

**POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF NATION STATE :  
SHIFTS WITHIN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT**

**DAVUT ATEŞ**

**JUNE 2004**

**POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF NATION STATE :  
SHIFTS WITHIN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT**

**A THESIS SUMMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**OF**

**THE MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

**BY**

**DAVUT ATEŞ**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS**

**FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**IN**

**THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**JUNE 2004**

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

.....  
Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

.....  
Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp  
Head of Department

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

.....  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev  
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman .....

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz .....

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık .....

Assoc. Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı .....

Assoc. Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev .....

## ABSTRACT

### POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF NATION STATE : SHIFTS WITHIN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

Ateş, Davut

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev

June 2004, 284 pages

The thesis investigates the basis of possible sources of shifts in the classical conceptualizations of political legitimacy of nation state as a result of the impositions of globalization. To this end, it first suggested that we should have a theory of globalization. Globalization in the fields of economy, politics, society, culture and identity along with fragmentation provides crucial changes in the roles and functions of the state, which result in fundamental transformation in the distinctive features of nation state, such as autonomy, capacity, unity, territoriality, sovereignty and identity. The depreciation in the classical roles and functions of nation state is observed in its decreasing capacity to cope with emerging global threats, such as environmental pollution, unequal development and international crimes. Economic globalization deprives nation state of its autonomy in determining its own economic policies. And identity/culture assertions of the locality disintegrate the unity and identity of nation state. Decreasing autonomy, capacity and unity lead to further depreciation in other two fundamental features of nation state, which are territoriality and sovereignty. These developments force nation state to find out new ways of legitimizing its position under the global context. In classical conceptions, political legitimacy of nation state had been constructed within the framework of the premises of its autonomy, sovereignty, territoriality, unity, identity and capacity. However, those fundamental characteristics of nation state seem to be depreciating under the global context. Actually, this depreciation will result in a new conceptualization of political legitimacy under globalization. Therefore, in this re-conceptualization of political legitimacy, individual, local and global impositions emerge as major sources. Nation state, which is eager to re-situate itself in a legitimate basis in the twenty first century, should take into account emerging individual, local and global concerns.

Keywords : Nation state, globalization, political legitimacy, political theory, international relations theory.

## ÖZ

### ULUS DEVLETİN SİYASAL MEŞRUIYETİ : KÜRESEL ORTAMIN SONUCU DEĞİŞİMLER

Ateş, Davut

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Doc. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev

Haziran 2004, 284 sayfa

Bu tez, küreselleşmenin dayatmaları sonucunda, ulus devletinin siyasal meşruiyetinin klasik kavramsallaştırmalarında kaymalara neden olabilecek muhtemel kaynakların kökenini sorgulamaktadır. Bu amaca dönük olarak, tez, herşeyden önce bir küreselleşme kuramına ihtiyacımız olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Küreselleşme parçalanmayla beraber ekonomi, siyaset, toplum, kültür ve kimlik alanlarında ulus devletinin üstlenmiş olduğu rol ve işlevlerde önemli değişimler yaratmaktadır. Bu değişimler ulus devletinin, özerklik, kapasite, birlik, egemenlik, kimlik ve topraksallık gibi en temel özelliklerinde köklü dönüşümlere yol açmaktadır. Ulus devletinin klasik rol ve işlevlerindeki aşınma, çevre kirliliği, eşit olmayan kalkınma ve uluslararası suçlar gibi küresel tehditlerle mücadeledeki yetersizliği konusunda gözlenebilmektedir. Ekonomik küreselleşme ulus devletini kendi ekonomik politikalarını belirleme özerkliğinden mahrum bırakmaktadır. Yerel kimlik ve kültürel talepler ulus devletinin kimliği ve ulusal birliğini bozmaktadır. Azalan özerklik, kapasite ve ulusal birlik ulus devletinin en temel özelliklerinden kabul edilen topraksallığı ve egemenliği daha da aşındırmaktadır. Bu gelişmeler, ulus devletini küresel ortamda kendi durumunu yeniden meşru kılabilecek yollar bulmaya zorlamaktadır. Klasik kavramsallaştırmalarda ulus devletinin siyasal meşruiyeti, özerklik, egemenlik, topraksallık, ulusal birlik ve kimlik ve kapasite önermelerinden oluşan bir çerçevede belirlenmişti. Halbuki, ulus devletinin bu temel özellikleri küreselleşme sürecinde aşınmaya uğramıştır. Doğal bir sonuç olarak, bu aşınma küresel ortamda siyasal meşruiyetinin yeniden kavramsallaştırılmasına yol açacaktır. Sonuç olarak, siyasal meşruiyetinin yeniden kavramsallaştırılmasında bireysel, yerel ve küresel dayatmalar başlıca zorlayıcı güçler olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Yirmibirinci yüzyılda, meşru temelini yeniden oluşturmak isteyen ulus devletinin, ortaya çıkan bireysel, yerel ve küresel talepleri dikkate alması gerekir.

Anahtar Sözcükler : Ulus devlet, küreselleşme, siyasal meşruiyet, siyaset kuramı, uluslararası ilişkiler kuramı.

To My Son, M. Gökçehan

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I express sincere appreciation to my thesis supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev for his guidance and insight throughout the research. Thanks go to the other members of the examining committee, Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık and Assoc. Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı for their valuable comments, contributions and directions. Suggestions and comments of my friends, Özkan Erkahraman, S. Sadık Aytakin and Fuat Kasımcı are gratefully acknowledged. I would like also to thank my office directors, Tuncer Kayalar, Tevfik Mengü and Kudret Ceran for their tolerance in my attendance to the university. To my wife, Hatice, I offer sincere thanks for her understanding my frequent absences and for her unshakable faith in me for the finalization of my work. And I apologize to my little son, M. Gökçehan, for my not joining frequently to his funny games.

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and result that are not original to this work.

Date : 26 / 05 / 2004

Signature :

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## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Definition of the Main Theme

The discussion on the globalization has gained strength following the end of the Cold War. In all discussions the state has a focal point. Why? The centrality of nation state in the discussions of globalization is mainly related to the legitimacy crisis of nation state. Legitimacy crisis stems from the impositions of the global context on the capacity, autonomy, territoriality and sovereignty of nation state. Globalization created unprecedented questions about political legitimacy of nation state. Development in the global economy, rise of the global civil society, cultural and identity politics and advances in information technologies began to depreciate the classical conceptualizations of state capacity and monopoly over the national polity.

So nation states are in need of finding new ways of legitimation of their position in world politics. In fact, one could answer the question simply by referring to the presumed a-historical nature of state that is one of the most dominant premises of international relations theory, and by considering the development of world capitalist system. As nation state is assumed to be sovereign, that is, monopoly over national polity and independence from outside and there are ruling principles in inter-state relations, like non-intervention, recognition, self-help and national self-determination; one of the most important face of globalization, that is advanced form of capitalism, targets the state to realize its economies of scale (Amin:1996)<sup>1</sup>. In other words, so-called sovereign nation state is being considered as an obstacle for advanced capitalism to reach freely every point on the earth. So the state is central in these discussions, because it defies the forces of advanced capitalism.

However, the answer is not as simple as “globalization versus state” formulations proposed. Although world capitalist system is taken as the main force of globalization in

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<sup>1</sup> Economies of scale is used in the meaning that the larger the market is, efficiency and productivity of factors of production could be provided better. For this aim advanced capitalism tries to restrict the authority of state on the economy and trade.

most of the globalization discussions, seeing nation state as an obstacle; the state could be considered as both proponent and opponent of globalization. The economic-based approaches undermine the importance of fragmentation, so dismisses the problems of legitimacy of state and consequently social and political theory. Globalization versus state debate is very complex, including economic, social, cultural and political shifts.

A more important reason for the centrality of the state in globalization debate is that, on the one hand globalization is trying to surpass the nation state that was a decisive framework for social life (Featherstone and Lash:1995:Introduction), on the other hand one aspect of globalization, *fragmentation*, is challenging the state in local context. Fragmentation is referred in the sense of differentiation in the definition of national identity and culture. The sovereign borders had been deemed to be the basis of a truly social and political life for a long time, which was the classical basis of political legitimacy. State was able to enforce a certain kind of national identity and to get the consent of its people. The state has been the single political formation for a long time that holds the political loyalty. For in the globalization process accordingly in fragmentation the physical borders of nation state are in question, the problems of identity and legitimacy deserve to be critically analyzed in depth. The state is central in this debate because there emerge different levels of identification and illegitimation. As globalization and its subsequent fragmentation impose other kinds of polity, the state reacts sometimes so powerfully that it becomes the sole target of transformation demands in social, political and economic senses. It is true that physical borders represent one aspect of the targets of globalization, but the problem of social borders and political legitimacy are nonetheless equally important. What was the state for in the past, and how could globalization and fragmentation change its conventional role and functions so that the basis of its political legitimacy?

How could we conceptualize the consequences of globalization and fragmentation for reformation or illegitimation of nation state? If the state's political legitimacy is challenged within globalization, this means that we will witness new kinds of politics, such as global or cultural, that require new conceptualization of classical social, political and international relations theories. The legitimacy of state is challenged just because the realm of state is in a process of change. Changing boundaries of the state is expected to have a great impact on social, political and international relations theory. Social theory had

assumed a society, whose boundaries are delimited from outside. Political theory had assumed a sovereign rule within a specific territory. And international relations theory had assumed that there are many equal sovereigns in international system. There is a notion of sovereign body in all these assumptions in defining society, politics and international system. If the existence of the sovereign body, that is state, is challenged on the ground of illegitimation, such a thing upsets all classical theoretical construct.

Globalization versus state approach depends on premises of changing or lessening functions of nation state within the global context. Lessening functions of the state consequently is expected to decrease its political legitimacy. In this view, functions and resulting political legitimacy of the state will be replaced by global structure of new politics. In this regard political legitimacy of the state is directly related to the issue of whether or not a global politics could arise. In other words, if the confines of state legitimacy will not be influenced by current process, then we cannot talk about the emergence of global politics, even if the global and local concerns are ready there. Thus the emergence of new kinds of politics, whether global or cultural, should be analyzed in contingent with political legitimacy of the state. State legitimacy and global politics are in competition. The tension between these two phenomena has a potential to result in a new conceptualization of politics, society and legitimacy.

There is a claim that the narration of globalization has produced a theory in social science today (Featherstone and Lash:1995:Introduction). Theories of globalization try to avoid the limitations of colonialism, world system approaches, modernization and state centric approaches. In most of the globalization literature the term is defined as “the emergence of awareness of the global” (Robertson:1992). This implies the expansion of a certain kind of consciousness all over the world. What kind of a consciousness is this? The emerging consciousness refers to the idea that the earth is becoming a single unit of analysis for social theory as a result of rapid communication and interactions between societies, states and other kinds of actors. In fact the notion of universalism was a familiar concept with globalization to social scientists for a long time. There existed many scholars who examined the possibilities for reaching a universal society of mankind both in ancient and modern times. At a first glance, globalization may echo certain implications of universalism. Although universalism implies an a-historical conception of society,

globalism is historical, that is time-space bounded (Albrow:1990). When we analyze these globalist claims, one sees that legitimacy of the state has been removed so as its actual existence should be terminated. In contrast to these arguments of the globalist theory, opponents of globalization stress on the point that states continue to have a function in politics, so they utilize legitimacy, but legitimacy is not a constant phenomenon, rather it has been reformed and reshaped.

Thus *the main theme of the thesis* is to clarify how political legitimacy of nation state could shift under the global context, and what the possible sources of this shift are. Despite the fact that there were many source of political legitimacy in history, ranging from divinity via kinship to consent, for the purpose of the thesis the evolution of political legitimacy of the modern nation state will be the subject matter. Throughout the discussions, liberal-democratic kind of modern nation state is to be the subject unit of analysis. In this analysis, globalization, nation state and political legitimacy would be the main areas of discussion. Globalization presents a certain kind of structure that is expected to transform the roles and functions of nation state, which subsequently result in changing the basis of political legitimacy. Taking into account the centrality of nation state in globalization debate, political legitimacy gains a crucial importance in clarifying the changing roles and functions of nation state. Although there are various arguments on state and political legitimacy, in globalization versus state discussion nation state and its political legitimacy are taken granted and defined within universal conceptualizations. Because of this reason, I will try to analyze to what extent classical formulations of nation state and its political legitimacy could be universally conceptualized, and to show that political structure, that is state, and its political legitimacy should be analyzed and conceptualized in historical context, so that we could develop a useful conceptualization of state and political legitimacy that are adaptable to the global context.

## **2. Scope of the Thesis**

The scope of the thesis would include a range of discussions from the enlightenment to modernity, from globalization to fragmentation, from political theory to international relations theory, from identity to culture, and from history to universality, and from liberal theory to capitalism. Definitions and descriptions of all these notions are debated in order to

clarify the ongoing discussions of political legitimacy throughout the thesis. These notions will be linked to globalization and political legitimacy debate as far as they have a sense in theorizing the current climate. In order to clarify the link between political legitimacy and those concepts, here I will try to shortly define some of them in relation to the main theme of the thesis.

The issue of the *universal* will be discussed in the thesis merely within the limits of modernity and its universal appeals. It is very important to note the link between the static universal existence and the universal claims of modernization and globalization. The universal identity and culture is the claim of modernity that contributes to the homogenizing forces of globalization. Universalism in social sciences began to emerge after the discoveries of the natural laws in physical sciences. One of the most important result of Renaissance was that conceptualization of the natural order was liberated from the divine order, through which laws of the nature began to be discovered. Those laws were deemed to be universal laws, which are independent of time and space. This development in natural sciences inspired the social scientists to discover the universal laws of society, social and political relations. For example, nation state has been for a long time understood as the universal kind of political structure for human beings.

*The enlightenment philosophy*, which was one of the most significant results of the European transformation from the Renaissance onwards culminated in rationalism, had contributed to the rise of thoughts on universal values and dignities of mankind. Rationalism had been understood as the mental capacity of human being to analyze and determine what is good and what is bad for his/her individual interests. So enlightenment, rationalism and individualism constituted the basis of the emerging philosophy that was liberated from non-human imposition of individual identity and social and political structure. Despite the fact that enlightenment philosophy includes lots of contending counter-argumentations, it mainly promised individuals to have a full capacity of self-determination through which every individual would be enlightened so that a rational social and political order could be established to that every individual contributed. Enlightenment philosophers proposed that human beings have an essential rationality that is independent of their religion, nation and local culture. Depending on this premises Kant formulated projects for a single world community, and Marx presupposed that the contradictions within

capitalism would result in a world communist society. Values, such as human rights and freedom, dignity of human being, democratization, social and economic rights began to assert themselves as universal values from which every human being has right to benefit. This cosmopolitan vision is upheld by some trans-national and non-governmental organizations worldwide. World community vision encourages globalization in social and political sense. For it contributes to the lessening capacity of states to manipulate the rights and freedom of its citizens.

To what extent globalization could be associated with *Modernity*? Enlightenment philosophy and the consequent rise of Western civilization are assumed to be the main determinant of modernity. Being modern refers to the retreat of the traditional. Sociology and anthropology are the disciplinary architects of the modernity. Founding fathers of social theory analyzed pre-modern societies and guide-lined the differences between the modern and the traditional. Enlightenment philosophy culminated in rational understanding of society, and new methodology used in natural sciences constituted the basis of positivist sociology. The resultant developments in science, technology, economics and social life were associated with the phenomenon of modernity. When we look at the arguments of the advocates of globalization, that is their focus on the progressive development of modernity backed mainly by the advances in technology; it seems that the phenomenon of globalization could easily be associated with modernity. In fact nation states could be taken as a certain step to reach the universal culture. So globalization, in their view, implies a new stage of modernity, differing from the stage of nation states. Modernity is inherently globalizing (Giddens:1990). However, some other globalization theorists claim that the emerging process is not simply connected to modernization and enlightenment (Robertson:1992). In this view the concept of modernization and globalization are not synonymous (Scott:1997:Introduction). Globalization implies another stage, not the continuation of modernity, in human historical development. Although both kinds of arguments have merits, most of the current literature on globalization process implies that globalization is the continuation of modernity at a different level with different priorities. Taking into consideration that the existence of a global consciousness as proposed by the proponents of that globalization is not the continuation of modernity simply undermines the cosmopolitan world society vision of enlightenment philosophers, we cannot describe globalization as distinct from enlightenment and modernity.

*Globalization*, while it is argued that it forces homogenizing the identity and culture, is a newly emerged process or context having taken place within the modernity. It has an outward movement to enlarge the space it controls. World capitalist system and accordingly cosmopolitan world community visions are already included by globalization. In other words, globalization tries to construct its own form of economic, political and social relations worldwide. This means that the new patterns of relations seem to change drastically the nature of political legitimacy of states. There are different arguments and definitions on this process. Whatever its definition and impact on societies and states, we have to construct a conceptual framework to make it applicable to social, political and international relations theory, like the formulations of global sociology or global social theory done by some globalization theorists (Robertson:1992). Despite the fact that most of the globalization literature focuses on the point that globalization represents a certain kind of homogenizing force that have well defined priorities and policies, as it could be seen throughout the thesis, it is a process or context in which there are contending parties and priorities. In other words, while the arguments of the advocates of advanced capitalism is most observable in globalization rhetoric; the analysis in the thesis shows that advanced capitalism could be the most influential party in the global context but not the sole one. Global context provides opportunities to every kind of contending parties to uphold their priorities.

*Fragmentation* is a simultaneous process with globalization. In fact fragmentation and globalization are complementary (Scott:1997:Introduction). Fragmentation operates at two levels. *First level* operates to put forward the locality that upholds reactions to the homogenizing enforcement of globalization. We could conceptualize the first level as the fragmentation of the universality. *Second level* of fragmentation operates at national level, which disintegrates the national identity and integrity by appealing to the universality of certain values, both local and universal. We could ascribe the second level as fragmentation of the nationality. In any way the phenomenon of fragmentation is closely related to globalization. In fact it is the reflections of the reactions to the global enforcement. Fragmentation in both levels creates certain problems for social and political theory. Because, the reference of the political science, that is the polity within immune national borders, and the reference of the social theory, that is the society, are under the challenge of

universal and local appeals. The fragmentation of the universality and the fragmentation of the nationality result in the emergence of a dual identity, one side appealing to the universalism of globalization, the other side re-asserting local authenticity (Apiah:1994). Both kinds of identity orientation undermine the dominant modern national identity. Undermined national identity and the emergence of new identifications challenge political legitimacy of nation state as an ultimate source of power and good society. *Post-modernity* discussions turn particularly around the fragmentation phenomenon. The objections against the universal claims of modernity, the positivist science and the despotic rule of modern nation states form the backbone of post-modern vision of the world. Post-modernism in a sense represents the fragmentation of the universal. Fragmentation within the global context implies significant results for nation state and its political legitimacy.

International relations discipline is the critical one, when we discuss globalization; for the relations among sovereign states is one of the primary subject matter of this discipline. How does *the international relations* contribute to and impinge on globalization? This question has two faces, *first* is that international relations contribute to the globalization process through some inter-governmental arrangements. Mainly in trade and economics states are aware of the interdependence among them. So they act to a certain extent in accordance with the requirements of advanced capitalist system. Their actions, such as in the World Trade Organization, conclusion of some free trade agreements and attempts for a common investment legislation, result in freer flow of goods and services and finance world-wide scale which promotes economic globalization. Moreover in political sense, inter-governmental arrangements of the states, such as the efforts of the United Nations, promote the emergence of a global politics. *Second* face of the question is that states prevent and control the process of globalization through their inter-governmental initiatives, which implies the re-assertion of internationalism (Amstrong:1998, Clark:1998). So we witness two simultaneous processes, one is the contribution of the internationalism to globalization, the other is the maintenance or reformation of internationalism. The state seems to be a broker within this two simultaneous processes (Clark:1998). Internationalism in the meaning of both proponent and container of the process of globalization implies significance of political legitimacy of nation state.

In fact, when we look at the global impositions on political legitimacy, we witness that the history of nation state is very critical in order to understand better the shifts in the formulations of political legitimacy under the global context. In early stage of *capitalism* and *nation state* in the West, there was an alliance between them, as the most of social and political thinkers agreed on. In its early period merchants, entrepreneurs, investors and bankers had sought for a secure area for profit and the rulers had needed taxable activities to finance their private armies. Therefore the aims of the both parties, states and capitalists overlapped. Following the industrialization, capitalism began to gain a world-wide character (Wallerstein:1974), which implied that the political authorities of nation states began to be in the service of capitalists. World capitalist system is notably managed by the multinationals. World capitalist system is an important supporter of globalization process, particularly in creating a global consumer culture. Homogenizing forces of world capitalism, through taking economic field out of control of the states, lessens the role of states in world politics to a certain extent. This results in questioning of political legitimacy of state that is expected to provide the well being to its citizens. Nevertheless, in the literature of globalization one frequently encounters a critique of world systems theories on the ground that it subordinates cultural and political developments to the logic of capitalism (Scott:1997:Introduction). In fact early alliance between national capitalists and nation state continue under globalization process as well to a great extent. Intergovernmental initiatives in trade, finance and investments for the aim of stable capitalist enlargement worldwide displays that nation state is in the service of advanced capitalism with different roles. In early stages, nation state was providing security both domestically and in overseas, in global context security of capitalist mode of operation has been provided through intergovernmental initiatives.

However, notwithstanding the evolution of capitalism had greatly contributed to the rise of global interactions world-wide through sometimes intergovernmental arrangements, global context provides us important implications other than that of global economic interactions. I mean that capitalist expansion transferred other social and political values as well to the other parts of the world. From this point of view I argue that there are two main effects of globalization in undermining political legitimacy of the state. *First* is the creation of universal appeals within national borders through the world community vision, which is associated with universal identity and culture. Particularly subaltern groups within states

have an appeal to those universal claims on the ground that they are deprived of certain rights and freedom for the sake of national integrity. Universal appeals carried out by world community vision show its consequences in social and political fields.

*Second* effect is operated through world capitalist system that is assumed to have its own dynamics independent of nation states. Advanced capitalism forces states to remove their economic controls over the borders for the aim of attaining enlarged area for freer flow of finance and commodities. As a result of these effects of globalization the nature and the identity of nation state are vulnerable to drastic changes (Mercer:1995).

There are two kinds of reactions of locality to globalization, one is the highlighting local culture and identity and the other is related to new ideological divisions in global politics between developed and underdeveloped world. With respect to the first reaction, there is an argument that the enlightenment project of world community is one-sided, that is, world community project is Western originated and represents the expansion of a particular body of values to the whole world. So the views of counter-world community advocate that so-called universal values are the pretexts of Western states to intervene into the under-developed world. With respect to *the second kind of reaction*, there emerges the argument that economic globalization is the result of enforcement of certain developed countries. This economic reaction seems to create a new division in global politics between the south and the north or between developed and underdeveloped countries. Stressing on such claims of new kind of exploitation supports the international character of the global system.

In the final analysis the scope of the thesis will be the examination of historical evolution of political legitimacy by referring to the general clarifications of the patterns of relations between fragmentation and globalization processes with relevant issues of modernization, world capitalist system, world community and international relations, social and political theories. Also the thesis will include the analysis of the effects of globalization in creating global culture and identity and in asserting local authenticity as a reaction to the homogenizing enforcement of globalization, which are assumed to undermine political legitimacy of the state. Although the state had benefited for a long time from the privileges of loyalty, non-intervention and having the right of legitimate use of force, the emerging

challenges coming from both outside and inside the state borders leads to the re-consideration of its political legitimacy.

Depending on the defined theme and scope of the thesis, the order of topics will be as follows. *First*, the current rhetoric of globalization will be examined. *Second*, a new theoretical approach to globalization will be proposed in order to construct a framework in which nation state takes part. *Third*, political theory and international relations theory will be re-considered. *Fourth*, emerging global actors and local assertions will be analyzed. *Fifth*, possible responses of nation state to the power of global and local actors will be examined and then changes in the distinctive characteristics of nation state will be debated. *Sixth*, classical basis of political legitimacy of nation state will be assessed in its historical evolution. And *in the last chapter*, I will try to develop a conceptual framework in defining the sources of shifts in political legitimacy as a result of the global and local impositions.

Globalization process, particularly following the end of the Cold War, produced a vast amount of literature, which could be classified in, namely opponents and proponents. Definitions of politics, international relations, social theory, state, source of the state legitimacy seem to be the main battle fields where the formulations of the two streams of theorists diverged, who are adherents and opponents of globalization. Their adherents and opponents have upheld the re-definitions for different concerns. The understanding of the factual developments and the usage of the empirical data are not different in these two views. However, their theoretical formulations are fundamentally distinct. The emerging global networks that are facilitating human life, and the global problems that are threatening the survival of humankind are objective data in our hand. Different interpretations of the same data stem in fact from different perceptions of the same situation by its adherents and opponents. Any new point of view or theory could not be explanatory enough as long as it does not overcome the basic dilemma whether or not the state as the most effective social and political formation in modern era and its legitimacy ground are in question. In any kind, it is very difficult to find a coherent theory on globalization, because the issue is very complex and divergent. However, one could construct a coherent approach to globalization through including its all aspects, actors and sub-processes.

Nation state under the global context is one of the most important actors, notwithstanding its inability in certain areas to respond to the demands of individual, local people and global actors. So, in order to situate nation state within the process of globalization, one should refer theoretically to political science and international relations theory. Also, local upheavals and global enforcement should be analyzed in order to determine which features of nation state are depreciating and which ones are strengthening. At the beginning of the twenty first century, the position of nation state came into the center of criticism on the one hand, the number of the states in fact dramatically increased on the other hand. This situation seems to present a serious contradiction. However, when one looks in details, it seems that the situation is not contradictory. Besides the two processes are complementary. How ? The nature of nation states is on the way of a drastic change. The national independence appeals in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia focused on the problem of identity politics. In classical political theory, when we talk about a nation state, the notions of a national economy, independence of the state from international community, a national army and national symbols like flags, national anthem and a uniform language come into our mind. However, in the new situation, nationalist appeals are mainly focusing on the national autonomy in cultural terms, meaning that they want a nation state just in order to show their cultural characteristics in global community. Globalist view criticizes nation state on the account of its monopoly of power in all areas of social and economic structure. This means that the emergence of nation states on cultural terms is overlapping with the critics of the globalists. The formation of Commonwealth of Independent States with the participation of newly independent states in Former Soviet Union and also the enthusiasm of independent republics of the Former Yugoslavia to be integrated with the European Union are the examples for this trend. Physical borders began to lose its absolute presence in the globalized context.

In fact, the intensity of the discussion of nation state within the process of globalization stems from the legitimacy problem of the state. For under globalization individual, local and global actors are aware of the fact that their state seems to be incapable to promise further things and to solve emerging global problems, which could be deemed as fundamental for the future of humanity all. If there is a growing belief that the capacity of the state is unable to cope with the new issues, this means also a decrease in the *raison d'être* of the state. In this respect the emergence of global politics is directly related to the

decrease in the classical legitimacy basis of the state. Whether the confines of state legitimacy are to be reformed or removed seems to be a basic question today. Analyzing global politics requires an examination of the legitimacy ground of the state in current era. It may be true that globalization will not remove the state, but seems to change fundamentally its legitimacy claims. This implies that as much as the conventional basis of legitimacy of the state is depreciated, we can talk about the emergence of a truly global politics and society as the globalists argue. Transnational formation of civil society and the emergence of global networks and problems, and local upheavals of identity/culture have brought the legitimate position of nation state into question. Today in social science in general and in political science and international relations in particular when the role and the power of the state is debated, this means that the legitimacy, *raison d'être*, of the state is troubled. In other words, if the state seems to be unable to provide the demands of the new era, people have a legitimate right to ask why it is still there.

Thus, throughout the discussions in the thesis, I will try to clarify the possible sources of shifts in the classical conceptualization of political legitimacy of nation state under the global context. While doing this, I will try to construct a theory of global context in which the changing roles and functions of the state is changing that result in a new conceptualization of political legitimacy, to reconsider political liberalism, democratic theory and international relations discipline, to define the ways of operation of emerging global and local actors, to determine which fundamental characteristics of nation state are challenged, and how classical conceptions of political legitimacy had been evolved in the history of nation state.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **GLOBALIZATION RHETORIC**

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, the world began to witness the rise of a vast literature on the new world order, new political economy and new kinds of state. The concept of “globalization” has been at the center of these rising literature, which has been used to depict the new climate from both positive and negative aspects. Positive aspects refer to the advances in telecommunication technologies, flow of finance worldwide, rise of interdependence in world economy, liberalization of international trade, rise of a homogenous consumption culture. In this grand literature the main point is that we are in an unprecedented stage of human history. All parts of the earth are interconnected. Negative aspects refer to the matters that are very related to the survival of human beings. As a result of industrialization and rapid advances in science and technology everyone is in a position to concern about the future of the globe as well. Ozone depletion, environmental pollution, illegal drug trade and nuclear weapons seem to be some of the most important emerging problems that nobody could disregard.

According to its advocates, globalization has a history, which could be equated with that of the rise of the West or Europe. Because, what we observe today in the world is the cumulative result of the transformation process in European economy, society and politics. The world has been witnessing a globalization process for the last five centuries. Grand civilizations, empires and economic formations, which had existed before the sixteenth century, had remained confined to certain regions of the world. Mesopotamian Civilization remained around the Tigris and Euphrate rivers, Roman Empire controlled environs of Mediterranean and Silk Road trade was confined to the regions beginning from China and India through the south and the north of Caspian Sea to Mediterranean or Black Sea through the north. Notwithstanding there are historical records displaying the existence of intercontinental trade and migration before the modern time, neither of these big structures nor others was able to influence all parts of the earth and was able to connect all parts of the

world to each other in contrast to what we are experiencing today. I mean that despite the fact that imperial order or trade as able to connect two or three continent of the world, they were not able to create a single global system all over the world. The expansion of the West, if we take it as the backbone of global occurrences, began to spread all over the world from the sixteenth century onwards. Great Divide approach in social analysis emphasized that there occurred a sharp break in the human history with the modernization period. This sharp transformation from tradition to modernity made world today's world. Particularly with respect to the beginning of globalization, there are two arguments. *The first* places the date around 500 years ago, focusing on the consolidation and expansion of Western capitalism from the sixteenth century onwards. *The second* focuses on the industrial revolution supposed to begin two or two and half hundred years ago. Giddens (Giddens:1990:55-58) re-affirmed this great divide by arguing that modern society is fundamentally different from what went before, and the history of civilization is of far less significance than the history of capitalism.

Depending on this framework, I will try to discuss the rhetoric of globalization in this chapter. *First*, the rise of capitalism and nation state will be debated in order to give a historical background of globalization process. *Second*, I will refer to some of the rising definitions of globalization, for the problem of definition is very important to analyze the issue coherently. *Third*, particularly with respect to the globalization debate in the post Cold War era, I will discuss liberal economic theory and its current reflections on globalization discussions. *Fourth*, civilizational aspect will be discussed in order to understand to what extent the globalization process is capable to produce its own civilizational structure. This issue is very significant within the framework of whether a global kind of world politics is rising or not. *In the last section*, whereas we could have hard difficulties in finding a comprehensive theory of globalization, I give a brief discussion of some authors claiming that they are constructing a global theory of society and politics.

Clarification of the globalization rhetoric is very important to in order to determine the changing conceptions of the roles and functions of the state, which are fundamental in shifts in its political legitimacy.

### **1.1. The Rise of Capitalism and Nation State : History**

In globalization discussions the crucial relation between the rise of capitalism and the formation of nation states in Europe is very important in order to understand the history of globalization. The development of trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe had been accompanied with the scientific outlook, state building and wars. The usage of gunpowder helped central rulers to remove the local lords and Reformation broke loyalty beyond national borders. To finance their wars rulers encouraged taxable activities (Anderson:1974:41), mainly trade and production of primary agricultural products. Both the development of capitalism and state building in Europe had fed each other. Merchants, entrepreneurs, investors and bankers had sought for a secure area and market for profit and the rulers had needed taxable activities to finance their private armies. The aim of both parties overlapped following the seventeenth century in Western Europe. Nation states were formed and capitalism began to flourish. Capital gained a national character and states protected their capitalists through tariff barriers in newly industrializing countries, while more industrialized countries like Britain forced the former ones to remove trade barriers. At its early formation, foreign policies of European states were determined to facilitate the activities of their businessmen in overseas. However, later on, army, state bureaucracy and centralized government led to absolutist regimes after the late nineteenth century (Anderson:1974:16).

Moreover, as the capitalist investments began to enlarge and production increased, aim of capitalists went beyond the national market. In most of the historical assessments, irreconcilable imperial policies of the European countries had been taken as one of the most important reason of the First World War, while the Second World War partly was resulted from the character of national capitalism. Once the national capitalism had been formed within secure national borders, it started to accelerate the forces of globalization, that is, activities, which would have soon created an interdependent world capitalist economy. Freer international economy had always been suggested to prevent another worldwide disaster. Ancestor of free trade, Adam Smith argued that resource over the earth could be utilized at optimum level through international free trade. By this there exists a division of labor among countries, that is, a country will inevitably produce the commodity for which it has advantageous price. All these developments contributed to the rise of worldwide

capitalist practices. Resources and markets began rapidly to be interconnected. Global trade and flow of capital were accompanied by the revolutions in industry and telecommunications.

The beginning of overseas trade contributed to the development of navigation, which created a competition among European states. Internal wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were transferred to overseas rivalries. Spain, Portuguese, France, Netherlands and England were the main powers in this struggle. Most of the European states created their own domestic market and established trade links with their colonies. On that occasion it is important to state that some parts of the capital accumulation needed for industrial revolution was provided by the transfer of precious metals to European Continent and by revenues obtained from slave trade. Creation of home market was the result of abolition of feudal privileges, granted to landlords over vassals and the church over its land. Confiscation of soils of the church, liberation of vassals from the land and the undermining of guild system resulted in the emergence of a genuine home market. Because, both idle lands controlled by landlords and by the church and labor force were brought to the market. Moreover, for dependency link between labor force and land was broken, men had to work more for survival. This created a demand for primary products like food and clothing. However, it was very usual in that period that people did not need to work when they were provided with their basic needs. As done by Poor Law in England, wages were kept down to encourage people to work more, and people had to work more to survive. Hard work furthermore resulted in more need to work, because lifetime of clothes was shortened. This was an enduring interaction between working more and more needs. Particularly in England, low wages resulted in lower cost of textile products and Englishmen began to export clothes first to all over Europe then to the whole world. Due to that fact textile industry was the first step of industrial revolution.

Colonies at first instance were used to obtain raw material, particularly cotton. But as the industrial revolution resulted in increasing production, the importance of colonies increased once more as markets of exporting textile products. New techniques in production process gained a competitive character and were easily adopted by other European countries. The aim of domestic production soon exceeded the borders of home market, as all

the earth became the target of capitalists. Innovations and inventions accelerated to reduce the production cost and to attain competitive prices.

In globalization debate Industrial Revolution has been depicted as a turning point in the emergence of world economy. Industrial Revolution both strengthened capitalism and gave it a global character. For industrial revolution created a new kind of society and market relations which grounded world capitalist economy on a global scale. Hobsbawm states that *Industrial Revolution* marks the most fundamental transformation of human life in the history of the world recorded in written documents (Hobsbawm:1968:6). U. Beck argued that the character of risks facing humankind has shifted with the advent of industrial society from naturally induced disasters to risks and hazards generated by human society (Bech:2000). Most important impetus behind the *Industrial Revolution* lies in economic and social transformation that took place particularly in England after the second half of the sixteenth century. This country was the first step in this process. In later centuries world economy emerged in which advanced regions were linked to the dependant ones by certain division of economic activities, a relatively urbanized area on the one hand, and zones producing and largely exporting agricultural products and raw materials on the other hand. These relationships may be described as a system of economic flows; trade, international payments, migration and capital transfer (Wallerstein:1974:349, Hobsbawm:1968:21).

Hill (Hill:1969:18) claims that the breaking line between medieval and modern is the idea of enlightenment, that is, people's expectations were transformed from religious appeals to political and economic demands and further claims that Industrial Revolution originated from a uniquely favorable balance, prepared by early capitalism, between population and resources. Until the eighteenth century Europe exhibited the characteristics of an agrarian society (Birmie:1953:13-31). However, two centuries later almost everything had been fundamentally transformed, and European supremacy was nakedly appeared all over the world. In this transformation industrial revolution had played an important role. Industrialization may be grounded on three main fields, cotton, iron and coal. Cotton was the motor of first phase of industrialization and other two were of the second phase.

Capitalist economy required and facilitated the secular process of increased centralization and internal control within the core European states. Kings centralized their

authorities through the mechanism of bureaucratization, monopolization of force, creation of legitimacy and homogenization of subject population. The creation of standing armies and conscription created a link between population and the monarchs on the one hand, between monarchs and capitalists on the other. For army became a market for food, textile and arms. The monarchy was absolute in opposition to the powers of feudal lords. Absolutism should not signify a system of tyranny and despotism. Absolutism was a system of concentrated force that counteracted to the crisis of feudalism, which resulted in the liberation of peasantry. Wallerstein (Wallerstein:1974:162) points out that on the one hand the capitalist world economy was built on a world wide division of labor in which various zones of this economy were assigned specific economic roles, developed different class structures, used consequently different modes of labor control, and profited unequally from the working of the system. On the other hand, political action occurred primarily within the framework of states, which as a consequence of their different roles in the world economy were structured differently, the core states being the most centralized (Hobsbawm:1977:64-87).

Wallerstein (Wallerstein:1974:348) strongly claims that capitalism as an economic mode is based on the fact that the economic factors operate within an arena larger than which any political entity can totally control. Nation states gained dominance in Europe and their preparation for wars pushed them to collect more money and men as conscripts from the population, so they established large bureaucracy. Doing so they had to promote participatory mechanisms through which they began to take on some responsibilities for public service, economic infrastructures and household welfare. Both capitalism and nation states mutually feed each other's formation (Tilly:1984:142), which resulted in industrial revolution that was the energizer of globalization process. The participatory mechanisms and mutual relations between the king and the people based on the consent of people to a certain degree were fundamental transformations in political legitimacy of the modern nation state.

There was a substantial social and political transformation in Europe following the sixteenth century. This transformation resulted in the rise of capitalist economy. But *without Industrial Revolution* it was hardly possible that capitalist economy could expand on a global scale. As a result of *Industrial Revolution*, capitalism enhanced a worldwide market

in which all parts of the world, whether developed or underdeveloped were integrated within global transactions. Today the globalization process we experience is running on the global market structures created by *Industrial Revolution*.

Globalization has a history in which it became subject to evolution. Globalization is not a newly emerged phenomenon, rather it has a history mainly beginning from the rise of capitalism and nation state in the West and reinforced further by industrial revolution. The analysis shows that both economic development of capitalism and industrial revolution and nation state had critical impact on the way of this evolution in creating a global network of economic and political relations. In the second half of the twentieth century the rise in information technologies constituted another important step in shaping of the world as a whole. This historical analysis signifies that globalization is not a phenomenon that we have become familiar instantly at the end of the Cold War. This historical evolution is very important, because, capitalism and nation state are also have a long history accordingly with globalization. Political legitimacy of nation state had been shaped within this history. So shifts in the basis of political legitimacy could not be analyzed independent of the history of capitalism and nation state.

After having analyzed important aspects of the history of globalization, from hereon I will examine how globalization is understood and defined in the current literature.

## **1.2. Some Definitions of Globalization**

Despite its long history, globalization as a core concept in social science has been newly introduced. Concept of globalization is frequently employed but seldom clearly defined. To be useful, the concept requires more careful specification, in particular, there is a need to demonstrate that globalization refers to a new, distinct phase in world politics (Bretherton:1996:3). If the concept is to have utility it must be demonstrated that it has meanings, which are distinct from older concepts such as Westernization or universalism. Much of this discussion has centered on what at first appeared to be an aspect of the hierarchical nature of imperialism, that is, the increasing hegemony of particular central cultures, the diffusion of American values, consumer goods and life styles. In some of the earliest discussions it was referred cultural imperialism and there was great alarm

concerning the obliteration of cultural differences in the world, not much in the official economic periphery but in Western Europe where, in the late 1950s and 1960s there was a genuine fear, at least among the cultural elites, of the hegemony of Coca-Cola culture.

Albrow (Albrow:1990:8) defines globalization as all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, a society in which humanity began to emerge for the first time a collective actor. This approach highlights the common concerns of humanity like environment, global pollution, natural resources, and human rights. The phenomenon of globalization is particularly associated with technological, economic and political developments since the Second World War. Although this might indicate merely an intensification of a long-term process rather than a new phase of global politics, the existence of such a phase is suggested by the emergence of globally oriented grassroots movements, which utilize advanced communication technologies. This embryonic global politics can be seen in a number of areas but associated, in particular, with the assumptions of environmentalists that such a global politics is necessary for the survival of the planet. Thus the apparently simplistic slogan 'think global, act local' is a manifestation of a new politics, which has proved capable of challenging governments, business corporations and intergovernmental organizations (Bretherton:1996:13).

Furthermore, globalization debate revolves around the socio-cultural processes and forms of life, which are emerging as the global begins to replace nation state as the decisive framework for social life. This is a framework in which global flows, in mediascapes, ethnoscapes, financescapes and technoscapes, are coming to assume as much or greater centrality than national institutions (Featherstone and Lash:1995:2). The essential character of globalization resides in the consciousness of the global, that is, individual consciousness of the global situation specifically that the world is an arena in which we all participate (Friedman:1995:70).

Global systems include globalization process, in which there seems the establishment of global institutional forms and global processes of identification and their cultural products. Global processes have also been the major forces of social transformation of large parts of the world even without the establishment of regular institutional framework. The collapse of great empires, upsetting of tribal social systems as a result of

reorientation of trade, the formation of colonial societies, even the production of hunters and gatherers, lumpen-proletariat and social classes are all parts and parcel of global system, that is, engendered by global processes. Globalization refers to the formation of global institutional structures that organize the already existing global field, and global cultural forms that are either produced by or transformed into globally accessible objects and representations (Friedman:1995:75).

Globalization process proved difficult to theorize, for the new global framework cannot be conceived as merely that of nation state writ large. Only in most minimalist sense, one can speak of a global society or a global culture, as our conceptions of both society and culture draw heavily on a tradition, which was strongly influenced by the process of nation state formation. Identification of global flows is introducing us that globalization is an outcome of the universal logic of modernity. That the process is the transition from the national to the global is superimposed on the change from industrial manufacturing order to a post industrial and informational order.

When global discussions gained strength, Fukuyama (Fukuyama:1992) argued that history came to its end. He claimed that Adam Smith's *laissez faire* economic liberalism has been twice assailed in the last century; first by fascism and then by communism; however, with the demise of Soviet Union, the last challenge to man's freedom and autonomy has disappeared and in this sense history has come to its end. For autonomy and universal human recognition has been realized. Given this deterministic metaphysical certainty, mankind is about to enter a new, post modernist era, in which the old problems and antagonism will disappear (Avineri:1993:25). Does this claim have really a solid base, or does it implicitly express that European culture and identity have been globalized so that the history has come to the end? The argument of Fukuyama has implications that globalization originated from capitalist mentality, which embodies economic liberalization and free market principles. From this point of view, the founding father of globalization might be considered as Adam Smith who was the proponent of international free trade. In the current global rhetoric, either in economic or in political sense, one can easily see that values and presumptions of liberal theories dominate the globalization literature and expectations. In other words, current perceptions of globalization seems to be the final stage of liberal

values; property rights, fundamental human rights, representation, accountability, constitution, freedom of speech, freedom of entrepreneurship.

In globalist formulations globalization, by definition, is an enduring process, which embodies the intensification of time and space over the globe, so characterized as making the earth a giant village. In comparison to early history of mankind time has gained a paramount importance, while distance in any meaning lost its restrictions as a result of rapid communication facilities. Could this grand process of globalization be associated with the expansion of Western Civilization or is it a process with its own values? In globalist view it is assumed that enlightenment and the subsequent advances in Western Europe constituted the backbone of this grand process of globalization. The radical changes in Europe spread out all over the world, which also carried the characteristics of Western Civilization. World capitalist economy, most important impetus behind globalization had began to take form in Western Europe and expanded to the whole world. While it was expanding, the new mode of production did not only carry out its own material facilities but also its own culture, politics and reason. So this grand process could be understood as both the expansion of the Western values and producing its own values as a result of combination with local values.

Despite the fact that the term 'Globalization' began to be used so often following the end of Cold War, globalists argue that in fact it was a process older than the Cold War itself. Even before 1990s the world economy had already been interdependent. Despite its rejection of capitalist system, the Soviet Union and its allies had significant economic links with the Western countries. Until its collapse, Soviet Union was an exporter of arms to developing countries and of raw materials to the West, mainly petroleum and natural gas. So it is absurd to argue that Eastern Bloc was out of the global market. The difference between the policies of the East and the West was not related to the globalization process, rather to define their ideological interests in a more favorable way in this process; world capitalist system based on free entrepreneurship advocated by the West, while cosmopolitan proletarian world advocated by the East. The collapse of Soviet Union was just the removal of one side of this ideological rivalry.

I have overviewed some definitions of the term globalization. While Albrow defines the term as a process in which the world becomes a single society, Robertson and Friedman

treat globalization as the consciousness of the world as a whole. Some liberals see globalization as the phase of historical development in which liberal values conquered the world in both political and economic senses. In any way, globalist outlook have a consensus that the world is becoming a giant village. Nevertheless, on this occasion we have to refer to the arguments of some neo-Marxists that globalization represents an advanced form of capitalism. Any definition of globalization refers to the issue of the rise of interconnectedness all over the world, which becomes observable through highly fast flow of information around the world. These definitions of globalization have sensitive implications for the shifts in political legitimacy of nation state. For nation state had benefited for a long time from its monopoly position in determining so-called national consciousness of its citizens. However, globalization has began to lead to the rise of a global consciousness, which is expected to diminish the priority of national consciousness so that political legitimacy of the state is being deprived of one of its important *raison d'etre*.

Most of the definitions of globalization process have been dominated by economic liberalization policies, particularly which have become important in the second half of the twentieth century. For this reason, in the coming section I will try to assess the development of liberal economy and globalization, and argue that liberalization of the economy is one of the aspects of globalizing factors.

### **1.3. Liberal Economy and Globalization**

The intrusion of free market principles into the lands of the former Eastern Bloc and all over the world, have been understood as the end of history by some scholars. Thus the last man is defined in terms of liberal market principles and no alternative. The theory of last man seems to be plausible at first instance, for liberal values will soon be globalized and internalized by all human beings (Fukuyama:1992:Part V). However, when we think of the dynamics of globalization, particularly capitalist mode of production that depends on the reproduction of its own rivals for survival; it could be expected that the ingredients of the last man could change drastically. Clashes among the constituent parts of the Global Civilization, re-assertion of local cultures and probably new ideological division between the center and the periphery of world capitalist system could challenge emerging liberal

values and its servant so-called the last man. Connotations of the formation of capitalist relation within the secure national borders in its early period; that is, the crucial relation between the rise of capitalism and the formation of nation states in Europe through which the aim of the king and the capitalist overlapped, however, this formation was succeeded by revolutions between the social classes that resulted in redistribution of national wealth; imply that such a development could take place in a global scale, if the earth becomes like a single national market. In other words, new series of revolutions could emerge between the poor and the wealthy regions of the world for redistribution of worldwide wealth that is today concentrated in the hands of the advanced capitalist countries. Probably, globalization process should be considered in this regard as the second most important stage of capitalist development after industrial revolution. Industrial revolution had broken impediments to the capitalism within national borders, and globalization would try to remove transnational obstacles to the development of capitalism.

At this point, it is necessary to point out the fact that liberal theory and advanced capitalism interpret well the process of globalization for their interest through which they shape the direction of the process itself. Liberalization policies are offered, and imposed in a sense, all over the world by neo-liberal theorists. In contrast to the thinking of liberalism in that way, it is very interesting that neo-Marxists theorists are inadequate in theorizing and proposing directions for the process. Theoretically, Marxism is globalizing as much as liberalism. Taking into consideration the international character of Marxism in the nineteenth century and its ideal to unite the proletariat of the world, it is expected from neo-Marxist theorists to analyze well in detail what is happening following the collapse of the Soviet Union and to propose new alternatives for the deprived parts of the world. In a sense, they could propose the theoretical basis of a global working class revolution. But they could not have done this just because of shock of the collapse. We see a wide range of works within the globalization literature on the debate of North-South division. But those analysts did not adopt a Marxist approach, rather they try to propose a theoretical framework within the limits of liberal theory.

I believe that Marxism has still merits in analyzing the current process depending on the classical and neo-Marxist premises. Many scholars and the dominant liberal pro-globalism argue that Marxism has become outmoded in globalization process just because it

had come to its end in the sense of the primary Marxist analysis of classes. Under the global context, we do not witness a working class, which is deprived of the fruits of capitalist advances, in developed countries, and also so-called real Marxism in the Eastern Bloc bankrupted. However, this is not the case. Marxism and liberalism are the twin brothers of industrial capitalism. If we perceive the current process as an advanced form of capitalism fed by liberal values, then the other has to have something to propose. Perhaps, we could the period after the end of the Cold War as a transition period in which people will see what liberal globalism would bring to them, and what they would gain and lose. I stress on the point that Marxist theory will refine itself as long as globalization is supported by and seen as the overspreading of the values of liberal theory. I underline this point because, there is a high potential of new kinds of struggle between the north and the south, metropolitan and periphery. Currently the most important rejections to the dominant liberal vision of globalization are coming from the critical and post-modernist theorists whose arguments highlight the culture and locality. Philosophically they will criticize the basis of liberalism and globalization, but their approach is deprived of political vision.

In globalist views the motor of globalization was primarily world capitalist system, and it could be associated primarily with the latest stage of capitalism (Thomas:1997) that necessitates a new division of labor within global economy (Amin:1997:31). In terms of political economy globalization is defined as a process whereby power is located in global social formations and expressed through global networks rather than through territorially based nation states (Schwartz:1994:4). As a process it is supported by liberal ideology. For liberalization in trade, finance and investment is a tool for the attainment of a secure environment for the entrance of Western capital into the underdeveloped areas of the world. As a unit of analysis of history and International Relations (IR), states are becoming unable to manage national economies. States are required as long as they could truly respond the necessities of global economy (Amin:1997:64-70).

The most important energizers of globalization are intergovernmental economic organizations, in alliance with multinational corporations, which envisage liberal economic policies particularly for the developing countries. The Washington Consensus is the highest expression of those organizations for the full application of liberal economic policies in the developing countries. The Washington Consensus has been interpreted as the liberalizing

economic reforms imposed by Washington based institutions like World Bank, IMF, US Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board. However, Williamson (Williamson:1999) states that this kind of interpretation stems from misunderstanding the concept. In fact there was a process of intellectual convergence that created the concept of Washington Consensus. Williamson points to a real danger that many of the economic reforms that the Bank tends to favor, notably macroeconomic discipline, free trade and market friendly microeconomic policies, will be discredited in the eyes of many, simply because the Bank is inevitably implicated in views that command a consensus in Washington and the term Washington Consensus has come to be used to describe an extreme and dogmatic commitment to the belief that markets can handle everything. He underlines that his original formulation of the Washington Consensus was for the economic reforms in Latin American countries. The core of these reforms was, fiscal discipline, improving income distribution, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of foreign direct investments, privatization, deregulation and secure property rights. There are some arguments that the implicit policy objective underlying the Washington Consensus is inadequate. The proponents of this view insist that the objectives should include sustainable development, egalitarian and democratic development. Particularly the objective of democratic development is a new policy objective of the Bank in post-Washington Consensus. Williamson particularly tries to reject the ideological interpretation of the Washington Consensus.

The blind application of so-called universal models of economic liberalism, be they neoclassical or monetarist, to emerging economies seem to have been the predominant practice by international institutions or other public and private creditors. To some extent, emerging economies themselves accepted such unilateral imposition of dogmatic formulas, fearing a negative reaction from the market if they rejected such prescriptions. In this sense, the Washington Consensus was not only the consensus in Washington, but represented the official position of G7 and other IMF and World Bank member countries, creditors as well as debtors, and market participants. This perfect coordination, on the other hand, generated mutually reinforcing, excessively optimistic and then pessimistic expectations about the country in question. The Asian crisis seems to be a good example of this Washington-generated excessive optimism-turned-into-panic. Markets believed the pay-offs for

implementing the Washington Consensus in Asia were high, Asia euphoria continued and resulted in huge inflows of capital from 1993 to 1996.

The World Bank in its famous 1997 Report acknowledges that the state is necessary to a market undergoing process of self regulation and it forces the state to conform to its requirements. It is also stated in the report that the factors influencing the efficiency of the state vary considerably from one country to another, because even when they have equal incomes, the size of the country, its ethnic composition, its culture and political regime give each state a unique character. For the World Bank, although the state is subject to local conditions, the market is homogenous in the sense that it is shaped the same way from one market economy to another.

The World Bank uses a paradigm of the generally accepted economic thought, that is, to compare the relationship between the market and the state with the relationship between a natural phenomenon and a human construct. There are two consequences of this view, one theoretical and the other political. Theoretically it implies that laws as exact as those of natural sciences could be derived from economic analysis. Those laws should be imposed on society, particularly on the political sector. In this regard, politically the World Bank feels that a globalized economy constitutes a protection from the arbitrariness of the state by limiting its royal rights in taxation of capital by which its monetary and budget policies can be sanctioned by financial markets.

The reproduction of center/periphery polarization is not mainly due to the so-called market laws, but rather to decisions taken by states so powerful that they belong to the group of monopolists in key areas. It is the ability to generate new technologies, organize new monetary systems, benefit from financial flows, control the access to the world natural resources, manufacture and hold weapons of mass destruction, prevail in the instances of political management crises that transfer weight to the countries at the periphery. The support of competition and productivity through technological innovation has remained constant. The state always intervenes most actively in the areas of research and development; therefore, any reduction in military research expenditures does not entail a sudden decrease in research and development. Public expenditures for research and development in all central countries are much higher than the total for development

assistance. In other words, economic systems of the central countries are simultaneously reinforced when opening to the world market.

One result of the Washington Consensus was that markets became not just one of several instruments to achieve economic and social objectives but the only instrument. The free trade argument directly and concretely challenged the authority of countries to regulate their borders, evoking a confrontation between nation states and markets, in which the position of market is represented by the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus was a post cold war organizing principle by its feature of transcendent and exclusive reach into nearly all dimensions of economy and society, and its application in an open global economy to carry all the weight of economic reform and vitality. There is a tension between the unbounded global reach of markets and the bounded territorial jurisdiction of nation states. Globalization in every way punctures the bounded space of nation state and sets up a conflict over sovereignty. It establishes an alternative source of reference to that of the national governing political process. The Washington Consensus lent political muscle to market challenges to nation state through international financial institutions, most important of all, through the newly inaugurated World Trade Organization in the mid-1990s.

The essence of globalization is a set of horizontal functional intrusions that cut swats through borders. First financial markets penetrated vertical borders, then increased trade fostered by a radical reduction in transportation costs, then foreign investments. Outside the economic realm, culture, environmental and ecological problems, and movement of larger numbers of people through illegal immigration are not seen as problems to be solved. In each of these realms the assault on national borders was nothing new. But what was new were the scale, the scope, the rapidity of movement, the shrinkage of time and space. The origins of globalization in the sense of economic governance of the world can be dated from 1971-1973 with the breakdown of the post World War II Bretton Woods system and its replacement by free markets in exchange rates and international finance. Following on this, privatization and deregulation became a second tranche in the challenge to the mid-twentieth century consensus. This produced a broader assault on etatism and was affirmed by the collapse of its most extreme form of central planning and the end of the Cold War. By the 1990s all of this could be cobbled together into what became known as the

Washington Consensus and applied universally within countries and across nations (Wachtel:2000).

Economic liberalism and Marxism are equally globalizing forces. It seems to be very plausible that globalization represents the realization of free trade ideal of A. Smith. Economic based approaches and its literal domination over the literature of globalization by referring to the increase and liberation of world trade, free flow of finance and technology, rise in foreign direct investments and homogenization of consumption culture create an illusion that globalization issue is dominated by liberal economy, which is supported inter-governmental economic organizations like the World Trade Organization, IMF and the World Bank. On this occasion I have stated that even though liberalism declared its triumph over its rival ideologies, Marxism might have new theoretical challenge taking into consideration its historical role in capitalist societies. For Marxism is also globalizing as much as liberalism. Moreover, liberalization in national economies as a result of advanced capitalist imposition creates question marks or possibility of shifts in the conception of political legitimacy of nation state. For well-being function of the state for its subjects had been regulated and managed by national economic policies. However, under the global context, nation state is being deprived of another important source of its political legitimacy.

In sum, I argue that globalization has a history and provides an historical context in which one or more aspects seem to dominate the literature, but this domination should not direct us to think that globalization is a well-defined project that is commanded by a center. Rather, it presents us another stage of human relations, which carries out a possibility of creating its own civilization. By definition, civilizational aspect deserves to be analyzed in order to understand better and to construct a conceptualization of the emerging global web of relations.

#### **1.4. Civilizational Aspect**

While the main impetus behind globalization seems to be economic concerns, its implications could reveal itself in the form of a “Global Culture and Civilization”. By Global Civilization, advocates of globalization refer to the works and values, including the characteristics of a civilization shared by the people of our earth. But I have to state that

because globalization is a process, so Global Civilization is not a completed civilization, rather its formation should be going on. Early civilizations were geographically bounded and there were concurrently multiple civilizations all over the world, each of which differed from other with its peculiar characteristics. However, Global Civilization that we experience today began to emerge after the Industrial Revolution and appeal to an ecumenical world system. Commercialization of war in Europe and the creation of the ecumenical world capitalism are the basis of modern Global Civilization.

Today it is undeniable that there are a number of criteria, which represent the emergence of a Global Civilization that covers all social formations all over the globe like states, societies and nations. *First* is the material life. The existence of a uniform material life that is represented in buildings, techniques, roads, clothes, is an important component of Global Civilization. In earlier civilizations material works were used as an important distinction of one civilization from another. So in modern times, if the whole material life is similar to one another all over the globe, then why can not we attribute it as a Global Civilization?

*Second* is the epistemological root dominated by positivist science. Today all people share similar approach to technical facilities and exploitation of natural wealth. Innovations and inventions are not confined to a certain region of the world, rather once when they are found out, they became the common good of all people within a short time.

*Third* is the form of government. More or less all states commit to base their legitimacy on the consent of people. It is exactly true that there are authoritarian regimes in some of the third world countries, but even they refer to the democracy as the form of government and elections are held. Democracy became a common ideal of Global Civilization, even if its application could fundamentally differ from one country to another.

*Fourth* is common values with respect to human rights. Today all people appeal the fundamental human rights that are genuinely expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. Any society that breached human rights is accused on a global scale, and few government could defy. Human rights became the ideal of Global Civilization, that is backed by some international conventions.

*Fifth* is the economy. Majority of states and nations attempt to apply the principles of free market economy, like free entrepreneurship and fair competition. Moreover, the world is on the way of becoming a single market through liberalization in international trade and some attempt to harmonize investment legislation.

*Sixth* is the culture. In respect to economy, politics and material life there is emerging a global culture sometimes that is represented in the form of music and style. Supported by concerns of the global market fashion is not national today. Architecture, fashion, music, and way of life are commonly shared by the all, despite the fact that their origins rest in this or that nation. Nationality of cultural values is challenged by the emerging global economy that forces all people to have similar preferences or tastes. Global culture is composed of those values that could be turned into material existences through presenting to the world market.

After having noted the general characteristics of emerging Global Civilization, I have to remark that it is not yet a genuine civilization as such as we understand, but it is in a process of formation towards that end. In this sense we could call globalization as the process of formation of this kind of civilization, which is based on a liberal ideology. Within Global Civilization local cultures and religions are turning into nuances differentiating distinct societies from each other. It may be too early to assert the existence of a Global Civilization, but globalization as a process seems to be destined to such a globally single civilization. I do not argue that with the formation of Global Civilization local cultural characteristics will disappear. But we have to make a fundamental distinction between civilization and culture. This distinction is very crucial for the political faces of globalization in conventional terms.

Global Civilization is referred to all uniformities among human beings all over the globe in terms of style, politics, economy, technology and material life. In this sense civilization has a political mission, meaning that the structure of power over the globe is determined according to the presumptions of the ideology of the civilization, while culture is referred to local values of societies, which gives just a color to the Global Civilization. Culture is not as political as we understand in conventional definition of power struggle.

Rather, culture is political to the extent that post-modernists and critical theorists proposed, in the sense that local culture and identity issue are being highlighted for the aim of representation under the global context. So civilization is getting a singular character backed by politics while culture is keeping its plurality appealing to recognition. This analysis could be grounded on a solid base, when we closely read the arguments of both advocates and opponents of globalization. Globalist views stress more on the features of a common civilization, even if they do not propose directly to use this term. However, opponents stress more on the cultural subjectivity among states and nations. It seems that the actual developments reflected in their theories in different directions. It always has been in social theory that theoretical arguments have practical aims and concerns. This justifies the view that theory is not independent of practice. While global vision adopts a revolutionary position, its opponent formulations attempt to propose a conservative position.

