

THE NGOs AS POLICY ACTORS:  
THE CASE OF TÜSİAD WITH REGARD TO  
TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ŞEBNEM GÜNDEM

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

JANUARY 2004

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Ali Gitmez  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Associate Prof. İhsan Dađı  
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Associate Prof. Dr. İhsan Dađı

---

Prof. Dr. Halis Akder

---

Assistant Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman

---

## **ABSTRACT**

**THE NGOs AS POLICY ACTORS:  
THE CASE OF TÜSİAD WITH REGARD TO TURKEY'S EU  
MEMBERSHIP**

GÜNDEM, Şebnem

Master of Science, Department of European Studies

Supervisor: Associate Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı

January 2004, 130 pages

This study explores the effectiveness of NGOs within the policy process and governments' decisions based on the case of TÜSİAD's activities with regard to Turkey's full membership process in the European Union. It firstly explains the process by which NGOs' have become "actors" in world politics. The thesis, then, scrutinizes the role of NGOs in the policy process with regard to pluralist and corporatist paradigms and the concept of power since policy process can not be well understood without this theoretical background. After examining the roles of NGOs, especially the lobbying one, the importance of NGOs and strength of civil society for Turkey's integration to the European

Union is discussed. The case of TÜSİAD with its effective lobbying activities both at home and abroad is studied to elaborate the changing role and expanding influence of NGOs in global politics. In doing so, TÜSİAD's similarities to Western NGOs and the "civil diplomacy" it conducts are analysed. Then, the Association endeavours to create a positive image of Turkey abroad by its lobbying activities, are explained. The thesis ends by emphasizing the cruciality of NGOs with regard to the democratic and economic development of Turkey.

Keywords: NGOs, World Politics, Pressure / Lobby Groups, TÜSİAD

## ÖZ

### POLİTİK AKTÖRLER OLARAK STK'LAR: TÜRKİYE'NİN AB ÜYELİĞİ BAĞLAMINDA TÜSİAD ÖRNEĞİ

GÜNDEM, Şebnem

Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. İhsan Dağı

Ocak 2004, 130 sayfa

Bu çalışma STK'ların hükümetlerin karar alma süreçleri üzerindeki etkisini, TÜSİAD örneğinde, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üyelik süreci ile ilişkilendirerek inceler. Öncelikle STK'ların uluslar arası politikada aktör haline gelmeleri incelenmiş, STK terimi tanımlanmış ve bu kuruluşların globalleşen dünyada değişen rolleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Karar alma süreçleri siyaset bilimi teorilerinden bağımsız incelenemeyeceği için, pluralist ve korporatist paradigmlar “güç” kavramını da içine alarak incelenmiştir. STK'ların üstlendikleri roller ve özellikle de lobi faaliyetleri açıklanmış ve Avrupa Birliği ile bütünleşme sürecinde STK'ların önemi ve sivil toplumun gücü demokrasi kavramı ile beraber çalışılmıştır. Örnek çalışma olarak hem Türkiye'de hem de yurtdışında etkili lobi çalışmaları gerçekleştiren TÜSİAD ele alınmıştır. TÜSİAD'ın Batı'da tanımlanan anlamda bir STK olması ve

devletin yrttę “resmi diplomasi” yanında yurtdiřında yrttę “sivil diplomasi” incelenmiřtir. TSAD’ın yrttę bu lobi faaliyetlerinin de yardımıyla Trkiye’nin, AB nezdinde, yurtdiřında deęiřen imajı anlatılmıřtır. alıřma STK’ların Trkiye’nin demokratik ve ekonomik geliřimi iin nemini vurgulayarak son bulmuřtur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: STK’lar, Dnya Politikası, Baskı / Lobi Grupları, TSAD

**To my Family and Fiancee**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I express my sincere appreciation to my advisor, Associate Prof. Dr. İhsan Dađı, for his guidance, insight and full comments throughout the research. He proposed this interesting subject to me and he has contributed greatly with his valuable suggestions throughout the thesis.

Special thanks go to Prof. Dr. Haluk Günüđur who has always encouraged me during my difficult days. I would like to thank him for also his understanding.

I offer my thanks to Prof. Dr. Mustafa Yařar Tınar, who introduced me to TÜSİAD's staff and gave leave to my Ankara visits. To honourable TÜSİAD staff, Head of TÜSİAD, Tuncay Özilhan, Head of High Advisory Council Tufan Ünal, Brussels representative Bahadır Kaleađası, Washington Representative Abdullah Akyüz and Press Consultant Cengiz Turhan, for their kind responses to my questions.

I want to thank my fiancée, Caner řener, for his unshakable faith in me and his willingness to endure with me the vicissitudes of my endeavours. He has always



been patient to me and has always found the light for me when I was totally in darkness.

I would like to thank also my mother, Ayşen Gündem, for her great efforts to finance me during my thesis and for her never ending love. She taught me toughness, determination, diligence and rationality. To my brother, Tümer Gündem, who taught me that the most momentous preference in life is the choice of profession and advised me that I should do the job I like. To my second mother, Sabriye Şener, for her technical guidance in the beginning of my study and for her great support and patience.

I want to send my sincere thanks to Burcu Kümbül, Metin and Arzu Kalender, for their special efforts in assuring some books and articles. And I finally thank to all my friends for their spiritual support.

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: 30.01.2004

Signature:

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	vi
DEDICATION .....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	xii
LIST OF TABLES .....	xv
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xvi
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. EVOLUTION OF NGOs .....	8
2.1 Different Meanings of the Term NGO .....	9
2.2 Analysing Single Components of the Term “NGO” .....	12
2.2.1 The “Non” in Nongovernmental Organization .....	12
2.2.2 The “Governmental” in Nongovernmental Organizations .....	14
2.2.3 The “Organization” in Nongovernmental Organization .....	15
2.3 Classification of NGOs .....	16
2.4 Evolution and Increasing Effect of NGOs in World Politics .....	19

2.5 Expansion of NGOs .....	26
<b>3. NGOs AS NATIONAL AND GLOBAL ACTORS: POWER AND ROLES OF NGOs .....</b>	<b>31</b>
3.1 NGOs as Actors in the Policy Process.....	31
3.1.1 Liberal Paradigm .....	32
3.1.1.1 Pluralism .....	33
3.1.1.2 Elitism and Its Critiques.....	35
3.1.2 Corporatist Paradigm .....	39
3.1.3 The Actors in the Policy Process .....	40
3.2 Strengths, Weaknesses and Force of NGOs .....	43
3.3 The Roles of NGOs .....	50
3.3.1 Service Delivery .....	52
3.3.2 Innovation .....	52
3.3.3 Maintaining the Value System .....	53
3.3.4 Lobbying .....	53
3.3.4.1 How To Make Lobbying More Effective .....	54
3.4 NGO-Government Relations .....	58
3.5 NGOs Today .....	65
<b>4. INCREASING ROLE AND EFFECT OF NGOs FOR THE MEMBERSHIP TO THE EU: THE CASE OF TÜSİAD .....</b>	<b>67</b>
4.1 The Role of NGOs in the EU .....	69
4.2 The Status of Civil Society and NGOs in Turkey .....	71
4.3 Case of TÜSİAD .....	78
4.4 Historical Background of TÜSİAD .....	79

4.5 TÜSİAD's Similarities to the Western Type of NGOs and Its Contributions to the EU Membership .....	90
4.6 TÜSİAD's Understanding of Democracy in the Light of The EU.....	96
4.7 TÜSİAD's Lobbying Activities and Its Power .....	100
5. CONCLUSION .....	110
REFERENCES .....	120

## **LIST OF TABLES**

### TABLE

1. Each and Every Factor That Effects NGOs' Structure and Activities ..... 64

## LIST OF FIGURES

### FIGURE

1. Boomerang Pattern .....	48
2. Structural Change of TÜSIAD .....	88

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the international scene is a significant development of the last two decades and they have proliferated in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This growth to a high degree depends on the developing consciousness of civil society.

The two world wars and then the Cold War created significant changes in world politics and the post-Cold War era is revealed as an era of a “new international order” based on a notion of democracy, cooperation and peace. The new era also heralds, the decline of nation-state, sovereignty, citizenship and the rise of transnational authorities, regionalism and globalization. Among the recent changes the most impressive one is the challenge to the existing state-oriented system and the rise of low-politics that gave way to a dramatic increase of NGOs. This increasing number and importance of different kinds of non-state actors not only challenges the state-centric concept of international politics but also weakens it. The state-centric concept is replaced by a transnational system, in which, with new actors incorporated, relationships have become more complex. Additionally, after the Cold War, powerful actors such as the United States and the European Union have become much more sensitive to the issues of democratization and human rights in different parts of the world. Proliferation of non-governmental organizations encouraged human rights activism, and they are forming the beginnings of a transnational civil



society. As a consequence of these developments, it becomes almost impossible to disentangle domestic politics from transnational influences.

In addition, studies on NGOs have significantly increased especially since mid 1980s in response to growing number and changing roles of the NGOs. States, in time, realized that they can not conduct all economic and political activities from one center. In other words, states needed some other actors that would share their burden. The importance of non-state actors in the globalizing world was first realized in developed and liberal democratic countries spreading to effect Turkey, too, which is a country that tries to integrate to a supranational organization, the EU. The evolution of world politics, the definition of NGOs and the place of these new non-governmental organizations in this changing political context is analysed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2 also looks for an answer to the question of “why NGOs are worth analyzing?”. It is the fact that NGOs are playing a more important role in the world than they ever did before. The reason for the growing recognition of NGOs is their strengths arising from their differences from states. NGOs are different from the states in terms of their narrow issue focus, severe commitment and high levels of information, expertise and resources to commit to issues, their flexibility and easier adaptations to changing conditions. The NGOs while having relationships with public agencies, remain autonomous legal and political entities because they are private voluntary organizations and they are not subject directly to the policies and regulations of governments. In other words, they are not founded under government initiative and they don't work under strict guidelines that determine its ambit of action. However, if one say NGOs impact on international affairs is not as great as the impact of nation-states, this will not be wrong. Yet it is also undeniable that if these relatively “less significant” actors are ignored, it will be so difficult to understand international politics.

In spite of the growth of the NGO phenomenon, confusion or ignorance persists as to their role and the nature of their relationship to other international actors and governments. To understand the new roles of NGOs and their relationship to other actors in the policy process, it is necessary to explain decision-making process according to theories such as pluralism, elitism, liberalism and corporatism in which the effectiveness of NGOs vary. Chapter 3 will do so. The liberal paradigm, according to which supremacy of government is central although interest groups are accepted as the basic mechanisms of interest articulation, is controversial to the neo-corporatism, in which public policy is made after close consultation with the non-governmental groups. As to pluralism, voluntary associations plays a crucial role in the policy process and state is a watchdog which is criticized by elitism with regard to pluralists' assumption of equal distribution of power among the interest groups. In general, there are three different positions: NGOs are not incorporated in the decision-making process, NGOs act as pressure groups but still not effective legally in the policy process, and NGOs collaborate with the government before decisions are taken. The first position is seen in liberal democracies of developing countries while the third one is witnessed in neo-corporatist systems of developed democracies. In other words, the more NGOs are incorporated into the decision making mechanism, the higher the level of development of a country.

In Chapter 3, different kinds of relationship between governments and NGOs, which vary along a continuum between confrontation and cooperation, is explained in order to apply one of them to the case study. The character and number of NGOs in a country depend mostly on governments' approach. Government-NGO relations though, depend on many different factors such as the type of political system, the willingness of the government and purpose of NGO projects. Purpose of these projects is a serious factor because in developing countries non-controversial projects such as clean water programs are acceptable but projects about human rights advocacy may be approached

with mistrust. In addition when governments try to control the activities of NGOs, another tension arises because NGOs regard these kinds of interventions as an attack on their organizational autonomy. It is crucial to point out that the factors that determine the government-NGO relationship change from one country to another. When the case is analyzed, it is seen that TÜSİAD and Turkish Government, generally, cooperate willingly.

Furthermore, at the end of Chapter 3, different roles of NGOs and their position in today's world is explained. As mentioned earlier, during the case study, the lobbying activities of TÜSİAD are dwelled upon, mostly the lobbying role of NGOs is studied in order to construct the case study upon the theory.

In Chapter 4 the role of civil society in improving the quality of democracy in the newly emerging democratic polities is studied. Since improving democracy is a necessity to Turkey's full membership of the EU, NGOs shaping and democratizing public policies within especially the process of being a member to the EU is analysed. Within this framework, the civil society at the EU level, the European Commission's views and Council's regulations about NGOs are studied. One of the key roles of NGOs is to speak for unheard voices within European society and thus to contribute to the creation of an equitable and balanced civil society. NGOs at the EU level are encouraged and the relationship between NGOs and the Community forms an important part of civil dialogue. In addition, Chapter 4 also looks for an answer to the question of "Why civil society could not develop fast in Turkey? What are the impediments?". Trying to give an answer to these questions, the history of civil society in Turkey and the strong state-centric tradition is examined.

TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen Association) is analysed as a case study in the rest of the Chapter 4. In Turkey, researchs were made about

TÜSİAD by Şebnem Gülfidan<sup>1</sup>, Ziya Öniş<sup>2</sup> and Ayşe Buğra<sup>3</sup>. However, all these studies mostly interested in the state-business relations in Turkey. In other words, all these researchs analyze the relations between TÜSİAD and Turkish governments and expose TÜSİAD solely as a business association which tries to increase only its own interest. In addition, these studies scrutinize the conflicts between the Association and Turkish governments especially after 1980s.

In this study, a different aspect of TÜSİAD is analysed. TÜSİAD is accepted not only a business association that represent the Turkish private sector, but also as an NGO that exactly meets the criteria of being an NGO in the West in the sense that it is largely independent of government and it does not pursuit profit in its activities. Also as being a private agency that raise awareness, influences policy and makes lobby, TÜSİAD resembles the NGOs in Western democracies and all these aspects are examined durning the case study.

During this analysis, the “civil diplomacy” that TÜSİAD conducts as an alternative to the government’s “official diplomacy” and its attempts to influence domestic politics are taken into consideration. Shortly, TÜSİAD is scrutinized as a pressure group that conducts a “civil diplomacy” abroad.

Within this framework, during the case study, the historical background of TÜSİAD with an emphasis on the Association’s so-called changing aims and mission is examined firstly. TÜSİAD was established in 1971 as an

---

<sup>1</sup> See Gülfidan, Şebnem, (1993), *Big Business and The State in Turkey: The Case of TÜSİAD*, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University: University Press

<sup>2</sup> See Öniş, Ziya, Türem, Umut, (April 2001), “Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Four Turkish Business Associations”, *Paper Prepared for Presentation at The Conference on “Political Parties, Civil Society and Democracy”*, Ankara: Bilkent University

<sup>3</sup> See Buğra, Ayşe, (1994), *State and Business in Modern Turkey A Comparative Study*, New York: State University of New York Press

independent non-profit organization that aims to provide the development of a competitive market economy and a democratic society in Turkey. Since Turkey has inherited strong centralized state tradition of the Ottoman Empire, the political elites have never considered business to be an equal partner in the whole policy-making process. Yet, the dominance of the state in the economy was ideologically challenged by TÜSİAD that is accepted as a breaking point in Turkish politics, in this study. Although TÜSİAD has been one of the pivotal actors in Turkish politics from its very inception in 1971, since the 1990s the Association has been interested in political issues increasingly in addition to the economic ones.

As well as the relationship between EU and Turkey is concerned, it can be clearly seen that this relationship had not been stable for years. The military interventions, witnessed in 1971 and 1980, were the most important breaking points during this continuous relationship. After 1980 military regime, the Community began to behave more conditional in contrast to its previous open and constructive attitude. Not only the attitude of the Community, but also the attitude of Turkish political elites were not so moderate until 1980s. Then the relations between the EU and Turkey have been restored and the desire for full-membership of the Union has re-emerged during the 1990s on the part of the Turkish political elites. Consequently, the influence of the European Union has become more intense in pushing Turkey for greater democratization and political opening.

The European Union and Turkey's potential membership of the Union has played an important role in the evolution of TÜSİAD's vision towards democracy in the 1990s. Indeed, European Union, its norms and priorities have been significant in shaping TÜSİAD's approach to domestic politics. One of the ultimate objectives of TÜSİAD at its very foundation was to establish such a model that resembles very much to that of Western European countries. Similarly, although the Association had been predominantly interested in

economic issues in the pre 1980 period, it appeared to be quite anxious also about the possibility of a military government. One of the most important reasons for this anxiety was the threat of isolation from the European Community. Until 1990s, TÜSİAD mostly concerned with economic issues, however, this does not mean that the Association did not deal with political issues. Of course it did, but to a limited extent. During 1990s TÜSİAD shifted its main focus from economic issues to political ones and it has supported the idea that EU membership is beneficial to Turkish society as a whole and this view is worth to analyse.

It is undoubtedly the case that TÜSİAD has been playing an active role in lobbying for Turkey's sake in almost every EU country and in the US and the lobby activities of TÜSİAD will be studied also in Chapter 4. The Association makes lobbying activities thanks to its representatives in Brussels, Washington, Berlin and it may plan to increase these kind of activities with the help of the future representatives in Paris, London and may be in Bagdat.

To sum up, the objective of the thesis is to analyze the crucial and increasing role of NGOs in world politics and their effects on decision-making mechanisms. In order to understand this important role, the case of TÜSİAD is analysed with regard to its double policy of encouraging Turkish governments to meet Copenhagen political criteria, namely democratization and human rights on the one hand, and of lobbying in the European countries for Turkey's EU membership.

## CHAPTER 2

### EVOLUTION OF NGOs

In the last century, two world wars, and then the Cold-War changed the shape of global politics in which the rise of NGOs challenged the traditional state-centric theory of international politics, which holds that nation-states are the primary actors on the world-political stage. According to this view “the state has purposes and power so it is the basic unit of action, its main agents are the diplomats and the soldiers. The interplay of governmental politics yield the pattern of behaviour that students of international politics attempt to understand and that practitioners attempt to adjust or to control”<sup>4</sup>. However, in the last two decades NGOs have experienced an excessive growth and influence and have undergone significant changes which have redefined both their role and mission, and elements of world politics.

Although NGOs have become recognized actors in international affairs, particularly over the last decade, it has not yet been clearly defined what the term NGO encompasses. This chapter is going to review the literature that seeks to define term ‘NGO’ and the evolution of the current, rapidly evolving world political system and the evolution of NGOs within this changing

---

<sup>4</sup> Kegley, Charles W., Wittkopf, Eugene R., (1989), *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Macmillan: London, p. 173-5

environment. Furthermore, the chapter is going to analyse the increasing need for NGOs activities and the expansion of NGOs today.

## **2.1 Different Meanings of the Term NGO**

The term “nongovernmental organization”, which is a post-World War II expression, first founded and used with the adoption of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945. In article 71, it was specified that NGOs could be accredited to the UN for consulting purposes. Because of this definition of the UN, at the very beginning, scholars applied the term NGOs only when referring to those societal actors which are international bodies and engage within the UN context. In addition, few people used the term NGO in a collective sense but instead they spoke of charities, hospitals or cultural organizations. However, with the increase in the influence of these organizations there has been an increase in the awareness that they constitute a “sector” of organizations with comparable goals and structures<sup>5</sup> and the term NGO has become popular for societal actors of all sorts engaged outside the UN framework, internationally and nationally, since 1980s.

Different institutions have established different sets of criteria which are similar in essence, however vary in terms of their broadness, for defining NGOs. These different definitions include a group of term such as “non-profit”, “community-based”, “charity”, “voluntary”, “independent”, “intermediary”, “private” and “informal”. Whatever definitions are, it is clear that an NGO phenomenon exist. It is less clear that, what entities constitute that phenomenon. The term NGO has many uses and many connotations. That diversity derives from differences

---

<sup>5</sup> Casey, John, (2001), *Non-Government Organizations as Policy Actors: The Case of Immigration Policies in Spain*, Departament de Ciència i de Dret Public Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Director: Dr. Richard Goma Carmona, p. 22



in size, duration, range and scope of activities, ideology, cultural background, organizational culture, and legal status.<sup>6</sup>

The Union of International Associations which was founded in 1970 aiming at collecting information on organization of all kinds, identifies seven aspects of international life as indicators of the eligibility of an NGO. First of all, the aim of an NGO must be international in character, with the intention of being active in at least three countries. Second, the membership must be drawn from individuals or collective entities of at least three states and must be open to any qualified individual or entity. Third and fourth ones concern the structure and the staff of the organization respectively. The constitution of the NGO must provide for a formal structure which allows periodical elections, a permanent headquarters, governing body and officers. Fifth, substantial financial contributions to the budget must come from at least three states. Sixth, entities formally connected with another organization are not necessarily excluded, but there must be evidence that they lead an independent life and elect their own officers. Seventh, the NGO must provide evidence for current activities. Furthermore, the UIA provides the world's largest data set on international organizations and distributed this through its annual Yearbook of International Organizations. Most of the scholars have referred to the UIA as the fundamental criteria for NGOs for a long time and even today UIA data or UIA criteria are used in many studies.<sup>7</sup>

The UN Economic and Social Council defines NGOs as:

Any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as an NGO...including organizations which accept members designated by government

---

<sup>6</sup> Princen, Thomas, Finger, Matthias, (1994), *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 5-14

<sup>7</sup> The Yearbook of International Organizations, the Union of International Associations, 1996/1997 edition, <http://www.uia.org>

authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.<sup>8</sup>

Before the spread of the usage of the word NGO, authors also employed other expressions such as “private organizations” or “international pressure groups”.<sup>9</sup> Although all these terms were used in time, today, the word NGO is the well-known style in all languages.

Now, the term NGO has been a commonly accepted phrase within the academic world and interest and literature about this word is increasing continuously. However, definition of the term differs depending on the perspectives of researchers. A more detailed look at the NGO studies, reveals the diverse and even contradicting interpretations of the word. So, firstly, for this study’s strength it is necessary to explore the term NGO in more detail.

The term NGO, sometimes, are interpreted negatively by governments. Governments negative interpretations based on the word “nongovernmental”, even in some countries NGO is defined as “against the government”. Princen and Finger, have explained why it is so complicated to establish clearly the typical characteristics of NGOs:

The difficulty of characterizing the entire phenomenon results in large part from the tremendous diversity found in the global NGO community. That diversity derives from differences in size, duration, range and scope of activities, ideologies, cultural background, organizational culture and legal status.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> ECOSOC Resolution 288(X) of 27 Feb. 1950 and 1296 (XLIV) of 25 June 1968 in Beigdeber, Yves, (1991), *The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations*, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 81

<sup>9</sup> Willets, Peter, (1996), “Introduction”, Willets P., (eds.), *The Conscience of the World: The Influence of the Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System*, Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, p. 8

<sup>10</sup> Princen, T., Finger, M., (eds.) (1994), p. 6

Some scholars find the easy way expressing that there is simply no such thing as the “typical NGO”, and as a result alternative expressions such as pressure group, interest group, independent voluntary sector, grassroots organization, nonprofit body or civil society that challenge the term NGO were introduced.<sup>11</sup> These alternative terms, however, highlight only one specific characteristic of NGOs, or one special type of NGO.

With regard to this difficulty of defining NGOs, the World Bank has made the following general statement regarding these organizations:

The diversity of NGOs strains any simple definition. They include many groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and that have primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives. They are private agencies in industrial countries that support international development; indigenous groups organized regionally or nationally; and member-groups in villages. NGOs include charitable and religious associations that mobilize private funds for development, distribute food and family planning services and promote community organization. They also include independent cooperatives, community associations, water use societies, women's groups and pastoral associations. Groups that raise awareness and influence policy and making lobby are also NGOs.<sup>12</sup>

## 2.2 Analysing Single Components of the Term “NGO”

The easiest way to analyse the definition of the term is to unpack the term into single components: N-G-O.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Weiss, Thomas George, Gordenker, Leon, (eds.) (1996), *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, Lynne Rienner : London, p. 17-50

<sup>12</sup> Hrebenar, Ronald J., (27-28 July 1998), “The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations and Nonprofit Organizations on Governmental Relations in the United States”, prepared for *The International Conference on the Challenge of New Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Achieving Effective Central-Local Relations*, Tokyo, Japan, p. 3-27

<sup>13</sup> Martens, Kerstin, (September 2002), “Mission Impossible: Defining Nongovernmental Organizations”, *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, Vol.13, No.3, p. 278

### 2.2.1 The “Non” in Nongovernmental Organization

According to the dictionary “non” refers to “not”. This is why a number of approaches to NGOs mainly define the term by referring to what NGOs are not. In other words, “the NGOs are *non-governmental*, *non-profit making*, *non-uninational*.”

