

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF
KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

HASAN KARAAĞAÇ

IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

APRIL 2004

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the
Degree of Master of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is
Fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of
Master of Philosophy.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdiñ Sayan
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Grünberg

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdal Cengiz

ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

Hasan Karaağaç

Ms., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdiñç Sayan

April 2004, 43 pages

This thesis analyzes the relation between Kripke’s rule-sceptic argument and Wittgenstein’s paradox. Besides, Kripke’s claim that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s private language argument is stated in PI § 202 will be discussed. The thesis will also evaluate the consistency of Kripke’s rule-sceptic argument independently of Wittgenstein’s views.

Keywords: Rule, Rule-scepticism, Private language argument, PI § 201, PI § 202.

ÖZ

KRIPKE’NİN WITTGENSTEIN YORUMUNUN ELEŞTİREL BİR DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Hasan Karaağaç

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Erdiç Sayan

Nisan 2004, 43 Sayfa

Bu çalışma, Wittgenstein’in paradoksuyla Kripke’nin kural-şüpheciliği argümanı arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemiştir. Kripke’nin Wittgenstein’in özel dil argümanının PI § 202 de belirtildiği iddiası tartışılmıştır. Ayrıca, bu çalışma, Wittgenstein’in görüşlerinden bağımsız olarak Kripke’nin kural-şüpheciliği argümanının tutarlılığını değerlendirmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kural, Kural-şüpheciliği, özel dil argümanı, PI § 201, PI § 202.

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I appreciate Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdiñ Sayan's guidance during my thesis study. Thanks to Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Grünberg and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdal Cengiz for their valuable suggestions and comments. The technical assistance of Erdem Taner is gratefully acknowledged.

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date:

Signature

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZ.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
CHAPTER	
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. RULE SCEPTIC ARGUMENT.....	4
1.1 An Analysis of the Paradox.....	4
1.2 Kripke's Interpretation of the Paradox.....	6
1.3 Dispositional Response.....	10
1.4 Kripke's Interpretation of Grue.....	11
1.5 PI 201.....	13
1.6 New Case.....	17
2. SOLUTION OF RULE-SCEPTIC ARGUMENT.....	19
2.1 Sceptical Solution	19
2.2 Assertability Conditions of Meaning.....	20
2.3 PI 202.....	23
2.4 Community View.....	27
2.5 Private Language Argument.....	31
2.6 The Relation between Private Language Argument and Rule Following Considerations.....	34
3. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS	
a. Conclusion.....	38
REFERENCES.....	42

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, my aim is to evaluate Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Kripke, in his book, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* presents a sceptical argument and a sceptical solution. Kripke claims that this sceptical argument and sceptical solution arises from Wittgenstein's book *Philosophical Investigations*. Furthermore, he says the conclusion of Wittgenstein's "private language argument" is stated at PI 202.

Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein is an unorthodox one. Therefore, it is not surprising that there exist various objections to his interpretation. The best known objections are found in the book *Scepticism Rules and Language* by Hacker and Baker. McGinn made another effective objection in his book *Wittgenstein on Meaning*. Besides, there are many articles in the literature written to show Kripke's misunderstanding of Wittgenstein.

Kripke, in the second chapter –after the introductory– of his book between the pages 7 and 22 deals with a sceptical argument and discusses a response (dispositionalist response) to his rule sceptical argument between the pages 22 and 53. In the third chapter of his book, he deals with a sceptical solution and he suggests changing the truth conditional theory of meaning with assertability conditional theory of meaning. He concludes that one person considered to be in isolation cannot be able to obey rules. The two remarks of Wittgenstein's book –PI

201 and PI 202 –are the core ideas of the Kripke’s book; therefore, I will especially concentrate on these two remarks.

My main concern is the concept of ‘rule’ but this analysis is confined with Kripke’s and Wittgenstein’s views about rules. There is a close relation between Wittgenstein’s views about meaning of a word and his views about rules. A general sketch is drawn in *Routledge*: “In his later writings, Wittgenstein rejects the idea of meanings as mental or abstract entities to be associated with particular signs. Instead he takes the meaning of a sign, or word, to be its use in language.”¹ And in *Stanford*, “Such liberation involves elimination of the need to posit any sort of external or internal authority beyond the actual applications of the rule.”² Therefore, the subject matter of this thesis is not “Platonistic” or “Mentalistic” concept of rules.

My thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I will analyze Kripke’s sceptical argument. I will try to derive an argument from the paradox, which is stated in PI 201. Then I will analyze Kripke’s interpretation of both the paradox in PI 201 and Nelson Goodman’s “grue paradox” and I will discuss Kripke’s response to dispositionalists in terms of my argumentation. Moreover, as Kripke’s argument arises from the paradox stated at PI 201, I will present a number of interpretations of PI 201. I think, Kripke’s “new case” assumption is another crucial part of his rule-sceptic argument.

In the second chapter, I will discuss Kripke’s solution to the rule skepticism and I will analyze Wittgenstein’s remark in PI 202 including different interpretations of that remark. In addition, I will examine the main topics of the subject like “community view” and “private language argument” in order to understand Kripke’s

¹ Barry, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

² Biletzki, Anat, Matar, Anat, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

sceptical solution. Furthermore, I will discuss the relation between “private language argument” and Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations.

Finally, in the last chapter, I will discuss the relation between Wittgenstein’s PI and Kripke’s book and I will try to show the consistencies and inconsistencies of Kripke’s book.

CHAPTER 1

RULE SCEPTICAL ARGUMENT

1.1 An Analysis of the Paradox

It seems that it is wrong to take the paradox in isolation from Wittgenstein's other remarks, however, I believe that without such a direct analysis of the paradox, we cannot comprehend both Wittgenstein's arguments about rules and Kripke's sceptical argument. According to Kripke, the paradox in the first sentence of PI 201 causes a new philosophical scepticism about rules. The first paragraph of PI 201 is:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

I want to use a derivation that follows the same structure as the sentences in the first paragraph of PI 201 in order to understand the paradox better. First, I will construct an argument from the paradox. I believe that my argumentation will make the issue more clear and it can be easily adapted to Kripke's understanding of the paradox.

Then I will show the dissimilarities between the structure of the rule sceptic-argument and the structure of the paradox.

Argument A³:

S1: Every course of action can be made out to accord with a rule.

(1) An action A1 is in accord with the rule R1. (premise)

(2) An action A2 is in accord with the rule R1. (S1)

Therefore: No course of action could be determined by a rule. (C1)

S2: Every course of action can be made out to conflict with a rule.

(3) An action A2 is not in accord with the rule R1. (S2)

(4) An action A1 is not in accord with the rule R1. (S2)

Therefore: There would be neither accord nor conflict here. (C2)

However, this argumentation does not help us understand the structure of Kripke's sceptic argument because in Kripke's argument, we are confronted with two different rules and these rules have the same practices at the beginning. Therefore, we should try to derive another argument from argument A.