Today we witness a dual process in theory and practice, on the one side there seems a run towards a Global Civilization, as it is defined in terms of material life; on the other side there is a run towards cultural fragmentation, as culture is defined in terms of non-tangibles. In this sense, the willingness of the local people to have a state is not a representation of the demand for an autonomous political institution, rather having a state is appreciated as the sign of honor for ethnic groups. Because, contemporary national or ethnic appeals to having a state do not focus on conventional reason of this appeal. They do not concentrate on economic independence, a full sovereignty over their territory or isolation from the rest of the world. I mean that the demand to have a state in fact is not political, rather a cultural assertion. This analysis entails a severe challenge to the position of nation state as it is examined in the classical political theory. The state is on the way of going out of political field. By the nature of things, politics is not independent of economic concerns and resources. If, in post modern world the state is demanded not as a political end, this means its political nature is so conducive to transform drastically into the cultural. Appeals to global civilization and to having a state are the natural consequence of modernity in which there exist homogenizers and heterogenizers (Robertson:1995).

The issue of fragmentation is given little attention in the debate of globalization. Everybody talks and writes about the massive developments in global economy,

communication technologies and ecological problems. However, few focus on the issue of cultural challenges to the homogenizers of globalization. The demand of the local people for a state in fact is a result of globalization itself. Just like the state as a local political organization became a global phenomenon. This trend is a continuation of the paradox between developed and underdeveloped parts of the world. The periphery follows the center, disregarding the fundamental changes in what is demanded. Like a fashion, periphery parts of the world seem to be so enthusiastic to have a nation state, because developed societies have their own states. The evolution of the state in the West has come to a mature point on the eve of a global construct. So the power and legitimacy of state in the West has been challenged in order to accommodate the emerging situation in a more rational basis alongside the historical evolution of modernity.

For the periphery or the developing part of the world, the state seems to imply what it was in the nineteenth century in the West, economically autonomous, militarily powerful and politically sovereign. In the decade of 1990s these demands for a classical nation state had to notice soon the naked facet of the new situation. Many new states as political organizations emerged in Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. When they noticed that the survival of their state depends on the fulfillment of global economy and on the political mercy of the center, their appeal to having a state turned into a cultural assertion. So nation state is a global trend to the extent that it serves people's need to be represented culturally within the family of nation states. Because of this reason, the security and politics of new states in Central and Eastern Europe have been incorporated within the European Union, and those of new republics in Former Soviet Union within the Commonwealth of Independent State. Neither of them was as able to confront any challenges to their nature of being a state as the classical nation states were.

Societies, states, organizations and markets are becoming more and more dependent on each other within global context. It seems that the motor of globalization is the integration trend among the national markets. This integration surely results in approximation in other fields, social, political, security, environmental, human rights and so on. In other words, political, cultural and social interactions follow the forces of the global market. This seems to be natural, for once the world capitalist system began to take shape in the early nineteenth century, it produced its own structures all over the globe through

international trade, investments, center-periphery relations and international rivalry. “Economic globalization is followed by others” argument is deeply debated by some scholars on the ground that economy in globalization process is highlighted to number one issue and others (politics, culture, environment) are degraded. These are similar criticism directed to the “high-low grading of politics by political realism”.

However, the argument “economic globalization is followed by others” has deep philosophical roots. Why does man move, and why do information, finance, goods and ideas move? This is a fundamental question in explaining the number one status of economics in globalization process. Communication, movement and activity of the most of people target material aims in the first run. The activities targeting economic ends carry non-material things in the second hand through which cultures, values and political attitudes confront. One can raise the objection that civil non-governmental initiatives, religious missionaries or trans-national volunteers organizations are not in this category. Then first, I ask the question that on which material facilities those non-profit initiatives run their activities. They use communication of telephone, internet, railways, roads, seaways, airways etc. When we look at the construction of these infrastructures over the globe, we notice that they had been constructed and used first for the aim of transporting commercial commodities, finance and information related to them. And second, I raise the question of to what extent those non-profit initiatives could fulfill their activities or finance their operations without the sponsorships of commercial or industrial corporations. Sponsorships, in globalization process, became an institution linking the economic actors and non-profit associations, without which the latter hardly survive.

Within the globalized world, the survival of human beings and the security of states are so interdependent that interests of any state, society or individual could not be defined through isolating others’. Environmental pollution, nuclear weapons, illicit drug trade, terrorism and deterioration in ozone layer are not the problems of any single formation, rather of the mankind as a whole. Common concerns are forcing separate political entities to cooperate. In later stages this cooperation and the emergence of consciousness could be expected to result in the formation of a genuine global society. However, within globalization process primarily economic interactions and mentality are globalized. Any value other than economic could enter into this process just when it acquired an economic

value for the global market. In other words values, which could be indicated in terms of money has a right to take part in globalization. This explains to a certain extent also how Global Civilization has been being continuously reshaped. Civilization by most scholars is defined in terms of material life and existences. Those values that are not transferable in terms of money cannot be a part of Global Civilization. They remain as the cultural attributes of local social formations. From this point of view, culture refers to the non-material possessions that could not be turned into payable goods of the Civilization. These points justify the argument that the process going towards a global civilization is running faster than the process going towards the formation of a global society. Virtue follows the economy. Globalization in the economy and fragmentation in the culture are going tet a tet.

One of the most important critical point of globalization is the civilizational aspect, in the sense that whether it is really capable to create its own civilization. Like colonialism and imperialism, globalization has been accused of being by its opponents a new ideology of the West to exploit the rest. In this context I have discussed that globalization is under the way of creating its own civilizational structure by taking into consideration the characteristics of being a civilization. For we witness today a uniform production and consumption culture, science, politics and values. Most of characteristics of being a civilization are embodied by globalization, but we cannot conceive this stage of development as a genuine civilization, for there are two important shortcomings. *First*, even though in the sense of material life globalization represents a civilization, in the sense of culture of non-tangibles globalization represents a process of fragmentation. This diversity of cultures carries a potential to disintegrate the emerging global civilization. The advocates of globalization do not adequately respond *second*, global problems that are critical for the fate of humanity like environmental pollution and nuclear threat yet. In other words, there are common concerns of security and survival, but they are not treated commonly. However, those common concerns have a potential to create a common treatment as a result of rising significance of threat in near future. Civilizational aspect of globalization represents the rise of global values and material uniformities all over the world, which depreciates the “national” monopoly in defining the kind of political and economic governance and fundamental rights and freedom. This development could create significant possibility of shifts in political legitimacy of the state, for rising consciousness of global civilization and society makes national arrangements somehow nonsense.

Perhaps, civilizational aspect is the main source of reason to construct a global theory of society, economics and politics. For civilization is one of the main components of being a society, which imposes a different kind of political structure world-wide that carries out critical result for shifting basis of political legitimacy of nation state. Because of this reason, in the coming section, I will try to analyze attempts of theorizing the global web of relations. Because globalization seems to create a civilization that is one of the significant features of being a society, theoretical attempts of globalization come first from sociologists, like Robertson, Sklair and Spybey. Also, opponent views arguing that globalization does not provide a civilization rather it is a kind of domination of liberal-capitalist outlook will be referred.

### **1.5. Theoretical Attempts**

Despite a huge amount of literature on globalization, few attempted to construct a theoretical framework of the global context. The most striking example is the works of Roland Robertson. In this part, with Robertson's conception of globalization, that of L. Sklair, R. Holton and T. Spybey will be critically analyzed, and also neo-Marxist approach of S. Gill and theoretical critics of J. Maclean will be debated.

According to Robertson (Robertson:1992:1-2) globalization is a concept which refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole. There is an empirical focus in line with the increasing acceleration in both concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century. This consciousness of the world is a serious challenge to the premises of classical sociology. In his critiques of classical sociology Robertson argues that although there are various global openings in the work of the classical sociologists, sociology's official role has been to address societal or comparative-societal issues. Robertson relates globalization to the modernization theory. This relation is also indicates the inadequacy of classical discipline of sociology. In modernization theory there developed two main streams, convergence and divergence, the former was emphasizing that all or nearly all societies were, at different speed, moving towards the same point, mainly as a result of the overriding emergence of industrial man, while the advocates of the divergence focused on the idea of

the existence of different paths to and forms of modernity and that in that sense there was not convergence but divergence.

However, a different conceptualization has been recently developed around the term of 'invariance', claiming that societies are converging in some respects (mainly economic and technological), diverging in others (mainly social and cultural topics). Working within the parameters of classical sociology is misleading for it involved concentration basically on the internal affairs of modern societies, which is a perspective to a large extent consolidated by the rise, during the period of high classical sociology, of the discipline of IR. Thus sociology came to deal, often comparatively, with societies, while IR (and portions of political science) dealt with them interactively, with relations between nations. But this division of labor has been recently destabilized by the growing interest in globalization, in which new academic areas such as communication and cultural studies have begun to play significant roles (Robertson:1992:16).

In referring to what Albrow (Albrow:1990:6) calls the stage of universalism, Robertson (Robertson:1992:27) points to the aspiration of early sociology to provide a science of and for humanity based on timeless principles and verified laws, that is a positivist discipline. The universalistic stage of sociology had roots in strands of the Enlightenment, which stressed such ideas as humanity, fraternity and indeed universalism (Robertson:1992:16). In his words globalization refers in particular sense to the coming into, often problematic, conjunction of different forms of life. This can not be accurately captured in the simple proposition that globalization is a consequence of modernity as proposed by Anthony Giddens (Giddens:1990). Present concern with globality and globalization cannot be comprehensively considered simply as aspect of outcome of the Western project of modernity or except in very broad terms, enlightenment. In an increasingly globalized world there is a heightening of civilizational, societal, ethnic, regional and indeed individual, self consciousness.

Robertson (Robertson:1992:52) focused on neglected dimensions of the globalization issue rather than repeating economic interdependence, growing ecological and environmental issues. *First*, he refers to the moral and critical aspects of the theme, notwithstanding the globalization theories presenting a realistic description of the world.

*Second*, as the driving forces of globalization he emphasized on the cultural perspective instead of stressing on the dynamics of capitalism or forces of imperialism. *Third*, he points to the term of relativization, which is used to indicate the ways in which, as globalization proceeds, challenges are increasingly presented to the stability of particular perspective on, and collective and individual participation in, the overall globalization process. What has come to be called globalization is, in spite of differing conceptions of that theme, best understood as indicating the problem of the form in terms of which the world becomes united, but no means integrated in naïve functionalist mode. Globalization as a topic is, in other words, a conceptual entry to the problem of world order in the most general sense, but nevertheless, an entry, which has no cognitive purchase without considerable discussion of historical and comparative matters. It is, moreover, a phenomenon, which clearly requires what is conventionally called interdisciplinary treatment. While there have been attempts to carve out a new discipline for the study of the world as a whole, including the long historical making of the contemporary world system, Robertson states that we have no need a new discipline in order to study the world as a whole but social theory in the broadest sense-as a perspective which stretches across the social sciences and humanities and even the natural sciences- should be refocused and expanded so as to make concern with the world a central hermeneutic, and in such a way as to constrain empirical and comparative historical research in the same direction.

Robertson (Robertson:1992:54) strongly acknowledges that the world could, in principle, have been rendered as a singular system via the imperial hegemony of a single nation or a grand alliance between two or more dynasties or nations; the victory of the universal proletariat; the crystallization of the world spirit; the yielding of nationalism to the ideal of free trade; the success of the world federalist movement; the worldwide triumph of a trading company; or in yet other ways. Some of these have in fact held sway at certain moments in world history. Indeed, in coming to terms analytically with the contemporary circumstance we have to acknowledge that some such possibilities are as old as world history in any meaningful sense of that phrase and have greatly contributed to the existence of the globalized world of the late twentieth century. Moreover, much of the world history can be fruitfully considered as sequences of mini globalization, in the sense that for example, historic empire formation involved the unification of previously sequestered territories and social entities.

Robertson (Robertson:1992:70) points out that it is important to make a distinction between the diffusion of expectations concerning the external legitimacy and mode of operation of the state and the development of regulative norms concerning the relationships between states, while readily acknowledging that the issue of the powers and limits of the state has been empirically linked to the structuring of the relationships between states and moreover, that it constitutes a crucial axis of globalization. There is a general autonomy and logic to the globalization process, which operates in relative independence of strictly societal and other more conventionally studied socio-cultural processes. The global system is not simply an outcome of processes of basically intra-societal origin or even a development of the inter state system. Its making has been and continues to be such more complex. The global field is highly pluralistic in that there is a proliferation of civilizational, continental, regional, societal and other definitions of the global human condition as well as considerable variety in identities formed in those respects without direct reference to the global situation.

Robertson (Robertson:1992:104) claims that relationship between the universal and the particular must be central at this time to our comprehension of the globalization process and its ramifications. Contemporary globalization could be best considered in its most general sense as a form of institutionalization of two fold process involving the universalization of the particular and the particularization of the universal. In Robertson's discussion of globalization there are *four* elemental points of reference for any discussion of contemporary globalization, national societies, individual selves, the world system of societies and humankind. This set of distinctions is that globalization increasingly involves thematization of these four elements of the global human condition or field. Any given element is constrained by the other three.

Robertson (Robertson:1992:121) criticizes Elias's ideas on the civilizing process and states that it takes insufficient account of the respects in which civility became a regulative principle in inter state relations and indeed, that the civilizing process operated as an external, politico-cultural constraint on nation states. Elias uses the concept of "civilizing process" mainly in reference to a pattern of objectively discernible trends in the direction of self as opposed to outer constraint thus largely ignoring the ways in which the

process of civilization came to take on a global life of its own. Robertson claims that globalization theory is an elaboration of civilizational analysis. Globalization theory partly rests on a pre-theoretical commitment to global heterogeneity and in that in any case, the theory itself leads, via its empirical investigations, to an emphasis on civilizational and societal variety. The pre-theoretical commitment arises from the view that a vastly homogenized world would have little vitality, while the theory itself argues that the globalization process itself –the rendering of the world as a single place- constrains civilizations and societies (including assertions of national solidarity) to be increasingly explicit about what might be called their global callings (their unique geo-cultural or geo-moral contributions to world history). In this framework, globalization involves the universalization of the particular, not just the particularization of the universal. The insistence on heterogeneity and variety in an increasingly globalized world is integral to globalization theory.

The emergence of what some call the modern world system has been discussed in either political or economic terms. But global state of being goes beyond relatively simple models of a world polity or a world economy. Even though world systems approach and globalization approach have few important things in common, they are rival perspectives. World systems theory has been used as a form of critique of the existing world situation, redefining exploitation and a problematic mastery of nature as global problems. The world systems theory in a diffuse sense has also become an ideology, and one possible definition of the global situation, a party in global cultural conflict (Robertson:1992:172).

Robertson (Robertson:1992:176) tries to show that the issue of the search for fundamentals of globalization cannot be divorced from the theme of fundamentalism. The term fundamentalism could lead some social scientist to think of extremism. But this is precisely where the cultural studies perspective is helpful. It enables us to see that the declaration that people are in search of fundamentals puts the people in a very safe place – all of them concerned with doing their own local and/or essential thing. Many forms of fundamentalism –in the widest reach of the term- constitute ways of finding a place within the world as a whole (occasionally withdrawal from the world), ways that frequently involve attempts to enhance the power of the groups concerned. Identity is power. The idea of the right to identity and the struggle for recognition is widespread at the present time.

When we speak of globalization we must realize that we are referring above all to a relatively specific path that the world has taken in the direction of its becoming singular. The world could in theory have become a single entity along different trajectories. In contrasting the global and the local there is considerable risk that the local will be omitted from the global. But if we are talking about the increasing unicity of the world in one sense or another, how could it be that all the localities in the world are not parts of the world ?

In Robertson, globalization is a relatively autonomous process. Its central dynamic involves the twofold process of the particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular. The particularization of the universal, defined as the global concretization of the problem of universality, has become the occasion for the search for global fundamentals. In other words, the current phase of very rapid globalization facilitates the rise of movements concerned with the real meaning of the world, movements searching for the meaning of the world as a whole. The universalization of the particular refers to the global universality of the search for the particular, for increasingly fine-grained modes of identity presentation. In this sense fundamentalism is a mode of thought and practice, which has become almost globally institutionalized, as far as the twentieth century concerned. Robertson (Robertson:1992:178) makes distinction between the kinds of fundamentalism, like anti- and pro-globalization or within and against globalization. But he did not present convincing grounds of this distinction. In fact, globalization operates at four levels, economy, politics, civil society and culture. Making distinctions like fundamentalism of anti or pro-globalizations requires a detailed analysis of the concerned fundamentalism with respect to its approach vis-a-vis these four levels of the operations; meaning that a fundamentalist movement is not totally anti or pro-globalization, rather it highlights one or few of these levels while it opposes other levels.

Robertson (Robertson:1992:182-3) tries to show that globalization, we experience today, began to take shape as an autonomous process during the period of the decline of feudalism in Europe. A crucial variable in globalization theory is the scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single place. When we speak of contemporary globalization we are very much concerned with matters of consciousness, partly because that notion carries reflexive connotations. Globalization does not simply refer to the objectiveness of increasing interconnectedness. It also refers to cultural and subjective matters. In very

simple terms, we are thus talking about issues surrounding the idea of the world being for itself. While these ideas are the basic reason why Robertson criticizes world systems approaches, he seems to be ambiguous on the point that the world system approaches carry also a consciousness of the world as a whole. But doing this, world system approaches try to take attention to the structure of the global system and criticize it on the ground of exploitation and injustices. I mean that it is not clear that why Robertson opposes to the arguments of world system approaches. His oppositions imply that Robertson understands globalization process in which there is a uniform consciousness independent of differences or oppositions. He disregards the relative considerations of different segments of pro or anti globalization theorists.

From a sociological point of view, Robertson defines globalization as the emergence of the awareness of the global. Robertson analyzes the development of the discipline of sociology and focuses on the point that globalization has drastically changed the unit of analysis of the discipline. Classical sociology had analyzed the relations among the constitutive parts of a given society. Given society was implying one, which has a specific territory where there is a political authority as defined by the classical political science. The determining factor of being a society was the existence of a state on which that society legitimized. Classical sociology was examining the relations among social groups of this kind of society, power relations in this society was the subject matter of the political science and the external relations of the political authority of this society was the unit of analysis of the discipline of IR. Robertson, by referring to the point that the awareness of the global requires to be examined by the sociology as such an awareness implies the emergence of a society, tries to upset the classical social theory. He grounds his arguments on the fact that the importance of physical borders of the state has been lost as the result of the rapid development in internet technology which provide people to freely communicate each other that results in the formation of global civil initiatives; multinational corporations force and erode the economic borders of the states; and global economic, security, environmental and ecological problems create and strengthen effective global civil initiatives whose pressures on the governments are resultant in most cases. Remembering the emergence of a global civilization, Robertson claims that such developments mean the emergence of a global society.

Consequently he argues that this global society could not be properly analyzed by the methods of classical sociology. He proposes the reconstruction of sociological method in order to theoretically respond the emerging globality. He well criticizes the shortcomings of classical sociology for the analysis of global society. But he does not develop a comprehensive proposal for how the rules of a discipline could be reconstructed. He is well aware of the fact that globalization is still a process. Currently neither we have a well-defined global society nor have we clear-cut social groupings worldwide. This is a transition period anyway. States are still to a certain extent decisive.

The propositions of Robertson for sociological reconstruction imply significant results for the disciplines of political science and IR as well. The units of analysis of the three disciplines are so linked each other. When the sociology begins to theorize a global society, this means that political science would begin to discuss global power politics and global sovereignty. Such a questioning brings inevitably political legitimacy of nation state into trouble. At this point we can talk about the demise of nation state as a political structure. The demise of nation state proves that we have no need anymore for the discipline of IR, whose subject matter is the relations among the sovereigns. If global society is assumed to create a global sovereign, a discipline like IR will be absurd. International relations had been brought out of political science in its early stages. The formulations of the emergence of a single global sovereign will make IR assimilated in the political science again. Or IR will be fused with the cultural studies.

Moreover, Robertson, by undermining the importance of economic face of globalization, is not aware of the emerging dilemma, in the sense that if mainly economic actors carry globalization while other issues participating in this train, politics, theoretically, should be constructed around the axes of economic actors first of all. However, by underestimating the economy, Robertson's theory seems to be unable to propose a genuine political context. In other words, for a full awareness of the world as a singly unity, economies of scale, that is the ideal of economic globalization should be constructed all over the world, so as depending on which global political formation have a solid stand. Perhaps this process should be a similar one to what happened in the formation of nation states, if we understand the process of globalization as the formation of a single global polity. First bourgeoisie had been formed, then nation state engendered, and the discipline

of sociology emerged. If the global modernization follow the same path with the national modernization project, formation of global capitalist bloc is crucial which would need a global political structure for the same reason why it needed nation state in the history. While Robertson tries to escape from this dilemma by arguing that globalization is not a new stage of modernization project, he could not have shown, in theory, what are the fundamentals of this sui-generis context.

Even though Robertson tries to construct a theoretical basis for the analysis of emerging global structure, his theoretical attempt carries out significant deficiencies, such as the issue of economy and civilization are not discussed which are the two important pre-requisite of forming a polity. Also, he is unable to show the breaking link between modernity and globalization, for he argues that globalization is not the continuation of modernity.

On this occasion it is important to refer to the arguments of another sociologist, Sklair (Sklair:1991:5) claiming that world society has historically become a believable idea only in the last few hundred years, and science, technology, industry and universal values are creating a twenty first century world that is different from any past age. Sklair argues that state-centric, transnational relations and neo-Marxist approaches, while often interesting and fruitful, tend to close off other interesting and fruitful avenues of theory and research; and thus we need a step towards a sociology of global system. This new approach should be grounded on transnational practices. Transnational practices could be distinguished on *three levels, economic, political, and cultural-ideological*. The global system is marked by great asymmetry. The most important economic, political and cultural-ideological goods that circulate around the globe tend to be owned or controlled by small groups in a relatively small number of countries. Sociologists, economists, political scientists, historians and others whose works demanded a global perspective had long been accustomed to perceive the world as split into modern and traditional, advanced and backward, progressive and stagnant societies, to mention only the most commonly used distinctions. However, upon these distinctions, we seem to need to construct a global perspective.

Sklair classifies (Sklair:1991:24) the global system as income-based, trade-based, resource-based, quality of life-based and bloc-based indicators. In his terms, these classifications can be used to organize the evidence for and justify morally one or other theory of development or the lack of development. These theories often guide the practice of those who make and carry out the related policies. These classifications give us a wealth of empirical data, but the result is conceptual confusion and general inconclusiveness when we try to explain anything in terms of such state-centric categories. The poor in all countries struggle against the domestic and global forces that oppress them and their resistance takes many forms. Where this involves opposition to those who run the global system in their own interests, it will naturally involve transnational practices in the economic, political and cultural-ideological spheres. It is important to recognize how the global capitalist system uses the myth of the nation state, sometimes in the form of reactionary nationalist ideologies, to deflect criticism and opposition to its hegemonic control of the global system onto the claims of competing nations. Dividing the world up into nation states, as it is for most practical purposes for most people, is therefore a profoundly ideological strategy.

The theory of global system, as it is proposed by Sklair (Sklair:1991:81-2), purports that global system is made up of economic transnational practices and at the highest level of abstraction these are the building blocks of the system. The political practices are the principles of organization of the system. They have to work with the materials on hand, but by manipulating the design of the system they can build variations to it. The cultural-ideological practices are the nuts and bolts and the glue that hold the system together. In order to work properly, the dominant forces in each of the three spheres have to monopolize the key resources for which there is great competition. The transnational corporations strive to control global capital and material resources, the transnational capitalist classes strive to control global power, and the transnational agents and institutions of the culture-ideology of consumerism strive to control the realm of ideas. However, in the last resort, it is the global control of capital and labor that is the decisive factor for those who do not wish to be excluded from the system. The ideas that are antagonistic to the global capitalist project can be reduced to one central counter-hegemonic idea, the rejection of the culture-ideology of consumerism itself. Without consumerism, the rationale for continuous capitalist accumulation dissolves. It is the capacity to commercialize and commodify all ideas and the material products in which they adhere, television images, advertisements, newspapers,

books, tapes, films and so on, not the ideas of themselves, that global capitalism strives to appropriate.

Therefore, Sklair as a sociologist seems to frame a globalization theory depending on transnational practices, on top of which there is capitalist mentality and consumerism. Also he is well aware of the ideological side of globalization rhetoric. He proposes that we have to construct a global sociology, which criticizes the ideological premises of the hegemonic outlook. In contrast to proposals of Robertson, Sklair's mode of analysis, theoretically, seems to be more coherent in the sense that the backbone of globalization is economic initiatives supported by political agents and legitimized by ideological instruments. So he proposes a sociology of the global system, which rests upon the working principles and ideological biases of the current process.

In order to situate the arguments of Sklair within a conceptual framework and to clarify the working principles and ideological biases of the new system, it is important to point out positive and negative aspects of globalization raised by Holton, stating that for some, globalization is seen negatively as the dominance of Western economic and cultural interests over the rest of the world. This dominance means the perpetuation of inequality between the rich and poor countries and regions. The problem here is not only the perpetuation of gross inequalities, but also what has been referred to as the Coca-Colonization of the world, whereby Third World populations are incorporated into the global economy as passive consumers of standardized products and nothing more. In other words, economic globalization rests on foundations of cultural imperialism. For others, globalization is evaluated more positively, stating that globalization as the penetration of capitalism into every corner of the world, bringing with it the possibility for all of the world's population to participate in the fruits of the international division of labor and market economy (Holton:1998:2-3). The second point of view is not much different from what modernization theory promised for a long time ago. It is the continuation of enlightenment philosophy through modernization, industrialization and globalization. In this sense globalization is the last circle of enlightenment philosophy for eventual progress. Globalization will bring well-being and happiness to the deprived parts of the world, if its principles and premises are adopted and implemented. Perhaps, in Habermasian terms this is a kind of legitimation of its operations and policies for this rhetoric. The first point is a

reactive one vis-a-vis the process. These reactionary attitudes reveal themselves in the works of cultural studies, south-north debates and in some fundamentalist movements in the periphery.

Holton introduces the term of “global-talk” to describe the globalization rhetoric. He argues that while the world economy and social life is daily becoming increasingly more global, there is the resurgence of both nationalism and ethnicity in many parts of the world. This has led to renewed episodes of genocide and ethnic cleansing. These processes strike at the heart of attempts to build a global political community based on the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Global-talk is selective by furthering just one side of global occurrence, meaning that it focuses on global production, consumption culture and mass communication, which are basically foundations of the globalized market economy. Globalization, in this sense, is not only integration but also fragmentation. Re-assertions of local religious, ethnic or national appeals are con-current trends side by side to the process of market integration of the world economy. The global and the local are unified in the process of advanced capitalism, in the sense that while production and consumption are globally identified, marketing strategies are determined within the framework of local peculiarities (Holton:1998:18). In other words, re-assertion of the locality does not provide an escape from the circles of global capitalism.

Holton (Holton:1998:85) argues that the reason for raising the distinction between nation and state is to emphasize the twofold problem involved in assessing the future of the nation state in globalized world. *The first* problem, that of the maintenance of state sovereignty in relation to cross-border economic activity and regulation, has already been sketched. *The second* problem, that of the national integrity of a people, brings into focus questions of cultural identity. These are influenced not only by the internal cultural composition of the nation, but also by global trends such as culturally diverse labor migration, globalization of culture industries such as music and film, and the cultural impact of transnational regulatory bodies in areas such as human rights and citizenship. Holton argues that in most cases, theoretically, cultural studies are associated with the fragmentation in the globalization process. This is an illusion. Culture, like globalization, has two faces; homogeneity and heterogeneity. While some values, like human rights, freedoms and democracy are getting universalized, some other values of locality are

particularized. But particularization is not an appeal to return back to the history. Rather, as it is stated by Robertson that modern local movements that appeal to particularistic claims rooted variously in locality, religion or ethnicity are globally oriented rather than being the primordial manifestation of ancient historical allegiances, even where there is no direct or explicit concern with the global. For these movements, along with the explicit proponents of globalization, are globally oriented, there emerges a normative discussion as well with respect to what the world should be and what values or ideals ought to be represented in global space (Holton:1998:80).

Negative and positive distinction and conception of global talk of Holton seems to be valuable conceptualization of globalization. But, his arguments and conclusions does not provide a coherent theory of globalization, for he misses the points what existed in Robertson and Sklair, that is, taking the globe a single unit of analysis for social disciplines. However, Holton, by introducing some concepts like global talk has contributed to the further conceptualization of globalization.

In contrast to Roberston, Sklair and Holton, Spybey tries to link globalization to the enlightenment and the rise of the Western Civilization. Spybey (Spybey:1996:2) argues that mass production, mass communication and mass consumption might be seen as a kind of trinity of high modernity, the materialistic culmination of Enlightenment project in the sense that they provided opportunities for people to harness science and technology and improve their standard of living. Equality of opportunity is held to be an overriding principle, but the society is competitive and equality of outcomes is not the goal. In classical sociology, it was argued that one of the hallmarks of modernity was the universality of social patterns. This was contrasted with the particularity of social patterns in traditional society. In the present context, globalization might be interpreted as the ultimate temporal expression of universality during the period of the late modernity. It was stated by Giddens that social relations have been lifted out from local contexts of interaction and their surrounding across indefinite spans of time-space (Giddens:1990). These arguments show that the appeal to particular is a demand for difference and identity. The assertion of particular is not the same as it is stated in nostalgia. Rather, identity and difference demanded through particularism would be expected to provide an intellectual power to the demander. This power is crucial within the competitive arena of globalization. Spybey

argues that the modes of production of the particular and the universal in globalization era share the same roots that are the enlightenment philosophy, liberal values and capitalist mentality.

Spybey claims that Western civilization produced the world's first truly global culture but many reactions to it, with their roots in alternative cultures, have formed part of its continuing reproduction. The result of this is that in the late twentieth century globalized culture is no longer exclusively Western. The process of reproduction and renewal in globalized social institutions is continuing many, if not most, aspects of polity, economy, communication and world order have clearly become global (Spybey:1996:8). In the late modernity, intensified globalization provides the individual with increased information to engage in social interactions. People are faced with an extending range of imagery and information involving models of citizenship, forms of production, styles of consumption, modes of communication, principles of world order. There is enhanced capacity for reflection as a result of the exposure to globalized social processes.

While Robertson, Sklair, Holton and Spybey try to construct an approach to globalization, in their approaches one of the most important aspect, that is ideological face, raised by some, but is not analyzed in depth. From a neo-Marxist point of view, Gill tries to analyze the ideological face of globalization. In his word globalization is a literal product of liberal-capitalist ideological bloc. In contrast to the neo liberal enforcement of globalization process both in economic and political terms Gill tries (Gill:2000:1223-4) to put forward the ideological aspect of globalization. He argues that capitalist norms and practices pervade everyday life in a more systematic way than in the era of welfare-nationalism and state capitalism, so that it may be problematic to speak of the emergence of what he calls a 'market civilization'. The concept entails, on the one hand, cultural, ideological, and mythic forms understood broadly as an ideology or myth of capitalist progress. These representations are associated with the cumulative aspects of market integration and the increasingly expansive structures of accumulation, legitimation, consumption and work. On the other hand, market civilization involves patterns of social disintegration and exclusionary and hierarchical patterns of social relations. The disturbing feature of market civilization is that it tends to generate a perspective on the world that is ahistorical, economistic, materialistic, 'me-oriented', short-termist and ecologically myopic. Although

the governance of market civilization is framed by the discourse of globalizing neo-liberalism and expressed through the interaction of free enterprise and the state, its coordination is achieved through a combination of market discipline and the direct application of political power.

Gill (Gill:2000:1226) argues that the dominant forces of contemporary globalization are constituted by a neo-liberal historical bloc that practices a politics of supremacy within and across nations. The idea of an historical bloc, in Gramscian terms, is consistent in some ways with what Foucault called a discursive formation; a set of ideas and practices with particular conditions of existence, which are more or less institutionalized, but may be only partially understood by those that they encompass. He argues that despite the Foucaultian preoccupation with the problematic of power/knowledge as localized and institutionalized by discourse and with localized resistance through interventions in the systems of power/knowledge, there is little way of an emancipatory dimension to this perspective and no adequate link between macro and micro structures of power. He understands globalization a part of a broad process of restructuring of the state and civil society, and of the political economy and culture. It is also an ideology largely consistent with the world-view and political priorities of large-scale, internationally-mobile forms of capital.

Politically, it is consistent with the outlook of affluent minorities in developed countries and in the urban elites and new middle classes in the developing world. The current phase of economic globalization has come to be characterized increasingly not by free competition as idealized in neo-liberal theory, but an oligopolistic neo-liberalism, oligopoly and protection for the strong and a socialization of their risks, and market discipline for the weak. Nevertheless, in its present mythic and ideological representation, the concept serves to reify a global economic system dominated by large institutional investors and transnational firms which control the bulk of the world's productive assets and are the principal influences in world trade and financial markets.

Partly as a consequence of the global decline of the left and the rising power of transnational capital, political life in many parts of the world has come to be configured, to a degree, by 'neo-liberal' economic and political principles. The neo-liberal concept of globalization, the dominant discursive formation of our time, suggests that the privatization

and trans-nationalization of capital are either inevitable or desirable from a broad social viewpoint. In this sense, the concept of globalization exhibits positive and negative forms of ideology. A positive aspect is the equation of free competition and free exchange with economic efficiency, welfare and democracy, and a myth of virtually unlimited social progress, as represented in television advertisement and other media, and in the reports of international economic institutions. A negative aspect is how neo-liberal market forces are often said to have marginalized non-market alternatives, especially from the political left. Some stress that global financial market is 'civilizing' (advocates of free trade). Some others (Fukuyama:1992) equate neo-liberal globalization with the 'end of history' in which 'the last man' was born. All these preoccupations claim that neo-liberalism is the only global alternative, and in fact, it has been actually realized.

By referring to the definition of discipline by E. Durkheim that is (self) discipline, or the restraint of one's inclinations, is a means to develop reasoned behavior and thus foster the moral growth of the healthy personality, for unregulated emotions can produce anomie; and referring to Foucault who states that the enlightenment, which discovered the liberties, also invented the discipline, Gill (Gill:2000:1233) claims that the concept of discipline combines macro and micro dimensions of power, the ability to promote uniformity and obedience within parties, cadres, organizations and systems. Neo-liberal forms of discipline are bureaucratized and institutionalized, and they operate with different degrees of intensity across a range of public and private spheres.

In Gill's words, the new constitutionalism can be defined as the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development. It is therefore related to the rise of market civilization. New constitutionalist proposals are often implicit rather than explicit. They emphasize the market efficiency, discipline, and confidence, economic policy credibility and consistency, and limitation on democratic decision-making processes. Proposals imply the insulation of key aspects of the economy from the influences of politicians or the mass of citizens by imposing, internally and externally, 'binding constraints' on the conduct of fiscal, monetary, trade and investment policies. With these terms, new constitutionalism confers privileged rights of citizenship and representation on corporate capital, while constraining democratization process that has involved struggles for representation for

hundred years. Therefore, the imposition of discipline on public institutions, partly to prevent national interference with the property rights and entry and exit options of holders of mobile capital, is central in new constitutionalism. By contrast, traditional notions of constitutionalism are associated with political rights, obligations and freedoms, and procedures that give institutional form to the state.

Constitutions define, describe, and outline the rights and obligations of citizens; common policy making institutions with authority over the entire polity; the limits to the scope of action of these institutions; and enforcement mechanisms and ratification and amendments procedures. Gill exemplifies the case of the European Union as a mirror of globalization. He states that the integration process of the European Union is very similar to the proposals of new constitutionalism, in the sense that liberal economic policies were prioritized and highlighted, while social policies and democratization were underestimated in the integration process. However, when we look at the enlargement pre-conditions and deepening policies after Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, one could easily see that democratization and human right and liberties have been also made compulsory for the admission to the Union. So the process in the Union seems to be consistent with liberal-democratic progress. In other words, like democratizations in the Western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when liberal economy and capitalist classes gained first their property-related rights, then the social rights of working classes came later; in the European Union as well, liberal economy had been achieved and then the democratization issue was opened up.

Gill (Gill:2000:1238) introduces the term 'panopticism' in order to identify surveying and disciplinary capacity of liberal democratic states. By this he tries to state that states have invested heavily in new technologies to create and manipulate data basis for tax collection, social security, immigration, social control and criminal enforcement. These aspects of disciplinary neo-liberalism may tend to make aspects of civil society and the state to become more panoptic and coercive. Gill points out an important theoretical contradiction in neo-liberal assumptions. Neo-liberal conception of rationality is largely instrumental, finding the best means to achieve calculated ends. Motivation is primarily individualistic. But this motivation is provided by a drive to a secure environment. Security requires that public goods should be provided locally and globally so as to encourage

production, consumption and exchange processes. Governments throughout the world are required to regulate and to compensate for the social, economic and ecological problems attendant upon existing patterns of consumption and production. This means that the state must find ways to sustain the tax base and to police and regulate the market society for a secure environment, in all meanings. However, this may prove difficult when prevailing economic ideology and the organization of the world economy validate cuts in public expenditures and reducing the scope of state action, which would also result in a rising black and informal economy and a tendency for organized criminal webs to grow in strength that is expected to damage heavily the very security of the market. Therefore, the logic of neo-liberalism is contradictory. It promotes global economic integration, while leaving empty the place of the state as the traditional provider of public goods.

While Gill's reasoning with respect to the contradictory character of neo-liberalism seems plausible, if we understand globalization as a final stage of human development. However, if globalization is understood as a process, perhaps a transition phase, then it would be too early to find a contradictory point in neo-liberal approach. For as the global economic integration gets mature, corollary political or economic regulatory mechanisms could emerge whose symptoms are the current intergovernmental organizations, like the United Nations, and international economic institutions. In other words, we could expect that some of the local regulatory powers of nation states could be, in time, transferred to the global set of arrangements. Also Gill is very enthusiastic in reading liberal theory in one way. In current process of globalization, liberal enforcement requires cuts in public expenditures and insists in minimal state. But for security reasons of the capital and investments, current application of liberal theories does not prescribe the dissolution of national armies or security forces. But, he seems to be right in putting forward these critics in environmental degrading. In other words, liberal enforcement in current globalization process tries to keep political security through nation states, but it disregards environmental security, which could be a self-defeating weapon for capitalist growth.

In sum, Gill focuses on the neglected ideological dimension of globalization rhetoric. In his words, globalization is associated with the concept of market civilization supported by neo-liberal ideology, which creates fundamental contradiction for the functions and the roles of nation state. The contradiction refers to that liberal ideology insists on minimal

functions of the state on the one hand, modern state has to commit into a more comprehensive regulatory functions supported by rapid advances in technology on the other hand. However, Gill's analysis misses other social and humanitarian aspect of globalization, in the sense that there is a growing threat of ecological pollution and there is a growing influence of global civil society. I mean, whereas globalization is literally dominated by neo-liberal arguments, civil initiatives and global problems should be equally respected independent of liberal domination. So we should also discuss to what extent those global occurrences is capable to produce a new kind of world politics, which is assumed to be so-called sovereign field of international relations theory (IR).

At his point, Maclean (Maclean:2000:4) tries to question the discipline of IR just as similar as what Robertson made for classical sociology. In explaining philosophical roots of and routes to globalization, he points out an important ambiguity. On the one hand in the dominant Western political thought and IR it is argued that classical Western political theory presents itself as a treasure house of experience, ideas and concepts, which are in general directly relevant to current issues, problems or developments within IR, particularly directly relevant to the problematic of globalization. On the other hand, this tradition of classical Western political theory within IR theory, in order to be constructed as continuously relevant across time, has had to declare itself as timeless or ahistorical. Approaches to IR located somewhere within the terrain of disciplinary orthodoxy, engendered and sustained regularly through the IR tradition, can only develop partial or inadequate conceptualizations of globalization, because they are able only to deal with the form or appearance of globalization. There is a mediated relationships of reciprocal causality between the dominant orthodoxy of realism and neo-realism in its various forms and the conditions, institutions, content and causal powers of globalization as a relation, rather than as a thing. They hinge a central assumption, namely that IR theory is not outside or external to international practice, but is constitutive of it.

Maclean (Maclean:2000:15) argues that in IR discipline notable exclusions from the mainstream of debate include issues of racism, of migration and refugees, of labor and employment, of health poverty and land tenure, of gender subordination and of imperialism and neo-imperialism. Putting this more generally now, issues connected to and indicative of gross and systematic inequality in the world have not been seen as central problematiques

within IR; unless of course they are inequalities of military capability, of sovereign territory, or of access to credit and finance. If the classical realist distinction between high politics and low politics can no longer be sustained either on substantive or conceptual grounds, and further, if people's security individually and collectively is increasingly threatened by such social conditions, and finally there are prima facie grounds for supposing that the causal mechanisms for such conditions reside within the structures and processes of the global political economy, then the discipline of IR could be said to have a clear responsibility to open up its substantive and conceptual boundaries.

Maclean (Maclean:2000:27) points out that the assumed distinctions between theory and practice or subjectivity and objectivity is causally necessary both to the process of construction of social reality as the objective conditions of social practice, and to sustaining relations of power and hegemony within that practice. These separations are the fundamental points of the orthodoxy in IR. The arbitrary nature of established social orders is obscured through a strategy of neutralization. Maclean firmly acknowledges that IR theory, notably realism, was a constitutive part of current international politics. Despite its claim of objectiveness and ahistoricalness, political realism unified theory and practice, through which current international politics emerged. If globalization, in one or another way, strikes the fundamentals of the nation state, then IR discipline has to re-define itself alongside the emerging reality.

Classical political realism and neo-realism mis-recognize globalization not so much because they construct it as part of the assumed to be external reality of IR, but more because there is no space for a reflexive consideration of their own constitutive relationship with globalization as a potential object of inquiry (Maclean:2000:34). Assumed separations in the orthodox IR theory between domestic and international, past and present and future, objective and subjective, theory and practice are clear barriers in the analysis of globalization, Maclean (Maclean:2000:50) noted. This shows the power of exclusion of the orthodoxy. The exclusion is ahistorical. If globalization, in the orthodoxy, means nothing more or less than the interconnectedness of parts of the world, it adds nothing to our understanding of globalization as a qualitatively different phenomenon. Such conceptualizations simply state the obvious, because the interconnections of parts are what it means to describe something as a system. The world is seen as a geographical spread of

ways of doing things. What is global about these processes can not be distinguished from what is international, and the places in the world are no different from space in the world; that is to say, they are all by implication territorial.

Despite the fact that globalization has been widely discussed on different accounts, we could rarely see attempts of theorizing it. Even though the approaches of many thinkers have been considered, the most striking one is that of Robertson. Robertson, from a sociological point of view, treats globalization as an autonomous process that needs its own structure of society, politics and economy. In his view, classical sociology is inadequate to cope with the emerging global structure, for classical sociology had been accustomed to analyze a specific society whose physical and cultural borders are clearly delimited. Classical sociology has two kinds of shortcomings in order to analyze the global society in Robertson's understanding. *First*, classical sociology was depending on a division of labor between sociology and political science. While the unit of analysis of political science is the state that is sovereign, the unit of analysis of sociology is the society that has a sovereign state. Because of this reason, classical sociology should renovate its unit of analysis to cover a society that has no sovereign body. For global society has no sovereign body.

*Second*, classical sociology had been much pre-occupied with the one-way values of modernization and civilization. Depending on this pre-occupation, classical sociology classified societies by their historical evolution like pre-modern societies, traditional societies and modern civilized societies. These classifications began to lose their conceptual framework under the global context. Being civilized is a relative valuation that is inapplicable to the diversified components of global society. By arguing these shortcomings of classical sociology, Robertson proposes that we need a discipline of global sociology whose unit of analysis is the world as a whole and that classical sociology should leave its classical value judgments for being applicable to the new context. Although Robertson's analysis of globalization and his theoretical proposal bring new expansions, he undermines the significance of economic face of globalization and the structure of advanced capitalism. One of the main characteristics of being a society (global or local) is the existence of an economic system that operates for the common interests of the society. From this point of view, unfair operation of global economic structure (between the south and the north) seems to prevent people all over the world to reach a consciousness of being a global society.

Rather, this unfairness has a potential to reinforce the classical struggle between the center and the periphery of the world system. This struggle could strength the existing power structure of politics, that is nation states. As long as economic unfairness and political structure of nation states sustains, it is very doubtful that we could reach a discipline of global sociology.

In sum, the arguments of both proponents and opponents of globalization have merits in theorizing the global context. Each theory refers to one side of globalization. Giddens stresses that globalization is one of the fundamental consequences of modernity. Globalization, which is a process of uneven development that fragments as it coordinates, introduces new forms of world interdependence, in which there are no others (Giddens:1990:174). Robertson disagrees and insists that globalization of the contemporary type was set in motion long before whatever we might mean by modernity (Robertson:1992:170). Robertson and Sklair propose radical changes in the discipline of sociology to cover up the global structuration. Spybey (Spybey:1996:54) argues that process of globalization have routinely involved the individual in a range of social institutions that are transnational in their effects. While the nation state is undoubtedly still significant, it should no longer be the only, nor even the foremost, parameter for society as it is studied by social scientists. Rather there needs to be a concept of world society that encompasses the study of global institutions and the relations between the individual and the global. It was thought that modernity brought universalization, but, in Robertson's terms (Robertson:1992:100), the interpenetration of the universal and the particular results to some degree in pluralism. Within the broad structure of modern social processes, differentiation and pluralism are therefore an essential part of globalization. On the other hand, Gill tries to show the contradictory nature of globalization that is supported ideologically by neo-liberalism. And Maclean attempts to prove that how a discipline, that is IR, could be formed in such a way that ideological priorities are constructed through unifying theory and practice. However, each of these authors focuses unilaterally more on one dimension of globalization.

In order to overcome the difficulties of theorizing the global context, in the coming chapter I will try to develop a conception of globalization, which implies certain reflections on society, politics, economy, culture and identity. A truly conception of globalization is

fundamental for the main them of the thesis, that is, that under the global context political legitimacy of nation state is conducive to fundamental shifts as a result of impositions of globalization.

## CHAPTER II

### A NEW THEORETICAL PROPOSAL TO GLOBALIZATION

In the former chapter, I have focused on historical evolution of globalization, its civilizational aspect, how it is defined in the literature and what the approaches are to it. Notwithstanding it is very difficult to theorize globalization, insistence on its one aspect as done by its adherents and opponents make theoretical attempts inconclusive, in the sense that we could not attain a coherent theory of globalization. Failure of theorizing the global context results in ambiguities in defining the changing conception of political legitimacy of nation state. I agree with the argument that globalization should and could be theorized, for it is what we are experiencing today. A coherent theory of globalization could provide us to understand better the position of nation state within this process, so we could conceptualize shifts in its political legitimacy.

In order to provide a coherent theory about globalization, *first* it should be *defined*, then depending on this definition, *secondly* we have to *distinguish or distinct* it from or relate it to the history of enlightenment and modernity, *thirdly* we have to determine the *main sub-processes* associated to it. Processes should be examined within their *ideological adherence*, and *fourthly nation state* should be situated contextually and historically within these processes. *Lastly* we have to analyze the *disciplinary challenges* in order to show that whether classical division of labor among social disciplines are adequate for examining the global context or to show what kind of an approach we need. Definition, distinguishing, determination of main processes, ideological orientation, position of nation state and disciplinary challenges may help us to construct a theoretical approach to globalization.

**Definition :** The term “*globalization*” refers to a specific historical stage of human development that is supported and directed by the contradictory enforcements of sub-processes in the fields of economy, politics, society and culture and identity, which results in the rising awareness of the world as a whole. Interdependence among states and societies,

emergence of global problems, rapid flow of information worldwide and appeals to universal human values results in rising global awareness. This definition covers three main characteristics of globalization. *First*, it implies that globalization is an historical process, which implies that certain developments in the history of mankind like enlightenment, capitalism, industrial revolution, political deconstruction in the form of democratization and technological developments culminated in what we understand as globalization today. Any attempt to remove globalization from the area of history will result in ambiguity in understanding it accurately. Its historical characteristics give us a contextual framework. Historicalness implies that it is still a process whose formation is continuing. Otherwise, any ahistorical approach to globalization will require a theory about the final stage of human development, that is globalization. Final stage arguments have to show every kind of its components and results, which are not foreseeable in near future. However, historicalness imposes that it is not a final stage, rather it is constantly being transformed. Globalization had a historical formation, has a current stage and probably will be transformed into another stage in the future.

*Second*, globalization process has sub-processes in the fields of economy, politics, society and culture and identity. When we think about globalization as a process, in fact we do not think about a single process, rather we consider its sub-processes. Despite the fact that each sub-process is dominated by the goals of one party among many others competing in current literature, each sub-process is a sub field of globalization for representation of each competing party. I will call this literal domination on one sub-process as the *ideological direction* within globalization process.

*Third*, globalization implies a rising consciousness of people about the world as a whole, which could be called as ‘*global consciousness*’. Global consciousness is the result of two main developments, which are rapid communication facilities and global externalities of development. Rapid communication began to facilitate the rapid transmission of information all over the world, and shared information began to flourish. The rise of global information networks and rapid flow of information began to erode the importance of location and physical distance. Developments in information technologies began to radically change the conventional way of social and economic life. For example, education and business possibilities on the internet are on the way of dominating education

and business kind for people. Also, information transmission lines across the national borders makes classically supposed immune physical borders of nation state and of national society problematic. Depending on the rapid flow of information, people began to be interested more in global problems, such as environmental pollution and nuclear threat that are related to the future of the human kind and the earth as a whole. The consciousness about the global problems results in the emergence of a new kind of civil society that is global civil society.

**Distinction :** With regard to the distinction of globalization process from the processes of enlightenment and modernity, globalization, historically, seems to be the continuation of enlightenment and modernity processes. Enlightenment philosophy and modernity paradigm were pre-occupied with the realization of human potential, possibly in the form of a uniform point of view and behavior. This realization of human potential would be realized through the dissemination of enlightenment ideals and modernization tools. The ideal was the full rationalization of human mind, that is free from all bonds, and the tool was the domination of human being over the physical environment, which resulted in material development. In this sense globalization process constitutes an important stage in reaching the ideal of enlightenment. Every parts of the world and every individual are interconnected and they think and behave in similar ways in rationalization and domination. However, this simple construction of historical continuation between modernity and globalization should not direct us to think in the way of disregarding their fundamental differences. In fact, domination of advanced capitalism and liberal ideology all over the world, which is one side of globalization process could be described better as the continuation of modernity in philosophical sense.

In this regard, we have to distinguish between historical continuation and philosophical continuation. I argue that globalization is the historical continuation of modernity process, while in philosophical sense, globalization as a whole is not the full continuation of modernity. Rather, just one side that is liberal ideology and impositions of advanced capitalism constitutes the philosophical continuation of modernity. In the definition I referred to the fact that globalization is an historical process, in which there emerge many kinds of contradictory sub-processors. So, we cannot think that globalization has a well defined ideal as similar as the modernity and enlightenment have. In

philosophical sense, while modernity and enlightenment have a *singular* and uniform face, globalization has a *plural* characteristics. In globalization process, there is a competition between the ideological direction and plural demands and enforcement. Ideological direction, that is the literal domination of liberalism and advanced capitalism, forces the globalization process to have a singular characteristics. But, the resistance and critics of the opponents of this ideological direction challenge the voice of singularization. In contrast to the singularization attempts of ideological direction, pluralization attempts criticize one-sided point of view of ideological direction and try to create a different kind of consciousness, mainly in the field of humanitarian and environmental concerns. So historically, while singularization process of modernity have new tools of enforcing its philosophy in globalization process, this attempt is being challenged by pluralization. Singular/plural axis constitutes an important difference between modernity and globalization processes. This axis could be shown in the field of science, philosophy, politics, material development and culture.

Despite the arguments of modernists that globalization is facilitating in reaching the enlightenment ideal, I will argue the reverse. Modernity had a singular rationality, but within globalization, this singular rationality began to be confronted with pluralization of rationality. In other words, enlightenment rationality is being challenged by diffusion as a result of pluralization of rationality. The changing nature of modern rationality could be seen in critics of the opponents of ideological direction. Critics to modern rationality come from individual, local and global levels. The universal claims of modernity about the rationality began to lose its monopoly position in its definition. The emergence of local identity and culture, the demands of individuals in attaining more autonomy in their private preferences and the survival handicaps of global problems for the future of human kind and earth resulted in the rise of alternative definition of human rationality. Pluralization and diffusion of modern rationality takes us to another significant difference between the two historical processes that is universalism versus historicism.

Within globalization process, universal claims of modernity which are related to human nature and historical development is being challenged and historicism began to illegitimate the universality claims of modernity. In modernity paradigm, location and communal authenticity had been seen as the obstacles in realization of human potential. So

all attempts of modernity had been directed to abolish physical and authentic social differences that is tradition through which a universal state of society could be achieved. Modern progress in technology facilitated to remove the importance of location and physical environment and tradition in globalization process to a certain extent, but the result are not seen as happy as the modernity promised. The abolition of tradition resulted in identity crisis and domination over the nature created survival related problems, which could be easily observed through the merits of rising information technologies. This awareness has began to dismantle the universality ideal of modernity. People began to be more aware of the fact that they are experiencing an historical process, in which any universality claim should be suspiciously approached. As a result in globalization process, we began to witness the rising appeal to tradition, local identity and historical rationality. Because of this reason, we could historically attribute globalization process as the continuation of modernity, but in philosophical sense globalization could not be attributed as the continuation of modernity. Globalization is an historical process in which there emerge different philosophical preferences, whereas modernity has well-defined philosophical priorities, which are dismantled in globalization process.

**Sub-Processes** : In the definition, I have referred to *the sub-processes of globalization process*, but I have to clarify what are those sub-processes and their ideological priorities. Within the globalization process, we witness four kinds of sub-processes, which operate in level of economy, inter-governmentalism, society, and culture and identity. *First*, economic globalization could be observed in the fields of creation of a market civilization through liberalization in trade and finance and homogenization of investment regulations. The priorities of advanced capitalism and the ideals of neo-liberalism carry forward economic globalization. The world is becoming a single market, as it had been idealized by Adam Smith. Economic policies in trade, finance, investment and taxation are approximated among the countries, except free flow of manpower. Advanced capitalism began to change its policies in the way that heavy industries are being dislocated from the developed countries and transferred to the developing part of the world, while information or technology-intensified industries began to emerge as the primary sectors of the economy in developed countries. The rhetoric of globalization, consciously by its proponents and unconsciously by the people in general, has been accustomed to be understood as in the globalizing developments in the field of economy. In fact, this is what I

have describe as ideological direction of neo-liberalism. In this sense, there is a literal hegemony of economic perspective in the presentation of globalization process. The collapse of the Soviet Union as an alternative for the periphery of world system has led to the dominance of liberal ideology. Liberal policies and capitalist mode of production has been presented as the only alternative way of economic development. And this imposition has been largely accepted by all countries. In spite of neo-liberal domination in theory and practice, as I have argued in the part ‘‘liberal economy and globalization’’, globalization process is conducive to new kind of ideological divisions, around the discussions of south-north debate.

*Second* sub-process is inter-governmentalism, which have two faces. *One* is the attempt of inter-governmental organization in line with the impositions of neo-liberal outlook. Barriers to trade is discussed, defined or removed through negotiations within the framework of World Trade Organization. IMF and World Bank impose a certain kind of economic policies all over the developing countries. Moreover, inter-governmental organizations in the field of trade, standardization, customs, investments, health and labor try to homogenize the applications of each member state. All these economic-based inter-governmental organizations attempt to achieve the goal that states will not be obstacles to the working of advanced capitalism. In the negotiations within the platforms of economic-based inter-governmental organizations, we witness that there is a wide difference between the expectations of the developing countries and the impositions of the advanced capitalism. While the proponents of economic globalization demands homogenization of economic regulations and free flow of factors of productions and commodities, they are blind and deaf with respect to the free flow of manpower that is one of the fundamental component of factors of production in liberal economic theory.

*The other* face of inter-governmentalism is shown mainly within the United Nations framework, which is relevant to the humanitarian aspects of globalization that is democratization and human rights. But, we witness that humanitarian inter-governmental impositions are not so powerful as it has been in the results of economic-based inter-governmental organizations. It is a fact that there have been many humanitarian interventions under the umbrella of the United Nations in different parts of the world following the end of the Cold War, but all these humanitarian interventions could not have

escaped from being understood as that they are arbitrary decisions of the powerful states for their own national interests. This image of double standard in the actions of the United Nations damages the expectations of people from humanitarian inter-governmental initiatives. But in any way, inter-governmental initiatives both in the fields of economy and humanitarianism constitutes an important sub-process of globalization, despite the fact that there are deep suspicions and uncompromising expectations of the related parties.

*Third*, the emergence of global civil society constitutes another significant sub-process that could be called as globalization of civil society. In globalization of civil society we witness that there are two main factors, one is the rise of rapid communication facilities, and the other is the emergence of global problems, which are related directly to the survival of humanity and earth. Nuclear threats, environmental pollution that damages the earth's ecology and the failure of states in confronting those survival problems resulted in an awareness of the people for the future of human kind and earth as a whole. Whereas the concerns of global civil society change from global problems to terrorism or to human rights and democratization, its primary and original concerns are those of global problems. However, as the process of globalization develops, in addition to the global problems that are related to the survival of the earth, democratization, human rights, terrorism, illegal drugs trade, unjust distribution of the benefits of economic development, arm trade and the position of children and women began to be the principal concerns of global society as well. Rapid communication facilities on the internet had made easy the distribution and sharing of the information related to those concerns. The interests of global civil society are not defined within the limitations of a certain state or society, rather defined within the framework of global consciousness. In other words, ozone depletion, chemical and biological pollution of the environment, nuclear threat and poverty are seen the common problems of the humanity. Disregarding one of these issues is expected to cost all human kind and earth. The concerns of global civil society are partly incorporated within the discussions of inter-governmental and global economic order, but they are not totally covered. The sub-process of demands and expectation of the global civil society constitutes a significant source of imposition on the working of advanced capitalism and on the debate of inter-governmentalism. The rise of global civil society implies a civil revolution all over the world, in the sense that it began to become a global bloc against advanced capitalism.

*Fourth* significant sub-process within globalization is the localization of culture. Conventionally, the development of capitalism and globalization of liberal ideology are expected to result in the emergence of a uniform culture worldwide. But, in globalization process, material aspect of culture that is civilization has been homogenized, but non-material aspect of culture, on the contrary, has been heterogenized. Consumption based identity conception of advanced capitalism and pure autonomy of individual identity conception of liberalism seem inadequate to satisfy the moral aspect of individual identity, because of this, individuals in globalization process adopted an adventure in search of alternative conceptions of identity and culture. The alternative conceptions of identity and culture are easily found in primordial tradition. The re-assertion of authentic cultures and revitalization of tradition as a source of identity conception for individuals within the globalization process show that the dominance of liberal conception of identity is not the sole alternative for the definition of culture and identity. The primary function of the emergence of local identity and culture seems to satisfy the moral expectation of the individuals, that is belonging to a certain community that have a distinctive culture, which resulted in a specific characters of identity. This trend of localization of culture is severely impinging the universality appeals of enlightenment and liberalism.

Thus, while globalization is presented as a certain kind of conception by the dominant literature of advanced capitalism and neo-liberalism, globalization is a large process that embodies mainly four kinds of sub-processes in the fields of economy, politics, society and culture and identity. Though each sub-process is dominated by the ideological priorities of a specific party, in fact, each sub-process is an area of conflict and competition among the competing parties. For example, although economic globalization is dominated by the actors of advanced capitalism, inter-governmentalism is dominated by the states, civil process is dominated by global civil society and identity and culture process is dominated by the locality; we have to perceive that there are two kinds of relations among the parties within those processes. *First* is that there occur different kinds of competition and cooperation among the sub-processes, because each sub-process is dominated by a certain kind of interests. Such as there is a competition between inter-governmentalism and economic globalization on certain issues as well as their cooperation on other issues. For example, parties of economic globalization that are advanced capitalist actors and of inter-governmentalism that are states compete on the issue of full liberalization of economic

activities on the one hand, they cooperate in measures to confront the expectations of global civil society on the other hand. Or, there is a competition between inter-governmentalism and culture/identity on the issue of territorial integrity on the one hand, they cooperate in confronting the impositions of advanced capitalism for the applications of liberal economic policies on the other hand. Or, there is a cooperation between global civil society and culture/identity on the issue of limiting the power of the state on the one hand, they compete on the definition of local and universal identities on the other hand. Or, there is a cooperation between global civil society and advanced capitalism in limiting the power of the state on the one hand, they compete in the ways of solving the emerging global problems on the other hand.