Firstly, NGOs are nonprofit organizations which means their primary aim is not the pursuit of profit, instead, they are interested in advancing their designated objectives, such as the interests of their members or universal claims.<sup>14</sup> Profits and benefits accrued are not for personal or private gain by members or leaders.<sup>15</sup> At this point, NGOs are completely separated from the multinational companies (MNCs), whose aim is to make profit. Also, NGOs try to influence governmental actors or to implement policies in their field of concern. They make money with publications, fund raising and members’ voluntary charities and by this way they pay the salary of their staff and make activities to support their goals more effectively. In this context, NGOs have often been described as having nonlucrative and nonprofessionalized societal groups. However, in time, the picture changed with increasing professionalism within these organizations. Today, many NGOs have a paid and permanent staff and activists have certain abilities which are specifically needed for their work in the NGO such as journalists.

Secondly, the nonviolent characteristic of NGOs differ them from groups that use force to achieve their aims. For example terrorist groups, national guerilla or organized crime are also nonstate actors<sup>16</sup> but they contain the violence factor so NGOs can clearly be distinguished from this kind of structures.

---

<sup>14</sup> Willets, P., (1996), p. 1-24

<sup>15</sup>The National Steering Committee for NGO Policy, (January 2000), *The National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations in Tanzania*, P.O.Box 5380 Dar es Salaam, p. 4

<sup>16</sup> Willets, P., (1996), p. 1-24

Although some scholars accepted the organizations that participate in illegal activities as NGOs, in this study the term NGO is used for nonviolent organizations. Of course, there exist NGOs that are established with nonviolent character, yet, in time, some of them began to do illegal activities. For example, in 1998, the Kenyan NGO, Mercy Relief International, were raided by a team of Kenyan police and US Federal Bureau of Investigations agents a few days after the August 7 bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam. Four other organizations were deregistered because Kenyan authorities found that they were involved in the blast. Kenyan authorities suspected that materials used for the building of the bombs, each weighing at least 800 kg, were smuggled into East Africa disguised as relief aid with the help of some Islamic relief agencies. In this study, these kind of organizations are not evaluated as they lose their NGO status.

Thirdly, the term NGO referred to nonuninational organizations. After the application of the term in the UN Charter, NGOs were primarily understood as international organizations.<sup>17</sup> This internationality is, at the same time, is one of the criteria of UIA.

Lastly, NGOs are organizations that do not seek political power or campaign for any political party.<sup>18</sup> In other words, NGOs are impartial.

### **2.2.2 The “Governmental” in Nongovernmental Organizations**

The term “nongovernmental” obviously refers to organizations that are not identified with the state. The most central to this definition of NGOs and to this research is the independence of these organizations. Can an organization be considered non-government, and independent if, for example, it was founded

---

<sup>17</sup> The Yearbook of International Organizations, the Union of International Associations, 1996/1997 edition, <http://www.uia.org>

<sup>18</sup> The National Steering Committee for NGO Policy, (January 2000), p. 4

under government initiative, has government representatives on its board of directors, receives the majority of its funds from government subsidies, and works under strict guidelines that determine its ambit of action?<sup>19</sup>

Although many NGOs may have collaborative relationships with public agencies they remain as independent and autonomous entities. Governments and governmental activities are excluded from the definition of NGOs. NGOs are composed of individuals that excludes the governmental representatives. Therefore some authors tend to describe NGOs as “private organizations” because they include individuals or private persons only. In this respect, the UIA states that membership must be made up of individuals or collective entities and must be open to any appropriate qualified individual or entity in the organization’s area of operation. Furthermore, it allows governmental elements as members but demands that NGOs must be free of the influence of the others. Exceptions are only those which are specifically set up by states for a precise purpose and are state instruments.

It is more serious that NGOs must not be dependent on governments for financial support. Of course they may receive financial contributions from governments but this must be limited to the extent that this financial support must not have the power to control or limit its activities. However, when NGOs accept governmental funding, they, inevitably, become increasingly dependent on government. Undoubtedly, this gives harm to the independence of NGOs.

### **2.2.3 The “Organization” in Nongovernmental Organization**

The word “organization” means, NGOs are not spontaneous forces or movements. NGOs are, not only different from spontaneous organizations, but also they are distinct from other less permanent organizational structure such as

---

<sup>19</sup> Martens, K., (September 2002), p. 280-1

public protests. “Organizational” refers at least a basic organizational structure including permanent members, offices or financial income. In other words, NGOs are not ad-hoc entities.<sup>20</sup> Ad-hoc entities can not be named NGOs because, NGOs, starting out the meaning of the term ‘organization’, should have some sort of central office, secretariat or headquarters, even if it be only the office of the president and has no permanent location. This permanency is demonstrated by a degree of organizational structure, such as regular meetings and rules of procedures.<sup>21</sup> Most NGOs or private organizations have permanent committees or commissions for study or activity purposes. The others have other governing, executive or administrative organs which cannot be classified as conferences, meetings, governing bodies or executive committees.

Altogether then, the spread of the term NGO has evolved in many ways since its introduction by the UN in 1945. In time, its content has been broadened and its usage varied. Academic works have developed a number of characteristics to define NGOs. In addition, the term has also been further developed and interpretations have changed over time. In recent years, as NGOs have increasingly become subjects of academic research, scholars have turned to refine some aspects of NGOs.

### **2.3 Classification of NGOs**

Similar to the difficulty in defining NGOs, a debate exists about how to classify them. Although, the classification of NGOs that are made by a number of scholars differ from each other, these different classifications have lots of common points.

In 1977, Lissner classifies 1.502 NGOs into eight groups composed of mission agencies, Church-related agencies, secular voluntary agencies, educational

---

<sup>20</sup> Weiss, Thomas G., Gordenker, Leon, (eds.) (1996), p. 17-50

<sup>21</sup> The National Steering Committee for NGO Policy, (January 2000), p. 4

institutions, student welfare organizations, Jewish welfare agencies, labour and business organizations, foundations and umbrella organizations.<sup>22</sup>

Douglas (1987) offers a classification of three categories: charities, organizations which benefit their members and political organizations.<sup>23</sup>

In 1981, former Oxfam UK Chair Sir Geoffrey Wilson characterized NGOs:

Most are concerned with development-agricultural, social, medical, educational, etc- in both urban and rural environments. Some are highly specialised and serviced by highly specialised staffs. Of the wide variety of organizations operating internationally, church-related bodies still make up the largest number. The Red Cross societies<sup>24</sup>, refugee relief bodies, the International Planned Parenthood Federation and its affiliated members, and Save the Children Fund organizations account for another group of specialised NGOs; followed by the specialist organizations concerned with leprocy, the blind and other professional fields like adult literacy, agricultural development and vocational training. The remainder consist of private foundations like Rockefeller and Ford, which provide funding; organizations like Oxfam<sup>25</sup>, which support a wide range of activities; some 'half-and-half' organizations that receive considerable government funding, such as CARE and the volunteer-sending agencies; and a larger number of small groups that fall into none of the above characteristic<sup>26</sup>.

To Hrebenar, NGOs can be classified according to their orientation into four as charitable orientation, service orientation, participatory orientation and cooperative orientation. Almost all include citizen participation but the last one involves maximum participation of the people with the NGOs acting as facilitators.

---

<sup>22</sup> Beigdeber, Yves, (1991), *The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations*, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 83

<sup>23</sup> Casey, J., (2001), p. 46-8

<sup>24</sup> Red Cross Societies exist in many countries such as America, Britain, French, Japan..etc.and they provide emergency support to people in crisis, both nationally and internationally

<sup>25</sup> an organisation dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world

<sup>26</sup> OECD Cooperation Directorate, (1988), *Voluntary Aid for Development. The Role of Nongovernmental Organizaions*, Paris: OECD, p. 2-10



It can be seen that there are various ways to classify NGOs under some categories. However, it is very hard to classify NGOs because making classifications create its own problems. NGOs are multi-purposed entities with activities in more than one sector such as Greenpeace. So, it will be useful to classify NGOs into more general categories. This kind of organizations can be, therefore, divided into six with a perspective on their historical evolution that is analysed above:

1. Relief and Welfare Agencies: Some organizations aim at relief work and various missionary societies. (Kızılay)
2. Technical Innovation Organizations: NGOs which operate to find new solutions or initiate new approaches to problems. These kind of NGOs specialized in their own fields. (British Intermediate Technology Development Group)
3. Public Service Contractors: NGOs which are funded by Northern governments and work in close cooperation with Southern governments and aid agencies. These NGOs act as the component of official programs. They are more flexible than governments and because of this flexibility they have the ability of perform the tasks more effectively. (CARE)
4. Popular Development Agencies: PDAs cocentrate on self-help, social development and grassroots democracy. (OXFAM)
5. Grassroots Development Organizations: GDOs are composed mostly of Southern NGOs whose members are the poor and attemp to shape a popular development. Some receive support from PDAs, but many receive no external fund at all.
6. Advocacy Organizations: NGOs which have no field project but exist primarily for education and lobbying (TUSİAD). This group of NGOs are significant and will be studied in this thesis because of their lobbying activities that create pressure on decision-making process of the governments. They also

play a central role in all advocacy networks.<sup>27</sup> Advocacy may be related to the particular mission and philosophy of the NGO, its religious or secular nature, its ideological beliefs, its technical orientation and approach.<sup>28</sup>

## **2.4 Evolution and Increasing Effect of NGOs in World Politics**

The evolution of the current world political system began in about the 15th century and then the states began to coalesce. Although integration and disintegration are the two continuum of a line, they both are the reasons of the emergence of states as the focus of political authority.<sup>29</sup>

Small feudal units and city states began to lose their autonomy and political viability because of many developments in technology and economy.<sup>30</sup> These developments caused the diminishing of their military and economic self-sufficiency. As a result, it is not wrong to express that integration process began with the weakening of these feudal units and city-states. Yet, at the same time, people did not want to accept distant authority and revolts against the multinational empires began. Alexis de Tocqueville in his “Democracy in America-Volume II” explains this situation as:

Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions: they want to be led and they wish to remain free. As they cannot destroy either the one or the other of these contrary propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a sole, tutelary and all-powerful form of government, but elected by the people. They combine the principles of centralization and that of popular sovereignty; this gives them a respite: they console themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen their own guardians. Every man allows

---

<sup>27</sup> Advocacy Networks are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to rationalist understanding of their ‘interests’

<sup>28</sup> Beigdeber, Y., (1991), p. 83

<sup>29</sup> Rourke, John T., Boyer, Mark A., (2000), *World Politics International Politics On The World Stage*, USA: Dushkin / McGraw-Hill, p. 130-51

<sup>30</sup> Kahler, Miles, (December 2000), “The State of State in World Politics”, prepared for the conference on *the State of the Discipline*, Washington, D. C., p. 6-17

himself to be put in leading-strings, because he sees that it is not a person or a class of persons, but the people at large who hold the end of this chain.<sup>31</sup>

This was a long process that began in the 16th and 17th centuries and arguably includes the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The founding of modern state is best symbolized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 because this treaty not only ended the Thirty Years War, but also recognized the independence of Netherlands, several German states and a number of other Protestant political entities from the secular authority of the Holy Roman Empire and from the religious authority of the pope in Rome.<sup>32</sup>

The first prominent characteristic of 18th century is the emergence of the notion of popular sovereignty. The questions such as “who owned the state” and “how should it be governed” found their new answers with the establishment of the concept of popular sovereignty. During the 18th century, when this idea began to take hold, it was accepted that the monarch was the sovereign and the people in the sovereign’s realm were subjects. This acceptance was challenged by first the American Revolution in 1776 and then by the French Revolution in 1789.

The story of modern state began with all these changes and, in time, the place of states in the international system has began to change. First and foremost, states became the primary actors in world politics. This continued for a long time and even today they still have great power but, of course, not as much as they used to have in the past. Secondly, as states possessed sovereignty, post-Westphalian system began to operate. In other words, the state system created by Westphalian Treaty had no central authority to maintain order and dispense justice, so the sovereign state reigned as the absolute authority. The rise of

---

<sup>31</sup> de Tocqueville, Alexis, (April 1945), *Democracy in America*, Vol. 2, New York: Vintage Books, p. 184-204

<sup>32</sup> Rourke, J. T., Boyer, M. A., (2000), p. 130-51

modern state as a territorially specific and politically dominant power was dependent, in part, on international agreements. The doctrine of the 'sovereignty' of the states in international law and the mutual recognition of their internal powers and rights by European states thus played a central part in the creation of a new relationship between power and territory.<sup>33</sup> The modern international system, thus, began with the states' being the primary actors in the world politics.

Then democracies were established because throughout the history people witnessed a spontaneous hunger for popular power and they demanded the right to have a say in shaping of their societies. And democracy is the only mechanism to bring unity, harmony and cooperation into a society.<sup>34</sup> At this moment the voluntary organizations came into the scene because this unity and harmony can be established not only by political parties representing different sections and interests of the population, but also additional arrangements such as associations, trade unions, press, academic institutions, social and intellectual clubs; which are not compulsory unions set up by the authority of government. In short, the evolution of modern polity began to speed up by the beginning of the 1900s. Democracy was rapidly eroding the legitimacy of dynastic monarchs. According to the new concepts such as democracy and following nationalism, sovereign political power rests with the people and participation in the affairs of state is necessary. If it come to be accepted that the people owned the state, then they had both a greater emotional attachment to it and greater responsibility to support it.

At this point the NGOs are seen as crucial voluntary associations that cover the whole range of human interests from the world of commerce, industry and

---

<sup>33</sup> Hirst, Paul, Thompson, Grahame, (1996), *Globalization in Question*, UK: Polity Press, USA: Blackwell Publishers, p. 172

<sup>34</sup> de Tocqueville, Alexis, (1961), *Democracy in America*, Vol.3, New York: Vintage Boks, p. 150-92

trade unions to the professions, science and technology, education, the arts, religion and ethics, social services, human rights.<sup>35</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, for instance, claimed that the establishment of voluntary organizations is the most eminent reason of flourishing democracy firstly in America. He wrote in his “Democracy in America”:

Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types: religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute. In every case, at the heart of any new undertaking, where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association...

In democratic country's knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge; on it progress depends that of all the others<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, Emile Durkheim in 1890s mentioned the importance of voluntary associations and he defined them as middle layer of power between the citizen and the state.

Thus, according to both of the scholars, voluntary associations create a critical layer between government and the masses and they, not only protect the masses from abuse of power but also provide a means of channeling citizens' input into the governing process.

Then after World War I, the first Northern NGOs<sup>37</sup> entered into the scene, although the consciousness of NGOs increased especially in the second half of the 19th century.

---

<sup>35</sup> Boulding, Elise, (1990), *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Independent World*, Syracuse University Press, p. 80-92

<sup>36</sup> de Tocqueville, A., (1961), p. 150-92

<sup>37</sup> Northern NGOs refers to the NGOs in the developed countries

Then, in 1939, World War II, a war that would change the balance of power in the world, began. World War II devastated most of the existing major actors. The becoming of United States as a military and economic superpower on the one pole, and Soviet Union on the other was after the World War II. The number of Northern NGOs added to in the aftermath of the this war, in response to the war victims' need for relief.<sup>38</sup>

After the Second World War, the disputes between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, particularly over the Soviet takeover of East European states, led Winston Churchill to warn in 1946 that an "iron curtain" was descending through the middle of Europe. The Cold War was a period of East-West competition, tension, and conflict short of full-scale war, characterized by mutual perceptions of hostile intention between military-political alliances or blocs. Thus, during the Cold War, conflicting interests of Soviet Union and the US were witnessed, a great deal of world politics was centered on the confrontation between two superpowers, however, with the breaking of Soviet Union, United States became the only super power. During 1950s and 1960s the number of Northern NGOs multiplied and because of their being developed, they shifted their attention to the Third World. They helped the poor communities to become more like Northern societies by importing Northern ideas, Northern technology and Northern experience. And this westernization of the international system is another notion that shaped the 19th centuries. The growth of the European power had enabled Great Britain, France and other European countries to thrust outward and take control of North and South America and some other regions. The international system dominated by the West because of scientific and technological advances that sprang from the Renaissance in Europe.

---

<sup>38</sup> Cleary, Seamus, (1997), *The Role of NGOs under Authoritarian Political Systems*, Great Britain and America: Macmillan Pres Ltd., p. 1-13

NGOs' coming to the scene faster after the end of the Cold-War, because the post-Cold War era is also an era of a "new international order". This "new international order" based on the development of democracy all around the world with the increasing sensitiveness of the US and EU to the issue, and a new spirit of cooperation and peace. The decline of nation-state sovereignty and citizenship, the rise of transnational authorities and international regionalism, the collapse of communism and globalization are witnessed. Among the recent changes the most impressive one is the challenge to the existing state-oriented system and the rise of low-politics that gave way to the dramatic increase of NGOs. This increasing number and importance of different kinds of non-state actors not only challenges the state-centric concept of international politics but also weakens it.

NGOs, during 1950s, more or less pursued a common agenda but at the beginning of 1960s things began to change. Some NGOs remained with their traditional activities, while others progressed to new activities and at different rates.<sup>39</sup> Up till 1960s the NGO community was under Northern preservation, yet, in time it has become increasingly a shared ground and many Southern NGOs became more assertive.

By 1980s, NGOs began programmes of development, education, public campaigning and parliamentary lobbying in pursuit of political changes because the poverty was political in nature and gave way to advocacy. Here, conflict of interests became apparent. NGOs which depended on government funding or a conservative donor base, were shy of this advocacy role. In other words this kind of NGOs were not totally independent because of the financial support they got from the government. The marked increase in NGO advocacy campaigns during 1980s should be regarded as a clear indication of how successfully these institutions persuaded many of the world's major political and economic actors that NGOs had something to offer which is of critical

---

<sup>39</sup> Clark, John, (1991), *Democratizing Development*, London: Earthscan Publications, p. 34-52

importance: in essence, NGOs claim that their representation of the mass of the people was greatly superior to that of governments. And the process of people's acquiring conscious through NGOs began.

Then in 1985 relations between East and West began to change more rapidly with the Mikhail S. Gorbachev's coming to power in the Soviet Union, resulting in the collapse of USSR in 1991. This marked the end of the bipolar system. United States became the only superpower economically and militarily.

The emerging international system seemed multipolar, yet rather different from the old one. Some scholars named this new system as modified multipolar system.<sup>40</sup> This suggests a system in which the power of even the major states is restrained by international organizations, international law and interdependence which created by the neo-liberal team in America, in order to impede the increase of the EU as a challenge to USA, with the establishment of international organizations and protocols such as UN and Kyoto Protocol. United Nations and other global organizations became more effective and even the most powerfull countries are not as free as they once were to pursue their unilateral national interest. However, this international system created mutual dependency that was not equal, the powerfull side of this dependence stand the United States always. Yet, the United States has climbing down in the last few years. Today, the United States try to destroy this international system because, from now on, this sytem, this international law bind the United States and effect its economy negatively. The military attack to Iraq was not more than the realization of a hegemon power that it begins to fall down and the effort of recovery.

While the dynamics of the emerging international system are being determined in part by the changing polar configuration of states and by the rise in

---

<sup>40</sup> Rourke, J. T., Boyer, M. A., (2000), p. 130-51



importance of non-Western states, the system is also being affected by the fact that states are no longer the only important actors in the world politics. There are political, economic and social forces that are breaking down the importance and authority of states and moving the world toward a much higher degree of political, economic and social integration. Political integration is evident in the increasing number and importance of international actors such as UN and WTO.

Furthermore, in this new world of growing economic interdependence countries are less self-sufficient economically. Of course, this loss of economic control diminishes the general authority of the states. If the situation of state is analysed in this new world order, it can be seen that nation-states are no longer the 'governing' powers that are able to impose outcomes on all dimensions of policy within a given territory by their own authority. They are now simply one class of political agencies in a complex system of power from world to local levels. They have a centrality only because of their relationship to territory and population<sup>41</sup> which may not exist in the future. Now, the category of NGOs is a misnomer. They are not governments, but many of them play crucial roles of governance, especially in the interstices between states and international regulatory regimes. Their range of activities is considerable and includes development, environment, advocacy and human rights issues. The scope of their activities is equally widespread, being international, national and local.<sup>42</sup>

## **2.5 Expansion of NGO**

It can be stated that the principal developmental actors since the Second World War have been the international bodies such as the World Bank and United Nations. They have promoted a style of development which has often been

---

<sup>41</sup> Rourke, J. T., Boyer, M. A., (2000), p. 130-51

<sup>42</sup> Cleary, S., (1997), p. 1-13

insensitive to the needs of ordinary people and to the environment. The problems got bigger and the need for NGOs increased.<sup>43</sup>

Because of the changes in world politics and in the needs of people the number and importance of NGOs have increased considerably in the last two decades. In 1900s there were 69 NGOs. Since then the number of NGOs has expanded to approximately 50.000. Furthermore, the influence and the range of activities of transnational actors are growing as their numbers increase and as technological advances allow them to operate and communicate more effectively across political boundaries.<sup>44</sup> The Union of International Associations has recorded:

- in 1951, 832 NGOs
- in 1960, 1.255 NGOs
- in 1972, 2.795 NGOs
- in 1981, 9.398 NGOs
- in 1990, 16.208 NGOs

have existed.<sup>45</sup> According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, in 1999 the number of NGOs increased to 43958.<sup>46</sup>

The most notable aspect of NGOs, according to some, is that their “role in global negotiations and global governance has been emerging stealthily and slowly over the last quarter century”.<sup>47</sup> They have expanded their influence

---

<sup>43</sup> Kegley, C. W., Wittkopf, E. R., (1989), p. 173-5

<sup>44</sup> Rourke, J. T., Boyer, M. A., (2000), p. 130-51

<sup>45</sup> Beigdeber, Y., (1991), p. 81

<sup>46</sup> [www.uia.org](http://www.uia.org)

<sup>47</sup> Weiss, Thomas G., Gordenker, Leon, (1995), “NGO Participation in International Policy Process”, in Weiss, Thomas G., Gordenker, Leon, *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, p. 209-23

within democratic societies and created both cooperative and competitive relationships with government for the development of public policies and the delivery of services. What is the reason for their recent expansion? Why do states share their responsibilities with NGOs if they already have the legitimacy and authority of the political system?

The end of the Cold-War as claimed before may be the most prominent reason of NGOs expansion. With the breakdown of ideological competition, the reluctance of many diplomats to interact with non-governmental staffs has disappeared. This gave way new possibilities of communication and cooperation within decision-making process.<sup>48</sup> With the end of East-West rivalry, the United Nations became a better forum for the reconciliation of views among governments. In addition, with the end of the Cold-War, NGOs promoted relevant policies and actions in response to the changing environment expanded their direct access to policy making.

Technological developments are another reason that gave way to the expansion of NGOs. Thanks to the technological innovations, NGOs began to communicate more easily within themselves and also they now can reach to the media and so convey their mission to the people. Modern communications technology is independent of territorial boundaries.

In addition to these specific reasons a number of authors examine the growth in this sector in the context of crisis of the welfare state and an apparent crisis of confidence in democratic institutions. The society was more complex in which many rational actors seek their interests so it became necessary to organize in order to have a say in most of the subjects. These are, undoubtedly, the properties of a pluralist society. So pluralism gave way to the increase of NGOs.

---

<sup>48</sup> World Bank, (January 1994), *Strategies for improving Bank-NGO relations*, Draft 9, Mimeo: World Bank

Furthermore, the growth of political, ethnic and religious diversity and the growth of political awareness among minority groups, the proliferation of a more differentiated and complex demand on public service and the growth of demands for new services related to social changes, governmental budget constrains that cannot meet these demands, a lack of confidence in public bureaucracies and traditional political parties related to an increase in the perception of corruption, the creation of alternative service delivery structures that can avoid the rigidity of government procedures and so be more responsive to client needs, increasing technical competence of NGOs, evolving from classic voluntary, to more professional, specialized, effective organizations, an increase in the organizational capacities of citizens, the increase in mechanisms for client oversight of the provision of services and greater concern about quality of service as opposed to quantity and the remission of the welfare state, which requires structures that can be more economically efficient than public agencies and/or maintain services despite cutbacks are the other reasons that lay behind this expansion.<sup>49</sup>

The factors seem to indicate both a desirability and inevitability of the growth of these organizations. It is true that NGOs expanded in the last decade, however, the reasons of this expansion depend on not only the type and characteristics of NGOs but also the country's cultural background and regime. For example, a higher rate of NGO development in Anglo-Saxon societies is seen as a result of a more individualist culture which encourages self-organization independent of the state; whereas in a Continental tradition, there is a stricter division between the state and civil society and the tendency is to leave the provision of public goods in the hands of the state.

The statistics of Johns Hopkins University proved that cultural differences effect the NGO expansion and development and found that the size of NGOs is

---

<sup>49</sup> Casey, J., (2001), p. 43-53

larger in the more developed countries and much less evidence in Latin America and central Europe.<sup>50</sup> In Netherlands the size of the nonprofit sector was %12.6 in 1995, while this rate was only % 0.4 in Mexico. Between these two ends the size of NGOs in Ireland was %11.5, in Belgium it was %10.5, in UK the rate was %6.2 and in such countries as Spain and Austria this rate was approximately %4.5.