Argument A':

(1) An action A1 is in accord with the rule R1. (premise)

(2) An action A1 is in accord with the rule R2. (premise)

(3) An action A2 is in accord with the rule R1. (premise)

(4) An action A3 is in accord with the rule R2. (premise)

(5) An action A2 is in accord with the rule R2. (S1)

Therefore: C1 in the argumentA

³ C1-the conclusion of the first sentence of the paradox- and C2 -the conclusion of the second sentence of the paradox- are conclusions. A1 is *any* course of action which is determined by the rule "R1". S1 and S2 are sentences that exist also in the first paragraph of PI 201. The function of S1 and S2 is similar to the theorems in an axiomatic system.

(6) An action A2 is not in accord with the rule R2. (S2)

Therefore: C2 in the argument A

When we compare argument A and argument A', it might be thought that we have to conclude (C1) after (3) in the argument A'. In the argument A even if A2 –in the second line– in accord with the rule R1, we can add another action which is not determined by the rule R1. In other words, the relation between A1 and A2 are important. If A1 and A2 are incompatible or A1 excludes A2 then we are confronted with the rule-sceptic argument. In argument A' let us assume that A2 excludes A3 if and only if the rule is R2 and from another point of view, if actual case is A2 then the rules R1 and R2 are incompatible.

In argument A', (S1) forces us to add two lines and (S2) forces us to add six lines. Since my aim is to compare the paradox with Kripke's rule-sceptic argument and to compare the solutions of them, I prefer to construct it in this way. It is clear that when we add a sentence like (6) –without referring to (S2)– then the rule-skepticism is defeated. In the next chapter we will give a solution for the rule skepticism.

1.2 Kripke's Interpretation of the Paradox

In chapter 2 of Kripke's book there is a sceptic person who inquiries about the result of the arithmetical question $68+57=?$ This sceptic person questions: "How can someone be sure that by '+', he means addition function?" He claims that may be he used the '+' sign to denote "quus function"⁴ in the past. The problem turns into the question, "How can someone be sure which rule he obeyed in the past?" If we

⁴ Quus function is a function that; $x \oplus y: (x+y \text{ if } x, y < 57; \text{ Otherwise } x+y=5)$.

obeyed the quaddition rule in the past, then we should answer the question ‘68+57=5’.

The sceptical hypothesis is that there cannot be a *fact*, which could determine someone’s use of “addition function” instead of “quus function”. Besides, the sceptic person claims that by ‘plus’ one might always have *meant* ‘quus’ in the past. According to Kripke, someone must answer two questions to overcome this sceptical challenge. “First, he questions whether there is any *fact* that I meant plus, not quus, that will answer his sceptical challenge. Second, he questions whether I have any reason to be so confident that now I should answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’.”⁵

Kripke’s sceptic person says that we applied “plus” to finitely many cases in the past; so how can we claim that our use of the word “plus” referred to the act of addition function instead of another function. My past usage of the addition function might be interpreted as quus function. According to Kripke,

...if the sceptic is right, the concepts of meaning and of intending one function rather than another will make no sense. For the sceptic holds that no fact about my past history – nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external behavior – establishes that I meant plus rather than quus. (Nor, of course, does any fact establish that I meant quus!) But if this is correct, there can of course be no fact about which function I meant, and if there can be no fact about which particular function I meant in the *past*, there can be none in the *present* either.⁶

Moreover, as a conclusion of this sceptic argument he says, “It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air.”⁷ Now, I will try to derive Kripke’s rule-sceptic argument from Argument A2’. We should include time clauses in the

⁵ Kripke, p.11.

⁶ Ibid., p.13.

⁷ Ibid., p.22.

argument A'. So that, in the argument B the sentences (1)-(2) which were in the argument A' are in past tense.

Argument B:

The rule 'R1' in the argument A' is: Addition rule in the argument B.

The rule 'R2' in the argument A' is: Quaddition rule in the argument B.

Action 'A1' in the argument A' is: ' $2+3=5$ ' in the argument B. (past intentions)⁸

Action 'A2' in the argument A' is: ' $68+57=125$ ' in the argument B.

Action 'A3' in the argument A' is: ' $68+57=5$ ' in the argument B.

(1) The mathematical operation ' $2+3=5$ ' *was* in accord with the addition rule.

(premise)

(2) The mathematical operation ' $2+3=5$ ' *was* in accord with the quaddition rule.

(premise)

(3) The mathematical operation ' $68+57=125$ ' *is* in accord with the addition rule.

(Dispositionalist response). (provisional premise)

(4) The mathematical operation ' $68+57=5$ ' *is* in accord with the quaddition rule.

(Dispositionalist response). (provisional premise)

(5) The mathematical operation ' $68+57=125$ ' *is* in accord with the quaddition rule.

(Rule scepticism). (S1)

In his book, Kripke explains the sceptical challenge at (5) in the argument B,

...“How do I know that ‘68 plus 57’, as I *meant* ‘plus’ in the past [(1) in the argument B], should denote 125?” If the word ‘plus’ as I used it in the past, denoted the quus function [(2) in the argument B], not the plus function (‘quaddition’ rather than addition), then my *past* intention was such that, asked for the value of ‘68 plus 57’, I should have replied ‘5’.⁹

⁸ Although I use only one action ‘A1’, action ‘A1’ in fact consists of all past applications of the both rules ‘R1’ and ‘R2’.

⁹ Kripke, p.12.

The oddity of Kripke's rule sceptic person's thinking is his acceptance of (5) in argument B but he is ready to change (5) with (4). According to Putnam,

The 'hypothesis' that Joan means *quus* by 'plus' is one that can be empirically refuted, by asking Joan what $57 + 2$ is. To be sure, it is 'logically possible' that Joan would still answer the question 'What is $2 + 57$?' by saying '59' rather than by giving the answer which is correct on the 'quus' interpretation of 'plus', namely '5', since Joan might make a mistake in 'quaddition'. The inference from the response ' $2 + 57 = 59$ ' to 'Joan does not mean *quus* by "plus"' is not a *deductive* inference. But so what? As Austin famously reminded us, 'Enough is enough: it doesn't mean everything'.¹⁰

In short: our philosophical problem is to defeat (5) in the argument B. As well as that the rule-sceptic is questioning whether there is any fact that establishes that I meant plus in both (1) and (3) in the argument B –not quus? According to Goldfarb,

In sum, Kripke's concern is with physicalist reductions of meaning notions, a concern that is narrower than Wittgenstein's and arises on a different basis; and Kripke's challenge relies on a highly problematic mixture of demands imposed on reductions. Thus it does not appear that Kripke has provided the means to illuminate Wittgenstein's views on the nature of meaning, or the ways in which the rule-following considerations are to support them.¹¹

Hacker and Baker say,

His conclusion is not that he certainly means either a or b by 'W', but cannot be sure which; nor is it that he knows what he now means, but cannot be certain whether it is the same as what meant yesterday. Rather he concludes with 'the paradox' that there is no such thing as meaning, so language cannot be possible. But this is not scepticism at all, it is conceptual nihilism, and, unlike classical scepticism, it is *manifestly* self-refuting.¹²

Kripke's rule sceptic-argument is a paradoxical one. If it was impossible to speak a meaningful language, it would be also impossible to ask this question. However, the question is asked, i.e. a language exists and it is not meaningless; but

¹⁰ Putnam, p.253.

