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TERROR AND THE MEDIA
A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE TV COVERAGE OF "TERRORIST
EVENTS" IN THE LIGHT OF LIBERAL THEORY
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY REGARDING THE TV ACCOUNTS
OF TWO INTERVIEWS ON TURKISH AND BRITISH TELEVISION

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

TERROR AND THE MEDIA

A Critical Approach to the TV Coverage of "Terrorist Events" in the
Light of Liberal Theory
A Comparative Case Study Regarding the TV Accounts of Two
Interviews on Turkish and British Television

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The aim of this study is to explore how the strict anti-terror legislations and restrictions impose over the Western media by some liberal governments since 1970s inevitably suspended the Liberal Theory's basic premises like "freedom of expression" and "press freedom", although they brought no fruitful political consequences.

To elaborate the reciprocity and consistency of the legal measures with the presumed effects of the coverage of media on the diffusion of terrorism, this study has chosen two troublesome interviews which were regarded as the "force majeure" of the government interventions in two countries; namely in Britain and Turkey, as the field of investigation.

The textual discourses of the two interviews were analyzed in detail while the producers of the programs were interviewed to discover the basic motivations behind their coverage. Both examples have supported the arguments that the coverage of terrorism was voluntarily controlled and restrained by the media themselves to avoid the possible manipulation by the terrorists, necessitating no further intervention by the governments.

A general evaluation of the cases proved that the restrictions imposed over the media to combat terrorism, actually gave harm not to the terrorists themselves, but to the media in particular and liberal democratic premises in general. Different reactions of the Turkish and British media and public to the similar interventions of the both governments imply that the exercise of press freedom depends not only on the normative regulations of a given country, but is determined by the nature of the political culture of its society.

Keywords: Mass Media, Terrorism.

ÖZ

TERÖR VE MEDYA

Liberal Teori'nin Bakış Açısından Terör Olaylarının Televizyona
Yansıtılmasına Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım
Türk ve İngiliz Televizyonlarında Yayınlanan İki Röportaj Üzerine
Karşılaştırmalı Bir İnceleme

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Bu çalışmanın amacı, 1970'lerden itibaren liberal ülkelerde Batılı medya kuruluşlarına dayatılan katı anti-terör yasalarının ve kısıtlamaların hiçbir olumlu siyasal sonuç doğurmaksızın nasıl kaçınılmaz olarak Liberal Teori'nin ifade ve basın özgürlüğü gibi temel prensiplerini askıya aldığını ortaya koymaktır.

İngiltere'de ve Türkiye'de medyaya dönük hükümet müdahalelerine gerekçe olarak gösterilen sansasyonel iki röportaj, bu konuda araştırma alanı olarak seçilmiş ve bu iki örnekten yola çıkılarak, medya yayınlarının terörizmin yayılmasında etkili olduğuna ilişkin varsayımların getirilen yasal önlemlerle ilişkisi ve tutarlılığı araştırılmıştır.

Her iki örnek de, teröre ilişkin yayınların, teröristlerin muhtemel bir manipülasyon girişimini önlemek amacıyla ve hükümetin fazladan bir

müdahalesini gerektirmeyecek şekilde bizzat medya tarafından gönüllü olarak denetlenip sınırlandırıldığı tezini destekleyen bir sonuç vermiştir.

Sözkonusu örnek olayların genel değerlendirilmesi, terörle mücadele adına medyaya getirilen kısıtlamaların, aslında teröristlere değil, özelde medyaya, genelde ise liberal demokratik ilkelere zarar verdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Her iki ülke hükümetinin getirdiği benzer kısıtlamalara, Türk ve İngiliz medyası ile toplumlarının farklı tepkiler göstermesi ise basın özgürlüğünün sınırlarının, sadece bir ülkedeki yasal kurallarla değil, o ülkede yaşayan toplumun siyasal kültürünce belirlendiğini kanıtlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kitle İletişim Araçları, Terörizm.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The mass media, especially television, have come under fire in the past twenty years for how they treat coverage of terrorist events.

The correlation between the escalation of global terror-violence in recent decades and the innovations in media technology that facilitate rapid dissemination of information to large audiences was regarded by official circles as a proof illustrating the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media. Many governments in the West believe that; terrorists rely on the media to further their terror-inspiring goals, while the media utilize the terrorists' acts as necessary or rewarding news items.

Generally, criticism has mostly been expressed in the form of questions on how the news media allow themselves to be exploited by terrorists, how the media encourage terrorism, and whether or not media coverage of terrorism has a contagion effect, the argument proposes that

the media attention given to terror violence encourages further incidents of terror violence.

Although the contagion theory would not appear entirely susceptible to empirical verification, concern over this contagion effect has been repeatedly expressed especially by official circles.

Consequently, some basic rights and freedoms of the liberal society were restricted during the 1970s and 1980s by an orthodoxy which imposed a series of strict security measures to combat terrorism in countries including Britain and Turkey.

The media, necessarily came under government pressure not to give terrorism "the oxygen of publicity" and not to criticize government policies regarding terrorism.

To preserve the necessary appearance of separation of the media from the state, liberal governments set an information policy within which the media voluntarily integrate into a national security policy. "Voluntary restraint" of the media helped the governments to balance the need for order with the desires for freedom.

This consensus, though, was threatened by the competitive nature of the media since the commercial basis of information sometimes necessitates alternative perspectives to be covered. When the media seek out other alternative sources, the states reinforced the official view by using stricter measures like overt censorship.

In this study we intend to explore the consequences of those measures under the light of two similar incidents that engaged the exercise of state intervention in two countries; namely Britain and Turkey.

Transmissions of Mithat Bereket's interview with Osman Öcalan, Chief of Staff of the PKK, and Paul Hamann's interview with Martin McGuinness supposed Chief of Staff of the IRA were both regarded by Turkish and British governments as challenging to their anti-terror campaigns. Reacting harshly, both governments used those interviews as reasons to justify the strict restrictions imposed on the media.

The similarity of the cases, together with their legal consequences provided us an unusual basis for comparison.

Our first fundamental question in this regard is whether

the mentioned interviews were as challenging as to necessitate the intervention of both governments or were they already voluntarily restrained by the interviewers themselves.

The second question to be answered is whether the restrictions which the governments imposed on the media to combat terrorism were consistent with the basic liberal premises.

This study, composed of two main parts, will deal in the second part with the legal, professional and political accounts of the two flashy interviews together with some background information about the historical basis of the problems. But a theoretical framework is needed to locate the study into a context and to draw conclusions for evaluations. This is tried to be done in the first part of the study.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. An Overview of the Theoretical Approaches

2.1.1. The Libertarian Theory of Press

As generally agreed the libertarian theory of the press has its roots in the philosophical arguments of the seventeenth century that man is a creature guided by reason, not by passion or narrow self - interest. Man can exercise this reason to its fullest power, libertarians believe, only when he/she has free choice. Given a free and open encounter, truth will triumph over error.

One of the earliest defenders of the libertarian theory was John Milton who expressed the view that men have reason and wisdom to distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad. By using his/her

reason he/she could discover the laws of nature which govern the universe, and so build a good and just society. In his famous "Areopagitica" he rejects the Puritans' policy of regulating the press by licensing books and papers: "Licensing hinders man's search for truth" Milton said, "Truth will win out in any free and open encounter of ideas". As long as we grant all men the freedom of expression, Milton believes, the clash of ideas ensure the triumph of the true and sound over the false and unsound. "Falsehood may seem to win out temporarily, but if the government does not weigh the balance in favor of both sides, truth will be the victor in the end.

Free expression was justified as a natural right and has become a major concept within the liberal thought together with the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.

In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith showed how economics fits into the idea of "free encounter of opinions". Attributing to the governments negative role in man's affairs, Smith, recommended a "laissez faire" position for the market place of ideas. If each individual can freely express his/her ideas in the market, the truth would inevitably emerge from the competitive exposure of alternative viewpoints.

John Stuart Mill expanded the boundaries of the libertarian theory in the nineteenth century: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person was of the contrary opinion" he wrote in his famous essay "On Liberty", "that he, if he had the power, would not be justified in silencing mankind". Mill had four reasons for this justification:

First, if we silence an opinion, for all we know we may be silencing truth. Second, even a wrong opinion may contain the grain of truth that helps us find the whole truth. Third, even if the commonly held opinion is the whole truth, that opinion will not be held on rational grounds until it has been tested and defended. Fourth, unless a commonly held opinion is challenged from time to time, it loses its vitality and effect (Mill, 1947).

This is regarded as the essence of libertarian theory: The task of society is to provide a free market place of ideas so that men may exercise reason and choice. In place of more formal controls, libertarianism chooses to trust the self-righting process of truth. This implies that ideas must have an equal chance and that everyone must have access to the channels of communication (Rivers and Schramm, 1969).

A free press has thus been regarded as an essential component of a free society. The advantage of a free press is that by allowing the free expression it gears to the expectations and interests of the community.

The libertarian theory generally regarded government as the traditional and chief foe of liberty. Men, the libertarians believe, are born with certain natural rights which limit the hand of government and demand protection for the individual's liberty and property. Nevertheless, press freedom, as McQuail (1983) notes, "has been taken to mean the right to own and use means of publication without restraint or interference from government". The press is assigned the task of maintaining a constant check on government, of playing the watchdog to warn the public whenever personal liberties are endangered.

Thus, according to libertarians, there would be no need to put restrictions on the private ownership of the media, since the great majority of men are moral creatures who will use their freedom responsibly in an honest desire to find truth.

Censorship before publication is therefore an evil for at least three reasons under libertarian theory (Rivers, Peterson, and Jensen, 1971): First, it violates man's natural right to free expression. Second, it could enable tyrants to perpetuate

themselves in power and to make the state a foe instead of liberty's protector. Third, it could temporarily hinder the quest for truth by throwing off balance the delicate process by which truth ultimately emerges. If man is to discover truth, he must have access to all information and ideas, not just those fed to him. Government's control over the press can only lead to irrationality or repression, even if it may seem justifiable in the short term. Thus, the publication should be free from any prior censorship and the act of publication should be open to any person or group without a permit or licence.

The first Amendment to the American constitution, thus, registered the freedom of press as an absolute right of the citizen by stating that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press".

2.1.2. Social Responsibility Theory

Despite all theoretical mandate, the application of press freedom has been far from straightforward in practice. Being accused by the conservative circles of being "superficial and sensational in their coverage of human happenings", the printed press has always been the object of many forms of state intervention designed to control ownership, content and indirectly, distribution.

When broadcasting started as a means of communication to large masses with the invention of radio in the 1920s, many in power felt the need for some regulation, since broadcasting was perceived as a potentially dangerous instrument in the hands of those who did not adhere to an established political system.

The classical dilemma of the libertarian theory has, then appeared: As the theory believes that "The best government is that which govern the least", the neo-liberals have been obliged to permit the governments, as a regulatory body, to put some restrictions on free expression. Censorship, which is used to be seen as an "evil" under the libertarian theory, has been condoned to regulate obscenity. Libel laws have been sanctioned to protect the individual from defamation. New limitations have been imposed via sedition laws to prevent "destructive views". And the role of the state has been strengthened in the name of "public good" or "national interest".

Although, in many Western liberal countries, broadcasting started as a private initiative, the state in all European countries very soon took over. In the beginning of the 1920s, private radio initiatives flourished, but already by the second half of the decade radio broadcasting was regulated in one way or another by the state. In most of the European countries like

Great Britain and Italy, broadcasting regulation took the form of a state permission to an institution, which was given monopoly to broadcast to the whole nation.

The pattern established in the 1920s for radio proved to be a strong guideline to how the new medium of television would be handled when it entered the European arena. In a few countries television experiments took place as private initiatives, but almost everywhere the new electronic medium, which was expected to have even greater power than that attached to radio was regulated from the very beginning. In the majority of European countries, television was placed under the same organization that had managed radio since the 1920s and was regulated and controlled by the state as a public institution with the same responsibilities and duties as radio. The legitimisation for this political control was the limited number of air waves, which made very few channels available for national broadcasting. But behind most of the regulation was a belief in the power of the electronic mass media and the fear of this power if used for purposes contrary to the establishment. Recognizing that journalists have tremendous power through the use of information, the states request them to use their power responsibly by serving national interests.

The established political system wanted to keep control over the media. And in Europe they were able to do so for quite a number of years.

Hitler's frightening success in using radio for the manipulation of masses during the Second World War gave rise to special situations for the post-war organization of broadcasting in Europe. Classical theory has been challenged by the "neo-liberals" who had concerns about the accuracy of the libertarian description of man and society. Attacking the tradition of natural law, they have questioned the radical individualism of libertarians and have raised doubts about even the possibility of a free and open market place of either commodities or ideas. Adam Smith's recommendation of "laissez-faire economics" has been rejected by the belief that "interfering with the free operation of the market may enable us to avoid the disastrous troughs of the business cycle".

State intervention for the sake of society has been justified in theory.

John Locke's philosophy of inherent rights and rational man has been challenged by modern philosophy, which is inclined to doubt the

existence of any right without corresponding obligation. New theory stated that "whoever enjoys freedom has certain obligations to society".

Neo-liberal understanding of the "free society" has echoed in the field of mass media as a new approach called "social responsibility theory". In order to solve the dilemma of permitting the governments to intervene to the "free market place of ideas" while the theory rejects any kind of state intervention, defenders of the social responsibility theory attribute the whole responsibility on the shoulders of the mass media. Its main impetus was a growing awareness that in some important respects the free market had failed to fulfill the promise of press freedom and to deliver expected benefits to society.

In "Responsibility in Mass Communication", Rivers and Schramm clearly criticize this failure: "Under libertarianism, the media were expected to reflect the world as their owners saw it, to tell the particular truth the owner preferred, to distort, to lie, to vilify, all with the confidence that rational men could discern truth among the falsehoods. No one today has confidence in such belligerent libertarianism" (Rivers and Schramm 1969, p.51).

The Commission on Freedom of the Press, sponsored by Time Inc. and Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. was formed in 1947 to dictate the media their obligations to society: "It becomes an imperative question whether the performance of the press can any longer be left to the unregulated initiative of the few who manage it" has thundered the Commission; "Those who direct the machinery of the press have engaged from time to time in practices which society condemns and which if continued, it will inevitably undertake to regulate or control" (Hocking 1947).

To prevent such an outright censorship, in the Commission's view, "the media should be self-regulating within the framework of law and established institutions".

The Commission's critiques were harshly received by European governments who were already willing to contemplate legal and fiscal measures designed to prevent the "destructive" effects of the media.

Anti-monopoly legislations have been imposed together with the new regulations of public advertising and of press subsidy. In many of the Western countries, the responsibilities of journalists have been detailed in codes of professional ethics. Some are formulated and adopted by the

journalists themselves on a voluntary basis. Others are imposed by law or a decree of the state. Press councils have been established to insure that all journalists respect the principles of ethical conduct and to investigate public complaints of distorted, false, or misleading reporting. Ombudsmen have been appointed by some newspapers to examine the complaints of readers and focus attention on the failures of the press to cover specific news items.

Although most Western journalists reject the notion of professional responsibility, believing that the best contribution journalists can make is to exercise their occupation with complete freedom and objectivity, media groups mostly welcomed the new regulations to prevent a direct intervention by the state.

2.1.3. "Communication Revolution"

The growth and acceleration of economic and cultural networks which operate on a worldwide scale and basis stimulate debates about so-called "world culture" and "globalization" in the late twentieth century.

Within the last two decades, national boundaries have been increasingly transcended with the emergence of communication technologies and media networks which allow for faster, more extensive, interdependent forms of worldwide exchange, travel and interaction.

The invention and near universal distribution of new information, communication and transportation technologies has begun to transform Western societies.

This trend did not come to fruition until the late 1950s and early '60s, with the emergence of television. By 1958 the number of television sets just about equaled the number of American homes, and the age of television really began. The arrival of the computer for general use in the 1960s made possible a new advance in the organization of information which had been spawned by the world-wide explosion of scientific and technical research. Limited at one time by large-scale equipment needs, technological change increasingly permitted television to cover the whole world on the fly, and to transmit images almost instantaneously from and to all portions of the globe.

During the 1960s and '70s the influence of television continued to grow. As the older established forms of national culture and identity

were eroded and destabilized by the globalization process, geographic and cultural barriers among viewers all over the world have been broken down by television which is dominated immediately by the three major media monopolies centered in New York. During the last 40 years, television has been regarded something of a newsmaker in its own right, particularly in the sphere of politics.

The challenge to monopolies and political control came gradually, but it was not really taken seriously until the end of the 1970s, when the notion of "communication revolution" began to gain currency. The United Nation's General Assembly mentioned the ideal of a "new global information and communication order" for the first time in 1978.

This ideal also supported by the development of electronic and satellite technologies, which feed upon the economics of scale inherent in broadcasting, where the marginal cost of an extra viewer is zero. Satellite communications enable users to fly over and around the walls of the nation-state. They are able to transfer voices, data, texts and images swiftly over long distances and to large geographical areas. The relayed information can take the form of television or radio broadcasts, fax messages and telephone conversations, or it can be specific data, related to

financial markets, professional conferences, sporting events or weather information often collected by computer databases at both ends of the link.

The large volume of information available and the collection of information in specialized categories has given people greater access to knowledge and its application.

Concepts like "global village", "computer society" and "video civilization" indicate the emergence of the new technological environment.

The development of the mass media as the dominant institutions of the public sphere coincided historically with the emergence of mass-based democracy in the West. Many Western researchers thus believed that information technology has the potential to aid political development by encouraging mass mobilization and citizen participation, and by providing information about the political process.

New concepts like "teledemocracy" have been imposed to emphasize the possibility of using telecommunications technology "to promote, improve, and expand direct, pure democratic forms such as town meetings, initiative, referendum and recall".

Naisbett (1982) sees teledemocracy as one of 10 megatrends transforming the fabric of American life.

Sharing such an optimism about the possible benefits of the new technology, authors like L.S. Stavrianos (1976) foresee that the

... current technological revolution is leading not to a new age of the pharaohs but to greater self-knowledge on the part of humanity. The long historical process of popular awakening is now reaching its culmination with the twentieth century demand for self-management in all phases of life".

The major trend from indirect forms of democracy to more direct democracy, as Ted Becker and Richard Scarce (1987) believe, meshes with patterns of social change. They describe these patterns as "a move from hierarchical arrangements to networks, from institutional help to self-help, from industrial society to information society, and from a top-down society, to a bottom-up society".

Similarly, Mark Satin (1979) and Marilyn Ferguson (1980) have written about the breaking down -decentralizing- of social structures into more malleable, personal, and accessible communitarian units.

Toffler (1980) describes much the same phenomena as a "Third wave" in the development of our civilization in which "a far more workable direct democratic system effectively utilizes the new 20th century technologies".

Among the variety of possibilities reviewed about the future of teledemocracy, Jim A. Dator's (1983) preferred scenario is "transformational society" which will be

... a de-massified, individualized society wherein information is a key commodity and is available to all. Just about everyone in a community has the right to participate in the decision-making process guiding that society.

In the transformation society, as Dator defines,

... citizens would have total access to the information which their representatives use to make law, accessing it through home or community computers. Through this information, as well as citizen -and government- produced television programming and community discussion groups, citizens might formulate their options and opinions on laws and policies, and vote on a regular basis.

The antagonists of teledemocracy, on the other hand, do not share the hope that the explosion in communication technologies must

inexorably lead to a golden age for democracy. "Communication and information technology can assist in the process of human development only if certain values are present, particularly among the elite who hold power" writes W. James Stover (1984). Reminding us of how Hitler's sophisticated means of communication pushed humanity into global warfare during the second world war, Stover emphasizes the importance of values like "democratic communication, freedom to communicate and journalist responsibility".

"After all, these inventions are equally accessible to the Soviet Union and East Germany" pointed out Becker and Scarce (1987), "but democracy does not thrive there and shows not the least sign of doing so".

Nevertheless the "velvet revolutions" which took place in the early 1990s in central- eastern Europe, were related to such developments in global communications media (Keane, 1992).

New information technologies are regarded as initiatory tools of a new social environment in which "the governments are simpler, more effective, yet more democratic than any we know today" (Toffler, 1980).

Global telecommunication networks like Internet, which are now used worldwide, gave hope to many authors in the West for a "smaller and more open world" in which the repressive governments are subverted. The end of the modern nation state and the decline of sovereignty are also regarded as political transformations which would strengthen the liberal ideal of "free expression".

John Keane (1992) proposes a fundamental "rethinking of the classical theory of 'liberty of the press' which viewed communications systems only within the framework of the system of single nation states": "Since the governmental bodies of nation state no longer determine the lives of their citizens" Keane believes, there should simply be "no single center of state power which could be occupied and used to transform radically civil society with the help of the means of communication".

In the 1980s, the defenders of the "New Right" especially in England and in the USA, proposed a systematic restructuring of forms of public provision and control and their replacement with those derived more directly from commercial market operations. Promising expanded choice and quality of services, they are engaged policies of "deregulation" within

which public monopolies are reorganized to compete more directly according to market forces of profitability, and consumer demand.

