

**THE EUROPEAN UNION FACTOR IN THE UNITED STATES -TURKEY
RELATIONS:1995-1999**

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
THE MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2003

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ABSTRACT**THE EUROPEAN UNION FACTOR IN THE UNITED STATES-TURKEY
RELATIONS: 1995-1999****Çankaya, Mine**

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September 2003, 188 pages

This study seeks to analyze the imperatives underlying the United States policy of supporting Turkey's full membership to the European Union from 1995 to 1999. It is basically composed of four parts. The first part discusses the US security policy in the regions surrounding Turkey following the demise of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the US security policies towards Russia, the Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Central Asia and the Caucasus are examined. The second part is devoted to the examination of American-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era. The third part deals with the role of the EU in Turkish domestic politics in the post- Cold War era. The last chapter serves as the essence of the study. It aims to focus on the implications of Turkey's relations with the EU for the US security policy. Within this framework the

domestic changes in Turkish politics especially the rise of Islam and nationalism in the mid 90s and their implications for the US security policy are explained. Second, Turkey's role in the emerging European security framework and its implications for the US security policy are scrutinized. Having elaborated these factors, this study concludes with a brief analysis of the basic points of the study.

Keywords: The US security policy, American-Turkish relations, Turkey-EU relations.

ÖZ

ABD-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİNDE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ FAKTÖRÜ: 1995-1999

Çankaya, Mine

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Dr. Fulya Kip Barnard

Eylül 2003, 188 sayfa

Bu çalışma, 1995-1999 döneminde, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin Türkiye' nin Avrupa Birliği' ne tam üye olmasını destekleme politikasının altında yatan nedenleri analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Başlıca, dört bölümden oluşmuştur. İlk bölüm ABD'nin Sovyetler Birliği' nin yıkılmasından sonra Türkiye' yi çevreleyen bölgelerdeki güvenlik politikasını açıklamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu bağlamda, ABD'nin Rusya, Avrupa, Balkanlar, Ortadoğu ve Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya politikaları üzerinde durulmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Amerika ve Türkiye ilişkilerini incelemektedir. Üçüncü bölüm, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası dönemde AB' nin Türk iç politikasındaki rolüyle ilgilidir. Son bölüm ise, çalışmanın özünü oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölüm, Türkiye' nin AB ile olan ilişkilerinin ABD güvenlik politikalarına yansımalarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, 1990lerin ortalarında Türk iç politikasında meydana gelen değişiklikler özellikle de İslam ve ulusçuluk

faktörlerinin yükseliş ve bunların ABD güvenlik politikası açısından doğurduğu sonuçlar verilmektedir. İkinci olarak ise, Türkiye' nin oluşmakta olan Avrupa güvenlik yapısı içindeki yeri ve bunun ABD güvenlik politikası açısından önemi incelenmektedir. Bu faktörlerin incelenmesinden sonra, çalışma ilgili temel noktaların özetlenmesi ile sona ermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD güvenlik politikası, ABD-Türkiye ilişkileri, Türkiye-AB ilişkileri.

To my dearest mother,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank those who aided me in this study. First, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Dr. Fulya Kip Barnard who has never denied me of her support and invaluable insights throughout this work.

I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı for letting me use the necessary resources related with my study from his personal library.

I must also mention my friend, Alper Doğan, for his valuable support, love and motivation especially during the research stage of the study.

My thanks also go to Lieut. Colonel, Nejat Derviş, who is the director of my branch in Turkish Air Force. Doubtlessly, without his respect and tolerance about my working hours, it would be very harder to finalize the study. Furthermore, I owe very much to Sergeant Major, Ferhat Fırtın for his help and patience to my never-ending questions about the technical details of the study.

I owe the most to my mother, Ayşe Çankaya. Her deepest love, encouragement and understanding were the main imperatives leading me to persist the challenges during the study and to do my best.

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: 05.09.2003

Signature:

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BUR	Bottom Up Review
CDI	Cooperation Defense Initiative
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DLP	Democratic Left Party
DTP	Democratic Turkey Party
EC	The European Community
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	The European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GNP	Gross National Product
IFOR	Implementation Force
KDP	Kurdish Democrats Party
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KYB	Kurdish Patriots Union
MP	Motherland Party
MTW	Major Theater War

NAFTA	North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NAP	Nationalist Action Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
RPP	Republican People' s Party
SFOR	Stability Force
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TPP	True Path Party
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
US	The United States of America
WEU	Western European Union
WP	Welfare Party
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning Cold War years, the United States (US) has been a vigorous supporter of Turkey's integration with the Western institutions. The US support was influential in Turkey's membership to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community (EC). Even before Turkey's application to the EC, the US urged Turkey's establishing an association with the EC.¹ Turkey now is a member of the Western political and security mechanisms such as NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe. However, Turkey still could not become a full member to the EU and reserves its status of an associate member going back to 1963. In 1999, Turkey was recognized as a candidate for full membership to the EU but Turkey's eventual full membership to the European Union (EU) seems to take a long time. In the post-Cold War era, the US continued its policy of supporting Turkey's integration with the Western institutions and lobbied for Turkey's accession to the EU in the official and non-official circles.

During the Cold War, the US policy for Turkey's integration with the Western institutions was based on the strategic concerns. Turkey's strategic location to contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Europe necessitated Turkey's inclusion in the Western bloc of countries. The US held the

view that Turkey's membership to the non-security institutions such as the EC would facilitate the settlement of Western values of democracy and free market economy. This in turn would strengthen the Western bloc against the Communist values. So, the US policy for Turkey's inclusion in the EC was a complementary part of the global US security policy. In this respect, the US was not doubtful about Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy orientation or Turkey's possible search of new alternatives. Turkey's established Western-oriented foreign policy and the weak position against the USSR on its eastern borders were the riding factors for Turkey's membership to NATO and thus the Western bloc. The EC also welcomed Turkey's application for an association with the Community in 1963 due to the strategic importance of Turkey. Within this context, it could be argued that the strategic imperatives of the Cold War era seemed to harmonize the US and the European approaches for Turkey's integration with the Western institutions and this balance in some way could continue till the end of the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era, this harmony between the Europe and the US both about Turkey and global security policies seems to be disrupted. The US and the European countries diverge on different matters such as the rogue states, trade policies, missile defense system and the emerging European security framework. In the academic literature, it is highly possible to note the works called as "transatlantic strains", "allies divided", "the divergence of transatlantic policies", "continental adrift" and "fraying ties" about the transatlantic alliance. The same is true for the US and the EU policy about Turkey. Contrary to the expectations, Turkey's strategic location again constitutes the riding element in the US-Turkish relations and it is possible to speak about a strategical partnership between the US and Turkey. This partnership encompasses the regions surrounding Turkey namely the Middle East,

the Balkans, the Europe and the Central Asia and the Caucasus especially the Caspian region. On the other hand, the EU evaluates Turkey in political terms and has a reluctant attitude for Turkey's full membership to the EU. Turkey's democratic deficits, human rights record, Cyprus question, and Kurdish question are regarded by the EU as the leading factors blocking Turkey's accession to the EU. Within this framework, the US policy for Turkey's integration with the Western institutions remained persistent due to the continuation of Turkey's strategic importance for the US. This policy is reflected in 1998 National Security Strategy of the US as:

...Turkey's relationship with Europe has serious consequences for regional stability and the evolution of the European political and security structures. A democratic, secular, stable and Western-oriented Turkey has supported the U.S efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, NIS and the Middle East as well as to contain Iran and Iraq. Its continued ties to the West and its support for our overall strategic objectives in one of the world's most critical regions is critical. We continue to support Turkey's active constructive role within NATO and the Europe.²

As it could be understood from the US security strategy, Turkey became a critical actor for the US security policies in more than one region. Turkey now has a multiregional role for the US security policy. This study seeks to analyze the imperatives for the US policy of supporting Turkey's full membership to the EU in the post-Cold War era. The period from 1995 to 1999 constitutes the main focus of the study. The study seeks to examine the EU factor in the US-Turkish relations from the US perspective and in the framework of the US security policy. The period covered by the study is significant because Turkey experienced the most problematic relations with the EU in this period. Turkey and the EU lived the most significant ups and downs in their relations but Turkey was announced as a candidate for the full membership to the EU in Helsinki European Council of 1999. In the meantime,

Turkey also suffered from domestic instability leading to the rise of new factors in Turkish politics such as political Islam and nationalism. The rise of political Islam tended to divert Turkish relations with the Muslim world while increasing nationalism paved the way for Turkey's more assertive policies such as S-300 missile crisis in 1997 and Syrian crisis in 1998. The rise of nationalism is reflected in 1999 elections and nationalist Democratic Left Party (DLP) and Nationalist Action Party (NAP) came into power. These developments were partly related with increasing anti-Western sentiments in Turkey especially the relations with the EU. So, the role of the EU as a reference for reforms to increase the stability in Turkey and to serve as an anchor for Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy became critical for the US security policy.

This period witnessed the transformation of the EU and the creation of an undivided Europe through the enlargement of the EU to the ex- Warsaw pact countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). In these years, the US security policy in the regions surrounding Turkey was settled better as a result of the assertive policies of Russia and its implications for the Central Asia and Caucasus, the Bosnia crisis and the worsening situation in the Middle East. Moreover, beginning from 1998 when the Europeanization of the European Defense and Security Identity (ESDI) was initiated, the EU undertook a greater step in the defense and security mechanisms.

The study is composed of four parts. The first three chapters are designed as the explanatory chapters and the last part is the essence of the study. The first three chapters aim to provide a general outlook and information in order have a better understanding of the last part. The first part of the study is devoted to the examination of the US security policy towards the regions surrounding Turkey in the

post-Cold War Era. In this regard, it seeks to find answers to questions such as: What are the basic parameters of the US security policy in general? What elements are transferred from the Cold War security politics of the US to the post Cold War one? To what point does Turkey fit in the US security policy? What security policies does the US follow in Russia, the Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Central Asia and Caucasus?

The second part provides an overview of American –Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, it tries to show the continuous and changing parameters in American-Turkish relations. It will try to find answers for the questions such as: What is Turkey's role in the US security policy? Is Turkey still an important player for the US security policy? How does the US and Turkey act in the regions surrounding Turkey? What are the converging and diverging points of the US and Turkish policies in those regions?

The third part deals with Turkey-EU relations in the post-Cold War era. It especially deals with the role of the EU in Turkey's domestic political and economic structure and foreign policy orientation with special reference to the EU's role in the identity problem of Turkey. In this respect, it will be argued that the EU turned into an actor in pushing political and economic reforms in Turkey due to Turkey's long-lasting dream of becoming a full member to the EU. The institutionalization of the membership criteria with the Copenhagen criteria in 1993 prepared the ground for the increasing influence of the EU on Turkish political and economic structure. At this point, the chapter will deal with the questions such as: What has Turkey done in its political and economic structure in order to adjust herself to the EU criteria: What could the EU bring for Turkey's political and economic structure? Moreover, what are the implications of the EU membership on Turkey's identification of itself? What

are the reflections of the EU enlargement to the CEECs on Turkey's identity? What reflections do the problematic relations between Turkey and the EU create on the country's domestic politics and foreign policy orientation?

The last chapter is focused on the implications of Turkey's full membership to the EU for the US security policy. It tries to establish a connection between the EU's role in Turkish domestic stability and Western-oriented foreign policy. Moreover, the implications of Turkey's relations with the EU in the emerging European security framework and the implications of it for the US security policy are to be dealt with. At this point, following questions will be answered: What is the connection between the domestic instability in Turkey in mid 1990s and the rise of political Islam and nationalism? What role did Turkey's problematic relations with the EU play a role in the rise of these factors? How could the full membership of Turkey to the EU prevent domestic instability in the country and reinforce Western-oriented foreign policy? How did the US interpret the rise of political Islam and its reflections on Turkish politics? What were the consequences of a more nationalist assertive Turkish foreign policy for the US? How could the rise of political Islam and nationalism influence the US security interests towards Turkey?

The second section of the fourth chapter will dwell on Turkey's role in the emerging European security framework and its implications for the US policy towards the transatlantic alliance. The US favors a stronger Europe to deal with the European security affairs and thus the US could confront various security challenges around the globe strongly. In this respect, Turkey could contribute to the military capabilities of the EU and project its power into the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus. At this point, the section deals with what contributions Turkey could bring

to the EU led defense and security mechanisms? In what grounds, could she extend the EU zone of security and power? What are the benefits of an efficient European partner for the US? Could Turkey improve the relations between NATO-EU?

¹ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), p.126.

² *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, White House, Washington D.C, May 1997, p.16. It is important to note that the importance of Turkey's integration with the EU are mentioned in the Strategy Reports of the US from 1996 to 1999.

CHAPTER 2

THE US SECURITY POLICY IN THE REGIONS SURROUNDING TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The end of the Cold War with the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the early 1990s brought important implications for the US foreign and security policy.¹ During the Cold War, America's security strategy was directed at containing the spread of communist influence around the world and addressing the global military threat of the Soviet Union. This strategy relied upon America's maintenance of an extensive alliance system and nuclear arsenal.² Although the resultant new international environment seemed to present a much safer place for the US, the broad range of security threats which eliminated the distinction between hard security and soft security issues, have challenged the US.

In reaction to the demise of the Soviet threat and the emergence of a new security environment, both George Bush and Bill Clinton administrations attempted to redefine the American security interests and reconfigure America's security strategy. While the Bush administration experienced a transition period from Cold War imperatives to the post-Cold War ones, the Clinton administration was composed of the first security policy makers of the post-Cold War era. In other words, the presidency of Clinton starting in 1993 determined the basic parameters of US security policy in the post-Cold War era. During the election campaign of 1992, President Clinton announced that he would not be a foreign policy president rather

focus on domestic issues especially on economics.³ Given the demise of the Soviet threat and the preponderance of the US in political, economic, military and cultural aspects of the new world order, it was expected that the US would return its home and decrease its activism in the world. However, the realities of the post-Cold War necessitated the US involvement in the international affairs and it followed an active foreign and security policy.

The security policy of the US during 1990s was designed in the framework of the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement announced by President Clinton in February 1996. The formation of the strategy goes back to 1993 and was firstly announced in 1995. The strategy developed to meet the broad security threats of the Cold War and was reoriented from a global one to a regional-oriented one in order to address the altered environment. In that end, Turkey's strategic importance for the US policy makers preserved its status of the Cold War era due to the significance of the regions surrounding Turkey in terms of the US security policy. This chapter will attempt to analyze the US security policy, mainly during Clinton administration, in the post-Cold War era in terms of the regions surrounding Turkey. First, it will provide an overview of the US security policy in the post-Cold War era and then it will dwell on the US security policy towards the regions surrounding Turkey namely; Russia, the Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Central Asia and the Caucasus.

2.1 The General Pattern of the US Security Policy in the post- Cold War Era:

The present international system derives its order from contrary trends and episodic patterns; what once seemed transitional is now enduring.⁴ In Haas's terms, in a period of "international deregulation" where new actors and players exist and no new rules help to deal with new concepts, it is hard to define clear-cut principles.⁵

The end of the dominance of ideological competition made the other minor threats more visible and severable and created an “environment of diffused threats.”⁶ The threats once included in the soft security issues like economic and political instability, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, terrorism, expansion of mass destruction weapons, rising fundamentalism or immigration began to dominate the both national policy and the foreign policy of the states.⁷

The strategy developed by the Clinton administration called as the “National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement” served as the premises of the US security policy in this complex security environment. This strategy was later improved with 1997, 1998 and 1999 “National Security Strategy for a New Century.”⁸ The formation of this strategy goes back to the famous speech of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Anthony Lake on September 21, 1993 at John Hopkins University which is called as “From Containment to Enlargement.” In his speech, Lake argued that throughout the Cold War, America contained a global threat to market democracies and now the US should seek to enlarge the reach of these features particularly in places of significance to the US. He mentioned that the engagement of the US throughout the Cold War was animated by calculations of power and by the belief that to the extent democracy and market economy hold sway in other nations, the US would be more secure, prosperous, while the broader world would be more humane and peaceful. So he suggested that the successor to the doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.⁹

The remarks of US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher in 1993 defined the basic interests of the US which would also be repeated in the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy of 1996. He said: “The United States must maintain a tough

mindful sense of our enduring interests; ensuring the security of our nation; the prosperity of our people, and the advancement, where possible, of our democratic values".¹⁰ In order to achieve these interests, Christopher added that the American engagement and leadership in the world- an activist foreign policy is most fundamentally in the US interests.¹¹ Accordingly, Henry Kissinger explained the premises of US engagement into world affairs: "Without our commitment to international security, there can be no stable peace; without our constructive participation in the world economy, there can be no hope for economic progress; without our dedication to human liberty, the prospect of freedom in the world is dim indeed."¹²

The engagement and enlargement strategy announced by President Clinton in 1996 brought the active involvement of the US in the world affairs and enlargement of the free market economies and democracies to provide the security of the US. The strategy is designed to meet three basic goals: to enhance security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad, to bolster economic revitalization and to promote democracy abroad.¹³ Thus, it could be argued that the national security for the US is a broad concept including the economic, political and traditional military interests of the country. In this framework, these three goals are interpreted as mutually supportive in order to enhance the US national security. President Clinton explained the connections between political, economic and the military interests as:

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies are more likely to feel secure and work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development.¹⁴

In the framework of the goals of US security policy, a clear discrimination between the interests of the US was made in 1998 National Security Strategy. According to the strategy, there are three categories of US interests. First, the vital interests which are overriding importance to survival, safety of the US citizens, their economic well being and the protection of critical infrastructures. Second are the important national interests which are not important for the national survival but for national well being. Third are the humanitarian and other interests which the values of the US demand. Some of these are human rights violations, support for democratization attempts and civilian control.¹⁵

The security strategy of the US put forward in the National Security Reports of 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 included five main features. First, the US now has to struggle with the broader range of threats including the traditional military one and non-military ones. During the Cold War, the US was confronted by a global and unidimensional threat in the form of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear and conventional military. However, in order to cope with the changing character of the security; the strategy explicitly involved a broad definition of security threats rather than just military ones. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows have been explained as the security challenges for the US.¹⁶ In addition, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic, religious and nationalist conflicts, the assertive policies of Russia and China, the challenges in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were expressed as the other threats for the US security.¹⁷ The Security Strategies mentioned these as transnational threats and the means to combat them were presented under different headings; some of these threats are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drug

trafficking.¹⁸ As an example for combating the non-traditional military threats, the US administration requested a counter terrorism and cyber-security budget amounting more than \$ 12 billion (twelve billion dollars) for 2000.¹⁹ This was a result of an attack attempt by a Muslim extremist with carload explosives to the US just before Christmas 1999. Within subsequent days, the arrests of co-conspirators were announced in Canada, Vermont and New York.²⁰

Second, a shift from the global defense strategy of the US during the Cold War to a regional one was observed. In this sense, the Gulf War became the landmark for the regional as opposed to global nature of post-Soviet threats to American forces, allies and interests.²¹ The Gulf War proved that there could be regional threats to the vital interests of the US and its allies and constituted a landmark for the definition of the US security strategy.

Just the day after Iraq' s invasion of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, President Bush announced the shift of the US defense strategy from addressing a global Soviet military threat to addressing potential, non-Soviet, regional challenges to the US security interests.²² In doing so, Bush redefined the future role of US' s armed forces by changing the American military from being a war deterring military to a regional conflict force.²³

The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein gave 20% of the world oil reserves into his hand and many observers feared that it could expand the invasion to Saudi Arabia which means that 40% of the world oil reserves would be at his hand.²⁴ The control of 40% of the oil reserves under a totalitarian regime would prevent the flow of oil to the industrialized Western countries which could result in the economic turbulence in terms of production, and posed an obstacle for the free market economy order. The intervention of the US was the continuation of the Carter

Doctrine which stipulated the use of military force when the Gulf region is threatened by any force and which defined the Gulf region an area of “vital interest.”²⁵

The US security is now assessed to be threatened by regional aggressors rather than a global power as during the Cold War.²⁶ The concepts of “rogue” or “failed states” mainly define such regional aggressors as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.²⁷ After the Gulf War, US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney’s Regional Defense Strategy identified the need to actively shape the future international security environment. The aim was to ensure that no region critical to America’s interests could become dominated by a hostile power and to prevent the emergence of a global threat to the United States and its allies.²⁸ In this respect, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) which is the full scale assessment of what defense forces and systems the US needs articulated that the US should maintain sufficient forces to wage two Major Theater Wars, simultaneously and without allies.²⁹ According to BUR, the US should always be ready to fight two conflicts on the scale of the Gulf War at once and without the assistance of any of the nations that had contributed to the coalition against Iraq. The BUR force level is 1.4 million personnel, 10 army divisions, 11 aircraft carrier groups and 3 marine divisions as of 1997.³⁰

In line with this in the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy, the regional contingencies were seen as one of the components of endangering the security of the US. Accordingly, the focus of the planning for major theater conflict was deterring, and if necessary, was defeating aggression by potentially hostile powers such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The overseas presence of the US forces is a part of his deterring and defeating strategy. In the National Security Strategy of 1997, the

threats to the US interests were further clarified and the regional threats or state center threats were seen as one of the three main threats to the US security.³¹

Third, the strategy reiterated the need for higher US military spending in the post-Cold War era. Both Bush and Clinton administrations have experienced intense public and Congressional pressure to reduce the size of the American defense budget to account for America's improved external security situation. However, neither Bush nor Clinton administration reduced the defense budget greatly. In January 1990, Bush explained that "In this world of change, one thing is certain: America must be ready.... This is not a time when we should naively cut the muscle of our defense posture."³² In spite of the end of the Cold War which was based on military balance, President Bush proposed a fiscal year 1993 defense budget of \$ 281 billion (two hundred eighty one billion dollars) a \$ 10 billion (ten billion dollars) reduction from fiscal year 1992.³³ During the Clinton administration, the Congress approved defense budgets of \$ 261 billion (two hundred sixty one billion dollars) in fiscal year 1994 and \$ 263 billion (two hundred sixty three billion dollars) in the fiscal year 1995.³⁴ The latter figure was five times greater than Russia's defense budget, equal to defense spending by the rest of the world combined, and 85% as large as the average defense budget during the Cold War.³⁵ In spite of the fact that the defense spending of the US was reduced to almost one third that of the Cold War, President Clinton proposed a \$ 296 billion defense spending for the fiscal year of 2000 in 1999.³⁶

Fourth, the US leadership was aimed to be continued in order to secure the interests of the country around the world. Repeatedly, the Gulf War was the main reason for the necessity of the US leadership. The Gulf Crisis was also significant in the sense that the US acted on the whole approval of the UN and it led to the

international coalition which reinforced its leadership role for the world order after the weakening of the Soviet Union. The Bush administration succeeded to bring different countries as Egypt, Morocco, the Gulf States and Syria under the international coalition in spite of the problems between these countries. Personally President Bush discouraged Israel from retaliating militarily for the Scud attacks since the involvement of Israel air force would have driven the most Arab states from the coalition.³⁷ All the strategy reports mentioned the necessity of the US leadership, for instance, in the National Security Strategy of 1997, President Clinton mentioned that: “The need for American leadership remained strong as ever.”³⁸ Stressing this, the heading of the section dealing with advancing the US security interests in 1997 Strategy was “Leadership for a more prosperous, safer tomorrow.”³⁹

Fifth, the US seemed to continue its extensive alliance mechanisms of the Cold War era in the post-Cold War era. Given the challenging security environment of the post-Cold War era, the US sought to cooperate with the other nations of the world in order to realize its security interests. In 1997 strategy, strengthening and adopting the security relations the US has with the key nations around the world and creating new relations and structures when necessary were stated as a central thrust of US strategy to ensure its security.⁴⁰ In this framework, NATO enlargement, PFP (Partnership for Peace), NATO –Russia Permanent Joint Council and African Crisis Response Initiative were given as the examples of this strategy.⁴¹

In Engagement and Enlargement Strategy of 1996, the reflections of the security policy of the US have been explained on various cases as follows: To enhance security, the US involved in peace initiatives in the Middle East; established NATO’s Partnership for Peace and initiated a process that will lead to NATO’s expansion; secured the accession of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to the Nuclear

Proliferation Treaty and their agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons from their territory. To bolster prosperity at home and abroad, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed and World Trade Organization (WTO) was established during Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To promote democracy, the US provided aid to new democratic Russia and other new independent states as well as Central and Eastern European nations, assisted Cambodia and attempted to restore the democratically elected government in Haiti. In line with this; the extension of cooperation with the old allies and the attempts for furthering democracy and free market economy in the Central and the Eastern Europe and the Central Asia and the Caucasus were stated. Within this framework, the new models under NATO and Southeastern Stability Pact were stated.⁴²

2.2. The US Security Policy in the Regions around Turkey

2.2. 1 The US and Russia

In the post-Cold War Era, Russia turned out to be an actor which could be taken into consideration on the basis of its nuclear potential and regional policies of the US concerning Central Asia and Caucasus and Europe rather than a global actor or rivalry as in the Cold War era. In this line, as a consequence of the enlargement imperative of its security policy, US attempted to settle free market economy and democracy in Russia through economic and diplomatic means. Furthermore, the US tried to enhance its security through attempts to keep Russia's nuclear power in check and tried to prevent the possible consequences of an assertive Russia with regard to the regional policies.

As an attempt to promote democracy in Russia, the Clinton administration helped Russia to improve the democratic order and free market economy while

conducting good relations with the government. Between 1992 and 1998, the US Administration distributed Russia \$5.45 billion and \$4.48 billion of this was marked for economic reform, denuclearization and humanitarian projects.⁴³ IMF (International Monetary Fund) loaned Russia \$ 15.6 billion while the loans of the World Bank amounted \$ 6 billion. The US government and other Western countries encouraged IMF and the World Bank to grant loans to Russia based on political calculations; the political argument that “Russia is too big to fail” implying that civil war, anarchy or any kind of dictatorship which would counter the Western world with a nuclear threat in case of Russia’s demise was the imperative for these aids.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the US provided technical assistance programs for the design of market supporting initiatives and non- governmental organizations of the US helped the Russian counterparts to draft electoral laws, build party structure, facilitate the emergence of an independent press and develop their advocacy groups.⁴⁵

On the political side, the relations went smooth until mid 1990s; both countries signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) in 1993. The formation of the “near abroad policy” in 1994 where Russia manifested its desire to have influence and dominance on the former territories of the Soviet Union signaled the outbreak of Russia’s assertiveness. When the communist and fascist forces opposing US hegemony with multipolar world order rhetoric and focusing on the supremacy of Russia in the Eurasia won 50 % of the seats Russian Parliament (Duma) at the end of 1995, the US had to redefine its security policy towards Russia.

The enlargement of NATO to the eastern borders of Russia resulted in Russia’s convictions that Russia is being contained by the West.⁴⁶ President Boris Yeltsin warned about a possible world war in order to reflect his opposition to NATO enlargement.⁴⁷ Moreover, Russia was apprehensive about NATO’s intervention in

Kosovo fearing that the same could be realized in its combat with Chechnya.⁴⁸ After NATO intervened to Kosovo, Russian President Yeltsin announced that NATO Partnership Agreement with Russia was terminated and Russia would preserve its all rights including the military measures.⁴⁹ The defeat of Russian military power in the war with Chechnya in 1996 became influential in the radicalization of Russian domestic and foreign politics and the greater role for assertive Russian military. In the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Summit of 1999, President Clinton has called Yeltsin to find a solution and improve dialogue with regard to Chechnya problem. However, President Yeltsin left the meeting as a reaction to this.⁵⁰ This implied that the integration of Russia to the Western world would not be easy and the US needed to take more active measures in order to balance Russian power.

NATO has also been useful for the US to engage Russia; through PFP (Partnership for Peace), the Russian military conducted relations with NATO militaries and also Russia's participation in NATO led IFOR (Implementation Force)/SFOR (Stabilization Force) for Bosnia symbolized that the new European security architecture was designed to include Russia rather than isolate it.⁵¹ As President Clinton noted in May 1997, "the traditional military alliance which was aimed against Russia is now being transformed into a transatlantic security system which includes it."⁵² In 1997 Russia and NATO signed a Founding Act to establish a Permanent Joint Council designed to give Russia's voice but not a veto in NATO decision making.

2.2.2 The US and the Europe

The transatlantic alliance is America's most important global relationship. It is the springboard for U.S global involvement , enabling America to play the decisive role of arbiter in Russia- the world' s central arena of power – and it creates a coalition that is globally dominant in all the key dimensions of power

and influence. America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability the locomotive of world's economy, and the nexus of global intellectual capital as well as technological innovation. Just as important, they are both home to the world's most successful democracies.⁵³

As suggested by Brzezinski, Europe is at the heart of US security strategy in terms of the geostrategic location of the continent and interdependent economic and political relations as well as the institutional security provided by NATO. Europe is the main geopolitical bridgehead of the US in Euroasia and the Atlantic alliance penetrates the US political influence and the military power in the mainland of Euroasia.⁵⁴ As of the post-Cold War era, a certain drift exists between the US and the European relations over a variety of issues such as rogue states, trade problem, and the newly emerging European security framework and missile defense system.⁵⁵ In terms of the security relations within the transatlantic alliance, the demise of the Soviet Union and the deepening integration of the EU with the enlargement of the EU to the Eastern and Central Europe resulted in significant differences in the US and the European security perceptions. As it will be focused in Chapter 5 in a detailed way, different security perceptions between the US and the European countries are reflected about their policies toward Iran, Iraq or Cuba and most importantly for the concern of this thesis, in the different approaches of the US and the EU about Turkey.