¹¹ Goldfarb, p.479.

¹² Hacker and Baker, p.6.

the fact that the question cannot be answered renders the language meaningless and the question becomes a meaningless question in a meaningless language. For this reason, Kripke uses 'provisional premises'. In other words, at the beginning of the rule-sceptic argument, there is a common language between us and the sceptic person. In addition, the sceptic person does not questioning the present usage of the sign '+'.

In section 1.5 we will see that Wittgenstein defeats (5) in the following paragraphs of PI 201 by saying that (5) is a misunderstanding which arises from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another.

1.3 Dispositional Response

In this part, with the help of the argument B, I will demonstrate Kripke's main views about the dispositionalist response which he deals within nearly thirty pages in his book. According to Kripke the main defect of the dispositionalist response is this:

Suppose I do mean addition by '+'. What is the relation of this supposition to the question how I will respond to the problem '68+57'? The dispositionalist gives a *descriptive* account of this relation: if '+' meant addition, then I will answer '125'. But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is *normative*, not descriptive. The point is *not* that, if I meant addition by '+', I *will* answer '125', but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of '+', I *should* answer '125'. Computational error, finiteness of my capacity, and other disturbing factors may lead me not to be *disposed* to respond as I *should*, but if so, I have not acted in accordance with my intentions. The relation of meaning and intention to future action is *normative*, not *descriptive*.¹³

If I apply Kripke's thought in the rule sceptic-argument B; the dispositionalist says if it was asked to me: '68+57=?' then (3). Certainly, this is not an answer to the sceptic person because the sceptic challenge is (5) in the argument B. However,

¹³ Kripke, p.37.

Kripke's sceptic challenge is not only (5) in the argument B but also he argues that is there any fact that '+' is used to denote addition both (1) and (3) in argument B.

1.4 Kripke's Interpretation of Grue

I will discuss Kripke's interpretation of grue paradox in terms of the argument A'. Although a *hypothesis* is not a *rule* and the sentence "An emerald to be first examined before time t , is green" is an observation, I use R1-R2 as the hypotheses and A1-A2-A3 for the observations in Goodman's paradox. Nevertheless, I have to make a change in Goodman's problem by including the rule-sceptic challenge in order to show Kripke's use of the "grue paradox".

The original paradox is:

Now let me introduce another predicate less familiar than "green". It is the predicate "grue" and it applies to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue... Thus although we are well aware which of the two incompatible predictions is genuinely confirmed, they are equating well confirmed according to our present definition. Moreover, it is clear that if we simply choose an appropriate predicate, then on the basis these same observations we shall have equal confirmation...¹⁴

It is clear that the argument A' is not acceptable for Nelson Goodman's "grue paradox". However, I assumed that it has the same structure as the argument A'.

Argument B':

The Rule 'R1' in the argument A' is the hypothesis, "All emeralds are green" in the argument B'.

The Rule 'R2' in the argument A' is the hypothesis, "All emeralds are grue" in the argument B'.

¹⁴ Goodman, p.74.

Action 'A1' in the argument A' is an emerald to be first examined before time t is green in the argument B'.

Action 'A2' in the argument A' is an emerald to be first examined after time t is green in the argument B'.

Action 'A3' in the argument A' is an emerald to be first examined after time t is blue in the argument B'. So;

(1) An emerald to be first examined before time t is green, is in accord with the hypothesis, "All emeralds are green." (premise).

(2) An emerald to be first examined before time t is green, is in accord with the hypothesis, "All emeralds are grue." (premise).

(3) An emerald to be first examined after time t is green, is in accord with the hypothesis, "All emeralds are green." (premise).

(4) An emerald to be first examined after time t is blue, is in accord with the hypothesis, "All emeralds are grue." (premise).

(5) An emerald to be first examined after time t is blue, is in accord with the hypothesis, "All emeralds are green" (sceptical challenge).

In his book, Kripke mentions the sceptical challenge (5) in the argument B'; "Who is to say that in the past [(1) in the argument B'] I didn't mean grue by 'green', so that now I should call the sky, not the grass, 'green'?"¹⁵ Hacking says,

Kripke's question is nevertheless odd, for what I meant in the past seldom matters to how I ought to use a word, or whether I should call something so and so. Even if I had meant grue by 'green', it is not the case that right now I ought to call the sky and not the grass 'green'.¹⁶

¹⁵ Kripke, p.58.

¹⁶ Hacking, p. 279.

Goodman is concerned with a problem of induction, not of a kind of rule-skepticism; whether ‘green’ is the same as the ‘grue’ or not. Although Kripke says his sceptic-argument has great affinities with Goodman’s “new riddle of induction”, he admits that Goodman’s intention was not to propose such a sceptical argument. Hacker and Baker say, “The core problem is, according to Kripke, a *normative* version of Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’”.¹⁷

1.5 PI 201

Now I am going to discuss the paradox with other related remarks. The whole of PI 201 is:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.

Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term “interpretation” to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another. (PI 201)

According to Hacker and Baker,

What has been rejected in §201 is not the truism that rules guide action (or that we know that our use of an expression conforms with its meaning, or that we are actually applying expressions in accord with their explanations, i.e. the rules for their use). Rather, what is repudiated is the suggestion that a rule determines an action as being in accord with it only in virtue of an interpretation.¹⁸

¹⁷ Hacker and Baker, p.10.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp.19-20.

According to Colin McGinn the paradox is:

Wittgenstein's stated reason for denying that understanding is a kind of translating is that 'any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support' (198). This point is elaborated in 201 with the observation that a mere association of signs cannot determine what is a correct and what an incorrect use of those signs: meaning fixes correct use, but interpretations cannot determine linguistic correctness, so meanings cannot be interpretations. In other words, a sign is in itself just a piece of lifeless syntax, and syntax can never add up to meaning; so it is hopeless to conceive of grasp of meaning as the association of signs. For no sign is *intrinsically* meaningful.¹⁹

Colin McGinn also says, "Grasping a rule *determines* use precisely because it is nothing other than what gets *displayed* in use; it is not something for which we need a further step to reach use, as on the interpretational conception."²⁰

In PI 201 we understand from the sentence "This was our paradox:..." that our paradox was solved in preceding remarks. In the second paragraph of PI 201, Wittgenstein says the paradox is a misunderstanding and this misunderstanding is also mentioned in the remark PI 198. In PI 198 he says, "Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule" so we should reject the view which is in the first paragraph of PI 201 that "Every action can be made out to accord with the rule" because Wittgenstein says in PI 198 "Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning". The solution is stated explicitly in PI 201. "What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases." In addition, in PI 199 he says, "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs*." Nevertheless, "Is there any fact that I meant plus by '+', not

¹⁹ McGinn, p.17.

²⁰ Ibid., p.43.

quus.” If there is no such fact, then how is it possible to follow a rule? Wittgenstein is not concerned with the answer of this question.