*Ssecond* kind of relations among the parties within the framework of sub-processes of globalization is that each sub-process is a specific area of cooperation or competition. Each sub-process represents the contradictory priorities of the actors in globalization process. For example, globalization process in the fields of economy reflects the priorities of economic actors worldwide, those of multinational corporation, or the agents of advanced capitalism on the one hand, it reflects the priorities of underdeveloped parts of the world in just distribution of world wealth on the other hand. Or globalization attempts in the fields of politics and society reflects the expectations of civil society worldwide for reaching a single world political structure on the one hand, it reflects the priorities of underdeveloped part for their true representation in this global context on the other. For example, when we think about economic globalization, the priorities of advanced capitalism dominates the literature, nonetheless the expectations for development of the underdeveloped regions have also something to propose. When we think that globalization is an historical framework, each proponent or opponent of sub-processes tries to represents themselves within this context as much as they could do. In other words, the goals and expectations of sub-processes are not uniform, rather sub-processes represents sub-fields of competition or cooperation.

**Nation State in the Globalization Process :** In order to determine *the situation of nation state* within globalization we have to clarify its relations to the sub-processes. The state is the main actor in inter-governmentalism. Inter-governmentalist initiatives operate at two major levels. *First*, by the nature of thing, inter-governmentalist initiatives at first instance aim at the interest of nation state, that is, the preservation of the state as a

determinant political structure on the global agenda. Commitments and responsibilities are taken within the framework of inter-governmental organizations on the name of the state, in the sense that they will principally implement the results of inter-governmentalist initiatives or those results will be implemented on the name of the states by the agents of inter-governmental organizations. The important thing is that all decisions and their implementations are operated on the name of the states. *This first level could be called as state-centered level.*

*Second*, all issues discussed in the state-centered level in fact are related to the expectations of other three sub-processes. Because of this, second level could be called as *state-response level*. All inter-governmental organizations or initiatives are related to the expectations of one or more of the other three sub-processes. Inter-governmental economic organizations, like IMF, World Bank and WTO are the platforms in which the responses of states *principally* to the expectations of advanced capitalism are shaped. I say ‘‘principally’’ because, in inter-governmental economic organizations, the expectations of advanced capitalism are not the sole processor. Rather, while states are preparing their response to the expectation of advanced capitalism, they also take into consideration the expectations of the global civil society as well. Inter-governmental political organizations like the United Nations are represented as platforms in which the expectations of global civil society are principally discussed. However, in the UN platform, the expectations of culture/identity and advanced capitalism are taken into consideration as well. Some other inter-governmental organizations on the issues of environmental protection, limitation of nuclear arms or disarmament are constituted principally in order to response to the expectations of global civil society. Or, some other inter-governmental initiatives on human rights or related issues are the principal platforms in which the responses of the state to the demands of culture/identity are shaped.

In all these inter-governmental initiatives the levels of state-centered and state-response work together. While the sub-processes of economic globalization, global civil society and culture/identity raise certain demands and expectations, the states put some of those demands on the agenda of their inter-governmental organization in order to contain those demands through which the survival of state structure could be provided. Containment policy of inter-governmental initiatives, on the other hand, legitimizes those expectations

and the states undertake certain obligations. The only exception in the issues of global inter-governmental initiatives is *the sovereignty* of nation state. But even this issue is included in the agenda of certain regional integration, like European Communities. How the power and fields of activity of the state is limited through inter-governmental initiatives is not important for the states, as long as this limitation is provided through a delegation system. Delegation means that some parts of sovereign authority of the state could be fulfilled by inter-governmental organization, but this is done by the consent of the state from which any time it could retreat. So, inter-governmental initiatives may display that there is a certain kind of erosion in state sovereignty, but this is not a significant one. In other words, official erosion could be corrected in any time by the unilateral action of the state. The containment policy of inter-governmentalism does not cover all expectations or demands of the other three sub-processes. These non-covered demands by inter-governmentalism operate autonomously. In the sense that some components of the formation and working of global civil society, or of advanced capitalism or of local culture/identity operate outside the inter-governmentalist containment. For example, rapid flow of information and difficulty of its control by the states, or rapid flow of finance that its outflow could really damage the welfare of a society and legitimacy of the state, or accommodation of the members and organization of certain segregatory movements based on local cultural demands by other states could actually erode the sovereignty of the state. So while inter-governmental initiatives try to contain the demands of the sub-processes so that the sovereignty of the state is preserved, autonomous operations of the sub-processes are actually damaging the sovereignty claim of the state.

Thus, within the globalization process, the state has a central position in the sense that all parties of the sub-processes impose certain demands some of which are considered by the states through inter-governmental initiatives, while some demands and expectations of the sub-processes operates autonomously through which they aim actually to erode the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state.

**Disciplinary Challenges :** After having examined the definition, distinction and sub-processes of globalization and the situation of nation state within this process, we have to review the dynamics of disciplinary transformation in the fields of sociology, political science and IR. The arguments of Robertson in proposing a global sociology due to the fact

that classical sociology and political science are theoretically inadequate to cope with the global context, and the arguments of Maclean in proposing that IR discipline and classical political science have become outmoded in globalization process show the main deficiencies in those three classical disciplines and their division of labor. In order to understand the imposition of globalization it is very important to point that globalization process has created significant results particularly for classical formulations of society, politics and state. The changing nature of society, politics and state is the main dynamics behind disciplinary transformation. As we have analyzed before, the emergence of a consciousness of a global society and the eroding effects of the autonomous sub-processes on the sovereignty of the state are the main results of globalization on society, politics and state that are fundamental units of analysis of the classical disciplines of sociology, political science and IR. Globalization is distinctive from the classical formulations of society, politics and state. So I will try to examine under *three* headings the disciplinary transformations, those are sociology-society, politics-political science and state-IR. The transformations in three main areas of society, politics and state have begun to create limitations for three disciplines of sociology, political science and IR. In fact, transformative effects of globalization in those three kinds of relations are not autonomous from each other, rather they are inter-related.

*First*, with regard to society, classical sociology was accustomed to analyze the national society whose boundaries were delimited from outside. Classical sociology was aiming to find out universal laws, which rules the working of a society. Those laws are expected to be applicable to all national societies. When nationalism was at its peak and the ideal of nation state was the main goal of all societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was very common for the discipline of sociology to focus on national societies. The boundaries of each society were differentiated from the outside through the physical borders of the state. In classical formulation of sociology, the consciousness was national. However, globalization process created a consciousness of a global society as a result of emerging global problems, so the discipline of sociology should refine itself to cope with the requirements of new kind of society. Moreover, the economies of the world are integrating, which is a constitutive part of a society. Economic relations are significant for analyzing a society as well. But, it is very interesting that in globalization process the motors of global society, namely global problems and economic integration, are mostly

examined still under the discipline of international political economy. This is an important contradiction. If a global society is emerging with certain kinds of impositions, then sociology should extend its unit of analysis to cover the *global side*. Global side refers to the emerging nature of global social relations. The organization of people on global scale for a certain goal or the effects of economic interdependence on global social relations or the emergence of global problems that have implications for the future of humanity as a whole should be analyzed within the discipline of sociology to a certain extent.

*Second*, like the classical discipline of sociology, classical political science focused on the power relations within a specific society whose boundaries are delimited from outside. Constitutionalism, political parties, fundamental human rights and freedom, democratization and political systems were the main subject matter of classical political science, all of which are examined in link with a national society. So the unit of analysis of classical political science was the power relations within a national society. However, as a result of the emergence of some characteristics of a global face of social relations and their significant effects on national politics and society, the unit of analysis of political science should be redefined as well in line with new requirements of global political relations. For global social relations have possible results for both national politics and contributive effects in the formation of a global politics. The impositions of global social and economic relations are fundamentally affecting the structure of national political system. Also, those global social and economic patterns of relations are on the way of creating its own global political structure. Conventionally, politics outside the physical borders of a society was appreciated as among the sovereign states. However, in globalization process we witness that nation state is just one of the parties of global political interactions, which are represented through inter-governmental organizations. Global economic agents and global civil formations from the outside and identity-cultural impositions from the inside are restraining the political area of states. This restraining is the result of actual inability of the state in confronting the global agenda. The inability of the state reflects the inability of the classical political science to cope with conceptualization of the emerging global political structure. Thus, the unit of analysis of political science should be refined to include other global actors and be extended to cover political relations outside the national borders.

*Third*, the discipline of IR, which was divorced from political science particularly after the First World War focused especially on the political relations among the states. Schools of idealism, realism and rationalism, an later behavioralism and neo-realism or some other schools especially on political economy tried to define the unit of analysis of the discipline as all kinds of relations among the states. Maclean's critics of IR discipline, stated as its inability to conceptualize the emerging global structure, seems to be right to a great extent. Because, by definition, IR theories assumed that the subject matter of the discipline is the relations among the sovereign entities whose borders are clearly demarcated. In this assumption there is a wide bias of internal-external distinction, inclusion-exclusion of subjects and to a certain extent a gradation of issues. And also, there was a strong assumption that the states are the sole decisive actors in IR. But in globalization process, all of these assumptions of IR theory become nonsense, in the meaning that for physical borders and capability of the state are eroded, the state began to be just one of many actors in global relations, conventional distinctions and gradation of issues become useless to conceptualize global relations. Similar to the political science as the strength of the state decreases, the disciplinary crisis of IR increases.

In fact, the disciplinary crisis in these three disciplines are not restricted to their specific area, rather the crisis is the result of a general crisis of social science as a whole. Within the modernization process and as a result of positivist understanding of science, we witnessed that there emerged a detailed division of labor among social disciplines, for the aim of this thesis, particularly among sociology, political science and IR. But this division of labor was contradictory with the goals of modernity and enlightenment. In the sense that, enlightenment project had aimed to reach a universal rationality of human being, which embodies the homogenization and unification of humanity around a single structure of society and politics. However, along with that, positivist social science searched for the iron laws of society and politics, those disciplines remained to a great extent at the level of making comparisons and contrasts among different types of societies and politics. Those iron laws remained restricted to the assumption of specific society whose physical and non-physical borders are strictly determined.

Thus, the extension of actual social, political and economic relations within the globalization process beyond the assumed boundaries by social science has created

fundamental disciplinary problems for each component of social science. The problem is very fundamental and great which requires a disciplinary revolution in social science as a whole. In this respect the proposition of Robertson about a global sociology is a serious attempt to overcome this great disciplinary crisis. This proposal could help other disciplines to review and refine their subject matter and unit of analysis. For sociology was the framework discipline of examining a society at the birth of modern social sciences, whose results are used by political science and IR disciplines. In this regard, if we take the proposal of a global sociology seriously, then the division of labor between political science and IR becomes nonsense. Globalization imposes the characteristics of a global society, economy and politics. Thus, sociology has a primary role in disciplinary revolution of social science in general. If global society will be examined by global sociology, then global power relations should be examined by global political science. I do not argue that classical sociology or classical disciplines of political science and IR should be replaced by global sociology and global political science, rather I propose that along with the classical disciplines and their units of analysis we have to have new inter-disciplinary approaches in order to conceptualize the emerging global structure. Because, in the definition of globalization I stressed on the point that it is a process. So this process includes patterns of relations both in the meaning of classical social science that could be analyzed with existing methods of social science and of new kinds of global relations that should be analyzed with methods different from those of classical social science.

In conclusion, globalization, even though it is simply conceptualized by its adherents and opponents to support or criticize the current occurrences, seems to be a complex issue. To clarify this complexity I have attempted to propose a new approach to globalization. Main components of this new proposal are definition, distinction, delimitation of sub-processes, position of nation state and disciplinary challenges. *First*, with regard to the definition, I have stated that globalization refers to a specific historical stage of human development that is supported and directed by contradictory enforcements of sub-processes in the fields of economy, politics, society and culture and identity, which results in the rising awareness of the world as a whole. This definition upholds that globalization is an historical process, it has sub-processes, and it implies a global consciousness.

*Second*, globalization, even though it is a continuation of modernity and enlightenment in historical sense, constitutes a distinctive phase of human development in philosophical sense. Philosophical distinction lies in the idea that while modernization and enlightenment have had a homogenization, globalization has a heterogenization force in rationality and ideological direction. The distinction between the two phenomena could be situated further by differentiating that modernization had a philosophy and ideology of progress so it represented a one way looking, but globalization, although it could be dominated literally by liberal ideology, represents a context in which there emerge different kinds of philosophies and ideals with regard to the world as a whole.

*Third*, those different philosophies and ideals are represented through their dominance over one segment of the sub-processes of globalization. Economy, inter-governmentalism, society, and culture and identity could be classified as the main sub-processes in which one or another global actor dominates more than the others. The collaboration or competition taking place within one or more sub-processes among the global actors is exercised for the aim of realization of their priorities. Intra-process interactions and inter-process interactions are not independent of each other, rather interrelated.

*Fourth*, nation state is one of global actors that operates within the process of inter-governmentalism in which it responds to the demands of other actors. Nation states through inter-governmentalist initiatives try to contain the enforcements of other sub-processes.

*Fifth*, with regard to disciplinary challenges by referring to the arguments of Robertson for sociology and Maclean for IR, I have tried to explore the limits of three main social disciplines in respect to their unit of analysis. In this sense, I have stated that the relation between society-sociology, between politics-political science and between state-IR began to be problematic as a result of new directions of globalization. The problemacy in the main disciplines creates a general crisis in social sciences.

Therefore, in order to understand and conceptualize globalization, we have to recognize that it is an historical process, it has distinctive characteristics, it has sub-

processes, it embodies the proliferation of actors among which the state is just one of them, and we have to have new disciplinary tools to make a theory about this process.

Thus, after having constructed an approach to globalization, in the next chapter I will try to discuss the theory of state in political science and international relations discipline in order to situate theoretically the state within the process of globalization. By doing this we could have better conceptual tools *first* to relate the state to the emerging global and local actors, *second* to determine the changes in distinctive characteristics of the modern state and *third* to study the sources of possible shifts in the classical conception of political legitimacy.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **NATION STATE AND GLOBALIZATION :**

#### **Theoretical Reconsideration**

As I have analyzed in the previous chapters, globalization represents an historical process in which global actors interact and nation state is one of those actors, in this chapter I will try to examine political theory, namely liberal and democratic, and international relations (IR) theory in order to determine theoretical impositions of globalization on the nature of nation state.

The notion of society as usually used in sociological argument reflects historically distinctive circumstances, associated with the advent of modernity. The great majority of the significant social, economic and cultural processes goes on within territorially bounded units, each hosting a population which tends to define itself as a nation, and each politically managed by a political apparatus, the state. Activities crossing the boundaries between states are relatively insignificant, largely constituting a spillover from those carried out within states, and are relatively easily handled politically via the interactions of states. What extent this paradigm is useful, in practice, to confront the emerging issues and to what extent explanatory, in theory, to understand the emerging structure of politics, economics and culture is a basic question today in social science.

At the center of new discussions the political structure, that is state, occupies an important locus. State is at a point in which global, local and individual demands intersect. The margins of global and local identity and culture constrict the area of national identity. Functions of local, individual and global agencies decrease the high-quality of the state legitimacy. However, in popular debate, it is sometimes assumed that this global, local and individual enforcement is just for the states of the third world or Southern countries. This is an illusion. There are today, as there have often been, some states in liberal democratic

societies in which legitimacy seems to have broken down. However, it would be a serious mistake to consider this a problem only of zones that are peripheral regions of the world-system. One can see a pattern of growing illegitimation of the states in the wealthy zones of the world-system as well. This can be seen in such diverse phenomena as the decline of voting participation, the increase in tax evasion, and the privatization of security systems, not to speak of the rise of groups who contest state legitimacy on general grounds, and not merely because of specific political discontents.

So in the following sections, giving little references to the popular ideas of decreasing state structure in the peripheries of the world system, the position of nation state in liberal and democratic theories and international relations discipline will be debated. Theory in any sense, whether liberal, democratic or international, will be reconsidered. For all theories have presumptions that could drastically change as a result of the global context.

### **3.1. Theory of State in Political Liberalism**

Liberal theory in general and political liberalism in particular has been one of the most important ways of thinking after the beginning of Enlightenment in Europe. Liberal view with regard to individual, society, economy and politics had great impact on the evolution of nation state and modern societies. Here, for the aim of the thesis I will try to give a brief summary of political liberalism in order to understand its relation with nation state within a globalized world. This is very significant in the sense that liberal values in the fields of economy and politics has been gaining a dominant position in the rhetoric of globalization.

The liberal view assigns a high value of human potential to the individual and aims to provide the full prospect of human dignity, self-determination, self-development and autonomy. Lund (Lund:1996:480) envisages that the visions of liberal order could be described under three versions. *First* is the "vulgar" or the Hobbesian version that sees the relations between citizens in terms of conflict of interest who share only a common interest, that of security and prevention of violence. *Second* version of liberal order is the "political" liberalism like that of Rawls that treats liberalism as "neutral" towards diverse and competing claims of the good and stresses equality. *Third* is the "ideal-based" liberalism

like that of Dworkin that argues that liberalism has its own theory of the good life. Depending on these three versions I will try to analyze main arguments of the founding fathers of liberalism in order to create a link between the current position of liberal democratic states and globalization with respect to the issue of political legitimacy.

With regard to modern conception of the state, the most important and influential theory, historically had been advanced by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes (Hobbes:1991), writing at the time of the English Civil War, in the absence of state power, believed, people would lapse into a situation of endemic violent conflict, which would afford no-one even basic security of the person. So appalling was this prospect, that any state power, provided it could maintain peace was justified and should be obeyed. Why does Hobbes believe that without a state people would be in such a miserable condition? To understand this we need to take a look at his account of the nature of human beings and human agency. He was concerned to deny three of Aristotle's central doctrines about human beings. First, he denied Aristotle's belief that there was a particular good way of living and a state of being - *eudaemonia* - achievable by that way of living. Second, he rejected Aristotle's belief in the naturalness and permanence of human inequality. Third, he rejected the idea that people are by nature social animals in favor of a conception that sees people are being basically dissociated; an atomistic view of society.

Hobbes believes that in a stateless society human beings would not be the human beings we know. So an order imposed by political authority is necessary for us to have other humanitarian values of life, equality, justice, law, rights and freedom. In other words, we relinquish just our freedom to a certain extent in favor of the state in order to have other values. In this view the state has a monopoly in using physical enforcement within its borders. Another classical thinker, who cannot be attributed as liberal but republican, Rousseau, argues that political structure, that is state, results from the notion of social contract. Assuming that there is no political authority and the members of a society are in a state of war, human being has a rationality of his interests. This civil war is not eternal, rather, the members of the fighting parties in a certain stage notice that the war is not for their benefit. The parties come together and agree on the rules of the game of politics. This agreement is social contract, according to which the rights and freedom of the individuals are defined and violation of this social contract is punished. The social contract theory is the

basis of modern constitutionalism of liberal democracies. In fact, this argumentation of Hobbes entails not a social contract in the sense of later liberal theorists, rather it necessitates the compulsory transfer of political autonomy of individuals to the ruler. The contract in Hobbes is very implicit, which is regarded as the acceptance of a sovereign ruler by subjects for their higher benefits.

Essentially, political liberalism has two ultimate values, which are equality before law and individuality. Whereas the former is questioned by many thinkers on the ground that liberal principle of equality is not very clear how it could be provided within the democratic societies, the latter is certainly the unique characteristics of liberalism in the sense of freedom. On the other hand, liberals have a strong discourse of value neutrality, which rejects any *a priori* political good, and instead rises a claim of equality that means the possession of rights regardless of the performance of any given good.

John Locke, who could be seen as the founding father of social contract theory, established the basis of the political and ethical life on the concept of natural rights that are prior to the political life. He was the proponent of constitutional government whose *raison d'être* is to protect individuals' rights that are namely rights of life, liberty and property, "as laid down by God's will and as enshrined in law." (Held:1996:79). In the state of nature humans are absolutely free in their thinking and acting, and their freedom are shaped by their rationality. Locke says, "being all equal and independent, no one might do harm to another in his life, health, liberty or possessions." His stress, unlike Hobbes, is on society not on the state. The government can be legitimate as long as it obtains the consent of the individuals that means the majority of the people's representatives. It is through the notion of consent that natural rights and the theory of the social contract are connected (Bobbio:1990:6-8).

Locke questions the Aristotelian idea of virtue as the basis of moral behavior. Virtue for him as well as other early liberal thinkers is "an instrumental good" for the end of nonmoral goods that the liberal politics try to attain. For Locke some of the liberal virtues are "self-denial, civility, justice, courage, humanity, industry, and truthfulness." (Galston:1986:130-1). All these virtues guarantee the self-preservation of the individual. According to Locke, political activity is instrumental, and not substantial because it secures

the condition of freedom so that other human activities can be carried out. The fundamental aim of his theoretical reconstruction of the original state of man is to assert that the state power must be restricted (Held:1996:79-82, Bobbio:1990:6). The law is presumed to preserve individuals' liberty essentially by coercing other people. It helps individuals to draw around themselves a circle within which the others may not violate their freedom.

By conceptualizing natural rights and civil society as synonymous with legal authority, Locke in fact legitimizes the state in the sense of power politics. His concept of rights-based state follows the medieval saying *lex facit regem* (the law makes the king) (Bobbio:1990:12), but the limits on the power of the state seemed to be left to the initiative of the state itself. Moreover, his conceptualization of the right to vote in elections is confined only to the propertied-classes. The non-propertied, on the other hand, does not have any voice in making the laws, but conversely "were to fully bound by the laws" (Macpherson:1980:xix). In this sense property constitutes the basis of the Lockean liberal moral and political order. Locke (Locke:1964:66) says: "the great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into common-wealth, and putting themselves under government, *is the preservation of their property.*" Property based formation of political order is the source of critics against liberalism on ground that it contradicts with the conception of equality. Property creates a fundamental inequality among citizens, which results in other inequalities in the realization of human virtues and potentials.

The notion of inequality as justified in God's bestowing reflects in Locke's description of reason in relation to the state of nature. The men in the state of nature possess reason and thus become equal moral persons. However, only those having property come to possess the reason after the introduction of money and thus property (Macpherson:1980:xix). Rationality becomes a calculative reason. Rationality loses its traditional moral character of the state of nature as a result of the introduction of the constitutive element of the liberal polity: inequality. Locke defends this tendency for moral justification of inequality in the formation of civil government that is under the ultimate control of the propertied class (Macpherson:1980:xx). This defense creates a basic contradiction in liberal theory of society and politics in the sense that humanitarian notion of reason of the state of nature is used to justify an anti-humanitarian political order of the

propertied. Toleration for Locke means that the state must be neutral towards the religious differences. He opposes any rational justification of beliefs and religions.

Barkçin (Barkçin:2001:61) argues that Locke differs from Hobbes who underlines the necessity of political legitimacy to be rooted in a certain high principle involving the intervention of the human reason and the consequent social contract. Locke places the individual as the main actor in the whole process of creation of government. Locke turned around the natural law approach and replaced the basis of the natural political law from divine laws to the laws of the human beings. Consequently, his formulation of rights, liberty, choice and individual endowments work towards replacing the religious notion of *raison d'état* of the political with the rationality of man who is essentially determined by his autonomy. The new man, in other words, can decide for his own good and is responsible for the actions he performs. This was a critical transformation in the post-Reformation political thought, which was followed by Kant who aimed to reconcile the rights approach with an ethics.

Locke situated the liberal self as prior to the state. The chain of justification of the liberal political ontology starts from the individual to the state. So, he constructs "the political" as a necessary evil out of which the individual autonomy must be preserved against the perils of the collective life. In other words, "the ethical" is highlighted as an autonomous sphere of the atomized individual, which in return shapes the liberal state as something like a neutral referee. Because of the extreme identification of the individual with separateness and isolation, and the identification of the political life with the government, the political becomes the domain of the government that is assumed to represent the atomized individuals who naturally possess some rights that stand as the wall between them. In this formulation the political is taken as a technical issue whose functions are minimized just to provide the common goods of order and security. In other words, social and ideological character of the state is removed through which the individual autonomy is secured. However, such a formulation of the state is very questionable how it could preserve its neutral and non-ideological status. For the politics represents the common interest of the propertied.

Immanuel Kant is another important thinker who provided much of the philosophical foundations of the political liberalism. Deontological liberalism of Kant advocated the notions of justice, fairness, individual rights and conceived "the priority of the right over the good". According to Michael Sandel (Sandel:1982:1), this type of liberalism supposes that justice must be the primary moral basis because of the plurality of the different conceptions of the good in the society. This necessity of justice relies on the concept of right, "a moral category given prior to the good and independent of it." The motive behind this primacy is that both morality and law perform the social function of overcoming certain basic difficulties of human life in society. Kant has been deeply influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who believed in the power of the masses and represented the democratic tradition, and by John Locke who believed in the power of individuals for governance and represented the liberal tradition. Kant's adoption of *volonté général* from Rousseau is very clear. However he thinks that the general will as the political self-legislation cannot be manifested without representation. He considers representation as moral because it relies on laws that are founded over the moral consent of the people (Barkçin:2001:64).

Kant (Reiss:1985:10-1), in contrast to Rousseau, upholds legality so strongly that he claims that there existed legality even in state of nature, in contrast to Hobbes. Kant, who is primarily an Enlightenment philosopher, thinks that citizenship is relevant even in the state of nature. He is a firm believer in natural law. His greatest effect in political thought was the introduction of the idea of *Rechtstaat*, the state governed according to the rule of law, which represents the legality face of political legitimation. On the one hand Kant has contributed to the liberal tradition by introducing the concept of rule of law, he represents the cosmopolitan tradition on the other hand. Kant's cosmopolitanism tries to overcome the dilemma of Locke's liberalism on the point of inequality. Kant's universal reference to the human dignity and potentials without binding them to a specific state of thing such as property is a serious attempt to resolve the inequality problem of Locke's liberalism.

In liberal tradition, utilitarianism constitutes a dynamic theory of political morality first conceptualized by Jeremy Bentham who argued for an empirical calculation of any political rule that would be judged whether it contributed to a diminishing or increasing in the sum total of human happiness. This simple definition was elaborated by John Stuart Mill

who differentiated between the levels and contents of happiness or pleasure. Utilitarianism provides "one of the clearest justifications for the liberal democratic state." (Held:1996:95). It is also an attempt against paternalism stating that "each individual is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, *or* mental and spiritual."(Bobbio:1990:61). Its basic claim is that the morally proper act or policy is the one that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of members of the society (Kymlicka:1990:9). Utilitarianism presumes that "principles of justice like all other moral principles take their character and color from the end of happiness." (Sandel:1982:4).

From a utilitarian point of view, Mill argues that the state could restrict the freedom of individuals only in cases where they would harm others, i.e. the principle of *neminem laedere* (Bobbio:1987:101). In this account, a harmful action may be prevented by the government but cannot be abolished altogether. It is up to the individuals to decide whether such an action would decrease their own utility. The limit for the state action, then, is when there is a threat to the others. Utilitarians have a negative concept of liberty, and therefore they believe that individuals will be free as long as they are not constrained by laws and regulations. Mill argues that the best polity is the representative democracy that could provide a counter-balance to a possible autonomous bureaucracy. In utilitarian tradition of liberalism, there is a highlight of representation on the ground that the happiness of a society could be understood by individual calculation of happiness. But this individual calculation could reflect in the happiness of whole society through representative participation of all individuals in the formation of political life.

One of the principal elements for liberal ethics is the public neutrality, which constitutes the fundamental source of criticism against liberal theory like its principle of equality. Liberalism certainly has a meta-theory of the good, which presupposes individual autonomy and happiness and liberal neutrality may be called the "moral ground" since it aims to accommodate a wide range of selves and beliefs within a neutral public system. Modern liberal thinkers like Dworkin thinks that the best response to the plurality and contestation of various ethical claims and projects of the good life in the society is the absolute neutrality of the liberal order. The liberal state must ensure only the moral grounds on which the citizens can follow their differing agendas of moral life and the vision of the

good life. Therefore, it cannot itself advance a program of the good life and impose it on the citizens (Barkçin:2001:99).

Barkçin (Barkçin:2001:100) points out that liberalism cannot do without a non-neutral account of the human good. Liberal thinkers including Rawls see neutrality as a guarantee for greater equality in the society since the notions of justice and rights would provide the most realizable general consensus of the citizens for a particular political decision. Thus, liberal neutrality can be seen as working for legitimizing the liberal state. At this stage, we face the liberalism of fear, meaning that individuals have to rationally decide what the good is for them, otherwise there would be a chaos of permanent conflict and antagonism. The conception of general good could be reached through rational consensus of individuals who are assumed to be those who can best evaluate and articulate their ideas, projects and wishes through the political structure. Therefore, political liberalism justifies a polity only as long as it sticks to the principle of neutrality and contrasts itself with those coercive polities who impose a certain version of the good life on its citizens. So, the advocates of public neutrality almost always rely on this fear of an enforceable good that would jeopardize the competing programs for the good life present in the society. For them, public neutrality becomes a criterion for political inputs, i.e. political participation, more than a value in itself.

The principle of value neutrality presents a serious field of contestation for the liberal theory. One of the strongest objections to this principle comes from communitarians. Communitarians attack it and argue that liberalism presents itself in the disguise of neutrality as a strategy to hide its real set of particular values and thus implicitly applies an exclusion towards certain interests and values in the society. Therefore what is presumed "neutral" is, in reality, false. In other words, liberalism tends to create its own metaphysics, a metaphysics of freedom and an ethics of neutrality that serve to fulfillment of the opposite processes of exclusion, inequality and indifference. For many liberals the moral dimension of the liberal theory is too feeble and vague and they perceive this weakness of moral infrastructure as a superior aspect of a polity that needs to pose ultimately as "neutral". But this statement fails to account for the strong moral claims and frameworks liberalism builds behind the veil of neutrality. Because according to the liberal principle of neutrality, rights stand as the "ordering principles" for diverse and conflicting positions of the good life in the

society. Liberalism, which strongly defends its moral-neutral nature, however, converts and reduces the civil claims of the good into its own conception of the good. Hence it tends to dominate, transform and intervene with the moral claims of the good in competition or in contestation within the society. As Sandel (Sandel:1982:11), explains, "the ideal of a society governed by neutral principles is liberalism's false promise."

John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness presents us "the paradigmatic statement of contemporary liberalism". His theory may be considered as the first major response to the legitimacy crisis of liberalism. Rawls engaged himself with the questions of distributive justice, which aimed at resolving the tension between the utilitarian conceptions of the good, the liberal objective of complete freedom, and the democratic ideal of equality. John Rawls revitalized the social contract theory and political theory in general with his *A Theory of Justice* in 1971. It is an important political work because it offers a fundamental analysis of the uneasy relations between social justice and economic performance. It renews emphasis on the political character of the conceptions of the good as well. It is at the same time an attempt to defend political liberalism, which establishes its autonomy from economic liberalism.

In Barkçin's (Barkçin:2001:119) statement, Rawls's objective in developing his *A Theory of Justice* is twofold; to construct a morality based on agreement as contract, and to formulate a liberal political ideal by stressing the definition of justice not as a good in itself, but as fairness. In pursuit of the former, he subscribes to contractarianism with a difference in the way that he emphasizes not on explaining the emergence of legitimate political power, but of justice. In pursuit of the latter, his theory is deontological, i.e. he takes the priority of the right over the good in order to preserve the autonomy of the individual. The two objectives bridge the gap between the liberal assumption of an individualistic self and the principle of self-interestedness with the political ideal of egalitarianism. Rawls tries to inject fairness into the liberal ethics. While he is a liberal in delineating rights and liberties, as a result, creating a liberal theory in its own right, he also goes on introducing an egalitarian element into the theory by the way of his argument of original situation in order to balance the liberal excess in emphasizing the priority of the individual. He is also responsive to the moral plurality in liberal societies. He tries to extend the principle of toleration to include the fullest possible range of practices and beliefs by designing a

theoretical framework that could reconcile the fact of pluralism with the need for social unity.

The main objective of Rawls's (Rawls:1971:61) attempt is to establish the principles over which people would agree upon in constructing a fair organization of the society. Here the principle of justice emerges as the hypothetical contract or agreement which are to "govern the assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages". The model of original position is used to highlight the agreement that could be reached in the way to realize this objective of a society composed of free and equal persons. While Rawls tries to construct a theory, which may be called the normative theory of political liberalism, he also tries to discard the socialist ideal of egalitarianism and a just distribution of income and wealth.

Rawls' political theory is constructed over two interrelated ventures; the original position and the veil of ignorance as the initial situation of the theoretical foundation, and, the issue of stability, a conception of well-ordered society and justice as fairness as the ideal of the theory. According to Rawls (Rawls:1971:302), people in the original position would accept two principles of justice that would regulate the society: 1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. However, the persons in the original position would also agree on the priority of the first principle of equal basic liberties over the second principle of advantages. They would also agree on the priority of the (b) of the second principle, i.e. the principle of fair equality of opportunity to (a) which is also called the "difference principle". People in the original position have the principle of *maximin*, i.e. that they would find the worst-off position as good as it can be and this leads them to support equality. Rawls tries to bridge both the equality and liberty sides of the liberal creed by asserting these principles and lists them under the motto "justice as fairness" to endow that bridge with a moral nature.

With regard to the state, Barkçin (Barkçin:2001:127) states that Rawls defines power as manifestation of public reason, which in return determines the ethical posture and

ensures stability. It is this conception of power that essentially weakens his theory. Because limiting the notion of power to the rational and thus the ethical realm necessarily drives the whole theory towards a rigid institutionalism and proceduralism that results in a weakened emphasis on the moral relevance of the individual will and absence of enough space for difference and non-consensual modes of social relations. One of the most striking examples of this weakness is the role of the state in determining the political and social will of the individuals. For example, the marriage codes in most liberal societies today do not reflect the gender dimension and the self-expression of the gender preferences, conversely it is the state, which almost single-handedly determines the identity of any given couple.

Indeed, Rawls' conception of public culture reveals us the fact that he does not analyze enough the extent of the involvement of the liberal state in creation of a "public" culture. In other words, he tries to define a public culture as if it is subject to no intervention from the state power or the dominant ruling classes, but conversely is created in vacuum by a visibility of an abstract moral idea. The same reasoning would imply that neutrality of the liberal state, an element of the western public culture, draws its legitimacy from its dominance as an idea accepted by majority of people and not necessarily created and invoked by the liberal state itself. Most of the questions of legitimacy certainly revolve around the role of the state as the repository of political power, such as in the debates around gender relations, racial segregation, ethnic identity and religious agendas. The state is the key player in all these debates either as the supposed "arbiter" or as the "certifier" for which discourses and which identities may benefit from the liberal repertoire of rights. The liberal state is no more a non-problematic given. It is at the center of a dynamic and possibly threatening depoliticization of citizenship along with politicization of certain identities unknown or taken for granted before. Therefore, it is clear that Rawls seems to stay away from the very nascent issues involving the liberal state by resorting to highly abstract notions of the self, reason and the formation of political morality. Rawls also enhances the neutral liberal state by his prioritizing stability. Indeed the whole theory may be considered as a precaution and remedy in favor of political stability under the guardianship of nation state against the dangers of pluralism.

All of these liberal propositions carry out both their theoretical strength and weaknesses that are subject to criticism. On this occasion, Rawls introduced the notion of

justice as fairness in order to resolve the tension between utilitarian ideal of good, liberal ideal of freedom and democratic ideal of equality. The most important weakness of liberal theory was hypothetical equality before law. Rawls tried to overcome this critic through introducing the notion of equality of opportunity. Equal opportunity implies that every individual should have equal reach basic requirements of achieving rights and freedom. This system is to be guaranteed through the hypothetical contract of justice. In any way, liberal political theory of state stresses on that fundamental human rights and freedom are prior to the political authority and individual should have equality with regard to those fundamental rights and freedom and to the formation of the political authority through social contract or constitution.

In sum, the whole adventure of political liberalism reflects that individual autonomy is a high value of self-realization, private property constitutes the basis of making politics, political authority is neutral, and the functions of the state should be minimized. Political liberalism in alliance with its economic version constitutes the most important proponent of current globalization process due to the fact that liberal domination of neo-liberalism on globalization literature emerge as a significant ideological direction. Offspring of this ideological direction reflects in the economic and political initiatives of the state in globalized world in the form of privatization, transparency, market economy principles and free trade.

When we look at the global occurrences, in contrast to their enthusiastic claim of liberalization of the global economy and decreasing role of the state in national economic policies, contemporary theories of political liberalism do not propose a global network of political relations. However, as it is analyzed in political liberalism, a polity is needed, preferably in minimal sense, within the society in order to provide common public goods of security and justice. In other words, political liberalism seems to be outmoded because of its inability to propose a global kind of polity. For globalization, within the limits of current stage of development in economy, culture and civilization, may require a conceptualization of global politics. But political liberalism insists still on the national character. The deprived vision of current political liberalism of an emerging cosmopolitan society deeply contradicts with its founding fathers, like Kant. In theoretical sense, economic liberalism in alliance with advanced capitalist practices is trying to impel globalization in line with economic

priorities. The silence of political liberalism on the issue of global polity, notwithstanding its efforts of liberalization of politics within current nation states, obscures the definition of the ‘‘politics’’ in its theory, in the sense that if politics, primarily, is the provision of public goods in liberal theory, then how global public goods will be provided. Current position of political liberalism presumes that while the private property would be globalized, public goods of security and justice would be locally provided. This position carries out a fundamental contradiction in political liberalism. Economic globalization imposes the liberalization of the movement of the property on the one hand, public good of security, for example, is assumed to be provided locally on the other hand. However, such a conception of the globality of the economy and of the locality of the public good creates questions for a working global system of relations. In other words, nation state, in political sense, is assumed to be local provider of public goods. But the ability of nation state to provide public goods is highly depreciated as a result of economic liberalization. So political liberalism, by not formulating a theory of global politics, contradicts with its premises with regard to political legitimacy of the state. Or, political liberalism underestimates the imposition of globalization on the changing roles and functions of the state, which would be expected critical results for shifts in basis of its political legitimacy.

Political liberalism in its historical evolution in the West had been associated with democratic features, in defining the liberal-democratic nation state. So in order to situate truly liberal-democratic state within the global context, we have to analyze briefly what democratic ideal imposes.

### **3.2. Democratic Ideal**

In its classical formulations, democracy had been referred as the self-determination of individual in the political field. In its direct and representative versions, the critical point is that political structure, that is government, should be determined by the members of the community. In this classical understanding, the way for self-government is shaped by voting system, which presumes that the majority view should form the government. Majority ruling was the basic source of criticism against classical formulations in the sense that majority ruling could result in despotism that denies the rights and freedom of the minority. However, in the evolution of the liberal-democratic states of the West, classical theories of

democracy has been re-conceptualized in a way to include liberal values of fundamental human rights and freedom. In this modern sense, democratic theory has been transformed into deciding a model of government that is obliged to protect the social contract that is constitution. Thus, constitutionalism and fundamental human rights and freedom became the basic component of modern democratic theory that is not expected to result in any majority tyranny. In this context, I will try to overview two contemporary kinds of democratic ideal, *the first one* is the deliberative democratic ideal of Jürgen Habermas, and *the second one* is the radical democratic position of post-modernists.

In contrast to the classical ideal of democracy that is the rule of the masses, Habermas argues that the ideal of democracy needs to be reconceptualized without recourse to mistaken illusions of a homogenous and united people, possessing one united will, but on the basis of communicatively shaped norms and institutions that imply diversity contained around the principle of rationality and universality. Habermas tries to incorporate social change and social interaction into the democratic theory with his stress on sociation, intersubjectivity and social and communicative construction of the moral-political choices. Democracy carries two distinct opportunities for Habermas. *First*, it is the only viable system of public negotiation and problem solving. *Second*, it alone can provide a legitimate system of governance. With these reasons, he advances his arguments for the principle of universality derived from the Kantian model, rational and autonomous self, communicative action and a public sphere founded around the principle of discourse, the emphasis on consent and its identification with communicative public sovereignty and the institutional representation of this consent through legal frameworks such as constitutional rights. Habermas based his normative democratic theory on rational consensus. Rational consensus entails a participatory procedure, which is defined as deliberation. Deliberation for him is the medium that will mediate and transform the conflict by issuing in consensus among different discourses (Barkçin:2001:178-80).

Discourse ethics means that "one must be able to test whether a norm or a mode of action could be generally accepted by those affected by it, such that their acceptance would be rationally motivated and hence uncoerced" (Habermas:1989:90,36). Consensus as the outcome of the deliberation, which passes through discourse ethics is taken as the sign of democratic agreement in Habermas. Comprehensiveness and scope of the participants

including those who are affected; the primacy of rationality of discourse, and the fact that this deliberative process omits any plausible coercion, thus the lack of regulative authority, or assertion of the principle of autonomy are the pre-requisites of a democratic system of government.

Habermas' normative theory (Habermas:1996:23-24) is an answer to pluralized moral positions in modern societies. He argues that in traditional societies facts and norms were fused by and dissolved by pluralism and complexity. In this sense deliberative democracy upholds a society that is necessarily and inevitably composed of pluralized, contending and often contradicting identities. What is needed is to develop an ethic that could sustain the democratic ideal by recognizing the participation of all identities in political decision-making through the medium of deliberation. Complex modern societies experience an identity fragmentation that is a direct challenge to liberal democracy that claims legitimacy across differences within its populace. As traditional life-worlds disintegrate, individuals find themselves burdened with new demands, choices, and freedoms. The Habermasian response is to provide open spaces in the public sphere, institutions that are designed to meet these demands that would secure solidarity, authority and collective action. As civil society is politicized in this way, the legitimation power of institutions, like tradition, will decrease. Therefore democracy emerges as the only element of legitimation, because other sources of legitimation cannot provide authority on political issues anymore (Barkçin:2001:181).

In deliberative democracy, the participation of citizenry is provided by their discursive link with institutional decision-making. This requires that while on the macro level, the Congress or the Parliament functions in a broader and "anonymous" communication, the public sphere is equipped with concrete and direct communicative interaction. There is the need for an institutional arena for public discourse and civic participation to counterbalance the pressures of both state and market. The aim of discourse ethics is not only to enable the democratic procedure to function by participation and mutual understanding, but also to bring about education of the citizenry. This falls parallel to the radical democratic position that emphasizes constant transformation of the populace in terms of freedoms. It also bridges the normative gap between the theory and the practice.

Democracy is thus conceived as a polity that reveals, mobilizes and utilizes the potentials of individuals.

While both the liberal and the republican models perceive the society centered around the state, deliberative democracy argues for a decentered society. It agrees with the republican view of the process of political opinion and will-formation, but contrary to that, it upholds constitutionalism. This is provided by the institutionalized communication in the public sphere. It also tries to escape the reductionism of the liberal political process to the representative bodies or of the republican view that views individuals following the system requirements blindly. Deliberative democracy upholds both the procedural and institutional elements at the same time fostering the informal networks of the public sphere. Informal public opinion-formation leads to "influence" which then is converted into "communicative power" through the channel of political elections, and then it is turned into "administrative power" through legislation. In this sense, solidarity is seen as a counterbalance for two existing poles of political power in liberal democracies; money and administrative power. Deliberative democracy thus legitimizes democracy through the people who not only monitor it, but also participate in it.

In terms of popular sovereignty, republican model talks about a fusion between the self-rule and the state, so people cannot delegate sovereignty. In the liberal model, representation is the means for popular sovereignty to manifest itself. In deliberative democracy, on the other hand, state and society are not considered as "the whole and the part", hence popular sovereignty is dissolved in the "subjectless forms of communication". Habermas states that political system is just one of the many social action systems, hence deliberative politics remains a component of a complex society. The role of law here is to be the medium of political communication with all other action spheres. Habermas introduces a set of principles of the constitutional state; popular sovereignty, the guarantee of legal protection, the legality of administration, and the separation of the state and the society. The communicative power that is derived from the public deliberation should not be confused with some sort of general will but rather "as the product of an overlapping and intermeshing of a variety of pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral discourses." Hence the liberal rule of law can become the rule of the people. Habermas reverses the Weberian query about how political legitimacy can be derived from legality, asks instead, how we can

justify the legitimacy of legality. Democratic legitimacy is thus tied not to some abstract and proto-historical contract or transcendental rights and entitlements, but to the actual and concrete intersubjective and rational communication, deliberation and agreement among the members of a society. For him, law is the medium through which communicative power can be channeled to the administrative power. The law is an element of public discourse, which grants it a democratic meaning in parallel with constitution or social contract.

In Habermasian terms, rationality is not a universal value independent of social environment, rather it carries out a communicative character which necessitates that absolute freedom of communication among different views gives ways to the rationality of the participants. Communicative rationality in contrast to the universal rationality of Kant or other liberals emerges as the basis of democratic theory of Habermas. Habermas defends rationality through not philosophy of consciousness as it is outlined by Kant, but in favor of a philosophy of communication. This is a precaution against the totalitarian drives that rely on a self-contained subject. Ingram suggests that this fight against totalitarianism is fought on multiple fronts (Ingram:1993:296). Rationality of deliberative process indicates the need for a conception of the self that is constituted by communicative rationality. By relying on a strategic medium of action, that is communication, Habermas intends to foster the individual action in the public and private life, which is intended to enhance democratic participation and solidarity. Communicative action is a type of social interaction that is oriented to mutual understanding. All communicative action is performed towards consensus. Habermas argues that, any communicative interaction must perform a speech action that raise universal validity claims and suppose that each claim may be accepted or rejected. The prevailing agreement is based on "better argument". This argumentation of Habermas reminds us very well of the dialectics of ideas of Hegel. Deliberation, negotiation, consensus and continuing deliberation and negotiation through communicative action constitute a chain of dialectics of public rationality on the way of doing politics.

In contrast to the communicative feature of deliberative democratic theory of Habermas, the radical view of democracy argues that democratic participation is an important means of self-development and self-realization, which means that participation will produce individuals who are open to difference, reciprocity, and tolerance. For radical democrats, democracy produces its own ethics and values (Barkçin:2001:224). Despite the

fact that deliberative democratic ideal of Habermas is inclined to social consensus, radical democratic model insists that consensus is not the basis of a democratic system, rather difference constitutes the basis of ideal of democracy. The radical model of democratic politics relies on considering democracy as an ideal, a system that does not close itself to change, uncertainty, transgression and contestation by sticking to certain "foundations". For radical democrats, democracy is not only a form of government, but also a mode of being. Radical democracy presumes that all identity/difference need to be perceived as inevitable and certain and that the contestation and the conflict between these identities are not "challenges", but do constitute the basis of the democratic ideal. In this respect, radical democracy is against the boundary-drawing of the modern liberal state that centers some identities and situates others as mere "anomalies" or points of alterity to be domesticated, contained and hegemonized.

In evaluating the characteristics of late modern democracy, Connolly (Connolly:1995:88-90) argues for a three-tiered structure; "normalization", meaning justification of unequal identity\difference configurations in the social order, not only as defined within a norm, but also as seen as a natural or true standard; "depoliticization" referring to the fact that political conflicts that incur risks for certain identities are left outside the scope of the political; and "pluralization" that relieves the society from these risks by fostering cultural diversity. A normalizing society is the one in which difference is seen as perversion and is converted into otherness or neediness. In contrast to the understanding of liberal view that difference creates instability and social disintegration so differences should be homogenized or any difference should be treated as *the other* meaning that *the other* needs help and toleration, in radical democratic model difference deserves to be accepted as an equal party in social and political system. This entails not just a kind of toleration, rather difference demands respect, which requires equal participation in the political field. Radical democratic claim argues that liberal claims of rationality and neutrality only hide violence and exclusion. Radical democratic pluralism, on the other hand, recognizes permanence of conflict and antagonism, and tries to underline the opportunities of exploring the commonality between identity/difference. Radical democrats stress that the liberal notion of absorbing otherness in unity is unacceptable and that alterity cannot be domesticated. Radical democracy rejects the possibility of a coercive consensus by rational argument as Habermasian theory advocates and instead "protects pluralist

democracy against any attempts of closure." This is the factor that secures the functioning of democracy in a dynamic way.

Connolly (Connolly:1995:97-104) proposes that democratic ethos is pluralistic not only that it incorporates the diversity, but also the types of ethics and identity sites for democratic debates. Therefore, the pluralizing ethos is to be aware that any consensus is subject to contestation and that what is fundamental is nothing but "difference". The democratic ethos is created when the constant surpluses, resistances, and energies of diversification are maintained. In this "ambivalent democracy", disturbance and pluralization acquire a positive value. Consent must go along with critique. In this democratic model, state is granted an important function; it is the key political site where majority assemblages can work against the normalization process which otherwise could be producing a "coercive consensus" under the state. The function of the state in radical democratic model and liberal model seems very similar in theory, in the sense that while radical democrats advocate the view that state that is expected to form as a result of representation as the rule of majority should not have any function of normalization of the other by which the democratic ideal could survive, liberals on the other hand adopt a view that state should be neutral vis-a-vis different social and political demands.

Neutrality in liberal model could function as an obligation of the state not behaving as a normalizer in radical democratic model. However, in practice, radical democrats argues that liberal state, while it asserts neutrality in theory, acts in a way of discriminating the other for the purpose of domestication. Connolly argues for a representational democratic politics that enables the citizen to serve both as a participant in procedural democracy and as an activist in social movements. This controversial view, however, needs some clarification with regards to its formal feasibility. Once representation is defined as the "labeling" of diverse and immensely unique individual and group perspectives, it is questionable whether such a generalization and fixation of the identity claims can still be supported by representation itself. No social movement genuinely reflecting identity claims can be considered as part of the representational system of liberal democracy since they generally cannot enlist themselves as distinct actors participating in formal party politics, and hence they need to converge with those "labeled" political entities that are the very "normalizers" of the social movements at the same time. The paradox here stems from

Connolly's own formulation of a tension between the form and content of the radical politics. While the form of democracy is preserved, what is proposed as the catalyst for greater participation and thus representation implicitly may work against the favor of difference.

In both radical democratic formulations and deliberative democratic theory of Habermas, the critical issue with regard to the state is how to reach a non-coercive consensus through which political legitimacy of the state could be truly provided. Proponents of democratic ideal stress the point that both liberal and classical democratic forms of state could be a coercive apparatus in reaching consensus. In order to overcome the shortcomings of liberal-democratic form of government, they propose re-conceptualization of democratic theory by incorporating communicative rationality and equally treating the difference.

Although democratic discourse has a long history of thinking beginning from the Ancient Greeks, I have tried to overview modern democratic ideal through examining the deliberative democracy of Habermas and the position of radical democrats for the purpose of the thesis to relate it to the global context. Whereas the fundamental element in classical democracy was the issue of participating in the election of the ruler, modern democracy refers to the participation into the process of governance.

In liberal-democratic states of the West, liberal values and democratic principles married within a compromising manner. Liberalism seems to be fed by democratic input that has appeared with expanded universal suffrage and egalitarian welfare state policies. The democratic element of liberal democracy was galvanized only after extensive conflicts, but it still remains a rather fragile achievement. While the liberal notion of negative rights push the individual introvert, the democratic resistance emphasized the positive rights to cement solidarity, collectivity, community and an ethic of care. At present, the liberal and the democratic elements are subjects of vibrant theoretical debate as radical democrats and deliberative democrats stress the democratic element in liberal democracy, while Rawls and libertarians underline the element of liberalism.

Although modern democratic ideals of participation in the governance and recognition of the difference implies certain critical questions within the globalization process, the proponents of democratic ideal miss the point in a similar way with contemporary political liberalism. They again focus on national polity. However, globalization with its sub-processes in the fields of economy, politics, society and culture provides a context, in which national and global have become inter-related. But while they insist on participation and recognition, they do not take into account the global system of relations. In other words, notwithstanding participation in the process of governance and recognition of difference are significant for the individual in nation states for democratization, participation in global governance and recognition within the global system are equally important for the democratic concerns of the individual. As an imposition of globalization if there is a tendency toward the emergence of a global economy, society, politics and culture, insistence on the drawbacks of the existing nation state for the concerns of participation and recognition in the way of democraticising nationally would not open the questioning of participating in the governance of the global context and recognition of the difference by the actors of the global context. In other words, democratic theory should pay equal attention to the implications of globalization with respect to the problem of participation and recognition in order to reach a democratic society of the globe.

Democratic theory should raise the participation of both peripheral states of the global system and of global civil initiatives into the global governance. And also democratic theory should raise the recognition of the differences within the global context. Otherwise, democratic theory would function as a discourse for culturalization of the state, which would serve to the continuation of inequalities and injustices of the dominant liberal-capitalist practices within globalization. Participation and recognition globally emerge as critical issues not only for solving global inequalities and injustices but also for bringing on the agenda global threats of pollution and nuclear armament that are very related to the future of humanity. Similar to political liberalism, modern democratic theory underestimates the reflections of globalization on the nature of nation state and its basis of political legitimacy. If, in Habermasian terms, political legitimacy could be provided through a rational communication among the participant, and in terms of the radicals, political legitimacy could be provided through recognizing the difference; then, we should

have tools and conceptions in order to impel participation and recognition in the global context. Disregarding the emerging effects of globalization or underestimating them would not lead to the realization of the role of democratic theory in global sense.

After having examined liberal and democratic theories, it is very important to refer to IR theory in connecting the relations between so-called rising global politics and nation state. For notwithstanding modern conception of the state had been mostly developed by liberal and democratic theories, IR theory is very complementary in the structure of the modern system of states. While liberal and democratic theories, except economic liberalism, did not focus enough on the relations among sovereign nation states, IR theory, disregarding liberal and democratic priorities to a certain extent focused on power relations among the states. So in the following section, I will try to examine how the imposition of globalization on nation state resulted in re-conceptualization of IR theory.

### **3.3. Nation State in International Relations (IR) Theory**

Political liberalism and democratic theory focus on the formation of government within the boundaries of a specific territory, which results in the definition of a public authority, that is state that has exercising a supreme power over the society. The limits, functions and obligations of the supreme, or sovereign power is the main focus of both democratic theory and political liberalism. However, in IR theory the subject matter of analysis diverts to the power relations among those sovereign units. Sovereign state is taken as granted. Youngs (Youngs:1999:5) argues that sovereignty is a category in mainstream international relations (IR) theory, which incorporates linkages between territory, identity and power. In state-centrism, that is political realism, sovereign political identity is essentially bounded identity; divisions between inside and outside are definitive in constructing and maintaining such identity. Sovereignty is a category with timeless, eternal qualities tied to a fixed sense of bounded territory or space. Sovereign identity in this context relates to political subjects as well as states, for the definition of sovereign being is intrinsically collective, dividing polities from one another and groups of political subjects from other groups. Such divisions are part and parcel of the security, including that of identity, which assertions of sovereign power seek to maintain.

Here I would like to refer briefly to the classical debate of realism-idealism, but particularly I will focus on the debate of positivism-post-positivism or critical theory. The examination will be in this line, because, the challenges to nation state in globalization process make critical debate more relevant to the main subject matter of the thesis, that is political legitimacy. In IR theory, political realism constitutes the most important paradigm with respect to the relations among states. Realism, first conceptualized by E.H. Carr and Morgenthau and then comprehensively elaborated by Waltz presumes that international system reflects an anarchical kind of relations, in the sense that there is no sovereign body in international arena in contrast to the case in domestic society. The absence of a sovereign body represents the state of nature defined by Hobbes.

In anarchical society, the identity of states is not shaped by some moral values, rather by sheer power relations. In this formulations, we could expect in IR neither law nor ethics. Moreover, in this paradigm, we witness that there is a hierarchical relations among issues like economy and politics, in which the political has an utmost importance. There is a clear cut boundary between domestic and international issues, and they are not synonymous meaning that in domestic politics there is a reference law and morals of the society, while in IR law and morals are up to the power relations. Anarchical character of IR reflects that states are in a continuous war against each other. Peace periods are exception and represent preparation for the coming wars. In this kind of anarchy, policies and relations are selfish that implies the selfish character of human nature as it is understood by Hobbes in state of nature. States pursue their national interests that are defined by the rulers. Realist paradigm assert that this anarchical and selfish relations in IR is a natural result of the system itself. In other words, human beings, by nature are selfish and the absence of central law in IR provokes the selfishness of the state, which is similar to individual.

Self-centered and aggressive nature of individual is expanded to cover the states as well. This constant nature of individual results in the reality, which could not be replaced with any ideal state of nature. In contrast to this realist paradigm of IR, idealist tradition criticizes selfish nature of individuals and states understood by realism, and, with reference to the Kantian ideal of a cosmopolitan world society, argues that selfishness is the result of certain historical conditions, rather than being natural. So by conscious initiatives similar to domestic society humankind could erase the anarchical character of IR and construct a

world community with a single universal sovereign. Idealist believes that human beings, by nature, are cooperative and inclined to human values, but historical biases and power relations make them selfish. Despite the arguments of idealists, mainstream IR theory has been shaped by realist arguments. Realism could not have been substantially criticized by idealists, for they proposed an alternative human nature, which could not be easily realized by conscious initiatives. However, emerging post-positivist or critical analysis began to criticize realist paradigm with strong argumentation.

In Youngs' words (Youngs:1999:59), one of the most powerful qualities of the third debate (positivism versus post-positivism) has been the identification of theory as discourse and extensive examination of its meanings, including notably in relation to state-centrism. Treating theory as discourse is to recognize it as a form of practice directly relevant to understanding power. It requires an awareness of the degree to which theoretical discourse embedded in social practices more generally. Similar to all practices, it takes place in time and space, and draw together associations from past and present that link time and space in particular ways. Treating theoretical discourse as material practice requires distance from abstract notions of knowledge processes as mystically passed through texts, and impels the capture of timeless ideas that float free from spatial links. It requires a literal grounding of critical considerations of knowledge, and thus the posing of all the kinds of questions about it that would be addressed to other practices. In this sense, the questions of; why and where it has been produced, for what purposes and how it changed over time, who uses it how and for what purposes, to whom it is addressed, how and with what results, what it reveals or obscures and why; become critical.

The examinations of discourses in the study of IR and international political economy have drawn on broader issue of discourse and power. We need to recognize politics as taking place in a world where its dominant meanings have already been generated and thus where there is an intimate relationship between textual meanings and political practices. Texts should be analyzed in relation to one another as well as their social contexts (Shapiro:1989:13). The critiques of state-centrism recognize states as historically created and key loci of politics and thus political subjectivity, and importantly, state-centric discourses as intrinsic rather than extrinsic to, that is, material rather than an abstract part of the process of politics. Critical theorists historicize and politicize state-centric international

theory and thus provide a contextualization of its principles and orientations. Central to the mystique of coherence, which surrounds that tradition are the concepts of security, identity and individuality. States as secure, individual units with sovereign identities have been personified implicitly and explicitly as rational man writ large. Spatial and temporal dimensions were introduced by Ashley through his concepts of presence and absence, which the dualistic structures, in complementing and reinforcing one another. Subjectivity is established on the basis of this presence and absence (Youngs:1999:62).

The realist tradition in IR, its principles and its orientations, can be fully understood only then contextualized within the times in which it was formed; those of the failure of the interwar hopes for international peace through the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II. The realist worldview was asserted at a time when a large part of the world was paying the price for what perceived as an overemphasis on the ideal and an under-emphasis in the real, the issue of power. Central to the security problematique in contemporary global relations is the technical-rational logic driving dominant forms of theory and practice. This logic continually presses the principle of ever-expanding human control over the environment, leading to a situation where human knowledge, skills and capacities to communicate are used, not for self-reflectively, but as instrumentalities of problem solving, control and domination. This logic confounds the fundamental interdependence of humans with one another and with their environment; it objectifies and seeks to control via the application of knowledge and skills and ensures that the concepts of autonomy, knowledge and power are soldered into one (Ashley:1980:251). In this way, the logic can be understood to predetermine questions of agency on its own terms and to work to close off potential for thinking about it otherwise. Ashley's approach (Ashley:1980:175) builds knowledge into the analytical picture with regard to interdependence, and it does so in a way that associates knowledge with action and thus with questions of agency. It addresses technical rationality as a dominant grammar of thought, identifying how its concerns are focused on resulting imperatives and their linkages of human beings to one another and their environment.

Mainstream state-centrism predetermines the nature of politics, rather than setting out to discover what it may be in historically contingent circumstances. The ontological and methodological bases of realist and neo-realist framing of politics implicitly and explicitly

place normative concerns and influences outside the realm of “real”, that is, effective politics. The point in critical questioning is not to underestimate the importance of states and their influence in global politics, but to stress the ontological limitations that state-centered conceptualizations place on one’s capacities to assess that influence accurately and most importantly dynamically, as part of the endeavor to analyze global relations more comprehensively. An important aspect of the contributions of these kinds of critical works has been to fill up empty category of state, to explore its political and economic content, and to address different dimensions of its social relations of power, including those associated with gender. As a result the state is no longer an abstraction; it becomes a dynamic social reality. This is the unsurprising result of the breaking of state-centrism’s conceptual bonds with abstraction (Youngs:1999:85). States are central participants in global changes, and they have to cope with the resulting problematiques. They never have been static social entities, but now more than ever, this is being revealed in their explicit negotiation of political and economic policies in direct relation to global factors. The nuclear era marked the first major crack in the security shield that had been previously the most important aspect of traditionally presumed state-citizen contract. Contract between state and citizen may still retain its largely traditional form, but this is severely being tested (Youngs:1999:137).

