

BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION:
BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS
BETWEEN : 1945-2003

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ABSTRACT

BRITISH SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

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This thesis analyzes the security perception of Britain within the framework of European security integration. The time that is covered in the thesis is between 1945 and 2003. The thesis examines the assumptions constructing British position and intends to reveal that each of the country in Europe has possessed its own perception of security and defense within this significant process, and that - one of whose position made a profound impact on further development of European security and defense policies. That is the position of Britain. This study, therefore, will try to reveal the position of Britain and her policies in terms of European efforts for having a common identity on security and defense fields.

Keywords : Britain and European Security Integration , British security assumptions, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDI) and Britain

ÖZ

İNGİLTERE’NİN GÜVENLİK ANLAYIŞI

Orhan, Pınar Buket

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

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Bu tez İngiltere’nin Avrupa güvenlik entegrasyonu çerçevesindeki güvenlik anlayışını inceler. Tezin kapsadığı zaman dilimi 1945 ila 2003 yılları arasındadır. Bu önemli süreç içerisinde tüm Avrupa devletlerinin güvenlik açısından yürüttüğü politikalar çok büyük önem taşımakla beraber, İngiltere’nin politikalarının Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının oluşumu ve gelişimi açısından son derece önemlidir. Bu düşünceden hareketle, bu tez İngiltere’nin yukarıda belirtilen süreç içerisinde Avrupa’nın çeşitli entegrasyon çabalarında güvenlik açısından sahip olduğu anlayışı, bu anlayışın oluşmasına neden olan koşul ve durumları ele alır.

Anahtar Kelimeler : İngiltere ve Avrupa Güvenlik Entegrasyonu , İngiltere Güvenlik anlayışı, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date : 15.04.2004

Signature

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

But Who Wants a Big Europe Anyway?

Stephen Low¹

The answer of the Stephen Low's question, in fact, comprises the positions of European allies in terms of their efforts to have a common voice in the realm of security and defense. Having common voice, to be influential and strong in said realms, became an indispensable process for Europeans once the cold war ended, though the process was by no means easy.

Each of the country in Europe has possessed its own perception of security and defense within this significant process, and one of whose position made a profound impact on further development of European security and defense policies.

¹ Quoted from International Herald Tribune, December 2-3, 1989 in Reinhardt Rummel, (ed.), The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's assertiveness(Colorado: Westview Press Inc, 1990), p.1. (Work not included in the attached Bibliography.)

That is the position of Britain. This study, therefore, will try to reveal the position of Britain and her policies in terms of European efforts for having a common identity on security and defense fields.

The study will focus on the period starting from the end of Second World War until 2003. It will refer substantial events of the cold war, détente, the second cold war and post cold war that made Europeans think of forming a common ground for themselves in security and defense fields. The study is organised in six chapters. Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 will handle each of the above mentioned periods.

The study concentrates on the British politics and motivations behind it. It also works on the changes occurring in these policies particularly in chapter 5. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 include background information to understand, better, the British attitudes towards to European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and to grasp the meaning and causes behind today's European endeavors to achieve common approach in the above-mentioned fields.

In addition to providing background information, the information in chapter 2, 3 and 4 will also be used to support of the main argument of this study that is Britain seems to have a strategic framework for ESDP where her main objective has been to preserve the cohesion of Atlantic Alliance. The changes occurring in this policy seem to be tactical rather than a radical strategic change and include pragmatic responses of Britain to events of that particular period of time.

The postwar security arrangements in Europe was founded upon NATO in 1949 and Britain has always remained committed to this arrangement and made considerable efforts to keep this status quo at different stages of Cold War. She has been a sort of balancer between Europe and the United States and pursued policies in conformity with this position of hers and her strategic culture and her general security and foreign policy assumptions. British strategic culture based on two major international concerns that are to maintain ocean access to the Empire and to prevent any power from dominating the continent of Europe². These two concerns has always made Britain keep her interest in balance of power politics traditionally.

The persistent realization in Britain that any state dominating the European Continent could afford to disarm on land and concentrate its resources on sea (later in air) power, thus jeopardizing British security. Moreover, the repose in Europe In Europe resulting from equilibrating the European powers one against the other was essential if Britain was to have her hands free to defend overseas territories³.

Based on these twin concerns, it is possible to observe other principles of British security and foreign policy that are at work in the cold war and post cold war years. These principles have are an interest in stability and status quo, a tendency to think in power terms, a concern to harmonize the interests of as many states as possible⁴. The practice of these principles has resulted in the pragmatic behavior of Britain in stead of her depending on grand theoretical approaches.

² John Baylis, British Defense Policy, Striking the Right Balance (London: Macmillan, 1989) p.5

³ Ibid., p.6

⁴ Ibid

This was very much the view of the 15th Earl of Derby when he observed on 31 May 1885: “I do not believe that it is possible for us to lay down any formula or any general which shall bind us in our foreign policy for all time and on all occasions. We must deal with the circumstances of each case arises.”⁵

In addition to pragmatism, British policy making includes a great amount of consultation and negotiation that can also be observed along the Cold war and post cold war years. .

By bearing these principles in mind, Britain faced quite tough job when she came up from the war as a victorious power. That was to form a security arrangement that would maintain the peace in the Continent and to restore the British power. This objective required a formation of strategy towards defense and security in Europe by keeping the Atlantic Framework coherent. Forming a strategy on security and defense in Europe and remaining consistent with it required a considerable effort on the side of Britain particularly when all the years up to 2003 as off the mid 1940s are considered.

The strategy actually started to be formed with the foundation of NATO. Before that, Britain had searched the ways to restore her image as world power and to face the Soviet threat by trying to form a third force equal to the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Socialist Republics Union (USSR). These efforts are described in chapter 2 within the context of first years of Cold War by considering the endeavor towards uniting Western Europe. Chapter 2 also explains how these

⁵ Ibid., p.9

efforts turn into Atlantic framework to be the founding bloc of British security and defense policy.

Chapter 3 studies détente when Britain recognized the need for standing more close to Europe in order not be left out from the developments in Europe and to protect the cohesion with the alliance. The period that is covered is 1960-1975.

Chapter 4 covers the years between 1975-1987 when serious attempts towards a separate Western European security and defense arrangement occurred. The chapter, also, studies significant events that necessitated these attempts as well as the British contribution in shaping Western European Security and defense arrangement.

Chapter 5 will examine the years as off mid 1980s to 2003 by relying upon the background information given in first three chapters. Chapter 5, as making the analysis of information comprising first three chapters, tries to identify British policies and the motivations behind them. To make the identification, basic negotiating position of Britain in Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) prior to Maastricht treaty, and in Maastricht negotiations themselves and her position during IGC prior to Amsterdam Treaty and during its actual negotiations are scrutinized by exploring the causes constructing British position. Furthermore the outcomes of these treaties in security and defense fields are evaluated in terms of the British perception.

Throughout the chapter, a number of meetings -where British politics on security and defense seems to change the track by sending substantial signals to other

European Union (EU) countries that she is ready to make further discussions on European security and defense policies that she has always been aloof to do- are also examined. These meeting are namely Pörschach informal summit of EU Heads of State and Government between 24-25 October 1998, the first informal meeting of EU Defense Ministers in Vienna on 4 November 1998, Franco-British summit St.Malo between 3-4 December 1998. The reasons of the change in the British attitude will be displayed in terms of the international relations in that particular period of time. While examining the effects of international relations, the relations between Britain and France – as each are representing different approaches as Atlanticist and Europeanist respectively- and Britain and the United States of America will also be referred⁶.

In order to understand the effects and results of this change, European Union summits happened in early 2000s will also be referred such as Helinski, Nice, Feira, Copenhagen. The chapter also briefly discusses the effect of 11th of September terrorist attacks in the US and Iraq crisis on the ESDP.

With this organization and content of the chapters, this study intends to reveal that British security policy accounts substantial place in the formation of today's Europe and in keeping the Atlantic Alliance intact. Britain can be put aside in a number of fields by a powerful French-German axis such as in the decisions relating to economy integration practices in the European Union (EU) – or as happened in

⁶ The special relationship between Britain and the United States of America has always been claimed to be an important factor in British foreign policy making towards European security and defense identity. See for instance Clarke (1998), Danchev (1997), Holmes-et al (1990), Rees (1991)

the establishment of the European Economic Community back in late 1950s – but security and defense fields were not and will not be, certainly, one of them. British policies have affected the formation of European and Atlantic security arrangements and her policy choices that have been always inclined to harmonize the concerns of hers and of related parties on the basis of her security principles- will seem to be keep influential in the future as it was in the past.

CHAPTER 2

BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY : 1945 – 1966

The end of the Second World War meant to be a beginning of an era that would affect the international system profoundly. The United States of America and the Soviet Union, each representing different ideologies, were born to be the superpowers after the war. War time alliance would soon be deteriorated and bipolarity dividing the Europe into two camps and making it a competition arena would begin and force the Western Europeans find themselves a place in this new system by struggling with the squeeze of the superpowers on them and by trying to have their voice heard on the international arena.

The years between 1947-1990 comprised many events shaping today's Europe but some of which were particularly significant not only in terms of efforts for uniting the Europe but also of integration endeavor in the field of security. This chapter will study the milestones in Western European security integration efforts within the context of substantial events of the years between 1947 and the mid of

1960s when détente began. The role of Britain and its policies in these efforts will be scrutinized and compared the outcome of these efforts with the policies of Britain.

The Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 and extension of it to the Benelux countries as Brussels Treaty in 1948, the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the efforts for forming European Defense Community (EDC) and the establishment of Western European Union (WEU) are the said milestones to be worked on along this chapter. While working on them, the British policies and its core assumptions, as summarized in the introduction - Preventing any power from dominating the continent of Europe, an interest in stability and status quo, a concern to harmonize the interests of as many states as possible, a tendency to think in power terms - will be traced. Between mid 1940's and the beginning of 1960s, these policies have resulted in British non-involvement in supranational arrangements of Western Europe and dual policy by keeping security issues strictly separate and reliance firmly on the Atlantic alliance. Even though it will be a brief manner, the chapter will also provide an overview of how Britain perceived the Soviets as threat and its reaction to it and how this reaction contributed in the configuration of both Western European and Atlantic security structure. The chapter will also note that contribution of Britain to the integration efforts is to be evaluated in terms of changes and differences in the policies pursued by British Foreign Office (FO), Treasury and Board of Trade (BOT) that played a significant role in shaping British policy towards post war political and economic security arrangement.

The End of Second World War and Britain

Britain came up from the war as victorious power after fighting with the might of Germany for four wearisome years. Despite her victorious pride, the second world war made devastating effects on Britain and made the country consume considerable amount of resources and brought it to the edge of bankruptcy. The British treasury had warned in 1939 that the reserves would be exhausted by 1940 in the face of military expenditures, so they were.⁷ After 1940, Britain became largely dependent on the American loans in economic sphere as Lend-Lease and the its military aid. “The enormous cost of war compelled Britain to incur vast new debts and liquidate so much of its overseas assets that a superpower role was beyond British resources”⁸ By 1947, it was clear for everyone that “Britain was boxing far above its weight and was not enjoying it”⁹. Britain had to maintain an army of occupation in Europe, it had problems not only with Egypt but also with Palestine. As it was still hegemonic power in Iraq and Persian Gulf, it had responsibilities that had to be fulfilled accordingly and it had to maintain Sterling area that had vital importance for BOT and the Treasury for the post war economic performance of Britain. Indeed the Sterling, claimed by BOT and Treasury, was not only important just for Britain but for the world trade.

⁷ Michael Howard, “1945-1995: Reflections On Half a Century of British Security Policy,” in International Affairs, 71, no.4, 1995, p.707.

⁸ Joseph Smith, The Cold War Second Edition, 1945-1991(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998), p.4.

⁹ Howard, op.cit., in note 1, p.708

The correctness of this claim would be revealed when Britain devaluated Sterling in 1948 that forced other European countries to make their own devaluation. In addition to the economic and social plight of the country, Britain also had to deal with the rise of USSR and to assure the security in the European continent. Since any power having a capacity of dominating Europe posing a security question for Britain, the rise of Soviets was perceived from this point of view. Britain was analyzing Soviet Union as security problem for her and her allies due to her traditions evolving around expansionist tendencies, its psychology and ideology. Britain's national interests therefore were defined as to form a containment policy against the Soviets and maintain it.

Considering all above mentioned reasons, the policies of FO headed by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in Labor Party, which was elected by Britons who opted for social welfare after the exhausting war years, were proved to be very important in shaping Western European security system to be established on the framework of containment. Even though all these policies are interwoven and are shaped by events on the international arena, they could be listed as searching for western unity through western bloc proposal thus forming the third power and establishment of Atlantic security structure

Attempts for Creating a Third Force

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, within the gloomy atmosphere of Europe lacking a stable security system against the growing

Soviet threat and in the wake of the lack of the US leadership, Britain came up with the idea of forming a western bloc in which she could restore her power equal to the US and the USSR and shape a security arrangement that could protect the peace in the continent.

The Western bloc proposal was not a new proposal at all by 1945 since it was originally put forward by Stalin in talks with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in December 1941¹⁰ The reasoning behind the Stalin's proposal was based on two major causes one of which was to hold Germans after the war via the British bases and most importantly, to compensate Britain for Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe.¹¹ Western European politicians, on the other hand, such as Belgium Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak, were expressing their willingness for Western European security cooperation under a Western European group to be headed by Britain in order to prevent resurgence of Germany and to maintain security in the continent. The British Chief of Staff (CoS) was also interested in the proposal as they feared the strong Soviet Union after the war.¹² Despite the fact that the FO did not like the anti-Soviet tone of the Western Bloc, it was keen on the idea, a bloc that could restore the British position in the post war world order by making it the leader of Western Europe in alliance with France and that could make Britain utilize the economic benefits.

¹⁰ John W. Young, Britain and European Unity 1945-1999 Second Edition (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p.6.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² John W. Young, "British Officials and European Integration", in Anne Deighton, (ed.), Building Postwar Europe National Decision Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995) p. 88.

However Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister of Britain, did not support the formation of such a group on the grounds that this would antagonize Soviets, distance the US from the continent. Churchill who was in support of a kind of loosely formed Council of Europe was not the only politician resisting the idea. British Treasury and BOT disliked it too by claiming that a common market aimed to be formed in the bloc would damage the sovereign control over economic policies, would stop the preferential trade with the European states, open up the colonial market of Britain to other European countries and most importantly would result in putting global free trade system (multilateralism) into a secondary position.¹³

Despite the unwillingness of the Prime Minister and strong resistance of the Treasury and the BOT, the FO remained to be interested in studying the idea. The interest of FO continued when the new Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin came into the office in 1945. By 1946, Bevin pressurized the British government to work on a Western European customs union to provide economic cooperation. The Western bloc and the customs union would help Britain to create a “third force” alongside the USA and USSR by which it could maintain its world power status. The FO’s interest in creating a third force climaxed when the East-West division, that would last over 40 years, became apparent with the failure of foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow in April 1947 and the complete breakdown of negotiations made in London conference of foreign ministers in the end of 1947 and with the announcement of Marshall Plan earlier to London Conference.

¹³ Ibid

For the officials in the FO, under these circumstances, third force formula was a multi-purpose solution that included customs union and western bloc in security and defense matters. It would not only help Britain in restoring its world power status and resisting the USSR but also in preventing US domination whilst controlling Germany¹⁴ For some of the writers, though, such as Elisabeth Barker and Nora Beloff, British consideration for constructing European links through this effort was merely “staging post on the road to NATO”¹⁵. However, Cabinet paper named “The First Aim of British Foreign Policy” issued in January 1948 was including only “ a Western Union among European states with the backing (not the participation) of America.”¹⁶ Through this union Britain would seek to be equal to the US and the USSR. Bevin considered the Western European Union cooperation genuinely. To meet the national needs of Britain, it was necessary to make an profound arrangement on security and defense in the continent backed by the US, especially when the US was still hesitant to participate in it and to reinforce the British role in the world. The speech of Bevin made to House of Commons in January 1948 displayed the orientation of British government towards the union in Western Europe. In the speech Bevin was stating that Britain could not stand outside Europe by announcing the talks on security with Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg that would establish their own customs union to be known as “Benelux”. The endeavor of Bevin ended up with signing of Brussels Pact in March 1948 with France and the three Benelux countries. The pact was of multilateral military

¹⁴ Ibid., p.90

¹⁵ Young, op.cit., in note 4, p. 15

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 16

cooperation nature but financial, social and cultural cooperation were also aimed. The Brussels Pact was not just serving in the purpose of western bloc formation but it was also fulfilling the requirement of Marshall Plan that envisaged more cooperation in Western Europe in terms of defense and security. Following to the Pact, Organization for European Economic Recovery Cooperation (OEEC) was established for monitoring Marshall aid program. All these developments were seen as significant steps towards an efficient third force. Despite these developments, Bevin would soon have to give up the third force aiming to preserve British independence from the US influence by creating self reliant Western Europe under British leadership¹⁷ and to pursue a foreign policy to be based on Atlantic alliance.

