IDENTITY FORMATION PROCESS OF YOUNG GENERATION EDUCATED PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL IN THE 1990s

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SUNA ERCAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCES
IN

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

DECEMBER 2003

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master Science of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur _____

ABSTRACT

IDENTITY FORMATION PROCESS OF YOUNG GENERATION EDUCATED PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL IN THE 1990s

Ercan, Suna
M.S., Department of Sociology
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç

December 2003, 177 pages

The main purpose of the present study is to explore the tendencies regarding identity definition of young generation educated Arabs who are Israeli citizens. The internal and external dynamics in the 1990s are investigated in relation to their impact on the identity formation of young generation educated Arabs in Israel. The aspirations and demands of the case study group on the civic and national grounds are analyzed. The research topic is focused on the changing attitudes of the Arab community in Israel by taking into consideration of previous years but putting emphasis on the recent decade. The common ground among the highly educated Israeli-Arabs is analyzed by questioning citizenship and minority rights.

In-depth interviewing, observation and literature analysis were used as data collection techniques. Fieldwork has been done in Israel during the summer 2001. A qualitative study, using in-depth interviews with 9 selected educated young Arabs has been applied. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and the transcribed texts were used for discourse analysis. During the interviews political opinions, obstacles to powersharing and areas of discrimination, daily life, definition of national and

civic identity, opinions on current issues throughout the world and in the region, education, language, culture and role as an educated group were inquired.

Findings indicate that young generation educated Arabs of Israel under the impact of two processes Israelization and Palestinization, are radical in their attitudes. On the one hand, the new generation intellectuals have more or less succeeded to integrate to the Israeli society, but on the other hand their awareness of their personal/social and collective identity as a Palestinian citizen of Israel is high. Increased civic and national aspects led to a shift in their identity definitions. In this sense, they carry the characteristics of the new political trend which claims recognition for Arabs collectively as a national minority within the Israeli system. They prefer to be called as Palestinians who are Israeli citizens.

Keywords: Israel, identity formation, ethnicity, citizenship, minority rights.

ÖZ

İSRAİL'DEKİ EĞİTİMLİ GENÇ NESİL FİLİSTİNLİLER'İN 1990'LARDA KİMLİK OLUŞUM SÜRECİ

Ercan, Suna
Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç

Aralık 2003, 177 sayfa

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, İsrail vatandaşı olan genç nesil eğitimli Arapların kimlik tanımlamalarına dair eğilimleri araştırmaktır. 1990'lardaki içsel ve dışsal dinamiklerin, İsrail'deki genç nesil eğitimli Arapların kimlik oluşumu üzerindeki etkileri incelenmektedir. Çalışmaya konu olan grubun amaçları ve talepleri vatandaşlık ve ulusallık zemininde analiz edilmektedir. Araştırma, önceki yılları gözönüne alarak ancak son on yıla vurgu yapmak suretiyle İsrail'deki Arap toplumunun değişen yaklaşımlarına odaklanmıştır. Vatandaşlık ve azınlık hakları sorgulanarak yüksek öğrenim görmüş İsrailli Arapların ortak yanları incelenmektedir.

Veri toplama tekniği olarak derinlemesine mülakat, gözlem ve literatür incelemesi kullanılmıştır. Saha çalışması İsrail'de 2001'in yazında yapılmıştır. Seçilen 9 genç ve yüksek öğrenim görmüş Arap ile derinlemesine mülakat yöntemi kullanarak niteliksel çalışma yürütülmüştür. Tüm görüşmeler kaydedilmiş, çözümlenmiş ve çözümlenen metinler ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilmiştir. Görüşmeler esnasında siyasi görüşler, iktidar paylaşımın önündeki engeller ve ayrımcılık alanları, günlük hayat, ulusal ve yurttaşlık kimliğinin tanımlanması,

dünyada ve bölgedeki mevcut olaylar hakkındaki görüşler, eğitim, kültür ve eğitimli kesim olarak rolleri üzerine bilgi toplanmıştır.

Çalışmanın sonuçları gösteriyor ki, İsrail'deki genç nesil eğitimli Araplar İsraillileşme ve Filistinlileşme süreçlerinin etkisi altında radikal bir tutum içindeler. Yeni nesil entellektüeller bir yandan İsrail toplumuna entegre olmayı belli bir ölçüde başarmışlardır diğer yandan İsrail'in Filistinli vatandaşları olarak bireysel/sosyal ve kollektif kimliklerine dair farkındalıkları yüksektir. Amaçlarında artmış olan yurttaşlık ve ulusallık öğeleri kimlik tanımlamalarında değişikliğe yol açmıştır. Bu açıdan, Arapların İsrail sistemi içinde ulusal bir azınlık olarak kollektif bir şekilde tanımlanması iddiasını benimseyen yeni siyasi akımın özelliklerini taşımaktadırlar. 'İsrail vatandaşı olan Filistinliler' olarak tanımlanmayı tercih etmektedirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler**:** İsrail, kimlik oluşumu, etnisite, vatandaşlık, azınlık hakları.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research has been made possible with the help of many people. I would like firstly to express my gratitude to Assist. Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç, for her valuable supervision, friendly attitude, invaluable moral support and endless patience. I am also grateful to Dr. Elie Rekhess who has given me precious advice and valuable suggestions during the fieldwork in Israel.

I owe very special thanks to Nurdan Atalay for her constructive comments and encouragement from kilometers away during all the steps of the present study.

I am greatly indebted to Aslı Özkoyuncu not only for her help in the preparation of the transcriptions but also for her never-ending support during the hardest time of my study.

I also wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Irmak Aydoğdu for her warm friendship and endless support during the preparation of this thesis.

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Abdullah Cabaluz who never stopped supporting me. He deserves special thanks for his love, care and understanding.

Finally, I owe a major debt to my family who always trust and believe in me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....iii
ÖZ.....v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....viii

CHAPTER
I.INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Methodology 10
1.1.1. Overview on Methodology 10
1.1.2 Assumptions 12
1.1.3 Hypotheses 13
1.1.4 The Framework of Research Question 14
1.1.5 The Setting and the Research Sample 15
1.1.6. Data Collection Method 17
1.1.7. Demographic Information of the Respondents: 20
II. THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 21
2.1. Citizenship and State: Theories and Approaches 21
2.1.1 Citizenship in Israeli Context 32
2.2. Identity Formations: Theories and Approaches 35
2.2.1. Ethnic Identity Formation Trends in the Early 20th Century 38
2.2.2. Primordialism: Fixed Identities 40
2.2.3 Circumstantialism: Fluid Identities 43
III. HISTORY OF THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 48
3.1. General Overview of the Arab Population in Israel 48
3.2. Aftermath of 1948 War and the Survivors' Generation under Military Government 53

3.3. Aftermath of 1967 War: Israelization and Palestinization of the Bicultural Second Generation 60
IV. 1990s: INCREASED CIVIC AND NATIONAL ASPECTS AMONG THIRD GENERATION 71
V. RESEARCH ANALYSIS: MAKING THE YOUNG GENERATION EDUCATED ARABS SPEAK 83
5.1. Introduction 83
5.2. Jewish Homeland versus Palestinian-Arab Homeland 84
5.3. Civic Identity versus National Identity 88
5.4. Areas of Discrimination and Demands of Equality 96
5.5. Daily Life 104
5.6. Language 108
5.7. Cultural Attitudes 111
5.8. Education 114
5.9. Social Contact with Jews 115
5.10. Political Orientations and Role as Young Activists 118
5.11. Views on Current Issues throughout the World and in the Region 124
5.12. Comparison with the Other Palestinians and the Arabs in General 136
5.13. Nakba Memory and Opinions on Previous Generations 142
5.14. Conclusion: Demands for Their Group 144
VI. CONCLUSION 147
REFERENCES 152
APPENDICES 160
A. GUIDING INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 160
B. ARAB NGOs WITHIN ISRAEL 169
C. MAIN ARAB TOWNS IN ISRAEL 172
D. MAPS 175
D. 1.1920-1948 British Mandate Period 175
D. 2.1947 UN Partition Plan 176
D. 3. 1948-1967 Israel 177

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The pivotal event of the period immediately following World War I was the breakup of empires and the granting of the right of self-determination to many nation states that had a large number of minority groups. This is same for the Ottoman Empire as well. When Ottoman sovereignty ended in the Middle East as a result of World War I, the mandate period began in the region. Only after World War II, a nation state formation could have been possible in Palestine. Israel, which was established by the Jews in 1948 after the British Mandate period in a part of the geographical region, which was known as Palestine, experienced the same trend, which is called as building up a nation-state. When the State of Israel had been established on the 15th of May 1948, several Arab states -Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq and Lebanon- declared war on the newly born state. The result of the 1948 War between the Arab countries and Israel caused many problems that are still unsolved. The 15th of May is the Independence Day for the Jews but the Arabs call it *Al-Nakba*, which means catastrophe.

In addition to the regional issues, Arab-Israel conflict and peace process, Israel since the very beginning of its establishment has been facing several internal problems. It is often rightly portrayed as a deeply divided society whose democracy is overburdened with problems and demands. The population of Israel is divided along certain major lines of cleavages such as political stream, religious observance, class, ethnicity, and nationality.[1] The Arab minority issue appears as one of the most

[1] There are mainly three different but overlapping divisions, first between Ashkenazi Jews -who immigrated from west European countries- and Sephardic & Oriental Jews – who immigrated from Iberian and Arab countries. Second division is between radicals (Hawks) –who adopts a strict political stand toward Palestinian question- and moderates (Doves) -who are moderate on Israeli-Arab conflict, and third is between secular and ultra-orthodox Jews. (Smooha; 1978, Smooha; 1993)

important internal cleavage -as a matter of fact, which is in a way, closely related to the Arab-Israeli conflict-. The Arab minority, which constitutes a notable percent (19% -including the Christian Arabs which constitute 2-3% of the whole population of Israel-) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website; 2003) in Israel experienced several transformations as an ethno-religious minority surviving within a state – within a majority which is also an ethno religious one and which is described fully by an ethnic/national dimension that is, Jewishness.

Today's international system is based on nation states and it is almost impossible to find any state, which is completely homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion across the globe. It is obvious that the status of minorities in the states based on the principle of nationality is highly problematic. In this sense, Israel with its Jewish character constitutes a special case in some respects but how to accommodate the minorities is a problem common to all countries in the world having nation state formations and minorities in their structures.

Making up almost one fifth of the population, the Arab population of Israel was recognized by the Jewish state as a religious, linguistic and cultural minority but it actually constitutes a national minority group within Israel. In this sense, this group regards itself historically and culturally affiliated to the people who live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Diaspora. After the 1948 War this part of the Arab population remained under Jewish control and was forced to accept Israeli citizenship. In this study, the identity definition of Israel's Arab citizens will be analyzed by focusing on the 1990s by using qualitative research which was conducted with the members of young generation educated Arabs in Israel. The identity definitions will be analyzed by questioning citizenship and minority rights of the group since the establishment of the state in 1948 until today.

There are some variations in terminology when talking about this minority; sometimes they are called 'Israeli Arabs' or 'Israeli Palestinians', at other times they are called 'Palestinian citizens of Israel'. These variations in terminology reflect the special position of the group regarding their identity and problematic nature of their identity definition. In parallel with its usage in literature on the issue and also in the

light of the developments of certain periods these terms will be used interchangeably through this analysis by trying to avoid any bias or prejudice while defining this group of minority. In this context, in order to understand the identity definitions of the groups themselves certain major facts should be focused on such as an analysis on position of Arab minority in Israel in terms of majority-minority relations, and the strategies that have been adopted by both sides until now.

What is special with the Arab minority in Israel is basically that they are natives of the place, and when the war ended between the newly established Israel and Arab countries, they became homeland minority. They had not undergone a colonial experience in the full sense of the term and they gained a kind of automatic citizenship to the State of Israel in 1949 by Ben Gurion.[2] Since the character of the State is stated as Jewish, the Israeliness constitutes a secondary importance and this exclusionary conceptualization creates a dilemma for Israeli democracy and leaves the Arab minority as a non-assimilating but fully separate and discriminated society within a Jewish majority in all spheres of life.

According to the Israeli Declaration of Independence, the State granted "full equality in social and political rights for all its citizens, without religious, ethnic or gender distinction".[3] Despite this commitment, there emerged an inherent contradiction between Israel as a Jewish state and as a democracy claiming to grant full equality to all citizens. Jews and Arabs in Israel are segregated and separated in all respects: socially, culturally, linguistically, geographically and economically is an assumption, which can be generalized and finds its proof in academic literature (Smooha; 1998, Landau; 1969, 1994, Rouhana; 1984, 1997, Kretzmer; 1987,

[2] Ben Gurion (1886 – 1973) is one of the Zionist leaders and founder of the State of Israel. He is the first and longest-serving Prime Minister during the formation period between 1948-1953 and 1955-1963.

[3] In the Document 26 of "State of Israel Proclamation of Independence", it is stated that the State of Israel will be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of their dispersion; will promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace as convinced by the Prophets of Israel; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race or sex; will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture; will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and will loyally uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the following paragraphs it is also stated that; in the midst of wonton aggression, we yet call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the State, on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its bodies and institutions-provisional and permanent (1948).

Lustick; 1980). In addition, the relations between them are constricted by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the Palestinian citizens of Israel are not formally "second class" citizens, they are relegated to an inferior status (Moore; 2002). Discrimination is expressed in several ways such as, in housing, in allocation of state resources to Arab towns and villages and in educational system. The Israeli government does not deny the existence of discrimination against the Arabs or, as they prefer to call it, the 'gap' which exists in Israeli society (cited in: Darweish & Rigby; 1995, 17).

As it was mentioned above, there are various internal cleavages in Israel but each of them has different characteristics and policies towards each of them and their reaction to these policies have been different in time. In Sammy Smooha's words: "the Oriental Jews are not separate-but-unequal, the religious Jews are separate-but-equal and the Israeli Arabs are separate-and-unequal" (Smooha; 1978, 3). There is an economical gap between Oriental Jews who came from Arab countries after the establishment of Israel and the Ashkenazi Jews who are immigrants from European countries. Arabs of Israel are both separate and unequal in comparison with the Jewish majority.

The identity definitions of the Arabs in Israel have been affected by some turning points that took place in the region up to now such as: the 1948 War, 1967 Six Day War, the *first intifada* (1987), Peace Process (1993), and the *second intifada* (2000). It goes without saying that in some way or another, the Arab world had direct or indirect effects on the Israeli Arabs from the beginning. While on the one hand the Arab population has been to a certain degree sensitive to the developments, which take place beyond the green line. On the other hand, how Israel, which is called as an 'ethnic democracy' by many scholars, has been coping with this matter also determine the identity definition of the Israeli Arabs to a great extent. The policies toward the Israeli Arabs and the obstacles to power sharing or integration have direct effects in addition to the internal and external dynamics in shaping the identity definition of the Arab community within Israel.

When we consider its linkage to the Arab world in terms of ethnic origin we can say that the Arab population in Israel is really a special case, so several external

(international and regional) dynamics have effect on them. What is taking place in Israel today concerning the status of Israeli Arabs is that 'a clash between two nations, in which the national minority feels a sense of belonging to mother countries of which some are still in a state of hostility or war with Israel' (Ha-Aretz, October, 31, 2001).

Although it is for sure that the Israeli Arab issue is a problematic issue like other cleavages for the State of Israel which has a multifaceted pluralistic structure in particular, it may be argued that in a sense it has been less recognized in the administration level than other issues in the past. Only after the October 2000 events – the start of *Al-Aksa intifada* when 13 Israeli Arabs were killed during the rioting in the Galilee- the Arab minority in Israel attracted the attention of the government and the whole society to a certain degree.

The issue of the civic status of Israel's Arab citizens recently has been placed at the top of Israel's national agenda by such items as the arrest of six Arabs (in September 2001) from the city of Umm Al-Fahm on suspicion of being accomplices in terror options, the investigation of the bloody events of October 2000 by the Or commission of inquiry[4], the debate in the Knesset concerning the removal of Balad (National Democratic Alliance) Member of Knesset (MK)[5] Azmi Bishara's parliamentary immunity, and expressions of support for Hezbollah by Arab MKs.

The October 2000 events was an unprecedented reaction. It is argued by most of the Israeli and Arab scholars as the 'explosion of emotions because of years of cumulative discrimination'[6]. Apart from the recent events and their effects on the issue concerning the reinforcement of Palestinian identity, it is argued by some

[4] The Israeli government, headed by then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak, announced the establishment of a three-member Commission of Inquiry in November 2000, in accordance with the Commissions of Inquiry Law (1968). The mandate of the commission is to investigate the clashes between the security forces and Arab citizens which culminated in the death and injury of Israeli citizens starting from 29 September 2000. It further calls for an investigation into the behavior of the inciters, organizers and participants in the events from all sectors, and the security forces. The Or Commission sets a precedent in Israeli legal history. This is the first time a Commission has been established to investigate police violence against the Palestinian minority, although the Palestinian community has demanded such commissions in the past (See Adalah website; http://www.adalah.org)

[5] Knesset is the name for the parliament of State of Israel and MK refers to member of Knesset.

[6] A slogan adopted in conference which was hold by Moshe Dayan Center in Tel Aviv University 'The Program on Arab Politics in Israel', 19 December 2001.

researchers that it has been already a trend which prevailed in the Arab sector in Israel.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the national aspect of identity has been a prevailing trend in both sectors: Jews and Arabs in the last decade as a result of several regional developments such as uprisings in the Occupied Territories and related to this increasing security problem within Israel. It is argued in the research of Dahlia Moore (2002) which was conducted in 2001 among a national probability sample of the adult Jewish (N=450) and Palestinian (N=160) population in Israel that: by the 1990s, the civic ideology weakened whereas the nationalistic ideology strengthened among both Jews and Palestinian citizens of Israel (Moore & Kimmerling; 1995). The most noticeable change involved the Arab sector's increasing identification after territorial reunion with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the War in 1967 and during the 1988 and 2000 *intifadas* (uprisings) (Rouhana; 1997).

As it is mentioned before, in this study the identity problem of the Arab population with its changing face focusing on the educated young generation Arabs is investigated. Identity problem is tried to be understood by analyzing the balance between the four circles of identity, that is, being Muslim/Christian, Arab, Palestinian and Israel citizen. It may be argued that there is a delicate balance among these four circles (Landau; 1994) and the Arab citizens of Israel try to create a balance between these components in their identity definition. In terms of identity definition, it may be also possible to talk about two basic trends which are in action at the same time from the very beginning: 'Palestinization', which is also called as 'radicalization' or 'politicization', and 'Israelization'. These terms are used by academicians to describe the political-national orientations of the Arab minority. While 'Israelization' signifies the trend toward cooption into Israeli society 'Palestinization' signifies the trend of national awakening. These two processes have been shaping the identity definition of Arabs in Israel in close interaction with certain domestic and external developments, which will be discussed in the following chapters in detail.

The 1990s signified the beginning of a new era in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and had impact on the weight of the two processes. It created a new kind of composition in identity definitions of Arabs in Israel by putting more emphasis on national and civic aspects, but narrowing the struggle of their own within the borders of the State of Israel. This trend which is observable in Arab society of Israel in 1990s is defined by Dr. Elie Rekhess as 'localization of the national struggle' (Rekhess; 2002). In Rekhess' words,

> The internal change which led to this conclusion has been the generational shift in the Arab sector's leadership, consolidation of representative institutions and political pluralism but also economic hardship and a widening gap between Jewish and Arab citizens which were the products of a discriminatory and evasive government policy (Rekhess; 2002, 6).

The external change has been the start of the Peace Process as a result of Oslo Agreement in 1993, which marked a historic turning point for the Arab-Israel conflict. These developments had far-reaching implications for the political and national world of the Arabs in Israel and changed the nature of the majority-minority relations forged in 1948 with the establishment of the State of Israel.

In this study, the manifestations of this new trend are explored by focusing on the young generation educated group of Arab minority which is regarded as the active agents of the new era. The analysis is made via using qualitative technique. In-depth interviewing was applied to the selected sample. It is not a randomly chosen sample but according to certain criteria like professions and the level of education. The methodology which was adopted will be explained in the following subheadings in detail. The selected representatives of the group which were analyzed are used to illuminate the atmosphere in the last decade since they can be considered as the carriers of the characteristics of this era more than the other generations. The educated Arabs who are at the age of 20s and 30s reflect the manifestation of the new trend and they want to be different kind of citizens, calling themselves as 'Palestinians who are Israeli citizens' and they belong to the same group who went to the street in October 2000 events. On the one hand, the new generation educated group has more or less 'succeeded to integrate' to the Israeli society, but on the other hand their awareness of their personal/social and collective identity as a Palestinian citizen of Israel is high. What is focused in this analysis is that, how the young

generation Arab elites of Israel tend to define their identity, what are the aspirations and demands of this group and what the *Nakba* memory means for them? Mostly the convergent parts of the attitudes among the younger generation of educated Arabs will be discussed in light of this new reality. The common ground among the interviewees will be analyzed by questioning citizenship and minority rights.

This chapter focuses on the methodology mainly giving information on the data collection method and research setting as well as defending the value and logic of the qualitative methodology which was applied to the sample group.

The theoretical and analytical framework used in the study is composed of three basic parts defined in the second chapter. The literature on the concept of identity, citizenship and majority-minority relations within the nation-state formation is displayed in the beginning of each part.

The historical background is given in the third chapter by exploring the issue in the light of certain turning points: the 1948 War, the 1967 War and the Peace Process that has started in the early 1990s. While discussing the issue, the main logic is that the political developments in and outside of Israel shaped the identity definition of the Arab minority and there are intergenerational differences in terms of being exposed to certain developments in each era. The constraints and opportunities embedded in the social context shape the perceptions, attitudes and life experiences of social agents while they condition their participation in the process itself argues Giddens in his structuration theory (Giddens; 1979). In the light of the political and social developments in each period that was categorized above, it may be argued that the constraints and opportunities embedded in each era took different shape, and these changes shaped the perceptions and attitudes of the Arab minority of Israel. The perceptions and attitudes in a certain period can best be traced by focusing on the active social agents of that period. The active social agents and carriers of the characteristics of a certain period are considered in this study as the young generation groups specifically the educated ones. Nevertheless, I will analyze the first two generations by retrospective data from the sample group and the researches on the issue in the existing literature.

In this analysis, I considered three basic generations in terms of being the carriers of the features of the so-called periods. The first generation who can be called as the survivors after the 1948 War and who lived through the period of military control between 1948-1966. The second generation can be considered as the group who lived in 1970s and exposed to the changes, which were brought about after the 1967 War. This group has been active in rebuilding the social fabric; especially the intellectuals who are bicultural were the main actors. The third generation who lived their youth in the 1990s are the ones who represent the general atmosphere of the era in 1990s and onwards. The young generation Arab intellectuals who live a bilingual and bicultural life show a great amount of awareness of their circumstances, which has a potential to create tension in their identity definition. With the light of this assumption it is worth to examine their evaluation, role and power in the public sphere to transform society. So the internal and external developments in each period are analyzed in relation with the impacts of these developments on the Arab minority of Israel, especially in terms of identity definition of the group themselves. While a literature survey is used to understand the previous two eras, the last period is analyzed both by the elaboration of the literature and my research results from the interviews.

After elaborating the relevant theories, the research results are presented respectively. The results of the in-depth interviews conducted with the young generation members of the Arab minority in Israel are discussed in detail under various subtitles with their relation to the relevant theories in the fourth chapter. In addition, theories are evaluated by discussing the convergent and divergent aspects of my research results and my own hypotheses.

In the final chapter, the theoretical and analytical framework, the content of the study and the findings of the research are summarized. Main points and arguments discussed in the previous chapters are emphasized and prospects for future studies are developed.

The guiding interview questions can be seen in appendixes part. The list of NGOs and main Arab localities are also put as appendix part as well as the three maps, which show the changing borders since 1948.

1.1. Methodology

1.1.1. Overview on Methodology

I have started to be interested in Israel and Middle East politics during my master degree while I was at the same time a Research Assistant in the Middle East Department of Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Ankara. I found the topic of Arab citizens of Israel very challenging with their position as a minority composed of Muslims and Christians and forming almost one fifth of the whole population of a Jewish State. My curiosity concerning the Arab community living in Israel increased in time as I read and learned more about the characteristics of the group which can be defined as 'a group of minority living in Israel enjoying full citizenship but tied to the Arab world nationally with whom Israel is in a state of war.' Although I have been interested in identity issues before, it became a challenge for me after I started to study on Arab minority in Israel.

Luckily, I was granted an 8-month scholarship from the Israeli Government, to conduct a research on the topic. By this way I had the opportunity to establish a comprehensive outlook on the identity definition of Arab citizens of Israel. I stayed in Israel for 8 months in total, mainly in Tel-Aviv, with two months break during the Operation Defensive Shield, which started in March 2002.[7] The first visit was done

[7] Operation Defensive Shield was a large-scale military incursion conducted by the Israel Defense Forces, in April 2002. It was the largest military operation in the West Bank since the occupation of this territory in 1967. In March 2002, more than 135 Israeli civilians were killed in terror attacks committed by Palestinian factions such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (the "military branch" of Fatah). These attacks reached their peak on March 27 2002, with the event known as the "Passover Massacre", in which a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 28 people at the Park Hotel in Netanya (later, 2 more died from their injuries, raising the death toll to 30). Within twenty-four hours, the IDF had issued emergency call-up notices for 20,000 reserve soldiers, the largest such call-up since the 1982 Lebanon War. The stated goals of the operation (as conveyed to the Israeli Knesset by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on April 8, 2002) were to "enter cities and villages which

between October 2001-March 2002, the second visit took place between June-August 2002. Due to severe security conditions, which had been effective in the region since September 2000 -the start of the *Al-Aksa intifada*-, during my stay I faced many obstacles while conducting my research especially when I had to travel to meet the interviewees.

During the first stages I followed the agenda of the country and tried to observe the attitudes towards the issue of Arab minority in particular. I visited the Arab towns of Acre and Umm Al-Fahm several times. Besides this, I searched the literature and had the chance to talk to the academicians who studied on different aspects of the Arab minority issue at Tel-Aviv University and Hebrew University. Although I could access only English sources, it did not matter seriously since English is widespread in Israel, especially in the academic sphere of both the Jewish and Arab sector. Around 75% of the publications are in English, so my lack of Hebrew was not a disadvantage for the study. But even so, by the help of Israeli friends I used several Hebrew articles translated into English, mainly the ones that appeared in some selected newspapers and periodicals.

The identity problem of the Arab society in Israel has been pronounced very often in different platforms such as conferences at the universities, newspaper articles and publications of NGOs like Adalah and Al-Ittijah[8]. Especially it started to occupy an important place in the national agenda of Israel after the October 2000 events. What are the reasons of the October 2000 events and its impacts on the Arab population were the critical issues in those days. As a result of the research and observations on the issue I constructed the body of the research proposal within the first three months. The research topic is focused mainly on the changing attitudes of

---

have become havens for terrorists; to catch and arrest terrorists and, primarily, their dispatchers and those who finance and support them; to confiscate weapons intended to be used against Israeli citizens; to expose and destroy terrorist facilities and explosives, laboratories, weapons production factories and secret installations. The orders are clear: target and paralyze anyone who takes up weapons and tries to oppose our troops, resists them or endanger them - and to avoid harming the civilian population." (Wikipedia, 2003).

[8] The Adalah is an Arab-run non profit legal center in Israel, which concentrates on protecting the rights of the Arab minority within the state. The Ittijah is an umbrella organization for the Palestinian NGOs in Israel. Currently the Ittijah has 44 member organizations in the Palestinian NGO Sector within Israel.

the Arab community taking into consideration of previous years but putting emphasis on the recent decade. I tried to determine the scope of the study as clearly as possible and decided to take young generation educated Israeli Arabs as the case study group for investigating the approaches in the last decade concerning Arab minority status. Moreover, the changing attitudes of the Arab minority can be better understood from the aspirations and demands of this group, since generally the younger generations are perceived always as the representatives of the changes in human history. By this way, I tried to trace the reflections of the era by analyzing the young generation educated Arabs of Israel.

For a comprehensive understanding of the identity definition of the group, the most appropriate technique would be a qualitative one. I applied in-depth interviews with 9 Arab citizens of Israel who are either graduates of higher education or still students at universities. The existing literature is available for searching the previous generations' definition of identity, so literature survey is used as complementary of the designed study. A comparative analysis investigating the generational differences by applying a survey on the representatives of each generation is beyond the scope of this study. This may be a ground base for a further analysis, which may claim a comparative investigation on the issue.

1.1.2. Assumptions

1. It is obvious that the place of minorities in a state based on the principle of nationality is highly problematic. In this sense, the State of Israel with its Jewish (ethnically and religiously) character constitutes a special case in some respects.

2. The Jews (defined ethnically) and Palestinians in Israel are segregated and separated in all respects: socially, culturally, linguistically, geographically and economically. In addition, relations between them are constricted by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Palestinian citizens of Israel are not formally 'second class' citizens, they are relegated to an inferior status.

3. The identity definitions of the Arabs in Israel have been affected by some turning points that took place in the region up to now such as: 1948 War, 1967 Six Day War, *first intifada,* Peace Process, Gulf War and *second* i*ntifada.* It goes without saying that in some way or another, Arab world has direct or indirect effects on Israeli Arabs from the very beginning.

4. The October 2000 events were an unprecedented reaction. It is argued by most of the Israeli and Arab scholars as 'the explosion of emotions because of years of cumulative discrimination'

5. It is possible to consider three basic generations within Arab minority in Israel: 1st generation who are survived after 1948 War and lived under the military control, the 2nd generation refers to the Arabs who were exposed to the changes after the 1967 War, the 3rd generation refers to the group who were born in the 1970s and have lived through 1990s -the era of *first intifada* after 1987, Peace Process starting in the early 1990s, and *second intifada* started in 2000.

1.1.3. Hypotheses

The Arab minority went through several changes in the recent decade, especially in the post-Oslo period. As a result of the growing impact of Israelization and Palestinization processes, which have been in action simultaneously within the Arab minority in Israel; a new kind of demand on the part of the Arabs of Israel, which has civil and national aspects, has emerged in 1990s. These new aspirations and demands lead to a shift in their identity definitions. Young generation educated Arabs of Israel who have been exposed to these two major processes more than the past generations, are the carriers of this new characteristic of the new era. On the one hand, the new generation intellectuals have more or less succeeded to integrate to the Israeli society, but on the other hand their awareness of their personal/social and collective identity as a Palestinian citizen of Israel is high.

Hypotheses can be summarized as:

1. As far as the identity definition of Arab minority is concerned there is an ongoing influence of internal and regional developments on the group.
2. Younger generation, especially the educated elites, are radical in their identity definition.
3. The changes in the identity definition were strongly influenced in the last ten years after the beginning of Peace Process.
4. There is an increase in awareness regarding both the national aspect and civic aspect of their identity.
5. The young generation educated group is expected to define themselves as 'Palestinians who are Israeli citizens'.

1.1.4. The Framework of Research Question

The aim of this thesis is to explore the tendencies related to identity orientation of young generation educated Arabs who are Israeli citizens. The underlying questions behind this research are: How do the so-called 3rd generation Arab citizens of Israel define their identity and what do they desire for their group? By tracing the answers of these research questions certain realities are illuminated which marked the 1990s and onwards on the Arab minority issue. I also wanted to reveal the aspirations and demands of the case study group on the civic and national grounds. Apart from these, the meaning which they attribute to the *Nakba* memory and their perceptions on the Israeli Jewish society are examined. By making them speak on the issue I questioned to what extent they feel loyalty to the state, moreover to what extent they feel themselves as an integral part of the Israeli society. Identification of the group themselves were questioned by the citizenship and minority rights. Through this analysis, I hope to understand if the tendency is toward compromise or rejection and if they see their future bound to Israel in one way or another. So the interview questions were formulated in accordance with the guiding research questions above.

1.1.5. The Setting and the Research Sample

As it was mentioned before that the first days at the field were very helpful to generate a problem focus out of observations, not only from library research. Therefore, this study is an exploration and not merely a study to find contextual data to verify old theories. Observations were made in all spheres such as: talking with Arab students at the university, following the daily agenda of the country related to the Arab minority, and visiting Arab neighborhoods. The research questions, which were posed initially, formed the basis for the study and further questions were formalized in time. It was an ongoing and dynamic process which was enriched by the observations. Therefore, since I was able to be in the research field, I decided to conduct a research to investigate the issue and I preferred to apply qualitative method of in-depth interviewing. By this way, I would have the opportunity to grasp the first hand information by making the selected group to speak about the research questions.

In this context, I made in-depth interviews with 9 selected Arabs who have higher education from both Christian and Muslim sectors. The place of residences of the respondents is mostly mixed-towns, where Jews and Arabs live together, since the professional activities and universities are located only in the mixed-cities such as Tel-Aviv and Haifa. However, I paid attention also to reach people who come from solely Arab towns. Actually, all the respondents in this group have an experience of living in the mixed-cities whatever their origin is, since they undergone higher education at the Israeli universities in the mixed-cities.

I tried to include as much people as possible as respondent from different professions. Since I was planning to conduct a research with the young generation educated Arabs who are active in the social and economic life of Israel, I talked to people from various categories like NGO leaders or representatives, public figures, professionals and university students. Gender is not a parameter in the study, but there is more or less an equal distribution of male and female respondents in the

research group. The other point which I examined the differences and similarities among the Muslim and Christian Arab respondents. The distribution in terms of religion is also equal.

Before starting the interviews, I made a pilot study with two university students from Haifa and Tel-Aviv. By this way, I tried to develop a critical approach towards my structured guiding questions and a couple of alterations were made as a result of the pilot study. I applied in-depth interviews during my second visit at the site between June and August 2002. The interviews were done in two parts and they were visited at least twice. Although the selected respondents were very willing to cooperate, I had some difficulties to reach some of them and all the interviews were done under the shadow of the terror attacks.

All interviews were recorded and deciphered directly and the transcripts were analyzed through thematic codes on three basic levels: identity definition, minority and citizenship rights.

The purpose of the study is to uncover and describe the participants' perspectives on events and concepts; that is, the subjective view is what matters in this study. Therefore, the interviews are used as the main way of gathering data besides the literature analysis and observations.

The potential concern was the question that: With such a small sample, how could the research be useful? As far as the characteristic of the study group is concerned, that is, the active positions they hold in social, political, financial and administrative realms, applying in-depth interviews to even such a small group can provide considerable amount of valuable information. Moreover, the representativeness of the sample group is high since a lot of effort was put to include different people from different backgrounds. The only common ground between them is that they have higher education and that they are young. Besides, due to the nature of in-depth interview method one can get large amounts of data quickly with the help of the comprehensive interview questions. Therefore, besides collecting general demographic data, more than 70 open-ended questions were asked to the

respondents together with the 7 closed questions. The method, which was applied, complies with the scope and purpose of the study.

1.1.6. Data Collection Method

In-depth interviewing, observation and literature analysis were used as data collection techniques. In addition, some academicians from both Israeli Jewish and Israeli Arab sector who studied on the topic were consulted during the first stages of the study.

In-depth interviewing is used very often as data collection technique in qualitative studies. It is described as 'a conversation with a purpose' by Kahn and Cannel (cited in: Marshall & Rossman; 1995, 80). Patton categorizes interviews into three general types: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide approach and standardized open-ended interview (cited in: Marshall & Rossman; 1995). I used the standardized open-ended interview and systematized the questioning because many participants were interviewed.

Since qualitative in-depth interviews are much more like conversations than formal events with predetermined response categories, I explore a few general topics such as identity definition, minority rights and citizenship structure. By this way, the participants' meaning perspective is uncovered by analyzing how the participant frames and structures the responses. This, in fact, is an assumption fundamental to qualitative research - the participant's perspective on the phenomenon of interest should unfold as the participant views it, not the researcher views it- (Marshall & Rossman; 1995).

I formulated questions on a wide range of topics covering the identity definitions, areas of discrimination, cultural, social and political orientations and daily life experiences. However, the order of the questions was not strictly followed during the interviews. The random conversations of respondents were also taken into consideration in addition to the 'real' answers of the questions like Marshall and

Rossman (1995) argue. The questions which were asked in a general frame at the beginning were asked in a more detailed form in the later phases of the interview. By this way, I tried to catch the 'accurate' evaluations of the respondents as much as possible. This control technique helped very much in terms of the reliability of the study. Since the interviews were conducted in a form of ongoing conversation, immediate follow up and clarification could have been also possible.

Observation is a fundamental and critical method in all qualitative inquiries. It is used to discover complex interactions in natural social settings. Observation is utilized in this study as a complementary strategy. It helped to discover useful insights about the respondents' attitudes. For instance, the respondents who define themselves as 'political' were showing high self-confidence. Similarly their attitudes concerning Israeli Jewish society were understood by their interpretations and comments on the daily life practices. I had the chance to witness their everyday life since the interviews were conducted at the houses or work places of them or public places such as university canteen and restaurants/cafes which they chose to meet. So, I made the interviews mostly in social surrounding of the respondents and I met other people from their environment which gave way to observe part of their lives in natural setting. Combined with observations, interviews allowed me to understand the meanings people hold for their everyday activities.