In fact, chief instruments for broadcasting had already made it possible to establish local senders, and this happened in a number of European countries including Turkey, as a private initiative without waiting for the state to make new laws for the electronic media. These private initiatives provoked the tendencies toward a deregulation policy willing to abolish or change public regulation. Deregulation has been part of the influential rhetoric which has been used both to describe and to effect the privatization of major public sector industries including telecommunications.

John Keane (1992) believes that "dispersed networks of communication can more easily penetrate the pores of civil society and weaken the tendency for a dozen censors to rush in, whenever we express our opinions, telling us what to say or not to say".

The air of optimism about the potential power of the new information technologies to create smaller states and freer mass media was shadowed by insurgent terrorism in the late 1960s. The rise of the modern

communication technologies coincided tragically with the explosion in revolutionary terrorist movements. Inspired by this coincidence, official circles in the West automatically linked these two tendencies with each other, claiming that "terrorism depends for its success on media coverage" (Bell, 1978; Frey 1987).

The old dilemma of liberalism has appeared again: While the so-called "communication revolution" is expected to stimulate simpler and smaller governments that are unable to use any form of political censorship have grown enormously in recent decades, an orthodoxy began to gain currency since the early '70s supporting that the governments should intervene the news management during the period of crises.

The question of who should do the policing of the media's is not devoid of controversy. The controversy on this matter centers on whether governments should provide guidelines for the media's coverage of terrorism, or whether the industry should engage in self-restraint in order to avoid the former. While law enforcement officials and other government officials in agencies concerned with terrorism would like to see government regulation, the sentiments among media personnel seem

to favor self-policing as a preemptive action against any legislative policy or governmental intervention (Anzovin, 1986).

The above mentioned discussion, as generally accepted, represents the return of the 50-years-old "social responsibility theory" in the age of the "global village".

To evaluate the possible effects of each approach (namely the government's intervention and self-policing of the media) over the basic premises of contemporary liberalism, this study, as we have already stated in our Introduction, will compare the two similar cases, representing the two approaches to the problem of "media's role in promoting terrorism" in two different countries, namely Britain and Turkey, with apparently similar regulations based on the same normative theory.

But the complex interaction among the three actors of the issue (the terrorists, the state, and the media) should be defined at first to locate the study into a context.

2.2. The Actors

As we examine the role played by the mass media in the diffusion of terrorism, we must redefine the three actors of the dilemma, namely the state, the terrorists, and the media, in terms of their complex interaction with each other.

2.2.1. The State

Within liberal-democratic thought, the state is usually understood to derive its legitimacy from its constitutionality, from fair and free elections, from separation of powers, its foundations in rational-legal norms respecting individual rights, and an adherence to the rule of law. Much less emphasised is the place of force, or of 'legitimate violence', in the preservation of the social order. Thus, for instance, in the sophisticated liberal apologetics of Poggi (1978), or even in the radical democratic theorizing of MacPherson (1977), the state's repressive face is largely ignored. Greisman (1977) came to a similar conclusion saying that "individual, or non-state terrorism is generally seen as evil, while official or legitimate terrorism is relatively accepted". But as Gramsci has noted, drawing upon the tradition which stems from Machiavelli, the political domain must be understood as combining both coercion and consent.

This point is also clearly understood by Max Weber who comments that the state lays claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. Such a perspective, as Sol Picciotto (1979) notes, is but the starting-point for further investigation since 'the mere combination of the contradictory ideas of consent and coercion does not help to explain what form of coercion is involved, nor how the consent is obtained'.

Nevertheless, those contradictory moments of force and fraud, of repression and ideological hegemony, while needing precise definition in any given set of circumstances, pose inherent problems for the system of ideological representations in a liberal democracy. For if the state acts within the field of its own legality and legitimacy and emphasizes the moment of consent, how then should politicians, intellectuals and the mass media represent the moment of coercion when the state has recourse to force? Moreover, how should violence which comes up against, or even transgresses the bounds of legality be handled? How should the basic premises of the liberal democratic state combine with the restrictions over the mass media when it comes to the coverage of a "terrorist action"?

It is precisely this problem we seek to address in this thesis.

Althusser (1971) suggested that states maintain power not just through "repressive state apparatuses" such as armies and police forces but also through "ideological state apparatuses" such as the legal system, educational and religious institutions, and the media.

This point is perfectly confirmed by the international wisdom which has been elaborated since the mid-70's within official circles in which the media are conceived as instruments which can contribute to the well-being of the liberal democracy. As we have mentioned in the earlier parts of this chapter, neo-liberals require "responsible journalists" to fulfill certain obligations in the best interest of society.

The debate over media reporting of unofficial terrorism in Western democracies has primarily developed within this compass of the psychological warfare aims of the state.

Many Western governments, which were faced with terrorism in the 1970s view the connection between the media and terrorism as a "symbiotic one in which terrorism's primary aim is media coverage" (Bell 1978). The perception of terrorism, according to Bell, is aimed primarily at

publicity rather than at the resolution of specific political demands locates its success not in the meeting of those demands but in the generation of publicity. Bell (1978) carries this argument further, claiming that media coverage is crucial to the tactical success of a terrorist attack such that "the quality of coverage is quite immaterial to the terrorist's purpose; only the intensity and quantity of coverage matter". This enables Bell to claim that an act of terrorism may yet be considered "successful", in this publicity sense, even if in political and tactical terms it fails.

This theory is founded upon the notion of reciprocal interest.

Terrorists provide the media with the sort of public spectacle they need to satisfy their audience- a highly compelling performance that combines the elements of bloodshed and mystery, human interest and politics, heroes and villains- while the media, for their part, supply the terrorists with an immediate audience, available at a low price, on a potentially planetary scale.

By connecting the advances in telecommunications technology in the 1970s with the increase in the number of terrorist actions that believed in the profitability of media coverage, the official and semi-official orthodox circles began to discuss the media's role in the diffusion of terrorism. Their concern has mostly been expressed in the form of

questions on whether or not media coverage of terrorism has a "contagion effect", the argument proposes that the media coverage of terrorism inspires repetition in the group that undertook the violent act and subsequently profited from the coverage, as well as imitation and emulation by other groups.

On the matter of the "contagion effect", there are two schools of thought. According to a leading proponent of the first school (i.e. "believers" of the contagion effect), Yonah Alexander(1979), a consequence of extensive media coverage of terrorism is the exportation of violent techniques which, in turn, often triggers similar extreme actions by other individuals and groups".

Aside from the contagion criticism, other criticisms have been leveled against the media. They range from "romanticizing terror to the media as participants, albeit with television cameras, in terrorist events". (Livingstone, 1982) The media are placed in a difficult political and moral position, given that both terrorists and media desire attention from a mass audience. Also, contemporary terrorist activity is said to be purposefully structured to meet the needs of television news by, for example, fulfilling conditions such as violence, intensity, unambiguity, and rarity, which

according to Galtung and Ruge (1973) closely fit notions of newsworthiness as defined by news agencies (Hartley, 1982).

The arguments of the proponents of the contagion theory are countered by those of a group called "non-believers". Those who oppose the contagion theory tend to share Grand Wardlaw's (1989) position that "there is no clear evidence that publicity (by the media) is responsible for significantly affecting the occurrence of terrorism".

Another "non-believer" Robert Picard suspects that "media are a contributing factor in the spread of terrorism, just as easy international transportation, the easy availability of weapons and explosives, the intransigence of some governments' policies, the provision of funds to terrorists by a variety of supportive governments, and a host of other factors are to blame".

It comes as no surprise that despite the lack of scientifically acceptable evidence about the media's effect on terrorism, the media are seen by many government officials as having an important role to play in any effort to combat terrorism. There have also been questions raised on what the proper role of the media, especially television, ought to be.

Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister, made this point forcibly in a speech delivered in May 1981 when she linked her general characterization of terrorism to a view of what responsible press and broadcasting will do:

They must, of course, report the facts. Nothing would be more damaging than misinformation and lack of balance. Yet the line is hard to draw, for terrorism needs publicity. Newspaper and television coverage can provoke the very reaction the terrorist seeks.

She pursued this theme in 1985 in a speech to the American Bar Association in London in which she called on journalists to "find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijackers of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend".

William Whitelaw, the former British Home Secretary agreed by saying that "terrorists seek and depend upon publicity. A principal object of their acts of violence is to draw attention to themselves and gain notoriety... they bomb and murder their way into the headlines".

This view is encapsulated by Professor Walter Lequeur of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington: "Terrorists

have learned that the terrorist act by itself is next to nothing, whereas publicity is all. But the media, constantly in need of diversity and new angles, make fickle friends".

The media's coverage of terrorism is therefore seen by official circles as playing into the hands of the enemies of the state, and of encouraging them to go even further.

Furthermore, in many cases, policy experts and government officials criticize the media for attempting truly balanced coverage or for showing the "other side" in a context other than the aura of crisis that surrounds the reporting of a major incident.

NBC's interview with Abu Abbas of PLO, the BBC's interview with Martin McGuinness of the IRA, and Show TV's interview with Abdullah of the PKK were examples which were severely criticized for legitimising terrorism.

"When policymakers criticize the media for legitimising terrorism", argues Ronald D. Crelinsten (1989), "they, in a sense, are arguing for

unbalanced, unfair coverage that stigmatizes the terrorist cause along with his methods and favors the official perspective".

Those criticisms provoked a call for tight controls over the media unless they managed to control themselves. If terrorist propaganda is criminal, then so are the media which uncritically relay it.

Rejecting direct causes, such as socioeconomic deprivation or political grievances as determining factors in the terrorism of the 1970s, Chalmers Johnson (1977) argues that "the rise in international terrorist incidents is due almost entirely to changes in the permissive causes" which he describes as being the existence of new targets, new technology (weapons and media), and new "toleration". With such a perspective on the causes of terrorism, which rejects any political basis to actions, Johnson's solution to the problem of terrorism follows accordingly: "Terrorism can be suppressed through 'special powers', but these inevitably entail a temporary curtailment or suspension of certain liberties. For example, censorship and detention without trial may be necessary".

Those arguments point -as Phillip Schlesinger noted, "in the perilous direction of increased censorship and enhanced secrecy", erasing

the basic premises of the liberal democratic system regarding free press. During the 1980s some basic rights and freedoms of the liberal society were restricted by an orthodoxy which imposed a series of sanctions to combat terrorism in countries including Britain and Turkey. The development of European anti-terrorism legislation and police and military cooperation for 'internal defence', the maintenance of vast intelligence collections, the weakening of the rights of defendants in both criminal and political trials, the growth of high-technology police surveillance of whole populations, the use of exceptional legislation, the expanded category of 'subversion', restrictions upon the rights of trade unions and of political demonstrations, the use of repressive technology in civil policing are all manifestations of this shift from a vulnerable liberal state, to a "national-security state". Strong measures against the media's coverage of terrorist affairs in times of crisis are also justified on the ground that terrorism is low-intensity warfare that should be treated accordingly without compromise. Hocking (1992) claims that "These elements all have their roots in colonial, military, counter- insurgency techniques".

The "coercive" face of the state has appeared with the demands for an outright censorship in order to deprive violent opponents of the state of the supposed advantages of publicity.

One of the prominent defenders of this tendency is Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, former minister for Posts and Telegraphs in the Irish Government, who has argued that liberal democracies need to take on an 'exceptional' character, 'relevant to the dangers of the day'. As a well-known supporter of the strengthening authority of the state under the law, Dr. O'Brien has persistently pursued this line in Britain and the Irish Republic, by advocating open censorship in some contexts such as refusing to allow interviews with spokesmen of illegal organizations engaged in political violence.

Bonanate (1979), on the other hand, claims that the imposition of stringent security measures (including media controls that would deny independent knowledge of the causal factors precipitating violence) will not only fail to resolve the root causes of terrorism, but will also place formidable obstacles in the path of the "democratization" that Bonanate sees as essential for that resolution -thereby exacerbating the already blackened political structure. "Not only is it not sufficient, therefore, to

introduce stricter security controls over the media in response to terrorism, it may well be generating the structural conditions within which the potential for violence is realized" said Bonanate; "Considering the relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism anew, until democracies broaden their participatory base, enabling a popular and active voice in political life, not only will terrorism never be eradicated, it will in fact be created".

Such measures like censorship, as generally agreed, might also threaten the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order, one in which the received concept of press freedom was that the media were completely separate from the state. This of course presents the fundamental dilemma between censorship (prescribed ostensibly to deny terrorists access to media coverage) and the liberal-democratic ideological tradition of free speech. Will violence invariably push liberty aside as the quest for freedom from fear of terrorism becomes more important than liberty? How can a democratic society balance its desires for liberty with its needs for order?

These questions have led the liberal state, to set an information policy which integrates the media into a national- security design while, at

the same time, preserving the necessary appearance of separation. Some contemporary counter-terrorism techniques have been developed for "media cooperation" or "voluntary restraint" in reporting incidents of terrorism. The effective use of the mass media, as Clutterbuck (1973) puts it, "does not mean government control of news which rebounds by killing its credibility; it means helping reporters to get to the scene of events, to meet those responsible, to get the facts and to report what they see and hear".

Adopting the policy of "voluntary restraint" by media organizations rather than outright censorship in the battle against terrorism, the state replaced the possible use of "coercion" with "consent".

"In free societies, the real question is not one of censorship but one of self-discipline" noted Benjamin Netanyahu (1986);

The Western media entail an obligation for responsible, restrained and critical reporting of terrorism. It is one thing to ensure that conflicting points of view within a society get a fair hearing. It is another to offer uninhibited access to mass communications to the very forces that are committed to the destruction of free society itself and its free press.

Another call for the "responsible media" came in 1991 from Turkey, a country which has been subject to "ethnic terror" since 1983. By agreeing with claims that the media give a unique chance to terrorists to attract widespread attention through the headlines, Turgut Özal, the former President of Turkey, asked for the media's cooperation in combatting terrorism, proposing that newspapers should announce terrorist affairs in the back pages instead of the headlines of the front page.

The transition from "coercion" to "consent" can clearly be observed in the United Kingdom's long-standing problem with terrorism in Northern Ireland with. Since the troubles grew more serious in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UK government has employed news blackouts and censorship to affect the content and tone of news coverage of terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Independent television stations and the press, as well as the BBC, have come under government pressure not to publicize terrorism and not to criticize government policy regarding terrorism.

With the passage of time, a new approach has been adopted into the British counterterrorism strategy. Rather than impose information

control on the media, Justice Hope (1979) recommended fostering close liaison between the government, the police and the media in an effort to establish guidelines which would operate in relation to a crisis incident. Stressing the need for media cooperation, Hope suggests that the "police and government should enlist media support and confidence, as far as possible, to enable it to report responsibly".

Patrick Murphy (1980), a New York police chief agrees with the worry that "censorship concedes a victory to terrorists' by suppressing freedoms".

H.H.A. Cooper (1977) of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism also argues for non-censorship in news reporting, but advocates 'care' in commentaries and investigations, suggesting that the media should recognize the possibility of their being abused and therefore be "responsible".

The "social responsibility theory" is revived against the background of some highly questionable assumptions about the nature of the contemporary liberal- democratic state and the operation of the media within it. These are: that liberal democracies are very fragile and that they

do not censor news; that the media are willing victims of terrorist propaganda and function as open conduits for terrorist views; that media coverage has a 'contagion effect'.

This is an extension of the view that such states are presently highly vulnerable especially when confronted by publicity-seeking terrorists. They are presumed to lack an effective repressive apparatus and to be perfectly open. Schlesinger, however, critically evaluates this assumption by reference to the

... recent growth of research suggesting that there have been significant alterations within the liberal democracies in the direction of what is variously termed a 'strong state', 'authoritarian statism' or the 'national security state'."

By attributing to examples like the recent anti-terrorist laws and restrictions upon political liberties in Western democracies, which in part represent a response to unofficial political violence, Schlesinger disagrees with the "picture of vulnerability which is drawn in the writings of the 'terrorism studies' experts- where, indeed, one rarely finds any analysis at all of the operations of the present advanced capitalist state".

When one considers evidence of the effectiveness with which the media may be subject to state direction at times, it is hard to accept the general picture of the "limp-wristed liberal democracy" current in the orthodox view. On the contrary, "we are witnessing the evolution of a new type of state" as Hocking (1992) notes, "in which the expansion of an increasingly bureaucratic security sector is a critical component". The state's integration of the media into a new national security design as well as the voluntary restraint of the "responsible" mass media, can be more destructive to than any outright censorship the foundations and the basic premises of the liberal-democratic thought.

Recent changes in the British approach to terrorism and the media, as a matter of fact, have clearly put an end to any notions of "voluntary restraint" ensuring apparent media independence. In October 1988 the Home Office banned all unedited or live interviews with "terrorist supporters". This step has been described as "part of an attack on civil liberties which is unprecedented in peacetime" (Pienaar, 1988).

The ban on interviews with "terrorist supporters" provides an example of the definitional problems associated with counter terrorism

measures in general. How is one to determine who "terrorist supporters" are?

The second actor of the conflict, namely "the terrorist", needs to be defined at this stage.

2.2.2. The Terrorist

In spite of the fact that terrorism has received tremendous attention from scholars since the 1930s, there is yet to be an agreement on what terrorism is.

Since the definition of what constitutes 'terrorism' varies from society to society, and from government to government, it is hard to develop a common policy against terrorism. As noted by Donna Schlagheck, "Terrorism is one of the paradoxes of our times. Over 100 definitions of terrorism have been proposed, but none has been universally accepted".

The 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism defined political terrorism as "criminal acts

directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public". The League's definition was so restrictive that it ignored atrocities committed by regimes against their own citizens, rejecting the notion that regimes could be the perpetrators of terrorism.

Passage of time, historical evidence of state-employed terrorism such as that demonstrated by Hitler's regime, decolonization which witnessed the emergence of numerous national liberation movements in violent opposition to former rulers, and state-supported terrorism have broadened the views of some governments.

The prevention of Terrorism Act of the British Government (1974) defines terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear".

The Anti -Terror Act of Turkey (1991) on the other hand, regards "any kind of actions against the state's authority, constitutional order, and national integrity by means of force, oppression, violence, threat" as "terrorist actions". Any kind of propaganda against the integrity of the country and the nation is forbidden by the 8th article of the Act.

The definition of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the German Federal Republic (1985), sees terrorism as

... an enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes like murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off a blast by explosives; or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such criminal act.

The European TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and political Violence) group was modelled on the British definition (1986): "Terrorism is defined as the use, or the threatened use, by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to effect political aims".

The European Convention to Combat Terrorism (1977) did not use any definition in order not to get stuck in a political debate. It simply listed crimes and 'depoliticized' these in order to circumvent restrictions on extradition.

The academic discourse is less broad and more precise on the matter.

Ronald D. Crelinsten of the University of Ottawa defines terrorism as "a specific form of political violence" whose selection of victims is symbolic and instrumental: "The victim is chosen because of whom she or he represents and because their victimization will resonate with specific audiences, either in generating fear or exhilaration, or in affecting allegiances and behavior". Thus, Crelinsten believes, "it is a form of communication that speaks to other audiences beyond the target that is directly addressed".

One of the most serious attempts to define terrorism has been that of Paul Wilkinson (1974) who makes a distinction between four types of terrorism (criminal, psychic, war, and political) before defining political terrorism as "the systematic use or threat of violence to secure political ends". He further distinguishes political terrorism into three broad types: "revolutionary", "subrevolutionary" and "repressive". The first two types, according to Wilkinson, are used by individuals and nonstate actors against target states to obtain a radical change in the political order, while the latter is used by states to maintain a status quo that may be advantageous to those belonging to a particular class, ethnic or racial group, or religious faith. States that practice this form of terrorism usually explain their repressive actions as being in the interest of "national

security" even though the real purpose of their actions may have been to maintain "regime security". Wilkinson noted South Africa as a good example of a country in which this form of terrorism was practiced.

To assure an academic consensus definition of terrorism, Alex Schmid (1992), questioned over 50 scholars and reached the following definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence- based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

The complexity of the term not only has created definitional problems for academicians, but also has confused and indeed polluted the debate on how to characterize acts of political violence.

Labelling certain acts of violence as "terrorism" depends mainly on the prejudicial viewpoints of the definer.

When Schmid (1992) asked editors of news agencies, television, radio and the press what kind of political violence they labelled terrorism, he observed the lack of consensus on the issue. The editors, for example, make a distinction between a hijacking for escape and one for coercive bargaining, while the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) assumes all hijackings to be acts of terrorism for the purposes of extradition.

"He who fights for a just cause, he who fights for the liberation of his country, he who fights against invasion and exploitation or single mindedly against colonialism, can never be defined as a terrorist" said Yasser Arafat in his speech at the United Nations's General Assembly in 1974.

When is an act of political violence an act of terrorism, and when is it a legitimate instrument of struggle for a people determined to escape a political cul-de-sac" ask Eke and Alali: "Differently put, when is one accurate in labeling an act of violence, an individual, or group 'terrorist', and when should the more sympathetic label 'freedom fighters' be conferred on an actor or group of actors?