However, the transatlantic alliance seems remain as a cornerstone of US foreign and security policy. One of the biggest trade partners of the US is Europe (the other is Asia-Pacific countries); in 1990 the US exported goods worth \$76 billion (seventy-six billion dollars) to the EU, while by 1999 this figure increased to \$ 400 billion (four hundred billion dollars).⁵⁶ The Western alliance's symbol NATO remained as the most efficient political and military organization in the post-Cold War era. Both the US and Europe are the defenders of the expansion of free market economy and

democratic values. In the changing international system, the US reinforced its position of being a “European power”⁵⁷ and manifested that Europe still remained central to the interests of the US. President Clinton explained this as: “Nowhere are our interests more engaged than in Europe. When Europe is at peace, our security is strengthened. When Europe prospers, so does America.”⁵⁸ Within this framework, the EU and the US signed Transatlantic Declaration stipulating the improvement of political and economic relations between the parties in 1995.

Despite the Europe’s mainland is not under of a direct threat by a hostile power, various security challenges endanger the European security. Conflicts in the Balkans, long-standing Turkish-Greek tensions, a wide range of potential trouble spots along the Mediterranean, possibility of northward migration, the proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction could change the peaceful European security environment⁵⁹. In all the National Security Strategy Reports from 1995 to 1999 to secure and foster an undivided Europe were given as the leading objectives of the US and the stability of Europe was regarded as the vital interest of American security policy. In this framework, there are two basic strategic goals of the US. First, to contribute to the building of a Europe that is democratic, prosperous and at peace, shortly integrated. Second, to work with allies and partners to meet future challenges to collective interests that no nation can confront alone.⁶⁰ Accordingly, the US since the Cold War, has encouraged the integration attempts in the Europe. The US support both for the extension of NATO and the EU is based on the fact that the larger Europe becomes, the less likely it is that neither external nor internal threats could challenge international peace.⁶¹

In this framework, it is important to note that the main threat to the European security is the instability in the European periphery and in some cases beyond

Europe's borders.⁶² An attack to the mainland of Europe as the possible Soviet one in the Cold War era is not a question anymore. NATO stands as the political and military actor for the stability in the eastern periphery as in Bosnia and Kosovo while the EU is an actor for the stability in terms of its political and economic character. Since "the task of extending stability to Europe's eastern periphery is as much, if not more, a political and economic task as a military one", the Europe's role has become more important.⁶³

In this respect, the US wishes Russia, Ukraine and the other Central and Eastern European countries to evolve peacefully into democratic economies and become prosperously integrated to world economy. The means that the US could realize these aims is NATO, which is the anchor of American engagement in Europe and linchpin of transatlantic security.⁶⁴ The development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 stipulated the conduct of regular exchange of views between NATO and the old Warsaw Pact countries. In 1994, PFP which was an American initiative turned the mechanisms of dialogue with the old Warsaw Pact countries to the instructional level.⁶⁵ Through PFP, NATO allies and partners are brought together in a number of joint defense security related issues and activities; apart from the defense work crisis management, civil emergency planning and air traffic management are the notable works of the programme.⁶⁶ The Programme was significant in the sense that in spite of the fact that it was an alternative to the NATO membership it became an "ante room" and in some cases a "conveyor belt" leading into membership.⁶⁷ These activities widened the geographical scope of the activities and the influence of NATO opening a way to it to integrate the whole Europe under its security and political umbrella.

The alliance enlarged in 1999 with the admission of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary and announced its openness to new members with the establishment of a Membership action Plan in 1999. The most significant side of the enlargement of NATO and the prospect of the enlargement for the desiring countries has been the fact that both reinforced the creation of a stable and democratic European order. The criteria set for the admission in NATO include peaceful relations with neighboring countries and renunciation of use of force in settling of disputes, the observance of ethnic minority rights, commitment to a democratic political system, civilian control over the armed forces and real military contribution to the alliance with the country's means.⁶⁸ These preconditions imply the transformation of NATO from a defense organization to a political actor in the domestic and foreign policies of the countries. For example, Romanian-Hungarian and Ukrainian-Romanian treaties on their border disputes were related with the countries' desire to be a NATO member and internally NATO incentives helped to put place in Poland civil military relations for democracy. Ukraine was also given a partnership agreement with NATO through a joint Charter and Commission.

Apart from NATO framework, the integration of the EU in defense and security matters has been supported by the US. The EU incorporated the common foreign and security policy in its structure as the third pillar of the EU integration by Maastricht Treaty of 1992. These attempts went further and EU through WEU (Western European Union) agreed to undertake the so called Petersberg missions in 1992. These missions included peacekeeping and humanitarian ones. So, the new European security structure is mainly characterized by dealing soft security issues or crisis management. Later, in January 1994, NATO welcomed ESDI as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and allowing the European

members of NATO to make a coherent contribution to the security of the Allies. In this process, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces was developed. This meant that the WEU could make use of NATO assets. The basic feature of these military capabilities was being separable which meant they are either used by NATO or the WEU but not separate from NATO framework. NATO, at Berlin Summit of 1996 approved that ESDI should be built within NATO.

The EU tended to gradually develop a distinct, EU-led capacity for actions independent of NATO and Europeanize the new European security and defense mechanisms beginning from 1998. The St- Malo meeting between France and England in 1998 signaled their intention to improve defense capabilities within the EU itself rather than WEU.⁶⁹ This was resulted from the ineffectiveness of the WEU and European powers in Kosovo crisis. The Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997 envisaged the incorporation of the WEU into the EU. During 1999, the EU appointed the former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to the newly –created post of High Representative of the European Council for CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). The appointment of such a high profile figure as Javier Solana was widely interpreted as the EU’ s seriousness in developing a capacity to act in the defense and security sphere.

At the Washington Summit of NATO in 1999, NATO reaffirmed its support for the building of ESDI. In December 1999, the European Council adopted a number of measures to advance European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and stated its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to the international crises.⁷⁰ In accordance with these decisions, a Rapid Reaction Force composed of 60,000 personnel would be established till the end of

2003. The lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo were the leading factors in the development of ESDP. During the Bosnia crisis, it was observed that there may be crises in Europe in which the US does not want to intervene. So, a great convergence between the European powers especially between France and Britain greatly emerged about developing the European military and political capability to deal at least with minimal management of the crises in their periphery.

The Kosovo crisis was a turning point clearly demonstrating the reliance of the EU on the US military capabilities and the deep gap between the US and the EU. 80% of the air strikes were made by US jets and 90% of the military intelligence was carried out through US satellites. The European powers had difficulties even sending 2% of their troops.⁷¹ The European forces lack the means to undertake modern military operations: airlift, sealift, satellite, intelligence, precision-guided munitions and all –weather and night-strike capabilities.⁷² Furthermore this gap does not seem to be narrowed given the limited defense budget of the European countries. US. For instance, the EU countries spend 60% of the US defense spending and the US pays \$59,000 (fifty-nine thousand dollars) per soldier while the EU pays \$ 20,000 (twenty thousand dollars).⁷³ On the other hand, the EU's acquisition and materiel expenditure, at less than US \$36 billion (thirty six billion dollars) remains just around 40% level of US\$ 82 billion (eighty two billion dollars) including equipment plus research, development, test and evaluation.⁷⁴

The US policy towards the ESDP was characterized as a “yes, but policy.”⁷⁵ This policy meant that the US supports the development of the ESDP provided that this will not undermine the primacy of NATO and the decision-making role of the US. The EU's effort in improving its defense capabilities is in America's interests since the US needs a strong partner in meeting the security challenges of 21st

century.⁷⁶ Washington argues that the improvement of the ESDI will be a “win a win” proposition for the members of the EU and for the Allies. The structure will bring more capabilities for NATO operations, a more effective EU ability to manage crises where NATO is not engaged and a more balanced partnership between North America, inside and outside of Europe.⁷⁷

The US policy towards the European move was troubled by St-Malo meeting in 1998. Indeed, the basic tenets of the US policy towards the European attempts were raised during George Bush administration. The Bush administration was certainly sympathetic to the need for stronger European contributions to the Alliance but the main priority for President Bush and his top officials was ensuring the continuity of the international leadership of the US, including the leadership in NATO. In the Administration’s diplomatic initiative of February 21, 1991, it was mentioned that the transatlantic partnership within a more confident and united Europe was welcomed but it warned that the efforts to construct a European pillar should not redefine and delimit NATO’s role, not weaken its structure or a create a bloc of certain members.⁷⁸ Moreover, US Ambassador to NATO, William Taft IV, in his speeches delivered in February and March of 1991 suggested the concerns of the US about the European defense initiative. He cautioned that the European pillar should not relax the central transatlantic bond, should not duplicate current cooperation in the Europe and should not leave out the countries that are not members of the EU.⁷⁹ These three concerns entailed the essence of the three ds of US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright in 1998.

The Clinton administration was more supportive towards European led security mechanisms. However, Washington again persisted to focus on the supremacy of NATO in the European security architecture and clearly supported the attempts of

the EU. The first version of Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994 to 1999 stated that : "While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European – only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the Alliance's integrated command structure."⁸⁰ On the other hand, US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot insisted that "There should be no confusion about America's position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against it; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious, we are for it."⁸¹

The concerns of the US were reflected just days after St- Malo meeting of 1998. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained the concerns of the US in the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 8, 1998, which are based on the arguments of the Bush Administration. She stated that:

... The US welcomes a more capable European partner, with modern, flexible military forces capable of putting fires in Europe's own backyard and working with us through the alliance to defend our common interests. The key to a successful initiative is to focus on practical military capabilities .Any initiative must avoid preempting Alliance decision-making by decoupling ESDI from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members.⁸²

At this point, decoupling seems the most challenging issue for the US. The US fears damaging of the primacy of NATO thus the leadership position of the US, in the words of US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen making NATO "relics of the past."⁸³ The US holds the view that there should not be a European Caucus with NATO; all the issues should be discussed on a transatlantic basis.⁸⁴ Through this way the decisiveness and the flexibility of NATO could be preserved. ESDP and the demands of its institutional creations could encourage we/they distinctions between Europeans and the US and even among European members of NATO.⁸⁵ The EU could create its own forces' standing distinguishing from American or NATO

positions. The second concern emphasizes that the EU could duplicate the NATO resources and should not spend its limited defense resources on forces or infrastructure that already exist. June 1996 Berlin Agreement stipulated that the future European led military operations could be given access to NATO assets to avoid spending limited defense sources of capabilities. However, the European decision to create autonomous military capabilities suggests that the European countries could transfer limited defense expenditures to the development of military capabilities of the EU. The third concern of possible discrimination to non-EU European allies arises from the fact the states contributing to the European defense significantly find themselves excluded from EU activities. Such discrimination would alienate Turkey and other non- EU NATO states leading to tensions and dissent within NATO.

2.2.3 The US and the Balkans

The outbreak of the ethnic and national conflicts after the disintegration of Yugoslavia shifted the US security strategy from the mainland of Europe to the periphery, the Southeastern Europe. In fact, the crises in the Balkans were of an indirect threat to the US not threatening it directly but were similar to the “rotten apple theory” of US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson or the “domino theory.” The possible spillover effects of the crises throughout the Europe were the main imperatives of the US intervention in the region.⁸⁶ The region has been the area where the US has mostly engaged after the Gulf in the post-Cold War Era.⁸⁷ Four features could explain the American engagement in the region. First, the Balkans is a strategic link to the destinations of greater importance such as the Gulf, Caspian region and the Mediterranean. Second, the area contains the potential features for the outbreak of conflicts and centers of conflict (Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia) which

could threaten the newly emerging European security architecture. Third, the involvement of the US in the region would prevent the influence of any other power like Russia or Germany. Last, the Balkans, similar to the Gulf, has been a test case for the containment and effectiveness of NATO as well as the leadership of the US in the new world order.⁸⁸

After the outburst of armed conflicts in Slovenia in June 1991, Washington believed that this was a local conflict to be solved by the Europeans. President Bush clearly stated that Yugoslavia was not a strategic interest for the US.⁸⁹ Instead of calling armed intervention, the Bush administration endorsed a UN-sponsored embargo on its arms shipments to warring factions. Clinton, during his election campaign criticized Bush's inactivity and urged for more activism. Instead, he offered a lift and strike policy in his election campaign of 1992.⁹⁰ Under this proposal, the US would press the UN to lift the embargo, allowing the Bosnian Muslims to obtain weapons and level the military playing field. The US and NATO allies would conduct air strikes to destroy the Serbian heavy weapons and possibly could attack neighboring Serbia to prevent it from supplying more weapons. However, the US avoided the deployment of ground troops and acting militarily till mid 1995. When the war in Bosnia turned into the murder of thousands of people and the UN and the EU were observed to be as inefficient, the US had to intervene actively. With the initiative of the US, a Bosnian-Croat federation was established in 1994 in Washington. At the end, NATO conducted air strikes and Dayton Peace Agreement was signed between the Serbians, Croats and Bosnian Muslims with the mediation of Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Richard Holbrooke.⁹¹ The US deployed 20.000 forces under NATO led IFOR in order to implement the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁹² The force completed its

mission in June 1997 and was turned into SFOR and the number of the American troops was reduced to 8.000.⁹³

In 1998, Kosovo crisis again necessitated the US engagement in the region.⁹⁴ The passive resistance of Kosovo Liberation Army for more than 10 years turned into an armed conflict between Albanians and Yugoslavian forces. The US offered the Rambouillet plan which stipulated the deployment of NATO forces in the region and the voting of for Kosovo's independence after 3 years. However, when this plan was rejected by Yugoslavia, the US and NATO conducted air strikes to Yugoslavia. As a result, Yugoslavia accepted the US plan and an international force KFOR (Kosovo Force) was deployed in Kosovo.

The engagement of the US under NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo and the ending of the conflicts were coupled with the initiatives of the US which could be included in the enlargement part of the US strategy. In line with this, President Clinton remarked that: "Europe's security, when it was threatened, as it was in Bosnia and Kosovo, we too, will respond. When it is being built we too always take part."⁹⁵ The US launched the South European Cooperation Initiative in order to gather the countries of the region and solve economic, regional and mutual problems leading to peace and stability in the region. Contributing to this plan, in February 1998, Clinton has announced his Action Plan for the Southeast Europe. This plan aimed to streamline the cooperation of the US with those countries of the Southeast Europe where the democratization process has moved. The aims presented by Clinton are consolidating of reforms, development of regional cooperating, assistance in integration in European and transatlantic instructions, strengthening the peace and stability around Dayton countries.⁹⁶ After Kosovo military action, Southeastern Stability Pact between the US, the European Union and the Southeastern European

Countries was signed with the urging of the US. The Pact was significant for the transatlantic partnership that it brought a new framework of cooperation in the improvement of democracy and human rights, reconstruction and economic prosperity and security apart from NATO or OSCE.

2.2.4 The US and the Middle East

The Middle East is a vital region in terms of the US security interests. The interests of the US in the Middle East are: “the survival of Israel and the completion of the Middle East peace process, access to oil, forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promoting peace and reforms and through it, the internal stability and holding terrorism in check.”⁹⁷ Since the Middle East was a major centre of non -communist radical doctrines, an arena where states felt more free to intervene in each other’s affairs and where the level of legitimacy for the regional order and individual states was less established, it has become an important area of rogue states for the US which are seen as big challenges to the US interests.⁹⁸ Iran and Iraq were included in the category of rogue states together with North Korea, Cuba and Libya which have been described by President Clinton as the major challenge to the post-Cold War order that pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe.⁹⁹

The dual containment policy firstly announced by US Senior Director for the Near East and South Asian Affairs, Martin Indyk on May 19, 1993 constituted the most important part of US security policy in the Middle East. He explained that the US gave up its traditional policy of balancing one country to another as was done during Iran and Iraq War since it resulted in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. He claimed Iran and Iraq as the hostile powers to the American interests in the region.¹⁰⁰ The policy mainly aimed to weaken the both countries in terms of political, economic and

military power; President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake has argued that as the sole superpower, the US has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and through selection of methods of pressure, perhaps eventually transform the backlash states into the constructive members of the international community.¹⁰¹ As for Iraq, the policy insisted on the continuation of the implementation of economic sanctions till the collapse of Saddam regime, the announcement of the UN that the weapons of mass destruction have been eliminated and the end of violence of the Iraq government to its people. Additionally, Washington aimed to support the opposition forces in Iraq against Saddam regime. For Iran, the US insisted on the prevention of the sale of the materials used in the production of weapons of mass destruction and the sale of these weapons rather than the totally isolation of Iran.

However, the policy did not totally bring the expected results and was subject to criticism especially in the second term of the Clinton administration. For Iraq, the country was contained but the policy failed to topple Saddam and as for Iran, the US did not get the international support from its allies in the transatlantic coalition.¹⁰² Additionally, the countries like Turkey and some Arab states reacted to the economic sanctions against Iraq since their economies were harmed. After the electoral victory of the reformists in Iran in May 1997 and Mohammed Khatami coming into power as the President, the US softened its approach to Iran and the relations improved. In late 2000, the Clinton administration changed the concept of rogue states to states of concern especially for North Korea and Iran to deal with these countries in a softer way.

Despite these changes, Iran and Iraq remain as the main concerns for the US for its policy in the region which was very clear with the proposal of Cooperative

Defense Initiative (CDI) in April 2000 by US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen. The CDI is a regional warning system designed to counter the missile attacks from Iraq and Iran and supports the increasing military presence of the US in the region. After the Gulf War, the US established military bases in Saudi Arabia, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Katar and has more than 25,000 personnel and 260 plane ships in the Gulf. It is also significant that the 80% of the arms sales to the countries in the region is made by the US.¹⁰³ So, it may be argued that the US serves as the guarantor of the security in the Persian Gulf apart from the small roles of Kuwait and Saudi Arabistan.

As a constant dimension of the US foreign policy in the Middle East, the US is committed to the cooperation with Israel and finding a solution in the Middle East peace process. September 1995 Oslo II Summit, October 1998 Wye River meetings and Camp David initiative in July 2000 built on the January 2000 Shepardstown meetings are the examples of the Clinton Administration's activism about the issue. Also, it is notable that US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher has made more than 30 visits to Damascus to urge Syria to negotiate with Israel.¹⁰⁴ The US also backed the cooperation between Israel and Turkey to increase the security of Israel and to force Syria to negotiate in the peace process; this cooperation could enhance the influence of US in the region. The US participated in the joint military training between Israel and Turkey carried out in 1998 in accordance with the agreements about cooperation in defense industry signed between Turkey and Israel in 1996.¹⁰⁵

2.2.5 The US and the Central Asia and Caucasus

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the emergence of new Republics in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. The US security policy towards this region is based on the strategic location of the region and its large oil and natural gas

potential. In 2015, the amount of the oil needed daily all over the world is estimated as 103 million barrels and the reserves in this region could meet the needs of Asian states for 18 years and the European states for 30-33 years.¹⁰⁶ Considering the dependency of the world especially the industrialized countries for the oil and new energy resources, the control of the lines from which these reserves will be distributed turned a center of competition for the important actors of the international system.

The US foreign policy in this area developed within two stages and its security policy was mainly clarified during the second stage. The first stage covered the period from the beginning of 1990s to 1994-1995. Initially, Washington was not keen on asserting its influence in the region, acknowledging it as Russian sphere of influence. As a part of its policy to promote democracy and free market economies all around the world, the US supported the transition to democracy and the development of free market economy in these countries through economic and political means. For instance, the US initiated various training programs in order to help the transition to democracy in Kazakhstan. These programs included training for political parties and voters, election arrangements, public administration, legal reforms, human rights, tolerance and plurality, foreign policy, independent media, diplomacy, university management and English courses.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, Washington extended Kazakhstan and Kirgizistan \$ 23 Million (twenty-three million dollars) and planned to grant \$ 10.5 Million (ten and half million dollars) for the restructuring of the economies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1995.¹⁰⁸ In this period, the US was concerned about the nuclear potential of Kazakhstan and nuclear energy production in the region. To enhance its security, the US made attempts in order to

provide the elimination of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan was eliminated from nuclear weapons by START II and Lisbon Protocol.

The ethnic conflicts in the Central Asia and Caucasus are also a concern for the US policy makers. In this respect, the Caucasus presents a source of greater turmoil than the Central Asia and this is critical for the US security policy given the large energy resources in the Caspian basin. These conflicts resulted in the fragmentation of the states of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia in the North Caucasus. Mini-independent states have emerged such as Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Armenian-Azeri conflict has the most important source of instability in the region. This conflict undermines the political and the economic development of the countries and facilitates the intervention of extra regional actors by lending support to either party altering the balance of power.¹⁰⁹ The political instability in the region serves for Russia's interests; Russia by supporting the centrifugal forces in the region could have more influence on the countries in the region. As an instance, Georgia had to accept Russian military bases in its country due to Russia's role in the regional conflicts.

After the assertive policies of Russia during Chechnya War, the US policy-makers understood that the conventional military capabilities of Russia could create substantial amounts of trouble but not a serious offensive military challenge.¹¹⁰ Thus, it not a coincidence that the US policy in the Caspian became increasingly assertive from the second half of 1996. Accordingly, the US has announced that it considers Caucasus and the Caspian region as a region of vital interest.¹¹¹ The energy security policy of the US is related with the energy need for the world economy and its policy enlarging free market democracies.

In December 1998, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State, US Ambassador Richard Morningstar for Caspian basin diplomacy defined the US energy policy in the region at four points: strengthening the independence and prosperity of the new Caspian states and encouraging political and economic reform, mitigating regional conflicts by building economic linkages between the new states in the region, enhancing commercial opportunities for the US and other companies, bolstering the energy security of the US and its allies and the energy independence of the Caspian region by ensuring the free flow of oil and gas to the world marketplace.¹¹² Such a policy requires the distribution of energy reserves without the control of Russia; consequently the US supports the Baku- Ceyhan pipeline and trans- Hazar natural gas line. On October 29, 1998, Presidents of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together with the President of Turkey endorsed Ankara Declaration supporting Baku- Ceyhan route with US Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson.

The revenues from these lines of energy will lead to the improvement of the economy of the countries in the region strengthening them politically thus freeing them from the Russian control.¹¹³ These positive conditions also would open the way through the solution of regional conflicts and result in the stability of the region which is in the interests of the US .In this line, the US desires to involve with NATO or the countries in the region in the peacekeeping operations to be conducted during the regional conflicts.¹¹⁴ Contributing to these policies, the US opted to prevent the expansion of fundamentalism; in this respect contained Iran under the dual containment policy and served attempts for the distribution of the energy reserves from Iran. To give an example, the US has tried to challenge the distribution of the Turkmen natural gas over Iran. In this respect, as it will be explained in Chapter 3,

the US tries to form a balance against Russia or Iran' s influence through supporting the Bakü- Ceyhan pipeline which would provide Turkey great leverage in the political and economic relations with the countries in the region.

2.3 Conclusion

Despite the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the US as a global power did not retreat from world politics and shaped its security policy in accordance with the requirements of the emerging international system. The security policy of the US is designed on the US activism and the enlargement of free market democracies. Being aware of the fact that today's security threats require more than the military imperatives; the US based its security policy on politics, economics and military. The security strategy of the US reserved the traditional components of its security policy as the leadership, huge numbers of military expenditure, extensive alliance systems such as NATO and close transatlantic relations.

Significantly, the US security policy is designed in accordance with the regional problems, which increased Turkey's importance for the US strategic interests. In the analysis, it has been observed that among the regions surrounding Turkey, the Europe and the Middle East are still the vital regions for the US economic, political and military interests. On the other hand, the Central Asia and the Caucasus own a great deal of significance for the US energy and nuclear security as well as its strategic location. The Balkans is important for the US since it has the potential to destabilize the Europe and the passage to the Middle East. Last, Russia is still a critical country in terms of its conventional and nuclear military capabilities and hegemonic policies in the Central Asia and Caucasus.

In all of the regions, the US both prevented the spread of severe crises such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo or the Gulf. On the other hand, it tried to settle down

free market democracies through NATO, the cooperation between NATO and the EU and economic and diplomatic means in Central Asia and Caucasus. In other words, the US both tried to contain the threats in these regions and enlarged its democracy and free market economy values. Thus, it could be suggested that the US security policy in the post-Cold War in fact did not diverge from the Cold War security policy. Containment of the Soviet Union gave its place to the containment of non-traditional and traditional security threats and the US tried to sustain a world order based on its political and economic values through activism and enlarging free market democracies. In this respect, friendly relations with allies like a free market democracy Turkey remain as one of the cornerstones of the US security policy in terms of its regional strategic policies and of global security policy.

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² Wyn Q.Bowen and David H. Dunn (eds.), *American Security Policy in 1990s: Beyond Containment* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Brookfield, Dartmouth, 1996) p.1; for the US foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War see George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and for the later stages see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Approach of Postwar American Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1994).

⁴ James N.Rosenau, “The United States In a Turbulent World”, Robert Hutchings (ed.), *At the End of American Century: America’s Role In the Post-Cold War World* (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.98.

⁵ Haas, “Paradigm Lost”, p.44.

⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, “Muddling Through? A Strategic Checklist for the United States In the post-Cold War World”, *Workshop Paper*, The Geneva Center for Security Policy, August 1998, p.1, Source: EBSCOHOST.

⁷ For a comprehensive analysis of the international security environment in the post-Cold War era see Barry Buzan *et.al* (eds.), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998).

⁸ A similar analysis of the US security policy in the post-Cold War era in the framework of these security strategies of Washington has been made by Çağrı Erhan, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Amerika’nın Güvenlik Algılamaları”, Refet Yınanç and Hakan Taşdemir (eds.), *Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye* (Ankara: Seçkin Yayınları, 2002).

⁹ Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”, *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol.4, Iss. 39, 27 September 1993, p.662, Source: EBSCOHOST.

¹⁰ Warren Christopher, “The Strategic Priorities of American Foreign Policy”, *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, Iss. 47, 22 November 1993, p.798, Source: EBSCOHOST.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Henry A. Kissinger, “Continuity and Change in American Foreign Policy,” *Society*, Vol.5, Iss. 2, January-February 1998, p.185, Source: EBSCOHOST.

¹³ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, The White House, Washington D.C., February 1996, p.i, Source: <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>.

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¹⁶ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p.1.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, pp.10-5.

¹⁹ Sidney Berman (ed.), *Strategic Survey 1999/00* (UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2000), p.76.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Bowen and Huhn, *American Security Policy in 1990s*, p. 38.

²² Cited from President Bush in *ibid.*, p.42.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Walter Lafeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy At Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York: Norton, 1994), p. 761.

²⁵ Mohd Nassem Khan, "The US Policy towards the Persian Gulf. Continuity and Change", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.25, No.2, May 2001, Source: EBSCOHOST

²⁶ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p.2.

²⁷ These states have not been directly mentioned in the National Security Reports of 1996,1997,1998 and 1999. In the reports, it has been set forth that a number of states have the capabilities and the desire to threaten the vital interests of the US through coercion or crossborder aggression. They have been claimed to have offensive capabilities and the capacity to obtain nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

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- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p.ii.
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- ⁸⁵ Sloan, "The United States and European Defence", p.7.
- ⁸⁶ The rotten apple theory was suggested to mention the expansion of communism from Turkey and Greece to the key regions of the US interests and this was the main reason for Truman Doctrine announced in 1947 and the domino theory marked the fear of the expansion of communism in Asia as a result of the conflicts in Vietnam in 1970s.
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¹¹¹ Ibid.

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CHAPTER 3

THE US AND TURKEY IN THE POST- COLD WAR ERA

The American-Turkish relations which are mainly based on the security concerns of the both parties during the Cold War seem to enter into a new phase with the end of the Cold War.¹ During the Cold War, the geographical location of Turkey served as the key factor in determining the nature of the relations between Turkey and the US. Turkey, at the intersection points of Europe, Asia and the Middle East with the important passages like the Straits accessing to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea was obviously a crucial country in the defense of the Western bloc. Turkey also served as a barrier to the expansion of Communism to the Western European countries and the Gulf Region. The demands of the Soviet Union on the Straits and Eastern part of Anatolia just after the end of World War II and western-oriented politics made Turkey act under the Western bloc and to be a member of NATO in 1952.

Like the other actors of the international system, Turkey and the US have been affected from the changing international circumstances of the post- Cold War era. Since the strategic location of Turkey and security concerns laid the ground for the pace of the relations, the demise of the Soviet Union; the common threat for the both sides, seemed to challenge the close relations. In spite of the discussions about the declining importance of Turkey to the West and the US, the developments occurred in the regions surrounding Turkey and the multidimensional and transregional

security threats of the new world order underlined the necessity of the continuity of this link.

In 1992, the US administration offered Turkey to construct an “enhanced partnership.” In 1997, five new matters, namely regional cooperation, economics, and trade, energy, Cyprus and defense and security cooperation were added to the agenda of the relations during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz to Washington. Lastly, during the visit of Prime Minister Ecevit to the US in 1999, President Clinton interpreted the American-Turkish relations as “a strategic partnership.”² This explanation could define such increasing level of the relations. The insistent support of the US on the membership of Turkey to the EU, the military cooperation of the parties under the UN and NATO missions in the Balkans, the help of the US to combat terrorism in Turkey and the support of the US in the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to carry the Azeri oil to the world markets could be handled as some of the new areas on the agenda of the relations.