The interviews were conducted in English. All the respondents were speaking English fluently enough.[9] But the Christians and the Muslims, who went to Christian Arab Private High Schools, have better communication skills in English than the Muslims who went to Muslim Arab State Schools and learned English there.

The in-depth interviewing has also some limitations and weaknesses which I also encountered. In-depth interviewing involves personal interaction so cooperation is essential. Interviewees may be unwilling or uncomfortable sharing all that the interviewer hopes to explore, or they may be unaware of recurring patterns in their lives as Marshall and Rossman (1995) emphasized. In other words, the interviewees may not properly comprehend elements of the conversation. Fortunately, because the

[9] Transcriptions are presented in its original version without any correction.

case study group was highly educated, there had been no serious problems in their cooperation and understanding.

They showed great amount of willingness to cooperate since they think that their status is overlooked on the international basis because of the Palestinian question in the occupied territories and they complain that people outside of this country do not even know that they exist. Therefore they showed even their appreciation that somebody who is neither Jewish nor Arab was conducting a research on their situation. They were ready to tell on any subject related to their status as a Palestinian-Arab minority within a Jewish State. So I had no difficulties in making them to speak or ask for their cooperation on the contrary, as it is the case in the elite interviewing they responded well to inquiries about broad areas of content and high proportion of open-ended questions allowed them the freedom to use their knowledge and imagination. The responses revealed very considerable interpretations in the realm of ideas, concepts and policies.

1.1.7. Demographic Information of the Respondents

Age	Gender	Religion	Place of Residence Duration	Place of Residence of Parents	High school	Education Status of Respondent	Employment status of Respondents	Previous Job
26	Female Suha	Christian	Haifa-mixed city One and a half years	Nazereth Used to be an Arab town but now became a mixed-city	Private Christian-Arab School in Nazereth	Hebrew University. BA, Psychology. MA, Psychology.	Director of NGO - Committee for Educational Guidance	Project basis jobs Research Projects
26	Male Sami	Muslim	Jaffa Part of Tel Aviv – mixed-city 10 years	Lod Mixed-city	Private Christian-(French) Arab School	Tel Aviv University BA, Middle Eastern History& Political Science. MA, Modern Middle Eastern History.	Research Assistant in two different academic projects in TAU.	Clerk in Library at TAU. Helping in grocery shop
29	Male Wadi	Muslim	Haifa-mixed-city Since his birth	Haifa Mixed-city	Christian-Arab State School in Jerusalem	Private College in Haifa Graphic Design	Owner of a café in Haifa Employer of 14 people.	Graphic Designer in an Arab Newspaper -Ittijad
30	Female Falestin	Muslim	Haifa-mixed-city 10 years	Nazereth Used to be an Arab town but now became a mixed-city	Private Christian-Arab School in Nazereth	Haifa University BA, General Literature and Women Studies	Director of NGO – Media Center for Palestinians (Al-Ilam)	NGO – Israeli Commitee for Civil Rights
22	Female Jasmine	Muslim	Tel Aviv Mixed-city 2 years (school times)	Umm-Al-Fahm Homogeneous Arab City	Muslim State Highschool in Umm-al Fahm	Tel Aviv University 2nd Year at Faculty of Social Works	Part-Time Job Interwiever in Arabic	1-Giving courses for secondary stud.
31	Male George	Christian	Nazereth – mixed-city 3-months (for the last ten years in Tel-Aviv)	Nazereth Mixed-city	Half Private Christian School	Tel Aviv University BA, Accounting & Economics	Newly established accounting office	Accountant in a Company
28	Female Raida	Christian	Jerusalem Mixed-City 7 years	Acre Arab dominated town	Private-Christian Arab School	Private College in Haifa Fine Arts	Model-Actress Private Theatre Companies She also plays in TV serials in Hebrew	
27	Female Mira	Christian	Tel Aviv Mixed-City 1 month (before in Haifa,	Haifa Mixed-city	Private-Christian Arab School	RIMON Art & Music School in Tel Aviv	Singer/actress In a private theatre company	
26	Male Salim	Muslim	Jerusalem Mixed-City 3 years	Haifa Mixed-City	Private-Christian Arab School	Hebrew University Pharmacy	Still student	Volunteer in Arab NGO for education

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Citizenship and State: Theories and Approaches

Citizenship is considered to be one of the key components of the state-society relationship both by the perspective of formal democracy that advocates universal citizenship rights and substantial democracy that emphasizes additionally constitutive elements of the citizen such as gender, race, ethnicity, culture, class and identity. Likewise, the advocates for the adoption of universal citizenship in a homogeneous framework or for the implementation of fragmented citizenships in correspondence with the differences and diversities existing in a society all presume a correlation between citizenship and democracy (Cohen; 1999, Kymlicka & Norman; 1994). In this sense, it is significant that citizenship discussions are within the domain of quality of equality, justice and democracy at the national and international levels.

The basic meaning that citizenship refers to is a constitutionality-based relationship between the individual and the state (Delanty; 1997). Yet, there are aspects to this relationship. The early studies on citizenship, for example, have primarily focused on the 'rights' model of state-citizen relationship. In his classical study, which was originally published in 1950, T.H. Marshall (1965) historicized the development of citizenship with the introduction of civil rights in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century and social rights in the 20th century. These three stages in the formation of modern citizenship signify a division of the citizenship into elements: civil, political and social. *Civil citizenship* refers to the scope of individual freedom and security (such as the rights to property, personal liberty, and justice)

institutionalized in a system for the rule of law. This stage emerged in the wake of the French Revolution as a liberal conception of the state. *Political citizenship* is the second stage and refers to participation in the political arena, such as the right to vote and to be elected to positions in political institutions and it was introduced in the nineteenth century. The final stage in Marshall's model is *social citizenship,* which encompasses rights to social security and welfare both closely linked to mechanism of economic redistribution. This dimension of citizenship was on the political center stage of European countries in the twentieth century.[10]

Recently, the concept of citizenship has been stretched in new directions in the post-industrial era. *Cultural citizenship, global citizenship* and even *ecological citizenship* have been introduced by different scholars with references to the challenges of contemporary world. Turner (2000) asserts, "Citizenship is not simply about class and capitalism, but it also involves debates about the social rights of women, children, the elderly and even animals". Turner's point is that citizenship as a membership institution cannot easily extend protection and care to "nonmembers" within the community. This approach can be viewed as presenting challenges to the contemporary citizenship theory from a perspective of universal human rights.

Especially with the development of identity politics after the 1980s, citizenship became to be accepted also as an identity that is membership to one or more political communities based on race, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession and sexuality (Kymlicka & Norman; 1994, 369). Simultaneously, it has been increasingly acknowledged that the health and stability of a democracy is correlated to the capacities, responsibilities and willingness to cooperate of the citizens, in other words, the civic virtue that the citizens possess and perform (Kymlicka & Norman; 1994, 352). As a requisite for the quality of democracy, responsible citizenship is argued to entail four virtues (Galston; 1991): general virtues (courage, law-abidingness, loyalty), social virtues (independence, open-mindedness), economic virtues (work ethic, capacity to delay self gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change) and political virtues (capacity to

[10] This way of organizing political development conceptually is characteristic of many studies of modernization and nation-building written mostly in the 1960s and 1970s. See for example, Bendix (1977) and Rokkan (1975).

respect others, willingness to demand what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse). The sense of identity that citizens have, their maneuvers to deal with competing identities, their willingness to participate in collective decisions and access to political processes, their sense of belonging to the social, political and economic order and their initiative potency all refer to different features of the civic virtue (Kymlicka & Norman; 1994, 352).

Basically, the three aspects of citizenship -legal status, identity and civic virtue- are interrelated to each other like as the sensitivity for identities increase, demands for legal rights increase correspondingly (Kymlicka & Norman; 2000). In another perspective, it is also argued that the three components of citizenship conflict each other under certain circumstances (Cohen; 1999). Yet, the dynamics of interaction between the three aspects are rather ambiguous and need further empirical data. In this regard, an investigation on citizenship needs to shed light on the correlations and divergences existing in the interaction between the aspects of legal rights, identity and civic virtue.

In the conceptualization of citizenship, the nation-state functions as the space, the territorial unit on which citizenship is triggered (Delanty; 1997, Cohen; 1999). Under the impact of globalization, not only nation-state, which rests on the myth of one nation and one state, is getting obsolete (Held; 1995) but also citizenship as belonging to a nation or belonging to a state is becoming intricate (Hammar; 1986). As the claims for substantive aspects of citizenship like ethnicity, gender, class, culture gain weight in response to uncertainty and insecurity that globalization bring about (Giddens; 1991), citizenship can be perceived to be getting fragmented (Delanty; 1997). In other words, as claims that call for diversity within societies to be recognized increase, universal citizenship rights fall short of grasping diversity. The status of the minority groups in multicultural societies imposes a constraint on universal citizenship and furthermore challenges the interaction between the legal, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship. Minority issues; including immigrant groups and homeland minorities can be considered to be contributors of fragmentation of citizenship and the nation states. Citizenship, at this point, seems to

be an arena where both the problems and the resolutions of cultural diversity are manifested.

The State and structure of nation building is directly related with the operation of citizenship therefore the discussion on state-citizenship relation may be helpful at this point. State and nation building involves basically the establishment of political institutions with monopolized into that polity. The structure of citizenship relations is a key factor in these processes, not only from the perspective of individual rights, but also from the perspective of state's capacity to create political loyalties and manage communal conflicts. As Bendix (1977) and Rokkan (1975) have demonstrated, successful nation building can be understood as the gradual extension of citizenship rights both in scope and inclusiveness.

The potential applicability of a citizenship-based approach to various social categories seems to be almost unlimited. However within the Middle Eastern context the issue requires to be analyzed differently since it constitutes a different historical development. Most of the advanced industrial countries had reached a level of nation building as defined by Marshall's final stage by the 1960s or 1970s. Therefore extending citizenship rights and reach another level is a European (Western) discussion. As it was mentioned, according to Marshall's approach each new sequence of social integration builds on the former. Social citizenship is inconceivable without an established political citizenship (and an industrial economy), and political citizenship presupposes civil citizenship. Progressive ideas of extending citizenship rights beyond the Marshallian model are based on the assumption that civil, political, and social rights are historically secured beyond doubt, at least in principle, and can be taken for granted as important elements for further advancements (Butenschon; 2000). This assumption is, however not applicable without important qualifications in the context of Middle Eastern political history or if applied to many other regions of the world. This point is emphasized by Hinnebusch (2000, 130) "In the Middle East, the 'premature' granting of socioeconomic rights – before the industrial take off - means that current democratization there is likely to be accompanied by the *opposite* of the Western experience – not the *expansion,* but the *reversal* of such rights."

In order to locate the question of citizenship more precisely in the process of state and nation building, Butenschon (2000) suggests a typology of normative principles for constituting political communities within state territories. It may be helpful to answer questions: Who are considered legitimate members of the collectivity that is to be organized within the jurisdiction of the state? How does the state relate to fragmented identities and group conflicts, to individuals or groups who reject the legitimacy of state authority, and to individuals or groups who are not considered legitimate members of the state (or national) community? The conceptions have been put forward by Butenschon as, *singularism, pluralism* and *universalism* to understand the relationship between state and citizenship.

Singularism refers to the idea that the state community is constituted by a single and specific collective identity, and that the state is the embodiment of that identity. He argues that, this principle can be found as the basis of authority and political organization in a number of Middle Eastern states. For instance in Saudi Arabia case; a tribal principle of paternalistic kinship norms, consultative practices, Islamic law, and neofeudal royal patronage are applied to secure political hegemony by the constituent family, the Saudis. Israel is an example where the principle of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by law of blood) forms the overriding mechanism in the process of Jewish state building in Palestine. This mechanism – as operationalized in a set of laws, regulations and implementing agencies – contributes effectively to Jewish control over territory and political institutions by excluding non-Jews from access and effective participation in centers of power (Butenschon; 2000).

In his classification, almost all of Middle Eastern countries constitute a singularism model. It is for sure that singularism as a state-building principle is not unique to Middle Eastern countries only. As Brubaker (1996) shows the European states that emerged from the disintegration of Ottoman, Hapsburg, and Romanov empires in the interwar period (1918-1945) in Europe were founded on this basis. In Brubaker's term it is called as *nationalizing states.* This pattern seemed to repeat itself in the 1990s in countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Butenschon argues that Brubaker's definition of

nationalizing states fits the category of ethnocratic singularism. The difference is Brubaker's definition takes its empirical references mostly from Eastern Europe but the Butenschon's definition of ethnocracy is a generalization of observed patterns in the Middle Eastern context. In this sense, in terms of regime categorization of the states in the Middle East Butenschon (2000), classifies Saudi Arabia as a dynastic state, Turkey and Israel as ethnocracies and contemporary Iran as a theocracy.

A clarification should be made on his categorization of Turkey and Israel as ethnocracies. There is a very important difference between these two cases and it has important consequences on the level of the two states' ethnic policies. Israel is founded on the idea that all Jews of the world in principle belong to the "Land of the Jews" (Eretz Israel) and that the historic mission of modern Jewish nationalism (Zionism) is to territorialize the world Jewry (ingathering the exiles). However, modern Turkish nationalism (Kemalism) seeks to integrate and homogenize the entire population of Turkey on the basis of a modernized conception of Turkishness (Kirişçi; 1998). In other words, Israel does not intend to integrate or assimilate the indigenous non-Jewish population of Palestine into the core national collective but Kemalist nation building precludes any ethnonational differentiation within the borders of Turkey.

Pluralism in this context refers to a conception of the national community as composed of separate subgroups, without programmatic predominance accorded to any of these groups. The role of the state in plural systems is not to promote a specific communal identity, but to facilitate politics of compromise that give the different groups a fair stay in the political decision-making processes. In the theoretical literature Lijphart (1977) introduced such principles of government as *consociationalism*. Lijphart wanted to demonstrate that intergroup conflict and political instability is not necessarily a characteristic feature of plural (socio-culturally fragmented) societies. The empirical reference for this could be smaller continental European democracies such as Holland, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. None of these countries is homogeneous, but every one is relatively democratic and stable. The critical factor in this model is that the segments have been able to agree upon a power-sharing formula based on the specific historical

experiences and structural characteristics of the country. Therefore for this model, the individual member of the society is accorded his or her legal status by virtue of belonging to a specific group thus citizenship becomes in effect an 'indirect' relationship between a citizen and the state. Because group affiliation determines the nature of that individual's relationship to the state.

According to Lijphart (1977, 129) Israel is a semiconsociationalism democracy. His presentation of Israel as a "semiconsociationalism democracy" is indeed questionable in terms of definitions and distinctions. Semiconsociationalism refers specifically to the relative institutional autonomy of the Jewish Orthodox community in Israel and the customary rule of including minority religious parties in governmental coalitions. The reason of this evaluation might be in Butenschon's (2000) word: "he [Lijphart] restricts himself to an analysis of the Jewish society in Israel because the Palestinian population falls outside what is generally considered in Israel to be the national community". In Middle Eastern context, Lebanon is the best-known example of a political system based on power sharing, in important ways closely related to Lijphart's model. There is no agreement whether consociationalism in Lebanon has been a success story or failure, or both. There are criticisms that this implementation has features consistent with ethnocracy (Maktabi; 2000), however it may be seen as an attempt of consociationalism in the Middle Eastern context.

Universalism refers to the normative presumption that the group-specific identities within a political community are irrelevant when it comes to each individual member's status and rights vis-à-vis the state. The political community constitutes the universe within which every adult is considered equal. This is clearly an expression of the classical model of democratic citizenship and is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948.[11] One should notice here an important difference between human rights and citizenship. Turner puts this distinction as follows:

[11] Universal Declaration of Human Rights addresses the question of citizenship by asserting following: "everyone has the right to a nationality (Article 15 (1)). No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality (Article 15 (2)). Note that nationality here refers to citizenship (UN website, http://www.un.org).

> In general citizenship is a set of rights and obligations that attach to members of formally recognized nation-states within the system of nations; hence it corresponds to legal membership of a nation-state. Citizenship identities and citizenship cultures are national identities and national cultures (Turner; 2000, 39).

One can explore the scope of citizenship studies through an examination of identity, civic virtue, and community as it was discussed before. Citizenship involves the institutionalization of political and social rights within the juridical framework of the nation state; it often produces important tensions, between social and human rights. Because social rights are national and human rights are global. Marshall's theory is explained above is an analysis of the relationships between social class, welfare and citizenship. He did not incorporate ethnic and religious differences into its study of modern citizenship.

From a sociological point of view the institutions of citizenship and social identity, the nature of inequality and access to socio-economic resources are the critical issues. In this context citizenship constitutes a very critical place since it controls the access of individuals and groups to scarce resources. If the legal rights and the obligations are institutionalized as formal status positions, they give people formal entitlements to scarce resources in society. Resources here mean traditional economic resources of housing, health, income and employment and also cultural resources such as education, knowledge, religion and language. In light of this analysis, it is possible to consider three categories of rights in general: economic, social and political rights. Turner (2000) asserts that these rights may be collectively referred to as social rights as distinct from human rights because they typically presuppose membership of a nation state.

As it was mentioned, the important aspect of citizenship is that it controls access to scarce resources of society. Weber's definition of social closure can be helpful at this point (Parkin; 1979). He defines social closure as an elementary form of group solidarity, producing an inevitable alienation and stigmatization of "outsiders". In this sense citizenship constitutes an important position in terms of belonging of marginal communities in an ethnically plural societies. As an essential ingredient of liberal democracy citizenship would have to include some notion of

egalitarian openness to differences and otherness. In addition to a legal status citizenship constitutes particular cultural identity on individuals and groups. Citizenship struggles in late 20th century society were often about claims to cultural identity and cultural history. These struggles were about sexual identity, gay rights and gender equality. Most debates about citizenship in contemporary political theory are about the question of contested collective identity in a context of radical pluralization (Mouffe; 1992). In other words cultural dimension of citizenship is now an essential component of citizenship studies.

Another aspect of citizenship is the idea of a political community as the basis of the citizenship. Political community here refers to nation states. Turner explains this as follows: 'When individuals become citizens, they not only enter into a set of institutions that confer upon them rights and obligations, acquire an identity, and are socialized into civic virtues, but they also become members of a political community with a particular territory and history' (Turner; 2000, 39).

Turner (2000) discusses that there are different types of citizenship and each of them holds different levels of involvement in the public domain. His category of *active citizenship* refers to a formal and legal definition of political membership but it also involves a civic culture within which there is a strong sense of moral obligation and commitment to society. Active citizenship is a positive involvement in the affairs of the public arena in defense of democracy. It is also because a successful democracy requires citizens to be active and involved in politics. Active citizenship came into being by French Revolution. The Palestinian struggles both inside and outside Israel present a case of active citizenship struggles over rights, a relatively secular ideology of egalitarian membership, and an understanding of the importance of participatory associations.

The Zionist movement, which had been in action since the late 19th century is also an active struggle for citizenship, based on the colonization and occupation of a hostile social and geographical terrain. It can be viewed as an active citizenship case on the one hand but on the other hand it also carries conflicts in itself when it comes to its relation with democracy. Actually this conflictual and problematic nature of its

relationship with democracy prevents us to evaluate the Israeli case as the best example for active citizenship.

> Its [Israel's] struggle with the British and then the Arabs had egalitarian and participatory consequences, but the secular and emancipatory elements of its socialist doctrines were constrained and undermined by the paradox that the Israeli claim to the land its ultimate based in religious mythology and lore. Thus the impact of conservative and orthodox Jewish elements has produced a highly particularistic and indeed racist definition of political membership (Turner; 2000, 47).

The two words national and citizen are often used as synonyms but actually they refer to different meanings. The word *national* as used in international law does not indicate the ethnic origin of the person. For instance, a Palestinian Arab can be an Israeli national in terms of citizenship.[12] Eide asserts that,

> In nonlegal contexts, nationality is used to denote an ethnonational identity. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka claim that the Tamils there constitute "a nation without a state"; Kurds similarly claim that they form a "nation without a state," and their members would then define themselves to be of Tamil or Kurdish "nationality" (Eide; 2000, 91).

So, given the distinction between "nationality" and "citizenship" it is possible for two individuals or of two constituencies to be of the same nationality yet unequal citizens of the same state; just as it is possible for the same to be of different nationalities and unequal citizens of the same state.

The general approach was that when the territory was the subject of a change of sovereignty, the inhabitants of the territory were presumed automatically to become the nationals of the new sovereign. Gradually, however, it was accepted that if such people refused to accept the new nationality, they could keep their previous one, but this would often require that they leave the transferred territory. What happened with Palestinians after the establishment of Israel in 1948 was that they became citizens under the new sovereign Jewish state.

Ethnonationalist preferences which means expressing selectivity in subsequent allocation of citizenship, which is given by preference to persons of the

[12] For example, the European Convention on Nationality, Article 2, Definitions, reads: "For the purpose of this Convention: 'nationality' means the legal bond between a person and a state and does not indicate the person's ethnic origin." (http://www.un.org).

same ethnic group, even to the extent that some of them are offered a direct and immediate right to citizenship (Germany, Israel), whereas others at best have to go through long and difficult processes of naturalization and in some places do not obtain citizenship even if they have lived within the territory for generations. Ethnonationalists are concerned with the substantive content of citizenship but especially with its function as criteria for exclusion. In some cases, they also make use of differentiation in the content of citizenship, reserving the broadest rights to those persons belonging to the hegemonic ethnic groups but presenting a more narrow set of rights to the others. Israel is one of the clearest cases in this point, but certainly not the only one.

Generally, for the new citizens who are added after the state has been established, the principle of *jus soli* is applied for acquiring citizenship. *Jus soli* refers to the acquisition of citizenship by everyone born on the territory. The states that adopted ethnonationalist approach tend to use the principle of *jus sanguinis*. It refers to the right to citizenship, which is limited to the children of those who are already citizens. Moderate forms of ethnonationalism have flexible combinations of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*: they make it a nearly absolute right for persons who are born in the country to obtain citizenship on request when they reach maturity, provided they in the meantime have had a period of uninterrupted residence. Most of these forms also allow for the naturalization of other persons after a period of residence. A few *jus sanguinis* countries such as Germany and Switzerland do not extend an automatic right to citizenship to anyone solely on the basis of long residence. There are people in those countries who belong to the second generation or third generation after immigration and unable to obtain citizenship.

As Kook points out, citizenship began to be considered as "a vehicle for minority advancement" in the last decades. She advocates 'different minority groups, who share the citizenship status started to channel their demands for increased inclusion, through the defining concepts and criteria of citizenship' (Kook; 2000, 269). The question, which might emerge following this argument, would be whether citizenship has the capacity to overcome social inequalities that manifest themselves in different forms of cultural or national disparity.

In this context, liberal approach has been criticized that it fails to account for the existence of differences within society and its insufficiency to accommodate these differences into a general shared identity. So it is argued that increasingly different types of groups feel excluded from society and from the institution of citizenship not because of their socioeconomic identity, but because of their sociocultural identity – or rather, difference (Kymlicka; 1995). Citizenship, she argues, should take account of these differences and a shared citizenship can only be a differentiated one. In this sense, alternative citizenship strategies emerged in the literature. One of the conceptions which has been discussed is the recognition of cultural rights alongside individual rights. This idea posits, simply, that separate and distinct cultural groups within the state deserve special rights as a group in addition to the basic rights they enjoy as individual citizens of the state.

2.1.1 Citizenship in Israeli Context

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 the Palestinian people acquired hyphenated citizenships in legal terms such as Israeli-Palestinians, Jordanian-Palestinians, United Nations Relief and Works Agency-Palestinians and Gaza-Palestinians[13]. In order to understand the status of Palestinians who became Israeli citizens after 1948, how Israel defines citizenship should be clarified. Kook (2000) argues that because of the way in which citizenship is defined in Israel, its capacity to overcome social inequalities is limited. The reason for this is that ethnonational structures of inequality have been defined into the institutions of citizenship, and leaves it ineffective as a political and social equalizer.

The definition of Israel's national identity determines Israeli citizenship. The constitutive role of the "nation" should be discussed to understand how citizenship operates in the country. Israel is a nation state and was established as a state for a specific nation, the Jewish nation. There are no consociational arrangements. For

[13] The term Palestinian used here is meant to include all people who enjoyed Palestinian citizenship form 1925 until 1948. Since 1948 segregation began between Jewish-Palestinians and non-Jewish-Palestinians. So Palestinian here means the non-Jewish-Palestinians.

example there is not any arrangement to negotiate political power between different national groups; there are no regions that have an autonomous or semiautonomous status. Actually the citizenry of Israel is made up of more than one nation (Arabs and Jews mainly) and in certain ways this is acknowledged by the Israeli authorities. For instance there are two official languages; Hebrew and Arabic and two parallel educational systems for its Jewish and Arab citizens. The state also distinguishes between nationalities in its public registration. On Israeli ID cards there is designation for nationality: "Jewish", "Arab", "Druze" or countries of origin for non-Jewish who are non-Arabs. Therefore in implementation it is considered to be more than one nation however there is no evidence of power sharing by recognizing collective national groups in legal terms.

Israel was conceived of both ideologically and politically as a Jewish State. This feature is reflected in the Citizenship Law of Israel as a state for the Jews. It was from the beginning formally inclusionary only toward Jews. It attempted to establish a polity and state culture that promotes a Jewish political and cultural identity. Its identification between religion and nationality manifests the maintenance of Israel as a Jewish state. In this sense, *Judaism* determines the religious identity but it also constitutes the basis for national, political and cultural identity in Israel. At the same time, Israel defines itself as a democracy and is committed to certain universalistic criteria. As soon as, it declared its independence it imposed citizenship to the 150.000 Palestinian-Arab who remained within the territory of Israel. In addition to this, implementation of separate educational and court system can be given as an evidence of tolerance and normative pluralism. If the resources and standards among the two groups would have been equal than this would have been the truth but the implementation of legal procedures gave preference to the Jewish nationals. It is argued by Rebecca Kook that the social inequality is caused by the citizenship itself. She expresses it as follows:

> In Israel we find a good example of a case where citizenship does not necessarily serve as an inclusionary mechanism and where citizenship is actually incapable of seriously combating the structures of social inequality. Indeed, citizenship itself, its content and parameters, embody the structure of social inequality (Kook, 2000, 266).

According to Israeli Nationality Law, which was enacted in 1952, every Jew who immigrated to Israel, was granted 'immediate' Israeli citizenship without taking any formal steps. But on the other hand, the law requires those non-Jewish residents who are mostly Christian and Muslim Arabs, to go through the process of "naturalization" to obtain Israeli citizenship (Kassim; 2000).

In order to define the legal situation for citizenship acquisition in Israel an example may be helpful. A Russian Jew, for instance, who immigrates to Israel, will be "immediately" granted citizenship. The new immigrant, or an *oleh* as the law calls him, is not required to take any action. He is not even required to apply for citizenship or to declare that he intends to reside in Israel. Before the law, he is "returning home". The principle of "return" and the necessary procedures are codified in the Law of Return and the Nationality Law. The Law of Return is legally an immigration law. However, the "right of return" as described in that law has been incorporated in the Nationality Law. Consequently, there are two different kinds of Israeli: Israeli by return (Jewish), Israeli by residence, birth, and naturalization (Palestinian-Arab). This preferential treatment is reflected in several other legal areas of life. As it will be pointed out in detail in Chapter 3, according to the 1985 amendment of the Basic Law, in order to run for elections in Israel, a political party should adopt that "State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people". In this context, there are barriers in front of the political representativeness of the Arab community as a national collectivity and seeking equality as a group of citizens. This situation is the outcome of the legal structure of the state.

Uri Davis, an Israeli scholar defines the situation of Arab minority in terms of citizenship as follows:

> The Palestinian citizens of Israel…have "passport citizenship" rights… but they are denied equal "democratic citizenship"…While enjoying equal access to the courts of law and to private property (civil rights), as well as to the ballot and to government (political rights), they are denied equal rights to social security, education and welfare (social rights), and to the land and water resources of the State (economic rights) (Davis; 1995, 28).

The last decade especially since the 1996 national elections there emerged changes in demands of some of the new Palestinian-Arab groups. Previous election

campaigns were carried out to fight for equality within the parameters of citizenship. Actually this reflected the belief among Palestinians that Israeli citizenship potentially has the capacity to implement equality for the Arab minority. Many of the newly established parties and groups show a distinct departure from this way of thinking: equality was now seen as attainable only through a redefinition of citizenship in Israel or through the formal recognition of the Palestinians as a national minority. However as Kymlicka (1995) demonstrated, demands for autonomy on behalf of national minorities invariably pose a threat to the stability and integrative function of political communities. 'The tentative conclusion would therefore be that demands of national minorities that reflect sincere dissatisfaction with the state will ultimately engender demands for the redefinition of citizenship' (Kook; 2000, 287).[14]

As to summarize, Israeli Palestinians are now strictly legal citizens of the state of Israel, but they are not equal to the Jewish Israelis. In other words according to Orwellian doctrine, the citizens of the State of Israel are all equal, but some are more equal than others. Jewish Israelis are more equal than Israeli Palestinians. This segregation is codified in Israeli laws and evidenced in Israeli official practices (Kretzmer; 1987).

2.2. Identity Formations: Theories and Approaches

In the contemporary world fundamental changes have occurred in the nature of the individuals' relationship with society. These are indicated by the use of such terms as pre-modern, modern, late modern and post-modern together with the introduction of notion of globalization in the second half of the 20th century. Parallel to these changes the notion of the identity of the subject underwent radical revisions. The enlightenment assumed the existence of the pure individual who was the principal subject of history. In the 20th century the individual was assumed the creation of society and parallel to this, identity was assumed to be socially created.

[14] The response of the Israeli side to this argument was discussed in Chapter 4.

However in the present era, which is widespreadly called as late-modern or post-modern period, identity is not conceived as clear and monolithical concept. The notion, which dominates the era regarding identity, is multiple identities and de-centered subject defining their self-hood only through a belief in a personal narrative (Hall & Gieban; 1992).

In this sense there have always been various kinds of sources of identification. These sources of identifications are mainly self-generated subjective identifications. Either individuals make them spontaneously or they stem from the most local locations in life. These variables of identification can be considered as family relations, birth position in the family, sexual preference etc. Self-identification is not only a simple rational calculation but is deeply implicated in emotional attachments and subjective preferences. In addition to this, identifications are influenced by the discursive context in which people find themselves. Pervasive narratives that surround people give shape to their perceptions and understanding of the world. Although identifications invite specifications of the agents that do the identifying, as Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 16) put it 'identification does not require a specifiable identifier, it can be pervasive and influential without being accomplished by discrete, specified persons or institutions. Identification can be carried more or less anonymously by discourses or public narratives.' Therefore narrative is central to identity formation. By narratives the identities can be constructed, maintained or reconstructed in some occasions. Margeret Sommers put the centrality of narrativity in the identity formations as follows:

> It is through narrativity that we come to know, understand and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities… All of us come to *be* who we *are* (however ephemeral, multiple and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives *rarely of our own making* (Sommers; 1994, 606)

Each individual's identity is made up of a number of elements. These factors include allegiance to a religious tradition, to a nationality, to an ethnic community, to a social class, sometimes to an institution or profession. As a matter of fact, the allegiances list is much longer. A person may feel relatively strong attachment to a province, a village, a clan, a profession team or one can feel very connected with a

sports team, a union or a community of people who have the same preferences and demands. In this sense, there are various parameters of identity definitions. Since the identity of a person is made up of a number of elements so various parameters are in action in shaping the identity definition of a person.

The components of identity have certain features and each of them creates a sense of belonging to a certain realm of life. We can assume that among the affiliations of an individual some of the allegiances may have central importance while others have relatively weak importance. Although it is not argued that there is a rigid hierarchy among the components, constituency of basic categories such as *ethnic* and *national* can be considered as the powerful elements in shaping the identity of a person or group. It should also be noted that this could change from person to person or from group to group under certain circumstances and priorities may change over time under the affect of the social and historical context.

Amin Maalouf in his recent book 'In the Name of Identity' expresses that, an individual does not have one overriding affiliation that constitutes his identity in every circumstances rather the social and historical context determines which of the component of the identity would have the priority. He asserts in a very simple way that 'where people feel their faith is threatened, it is their religious affiliation that seems to reflect their whole identity. But if their mother tongue or their ethnic group is in danger, then they fight ferociously against their own co-religionists' (Maalouf; 2001, 13). This means that while there is a certain hierarchy among the elements that make up individual identities, that hierarchy is not immutable; it changes with time and brings about fundamental changes in behaviours.

Among the components and conceptualizations of identity formations, the ethnic and national identities continue to occupy a very important place in the social arena with their changing face. Ethnic identity can be considered as a primary identity similar to the Harold Isaacs' suggestion (1975), which portrays ethnic identities as 'basic group identity'. Besides, ethnicity and nationalism is not vanishing as part of an obsolete traditional order. As Craig Calhoun (1993) argues ethnic and national attachments are modern set of categorical identities invoked by

elites and other participants in political and social struggles. In his view these categorical identities also shape everyday life, offering both tools for grasping pre-existing homogeneity and difference and for constructing specific versions of such identities. It should be noted here that national and ethnic ties are not separately different concepts, they have certain differences but there is a common ground. Calhoun defines nationalism for instance as a 'pre-eminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by reference to "the people" of a country' (1993, 211). Ethnic identities are defined in most cases as groups who do not seek "national autonomy" but rather an internal recognition or a crosscutting recognition in national and international spheres. Regardless of the differences, which are attributed by different perspectives, these two sorts of identities are often invoked in similar ways.

In this sense while investigating identity in national and ethnic levels the literature, which attempts to explain ethnic identity construction and have prevalent since the 1960s can be helpful to understand the basis of the identity formations. Much of the sociological debate about ethnicity and race is revolved around two approaches. One of them is primordialism which argues "assumed givens" of social existence that are fixed determine the identity. The other approach is circumstantialism, which supports the idea that ethnic identity is fluid and changeable. Despite their defending of contrary arguments these two perspectives carry great amount of clues why ethnic identities survived, how they are constructed and under which conditions can they transform. So one should perceive them as complementary arguments and keep in mind that both of the approaches have certain strengths and weaknesses.

2.2.1. Ethnic Identity Formation Trends in the Early 20th Century

Before explaining the arguments of primordialism and circumstantialism it would be illuminating to mention the trends at the beginning of 20th century. From the mid-19th century till early 20th century social Darwinism was the major approach in social arena. It was viewing human behavior as deeply rooted in biology. Since the

first decades of the 20th century a serious and systematic reconsideration of the biological and genetic theories has occurred. Franz Boas was one of the key figures in the reconsideration of biological models of ethnicity and race. He adopts the perspective that culture was far more involved than biology in explaining how different peoples behaved and why some did better than others economically. Following this, during the first decades of the century the assimilationist model prevailed (Cornell & Hartman; 1998).

The defenders of assimilationist model were the scholars of Chicago School of Sociology. W.I. Thomas, Robert Park and others suggested that human behaviour is rooted in culture and may change via social influence. They were mainly dealing with questions such as: what happened to the immigrant groups in America? What sorts of adjustments did they make to the society they had entered? What happened to the identities they brought with them? How did the larger society adjusted to them? Park developed a theory on race relations arguing that immigrant groups, ethnic or racial populations more generally went through a series of phases as they gradually melted into the larger society. These phases were contact, competition and conflict, accommodation and ultimately assimilation. In the final phase, group members "acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups and by sharing their experience and history are incorporated with them in a common cultural life' (cited in: Cornell & Hartman; 1998, 43).

Assimilationist approach views ethnicity mostly as a cultural phenomenon and posed a socially and culturally rooted ethnic dynamic. In their view ethnicity constitutes a variable and contingent nature so they argue that it could change. They projected a general process of assimilation, a process in which minority identities eventually would disappear. Ethnic and even racial groups would be integrated into majority society's institutions and culture. They propose a universalistic model on the issue. It was conceived that ethnic ties within ethnic groups are getting weaker and ethnicity will decline in importance by the time. In other words, it was projected that as a result of process of assimilation minority identities eventually will disappear.

However what had been seen on the contrary to this argument was that; rather than disappearing or getting weaker ethnic and minority identities began to constitute greater importance. The misprojection of the assimilationist model was evidenced as a result of two major world developments which occurred after the 1940s. As Cornell and Hartman (1998) argue one of the developments was the postindependence experience of the new nations after the colonial era. The newly established states in Asia and Africa which were formerly European colonies experienced a great deal of ethnic and regional reawakening. As the colonial power loosened ethnic, kinship, regional and religious ties began to gain importance, in some occasions even leading to ethnic conflicts. The other evidence was the experience which industrial states underwent. By the 1970s the ethnic and racial identities reasserted themselves across the globe. So the expectation of ethnicity's imminent, eventual, or ultimate demise did not occur. The nation-building of the Third World and the nation-maintaining of First World experienced the increase in ethnic and racial claims. So alternative approaches emerged within the second half of the 20th century; primordialist and circumstantialist views to understand how ethnicity construction and maintenance take place.