In response to the critical impact, Mercer for the aim of re-asserting the power of realism states that competition among the states results from categorization, comparison and a need for a positive social identity. Mercer (Mercer:1995:230) argues that only groups are inherently competitive, this supports the neo-realist claim that principle of action in anarchy is self help. Mercer discusses formation of the identity of state in historical process and claims that the identity of state could change in time, which inevitably could transform the basic premises of realist outlook. The competitive self-help nature of international politics is not an inevitable feature of anarchy. For we have neither interest nor identity prior to interaction with others. So we cannot discuss the possibility for conflict or cooperation unless we recognize self and other. Identities are made, not given. This does not mean that the absence of all constraints on how our identities form. All material needs and historical or social processes shape the identity that could tend to peace or conflict. Mercer opens some new clarifications in realist tradition in the sense that so-called nature of state could change in time so that their way of interaction depends on changing conditions.

The reduction of level of analysis to the individual level, as done by the realists in respect to behavior of states, leads to diluting results. Because, the identity of individual is shaped and determined by the social context in which he lives. The nature of individual is central in both realist and idealist account of IR. But one should be cautious that individual has an essence, rather his identity as his attitudes and behaviors are motivated by his sociality. Identity, both in the sense of personal and in the sense of group identity may change in time. In European Union, as an example, national identification seems to be superseded by a wider source of identity, that is being European. When identity changes, so do the definitions of self-interests. The constructivist emphasis that identity is not given but constructed by the processes is significant. Expanding definition of self to include former adversaries may be expected. Expanded or collective definition of self would represent an important change in relation between certain states.

The identity of state that is associated with sovereignty is challenged in postmodern age both by the factors within the state themselves that is identity politics in the sense of both individual liberation and collective characterization; and by the factors outside the state, which search for transnational identities. The new situation also challenges the theory of state-centric world, that is realism that aimed to show that the world is solely composed of states with a-historical attributes. The constructivists do not share the pessimistic characterization of international politics as presented by realist. For processes determine identities and interests. While both realists and constructivists accept that international politics lacks a central enforcer of rules, constructivists believe that norms, laws, economic interdependence, technological development, learning and institutions can fundamentally change state identity and interests. Constructivists argue that the state egoism assumption is problematic because we should not make a priori assumptions about state identity in anarchy. By understanding that identities are created through interaction, we open the door to systemic change (Mercer:1995:231-3).

In contrast to self-help principle of realism, other help system means that a state looks out for others as well as for itself. It means one's own interests are not defined independent of the other's interests. In a self-help system a state views the other in instrumental terms; in another help system states identify with one another. Self-help is an

institution, not a constitutive feature of anarchy. Any institution could change. Constructing another help system requires taking the perspective of the others and identifying with the others. This identification creates a system founded not on the egoism of self-help but on a definition of self that includes the other. Because process, not structure, determines state identity, we can create non-egoistic identities through perspective taking and empathy.

To conceptualize the causes of war and the conditions for peace that starts from individual psychology rather than from an analysis of the relation between nation states is of questionable relevance. For a group is different from the sum of its parts. Mercer argues that instead of examining the individual in the group, social identity theory focuses on the group in the individual. Our social group partially defines our social identity. Social identity theory posits that people seek a positive self-identity that they gain by identifying with a group and by favorable comparison of the in-group with out-groups (Mercer:1995:241). Instead of ego-centricism, social identity theory proposes ethno-centricism in the explanation of inter-group relations. Social identity theory suggests that war, conflict and misery are not natural and inevitable products of international politics.

Strong in-group identity leads to sharing, cooperation, perceived mutuality of interests and a willingness to sacrifice personal interests for group interests. On the other hand this in-group identity leads to inter-group discrimination as well, which results in competition, conflict and perceived divergent interests. Sociality promotes ethno-centric conflict, furnishing a critical building block for in-group amity and out-group hostility (Mercer:1995:245). States, like other social collectivities, are social groups that construct an identity of their own. When we take into account that all social groups are the products of historical process, then there is no reason to defend the state-centric worldview, which takes the states as eternal. With the changes in historical context as a result of social, economic and political forces, then the identity of states also could change in such a way that the existing functions and the nature of states could be drastically transformed.

With regard to the theory-practice dilemma of realism, Robert Cox states that theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of

dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future. There is accordingly no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it is more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective (Cox:1986:207). Depending on these statements of Cox, Ashley and Walker (Ashley and Walker:2000:136) examine the dissident works in IR, and they argue that dissident works of thought elicit attention and prompt critical readings because these works accentuate and make more evident a sense of crisis, what one might call a crisis of the discipline of international studies. Dissident works put the discipline's institutional boundaries in question and put its familiar modes of subjectivity, objectivity, and conduct in doubt; they render its once seemingly self-evident notions of space, time, and progress uncertain; and they thereby make it possible to traverse institutional limitations, expose questions and difficulties, and explore political and theoretical possibilities hitherto forgotten or deferred.

Nevertheless, Ashley and Walker focus on the idea that it is hard to confine the notion of disciplinary crisis to a discipline alone, because the crisis puts in doubt any imaginable boundaries that would separate the discipline of international studies from other disciplines and, indeed, from all other contested sites of modern global life. To think of disciplinary crisis in this way is thus to understand a crisis that folds out beyond a discipline's imagined boundaries, connecting to a crisis of human sciences, a crisis of patriarchy, a crisis of governability, a crisis of industrial society, a generalized crisis of modernity. It resonates with the effects of feminist movements questioning the modes of social and political discipline engendered as masculine, ecological movements questioning the disciplines of industrial society, peace movements questioning the disciplines of national security, worker movements questioning the disciplines of managerial orders, and cultural movements questioning the disciplines of information.

Ashley and Walker (Ashley and Walker:2000:139-41) point out that several aspects should be elaborated in order to understand the crisis in social science in general and in the discipline of IR in particular. *First*, the crisis is not contemporary, or the crisis of today. Rather, it has a history, beginning from the breakdown of traditional values after the enlightenment. *Second*, crisis has always been permanent, in the sense that progress

ideology of enlightenment and modernity carried the sense of crisis in itself in order to have a perpetual dynamism. Existing social orders have been contested and criticized whereby changes in social order prevailed. *Third*, there are no clear-cut boundaries between the contester and the contested. In a crisis, there is no clear and indubitable sense of inside versus outside, domestic versus international, particular versus universal, developed versus underdeveloped, reality versus ideology, fact versus fiction, political theory versus political practice, identity versus difference. There is not a determinate negation of the one side by other side of these oppositions. *Fourth*, the crisis is of representation. Without the absolute presence of an institutionalized subject whose meanings and words might represent and without the absolute presence of an institutionalized object to which words, as representations, might refer, the word breaks off. The very possibility of truth is put in doubt. Subjects and objects appear not as sources of meanings that might be signified or represented in words but as open texts that are ever in the process of being inscribed though a hazardous contest of representation. *Fifth*, crisis has two important façades. *Celebratory face* proceeds of freedom, a freedom that is prior to all abstract and universalizing notions of necessary limitations. It prepares a circumstance for opportunities of creativity, which does not aspire to return to some comforting, securely bounded domicile of self evident being. It instead exhibits a readiness to explore the new cultural connections and resulting new modes of thinking and doing that become possible when boundaries traversed. *Religious attitude* reverses the priorities of the celebratory.

The proliferation of cultural possibilities is not welcomed but received as an irruption of unnamable dangers, and the event of crisis is greeted with a sadness, a sense of nostalgia, and a kind of homesickness for an institutional order that can impose stable boundaries. It sees in crisis a dangerous moment in which the institutionalized subject is made witness to the possibility of its own dissolution and death. *Sixth*, where thought and conversation are dominated by religious attitudes and animated by this desire, they become political discourse, for they are preoccupied with the paradoxical political sovereignty. It is a problem posed amidst a crisis of representation. Then, we encounter the possibility of ambiguity, uncertainty, indeterminacy, and multiplying cultural possibilities where time knows no certain measure, space knows no certain bounds, and human conduct reliably obeys no law of nature, of language, of father, of king or of state.

Sovereignty enters discourse not as a matter of describing something that is thought to be real, already present, and perhaps distinguishable from other equally real or present things, but precisely on a lack, on a loss, on something that might have been but is no longer. To speak of sovereignty therefore is never to name something that already is. It can never be to refer to some source of truth and power that is self identical that simply exists on its own. When spoken in religious way, the word 'sovereignty' is often used ideologically, as if it represented some source of meaning, some effective organizational principle, some modes of being already in place, some simply and self-evidently given resolution of paradoxes of space, time and identity (Ashley and Walker:2000:143-5). *Seventh*, the great reference texts of the discipline of IR had been written under specific historical circumstance and within specific time. The grand theory of IR is a certain interpretation of those texts. However, relying on the religious attitude, those main texts, such as those of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Kant and Weber, are abstracted from their spatial and temporal contexts and revealed as a-historical truth. The crisis in this way is the reflection of those texts as a result of different readings. Any reading different from the orthodoxy is appreciated as the signal of diluting the truth itself. Reading differently opened the way of possibility of seeing the paradoxes within those texts, which also brings the notion of crisis here and now. Paradox, ambiguity and intermediacy are not allowed to disturb the ostensibly central logic of resolution that redeems the sovereign presence (Ashley and Walker:2000:146).

Ashley and Walker (Ashley and Walker:2000:148-9) state that the different readings of the great texts could be divided into two main streams, one is memorializing and the other is counter-memorializing. For example, Waltz's reading (Waltz:1979) memorializes *The Prince*. In it Machiavelli is grounded a paradigmatic figure of the realist tradition. What is affirmed is the resolution to the paradoxical problems of sovereignty toward which *The Prince* no doubt wants to move in its closing the production of a state that is unitary, bounded and distinct from its external environment and decisively controlled by a unique center of governance. Thus, for Waltz, Machiavelli exemplifies a kind of timeless *raison d'état* among unitary territorial states wanting to survive and bending every means to this end. On the other hand, Walker's reading (Walker:1989) of *The Prince* is a counter-memorializing reading. In Walker's reading, it becomes clear that Machiavelli's text can hardly provide a foundation or origin of the sort of realist tradition Waltz would like to

invoke. The most unsettling of paradoxical problems resides at the very center of Machiavelli's concern; how to found a state? Once Machiavelli is read in this way, *The Prince* is no longer caricatured as a paradigm capable of founding and limiting the thought of a tradition or discipline that would religiously affirm the solution to the problem of sovereignty it so desperately desires to reiterate in its own uncertain time. Ashley and Walker strongly state that state-centric, sovereign-bound theory of IR, that is realism and neo-realism, is a kind of discourse.

Wendt (Wendt:2000:617) tries to build a bridge between realist and rationalist traditions by developing a constructivist argument, drawn from structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology, on behalf of liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests. In contrast to the economic or political-military theorizing that dominates mainstream systemic IR scholarship, this involves a sociological social psychological form of systemic theory in which identities and interests are the dependant variables. By arguing this A. Wendt concludes that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self –help world, this is due to process, not structure. There is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it.

Classical realists such as Hobbes and Morgenthau attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature, whereas structural realists or neo-realists emphasize anarchy. The difference stems in part from different interpretations of anarchy's causal powers. Waltz defines anarchy as a condition of possibility for or permissive cause of war, arguing that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them. It is the human nature or domestic politics of predator sates, however that provide the initial impetus or efficient cause of conflict, which forces other states to respond in kind. In criticizing Waltz's arguments, Wendt (Wendt:2000:618) does not contest the neo-realist description of the contemporary state system as a competitive, self-help world. Rather, he contends the explanation of neo-realism, by arguing that the concepts of self-help and anarchy and of security are not constitutive property of anarchy; that self-help and competitive power

politics may be produced causally by processes of interaction between states in which anarchy plays only a permissive role; and that self-help, anarchy and power politics are the result of a specific social and identity formation, not of a nature in some kind.

In contrast to the ordering principles of international political structure in Waltz, that is anarchy in first instance, which determines the nature or identity of states, Wendt (Wendt:2000:619-21) puts forward the arguments of constructivist social theory emphasizing on the relational character of identity formation. Actors acquire identities, relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self, by participating in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently relational. Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed world. Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a portfolio of interests that they carry around independent of social context, instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations. Human being, as a participant in the ongoing social process in which he necessarily finds himself, defines a problematic situation as calling for the performance of a particular act. Acting in particular way that is assumed in the interest of the actor, shapes the identity of actor. Therefore, acting in a particular ways of different actors continuously constitutes social institutions. In this sense an institution is a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas and actions about how the world works. Identities, interests and formation of institutions require a process of participation and socialization. In this sense, self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with the preservation or security of the self. In fact, what A. Wendt tried to do is that he changes the location of the determinants in realist theory of IR, meaning that whereas in neo-realism the essential determinant is presented as the anarchic nature of the international system, Wendt tries to put the socialization process of the actors in the center as the main determinant of international system.

Wendt argues (Wendt:2000:624-6) that the process of signaling, interpreting and responding completes a social act and begins the process of creating inter-subjective meanings. The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behavior; potentially mistaken and certainly tentative. The mechanism here is

reinforcement; interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others. If repeated long enough, these reciprocal typifications will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at state in the interaction. It is through reciprocal interaction, in other words, that we create and instantiate the relatively social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests. The parameters of social organization themselves are reproduced only in and through the orientations and practices of members engaged in social interactions over time. Social configurations are not objective like material things, but neither are they subjective like dreams. They are, as most social scientists concede at the theoretical level, inter-subjective constructions. Self-help security systems evolve from cycles of interaction in which each party acts in ways that the other feels threatening the self, creating expectations that the other is not to be trusted. Competitive or egoistic identities are caused by such insecurity; if the other is threatening, the self is forced to mirror such behavior in its conceptions of the self's relationship to that other. Being treated as an object for the gratification of others precludes the positive identification with others necessary for collective security; conversely, being treated by others in ways that are empathic with respect to the security of the self permits such identification.

Competitive systems of interaction are prone to security dilemmas, in which the efforts of actors to enhance their security unilaterally threatens the security of the others, perpetuating distrust and alienation. We do not begin our relationship with the alien in a security dilemma, security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature. In a Hobbesian state of nature, states are individuated by the domestic processes that constitute them as states and by their material capacity to deter threats from other states. In this world, even if free momentarily from the predations of others, state security does not have any basis in social recognition, in inter-subjective understandings or norms that a state has a right to its existence, territory, and subjects. Security is a matter of national power, nothing more. The principle of sovereignty transforms this situation by providing a social basis for the individuality and security of states. Sovereignty is an institution, and so it exists only in virtue of certain inter-subjective understandings and expectations, there is no sovereignty without another. These understandings and expectations not only constitute a particular kind of state, the sovereign state, but also constitute a particular form of community, since identities are relational. The essence of this community is a mutual recognition of one

another's right to exercise exclusive political authority within territorial limits. State tax their citizens and not others, protect their markets against foreign imports, kill thousands of Iraqis in one kind of war and then refuse to intervene to kill even one person in another kind of war that is civil war. If states stop acting on those norms, their identity as sovereign would disappear. The sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once and for all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice. Thus, saying that the institution of sovereignty transformed identities is shorthand for saying that regular practices produce mutually constituting sovereign identities (agents) and their associated institutional norms (structures) (Wendt:2000:630).

Cooperation within a Hobbesian state of nature is extremely difficult, since trust is lacking, time horizons are short and relative power concerns are high. The institution of sovereignty transforms this system of nature into a Lockean world of mutually recognized property rights, reducing the fear that what states already have will be seized at any moment by potential collaborators, thereby enabling them to contemplate more direct forms of cooperation. A necessary condition for such cooperation is that outcomes be positively independent in the sense that potential gains exist which cannot be realized by unilateral action. One important source of incentives for such cooperation is the growing dynamic density of interaction among states in a world with new communication technologies, nuclear weapons and externalities from industrial development. At this point A. Wendt refers also a great difference between game theory and constructivist analysis in order to understand new kind of cooperation. In traditional game theoretic analysis of cooperation the structure of the game, of identities and of interests is exogenous to interaction and, as such, does not change. The analysis focuses on the relationship between expectations and behavior.

However, a constructivist analysis of cooperation would concentrate on how the expectations produced by behavior affect identities and interests. The process of creating institutions is one of internalizing new understandings of self and other, of acquiring new role identities, not just of creating external constraints on the behavior of exogenously constituted actors. A constructivist analysis of the cooperation problem in other words is cognitive rather than behavioral, since it treats the inter-subjective knowledge that defines the structure of identities and interests, of the game, as endogenous to and instantiated by

interaction itself (Wendt:2000:632-3). A good example to this case is cooperation in the Western Europe. A neo-realist or rationalist analysis, associated with classical game theory, would assume that the European states' portfolio interests has not fundamentally changed and that the emergence of new factors, as such the collapse of the Soviet threat and the rise of Germany, would alter their cost-benefit ratios for pursuing current arrangements, thereby causing existing institutions to break down. The European states formed collaborative institutions for good, exogenously constituted egoistic reasons, and the same reasons may lead them to reject those institutions; the game of European power politics has not changed. However, a constructivist analysis of this problem would suggest that four decades of cooperation might have transformed a positive interdependence of outcomes into a collective European identity in terms of which states increasingly define their self-interests. Even if egoistic reasons were the starting point, the process of cooperation tends to redefine those reasons by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of new inter-subjective understandings and commitments. Through participation in new forms of social knowledge, in other words, the European states of 1990 might no longer be the states of 1950.

In IR theory, the international has been conceptualized in a positivist manner as an objective reality having an ontological existence outside national formations. The more IR theory is derived from a strong Western rationalist and universalistic posture, the more it reduces the ethical space for the Other to represent itself in its own history. International relations theory tends to dissolve the Other into the unitary conception of the modern self as a rational knowing subject. While as a discipline in constant interaction with the Other, IR theory operates as a practice of inclusion/exclusion, in which the privileged role of the Western sovereign self is maintained as a rational, Cartesian and modern man and what is perceived as the Other is excluded, marginalized and denied to be recognized as different (Keyman:1997:7-11). In contrast to this formula, the evident voices of critical theory, postmodern discourse, feminism and post colonial criticism suggest in different directions that IR theory functions as engendered and accidental grand narrative of modernity. Thus one can believe that there emerge fundamental shifts; first, in the sense that IR theory can no longer be seen as an abstract and neutral device to explain the existing political and economic conditions in the world; and second, in the sense that concerns about human community can no longer be seen to an element of low politics that ca not have a direct influence on the process of theorizing about IR.

IR theory is very critical for us to understand the position of nation state within globalization. Realism has remained for a long time the dominant outlook in inter-state relations. The selfish human nature understanding of Hobbes was adopted by realist thinkers in order to verify the selfish identity of nation state and their ethno-centric pursuit of their national interests. Even though realist arguments have great strength in explaining inter-state relations with reference to the anarchical character of the system that results in power politics, their main weakness lies in that they cannot explain the changes and do not suppose any change in the nature of IR politics.

On this account, identity formation arguments of Mercer try to give a new dimension to realism in order to overcome its inability to explain the problem of change. In her words, states like individuals are social actors whose identities are formed and determined through social interactions. Mercer's analysis has merits when we take into account the impositions of globalization. In its early formation, the identity of nation state had been shaped under an anarchical arena in which the main determinants were nation states, but the global context is expected to provide a new kind of arena in which the sole determinants are not the states rather there are other global and local actors. Under this new context, the identity and consequently policies and actions of nation state could be subjects to shifts. Global context requires that states should share their power not only with other states but also other non-state actors. In this respect, premises of classical realism seem to be inadequate theoretically to deal with the new climax.

Similar to the approach of Mercer, Wendt introduces his theory of social constructivism in order to explain nature of inter-state relations. Identity and structure in his analysis are not naturally given, but rather they are determined through a process of interactions. From this perspective, selfish definition of national interests under the anarchy is not naturally given to the state, rather they are constructed through inter-subjective relations. Both Mercer and Wendt try to overcome the shortcomings of the universal discourse of realism with regard to the state, identity and national interests.

While Mercer and Wendt try to explore new theoretical dimensions to realist premises, critical thinkers, such as Walker, Ashley and Cox commit in to de-legitimize the

dominant position of realist outlook by pointing out to theoretical and historical biases of realism and its alliance with the existing political structure. Critical writers stress on the point that so-called holy books of realism like that of Machievelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau had been read by so-called later realist thinker in one way just in order to justify their way of argumentation. Textual bias or one-way reading removes the plurality of meanings in the classical works, which results in a homogenized and uniform prescription. In critical wording, this one-way reading is done in order to naturalize and sustain the existing kind of power politics. This technical rationality of the dominant realist outlook deprives us of exploring possible kinds of changes in power relations. Under the global context, the issues that are treated as secondary by the realist position are coming to have a primary role in shaping and directing global processes. Although some institutionalists who try to catch new dimensions of realism like James Roseneau through analyzing inter-governmental organizations, global context and its power relations seem to have a complex web of interactions that could be examined by depending on realist premises.

In contrast to the absolute categorization of classical realism in IR, Youngs, Mercer, Ashley, Walker, Cox, Wendt and Maclean criticize the presumptions of classical realism on certain accounts that could help us to conceptualize new dimensions of power relations on global scale. Their common concern is the drawbacks of classical realism in explaining IR. We witness that post-positivist and critical questioning in social science in general and in IR in particular are greatly influenced by Derrida and Foucault, whose philosophies constitute the most important critiques against positivist understanding of social science. Hermeneutics, textualism, contextualism and discourse argumentation cover the critical questioning of the premises of political realism that reveals itself as universal, timeless and objective theorizing of IR. They focus inter-subjective relations and one way reading of so-called classical realist texts, through which they try to show that identity and power is a result of specific historical conditions supported by a strong discourse that unifies the theory and practice. The critical way of thinking in IR is very relevant in globalizing world, in the sense that locality, identity, and culture began to assert, and modernity, hegemony and sovereignty creates fundamental crisis for the globe as a whole. In other words, globalization imposes radical changes in conceptualization of *prima facie* issues of classical IR theory.

Rising critical and post-modern approaches in IR theory as a result of globalization and fragmentation began to bring the classical basis of political legitimacy into discussion, through internalizing the global within and externalizing the local beyond the borders of the state. As a result of these critics, sovereignty, political legitimacy, territoriality and autonomy of nation state became subject to the imposition of the global and the local. In comparison to political liberalism and democratic theory, critical approaches in IR theory seem to be more convenient within the global context. In line with the actual practices of globalization and fragmentation, identity, territoriality, uniformity and autonomy of the state has been put into theoretical discussions.

After having analyzed theoretical reconsideration of political liberalism, democratic theory and IR theory, in the next chapter I will try to situate within globalization the emerging global and local actors, which have possibility of resulting in fundamental changes in the premises of political liberalism, democratic theory and IR theory with respect to the nature of nation state.

## CHAPTER IV

### EMERGING GLOBAL AND LOCAL INITIATIVES

Emerging global and local actors seem to change fundamentally the distinctive characteristics of nation state, which is defined by political liberalism, democratic theory and IR theory. Global and local actors operate at different levels and with different concerns in globalization. Before going into analyzing which characteristics of nation state are transformed as a result of global and local initiatives, in this chapter, I will try to analyze how they work. This is very important, for formulation of how global and local actors work would help us to determine the changing functions and roles of the state, by which we could conceptualize the basis of shifts in political legitimacy of nation state. The organization of this chapter will be under two main titles, emerging global non-state actors and local actors.

#### 4.1. Emerging Global Non-State Actors

Despite their diversity, non-state actors can be broadly grouped into four categories; *for-profit organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and criminal organizations.*

**For-Profit Organizations :** *For-Profit Sector* in which there is a growth in transnational corporations is one of the major challenges to states today. Transnational corporations (TNCs) operate on a global basis, and their manufacturing facilities are integrated into a global production strategy. Multinational corporations (MNCs), in contrast, are multidivisional business organizations in which separate production facilities are established in different countries. One effect of trans-nationalization is the fact that a growing share of world exports and imports is now accounted for by trade *within* corporations instead of between them.

The organization of production has changed dramatically in the fourth quarter of the

previous century. Major corporations have centralized decision-making within the firm and some international markets are now dominated only by a few firms. At the same time, many firms are decentralizing operations into transnational networks of partners and suppliers. Large and small corporations participate in various types of relationships including joint ventures, strategic alliances, and technology partnerships. Networks of contractual relationships blur the boundaries of the firm and redefine the nature of international economic competition, as competitors cooperate on specific ventures. With the advent of e-commerce, corporate organization will change further, facilitating global, decentralized commercial relationships. All of this represents a transformation of the business world from the traditional hierarchical, arm's-length model of organization and competition to something that is more complex and difficult to characterize. Citing the 1998 UNCTAD World Investment Report (World Investment Report:1998:UNCTAD), one can observe that there are at least 53,000 transnational corporations with more than 450,000 affiliates. Worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased steadily. FDI combines long-term investment capital, managerial expertise, and technology into an integrated package in which the parent corporation has an ownership stake and is directly involved in the management of its foreign holdings. The most significant trends in the past decade have been; the wave of merging and acquisitions across national boundaries; the large privatizations of government-owned assets in many countries around the world; and the more welcoming attitude by almost all developing countries towards foreign investment. Transnational mergers and acquisitions each year attain a new record in terms of the size of the deal involved. Privatizations in the big emerging markets alone (BEM) have been steady and massive, attracting foreign investment in the newly privatized assets.

Almost every country has revised its laws to be more investment-friendly. Despite this trend, there still remain some sectors that individual governments declare off-limits to foreign investors, such as certain real estate, print and electronic media, and transportation. Transnational corporations affect state capacity in a number of ways, both positively and negatively. How vulnerable a country is to challenges from transnational corporate activity depends on the size and attractiveness of its market. TNCs decide where to invest their capital and technology, and thus determine to a large extent where economic activity and innovation will occur. Transnational corporations do not just determine the location of investment, but also the organization of production and the degree of technological transfer.

The networks of partners and suppliers a TNC constructs provides it with more flexibility to cut contractual relationships quickly. This means local companies have a much more tenuous link to the global economy than if they were integrated more directly within a corporate organization.

Today many government policy makers fear that transnational corporations are too transnational, with little commitment to any one national economy. The industrialized countries in particular express concern that even long-standing investors in a country may pull up roots and move offshore if a better opportunity presents itself. This action could undermine industrial and employment policies and create economic havoc in local communities. To prevent such a trend developed countries try to homogenize the investment laws and conditions worldwide, by which they aim to attain just distribution of foreign direct investments. Typically, transnational corporations prefer not to be associated with any one country, although the way they organize and conduct business clearly reflects significant characteristics of their country of origin. In conflicts between home and host countries, many foreign investors try to remain neutral, although this can be extremely difficult. Industry standard-setting and corporate diplomacy are two areas of activity that have received much less attention than they deserve in discussions of state capacity. Both may affect state capacity by changing the relationships between the public and private sectors. Standard-setting is typically viewed as a public good that is a basic function of government. Private efforts to set industry standards may supply all the benefits of standardization without the need for government intervention, but it may also lead to the adoption of standards with pro-business biases that pose high barriers to entry to particular firms and countries attempting to participate in international markets. International corporate diplomacy is part of a larger trend in which non-state actors are almost equal participants in world affairs.

Among the main OECD countries, the capacity and legitimacy of the state may be challenged by transnational corporations in a number of significant areas, but primarily in the areas of taxation and regulation of the private sector. Firms will increase their engagement with non-governmental and intergovernmental actors in response to increased consumer and shareholder activism, as well as to counter the increased threat of government regulation. A strong backlash against globalization and against corporate activity may be

possible, which could turn back some of the economic openness of the last several years.

**Intergovernmental Organizations** : With regard to *Intergovernmental Organizations*, Anthony Judge (Judge:2000) notes that there have been numerous initiatives to identify, count and categorize intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, as society becomes more complex, fluid, and dynamic, international organizations change along with it, and it becomes necessary to examine more comprehensive ways of categorizing their features. It is particularly useful to explore the nature of IGO inter-linkages with other transnational bodies and networks, especially when this contributes to hybridization of form and function across classical categories. Judge describes how the subject classification scheme of the Union of International Association (UIA) shifts the paradigm from the conventional laundry list of topics to an integrative structure more consistent with the pattern of functional interaction between subjects. A rich scheme of categories can predict the possible existence of unidentified forms of intergovernmental organization, and can also encourage the design and use of unforeseen types of organization. The intention is to proceed progressively from the relatively unmistakable to the more ambiguous and challenging cases. The functional boundaries of IGOs (through strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, multi-group initiatives and campaigns) have been effectively redefined. Most importantly, the meaningful unit of analysis is shifting increasingly from isolated entities to networks or configurations of entities.

Judge states that the global challenge is to explore and develop “organizational ecosystems,” operate “ecosystems of strategies,” and deal with “ecosystems of problems,” in the light of “ecosystems of values.” Equivalent challenges exist at the national level. It is unfortunate that these challenges are addressed by nation states in a strategic environment that has largely shifted its center of gravity from “statics” to “dynamics.” Judge asserts that the dynamism of problems, and the creativity of transnational criminal networks, will drag the nation state into a new mode during the years in the twenty first century -- catalyzed by the potentials of the Internet with which the politically apathetic younger generations will identify. Judge asserts that the many territorial disputes that currently destabilize global society point to the failure of intergovernmental organization to shift to a more complex level of analysis of boundaries.

Within this emerging environment, much depends on a shift in perspective. In a world of gaps (north-south, male-female, young-old), the most fundamental gap is liable to be between commitment to the static attribute of states and an ability to function in terms of global dynamics. Many bodies and institutions will learn to function on either side of the gap and will be able to transmit between them. The core challenge to the nation state is liable to be its over-identification with static boundaries and structures in a world that is liable to be defined above all by shifting boundaries and structures in transformation. The nation states that will thrive in this new environment will be those that discover ways of getting “into the flow,” so that they can play a role in motivating constituencies and re-framing concepts.

Judge concludes that governance, and the integrity of the nation state, increasingly will rely on the process of ensuring the emergence and movement of such “guiding metaphor-models” through the information system, as well as their embodiment in organizational form. The merit of this vision of nation state governance at the beginning of the twenty first century is that it does not call for a radical transformation of institutions -- which is unlikely in the absence of any major catastrophe. Rather it calls for a change in the ways of thinking about what is circulated through society’s information systems as the triggering force for any action. Nation states will survive and evolve to the extent that they are able to cultivate more attractive, dynamic metaphors as information-interpretation vehicles through which to navigate within the complexities of turbulent societies.

**Non-Profit Organizations :** In describing *the Nonprofit Sector*, Lester Salamon (Salamon:2000) asserts that the world is in the midst of a “global associational revolution,” a massive expansion of nonprofit activity and citizen action outside the boundaries of the market and the state, that may prove to be as significant a development as the rise of the nation state. This development reflects a number of rather profound social, political, and technological developments. Despite its increasing importance, Salamon maintains that the nonprofit or civil society sector is poorly understood and under-appreciated in most parts of the world. One reason for this is the tremendous diversity of this sector and the resulting confusion that exists about what it really contains. A wide variety of terms used to depict the range of non-profits focus attention on one facet of these organizations while

downplaying or minimizing other important aspects. Several different definitions in the literature have significant drawbacks.

As of the mid-1990s, approximately 3 million organizations were in operation (Salamon:2000). The number of organizations, however, is not a very effective measure of the presence of non-profit activity because data on the number of organizations is rarely reliable, organizations vary widely in size, and most data systems fail to purge inactive or defunct organizations. A more reliable indicator of organizational activity is the number of people that work in non-profit sector organizations either as paid staff or volunteers. Non-profit organizations turn out to be major employers in many countries and have substantial expenditures as well. The bulk of this employment is in the social welfare field, including health, education, and social services; development and advocacy account for relatively small shares. Salamon asserts that the spread and growth of non-profit organizations throughout the world has important implications for the power and role of states and for the governance process.

Salamon explains that the spread and growth of nonprofit organizations has facilitated the emergence of a new collaborative style of governance in which government is obliged to share significant portions of its discretionary authority over the spending of public funds with a host of third-party institutions, including a wide assortment of non-profit organizations. A paradigm shift is therefore under way in the operation of the public sector as we enter the era of “new governance.” This new governance involves some major shifts in how we think about public management and how we approach public problems. The non-profit sector’s growing availability and its expanding ability to shoulder additional social functions has significantly helped to facilitate the trend toward indirect governance that is now under way. In the process, the non-profit sector has benefited tremendously, gaining new sources of revenue and new relevance to social problem solving. Salamon contends that the “new governance” is the wave of the future and that states will increasingly have to adjust their structures and their management styles to this new reality of shared rule.

Salamon concludes by noting that the civil sector has clearly arrived as a force to be reckoned with on the global level. While it can at times be a disruptive force, as the recent

events in Seattle demonstrated, it is also a potentially positive one, mobilizing citizens yearning for a better life and signaling a new popular willingness to take some initiative in working for the common good. He asserts that a key issue for the next two decades will be how governments at all levels react to these developments. Where governments resist them, difficulties are sure to follow. But where they accommodate the new pressures and join forces with the new organizations, important synergies are possible that may strengthen efforts to deal with public action. For this to be possible, however, new attitudes will need to develop as well as new forms of political and administrative skill. Developing such attitudes and skills are therefore high priorities for the years immediately ahead.

**Transnational Criminal Organizations :** While analyzing Transnational Criminal Organizations and Networks Louise Shelley (Shelley:2000) warns that since they are clandestine, knowledge concerning their operations is sketchy at best and would profit greatly from further research. Despite the secrecy that surrounds them, transnational criminal organizations are known to be extensive, and they are growing. Criminal networks are flexible and capable of rapidly changing structure to suit particular missions and activities. Transnational criminal groups incorporate components of licit business (to facilitate money laundering, for example) as well as elements of state governments (to assist in conducting illicit activities with a minimum of interference). In some countries, such as Japan and Italy, organized crime has developed along with the state. In others, such as Colombia, the rise of organized crime has contributed to the collapse of state institutions and the rise of regional conflicts.

Violence and corruption are two potent weapons of organized crime in their struggle with the state. Politicians and law enforcers who subsequently rethink their relationships and crack down on crime groups are subject to particularly violent retaliation. But often collusive relationships are based on the corruption of public officials without any hint of violence. The costs of corruption can be as high or higher than those of organized crime. Corruption reduces the level of foreign direct investment and makes domestic firms more reliant on bank loans. Corrupt countries also have more volatile stock markets, more insider trading and smaller capital markets. Research commissioned by Transparency International reveals that the highest levels of corruption are in many of the transitional societies of the former socialist world and also in those with strong export dependence on oil such as

Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Nigeria, which rank as the most corrupted countries (Shelley:2000).

The Internet has also proved to be a valuable tool of organized crime, which exploits forms of Internet communication because electronic messages leave no trace and are hard or impossible to trace to their point of origin. Information technology enables criminal groups to operate across borders in an environment essentially free from government controls. Shelley notes that organized crime might not be an unmitigated bad in some parts of the world. The proceeds of organized crime may be repatriated and invested in the host country, providing capital for economic development. On the other hand, criminal groups may repatriate little of their capital. For instance, crime groups in Russia and other post-socialist countries usually export almost all of their profits, exacerbating capital flight problems.

Shelley (Shelley:2000) asserts that transnational organized crime groups and their networks will be much more important determinants of international politics and state capacity in the twenty first century than they are today. Already the crime figures significantly in international diplomacy in many regions of the world, and the exchange of law enforcement personnel is assuming an importance diplomats once assumed. This trend will accelerate over the next decade because the financial resources of the crime groups are increasing along with their political power. The failure of legal systems to keep pace with globalization, intelligence services have difficulties to understand and assess the centrality of the crime issue, and the development of a digital era without adequate thought for regulation provides a very different world in coming century, a world in which nation state will be a less important actor on the international scene.

Transnational criminal organizations and their networks pose a serious challenge to state capacity, legitimacy, and cohesion, even to the most technologically developed states. Criminal organizations have been able to co-opt major portions of the governments of several states, making them “captive states.” Organized crime may also create “criminal” states, a condition in which the state’s government executes the policies of criminal organizations. Nation states are currently not well -equipped to counter transnational crime. Well-financed and technologically-refined transnational criminal organizations and networks, unencumbered by the need to remain within the law and capable of shifting their

base of operations to the most accommodating country, actively seek to exploit the weak points, or “capacity gaps,” in a state’s enforcement mechanisms. While developed states may use advanced technology against criminal elements, this technique entails a danger of imposing such harsh restraints upon its citizens’ civil liberties that state legitimacy suffers and the quality of civil society decreases. This is a particularly sensitive limitation where democratic forms of government are concerned. A good example to this case was the initiatives of US Government after the September 11 attacks. Hard controls in airports and arbitrary convictions of Arab origin people for reason of struggle with terrorism attracted criticism of people on the ground that their civil liberties had been injured. Particularly, the episode of September 11 displayed the delicacy of the phenomenon of globalization. Some argue that interdependence among states made states weaker not vis-à-vis other states but vis-à-vis international crimes, because criminal and terrorist organizations use advanced communication technologies and merits of growing liberties across the borders. The severity of the threat of organized crime has become so pronounced that it would begin to redefine the idea of a state. So-called “captured state” is used to describe situations in which criminal influence has become so pervasive that the state effectively becomes a partner with organized crime.

In conclusion, global non-state actors are not new to the international (or domestic) arena, but their numbers and influence have increased dramatically in recent years and continue to expand, fanned by the spread of information technology, the increasing importance of trans-sovereign issues, and changes in popular expectations. Power relationships between non-state actors and the state defy simple categorization. Some non-state actors and networks have been able to exert their collective will and bring about desired outcomes at the expense of the state’s capacity and legitimacy (e.g., transnational criminal networks). In other cases, non-state actors help to harmonize state effort with that of other organizations, thus increasing the overall efficiency with which important issues are tackled. Still other non-state actors serve as extensions of the state, receiving a majority of their funding from state governments. This arrangement helps state governments distance themselves from projects that they either are ill-equipped to support directly or prefer to keep at arms length (e.g., many states provide funding to humanitarian nonprofit organizations that distribute food and medical aid). In these cases, state legitimacy may be preserved, or even enhanced, despite the fact that the state has reduced its capacity. Other

non-state actors fill “capacity gaps,” i.e., perform functions that help people at the grassroots level when the state is unable to do so or is skeptical that some new innovation will work (e.g., micro-lending enterprises). In these cases, state legitimacy may suffer. Still other non-state actors remain marginalized, but the increasing spread of internet access allows these groups to organize larger and larger constituencies and speak with ever-louder voices.

The organizational forms of non-state actors vary widely. While some organizations rely on traditional hierarchical organizational structures, many increasingly rely upon a structure in which authority is widely distributed. Network membership often crosses traditional boundaries to include state governments, transnational corporations, and nonprofit organizations in various combinations. Systematic analysis of networks is just beginning, making this an important area for additional research. Authority structures within many organizations and networks are not democratically based. As noted by Ann Florini (Florini:2000), non-state actors differ considerably in terms of their transparency, i.e., the degree to which their operations, decision-making processes, and sources of funding are open to public scrutiny.

Each global actor has its own priorities stemming from their position within globalization. *For-profit organizations* are the main proponent of economic globalization. Their main target is the conventional role of nation state. They try to decrease the functions of state in the field of economy. *Intergovernmental organizations* aim to sustain the strength of nation state in shaping the global politics. Intergovernmental organizations try to preserve the anarchical state of IR. They aim to prevent any instability in IR through containing some of demands and expectations of non-governmental global actors. While intergovernmental global organizations seem to be a broker between the agents of advanced capitalism and global civil society, it seems that their role of being broker is unjust in the sense that for there is high possibility of alliance in economic interests between intergovernmental organizations and the agents of advanced capitalism, the demands and expectations of global civil society are undermined or manipulated. *Non-profit organizations* seem to be the proper representative of global civil society.

It has been advocated that the advances in information technologies has facilitated the formation of global civil society, for everybody could easily reach information about the others and the world as a whole. In fact, the rise of global civil society has solid grounds that are easily observable. I have argued that there are mainly three kinds of those grounds. *The first* is related to the externalities of capitalist mode of production, which is described as environmental pollution as a whole. *The second* is the result of power politics of nation state, that is nuclear threat. And *the third* is the unjust distribution of economic output and of 'humanitarian' values. The first and the second issues are directly related to the survival of mankind and earth as a whole. They damage our ecology as much as we could not have a possibility of living on the earth as human beings. Global civil social initiatives insist that environmental pollution and nuclear threats are the real ones that should be solved, otherwise we are preparing our own end. The third issue is related to the stability and peace worldwide. Unjust utilization of world resources and consequently unjust distribution of world output creates winners and losers, the difference among which is not tolerable in order to integrate the losers within the existing global structure. These injustices result in *global criminal organizations*. I did not argue that the only cause of international terrorism is the unjust distribution of well-being, rather this unjust distribution is the most important cause of rising threat of international terrorism.

The activities of international criminals and terrorists are legitimated through reference to two important phenomena. *The first* is the unjust distribution. *The second* is the unequal opportunities. The two issues are interrelated. In the global context, we witness that there are illegal drug trade, human smuggling and terrorist activities. While unjust distribution and unequal opportunities direct some of the loser to focus on the activities, which are highly profitable in money value, like drug and illegal migration, some other losers focus on direct terrorist activities in order to show that as long as injustices exist, there would not be a secure milieu for the winners as well. In sum, global context emerges as an arena in which these four kinds of global actors struggle for their interests and priorities, all of which restricts the areas of activities of nation state as sovereign units.

In fact, as I have tried to explain in Chapter I, sub-processes of globalization produce their own global actors, which try to restrict the area of action of nation state. Within this context, intergovernmental organization is the most important area of activity of

the states on global scale to contain the area of activity of other three kinds of global actor. Nonetheless, the activities of emerging global actors together with the local adherence that will be analyzed in the coming section affects fundamentally the features of liberal-democratic states and their legitimacy basis. For global and local actors undertake some of the roles and functions of the state or of those organizations constitutive to the state apparatus. For example, global civil initiatives began to share social services of the state and labor unions within national borders. And local actors began to share the power of state in defining group identity. So more global and local actors undertake or share the roles and functions of the state, more classical basis of political legitimacy of the state is shifting.

#### **4.2. Localization of Identity and Culture : Fragmentation**

After having discussed political and IR theories and the emerging significance of global actors with relation to the position of nation state within globalization, in this section I will try to revise the issue of fragmentation for the aim of assessment of its impact on political legitimacy of nation state. Like the imposition of global actors, locality and identity/culture debate have imminent reflections on the roles and functions of the state.

The problem of identity/difference did not significantly take place in the discussion of IR until the collapse of Soviet Union when the ethnic minorities began to search for independence or autonomy. Why it is ignored in international and political theory is a crucial problem, which could be explained by referring to dominance of realist outlook in this field. In realist terms national identity and its formation were not discussed. National identity is taken for as granted in terms of being citizen of a nation state. W. Connolly states that IR theory dissolved the issues of identity and difference into the categories of theory, evidence, rationality, sovereignty and utility (Connolly:1991:49). As a result, identity and difference have no place in IR theory. Today the issue, in the form of both at individual level and collective level, is in the center of international and political theories. At individual level feminism and gender studies have been included into the debate, and at collective level the demand of ethnic or other kind of collective identities for recognition began to be within the framework of the theoretical discussions.

Identities have been to a great extent defined for individuals externally. For example, the passport combined two forms of external construction of identity. *One*, the measure of assigning names, is archaic; *the other*, numbering and picturing, is modern. When it was passed from the feudal structures to the time of nation states, the absolutist state took upon itself these functions of nomination. It is only with modernization that an opposing process of self-identification arises (Lash and Friedman:1992:17), which constitutes the category of personal demand of identity politics. Identity, as the reply to the question of ‘‘who I am’’, is the image of self in the mind of others. The question has no single representation, rather individual has a variety of identification. The self is composed of multiple identities and roles, familial, territorial, class, religious, ethnic and gender. A. Smith clarifies mainly six of them. *First*, identification based on gender is universal and pervasive, which is also the origin of other differences and subordination. *Second*, local and regional identity is equally widespread, particularly in pre-modern era. *Third*, the class identification seems to be a new one, especially after the industrialization and Marxism came into scene. *Fourth*, religious identity, with which the people give their loyalty to the religious institutions, is either national or universal. *Fifth* kind of identity is national identity, which could be associated with the advent of modern nation states. The *last one*, ethnic or ethno-religious identity is also an important source of collective identification of the people (Smith:1991:4-9).

Despite the fact the self-identity is a defining feature of being human, rather than it is peculiar to the modernity (Jenkins:1996:171), identities began to become problematic as a result of modernization period and being problematic gained strength more within the globalization process, for rapid communication between different identities force the individuals or groups to re-discover their individual or group identities. The focus about that identity question newly emerged, in fact, is a result of homogenizing forces together with modernity and globalization. But in pre-modern time there was no debate on identity because there was no homogenizing process. Within globalization identity is consolidated and self-reassured through the constitution of difference and the construction of otherness (Connolly:1991:9). Identity politics, on the one hand, is a term characterizing those movements in which membership in oppressed and marginalized groups provide the basis of a common identity for the making of political claims (Dunn:1998:18); the term, on the other hand, is associated with emphasis on the particular as opposed to the general.

Difference connotes the refusal to homogenize or aggregate. The politics of identity and difference is generally associated with a rejection of universalizing philosophies descending from the enlightenment (Zaretsky:1995:244).

Eli Zaretsky (Zaretsky:1995:245) claims that when neo-Marxism was the dominant critical outlook in 1960s and 1970s, there was a tacit division of labor between Marxism and psychoanalysis. This division was based on an assumed division between the public and the private, where the public was understood by Marxists as the capitalist economic realm and the private was the realm of gender relations, sexuality and family. But in another sense the private realm also referred to ethnicity, cultural and national, racial or religious identities. Psychoanalysis developed theories that applied to both meanings of private sphere. In other words he tries to show that with respect to critical outlook there is continuity between Marxism-psychoanalysis and identity politics, just because both criticize the existing social relations and try to reach an alternative one. Liberal conception of public-private split is that; public sphere is related to politics where organizing principles are justice, representation, rights and freedom and equality; on the other hand the private sphere is related to private ties, beliefs, values and culture of individuals which are considered to have autonomy vis-a-vis public life. On the other hand identity politics originates from the demand of recognition both at individual and collective level in the public sphere. Liberal conception of public-private split is challenged by identity politics, because individuals or ethnic or religious communities search for representation of their attributes in the public life. Commodity culture, civil society and media became increasingly important as the terrain of identity creation. As the cultural sphere emerged with a new kind of force and autonomy, the meanings of the division between the public and the private changed. Marxists see culture as a mask covering the truths of the public and Freudians see it as a mask covering the truths of the private (Zaretsky:1995:253). On the other hand identity politics tries to remove the oppression on public representation of identity, and search for uncovering identity representation.

The politics of identity and difference resulted from a global shift in the character of capitalism. Difference emerged socially through two related processes; the development of a diversified proletariat and globalization of capital. Industrial proletariat is divided through factors such as race, skill, seniority, ethnicity and gender. Despite the Marxist attempts from

the beginning of industrialization there had been a tendency for working class to draw their identity from cultural images rather than from workplace experience (Zaretsky:1995:247-52). Globalization encouraged the entry of previously marginal groups, like women, minorities, immigrants and peripheral nations, into the metropolitan factors of production. The background of identity politics lies not only in ideological and cultural changes but also in transformation of social structure and societal integration (Calhoun:1995:205).

Particularly in the West the politics of identity can be seen as an effect of dramatic transformations in the culture of society after the Second World War, transformations that intensified during and following the turmoil of the sixties. The reorientation of politics toward the issue of identity reflects a growing mood of uncertainty arising from economic insecurity, social and cultural changes, worsening inequality, a perception of moral decay and a sense of threatened social disintegration (Dunn:1998:17). Scott Lash argues that radical identity politics takes its inspiration from intellectuals, like Derrida and Heidegger whose core assumptions are deconstruction and difference (Lash:1996:253). C. Calhoun claims that the discourse of self is distinctively modern, and modernity distinctively linked to the discourse of self (Calhoun:1995:194).

The new kind of politics represents two different types of demand; *first* is the recognition of ethnic and national particularities in the cultural sphere. National identity may be an umbrella but it is rejected as a homogenizing force, rather people tend to show their sub-national identities in public sphere and demand that it should be respected. *The second* is the liberation of suppressed wishes in the private realm, which is related to feminism and gender studies.

The birth of identity politics began with an intense rejection of psychoanalysis, which considers the identity as personal. The new politics reflects the fact that in modern society identity is created, not given, and that culture is the sphere of identity creation. Identity creation is appreciated as a process. When identity is taken as personal, so the society and the culture are taken as mechanical structure of all individuals. The politics of identity from another point is a response to the challenge of the postmodern critiques of positivist science. That is, culture is an autonomous sphere in which identity is created,

which displays that individuals are not uniform and controlled mechanically (Zaretsky:1995:257).

Recognition is at the heart of the identity politics. Identity turns on the interrelated problems of self-recognition and recognition by others. Problems involving recognition or non-recognition by others are integrally related to issues in personal self-recognition. This is one of the reasons why the sometimes abused and increasingly criticized feminist slogan “the personal is political”, still merits attention (Calhoun:1995:213-9). Proponent of identity politics offer claims to have difference recognized as legitimate within a field like employment or legal treatment where people with many different identities are making similar claims. Such claims for legitimacy or recognition are more than claims for tolerance. The demand for recognition is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity. Our identity is shaped partly by recognition, or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others through which a person or a group of people can suffer real damage and distortion (Taylor:1994:25).

Tension between identity-putatively singular, unitary and integral- and identities-plural, cross cutting and divided is inescapable at both individual and collective levels. That is the continuing tension between the politics of personal identity and the politics of collective identity. Each person’s individual identity is seen as having two major dimension; one is the collective dimension and the other is personal dimension. These two faces reflect on the politics of identity through both collective and individual demand (Apiah:1994:150). If you are marginalized or excluded by public identifications inscribed upon you, and if these identifications are somehow fundamental to the integrity of collective identity, the politics of identity places you in a double jeopardy. First, the collective identifications constitute you in ways that you would resist or oppose and that impinge upon your freedom in significant ways. Second, your public engagement impressing for shifts in these forms of identifications is severely cramped by the categorization applied to you (Connolly:1991:199-200).

When discussing identity, it is important to point out the arguments of communitarian theory, which stresses that human being is human because of his existence within a society. All human capacities could be realized within the society, otherwise man is

not human and can not realize his humanity (Taylor:1985:90). Authors of communitarian outlook argue that self's absolute detachment from the society is not possible, by nature of thing (Sandel:1982:20), self is defined within a society through the recognition of others. This requires a tacit contract between the self and the community, which imposes certain commitments on both sides. Because community gives individual an identity which provides human potential to him and the very meaning of ourselves, and in return commands us to respect the very nature of our identity, that is, community life and values. From this perspective it is clear that the identity is created through social process, it is not just given. And identity creation is not independent of historical process, that is, identity has no essence in its own, rather it is created, defined and shaped by the circumstances of a specific historical context; which implies that identity can change in time because the situation in which it is created is conducive to change. But communitarian insistence on the bond between community and individual echoes a danger for the proponents of identity politics, that is, the erasing of private dignity of human self. Individualization projects of enlightenment, that is, the liberation of individual from communal, divine and natural commitments; and the communitarian insistence on the social character of human nature that requires some social obligations; constitutes a basic dilemma of social science. But we have to consider that social changes occur where there is a deviation from the existing social values.

Identity originates from a long history of past. Tradition is not destroyed totally by modernity, rather it is reduced to a fragmentation mosaic composed of disconnected pockets of persistence. Tradition still survives, behind, between or beneath the practices and structure of modernity. Tradition has been reproduced within modern condition, it should not be regarded as static, backward and conservative (Luke:1996:112). In relation to the formation of identity aspect of tradition, there are two types of identity formation; first, self-identity refers to the sense of oneself as an individual endowed with certain characteristics and potentialities. Second, collective identity refers to the sense of oneself as a member of a social group or collectivity (Thompson:1996:93). Within modern life, while normative and legitimation aspects of tradition declined, identity aspect of tradition survived.

Schaar (Schaar:1989:335), by referring to the original usage of the term 'culture' as the human interaction with nature, the activity of tending and cultivating natural things and

processes, thereby improving them, turning the natural world into a place fit for human habitation; argues that the word implies an attitude of devotion, care, aiding and serving, and stands in sharpest contrast to the attitude of dominating nature and subjecting it to our purposes. An instrumentalist orientation, always straining toward forcing and exploiting, and away from nurturing and caring, pervades our thinking in both areas. The term also, in the second level, refers to the cultivation of self, our distinctive human nature, tending to and developing the capacities of mind and spirit. This is the basic meaning we have in mind when we speak of a cultured or cultivated person. In Nietzschean term, culture is always a 'second nature', a process of nurturing and developing the highest potentials inherent in and properly belonging to a thing or being. Thus, by taming and shaping through culture our natural impulses, needs and desires, we give ourselves back to ourselves in a higher or sublimated form. After referring to these aspects of the origin of the term 'culture', Schaar implies that we live a cultural crisis in globalized age, because the meaning and prescription of culture have been lost as a result of enlightenment philosophy, industrialization, modernization and consequent globalization of de-generated culture of the capitalist-production and consumption mentality. The crisis has been brought on by devotion to the religion of technology with its passion for profits and power on the one side, and its craving for limitless consumption on the other. From this perspective, the crisis takes the form of a societal growth that is so rapid and complex as to be cancerous. The growth consumes the very energies and destroys our collective capacities for self-determination and outruns the processes, institutions and interests that reweave and repair the fabric of social life. We are destroying the self-controlling and self-restoring processes and capacities of the non-human biosphere (Schaar:1989:345). Thus J. Schaar proposes that search for renewal of culture should look toward social forms and relations that are cooperative, localist and versatile, and away from those that are statist, centralized and specialist (Schaar:1989:357).

There is a wide range of ethnic encounters, from discrimination, suspicion, dislike, to violent acts, among ethnic groups that no theory or perspective will cover the myriad processes involved in ethnic relations. However, many accounts of ethnic conflict do highlight economic inequality between ethnic groups as a key cause. This is especially so when commercially strong minorities appear far richer, on average, than the majority group. Economic inequality and economic competition are important considerations in ethnic conflict, but theorists are right to point out that economic explanations *per se* are only part

of the story. What makes a people feel as a group, and hate as a group must first be explained.

Fragmentation is very critical for both globalization and nation state. It is disintegrating both universal imposition of globalization and national imposition of nation state. The issue of identity is considered as a modern phenomenon by most of the social scientists, for the intensity and nature of inter-community relations changed after the advent of modernity. Identities are defined externally. Interactions between the communities and individuals create difference. In order to understand what we mean identity, I overviewed A. Smith's classification of identity, those are gender, social, class, religion, ethnicity and nation. In global context all of these identity classifications assert themselves in new directions. The advocates of the identity and cultural politics stress that identity and culture are subjects of politics as well, for identities could be used as discriminatory measures by the holders of political power. At the heart of identity politics we notice that there is the issue of recognition in contrast to tolerance. Also more liberal economy in the sense that the state retreated from it, more identity politics began to rise in the public sphere. Global context contributed to the highlight of identity and culture as a result of communication facilities.

The new kind of politics represents two different types of demand; *first* is the recognition of ethnic and national particularities in the cultural sphere. National identity may be an umbrella but it is rejected as a homogenizing force, rather people tend to show their sub-national identities in public sphere and demand that it should be respected. *The second* is the liberation of suppressed wishes in the private realm, which is related to feminism and gender studies. The birth of identity politics began with an intense rejection of psychoanalysis, which considers the identity as personal. The new politics reflects the fact that in modern society identity is created, not given, and that culture is the sphere of identity creation. Identity creation is appreciated as a process. When identity is taken as personal, so the society and the culture are taken as mechanical structure of all individuals. The politics of identity from another point is a response to the challenge of the postmodern critiques of positivist science. That is, culture is an autonomous sphere in which identity is created, which displays that individuals are not uniform and controlled mechanically.

Ethnicity, identity/difference, culture and life politics may not be attempts directly to illegitimate the power of nation state, but these attempts create suspicions and question marks on the authority, legitimacy, unity and identity of nation states. Coupling with the forces of liberal capitalism that commit in to erode the sovereignty of state externally, politics of identity erodes the unity and legitimacy of state internally.

In this chapter, I have tried to clarify how global and local actors operate within the global context. Depending on the ways of their operations and demands, in the next chapter I will try to analyze how nation state responds to those global and local initiatives. and which fundamental characteristics of the state are conducive to changes.

## CHAPTER V

### RESPONSES OF AND CHANGES IN NATION STATE

Globalization is expected to have a significant impact on state behavior. Particular attention has been paid to the dramatically increased efficiency of handling information, the integration of national economies into global financial markets, the increasing porosity of borders, and the continuing expansion in the volume of international trade – all factors that make states progressively more interdependent (or dependent in some cases) upon forces and institutions outside their borders. Also there is a growing concern on how the state would respond to the demands of locality and identity. Although there is no consensus about the cumulative effects of globalization on the state except that they appear to be very wide-ranging, analysts note that the ability of states to cope with globalization varied considerably. In this chapter, I will try to analyze how nation state could respond to global and local impositions, and which fundamental characteristics of the state could radically be transformed under the global context.

#### 5.1. Responses of Nation State to the Power of the Global and the Local

Richard Rosecrance (Rosecrance:1999) presents one view of how a state can respond to globalization in a way that successfully preserves its capacity, legitimacy, and cohesion. He argues that a state must increasingly concentrate on managing *flows* to achieve a greater share of world output rather than, as in the past, focusing on amassing *amounts* of territory, natural resources, population, and production within its borders. Historically, state capacity had been viewed in military terms, always concerned with the ability to control and mobilize manpower and other resources. Now, states are moving toward a model more like that of a modern multinational corporation, employing decentralized production and outsourcing for raw materials and intermediate products. If these trends continue, states must be in a position to control flows across and within their borders. In addition to directing flows of capital, technology, and labor, the state must also attract the right factors

to enter its own territory. Rosecrance stresses that this phenomenon does not necessarily mean that the state is weaker, but rather that the source of its power and capacity has changed.

Rosecrance has coined the term “virtual state” to describe a state whose government makes this adjustment and continues to thrive as globalization intensifies. Because the virtual state is primarily concerned with managing flows of capital, technology, human resources, and information, the quality of its educational system and the refinement of the infrastructure supporting its service-based economy clearly become predominant elements of state capacity. Rosecrance asserts that these trends would lead states to become divided into “head” and “body” states. Head states, with their mature financial systems, high educational levels, and advanced technological capability, will optimize their work forces to provide services, including the design and financing of production facilities in the body states, where large pools of relatively inexpensive labor can produce goods at lower cost than in the head countries. Body states can develop into head states, and until then, can leverage their comparative advantage in production to pit head state against head state in competition for the body state’s production capability.

The challenge posed by globalization might be even more fundamental, leading to a qualitatively different type of international structure in which states no longer serve as the principal actors. Solving trans-sovereign problems requires capacity, authority, and legitimacy, yet no one actor (including states) has the requisite strengths in all three areas. Accordingly, state governments must increasingly rely upon networks of actors to combat these problems. Networks can include states, intergovernmental organizations, transnational corporations, and organizations in the nonprofit sector, each network member being selected for its particular capabilities. This shift is significant because states, which once exercised extensive control over affairs that affected their territory and population, must now surrender some control to its network partners if trans-sovereign problems are to be successfully combated. Even strong states are increasingly “contracting out” to licit non-state actors in an attempt to align capacity to authority and legitimacy. Licit and illicit non-state actors perform functions which states are either unable or unwilling to perform.

The explosive growth of influential non-state actors is affecting not only the range of governmental functions, but also *how* states govern. The “new governance” entails a shift away from “programs and policies” thinking towards a “tools and instruments of action” approach. An associated shift, in which the nonprofit sector is very significant, is in a change from “public sector versus private sector” thinking towards “public sector plus private sector” thinking. This alters the role of the nation state away from command and control towards negotiation and persuasion. Where governments have traditionally viewed themselves as the exclusive provider of services, they will evolve into managers of services, turning over the provision of certain services to non-state actors that are better qualified to provide them. Multinational corporations, nonprofit organizations and criminal organizations are challenging the predominance of the state in providing services to their citizens. A new era of governance may have dawned, in which the focus of state governance is shifting from traditional monopoly provider of services to one of manager of a range of non-state actors providing services directly to citizens. The increased pervasiveness of non-state actors has led to calls for greater transparency regarding their operation, funding, organizational structure, and membership, so that both governments and individuals can monitor the performance of non-state actors more effectively.