The solution of the paradox also can be implicitly found in Wittgenstein’s views about the meaning of a word. In PI 43, he says, “For a *large* class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” We get clues from the word “use” here. What does it mean to *use* something? It is an ability, a practice, a technical knowledge and may be a custom, may be a regular activity.

It is clear that Wittgenstein’s paradox is not as complex as Kripke thinks. If we evaluate the paradox related with the other remarks, the history of the paradox begins with the remark PI 143. In PI 143, a teacher tries to teach the series of natural numbers to a learner. After the learner gets the system of natural numbers, in PI 185 the teacher gives another command which aims to continue a series of number as 1000,1002,1004 respectively but the learner continued the series 1000, 1004, 1008. Although the learner’s following the rule is not correct, the learner insist on writing 1004 after 1000. The insistence of the learner that the answer ‘1004’ is the correct application of the rule is surprising. I consider the answer ‘1004’ as following a rule privately. This means that private rule following is a practice as well. The insistence of the learner is, in fact, to think that he is following the rule. Someone can wonder that from the point of learner’s view whether the answer ‘1002’ is the correct answer or not. It is also possible that the learner insists on ‘1002’ is not the correct answer but in PI, the learner accepts that both answers are in some interpretation true.

In my opinion, after this process it seems to the learner that every action in one interpretation accords with the rule and the learner tells this opinion to the teacher

both in PI 198 ““But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at *this* point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.”” In addition, in PI 201 “...every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.” In PI 198, the teacher told the learner that obeying a rule is a custom, a regular activity and explains the causal connexion of following a rule by saying “I have been trained to do so”. The teacher gives another answer in the second sentence of the paradox: “if we accept your idea then it is not possible to obey any rule because in some interpretation any action also can be made out to conflict with the rule.” In short, my interpretation of the first sentence of the paradox is the thoughts of the learner about rules and the second sentence of the paradox is the teacher’s answer to the learner assuming as if the learners’ reasoning is correct.

Kripke’s sceptic argument is only related with the first paragraph of the PI 201 and if we analyze his sceptic argument in accordance with other remarks or other writings of Wittgenstein then, in my opinion, we may lose the main point of Kripke’s sceptic argument.

Finally, we should notice the most important thing about the paradox and the sceptical argument: do they both have the same conclusions? And, in my opinion, they both have the same conclusions. However, I have doubts about whether Wittgenstein’s solution of the paradox is also applicable to Kripke’s rule-sceptic argument. In other words, “Are the second and third paragraphs of PI 201 also applicable to Kripke’s argument?”

In short, up to this point the problem can be summarized in a few sentences taken from the book *Scepticism Rules and Language*: “Kripke in effect shifts Wittgenstein’s problem of how, in what sense, a rule determines its application, to a

problem of the relation between my past and present intentions, my meaning addition by ‘plus’ (and not a different arithmetical operation christened ‘quaddition’).”²¹ In the third chapter I will examine Kripke’s solution to the problem of the relation between someone’s past and present intentions.

1.6 New Case

The “new case” is another difference of Kripke’s rule sceptic-argument and Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations. It is not clear in Kripke’s example but may be another formulation help us to understand its function.

Let us consider the case in which someone uses an addition function which is different from ours. In other words, he needs infinitely many symbols and names for defining numbers. Let us suppose, he uses a symbol ‘ Θ ’ for representing the number ‘ten’. Then the addition is:

(1) $1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1=\Theta$ (Θ is a symbol which is not used before).

He realizes that he can manage to define infinitely many symbols by finite symbols.

So the new addition is:

(2) $1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1=10$ (Both the symbols 1 and 0 are used before).

Is there any fact that this person can distinguish the meaning of ‘+’ sign in both the lines (1) and (2)? It is clear that ‘+’ sign does not have the same use in both the lines (1) and (2). For instance, when we taught the natural number up to ‘9’ to a learner and also taught him addition function only by the numbers which is smaller than 5, we can not know his answer to the question ‘ $9+1=?$ ’. This is a new case for the learner.

²¹ Hacker and Baker, p.27.

Hacker and Baker's objection to Kripke is that "68+57" is not a new case for addition. In my opinion, when we are confronted with a new case, we should change the old rule with the new rule and we expect that this new rule solves the problems which could not be solved by the old rule.

It is clear from the previous sections in this thesis that in Wittgenstein's paradox "new case" is not the case. However, independent from Wittgenstein text, the "new case" is one of the crucial premises of Kripke's rule sceptic-argument. In my opinion, dispositionalist response fails because of this assumption.

CHAPTER 2

SOLUTION OF RULE-SCEPTIC ARGUMENT

2.1 Sceptical Solution

Kripke claims that Wittgenstein's solution to the rule scepticism is,

He does not give a 'straight' solution, pointing out to the silly sceptic a hidden fact he overlooked, a condition in the world which constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus'. In fact, he agrees with his own hypothetical sceptic that there is no such fact, no such condition in either the 'internal' or the 'external' world.²²

The solution of the sceptical argument is, according to Kripke, a sceptical one.

In other words, Kripke concedes that we cannot give an answer to the sceptic person's doubts since there can be no fact in the world that confirms our meaning plus instead of quus. The skeptical challenge was: "For the sceptic holds that no fact about my past history –nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external behavior – establishes that I meant plus rather than quus."²³

²² Kripke, p.69.

²³ Ibid., p.13.

On the other hand, according to Hacker and Baker,

Of course, according to Wittgenstein, I may confidently say that I mean addition by 'plus', but not because I am introspectively aware of my inner state of meaning. Rather, as I am confident that I intend to play chess (and not some other game), or confident that what I now expect is John to come (and not, John to go, James to come or the pound sterling to fluctuate). If my confidence rested on an inner awareness, it would be inductive. I would have to reason that whenever I have in the past had this inner state, then I have gone on to...But then I ought to say 'I think I intend to play chess. Let's see!' which is absurd.²⁴

The solution Kripke offers to the problem of the relation between our past intentions and present intentions is similar to Humean solution and this relation is constructed by *custom*. However, I have doubts that Kripke's "new case" assumption is defeated by appealing to *custom* because I consider "new case" is also independent from custom. I find great similarities between "new case" and Thomas Kuhn's paradigms. In other words, in my opinion, "new case" is similar to a "new paradigm" in Kuhn's terminology.

2.2 Assertability Conditions of Meaning

Kripke draws our attention to some concepts of Wittgenstein. The first one is agreement. In PI 241: "“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”—it is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.” There must be agreement between someone and community. For example, there must be agreement in the rules of a game otherwise, the game could not be played. The players must prove that they learned or knew the rules of the game. Quus-like answers are, according to Kripke, one form of life and addition rule is

²⁴ Hacker and Baker, p.30.

another form of life in Wittgenstein's terminology. According to Kripke, although we cannot explain objectively our agreement in particular cases, we agree in general. Another concept is the concept of criterion. In PI 580 Wittgenstein says "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria." This outward criterion is checkability.