2.2.2. Primordialism: Fixed Identities

The basic claim of primordialism is that ethnicity is fixed, fundamental and rooted in unchangeable circumstances of birth. It continues to exist because it is basic to human life and 'given' by the facts of birth. This approach, which is categorized as a sociocultural view was first introduced by Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz in 1960s (Cornell & Hartman; 1998). They pointed to the fact that primordial ties continue to constitute a groundbase for the social relations in the modern world.

As it was mentioned partly above, the basic argument of the assimilationist model was that as a result of the steady progress of rationality and science which are the features of modern era, the small-scale, face to face human communities were likely to dissolve. On the contrary to this argument, primordialist view defends the value and strength of the primordial ties. Shils (1957) elaborated Tönnies' distinction

which was put forward in 1887 as *Gemeinschaft* (small-scale, affective and intensely solidary) and *Gesellschaft* (expedient, individualistic, more rational and voluntary) forms of society and concluded that in modern society *Gemeinschaft* model continues to be the prominent form of society.

> Modern society… is no *Geselschaft*, soulless, egoistical, loveless, faithless, utterly impersonal and lacking any integrative forces other than interest or coercion. It is held together by an infinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense which is low in many, high in some, moderate in most persons. (Shils; 1957, 131)

Both Shils and Geertz acknowledged the human need for communities of interaction and meaning based on something other than rational utilitarian interest. They focus on the intense and internal aspects of ethnic group solidarity, the subjective "feeling of belonging" that is often associated with racial or ethnic group membership (Cornell & Hartman; 1998). Geertz asserts that:

> Congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of them. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessarily, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great party by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The strength of these such primordial bonds, and types of them that are, important different from one person to person, from society to society and from time to time (Geertz; 1963, 109)

The ethnic conflicts, which occurred in the history of the world, are evidences of the power of the primordial ties. Because ethnic attachments often carry a powerful emotional charge and can compel a high degree of commitment from group members (Cornell & Hartman; 1998). This means that ethnic and racial identities have a capacity to arouse the emotions and may have very crucial role under certain circumstances.

Ethnic attachments also constitute a very important role functionally in the modern era. The need to belong is satisfied by way of primordial ties in industrial societies. However it should be noted that although the primordial ties have a positive effect in terms of satisfying the need to belong it is not the actual circumstances of birth that are important in this context. Perception and attribution are more important than the presence or absence of a genuine blood connection

(Cornell & Hartman; 1998). Geertz pointed out this aspect as follows: "By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens'- or more precisely, as culture is inevitable involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens'- of social existence" (Geertz; 1963, 109). Thus, both the primordiality of ethnicity and the emotional charge it often carries lie not in the "givens" of social life but in the significance group members attach to them (Cornell & Hartman; 1998). In other words, the focus is not on the blood ties in this analysis, identity is considered to be created as a result of blood ties and power given to it in the end.

Following the primordialist theories of Geertz and Shils a new version of primordialism has been put forward which has a sociobiological perception in 1970s by Harold Isaacs. This version of primordialism asserts the givenness of ethnic and racial identities and accepts a common understanding of that givenness in many societies and within many ethnic and racial populations. Isaacs views ethnic attachments and characteristics as basic, enduring and somehow natural (Cornell & Hartman, 1998). As it is mentioned before in Isaac's view ethnic identity constitutes a 'basic group identity'. He defines it as follows: 'basic group identity consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born at that given time in that given place' (Isaacs; 1975, 38).

In Isaacs' view belongingness and the quality of self-esteem have important constitutive role in every individual's life and experience. Apart from these, there are eight elements, which directly have affect on basic group identity. Their relationship with one another determines characteristic of the basic group identity.

One of these eight elements is the physical body including size, shape, skin color etc. To a certain degree this makes the identity of a person visible. The second one is the name which helps to distinguish people according to their origin and has permanency and also in most of the occasions indicates the gender. The history and origin of the group one is born into constitutes a very important element that has power to shape the identity structure. One's nationality is also a very crucial aspect of identity formation. The other element is the language which a person first to learn

as a mother tongue. Language carries the characteristics of the culture which is shared by those speakers therefore it is very significant. Another element is religion which has an affect in person's identity definition. Shared religion brings about certain similarities and cultural aspects to one's life and can be considered as the biggest sphere of identity since it comprises great number of people across the globe. Culture is the other element which determines the one's way of life to a great extent. The last element is the geography which one was born in. Territorial attachment is also a basic element and shapes the identity by distinguishing them from others.

Under the effects of these elements the basic group identity is formed. Actually it is dynamic in an almost state of becoming. Identity is shaped by the impacts of each element together with all kinds of political, social and economic parameters.

There are certain weaknesses of this approach, which have been criticized by the circumstantialist approach. When it comes to explain the multiple-identities primordialist perspective may not be sufficient. Another objection can be made on the point that for some people ethnic and racial identities may be less compelling and less important than other identities. Isaacs calls the other identities as 'secondary identities' such as class or occupation. Primordialist approach can also be criticized that it gives no chance to change and variation since it assumes the social givens as fixed (Cornell & Hartman; 1998, 52).

2.2.3 Circumstantialism: Fluid Identities

Circumstantialist approach prevailed in 1970s and contrary to the primordialists it suggested that the practical uses of ethnic identities provided the existence of the ethnic and racial groups in the modern industrialized era. Their main argument is that the ethnic groups constituted interest groups. Interests have primary importance and are shaped by the impact of circumstances rather than the shared cultural norms. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan the two scholars who defended this perspective as a result of their investigation in America concluded that 'ethnic

groups are continually recreated by new experiences in America'. As a result of his analysis of ethnic communities in Africa Abner Cohen came to the similar conclusion that 'ethnicity is fundamentally a political phenomenon…It is a type of informal interest grouping' (Cornell & Hartman; 1998, 56). Ethnic identities began to be evaluated in line with the utilitarian logic by group of scholars and this led to interest-based conception of ethnic identities after the 1970s.

The basic claim of this approach is that individuals and groups emphasize their own ethnic and racial identities when such identities are in some way advantageous to them. The circumstances and contexts have great power in the formation of ethnic identities. Ethnic identities are not purely the products of the circumstances but to a great extent they are reinforced and shaped by the mediation of circumstances and contexts. In contrast to the argument of primordialism the circumstantialist approach views ethnic and racial identities as not fixed and unchanging but rather fluid and contingent and they respond to the needs of the situation.

By some of the scholars the circumstantialist approach is identified as 'instrumentalism' as a result of their adoption of utilitarian logic to evaluate the ethnic formations. Culture does not contribute directly to the formation of ethnic identities rather ethnic groups use certain cultural norms and values to legitimize their ethnic claims in their struggle within social and political realms. Hutchinson and Smith (1996) assert that ethnicity is socially constructed and the individuals have the ability to cut and mix from variety of ethnic heritages and cultures to form their own individual and group identities. Social change has the primary importance in this kind of analysis. Cornell and Hartman (1998) state that the term instrumentalism is not fully appropriate to explain this way of interpretation. The term circumstantialism is more appropriate to grasp the power of social and historical context in shaping the identity formations. Because, this way of analysis concentrates on the interests which are subjective. They overlook the fact that actually the circumstances give shape and cause people to see the particular interests in that particular situation. In addition to this, in some occasions circumstances and social change have impact on the formation of ethnic identities without any affect of

interests. They point out the fact that, even in the absence of a clear set of economic or political interests immigrant groups sometimes find themselves concentrated in housing areas or jobs or social institutions. In this case, circumstances have the major affect on the issue and this is not a choice or interest on the part of the members of the group.

Since the circumstantialist approach focuses on the effects of social, political and economic dynamics in shaping the identity formations, the analyses mostly deal with the relations among the different ethnic groups within a system and the conceptualizations revolve around two basic concepts: competition and conflict. As Cornell and Hartman indicate:

> In fact, competition and conflict have been at the core of the circumstantialist account from the beginning. The fundamental premise of this approach is that ethnic and racial identities become bases of collective conception and action when distinct populations are thrown into competition with one another for relatively scarce resources, such as job, housing, political power, or social status (Cornell & Hartman; 1998,60).

Max Weber's theory of 'social closure', which was mentioned in the previous chapter when defining citizenship formulations, is also significantly important in these analyses. According to social closure, members of one group or another in the society tend to protect access to scarce resources by restricting other people's access to those same resources. Ethnicity and race can be viewed as bases of social closure process due to their nature of being common bases of mobilization. Therefore by way of social closure competition may lead to an emphasis on ethnic or racial boundaries. Besides it is likely to reinforce and reproduce the ethnic and racial identities in the end.

In relation to this view, the recent analyses of circumstantialist approach focused their attention into the forms of competition and conflict. One of these analyses is known as 'Internal Colonialism'. According to this approach, when a richer, culturally dominant group subordinated an ethnically or racially defined minority or periphery group within the same country. This view points out the parallelism between the colonial period of Europe in Asian and African countries and

the subordinate and disadvantageous position of ethnic and racial minorities within the states.

The other analysis called as 'Split Labor Market Theory'. This theory focuses on competition between ethnic and racial groups that are in the same class. Employers in some occasions in order to reduce the expense of the labor, tend to replace the workers who belong to their own group with the workers from subordinate minority groups. In this kind of situation the dominant-group workers may have an incentive to protect their privileges by discriminating against lower-cost, subordinate-group workers. As a response to this, they tend to implement social closure to the members of their own social class by emphasizing their ethnic and racial identities. In this context the ethnic or racial content in their identity, which are primordial attachments, are reinforced under the impact of such circumstances. This theory can also be framed in a colonialist discourse since the colonialist perspectives elaborated the split labor market theory in their analyses very often.

> Since capital gravitates towards the employment of the cheaper labor (the non-settle labor force), the higher paid workers (settler workers) are threatened with displacement. To protect themselves, rather than launching a struggle against the capitalists (who seem to be more formidable opponents) they resolve to exclude the lower paid workers from the market and they couch their economic struggle in ethnic and national terms (Ram; 1999, 69).

The experience that took place between the Jews and Arabs during British Mandate period (1918-1948) in Palestine is a good example for this view. The Jews implemented the social closure toward the cheap Arab labor. According to historical argument of Shafir,

> The capitalist Jewish settlers of Palestine tended to employ the cheap local Arab workforce. The Jewish workers, determined to secure a quasi-European standard of living, resolved to forestall the employment of their competitors by excluding them from the labor market through the use of the nationalist argument. Thus they ushered in the struggle for the "conquest of labor" or for "Hebrew labor" (Shafir; 1989, 45).

The other analysis, which emphasizes the competition and conflict within social realm, is 'Middleman/Enclave Theory'. According to this analysis, by way of small businesses ethnic and racial groups especially the immigrant ones are able to constitute their existence in the economic order. Entrepreneurs of such groups employ members of their own group and serve their own group or other minority

populations as ‘Middleman’ traders. They even attempt to compete in the larger context. It may be viewed as a surviving strategy for the ethnic minority groups within the system. By this way they are able to cope with the limited economic opportunities and posit themselves as minor forces in the economic system.

These three analyses are significant in understanding how the intergroup conflict and competition promote ethnic and racial boundaries. In this sense, by the help of these analyses how modern organization of society gives way to reinforcement or disengagement of such boundaries can be examined. Another contribution of these analyses is that their introduction of the class dimension in the very center of the ethnicity analysis.

These conflict and competition oriented analyses also bring to light the limitations of the circumstantialist view. Since there are various kinds of formations and resurgences of ethnic and racial identities under different circumstances these theories can be weak to explain every case. Moreover, ethnicities are seen as dependent variables so this view may remain weak to grasp the logic of the cases which do not fit to these models. Focusing solely on the circumstantial components of ethnic identity formations may fail to reach a comprehensive understanding. Because it ignores the personally felt power of many ethnic identities and the socializing process that often produces ethnic identities. However, despite its weaknesses this approach continuous to have significant role in understanding the nature of the identities in the present era. Most of the contemporary analyses in some way or another adopt this understanding and seek to explain the ethnic and national formations in parallel with this view like Benedict Anderson’s who argues that imagined structures of communities give way to nationality and nationalisms (Anderson; 1994).

CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL

3.1. General Overview of the Arab Population in Israel

Today, Arab citizens of Israel comprise close to 20% of the total population of the country, numbering over 1.000.000. Generally the non-Jewish minority[15] in Israel is seen as the Arab minority since it constitutes the vast majority within the non-Jewish minority. They live predominantly in villages, towns, and mixed Arab-Jewish cities in the Galilee region in the north, the Triangle area in central Israel[16] and the Negev desert in the south. They constitute an ethnic, linguistic, religious and national minority. Although Arab citizens of Israel are defined collectively, the Arab Israeli sector includes a number of different groups in itself according to religious and social affiliation. They belong to three religious communities: Muslim (%81), Christian (10%), and Druze (9%) (Adalah website; 2003).[17] It is worth to clarify the groups' characteristics before focusing on the issue in detail.

The Muslim Arabs, the largest group, constitute three-quarters of the Arab Israeli sector and most are Sunni Muslims. Nearly one-tenth of Israel's Muslim

[15]Among the non-Jewish minorities the Circassians is a significant group. They comprise some 3,000 people, who are Sunni Muslims. They do not share the Arab origin. While maintaining a distinct ethnic identity, they participate in Israel's economic and national affairs without assimilating either into Jewish society or into the general Muslim community. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 2003)

[16] So-called Triangle area is an area in central Israel densely populated by Arabs.

[17] The demographic numbers differ slightly in various sources. While the Arab NGO Adalah in Israel claims the aforementioned figures, in the Israeli Foreign Affairs website (2003) it is put forward that Israel, of its 6.4 million people, 77.8 percent are Jews, 17.3 percent are Arabs (mostly Muslim) and the remaining 4.9 percent comprise Druze, Circassians and others not classified by religion. In addition, Druzes are recognized separately in official level so they are not included in the Arab sector number in Israeli official records.

Arabs, are Bedouins formerly nomadic shepherds mostly residing in the Negev region in the south.

The Christian Arabs form the second largest group in the Arab Israeli sector. Although many denominations are nominally represented, the majority of the Christian Arabs are affiliated with the Greek Catholic (37%), Greek Orthodox (30%), Roman Catholic (23%), Maronites (5%) and other (5%) churches (Rekhess; 2000). The analysis of this thesis is concentrated on the Muslim and Christian communities who are Arab-Israelis.

The Druze, some 100,000 Arabic-speakers living in 22 villages in northern Israel, is a separate cultural, social and religious community.[18] While the Druze religion is not accessible to outsiders, one known aspect of its philosophy is the concept of *taqiyya*, which calls for complete loyalty by its adherents to the government of the country in which they reside. The Druze religion has its roots in Ismailism, a religio-philosophical movement which founded the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt in the tenth century. During the reign of al-Hakim (996 - 1021) the Druze creed came into being, blending Islamic monotheism with Greek philosophy and Hindu influences. Active proselytizing of the new creed was brief; since about 1050 the community has been closed to outsiders.(Aridi; 2003, Yiftachel & Segal;1998)

The Druze community in Israel is officially recognized as a separate religious entity with its own courts (with jurisdiction in matters of personal status - marriage, divorce, maintenance and adoption) and spiritual leadership. Their culture is Arab and their language is Arabic but they opted against mainstream Arab nationalism in 1948 and have since served (first as volunteers, later within the draft system) in the Israel Defense Forces and the Border Police. They have been open to affects from inside and outside of the country: both the special treatment of State of Israel toward the Druze community and Palestinian conflict in the occupied territorries have affect on the group. According to Gabriel Ben-Dor (1995) who is a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Professor of Political Science and former Rector at the

[18] Worldwide there are probably about one million Druze living mainly in Syria and Lebanon, with 100,000 in Israel, including about 18,000 in the Golan (which came under Israeli rule in 1967) and several thousands who emigrated to Europe and North and South America (Aridi; 2003).

University of Haifa, ‘The Druze cannot and should not be taken for granted by Israel because their identity is malleable and may well shift according to political circumstances and conditions’. Due to their special characteristics and status, the Druze community is not within the scope of this study.

The Arab Israelis have a distinct identity and have not been assimilated. The community's separate existence is facilitated through the use of Arabic, Israel's second official language; a separate Arab school system; Arabic literature, theater and mass media; and maintenance of independent Muslim and Christian denominational courts which adjudicate matters of personal status.

The Arab minority went through several changes since the establishment of the State of Israel and the terminology which is used to define this group have taken various forms such as, ‘Arabs of the Land of Israel’, ‘Israeli-Arabs’, ‘Palestinian-Arabs’, and ‘Palestinian-Israelis’. The terms can be seen to reflect either the radicalism and alienation felt by Israeli-Arabs, or their senses of moderation and their desire to be integrated into Israeli society. ‘Palestinian’ and ‘Palestinian-Arab’ identities signify radicalism while ‘Israeli-Arab and ‘sectarian religious terms’ of identification signify moderation and a desire to integrate. The newly invented image of ‘Palestinian-Israeli’ stands somewhere in between. However, the common term used by Israelis to describe the Arab minority is ‘Israeli-Arabs’. Although it is criticized by many scholars especially the Arab ones, that this definition excludes the national content and it is imposed by Israeli State policy, it has been widely used in academic and political arenas of both sectors. Actually, in the literature each term reflects to a great degree the standpoint of the researcher and his/her national affiliation.

In this study, in addition to the term ‘Israeli-Arabs’, the ‘neutral terms’ such as ‘Arab population of Israel’ and ‘Arab citizens of Israel’ are adopted mainly, but although being very limited, the other terms are also used interchangeably. It is worth to mention the differences in usage in accordance with the periods. While ‘Arab Minority’ is used mostly in referring to the period between 1948 and 1966, ‘Israeli-Arabs’ are used for the period, which starts after the 1967 War and lasts until the

1990s. The 'Palestinian' content is expressed only while discussing the last decade by using 'Palestinian citizens of Israel'. This preference of usage is adopted in parallel with the literature on the issue and also in the light of the developments of each period.

Before explaining the internal and external historical turning points in relation to their impacts on the Arab minority issue, conceptualization of the status of the Arab population in Israeli context according to certain major perspectives should be defined in order to give an idea of the general characteristics of the group.

There are no laws that discriminate explicitly against non-Jewish citizens, but the statutes that uphold Israel's Jewishness promote inequality by legitimizing preference for Jews. In addition, some laws and arrangements that are formally indifferent to ethnicity nevertheless operate de facto to differentiate between Jews and Arabs. For example, Israeli citizenship law was formulated to make the principal of citizenship by descent (*jus sanguinus*) applicable to Jews everywhere, while to Arabs was applied a carefully limited version of citizenship by physical presence (*jus solis*) designed to prevent a massive influx of Arab refugees. Similarly emergency regulations of the British Mandate which will be discussed in detail in the following part have been implemented disproportionately against the Arab minority.

The importance of quasi-governmental institutions in Israeli life also contributes to de facto preferential treatment for Jews. The World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, the United Jewish Appeal, and other organizations that grew out of the Zionist movement are all explicitly Jewish organizations, funded by world Jewry (not the Israeli tax-payer) and serving Jewish goals. Having a legal status defined by special statutes, they have a significant role in the development of the county. They provide services that are a government responsibility in most modern states.[19]

[19] The Jewish Agency for example, is central in support of immigration and rural settlement, coordinates a massive urban renewal program, and provides numerous other cultural, social, educational services to the Jewish population. The Jewish National Fund (JNF) acquires and leases land in the name of the Jewish people; even though these lands are administered by the Israel Lands Authority (a government body), under established JNF policy they can not be "alienated" to non-Jews.

Apart from the preferential treatment of Jews by certain laws and mechanisms mentioned above, the only legal distinction between Arab and Jewish citizens is in army service issue which is one of the civic duties. Since Israel's establishment, Arab citizens have been exempted from compulsory service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). This exemption was made out of consideration for their family, religious and cultural affiliations with the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world, given the on-going conflict. Still, volunteer military service is encouraged and IDF service was made mandatory for Druze and Circassian men at the request of their community leaders. So there is a legal distinction between Arab and Jewish citizens in army service duty issue and it has some outcomes in terms of rights of the group. Service in the Israeli Defense Forces gives veterans certain economic and other benefits. Although Arab Israeli youth who do not volunteer for army service gain a two-to-three year head start in their higher education or in joining the workforce, this does not always compensate for missing out on the benefits and training enjoyed by veterans. It is discussed by Dowty (1998); that army service is another basis for de facto discrimination.

> The military interlude is not only the defining rite of passage for both men and women in Israeli society but is also the source of important benefits in employment, housing and education during the critical years of young adulthood. Though few in either community suggest compelling Arabs to serve in the army, many Jewish Israelis justify the lack of equal rights on grounds of lack of equal duties. And there is a general tendency to regard the structural impediments, such as JNF (Jewish National Fund) land policy or soldiers' benefits, not as discrimination against Arabs but as legitimate preferences accorded Jews in a Jewish state. Preference for one group logically means relative disadvantage for others, but public attitudes often do not admit this logic. (Dowty; 1998, 189)

Several attempts have been made to categorize Israel within the context of the cleavage between its Jewish and Arab citizens. Lustick (1980) claims that the Arab minority has been placed under a system of control that severely restricts its political rights. However, in a later study, Lustick (1990) states that this situation is changing and that the system of control is being dismantled owing to the electoral power of the Arab population. Cohen (1989) suggests that Israel's claim to being both a democratic and a Jewish state creates a dilemma of legitimacy in terms of universalistic precepts of democracy and equality before the law.

The term *ethnic democracy* has been proposed to describe Israel's political system. Smooha (1990) defines an ethnic democracy as one that combines the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective rights to minorities, with institutionalized dominance over the state by one of the ethnic groups. Israel's ethnic democracy is regarded as having evolved out of the tension between the Jewish character of the state, which stems from the prevailing basic attachments of the Jewish majority, and the state's democratic features. Therefore, it can be argued that, accommodative and power-sharing features of Israeli politics in other contexts do not apply to relations between Jews and Arabs.

Rouhana, Yiftachel and Ghanem (2000) questioned the theoretical and empirical validity of the ethnic democracy model. In their view, 'the Israeli governmental system implements a wide range of laws, practices and political procedures which violate the basic principles of democracy: legal distinctions between citizens based on ethnic nationality; exposure of the minority to the tyranny of the majority; perpetuating blurred political and territorial boundaries; and broad discrimination against the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel'. Their conclusion was that the imprecise classification of Israel as a democracy legitimizes an ethnocratic, discriminatory and stratified system of government. Israel, these academicians argued both together and individually, is not democracy but in the best case an 'ethnocracy' or an 'ethnic state' which imparts constitutional exclusivity to the ethnic majority. This type of state invites the Arab citizen to participate in its life but in no way offers him equality.

3.2. Aftermath of 1948 War and the Survivors' Generation under Military Government

In 1946 one year before the end of British Mandate in Palestine, there were 1.269.000 Arabs and 678.000 Jews in the region now called as State of Israel and Palestinian territories (Mansfield; 1992). In February 1947 Britain handed the Palestine issue over to the United Nations. In August 1947 a majority report of a UN Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended the partition of Palestine

into Arab and Jewish states, which would still be economically unified, with Jerusalem and its environs to be international (Appendix 4.2). This recommendation was adopted by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947. Britain had already announced its intention to give up the Palestine Mandate on 15 April 1947. While the Zionist groups welcomed the partition because it recognized a Jewish state which, although including a large area of desert in the south, the Negev, covered 55 percent of a country in which Zionist landholdings still amounted to less than 8 percent of the total, the Arabs bitterly opposed the partition because the proposed Jewish state would include almost as many Arabs as Jews.

The State of Israel declared its independence on the 15th of May in 1948 and immediately the first Arab-Israeli war broke out between the newly founded State of Israel and the armies of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq, and small expeditionary forces from a number of other Arab countries, including Yemen and Saudi Arabia. When the fighting ended in January 1949 the Jews had occupied all the Negev up to the former Egypt-Palestine border except for the Gaza Strip on the coast. The Iraqis and Jordanians held a slice of territory to the north and south of Jerusalem. Only 21 percent of Palestine remained in Arab hands. The number of Arabs within the area held by Israel had decreased between 700.000 and 750.000. The separate armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt and the Arab states were secured by the intervention of a UN mediator between February and July 1949. Jerusalem was divided between the Arab east and the Jewish west. The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian administration. No peace treaty was signed and since then the security and stability was not reached in the region (Morris; 2001, Mansfield; 1992).

Besides the emergence of the State of Israel, the other major result of the 1948 war was the destruction of Palestinian society and the birth of the refugee problem. In Palestinian discourse it is called as *Al-Nakba*, which means catastrophe. About 700.000 Arabs fled or were forced to move from the areas that became the Jewish state.[20] The ones who stayed in their homes within the newly borders of State of Israel became Arab minority in the Jewish state numbering 150.000. Of the

[20] The figure on the refugee number later became a major point of dispute, the Israelis officially speaking of some 520.000, the Palestinians themselves of 900.000-1.000.000.

150.000 Arab who remained in the new state, approximately 25% were displaced from their homes and villages and became internally displaced persons in other words 'internal refugee' as the Israeli army destroyed over 400 Arab villages (Morris; 2001). Therefore, at the conclusion of the 1948 War the problem of the Arab minority in Israel came into being.

But another result of the new situation was, paradoxically, that the Arab minority within Israel became a secondary concern. The 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war shifted the focus of the Arab-Israeli conflict from interethnic strife within Palestine to a state-to-state confrontation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, who had previously played a marginal role in the conflict. The Arab population who remained within Israel were demoralized, largely leaderless and cut off from contact with other Arabs. Their situation was now but a minor aspect of a much larger picture, and the new government of Israel instinctively tried to keep the internal Arab problem separate from the larger issues of Arab-Israeli diplomacy and war (Dowty; 1998).

Before 1948, little thought had been given to the possibility that the future state of Israel might harbor on Arab minority. As Rekhess (1991) indicates,

> The initial line adopted by the government was a middle-of-the-road solution; an attempt to find a compromise between two contradictory approaches: one that was security-oriented and viewed the Arabs as an 'enemy-affiliated minority'; and another, drawing upon liberal democratic principles, that argued for the equality of all citizens and for the integration of the Arab minority into Israeli life (Rekhess; 1991, 103).

It must be noted that, there had been no clear and agreed-upon guidelines for government policy towards the Arab minority issue as it is argued by Rekhess (1991) and Dowty (1998). The policies actually followed have often contradicted each-other. Benziman and Mansour (cited in: Dowty; 1998) argue that four different tendencies have at a various times and varying degrees been observable: expulsion ("transfer"), arbitrary imposition of inferior status, Arab-Jewish coexistence based on recognition of differences, and full integration of Arabs into public life. In part, this confusion prevailed because of an astonishing lack of attention on the policymaking level. Consistent with their failure to recognize the dilemma of Arab citizens in a Jewish state, and also with a natural desire to keep the issue quite, top policymakers

devoted little time and energy to internal Arab issues. They adopted a posture of avoidance. In the light of such indifference and in the absence of clear guidelines, short-term security interests became the touchstone of government policy. Sometimes very marginal security considerations outweighed all political, diplomatic, and human factors, as in the case of Biram and Ikrit, two small Arab villages on the Lebanese border whose inhabitants were evacuated after the fighting in 1948 and were not allowed to return.

Security-oriented policies towards the Arabs were pursued in three areas: the partial expulsion of Arabs from towns and villages during war time operations and afterwards; the seizure of abandoned property and the expropriation of land holdings; and the institution of military government in areas densely populated by Arabs. The third measure, military government, was introduced in order to prevent the return of refugees, to forestall border crossings by infiltrators, and to complete the evacuation of villages or urban neighborhoods partially abandoned during the war.

The military government's authority was virtually unlimited. Legally speaking it drew on British mandatory emergency regulations issued in 1945, which made it possible to restrict the movements of Arab inhabitants and to seize land and property. It also became an important means of political control. One of the very serious events, which took place during military government phase, was the Kufr Kasem event in 1956. 49 Arab farmers were killed because of "violating" the curfew imposed on their village. Unaware that a curfew had been ordered, the farmers were returning home from working their agricultural lands when they were killed.[21] The abolishment of military rule came into being in December 1966, only after the retirement of Ben Gurion.

The other security-oriented measure which is; seizure of abandoned property and the expropriation of land holdings, left a great amount of Arab landless peasants. The majority of the Arab community who remained in Israel was traditionally relied on agriculture as their main resource of income, state expropriation of lands forced

[21] Substantial demonstrations on the anniversary of the event in 1957 marked the first time that Arab minority in Israel had organized on a large scale to protest the state's repressive policies (Adalah website, http://www.adalah.org; 2003).

Arabs to seek work as wage-laborers and thus become primarily dependent on the Israeli economy (Adalah; March 1998). In his analysis of Israeli policy towards the Arab minority in the first years of statehood, Lustick (cited in: Rekhess; 1991, 117) states that the government had the following objectives:

> To prevent the Arab minority from serving as a fifth column or abetting large-scale infiltration; to acquire from Israeli Arabs a large percentage of their landholding; to take advantage of Arab resources for the absorption of new immigrants; to harness Arab economic power for the rapid development of the Jewish-controlled Israeli economy; to aggregate political support among Israeli Arabs for partisan advantage; and to prevent the Arab minority from becoming a burden in the arena of international politics.

Sammy Smooha (cited in: Rekhess; 1991, 117) arrives at a similar conclusion. In his view, the primary objective of the government was: 'To institutionalize effective control over the Israeli Arabs for an indefinite period of time, thereby neutralizing them as a threat to [Israeli's] security and to the Jewish-Zionist character of the state, and to mobilize their resources for the benefit of the Jewish people'. The democratic and egalitarian policy, Smooha asserts, was no more than a verbal "ethos".

On the contrary to these views; Rekhess (1991) argues that; a more balanced assessment would have taken into account the overall conditions under which policies towards the Arab minority were formulated. Basic policy guidelines were worked out within 8-months just after the war broke out in 1948. Although no clear policy evolved there had been several attempts in different areas to endorse the development of the Arab community in objective terms. One example for this is that the establishment of Minority Ministry, although closed down very soon (June 1949), and special efforts were made to fight unemployment of the Arab sector and rehabilitation in the education system. Since these attempts were not coordinated well, the result was not influential in any area through the formative years of the State of Israel Rekhess argues.

What was done practically on the Arab minority issue as a governmental act following the Declaration of Independence in 1948 can be summarized as follows: All Arabs remaining in the country were granted citizenship and some 30.000 Arabs with voting rights participated in the first Knesset elections, held on 25 January 1949,

and three Arab candidates were indeed elected to the Knesset.[22] Arabic was virtually granted the status of an official language, although Hebrew was the state language. Coins, postage stamps, and banknotes had Arabic, as well Hebrew inscriptions. The official gazette was published in Arabic as well as Hebrew. But there were no truly independent Arab newspapers of significance. Arabs were free to address government departments and plead in courts in their own language. Arabic remained the language of instruction in all state-maintained Arab schools (Rekhess; 1991).

As it is mentioned before, as a result of the war, the Arab population in Israel found itself disoriented and severely weakened. They had been effectively transformed from members of a majority population to a minority in an exclusively Jewish state. They lacked political as well as economic power, as their leadership, as well as their professional and middle classes, were refused the right to return and compelled to live outside of the state. In addition to this living under military control reinforced these characteristics of the group and making them more passive in the end. In his analysis of the first generation Azmi Bishara (1996) an Arab intellectual and prominent political figure in Israeli politics and who belongs to the second generation states that, under the tight military control until 1966 and with the lack of strong leadership of their own, Arab minority reflected the social situation of a defeated population seeking security from the victorious state.

Under these conditions, politically Arab minority adopted a pattern of opportunistic behavior up until mid 1960s (Shapira; 1996). We can argue that the reason for this attitude is the fear and despair. Basically there were two political trends in Israeli political arena in the pre-1967 period: Zionist and Non-Zionist. Most of the Arab public voted for the Arab Lists within the Zionist parties. Israeli Communist Party who had a legal status and pro-Soviet tendencies believed in fighting for Arab rights within the Israeli system. It was composed both Arab and Jewish members. Arab nationalists did not manage to organize as a political party. Pro-Nasserite[23] Al-Ard (The Land) movement which supported the Partition Plan in

[22] For the first four decades there was no independent nationwide Arab political party or organizations.

[23] President Nasser dominated Egypt and the Arab world until his death in 1970, his ideology of Arab nationalism and socialism making him supremely popular with the masses (if not always their

the early 1960s was not recognized officially. Although there were groups who voted for the Israeli Communist Party, the 75% of the Arab vote went to the Zionist Parties in this period. 'The Arabs effectively functioned as a vote bank for the Israeli Labour Party, which in the years was the perennial government of the state' (Minns & Hijab-1990).

As it was explained briefly above, there had been several obstacles in raising political awareness among the Arabs of the 1948. In light of the realities of this period we can argue that the Arab content of their identity was suppressed and they left as a passive minority. Since they were fragmented, dispersed and isolated, they lacked an overall view of the national implications of their experience with the *Nakba*. Besides they could not develop means to articulate a nation-wide response to their situation. The shock of defeat left the generation that was aged in their twenties and thirties in 1948 with a sense of fear and impotence. In their study (Minns & Hijab; 1990) discuss about the criticisms, which are being raised by the younger generations in relation to the first generation. In some occasions, younger generations (both second and third generations) criticize the first generation as being passive, and doing nothing to change the situation. One group of old men responded to these criticisms cited in (Minns & Hijab; 1990, 42) as follows:

> The young do not know what it was like to be brutally robbed of our land and homes. They do not know what it was like to live under military rule, forbidden to move from place to place without permission. We struggled in our own way, by resisting the police and soldiers, by singing nationalist songs at weddings and festivities, by listening to the national poets. The younger generation's awareness has developed as a result of our own experiences. We did not have what they have today. Conditions and convictions have changed, and so have the methods of struggle.

When we examine the identity of the Arab minority in the early years of the state, we can argue that the national content was severely suppressed as a result of the regulations which they had been exposed to. National content refers to the Arab sense of belonging since the era was witnessed the Arab nationalism overwhelmingly in the Middle East. So the Arab content of their identity was more uttered than the

---

governments) from Iraq to Morocco. Under his leadership, Egypt was at the forefront of anti-colonialism, lending support to liberation struggles in Algeria, sub-Saharan Africa and other regions. Nasser also helped to set up the Non-Aligned Movement with Yugoslavia, India and Indonesia in 1955 (Morris; 2001).

Palestinian one. Besides, the integration to Israeli society was at the minimum level and the civic awareness was not raised yet.

3.3. Aftermath of 1967 War: Israelization and Palestinization of the Bicultural Second Generation

The 1967 War, which is also called as Six-Day War, took place between Israel and Arab countries; Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.[24] It had many immediate and long-term consequences in the region. The State of Israel had gained military control over all Jerusalem and the remaining 21 percent of Palestine. Some 200.000 more Arab refugees crossed the River Jordan to the East Bank.[25] Israel had occupied the whole of Sinai and its forces were on the banks of the Suez Channel. Moreover, Israel had removed Syria's strategic advantage by seizing the Golan Heights. Following the War, UN Security Council resolution 242 (1967) called on Israel to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in the 1967 conflict but it never came into being in the full sense for the last three decades.

The war marked the beginning of decline of Nasser era, which is known as its pan-Arabist character, in the Middle East. As a result of the Six-Day War Israel gained new confidence as the indisputably dominant military power in the region. The military rule, which had ended in 1966 inside Israel, was now shifted toward other territories: West Bank and Gaza. Rather incorporation of the newly occupied territories, Israel against the UN Resolution 242 has kept them as occupied territories until today. On the other hand, the oppression of the Arabs of West Bank and Gaza

[24] In May 1967, Egypt and Syria took a number of steps which led Israel to believe that an Arab attack was imminent. Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt on June 5, 1967 and captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. Despite an Israeli appeal to Jordan to stay out of the conflict, Jordan attacked Israel and lost control of the West Bank and the eastern sector of Jerusalem. Israel went on to capture the Golan Heights from Syria. The war ended on 10 June 1967 (Morris; 2001, Mansfield; 1992).

[25] As there is not agreement on the numbers of refugees of 1948 War, there is also a difference in the estimation of the number of second wave of refugees as a result of 1967 War. It is estimated by some that the number is half a million.

Strip intensified and there began the process of asserting their own national identity, which is Palestinian.

During the Six-Day War the attitude toward Arabs of Israel was calm and confident by Israel. Actually, Israel functioned more democratically in a more emancipated fashion during the latter 1960s, a characteristic of the post-Ben Gurion era (Shapira; 1996). The 1967 War and its outcome created deep awareness in the Arab population that Israel was an immutable fact and that their existence as a minority within it was irreversible (Mana; 1996). Besides, the war was a turning point for the Arabs of Israel since it marked the beginning of a new era so it is possible to talk about several implications of 1967 War on the Arab minority of Israel in social, cultural and political realms.