Decline of Third Force and Rise of Atlantic Alliance

A number of reasons could be identified for the decline in establishing the third force efforts. These are summarized as political and philosophical differences with France which was chosen by Britain to build an alliance together around which the third force would flourish, the strong opposition of the Treasury and the BOT against the customs union that was an important part of the third force, unwillingness of FO and British government to surrender significant sovereign rights in supranational arrangements in contrast with other European countries like France, Benelux states and Italy, the inadequacy of British resources to face the Soviet strength as the leader of Western Europe and acknowledgment of the situation by the

¹⁷ Young, op.cit., in note 4, p. 16

British policy makers in the face of political developments at the continent such as communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and starting of Berlin blockade in June 1948.

The national needs, political and philosophical approaches of Britain and France were not matching and this, as indicated above, constituted one of the major reasons for decline British third force vision. Although Bevin tried to figure out the differences between France and Britain, it was getting harder to do so in an international environment where East-West tension was raising. Britain and France had political differences on the issues of Germany and Middle East . France, as being invaded for three times (1840, 1914 and 1940) by Germany, was highly sensitive on the revival of Germany that started to become a necessity as the Soviet threat was increasing and would like to separate Ruhr and Rhineland from Germany. This was an issue resisted by Britain on the grounds that this would rekindle the nationalist sentiments in Germany. Indeed the issue became even more controversial when Britain combined its occupation zone with the US due to economic reasons and when the US also started to advocate Germany revival. Another controversy was experienced in the Middle East. France wanted Britain to respect its rule in Syria and Lebanon. However, Britain, as being predominant power in the Middle East did not want to upset Arab nationalist by doing so. Indeed these differences were the stumbling blocks in 1945-1946 on the way to Western block. In addition to political differences, there were philosophical difference. Bevin was supporting gradual development in Western European union with traditional British pragmatism whereas France has more ambitious plans for the union. Furthermore France, was ready to surrender some of its sovereign rights to supranational organizations where as Britain

was neither ready nor willing to do so. “Because foreign office had always wanted Western European cooperation as a way to *improve (emphasis in the text)* Britain’s international standing, a way to match the power of America and Russia-not as a step towards the loss of independence”¹⁸ Despite continuing the differences, Britain and France signed Dunkirk Treaty in March 1947 that included a long-term British security commitment to the continent. It was

An Anglo-French alliance had been proposed since 1944 as way to renew the entente cordiale (emphasis in the text). The Treaty of Dunkirk was a fifty year alliance directed against a revival of German aggression but also promising wider co-operation. It was closely based on the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet alliances in order not antagonize Moscow.¹⁹

Although the significance of the Treaty did not last much, it would provide a basis in signing Brussels Pact in 1948. The dialogue with France on the Western European integration both in economic and political field continued uneasily until the mid 1948. This uneasiness was further complicated by the strong opposition of British Treasury and BOT.

From the beginning of discussions of establishing Western bloc comprising a customs union, the Treasury and BOT expressed its dislike on a possible customs union combining the Western Europe and Commonwealth. Because, as explained in the paragraphs above, this would damage the sovereign control over economic policies, would stop the preferential trade with the European states, open up the

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.13.

¹⁹ John W. Young, Cold War and Détente 1941-91 (New York: Longman Publishing, 1993) p.196.

colonial market of Britain to other European countries and most importantly would result in putting global free trade system (multilateralism) into a secondary position as they were explained in paragraph above. Moreover, the Treasury and BOT were also concerned in acting together with unstable and weak economies like that of France. The concerns were of these two bodies were reinforced with the protests from Colonial Office (CO). The liberal views of CO was not matching with the central control that would exist in a customs union. “The CO also pointed out that a customs union would upset Commonwealth trade patterns and lose the colonies revenues from tariffs”²⁰. What was very important for economic official in Britain that the Western European economies were not complementary but competitive in what they produced. By and large, British economic ministries did not see much benefit from cooperating with the Western European.

Their point of view was shared by Chief of Staff (CoS) that would like to side with the US against USSR rather than relying on a security system centered on the Western Europe. FO and Bevin seemed to be alone in keeping faith in the third force. However, they recognized the fact that neither Britain nor any other European country could compete with or fight against the strength of the USSR. Britain was desperately in need of the US and had to look for a sort of Atlantic arrangement. This reality well displayed itself in 1948 Berlin Blockade crisis and Britain perceived the fact that Europe was actually defenseless.

²⁰ PRO:FO 371/62553, Thomas, of CO, to Bevin , 6 September 1947 .Quoted in John W.Young, “ British Officials and European Integration” , in Anne Deighton , (ed.), Building Postwar Europe National Decision Makers and European Institutions , 1948-63 (London : Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995) p. 90.

Regarding the pressure inside and political realities of time and national differences made Bevin and the FO take the third force initiative out of their agenda and concentrate on building a prosperous Western Europe to face the Soviets within an intergovernmental framework like that of Brussels Pact and OEEC and on constructing Atlantic Alliance and being loyal to it. This decision of British government provided a long term consensus in British security politics. Indeed the FO shared common ideas with the US like the need of reviving Germany, to resist Soviet expansion and was careful on maintaining special relationship with the US. Regarding these, Britain's rejection of third force was confirmed. As off February 1949, Britain accepted its dependence on the US for defense and economic aid and on the leadership of the US however she assumed that co-operation with the Western Europe and Commonwealth would balance the US domination.²¹ By making the US and the Commonwealth as the two pillars of security policy, Britain risked itself distancing from the developments in Western European integration. But in any case the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade brought the Soviet threat closer and resulted in the belief that peaceful coexistence with the USSR was not possible any more and joint defense for Western Europe was inevitable. With the participation of the US, Canada, The Brussels Pact Powers North Atlantic Treaty signed to form North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949. The formation of NATO reinforced the consensus in British security politics, but it did not stop the search for integration in Western Europe from which Britain distanced itself and of which leader became France then.

²¹ Young, op.cit., in note 4, p. 23

European Defense Community Initiative and Britain

When 1950s came, there were more challenges that Britain had to face as tensions of cold war climaxed with the outbreak of Korean War in 1950. The war in Korea made NATO to adopt “forward strategy” which made the rearmament of Western Germany compulsory. Federal Republic of Germany was not enjoying the security guarantees of the West and it had not have means to defend itself. “In this situation, giving the Federal Republic the right to and means to defend itself, while incorporating its contribution to Western defense, became issues that could not be ignored”²² . In the prospect of German resurgence and participation of it in NATO, France had significant reservations due to the belief that NATO did not offer enough guarantees for France against a rearmed German national army either. What was acceptable for France was the formation of a German army under the auspices of a European supranational framework in which German divisions would be put under the command of a single European Defense Minister. The success of Schuman Plan for European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) further encouraged France to provide linkage between the ECSC and a European army namely European Defense Community (EDC). By realizing EDC, France would not only manage to deal with the German rearmament problem and please the Americans but also make the defense cooperation be a part of larger integration process in Europe.

²² Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community, a History (London, 1980) Quoted in Gülnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997) p.71

In terms of Britain , however, neither Schuman Plan for ECSC nor EDC were acceptable due to the supranational nature of both. The consensus that was reached in 1949 was maintained, therefore, the Schuman Plan was rejected by Britain. Similarly, the FO was, now, indifferent to any kind of third force plan because of fearing to upset the cohesion of NATO. Therefore Britain was not very much keen of forming European army when Pleven Plan was announced it in 1950. “When the Pleven Plan, designed to create such an Army, was launched, FO officials and the CoS were united in their contempt for yet another “impossible” (emphasis in the text) French idea-as one official described it.”²³ . CoS and FO were supporting the idea of rearmament of Germany in NATO and its rearmament would be delayed if it was to be realized within a supranational community. Nevertheless, Britain showed its support to EDC publicly as the researches were pointing out the fact that some of continental European states were not satisfied with intergovernmental arrangements but were after federalist structuring and Britain, for the sake of Atlantic Alliance, had to hold atlanticist and federalists together in the continent. Furthermore, after her rejection of Schuman Plan, Britain did not want to be seen as sabotaging the EDC. She supported it and even agreed to establish link with EDC through association agreements despite the fact that it did not want to commit itself in the EDC as a member of it.

²³ Young, op.cit., in note 6, p. 92

The change of government from Labor to Conservative in 1951 under the leadership of Churchill did not make any profound change on the British standing in the EDC matter. Even though there was a hope for more change towards the Europe with the election of this new government since Churchill had played an important role in the creation of Council of Europe back in 1940s, European states would soon be disappointed when Britain decisively refused to be a part of EDC. This disappointment was not healed with the plan of the new Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that was to be known as “Eden Plan”. Eden Plan foresaw institutional ties between the Six, Council of Europe and the Britain. For the FO the plan would serve as a bridge between the supranational institutions of the Six and the countries that preferred inter governmental cooperation.²⁴ This plan, in wake of disappointment created by conservatist government, did not mean much to France. In the meantime, deliberations were continuing on EDC but the course seemed to be not going very well despite the pressure of the Americans and despite that EDC treaty was signed between France, Belgium and Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in May 1952. Britain did not participate in it but she signed a protocol in which “she promised all military and other aid in its power should one of the EDC members come under attack”²⁵. The security guarantees between EDC and NATO were also confirmed with a protocol.

EDC, however, started to lose the support that it had from the state that actually designed it. There are a number of reasons for this. British non-involvement was a problem for France and the protocol between the EDC and the Britain was not

²⁴ Young, *op.cit.*, in note4, p. 37

²⁵ Gülnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997) p.76

seen enough to placate the French fears in the face of participation of rearmed Germany into NATO.²⁶ Moreover change in French foreign policy that aimed concentrating on overseas territories to exert French influence and new Foreign Minister of France George Bidault's being skeptical about the EDC on the grounds that it would decrease French effect in NATO were also effective in the decline of popularity of EDC in France.²⁷ Moreover, the war on Indo-China became the priority for France in 1954, therefore France could not focus on the EDC. When attempts for making the EDC treaty more favorable for France were not realized as the other signatories refused to include the amendments²⁸ proposed by France- since they have already completed the ratification process- the hope for ratification of the treaty by French Parliament started to fade away. Indeed, the EDC initiative was buried by the state that gave birth to it and the French Parliament did not ratify the EDC treaty.

The Establishment of Western European Union

The demise of EDC was a blow to Western European integration on supranational grounds and offended the US that had been waiting for the rearmament of Germany since 1950. However, this death gave an opportunity to Britain to lead the Six back to intergovernmental cooperation. Foreign Secretary Eden proposed to

²⁶ Arnold Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe(Westport : CT, 1975) Quoted in Gülnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997) p.76

²⁷ Aybet, op.cit., in note 18, p. 78

²⁸ The amendments were proposed by new French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France who opted for closer ties with NATO by foreseeing political decisions be made by member states and supranational elements to stay in technical matters and also he foresaw the demise of the EDC in case of withdrawal of support by US and Britain. Such attempt would result in losing the supranational spirit of the treaty and losing the aim of political community establishment. See Furdson, op.cit., in note 16, p. 273

extend 1948 Brussels Pact to Italy and Germany, thus to control rearmament of Germany. For Eden, extension of the Pact would, simultaneously serve two purposes that were to control the revival of Germany and to bind the Britain to the Six in an intergovernmental organization so that Britain would be able to monitor and check the developments on the side of the continental Europe. The proposal of Eden was accepted in London Conference and the Brussels Pact turned into Western European Union (WEU) in 1955. WEU made possible for Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) join the NATO and rearm. But after that, its tasks became vague as WEU had never given the role assumed for the EDC. “ The Western European Union served intermittently to overcome essentially political problems, but it was purely ancillary to creating and preserving NATO.”²⁹ WEU started to serve as a platform where controversial issues (such as the discussions on British membership negotiations into EEC) that did not handled by another institution were discussed. NATO, to the satisfaction of Britain, was confirmed as the only common security and defense framework for Western Europe.

The establishment of WEU was a triumph for British government. They managed to apply their non-involvement policy with success between the years 1950-1955 and the establishment of WEU was a fruit of this policy. Between these years, Britain pursued the policy of non-involvement in supranational institutions but also searched for association with them. With this policy, Britain managed to secure not to be placed in supranational arrangements. But she placed its political, security

²⁹ Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy Challenges and Choices for 21st Century (London : Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 109

and economic policies on three pillars that were the US, the Commonwealth and the Europe. This made Britain preserve its sovereignty and keep its world role. However, there were other developments that were at work that would soon Britain force to review its non-involvement policy towards Europe that was the establishment Western European customs union under European Economic Community (EEC).

Relying on the failure of EDC, Britain was not genuinely interested in the European attempts to build an economic community, when it was invited to the talks on the issue in the Spaak committee after it was discussed by ECSC ministers in Messina in June 1955. The failure of EDC did not stop other Western European states searching for supranational arrangements for the future of Europe that Britain did not appreciate³⁰. Instead Britain tried to change the course towards the economic community by proposing Free Trade Area (FTA) that disturbed the Six as it was perceived as an attempt to undermine the EEC. Even the FO under Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan known for being a pro European, was very much interested neither in Messina process nor the Spaak Committee. In fact they were occupied with the Suez Crisis occurred in 1957 and the strained relations with the US as a result of military campaign in Egypt together with France. In fact, the decision of British government to stop military action in Suez further upset France and pushed it to the EEC whereas Britain got closer to the US.

When 1960s approached, the fundamentals British policy in terms of European security integration started to be consolidated. That was to rely on NATO as the primary defense and security cooperation for Western Europe, to keep the US

³⁰Young, op.cit., in note4, p. 49

in the security and defense of Europe as it had the only power that could ever compete with the USSR and to provide a protection shield for the continent with its nuclear superiority from the USSR, to stick on containment policy, that was originally articulated in the US in 1947 but suiting good to British pragmatism since “ it provided a clear rationale for collective –and transatlantic- alliance which was the only means by which Britain could restrain the power of Soviet Union”³¹ and to base any security and defense cooperation on intergovernmental framework by staying out of any supranationalist arrangements which let Britain to keep security and economic matters strictly separate in compliance with “dual policy” towards European unity as referred by British Foreign Secretary Macmillan³² and to nurture the special relationship with the US. This position of Britain was confirmed with her approach to the establishment of WEU and the EEC as concisely described above and this started to make western European states see her as an irremediable Atlanticist.

Atlanticism that remained a consistent policy throughout the Cold War for Britain served good to her interests. Both major parties in Britain, Labor and Conservative, followed the fundamentals of the policy indicated above because “ For Conservatives such policy maintained simulacrum of Great Power status: Britain was still at the top table.... For Labor it preserved American support for an increasingly dodgy economy and enabled the party to evade difficult issues in foreign policy”³³. When 1960s came, however, the Cold War language started to change, détente, even

³¹ Michael Clarke, “A British View”, in Richard Davy, (ed.), European Détente : A Reappraisal (London : Sage Publications, 1992), p.88

³² Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm (London : Macmillan, 1971), pp. 80-4

³³ Michael Howard, “ 1945-1995: Reflections On Half A Century of British Security Policy”, in International Affairs, 71, no.4, 1995, p.710.

though it did not become a reason of major discontinuities in the British politics, became an important theme of Cold war years.

CHAPTER 3

BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY : DÉTENTE

This chapter will study on the years starting from 1960s to the late 1970s. When doing so, it will scrutinize détente that lasted between 1966-1975 as being an important stage in the Cold War. Even though it did not cause fundamental reappraisal on the British policy toward European Security integration; It had certainly significant impactions on these policies because, unlike intense cold war years, during the periods of détente, “British influence declined within the Western Alliance as it was not a central player in *Östpolitik* (emphasis in the text), economic cooperation and normalization of disputed borders... in periods of détente it had less to gain and more to lose in the process”³⁴. The period of détente actually coincided with a number of major changes in British foreign policy. Britain accepted the fact that she was no longer a major world power after her withdrawal from East of Suez in 1967 and that she became a manager within the transatlantic alliance in the face of

³⁴ Michael Clarke, “British Security Policy”, in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 125

the crises happened in NATO such as withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure. She, also, acted as a manager in burden sharing debates where she promoted the establishment of Eurogroup within NATO in 1968 to deflect the pressures coming from the American Congress. The most important point above all for Britain was to ensure alliance cohesion this relaxation period.

The chapter also works on continuing efforts towards European integration on political level on the side of Western Europeans and the reactions of Britain to them like the initiatives of French premier of De Gaulle to form a third force, British attempts to become a member of the EEC. The chapter also cover the British contribution to the search for a European dimension in the Alliance such as formation of Eurogroup as mentioned in preceding paragraph.