According to Kripke, we should accept assertability-conditions of meaning in order to find a solution and we must change our truth-conditional picture of language. In addition, we cannot say that assertability conditions are applicable for a person in isolation. Therefore, someone's assertion "I mean plus by 'plus'" under certain conditions should be checked by the community. Kripke insists on the claim that it is not conceptually possible to defeat the paradox in PI 201 by a person considered to be in isolation. Kripke claims that early Wittgenstein defends truth conditional theory of meaning and later Wittgenstein defends assertability conditions of meaning. Malcolm objects to this interpretation of Kripke. This is an important criticism for Kripke because Malcolm, like Kripke, defends the communitarian reading of Wittgenstein. In my opinion, PI 241 and 242 can be seen as evidences for Kripke's claim. Kripke says,

Wittgenstein replaces the question, "What must be the case for this sentence to be true?" by two others: first, "Under what conditions may this form of words be appropriately asserted (or denied)?"; second, given an answer to the first question, "What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting (or denying) the form of words under these conditions?"²⁵

Kripke explains the function of this shift by saying;

First, it offers a new approach to the problems of how language has meaning, contrasted with that of the *Tractatus*. But second, it can be applied to give an account of assertions about meaning themselves, regarded as assertions *within* our language.²⁶

²⁵ Kripke, p.73.

²⁶ Ibid., p.77.

In addition He says,

Wittgenstein's sceptical solution concedes to the sceptic that no 'truth conditions' or 'corresponding facts' in the world exist that make a statement like "Jones, like many of us, means addition by '+'" true. Rather we should look at how such assertions are *used*.²⁷

Kripke mentions the relation between 'assertability conditions' and his rule sceptic-argument;

What follows from these assertability conditions is *not* that the answer everyone gives to an addition problem is, by definition, the correct one, but rather the platitude that, if everyone agrees upon a certain answer, then no one will feel justified in calling the answer wrong.²⁸

According to Boghossian, Kripke's view can be called "non-factualist theory of meaning". He says,

It would appear, in other words, that the acceptability of the communitarian conditions is strongly parasitic on the acceptability of the solitary ones, and not the other way around.

In sum: both because it is difficult (impossible?) to generate constitutive results out of non-constitutive accounts, and because our actual assertability conditions for meaning ascriptions appear not to be communitarian, I conclude that the sceptical solution does not yield a convincing argument against solitary language.²⁹

I will try to construct Kripke's rule-sceptic argument in a different way. Let us consider that the structure of the meaning of a word is 'X means Y in context C'. Kripke's rule sceptic argument is one of the extra-ordinary cases of this structure but it is not logically impossible. In other words, 'X1 means Y1 or Z1 in context C1'. If Y1 and Z1 are incompatible with each other then we are confronted with conceptual relativism. Consequently, following the paradox stated at PI 201, this conceptual relativism turns to be a conceptual nihilism.

²⁷ Ibid., p.86.

²⁸ Ibid., p.112.

²⁹ Boghossian, p.522.

Normally one should say that ‘X1 means Y1 in context C1’ and ‘X1 means Z1 in context C2’. Kripke’s metalinguistic question is, “What determines the difference between contexts C1 and C2?” Is it impossible for an individual to think or interpret the context is C2 but in fact the context is C1? In my opinion *assertability-conditions* helps to determine the context.

When we evaluate Wittgenstein’s views in PI 201 and 202 according to this structure, in my opinion, in PI 201, Wittgenstein shows us the threat of conceptual relativism and conceptual nihilism and he explains “What does it mean to understand a context?” Let us assume that Z1 excludes Y1 and ‘X1 means Y1 in context C1’. Then, ‘X1 means Z1 in context C1’ is not the correct application of the word X1 –in fact Y1 is the correct application of it. I think the application of this structure to PI 202 is like: If someone insists that context is C2 not C1 then there is nothing to do. Nevertheless, if someone admit that context is C1 but insist on the claim that ‘X1 means Z1 in context C1’ we have to say that this person obeys a rule privately. As a conclusion we should try to understand how this rule is used in society (context)?

2.3 PI 202

The whole of PI 202 is: “And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to *think* one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.” This is one of the most discussed remarks of Wittgenstein. Since it is not clear, there is not an agreement of the meaning of this remark. Here I will give some interpretations of it.

According to Hacker and Baker,

The first sentence of §202 merely repeats the penultimate point of §201, viz. how I understand a rule (*meine Auffassung*) is ultimately exhibited not by an interpretation (the substitution of one expression of a rule of another), but in what we call ‘following the rule’, i.e. in what I do in applying the rule. Hence following a rule is an activity, a *Praxis*. It is a misinterpretation to take ‘Praxis’ here to signify a social practice.³⁰

It is true that there is no evidence in the text that by practice Wittgenstein means social practice. However, I defend the idea that private rule following is also a practice and this is *necessarily* social practice otherwise to give an answer like ‘1004’ can be also called obeying the rule. As conclusion, I think writing ‘1004’ is also an example of following a rule privately. They continue,

Of course, with us social creature rule-following is generally a social practice. But the point of the argument was not to establish this (obvious) fact, but rather to show that rule-following, and hence a language, is a kind of customary behavior, a form of *action*, not of thought. The ‘foundations’ of language are not in private experience, the ‘given’ indefinables, but in normative regularities of conduct.³¹

According to McGinn the first sentence of PI 202 “...recapitulates what was said in 198-201, namely that obeying a rule is a practical activity, something overtly done over time; correlatively, to grasp a rule is to be master of such a practice, i.e. to have a certain capacity.”³² According to him, the second sentence of PI 202 says that “...it does not follow from the fact that one thinks one is obeying a rule that one really is: one could believe oneself to be master of a practice and to be exercising such mastery and one in fact not be, i.e. self-ascriptions of rule following are fallible.”³³

³⁰ Hacker and Baker, p.20.

³¹ Ibid., p.21.

³² McGinn. p.43.

³³ Ibid., pp.43-44.

According to McGinn, “The key point here is that Wittgenstein uses ‘private’ to mean ‘inner’ and so in contrast with ‘outer’ or ‘public’...”³⁴ and these sentences, in my opinion, unlike McGinn, implicitly means “private language argument” is related with PI 202. Here, I should remind that I suppose the answer of the learner in PI 185 ‘1004’ is privately rule following. Privately rule following need not to be related with the ‘inner’. But the use of Wittgenstein’s “private” in the “private language argument” certainly, means ‘inner’ and this word is used in contrast with ‘outer’ or ‘public’. If we take the word ‘privately’ in PI 202 as to denote ‘inner’ then this means that there is a direct relation between PI 202 and “private language argument”.

In the actual world, it is conceivable for us that one can play chess in his mind against himself. Let us consider the case in which there is a chess master (the person A) who can play chess without using a chessboard. Now, the person A is playing chess (in mind). Then the person B asks to A; “What are you doing now?” A answers, “I am playing chess”. However, B can doubt that A is playing chess. Like one can doubt that another person is in pain. A tells him the moves in chess language (e.g., e2-e4). Here the chess language represents the natural expression of our sensations. B controls the moves of A on the chess board and after that B convinced that A is playing chess. Finally, another person C can claim that A called the moves by heart. This is similar to the case in which we show pain behavior without feeling pain. A can play chess with C. In this case, C will use a chessboard and A will play in his mind. It seems that there is an important difference between our grammar of sensation language and my scenario because C normally should stop

³⁴ Ibid., p.47.

doubting. Nonetheless, someone can always doubt another person's sensations. Actually, one point remains that C can continue to claim that although you have ability to play chess in your mind, you could not play chess in your mind against yourself. According to McGinn, in my opinion, it is not possible for the person A to play a chess game. Furthermore, I think, playing chess in mind is not related with both private language argument and PI 202. Playing chess in mind is similar to have pain without pain behavior.