The war brought the two populations back into direct contact after two decades of separation. Relatives, friends, professional or business acquaintances separated by the coincidental vagaries of the armistice demarcation border (known as the "Green Line") came together again. Although the status of Arabs in the Occupied Territories and Arabs in Israel were different in legal terms they became now part of a single "control system". Manifestations of the renewed and deepened contact between the two groups were seen in political, social, cultural and economic spheres. After 1967 War there was a consensus on the Israeli side that the contact between the two Arab populations may greatly moderate the attitudes of each group to Israel. (Dowty; 1998, Rekhess; 1989) However, what developed was largely a "one way channel" with the West Bank and Gaza influencing the attitudes of Israeli Arabs. Although their respective level of material progress in terms of health services, physical infrastructure and overall quality of life over the preceding two decades was a fact, this was not found sufficient in comparison with the West Bank and Gaza.

> Many Israeli Arabs began to feel that, appearances notwithstanding, they themselves were in many ways the inferior partners in this renewed encounter. For instance, they were impressed –and embarrassed- by the large number of academics and university graduates in the West Bank, as compared with their own community; by the high standard of secondary education; by the development of cooperative enterprise in the West Bank; and the achievements of citrus farming in Gaza (Rekhess; 1989, 59).

Such comparisons made many Israeli Arabs uncomfortable and caused them to reconsider their own position and standing in the Israeli polity. So, their attention began to be centered not only on the social and economic level but also on the political and national level. As it was mentioned, there had been a resurgence of "Palestinianizm" among Arabs outside Israel following the 1967 War. And this had very important impacts on the Arabs of Israel especially in their identity definition.

The term 'Palestinization' is used widespread in the academic literature to describe the changes in the Arab minority in Israel after the 1967 War and throughout the following two decades. The Palestinization trend refers to the growth of solidarity with Arab Palestinians outside Israel, the rise of radical movements and a general greater level of political activism and self-assertion within the Arab minority of Israel. The trend, which is sometimes called also as 'politicization' and 'radicalization', results from both external and internal forces. While the external force is mainly the growth of Palestinian nationalism as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the internal force refers to the important transformations within the Arab community in Israel.

The October 1973 War and the PLO's great gain in status since 1974 influenced the Arab population in Israel.[26] The war gave the Israeli Arabs a more pronounced feeling of national pride;[27] the 1974 Rabat summit resolutions in favor of the PLO and Yaser Arafat 1975 speech at the UN General Assembly caused Israeli

[26] In 1974, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national and sovereignty, and to return. The following year, the General Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The General Assembly conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the Assembly and in other international conferences held under United Nations auspices http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html

[27] On October 6, 1973 —Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar — Egypt and Syria opened a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe were mobilized on Israel's borders. On the Golan Heights approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, fewer than 500 Israeli defenders were attacked by 80,000 Egyptians. At least nine Arab states, including four non-Middle Eastern nations, actively aided the Egyptian-Syrian war effort. On October 22, the Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for "all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately." The vote came on the day that Israeli forces cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army and were in a position to destroy it. Despite the Israel Defense Forces' ultimate success on the battlefield, the war was considered a diplomatic and military failure. A total of 2,688 soldiers were killed (Mansfield; 1992).

Arabs to identify more profoundly with the PLO and with its claim to represent all Palestinians, including those residing in Israel. After 1973 as the Palestinian nationalism increased in the territories and even the moderate Israeli Arabs began to more openly and strongly express support for the Palestinians' right of self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian State, proclaiming the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (yet, excluding the Israeli Arabs). More than ever in the past spokesmen for this trend identified themselves as "Palestinians" in addition to being "Israelis" and "Arab". The radical camp, for its part underwent the same trend. Political protest increased and the ultra nationalist group like Abna al-Balad (Sons of the Village) emerged after 1973. Identification with PLO increased, the famous slogan which was adopted by the radical camp was that; "Hebron is like Galilee".

During the following decade, the general events remained in a negative course in the region. 1980s witnessed several important events such as the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the uprising which is called *intifada* in the occupied territories. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the declared intention to eliminate the PLO. A cease-fire was arranged. PLO troops withdrew from Beirut and were transferred to neighboring countries after guarantees of safety were provided for thousands of Palestinian refugees left behind. Subsequently, a large-scale massacre of refugees took place in the camps of Sabra and Shatila. These events on the ground left the Arab minority of Israel in a contradictory understanding which can be defined as 'my state is at war with my people'.

In December 1987, a mass uprising against the Israeli occupation began in the occupied Palestinian territory. Methods used by the Israeli forces during the uprising resulted in mass injuries and heavy loss of life among the civilian Palestinian population. Following the outbreak of *first intifada* in 1987, the Arabs of Israel made attempts to put their firm support for the struggle in the territories, although their support was passive in nature (Shapira; 1996). During the *intifada* (Mana; 1996) they expressed their pride in and support for the activities of their brothers in the territories. However it soon became apparent that, in contrast to the Palestinians

across the Green Line, they were not prepared to endanger their achievements and in time their solidarity with the *intifada* became declarative and symbolic only.

As it was mentioned before, there had been also internal changes within the Arab community in Israel after 1967, which accelerated the Palestinization process to a great extent. Changes within the Arab community include a higher level of education, rapid growth of professional and middle classes, emergence of new leadership to fill the initial vacuum, accumulation of grievances and frustrations over time, and development of political skills and tactics geared to Israeli reality. Those who see the process more as 'politicization' such as Sammy Smooha (cited in: Dowty; 1998) emphasize these internal developments and the efforts to achieve concrete results.

Therefore it is worth to mention the new voting patterns which emerged following the Six Day War in the Arab sector. Before the 1970s fewer than a quarter of Arab voters voted for oppositionist parties (the various communist lists) while around half had supported minority lists affiliated with Jewish-Zionist parties and the rest had voted directly for Jewish-Zionist parties. In the 1970s the minority lists disappeared and the ranks of the oppositionist grew. The result of the 1967 War had helped to change previous passivity and fragmentation of Arab population.

Besides, new parties emerged such as Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) which was established at the initiative of Communist Party in 1977. Even more radical movements appeared by the 1970s such as Abna al-Balad which emphasized Palestinian identity (Minns & Hijab; 1990). While the communists called for activism within the legal framework, Abna al-Balad argued against it, and did not vote in the general elections for the Knesset. Within this period the radical parties began to gain power in comparison with the past. In 1965 the Arab vote percent of the radical parties which supports the equality between the Arab and Jewish sectors was 23. This figure increased to 51% in 1977 showing the evidence for the Palestinization trend. In addition to this, in 1970s Arab politics began to develop independent organizations such as the Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands and the Regional Committee of Heads of Local Arab Councils. These

organizations gained power in the Israeli-Arab politics and began to criticize the discrimination of the Arabs in social and economic fields. Under this political atmosphere there emerged the huge political protest in the history of Arab minority in Israel. When the Israeli Government decided in February 1976, on a serious of land sequestrations in the Galilee, the Israel Communist Party took the initiative in forming the national comity for the defense of the Arab Lands. The Comity designated 30 March "Land Day" and called for general strike. The Palestinians outside of Israel also supported the Land Day and showed their solidarity with the Arabs of Israel in their cause. In its course six Israeli Arabs were killed in clashes between security forces and disorderly strikers and demonstrators.

Another phenomenon of the period after 1967 is that the Islamic Movement began to flourish among the Arab community of Israel. Contacts with the territories also affected the Islamic fundamentalism among Israeli Arabs. The encounter with the West Bank and Gaza Arabs brought them in touch with an active Islamic life conducted by a well organized and efficient villages establishment (Rekhess; 1989). Therefore a very potent new force, Islamic Movement, which burst on the political scene, won several municipal councils in the 1989 local elections, to the consternation of the other Arab parties. The fundamentalists reached people through a simple slogan: 'Islam is the answer'. As throughout the Arab world, the fundamentalists' strong point is organization at the grass-roots level and the provision of needed services. As religious organizations, they have some degree of protection against legal harassment. This combination of the practical and religious makes a powerful for successful organization. Although they won control of several municipalities in 1980s and onwards the Islamic Movement did not enter Knesset elections until 1996.

In comparison with the past, this period witnessed an increase in the political parties. New political parties were established in 1980s. One of them was the Progressive List for Peace, which was established by Muhammed Miari, one of the founders of Al-Ard movement, and Matti Peled a retired Jewish general. They ran for the 1984 national elections and both leaders were elected. The other new party of the 1980s was the Arab Democratic Party which was established by Abdel Wahab

Darwaesh who broke away from Labour Party in protest against Israeli policy in the occupied territories after the outbreak of the *intifada.* In 1988 national elections, it won only one seat. Although being small-scale, the existence of these kinds of parties gave way to express different ideas about Arab minority issue in certain platforms and challenged the national politics of Israel.

However, given the Arab sectors turn in Israeli political events, the State reaffirmed its control through amendment no.7, 1985 to the Israeli Basic Law: 'A list of candidates shall not participate in the elections for the Knesset if it aims or action, expressly or implicitly, point to one of the following: (1) Denial of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people….' The Knesset refused proposals by Arab MKs that it should refer to the state of 'the Jewish people and its Arab citizens', or restrict the amendment to denial of 'the existence of the state of the Israel' (Mana; 1996).

By the close of the 1980s then, the Arab community of Israel did not form a single, unified political bloc, but they were certainly far more politicized and well organized than at any time during the previous forty years. In spite of the differences and sometimes animosity between the various Arab parties and organizations most of the political analysts see a form of 'consensus' on the basic issues. The common grounds are: the right of Arabs as equal citizens in Israel; cancellation of regulations for expropriation of land; an Arab-Israeli peace settlement based on withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967; a Palestinian state that included Arab Jerusalem; the PLO as the sole legitimate representative for peace negotiations; and cooperation with the forces of peace in Jewish society. Rekhess (1989) defines the transformation of the Arab society by emphasizing the new generation (2^{nd} generation) of the era as follows:

> The old leaders had left the scene, to be replaced by younger more dynamic men who now made their mark in the Knesset, in local politics and in the trade union movement as the elected representatives of their community. This new leadership generation placed equal emphasis on complete equality for Israeli Arabs in all civic spheres and on their full integration into Israeli life and into the Jewish parties as well as on loyalty to the Palestinian cause and their growing acceptance of the PLO and some (though not all) of its aspirations (Rekhess; 1989, 55).

As it was discussed briefly above, from the 1970s onward, the Arabs showed a growing tendency to identify themselves as Palestinians as well as to identify with the Palestinians of the territories. Simultaneously however the process of cooperation with and integration in Israeli life continued. So whatever the extent of Palestinization or radicalization, it is only one dimension of the total picture. Arabs in the Israel were also subject to a process of 'Israelization' that over time differentiated them from their fellow Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Although imperfectly integrated into Israeli economy and society, Arab citizens were exposed to Israeli life and to the cultural patterns of a modernizing state. They could not totally identify with Israel, but its impact on their thinking and behavior was undeniable, and by the time they came to recognize that their future was tied to Israel.

As examples of integration to Israeli polity and life, their increase in participation in exclusively Jewish frameworks can be given as evidence. By the end of 1980s Arabs accounted for almost 15 percent of Israel Trade Union (Histadrut) membership. The Hebrew speakers among the Arab community increased. In addition, despite the recent visibility of the Islamic Movement, Israeli Arabs (like Israeli Jews) have become more secular over time (Dowty; 1998).

Smooha's surveys of Israeli Arabs in 1976, 1980, 1985, and 1988 represent the most extensive study of attitudes within the community. While opinion surveys do not tell the entire story, they are clearly one important measure and certainly provide a sense of trends over time when the same questions and methods are repeated. Smooha's results provide massive evidence of Israelization, as well as Palestinization (cited in: Dowty; 1998). By 1988, for example, 55.5 percent of Israeli Arabs surveyed felt that their style of life and daily behavior was more similar to that of Jews in Israel than to that of Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza. 64.3 percent said that they felt more at home than in an Arab country, and only 13.5 percent rejected Israel's right to exist (down from 20.5 percent in 1976). This did not mean that fundamental disagreements disappeared; a consistent majority in all surveys continues to regard Zionism as racism and to oppose Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state.

In other words, while they accept Israel as a state and their own citizenship within it, they object to aspects of Israeli ideology that they see as exclusivist principles barring Arabs from true civic equality.

Consequently, there is also general consensus that the fight to achieve equality should be conducted within the limits of Israeli law. From 1967 and throughout the *first intifada* (1987-1993) Arab minority of Israel confined their struggle to a civic one and restricted their national effort to events in the Occupied Territories. Israeli-Arabs certainly identify with West Bank and Gaza Arabs and favor the establishment of a Palestinian state in those territories, but they also distinguish between this issue and their own interests within Israel. In Smooha's study, only a small minority (14.4 percent in 1976 and 7.5 percent in 1988) stated a definite willingness to move to a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Their own fight for recognition and equality as a national minority began to occupy an important place in their agenda within the borders of the State of Israel.

Adel Mana (1996) criticized the scholars who emphasize the Israelization process and put it as a trend opposed to Palestinization, instead he argues,

> The truth was that the Arabs underwent a process of political maturation during the 1970s and began making realistic and legitimate use of their electoral and civil strength. Scare tactics, threats are outdated and ineffective against a minority that had become aware of its basic rights. The authorities gradually adjusted their policy to the new reality and improved their attitude toward the Arab citizens. This improvement however is still far from constituting an equalization of rights and opportunities. The gaps in public services and income level between Jews and Arabs are not small and are widening, at least in certain areas (Mana; 1996, 25).

Palestinization and Israelization appear at first to be contradictory processes, and they can be understood differently. However both trends are clearly taking place at the same time, and in some senses they may even reinforce each other. Under these conditions, two so-called trends have been shaping the identity definition of the group.

When it comes to the problem of identity definition the Arabs of Israel tend to show more nationalistic approach. A survey by Rouhana in 1982 (Rouhana; 1984) which was also discussed by Minns & Hijab (1990) showed that in a systematic,

national sample of the adult population, excluding Druze and Bedouin, 68 percent chose the term Palestinian Arab or Palestinian to describe their collective identity; 6.1 percent chose Palestinian Israeli; 18.2 percent chose Israeli Arab; 6.9 percent chose Arab; and only 0.5 percent chose Israeli. If we evaluate Smooha's and Rouhana's findings as complementary of each other we can conclude that the period which they lived through made them more nationalistic in terms of identity but at the same time stronger at their civil character as citizens of Israel. Salem Jubran who belongs to the 2nd generation argued (cited in: Minns & Hijab; 1990) as follows:

> We take part in the Palestinian struggle by staying put, by struggling for equality, by holding on to our land, by our national commitment, by interacting and cooperating with Jewish advocates of peace, and by working to establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel. This important place is valued by the Palestinian people at large, headed by the PLO. The stone that was neglected by the builders has become, truly, the corner-stone.

As for the identity of the Arabs of Israel Dr. Sami Mari who also belong to the 2nd generation said in 1985 (cited in: Minns & Hijab; 1990) that 'the Arabs in Israel simultaneously an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people, on the one hand, and a group which maintains Israeli citizenship, on the other.' The result of Smooha's study on the issue of willingness to move to a future Palestinian state which was discussed above is reaffirmed by the study of Minns & Hijab (1990). None of their interviewees had any intention of moving to live in a Palestinian state. But the reason was put in the context that they feel strong attachment to their land as territory and have been seeking their equality within the borders of the country, which they have citizenship to.

Certainly the *intifada*, which was discussed before, had certain implications on the Arab minority side. Majid al Haj who is a lecturer in the Haifa University asserts that (cited in: Minns & Hijab; 1990) 'we are now standing on the Green Line. Before the *intifada* it was not so easy to balance the two components of our identity [Israeli-Palestinian], but it was possible. But the *intifada* has heightened the confrontation between them.' So it can be argued that the tension between their identity as Palestinians and Israeli citizens have become greater following the *intifada.*

What can be said as a general outcome of the regional and internal developments between the period 1967 and 1993 on the Arab minority's self-definition is that: the national aspect of their identity increased as well as the civic aspect. However there are various interpretations regarding the relationship between the national and civil identities of Arabs of Israel. Darweish and Rigby (1995) categorized the explanations of the scholars in three categories as *conflict model*, *accommodation model* and *collective identity model.*

Conflict model posits constant tension between national and civil identities emphasizing split identity of the Arabs between Israeli and Palestinian-Arab. Accommodation model asserts that Israeli Arabs are both Israeli and Palestinian. They have a dilemma in deciding between, or combining, Israeli and Palestinian identities. The collective identity model argues that interaction between the individual and society must be examined in the context of its historical persistence.

In the light of all the approaches and given history of the Arab minority of Israel between 1967 and 1993, it may be argued that the Arabs of Israel transformed in every field after the abolishment of the military rule in 1966. Historical context had been very determinant in this transformation. Therefore they began to struggle both for their national and civil rights in parallel with their increasing awareness on the national demands and civic rights.

CHAPTER IV

1990s: INCREASED CIVIC AND NATIONAL ASPECTS AMONG THIRD GENERATION

A peace conference on the Middle East was convened in Madrid on 30 October 1991, with the aim of achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement through direct negotiations along two tracks: between Israel and the Arab States and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) ('the land for peace' formula).[28] A series of subsequent negotiations culminated in the mutual recognition between the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian People, and the signing by the two parties of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993. Actually, the talks began in Oslo, Norway on January 20, 1993 with the objective to draft an informal document of basic principles for future peacemaking between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. "Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements" is the official name of the Oslo accords the foundation on which peace negotiations between Israel and the

[28] In the later stages of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, after Israel repulsed the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights and established a bridgehead on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal, international efforts to stop the fighting were intensified. US Secretary of State Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20, 1973 and, together with the Soviet government, the US proposed a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council. The Council met on October 21 at the urgent request of both the US and the USSR, and by 14 votes to none, adopted the resolution on October 22, 1973. Resolution 338 is quite short and calls for: all parties to the fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned "aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East". A cease-fire was arrenged with the efforts of Henry Kissenger's shuttle diplomacy, but the peace negotiations demanded by Resolution 338 would not begin for almost another decade (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history, 2003).

Palestinians were based from 1993 to 2000. The subsequent implementation arrangements include, such as the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces, the elections to the Palestinian Council and the presidency of the Palestinian Authority, the partial release of prisoners and the establishment of a functioning administration in the areas under Palestinian self-rule (http://www.un.org; 2003, Morris; 2001).

The Arab population in Israel gave the Israeli-PLO accords a warm reception. Aside from some fringe elements that objected to the agreement[29], the overall reaction was one of satisfaction and optimism. The Arab MKs and heads of local authorities congratulated the government. The Israeli-Arab mass media showed great enthusiasm to the developments on the peace. Besides, support was shown by the mass rallies in the Arab towns. However, after a while the Arab political figures began to discuss the impact of the peace agreement on the Palestinian-Arabs of Israel.

The start of a political process between Israel and Arab world and the peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israel were the external developments, which had far-reaching implications for the Arab population of Israel. But on the other hand, several internal developments such as; generational shift in the political leadership, consolidation of representative institutions, political pluralism, economic hardship and widening gap between Jews and Arab citizens of Israel, were also affected the Arab population in Israel. According to Rekhess (2002), these changes, the domestic and the external, sharpened the dilemma of national identity faced by the Arabs of Israel.

First of all it should be mentioned that Israel's recognition of the PLO and the Palestinian people, and of their legitimate rights, prompted a great sense of relief on the part of the Arabs of Israel. The important change that this development brought about for the Arabs of Israel was that, their Palestinian identity would not necessarily

[29] Some prominent Israeli-Arab leaders who represent a more militant trend opposed the agreement such as: Sheikh Kamal Katib of Kfar Kana in the Galilee and the Sons of the Village. They criticized Arafat because they found the agreement very weak to be a solution for the Palestinian question. (Rekhess; 1995)

imply disloyalty to or non-identification with the state any longer. Moreover since the basic aim, the peace, was 'nearly' achieved, the focus was shifted to other issues such as: equality in material and ideological sense.

It is a fact that, in the socioeconomic context, the gaps between Jews and Arabs widened after the 1990s. There are two reasons for this situation: accelerated demographic growth, which led to a sharp increase in the needs of the Arab population and discriminatory governmental policy (Rekhess; 2002). While Israeli governments from the start of the 1990s declared their commitment to deepening Jewish-Arab equality, in most cases this remained lip service only. Unemployment and poverty increased during this period. The government failed to develop a sound economic infrastructure in the Arab communities; barely granted them the status of a preferential development region; and did not set up industrial zones in Arab localities. The proportion of Arab governmental employees remained low, and no serious effort was made to solve the employment problems of university graduates in the Arab sector. The status of land use remained frozen. While some progress was made in the area of education, problematic issues remained, e.g., gaps in teaching and enrichment hours, high dropout rates, low achievement on university entrance exams, an absence of infrastructure in the areas of culture and sports. The local municipal councils continued to be in a chronic state of financial distress while the problems of particular sectors, e.g., the Bedouins in the south and Arab residents in cities with mixed Arab-Jewish populations, worsened. Aziz Haidar (1995) who conducted a comparative analysis on economic situation of Arabs asserts that; despite the changes in professional skills and working conditions that have taken place in the employment of Arab workers, large differences remain between them and Jewish workers. Arab workers are in the lowest positions in all branches of the labor market, their working conditions are inferior to those of their Jewish counterparts, and they are much more vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy. Apart from these facts about the socioeconomic situation during the last decade there was also a distress and criticism on the issue of 'dual peripheralism' which intensified increasingly after the Oslo-Accords. As Rekhess (1996) puts it; a feeling of marginality vis-à-vis both the Jewish majority and the Arabs in the territories, who will be the recipients of development budgets in the realm of hundreds of million

dollars'. When it comes to the struggle for the material equality, it can be argued that the Arabs of Israel have become more aware of the economic gap and they have become more prepared to wage a struggle in order to eliminate deprivation and discrimination.

In ideological sphere, the topics like equality of opportunity, true partnership in decision-making, playing an active role in policy making have clearly gained new attention. Therefore the public discussion began about the existence of Israel as a Jewish national state and as a democratic state at the same time. Some Arab intellectuals believe that the state should grant cultural and institutional autonomy to its Arab citizens. Others claim that the only solution to the conflict involves eliminating the Jewish character of the state and turning it into a 'state for all its citizens'. What does this mean 'state for all its citizens'? This means that the rights of the Arabs as a distinct national group will be recognized. As it was mentioned in the previous parts, the Arabs were viewed as a group of individual or as segmented, separated 'minorities' in the past. These national demands of the Arabs of Israel created tension in the national aspect of the both group's identity; Jews and Arabs. The Jewish side has responded to these demands on the discursive level as follows: the elimination of Jewish character of the state may bring a greater identification on the part of the Arabs but simultaneously deprive the Jewish people of their right of self-definition. In other words, Israeli side claims that the desires of the majority will be subverted to those of the minority. This issue has been a public discussion, which has been supported by group of intellectuals. However, it did not take the mass support in Israel. Besides, the Arab political leaders have been more cautious on the issue since they are well aware of the high price this demand would bring. Apparently, they preferred to advocate a subtle position by asserting the definition of the state of Israel as 'the state of the Jewish people and the state of all its citizens' (Rekhess; 1996).

The terms, which have been used by the academicians to describe the political-national orientations of the Arab minority: 'Israelization' and 'Palestinization' began to be understood differently during the post-Oslo period. New content was brought about in the identity definitions of the group. Elie Rekhess

(2002) defines the situation as 'localization of the national struggle' since Palestinization has undergone very important changes. Following the peace negotiations and Israel's recognition of the PLO the awareness on the part of Arab minority of their particular status increased. Israel's recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians created legitimization to the claim for recognition of the separate national status of the Arabs in Israel. So we can argue that the external dimension of the Palestinization, which can be, defined as the tie to PA and to the PLO has decreased however the internal dimension increased. This means that the peace process changed the priorities of the Arab minority in Israel. While for a long time priority was given to a type of Palestinian nationalism, the struggle in the post-Oslo period has been focused on the civic issue. This trend can be evaluated as a new formulation of Israelization process since acceleration of daily and civic level means integration in Israel. Therefore, the early stages of the peace process gave way to ease the internalization of the Israelization. But it should be noted that Israelization in this context does not mean 'assimilation' or 'full integration' thus it means increasing awareness on the situation as a citizen and as a member of a collective group and seeking to express their demands within the Israeli context.

In this sense, the social and political activism on the part of the Arab community which increased within the Israeli system is a manifestation of the new trend which carries the Palestinian content but reflects itself as a new form of Israelization. In this context, the end of the *first intifada* and the political repercussions of the Oslo agreements began the present era of political and social activism evidenced by the proliferation of new NGOs devoted to improving all aspects of life in the Arab community.

Actually Palestinian-Arab NGOs appeared on the political and social scene by the 1970s and continued through 1980s but the large-scale of proliferation occurred in the 1990s. 656 Arab non-profit organizations were officially registered with the state in 10 years. Therefore it is a fact that today the NGOs are growing in strength in Israel. This change is partly related with the general trend of NGOs across the globe and the Israeli civil society in particular. Since the1970s, oppositionist and independent Jewish civil society began to emerge in the Israel. Israeli-Arab

community for its part began to adopt this trend under the domestic state of affairs. Presently, it is possible to talk about a dynamic Palestinian Arab civil society arena in Israel.

Civil society is the sphere mediating between the individual and the state composed of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communication (Cohen & Arato 1992). Today there are 7 important Arab human rights groups within Israel. Ittijah: the Uninon of Arab Community Based Association currently has 44 member organizations in the Arab Palestinian NGO sector (Appendix II). Civil-society organizations also played a significant and direct role in the election campaigns promoting complementary agendas to those of the parties. Especially by the 1999 elections their activities increased. Al-Ahali was established a few months before the 1999 elections. The project has constituted the most directly involvement of a Palestinian institution in the process of voting in the national elections. The organization of which al-Ahali project is part of, is named 'the Center for Community Development', designated to promote the full participation of Palestinian citizens in Israel in all areas of civil society. The other project of organizations which followed al-Ahali includes promoting Arab women participation in civil society, work with women of the unrecognized villages in the Negev, promoting youth leadership, and coping with geographical obstacles to civic participation. Al-Ahali defined about 40.000 Arabs in peripheral locations who did not vote in 1996 as the project's target population. Field activists worked for persuasion of these people to vote as well as transportation for voters who had to vote in distance from their homes. It is reported that al-Ahali achieved eighty percent success (Ittijah website). Al-Ahali represents a model of empowering the community's grassroots.

Among the Arab NGOs Adalah (Justice in Arabic)-The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel which was established in 1996 constitutes a significant position. In short period of time the organization has managed to become to a recognized address for legal consultation of over issues of collective rights of the Arab minority in Israel.

The other civil-society organization Mosawa, which means equality in Arabic, was established in 1997. It is an advocacy association designated to affect governmental policies and state laws towards increasing equality for Arabs in Israel. It aims to empower Palestinian organizations and groups vis-à-vis state institutions. Mosawa concentrates its activity on the method of data collection and analysis, in order to provide the Palestinian and Jewish public in Israel with accurate information and possible alternative policies for the minority's situation (Peretz & Peretz; 1998). Like al-Ahali and Adalah, Mosawa does not identify with any political party. However in contrast to al-Ahali it did not aim to influence the number of Arab voters in the elections. Through NGO activities great amount of development has been achieved within the Arab community in Israel. Especially of October 2000 events provided Palestinian-Arab NGO sector with an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to work together as a unified force advocating for the civil and political rights of Palestinians in Israel and in solidarity with the Palestinian Diaspora.

What happened in politics in concrete during 1990s also should be mentioned to understand the trends which were discussed previously in economic, ideological and NGO level. As it was mentioned in the beginning of this part following the Israel-PLO accords of September 1993, demands which had been strived for so many years by the Arabs of Israel were achieved to a great extent such as the recognition of PLO and to agree on withdrawing from West Bank and Gaza. So the level of expectations of the Arab population for the fulfillment of equality had risen considerably since 1993.

This trend was strongly influenced by the Rabin government. Rabin admitted that the government had neglected the Arab sector and promised to do everything possible to close the gaps between the Jewish and Arab communities. However, the actions which were taken were far from satisfaction on the part of the Arab population and insufficient to substantively close the gap between the Jewish and the Arab sectors of Israel.[30] The situation further deteriorated under the Likud

[30] Developments took place in the fields of transportation, tourism, health, labor, and welfare. Of special significance was the Knesset decision in 1993 to equalize the child allowances paid by the

government established in 1996. This state of neglect had been very helpful for the Islamic movement during this period. The Islamic movement provided practical solutions to daily hardships. While secular activists led campaigns of verbal protest, the Islamists showed that people could do things for themselves similar to the NGO structure, rather then clamor for the authorities to help (Rekhess; 2000, 188). The proof of the success of the Islamic Movement came into being especially in the 1989 and 1993 municipal elections.

The integration of the Arab community into Israeli politics had been significantly enhanced since the early 1990s. Participation to the elections increased especially in 1996.[31] In 1996 Arab representation in the Knesset reached an unprecedented record of 12 members. (five representing Hadash – Democratic Front for Peace and Equality; four representing the Arab United List; two representing Labor; and one, Meretz). This shows that Arab population seems to have opted clearly for the Knesset seeing it important tool for political activity. In the 1997 Tel Aviv University poll (Program on Arab Politics in Israel; 1997) 44% of the respondents said that most effective method to achieve equality for the Arabs is parliamentary activity by the members of Knesset. The same result is significantly appeared in my own research. The respondents were asked "What represent the Palestinians in Israel the best?" All of them said that the Arab member of Knesset represent the Palestinians in Israel best then follows the other bodies such as NGOs.

NGOs were given great importance in representing Arab community's standpoint and supported and appreciated in the full sense by the interviewees in this study. However a few of the respondents argue that although NGOs are doing a good job, a 'real' and 'effective' civil society has not merged within the Arab community in Israel yet.

National Insurance Institute. Until then, Israeli Arab families were denied the extra child payments accorded to Jewish families whose members served in the army. Pressing issues of importance, such as education [classrooms, curriculum, rate of dropouts], the resettlement of Bedouin, unrecognized Arab villages, housing municipal budgets, and economic development remained problematic. (Rekhess; 2000)

[31] Electoral participation rate increased 69 percent in 1992 to 77 percent in 1996. General electoral participation was 79.3 percent. (Rekhess; 2000)

In addition to the parties -Arab Democratic Party and Hadash- two new parties emerged by the 1996 elections. The first one was the Islamic movement. Despite their activism since the 1980s in the local elections they have not entered the general elections until 1996. The second one was the National Democratic Alliance, which was headed by Dr. Azmi Bishara. He is a former communist activist and lecturer in philosophy in Bir Zeit University of West Bank. He is a strong supporter of the concept of turning Israel into a state of all its citizens. The emergence of NDA is a reflection of the new trends in the realm of ideology which was mentioned before. The party advocates granting of a special recognized status of "national minority" to the Arab population of Israel which would be expressed by cultural autonomy. In the interviews with the young generation educated Arabs for this research Azmi Bishara were mentioned most of the times when they were explaining the demands for Arabs in Israel. One of the interviewee (Sami) who identifies himself with this movement explains that:

> Well, it is a very new trend. Logically it is very convincing; it has a very good leader. Azmi Bishara is simply a genius, he can convince everybody easily. In this movement, the focus is the democracy of Israel as a Jewish state and the rights of the Palestinians as the natives of this land. The weakness of this movement is because people are too afraid to believe. They try but they are still afraid to believe. ….I worked in this party I know everything about it. Lots of our supporters are young people, I love our young people. But also most of the intellectuals support our party. I mean Azmi Bishara's generation, most of the intellectuals belong to his generation. …… they want to build our party on the young people. Because we believe the young people suffered less from this inferiority complex. Arabs in Israel became much more confident in general. This generation, because of the political hole, which they are living in makes them be more racist than it was before. Israel as a Jewish state was less racist in the 1970s because it felt less danger from the Arabs living in it. It didn't believe that these 'poor' Arabs, small minority which exactly doing what they want them to do will one day try to do things differently. By the way the whole discourse of Israel is not a democracy is a new trend. People used to talk about it also in 1950s and 1960s but the first man who brought it to the popular discourse has been Azmi Bishara in the 1990s. Before Bishara it really did not exist.

Despite the growth in Arab representation in the Knesset in 1996 and the profound strengthening of the Arab parties, the outcome of the 1996 elections was that the Arab political system maintained its traditional state of marginality. As part of the opposition, the Arab Knesset members remained powerless and unable to practically influence the course of events, either domestically or in the Israeli-Palestinian sphere. The assassination of Rabin and the rise to power of Likud Party that represents the hawkish approach in Israeli polity created an atmosphere of disorientation hopelessness on the side of the Arab population of Israel.

The following elections did not bring more to the Arab population as well. With the help of the Arab votes, Barak of Labor Party won the elections in May 1999. The Arab parties won ten seats in the Knesset. Expectations were reawakened following the elections to the 15th Knesset in May 1999 when Ehud Barak was elected prime minister. But Barak turned his back on the Arab parties, despite having being given a massive 95% of the Arab vote, and the Arab parties' hopes to participate in coalition negotiations were quickly dashed (Rekhess; 2002). Although the Barak government set up a ministerial committee to deal with the affairs of Arab citizens, and several operative recommendations in the area of economic development were adopted, implementation was delayed. As of late 2001, a four-year, 4-billion-shekel development plan, approved toward the end of Barak's term, was far from implementation.

Disregard of the governments toward the Arab minority, gave way to diffuculties for the Arab community but at the same time evoked a perception of exclusion and alienation on the part of the Arabs in Israel. Adel Mana (1996) correctly observed that since the Oslo process began, the Arab population in Israel did not perceive any kind of conceptual change in the attitude of the Jewish leadership of the state toward the Arab minority to parallel the change in its attitude toward the Palestinians in the territories.

In the light of thsese conditions with the October 2000 events a new era began in the relations between Arab community and Israel and particularly in the pattrens of struggle. The *second intifada* which is widely called as Al-Aksa *intifada* erupted in 29 September 2000 following the visit of the right wing leader Sharon to the holy place Al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem. Violent clashes erupted between Israeli forces and Palestinians evolved into a *second intifada* and ended the Camp David talks which took place between Israel and PA under US mediation in the summer of 2000. Israeli-Arab demonstrations in support of the uprising deteriorated into violent clashes and led to death of 13 Arab citizens of Israel. The October 2000 events marked the first time in decades that such violence was used by Israeli police against Arab citizens of the state. In November 2000, the commission of inquiry which was

mentioned in the first chapter (footnote 3) was established to investigate the events. This initiative greatly caused by intense pressure from Arab MKs, non-governmental organizations and the Palestinian community.

Following the accumulation of grievances on the part of the Arabs of Israel as a result of the October 2000 events the socio-political atmosphere has changed. In prime-ministerial elections of February 2001 the participation rate for the elections decreased to 23%. The reason for this is that; for Arab citizens of Israel, the choice between Barak and Sharon afforded no political option. The unity government created by Sharon is facing the end of Oslo process, as political negotiations have broken down and massive violence rages in the West Bank and Gaza and the suicide bombings increases inside Israel.

These internal developments reinforced the national consciousness of the Arab citizens of Israel and created awareness on their national component of their identity. In other words, their struggle for equal rights and treatment began to include the national awareness. National struggle of their own began to rise within the borders of Israel demanding equal treatment as citizens of Israel on a group level. In this state of affairs, the increased national awareness has been represented in several spheres of life one of them has been the commemorations of *Al-Nakba*. In an effort to revive their heritage, an increasing number of books and monographs are being published documenting the history of the Palestinian-Arab society in Israel. Another facet of the reconstruction of the national past is the new trend of tours organized by the Arab Cultural Association based in Nazareth, which is identified with the NDA, to the sites of destroyed villages. These "in-search-of-roots" tours, which are organized mostly for school children, follow various routes and are conducted around *Nakba* Day.

Manifestations of the new trend which prevailed through the last decade can be summarized in three major points: the first one is the examination of the character of the State of Israel as a Jewish democratic state, and the positing of alternative models (such as state of all its citizens, autonomy or binational model) to the previous one. The second one is that a new conceptual approach to the status of the

Arab population in the state based on its self-perception as a national minority with collective rights. The third point, which manifests the new trend, is that the reconsidering of 1948 question -the national awakening on the question of land ownership, the right to return to uprooted villages and the impulse to commemorate the *Nakba.*

The respondents which were interviewed for this study expressed their views on the issues which were discussed through this part and their own framing is used to illuminate the socio-political agenda of the era. In their own narrative they tell the conditions and policies which they are being exposed to and their point of view as a young educated member of this group. The general tendency is that; on the one hand they are nationalistic in their interpretation as a member of Arab minority and want to be recognized collectively on the other hand; they are well integrated to the Israeli system as the young professional citizens and they demand full equality in the system.