Thus, the developed Western European countries turned out to have the largest nonprofit sectors among all Project countries, surpassing their Eastern neighbours by a ratio of about %7.1. So it can be said that the more developed a country, the higher the size of the NGOs.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> Salamon, Lester M., Sokolowski, Wojciech S., Anheier, Helmut K., (December 2000), Social origins of Civil Society: An Overview, *Working papers of The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, p. 1-6

<sup>51</sup> Salamon, L. M., Sokolowski, W. S., Anheier, H. K., (December 2000), p. 1-6

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **NGOs AS NATIONAL AND GLOBAL ACTORS: POWER AND ROLES OF NGOS**

#### **3.1 NGOs as Actors in the Policy Process**

Fundamental concepts with regard to the policy process should be explained in order to understand how the policy process is effected by governmental or non-governmental actors. But, there is a differentiation between the perspectives of rational and current models to the phases or stages exist within the policy process which is the first concept that will be analysed. According to the former, the policy process begins with a problem and ends with the solution of that problem, however, the latter approach claims that policy process functions as a cycle of phases of interactions between the participants and the determinative elements. Additionally because of the complexity of the dynamics involved in the public policy process, it is not always the case that one phase follows the other or that one finishes before the other begins. In

contrast, it is generally the case that the policy process involves simultaneous activity in the differing phases.<sup>52</sup> The conflict between various actors is seen usually in the first and second phases which involves agenda-setting and decision-making. If NGOs seek to take part in the policy process, they should intervene effectively in these phases.

The second fundamental concept is that of power and its distribution among the participants in the policy process. In order to participate effectively in the policy process, an actor must have the power to induce others to act in a manner coherent with that actor's interests. However, beyond such a general definition there is little consensus as to what constitutes the concept of power's basis. With regard to policy process and the concept of power, liberal and corporatist paradigms should be explained briefly.

### **3.1.1 Liberal Paradigm**

In the liberal paradigm, the individual is the main unit of political activity. The interest groups and political parties are the basic mechanisms of interest articulation and aggregation. Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell defines interest groups as a set of individuals who are linked by bonds of advantage and who are aware of these shared interests. Although interest groups are the basic mechanisms, Parliament is still the major institution through which these articulated and aggregated interests are transformed into authoritative, central political decisions. Interest groups may take the advantage of both constitutional or formal channels such as mass media, legislatures cabinet and bureaucratic agencies and informal channels such as personal connections and elite representation. Thus, the supremacy of the parliament is central in liberalism, elite representation and lobbying in the legislature are the primary

---

<sup>52</sup> Cahn, Matthew A., Theodoulou, Stella, (edt.), (1995), "The Players: Institutional and Noninstitutional Actors in The Policy Process", *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, p.201-209

channels of access for the interest groups wishing to influence the decision of the political elites.<sup>53</sup>

### 3.1.1.1 Pluralism

Pluralist approaches have a long history that began with John Locke, Montesquieu in the 18th century and continued with Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19th century, but are mostly identified with the liberal democracies of the second half of the twentieth century. According to pluralist theory individuals are rational and they are aware of their interest. However, the interests of the people may not be the same. Therefore, there are voluntarily formed interest groups and these groups compete with each other and they all try to influence the decision-making process for their own sake. For Alexis de Tocqueville, Arthur Bentley and David Truman, that voluntary associations plays a crucial role in the policy process and state is a broker. To Tocqueville, an essential part of pluralism is the presence of free associations of citizens which participate in political negotiations. It is the very fact that the relation between associations and democracy has been one of the most undisputed thesis within the studies of political culture. Thus, the main assumption of pluralism is that political power is not concentrated, instead dispersed among freely contributing interest groups. No one single group should dominate or have priority or a monopoly over the others. These different interest groups check and balance each other and they comprises mass representation organizations such as political parties and unions, lobbies that represent the interests of specific sectors of society. There are competition and negotiation between these groups and this is essential for democracy.<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> Gülfidan, Şebnem, (May 1993), *Big Business and The State in Turkey: The Case of TÜSİAD*, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University: University Press, p. 1-30

<sup>54</sup> Akçalı, Pınar, (1999), “Political Participation and Electoral System”, *Lecture Notes*



As far as the role of the state is concerned, Pınar Akçalı, quoting from Truman, said that “the state, among these associations, is like a watchdog or a traffic light that impede a deadly accident. The main idea is that no one is left out of policy process if everyone is given the chance of organize. However, one of the most important shortcoming of this thesis when it is tried to be applied to the real life is the reality of economic resources are not being the same for everyone”.<sup>55</sup>

Plurality reflects the fact that the political community is essentially made up of groups and these groups are natural and legitimate, reflecting the diversity of interests and needs in society itself and the best means by which people can participate in politics. The state is an aggregate of all these competing interests, producing policy decisions and outcomes which reflect a compromise between competing demands.<sup>56</sup> Thus, pluralism assumes equal ‘inputs’ into the decision-making process from all sections of society.

With regard to the concept of power, firstly, it is necessary to explain what power is. Robert Dahl explained his one dimensional view of power as: “A exercises power over B to the extent that he/she changes B’s actions or predispositions”.

Bertrand Russell in his “Power: A New Social Analysis” claimed that: “The fundamental concept in social science is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics”. He defined power as “the production of intended effects and the two methods of producing intended

---

<sup>55</sup>Akçalı, P., (1999), *Lecture Notes*

<sup>56</sup> Dahl, Robert, (1961), “*Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*”, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 3-33

effect are force and persuasion, which are both a kind of influence”.

Additionally Michael Foucault said:

Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. ... [T]hey are imbued, through and through with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject.<sup>57</sup>

Foucault sees power as something located within the society, but not above it as Hobbes does. Power is an aspect of everyday life. As it can be understood from the above quotation of Foucault, power is exercised not through persons but through arrangements and he explicitly rejects the appropriateness of the “rule of law”.

For Foucault, power is “the name of a complex strategical situation in a particular society” which is exemplified by the “multiplicity of force relations in the sphere in which they operate”. This multiplicity flourishes in two forms: war and politics. Power is not a thing to be obtained; instead, it is the interplay of complex relationships. Power is not a simple separation of binary relationships into the controller and the controlee; instead, it is a part of other relationships such as economic, knowledge, and sexual relationships.<sup>58</sup>

In short, according to pluralism, generally, no group is without power to influence decision-making, and equally no group is dominant. However, this position does not hold that power is equally distributed. Although some groups have more influence than others, even the least powerful are able to make their thin voices heard at least at one stage in the decision-making process. No individual or group is completely powerless since the sources of power are distributed noncumulatively and no one source is dominant.<sup>59</sup> The theory does

---

<sup>57</sup> Foucault, Michael, (1980), *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Vintage/Random, p. 3-13; p. 81-114

<sup>58</sup> Foucault, M., (1980), p. 3-13; p. 81-114

<sup>59</sup> Gülfidan, Ş., (May 1993), p. 1-30

not take into account the possibility of unequal power relations in a society which is a handicap of the theory.

### 3.1.1.2 Elitism and Its Critiques

After the explanation of power by the pluralists, Bachrach and Baratz claimed a 'second dimensional view of power' as "facilitating 'non-decision-making' is as important as changing a person's actions when it comes to power relations" and criticized Dahl's concept of power. According to Bachrach and Baratz, power does not simply involve examining key decisions and actual behaviour. They stated that:

power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A<sup>60</sup>

The pluralists responded to Bachrach and Baratz's critique by claiming that non-decision was unresearchable. Bachrach and Baratz then replied as "a nondecision is a decision that result in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker."

Steven Lukes' 'third dimensional view' is taken the debate on power a step further and claimed on the other hand that "A has power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests". A also exercises power over B by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. That is to secure his own compliance by controlling the other's very wants, thoughts and desires. In modern societies that is through the control of information, through the mass media, and through the process of socialisation. Almost the entire adult population has been subject to some degree of indoctrination through the schools. Actual conflict is not necessary for power.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup> Akçali, P., (1999), *Lecture Notes*

<sup>61</sup> Lukes, Steven, (1974), *Power: A Radical View*, London: Macmillan Press, p. 1-24

These criticisms to pluralism may result directly through government acting as agents for the elites, or can be introduced by powerful, non-governmental actors. There may occur a situation in which pressure groups achieve domination over the institutions charged with controlling them. Additionally, neopluralist writers ultimately believe that a well-organized interest sector with a good case will have the potential to influence the policy process. Despite the recognition of the inequalities of pluralism, these authors generally do not look beyond the concept of competing groups and rarely incorporate state and structural power into their analysis, and most say that there are both internal and external constraints, or countervailing powers, that create a degree of equality within pluralism by imposing limits on the power of any one interest.<sup>62</sup>

A final criticism of pluralism, regards the power that some groups have as dysfunctional to democracy because it can distort the political agenda by pushing issues that are of concern for a resourceful minority but not the “silent majority”.<sup>63</sup> Interest intervention leads not to democracy but to fragmentation and some commentators continue to speak of Samuel Huntington’s “excess of democracy”<sup>64</sup> that threatens the vitality of the democratic process.

According to the elitist theory the distribution of power is an illusion that provide the continuity of the power of elites. Political decisions are dictated by a governing elite. The position of these elites strengthened by their access to particular resources, eg. status, wealth, knowledge, achievement. These elites can be conceived in a purely Marxist sense of the “owners of the means of

---

<sup>62</sup> Smith, Martin J., (1990), “Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism and Neopluralism: The Role of Pressure Groups in Policy-Making”, *Political Studies* 38 (2), p. 302-322

<sup>63</sup> Smith, M. J., (1990), p. 302-322

<sup>64</sup> Samuel Huntington stated that the crisis of democracy arose from an excess of democracy on the part of the citizenry. Huntington argued that inflation, unemployment and other problems could best be solved by less, not more, democracy.

production”, the bourgeoisie, who protect their economic interests through a diversity of social agents which create a democratic appearance. This minority is small but superior and distinguished. It is impossible to talk about the degree of political power because an individual either has a political power or not. According to this theory masses can not take rational decisions, they need to be guided. The elite in liberal democracies are the leaders of various groups, ie bureaucracy, political parties, business and other pressure groups like military.<sup>65</sup>

The elitists can be divided into two groups as classical elitists composed of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto and contemporary elitists involve Joseph Schumpeter, Harold Laswell and Robert Dahl. Akçalı, referring to Mosca’s “The Ruling Class” and Pareto’s “The Mind and Society”, stated that according to the elitists all societies are governed by an elite and so Marxist dream of a classless society is impossible. Contemporary elitists mention democracy in their explanations. According to them, the existence of elitists in the society does not mean that regime is not a democratic one. Political decisions can not be made by masses, the rational decision is to elect the ones who will take the political decisions. Robert Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy” summarize elitist theory as:

the formal organization of bureaucracies inevitably leads to oligarchy, under which organizations originally idealistic and democratic eventually come to be dominated by a small, self-serving group of people who achieved positions of power and responsibility.<sup>66</sup>

In short, a minority always rules the majority in every society. Consequently, a small group is given the responsibility of making decisions.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>65</sup> Akçalı, P., (1999), *Lecture Notes*

<sup>66</sup> Akçalı, P., (1999), *Lecture Notes*

<sup>67</sup> Michels, Robert, (1959), *Political Parties, A Sociological Studies of Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, New York: Dover Publication, p. 18-24

The Iron Law of Oligarchy suggests that organizations wishing to avoid oligarchy should take a number of precautionary steps. They should make sure the leaders not be granted absolute control of a centralized administration. As long as there are open lines of communication and shared decision making between the leaders, an oligarchy cannot easily develop. Michels's analysis was a turning point for the elitist theory. Furthermore, this elite theory, clearly, underestimates the inter-dependency of so-called elites and non-elites and the possibility that elites may not always share the same interests.<sup>68</sup>

### **3.1.2 Corporatist Paradigm**

It is difficult to find one clearly and consensually accepted definition of corporatism, but in the most general sense, the term corporatism describes a society in which the state, as the central actor in a strict hierarchy of power relations, shares power within the policy process with other major actors, including business groups, unions, and other "peak" associations.<sup>69</sup>

Under the corporatist model certain groups receive formal sanction from the state, and thus are granted official status as legitimate participants in the governing and decision-making process. A system of interest intermediation is created among a reduced group of privileged centralized participants and this results in a relatively non-competitive process for the formulation and implementation of key economic and social policies.

There are two types of corporatism: neo-corporatism and authoritarian corporatism. These are both anti-liberal and anti-Marxist but not anti-capitalist. In authoritarian corporatist models, the state regulates and controls political and economic life through the medium of non-governmental actors, but of course, placing itself above them. These non-governmental groups have no legal

---

<sup>68</sup> Michels, R., (1959), p. 18-24

<sup>69</sup> Locke, Robert, (September 2003), "What is American Corporatism?", Front Page Magazine

independent personality, and the staff should give a guarantee of loyalty to the state.

Neo-Corporatist model came to the scene with the concept of welfare state. As the burden on government grew its intervention in economy decreased accordingly while the interest groups became more influential in the politico-administrative process. According to neo-corporatism, the nongovernmental groups are legally constituted groups which play social role, instead of expressing only various combinations of interests like in liberalism. They are positioned between the individuals and the state and have a high degree of internal autonomy. They also check and restrain the state's interference in their autonomy, thereby, protecting the rights of individuals. The state is the product of social solidarity. Its main function is to promote the public interest. Thus, the state is legitimate as long as it serves the public interest and its legitimacy is determined by its daily functioning. With regard to its economic role, the relation between the state and these groups is not a relationship of subordination but partnership.

In neo-corporatist countries, public policy is made after close consultation with the non-state groups. The government takes its decisions by seeking the prior approval of organized interest groups.

### **3.1.3 The Actors in the Policy Process**

After the brief explanation of these systems, some conclusions can be drawn in order to analyse the non-governmental actors in policy making.

Firstly, it should not be forgotten that public action is the result of negotiation between various actors. The decision-making process is the result of multiple inter-actions of diverse actors. Thus, during the process of decision-making, various actors participate with different ideologies from distinct backgrounds.

Secondly, these interactions are governed by “rules of the game” resulting from the number of actors involved and the relative power of each of them. The impact of the actors depends on the political power which they bring to, or accumulate in, the process. Actors are those organizations and individuals whose potential capacity to affect the collective outcomes of policy decisions must be taken into account by other participants.<sup>70</sup>

In the majority of contexts and commentaries on the political process, “actor” mostly refers to governmental actors, and there is a tendency to ignore the roles of non-governmental actors. However, there has been a diversification and growth in the number of actors in the last decades due to the growth of the public sector, the professionalization of government employees, the privatization of public services, and the growth of lobbies and other non-governmental organizations.

NGOs, one of the most significant element of these non-state actors, are seeking to influence governments as the formal decision makers and these attempts should be seen in the broadest sense. Even NGOs who proclaim themselves to be non-political often seek to influence governments. The participation of NGOs in the policy process is not always accepted and attitudes towards it vary according to social and economic conditions. NGOs may be seen either as peripheral to a strong governmental system; essential and desirable players in a pluralist distribution of power; a threat to democracy or the legitimate future of democracy. Whatever they are, in order to intervene in the policy process, NGOs should have a broad political base and they have to prove that they are experts in the theory and practice of the policy in question.<sup>71</sup>

They should have the ability to participate in the policy process. Participation is

---

<sup>70</sup> Laumann, E. O., Knoke, D., (1991), *The Organizational State*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

<sup>71</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 74-83



usually either through institutionalized channels of cooperation or through more confrontational tactics which create lobbying pressures which will be explained later.

The policy impact of NGOs is so crucial for the purposes of this thesis. Some scholars tend to ascribe almost endless powers to NGO lobbying efforts, while some tend to generally ignore them except when a specific organization has exceptionally achieved a high level of political power. Here, the factors that determine the possibilities for political participation by NGOs and the impact of the different strategies available to them will be analysed in order to find a point between these two opposite views.

The most important factor that determine possibilities for political participation is the other non-state actors effecting policy processes which NGOs should have to colloborate in order to be more powerfull and effective.

First group is the powerful individuals, experts and opinion makers who have accumulated economic power or social status that help them to influence policy decisions.<sup>72</sup> In many policy areas these are usually academics, researchers and consultants who are experts of the issues in question. Normally, they work in the framework of universities, the press, or research institutions.

Second group is the potential actors who exercise influence through their potential participation. These have direct influence because of their perceived potential to organize, their future vote and the symbolic value of their interests. “Public opinion” or the “silent majority”<sup>73</sup> are the common popular designations of these actors, increasingly expressed in opinion polls and other survey research. “What will the voters say?” or “the polls indicate that ...” often

---

<sup>72</sup> Kingdon, John W., (1995), *Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, p. 67

<sup>73</sup> Berinsky, Adam J., (2002), “Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America”, *a paper for Princeton University*, p. 1-24

have as much power over public actions as the outcome of organized lobbying efforts. Above all they have the legitimation of representing majority interests in the face of minority lobbying and they can direct governments to act, or constrain them from doing so.<sup>74</sup>

Finally, the media, who have the greatest power, functions to channel and communicate the interests of other actors, particularly that of the dominant ideologies reflected by the rich and powerful. However, others consider the media as having its own dynamic and separate role from the expressions of others. The scrutiny to which they subject public figures and their ability to select and influence what they consider to be news can significantly influence the agenda of public policies. The US-based CNN, particularly since its coverage of the Iraqi war, is seen as an ideal example of how the media can arbitrate which issues politicians are forced to deal with.

### **3.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of NGOs**

After drawing this analytical framework, to analyse strengths and weaknesses of NGOs is necessary to find the ways of increasing their effects.

The media loves NGOs. The world's public love NGOs. And increasingly many Third World governments are taking them into consideration. Clark asks: Is the glowing image realistic? It is undeniable that the image of NGOs changed so much in developed countries and changing nowadays in developing countries like Turkey. The people who do not trust large bureaucracies, increasingly believe in NGOs.<sup>75</sup>

Increasing importance and number of NGOs may be explained by their own strength in contrast with the limitations of governmental and intergovernmental

---

<sup>74</sup> Kingdon, J. W., (1995), p.67

<sup>75</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 52-74

agencies' action. NGOs are seen as more efficient institutions than the official agencies.

One of the most significant strengths of NGOs is their ability to persuade people. This increased persuasiveness enables them to carry messages from its political analysis and self-awareness to a broader audience. The NGOs learn to position their experience in the context of the main political debates of the day and to discover ways of influencing those debates. For example, in Turkey, TÜSIAD continuously interested in the main political and economic debates and so the Association influences the debates with its increasing experience.

Secondly, as private organizations, NGOs are not subject directly to governmental or intergovernmental agencies' policies, rules and regulations. They are smaller organizations, with flexible administrative structures, which can react quickly and effectively to emergencies. NGOs' independence from governments may allow them to help in situations and locations where governmental organizations are unable to intervene for political or other reasons.<sup>76</sup> They may also identify, formulate and publicize problems without exclusive reliance on official sources of information.

Thirdly, it is undeniable that NGOs are usually the best-informed group. They have personnel on the scene before official action is taken. They have the ability to innovate and adapt, in other words, they are less circumscribed by restrictive objectives and regulations so they are free to adjust more quickly to changing environments and circumstances than governmental and intergovernmental bureaucracies.<sup>77</sup> NGOs have detailed knowledge, first-hand

---

<sup>76</sup> Beigbeder, Y., (1991), p. 92-4

<sup>77</sup> Beigbeder, Y., (1991), p. 92-4

information and the capacity to make strong common statements.<sup>78</sup> As it will be explained in the case study, TÜSIAD is on the scene, especially abroad, before the official action is taken thanks to its foreign representatives.

Fourthly, NGOs are cost-effective. Their light administrative structure and their focus on limiting non-operational expenditures makes them more cost-effective than governmental organizations.<sup>79</sup>

Fifthly, NGOs' staff are generally highly committed to their work because of widely shared values and a belief in the mission inherent in their work. This high commitment increases the work performance and the quality of work. Committed staff also tend to have strong ideas of their own which they are keen to express. However, this commitment factor can be a double-edged sword. It may be difficult to persuade "periphery" staff to follow approaches and procedures agreed centrally by the organization. But if staff feel respected and listened to, the organization would function best. If all the strong views are in the same direction then the path is easier to follow, but if there are tensions then decision making can be extremely difficult. Lengthy staff debates may lead to consensus compromises in which participants are careful to guard against any decisions which effect their own work plans. This sort of "negative decision making"<sup>80</sup> results in organizational planning that is conservative. Such an organization risks loss of coherence, and risks becoming a loose partnership of the staff it employs.

Finally, NGOs have international structures and linkages and also they have the potential to construct global network of citizens pressure. They are also able to

---

<sup>78</sup> Hersel, Philipp, (1996), *Democratizing World Politics: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations*", MA Dissertation for MA Programme in Global Political Economy at University of Sussex, Supervisor: Marc Williams, p. 20-9

<sup>79</sup> Beigbeder, Y., (1991), p. 92-4

<sup>80</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 52-74

experiment with new approaches to the crises because of their size and flexibility. They can easily reach their message to the people with using their access to the media. More importantly, they are trusted by the public at large since their aim is not to make profit.<sup>81</sup>

However, when practice fails to live up to the rhetoric, the stated strengths start to resemble weaknesses. In the words of Sheldon Annis, a prominent American analyst of NGO performance,

sometimes 'small scale' can merely mean 'insignificant', 'politically independent' can mean 'powerless' or 'disconnected', 'low-cost' can mean 'underfinanced' or 'poor quality', and 'innovative' can mean simply 'temporary' or 'unsustainable'.<sup>82</sup>

In real life, sometimes these strengths may leave their seats to the weaknesses. Leadership problems can be stated as the first weakness of an NGO. Good leadership is critical to the success of an NGO but NGO staff often resent and impede strong leadership. Though leadership is critical to the success of NGOs, usually little attention is paid to the development of leadership potential or to management training.<sup>83</sup> So a good leadership style can solve the staff problems. Here, the question of "what is the good leadership style" will not be analysed in detail, yet this can be found in Drucker's *Managing The Non-Profit Organization*. He explained such thing as what the role of the leader should be, effective strategies for an NGO, what kind of relationship a leader should develop with the staff very well by depending on real examples and practices of leaders.

Then comes the second problem, financial insufficiency that arise from one of the significant characteristics of NGOs: independency. The most important element of independence is, surely, financial sufficiency. Most of the NGOs

---

<sup>81</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 52-74

<sup>82</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 52-74

<sup>83</sup> Drucker, Peter F., (1990), *Managing The Non-Profit Organization*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 9-29

have limited financial resources.<sup>84</sup> As development economists using GNP indicators as their measure of progress, NGO leaders are preoccupied by their organizations' turnover. Intellectually they are aware that money spent does not equate the development achieved and all problems cannot be overcome through projects but they also know that the public and the media judge the worth of their organizations by money.

Thirdly, size of an NGO may become a weakness. Although "smallness" is often seen as a virtue within NGOs, being "small" brings the danger of being "insignificant". The challenge for NGOs is to seek ways of maximizing their impact and of maximizing the value of the lessons drawn from the experience without sacrificing the quality of their programmes. A small NGO can remain in obscurity but as it grows it has to learn to coordinate with others, even with a government it dislikes. All these would give way to more regulations and interventions.<sup>85</sup>

Finally, governments may distrust or be hostile towards some NGOs because they have the fear of political or ideological activities undertaken by NGOs. Governments fear that autonomous NGOs may challenge or oppose laws or public policies.

After the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs, now, it will be explained that how NGOs can use their force if they increase their strengths and cure their weaknesses. And if the force of NGOs would be analysed, it is necessary to talk about transnational advocacy networks briefly because NGOs play a central role in all advocacy networks and these networks are serious tools for effecting governments. Advocacy networks are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals


---

<sup>84</sup> Beigbeder, Y., (1991), p. 94

<sup>85</sup> Beigbeder, Y., (1991), p. 94

advocating policy changes. NGOs, analysed as advocacy organizations in Chapter 2, usually initiates actions or exert pressure on more powerful NGOs to take actions in case of a blockage that impede their activities. NGOs introduce new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes. The other actors in advocacy networks are foundations, local social movements, trade unions, consumer organizations, international organizations, the media...etc. These actors are also crucial because the groups in a network share values and frequently exchange information and services.<sup>86</sup> Two or more of these actors act together sometimes and by this way they can effect the government easier.

In other words, NGOs may seek international connections to express their concerns. When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern<sup>87</sup> of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur. Keck and Sikkink explains this boomerang pattern as ‘domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside’ and also they use the following figure:



<sup>86</sup> Keck, M. E., Sikkink, K., (1998), p.1-32

<sup>87</sup> Keck, M. E., Sikkink, K., (1998), p. 1-32

### Figure 1: Boomerang Pattern

Within transnational advocacy networks, actors seek influence in many of the same ways that other political groups or social movements do. They generally use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to change the states' information and values according to which they take decisions.