Malcolm's interpretation of PI 202:

...a person's actions cannot be in accord with a rule unless they are in conformity with a common way of acting that is displayed in the behavior of nearly everyone who has had the same training. This means that the concept of following a rule implies the concept of a *community* of rule followers. When Wittgenstein says, also in *PI* 202, that one cannot follow a rule 'privately', I think he means that the actions of a single individual, whether these actions are private or public, cannot *fix the meaning* of a rule. Wittgenstein relies, in *PI* 202, on a simple but powerful point, namely that the concept of a *rule* implies a distinction between *following* a rule and *believing* one is following a rule. A person can believe that he is following a rule but may be *wrong*.³⁵

In my opinion Wittgenstein's use of following a rule does not imply community of rule followers. However, I claim that following a rule privately implies this. That is to say, to claim that someone obeys a rule privately is the same as to claim that this person does not obey the rule. Of course, it is possible that someone makes mistakes and cannot be aware of it unless community checks his applications. There are two types of mistakes; 'systematical' and 'random',³⁶. Once someone got the system, he can also make mistakes but these are not systematic

³⁵ Malcolm, p.156.

³⁶ The terms "random mistakes" and "systematic mistakes" are used by Wittgenstein in PI 143. In my opinion, the crucial difference between them is; random mistakes happen after one gets the system. For instance, my reading mistakes are random mistakes. However, reading mistakes are systematic mistakes for the ones who does not know how to read.

mistakes anymore. Nevertheless, the point is “How can someone learn to obey any rule?”

2.4 Community View

The community view defends the idea that “language is essentially social”. In my opinion, like Kripke, if it is possible for a person considered to be in isolation to obey a rule then we are confronted with the rule sceptic-argument again. For in actual cases how can someone claim that I obey the rule ‘R’? Kripke’s sceptic argument must be answered now. The concept of community is in fact clear. The necessary and sufficient condition for a community to exist is that there must be at least two persons. Moreover, the agreement between their language is sufficient to determine the criteria for correct use of words. The opponent views are much more complex and are not easy to understand. I think, “community view” is more common sensical. According to HB,

But does this really solve the sceptical question? Given that no one previously ever added 57 and 68, how do we know that our present community-wide inclination to answer ‘125’ accords with what we previously meant by ‘plus’, i.e. with what we would have been inclined to say, had we previously been asked what 57+68 is?³⁷

Kripke’s appealing to a community fails to defeat skeptical challenge because of his new case assumption. The importance of this point is that in a new case appealing to *custom* is not enough to defeat the sceptical paradox. I can say that in a new case, community is at the same position as a single individual. I think assertability conditions undertake this role from community in the case of “new case”.

Kripke says,

³⁷ Hacker and Baker, p.37.

What is really denied is what might be called the ‘private model’ of rule following, that the notion of a person following a given rule is to be analyzed simply in terms of facts about the rule follower and the rule follower alone, without reference to his membership in a wider community.³⁸

Let us assume that there is a person who passes through when the traffic light is red and stop when the traffic light is green. We have to say that he is following a rule “privately”. In fact, this is another way of saying “You are not obeying the rule.” There is a misunderstanding arising from his misinterpretation of traffic rules. It is wrong to interpret traffic rules like this. Of course stopping at the red light is also an interpretation but that is all and there is no place for another interpretation.

Somehow, all of the community members suddenly begin to obey the traffic rule like him. In addition, let us assume that another person from the members of the community continues to stop at the red light. Now we should say that this person is following the rule “privately”. If there is one person in traffic, it does not matter whether someone is passing through the red or green light.

The opponents of “community view” use passages from other writings of Wittgenstein but there exists only one remark in PI that someone can interpret ‘against community view’. That is the first paragraph of the remark 243.

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. –An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people’s actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)

I do not believe that PI 243 has a textual evidence for a lifelong solitary. If we see the “private language argument” as a counter-example of Wittgenstein’s views

³⁸ Kripke., p.109.

on “rule following” we should not separate PI 243 from PI 241-2. The first paragraph of PI 243 is in my opinion related with the issue of how can such an agreement is possible in language. So to speak, the person in the first paragraph of the PI 243 uses a different language from us. Namely, we are an observer and all we need is to translate the monolinguists language into our own. In this interpretation, the first paragraph of PI 243 is not about a person isolated from community like the lifelong solitary, but a person who prefers to talk with himself in a different language.

Another topic related with the discussions about community view is called “Robinson Crusoe case”. Kripke says,

Does this mean that Robinson Crusoe, isolated on an island, cannot be said to follow any rules, no matter what he does? I do not see that this follows. What does follow is that *if* we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria for rule following to him. The falsity of the private model need not mean that a *physically isolated* individual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an individual, *considered in isolation* (whether or not he is physically isolated), cannot be said to do so.³⁹

In literature, we see different versions of the Robinson Crusoe case. For example, Robinson Crusoe1 is Daniel Defoe’s Robinson and Robinson Crusoe2 is a lifelong solitaire. Stephen Davies criticize Kripke’s understanding of private linguist,

Kripke’s private linguist is solitary in not belonging to any community. Whereas Wittgenstein explicitly allowed that isolated, solitary human beings, such as Crusoe 2 is, might speak languages. As I have discussed above, Wittgenstein’s putative private linguist is isolated in a way that no flesh-and-blood human being could be isolated.⁴⁰

³⁹ Kripke, p.110.

⁴⁰ Davies, p.65.

Another version is “simple Crusoe” who is a lifelong private linguist. Simple Crusoe has only ability to play one-person language-games and “sophisticated Crusoe” also who is a lifelong private linguist, has ability both to play one-person language-games and two-person language-games. According to Canfield, the first paragraph of PI 243 is an example for the possibility of a simple Crusoe. As well as that he says, “Wittgenstein believes both that language is essentially communal and that there can be a lifelong solitaire who follows rules or language.”⁴¹

One thing is crucial: a negative assertion cannot be justified by the help of possible worlds. Wittgenstein’s negative assertion is in PI 202: “... it is not possible to obey a rule privately:...” So it is normal to use the method of possible worlds as a counter-example for the “community view” but in fact it is not enough to think of a world in which a private linguist lives; it must also be convincing. I think these examples must answer some questions like, “What is the function or purpose of this language?” And how can someone practice this language? Especially, how can someone decide the correct and incorrect application of a rule? For Kripke’s sceptic argument the most crucial question is, “How does this private linguist manage to acquire the normative character of the concept of rule?”