This chapter will try to dwell on the facts underlying the deepening relations between Turkey and the US in the post- Cold War era. The main theme of the analysis depends on the assumption that the strategic relations between US and Turkey have preserved its nature in the post-Cold War era due to the fact that the security interests of the parties in the regions surrounding Turkey greatly overlap. In this context, the chapter will provide an overview of Turkish- American relations during the Cold War. Second, a reassessment of Turkey’ role for the US security policy in the post-Cold War era will be provided. Last, given the fact the Turkish-American relations gained a multiregional character and include the military and strategic aspects in the regions surrounding Turkey, the relations will be explained with regard to these regions.³ It is important to note that the relations between the US

and Turkey about Europe is given in a shorter analysis than the other regions. This is due to the general plan of the thesis. Turkey's security relations with Europe are now handled in the emerging European security framework composed of mainly NATO and the EU led defense and security mechanisms. In that end, the last chapter of the thesis will provide the US and Turkish policies towards this new framework in order to explain the US's policy of supporting Turkey's full membership to the EU.

3.1 The US and Turkey in the Cold War Era

The establishment of close relations between Turkey and the US goes back to the end of the World War II. The demands of the Soviet Union including granting territorial concessions in Eastern Anatolia and along the Straits constituted the fundamental element leading Turkish foreign policymakers to ensure its security with new arrangements and neutralize the Soviet demands. The symbolic act of Turkey to declare a war against Germany to become a member of the UN also served this goal.⁴ For Turkey, an alliance with the US served three interests; first, it could ensure her security; second, Turkey could make use of economic and military aid to be provided by the US especially in a time where steps for a more open economy were taken, and third it could strengthen her Western orientation.⁵ For the US policy makers, the Soviet note to Turkey in 7 August 1946 could lead to the control of Turkey by the Soviet Union which could spill over to Greece, which would challenge the balance in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This became the main imperative for Truman Doctrine of 1947.⁶

As suggested, the arrival of Missouri warship and the introduction of Truman Doctrine in 1947 aimed to provide the security of Greece and Turkey and to build a bar to Soviet expansionism. This was due to Turkey's geographical importance for the US within the framework its containment strategy. The physical proximity of

Turkey made it a perfect place to serve as a military platform for strategic and conventional offensive operations against the Soviet Union in the case of war.⁷ Additionally, the presence of the US in Turkey helped it to project power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf, which is a vital interest for the US and its allies for the oil reserves. The Turkish army could delay the advancing of the Soviet forces until the US and the Middle East based British sources could launch a counteroffensive.⁸ On the other hand, Washington assessed Turkey “as the most resolute, independent, stable and unquestionably the most western element in a semi- oriental area of wide spread political and economic unrest.”⁹ As it will be explained in Chapter 5, Turkey’s being a democratic, stable and western- oriented country would become a shaping factor for the US security policy.

The relations between Turkey and US improved very well in 1940s and 1950s. Turkey was provided aid of military equipment amounting to \$400.000 (four hundred thousand dollars) under Truman Doctrine announced in 1947. By the efforts of the US, Turkey was included in Marshall Plan and Turkey sent 450.000 Turkish soldiers to Korean War in 1950 to be a member of the Western club. As a result of Turkey’s desire and the efforts of the US, Turkey became a member of the UN and NATO. The membership of Turkey to NATO institutionalized Turkish-American relations. In accordance with NATO agreements and bilateral agreements between both parties within the framework of NATO, Turkey was granted economic and military aid; Turkish army was modernized; new military bases were opened and US soldiers were deployed in Turkey. Beginning from this period, the nature of Turkish-American relations has begun to be described as a strategic relation with the basic tenets of military aid, military cooperation and NATO alliance.

The relations developed within a positive atmosphere till the mid 1960s. Turkey entered into the Baghdad Pact, supported the Eisenhower Doctrine which provided the defense of the Middle East against the Soviet expansionism. Even Turkey did not reject the use of İncirlik base without being informed by the US during its attack to Lebanon in 1958.¹⁰ The economic aid provided by the US helped to create a more open economy and the close relations with the US were used in Turkish domestic politics. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes tried to increase the domestic support for the liberalization of Turkish economy by evidencing similarities between Turkey and the US.¹¹

From mid 1940s to mid 1960s, it could be argued that Turkey totally followed a Western-oriented foreign policy. Turkish leaders evaluated the interests of Turkey converging with those of NATO countries and the US.¹² However, the nature of parameters of the systematic competition between the superpowers, the US, and the Soviet Union seemed to challenge the convergence of interests between Turkey and the US. Two events were remarkable in this context; the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey and the so-called “Johnson letter” incident.¹³ The Jupiter missiles were deployed in Turkey against a Soviet threat by the US and these missiles became a part of superpower negotiations during Cuban Crisis in 1962. The Soviet Union proposed that it could withdraw its missiles in Cuba in return for the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. After long discussions, the US and Turkey had to agree the removal of missiles in 1963. This was a source of disappointment and loss of credibility of the US in the eyes of Turkish government. Turkish leaders thought that the US overlooked the security concerns of Turkey and understood that the interests of a smaller country could be neglected for the systematic interests of the US.

The second incident was again related with the credibility of the security alliance with the US. In 1964, Turkey seemed to intervene in Cyprus as a guarantor state to end the conflicts in the island. However, a letter sent by President Johnson to prevent the military intervention to Cyprus had critical repercussions for Turkish- American relations and NATO. The letter mentioned that NATO would not help Turkey in case of an attack by the Soviet Union after a possible intervention of Turkey in Cyprus. Additionally, it mentioned that Turkey could not use US military equipment in a possible intervention without the approval of the US. The letter clearly showed NATO and the US might not be the security provider of Turkey despite Turkey's full compliance with NATO.

These developments led the Turkish foreign policymakers to understand that they would be alone if they involve in a crisis with the Soviet Union based on its national security interests.¹⁴ This resulted in a change Turkish foreign policy behavior; from that point Turkish foreign policy started to follow a multidimensional policy aiming to improve relations with the Eastern bloc and Arab countries rather than acting in full compliance with the US and the Western bloc.¹⁵

In 1970s, the poppy problem and Cyprus problem once again complicated the relations between the US and Turkey.¹⁶ The poppy problem continued from 1969 to 1974; however it was replaced by Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. This resulted in an embargo on the US military sales to Turkey beginning from 1975. Turkey announced the unilateral suspension of Defense Corporation Agreement and all bilateral agreements between the US and Turkey. Additionally, the American bases in Turkey were taken under the control of Turkey.

However, the outbreak of Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 underlined the strategic importance of Turkey for the US. Just four months after the Revolution, the

US arms embargo was lifted. In 1980, a Joint Defense Agreement between the parties was signed for a five-year period. The solution of this crisis in the relations due to the systematic factors is a significant example of the US policy towards Turkey. So, it could be argued that whatever problems occurred between the US and Turkey, the strategic environment concerns of the Cold War era prevented serious breaks in the relations.

Similarly, the US did not react the military coup d'état in Turkey in 1980 in spite of its provocative and supportive attitudes for the improvement of democratic and human rights situations in the domestic politics of the countries with which it has relations. This is due to the US's vision of Turkey; stability in Turkey ranked as the first factor for the US policy rather than a strong democracy. From 1980 to 1990s, the security cooperation between two countries deepened due to the systematic factors such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In spite of the ongoing strategic corporation between US and Turkey in 1980s, the fact that the military aid provided by Turkey was made interconnected with the contributions of Turkey to Cyprus problem, human rights and the claim of Armenians in the US about an alleged Armenian genocide. In this period, the military aid both Turkey and Greece was provided in accordance with 7/10 rate and the amount of the aids was related to the improvement in political conditions of the country and the solution of Cyprus problem.¹⁷ While the Greek-Armenian lobbies were influential about the release of military aids in Turkey in some way, the strategic elements of the international system in 1980s maintained the improvement of the relations in a smooth way.

In sum, it could be observed that the relations between Turkey and the US continued its structure during the Cold War. The security concerns of the both parties

led to the formation of a military cooperation between the countries and under NATO and this strategic relation was not heavily affected from the other political elements.¹⁸ However, the establishment of relations on a wider scope including economic policies or the common policies for different regions could not be observed. Also, from the analysis it could be understood that, Cyprus problem, Turkish- Greek relations, Turkey's record on human rights and democracy and the role of Greek and Armenian lobbies on the aids provided by the US to Turkey entered in the agenda of the relations. These issues will remain to be continuous in the US-Turkey relations in the post-Cold War era.

3.2 The US and Turkey in the post- Cold War era

3.2.1 A Reassessment of Turkey's Role for the US Security Policy

The changing dynamics of the post-Cold War era have effected Turkish and the US foreign policy thus their relations.¹⁹ Repeatedly, the geographic location of Turkey was the element determining the basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy and the approach of the US to Turkey. Differently from the Cold War, rather than being a periphery state, Turkey remained at the very "center" of the dramatic developments of the post-Cold War era²⁰ and was faced with new opportunities and challenges.²¹ As Ian Lesser explained, the horizons of Turkish foreign policy have expanded; Turkish interests are now more global and questions of direct concern to Turkey now begin from Western Europe and extend till China, quite apart from more traditional challenges caused by the troubled regions on Turkey's borders.²²

On the other hand, for the US, Turkey turned out into a "frontline" state rather than a periphery state.²³ In this period, Turkey's importance for the US foreign policy was assessed by its transregional strategic importance for the US global strategy. In 1995, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs,

Richard Holbrooke mentioned that Turkey stood at the very point of Eurasia related with almost all American interests.²⁴ President Clinton has summarized this situation very well in 2000 “We have significant interests in this troubled region of the world; combating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein; working for peace and stability in the Middle East and Central Asia; stabilizing the Balkans; and developing new sources of energy.”²⁵ Due to its geostrategic location, Turkey could act as a bridge or barrier over critical routes of transportation, both maritime and overland or provide for an easy and short access to strategic natural resources.²⁶ So, Turkey could influence the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

In addition to this critical location, Turkey’s military power makes it a natural balance holder not only in regional terms but also between competing power centers as was the case during the Cold War.²⁷ In this framework, Turkey in the US strategy has constituted “an ideological balance against Iran, an important participant for the attempts to provide peace in the Balkans, an important non Russian and pro- Western communication line for the Central Asia and Caucasus Republics, a model country for the normalization of the relations between Israel and Arab countries, the supporter of Israel- Palestine Middle East process, an alternative gate for the energy resources in the Caspian region other than Russia and Iran, a barrier to Russian expansionism in the Middle East and the Gulf, an example for being a democratic country in the Islamic world.”²⁸

In fact, during 1990s, the basic dynamics of the Turkish foreign policy overlapped with the US foreign policy on many issues; a convergence of interests was notable. Turkey followed a policy similar to that of the US; it converted its energy to a variety of regions and had to take the multidimensional developments into consideration. Similarly, the US as a global power defines its foreign policy in

terms of multiregional and transregional developments. In other words, the security policies of the US and Turkey greatly overlapped and this fact has led to a deepening strategic cooperation between the two countries with regard to the regions surrounding Turkey. As it will be explained in the next section, the convergence of security interests of the US and Turkey has been reflected in their policies about the Gulf War, the Balkans, the Central Asia and Caucasus and the Europe.

By the 1990s, Turkey started to implement a new foreign policy called as “measured activism”²⁹ or “daring and caution”³⁰ which has regional focus. This shows a convergence with the region-oriented foreign and security policy of the US explained in Chapter 2. During the Cold War years, Turkey pursued a reactive policy rather than innovative and creative policies³¹; the policy was usually characterized as cautious and passive policy. In the post-Cold War era, the foreign policy activities of Turkey served for two objectives; first, to manage the conflicts in the borders of Turkey by attracting the attention of the international community. Second, as a long-term objective, Turkey aimed to bring a stable international order to replace the volatile regional environment resulting from the collapse of the bipolar world order.³² Thus, the activities of Turkey carried similar objectives with the US and the regions to which Turkey’s activities are directed are the same with those of the US.

The systematic consequences of the post-Cold War era fueled by the changes in the domestic politics of Turkey reinforced the formulation of a more assertive and active policy for Turkey. The demise of the Soviet threat made Turkey to feel more secure and follow policies without the fear of any Soviet reaction. The Western dominance in the post-Cold War era made Turkey advantageous in the regional policies and have more freedom of action. Also, it led to the weakening of Turkey’s enemies such as Syria, Iraq and Iran; thereby enhanced Turkish foreign and security

policy options and opened new areas for Turkish economic and political activities from Balkans to the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan.³³ In the meantime, Turkey strengthened its military and economic position especially in the second mid 1990s which boosted the potential of Turkey as being a regional power.³⁴ So, Turkey with its large army, strong economy, democratic political system and demographic power turned into a regional power. Mark Parris, the former Ambassador of the US in Ankara suggested Turkey as a unique case for these features, he stated:

...Turkey is important as a paradigm Western and eastern; Muslim and secular; democratic and authoritarian; market and statist. Turkey combines within itself characteristics that anywhere would be assumed to be incompatible. And, that makes it a unique role model for a large number of states in the region..... Turkey is important as an economic partner.... It has a large, young skilled population; 20 billion economies.....³⁵

For the US foreign policy, Turkey is identified as a “pivotal state” owning a great deal of capability to influence the political and economic developments in the regions surrounding it.³⁶ So, it could be argued that Turkey’s importance no longer could be measured for its geographical importance. Ankara is also increasingly turning into a capable security actor with the resources and the willingness to use military power beyond its borders.³⁷

The new measured activism of Turkey includes the use of diplomacy and multilateralism as far as possible to promote stability and prosperity in the various regions; its assertiveness has been observed in the confines of diplomatic initiatives.³⁸ As another point differing from the Cold War Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has been more sensitive to national sovereignty issues. The crisis between Turkey and Syria in 1998 and Turkey’s threat to attack Russian supplied s-300 missiles if the system was to be deployed in Cyprus manifested Turkey’s desire and self- confidence to use force when its interests were attacked. Additionally, the

cooperation between Israel and Turkey is a clear evidence of Turkey's more active strategic engagement in the Middle East for Turkey in defense of geopolitical and strategic interests.³⁹

In accordance with the factors mentioned above, it is clear that Turkey has become a more powerful and more assertive regional power in the post Cold War era. This factor is coupled with Turkey's Western oriented foreign policy. Within this framework, the US officials identified Turkey as an "indispensable country" for the for Washington's security policy.⁴⁰

3.2.2. The US and Turkey in the Regions Surrounding Turkey

3.2.2. 1 The Europe

The relations between the US and Turkey about Europe are based on the strategic considerations of the Cold War era and institutionalized under NATO alliance. Both parties are culturally, politically and economically closely linked to Europe. In that end, the European security and an active policy regarding European security affairs have been a part of their foreign policy. On the other hand, NATO membership constituted the main framework of Turkey's security providing it considerable leverage in the Western political system. For the US, NATO has been the means for its involvement in the Europe and a means for the transatlantic leadership.

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has been a critical actor for the European security depending on three factors, its NATO membership, strategic location, and military capacity.⁴¹ First, Turkey's NATO membership gives Turkey a means of political and military influence in the European security affairs. Second, its huge military capability compared to the European countries increase influence in the newly emerging European security framework.

Third, Turkey's strategic location not only serves for the prevention of direct threats to the European mainland but also could hinder the indirect threats to European security from Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and Central Asia or Caucasus. Thus, it could be argued that the importance of Turkey in terms of European security is also based on its role about the regions surrounding Europe. In this respect, Turkey's domestic and foreign policy orientation should be Western oriented and the domestic political and economic system of the country should be stable. Thus, Turkey's cooperation with regard to the European security issues could be unproblematic. William Park summarizes the combination of these factors as:

The real post-Cold War significance of Turkey lies in the problems that a less stable or more activist Turkey could create. Europe requires a stable, modernizing and democratic Turkey to (hopefully) keep radical Islam from Europe's very borders. It needs to provide Ankara with incentives to keep its differences with Greece from spilling over into increased tension or armed conflict. It needs a Turkey that is cautious in its regional policies towards the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East and that seeks to avoid confrontation with Moscow. The point is not so much what Turkey offers to Europe as what the loss it could entail.⁴²

The end of the Cold War made the discrimination between the Western political systems clear. During the Cold War Era, NATO membership provided both European and non-European members to be identified as a Western country. However, now, the European political system consists of two categories. Firstly, the security community involving NATO alliance which includes European and non-European members. The second is the political community composed of the EU which encompasses all European countries. Since neither Turkey nor the US are not the members of the EU, NATO alliance remains as the only tool for their political influence regarding the region. In this framework, the policies of the US and Turkey regarding Europe greatly overlap. Both parties are concerned about the security of Europe and are NATO centric. They support the primacy of NATO in the new

European defense arrangements should be constructed around the EU and NATO and oppose the formation of a European caucus within NATO.

In spite of the fact that Turkey contributes greatly to NATO alliance and the European security, its problem with Greece over Aegean and Cyprus imbroglios remain serious concerns for the US in terms of the European security.⁴³ Many Western experts and the US fear that Greek-Turkish conflicts over Aegean and Cyprus could collapse the southern flank of NATO and harm NATO coherence. Ankara and Athens could reflect their disputes to NATO and alliance plans through their power of veto and delay.⁴⁴

In the mid 1990s, the US mediated in various problems between Turkey and Greece. The US exerted its political influence on both parties for a solution during Kardak-Imia crisis in 1996 and S-300 missile crisis in 1997. With the urging of the US, Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and Turkish President Süleyman Demirel signed Madrid Declaration in 1997. However, since Turkey and Greece resist the intervention of the US on Aegean disputes, the Cyprus question remains the focal point in Turkey-Greece and the US triangle.⁴⁵

Since 1963, the US has vigorously made attempts for the solution of the Cyprus problem.⁴⁶ The presence of Turkish population in Cyprus, the strategic importance, and the historical hostility between Greece and Turkey constitute the basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus. For Turkey, Cyprus is seen as a national cause and a bastion of strategic interests. The extension of Karpaz peninsula provides Cyprus the possibility of blocking the exit from Gulf of İskenderun and thus threatens Turkey's naval maneuverability.⁴⁷ The US argues that the solution of Cyprus problem could improve Turkish-Greek relations and could lead the way for the solution of problems over Aegean. After rising of the tensions resulting from

EU's March 1995 announcement for beginning accession negotiations with Greek Cypriots six months after 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the EU, the US appointed Richard Holbrooke as President Clinton's special envoy to Cyprus. Prior to this period, the US efforts were restricted to sending State Department officials on special diplomatic missions to the region.⁴⁸ As it will be focused on Chapter 5, after rising of the tensions between Greece and Turkey by Kardak-Imia crisis and s-300 missile crisis, the US believed that the EU membership of Turkey turned out to be very critical ever than before.⁴⁹

3.2.2. 2 The Balkans

Among the new areas of cooperation between the US and Turkey, the Balkans could be regarded as a region where the Turkish and the US foreign policies nearly totally converge and a significant degree of continuity in Turkish- American cooperation could be observed.⁵⁰ During the Cold War, Turkey entered into the Balkan Pact in 1954, which was a part of the US foreign policy to strengthen the Western alliance with regional alliances.

As a continuous element, it was observed that both countries had similar objectives, implemented similar policies, and acted together in 1990s. The US made use of cooperating with Turkey in the region since it comparatively had little knowledge about the region and Turkey exploited the opportunity to cooperate with a superpower.⁵¹ Both the US and Turkey engaged in the Balkans through multilateral rather than unilateral initiatives. The use of force against the Bosnia Serbs, the armament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to maintain the territorial integrity of Macedonia and to improve the regional cooperation were the common policies of the both parties.

The US and Turkey aimed to prevent the instability emerging from the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts after the disintegration of the Yugoslavian Federation in 1992. The importance of the strategic location of the region for both Turkey and the US determines the specific foreign policy steps of the parties. The Balkans is a passageway for the US to go to the Straits and the Gulf, while it is the main connection of Turkey to Europe with which more than half of Turkish foreign trade has been realized. Additionally, a certain number of Muslim Turks live in the region and 10% of Turkish people have family connections with those living in the Balkans. In fact, the main importance of the region is based on its being in Europe the stability of which has critical importance for political, economic and the military interests of the both parties.

Turkey and the US focused on the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav Federation but then had to recognize the separated countries. Since the secession movements in the ex –Yugoslavia may reinforce the Kurdish separatism in the Turkey; Turkey opposed its fragmentation. Turkey avoided the use of Islamic sentiments or neo Ottomanism in the region rather she preferred to act with the multilateral institutions or it could be said that caution dominated the approach of Turkey. In this sense, Turkey tried to make the international community to act against Serbian aggression in Bosnia through lobbying at the Organization of Islamic Conference.⁵² Also, Turkey supported the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and the use of force against them. In spite of the fact that the US did not use force since 1994, it had to intervene in the region when the attempts of the European countries and the UN failed. As a result of the military and diplomatic attempts of the US, the civil war in Bosnia could be ended.

The US seemed to support Bosnians during and aftermath of the war; this was related to the balance of power in the region. The US tried to balance the influence of England, Russia and France which supported Serbs and Germany backing Slovenia and Croatia. Turkey approved the Dayton agreement designed under the mediation of the US and participated in the IFOR and is a part of SFOR which were established to enforce this agreement. Turkey cooperated with the US in the “Train and Equip” program; the program aims to arm the Bosnians. Within the scope of the program, the US provides the arms while Turkey undertakes the training of the military personnel. In the bombing of Kosovo in 1999, Turkey sent its F-16s and opened her bases in Bandırma and Çorlu for the use of the US but the bases were not used. After the military intervention in Kosovo, Turkey participated in KFOR. The activities of the US and Turkey in Bosnia and Kosovo gave it the opportunity to be perceived as making attempts for the Muslim world.⁵³

Apart from these multilateral initiatives, Turkey and the US improved closer relations with the same countries. Ankara signed a military cooperation agreement with Albania in 1992, which included the modernization of the Albanian army by Turkey and the training of the military personnel by Turkey.⁵⁴ Albania emerged as an ally of the US; the visit of US Secretary of State Foreign Secretary Baker in 1991 could show its importance for the US. Macedonia was the other country where Turkey and the US paid great attention, both countries tried to maintain the integrity of Macedonia for the fear of the conflicts in Bosnia could spread to the South. In this respect, Turkey called the US to deploy soldiers in the Macedonia-Yugoslavian border and the US sent forces to United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia.

Turkey improves the regional initiatives in the region; Turkey was the leading country in the establishment of BSCE (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) to improve stability and security in the Balkans. In compliance with the initiatives of the US for establishing democracy and stability in the Balkans, Turkey also entered the Southeastern Europe Stability Pact established in 1999. Turkey also greatly supported the accession of Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia to NATO, which will enhance the stability in the Balkans and close the geographical gap between Turkey and Western European NATO countries.⁵⁵

3.2.2. 3The Middle East

The Middle East has a unique position for both the US and Turkish security policy in the post- Cold War era. Apart from the critical importance of the region for the oil reserves, the region now carries a variety of serious risks which could have spillover effects for the security of the both countries. The region is vulnerable to terrorism, fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction and economic and political instability. The vacuum of authority after the disintegration of the Soviet Union increased the degree of these; doubtlessly, the Gulf War was the most significant example of to what the implications of the insecure environment in the region could lead.

In order to meet the challenges in the Middle East, the US increased its military presence in the Gulf and designed the dual containment policy while Turkey, beginning with the Gulf war, engaged in a region in a greater degree in order to guarantee her security. Accordingly, the Turkish- Israeli cooperation could be regarded as Turkey's activism and alignment with the US, which is a clear deviation of Turkish foreign policy of balancing the Arab and Western world during the Cold War.⁵⁶

The outbreak of Gulf War in 1991 signaled the beginning of a stronger Turkish-American cooperation. The War was also an important point for the Turkish foreign policy since it is regarded as the point which changed traditional Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War to an activist policy. During the War, Turkey opened İncirlik air base for the use of the US, closed Yumurtalık pipeline, deployed soldiers and implemented embargo on Iraq in accordance with the UN resolutions.⁵⁷ The jets taking a lift from İncirlik bombed Iraq and the closing of Yumurtalık pipeline, which previously was the route for the Iraqi oil to the West, greatly damaged Iraqi economy. The deployment of Turkish soldiers on the Iraqi border diverted the energy of Iraq forces.⁵⁸ Considering Turkey's important role in the Gulf War, the US increased the amount of security assistance and extended additional trade benefits to Turkey, doubling the value of textile quota and granting the Turkish government \$282 million for additional military and economic assistance for 1991.⁵⁹ The US also tried to compensate the financial loss of Turkey resulting from the shutting of Yumurtalık pipeline, loss of cross-border revenues and the high cost of mobilizing Turkish army. Washington encouraged Egypt to purchase forty Turkish manufactured F-16s and persuaded Gulf Crisis Financial Coordinating Group to provide Turkey with 4 (four) billion assistance and its allies in the Gulf to contribute \$2.5 billion to Turkish defense fund.⁶⁰

The Gulf crisis was significant for the Turkish foreign policy at the beginning of 1990s. It once more manifested Turkey's strategic importance for the West while discussions for the decline of Turkey's role for the Western world with the demise of the Soviet threat made Turkey anxious. The crisis was used as a means to demonstrate Turkey's geostrategic importance for the West; the cooperation with the US also happened at a period when the relations of Turkey with the Europe were

strained especially after the rejection of Turkey's application for the full membership to the EC in 1987. President Özal who strongly insisted on the involvement in the international coalition believed that Turkey's Western European NATO allies would appreciate Turkey's contribution to the war and think about Turkey's possible admission to the EC.⁶¹

The strong American Turkish cooperation continued with the establishment of a no-fly zone for the Kurds running away from Saddam regime on the in the north of 36th latitude in 1991. A rapid reaction force called Combined Task Force Provide Comfort or publicly known as Poised Hummer Force under Operation Provide Comfort II deployed at Silopi. İncirlik air base in Turkey was used by Gulf coalition forces to protect this no-fly zone.⁶² In 1991, the ground troops of this force were withdrawn by Turkey's request and the air forces of the OPC II countries undertook the protection of the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq. These forces were deployed at İncirlik and the mission of these forces have been extended in every 6 months by the Turkish Parliament. After 1996, the name of this operation turned into Operation Northern Watch. The presence of this force internationalized Turkey's Kurdish problem⁶³ and the developments about creating a Kurdish state created tensions between the US and Turkey. In 1992, an autonomous Kurdish state was established as a result of the parliamentary elections after the compromise between Kurdish Democrats Party (KDP) and Kurdish Patriots Union (KYB). In 1994, the armed conflicts between these two parties created an atmosphere of instability and facilitated the infiltration of PKK terrorists from Iraq border. Turkey had to make cross-border operations to combat PKK terrorism.

Turkey and the US differ with regard to Iraq policy at various points. As a border country, Turkey has played a critical in the implementation of the US's dual

containment policy as well as her contributions during the Gulf War. In this sense, it could be argued that the Turkey served as a springboard to increase the influence of the US in the Middle East.⁶⁴ However, after the Gulf War, Turkey has resisted the bombing of some Iraq targets and signaled that it would not allow the use of its bases for an attack against Iraq in 1998. The US bombed Iraq in order to force it to eliminate mass destruction weapons as stipulated by the UN decisions. As a second point, Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Iraq whether with the rule of Saddam or not. In this framework, Turkey suggests a compromise between the two Kurdish groups and Iraqi government. Ankara fears that the establishments of a federal Kurdish state in the region could reinforce Kurdish separatist activities. On the other hand, while the US seems to support the territorial integrity of Iraq; the formation of a Kurdish state does not pose a problem for the US. The US Administration makes every effort to topple Saddam and could cooperate with the opposition forces in Iraq.

Aftermath of the Gulf War, international commercial embargo was imposed on Iraq in accordance with the UN decisions. While Turkey has advocated the lifting of this embargo since 1992, the US suggested the implementation of the embargo till the toppling of Saddam regime, the destruction of weapons of mass destruction and the end of the violence by Iraqi government to its people.⁶⁵ Iraq was a great trade partner of Turkey before the Gulf War but the Gulf War brought great economic loss for Turkey as a result of the closing of Yumurtalık pipeline and the end of cross-border trade with Iraq. Prior to the war, the pipeline in Turkey that carried oil from Northern Iraq to Mediterranean earned Turkey \$1.2 billion (one and half billion dollars) annually.⁶⁶ Iraq was the second largest recipient of Turkish goods receiving 9.3 % of the total exports.⁶⁷ The Gulf War stopped cross- border trade and resulted in

the unemployment in the southeastern part of Turkey. In 1996, Kerkük-Yumurtalık pipeline was opened but this did not compensate the losses of Turkey. With the attempts of Syria, Iran and Turkey the embargo was made more flexible in 1996. In accordance with this decision, Iraq could sell oil in return for buying food and medical equipment and this program was called as Oil for Food Programme.

Turkey and the US diverge on their policies about Iran. While Iran was the other country to be isolated within the framework of the US dual containment policy, Turkey favored more flexible approaches to Iran. Ankara has strong interest to maintain its relations with Iran for its growing need energy and needs to take account of Iran' s interest in Central Asia. Furthermore, both countries highly support the territorial integrity of Iraq and fear any separate Kurdish entity due to Kurdish population in their countries. The pragmatic relations between Iran and Turkey were disturbed during Welfare–True Path coalition in 1996. Prime Minister Erbakan' s first foreign visit was to Iran and he emphasized Islamic solidarity between Iran and Turkey. However, these were harshly criticized by Turkish military and foreign elites. Erbakan signed a 23 billion gas deal with Iran. This was followed by a visit of by Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani to Turkey in December.