An answer came from Ireland: According to Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, the Irish Government's former Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, being "democratic" brings "legitimacy" : "The force used by a democratic state is legitimate while the violence of the terrorist is not legitimate".

Then the question is; "Who is the terrorist?"

As an overused cliché noted, "one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter". Nelson Mandela who used to be called "a terrorist" by the racist South African government, is now seen as a respectable statesman, thanks to his devoted struggle against racism. One of "the most wanted terrorists" of the 70's, Yasser Arafat was rewarded as a peace initiator in the 90's, while his "terrorist militias" turned into "little generals" in the Western media.

The same has happened to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, when they succeeded in overcoming the Somoza regime. Old "guerillas" became "officials" overnight, proving the argument that "conceptualization derives from the power relations of a given society".

As Philip Schlesinger puts it, "the rationality of political violence employed against the liberal-democratic state depends upon the likelihood of a successful outcome".

This "realist approach" to the use of violence makes it more difficult to define terrorism.

In the lack of consensus over the definition of terrorism, the media's coverage of "terrorist incidents" has always been a subject for discussion.

Believing that publicity has always been an integral part of terrorism, some authors extend the beginning of media-terror relations to the anarchists of the nineteenth century who hoped to use press coverage of bombings and assassinations to stir up public support and make governments appear incompetent and impotent.

Gabriel Tarde (1912), a French sociologist, discussed the phenomenon of "contagious violence" long before the beginning of the twentieth century. Arguing that news of sensational violent crimes often prompt similar incidents, he wrote, "Epidemics of crime follow the line of the telegraph".

Social studies have only recently begun to search for empirical data for Tarde's argument.

A study by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's National Foreign Assessment Center (1979) reported that between 1968 and 1978 there were fewer than 3,100 recorded incidents of terroristic violence in the categories of hijacking, kidnapping (of diplomats, business persons, and political figures), hostage-taking (of civilians), political assassinations, bodily harm in the above contexts, bombings (of public places or private residences of political figures, business persons, and diplomats), and related crimes.

Contemporary terrorism is believed to have begun with the first airline hijackings, organized by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the late 1960s, and, as the CIA's report pointed out, "a high level of terrorist activity characterized the 1970's, relative to the overall level of recorded incidents during the latter 1960's". International terrorism, according to this study, produced 2,102 dead and 5,078 injured persons between 1968 and 1978.

Berkowitz and Macaulay (1971) reported a significant increase in violent crimes after several spectacular murders including President Kennedy's assassination.

Philips (1974) conducted a series of studies on the consequences of widely publicized suicides and found that when the media, led by television, paid considerable attention to a famous person's suicide, it was followed by an increase in the number of people taking their own lives.

The anxiety grew during the 1972 Olympic Games when Palestinian kidnappers of Israeli athletes had a global audience of perhaps 800 million viewers who were introduced to the desperation and grievances of the Palestinians. Many had never before heard of the Palestinians or their complaints against Israel. "Black September" kidnappers successfully diverted media coverage of the games to their cause, and showed the ways of using publicity for communicating with a worldwide audience.

Two years later, the Symbionese Liberation Army kidnapped Patricia Hearst, whose father Randolph Hearst owned the San Francisco

Examiner, among many other media investments. The kidnappers demanded a food "giveaway" and accompanying media coverage.

The main incident which attracted the greatest media coverage and made the most powerful impression on the American public was the 1979-1981 occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the detention of fifty-four Americans.

The captors publicized their demand that the Shah be returned to Iran in exchange for the American hostages to face prosecution by the new government led by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The intense media coverage surrounding the Americans held hostage gave the Iranian captors a platform from which to make their demands. That platform enabled them to speak to the American public in an attempt to manipulate public opinion and put pressure on the U.S. government to give up the Shah.

Concern about terrorist manipulation of a competitive news industry reached its peak in 1985 when commercial television networks devoted extensive coverage to the TWA hostage crisis, the Achille Lauro

hijacking, the Malta debacle, and the Rome-Vienna Airport bombings. Studying the coverage of the NBC Nightly News during the TWA hostage crisis, Tony Atwater (1987), indicated that extensive coverage was devoted to the crisis over 17 days. Approximately 67 percent of news time and 61 percent of news stories were devoted to the crisis.

When NBC News broadcast a three-and-a-half minute interview in May 1986 with Abul Mohammed Abbas, head of the Palestine Liberation Front which hijacked the Achille Lauro in the previous year, the news organization was subjected to swift and pointed criticism. In the interview, Abbas described President Reagan as enemy "number one" and vowed to import terrorism to the United States by attacking Americans in their own country. U.S. State Department officials quickly denounced NBC and stressed that because liberal governments agree that a new mode of terrorism has emerged that depends on media exposure, there may be times when the public good is best served through deliberate "non-exposure" by the press. "Terrorism thrives on this kind of publicity" charged State Department spokesman Charles Redman, adding that "it encourages the terrorist activities we're all seeking to deter".

According to a public opinion poll (Gallup-1986), ninety- three percent of police chiefs believed that television coverage encourages terrorism.

Consequently, since the mid-1970s, most discussions about the relationship between terrorism and the media have proceeded on the assumption that news coverage encourages the spread of terrorism.

Using Clutterbuck's (1975) often quoted passage -"The television camera is like a weapon lying in the street. Either side can pick it up and use it" -subscribers to the contagion theory argue that the media are instruments used by terrorists to create a theater of terror, commanding publicity, gaining a following and spreading information about terrorist tactics. Lacking media coverage, contagion theorists argue, terrorists would have no visibility or hope of legitimacy, and thus terrorism would be reduced.

Yonah Alexander (1979), a leading proponent of the contagion theory, cites the attention drawn to the terrorist by extensive media coverage as a primary reward for the terrorist. He compares terrorism to advertising and claims that the effectiveness of the terrorists' message is

increased "by focusing on spectacular incidents and by keeping particular incidents alive through repetition".

Attention to terrorism not only keeps the issue alive in the public mind as an ever-present threat but also, according to Alexander and O'Day (1984), amounts to greater support for the terrorist's cause. They explain that "by providing extensive coverage of incidents the media give the impression that they sympathize with the terrorist cause, thereby creating a climate congenial to further violence".

Walter Laqueur (1976) has called the media "a terrorists's best friend" while Frederick J. Hacker (1976) alleges that the mass media "serve as propaganda agents of terrorism".

Netanyahu (1986) claims that the "world's free press assists the terrorists" because it "often adopts their terminology and arguments and transmits them to the public uncritically, even sympathetically".

The Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, under the aegis of the U.S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and

Goals (1976), goes even further, alleging that, "In many ways, the modern terrorist is the very creation of the media".

Although not all supporters of the contagion theory emphasize press bias in their account of the ways in which media coverage helps encourage terrorism, the claim that coverage enhances the legitimacy of the terrorist is central to the contagion theory.

A final assumption of the contagion theory is that media coverage supplies information about the methods of terrorists as well as their political objectives and rationales. "The exportation of violent techniques ...in turn often triggers similar extreme actions by other individuals and groups" (Alexander and O'Day, 1984). Watching a successful terrorist attack may increase the morale of other terrorists (Dowling, 1986) and "may advance not only further acts of terrorism, but also the adoption of terrorist tactics by common criminals" (Gal-Or, 1985).

During the 1960s and '70s, the literature associating media with terrorism and implicating media as a contagion of such violence has grown rapidly. Although the "contagion theory" received considerable attention among the orthodox circles, its assumptions are yet to be proven

by empirical data. "No single study based on accepted social science research methods has established a cause - effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism" claims Picard (1990). "Although terrorists do gain publicity from news coverage" confesses Dobkin (1992), "the effects of this coverage are less clear".

Evidence of legitimacy conferred through coverage is, as yet, nonexistent. Alexandre (1979) for example, uses public opinion polls about audience awareness of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to support the inference that awareness of terrorist acts amounts to support for the group. But as Schlesinger (1981) counters,

... Public recognition of a group's existence does not indicate that its goals are now publicly favored. Nor, indeed, does recognition mean that the public necessarily understands the political aims of the group in question in terms that it itself would wish.

While Dowling (1986) suggests that such an effect may exist, no study of terrorist groups exists to support this claim.

Finally, as Dobkin (1992) emphasised, "no empirical research exist to demonstrate a sympathetic slant in reporting about terrorism". In their

analysis of the New York Times and the Times of London, Kelly and Mitchell (1984) found news reports to be "sapping terrorism of its political content" by "focusing on the sensational aspects of the incident" rather than providing explanations about it. Terrorists do not receive coverage about their political motivations; "less than 10 percent of the coverage in either newspaper dealt in even the most superficial way with the grievances of the terrorists".

Additionally, as Dobkin (1992) noted, "press bias tends to run in favor of official stands against terrorism".

Although there is a common concensus that the terrorists often use the media for their own communicative purposes to draw attention, Crelinsten (1989) argues that

... in the case of state-terrorism, media are used to draw attention away from the government by calling opponents of the regime terrorists themselves and having the media reproduce this official version of events instead of the actual state of affairs. This is exactly what the Chinese government did in June of 1989" says Crelinsten, "when its own regime of terror was disguised by labeling its victims ruffians and rioters and using the state-run media to depict this version of events and to depict the soldiers who conducted the massacre in Tiananmen Square as victims of violence themselves.

In sum, then, the media can serve to render terrorism invisible in the case of state terrorism, while in other cases they can serve as amplifiers or legitimizers of terror.

As Gerbner (1988) argues, though, it may not be the terrorist who receives legitimacy from coverage; rather, "the media, placed in a position to report the facts of the terrorist situation, receives enhanced credibility".

Crelinsten (1989) sees the media as "vehicles" for the legitimization struggles between those seeking power and those holding power. The media perform this function by choosing to cover or not to cover terrorism and, when covering it, by choosing to present it in certain ways.

Schlesinger (1981) summarizes that

...the orthodox view of the media as 'willing victims' of the terrorists...fails to attend to how the media routinely deny the rationality of anti-state political violence and how in some circumstances they invoke the sacred dimension of nationhood to ward off subversive evil.

To argue that the presence of the media alone explains the taking of a terrorist action is simplistic reductionism that treats media as unrealistically divine, and political terrorism as undoubtedly nonideological or pathological.

adds Tan (1988) who made a content analysis of selected newspaper reports of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) over a 70-year period.

Finally, the view that terrorism is spread primarily through media coverage promulgates the contagion theory as conventional wisdom and thus shifts attention from the content of news coverage and politically motivated violence to issues of press censorship.

2.2.3. The Media

As a devoted defender of "contagion theory" Neil Livinstone (1982) claims that "There is little question that if the television cameras were prevented from recording every terrorist incident, there would soon be fewer incidents".

But like Livinstone himself, almost every supporter of contagion theory believe that "suppression of news and information is not the answer", and such an approach is inconsistent with the goals and traditions of liberalism which promises to protect the rights of a free press and freedom of speech.

Donna M. Schlagheck (1988), summarised the arguments against censoring news coverage of terrorism under eight reasons:

1. To understand a problem and make careful policy choices, the public must be informed. If the public gives up its right to know, it gives up the right to self-government.
2. Any censorship will undermine the news media's credibility.
3. Censorship of reporting on terrorism lulls the public into believing it is safe and that there is no terrorist threat. This ignorance undermines the public's ability to comprehend and respond to terrorism effectively when it does occur.
4. The rumor mill is more sensationalistic and inaccurate than a free news media. Rumors about terrorism can create panic and hysteria out of proportion to the threat, causing further problems for law enforcement officials trying to resolve a terrorist crisis.
5. Terrorists will do whatever is necessary to attract public attention. Censorship might cause more outrageous acts than those presently committed by terrorists and covered by the media.
6. Censorship might encourage government or law enforcement officials to take action that the public would not approve. Media coverage holds them to a high standard of behaviour and discourages the use of tactics that violate human and civil rights.

7. Censorship would be a victory for terrorists who want to force the state to take undemocratic and repressive measures. Those measures undermine democratic principles and popular support for the government.
8. Censorship of news coverage of terrorism indicates that a government is treating symptoms (violence, publicity) rather than attacking the causes of terrorism. Political terrorists do not seek publicity for its own sake but rather to accomplish certain goals. A government policy focusing on publicity and censorship may signal a failure to grasp the nature of the problems giving rise to terrorism.

These were the reasons why censorship by government officials would be a grievous mistake.

While many government officials as well as the news-gathering media personnel concerned with the damaging effects of an outright censorship, many Western news media have devised voluntary guidelines, since the second half of the 1970s, to govern coverage of terrorist events by their reporters.

CBS is prominent amongst U.S. television networks that have adopted these types of guidelines.

This tendency was immediately adopted in Britain by the BBC who imposed a set of guidelines to follow when reporting stories about Northern Ireland or the Irish Republican Army (IRA). "In a society subject to terrorism, and partly divided by it" according to the Producer's Guidelines of the BBC, "the Company's role is to tell the truth -quickly, accurately, fully but responsibly".

John Wilson, controller of editorial policy and originator of the code, justifies it in terms of the BBC's need to be and be seen to be a credible and trustworthy provider of information. In the words of the Guideline, "People must listen to the BBC before they listen to rumour. If they are to trust what the BBC tells them, we must be seen to be independent as well as well-informed".

When we interviewed Towyn Mason, the former Deputy Secretary of the BBC, for our thesis, he defended the Guidelines for assuring a protection not only for the public, but also for the producers so that "when people complain about a programme the BBC checks to see if the

guidelines were consulted properly. Thus it functions as a safeguard for the producers of the BBC as well".

In the Guidelines, BBC reporters are advised as to which terms should and should not be used on the air: "Programs should whenever possible avoid terms by which terrorist groups try to portray themselves as legitimate". Journalists must clear their stories through several levels of editors and management staff.

Controversies about responsible journalism in Great Britain have led to what Schlesinger, Murdock, and Elliott describe in "Televising Terrorism", as "a process of 'reference upwards', according to which all editors, producers and reporters wishing to produce programs or items about Northern Ireland have had to take their request to the highest editorial levels of their organizations. This process has had an inhibiting effect on investigative reporting about N. Ireland that clearly obviates the need for any explicitly imposed government guidelines, amounting to a kind of self-censorship that is justified as preventing government interference".

The result; many stories are not covered at all; or the reporters "self-censor" -i.e. they do not pursue stories they expect will be rejected by the management of the media organization. In this way, successful "informal" control of media coverage was achieved without "formal" compulsion.

Dual benefit: The state remains its ideological capital by avoiding evident censorship while the media retain their public credibility by being socially responsible and by pursuing "voluntary self-restraint".

From the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s the British model of media control provided a particularly good illustration of how crass overt censorship by the state may be avoided and instead be substituted by indirect control coupled with media self-censorship. At the 1978 IPI conference on "Terrorism and the Media" it was widely hailed as an example worth following. Similar media guidelines have accordingly been adopted by other Western media organizations and include the following:

- No live coverage of terrorists, in order to avoid providing them with an unedited propaganda platform.

- ♦ Avoidance of inflammatory catchwords and phrases.
- ♦ Reporting of any demands should be free of propaganda and rhetoric.
- ♦ Media representatives should avoid making themselves part of the story.
- ♦ No telephone calls should be made to the terrorists.
- ♦ Media representatives should do nothing to further endanger the lives of hostages.

Although these are well-prepared principles , they are not binding for the whole of the journalistic profession.

When it comes to the coverage of terrorism, it is arguably not only the violation of these principles that makes media coverage problematic, but also the issues not covered adequately by these principles. If a terrorist leader instructs his disciples literally -and this is a quote from an Algerian terrorist fighting France in the late 1950s: "We must have blood in the headlines of all the newspapers" (Schmid, 1984)- an ethical problem arises for the editor that demands new instruments to cope with such manipulation.

In fact, such principles live strongly only among the editors of relatively few quality newspapers and radio and television stations.

Tim Gallimore solicited 30 media and journalism organizations in the United States for written guidelines and received replies from 18. Only four had written guidelines: the three major networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC (CNN did not), and one wire service, UPI. Gallimore points out that none of the print media nor the professional associations had written guidelines.

In some countries like Turkey wherein media organizations do not have written guidelines specifically devoted to terrorism coverage, there are general principles of professionalism that exist within the media community. Article 13th of the Press Code of the Turkish Press Council, for example, warns the media to avoid coverage inciting violence and bullying.

Another problem is lack of consensus among the guidelines. Even if the guidelines are established at the national level, many have internal contradictions. Some guidelines, for example, state explicitly that "the news

must not be dramatized or sensationalized", while others state that "the news must provide context so as to inform the media consumer".

Gallimore identifies two main categories into which media guidelines seem to fall : "Standards for responsible coverage and standards for governing the behavior of journalists at the scene of ongoing incidents".

An example of the first type is an injunction not to rely solely on terrorists as sources.

"Ways of publishing or reporting terrorists' demands or deadlines, if at all, without providing them a platform for propaganda" is another example placed in the second category.

There have definitely been cases, though, where the media have acted "responsibly" during a terrorist incident or media coverage. But there is still a crucial problem which jeopardizes the proposed self-censorship; that is the fact that the mass media is a consumer industry based on competition within the liberal system.

Because of the media's competitive nature, there will always be pressure on journalists to ignore guidelines or not to cooperate with government if a scoop is likely.

The commercial basis of information also requires that news be sold while it is still fresh. "If extra profits can be made by being 'irresponsible'" add Paletz and Schmid, "there will always be irresponsible editors".

As Ronald Crelinsten (1989) rightly notes,

...there is an inherent contradiction between the ideology of good reporting and the practice of good reporting. While the former emphasizes ethics, fairness, accuracy, balance, and objectivity, the latter emphasizes shock value, entertainment value, drama, violence, crisis, official perspectives, and other factors that increase viewer and reader ratings, circulation ratings, and advertising revenues.

Therefore, the media is caught between those who say, "We must be balanced; we must be fair; we must not sensationalize"; and the unbalanced, unfair, sensationalistic coverage that sells.

As Paletz and Schmid (1992) summarize,

...the art of responsible news judgement on the part of an editor consists of finding a suitable balance among the public's need to know, its mere desire to know, the terrorists' wish to intimidate and/or to propagandize the public or sectors thereof, and last but not least, the hostages' and other victims' right to survive.

The commercial television's need to increase its ratings and advertising revenues should be added to "the list of desires to be balanced".

The liberal governments, on the other hand, are caught between their courage to combat terrorism and their pledge to the basic liberal principles like the free circulation and competition of ideas.

The dilemma between the security needs of the state and the media's right to cover every news is indeed less problematic when we have a deeper insight about the nature of the relationship between the media and the state.

Philip Schlesinger criticizes the orthodox view which sees the liberal democracies as uncensored with media engaging in the untrammelled pursuit of news values stressing violence and drama, by saying that : "this argument runs against actual developments where some

liberal-democratic regimes, in strengthening their repressive apparatuses, have also developed sophisticated policies for the management of publicity".

Ronald Crelinsten of the University of Ottawa (1989) agrees with Schlesinger noting that "people, who always emphasize how terrorists manipulate the media to their advantage, do not seem to realize that governments use the media all the time". He adds that "Government officials can take advantage of their privileged access and the working relationship they have with the media by timing the release of information according to policy needs":

Government officials can issue formal press releases or hold press conferences that are then routinely covered. They can leak information to a favored reporter to test public reaction and opinion without ever having to reveal the source of the information. The reporter can be expected to cooperate since the official is a valued source who can withhold information in the future if cooperation is not forthcoming.

Accepting everything provided by official sources without any questioning or criticism, the media, as Crelinsten notes, sometimes are engaged in a "disinformation campaign" by the government.

Crelinsten's points highlight the "hegemonic function of the mass media in manufacturing public consent for counter- terrorism policy and official frames for terrorism discourse by preferential disclosure of official information and agendas at the expense of other perspectives".

Turkey witnessed such a manipulation policy during the hunger-strikes of July 1996 when the government used a 1994 censorship law for the first time to block a television report on conditions in a prison while allowing of public channel's producers to make pro-government interviews in order to prepare the public for a supposedly bloody operation.

"In this respect the media strategy, which places the media within the state's counterterrorism network, permits an official construction of a particular, contentious, reality" points out Jennifer Jane Hocking (1992) adding that, "This is the necessary corollary of 'voluntary restraint'- the replacing of independently garnered information with officially sanctioned information. It differs little from the controls of wartime, with much less fuss".

Stuart Hall and his colleagues make a distinction between primary definers and secondary definers to highlight the impact of official sources on the nature of the news. In their categorization "primary definers" are the individuals who occupy positions of authority and who, as media sources, present the official version of events. "Secondary definers" are said to be the media personnel who reproduce this official version in their reporting of news. The reason why Hall and his colleagues use the term of "reproduction", is that "the primary definers, when they are sought out by the media as valuable and reliable sources, establish the parameters of discussion and thereby, frame the issue in a particular way". Thus, when the media, in the interests of balance or objectivity, seek out other alternative sources, these sources, even if they oppose the official view, must frame their remarks in terms of the agenda as already set by the primary definers. If they do not, the secondary definers, i.e. the media, often package their remarks in such a way as to trivialize them or misrepresent them. The result is that the official view is reinforced and legitimized by the coverage. This legitimizing function of the mass media has been linked to the way in which the media operate, the relationship between media and their sources, and the criteria for newsworthiness that go into the construction of news.

