatte Gazi Enstitüsünü, İsmet Paşa Enstitüsünü, Muzika Muallim Mektebi, Etnoğrafya Müzesini, Ziraat Enstitüsünü ve şehrin sihhat Müesseselerini gezecekler ve kabul buyurmak arzusunda buldukları zevatı kabul buyuracaklar ve öğle yemeğini hususî olarak tenevvül buyuracaklardır.

Saat 16 da Şah Hazretleri Halk Evinde şerefilerine ita edecek konseri dinliyecekler ve « Öz soy » atlı piyesi temaşa buyuracaklardır.

Şah Hazretleri, akşam hususî trenlerine rakiben saat 20,30 da İstanbula müteveccihen Ankara'dan müfarekat buyuracaklar ve istikballeri veçhile teşyi olunacaklardır. Şah Hazretleri ve maiyetleri Erkânı akşam yemeğini trende yiyeceklerdir.

### İstanbula Muvasalat

### 20 Haziran Çarşamba :

Hususî tren saat 10,50 de Haydarpaşaya muvasalat edecektir. Şah Hazretleri istasyonda İstanbul Vali ve Belediye Reis Muavinleri, Merkez Kumandanı, Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Reisi, Jandarma Kumandanı, Belediye Cemiyeti Azası tarafından istikbal edilecektir. Bir ihtiram kıtası rasimeî ihtiramı ifa edecek ve muzika İran marşını çalacaktır.

Şah Hazretleri maiyetlerinden arzu buyuracakları zevat ile birlikte Söyütlü yatına rakip olacaklar ve diğer zevatta Ankara ve Çankaya motörlerine rakip olarak hareket edilecektir. Söyütlü yatı ile diğer motörler doğruca

Dolma Bahçe rıhtımına yanaşacaklardır. Rıhtımda Sarayın muhafazasına mahsus bölük ile bir Polis müfrezesi rasime ihtiramı ifa edecek ve Şah Hazretleri rıhtımda İstanbul Polis Müdürü ve Saraylar Müdürü tarafından istikbal olunacaktır. İstikbalde bulunup da Söyütlü ile Saraya Şah Hazretleriyle beraber gelen zevat Müşarünileyh Hazretlerini dairelerine isal edecekler ve avdet edeceklerdir.

Şah Hazretleri İstanbul'da ikamet buyuracakları müddet zarfında Asarı Atika Müzesini, Topkapı Müzesini, Askeri Müzeyi, Evkaf Müzesini, Camileri, Askeri Mektepleri ve Üniversiteyi gezecekler ve Marmarada ve Boğaziçinde bir tenezzüh icra buyuracaklardır. Şah Hazretlerinin şereflerine Dolma Bahçe Sarayında bir kabul resmi yapılacaktır.

Şah Hazretlerinin rakip oldukları Söyütlü Yatının Dolma Bahçeye muvasalatında Dolma Bahçe açıklarında demirli bulunan harp gemilerinin önünden geçerken bunlar tarafından topla selâmlanacaktır.

İstanbul Valisi ve 3 üncü Kolordu Kumandanı Şah Hazretlerini Vilâyet ve mıntakaları hududundan istikbal edeceklerdir.

APPENDIX-D

ÖZSOY LEGEND, WHICH WAS COMPOSED AS AN OPERA FOR THE  
HONOUR OF REZA SHAH



Iran Şehinşahi

Alâhazreti Şimayun

Reza Şah Zehlevi Şajresterinin

Ankara Halkovinde verilecek

Öz Soy

Destanı

Yazan:

Münir Hayri

Bestelleyen:

Ahmet Adnan

İlk baskı:

19 Haziran 1934



*Iran Şehinşahi*  
*Ala Hazreti Hümayun*  
*Reza Şah Pehlevi Hazretlerinin*  
*Şereflerine*

*Ankara Halkewinde Temsil Edilecek*

*Oz Soy*

*Destanı*


*Yazan:*

*Münir Hayri*

*Basıleyen:*

*Ahmet Adnan*

*19. Haziran. 1934*



Dedeler Seyrediyor.