The chapter intends to display that the British reactions to the developments in Western Europe comprised the fingerprints of British Atlanticist policy and the fundamentals of the policy were not changed and that as being a status quo power, Britain was responding to the developments with her natural pragmatism.

Efforts for European Dimension In The Alliance

The decision of Britain on not entering into the EEC and trying to establish an alternative to it by proposing FTA to the Six –that was not acceptable to them– pushed Britain to look for a kind of FTA without the Six in early 1960s that would result in the formation of European Free Trade Area (EFTA) established by Britain,

Sweden, Norway and Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal. Lacking the sorts of political or economic commitments of EEC – even though the EEC founded upon the idea of economic unity, it assumed a role of a step towards political integration-, EFTA soon proved to be not beneficiary for British interests since it just solidified the division of Western Europe into two separate trading blocs and did not help to improve the British economic performance. “By April 1960 Macmillan’s government faced numerous difficulties. At home there was a growing sense of national malaise- of social divisions, economic failure and loss of purpose... In Europe the Franco-German combination was strong and the Six were growing more confident”³⁵ These developments was triggering the decline of British influence in the Western Europe and this situation was confirmed by the studies conducted by “Future British Policy down to 1970 ” study group between June 1959 and February 1960. Despite the confirmation of this situation, final papers of the Future Policy exercise in February 1960 avoided recommending membership of the EEC.

The study warned that if the Six achieve a real measure of integration, a new world power will have come on the scene and that by 1970, Britain’s position vis-à-vis both the United States and Western Europe will...decline”, but it recommended the maintenance of the Atlantic alliance and the strengthening of the Commonwealth, and vaguely hoped for a more “intimate....association” between the UK, North America and Western Europe. It can be said however, that the study helped concentrate Whitehall minds on British declining influence relative to the EEC, the limited value of EFTA and declining importance of Commonwealth links³⁶

³⁵ Young, *op.cit.*, in note 4, p. 65

³⁶ Young, *op.cit.*, in note 6, p. 99

In addition to these economic and political concerns evolving around the EEC, Britain had to face, like the remaining of the Western European allies, two basic problems. Aybet was defining these problems as lack of Western European participation in strategic and nuclear planning that became a source friction between the US and the allies and secondly, the burden sharing debates comprising the complaints of the US Congress that would like to see the European allies increase their share of the burden in the alliance.³⁷ In the face of these problems, Britain chose to maintain its policy that was consistent on the fundamentals of the preservation of the widest market (with the lowest possible tariffs) for British trade, the need for keeping Atlantic Alliance united as an anti-Soviet security device, and the maximization of British influence in a situation where all states were increasingly interdependent within the European framework rather than only just relying on the US and the Commonwealth.³⁸

To this end, Britain applied for membership to the EEC in 1963 which ended up failure upon the veto of France under the leadership De Gaulle who was in search for a European voice equidistant from both of the superpowers by allocating defense responsibilities to the EEC and there was not much place for Britain in his plans.

De Gaulle was after French leadership in Europe and this required distancing Britain from the rivalry by duplicating WEU in the EEC that seemed to be possible in association with FRG . To the dislike of members of the EEC, De Gaulle did not foresee any supranational arrangement in the field of either security or defense. This

³⁷ Aybet, *op.cit.*, in note 18, p. 93

³⁸ Young, *op.cit.*, in note 6, p. 103

was apparent in his proposal for Franco-German confederation including a common foreign and security policy around which “he envisaged a WEU like organization for the political union of the six, thus making WEU null and void and further disengaging Britain from European cooperation”³⁹. Even though, the remaining five did not support the idea because a political union without Britain could be unfavorable for smaller countries in the EEC and could result in Franco-German domination and a union on the terms of De Gaulle was a departure from the spirit of Rome Treaties, Britain was left out of the discussions that would shape the future of the Europe. This situation was also evident when Fouchet Committee started to work on drafting a treaty for a political union in 1961. The draft was not again acceptable to the remaining five members of the EEC because of the reasons indicated above. Britain, announced its willingness to participate in these deliberations for political union only when the deliberations approached to an end.

Even though, Fouchet committee works were watered down, it was an important signal of side effects for Britain to neglect the European integration process and emphasizing the need to put more attention on European integration and be a part of it to shape the events that would affect her foreign and security policy.

Indeed Britain had to make efforts on the side of Europe not only because of economic and political concerns but also to mitigate the effects of her enjoying the US assistance in developing her nuclear capability. MacMahon Act of 1954 in the US that was putting restriction on know-how transfer on the nuclear weapons and

³⁹ “De Gaulle Plan for the “six”, Sunday Times, 26 July 1961 Quoted in Aybet, op.cit., in note 18, p. 93

research and development activities to the allies for preventing nuclear proliferation amended in 1958 and only Britain was permitted to enjoy the exchange of information on nuclear issues with the US. This situation worsened the rift between Britain and European allies especially France that wanted to develop a nuclear capability independent from the US. The situation was further deteriorated when the US President John Kennedy and the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made a deal known as Nassau Accord in 1963 where it was agreed to supply Britain with Polaris missiles to be fitted with British warheads. The US that wanted to prevent nuclear proliferation behaved inconsistently by giving the Polaris to Britain and this became another major reason for De Gaulle's rejection of British bid for the ECC.

To heal the adverse effects of this inconsistency and to placate the concerns of allies especially that of FRG in nuclear sharing and decision making, the US official started to work on Multilateral Nuclear Force idea (MLF) to give a greater say to European allies in the nuclear decision-making. "The British became increasingly concerned about the proposal"⁴⁰. As Freeman noted "how to prevent Germans getting close to the nuclear trigger. The MLF might have helped Germans politically, but Britain was deeply suspicious of a device that appeared to encourage nuclear proliferation, albeit within the alliance"⁴¹. This put the Americans and British to the different sides. Furthermore, Britain feared that it would damage the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) process as the Soviets wanted MLF be dropped. Alternatively, British worked out Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). Although both of

⁴⁰ Brian White, Britain, Détente and Changing East-West relations (London : Routledge, 1992), p.115

⁴¹ J.P.G. Freeman, Britain's Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations 1957-1968 (London : Macmillan, 1986) p.169

the attempts dropped in the end for the sake of more appropriate intra alliance consultative arrangements, this pointed out the fact that the special relationship between London and Washington did not work well all the time.

The decline in the special relationship displayed itself in the Vietnam War, too, where Britain tried to act as intermediary between the Americans and North Vietnamese. This attempt failed because Wilson government refused to provide either material assistance or, more importantly to Washington diplomatic support when they escalated the crisis in Vietnam.⁴² After 1964, the special relationship was severely deteriorated.

The period of détente caught Britain under the circumstances described above. Neither was she the part of Western European integration, nor could she maintain the special relationship as intimate as in previous years. Moreover, she had to accept that she could not act as global power as envisaged after the Second World War when she withdraw East of Suez, as Clarke pointed out “taking the most decisive step so far to concentrate its security interests within the European continent.”⁴³

⁴² White, op.cit., in note 34, p. 110

⁴³ Clarke, op.cit., in note 28, p. 90

Britain and Détente

When the tough language of the Cold War started to relax, the decline of British influence on East-West relations confirmed by a deterioration of special relationship and by not being a part of Western European integration was evident. For both White and Clarke, the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was the last example where Britain had exercised its influence on superpower diplomacy.

Détente became a period where Britain sought to preserve allied unity badly influenced by French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command and by the burden sharing debates voiced louder by the American Congress. By seeking said objectives, Britain did not change its fundamental policy which was containment towards the USSR and preserving allied unity. "With Gaullist France effectively opting out NATO politics and Germany still wary of playing major role in European security, there was in any case little alternative for Britain but to step in as a key mender of Atlantic fences"⁴⁴ And to do that it had to maintain better relations with the EEC and to support the détente politics. If not, it would take the risk of being marginalized at a time when her relations were not at its best position with the Western Europe and the US. Moreover, its relations with the East and the USSR were thin. Even though Soviet Union was a major theme in British foreign policy, it had little to share with the USSR on bilateral basis in comparison with FRG and other countries of the European community.⁴⁵ Despite the fact that the trade relations were the essence of British relations with the Eastern block, its trade with all of them constituted more than 3% of British total trade, moreover these relations were largely

⁴⁴ Clarke, *op.cit.*, in note 28, p. 91

⁴⁵ Curtis Keeble, *Britain and Soviet Union, 1917-89* (London : Macmillan, 1990), pp.311-314

dependent on the state of broader East-West relations- if it was good, the cooperation was good, if it was bad, the relations were harmed -. Indeed Britain was simply lacking the more bilateral interests that would make it play a more prominent role.⁴⁶

In consideration of these facts and to preserve the allied unity, Wilson government first overcame the confusion created by the announcement of De Gaulle about France's withdrawal and when the US did not put forward a clear response to it. "There was evident lack of leadership within the alliance at this crucial time until British stepped into the breach"⁴⁷ Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart confirmed the British commitment to NATO and to the NATO's integrated military system. The other fourteen members of NATO also confirmed that the allies would continue to operate under the terms of 1949 Treaty, thus the crisis was handled successfully thanks to British decisive diplomacy pursued by the effective diplomacy of Minister of State George Thompson who paid visit to many of the NATO capitals and of Evelyn Shuckburgh, the British Permanent Representative.⁴⁸

Despite the fact that crisis caused by French was handled effectively, there was need to respond another problem, this time coming from the US Congress. The problem was about burden sharing and it required European allies to increase their share in the burden for their defense. The debate was essentially climaxed by the Mansfield Resolution of 1966 that was calling for a substantial decrease in US troops. The support for the resolution grew between 1967-1968. To respond this

⁴⁶ Clarke, *op.cit.*, in note 28, p. 93

⁴⁷ White, *op.cit.*, in note 34 .p. 128

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.129

challenge to the Atlantic cohesion, British Defense Secretary Denis Healey proposed to establish a ministerial forum in the Alliance for informal consultations. The EUROGROUP was established in 1968.

Although, it was not wanted to be turned into an ambitious arrangement in terms of European capability in the alliance, it managed to forestall the troops reduction pressure of Mansfield Resolution. In addition to this, EUROGROUP also served another objective that was to unite European allies for maximizing their influence on the bilateral strategic talks between the US and USSR. Thus Britain “ found herself increasingly in common accord with other EUROGROUP states in collective effort to ensure that the United States did not sacrifice Europe’s strategic interests in its search for accommodation with the Soviet Union”⁴⁹

In addition to above mentioned endeavor, Wilson government worked to gain the support of Ostpolitik of FRG from the Nixon Administration. In essence, British knew that the process would proceed anyway, therefore, they chose to support it before it caused a gap in the alliance.

The support of Ostpolitik indeed led to the further decline in British influence. Britain, whose second application to the EEC turned down in 1967, still could not become a part of the European community and started to be marginalized, this time by the effects of détente. Towards the end of 1960s, with the normalization of FRG-Soviet relations, the need for Britain declined in Moscow. In stead of

⁴⁹ John Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-84, 2nd Edition (London : Macmillan, 1984) p. 167

Britain, the influence of FRG began to grow. This played a significant role in leading Britain to a more Europeanized foreign and security policy while seeking to protect Atlanticist framework.

The European Foreign Policy and Security Initiatives and Britain in 1970s

By recognizing the possible marginalization in détente process, Britain further sought to be a part of the European community in 1973, this time with success. While on one hand, she was trying to consolidate her place in Western European networks and to increase its influence, on the other hand she was trying to tie the US in European initiatives in order to prevent a European foreign policy and security formation that was independent from the Atlantic framework. Ensuring of US involvement was important for Britain due to the fact that détente was only a variation of cold war and most probably a tactic of the Soviets to drop the guards of the Europe in the eyes of Europe. Therefore, Britain was very eager to interest the United States in Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that was being proposed for a long period of time by the USSR. For British FO, the CSCE could not achieve much but it was still presenting a source of concern because it could create more expectations about the CSCE's prospects on the western public opinion that could upset the cohesion of NATO. "While attempting to ensure that the United States became fully involved in the CSCE, the British Foreign Office also tried to prevent the other European allies from becoming over optimistic about it"⁵⁰ Although, Britain was not entirely successful in keeping the US interest in the

⁵⁰ Clarke, *op.cit.*, in note 28, p. 94

conference, the outcome of CSCE, Final Act, presented favorable outcomes providing a leverage to the public opinion in the Soviet Union by Basket III covering human rights for Western Europe to the surprise of Britain itself. What was more surprising than this, Britain realized that it could still maintain its influence within European framework in case she could not use NATO forum.

Britain owed to this increase in her influence to the European Political Cooperation (EPC) that launched with Davignon Report approved in October 1970. Although EPC, that was very loosely formed, did distance itself from defense and security fields after Henry Kissinger's Atlantic Charter – the then US Secretary of State- and confine these to Atlantic framework, it made Britain see that in the absence of clear-cut American leadership, more effect could be achieved within the EPC. She realized that EPC was advantageous to maintain the balance between negotiating with the East and preserving the unity of the West.⁵¹

Britain, by making a considerable effort, managed to safeguard the alliance unity during years of détente by strengthening its position as a manager within the alliance. British foreign policy was enjoying a considerable domestic consensus. Before 1975 the CSCE and the policies towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance were not a subject of public debate and as Clarke comments “the change of government from Labor to Conservative in 1970 and then another Labor victory in February 1974, made no discernible difference to the political outlook on broader issues”⁵²

⁵¹ Clarke, *op.cit.*, in note 28, p. 94.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p.95.

The year 1975 meant a change in détente politics in Europe caused by regional rivalry between the superpowers (1973 Arab-Israeli War; Angola in 1974-75; 1977- 78 Ogaden War) and by the delay in the ratification of SALT II by the US Congress. The year 1975 meant a change in the British foreign policy when Margaret Thatcher was elected as the leader of Conservative Party. The new cold war was about to start and the bipartisanship on the foreign policy was also about to fracture with the rise of New Right that would determine the British policies for the next decade and a half.

CHAPTER 4

BRITAIN IN 1980s

When détente was over , the new cold war imposed new problems in terms of both Western European allies and Britain. The change of the international climate was not the only difficulty that Britain had to deal with. She had to work on the economic problems that forced Labor governments to ask for loan from International Monetary Fund (IMF). Rising unemployment and the discussions of British contribution to the budget of European Community were the other problems that Britain had to face. The economic difficulties coupled with the troubles with the Community brought the rise of New Right under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher.

This chapter will study the changes that Thatcher brought to the foreign policy making of Britain in terms of Western European security and foreign policy integration within the context new cold war. While doing this, the chapter will cover the years between 1975 and the end1980s. These periods will be studied in terms of three conservative governments of Conservative party under the leadership of Thatcher ; 1979-1983, 1983-1987 and 1987-1990.

The major disturbances happened between those years, the Euro missile crisis, INF negotiations and Strategic Defense Initiative, contributing the revival of WEU will be studied in terms of British politics pursued during these years. The chapter intends to show that even though there would not a reappraisal in the British foreign and security policy, the inclination to Europe became lukewarm and Atlanticist side of her policies were strengthened. However, it will also reveal the end 1980s, in the prospect of above-mentioned crisis, the cooperation with Europe became an indispensable part in the British security policy and could not be ignored within a isolationist approach.

The End of Détente and Britain towards the End of 1970s

Détente that effectively ended in 1979 with the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan, started to be deteriorated as off 1975s. Not only because of the resurrection of superpower rivalry in Third World and the delay in the ratification of SALT II in the US Congress but also because of the Soviet Union's inclination to expand its navy, air force and missile systems. This situation became a concern in Britain too although Labor government was still committed to détente. This commitment was also generating differences in policies of Britain with those of the US especially when President Carter decided to use human rights issue in CSCE review conferences to push the USSR and to appeal the Soviet Union in 1977-78.

For Britain, however, “The CSCE process had turned into a weapon that could be used by the West; but it was... one which had to be used with care”⁵³.

The policy differences as illustrated in CSCE conferences were marking the the decline of British influence in East-West relations.

When Margaret Thatcher won the leadership of Conservative party in 1975, she started to criticize the commitment of Labor Party to détente policy. In the speech she made to Chelsea Conservatives in July 1975, she was saying

Détente sounds a fine word. And to the extent that there has really been relaxation in international tension, it is fine thing. But fact remains that throughout this decade of détente, the armed forces of Soviet Union have increased are increasing and show no sign of diminishing⁵⁴

For Labor government, however, as it was defended by Foreign Secretary David Owen in his speech delivered in March 1977 to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers’ Association, détente was a historical process that could not remove the areas of competition that was existing in the nature of continuing bipolar struggle between East and West, however, détente was expected to expand the areas of cooperation to contract the areas of competition thus requiring careful maintenance of confrontation and cooperation⁵⁵

⁵³ P. Williams, Britain, détente and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Quoted in K. Dyson (ed.), European Détente (London . printer, 1986) pp.221-37

⁵⁴ White, op.cit., in note 34 .p. 138

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 139

The party uneasiness on the issue of détente and the worsening climate of East-West with the invasion of Afghanistan and the election of Conservative party in 1979 in Britain did not let détente politics go on any further.