For example according to Keck and Sikkink one of the tactics to influence states is to quickly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact. Within this process NGOs gain influence by serving as alternate sources of information to E-mail, fax or telephone.

Another way of influencing politics is to call upon powerful actors to affect situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence. NGOs may create links with the more powerful actors and affect the situation. Although NGOs' influence often depends on securing powerful allies, their credibility still depends in part on their ability to mobilize their own members and affect public opinion via the media.<sup>88</sup> In democracies, like Turkey, potential to influence votes gives large membership organizations an advantage over nonmembership organizations in lobbying for policy change.<sup>89</sup>

In short, as explained in the previous part NGOs search for the ways to influence politics and nowadays they are increasingly looking beyond their national boundaries. They have realized the strength that comes from joining forces or "networking" with other actors in different countries.

As the NGO sector becomes higher profile and engaged at a variety of levels it has attracted a wider range of supporters and they, increasingly, fill the growing diplomatic gap thanks to their influential force. This influence is achieved by

---

<sup>88</sup> Keck, M. E., Sikkink, K., (1998), p. 1-32

<sup>89</sup> Hersel, P.,(1996), p. 30-44



building expertise in areas diplomats tend to ignore and is grounded in immediate community needs. From the perspective of leadership, the influence of NGOs is gained from speaking when others are quiet, from espousing something more than narrow self-interest, from sacrificing personal gain for broader goals, from giving voice to those who otherwise do not have it. In other words, it is the influence gained by filling a gap that other actors are ill-equipped to fill. As a result, it will not be wrong to claim that NGOs are increasingly becoming actors with their own organizational imperatives, their own frailties, their own bargaining assets<sup>90</sup> and within international politics.

### 3.3 The Roles of NGOs

Given the differing views, the definitions, origins and classification of NGOs, it is to be expected that there are different perspectives on the role that they play within society. Etzioni, in one of the first works written in the context of U.S. neoliberalism, sees them simply as an efficient form of organization which “combines the best of two worlds: the efficiency and knowledge of business with the public interest, responsibility and wide perspective of government”<sup>91</sup>

Others point to the pluralist role of NGOs. Berger and Neuhaus called the attention of policymakers to the importance of "mediating structures," the "value-generating agencies" that mediate between individuals and the state.

They say:

The old paradigm of the welfare state continues to haunt the political discourse. It is based on the following formula for social policy: locate a social problem; define it as a government responsibility; set up a government programme designed to solve it. Intellectual habits die as slowly as other habits. People who have thought according to this formula for many years are not easily induced to look at reality in new ways. But there is more at stake here than sluggish mind-sets. Very large and powerful vested interests have grown up around every policy of the

---

<sup>90</sup> Princen, Thomas, Finger, Matthias, (1994), *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 3-33

<sup>91</sup> Etzioni, Amitai, (1973), “The third sector and domestic missions”, *Public Administration Review* 33, p. 314-23

welfare state. The paradigm shift suggested by the concept of mediating structures directly threatens some of those interests.<sup>92</sup>

Kramer speaks of their role in bringing people together to form a solidarity network which fills the gap between a democratic state and its citizens and allows them to intervene in the democratic process outside the usual channels of the ballot box.

The research on civil society in recent years has taken this idea further and suggested that a strong network of associations is a prerequisite of democracy and communitarianists see them as the future basis of participatory democracy. The neomarxists see associations as part of the postindustrial adjustment to the crisis of capitalism, providing new modes of control over the political aspirations of a new generation. There are also multi-dimensional perspectives which attempt to determine the role of NGOs according to the model for distribution of responsibilities between the state and the third sector.

Chinnock and Salamon analysed the roles of NGOs in five categories as service, innovation, advocacy, expression, and community building. Similar to Chinnock and Salamon, Kramer stated four primary roles: a) service delivery, b)innovation, c) maintaining the value system, and d) lobbying.

Of course, it is impossible that all nonprofit organizations would play all of these roles, or these roles are unique to nonprofit organizations. However, a set of roles should be identified in order to provide an appropriate framework for the analysis for NGOs. Especially the lobbying role is going to be analyzed in this thesis with the case of TÜSİAD, the other three roles Kramer describes help create the climate of legitimacy which potentially allows NGOs to also take on a political role. It is almost impossible to separate the political role of

---

<sup>92</sup> Berger, Peter, Neuhaus Richard John, (June 1977), *To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Press, p. 52

NGOs from the other roles as well as political NGOs from non-political ones since almost all organizations take on some policy role.

### **3.3.1 Service Delivery**

The service delivery role of NGOs helps to understand why there has been improvement in human life in the last few years and to attempt to increase management effectiveness. Within the whole range of public goods and services, the work of NGOs is concentrated in those services considered to be “quality of life” such as education, welfare, culture, environment and leisure and sometimes in such services as defense, public order, and foreign relations, if these are not been maintained by the state.<sup>93</sup>

### **3.3.2 Innovation**

NGOs are flexible and adaptable than other types of organizations and they are more able to take risks.<sup>94</sup> In addition, many authors claim that NGOs take on the role of preparing grounds to develop new projects and services. Thus, it can be expected from this sector to be an incubator for new ideas and approaches for identifying and solving problems. They must create new services and innovative approaches to inadequacies, as well as demand the development of policies where none existed previously. It is the voluntary sector which first organizes new collective goods and, only then government assumes responsibility for them. Similarly, sociological and political approaches also attribute the role of innovator to NGOs.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup> Kramer, Ralph M., (1981), *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 9-15

<sup>94</sup> Salamon, Lester M., (2000), “The Nonprofit Sector: For What and For Whom?”, *Working Papers of The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project*, No.37, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies, p. 6

<sup>95</sup> Kramer, R., M., (1981), p. 9-15

This capacity derives from two primary factors: a) the bureaucratic rigidity within the governmental actors which impede innovation, b) the concentration within NGOs of activists with an entrepreneurial spirit.

### **3.3.3 Maintaining the Values**

It is usually claimed that NGOs are the keepers of the values of democratic system such as altruism, social integration, self-help, cooperation, pluralism, and participation. However, democratic NGOs often use practices inconsistent with the notions of public scrutiny and fair practice in their decision-making and for the distribution of funds raised. In some cases the unethical attitudes of NGOs has led to the establishment of self-regulation mechanisms. Generally the same rivalry that exists between government and NGOs often exists between different NGOs that work in the same field. In some service areas NGOs' efforts are spent in preserving their hegemony, as well as looking after the interests of their clients.<sup>96</sup>

### **3.3.4 Lobbying**

Ulysses S. Grant, who was the US President between 1869-1877, was surrounded by a group of citizens who try to explain their grievances while he was trying to relax with his cognac and cigar in the lobby of Williard Hotel. He named these people as lobbyists.<sup>97</sup>

The term "lobbying" was used in the early 1800s to describe the activities of people who sought governmental favors by approaching political office holders in the lobbies of public buildings. As time passed, the term referred to a process in which interest group representatives reached and made contact with persons

---

<sup>96</sup> Kramer, R. M., (1981), p. 9-15

<sup>97</sup> Kaleağası, Bahadır, (March 2003), *Avrupa Yolunun Haritası*, İstanbul: Dünya Yayıncılık, p. 209

in political power to argue in support of their objectives. Today, however, the term is used in much a broader sense to include any attempt by pressure groups to influence governmental decisions.<sup>98</sup>

NGOs can be part of social movements or other interest groups, formed specifically to intervene in the policy process; but, at the same time, all NGOs can potentially participate in lobby activities even though they have not been constituted directly for this purpose. The decision to restrict their activities specifically to service delivery or, on the contrary, to play a more political role depends on the internal tendencies of the organization. In some countries there are attempts to limit the lobby activities of NGOs, but in general NGOs are free to participate in this type of activity.

The increasing strength of the NGO lobby comes in part from the growing credibility of the NGO sector as a whole. Learning how best to use democratic channels has led to more strategic lobbying. For example, many US groups and coalitions regularly present evidence to congressional committees and draft bills for individual congressmen and senators. The structure of the US political system gives greater opportunities to NGOs, than in most other countries.

#### **3.3.4.1 How To Make Lobbying More Effective**

The lobbying activities of NGOs are influential tools only if they know how to use these apparatus. NGOs need to demonstrate expertise regarding both the issue itself and the policy opportunities and dilemmas. They also need to demonstrate their field-based experience. They need to have evident, widespread and influential support for their cause and also they need to establish a negotiating relationship with the authorities they seek to influence. The effect of Israel lobby in the US, the gains of US lobby in Latin America,

---

<sup>98</sup> Çuhadar, Esra, (January 1996), "The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Turkey that is in Integration Process to the European Union", *a thesis submitted to Graduate School of Social Sciences of METU*, Ankara: ODTÜ, p. 15-7

the development of Poland lobby within the EU, the success of Greek lobby about Olympiads and the leap of Armenian lobby in a number of countries are good examples of the power and importance of lobbying activities. Thus, lobbies' effectiveness can be increased if the right ways are followed.

It is the very fact that, effective lobbying affords a powerful and increasingly noteworthy means for NGOs to multiply their impact on significant decisions that governments take, however, NGOs which engage in lobbying can expect trouble to follow. If they don't experience a backlash it indicates that their lobbying is ineffective. However, risks can be minimized by careful planning. They should ensure that their case is well researched, free from prejudice and that political conclusions drawn are restricted to those which really do stem from the NGOs direct or indirect experience.<sup>99</sup>

There are four basic power resource of lobbying activities: Money, vote, sympathy and knowledge. How these power resources are fed? The answer can be found in another concept: Campaign. NGOs generally seek to influence decision-makers into changing some aspects of policy or practice. In this sense, these organizations may be in a position to serve as a link between individuals and the broader political process, providing a way to bring group concerns to broader public attention and to push for policy.<sup>100</sup> In order to make significant political change, a groundswell of public opinion is needed.<sup>101</sup> The converse is also the case. If a campaign mobilizes public opinion but does not have a perfect argument, the decision-makers will find it easy to dismiss it. Therefore, an NGO needs skills of both lobbying and public campaigning. Their supporters must be informed about the issue in question, invited to join the lobbying and asked to help mobilize public opinion. It is true that one NGO acting by itself

---

<sup>99</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 74-91

<sup>100</sup> Salamon, L. M., (2000), p. 1-11

<sup>101</sup> Brehm, Vicky, (April 2001), "NGOs and Partnership", *NGO Policy Briefing Paper*, No.4, UK: International NGO Training and Research Center

has little chance of bringing about significant change just by presenting its evidence in isolation.<sup>102</sup> But, when the well-argued case is strengthened through an effective campaigning strategy a much greater force can be generated. If this effective campaigning strategy is supported by media then the power would be increased extremely.

In other words, NGOs should build strong networks and perhaps avoid any one NGO being identified as the leader of that network. This affords “security of numbers” to guard against reprisals from offended governments. NGOs should also seek allies in other quarters. The more people outside the NGO sector who add their voice, the more difficult it will be for the authorities to dismiss the lobby as an unrepresentative figure.<sup>103</sup>

NGOs have also formed closer links with journalists and the broadcast media. Their causes are, as a result, more likely to be the subject of documentaries and feature articles. And their events are more likely to be planned with a view to being “media worthy”.<sup>104</sup> One of the more significant campaigning throughout the 1980s is about foreign policy. The major issues of foreign policy are ones on which governments have deeply entrenched views. NGOs have considerable potential for putting a new item on the political agenda, or for changing a weak view on a subject on which there has been little debate. But to change a government’s approach to an issue on which it has taken a firm stand requires an enormous effort. This can be done only if they engage in strong allies.

In addition to this, the first thing that should be done is planning a strategy for presenting the case. The people, who NGO seeks to influence, should be the first ones that hear about the activity. Because if the authorities first hear of the

---

<sup>102</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 83-91

<sup>103</sup> Newsletter of the World Education Forum, (26-28 April 2000), Paris: UNESCO

<sup>104</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 144-60

lobbying activity through the media, they probably think that the object of the NGO is to embarrass them rather than to resolve the problem at issue. The initial presentation of the problem is important. This initial presentation should not be too shy, also it should not be so sharp if it is wanted to be taken into consideration.<sup>105</sup> Before presenting the case, the lobbyists should get enough information about the subject to be lobbied.

Secondly, the NGO has to decide whether it would engage its supporters and public at large or to take it forward by the work of the NGO's representatives. This decision is, of course, not an easy one because if the NGO decide to use public campaigns this, naturally, would increase the momentum of the lobbying activities, however, this would only be realized if the NGO has the ability to excite a significant number of people. An effective public campaign also requires considerable inputs of time and money to produce the materials required.<sup>106</sup> Additionally, the objectives should be clear and realistic.

Thirdly, an NGO should achieve bargaining power. It needs to shift from being a body that has something to say, to being a legitimate interest group that knows what it is talking about and that authority feels obliged to negotiate with. Furthermore, the NGO needs to have frequent meetings with the relevant decision-makers. Of course, as mentioned earlier, they first need to know who these decision-makers are. The NGO team needs to steer meetings around to clear decisions and to follow them up. It needs to be continuously obtaining new information about its case and watching for new developments which present opportunities.<sup>107</sup> The decision-makers are more moderate to this kind of negotiating relationship when they respect the NGO team, thus, when the team composed of experts and influential allies. Additionally, when the decision-

---

<sup>105</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 145-66

<sup>106</sup> Brehm, V., (April 2001), p.1-5

<sup>107</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 145-66



makers sense that the NGO listens as well as preaches, when they know the campaign is persistent and when they believe the outcome of the meeting will be noticed which is the case related the NGOs' having good access to media and politicians, they would be more sensitive to the subject.

Fourth element of an effective lobby is to know the style to act. The activity must be authoritative, persistent, morally charged and professional, however, within these parameters the NGO has to decide what style to adopt. This would depend on the stage and history of the lobbying activity and also the culture of the NGO.<sup>108</sup>

Fifth one is the ability of the NGOs' anticipating the backlash. There may occur a counter-campaign and this may challenge the NGO's efforts. To guard against this threat the lobbyists need to ensure that they have influential allies and everyone with organization is aware of and supportive of the campaign.

Finally, they should build strong networks, taking the "boomerang pattern" which was explained earlier into consideration. This kind of acts provide them the possibility to specialize in areas in which they have individual advantage such as some NGOs might have wide public constituencies, others might be respected by a small but influential academic audience and others might be particularly strong at media relations.

### **3.4 NGO-Government Relations**

In addition to these ways of being more effective, an NGOs' relation with its government is also a prominent element that determine the effectiveness.

In dealing with government, it is ... important to make sure that you participate on your own terms. This means you do not access money from government, nor do you sit down in meetings, just to be co-opted.... You

---

<sup>108</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 145-66

must be able to enter as an NGO into relationships where you can participate in the conceptualization and onward to the implementation of every project.

Philippine NGO leader

Do governments learn from NGOs? The answer to this question depends on the behaviour of both sides. Government-NGO relations have evolved from limited interaction and to greater engagement within the past decade. Government officials and NGO leaders are interacting more and more, acknowledging the complementary nature of their separate but related roles.<sup>109</sup> This relationship range from repressive to mutually beneficial one. NGOs are often distrustful and critical of governments and wary of forging close contacts. These sentiments are often reciprocated. Governments may be autocratic or democratic, stable or unstable; they may be subject to strong political cultures or traditions, and they may differ from one another in their ability to implement policy. Thus, there are different types of relationship between the governments and NGOs depending on not only NGOs independence, type and power but also social and political context of a country and the regime of the governments.<sup>110</sup> Of course, geographical, and so, cultural differences effect the type of relationship, such as the point of view of governments to NGOs in developed countries is being different from the one in the third world. In the United States, for example, voluntary organizations emerged during the nineteenth century, when charity and paternalism were predominant social values. It was only later that government made the provision of services a right rather than a privilege. In contrast, in the third world, NGOs are founded as a result of governmental failure to address precisely those areas where governments held a comparative advantage in Europe and in the US.<sup>111</sup> It is undeniable that any of these contextual variables can directly affect policies

---

<sup>109</sup> National Consultative Group (NCG), (October 2000), Draft National Policy for “Strategic Partnership with NGOs”, p. 19-20

<sup>110</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 145-66

<sup>111</sup> Fisher, Julie, (1998), *Nongovernments: NGOs and The Political Development of The Third World*, USA: Kumarian Press, p. 39-75

toward NGOs by influencing NGO proliferation. As increasing numbers of NGOs contribute to the emergence of stronger civil societies, governments face a changing political context, which forces them to reevaluate previous policies towards NGOs.<sup>112</sup>

Different scholars have explained this relationship with different ways. Some explained this relationship along a continuum between cooperation and confrontation which constitute the two ends. According to Chinnock and Salamon these relationships may be cooperative and positively influence nonprofit activity and may take a variety of forms such as government funding, technical assistance, training, planning and coordination of activities and policy. However, according to these scholars, the relationship, no matter of its type, may impede the role performance of NGOs. Yet, they assume the financial dependency of NGOs on governments. Berger and Neuhaus offer two approaches, named minimalist and maximalist approaches, in order to define the government's relationship with mediating institutions. Minimalist approaches involve stopping damage to mediating structures, they accept that this damage is not intentional however this unintentionality does not make it any less damaging. The maximalist proposition is about utilising mediating structures for public policy ends such as social inclusion, racial equality or national security.<sup>113</sup>

In addition to all these different approaches Beigdeber, in his “The Role and Status of International Volunteers and Organizations”, explained Lissner’s classification of 6 different NGO roles in relation to governments, in a spectrum ranging from the subservient to the subversive.

---

<sup>112</sup> Fisher, J., (1998), p. 39-75

<sup>113</sup> Berger, P., Neuhaus R. J., (June 1977), p. 52

The first role that an NGO may play is the subservient role to the government, which refers the NGO's acceptance of any government request without questioning.<sup>114</sup> Thus, the NGO would be fully loyal to its own country's foreign policy objectives and directives. A friendly coexistence between the NGO and the government occurs. The NGO requires of the government little more than the freedom to get on with its chosen task, does not seek to influence wider areas of development planning. The government would be, of course, happy with such a relationship because it feels neither threatened nor challenged.<sup>115</sup>

With regard to this subservient role, an NGO's loyalty to its own government is expected, but, its total subordination to his country's "instructions" without questioning is unacceptable. Because this kind of subordination probably harm its independence, which is one of the most important characteristics of an NGO as explained in Chapter 1. Such independence is related to the NGOs degree of financial dependence on government subsidies, as well as to other non-financial actors such as country's politicians and elites.

The second role is the NGO's "partnership" role. Rather than a relationship of domination or rivalry, government and NGO cooperate willingly.<sup>116</sup> NGOs' own programme fills the gaps in the government's services in such a way as to make those services more subject to democratic influences. Sometimes, governments worked together with NGOs in order to use the media to produce a strong political sentiment in favor of change.<sup>117</sup>

The "compensatory" role, the third one, emphasizes the importance of NGOs helping people who have become victims of governmental mistakes,

---

<sup>114</sup> Beigdeber, Y., (1991), p. 87-8

<sup>115</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 74-91

<sup>116</sup> Beigdeber, Y., (1991), p. 88-9

<sup>117</sup> Smith, Gordon S., (1999), "Reinventing Diplomacy: A Virtual Necessity", Washington DC: United States of Institute of Peace, p. 1-18

unwillingness or inability to help.<sup>118</sup> While the NGO realizes the government's inadequacy, it does not openly criticize the government, rather they help those departments improve the services they provide. The NGO would position itself not so much as a co-producer but as a co-director of these services. They are not taking responsibility for actual service delivery, but helping to strengthen the existing systems.<sup>119</sup>

The fourth mission that an NGO can take is the "corrective" role which is characterized by a conviction that NGOs are "the voice of the voiceless": the NGOs have expertise and for this reason they are responsible for defining needs and pressuring governments into correcting harmful or unsatisfactory policies.

The "disobedient" role which constitutes the fifth role, is adopted by NGOs that put a premium on their own values and are indifferent to legalism. The final loyalty of the NGO is not to positive law, which may be unjust but to religious or moral principles concerning justice and human solidarity. Disobedience is directed against a specific law or act of government. It grows out of a concern for the values of the NGO and by a hope that public pressure will change the law or reverse the decision in question. The attitude of the NGO is reformist, not revolutionary.

Finally, the "subversive" role takes disobedience one step further, as the conflict between the values of the NGO and the existing political order will justify outright confrontation.<sup>120</sup> The worst tension arises at this point. The NGO may choose to keep out of government's way or to oppose to state outright. Opposing the state would mean using whatever channels are available to frustrate any government plan. This may mean organizing projects, using

---

<sup>118</sup> Beigdeber, Y., (1991), p. 88-9

<sup>119</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 74-91

<sup>120</sup> Beigdeber, Y., (1991), p. 88-9

law courts to challenge official decisions, joining forces with the political opposition or other popular movements such as trade unions or widespread use of the media and unofficial communication channels. At this end of the spectrum, governments are fearful of NGO activity; indeed, some political leaders assume that nongovernmental means anti-governmental<sup>121</sup>, as covered in Chapter 1. The government is uneasy about such NGOs. On the one hand they may well recognize the economic value of their projects, but on the other hand they see the empowerment elements as trouble-making.<sup>122</sup>

Most NGOs have adopted a partnership and compensatory role in relation with governments. Only a few, decide to take illegal or subversive positions, at the risk of legal sanctions.<sup>123</sup> With regard to this NGO-government relation, it can be mentioned that NGOs and governments are not necessarily adversarial, but can also be more symbiotic, with administrations at times relying on NGOs for technical input, for political support and as contactors for policy implementation. The relationship is not necessarily direct, NGO influence efforts can be aggregated through coalitions with other actors and can also be filtered through other political structures such as parties and unions.

Until now, it can be clearly seen that to define NGOs, to classify them, to explain their strengths and weaknesses, their roles and their relations with governments depend on many different factors and these factors vary according to the political and social context, the regime, culture, the development level of a country and the characteristics of the NGO. Here, the following table (Table 1) demonstrate every factor which effects NGOs' structure and activities.

---

<sup>121</sup> Fisher, J., (1998), p. 39-75

<sup>122</sup> Clark, J., (1991), p. 74-91

<sup>123</sup> Beigdeber, Y., (1991), p. 88-9

**Table 1: Factors that effect NGOs’ structure and activities**

<b>FACTORS</b>	<b>EXPLANATION</b>	<b>EFFECTS</b>
Political Context of a country	1.Political stability/instability	1.for the initial establishment of an NGO, the best situation is the political instability that increases the needs for NGOs and they gain more trust in such situations
Cultural Background of a country	1. Anglo-saxon 2. Continental 3. Mediterranean	1. more individualistic culture that encourages self-organization, they can be more capable of being a part in “boomerang pattern” 2. strick division between state and civil society; provision of goods is in the hands of state
Regime of a country	1.Authoritarian Corporatism 2. Neo-Corporatism 3. Liberal democracy 4.PluralistDemocracy	1. limited scope for NGOs gaining power and NGO-government colloboration, they are peripheral to strong governments 2.Public policy is made after close consultation to NGOs. NGOs are very important and they play a certain role. 3.enough space for NGOs, they can best grow in these type of regimes, “boomerang pattern” should be used but Parliament is stil the major institution 4.NGOs are essential parts of pluralist democracy
Development Level of a country	1. Developed 2. Developing	1.size is larger and emerged earlier 2.size is smaller and NGOs only flourish as a result of governmental failure
Characteristic of the NGO	1.capacity to persuade 2. strategic decisions 3. professionalism 4. expertise 5. bargaining power	1.persuasiveness increases NGOs’ size and so its power 2.ability to make strategic decisions proves its reliability 3.the more professionalism, the more lobbying 4.the more expertise, the more they are taken into consideration 5.bargaining power provide them the chance of getting what they want

As a result, the rationale for attempting to influence state policies and services is clear. This avenue provides possibilities both to improve the efficiency and equity of government services, and to democratize state functions. Ignoring such opportunities may cause the wasting of NGOs' experience. Many NGOs are for this reason beginning to magnify their impact by stepping into the political and governmental arena.

Risks are inevitably posed for the NGOs. Their profile will become higher. Potential conflicts with governments become greater. And they may find it difficult to remain in such intimate contact with their popular base. But, they should be insistent to develop this relationship.

Additionally, it is the fact that the whole dynamic of civil society is unstoppable. With regard to this reality, governments should and will increasingly recognize the value in partnership with NGOs.<sup>124</sup> In order to support this process, what is being said by NGOs should be listened carefully. Above all, they should be dealt with respect.