Kripke says,

If our considerations so far are correct, the answer is that, if one person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding the person who adopts it can have *no* substantive content. There are, we have seen, no truth conditions or facts in virtue of which it can be the case that he accords with his past intentions or not. As long as we regard him as following a rule ‘privately’, so that we pay attention to *his* justification conditions alone, all we can say is that he is licensed to follow the rule as it strikes him.”⁴²

⁴¹ Canfield, p.471.

⁴² Kripke, p.89.

Hacker and Baker criticize the general features of the community view. First, we think that community does not make mistakes, in contrast to individuals who can make mistakes. Second, like an individual, community could not give the sceptic further justifications and says this is what we do. Third, Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a rule that can be applied only by an interpretation that mediates between the rule and its extension. Nevertheless, the defenders of the community view suppose that there is an interpretation mediating between a rule and its application.

According to HB, following a rule correctly does not mean doing what most people do. They claim that between a rule and its application there is an internal relation. HB believes that the rule sceptical problem arises from admitting understanding and meaning as a mental state. The answer of what one understands by '+' cannot be determined by my past mental states because understanding is a mastery of a technique; it is an ability, not a mental state. Finally, they say that the sceptic assumes that there are two different things: rule and its application. Moreover, the sceptic tries to discover the relation between them. However, the rule and its application are two sides of the same coin.

One of the most important criticisms directed to the community view is: "How can community manage to establish agreement in language while a private linguist could not?"

2.5 Private Language Argument

The second paragraph of PI 243 is,

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?—Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to

what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.

The sensation language is one of the difficult subjects in philosophy especially in philosophy of mind. Besides, the “private language” is a language that nobody can understand. It is described in Stanford,

The conclusion [of private language argument] is that a language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is impossible. The reason for this is that such a so-called language would, necessarily, be unintelligible to its supposed originator too, for he would be unable to establish meanings for its putative signs.⁴³

Wittgenstein’s private language argument tells us that sensations that everybody has, but which have no external reaction, cannot have a place in everyday language even if they are realized by the person who has them. In the grammar of our everyday language, where we name our sensations, our sensation words do not named by the technique of “internal ostensive definition”. The important thing in private language argument is if one has a vocabulary for his immediate private sensations this does not have any meaning because meaning is its use and in ordinary language it has no use. Also, the correctness and incorrectness criteria lost its value in the case of private language.

“How can we get the concept of rule?” is an ontological question and “How can I know whether I am following a rule or not?” is an epistemological one. Private language argument can be seen as an intersection point of ontological and epistemological questions about rules.

I assume that the person in the first paragraph of PI 243 has a language but he prefers to use another language (personal language), which might be called “private

⁴³ Candlish, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

language”. However, this unknown language is not really a “private language” because an observer can translate it into our language. In the second paragraph of PI 243 Wittgenstein discusses, “Can we also translate this person’s word about the sensations?” The answer is yes, but if he named his ‘immediate private sensations’ then no one could translate this language.

In my opinion, Wittgenstein argues how agreement can be possible in our sensation language. He shows us the case, in which agreement is not possible (private language). For example, a person can give name to the changes in his blood pressure. (Blood pressure may be a misleading example because we use these words in our ordinary language, but we need to think someone who calls “S” what we call “blood pressure 10” in the times when people did not use the notion “blood pressure”). In other words, a person can give a name to his sensation which has no natural external expression.

Does this ‘S’ have a place in “personal language”? Even if it has, what is this place for? Even if it has a place, a technique that is different from our ordinary technique is going to be used to name the sensation, namely, pointing the sensation internally. An enquiry concerning this technique of internal pointing to a sensation takes place in Wittgenstein’s “private language argument.” According to Hacker and Baker,

The private language argument is not about ‘the problem of sensations’, which constitutes a *prima facie* counter-example to a thesis about rules. It is concerned with establishing the non-primacy of the mental, the ‘inner’, the subjective. In this enterprise Wittgenstein is stalking a much larger quarry than a potential counter-example to one of his own ‘theses’ (what theses?), namely the conception of the mental underlying the mainstream of European philosophy since Descartes.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Hacker and Baker, p.23.

In my opinion, the private language argument deals with the subjective but this is not the whole purpose of private language argument. As I mentioned above it also explains, the agreement in our sensation language. According to McGinn,

The basic point of 202 is that grasping a rule (understanding a sign) is not a condition that is infallibly given, as a state or process of consciousness is; the basic point of 258-9 is that words for private (unknowable-to-others) sensations cannot be associated with determinate semantic rules since there would be no criterion for whether such rules were being conformed to.⁴⁵

The criteria of knowing any rule is to teach this rule to anyone. Otherwise we can say that this is a private rule. For in PI 692 Wittgenstein says, "...But now the problem is how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such? –The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion".

2.6 The Relation between Private Language Argument and Rule Following Considerations

A general view of private language argument begins with the remark 243. The main feature of this remark and the following remarks is the idea that "private language argument" deals with the grammar of the language about our sensations not related with rules. Kripke's main difference from orthodox interpretation of Wittgenstein is that he claims that the conclusion of the private language argument is explicitly stated in PI202. It is true that Wittgenstein presented a paradox about our notion of rules. Can we say that this paradox is related with private language argument or in other words our inner sensations?

⁴⁵ McGinn, p.49.

Let us consider the possible world in which only the person A has a color vision and the other members of the community C1 have black and white vision. The members of community C1 named 'x' (let us assume it is grey in our world) as a color of an object. But the person A realizes that 'x' (grey) in fact refers to two different colors 'a' and 'b' (let us assume blue and red in our world). –I assume that person A learned the color words of the community C1–. Person A can prove this difference to the other members of the community. For example, he takes spheres which are blue and red and both seen as grey by the community, and puts little balls in the ones which are red. Then he claims that he can pick the ones which have balls in them every single time. Though the members of the community C1 cannot understand how he does this. Does it mean that person A obeys a rule privately?

The person A is right to think that he is following a rule and certainly he is able to check the correct and incorrect uses of the words 'a' and 'b'. Also the community can check if person A uses the words 'a' and 'b' correctly or incorrectly as we see above. We have to accept that the person A follows a rule. However, according to the community C, person 'A' cannot use the words properly. Someone may insist on the claim that this person must use 'x' in order to follow a rule in the community C. Naming the color as 'a' and insisting on saying '1004' in PI 185 are not the same. The difference between using 'a' and answering 1004 resides in this: the person who calls his color vision 'a' has actually mastered the color language whereas this is not so with the person who continues the series with 1004. So, 'a' and 'b' mean nothing like '1004'.

Although the community may claim that the person obeys the rule privately, existence of a certain rule can be verified by the person. Saying this may make the

case clearer: If a member of the community that sees black and white try to use the “special language,” then the person who has color vision would say that he is following the rule privately (that is, a member of the community that sees black and white calls an object red or blue, when the rest calls it grey).

Now let us suppose that the person A is a lifelong solitary and *somehow* he has a language. The members of the community C1 observe his language and decide that the language of this person A does not include color vocabulary. So Kripke is right to say we take him into our community and apply our rules to him. Another community similar to us can translate color words of the person A into their language.