The Conservative Government and The New Cold War

The invasion of Afghanistan vindicated a long standing position of British FO about the sincerity of the Soviets on détente. “ As for a former head of Foreign Office put in 1976, The Soviet Doctrine of peaceful coexistence as struggle is primary, strategic and comprehensive; Soviet statements about *détente* (emphasis in the text) are secondary, tactical and partial ”⁵⁶ With incoming new Conservative government whose leader was known for her hard-head approach, the policy for reestablishing Anglo-American special relationship which served very well to British during the Cold War years, and toughening the British position against the USSR became the major themes of British security policy between 1979-1983. This attitude broke the bipartisanship consensus on defense policy in Britain by making Labor party adopting unilateral disarmament policy that would last until 1987.

For re-establishing the special relationship and to support her tough rhetoric against the Soviets, Prime Minister Thatcher culminated a very good relationship with the President Regan of the US by pursuing too overt Atlanticist policies and by making strongest statements during Afghanistan crisis and imposition of martial law

⁵⁶ Thomas Brimlowe Quoted in Julian Critchey, The North Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union in 1980s (London : Macmillan, 1982) pp.20-1

in the Poland. She also supported NATO's decision to increase defense spending 3 per cent per annum and endorse "dual track" decision of NATO and decided to buy Trident missile system from the US. Prime Minister Thatcher was not the first prime minister to seek close relationship with the US.⁵⁷ In fact, as being a traditional tenet of the British policy identifying the need to have influence over the US for security interests, Thatcher government was restoring the special relationship that declined after the end of 1960s between the leaders – it must be noted that it continued on intelligence and nuclear sharing level despite the cool relations between the leaders-. The striking feature about the Thatcher diplomacy in the period is that despite her strong public statements on the side of the US, the Prime Minister managed to apply tactical differences so as to be inconformity with that of her allies in Europe. For example, she did not apply the sanctions against the Soviet during Polish crisis.

The culmination of this relationship paid back to Britain during the Falkland Crisis in 1982 that ended with British success and strengthening the hand of Mrs. Thatcher. However, this relationship was not enough to overcome the differences between the US and Britain as it happened in Grenade case . When US interfered Grenade, a member of Commonwealth, in 1983 without consulting Britain, this created uneasiness in Britain and for Mrs. Thatcher. The uneasiness was further coupled during the INF negotiations and the announcement of Strategic Defense Initiative. All these events made Western European allies, including Britain, think of

⁵⁷ Wyn Rees, "The Anglo-American Security Relationship," in Stuart Croft (ed.), British Security Policy : The Thatcher Years and The End of Cold War (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991) p.144

their own security and defense arrangement in the second half of 1980s when a new détente started.

Second Thatcher Government and Efforts for Separate Western European Security Arrangement

The differences in national security interests between the European allies and the US became visible approximately a decade before the new détente began in 1984. During Middle East crisis, the European allies, as having a desire for preserving détente and as being heavily dependent on Arab oil, had decided to follow a foreign policy divergent to that of the US, that felt Soviet policy in the Middle East was contradictory to the understanding of détente⁵⁸. This resulted in the formation of EPC but vindicated that the foreign policy differences between the US and Europe could entrap, as termed by Jane Sharp and used by Aybet in her book, Europe vis-à-vis the Soviets and this situation necessitated to separate arrangement for European foreign policy and security identity.⁵⁹ This idea was further reinforced with the disapproval of Western European public on NATO's decision for mounting Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe. Through such a separate European arrangement, it was not only possible to legitimize NATO's decision, but also it would be possible to deal with East-West relations on European terms. To this end several initiatives started.

⁵⁸ Aybet, *op.cit.*, in note 18, p. 132

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 134

Gencher-Colombo Proposal in 1981 proposing coordination of security policy, a common foreign policy and the bringing the EC and EPC under European Council, was made. Gencher-Colombo proposal watered down due to the differences among the member states of the EC. Gencher-Colombo proposal was not received with a great deal of an enthusiasm in Britain as Britain was not willing to change the status quo in existing security system. Britain was still culminating the special relationship and she did not want to be disturbed by an action that would create doubts about the cohesion of NATO in terms of the US. But this situation started to change, as explained above, with start of INF negotiations and SDI initiative. These developments intersected with the election of Conservative party for the second time in 1984.

When Mrs. Thatcher was elected in 1984 for second term, discussions on INF and SDI were not the only developments that forced Britain to think again a separate Western European security arrangements. Mrs. Thatcher was started to be criticized for her tough policy on the Soviet Union and she was recommended to take advantage of new conditions appearing in the international context by considering the difficulties in INF and SDI. Defense Secretary Lord Carrington was urging the Prime Minister for returning a more balanced policy between the Europe and the US. In line with these recommendations, Prime Minister managed to balance her policy and increase the British influence both in Western Europe and in East-West relations. In terms East-West relations, she became an important communication channel between the US and the USSR due to her special relationship with both President Reagan and General Secretary, Gorbachev, providing a considerable input through negotiations and consultations for relaxation of the affairs between the

superpowers further consolidated British influence as being interlocutor. In terms of Western Europe, she, because of consolidating her role as interlocutor, was accepted as representing the interests of Western Europe as well.

It was during 1986- 87 period that Mrs. Thatcher could fully exploit her position as the senior Western Leader in her dealings with the East.... During her visit to Moscow at the end of March 1987 when having made a point of consulting with both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in advance she let be known that she was representing European interests. As the superpowers moved inexorably towards an INF agreement, those interests included growing European resistance to any further denuclearization of Europe⁶⁰

However, once bilateral relations between the superpowers proceeded, the influence of Britain began to decrease. This situation became apparent due to the lack of consultation of the US with her allies during the arm control deals with the USSR. This attitude of the US was very disturbing for the allies including Britain. This disturbance led to the decision of revitalizing the WEU in 1984 with Rome Declaration. Britain, by approving the process of revitalization of WEU, not only tried to side with the her Western European allies but also she was trying to restore her declining image due to the debates on British contribution to the EU budget and her overt Atlanticist standing. With the Rome declaration, Western European allies were searching for the ways that could increase the profile of WEU by strengthening Western European political, psychological military dimensions.

⁶⁰ White, op.cit., in note 34 .p. 149

The correctness of decision of initiating the revitalization process of WEU was further vindicated with SDI initiative of President Reagan. Although the Western European allies did not form a common response to the initiative that envisaged a protection shield for the US from the nuclear attacks. European allies had reservations on it because it would leave Western Europe without protection. There were some other of reasons of the reservation of allies. Firstly, SDI seemed to changing the NATO strategy from flexible response to defense; Secondly, the Soviets could build their own shield which could undermine the deterrent value of French and Britain nuclear forces; thirdly, the Western Europe could not provide necessary public support for it as they had newly accepted to receive new missiles to their own soils.⁶¹ The US was proposing technical cooperation in the initiative to all interested European parties. Even through WEU, Western European allies could not obtain a common response to it. Without the absence of coordinated response, Britain accepted to participate in SDI activities. With SDI saga, WEU revitalization process seemed to be slowed down. However, the process would be soon accelerated when Reykjavik Summit meeting between the US and the Soviets were held in October 1986 and continued throughout 1987. This coincided with the third term of Thatcher Government.

Third Thatcher Government and Changes in East-West Relations

The Reykjavik Summit between the US and the Soviets in October 1986 offended the European allies because of complete lack of consultancy with them. At

⁶¹ Ibid., p.145

the summit both parties agreed to eliminate all land-based missiles. Western European were concerned about a total elimination of INF in Europe thus exposing Europe to Soviet short range nuclear missiles. Moreover they also disliked the idea of 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear systems decision that would require a drastic improvement in NATO's conventional forces. For the sake of Western European allies, Reykjavik summit ended up with failure. But it underlined the fact that the US's lack of consultancy with her allies as she did in INF negotiations and announcement of SDI. The dislike of European allies on the unilateralism of the US in the decisions closely relating to Western Europe displayed itself in Western European Charter of Security Principles prepared by French Prime minister Jacques Chirac. Same dislike was also expressed by British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech made in Brussels. Britain was proposing to create a forum in which Europe could make its contribution to the East-West debate and WEU was a suitable forum to this end; hence the European pillar of the Alliance could be strengthened and be prepared if the US decided to reduce its defense commitments in the continent.⁶². With the effect of these calls, a Platform on European Security Interests adopted in October 1987. But it must be noted that Britain was opposing to the word charter as proposed by the French for the revival in order not to upset the Atlantic harmony.

The British influence, unlike the years between 1984-1987, was not forthcoming due to the events explained above. While turning her face to Europe,

⁶² "Howe Hints NATO must be Ready for US Military Cuts in Europe", Guardian 17 March 1987
Quoted in Aybet, op.cit., in note 18, p. 152

Britain was facing difficulties in her relations with the US as well as with the Soviets. The difficulty in the relations with the USSR caused by the expulsion of Soviet diplomats due the spying allegations which was reciprocated by the Soviets in 1989. President Bush unlike President Reagan was not very much keen on maintaining the special relationship with London as intense as before and to the fears of Britain, this became visible in the first visit of President Bush in Europe. In the wake of changes in the late 1980s, President Bush seemed to be more interested in a relationship with Bonn rather than London.

Thatcher was severely criticized for her formidable Atlantcist standing on the grounds that she dutifully realized the 3 per cent increase in the defense budget, allowed the United States to stage the April 1986 attack on Libya from the bases in Britain, stepped forward as the first NATO ally to cooperate with the US in SDI research programs. The British press started to name the Prime Minister as “Little Lady Eco” or “ Reagan’s Poodle”⁶³ Mrs. Thatcher seemed to be not comprehending the deep changes in the late 1980s that would soon required British response.

In late 1980s, the other Western European leaders, particularly German and French leaders that comprehended the changes better was calling for deeper European cooperation and were exchanging views compressively. Britain, despite her reluctant contribution to the revitalization of WEU, was still ambivalent “hesitating between skepticism about the possibilities of real progress, misgivings

⁶³White, op.cit., in note 34 .p. 149

about the perceived dangers of undermining the prior commitment to Atlantic solidarity, and reluctance to be left out”⁶⁴ But for many intellectuals in Britain,

The real danger for British interests in accepting secondary role, especially in the view of political, military and industrial interests at stake. The British government ... must take up more enthusiastic declaratory policy and offer specific commitments rather than bland generalities. If it does not, the European Allies could all too readily conclude that British reticence disguises indifference if not disapproval⁶⁵

The end of 1980s and 1990s would pose a number of important security problems that Britain had to face by trying to keep its Atlanticist stand and trying to be a part of European arrangements that would be discussed in the following chapter.

⁶⁴ James Eberle, John Roper, William Wallace , Phil William, “European Security Cooperation British Interest, “ in International Affairs, 60, no.4, 1984, p 545

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.546

CHAPTER 5

BRITAIN IN 1990s

In this chapter, the most notable events that have influenced the European security arrangements in 1990s up to 2001 and their effects on the arrangements will be analyzed by focusing on the British security perceptions. The establishment of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), aspirations of European Union to extend its competences in defense field, formation and strengthening European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and to equip it with necessary means to give it a genuine identity are the notable events that will be dealt with throughout the chapter.

The chapter will also scrutinize the British core security assumptions and perceptions on the question of having European Union get common security and defense policy and evaluate the above-mentioned events in terms of these assumptions and perceptions as well as British negotiation position in Maastricht and Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) and her approach in Helsinki and Nice European Council Meetings.

While doing it, the Saint Malo process will particularly be assessed as it represents a shift in the policies of Britain towards European security arrangement.

Saint Malo is considered to be a major step in the realization of ESDP. The reasons of said shift, such as consecutive crisis in the Balkans, will be studied together with its impacts, albeit they could be best assessed in the long run, on the European security arrangements up to 2001.

When the chapter illustrates above mentioned developments, it does not go into the details of European Union's institutional mechanisms operating ESDP except the ones affecting the British negotiation positions.

British Security Policies After The Cold War

Although, the signs of profound changes that would put an end to bi-polar international system started to be apparent from mid-1980s the change became visible at the end of the decade. Mikhail Gorbachev's rising to power in 1985 was indeed a turning point that ignited the events which would result in the change of international system. Gorbachev who wanted to heal economic and political problems in the Soviet system introduced *perestroika* (*restructuring*) into the economy and *glasnost* (*openness*) into the political system which would soon become a catalyst for the Soviet disintegration.

With the introduction of perestroika Gorbachev planned to rehabilitate the Soviet economy. However he also recognized the fact that such rehabilitation needed a substantial cut on military expenditures, namely decreasing arms race, thus removing war threat by relaxing of tense relations with the West. After missing an important opportunity in Reykjavik summit in 1986 to this end, in order to prevent exhaustion of the economic sources and to provide necessary relaxation, Gorbachev had to go for unilateral reductions that he announced in a speech made at the United Nations in December 1988. With this announcement, the Soviet Union cut 500.000 men and 10.000 tanks, including the ones facing NATO and reorganized the rest of the forces in Central Europe for defensive purposes.

Despite various efforts one of which is indicated above, *Perestroika* that proved to be inefficient to solve the problems of an economy that was mismanaged, resulted in the decrease of industrial and agricultural production and in the increase of inflation, foreign debt and trade deficits⁶⁶.

The economic discontent coupled by demands for autonomy and independence of ethnic groups and the states in the Union made perestroika and glasnost an opportunity to obtain more freedom that would lead even to independence and/or getting out of the Soviet sphere of influence. "In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany, the communist parties' predominance was challenged by groups demanding more freedom and invoking Basket III of the Helsinki Accords on human rights. The periodic review meetings of the European

⁶⁶ Joseph Smith, The Cold War Second Edition, 1945-1991 (Oxford: Balckwell Publishers Ltd. 1989), p. 85

Security Conference kept the issue alive.”⁶⁷ Gorbachev, who had to make political choice between “political suicide” by intervening Eastern Europe in the face of the developments and “the slow erosion of his power”, chose liberalization.⁶⁸ In parallel with this choice, he seemed to give up Brezhnev Doctrine demanding the Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe by renouncing “spheres of influence” in a speech that he made to Council of Europe in July 1989⁶⁹.

Liberalization however proved to be counter productive and further encouraged the states that would like to get back their independence. First came the three Baltic states which lost their independence in 1940 when Stalin forcibly annexed them to the Union; Estonia in 1988 and followed by Latvia and Lithuania in 1990. Non-communist government took power in Poland in August 1989 whereas the liberal communists came into power in Hungary that opened its borders to the West in September 1989. Communist administration in Romania was overthrown and non-communist government in Czechoslovakia came to power in December 1989. The most astounding among all was the fall down of Berlin Wall in November 1989 and reunification Germany in October 1990. The end of Cold war was proclaimed to end in CSCE in November 1990. By 1991 the Soviet Union lost its sovereign entity and in December 1991 it formally dissolved and became the Commonwealth of Independent States.

⁶⁷ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.793

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p,794

All these developments that could be hardly expected by the Western alliance 10 years earlier posed important security questions not only on the Western Alliance but also on Britain. Although it is not the aim of this thesis to make a comprehensive analysis of the security concerns in 1990s, it is still significant to refer them, albeit in a brief manner, since they acted a substantial role in acceleration of European integration on security and in order to understand the British security politics in 1990s and to evaluate its overall strategy and the tactics within this integration. As William Wallace stated, “Foreign policy should start from an understanding of the international context within which national governments have to define-and defend-their national interests”⁷⁰.

The security concerns could, concisely, be based on two main reasons: First the need of cold war institutions, including NATO, the EC, CSCE and the WEU, to redefine their tasks and objectives and second the need of Western alliance to accommodate the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.⁷¹

Faced with the Soviet threat and unable to provide for its own defense, Western European states had little choice but to put their past differences aside and cooperate with each other under collective defense system led by the US. But over the years, the relationship between the Western European states which evolved from this restrictive framework eventually became customized through a process of mutual transactions and the emergence of “mutual responsiveness”. The end result has been the emergence of a security community in Deutsch’s terms...⁷²

⁷⁰ William Wallace , “British Foreign Policy after the Cold War,” in International Affairs, 68, no. 3(1992), p. 423

⁷¹Aybet, op.cit., in note 19, p.168 (London: Macmillan Pres, 1997)

⁷² Ibid, p.177

Now that a consensus on code of conduct for a security community had been formed over the years, it was not in the interest of any state in the western alliance to put aside the security community and turned back to territorial rivalry thus into instability. Therefore, the preservation and reconstruction of these institutions was for the benefit of all states in the alliance to face the uncertainties of 1990s. Among these institutions, NATO seemed to be getting priority in the list of the institutions that should be preserved and reconstructed. Its reconstruction and maintaining its prominent role in the alliance structure were particularly important to Britain of which reasons will be analyzed in the proceeding sections of this chapter.