### **3.5 NGOs Today**

Since the last 50 years, two fundamental power has been increased in the world scene: NGOs and media. It is the very fact that, both of them effect and oriente public opinion, however today communication technology bring two of them together in the way that has never been tried. Information Networks on environmental, human rights and advocacy NGOs have began to flourish among the national and international organizations. These are, for the first time, react to the international events and to put pressure on governments, firms and international organizations. This technology broke down the information

---

<sup>124</sup> Sorensen, Gillian Martin, (October 2002), "The Roles a 'Civil Society' Can Play in International Dispute Resolution", *Negotiating Journal*, Plenum Publishing Corporation, p. 355-8



barriers and governments that are hostile to NGOs failed in their efforts to prevent information flows. Electronic means have physically made it easier to ignore borders and to create the kinds of communities based on common values and objectives.<sup>125</sup>

Information Revolution cause the shifting of power from nation-state to NGOs according to a report that was published by the Rand Consultancy Institute, which has a close relationship with White House. The authors claimed that this fact would create a great effect not only on the development of the societies, but also on the foreign policy of governments.<sup>126</sup>

Consequently, the new vision and challenges that NGOs can bring have much to offer to the development and democratization of the world itself. NGOs have never this much opportunities and resources throughout history. Today, they have the chance to influence the shape of the projects and policy process. NGOs today is more powerfull than yesterday, and it seems so that they will gain more power tomorrow thanks to the developments in communication and information technologies. The only necessary thing is to learn how to use this power in order to increase the improvement of the societies.

---

<sup>125</sup> Cumhuriyet Dergi, (Ocak 2000), Sayı:723

<sup>126</sup> Cumhuriyet Dergi, (Ocak 2000), Sayı:723

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **INCREASING ROLE AND EFFECT OF NGOS FOR THE FULL MEMBERSHIP OF TURKEY TO THE EU: THE CASE OF TÜSİAD**

Our central premise is that a “strong” civil society constitutes a crucial force for the emergence and consolidation of democracy. Within the same logic, a “weak” civil society which fails to obtain autonomy from the state and whose activities are heavily shaped and constrained by a highly centralized and all powerful state is likely to form a barrier and undermine attempts to consolidate liberal democracy in the emerging democratic polities.

Until now, the definition, evolution and expansion of NGOs and their becoming actors within the policy process are tried to be explained. The significance of NGOs has increased in line with the increasing importance of the notion of democracy because civil society is considered one of the basic conditions for the consolidation of democracy, which is part of the Copenhagen political criteria.

At this point, the status of NGOs both in Turkey and in the EU, of which Turkey wants to be a full member, and the evolution of democracy and civil society in Turkey should be analyzed because democracy and human rights

issues were repeatedly expressed by the West European states in their bilateral relations with Turkey since 1960s. The military regime in 1980 blocked the process of integration into the EC. The European Parliament, the representative body of the EC, had a debate on the situation in Turkey on 18 September and adopted a resolution that expressed its concern about political and civil rights. The most significant article of the resolution was the one in which Turkey was reminded that respect for internationally recognized human rights was an essential condition for dialogue with a state, like Turkey, that was associated in a Community.<sup>127</sup>

Then very recently, in 2001, Council Regulation of 17 December states:

As Turkey does not yet fulfil the political criteria of Copenhagen, the Community has called on it to improve and promote its democratic practices and respect for fundamental human rights and more closely to involve civil society in that process.<sup>128</sup>

In the same regulation it is also said that the Community should undertake specific actions to promote the development of civil society in Turkey. Furthermore in Article 4 of the same Regulation the Community says:

A financial contribution to each programme or Project may be required from the recipients of the assistance. The contribution shall depend on the nature of the programme or project. In exceptional cases, for programmes or projects aimed at the promotion of civil society development, the contribution may be in kind<sup>129</sup>

This means that, the EC could give extra financial assistance to Turkey if it would be used for the development of civil society. Commission proposed that a financial contribution to each programme or project might be required from the recipients under their pre-accession assistance programme and the precise

---

<sup>127</sup> Official Journal of European Communities, (13 October 1980), Information and Notices, c 265.

<sup>128</sup> Official Journal of European Communities, (17 December 2001), Council Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001

<sup>129</sup> Official Journal of European Communities, (17 December 2001), Information and Notices

contribution would depend on the nature of the programme and project, for example civil society development and private investment support programmes could expect to be treated differently.<sup>130</sup> Supported actions relate to the first Copenhagen criterion as well as support for NGOs with special attention on women's NGOs.

#### **4.1 The Role of NGOs in the EU**

According to the understanding at the EU level, the NGOs are the voluntary associations, foundations, federations and confederations. European Commission gives priority to the NGOs which have more representative power. Within this framework, the NGOs at the EU level are encouraged. The EU tries to provide transparency in the decision-making process of NGOs, instead of restricting the activities of NGOs by regulations. In addition, the EU prepared an NGO directory in order to provide a database. For an NGO to be added in this database, the organization should send the documents that give information about itself.

Furthermore, the Commission prepared a budget in order to provide financial support for the organization of NGOs and to sustain the continuity of the influence of NGOs on the decision-making process at the EU level.

According to the articles of 138 and 139 of the Maastricht Treaty, European Commission should consult to the economic and social organizations while preparing the draft regulations. European Commission meets the social organization at the EU level, before initiating the decision-making process on social issues. At this point, the question is "which organizations are consulted by the Commission?". The representative power of the social partners are

---

<sup>130</sup> Commission of the European Communities, (25 April 2001), proposal for a Council Regulation concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey, Brussels

depended on some criteria<sup>131</sup> in which the answer of the question can also be found. Firstly, the organization should represent a sector, a profession or a group at the EU level. Secondly, the members of the organization should be social partners and should be known in the other countries. And thirdly, the organization should have the capacity and structure to join the consultation process.

Within this criterion, UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe), ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) and CEEP (European Center of Enterprises with Public Participation and Enterprises of General Economic Interest) become as the social partners. In addition to these organizations, EU has a dialogue with UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), EUROCHAMBRES (The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry), CEC (Commission for Environmental Cooperation) and EUROCADRES (The Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff) for a source of information and consultation.

In addition, there is the Platform of European Social NGOs which proves the importance and power of NGOs in Europe. Giampiero Alhadef, who is the president of the Platform of European Social NGOs, said that Commission's open consultation on the issue of civil dialogue would create an environment which civil society organizations can flourish, be accountable, independent and transparent and contribute to the development of European democracy. The Platform of European Social NGOs emphasized that the concept of democracy is broader than that of political representativeness, but a significant step towards the strengthening of the relationship between the NGOs and the Commission.

---

<sup>131</sup> COM(92)600 final, COM (98) 322 final

One of the key roles of NGOs is to speak for unheard voices within European society and thus to contribute to the creation and equitable and balanced civil society. European NGOs form a significant link between civil society and the European institutions and articles 138 and 139 of the EU Treaty provide a legal basis for the civil dialogue. Because without such an article, consultation with NGOs would remain ad hoc. Thus, the relationship between NGOs and the Commission forms an important part of civil dialogue within the EU.

#### **4.2 The Status of Civil Society and NGOs in Turkey**

Turkey is among a few non-Western countries which was not colonized and which inherited a bureaucracy. Turkey is a secular state and recognized gender equality, secular education, and a conception of public service, both within the bureaucracy and in the political arena. The political and bureaucratic establishment never belonged to a specific ethnic group, family, clan or people of the same class being the only democratic secular state among the Muslim countries with a dynamic civil society.<sup>132</sup>

However, this does not automatically mean that Turkey has a strong civil society in Western term. The strong state tradition that comes from Ottoman Empire is an obstacle for free association of social forces in Turkey. There has been a dominant center and a weak periphery dating back to the Ottoman Empire. The center was continuously suspicious about civil society, which it tries to coopt, control or suppress.<sup>133</sup> There existed a belief that without this strong position of state, civil society could have degenerated into civil warfare over ethnicity, religion or class. Thus, the concept of civil society in Turkey is linked to the existence of strong state that functions under a legal order based on criteria which are universally applicable such as the guarantee of civil rights

---

<sup>132</sup> Toprak, Binnaz, "Civil Society in Turkey", in Norton, A.R., Brill E.J., (1996) (edt), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden, New York, Köln

<sup>133</sup> Toprak, B., "Civil Society in Turkey", in Norton, A.R., Brill E.J., (1996) (edt)

and non-discrimination before the law. This linkage does not mean that civil society should be always linked to the state, to the contrary, of course civil society is a separate domain from the state, however, the state pressurize it to function under its own rules. This was clearly seen in the attitude of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, after TÜSİAD's expressions about the debates on sending Turkish military troops to Iraq in September 2003. Erdoğan clearly stated that: "an NGO on no occasion can determine or effect the government's decisions".<sup>134</sup>

All these emphasize the importance of historical processes in the building of strong state tradition, however, it is also important not to ignore the other face of the madalion which began from mid 19th century onwards. The Tanzimat edict of 1839 was the first declaration of civil rights by the Ottoman State and led to the codification of the legal system. Napoleonic codes translated to the Ottoman Turkish and accepted as the basis of public law guaranteeing the rights of the individual to life and property and recognizing the equality of Muslim and non-Muslims.<sup>135</sup>

The Tanzimat period ended with the declaration of the Constitution of 1876 which signalled the influence of civil society over the state. The acceptance of the constitution followed years of struggle by the Young Ottomans which were a group of intellectuals committed to curbing state power. This constitutional period was aborted by Sultan Abdulhamit's regime, but it was restored in 1908 by the Young Turk Revolution.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup> See Hurriyet Newspaper on 24 September 2003

<sup>135</sup> Toprak, B., "Civil Society in Turkey", in Norton, A.R., Brill E.J., (1996) (edt)

<sup>136</sup> Akşin, Sina, Kunt, Metin, (1997) (eds), *Türkiye Tarihi 3: Osmanlı Devleti 1600-1908*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, p. 239

The second constitutional period witnessed an unprecedented degree of activity by organized groups. Between 1908 and 1918 so many political parties, social associations, chambers of commerce and industry, associations of small businesses and organizations of entrepreneurs. In 1923, after the establishment of Turkish Republic, these activities ended and only after 1946, with the transition to democratic politics, these associational activities came back.

The period between 1950 and 1980 witnessed a lot of struggles and confusion and three coups. First one is the 1960 coup which culminated in a new constitution that was designed to protect free speech and free association. As a result, between 1960 and 1970 there established a number of political parties, interest groups and civil associations. However, those times were shaped by the confrontation of anti-system movements , which increasingly turned into armed conflict between the Left and Right and inevitably, gave way to the 1980 coup.

Unfortunately, both in 1971 and 1980, because of these struggles between Left and Right which turned into armed conflict, formal democracy resumed after brief periods of military rule. In addition to the military rule, the strong state tradition and attitude of bureaucrats serving within the state mechanism and dealing with the periphery are the other reasons that impede the full development of civic culture.<sup>137</sup> Another major obstacle to the development of civil society is an overpowering bureaucracy which leaves little room for individual initiative and collective pursuit of interests. Mostly, especially the last military rule in 1980 impeded the development of civil society. Dağlı claimed that:

This last military regime tried to change the political attitude of people and to de-politicize the whole society in an attempt to prevent in future

---

<sup>137</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, (2001), “Civic Culture in ‘Secular’ Turkey”, *extracts of Dr. Aryn B. Sajoo’s Introductory Remarks*, The Institute of Ismaili Studies, p. 1-3



the political and ideological fragmentation and polarization which had characterized pre-coup Turkey.<sup>138</sup>

Unlike 1960 coup, the 1980 coup helped the strengthening of state against civil society with so many new institutions and applications. Some of these are Board of Higher Education (YÖK) which constrains the autonomy of the universities, new legislation on political parties that limited the activities of civic associations, unions and interest groups.

During these coups, Turkish military have always accomodated a dilemma: they have, on the one hand, a historical-aspirational desire for a Western model and on the other hand, their practical distrust of party-politics that lead to the intervention in political life. The military regime, in 1960 and 1971 did not continue for a long time because of this commitment to democracy and desire for a Western model however, after 1980 coup the transition to democracy took three years because of the different aims of this coup as explained above.

Truly, the 1980 coup changed the political scene in Turkey and effected the civil rights negatively. National Security Council (NSC) was established and legislative power was transfered to NSC. Between 1980 and 1983 over 60.000 people suspected of terrorism and illegal political activities were claimed to be arrested. The aim was to suppress the domestic opposition to the army and then reestablish the political structure. However, after 1980 the importance of civil society increased despite the efforts that set out to destroy the institutions of civil society with the help of the opposition and reaction of Europe to this military interventions impede military's actions. These reactions were not only at the base of comments and interpretations but also included financial restrictions as the fourth financial protocol was not activated. Thus, the

---

<sup>138</sup> Dađı, İhsan, (1996), "Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy", *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, p. 125

important thing here is the fact that the European Community has a considerable effect and pressure on the speedy return to democracy.<sup>139</sup>

In short, Turkey has a long history of military interventions and transitions to democracy. The recurrence of intervention and transition to democracy seems to justify the view that the Turkish military is committed to a democratic form of government.<sup>140</sup> Nonetheless, the evolution of Turkish democracy in the post-war period has developed a high degree of instability and has been characterized by periodic breakdowns by military interventions. Today, Turkey still faces major challenges in terms of deepening and extending the frontiers of its fragile liberal democratic regime.<sup>141</sup>

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of communist regimes also had an important repercussions on discussions of civil society in Turkey, as elsewhere. Because this disintegration showed that a strong state with a command economy neither provides material wealth nor freedom for citizens. The interest was now towards building institutional mechanisms to contain state power and to open the political space for civic association.

Today, civil society in Turkey, although it has been in the forefront of all the Muslim countries, remains underdeveloped, to some extent constrained by the state. The Turkish State still has an official ideology. This official ideology serves to impede the development of civil society that could function with complete freedom.<sup>142</sup> This situation has a lot to do with the cultural heritage. Non-governmental organizations, as explained above, did not exist in Otoman

---

<sup>139</sup> Dağı, İ., (1996), p. 124

<sup>140</sup> Dağı, İ., (1996), p. 124

<sup>141</sup> Özbudun, Ergun, (2000), *Contemporary Turkish Politics Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

<sup>142</sup> Ayrılar, Servan Adar, (2001), "Civil Society and Democratization (The Case of Turkey), *a paper for the Department of International Relations*, Ankara: Atılım University, p. 6

Empire, a tradition in which the state has a certain priority over civil society. The establishment of NGOs gained momentum with the establishment of multi-party politics. However, this development was insufficient for the development of NGOs in its modern and democratic form as explained earlier.

In addition, today still most NGOs in Turkey fail to meet the criteria as defined in the West. NGOs in Turkey lack independency. As explained earlier independency is one of the most prominent characteristics that an NGO should have in order to be powerful and more effective. To be independent is strictly related with financial sufficiency. However, most of the NGOs in Turkey dependent on the state because of financial incapability. Independency gives an NGO the freedom of speech, sometimes even on the contrary to the government and they can lobby in the direction of their aims. In Turkey, TÜSİAD which is a businessmen association, resembles the NGOs in the West. Here, it is necessary to explain the situation of business associations in order to understand why TÜSİAD is different from the other business associations in Turkey. Business associations, which are part of civil society, typically occupy a privileged position in most late-industrializing societies because the development of private capital has been heavily shaped and encouraged by the centralized state. Businessmen in such contexts tend to benefit from direct and individualized access to various layers of the state as a means of promoting and protecting their interests through a complex web of clientelistic relationships. In such an environment, business associations have no clear incentives to join with other segments of the civil society and challenge the state in direction of further democratic opening and an extension of the public space. Stated somewhat differently, if businessmen are typically interested in a stable and predictable macro environment in which their activities are not constrained by the state or other social groups and if such an environment can only be guaranteed in an authorotiarian setting, they are unlikely to emerge as a vocal force for the extension of democratic rights. However, in Turkey TÜSİAD's attitude is different because TÜSİAD does not behave as solely a business

association in the sense that the Association harmonizes the interests of its members and the interests of the whole society that will be explained detailly later.

For the development of civil society, firstly, Turkish government should respect the rule of law and should have limited space for intervention in political, cultural, social and economic life. Civil society and state is like the two pair of scale in terms of one's being heavier causes the other's being lighter.<sup>143</sup> The state should act in the provision of justice, defence and security areas and should leave the other service areas to civil society.

Besides the government, Turkish society should develop some characteristics for the emergence of a strong civil society with regard to social differentiation, social organization, voluntariness and constituting pressure mechanisms. Ethnic, cultural, religious, economical and sexual differentiation and equal treatment of all these different groups in a society, which at the same time a sine-quo-non of democracy, is a necessity for the development of civil society. This differentiation is not merely enough, there should be social organizations which have the ability to produce politics at these differentiated areas.<sup>144</sup> In other words, there should be no impediments in front of establishing associations, foundations, unions...etc. In addition, these social organizations should be voluntary which provide the continuation of freedom of decision and choice of an individual and also they should be free to determine their politics. For example if an NGO is tied to the government with a law or with some other tool, there is no possibility of that NGO cannot act opposite to the government or cannot produce alternative politics or ideas. Finally, for the sake of the

---

<sup>143</sup> Çaha, Ömer, (1990), "Sivil Toplumun Türkiye'deki Sorunları", *Sivil Toplum, Aydınlar ve Demokrasi*, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, p. 71-7

<sup>144</sup> Çaha, Ö., (1990), p. 71-7

development of civil society, the organizations should behave like pressure groups and they should lobby through democratic ways.<sup>145</sup>

All these characteristics would help democratization, a notion that is very notable for the Western world, of Turkey. It is necessary to clarify again that NGOs are the most important mechanisms for democratization, for increasing political and economic consciousness and development of the society and with regard to Turkey, NGOs should play a considerable role for being a member of the EU. NGOs, as they develop, can bring the handicaps or wrong decisions of the state into light. Thus, Tayyip Erdoğan's words as: "an NGO cannot effect or interfere the political decisions of the government" can not be applicable if Turkey is a democratic state.

#### **4.3 Case Study: TÜSİAD**

As it was stated, the emergence of NGOs in Turkey, in the sense observed in pluralist democratic societies dates back to the 1950s. However, at the beginning, the system basically resembled authoritarian corporatism in which the organizations have functioned under the supervision of the state. State regulated and controlled political and economic life through the medium of nongovernmental organization, but always placed itself on the top. NGOs had not a legal independent personality. There were limited scope for NGOs gaining power and NGO-government collaboration, and NGOs were peripheral to the strong government.

However, with the extension of individual rights and liberties with the 1961 Constitution, and with the spreading of the concept of "welfare state" voluntary organizations started to appear in the political arena. Among these newly established interest groups was TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen Association). Today TÜSİAD is very differentiate from other

---

<sup>145</sup> Çaha, Ö., (1990), p. 71-7

NGOs in Turkey with its publications, press meetings, continuous relations with other governmental and non-governmental actors, and with always asking its members to lobby. TÜSİAD conducts a social diplomacy just beside the official diplomacy of the government. The political situation in Turkey with regard to the development of NGOs is like liberal democracy. Interest groups and political parties are the basic mechanisms of policy making but Parliament is still the major institution. Public policy is not made with a consultation of NGOs as in the neo-corporatist model. As in all liberal democracies, this is the best situation of an NGO to develop in Turkey and TÜSİAD does its best. The Association realizes the value of every chance and tries to spread the consciousness about civil society in Turkey.

### **4.3 Historical Background of TÜSİAD**

While Europe was shaken by student movements which was rising in 1968s' France, the world Left was living its golden age. During those times the labour movements were increasing and the concept of "social state" was becoming popular. Turkey, as well as the rest of the world, was effected from these movements; the labour unions, as was explained, were gaining power, the employers were resisting against the employee and labour unions, protests were continuing all of which were the reasons of 1971 coup. The industrialists and businessmen, who came to the scene with the import-oriented economic structuring, were not comfortable because of these movements. At that time, Selçuk Yaşar called his close friend Vehbi Koç and said: "we have to be organized, otherwise we cannot stand against these movements". And the story of TÜSİAD began.<sup>146</sup>

TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen Association) was founded on 2 April 1971 by Yaşar, Koç, Sabancı, Eczacıbaşı, Özsaruhan, Sapmaz,

---

<sup>146</sup> Buğra, Ayşe, (1994), *State and Business in Modern Turkey A Comparative Study*, New York: State University of New York Press, p. 247-62

Berker, Özakat, Bodur, Erenyol, Boyner and Gazioğlu, all of which began to work in the association effectively.<sup>147</sup> The concept of “bosses club” came from this beginning story. However, even at those times the fundamental aim was “common voice” and “common movement”. TÜSİAD, since its foundation, has been interested in national problems, has been in the vanguard of the new concepts and has published scholarly research opinions. The twelve businessmen who signed the TÜSİAD Founders’ Memorandum were owners/managers of the big groups of companies. Other than the similarity in their sociopolitical approach, owning or managing a big company was the only common characteristic that they shared. They have hardly any communality of economic interests because of their differing field of activities in commerce and industry.<sup>148</sup>

The societal model that the leadership of TÜSİAD had in mind was deeply inspired by the social structure of developed Western countries in the era of late capitalism. In the Founding Members’ Memorandum, it was stated that the association stood for the principles of a mixed economy model.<sup>149</sup>

It is possible to rearrange the evolution of TÜSİAD since its inception into three distinct 10 years phases which composed of the periods between 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-today.

The late 1970s constituted a period of severe economic and political crisis in Turkey. TÜSİAD’s approach during 1970s was primarily motivated and dictated by economic considerations. This was closely evident in the organization’s publications which concentrated almost exclusively on identifying major economic problems and providing appropriate solutions to

---

<sup>147</sup> TÜSİAD Publication, *TÜSİAD*

<sup>148</sup> Buğra, A., (1994), p. 247-62

<sup>149</sup> TÜSİAD, (18 Ocak 1996 itibariyle), Tüzük

such problems which would be beneficial not only to big business but also to society at large.<sup>150</sup> Certainly this does not mean that TÜSİAD was not interested in politics during these periods. Quite the contrary; it was very much interested. For example TÜSİAD widely criticized the coalition government and its policies during 1979 and with a great effect of these criticisms Ecevit government toppled down. Certainly, the organization displayed a commitment towards the principles of secularism, westernization and liberal democracy since its very foundation. Nonetheless, the essential axis around which TÜSİAD has formulated its political agenda was very much driven by purely economic concerns.

The period between 1980s and 1990s was the second distinct phase in the evolution of the organization. The 1980s in Turkey represented a radical departure away from the inward-oriented industrialization model of the 1970s, towards a more open, export-oriented model of accumulation. The early phase of this transformation occurred under a military government during the 1980-1983 era and subsequently under a regime of restricted parliamentary democracy following the general elections of November 1983. TÜSİAD's primary concern during this period was to contribute towards the successful implementation of economic reforms and criticizing inconsistencies in government's economic policies, notably the growing fiscal deficits and rising inflation which became increasingly endemic towards the end of the decade.

TÜSİAD had a number of expressions about the government's policy during the 1980s. Especially, in the second half of the 1980s, the frictions between government and TÜSİAD became eminent. The criticism by TÜSİAD of unplanned and instable interventionism of government became harsher. And on the other hand, the government made negative public declarations about TÜSİAD's views. The government stated that 'the association should deal with its own business but not with the government's decisions'. In the second half of

---

<sup>150</sup> See TÜSİAD's publications and speeches of Board of Directors in 1970s and 1980s



the 1980s a questionnaire was sent to TÜSİAD members with a view to assess their evaluation of the economic policies then being implemented. The answers reflected a highly critical, even hostile attitude toward the government's economic policy. The results published in press, and a meeting was organized to discuss them in the presence of government authorities.<sup>151</sup> However, there was not any proof of that these critical views were shared by the other members of the Board of Directors, especially by the old ones because the old members usually thought that everybody has some business in Ankara the next day. The older members were more prudent than the younger ones because, depending on their experiences, they knew the state-business relations.

Furthermore, through the end of the 1980s, Cem Boyner, who was the president of TÜSİAD in 1989, was called to the prosecutor's office for interrogation because of his so-called illegal political speeches.<sup>152</sup> The matter resulted as there was nothing against the prevailing law of associations. After Boyner, in 1991 Bülent Eczacıbaşı became the president of TÜSİAD. Eczacıbaşı, as Boyner, had critical attitudes towards Motherland Party's government policies. However, it is not clear whether this attitudes of the presidents are shared by the overwhelming majority of the leadership. Then some claims about "an undemocratic structure of TÜSİAD" spread out. TÜSİAD's so-called undemocratic decision-making came to the agenda again at 8 April 1997 during the TÜSİAD's High Advisory Council. One of the members, İbrahim Şencan explained this undemocratic decision-making mechanism after the publication of TÜSİAD's Democratization Report as:

I applied to TÜSİAD in order to be a member at 2 July 1996 and I was accepted at 17 July 1996. I wrote in the membership application form that I wanted to be a member in order to make some contributions to TÜSİAD's activities that are on behalf of Turkey's interest. I do not know whether I had any contribution to this process, the only thing I know is that if I hadn't any contribution it is because of TÜSİAD but not me. Of

---

<sup>151</sup> Buğra, A., (1994), p. 247-62

<sup>152</sup> Buğra, A., (1994), p. 247-62

course, the Board of Directors are not obliged to consult to the members for every single decision, however, they should have consulted on such a democratization report that is so important and binding for members.<sup>153</sup>

These discussions about the level of democratic structure within TÜSİAD is not analyzed in detail in this thesis, however, the reason behind all these arguments was the desire of businessmen to be always in harmony with the state. However, the young businessmen behave differently. The counter arguments of these young presidents are unusual according to the historical characteristics of business outlook and behaviour in the country.