## ÖZ SOY

Destan  
3 Perde 12 Tablo.

Yazan ve Sahneye koyan : Besteleyen ve Okesiza şifli:  
Münir Hayri Ahmet Adnan

Okesiza, İstanbul Konservatuarı şifli sazlar heyetiyle  
Riyaseti Cankur Bando Heyeti

Dans ve koroğrafli: Selma ve Arade Selim Sirci

Sahne : Dekor ve kostümler :  
Hami Mahmut - Galip

Koro idaresi: Muallim Halil Bedi, Mehina Adnan.

Koro : Ankara Kız lisesi  
Kız ortanmektebi  
Bedon Terbiyesi Enstitüsü lalabesi

Kondukl : Şevket  
Sünlör : Kaver Necip



bir de mitoloji birlikti vardır. Bur bir soyan iki kardeş bo-  
yunun milli mitolojisi o kadar bir birinin esidir ki bunları  
ayrı eden yalnız isimlerin, göbhesiz, lehçelere göre deyiş-  
mesinden başka bir şey deyhdir.

Bu *Kozmogonik* mitolojiye göre yer yüzünde insanlar  
ihtedikten bir müddet sonra dünyada karanlıkla ışığın  
çarpışması başlamıştır. Karanlıkla aydınlığın bu ezeli  
döğüşü bu en eski din insanından bütün milletlerin dinine  
geçmiş ve kalmıştır. Nihayet bir gün gelmiş ki karanlık  
ve kühnikler insanlığı eline almış ona hüküm elmeye  
başlamıştır. Bu, Firdavsinin ölmöz eseri Şehname'de  
" *Dabak* " olarak anlatılmıştır. Bu zalimin karanlığı  
usurlarca silmiş nihayet bir demirci, Türk versiyonunda  
" *Baz karı* " İran versiyonunda " *Cüce* " ortaya çıkmış  
bu karanlığı devirmiştir.

Yeniden ışığın kavuşma insanlar başlarına bir *Boş*  
seymişler: " *Feridun* "

İşte Münir Hayri lejandın bu güzel noktasını eserine  
mevzu olarak almış ve on dokuzuncu sayıdaki Alman milli  
tiyatrosunun yaratıcılarının kullandığı leknöğe müracaat  
edererek *Feridun* hikayesini *Zendavesta*, *Şehname* ve  
Efrasyap destanlarıyla Hıd ve Üygür mitolojilerindeki en  
uygun parçalarla bağlayarak *Öz Soya* meydana getirmiştir.

Asıl lejanda göre *Feridun*un üç oğlu olmuş ve bunlar-  
dan *Zer* bütün Asyaya hakim olarak İranlılara cet  
olmuş, *Frog* İranda kalmış ve İranlılara ata olmuş *Serri*  
de Avrupa'ya giderek Avrupa *Art* lerine baba olmuştur.

Münir Hayri bu lejandın bur ile iray'ın doğumuna ait  
olan kısmını almış ve onu genişletmiştir. Bunda da efsa-  
neyi bırakarak doğrudan doğruya tarihle girmiş ve bu  
lejandın tamamıyla ilim alemince tasvir edildi *Praksis-*  
*Fal* soy nazariyesine olan saygıyı hayret bezeyişine da-  
yanarak mevzuunu tarihle nakletmiştir.

**Mevzu:**

*Öz Soya* un muayyen yerlerinde musikisti ile bir *Opera*  
teknikğine giren mevzuu şöyle hulaşa edilebilir.

## Birinci Perde

İlk tabloda bir *Ozan*, destana başlar. Ve kendini ta-  
nıtır.