As for the accommodation of new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, it was an important priority of Western European states as any instability in these regions would directly influence the overall security of Western Europe. However, then, it was not likely to integrate the states in Central and Eastern Europe into the security structure of the Western Europe in the short term. Therefore, political cooperation with these states became an initial step to be taken to accommodate them. This sort of cooperation included providing economic aid which made the EC very important for these states.⁷³

Because of the basic reasons indicated in the preceding paragraphs, NATO and the EC would become a major theme of security scrutiny. Whereas the NATO commenced the process of redefinition of its tasks with the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance that was announced in the London Summit

⁷³ Ibid. P. 168

1990, the EC was calling for further integration that was demanded to be discussed in an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on economic and monetary union as well as on the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This call was put as a formal request before The European Council in 1990 by a joint letter of France and Western Germany. Indeed, the redefinition of the tasks of NATO and the further integration in the EC in the field of security have been displaying overlapping nature. The EC's involvement into union encompassing the security field at the beginning of 1990s can not be separated from the redefinition process of NATO's tasks. Because the security arrangements to be made in the union particularly envisaged the full merger between WEU and the EC. This sowed the seeds of contention among the members of the EC and in the western allies. The comprehensive review initiated in the London summit announced in London declaration designated three different levels having different tasks in the process⁷⁴ which would result in the definition of NATO's "core functions" in the NATO Summit to be held in Copenhagen in June 1991. However, to define these "core functions" could have been possible only when a compromise that reached with the EC's goal of having a CFSP that presented a contentious process that began in the wake of the reunification of Germany.

The reunification of Germany, in addition to the strong desire to preserve the institutions established during the years of cold war of which reasons are indicated above, was a substantial factor in accelerating the integration of Europe. This

⁷⁴ Gülnur Aybet, *op.cit.*, in note 19 p. 180, defined the levels. The first one is North Atlantic Council responsible for discussing fundamental political questions of Nato's role, the second level is the Strategy Review Group formed in Defence Planning and Policy Division International Staff responsible for formulating NATO's new Strategic Concept and the last one is the Military Committee in charge of implementing of the new strategy.

acceleration brought the above mentioned call of France and Western Germany for an IGC on economic, monetary and political union. France that needed to anchor the united Germany into Western Europe in order to prevent any decrease in its international influence because of a strengthened Germany took diplomatic lead to underwrite EC unification. For France, dealing with Germany's reunification problem within the community was the most appropriate way.

Germany stayed aloof to the call of France at the beginning due to the necessity of dealing with national problems of reunification first such as economic and monetary convergence between the two Germanys. She wanted the reunification to happen without external disturbances which could be well prevented by Germany's demonstration of its commitment to Western Europe. Besides, France has always been in favor of autonomy for European based security arrangements and re-balancing Euro-American relationship and in this sense it could be said that the reunification of Germany and the collapse of Berlin Wall when NATO's days were assumed to be numbered presented her a good reason to open the discussions of European security arrangements.

Despite France and Germany's interests intersected on further European unification particularly on political integration aiming to form CFSP that later evolved in Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) , it was definitely so neither for Britain nor the United States in early 1990s. When French-German joint letter published for convening IGC to Irish Presidency of the EC, a strong opposition came from Britain. British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher had always had a dislike to any endeavor that might imply deeper integration that could

undermine NATO which should be the only forum for handling defense and security issues and that could cause the loss of sovereignty of individual states. Indeed Mrs. Thatcher had already illustrated her European ideal on the integration in one of her speech in Bruges in 1987. “The European ideal was best envisaged through the centrality of the nation state and via intense cooperation between states-not through the integration that undermines them”⁷⁵. “Given the centrality to the entire CESDP story of French aspirations for autonomy, and of “Anglo-Saxon” resistance to such notions, it is worth analyzing closely debates of the early 1990s”⁷⁶.

While analyzing these debates, France’s point of view, as representing Euro-centered thinking and as igniting the Euro-centered security debates in early 1990s needs to be referred briefly in order to reveal the resistance points of Anglo-Saxon better. For Howorth, these views of France could be traced in the Franco-German joint letter calling for IGC and they can be summarized as follows⁷⁷:

- Aspiration for rebalancing of Euro-American relationship
- Want of labor division between NATO and the EC. Collective defense issues to be for NATO where as collective security matters to be progressively absorbed by the EC
- Aspiration for greater security role for the EC probably through WEU
- Accommodation of newly emerged democracies of Central and Eastern Europe through CSCE or by the EC not by NATO

⁷⁵ Clarke, *op.cit.*, in note 28 p.134

⁷⁶ Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defence: The ultimate challenge? (Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2000) p. 5

⁷⁷ Ibid. P,6

- Maintenance of Defense Budgets as the end of Cold War does not mean the end of threats in Europe.

The Key Largo meetings held between President Mitterrand and President Bush in 1990 right after the publication of the letter including above mentioned viewpoints encountered a different approach expressed by President Bush representing Anglo-Saxon resistance to French aspirations.

Although Bush did indeed refer to the need to establish a political dialogue between the EC and the United States, and although he envisaged a strengthened role for CSCE in a reconciled Europe, his overwhelming concern was for the future of NATO...The United States wanted to transform NATO from military to a much more political alliance, embracing collective security tasks and immediately restructuring NATO's military forces to reflect the new reality. France wanted to maintain the Alliance as a strictly collective defense structure and to ensure that the politics of European transformation should essentially be the responsibility of the EC⁷⁸

Although the views of President Bush on the issue of NATO's restructuring representing almost the British position, it must be noted that Britain initially opposed to NATO's adoption of collective security, it soon became clear for Britain, that NATO was the only reliable organization that could assume the role. As for the CSCE, Britain thought that it was always a useful form and there were various roles that it could play but maintenance and enforcement of collective security was not one of them.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p,7

Britain & Treaty on European Union & Treaty of Amsterdam

When IGC on political union and economic and monetary union convened in December 1990 in Rome the position of Britain and the France have been already established and the run-up to the EC's Maastricht summit concentrated on reconciling these positions.

France favored the EC to bear responsibilities for European security by making WEU its defense and security arm. Britain favored closer ties with Europe, but maintaining NATO as the main security and defense forum for Europe with the WEU serving as its European pillar.⁷⁹ 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the inability of Europeans to respond such crises thus made France with the support of Spain and Italy, argued for a common foreign and security policy more severely by supporting the idea of merging WEU into the EC upon the expiry of the WEU Treaty in 1998. Britain, on the other hand, together with the Netherlands and Germany was hesitant of giving the EC military identity which might result in collapse of NATO. Nevertheless, WEU became an important point on the IGC agenda over which opposing views of member states, particularly that of France and of Britain fought each other.

A proposal of the Italian Presidency to IGC calling for WEU's putting under the aegis of European Council by incorporating article 5 of Brussels Treaty into the new political treaty advocated by Franco-German proposal made in February 1991.

⁷⁹ Aybet, op.cit. in note 4, p.173

This proposal was suggesting European Council's making the directives and guidelines of a CFSP implemented by WEU. These two proposals apparently aiming to end up in the full merger of WEU into the EC were not acceptable to Britain. Britain was scared of alienating US by making it pursue isolationist policies. Instead, Britain revealed its position once more with a paper jointly prepared with Italy in which it envisaged a bridge role for WEU "in forming the defense arm of the EC and the European pillar of the alliance simultaneously"⁸⁰. Furthermore the paper defined a out-of area role for European forces on contrary to Franco-German proposal ,made shortly after Anglo-Italian paper, to create a European army based on available Franco-German brigades –Euro-corps-. Euro-corps seemed to have overlapping functions with those of NATO. Britain and the United States criticized the Eurocorps proposal severely at a meeting of NATO's defense ministers convened in Taormian, Sicily.

While these debate were going on, NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991 was timely to define the relations between the institutions.

Shortly before the Maastricht Summit, the NATO Rome Summit in November acknowledged that no one institution could address the challenges facing Europe by itself, and therefore these tasks fell upon a " framework of interlocking institutions". This would be consist of complementary relationship between NATO, the EC , the WEU and the CSCE....The role of WEU was acknowledged as developing the defense arm of the European Union and as means of strengthening the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance⁸¹

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 184

⁸¹ Ibid., p., 185

The Anglo-Italian view won over the Franco-German view in Rome Summit of NATO. However to the content of France, NATO's Rome Summit acknowledged the importance of an European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to be developed in compliance with NATO and provided a green light to Europeans to create new security and defense arrangements in the EC through WEU⁸².

The resulting Maastricht Treaty signed in December 1991 was carefully worded outcome of the fierce debates and called upon its members "to establish a common foreign and security policy, which might in time lead to a common defense"⁸³ by making WEU an integral part of development of European Union, however stating that common security and defense policy had to be compatible with the Alliance.

During the IGC conferences prior to Maastricht Council meeting, during Maastricht negotiations themselves and throughout the tediously long 1996 IGC leading to Amsterdam Treaty, it was the British government that led the resistance the newly born CFSP to take on serious defense remit via European Union itself.⁸⁴ Britain has always promoted and advocated the development of a serious European Security and Defense Capability, indeed recognized the significant need towards this capability as a result of the events happened in mid 1980s which was explained in preceding chapter and during the crisis in the Balkans albeit as long as NATO remained the primary reference and the intergovernmental nature of decision making

⁸² Peter Van Ham, "The Prospects for a European Security and Defense Identity", in European Security, 4, no.4, 199, p.534

⁸³ Ibid., p., 529

⁸⁴ Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics" in European Foreign Affairs Review, 5, 2000, p., 380

on CFSP was preserved. Atlanticism has been always the primary referrence for Britain even though there were occasions when Britain+ acted in defiance of US policy ⁸⁵. To understand better the Atlanticist nature of British policies, the core assumptions constructing them should be referred to.

As a status-quo power, Britain, characteristically, believes in the diplomatic process to change the status-quo rather constructing the conditions to change it. “And if the British are characteristically vague over what might be constructed, they are very clear on what must be preserved in any future European security arrangements”⁸⁶ And the elements to be preserved actually were forming the core assumptions of British Atlanticist policy. Michael Clarke has found out three core assumptions around which British policy towards European future security structure shaped⁸⁷

The first element was the preservation of US interest and involvement of European Security issues. Britain perceives the importance of creating and strengthening of ESDI for the cases where the United States could be unwilling to intervene. However it is still very important to preserve US involvement in Europe. There are two basic reasons that could be considered under this heading. In the first place, the US provides pretty significant military and economic resources which can not be easily replaced by the Europeans. American superiority does not only base on

⁸⁵ Profosser Howorth, op.cit., in note 76, noted Suez crisis as an example for British policy diference from the that of US and secret tmeetings of President Georges Pompidou and prime Minster Edward Heath to combine French and British military and nuclear capabilities to increase the autonmoy of Europe from the US.

⁸⁶ Clarke, Op.cit., in note 28 p. 127

⁸⁷ Ibid.,pp 127-129

its conventional and nuclear forces but also bases upon its extraordinary means in the field of operation planning including communications, electronic warfare and intelligence upon which any military operation would fall back. The defense expenditures of the allies altogether did not and does not match the US expenditure in the defense field which requires huge spending on Search& Development activities. Even if necessary allocation could have been made on the budget of European allies, it had not been wise for Britain to do so especially if there was a possibility of being “intelligent consumer of NATO’s military service”⁸⁸. Therefore, “The institutionalization through NATO and close bilateral relations of this enormous US potential in European security provides considerable reassurance that it will not be called upon”⁸⁹. If institutionalization could be achieved, the US involvement was guaranteed when ESDI could not respond a case imposing important threats on the security of Europe. The reason verifying the US involvement is in parallel with the first one that is the involvement of the US has always brought a diplomatic movement in the conflictual cases as it happened in Bosnian crisis. After staying aloof to the crisis for three years, it was the American initiative that brought an end to the conflict. The influence of this element can be observed both in Maastricht (1990-91) and Amsterdam (1996-97) British negotiation positions.

The second element constructing the Atlanticist policies of Britain and having impact on above mentioned negotiation positions is linked with the first one that is preservation of so called “special relationship” between Britain and the US. The

⁸⁸ Howorth, Op.cit., in note 76, p. 390

⁸⁹ Clarke, Op.cit., in note 28 p. 128

special relationship has been the cornerstone of British politics for the last 40 years.⁹⁰ Although it is not always possible to trace the relationship with the same intensity- having ups and downs-, the relationship displays itself on every possible occasion and Britain has benefited from this relationship more largely in comparison with the benefit of the United States. The apex of the relationship could be best observed during the Cold War through the close relationship between the leaders of the two states- Churchill and Roosevelt, Macmillan and Kennedy, Callaghan and Carter, Thatcher and Reagan-. This relationship has made a significant contribution to the strong image of Britain in the world during the cold war despite of its declining strength and becoming a medium power in postwar period particularly marked by its withdrawal from East of Suez in 1967. Britain enjoyed a comprehensive intelligence cooperation, nuclear cooperation and armament systems in both deployment and testing weapons that was not enjoyed by any other European state for a considerable period of time. It also received a considerable support of the US during Falklands War in 1982. Britain, in exchange, proved that she was good ally of Washington in every possibility though she was severely criticized because of this by its European partners. For instance, “Britain dutifully implemented the 3 per cent real increase in defense resources between 1979 and 1985 and agreed to take a larger share of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLMC)”⁹¹. Another example is the permission of Britain given the US to use F111 aircrafts based in Britain when it attacked on Libya in April 1986.

⁹⁰ Christopher Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The special relationship in 1990s”, in International Affairs, 68, no.3, 1992, p, 407

⁹¹ Wyn Rees, op.cit., in note 51, p, 148

In addition to special relationship, Britain defined herself a new role that was a duty of being interlocutor or so called “honest broker” between the Western European states and the Washington. This role has especially strengthened with Thatcher. “Britain attempted to explain European concerns in Washington and dispel the impression of weakness and vacillation gained by the Americans”⁹².

As the relationship was not always smooth, the intermediary role of British government was put into test with the announcement of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, Euro missile Crisis and Reykjavik Summit in 1986. Indeed these events, studied in the preceding chapter at the revitalization efforts of WEU, not only put intermediary role of Britain in test but also constituted some of several sources of friction causing decline in the special relationship. It must be noted that the cause of the decline in special relationship was no due to party politics in Britain. “Leaders of the Labor Party are not generally less committed to the relationship with Washington than those in the Conservative Party. Rather it has been a matter of circumstance and friendship at the apex of special relationship”⁹³ Harold Wilson, the leader of the Labor Party did not have good relations with Lyndon Johnson because the Vietnam war was going on and there was a general decline in the relationship with the US particularly because of Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez in 1967. Same goes with Conservative Party leader Edward Heath who also did not enjoy good relations with President Nixon who was in the office during the US withdrawal from Vietnam and British intensive attempts of becoming a member of the EC in 1973.

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ Clarke, Op.cit., in note 28 p. 133

Nevertheless, the special relationship between Britain and the US seems still continuing and it seems that it will continue to have an important place in British politics as one of its core assumptions.

The third element complementary to British Atlanticism and shaping its position on the future of European Security issues is her desire to maintain room for political and military maneuvering. Britain as being one of the most prominent military powers in Europe and as having military specialization that she can employ when necessary as she did in the “ Gulf War in 1991, in peacekeeping and peace support operations as in Cyprus, former Yugoslavia, Angola, Rwanda, Mozambique, Cambodia, Western Sahara, Somalia and Haiti”⁹⁴ and as having a seat on UN Security Council and being the most important member of Commonwealth has extra European interests as happened in the Falkland crisis in 1982. Therefore, she needs political and military flexibility. This need of Britain resulted in her strict intergovernmentalism in negotiations both prior to Maastricht and to Amsterdam that also respond the domestic skepticism over an increased federalism

The Government believes that the nation state should be the basic building block in constructing the kind of international order we wish to see; that the nation state remains in particular the fundamental entity for co-operation in the field of defense...so the unshakeable conviction on which our approach to the development of a European defense policy will be based on inter-governmental, co-operation between nation states⁹⁵.

Depending on these three basic elements, it can be concluded that Britain in the immediate post cold war period saw the real threat not in the European crises but in the collapse of collective security approaches in Western Europe that had been

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.131

⁹⁵ Ibid. p.,130

established and flourished for a considerable period of time and proved to be very productive. “For Britainno European crises are uncontrollable if the Western allies deal with them through a genuinely collective approach. But a comparatively minor and distant crisis could be debilitating for British interests if it sows disunity within the Western Camp”⁹⁶ The resistance of Britain over the European Union’s getting a defense remit by absorbing WEU together with article 5 of the Brussels Treaty of 1955 and its endeavor to create and consolidate a European pillar in NATO could be more understandable in the light of this reasoning. However, it did not stop other members of the Union, especially France proceed in the way going to common security and defense and Britain had to continue to its efforts to shape the future in wake of new security developments in Europe that will be studied in coming paragraphs.