While the economic interests are important in the relations between Iran and Turkey, Iran' s support to Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) raised the concerns of Turkey. Especially in 1996, a significant increase in the number of PKK terrorists from Iran border was reported and Iran was warned about border security and PKK.⁶⁸ Turkish officials also got records on the attempts of Iran for the transfer of fundamentalism to Turkey. So, the US and Turkey' s security concerns overlap on the prevention of terrorism and fundamentalism in the Middle East.

Boosting Turkish-Israel cooperation could be regarded as a complementary part of Turkish alignment with the US in the Middle East. Turkey's policy about close relations with Israel is regarded as an evidence of more activist Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and a deviation from its dual pillar policy for Israel-Palestinian conflict during the Cold War. After the signing of Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration of Principles in 1993 by which the two signatories formally recognized another, Turkey could develop closer relations with Israel. In other words, this declaration eliminated the restraint on Turkey for closer relations with Israel.⁶⁹ The relations encompass trade relations especially in tourism sector and most significantly defense cooperation. In August 1996, two countries signed Defense Industry Cooperation agreement. As suggested in the previous chapter, the US welcomed this cooperation and participated the joint training between Turkey and Israel in 1998. This cooperation is beneficial for the US for various reasons; first, it could be model for the closer relations between the Muslim world and Israel. Second, the US could use force armed during a crisis in the Middle East easily and this cooperation could be a means of pressure on Syria in the Middle East process. Furthermore, the closer relations between countries would take the support of Jewish lobby in the US Congress and solve the problems such as arms sales and criticisms for the human rights policy of Turkey.⁷⁰

3.2.2. 4 The Central Asia and Caucasus

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Central Asia and Caucasus emerged as new areas of interest for the US and Turkish foreign policy makers. The rich oil and natural gas resources and the strategic location of the region turned the place to an arena of competition for important political actors of the international system recalling the start of the great game. As stated in Chapter 2, the US

increasingly focused on the region in the mid 90s especially after the announcement of the Near Abroad Doctrine of Russian Federation in 1994 and the war between Chechnya and Russia.

Apart from the fact that the strategic location of the region and the rich oil and natural gas resources makes the region crucial for the international actors, there are unique reasons for Turkey's interest in the region. The independence of the Turkish republics in the region was rejoiced by Turkey; the kinship between these countries and Turkey and the common language brought the opportunity to create a Turkish world from the Balkans to China.⁷¹ In addition to these factors, for Turkey the increase of her sphere of influence in the region was regarded as means to increase its importance in the eyes of the West after the demise of the Soviet threat.

Reinforcing Turkey's interest in the region, the US and the Western world assessed Turkey as a model for the countries in the region. Turkey could be a means for expanding Western type of democracy, free market economy and secular state structure for these countries. In 1992, during his visit to the capital of the Central Asian countries, US Secretary of State, James Baker recommended the newly independent republics to adopt the Turkish model.⁷² This model was seen as a barrier to the expansion of the influence of Iran and a fundamentalist regime. this could have essential implications because the region suffered from instability and the countries had a great nuclear potential.

Turkey also had the same vision for these countries; according to this vision the republics should emerge as independent, secular and democratic with liberal and free market economies. Turkey's role in the US strategy was to encourage the necessary reforms while working with the West to act as a "funnel of investment".⁷³ Turkey was the first country to recognize these states; in 1992 President Süleyman Demirel was

the first Western leader to visit the countries. Turkey cooperated with these countries in education, science, culture, banking, sports, culture and even religion, and from 1992 to 1996 four hundred seventy two (472) bilateral and forty three (43) multilateral agreements were signed between these countries and Turkey.⁷⁴ Turkey's capacity to be a model for these countries is questionable. They are still politically and economically dependent to Russia while Turkey has a limited capacity to act as a model.⁷⁵ Besides, the countries are reluctant to accept such a leadership of Turkey. However, Turkey is still being seen as an important regional power owing to a crucial deal of importance for those countries especially those in the Caucasus; Georgia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a critical country for Turkish foreign policy due to its rich oil resources and close relations.⁷⁶ Within this framework, the competition between Russia, Iran and Turkey to carry Azeri oil to the world markets still continue.

Especially towards the end of 1990s, the routes to carry the Azeri oil dominated the agenda of US, Iranian Turkish and Russian foreign policy. With the rise of the nationalist sentiments in Russia and the announcement of near abroad doctrine, Russia hardened its policies. For Russia, the control of the pipeline routes is a means to have influence in the region. Since 1994, Russia is trying to create a sphere of influence in Caucasus by supporting the ethnic conflicts in the countries. In Georgia, Russia played a dubious role in the secession conflicts of south Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia had to accept to join Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993 and accept Russian bases as well as military personnel in its country.⁷⁷ Additionally, Azerbaijan has the same problem with its conflict with Armenia on Karabakh. These reasons lead both counties to make alliances with the West and Turkey.

Turkey and the US form a balance against Russian- Iranian cooperation in the region; the US does not desire the hegemony of Iran and Russia in the region through the control of pipelines. Thus, the US supports the Baku- Ceyhan pipeline which carry the Azeri oil through Turkey to the world markets, the US preferred to make its choice as politically and strategically most compatible. The US holds the view that the countries in the Central Asia and Caucasus will decrease their dependence on Russia with the revenues they would have with the pipelines. This will imply the promotion of democracy and free market economy in those countries and will lead to the resolution of ethnic conflicts between the countries in a peaceful way. In 1998, the US Undersecretary of State, Stuart Eizenstat mentioned that the US strongly resisted the construction of a pipeline through Iran and supported the building of an east-west pipeline in which Bakü-Ceyhan formed an important part.⁷⁸ Supporting Bakü-Ceyhan pipeline route, Caspian Finance Center aiming to help American businessmen Turkey improves the regional initiatives in the region. Turkey was the leading country in the establishment of BSCE to improve stability and security in the region.

3.3 Conclusion

The strategic relations between the US and Turkey seem to retain its significance for both parties in the post-Cold War era. Despite the fears of Turkey about its decreasing importance for the US, changing international environment and the variety of security risks resulted in the deepening of the corporation between the US and Turkey. The vulnerable and critical location of Turkey for the US security interests was again the element constituting the character of the framework of the relations. Different from the Cold War era, Turkey and the US have similar security risks on different regions rather than a one single region.

The regions surrounding Turkey have become the main areas of the agenda of the US and Turkey relations. In these areas; the policies of the US and Turkey to resist the risks of different kinds of security threats have greatly overlapped. This started with the invasion of Iraq of Kuwait in 1991 in order to provide to restore the balance of Middle East and secure the stability in the region.

Apart from Turkey's strategic importance, its being a Western oriented democratic secular state increased its importance in this period. Turkey was chosen as model for the newly independent republics in the former territories of the Soviet Union and was seen as a barrier to the influence of fundamentalist regime of Iran. In this context, the effect of the EU on the record of Turkey and its democracy and human rights brought about the great support of the US for the membership of Turkey to the EU especially from 1997 to 1999. In this framework, the rising tensions between Greece and Turkey over Aegean and Cyprus in mid 1990s constituted one of the elements influencing the support of the US for Turkey's full membership to the EU.

Turkey benefited from close relations with a superpower, in the implementation of different policies which could attract the reaction of the regional actors such the Turkish-Israeli cooperation, Turkey gained freedom of action. The support of the US about Turkey's participation in the ESDI and sharing the concerns about the priority of NATO were also landmarks for Turkey's link with the Europe. On the other hand, Turkey emerged as a critical country for the US beginning with the Gulf War. The presence of Turkey at the most vulnerable and the volatile regions of the world decrease the burden on the US. Thus, from the above mentioned analysis it could be argued that the relations between Turkey and the US which tend to go on a more

solid and concrete basis with an enhanced scope will seem to improve in the later steps.

¹ For a detailed analysis of the Turkish- American relations in the Cold War and post- Cold War era see Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası: Kuram ve Siyasa* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999); Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2001); for the US-Turkey relations at the different stages of the Cold War see George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's Entry Contained the Soviets* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1990); Oral Sander, *Türk- Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964* (Ankara: AÜSBF, 1979); George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Relations in Historical Perspective: 1945-1970* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972); Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti' nin Dış Politikası* (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1990), Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995); Lewis V.Thomas and Richard N.Frye, *The United States, Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952) ; Haluk Ülman, *Türk- Amerikan Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaacılık, 1952).

² İlhan Uzel, "ABD ve NATO' yla İlişkiler", Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt 2, (İstanbul: İletişim Kitabevi, 2001), p.253.

³ Alan Makovsky explains the Turkish-American bilateral ties in the post-Cold war era as a basket of many tightly woven strands. This is used in order to define the transition from a single issue of a Cold War paradigm to cooperation based on multitude of issues. Alan Makovsky, "US Policy Toward Turkey: Progress and Problems", Morton Abramowitz (ed.), *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000), p.226.

⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, "The End of The Cold War and Changes in the Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior", *Dış Politika/Foreign Policy* (Dış Politika Enstitüsü:Ankara), Vol.17, No.3, 1992, p.4.

⁵ Nasuh Uslu, "1947' den Günümüze Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Genel Portesi", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Cilt 6, No.2, Yaz 2000, p. 204.

⁶ Ülman, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, p.79.

⁷ Marioas Evrivas, "Turkey's Role in United States Strategy During and After the Cold War", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.9, No.2, Spring 1998, p.37.

⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

⁹ Thomas and Frye, *The United States, Turkey and Iran*, p. 145.

¹⁰ Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, p.214.

¹¹ Çağrı Erhan, "Türk-ABD İlişkilerinin Mantıksal Çerçevesi", İdris Bal (ed.), *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Alfa Basın Yayın Dağıtım Ltd. Şti, 2000), p.12.

¹² Dankwart A.Rustow, *Unutulan Müttefik (Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally)*, trans. Hakan Türktas (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1989), p.128.

¹³ For both crises see Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, pp.161-179.

¹⁴ Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, p.17.

¹⁵ Bostanoğlu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, p.345. For a comprehensive analysis of Turkish foreign policy in an historical perspective see William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London, Portland: Frank Class Publishers, 2000); Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994).

¹⁶ The poppy problem was based on the spread of narcotic drugs in the US and the influence of them on the crime and theft rates as well as domestic stability of the country. Thus, the US was determined to control the poppy seduction all around the world. Turkey was considered to be one of the main producers of the poppy and the US largely pressed Turkey to forbid poppy seduction from mid 1960s till 1974. On the other hand, Turkish government argued that there was no correlation between the

poppy seduction in Turkey and spread of narcotics in the US. Furthermore, the poppy seduction provided the most important economic revenue in Afyon region of Turkey. See Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, pp.247-52.

¹⁷ Özden Alantar, “Türk-ABD İlişkilerinin Güvenlik Boyutunda Dönüşümü”, Şule Kut and Gencer Özcan (eds.), *En Uzun On Yıl: Türk Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, 2. Basım (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2001), p. 220.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.221.

¹⁹ For an analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War era see Kemal Kirişçi and Barry Rubin (eds.), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 2001); Andrew Mango, *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, Washington Papers, No.163*, (Westwood: Praeger, 1994).

²⁰ Of the 13 of the 16 defined security threats of the post-Cold War era by NATO experts are located in the regions surrounding Turkey.

²¹ For an earlier analysis of the changing international environment of Turkey in the post-Cold War see Ian Lesser and Graham Fuller (eds.), *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Washington: Westview/Rand Corporation, 1993).

²² Ian Lesser, “Turkey s Strategic Options”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 34, No.1, January-March 1999, p.79.

²³ Cited from Richard Holbrooke in Yasemin Çongar, “The State of Turkish- American Dialogue”, *Insight Turkey*, No.7, April-June 1999, p.40. The concept was mainly used by US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Richard Holbrooke who strongly advocated the strategical importance of Turkey and supported the improvement in Turkish- American relations during his post.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Cited from President Clinton in Yasemin Çongar, “A Strong Alliance Yet To Outgrow More Politics”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.1, No.2, Spring 1999, p.83.

²⁶ Şadi Ergüvenç, “Turkey’s Strategic Importance in Military Dimension: A Regional Balance Holder”, Mustafa Aydın (ed.), *Turkey At the Threshold of 21st Century* (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1999), p.62.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.63.

²⁸ Alan Makovsky, “US Policy Toward Turkey”, p.222.

²⁹ See Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.1, No.2, April –June 1999.

³⁰ Malik Müftü, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.52, No.1, Winter 1998.

³¹ Kirişçi, “The End of the Cold War”, p.3.

³² *Ibid.*, p.13.

³³ Shireen Hunter, “Bridge or Frontier? Turkey’s Post –Cold War Geopolitical Posture”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 34, No.1, January-March 1999, p.65.

³⁴ It is argued that the concept of a regional power should not be mixed up with a hegemonic regional power. In that sense, it is explained that a regional power is a country the power of which may not be

neglected by other countries of the region easily. Turkey is a regional power with its political military and economic capacity but not a regional superpower which could lead the whole region. See Şule Kut, “Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dış Politikasının Anahatları”, Kut and Özcan (eds.), *En Uzun OnYıl*.

³⁵ Mark Parris, “Managing US- Turkish Relations”, *Policy Watch*, No.530, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 19 April 2001, Source: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index/html>

³⁶ See Alan Makovsky, “Turkey”, Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (eds.), *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World* (New York, London:W.W. Norton Company, 1999); Zbgniew Brzezinski also calls Turkey as a geopolitical pivot in the US strategy toward Euroasia. See Zbgniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

³⁷ Ian O.Lesser, “Turkey in a Changing Security Environment”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1, Fall 2000, p.183.

³⁸ Makovsky, “The New Activism”, p.5.

⁴⁰ Cited from Mark Paris, the former Ambassador of the US in Ankara in *Turkish Daily News*, 7 May 1999.

⁴¹ Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Turkey s Role in the EU’s Security and Defense Policies”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.31, No.4, December 2000, p.490.

⁴² William Park, “Turkey’s European Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki-Ankara”, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.5, No.3 Autumn 2000, pp.46-7.

⁴³ For a comprehensive analysis of Cyprus problem see Clement H.Dodd, *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspective* (Huntingdow: The Eothen Press, 1999).

⁴⁴ Tözün Bahçeli, “Turkish Policy Toward Greece”, Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (ed.), *Turkey’ s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.149

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.148.

⁴⁶ For an earlier analysis of US’s efforts on Cyprus question see Süha Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus* (Lanhan: University of Virginia, 1988).

⁴⁷ Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership In the European Union”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, Spring 2003, p.56.

⁴⁸ Heinz Kramer, “Cyprus and European Security”, *Survival*, Vol.39, No.3, Autumn 1997, p.18.

⁴⁹ Bahçeli, “Turkish Policy Toward Greece“, p.149.

⁵⁰ İlhan Uzgel, “Doksanlarda Bir İşbirliği ve Rekabet Alanı Olarak Balkanlar“, Kut and Özcan, *En Uzun On Yıl*, p.400.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.402.

⁵² For Turkish foreign policy during Bosnian Crisis see Ali Fuat Boravali, “The Bosnian Crisis and Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Dış Politika/Foreign Policy*, Vol.17, No.3, 1992.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.78.

⁵⁴ For a detailed analysis of Turkish-Albanian relations and the relations between Turkey and Balkan countries see Şule Kut, “Turkish Policy Toward the Balkans”, Makovsky and Sayarı, *Turkey’ s New World*.

- ⁵⁵ Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 102.
- ⁵⁶ For a detailed analysis of this dual policy see M. Hakan Yavuz, “İkicilik (Duality): Türk-Arap İlişkileri ve Filistin Sorunu”, Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*.
- ⁵⁷ See Tayyar Arı, *2000li Yıllarda Basra Körfezinde Güç Dengesi* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 1999).
- ⁵⁸ See Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskaçında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası* (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2000).
- ⁵⁹ Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey: Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.46, No.1, Winter 1992, p.19.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., p.19.
- ⁶¹ Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası*, p.404.
- ⁶² For a detailed analysis of Kurdish question and this force see Baskın Oran, *Kalkık Horoz: Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998).
- ⁶³ For a historical analysis of Kurdish question see Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow (eds.) *Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi (Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict)*, trans. Ahmet Fethi (İstanbul:Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,1997).
- ⁶⁴ Obrad Kesiç, “American-Turkish Relations At Crossroads”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.6, No.1, Winter 1995, p.98.
- ⁶⁵ Ayşegül Sever, “ABD’ nin İkili Çevreleme Politikası ve Türkiye”, Kut and Özcan, *En Uzun On Yıl*, p.347.
- ⁶⁶ Phebe Marr, “Turkey and Iraq”, Henri Barkey (ed.), *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’ s Role in the Middle East* (Washington D.C:U.S Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p.45.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., p.52.
- ⁶⁸ Atilla Eralp and Özlem Tür, “İran ile Devrim Sonrası İlişkiler”, Meliha Benli Altunışık, (ed.), *Türkiye ve Ortadoğu: Tarih, Kimlik ve Güvenlik* (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998), p.90.
- ⁶⁹ Makovsky, “Turkish –Israel Relations: A Periphery Strategy”, Barkey, *Reluctant Neighbor*, p.51
- ⁷⁰ Makovsky, “US Policy Toward Turkey“, p.236.
- ⁷¹ The term was first used in the *Economist* in 1991, Mustafa Aydın, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya’ yla İlişkiler”, Oran , *Türk Dış Politikası*, p.380.
- ⁷² İdris Bal, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası İçin Türk Cumhuriyetlerinin Önemi”, Bal, 21. *Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, p.336.
- ⁷³ Philip Robbins, “Between Sentiment and Self Interest. Turkey’s Policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 47, No.4, Autumn 1993, p.600. The study presents a detailed analysis of the earlier policies of Turkey with regard to the region.
- ⁷⁴ Meryem Kırımlı, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Bağımsız Türk Cumhuriyetlerine Yönelik Türk Dış Politikası”, Bal (ed.), 21. *Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, p.363.
- ⁷⁵ See İdris Bal, “Orta Asya ve Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Türk Modeli”, *Yeni Türkiye*, No.1, Mayıs-Haziran 1997.

⁷⁶ See Süha Bölükbaşı, “Ankara’s Bakü Centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has It Filed?” *Middle East Journal*, Vol.51, Winter 1997, pp.80-94; Temel İskit, “Turkey: A new Actor in the Field of Energy Politics”, *Perceptions*, Vol.1, No.1, March-May 1996.

⁷⁷ Roland Guetz, “Political Spheres of Interest in the Southern Caucasus and in Central Asia”, *Aussenpolitik*, Vol.48, No.3, 1997, p.259.

⁷⁸ Cited from Stuart Eizenstat in Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, , p.105, quoting “Europe Said Interested in Pipeline Skirting Iran”, *Turkistan Newsletter*, 25 February 1998.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF THE EU FOR TURKEY: A REFERENCE FOR REFORMS AND WESTERN IDENTITY

For forty years, Turkey is destined to be a full member of the EC/EU.¹ In this regard, Turkey and the EC signed Ankara Agreement in 1963; which implicitly brought about the full membership of Turkey to the Community after the successful implementation of the association period.² The agreement mainly aimed to have economic convergence between the both parties and thus was like a stepping stone facilitating the full integration of Turkey to the Community. However, the path to the membership did not take place easily for Turkey. In spite of the fact Turkey is the most economically integrated associate country with the longest association period to the Union; she could only be announced as a candidate country for the full membership to the EU in Helsinki European Council of the EU held on December 10-11, 1999. Such a long journey turned the EU full membership for Turkey a “dogma” and “the pursuit of it almost a ritual.”³

Beginning from 1970s, the EC/EU has turned from an economic actor to a political actor and reflected this policy in its foreign relations. It has undertaken a role to maintain a democratic and liberal economic European system; thus it gradually intervened in the political situation of the countries it conducted association with or that of the ones desiring to be a full member. In other words, the

distinction between the attempts for sustaining the economic convergence and political convergence with the countries on the road to the membership has blurred. So, it could be suggested that the EU played the role of being a “civilian power” pushing for a more democratic Europe where the rules of free market economy are regularly applied.

Turkey has been one of the test cases for the post-Westphalian character of the EC/EU especially in the post Cold War era, which means the EU as an institution can intervene in the domestic affairs of the state. The insistent desire of the Turkey to be a full member of the EU and the demands of the EU especially on domestic politics turned “Europeanization” as synonymous to democratization or pressure to enhance and improve liberal democracy and to maintain appropriate citizenship rights.⁴ Furthermore, the establishment of the Customs Union between Turkey and EU paved the way towards deeper integration between Turkish and EU economies. This has led to a greater influence of the EU on Turkish economic system.

For Turkey, to be a full member of the EU means more than the conduct of relations with an international institution. The membership is related to Turkey’ s identity, domestic and foreign policy orientation; it will confirm Turkey’ s being a European country and her Western identity while sustaining the implementation of domestic and foreign policies in accordance with the Western economic and political values. In Turkey, to be a full member to the EU is regarded as the climax of Europeanization since the Cold War and this has intensified especially after the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the course of the relations between Turkey and the EU has been a significant factor defining Turkey’ s alignment with pro-Western politics in Turkey’ s domestic arena which has been further reflected on the foreign policy the country.

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This chapter will examine the influence of the EU on Turkey's domestic landscape in terms of its political system, economic system and foreign policy orientation in the post- Cold War era especially during the years from 1995 to 1999. The influence of the EU on Turkey has increased in the post-Cold War era after the institutionalization of the accession process of candidate countries by the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. In this respect, Turkey has to make new reforms and adjustments in its political and economic system in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. So, it could be argued that Turkey's insistence on full membership to the EU made the EU as an actor pushing for economic and political reforms for a democratic Turkey with liberal economy standards. Furthermore, the EU factor in Turkish politics is accepted as an anchor for reinforcing Turkey's Western identity and Western oriented foreign policy orientation. It is important to note that the economic criteria of the EU do not pose a great problem for Turkey as a result of the Customs Union and the structure of Turkish economy. As it will be explained, the

main problem is the political ones. So, the influence of the EU on Turkish economy will be examined on the future prospects of Turkey's full membership.

4.1 A Historical Overview of the Relations between Turkey and the EC/EU

The establishment of the relations between EC/EU and Turkey depended on the systematic factors emerged after 1945 and the geostrategic position of Turkey. The emerging Cold War pushed Turkey to play a role inherited from the Ottoman Empire, which was balancing Russian power in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 19th century. Turkey was a key player in the containment strategy of the US against the Soviet Union; as a member of the Western bloc Turkey acted as a buffer zone. She prevented the expansion of the Soviet power to the Southern Europe and the oil rich places of the Middle East. This important strategic position and Western orientation made Turkey a member of Western institutions like NATO, OECD, and the European Council at the height of the Cold War.

Similarly, the application of Turkey to the EC for the associate membership in 1959, derived mainly from political concerns.⁵ In spite of the fact that, the EC, at that time, was overwhelmingly an economic institution and Turkish economy was not good enough to cope with the close relations with the Community, the membership was seen as an economic extension of the Western political link. The strategic concerns eased Turkey's recognition as a European state. In the Cold War period, identification with a bloc-whether East, West or non-aligned was the source for the definition of identity.⁶ Turkey, at the southern part of NATO was a part of Western security system on which the identity of Western Europe was based and found its identity in Europe within the context of this strategic culture.⁷

Since the disintegration period of the Ottoman Empire, Westernization has been considered as a means of modernizing and the developing the country. As continuity,

Republic of Turkey was founded through the adaptation of Western political and economic model. After 1945, Westernization gained a new dimension, it not only meant to adopt a given reform model but also the attempts spent in order to decrease the possibility of deviations from the modernization project.⁸ Thus, the membership of the Western institutions served as an anchor preventing the deviations from the modernizing project and legitimizing the pro-Western economic and political steps for the possible reactions, which arise in a multi-party system democratic country.⁹

The application of Greece for the association to the EU in 1959 was another political factor for Turkey's application to the EC. Turkish elite held the view that Turkey should be in all the platforms where Greece is placed given the competition and strained relations between the two countries. In addition, the need for foreign aid to improve the liberal economy attempts of the ruling party DP was the other incentive pushing Turkey to make an application for an association with the EC.¹⁰ The Community's response to Turkey was based on political concerns; the positive response of the Community reflected the desire to anchor Turkey to NATO and to balance its relations with the Eastern Mediterranean members of NATO.¹¹

The Ankara Agreement set three periods for the implementation of the association period; the final stage of the agreement was the establishment of a customs union between the parties. In the first period, which is called as the preparatory period, the EC would make the necessary financial aid to help Turkey in the implementation of the association. In this period, the relations went smoothly and in 1967, Turkey applied for the start of the second phase, which is called as the transitional period, and this period started with the signing of the additional protocol in 1971. This protocol included a program for the trade liberalization, which would be finalized with the signing of Customs union at the latest at the end of 1995.

1970s were problematic for the EC and Turkey for various reasons. Turkey increasingly began to interpret the association with Europe in terms of economic development rather than as a matter of foreign policy. Faced with the difficulties of 1973-oil crisis and American arms embargo, Turkey questioned the advantages of this association period. Turkish industrialists advocated that that the period to the transition to Customs Union was very short and Turkish economy based on important substitution would be damaged.¹² Under these conditions, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit requested the review of Turkey-EC relations and an additional five years period in 1973. This led to the suspension of the Turkey-EC relations for a certain time.¹³

During this phase, in contrast to Turkey's changing direction of seeing EC as a matter of economic concern rather than a foreign policy issue, the EC put more emphasis on political concerns rather than economic ones. The Community took steps for the further political cooperation and making itself a civilian power. With the belief that the membership would facilitate the transition and consolidation of democracy in Greece and Spain where authoritarian regimes held power in the beginning of 1970s, EC welcomed their application. The accession of Greece to the Community in 1981 would lead to the intensifying of the problems between the Community and Turkey would complicate the membership road for Turkey. From then, Cyprus question and Aegean disputes began to be placed in the agenda of EC/EU-Turkey relations.

The attempts for transforming the Community from an economic entity towards a political organization, which aimed to create a union of democratic and liberal states, started in 1962. Even in the Founding agreement of the EC, the Treaty of Rome, it is stated that any democratic European state could apply for the

membership to the institution. 1962 Birkelbach Report further affirmed that states guaranteeing the implementation of democracy and respecting fundamental rights and freedom could be a full member to the Community. 1973 Copenhagen Summit mentioned that the European identity was based on democracy and human rights.¹⁴ For the sustainment of economic integration, the political system of the states should be harmonized whereby full integration could become possible.

The military coup d'état taking place Turkey in 1980 was significant in the sense that it started an era where political factors in the relations between the EC and Turkey began to effect the economic relations. From then, influence of the EC on Turkey's political system increased. After the coup d'état, the EC pressed Turkey for the rapid transition to democracy. It imposed various embargoes on Turkey ranging from diplomatic warnings decisions and economic ones in order to urge her reconstructing democracy.¹⁵ In 21 January 1982, the European Parliament agreed to suspend the Association Agreement till the restoration of political order guaranteeing the democratic principles and respect for human rights. The Agreement could only be reactivated in 1988. After the normalization of the relations, in 1987, Turkey applied for the full membership. The Commission spent two years in evaluating the application of Turkey. In 1980s, Turkey's economy was highly liberalized and the economy opened to new markets, the government under Turgut Özal held the view that the full membership would facilitate Turkey's integration with the world markets and for democratization.

However, after two years of examination, the Commission rejected the application of Turkey on various grounds. The Commission officially stated that the Community aimed to implement the Single Act and would not accept any negotiations with any country for the full membership before 1993. The Commission

also mentioned that Turkey had important deficiencies in political pluralism and respect for human rights. Besides, the problems over Cyprus and with Greece were regarded as obstacles to the membership. Nevertheless, the Commission suggested the reactivation of the Association Agreement and deepening the links between the Community and Turkey through greater degree of cooperation in economics.

Understanding that the full membership was a distant option especially while dramatic developments concerning the international system was taking place, the establishment of the Customs Union especially beginning from 1993 became the focal point in the relations between Turkey and the EU in the post Cold War era.¹⁶

4.2 The EU and Turkey in the post- Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War at the beginning of 1990s and the transformation of the international system from a bipolar world order to a new unique order created important repercussions for Turkey and the EC. In this new era, as the other actors in the international system both had to redefine their domestic and foreign policies, which were previously designed in the framework of ideological competition. The transition of the ex-communist Central and Eastern European countries to a democratic and liberal economy state system brought about the idea of a united Europe under the EC. The EC was reshaped and turned into the EU in Maastricht Summit in 1991. Turkey was faced with a new environment; on the one hand, its importance for the Western world, which has been its a priori policy option, decreased while new foreign policy links such as the newly emerged Turkish Republics in the Central Asia and Caucasus emerged.

After the signing of trade and cooperation agreements with the Central and Eastern European countries between 1989 and 1992, 1993 Copenhagen European Council agreed that the accession of Central and Eastern European Countries

(CEECs) was a common objective. The Summit set about membership criteria, which basically determined the conditions of a pre-accession strategy. The Copenhagen criteria were composed of three elements for the membership in political terms, to achieve stable democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for, and the protection of minorities. Second element required the economic conditions; the candidate country is to have a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. The last one necessities the existence of the ability to assume the responsibilities of membership such as the adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary solidarity.

The decision of the EU to integrate the CEECs and the Copenhagen criteria, especially the political ones, were notable for the process of European integration and the relations between Turkey and the EU. The settlement of democratic regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe relaxed Europe from external threats, eased its capacity of being a civilian power producing peace and security in Europe. Now, it became clearer that “on the EU context security is built on the international affinities as well as on shared norms and values, rather than on external threats and this conceptual transformation of security is reflected in the political demands of Copenhagen Criteria.”¹⁷ The elimination of traditional security conceptualization in the Europe pushed the EU as an external actor to have more pressure and influence on Turkey for the development of political conditions in order to improve democracy.

