

FRANCE AND THE SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

FRANCE AND THE SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

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This thesis depicts the French security and foreign policy regarding European security. The study covers French foreign and security policy in the aftermath of the Second World War, the period of Charles de Gaulle, François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac. The theme of autonomy in European security is maintained throughout the years under scrutiny. It is argued that the search for autonomy has been a constant goal of the French security and foreign policy. It is also maintained that France has a policy of employing organizations like NATO and European Union as an instrument to advance its own causes, where possible.

Keywords: French foreign policy, European security

ÖZ

FRANSA VE AVRUPA GÜVENLİĞİNDE ÖZERKLİK ARAYIŞI

Bahçecik, Şerif Onur

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez Fransız dış ve güvenlik politikasını Avrupa güvenliği açısından tasvir etmektedir. Çalışma, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasındaki, Charles de Gaulle, François Mitterrand ve Jacques Chirac dönemlerindeki Fransız dış ve güvenlik politikasını içermektedir. Avrupa güvenliğinde özerklik teması tez boyunca korunmuştur. Özerklik arayışının Fransız dış ve güvenlik politikasının sabir bir hedefi olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Ayrıca Fransa'nın NATO ve Avrupa Birliği gibi organizasyonları kendi amaçlarını gerçekleştirmek için mümkün olduğunca kullandığı ifade edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fransız dış politikası, Avrupa güvenliği

To My Mother and My Father

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to shed light on the French European security policy from the election of Socialist President François Mitterrand up to the Iraq crisis of 2004.

France has always been deemed as the *Republic exceptionnelle*. One area that seems to confirm this observation is European security. For many years since de Gaulle France has been at the forefront of any initiative that has been proposed in the name of European security autonomy. French diplomats have initiated various projects, blueprints, initiatives and plans for the development of autonomy. It is not a coincidence that since the 1950s documents relating to the European security have been known with their French compilers, like the Pleven Plan, Fouchet Plan, etc. There is no question regarding the pro-active French approach to European security.

This study aims to depict the evolution of this odyssey. It starts with a brief chapter devoted to the policies of de Gaulle in the aftermath of the Second World War. In that era, France, together with Western European partners struggled to overcome its hostility with its neighbour and also reconstruct the French political system. In the field of foreign policy, France was getting accustomed to the rising hegemony of United States in international politics. France took its first decisive lesson with the *Suez Crisis*. After that, it increasingly came to posit itself against the American policies in Europe. This led the observers to argue that France and de Gaulle himself was trying to increase its strength with a intransigent policy. The study at hand scrutinizes this point of view. In this, one of the challenges has been the employment of the concept of *Gaullism*. Anglo-Saxon writers largely used this in a pejorative manner. Moreover, it found its way into the academia as such. In this context the options at hand were either to dismiss the concept as a whole or to redefine it in a way that would help the overall study. In this thesis the second option is preferred.

The second chapter of the study is devoted to the Mitterrand era in French politics. This section bypasses approximately 12 years of activity in French foreign policy. This does not mean that the years between 1969-1981 are insignificant but the omission is justified with the renewed dynamism in European security debate, which started in 1980s.

This section of the thesis is marked with the emphasis put on the domestic politics of France, at least in the first term of Mitterrand. This is so because the experiences France has gone through in the early 1980s are significant in their directing of the polity towards the European integration. The remaining of the section is devoted to the emergent European security activity and early efforts at establishing a European identity in this sphere.

The third chapter is about the end of the Cold War and French reaction to it. In the early months of the *annus mirabilis*, French minds were obsessed with the balance of power in Europe and retarding the imminent German unification. After a period of hesitation France finds its proper place in Europe.

The fourth chapter is devoted to one of the most significant instances of modern French foreign policy, that of the *rapprochement* with NATO. Coming as a result of the experiences on the terrain, Chirac and the French polity tried to bring into life the policy which was being proposed since de Gaulle: "NATO reform." The chapter also depicts how it failed.

The last chapter, a substantial one, is reserved for the post-St. Malo situation in the European security. The chapter witnesses the incremental evolution of the European security architecture and change of British attitude vis-à-vis the European project in defense. The latest situation after September 11 and Operation "Iraqi Freedom" is also addressed. One of the prominent challenges to this section was the development of CFSP and ESDP. With these European security policy became largely institutionalized and it became increasingly difficult to separate the French policy from the European policy. This prompted the need to consult to different sources.

The study is mostly concerned with scrutinizing the France's input to the development of European security initiatives. In that, French defense policy is also brought into attention together with the British, American and German approaches to

the European security to put the study into perspective. The nuclear dimension of the European security and French defense policy are largely ignored since they do not constitute an important part of the European agenda nowadays.

The study consults to original documents, speeches and other relevant first hand material whenever it is feasible.