Ey beal dinlesemiz, ey karşındaki erler  
Tanırsanız beni ?.. baaa " *Öz Ozan* " derler.  
Besim sesim haykırır, fakat sesim ağlamaz  
Gönlüm doğruya duyar, boğa umut bağlamaz.  
Ben ne puta tutmuşum, neşe yara vurmuşum,  
Ne bir sevgi bilirdim, ne didara vurmuşum.  
Ne kasıma imantı, ne bir ebs acırtım.  
Ne bir sevgili tanırt, ne de bir yarı acırtım.  
Nihinde dedaunma yalnız hakka hakarım.  
Doğruya anlattım, gönüllere aharım.  
Gönül acık oluklar beni ellet severler,  
Tanırsanız beni ?.. baaa *Öz Ozan* derler.

Ve kendisinin diğer destan mahurritlerinden ayrı  
dışındığını anlatarak diyor ki :

Tarih diyor ki bise, Medeniyet irmağı  
Bıraksöhal soyda bulas ozla kaynağı  
Bu soy ağzından gelmiş bir yama yayıldı  
Bu tarih, yaksedilmiş başlangıca sayıldı  
Avrupa, Anadolu, İran ve orta yayla  
Medeniyete gördü bekta bu büyük soyula  
Zaman dururuna sakin zamanı durur zamanı,  
Duran diğer, herden gayrihale insanı.

Nihayet dinleyicilerini kırk bin yıl eskiye götürüyor ve  
bu sırada ikinci tablo gözümüzün önünde beliriyor. İkinci  
tabloda kendimizi en eski Saman dininin bir mihrebinin  
önünde bir *Kronik* de buluyoruz. Türk dilinin bil-  
nen en eski duasını burada bulduğuk di ille ve 80 kişilik  
bir *Koro* ağzından dinliyoruz. Ve anlayamaz ki yurdun  
dileği yerine gelmiş ve Ulu Hıkan *Feridun*un bir yavrusu  
dünyaya gelmek üzere.

Dört yama, doğuma, latına, gda ortasına ve kara  
Yurdun beşleri. Bu mevsim gecenin Ulu Hakan Feridunun  
Çağırması büyük verdimiz ve buraya toptadınız.

Ve işte Feridun da geliyor.

Derin göklerden akan yüce yavuz kartallar.  
Sizi serdiğiniz bey ile yitmiş selamlar.  
Aydınca karnı pillecek gibi harpa  
Kandemizde siz en varılmaz en yalın  
Kayalet yikarak nar şen beyleriniz  
Üstünüz yüse olsun. Yurdunuz hog geldiniz

Kıro cevap verir :

Yasa yaga Feridun son hasretinde var ol.  
Sana mutlu dilekler gelirdi bu günkü kıl

Ve Feridun :

Sizce şen hasretir. Karanlar siki baklar.  
İki pesdelli günde nar gullerle beşer.  
Hog kollar göge kalkın yere kapının diler.  
Herimle bir oldunuz dua ettiniz sizler  
( Hatun anne oluyor. Siz mutlu beyleriniz  
( Dördünüz yüce olsun. Yurdunuz hog geldiniz

İyeyecanlı bekleme artık biliyor. Feridunna babu olduğu  
mühüresi geliyor.

Ve nihayet Hatun da iki güruhla Yavrusuile sahneye  
geliyor. Ve :

Yurda armozun olma hakının bu cille kurt  
Sevel bir gda güdres kara gda bu güzel yurt  
İhtî arslan biri kurt olarık saldirtınlar.  
Yerüstünden köşüğe köküne halimimlar.

Kedine annelik vatan severlikliir bog diyor.

Bunu Feridunun şu güzel cevabı karşılıyor.

Kadın anne olunca fakihin durtu uzar.  
Yarlar göge yalınlar. Karlar gözleri vular.  
Bugün sevin Bahadır bayırtmak feliyortun.