After Maastricht Treaty was signed by turning the EC into European Union incorporating common foreign and security policy in a distinct pillar –the second one- and by making WEU an integral part of development of European Union, albeit recognizing the primacy of Atlantic alliance as common security and defence forum, the WEU member states set on work about the missions that they could bear. Six months after signing of Maastricht Treaty, WEU member states adopted the Petersberg Declaration in June 1992. According to the declaration WEU’s role would be *conflict prevention* and *crisis management* and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) could undertake *humanitarian* and *rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks* and

⁹⁶ Ibid. p.,131

*tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking*⁹⁷ Of course, if necessary means was not given to WEU and essential institutional arrangements were not achieved, it could never be an influential organization. To this end a number of steps were taken including the establishment of WEU Planning Cell in Brussels whose task is to do contingency planning for crisis situations , keeping records of FAWEU, WEU Satellite Center in Spain of which responsibility to produce satellite images that are important for intelligence reasons, the establishment of Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). While these were happening on the side of WEU, the further development of ESDI had to wait North Atlantic Council Meeting in Brussels where it first unofficially launched.

The outcome of North Atlantic Council Meeting in 1994 was the fruit of British efforts that sought to establish a European pillar in the NATO. With the Council meeting, it was understood that the US, under Clinton administration, did not have strict reservations on the prospect of flourishing ESDI within NATO. Burden sharing debates were still keeping the American Congress busy whenever a European security issue arose and that France and Britain were able to reconcile their differences over European security arrangements after the tragic experience of the war in Bosnia since “both were conscious of the marked and growing reluctance of Washington to continue writing blank cheques in favor of European security. Both were increasingly fearful of the consequences of Congressional swings toward wither isolationism or a new burden-sharing debate.”⁹⁸ It is important to note that in handling the crisis, both CFSP and WEU were proved to be effectively incapable of intervening the crisis in the absence of an apparent American lead in addition to the

⁹⁷ Van Ham, *Op.cit.*, in note 82, p., 532

⁹⁸ Howorth, *Op.cit.*, in note 76, p., 13

fact that “ .. the break up the Balkans...revealed very serious divisions between the allies’ strategic approach and disturbing disparity between their national interests in regard to the Balkans”⁹⁹. This crisis also revealed that WEU was suffering from the shortcomings in logistics and operational fields. Another point to be noted is that even the British Prime Minister John Major, Conservative leader, who was not enjoying a personal rapport with President convinced that “some type of European solution” should be found after seeing significant divergences between his government and Clinton’s administration¹⁰⁰. Following to Brussels Council meeting, Britain played an important role in the official creation of ESDI and giving it necessary means . This role essentially required drawing closer French and American perspectives closer and to ease the progress towards ESDI. The endeavor actively promoted by Britain proved to be fruitful in the period 1994-1996, culminating in NATO’s Berlin Ministerial meeting in June 1996 at which ESDI was finally given not only an official launch but also a military instrument- Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)¹⁰¹. Britain played a very important role in the creation of bases essential for the development of the European capability within NATO. Therefore ESDI had been always a NATO project and for Britain, it did not mean a leverage over which the EU could gain an authority in the defense field which was being proposed by France with increasing insistence.

⁹⁹ Lluís Maria de Puig, The Myth of Europa: A paradigm for European Defence (Assembly of Western European Union 2000), p.51

¹⁰⁰ Howorth, Op.cit., in note 76, p., 13

¹⁰¹ Howorth, Op.cit., in note 84, p. 380

The IGC in March 1996 prior to Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 was started with the divergent point of views on security and defense issues. The conservative government headed by Prime Minister Major who had to face increasing Euroskepticism in his own party in the wake of IGC of 1996, had published two documents that were revealing the British negotiation positions on European security and defense matters. These were; *The Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's approach to the treatment of European Defense issues at 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of 1 March 1996* and *The White paper on IGC A partnership of Nations-The British Approach to the 1996 EU IGC(published on 12 March 1996)*. These two documents were giving important clues of Major's government negotiation position that was as follows¹⁰²:

- The EU should not develop its position on defense matters beyond that agreed in the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in 1991
- It was inappropriate for EU institutions to have any role in defense decision-making.
- European defense cooperation should be organized through NATO, with Europeans developing a capacity to engage in small-scale operations without the North American NATO members, when the latter chose not to be involved in such operations.
- In the British governments view, the WEU's role was to provide the framework for the development of operational capabilities to enable it to engage in Petersberg task operations, remain an organization **separate from the EU, but closely bound to NATO**. (emphasis added)

One of the most controversial issue in 1996 IGC was the future relationship between the EU and the WEU. Regarding this, there were a number of proposals relating to the future relationship between the EU and the WEU. These proposals

¹⁰² Richard Whitman, "Amsterdam's Unfinished Business? The Blair Government's Initiative and the Future of the Western European Union," in WEU Institute for Security Studies, Occasional paper, No.7, 1997 p. 5

could be summoned under two basic groups, one was supporting the preservation of WEU as an autonomous entity while it was representing the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance which was the position of Britain then and the second group was advocating the integration of WEU into the EU which was then supported by France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain. The Reflection Group that was responsible for preparing agenda items for the coming IGC offered four options ¹⁰³

- Maintaining full autonomy of WEU but reinforced partnership
- A closer link between EU and the WEU to allow the Union to direct WEU for Petersberg tasks
- Incorporation of Petersberg tasks into Treaty on Europe (TEU)
- A gradual integration of the WEU into EU

The Reflection Group was not the only group that made proposals for this relationship, WEU Council of Ministers also made a proposal including three options. These were; Reinforced partnership between an autonomous WEU and the EU where WEU had been expected to develop necessary capabilities to undertake Petersberg tasks however with its existing institutions but there would be close working relationship between the WEU and the EU; Intermediate options toward EU-WEU institutional convergence where a greater convergence had been expected to be realized between the EU and the WEU; Last option was integration of WEU into the EU where Brussels Treaty would be denounced and WEU's capabilities would transfer to the EU into expanded second pillar of the EU ¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.,8

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.,p.9

Based on what British government had been published, it could be easily seen that British government's position was reflected in the option one of the Reflection Group and again option one among the other options of WEU Council of Ministers. Although the government was changed in Britain in May 1997 and Labor party headed by Tony Blair came into the office, the position of Britain did not change. In June 1997 Prime Minister Blair vetoed a proposal envisaging gradual integration of WEU into EU formulated by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg at Rome Summit in March 1997. Consequently the resulting agreement on defense matters covered at Amsterdam Council Meeting in June 1997 was, indeed very close to the British position

...the final form of the agreement on defense matters in ToA was very close to the White Paper position. The Amsterdam provisions retained the organizational separation of the EU and the WEU, introduced changes in wording, and most importantly limited the future development of a common defense policy (and the possible integration of the WEU into EU) to a unanimous agreement by all states through a European Council decision.¹⁰⁵

For further satisfaction of British government, neither a protocol relating to collective defense commitment nor a provision relating to the area of enhanced cooperation that was originally proposed by joint Franco-German letter in October 1996 aiming to give opportunity to the states that would like to cooperate to do so via qualified majority voting was attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Peterberg tasks were included in the Treaty which was also acceptable for Britain since it encouraged WEU to conduct crisis management tasks as a separate organization. It

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

must be noted that the Treaty also recognized the need for fostering institutional relations between the EU and the WEU in case of an integration possibility.

With this result, Britain attained most of the objectives that were determined before 1996 IGC albeit its policies were interpreted by the European partners as “irremediably committed to the American hegemon” and as effective prevention of any effort link to giving the EU security and defense capability. Indeed this interpretation was further strengthened when France failed in restructuring of AFSOUTH based on the results of NATO’s June 1996 Berlin Ministerial Meeting aimed to replace the traditional American officer in charge of NATO's southern flank with a European commander.

In 1997, ESDI neither seemed to proceed out of the confines of NATO, as it was overtaken by other projects of 1994 Brussels NAC that were Peace for Partnership and NATO enlargement, nor did it receive to get necessary support for its further development in the EU by using the means of WEU. While ESDI was calling for more responsibility for Europeans in security field, PpP and NATO’s enlargement put the emphasis on Atlantic network and further reinforcing the position of the US. Britain was resisting to NATO's enlargement until 1995 on the grounds that “an enlarged NATO may be a more diluted NATO”¹⁰⁶ and involving the risk of alienating Russia “ in way that might be irremediable which for the British would be general price higher than any localized benefits in Central and Eastern Europe, where British interests are comparatively slight”¹⁰⁷ accepted it as a policy of

¹⁰⁶Clarke, *Op.cit.*, in note 28 p. 136

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

NATO for the sake of collective solidarity providing, however she did not display same attachment to the European cause which was deeply disappointing her European partners.

British government's attachment to the Atlantic framework more than the European one did not only get the criticism from Europe but also made the governments face with intraparty debates over European integration. The Eurosceptics was arguing that the sovereignty was at stake whereas Europhiles were considering the fact that British influence in the tide of history was at stake. Parties were not the only platform where these debates were made, there were also a number of papers started to be published on the British security policy calling for more devotion in the European cause after the end of Cold war. Sir Geoffrey Howe, in his article on sovereignty and interdependence argues that "recombination of sovereignty in the EC is the best guarantee of strengthening Britain's position in the world"¹⁰⁸ George Robertson, in his article on Britain and Europe, indicates the following

Britain's role will never again be as grand or as glorious. But neither do we have to accept a role that is reactive, marginal and ineffectual ...In a continent changing beyond description, and with the whole world affected by it, Britain needs nerve, ambition and a new direction. That is the only way we will stay in front rank, influencing the events which mould our future¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Geoffrey Howe, "Sovereignty and interdependence: Britain's place in the world," in International Affairs, 66, no.4 p.675.

¹⁰⁹ George Robertson, "Britain in the new Europe", in International Affairs, 66, no.4,1990 p., 702

Britain, however, had already taken the risk of being marginalized over the debates of IGC. Furthermore, there was a strong Franco-German axis that bypassed Britain on most of the EU matters albeit successive British governments were confident in the fact that Britain could not be so easily ignored on defense issues as it was the situation in economic and monetary integration. When 1998 came, the new Labor government had to face a number of problems including the dilution of Franco-German effect; the burden-sharing debates came on the agenda due to two successive crisis in Albania (Spring 1997) and Kosovo (1998-1999) and the incapability of CFSP of the EU. The crisis in Albania and Kosovo put ESDI on the forefront once again when its star was thought to be waned in ToA and in the face of NATO's enlargement. Because these two crises revealed two important facts.

The first was the Europeans lacked any mechanism to formulate an agreed policy among them, especially in the absence of any clear US lead. The second was that they were effectively dependent on the USA for any military operations going beyond medium scale policing of an existing political settlement. In other words, the Europeans sorely needed both institutional arrangements for the formulation of policy and military capacity for the implementation of that policy. This was increasingly perceived in both Washington and London as totally **unsatisfactory states of affairs**. (Emphasis added) Indeed by the end of 1997, it had become clear to most actors in the USA and the UK that, far from European capacity being a threat to the cohesion or even to the existence of NATO. **Such capacity becomes the very survival of NATO as viable alliance**¹¹⁰. (Emphasis added)

¹¹⁰Howorth, Op.cit., in note 84, p. 382

SAINT MALO PROCESS

Recognizing the urgent need of equipping the EU necessary means to intervene “near abroad” crisis without calling the American help and realizing the need for placating the burden share debates in the US Congress that had become more and more reluctant to foot the bill of European security and by admitting the reality that current state of affairs would jeopardize the solidarity of the alliance, the new Labor government conducted a “Strategic Defense Review” in July 1998. The results of the review are important because British government, for the first time, spoke of “vital role” of the EU’s common foreign and security and WEU was mentioned as having an important role to play. These attempts would soon carved the way of Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit in 1998 that was accepted as a turning point in further shaping European security and defense arrangements by reopening the debate on this issue and which was referred as a shift in traditional British security policy towards ESDI and CFSP.

In fact, prior to Saint-Malo Summit, British government started to give signals of their change of mind in the two successive events. The first one is Pörschach informal summit meeting of EU Heads of State and Government in October 1998 and the first informal meeting of EU Defense Ministers in Vienna in November 1998.

In Pörschach informal summit meeting where EU Heads of States and Governments discussed a variety of possible defense roles for the EU, Prime

Minister Tony Blair expressed four possibilities on the matter in terms of institutional arrangements without stating a special preference on one of them¹¹¹

- strengthening the ESDI within NATO
- the scrapping of the WEU
- the creation of a fourth pillar
- the creation of a European Defense Council

Following extract taken from the speech of Prime Minister Blair after the Pörschach summit was well indicating an upcoming openness towards the EU's foreign policy capacity in Britain:

As I have already told my European colleagues, Europe's foreign policy voice in the world is unacceptably muted and ineffective, given our economic weight and strategic interests. In Kosovo, we once again showed ourselves hesitant and disunited. We must change this, but ensuring that the EU can speak with as single, authoritative voice on the key international issues of the day, and can intervene effectively where necessary.¹¹²

Another British senior official that was surprising the European colleagues was the Defense Minister of Britain then, George Robertson, at EU's Defense Ministers' informal meeting in Vienna by proposing following option with regard to the future relationship between the EU and the WEU¹¹³

- merging of the EU and the WEU
- merging some elements of the WEU into the EU and associating other elements more closely with NATO
- creating a more distinct European dimension within NATO
- reinforcing and reinvigorating the WEU

¹¹¹ Whitman, Op.cit., in note 102, p.,3

¹¹² Puig, Op.cit., in note 99 p.,104

¹¹³ Ibid.,p.,4

Although neither Prime Minister nor the Defense Minister of Britain proposed a specific blueprint on the future relationship between the EU and WEU, it was clear that Britain was ready to discuss the European security and defense matter with a new point of view, not in terms of its strict position that it revealed during IGC of 1991 and IGC of 1996 and willing to consider all possible ways. The positive approach of Britain coincided with French proposal made on the relationship between the EU and the WEU in December 1998. Despite this proposal was not a new one, indeed the same Franco-German proposal that was put on the table during 1996 IGC calling for making WEU the defense agency of the EU and demanding a possibility to let member states that would like to further cooperate in defense matters even other member states chose not to do it-. Both Britain's new positive approach and France's continuous energy to let the EU defense have remit turned into an actual summit between Britain and France in St.Malo on 3-4 December 1998 that carved the way of institutional arrangements proposed in EU Cologne in June 1999 and military capabilities accepted in EU Helsinki in December 1999.

Saint-Malo summit was regarded as a major step in terms of its results which made both institutional and military arrangements, which had been longed for a considerable amount of time, a reality. To achieve this, the summit brought Britain and France together one of which represents the Atlanticist thinking, namely Britain, France represents Europeanist viewpoint For Jolyon Howorth, the biggest single stumbling block to both a CFSP and an ESDP has been the inability of Britain and France to agree on the fundamentals, a problem dates back to negotiations to the

Treaties of Dunkirk (1947) and Brussels¹¹⁴. The most important fundamental concern, then and until the St. Malo was that London had been anxious to see the US turned back to isolationism in the face of genuine European defense capacity whereas France believed that a genuine European defense capacity would provide a more balanced relationship between the Europe and the US thus strengthen the alliance.

Regarding this fact, Saint-Malo can be said to have somewhat reconciliatory effect to overcome the differences of atlanticist and Europeanist fundamentals as well as in a number of fields strongly linked to these fundamentals. Said fields will be studied in sequence in the following paragraphs represented by these two countries. Therefore when a comparison is made in said fields, France, as the most leading Europeanist country, will be used as a reference to illustrate the differences of opinions. All in all, for some studies, “Without intense Franco-British cooperation and even integration, there is no possibility of developing either a credible CFSP, or viable ESDP”¹¹⁵.

After Saint Malo Meeting, the joint *Declaration on European Defense* announcing the bilateral statements of Franco-British summits. The declaration includes the following¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Jolyon Howorth, “ Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative,” in Survival, 42, no.2, 2000, p.,33

¹¹⁵ Ibid,p, 34

¹¹⁶ Whitman, Op.cit. in note 102 ,p. 4-5

- i- The EU must have the capacity to decide to act, to be able to act autonomously and to be ready to do so in international crises situations requiring military force.
- ii- NATO remains the foundation of collective defense for Europeans through article 5 of the Washington Treaty. However, a collective defense commitment must be maintained as through Article V of the Brussels Treaty.
- iii- The institutional arrangements for decision-making by the EU on defense matters are to remain intergovernmental and to take place through the EU institutions of the European Council, General Affairs Council and a forum for the meeting of Defense Ministers. Defense is not to be “communitarised”
- iv- The EU will need to have capabilities to analyze, have access to sources of intelligence, and to be able to plan to facilitate the decision-making of eventualities in which military actions are to be undertaken without the involvement of the whole Atlantic Alliance.
- v- The EU-meaning its Member States-needs to give attention to creating armed forces that are capable of undertaking the military tasks that may be required without the involvement of the whole Atlantic Alliance.