As the influence of non-state actors grows, and the interaction between states and non-state actors expands, *transparency* may become a major tool in facilitating the adaptation to some of globalization’s effects, says Ann Florini (Florini:2000). An organization is transparent when information concerning its financial, administrative, and operational practices is available to the public. Observing that the vast majority of non-state actors do not practice transparency, Florini stresses the need for greater transparency as the influence of these actors grows. Florini observes that, even where transparency exists, the state finds it very difficult to obtain and manage such large amounts of data. Fortunately, transparency often makes large-scale data management by the state unnecessary. Some regulatory actions by the state have fostered transparency and consequently have led to changes in behavior through grassroots action rather than government enforcement. For example, the lowering of toxic waste levels by the US industry following the passage of the Community Right to Know Act resulted from public mobilization after the government required firms to make information about pollution levels from individual sites available to the public, not from enhanced government oversight.

Krasner's (Krasner:1999) observations focus on the fact that states do not have to be mere bystanders where standards and expectations are concerned. *First*, governments can and do actively participate in setting expectations. For example, Zartman (Zartman:2000) observes that, by promising their people extensive social services, communist and socialist regimes have had the effect of raising popular expectations concerning what constitutes adequate state capacity. At the other end of the spectrum, he notes that the people of disappearing and collapsed states will slowly reduce their expectations concerning the services the state should provide, often coming to expect non-state actors to fill gaps in the provision of services. This process can work both ways, however: revolutionary movements and other non-state actors can preemptively seek to change popular expectations in ways that make state capacity appear inadequate.

*Second*, state/governments may recognize that non-state actors might be the best agents to provide certain services that citizens reasonably expect. In many cases, a government can delegate control to these actors, meet the expectations of their citizens, and, if handled properly, actually gain legitimacy in the process.

*Third*, states can abdicate control over functions that have become too fractious or otherwise too hard to handle without loss of legitimacy. Krasner contends that the Peace of Westphalia incorporated just such an event: despite rhetorically endorsing the slogan *cuius regio eius religio* (the principle that the ruler could set the religion of his territory), at least within the Holy Roman Empire there was a commitment to religious toleration. The principalities of the Empire agreed to a con-societal form of decision-making that effectively denied rulers the right to act unilaterally on religious issues. Although this decision constituted a severe decrease in state capacity, states emerged as more unified political structures because they had shed responsibility for controlling an extremely contentious issue.

*Fourth*, Krasner states that sovereignty has four dimensions, which do not always work together, either logically or empirically. These dimensions are those; domestic sovereignty, or the authority structure within states and the degree to which that structure exercises internal control; interdependence sovereignty, or the control over cross-border

flows; international legal sovereignty, a set of rules by which territorially bounded political entities with juridical independence are recognized; and Westphalian sovereignty, or the exclusion of external authority over domestic issues. Krasner's multi-dimensional definition of sovereignty implies that a state can offset decreases in one dimension of sovereignty by increasing its reliance on another dimension over which it has greater control. For example, many of the factors eroding domestic sovereignty (the ability of government to exercise control within its territory) are based on flows. The state possessing the appropriate endowments may be able to partially offset the erosion of domestic sovereignty by subscribing to international agreements that strengthen its interdependence sovereignty (the ability of state government to regulate flows across its borders).

When assessing these impacts of non-state actors upon the nation state, the relationship between state capacity, legitimacy, cohesion, authority, control, and the condition of civil society does not appear to be straightforward. Significantly, it appears that a state/government can delegate significant *control* over activities within its borders to non-state actors – in effect reducing state *capacity* – without serious consequences in terms of *legitimacy* as long as; the standard of delegated services meets or exceeds popular *expectations*; the state retains the *authority* to regulate effectively the actions of non-state actors to which it has delegated control; and the citizenry attribute the new role of non-governmental organizations to a wise decision by the government to find creative ways to improve quality of life. The government's legitimacy may suffer if citizens perceive that its failure to provide services in the past was due to ineptitude, the result of corruption, or lack of concern for the masses.

Given the increased involvement of non-state actors and networks in carrying out essential elements of state performance, it is questionable whether there are minimal standards that states must maintain to preserve their legitimacy and cohesion. Discussion focused on identifying those state behaviors and societal conditions that were most likely to protect citizens from violence and poverty. Specifically, the project turned to recent research on state failure, where aggregate statistical analyses have enjoyed success in identifying what can be considered minimum standards of state performance. These studies have examined historical cases in which states succumbed to violence, which encompasses

both intrastate war and various kinds of intrastate conflict, as well as instances where states have experienced financial crises, which include both monetary and banking crises.

In a more interdependent world, globalization progresses will create more and more trans-sovereign problems that are not responsive to unilateral state action, but rather demand cooperative solutions involving many different kinds of actors in addition to states. In such cooperative ventures, the state must share power with other entities. These problems include the increasing porosity of borders, the growth of transnational crime, a general lack of transparency among non-state actors, the anticipated rapid growth of worldwide energy demand and its impact on global warming, and the concentration of population growth among the world's poorest people. The rise of non-state actors and the proliferation of trans-sovereign problems will pressure states to change the manner in which they exercise control over affairs in their territories. Governments will change from monopoly providers of services to managers of services that are provided both by the state and by a variety of non-state actors. A principal reason for this development is because popular expectations concerning the services that the state should supply have expanded since World War II. Many states are experiencing difficulty providing all of these services, and non-state actors, including criminal organizations, may step in to fill state capacity gaps. In other cases, governments may be capable of performing a given function, but it proves more efficient to delegate the responsibility for providing this service to a non-state actor specializing in the functional area in question.

Since each state possesses a unique combination of capacity, legitimacy, and cohesion, and will experience the effects of globalization and the rise of non-state actors differently, individual states will exhibit a wide range of responses to these trends. Some states will actually improve their legitimacy and cohesion by skillfully adapting to changing circumstances. A number of states will merely cope with the new developments: their governments will remain in power, but these states will not contribute meaningfully to solving pressing trans-sovereign problems, and their citizens' quality of life will lag behind. A number of states will not be able to cope with the challenges confronting them. Their governments may slowly lose legitimacy and collapse at some point.

Despite the general discussion on state collapse within globalization, Scholte (Scholte:2000:1512) points out that post-sovereign statehood does not involve significant problem for globalization process, rather it creates important problems for democracy. In the territorialized world, sovereignty, when it was invested through liberal-democratic institutions, provides a framework for democratic governance. The people could hope to control the state. However, by dissolving sovereign statehood, globalizing capitalism has made this traditional model of democracy impracticable. Transborder production, markets, monies and business association readily evade most democratic controls that might be attempted through a state. No mechanisms have been devised thus far to guarantee transparency, open debate and accountability in relationships between states and their supranational constituents. Trans-border process of surplus accumulation have marginalized not state but democracy.

Michael Mann (Mann:2000:1468-70) summarizes the arguments of globalism as follows. A global society is emerging. Capitalism now became global, transnational, post-industrial, informational, consumerist, neo-liberal and restructured. Global character of capitalism is undermining the nation state, its macro-economic planning, its collectivist welfare state, its citizens' sense of collective identity, its general caging of social life. New global limits, especially environmental and population threats, produce perhaps a new risk for society, which have become too broad and too menacing to be handled by the nation state alone. Identity politics and new social movements, using new technology, increase the salience of diverse local and transnational identities at the expense of both national identities and those broad class identities which were traditionally handled by nation state, and transnational civil society, social movements for peace, human rights and environmental and social reform are becoming truly global. Nuclearism undermines state sovereignty and hard geo-politics, since mass mobilization warfare underpinned much of modern state expansion yet is now irrational. Depending on these globalist adherences he argues that since national and international networks are constituted or fundamentally constrained by nation state, the future of nation state thus turns critically upon the answer to question of whether social significance of national and international networks is declining relative to some combination of local and transnational networks, and what the relative contribution of national/international versus local/transnational networks to the emergence of global networks.

In contrast to many, Palan (Palan:2000:140-4) treats the state and globalization not as contending and conflicting structures, but as mutually restructuring agents so that globalization shapes the nature of modern political authority just as the state shapes the nature of globalization. He reminds that the post feudal and absolutist state settled its territorial boundaries through dynastic marriages or wars; nation state of the nineteenth century sought to correct and settle its territorial boundaries on the principle of national self-determination; the modern competition state is increasingly presented as the most economically competitive form of political incorporation. He points out that globalization is the transition from second level of territorial rationalization to the third phase of territorial rationalization. These consist simultaneously of process of destruction and construction. The destructive sets of processes are often mistaken for the demise of nation state and the constructive aspects are largely ignored. The current globalization literature originating from the political economy embodies a presumed assumption that state and market are the two alternative apparatus for resource allocation. States and markets are viewed in this tradition as two alternative and competing modes of resource allocation so that the increasing scope of one implies by necessarily a reduced scope for the other. In this way a conceptual separation of politics from economics has become a presumed political conflict between state and market. This presumed conflict serves as the underlying model for the study of the state and globalization.

Palan argues that there is no particular reason why globalization should adversely affect the institutional framework of representation, which is the state. The significance of globalization lies in how it undermines the nation state theory of government and replaces it with a new concept of governance. The crucial point in Palan's arguments is that the new kind of governance represents a competitive character of the state. The nature of competition is determined by the market forces. The rising role of multi-national corporations, of regional economic institutions like NAFTA, EU and APEC and of global economic institutions are the indicators of the competitive character of nation state in the age of globalization. Thus state will not be totally overthrown by globalization rather its role and functions will be re-organized. State and market are not competing axis, on the contrary they feed, change and shape each other.

Zartman (Zartman:2000) describes several characterizations for state collapse that fall outside the ability of quantitative analysis to predict. For example, regimes can “quit.” In this case, the frustration resulting from trying to cope with globalization, increasingly numerous non-state actors, and high popular expectations may tire individual regimes to the point that the leadership steps down. A state may be “privatized” when non-state actors take over the functions that the government has proven unwilling or unable to perform. A state may be described as “disappearing” when its government becomes so ineffective at providing for its people’s needs that the citizenry no longer expects it to have any real capacity. The people look elsewhere for provision of vital security, health, and economic functions, perhaps finding that non-state actors (including criminal organizations) step in to fill the state’s shoes, and do so quite effectively. The regime may continue to exist as an entity, but it plays very little role in controlling activities in its territory, and its legitimacy is destroyed. Alternatively, if state cohesion was initially weak, the regime may collapse as insurgency movements seek to take its place. In the absence of a clear successor to the previous regime, the state becomes a “collapsed” state. It may also be useful to create the label of “coping” state. In a coping state, the government manages to maintain an adequate level of capacity, cohesion, and legitimacy to remain in power, but is not able to capitalize on the changing international environment to create increased quality of life for its people.

There is a general consensus on the point that states will remain the principal actors in international affairs in the near future, although individuals differ considerably regarding the degree of predominance states would retain. This range of views primarily stems from differing beliefs regarding the impact of globalization and the changing role of non-state actors. Some contend that the development of a more interdependent world would create more and more trans-sovereign problems that are not responsive to unilateral state action. But this does not imply that multilateral state action would be ineffective. Similarly, it was argued that the continuing rise of newly influential non-state actors and their networks would compete with the state for people’s allegiance in certain issue areas. At the other end of this debate, some argue that states possessed the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances rather than be overcome by them. Others assert that states governed in accordance with increasingly standardized performance criteria could

preserve legitimacy even while delegating to non-state actors the responsibility for providing various services within the state's territory.

These arguments have merits. Given the widely disparate capacities of states and varying popular standards of expected state performance, individual states will respond to globalization and the rise of non-state actors differently. Some states – developed states appear to have an advantage in this regard –are likely to use globalization-related developments and non-state actors as tools to improve their legitimacy and cohesion. Other states will not be able to handle the evolving international environment, and some of these will fail or collapse.

In conclusion, it seems that; states will remain the principal actors in the near future; unilateral state action will become less effective as trans-sovereign problems become more prevalent; ongoing globalization and the increasing influence of non-state actors will pressure states to change the *manner* in which they exercise authority over affairs in their territories; the increased numbers and influence of non-state actors that operate across state boundaries, and the need to grapple with trans-sovereign problems, will tend to create increasingly uniform standards of acceptable governmental performance; and given the diversity of influences at work, there will not be any single predominant outcome in terms of nation state adaptation to evolving international and domestic environments. Nation states are well structured to provide certain important services such as domestic security and the provision of justice. In addition, the state has proven itself to be a very flexible and adaptable form of political organization. However, there is a great difference among the social scientists regarding the degree of predominance states would retain. This range of views primarily stems from differing beliefs regarding the impact of globalization and the changing role of non-state actors.

Possible responses of nation state to the power of the global and the local are conducive to create imminent formation of its political legitimacy. The responses of the state could be grouped in three axes. *First* is related to the demands of advanced capitalism. National barriers to international trade, finance and investments are decreasing, for the states are expecting the agents of advanced capitalism to invest in their countries through which they could provide economic development and rising well-being of their

citizens. Accordingly, in domestic field states are leaving their economic functions through privatization and the deregulation of social security systems. All of these changes in the policies of state are done for the aim of attaining a proper functioning of the so-called market economy. However, these measures with regard to the demands of advanced capitalism seems not to produce the expected result, for the relative gap between the rich and the poor is increasing. This issue is crucial for the developed countries as well, for their investors are going to the poor areas of the world because of low wages, and in the result this process contributes to the increasing unemployment in the central countries. So the process and the legitimacy of both advanced and underdeveloped countries come into question from the point of view of the working segments of the society.

*Second* counterpart of state's responses is the demands of the global civil society, particularly with regard to the ecological problems. States responses in this area through inter-governmental arrangements, but those initiatives seem not to produce the expected result as well. This is primarily because of the nature of relation between advanced capitalism and state. The unequal treatment of the state to the demands of advanced capitalism and of global civil society produces question marks on its capacity and legitimacy to guarantee the survival of the earth as a whole.

*Third* kind of counterpart of the state's responses is the demands of the identity. In this area, the demands change from the local cultures to the recognition of the individual preferences in gender. State is in a crossroad of its conventional source of legitimacy and of rising demands that their fulfillment could directly damage its conventional commitments. For example, the cultural rights of local communities could result in illegitimation of the national identity, and the recognition of intra-sex marriage could damage the state's role in preserving its image of being as the guardian of the patriarchy.

Therefore, notwithstanding any retreat from or advance to of the state in order to respond to the one segment of global, local and individual demands would have a possibility of depreciating its conventional basis of political legitimacy, global, local and individual impositions and practices result in changes in the distinctive characteristics of the state that will be analyzed in the coming section.

## 5.2. Changes in the Distinctive Features of Nation State

Political structure, that what we call one or another kind of state in human spaces did always exist, which regulates the functioning of the community in the field of authority, politics, economics and social relations. In this sense political authority could be described as the common authority of a community. The existence of a common political authority is a universal characteristic of the humanity. One of the distinctive features of common political authority is the legitimate right to resort to violence that is monopoly of using legitimate violence.

By referring to the argument of Peter Berger that “the ultimate and, no doubt, the oldest means of social control is physical violence”, Poggi (Poggi:1990:5-7) argues that even in the politely operated societies of modern democracies the ultimate argument is violence. No state can exist without a police force or its equivalent in armed might. This ultimate violence may not be used frequently. There may be innumerable steps in its application, in the way of warnings and reprimands. But if all the warnings are disregarded, even in so slight a matter as paying a traffic ticket, the last thing that will happen is that a couple of cops show up at the door with handcuffs and a Black Maria.” Poggi argues that what we should consider as unique to political power, as conceptually intrinsic to it, is control over the means of violence, rather than the direct and frequent recourse to their employment. In any case, the non-coercive aspects of political experience, or indeed of political power, are numerous and significant.

A central feature of political power, once it is stabilized, standardized into authority, is that its exercise takes the form of the issuing commands. A command on the one hand is always explicitly or implicitly complemented by an or else clause, a pointer to the command giver’s ability to use coercion in order to overcome recalcitrance or resistance on the part of the person receiving the command. On this account, there is a distinctive factuality to commands, an implicit reminder that ‘we have ways to make you obey’. On the other hand, a command is a thoroughly inter-subjective operation. By means of it one subject seeks to initiate and control another subject’s activity. It is also symbolic in nature, and presupposes the other subject’s ability to entertain and interpret the message addressed to him. Commands are not given for the sake of giving them; whether or not

they evoke obedience is not a matter of indifference to the giver of a command. In case of disregarding the command by its receiver, command giver can prefer to do the 'we have ways ...' component of the command. However, command givers consider a compliance exacted through fear as less reliable, more brittle and niggardly than a compliance willingly granted by a person convinced that the command giver is morally entitled to expect obedience, and correspondingly feeling morally obligated to grant it. A political power relationship, other things being equal, is made more secure, and its exercise more effective and less costly, to the extent that it can credibly appeal to principles establishing such an obligation. It may be said to be legitimate to the extent that it can do so.

Poggi (Poggi:1990:9-19) accepts that there are economic, normative and political forms of social power, but political power has functional priority over the others. For it consists of safeguarding a given society's territorial boundaries against aggression and encroachment from outsiders. Otherwise, other forms of social powers can lose their reason of existence. Political power is paramount. On the other hand within a given society political power is the ultimate one in using violence. Violence appears as the facility of last resort in shaping and managing interpersonal relations. Physical violence has the particularity of producing direct result, immediately, without recourse to media of communication. It addresses the integrity of human body in direct, immediately graspable and comprehensible fashion. One another feature should be added to the characteristics of paramouncy and ultimacy of political power, that is, it carries a feature of monopoly in the domestic affairs. Monopoly particularly should be attached to the feature of ultimacy. Political power is ultimate, because the state is a monopoly in using physical violence. Paramouncy, ultimacy and monopoly of the political power raise the term of 'sovereignty' as a factual ground and theoretical meaning. The modern state is an organization so far as it exercised through a set of purposes and fully contrived arrangements – a body of rules, a series of roles, a reserve of resources that is committed to a distinctive, unified and unifying set of interests and purposes. Ideally, coercion should figure within political activity as a background potentiality, and in the foreground should stand instead process of a different nature, which appeal directly to loyalty, custom, shared advantage, conviction and obligation. Even commands should appeal as much as possible to insight and grounds, rather than fear.

The distinctive feature of the political authority in traditional and modern societies is the monopoly over the use of violence. What distinguishes modern state from its traditional forms is the change in the functioning of the political authority. The modern nation state is defined as a specialized type of political organization characterized by a full-time, specialized, professional work force of tax-collectors, soldiers, policemen, bureaucrats and the like that exercises supreme political authority over a defined territory with a permanent population, independent from any enduring external political control and possessing a local predominance of coercive power (always supplemented with moral and remunerative incentives as well) great enough to maintain general obedience to its laws or commands within its territorial borders. Roving bands of hunter-gatherers and even fairly sizable and complex tribal societies based on herding or agriculture have existed without any full-time specialized state organization, and these "stateless" forms of political organization have in fact prevailed for all of the prehistory and much of the history of the human species (Paul Johnson, Dept. of Political Science, Auburn University).

One has to look at this picture over a very *longue durée*. In the early days of the modern world-system, in the sixteenth century, states were generally very weak and generally not very legitimated as it is outlined in modern political science. Absolute monarchs, in their various guises, sought to proclaim their authority over very recalcitrant local barons and subject populations. Some succeeded better than others. The states began to use the cement of nationalist sentiments to create a minimum level of legitimacy. This kind of nationalist cement only began to take hold seriously in the period following the *French Revolution*. The crucial element that transformed the situation was the rise of the concept that sovereignty resided in the people. Once this idea became widespread, the people were defined as nations, and the nations became the supporting structures of the states. Nations did not descend from the skies; they were created. States and intellectuals worked hard at creating nations. Two of the most effective mechanisms were primary education and military service. Slowly, one language or one variant of a linguistic family, tended to become dominant, in large part through state pressure. Patriotism now became a *leitmotiv* of national life.

There was however a big problem in the nineteenth century. The expansion of capitalist enterprise deepened a cleavage within the nation. Marx called this the "class

struggle." Whatever the formula, the reality threatened the entire project of legitimating the state structures. Curiously, both rightwing and leftwing forces worked not together but side by side to overcome this cleavage. The rightwing forces emphasized national unity against external enemies. Leftwing forces had no truck with patriotic jingoism. Instead, they emphasized the importance of taking control of the state structures themselves by the popular forces. They promised that, if this happened, the popular forces in power could transform the world, or more specifically the nation. What this did was to offer long-term hope. The popular movements promised their followers fundamental change. The price was the work of political mobilization and struggle in the present, to be rewarded by a better world in the future. This had the effect that the followers of popular movements saw the state, once it was in their hands or about to be, as a positive force for fundamental change. They therefore legitimated the state, at least the state when their movements were in power (Wallerstein:2000).

Therefore, as it is analyzed in the thesis so far, the distinctive features of modern liberal-democratic nation state are capacity, identity, rationality, territoriality, sovereignty, unity, autonomy and political legitimacy. However, under the global context those distinctive characteristics of nation state would be subject to fundamental changes as a result of global, local and individual impositions, which will be handled briefly in the rest of this section.

**Authority – Capacity :** Regardless of whether a fundamental change in the international system is underway, state capacity is expected to decrease in the coming century as a result of globalization and the increasing influence of non-state actors and their networks. This conclusion is based on three principal reasons. *First*, John Steinbruner (Steinbruner:2000) notes that states seem naturally suited to provide certain essential or core services that will continue to legitimize them unless individual regimes practice such poor governance that they drive their citizens to look for alternatives. This first reason is linked to the issue that states will turn back to their essential and primary commitments in the age of globalization, for other services would be undertaken by local and global agents. These essential commitments include the maintenance of law and order and the provision of justice. *Second*, Stephen Krasner (Krasner:1999) contends that states are a very flexible form of political order with many tools at their disposal – including a

bendable definition of sovereignty – for co-opting and otherwise accommodating increasing interdependencies and the emergence of newly-empowered non-state actors. Non-flexibility is related to the nature of nation state that is sovereign character. Sovereignty does not permit the state to re-organize itself to share its power with emerging local and global agents. However, strict pursuance of sovereignty does not mean that the capacity of the state is adequate to cope with emerging issues. In other words, sovereignty invokes a breaking in state structure, which is related to the comparative rising capacity of non-state actors. *Third*, Krasner, in the distinction he draws between the concepts of state control and state authority, and Stephen Flynn (Flynn:2000) who best illustrated this distinction through his discussion of the problems resulting from the increasing porosity of borders, calls attention to the fact that the *legitimacy* that citizens ascribe to their state's government is not directly proportional to the government's ability to control directly events within its territory.

Zartman believes that popular expectations of state capacity peaked during the heyday of communist regimes (whose expectations were successfully exported to many post-colonial states) and may now be declining. Assessing shifting public attitudes towards state performance requires identifying an appropriate baseline from which to judge the effects of current trends. The expected decrease in state capacity is direct result of globalization and localization. This two dimensional erosion constricts the state in a position in which there could be little compromise between the expectation and the capacity. Global problems, such as environmental pollution, nuclear threat and underdevelopment and local identity-culture adherence demands the state what it could not be able to fulfill. The resulting silence of the state depreciates its authority that erodes further its capacity.

**Identity - Unity – Rationality - Universality :** At the beginning of the formation of nation state, absolutist rulers sought to homogenize and rationalize their territories in the belief that diversity encourages factionalism and conflict. The slow process of homogenization, the enclosure movement and the rise of market encouraged the breakdown of the self-enclosed communities. The breakdown of self-enclosed communities brought the question of mechanic or natural ordering, monitoring, administering and functioning apparatus of the new system. Statist order penetrated and

dominated more comprehensively every aspect of social life. The changes in social relations and modes of production brought the end of natural law understanding. Dynamic and evolutionary social theories like Hegel's and Kant's began to shape the nature of state. The breakdown of traditional communities resulted in individualization of the object of scientific inquiry. With the atomization of the individuals the state came to a privileged position of being the organizer of the people. The rise of individualism brought the assumption of a shared destiny of a group of people. Shared destiny consequently resulted in the emergence of consciousness of shared responsibility and collective choice. Then the nation began to be understood as a self-organizing organic unity, which represented best by the state mechanism. In the final analysis, the ideas of shared destiny, collective choice and shared responsibility re-organized the social classes among which national bargaining processes were settled, whose conclusions were culminated in the state actions and policies. Within all these processes and changes the principles of nation state in the area of politics, society, law, economy and culture were configured.

In the rising stages of nation state, national identity, state's organizational unity, political rationality and state's universality as a political organization had filled the gap after the collapse of traditional kinds of society and political structure. However, as a result of globalization two main characteristics of the state, which had earlier established its distinctiveness and superiority as a form of institutionalized political power center began to be eroded; unity and rationality. Unity characterizes primarily the state's structure, designed to connect systematically all social units engaged in political activities within the territory to a single center. In that design, the center exercises supreme political initiative, and activates and controls all those other units, treating them as components in a complex division of political labor, which it unilaterally ordains and monitors. Even if we consider just a state's administrative apparatus, we must today think of it as making up instead a vast, diverse, complex organizational environment. The units of this are themselves discrete, largely autonomous organizations. These are strongly insulated from effective guidance and supervision on the part of higher level units, and routinely engage in competition among themselves, or form coalitions with one another in order to evade and resist the feeble attempts of those higher level units affectively to perform their official guiding and supervising role. The loss of unity among the administrative components of the state's structure is due not only to their proliferation and

diversification, and to the attendant, ever-growing distance between them and the purported center of unitary initiative and control. It also flows from the fact that many administrative units establish close, privileged relationships with organized social interests, or that these in turn, seek to use administrative units as their own bridgeheads within the state apparatus.

Rationality characterizes primarily the state's mode of operation. In the state, arbitrium and the appeal to tradition, which had long been the primary ways in which the conduct of rulers had been oriented and justified, are to be supplanted by purposeful, reflexively articulated choice between rationally assessed alternatives of action. Structured originally as a unitary system, the state was also supposed to rationalize the social process, to adopt and follow valid criteria in performing the political functions, which had become its exclusive prerogative. It consisted in the negative conclusion that a ruler might have to disregard the dictates of religion and morality in pursuing the realms of greatness and security; positively it saw too exclusively the ruler's personal qualities of leadership as the source of the rationality to be applied to that pursuit. In contemporary state, rationality of state action has been grounded on the construction of the process of democratization on the one hand and of technocratization on the other.

The essence of democratic process lies in the extent to which the state opens itself at all levels to inputs of demand and support on the part of the population, so that its action can attend to the population's multiple, varying interests and preferences. In this view, what make state action rational is its responsiveness to social needs, rather than its accountability to public opinion. However, increasing complexity of advanced industrial societies makes it implausible to expect much rationality from a state operating according to that understanding. Social demands are too multiple, varying, impatient and contradictory that a state effectively opening itself to them can develop no coherent policy. In the extreme liberal views, the state in general and the government in particular, as independent of all economic commitments and as arbiter among the competing parties, is seen as a technical issue. The issue of 'technical' is associated with the results of scientific inquiry and analysis. But, the fragility of objectivity and of pure scientific facts in social issues raises some doubts in the technocratic rationalization of state action (Poggi:1990:183-9).

The technical aspect of state rationality began to be problematized in the age of globalization, particularly as a result of localization of identity and culture and of gender politics. In fact the critics against the technical rationality of the state entails critics directed to the heart of political liberalism. Especially, the enforcement of global capitalism, which upholds liberal state neutrality causes that state is deemed as an agent of advanced capitalism by the deprived segments of the society. The erosion in the identity, unity and rationality of nation state results in erosion in the universality claim of the state as the sole political organization as well. For a long time, nation state utilized from the image that it is the only alternative political organization for fulfillment of people's material and non-material expectations. However, globalization process and subsequent results showed that nation state could be inadequate or inappropriate for overcoming the emerging issues of globalism and cultural diversity. Therefore, global forces and local upheavals depreciate the unity, identity, rationality and universality of nation state.

**Autonomy – Sovereignty - Territoriality :** Owing largely to the growth of trans-border capital, sovereignty in the traditional understanding of the world has been deemed by many theorists impracticable in the late twentieth century. Sovereignty in classical formula entailed the autonomy and territoriality of the state as well. Leaders in many countries continue regularly to speak of 'defending sovereignty', however, sovereignty is no longer in place to defend. In most cases, governments have not pursued 'deregulation' in the economy as a result of sovereign initiative, but because they assume that such steps would be indispensable to job creation, technology transfer and general economic prosperity in a globalizing world. On the whole, contemporary states would rather compete to attract capital rather than compete to acquire territory (Scholte:2000:1508).

The rise of trans-sovereign problems and trans-sovereign solutions does not mean that the state will disappear, but that sovereignty is changing. In democratizing states, and states undergoing transitions after empire, state capacity has declined. Regime effectiveness suffers as new political and economic institutions are constructed while day-to-day governance must continue. However, legitimacy may be increasing in these states even though state capacity is decreasing. In developed states, one might argue that globalization's open markets, societies, and technologies are increasing state capacity.

However, even in the most powerful states, such as the United States, the public sector is either shrinking or not growing as fast as the private sector. Relative to the private sector, state capacity has decreased, leading even the strongest states to enter into partnerships with non-state actors to try to manage trans-sovereign problems, from money laundering to cyber-crime. In some developing countries, disproportionate growth in the private sector versus the public sector allowed criminal and terrorist networks to grow faster than the state's ability to respond. Democratic, capitalist states are not able to increase state capacity radically without compromising ideological principles that underlie the legitimacy of the state. Non-state actors are able to make relatively free use of significant prior investments in global infrastructure. States will not wither away; citizens still expect states to provide justice, peace, and collective representation. However, the private sector is investing in information technology faster and more extensively than the public sector.

The private sector also uses more adaptive, network organizational structures, which are faster and more fluid than the public sector's preferred organizational form, the hierarchical bureaucracy. This means that the private sector's capacity is increasing in technology, information, speed of response, adaptive organizational structures, resources, personnel, and competency relative to state capacity. States' attempts to work with the private sector to manage trans-sovereign problems (by borrowing, buying, or deferring to private sector capacity) may have the unintended effect of further undermining and changing sovereignty. A good example to this case is that there were some claims in 2002 March that a multinational energy giant, Enron, committed into tax evasion and also some other big firms attempted financial manipulations. So-called the most powerful state, the United States, seems to unable to totally control the activities of private sector. This case brings into the question of the legitimacy of political authority.

Krasner (Krasner:2001) states that when philosophers, Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, first elaborated the notion of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were concerned with establishing the legitimacy of a single hierarchy of domestic authority. Although Bodin and Hobbes accepted the existence of divine and natural law, they both believed that the concept of sovereignty was law. Subjects had no

right to revolt. They realized that imbuing the sovereign with such overweening power invited tyranny, but they were predominantly concerned with maintaining domestic order, without which they believed there could be no justice. More recently, sovereignty has come to be associated with the idea of control over trans-border movements. When contemporary observers assert that the sovereign state is just about dead, they do not mean that constitutional structures are about to disappear. Instead, they mean that technological change has made it very difficult, or perhaps impossible, for states to control movements across their borders of all kinds of tangible and non-tangible inputs.

The rapid advance in information technologies and the rise of private sector in the emerging sectors damages the autonomy and territoriality of the state that results in serious depreciation in sovereignty. Autonomy, territoriality and sovereignty have been further impinged by emerging global problems as well, for any territory is no more immune from those problems.

**Stability – Security :** Stability and security were the two main results of the rationality and territoriality of the state in the past. Stability was related to the domestic order, while security was related to the external stability. Stability within the state, according to William Zartman (Zatman:2000), is tied to an appropriate balance in the types and amounts of functions a state performs. Basically, citizens surrender some of their wealth and forgo certain liberties to live in a given state, and the ruling regime provides services, including some commitment to improving quality of life and the enforcement of law and order. State collapse is predicated upon the failure of the regime to provide *expected* services. The expectations of the citizenry are predicated upon the amount of taxes they pay and the liberties they forgo. Zartman contends that an enormous increase in expectations has occurred since World War II. The state is not being replaced, but the number of functions that society expects it to perform has increased dramatically.

Since states vary considerably in their ability to provide all of these additional functions, non-state actors have taken on many of them. In addition to taking over state functions, Zartman notes that non-state actors could raise or lower public expectations regarding certain state functions. When Susan Strange says that the nature of states and their behavior has changed, she means that industrial policy and trade policy are becoming

more important than defense and foreign policy. States are obliged by structural change to seek commercial allies rather than military ones. The conclusion that peace or war is no longer the core problematique [of international studies] poses the question, 'If not that, then what is, or are, the issues?' If interstate war is on the way out, that is, incidentally, one very good reason for the declining authority of the state. The state was once the guardian of national security; its right to loyalty and obedience and its authority to levy taxes rested fundamentally on that role. If the role goes, and if it is then insufficiently replaced by the welfare role of the state as guardian against economic insecurity, it is little wonder that its authority declines (Strange:1995). In other words, stability and security are losing their conventional meaning.

**Political Legitimacy :** For the pioneer attitude in discussing globalization, that is the capitalist expansion, when state legitimacy is debated, it is linked directly to the functioning of global capitalism. Scholte (Scholte:2000:1492-1503) argues that in one way or another, discussions of globalization usually highlight the question of borders, that is, the territorial demarcations of state jurisdiction, and associated issues of governance, economy, identity and community. Globalization, in terms of proliferation of cross-border exchanges, is in effect synonymous with 'internationalization'. The term 'globalization' denotes increased movements between countries of goods, investments, people, money, messages and ideas. From this perspective, greater global interconnectedness means no more and no less than deepened international interdependence.

Globalization, in terms of large-scale opening of borders as states remove countless regulatory barriers to international trade, travel, financial flows and communication, is synonymous with 'liberalization'. On this account, the term describes the creation of a single borderless world. Opening borders will yield integration and a unitary global economy will replace with national economies; a global government will replace territorial states; a hegemonic culture will replace diverse local cultures; and allegiances to a global community will replace national loyalties. Contrary to liberal presumptions, every market requires a framework of rules, and states have created much of the regulatory environment in which transborder capital has thrived, governments have facilitated global firms operations and profits with suitably constructed property

guarantees, investments codes, currency regulations, tax regimes, labor laws and police protection.

A great deal of globalization would not unfold, if state did not sponsor the process. Mann (Mann:2000:1487) argues that so-called threats to nation state, those are capitalist transformation, environmental limits, identity politics and nuclearism of defense, may not absolutely decrease the legitimate position of nation state and increase the possibility of a global society. Rather, the effects of these trends should be analyzed on two main dimensions. *First*, some impact of these trends is weakening nation state while some other impact strengthening it. *Second* dimension is that those weakening nation state are strengthening trans-nationalism and those strengthening nation state are endangering the possibility of a truly global society.

Most of the economic life had never come into the realm of the state in the modest nation state, liberal-democratic states of the Western Europe and North America in Mann's definition, what we call private property. Also modest nation state triumphed three rivals in the nineteenth century, first was the multinational empires of Habsburg, Romanovs and Ottomans, second was Nazism and third was Communism. The latter two rivals attempted to achieve the monopoly of morality and economic life, which modest nation states never did. After the dissolution of Soviet Bloc, modest nation state might seem to dominate the entire globe. Only a few states do not base their legitimacy on the nation, or lack a monopoly of domestic coercion or real territorial boundedness. Almost all manage to implement policies oriented towards basic population control, health and education. And also all they try to implement the basic principles of liberalism. So in Mann's term, in a sense, that what is globalized is globalization of the modest nation state. Mann claims that depending on the liberal principles of freedom of entrepreneurship and rights of property, capitalism began to gain a global character.

But, its globalized feature is limited in contrast to the position modest nation state. For most global capitalist transactions are centered between and among the three centers of the globe, North America, Western Europe and Japan. However, it is a fact that this limited set of transactions attempts to enlarge itself through the arrangements of international economic organizations that have global appeals (Mann:2000:1472-4). The

nature of liberal-democratic state in the twentieth century began to change as a result of new political movements and of the penetration of state into the private realm. States are asked to legislate and enforce legal-moral conduct in what had been private arenas. For example, individual can no longer pollute the public environment by smoking, or can no longer beat his wife or children. Much of the new legislation is paradoxically framed in the spirit of not restrictiveness, but of extending personal freedoms. Gays may practice their life-style openly and women may abort unwanted fetuses. But this result is not of a neo-liberal absence of state regulation, but it is related to the re-definition of public and private spheres (Mann:2000:1485).

Political legitimacy in liberal-democratic states has two fundamental basis; *first* is the liberal value of private property (freedom and material wealth), and *second* is the democratic value of self-determination which result in the definition of private-public spheres. Modern nation state has politically utilized for a long time a legitimate position, for it was able to combine liberal and democratic values within a coherent political structure. But, in globalization process, because the liberal values particularly in the field of economy is confronted by the territorial state thereby critics against political legitimacy comes from the liberal economy, self-determination side of political legitimacy seems to be enclosed to a certain extent. Nonetheless, the issue of political legitimacy of the state is more complex than simply reflecting the demands of advanced capitalism and economic liberalism. This issue will be debated in detail in the next two chapters, but here I have to point out that political legitimacy of the state is closely related to the developments and changes in capacity, unity, rationality, territoriality, sovereignty and security aspects. In other words, political legitimacy is the culmination of the distinctive characteristics of modern nation state. For example, any change, increase or decrease, in the capacity of the state is expected to reflect in the degree of its political legitimacy. So, afro-mentioned changes in the characteristics of modern state will create discussion about its legitimate position as well.

I have tried to explore the way of changes in the distinctive characteristics of the modern state as a result of the initiatives of both global and local actors. *The authority and capacity* of the state is decreasing as a result of its retreat from certain areas of policies. Lessening functions of the state or ‘deregulation’ results in the disintegration of *identity*,

*rationality, unity and universality* of the state. Its unity is vulnerable to both global and local impositions, its rationality is being questioned on the ground its decreasing capacity in solving the emerging global problems, its universality as ahistorical political structure is being eroded as a result of emerging global and local alternatives, all of which depreciate its uniqueness of its identity. Global and local web of relations are undermining its *autonomy, sovereignty and territoriality*. Any state in the global context is not immune from being affected from the developments out of its physical borders. The fundamental changes in those characteristics of the state result in decreasing expectation of its citizens from the state to provide *stability and security*. In other words, stability and security that could be classically provided by the state to its citizens are not anymore under the tutelage of the state. Decrease, erosion and depreciation in those characteristics of the state bring its *political legitimacy* into question.

In this chapter I have tried to analyze the possible responses of nation state to the emerging demands and operations of the global and the local actors and the changes in its distinctive characteristics. These changes have serious implications for shifts in the classical basis of political legitimacy. But before going into the analysis of this shift within the global context, in the next chapter, I will try to examine the historical evolution of political legitimacy of nation state in order to show that although there are some universal characteristics of political legitimacy, it is subject to historical evolution as a result of some contextual impositions.

## CHAPTER VI

### CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

So far I have tried to explore the issue of globalization and the position of nation state in global context with reference to theory and to actual practices, from hereon the most delicate issue for the state on the account of globalization discussions, that is political legitimacy, will be debated. As I have stated before, issue of political legitimacy of the state is the most significant one in the axis of the discussions of globalization and the role of nation state. Advocates of globalization stress on the point that if there are fundamental changes in the functions and the roles of the state, this proves that the basis of its political legitimacy is shifting at best, or terminating at worst. Even though the actual changes in the nature of the state under the global context is a fact, this changing nature alone does not presume the future of nation state. Rather, the issue of political legitimacy is being problematized through which the future of the roles of the state are presumed and shaped. For legitimacy is very critical in transforming a structure. If you have 'legitimate' causes in changing or preserving any structure, the actual occurrences in the future are shaped and designed within the framework of those 'legitimate' causes. So in this chapter I will try to explore the historical evolution of political legitimacy in classical terms in order to prepare a conceptual framework for the analysis of shifts in political legitimacy within the global context that will be the subject matter of the last chapter.

#### 6.1. Distinctive Features of Political Legitimacy

In human conduct of relations, there are many kinds of legitimacy bonds, but political legitimacy has distinctive features from other kinds of legitimacy argumentation. What distinguishes political legitimacy from other kinds of legitimacy, such as moral and legal? Barker (Barker:1990:22) summarizes two approaches to political legitimacy. *First*, he suggested that the legitimacy of states and of political arrangements should be seen as parts of a complex set of social and economic values within which, either specifically or

by implication, the state and government play a subordinate or secondary role. Political or governmental legitimacy, if it is dealt with at all, thus becomes derived from other forms of legitimacy and is one aspect of the justification of an entire social and economic order. The collapse of political legitimacy into either justification of the entire social order, or no more than an expression of pragmatic support for the material or other consequences of government results in a general deficiency, because it empties the concept of legitimacy of any precise political meaning. Either it dissolves or erodes the distinctions between political and other relationships, or by seeing political legitimacy as part of a continuous spectrum of values and aspirations, removes the claim to inherent authority, which distinguishes political legitimacy from the approval or disapproval of the character or consequences of an economic system. To deny or accept the legitimacy of an economic order is to adopt a far less precise moral stance. For to say that a state is not legitimate, is to say that it has no right to enforce its commands, and that its commands therefore should not be obeyed, or obeyed only at the point of a gun. To say that an economic order lacks legitimacy may mean no more than to deplore its distributive consequences, or the value it places on labor or innovation.

So the strong response insists that there are three principal differences between political and other forms of legitimacy. *First*, political legitimacy is a justification of a right to do specific and distinct things; enforce commands which cannot be counter-commanded, and to have a monopoly of such legitimate enforcement. *Second*, political legitimacy involves an accredited moral claim, which is both more specific and more absolute than the moral claims advanced on behalf of social or economic arrangements. It is a clear and absolute assertion with consequences for identifiable action, rather than a broad statement of moral approval with no necessary consequences for action. *Third*, political legitimacy, though it identifies an author, an authority, the exerciser of legitimate power, the nature of that authority derives either from the character of the institution or persons claiming or enjoying it, or from the procedures which they follow in taking or exercising power, rather than from the substance of what they do or what they say they wish to do. In the *second* approach, legitimacy is mere rhetoric masking or sustaining the pursuit of power or interests. For the use of legitimacy is not comprehensible as an instrument to maintain obedience, unless someone is convinced by the claim to legitimacy. Legitimacy is itself not adequately understood as an independent cause of loyalty. The

second approach in particular is very critical of Weber's account of legitimacy, since it identifies legitimacy as a belief of subjects, is indifferent to the reasons which may exist for approving or disapproving of a system of government (Barker:1990:25).

For Weber (Weber:1948:78-80), the state was to be seen as an institution characterized not by the function it performed, but by the means it used. Its characteristic means, which it denied or attempted to deny to all other institutions and persons, is the monopoly of legitimate coercion. There are both inner justifications and external means whereby the domination of subjects by states is made possible. The external means and the inner justifications are different resources or aspects of government, and different characteristics of its exercise. The external means consist of the control of governing apparatus and of the material means for running it and using coercion, and of the obedience of the subject population. That obedience may be obtained in reality by highly robust motives of fear and hope – fear of the vengeance of magical powers of the power holders, hope for reward in this world or in the beyond – and besides all this, by interests of the most varied sort. In the same way the loyalty of those who actually run the government machine is secured not only by legitimacy, but also by personal interests, material reward and social honor, which constitutes the inner justification. The inner justifications are a part of what he meant by legitimacy. Weber's third kind of legitimacy, legal-rational, is the domination by virtue of legality, by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional competence based on rationally created rules. This is domination as exercised by the modern state. Legitimacy as used by Weber has two aspects; it is both a contributor to domination, and a justification of it. It is both a belief held by subjects and a claim made by rulers. It seems that for Weber legitimation is both a necessary condition for the exercise of power, and a psychological condition for its enjoyment.

Saward (Saward:1992:35), by interpreting Weber's account of legitimacy, argues that Weber did not think about the outcomes of the state actions, he focused just on the source of legitimacy and formal procedures of its representation. For Habermas (Habermas:1975:95), if the criteria of moral legitimacy are to be independent of perceptions, then they must be truth-dependent. He recognizes the unbreakable link between legitimacy and perceived legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy is based on the

reception of validity-claims stemming from a certain conception of what constitutes moral legitimacy, be the reception ever imperfect. However, this is where the most crucial problems arise in his account of moral legitimacy. Moral legitimacy for him can only arise if the arbiter of validity-claims is no less than 'truth'. In other words, it is only through discourse that what is truly moral can be known. The highest stage of moral consciousness corresponds to a universal morality, which can be traced back to fundamental norms of rational speech. Saward (Saward:1992:38).criticizes the view of Habermas on the point that the basis of moral legitimacy, attainable through discourse conducted in ideal conditions, will be truth-dependent is very difficult to sustain. The view implies that discourse could lead to what would be in effect 'a theory of good' that is truth. For a variety of reasons, however, there could be no guarantee that one result could emerge from the discourse.

The introduction of a political theory based on the sovereignty of the individual citizen would lead, through the translation of that theoretical right into constitutional and governmental practice, to the domination by the state over all individuals, institutions, cultures and traditions. Conservatives have presented democracy as an actually observable but theoretically unacceptable legitimation for mass tyranny. In a democratic state if the legitimacy is reduced just to the representation, there will be no room for questioning the outcomes, which is uncomfortable to somebody. Then the criticism will be directed to the procedures or character of the representative system on the account that they are inadequate for fulfilling the people's will (Barker:1990:69). In a liberal pluralist theory the actions of the state are seen as properly and predominantly neutral and flexible reflex or expression of other forces and institutions, and its role is principally to be seen as one of meeting and coordinating the needs and desires of those forces and institutions. If state's actions are merely the current balance of interests, why should losers obey?

Legitimacy is likely to be threatened either when there is a challenge to the status of major conservative institutions or when there are major groups, which do not have access to political power (Barker:1990:75). Marx's critical account of capitalist society meant that he is concerned principally to show why it could not, in theory, justify allegiance, rather than why or in what manner it might in practice enjoy it. His accounts of actual obedience derived from an assumption that such obedience arose from irrationality.

Marx perceived that in so far as people accorded the state and its decisions, which were the result of political action of any authority, they did so because they failed to understand the nature of state, politics and society. And in so far as there was a view of the historical explanation, as opposed to the logical status, of a belief in legitimacy implied in this argument, it was that such legitimacy was a part of what Marx meant by ideology. If there was an historically discoverable belief that the state deserved obedience, this belief was seen as functional to the dominance of a class state and of the interests, which it sustained. Successor Marxist thinkers developed this idea of Marx. Gramsci's term hegemony was an innovative concept by which he meant that state maintained themselves in part by ideological means, by securing, through the enjoyment and manipulation of ideas and values, the willing obedience of their subjects, and in part by coercion. The normal exercise of hegemony in the area, which has become classical, that of the parliamentary regimes, is characterized by the combination of force and consensus, which vary in their balance with each other, without force exceeding consensus too much. Thus hegemony tries to achieve that force should appear to be supported by the agreement of the majority, expressed by the so called organs of public opinion newspapers and associations.

The objection raised by pluralists to the democratic description, as opposed to the democratic justification, of modern politics is that it made the mistake of assuming that because all people have equal moral claims, they all have equal political power. If, as elitists of various kinds have argued, in a way which distinguishes them from both Marxists and democrats, political and governmental power is exercised by and depends on minorities rather than masses, there are consequences for an account of legitimacy. Legitimacy is differently composed for different persons and different groups. In so far as the state uses different methods to govern depending both on the nature of the function and the character of the subjects, the accompanying form and intensity of legitimacy may also be expected to differ. The relative use made by the state of legitimacy, coercion, habit and reared changes both over time and over geographical and social space. Legitimacy with some has greater prominence than legitimacy with others, and thus not only will the state seek to maintain differently justified obedience at different times, but different legitimations of obedience at the same time but with different groups. Different sections of the population may be involved in different kinds of legitimate relationships with government.

Physical coercion and legitimacy cannot be separated as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they sustain one another. Physical force works partly because of the clear coercive superiority of the coercer, but partly also because of the assumption by the those not coerced that coercion will be accepted (Barker:1990:132-6). Anarchists who have believed in propaganda by the deed have often hoped that it would be effective through the deeds it provoked rather than through those it actually committed. It was part of the tactic of anarchists in the 1890s and situationists in the 1960s and 1970s to provoke the state to violence in the expectation that this violence would undermine legitimacy or, as they would argue, reveal the state's true nature. For anarchists, the state would lose its legitimate claims on its subjects by showing the true nature of all states, and hence the illegitimacy of all states. Coercion is a dangerous weapon in the hands of the state when it attempts to sustain, let alone extend, its won legitimacy. A state, which can only coerce its subjects is not governing them, it is at war with them. Government is characterized by both claims and recognition of a monopoly of legitimate coercion, and in the articulation of that legitimacy, the state and its personnel are likely to be amongst the principal contributors. The foundations of legitimacy are seen to lie in the economic and social relationships between subjects, and in the state's part in sustaining them.

States frequently find alleged external threats convenient ways of justifying existing or new powers. Nor need the threat be presented as exclusively external. The real or alleged external threat of foreign arms is often linked to internal subversion by the state's propagandists in order to present dissent as treason. This is both the most powerful instrumental argument, and the argument used most frequently to defend the state's most secret and oppressive actions. It was a device fictionally described by George Orwell, when he presented a regime, which regularly employed largely invented foreign and internal threats to sustain the enthusiastic submission of its people. The advantage of the tactic is that the external enemy can be extended to include internal political opponents (Barker:1990:151).

Yet both pluralist theory and Marxist theory see the breakdown of legitimacy as principally as consequence of the state's failure to meet political and economic expectations which, if not the creation of, are the political property of, subjects. The

creation and maintenance of legitimacy is thus seen as a result of the state's success in responding to external, societal demands. To that extent the source of strain upon legitimacy lies in the first instance in the social and economic arrangements of society or in the actions, expectations, and conditions of its members. Legitimacy is secure, or eroded, in so far as the state with greater or lesser success meets these expectations. For the pluralists this is so because government is seen largely as a reflexive activity, so that even satisfactions and dissatisfactions about essentially political matters are expressed through government rather than created by it. For the Marxists, it is the economic relations, which form the basis for the political and governmental ones, and the state's legitimacy is challenged either when it fails to deliver the goods to the people, or the effective means of producing the goods to the capitalists.

The presumption, that no taxation without representation, was the corner stone of the state-civil society relation in the liberal democracies. Taxation, as an absolute authority of the state that has been conceived within its sovereign bounds, has been rejected on theoretical grounds that if the taxed persons are excluded from the political power, then the taxation activity of the state will be illegitimate one, so as the state itself. The idea of contract can still be of some usefulness in giving an account of legitimacy. For although a contract may never have been made, and although subjects may have no articulate conception of such a thing, there will be circumstances where a contract, dormant but implicit, has been articulated in response to its being breached. The legitimacy of the state is contested when the state attempted to do things or to act in a manner which individuals or groups among either citizens or the personnel of government regarded as wrong, absurd or oppressive.

Most people tolerate the state they live in, and try to stay out of the way of the government as far as possible. They are seldom enthusiastic about state, but they are also seldom in open rebellion. They accept that the government passes laws, and taxes them, and polices them. The fact that they accept these things is what we mean by saying that the population legitimates the state. But legitimation is not a constant one. Sometimes the degree of legitimacy is relatively high, and sometimes it is relatively low. In point of fact, if we look at the history of the modern world-system over some 500 years, we see that the legitimation of national governments by their populations was for a very long time on the

rise. This was partly because, as state structures grew stronger, they could do more things for people's demands. It was partly because, as a result of the changes in government structure that permitted more people to participate in choosing the leadership, ordinary people were more likely to think that the government authorities responded to their interests, at least partially (Wallerstein:2000).

The legitimacy of state refers to the principle that indicates the acceptance of the decisions of government leaders and officials by (most of) the public on the grounds that these leaders' acquisition and exercise of power has been in accordance with the society's generally accepted procedures and political or moral values. Legitimacy may be conferred upon power holders in a variety of ways in different societies, usually involving solemn formal rituals of a religious or quasi-religious nature -- royal birth and coronation in monarchies, popular election and "swearing in" in democracies and so on. "Legitimate" rulers typically require less use of physical coercion to enforce their decisions than rulers lacking in legitimacy, because most of the people are apt to feel a moral obligation to obey the former but not the latter. People who gain or hold power by illegitimate (!) means tend to work very hard to discover or create ways of endowing themselves with legitimacy after the fact, often by inventing a new ideology or religion and attempting to indoctrinate the people with its legitimating formulas through various forms of propaganda, thus creating moral incentives for the citizenry to obey their government.

Legitimacy, authority and structure are the key concepts that need to be defined in order to clarify the changes in the attributes of nation state and its legitimacy basis. Political structure is the web of relations, instruments and institutions that are relevant to the public affairs of a society. Political authority is those figures or institutions that control and use the political structure for the explicitly or implicitly defined purposes of the society. Political legitimacy represents the degree of acceptability of how the political authority is formed and to what extent its operations and activities and their results are in comfort with the defined priorities of the society. In current discussions there is an important correlation between the changes in the nature of the political structure and of the operation of the political authority and the changing basis of political legitimacy. As the structure changes, its way of operation changes. These changes result in new ground of political legitimacy. In fact, the problem is very historical, in the sense that society is on

the way of a constant changes. Social changes affect the conduct of politics, authority and legitimacy.

Political legitimacy has several aspects as stated by Barker (Barker:1990:195-6). *First*, a non-normative, descriptive or taxonomic account of legitimacy is worthwhile. Only by this way, knowledge of the actual conduct of government and subjects and of the character of historically observable legitimacy provides a more clearly defined object for ethical discussion. *Second*, there is a point in separating, analytically, political legitimacy from other kinds of authority. Only by so doing can the state be distinguished from other kinds of institutions which use or are accorded forms of authority. *Third*, the relationship between legitimacy and other features of government is organic rather than mechanical. Certainly legitimacy cannot be treated as an independent variable, but is to be seen as an accompaniment of government. *Fourth*, legitimacy is not just a relationship spread evenly and uniformly between the states on the one hand and the mass of its subjects on the other. It will vary in both kind and intensity over time and in its social location. One form of legitimacy will characterize the state's relations with one group or section of its subjects, another from and intensity, with others. One legitimate action or outcome of the action, so perceived by a section of its subjects, of the state could be perceived as illegitimate by other section of its subjects.

Academic writings on legitimacy have come heavily, though not exclusively, from Marxists. These writers have not so much feared that obedience was threatened, but hoped that it might be, and in studying legitimacy hoped to see the fault-lines running through the heartland of capitalist prosperity and success. From this point of view political science therefore needs to take account of the state as an active and initiating force, not just a reflexive or representative one. For just as people are sometimes citizens but always subjects, so the state is sometimes a reflection or expression of the needs, desires, or rights of citizens, but always an active expression of itself and its own purposes. The understanding of legitimacy thus becomes in the first place an understanding of the means by which governments and those who serves them justify their power, not for the appeasement of their subjects, but to render coherent and justifiable to themselves their own occupation of government (Barker:1990:200).

I would like to analyze the historical evolution of political legitimacy of nation state in this chapter and then construct a final stage of political legitimacy under the global context in the next chapter. In order to answer the question of which values and kinds of relations constituted in the past or are constituting at the present the basis of political legitimacy, I will historically distinct five periods of time, which contributed to the formation of political legitimacy. Under the heading of classical stages there are four periods. In classical political theories nation state was legitimate for that it was able to provide the basic needs of order, security and justice. Also with respect to the origin of political power, it was dependant on democratic principles and procedures (participation and formal elections). The state was responsible for the provision of public goods, such as welfare-related services, infrastructure, justice, protection of liberties and human rights and defense of the national borders (responsibility). Participation of the people to the political power and the responsibilities of the state and citizens were taken under the guarantee within the framework of social contract (constitution). And responsibility has been constituted in such a way that it could be tested (accountability). In fact, these stages of political legitimacy are cumulative, in the sense that each stage does not refer to different source of political legitimacy. Rather this process is evolutionary and cumulative. The source of political legitimacy of nation state at a certain time includes all the components of political legitimacy so defined in the former periods. Or, former values and components of political legitimacy could have undergone to re-definition or reformation in the new stage. But re-interpretation of the former value did not remove its original essence.

The fifth stage is the global stage of political legitimacy that will be the subject matter of the next chapter, in which I will try to analyze how the classical basis have been changed or reformed, or what kind of new components have been added to the phenomenon of political legitimacy. In the evolution of political legitimacy, we can observe that transition from one level of political legitimacy to another was a result of legitimation crisis. Legitimation crisis arises when the expectations of the ruled are not satisfied by the political authority, and when there is a rise of belief that the political authority is serving to the continuation of injustices. In history of nation state, we cannot observe that there is no period in which nation state has been absolutely legitimated. Rather, legitimacy and legitimation crisis lived together through which the evolution was

possible. But, we can talk about that there could be some period when a higher legitimacy was observed that provided a degree of political stability, and there could be some period when lower legitimacy was observed that provided a degree of political instability. Politically unstable periods show “the end and beginning” of the transition period from one level to another.

## **6.2. Minimal Stage of Political Legitimacy**

Nation state had been formed in an atmosphere of radical social and economic changes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I have shortly mentioned about the formation of nation in Globalization Chapter. Enlightenment philosophy, mainly resulted from Renaissance and Reformation, led to the formation of a rationality different from scholasticism of the medieval age. Renaissance contributed to the rise of creativity of human mind on mental and material possessions. Enlightenment philosophy and rationality contributed to the decline of religious authority and to the rise of the power of worldly authorities, those of kings and monarchs. Enlightenment was a breaking point between the medieval and the modern. Privileges of the churches had been removed and temporal power had become the supreme authority on the territory. Also, some new inventions like gunpowder facilitated monarchs to remove local feudal privileges. After the loyalty bonds between the church and the people, and also between the vassals and the landlords, the king had risen as the sole representative of the community.

Under this context, political writers like Hobbess and Bodin prepared the theoretical basis of political legitimacy of the king’s power. A supreme authority had been presented as the single guarantee of order, justice and security, and also as the representative of the god on the earth. Hobbes invites us to participate in a thought experiment where equal and dissociated individuals are places together in a state of nature without the existence of a state power placed over them. He believes that they will soon lapse into a state of war where each person is threatened with violent attack. He attributes this conflict to three basic factors, which he calls competition, diffidence and glory. Competition consists in the fact that in the state of nature, if there is some resource which a person wants there are no restraints on getting it other than the physical and mental powers of other people. Glory, consists in the concern that each person has to have value

for others. But arguably more important than either of these is 'diffidence'. This is essentially the suspicion that another may be about to attack you, a suspicion, which makes it rational for you to get in the first blow. Many modern theorists have sought to illuminate Hobbes' argument by suggesting that each person's encountering with other persons in the State of Nature have produced the structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma (Hobbes:1991).

Hobbes' solution (Hobbes:1991) to the problem of endemic conflict engendered by this kind of situation is the absolute sovereign. Hobbes told us that in a state of nature each person has a right - that is a liberty - to use all things, including the bodies of other people. But each person is also possessed of reason. As possessed of reason each person is at the same time led into pre-emptive non-co-operative action and is also enabled to see the possibility of a set of co-operative conventions (laws of nature) which, if only they could be generally enforced, would be in everyone's interest. The rational person is bound to will the implementation of such conventions but also knows that it would be folly to implement them unilaterally since that would be to deliver oneself up to the predations of would-be exploiters.

The problem then is to generate an atmosphere of sufficient confidence that people will be tend to abide by these laws of nature, to keeps their agreements and so on. Hobbes' answer is straightforward: '...the Laws of Nature of themselves, without the terror of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.'. But a problem immediately arises: how are people incapable of spontaneous co-operation going to institute such a power? And we may also notice a subsidiary problem: if they can co-operate to institute a power without the prior existence of that power, why would they need a power to get them to co-operate?

Somehow, people overcome the collective action problem with involving in forming a state. They enter into a once-and-for-all bargain with one another whereby they mutually renounce their right to all things in favor of themselves considered as a collective body. The power of this collective body is then vested in a person or a group of persons. This sovereign power inherits the liberty to all things that each person had possessed in the

state of nature, and, having voluntarily ceded that right, persons have no residuary right to impede the sovereign power. The only ground on which they may do this is if the sovereign becomes a threat to the very purposes for which it was instituted (namely the preservation of each person), so people threatened with death by the state may reasonably resist. The legitimacy of this state seems then to be founded in the agreement that people make.