Ve koro :

Sokun senindir halim, senindir ayta güneş  
Bu İhtî hasunla sen sayılırın göge eş

Yedi felek gökten yere iniyor. Ve hediyelerini sunu-  
yorlar :

Bu çocuklar, ve onların öz soyn dalma dnyanın en  
gürbüz soyn olucak ve bütün insanlığın iyiliği onlardan  
doğacak.

Bu iki çocuk hiç ölmeyecekler ve dalma yagayacak-  
lar. İhtiyarlayacaklar fakat ne vakti mülkelerinde yeni  
bir nur başlarsa yeniden gençleşeceklerdir.

Bu dilekler üzerine büyük şenlik başlıyor, kirtina  
ve gökden düşen yıldırımlar arasında bu şenlik dağılıyor.  
Öz gözün görmüyor ve hatun iki yavrusuyla kendisini  
karanlık perisi *Abirinan* ile karşı karşıya buluyor.

*Abirinan* kendisinin bu şenliğe çağrılmamasından  
muğberdir. Yeni doğan iki çocuğa bir şey yapamayacak-  
tır. Fakat onların hayatına el ele vermeslerine mani olmi-  
ya çalışacaktır. Bu iki çocuk lâyetmülmür. Fakat soyları  
arvasında dalma meçhul kalmaya mahkûmdurlar.

Lâkin annenin feriyadı gökte aksini bulacaktır.

Hatun kalime salın. Annelik selaset deri  
Buz cıvresı onun gerdandras bile sarı  
Annemin seni gök kubbede cevap bulur  
Annemin alışıldığı ne ise öyle olur  
(Ve bakın bir ses duyular)

Hatun cevap olma salın. *Abirinanın* alışıldığı ancak üç delâ yerini  
bulabilir. Senin yavrusunun bir dörtüncü defa el ele vertilerse bir gda  
Akrcının geliyacak yor yadı nur dolacak..





### Üçüncü Perde

Lozan Muahhede-i imzalanmıştır . Herkes sen fakat *Ayyım* gamlıdır . Çünkü babası Köse ağayı köyü bu sefer istememektedir .

Köse ağa evini kiralamıştır . Burada kiracıya da iniyoruz : Tur gençleşmiş harbe girmiş dönüştü buraya gelerek bu evi kiralamıştır . Bedbin olan Köse ağaya gidüp kızını okutmasını tavsiye etmektedir .

Köse ağa ile *Ayyım* gülmeye Mehmet gelir . Mehmet *Ayyım*'i unutmamıştır .

Onun affını aramak ister . *Taz* Mehmede Avrupa'ya gidüp labetli emosini tavsiye eder .

En güzel iutkım düşmanın üstüne gükunmaktadır . İşlerini düzeten *Taz* pak şendir . Şimdi ahırman o erar ve ahırman da gelir .

*Taz*'a henüz mühdelenin bilmediğini menleketle zafır kazanılmış ise de onun daha kuvvelleri olduğunu haber verir .

#### *Tablo değişir .*

İkinci perdedeki kasabanın on yıl sonraki halı . Fakirliklerin önünde canlı şarklarını söyleyen işçiler .

Almanada tar inel  
Bir umutmuş sevinel  
Haykelleri ytrekten  
Bak gün doğdu smekten  
Haydi yâri arkadaş  
Bu saavş yaman sarvâş  
İçti eil, güc eil  
Doğurur buñ solı  
Çalışkan ydrenklerden  
Gün doğur daha erken  
Haydi yârî arkadaş  
Bu saavş yaman sarvâş .

Bugün kasabada on yıl abidesi açılacaktır . Herkes onun şenliği ile meşguldür .

*Ayyım* kasabana uyanışında bir anlı olmuştur . Köse ağa da memleketle mülki olmaya çalışıyor . Fakat derdi *Ayyım*'in evlenmemesidir . Bunun da tur halededir . Hakikaten Mehmet köye 10 yıl abidesinin yapıcısı olarak dönerek *Ayyım* ile onu affedecektir . Bu sadetli günde tur ikisini birleştirecektir . *Ayyım*'in Mehmedine kavuşurmuş Gazı tekrim edilir . Fakat turun kendi derdi ne olacaktır .