Another serious development at the end of the 1980s is the increasing criticisms of other NGOs and Chamber of Commerce's to the government's economic policy. In 1990, several businessmen representing local chambers or associations such as TİSK responded to TÜSİAD's call for pressuring the ruling MP (Motherland Party) government to hold early elections.<sup>154</sup> These all can be interpreted as the developments that began thanks to TÜSİAD's activities. In other words, TÜSİAD helped the rest of the civil society to become a well-established class with a sense of class ethics and social responsibility, in other words TÜSİAD raised the awareness within the society which is a characteristic of an NGO.

The 1990s, the third distinct phase in TÜSİAD's evolution, was so different from the previous two decades in the sense that an explicit agenda for democratization, involving a series of legal and constitutional reform proposals,<sup>155</sup> became the focal point of the association's activities. Thus, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of TÜSİAD as a significantly vocal political actor in articulating the demands of big business for democratization. For

---

<sup>153</sup> TÜSİAD High Advisory Council Meeting, İstanbul, 8 Nisan 1997

<sup>154</sup> Buğra, A., (1994), p. 247-62

<sup>155</sup> See TÜSİAD Publication, *Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey*, (1997), İstanbul: LebibYalkın Yayımevi

example, Bülent Eczacıbaşı, who was the head of High Advisory Council in 1999, said that the citizens had no longer trust in the government, the society wanted clear politics, however they could not explain this because of the impediments that were put by restrictive laws. He added that the laws should be changed and the democratization process should not be impeded anymore.<sup>156</sup> Although TÜSİAD has been one of the pivotal actors and agenda setters in Turkish politics from its very inception in 1971, the 1990s displayed a considerable discontinuity with the previous decades, particularly due to the significant shift of focus from economic issues to political ones. This is clearly evident from the organization's publications as well as the public pronouncements of its leaders. This does not mean that TÜSİAD was not interested in economics anymore, in contrast, the organization continued to be interested in the reform of state finances, the implementation of the Customs Union Agreement and other major economic indicators of the day.<sup>157</sup> However, in addition to all these economic aims, an explicit democratization agenda occupied a central stage during the course of the 1990s that, in turn, made a sharp contrast with the single-minded interest in economic issues that had characterized the association's approach in the previous stages.<sup>158</sup> As well, during the 1990s TÜSİAD added the lobbying activities to its vision.<sup>159</sup> Within this framework, the association opened its Brussels branch in 1996, Washington branch in 1998 and lastly Berlin branch in 2003. The Association

---

<sup>156</sup> See the news entitled as "Daha Fazla Demokrasi" that was published in Radikal Newspaper at 11 September 1999

<sup>157</sup> See Erdal Sağlam's article titled as "TÜSİAD'ın İyimserliği" and published at 23 September 1999 in Star for seeing that TÜSİAD was interested in both economics and politics at the same time. Sağlam referred to Yücaoglu's speech, who was the head of Board of Directors of TÜSİAD, that they present to the government about the things that should be done in both economical and political arena.

<sup>158</sup> Öniş, Ziya, (August 2001), "Entrepreneurs, Citizenship and the European Union, *prepared for E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu's (eds.) Challenges to Citizenship in a Globalizing World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, p. 1-30

<sup>159</sup> See Star, (23 September 1999), a makale written by Mustafa Mutlu titled as "TÜSİAD'ın Yeni Misyonu"

plans to open another representative in Paris through the year 2004. Furthermore, Aldo Kaslowski, head of TÜSİAD International, said that a branch of TÜSİAD should be opened also in Bagdat.<sup>160</sup> Cengiz Turhan, during my interview said that Berlin representative was opened because of the Germany's weight in the decision-making process in the EU. With this new branch in Berlin, TÜSİAD plans to organize activities to German public opinion and then with Paris representative, which will be opened because of the same reason with Berlin, TÜSİAD will try to effect the French public opinion. TÜSİAD always tries to give some messages to the foreign governments and creates positive attitudes towards thanks to these representatives.<sup>161</sup>

In 1990s TÜSİAD, for the first time, published a number of specially-commissioned reports which were designed to highlight certain inherent deficiencies of the democratic order and to propose ways of overcoming these deficiencies and, hence, extend the boundaries of democratic politics in Turkey. TÜSİAD predicted a long time ago that Turkey's political structure was heading towards deadlock and eventually to a crisis. With this in mind, TÜSİAD carried out a comprehensive research on the needed reforms and, at the beginning of 1997, published its volume entitled, "Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey" which brings a number of proposals for democratization process of Turkey. Two progress reports have been published following the 1997 report, in 1999 and 2001.<sup>162</sup> In May, June and September

---

<sup>160</sup> Kaslowski, Aldo, (June 2003), the opening speech in the seminar titled "ABD'de Dış Politika Oluşturma Sürecinde Lobilerin Etkileri", TÜSİAD and Boğaziçi University Foreign Policy Forum

<sup>161</sup> See TÜSİAD Görüşleri, 24 Mart 1997, TS/SEK/97-016

<sup>162</sup> See "Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey", (1997), and a sequel in 1999 which represented a response to the debates and discussions surrounding the initial report. The initial report, in particular, touched on a wide variety of sensitive issues from freedom of expression to an extension of the language and cultural rights of the Kurds and the need to institute civilian control over the military. Hence, the report tackled directly and suggested deep-seated reforms in the two key areas constituting the most troublesome and problematic aspects of Turkish democracy, namely the issue of "minority rights" and the pervasive role of the military in Turkish politics

2001, TÜSİAD published another series of reports on democratization entitled “Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey and EU Copenhagen Criteria”.<sup>163</sup> In retrospect, the majority of TÜSİAD's publications during the period can be classified under the category of democratization as a means of achieving “good governance”. A number of studies dealing with electoral reform and “optimal government”<sup>164</sup> clearly reflected the desire of TÜSİAD members to establish a new pattern of relations with the state. They aimed at establishing a kind of relations that is not based on individualized and personalized access to state resources. TÜSİAD progressively pushed for smaller and accountable government and the implementation of the rule of law as a means of accomplishing a stable and predictable environment in which a competitive market system could flourish. Stability, predictability and accountability emerged as the key concerns underlying TÜSİAD's drive for democratization.<sup>165</sup>


Also TÜSİAD, in 1995 started its structural change and lots of commissions and working groups are established. Some of these commissions and working groups would specialized about the EU and this would make TÜSİAD more effective on this issue. The structural change of TÜSİAD can be seen from the following figure (Figure 2):

---

<sup>163</sup> See “Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey and EU Copenhagen Criteria”, (June 2001), Publication No: TÜSİAD-T/2001-06/314 that aim at the strengthening of civil society with the proposal about changing the political parties law

<sup>164</sup> See *Optimal State*, TÜSİAD Publication

<sup>165</sup> Öniş, Z., (August 2001), p. 1-30



**Figure 2: Structural Change of TÜSİAD**

Since 1997, TÜSİAD established a platform with the volunteer occupational-social organizations known as SİAD's all over Turkey. SİADs are composed of Turkish industrialists' and businessmen who supports market economy rules and a secular and democratic system. The idea to set up a common platform emerged from the need to play a leading role in the process of decision-making and policy formulation, and to act as pioneers in the creation of a well-organized and participatory society. TÜSİAD believes that promoting private initiative to reduce disparities at all social and economic levels in all regions in Turkey is crucial. TÜSİAD's objective in this context is to enhance regional development by supporting businessmen who are committed to promote projects for regional development. TÜSİAD wishes to convey its experience and knowledge to the SİAD's, which largely contribute to voice different opinions in the Turkish society. SİAD's Platform is composed of 51 SİAD's,

which are operating in national, regional and local levels. Criteria for membership are:

- to have an independent structure in which political, ethnic, religious differentiations are treated equally,
- to contribute to the local economy
- to have the capacity of representation.

The Platform's organs are Executive Committee, Council of Presidents and Summit.

Executive Committee is composed of seven members chosen by Council of Presidents organizes summits and meetings of Council of Presidents. The President of the SİAD, which organizes the Summit, is also the chairman of the Committee.

Council of Presidents gathers four times a year in different cities and evaluates national economy and works on regional projects. This is the decision-making organ of the platform, which determines the Summit organizer SİAD, and members of Planning Committee.

Summit gathers once a year in a different city with participation of all SİAD's and their members. Exucutive Committee determines a topic for each summit and a report on that topic is presented and discussed at the summit. The first summit held in Istanbul, second in Bursa, third in Mersin, forth in Sanliurfa, fifth in Antalya sixth in Trabzon, seventh in İzmir and eighth planned to be held in Kocaeli.

This new establishment was totally the result of the endeavours of TÜSİAD. And also this is an answer to all criticisms about TÜSİAD's being such an

organization that do not want to cooperate with other SİAD's.<sup>166</sup> TÜSİAD has wanted to cooperate with all the SİAD's in Turkey. Furthermore the Association has wanted to bring all the SİAD's at the same region together as federations. Then, the final aim is a confederation under which all these federations gather and speak in one powerful voice. However, although the Marmara and Black Sea Federation was established and began its activities, TÜSİAD's not being a member of this federation yet brings the question of "whether TÜSİAD is sincere or not".

And finally in 2001, TÜSİAD International was established in order to develop the relationship between Turkish private sector and the foreign countries' private sectors.

In short, TÜSİAD has always advocated the development of a social structure in conformity with the principles of democracy and secular law. The Association has tried to cure its weaknesses in time and it has gained more strength day by day. In addition, it has been striving to secure a distinct and permanent position in the international economic and political system by making Turkish business fully competitive in the global economy since its very foundation.

TÜSİAD has tried to project itself as a voluntary organization acting in the broader public interest. It never visualized itself as a narrow, sectional interest group representing or promoting the interests of large-scale business establishments.

---

<sup>166</sup> For example Ziya Öniş made such criticisms in his "Entrepreneurship, Citizenship and The European Union"



#### **4.5 TÜSİAD's Similarities to the Western Type of NGOs and Its Contributions to the EU Membership**

Before analysing the similarities of TÜSİAD to western type of NGOs, first it should be cleared that whether TÜSİAD matches to the definition of an NGO in the literature that were mentioned in Chapter 2. The Union of International Associations, that most scholars have referred to as the fundamental criteria for NGOs, determined some criteria to name an organization as NGO. In this regard; charter of TÜSİAD provides for a formal structure which allows periodical elections, a permanent headquarters, governing body and officers; TÜSİAD is active in three countries for the time being and its activities are international in character thus TÜSİAD almost meets this definition. This business association tries to lobby abroad for the sake of both Turkey's interests and the organization itself.

In addition, TÜSİAD does not seek political power for any political party, thus TÜSİAD is impartial as Muharrem Kayhan, who was the Head of the Board of Directors at 1997, claims in one of his speeches. He mentioned that NGOs should join the decision-making process, they should be interested in politics and they should create a layer between government and the people. He continued as:

However, I do not mention that an NGO should be a part in politics or a supporter of any political party. In contrast, NGOs should be impartial and they should specialized in their fields. TÜSİAD's 25 years is a good example for all NGOs. It is possible to be inside the issues while protecting the distance with political parties or some groups.<sup>167</sup>

Furthermore, TÜSİAD was not founded under government initiative and more importantly, it does not take financial support from the government, so it is not subject directly to governmental or intergovernmental agencies' policies, rules or regulations. This independency gives TÜSİAD the chance to support its

---

<sup>167</sup> The Speech of Head of the Board of Directors of TÜSİAD, 3 April 1997, İzmir

views even they are not compatible with the government's and it can react quickly and effectively to emergencies because of its being free from bureaucracy. TÜSİAD is also free to adjust more quickly to changing environments and circumstances than governmental bureaucracies. TÜSİAD is a pressure group similar to the ones in the West that is accepted as the indispensable element of parliamentary democracy.

The sui-generis conditions of Turkey brought some extra responsibility on the shoulders of TÜSİAD. One of these responsibilities is to form a federation and then a confederation with the other SİAD's in Turkey. The second one is to find a solution about the absence of think-tanks in Turkey. TÜSİAD published lots of reports about a number of issues range from economics to education, from technology to local administration and the Association has been the initiator of lots of debates in the public opinion.

It is the very fact that all NGOs, both in Turkey and in the West, need to position themselves at a powerful and effective position. They need to shift from being bodies that have something to say, to being legitimate interest groups that knows what they are talking about and that authority feels obliged to negotiate with. This happens when authority cannot afford to ignore the case being made and cannot satisfy it with vague expressions of good will. The NGO need to have frequent meetings with the relevant decision-makers as TÜSİAD has in Turkey. TÜSİAD meets the governmental officials routinely and this meetings serve to draw TÜSİAD into the governmental issues. TÜSİAD also steer meetings around clear decisions, follow them up and publishes progress reports. It constantly gathers new information and watches for new developments which present opportunities for follow-up meetings. All these activities and strategies that TÜSİAD adopt, are done in the West very often. TÜSİAD, from this perspective, knows the rules of the game very well.

There are several actors and phases in the policy process as explained in Chapter 2. Although there are different theories such as liberal and corporatist paradigm, the common point is these different actors and their effects within the policy process. Although, the participation of NGOs in the policy process is not always accepted especially in the developing and underdeveloped countries, attitudes towards them vary according to political and economic conditions. Sometimes NGOs have been criticized for its negative meaning by governments and even that define NGOs as “against the government”. In Turkey, still this prejudice comes to the surface sometimes. They either be seen as peripheral to a strong governmental system or essential players in a pluralist system. Whatever they are, they should have a political base and they should prove that they are experts in the theory and practice of the policy in question. This is what TÜSİAD always does by preparing reports with the help of experts and by participating in the policy process with the help of its lobbying activities that create pressures.

TÜSİAD has the aim of taking a leading role in encouraging the development of a well-informed and participatory society. TÜSİAD, also monitors executive and legislative processes in the government and parliament. It follows the law-making process by analyzing draft laws in working groups and determines the position of TÜSİAD. This businessmen association tries to promote effective communication channels with the bureaucracy, parliament and government which is a good proof of its’ endeavour of being an effective lobby group at domestic level. As well as the foreign policy is concerned, it is true to express that NGOs have considerable potential for putting a new item on the political agenda, or for changing a weakly held view on a subject on which there has been little debate. Yet, to change a government’s approach to an issue that can not be effected by only the efforts of an NGO is nearly impossible unless they can engage remarkably strong allies<sup>168</sup> as explained in Figure 1. There were some experiences of TÜSİAD which it had a great effect on the government

---

<sup>168</sup> Clark, John, (1991), p. 145-66

and at last change its views. Of course, the very effect of media can not be ignored and this is the result of its being the most powerful economic organization in Turkey. The views of TÜSİAD usually published in the press whether they are supported or not and this provides kind of strength to TÜSİAD. Media has the greatest power over decision-makers among other actors and TÜSİAD follows the right path by being in the agenda. By this way the Association can easily reach the masses, thus it constitutes a critical layer between the masses and the government. By using its access to the media, TÜSİAD can easily reach its message to the people and so it can get the support easily. With regard to this relationship of TÜSİAD, Tufan Ünal stated that there is no such situation as media always supports TÜSİAD and added that: “Media follows the thoughts and feelings of public opinion, it has to, otherwise it can not be successful and lost its ratings. Thus, the activities of TÜSİAD are right and very useful for our country so media loves TÜSİAD.”

Similarly Bahadır Kaleağası does not accept that media is a faithful ally of TÜSİAD as most people believe and said that TÜSİAD is economically the most powerful association in Turkey so the reports and activities of the Association take place in the agenda.

With regard to the relationship with the media may be the most noteworthy interpretation belongs to Cengiz Turhan because of his being the press consultant of TÜSİAD. He said that:

TÜSİAD does not always get the support of media. In the past lots of criticisms of TÜSİAD are made by the media and this can be repeated in the future. If your word is worthy, it would be heard whether or not it is supported. Yet, this doesn't mean that TÜSİAD never establish a contact with the media, of course it does. And the continuous and systematic relations of TÜSİAD with the media contribute to the strength of the Association

Finally, Abdullah Akyüz expressed that:

The media needs some proposals that come from non-state actors within this centralized state tradition. Turkey needs some organizations that

discuss the countries' problems and that are able to find solutions to these problems. For my opinion TÜSİAD is mostly supported by media because of its this kind of serious and qualitative studies and discussions. However, this does not necessarily mean that media loves TÜSİAD in every situation, in contrast, sometimes, TÜSİAD can not get the backlash as much as its rank of voice in media

Although TÜSİAD, as its members and representatives mention, is not always supported by the media, it has a continuous relationship with media that provide TÜSİAD a degree of strength. Under this circumstances, it is really a hard work to continue this relationship which is completely the success of the Association itself. Furthermore, TÜSİAD ally with powerfull individuals, experts and opinion makers who have accumulated economic power or social status that help TÜSİAD to influence policy decisions. In many policy areas, TÜSİAD get the help of academics, researchers and consultants who are experts of the issues in question.<sup>169</sup>

TÜSİAD communicates its views and recommendations directly to the parliament, government, foreign states and international organizations and through the press, to the public at large. Thus, TÜSİAD by mentioning its views to the decision-making mechanisms directly, acts as the NGOs in the West and by establishing an information flow to the press, does the right thing in order to be more powerfull, as clarified in the early chapters. It maintained close contacts with the media by its press relations unit, in order to explain and promote TÜSİAD's mission and activities in a timely, effective and accurate manner.

TÜSİAD has a critical role to play because it has international structure and linkages. This organization has the potential to construct global network of pressure with the membership of UNICE in 1987, with the establishment of Turkish SİAD's Platform and with the opening of Ankara, Brussels,

---

<sup>169</sup> See *Çağdaş Yurttaş Üçlemesi 2002*, a CD about geography, history and philosophy aimed at inform primary and secondary school students that is prepared by a number of academics and experts, TÜSİAD

Washington and Berlin offices. TÜSİAD has a unit that tries to establish contacts with voluntary professional associations and thus it can create “boomerang pattern”. As explained earlier, to build strong networks of NGOs provides strength to an NGO in order to be more effective on policy-making.

TÜSİAD opened its Ankara Representative on 15 May 2000 in order to enhance the effectiveness of and speed up TÜSİAD’s participation in political, economic, social and cultural decision-making processes. The Ankara Representative will represent TÜSİAD in Ankara before public and private institutions, NGOs, international institutions, the government and the Parliament.<sup>170</sup> TÜSİAD needed to be represented before especially the government and the Parliament because with regard to its relationship with the government, in Turkey, TÜSİAD play mixed roles as in other liberal democracies. The organization sometimes collaborate with the government on specific programmes and in contrast, sometimes they challenge the government. The reverse is also true, thus the government sometimes collaborate with TÜSİAD and sometimes not. One of the example of the negative attitude of the government was Boyner’s interrogation which was analysed before. A nearer example that was witnessed during March 2003 is TÜSİAD’s severe criticism of the AKP (White Party) government and the government’s answer. The relations between the government and TÜSİAD was such tense at those times that Tayip Erdoğan hint at they can survive without the support and capital of TÜSİAD by these words: “Anatolian capital support our government and our capital is able to create international lobbies.”<sup>171 172</sup> During the interview with Derya Sevinç, officer at TÜSİAD’s Ankara Bureau,

---

<sup>170</sup> TÜSİAD Newsletter, June 2000

<sup>171</sup> See the news that explains TÜSİAD’s views titled as “Hükümet Hazırlıksız Çıktı: 50 Yıl Geriye Gidebiliriz” in Milliyet at 27 March 2003 and “Siyasete Atıl Hesaplaşalım” in Hürriyet at the very next day as an answer to TÜSİAD

<sup>172</sup> Another example of this tension is the news titled as “Adalet Mi İstiyorsunuz, Ayrıcalık Mı?” published at 12 June 2003 in Finansal Forum Newspaper

she mentioned that they try to gain the support of technocrats and want them to conduct lobbying activities when the question is the European Union. Thus, the Ankara Representative tries to create an environment of continuous dialogue with the government, represent TÜSİAD before foreign representatives and the government and monitor the process of Turkey's full membership to the EU by ensuring TÜSİAD's effective participation in the decision making process.

#### **4.6 TÜSİAD's Understanding of Democracy in the Light of The EU**

In the more relaxed environment of the post-Cold War order, with the triumph of capitalism as an economic system, powerful actors such as the United States and the European Union have become much more sensitive to the issues of democratization and human rights in different parts of the world. Moving beyond the realm of powerful nation states or supra-national actors, human rights activism has also been encouraged via the proliferation of non-governmental organizations forming the beginnings of a transnational civil society. As a consequence of these developments, it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle domestic politics from transnational influences.<sup>173</sup> Within such an environment the case of isolation, insecurity and inability to capitalize on economic benefits and inability of being a member of a supra-national organizations such as the European Union would cost too much for the political and business elites in emerging democracies.

With these changes and developments in world politics, in Turkey, as well as in the world, business leaders and business associations have increasingly become the most significant NGOs which assume key political roles in terms of determining the course of democratization and condition of citizenship. Democratization necessitates the improvement of civil and human rights such

---

<sup>173</sup> Öniş, Ziya, Türem, Umut, (June 2001), "Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Four Turkish Business Associations", *Revised Draft of a Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Conference on "Political Parties, Civil Society and Democracy"*, Ankara: Bilkent University, p. 3-19

as the right to assert one's ethnic identity, market-centered rights and freedoms, thus a strong civil society.<sup>174</sup> Here, the question is 'how NGOs, specifically TÜSİAD situate itself in relation to this concept of democratization?'. 'How significant is the EU factor for this business association towards adopting a more vocal democratization agenda?'

With regard to the relationship between Turkey and the EU, it is undoubtedly the case that TÜSİAD has been the most powerful and vocal pro-EU actor in the Turkish context. Indeed, as Cengiz Turhan said, the organization has played an active role in lobbying for Turkey's promotion to the fullcandidate status at the EU's Helsinki Summit of December 1999.

Needless to say, TÜSİAD's broad democratization agenda reflects heavily the influence of the EU and conforms closely to the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria as applied to the Turkish case. TÜSİAD published a report in 1997 named "Perspectives of Democratization in Turkey" that was prepared by Prof. Dr. Bülent Tanör and in this report, the association analyzed the anti-democratic elements within a broad framework that was varying from human rights to rule of law, from political party law to civil society. This report both in Turkey and abroad attracted a great interest. In general it was supported, yet, of course, lots of criticisms such as "TÜSİAD is behaving like a political party" or "TÜSİAD is politicized" came out. For example a report titled "The Democratization Report Created Debate", was published at 24 January 1997 in Dünya Newspaper.<sup>175</sup> The reason that lies behind all of these criticisms is the inability to understand the dependency between economic and political development flourished as a result of the end of Cold-War and international integration. Nonetheless, with the help of all these kind of publications, Turkey has been announced as a candidate country at Helsinki, a decision that has

---

<sup>174</sup> Öniş, Z., (August 2001), p. 1-30

<sup>175</sup> See Dünya Newspaper, (24 January 1997), the news entitled as "*TÜSİAD'da Kayhan Dönemi*" and subtitled as "*Demokrasi Raporu Tartışma Yarattı*"



helped to reverse the disappointments of the earlier Luxembourg Summit of December 1997. In 1999, TÜSİAD, based on its report “Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey”, published a “balance sheet” titled “Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey – Progress Report 1997”. This was an attempt that resembles the EU’s progress reports, and put forward which proposals were accepted and which were not and also the consequences.