Hobbes (Hobbes:1991) wanted to found the legitimacy of the state and ultimately of all states on the prevention of endemic civil war, rather than consent. But it is far from clear what purpose his principal account actually serves. If it is, implausibly, given a historical twist, and purports to tell us what our ancestors did in founding the first state, why should that have any legitimizing force for us? If the argument is supposed to show that a rational person in the state of nature would consent, again that seems to have little force for us. Even if it can be shown that we ourselves would agree to something in certain hypothetical circumstances then that hardly suffices to bind us to that norm or institution now. Moreover, Hobbes' account of consent seems much too weak to ground any sort of moral obligation. The suspicion is that Hobbes justifies the state not because people agree to it, or would agree to it, but rather because of the good the state secures : the avoidance of war. Therefore in Hobbes, the legitimacy of the state in people's mind is not their consent for the existence of state or their participation in the formation of state, rather the function that the state fulfills. The state, despite constituting a threat to liberty, is legitimate just because it prevents more serious and disastrous results for each human being. First and foremost of all the legitimacy of state lies in its provision of physical security to the people. This is a fundamental reasoning in the legitimation of state structure, for without physical security requirement other freedoms or rights have no meaning. In fact Hobbes' theory depends on an assumption of "if there was no state, what would be the result?". Within the known human history there was no absolute example of a stateless society, taking the state in the meaning of an authority among the members of a given community. Following this essential hypothesis, Hobbes constituted a theory on the necessity of an authority within community, called state, without which he assumed that there will be no room for being a community.

Wolff (Wolf:1976:18,110), encountering the basic dilemma of state/society or despotism/liberty of Hobbes, pronounced that the fundamental problem of political philosophy is how the moral autonomy of the individual can be made compatible with the legitimate authority of the state. The reconciliation proved impossible for Wolf because the defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule, while the primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. He argued that personal autonomy and legal or political authority are irreconcilable. The state, in his view, is necessarily illegitimate, and political philosophy, as the study of that legitimate political authority which distinguishes civil society from the state of nature, is dead. Accordingly, one might say that the fundamental problem confronting political philosophy is that of explaining how the state can be legitimate if there is no general duty to obey its laws. In opposition to the arguments of Wolff, Edmundson (Edmundson:1998:7) keeps hope that we can make sense of the idea of a legitimate political authority without positing the existence of a general duty to obey the law. He argues that this requires as a result of self interest of the individual. The duty to obey the law can arise from consent (explicit, hypothetical, or implicit), participation, benefits, expectations, respect, utility and necessity. These aspects of the duty to obey law make the political authority legitimate to the extent that these elements are fulfilled or realized (Edmundson:1998:15-31). All these reasons for the legitimate political authority have been included by the classical political theorists, like Hobbes', Bodin's, Bentham's and Lock's.

Enlightenment philosophy created a division of labor between the king and the church, former would be lord of the world, and latter would be responsible for the other world. The church had anymore neither authority on nor responsibility for the worldly affairs. Moreover, there emerged another division of labor between the politics and economics. Politics was the area of responsibility of the king, while the economics had been left to the market. At the early times of formation of nation state, the king had supreme political authority over the society with reference to its capability to save order, justice and security. In all areas of society, economy and politics, enlightenment deployed a *material rationality* that depends on scientific approaches, whose main components were the calculation of *cause and ends*, *observation*, *analysis*, *search*, *working of human reason*. Material rationality focused on the formation of a society, politics and economy depending on the principle of material criteria. Notions of organization, efficiency,

productivity, marketing, division of labor constituted the basis of emerging nation state and market. On this direction, the king organized his political authority through establishing a bureaucracy and standing army. Army and bureaucracy would fulfill the aim of order, security and justice. The values of order, security and justice were for the physical survival of the members of the community, and also for the preservation of private property.

At this early formation, the king in order to attain the identification of its subjects developed a *civic* kind of nationalism. Through civic nationalism the subjects had been made aware of belonging to a community, that is the nation. Social scientists agree on that group identification is one of the basic needs of human being, like sex, hungry and thirsty (Maslow:1998). Civic nationalism served as the main bond among the subjects and also between the political authority and subjects. Civic nationalism had been persisted through *standardizations* in the fields of education, law and military service. Standardization had been strengthened through the invention of national myths, heroes, anthem, flag and language. All these activities of the king required a financial source. Taxation, in the meaning of standardized revenues of governments for the fulfillment of public goods in modern sense, had been invented by early nation state. Taxation issue would also serve as the tempting force in changing nature of political legitimacy to the participatory stage.

Early nation states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been approved as legitimate, as long as they could fulfill the minimal requirements of order, security and justice and as long as the king could create an atmosphere of civic national consciousness, which had been provided through unilateral enforcement of the state of conscription and some national symbols. *Order* served stability in which people could make plans for the future, and people have no concern about the uncertainty in respect to their relations with the other members of the community. In other words, order had been appreciated as the main requirement for the realization of other human capabilities. Without order the society would turn into one in which all are in war against all as estimated by Hobbes. *Security* was basically an external phenomenon in the sense that people have no concern about that external states would not interfere or plunder their life and wealth. Security had been provided through the standing army of the king. Also order could have been better protected through the security. *Justice* was basically related the equal treatment of the king

to its subjects. This belief or consciousness had been realized through the codification of standardized law, which denies fundamental privileges and discrimination in contrast to the situation of medieval age. Justice also presumed a certain transparency in the policies of the king. *Order, security and justice* were the fundamental premises for political legitimacy of the king, but not adequate. In addition to these outcomes, the king also had to create a consciousness of being a nation, which would establish a loyalty link between himself and his subject.

These minimal criteria of order, security and justice were related to the outcome of political authority, and creation of a consciousness of being a nation was related to the identification side of political legitimacy of early nation state. In the minimal stage there was no questions on the origin of the political authority. In fact in this stage, medieval theory of the God's representation on the earth had been preserved with respect to the origin of the political authority. Minimal stage of political legitimacy was a transition from the medieval to the modern conception of political legitimacy. In the medieval age, order and security were also fundamental components of the legitimacy of the political authority. Innovations of the minimal stage were justice and civic national identification.

### **6.3. Representative or Participatory Stage of Political Legitimacy**

Taxation issue in the early nation state was the key processor of the beginning of the participatory face of political legitimacy. The slogan of "no taxation without representation" was the corner stone of the state-civil society relation in the liberal democracies. Taxation, as an absolute authority of the state that has been conceived within its sovereign bounds, has been rejected on theoretical grounds that if the taxed persons are excluded from the political power, then the taxation activity of the state will be illegitimate one, so as the state itself. The absolute king of the early nation state needed revenues to carry out his war of state building and also to provide basic public goods of order, security and justice. The source of those revenues was mainly the production activities of early capitalists. So the state had to provide a secure area of national territory to facilitate the taxable activities. However, when newly emerging capitalist financed the activities of the state through their tax, they also began to question the absolute ruling of the king. If their wealth and gains would be taxed and those revenues would be used for some goals, then

they began to share the sovereign decision making power of the king. English revolutions and later *French Revolution* were the turning points in transition to participatory stage. National parliaments, first as an advisory body and then a decision-making body were formed in determining the rates of tax that would be collected by the king and the areas of expending those collected taxes. The sharing of the absolute power of the king by the tax-payers at first was the time of the rise of liberal-democratic principles as well.

In fact in minimal stage, the obligations of the king were minimal so as the demand in participating in decision-making process was minimal. In other words, the state was obliged to fulfill a limited number of outcomes, which required a limited source of finance. In early participatory stage, participation demand came from the tax-payers on the ground that government put into force some financial obligations for them, and tax-payers would like to participate in the decision-making of tax-collection, and also tax-payers would like to establish a mechanism of control in order to see where their taxes were expensed. Participatory demand and controlling mechanism had brought the phenomenon of accountability of the king.

Participation has been realized through elections and formation of a national assembly. At the beginning the role of national assemblies was just consulting. But in later stages, advisory function of national assemblies had disappeared, and they had been turned into law-making body of the state, that is legislation. Participation and accountability in taxation matters had been extended to the other areas of government. *French Revolution* of 1789 and workers' revolutions in middle of the nineteenth century were the turning points in which participation issue began not to be constricted just to taxation matter. The rise of industrialization at the beginning of the nineteenth century resulted in participatory demand of working class as well. *French Revolution* provoked by bourgeoisie and effectively participated by working class resulted in the formation of constitutive national assembly which had prepared a constitution. In the national assembly bourgeoisie and working class were represented together. Representation, participation and constitutionalization began to be the core attributes of transforming nation state in Europe.

Connolly argues (Connolly:1984:8-10) that the disenchantment of the world, the withdrawal of God's will from things, events, words and standards, which surround a

people, conventionalizes social life. Since conventionalization is incompatible with traditional authority, modern order and legitimacy assume a bureaucratic face. A bureaucratic state achieves legitimacy through following impersonal and rational procedures of decision-making. The bureaucratic method legitimizes the conventions emanating from it, but it also generates discipline, the consistently rationalized, methodically trained and exact execution of received orders. Writing just before the dislocations and disaffection of the 1960s Lipset expresses confidence in the stabilizing effects of democratic accountability and bureaucratic rationality. Legitimacy and popular belief in acceptability of the established institutions were treated as equivalents by Lipset. Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.

In contrast to earlier stage, participatory or representative stage had brought new dimensions to political legitimacy of nation state. There would be a constitution that guarantees fundamental human rights and freedom. There should be held regular elections to form national assembly. There should be a *check and balance* mechanism between the legislation and the government. Constitutionalism resulted in division of powers of nation state. National assembly would make the law, government or king would implement those laws, and an independent judicial power would inspect the whole system and judge problems emerging from the implementation.

Political legitimacy in participatory stage was not fundamentally related to the outcome of the existence of nation state, that is order, security and justice. Rather, it was related to the origin of the political power. Political power was legitimated through the argument that people or citizens participated and determined who would govern them. There was a constitution, upon which people agreed, which prescribed the rules of the game of participation and government. The origin of political power was the people themselves. But this does not mean that order, security and justice were not important, rather in addition to these fundamental values of minimal stage, participation, representation and constitution emerged new values of political legitimacy. In other words, if elected political power could not have fulfilled order, security and justice, its legitimacy were questioned on the ground that it could create appropriate outcomes of order, security and justice. While in minimal stage, the problem of who would determine who would

provide order, security and justice was not a component of political legitimacy; in participatory stage former question emerged a fundamental component of political legitimacy.

In the evolution of political legitimacy of nation state, participatory stage constituted the backbone of liberal democratic nation states in the west. Its main relevance to the origin of the political power, that is people, and to the procedures, that are constitution and elections, had been imitated by non-western states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but this imitation, to a great extent, remained in the level of copying the formalities. Today, almost all states in the world have constitutions, hold elections in forming the political power, have division of political powers and other formalities, but their implementation does not reflect the original example of liberal democracies in the west.

National participation in the formation of political power resulted in the next stage of political legitimacy that is ethnic-national component. In fact in participatory stage, nation building and nationalism had been comprehended and consolidated around the idea of *civic* nationalism in the sense of rights of the citizens, while in the stage of ethnic-cultural nationalism had been highlighted around the myth of nationalism.

#### **6.4. Ethnic-Cultural Stage of Political Legitimacy**

In minimal stage and participatory stage before and after the *French Revolution*, the idea of nation building and nationalism had been forced by the state for the aim of creating a consciousness of belonging to a community over a specific territory. For this aim, standardization in education, language and culture had been forced. We cannot understand nations and nationalism simply as an ideology or form of politics but must treat them as cultural phenomena as well. That is to say, nationalism, the ideology and movement, must be closely related to national identity, a multidimensional concept, and extend to include a specific language, sentiments and symbolism (Smith:1991:vii). Anthony Smith enumerates the elements of standardized national identity that emerged in the West; *first*, a well-defined territory or an historic land is required. *Second*, a single polity must emerge with a single political will and common regulative institutions that will

give expression to common political sentiments and purposes. *Third*, legal equality or the notion of citizenship should be formed, that would cover civil and legal rights and obligations equally of all citizenry and also would include all citizens and exclude the outsiders. *Fourth*, a common culture or civic ideology should bound all citizens to each other, whose components are common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions (Smith:1991:9-11). After he stated the elements of national identity, A. Smith defines the nation “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”. Functions of national identity, according to A. Smith (Smith:1991:16-7), are those; *first* is external function that delimits the defined nation from others. *Second* is economic that prescribes the monopoly of control over the national resources. *Third* is political the state over the territory is associated with national identity. *Fourth* is legitimizing role for common legal rights and duties of legal institutions. *Fifth* is socialization in which all members of the nation are socialized through a standardized mass education system and a homogenous culture. *Sixth* is symbolic, that is, national identity produces its own symbols like flag, coinage, anthems, uniform monuments and ceremonies, through which all the members of the society are bound to each other. The last one is self-definitive, that is, a sense of national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world.

Disregarding, to a great extent, the ethnic origin of its citizens, the state tried to gather its subjects around a myth of nation. This was a rational building of the nation. Nationalism in this period was a kind of *civic* nationalism, in the meaning that the members of the community feel themselves belonging to the nation, not because of the same ethnicity, rather because of sharing the same territory. *Civic* nationalism was not a component of political legitimacy in minimal stage and at the beginning of participatory stage. Rather it was a tool of the state to homogenize its subjects through which the territorial integrity and order could be provided. *Civic* nationalism had practical aims of building a community.

However, this understanding of civic nationalism began to turn into ethnic nationalism with the Italian and German unification movements after the middle of the nineteenth century. Ethnicity together with cultural aspect, meaning belonging historically

to the same blood and world of values, began to emerge a new component of political legitimacy. National participation into the formation of political power through elections and wars among the states of Europe strengthened ethnic-cultural national consciousness. Moreover rational nation building through *civic* nationalism in France and England was almost complete, and German and Italian nation building was on the process. Wars in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe and the First World War resulted in transformation of *civic* nationalism into ethnic-cultural nationalism. Ethnic-cultural national face of political legitimacy was also an important example to the nation building attempts in the Third World countries in the twentieth century.

Ethnic-cultural nationalism had legitimated the implementation of totalitarian states in the first half of the twentieth century. Totalitarian regimes came into being through the participatory principles in accordance with constitutional rules. Domination by a single, like-minded governing elite of all (or virtually all) organized political, economic, social and cultural activities in a country by means of a single-party monopoly of power, police repression not only of all forms of dissent and opposition but also of all forms of independent private organizations as such, rigorous censorship of the mass media, centralized state planning and administration of the economy, and pervasive propaganda to inculcate the principles of the obligatory official ideology; are the main characteristics of totalitarian regimes. Totalitarian states differ from traditional dictatorships or despotisms primarily with respect to the broader ("total") scope of human behavior that the authorities seek to regulate in detail and with respect to their much more effective control mechanisms made possible by exploiting twentieth century breakthroughs in rapid communication and transportation, scientific psychology, pervasive mass media, surveillance technology, electronic information retrieval, and so on.

I have to point out the difference that *civic* nationalism did not constitute a basis of political legitimacy. It aimed just to create a consciousness of community among the people living on the same territory. Community consciousness was important in the formation of nation state at the beginning. Community consciousness had been practically expected to contribute to the standardization policies of the state. Nonetheless *civic* nationalism was not directly a source of political legitimacy, rather it would prepare a convenient social context in which the obligations of the state could be easily fulfilled

through which political legitimacy be provided. However, ethnic-cultural nationalism exceeds the practical aims of creating community consciousness, and proceeds that the nation with its existing cultural aspect has a *high value* of itself that should be served by subjects. The definition and realization of this high value, on the other hand, is up to the power holders. In other words, the definition and realization of high value becomes the source of political legitimacy. Order, security, justice, participation, constitution and accountability lose their legitimating meanings and turn into instruments for the realization of high value.

After the Second World War that removed totalitarian regimes in Europe, ethnic-cultural dominance or priority of political legitimacy had been reformed. Its totalitarian character and presumptions had been tamed and turned into an understanding of the true representation of national culture and identity within the society of states. Whereas minimal and participatory faces of political legitimacy embody material existence, rules and procedures and outcomes, ethnic-cultural face addresses to the psychological aspect of identification of citizens with nation state. The psychological bond is established through the formation of a common culture, and same ethnicity in some cases. In other words, legitimacy link established via ethnic national aspect between the state and its citizens imposes on the state the obligation of protecting the national culture. The ingredients of national culture may change from common language, history, way of life, religion, ethnicity, myth, to historical heritage of monuments or literature.

### **6.5. Social and Welfare Stage of Political Legitimacy**

I would like to examine this stage in two periods. *First* is the rise of social policies in the nineteenth century, and *second* is the rise of welfare policies after the Second World War. We need such a distinction because these two kinds of policies refer to the different level of state obligations. Social policies refer to the policies of the state in the nineteenth century in order to respond the demands of working class. Those policies are related to the workers' rights. Social policies do not prescribe an intense intervention in the working of the economy. However, welfare policies began to emerge after the Second World War for the aim of fulfilling changing public services. Welfare policies were interrelated with consumption, investments and employment, through which public services could be truly

fulfilled. Welfare policies require state intervention into the economy through fiscal and monetary policies.

With respect to the social policies, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was a transformation from commercial capitalism into industrial capitalism. Industrialization led to the rise of working class in industrial bases of Europe. Heavy working conditions produced awareness among the workers, of how they could achieve rights and freedom. Among the working class there was a rise of leftist ideologies, first of which was anarchism, which is an ideology the fundamental belief that the state and all similar forms of governmental authority are unjustified and oppressive and illegitimate and therefore ought to be abolished, with future social and economic cooperation to be carried out only by means of voluntary relationships and consensual agreements under conditions of perfect legal equality. Private property was questioned, and in order to achieve a just and free community, state and private property should be eliminated. The elimination process should be carried out through a revolution of working class. Godwin in England and Proudon in France were the chief ideologues.

Revolutionary demands resulted in a series of workers' revolutions in the middle of nineteenth century. But the failure of these attempts gave way to the formation of disciplined revolutionary movements of communism, led by Marx and Engels. In contrast to anarchists, Marx and Engels stressed on the organization of working class and taking over of the state apparatus. In communist ideal, capitalist state should be changed with the state of workers. While anarchists focused on the elimination of private property and state all, communists reformed this idea in a way that workers need a organization and a socialists state in a transition period and private property should be changed with public ownership over the means of production. Along this line of thought workers organized around the syndicates in the second half of nineteenth century and they attempted many times revolutionary movements. However, on the one hand the failure of revolutionary attempts and on the other hand the rise of the left in participatory procedures in politics led to the rise of socialist parties and workers' syndicates in Europe. In fact the rise of socialism was a compromising point between capitalism and communism, in the sense that workers' demands for social rights were channeled through participation to the state and responded by the government with the rise of social, political and economic rights of the

workers. Participation in the elections became a general political right. Syndicalization, in which organization of workers, general strike and collective bargaining became main economic rights, had been expanded. And specific working hours, formation of pension funds, periodic weekly or annual paid vacations and minimum working age became social rights.

After the Second World War there began to emerge welfare policies together with preserving the social rights gained before. Welfare state could be defined as state whose government devotes a very large proportion of its activities and expenditures to the direct provision of personal benefits to be consumed by qualifying individuals or families (as contrasted with such more traditional and less individually divisible government activities as national defense, law enforcement, controlling the money supply, economic regulation, maintaining transportation and communications nets, administering the public lands, etc.) (Paul Johnson, Dept. of Political Sciences, Auburn University). Welfare benefits to individuals may be in the form either of bureaucratically supplied professional services of government employees or in the form of government-issued stipends or allowances or subsidies (transfer payments) to help qualifying households pay for general subsistence or for specific categories of state-favored expenses (merit goods). Examples of such social welfare programs would include old age and disability pensions, unemployment benefits, aid to families with dependent children, income supplements for the poor, public housing and housing vouchers, health care provided in state hospitals or clinics and reimbursement for the costs of privately-provided health care, government-funded drug abuse rehabilitation programs, food stamps, public education and child care, etc.

Advocacy of extensive "welfare state" programs was at first associated mainly with socialist movements, but in most Western industrial societies today many welfare state programs are endorsed as well by non-socialist parties that nevertheless still continue to reject the socialists' traditional demands for much more extensive state ownership, state planning, and state administration of industry and commerce. In other words, welfare programs were put into force in order to guarantee *order, security and justice* in the society, otherwise the legitimacy basis of state could have been easily questioned.

In social policies of the former century, there was no concern of creating employment, or free provision of public services. Public services had been limited areas of order, security and justice. However, the definition and contents of public services have been radically changed by welfare policies. Health, education, transportation and communication facilities, unemployment funds, social security systems have been included into the fields of public services. Those welfare gains began to emerge an important component of state legitimacy in the second half of the twentieth century.

When we look at so-called classical stages of political legitimacy, we see that political legitimacy became subject to an historical evolution. *First*, in the *minimal stage* of political legitimacy in which there was a transition from traditional political order to the modern state, the issue of political legitimacy was related mainly to the provision of order, security and justice by the state. In this time, so-called fundamental components of modern conception of political legitimacy had been grounded on the outcomes of the political authority, those are the essential functions of the state. With respect to the origin of political legitimacy, traditional way of thinking that the kings are the representatives of God on the earth had continued.

*Second*, in *representative and participatory stage*, there was a transformation of political legitimacy with respect to the origin of the political power in the way that the origin of the political authority should be the people. Subject began to participate in the formation of political authority through taking in part in elections. In other words, every individual was appreciated as self-determined so that political commands over him should be exerted by his consent. His/her consent was represented through his participation in determining who will govern. Although representation was essential at the beginning in the sense that individual would determine who would govern, in later evolution of this participation in the twentieth century individual began to participate in the formation of the political authority in order to determine both *who* and *how* would govern.

*Third*, ethnic-cultural aspect of political legitimacy emerged in half of the nineteenth century. Until the formation of Italian and German unifications nationalism had been appreciated as civic kind, meaning that nation was defined as an aggregate of people sharing the same territory, so common ethnic origin was not a primary requisite for a

legitimate political authority. Although the *French Revolution* has been taken as a turning point in the idea of nationalism, it was related more to civic interpretation. However, Italian and German unifications created the issue of common ethnicity in defining a nation and its political authority, which resulted in the formation of totalitarian right wing regimes in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Ethnic-cultural aspect of political legitimacy is very critical, for we witness that there has been a re-assertion of ethnic appeals after the end of the Cold War. Ethnic-cultural aspect of political legitimacy loads a cultural function over the state in order to preserve and advance the national culture.

*Fourth*, in *social and welfare stages*, political legitimacy had gained other important components. Particularly, social side in the nineteenth century refers to the rights of working class with respect to working hours, minimal wages, general strikes and workers' unions. The welfare stage of political legitimacy beginning from the second half of the twentieth century refers to the functions of the state in order to provide a minimum welfare level of its subjects. For this aim, the state began to undertake the functions of creating social security systems, unemployment wages, pension funds, and also employment opportunities both public and private.

In those classical stages of political legitimacy, there was an enduring evolution. But we could distinguish three important aspects in this evolution. *First* is related to the *origin* of the political authority. What distinguishes modern conception of political legitimacy from the traditional one, in this respect, is the participation of the subjects in determining the formation of the political authority. In traditional paradigm, the legitimate origin of the political authority was either kinship or religion. However, in modern sense the origin of the political authority has been the people that would be governed. *Second* is related to the way of governing that is the law. In traditional governing the king had an absolute competence in determining the way of government. However, in modern sense after having determined who will govern, people did not leave the process, rather they began to determine who the elected ruler will govern. In other words, people began to determine the laws that would be applied to them. The formation of law, either through determining the constitution or through making the law via national assemblies began to be up to the people. *Third* is related to the outcomes of the governing process that is the

aim of why people elect a ruler and determine how he will govern. In this framework we should refer to two important aspects of the outcomes. *First* is in contingent with political legitimacy of nation state paradigm. Although the goals of different segments of the society diverge, the main duties of the political power are guide-lined in the constitutions, which are mainly the provision of so-called primary public goods of security, order and justice, and protection of fundamental rights and freedom. Every political power, first of all, is expected to do their best in fulfilling those constitutional duties.

*Second* aspect of the outcomes is in contingent with political legitimacy of the ruling government. This is related to the realization of expectation of the majority of people who elected the government. These expectations could be class-based, that is the intervention of the state in key areas of the economy through which it creates a re-direction of sharing the national output. So with respect to the outcomes we have to distinguish political legitimacy of the state as a whole from that of the government. Depending on transformation on the first aspect, the system of nation state, that is constitution changes, while depending on changing expectation on the second aspect the laws or the governments change. For the purpose of the thesis, in the evolution of political legitimacy, I have tried to take into account the aspects of outcomes, which are related to the transformation in the nature of nation state.

The question of political legitimacy arises when an authority is exerted. Authority is a kind of relation in which the author or the subject decides and acts, whose results, in one way or another, influence others, in the form of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the objects. In classical terms, we can speak of a legitimate authority when the objects' assent has been provided, while it is described as illegitimate in case when the objects reject assent. Political legitimacy in classical theories has four level of relations in order the state to be described as legitimate. *First* is related to the source or origin of the political authority (divine, kinship or mass). *Second* is related to the method used for the attainment of the political power (representation or heritage). *Third* is related to the quality or virtue of policies and actions used by the state (democratic or authoritarian). *Fourth* is related to the outcomes of the actions of the political authority (satisfactory or unsatisfactory for those who are governed). Then the legitimacy of the modern nation state depends on people's consent, representative way of formation of the political authority, government's

equal and just policies and actions, and comfortability of the outcomes for the demands of the people. These four levels of relations had been constituted through the evolution of political legitimacy beginning from the collapse of feudalism in Europe. Through a cumulative evolution, political legitimacy of nation state had been enlarged and deepened. This enlargement and deepening resulted in the rise of quantity and quality of nation state in order it to be defined a legitimate authority.

Successful economic development is also essential to legitimacy, since it generates a surplus to relieve felt injustices and dampens the class struggle over income shares. It is perhaps the key to modern democratic legitimacy. The factors involved in modernization or economic development are linked to those, which establish legitimacy and tolerance (Connolly:1984:11).

Connolly (Connolly:1984:4-8) argues that by the time Rousseau wrote, the world was no long understandable as a meaningful order filled with divine purpose discernable to some degree by human being. Changes in the understanding of God, nature, language, self, and knowledge forced the retreat of divine authority, enlarged the sense of the conventional, and, thereby, inflated the issue of legitimacy. After God's retreat from the world nature becomes a deposit of objects to be understood through humanly constructed categories; words become human instruments of understanding and representation; knowledge is grounded in perception and logic; and agency, purpose, will, and intelligence migrate from a cosmos in which human beings are privileged participants to human beings alone. Rousseau enters this clearing to pose the question of legitimacy in a radical, uncompromising manner; 'man is born free' signifies that we are released from enclosure in a larger, meaningful cosmos. And 'everywhere he is in chains' implies that we experience an enclosure and confinement by the enhancement of human will. Unwilled limits are now chains, rather than customs touched by divine purpose. The chains have been created not by God or by nature; they emerged from the previous history of innocent and willful beings whose will has constantly outstripped their ability to anticipate its effects. We have chained ourselves and thus the remedy resides within us. Rousseau believes that human being is capable of formulating and living in accordance with the general will.

But our willfulness requires the general will to be limited to a few simple laws, everything else is to be lived by the participants as a set of traditions insulated against the play of willful change. Marx understands the accentuation of political will to flow from the conventionalization of social life. And he criticizes the willful character of capitalist politics. He does so in anticipation of a world in which the collective will can be realized truly. He anticipates a future condition in which ideology and mystification disappear and the collectively assumes control of its own fate. The state, which by definition is linked to mystification, thus withers away as mystification is lifted. The conventions will become transparent to the participants, reflecting the rational will of the collectivity, which gives its informed allegiance to them. Thus legitimacy lies in the transparency of order (social, economic and political).

In classical political theory, legitimacy of political authority was justified on the ground that political authority serves an order in which physical security, private property and morality are attained, without which individuals would not become human being. Classical writers, like Hobbes, Lock, Rousseau, Hegel focused on the alternative of in case of state of nature, and justified the existence of state structure. Their writings were at the time of formation of modern nation states. In fact, their theories shaped the formation of nation states as well. However, in the twentieth century, legitimacy of nation state were not grounded on what we have, rather nation state were criticized on the ground of what we have not. Habermas, Schaar and many others criticized the legitimacy of state from different perspectives, like individual autonomy, human rights, freedom, rationality, identity and communication. In other words, in time of Hobbes, state could have been justified with reference to its capacity of securing an *order*. However, in the twentieth century state have been justified with reference to its capacity of providing *welfare*.

The conduct of government cannot be separated, though it may be distinguished, from that of those who are governed. Legitimate government is a relationship between the state and subjects. Both its successes and failures involve rulers and ruled, and the erosion of conventions of conduct is reciprocal. Barker (Barker:1990:4) states that legitimacy, in so far as it sustains government, can involve both citizenship and subjection. Legitimacy can sustain subjection, but it also can arise from the character of citizenship. The rights and the powers of the citizen may involve processes whereby authority is transferred to the

state, or to certain of its functions, either by representation or participation. However, while legitimacy is generally related to the citizenship in general terms, in that it is the collective and hypothetical actions of the state which are authorized, legitimacy relates to subjection in particular terms, in that subjection is never general, but always particular.

Barker (Barker:1990:7) argues that illegitimation comes into question in two ways; on the one hand it is suggested that government exceeds the conventional limits on the impartial use of state power, and threatened the contract, which sustains its ability to rule. On the other hand it is argued that citizens, or particular groups of citizens, rejects the rule of law, or the normal restraints on the political activity, and are prepared to go to any lengths in order to pursue their own self-interested or doctrinaire goals. The arrival of territorial nation state created new questions and new kinds of obligations. The question of how obedience can be justified thus acquires new importance, and the arguments of Hobbes, or of Rousseau, are directed to discovering a way of justifying government when in previous times such justification would not have seemed necessary.

In classical theories sovereignty had focal point in explanation of political legitimacy. Sovereignty, as distinct from power, is a normative rather than a descriptive or explanatory concept, and consists of the right to make commands which cannot themselves be counter-commanded. It is normally characterized as being absolute, illimitable and indivisible. By definition there cannot be circumstances in which a sovereign authority may legitimately be resisted or ignored. Where there is no sovereignty there is neither law nor constitution. For legitimacy is precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority, because subjects believe that they ought to obey. As part of practical exercise of this kind, it has been argued that legitimacy is a distinctive cause of effective government, or sustainer of regimes. A study of legitimacy will involve not only an examination of the justification of government, but of the different ways in which the various aspects of government are justified, the various relations of legitimacy which exist between the state and its subjects, and the differing character of legitimacy which is associated with different groups and sections of citizens, both within and outside the structures of government (Barker:1990:16).

The constitutional, liberal state of the nineteenth and twentieth century West was, so to speak, systematically coherent with a capitalist economy. The production and distribution of wealth take place primarily through the market interactions of a plurality of independent, self-regarding units, which seek profit through the productive employment of labor power, itself sold on the market. This system's prime political requirement was a negative one: The public powers should remove all impediments to the autonomous operation of the markets. But meeting this requirement involved the state in a number of positive, forceful activities. These ranged from the development of physical and institutional infrastructures, like roads, railways, education, telecommunication system, necessary for industrialization (Poggi:1990:61).

The constitutionalization of politics, which had originally been demanded by the middle classes, began later to benefit other social groups, by widening and strengthening the public sphere. Urbanization, industrialization, the growth of literacy, the increasing ease of communication beyond the face-to-face range, were allowing increasing numbers of people to establish contact with one another in contexts different from those of work and of domestic life, and to discover what interests they shared with one another. They could make use of the constitutional freedoms of speech, of assembly and of association, to align themselves with like-minded individuals in promotion those interests. Finally, those alignments could legitimately observe and comment on public policies affecting them, decide whether to support the authorities responsible for them or the political groupings opposing them, and thus seek to influence and shape further policy. In this manner in the context of constitutional, liberal regimes, advancing economic and social modernization rendered broader and broader masses politically aware, involved and demanding. These phenomena placed under irresistible pressure the suffrage restrictions characteristics of those regimes, leading to the progressive loosening and eventually to the elimination of those restrictions. We can label this process 'democratization', and the political arrangements which it puts into place 'liberal-democratic', in so far as it does not wholly displace other features of the liberal, constitutional political order (Poggi:1990:62).

Citizens can have a duty not to obey a law if it seriously injures the common good. And were such laws propounded as essential features of the constitutional order itself-

which is to say, propounded as laws governing the making of any other laws-then we could reasonably ask about the legitimacy of that regime. Bearing in mind that we are speaking not of isolated statutes, but of authoritative renderings of the fundamental law, such laws would be laws that deny protection to the weak and the vulnerable, especially in matters of life and death, and that systematically remove the legal and political ability of the people to redress the situation. Constitutional legitimacy uses the law as a frame of reference and requires transparency, clarity of objectives and the strict avoidance of junta-style techniques of acquiring, wielding and consolidating power.

Therefore, classical basis of political legitimacy were able to make nation state strong and the unique alternative for political organization until the end of the twentieth century. Because, it was able to gain the loyalty of its subjects on legitimate grounds. Nonetheless, at the end of the twentieth century, securing order or providing welfare or participatory procedures through elections seems not satisfactory in explaining political legitimacy. I do not mean that state need not anymore provide order or welfare, rather addition to the former capabilities of states, new commitments or quality of services are desired by people.

From the beginning of the thesis, I have stated that the main theme is to clarify the shifts in legitimacy basis of nation state under the global context. Around this main theme, so far, I have tried; *first*, to clarify the global context in which expected shifts in the basis political legitimacy would be formed; *second*, to propose a conception of global context; *third*, to reconsider the development of nation state on theoretical level; *fourth*, to specify how global and local actors operate; *fifth*, to determine what the possible responses of the state are and which characteristics of the state are changing and *in this chapter*, to conceptualize how modern conception of political legitimacy had been evolved in its historical development. So, *in the last chapter* I will try to construct a conceptual framework with regard to the emerging possible sources of shifts in political legitimacy in order to contribute to how political legitimacy under the global context should be reformulated.

## CHAPTER VII

### GLOBAL STAGE OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The emerging global context has begun to question the classical political theories on the point that nation state is not anymore the ultimate source of power and identity. Nation state should be radically reformed in such a way that the worldwide governance (political, economic, environmental) could replace it in order to meet the new needs of humankind. And also individual and local realms should be free of state interventions. This questioning in fact is a discussion on political legitimacy of nation state. Because, the existence of nation state and consequently its overwhelming power in classical terms was emanating from its legitimate position in social context. In classical theories nation state was the absolute source of power and it has a monopoly of violence. Poggi (Poggi:1990:33) points out that in modern state, political power has mainly three characteristics. *First*, it has been depersonalized. Depersonalization of political power refers to the nature of state as an organization, that is, as a set of positions that shape and constrain the conduct of inhabitants, to the point of rendering relatively insignificant their individual identities. Depersonalization is related to the bureaucracy as well. There are depersonalized officials, mainly chosen by through public, objective examinations and guided in their activities by their knowledge of rules and circumstances. *Second*, political power has been formalized beginning first from the principles of constitutions through standardization of laws and procedures. *Third*, political power has been targeted of the integration into a greater social whole. Claims to being a nation, near-universal democratic legitimation, significance of citizenship as a mutual claims and reciprocal involvement binding together the state and the individuals, seem to be the cornerstone of this integration. In fact, the characteristics of political power as defined by Poggi in modern states are the source of it legitimacy. However, depersonalization, formalization and homogenization create problems for political legitimacy of nation state.

In the global context, we can identify three sources of shift that aim to refine the classical basis of state legitimacy. *Individual, local and global* processes force nation state to redefine its role in social milieu. These three sources may be defined as dynamics of the crisis of political legitimacy in transition to global form of politics as well. These three processes work together at different levels, and sometimes independent of each other. They attempt to change the original meanings and framework of components of classical political legitimacy. Order, security and justice, participation, national identity, social-welfare policies are not anymore those what we understand in classical terms. So in this chapter I will try to analyze the possible sources of shifts in classical formulations of political legitimacy within the global context, which will result in its further evolution.

### **7.1. Individual Aspect of Political Legitimacy**

Individual demands are those political demands, which are related to the freedom of individual in his private realm. Those demands of individual freedom are expected legally to be recognized by the political authority. Those individual demands change from individual preferences to new kinds of participation. Classically respecting fundamental human rights and freedom, like life, security, individual autonomy, property, citizenship, and freedom of organization or thought and speech were adequate to provide political legitimacy. However, in global context, new dimensions of individual freedom emerged, and the political authority is expected to recognize or guarantee their performance. New demands of individual freedom are gender politics, libertarian demands, welfare, civil participation, transparency and justice and equality.

**Gender Politics and Feminism:** After 1960s there have been emerging the notion of *gender politics and feminism*. Gender politics is related to the power relations between male and female and also to the private preferences in changing sex. Feminism focuses more in women's condition in the society, and demands social equality, sometimes in its extreme forms it articulates the supremacy of the female over the society. Through gender politics people search for a wide range of preferences in choosing their gender or their preferences for sex. It means that gender could be chosen, rather than taking it given (Zaretsky:1995:253). In respect to the second category, in traditional society, identity is more or less fixed at birth and integrated into relatively stable structures of custom, belief

and rituals. By contrast, with the cultural beginnings of modern society the locus of identity formation shifts to the inner life of the individual. As group ties weaken, individuals are distanced from collective beliefs and attachments and challenged to invert, change or oppose society in accordance with their own vision and interests, independently of ritualized frameworks of belief (Dunn:1998:53).

Moreover in modernity, identity became mobile, multiple, personal, self-reflexive and subject to change and innovation (Kellner:1992:141). In the heart of gender politics, like in other kinds of identity politics, there is the demand of recognition. Sex may have been godly given by birth, but individual have always a right to change it anytime, which should be legally recognized by the state. Also, marriage right between the same sexes should be coded in the law. Proponents of gender politics invite the state to take necessary measures through education, information and law in order to remove social bindings and discrimination against whom that have sexual preferences. Moreover, the participation of female in politics, business and social life should be encouraged by the state, even the state should be obliged to employ equally men and women in its structure. Gender politics is a critical issue for the state to refine itself. Because, nation state traditionally represented a patriarchal relations of power. Inviting the state to intervene in the power relations between sexes on the behalf of the female is a serious contradiction for patriarchal status of nation state. Nation state is on the crossroad of contradicting demands of gender activists and tradition. If it would truly responds to the new demands of theories of gender politics, it would be rejected by the majority of its subjects who retain traditional views with respect to gender relations. On the other hand if it totally rejects the new demands, it would be face to face to lose its political legitimacy for a proportion of its subjects who highlights gender demands. In fact, this process is a transition from patriarchalism to sexual egalitarianism. Most of the liberal democratic states of the West represent a gradual and peaceful settlement of these contradicting demands. The adaptability and settlement capacity of the state in this issue will determine the future of its political legitimacy.

*Emerging gender politics and feminism* could be observed that sexual preferences exceed the boundaries of the classical limits of natural law. Rising individual autonomy in choosing sex and criticism on male-domination on the power constricts the classical structure of law of the state, meaning that understanding of family, parents and civil codes

began to be subjects to drastic upset, which erodes the patriarchal nature of politics in modern state.

**Libertarian Demands :** *Libertarian demands* force nation state to be less ideological and interventionist in the private realm. In its early formation, nation state was trying to create a consciousness of nation through intervening in the field of education, language and culture. This kind of intervention had got strength in the twentieth century as a result of emergence of new technologies. In this regard Schaar (Schaar:1989:17) argues that what we mainly feel in our hearts is the granite consolidation of the technological and bureaucratic order, which may bring physical comfort and great collective power, or sterility, but not political liberty and moral autonomy. This trend results in crisis of legitimacy of modern states. Legitimacy crisis is a product of the orientations of modernity itself, specifically, rationality, the cult of efficiency and power, ethical relativism and equalitarianism. It could be argued that the modern mind, having reached nearly full development, is turning back upon itself and undermining the very principles that once sustained order and obedience in the modern state. Depending on this phenomenon, contemporary social science that is a product of modernity again has failed to appreciate the precariousness of legitimate authority in the modern state. Standardization, homogenization and impersonalization in every fields of its activity, nation state tried create a common sense of community. In order to achieve this goal, it intervened in every aspect of social and individual life.

According to Schaar, legitimation of political authority in modern state carries out a self-defeating character on the ground that de-personalization, formalization and homogenization erase the human face of political authority. The lack of human face in modern political authority creates a serious legitimation problem. There is little identification of individual with the political authority. Rather, there is an enforcement of a defined kind of morality, law and legitimation. The enforcement character of modern political legitimacy is represented by citation of detailed laws in the field of economy, politics and social order. Even any reluctance to obey those rules is punished by the state. Individuals, within this defined rationality of self-interest, seldom rise up and question legitimacy. However, in global context, individuals demand moral autonomy. Pre-determined morality monopolized by nation state has been in a process of fragmentation.

Social design or engineering by nation state is being questioned on the ground that it leaves not room for the realization of the potentials of moral autonomy of the individual. Decrease in the monopoly of morality of the state is closely related to the emergence of local cultural appraisals and of universal dignity of human being. The questioning of moral monopoly of the state results in decreasing significance of the role of ideology used by the state.

Barker (Barker:1990:145-9) underlines that when the state actively promotes its own legitimacy it does so in three ways. First it engages in rituals, second it employs propaganda, and third it uses education. *First*, in United Kingdom, the constitutional arrangements of the nation were actively sustained by the use of ritual. What was termed as the dignified parts of the constitution, particularly the visible show of monarchy and aristocracy, transmitted a message to the unenfranchised and unsophisticated masses by means of symbol and spectacle. The dignified parts of the constitution excite and preserve the reverence of the population. Parades, drums and flags had been the most used tools of the dignified part of these symbols. *Secondly*, the state directly promotes its own legitimacy with the mass of its subjects is by propaganda. Like ritual, this as a normal part of its governing. During both world wars the state in the United Kingdom employed propaganda to persuade its subjects of the justice of its cause, the special qualities of the regime, and the absolute superiority of the British state over all possible rivals. *Thirdly*, the state promotes its legitimacy through formal education, which raises the wider issue of ideology. In so far as the education, which all citizens receive deals with government and politics, it is complimentary rather than critical. It encourages politics, it encourages participation in a system whose character is both assumed and approved. Further, in the examples it gives by way of its own organization, it teaches submission to the authority of office. These ideological aspects of the legitimacy are losing its importance under global context as a result of libertarian demands. Because, individual has a moral autonomy and he/she has no need of an ideological justification of state policies. While gender politics forces the state to take on new roles in equalizing between the sexes, libertarian demands force the state to exit from the moral fields of the individual.

*Libertarian demands* focus on less state intervention in the private realm. In early formation of nation state, it was intervening in language, education and culture to create a

consciousness of being a nation. However, in global context, those classical roles of nation state are questioned on the ground that they are occupying the private realm through enforcement so that the state should be taken out of this realm. Libertarian shift highlights the moral autonomy of individual in his/her private realm that is considered as public in classical terms.

**Welfare Expectation :** *Welfare expectation* of the individual is enlarging. In early nation state there was no problem of welfare for political legitimacy. In the nineteenth century we witnessed the rise of social rights and in the twentieth century there emerged the rise of welfare policies, which I have examined in the welfare stage of political legitimacy. Welfare expectation is related to two kinds of relations. *First* is the continuation of capitalist mode of production under global context. Human essence is to be realized fully only in free, conscious, creative activity; human beings have a greater capacity for this if they are allowed; capitalist society denies this essential humanity to most of its inhabitants. The role of the state in a capitalist society is to maintain the conditions for capitalist enterprise and capital accumulation. The state is seen to have been moving from being a mere superstructure and to have attained a significant degree of autonomy. The holders of state office must in their own interest maintain and support the accumulation process because the state's revenue and the power of the state's officers depends on it. Hence in a democratic capitalist society, although the electorate determines who shall hold office as the government, governments are not free to make what use they might like of their constitutional power. The government must stay within the limits imposed by the requirements of the accumulation process, limitations generally imposed on social democratic governments through the mediation of the permanent bureaucracy and sometimes of the military. The need to promote accumulation has, with the maturation of late capitalism, required the state to take on a new range of functions. The whole apparatus of welfare state provides cushions against unemployment, otherwise that would endanger public order. Modern state increased infrastructure support, in the sense of technical and social, like transportation and telecommunication systems, education, energy plants, public housing, research and development activities and regional development schemes. These measures are taken to prevent the side-effects of capitalists' search for profit.

*Second* is related to the new nature of the state under the global context. Welfare demands at the beginning of the twenty first century focus on more international politics of the state, in the sense that the state is expected to be more cooperative and peaceful with other state, which will result in diminishing defense expenditures. Decrease in defense expenditures of armaments and tacit policies of the state will lead to increasing public financial sources for investments. Investments will create more opportunities for employment and social welfare. In this context, the basis of political legitimacy to a certain extent lies in whether the state becomes a party to global frameworks of disarmament and conventions on banning certain kinds of weapons, like nuclear, chemical and biological.

*Welfare expectation* of individual is changing to the extent that it threatens the classical authority of nation state in its freedom of expenditure in armament for so-called national security. Instead of armament and other ideological expenditures of nation state, new shifts in welfare expectations forces the state to expenditure more in creating equal opportunity for all individuals in the society in reaching freedom and well-being.

**Changing Nature of Participation :** *Participation* in government classically was periodical elections. In global context, participating through periodical elections began to lose its *prima facie* importance for political legitimacy. *Participation is taking the form of permanent*, not periodical. Participation began to be understood not only in the formation of political authority, but also in the governing process. Civil society is gaining more importance, and civil society organizations are taking the role of classical political parties. Saward (Saward:1992:39) claims that contractarian liberalism grounds legitimate government on the notion of the consent of the governed. Free individuals voluntarily consent to the rule over themselves, giving rise in turn to the obligation of consent-givers to obey that rule. The concepts of consent and political obligation have been the subject of a great deal of classical and modern discussion. Yet, the notions of both contract and consent, in one way or another, are abstractions. Most of us have not signed any contract with our government or our society or our fellow citizens. There is no such contract for us to sign. Even if the metaphorical social contract were ever actually signed by the first citizens of a civil society, the consent of later generations cannot be taken for granted. An act of consenting, or a promise, cannot be made on behalf of B by A and necessarily give

rise to obligations for B, other things being equal. Saward, after examining liberal theories of legitimacy, concludes that in principle, we can say that most people, on reflection and with enough relevant information, would be prepared to accept the regime in question as morally legitimate if the principles are sufficiently realized across a range of central areas of policy. The procedural and substantive principles, in this case, are those that there should be genuine and formal opportunities for citizen participation in government decision-making processes; that there should be genuine and formal procedures for citizens to hold decision-makers accountable for their decisions and non-decisions; that policy outcomes should promote the efficient use of resources in implementation in order to promote want-satisfaction; and that policy outcomes should promote substantive equality between citizens.

The participation principle holds that all citizens should have the chance to participate at least formally through representatives in the process of government decision-making, and that, outcomes should be contingent somehow on participants' opinions. Morally, people should have the opportunity to influence particular policy outcomes in line with their concerns. These opportunities should work through formal mechanisms so that people can know and understand how they can be taken (Saward:1992:49). If decision-makers cannot be held formally and genuinely accountable for their actions then citizens may have no way of knowing whether policies continue to be justifiable in terms of their concerns or interests. The principle of accountability holds that those involved in the formulation and implementation of government policies should be formally answerable to the citizenry for these policies. In a system of direct democracy this would not be a major problem. However, in representative system of modern states the problem is of course major and complex. The technical difficulties in the implementation of a direct democracy in modern society and the problems of representation system to secure a just delegation resulted in the decreasing importance of voting in modern state. Participation, voting and representation in classical political theory were for the authorization of who will govern. However, in emerging discourse, participation in the formation of political authority is not so important, rather participation in the governing process has gained significance for political legitimacy. Taking into account the decrease in voting rates and the rising role of civil society organizations in liberal democratic states, political legitimacy of the state lies in sharing, to a certain extent, the decision-making power and implementation of policies

with the civil society. While classical participation through voting process loses its importance, participation in the governance process has began to get strength. The legitimacy of the state is being questioned not on the ground of less participating in the elections, rather on the ground that the state disregards the ideas of civil society organizations.

This issue is related to the formalization of participatory procedures and rising autonomy of state bureaucracy. Epistemology and morality of the modernity resulted in the reduction of human freedom and responsibility just to purely individualistic goals; and the de-humanization of leadership. Schaar (Schaar:1989:33-7) discusses the de-humanization of modern leadership on the account of rationality and bureaucratization of modern state. Modern societies become increasingly like self-regulating machines, whose human tenders are needed only to make the minor adjustments demanded by the machine itself. As the whole system grows more and more complex, each individual is able to understand and control less and less of it. It is very difficult today on the corridor of bureaucratized state to find the right responsible person for a specific issue. The functions of planning and control, and ultimately of decision-making, are increasingly taken away from men and given to machines and routine processes. Perhaps the final solution to the problem of human governance will be to make a machine king. The organization of human resources needed to serve this process is done in the bureaucratic mode. The system carries a bureaucratic epistemology. Knowledge or information could be useful only after passing through the stages of this bureaucracy, which assures the autonomy of this process. This bureaucratic epistemology shapes the end, for just it could admit the inputs and evaluation of those inputs are conditioned alongside the bureaucratic mentality. Bureaucracy is rational in certain ways; management is de-personalized, it is assumed to be objective, and the person in the office could be easily replaceable since bureaucracy is run by fixed rules and techniques. Bureaucratic rationality, despite its assumptions, denies responsibility for the consequences of action on the ground that it lacks full knowledge of the reason of action. This is because rationality is widely diffused and it is very difficult to find a whole responsible. Depending on these points, bureaucratic rationality in modern states, despite its assertion of being de-personalized, objective and transparent through which it appeals to legitimacy, became an irresponsible and de-humanized administration apparatus.

*Process of participation* in politics is changing to upset classical high value of state as de-personalized and technical rationality of working state. Participation, in classical terms, had been understood as participating in determining who and how would govern the society, that is election and law-making. This kind of participation presumed that once who and how would govern is determined, the political structure of state and its bureaucracy had been de-personalized and so-called technically rationalized in order to guarantee its neutrality vis-à-vis the members of the society. The technical participation in the governing process creates the problem of identification between the state and the individual, which is one of the strongest bases of illegitimation of the state in the eye of the individual. However, in global context, the technical rationality and de-personalized character of bureaucracy are questioned on the ground that they are indifferent to act to respond the demands of the individual. In other words, de-humanized nature of the state is incapable to respond effectively to human demands. So civil initiatives emerge as alternative to so-called public services fulfilled by the state, which makes state bureaucracy unnecessary.

**Transparency** : Depending on the changing notion of participation and expectation of welfare, government activities are expected to be *transparent* in global context. Transparency is related to the full information or awareness in order to secure the efficient use of public resources and also full information about the possible outcomes of this usage. The principle of efficiency refers to the rational and optimal use of public resources in the implementation of public policy. This idea of efficiency accords closely with the capitalist market principle of maximizing returns from a careful expenditure of resources. It is a want-regarding principle in that it has to do with the satisfaction of wants among citizens, and as such deals with the optimal use of available government resources. Efficiency can be regarded as aggregative (as opposed to distributive, which has to do with the equality principle), meaning that it mentions only the total amount of want-satisfaction among the members of a reference group. Efficiency principle provides us with both an account of restrictions on state action and an imperative on states to act. The restriction is that the state should not act unless it could reasonably expect that the resulting outcome would be of general benefit to citizens (Saward:1992:54-6).

The principle of equality is also want-regarding, but is best seen as distributive rather than aggregative. When we speak of equality we refer to the distribution in society of the opportunities for people to get or to do what they want, rather than the total amount of want-satisfaction evident in a society. The principle of equality holds that policy outcomes should promote equality of means and or prospects among citizens. At this level there is no distinction between one citizen and the next in the provision of rights, benefits and opportunities. The moral point is that the provision of state services should be to all in equal quantities and quality, with no discrimination without good and relevant reasons (Saward:1992:57). Accordingly, democracy is defined as a political system in which competing interest groups seek to maximize their interests through using democratic rights and freedoms.

Clark (Clark:1984:156-7), by referring to the arguments of Dowson that implication of uncertainty and inadequate information in affecting rational decision-making is a severe handicap in the democracies in line with an analogy in economics that market equilibrium can collapse because of inadequate information of true market prices; argues that voters may not know the true policies of competing parties while parties may mistake voter preferences. In the absence of information costs it is argued that competing political parties will tend toward the center of the political spectrum. Lack of adequate information could create, as in economics, problems of political monopoly and disequilibrium solutions. The heart of this analysis is the negation of political ideology as a legitimate, identifiable, and non-divisible political attribute of individual's and groups. Ideology for this analysis is a problem of inadequate knowledge or of irrationality in decision-making. Ideology is seen as a screen or impediment to the expression of true voter preferences and implies less than optimal solutions for the allocation of government outputs according to such preferences. Transparency appeals of the individual impinge on the classical working of the state, in the sense that participation in the governance, full awareness about the procedures.

*Transparency issue* began to gain an utmost importance in global context with respect to the state policies and actions from the side of individual. Transparency means that individual know well the content and outcomes of public affairs through which he/she could benefit best from those policies. However, impersonal, technical and complex nature

of the state structure and bureaucracy prevents individual from knowing how he/she could get opportunities in order to benefit his/her legal rights and freedom. Complexity of the state bureaucracy and subsequent difficulties in reaching proper information on the rights of individual in public policies creates alienation of the individual to the state, which makes political legitimacy vulnerable to strong criticism.

**Justice and Equality :** In classical terms, justice had been understood as codification of law and the equality of citizens before this law. However, in global context individuals are searching equal opportunities in the formation of government, and equal participation in governance process. This equality demands exceed the classical meaning of equality before law, rather equal opportunities are related to the enlarging welfare and transparency through which the individual will have equal opportunity in benefiting from social and economic gains. Contemporary normative theorists are working with a market model of man and society, like Rawls and Nozick. Rawls is happy with the welfare state encroachments on unalloyed capitalism, whereas Nozick argues for a return to the minimal state. But they both endorse the fundamental relations of capitalist market society and its property institutions. Since they assume maximizing market man as the norm, they need not go behind that to inquire into the nature or potential of man and to relate that to the state. They need not be concerned with any necessary or historical relation of the state to society or to supposed essentially human proposes or capacities. They do not need a theory of state, but only a theory of distributive justice (Rawls), distribution of primary goods, or of holdings (Nozick), or a theory of liberty. The state can be treated as simply an agent, which does or should subserve the principles of justice or liberty, which the theorists argue for (Macpherson:1985:58).

However, Edmundson acknowledges that justice in terms of equality, in contrast to the arguments of many political theorists that it is essential for the legitimacy of political authority, is not an unavoidable element of legitimacy. Classical Athenian democracy was unjust (think of slavery and its treatment of women) but legitimate. Any unjust but consented regime has a claim to legitimacy that we may deny but cannot ignore. In any way, equality before law, full knowledge about the codified laws, and distributive justice are the basis of classical political legitimacy of the state. Unjust distribution of wealth, opportunities and liberties worldwide between the north and the south creates the problem

of global justice. In classical terms, justice within the national society was adequate in legitimation of the state with respect to justice. In global context, issue of justice is enlarging and deepening; enlarging in the sense that global injustices began to constitute a basis of political illegitimacy, and deepening in the sense that equality of citizens to benefit from the public goods does not guarantee equal opportunities in benefiting process. Even among nation states there emerges unjust implementation by force.

Falk (Falk:1994:479-80), referring to the global apartheid, states that in the Pentagon Guidance Document of 1992 it is argued that as possibly necessary for the United States even to use military force to prevent North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and India from acquiring nuclear weaponry, but no reference is made to the acquisition of such weaponry by Israel or South Africa that are governed by light-skinned elites. This nuclear apartheid may not be explicitly and deliberately racist, but the de facto racism evident in practice contributes to the impression of a racially stratified world order. The Southern concerns stress 'instability' rather than illegitimacy, possibly to communicate more easily with adherents of the realist consensus, who are not inclined to regard normative factors as relevant determinants of international behavior by sovereign states. In fact, they know well also that instability flows from illegitimacy, more importantly instability is more likely to arise from political efforts to oppose illegitimacy. Issue of justice has both individual and social aspect; while individuals demand more justice in the implementation of state policies, states demand more justice in the implementation of classical laws of international politics and societies of the south demand more justice in the division of wealth and opportunities. If nation state locally provides order, security and justice in line with the requirements of advanced capitalism, this will create the problem of global justice.

*The problem of justice and equality* emerges as a result of the incapacity of the modern nation state in properly responding to the demands of individual with respect to the issues of gender-feminism, libertarianism, welfare, participation and transparency. Taking into account the current structure of the state and its bureaucratic face, individuals have a great suspect of justice about equal treatment of the state and equal opportunity in reaching rights and freedom, including those of material well being.

Individual aspect of political legitimacy is mainly related to the general demands of individuals in representation of their personal identity and preferences within the public sphere. These demands could change from sexual preferences to transparency of public authority, from equal opportunity to participation. In fact, globalization and fragmentation resulted in further personalization of individual features. But individual demands turn around the recognition of this further personalization by legal codes and political manners. The rising demands of individual create critical questions on how the existing form of nation state could arrange those demands in accordance with its existing basis of political legitimacy. Any unresponsiveness of the state vis-à-vis those demands would result in alienation of individual to the state at personal level, which provokes sub- and trans-national movements of identity representation. Sure, individual alienation would create the fundamental question for individual of “why is the state ready there?”.

## **7.2. Local Aspect of Political Legitimacy**

There is a trend in standardization of human rights and freedom worldwide, but there is a concurrent trend in specification of local identities and cultures. Fragmentation trends result in emergence of minor states, which need advanced capitalism in order to attain its goals of development and welfare. In classical theories of political legitimacy, national identity and culture were the basis of cultural aspect of political legitimacy. However, in global context, we experience the fragmentation of national identity and culture. Local identities and cultures put certain demands on the state, which are irreconcilable with the classical understanding of national society and culture. Similar to the demands of the adherents of gender and libertarian politics in the field of morality, identity and cultural politics of the local impinges on the monopoly of the state in defining identity and morality. Classically, it had been believed that identity and morality could be defined and exercised by nation state within the national territory. Common identity and morality of the nation had served to the emergence of a national consciousness that guaranteed being a society over the delimited territory. Identity and morality of the nation was so similar to those of a tribe. Schaar (Schaar:1989:29-33) argues that each tribe believes that there is no morality outside the tribe and that without its morality it is no longer a tribe. Morality is, then, both a means and the basic means of preserving a community, holding it together, making pathways through the landscape of social

relations, defending it against threats from strangers and the gods. Also, through actions based on myth and ritual, the people themselves reenact and reaffirm the harmony between the ontological order and their own human realm. Thus, identity and legitimacy were inseparable.

However, in modern society, each man becomes his own author, his own boundary setter and truth maker. The ego recognizes no source of truth and morality external to itself, which troubles both identity and legitimacy, by erasing the external source of identity formation. Hobbes never conceived the possibility of selfhood, which transcends the purely individual. For him there is no trouble so long as one self does not impinge upon another. When this happens, Leviathan puts curbs on all. In this perspective, order is a question of power, and legitimacy is reduced to prudent self-interest. In this sense, Schaar refers to the argument of Lipset about the foundation of the United State that the doctrine and sentiments were largely widespread that each individual comes into this world morally complete and self-sufficient, clothed with natural rights and no in need of fellowship for moral growth and fulfillment. The human material consisted of a gathering of people each of whom sought self-sufficiency and the satisfaction of private desires. Community and society meant little more than the ground upon which each challenged or used others for private gain. Americans have always been dedicated to 'getting ahead', and getting ahead has always meant leaving others behind. Affective life centers almost exclusively in the family, and other associations are more or less useful in the pursuit of private goals. Once the goal of self-sufficiency is reached, the individual retreats from the group life. Modern man appears ready to attempt a life built upon no other ideal than happiness defined in terms of comfort and self-expression. All ideals are suspect, all renunciations and disciplines are seen as snares and stupidities, and all corporate commitments are nothing but self-imprisonment.

Therefore, Schaar concludes that in the name of so-called autonomy of individual, modern society and politics disregarded the moral origin of the individual, thereby identity that could be meaningful only within a society has been erased, so way the legitimacy of society and politics disappeared. Identity has been reduced only to private desires and goals, and legitimacy, which requires genuine social and political relations, has been shaped just around the instrument of providing a circumstance in which private goals of

individual could selfishly be realized. This trend had been strengthened by the participatory implementation of nation state as well. In other words, in the evolution of nation state, the binding power of national identity and morality has been lost as a result of the rise of absolute autonomy of the individual as a universal dignity.