Saint-Malo Declaration was a major step towards ESDP and there are a number of reasons for this. The first reason is that it represents a shift in British policy that made the significant development in the European defense capacity possible and this shift was more influential in doing so even than the impact that was done by the creation of ESDI. Before elaborating on the other reasons, what the motivations are behind this shift needs to be clarified.

For some of the analyst, Britain did this because it would like to supplant WEU by forming EU defense capability within NATO. This claim was based upon memorandum prepared to investigate the opportunities to maximize the Britain’s potential in Europe by a officer of Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Robert

Cooper and the further explanation on this proposal can be found in the work of Charles Grant named “ Can Britain lead in Europe” in which the scarping of the WEU was favored whereas its political function would be integrated into the EU in the fourth pillar while its military function would be put under the aegis of NATO.¹¹⁷ For some of the analyst, like the work in Maria de Puig, Blair government feared the isolation, because it is outside the Euro zone, thus would like to be real player and leader in the defense sectors. All those can be observed as factors but these still do not represent the core reason behind the shift.

The European military inadequacy and lack political will that were so evident in Kosovo crisis resulted in hesitance and disunity of the European Union. This coupled with the burden sharing debates in Washington that did not want to spend large sums of money to secure the neighboring of the European allies. The two naked realities leading the Saint-Malo was increasingly recognized by the Britain that was convinced that the US lead in security and defense in Europe would not be as same as in the Cold war and be the primary reason of British policy shift “London, than, believed that the maintenance and strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, far from being threatened by ESDP, in fact dependent on it”¹¹⁸. Indeed the words of Geoffrey Hoon, the Defense Secretary of Britain, extracted from his address to the Brooking Institution, Washington DC, 26 January 2000, well summarized the issue “if hanging a ‘European’ tag on it is what it takes to make it happen, then so be it”.

Indeed the US analysts were also reciprocating the idea. The following extract taken from the statement of Dr. Stephen Larrabee presented to hearing before

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.,3

¹¹⁸ Howorth, *Op.cit.*,in note 102, p., 34

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate was an example for this viewpoint

... if our European allies develop an integrated capability that is able to plug into US/NATO systems but is also able to operate on its own, then there is no basic incompatibility between NATO and the EU. Indeed, this could strengthen the Alliance's capability to act more effectively in a crisis¹¹⁹.

Britain by considering all the fact mentioned above could said to assume its old role of being interlocutor between its European partners and the US. Because, unless it acted on time and melt the demands of the European partners and of the US and of herself in the same pot to guarantee the institutionalization of the US involvement in European security, she would see the collapse of the Atlantic alliance that was totally unacceptable for Britain and she would run the risk of facing more completions in a future crisis with a European Union lacking military capability. Even if its European partners managed to shape an arrangement on defense, it would be an arrangement that would be imposed upon the Britain and it would be an arrangement that was built without British contribution. Therefore, if all those meant to cooperate with the European Union on defense matters via consolidating ESDP within EU, Britain chose let the genie out of the bottle. It was in the national interest of Britain to do it.

The second reason of Saint-Malos's importance lies in the fact that it was a major expression of political will towards the EU autonomous political and military

¹¹⁹ F.Stephen Larrabee, The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and American Interests, CT-168 Marc 2000, p., 3

action making necessary institutional – handled in Cologne at the European Council (June 1999)- and military arrangements (handled in Helsinki European Council (December 1999)).

The third reason regarding the importance of the summit was that the process that started could end up in “a dynamic security dialogue between Brussels and Washington”¹²⁰ which was generally managed on bilateral discussions like Anglo-American, Franco-American, and German-American.

The fourth reason was that it would initiate process that could seriously handle the problem of military inadequacy which was not very much considered until the day because of relying on the military assets of NATO.

Saint-Malo Summit was a breakthrough in terms of its results but of course it did not remove all the differences in points of view among European states even between the two states that constructed the Saint-Malo Summit namely France and Britain. By and large, for London, the autonomy especially in strategic sense for which France had been yearning for a long period of time was not an attainable goal. In this regard, British thinking was much more tactical and pragmatic in comparison with the French long-term strategic aspirations. To illustrate the situation better, it is good to glance upon the differences by referring to specific fields of divergence as well as convergence revolving around the further development issue of ESDP between the two states after Saint-Malo.

¹²⁰ Howorth, Op.cit., in note 114, p., 34

Convergence

Howorth identified ten areas of convergence between Britain and France which are as follows¹²¹

- The EU should have greater military capability for conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping operations-essentially in Europe's hinterland.
- When NATO opts out to intervene in a crisis situation, the EU must be able to act autonomously to decide and to act.
- The EU 15 and the partner nations should do their best to create a military procurement synergy to impede unnecessary multiplication of military capacity
- Setting Defense planning targets for all the EU members would be useful.(Which was linked to the progress of Helsinki headline goal to be determined in Helsinki 1999)
- The EU should adopt with significant institutional infrastructure to allow it to forge CFSP and ESDP.
- Participation of non-EU NATO Members in the process was essential
- Most of the principal functions of the WEU should be progressively transferred to the EU.
- There should be collaboration on armaments production and supply within the EU to maximize its effectiveness
- Discussions within the Alliance should lead to agreement with the US both on the broad question of EU-NATO relations and on the operational structuring of CJTFs.
- All of above is compatible with and complementary to, an enhanced and strengthened Alliance.

Although, there seemed to be a great amount of convergence between Britain and France in aligning the Atlanticist and Europeanist approaches, there were still divergence within these convergences which are studied below. Whereas Britain would like to proceed step by step and to focus on what was likely to be in the reach

¹²¹ Howorth, Op.cit.,in note 49, p., 34

of the European states such as troop levels, deploy ability, sustainability, mobility, interoperability, flexibility whereas France was talking of catching up with the areas that the Europeans depended upon the US including command and control, intelligence, electronic warfare. Regarding this fact, it can be useful to study each area of divergence one by one.

Divergences

Howorth also studied the divergences in the said ten areas of convergence between Britain and France which are as follows

Military Capacity

When the “Strategic Defense Review” was published in Britain in 1998, it was seen that Britain wanted to be able to deploy and sustain two brigades simultaneously one for war fighting and the other one was for crisis management types of tasks. Same understanding was valid for a European military capacity. Britain was more interested in the readiness, deployability and sustainability of the armed forces as a lesson derived from the Kosovo crisis. France, however, got another lesson from the same crisis which was the need to develop intelligence, communication that the Europeans depended on the US. Britain preferred to solve the problem by being “intelligent consumer of NATO services”¹²² thus handling the issue through the dialogue with the US which did not sound good to French as they argued that NATO could not behave as if it were a neutral organization.

¹²² Howorth, *op.cit.*, in note 84, p. 392

EU Missions

In this field, there was a difference between the two states as well. The three types of missions were being considered as NATO only, the EU using NATO assets and the EU alone. While Atlanticist thinking tended to link importance on the first two, Europeanist view point stressed the significance of the last option. Britain was underlying the fact that the primary reference was on NATO as it was stated by British Defense Minister Geoffrey Hoon in Washington in January 2000 “For meaningful large-scale operation, NATO will remain, the only game in town. It will be the sole organization for collective defense in Europe. It will be the organization that we expect to turn to for significant crisis management operations”¹²³. However France thinks that the EU is an autonomous institution and therefore it has right to create an autonomous ESDP which will engage in equal dialogue with NATO whereas Britain interprets autonomy in pragmatic terms that is to say one day an EU autonomous action may be required and it is good to be prepared for it but this does not mean to create a structure that rival the NATO therefore threatening its cohesion.

Synergy

Britain would like to form a synergy between the military procurement programs of the EU member states. While doing it, it wanted NATO’s “Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)” (launched in April 1999) and WEU’s “Military Capability Audit” (established in November 1998) cross-referenced. France, on the

¹²³ Howorth, *op.cit.*, in note 76, p., 30

other hand, wanted WEU's audit to be considered primarily as the EU itself can decide on its own military needs.

Defense Planning Targets

Indeed both of the countries would like to enhance the military capabilities necessary for undertaking crisis management tasks. The proposals relating to this realm was focusing on deployability and sustainability and aligning the defense targets of the main European partners. Indeed both countries would like to have their major partners to do more to fulfill this objective.¹²⁴

Institutional Arrangements

The argument central to the institutional arrangements revolved around the establishment of Political and Security Committee (PSC). France attached a great deal of importance on PSC as it was expected to influence the policy whereas Britain did not want PCS to complicate the European security more. It must be noted that the US was also anxious about the committee. There were important questions of the US as well including how much weight will be put on PCS, thus how far autonomous the committee would be.

¹²⁴ Howorth, *Op.cit.*, in note 114, p., 40

Participation

One of the most controversial issues regarding the ESDP was the participation of non-EU NATO members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey) in the decision making process as well as the situation relating to candidates to EU accession but not members of NATO (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia).

One of the major reasons of British veto on the merger of the WEU and the EU was a discrimination against non EU NATO members during 1996-1997 IGC. In terms of French point of view, these states could be divided into three groups to tackle with the problem properly. These groups would include a) candidates for EU accession who are also NATO members b) candidates for EU accession not yet NATO members c) NATO members but not candidates for EU accession. For France group “b” should prioritize over the other groups whereas the Britain favored the group “a”. In the Atlanticist view point, the priority should be given to NATO reference in military issues relating to ESDP. Because political transparency should be maintained to do it, group “a” states should participate the meetings of the new EU military committee and regular meetings with PSC with these states should be hold. For France ESDP was the project of the EU, therefore the candidates to accession should prioritize over the others albeit Norway and Iceland were isolated in this case. So the discussions began, as generally referred as 15 plus 15, 15 plus 6, 15 plus 13. The compromise was reached on 19 April 2000 at the meeting of a Political Committee which was emphasized in Feira European Council Meeting. The

solution was that there would be regular meetings on 15 plus 15 formats in addition to two meetings with 15 plus 6 per presidency.

Transfer WEU To The EU

The real issue creating the controversy on the issue was the retention of Article V, the collective security guarantee of the Modified Brussels Treaty. France believed that the preserving a collective defense article for the EU was an indispensable part of ESDP. Therefore it favored the freezing of the article until the time it was necessary to use it. For Britain, on the other hand, this issue was of irrelevance because collective defense issue was considered in the confines of NATO. Indeed, the discussion on retention of article V had gone with pillar language.

Those who want to see the article V as central to the development of European defense want to preserve favor a fourth pillar which could not be diluted by opt outs whereas those who do not see this article central to the development of EU common defense policy favored the second pillar in which opt outs could be made possible by attaching a protocol.¹²⁵ However it must be noted that during the course of the discussions, “The British Government had previously (in 1994) been credited with proposing that the WEU should become a fourth pillar of the EU, albeit a position the then Major Government subsequently denied”¹²⁶ In this understanding of Britain the fourth pillar would include a non-obligatory protocol including the article V that would be a part of the EU’s treaty.

¹²⁵ Whitman, *Op.cit.*, in note 102, p.,12

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 10

Armaments Policy

Armaments policy was also important issue toward the European defense capability. By the end of 1999s some of the defense companies like Bae, Aerospatiale, Matra-Dasa went to merger. Britain, in its traditional understanding left the developments to market sources whereas France wanted to influence the developments¹²⁷

The important issue here was that emergence of European defense industrial base. France seemed to be ready to put its weight to this end whereas Britain preferred the market forces do the job. However, this does not mean that Britain did not show any support at all. In fact by deciding to procure European air to air missile Meteor and to join the European's in the developments of the A-400M air transport planes to the American counterparts, Britain was displaying its willingness to underwrite the European defense industry base.

Combined Joint Task Forces

For Britain, EU-only scenarios were unlikely and therefore a well arranged CJTF would solve the problems regarding the usage of the capabilities of NATO where as France was demanding more strategic capabilities such as European

¹²⁷ Howorth, Op.cit., in note 114, p., 42

intelligence capability and access to data which were largely the assets of the US army.

All these nine points having certain amount of divergence between the Atlanticist and Europeanist viewpoints indeed more or less attached to a main question which is the autonomy of Europe and ESDP's compatibility to NATO. Even though Saint-Malo Summit's results made a breakthrough for ESDP, the word of autonomy was hard to understand and assimilate; therefore it still received reactions from abroad, most notably from the US and from the inside as well. After all the word autonomy was first explicitly used in a document relating to the European initiative on security and defense fields.

Conservative party was criticized Blair government mainly on the two grounds. The first allegation was that this initiative which would result in European federal state and secondly this would end up in the collapse of NATO.¹²⁸ Although, these allegations could be responded by a counter thesis such as the fact that as defense Europeanized, the intergovernmental nature of the Union would be strengthened making the European federal state even more remote.¹²⁹ As for creating a big cause that would the collapse of NATO, Blair government was actually doing it to keep the NATO intact.

The US reaction was largely on the "autonomy" of the EU. Even though the US would appreciate the burden sharing of the Europe in the security and defense field, the US had some reservations that were expressed by the then Secretary of

¹²⁸ Howorth, *Op.cit.*, in note 84, p. 383

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

State, Madeline Albright and known as 3Ds; decoupling of the alliance, duplication of alliance assets, discrimination against NATO states that were not the members of the EU. It must also be noted, although Britain did not seem to believe that France's strategic autonomy goal for the EU was actually attainable, to placate the concerns of the US, Britain tried to persuade its partners to give up word autonomy in Helsinki Council Meeting to be studied the coming paragraphs. However Helsinki document would not only retain "the notion of giving the EU the autonomous capacity to take decisions"¹³⁰ but also "where NATO as whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct military operations"¹³¹.

Britain, as playing the bridge in between the US and the Europe, responded the demand of the both by indicating the fact that its way of thinking is tactical and pragmatic. As one of the primary reason leading to Saint-Malo was to preserve the NATO in terms of Britain, it reassured the US that the primary importance was given to the supremacy of the Alliance and ESDP would not be a separate an entity that would be in rival with NATO. Britain was trying to calm down the concerns of the US by denying 3Ds of Madeline Albright with the replacement of 3Is announced by NATO's General Secretary George Robertson, who was the previous Defense Secretary of Britain: indivisibility of the Alliance, improved European capabilities and inclusiveness of all partners.

¹³⁰ Howorth, *Op.cit.*, in note 114, p., 44

¹³¹ *Ibid*

All in all, all divergences summarized above most of which caused by British pragmatism and tactic-wise approach and French long term strategic thinking melted into the same pot and built the Saint-Malo in which the most controversial partners, France and Britain took a very promising step towards autonomous EU action in the defense field despite the disturbing implications for the US and the criticism of the Conservative party in Britain.

Britain in 2000s

After Saint-Malo summit, ESDP gained an important momentum. NATO, in Washington Summit April 1999 boosted the ESDI by stating the development of ESDI within the Alliance through improving CJTF concept by making necessary arrangements known as “Berlin plus”. By the 2000, NATO would start to push for opening the dialogue between the EU and the NATO as it was expressed in May 2000 Florence Ministerial Meeting.

On the side of the EU, developing ESDP both in terms of institutional arrangements and military capabilities was on its way. Cologne Summit in June 1999 put institutional framework necessary for taking decisions on security and defense fields. In Cologne the EU leaders agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to the international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”, the crisis management was put at core of the process strengthening CFSP and in Helsinki Summit Meeting in December 1999

established the Headline Goal that was very important in terms of real military capability:

- Co-operating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member states must be able to, by 2003, to deploy within the 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of tasks stated in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
- New political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework.

The Nice European Council in December 2000 notified the establishment of the new political and military bodies called for in the Helsinki Summit. These bodies whose establishments were notified were as follows:

- The standing Political and Security Committee (PSC)
- The European Union Military Committee (EUMC)
- The European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

Pursuant to these developments, European Council Meeting at Laeken in December 2001 announced that the continuing development of ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, the creation of the appropriate structures. Through these developments, the Union would be able to conduct some crisis-management

operations. The Union would be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop.