As we will see in the coming chapter, the flashy interview of Turkish Show TV with a commander of the rebellious PKK in 1993 was realised under the ideological domain of Turkish official views; so that interviewee could only reply to the accusations of Turkish officials instead of explaining their view of the situation.

Analysing the interviewing of terrorists by the media, Ronald Crelinstein (1989) gives another example of the "reproduction of official views":

While media can choose to go to a terrorist, we have seen that they primarily go to government officials or spokespeople, to policemen, or to persons recognized as authorities or experts in a particular area. They rarely go to dissidents whose views are not those of the majority and, when they do, their treatment of these sources usually differs from that of established or official sources. Treatment ranges from trivializing them or patronizing them, through ridicule or vilification, all the way to sensationalization and dramatization.

Knight and Dean (1982) gave an example of this preferential treatment of authority sources and the differential legitimation of authorities at the expense of terrorists, in their work on the Canadian press coverage of the 1980 Special Air Services assault on the Iranian

embassy in London. They showed how the violence of the SAS teams was legitimized as a natural response to the violence of the hostage-takers.

In a similar study on "The I.R.A, the Red Brigades and the F.A.L.N.", Paletz, Fozzart and Ayanian (1982) reached a similar conclusion. Encompassing the coverage afforded the above-mentioned groups by the New York Times during the period July 1, 1977 through June 30,1979, authors found "no evidence that the Times' coverage legitimized violent causes".

As their study demonstrated, "authorities hold the greater influence over how violence is portrayed in Times stories, both because of the frequency with which they are sources and of the interpretations that they offer. Authority figures are much more accessible to reporters than violent sources and little effort is expended to seek out those who could articulate alternative views. More importantly, reporters and editors at the New York Times apparently share the assumptions about terrorism which undergird the politics of the governments of the United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States. Certainly violence attracts media attention, but the causes of violent groups are denied legitimacy by the authorities and hence by the New York Times".

As proven by such examples the relationship between the liberal government and the media, specifically as it pertains to terrorism, is an uneasy relationship marked by struggles over the balance between autonomy and control, coercion and consent.

In the light of the above review now we can evaluate our cases to get a deeper insight about the consequences of the restrictions put by the liberal governments on the media to regulate their coverage of terrorism.

Within the context of this interaction between the state, the media and the terrorists, now it can be claimed, as already stated in the First Chapter, that overt censorship by the state together with the voluntary restraint of the media brought no useful results apart from their damaging effects on the democratic rights and on the liberal premises.

Having this claim in mind, now we can proceed to more careful analysis of the cases which would enable us to test our arguments discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

THE CASES

In this chapter we propose to consider the relationship between terrorism and television in the context of the responses of the governments and publics of Britain and Turkey, to the media coverage of the IRA and the PKK, centering mainly on the two specific programmes both of which included interviews with the leaders of the above-mentioned organisations.

3.1. In Britain

3.1.1. Background: Britain and the IRA

Since 1968 the United Kingdom has experienced several violent challenges which have prompted and moulded its response. Those challenges have mainly been connected with Northern Ireland affairs, that is to say, connected with the question whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom or should rather be detached to form part of an all-Ireland republic.

Those were the years that the phenomenon of international terrorism surfaced as a number of groups using violence for political purposes : the Red Army Faction (the Baader- Meinhof gang) in West Germany, the United Red Army in Japan, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Israel, and the IRA in Britain.

Political violence in Northern Ireland was perpetrated by paramilitary groups on both sides of a sectarian divide, in a context in which religious affiliation and political loyalties coincide: by Republicans/Nationalists (Catholics) on the one side, and by Loyalists/Unionists (Protestants) on the other.

The IRA's (Irish Republican Army) violent campaign in England began in 1972, with an explosion near a British Army officers' mess in Aldershot. Seven people were killed.

In 1973, British authorities recorded 86 IRA attacks, resulting in one death and 380 injuries.

In 1974, casualties escalated to 45 deaths caused by political violence, including 21 people who died as a result of the bombing of two crowded pubs in Birmingham.

The most spectacular attack of the IRA was the Brighton bombing in October 1984, designed to eliminate the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and many of her Cabinet.

The February 1991 missile attack on 10 Downing Street while Prime Minister John Major's cabinet was in session at the height of the Gulf War appeared as a variant on the theme of targeting the highest level of government on the mainland.

Some 3,000 people have been killed in the troubles in Northern Ireland since 1969.

After the Birmingham bombings, the British government responded to the problems posed by political terrorism with the passage of anti-terrorist legislation -the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974- that banned public displays of support for the

IRA and increased the police's power such as arrest, detention, and security checks of travelers.

Although the act was not aimed at the media, some of its provisions could be interpreted as applying to journalists. During the late 1970s, the British government threatened on several occasions to use the Prevention of Terrorism Act against the media for its coverage of Northern Ireland.

In fact, -as an example of "voluntary restraint" on which we have concentrated in the second Chapter-, British televisions conducted very few interviews with members of the IRA during the 1970s. Between 1972 and 1985, BBC television had carried just four interviews with people speaking on behalf of the IRA. Representatives of the IRA were virtually excluded from the airwaves and rarely profiled in the press, so that the British consensus view of their rationale -or lack of it- and of the personalities of their members goes unchallenged (Curtis, 1984).

The last IRA interview, before our case, carried by the BBC in 1979, on the 10th anniversary of the deployment of British troops in Northern Ireland. Although the British Government had already banned the IRA under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the BBC had decided to broadcast

the interview on the grounds that "it would help the public to understand the reasons for the ban".

Commercial channel ITV had a very similar record. There have been very few IRA interviews since 1972 when the IRA's campaign began. Only two interviews with IRA people were transmitted on commercial television until March 1983, when Channel 4 aired a documentary, including IRA interviews.

Each time an interview took place, though, there was a political row at Westminster.

The Irish Republic tried to ease those reactions in 1976 when Section 31 of the Irish Broadcasting Act was amended to prohibit all interviews or reports of interviews with any spokesman or representative of the IRA or Sinn Fein, together with any material that might be construed as "inviting support" for those organisations.

But Sinn Fein overcame this prohibition by joining the elections which made some of its supporters legally elected representatives of a duly constituted assembly of the state.

The "armalite and ballot box strategy" -as Britons called it- was born. The IRA would continue its violent campaign while Sinn Fein, as a legal political face of the IRA, would attempt to validate its campaign by seeking and winning votes.

The policy got its first test in the October 1982 elections in which, against most of the predictions, Sinn Fein won 5 seats, 64,000 votes and 35 per cent of the nationalist vote. A year later in the Westminster general election Gerry Adams won West Belfast while Sinn Fein's vote topped 100,000 and its share of the nationalist vote reached 43 percent.

The British government has then, followed the Irish example. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1976 was renewed in 1979, making it an offence (section 11) for a person to fail to disclose information which he knows or believes might be of material assistance in preventing an act of terrorism or in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person for a terrorist offence. It was also regarded as an offence (section 1) to arrange a meeting of three or more persons knowing that the meeting is to support or to further the activities of a proscribed organization or is to be addressed by a person belonging or professing to belong to it; or (Section 9) knowingly to harbour any person who he

knows or believes would be excluded or removed from Great Britain or Northern Ireland under the Act.

According to Clutterbuck (1981) the journalists involved in the IRA interviews might well have been charged under one or more of these provisions, and the BBC senior management involved in the decision to record and broadcast the IRA interview might also have been liable under certain sections of the Act.

But there had been no intervention to the BBC about its coverage on terrorism till the bitter clash of 1985 over a BBC documentary in which the interviewee was not an IRA militant, but a selected member of the Parliament.

3.1.2. The Sequence of Events

A major controversy between the British government and the media developed when "At the Edge of the Union", a 45-minute documentary on Northern Ireland, was scheduled to be shown on BBC's Real Lives series in March 1985.

The documentary was built around filmed profiles of two legally elected political figures from opposite ends of the Northern Ireland ideological spectrum.

Paul Hamann, the 36-year-old producer of the film, who spent much of his 15 years in the BBC working on Northern Ireland, investigated the 16 years of violence in the city of Derry (known as Londonderry to the Protestants) by contrasting and comparing the lives and beliefs of two of the rival leaders: Martin McGuinness, known to be the chief of staff of the IRA and a member of the Sinn Fein, Irish Nationalist party, and Gregory Campbell, a militant Loyalist who believed in a Northern Ireland linked to Britain. Both men were members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and were allowed to put their positions straight to the camera.

Campbell and McGuinness had only been televised in public affairs interviews until then, frequently interrupted and abrasively questioned.

In a documentary setting, Hamann gave them the time to respond, to show themselves as the people they are.

Giving a special interview for our study on August 1995 in London, producer Paul Hamann explained his reasons for making a film on Northern Ireland:

There have been many films on what the statesmen thought, or what the people on the streets of Belfast thought, or even what the journalists thought. Journalists love to interview each others. But who cares about what journalists think about Northern Ireland? I decided to make a very simple documentary, mirroring two Irish men; both elected representatives of their communities, and both hated by each other.

Hamann found, ironically that the two men have many similarities. Both are affectionate family men who live in constant fear of assassination. Both were initially reluctant to appear in the documentary. Filming was restricted -neither man dares walk freely outside his own area. There was always a crowd of heavies: "armed police for Campbell, strange gentlemen for the other". The McGuinness house could not be filmed because of its security system. The Campbell house appears, but inside a cage, TV-monitored, bristling with armed guards.

"They each had their own justification for killing people, and a fanaticism that went beyond rational argument" said Hamann.

Of the two, Campbell appeared as the more adamant advocate of a violent solution, arguing that "something has to be done to finish this trouble once and for all and the only way to do that with the IRA is to kill them".

In contrast, McGuinness, who was elected in 1982 on the Sinn Fein ticket to the Northern Ireland assembly, but has never taken his seat, presented his support for armed struggle as a "regrettable necessity", arguing that although it was "the only way the Irish people can bring about the freedom of their country-if someone could tell me a peaceful way to do it I'd gladly support them".

Hamann had a carefully written script which introduced its actors in the beginning:

The city of Londonderry is where the present Northern Ireland troubles began 16 years ago. It is an increasingly polarised city with public support having grown in recent years for the extremes on both sides. This film looks at those extremes through the eyes of two men, both young, working class, teetotal, churchgoing elected representatives, members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

The first, Martin McGuinness, is thought by many to be the IRA's present Chief of Staff, responsible for bombing the heart out of the city in the 1970s. Yet today he stands as a legitimate politician, able to attract 10,000 votes for his party Sinn Fein.

The second man, Gregory Campbell, is McGuinness' political and religious opposite, a hardline Loyalist who needs constant armed police protection following a bomb attempt on his life last year. Campbell is a target because of his outspoken views, a strong advocate of a shoot-to-kill policy against the IRA.

Keeping an equal distance with both men the documentary stays neutral between their contradicting ideas. There was no voiceover commentary to suggest a preferred interpretation and no on-screen interviewer to raise questions from within the official discourse.

The official stereotype of the "inhuman IRA operative" was further challenged by shots of him at home with his family.

Hamann wanted to end his film with the two men sitting down together. But Campbell rejected that offer arguing that "It would be an insult to the bereaved to sit with the man who had planned and executed the murder of their loved ones. They want action".

After the editing Hamann consulted with his senior people for approval.

Any decision to interview "a terrorist", according to the BBC's guidelines, should be referred up the management chain to the Director-General for prior approval.

According to part 7 of the Producer's Guideline,

...the BBC interviews active terrorists only on occasions where it believes the public interest in doing so outweighs the outrage and offence such interviews are likely to cause our audience. Any proposal to approach a terrorist or terrorist organisation for an interview must have the support of the Head of Department and must be referred in advance to Controller Editorial Policy for approval.

In the case of Northern Ireland terrorism, the BBC has special guidelines because of "the special circumstances of Northern Ireland":

"All proposals for programmes touching on Irish issues in general or on Northern Ireland in particular must be referred to the Controller in Northern Ireland" according to Section 8 of the Producers Guidelines.

"The rule" as Towyn Mason, former Deputy Secretary of the BBC told us in a special interview made for this study, "is that if the programme wish to bring a known person speaking on behalf of terrorism, the producers have to put the proposal up to certain senior

people and inform the controller in Northern Ireland who is in charge of the BBC in Northern Ireland since he is knowledgeable about the circumstances there".

As far as the Guidelines are concerned, Mr. Hamann, producer of the "Real Lives", said that his documentary was "totally in the interest of the public", as required by the Guidelines: "I thought that it was time to make such a film because I wanted people to understand how fanaticism of the opposing sides is potentially horrific".

"The programme was properly consulted" added Hamann, that is to say, his documentary has been approved by the BBC's management.

When asked whether he was concerned about the possible reactions, Hamann said;

Of course I was expecting some opposing voices to be raised. Because it was a programme made on an area where the tension was generally high, although it was a quite quiet period when I made the film. But after the Beirut hijacking during which I was editing the documentary, I began to worry about my film.

The television's treatment of terrorists had become a controversial issue once again in June 1985 when armed Shiites had hijacked a TWA jet

and the American networks had been criticized by official circles for giving "unlimited publicity and perhaps even some forms of advocacy" to the hijackers. There has already been calls for more control over what is aired and printed about terrorism and those who engage in such political violence.

In July, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had taken up the theme in a speech delivered to an American Bar Association conference in London: "We must try to find ways to starve the terrorists of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend". Her statement met with support from U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese and other U.S. officials.

Consequently, when a reporter from the Sunday Times asked her at a Washington press conference a few weeks later how she would react if she discovered that a British television channel was planning a program featuring a leading member of the IRA, she replied immediately that she would "condemn them utterly".

Unlike the newspaper, she was not aware of the prepublicity for the documentary, but the quote was sufficient to build a front-page story.

On July 27, the papers reported that Thatcher reacted to the scheduled broadcast of the "At the Edge of the Union" by demanding an explanation from the BBC concerning the documentary. The Times collected further comments from senior Conservative politicians, all of whom condemned the planned screening, and published a lead story on July 28, headlined "IRA: Thatcher Anger at BBC".

On July 29, the Board of Management collectively viewed the programme. After the meeting the deputy director-general declared the Board's view that "the programme required amending, together with a suitable foreword describing its purpose. At the end of its transmission a programme should be shown discussing the issue of television and terrorism". With these matters being dealt with, the Board of Management wished the programme to be transmitted.

Till that point, as Towyn Mason, the then Deputy Secretary of the BBC confessed to us, "nobody had realised that the programme would become such a controversial issue, because it wasn't to do with current political activities, it was a human interest programme".

But on the same day, Leon Brittan, the then-Home Secretary, who was responsible both for broadcasting and counter terrorism, reacted immediately, by conveying a formal message to the chairman of the BBC's Board of Governors, Stuart Young, to stop the programme. Even though he had not seen the film, Brittan claimed that "the BBC would be giving an immensely valuable platform to those who have evinced an ability, readiness and intention to murder indiscriminately its own viewers". The letter also deplored the fact that the documentary would "materially assist the terrorist cause and enable McGuinness to advocate or justify the use of violence for political ends, and thus the murder and maiming of innocent people". Brittan went on to argue that "even if the programme and any surrounding material were, as a whole, to present terrorist organisations in a wholly unfavorable light, I would still ask you not to permit it to be broadcast".

Brittan concluded his letter by urging the Corporation not to be used by the terrorists:

For the gain that the terrorists would secure by the broadcast would not be the conversion of large numbers of people to their cause, but the opportunity to boost the morale of their supporters and to alarm the innocent majority who have every reason to fear their intentions. It must be damaging to security and therefore wholly contrary to the public interest to provide a

boost to the morale of the terrorists and their apologists in this way. I cannot believe that the BBC would wish to give succour to terrorist organisations.

He also indicated that if the BBC were to show the programme he would like to see it before transmission.

According to Towyn Mason, the intervention of the Home Secretary "was very unusual".

There are two documents which provides the BBC legal basis: the BBC charter and the License of Agreement.

The government gives license to the BBC, with the second document, to operate according to certain rules. But it also allows the government in certain circumstances to require the BBC to do things or not to do things. Mason described this competence as "a weapon which is almost one you can't use except for a serious national emergency situation or an enormous national disaster".

Brittan's letter shook the BBC whose Director General was on holiday on a boat at the time.

The BBC's Board of Governors, the responsible body for the editorial policy of the corporation, responded to Brittan's letter by convening an emergency meeting during which they heard the BBC's Board of Management's case for showing the film, which the head of the BBC documentary unit had described as "careful, thoughtful and informative", and as a "balanced piece of work".

Then the governors took the unusual and exceptional step of viewing the film prior to transmission. After an extensive debate on the film, "all governors were concerned about lack of balance in the programme" declared Stuart Young, the Chairman of the BBC: "The majority were equally concerned in the present climate of high feelings, about its soft treatment of the extremist case".

In the end, the governors stated it would be "unwise" to show it and "exercised its constitutional right in taking the editorial decision not to transmit the scheduled programme on a vote of ten to one".

The press angrily charged that the governors, many of whom were appointed during Thatcher's term, were allowing the government to dictate BBC policy.

On August 1, the Governors' Chairman, Stuart Young, tried to soothe the conflict between the governors and the Board of Management, who were pressuring the governors to reverse their decision to ban the film. BBC management took the position that "the independence of the BBC is more important than any single programme".

Outraged broadcast journalists in Britain and Northern Ireland met to consider a possible strike in protest against the government's interference with the BBC's independence. The BBC's senior management met to discuss the option of mass resignation, and the crisis escalated. In an effort to restore morale, the Board of Management, which includes senior editorial personnel, prepared a statement reiterating that, although "in the matter of Northern Ireland, the BBC has not and will not provide unchallenged opportunities for the advocacy of terrorism", present policy does extend "to the exploration and explanation of the views and motives of those who avow terrorist activity-and their associates" and "includes, on occasion, the use of broadcast interviews".

On August 7, the Home Secretary had a two-hour meeting with BBC leaders, who sought a restatement of the Corporation's editorial independence. This, said Mr. Brittan, he had been happy to give. He also

said: "I do not accept that any kind of undue or improper pressure was brought. My views were expressed to the BBC. It was right for them to take them into account. They were not bound to follow them".

More than 2,000 BBC journalists and technicians staged a one-day strike, for the first time in their history, on August 7, the day the film was originally scheduled to be broadcast. They were joined by a substantial number of their colleagues from Independent Television News (ITN), Channel 4 News, and the National Union of Journalists. The strike stopped most television and radio newscasts in Britain.

This furor ended with the governors agreeing to run the film later in the year after some alterations and changes had been made "for the sake of clarity".

3.2.1. Reactions and Consequences

Almost two months later, on October 16, 1985, the controversy over "At the Edge of the Union" ended when the film was aired unchanged, except for the addition of 19 seconds of archival footage of victims of an IRA bombing in Belfast.

During the crises the British press in general, backed the opposition of the BBC staff to the government's intervention and disapproved the broadcasting ban.

"Even the right-wing columnists who had reacted against the McGuinness interview, supported the BBC's strike against the Government's intervention" said Paul Hamann, the producer of "Real Lives".

A former army officer, Michael Yardley, also a researcher on terrorism at the London School of Economics, wrote in *The Times* that "men like McGuinness speak not only for their own fanatical minority but for a larger number who sadly and partly because of our own inaction, have come to see individuals like him as their only voice".

The documentary is a flawed programme, but it did not deserve to be censored" wrote the *Sunday Times*, in its editorial column on 4 August: "If the governors genuinely thought that "At the Edge of the Union" was naive in its approach and treated men of violence with kid gloves then they should have said so and withdrawn the programme for that reason, though that is an editorial judgement best exercised by senior management. If, as seems more likely, they thought it an imperfect documentary but not one which gave succour to terrorism, then the governors should have had the guts to defend the BBC's independence from government pressure and backed their management's decision to screen it, saying that if the Home

Secretary really felt that wider consideration in the struggle against the IRA required a ban then the government should do the banning itself. In the case of "At the Edge of the Union", it would have been just as wrong for the Home Secretary to ban it as it was for the BBC governors to do his job for him.

It was the UK Press Gazette which, on 5 August, in its Opinion column entitled "The glory of the BBC gets sadly tarnished" expressed the typical media view:

The whiff of hypocrisy, humbug and cant hangs pervasively over the BBC governors' decision. All of those who were ready to fight for the ideal of a public service broadcasting organisation must now be having second thoughts. By submitting to the government's wishes the Board of Governors may will have signed the Corporation's own death warrant.

Describing himself as a "passionate opponent of terrorism", Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations at Aberdeen University, condemned the government's intervention, in the Sunday Times on 4 August:

The banning shows how rapidly Mrs. Thatcher and her ministers have slid from talk of a voluntary code on the media's coverage of terrorism to the arbitrary technique of indirect censorship. The free media are such a vital precondition for a free society that any introduction of censorship plays into the hands of enemies of democracy. It is also an insult to the intelligence of our citizens.