Diminishing value of common identity and morality of the nation in global context resulted in the emergence of local identity, morality and culture, which are becoming the point of reference of being human. In this new trend, tradition of history in the form of ethnic culture or religious awakening has been discovered and appealed to people as a bond gathering their members around the myth of creating a community. Identity and cultural politics imposes a direct threat to the integrity of nation state. Territorial integrity for providing security behind the immune physical borders was an unavoidable component of political legitimacy. Threat of identity and cultural politics to the state is direct in the sense that each local community demands its own political structure that is state. Proponents of identity and cultural politics turn into separatist movements. Because of this reason, at the beginning of the new century there are more than 200 nation states all over the world. This is the localization process of nation state. Territorial localization of the state results in functional limitations as well. As it will be analyzed in the part of global aspect of political legitimacy, functionally constricted state is that kind which is unable to meet welfare, security and problem-solving expectations of its subjects. Territorial localization and functional limitations makes the state vulnerable to the demands of advanced capitalism.

This localization process has great implications for both liberal and anarchist ideal of the state as the local technical structures, and gets the two extreme approaches close to each other, anarchists and liberals. Anarchical theorists like Godwin, Proudon, Bakunin and Kropotkin emphasized on the point that the existence of political authority is a direct challenge to the liberty. So they focused on constituting local-technical structures for the operations of mechanism in order to attain common goods. Like anarchist liberal theorists also stressed on minimizing the authority of the state, through which only common and technical questions would be handled by this minimal authority. Their basic difference lies in the public ownership of the production of common goods. Some anarchists tolerate even private property in case of not related to the production of common goods. The

technical façade of the political authority seems to be the basic source of its legitimacy in these paradigms. However, the formation of modern state is not emanated just from the technical questions, as assumed by liberals or anarchists, more importantly ideological expectations and policies had gave the state apparatus a high value of existence. Capitalism, nationalism, socialism dominated the operations of state apparatus in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, just like the religious political structures of the dark ages. So political legitimacy is closely related to the ideological discourse of the state. While the ideological basis got strength, technical basis lost importance. However, in the twenty first century, it seems hardly that neither ideology nor its technical capability will dominate its source of political legitimacy. Rather, the rise of identity and cultural politics and ethnicity force the state to be a cultural phenomenon.

Identity and cultural politics has served multiple but ideologically ambiguous purposes. It has been a continuation of historical struggle for equality and justice. It addressed the alienation, insecurities and contradictions of mass culture and affluence of modern society (Dunn:1998:27). Within the globalization process identity politics became a major factor that could damage the integrity of national identity. It also directed severe criticism against the conventional forms of legitimating political power. Known and experienced democratic principles and procedures in nation states have been challenged on the ground that they are not the guarantors of sub-national ethnic or individual identities. Also the separation of public/private division of liberal theory does not promise any working theoretical framework for the demands of identity and cultural politics, for depression, segregation and deprivation remain unsolvable problems in liberal theory. These criticism and expectations are expected to enforce liberal theory to refine its division of public/private in globalization process.

Within a hegemonic understanding, the problematization of identity and culture requires both the recognition of multiple determinants of power relations and the multiple construction of subject position in a given hegemonic system (Keyman:1997:146). Postmodern discourse of international relations calls for the need to oppose the cultural essentialism of global modernity to recognize difference (Keyman:1997:193). While modernity tried to homogenize identity and culture, the result became the reverse; ethnic and religious identities re-asserted themselves in modernity. As a modern phenomenon

nation state was in coalition with the modernity in creating a uniform culture and identity within its defined territory. But with the emergence of different identity appeals, the unity and legitimacy of nation state began to be questioned. In terms of the ambiguous nature of the present, what we are facing today is, on the one hand, the crisis in the presumed unity of state and nation, the manifestation of which is the dissemination of security and insecurity from state to nation, or from sovereignty to identity. On the other hand we find ourselves ill-equipped theoretically and practically to encounter the complex challenges posed by ethnic-base violence and ethnic nationalism that produces it (Keyman:1997:210).

Within globalization and under the growing influence of identity and cultural politics, the struggle between the core (state) and the periphery (marginal groups or individuals), between the dominant self and the Other is not a struggle over whether there is to be a certain kind of identity or culture of globalization, rather over the terms of such global integration, and in particular over what or who is to define identity of social groups (Lash and Friedman:1992:24). Identity in the sense of personal liberation from social determinants was one of the grand promise of the modernity, which aims to construct a universal dignity for identity, to abolish traditional barriers and to remove collective suppression. The modern was an attempt to construct freely the personal identity, which as a stage in historical process (Hoffmann-Axthelm:1992:200-5), in which there is a transition from modern to postmodern. Within the latter stage, people began to exceed the boundaries of modern identifications. A main consequence of this, in Spybey's (Spybey:1996:9-10) words, is that individual has tended to develop increased expectations of personal fulfillment and satisfaction, which is a fundamental of enlightenment project. The pursuit of these individualized forms of emancipation may be termed in the broad sense 'life politics'. This distinguishes it, as a project of social development, from the emancipatory politics of early modernity, which involved the attainment of citizenship rights. 'Life Politics' concerned with human self-actualization, both on the level of the individual and collectively. Life politics embraces reflexive reactions to modernity. These include both demands for more personal choices in life, as supplied at the materialistic level by flexible manufacturing, and at the same time, reactions to the aspects of modernity and consumerism.

Both local cultural re-assertions and more personal liberation as demanded by individual are fragmenting the unity and integrity of national politics, identity and culture, which were, in classical terms, important basis of political legitimacy. If local culture and identity would define the state of being human as a reference point of being a community, both the sovereign territory of nation state and the sovereign unit of analysis of classical sociology and political science is disintegrating. This trend is expected to change the classical boundaries of political authority, identity and legitimacy. Under the new circumstances, classical means of acquiring political legitimacy, like participation or constitution, would hardly be adequate for the legitimation of nation state. Then, nation state seems to have two alternative for continuation of its political legitimacy vis-a-vis the demands of localization of culture and identity. *First* is to relinquish territorial integrity, which has been in use after the Second World War that resulted in dramatic increasing of the number of the state all over the world. *Second* is a peaceful settlement of the localization on the principles of recognition and justice. This would result in the decreasing power of the center in political, economic and cultural terms, which will transform unitary nation states into a federal type of government.

### **7.3. Global Aspect of Political Legitimacy**

Global aspects constitute the third level of enforcement that will transform the classical basis of political legitimacy of nation state. Global aspects are those global occurrences, which are not directly related to the individual and local aspects. At the beginning of the twenty first century we could identify three kind of global aspects, *advanced or global capitalism, survival and security-stability and information networks*. But this is not absolute, rather to facilitate the argumentation, in the sense that all are interrelated in certain points.

**Advanced Capitalism** : Capitalism has been transforming into the form of *advanced capitalism*. The differences between classical capitalism and its advanced form could include a variety of ranges, but for the purpose of the analysis we have to identify their differences as those; classical capitalism has a national character which resulted in two World Wars, but advanced capitalism is multi-national; for classical capitalism the world was comprised of two different areas, one is the periphery that provide the raw

materials and the other is the metropolitan field in which the production activities took part, but in advanced capitalism production activities has been globalized; in classical capitalism the nature of proletariat was hand workers, while in advanced capitalism there is automation of production process; in classical capitalism heavy industry was important, but in advanced capitalism information and finance are more central.

Depending on these main differences in advanced capitalism regulatory mechanism began to get a global character in the sense of harmonization of economic and trade policies among all states. In fact, the main demands of both classical and advanced capitalism from the state did not radically change. Both demand order, stability, security and non-intervention by the state in the market. However, in its evolution, instruments and the degree of usage of these instruments in order to attain those demands changed in circumstances. Poggi (Poggi:1990:21), historically, points two aspects of state differentiation; *first* is the secularization of political power, meaning that the state claims no responsibility for the spiritual well-being of its population. *Second* aspect is the separation of state from civil society. It conveys that state recognizes that individual subject has its power and capacity in autonomously pursuing its interests of non-political character. This pertains in particular to the citizens' economic activities, for the production and distribution of wealth are largely assigned to the institutions of private property, contract and market, with respect to which the state claims to operate as an outside guarantor rather than as an interested party. Despite the state's initiatives to retreat from certain areas of activities, increasingly, under advanced capitalism, the operation and development of a country's industrial system depends on complex and expensive infrastructures, for instance, schools, universities, research establishments, which are mostly provided for and maintained by the state. At the very center of the system are often found whole industrial sectors, typically, those associated with military industrial complex, or with space exploration and other high-tech ventures, which depend on state contracts for the majority of their financial needs. A high level of aggregate demand, resulting from the spending choices of buyers of both intermediate and finished products, is indispensable both to the health of the industrial system at large and to that of the political system itself. For the latter relies, for its legitimation and thus for its relatively smooth functioning, on the citizenry enjoying a relatively high and possibly rising standard of living (Poggi:1990:117).

When we take into account that nation state and capitalism are twin brothers of modernity, legitimation crisis arises from the failure in meeting material expectation of the people. Material expectation is closely related to capitalism. So legitimation crisis of the state is the result of the implementations of capitalist mode of production. In other words, evolution of political legitimacy is in line with the evolution of capitalism to an important extent. In Habermasian terms the concept of rational communication is an explanatory tool to understand the legitimacy. Legitimacy is after all only possible when citizens all become as deeply and truly informed as Plato's philosopher-king. Governments in capitalist societies maintain their own legitimacy, he argues, principally by creating an illusion of their separation from the economic workings of society, despite the fact that they do in fact maintain those workings, what Habermas (Habermas: 1975:69-70) terms "the functional necessity of making the administrative system, as far as possible, independent of the legitimating system". In a capitalist society argues Habermas (Habermas: 1975:46), the state is forced to act in ways, which will undermine its legitimacy, because it must intervene to try and remedy the deficiencies of the economic system. A legitimation crisis will arise as a result of government's unsuccessful attempts to avoid economic crisis through extending its won responsibilities. While the erosion of legitimacy arises from failure to meet popular material expectations, the state's own efforts at maintaining legitimacy are not directed principally to this goal.

The problem of legitimacy is thus one of maintaining mass consensus through both economic growth and some system of at least apparent redistribution of material benefits. The state thus provides benefits in order to pacify the poorer parts of the nation, maintaining itself by quietening material discontent. The social services are designed chiefly to keep social peace among unemployed workers, and to pacify and control the surplus population. It is one of Habermas' particular contributions to the theory of legitimacy to argue that the state deliberately attempts to distance itself from its economic functions by presenting them as the impartial application of "natural" law. The social order is maintained by devices such as tradition considered a safer alternative than government regulation for the state wishing to preserve its legitimacy. Privatization is a device to keep conflicts out of the sphere of politics and thus prevent them from threatening the state, while at the same time, by making distributions seem natural, making

it less likely that they will be challenged. By moving services from the state to the market, the intention is to end the possibility, both in practice and in the expectations of citizens, of radical challenges to the existing collective distribution of rewards, goods, and services, and to channel energies instead into the system maintaining activity of private individual economic advancement. But acting in this way, the state may be seen also as defending itself, by removing itself from an area where conflicts may erode its own reputation or authority.

Modern state imposed marketing boards designed to stabilize markets in commodities, labor and capital. In late capitalism, labor and capital has been fragmented into three sectors. *First* is the corporate oligopolistic sector in which firms are largely able to set their own prices. *Second* sector is the competitive private sector in which small firms take role and are unable to achieve in stability of prices and labor. *Third* sector is public sector consisting of government agencies and public bureaucracy. The combined effect of the increase in the role of the state, and the fragmentation of labor and capital into the three sectors, has been a considerable alteration in the classical capitalist relations of production and the relation of capital to the state. Since the state is democratic, it faces two fundamental difficulties; it must reconcile the requirements of accumulation with the demands of the electorate and it must extract an increasing revenue from capital to finance its support of capital and its responses to the electorate.

On this occasion, Macpherson (Macpherson:1985:63-9) points out two kinds of crises. *First* is the legitimation crisis as proposed by Habermas, which focuses on that accumulation supportive state has to legitimate its activities vis-à-vis the electorate. *Second* is the fiscal crisis as referred by O'Connor, which focuses on the contradiction between state's need for expanded revenues and the maintenance of capital accumulation. Crisis suggests either the impending breakdown of capitalism or, if capitalism is to survive, the breakdown of democracy. Macpherson argues that either of these results is possible, but not necessary. He claims that certainly the late capitalist state has a legitimation problem, which the earlier capitalist state did not have. Earlier, when the market, not the state, was responsible for the economy and all the recurrently damaging effects of depressions, and when the market allocation of rewards as thought either to be fair or inevitable, the state had no great difficulty about legitimating its existence and its

performance of its minimal functions. But now the state takes heavy responsibilities for the economy and its side-effects, the state has a serious legitimation problem.

Macpherson states that there are three sections of the population whose consent can still be taken by state for its operations. *First* are the bureaucracy and its personnel. *Second* is the recipient of welfare state. And *third* is the organized labor force employed by private sector. In his words, modern state has no legitimacy problem as long as it provides relatively job security and high wages to public servants, as long as it carries out welfare activities; and as long as labor force in private sector appreciates the subsidization of their employers' operations for job stability and enough wages.

Welfare demands and related employment and economic growth are closely related to the foreign direct investments. On the other hand, global capitalism demands certain conditions from the state in order to process foreign direct investments in a country. Every state in global context needs global capitalism in order to achieve its goals of welfare and thus political legitimacy. Similar to the alliance between early capitalism and nation state, in global context, the state and global capitalism need each other. This situation will sustain most probably their alliance situation in global economic networks, like World Trade Organization and other global economic ordering. In fact, both side have equal power of impositions on each other, in the meaning that global capitalism has to enlarge and deepen worldwide in order to remove any possibility of crisis. On the other hand, the state has to respond constructively to the demands of global capitalism in order to fulfill its obligations of welfare. Between these two axes there has been emerging after the Second World War a participatory mechanism in regulating the boundaries of this alliance. Participatory mechanisms are those of international governmental organizations. However, this participatory process is still one-sided and first level between the capital and the authority, which does not guarantee the legitimacy of both side. In other words, participatory process should include the voices of civil society or international non-governmental organizations as well for a truly political legitimacy. The problems of this first level of participation could be seen better in the demands of solving emerging global problems of survival and security that will be analyzed in succeeding paragraphs.

**Global Security Problems :** *Global security problems*, which are related to the survival of humankind. Global problems have been emanating from the functioning of capitalism and from the division of labor between the market and the state. Global security problems could be gathered under three main topic, environmental pollution, nuclearization of defense and terrorism. Environmental pollution is a result expansive and uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources by the capitalist mode of production and market consumerism. Nuclearization of defense is the result of security dilemma of nation states, in which defense instruments under the context of forever insecurity feeling began to cover nuclear, biological and chemical weapons discovered by modern science, which are directly threats of survival of human kind and also of the physical environments. International terrorism, to a certain extent, is the result of global injustices and got strength with the usage of modern communication technologies.

These three aspects of global security began to change fundamentally classical security formulations of nation state. In classical security phenomenon, threat was coming from other human communities, which are defined as *others*. Others were the people or their political structure that is state, which were outside of territorial boundaries of the state. So nation state was politically legitimate as long as it was powerful enough to encounter the threat from other man. However, in global context and advanced capitalism “security against man” understanding had been transformed into “security against pollution, terror and perishing of human kind”. In the past security was for the physical existence of a specific community, but at the beginning of the twenty first century security is for the survival of a planet, which includes all species of human, plants and animals, that is the ecology.

Poggi (Poggi:1990:118) argues that while it remains as mandatory for advanced as for earlier capitalism that the state should allow the market to function as an autonomous realm, today that very requirement commits the state itself to more activity, and more expensive and varied activity than it did in the past. Furthermore state activities not themselves intended to satisfy that requirement must not interfere too heavily with the freedom of action of private economic power. The process of policy formation and implementation of contemporary states are systematically open to inputs originating also from the holders of that power, and the effect of those inputs is often to make state action

more extensive and penetrating. Accordingly to the demands of private business, other social segments whose interests are other than economic ones raise different concerns on the state actions and policies. For instance, growing concerns about the conditions of the natural environment have found expression in political demands which can only be satisfied if the state confers new faculties and facilities upon its agencies, allowing them to monitor the environment, to identify the processes which threaten it and to halt or moderate that threat.

Modern bureaucratic states typically distinguish a technical, professional or administrative sphere in government, which they hold separate from politics. Indeed, the military, civil service, scientific agencies and public health services are generally not only thought but legally required to be divorced from politics in the restricted but important sense of being nonpartisan and professional. Also the fate of human species, and indeed of the earth itself is frighteningly in jeopardy in the nuclear era. Although in the nuclear era all-out war has lost whatever rationale, it may have previously possessed as the last resort in deciding inter-state disputes, this does not sufficiently secure humanity against its recurrence. The territorial character of the modern state had constituted the unique physical base and referent of the state's institutional mission, its very body, the ground of its being. This essential territorial reference of the state has been under pressure. What are at stake are each state's ability to monitor competently, and to intervene effectively in a growing range of aspects of social existence, in spite of the fact that such aspect decisively affect the well-being of its population, the resources available to the state, and its ability to form and carry out policy.

The threats to the territoriality of the state are mainly the nuclearization of the military power, expanding visibility of international terrorism, growing role of multinational corporations under advanced capitalism, rising appeals to transnational or ethnic cultural values or invitations, and physical threats to the ecology on which human existence is securely grounded (Poggi:1990:178). The activities of human population, which necessarily make use of natural resources and affect the environment, are overstraining or damaging that environment's capacity to reproduce itself, to endure as a viable biological setting for those very activities, and as a store of resources upon which they can safely continue to draw. The point of this concern is that a state's territory may

no longer be, if it ever was, a framework appropriate for identifying, moderating or suppressing the strains imposed on the natural environment by the ongoing production and consumption activities of its population and those of other states. For territories including territorial waters have become vulnerable to the damaging environmental effects of what goes on outside them, as a product or by-product of other populations' activities. Basically, because it is politically ordered on the basis of territoriality bounded states, the globe lacks the political structures necessary to confront the biological threats represented by environmental degradations, which ignore state boundaries – best exemplified by the Chernobyl disaster, ozone depletion, acid rain, the pollution of the oceans and the rapid diffusion of AIDS, or the international drug traffic.

In early nation state, territorial borders were enough to give its population a sense of security against others. However, in global context, whereas there is a enormous increase in the number of nation state as a result of localization, it seems very doubtful whether those nation state could be able to provide to its citizens a sense of security against ecological perishing. Thus under the global context, nation state framework is not an adequate instrument in providing a sense of security to the people. Content and meaning of security has been dramatically transformed. It is right that conventional security paradigm against other human being in localized nation states could serve a sense of security for the members of the community, but this is not the core of expanded and transformed security expectation. There are many attempts of nation states to handle this global security dilemma through intergovernmental organizations for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources and for environment-friendly mode of production, but these attempts seem very inadequate in solving rapidly growing global threats. At the beginning of the twenty first century, the most important source of illegitimation of nation state is its inadequacy to confront with the global security problems.

Hegemonic security and stability in classical terms was useful to prevent an absolutely anarchical situation within international politics. Hegemony was guiding the general principles of the international system, supporting the implementation of these principles by force and legitimating the usage of force through creating an hegemonic ideology, through which an order or stability had been constituted. However, in global context, it seems very difficult that the implementation of the classical theory of

hegemonic stability could overcome global problems. After 1990s the world has been witnessing the hegemonic stability attempts of the United States. The order and stability in classical terms has been seen established by force backed by the ideology of human rights and freedom. But this could not have prevented September 11 Attacks, which is the biggest assault on the United States territory after the Second World War. Nuclear programs are being handled by some states even if the hegemony tried to prevent this process. Also, two Gulf Wars showed that there is a deep contradiction between the acts and the words of the hegemony, in the sense that instability in the oil-sensitive regions of the world had been immediately confronted despite tolerating human rights violations and oppressions in the same region. Like political legitimacy of nation state, hegemony needs a type of political legitimacy as well. In its classical implementation, this legitimation has been provided through an ideology and harmonizing this ideology and implementation. So in the twenty first century we witness that the United States lacks even this minimal level of justification of its acts. Moreover, when we take into account the great alliance between the advanced capitalism and the hegemony, it is very doubtful that the hegemony would be able, in foreseeable future, to commit into policies in order to prevent the externalities of capitalist mode of production and market consumerism. This process of ecological threats degrades further political legitimacy of the hegemony as well.

Neither the classical nation state nor the hegemony seems to address truly the emerging global problems. Rather, the main producers of those problems, which are the capitalist mode of production and nation state, are living a legitimation crisis. Particularly with regard to the ends that legitimate authority provides security that will prepare a convenient circumstance for material abundance, modern states seem to be unable anymore. The nuclear age ended the monopoly of providing security of the states. The challenge to material abundance comes out in the same way. Modern civilization has been dominated by production and consumption nexus. Since consumption is limitless, so too is production. But to produce something means to destroy something else. Abundance of material wealth is possible as long as there is anything left to destroy. This is the dynamism of modern economies. Production must run until it consumes those who think they run it; until man is absorbed into technique and production. This state of production has fulfilled its promises of abundance, but only at the price of raising a new and formidable threat to freedom, and even to survival (Schaar:1989:24). Intergovernmental

initiatives seem unable to overcome this legitimation crisis, rather the state and the hegemony are expected to take on new roles or to leave some of their roles that are deemed under their sovereign body. Redefinition and changing of these roles, nonetheless, are related to the rising power of civil society, which is conscious of global security problems.

**Global Civil Society :** Information technologies results in diminishing the classical importance of physical borders, which is expected to cause the rise of *global civil society*. Information moves rapidly and online communication among the people gets strong so much that a virtual civil society emerges across the national borders, which sometimes turns into actual civil society movements and actions. Spread of information technologies is already nurturing the creation of a global civil society, whose nascent strength was demonstrated at the WTO meeting in Seattle. Many civil society actors are networked very effectively, and are able to exert considerable influence on policy. For state governments to be effective as the number of influential non-state actors grows, they must be able to obtain a large amount of reliable information about the operations of individual actors and their networks. Similarly, the public must have access to reliable information, both to facilitate the grassroots assessment of government performance and to foster the development of healthy civil societies, both domestically and internationally.

By reference to Salamon's (Salamon:2000) definition of "associational revolution", expansion of global civil society has been caused by; the limitations of states' abilities to deal with the interrelated social welfare, developmental and environmental challenges; the spread of information technology, which has opened new opportunities for grassroots organizational development and cross-national organizational linkages; the significant growth of educated middle classes, who turn to alternative forms of political organization to achieve upward mobility when they perceive that state-based forms of political organization are unresponsive; and globalization of philanthropy and the emergence of external actors committed to fostering the growth of civil society in developing regions. Global civil society organizations are rising mainly in opposing to the emerging global security-survival problems of environment, nuclearization and unjust distribution of wealth between the north and the south and to the policies of nation states in the field of armaments and oppression of civil rights and freedom. The rising power and

influence of civil society movements results in that they began to take on some roles of political parties in the participation process, as I have asserted in the individual aspect of political legitimacy in global context before. For political parties, the proliferation of non-profit organizations has disrupted their monopoly on the political process as upstart single-purpose groups emerge and attract popular support. This trend also provides greater opportunities for popular political expression and contributes to the democratization of political systems. While contributing to democratization, the expansion of non-profit issue and interest representation can lead to political stalemate and gridlock; specific outcomes will depend on local political traditions, governance arrangements, and leadership skills.

Along with multinational corporations that challenge the premier role of national governments in the international arena, multinational non-profit networks have also become major actors on the global policy scene. Despite their loose structure, the ability of these networks to mobilize constituencies from around the globe has caused the impact of these networks on both domestic and international policy to grow. Multinational corporations have been increasingly vulnerable to forms of cross-national mobilization by non-profits. Through access to the press and networks of local activists, non-profit organizations are increasingly in a position to hold the reputations of large multinational corporations hostage, inducing the corporations to take preemptive action to fend off the risk. The rising power of global civil society does not only impinge on the policies of nation states, but also on the actions of multinational corporations, that is the actors of advanced capitalism. Because of that reason, some multinational corporations began to take on social roles as well or to support financially global civil society. This support have two implications; *first* is that in order to gain the legitimacy of people in their policies they commit in social roles, through which, they believe, their production and trade actions would be less criticized on the account of injustices. *Second* implication of this support is that multinational corporations support financially global civil organization in order to direct ideologically criticism against their actions, through which their production and trade chains would not be damaged or upset by global civil organizations. Despite the fact that sponsorship relation between global civil organizations and multinational corporation have both merits and drawbacks, demands from and criticism of civil organizations against both governments and advanced capitalism results in that global civil society is rising a political actor under the global context.

As Salamon asserts, along with a number of other forces, the growth of non-profit organizations is pushing government into a far different role: a role as *orchestrator* and *collaborator* rather than *monopoly provider* of public services. In other words, states will increasingly manage the activities of a range of non-state actors that provide services directly to citizens rather than attempt to provide all services itself. The impulse for this transformation has been both conceptual and practical origins, stemming from both a growing public frustration with the cost and effectiveness of exclusively governmental solutions to complex social, economic, and environmental problems and an ideological commitment to rely heavily on alternative arrangements to address public problems. The result of this transformation has been a massive proliferation of new tools of public action including loans, grants, and vouchers. Their indirect nature and their reliance on a host of third parties to carry out public functions characterize these new tools. As major beneficiaries of this trend, non-profit organizations have been instrumental in advocating programs that they then help to implement. Non-profits consequently function both as pressure groups pushing governments to act and as partners helping governments respond to the pressure.

Since global civil society actors will wield an increasing degree of influence in foreseeable future, they increasingly will help set global state performance standards. Pressure will continue to build for developing states to democratize and to accept the economic and fiscal standards embedded in the Washington consensus, as well as the standards for civil society included in the charters of many non-profit and intergovernmental organizations. Also, developed states are forced by non-profit civil organization to take on new roles in removing global unjust distribution of opportunities. Given the increasing pervasiveness of information technology, the expectations of citizens in all states may increasingly reflect common, worldwide standards. Individual state governments can seek to raise or lower the expectations of its people away from increasingly global standards, but doing so might require that state to isolate itself from mainstream developments. Depending on its capacity, such a state could become a destabilizing influence on the international system as its standards increasingly deviate from the mainstream.

The ideology of globalization, that is global liberalism in alliance with advanced capitalism, imposes a certain kind of political and economic order on nation states, depending on the liberal values of privatization, participation, fundamental rights and freedom and free market economy. This imposition of liberal values implies a transition from contractarian liberalism that is represented by Lock into a cosmopolitan liberalism that is represented by Kant. Barkçin (Barkçin:2001), on this occasion, proposes three crisis of liberal democracy in the fields of identity, rationality and universality, which were the claims of nation state with reference to its classical basis of political legitimacy. Globalization, in which individual, local and global assertions rise up new directions of politics, began to erase the monopoly of nation state in defining identity, rationality and universality. Despite the fact that we are witnessing a transition to Kantian ideal of cosmopolitan society and politics around the values of global liberalism and the impositions advanced capitalism, localization and identity fragmentation is also a concurrent trend, which creates legitimacy problems for the emerging structure. In this stage of the global, while there is erosion in the classical basis of political legitimacy of modern nation state, issues of illegitimacy in emerging structure of global framework are also emerging. This shows that issue of political legitimacy has no universal basis or a sole kind of definition applicable to all periods and circumstances, rather it is both related to theory and practice, and also both related to accumulation and context, which implies its characteristics of historical evolution, that will be referred further.

Political legitimacy of nation state in the stage of globalization, in addition to what had been achieved in earlier stages, has three sources, *individual, local and global*. I have tried to construct a framework of the global context that is very conducive to produce transformations in the classical structure of political legitimacy of nation state. As I have outlined in the former chapter, classical transformations are more related to domestic affairs, which is a battlefield for the divergent priorities of the social classes. So the evolution of political legitimacy had been shaped as a result of intra-nation state struggles, notwithstanding the effects of modernity, capitalism, Marxism and French Revolution contributed to this evolution. Particularly with regard to the outcomes of political legitimacy, domestic affairs have a paramount importance. However, in global context the basis of political legitimacy is subject to changes as a result of particular levels of interaction. Those levels are *individual, local and global*. Each level has a dynamic of

changing what is expected from nation state. Although they are not autonomous from each other, in order to facilitate the analysis I have classified those sources of dynamism.

Each aspect of individual, local and global impositions forces nation state to re-define its political legitimacy from different level and complexity. As long as nation state fulfills truly the functions expected by these different sources of demands, there would be a minimal questioning of its political legitimacy. However, this kind of nation state would be not nation state of the nineteenth or of the twentieth century. The new kind of nation state would be rather a local public administration whose main function is to provide locally minimal public goods of order and security. Or we could attribute it as the local agent of advanced capitalism or global liberalism. Habermas perceives the modern state to be caught within a set of contradictory institutional imperatives; if it responds to one set, it undermines the rationality of the economy, and if it responds to others, it depletes the legitimacy the state itself needs to steer the economy and the motivations people require to carry out the roles available to them in the political economy. Habermas sees that every legitimate order must be grounded in mystification, manipulation, and ideology. He implies that every effective belief in legitimacy is assumed to have an immanent relation to truth that can be tested and criticized. How would members of a social system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs if they could and would have decided on the organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of the society. Habermas believes that the extension of the state into more and more areas of economic and social life, an extension required to maintain the performance of the economy and to protect the natural and social environment damaged by the history of its operation, helps to render the conventional character of existing rules and norms more visible, and thereby amplifies pressure on the state to legitimate the specific rules and policies it enacts. He insists that in a rationally formed society it is possible to elaborate valid criteria of legitimacy and for the public authority to act in ways, which correspond to those standards (Connolly:1984:12-3).

However, if we would understand the legitimacy crisis of modern state as the crisis of modernity itself, we have to refer to the arguments of Schaar (Schaar:1989:28-9) who states that we have to differentiate pre-modern and modern conceptions of truth in order to

understand the crisis of legitimacy today. Until recently, the concept of truth rested upon certain assumptions about the relations between the knower and the known. *First*, man's cognitive apparatus did not itself basically determine the quality and nature of what was known. *Second*, there exists a kingdom of order outside man and independent of him, those are the laws of God, of nature, and of history. Given the first assumption, truth always meant discovery. Given the second, truth meant the discovery of a pre-established order. Discoveries made by the methods of science, philosophy and theology, from this perspective, were not fabrication of human mind, but faithful reflections and representations of an order independent of the discoverer. For us to increase our own harmony with the pre-established harmony outside ourselves, we had only to increase our knowledge of the world. Given the right methods and concepts, increasing knowledge brought increasing harmony between man and the world. In terms of this concept of truth, social and political life could be seen as a harmonious association of self and society within an objective order external to man and constituted by some forces independent of him. In the older version of truth, philosophers or theologians searched for the truth for itself in order to understand the world and reflectively themselves. With the disappearance of this older conception of truth, order became dependent upon will, with no source of rewards and punishments external to the system and its members. Social and political worlds became 'unfrozen', moveable by skill and power, which justifies the view that all things could be other than they are. The modern search for truth or knowledge is made for gaining power, power over nature or over other men or over other nations. Translated into political terms, man gained power through knowledge, but few men have gained the means of unprecedented power over a great many other men.

From this perspective, scientists are not, in fact, truth searcher, rather they are the servants of power defined in terms of material abundance and enslavement of nature and human beings. Under this context, power and authority in modern social and political space experiences a legitimation crisis, not because of the disaccordances in its promises and outcomes, but because of that it carries out a self-defeating character. Destructive consequences of global production on the planet, de-humanization of consumption culture, de-socialization of self within the society and of humanity within the nature too, are prominent self-destructive results of the existing hegemonic mode of society and politics. This severe problem is an epistemological difficulty.

The critics of Schaar against nation state and the modernity on the account of legitimacy, directs more towards the modernity itself. The problematization of modernity in examining political legitimacy has both merits and drawbacks. Problematization of modernity does not seem a useful instrument to understand the situation of nation state under the global context. Modernity, which had began from the enlightenment philosophy, theoretically had set the ideal stage of a full rationality of human reason. But this rationalization, by the nature of thing, has been and is a process taking place in the context of history. All historical process includes crisis, which are unavoidable fact of development and change. Modernity in its historical process has been always living legitimation crisis in the fields of politics, epistemology, morality, freedom, welfare and development. The modern nation state was just one instrument of modernity in the fields of politics, which aims full liberation of human being from pre-modern power relations. So if legitimation crisis of nation state is turned into the legitimation crisis of modernity as a whole, we cannot truly understand the changing basis of political legitimacy. Because, modernity is a larger process that we cannot determine easily where its structure lies, whereas nation state is a concrete phenomenon and structure that is visible. On the other hand, modernity critics of Schaar is valuable in contributing to the discussion of changing political legitimacy, in the sense that political legitimacy had been framed under the modern context, so in order to determine the changing features of political legitimacy we have to see in what ways the modernity is processing.

Legitimacy, as could be seen in its evolution of political form, is related to the power, in the sense of Foucault's terms. The problematic of legitimacy, in Foucault, is the identification of power as the basis of order. He identifies two complementary loci of power in modernity. *First*, there are overt forms of coercion, force, incentives, regulations, penalties that regulate behavior in so many areas of life. *Second*, there are more insidious mechanisms of normalization, which draw people into the sticky web of self-discipline (Connolly:1984:16). In the evolution of political legitimacy, the concept of power is related to both the ruler and the ruled, in the meaning that if the ruler is powerful in order to impose his order, this had been identified as legitimate. But if the power of ruled began to exert an impact, the demand of change of the ruled is understood a legitimate demand and the ruler re-organized his way of ruling in accordance with the new enforcement by

the ruled. In any way, discourse or ideology served as the insidious mechanism of legitimation or illegitimation argumentation. Ideology is defined as a comprehensive and coherent set of basic beliefs about political, economic, social and cultural affairs that is held in common by a sizable group of people within a society. Such interrelated ideas and teachings purport both to explain how political, economic, social and cultural institutions really do work and also to prescribe how such institutions ought ideally to operate.

Conservative ideologies, that are the face of legitimation process, seek to demonstrate a close correspondence between "the way things are" and "the way things ought to be," thus legitimizing the existing order in the eyes of those who can be convinced to believe in the ideology. Radical and revolutionary ideologies that is the illegitimizing face, on the other hand, set unconventional, higher, or even utopian standards with regard to what would constitute a legitimate and supportable social-economic-political system and then demonstrate in detail that the existing order does not even come close to meeting these standards, thereby de-legitimizing the existing system and helping mobilize believers in the ideology for concerted action to reform or overthrow the existing order.

The concepts of power and discourse or ideology will play also an important role in the changing features of political legitimacy of nation state under the global context. Nation states and advanced capitalism could be seen as the conservative side of global legitimation, while individual and local demands, consciousness of global security-survival problems and of civil society could be seen as the revolutionary side of illegitimation side of the existing order. The phenomenon of order embodies authority, which requires a legitimation relation between the holder of authority and subjects to it. Liberal ideology and current globalized form of liberalism, that is the ideology of globalization process, reified *de facto* authority while dislocating *de jure* authority. *De facto* authority is related to oppression while *de jure* authority is related to legitimation relation. Under freedom, the authority will be vested upon those who have material capabilities to capture it. This *de facto* capturing of authority is legitimated by reference to the state of nature, which disregards human conduct of culture. The reference to the state of nature emerged as a discourse, a valid theory of society and politics upon which all social and political web of relations are constructed. Particularly, globalization theories

depending on the liberal presumptions are seeking to acquire the legitimacy of *de facto* authority of those who have goods and ideas to export to the whole world. In this process, democratic and cultural aspects were undermined on the ground that they could create obstacles to the so-called natural progress of production and consumption, and material development.

The historical transformation of political legitimacy shows that it has two main characteristics. *First*, the changes in political legitimacy are *cumulative*. Cumulative character of political legitimacy is that it has an historical evolution on which values and forms are constructed. Though the interpretation of these values and forms changes in time, each interpretation is added to the accumulation. Cumulative façade of political legitimacy displays the universal claims of modernity process, in which human reason has been progressively liberated from external bindings. The universal claims of modernity are an attempt to escape from the historical bond. Cumulative character and its appeals to universality requires an essence of political legitimacy, such as rationality, regularity, consent, equality, individual autonomy, fundamental rights and freedom, order and security. The methods and implementations of these values could rarely become a part of essence, but the merit sustains despite difference forms.

*Second*, political legitimacy is *contextual*. Contextuality of political legitimacy is related to both essence and form, but more related to changes in form of reaching the essence. Contextuality concerns about the bindings of a defined historical and territorial bindings. The essence of accumulated values could rarely change in context-bounded conditions. Rather, the methods and forms in reaching the essence could drastically change. Despite the fact that essence face of political legitimacy is more related to the accumulation, forms in time could become a part of the essence values. Contextuality results in rare change in the definition of essence, but those changes are the turning points in the evolution of political legitimacy. Global imposition implies one of these dramatic changes in the definition of components of political legitimacy, like Industrial revolution, French Revolution and workers' revolution. Cumulative and contextual characteristics of political legitimacy could be taken as a debate between the theory and practice as well. Cumulative face is related more to the theoretical side, while contextuality is related more to the practical one. This is the point where theory and practice feed each other. New ways

of theoretical interpretation in order to solve the practical questions results in change in theory as well. Due to this fact while theory is cumulative in the sense that it is reshaped through the practice. Also some contextual situation tempts referring to the theoretical arguments, through which practical implementations are forced to be in accordance with the theory, that is the essence values. The balance of mutual feedback between the theory and the practice, or between the cumulative and the contextual faces determines in change in either side. The historical evolution of political legitimacy is about its development between theory and practice, and between accumulation and contextuality.

The critical issue in global context for political legitimacy of nation state is the concept of *sovereignty*. In classical political theories the concept refers to two sources of legitimation of the state. *First* is external source that is defined as independence and non-intervention. Each nation state had been taken as autonomous units. Nation states were categorized as immune from the intervention of each other into their domestic affairs. Non-intervention principle had been constituted as the basic principle organizing the relations among those externally autonomous units. *Second* source of sovereignty was internal side that is defined within the concept of self-determination. Self-determination principle was giving a right of absolute monopoly to the state in their domestic affairs. In fact, the monopoly of the state on domestic affairs was fundamentally observed in the field of physical violence. Nation state has an absolute right, independent from outside, in determining its way of domestic political, economic or social organization and way of working of this organization. Internal and external requirements of sovereignty signified that nation state has no obligation of taking into consideration the views of the others in determining and forming its way of domestic working. However, when we take into account the historical evolution of nation state and its political legitimacy and also impositions of global context, the governing principle of sovereignty has been also subject to fundamental transformations.

In conclusion, under the global context the changing direction of political legitimacy of the state is closely related to its reconciliation capacity of the divergent demands coming from individual, local and global levels. Legitimacy crisis of the state implies severe threats under the global context, for the state is losing power on more issues that would be replaced with the rising power of the global and the local actors, and it

encounters serious identification problem at individual level with its citizens. Although in the course of the twenty first century, we cannot firmly anticipate how the politics, global, national or local, would be shaped, and how the basis of political legitimacy of nation state, if it still sustains, would be shifted; we can argue that we will witness fundamental shifts in the basis of political legitimacy under the global context as a result of changing milieu of individual, local and global demands and expectations.

## CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have focused on the changing nature of nation state and on the possible sources of shifts in its political legitimacy as a result of the impositions of globalization. I have argued that the position of nation state is very critical in globalization debate, for political legitimacy of nation state has been problematized in order to decrease the roles and functions of nation state both in the field of economy that is targeted by the agents of advanced capitalism and in the field of identity and culture that is targeted by individuals and local groups. In conclusion, I will try to note some theoretical remarks of the thesis and summarize its main arguments.

**History, Theory and the Problem of Change :** One of the main problematic of social science is the question of how to explain social change. This is a fundamental question, for all theories, thoughts and explanations turn around this phenomenon. One could formulate a theory of society or a political theory that could suffice, in theory, all others. Virtues, freedoms, rights, law and morals could be ideally theorized in a way that this formulation could seem satisfactory to all members of a given society, in a specific time and under a specific context. However, the problem could not have been solved through the articulation of an ideal form. Greater problem than theory-making emerges in the stage of how this ideal form could be put into practice. This is the problem of change. Most probably, the members of a given society, who appreciates the theory, would resist its enforcement in practice. So how is the change provided ? Or, a theory could be empirically capable in explaining the social and political relations at a given time and within a given society. It could have satisfactory explanatory power why a certain group of people behaves in such or that way, or why a political party or a trade-union adopted a certain kind of stance, or basically why a certain kind of constitution emerged in a given society.

The theory would explain all these questions beginning with 'why'. However, when the constitution, or political rights and freedoms or morals of this given society

changed, the theory could become miserable in explaining these changes. It has no use of examining whether the voluntary actions of the members of the society resulted in those changes. That what would be good for the society is a subjective matter. Social science or political science is unable to propose an objective and ideal form of politics and society, simply because, the so-called objective propositions could be appreciated as subjective by other members of the society.

At this point, we have to apply to Foucault's insistence on power in social change and correlatively on the formation of discourse. Change could be possible at a point when a subjective proposition of a certain group have enough capability to transform an existing social form and discourse in line with their subjective proposal. In this sense, there are no absolute values, principles, rights and freedoms. Rather, they are re-defined in a way of the triumphant part has directed, which results in the formation a new discourse. Of course, there is no zero-sum game in social interactions and struggles. The discourse of the triumphant party is not as the same discourse as they have before the beginning of change. Only in this way we could explain the changes in liberal-capitalist democratic states of the West. From this point of view, any explanatory theory, which presumes the existence of timeless values and processes, would fail in explaining the change from one discourse to another one. This is all the more necessary in our contemporary world with its drive towards globalization, and its transformation from a bipolar world system into a system whose features have yet to be finally determined. What could have been legitimate in the previous system need not be so in the new one. Nor can it be said that rules have been established to pass from one system to another without exposing state legitimacy to crises. In the new era, international legitimacy has also acquired new connotations that are very different from what they were one or two decade. In general, issues of legitimacy are closely related to those of stability and security, and an effort must be furnished to try and foresee the course of events to ensure that deviations in undesirable directions are kept to a minimum.

Theory has two functions, *first* is to *naturalize* an existing political order, which denies any change in current situation. Conservative face of the theory legitimizes the existing order but illegitimizes any change. *Second* function of the theory is *idealization*. Idealization is a theoretical framework, which aims to illegitimate the existing order and to

legitimize an ideal form of organization of things that are not experienced currently. Idealization legitimizes the change. In the evolution of political legitimacy naturalization and idealization functions of the theory had been going hand in hand. Because of that reason we witnessed a change in the definition and content of political legitimacy. Naturalization face serves stability, while idealization face serves instability in society. Instability elements within the stable political conditions result in changes. In order to explain how idealization, which creates instability lead to change, we have to refer to power that is the ability to influence the other in the direction that is desired. Depending on these key concepts of political legitimacy, theory, change and power and their relations with each other, globalization process displays both naturalization and idealization, which results in both stability and instability that carries the elements of both legitimacy and illegitimacy. This is a process of change, transition from the classical conception of modern nation state into the politics under global context. Current idealization of individual, local and global appeals are severe threats to the a-historical naturalization of classical conception of nation state, which is up to change with the power of the idealization face.

All changes and theories are taking place within human history. Notwithstanding that scientists in physical matters could discover laws that are relatively more applicable than so-called social laws to all natural occurrences in all times, the matter is very problematic in social sciences due to the fact that we had experienced dramatic changes in human history in the field of society, economy, politics, philosophy, identity and so on. So in social matters, theory carries the functions of naturalization and idealization together, both of which are defined within the framework of the author's biases. Both naturalization and idealization functions of social theories have both explanatory conceptions of current social relations and change conceptions for the directions of events in the future. In fact, both naturalization and idealization attempts in social theory carry the shortcomings of arguing that their claims of social laws are a-historical, in the sense that their theories are best applicable to the 'nature' of the society and politics. The reference of 'nature', which is very doubtful that the society and the individual have a genuine 'nature', obscures their claims on social changes. In this respect, I argue that any theory could presume changes in social matters, but it should not relate this change to the nature of society or individual. Constructing any relations between the nature and the social change makes the theory

vulnerable to the critics of legitimizing the existing state of society without reference to human face of historical change or destabilizing the existing state of society without reference to human face of existing state of society.

This ambiguity of the 'nature' of society and individual constantly creates disciplinary crisis in social sciences. Taking into account the phenomenon of change, we have to accept that practical change reflects in change in theoretical approaches. From this perspective, approaches to nation state or political legitimacy as a subject matter of analysis by different disciplines need to be reconsidered in line with global requirements. Nation state has been the basic matter of study of in political and IR theory. The two disciplines of social science are very interrelated that IR theory came out from the political theory at the beginning of the twentieth century as a separate discipline. While it is very questionable that the division of labor between two disciplines is useful, political theory focused on the formation of modern nation state, its legitimacy basis and government structure; IR theory, taking nation state as a given phenomenon, focused on the relations among the units of analysis of political theory. In this division of labor, the existence of strong physical borders among nation states is crucial. However, with the globalization arguments, the physical borders began to be challenged which resulted in increasing interdisciplinary works.

Taking into account the sociological approaches of global proponents, the problem of political legitimacy seems to be situated at the crossroad of three disciplines, sociology, political science and IR theory. In globalization literature, giving little significance to the division of labor among sociology, politics and international theory, there developed a wide ranges of approaches to the state, IR, state's identity, society, society of states and identity politics. In fact, using the method or unit of analysis of one or another discipline, for example one can talk about the identity of state and construction of this identity within the society of states. Classically, we are accustomed with that the issue of identity had been analyzed in relevance to the individuals. In the new climate we witness that social disciplines are entering into each other's "sovereign" fields. In similar to the ambiguity in the nature of society, we cannot delimit sovereign borders of social sciences.

**Global Impositions on Nation State :** Global impositions on nation state could be classified mainly under three topics. *First* is the rising influence of the advanced capitalism. The relation between advanced capitalism and nation state is very critical under the global context. Usually higher degree of global flows in terms of capitalist impetus that are the flows of goods, finance and investment, is attributed an important aspect of current globalization. However, one important reason of these global flows is the unequal political and economic conditions of the countries. Global capital tends to go and invest in favorable circumstance where it has advantages in labor costs, taxation and social requirements. If the investment conditions and the fiscal structure of all states would be the same or similar to each other, then we could not have witnessed so much mobility in trade and finance. From this perspective, divergent policies of each nation state encourage global transactions. If one perceives that advanced or global capitalism began to constitute the basis of global social and political arrangements, that means that states, which relinquished most of their former sovereign rights over their territories in favor of global capital that is assumed to contribute to the local development, would be transformed into 'local security servers' or 'agents' of global capitalism.

*Second* is the rising sensitivity of global threats that are related to the survival of mankind, and consequently rising influence of global civil society. Global threats of environmental pollution, armament, unjust development and terrorism began to upset the classical formulations of security and stability. In the early stages of nation state formation, security and survival of individuals were more related to the invasions or intrusions by the outsiders who are other human communities. So the primary role of the state was to protect its citizens against external human threats. The security function of the state was up to its own capability, which guaranteed both its survival and political legitimacy. However, global threats are not originating from direct resort to force by others, rather they are result of capitalist mode of production and consumption, which threatens the physical environment that challenges directly the survival of mankind as a whole. Also, classical armament did not mean the extermination of the communities, rather they were threatening the lives of current people. But, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are so influential that in case of their usage an important proportion of world community could perish. Those global threats began to create global civil initiatives in order to confront the rising sensitivity of human survival as a whole.

*Third* is the rising influence of *representation* that could be analyzed under the issue of fragmentation. In early stages of nation state, it had a monopoly of power and *raison d'être* to homogenize local identities and enforce a single uniform identity over its citizens around the myth of creating a nation. This was reasonable at early time for the aim of strengthening the integrity of the territorial security. However, global context presents that security conception changed so the identity representation could change fundamentally. We witness that people are in search of their local ethnic identities for representing their authentic communal self. National identity and morality are losing their power of being reference in defining self, culture and morality. Because of this reason, there are many local groups, which have appeals to their local authentic identity and culture for the representation of their self. This is a concurrent process of fragmentation along with the globalization process. Fragmentation issue is related to the rise of identity politics, which problematizes the unity of national identity and culture.

In fact, politicization of identity and culture could be deemed as a direct result of de-politicization of the economy under the advanced capitalism. In other words, the decreasing roles and functions of the state on economic matters created new areas of politics for the local peoples within the national borders. Localization of politics in cultural terms and its subsequent results in political demands brings the issue of shattering national territorial integrity. Under the global context, taking into account the diminishing roles and functions of nation state in the fields of economy, and its incapacity in confronting global problems and holding its monopoly on defining identity, nation state could be dispersed further and transformed into local cultural structure, rather than being a political formation. De-politicization of the economy and politicization of identity and culture could result in more localization of nation state as a cultural-political structure. For the issue of having a state under the global context does not carry *raison d'être* of having a state in its early formation. Globalization provides the issue of representation, which requires that each local community should have a state that is expected to leave its classical functions on the economy and carry new functions on cultural representation within the global context.

**Crisis Analysis of Political Legitimacy :** As I have argued in the section of history, theory and change, that social sciences have more difficulty in building up a theory of society and politics that is viable at all times and in all societies than that of natural sciences in natural occurrences. This is precisely because of that human occurrences are subject to history and change. Changes take place as a result of social, political and economic crisis in human societies. Also, as I have analyzed in Chapter IV the historical evolution of political legitimacy and argued that political legitimacy is an historical phenomenon that could be changed depending on historical stage of development and on the state of society, the changes in the conceptions of political legitimacy occur as a result of crisis in roles and functions of the holder of political legitimacy that is *the state*. In fact, it is very difficult to describe a political situation absolutely legitimate or illegitimate. Rather, we use the terms ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ with reference to the relative balance between the two conceptions. In the sense that the usage of one of the either term is related *first* to the intent of the user subjectively, and *second* related to the degree of stability in political field objectively. In either case, it is very doubtful to delimit the borders between legitimate and illegitimate situation. Even if we attribute a political structure as legitimate, it is undeniable that there are sources of illegitimation. Or even if we attribute a political structure as illegitimate, it is inevitable that there could be sources of legitimation. The obscurity in absolute description of legitimacy and illegitimacy has strength in explaining the change, which is the result of crisis.

The crisis in social occurrences could be defined as state of being disharmony between the generally accepted rules and their outcomes and the actual functioning and its actual results. This disharmony explains the social change. From this point of view, political legitimacy carries a constant crisis, which is conducive for changes in its conceptions. Crisis in the existing conception of political legitimacy refers to the arguments of putting forward the idea that there are elements of illegitimacy in the current functioning of the state. The transformative effects of so-called crisis are up to its relative dominance over the stability. Under the global context, I argue that crisis in the current conception of political legitimacy of the state dominates over the claim of its stability. Because of this reason, we could expect fundamental shifts in the conceptions of political legitimacy.

Legitimation crisis of the state represents through the levels of individual, local and global shifts, which have been analyzed in the former chapter. Individuals are in search of finding out new dimension of their private life and try to link this private life to the state of politics. However, the liberal-democratic states had based their political legitimacy on the definite division between the private and the public. The former had been considered as irrelevant to the politics, and the latter had been considered as the field of politics. Also, other individual demands on more liberty, welfare, participation, transparency and equality and justice shows that modern nation state has lots of difficulty to legitimate its political position. The divergence between the capacity of the state structure and what individuals expect results in alienation of the individual vis-à-vis the state. At local level, alienation and consequent legitimation crisis is so fundamental as to threaten both territorial integrity of the state and its monopoly in defining identity and culture as a bond keeping localities around the myth of the national identity and culture. At global level, the rising influence of advanced capitalism and of global threats and their consequent enforcement in changing classical formulation of security and stability make the state insolvent to confront the emerging agenda. Incapacity of the roles and functions of the state in intervening into the global threats is because of its classical claim of territoriality. From this point of view, even if the policy makers of the state are eager to undertake some responsibilities in solving global problems, they will be inconsistent with state of territoriality. To diminish this legitimation crisis at global level, states commit into establishing intergovernmental organizations in order to decrease the negative effects of global threats to a certain extent, but these initiatives are futile in the sense that these organizations could not have functional roles because of decision-making process under the claims of sovereignty and territoriality.

Alienation at individual and local level and incapacity of the state at global level could be expected that legitimation crisis of the state would get strength under the process of globalization so that the state could be terminated in classical terms of sovereignty, independence, territoriality and source of identity. This trend could result, as I have stated before, in a state of being either an agent of advanced capitalism for local security or an instrument of cultural representation through its further dispersion.

**Shifts in the Basis of Political Legitimacy :** Globalization process echoes the idea of being a whole all over the world. But as we have examined, if globalization is a grand process, individual and local processes are running as well. The position of nation state and its political legitimacy basis are related to these three levels of processes, as well as to the crisis of modernity. Global issues exceed the boundaries of the state, and it is very doubtful that the state could continue to benefit from an unlimited political legitimacy forever. Also local groups within the state tend to discover their authentic identity and culture that are alienated from the national.

Both global forces and local re-assertions create question marks for political legitimacy of the state. If political legitimacy was for the well being of the people, it is very difficult to believe that people, carrying local and global concerns, could remain still loyal to their states. From this point of view, classical construction of the legitimacy of nation state has been theoretically undergone radical changes. Within this framework there are two sides of the discussion. One is the position of the outsiders who endeavored to formulate a new theory of global society and politics, described as globalists. The other position is that of the insiders who try to reform classical political and international theory, described as reformists. The stands of the globalist and the reformist theories are the two axes of the new discussion on nation state within the global context.

Globalism is a new stream in social science, covering social scientists from sociology to political science and from political economy to international relations. Their arguments concentrate mainly on three fields. *The first* is 'society' which is a narration of the formation of global society as a result of a global common culture. *The second* is 'politics', which argues that if the world has been formed as a global society, so that there should be a global politics. *The third field* is 'economy' that is on the way of making the world a single market. In their wordings the transformations in these three fields are interrelated and feed each other. They challenge the premises of the classical disciplines of sociology, politics, economics and international relations. The world is becoming a single society, which needs a single political structure and a single economy. These changes produce their own global culture. In their theories, globalization is upsetting many conceptions in social science in general and in international relations discipline in particular. Society, social relations, politics, state, state legitimacy, the role and the impact

of the state, international politics, international relations are the main concepts that need to be re-defined. Re-definitions of these concepts result in the renovations in social, political and international theory as well. Unit of analysis of social science, political and international theory has to be re-defined. On the other hand, the arguments of some neo liberals and neo Marxists under the umbrella of 'reformists' try to reform their classical theories of liberalism and Marxism in order to show that the world is not ready for a single political or social structure. They do not deny the rise of globalization, but they stress on the point that humanity has a long time to realize the assumptions of the globalists.

It is a core problem today for social science whether globalization is really capable to produce a global politics as its advocates guess. While the state is still the basic actor decisive in the global field, its power is under challenge. Both global concerns and local upheavals force the state to refine itself. Because of this reason, states seem to be eager to relinquish some of its power, for instance in the economy and foreign trade. States also tend to do further cooperation among themselves in some fields that had been solely considered within its sovereignty. Globalization implies significant changes in the nature of nation state and its legitimacy basis. If globalization could be adequate to create a global politics, then we have to talk about the legitimacy basis of this globality. Notwithstanding the emergence of global politics, all political regimes tend to project their legitimacy as an invariable and constant feature that remains unchallenged by the vagaries of time and, as such, justifies their remaining in power indefinitely. But overplaying the symbols of legitimacy can be counter-productive, especially if state institutions are unable to respond to the requirements of the demands and the aspirations of society. It is precisely because this lag can, and often does, occur, that it is necessary to see legitimacy as a process that must constantly be renewed rather than as a quasi-divine attribute.

Under the global context, it is inevitable that the basis of political legitimacy of nation state is subject to shifts as a result of the changing web of relations of advanced capitalism, of the emergence of global survival problems and the rising influence of civil society and of the impact of representation issue on local account. As I have analyzed in the evolution of political legitimacy of the state, capacity and identity features of the state guarantees its legitimate basis on theoretical level. However, under globalization both fundamental characteristics of the state began to erode as a result of fundamental changes

at individual, local and global levels of social and political interactions. Advanced capitalism and global threats diminish its capacity to confront the emerging problems, fragmentation erodes its identity base, and more individual demands of self's liberation creates alienation problems between individual and state's current structure. In other words, under the global context people have a legitimate right to question why their state is still ready there.

*First, at individual level*, we witness that there are dramatic changes in classical conceptions of freedom, rights and justices, all of which result in changing expectation of individual in the field of *gender, libertarian demands, welfare expectation, process of participation, transparency and equality and justice*. By nature of thing, classical structure of nation state is very constrictive on responding of the state to those emerging demands, for the state had been designed as a political structure primarily in responding to the expectations of social organizations, like unions of the classes, firms, political parties and civil associations. This organizational structure of the state required that other sub-organizations, in most cases, become an agent of the state within the society. Technical rationality of all organizations is similar to that of nation state. So organizational and technical rationality of the state is improper in truly responding to the individual demands. The consequent issue is that at individual level there emerges alienation between the state and the individual, which is very fundamental in de-legitimization of the state. Notwithstanding, in global context we witness that there is an emergence of civil initiatives representing human side of organizations in responding to individual demands, which began to exert strength on the humanization of the state structure. Civil initiatives seem to be the most important bases of dynamism in transforming the de-humanized and alienated nature of the state vis-à-vis individual demands. In other words, political legitimacy of nation state from the side of individual seems to be very problematic and criticized and forced to shift in direction to respond the individual demands through enforcement of civil initiatives.

*Second, with respect to the local aspect of the global stage of political legitimacy*, I have argued that nation state had tried to have a monopoly in defining identity, morality and culture for the aim of creating a national consciousness within its territorial boundaries for reaching unity and integrity. In this classical design it had believed that there is no

morality within the territory, there would be no community. However, under the global context this enforcive policy of the state failed, for we witness the emergence of the re-assertion of local identity and culture. Re-assertion of locality represents the concurrent process of fragmentation, as analyzed in Chapter IV, first as fragmentation of the universality and second as fragmentation of the nationality. When I consider about political legitimacy of nation state, I have examined the second kind of fragmentation under the global context. Uprising of the locality under the global context shows that homogenizing policies of nation state of identity and culture failed, as a result its political legitimacy began to undergo to criticism. The appeal to local identity and culture is a direct threat to the territorial integrity of nation state, in the sense that the proponents of the locality could sometimes tend to be separatist movements in political terms.

Although the reasons behind the identity politics could change from the unjust distribution of national output within the national territory to the suppression of ethnic identity and culture around the myth of national integrity, we witness that the problem is more related to the representation issue, which could be understood as a reaction to the domination of one or another identity over the rest within the national territory. We have to keep in mind that in the process of formation of the national identity and culture the power holders of nation state did not invent a new form of identity and culture, rather they tried to surpass local identities and cultures via enforcing most populated identity and culture within their national territories. Under the representative nature of globalization, those surpassed and suppressed local identities and cultures began to re-discover their tradition and authenticity through which they began to criticize the arbitrary policies of nation state in creating an unjust distribution of national output or incapacity of nation state in representing their local features. The fragmentation of national identity and culture and consequent of unity and territorial integrity of nation state creates vital problems in its political legitimacy.

*Third*, we witness that there is an enforcement of *global aspect in the global stage of political legitimacy* of nation state. *Advanced capitalism, global security problems and consequent rise of global civil society* as a result of advances in information technologies are the main features of this third kind of sources of transformation in the classical design of political legitimacy under the global context. *First*, with regard to the relation between

nation state and capitalism, the nature of this relation began to undergo certain structural changes, the most important one is that under classical capitalism nation state had been appreciated as a direct protector of the interest of national capitalists. However, under the advanced capitalist stage of the global context the function of nation state began to direct to protect the interests of the agents of advanced capitalism. In other words, the separation between different national capitalists has been removed so as to include all multinational agents. In fact, the expectation of the capitalists, both in terms of classical and advanced, did not change from the state, which is that they demand order, security and stability within the territory of the state. Under classical capitalism, political legitimacy of the state was dependent on a separation of the economy from the political field, through which the state was expected not to intervene into economic operations. The same ideological side of capitalism source of political legitimacy of the state sustains under advanced capitalism, in the sense that the state is expected to remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods and finance. In global framework, capitalist source of political legitimacy has a direct impact on the well-being expectation of the citizens, for well-being is directly related to the inflow of foreign direct investments that creates employment opportunities. Because of this reason, under the global context the state is trying to retreat itself from any initiatives that could damage the free flow of goods and finance, through liberalization of trade, finance and investment regulations, and privatization that is expected to attract foreign direct investments.