Another significant result of the Eastern enlargement of the EU was the fact that the attempts for the integration of the CEECs were brought about the definition of Europeaness. Since CEECs could be seen as an integral part of the European history

and the enlargement could provide the return of these countries to the Europe adding a cultural dimension.¹⁸ Thus, it could be argued that the fact that the full membership of the CEECs countries was given priority confirmed that the definition of “Europeanness” was linked to geography, culture and history. This was a great concern for Turkey being a Muslim state not a Christian one in spite of being geographically in the borders of Europe, but defined as the other throughout the European history.¹⁹

Considering that the eastern enlargement could be the last wave of enlargement, Turkey insisted on the finalization of the Customs Union beginning from 1992.²⁰ In its response to Turkish application for full membership, the EU called for taking steps for accelerating the establishment of the Customs Union. It was observed that the EU states believed that it was difficult to “digest” Turkey at the same time with the Central and Eastern Europe but the Customs Union was “necessary and enough to keep Turkey pro-European while denying membership.”²¹ However, for Turkey, the Customs Union was seen as a means for the full membership, the Customs Union would finalize the transition period and start the final period when Turkey’s accession could be possible.

In March 1995, the Customs Union Agreement was signed and was welcomed in a joyful way in Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller called the establishment of the Customs Union a “historical moment.” She stated that the Customs Union was an important and vital milestone in Turkey’s relations with the EU.²² The establishment of the Customs Union was also interpreted as a factor increasing the confidence of Turkey about their Europeanness since they had “officially foot at the door”.²³

The Agreement of Customs Union was highly politicized; ²⁴Greece withdrew its veto for the Agreement only after the setting a certain date for opening accession negotiations with the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus. Additionally, the European Parliament was very reluctant to ratify the agreement on the grounds of human rights violations, democratic deficits and Kurdish question in Turkey.²⁵ Nevertheless, the influence of the US and British and French diplomats and the fear of strengthening Islamist forces Turkey solved the problem and the Agreement was ratified in 1995.²⁶

In spite of Turkish expectation of the candidacy for full membership, the EU did not announce Turkey as a candidate for the membership at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. The Council affirmed that Turkey was eligible for the membership and included it in the enlargement process where ten CEECs, Cyprus and Malta took place. While Turkey was taken in the enlargement process it was not given a pre-accession strategy like the other candidate countries; rather a European Strategy was developed in order to improve the relations between the EU and Turkey. In the Turkish government 's statement about the conclusions of Luxembourg European Council, it was mentioned that partial, prejudiced and exaggerated statements were made about Turkey' s internal structure and its foreign policy including Cyprus question.²⁷ On the basis of this, Turkish Foreign Ministry announced it would suspend political dialogue with the EU while sustaining economic relations.²⁸ The Luxembourg Summit was significant for Turkey-EU relations in terms of Turkey's alignment with the Western world. As Ziya Öniş writes: "...For the first time there was a clear recognition that there was nothing inevitable about Turkey's claims to full membership. This is turn led to a generalized sense of isolationism, not present at any other stage in Turkish history during the post Cold War period."²⁹

In March 1998, the European Commission set forth a pre-accession strategy for Turkey and Turkey's convergence with the Copenhagen Criteria was assessed. As a result, in 1999 Progress Report, the Commission agreed to recognize Turkey as a candidate for the full membership to the EU and at the Helsinki European Council held in 11-12 December 1999; Turkey was given the status of a candidate country.

The decision of the EU to announce Turkey as a candidate for the full membership to the EU is a result of the political developments within the EU and Turkey. ³⁰First, the shift in the number of EU states from Christian to Social Democratic governments, most notably in Germany, softened the stance of the EU. Chancellor Gerald Schröder's government aimed to improve the relations with Turkey and the EU. In this respect, a letter sent by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to German Chancellor Gerald Schröder in May 1999 reaffirming Turkey's commitment to implement the domestic reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria.³¹ The commitment of the newly elected coalition government of Democratic Left Party (DLP) and the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) to undertake political and economic reforms opening the way for a more stable Turkey strengthened Turkey's position in the eyes of Europe. Second, the attempts of the Clinton administration, though being criticized for interference in European affairs, were influential. President Clinton paid a five-day visit for Turkey in November 1999 and made supportive explanations for Turkey's accession to the EU.³²

Third, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK pulled off a great political economic and security burden on Turkey. From then, Turkey had the opportunity to develop a more flexible approach to Kurdish question because the security restraint on greater political rights to Kurdish population seemed nearly to end. Turkey's combat with PKK was resulted in the accusation of human rights

violations by the EU countries and pressure for a more civilian solution to Kurdish problem. Being aware of the fact that, Öcalan's death sentence would jeopardize Turkey's chances of becoming a candidate, Turkish government implicitly expressed that it might put the issue before the European Court of Human Rights particularly in the event that Turkey be granted accession status at Helsinki.³³ Accordingly, Ankara put Öcalan's case before the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Fourth, the improving relations between Turkey and Greece after the earthquake in Turkey on 17 August 1999 lifted the Greek obstacle. Within the framework of the so-called earthquake diplomacy, Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and his counterpart George Papandreou were committed to improve the relations.

Differently from these political developments, as it will be explained in Chapter 5, the implications of the inadequacy of the EU during Kosovo Crisis in terms of military and political aspects underlined the strategic importance of Turkey's geostrategic location. Moreover, Turkey's military power could make a significant contribution to the ESDP. In this framework, it is argued that Turkey's candidacy to the EU is a result of the transformation of the EU's enlargement policy from a political character to a geopolitical and strategic one.³⁴

4.3. The Influence of the EU on Turkey in the post-Cold War Era

4.3.1 Political System

The political relations between Turkey and the EC/EU have served as the most problematic case for Turkey's full membership to the EU. Turkey has lagged behind the EU political standards and the EC/EU has been a criticizer of Turkish political system especially democracy and human rights conditions since 1980. As explained in the previous sections of the chapter, the EC prioritized the democracy and human rights in the relations with Turkey after 1980 military coup.³⁵ Even, before this point,

Turkey's political system was criticized. At the negotiations between Turkey and the EC for the association between 1959 and 1963, where the relations were mainly based on systematic factors, problems related with the political system in Turkey were articulated by the EC.³⁶

During the Cold War, the Turkish elite failed to understand the necessity of political reforms for the improvement of the relations with the EU. However, even in a limited degree, the desire of the EU membership created more democratic political conditions and greater respect for human rights in Turkey beginning from 1980s. In the post-Cold War Era, the EU set the "respect for human rights" and a "strong democracy" as the prerequisite of membership as clarified in Copenhagen political criteria and this gave the EU a larger leverage to influence Turkish political system. Since the Customs Union could manifest that the Turkish economy can compete with the economics of the EU, political convergence between the parties turned out to be the focal point in the relations. The fact that Turkey has failed to meet the requirements of the EU political standards caused problems during the ratification of the Customs Union in the second half of 1995 and the decision of the Union not to recognize Turkey as a candidate for full membership in Luxembourg Summit of 1997. In this respect, Agenda 2000 serving as the reference for the EU's enlargement stated that Turkey fell short of the standards of the EU in terms of individual rights and freedom of expression and criticized Turkey's combat with PKK terrorism in the south and urged for a civilian solution.

Beginning from 1995, in order to converge with the EU political criteria, Turkey has made various adjustments in its political system. The EU has criticized Turkey in terms of its political system in the following areas namely; the deficiency of full participatory democracy and the rule of law, the role of military which is examined

in the framework of participatory democracy, breach of human rights and the Kurdish problem in that framework. Furthermore, the resolution of territorial disputes with Greece and Cyprus problem have been the long lasting and complex political obstacles for Turkey's quest for full membership to the EU.

In terms of the participatory democracy and the rule of law, the European Parliament explained in Gonzales Report of 13 November that 1982 Constitution, which stipulated restrictions on participatory democracy, human rights violations and Kurdish problem constituted the main problems of Turkish political system.³⁷ Considering the criticisms of the EU, in July 1995, Turkey adopted a reform package. In that package, the university professors are allowed to participate in the political parties, the election age is decreased to 18 from 21, public workers were allowed to establish unions and voting rights were extended to the citizens living abroad.³⁸ About the rule of law, the EU focuses on the presence of military judges in the State Security Courts. Turkey replaced the military judge in the State Security Courts with a civilian judge as observed during the trial of Abdullah Öcalan in Ankara State Security Court taking place in 1999. Upon the criticisms of the EU after the closing of the Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court in 1998, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) adopted amendments to the Political Parties Law, which hardened the closure of a political party and banning its members from subsequent participation in political life.³⁹

In the framework of participatory democracy in Turkey, the role of military in Turkish political life contradicts with the civilian structure of democratic standards of the EU. The military has a unique status in Turkish politics and could have significant influence on domestic political life.⁴⁰ The military has intervened in Turkish domestic political life three times. (1960, 1971, 1980) and the so-called post

modern coup d'etat led the resignation of pro-Islamist WP and the right wing True Path Party (TPP) coalition government in 1997. Apart from the fact that the governments had to consider the policies of the military about politics due to the state structure, the military could influence the decisions of the government through National Security Council (NSC). The upper ranks of Turkish military staff could express the views of the military in the critical political discussions and limit the power of the government.⁴¹ 1998 and 1999 Regular Reports of the European Commission on Turkey criticized this role and recommended the NSC to be employed as an advisory body.⁴²

The breach of human rights is the other issue to which the EU has attached great importance in the relations with Turkey. Turkey lags behind the EU standards due to its failure to prevent torture and ill treatment of citizens. The EU has reported many cases of "torture, extra-judicial execution and disappearances" in Turkey.⁴³ In 1990, a Human Rights Commission was established and a reform of political procedures was enforced in 1992. This reform stipulated that future suspects should only be held for 24 hours before being charged and granted them the right to demand the presence of a lawyer during preliminary questioning. In 1997, TGNA reduced the duration of police custody from fourteen days to four days and a High Board for Human Rights was established. In the fall of 1999, this Board presented a report entitled "Agenda Human Rights 2000" prepared by the representatives of some 50 Turkish universities as well as 18 non-governmental organizations. This contained several constitutional and legal amendment projects. In October, for the first time, the State Minister on Human Rights convened the state and civil society representatives to create a Consultative Council on Human Rights. This was an important step towards reconciling the State with civil society.⁴⁴ In 1999, a draft bill

was provided for abolishing the death penalty, which will later be abolished, and result in the life- time prison of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

Within the context of human rights, freedom of expression is a unique issue where Turkey and EU relations remain very problematic. In this framework, the EU states: “Article 7,8 of Anti Terror Law and Article 158,169, 311 and 312 of Criminal Code enforced for the protection of the unity of state, territorial integrity, secularism and respect for formal institutions, are reported to be used to charge and sentence elected politicians, journalists, trade unionists or NGO workers.”⁴⁵ In that end, the domestic political structure of Turkey poses a great challenge for a more liberal democratic system.

The strong tradition of Kemalism, which involves a deep commitment to secularism and the unitary nation- state, hardens the development of a more liberal political system in Turkey. The Turkish elite still fears the constant threat of fragmentation or the breakdown of nation state. This is a direct result of the Sevres experience during 1920s; the so-called Sevres Syndrome is still influential in Turkish politics. ⁴⁶Turkey tries to prevent the spread of political waves against the unity and the secular character of state for the security concerns.⁴⁷ In this framework, Turkey is reluctant to give greater rights to Kurdish people partly as a result of PKK experience and to develop a mild approach to political Islam in Turkish politics. Thus, the security needs of Turkey justify certain limitations to the country’s democratic reforms.⁴⁸

As a step for improving its human rights record, Turkey adopted Regulation on Apprehension, Detention and Release Procedures aiming to improve the current practices in police stations and courses for police training were initiated in 1998. As an improvement to prevent torture cases in the same year, the Turkish Parliament

adopted a law amending articles 243, 245 and 354 of Penal Code. This law stipulated higher penalties for public officers employing torture cases.⁴⁹

One of the significant problems related with Turkey-EU relations in terms of human rights is the Kurdish question. There are 8-15 million Kurds in Turkey depending on the source.⁵⁰ These greatly live at the southeastern part of Anatolia and the others live in the metropolitan cities such as Istanbul, İzmir and Ankara. Kurds are not recognized as constituting a minority group in Turkey. Lausanne Treaty of 1923 stipulated the minorities in Turkey are to be identified by religious differences rather than ethnic ones. In this sense, non-Muslim communities, Christians, and Jewish are considered to be minorities in Turkey. In accordance with Atatürk's definition of nationalism, the ones living in the borders of Turkey are deemed as Turkish citizens regardless of their ethnic or national origin. As suggested, this kind of identification is related to the attempts of Western powers designed for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Sevres Treaty of 1920 called for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey fears that the enlargement of Kurdish political and economic rights could reinforce the separatist tendencies.

In 1980s, with the establishment of the pro-Kurdish separatist group PKK turned the Kurdish question from a political problem to a security one. PKK and Turkish Armed Forces were involved in military clashes for 13 years. Turkey has suffered from this problem politically and economically. Many Turkish soldiers died and the development of the Southeastern Anatolia could not be maintained due to the insecure environment and the channeling of the state resources to the military.

The Kurdish question has challenged Turkey's democracy and human rights records since 1990s. The EU has called for the end of emergency rule in the

Southeastern Anatolia and urged for a civilian solution of the problem guaranteeing the rights of Kurds. According to the EU, greater tolerance for expressing Kurdish cultural identity and the recognition of certain forms of Kurdish identity should be in the scope of this solution.⁵¹ Turkey officially accepted the existence of Kurdish problem and the restrictions on the cultural activities of Kurds were softened. The prohibition on speaking in Kurdish was eliminated and celebrations of for the Persian's New Year Day (Nevruz) were allowed in 1991.⁵² In 1994, Turkish government decided to lift immunities of six deputies of Democracy Party (DEP) claiming their support for PKK. Following this, the Constitution Court closed DEP in the same year. As a reaction of this, in 1994, the European Parliament decided to freeze the activities of Joint EU-Turkey Parliamentary Commission.

As an another part of meeting the EU requirements, Cyprus problem and the territorial disputes with Greece need to be solved for Turkey's full membership to the EU. In Luxembourg Summit of the EU in 1997, the EU stipulated: "Strengthening Turkey's link with the EU depends on country's pursuit of political and economic reforms on which it has embarked including alignment of human rights and standards and practices on those force in the EU, respect for minorities, the establishment of satisfactory ad stable relations between Greece and Turkey in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice and support for negotiations under the aegis of UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions."⁵³

In spite of the fact that it is not an explicit condition for Turkey's entry in the EU, in Helsinki European Council held in 10 - 11 December 1999, the EU has urged the candidate countries to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and related issues through International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the latest by

the end of 2004.⁵⁴ Thus, the EU unambiguously makes it clear that a candidate country having problems with a member country could not be accede to the EU. On the other hand, from early 90s, Turkey has suffered Greek veto in the financial aid and significant political decisions. In early 1990s, the EU failed to grant Maastricht package, financial assistance, and Fourth Financial Protocol due to Greek veto based on Cyprus problem.⁵⁵ In addition, Greece stipulated the ratification of the Customs Union in 1996 conditional on the beginning of accession negotiations with Greek Cypriots.

As the Kurdish problem, Cyprus question is a critical issue, which rises deep emotions and national sentiments in Turkey on part of political elite and public.⁵⁶ Within this framework, the EU membership is seen as a catalyst for Turkey's contributions to the problem.⁵⁷ The Cyprus problem has been Europeanized after the application of Greek Cypriot to the Union in 1990 and that of Turkey in 1987. The EU opened accession negotiations with Greek Cypriots in 1995, included it in the first wave of the candidates in Luxembourg Summit, and announced that Cyprus could be a full member till 2002. In 1999, the EU declared that the solution of Cyprus problem is not a prerequisite for the accession of Cyprus to the EU. From these developments, it could be argued the EU preferred to pressure Turkey by highlighting that Turkey's possibility of full membership could increase if the country actively contributes to the settlement of the problem prior to Helsinki Summit. However, the fact that the EU pressures on Turkey while giving no prospect for the candidacy and the membership of the country eliminated the bargaining capacity of the EU for a solution to the problem.

After the decision of the EU to start the accession negotiations with Greek Cypriots, six months after 1996 EU Intergovernmental Conference in 1995, Turkey

and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) signed a declaration on December 28, 1995. The declaration asserted the reinforcement of the ties between two countries in political and economic levels. On August 6, 1997 Turkey and TRNC established the Association Council which engineers partial integration at economic, military and foreign policy levels. When the European Council decisions of Luxembourg Summit declared that the EU would start accession negotiations with Cyprus and excluded Turkey from the list of candidates for the next wave of EU enlargement, the problem worsened. President of TRNC Rauf Denktaş and Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, declared the integration between Turkey and TRNC. Symbolically, the first meeting of the Association Council between Turkey and TRNC took place on March 31, 1998 the day the EU began accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots.⁵⁸

1999 Helsinki European Council changed the situation leading a concrete framework for Turkey's compliance with EU political norms and standards and increased the pushing force of the EU for the improvement of the political conditions. In other words, the announcement of Turkey's candidacy to the EU in Helsinki Summit deepened the role of EU membership as a carrot for the improvement of Turkish political system in terms of democracy and respect of human rights. So, the Turkey is more pressed in order to develop more concrete steps in the political system.

4.3.2 Economic System

The relations between Turkey and the EU were firstly established on economics. The Ankara Agreement firstly aimed to have economic convergence between both parties, the EC/EU provided monetary aid and grants in accordance with the framework of the Association Agreement. As a result of the institutional and legal

framework of Turkey-EU economic relations, Turkish economy is greatly integrated into the EU and more than % 50 of the trade relations is conducted with the EU member states. More than % 50 of the foreign investment in Turkey is made by the EU countries. Especially after the introduction of the Customs Union and liberalization of Turkish economy, Turkish economy is greatly integrated with the European Market. The Customs Union has generally improved third countries' access to the Turkish market. Further, as a step to integrate Turkey' s economy to the EU economy, Turkey signed Free Trade Agreements with the EU candidate countries in 1999.⁵⁹

The influence of EC/EU on Turkish economy has been extended in three pillars; reforms required meeting Copenhagen criteria, grants and aids under Community Programme and increasing trade relations.⁶⁰ In this respect, the quest for the full membership to the EU and subsequent full membership has created and could create a more prosperous, more economically stable and a more secure country for foreign investments. The EU has strict criteria for low inflation rates, transparency rules and the foreign trade balance of the countries as well as a high rate for GNP and strong administrative and legal economic structure.

In terms of reforms, the criteria of EU membership in economy require the solution of serious problems of Turkish economy. By many of the observers and politicians, Turkey is accepted as a big market and owning a large potential with its young population, location, and dynamic economic growth. It is reported that in spite of its regularly functioning market economy, macroeconomic instability, high inflation rates, deep regional gaps and weak financial sector are the obstacles reducing the ability of Turkey to integrate with the European market.⁶¹ Further, the political stability is reported as a complementary factor for comprehensive structural

reforms. At this point, incentives for the EU membership could lead to the elimination of deep regional gaps and differences in the incomes of the segments of the society which would bear significant political and social reflections.

Turkey has made various reforms in order to develop the economic relations with the EU and to meet the economic criteria. Mainly, before the introduction of the Customs Union, reforms have been made to provide the smooth implementation of the Customs Union.⁶² With the entry into force of the Customs Union on 31 December 1995, Turkey abolished duties and other charges; it has fulfilled its responsibilities concerning harmonization of customs legislation. The Customs Union created an imbalance unfavorable to Turkey; however, it is expected to make positive changes in the long run. The Customs Union led an increase in the external liberalization of Turkish economy, it has improved third countries' access to the Turkish market and 66% export rate of Turkey to the EU countries rose to 70%.⁶³

As a part of the liberalization adopted by Turkey in 1997, the Turkish government has succeeded in reducing the inflation and privatized state assets, which played an important role in debt redemption.⁶⁴ In 1999, three state banks, Emlak Bankası, Ziraat Bankası and Halkbank were privatized and Banking Regulation and Inspection Body was established to improve transparency. The pension code on the public deficits was amended and changes about customs code, the bill on unfair competition in imports and accreditation, and the capital markets board are put before TGNA.⁶⁵

4.3.3 Foreign Policy Orientation

As suggested, to be a full member to the EU is regarded as the acceptance of being European by Turkish elite and Turkish people. Thus, the course of relations between Turkey and the EU has determined how much Turkey identifies itself as

being European or a Western country. In other words, Turkey's relations with the EU could be characterized as an identity problem. This fact has been further reflected in the domestic choices of Turkish people and thus on foreign policy orientation. While the Western- oriented foreign policy of Turkey seems hard to be transformed, the ambivalent relations between Turkey and the EU in the post-Cold War era, caused serious breakdowns in Turkey's identification itself as a Western or European country. This turned into one of the main factors in the rise of political Islam and growing nationalism in Turkish politics. The emergence of a European identity with the enlargement of the EU to CEECs reinforced Turkey's feeling of exclusion and being the other. Furthermore, the reluctance of some EU members such as Germany to admit Turkey on cultural grounds created an anti-Western and defensive posture in Turkey.

Geographically, Turkey is a European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian country. Historically, Turkey has been the place where the Eastern and Western culture has met. However, beginning from the 19th period, Turkey has opted Western political system and being a European country rather than the other two components. Its close relations with the Western world and Western oriented foreign policy during the Cold War were a reflection of this choice. As suggested in the second part of the chapter, Turkey's identity was formulated within the restraints of the strategic environment of the Cold War period. In the Cold War period, the idea of the West and even Europe meant NATO members and other free market states. Being a member of NATO and an associate member of the EC, Turkey as a developing and Muslim country considered itself to be one of the European countries. However, with the changing international circumstances and the nature of the relations with the EU, Turkey had to discover which component of its complex identity would prevail its

both domestic and foreign politics. The independence of the Turkish Republics in the Central Asia and Caucasus and the rising trend of Islam in Turkish politics with the democratization process in 1990s challenged the European choice of Turkey.

On the other hand, the transformation of the international system in 1990s eliminated the basis for the necessity of the close Turkey-EU relations in the framework of a larger Western alliance. As Turkey, the new situation brought the challenge for a definition and reconstruction of a European order. The first task of this order was the definition of European identity, which has posed certain limitations on the improvement of the relations between Turkey and the EU.

Through the establishment of an immediate road map for the CEECs, the EU tended to indicate that Europeaness is based on geography and religion. In spite of their long time of Communism history and political and economic backwardness, the CEECs were agreed to be admitted the EU in Luxembourg Summit of 1997. Considering the seven- years time between the disintegration of the Soviet Union and this decision, the political and economic adjustment of these countries to be a full member of the EU seemed harder. The arguments related with the economic backwardness and the deficiency of democratic institutions have been used for a reason for helping the political and economic adjustment of the CEECs. In this framework, the full membership of Turkey which is a Muslim country, which is geographically in Europe but defined as the other throughout the history will result in the reidentification of the EU as well as Turkey itself. In other words, the internal political constitution of Turkey and the construction of the collective identity of the EU are deeply related with the nature of the relation between them.⁶⁶

While the economic and political problems of CEECs have been assessed to be solved together with EU membership, Turkey's political and economic deficits are

regarded as significant barriers for Turkey's accession to the EU. Considering that the capacity of the CEECs in political and economic terms is lower than Turkey, the attitude towards Turkey was suggested as being discriminative by Turkey. In this sense, after the Luxembourg Summit on 13-14 December 1997, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz accused Europeans of ethnic and religious prejudice and discrimination and declared a new Berlin wall; a cultural wall was built between the EU and Turkey as a result of decision.⁶⁷

In fact, the meeting of Christian Democrats of the EU in March 1997 focused on the importance of civilizational differences between Turkey and the EU.⁶⁸ This decision was influential in Luxembourg Summit. Especially, the firm stance of the Christian Democrats in Germany blocked a positive result for Turkey.⁶⁹ The underlying facts of this approach of the EU are very well reflected in the words of Heinz Kramer:

It can hardly be denied that a majority of western European politicians and even more members of the general public are of the opinion that in a cultural and historical perspective the Turks are not really Europeans and Turkey is not an integral part of Europe. This perception can be regarded as a result of a process of European identity creation which has unfolded since the Middle Ages. Over centuries the Turk and the Ottoman Empire was assigned the role of the other which was by definition that of the non-European. More recent political experiences with Turkey as a reliable partner of the western security alliance and a country associated with a multitude of personal contacts with the westernized Turks at the elite level, have not contributed to a substantial revision of this deeply rooted European view of Turk. It should be recognized that the EU project is not a political and economic one but includes civilization and cultural factors.⁷⁰

The ambivalence of the EU towards Turkey's membership in 1990s with its transformational structure manifested how the EU membership serves as a force of determining which component of the identity of Turkish people will dominate her domestic and foreign policy choices. The crisis-prone relations with the EU especially in mid 1990s, has resulted in an appropriate climate for the rise of

authoritarian brands of identity politics, namely political Islam as well as ethnic nationalism.⁷¹ As Çağlar Keyder notes:

The European policy of ambivalent inclusion exacerbates the Turkish identity problem... Thus, the behavior of the EC paradoxically undermines the credibility of the pro-western political forces within Turkey, which have to engage in much defensive posturing.... Each delay by the EC Commission and each veto by Greece recalls the search for identity that characterized the decline of the unsettled issue, which has dominated Turkish cultural life ever since. Commission and each veto by Greece recalls the search for identity that characterized the decline of the unsettled issue, which has dominated Turkish cultural life ever since.⁷²

In that sense, it is not a coincidence that the Welfare Party could get the highest votes of its history in 1995 when the Turkish government tried hard for the ratification of the Customs Union. On the other hand, the election of nationalist parties DLP and NAP in April 1999 were realized within a period when Turkey suspended the political dialogue with EU. The stance of the EU on Cyprus and Kurdish problem which is of a great concern for the nationalist sentiments contributes to the emergence of anti-Western sentiments. In an analysis made before the Luxembourg rebuff, Heinz Kramer and Friedman Müller explained the implications of any clear prospect of Turkey's full membership to the EU.

..Such a move would not imply Turkey's accession to the EU, but it would help to consolidate Turkey's links with the rest of Europe. Beyond that, it would contribute to the strengthening of the domestic position of Turkey's Westernizers; it would revive the European orientation of Turkey's public; it would force Erbakan and his followers to make a more unequivocal position with respect to Turkey's position in Europe. The element of a self-fulfilling prophecy that it is a part of Europe's doubts about Turkey's future European orientation would be eliminated and the process of Turkey's creeping alienation from Europe could be reversed. European criticism of Turkey's domestic affairs would become less hypocritical in the eyes of many Turks.⁷³

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has mainly argued that the relations between the EC/EU have a unique position for Turkey's political and economic system as well as the

identification of her identity. In the post-Cold War era, the EC activating mainly in economics turned into the EU which could be regarded as one of the main actors of the international system in terms of politics, culture, and economics. The transformation of the EU brought about the institutionalization of the accession process of the candidate countries to the EU and redefinition of the relations with the third countries. In this framework, the EU developed Copenhagen criteria as standards which a candidate country must meet. In this framework, Turkey was included in the enlargement strategy of the EU in Luxembourg Summit of 1997 but not given a pre-accession strategy till 1999.

These developments could be interpreted as the interference of the EU in Turkish domestic politics ever than before given Turkey's insistent desire and application for the full membership to the EU in 1989. Accordingly, Turkish traditional political system has contradicting points with the EU's standards of a democratic political system and Turkey had to make adjustments in its political system. The EU mentioned what Turkey should do in its 1998 and 1999 Progress reports and frequently made explanations about Turkey's political situation in an official way. In this respect, the main points the EU focused are the democratic system of Turkey, human rights problems, Kurdish question, and the role of military in the political life.

From 1995 to 1999, Turkey made some significant attempts like the replacement of military judges by a civilian judge in State Security Courts, improvements about the custody conditions and some amendments on Turkish Penal Code. However, the Kurdish problem and the role of military in Turkish political life have not been solved in a degree to meet EU requirements. Two problems are related with the

traditional Turkish political structure and the security concerns of Turkey thus seem harder to be resolved.

On the other hand, the nature of the relations between the EU and Turkey is a strong actor for the definition of the multiple Turkish identities and its foreign policy orientation. In Turkey, to be a full member of the EU means the recognition of Turkey as a European state and the justification of Western oriented policies both at home and abroad. The crisis-prone relations with the EU and Turkey from 1995 to 1999 served as one of the factors leading to the rise of Islamist or national sentiments in Turkish politics. At this point, the fact that the EU accepted the CEECs as candidate countries in spite of their communist history and adjustment problems arose concerns in Turkey about the inevitableness of the EU membership and the credibility of the EU. A great majority of Turkish people and Turkish elite tended to accept the main reason for Turkey's non-admission to the EU is being a Muslim and Eastern country.

1999 Helsinki Summit decision of the EU to announce Turkey as a candidate country for the full membership draws a certain framework for the prospect of membership. In spite of the fact that a candidate country is not necessarily to be a full member to the Union, it relaxed the reactionist tendencies in Turkey. The prospect of a possible membership, in other words seeing Turkey as an accepted candidate for the track of the membership to the EU acts an incentive for the further democratization and the strengthening of pro-western domestic and foreign policy orientation which is in line with the US security policy in the regions surrounding Turkey.