Tur kendi kardeşini aramaya çıkar . *Ahırman*'in son ve şiddetli bir mücadele başlar fakat tur artık galiptir . *Taz* nihayet İrâç'ın bulur ve gökten inen bütün edatı bu günü kutular .

#### Öz soyan Musikisi :

Öz söy birinci ve dördüncü perdesinde çok kesif musikisi ile bir nevi *Operett*'dir . Bunun bestelenmesi işi *Ahmet Akhvan* beye havale edilmiştir .

İstanbul konservatuarı yayınsızlar hey'eti ile Riyaset-i Cümhuriyet Bandusundan mürekkep Orkestrayı Bestekar idare edecektir .

Öz soy temiz türk dilinin gury musikisine uymasının ilk fakat şüphesiz ki güzel bir örneğidir . Birinci perdede 19 uncu asır Alman musikisini andıran azameli temlerin yendi, ikinci ve üçüncü perdede halk musikimizin temlerine armonize edilmiş güzel işçileri alınmaktadır .

#### Eserin sahneye konusu ve temalı :

Ankara Halkevi gençleri bu kadar mürekkep bir musiki eserini ilk defa sahneye koymaktadırlar . Fakat buna işçi-



rak eden deęerli gençlerimizin her birisi bu sahada uzun  
hazretlik devreleri geirmişlerdir. En mühim rollerini *ula*  
*ame* muallim Nimet Yahit hanım efendi teğanni edecektir.  
Nimet Yahit hanım *Mevah* de musiki tahsil etmiştir. *Feridun*  
rolü muallim Murullah Şevket bey tarafından yapılma-  
caktır. Murullah Şevket bey Berlin ve Milano konservalu-  
varlarında leganni tahsilini bitirmiş deęerli bir gençtir.  
*Koro* idaresini bilhassa Prag da bu işi laheli emmiş olan  
muallim Halil Bedi bey arkadaşımız üzerine almıştır.

#### Eserin sahne takniğı :

Öz soy ile Ankara Halkevi sahnesi süryanle dekor  
değiştirilmek ve porojekte dekorla inşa edilmiş dekorları  
aynı zamanda kullanmak suretille yeni bir adını almıştır.

Bu kısımlara kendi kalebeleri seçme ile Süleyman  
refakat edecektir.

Eserde ki koro parçalarının kadın seslerini Ankara  
kız lisesinden Naciye Hanımın kız ortamektebinde Me-  
dha Adnan ve erkek seslerini de Üzal terbiye enstitüsü  
erkek kalebeleri hazırlamışlardır.

İlk defa olarak Öz soy da sahada 50 metre murabbu  
bir yer kullanılmaktadır. Elektrik ve sahne tertibatını  
Haani bey idare edecektir. Dekor ve kostümler muharri-  
rin porjelelerine nazaren Mahmut ve Galip beyler tara-  
fından yapılmıştır.

Öz soy ile Ankara Halkevi sahnesi bir yaşam daha  
bütünlüğünü gösterecektir. Yeni başladığını bu yolda da  
ünütü dolu yarımlara doğru koşacaktır.

ÖZ SOY

Temsiline ait

H A T İ R A L A R



Öz Soyu Yazan Münir Hayri



Öz Soyu Bastaleyen Ahmet Adnan






Öz Soyun Temsil ve Hazırlığına Elverenlerden Bir Grup



Feridun Rolünde Nurullah Şevket





Ulu Anne Rotunda Nispeti Vanki



Ahmed Paşa Rotunda Süleyman



Ayşim Rolünde Sanirha



Yalvarırım Sana

Perde 1 Tablo 3