*Second*, the sub-servant role of the state to the demands of advanced capitalism creates important illegitimation arguments of its political legitimacy, for capitalist mode of production produces *global security problems* that are directly related to the survival of mankind. Unlimited exploitation of natural resources, environmental pollution, inorganic nature of food production that results in new kinds of diseases, and chemical-biological-nuclear armament that provokes instability produce highly delicate issues for the survival of mankind, all of which endanger individual and global security. Although the externalities of the capitalist mode of production fundamentally transformed the security perception of individuals and societies, the nature of state that is very preoccupied with its classical functions and perceptions of threat and security makes the state to take accurate measures to diminish the effects of global security problems. The incapacity of the state vis-à-vis the rising global security makes its basis of political legitimacy problematic, in

the sense that people began not to hope that their states could guarantee their fundamental security against global threats. Despite the fact that the state is trying to sustain its basis of political legitimacy through re-establishing an alliance with the agents of advanced capitalism, it becomes vulnerable to critics originating from the idea that the state is incapable to cope with emerging global threat so that it has no a legitimate bases to sustain its existence.

*Third*, incapacity of the state in solving the rising global security threats and incapacity of both the state and the capitalist mode of development to create a just distribution of global output among the north and the south results in rising appeals to the emergence of *global civil initiatives* that is facilitated by the advances in information technologies. Under the global context alongside with the agents of advanced capitalism, global civil associations have began to exert impact on the state in the fields of environment, armaments, human rights, just economic development and democratization. Even though the organization and impact of global civil associations could be seen currently loose and less effective, they are expected to take important roles and functions both on the activities of global economic agents and on the state in near future. From the point of view of global civil associations, political legitimacy of the state is highly problematized, for not only the state's incapacity in intervening into the solution of global threats, but also for the state is more inclined to collaborate with the ideology of advanced capitalism.

The facts of rising impact of both advanced capitalism and of global civil initiatives show that we could observe the emergence of a global politics in which the roles and functions of the state would be re-defined and re-shaped, as we understand the politics, notwithstanding its divergent definition, as a negotiations process of determining the rules of the game. I argue that both the agents of global capitalism and of global civil society would be happy in seeing one global political authority for the solution of their problems, instead of many nation states. However, this expectation is very immature taking into account the relative power of the global parties, in the meaning that states and global economic agents and their alliance seem to be dominate to determine the way of global politics. But this domination, on the contrary, provokes the critics against their legitimacy basis as well. Because of this reason, as long as the state remains more

responsive to the demands of the global economic agents, more its legitimacy basis would be vulnerable to the critics of individuals and global civil society, which could transform the state system as a whole.

Globalization, nation state and its political legitimacy are historically determined phenomenon like all other social occurrences, and they are all subject to change and transformation within the process of historical development of humanity. Neither of these social transformation has a universally valid laws or structures. Because of the central situation of the state within current globalization debate, I have tried to answer why the state is central in this debate by arguing that this centrality is due to the claims of the state of its political legitimacy for all communities for ever, and to show that nation state and its political legitimacy are subject to historical evolution, and I have concluded that certain changes in human society could transform both political structure and its legitimacy basis. The problem is not absolutely a state of globalization versus state as proposed by proponents and opponents of globalization or state, rather the problem is very complex that is related to economy, society, politics, identity and culture. In discussion of globalization versus state, in fact, the problem is turning around the situation of the state with its current roles and functions, which is directly related to its (il)legitimate position.

In this discussion I have tried to show that globalization is not a structure that is commanded just by one center whose goals and policies are well defined. Rather, it is an historical process, in which there are divergent and convergent interests and goals among the participants, and by nature of things, as an historical process, globalization is conducive to transformation in society and politics. Notwithstanding, at literal level, globalization could be observed as an ideology of neo-liberalism and market economy. In other words, even though globalization is a process in which there are sources of struggles among the competing parties, because of relative dominance of advanced capitalism it is identified as the spokesman of emerging liberal-capitalist world order. More specifically, this literal domination tries to display that globalization is the latest and strongest stage of the triumph of liberal-capitalist outlook all over the world. However, as analyzed in Chapter II, globalization issue is not so simple as proposed by the advocates of liberal-capitalist ideology, which tries to show as if its theory is natural and universal. Rather, globalization is conducive to produce different kinds of outlook and actual development.

We cannot determine what other alternative developments would be, but we could anticipate the potential sources of other developments that would be very different from the liberal-capitalist premises. For this aim, I proposed that global threats of environmental pollution of the ecology, nuclear-chemical-biological armament, unjust distribution of world sources and outputs and consequently rising influence of global civil society and of global terrorism carry the potential of counter-developments in contrast to the expectation of liberal-capitalist literature.

In the formulations of liberal-capitalism, the state is deemed as the most important possible threat to the realization of its theory. Because of this reason, pro-liberal-capitalist globalization arguments propose that the roles and functions of the state should be so limited as allowing free functioning of the market economy. They promise that free functioning of the market economy would be beneficial for all. And if the state does not leave economic functions, it would deprive its population of this promised benefits, so such a state would be illegitimate. The developments under the global context is directed to this result, meaning that economic functions of the state is restricted, if possible, exterminated.

However, political legitimacy of the state, as I have analyzed in Chapter VI and VII, has not a well-defined meaning and source. Rather, political legitimacy, as a social phenomenon, has many components that are subject to historical evolution. These components in the evolution of political legitimacy of the state change from the origin of the political power, participation, identification, security-stability, justice and cultural aspects to welfare. So, welfare function of the classical nation state may be the most prominent source of political legitimacy, but it is not the all. Besides, economic liberalization policies after the second half of the twentieth century showed the opposite of liberal-capitalist promises, meaning that the relative gap between the developed and underdeveloped world increased to a point of provoking injustices. Also, economic crisis and depression in Latin America and South East Asia in 1990s proved that economic liberalization and functioning of the market economy does not work for economic stability of underdeveloped or developing part of the world, on the contrary it provokes instability and crisis.

Leaving aside to what extent the liberal-capitalist promises of sharing the fruits of economic liberalization has been realized, I argue that political legitimacy crisis of the state lies in other sources different from what is proposed by liberal-capitalist paradigm. These sources of legitimation crisis function at individual, local and global level, which have been analyzed in Chapter VII. These levels of legitimation crisis, including welfare expectation, carry the potential of transforming classical basis of political legitimacy of the state. Therefore, globalization process, even though it surpasses nation state, would not exterminate the state, rather it would result fundamental changes in its legitimacy basis and consequently its functions and structure.

However, there could be two significant risks for fundamental shifts in political legitimacy of the twenty first century as a result of the global context. The risk is in the sense that classical formulations of political legitimacy could sustain. *First* is the civilizational division between the West and the East, or between the West and the *Islamic* or other resurgence. *Second* is a possible division between the North and the South, or between the rich and the poor. If one of these divisions gets strength, some requirements of globalization for legitimacy shift may be delayed. For such a development would justify the classical formulation of nation state and of political legitimacy. We could describe the first kind of division as *civilizational* split, and the second as *development* split.

But these two kinds of splits are not independent of each other. Because civilizational supremacy of the west and unjust distribution of wealth will lead to the questioning of the western domination all over the world. Civilizational split is related to the hegemony of enlightenment philosophy that resulted in modernity. Evolution of modernity and its spread all over the world through the western epistemology and capital gives way to the others' rising adherence to the tradition and identity defined within the boundaries of their authentic civilization. Critics of civilizational and underdeveloped axes direct to the fact that whole process of enlightenment and modernity had been a story of the western civilization's domination over the rest of the world. This domination could be represented as both physical wealth and normative aspects of identity, rationality and morality. In other words, as long as unjust distribution of wealth is sustained within globalization, "the other" will see the values and merits of enlightenment and modernity as the instruments of the west of acquiring power and of preserving it over themselves. In

this context, participation in its classical meaning will be the matter of participating in global framework.

Despite the fact that there are numerous intergovernmental organizations that have been constituted in which both developed and underdeveloped took part for negotiating global governance, when we take into account that quasi-liberal democracy in the south is not a true spokesmen of the people, intergovernmental organizations could not be seen as a legitimating procedure of global liberal-capitalist structure. Such divisions and illegitimacy assertions will definitely show that cosmopolitan world society ideal of Kant is not a reachable goal despite the arguments of the proponents of globalization. Working mentality of advanced capitalism and theoretical premises of liberal theory are not adequate, or have no theoretical capability, in order to overcome the problem of unjust distribution of wealth. For liberal theory proposes freedom and equality before law under the conditions of *ceteris paribus*. Equality and freedom under the existing conditions signifies the continuation of current injustices and power relations, which does not promise better conditions for the southern people.

The two risks mentioned above in the short run could bring a possibility that classical formulation of political legitimacy could re-assert itself, but in the long run, even if the world politics are shaped either by civilization or development axis, political legitimacy are to be subject to fundamental shifts, for civilization and development splits on the earth exceeds the classical boundary of the state. They are expected to bring impositions on political legitimacy of the state in a way to shift it fundamentally.

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## APPENDIX A

### TURKISH SUMMARY

Özellikle 1990'lı yıllarla beraber küreselleşme konusundaki tartışmalar yoğunluk kazanmaya başladı. Bu tartışmalarda ulus devlet merkezi bir konuma sahip bulunmaktadır. Ulus devletin küreselleşme tartışmalarındaki merkezi konumda bulunmasının en temel nedenlerinden biri siyasal meşruiyetin sorunsallaştırılmış olmasıdır. Zira, küresel ortamda ortaya çıkan küresel ve yerel güçler ulus devletin geleneksel birçok işlevini sınırlandırmaya, yerine göre onun yerine geçmeye başlamıştır. Bunun doğal sonucu olarak da, ulus devlet yükselen yeni taleplerin önünde geleneksel haliyle bir engel olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Küresel kapitalizmin ölçek ekonomisini genişletmekteki ısrarı, örneğin, liberal-kapitalist ideoloji tarafından ulus devletin bu yeni gelişmenin önündeki yegane engel olarak sunulmasına neden olmaktadır. Ya da etnik temelde yerel/kültürel özelliklerin bireylerin kimliklerinde daha gösterişli bir yer elde etmelerinin sonucunda ulusal kimliğin önemi ikinci planda kalmaya başlamıştır.

Tartışmaların özellikle Soğuk Savaş sonrasında başlamış olmasına rağmen, küreselleşme olgusunun başlangıç tarihini iki kutuplu sistemin yıkılmasına bağlamak elbette yanlış olacaktır. Küreselleşme temelde kapitalizmin ve ulus devletin tarihiyle denkleştirilebilecek bir geçmişe sahiptir. Ancak, küreselleşmenin bugün gelmiş olduğu noktada, ulus devletin geleneksel işlev ve rolleri üzerindeki baskısı nedeniyle, hem ulus devletin yapısında hem de siyasal meşruiyet temellerinde köklü dönüşümler beklenebilir.

Küreselleşme içerisinde ulus devletin konumu ve meşruiyet temelleri, önümüzdeki dönemde bu alanda yapılacak tartışmaların önemli bir merkezini oluşturacağı benziyor. Bu yüzden bu tezin ana teması, küreselleşme içerisinde ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyet temellerindeki kaymaların temel kaynaklarının kuramsal bir çerçevede belirlenmesi, ve yeni meşruiyet temellerinin kavramsallaştırılması olarak belirlenmiştir. Ancak, bunu yaparken tutarlı bir küreselleşme yaklaşımına ihtiyacımız olacağından hareketle tezde yeni

bir küreselleşme yaklaşımı ortaya konmuştur. Tezde ayrıca, siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası ilişkiler kuramlarındaki ulus devlet anlayışları incelenmiş, etkileri gittikçe daha fazla hissedilmeye başlanan küresel ve yerel aktörlerin hareket tarzları ve beklentileri ele alınmış, küresel ve yerel aktörlerin oynamaya başladıkları rollere ulus devletin muhtemel cevap şekilleri analiz edilmiş, ulus devletin geleneksel olarak en temel özellikleri kabul edilen unsurlardaki değişimler incelenmiş, ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin geleneksel kaynaklarının evrimi kavramsallaştırılmış ve son olarak da küreselleşme ortamı içerisinde ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyet temellerinde kaymalara neden olabilecek muhtemel kaynaklar ele alınmış ve incelenmiştir.

*Birinci bölümde*, küreselleşme olgusuna günümüz sosyal bilimcilerinden gelen yaklaşımlar incelenmiştir. Tarihsel açıdan, dünya çapında ilişkiler ağı oluşturarak evrensel egemenlik iddiasında bulunan birçok imparatorluk var olmuştur. Veya, ipek yolu ticareti gibi dünyanın belirli bölgeleri arasında yoğunluk arz eden ekonomik ilişkiler ağı oluşturabilmiştir. Ancak, bu girişimlerin hiçbiri, belirli ölçüde dünyanın belirli bölgelerini derinden etkilemiş ve bağımlı hale getirmiş olmalarına rağmen, dünya çapında bugün tanık olduğumuz küresel ilişkiler ağına benzer bir durum ortaya çıkaramamışlardır. Halbuki, Rönesans ve Reform hareketlerinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan akılcılığa dayalı aydınlanma felsefesi, bunu takip eden ulus devletlerin oluşumu ve özellikle onsekizinci yüzyılın ikinci yarısı ile ondokuzuncu yüzyılda yoğunluk kazanan sanayi kapitalizmi sayesinde dünyanın aşağı yukarı her köşesi ekonomik ağlarla örülmeye başlanmıştır. Kapitalist üretim ve tüketim tarzının getirmiş olduğu hammadde ihtiyacı, nihai ürünlerin yeni pazarlara satılabilmesi zorunluluğu ve bu sistemin işleyebilmesi için Avrupalı ulus devletlerin denizaşırı imparatorluklar kurma girişimleri, bugün anladığımız anlamda küreselleşmenin başlangıcı olarak kabul edilmektedir. Her ne kadar, küreselleşmenin temelinde kapitalist üretim tarzının getirmiş olduğu zorunluluklar yatıyor olsa da, bu şekilde bir genişleme aynı zamanda aydınlanma felsefesiyle Avrupa'da yaşanan köklü sosyal ve siyasal değişimlerin de dünyanın diğer bölgelerine yayılmasına yol açmıştır. Dolayısı ile küreselleşme, hem ekonomik ilişkiler ağının dünya çapında yaygınlaşması ve yoğunlaşmasını ifade etmekte, hem de batılı siyasal, kültürel ve sosyal değerlerin dünyanın diğer toplumları tarafından kabul edilmesi gereken bir tercih olarak ortaya çıkmasına neden olmaktadır. Bu değerler, tüketim kültüründen demokratik yönetim tarzına, insan hakları anlayışından pozitivist bilime kadar birçok alanı kapsamaktadır.

Küreselleşme süreci birbiriyle ilintili birçok alanı kapsıyor olmasına karşın, bugünün hakim literatüründe küreselleşme kavramsallaştırılması liberal ideolojinin tekelindeymiş gibi görünmektedir. Özellikle, ekonomik alanda yaşanmakta olan ilişkiler ağının yoğunlaşması, toplumların birbirlerine daha bağımlı hale gelmesi, serbest ticaret, doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar ve finansal kaynakların serbest hareketi gibi günlük hayatımızı yakından ilgilendiren konuların yoğunluklu olarak tartışılması nedeniyle, küreselleşme liberal ideolojinin yeni bir ifade şekli olarak algılanmaktadır. Halbuki, tezde de ifade ettiğim gibi ekonomik ilişkiler ağının yoğunlaşması küreselleşmenin alt süreçlerinden sadece birini kapsamaktadır. Ancak, literatür olarak bu alt süreç bütün bir küreselleşme sürecini tanımlar hale gelmiştir.

Küreselleşme bu anlamda bir medeniyet yaratma çabası içerisinde görünmektedir. Geleneksel medeniyet kavramsallaştırmalarına baktığımızda ve benzer ekonomik sistem, kültür, siyaset şekli, bilim, hayat tarzı ve maddi öğeler gibi temel unsurları aldığımızda, küreselleşme gerçekten tek bir dünya medeniyeti yaratma süreci gibi görünmektedir. Zira, dünyadaki bütün toplumlar bu alanlarda ortak paydaları paylaşmaktadır. Ancak, şunu ifade etmek gerekir ki, mevcut haliyle süreç küresel bir medeniyet yaratma çabası içerisinde olsa da, bu henüz olgunlaşmış bir medeniyet değildir. Çünkü, kimlik ve kültür anlamında dünyada küreselleşmeyle eşzamanlı olarak bir parçalanma (fragmentation) ve yerelleşme eğilimi de bulunmaktadır.

Küreselleşme sosyal bilimciler tarafından farklı şekillerde tanımlanıyor olsa da, bu geniş tanımlamalar bütününün ortak paydası, küresel ilişkiler ağında zamanın ve mekânın önemini yitirmesi ve küresel ölçekte bir bilinç ortaya çıkmasıdır. Küreselleşme olgusuna yaklaşımlar açısından en dikkat çekici ve en tutarlı olması nedeniyle tezde, Robertson'un yaklaşımına önemli bir yer ayırdım. Bir sosyolog olarak Robertson, küreselleşmeyi küresel bazda bir bilincin ortaya çıkması olarak tanımlıyor. Eğer durum böyleyse, modern sosyal bilimlerin temeli olarak kabul edilen geleneksel sosyolojinin köklü bir dönüşüme tabi kılınması gerektiğini vurguluyor Robertson. Zira, küresel ilişkiler ağının her alanda yoğunlaşması küresel bir toplumun ortaya çıkmasına işaret ediyor ve küresel bir toplum ana inceleme ünitesi olursa da, geleneksel sosyoloji sahip olduğu mevcut kuramsal araçlarla küresel toplumu inceleyemez. Bu yüzden, sosyal bilimlerin diğer alanlarındaki

yaklaşımları ortaya çıkan bu küresel durumu açıklayabilme kabiliyetine kavuşturabilmek için, öncelikle sosyolojinin kendisi içerisinde bir devrim yapılması gerekiyor. Kuramsal düzeyde Robertson'un bu önerisi makul görünüyor olsa da, küresel durumu tam olarak algılamamıza ve kavramlaştırmamıza yardımcı olmuyor. Zira, Robertson sosyolojinin üstlenmesi gereken yeni roller konusunda bu kadar ısrarcı olurken, küresel güç ilişkilerinin önemini azımsıyor. Ayrıca, bir toplumda var olan ekonomik, siyasal veya kültürel güçler arasındaki ilişkiler ağının tam olarak ortaya konabilmesi ve buna uygun bir kavramlaştırma yapabilmemiz için küresel toplumdaki bu güçlerin, süreçlerin ve aktörlerin iyi belirlenmesi ve buna uygun kuramsal araçlar edinilmesi gerekiyor.

Bu temel gereklilik çerçevesinde *ikinci bölümünde*, küreselleşmeye ilişkin yaklaşımların yetersizliğinden hareketle, küreselleşmeye yeni bir bakış açısı getirebilecek bir yaklaşım öne sürmeye çalıştım. Küreselleşmenin iyi tanımlanabilmesinin, tezin ana konusu olan ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin yeni temellerinin belirlenmesi açısından gerçekten önemli olduğunu düşündüm. Bu çerçevede *ilk olarak* küreselleşmeyi “insanlığın gelişiminde, dünya çapında bir bilincin ortaya çıkmasına neden olan ekonomi, toplum, siyaset ve kültür ve kimlik alanlarındaki alt süreçlerin çelişkili dayatmalarıyla yönlendirilen ve desteklenen belirli tarihsel bir aşama” olarak tanımladım. Bu tanımlama küreselleşmeyi alt süreçlerden oluşan tarihsel bir süreç ve dünya çapında bir bilinç ortaya çıkmasına neden olan bir olgu olarak görmektedir. Tarihsellik, alt süreçlerin bir bütünü olma ve ortak bilinç bugünü anlamak için çok önemlidir.

*İkinci olarak*, küreselleşmeyi iyi anlayabilmek için küreselleşmenin evresellik, aydınlanma ve modernite gibi kavramlardan ayrıştırılması gerektiğini düşündüm. Bu kapsamda, küreselleşme sürecinin diğerlerinde olmayan en önemli farkı tarihsel olmasıdır. Yani, evresellik, modernite ve aydınlanma tarihsel gelişimlerden bağımsız olarak belirlenen bir insanlık durumu ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmışlardır. Onların ideali her zaman ve her yerde geçerli ve kabul gören evrensel değerlerin yerleştirilmesiydi. Halbuki küreselleşmenin böyle yeknesak olarak tanımlanabilecek bir amacı ve ideali yoktur. Tarihsel olarak, bugün gelmiş olduğumuz küreselleşme aşaması modernitenin bir devamı sayılabilir, ancak felsefi anlamda kesinlikle ayrı bir dönemdir. Modernite ve aydınlanma tek tip rasyonel bir birey ortaya koyabilme çabası içindeydiler. Buna karşın küreselleşme sürecinin böyle iyi tanımlanmış bir amacı mevcut değildir. Tam tersine, küreselleşme

kimlik, kültür ve dünyayı algılayış farklılıklarının olabildiğince fazlaştığı bir durumu gösteriyor.

*Üçüncü olarak*, küreselleşmenin alt süreçlerinin ana başlıklarının dört grupta toplanabileceğini savundum. Bunlar, ekonomik serbestleşme hareketi, hükümetler arası ilişkilerin yoğunlaşması, dünya çapında tek bir toplum olma bilincinin artışı ve kültürün yerleşmesidir. Bu alt süreçlerin her biri kendi aktörleri aracılığı ile küreselleşme sürecine müdahil olmaya ve onu kendi öncelikleri ekseninde şekillendirmeye çalışıyor. Alt süreç aktörlerinin amaçları, politikaları ve davranışları kimi zaman birbiriyle çelişiyor olabileceği gibi kimi zaman da diğer bir alt sürecin beklentileri ile bir ittifak söz konusu olabilir. Örneğin, hükümetler arası ilişkiler eksenindeki aktörler olan devletler çoğu kere ekonomik serbestleşmenin aktörleri olan çok uluslu şirketlerle ekonomi politikaları konusunda uyum içerisinde çalışmaktadırlar. Ancak, bu uyum kimi zaman dünya ölçekli sivil toplum hareketinin çevre kirlenmesi konusundaki baskısı nedeniyle bozulabilmektedir. Ya da çok uluslu şirketler ile sivil toplum girişimleri devletin fonksiyonlarının azaltılması konusunda uyumlu beklentiler geliştirirken, bu uyum küresel kirlenme konusuna gelince bozulabilmektedir.

*Dördüncü olarak*, küreselleşme süreci içerisinde bir alt süreç olan hükümetler arası ilişkilerin en önemli aktörleri olan devletlerin konumunu inceledim. Aslında, devletler diğer üç alt süreçten gelen beklentilerin ve taleplerin tam orta yerinde durmaktadır. Müdahale yöntemleri genellikle hükümetler arası girişimlerle diğer alt süreçlerin taleplerine olumlu veya olumsuz cevap vermek şeklindedir. Her iki durumda da, devletler bir meşruiyet sorunu ile karşı karşıya bulunmaktadır. Zira, alt süreçlerin beklentileri birbiriyle taban tabana zıt olabilmektedir. Devletlerin birini diğerine tercih etmesi, tercih edilmeyen kesimlerin gözünde devletin meşruiyetinin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi sonucunu doğurmaktadır. Çevre duyarlılarının hoşuna gidecek hükümetler arası bir karar çok uluslu şirket ve onların çalışanlarını hoşnut etmemekte, ya da çok uluslu şirketlerin hoşuna gidecek bir karar çevre duyarlılarını hayal kırıklığına uğratmaktadır. Küresel ortamda devletin rol ve işlevlerinin bu şekilde sıkışmış olması, onun siyasal meşruiyetinin doğal olarak tartışma konusu yapılmasına zemin hazırlamaktadır.

*Son olarak* bu bölümde, devlet merkezli olarak belirlenmiş olan sosyoloji, siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası ilişkiler gibi sosyal bilimlerin, küresel ortamda devletin acizyetinden kaynaklanan boşlukta ne tür krizlerle karşı karşıya olduklarını açıklamaya çalıştım. Toplum, siyaset ve uluslararası ilişkilerde küresel ortamın getirmiş olduğu köklü dönüşümlerin mevcut sosyal bilimler anlayışı ile kavramsallaştırılamayacağını, her sosyal bilimin kendi alanını yeniden gözden geçirmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum.

*Üçüncü bölümde*, liberal kuram, demokrasi ideali ve uluslararası ilişkiler kuramlarındaki devlet yaklaşımlarını incelemeye, ve bunların günümüz küresel koşullarını kavramsallaştırmada ne derece yeterli olup olamayacaklarını belirlemeye çalıştım. *Klasik liberal kuramda* devlet, temel haklar olan yaşam, mülkiyet ve özgürlüğü korumakla görevli asgari şartlarda belirlenmiş bir kamu otoritesi olarak tanımlanmıştır. Söz konusu ortak kamu otoritesinin belirlenmesinin ise açık veya gizli toplumsal bir mutabakat ile sağlanabileceği varsayılmıştır. Her ne şekilde olursa olsun, birey devletten önce gelir ve bireyin temel hakları kesinlikle devletin yüce idealleri uğruna kurban edilemez. Bireyin de düşünce ve hareketlerinde, kendi çıkarını en iyi bilen olarak, akılcı bir şekilde davranacağı kabul edilmiştir. Liberal kuram toplumdaki adaletin ancak bu şekilde oluşturulacak bir devlet aracılığı ile gerçekleştirilebileceğini, ne doğal durumun ne de müdahaleci devlet anlayışının adaleti sağlayamayacağını varsaymıştır. Şimdi bu kuramı küresel ortama uyarlamaya kalktığımızda, karşımıza aşılması güç sorunlar çıkacaktır. Liberal kuramdaki özgürlük ve adalet varsayımının, varlıklılar ile yoksunlar arasındaki fırsat eşitsizliği nedeniyle bir toplumda bile ne kadar makul olduğu konusundaki soru işaretini bir kenara bırakarak, küresel durumda bu tezlerin savunulması, ekonomik küreselleşmenin sözcülüğüne soyunmak olacaktır. Böyle bir durumda devlet, yerel olarak küresel sermayeye güvenlik imkanları sağlayan, ancak yerel insanların hareket özgürlüklerini kısıtlayan bir yapıya dönüşecektir. Halbuki, liberal kuram, toplumsal mutabakat varsayımını dünya ölçeğinde dillendirmeye çalışabilir, böylece küresel durumda en azından hakemlik yapacak küresel bir kamu otoritesinin gerekliliğini vurgulayabilirdi.

*Demokrasi ideali* bireylerin kendi kaderleri hakkında bir bütün olarak kamu alanında karar verme sürecine katılımlarını ifade eder. Modern dönemde bunun uygulaması temsil ve çoğunlukla karar alma yöntemleriyle yapılmaktadır. Son yıllarda dillendirilen radikal demokrasi söylemi de tam bu noktada katılım ve temsil gibi iki ana

ilke etrafında şekillenmiş ve bunların ideal olarak nasıl sağlanabileceğine yoğunlaşmıştır. Katılım, karar vericilerin belirlenmesi sürecine her aşamada katılımı ifade etmektedir. Yani sadece seçim dönemlerinde oy kullanarak bizi temsil edecek ve bizim hakkımızda karar verecek temsilcilerin seçilmesi, gelişen radikal söylemde katılımın sadece bir unsurunu ifade etmektedir. Temsil ilkesinden anlaşılması gereken ise, farklılıkların kamu alanında özgürce kendilerini ifade edebilmesidir. Radikal söylemde, farklılık merkezi bir konuma sahiptir. Zira, farklılık nedeniyle müzakere, seçim, katılım ve mutabakat vardır. Eğer farklılıklar olmasaydı demokrasiye de gerek kalmazdı. Bu bakış açısından küresel durumu değerlendirdiğimizde, radikal demokrasi söyleminin liberal kuramdaki benzer eksiklikleri taşıdığını görüyoruz. Karar verme sürecine her aşamada katılım ve farklılıkların kamu alanında temsili üzerinde bu kadar yoğunluklu olarak duran radikal söylem, küresel duruma ilişkin bir öneri veya eleştiri getirememektedir. Radikal söylemin üzerinde durduğu nokta mevcut devlet yapılarındaki katılım ve temsili ifade etmektedir. Halbuki, küresel ilişkiler ağı ile herhangi bir ulus devletin uygulamaları birbiriyle yakından ilintilidir. Yani, bireylerin özgürlüğü için katılım gündeme getirilecekse, bu katılım küresel güç ilişkilerine katılımı da içermeliydi. Aynı şekilde, bireylerin ve kimliklerin farklılıklarının özerkliği gündeme getirilecekse, farklılıkların temsili küresel ortamdaki temsili de içermeliydi.

Liberal kuram ve radikal demokrasi söylemleri, küreselleşen dünyadaki bireyin beklentilerine ve değişen koşullarına sadece mevcut devletler yapısı içerisinde çok ciddi açılımlar getiriyor olsalar da, küresel güç ilişkileri ve yükselen küresel bilinç çerçevesinde ulus devletlerin değişen rol ve işlevlerinin küresel kamu otoritesi veya küresel katılım ve temsil anlamında köklü bir değişim önermemektedirler.

Bu konuda belki de en ciddi açılım *uluslararası ilişkiler kuramcılarında* gelmiştir. Geleneksel olarak egemen ulus devletler arasındaki güç ilişkilerinin incelenmesi üzerinde yoğunlaşan uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları, egemenliği evrensel bir veri olarak kabul etmiş, bu bağlamda da iç ve dış, önemli ve önemsiz konular gibi ayırımlara girmiştir. Halbuki küreselleşen dünyada, ekonominin siyasetten daha önemsiz olduğunu iddia etmek veya ülke içi konuların diğer ülkelerdeki gelişmelerden soyutlanmış bir şekilde incelenebileceğini öne sürmek artık gerçeklik olarak mümkün değildir. Üstelik geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları bu nedenle her zaman mevcut devletler

sisteminin meşrulaştırıcı kuramsal çerçevesi olarak suçlana gelmiştir. Küresel ortamda geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler kuramlarının bu açmazlarının gözler önüne serilmesine ve gerçeğin hiç de bize anlatıldığı gibi olmadığını gösterilmesine ilişkin en önemli çaba eleştirel düşünürlerden gelmiştir. Özellikle metinsellik (textualism) tartışmalarını gündeme taşıyan eleştirel kuramcılar, Machievelli'nin Prens'inin geleneksel olarak tek yönlü bir okuma sonucu yorumlandığını, aslında bu metnin farklı bir şekilde okunabileceğini ve yorumlanabileceğini göstermişlerdir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, egemen devletlerin uluslararası ilişkilerde evrensel geçerli bir veri olarak kabul edilmesi veya devletlerin gücünün sadece askeri-siyasal göstergeler ile tanımlanabileceğinin iddia edilmesi biraz saçma kalmaktadır. Üstelik geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler kuramlarının değişimi açıklamaktaki sıkıntıları da göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, devletler arası ilişkilerin bazı değişmez kabul edilen varsayımlardan yola çıkarak incelenmesiyle küreselleşmenin kesinlikle açıklanamayacağı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Eleştirel kuramcılar dışında, her ne kadar geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler kuramına bağlı kalmakla birlikte, bir kısım yorumcular geleneksel kuramda önemli kavramsal değişimler yaratabilmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda, Mercer'in sosyal bir ünite olarak devletin kimliğinin değişebileceği yönündeki incelemeleri ve yine Wendt'in etkileşim (interactionism) ve oluşumculuk (constructionism) üzerinde durması ve uluslararası ilişkilerin tarihsel bir süreç sonucunda meydana geldiği ve tarihsel oluşum sürecinin devam ettiği, bu yüzden değişmez kabul edilen kavram ve verilerde her zaman değişiklik meydana gelebileceğini göstermesi, uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımlarına yeni açılımlar getirmiştir. Ancak, bütün bu yeni açılımcı girişimlere rağmen küreselleşmenin kavramsallaştırılması ve bu süreç içerisinde devletin konumunun ve meşruiyet temellerinin yeni kavramsal dayanaklara oturtulması konusunda, kuramsal bir devrim yaratabilecek ve küreselleşme sürecini tanımlayabilecek köklü bir değişim olmamıştır.

*Dördüncü bölümde*, ulus devletin rol ve işlevlerinin köklü değişiminde en önemli etkiye sahip olan küresel ve yerel aktörleri ve bunların hareket tarzlarını incelemeye çalıştım. Devlet-dışı küresel aktörler dört ana grupta toplanabilirler. *Birincisi*, ekonomik merkezli aktörler olan çok uluslu veya ulus ötesi şirketlerdir. Uluslararası ticaret, yatırım ve finans alanlarındaki serbestleşme, küresel ölçekte kurumsallaşmaya çalışan kapitalizme yeni bir ivme kazandırmıştır. Doğal kaynakların temini, üretim tesislerinin re-organizasyonu, pazarlama stratejilerinin yeniden şekillenmesi, teknolojinin önemli hale

gelmesi ve bilgi teknolojilerinin kullanımı konularında bir önceki yüzyıl ile karşılaştırıldığında, küresel ekonomik aktörlerin devletlerin işlevlerini önemli oranda sınırlandırdığı görülmektedir. Vergi, yatırım, ticaret, finans ve sosyal güvenlik gibi devletin ekonomi merkezleri politikaları küresel ekonomik aktörlerin beklentileri doğrultusunda şekillenmeye başlamıştır. Bunun da en önemli nedeni, devletin istihdam yaratabilmesi ve dolayısı ile vatandaşlarına daha iyi bir hayat seviyesi sunabilmesinin temelinde yabancı sermayenin rolüdür. Eğer geleneksel anlamda, devlet, işlevlerini yerine getirmeye devam ederse, bu, vatandaşlarının hayat seviyelerinin yükseltilmesi anlamında çok keskin bir hayal kırıklığı yaratabilir. Aslında, son yarım yüzyılın verileri incelendiğinde gelişmiş ülkeler ile gelişmekte olan ülkeler arasındaki gelir dağılımının gittikçe bozulduğu görülmekle birlikte, yabancı sermaye ve yatırımın gelişmekte olan bir ülkede istihdam yaratması ve göreceli olarak bir önceki konuma göre daha iyi bir hayat seviyesi getirmesi, devletlerin çok uluslu şirketlerin beklentilerine olumlu yanıt vermesini meşru kılıyor gibi görünüyor. Ancak, bu her zaman sorgulanmaya açık bir gelişmedir.

*İkincisi*, küresel düzeyde ortaya çıkmaya başlayan sivil toplum girişimleridir. Sivil toplum girişimlerinin temelinde üç ana neden gözlemleniyoruz. Birincisi, ileri düzey kapitalist üretim zihniyetinin dünya ölçeğinde yaratmış olduğu doğayı yıkıcı etkidir. Çevre kirlenmesi, ozon tabakasındaki incelme veya köklü iklim değişimleri ve doğal olmayan gıda üretiminin yaygınlaşması genelde çevreci diye nitelendirilebileceğimiz küresel bir girişimin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu tür sivil toplum örgütlerinin temel endişesi, üretim modeli bu şekilde devam ettiği takdirde insanlığın bir tür olarak geleceğinin ve bir ekolojik düzen olarak yeryüzünün geleceğinin riske edildiğidir. Küresel sivil toplum girişimlerinin ortaya çıkmasındaki ikinci tür neden, yine küresel kapitalizmin getirmiş olduğu, gelişmiş ve az gelişmiş ülkeler arasındaki farkın gittikçe açılıyor olmasıdır. Mal ve sermaye hareketleri serbestleşirken, işgücünün serbest dolaşımına hala izin verilmemesi bu adaletsizliğin artmasındaki en temel öge konumundadır. Küresel ölçekte artan adaletsiz dağılım dünyamızdaki istikrar ve güveni tehlikeye atmaktadır. Üçüncü neden ise, ilk iki nedene bağlı olarak ulus devletlerin küresel ölçekte ortaya çıkan sorunları çözmekteki yetersizlikleridir. Tam tersine, ulus devletler konvansiyonel-nükleer- biyolojik-kimyasal silahlanmaya hala önemli harcamalar yapmakta, bu harcamalar doğrudan doğruya insanların hayat seviyelerini olumsuz etkilerken, aynı zamanda küresel bir güvenlik felaketinin de habercisi olmaktadır. Ulus devletin belki de meşruiyet temelinin

aşınmasındaki en temel öğelerden biri, ortaya çıkan küresel sorunları çözüme kabiliyetinden yoksun olması, üstelik kendi uygulamalarının bir küresel felakete yol açabilecek nitelikte genişlemesidir.

*Üçüncüsü*, uluslararası suç teşekkülleridir. Terörist örgütlerden insan kaçakçılığına, yasadışı ticaretten uyuşturucu ticaretine kadar birçok alanda değişebilen suç örgütleri bilgi teknolojisindeki gelişmelere paralel olarak küresel bir aktör hüviyetini kazanmıştır. Uyuşturucu ticareti gibi adi nitelikli örgütlenmeleri bir kenara bırakır isek, uluslararası insan kaçakçılığının ve terörizmin temelinde dünyada var olan ve yukarıda bahsettiğimiz adaletsiz uygulamaların bulunması yer almaktadır. Yani, iş gücünün serbest dolaşımında kısıtlamalar var olduğu sürece insan kaçakçılığı da mutlaka var olacaktır. Ayrıca, gelişmiş ülkeler ve az gelişmiş ülkeler arasındaki uçurum açıldığı sürece, güçlü ülkeleri hedef alan bir kısım terörist girişimler de teşvik edilmiş olacaktır. Özellikle 11 Eylül olayıyla birlikte küresel bir boyut kazanan terör eylemleri, adi birer eylem olmaktan daha öte ideolojik bir boyut taşımaktadır. Bu ideolojik boyutun altında, dünya ölçeğinde var olan kapitalist düzenin yaratmış olduğu gelişmişlik farkı, ve bu düzenin korunmasında merkezi ülkelerin önemli rol üstleniyor olmalarıdır. Azgelişmişlik, kültürel ve kimlik anlamında aşığılanma ve sistemden dışlanma, bir kısım ülke ve halkların küresel ortamda kendilerini yeterince temsil edememelerine yol açmaktadır. Bu çaresizlik durumu, bu ülkelerdeki bir kısım insanları terör yöntemine itmekte ve gelişmiş ülkelerin de kendilerini güvende hissetmemelerini sağlamaya dönük olarak terör girişimlerine başvurmalarına neden olmaktadır. Bu terör havası, az gelişmiş bölgelerdeki devletlerin meşruiyetini aşındırdığı gibi gelişmiş ülkelerdeki ulus devletlerin de meşruiyetini aşındırmaktadır. Zira, güvenlik sorunu ortaya çıktığında, devletin en temel görevlerinde birini yerine getirmesi beklenir. Eğer devlet bu tehdidi bertaraf edemiyorsa insanların gözünde asli fonksiyonlarından birini yapamıyor demektir.

*Dördüncüsü*, hükümetler arası örgütlerdir. Aslında hükümetler arası örgütlenmeler yukarıda bahsettiğimiz diğer üç tür aktör grubunun taleplerine ve beklentilerine cevap verebilme veya onların tehditlerini sınırlandırabilme anlayışı temelinde şekillenmektedir. Bir anlamda hükümetler arası örgütler mevcut devletlerin meşruiyetini devam ettirebilmeleri için küresel bir işbirliği ortamı yaratmayı hedeflemektedir. Ancak, hükümetler arası örgütlerin çalışmalarındaki prosedürel sorunlar ve etkinliğin olmaması

nedeniyle, küresel güvenlik, çevre felaketleri ve terör konularında bireysel bazda devletlerin üstlenmesi gereken işlevleri etkin hale getiremediği ve ulus devletin meşruiyet temelini sağlama alınamadığı açıktır.

Küresel durumdaki *ikinci* temel aktör grubu *yerel aktörlerdir*. Yerel aktörler temelde kimlik ve kültür konuları üzerinde durarak ulus devleti içeriden gayrı meşrulaştıran bir yapıda gelişmektedirler. Bir tarafta ulus devletin dayattığı ulusalcı kimlik ve politikaların reddi, diğer tarafta da küresel kapitalizmin dayattığı tek tip tüketim kültürünün reddi yerel kimlik ve kültür politikalarının ortaya çıkmasındaki en temel öğeler konumundadır. Kimlik politikası daha çok bireysel alandan kaynaklanırken, kültür politikaları daha çok grup kimliğinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bireysel alanda aydınlanma felsefesinin getirdiği ve liberal kapitalist küreselleşme ile dayatılan bireyselleşme ideali çerçevesinde, küresel ortamda bireysel tercihler geleneksel konularından oldukça farklılaşmaya başlamıştır. Cinsiyet merkezli şekillenen bu bireysel tercihler ataerkil toplum ve siyaset yapısına önemli tehditler getirmektedir. Diğer taraftan, bu aşırı bireyselleşme içerisinde, kimliğin aslında bir farklılıktan doğduğu ve bir grup niteliğinden ortaya çıktığı varsayılır ise, birey, kendisini ulusal kimliğe yabancı hissetmekte, daha çok yerel merkezli etnik veya dini kimi kültürel öğelere dayanarak yeni bir kimlik arayışına girmektedir. Bu yerel kültür merkezli kimlik arayışları ve bunun sonucunda ortaya çıkan yerelleşme hareketi, ulus devletin moralite üzerindeki tekeli kırmakta ve parçalamaktadır. Zaten, küresel kapitalizm ile işlevleri iyice sınırlandırılmış ulus devletin en önemli dayanak noktası olarak kalan ulusal kültür ve kimlik böylece parçalanma riskiyle karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Bu süreç doğrudan, devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin sorgulanmasına yol açmakta ve mevcut devlet yapısının yerel özellikleri temsil etmediği gerekçesiyle ulus devletin topraksal bütünlüğü de tehdit altına girmektedir.

*Beşinci bölümde*, küresel ve yerel aktörlerin taleplerine, beklentilerine ve tehditlerine karşı ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetini devam ettirebilmek amacıyla ne tür tepkiler verebileceğini ve ulus devletin ayırıcı özellikleri olarak kabul edilen özelliklerdeki değişimleri incelemeye çalıştım. Küresel ve yerel taleplerin incelenmesinden, ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetini devam ettirebilmesi için, liberal bir ekonomi politikası, çok kültürlülüğü tanıyan bir siyaset yöntemi ve küresel sorunları çözmekte hükümetler arası örgütlerin etkinleştirilmesi yoluyla bir mesafe kaydedebileceği gerçeği ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Önümüzdeki dönemde ulus devletin bu önceliklerden hangisine ağırlık vereceğini göreceksak da, ayrıca mevcut yapısı içerisinde halen üstlenmiş olduğu liberal ekonomi politikalarına devam etmesinde bir sorun olmasa da, eğer küresel sorunları çözmekte bir işlev üstlenemediği ve yerel kültürlerin tanınması konusunda bir ilerleme kaydedemediği takdirde, ulus devletin varlığının ciddi olarak sorgulanacağı açıktır. Zira, küresel ve yerel aktörler ulus devletin değişmez kabul edilen en temel özelliklerini köklü bir dönüşüme tabi kılmaktadır. Ulus devletin kimlik, ulusal birlik, rasyonalite, evrensellik, özerklik, topraksallık ve egemenlik gibi en temel özellikleri küresel ortamda artık bundan yüz yıl öncesinde buldukları konumda değildir. Bu temel özelliklerdeki aşınma istikrar ve güvenlik gibi, sağlanması gereken en temel kamu mallarının üretilmesinde ulus devleti çaresiz bir konumda bırakmaktadır. Bu çaresizlik ve iktidarsızlık doğrudan doğruya ulus devletin varlık temeli olan siyasal meşruiyetinin sorgulanması sonucunu getirmektedir.

*Altıncı bölümde*, ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin temellerinde küreselleşme içerisinde ne gibi kaymalar meydana gelebileceğini daha iyi anlamak açısından, ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin tarihsel gelişmesini incelemeye ve belirli dönüm noktalarını kavramsallaştırmaya çalıştım. Yaklaşık beşyüz yıllık tarihi boyunca modern ulus devletin meşruiyet temeli, küresel ortama gelinceye kadar, dört temel aşamada belirlenmiştir. *Birincisi*, asgari (minimal) düzey diye adlandırdığım ilk dönemdir. Bu dönemde ulus devletin meşruiyet tanımlaması, modern öncesi kimi öğeleri taşımakla birlikte, düzen, güvenlik ve adalet kavramları etrafında şekillenmiştir. Bir ulus devlet bunları sağlayabildiği takdirde meşru bir devlet olarak kabul edilmiştir. *İkincisi*, temsil veya katılımcı olarak adlandırabileceğimiz aşamadır. Özellikle, onyedinci ve onsekizinci yüzyıla tekabül eden bu dönemde, vatandaşların toplumu yönetecek kanunları yapma sürecine katılmaları başlamıştır. İlk olarak vergilendirme nedeniyle gündeme gelen bu talep, ilerleyen dönemde bütün vatandaşların en temel haklarından biri halinde gelmiştir. Böylece, temsil yöntemiyle ve vatandaşlarının katılımı ile yönetilen ulus devlet meşruiyet temelini biraz daha genişletmiştir. *Üçüncüsü*, özellikle ondokuzuncu yüzyılda yaşanan Alman ve İtalyan birliklerinin kurulması sırasında, ulus devletin özelliklerine kültürel ve etnik öğeler katılmıştır. Elbette buradaki etnik öğe daha önceki dönemlerdeki sivil vatandaşlık anlayışına hanel getirmemiş olmasına rağmen, ulus devletin ayırıcı bir özelliği ve meşruiyet kaynağı olarak ortak milliyetçilik anlayışını getirmiştir. *Dördüncü aşama*, sosyal hakların ve refah uygulamalarının ulusal devletin bir yükümlülüğü haline geldiği

aşamadır. Sınırlı çalışma saati, asgari ücret ve asgari çalışma yaşı gibi sosyal hakların temelleri ondokuzuncu yüzyılda atılmış olmasına rağmen, ilerleyen dönemlerde genel grev ve toplu sözleşme hakları tanınmış ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde ise işsizlik ücreti, emekli sandıkları gibi alanlar sosyal haklara dahil edilmiştir. Refah politikaları ise daha çok yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısında uygulamaya konulan istihdamı artırıcı politikalar ile sosyal güvenlik ve sağlık sistemlerinin daha gelişmiş düzeye erişmesini ifade eden genel bir tanımlamadır. Söz konusu dört kırılma noktasında da ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyet temeli sürekli bir inşa halinde gelişmiştir. Bu, modern devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin birikimci (cumulative) bir şekilde belirlendiğini göstermektedir. Yani, örneğin asgari dönemde meşruiyet temeli sayılan özellik, katılımcı öğeler ortaya çıkarken kaybolmamış ve varlığını devam ettirmiştir. Aynı şekilde, sosyal haklarda kazanılan ilerlemeler refah politikaları ile sekteye uğratılmamıştır. Bu dört temel aşamayı ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin geleneksel temelleri diye adlandırmayı uygun gördüm.

*Yedinci bölümde*, küreselleşmenin getirdiği dayatmaların sonucu olarak ulus devletin geleneksel siyasal meşruiyet temellerindeki kaymaların nerelerden kaynaklanabileceğini belirlemeye çalıştım. Elbette, küreselleşme ulus devletin geleneksel meşruiyet temellerinin uygulanmasında köklü bir gerilemeye neden olmayacaktır. Ancak, küreselleşme, meşruiyet temellerinin uygulanmasında köklü politika değişiklikleri yaratabileceği gibi, yeni tür meşruiyet temelleri de ortaya çıkarabilecektir. Yani, düzen, adalet, temsil, sosyal haklar, refah beklentileri gibi geleneksel meşruiyet kaynakları ulus devletin yükümlülüğü olarak devam edecek olmasına rağmen, küreselleşme bunlara yenilerini ekleyebilecek veya mevcutların uygulanmasında köklü anlayış farklılıkları ön plana çıkarabilecektir. Bu kapsamda, küreselleşme içerisinde ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin icrasında köklü dönüşümlere yol açabilecek veya yeni meşruiyet kaynakları zorlayabilecek etkenler olarak üç ana unsur belirlemeye çalıştım. Bunlar, bireysel, yerel ve küresel unsurlardır.

*Bireysel* bazda baktığımızda, küreselleşmenin etkileri bu kadar fazla hissedilmezken geleneksel meşruiyet temelleri uygulandığı sürece ulus devletin birey açısından siyasal meşruiyetinin sorgulanması olasılığı azalıyordu. Halbuki küreselleşme süreci içerisinde bireyin talepleri ve beklentileri o kadar farklılaştı ki, geleneksel meşruiyet temellerinin yine geleneksel anlamda uygulanması bireyin taleplerinin kösteklenmesi,

dolayısı ile ulus devletin birey gözünde bir anda gayrı meşru bir hale gelmesi sonucunu doğurabilir. Cinsel tercihlerin tanınmasını talep eden cinsiyet politikaları, cinsler arası eşitlik üzerinde duran feminizm, devletin özel alana müdahalesini sınırlandırmak isteyen daha özgürlükçü talepler, özellikle silahlanma harcamalarına ayrılan payın bireysel refahı olumsuz etkilediği gerekçesiyle devletin savunma harcamalarının kısılmasına ilişkin talepler, katılımın sadece seçimlerde oy kullanmak yerine yönetim sürecine katılımı da içerir hale getirilmesine ilişkin talepler, devletin politikalarının ve yapısının bireyin anlık taleplerine cevap verebilecek halde şeffaf hale getirilmesine ilişkin talepler ve fırsat eşitliğinin tam olarak sağlanarak adaletin daha iyi sunulmasına ilişkin talepler küreselleşen dünyada bireyin devletten en fazla öne çıkan talepleridir. Bu tür talepler, önceki dönemde bu kadar ağırlıklı bir konumda değildi. Halbuki küreselleşme aynı zamanda bireyselleşmeyi de bir şekilde teşvik ettiğinden, bireysel talepler farklılaşmakta ve aciliyet arz etmektedir. Bu kadar farklı bireysel talebin sağlıklı bir şekilde ve istenen ölçüde karşılanabilmesi mevcut ulus devletin yapısı ile hayli zor görünmektedir. Örneğin, cinsiyet değiştirmenin tanınmasının toplumun geleneksel kesimleri üzerinde yaratacağı olumsuz etkiler de ulus devletin meşruiyetini farklı bir yönden aşındıracaktır.

*Yerel* unsurları incelediğimizde, ulus devletin oluşum sürecinde tek bir kültür ve kimliğin bütün vatandaşlara dayatıldığı ve zaman içerisinde homojen bir ulusa erişildiğine tanıklık ediyoruz. Halbuki, erişildiği sanılan homojen ulus küreselleşme ile birlikte yeniden yerel özelliklere bürünmektedir. Bu gerçek de, ulus devletin uzun tarihi boyunca tek tipleşirmeye çalıştığı yerel özelliklerin aslında bastırıldığını, ancak toplumların zihninden silinemediğini göstermektedir. İnsan hakları, demokratikleşme ve özgürlükler konusunda aydınlanmacı felsefenin etkisi dünyanın her yerinde hissediliyor ve bu değerler önemli oranda benimseniyor olsa da, küreselleşme bu değerlerle birlikte evrensel kabul edilen öteki değerlerin de göreceli hale gelmesine neden olmuştur. Uzun zaman boyunca ulusal kimlik ve kültür ekseninde bir arada tutulan topluluklar, küreselleşmenin getirmiş olduğu yansıtma özgürlüğü ortamında kendi öz yerel değerlerini ve kültürlerini ön plana çıkarmaya başlamışlardır. Yerel kültürel talepler temelinde, yerel farklılığın ulus devlet tarafından hukuksal, toplumsal ve siyasal olarak tanınması etrafında yoğunlaşmaktadır. Böyle bir tanınmanın varacağı sonuç olarak, ulusal dilin, eğitim sisteminin ve kültürün parçalanması ve dolayısı ile ulusal bütünlüğün dağılması tehditleri göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, bunlar, ulus devletin mevcut yapısı içerisinde gerçekten yerine

getirilebilecek talepler olarak görülmemektedir. Ulus devletin bu konudaki isteksizliği, kimi zaman keskin tartışmalara da neden olabilmekte, ve bu talep, yerel farklılıklarının tanınmasını isteyen bir grubun ayrı bir ulus devlet oluşturma yönündeki siyasal talebine dönüşebilmektedir. İşte, ulus devletin en temel özelliklerinden kabul edilen topraksal bütünlüğün parçalanma riski de burada yatmaktadır. Topraksal bütünlüğün korunmasındaki aşırı istek, yerel toplulukları ulus devletten yabancılaştırabilmekte, veya yerel taleplere olumlu cevap verilmesi durumunda ise topraksal bütünlüğün tehdit altında olduğu yönünde toplumun diğer kesimlerinde ortaya çıkabilecek bir güvensizlik ulus devletin meşruiyet temelini hepten sarsmaktadır.

Küresel ortamda ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetinin küresel unsurları diye tanımlayabileceğimiz değişim kaynakları ise ileri düzey kapitalizm merkezlidir. Liberal uygulamalar nedeniyle küresel ortamda ulus devlet küresel ekonomik güçlerin beğenisini yeterince kazanmış durumdadır. Ticaret, yatırım ve finans alanlarındaki serbestleşme hareketi bütün ulus devletlerin katılımı ile ivme kazanmakta, bu sürecin dışında kalan ulus devletin konumu ise tam bir yalnızlıktır. Ulus devletin bu süreçte küresel kapitalist taleplere olumlu cevap vermesindeki en önemli etken, vatandaşlarına vaat etmiş olduğu refah düzeyidir. Liberal politikalar uygulayan ülkelere doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar yapılmakta, istihdam artırılmakta ve ulusal gelir yukarılara çekilerek vatandaşların talebi kısmen karşılanmaktadır. Ancak, kapitalist üretim sürecinin doğurmuş olduğu çevre felaketleri, ileri düzey kapitalizme yapılan eleştirilerden ulus devletin de pay almasını sağlamaktadır. Ayrıca, küresel kapitalizm ile işbirliği yapılmış olmasına rağmen gelişmiş ülkeler ile az gelişmiş ülkeler arasındaki dünya üretiminin ve tüketiminin dağılım payının gittikçe gelişmiş ülkeler lehine açılıyor olması, ulus devletin liberal politikalar uygulayarak çevre felaketlerine neden olması dolayısı ile ağır eleştiriler toplamasına neden olmaktadır. Üstelik bu eleştiriler sadece az gelişmiş ülke vatandaşlarından gelmemektedir. İş gücünün ucuz olması nedeniyle yatırımların az gelişmiş ülkelere kayması sonucunda işsizlik tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya kalan gelişmiş ülke vatandaşları da küresel kapitalizm ile birlikte kendi ulus devletlerine gittikçe daha soğuk bakmaktadırlar. Az gelişmiş ülkelerdeki çevrenin korunmasına ilişkin düzenlemelerin bulunmaması ve bu yüzden küresel olarak çevre felaketlerinin bir anlamda teşvik edilmesi nedeniyle, küreselleşen dünyada çevre kirlenmesine duyarlı bir sivil hareket doğurmuştur. Bilgi teknolojilerindeki ilerlemenin de yardımıyla hızla örgütlenebilen ve harekete geçebilen bu sivil girişimler,

mevcut ulus devletlerin politikalarını sorgulamakta, çevre kirliliği ve nükleer silahlanma gibi olgular nedeniyle güvenlik anlayışının kökten değiştiğini ön plana çıkarmaktadırlar. Gerçekten de geleneksel anlamda güvenlik ulus devletin kendi topraklarının güvenliğini sağlama anlayışı üzerine inşa edilmişti ve bu da genellikle konvansiyonel askeri yöntemlerle elde edilebiliyordu. Halbuki küreselleşme sürecinde kapitalist üretim zihniyetinin sonucunda ortaya çıkmış olan çevre kirliliği tehdidi ve ulus devletlerin nükleer-biyolojik-kimyasal silahlanma yarışına girmiş olması, güvenlik sözkonusu olduğunda hiçbir ulus devletin toprağının sınır ötesinde meydana gelebilecek iklimsel veya çevresel değişikliklerden etkilenmez olmadığını göstermiştir. Güvenlik anlayışındaki bu köklü değişiklik ulus devletin mevcut yapısı içerisinde anlamlandırılması çok zor bir durumdur. Ortaya çıkan sivil girişimlerin tek endişe kaynağı çevre felaketlerinin kürenin ve dolayısı ile insanlığının geleceğine olan doğrudan tehdidi değildir. Küresel sivil girişimler, dünya ölçeğinde adaletsiz bir gelişme seyrinin geleneksel anlamda bile insanlığın huzurunu bozucu ve istikrarı tehlikeye atıcı bir durum olduğunu ön plana çıkarmaya çalışıyorlar. Zira, küresel düzeyde gözlemlenen ideolojik kökenli terör eylemleri başta olmak üzere, dünyanın değişik yerlerindeki işsizlik, açlık ve çaresizlik durumunun her an bütün ulus devletlerin ve onların vatandaşlarının güvenliğini tehlikeye atıcı bir tehdit kaynağı olduğu açıktır. Bu tür küresel ölçekli sorunların mevcut ulus devlet yapısı ile bir çözüme kavuşturulması yönündeki görüşe olan inanç gittikçe azalmaktadır. Bu azalış ulus devletin siyasal meşruiyetini kökten sarsıcı bir durumdur.

Bireysel, yerel ve küresel bazda bugün tanık olmakta bulunduğumuz gelişmeler, ulus devletin hareket edebilme kabiliyetini olabildiğince sınırlandırdığından ve ortaya çıkan yeni talepler genellikle sınır ötesine veya sınırın özüne taşıdığından, ulus devlet mevcut yapısı ile çaresiz bir konumdadır. Bu çaresizlik siyasal meşruiyetini olabildiğince aşındırmakta ve onun fiziksel varlığının da kökten sorgulanmasına yol açmaktadır.

Elbette sosyal ve siyasal olaylardaki değişimlerin açıklanmasında birçok değişken bulunmasına rağmen, ileriye dönük kesin bir tahminde bulunma olanağı yoktur. Bu yönde bir çaba içerisinde olan kuramsal yaklaşımların da doğrulanması veya yanlışlanması tamamen tarihsel süreçte gözlenebilecek bir olgudur. Ancak, toplum ve siyasetteki değişimlerin açıklanmasında güç kavramı çok merkezi bir rol oynar. İdeal olarak olması gereken ile gerçekte olanlar arasındaki kuramsal fark da tam bu noktadan kaynaklanır.

Yani, güç olgusunu dikkate almayan ve ideal kimi kuramsal gereklilikler üzerinde duran kuramların bir ütopya olarak adlandırılması bu yüzden dendir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, devletin bir siyasal yapı olarak varlığını mevcut haliyle nihai olarak sürdüreceği veya devletin tamamen ortadan kalkacağı ya da mevcut yapısındaki kimi rol ve işlevlerde değişikliklerle varlığını sürdüreceği yönünde kesin bir tahminde bulunmak gerçekten zordur. Küreselleşme sürecinde devletin varlığının veya meşruiyetinin nasıl devam edip etmeyeceğine karar verecek olan, küresel ortamdaki güçlerin önümüzdeki dönemde kazanacakları veya kaybedecekleri güç oranlarıdır. Ancak, devletin fiziksel varlığı onun siyasal meşruiyet zeminine doğrudan ilgili bir konudur. Ben bu tezde, küresel ortamda devletin meşruiyet zemininde kaymalara neden olabilecek kaynakları kavramlaştırmaya, dolayısı ile devlet ve küreselleşme olguları tartışılırken siyasal meşruiyetin ne kadar merkezi bir konumda olduğunu göstermeye çalıştım.

## VITAE

Name and Surname : Davut Ateş

Place and Date of Birth : Gülnar / Mersin / Turkey, 03/02/1972

Martial Status : Married, One Son (5 years old)

Current Nationality : Republic of Turkey

Primary School : 1983 / Gülnar / Mersin / Turkey

High School : 1990 / Gülnar / Mersin / Turkey

Undergraduate : Department of International Relations,  
Middle East Technical University, 1995

Graduate (M.S.) : Department of International Relations,  
Middle East Technical University, 1998

M.S. Thesis : Economic Liberalization and the Changing Nature of Radical  
Movements : The Case of Egypt

Post Graduate (Ph.D.) : Department of International Relations,  
Middle East Technical University, 2004

Ph.D. Thesis : Political Legitimacy of Nation States : Shifts within the Global  
Context

Occupation : Foreign Trade Expert, 1996 - ....., Office of the Prime Minister,  
Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, Ankara / Turkey

Languages : Turkish (native), English (high level), Arabic (basic),  
French (basic)

Computer Skills : User of MS Office Programs (Word, Excel, Power Point)

Professional Interests : Foreign Direct Investments and Economic Development, Foreign  
Trade Policies, European Union

Academic Interests : Philosophy, Political Science, International Relations, Political Sociology, Radical Politics, Social Justice, Underdevelopment, Cultural and Ethnic Studies, Democratization

Personal Interests : Poetry, reading, nature, football, table-tennis, traveling

Permanent Address : Mollaömerli Köyü 33700 Gülnar Mersin / Turkey