1 Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Türkiye ve Avrupa* (Ankara: İmge Kitabecisi, 1997), Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Avrupa Macerası: 1959-1999* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2000); Meltem Müftüler Baç, *Türkiye ve AB: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası İlişkiler* (*Turkey and the EU: Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*), trans. Simten Coşar (İstanbul: Alfa Yayıncılık, 2001); İlhan Tekeli and Selim İkin, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993); Mehmet Uğur, *The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma* (Hants: Ashgate Publishers, 1999); Canan Balkır and Alan Williams (eds.), *Turkey and Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993); Heinz Kramer "Turkey and the EU: A Multidimensional Relationship with Hazy Perspectives," Vojtech Mastny and R.Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, "The EU and Turkey", *Survival*, Vol.41, No.1, Spring 1999; Meltem Müftüler Baç, "The Never Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No.4, 1998; Meltem Müftüler Baç, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics", *East European Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.2, 2000; Lauren M.Mclauren, "Turkey's Eventual Membership of the EU: Turkish Elite Perspectives on the EU", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2000; Paul Taylor, "Turkey-EU Relations In 2001: Structural Change and Agency Opportunity", *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol.9, No.1, 2001; Mehmet Uğur, "Europeanization and Convergence via Incomplete Contracts? The Case of Turkey, Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias (eds.), *Europeanization and Southern Periphery* (Great Britain: Frank Class Publishers, 2001).

² Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement states that "... as soon as the operation of the Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community". For the full text of Ankara Agreement see [http:// www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr).

³ Ersel Aydın and Dov Waxman, "A Dream Become Nightmare?: Turkey' s Entry into the EU", *Current History*, Vol..100 No.649, 2001, p.381.

⁴ Spyros A.Sofos, "Reluctant Europeans? European Integration and the Transformation of Turkey", Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias (eds.), *Europeanization and Southern Periphery* (Great Britain: Frank Class Publishers, 2001), p.248.

⁵ Atilla Eralp, "Soğuk Savaş' tan Günümüze Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", Eralp, *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, p. 90.

⁶ Gülnur Aybet and Meltem Müftüler Bac, "Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe", *International Journal*, Vol.55, No.4, Spring 2000, p.574.

⁷ Ibid., p.575.

⁸ Uğur, *The European Union and Turkey*, p.2.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Atilla Eralp, "Turkey and the EC in the Changing Post War International System", Balkır and Williams, *Turkey and Europe*, pp.26-8.

¹¹ Baç, *Türkiye ve AB*, p.26.

¹² Eralp, "Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği", p.95.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ A similar emphasis about the transformation of the EC from an economic organization to a political one has been made by Baç, *Türkiye ve AB*, p.129.

¹⁵ See İhsan Dağı, “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-1983: The Impact of European Diplomacy”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.32, No.2, April 1996.

¹⁶ Turkey considered that the establishment of a customs union would be a means for the full membership. The recommendation on this issue was given to then Prime Minister Turgut Özal by French Prime Minister Raymond Barre in 1988 during his visit to Ankara in 1988 and Özal directed his advisor Özden Sanberk to deal with this issue in 1990. The strategy was later developed in 1993. For the recommendation see Birand, *Türkiye’ nin Avrupa Macerası*, p.107.

¹⁷ Dietrich Jung, “Turkey and Europe, Ongoing Hypocrisy”, *Workshop Papers, No.35*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, 2001, p.11, Source: EBSCOHOST.

¹⁸ Sevılay Elgün Kahraman, “Rethinking Turkey-European Relations,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2000, p.6.

¹⁹ This fact is very well explained by A. Nuri Yurdusev as being in Europe but not being a European. For a comprehensive analysis of the construction of the European identity in terms and Turkey’s position see A. Nuri Yurdusev, “Avrupa’ yı Kurmak, Türkiye’ yi İdare Etmek ve Tarihin İpoteğinden Kurtulmak”, Şaban H.Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı, Ramazan Gözen (eds.), *Türkiye’ nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi ve Güvenlik* (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), pp.161-183.

²⁰ Birand, *Türkiye’ nin Avrupa Macerası*, p.481.

²¹ Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: Differences in the European and US Attitudes and Changes for Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.2, No.1, Spring 2001, p.26.

²² Shada Islam, “Customs Union with Turkey”, *Middle East International*, No.496, 17 March 1995, p.11.

²³ Nicole Pope, “Turkey’ s Sigh of Relief”, *Middle East International*, No.496, 17 March 1995, p.12.

²⁴ Birol Yeşilada, “The Worsening Turkey-EU Relations”, *SAIS Review*, Vol.19, No.1, Winter-Spring 1999, p.147.

²⁵ For a detailed examination of Turkey-EU relations within the framework of the Customs Union see Pia Christina Wood, “Turkey and Europe: A Relationship under Fire”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.10, No.3, Summer 1999.

²⁷ *Statement of Turkish Government regarding the Conclusions of Luxembourg European Council*, 14 December 1997, Source: [http://: www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr).

²⁸ *Statement of Turkish Foreign Ministry regarding the Conclusions of Luxembourg European Council*, 14 December 1997, Source: [http://: www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr).

²⁹ Ziya Öniş, “Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity. Perspectives on the International context of Democratization”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.10, No.3, Summer 1999, p.125.

³⁰ For a comprehensive analysis of these factors see Atilla Eralp, “From Luxembourg to Helsinki”, *Perceptions*, Vol.5, No.2, June-August 2000; William Park, “Turkey’s EU Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki-Ankara”, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.5, No.3, Autumn 2000.

³¹ See for the letter, *Hürriyet*, 5 June 1999.

³² These explanations are presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis in a detailed way.

³³ *Turkish Daily News*, 7 December 1999.

³⁴ Eralp, “From Luxembourg to Helsinki”, p.31.

³⁵ See İhsan Dağı, “İnsan Hakları ve Demokratikleşme:Avrupa Birliği Türkiye İlişkilerinde Siyasal Boyut”, Eralp, *Avrupa ve Türkiye*.

³⁶ Baç, *Türkiye ve AB*, p.27.

³⁷ See Zafer Üskül, “Turkey’s Democratization and the EU”, *Turkish Political Quarterly*, Vol.1, No.3, Fall 2002.

³⁸ Commission of the European Communities, *Regular Report on Turkey’ s Progress Towards’ s Accession*, Brussels,1998, p.11, Source: <http://www.kobinet.org.tr/kosgebabm/english/lib/tr/RR9 pdf>

³⁹ Ibid., p.10.

⁴⁰ For a comprehensive analysis of Turkish military in the domestic politics of Turkey especially in the post-Cold War era see Eric Rouleau, “Turkey’s Dream of Democracy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.79, No.6, November-December 2000.

⁴¹ For the civilian-military relations in Turkey see Nilüfer Narlı, “Civilian-Military Relations in Turkey”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001.

⁴² See *Regular Report on Turkey’ s Progress Toward Accession*, 1998, p. 14; *Regular Report on Turkey’ s Progress Towards Accession*, 1999, p. 10., Source: <http://www.kobinet.org.tr/kosgebabm/english/lib/tr/98pdf>

⁴³ *Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress* , 1998, p.15.

⁴⁴ Fisun Türkmen, “The Human Rights Factorin Turkey-EU Relations”, *Turkish Political Quarterly*, Vol.1, No.3, Fall 2001, p.64.

⁴⁵ *Regular Report on Turkey’ s Progress*, 1998, p.15.

⁴⁶ According to Sevres Treaty of 1920, the victorious allies of World War I limited the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire largely and Asia Minor was partitioned by the allies.

⁴⁷ The quest for Turkey’s full membership to the EU seems to challenge the basic tenets of Turkish domestic politics and Kemalism. For a comprehensive analysis of the possible changes, see Nathalie Tocci, “21st Century Kemalism Redefining Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Cold War Era”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001; Ziya Öniş, “Luxembourg , Helsinki and Beyond: An Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations”, *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, Fall 2000.

⁴⁸ Aydınlı and Voxman, “A Dream Become a Nightmare”, p.385.

⁴⁹ *Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress*, 1998, p.20.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.20.

⁵² Dağı, “İnsan Hakları ve Demokratikleşme“, p.158.

⁵³ *Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions*,12-13 December 1999, paragraph 35, Source: [http:// www.euroa.eu.int/council/off/conc/ dec.97.htm#Turkey](http://www.euroa.eu.int/council/off/conc/dec.97.htm#Turkey)

⁵⁴ See *Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 10-11 December 1999, paragraph, 4, Source: <http://www.europa.eu.int/council/ off/conclu/ dec.99.htm>.

⁵⁵ For the the influence of Greece regarding Cyprus problem on Turkey-EU relations, see Serhat Güvenç, “Turkey’ s Changing Perception of Greece Membership In the EU: 1981-1998”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, No.4, 1998.

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- ⁵⁶ Ziya Öniş, "Greek-Turkish Relations and the EU: A Critical Perspective", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, 2001, p.32, Source: EBSCOHOST.
- ⁵⁷ For EU' s policy about Cyprus see Neil Nugent, "EU Enlargement and Cyprus Problem", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No.1, March 2000.
- ⁵⁸ Semin Suverierol, "The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the EU", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, Spring 2003, p.60.
- ⁵⁹ *Regular Report on Turkey' s Progress*, 1998, p. 22.
- ⁶⁰ For the grants and aids of the EU to Turkey and trade relations see [http: www. mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)
- ⁶¹ See the economic criteria section of *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Toward Accession*, 1998 and 1999.
- ⁶² Baç, Türkiye ve AB, p. 164.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.177.
- ⁶⁴ *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress*, 1999, p.19.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.21.
- ⁶⁷ *Milliyet*, 16 December 1997.
- ⁶⁸ *Milliyet*, 4 March 1997.
- ⁶⁹ *Milliyet*, 6 March 1997.
- ⁷⁰ Heinz Kramer, "Turkey and the EU: A Multidimensional Relationship with Hazy Perspectives", Mastny and Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West*, p.26.
- ⁷¹ Öniş, "Turkey, Europe and Identity", p. 109.
- ⁷² Baç, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.2, No.1, Spring 2001, p.31, quoting Çağlar Keyder, "The Dilemma of Cultural Identity on the Margin of Europe", *Review*, Vol.16, No.1, 1993, p.23.
- ⁷³ Heinz Kramer and Friedeman Müller, "Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries in Robert Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (eds.) *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for a Greater Middle East* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p.183.

CHAPTER 5

THE US POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EU:

1995-1999

“We have a chance to start a new century on higher ground. To me, that means, in part, we must continue to fulfill the vision of a Europe, undivided, democratic and in peace for the first time in history anchored by a stable and prosperous Turkey.”¹These were the remarks of President Clinton in his speech made in TGNA in November 1999. During the post-Cold War era, in spite of the reluctance of the EU to accept Turkey as a full member, the US has vigorously supported Turkey's full membership to the EU beginning from mid 90s and still supports. Why? What is the implication of the EU membership of Turkey to the EU for the US foreign policy? The answer is mainly based on the strategic relations between the US and Turkey and the US policy towards the transatlantic alliance.

As suggested in the second part of the thesis, Turkey is at the intersection points of many areas where vital security policy steps of the US security policy are carried out, namely; the Middle East, the Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially the Caspian region, the Balkans and the Europe. In that respect, Turkey's foreign policy orientation is of utmost importance for the US security policy. As Alan Makovsky notes “Were Turkey to turn decidedly away from the West, the US interests in the

regions surrounding Turkey would suffer.”² Thus, the Western-oriented foreign policy of Turkey is a critical factor influencing the capacity of the US security policy in the regions surrounding Turkey. Second, as defined by President Clinton, stability of Turkey is notable for guaranteeing the interests of the US in those regions. The instability of Turkey could be a source of turmoil in the regions surrounding Turkey. In that end, the political developments of mid 90s in Turkey signaled the US to take certain preventive measures in terms of the foreign policy orientation and stability of Turkey.

In this period, Turkey suffered from domestic political and economic instability and Ankara alarmed Washington by her foreign policy steps exerting deviations from the Western- oriented foreign policy. During this period, two trends in traditional Turkish politics gained significant power, namely; political Islam and nationalism. These were related to unstable domestic and political conditions in Turkey and changing foreign policy conditions, especially the increasing alienation of Turkey from the West. In this context, Turkey’s problematic relations with the EU in this period prepared the ground for anti-Western sentiments. The emergence of Islam tended to divert Turkish foreign policy to the Muslim countries while nationalism resulted in more assertive and independent foreign policy steps as well as the increasing sensitivity to sovereignty issues.

In order to prevent the possible foreign policy deviations, to reinforce Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy orientation and to ensure the stability of Turkey, the US lobbied hard for Turkey’s accession to the EU from 1995 to 1999. For the US, the membership of Turkey to the EU could serve as an instrument strengthening Turkey’s domestic political and economic conditions, providing the elimination of

anti-Western sentiments in Turkish politics and reinforcing its western-oriented foreign policy orientation.

Furthermore, Turkey's accession to the EU would reinforce Turkey's integration to the Western defense and security mechanisms. Since Turkey is not a full member to the EU, she could not participate in the decision-making mechanisms of ESDP and this has led to repercussions in the country's alienation from the West, her role in the Western security system and NATO-EU link. For the US, Turkey is a critical actor for a stronger European defense and security mechanism and an efficient transatlantic alliance of more equal burdensharing. Turkey's accession to the EU would enhance the Euro-Atlantic area to the emerging Atlantic-Eurasia and intensify the leverage of the transatlantic alliance out of the Europe. Thus, US support for Turkey is related with both short term and long-term implications of the EU membership of Turkey on her domestic stability, foreign policy orientation, and the US policy towards the transatlantic alliance.

Under the above-mentioned conditions, this chapter will be a case study to prove the reasons leading to the support of the US for Turkey's full membership to the EU from 1995 to 1999. In this context, the foreign policy reflections of the rise of Islam and nationalism in Turkish domestic politics in the mid 90s and its significance for the US security interests in the regions surrounding Turkey will be focused. Second, the implications of Turkey's position in the emerging European security framework, the potential contributions of Turkey to the European security architecture and the US policy towards the transatlantic alliance will be examined. Last, the US support for Turkey's full membership to the EU on many official and unofficial platforms will be focused.

5.1 A Cost and Benefit Policy: The Reasons of the US Support for Turkey's Full Membership to the EU

It is very well known that the US wants a stable and democratic Turkey while the EU insists on democratic and stable Turkey.³ This arises from the divergence of the EU and the US policies about Turkey. As suggested in Chapter 3 and 4, Turkey is still assessed in terms of its strategic grounds for the US while political conditions set the course of the relations with the EU. These two different approaches lead different conclusions concerning how firmly should be anchored to the Western institutions as a whole.⁴ The US insists on Turkey's more intensive integration with the Europe, the EU, at this point, is reluctant to admit Turkey as a full member.⁵ Within this framework, it could be noticed that the relations between the US and Turkey depend on security and strategic considerations and lack political, social and economic considerations as Turkey shares with its relations with the EU. So, the US is in no position to carry the burden of integrating Turkey to the West.⁶ In this sense, the EU seems to be the most efficient and strongest anchor for Turkey's integration with the Western world.

The US policy about Turkey's domestic stability is conditional. This is the continuation of the US policy towards Turkey since the Cold War. During the Cold War, the US tended to support the parties following pro- American foreign policy steps in Turkey. These parties could be identified as the center right or center left parties in Turkey.⁷ So, it could be suggested that the US favors a conditional stable Turkey which means Turkey should be stable and be governed by governments following foreign policy steps greatly converging with those of the US. Within this framework, Turkey's full membership to the EU would retain Turkey's confidence to

the Western world including the EU and the US. So, the more Turkey is connected to the EU, the more stable it is and the more it is expected to realize the US interests⁸.

How does the EU gain the character of being a stability and Westernization actor for Turkish politics? As explained in Chapter 4, the EU serves as a reference for the reforms and Westernization of Turkey. The EU acts as a pushing factor for the political and economic reforms in Turkey through its institutionalized accession criteria for the candidate countries. The EU membership of Turkey to the EU could bring the development of Turkey's democracy and human rights as well as the solution of its long lasting foreign policy problems such as Turkish-Greek relations and Cyprus problem. The improvement of the economic conditions in Turkey as result of the full membership to the EU could also change the political scene by ensuring political stability.⁹ Like in Greece and Portugal examples, the improvement in the economic conditions could make Turkey wealthier and less "crisis-prone" country. The better economic conditions could create an environment of democratic polity in favor of Western oriented political parties.

While stability ranks as the first imperative of the US security policy towards Turkey, the development of democracy and liberal economy in Turkey are the other pillars of US policy towards Turkey. In this framework, it is important to underline that stability and Western- oriented policy orientation are the prominent factors in the US support while the development of democracy and human rights are of secondary importance. So, it may be argued that realism has been more influential than idealism in the US policy towards Turkey's accession to the EU. At this point, it is observed that the US support for Turkey's full membership to the EU is consistent with the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of Clinton administration announced in February 1996 which is stated in Chapter 2. In the

strategy, it is suggested: “The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”¹⁰ So, the support of the US for Turkey’s full membership to the EU, which will push democratic development and liberalization of Turkey, is a clear reflection of the US national security policy.

At this point, the words of Mark Parris, remind the above-mentioned stability, democracy prosperity and Western orientation pillars in the US security policy towards Turkey:” We want a democratic, stable Turkey. We want a prosperous, dynamic Turkey that can be an engine for economic development in the region, we want a Turkey that remains firmly grounded in the West and that can continue to play a responsible, constructive role in a vital region.”¹¹ Turkey’ s evolution in terms of internal stability, free market economy and democratic conditions could also increase its potential as being a model country for the Muslim world. The US assessed Turkey as a model country for holding democracy, secularism and Islam simultaneously and attaches importance for the success of this model.¹²

On the other hand, the course relations with the EU have a determining effect on Turkey’s identity problem relations with the West. It is not a coincidence that the WP and NAP which are nationalist in their foreign policy rhetoric increased their votes in 1995 and 1999 elections. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey is no longer to wholly identify itself with the Western word. As explained in Chapter 4, the period from 1995 to 1999 were the most problematic period in course of the relations of Turkey with the EU. The problems in the ratification of the Customs Union and the Luxembourg rebuff were combined with the increasing dissatisfaction of Turkish

people on the policies of the Western world about Cyprus problem, Bosnia tragedy, Kurdish question and PKK problem.

Accordingly, the domestic political and economic instability of Turkey and foreign policy orientation of the country proved to be interconnected. As it will be explained in the following sections, the worsening political and economic conditions in Turkey beginning from 1990s led in the search of new alternative political parties rather than the traditional ones. Neither the WP nor NAP could get those votes just due to their national political rhetoric. One of the reasons leading Turkish people to choose these parties was their clear record on political and economic services. From mid 1990s, due to the ongoing political and economic turmoil; Turkish people have lost faith in the existing political class. In the long run, the ongoing political and economic turmoil could create a more nationalist and inward-looking tendency as well as decrease the potential of Turkey in the foreign policy arena. This could have significant repercussions in Turkish- Greek relations, relations with the US and Europe.¹³

Besides the connection between Turkey's domestic picture, foreign policy orientation and the EU membership, the US policy about Turkey's role in the newly emerging security framework within the transatlantic alliance could be regarded as the second factor of its support for Turkey's full membership to the EU. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Turkey is an important security actor in Europe, in terms of its strategic location, military capabilities, and NATO membership. However, since Turkey is not a full member to the EU, it has posed serious obstacles in the development of NATO-EU link especially after the Europeanization of ESDP through its veto power on the use of NATO assets by the EU. As a preventive measure, the US has meditated to find a solution for Turkey's satisfaction but the

best means seems the full membership of Turkey to the EU. Furthermore, due to its geostrategic location and military power, Turkey could improve the capabilities of the EU in defense and security areas and justify the EU's involvement in the regions surrounding Turkey. This fits in the US vision of a stronger Europe as an efficient partner in dealing with the security problems around globe.

To sum up, the US policy of supporting Turkey's full membership to the EU is a policy of cost and benefit analysis. The years from 1995 to 1999 served as a case study what losses the US security interests could face in case of an unstable Turkey and its increasing alienation from the West, partly as a result of the problematic Turkey-EU relations. In this sense, Turkey's full membership to the EU is a preventive means or of an "instrumental" character for the US security policy.¹⁴ The EU membership owns a great potential for improving Turkey's stability and anchoring it to the West. Hence, the full membership of Turkey to the EU serves as a "loss preventing" and "benefit improving" instrument for the US security policy. In a recent analysis of 2002, Soner Çağaptay, a soref fellow to Washington Institute of Near East Policy, makes an assessment about "loss preventing" and "benefit improving" implications of Turkey's relations with the EU for the US policy:

.....Turks have a love-hate relationship with Europe. On the one hand, they would like to become a part of the Europe, and have striven to do so for the past two centuries. On the other hand, they would rather not feel dependent on Europe. If the EU refuses to grant Turkey's accession date this December, the latter emotions would certainly take precedence. The most likely beneficiaries of the subsequent anti-Western political sentiments would be Turkey's nationalist and Islamist parties. A recent example of this phenomenon was the widespread anti-European hysteria that plagued Turkey in 1997. The hysteria was sparked by the EU's Luxembourg Summit, during which the union left Turkey off the list of candidate countries. From then until 1999-when the EU officially named Turkey a candidate-Turkish politics adopted anti-Western attitudes with alarming alacrity. Washington has a vested interest in the reoccurrence of these conditions. Turkey is an increasingly vital U.S ally. Moreover, the public is a beacon of support for the United States, shying away from much of the anti-Americanism that characterizes Turkey's neighbors. Thus, Turkey's membership in the EU would give Washington a strong ally in Brussels. In addition, Turkey

is a secular, democratic and market-oriented Western country. Such a nation is greatly needed in the EU...¹⁵

Furthermore, Turkey's full membership to the EU would eliminate the human rights problem in the US-Turkey relations. As suggested, this factor could not be regarded as one of the main reasons of the US support but could be a beneficial result for the improvement of the relations between the US and Turkey. In spite of the fact that Turkey has been harshly criticized by the EC/EU due to its human rights record since 1970s, the US did not make the issue of great concern during the Cold War due to the geostrategic importance of the country.

However, in the post-Cold War, the lobbies in the US Congress and non-governmental organizations such as the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch pressed the US government to impose restrictions on the sale of weapons and helicopters claiming the human rights violations in Turkey during its combats with PKK terrorism. In this respect, the US Congress has urged Turkey for a civilian solution for the Kurdish question.¹⁶ As a result of this pressure, the Congress decreased \$405 million (four and half million dollars) credit to be provided to Turkey to \$364.5 million (three hundred sixty-five and half million dollars) and afterward decided that the relief of 10 % of this aid would be conditional with the human rights conditions in Turkey.¹⁷ Furthermore, the Congress rejected granting \$40 million aid to Turkey due to the human rights violations in Turkey in 1998.¹⁸

President Clinton also has emphasized more democracy and respect for human rights in Turkish politics during his visit to Turkey in 1999. The improvement of the democratic and human rights conditions in Turkey would end the tensions among the Department of Defense, Department of State versus the Congress about

Turkey. Department of Defense and Department of State follow a more moderate policy towards Turkey in terms of human rights and democratic conditions while the Congress has a harder line in this respect.¹⁹

5.2 The US Security Policy and the Reflections of Domestic Changes on Turkey's Foreign Policy

5.2.1 Domestic Situation of Turkey in the mid 1990s

In 1990s, Turkey's state structure and traditional foreign policy are challenged by the changing political, economic and social circumstances. Beginning from the liberal reforms aimed to integrate the country with the world during the Özal period in 1980s; the country acquired a significant level of economic growth, improved a dynamic private sector and turned into an important military actor as a result of the modernization of the Turkish army.²⁰ As a consequence of the institutions of market economy and privatization of mass media, civil society and associative life had expanded and non-governmental organizations have proliferated. On the other hand, the country gradually took steps in order to create a more democratic society largely due to its desire to be full membership to the EU. Consequently, new groups have emerged to challenge the power of the Kemalist state. As a result, many of the components of Atatürkism, Westernization, statism, secularism and non-intervention –have been pressured to be changed.²¹

On the external front, Turkey is faced with many challenges and opportunities. The foreign policy of the country which was composed of countering the Soviet threat on the East has been replaced by the need to formulate new policy steps in each of the regions surrounding Turkey. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Turkey was faced with many challenges and opportunities in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Europe and the Central Asia and Caucasus which could have significant reflections

for its domestic politics. The reorientation of the foreign policy is also further contributed by these complex sources of domestic policy. It has been observed that each new political wave coming on the rule tried to challenge the traditional western oriented foreign policy. The WP tended to have closer relations with the Islamic world while the DLP-MP coalition government has tended to have a regional foreign policy with nationalist considerations.

The domestic instability ranks as the first of the sources influencing the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The political scene of the country is fragmented as a result of the democratization process started in 1980s and the incapability of the political parties to meet the political, social and economic demands of the Turkish people. The economic liberalization measures in 1980s worsened the distribution of income. The improving economic conditions deepened the gap between the rich and the poor and resulted in high inflation rates. At the end of 1999, 20% of the poorest part of the population owned only 4.9% of the Gross National Product (GNP) while the richest part of the population composing 20% of the population had more than that of 50%.²² The poor got poorer but the richer found new ways to flaunt their wealth. As a result, the poorer sectors of society grew increasingly dissatisfied with the mainstream of political parties and supported the alternative movements such as Islamists. 1994, 1998 and 1999 economic crises influenced Turkish economy in an adverse way and the economic structural problems deepened the political and economic instability.²³

The irregular nature of political parties by systematic failures such as corruption allegations and socio-cultural cleavages were also a dimension of this picture.²⁴ The strong role of military in Turkish politics was also again on the agenda of the Turkish domestic politics. As a result of the so called “post modern” coup d’etat of Turkish

military reflected in 28 February NSC Decisions, the coalition government composed of WP and True Path Party (TPP) resigned in 1997. The military interpreted the pro-Islamist WP's activities as a threat to the secular order of Turkish Republic.²⁵

The fragmentation of Turkish political system as a result of the insufficiency of the current political parties was very deep. For instance, TPP and MP – the two center right parties had together still acquired 51% of the popular vote in 1991, they fell to 38.8% in 1995 elections.²⁶ The more negative, in 1999 elections four mainstream parties of Turkish political system TPP, DLP, MP and Republicans People Party (RPP) received only 58 % of the votes while this was 88 % in 1987 and 66 % in 1995 and 1999 elections were interpreted as the decline of secular centre right which had been accepted as the natural party government in Turkey.²⁷ In 1999 elections, the leftist party DLP and the nationalist right party NAP took the rule with 36 % of the votes. These numbers represented the split in the domestic politics of Turkey, the irregular structure of Turkish political system and the emerging international circumstances.

5.2.2 The Rise of Political Islam and Turkish Politics

In this context, the rise of Islam in Turkish political life was the first evidence of the search for the new alternatives. The pro-Islamist WP under Necmettin Erbakan acquired 21.4% of the votes in 1995 elections. Through this, it was the most preferred party and got 158 chairs in the TGNA composed of 550 chairs. On 28 June 1996, it formed a coalition government with the conservative centrist TPP and held on power for 11 months. The WP under Necmettin Erbakan was the continuation of the National Salvation Party (NSP) of 1970s which was closed down by the 1980 military coup d'etat. It was the first time in the history of Turkey that a pro-Islamist party gained such a majority of the votes. Just one year before, in 1994, through the

local elections, the WP gained the control of the municipalities of the two biggest cities of Turkey, Ankara, and Istanbul. Despite the corruption claims and investigations, the party officials managed to receive “high marks from many by providing services in working-class neighborhoods.”²⁸

However, it is significant to suggest that the power of the WP does not depend on the role of Islam in its rhetoric. In this framework, the greatest supporters of the WP were identified as the lower middle class and the urban lower classes who were economically marginalized, whose ranks grew with economic restructuring and liberalization.²⁹ Different branches of WP established an efficient system of grassroots organizations to provide cheap bread, health services, and education to the poor. The WP was able to capitalize the ineffectiveness of the other parties, which were engaged in political squabbles and corruption scandals in providing basic services to the people.³⁰ As summarized by Işıl Anıl:

.....The Welfare Party benefited from the insufficiencies of the previous administrations. Deepening inequality between rich and poor and the lack of successful programs to address the issue, increasing corruption and the mismanagement of state offices, personal rivalries, clashes and accusations between the center parties, both at the right and the left, have largely played in the hands of the Welfare Party. The rhetoric of a ‘just order which called for a change of the existing situation had considerable influence over the masses; political connections throughout the country differentiated the Party from other ones.³¹

The WP was established on anti-Westernism in terms of identity, rhetoric and politics.³² The WP greatly opposed the Westernization process, called the EU Club of Christian countries and advocated the development of close relations with the Islam world rather than the Western world. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the WP, expressed his desire to form an Islamic NATO and Islamic common market as well as an organization of eight important Muslim countries resembling the Group of Seven (G-7) called Developing 8. (D-8) Erbakan also declared to withdraw from

NATO, end military ties with Israel, and cancel the agreement of OPC. The WP was advantageous in terms of foreign policy environment as well as the political and economic circumstances. The differences between Turkey and the EU on the Kurdish question, the indifference of the European countries to Bosnia tragedy, the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict, and the problematic relations with the EU created an environment for reactive and nationalist sentiments.³³

Although the Ankara Agreement stipulated the establishment of the Customs Union would coincide with the free circulation of labor, the EC had withdrawn this provision from its negotiations with Turkey. Furthermore, the visas that most European countries imposed on Turkish travelers in earlier times remained in place.³⁴ As a result, “not even the establishment of Customs Union could prevent the Turkish public from feeling that they were excluded from Europe and that they would still remain outsiders.”³⁵ In other words, this was a period when anti-Westernism could be justified both by the pro-Western and anti-Western groups in Turkey.³⁶ Within this framework, as a result of a research made by Turkish Economic and Social Sciences Foundation (TESEV) in 1996, it was reported that Turkish people answered the question of in what kind of a bloc of countries they wanted to be. 47.4% of the participants answered as the EU, 21.7% Islamic worlds and 20.5 %Turkish worlds.³⁷ Consequently, it could be suggested that half of Turkish people was open to new alternatives other than the long lasting dream of being a European country.