CHAPTER V

RESEARCH ANALYSIS: MAKING THE YOUNG GENERATION EDUCATED ARABS SPEAK

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter the results of the in-depth interviews conducted during the period June-August 2002 with nine members of young generation educated Arab citizens of Israel are examined. Findings are discussed under several thematic headings such as: national-civic identity interpretation, general attitudes and tendencies in social, cultural and political issues, obstacles to powersharing and demands and aspirations as a group. Individual-level analysis is used in order to reflect on how young generation highly educated Arab citizens they themselves perceive and perform citizenship in terms of legal rights, identity and civic virtue. The purpose is to give an account of the feelings, attitudes and behaviors of this group of citizens with regards to equality, justice and democracy that they experience as a member of a minority group.

Daily life experiences are underlined and domestic and regional developments are discussed in relation to their impacts on the interpretation of the respondents. Besides divergent and convergent parts among the respondents are demonstrated but main focus is put on the common ground they share in terms of social and cultural aspirations. Information on how they view Israeli Jewish majority and the frequency and density of social contact with the Israeli Jewish society highlights the extent of their integration in the wider society as a young member of the Arab minority. The positions they hold in the public sphere illuminates great amount of insight on their standpoint in political issues.

In parallel with the hypothesis that was put forward at the beginning the general tendency among the third generation can be summarized as that their awareness on civil rights increased simultaneously with the increase in their awareness in national aspect. Moreover they are well aware of the constraints and obstacles to powersharing within the Israeli system and therefore they question the ideological structure of the state and blame its Jewish character as the main reason for their unequal position. This attitude which emerged in 1990s following the Oslo Accords, has been widely accepted by the younger generation, in this sense the changings in the perceptions of Arab sector can be best followed by focusing on the so-called third generation. In the light of the historical turning points the characteristics of three generations were demonstrated. Now let us re-examine the 1990s era by discussing the first hand information that was gathered. By this way, what is fixed what is fluid in their identity formation can be portrayed and new demands they ask for as citizens of the Israel can be illuminated.

5.2. Jewish Homeland versus Palestinian-Arab Homeland

Arab minority of Israel as it was discussed before constitute a 'homeland minority' and they came under a newly established sovereign Israeli state in 1948. Put it differently, their status has changed from a majority to a minority in their own homeland within a very short period of time. The state of war with the Arab states from the very beginning is the evidence of the mutual perception on the Arab side that 'Israel does not have a right to exist' because in their view 'whole Palestine is the homeland of the Arab people'. This perception has been changed to a great extent in time when the hope to demolish the State of Israel was vanished in the region. Especially after the 1967 War as it was discussed in chapter 3, Israel came to be recognized as an indisputable dominant power in the region. From then on, despite the criticisms on the legitimacy of it, Israel began to be considered though reluctantly as a 'fact' in the region. The Peace Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Israel and Jordan and the PLO-Israel negotiations are the evidences of the change in the political attribution of the hostile Arab world. However the legitimacy of Israel is

still the major controversial issue in the perception of the Arab side. Especially, radical groups within PA and the larger Arab world adopt the view that Israel is not legitimate and they struggle for its demolishment.

When the Arab citizens of Israel are considered in this context the issue becomes more different. They have been the legal citizens of the state from the beginning so their questioning of the same issue constitutes a strict dilemma for their identification with the state, which they are citizens of. Today's view concerning Israel's right to exist and its legitimacy is far from total rejection on the part of the Arab minority within Israel. Because they have been the group, which were exposed to the reality of Israel's existence more than any others. When their perception is asked on this issue the respondents generally show a great deal of accommodationist approach stating that Israel is a fact but they have reservations regarding its structure. Under which conditions State of Israel continues to exist is the main problem in their view. In addition to this, rather than its legitimacy within the 1948 borders the legitimacy of Israel's existence in West Bank and Gaza since 1967 is much more concerned and it was referred very often by the respondents.

The common tendency observed is; accepting the State of Israel as a homeland both for the Jews and Arabs and in particular for the Palestinians. However it should be noted that, their acceptance refers to the present situation. Historically they do not accept the claim that Israel is the homeland of the Jews. They underline this point in their answers. As one of the respondent (Jasmine) expresses 'This is the land of the Palestinians not the Jews. They exist but it is not their right to be here and own this land. They wouldn't have been here. This is not fair, this land belongs to the Palestinians. But they exist here now and no one can change this fact'. Another respondent (Salim) states that 'it has been an Arab land for hundreds of years, so it is the homeland only of the Arabs'. They emphasize the historical context and point out that the Jews are the 'newcommers' of the land. Since the Jews exist now, they tend to accept the present situation.

The social and cultural integration also have an impact in the evaluations. The interviewee Jasmine who is from a solely Arab town Umm Al-Fahm but lives in Tel Aviv at the moment defines the changes in her attitude as follows:

> For the past the answer should be 'no' but for these days 'yes'. It is also related to my own experience because in the past I had no contact with the Jewish people now I have a chance to be with Jews a lot so now I have an idea about how they are. So after I started to get closer to the Jewish society my perception changed a bit. I started to believe that they are here and it is also their homeland unfortunately.

Only one of the respondent stated that it is the homeland of the Jews as well as the Arabs. So we can argue that deep in their perception they do not accept it as a homeland of the Jews, but when they consider the existing situation which has been prevalent since 1948 they accept Jewish presence and parallel to this Israel's right to exist with its people on this land. One of the respondent Sami, argued that the problem is the question of Zionist discourse. In his view, the statement which says 'Israel does not have a right to exist' does not mean necessarily that Jewish people do not have a right to exist.

> The state is only an institutional organization that people can live in it. It doesn't say anything about the people. If you ask about the people all the people have the right to exist. Nobody doubts. The Israel's existence as a Jewish state on the Palestinian land in my point of view is not legitimate.

Similar to this view another respondent criticizes the nature of the Nationality Law and the Jewish immigration regulations and posits that, since the state is created as a homeland for the Jews intentionally as a result of a plan, it is not legitimate. He argues,

> Making this land a homeland of Jewish people is not legitimate in my point of view. Of course Jewish people that now lives in Israel has a right for being a nation and as a nation they have rights. But this should not include all the Jewish people all around the world who are simply do not know anything about the place and the people. They are not part of the state. Bringing all kinds of different people to Israel and telling them this is your country is not right.

So he concludes that State of Israel with its regulations and character is not legitimate and can be demolished. He argues that this does not mean of course to clean all Jewish people. In other words; he claims that as a state it is not legitimate due to its problematic nature which constitutes itself as the state of the Jewish people.

The distinction between people and state is emphasized here by the respondent, in his point of view as a people no doubt they have a right to exist and right to have a state. But he criticized it as a Jewish state for all the Jews of the world. Jewish character of the state was mentioned in almost all of the answers for the questions, which will be discussed again under the other headings.

When they were asked how they view the Zionist movement in its past and present forms, and whether they see it as a national liberation movement, most of the responses argue that the Zionist movement contains fascistic and racist ingredients. Even if the moderate answers who see it as a kind of national liberation movement for the Jewish people express their concern that Israel's ignorance on the liberation movement of Palestinians. Referring to the occupied territories they criticize the suppression of the Palestinian national cause. The basic claim is that, the independent state of Israel for the Jews was established more than fifty years ago however Palestinians who are the homeland people still do not have an independent and recognized state of their own. Concerning their own position as a group of minority they also express their concern. Rather than the Zionist movement, the implementation of Zionist ideals in expense of the Palestinian cause and the organization of the state as a Jewish state which implements preferential treatment toward the Jews is unacceptable and problematic.

It is also argued by one of the respondent is that the Zionist movement which emerged at the end of the 19th century and led to establishment of a Jewish state in the end, is a colonialist movement rather than a national liberation movement. He advocates this idea as follows:

> I don't consider Zionism as a national liberation movement, it has few components of different nationalisms but it has also a lot of components of a colonialist movement. It carries similarities with the European version of colonialism. In their writings thinkers of the Zionist movement use simply colonialist discourse. You can find it in anything that was written by Herzl[32] and others. The Arabs in their books are described like the people of African countries which has no national aspirations or any way how to improve or do things alone. They believe that the Arabs needed the Jewish people. They brought the wide European culture to the less progressed, underdeveloped communities. Colonial discourse was totally legitimate at their times. And it really still exists nowadays. Israel and the Jews think that they made a lot of good things to Arabs. They think in this way and Arabs are so angry about

[32] Theodor Herlz is the founder of the Zionism in the 19th century.

> it. So they are all the time surprised when Arabs do anything against Israel. Because they think that they brought culture to this place. There are lots of colonial components in the formation of the contemporary Israeli society. They established a Jewish State ignoring the populations that were living here. Such things can only occur in the colonial mentality. They ignore the whole people, Herlz had been three times here [Jaffa] before he wrote his book and he didn't see the people. So we can call the Zionist movement as a colonialist movement first of all and then a national movement. It has several components from national movement and colonial movement. Mix of the two still operates.

Land is a problematic and sensitive issue in the Israeli-Arab context and also for the Arab minority within Israel which witnessed the confiscation of lands by the state through their history. So the questions pertaining to Israel's legitimacy, land issue is referred very often. Apart from the issue of legitimacy, the answer for the question of 'whose homeland is this' reflects the basis of the subordinate group's national background and history. But acceptance of existing situation is the general attitude which can be called as a 'rational' attitude as a citizen of the country. In this sense more moderate responses to this question concentrate on the condition of state's existence. For instance, following the acknowledgement of the state's right to exist they put forward additional statements such as: 'ignoring the international human rights laws' 'overlooking the Arab minority' or 'without treating the Arab citizens in equal manner'. This approach gives clues on the importance and centrality of their own position in their perceptions as an Arab minority group within the state. Their agenda as the Arab population of Israel is asserted in different contexts, and they answer every question in relation with their status. This can be evaluated as an increased self-awareness on the part of the respondents as a citizen and a member of national/ethnic minority. Besides, since the respondents are highly educated people they show great interpretative ability and confidence while expressing their views and in putting in order of the historical facts and priorities of their own.

5.3. Civic Identity versus National Identity

As it was discussed in the Chapter 4, by the 1990s both national and civic content in the identity definition of the Arab minority of Israel increased under the impact of the external and internal developments. While the manifestations of the increased civic awareness among the respondents reflect itself mostly in the

expressions pertaining to areas of discrimination, the national aspect can be traced in the responses pertaining to identity definition.

The respondents were asked three sets of question on identity definition. At the end of the interview they were requested to explain their views in detail on the identity definition of themselves, mainly on the Palestinian national identity once again. By this way the overall perception was controlled.

The first set of questions (Q-B1, B2) were formulated as closed questions. They were asked first of all whether the term 'Israeli' describe their identity. All the respondents stated that the term 'Israeli' is inappropriate to define their identity. Two of the interviewees expressed that the term Israeli describes them partly but not fully so they said it is not sufficient to name them. Following this question they were asked if the term 'Palestinian' is appropriate to describe their identity. On the contrary to the first questions all the respondents asserted that the term is appropriate to define their identity. Only one of the respondent commented that the term Palestinian alone might not be sufficient to define them.

The second set of questions (Q-B3) on identity was also formulated as closed questions. They were requested to choose among the nationality affiliated identity terms which were shown to them. Although the question seemed to be formulated as closed one actually they explain their comments for each of the term so this helped very much to understand the logic behind their choice. The identity terms which were shown to them consist of; Arab, Israeli-Arab, Israeli, Palestinian, Palestinian-Arab, Israeli-Palestinian, Palestinian citizen in Israel, 1948 Palestinians, Palestinian Minority in Israel. While some of the respondents chose two terms at the same time, few of them preferred to explain their attitude with their past and present forms and talked about a shift in their identity definition with reference to the proposed terms for their identity.

The general tendency is towards the term 'Palestinian citizen in Israel'. Six respondents without hesitation chose it at first glance. The second most chosen term

was Palestinian-Arab and third most chosen term was the Palestinian-Israeli. The rest of the terms were not chosen by any of the respondent.

The ones who define themselves as the 'Palestinian citizens of Israel' emphasized that they see themselves first of all as Palestinians but as a different version of it since they grew up in Israel as a citizen of the country. Although they admit that they have been exposed to the social and political life in Israel through their life and studied in Hebrew in the Israeli universities the citizenry identity reflects a very limited part of their identity definitions. They call it as a 'formality'. They carry the passport of State of Israel but even in the passport and identity cards it is indicated that they are Arabs. They pointed out the fact that they constitute a different national group within Israel therefore the term only Israeli citizen is not enough to define them. They preferred to be called as Palestinians who are Israeli citizens.

The majority of the respondents pointed out that the term Arab has a very wide connotation and does not reflect their identity completely. They say they belong to the Arab culture but they do not share everything with the rest of the Arab world in particular. Being Palestinian means that person is an Arab at the same time. So they assert that they have distinct identity as Palestinians. It was found out that the ones, who use nationalistic expressions throughout the interviews and strictly argue that Israel is only the homeland of the Arabs historically, adopted the term Palestinian-Arab for their identity definition. Two of the respondents show great similarities at this point arguing also that Zionism is a fascistic and racist movement. It can be argued that affiliation to the Arab nation constitutes the primordial attachment in their identity formation. While also the Palestinian content with its changing forms connotes the same primordial ties. Almost all of the respondents mentioned either Arabs or Palestinians as their origin during the interviews. This answer 'Palestinian-Arab' shows much about the need to emphasize the Arab origin but at the same time distinguishing the Palestinian identity in particular and reflects the ethnic and national affiliation precisely.

The term 'Palestinian-Israeli' was also expressed by two of the respondents. As it was mentioned in 3.1 and 4 this term is began to be used increasingly in the recent decades by the Arab population of Israel. On the contrary to the Israeli official terminology for the group, which calls them as Israeli-Arabs, they preferred to be called as Israeli-Palestinian highlighting the Palestinian content in their identity as well as mentioning their being Israeli.

'Israeli-Palestinian' identity definition was criticized by one of the respondent (Mira) very severely who expressed her concern on the naming of her identity. She stated that,

> I have a problem to name it. I don't succeed to call myself 'Israeli-Palestinian'-. How can they go together? Because after all Palestinian Authority is on the way to an independent state therefore there will be a contradiction with this definition.

The same interviewee follows her argument by telling the reason for not finding any identity definition for herself;

> The term Arab more specifically 'Arab Woman' is also problematic for myself because of other Arab countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia etc. So what am I? We are being called as the Arabs of 1948. It sounds reasonable to a certain extent but the new generations which I am also part of it, grew up in this state are very much influenced from the Israeli life. We speak perfect Hebrew, we go to the same clubs and restaurants on the other hand the Israelis do not know what is happening to us. In short it is very difficult since I don't have a precise answer concerning my national identity. Actually I chose to follow my personal identity which is built on values that I adopted: respect for the human being and his/her rights to live. It does not mean that I make things easy for myself. I have not stopped to search. Since I am not a politician I don't need to deal with this issue 24 hours a day.

Shift in identity definition was also pointed out in the interviews. George who is a Christian Arab indicated that under the impact of the developments in and outside of Israel he experienced a shift in his identity definition in time. He stated that earlier when he was a child he used to call himself as Israeli-Arab. The reason for this kind of definition he expressed is the dominant Israeli official taught in the school curriculum. However when he grew up and came to the age of 18- 19 he began to see himself as Israeli-Palestinian. When the Palestinian content is added to his definition the 1st *intifada* was going on in the territories. He stated that for the time being he prefers to call himself as Palestinian citizen in Israel. This interviewee who is now 30 years old, is a good example for the suggested argument which were

discussed in the previous parts concerning shift in identity definitions in line with the historical and political contexts. Besides at this point the personal history of the individual is also the important criteria in conceiving his/her own status.

> If you ask me to say what I am, I prefer to call myself as 'Palestinian citizen in Israel'. If you have asked me the same question two years ago I would have said 'Israeli-Palestinian'. If you ask me how I was defining myself when I was a kid my answer would be an Israeli-Arab. You see what is happening to me? This is interesting. Because the things surround you influence you. When the situation is bad you feel bad you don't give chances (hope) but when the situation is good you can give keeping more chances and hope. Today once again we are living in a complicated situation. I don't know two years later what would be my answer. The things can change.

The third set of question (Q-B4) pertaining identity definition was about the priorities they attribute to the components of their identity. The same respondent, who was cited above, also emphasized that the priorities may change over time under different circumstances. He expressed that Israeli identity does not count for him in a strong sense especially after the October 2000 events. He says,

> The problem is that they; the country does not give me the good mood of being Israeli citizen. Although I would like to… It is my dream to be a full citizen of Israel really but the country does not give me the appropriate condition.

His explanation can be considered as supporting the claim of circumstantialist approach. However the basic affiliation 'Arabness' which he expressed as his origin remains constant in each of his identity definition. In other words, circumstances operate to a great extent on the fixed components of identity.

With the questions on priorities of identity components, what was assumed following the Landau's argument (1994) was that there are four circles of identity component for the Arab minority in Israel: religious, national, ethnic and civic. Being Muslim or Christian is the largest circle, which is shared, by millions of people across the globe. Then comes the Arabness which is shared by all of the Arab world. The third circle becomes narrower and constitute itself as the Palestinian national identity. Then the smallest circle is the civic identity which is shared with the citizens of Israel.

The order of circles from the larger to the smaller was only followed by one of respondent Jasmine who is a Muslim religious person. She stated that she sees herself first of all as a Muslim then Arab and then as a Palestinian. She refrained from defining her identity as Israeli in her response to this question. In her previous answer she adopted the Palestinian citizen of Israel but when it is asked in another form she said the Israeli identity does not reflect her or in other words she does not give any priority to her Israeli identity as a citizen.

Another respondent Falestin who defines herself as a 'Palestinian-Arab' and who is very nationalistic refused to put the components of her identity in an order. She argues that there is one and only identity of hers which is Palestinian-Arab. Moreover she did not want to tell her religion in the demographic information part (Q-A). During the second session of the interview when she was telling a story of her mother it was revealed out that she is Muslim.

The logic of the question was criticized by one of the respondent who defends the idea that identities do not have priorities. Sami who is a graduate student at Middle Eastern History & Political Science argued that the priorities pertaining identity may change from person to person and from situation to situation. He said,

> None of them has a priority. I do not think that identity is not something you go and buy from a pharmacy. It really differs for any person I believe, where he is and which situation he is in. If I go to mosque my Muslim identity will have the priority. It depends on where I am and what I am doing. I cannot generalize it. This is the fault of social sciences concerning priorities of identities.

Except for the Muslim religious respondent who gives the priority to her Muslim identity and the respondent who refused to give priority to any of his identity, the rest of the respondents put their national identity 'Palestinian' in the first order. The findings revealed out parallelism with the hypothesis that the Palestinian content in their identity definition constitutes a greater importance. Ethnic/national affiliation constitutes the basis in their definition of identity.

Regarding their civic identity, the findings demonstrated the fact that; although putting it in the third or fourth order, the vast majority of the respondents

include the ‘Israeli citizen’ in their identity definition. Above all, as it was explained they prefer to call themselves as ‘Palestinian citizens in Israel’ while answering the previous question concerning their identity (Q-B3). It is worth to mention that, they emphasized their civic attachment by referring themselves as ‘citizens’ of the state. National and civic aspects of their identity manifested clearly themselves together by the definition ‘Palestinian citizen in Israel’.

How the respondents perceive their attachment to State of Israel reveals their conception regarding their civic and national identity. A certain level of conflict is observed in the responses to the question ‘Do you feel that Israel is your own country?’. Their first reaction is totally rejection toward this statement. Only two of them tended to accept the Israel ‘partly’ as their own country after they asserted their reservations and concerns. They were asked to define their perception on the issue in detail and the question was asked in subcategories form once more. By this way they were made to speak how they see their national and civic attachment to the country. They told their belongingness is not identified nationally within this state and moreover culturally and socially they feel no identification with the majority and specifically with the state. Sami explains this situation as follows:

> I don’t feel that I may have anything to do with this organization called Israel. Nothing seriously. It was build as a Jewish state for the Jewish people. Everything it tries to improve got to with these things: Jews and Zionism. This has nothing to do with me. Economically I don’t have a choice. There is no Arab market inside Israel. Israel destroyed anything that could have made possible any development within the market. It confiscated the land so we can have no farmers. It confiscated all of the money of the people. So economically I am totally Israeli and have to be totally integrated.

Sami who also accepts the Israel partly as his own country pointed out the fact that economically they are required to act in the Israeli system since they have no any other chance. Although they have criticisms for any kind of identification with the state general tendency is towards to accept of the State of Israel as a citizen. Their perception regarding their civic identity is towards identifying themselves with the civic identity of the State. They mostly support their standpoint simply by telling that they have Israeli passports which identify their legal attachment to the state. At this point they question the status of the Arab minority within the Israeli system and argue that their full identification with the state can only be possible by changing the

definition of the state as Jewish state. Even in the ID cards they are identified as Arabs and a distinct group but their status is far from equal recognition as a group they claim. Therefore they asserted that they have difficulties in identifying themselves with the State. Apart from the civil and political rights they enjoy there are several obstacles to power sharing in all spheres of life which prevents their full integration and leave them as partly identified with the state. As a result of this situation they claim that their civic identity is Israeli however it constitutes a problematic case for their part. Increased civic awareness on the part of the Israeli Arab group which has been prevalent among the younger generation is the reason for this conclusion. Despite their acceptance of the Israeli civic identity they question it by putting forward the other aspects such cultural, national and social.

The common ground is that they can not identify themselves with the state socially, culturally and nationally but when it comes to the territorial attachment and claim they also share the same view which fully asserts territorial attachment to the country. Concerning territorial attachment to the country Sami argues that ‘it is my own country but I don't call it Israel’. This point of view was also reflected in the previous part while discussing the homeland perceptions of the respondents.

The importance of circumstances appears at this point once again. In the solely Arab towns they have less problematic perception regarding their national and social identification since they come across less with the Jewish cultural and social life. But in the mixed-cities the identification with the state and its culture becomes harder.

As to conclude the civic identity and national identity of the Arabs is in a state of dilemma and the responses support the fact that awareness in both of them is increasing among the younger generations. The increased civic aspect in their identity prevailed itself also in the answers to the questions which are related with areas of discrimination which will be discussed in the following subheading in detail.

5.4. Areas of Discrimination and Demands of Equality

The respondents uttered throughout the interview in several ways the areas of discrimination in which Palestinian citizens of Israel have been exposed to. The questioning of their own status as citizens of Israel and the increased civic awareness on the part of the group reveals itself also at this point.

None of the interviewee claimed satisfaction with the degree of civic and democratic rights given to Arabs in Israel. They also show their dissatisfaction regarding the quality of services and development given to Arabs in Israel. Relative deprivation is seen in their explanations in most of the occasions. They portrayed the social welfare system and the standards of life in Israel as being good compared to other countries in the world and far much better than the Middle Eastern countries however they still claim that their position as a group within the system can be considered as disadvantaged. Salim says,

> Israel gives lots of services to its citizens. I am satisfied with services in the cities. I think it ignores lots of the Arabs inside it especially the Arabs in Negev and Beer Sheva especially the Bedouins in the rural areas. But on the whole Israel gives very good services to its citizens. Especially the health services are very good. Welfare funds are great in Israel. Israel tries to be a welfare state. Still wants to keep the components of the welfare system. Most of the countries have forgotten about it. It also provides very good education services. But in compared to Jewish majority I am not satisfied with the services given to Arabs. We don't have one hospital for the million of Arab inside the country. We have hundreds of people with Ph.D degrees but do not work because they have their Ph.D in biology, chemistry or any positive science subject. Although this discrimination is well known in every field Israel also gives services. But it gives to individuals not to groups. Our fight nowadays is try to get our rights as group. Not as individuals because this is something better. If the country gives you rights as a group you get more and you get the things, which are better in quality. You can develop your culture since your culture is better for you. But above all, the services that the Arabs in Israel get are much better than most of the services that any population gets in the Middle East.

On similar lines the other interviewee Wadi notes that the quality of services are only sufficient for a part for the Arab citizens in Israel. In his own words he explains 'it is satisfying fifty percent, because it is not very good but can be considered as still good enough'.

General tendency is to emphasize the economical gap between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority within Israel. But concerning democratic and civic

rights given to Arabs they are more critical. Nature of democracy and the Jewish character of the state are criticized very severely at this point. It is stated by all of the interviewees that Israel's claim of being a democracy is a problematic issue since it ignores the Arab minority within Israel and can not succeed to provide equality for all of its citizens. Sami asserts,

> I don't think that there is a democracy in Israel and I don't think that Israel views Arabs inside Israel as a group or gives them any group right. But it gives them individual rights which are not bad at all. They get education and health services and infrastructure services. I think Israel make these not just because of it thinks that it is their right. It gives them these services and makes them quiet not because it thinks that it should give them. This is why all the Israeli ministers all the time tell the Arabs why Israel is so good for them. Because their rights are not given to them because they are citizens. Israel all the time gives the Arabs this feeling that it made a favor with its democracy. It always says that I am a Jewish State, you are not Jewish and I also give you something. Perception of the official people is that these rights do not belong to Arabs. They are making a favor to them. They think 'Look how good we are, how democratic we are'. It is nice for the Arabs in their point of view.

Following this argument he also blames the mass society of Palestinians inside Israel. He finds the Palestinian society passive in uttering the faults and ignorance of the Israeli system.

> Very big part of the mistake is being done by the Palestinians themselves. Palestinians do not bring into discourse the racism of the state. This is because of the inferiority complex inside Israel. Usually when they go out of the state they try to tell everybody in the Arab world or abroad how good is Israel.

Their demand of equality in all aspects of life appears almost in all of the answers. What is also common among the interviewees' answers is that their criticism concerning the obstacles in front of the providing equal rights to all of the citizens in Israel. Their concern concentrates primarily around the Jewish character of the state, which is in compliance with the hypothesis. Following the open ended question on the issue, the obstacles to power sharing and equality are asked in detailed form by proposing a set of concepts; Jewish character, security considerations and economical gaps. Except for two interviewees the priority were given again to the Jewish character of the state.

The need for the state to be neutral is emphasized by one of the interviewee Falestin, she notes that,

> The main obstacle for giving equality to all the citizens is the declaration that the state is a Jewish state. It means that it should give something more to Jewish people. As long as it has to do anything with the Judaism or with Arabism it will continue like this. All these, any national or religious identity, will prefer part of its people over the others this is why it can't give equality to everybody. The state should be an organization that gives services to its citizens nothing more than this. People can have their own national identity and all kinds of components of their identity but the state must be neutral.

Although being in the secondary position the security considerations were also mentioned by three of the interviewees as an obstacle to be equal for the Arabs within Israeli system. In this sense, the ongoing conflict in the West Bank and Gaza and the related security problem within Israel are considered by these three respondents as the obstacles to power-sharing equally in addition to the Jewish character of the state.

On the contrary to this view, it is also argued by one of the interviewee (Sami) that the Jewish character of the state is the one and only reason for both of the problems inside and outside of Israel. The root cause of the ongoing conflict in the occupied territories is again the Jewish character of the state and its legal and conceptual definition in the minds of the people. He argues;

> If the state will be all of its citizens there won't be a security problem. The security problem will simply be demolished if it is neutral. If it becomes a secular democracy not a Jewish State it won't have all these security problems.

He also criticized the view that sees the economical gap between the Jews and Arabs as an obstacle to equality of the Arab citizens in Israel. He states,

> The state of Israel does not want to believe that it is not an economical problem. Not because of the money. This is used to be what most of the Jewish Israelis believe: 'if you give them more money they will become quiet'. There is nothing to do with the money. If you give them more money you will have a wider middle class and they will be more revolutionary in the end. It is a national question: they have national component in their identity because it is psychologically needed. And in the Jewish State, all the signs bring up the national component of Jewish identity. Flags are everywhere. They can't make Palestinians ignore this fact. You got to convince that the Arabs which started living after 1948 in this country. Palestinians have a long history. My grandparents have a Palestinian identity. They still live. This attitude of trying to uproot people and bringing them far from their roots is totally stupid it will never work. It works nowhere.

The common attitude towards considering the Jewishness of the state as the primary obstacle in providing equality for the Arab citizens of Israel is

conceptualized differently by one of the interviewee Suha. She claims that rather than the Jewish character, the Zionist nature of the state is responsible for the unequal treatment of the Palestinian Arab citizens of the state and security considerations are only the excuse for the ongoing ignorance toward the Arab minority.

> Jewish character is not really the problem. Judaism is not Zionism, it is totally different. Judaism for me is religion and I respect it. Zionism, I don't respect it at all. It is the Zionist character. Today it is also the security character though it is a kind of nonsense argument because 52 years ago or let's say 20 years ago there were again security character and still the Arabs are discriminated this is only the excuse. The minute we have peace we will have better economical life it is not the real obstacle. So the most important thing is Zionism it is a lot of ignorance. People in Israel are very ignorant they really believe, I mean that common people, they really believe that Palestinians are terrorists and heartless, not truthworthy terrorists. Israel still thinks today that we are enemies and if I say I am Palestinian then I am a terrorist immediately in their view.

Different from the above mentioned answers the interviewee Wadi asserts a different reason for the inequalities within Israeli system. He argues that the cultural difference in addition to economical gap causes the problem. He gives the example of the Mizrahi (Oriental) Jews. This group is exposed to a similar kind of discrimination in Israel since they are different from the dominant culture (Ashkanezi) in his view and are seen as the lower culture similar to the Arabs living in the country.

As it was mentioned before there is a legal distinction between Arab and Jewish citizens in the army service duty issue and it has some outcomes in terms of rights of the group. Service in the Israeli Defense Forces gives veterans certain economic and other benefits and it was discussed before that this creates another area of de facto discrimination towards Arab citizens. In this sense the interviewees were asked if they support national service for Arabs in Israel instead of military service and if they consider this difference as an advantage or disadvantage for their group. Except for two they state that they do not support any kind of service instead of military service. Their evaluation on the issue more or less revolves around the same axis. The military service in the State of Israel requires fighting against their own people so it is not acceptable. Following the same logic, any kind of service which which is also perceived as a substitute of the military service although is not accepted, because it finally is seen as serving the same aims and intentions. Only two

of the respondents showed a tendency to support a national service for the Arab minority. Jasmine who comes from the solely Arab town Umm-Al Fahm states,

> I don't support the military service for Arabs because they fight against my people. But as a national service I support it under the condition that it would be for the good of Arab community in Israel.

Likewise Wadi who owns a coffee shop in Haifa which has mostly Arabs customers notes that, 'It is acceptable for the Arabs if only the service would be for the Arab villages'.

Both interviewees can be characterized of having very close and intensive relations and interactions with the Arab communities in their daily life. Therefore, they are able to develop an empathy and they obviously feel the need for cooperation.

Apart from these interviewees all object to this idea advocating the reason in similar ways and in most of the cases the disadvantaged positions they have due to this regulation are expressed. For instance, George states,

> For Israel and for me situation is very complicated. Why do people do this service? To protect their country. I don't feel the need to protect Israel. I don't feel full citizen of Israel. By the way Israel is fighting against my people. There is a problem for me. It is understandable… many things go hand in hand. It is an advantage for the Jews because that is why they claim that I don't deserve full service as a citizen. Because I am not giving duty job for country. In the U.S or France I don't see such thing. Besides I don't see any connection between being a citizen of Israel and doing the army service.

Similarly, Sami asserts 'It is a disadvantage in Israel for the Arab citizens. Because, it is directly related with rights and duties. In this sense duties are not fulfilled by Arabs so the rights are not available for them.' The basis of citizenship in the Israeli system is questioned at this point. Their status as citizens of the state leaves them in a disadvantaged position and the general logic behind the issue is criticized. Suha explains this view as follows:

> I suppose national service for Arabs in their communities. I mean national service but not instead of military service there is no law that obligates me to go to military so I won't. Not to go to army should not be the reason of ineaquality of the Arabs in Israel. It is not an excuse. As a national service someone can volunteer and work for the development of his/her

> country or community as for Arabs especially. But I don't support it to be an alternative for military. This is conservation of excuse. If I suppose this then I accept the excuse that Israel is using. The excuse that I don't get this because I don't go to military.

Here it should be mentioned that Suha is actually working as a leader of a NGO, which is dealing with education in rural areas. Being a member of such an organization she anyhow is actually engaging in voluntary activities and thus argues that this kind of services should not be imposed by the state.

They also showed great objection towards the Druze people and some Bedouins who volunteer for the military service. All of the interviewees strongly disagree with this regulation and show their disrespect towards the Druze community. It is also indicated by one of the respondents (George) that this regulation has not brought much to Druze and Bedouin communities. He states,

> One of my best friends went to the army who is a Druze. I don't respect. By the way, a lot of Druzes have stopped to go to the army. Newly, also half of the Bedouins stopped to go to the army. In Druze this decrease is a little bit less. You know why? They promised them giving rights. They try to provide for them full rights. But they are giving then nothing.

Apart from the questions asked about the quality of services and democratic rights given to Arab citizens of Israel, a more practical issue was analyzed by asking the interviewees if they think an Israeli Arab has a good chance to fulfill his/her professional ambitions in Israel. Very similar understanding was observed in the responses to this question. They tell that there are several barriers; they are denied their rights formally or informally to access and to work in some of the professional fields. The military, for instance, is a very important sector to develop a career in Israel. Thus, an Israeli Arab cannot be a pilot or a top manager in one of the state institutions. Wadi notes that because of these barriers they all become teachers. 'Because to be teacher is the easiest thing for an Arab in Israel. They can be a teacher in Arab schools afterwards.'

George in a similar manner states that, 'I can be anything I want but if you ask in general I should say that there are some areas which are not available not only in army but in several sectors. Limited, many jobs are not possible just because of

being an Arab'. The lack of a flourishing separate Arab private sector within Israel is another reason for Suha, she asserts,

> For professional ambitions we do not have much chances. Palestinians can reach to a level but can never get more than that. Mainly to be employed as manager or director for example in governmental offices is impossible. No way! There are no Palestinian industry in Israel there are Palestinian industries in PA but not in Israel. So it is not possible.

The most uttered reason basically is that they do not have equal opportunities. The military service issue is again mentioned in this case. Moreover the difficulties they have during the university entrance exams is pointed out, since they are educated in Arab schools and the instruction is only in Hebrew at the Israeli universities. They claim that poor language skills are indirectly causing discrimination. It is also mentioned that in recruitment interviews the preference usually lies on the Jewish Israelis. For applications you need to give your military service number, if you do not have a number that automatically means that you belong to the Palestinian Arabs. Thus, there exists no official discrimination in terms of rejecting the application to universities, etc. but the actual practice uses language and other codes (name, religion, military number) to discriminate.

The mutual understanding, as it was expressed can be summarized as that Israeli Arab citizens are not given equal chances to choose their professions and jobs. There are certain barriers and only certain areas in the job market are open for them such as education. Slightly deviating from the common understanding, Mira, who is an actress and won the national contest in theatre does talk in more optimistic manner. She states,

> It depends but I can say that it is not easy. Even if you manage there are so many difficulties on the way to reach success. But the contest which I won is very important for instance and I was the only Arab there and I won it. This is an evidence that it is not everywhere at the same level. Or we can say that it is getting better.

The personal history and the circumstances, in other words one's own life experiences have a great affect in evaluating the issue. This case is a good example due to her being not very political and involving explicitly in Jewish culture and social life because of her special career in arts. Despite her criticisms and dissatisfactions as an Arab in Israel she expresses more hope towards the existing

situation. This difference in approach and framing reveals itself in other discussions throughout the interview.

Concerning discrimination towards the Arabs in Israel the respondents were also made to speak about their own experience of discrimination; if they had any in their daily life. Mira who is an actress tells her personal experience while she was a student at the Jewish art school RIMON. She tells,

> I was there for four years at RIMON School. I couldn't understand what is going on there. I tried to fit myself in but I couldn't succeed. I come from a different singing style. I love Jazz. I tried to invent Jazz musical tricks on Arab music but it wasn't accepted. For example, I took one of Shalom Hanuk's songs translated it into Arabic and sang in an Arabic style and did not manage to make them enthusiastic. Most of the time I feel comfortable socially. There was some sense of alienation I felt. This is a school which raises up stars of a specific society: Jewish society. I was often asking myself what am I doing here? I found it difficult to find my own exact place within that framework.