Among this chorus of disapproval and concern, there were few supporters of the "contagion theory", expressing agreement with the actions of government and the BBC's governing body: "The BBC was right to cancel the screening of an interview with IRA man Martin McGuinness" wrote the Daily Express.

John O'Sullivan in The Times shared the same view by saying that

talks of aims and philosophies confuses the question of whether a terrorist is a sort of politician or a sort of criminal and bestows an unintended respectability upon him. He is an advocate of murder and murder is not an opinion which governments are obliged to respect. The right to know is important. But it takes second place to the right not to be murdered.

Professor Alan Thompson, a former governor of the BBC, in a letter to the Daily Telegraph said:

I can testify how jealously the Board guards its independence from government interference. In this case, however, it had to bear in mind a number of urgent external issues. Had I been a governor at the present time I would have borne in mind the distress and grief such a presentation would have caused to injured survivors of terrorist outrages and to the relatives of IRA murder victims.

Producer Paul Hamann replied to those critics in our conversation:

I was not worried about giving McGuinness a chance to express himself as a terrorist. Because he was a democratically elected representative of the people of Ireland. It was absolutely a legitimate thing to interview him, and the documentary was an excellent piece of journalism.

When asked to whom he felt himself responsible to, he put "himself" first, and the BBC second. He said that the security of the state was not his overriding concern during the filming. Within Hamann's "priority of concerns", state security comes only after his duty to give the public fare and accurate reports.

Towyn Mason, the then Deputy Secretary of the BBC agrees with Hamann:

As responsible broadcasters we have never intentionally given a platform to terrorist of any kind. Our job is not to restrict information, but to give them, as honestly as we can, so that the public, properly informed about what's happening, can make up their minds. We have always sought to keep strict control, via producers' guidelines, over our coverages concerning such issues. But, sometimes we may interview terrorists to see how come they possibly justify killing people. As a broadcaster myself, I have more trust in the judgement of people. I do not think that people are such fools that when they see a terrorist who comes over, soft-spoken, philosophical, quiet, calm and gentle, they may be influenced. Instead they may think that 'He is trying to cover up something'.

Apart from the possible effects of the McGuinness interview on the public, many in the conservative media questioned the "neutral" discourse of the programme.

The Daily Telegraph published an article, on August 2, claiming that "for the BBC there is officially no distinction between a man who is an avowed enemy of this country, member of an organisation which has carried out murders both in Britain and in Ireland, and a member of an organisation which has carried out murders in Ireland but not in Great Britain". According to the author, "Mr. Campbell is, in so far as he is allowed to be, on the side of this country".

When we remind Hamann of the criticism of the right-wing media regarding his humanistic mirroring of McGuinness he replied: "It was very easy to say 'He is a killer, a terrorist. He blew up women and children'. And everybody has already done it. Why do I need to add another film to the 'catalogue of documentaries' that would repeat themselves. I wanted to make a more realistic film which would reach a wider audience, so that even left wingers might get persuaded against terrorism. I don't support terrorism, and I believe this is a much cleverer way of exposing those men

as being what they are. We show both of them deliberately. It is not my problem, if one of them seems sympathetic to some people".

When the tension diminished, the BBC announced that it would continue to make programmes and broadcast interviews on Ulster terrorism.

Then followed a most extraordinary revelation. On August 18, the Observer broke an exclusive story charging that the British intelligence service, MI5, had secretly controlled the hiring and firing of BBC staff for years. The Observer published case histories of eight persons who had been as bitter as that surrounding the McGuinness film and perhaps even more ominous, enveloped the BBC.

The National Union of Journalists warned BBC management of a "head-on conflict" if evaluation and approval of its members by MI5 did not cease.

This new scandal pushed the banned film out of the media limelight.

But its consequences remain:

3.1.3.1. Legal Consequences

The crises over "At the Edge of the Union" compelled the British government to exercise more strict legal measures towards broadcast interviews.

Taking an example from legislation in force in the Republic of Ireland since 1976, the British Government in October 1988 banned the broadcasting of interviews with representatives of Sinn Fein and 10 republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations.

What specifically contributed to the support for a broadcasting ban was an interview with Garry Adams, from Sinn Fein, aired on BBC Radio Ulster's Talkback programme on September 12, 1988. Earlier in the day, the IRA had bombed the home of Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, Northern Ireland's top civil servant. In his interview, Adams took the opportunity to make it clear that civil servants who advise security forces "run the risk", and that the IRA was giving them a chance to resign their positions.

Bloomfield found the broadcast almost as sickening as the attack on his home.

Only 5 weeks after the incident, Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary announced in the House of Commons that he had issued instructions to the two broadcasting authorities, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), which required them to deny representatives of eleven organisations in Northern Ireland including Sinn Fein, direct access to the airwaves.

According to the text of the notices, the material to be refrained from broadcasting includes :

1...any words spoken, whether in the course of an interview or discussion or otherwise, by a person who appears or is heard on the programme in which the matter is broadcast where-

(a) the person speaking the words represents or purports to represent an organization specified in paragraph 2 below, or,
(b) the words support or solicit or invite support for such an organization, other than any matter specified in paragraph 3 below.

2. The organizations referred to in paragraph 1 above are-

(a) any organization which is for the time being a proscribed organization for the purposes of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984 or the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978; and

(b) Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defence Association.

3. The matter excluded from paragraph 1 above is any words spoken-

- (a) in the course of proceedings in Parliament, or
- (b) by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary, European Parliamentary or local election pending that election.

Those restrictions constituted the most stringent editorial control imposed on the electronic media since the Second World War.

The rationale behind the ban was explained by Conor Cruise O'Brien, an editorialist for The Times of London, who had introduced the Irish legislation directed against the IRA and Sinn Fein while a member of the government in the Republic. The main justification for the ban, as O'Brien described it, is the fact that "the broadcasts boost the morale of the members of the organizations and help them in recruiting. It also confers a certain aura of respectability, which is helpful to the terrorists. The acts that they commit can not really be crimes if they are permitted to be broadcast. When they appear on television, the message is that they represent a political cause that has a significant degree of legitimacy".

The ban has drawn heavy criticism from members of the media and opposition parties, in particular, who described it as "unwise and counterproductive".

According to D. Miller (1990) "this was only the sixth time in the history of British broadcasting that the Home Secretary had used his reserve powers to ban public circulation of specific sorts of material".

The first part of the ban, Ed Moloney (1991) believes, "was mostly unnecessary" as television and radio companies had long since applied a voluntary prohibition on interviews with paramilitary groups, particularly republican ones".

Brian Thompson of the Faculty of Law, University of Liverpool (1989), also reminded that

...before this overt censorship by the government, the two broadcasting authorities operated a system of self-censorship so that those whom the government sought to ban had very little access to television and radio.

The BBC and IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority) are unhappy about the ban, but they have not sought to challenge it in the courts. They acquiesced in this, fearing the consequences of opposing the government. This is an example of what might be called the 'chilling effect' of the Home Secretary's action. Not only has he struck at Sinn Fein,

but also at the broadcasters who have been at odds with the government before over aspects of the coverage of Northern Ireland.

Despite the wave of heavy criticism on the broadcasting ban, the Houses of Parliament approved the action of the Home Secretary in issuing the directions.

Six journalists, with the backing of the National Union of Journalists in Britain, sought judicial review of the Home Secretary's notice, claiming that the Notice was unlawful as it conflicted with the European Convention on Human Rights which states that "Everyone has the right to freedom and expression" and public authority can not interfere with the freedom of speech "unless there was a pressing social need". The Union stated that there was no evidence of such a "pressing social need".

But the Divisional Court held that, given the context of fighting terrorism in Northern Ireland, "the Home Secretary's decision was not perverse" and that there existed a "pressing social need" for the introduction of the notices.

The judges rejected the claim that the ban was in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and said that experienced broadcasters could overcome the difficulties caused by the ban.

3.1.3.2. Professional Consequences

The BBC, accordingly, warned its staff that "the Notice bans British broadcasters from transmitting the voices of Northern Ireland terrorists, members of paramilitary groups and of other organisations".

The amended guidance, though, was written with the words of objection:

The BBC opposes the continuation of the Notice because it believes that the ban deprives audiences of the right to hear and judge the representatives of organizations which have a profound effect on life in Northern Ireland, and because it enables those organisations more easily to avoid taking responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

While the Notice remains in force it is necessary to observe its provisions but it is also vital that we do not extend its scope unnecessarily. BBC journalists must ensure that they continue to seek, question, and report the views of all significant parties and organisations in accordance with providing full, responsible coverage of the Northern Ireland situation and in accordance with the other provisions of these Guidelines. (6.11 of the Part 8; Producers' Guidelines of the BBC, 1993)

The Guideline, on the other hand, gave its reporters a clue for overcoming the Notice: "Anyone, including representatives of the organisation, can be quoted in reported speech. Pictures of the individual speaking can be shown with the words spoken in voice-over by someone else or shown in caption.

"Television could show pictures of demonstrators waving banners of support for one of the organisations affected, but the sound would have to be cut if they chanted support for the organisation" (6.3 and 6.4 of the Part 8; Producers' Guidelines of the BBC, 1993).

In reporting the views of listed organizations BBC reporters, then, began to use an actor to read a banned representative's words over silent pictures of him or her talking or to use subtitles.

When the BBC repeated "At the Edge of the Union in 1995", on the tenth anniversary of the conflict over the documentary, it had to use an actor's voice to cover some of McGuinness' words, because of the government's restrictions. But it was reminded that "In 1985, Real Lives had real voices".

The ban did not apply to the print media. Radio and television journalists were able to report what the representatives of the banned organisations had said. Even so, the ban has led a substantial effect on the coverage of Northern Irish affairs. The additional practical difficulties involved in covering the issue has had to a marked drop in interviews, and those that do appear tend to be shorter and less informative (Henderson, Miller, Reilly, 1990).

As Graham Murdock observed, "the uncertainty over which words qualify as 'inviting support' for a listed organization has also produced a high degree of caution".

Those symptoms underscore the general argument that what is ultimately at stake with the ban is not just the right of Sinn Fein and other listed organizations to speak directly to the British people but the electorate's collective right to open debate.

As the Guardian's political columnist Hugo Young (1988) argued when the ban was introduced, "Those who have been deprived are not, as our leader would have it, a handful of gunmen but an entire citizenry".

The British Government, subsequently, extended the boundaries of the ban, and included commercial radio.

The BBC suffered most of all. Its independence having been challenged, the Board of Governors failed to follow the drill which had been established over many years for dealing with an assault on its independence.

"Having spent the whole of its existence trying to convince the world of its independence from the Foreign Office, here was the BBC collapsing in the face of a government dictat" wrote Mark Bonham Carter(1988), Vice Chairman of the governors of the BBC from 1975 to 1981. He also said that the banning struck at the BBC's standing and the credibility of the World Service, which depended upon the fact that it was not an organ of propaganda. His was only one of many critical voices in Britain, which included the following:

"The BBC is damaged in its reputation for independence from the government of the day, an asset that tends to be taken for granted at home and is a principal source of its unique strength abroad".

It had been an ultimate test of BBC's independence from Government and of its ability to provide an adequate informational base for a mature democracy.

As the BBC's Assistant Director-General at the time, Alan Protheroe, later pointed out: "It is necessary for the maintenance of democracy that unpopular, even dangerous, views are heard and thoroughly understood. The argument about the 'national interest' demanding censorship of such voices is glib and intrinsically dangerous. Who determines the 'national interest'? How far does the 'national interest' extend?"

Mark Bonham Carter, a former vice-chairman and governor of the BBC, agrees by saying that in recent decades

...people started referring to the public interest, instead of talking about the national interest. The difference is a subtle one. The national interest tends to coincide with what the government sees it to be. The public interest is concerned with what the public needs to know-and the two may differ. Which is the superior interest? In a democracy it seems clear that the public interest is the more important. The government is responsible to Parliament and Parliament to the electorate. The electorate cannot make proper judgments unless it is properly and fully informed. (And) it is surely in the public interest that the public should have as much information as possible about what is happening in Northern Ireland and whether, to take a

topical example, there was or is a policy of 'shoot to kill' in tackling IRA terrorists- and if so by whom it was authorised.

Towyn Mason agrees: "All governments everywhere in the world tend to equate national interest with what they believe to be national interest, and in some cases it was their own interest. That's why we should care for public interest, since we are not responsible to the governments, but to the public".

3.1.3.3. Political Consequences

Not all the political effects of the broadcasting ban are measurable. The refusal of the broadcasting companies to monitor its effects is one major reason. Another is that by its very nature the ban has produced intangible results -programmes not made, interviews not filmed and so on. When censorship means programmes are pulled or altered, it is easy to gauge; when it means inactivity, it is often impossible to access.

"The producers", according to a BBC executive, "are just not putting up ideas in areas where it would come into conflict with the ban, because they think it's not worth trying to get round it or they think they might be thought lefties or editors that would reject it out of hand".

Ultimately, the restrictions introduced by the Thatcher government extended censorship, from the terrorist organisations, to a whole new category, to groups that were not only perfectly legal but had elected representatives in their ranks. At the time the ban was announced Sinn Fein had one MP, Gerry Adams in West Belfast, and some 55 councillors.

This reduction in coverage of issues concerning Northern Ireland, brought questions about the acceptability of anti-terrorist measures in terms of human rights and liberal democratic values.

Michael Yardley from the London School of Economics, urged in The Times, that "the danger of denying McGuinness a platform is that it also denies a platform to the people who elected him as their democratic representative. To do this is to invite a widespread rejection of the democratic method".

Kevin Boyle, director of the free speech group Article 19, commented on the day the ban was announced:

Although the situation in South Africa is vastly different from the situation in Northern Ireland, the means now being used by the British government to stifle debate -political censorship- is the same as the means used in South Africa.

The critics have grown while the IRA attacks have not diminished.

After a period of chaotic exercise for 6 years, the ban was lifted by the Major Government in 1995, admitting that "it made no useful result" concerning the problem.

3.2. In Turkey

3.2.1. Background : Turkey and the PKK

The story of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is accepted as being the most violent guerilla group in the Middle East region, dates back to the mid-1970s, when Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the movement, decided to set up a Kurdish-leftist organization together with his 11 comrades.

The party was established in November 1978 in order to "break the chain of treachery against the Kurdish cause" by using guerilla warfare tactics.

Öcalan had already managed to gain support in the southeast region when Turkish Army took over in September 1980. Operations

throughout the country intensified under the control of military troops, forcing the PKK units to move out of the Turkish border. They began to pile up across the border, especially in Syria for cross- border operations into Turkey.

The "campaign of terror" began on August 1984 when the PKK delivered its first serious blow in the southeastern border towns of Eruh and Semdinli. Raiding the settlements with machine guns and rocket fire and hitting at police stations and military buildings, the PKK killed one private and wounded 9 people, including civilians.

The Turkish press and the state-run radio and television didn't pay much attention to the PKK's first "armed propaganda attack" which was regarded by Öcalan as the "begining of the Kurdish revolution".

While striking the PKK units with repeated military blows, the governments failed to distinguish the movement and insistently treated them as a "bunch of bandits" who had taken to the mountains seeking independence of a land which never existed.

During the 1980s, Turkish governments basically opted for a military solution to solve the Kurdish problem.

Interior Minister İsmet Sezgin admitted in 1991, that the outlawed PKK organization which had only 12 members when it was established in 1976, managed to expand its structure to "a force of more than 10,000 armed guerillas with about half of this based in Turkish territory and the remaining in neighboring countries".

Between 1984 and 1991, the separatist campaign of the PKK cost more than 5,100 lives according to official sources.

Caught by the armed separatist campaign in southeast Turkey, the first steps Ankara was forced to take was to dissolve a taboo and initiate a realistic approach accepting the 'Kurdish identity' as in the words of Erdal İnönü, ex-deputy Prime Minister in the early 1990s. But not many were willing to go any further than this. (İsmet, 1992)

In the 1990s, the PKK has increased the pace of its activities while the security operations of the Turkish governments have intensified.

The Turkish press had not published any interview with any PKK person, till September 1988, four years after the first attack of the PKK,

when Mehmet Ali Birand in Milliyet, conducted the first interview with Abdullah Öcalan in the Bekaa valley.

Özal regarded the interview as an "advertisement for Öcalan" and reacted accordingly. The reaction of his government was so strong that the copies of Milliyet were seized while Birand was sent to the State Security Court charged with crimes carrying a punishment of 15 years of imprisonment. Birand later claimed that most of the reactions were to the "humanitarian approach of the interview" in which Öcalan had admitted his sympathy for "pidgeons and Galatasaray", his favorite soccer team. (Birand, 1992)

Birand was acquitted in the court and made another interview with Öcalan in 1991. This second interview was also published in daily Milliyet.

Some scenes and quotations from those two interviews were aired in March 1992, in the "32nd Day" news programme of the Show TV, a Turkish commercial channel. This was the first time that Turkish audiences had seen the face of "Apo", the man who has been the main target for the security forces for 15 years.

Keeping close ties with the governments, the Turkish media preferred to exclude the PKK from the airwaves, and criticized colleagues behaving otherwise.

In 1991, the Iraqi Kurds established their first high-level contacts with Ankara. Willing to establish relations with Turkey, Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani got in touch with President Turgut Özal in early 1991.

In almost all contacts in Ankara, the Iraqi Kurds would complain of ongoing Turkish air raids on Northern Iraq while the Turks would raise the issue of the PKK, demanding that the Kurds to do something and thrust this organization out of their territory.

In mid-1991, Talabani sent an envoy to Öcalan demanding that he end his violence-based campaign against Turkey and stop all attacks out of Iraqi territory into Turkey.

In August 1992 Talabani held a crucial and secret meeting with Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Esref Bitlis, during which he reportedly broke the ground for an overall operation to be launched against the PKK

in the North of Iraq. Talabani also promised that his Kurdistan Front would soon be taking measures to purge the PKK out of Iraqi territory and asked officials to show some patience.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry, on the other hand raised serious questions on how sincere Talabani actually was and whether he was involved in secret -behind the scene- talks with Öcalan.

In August 1992, Turkey and Talabani agreed on an operation with the consent of the USA to throw the PKK out of Northern Iraq.

Accordingly, Turkish troops cut off the Iraqi border preventing the PKK from withdrawing into Turkish territory and crossed into Kurdish territory on the 10th of October. Supported by the Talabani peshmerges, the Turkish army launched a massive operation against PKK camps in Northern Iraq.

Happy with the results of the military operation, the Turkish government proudly announced that the "PKK is surrounded and disarmed by Talabani's peshmerges". The losses of the PKK were declared as 573 by the General Staff.

Talabani, the leader of the Kurdistan Union Party, also declared that they had finished the PKK by surrounding their arms, and PKK guerillas were now being kept somewhere in the Iran-Iraqi border, faraway from the Turkish border.

Osman Öcalan, the field commander of the PKK and brother of Abdullah Öcalan, told Agence France Press in those days that they decided to leave their camps and arms, and surrender to the Northern Iraqi administration. He said that "from then on, in their new headquarter, faraway from the Turkish border, they would start a political campaign by using the media".

The media was searching for his whereabouts while he was trying to find out a "proper channel" to declare their position. Both of them got the chance to realize their objects when a crew from Show TV's well-known news programme 32nd Day, reached Öcalan's camp in Zeli in the beginning of November.

Mithat Bereket's interview with Osman Öcalan constituted a turning point in the relations between the media, the PKK and the government.

3.2.2. The Sequence of the Events

The idea of interviewing Öcalan was shaped during the 32nd Day's routine weekly meeting in November 1992 with the curiosity over the PKK's real conditions after the operation. The aim was to investigate the allegations that the PKK units were totally surrounded by Talabani peshmerges. The only way to check this claim was to talk to Talabani and Osman Öcalan both of whom were very popular in the Turkish media at that time, although nobody could film either of them.

Foreign news editor of the programme, Mithat Bereket, who knew the region very well from his previous experiences went to Northern Iraq to get in touch with Talabani and the PKK. After a long journey, the crew arrived in Erbil where they interviewed Talabani. During the interview Talabani pointed out that his party and the PKK had reached an agreement according to which PKK guerillas would hand over their arms to peshmerges and be settled in the camps in Zeli, a town around Suleymanie close to the Iranian border.

By climbing the mountains with a hired car Mithat Bereket and his cameraman, then, found the mentioned PKK camp. As Bereket told us in a

special interview made for this study, "PKK guerillas kept them for about 4 hours in a tent, but the first thing he noticed was that the PKK had not been surrounded". He said: "When I saw their arms, and heavy, anti-aircraft machinery, I understood that Talabani was misleading the Turkish government".

When asked whether his major aim was to prevent the Turkish government from being misled, Bereket replied "Definitely. I was trying to find out what was really happening".

But later he added:

To tell the truth, in principal, my job is to give information, and I don't care whether this information is against the Turkish government's position. That's not my problem. But in a way, I helped the Turkish government and the Turkish army in this case by giving them true information about what really was happening. Because they were not informed about the positions of the PKK people in the camp, and Talabani was stabbing them from behind.