5.2.3 The US and Political Islam in Turkish Politics

The US administration was reluctant and skeptical about the rule of WP in Turkey. Washington seemed to develop a wait and see approach for the WP.³⁸ This was partially related to the fact the US thought that Turkish military would not let fundamentalist policy steps or any deviation from the Western-oriented state

structure of Turkey. In addition, the other coalition partner, the TPP was a center-right party and generally sided with pro-Western policies. Thus, a balance could be established within the coalition policies of the Party.³⁹ So, the US government responded in a slight manner for the rule of the WP, even before the Erbakan-Çiller had government faced a parliamentary vote of confidence, the US expressed that this was the result of democratic elections and expressed satisfaction that the political uncertainty in Turkey had finished.⁴⁰

On the other hand, the US was cautious for the foreign policy of Turkey; the US paid attention for the continuity of Turkish Western-oriented foreign policy. At the earlier days of Welfare-True Path coalition in Turkey, US State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns stated that:

Turkey, under Erbakan must remain connected to the West. Such links covered Turkey's connections to the West, Turkey's connections to the United States, to NATO which is the bedrock of Turkish security and Turkey's connections we hope to be built with the EU. The United States and both the Bush and Clinton administration had been a major supporter of Turkey becoming a part of the EU. No country supported Turkey's place in the West more than the United States. We hope Turkey will remain interested (in keeping its firm place in the West).⁴¹

The period when the WP was notable in the sense that for the first time in the US government, senior government officials come together to assess the implications of the pro-Islamist rule in Turkey for the US interests. Before that time Turkey's position was not discussed in such higher circles since US government took Turkey's alignment with the West for granted.⁴² Lesser interpreted the concentration of the US on Turkey's domestic problems as one of the positive result of the political instability especially the rule of the WP.⁴³ Furthermore, it is notable that the famous dailies of the US, the Washington Post and the New York Times covered the coalition government on their front page. The New York Times assessed Erbakan's coming

into power as a “milestone” or breaking a “75-year chain of secular rule.”⁴⁴ The dailies emphasized Erbakan’s plans for an Islamic United Nations, Islamic NATO, and an Islamic European Union.

This cautious initial approach of the US was assessed as to maintain the extension of the deployment period of OPC in Northern Iraq.⁴⁵ US Undersecretary of State Peter Turnoff urged Erbakan to extend the OPC during his visit to Erbakan before the government had taken vote of confidence.⁴⁶ One month after the start of the coalition government, Alan Makovsky has explained how the pro-Islamist ideology of the WP could be made concrete and mentioned that the US should alter its approach. He summarized four challenges that the WP would bring to the US interests and the US-Turkish relations. :

..... Erbakan prime ministry poses several fundamental challenges to U.S. interests and U.S.-Turkish relations. First, Erbakan's very presence in office renders difficult the task of the U.S. Administration and other traditional Turkey supporters to convince skeptics in Congress and elsewhere (including the EU) that Turkey remains set on a secular, democratic, pro-Western path. Second, his conspiratorial views and penchant for making offensive remarks, unless kept under more control than his history suggests is likely, inevitably will alienate many who count themselves as Turkey's friends. Earlier this year, Erbakan called Israel "a timeless enemy"; even since taking office, Erbakan reportedly told a private gathering that the two stripes on Israel's flag reflect Zionist plans to conquer all land between the Nile and Euphrates Rivers. Third, Erbakan's openly expressed sympathy for and connections with Islamic radicals such as Iran, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas raise potentially serious security problems..... Fourth, Erbakan is an ideologue who seeks ultimately to re-orient Turkey in ways that surely would be incompatible with U.S. interests. Consistent in words and policies throughout his 27-year political career, Erbakan as deputy prime minister in the mid-1970s persistently undertook efforts, often successful, to Islamize Turkish society and government bureaucracy.⁴⁷

In line with Makovsky’s arguments, Dan Burton, the foreign policy aide for Republicans and who is a strong advocate of Turkey in the US Congress affirmed this by his statement to Turkish Daily News. He stated that: “if the Welfare Party’s anti-Western, anti-secular rhetoric will not moderate now, it will be much more

difficult for those members in the US congress who appreciated what a great friend Turkey has always been to the US and want to work to maintain strong US-Turkish relations.”⁴⁸

The trips of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and some of his statements seemed to justify the concerns of the Western world. Erbakan visited Iran in August 1996 and signed a \$ 23 million (twenty- three million dollars)gas agreement with the Iranian government. The statements of State Department Spokesman, Nicholas Burns reflected the dissatisfaction of the US:

The US doubts if Turkey and Iran will develop a closer relationship. We’ re very skeptical about any improvement in Turkey’ s relation with Iran .We certainly do not question the right of Mr. Erbakan to travel where he wants to travel. We just think that Iran can not be trusted. Iran has negative influence in the region. So we are skeptical; we’ ll be watching carefully Turkey s relation with Iran.⁴⁹

It was very surprising that this visit was made just after few days that President Clinton signed D’ e Amato law stipulating the punishment of the foreign firms making more than \$40 Million (forty million dollars) investment to Iran.⁵⁰ In fact, the visit of Erbakan to Iran was symbolically important because it was it his first visit to abroad. However, this visit could not be assessed as a clear deviation from the traditional Turkish Western -oriented policy because the secular circles supported the visit. The secular circles mentioned the main reason for the visit was Turkey’s increasing need of energy.⁵¹

The main resentment of the US about Turkey’s foreign policy came with the second group of trips of Erbakan. In October 1996, Erbakan visited Nigeria and Libya; Libya was announced as one of the rogue states by the US and was imposed embargo and Nigeria was criticized for its human rights record. Before the visit of Erbakan to Libya, the US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said that: “We have concern about any country normalizing relations with Libya. So, when

other countries especially friends of the U.S like Turkey consider normalizing or treating on an equal basis like Libya, we have some concerns.”⁵² The US press covered the trips widely and interpreted them as the change of Turkish foreign policy from a Western oriented policy to a Muslim one and argued that these would create problems in Turkey’ s relations with Europe and the US.⁵³

The reaction of the US intensified when Erbakan on his trip to Libya defended Libya and proposed the lifting of embargo imposed by the US. Before his visit to Libya, Prime Minister Erbakan said: “Our government rejects the unjust sanctions imposed on Libya, and we have experienced by ourselves the lack of credibility of these measures.”⁵⁴ The relations were even more strained when Erbakan, referring to the American bombing of Tripoli in 1986, declared Libya, instead of being a terrorist state, was in fact a victim of terrorism.⁵⁵ The US found this visit very disturbing and went a step further and mentioning they have advice for Turkey in private.⁵⁶

The WP-TPP coalition government had to resign at the end of June 1997. This was a result of a process starting from 28 February decisions of the NSC Council and the ongoing pressure from the military and secular circles. The US avoided from making any statements criticizing the role of military in this process and stipulating any democratic elections. In fact, this was a satisfactory result for the US; on the one hand the Western oriented foreign policy of Turkey was to continue and Washington once again saw their trust for Turkish military was a right choice.⁵⁷

As a conclusion, it could be argued that the WP could not bring any critical changes in Turkish foreign policy greatly due to the Western-oriented foreign policy elite of Turkey and the Turkish military. Erbakan signed the agreement on the modernization of F-4 agreement by Israel on 8 August 1996. The government also signed the agreement on the extension of OPC. Furthermore, the WP did not make

any initiative blocking Turkey-EU relations. But, as defined in Chapter 4, the EU evaluated the Customs Union as the final stage of Turkey-EU relations rather than the accession of Turkey to the EU. Hence, the WP did not need any anti-EU remark since the arm length stance of the EU provided a negative environment in Turkey-EU relations.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the Party alarmed Washington with its intentions on closer relations with the Middle Eastern countries with which the US has tense relations. This meant that such a government could jeopardize the US interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Also, in spite of the fact that the Islamist threat in Turkey was eliminated by the Turkish military; this was not a good option in terms of the democratic conditions in Turkey. During the period when the tensions between the government and Turkish military increased, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confirmed the importance of civilian democracy in Turkey and called that any change should be made in the confines of democracy without any extra constitutional approach.⁵⁹

5.2.4 The Rise of Nationalism and Turkish Politics

Nationalism, the second rising trend in Turkish politics, in the mid 1990s, has been considered to be more influential than Islam.⁶⁰ Nationalism has been a component of Turkish politics since the early periods of Turkish Republic especially in Turkish domestic politics.⁶¹ However its power on domestic politics and reflection on foreign policy strengthened in mid 1990s as a result of changing domestic and international circumstances. The outbreak of the nationalist sentiments placed the right wing NAP and the leftist –nationalist DLP on the rule in April elections of 1999. Differently from the success of DLP, which was greatly due to the personality, and the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, NAP' s increasing power was linked to the certain domestic and foreign policy circumstances.⁶² Similar to WP, the rise of

nationalism was not the leading reason for the NAP's coming to power. As the WP, NAP did not have a record on corruption or inadequate political and economic reforms as MP and the TPP. Furthermore, the closure of the WP by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and the pressure on the pro-Islamist politics shifted the votes of conservative Turkish votes from WP to NAP. NAP is tolerant to the Islamic factors in Turkish domestic system. Differently from WP, foreign policy environment played a more considerable effect for the rise of nationalism. M.Hakan Yavuz gives a brief flashback of the international events leading to the unexpected rise of NAP in 1999 elections as:

... The MHP (Nationalist Action Party) effectively tapped into popular views that regard external forces as being anti-Türk. In this respect, the EU's 1997 rejection of Turkey's membership application crystallized deep stated suspicions of Europe, suspicions that originated in the growing disenchantment with the EU's policies on issues such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo and Turkey's own separatist movement among Kurdish guerrillas in Southeast Anatolia. This perception of external and internal threat undermined consensus politics and one result has been that a larger percentage of the electorate embraced MHP's longstanding political practice of identifying enemies and friends of the state. As suggested, the Gulf War, which Turkey suffered from political and economic losses, PKK problem, Cyprus, Armenian question, the conflicts in the Balkans contributed to the assertion of nationalist sentiments in Turkish republic..⁶³

So, it could be easily observed that the period from 1997-1999 had undertaken certain resentments of the Turkish public from the beginning of 1990s about the relations with the West, especially with the EU. Thus, the record of the West was not good enough to be defined in the confines of the friends of the state in the eyes of many Turkish people. Among the above-mentioned factors, which also justified anti-Westernism and helped the rise of the WP's nationalist foreign policy rhetoric, Luxembourg rebuff has a unique place. From then, Turkey had to accept that it will remain as the other Europe, ever than before. In this respect, as explained in Chapter

3, the EU seemed to lose its leverage on Turkey for a more flexible stance on certain foreign policy issues such as Turkish-Greek relations and Cyprus.

Besides the anti-Western elements, the psychology of the exclusion from the West made Turkey to be in a more defensive posture and show more sensitivity to the issues of national security interests. Accordingly, Turkey followed a more activist, assertive and foreign policy independent policy rather than its cautious Western-oriented foreign policy. After Luxembourg Summit, Turkey announced that its foreign policy was no longer fixated in Europe. Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem mentioned that the fixation of Europe had been the result of a limited outlook, of a feeling that Turks had to resolve a conflict over whether they are European or Asian. Culturally, historically and geographically, Turks were becoming aware of the fact that they did not have to choose and that they were a global state.⁶⁴

In 1999, the foreign policy of NAP and DLP government was expected to be more nationalist and regional policy. DLP leader and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit is known about his national stance at foreign policy and focus for a more regional foreign policy. He is also a skeptic about the EU. NAP foreign policy includes boosting ties with Turkish world, a firm stance to Cyprus issue and a cautious approach to the EU. Interestingly, the NAP did not refer the relations with the US in its foreign policy programme.⁶⁵ It was expected that NAP and DLP could implement a more assertive policy on Northern Iraq, Cyprus and the EU. The S-300 missile crisis in 1997 and Syria crisis in 1998 serve as significant examples of Turkey's assertive and nationalist stance. During both crises, Turkey presented an approach far from reconciling with the parties in the crises. These examples were critical for the US security policy because they had the potential to influence the security interests of the US in an adverse way.

5.2.5 The US and Nationalism in Turkish Politics

In fact, the S-300 missile crisis occurred before Luxembourg Summit was the first evidence of Turkey's assertive and more nationalist policies. In January 1997, the Greek Cypriot government announced that it had ordered a total of 48 S-300 missiles from Russia, which would be able to hit targets in the Turkish mainland as well as in Cypriot airspace. However, Clerides government made no explicit statement about the place to deploy the missiles. This decision was evaluated by Turkey as a direct threat to the security of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, the decision was a setback for the relations between Greece and Turkey. In this respect, the most critical statement was made by Turkish Foreign Minister, Tansu Çiller; she stated that if Southern Cyprus insists on deploying S-300 ground air missiles brought from Russia Turkey would hit the bases on the Greek side of Cyprus.⁶⁶ She added in her unusual diplomatic manner way that the missiles "either be removed or removed."⁶⁷

On the same days, Turkish military declared that the military staff would continue its efforts in emphasizing diplomatic solutions and only use the military action against the Greek Cypriots if such solution had not been found. Turkey seemed to be alarmed by the situation, plans about the building of new land and new navy bases in Cyprus were made. Significantly, Turkish General Staff Commander, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu went to Cyprus on the subsequent days of Çiller' s explanation to demonstrate Turkey' s firm approach for the problem.⁶⁸

This was the second time when an open conflict between Turkey and Greece could occur after Kardak-Imia crisis. For the US interests, any open conflict between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean would harm the security balance in the region and thus any threat of use of force between the powers could not be

acceptable. After the statement of Turkish Foreign Minister, Tansu Çiller, the US State Department Spokesman, Nicholas Burns defined the US position by criticizing Turkish stance: “The US does not support the decision by the Government of Cyprus to purchase and in the future to deploy S-10 anti-craft missile system. But, nevertheless any threat of the use of force, any decision to use force is absolutely beyond the bounds of an unacceptable international behavior. We have made known this directly to Turkish government.”⁶⁹ The crisis was only solved after the US pressure on Greek Cypriots and in 1998; the Clerides government announced that it would deploy the missiles to Crete rather than Cyprus.

1998 Turkish-Syrian Crisis was the other example of Turkey’s increasing sensitivity to her national security interests and how this could be detrimental for the US security interests. Syria was known as one of the countries sponsoring PKK terrorism observed in the Southeast Anatolia of Turkey from late 1980s. The Turkish authorities confirmed the presence of PKK bases within Syrian borders and the Syria’s sheltering of Abdullah Öcalan. In 1998, Turkish army had reached a superior position in its war against PKK within Turkey and had limited PKK’s ability to operate from Northern Iraq.⁷⁰ The Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani, the leader of KDP and Jalal Talabani, the leader of PUK signed an agreement pledging to end PKK presence in Northern Iraq. In the meantime, Turkey had neutralized Iranian support for PKK through political and economic means. Hence, the elimination of the PKK presence in Syria seemed to be the only remaining factor for the effectiveness of the organization.

During September 1998, Turkey initiated a strong campaign against Syria, backed up by military force and submitted a bid to force Syrian President Hafiz –al Assad to carry out his commitments under 1987 and 1992 arrangements. At the

opening session of TGNA, President Demirel warned Damascus by stating that: “I declare once more to the world that we reserve the right to retaliate against Syria, which has not abandoned its hostile attitude despite our warnings and peaceful initiative, our patience is nearing an end.”⁷¹ Just a few days later, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz declared that the government might request parliamentary consent for a war with Syria although the war was still not the desired outcome.⁷² As Turkish army massed its troops to the southern borders of Turkey, the Commander of Turkish Land Forces, General Atilla Ateş visited Reyhanlı, just north of the Syrian frontier and said that: “if Turkey’s expectations are not met, we will earn the right to take any sort of precaution. Our patience has run over.”⁷³

However, the timing for the crisis was so detrimental for the US security interests in the Middle East. The time of the crisis coincided with the new hopes of the US and Israel that Damascus could be persuaded to join Middle East process after the agreement with Palestinians had gone through in late October.⁷⁴ At this time, the Palestinians had agreed for a new arrangement for the withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank. Thus, neither the US nor Israel wanted to intimidate Syrians which they feel would be the next to participate in the peace process.⁷⁵

From the beginning of the crisis, the US insisted on a diplomatic solution for the problem and tried to prevent the escalation of the tensions. In that period, the US Department of State Spokesman, James Foley said that the US wanted a diplomatic solution to Turkey-Syrian crisis and warned Syria about its support to PKK.⁷⁶ The US also encouraged the mediation efforts of Egypt’s President, Hosni Mubarak. Following the talks with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, US Deputy Secretary of State, Martin Indyk called Turkey to be patient and urged Syria to take the necessary steps to diffuse the crisis.⁷⁷ He mentioned that Washington and Cairo agree that the

situation had to calm down prior for evaluating Turkish concerns and the best way to eliminate the tension was a serious dialogue.⁷⁸ In the end, the crisis was solved by the extradition of Abdullah Öcalan from Syria in 7 October 1998.

Both S-300 missile and Syrian crises demonstrated Turkey's assertive and activist foreign policy. As suggested in Chapter 3, Turkey, in spite of the ongoing political and economic instability acquired great prosperity and political power in the post-Cold War era and is in a more advantageous position compared to the states in its surrounding. Thus, how Washington views a Turkey that is stronger, more prosperous, more regionally assertive and more foreign policy-independent, in short, Turkey that is already emerging is critical.⁷⁹ In this sense, Washington seemed uneasy for the crises and it was not clear whether the new Turkey would be more or less supportive of the US policy goals with regard to Greece, Cyprus, or Iraq.⁸⁰

5.3 Turkey's Role in the Emerging European Security Framework and the Implications for the US

5.3.1 The US and Turkey's Policy towards the Emerging European Security Framework

Since the Cold War, Turkey's place in the European political system has been defined on the basis of its strategic location and NATO membership. In other words, Turkey's Europeaness was based on its status in the European security system. Turkey has evaluated its position in NATO and European system as an evidence and justification for the necessity of being in European institutions and an ultimate guarantee of the EU membership.⁸¹ As continuity, the politics of the post-Cold War era and the security dimension between the EU and Turkey has been used by Ankara as a means for justifying being in the EU where it has failed the EU membership

criteria. Such a view is reflected in the words of Nezhir Çakar, a senior advisor to President Demirel about Luxembourg Summit:

.....EU concerns about human rights issues, democratization and disputes with the EU member Greece were put forward as pretexts for the different treatment of Turkey. After making great sacrifices in fulfilling its responsibilities within NATO for the security of the Western community for more than 45 years, Turkey does not want further delays of its membership nor can it wait behind the other candidates, the bulk of which can not compete with Turkey. It is highly irrational to accept former Warsaw Pact countries as candidates to become full EU members and exclude Turkey, a staunch NATO ally.⁸²

Given the problematic and politics oriented relations with the EU, it could be argued that the security dimension in Turkey and European political relations constitute the only institutional pillar where Turkey has the most power. This is achieved through Ankara's membership to European security institutions as NATO, OSCE and Council of Europe. Thus, considering the fact that that Turkey is not a member to the EU, what the EU offers in the security field to Turkey is very important for the definition of the relations between Turkey and EU.⁸³ Furthermore, Turkey sees its place in the ESDP as a test case for its evolving relations with the Europe. In other words, accommodating Turkey in the European security sphere is a source of credibility of the EU for Turkey's full membership to the EU.⁸⁴ This in turn would reinforce the perceived commitment of the EU towards Turkey and push political changes in Turkey, thus speeding up Turkey's accession to the EU.⁸⁵

The emerging European security structure of the post-Cold War era composed of the institutional link between NATO and the EU has posed important concerns for Turkey threatening this critical dimension. Turkey is not a full member to the EU and thus could not have enough influence in the EU- controlled mechanisms within the European security framework. The exclusion and dissatisfaction of Turkey with the EU security structures would be the another leading factor for the psychology of

being left out of the European game other than the quest for the full membership to the EU. As William Hale explains about Turkey's objections to its status in the new European security framework: "The main cause for Turkish resentment was psychological, that is to say that, as in the case of the EU, the West Europeans were treating the Turks as no more than distant relatives, allowed into European house but not in the garden."⁸⁶ In this respect, Turkey's status in the emerging European security framework could lead Ankara's alienation from the West.

In addition, the new emerging security structure has certain aspects which are related with Turkey's nationalist considerations. Above all, national security occupies a unique and critical place in Turkish political system due to country's strategic location and vulnerability to internal and external threats. Geographically, Turkey faces many of the security risks surrounding the Europe and therefore it seems likely that any kind of Petersburg mission could be conducted in the potential conflict zones around Turkey. Thus, Turkey wants a secure seat in the European security mechanisms in order to protect its interests. To that end, Turkey claims that it has the right to be included in the decision-making mechanisms of ESDP. Turkey desires that the security interests of her should be taken into consideration rather than the limiting of participation in the EU led mechanisms, on the basis of full membership. In other words, Turkey opposes the political aspect of the security dimension in the ESDP. Duygu Sezer explains about this issue:

Mediterranean security, Balkan security, Middle Eastern security, Black Sea security. Security to the Eastern Europe converges, come across, and cut across Turkey. ..Strategic logic tells us that Turkey will maintain a strategic significance. The political logic does not always correspond to strategic logic. Politically at this point in Western Europe, because this is where the European security thinking is conceptualized, planned and than put into action. Political logic does not always see strategically logic as clearly as we think that it should.⁸⁷

Apart from the general picture of Turkey's dissatisfaction about its role in ESDP, the Greek factor and Cyprus are the other sources of Turkey's apprehensions. Turkey finds itself in a disadvantageous situation in the EU due to Greece's full membership and the eventual full membership of the Greek Cypriots. Turkey fears a European defense involvement in Cyprus. As focused in Chapter 4, Turkey and the EU diverge on their positions about the conflict. As Nathaline Tocci suggests: "Turkey is adamant not to transfer these political divergences to the security domain, which could occur with the creation of an ESDP which Turkey is excluded."⁸⁸

Turkey's policy about the new European security structure has evolved within the process of ESDI/ESDP. Principally, Turkey has consistently supported the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO and insists on the primacy of NATO as the primary security organization in Europe. To the Turkish point of view, "NATO should be the unavoidable, the indispensable Europe wide consultation forum in all matters related to the use of force. EU/WEU merges or a WEU rendered responsive to EU should not lead to circumstances where issues are considered as EU only and the responses that are determined after an EU only consultation process."⁸⁹ Turkey also advocates that the European pillar of NATO is not the EU but the European countries of the Alliance.⁹⁰ For Turkey, NATO, not the EU should be the starting point and the WEU should remain as a bridge between the two institutions and mechanism through which ESDI was expressed.⁹¹ So, Turkey signed June 1996 Berlin North Atlantic Council Agreement which set forth that ESDI should be developed within the Alliance.

The succeeding steps of the ESDP which tended for the Europeanization of the EU led security framework constituted the point of departure between the US, the EU and Turkey. The problem is simply that, the more the EU has improved an

autonomous defense and security structures, the harder Turkey, as a non-member to the EU, finds to be involved in the EU led security mechanisms. In that respect, Turkey has reserved its NATO card in return for a satisfied status in the ESDP. As explained in Chapter 2, the EU strongly needs the use of NATO assets due its limited military capabilities and declining defense budgets. In that end, the prevention of the duplication of the military capabilities of the EU countries is also a concern. The problem of Turkey within ESDP can be explained as the Turkish veto letting the EU use NATO assets and capabilities, unless her demand for inclusion in ESDP decision-making mechanisms is filled, even without being an EU member.⁹² However, Turkey's satisfaction is critical. Every scenario for the EU -led crisis management operation involves Turkey in one way or another. Simply put, "if the crisis is very serious, NATO will be included -and that includes Turkey. If the crisis is less prone to escalation, but still requires a significant amount of force, then the EU may lead, not only with the help of NATO."⁹³

Among other associate members to the EU, Turkey seems the most problematic case for the improvement of a healthy NATO-EU link and the improvement of the ESDP. Turkey became an associate member of the WEU in 1995 and the other associate members are Iceland, Norway, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. It seems that the political involvement of Iceland and Norway in such operations do not pose a great concern, as long as they are fully informed about the developments.⁹⁴ Iceland does not have any armed forces due to its unique position. The other three associate members Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland have clear prospect of EU full membership and do not worry about any exclusion from European affairs. The Turkish veto could have three damaging effects on the EU: an expensive duplication of NATO headquarters, an uncertainty on the part of potential adversaries about

whether NATO would reinforce an EU operation and estrangement between NATO and the EU.⁹⁵ Thus, the US has meditated to satisfy Turkey's position in the ESDP in order to sustain the cohesion in NATO-EU cooperation. Furthermore, the US's support for Turkey's position could be interpreted as the implementation of the third d of Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright; to prevent the discrimination of the non-EU allies.

By the Europeanization process of the ESDI, the absorption of the WEU into the EU would raise institutional questions in terms of the decision making power of Turkey. What is to be done in the WEU's official bodies and treaty legislation is an open question. Since Turkey is not a full member to the EU and the WEU seems to be absorbed in the EU, Turkey's main question is what platform Turkey could be included in the decision making. In this respect, Turkey focuses on the preserving the legal and political *acquis* within the EU. As an associate member, she enjoyed all possibilities of participation in WEU activities from biweekly meetings of the WEU Council and to having five officers on duty in the defense-planning cell to the meet twice a year.⁹⁶ However, most importantly, Turkey was excluded from the decision-making in the WEU Council and not subject to Article V which is collective defense clause of Brussels Treaty.⁹⁷

Turkey supported the transfer of its authorities in the WEU to the ESDP mechanisms. In 1999, Turkish Defense Minister Hikmet Sami Türk stated: "If the WEU is to be incorporated in the EU, it will be essential to preserve the vested interest and *acquis* that Turkey has accumulated within the WEU so far. This leads to the need to include Turkey fully in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mechanism of the EU on equal footing.⁹⁸ But, as the EU's ability to function requires

a clear distinction between members and non-members, the WEU's differentiated system of participation may no longer apply.

The final communiqué of April 1999 NATO Washington Summit reaffirmed commitment on building ESDI within the Alliance and declared that the strengthening of common European policy would be by building on the existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. Before the Summit, Turkey pressed for the approval of the North Atlantic Council for the use of assets in the EU led operations. In the Summit, Turkey continued its lobbying in order to prevent the automatic use of NATO assets by the EU. By the last minute insistence by the Turkish delegation, the communiqué ensured that NATO assets could only be made available for an EU-inspired operation if the whole NATO Council has approved and on case by case basis and by consensus. In this respect, Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem said that: "If the EU countries want to establish their own defense organization, it's up to them. We have no objections. But if they want to use NATO assets and capabilities, NATO members should be involved (in the decision making) and therefore Turkey should be involved."⁹⁹

The US and Britain's support for Turkey's desire were the leading factors for the inclusion of such a statement in the communiqué.¹⁰⁰ The US position was clear before the Summit, the US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Alexander Versbhow stated that any European operation has the chance to succeed if it was supported by the non-EU members of NATO especially Turkey politically and operatively.¹⁰¹ Washington has focused on the participation of non-EU allies in ESDP decision making mechanisms; this point is known as the third d of Albright; no discrimination for non-EU NATO allies. The need for the participation of non-EU

allies in ESDP are reflected in the US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Alexander Versbhow's words:

The United States firmly believes that the participation by non-EU allies should be seen by the EU as a benefit rather than a burden of favor. The six non-EU European allies deserve special status above and beyond that of the EU's nine other partners who are candidates for EU membership. Turkey and other non-EU allies want to contribute, they have military means to bring the table, and they have experience as Associate Members of the Western European Union.¹⁰²

Cologne European Council in June 1999 defined the end of the year 2000 as the target date by which the necessary decisions on the institutional mechanisms of the EU's ESDI have to be taken and once this has been done, the WEU would have completed its purpose. At Helsinki European Council of December 1999, the EU went further and expressed its willingness to establish a rapid reaction force designed to enable the EU lead crisis management operations where the Alliance as a whole not has engaged. In accordance with this, the member states were assigned the task of deploying within 60 days and sustaining for at least one year-50, 000, 60-000 troops to undertake Petersburg tasks. According to Helsinki Summit Conclusions "... appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management".¹⁰³ The Helsinki European Council also asserted that, "Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate, if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets." The statement adds, "They (non- EU countries) will on the decision of the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets." The possibility of EU-led operations neither requiring the use of NATO assets nor necessarily inviting the participation of non-EU NATO members strongly suggest the notion that it could

pursue policies and operations in the security field which might be quite independent of NATO.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, the establishment of new political and military structures—a political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and the Military Staff within the Council, also served to reinforce the impression that the EU was determined to achieve a significant degree of distinctiveness and autonomy for ESDI.