Among all these developments boosting ESDP, the most important ones were the enhancement of military capabilities and relating institutions – the institutions established with Nice European Council Meeting in December 2000-. Helsinki headline goal was largely inspired by Britain. The reason for this was well understood from the speech of former Defense Minister of Britain, George Robertson in which he said “the institutions are only the first part of equation, and that you cannot send a wiring diagram to a crisis”¹³². Although with the announcement of Helsinki Headline goals, they were found out to be very ambitious to attain. However, it was necessary for Britain to determine high goals because without the considerable increase in European military capability, it was going to be more and more difficult to preserve the Atlantic alliance especially when she considers the spending on military between the years 1995-1999 of European NATO members in comparison with the US military expenditure. The following tables illustrate the defense budget and procurement spending Western European NATO Members

¹³² George Robertson speech to Chatham House Conference, 7 October 1999 quoted in Howorth, Op.cit, in note 19, p. 386

Table 1 Defense Budget

COUNTRY	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
\$ US m					
Belgium	3,534	3,186	2,806	2,723	2,588
Denmark	3,250	3,099	2,726	2,652	2,395
France	42,240	37,861	32,711	30,703	28,353
Germany	34,625	32,745	26,641	26,002	23,790
Greece	3,473	3,598	3,648	3,867	3,675
Italy	16,619	20,680	18,237	17,495	15,609
Luxembourg	128	124	109	105	98
Netherlands	8,775	8,249	6,992	6,869	6,797
Norway	3,901	3,820	3,597	3,099	3,070
Portugal	1,869	1,755	1,698	1,554	1,564
Spain	7,243	7,014	5,942	5,888	5464
UK	35,725	34,196	35,736	36,111	33,254
Subtotal	161,382	156,327	140,843	137,068	126,657
US	274,624	271,739	257,975	253,423	252,379

Source Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The ultimate challenge?* (Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2000)

Table 2 Equipment Procurement

COUNTRY	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
\$ US m					
Belgium	293	217	192	203	183
Denmark	406	384	339	351	322
France	7,952	7,588	6,465	5,620	5,242
Germany	3,969	3,705	2,956	3,455	3,715
Greece	1,022	1,146	1,146	1,287	1,273
Italy	1,642	2,206	2,100	2,394	1,905
Luxembourg	3	7	6	5	5
Netherlands	1,338	1,578	1,324	1,581	1,380
Norway	826	839	906	773	691
Portugal	140	263	352	365	400
Spain	998	1,243	1,012	781	744
UK	7,334	8,189	8,466	9,354	8,263
Subtotal	25,923	27,185	25,264	26,169	24,123
US	46,251	43,332	42,930	43,887	47,052

Source Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The ultimate challenge?* (Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2000)

The figures illustrate the fact that the Europeans were not investing in the military spending as much as the US did; therefore it could not share the burden with the US enough to clam down the arguments of burden-sharing at the US Congress. For Britain, the Helsinki headline goals were ambitious enough to make the European allies to put more on the table.

“...the UK has signed up to the notion that the EU must enjoy the capacity to engage in autonomous action and there is certainly an assumption in Whitehall that crisis situations may well arise where the US would not to be involved. That is the entire purpose behind the Helsinki Goal.”¹³³ Therefore Britain acted quick to denounce that” any suggestion that we are going to create a European federal army, is of course, nonsense”¹³⁴

In addition to the need of increase in military spending due to pragmatic reasons explained above, there was something very significant for Britain that was the relationship between the EU and the NATO. In the wake of the developments on the side of ESDP, the US, in early 2000, started to push more to start the dialogue between the EU and the NATO. France firstly resisted it because of the fact that it feared the NATO’s well established institutions would absorb the newly born ESDP which was also agreed by Britain at the outset. However, after some time, France was isolated and in April 2000, French negotiators were convinced by British colleagues to accept a plan arranging four EU-NATO working group: on military capacity, on security, on transfer of assets, and on permanent arrangements for consultation between the two bodies”¹³⁵.

Indeed the debates that have already begun on the relationship between the EU and the NATO made obligatory to initiate the dialogue somehow. The most

¹³³ Howorth, Op.cit., in note 84, p. 383

¹³⁴ Address by Defense Secretary Geoffery Hoon in Brooking Institution, Washington DC, 26 January 2000 cited in Howorth, Op.cit., in note 84, p. 384

¹³⁵ Howorth, Op.cit., in note 114, p., 46

controversial debate was the “right of first refusal” by NATO. The US Defense Secretary Cohen, in late 1999, expressed that NATO should have the first option on a military action to be made. Of course, it resented France significantly because it was understood by French Officials that the US would have a veto right over any European action whereas Britain preferred to refrain from entering the polemics although she did not see anything terribly wrong on the “right of first refusal” of NATO by stressing the primacy of the Atlantic alliance. Although it was understood that this debate was a misunderstanding especially when Secretary Cohen ignored the right of first refusal issue in his speech in Wekunde on 5 February 2000, it still created a resentment between the Europeanist allies and the US.

The resentment was further fueled when the US Congress refused to ratify Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the US’ intentions to establish national missile defense system and the American reluctance on interfering in Balkan crisis. Therefore, as it happened in the revitalization of WEU in 1984, the creation of ESDP seemed to be justified and, unlike the end of 1980s, British policy shift seemed to strengthen the development of ESDP and made it more sustainable and viable.

ESDP could one day act autonomously as it was being energetically demanded and pursued by France as a consistent policy and Britain, the biggest obstacle on the way to viable European autonomy in the security and defense field seemed to be collaborating. The outcomes of a number of European Council Meetings seemed to verify the fact that ESDP was growing steadily.

A European Air Transport Coordination Cell was established in November 2001 upon a German-Dutch initiative, significant progress were made on police capabilities where as there was a limited development on military capabilities. However at Laeken Belgium (December 2001), the EU announced its military capacity operational. A number of significant developments occurred in the year 2002 including the first formal meeting of the EU Council of Defense Ministers, the first EU crisis management exercise, an agreement on financing EU-led crisis management. At Seville European Council Meeting in June 2002, the EU not only adopted a first report on conflict prevention but also declared that ESDP to pursue the fight against terrorism in addition to its announcement of enhanced cooperation with NATO and with countries such as Russia and Ukraine and of its willingness to take over NATO's peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and the EU police mission in Bosnia.¹³⁶

While these were happening in Europe, the meetings between the Atlantic alliance and European security bodies begun as well. The first meeting between North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU's PSC was held in February 2001 whereas the meeting between the EU and NATO Military Committees took place in June 2001 followed by bi-monthly meetings afterwards.

Everything seemed to be proper on the surface; however it was not that proper in closer look. The process of strengthening ESDP slowed down due to a growing discord between France and Britain starting in 2001 and lasted until October

¹³⁶ Jolyon Howorth, "France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis," in *Survival*, 45, no.4, 2003-04, p.,178

2003. Britain, between these two years seemed to loose its concentration on ESDP and changed its policy priorities. There were a number of reasons for that among which the terrorist attacks of 11th September and the policy towards Iraq was the most significant ones. However, according to Jolyon Howorth, even before the terrorist attacks of 11 the September, Britain started to question whether the European conflicts had major strategic priority. “After a decade of instability in Europe’s vicinity, the real challenge appeared to stem from far beyond it: Iran, Iraq, Korea, China, South Asia, and the Middle East”¹³⁷.

Another important factor that must be considered was the fact that the incoming US administration, Bush administration, did not express its support to ESDP unlike outgoing Clinton administration. The dislike of this new administration towards ESDP was noted in Tony Blair’s visit to Camp David in February 2001. This situation was resulted in the increase of the concerns of Britain’s European allies. Under these circumstances, the spirit of Saint-Malo, that managed to convene two different approaches together namely, British pragmatism and France strategy, started to proceed to the verge of vain. The attacks of 11th of September became a factor for accelerating the proceed.

After the terrorist attacks, Prime Minister Tony Blair envisaged a new task for Britain that was “re-ordering” the world around Britain. These tasks had threefold. The first was to give full support to the US in the war against terrorism which had the utmost priority, the second was to address the global roots of instability and

¹³⁷ Ibid., p., 176

inequality that were evaluated as the major reasons behind the terrorist attacks and finally he wanted Britain to play full part both in global scale and in Europe.¹³⁸ This new task was degrading the ESDP to a secondary level by requiring Britain' attention on global level.

Unlike Britain, France, however, saw the terrorist attacks for 11th September as a strong justification of ESDP and a significant reason to go on the project. However without substantial support of Britain, a viable ESDP was not attainable. In fact the final goal of the project for both states was entirely different –while Britain was envisaging a strengthened NATO, France was in search of autonomous European capacity to balance the alliance- . However, British efforts were now focusing on a different priority as explained in “2002 The Strategic Defense Review” which was to eliminate terrorism as force of change in international affairs¹³⁹. To this end British concentrated its efforts to make NATO gain new purpose thus means to struggle with terror and conducted an effective campaign. Spain and Britain jointly prepared “UK-Spanish Vision of the Future of NATO” in which both countries’ understanding of new NATO was revealed. Several other proposals were also made including the establishment of NATO Response Force, prioritization of NATO enlargement. In NATO’s Prague summit NATO Response Force that gave NATO a new military life was approved.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 176

¹³⁹ <http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/nechapter.htm>

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 180

In this process it must also be noted that British skepticism towards the enlargement of NATO started to decrease dramatically as it could be understood from the speech of British Prime Minister in which he said “We in Britain favor as large enlargement of NATO as possible”¹⁴¹

British attitude became favorable towards expansion of NATO because it perceived that the countries that would like to become a member of NATO would be useful in the war against terrorism. Of course while Britain was concentrating on NATO and making it gain a new military identity and have a new task encouraging the organization to perform out of area missions, it lost its concentration on ESDP as explained above.

Considering these developments, France became anxious even further furious as it interpreted British activities as restricting ESDP to low-intensity tasks particularly whenever Britain expressed that ESDP was complementary to NATO. This attitude was a major obstacle in the Franco-British cooperation on security and defense filed. Indeed the question of “autonomy” constituted the major source creating the uneasiness in Franco-British relationship. Even though it seems that Britain had never taken the notion of autonomy seriously even in Saint Malo Summit-since it thought that this was not an attainable goal at the end of the ay-, what mattered for France was the autonomy of the EU in security and defense field which was always expressed by France in almost every possibility.

¹⁴¹ Tony Blair, speech at the Vilnius 10 meeting in Riga, July 2002 quoted in Ibid.

The Iraq Crisis further deepened the gap between Britain and France and slowed down the pace of ESDP. Britain and France took the opposite sites in the crisis. Britain was ready to go war by deploying its troops in the Gulf, by supporting the US when it proposed to give formal guarantees of NATO to Turkey in case of an attack to the country, by co-sponsoring a resolution in UN demanding military action against Iraq, whereas France was expressing her concerns on further destabilization of Middle East. France was opposing any policy that went out of UNSC resolutions on the crisis. The row about the visions of the world of the states complicated the problem more. France was supporting multi polar world whereas Britain was severely criticized this vision. Multi polar world vision envisages a world that was structured by a number of small poles which could be regional power based like China, or the community based like the EU so the international system was to be shaped by the consensus of these poles. For the US, the attempt behind the multi-polar world was balancing the US power by a group of several small powers and France's policies in Iraq crisis were perceived by the US as aggressively intentioned. The reaction of Britain was not so much different when it denounced multi-polar world vision dangerous. "In an interdependent, globalizing world, Britain and Europe, according to Blair, must engage in permanent, strategic, structured alliance with the United States"¹⁴². As compatible with its traditional standing, Britain was favoring partnership rather than greater balance in the transatlantic alliance. Moreover, for Britain, influencing the US policies from outside as tried by France was more difficult than to do it from inside. Therefore France's attitudes

¹⁴² Ibid., p., 185

eminding rivalry started to be perceived as threat to the success of British global strategy.¹⁴³

France saw Britain a major obstacle to the autonomy of Europe and Britain perceived France a big threat to its global strategy. Under these circumstances, an autonomous EU Planning Cell discussion started. While EU operational planning cell was called for establishment in Tervuren, Britain proposed a planning cell to be placed inside Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). This issue was irritating the US. Despite of the irritation of the US, Britain also recognized the fact that without a European planning cell, it was difficult to mention a serious development on ESDP and the basic logic behind ESDP did stay there, to have necessary capacity to intervene in a crisis where the US would not be involved and Tony Blair knew the fact that if he stuck on the transatlantic alliance unconditionally, Britain would be marginalized in two fields, security and defense, where she could effectively lead the developments . Because of the pragmatic acceptance of strategic reality, Britain moved closer to the ESDP again by accepting the principal that the EU should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities. This required tighter structured cooperation in EU.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p., 187

ESDP began to be operational when the first ESDP operation was launched in January 2003: the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in March 2003 the Union decided to launch its first military operation which was EU-led Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Furthermore it announced, in June 2003, that the EU's rapid reaction force of up to 60,000 soldiers operational for peacekeeping purposes.

The EU undertook its first military operation outside of Europe and without NATO assistance to secure the town of Bunia in northeast Congo, which was threatened by civil war and a refugee crisis. The first EU forces arrived on 6 June and the mission (Operation Artemis) concluded on 1 September having involved a force up to 1,000 soldiers,¹⁴⁴

Britain, along all this process has played a significant role in having the EU gain a serious capability in security and defense matters. Her policy shifts, that is to say her shifts in policy priorities made the project gain an extraordinary momentum as happened in post Saint Malo process or it put the project in stagnation and as happened the situation during Iraq crisis. But the fact is that Britain moved closer to the EU and its European partners and it contributed a quite a lot in an ambitious project like ESDP and it is assumed that Britain will continue to shape the project by considering its policy priorities. As Dominique de Villepin stated in his BBC interview that "There will be no Europe without European defense. There will be no European defense without United Kingdom"¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Sten Rynning, "Towards a Strategic Culture for the EU", in Sage Publications, vo. 34, no.4, 2003., p., 485

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=37783> quoted in Howorth, Op.cit. in note 72, p., 188

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study intended to reveal and trace the British policies in the European security and defense integration between 1945 and 2003. This study aimed to do this revealing and tracing within the context of international climate prevailing of the specific time.

Britain, as being one of the most prominent powers in Europe, played a significant role in the formation of postwar security arrangements by watching for her foreign policy principles

1. A clear belief that Britain should be a major player on the world stage
2. Unambiguous commitment to free trade
3. Emphasis on the role of the armed forces as the ultimate guarantee of British security. The nuclear deterrent is seen as an indispensable part of that guarantee
4. An irreversible commitment to Europe, which in security terms expresses itself chiefly through the membership of NAT, and which in economic and political terms expresses itself in the membership of the European Union.
5. Abiding interest in Anglo-American relationship which successive governments have regarded as critical to European security.

6. An awareness of historical responsibilities which are residue of Britain.
7. A willingness to take a leading role, with others, in creation of a safer and more decent international order.
8. An understanding although Europe is important, economically speaking, the rest of the world particularly Asia can not be ignored.¹⁴⁶

Throughout the study, it is seen that these foreign policy principles are signed up by both Labor and Conservative Parties in Britain thus British foreign and security policies have enjoyed the benefits of bipartisanship. That is not to say there has been no differences of opinion like the rift between the two parties on the nuclear deterrent issue that is mentioned in chapter 4 but the difference has never went into the substance of the principles. This feature of the policy has also contributed to the British government to keep the strategy intact but to apply tactics, as it apparent in the discussions ESDP.

Although it is possible to monitor Europe's desire to have its own voice in security and defense polices throughout the cold war years, this desire turned into substantial efforts to have a common, strong and influential voice through strengthening ESDI within the NATO. This constituted one of the significant discussions concerning with security and defense matters of a period between 1990-2002. The attitudes of Britain, as being one of the most preeminent military powers in Europe, influenced these discussions by making substantial contributions in the

¹⁴⁶ Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy, Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century (London : The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997) p. 85

formation of ESDI that made profound impact in the development of the idea of Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP).

Britain, that understood the need for being in the European arrangements in order not to be dependent on the USA and be isolated from Europe, dropped its traditional indifference towards European arrangements in security and defense towards the end of 1990s. Although this situation is generally illustrated as a shift, this study argued that the shift did not happen on the strategy level- because Britain has always been in the security arrangements calling for separate European voice with more or less enthusiasm- but it caused Britain to change its tactic. The reason is that a number of aspects in British policies which can be identified such as keeping NATO intact, developing ESDI within NATO, confining European only operations within the limits of Petersberg type tasks, giving the priority to NATO framework, emphasizing intergovernmental type of cooperation in security and defense matters posses continuous nature.

This study intended to illustrate above-mentioned continuities by referring British position in negotiations and treaties of significant value for European integration and by evaluating British attitudes in terms of outstanding events of 1945-2003.

As security and defense realms are continuing to be one of the most sensitive and significant issues in international relations and as they continue to be on the agenda of EU in the future, the attitudes of countries in EU, particularly France, and

in the NATO is also scrutinized. Britain, as being one of the most influential military powers in Europe and NATO, her thoughts and feelings played significant role in shaping and developing ESDI and her position seems to continue having substantial value in further development of ESDI and in the flourishing of CESDP in the future.

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