The European Union and Turkey’s potential membership of the Union has been significantly instrumental in the evolution of TÜSİAD’s vision towards democratization and politics oriented outlook in the 1990s as can be understood from the words of Abdullah Akyüz: “the full membership of the EU meets the understanding of democracy of TÜSİAD’s members”. Of course, the European Union is not the only motive for TÜSİAD to turn its attention to political issues and democratization, however the weight of this dimension was too much. In fact it is widely known that the ultimate objective of TÜSİAD at its very foundation was to press for a model which resembles very much to that of Western European countries. TÜSİAD’s interest in political decisions of the government is because of the threat of isolation from the European Community. Influential members of the business community were also anxious about the possibility of arbitrary government that may cause an extended military government. The 1990s, nevertheless, appeared to be much more illustrative in demonstrating the strength of the European anchor in getting TÜSİAD towards a highly vocal stance in its democratization efforts. The relations between the EU and Turkey have been restored and the desire on the part of the Turkish political elites for full-membership of the Union has re-emerged during the 1990s. Consequently, the influence of the European Union have become more profound in pushing Turkey for greater democratization and political opening.<sup>176</sup>

---

<sup>176</sup> Öniş, Z., (August 2001), p. 1-30

Democracy and democratization, as a vital prerequisite of an eventual EU membership, have been assumed to be among the most important goals that Turkey should aspire to. Having been required to take certain democratic measures particularly in the second half of the 1990s, in the post-customs union period after 1995, Turkey has faced a challenging environment in terms of its relations with the European Union. Such an environment has naturally created certain conflicts as well as opposing points of view between those who wanted to be part of the Union and those who did not. TÜSİAD has been a vocal supporter, almost the leader, of the pro-European coalition in this context. As an organization, claiming to represent the interests of the public at large and not the narrowly-defined, sectional interests of the business community, TÜSİAD's view is that EU membership is beneficial to Turkish society as a whole. From an economic point of view, TÜSİAD frequently points to the importance of joining the EU club and its benefits.<sup>177</sup>

Then, TÜSİAD seems to be the association which stresses the idea of democracy more than any other business organization. TÜSİAD also seems to differ from the remaining associations in terms of the global reach of its activities, with its lobbying efforts extending well beyond the frontiers of the nation state to influence key foreign governments<sup>178</sup> or supranational entities such as USA or EU respectively.<sup>179</sup> The setting up of offices in Washington D.C. and Brussels in recent years constitutes a clear indication of increasingly global reach of TÜSİAD's activities.

Almost until this year, Turkey, on the one hand, wanted to be in the process of integration to the EU, but on the other hand, she was persistent to accept this

---

<sup>177</sup> Öniş, Z., Türem, U., (June 2001), p. 20-4

<sup>178</sup> See TÜSİAD Bülten, Temmuz-Aralık 2002: TÜSİAD's visits to Hungary, Portugal

<sup>179</sup> See TÜSİAD Bülten, Temmuz-Aralık 2002: TÜSİAD's meetings with Günter Verheugen, with French President Jean-Pierre Raffarin in order to explain the efforts of harmonization to the EU and visits to Brussels, Copenhagen, Greece

process as completely independent from the issues home. This attitude resembles the following attitude:

“Let’s destroy the walls between our homes, but, you do not interfere and do not pay any attention our untidy home.” This kind of an approach is far away the structure of today’s world.<sup>180</sup> And, certainly TÜSİAD has played a leading role in this picture by its publications, lobbying, speeches, meeting...etc since its very foundation.

As far as the EU is concerned TÜSİAD expresses that to leave Turkey out of the EU’s enlargement can only be described as political and historical irresponsibility and irrationality.

#### **4.7 TÜSİAD’s Lobbying Activities and Its Power**

The question “how TÜSİAD acquires such a credibility both on the eyes of foreign governments and media, NGOs and business world?” can be answered as TÜSİAD fills the diplomatic and social gaps that other actors are ill-equipped to fill. It fills these gaps by building expertise in areas diplomats and other NGOs tend to ignore and by its lobbying activities. TÜSİAD financed lots of researchs which broaden the horizon of Turkey and Turkish citizens and published the results. With regard to the lobbying activities, the Association fills the gap in politics by conducting a social diplomacy. Otherwise, this gap is filled by other actors who have the possibility to be against Turkey’s interests or political refugees who are the opponents of Turkey. TÜSİAD meets the governmental officials and NGOs of the EU member countries and of the US regularly.

The lobbying activities of TÜSİAD abroad should be analysed in detail because lobbying is the most pressing tool in effecting governments’ foreign policies

---

<sup>180</sup> Kayhan, Muharrem, *The speech of the Head of Board of Directors of TÜSİAD*, 3 April 1997, İzmir

within a number of both internal and external factors. Especially in the US, the lobbying activities in American politics are so effective and the reason is the openness of American politics to the effects of different communities from different ethnic backgrounds. Today, in the US, Turkish, Armenian and Greek of Turkish Nationality groups' lobbying activities are the most weighty mechanisms to effect the US foreign policy parallel to their interests. The effectiveness of a lobby group in shaping the foreign policies of governments depend mostly on four factors: number of its members, its places of location, its economic and intellectual strength and its support to the organizations or branches abroad.

Today, the support of the organization to its branches, unlike in the past, can not be measured only by political values, but economic power becomes increasingly serious. Thus, the private sector gaining critical importance with regard to this support. Within this framework, TÜSİAD opened its branches in Brussels in 1996, in Washington in 1998 and in Berlin in 2003.

The Brussels representative organizes meetings with the EU institutions as well as the EU representatives of international firms, international economic institutions and members of press and academic experts. The representative also participates in various meetings and explained EU-Turkey relations and the views of Turkish business community on different issues.

TÜSİAD's Representative Office in Washington makes similar things. The Office establishes contacts with various institutions and informs American public opinion. Abdullah Akyüz, the Washington representative of TÜSİAD, mentioned that they establish a continuous contact with the decision-makers in order to inform both the officials who are interested in Turkey and the rest of the people about Turkey properly. Regular meetings are held with Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), National Democratic Institute (NDI), American Turkish Council (ATC), the Congress, academics, media and the

experts. Abdullah Akyüz said that TÜSİAD's credibility among the US government, NGOs, and business world is very high thanks to their being in the US such a country that realizes the seriousness of NGOs in the foreign policy making.

Akyüz beckoned a distinguished point during the interview:

Globalization hold a momentous place within TÜSİAD's proposals. In other words, the Association tries to prepare Turkey for a globalized world with its proposals on economy, education, justice politics...etc And this globalization and EU motifs are included in each other

This point is really serious because TÜSİAD is able to read the future painting of the world and within this framework the Association link the aims of being a full member to the EU, having a competitive market economy and having a powerfull foreign policy in order to be an infuential actor in this globalized world.

In addition TÜSİAD has been the full member of UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe) which is accepted as the representative of the European Private Sector and which is in relation with the public and private foundations that effect business world, since 1987. The aim of this membership is to realize the national target of Turkey that is becoming a full member to the EU. TÜSİAD strongly believe that European business community can contribute to the development of the relationship between the EU and Turkey. Having this in mind, TÜSİAD has launched an initiative aiming at the deepening of bilateral relations with its counterpart business federations in Europe as well as encouraging Turkey's political and economic inclusion within the EU's enlargement process. Acknowledging the fact that UNICE created a fruitful platform for TÜSİAD and the organization planned to put together high level TÜSİAD delegations to pay a number of visits to UNICE Member Federations. The first visit in this context was made to German business federation in June 1999. After this visit, a fruitful meeting

was held with the Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany on July 21. In addition, before the Helsinki Summit, TÜSİAD delegations paid visits to UNICE Member Federations and TÜSİAD aspired to meet the Prime Ministers of the countries to be visited and present its views with respect to the development of relations between those countries and Turkey.<sup>181</sup> As mentioned in Chapter 2, the strength of lobbying is parallel to the strength of NGOs and the level of democracy in a country.

TÜSİAD's lobbying activities are very effective because the organization knows the style to act. Their activities are persistent, morally charged and professional. Furthermore, because of its long history of lobbying activity, it has got the experience. For example TÜSİAD delegation made rounds in Washington DC and New York during ex-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's visit to the US. TÜSİAD-US organized a breakfast meeting on "US-Turkey Relations on the Brink of the Year 2000" for the Turkish bankers. The consequential point here is the other contacts that TÜSİAD made. The association not only met the officials, they also met some other influential non-governmental actors. That time, they organized a lunch with Ron Dagony, Washington representative of Globe, an influential newspaper published in Israel, and visited to the Institute of International Finance to explore the possibilities of cooperation between the two institutions in the process of reforming the Turkish Banking system.<sup>182</sup> In addition, the Turkish-American Business Forum (FORUM) charter members hosted a dinner for TÜSİAD delegation in New York.<sup>183</sup> At the meeting, methods of promoting cross membership in both associations were discussed.

---

<sup>181</sup> See TÜSİAD Newsletter, December 1999

<sup>182</sup> See TÜSİAD Newsletter, December 1999

<sup>183</sup> See TÜSİAD Newsletter, December 1999

Unlike other NGOs in Turkey, TÜSİAD's members are asked to lobby on politicians and to get articles published in the newspapers. The organization gives excellent briefings, including monthly telephone conferences, which make the members feel valued and professional and which ensure a well-informed advocacy.

TÜSİAD lobby very effectively and everytime takes the advantage of asking its members and the other voluntary organizations for lobbying. For example, Tuncay Özilhan in his Presidential Committee speech in Mardin claimed that the importance of Turkey's being a full member to the EU should be explained to the European Union with the help of an information campaign that is realized by NGOs.<sup>184</sup>

A good illustration of TÜSİAD's effective lobbying is the visit realized by a TÜSİAD delegation to France between 14-17 March 1999. A meeting was held with the TÜSİAD's counterpart in France and the delegation paid visits to the international editorial board of *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*.<sup>185</sup> The reason for these visits was TÜSİAD's being aware of the fact that foreign media created a negative Turkey image by using the so called Kurdish or Armenian problems. In their meeting with the editors from *Le Monde*, the TÜSİAD delegation briefed the editors on TÜSİAD and explained the views of Turkish business community regarding the capture of Öcalan, the current issue of that time. It was put forward to the editors that Abdullah Öcalan is seen to be the head of a terrorist organization, responsible for the death of 30.000 people, by the Turkish public opinion. It was explained that the supportive stance taken by the Italian and Greek media towards the PKK therefore generated a very strong reaction in Turkey. A similar discussion also taken place with the editors of *Le*

---

<sup>184</sup> See Özilhan, Tuncay, (13 Eylül 2002), TÜSİAD's Head of Board of Directors, TSP Mardin Başkanlar Kurulu Speech, Mardin

<sup>185</sup> See TÜSİAD Newsletter, May 1999

Figaro.<sup>186</sup> Thus, TÜSİAD knows the style to act and these kind of visits are so convenient for Turkey in order to change the bad image of Turkey and the minds of EU citizens. Because, the first step that goes to the full membership to the EU is to change the image of Turkey in the public opinion.

TÜSİAD is accepted as a reference point by the European Union and by the United States. During my interview, Tuncay Özilhan stated that understanding and resolving issues related to economic and political situation in Turkey of the US, requires a broad horizon. The United States believes that, to meet and consult Abdullah Akyüz, who is the head of TÜSİAD's Washington Representative, is essential for the US Congress to this end. Apart from this, what is attractive for the US is the opportunity to observe first hand information about Turkey without prejudice and bureaucratic impediments. As well as in the US, when a question about Turkey raises in the European Commission or Parliament, these institutions consult Bahadır Kaleağası, the representative of the TÜSİAD's Brussels Bureau instead of the governmental officials. Özilhan added that both representatives have free access to the governmental buildings of the European Union and United States and they are like diplomats of Turkish government in the eyes of foreign governments. As Tuncay Özilhan, Cengiz Turhan also said that these representatives do not represent only TÜSİAD, but they are accepted as the representative of Turkey for every issue. TÜSİAD behave like this both to lobby for the interest of Turkey and to find international allies in order to bring pressure on Turkish government from outside. Nowadays, the sight of the EU to Turkey has changed positively and they try to prepare their public opinion and political structures to this new process.<sup>187</sup> During this process they wait for support from organizations such as TÜSİAD and they are very pleased when they get support from TÜSİAD.

---

<sup>186</sup> See TÜSİAD Newsletter, May 1999

<sup>187</sup> For example French-German TV Channel interested in the problems of Turkish minority in Greece. They make interviews with the fishermen who are migrated from Midilli to Ayvalık. This channel organize travels to Midilli and they show to the fishermen, their old neighbourhood



Since 2000, TÜSİAD has significantly increased its lobbying activities within the borders of the EU and especially in Brussels.<sup>188</sup> Between 2000 and 2002, they visited almost every EU country more than once. The crucial point is not this visits but the content of these visits. They did not only meet the business associations or voluntary organizations, but also they organized meetings with the ministers and heads of states. For example, TÜSİAD paid a visit to Stocholm at 24-25 September 2001 and met a number of government officials. TÜSİAD mentioned that the geographical position, cultural ties and manpower of Turkey that can bring great advantages to Sweeden during these meetings. TÜSİAD, not only met with the government but also visit Sweeden Entrepreneurship Confederation named Svenskt Naringsliv.<sup>189</sup> Another example of the visits to NGOs abroad is the TÜSİAD's visits to UNICE Member Federations during 1999 and 2000. TÜSİAD, during these visits, expressed the importance of the economic relations between Turkey and those countries, the role of Turkey in the Balkans and in the Eurasian Area and the common desire of the business communities of the concerning countries that Turkey's being a member of the EU.<sup>190</sup> Parallel to these activities, lots of NGOs and even university students realized this kind of activities both in Turkey and abroad. It is undeniable that the triggering effect of all these activities is no one but TÜSİAD.

About almost every political issue, TÜSİAD expresses its views and pressurize for the acceptance of its decision. How this business association creates such a pressure? One of the factors is its international relations and connections. Its sound place within the global network gives the Association the opportunity to create pressure on Turkish government. For example during May and June 2003, TÜSİAD made lots of meetings with the government officials of Greece,

---

<sup>188</sup> See the news titled as "TÜSİAD AB Lobisi için Fransa'da" at 21 November 2002 in Hürriyet

<sup>189</sup> See TÜSİAD Bülten, Nisan-Eylül 2001, Sayı: 27-28, TÜSİAD Publication

<sup>190</sup> See TÜSİAD Newsletter, December 1999

Poland and the United States. Of course the most curiosity was about the US because of the debates about sending Turkish troops to Iraq during the American invasion to Iraq. TÜSİAD, as a consequence of its meetings with the US officials, stated that the US wanted to know whether its anxieties about Syria and Iran were shared by Turkish government.<sup>191</sup> TÜSİAD clarified this attitude of US to Turkish public opinion and what they want from Turkey. Then, at 8 October 2003, Özilhan expressed that whatever the decision about the relations with the US was, it was the decision of the Parliament and they respected the decision. And he added that the only thing they pressurized is: “this issue should be discussed, should be talked, should be open to the public opinion and every risk should be taken into account”.<sup>192</sup> This point is so momentous because TÜSİAD, thanks to its nonbureaucratic structure, its effective lobbying and its good relations with foreign governments provides the information flow to Turkish citizens very openly. Furthermore, all these are the proofs of TÜSİAD’s conducting a social diplomacy which is, not more powerful with regard to laws, but certainly more effective.

With regard to TÜSİAD’s this mission, Tufan Ünal said during the interview:

TÜSİAD always hold the EU issue on its agenda, discuss this with foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations. TÜSİAD transfers some information which are said only to them, to Turkish officials. TÜSİAD by conducting a social diplomacy provides the transparency of the official diplomacy. A country is accepted in world politics as much as NGOs conduct a social diplomacy. Although TÜSİAD’s this attitude is not accepted by officials, I think that TÜSİAD’s acts are beneficial to the country.

An example of TÜSİAD’s foreign activities in search of a support for the full membership of Turkey to the EU, is the visit of a TÜSİAD delegation to Spain, who was the EU president during 2002, on 21-22 February 2002. TÜSİAD

---

<sup>191</sup> See Özilhan, Tuncay, Head of the Board of Directors of TÜSİAD, (11 June 2003), *Speech in H Advisory Council*, Sabancı Center

<sup>192</sup> See Dünya Gazetesi, (8 October 2003), the news titled “Özilhan: Türkiye Düzgün Yola Çıktı”

claimed the decisiveness of Turkey to become a full member of the EU and the triggering effect of private sector about this issue at the meeting that was held at Moncloa Palace with Jose-Maria Aznar.<sup>193</sup>

One of the most outstanding activity that was organized by TÜSİAD for the full membership of the EU, was the visit of 200 Turkish NGOs to Brussels. The Turkish SİAD Platform made its third meeting in Brussels just before the Kopenhagen Summit. The members of NGOs met with the European NGOs and they tried to get the support of the European public opinion.<sup>194</sup> After this visit to Brussels, on 13 December 2002, TÜSİAD delegation this time made lobby at home. They met with the government officials and said that there is no way except the EU. They added: “whether the EU determines a date or not, Turkey should go on her way”.<sup>195</sup> Thus, TÜSİAD tried to prepare the government for the negative decision and at the same time Association gave the message about there is no possibility for Turkey but the EU. They lobbied very effective and rational. After the EU’s not giving an exact date to Turkey, TÜSİAD immediately began to create a positive environment and gave strength and hope to both the government and the citizens. After the Summit, TÜSİAD put forward its decisiveness by claiming Turkey should go on the way without a break.<sup>196</sup>

TÜSİAD is aware of the fact that Greece, if it wants, can be a big impediment in front of Turkey’s membership as was in the past. In order to soften the relationship between the two countries, the Association meets Greece

---

<sup>193</sup> See TÜSİAD Bülten, Ocak-Haziran 2002

<sup>194</sup> See the news titled as “AB’ye Tarihi Çağrı” that was published at 27 November 2002 in Sabah Newspaper

<sup>195</sup> See the news titled as “TÜSİAD: AB’ye B Planı Olmaz” published at 13 December 2002 in Sabah Newspaper

<sup>196</sup> See the news about TÜSİAD at Sabah, Hürriyet and Milliyet Newspapers at 14 December 2002

Businessmen and government officials from time to time. These meetings generally are organized in Turkey and in Greece respectively, especially in Sakız and in Çeşme. TÜSİAD wants the support of Greece at every opportunity.

TÜSİAD is not always at the EU side, the Association makes some criticisms to the EU and assumes a negative position when necessary. For example, during February 2003, TÜSİAD criticized the EU about the Cyprus issue.<sup>197</sup>

After September 11, TÜSİAD in the first quarter of 2002 visited US with three different delegation in order to develop the economic and political relations between the US and Turkey.<sup>198</sup> As it can be followed from the press that TÜSİAD supported to send the Turkish troops to Iraq and after the negative decision of the Parliament, the Association believed that the relationship between US and Turkey damaged seriously. The reason of such often visits were to repair the economic and political relations between two sides. TÜSİAD sent letters to senators and some crucial officials and set up contacts with the effective members and groups of the US Congress.<sup>199</sup> Although the relations between TÜSİAD and the Turkish government was not so good during Spring 2003, TÜSİAD continued to conduct a “civil” or “parallel diplomacy” in order to melt the ice between Ankara and Washington.

---

<sup>197</sup> See the news titled “Soğuk Ziyaret” in Hürriyet and the article of Oya Berberoğlu in Akşam at 1 February 2003

<sup>198</sup> See TÜSİAD Bülten, Ocak-Haziran 2002

<sup>199</sup> See the article of Murat Yetkin titled as “Tamirat Lobisi” in Radikal Newspaper

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

A conclusion of the intent for seeking to further the studies on NGOs, of special interest to this thesis were the NGOs that have strong influence on policy-making, would be incomplete without a final clarification of the importance of the non state actors.

When the evolution of world politics is analysed, it can be easily noticed that international relations is a dynamic process. Within this dynamic process, the roles and responsibilities of the actors change continuously while new actors added to the old ones. When states realized that they can not conduct all economic and political activities from one center, the need for some new actors that would share the burden of the states arose in world politics. With this triggering effect, the importance of NGOs are realized gradually from the developed and liberal democracies to the developing world. Within neo-corporatist societies in which the importance of NGOs are realized more than the other types of societies, public policy is made after close consultation to NGOs. NGOs are very important and they play a certain role in these type of regimes and in developed world. Besides, NGOs can best grow in liberal democracies because they have enough space to act as in Turkey. In other words, although Parliament is the major institution, interest groups may take

the advantage of both constitutional or formal channels such as mass media, legislatures cabinet and bureaucratic agencies and informal channels such as personal connections and elite representation. Shortly, during the process of decision-making, various actors participate with different ideologies from distinct backgrounds and their effectiveness depend on both their power and the regime of the country. Regarding the European Union, after the Cold War, following the US, the Union with the signing of EU Treaty, began to give more importance to the NGOs in order to increase the representative democracy at the EU level.

In this study, it has been demonstrated that NGOs should create a public opinion pressure on governments by utilizing democratic means and institutions in order to advocate their views and contribute to the solution of the problems. To reach the same policy objectives, they must also lobby abroad which will create a sympathy towards their campaigns with the help of academics, experts, business world, politicians and other NGOs. Also, NGOs can potentially participate in lobby activities even though they have not been constituted for this purpose. The lobbying activities of all these groups create a good image of the country in question and this good image brings political and economic advantages because of the growing credibility of the NGO sector as a whole. The lobbying activities of NGOs are influential tools if they follow the right path, in other words if they have the ability to increase the effectiveness of lobbying as explained in Chapter 3.

The fact is that today it becomes almost impossible to disentangle domestic politics from transnational influences which are partly derived from NGOs the number of which increased dramatically. Every action has a cause according to the rule of physics, thus there should be a reason of NGOs' increase in number and their gaining power. The reason is pluralism, the end of the Cold-War, the growth of political, ethnic and religious diversity, the complexity of the society, the development and spread of democracy. In general, the reason is the

governments' insufficiency to meet the need of the people in this continuously growing, developing and globalizing world and their decreasing reliability because of increasing corruption in politics. NGOs' role in global negotiations and global governance has been emerging stealthily and slowly over the last quarter century. They have expanded their influence within democratic societies and established relationships with both the governments and non-state actors. Thus, to stand against the development of NGOs means to stand against political and economic globalization.

In this rapidly changing world, if Turkey wants to make serious progress in a short time, she should be aware of the fact that such a progress can not be reached without the support of people, especially the people who have economic power or societal prestige. This kind of support can be provided only by social compromise and the NGOs are the architects of social compromise. NGOs have the ability to establish "networks" with other governmental or non-governmental actors. The doors of decision making process should be opened for NGOs because as emphasized many times during this thesis, the NGOs are the critical layer between the government and the masses. Furthermore, NGOs can be effective abroad if only these doors at home is opened to them.

In order to be a full member to the EU which is a government policy of Turkey, discussions at home should be executed with respect to the pluralist and parliamentary democracy and involving the civil society within the policy-making process as it was stated in the European Council's regulations that was explained in Chapter 4. Within this framework, Turkey's foreign policy, in particular policy towards the EU, should not be constituted without taking the opinions of local administrations, private sector, unions, academic experts and NGOs.

Turkish government needs NGOs not only for their opinions or for their contributions on the way to the full membership of the EU, but also for creating

a better image of Turkey abroad. The common problem in Turkey is the lack of credit of the country abroad. Turkey can not be presented well and this problem brings other problems such as political ineffectiveness, inadequacy of economic competitiveness and lack of societal prestige. All these problems can be solved with sufficient sources, strategic strength and the ability to eliminate the prejudice of some countries against Turkey. Unfortunately, there are prejudices within both the EU and the US against Turkey because of not only their limited knowledge about the country, but also the lobby groups that work against Turkey in these countries. Susceptible feelings about Turkey dominate within public opinion in the West. The position, identity and role of Turkey in the modern world is not clear in their minds. The serious point is that the anti-Turkey lobby groups reach their aims so easily in the EU countries because of the European Countries' lack of information about Turkey. Besides, already some prejudices exist. Because of this lack of information, everyday some wrong and unscientific claims appear in the media such as 'the population of Turkey will be 150 million in 2010' or 'Turkey is an underdeveloped agricultural society'. Within this framework, first and foremost the prestige of Turkey should be changed by conducting right information about the country. In order to create a good image abroad, the country needs effective NGOs that have the ability to make lobby.

Additionally, today, the biggest obstacle of Turkey's full membership to the EU is the uncompleted democratization. To overcome the difficulty in the field of democracy, the NGOs have a special role to play because to provide unity and harmony within a society additional actors to political parties such as academic institutions, social and intellectual clubs, associations, trade unions, press which are not compulsory unions set up by the authority of the government are needed. Thus, there is a mutual dependency between the development of democracy and NGOs. In United States and within the European Union, NGOs' effect and importance were understood by both the citizens and the governments. NGOs have a say on the governments' decisions



and they have good relationships with other governments. The European Union provides strength to citizens vis-a-vis their governments. As citizens gain power, foreign governments look for nongovernmental organizations to meet, furthermore may be to engage and interact, as well as the government of the country during diplomatic relations. The more European Union becomes powerful, the more nations gain strength and the more nongovernmental organizations are taken into consideration. In addition at the EU level NGOs are encouraged since the last few years because of the fact that the EU gives priority to NGOs which have more representative power. Turkey should follow this trend, thus the country should be scraped its strong state-centric tradition. The access of NGOs into decision-making process should be provided and Turkish government should be aware of the fact that NGOs can be effective abroad only as much as their effect at home and home country's foreign policy making.