The discrimination they come across in general will be discussed under the subheading Daily Life with their framing and comments on the issue in detail. But as it is indicated in the previous discussions, the general tendency is questioning their status as a group of minority and expressing their discomfort as a citizen since they think that they are not treated equally. In one way or another they complain about discriminations in their life as a minority living within the state of Israel. The areas of discrimination which were expressed by the interviewees consist of every field: legal, social and economical. This is also the evidence of the increased awareness as a citizen and a member of minority. Also the challenging approach was observed among the entire respondents which is a common characteristic of the young generation educated Palestinian Arabs in Israel. Sami tells,

> Toward Arabs they use the Zionist discourse. They want to make Arabs saying 'Israel is very good for us'. Compared to the Arabs in Syria we are better. Usually they don't compare themselves with any other minority in a democratic country. Because in Zionist discourse they usually feel that 'why are you complaining about? Look at the Arabs in Syria they live much worse than you do.' But when you look at the other minorities for instance of Denmark or Sweden or Switzerland or any other democratic country you see that all the minorities in any democratic country have better life.

We can state that the tendency to compare themselves with the other minorities living in western democracies is observed among the target group. Sami adds that this approach has started to appear within the last 5-6 years.

> The younger generation is aware of this trick and we began to compare our status with the western minorities not with the minorities in the Middle East or with majorities in the Middle East. I can say that Adalah has been doing very good job on this. A few of our intellectuals are doing very good things on this. But most of the people do not. The young generation of intellectuals is the ones who criticize in this way.

With the help of the questions in this section the areas of discrimination were traced in the interviewees' framing and at the end of this part they were asked (Q-E7) In order to identify your identity with State of Israel what is needed mostly? As a summary under the light of the previous discussion and as the last comment on the issue they put forward their own solution. By this way their view was also checked on the issue of problem with identification with the state once again in a different part. So they summarized the situation by telling the causes to the equality problem and they were given the chance to explain what is needed mostly to change the situation they complain about.

Changing the definition of the state of Israel as a Jewish state to a state of all its citizens is the most expressed answer; the other claim is the recognition of the Palestinian Arab citizens on a collective base. A democratic regime which treats all of its citizens without preference for any group.

Suha notes in a very simple and clear way what is needed to identify themselves with the state, 'One secular democratic state for all of its citizens with one norm, national anthem which is not a Hatikhva which represents all of us. Without any Jewish or Zionist symbols and which is totally secular'.

5.5. Daily Life

I asked the interviewees who are members of the younger generation Arab minority certain questions about their daily life and practices in Israel. How they

experience their identity as an Arab citizen in their social surrounding such as university, in professional life and on the street. They were asked if they think their identity is recognized easily for some reason in the public sphere. The visibility of their identity and its affects on their daily practices are analyzed in this section. Besides they were also asked if it is possible to talk about any definite kind of discrimination against the Arabs in daily life apart from the discriminations they claim in legal, social and cultural spheres already discussed in the previous part. In addition to this, they were asked to tell the most discriminative act they have experienced in their daily life. It is assumed that daily level practices have a strong influence on the shaping of self-perception and identity.

It was found out that they are exposed to several kinds of discriminative acts in their daily life in varying degrees. Even the ones who did not tell a specific example asserted that the Arabs in general are being exposed to discriminative acts in their daily life. It should be noted that there is a direct correlation between the visibility of identity and the possibility of discriminative acts they may experience. The other factor is the social surroundings. It depends on where they are; if they are living in the mixed-city or in the Arab neighborhood or in the university campus determines to a great extent the likelihood of discriminative acts towards them.

Suha who defines herself as having very low degree of visibility of her Palestinian/Arab identity says,

> I feel discrimination not in Haifa but in Jerusalem, when I am in Jerusalem everytime I witness people are looking at me suspiciously, checking my bags more intensively only because I am an Arab, and at the airport I suffer hours only just because I am an Arab.

Likewise George explains his view as follows ‘When I live in Nazereth[33] there is no problem. It depends where you live’.

Jasmine who is a Muslim woman at the age of 22 and who is strictly religious observant of Islam also emphasizes the importance of the circumstances. She notes that she experienced a lot of discriminative acts by Jews in her daily life but not at

[33] Nazereth is a mixed city in the north of Israel which is highly populated by Arabs both Christian and Muslim.

the university. She lives at the university dormitories and shares her room with Arabs. Inside the university there is a more liberal atmosphere and they are used to study with the Arab friends together. She says outside the university in some occasions Israelies talk in a very bad way to her. She says that they do it on purpose to bother her. Since she is veiling according to Islamic rule it is very apparent that she is a Muslim Arab and the veiling signifies radical Islam and mobilizes all the prejudices toward Islam and the Arabs, she argues. She began to suffer a lot after she moved to Tel Aviv from her hometown Umm Al-Fahm which is exclusively populated by Muslim Arabs. The visibility of her identity is the highest among the interviewees and this shows the likelihood of being exposed to discrimination in daily life more than the others especially the Christian Arabs or the male Muslim Arabs. Veiling reveals her 'visibility' of identity.

When she was asked about the most discriminative act she experienced, she told one case and expressed that it is not easy to live as a Muslim Arab in Israel:

> I have a very bad story, do you want me to tell? Once when I was going on the bus to Jaffa, the passengers wanted me to get out of the bus since they thought that I might be a suicide bomber. They were all staring at me and they stopped the bus. I didn't say anything they were afraid of me all of nothing and I felt very bad and sad and full of anger. I was alone and did nothing. I got out of the bus. My parents do not know this if they would know they wouldn't let me to stay in Tel Aviv.

On the other hand Suha who is Christian and carries almost no sign of her Arab identity in her appearance or in her Hebrew tells,

> When I was at the bus in Jerusalem a religious woman with a baby heard that I was saying something in Arabic to my sister. Then she said something to the other woman sitting next to her and said 'we understand all you say'. Then I said what! Are we going to hack you or what? They were thinking that maybe we are going to bomb the bus all of nothing just because we are Arabs.

She continues with another example,

> And once in the airport I was checked for hours only because I was reading an Arabic book. Every time I am double-checked at the airport. And once when I came back from Jordan someone told me that they want to check my bags and saying that 'you are our enemies and we don't want you here.' I said 'really how do you know that?' He answered 'You come and visit our country but we don't visit your country'. Then I told her that 'how do you know about the passport I have, I have an Israeli passport I told him. I was here before you were

> here I said him. 'Oh really' she said. You cannot know how is it like you are hated, because in their eyes you are an enemy.

Mira who is a young actress tells that on the contrary to the other respondents she has not experience any discriminative act in her daily life since her identity is not visible and is not recognized from outside. She tells that she does not have an Arabic dialect in her Hebrew and she has a pale skin so the likelihood of being exposed to discriminative act by the Jews is very less. Even this is the case for her, she also knows much about the prejudices and discriminations toward the Arab citizens in daily life. She gives examples on the issue in general and she tells,

> Once, I went to the public toilets that were dirty. One woman told me: 'surely an Arab woman was here'. In fact a Jewish woman could also leave the toilets like this. Once I took a taxi in Jaffa, the driver said 'I wish you are not giving works to Arabs' then I asked him to stop the taxi because I didn't want him to earn money from me if his approach is like this.

As it was confirmed by the respondents, as the visibility of identity increases the discriminative acts in daily life increases. However at this point some of the interviewees adopt a kind of aggression approach rather than avoidance. Despite their fluent Hebrew they prefer to insist on their Arabic accent as in Falestin and Sami's cases. The most recognized difference in language accent is the confusion of 'b' and 'p' sound in Hebrew. Since there is not 'p' sound in Arabic the Arabs have difficulties in using 'p' sound in their Hebrew. The name which clearly reveals one's identity is also the other factor in daily life which increases the prejudices and discriminative acts in some occasions. In some cases they are exposed to prejudices after they tell their name which makes apparent that they are Arabs.

In varying degrees a challenging approach was observed in all of the respondents. Sami tells that although he can speak Hebrew very good and they can't notice from his accent that he is an Arab he uses it on purpose so they would notice. Similarly Falestin argues that she has to insist on her Arabic accent in Hebrew in order to make her identity to be recognized and accepted regardless of the majority's approach because this is a very important component of her Palestinian-Arab identity and it is not true to hide it, she claims. This can be actually interpreted as a claim of recognition. Wadi asserts in a different way that it is not difficult to figure out that he is not a Jew when he speaks in Hebrew because of his accent. But he does not need

to pretend to look like a Jew in most of the cases they think that he is a Portuguese or Italian.

> This is not a problem because nobody speaks good and perfect Hebrew in this country. The majority of the Jews learn Hebrew as their second language following their immigration. So many people carry a kind of accent in his Hebrew.

Their views concerning the status of Arabic and its impacts on their life as a bilingual and bicultural group in Israel is examined in detail in the following part.

5.6. Language

As it was mentioned before in Israel there are two official languages Arabic and Hebrew. Arabic was virtually granted the status of an official language from the very beginning however the dominant language in everyday life is exclusively Hebrew. The legal status of the Arabic as an official language within the State of Israel shows that the Arab minority is identified as a linguistic minority within the state. The right to use the Arabic language as instruction in the education system in the primary and secondary school system and freedom to address government departments and plead in the courts in their own language constitutes them as a distinct and non-assimilated minority within Israel. Yet, in practice the status of the Arabic language is not even in the secondary position besides in some occasions does not have a place in the everyday life.

Despite its official status Arabic does not appear on the street name boards in the Jewish neighborhoods and mixed-cities. All the street names are written bilingual; Hebrew and English. Only in the solely Arab towns such as Umm-Al Fahm and Shafa'amr the street names are written also in Arabic. The other area which one can observe the same situation is the menu language at the restaurants in all over the country. Only Hebrew and English are used in the menus. These practical issues show that bilingual character of the country is not reflected in the basic areas of life in everyday life.

Apart from these facts there is Arabic state owned broadcasting however it was declared by the all of the respondents that the Arab citizens do not prefer them. The sample group all have high level of communication skills in Hebrew both written and read forms on the contrary to the previous generations. When they were asked about their parents' level of Hebrew they all told that their parents know Hebrew but except for the three respondents they all told that their mother's level of Hebrew is not as good as their father's. This gives idea about the level of exposure to Jewish Israeli social and cultural life of the female members of the previous generations. This difference is not seen nowadays they all argue. Gender difference is not seen in Hebrew language skills issue among the third generation. The younger generations have almost no problem in Hebrew regardless of gender and area of residence. They started to learn Hebrew in the primary schools and continue to learn in the secondary schools. Since the instruction is only in Hebrew at the Israeli universities they should learn Hebrew very well if they determined to continue higher education.

As it was discussed as an area of discrimination in the previous parts the language skills in Hebrew puts the Arabs in a disadvantaged position in university entrance exams. The respondents were asked if they have any difficulties with Hebrew at the university and besides if they think they have been in a disadvantaged position during the university entrance exams. All of them expressed that they used to have difficulties in the first years to some degree however it became easier for them after a certain period. Falestin tells,

> Well, at the beginning yes, I felt very disadvantaged, because Arabic is my language but there is nothing written, no source, no information in Arabic in the higher degree. No right to use your own language at the university in your own country since you are a minority group. So this puts you in a disadvantaged position.

George on similar lines tells, '…we start to learn Hebrew in the third or fourth grade. My Hebrew is much better than most of the many Israeli. In writing I mean, not only in talking but I have an accent of course'. Raida claims that as a result of the education system especially the highly educated Arabs have a very good command of Hebrew, even much better than their mother tongue Arabic. When they were asked if they would prefer to study in an Arabic university all of them

responded that they would prefer if it were possible. The common attitude is towards accepting this situation related with language. Although they perceive it as a disadvantage for themselves they tell that it is not a big problem. They agree on the point that it is required to have a good command of Hebrew in this country by emphasizing the fact that it is a Jewish country so one should learn Hebrew and manage to live with this fact.

Concerning the official status of the Arabic language they all argue that is not practically the official language. Falestin gives the following example;

> In all the governmental institutions Hebrew is used. For instance if an Arab person who is 68 years old and who does not know any Hebrew goes to ask for an insurance problem cannot communicate because of lack of Hebrew. So she can not understands her rights. So practically it is not an official language.

Jasmine's comment is similar, she tells she speaks Hebrew in state organizations because it doesn't matter if the Arabic is the official language in this state because nobody speaks Arabic she argues. She adds, 'They only speak Hebrew and English'.

> Nobody thinks that Arabic is really the second official language. I never use Arabic in state organizations. There is no opportunity like this. The workers who sit at the desk speak only in Hebrew. So you use Hebrew because you don't have a choice. You can talk but nobody will understand you. Usually what I do when I go to restaurants in Tel Aviv just for fun. You know they have a menu in Hebrew and in English and I asked them do you have a menu in Arabic? Usually they say no. But there are more Arabs than English people here.

The place of the Arabic and Hebrew languages in their life and the level of importance they attribute to both of the languages worth to examine in a more detailed form. The state of affairs which can be summarized as bilingualism on the part of the highly educated Arabs lead them to adopt a bicultural life. The level of integration to wider Israeli society and their increased national awareness as a Palestinian-Arab citizen of Israel which operate at the same time can be better understood by questions on the culture.

5.7. Cultural Attitudes

The integration level of the sample group to the Jewish culture is analyzed by the help of certain questions such as the language preference in reading a novel or listening music, their preference on Jewish authors, the newspaper and TV channels they follow. Following these questions they were also asked if they feel culturally alien in Israel. Moreover they were also made to speak on the young generation Arabs' attitudes toward Arab cultural heritage. How they see their generation in terms of self-confidence in Arab cultural heritage and seeking its cultivation were analyzed in the light of the answers of the respondents.

All of the respondents without any exception told their preference on the Arabic and Arab authors while reading a novel. Two respondents told that they rarely read also Jewish authors. The general approach towards reading newspaper articles in Hebrew newspapers and following scientific and academic periodicals in Hebrew. Suha tells this as follows:

> I read novels in Arabic. I prefer Hebrew or English in scientific subjects and my interest areas. I am more emotionally attached to my Arabic. More rationally attached to English and Hebrew. I studied everything in English or Hebrew at the university. So it is easier for me to understand the terminology in English and Hebrew rather than Arabic.

On the other hand, Raida tells that she only reads books in Hebrew, which are translated from English. Since the instruction language at the universities is Hebrew they are required to a certain degree to read Hebrew sources. Apart from that, they also show great tendency to follow the Israeli-Jewish mass media especially newspapers. The most preferred newspaper is Ha-Aretz, which is conceived as having liberal democratic approach, and even challenging stand towards political issues especially towards peace process. Two of them also state that they sometimes read mainstream Arab newspapers; Yediot Ahronot and Ma'ariv. However, the sources which they follow news is primarily TV channels. The preference at this point is towards Arab satellite channels. The most preferred and favorite channel is El-Cezire broadcasting from Saudi Arabia and is known as its challenging approach towards the political issues. None of them watches the Arab channels in Israel, which are owned by state.

In addition to the above questions they were also asked about their preference in music. The taste of music is considered to reflect very much about cultural affiliations. The entire sample group likes to listen Arabic music. However three of them also stated that they like some Hebrew songs and some Israeli-Jewish singers. On the other hand, the other three respondents among the group told that they dislike Hebrew music and even told that they hate Hebrew songs. Wadi who owns a café tells that he likes almost all kind of music from all around the world but he does not like Israeli-Jewish music at all. He also adds that he never plays Hebrew songs in his café. Mira who had a musical education in Israeli music and theatre school Rimon tells that she likes only few songs in Hebrew music and is looking for clear sounds which does not reflect Israeli-Jewish musical taste.

Despite their being bicultural stand in the Israeli system, in varying degrees a sense of alienation is also expressed by the respondents. As it was indicated they constitute the group, which has the highest level of integration to the wider Israeli social and cultural life. Based on the observations and responses of the sample group it was also seen that their sense of alienation is still considerable according to their claims. A feeling of alienation is expressed by five of the respondents. On the other hand, the rest of the four claim that it is not a total alienation but can be defined as 'being foreigner' in one's own land and country. One respondent George notes that he feels not alienation but very much influenced by another culture involuntarily.

The impact of circumstances appears once again at this point. Jasmine tells 'Here yes I feel like I am alien! But I do not feel like this in my home town Umm Al-Fahm'. Similarly Mira says regarding her feeling of alienation

> Not all the time but sometimes yes I feel culturally alien. For instance when I live in Tel Aviv my feeling of alienation increases. Sometimes for weeks I speak or hear no Arabic in my daily life except for the talks with my mother on the phone. In my professional life I deal with Jews mostly. This creates a feeling of alienation.

On the other hand, Wadi who owns a café remarks his sense of alienation culturally as a member of Arab minority however he tells he feels this less than the others since he has a kind of freedom due to his job.

> Yes in this state under these conditions I feel culturally alien. But I am lucky because I can come to my place and can leave partly everything outside. I am not so much involved with Jews in my daily life. All my customers are Arabs.

In this state of affairs their self-evaluation of their generation in terms of adopting and preserving Arab cultural heritage are very optimistic in general. Majority of the interviewees states that the young generation is becoming more aware of their Arabness. Moreover the Palestinian content in their identity has begun to be expressed more.

Raida comments in a different manner that, the ongoing political issues increase their Arabness however they are stuck in between modern and traditional culture by asserting,

> Actually there is a dilemma in identity; we are Arab, Palestinian and Israeli at the same time. The young people's culture is in between, becuse we mixed up also with the traditional Arab culture and modern culture which is dominant. Today the youngs want to live modern life. This also creates a dilemma. Almost every Arab knows traditional Arab Dance and old songs but actually when they get older they go back that olds. When they are teenage they only listen English and modern popular songs.

On similar lines Suha tells that 'integration to Israeli society and world trends is common in daily life activities among younger generations which is a natural process'. However she also claims that young generation Arabs are also becoming more self-confident in Arab cultural heritage.

On the contrary to these arguments Sami and Wadi adopt a different view. Sami puts the blame on the policy of teaching Arabic at schools. He asserts, 'most of the youngsters know nothing about the Arab culture. They hate learning Arabic for instance. This is because of the policy of teaching Arabic'.

Wadi asserts a controversial approach and claims that generalization is not possible on this issue. But for the highly educated group it can be said that they are self-confident in Arab culture and they seek its cultivation. He asserts 'There are many kind of groups, so you can not generalize approaches. But if you say the

educated ones yes mostly they are more aware of the importance of seeking cultural heritage'.

5.8. Education

Education system is elaborated in the previous parts in certain aspects. As it was mentioned there are separate school systems in Israel for Jews and for Arabs. Until university the Arabs attend homogenous schools. However the schools for Arabs are also differentiated among themselves according to two criteria. The first difference is according to religion. There are Christian and Muslim high schools for the Arab students. The other differentiation is according to the status of these schools. There are state schools as well as private schools. The overlapping forms also exist. Among them the private Christian high schools are much more in number than the private Muslim high schools. The general view which was expressed by the respondents is that the quality of education is much better at the private Christian schools. Because of this reason in most of the cases Christian private schools are preferred also by the Muslim Arabs increasingly.

Among the respondents only three of them went to state high schools, either Christian or Muslim. The rest of them all went to Christian Arab high schools including the Muslims. Salim tells that,

> Also Muslims can go to those Christian private schools. Usually owners of the schools are German or French. The Christian church provides the Arab Christians with many opportunities especially in the area of education. The religious courses are not very much opposed of the expectations. Since they are better in quality of education Muslims also prefer to go to those schools. Also only well of people's children can go those schools regardless of their religion because only they can pay money for education.

Private Christian high school graduates is perceived advantageous in the university entrance exams. Based on the observations it can be stated the ones who went to private Christian high schools have better command of English. This aspect was also mentioned by some of the respondents. The other aspect which was pointed out by one respondent Falestin who has a Muslim origin is that in private Christian schools students become more aware of their identity as a Palestinian.

During university education as it was discussed, they face some difficulties related with Hebrew language skills and as well as university entrance exam problems which are also related with Hebrew. Apart from this in the university education system all the holidays are arranged in accordance with the Jewish national or religious days. Therefore, as a Muslim or Christian they are denied of having holidays in their religious days. Almost all of the interviewees tell that since they are not recognized as a group they are denied of such simple rights and this creates a sense of alienation and discomfort on the part of the Arab students.

Although the education system in comparison with the Jewish education system is criticized in some senses, they agree on the fact that the education services in the primary and second degrees are still sufficient. The other common ground among the respondents is that they all would prefer to study abroad if they would have the chance. Three of them even asserted that they would prefer to study in an Arab country in an Arabic university. However the other six respondents told their acceptance towards the issue by asserting that 'it is a Jewish country in the end so one should get education in this country and obey the rules and compete in accordance with the existing regulations'. The modern attitude of the university education system is also uttered by many respondents and it is perceived that this may give them the chance to continue their studies in the Western countries.

5.9. Social Contact with Jews

In order to understand the educated young Arabs' integration level to the wider Israeli-Jewish society, the forms of social relationship and how the interviewee group perceive the relationship with Jews were investigated. In this sense they were asked if they have any Jewish contacts and when and where did they meet them. Moreover they were asked if they favor personal relations and friendships with Jews.

All of the respondents said that they had their Jewish contacts first time when they entered university at the age of early 20s. The ones who grew up in mixed-cities

had the chance to meet Jewish peers during their early childhoods however for these cases the relationships can not be called as being friends and to share a common ground for any kind of activity since they have separate education systems and their social surroundings are totally different from each other. Therefore the socializing processes of each group are experienced separately and the interaction between the two groups are very limited almost giving no way to be affected from each other until university. As the social environment changes with the entrance to university they begin to meet with their Jewish peer groups by going to same classes and studying at the same universities and even staying in the same university dormitories. They come across first with the explicitly Jewish life in the university by becoming also the residents of the mixed-cities such as Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beer Sheva and Jerusalem since the universities are only located in these mixed-cities.

General tendency is showing no objection to formation of personal relationships with Jews except for the one interviewee (Jasmine) who is a Muslim girl and has been living her second year at the university in Tel Aviv. She argues that she cannot be a good friend with Jews. Although she has some contacts however they cannot be called as friends in real sense 'they are only classmates' she asserts. As the duration of exposure to Jewish social and cultural life increases and the more they meet with Jews in their social surroundings the prejudice decreases and they become more likely to build personal relationships with Jews. Religious observance and adopting conservative approach in life might also be the other influential factors in this case.

All of the other respondents expressed that they have no problem with building personal relationships with Jews. The common ground for them is that they have lived much more time in mixed-cities and they are mostly graduates of the university and still living in the mixed-cities and even working with Jews in their professional life. As the social distance decreases they become more likely to accept Jewish social contacts in their life. It is expressed in most of the cases that they began to build friendships in the late years of the university. Suha who is the head of an Arab NGO tells that,

> I do have Jewish friends today. First time I had Jewish friends when I entered the university. Actually I hardly met Jews before university. After high school for half a year. I worked with Jews but they were not my friends. But during the late years of university I had Jewish friends.

She told that she has even 2-3 very close people among Jews. Despite this fact she also argues that she prefers Arabic relationships [social and personal] emphasizing the importance of the language. 'I prefer Arabic relationships. It is easy for me to speak in Arabic when I am in social relationship I favor Arabic because I feel more natural. It is more convenient for me.'

It should be noted here that all the respondents including Suha speak perfect Hebrew. Language which is one of the carriers of the culture constitutes a primary importance in their view. As Harold Isaac (1975) claims language constitutes one of the elements which affects basic group identity since it carries the characteristics of the culture which is shared by those speakers. This point concerning language was also reflected in the other answers to the questions which are related with daily life and culture which are already elaborated under the previous headings.

The other concern which was put forward by most of the respondents is that the approach of the Jewish people toward them in their social relationships. As long as the Jews whom they meet are open minded people there is less likely to be a problem in forming personal/social relationships. Mutual respecting and understanding are crucially important in this sense. George who is a Christian Arab tells that he has too many Jewish friends and he even used to share an apartment with two Jewish friends for more than two years. He said 'I have very close Jewish friends. My very close friends are not Arabs but Jews'. At this point he also asserted that he even has Jewish contacts that can be called as religious observant.

The first session of the interview with George was conducted at his house while one of his Jewish flat-mate was present and this led me to observe the way of life they share as friends at the house. His friend with whom he was sharing the apartment was wearing 'kipa'[34] and who observes religious practices such as kosher eating practice special to Judaism which requires to eat milk and meat separately. For

[34] A hat, which is worn by religious Jews.

instance, they were using separate set of dishes in the kitchen for milky and meat meals. This very simple adjustment within their daily life shows a great deal of mutual respect and understanding of each other. George and Sharon both tell that cultural adherents in their daily practices can be easily managed by mutual respect each other. Even the religion and its practices may not be a barrier in their relation. Rather than cultural and religious differences strict ideological difference can only be cause a conflict in the interpersonal relations in their view. They both share this view and tell that, 'as long as the individuals adopt a liberated and democratic view there will be no problems, only 'fascistic approach' can prevent formation of social and personal relationships between the Jews and the Arabs'. It should also be noted that they themselves see also their situation very exceptional in some senses and also tell that, this kind of example can only be seen among the highly educated sectors of the Israeli society.

It can be said that the level of education and the circumstances greatly affect the formation of such close interpersonal relationships between Jews and Arabs in Israel. As to conclude, the intensive social contact with Jews is seen among the young generation educated group but still it depends on the people's standpoint. As Wadi tells,

> I am not object to formation of personal relationships with Jews although I have almost no close Jewish friends. But I should mention that I am not against it. We are all human beings at the end of the day. So no problem for me and I am open minded and can be good friends as long as the people are open minded too.

5.10. Political Orientations and Role as Young Activists

The political atmosphere was elaborated in the Chapter 4 and the increased political activism on the part of the Israeli Arab citizens were explained under the light of the internal and external developments. The profound strengthening of the Arab political representation since the early 1990s has been one of the characteristic of the era together with the appearance of the new trends which advocates the national awareness as 'Palestinian citizens of the Israel'. Claim of recognition as a group of national minority began to be uttered by the political leaders and began to

gather support increasingly among the Arab communities. The leader of this movement Dr. Azmi Bishara who is the head of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is seen as the most important figure in representing the new demands of the Arab community and exclusively supported by the Arab intellectuals and the younger generations. As it was discussed, the increased civic awareness together with increased national awareness is defined by Elie Rekhess as 'localization of the national struggle' in the 1990s. Claim of recognition and several alternative approaches cultural autonomy, institutional autonomy, definition of state for all of its citizens and the like began to occupy a prominent place in the Arab politics in Israel in the second half of the 1990s. The proliferation of NGOs is the other important change in the 1990s.

The sample group which is composed of the highly educated Arabs who are in their 20s and early 30s tell their views on the political issues and it is seen that they are the ones, who are, to a great extent, the carriers of the new trend. This finding, which is also in line with the hypotheses, reflects itself in the answers to the questions related with political attitudes and the political identity of the respondents. The political trends in the 1990s have tremendous affect on the identity definition of the group and their claims as a group.

Firstly they were asked if they call themselves as political or radical. Except for two they all define themselves as political. The concept of 'radical' to define themselves were also preferred by two respondents. However the majority tell that they are political rather than radical and it was also mentioned that in the state of affairs one can have no option other than being political as a member of Arab minority in Israel. In this context Raida notes, 'I am political. You are naturally political if you are a Palestinian and in general if you are a minority you are political it is the same for all the minorities I believe'. In parallel with Raida's argument Jasmine asserts, 'I am neither political nor radical in my acts but you can't get out of thinking politically in my situation. Being an Arab-Muslim minority in a Jewish society is itself enough political.'

On the other hand, Mira who defines herself not political also asserts that she is aware of the things going on around her and this is enough to act politically on an individual level. She says, 'I care for the Palestinian question in broader sense as much as the other Palestinians. But I am not a follower of any political party and I do not involve with political movements in my life.' In similar lines Wadi calls himself as 'just a person' however he adds 'but being human being directly makes you political so I am political.'

Political party membership is not common among the sample group. Only two of them George and Sami are both member of National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Sami has been working in NDA since 1996 and elected as a member for the youth council of the party twice. While political activism within NDA is high in Sami's case, George standpoint as a party member is lesser in degree. The other party which was mentioned by three of the respondents is Communist Party (Hadash). Suha says although she is not a member of the party she identifies herself with the Communist Party in Israeli Arab politics and votes for it. Political party membership in Communist Party is only seen in Wadi's case. Wadi who is now 29 years old tells that he stopped to work for Communist Party two years ago. He explains the reason as follows:

> I used to be a member of Hadash, the communist party. But then I left because although I agree the ideology the approach of the party to the Arab population is not sufficient. They are not really concerning Arab issues, they only care about coexistence. We need our own voice to express our problems.

The rise of the National Democratic Alliance can be explained by the political void which have occurred in the late 1990s. Five of the respondents state that rather than coexistence there is a need to express their own voice by solely Arab parties in political system. The followers of the NDA who also voted for it in 1999 elections (George, Mira, Sami and Salim) told that the demands of the Arabs in Israel can best be advocated by the Arab parties and the NDA and its leader Azmi Bishara brought the scene the most needed aim, recognition as a collective minority for the Arab minority.

The voting behaviours of the sample group in the 1999 elections reflect the equal distribution between Communist Party and National Democratic Alliance. What is common among the group without any exception is voting for Ehud Barak as prime-ministerial vote in the same elections. As it was explained in Chapter 4, in Israel political system in the national elections two separate voting is in place one for the political party, one for the prime-minister. In 2001 a prime-ministerial election took place only. The other common behaviour is observed also at this election. None of them voted for any of the candidate although all of them voted for Ehud Barak in the previous elections. The general tendency which was mentioned before has been to protest the elections. Each of the respondents either did not go to vote or voted blank ballot in the 2001 prime-ministerial elections. The reason for this is asserted as Barak's turning his back to the Arab population after he was elected prime minister.

At this point their views regarding Arab politics in Israel were also examined by asking if they think Arab politics within Israel represent well enough the Arab sector's demands. The general tendency is towards viewing the Arab politics as insufficient in order to advocate and represent the demands of the Arab citizens. For instance, Suha argues that they only represent their own interests in most of the cases. Similarly Wadi enunciates that Arab politics is not really successful because they are not dealing with important issues.

On the other hand two of the respondents although state their criticisms towards the Arab politicians and Arab politics they also mentioned about the structural obstacles. In this sense Falestin claims that 'they are trying to do things, but there are so many discriminative acts against the Palestinians and there are not enough Arab members of Knesset that can work for it.' On similar lines Wadi points out the fact that united Arab party is needed to overcome this insufficiency on the part of the Arab politics. In this sense he evaluates the Islamic movement as an obstacle to formation of united power. He alludes,

> They are trying to do their best but united Arab party is needed covering all the elements and will be a voice of Palestinians inside Israel but it is not realistic unfortunately. Especially the Islamic sector is a barrier for this to come to true.

Although adopting a critical approach toward the issue, Sami claims that there is hope for its improvement. He asserts that the new generation who are educated adopt a much more serious approach and this brings a greater hope for the improvement of Arab politics within Israel.

Following the argument concerning the Arab politics and its role in the system the strengthening of the non-governmental organizations within the Arab community is also emphasized by some of the respondents. Rather than Arab politicians and political parties the NGOs are seen as the major solutions for the Arab sectors demands. Especially Suha and Falestin who are working for Arab NGOs claim that civil initiative should be mobilized more effectively within the Arab minority. Falestin points out that, there is not a real Arab civil society and it cannot be said that it is effective enough yet. At this point she asserts, 'however the NGOs put great effort for the Arab community of Israel and advocate the Palestinian rights.' On similar lines, Suha tells that 'today it is one of the huge part that society is provided with services.' In her view, the other outcome is creation of awareness on the Arab communities about their Palestinian national identity and their rights as citizens of the country.

For some of the respondents the role of NGOs are not very effective. Rather, their activities and scope are found limited as it is the case with Jasmine. Raida thinks that NGOs are getting power and will be much more effective in the near future. The criticism, which was brought by Sami, is that the power of the NGOs is weak in general. He states that it is only possible to talk about only two or three prominent organizations. He states that, 'although they are many in number the good and the prominent ones are just a few in number. All the rest are do not do anything really useful.' Different from these views Wadi's criticism revolves around the political impact of the NGOs. He notes, 'in the last decade NGOs are becoming more influential in Arab society. However they brought no tremendous change for the Arabs actually. No big concrete action took place. Maybe instrumentally yes but not politically'.

As the last question at the political orientation section the respondents were asked how they see themselves as young generation elite/intelligentsia or young activists of Arab sector in Israeli society. They do not avoid calling themselves as the young activists or young generation intelligentsia except for Falestin. She argues at this point that she does not see herself as 'elite' she tells that 'I am coming from a worker family and I established my view not only in the university but throughout my practices as a Palestinian minority in this country.' However she accepts the impact of education on her standpoint and status in the Israeli system. She tells that education is a very effective tool to be activist and as an activist she tries to her best for the good of the Arab community.

When it comes to their sense of responsibility towards their community without any exception they all agree that they have a high degree of responsibility towards Arab community, which they are member of. The shared approach is to see themselves as the ones who can change some issues into better state for the Arabs. Creation awareness on the part of the Arab community is the basic aim among the interviewees. They all claim that this mission can best be implemented by the young generation educated groups.

Arab students in Israeli universities have traditionally been politically active as Rohuana (1997) argues. So this characteristic of the educated Arabs may likely bring the some useful benefits. They are well aware of this situation. As Salim asserts, 'I feel strong responsibility to my people. I am going to work for the better future of the Arab society.' Mira and Raida, due their professional position which they mostly deal with the Jewish social and cultural life as art performers they try to bring their standpoint as much as possible to the Israeli life to create awareness in both of the group, Jews and Arabs they claim. As Raida summarizes,

> I put a lot of effort in my work and I am known in the country among the Jews and Palestinians and I work most of the time with the Jews. So I am sort of divided between the Israelis and Arabs. I try to see myself more or less as a bridge between these two societies.

5.11. Views on Current Issues throughout the World and in the Region

In order to understand their standpoint in general some questions were asked regarding current issues of the world which occupies the agenda in today's world. More specifically they were made to tell their views on the regional issues and internal developments within Israel. Their evaluation concerning most challenging problem of the world today was investigated. The answers although constitutes differentiations the basic approach as seeing the world in a conflictual situation especially in terms of identities. Mostly they pointed out the terrorism discussions and mostly they refer to the War in Afghanistan, besides the US politics were also criticized heavily.

In general terms Wadi put forward concepts such as 'borders and flags' in explaining the reason of the world's problematic situation. He adds that the power seeking countries beyond their borders is the cause of all the problems in the world today. On similar lines, US dominance mentioned in the response of Sami criticizing vanishing of bipolar system of the world order is the cause of all the problems all around the world. While war and poverty is mentioned by Falestin in general terms, the threat of terrorism is criticized by Suha as the major problem of the world today. She states in a controversial approach by asserting the following view,

> The terrorism, especially the Islamic terrorism has been seen as the problem of the world today however it is not only the terrorism by the radical Islam only, US itself is the major operator of the terrorism across the globe. We can name it as the terrorism against to the poor of the world by a hegemonic a state.

Raida, Salim and Mira share a common approach and see the main problem of world today as the conflicting identities. Interestingly, Jasmine and George introduced their own situation as the major problem of today's world. Jasmine argues that the dispute of 'whose land is Palestine/Israel' is the most challenging issue of world today. She explains the reason as follows:

> When you open the newspapers or watch any TV news channel all around the world that is for sure that consistently the Arab-Israel conflict occupies a place. It has been in the agenda of the world due its violent and problematic nature for tens of years. Besides this issue has been open to any development that takes place outside of the region. So in my view it is most problematic issue in today's world.

George in a more subjective way advocates that his situation as an Israeli Arab is the most important problem for him. He explains the reason by putting forward the idea that he cares about the country that he lives in, and the people that he is living with.

> In this state of affairs everything is becoming worse for me as an individual and group of minority. The developments in the world scale either directly or indirectly affects my situation in a badly way. The prejudices and discriminations are increasing and the heavy suppression is a likely threat for my people in this country. Above all, nobody cares about us here. Everybody and every country talks about Israel and its problem with the Palestinian people. But they never talk about Palestinian Arabs living inside Israel they all forgot about us. Now again after the recent event [October 2000 events] they started to talk about us. But it is temporary and it is not comprehensive and influential act for the Arabs.

In a similar way, they were asked to define the important issue of Israel today in more general form. This question which was asked in a different pattern and within another set of questions is used as control question. They were already expressed their view on the problems they have in the Israeli system and they discussed the system in detail while answering to the previous questions however the framing of the question is much more simple form and give the chance to reconsider the issue in more general terms. Therefore, there appeared a common tendency in their responses. The most uttered framing is 'occupation'. They either prefer to call it as occupation in the West Bank and Gaza or occupation of Israel on Palestinian nation. While four (Falestin, Raida, Mira, Sami, and George) of the respondents name it as occupation, the other two (Jasmine, Salim) referred to the same issue but framed it as peace process and security issues. At this point Sami notes about the differentiation on the definitions on the same issue. While Jews call peace process as 'security dilemma' the Palestinian side prefers to call it as liberation of the Palestinian nation he argues.