To convince Öcalan to give the interview took another 4 hours for Bereket who was told that there was an embargo that the PKK were enforcing against the Turkish media because of their attitude against the PKK.

Taking all the responsibility for the interview, Bereket assured him that "nothing factual will be distorted in his coverage".

Then in the next morning Öcalan agreed to give "a five minute long declaration". Bereket refused and insisted on an interview. He believed that Öcalan's intention from the beginning was to give the interview: "Because he needed to do so" Bereket explained: "He was just playing and trying to find the right channel to give their opinions. We did quite a good bargain: He thought that I would be the best to talk to and I got the interview that I wanted".

Before he went to the camp, Bereket had already been worried about the possible consequences of such an interview. That's why he prepared his questions very carefully. He said:

I knew that Öcalan would not only give me what I wanted, but the propaganda of his party as well. That's why I prepared my file so that I would not be used for his propaganda purposes. I prepared every question according to all ways he could answer to them. So I was, in way, trying not to fall into his trap. I knew that the interview might create some difficulties. That's why, just before the interview, in audio type and in video, I told him that, 'I don't agree with what he is doing; that he is a terrorist, because his party killed innocent women and children'. And to clarify my position, I reminded him that 'I had to obey the Turkish law, because I was a Turkish citizen and that if he said anything against Turkish law, we would not publish it'. I

added: 'I'm here to get the facts, not the propaganda'. He agreed, but in the beginning of the interview he did talk a lot about their independence war against the Turkish army. Later, we did cut them off in the editing.

During the interview, Öcalan, who was sitting in front of armed PKK guerillas, undoubtedly made it clear that the PKK was not unarmed and was preparing for new attacks against the Turkish army. But he didn't let the cameras film the armed guerillas. It was obvious that they had a secret agreement with Talabani, though he did not say so. What he said openly was that the Turkish army had lost 500 soldiers and their loss was "not more than 150" while it was declared by the Turkish army that "1,800 terrorists were killed".

When Bereket asked him whether they were scared of the Turkish army, he replied with the words of challenge: "A people, determined to its salvation, with the right causes to fight for, can overcome the strongest army in the world"

As Bereket turned back to his office with this challenging interview, long discussions began in the editorial committee of the programme. The sentences that could be regarded as propaganda were eliminated one by one, while the wording of Bereket's script was also a case for discussion.

The script was a carefully written text in which both the Talabani and the Öcalan interviews were used together with the personal observations of Bereket himself. The Öcalan interview had taken about 20 minutes out of which only 12 minutes were found to be usable in the programme. The rest was, with Bereket's words, "purely propaganda stuff".

The main purpose of M. Ali Birand, the producer of the programme, and the other editors, was "not to be used for the propaganda purposes of the PKK". When asked whether they kept in mind the possible accusations that such an interview might have a destructive impact on the morale of the soldiers fighting in the front line, Bereket admitted that "this was not their first concern". "My first instinct, as a journalist was to uncover the truth and tell it to the public. I did not really care what the soldiers on the front line would think when they watched my programme".

Bereket's file ended with the words of warning: "In summary, no declaration over the agreement between the PKK and the peshmerges was true but, for the moment, both sides preferred to keep warm relations with

each other to prevent the truth from being uncovered. The only think definite is that the PKK stepped back after the operation, but it didn't mean that the danger was all over. From now on, Turkey has to be more carefull in such slippery ground".

The important parts of the interview were published in daily Sabah's front page with the picture of Bereket, interviewing Öcalan, just on the day that the programme would be shown on Show TV. The headline was "The PKK is not finished".

Bereket was expecting the first reaction after this headline:

I thought that, when generals or the intelligence officers saw the headline that morning, (before the programme was aired), they could have easily called me and said 'Bring us the cassettes, we want to see it'. I would not say 'No'. Because I am not working against the state. I do not have that intention. Of course I wouldn't have let them play with my text, but I would answer their questions. If they would have said that 'We know that you were in that camp. Tell us what you saw, that would be a very difficult situation. I would have accepted it after the programme. So in the text, I tried to put in everything which might create problems later on. Even the map of the camp, very openly, so that I could have said that whatever you saw in the programme, that's what I'm going to say to you. Nothing else.

The managers of Show TV did not even ask to see the programme before it was aired on 16 November 1992. The programme was very forceful since it included -together with Bereket's Öcalan interview- another file on the Turkish connections of the secret organization called "Gladio".

So the reactions have multiplied.

3.2.3. Reactions and Consequences

The reactions to the Öcalan interview were politically and legally not so much different in Turkey, than the reactions shown to a similar programme in Britain. But when it came to the reactions of the public and the media, the difference between the two countries in terms of their political cultures clearly appeared.

In the very next morning, the first reaction came from Süleyman Demirel, the then-Prime Minister, who in a speech given to his Parliamentary group, accused the programme, without naming it, of destroying the morale of the soldiers fighting in the front line.

Then came the worst.

According to a news item published the day after, in daily Hürriyet, the General Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş had shown the programme to some experts in the public channel TRT and been told that the Öcalan interview was a "montage". He furiously claimed that, "the reporter actually had not been in the camp. The interview with Öcalan was made by one of the PKK terrorists, who was imitating Mithat Bereket by putting on his white coat". Gen. Güreş was accusing the programme of being used by the PKK for propaganda purposes especially about the speculations over the number of soldiers and terrorists killed.

On the day that Güreş's accusations were published, 32nd Day made a press release, declaring that it was not a PKK terrorist, but Mithat Bereket himself who interviewed Öcalan and the roll types proving their meeting was open to anyone who wanted to see it.

In the afternoon, a group of journalists visited the 32nd Day bureau and watched the roll types. They were assured that the interview was not "montage" in the sense that Gen. Güreş had alluded.

The roll types also transmitted in the next 32nd Day, but even this didn't prevent the General Staff from going to the courts with the same accusations.

3.2.3.1. Legal Consequences

Motivated by the warning of the General Staff, the Public Prosecutor filed a complaint against M. Ali Birand, the producer of the programme, claiming that he had insulted the armed forces of the state both with the Öcalan interview and the file on "Counter-guerilla".

The prosecutor claimed that the programme propagated the PKK terror organization and tried to destroy the morale of the security forces and the public by interviewing Osman Öcalan.

Being accused of "distorting the truth by belittling the effective and successful operation of the security forces" Birand was charged with crimes punishable by 15 years of imprisonment, according to Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code.

The defence of Birand was mainly based on the idea that the Öcalan interview was a journalistic success which would be regarded so everywhere in the world.

"Our aim was to exhibit the real situation to the public and the state, not to propagate the PKK" Birand said:

We awakened the government about the possible betrayal of Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Consequently Turkey has had to review its policy towards those leaders. By exposing the forthcoming danger in advance, we fulfill a warning mission.

To support Birand's defence, Bereket gave the court the video types of the total interview in which he introduced himself as a journalist who didn't want to hear terrorist propaganda but the factual truth.

"I think that introduction saved my life" Bereket later told us, "This is a recommendable approach for every journalist who intend to interview a terrorist. Before the interview, you have to clean yourself, on camera..."

After reviewing the case, 3 experts (Dönmezer, Cihan, and Artuk) decided that the interview had not intended to insult the armed forces. Öcalan's confessions about their relations with Talabani were found useful

in terms of the public's right to know. But his words about their struggle to overcome the Turkish army were regarded as mere propaganda, which might give wrong impressions to the public.

But experts pointed out that when they checked the roll types they saw more disturbing expressions in the parts that were cut before the transmission. That was regarded as a proof of the good intention of the producers.

In the expertise, nevertheless, it was said that "some Western countries had introduced legal measures to prevent those interviews. Since Turkey has not had such law enforcement, one could not expect from a terrorist to talk about -let's say- recipes instead of making their propaganda. In the lack of proper laws, it is possible to encourage terrorist propaganda by using excuses like 'freedom of information' or the 'public's right to know'".

Agreeing with the expertise, General Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş, demanded such legal measures against terrorist propaganda in the media, in his conversation with Ertuğrul Özkök, the editor of daily Hürriyet.

Özkök wrote an article on the subject in July 1993 and narrated Gen. Güreş's desire for British type of restrictions over the coverage of the terrorists. Auditing to the British Home Secretary Brittan's letter to the BBC and the ban imposed on IRA coverage, Güreş called attention to the fact that "even the most democratic countries take the necessary steps to prevent the media from being used for propaganda purposes by terrorism".

A week after, Özkök published a letter sent to him by a tv journalist (Nuri Çolakoğlu), who worked for the BBC for years, pointing out that the mentioned ban had a very limited object, preventing only the voices of the terrorists to be heard on tv or radio channels, and nothing to do with the printed press.

In April 1994 the new law regulating the commercial television stations was passed by the Turkish Parliament.

The 4th Article of the law imposed "Broadcasting Principles" one of which was asking radio and television stations "not to facilitate coverages encouraging the public to violence, terror, or ethnic separatism".

Article 25 of the law allows the Prime Minister to put a ban on broadcasting whenever the national security or public order necessitates.

Although Birand was acquitted in November 1994, the legal consequences of the Öcalan interview has remained in the Turkish judicial system.

3.2.3.2. Professional Consequences

The Öcalan interview has divided the Turkish media into two fronts: Some authors regard it as a "journalistic success" while others treat it as a "betrayal".

The first reaction came from Emin Çölaşan, a nationalist hard-liner, who accused the producers of the programme of treason. He wrote that, "if the Turkish army fails to overcome the PKK, the producers of the programme will escape first".

Later on, the personal telephone conversations of Birand with the high-ranking generals in the General Staff on the issue, were leaked to Çölaşan who published those records textually.

As Çölaşan insisted on attacking the producers of the programme, Bereket applied to the Press Council together with some colleagues for a warning against Çölaşan; but their application was rejected

M. Tali Öngören from Cumhuriyet, joined the discussion by saying that whoever was disturbed by Öcalan's claims should apply to the same programme for a right to reply. There is no other harmless way for the sake of civilisation and the public's right to know".

Agreeing with Öngören, Ergun Balcı, wrote in Cumhuriyet that "The producers should be congratulated instead of being damned". In his article Balcı reminded us of the neutral position of the BBC during the Falklands war and pointed out that "the mission of a journalist is not to give morale to the army, but to feed the public the truth".

He concluded: "The main element which destroyed our morale in terms of democracy and the freedom of the press is not the programme's coverage of the fight but the choleric aggression against the producers".

Mithat Bereket classified the Turkish journalist according to their responses to his interview: "Now we have two schools of journalists: One

saying that the job of a journalist should be to protect the interests of the state; and the other one which we are in, saying that 'No, security of the state is not our major concern. Our first duty is to find out the truth. That truth may be against the government's propaganda, but in the long term it is in the interest of the country and its people. For the time being, those two schools of the press are clashing and accusing each other. This is astonishing".

A more astonishing fact was that the General Staff took side in this conflict by giving "soldier (Mehmetcik) medals" to 45 journalists who covered the operation "responsibly".

In a ceremony, held in Ankara, on November the 19th, just 3 days after the 32nd Day was transmitted, the medals were given to the selected journalists with the appreciation of the General Staff for "their coverage that assured the support of the Turkish nation to its armed forces".

The only journalist who rejected the army's offer was Kunter Kunt, a reporter from the public channel TRT, who was immediately appointed to another bureau, as his protest was regarded as a "support to terrorists".

The consequence of the rising wave of criticism has become a growing fear among the Turkish media which, for a period of time, did not intend to interview terrorists.

In March 1993 when the PKK declared a cease-fire, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, appeared on 32nd Day once again (after a year) in a special interview on the conditions of the cease- fire.

But with the failiure of the cease-fire, the war started again. Since then, the only channel who dared to interview Öcalan has been the PKK's unlawful Med-TV which transmitted their programmes from Europe via sattellite.

3.2.3.3. Political Consequences

The public's reaction to the Öcalan interview was contradictory.

On the night that the programme was transmitted, Show TV received many calls condemning the interview. Reactions were multiplied, especially after Güreş's accusations. Bereket was protested against during

a celebration in those days by angry militants who believed that the interview was "purely PKK propaganda".

In the southern Turkey, on the other hand, Turkish citizens with Kurdish orientation reacted differently. What's surprising for them was the image of Osman Öcalan who was nervously moving his head round and round during the interview as if he was on drug. That image was contradictory with the image of him in their minds.

But as the time passed, it was understood that the situation in Northern Iraq was exactly as it had been reflected in 32nd Day. Talabani had lied to the Turkish government about the PKK being surrounded. The truth was that he had settled the PKK in his camps in Iranian border by letting them be packed up for further attacks.

Distinguishing that, the General Staff carried off a group of journalists to the Zeli camp, to observe that Öcalan was settled there with his armed guerillas.

14 months after the 32nd Day's coverage, the Turkish army launched another operation using jets and helicopters into Northern Iraq

in January 1994. Turkish officials claimed that Öcalan's camp in Zeli was also hit in air attacks.

Writing on the operation Birand was reminded of the anger towards his programme in November 1992 and said, "We had done just what our duty was as a journalist".



CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

4.1. Comparative Evaluation of the Cases

Founders of libertarian theory believed in man's wisdom to distinguish between right and wrong as long as the ideas had an equal chance and the alternative viewpoints were granted to all in a competitive market place of ideas.

The free press, has thus been regarded as an essential component of a free society. The media are assigned the task of maintaining a constant check on governments.

But in practice liberal mandate has been challenged by the "irresponsible and sensational coverage" of the press which has consequently been the object of many forms of state intervention.

Faced with terrorism in the early 1970s, European governments, reacted almost immediately by imposing strict legal measures some of

which inevitably entailed a temporary suspension of certain liberties like "freedom of expression" and "press freedom".

Considering the relationship between the media and the terrorists, as a "symbiotic one", most governments in the West raised objections to the extensive media coverage of insurgent terrorism, under the domain of "contagion theory". Despite the lack of scientifically acceptable evidence about television's contagious effect on terror, the media were seen by many governments as having an important role in the diffusion of terrorism.

The media's "irresponsible" coverage of terrorism, therefore has always been a subject for criticism and an excuse for restrictions imposed over the mass media.

The controversy between the media and the state started as the separatist violence began in Britain in the late 1960s and in Turkey in the mid-1980s with similar attacks on official targets.

The restrictions which both countries imposed over the media via anti-terror legislations, generally occurred as a reaction to the interviews

with terrorists and were justified by the necessity of the state to protect itself from the enemy.

To elaborate the consistency of this justification, this study has chosen two overwhelming interviews, which were regarded as the "force majeure" of the government interventions in two countries; namely in Britain and in Turkey, as the field of investigation.

The textual discourses of the two interviews were analysed in detail while the producers of the programmes were interviewed to discover the basic motivations behind their coverage.

The first hypothesis of this study to be tested was the fact that the coverage of terrorism was voluntarily controlled and restrained by the media themselves necessitating no further intervention by the governments.

When challenged by the terrorist threat in the 1970s, many Western governments, as if they cooperated to confirm Althusser's view which placed the media among many other "ideological state apparatuses"

through which the modern states maintain power, asked for the support of the media to combat terrorism for the sake of liberal democracy.

Indeed, growing intervention by the states to place the media into their counterterrorism strategy, have compelled the Western media to take measures voluntarily.

We can claim that the state's possible use of "coercion" over broadcasting was tried to be avoided and preference was given to the obtaining of "consent" -in the Gramscian sense- of the media by granting them a positive and an active role in the anti-terror campaign. Consequently, to overcome the damaging effects of an outright censorship, news media have devised voluntary guidelines to assure the "responsible coverage of terrorist events" as illustrated by the states.

The problematic interviews with Osman Öcalan and Martin McGuinness provide us two suitable examples to exhibit the media's voluntary restraint policy to avoid the possible manipulation by the terrorists.

Firstly, despite all the complaints of the governments about the media's coverage of terrorism, the data on the issue have proven that the television channels -at least in Britain and in Turkey- were not as enthusiastic as they were thought to be, about interviewing terrorists.

Both in Turkey, and in Britain, the number of such interviews were not more than 5 in the last 10 years. Between the troubled years of 1972 and 1985, the BBC conducted just 4 interviews with IRA militants, while in Turkey the access given to the terrorist leaders has been fewer, since the beginning of the trouble in 1984.

Ironically, the interviewees (Öcalan and McGuinness in our cases) was also reluctant to give interviews. In our cases both men laid down conditions on the interviews and put restrictions on filming.

When we looked at the content of the interviews, on the other hand, we could hardly see the signs of a mere propaganda. Using very carefully written scripts, both producers have refrained from being used for propaganda purposes by the interviewees and concentrated mainly on the factual side of the stories.

Both Paul Hamann and Mithat Bereket pointed out that they had not intended to support terrorism; what they had tried to do was to explore the truth. Believing in journalistic success and the balance in their coverage, both men denied the accusations that their programmes gave the terrorists a free platform for propaganda.

Bereket admitted furthermore that, by exposing the threat of the PKK in Northern Iraq beforehand, his coverage indeed protected the interest of the state, although "this was not his primary concern". By calling Öcalan a "terrorist" during the interview and cutting all the "propaganda stuff" before the transmission, Bereket proved his loyalty to the official view. He even said that he had been ready to brief the generals or the intelligence officers about the details of his story.

Those facts constitute a good example of voluntary restraint which is assured by Guidelines in Britain, and by self-censorship in Turkey.

To highlight the impact of official sources on the content of interviews, we should refer to the study of Stuart Hall and his colleagues, which makes a distinction between primary definers, (i.e. the officials

presenting the official version of events), and secondary definers (i.e. the media personnel who reproduce this official version in their reporting of news): "When the media seek out alternative sources", they claim, "these sources, even if they oppose the official view, must frame their remarks in terms of the agenda as already set by the primary definers".

The Öcalan interview is an example of how the official view is reinforced and legitimized by the coverage of the media. The questions were so manipulating that Öcalan was compelled to reply to the accusations under the ideological domain of the Turkish official views, instead of using his alternative stand.

Another fact was that, the violent face of the British troops in Northern Ireland, or the accusations that Turkish troops killed Kurdish civilians during the operations in Northern Iraq had not been reflected in both stories that we worked on. The "state's terror" was legitimized as a natural response to the violence of the terrorists.

These facts confirm our argument that the media, while conducting even the most critical interviews with the terrorists were not contradicting

the interests of the state since the voluntary restraints were as affective as an overt censorship over the media.

The second hypothesis to be examined was that the restrictions imposed over the media to combat terrorism, actually gave harm not to the terrorists themselves, but to the media in particular and liberal premises in general.

Ethnic terror was spread in Turkey in the years when there was no single possibility for the PKK of any kind of television coverage in the public channel TRT which had been the only television station till the 1990s. Since that time, newly emerged commercial channels have been very careful in their coverage of terrorism in the lack of a judicial basis for their foundations.

Thus, there is not enough reason to believe the cause and effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism -at least in the Turkish case. Yet the governments, insisting on the stimulating role of the media coverage on terrorism, introduced strict measures on the media.

The immediate reactions of the officials to the televised interviews of Martin McGuinness and Osman Öcalan, took the form of an overt censorship in Britain, while in Turkey, the government preferred to take the producers to court.

Both states subsequently advanced their first reactions with permanent legal measures.

But when we examine the political consequences of the British and the Turkish governments' restrictions imposed on the media after the two interviews that we studied were transmitted, these seemed to bring no reduction in the number of terrorist attacks either by the IRA or by the PKK.

On the contrary, censorship caused more outrageous acts by the IRA in Britain, pushing the terrorists to do whatever is necessary to attract public attention.

The ban put on IRA interviews did not work and consequently was lifted in Britain, while the producers were acquitted in Turkey.

As a result, the measures like censorship brought by anti-terror legislations seemed to threaten not the terrorists, but the legitimacy of the liberal- democratic order, one in which the received conception of press freedom was that the media were completely separate from the state.

Donna Schlagheck's (1988) arguments, summarised in the second Chapter, about the inconvenience of those measures were supported by the outcome of our cases:

- ♦ Firstly, the government's overt censorship undermined the BBC's credibility in Britain.
- ♦ Secondly, restrictions on reporting of terrorism lulled the Turkish public into believing that there was no terrorist threat in Northern Iraq although the threat was there to be responded to.
- ♦ Thirdly, the rumor mill about Osman Öcalan was so effective that he had turned into a "mythical hero" before he was seen on tv with a contradicting image.
- ♦ Fourthly restrictions helped the Turkish government to cover up its faults in trusting Talabani.
- ♦ Fifthly, censorship of the British government was regarded as a victory for the IRA who wanted to force the state to take repressive

measures to exhibit its undemocratic character and to undermine its popular support.

- ♦ Sixthly, interventions of both governments into the media were regarded as an indication that the state was treating symptoms (violence, publicity), rather than attacking the causes of terrorism. By underestimating the role of socioeconomic deprivations or political grievances in the spread of terrorism, governments prevented only the vision of terrorists, but not the problems giving rise to terrorism.