According to Hacker and Baker,

Kripke holds that someone would follow a rule ‘privately’ if his actions are considered in isolation from the behaviour of his community in respect of responses to this rule. But on Wittgenstein’s account it is essential that the putative rule allegedly being followed ‘privately’ is one to the *expression* of which only *I* have access, i.e. it is expressed by a private ostensive definition.⁴⁶

According to Kripke,

The impossibility of a private language in the sense just defined does indeed follow from the incorrectness of private model for language and rules, since the rule following in a ‘private language’ could only be analyzed by a private model, but the incorrectness of the private model is more basic, since it applies to all rules. I take all this to be the point of §202.⁴⁷

According to Kripke, what we called rule following is nothing but social agreement. Language gets its meaning in a society. What is the meaning of the private language? The words, which are ascribed to this language, have no use in our

⁴⁶ Hacker and Baker, p.25fn.

⁴⁷ Kripke, p.110.

ordinary language. Private language is a language but it is not a meaningful language. In addition, it cannot be a custom.

Staying in the realm of Wittgenstein's views, we may add: Private rule following is analogous to openness of an ostensive definition to different interpretations. How is one to decide what to do when the order "Five slabs!" is given to him? One needs practice. After the practice, one may or may not learn the rule (following a rule is an ability). Following a rule is also to be master of a technique.

I believe that, if someone has mastered a technique, then we can easily understand his technique by observation. However, this technique should not be a "special technique". For instance, the observers of a lifelong solitary –who somehow mastered a technique– have no difficulty understanding his technique. It is also possible that this technique is one with which we are not accustomed.

CHAPTER 3

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 Conclusion

In his rule sceptic-argument, Kripke, as a sceptic person, asks another person who performs an action according to a rule what this rule is which determines his action. When this person explains the rule that determines his action, the sceptic asks further, why it cannot be another rule. Past performances of the person who acts are not considered adequate by the sceptic. Since it is conceivable that all past performances were determined by a different rule (Kripke makes use of the assumption of a “new application of the rule” here and claims that it is similar to Nelson Goodman’s “grue paradox”), since the rule cannot be found in the performer’s mind with all its applications, and since the performer cannot give another factual answer, the person is confronted with a scepticism about rules. When

the person says “This is what I do,” Kripke interprets this, in my opinion, as this person’s thought that he obeys the rule.

Kripke claims that an individual cannot give an answer to these questions and accepts a thesis about the ontology of the rules, that is: “Rules are essentially social.” This means that, the person, after explaining the rule that he obeys, answers the sceptic argument as: “We obey this rule, this way.” If the sceptic says that he obeys the rule in a different way, he is answered by the person (who was to answer the question in the first place) as: “You did not understand the rule that we obey or you are following a different rule.”

It is not obvious that Wittgenstein is sceptic about rules. I believe the fact that the rule sceptic-argument, which is attributed to Wittgenstein by Kripke, is not owned by Kripke can be better understood as an academical ethics attitude. If Kripke presents the argument as his own, an expert on Wittgenstein could accuse him of modifying Wittgenstein’s views and presenting them to us as a novelty. For instance, Anscombe says,

Kripke’s explanation is . . . that Wittgenstein has propounded an irrefutable skeptical paradox and come up with a ‘skeptical solution’ – a “sceptical conclusion about rules and the attendant rejection of private rules.” . . . The exegesis is wrong. Wittgenstein was not putting forward skeptical arguments; the ‘new skeptical problem’ about which Kripke expresses such great admiration on page 60 – is Kripke’s.⁴⁸

Wittgenstein’s paradox is different from Kripke’s rule-sceptic argument. In my opinion, the paradox that Wittgenstein presents cannot be considered for every person. It is for those who cannot understand what the rule says and who think that he obeys the rule. Any person who does not understand what the rule says can claim that his actions are in accordance with the rule. We can say, keeping PI 201 and PI

⁴⁸ Anscombe, p.347.

202 in mind, that the ones whose actions are not in accordance with the rule and who insist on obeying the rule, do not know which actions are against the rule. In short, in his book Kripke searches under what conditions a person or a community can claim that “This is the rule we follow.” As conclusion, he says that agreement is essential for the rules, and if there is a rule on which the community agrees, we are not confronted with the rule sceptic-argument any more.

In my opinion, the oddity of Kripke’s rule-sceptic argument arises from his assumptions. For instance, could we claim that God does not know “All emeralds are green or not?” Kripke’s conclusion that a person considered to be in isolation can not follow rules is consistent with his assumptions. To accept Kripke’s sceptic argument and to reject his answer requires the explanation about how an individual (a lifelong solitary) can become master of a technique and recognize he is a master. Intuitively, rules have no truth-value. If they did, the person mentioned above would say that “The essence of the rule is the way I obey it.” If Kripke told us that a lifelong solitary person who follows a rule was conceivable, he would be inconsistent. For then, he would have to answer directly to the rule-sceptic person.

In my thesis, I studied the consistency of “rule scepticism” argument, which Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, and its accordance with Wittgenstein’s views that are found in his book *Philosophical Investigations*. I did not evaluate the correctness of Kripke’s interpretation of Hume, dispositionalist response, grue paradox and his claim that later Wittgenstein changes his truth conditional theory of meaning. Analyzing dispositionalist view and deciding which meaning theory is related with later Wittgenstein may be another work valuable for philosophy of language.

As conclusion, I found the idea that establishing a linguistic rule without having the concept of 'rule' is not possible for a private linguist more common sensical than the idea a lifelong solitary can invent a language. In my opinion, those who are to study this argument should not ignore Kripke's Wittgenstein interpretation, which tells us that Wittgenstein's "private language argument" is concluded at PI 202.

REFERENCES

Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S. *Scepticism, Rules and Language* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

Barry,C.,Smith. "Meaning and rule-following", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Version1.0, London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

Biletzki, Anat, Matar, Anat. "Ludwig Wittgenstein", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL= <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/wittgenstein/>>.

Boghossian, A., Paul. "The Rule Following Considerations" *Mind*, 89(1989), pp.507-49.

Candlish, Stewart. "Private Language", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL= <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/private-language/>>.

Canfield, V., John. "The Community View" *The Philosophical review*, 105(1996), pp.469-88.

Davies, Stephen. "Kripke, Crusoe and Wittgenstein" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 66(1988), pp. 51-66.

G.E.M. Anscombe. "Review of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language", *Ethics*, 95(1985), pp. 342-52.

Goldfarb, Warren. "Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules." *Journal of Philosophy*, 82(1985), pp. 471-88.

Goodman, Nelson. *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard, 1955).

Hacking, Ian. "On Kripke's and Goodman's Uses of 'Grue'" *Philosophy*, 68(1993) pp. 269-95.

Putnam, Hillary. "On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics", *Aristotelian Society*, 70(1996), pp. 243-64.

Kripke, Saul, A. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Argument: An elementary exposition* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).

Malcolm, Norman. *Nothing is Hidden* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

McGinn, Colin. *Wittgenstein on Meaning* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Mac Millan, 1973).