The rest of the two asserted different approaches. Suha points outs that following the permanent security problems also the arrangement in budget of the state is the most important issue by emphasizing that the security expenditures are very high so it creates a problem. Wadi frames the most important issue in Israel as racism. He notes that it is the cause of the all the problem related Israeli policies in and outside of the state. So the Palestinian question in the broader sense is the most

problematic issue and occupies a place in Israel's agenda according to the answers of the interviewees. And the Arabs living inside the Israel are feeling its direct affects. as to summarize, as long as the security issues will not be resolved nothing can be thought without considering the security dilemma both for the Jews and the Arabs in Israel.

More specifically they were made to speak on the September 11 2000 Events and the operation of war in Afghanistan. The views regarding the war and its causes to great extent shared by the entire respondents with some degree of differentiation however the impact of the September 11 events on the Arabs in general and on Arabs of Israel in particular is the same. They all agree that the image of the Arabs were badly damaged by the course of events.

It was expressed by Falestin that the war in Afghanistan is the continuation of the policies of US towards Arabs and Muslim world with a different version this time. She notes that September 11 Events only created a legitimate ground for US's acts. In a stricter manner Wadi thinks that the reason for the event are actually the American policies in the Middle East. He asserts that 'although it is catastrophic there was no other way of expressing the anger of the Arab people'.

Sami finds the events very catastrophic too and introduced his view as follows, 'Catastrophic. And I feel very sorry that there are these kinds of groups who have such a huge power to do such big disasters. The El-Kaide organization or any kind of small organization that can have this huge power is very frightening.' But he continues in a critical way and tells that things can not change by way of violence and war. He argues,

> In their view, they are clearing out the danger of the fundamentalism now. It has been in action for so long in all over the world. But on the Palestinian level I think it really damaged the Palestinian issue. Since 1960s Palestinians have been trying to convince the world that they are not terrorists and they have rights and they are trying to get their rights. It simply damaged the Palestinian issue, the Arabic people, the Arab and Muslim people.

The views are concentrated around the bad impact of the September 11 Events on the Arab nation. Suha asserts in a very anxious way that the to see the whole event as an Arab issue and specifically Palestinian issue is wrong. She argues,

> One crazy Saudi guy who kills thousands of innocent people claims that he did it for the sake of Palestine. I do not want him to claim it for Palestine. I am Palestinian and I don't want him to claim it for myself. So all the people in the world now thinks that we are terrorists. So it means it impacted badly and damaged the image of Palestinians and Arabs. But what US do now in Afghanistan is also terrible because innocent people are getting killed. Moreover they do it for their own political interests.

On similar lines George criticizes the present situation and tells that there is no connection between Afghanistan war and Palestinians but unfortunately it is seen that way he adds.

> Afghanistan doesn't talk to me at all. It is tough. I don't see the relation of being an Arab and be seen connected with the Afghanistan war. I think that is fool for Arabs to be related to Afghanistan. We have no connection with Afghanistan. We are not the same nation. We do have the same religion. So what? I don't care about this. I am a human being. It is something else different. September 11 Event is very stupid. I have nothing else to say about it. It is bad. It is not terror only it is stupid at the same time. They are successful but in what? In damaging the whole image of Arab nations they have been successful only. They made us look like terrorists. They made bad things to the Arabs not good things. By the way I have to differentiate it: I am talking about the Arabs as a nation not about the Christians. You may think that I am talking in this way since I am Christian, which is not true.

Their evaluations regarding second *intifada* which broke out in the territories in 2000 were also examined by making them to compare it with the first *intifada* in terms of its affects on the Arab minority. The second *intifada* is attributed to have greater impact on the Arab minority in terms of reaction and solidarity. It was pointed out that, on the contrary to the first *intifada* the second *intifada* brought much more violence to the Israel by the protest of the Arab masses. They enunciate that the discrimination increased toward the Arabs of Israel by the state but on the other hand the it also increased the national consciousness among the Arabs. It can be stated that the Palestinianism increased in their identity definition as a result of the second *intifada.* Falestin points out the negative aspect of the impacts and asserts that,

> We have more poverty here and more discrimination, legitimate institutional discrimination towards the Palestinians inside Israel increased after the events. And there are a lot of changes in the law by Knesset and there are more racist laws against Palestinians now. Directly or by indirectly it is the result of the recent events. The impacts of the 2nd Intifada on the Palestinians inside Israel are worse than the 1st one. There is more discrimination than the 1st one.

While Wadi focuses on the increase of solidarity with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, George points out the increase in violence on the part of the Palestinians inside Israel. He states that the first *intifada* was welcomed in a peaceful manner inside the Israel.

The character of the impact of the second *intifada* inside Israel is summarized by Suha by emphasizing the increase in Palestinianism as follows:

> It is much different from the first one. First *intifada* was less violent in Palestine and inside Israel. During the first *intifada* there were lots of Jewish and Arabs opposing occupation and it was less violent of course. In the second *intifada* there were many more Arabs opposing occupation and less Jewish with the second *intifada.* For instance the Jewish left did nothing in October 2000 events. Now the left is much less than it is used to be in Israel. And also Arab citizens were killed something that didn't happen before. There was more protest inside the Palestinian population inside Israel. People were more involved with the issue, they went to the street and they made demonstrations. People were more involved with the uprising than the 1st *intifida*. The reason is that they felt more Palestinian. And these events in the end reinforced their Palestinianism more.

The decrease in the support of the Israeli left wing politics can also be defined as the increased in the nationalism on the part of the Jewish Israelies. In this study it was assumed that the course events made the two groups more nationalist in their approaches and led to a clash between them in material and ideological spheres in Israel.

Differently from the other respondents the positive affects of the second *intifada* is portrayed by Sami as being one of contribution to the national consciousness of the Arabs of Israel. He explains this situation as follows:

> No doubt that 2nd *intifada* had much bigger affects than the 1st *intifada* on the Palestinians inside Israel because it was much more violent and the Israeli reaction is much more violent and this violence affected more Palestinians inside Israel. I think it had lots of good affects on the national consciousness inside Israel. The death of 13 of their own young brilliant people who were killed by the police inside the state triggered the national aspirations. These huge funerals that they have increased national consciousness and for the national movement politically speaking it made us a work that by ten years that we could not have done alone.

The violent events which resulted out with the death of 13 Arab citizens in Israel in October 2000 were evaluated both negatively and positively by the

respondents. The general tendency is towards to judge the affect of the events as reinforcing Palestinian identity among Arab community of Israel. there is common understanding on the issue as a result of the events Arab citizens have become stronger in some respects but weaker in other respects at the same time.

Firstly it is better to analyze what they see as the main reason of the October 2000 events. In addition to the external reason which is the eruption of the uprising in the occupied territories there are also the internal reason led to the events in the Israel. All the respondents agree on the issue that there has been already a mounting tension among the Arabs before October toward the policies of government. Besides, the increased awareness, both civic and national, which has been prevailing in the 1990s among the Arabs led to the October 2000 events. Falestin for instance explains that, 'the direct effect was what had happened in West Bank and Gaza but the indirect was also the situation of the Palestinian citizens in Israel'. Similarly Jasmine argues that the anger of the Arab minority triggered the events so the main reason is the internal reasons. Suha points out the socioeconomic reasons as follows:

> The reason is more internal because, if the Palestinians inside Israel were given equal rights and good social and economical life they wouldn't have been such involved. It is the expression of anger of 53 years, expression of discrimination of 53 years, discrimination against the Palestinians.

George introduced a different view on the issue;

> Although it happened after the 2nd *intifada* there is no connection. It had to happen. It is connected in a sense but the internal dynamics of the Arabs in Israel gave way to these events. They needed a reason to express themselves and their problems. They didn't use the *intifada*. They didn't plan it at all. It wasn't planned. It is a thing that got to be outside with anger as *intifada* – no plan. No one planned the *intifada* either. But when something has to happen it happens. When a situation is bad you can stand it for a while. For one month, two months, 1 year, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 years, 20 years, 40 years but one day it may explode. The question is 'when' that is all.

Wadi similarly framed the situation as resembling a bomb, which was ready to explode. In their opinion October 2000 events brought both positive and negative outcomes for the Arab population of Israel. The outcomes are discussed in a more controversially. The most expressed view is that it realized awakening on the Arabs especially with respect to national issues. But on the other hand it damaged badly the

relations between Arab minority and Jewish majority, badly influenced the economy in the Arab sector and increase the negative attitudes on both sides. Although lesser in number the outcomes such as changing the patterns of the civil protest and bringing the Arab minority issue on top of the agenda of Israeli politics were also mentioned by the respondents. Except for two respondents Salim and Jasmine it was told by the respondents that as a result of the events they become weaker and stronger at the same time in different aspects. Salim and Jasmine believe that it made the Arabs stronger since it showed the Jews that Arabs are not a silent minority.

On the same issue Suha argues that 'Arabs have become stronger in self-questioning their situation as Israeli citizen but they have become more afraid from the state and they lost the trust to State of Israel fully.' Positive impact of the events were expressed by George as follows:

> It is painful but it made the Israeli Arabs to know and understand their demands which haven't been recognized before. They were shocked and became aware of the situation. I think the events opened the eyes of the people and makes them think of us that we are part of the Israel. That's why we have to ask this country but we are part of it and it has to give us what we deserve. That's exactly what had happened. This is the good thing about it if there is a good thing about what had happened.

Sami who strictly advocates that the reason of the events has been national question of the Palestinian people in Israel rather than economic reasons also argues that younger generation is the actors in this movement. In his words,

> I think the *intifada* that the Palestinians made inside Israel was the first symptom of the awareness of national component of their identity. This was the first act, which the Palestinians inside Israel made as Palestinians because of what was done in their own territories to their own people. Not for their own reasons not for economic reasons. The economical situation was not bad. I think what made them revolt was the national components of their identity. This was the first time that the Palestinians as a group inside Israel were motivated by the Palestinian agreement. Any violent act is moved by younger generations in general. You will never see people aged 40s or 50s throwing stones on policeman. Usually who have revolutionist spirit believe that they can change things or do things, they are the young people. It is the generation that can change things. In October 2000, a lot numbers of this generation were hurt badly because friends, relatives, brothers were killed or injured by the Israeli forces. And tens of thousands joined the huge funerals that they were made for shehids all over the state. They had this kind of adventure that the other generations did not have. Usually identities are built on adventures the more you do have adventures common in certain a group, the more you feel belong to this group. October 2000 events gave the Palestinians a very big opportunity to share things together. They shared things, funerals and fighting together. Their national component of identity came out in the end.

Concerning the changes aftermath of the October 2000 events the views show differences in some respects. Salim talks about the increase in rationality and afraid simultaneously. He asserts,

> After the events they became much more rational, they do less demonstrations, they are much more afraid. It worked, this message of fear worked. It had succeeded. But state failed totally in trying to win the elites of all Arabs citizens. They simply lost the hope of to do anything good with the Arabs inside Israel. All of the Arabs of the Israel now know that; it is a racist country, very violent so nobody likes it anymore.

On the contrary to the argument that the Arab economy has been damaged badly as a result of the events Sami puts forward that in the long period it led to some positive structural changes for the Israeli-Arab economy. He advocates this by stating that,

> Before October 2000 a huge percentage of the consuming of Israeli Arabs was done at the Palestinian markets in the West Bank and Gaza. After October 2000, the roads were closed it was very dangerous to go there. So most of the Arabs went into the Arabic market inside the villages and inside the cities. I know about a few malls that were built within the Arab sector because of this huge consuming wave inside the state. And more, because of the racism of the Jewish majority Arabs started developing their own racist way of consuming. And now they prefer to buy at Arab places. For example Umm Al-Fahm and in other big Arab cities there are shopping malls. They don't go to Jewish places anymore, because the Jews punished them. They didn't come to buy at their places especially in mixed cities. So the number of business that they made there became less. The Arab consuming cannot supply enough money for it. But in places like Sakhnin which are mostly Arabs, is good enough for them. And it gave them after a very big disaster good contribution. After the Jews and state wake up they started to think about what had happened. And now they are trying to make the damage less next time. This will cost the state a lot. Big Arab businessman started to think about big companies. It will cost the country on the high levels.

All the interviewees stated that it has brought Palestinian minority issue on top of the Israel's agenda but it is also argued that it has been only temporarily and the need for structural changes have not emerged on the part of government. In practice nothing has changed according to their view. At this point Suha argues,

> It brought it to the agenda but it did not bring the discussions about how to treat the Arabs or how to make them more equal citizens or how to solve the problem. It is more to see them as enemies and brought the idea of 'we have to kick them out' only. Bad attitudes increased.

Sami asserts the same view by emphasizing another aspect, 'at that time for a few days it brought the Arabs into agenda. But the only thing that it increased in the Arab sector was the intelligence services working better in the Arab society'.

The respondents discuss what may bring these events to the Palestinian minority in different ways. As Suha argues,

> These events made the Arabs stronger in their own struggle and in their unity but at the same time made them weaker. They are likely to come across more discrimination in government institutions since they will be suspected more.

On similar lines, Raida claims;

> Palestinians inside Israel became more aware of their Palestinian identity and more involved, part of them became more racist but a small part, mainly young people Israeli left decreased a lot, became a little group. The institutional policy, government policy became more violent and cruel.

One respondent also mentioned increase in the rightist movements among both of the sectors of society as a result of the October 2000 events. Wadi says,

> Social and culturally they are becoming more separate everyday. They are part of the people in this country but they are treated differently. As a result both the rightist and leftist approaches have been sharpened and increased extremely after the October 2000 events.

Sami views the situation in the aftermath of the events in a positive way and he thinks that it may bring more power to the Arab minority in the long term. Politically they may likely to become stronger in the near future since the number of voting for the Zionist parties will likely to decrease. He also points out the fact that fear is felt by all of the Arabs at the moment but also the national awareness is very high which he finds very useful for their struggle.

> Potentially it made them stronger. Especially on the national component of their identity but meanwhile they are much more afraid. It will take another few years maybe after this next elections this fear will become less. Because they will see if they will, the very most of the Arabs now believe most of the Arab communities in the coming elections will elect Arab Members of Knesset. And there might be a unity between the Arab parties. Also if there won't be unity among the Arab parties, they will have much more members in the Knesset Arabs more powerful and better. I don't think that they will vote for Zionists. It will be very hard to convince them again to vote for Zionists. It was the most liberal professor from Tel Aviv University Shlomo Ben Ami that was the minister of the interior security in Israel that was responsible for killing 13 people. If Ben Ami was that extreme they will not believe in anybody. Of course they buy few families then they will have few voters as usual. But most of the Arabs will vote for the Arab parties.

The interviewees were also made to speak on the Defensive Shield Operation of Israel in the occupied territories which was going on when the interviews were made. Following this topic they were asked if they think peace will be reached in the near future. They all expressed their anger about the operations of the military in the West Bank and Gaza. While Falestin calls the operation as war crime, Jasmine calls it as a very violent act which will not bring solution to the Palestinian problem. Raida claims that it is a very fascistic act and what is sad about the situation is that it takes place in front of the millions of the people and nothing can stop this violence of Israel she argues. On similar lines Wadi states that,

> The occupation from the very beginning is unfair. Generals and government do not understand the way to solve this problem. It is their way to control the Arab population by means of social and legal discrimination together with violent military acts.

With a more critical approach Salim asserts that;

> I am not surprised of the operation. The occupation was there since the beginning. Israel simply ignored that the fact that there are Palestinians living. Till 1987, for Israel there were no Palestinian people. Since the 1st *intifada*, Israel came to recognize the Palestinian people, only in 1990s after the 1st *intifada*. Before then it simply made all the Palestinians work in its fields. Now they are seeing the violent face of it which is clear and was known to everybody but it has lots of violent faces that don't come to our awareness usually we don't think about them. The occupation is violence. Living under occupation, to grow up under occupation. I think their education systems under occupation. You can kill the people without killing them physically just by killing the national awareness for me it means killing them, just by cutting all their connections with their cultures. This means killing them. That is what Israel has been doing for lots of years.

Sami in a similar way introduced a view which asserts that the Palestinians inside Israel under military control had been exposed to the same implementation by Israel. besides he discussed the impact of this situation on the generations.

> It has done the same thing to the Palestinians inside the Israel during military government. The military government abolished in 1966, but its psychological affect still exists nowadays. When I go to a demonstration my grandfather simply gets shocked. He is so afraid. Still lives at that period. Because you know lots of people were killed or hurt in that time. So fear still controls most of the older generations a lot of, the second generation is more or less the same and even our generation. Fear still exists. So this explains why Palestinian minority is so quite. Lustick was so surprised when he came to Israel in 1980s, he discovered that the Arabs inside Israel are so quite although it is a democratic country. Racism is well known to everybody, everybody sees it but nobody does anything. It was surprising for Lustick, so he made his research on the Palestinians inside Israel. He came to conclusions of psychological fear. I think during the military control it is normal and understandable. But 20 years after it, now 40 years after it, nothing has changed.

When it comes to the question of the time of the likely peace agreement between the Palestinian people and State of Israel they asserted almost no hope for the near future. Although it is needed urgently it is not likely to happen in the near future. At least 20 years should pass in Jasmine's opinion. Suha adopts a more pessimistic approach she thinks that minimum for the 50 years peace can not be reached in the region. She continues as follows by also criticizing the Oslo Agreement,

> This is the main issue that we think of how many blood should be spent more, how many people should be killed to reach the peace. Because of stupid people and stupid politicians peace cannot be reached. We won't have peace in the near future at least for 50 years. If for 52 years Israel couldn't make a durable peace why now in ten years? The Oslo has not been a peace. It wasn't a peace. Oslo is just a Muppet show. It is a stupid thing.

Similarly Wadi argues that justice peace is needed but it is not foreseeable in the near future. Sami introduced a different view on the issue and talks about the nature of peace which is required.

> A kind of peace of course will be reached. You can find a kind of peace every time. Something that will satisfy the Palestinian people in the near future I don't believe. Israeli society especially the Jewish Israelis are not prepared psychologically for peace. Because peace has lots of risks that the Israeli society can not take. A strong Palestinian democratic state alongside Israel is considered to be very dangerous. Because they think that Palestinians are dangerous by potential. Besides natural process is not welcomed. Israel wants to make peace in order to get rid of the Arabs By the way the leadership is fully aware that the Jewish suppliers do not want this. They want to own and control everything.

It was asserted by all of the respondents that in order to have a peace between Israel and Palestinians an independent state should be established and recognized for the Palestinians. Otherwise peace cannot be reached in their opinion. Following the arguments on the ongoing policies of Israel beyond the green line their views were asked about their status in the condition that peace is reached. The strong connection between the Palestinian question in the West Bank and Gaza and their status has been examined throughout this research. The impact of the regional developments on the Palestinian Arabs of Israel were discussed in all periods until today. Therefore in accordance with the assumption it was proved that there is a strong correlation between the future of the Palestinian nation in the occupied territories and the Palestinian citizens of Israel. What they expect from the possible peace agreement between Israel and Palestinians for themselves was investigated in the research.

They argue that possible peace agreement although at the moment is far from to happen will bring many changes in their life. The economical benefits were mentioned as well as the improvements in their political status as a member of a nation which has its own state just next to Israel. the positive expectation were summarized by Wadi as follows:

> I expect from the peace for the Arab people in Israel very positive things. If once the peace will be reached then will come the stability and this will make the two regions very connected. So the business and tourism will increase which means an economical progress and wealth for the whole people both in Israel and territories. Investments will increase and work opportunities will be increased.

In addition to the view concerning possible improvement in the economic sector a possible change in their status as a group of minority is expected together with the changes. The struggle of the Palestinians for more equality which has been active inside Israel in the last decade may likely to increase. The peace outside of Israel will bring much more freedom for the Palestinians inside Israel in seeking their demands and rights as citizens. As Suha argues,

> Economy will be much better that is for sure, and social and culture and tourism and everything but then we will start our struggle for equal rights. We have started already but then we are going to put more emphasis. And will become stronger because now we struggle for us and for the Palestinians in Palestinian territory. But we will keep connection with the Palestinians of the territories and we will teach them to become democratic then we will continue. We will put more stances in our struggle.

Equality within and outside of Israel is the major expectation from a possible peace agreement however it was also seen by the respondents that it has to remain as a hope since it is hard to change the situation both for the Palestinians in the occupied territories and inside the Israel. The expectation toward being equal within Israel may be to great extent will be reached when the peace is reached however they argue that the basic long-term aim should be to change the definition of the state as a Jewish state. They still expect to change first the situation in the West Bank and Gaza and then their struggle will begin the minute peace will be reached. They argue that they have already start their own struggle different from the previous generation for equal rights and recognition as a collective minority but the political atmosphere will be much more available for their struggle when the peace is reached.

5.12. Comparison with the Other Palestinians and the Arabs in General

As it was discussed in the previous parts by the 1990s the civic awareness and national awareness increased together among the Arab minority in Israel. Therefore their view on their own struggle for equality and recognition began to occupy a prominent place in their agenda. In this state of affairs, the search of equality within the Israeli system make them more aware of their rights as citizens. The bicultural young generation educated group, which is the scope of this study, tend to compare themselves more with their Jewish counterparts in terms of equality. They reject to compare themselves with the Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza or with the rest of the Arab world. When they were made to compare their position with the Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza economically, culturally, socially and politically the responses demonstrate that they are well aware of the advantageous and disadvantageous components of their position in comparison with the Palestinians beyond the Green Line. But when it comes to make comparison with the Arab people living under sovereign Arab states they show totally rejection to this kind of question.

Basically they tend to find the cultural life of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza better in all senses. They point out the fact that they are in better condition culturally since their existence as a nation has been recognized. Moreover the views revolve around the claim that the Palestinians in the occupied territories are living a life which they feel no alienation at all in their daily life. Although living under occupation, they have the opportunity of living their own cultural way of life without feeling alienation. The reason is stated that Palestinian Arab culture is not seen as inferior in the territories therefore it is very good atmosphere for an Arab living within an Arab culture. At this point Salim's argument can be given as an example; 'the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have much better life socially and culturally. Nothing can be compared with the Arabs of Israel. They are developing their own culture with their own attitudes and their own ways'. However in terms of social life, majority of the respondents tell that Palestinians inside Israel

have better condition than the Palestinians of the occupied territories. Since the occupation is ongoing there are several constraints in their social life so this makes them to live a socially limited life, denied of some social practices, which are being practiced freely by the Palestinian Arabs inside Israel. Jasmine defines this situation as follows,

> If you go to Ramallah for instance, it is beautiful to go there when things are silent. Beautiful city. They have anything they need in their own language. People speak your own language and you share the same culture and you don't have any inferiority complex toward your own culture. Because in Israel you study very bad things about your own culture, simply you are an Arabic culture. They bring you up to feel inferior and tell Jews are superior. In West Bank and Gaza things are not like that. Arabism is superior. Jews really think that they are superior all over the world.

The comparison regarding the economical situation of the two groups the tendencies are differentiated. Some argue that they have better opportunities in Israel and the standards of living are far better than the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Despite their claim of inequality in terms of distribution of resources in comparison with Jewish Israelis, the standards are seen as being much better than the occupied territories. Relative deprivation appears in their opinion by evaluating their situation is worse than the Jewish Israelis but better than the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.

Different from the above-mentioned view three of the respondents (Sami, Suha and Wadi) introduce a contradictory arguments on the same issue. The economical situation in West Bank and Gaza is seen well in comparison with the Palestinians inside the Israel. The status of the Arabs in the Jewish economy is not perceived as sufficient since the majority of the Arabs in Israel are only workers and wage-laborers. The other reason is that the Arab workforce is not safe in the Jewish economy, which puts them in an insecure position. Therefore they are the ones who are likely to be impacted firstly by the economic fluctuations and instabilities. The potentially well being of the Palestinian economy in the occupied territories is emphasized but they argue that situation seems very bad at the moment since they are under occupation and have no chance to control freely their economy and are dependent on the Israeli economy totally unfortunately. In this sense Sami argues,

> Israel is much richer; it has more money but the fact that this money does not give me a better life. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have more opportunities in potential. And they have dozens of good things that Palestinians inside Israel do not have. They have their own universities we don't have any Arab university inside Israel. They have their own factories, they have their own farms, and they own the land. To be honest economically they are much richer. If you check in depth Palestinians are much richer. They are the owners of everything in their states. Arabs in Israel are only workers in the Jewish economy and they are not safe in this economy. What had happened in October 2000? After two demonstrations you could not find anything to buy in the Arab cities in Israel. We did not have milk because we do not have milk companies. We did not have anything in our shops because all the things we have in our shops come from the Jewish companies. Electricity companies are Jewish, everything is Jewish. Meanwhile Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza while living under siege for years, they have most of the things they need because they manufacture themselves, and they do things themselves. Most of the Palestinians inside Israel are stupid enough to think that our situation inside Israel is much better because they do not think about it comprehensively. If you think about what happens to us only in October 2000 you see how poor and stupid minority we are. How stupid we are is unbelievable. We could not bring milk to our babies, which is totally stupid. The minority of more than one million people, a huge minority, should have everything but we do not have anything in practice. Also universities, in the West Bank and Gaza there are seven universities.

The disadvantages and advantages of their being Israeli citizen were also asked in political terms. There are divergent and convergent parts among the responses of the interviewees. On the one hand they tell that despite its limitations there is democracy and freedom of expression for the Arabs inside Israel however it is not applicable to make comparison in this state of affairs since they are living under occupation. Although being a discriminated minority they are the citizens of a sovereign country on the contrary to the Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza who are living under occupation. In this sense, Falestin notes, 'we cannot compare them, because first they have to establish their own state and rules and regulations. They live under occupation.' Similarly Wadi argues that 'it is not possible talk about democracy and freedom of expression under an occupation'. Since they have not get their own state yet, the comparison may not be meaningful in their view.

The other approach on the issue is towards claming that there is no democracy and freedom of expression both for the Palestinians within and beyond the Green Line. Jasmine and Raida who adopt this view argue that both of the Palestinians are under control of Israel so both of them have its own limitations although being in different versions. Politically none of them is seen well in their opinion.

By bringing a different argument, Suha argues that their political struggle is different and difficult from the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. While the Palestinians in the occupied territories struggle for independence the Palestinians inside Israel struggle for equality and recognition as a collective minority. She states that the groups from all over the world support the struggle in the occupied territories but they only themselves struggle for themselves within the system. She continues as follows:

> Our struggle is much harder than the Palestinian struggle. Because our struggle is as citizens and it is a struggle for equal rights and law. They have the entire world's support behind them and for us lots of people all over the world do not know that we exist. Many people do not know that there are Palestinians inside Israel. So we have to first create awareness and start our fight. When you claim that Israel is not democratic it is not easy but for the Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza it is easy to claim that there is an occupation etc. We will have to falsify Israel's claim of being democratic and this means we will have to do harder job. I thought once that being citizen would be helpful and useful for struggle for equal rights but after October 2000 when 13 Arabs were killed no more I believe that it is better. It was a turning point. Today even in my world when I see how we are persecuted as a committee for education: how we persecuted by government and by ministry of interior. We do not have any power on execution of our own issues we are persecuted in the Knesset, in the universities. It is really even harder and they do it by law.

As Suha asserts within a democratic system at first glance it may seem easier for a group of minority to struggle for their rights however to convince and come to an agreement by the majority may not be easier and it may take more time. Because in this context they challenge the democratic nature of the state claiming that it is not a real democracy and this claim will not be accepted by the state and the majority. What is observed also at this point is that after the October 2000 events the hope and self-confidence have decreased among the respondents. George says,

> Let me tell you something important: during the last years if you look at the political attitudes of Israeli authorities toward the Arab minority in Israel you can easily see that they have a war against the Israeli Arabs. I mean the Member of Knesset. Why is that? I think they are taking an advantage of the situation to shut their mouths. They do. Yes. And this is the problem. Israel claims that it is a democracy but it is not democratic with Israeli Arabs.

George also mentions the difference in the nature of political conditions between two groups of Palestinians as follows;

> Politically I do not feel we are better than them. You know my problems in this country. What I am seeking for is change. What I think about the Palestinians in Gaza and West Bank is that; they will have a potential country in the future. Here in Israel if the situation does not change I will always be limited. If you ask me now I am living well. I am living very well. I

> can do anything I want. Yes I don't have existential problems like them. They have no job. They have no food sometimes. I don't have these problems. This is because of the political status of the group.

In Sami's view situation is getting worse for both of the populations day by day since 2000. He tells,

> I do not think that the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza have better life than the Palestinians in Israel till October 2000. They used to have more belief the things would be better. Since then they do not believe any more in that leadership. They lost their belief in the leadership. They used to believe until 2000 that one day when they have their own state to be a democratic one and will give them much better condition of living. But still they have more hopes than the Palestinians in Israel. Palestinians in Israel have very little hopes, politically.

In addition the comparison between Palestinians within and beyond the Green Line, the respondents were also made to compare their situation with the Arabs living in sovereign Arab states. They reject to compare themselves with the other Arabs in the Middle Eastern countries. Falestin tells that there is no point such kind of comparison and continues;

> I don't compare them and us. Because it doesn't matter that some Arabs are living worse conditions or treated worse. If you think in this way this makes it easier for Israelis to discriminate the Arabs in Israel. I want to compare myself with the citizens who live in my country, in my land!

On the other hand, in a more moderate approach Raida notes, 'there are various kinds of Arab regimes and structures but in terms of cultural and social life they do not feel alienated so it is very good'. Jasmine tells that she would love to live in an Arab country but she also asserts 'I am Arab of this land so I am attached to this land but it should be good to live in an Arab country'. Similarly Wadi tells that the most of the Arab countries are poorer than Israel but the people live better life in terms of culture and social life. Suha introduced the difference between them and the other Arab people living under the Arab countries as follows;

> I have relatives in Jordan so I have been there many times. Before I always used to say that Israel is at least in a way democratic when you compare with Jordan. When I went to Jordan realized that they live much better life than us even in Jordan. Because they do not have this political issues everyday to think of, they just live their life, a normal life without thinking of politics. Without thinking of stress they go out and have fun etc. They have regular, normal, boring life. For instance during the last events we used to work 8-9 hours a day and then go as volunteer for another 8-9 hours, 2 hours for sleep maybe so this is not a normal life. When I go out with my boyfriend we only talk about politics that is not a normal life. It makes you

> also always defensive saying I am human being a Palestinian not a terrorist. I am against terrorism and I have to defend myself always.

In a similar way Sami points out the common culture they have with the other Arabs living in Arab countries. He states,

> We have lots of things in common. Only the language, language itself is huge shared component. Language carries the whole culture in it, without thinking about it. It brings lots of things that these all people share. There are lots shared perceptions about the whole world we have the same religion. Most of the Arab people either Christian or Muslim. They love the same music. But for myself I have never wanted to live in one of those countries.

At this point he points out the democratic nature of Israel in a contradictory act to his previous arguments. Although he finds the democracy in Israel insufficient and ignorant to the Arab minority in general terms Israel is much better than the Arab countries for an intellectual. But he also asserts that;

> If I was a normal person who knows nothing about politics it can be great. But after you have knowledge about democracy and human rights it is very difficult to live as an intellectual in any of these states. Most of the serious intellectuals of the Arab world go out from their countries. You are not allowed to think in the way you want.

On the same ground George expresses that among the Arab countries Lebanon is one of most democratic. He tells that Palestinians are like Lebanese so he would like to live there for a while but not permanently. It is worth to clarify that none of the respondent expressed a wish to live in one of the Arab states. In all instance they express their attachment to their land, which they prefer to call 'Palestine'. When they were asked about if they have an intention to move to Palestine if a Palestinian independent state will be established in the future the general tendency is towards to continue living in Israel.

Their intentions regarding future were also investigated by asking them if they think their future is bound to Israel in one way or another. Suha, Falestin and Wadi argue that they can leave the country to live in another country in the West. They define themselves as being flexible on this issue. Suha asserts that, it is going to be her choice and she can choose to leave the state since she is sick of the state. She adds, 'I do not think my future is bound to Israel. It is bound to Palestinians and I can continue to struggle from somewhere else for the Palestinians'.

But on the other the rest of the respondents expressed that they have no intention like going abroad and live there. The sense of attachment to their land and country is high. Jasmine tells her view as follows:

> I am here. I was born here. I do not have any plan like going abroad and living there. This is my country. I can live temporarily but not for very long. Not even in Arab country. I see my future in Israel and in my hometown Umm Al Fahm.

5.13. Nakba Memory and Opinions on Previous Generations

The young generation educated Arabs of Israel who grew up as bicultural and bilingual constituted as the third generation in this study. The social and economic changes, which have been experienced in Israel in 1990s, impacted their identity and political stance both as a member of Arab minority and as a citizen of Israel. In this context the sample group were asked about also their views on the generational differences in terms of identity. The revival of Nakba memory, which has been appeared in the second half of the 1990s, was also investigated by asking their opinion on the issue. As well as internal and external developments the initiatives on reconstruction of the past is considered to affect greatly their identity definitions.

All of the interviewee asserted that there are certain differences between the older generations and their generation. They share the view that the basic interests and demands of Arabs in Israel transformed and changed in time. This reveals itself in the identity definition of the group. In this sense it can be stated that their identity definition is more complex than the past. Both components, civic and national have been sharpened. Jasmine tells at this point,

> In the past it was harder for the Palestinians. But now although the identity is more complex it is better than the past. Because now they are more aware of their rights, and national belonging to the Palestinian people.

The increase in national awareness is emphasized in the responses by asserting the reason for this as education. Falestin introduces a different view advocates that the identity is the same only the conditions have changed. She argues,

> At the beginning it was worse. They were very poor people, then the next one was under the military control, they were very afraid. But then with the help of education, then they became organized. Actually the identity is the same but now the conditions are better.

Sami points out the changed fact among the generations by emphasizing the modern content in the socioeconomic life and political understanding of his generation. He thinks that the previous generations did not struggle in the same way that they struggle. The methods to cope with the situation had been totally different in the previous generations and basically it can be considered as very passive due to the political developments such as the military control and strict security measures which were implemented towards the Arab minority. The experiences and views which are totally different from the past and special to the young generation is expressed by Sami as follow:

> It is actually two generations, which changed in time because my grandfather's generation was under mandatory Palestine. They were Palestinian as well but they were living under military government they were afraid and disappointed so they had to accept the Israeli power. Today the generation is fighting different from our parents' generation struggle. Because our parents did not really struggle. They were Palestinians and many of them were really patriot but they didn't really struggle. Because they were still living after a shock. Now the new generation of today which I am part of, use the tools which are available and try to raise the awareness. They were frightened by the military government. I believe the identity is more complex than the past generations. It changed there is no doubt. The feeling of belonging to Palestinian people is much stronger than other generations. They have more national consciousness. Other kind of practical identities in other words traditional identities weakened like; family identity or tribal identity. They are much weaker nowadays; today's people have more modern identities like civic and national identities.

While expressing his views on the differences among generations Salim defines the new generation as more conscious in comparison with the previous generations. He asserts that, 'today especially the young people are more aware of their civic rights and they interpret more deeply the governmental policies towards the Arab minority of Israel'. On the other hand he also criticizes the younger generation as follows, 'but also there are people who tend to be live more westerners and don't care about the national values'.

The revival of Nakba memory among the younger generations was accepted as a true phenomenon by all of the respondents. It was told that it is becoming more

important in the minds of the people especially the young generation. Sami asserts it as follows;

> Since 1998, after 50 years the Nakba, not only the Palestinians inside the Israel but also the Palestinians in the territories and Diaspora started to renew their memory about the Nakba. The Palestinians themselves till 1998 did not use or celebrate or mention the Nakba. It was very rare. There were very weak celebrations. Just in the 1998 after 50 years, the Palestinians started to renew their trauma, the old memory of trauma.

As a result of the efforts on the revival of Nakba they began to discuss more about the past issues and this has greatly affect their understanding as descendants of the traumatic period. Apart from the practical and concrete reasons such as increase in the publications on the issue George explains the real cause of the situation as follows:

> It happens with all the people all over the world. It takes them at least two generations to recover from a serious trauma. The same thing happened with the Jews during the Holocaust. All the refugees of 2nd World War started to talk about their problems in 1980s. It takes people at least 50 years to recover a trauma. The first generation had all this feeling of guilt, disappointment and all bad feeling. And they did not want to say these feeling to their sons. Second generation knew very little about it. Third generation because of all the intellectual think and novels and stories that came out know much more.

It is a new phenomenon and is attributed a great importance by all of the interviewees in this study. Wadi notes that it is important because it is turning point for the national consciousness of Palestinian people in Israel. He says that for commemoration of the Nakba he shuts down his shop on the 15 of May for the last three years. Suha tells a newly prevailing understanding which can be summarized as in the form of famous slogan of 'everyday is a Nakba'. It can be stated that the increased national awareness have been realized by way of initiatives to reconstruct the past. Among these efforts the Nakba memory is the major influential issue.

5.14. Conclusion: Demands for Their Group

The interview questions contain a set of questions in the last section about the respondents' demands and aspirations. The interviewees were submitted four alternatives to choose regarding Arab minority's status. By this way the views could

have been brought in a more precise form. The options are as follows; 1- Separate but equal in Israel, 2- Part of Palestinian state along side Israel, 3- Part of secular state where Arabs and Jews have equal rights, 4- A kind autonomy in terms of economy, culture etc. (separate cantons model).