The lack of consensus over the definition of terrorism, on the other hand, posed inherent problems for the system of ideological representations in those liberal democracies. The producer of "At the Edge of the Union" accepted his interviewee Martin McGuinness as a democratically elected legitimate representative of the Irish people, while the British government had listed his party, Sinn Fein, among the other terrorist organizations whose access to the media was banned.

The definitional problem of terrorism caused a similar political consequence in Turkey where the anti-terror legislations had placed formidable obstacles not only on terrorist propaganda but also on the free

expression, and on the freedom of press as the Article 8 of Turkish anti-terror law had indiscriminately banned every written material damaging the integrity of the nation. This article was softened in October 1995 after causing the punishment of hundreds of authors and intellectuals for their published views about the Kurdish problem.

That constitutes the final damage done by anti-terror restrictions on the media and the liberal system: that is to say, blocking the path of democratization which might be essential for the solution of terror.

4.2. A General Evaluation

The purpose of this study was to explore the consistency of the restrictions put over the mass media by the liberal governments with the premises of the liberal theory.

To evaluate this, we analyzed the legal, professional and political accounts of the two troublesome interviews aired on the Turkish and British televisions one after another, under apparently similar conditions.

In the second chapter we tried to frame the discussions over the media's coverage of terrorism in liberal democracies in terms of a complex interaction among three actors involved, namely; the state, the media and the terrorist.

The cases which our study mainly concentrated on were evaluated in the third chapter in which some background information was also given about the historical bases of the problems together with the sequence of the events and their legal, professional and political consequences.

In the light of the cases evaluated in the third chapter within the context of the theoretical framework drawn in the second part, we can now answer the questions posed in our Introduction.

The consequences of the restrictions imposed by the liberal governments on the media show us that, neither the coverage of terror, nor the terrorist actions could be avoided by imposing pressures on the media.

Functioning as a consumer industry based on competition within the liberal system, mass media easily ignore the guidelines or censorship

to reach the greatest audience. But when we examine the content of the interviews in detail, there seems to be no intentional coverage by the media to legitimize the terror. On the contrary, what we are witnessing is that the media, under the ideological domain of the state, is voluntarily taking part in the anti-terror campaign of the governments by choosing to present and interview terrorists in the way that the states tolerate. That, we believe, constitutes the revival of the Social Responsibility Theory of the 1950s, in the age of the so-called "communication revolution".

While the recent changes are expected to stimulate simpler and smaller governments that are unable to use any form of political censorship, an orthodoxy has begun to gain currency in recent decades that the governments should intervene in news management during periods of crises, especially when terror is involved.

The fear of terror diminishingly undermines the liberal democracies although the government control of news -via consent or coercion- is justified as being in the "public interest".

Despite the voluntary consent of the media to the official policies, the coercive face of the state appeared not only to deny access to terrorists,

but also to prevent alternative viewpoints which may challenge the official policy, from being heard.

By damaging the traditional separation of the media from the state, the governments give harm not to the terrorists but instead, to the liberal premises.

The lack of harmony between the ideological promises of the liberal theory and its daily practices, brings doubts about the applicability of the ancient liberal principles to the subversive policies of the national - security states.

Another result that our case study exposes, is the different reactions of the Turkish and British journalists to the interventions of the governments in their fields. While the broadcasting ban imposed on the BBC in Britain was heavily criticized in order to keep the BBC's independence from the state, by British journalists -despite the fact that some of these journalists supported the idea behind the ban-, the Turkish journalists generally stayed silent about -if not stimulated- the pressures directed to their colleagues and their liberal rights.

This result implies that the exercise of press freedom depends not only on the normative regulations of a given country, but will be determined by the nature of the political culture of its society.



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE SCRIPT OF MİTHAT BEREKET'S NORTHERN IRAQ FILE INCLUDING THE OSMAN ÖCALAN INTERVIEW

Voice-over:

"İran-İrak sınırında, kaçakçılığın merkezi ve geçiş yeri olarak bilinen bu bölgede şimdi yeni misafirler var. Büyük bir hızla buraya yerleşip, kışı geçirmeye hazırlanıyorlar. İşte peşmergelere teslim olduğu söylenen PKK burada. Aslında PKK'lıların ve komutanları Osman Öcalan'ın buraya geliş öyküsü, birbirinden karmaşık politikalar, diplomasi oyunları ve ard arda söylenen yalanlarla dolu.

Permergelerle PKK'lılar, geçtiğimiz bir ay içinde önce bozuştular, sonra savaştılar ve sonra da barıştılar. Bu iki kardeş grubun arasında nasıl bir ateşkes olduğu da bir türlü anlaşılamadı.

Kuzey Iraklı Kürt liderlere göre herşey gayet açıktı. PKK, peşmergelerle Türk ordusu arasında sıkışınca, komutanları Osman Öcalan permerge kardeşlerine yanaşmış ve silahlarını bırakıp teslim olmuştu.

Teslim olduğu söylenen PKK'lılar, peşmergelerin denetiminde, silahsız olarak, 200-300 kişilik gruplar halinde, Erbil şehrine getirilmiş, geceyi buradaki Havraman ve Altın Saray otellerinde geçirdikten sonra İran-Irak sınırında, Türkiye'den uzak bilinmeyen bir yere götürülmüşlerdi.

Ancak, bu anlaşmanın şartlarının tam olarak ne olduğu açıklanmadı. Kürt liderlerin söyledikleriyle PKK'nın Avrupa bürosunun yaptığı açıklamalar birbirini tutmuyordu. Türkiye kendisi için son derece önemli olan böyle bir gelişmeden, bir türlü iyi haber alamıyordu.

Biz de PKK ile peşmergeler arasında neler olup bittiğini ve anlaşmanın şartlarını başından beri bu örgülle ilişkileri yürüten Kürt lider Celal Talabani'ye sorduk:

TALABANI: " Peşmergeler, Hakurk vadisindeki savaş sırasında Osman Öcalan'ın kampını kuşattılar. Burada PKK'nın politik bürosu vardı.

Çaresiz kalan komutanları, bizimle telsiz bağlantısı kurup ateşkes istedi. Silahlarını bırakacaklarını ve kendilerine daha önce verdiğimiz şartlara uyacaklarını söyledi. Osman Öcalan'la hükümetimizin başbakanı arasında bir anlaşma imzalandı. Buna göre PKK, sınırdaki kamplarını boşaltacaktı. Irakt Kürdistan'ından Türkiye'ye yönelttiği askeri saldırılarını durduracaktı. Ayrıca bizim iç işlerimize karışmayacaklar ve aleyhimize propaganda yapmayacaklardı. Güvenlikleri de hükümetimiz tarafından garantiye alındı. Türk sınırından uzak bir bölgede yerleşmelerine izin verildi. Şu anda tam olarak kontrolümüz altındalar. İçişleri bakanlığının izni olmadan silah taşıyamaz, kamplarından çıkamazlar.

BEREKET: "İyi hoş da, Hakurk vadisini nasıl kontrol edeceksiniz? Doğa şartları yüzünden orada kontrolü sağlamak çok zor. Baharda buradaki kamplara geri dönmeyeceklerini nasıl garanti edeceksiniz?"

TALABANI: Çok güzel bir soru sordunuz. Bu çok önemli bir nokta... Hakurk'ta tam kontrolü sağlamak için, baharla birlikte oradaki köylere kendi köylülerimizi yerleştireceğiz. Oraları mümkün olduğu kadar yerleşime açacağız. Böylece herşey kontrolümüz altında olacak. Şu anda orada bir tane bile kampları kalmadı ve baharda da olamayacak.

BEREKET: Kontrolunuz altında olduğunu söylediğiniz PKK'lıları neden Türkiye'ye teslim etmiyorsunuz?

TALABANİ: Bunu yapamayız. Uluslararası anlaşmalara, Cenevre sözleşmesine aykırı bu... Ancak Türk yetkililere şu yetkiyi verdik: Aramızdaki sınırdan, Türkiye aleyhine kesinlikle faaliyet yapmayacaklar. O yüzden Türk ordusu gitsin, diğer sınırlarını korusun. Biz bu işi Türkiye için yapıyoruz. Zaten PKK'lılar şu anda sınırdan yüzlerce kilometre uzaklıkta, Süleymaniye yakınlarında, İran sınırındaki bir kampa götürüldüler.

Voice-over:

"PKK'nın yeni kampı, Irak-İran sınırındaki Kalediz şehrine yakın... Kalediz, Kürtçede "Hırsız Kalesi" anlamına geliyor. İran'dan yapılan kaçakçılığın merkezi olduğu için buraya, "Hırsız Kalesi" deniyor. Kamp, İran sınırındaki Zeli köyünde... Oraya gitmek için, Kalediz'den sonra, İran sınırı boyunca uzanan dağlara tırmanmanız gerekiyor. Ancak, yağın yağmur yüzünden iyice zorlaşan yol şartları, kampa ulaşmayı neredeyse imkansız kılıyor.

Bir yanda kaçakçılar tarafından her an soyulma ya da öldürölme tehlikesi, öte yanda dağ başında kalıp donma olasılığı... Yol boyunca gördüğümüz tek şey bozuk bir yol, derin uçurumlar ve İran'dan getirilen kaçak malları taşıyan katırlar... Sonunda binbir güçlölkle kampın bulunduđu Zeli köyüne varıyoruz.

Ancak Osman Öcalan Türk basınına karşı beslediđi güvensizliđi öne sürüp kampta çekim yapmamıza izin vermiyor. Bu yüzden, PKK'nın yeni kampını ve buradaki faaliyetleri size gösteremiyoruz. Ancak kesin olan birşey var: Buradaki PKK militanları Kürt liderlerin dediđi gibi silahsız değiller. Ayrıca çevrede hiçbir peşmerge kontrolü de yok. Gayet rahat bir şekilde günlük eğitimlerini ve faaliyetlerini yürütüyorlar.

Kürtler arasında "Ferhat" kod adıyla bilinen Osman Öcalan, söyleşi talebimizi binbir güçlölkle kabul ediyor:

BEREKET: Şimdi Türk halkı şunu öğrenmek istiyor: Kürt liderleri Barzani ve Talabani'yle gerçekten bir anlaşma imzaladınız mı, imzalamadınız mı? İmzaladıysa bunun şartları tam olarak nelerdir?

ÖCALAN: "Kürdistanî cephenin iki büyük örgütü olan Yenkiyani İstimali Kürdistan, yani Celal Talabani'nin liderliğini yaptığı örgütle, Mesut Barzani'nin önderliğini yaptığı KDP ile bir anlaşma yaptık. Anlaşmamızın öze, Türk devletinin sınırdaki güçlerimizi Güney Kürdistan'a yönelik müdalalelerine gerekçe yapmasının önünü almaktır. Bunun için sınırdaki güçlerimizi yeniden düzenledik. Bir bölümü kuzeye, yani Türkiye'nin egemenliğindeki Kürdistan parçasının çeşitli alanlarına giderken, bir bölümü de daha güneye, yani şimdi bulunduğumuz alana gelmiştir.

BEREKET: Yani siz peşmergelere teslim olmadınız mı?

Celal Talabani ile yaptığımız söyleşide, ilk olarak sizin silahlarınızı bıraktığınızı ve Kürt hükümetinin ultiatomunu kabul ettiğinizi söyledi.

Bu bir teslim değil mi?

ÖCALAN: Bizim kendileriyle yaptığımız anlaşmada böyle bir durum yoktur. Anlaşmamız tek bir amacı içeriyor: O da sınırdan uzaklaşmak, sınır hattını boşaltmak, Türk devletinin Kürdistan'a müdahalelerde bulunma ve yine kitleleri kandırma gerekçelerini ortadan kaldırmaktır. Devlet hep şu propagandayı yapmıştır: İşte mücadelemiz dışardan kaynaklanıyor. Suriye'den kaynaklanıyor, İran'dan kaynaklanıyor. Ve

yine sınır hattındaki alandan kaynaklanıyor. Bu biçim propagandalar yapmıştır. Bunlar gerçeği yansıtmıyor. Evet, bu tür alanlardan yararlandık. Ama hiçbir zaman mücadelemizin geliştirilmesinde temel dayanaklar olmadılar. Biz biraz da devletin bu propagandasını etkisiz bırakabilmek için, taktik açıdan alanı boşaltmayı yararlı gördük.

BEREKET: Yani şimdi Hakurk vadisindeki kamplarınızı tamamıyla boşalttınız mı?

ÖCALAN: Biz sınırda, sınırdaki güçlerimizi sorun olmaktan çıkardık ve o alanlarda ciddi bir askeri faaliyette bulunma gereğini görmüyoruz.

BEREKET: Ancak sınırdaki kamplarınızı bırakıp peşmergeler nezaretinde buraya getirildiniz. Sizce bu, bir geri adım değil mi?

ÖCALAN: Şimdi biz bir savaş faaliyeti yürütüyoruz. Savaş her zaman büyük bir hat izlemez. Siyasal ve askeri çıkarlarımız eğer iki adım ileri atmak için bir adım geri atmayı gerektiriyorsa, bu fazla bir sorun değildir.

BEREKET: Peşmergelerle anlaşmayı neden Abdullah Öcalan imzalamadı? Apo, eskiden grup grup gazetecileri alır görüşürdü. Şimdi pek görünmüyor, neden acaba?

ÖCALAN: Bir aylık savaş yüzünden... Çok çetin bir savaş yürütüldü. Karşı tarafımızda, 100 bine yakın güç vardı. 75 bin Türk ordu birliği, her türlü teçhizatıyla, Kobra helikopterleri, uçakları, tankları ve en modern topları, silahları vardı. 25 bin civarında da peşmerge güçleri vardı. Bunlar da ABD ve Türk devleti tarafından modern askeri teçhizatla donatılmışlardı. Buna karşılık bizim alanda bulunan tüm gücümüz 2 bin 500 civarındaydı. Ve bir kişi, 40 kişiye karşı savaştı. Artık karşı karşıya bulunan komutanlar birbiriyle ilişki kurmak gereğini gördüler. Bizim tarafımızda da biz bu görüşmeleri yürüttük. Yani siyasi lider, önderlikten ziyade cephe komutanları görüşmeleri başlattılar. Gelişmeler bu noktadan başladığından dolayı da görüşmelerin ardından yapılan anlaşmayı biz imzaladık.

BEREKET: Daha önce, hem Barzani'yi hem de Talabani'yi Amerikan işbirlikçiliği yapmakla suçladınız. Şimdi onlarla anlaşma yaptığınızı söylüyorsunuz. Sizce bundan bir çelişki yok mu?

ÖCALAN: KDP ve YNK halka dayanma yerine hem çeşitli uluslararası güçlere, hem de bölgesel güçlere dayanan politikalarını uygulamak istiyorlar. Bu politikalarının sonunun olmadığını, bu tutumlarının kendilerini şu veya bu gücün çıkarlarını yerine getirmeye zorlayacağını belirttik.

BEREKET: Türk sınırına koyduğunuz ambargoyu da kaldıracak mısınız? Bu da anlaşmada var mı?

ÖCALAN: Ambargo savaşın bir yan taktiği olarak ortaya çıktı. Savaş durduğuna göre bu sorun da çözülecektir.

BEREKET: Peki sınırda yürütülen operasyonda tam olarak siz kaç kişi kaldınız? Yani tam olarak kaç ölü, kaç yaralı verdiniz? Bu 1800 mü, yoksa daha mı fazla?

ÖCALAN: Kayıplarımız 150'yi aşmaz. 150'nin altındadır. Bir o kadar da yaralımız vardır. Buna karşılık Türk ordu birlikleriyle girilen çatışmada 500 asker yaşamını yitirmiştir. Kürdistanı Cephe güçleriyse 1000'in üzerinde kayıp vermişlerdir. Ve gene bir o kadar da yaralıları bulunmaktadır.

BEREKET: Peki burada ne kadar kalacaksınız? Bahar gelince geri dönmeyi düşünüyor musunuz, Türkiye sınırına...?

ÖCALAN: Bizim buradaki gücümüzün mücadelede pek belirleyici rolü yoktur. Daha çok savaşta aktivite kazanan bir ön gücümüzdür. Eğitim adaylarıydı ve yine çoğu bayanlardır, çocuklardır, yaşlılardır. Bu gücümüz sınırda savaşmak zorunda kaldı. Ama bizim savaşı geliştirirken hesaba katmadığımız bir güçtür. Yedek bir güçtür. Bu gücümüzün savaş içinde olup olmaması sorunu değiştirmez. Kaldı ki istediğimiz kadar genç derleyip, içerdeki karargahlarımızda eğitip savaşa sokabiliriz.

BEREKET: Şu anda Türkiye’de kaç adamınız var peki..?

ÖCALAN: Son sınırda yürütülen savaşın sonuçları nedeniyle, ülkeye aktardığımız güçlerle birlikte 7 bini aşkın örgütlü gerillamız vardır. Bunun yanısıra binlerce silahlı milisimizin de olduğunu eklersen 10 bini aşam silahlı gücümüz bulunmaktadır.

BEREKET: Şu anda bu kampta kaç kişi var?

ÖCALAN: Bu kampta 1250 civarındayız...

BEREKET: Siz sürekli olarak Türk silahlı kuvvetlerine darbe vurmaya ve onları izole etmeye çalışıyordunuz. Ancak şimdi siz darbe yediniz ve izole oldunuz. Bu durumda ne yapacaksınız?

ÖCALAN: Silahlı savaşımız hızından hiçbirşey kaybetmeden sürecektir -ki temel güçlerimiz çeşitli eyaletlerimizde üstlenmiştir ve savaş faaliyetlerini aralıksız sürdürecektir. Savaşı dayatan Türk devletidir. Halkımızın temel ulusal ve demokratik haklarını tanımayarak, savaşma zorunluluğuyla karşı karşıya bırakıldık. Bu temel haklarımız verilene kadar ve yine bu temel haklarımızın elde edilmesi için siyasal çözüm kabul görene kadar silahlı savaşımız sürecektir. Bu konuda herhangi bir gerileme yaşanmayacaktır.

BEREKET: Ama bu arada masum insanlar da ölmeye devam ediyor. Masum insanları öldürmek size ne kazandırıyor?

ÖCALAN: Şimdi şunu belirtelim; gerçekten de savaş hem Türk halkına, hem de Kürt halkına büyük acılar veriyor.

BEREKET: Peki bu karşılıklı öldürmeler daha ne kadar gidecek? Yani karşınızda koskoca Türk ordusu var. Bundan korkmuyor musunuz? Daha ne kadar devam edeceksiniz bu işe..?

ÖCALAN: Bir halk eğer kurtuluşu için azmetmişse ne kadar büyük bir ordu olursa olsun ve bunun donanımı ne kadar büyük olursa olsun zafer, haksız olan militarist güçlerin değil, haklı bir savaşım yürüten ve yine çağdaş bir önderliğe kavuşmuş olan halkın olacaktır. Biz bu inançtayız.

BEREKET: Türkiye’de şöyle bir hava var: Bölge halkı artık sizi desteklemiyor. Eskiden belki biraz desteğiniz vardı, ancak şimdi o da kalmadı. Darbe üstüne darbe yediniz. Şimdi ne yapacaksınız?

ÖCALAN: Eğer devlet bu iddiasında ciddiye ve yine basın inanıyorsa, buyurun diyoruz, bir özgür referandum yapın. Halk gerçekten devletten yana mıdır, yoksa devlete karşı mıdır, o zaman çok açık bir biçimde ortaya çıkar.

BEREKET: Ama halkın bu desteğinde, onlara verdiğiniz korkunun hiç etkisi yok mu?

ÖCALAN: Mücadelemiz çok çeşitli aşamalardan geçti. Bir dönem oluyordu. Halk devletten korktuğu için hiç destek vermiyordu. Ama bugün devlet, şiddet uyguluyor, öldürüyor. Cezaevine atıyor. 1992’de 50 bin civarında insan gözaltına alınmış, bunların birçoğu tutuklanmıştır. Ama buna rağmen halk her türlü ihtiyacını karşılıyor. Korkuyla kimse en ufak bir desteği sunmaz. Yani, şimdiye kadar korktuğundan dolayı bize destek veren olmadı.

BEREKET: Saddam Hüseyin size yardım ediyor mu, etmiyor mu? Bunu Türk halkı bilmek istiyor.

ÖCALAN: Partimiz her zaman kamuoyuna açık davranmıştır. Eğer Saddam Hüseyin’le ilişki kurmak gereğini görürsek, o zaman biz bunu kamuoyundan gizlemeyiz. Bizim kamuoyundan, halkımızdan gizleyeceğimiz herhangi bir şeyimiz yoktur. Bizim bu durumda Saddam’la herhangi bir ilişkimiz yok. İlişki kurmak gereğini de görmüyoruz. Çünkü O, Halepçe katliamının sorumlusudur. Boğazına kadar halkımızın katliamına batmıştır. Halkımızı katleden, halkımıza yaşam hakkı tanımayan bir diktatörle ilişki kurmamız sözkonusu değildir.

BEREKET: Peki İran'la ilişkileriniz nasıl? Şu anda tek çıkışınız orası kaldı. Oradan yardım geliyor mu?