Turkey has chosen the way of integration to the West and the way of democratic development. She has taken crucial steps on this path. Hereafter, no one can carry the responsibility of Turkey's isolation from the EU. In order to be member to the EU, Turkey, first and foremost, proceed in her democratization. And NGOs are indispensable for the development of democracy as they are the means of channelling citizens' input into the governing process.

All these take us to the case of TÜSİAD because TÜSİAD is an NGO that is similar to the Western ones in the sense that the Association is largely independent of government, it raises awareness within society, supports the economic and political development of the country, tries to influence the policy-making, directly or indirectly communicates to the governmental officials, establishes continuous relationship with other effective non-state actors, does not pursuit profit and does not support any political party. Furthermore, the societal model that the leadership of TÜSİAD had in mind

was deeply inspired by the social structure of developed Western countries in the era of late capitalism. However, TÜSİAD has approximately one million US Dolar debt and there are some criticisms as this debt limits the organization's independency. But, the Association is still independent since it is indebted to a number of banks not to the government or not to one big company. However, if the debt will increase in the future, the Association will become indebted to the banks whose owners are the members of TÜSİAD and these members' influence on the activities of the Association will be unavoidable which may effect its independency negatively. Besides all these future estimations, today, TÜSİAD seems independent as it can be understood from its statements some of which are contrary to the government's decisions.

Because of this increase in the number of NGOs, and the very effect of TÜSİAD in Turkey and abroad, Turkish government faces a changing political context which forces it to reevaluate previous policies towards NGOs. The government meet TÜSİAD representatives continuously and takes the attitude of TÜSİAD into consideration.

All around the world the success of the pressure groups, similar to TÜSİAD, depends on mostly one factor: to unite the interests of the group that they represent with the interest of the country that they belong to. The NGOs that cannot succeed not only disappear in time, but also they cause to lessen the effectiveness of the group that they represent. TÜSİAD is aware of this fact and the Association always determines its policies in this direction. For example, TÜSİAD always supports the full membership of Turkey to the EU because, on the one hand EU membership is beneficial to Turkish society and on the other hand, from an economic point of view, joining the EU club is beneficial to Turkish businessmen.

TÜSİAD, in the last 30 years, pionered lots of changes that were not in conformity with the short-run interest of its members but fit with the long-run

interests of both its members and the community as a whole. It became as a model for the other industrialists and businessmen associations and it established a network among all of them. This network provides the continuous relationship between the associations and they gather four times in a year. In addition, a summit is organized once a year during which the attitudes and views of all businessmen in Turkey are announced. By this way the voice of business elites becomes stronger. The ultimate aim of the industrialists and businessmen associations is to take this network one step further towards five federations among Turkey in order to play a leading role within the process of decision-making. Two federations were established, one is in West Anatolian and the other is in the Marmara and Black Sea region. TÜSİAD is expected to be a member of the latter one, however, its not being a member of this new organization until now, creates some questionmarks in the minds such as whether TÜSİAD doesn't want to be a part of a big structure, although the initiator of this new structure is TÜSİAD itself.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are some criteria for the decision-makers to develop a negotiating relationship with an NGO. TÜSİAD provides all these criteria. Firstly, the government, the decision-makers, the media and other strong groups respect TÜSİAD because of its including experts in its working groups. The publications and studies of the Association depend on the scientific researchs of experts who are mostly academicians. Secondly, the government, when they become face to face with TÜSİAD, sense that TÜSİAD listens as well as preaches thus the dialogue established in two-ways. TÜSİAD in order to follow the law-making process, and to promote effective communicative channels with parliament, bureaucracy and government established its Ankara representative in 2000. More importantly and more binding for the government is the fact that the outcome of the meeting would be noticed by the media and people. TÜSİAD always stays on the agenda, thus the organization knows the way to be effective. TÜSİAD allies with the influential people in media. For example, Arzuhan Yalçındağ, who is the daughter of Aydın Doğan, the owner

of Doğan Media, is the member of the Board of Directors. In addition to all these TÜSİAD has lots of international linkages and allies thanks to its being a member of the UNICE. European Commission tries to sustain the continuity of the influence of NGOs on the decision-making process at the EU level. Furthermore, Article 138 and 139 of the Maastricht Treaty provides a legal basis for this aim. TÜSİAD realizes that the European businessmen is very effective on the formal decisions at the EU level, so the Association tries to improve the relationships with the counterparts of itself within the EU countries. All these peculiarities open TÜSİAD the way to be more effective.

“The EU constitutes the main axis of TÜSİAD’s activities, especially during the last few years” says Abdullah Akyüz and added that:

because the EU project is the project of being a part of a powerful bloc with the same rights of other partners. The reforms that should be done in Turkey are nearly the same with the reforms that the EU wants so TÜSİAD support the EU membership for the sake of the country

TÜSİAD established lots of commissions and working groups that are specialized about the EU and tries to provide a basis for a deep relation between the EU and Turkey. TÜSİAD uses its potential ability of putting an item on the political agenda as being an NGO and it does not miss any opportunity to bring the EU issue on the agenda in order to contribute to the process of full membership of Turkey. In addition, TÜSİAD publishes lots of reports about the democratization process in Turkey, the EU copenhagen criteria and Turkey-EU relations. Furthermore, TÜSİAD makes lobby both at home and abroad that are significant tools for democratization and Turkey’s full membership of the EU. TÜSİAD does effective lobby abroad in order to inform the foreign governments about Turkey and in order to create a positive image of the country. TÜSİAD is accepted as a reference point because, today, foreign governments look for non-state actors to get information about the countries which they are in relation. The reliability of NGOs are increasing day by day all around the world. According to the Eurobarometer survey that was done in 2002, in Germany, the lobbies or campaigns that were initiated by

consulates or governments could not effect the public opinion, in contrast some of these campaigns created negative consequences. However, the campaigns that were conducted by NGOs effected public opinion deeply.<sup>200</sup> TÜSİAD is a pressure group that conducts a “civil diplomacy” with the foreign governments that have deep effects, in addition to the official diplomacy of the government.

TÜSİAD is an effective, reliable and credible NGO both in Turkey and abroad. TÜSİAD acquires this image on its own which can be a commendable sample for other NGOs in Turkey. Thanks to its lobbying activities both in Turkey and abroad, the Association gains more power day by day because lobbying is a mean that creates pressure on decision-makers which result in the interest of the lobbyist. So all the NGOs in Turkey should become able to use their power of influencing decision-making process, as TÜSİAD, for both their own interest and for the sake of the country.

To sum up, to become a full member of the EU is a government policy in Turkey since 1960s and one of the requirements of being a full member to the Union is the development and spread of democracy. The path through the representative democracy involves the participation of NGOs in the decision-making process since these organizations constitute a critical layer between the citizens and the government. In other words, NGOs are the voice of the masses in general and their members in particular as they have the ability to harmonize the interests of the country and their members.

NGOs not only contribute to the development of democracy, but also they are the only channels that can explain these developments to the Western World, particularly to the EU, present Turkey positively abroad and increase the credibility of the country by their lobbying activities. However, the lobby network of Turkey, especially in the EU and then in the US, still inadequate

---

<sup>200</sup> See Eurobarometer Survey in 2002, “Monitoring the Public Opinion in the European Union”, University of Cologne: Center for Survey Research and Methodology

because of the unconsciousness about the importance of NGOs among the society and the government officials.

Today, TÜSİAD makes lobby both in Turkey and abroad. The Association tries to reach the political, military and bureaucratic officials with direct contacts in order to make effective lobby at home. Besides, there are indirect contacts composed of the publications, press meetings and conferences. As well as the lobbying activities of the Association abroad is concerned, there are regular meetings with both the governmental and non-governmental agencies of the foreign governments, visits, seminars, conferences and publications.

To this extent, if only the number and effectiveness of NGOs -in the same sense with TÜSİAD- increases, the civil society can become more effective and developed in Turkey that may make the way to the full membership of the EU more smoother. Because the more NGOs become actors in politics, the more effective the social diplomacy they conduct.

## REFERENCES

### BOOKS, ARTICLES AND JOURNALS

Akçalı, Pınar, (1999), “Political Participation and Electoral System”, *Lecture Notes*

Akşin, Sina, Kunt, Metin, (1997) (eds), *Türkiye Tarihi 3: Osmanlı Devleti 1600-1908*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi

Anheier, Helmut K., (1990), *The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations*, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter

*Avrupa Birliği, Devlet ve STK'lar*, (2001), Turk Tarih Vakfi, İstanbul: Numune Matbaacılık

Avşar, Servan Adar, (2001), “Civil Society and Democratization (The Case of Turkey)”, *a paper for the Department of International Relations*, Ankara: Atılım University

Bachrach, Peter, Baratz, Morton S., (1970), “*Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*”, New York: Oxford University Press

Beigbeder, Yves, (1991), *The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations, The Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance*, Dordrecht/Boston /London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

Berger, Peter, Neuhaus Richard John, (1977), *To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Press

Berinsky, Adam J., (2002), “Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America”, a paper for Princeton University

Boli, John, Thomas, George M., (edt), (1999), *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875*, Stanford-California: Stanford University Press

Boulding, Elise, (1990), *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Independent World*, Syracuse/New York: Syracuse University Press

Brehm, Vicky, (April 2001), “NGOs and Partnership”, *NGO Policy Briefing Paper*, No.4, UK: International NGO Training and Research Center

Buğra, Ayşe, (1994), *State and Business in Modern Turkey A Comparative Study*, New York: State University of New York Press

Çaha, Ömer, (1990), “Sivil Toplumun Türkiye’deki Sorunları”, *Sivil Toplum, Aydınlar ve Demokrasi*, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık

Cahn, Matthew A., Theodoulou, Stella, (edt.), (1995), “The Players: Institutional and Noninstitutional Actors in The Policy Process”, *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp.201-209

Casey, John, (2001), *Non-Government Organizations as Policy Actors: The Case of Immigration Policies in Spain*, Departament de Ciencia i de Dret Public Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Director: Dr. Richard Goma Carmona

Chinnock, Kathryn L., Salamon, Lester M., (July 2002), “Nonprofit Impacts: Evidence from Around the Globe”, paper presented at *Fifth International ISTR Conference*, South Africa: Johns Hopkins University

Clark, John, (1991), *Democratizing Development*, London: Earthscan Publications

Cleary, Seamus, (1997), *The Role of NGOs under Authoritarian Political Systems*, Great Britain and America: Macmillan Pres Ltd., pp. 1-13

Çuhadar, Esra, (1996), “The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Turkey that is in Integration Process to the European Union”, *a thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of METU*, Ankara: ODTÜ

Dağı, İhsan D., (September 2001), *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.1, No.3, London: Frank Cass, pp. 51-68

Dağı, İhsan D., “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy”, Kedourie, Sylvia, (edt. 1996), *TURKEY Identity, Democracy, Politics*, London: Frank Cass

Dahl, Robert, (1961), *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven: Yale University Press



de Tocqueville, Alexis, (1961), *Democracy in America*, vol.3, New York: Vintage Books

de Tocqueville, Alexis, (April 1945), *Democracy in America*, Vol.2, New York: Vintage Books

Donnelly, Jack, "Human Rights in a New World Order: Implications for a New Europe", Forsythe, David P., (eds. 1994), *Human Rights in the New Europe*, London: University of Nebraska Press

*Draft National Policy* for "Strategic Partnership with NGOs", (October 2000), National Consultative Group (NCG)

Drucker, Peter F., (1990), *Managing The Non-Profit Organization*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers

Eurobarometer Survey (2002), "Monitoring the Public Opinion in the European Union", University of Cologne: Center for Survey Research and Methodology

Fisher, Julie, (1998), *Nongovernments: NGOs and The Political Development of The Third World*, USA: Kumarian Press

Foucault, Michael, (1980), *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Vintage/Random, pp. 3-13; pp. 81-114

Gordenker, Leon, Weiss, Thomas, (1995), "NGO Participation in The International Policy Process", in Gordenker, Leon, Weiss, Thomas G., (1996) (edt.), *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Gruber, Lloyd, (2000), Introduction of *Ruling The World: Power Politics and The Rise of Supranational Institutions*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Gülfidan, Şebnem, (1993), *Big Business and The State in Turkey: The Case of TÜSİAD*, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University: University Press

Haas, Ernst B., (1990), *When Knowledge Is Power*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford: University of California Press

Hersel, Philipp, (1996), *Democratizing World Politics: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations*, MA Dissertation for MA Programme in Global Political Economy at University of Sussex, Supervisor: Marc Williams

Hirst, Paul, Thompson, Grahame, (1996), *Globalization in Question*, UK: Polity Press, USA: Blackwell Publishers

Hrebenar, Ronald J., (27-28 July 1998), "The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations and Nonprofit Organizations on Governmental Relations in the United States", prepared for *The International Conference on the Challenge of New Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Achieving Effective Central-Local Relations*, Tokyo, Japan

İşlet, Banu, (1998), *The Role of NGOs as Non-State Actors in International Politics*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi

Kahler, Miles, (December 2000), "The State of State in World Politics", prepared for the conference on *the State of the Discipline*, Washington, D. C.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, (2001), "Civic Culture in 'Secular' Turkey", *extracts of Dr. Aryn B. Sajoo's Introductory Remarks*, The Institute of Ismaili Studies

Kaleağası, Bahadır, (2003), *Avrupa Yolunun Haritası*, İstanbul: Dünya Yayıncılık

Keck, Margaret E., Sikkink, Kathryn, (1998), *Activists Beyond Borders*, USA: Cornell University Press

Kegley, Charles W., Wittkopf, Eugene R., (1989), *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, London: Macmillan, p. 173-5

Keohane, Robert O., (1984), *After Hegemony*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Kramer, Ralph M., (1981), *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press

Kubicek, Paul, (Summer 2001), "The Earthquake, Europe and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.5, No.2

Laumann, E. O., Knoke, D., (1991), *The Organizational State*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Locke, Robert, (September 2003), "What is American Corporatism?", *Front Page Magazine*

Lukes, Steven, (1974), *Power: A Radical View*, London: Macmillan Press

Martens, Kerstin, (September 2002), "Mission Impossible: Defining Nongovernmental Organizations", *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, Vol.13, No.3

McFarland, Andrew S., (1984), *Müşterek Dava: Kamu Yararına Lobcilik*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institutions

Michels, Robert, (1959), *Political Parties, A Sociological Studies of Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, New York: Dover Publication  
Napoli, Daniela, (1995), “The European Union’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights”, Neuwahl, Nanette A., Rosas, Allan, *The European Union and Human Rights*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

Newsletter of the World Education Forum, (26-28 April 2000), Paris: UNESCO

*NGO Funding and Policy Bulletin*, Bulletin No.6, (May 2002), INTRAC: Intrac-NGO Research Programme

*Official Journal of European Communities*, Council Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001 of 17 December 2001

*Official Journal of European Communities: Information and Notices*, c 265, 13 October 1980

Öniş, Ziya, (August 2001), “Entrepreneurs, Citizenship and The European Union”, Keyman, Fuat E., Üçduygu, Ahmet, (eds. 2001), *Challenges to Citizenship in a Globalizing World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, İstanbul: Koç University

Öniş, Ziya, Türem, Umut, (April 2001), “Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Four Turkish Business Associations”, *Paper Prepared for Presentation at The Conference on “Political Parties, Civil Society and Democracy”*, Ankara: Bilkent University

Özbudun, Ergun, (2000), *Contemporary Turkish Politics Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Papp, Daniel S., (1984), *Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks For Understanding*, New York: Macmillan

Princen, Thomas, Finger, Matthias, (eds.) (1994), *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global*, London and New York: Routledge

*Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey*, (25 April 2001), Brussels: Commission of the European Communities

Rosenau, J. N., (1998), “NGOs and Fragmented Authority in Globalizing Space”, *paper presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations*

*Conference and Joint Meeting with the International Studies Association, Vienna, Austria, September 16-19 1998*

Rothenberg, Lawrence S., (1992), *Linking Citizens to Government Interest Group Politics at Common Cause*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Rourke, John T., Boyer, Mark A., (2000), *World Politics International Politics On The World Stage*, USA: Dushkin / McGraw-Hill

Russell, Bertrand, (1938), *Power: A New Social Analysis*, New York: W.W.Norton and company

Salamon, Lester M., (2000), "The Nonprofit Sector: For What and For Whom?", *Working Papers of The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project*, No.37, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies

Salamon, Lester M., Anheier, Helmut K., (1996), "The Nonprofit Sector: A New Global Force", *Working Papers of The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project*, No.21, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies

Salamon, Lester M., Sokolowski, Wojciech S., Anheier, Helmut K., (December 2000), "Social origins of Civil Society: An Overview", *Working papers of The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University

Smith, Gordon S., (1999), "Reinventing Diplomacy: A Virtual Necessity", Washington DC: United States of Institute of Peace

Smith, Martin J., (1990), "Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism and Neopluralism: The Role of Pressure Groups in Policy-Making", *Political Studies* 38 (2), 302-322

Sorensen, Gillian Martin, (October 2002), "The Roles a 'Civil Society' Can Play in International Dispute Resolution", *Negotiating Journal*, Plenum Publishing Corporation

*Strategies for improving Bank-NGO relations*, (January 1994), Draft 9, Mimeo: World Bank

Tandon, Rajesh, (1991), "Civil Society, The State and Roles of NGOs", *IDR Reports, Vol.8, Number3*, New Delhi: Society for Participatory Research

*The National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations in Tanzania*, (2000), P.O.Box 5380 Dar es Salaam: The National Steering Committee for NGO Policy

*The Yearbook of International Organizations*, the Union of International Associations, 1996/1997 edition

Toprak, Binnaz, "Civil Society in Turkey", in Norton, A.R., Brill E.J., (1996) (edt), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden, New York, Köln

Üstüner, Fahriye, (1997), "Modern State and Politics", *Lecture Notes*

*Voluntary Aid for Development. The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations*, (1988), Paris: OECD Cooperation Directorate

Wapner, Paul, "Politics Beyond The State: Environmental Activism and World Civil Politics", *World Politics*, Vol 47, No 3

Weiss, Thomas George, Gordenker, Leon, (eds.) (1996), *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 17-50

Willets, Peter, (1996), "Introduction", Willets P., (eds.), *The Conscience of the World: The Influence of the Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute

Willets, Peter, (2000), "From Consultative Arrangements to Partnership: The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN", in *Global Governance* 6, pp. 191-212

## **TÜSİAD PUBLICATIONS**

*Çağdaş Yurttaş Üçlemesi 2002*, a CD about geography, history and philosophy aimed at inform primary and secondary school students that is prepared by a number of academics and experts, TÜSİAD

*European Union and Turkey: Towards Full Membership*, İstanbul: Lebib Yalkın Yayımevi

Kayhan, Muharrem, *The Speech of the Head of Board of Directors of TÜSİAD*, 3 April 1997, İzmir

*Optimal State*, TÜSİAD Publication

Özilhan, Tuncay, "Siyasi Reformları Unutmayalım", *Görüş*, (Ağustos-Eylül 2001), İstanbul: İyi İşler Matbaacılık

Özilhan, Tuncay, (13 Eylül 2002), TÜSİAD's Head of Board of Directors, *TSP Mardin Başkanlar Kurulu Speech*, Mardin

Özilhan, Tuncay, "Küresel Dünyaya Açılan Kapı: AB", *Görüş*, (Mayıs-Haziran 2002), İstanbul: İyi İşler Matbaacılık

Özilhan, Tuncay, Head of the Board of Directors of TÜSİAD, (11 June 2003), *Speech in High Advisory Council*, Sabancı Center

*Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey and EU Copenhagen Criteria*, (June 2001), Publication No: TÜSİAD-T/2001-06/314 that aim at the strengthening of civil society with the proposal about changing the political parties law

*Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey Progress Report 2001*, (March 2001), İstanbul: Lebib Yalkın Yayınları

*Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey*, (1997), İstanbul: LebibYalkın Yayınevi, TÜSİAD Publication

Private View, Autumn 2000, No.9

Private View, Spring 2000, No.8

Private View, Spring 2002, No.11

*Turkey-EU Relations: The Way Forward*, (July 2001), No. T/2001-07/306, TÜSİAD Publication

*Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri ve AB Kopenhag Siyasi Kriterleri*, (Mayıs 2002), Yayın No. TÜSİAD-T/2002-5/321, İstanbul: Lebib Yalkın Yayınları

*Türkiye'de Demokratik Standartların Yükseltilmesi Tartışmalar ve Son Gelişmeler*, (Aralık 1999), İstanbul: Lebib Yalkın Yayınları

*Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri ve AB Kopenhag Siyasi Kriterleri*, (Eylül 2001), Yayın No. TÜSİAD-T/2001-9/308, İstanbul: Lebib Yalkın Yayınları

*Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri ve AB Kopenhag Siyasi Kriterleri*, (Haziran 2001), Yayın No. TÜSİAD-T/2001-6/314, İstanbul: Lebib Yalkın Yayınları

*Türkiye’de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri ve AB Kopenhag Siyasi Kriterleri*, (Mayıs 2000), Yayın No. TÜSİAD-T/2001-5/300, İstanbul: Lebib Yalkın Yayınları

*TÜSİAD 2001 Yılı Çalışmaları*, İstanbul: TÜSİAD Merkez Binası

*TÜSİAD 2002 Yılı Çalışmaları*, İstanbul: TÜSİAD Merkez Binası

*TÜSİAD Bülten*, Nisan-Eylül 2001, Sayı: 27-28

*TÜSİAD Bülten*, Ocak-Haziran 2002

*TÜSİAD Bülten*, Temmuz-Aralık 2002: TÜSİAD’s meetings with Günter Verheugen, with French President Jean-Pierre Raffarin in order to explain the efforts of harmonization to the EU and visits to Brussels, Copenhagen, Greece

*TÜSİAD Bülten*, Temmuz-Aralık 2002: TÜSİAD’s visits to Hungary, Portugal

*TÜSİAD Görüş*, (Mart-Nisan 2003), Sayı:54

*TÜSİAD Görüş*, (Özel Sayı 1994-1995), Sayı:18

*TÜSİAD Görüşleri*, 24 Mart 1997, TS/SEK/97-016

*TÜSİAD High Advisory Council Meeting*, İstanbul, 8 Nisan 1997

*TÜSİAD Newsletter*, December 1999

*TÜSİAD Newsletter*, December 1999

*TÜSİAD Newsletter*, December 1999

*TÜSİAD Newsletter*, December 1999

*TÜSİAD Newsletter*, June 2000

*TÜSİAD Newsletter*, May 1999

*TÜSİAD Newsletter*, May 1999

*TÜSİAD*, TÜSİAD Publication

*Tüzük*, (18 Ocak 1996 itibariyle), TÜSİAD Publication

## **TURKISH AND FOREIGN PRESS**

Berberođlu, Oya, (1 February 2003), “Kıbrıs’tan Bildiriyorum”, Akşam Newspaper

Cumhuriyet Dergi, (Ocak 2000), Sayı:723

Dünya, “Özilhan: Türkiye Düzgün Yola Çıktı”, 8 October 2003

Finansal Forum, “Adalet Mi İstiyorsunuz, Ayrıcalık Mı?”, 12 June 2003

Hürriyet, “TÜSİAD, AB Lobisi için Fransa’da”, 21 November 2002

Hürriyet, “Siyasete Atıl Hesaplaşalım”, 28 March 2003

*Latest News From Turkey*, (May 2001), Press Office of the Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU, No: 4-28

Milliyet, “Hükümet Hazırlıksız Çıktı: 50 Yıl Geriye Gidebiliriz”, 27 March 2003

Mutlu, Mustafa, (23 September 1999), “TÜSİAD’ın Yeni Misyonu”, *an article published in Star*

Radikal, “Daha Fazla Demokrasi”, 11 September 1999

Sabah, “AB’ye Tarihi Çađrı”, 27 November 2002

Sađlam, Erdal, (23 September 1999), “TÜSİAD’ın İyimserliđi”, *an article published in Star*

Yetkin, Murat, (5 April 2003), “Tamirat Lobisi”, *an article published in Radikal*

## **INTERNET**

[www.docs.lib.duke.edu/igo/guides/ngo](http://www.docs.lib.duke.edu/igo/guides/ngo)

[www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/globact.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/globact.htm)

[www.uia.org](http://www.uia.org)

[www.usip.org/vdi/vdr/gsmithISA99.html](http://www.usip.org/vdi/vdr/gsmithISA99.html)



[zena.secureforum.com/Znet/chomsky/dd/dd-c12-s06.html](http://zena.secureforum.com/Znet/chomsky/dd/dd-c12-s06.html) A report to the Trilateral Commission (1975) in M.J. Crozier, S.P. Huntington, and J. Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy*, New York University