It was found out that the basic demand of the respondents is being part of secular state where Arabs and Jews have equal rights. Without exception they accepted this alternative for the Arab minority in Israel. However at the same time an autonomy option was also chosen in the secondary position by four of the respondents.

The interviewees were made to speak for each of the alternative proposed to understand the reason behind their decision. 'Separate but equal in Israel' option which was not chosen by any of the interviewees is perceived as impossible. It was also stated that the historical reality showed that it is not attainable. As it was discussed in the Chapter 3 it has been the state's official imposition and propaganda till 1990s. They claim that you cannot be separate but equal at the same time in Israel as a group of minority. Now the existing situation is explained as separate and unequal within Israel for the Arab minority. Moreover it was very good expressed by Sami that to be separate is not possible in modern era the integration is crucially required. In this state of affairs neither to be separate nor to be equal is possible for the Arabs in Israel he claims. On similar lines George also argues that,

> In such a small country you cannot separate Arabs and Jews inside Israel. The two communities are integrated economically. They have companies and we work for them. There are people who think in that way but it is not available to implement.

For the second option, which proposes to be 'part of Palestinian state along side Israel', they claim that it is not realistic to think. Israel will never agree on such an alternative because this means that it will give the Arab towns to Palestinians to be part of the Palestinian state. Although they would like to have this option it is perceived as totally unrealistic.

‘Part of a secular state where Arabs and Jews have equal rights’ is the chosen option by all of the respondents. The difference in this option for them is their view on the need of the change in the definition of the state. Secular and equal state means they will be recognized and will be given the same rights as equal citizens without preference over the one dominant population. At this point Suha argues that she would prefer to live in one binational state, which will be established in all Palestine including Israel and the occupied territories.

The autonomy option which is defended by Azmi Bishara is appreciated also by the interviewees. However the limitations are also expressed at the same time. Suha states concerning this option as follows;

> I would like to live in a canton model like Switzerland or Belgium. But we are not still sufficient to have economic and cultural autonomy. We do not have the resources yet. But the best option could be canton model. In Israel, I mean, I am not talking about Palestinian territories, I mean autonomy within Israeli borders only. In Belgium they have a canton for the Germans who are only 60.000.000 in number only. We are 20% here, 1.200.000.000 Arabs in Israel. so it should be the reasonable way but it is not possible unfortunately.

Sami also tells that political autonomy is not realistic but cultural autonomy should be implemented for the Arab minority in Israel because cultural autonomy includes to establish their own radio, TV and newspaper moreover to control their education system for the Arabs of Israel. But he also tells that this will have no chance to come true as long as the state continues its existing exclusionary and discriminative policies towards Arabs in and outside of Israel. As to conclude, the replacement of the regime in State of Israel by a secular democratic one is the shared demand among the selected young generation educated Israeli Arabs and reflects the trend, which has been prevailing in the 1990s among the Arab minority of Israel.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Arab minority of Israel, which constitutes almost one fifth of Israel's population, has been living as citizens from the outset. When the State of Israel was established as a result of the 1948 War, which took place between Israel and five Arab countries, they became homeland minority in the newly established Jewish state. Their official status had been changed over a night by the declaration of the independence of the State of Israel. The Palestinian citizens of Israel can be viewed as a national (Palestinian/Arab), ethnic (Palestinian/Arab), religious (Muslim, Christian and Druze) and linguistic (Arabic) minority in Israel. What is special about this minority is they feel belonging socially, culturally and nationally to countries of which some are still in a state of hostility or war with Israel. They have undergone several transformations in time under the impact of certain internal and external developments and this have greatly affected their identity definition as a group.

1990s signified a new era in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and impacted the two processes 'Palestinization' and 'Israelization', which have been in action from the very beginning on the part of the Arab minority. In this context Israelization is considered to be a trend toward cooption into Israeli society, Palestinization is considered to be a trend of national awakening. These two trends have been sharpened in the last decade especially in the post-Oslo period.

The Peace Process, which marked a historical turning point for the Arab-Israel conflict, created a new kind of composition in identity definitions of Arabs in Israel by putting more emphasis on national and civic aspects, but narrowing the struggle of their own within the borders of the State of Israel. The manifestations of

the new trend evidenced in a great extent in the aspirations and demands of the young generation Arabs who are highly educated. The interviews with the selected representatives of the young generation educated group show high conformity with this argument.

Apart from the external reasons, the socioeconomic context has been also very influential on the increased demands of the Arabs of Israel regarding equality and recognition. It is a fact that the economic gap has been widened in the last decade as a result of demographic growth and ignorant governmental policies towards the Arab minority. The awareness increased in all terms among the group. They began to criticize their own position in comparison with the Jewish majority. It can be stated that relative deprivation is dominant in their views. In the ideological level, the topics like equality of opportunity, true partnership in decision-making, playing an active role in policy making have clearly gained new attention. Therefore the public discussion began about the existence of Israel as a Jewish national state and as a democratic state at the same time. Moreover since the basic aim, peace, was 'nearly' achieved, the focus was shifted to other issues such as: equality in a material and ideological sense.

These changes, the domestic and external, sharpened the dilemma of national identity faced by the Arabs of Israel. In this thesis the new aspirations and demands of the group are investigated by focusing on the young generation educated Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel. Although there is no betterment about the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza in the present era, the localized struggle of Arab minority inside Israel, which started in a relatively peaceful atmosphere continues to flourish.

One of the major findings of this research is that young generation educated elites are more radical in their attitudes. On the one hand, the new generation intellectuals have more or less succeeded to integrate to the Israeli society, but on the other hand their awareness of their personal/social and collective identity as a Palestinian citizen of Israel is high. The new aspirations and demands led to a shift in their identity definitions. A new kind of demand is defended very strongly by the

third generation, who are at the age of 20s and 30s. They carry the characteristics of the new political trend which claims recognition for Arabs collectively as a national minority within the Israeli system.

Education is very important in this context. The vast improvement in the educational level is observed in the last decade among the group. Despite the disparities, the educational achievement of the Arabs in Israel has had a profound impact on the social, political and cultural dynamics of their society, and consequently on their collective interaction with the state. Most educated Arabs are the product of the Israeli educational system, which has a Western orientation. Arabs and Jews attend the same universities, which are Jewish-centered and Jewish-dominated. Most Arabs are therefore bilingual, and educated Arabs are to a large extent bicultural. They rely mainly on the Hebrew-language mass media, because the Israeli Arabic radio and TV stations are state-run and heavily controlled by propaganda considerations. For educated Arabs, this has opened channels of firsthand knowledge of the Israeli political system and political culture, by which they have been deeply influenced. In universities, Arab students also become well acquainted with Israeli culture, politics, society and lifestyles.

In this state of affairs a new version of Israelization and Palestinization appears with the increased social and political activism among the younger generations who are highly educated. The integration into Israeli politics significantly enhanced since the 1990s. Besides new Arab political movements emerged in the mid 1990s. One of these movements is the National Democratic Alliance, which is headed by Dr. Azmi Bishara. NDA challenges the Jewish character of the state as being the main reason of the Arab minority's unequal status. Furthermore it defends the argument of the need for cultural autonomy for the Arab minority. It was found out in the present study that young educated Arab elites express their demands in the same way as Azmi Bishara and his party. The influence of this political movement on the discursive level occupies a great place among the younger generation elites. Support of the new alternative movements, which emerged in the second half of the 1990s, is common to young members of the minority who are highly educated. The proliferation of Arab NGOs is another manifestation of the

new political and social trend which has been brought by the new version of Israelization and Palestinization processes. The ranks of advanced graduates provides cohorts of professionals who can initiate a number of socially conscious organizations that promote social work, health services, education, psychological health, and the like. Such organizations not only provide services but also focus community awareness on systematically assessing needs. Adalah (The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) is appreciated greatly among the young educated elites. It was also revealed in this research that voluntary participation in civil society organizations is very high among the young generation.

Throughout this study it was found out that there is an increase of self-awareness on the part of the respondents as a citizen and as a member of a national/ethnic minority. Rational attitude as a citizen is seen in this context. There is a common ground on dissatisfaction with the quality of services and development given to Arabs. The other shared view is dissatisfaction with the degree of civic and democratic rights given to Arabs. They question the status of their group and criticize the democratic nature of the state. The common tendency is towards the need for a redefinition of the state, which defines itself as the Jewish state for all of the Jews of the world.

The basic argument which is raised by the present study is that the identity formation process of the young Arab elites in Israel has been shaped by certain internal and external developments and they tend to identify themselves as 'Palestinians who are Israeli citizens'. Ethnic and national affiliations are seen as of primary importance in their identity definition. Affiliation to the Arab nation and culture constitutes the primordial attachment in their identity formation. Palestinian identity in its changing forms connotes the same primordial ties. It can be argued that circumstances operate on the fixed components of their identity. The other major finding of the research is that the young generation Palestinians inside Israel tend to see their identity as distinct and different from the rest of the Palestinians because of their different experience as Israeli citizens.

The young generation educated elites constitute the group among Arabs of Israel which has the highest level of integration to the wider Israeli social and cultural life. Despite their being in a bicultural stand in the Israeli system, in varying degrees a sense of alienation is also experienced. The reason for this, is not only the sense of non-identification with the state culturally and with the Jewish majority but the obstacles which they face in their life also lead to a sense of alienation.

The other finding which is revealed in this study is that the young educated elites are more self confident in Arab cultural heritage and they are seeking its cultivation. They attribute themselves a mission, to raise awareness on the Arab minority in national and civic aspects. They strongly support the civil society initiatives (NGOs) toward the development of the Arab communities.

On the contrary to the Israeli official terminology which calls them as Israeli-Arabs, they preferred rather to be called as Israeli-Palestinians highlighting the Palestinian dimension in their identity as well as mentioning their being Israeli. This kind of definition in fact may seem more contradictory when an independent Palestinian state will be established alongside Israel. The above mentioned contradictory processes of Palestinization and Israelization shape the identity definitions of the group, create conflicts between civic and national belonging and bring about a different kind of identification with the state as a citizen. Therefore the prevailing tendency which has been observed among the group is defining them as ‘Palestinians who are Israeli citizens’.

REFERENCES

Adalah (The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) website, http://www.adalah.org

Adalah (The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) (March 1998), *Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel*, Israel: Adalah Publications.

Anderson, B. (1994), "Imagined Communities" in J. Hutchinson, A. D. Smith (Eds.), *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.89-95.

Aridi, N. (2003), "The Druze in Israel", http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0mv90#top

Bendix, R. (1977), *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order,* Berkeley: University of California Press

Bishara, A. (1996), " The Crisis of Arab Leadership: Where is the New Generation?" in E. Rekhess (Ed.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads,* Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press.

Brubaker, R. (1996), *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the Nat ional Question in the New Europe,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R.; Cooper, F. (2000), "Beyond Identity", *Theory and Society*, no.29, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p.1-47.

Butenschon, N. (2000), "State, Power, and Citizenship in the Middle East: A Theoretical Introduction" in N. Butenschon, U. Davis, M. Hassassian (Eds.), New York: Syracuse University Press, p.3-27.

Calhoun, C. (1993), "Nationalism and Ethnicity", *Annual Reviews Sociology*, Carolina: Annual Reviews Inc.

Cohen, E. (1989), “Citizenship, Nationality, and Religion in Israel and Thailand” in B. Kimmerling (Ed.), *The Israeli State and Society*, New York: State University of New York Press.

Cohen, J. L. (1999), “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos”, *International Sociology,* Vol.14, no.3, p.245-268.

Cohen, J. L.; Arato, A. (1992), *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press.

Cornell, S.; Hartman, D. (1998), *Ethnicity and Race,* London: Pine Forge Press.

Darweish, M.; Rigby, A. (1995), “Palestinians in Israel: Nationality and Citizenship”, *Peace Research Report, No: 35*, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, no.2400, Bradford: University of Bradford Press.

Davis, U. (1995), “Jinsiyya versus Muwatana: The Question of Citizenship and the State in the Middle East – The Case of Israel, Jordan, and Palestine”, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.17, no.1-2, p.19-50.

Delanty, G. (1997), “Models of Citizenship: Defining European Identity and Citizenship”, *Citizenship Studies,* Vol.1, no.3, p.285-304.

Dor, G. B. (June 1995), "The Druze Minority in Israel in the mid 1990s", *Jerusalem Letters of Lasting Interest*, no.315, Jerusalem: the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Dowty, A. (1998), “Arabs in Israel”, *The Jewish State a Century Later*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Eide, A. (2000), “Citizenship and International Human Rights Law” in N. Butenschon, U. Davis, M. Hassassian (Eds.), New York: Syracuse University Press, p.88-122.

Galston, W. (1991), *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Duties in the Liberal State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Geertz, C. (1963), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York: The Free Press.

Giddens, A. (1979), *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis*, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Giddens, A. (1991), *Modernity and Self Identity,* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ha-Aretz, Daily Israeli Newspaper.

Haidar, A. (1995), *On the Margins: The Arab Population in the Israeli Economy*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hall, S.; Gieban, B. (1992), T*he Formations of Identity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hammer, T. (1986), "Citizenship: Membership of a Nation and of a State", *International Migration*, Vol.24, no.4, p.735-748.

Held, D. (1995), *Democracy and the Global Order- From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hinnebusch, R. A. (2000), "Liberalization without Democratization in 'Post-Populist' Authoritarian States: Evidence from Syria and Egypt" in N. Butenschon, U. Davis, M. Hassassian (Eds.), New York: Syracuse University Press, p.123-149.

Hutchinson, J.; Smith, A. D. (1996), *Ethnicity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Isaacs, H. (1975), *Idols of the Tribe*, New York: Harper & Row.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, (2003), http://www.mfa.gov.il

İsrail Enformasyon Merkezi, (1997), *İsrail'in Gerçekleri,* Jerusalem: Hamakor Press.

Ittijah website (the network for Palestinian non-governmental organizations in Israel), http://www.ittijah.org

Kassim, A. F. (2000), "The Palestinians: From Hyphenated to Integrated Citizenship" in N. Butenschon, U. Davis, M. Hassassian (Eds.), New York: Syracuse University Press, p.201-262.

Kirişçi, K. (1998), "The Case of the Kurds in Turkey" in G. Dru (Ed.), *Making Majorities*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p.227-245.

Kook, R. (2000), "Citizenship and Its Discontents" in N. Butenschon, U. Davis, M. Hassassian (Eds.), New York: Syracuse University Press, p.263-287.

Kretzmer, D. (1987), *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*, Tel Aviv: International Center for Peace in the Middle East.

Kylimcka, W.; Norman W. (2000), "Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts" in W. Kymlicka, W. Norman (Eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, p.1-41.

Kymlicka, W. (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford: Clarendon.

Kymlicka, W.; Norman, W. (1994), "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory", *Ethics,* no.104, p.352-381.

Landau, J. (1969), *The Arabs in Israel - A Political Study*, London: Oxford University Press.

Landau, J. (1994), *The Arabs in Israel, 1967-1991: Political Aspects*, London: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1977), *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration,* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lustick, I. (1980), *Arabs in the Jewish State - Israel's Control of a National Minority,* Austin: University of Texas

Lustick, I. (1990), "The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs" in A. Arian, M. Shamir (Eds), *The Elections in Israel - 1988*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Maalouf, A. (2001), *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*, First North American Edition, New York: Arcade Publication.

Maktabi, R. (2000), "Tune in Religion, Turn on Pluralism, Drop out Citizenship? Membership and Political Participation in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon " in B. Olav, K. S. Vikor (Eds), *The Middle East in a Globalized World*, London: C. Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd., p.38.

Mana, A. (1996), "The Identity Crisis: The Arabs in Israel and Israeli-PLO Agreement" in E. Rekhess (Ed.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads,* Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press.

Mansfield, P. (1992), *A History of Middle East*, England: Penguin Books.

Marshal, C.; Rossman, G. B. (1995), *Designing Qualitative Research*, Second Edition, California: Sage Publications.

Marshall, T. H. (1965), *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, New York: Anchor.

Minns, A.; Hijab, N. (1990), *Citizens Apart: A Portrait of the Palestinians in Israel*, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

Moore, D. (2002), "Assuming Social Responsibility: Jews and Palestinians in Israel", *Kaveret*, no.4, p.76 - 81.

Moore, D.; Kimmerling, B. (1995), "Individual Strategies of Adopting Collective Identities: The Israeli case", *International Sociology,* no.10, p.387-407.

Morris, B. (2001), *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*, New York: Vintage Books.

Mouffe, C. (1992), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy, Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, London: Verso Books.

Parkin, F. (1979), *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, London: Tavistock.

Peretz, D.; Peretz, M. (November 1998), "Israeli Palestinians and the Middle East Peace Process", QMERS: Reflections on the Middle East Peace Process, Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee: Middle East Program.

Ram, U. (1999), "The Colonization Perspective in Israeli Sociology" in I. Pappé (Ed.), *The Israel/Palestinian Question*, Routledge, p.55-80.

Rekhess, E. (1989), "Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza: Political Affinity and National Solidarity", *Asian and African Studies,* Vol 23, no.2-3.

Rekhess, E. (1991), "Initial Israeli Policy Guidelines toward the Arab Minority, 1948-1949" in L. Silberstein (Ed.), *New Perspective in Israeli History,* New York: New York University Press, p.103-123.

Rekhess, E. (1995), "Israel's Arab Citizens and the Peace Process" in R. O. Freedman (Ed.), *Israel under Rabin*, Boulder: Westview.

Rekhess, E. (1996), "Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads" in E. Rekhess (Ed.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads,* Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press.

Rekhess, E. (2000), "The Arab Parties" in R.O. Freedman (Ed.), *Israel's First Fifty Years,* Florida: University Press of Florida.

Rekhess, E. (2002), "The Arabs of Israel after Oslo: Localization of the National Struggle", *Israel Studies,* Vol.7, no.3, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rokkan, S. (1975), "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe" in C. Tilley (Ed.), *The Formations of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rouhana, N. (1984), *The Arabs in Israel: Psychological, Political, and Social Dimensions of Collective Identity,* Michigan.

Rouhana, N. (1997), *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shafir, G. (1989), *Land, Labor, and the Origin of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shapira, B. (1996), "An Arab Minority in Israel: Past Barriers and Future Constraints" in E. Rekhess (Ed.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroad,* Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press.

Smooha, S. (1978), *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, Berkley: University of California Press.

Smooha, S. (1993), "Class, Ethnic, and National Cleavages and Democracy in Israel" in E. Sprinzak, L. Diamond (Eds.), *Israeli Democracy under Stress*, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers Co.

Smooha, S. (1998), "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype" in S. I. Toren (Ed.), *Israel Studies*, Vol.2, no.2, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Smooha, S. (1990), "Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The State of Arab Minority in Israel", *Ethnic and Political Studies*, Vol.13, no.3, p. 389-413.

Sommers, M. R. (October 1994), "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relationship and Network Approach", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23, p.606.

Steenbergen, B. Van (1994), *The Condition of Citizenship,* London: Sage Publications.

Turner, B. (2000), "Islam, Civil Society, and Citizenship" in N. Butenchon, U. Davis, M. Hassassian (Eds.), New York: Syracuse University Press, p.29-48.

UN website, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html

Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://www.wikipedia.org

Yiftachel, O.; Segal, M. (1998), 'Jews and Druze in Israel: State Control and Ethnic Resistance', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.21, no.3, p.476-506.

Yiftachel, O., Ghanem, A. and Rouhana, N. (2000), 'Is Ethnic Democracy Possible?', *Jamaa (Journal of Middle East Studies),* no.6, p.58-80 (Hebrew, in press). (two thirds of this paper are translated from the English version in Israel Studies, while two new sections were written anew).

APPENDIX A

GUIDING INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

A - Demographic Information:

1. Gender
2. Age
3. The school that you lately graduated from and when
4. Place of residence and for how long
5. Where are you from originally? Rural/urban, geographically exact place, Arab village/town/city or mixed town.
   (If he doesn't live there at the moment) How often do you go to your home town/village? And for which purposes do you visit?
6. Where do your parents live? Where do your grandparents live or used to live?
7. The occupation of your parents
   Father:
   Mother:
8. The school that your father graduated?
   The school that your mother graduated?
9. Do you have any brothers or sisters? If yes what is their education or occupation?
10. Do you have a permanent job?
    a. Job description:
       - What are your responsibilities and duties?
       - Job conditions: state owned/private, work hours, with Jews or with Arabs?
       - For how long have you been working here?

- Are you happy or satisfied with your job?
- What kind of job would you prefer?
- What was your former job? (If you had any)

b. Are you a student? Degree, department, university.

c. If unemployed since when? Do you take any unemployment assistance from the state?

11. For students and unemployed ones: How do you earn your living? Do you take any financial assistance from your parents?

For the respondents who are not students anymore: When you were student how were you earning your living?

B - Questions on Personal and National Identity

1. Does the term 'Israeli' describe your identity?

Appropriate

Inappropriate

2. Does the term 'Palestinian' describe your identity?

Appropriate

Inappropriate

3. How would you characterize yourself if you had to choose from the following identities:

Arab

Israeli-Arab

Israeli

Palestinian

Palestinian-Arab

Israeli-Palestinian

Palestinian citizen in Israel

1948 Palestinians

Palestinian Minority in Israel

4. Do you think which of the component of your identity has the priority?

Muslim/Christian/Druze, Arab, Palestinian, Israel citizen.

Do you think there is a balance between them or let's say do you try to create such a balance? Can you say 'this is my main identity or the one and only identity affiliation, which I feel strongly attached'?

C - Questions about Israeli and Palestinian Legitimacy

1. Do you think that the state of Israel is the homeland both for the Jewish and Arab people?
2. Do you consider the Zionist movement a national liberation movement for the Jewish people? And related to this what do you think about Israel's right to exist?
3. Do you think Arabs can be equal citizens in Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state and can identify themselves with the State?

   Yes Uncertain No
4. How would you describe the regime in Israel by selecting the items below?

   Democratic

   Nation state

   Ethnic democracy

   Majoritarian democracy

   Racist

   Religious

   Discriminative

   Tolerated

   Liberal

   Respectful to the international human rights

   Illegal

   Legal
5. Which of the following fits to the description of social and economic way of life in Israel?

   Modern

   Traditional

   Western type

   Middle Eastern Type

   Dominated by Middle Class Groups

Wealthy

High standards of living

Successful in social welfare system

Gaps between the social staratas within the society (between rich and poor)

6. How do you evaluate the democratic nature of the state in Israel?
7. Do you think that Israel should recognize the Palestinians as a nation?
8. Are you in favour of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel?
9. Do you prefer to live in a Palestinian state? (If such an independent state may come true sooner or later would you prefer to move there and live and be full citizen?) Why? (q13)
10. Would you prefer to live as a full citizen of any Arab country? (Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia etc.) Why? (q14)
11. Do you support the replacement of the regime in State of Israel by a secular democratic one?
12. What are the obstacles in front of providing equal rights to all of the citizens, in Israel?

    Which one of them is more important as an obstacle to power-sharing and equality for the Arab minority in Israel?

    a. Jewish Character b. security considerations c. economical gaps
13. When you compare yourself with Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza what do you think about your situation in Israel?

    in terms of economically, culturally, socially and politically:

    <u>economically</u>: job opportunities, standards of living, distribution of resources

    <u>culturally, socially</u>: recognition of full national rights, non alienated society although living under occupation,

    <u>politically:</u> democracy and freedom of expression

    I mean what are the disadvantages and advantages of your being Israeli citizen?
14. What do you think when you compare yourself with the Arab people living under the sovereign Arab states? In terms of the same criterias above.

15. What do you think about when you compare the Arab minority in Israel with the Jewish majority? (Same criterias)
16. What would you choose from the following three alternatives for the Arabs in Israel?
    - Separate but equal in Israel
    - Part of Palestinian state along side Israel
    - Part of secular state where Arabs and Jews have equal rights
    - A kind autonomy in terms of economy, culture etc. (separate cantons model)

D - Questions on Current Issues throughout the World and in the Region

1. What is the most important and challenging problem of world today in general?
2. According to your point of view which of the issues in Israel is important nowadays?
3. How do you evaluate the September 11 Events and the following operation of war in Afghanistan? What they recall you in brief?
4. How did the 2nd Intifada affect Arab population in Israel? Do you think that this 2nd Intifada is different from the first one in terms of its impacts on the Palestinians inside Israel?
5. In your opinion what is the main reason of the October 2000 events? (internal or external reasons have been more effective in triggering the events) Why? Has there been already a mounting tension among the Arabs before October toward the policies of government?
6. What has changed after the 2000 October Events?

   Change the patterns of civil protest

   increase the awareness on civil and national rights

   realized awakening

   badly damaged the relations between Arab minority and Jewish majority

   badly influenced the economy in the Arab sector

   increase the negative attitudes on both sides

   brought the Arab minority issue on top of the agenda of Israeli politics

   Has October 2000 Events made Arabs in Israel weaker or stronger?

7. What do you think about the recent operation of Israel (Defensive Shield Operation) in the territories?
8. Do you believe that Peace will be reached in the near future?
9. What do you expect from the possible peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians for yourself?

E - Questions on Areas of Discrimination

1. Do you feel that Israel is your own country? Why?
   nationally,
   civic identity
   territorial attachment and claim
   socially
   culturally
2. Are you satisfied with the quality of services and development given to Arabs in Israel?
3. Are you satisfied with the degree of civic and democratic rights given to Arabs in Israel?
4. Is it possible to talk about any definite kind of discrimination against the Arabs in daily life?
   What kind of discrimination do you yourself experience in your daily life or in broader sense?
   When did you first experience a kind of discrimination at your time of life?
5. Do you support national service for Arabs in Israel instead of military service? Do you think is it an advantage or a disadvantage when you compare yourself with the Jewish and Druze communities?
6. Do you think an Israeli Arab has a good chance to fulfill his/her professional ambitions in Israel?
7. In order to identify your identity with State of Israel what is needed mostly?
8. Could you please tell me the most discriminative act you have experienced until now at your time of life?
9. Do you think the discrimination acts mostly concentrated in legal, social or economic spheres?

F - Education System

1. The High School which you graduated is state school or private? (Christian, Jewish, mix). Why did you prefer to study there?
2. Where did you learn English?

G - Language

1. Did you have any difficulties with Hebrew at the university? Do you think that you have been in a disadvantaged position when you were at the university?
2. Would you prefer to study at the Arabic University?
3. Do you think Arabic has the equal status with Hebrew since both of them are official languages? For instance, do you use Arabic in state organizations?
4. Do your parents speak Hebrew? How good?

H - Social Contact with Jews

1. Have you ever had Jewish friends when you were young? When did you have your Jewish friends and where?
2. Do you favor the formation of personal relations and friendships with Jews? Do you have any permanent Jewish friends or any close contacts?
3. Have you ever had a Jewish girlfriend/boyfriend?

I - Daily Life

1. Do you think your identity is visible? Do you think at public sphere your identity is recognized easily for some reasons?

   strong Arabic dialect in Hebrew (‘p’ ‘b’ sound)

   appearance or because of anything else

J - Culture

1. In which language do you prefer to read a novel? The book that you read lately and what was it about? Do you read Israeli Jewish authors?
2. Which newspaper do you prefer?
3. From which sources do you follow the news? TV, radio, internet, newspaper, the names?

4. Do you have satellite TV and an access to world channels? Which channels do you watch mostly?
5. In which language do you prefer to listen music?
6. Do you think young generation Arabs are self-confident in Arab cultural heritage and seek its cultivation?
7. Do you feel yourself culturally alien?

K - Political Behavior and Role as an Elite

1. Do you call yourself as political or radical?
2. How do you see yourself as a young generation elite of Arab sector in Israeli society? Sense of responsibilities
3. Are you a member of any political party?
4. For which party did you vote for during the 1999 elections?
5. For whom did you vote in the prime-ministerial election?
6. How do you see the Arab politics in Israel? Do they represent well the Arab sector's demands?
7. What is the role of the civil society and NGO's in the Arab society in Israel?

L - Questions on Palestinian Identity

1. What is the role of being refugee in the construction of Palestinian identity? Internal refugee problem is a domestic issue of Israel or should it be included in the negotiations?
2. Do you think that there is one Palestinian nation, which includes all the Palestinians here and there, and the whole diasporas?
3. Does

   PLO

   PNA

   Arafat

   Arab MK

   Local Leaders

   Islamic Movement

   Civil Society initiatives/NGO

   represent the Palestinians in Israel the best?

4. Revival of Nakba memory among the younger generations is a true phenomenon or not? (in terms of reconstruction of the past to create national awareness)
5. a. Do you think being Palestinian in the State of Israel is something different in terms of identity? Is it a distinct and unique identity?

   b. When you compare yourself with other Palestinians in your generation who don't live in Israel, do you think you share one and unique identity with them?

   c. If yes what are the common interests? If the answer is 'partly' or 'to a certain degree' then what is the differences between you and them?
6. Do you see yourself as the part of the Palestinian people at first hand then secondly the part of Israel? Do you have the sense of belonging to cultural and social life of Israel?
7. What are the differences between the generations in terms of identity definition? Do you agree the basic interests and demands of Arabs in Israel transformed and changed in time? Is it better or complex than the past?
8. Do you think the awareness as a citizenship has increased in the last decade especially among the younger generation?
9. Do you think that your future is bound to Israel in one way or another?

APPENDIX B

ARAB NGOs WITHIN ISRAEL

- Adalah

  - Arab-run non-profit legal center in Israel, which concentrates on protecting the rights of the Arab minority within the state.

- Alternative Information Center (AIC)

  - A joint Israeli-Palestinian human-rights group, based in Jerusalem and Bethelem.

- The Association of Forty

  - Organization which focuses on the plight of unrecognized Arab villages in Israel.

- The Galilee Society

  - Organization which focuses on issues of health and development, as they affect the minority in Israel.

- Birem

  - Kafar Bir'em is an Arab Christian village located 4-km south of the Lebanese-Israel border. In 1948 the villagers were driven out by the Israeli Army with the promise to return to their homes within two weeks. Today they are still waiting.

- The Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA)
- Ittijah: The Union of Arab Community Based Associations

<u>Ittijah currently has 44 member organizations in the Palestinian NGO Sector</u>:

- Acre Arab Women's Association
- Adalah, The Legal Center for Minority Rights in Israel

- Ala'an Social and Cultural Development
- Al Aofuk Association for Culture and Arts
- Al Beit: Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Israel
- Al-Moriscos (Al-Mawarka): Society of Andalusian Arabs
- Al Tufula Center
- Al Wafa & El Amal: The Women's Relief Association
- Al-Yanabia
- Al Zahraa
- Ansar al-Sajeen- Friends of Political Prisoners
- The Arab Association for Human Rights
- Arab Children's Friends Association
- Assiwar- Arab Feminist Movement in Support of Victims of Sexual Abuse
- The Association of Forty
- Barta's Relief association
- Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Uprooted Palestinians
- Committee for the Development of Arab Libraries
- Committee for the Educational Guidance for Arab Students
- Dar El-Tefil El-Arabic: Triangle
- El-Amal: Committee for Educational Development
- Follow-Up Committee for Educational Development
- The Fund for the Development of Technological Education in the Arab Sector in Israel
- The Fund of El-Haji Roqueia Bayadseh for Support to Arab Students
- The Galilee Center for Social Research
- The Galilee Society: The Arab National Society for Health Research and Services
- Graduates Committee of Shefa'amr
- Hura Community Center
- Ibn Sina Charity Association
- The International Christian Committee in Israel
- Iqrit Heritage Society
- The Islamic Council of Jaffa

- The Islamic Women's Relief Committee
- Kayan: A Feminist Organization
- Marj-Ibn-A'mer Association
- The Nahef Development and Welfare Association
- Naji El Ali Kindergarten
- Nazareth Arab Institute
- "Salma" Dancing Group
- The Social Development Committee of Haifa
- The Social, Educational & Cultural Association of Kufar Yasif
- Women Against Violence
- Women's Association of Ara and Arara

APPENDIX C

MAIN ARAB TOWNS IN ISRAEL

BY ALPHABETICAL ORDER:

Name	Location (region; district)	Arab population (in thousands)
Abu Sinan	North; Acre	9.3
Acre (Akka)	North; Acre ('Mixed City': Arabs represent 24% of 45,300 inhabitants)	10.9
Akko*: see under: Acre		
Ar'ara	North; Hadera	12.1
Ar'arat Al-Naqab (Aro'er*)	Centre; Hadera	7.8
Arrabe	North; Acre	14.7
Baqa Al-Gharbiya	Centre; Hadera	16.3
Barta'a: see under: Basma*		
Basma (Barta'a, Mu'awiya, Ein Al-Sahle)	Centre; Hadera	5.0
Bayyada: see under: Maaleh Iron*		
Beit Jann	North; Acre	8.2
Bi'ne (Al-)	North; Acre	5.7
Bir Al-Maksur	North; Acre	5.3
Bu'eine-Nujeida (Al-)	North; Nazareth	5.8
Dabburiya	North; Afula	6.4
Daliyat Al-Karmel	North; Haifa	11.8
Deir Al-Asad	North; Acre	6.9
Deir Hanna	North; Acre	6.6
Ein Al-Sahle: see under: Basma*		
Ein Mahel	North; Nazareth	8.2
Fureidis (Al-)	North; Haifa	7.9
Haifa	North; Haifa. ('Mixed City': Arabs represent 12% of 262,600 inhabitants)	32.4
I'bilin	North; Acre	8.5

Iksal	North; Afula	8.5
Isfiya	North; Haifa	8.5
Jaffa (Tel Aviv-Yafo*)	Centre; Tel Aviv ('Mixed City': Arabs represent 6% of 349,200 inhabitants)	19.7
Jaffa of Nazareth: see under: Yafa of Nazareth		
Jaljuliya	Centre; Petah Tiqva	5.4
Jatt	Centre; Hadera	7.2
Jisr Al-Zarqa'	North; Haifa	8.3
Judeida (Al-)-Makr	North; Acre	13.4
Kabul	North; Acre	7.3
Kafr Kanna	North; Nazareth	13.4
Kafr Manda	North; Nazareth	11.4
Kafr Qare'	Centre; Hadera	11.2
Kafr Qasem	Centre; Petah Tiqva	12.6
Kafr Summei'a: see under: Kisra		
Kfar… see under: Kafr…		
Kisra-Kafr Summei'a	North; Acre	5.3
Lod*: see under: Lud (Al-)		
Lud (Al-)	Centre; Ramle ('Mixed City': Arabs represent 21% of 55,000 inhabitants)	11.4
Maaleh Iron* (Musmus, Al-Musheirfe, Salem, Al-Zalafe, Bayyada)	Centre; Hadera	8.7
Maalot-Tarshiha*: see under: Tarshiha		
Maghar (Al-)	North; Tiberias	15.6
Majd Al-Kurum	North; Acre	9.6
Makr (Al-): see under: Judeida (Al-)		
Mashhad	North; Nazareth	5.4
Mu'awiya: see under: Basma*		
Musheirfe (Al-): see under: Maaleh Iron*		
Musmus: see under: Maaleh Iron*		
Nahaf	North; Acre	7.6
Natzrat Illit*	North; Nazareth ('Mixed City': Arabs represent 11% of the total city's population)	4.2
Nazareth	North; Nazareth	54.1
Nazareth Illit: see under: Natzrat Illit*		
Nujeida (Al-): see under: Bu'eina (Al-)		

Qalansuwwa	Centre; Netanya	12.4
Rahat*	Negev	24.6
Rame (Al-)	North; Acre	6.8
Ramle	Centre; Ramle ('Mixed City': Arabs represent 17% of 60,000 inhabitants)	10.4
Reine (Al-)	North; Nazareth	12.2
Sakhnin	North; Acre	19.2
Salem: see under: Maaleh Iron*		
Shafa'amr	North; Acre	25.4
Shfar'am*: see under: Shafa'amr		
Tamra	North; Acre	20.1
Tarshiha (Maalot-Tarshiha*)	North; Acre ('Mixed City': Arabs represent 26% of 16,800 residents of Maalot-Tarshiha)	4.3
Tayibe (Al-)	Centre; Netanya	25.3
Tel Al-Saba'	Negev	7.6
Tel Aviv-Yafo*: see under: Jaffa		
Tira (Al-)	Centre; Netanya	16.4
Tur'an	North; Nazareth	8.7
Umm Al-Fahm	Centre; Hadera	30.7
Upper Nazareth: see under: Natzrat Illit*		
Yafa of Nazareth (Yafat Al-Nasira)	North; Nazareth	12.7
Yafi'a*: see under: Yafa of Nazareth		
Yarka	North; Acre	9.9
Zalafe (Al-): see under: Maaleh Iron*		
Kufr… see under: Kafr…		

* Asterisks designate Hebrew names

APPENDIX D

D.1. BRITISH MANDATE PERIOD 1920-1948

D.2. 1947 UN PARTITION PLAN



D.3. ISRAEL 1949-1967