Turkey was unsatisfied with the decisions of Helsinki Summit and pressed for a role in the decision-making mechanisms of the EU. After the Summit, Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem stated at NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels that it would be unfair for non-EU allies if they were excluded from decision-making by inner core of the EU countries proposing to undertake the crisis management that would rely on NATO assets.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Turkish Foreign Ministry expressed its dissatisfaction about the conclusions of the Helsinki Summit on ESDP. In a statement issued by the Ministry, it was mentioned: “The points reflected in the progress report at the Helsinki Summit indicate that the understanding prevailing in the EU is still far from satisfactory as far as the participation of non-EU European allies like Turkey.”¹⁰⁶

5.3.2 The US and the Contributions of an EU Member Turkey within the Transatlantic Alliance

Turkey’s accession to the EU could bring further contributions to the European security. This converges with the US policy to make the Europe a more secure and stable environment. Turkey’s military power and geostrategic location make it an indispensable part of the European security system. The imperatives of European security involve both the security of the continent and its periphery. The political and economic stability of the Europe could be threatened by the disruption of the oil from Middle East, growing radicalism, expansion of anti-Western culture, spread of

fundamentalist terrorism, proliferation of armaments and especially the danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the potential assertiveness of Russia which became critical after its near abroad doctrine.

So, it could be clearly observed that most of the threats to the European security come from its southern periphery and Turkey is at the intersection points of these threats. Turkey perceives itself as a frontier country, which means that the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and the Middle East are of immediate concern both for her security and Europe.¹⁰⁷ In this respect, Turkey's contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management as well as political and financial support could be very beneficial for the capability of the EU in defense and security matters, Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Onur Öymen focuses this point as:

When we talk about Turkey, we are talking about the second strongest armed forces in NATO. Therefore, Turkey can not be and should not be considered to be a marginal country. We are an important component of European security. We were during the Cold War and we are still today. We play an extremely important role in our neighborhood and therefore a producer of security and not a consumer of security. When the EU talks about defense capabilities, they should not ignore the defense capabilities; they should not ignore the defense capabilities of Turkey. When they organized a troop contributors conference a few months ago in Brussels, Turkey committed more troops than 10 EU countries to the EU headline goal.¹⁰⁸

Turkish army can mobilize large forces and maintain a high degree of readiness for a considerable short length of time. Its industrial base is now capable of producing a good proportion of its military hardware requirements.¹⁰⁹ Turkey indicated its willingness to contribute to the EU's rapid deployment force by offering in February 2000 to provide a brigade-size unit supported by air and naval components. Turkey's large army and many F-16 fighter planes would enhance the EU's capability in building of Rapid Reaction Force.

According to Meltem-Müftüleri Baç, Turkey's strategic value for the Europe could be identified in four areas. Iraq, Middle East, the Balkans and the Caspian region.¹¹⁰ Turkey's participation in the allied coalition and the access to İncirlik airbase were crucial for conducting air campaign to Iraq. Furthermore, Turkey's participation in the embargo against Iraq and its role in maintaining no fly zone in Northern Iraq were also notable. Hence, it could be argued that access to Turkey's military bases would be critical for any possible NATO-EU operations in the Middle East. Second, Turkey has been an important mediator in the Middle East process. She has close links with Israel and Palestinians enabling it to expand stability and security in the Mediterranean. Third, as suggested in Chapter 3 Turkey has contributed to the peace in the Balkans under NATO and EU initiatives. Apart from its participation in IFOR, KFOR, UNPRDEP and the Southeastern Europe Stability Pact, Turkey has led establishing a multinational peacekeeping force in the Balkans (Southeast European Bridge). This unit is comprised of the units from Turkey, Italy, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania. Fourth, Turkey will be one of the points of oil transfer to Europe through Bakü-Ceyhan pipeline and building on this role, in Summer 2000, Turkey suggested forming a Caucasus Stability Act which could increase the EU's involvement in the region and make Turkey instrumental for this process.¹¹¹

Turkey's security environment is regionalized in the post-Cold War. Turkey now has to cope with various threats and instability coming from the regions surrounding it. As known, Turkey is situated in the most volatile regions of the world. While Turkey faces no direct threat to its mainland as in the Soviet threat of the Cold War era, Turkish officials still fear any direct attack by Syria, Iraq and Greece. The Cyprus question and the problems with Greece on Aegean are far from a solution and

even complicated by Greek Cypriot's accession to the EU. Also, the imperialist ambitions of Russia in the ex- territories of the Soviet Union made explicit by the near abroad doctrine of 1994 could lead an open confrontation between Turkey and Russia. In the Middle East, the security concerns of Turkey range from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fundamentalism, terrorism and economic and political instability. Iraq and Syria provide a sanctuary for Kurdish separatism. The Balkans has showed to be a center instability and ethnic nationalism - with Bosnia and Kosovo crises. Turkey is at the opposite with Armenia on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and on historical accounts. The EU could engage in more activism in these regions through the membership of Turkey and could sustain certain leverage.¹¹² So, NATO-EU link would be improved and the borders of the Euro-Atlantic area could extend to the Middle East and the Central Asia as well as the Caucasus. So, the sphere of influence under the control of NATO could be identified as Atlantic-Euroasia. Karaosmanoğlu noted this factor as the main imperative for the support of the US for Turkey's full membership to the EU.¹¹³

Thus, the military power and geostrategic position of Turkey could project the European power to the possible crisis points. In other words, Turkey in ESDP means the expanded range of the European force.¹¹⁴ Strengthening of the EU military capabilities and the extension of the EU power are consistent with the US interests. As Brzezinski suggests any extension of the European influence would automatically lead to the extension of the US influence.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the existence of Turkey in the EU could press the EU to deal with strategic issues more and could improve the cooperation between the EU and the US.¹¹⁶

The convergence of the security policies, cultures and risks of the US with those of Turkey could become influential in EU's becoming a partner for the US and

addressing the similar security challenges with the US. As Ian Lesser and Stephen Larrabee focus in a brief way:

The two countries have also shared if not entirely convergent approach to international affairs. Turkey's internal and external geopolitical positions and the influence of Turkish military have fostered a security conscious approach to policy making. Cold War imperatives fostered a parallel security-oriented approach to foreign relations as seen from Washington.

The two countries also share additional characteristics in their strategic cultures. These characteristics include a pronounced sensitivity to questions of national sovereignty (far higher from modern norm in Europe), a low threshold of tolerance for national security and threats to the homeland, a high threshold for international intervention, and a willingness to act more decisively and firmly when this threshold is crossed.¹¹⁷

As explained in Chapter 3, Turkey and the US have similar security risks in the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia and Caucasus which led to continuity of the strategic cooperation between the parties established during the Cold War. However, the same is true for neither Turkey's security relations with the Europe nor the relations between the US and the EU.

The essential difference between the US and Europe in the analysis of post-Cold War security challenges is that the US shares with Turkey a view that security must be increasingly seen on a trans-regional basis while the countries of the EU concentrate, primarily not exclusively, on problems of the European security.¹¹⁸ The European stance reflects a vision of world politics and threat assessment that is profoundly regional while the US worldview must remain global. These different perceptions could lead substantial drifts between the US and European policies in Iran, Iraq and the Middle East peace process.¹¹⁹

On the other hand, the perception of the Europe about Turkey's position regarding the European security is not positive as that of the US. Since the mainland of Europe suffers from no tangible threats as in the Cold War Era, the strategic

importance of Turkey seemed to decline in the eyes of Europe. The lesser strategic interests of EU countries in the regions surrounding Turkey and weakness in their commitment to Turkey was best evidenced by German opposition to viewing Iraqi missile attack on Turkey during the Gulf War as an attack on NATO. More profoundly, the EU has a political approach for Turkey compared to the strategic stance of the US. The Greek-Turkish relationship, Cyprus issue, Kurdish question, and human rights in Turkey are main subjects of Turkey-EU relation's rather than a strategic partnership with Turkey in the newly emerging European security architecture.

One of the main reasons of the rejection of Turkey's accession to the EU is that the European countries do not desire to face with the challenges from the Middle East. If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, the borders of the EU will extend to Iran, Syria and Iraq which are seen as the trouble maker countries. Thus, Turkey is seen as not a country producing security but rather consuming security and producing insecurity by the EU.¹²⁰ In this respect, the words of Ian Lesser in the beginning of 1990s are notable:

As the half-century imperative of containing Soviet power wanes, Europe has lot a great deal of its interest in the strategic engagement of Turkey. Indeed, as Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, there is a risk that Turkey will be seen as a strategic and political liability; a strategic liability because of its complex and immediate security concerns; a political liability because of its position outside the European Community and its bilateral relations with the United States.¹²¹

Turkey and the American security policies also converge on the primacy of the transatlantic link and the US leadership. As of the period covered by the thesis, the US leadership, and the continuation of transatlantic link seemed in line with Turkey's security interests. While Ankara's full membership to the EU could enlarge her security zone and capacity to encounter security challenges, the security umbrella to

be provided by the EU does not seem to help Turkey's security risks. Turkey's security policy is based on two principles; protection of territorial and national integrity and the defense of legitimate rights and freedoms.¹²² Thus, Turkey's security policy does not depend on conflict resolution and international multilateralism provided under the EU led European security framework.¹²³ Considering the fact that the EU could be capable of undertaking Petersburg missions for a longer term, NATO and American leadership seem to continue to be the basic pillars of Turkey's security policy.

Traditionally, there seems to be a division of labor between the US and the EU. The EU has tended to handle the contingencies in the borders of the Europe while the US as a global power would intervene in Mediterranean and the Middle East. Also, it seems that the EU will handle just crisis management problems in the confines of Europe.¹²⁴ But, as suggested in Chapter 2, the US aims to make the Europe as a valuable partner, which is going to help it in tackling the problems around globe. Single mindedly, it is suggested that Washington is interested in only one issue: What can Europe contribute? In what areas of burdensharing is it able to take over world political responsibility?¹²⁵

Naturally, it would be useful for the US to have a European partner able to help solving problems. The US seeks burden-sharing help not only in Europe but behind the confines of Europe such as Iran and Iraq and for the range of conflicts in Africa. Marten van Haeuven and Gregory F.Treverton, who are the analysts of RAND, which could be regarded as the US leading think tanks recommending the US government about foreign policy options, stipulated a greater role for Europe in 1998. They emphasized that the Europe would assume a leadership role in managing crises and ongoing humanitarian aid in Africa, the south of Sahara, the border

disputes between Baltic States, the solution of Cyprus problem and Northern Ireland.¹²⁶ Also, the analysts underlined that US could seek the help of Europeans in the Middle East and the Europe could contribute to the activities of the US in countering Iraqi aggression in the Gulf, for keeping the Suez and sea lanes open for energy shipments to Europe and for assisting Israel defense remain with the US.¹²⁷ Another RAND report issued in 1999, examined the need for developing a common strategy for the Middle East within the transatlantic Alliance. The report underlined the necessity for stronger European military and power projection capabilities in order to defend world energy supplies and thwart weapons of mass destruction.¹²⁸ One part of the strategy was mentioned as enlisting Turkey as a partner; to the analysts, Turkey could advance the Atlantic interests in the greater Middle East. Within this respect, the report mentioned that Turkey should be a key actor in the European-American partnership.¹²⁹ Indeed, the report showed how Turkey's full membership to the EU is critical to the US security interests. In this respect, the report mentioned that: "the more the Europeans snub the Turks, the harder it is for the Americans to retain Turkish confidence."¹³⁰

In Chapter 2, working with the allies and partners such as NATO and the EU is given as one of the components of US security strategy. The National Security Strategy Reports of the US from 1995 and 1999 also focused on the importance of allies and partners such as NATO and the EU for meeting the security challenges around Europe and behind the borders of the Europe. Thus, the accession of Turkey to the EU with its significant contributions to the transatlantic alliance and NATO-EU link seems to be in line with US policy towards the transatlantic alliance. The words of the US Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural

Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat could be helpful in understanding how the EU could help the US in tackling the problems beyond Europe.

During the Cold War, it made sense for Europeans to focus on their own territory and for the U.S. to assume the primary responsibility for defending common transatlantic interests elsewhere. This approach, however, makes less sense when new threats to our common interests come from beyond our borders. In the U.S.-EU relationship, we often deal collectively with the same issues we do in NATO. For example, new WMD threats may be addressed through NATO and through U.S.-EU agreements to discourage states from acquiring or developing the means to contemplate the use of WMD. We should begin to consider ways in which we deal with common problems through NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.¹³¹

Eizenstat also mentioned that the US and the Europe must act together to deal with traditional regional crises and to develop common strategies against new types of threats to their peoples. These threats involve illegal flows across national borders of people, money, weapons, technology, toxins, terror, drugs, or disease that can not be confronted effectively alone.¹³²

5.4 The Support of the US towards Turkey's Full Membership in 1995-1999

The US administration tried hard for the improvement of the relations between Turkey and the EU within the period from the signing of the Customs Union in 1995 till the announcement of Turkey's candidacy for the full membership to the EU in 1999. Washington consistently made statements including remarks for closer relations between Turkey and the EU and lobbied at senior levels in the European circles.

The US was anxious about the rise of Islam in Turkish politics in mid 1990s and accepted the EU as a factor which could strengthen pro-Western or anti-Western sentiments. As a measure, before 1995 elections, the US Administration appointed the permanent delegate of the US in Brussels, Stuart Eizenstat for the coordination of support of Turkey. During the ratification of the Customs Union Agreement in the European Parliament, fifteen ambassadors of the US to the European countries were

assigned for this issue.¹³³ The US used the arguments that the rejection of Turkey would strengthen the anti-Westernism within the country and this would harm the Western strategic interests. To the US, the ratification of the Customs Union agreement before the elections would decrease the support for the radical Islamists like the WP and increase the votes for the pro-western parties.¹³⁴

After the challenges in the ratification of the Customs Union Agreement, the US made statements urging Turkey's inclusion in the EU. In January 1997, US State Department Spokesman, Nicholas Burns said that "We are in favor of full inclusion by Turkey to the Western institutions.... Turkey's future does not only lie in South East Europe, in South Asia or toward Asia, it lies in Europe."¹³⁵ In May 1997, Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott issued a firm warning "There are those who resist vehemently the idea that any nations to the east of what might be called traditional Europe can never truly be a part of larger, 21st century Europe. We believe that this view is quite wrong- and potentially quite dangerous".¹³⁶

Following the resignation of the WP-TPP government, a coalition government was built between MP-DLP and Democratic Turkey Party (DTP). The new government tried hard for the announcement of Turkey's candidacy for the full membership in the Luxembourg European Council to be held in December 1997. Including the visits of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz and the Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, the senior level officials of the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid 48 visits to the EU countries and involved in many negotiations.¹³⁷ In spite of these attempts, it seemed very hard that Turkey would be announced as a candidate for the full membership largely due to the reactions of Greece and Germany. The letter written by Prime Minister Yılmaz to the leaders of all EU countries was the last official initiative of the government. The words of Yılmaz clearly explained the

significance of the decision of the EU on the domestic politics of Turkey and the reasons underlying the support of the US. In the letter, he mentioned that the exclusion of Turkey from the enlargement process would challenge the advocates of Westernism and may cause hard reactions from the Turkish republic¹³⁸.

During this struggle, the US as during the Customs Union, activated all its embassies in the European countries to press the EU. Before the Summit, the US reiterated its support, State Department Spokesman, Jim Foley repeated the traditional view of the US: "...Turkey is a European nation, and it has a European vocation. And we've encouraged our European friends and allies to keep the door open to Turkey and to offer real incentives and a credible perspective on eventual membership."¹³⁹

Another important reason for the support of the US also became clear during this period. It was reported that President Clinton's special envoy for Cyprus Richard Holbrooke had focused on Turkey's joining to the EU since he believed that this could be the key to the resolving of Cyprus problem.¹⁴⁰ Turkey's full membership to the EU could provide the incentives to settle the Cyprus problem and the problems between the two NATO allies. Similar to this, after the rebuff in the Luxembourg Summit, Jim Foley responded a question about the accession of the Greek Cypriots to the EU by saying "... The process of negotiating Cyprus's entry into the EU can be a catalyst if all sides are willing to approach the issue with a constructive spirit-offers itself as a catalyst for resolution of the issues that are dividing the communities on the island."¹⁴¹

The European press and the US focused these points widely just after the Luxembourg Summit. In the Washington Post, it was mentioned that the rejection of Turkey's candidacy "is a blow to find a settlement in Cyprus" and "the rebuff may

pose serious problems for NATO.”¹⁴² The same daily mentioned that for the US, the full membership to the EU is an award for Turkey to relax on Cyprus.¹⁴³ The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy made a connection about the problematic relations between the EU and Turkey before the ratification of Customs Union and the victory of the WP in 1996 elections. It was argued that the WP was able to get those higher votes due to the alienation of Turkey from the West.¹⁴⁴

The decision of Turkey to suspend the political dialogue with the EU and the integration attempts between Turkey and TRNC constituted great concern for the US. Clinton administration asserted the Luxembourg decision as a strategic failure in the long term but warned Turkey for not taking an immediate decision.¹⁴⁵ The visit of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz to the US ten days after Luxembourg Summit prepared the ground for voicing the concerns of the US and exerting its influence on Turkey for the improvement of the relations with the EU. Before the visit, President Clinton mentioned that he would make every effort to anchor Turkey to the West and the solution of Cyprus problem.¹⁴⁶ President Clinton assessed Yılmaz’ s threat of the withdrawal of Turkey’ s application for the full membership in case the EU has not granted candidacy status in six months as an extreme reaction and a failure during the meeting between himself and Prime Minister Yılmaz.¹⁴⁷

In 1999, the trip of President Clinton to Turkey for a five-day visit for OSCE Summit just one month before the Helsinki European Council of the EU where Turkey’ s status was to be clarified, was notable. Clinton’ s remarks underlined the expectations of the US in its relations with Turkey and its support for Turkey’ s EU membership.¹⁴⁸ President Clinton said that his visit is intended to demonstrate solidarity with the Turkish nation and encourage Ankara’ s ambitions to join the EU.¹⁴⁹ Prior to his visit to Turkey, Clinton also had declared that. “Turkey is a

country at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia; the future can be shaped for the better if Turkey can become fully a part of Europe, as a stable, democratic, secular and Islamic nation.”¹⁵⁰

Apart from the remarks of Clinton about Turkey’s importance in the Europe, his statements about the democracy and human rights conditions in Turkey set a framework about the US vision of Turkey.¹⁵¹ President Clinton praised Turkey’s impressive momentum of improving its human rights and strengthening its democracy and expressed his hopes about the continuation of this progress especially in the freedom of expression. The insistent stance of the US about the solution of the problem was also reflected in Clinton’s statements, he mentioned that he expected a comprehensive settlement about Cyprus during the negotiations to be held between the leaders of TRNC and Greek Cypriots.

Before the Summit, similarly to Luxembourg Summit, comments were made about the possible results of Turkey’s candidacy for the EU membership reflected the reasons underlying the US stance on Turkey’s full membership to the EU. Alan Makovsky mentioned that the announcement of Turkey’s candidacy would have physiological affects on Turkey’s belief of being a European country and serve as an incentive for reforms.¹⁵² He added that the failure to grant Turkey the candidate status by the EU would end Cyprus diplomacy for a long time and reinforce the alienation of Turkey from the West. Center for International Security Studies (CISS) one of the leading think tanks of the US also reported that the US, as the leader of the Western world and the strategic partner of Turkey would absolutely play a role for the inclusion of Turkey in the enlargement process of the EU.¹⁵³

The statements by the officials of the US and lobbying in Brussels for Turkey’s full membership to the EU were one of the influential factors in the announcement of

Turkey's candidacy for full membership to the EU held on 10-12 December 1999. After the Helsinki decisions, President Clinton sent a letter to Prime Minister to Bülent Ecevit reiterating his support for Turkey's journey with the EU. Clinton interpreted Turkey's candidacy for the EU as a historical step which will create permanent results for both the US and the EU.¹⁵⁴ This letter was an open express for the continuation of the support of the US for Turkey's quest to join the EU and this was confirmed in the following years of the US-EU-Turkey triangle.

5.5 Conclusion

From the above-mentioned analysis, the support of the US policy for Turkey's full membership to the EU could be categorized in two ways. The implications of Turkey's full membership to the EU on its domestic stability and foreign policy orientation and the implications of that in the US policy towards transatlantic security relations. The period from 1995 to 1999 was a test case for how could the EU membership could be a determinant and beneficial instrument for Turkey's domestic stability and foreign policy orientation. In terms of the US security policy, the full membership of Turkey to the EU acts as an instrument for reinforcing the stability and Western oriented foreign policy of the country. The spillover effects of the possible full EU membership of Turkey on the politics, economics and identity politics of Turkey made the EU an actor for the stability and Westernization of Turkey for the American policy makers. The support of the US for Turkey's close relations with the EU and its final accession to the Union were related with its strategic interests in the regions surrounding Turkey; the Middle East, Balkans, Europe and the Caspian regions and the emerging European security framework. The initial steps of this support covered the years from 1995 to 1999. Washington was

accepted as one of the influential factors in the announcement of Turkey's candidacy in Helsinki European Council of the EU on 10-11 December 1999.

For the US, the domestic politics and certain issues of Turkish foreign policy in mid 90s justified the use of the EU as an anchor for Turkey's stability and Western-oriented foreign policy. In other words, the US became aware of the fact that it is urgent for the US to prevent the reoccurrence of such conditions. The domestic instability in Turkey was one of the factors bringing the political Islam and nationalist sentiments on the rule of the country. The anti-Western sentiments which broke out in the post-Cold War era were reinforced by the ambivalent stance of the EU during the ratification of the Customs Union and the Luxembourg Summit in the same period.

The rule of the WP with its anti-Western rhetoric raised the concerns of the US that Turkey could be distanced from the Western world. At first, the US government acted cautiously in its relations with WP-TPP coalition government but the trips of Erbakan to Iran, Libya, Nigeria and Muslim countries caused harsh reactions from American foreign policy makers. There were evaluated as the divergence of Turkish foreign policy from a Western oriented one to a Islamic one. After the end of WP-TPP coalition, Turkey began to implement a more nationalist and assertive foreign policy. This policy was in some way linked to Luxembourg rebuff and the outbreak of anti-Western feelings. During S-300 missile crisis with Cyprus and Syria over PKK problem, Turkey expressly claimed the use of force. Both crises were an indication of how more assertive Turkish foreign policy could be detrimental to US interests.

Apart from the implications of the course of relations between Turkey and EU on the country's stability and foreign policy orientation, the US policy about the

transatlantic alliance necessitated the US policy for anchoring Turkey to the EU. Above all, given the fact that Turkey's full membership to the EU is not clear or will be in an uncertain time, Turkey's role in the emerging European security framework remains as the only link in the definition of Turkey as a European or Western state. However, the Europeanization process of ESDI seemed to alienate Turkey from the West. Since Turkey is not a member to the EU, she could not take place in the decision making mechanisms of the EU. In order to acquire a larger role in EU decision making mechanisms of the EU- led security and defense mechanisms, Turkey tried to block the use of NATO assets by the EU. In this respect, the full membership of Turkey could eliminate the problem of Turkey.

Within the framework of US policy about the transatlantic alliance, the convergence of the security perceptions of the US and Turkey made Turkey a valuable ally for the US. Turkey's involvement in the regions surrounding would extend the European influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. This could improve the strategic relation between the EU and NATO. This is compatible with the US interests seeking for more burden- sharing in its global foreign policy.

In sum, the period from 1995 to 1999 served as a test case for the necessity of Turkey's accession to the EU. The US became aware of the fact that it is critical to prevent the reoccurrence of Turkey's instability and reinforce the country's Western oriented foreign policy. The negative implications for Turkey's alienation from the West were also reflected in NATO-EU link. Moreover, this policy would improve the US strategic interests in the regions surrounding Turkey and transatlantic alliance in the long run.

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- ¹ For the remarks of Bill Clinton on TGNA, see all Turkish papers in 16 November 1999.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study showed that Turkey turned into an “enabling partner” for carrying out the critical US security interests in the regions surrounding Turkey in the post- Cold War era.¹ In other words, Turkey could enhance the capacity of the US to ensure its security interests in the regions surrounding Turkey. At this point, Turkey’s Western-oriented traditional foreign policy and its stable character compared to the instability in the regions surrounding her, increased Turkey’ s foreign policy potential and an active cooperation between the US and Turkey. However, the changes in the domestic structure of Turkey resulted from the changing international and domestic condition, especially the domestic instability created significant problems in Turkey’ s foreign policy orientation contradicting with the US security interests. In this respect, the problematic EU factor in Turkey’s domestic politics led the worsening of the situation and Turkey’s alienation from the West. These facts urged the US to improve Turkey’s stability and anchor it to the Western world in the strongest way.

In the meantime, the US interpreted the EU as a second enabling partner for the US economic, political and military interests. Since the Cold War the US supported the integration attempts of the European countries and this was also observed in the changing international circumstances. After developing its capacity as a economic and political actor in world’s politics, the EU took steps for undertaking

commitments in defense and security mechanisms. Through the decisions of Helsinki European Council in 1999, the EU now could build its own army for undertaking Petersburg missions. The ESDP mechanism could create a stronger Europe with efficient military capabilities and the EU could deal with the crisis in the European security affairs without the involvement of the US. While there are problems about the military capabilities of the EU and building a balance between the NATO and the EU, the US has strongly backed this initiative. At this point, the concerns of the US about its policy about Turkey and the EU intersected. To put it simply, Turkey's full membership to the EU could eliminate the problems in Turkey's stability and Western oriented foreign policy orientation while making the EU as an efficient security actor both within Europe and beyond the borders of the Europe.

First, the role of the EU as a reference for reforms and Western identity justifies its role in the improvement of Turkey's potential of being an enabling partner. The period which is analyzed in this thesis provided examples how the EU could push the political and economic development of Turkey and reinforce its Western oriented foreign policy orientation. In order to meet the EU's membership criteria, Turkey improved the conditions in human rights and political system. The Customs Union provided the integration of Turkey's economy with the EU and the requirements for the EU membership are on the way for providing macroeconomic stability, high investment rates and low inflation rates. The political criteria could also sustain political stability reinforcing Turkish economic system as in Greece and Portugal examples.

In terms of the role of the EU on the foreign policy orientation of Turkey, the analysis proved the worsening effect of the problematic Turkey-EU relations on the country's domestic and foreign policy arenas. The problematic relations with the EU

and the increasing feeling of Turkey's distinctiveness from the European identity served as a burden for the country's Western oriented foreign policy. After a long journey of the relations, Turkey and the EU signed the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 and Turkey expected to be announced as a candidate for the full membership in the coming years. However, Turkey's problematic democracy and human rights record, Kurdish question, and the problems with Greece and Cyprus problem postponed Turkey candidacy. In the meantime, the enlargement decision of the EU to the CEECs reinforced the feeling of being other in Turkey. These feelings combined with the anti-Western elements in Turkey emerged as a result of Bosnia tragedy, Kurdish question, and PKK problem. These anti-Western sentiments paved the way for the rise of political Islam and nationalism in Turkey in mid 1990s.

The rise of political Islam and nationalism were reflected in the foreign policy of Turkey which were detrimental to the US security interests. Turkey's Western oriented foreign policy did not become a problem in the Cold War; Turkey was a member of the Western bloc and act in compliance with the interests of the Western bloc. Thus, Turkey's integration with the Western institutions other than the security mechanisms was just interpreted as a complementary part of Turkey's alignment with the West. However, the US observed that Turkey's integration with the EU turned into the basic means of Turkey's identification of herself as a Western country and continuation her Western oriented foreign policy orientation. Within this framework, the study also showed that the domestic instability and foreign policy orientation are interconnected. So, in the US perspective, Turkey's accession to the EU seemed to prevent the reoccurrence of such negative situations in Turkish politics and foreign policy.

The second part of the US policy towards Turkey's accession in the EU is based on the policy of the US about the transatlantic alliance. Turkey's non-membership to the EU tended to cause significant repercussions for an effective European defense mechanism in this period. Turkey could not participate in the decision-making mechanism of the EU led mechanisms and this led the emergence of the problem of Turkey within NATO-EU link. Given the importance of security dimension in Turkish politics and the relations with the West, the exclusion of Turkey from ESDP could be an additional factor for Turkey's alienation from the West and could decrease its contributions to the EU defense mechanisms. Such a condition could create a set back in the US policy of creating a stronger Europe and efficient Europe in the security affairs. On the other hand, Turkey's accession to the EU could project the power of the EU in the Middle East and Central Asia and Caucasus. In other words, through Turkey's membership to the EU, the EU could become a partner helping the US to tackle the security problems around the globe. At this point, it is important to note that the US policy for Turkey's accession to the EU is based both on the benefits of Turkey's membership to the EU for Turkey's Western-oriented policy and its policy toward the emerging European security framework. In spite of the fact that the relations between Turkey and the US are of strategic nature thus Turkey's contributions to the European security is critical, Turkey's domestic politics and its foreign policy orientation are also significant for the US security interests around Turkey. So, the US favors Turkey's accession to the EU for its global security policy; Turkey's integration to the newly emerging European security institutions may not be satisfying for the US security interests other than those about Europe.

To sum up, the US policy towards Turkey's accession to the EU from 1995-1999 aimed to strengthen the potential of Turkey and the EU for carrying out its security interests around the regions surrounding Turkey and in the latter case around the globe. In fact, working with allies and partners in dealing with the security affairs was a part of the US security strategy during Clinton administration. The strengthening of the transatlantic alliance as a partner of the US around the globe and Turkey as a regional partner would improve the security interests of the US. The accession of Turkey to the EU could enlarge the free market and democracy in one of the volatile regions in the world and could provide the US engagement in a larger way

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