ÖCALAN: İran'la geçmişten beri zayıf bir ilişkimiz vardı. Daha çok oradaki Kürt halkının desteğiyle duruyorduk. Bizim İran devletiyle öyle ciddi bir ilişkimiz yoktu. Başta da belirttik: Her zaman abartma yapılmıştır. Yani gerek Suriye , gerek İran, gerekse diğer sahalarda olsun, Türk devletinin açıkladığı gibi oralara dağılma, oralardan güçlü bir destek alma söz konusu değildir.

Voice-over:

PKK, doğa şartlarının, insanları son derece zorladığı bu topraklarda, belki de ileride yeni bir bekaa vadisi yaratacak. Kampta bizzat tanık olduğumuz silah gücü ve Osman Öcalan'ın anlattıkları, bu kampın ileride bir üs olarak kullanılabileceğini kanıtlıyor.

Kısacası PKK-Peşmerge anlaşması konusunda yapılan açıklamaların hiçbiri doğru değil. Ancak bunun açığa çıkıp, ortalığı karıştırmamasını önlemek için, şimdilik her iki taraf da birbirine karşı ılımlı davranmayı yeğliyor.

Ne olursa olsun, kesin olan birşey var:

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin operasyonu şimdilik PKK'yı bir adım geriletmiş durumda. Ancak bu, tehlikenin bittiği anlamına gelmiyor. Asıl önemlisi şimdi başlıyor: Herşeyin böylesine kyagan olduğu bir zeminde Türkiye bundan sonra çok daha dikkatli ve temkinli davranmak zorunda...



APPENDIX B

THE SCRIPT OF THE DOCUMENTARY "AT THE EDGE OF THE UNION"

Voice-over:

The past 15 years have seen many sacrifices. In Republican graves throughout Ireland lie the remains of Irish men and women who saw that resistance was the only method that Britain understood, a resistance which is not confined to members of the Republican movement alone. The nationalist people of the Six countries have born the brunt of British repression, murder, torture, harassment, intimidation, arrest, imprisonment, dawn raids and martial law.

GREGORY CAMPBELL: There's one man who was described in a Fleet Street newspaper as the Chief of Staff of the IRA, Martin McGuinness. The man is a craven coward because he is the same as the IRA murderers. He's a yellow-bellied coward at heart.

Voice-over:

The city of Londonderry is where the present Northern Ireland troubles began 16 years ago. It is an increasingly polarised city with public support having grown in recent years for the extremes on both sides. This film looks at those extremes through the eyes of two men, both young, working class, teetotal, churchgoing elected representatives, members of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The first, Martin McGuinness, is thought by many to be the IRA's present Chief of Staff, responsible for bombing the heart out of the city in the 1970s. Yet today he stands as a legitimate politician, able to attract 10,000 votes for his party, Sinn Fein.

MARTIN McGUINNESS: I became involved in the Republican movement in the late 1970's, and I played, I believe a full role in attempting to bring about what I believe was the only solution to the particular problem, and that was that the British must leave this country and that peace could only be made whenever they did so.

Voice-over:

The second man, Gregory Campbell, is McGuinness' political and religious opposite, a hardline Loyalist who needs constant armed police protection following a bomb attempt on his life last year. Campbell is a target because of his outspoken views, a strong advocate of a shoot-to-kill policy against the IRA.

CAMPBELL: There is no such thing as arresting people or detaining people who have rocket launchers, rifles, pistols and other weapons of death. You either have to be killed by them or kill them. I know the option I want. I want to see them dead. They've got to be killed or else we're going to have another 16 years like we've had before. (Caption: "Since the troubles began 16 years ago 2,500 people have been killed and over 19,000 people have been injured").

I think that the IRA could be defeated far more easily by the adoption of stringent security measures such as shooting on sight active units of the IRA. Obviously this would deplete the numbers physically of the IRA and not only would it do that but hit the morale of the young people who foolishly join such an organisation because if they knew that

to join the IRA would mean being sent out on a mission and that that in turn would mean the very serious possibility of them ending up dead, then the morale would be severely hit.

MRS. CAMPBELL: I think that some people think that Gregory is very outspoken and that maybe it does lead to bitterness maybe in the Catholic community. Just a few miles away from us two IRA men were shot dead and my husband made a statement agreeing 100 percent with them...with what the security forces had done, and in that statement he said that Christmas had come early for him and for the Protestant people because two IRA men had been shot dead.

CAMPBELL: And I make no apology for saying that. It was simply a Protestant saying that the IRA were getting a dose of their own medicine and I wish that they couldn't take it.

MRS. CAMPBELL: The result of Gregory's statement was that the INLA planted a bomb under our car one Sunday evening. We were leaving to go to Church, to take the children to Gregory's mother and fortunately the bomb fell from the car. We had to do a roundabout turn to go to church and we came as far as the house and we noticed there was a police

checkpoint and when we were stopped we found out that a bomb had been found in the exact spot where the car had been parked.

CAMPBELL: As a result of the murder attempt, there is a fairly large screen fitted to the back of the house almost like a cage. There's been a camera and monitors fitted. All the external doors of the house have been fitted with bulletproof glass. There've been extra bolts and locks put on the front and back doors. I have police escorts with me wherever I go, almost anywhere.

MRS.CAMPBELL: I have to live with the fact that I know one day Gregory might be shot and killed, but as a Christian I believe that God will keep us safe and that's something I'm glad about. All people have husbands and I say to them, just be glad that you have them, because you don't know...I don't know in my circumstance how long I'll have Gregory for.

PRIEST: I can't see how those who are involved in terrorism, those who deliberately go out and take a man's life, doesn't matter what the reason is, deliberately take away a man's life just like snuffing out a candle, I cannot see from God's book how they can be Christians. I cannot see how anybody with the new nature could involve himself in deliberate act of

wickedness and murder and violence and terrorism. I can't see it and I cannot see that the word of God in any way countenances or allows it.

McGUINNESS: We don't defend the killing of innocent people at all. The IRA doesn't even defend innocent people being killed. The fact of the matter is that we're strongly convinced that the responsibility for every death in Ireland, whether it be the death of a British soldier, an IRA man, an RUC, a UDR man or innocent civilians, at the end of the day responsibility for all that lies at the feet of the British government. They are the people responsible because they partitioned this country against the overwhelming wishes of the Irish people. They are the people who must pick up the tab for that, not the people of Ireland.

McGUINNESS' FRIEND: I believe that it's absolutely essential that the Republicans express to the world in a very forcible fashion that there's a big demand in Ireland for the removal of the British presence.

McGUINNESS' MOTHER: I worry about his safety all the time. Any mother would worry that had her son involved in a political struggle. I worry all the time about his safety and about all the family. Martin's a man. He can use his own judgement. I never tried to influence him one

way or another. I know that we have suffered, but there are lots of people in Derry and the Six Countries who have suffered a lot more than we did. They've had their husbands killed, their sons killed, even their little children killed. The first of October '68 was the beginning of everything.

McGUINNESS: Well the first time which really deeply affected my political consciousness was the fact that my people, people from this city, were battered to the ground Tuesday October 1st. 1968. For me, I think that was the turning point as far as I was concerned. It made a very deep impression on me, the fact that people who were seen to be civic and political leaders of the city couldn't march in their own streets without being battered by the RUC, that made a very lasting impression on me.

CAMPBELL: It was portrayed as a peaceful parade which the police had attacked and that wasn't the case at all, because I know many people who were at the parade and who said that the civil rights marchers shouldn't have been marching there because it was an inflammatory part of the city to march in and it was a provocative type of a march and that type of a march there was bound to cause trouble. The police naturally wanted to stop it and then that's where the violence came in. I think that the RUC on the first of October obviously weren't as professional as they are now,

because any police force that comes up against something for the first time that they have never encountered before, then obviously they can't be as professional. Well, I would have no doubt that in 1969 and 1970 and, indeed, right through to 72, 73, through Operation Motorman, through Bloody Sunday, I have no doubt there was one man in Londonderry who helped keep the pot boiling more than any other and that man's Martin McGuinness. I have no doubt of that. I have evidence which shows that he was implicated. Of course, the police also know that but they cannot get enough evidence to put him where he belongs, behind bars.

McGUINNESS: It is no secret to the people of these areas and the people of Derry that I was actively involved against the British involvement in Ireland and the British forces of occupation and I've no regrets whatsoever about that.

INTERVIEWER: But were you not, as you were widely described, weren't you the military commander in Derry at that time of the IRA?

McGUINNESS: Well, the British said that I was the military commander of the IRA. I never said it and I believe that for me to actually talk about that particular issue at this time, that what I would actually do if I was to

elaborate on it would be to give information to the RUC Special Branch and the British Military Intelligence who may be watching the programme, so I've no intention of supplying them with any information that would be helpful to them. I don't really care if the British feel that I'm actually evading the question. The fact of the matter is that we had a situation where the British army were seen as an occupying force and the RUC were seen as a force which acted on behalf of one section of the community against the other. Many young men of that particular time in areas like these done what they thought was best in the circumstances. Some involved themselves in political opposition, others involved themselves in military opposition to the British forces and a lot of them were my friends and I couldn't have had better friends as far as I'm concerned and I won't apologise to anyone for that.

INTERVIEWER: Were you involved in military action yourself?

McGUINNESS: I was involved actively on behalf of my people against the British forces of occupation. That's as much as I'm prepared to say.

(CAPTION: Martin McGuinness served two sentences in the Republic of Ireland for IRA membership but no British court has ever convicted him for this or any terrorist offence)

MRS. McGUINNESS: Everytime he goes out you're wondering like will he get back safe, it's only natural, really, you know? The first house we got and he got word it was going to get blew up and we had to move house. I don't like to see anybody getting shot, but they shouldn't be here, you know. This is our country. That's the way, this is just a war, that's the way it goes, you see. I don't mind at all about him going into politics, like he has a mind of his own and he knows and what I've read, always I just support him, you know. I think it's a silly way for everybody...the only way we're ever going to get rid of them is through the ballot box, you know?

INTERVIEWER: Do you think then that they ought to give up the Armalite?

Mrs. McGUINNESS: I don't think they should give up the Armalite either.

A SPEECH BY McGUINNESS TO THE CROWD:

"Well, today is the annual Easter Commemoration. It's the time when we specifically pay tribute to the volunteers of the Irish Republican

Army who've lost their lives in every campaign since the partition of Ireland".

CAMPBELL: Martin McGuinness is the man who is responsible for so many deaths; deaths not only of policemen, soldiers and UDR men, but deaths of many innocent Catholics as well and that is why there are a number of Roman Catholics who're very much opposed to the IRA because of what the IRA, Sinn Fein and Martin McGuinness have done to them.

McGUINNESS: We believe that the only way that Irish people can bring about the freedom of our country is through the use of armed struggle. I wish that it could be done in another way. If somebody could tell me a peaceful way to do it, then I would gladly support that, but no-one has done that yet.

A SPEECH BY McGUINNESS TO THE CROWD:

"Republican people of Tyrone, I'm proud and honoured to be with you here today to commemorate and pay tribute to the volunteers of the Irish Republican Army from this historic country who gave their lives in

every generation in our legitimate struggle for freedom and justice for Ireland. In doing so we are in union with Republicans from every part of Ireland in honouring a memory of our friends, the freedom fighters of the IRA who unselfishly gave their everything in our continued struggle against foreign occupation, and on this Easter Sunday we particularly remember our fallen comrades of this generation with their families, many of whom are here, and the people that have endured such torment and hardship for 15 years can never forget the sacrifices made by our comrades in jail throughout England, Ireland and America. Their incomparable spirit will always be an inspiration to us all".

CAMPBELL: In the Protestant community there is a great concern that somebody like Martin McGuinness can become almost a cult figure in the Republican community, can be elected in election after election, can get thousands of votes from the Roman Catholic community with the record that he has and with the viewpoint that he has on life.

(CAPTION: It is the policy of the security forces not to arrest IRA men during crowded rallies to avoid possible loss of life)

CAMPBELL: His viewpoint's quite clear, that those who want the British connection either get out voluntarily or get out at the point of a gun. Now that point being endorsed by a large section of the Catholic community, Protestant people very rightly feel alarmed that that's the case and feel disgusted that a man such as that should receive some type of endorsement from the Catholic population.

A SPEECH BY CAMPBELL TO THE CROWD:

"I think that last, a newspaper last week described McGuinness as the Chief of Staff of the IRA and even though McGuinness issued a denial there seems to be a strong feeling that McGuinness is very deeply implicated, here especially, and with all the destructions there have been in Londonderry, now that Fleet Street newspaper revelation that he was the Chief of Staff is very disturbing if it's true.

REV. IAN PAISLEY: Well, of course, I think that there's no difference between the leadership of Sinn Fein and the leadership of the IRA, but I think that the papers that the police have got have proved that and I don't draw the distinction at all. I believe that the leadership of the IRA and the leadership of Sinn Fein are one and the same. We have always maintained

that, and whether they want to deny it or not proof positive is that they don't come out and condemn the atrocities that the IRA carry out and, of course, they say that they're the political wing but I think they're both part of one overall organisation and I believe the leadership of Sinn Fein and the leadership of the IRA are identical and I can't see Gerry Adams, McGuinness and Dallymore as being outside the IRA Army Council. I don't think so.

CAMPBELL' SPEECH TO THE CROWD:

"The onliest thing I like about the end of winter and that is that it's coming round to the band season again and then the Protestant feet star marching. You know, there's one thing the Republicans don't like, that they don't like in this city, ant that is Protestants maching for their rights and for all that they hold dear".

PAISLEY'S SPEECH TO THE CROWD:

"I have absolutely no time for those pussy-footers in high places who would like to stop the Protesant bands from marching. We will march and we will continue to march. I have got a message tonight from

Sinn Fein and the Martin McGuinness and the Gerry Morris and the Gerry Adamses of this world. You'll never defeat the Protestant people of Northern Ireland. Let me remind them that they have never faced the Protestant people of Ulster as yet. Oh, yes! Our security forces have been handcuffed by the treachery of Whitehall and of successive British governments both of Labour and Conservative colour, but a day will come when we, the Protestants of Ulster, will take on the IRA and bury them once and for all".

(CAPTION: April 1995: the political parties in Northern Ireland prepare for the forthcoming local elections)

CONVERSATIONS FROM THE SINN FEIN OFFICE:

- " I want to start this morning with a report from each of our areas on how our nominations went. Any problems with candidates and any problems with harassment?"

- "Joe Wilson has been arrested today entering Glasgow, is it? Is Fran McCann released?"

- "Fran McCann's released, yes. It would all stem from the fact that, I think, that when you were stopped last week, all the addresses of the candidates, election agents and director of elections and nominees... for example, Kerry McGarvey in Castle Dearg who just signed the nomination papers of a candidate there who isn't involved in Sinn Fein was arrested and taken to Strand Road as well, so there's a fairly widespread campaign of harrassment from the RUC"

- "The British government has never listened to anything else other than the use of force and at the end of the day while, while an electoral policy or electoral strategy is an important part in the overall Republican struggle, if everyone in Northern Ireland tomorrow voted for Sinn Fein, it wouldn't make a blind bit of difference to the British government.

- "They should be instructed to keep a file on an area.."

McGUINNESS: Well, I think the deaths of British soldiers, like the deaths of any human being are very regrettable. I think all the more so because they're unnecessary deaths. British soldiers have been killed here because

of the intention of their government to maintain this statelet and British forces have actually become the life support system by which this statelet is maintained. On a personal level, if they weren't here as the army of occupation, I could obviously identify with them. Most of the squaddies are working class people from areas not unlike West Belfast, from Liverpool or Glasgow or London or wherever, but there is a war and the way to stop the killing is to resolve the problem. The killings are a symptom of the problem. If the problem's resolved, then no one needs to get killed.

CAMPBELL: I think if the British army were to pull out of Northern Ireland, and if the British government were to announce that at some future date the United Ireland was to come about, Protestants would then feel that all they had campaigned for, all they had fought for, all they had worked to try and prevent happening had all been thrown to the one side and the British government had betrayed us totally. There would then be a substantial number of Protestants who would see no alternative, they would see no way forward in politics and they would see that the IRA had bombed a million Protestants into a United Ireland and they would then say there is only one way we are going to resolve it and that is by fire.

INTERVIEWER: Would you support them?

CAMPBELL: Well, in that situation every Unionist politician would be placed in a dilemma. I have no doubt that in that type of a situation I would be out on the streets with the people.

INTERVIEWER: With arms..?

CAMPBELL: Yes with arms...

CAMPBELL'S SPEECH:

"Well... I think that one of the main issues that we have here in Londonderry is the most recent revelation that we've had in the English press about Martin McGuinness and his position with the IRA and I think it's now become apparent that he's been named in the prominent Fleet Street press and I think we've got to hammer that and we are engaged in a "Smash Sinn Fein" pledge to the electorate and I think the fact that McGuinness has now been named in such a capacity will add impetus to our election campaign and I can only see us having a good, successful campaign with that as one of the prime issues of the day.

McGUINNESS: The reports in the Sunday Times that I am the Chief of Staff of the IRA are not true, but I regard them as a compliment and I feel that in saying that what is actually happening in these reports is, is that we have a situation where British Intelligence and the RUC are, through feeding stories to the press and creating a climate whereby somebody like me will possibly be targeted by the Loyalist gangs and possibly be assassinated, so the only possible motivation I can see from their reports is that British Intelligence and the RUC are trying to create a climate whereby I would be assassinated and labelled as the Chief of Staff of the IRA, but as I said earlier the reports are a quite untrue.

McGUINNESS: What divides Catholics and Protestants, Unionists and Nationalists in Northern Ireland is the British presence. Take the British presence and the guns out of Ireland, there would be peace in Ireland, there's no question or doubt about that.

INTERVIEWER: Isn't that rather optimistic?

McGUINNESS: I don't think that it's optimistic at all. I think that I am right to be optimistic because I firmly believe that that is the case, that in a situation where the root cause of the problem, i.e. the British presence,

British guns, are removed from Ireland, the Catholics and Protestants, Nationalists and Unionists, call them what you will, will live together in peace. I don't think there's any problem about that whatsoever.

CAMPBELL: I have no doubt that in the event of a British withdrawal there would be the most bloody civil war that Ireland has ever seen and Ireland has seen some of the worst civil wars that Europe has ever seen, but I have no doubt in future that Britain should ever consider withdrawing, that the Protestant people would react in such a way that there would be untold violence, untold loss of human life. What we've seen until now could only be a picnic in comparison with what would happen then, and it would be the most horrendous bloodshed when protestants and Roman Catholics alike would be slaughtered in their thousands simply because we would have reached a doomsday situation.

(CAPTION: May 1985, Sinn Fein fighting the local elections for the first time wins 59 seats in Northern Ireland with 12% of the total vote)

PEOPLE SHOUTING: "IRA...IRA..! up the 'RA... up the 'RA..!"

INTERVIEWER: With your success in today's elections, is this now not the time to give up the Armalite?

McGUINNESS: Well, we have always said that we believe we can only achieve what we are attempting to establish in Ireland, a democratic socialist republic, through the belief that winning elections and winning any amount of votes will bring freedom to Northern Ireland. At the end of the day, it will be the cutting edge of the IRA that will bring freedom.

CAMPBELL: The suffering in Northern Ireland is such that people in England can't comprehend the extremity of that suffering. In fact, that suffering could be clearly seen if you look at the figures in Northern Ireland. Two and a half thousand people have been killed by terrorism in Northern Ireland. To put that into language that people in England can understand, that would be, in England, 75,000 people murdered, butchered in 15 years of trouble. If it was to happen in England, there would be 600,000 people injured in 16 years. The outcry, the suffering, the hardship and the grief would be just something that the country couldn't contain and that's what's happening in Northern Ireland.

McGUINNESS: Unfortunately, we do live in a world where the use of a gun, the gun is justified. It's justified. It's justified by governments all over the world. It's justified by Reagan in Nicaragua. It's justified by Margaret Thatcher in the Falklands. It's justified by political parties and political leaders all over the world and I believe that there are certain circumstances in which the use of a gun is quite justified and I believe this cause in Ireland, the freedom of Ireland to establish an independent Irish republic, is a just cause.

INTERVIEWER: Don't you think that one of the ways of ending the suffering is to sit down at a table with Martin McGuinness and start negotiating?

CAMPBELL: No, I think that all those who have lost their loved ones, all those that are grieving, would take that as the most grievous insult, if anyone were to sit down with people like Martin McGuinness and those who planned and executed the murder of their loved ones. The one thing they don't want is, after all they have suffered and all they have come through, the one thing they don't want is anyone sitting down to talk with those people. What they want is those people dealt with so that others

won't have to go through the same grief and the same suffering as they have gone through.

INTERVIEWER: What do you mean, "dealt with"?

CAMPBELL: I have no doubt that all those who've suffered so terribly want to see effective action taken against the IRA. They want to see any measures introduced and I would say that some of them are grieving so much that they don't really care about the measures, they wouldn't go into the detail, but all they will tell you is something has to be done, there's got to be something which will finish the trouble once and for all, and the only way you will do that with the IRA is to kill them".

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