CHAPTER 2

FRANCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF SECOND WORLD WAR

2.1 The Situation in the War's Aftermath

Any study on French foreign and security policy must consider the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (WWII) and the Presidency of General Charles de Gaulle to understand today's French policies. Ever since de Gaulle, any government and Presidency needs to make a reference to General's policies to explain itself. In line with this convention this study under question will devote its first pages to this era.

After the liberation of France in June 1944, de Gaulle entered Paris on 25 August 1944. He was the leading figure of the *Resistance*, which he externally represented first in London, and then in Algeria after its liberation in 1943. Despite his authoritarian and conservative views, the anti-Nazi and anti-Vichy resistance groups within France had already adopted him as their leader in the underground French press.¹

At the time of General's installation of the first post-war government of France, main concerns of the society and duties of the leadership was rebuilding the French polity. Because of Marshall Pétain's collaboration with Nazi Germany, that is the Vichy Regime, most of the French country had not become the target of German attacks. Hence the main problems to be tackled were: the French constitution comprising the basis of the 3rd Republic (1870-1940), which was deemed to be the major source of problems especially in the interwar era,² the independence and the international standing of France,³ economic recovery, ending the problems in

¹ John W. Young, *Cold War Europe 1945-89*, Kent: Edward Arnold, 1991, p. 80

² Henri Peyre, "The French Situation: A French View", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 59/3, September 1944, p. 376

³ Roy C. Macridis, "French Foreign Policy: The Quest for Rank" in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, 6th Edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985, p. 34

“overseas France”⁴ which were both a heavy drain on French resources and a factor that divided the French society. A major problem, which much occupied French minds, was the German question. The leadership was concerned that an inappropriate handling of the question might lead to a German revival in Europe. The official position was that German industrial areas should be broken up;⁵ *à la Richelieu*, Germany should be dismembered and replaced with a confederation.⁶

The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov opposed the French design as early as July 1946. The Soviets demanded a politically united Germany. On the American side, Germany was seen as the key factor in the European security and US itself was ready to forget the German aggression in Europe bearing in mind the problems that followed First World War, that is German revanchism. As the Cold War advanced, the eventualities undermined the prospect of French designs in central Europe. First came the coup in Prague in February 1948, teaching both the French and the allies that Soviet Union would not hesitate to use force to protect *status quo* in Eastern Europe. The Berlin Blockade of 1948-9 added to the European and Allied fears of a Soviet aggression.⁷ These events precipitated the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 4 April 1949. The June 1950 North Korean aggression towards its Southern neighbour not only reinforced perceptions of threat from the East but also led to the establishment of an actual organization in NATO, the so-called Allied Command Europe. The formation of this body within the NATO and supplement of 4 divisions led by General Eisenhower was a sign of further US commitment to the Old Continent.⁸

From then on we can confidently say that what had remained from the German threat in central Europe was replaced with a fear of Soviet offensive on the continent.⁹ This immediately brought up the issue of European contribution to the

⁴ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 83

⁵ Peyre, *op. cit.*, p. 372

⁶ George W. Ball, *The Discipline of Power*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company: 1962, p. 127.

⁷ Klaus Schwabe, “The Origins of United States’ Engagement in Europe, 1946-52” in Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds.), *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe*, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 171

⁸ Robert Hunter, *Security in Europe*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972, p. 31

⁹ Gülnur Aybet, *Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-91*, London: Macmillan, 1997, p.

defense of the continent. Time was ripe for US to press for German rearmament in the face of such a threat.

2.2 Searching for Security

In the face of US pressures for remilitarization of Germany, a vital issue for the Hexagon where the memory of 1870, 1914 and 1940 was still fresh, the seeds of what would become the French European policy began to appear. Contrary to the American offer of German entry to NATO, France proposed the creation of a European Army, as a formula which would both meet US demands for German military contribution and placate French fears of a national German army.

The substance of the plan came out of the so-called Pleven Committee, and went through several revisions to meet the demands of the British, American, German and other allies. The ensuing European Defense Community Treaty was signed by France, Benelux, Germany and Italy on 27 May 1952. Two protocols were added to the Treaty, saying that any attack on an EDC member would be counted as an attack on NATO and Britain would support, and associate itself with the EDC. As such the plan had extended the security guarantee of NATO to the non-member Germany and at the same time served to the long-standing French purpose of linking the destiny of Britain with that of the continent.¹⁰

The shock to Allies and France was that the plan was rejected in the French Assembly in August 1954. Indeed the plan was not supported wholeheartedly even by the French premier Mendès-France, who told his government members that they could vote as they would like.¹¹ The plan raised doubts equally among the cabinet members and the opposition ranks due to Britain's weak commitment, and also an emerging switch of attention from European integration to overseas France.¹² Moreover, the gravest concern was the federal spirit of the plan that decreased the backing for it by the opposition in Assembly.

¹⁰ Jolyon Howorth, "France, NATO and European Security: Status Quo Unsustainable, New Balance Unattainable?", *Politique Etrangère*, Vol. 4/2002, Winter 2002-2003, pp.1-2

¹¹ Lord Gladwin, *Europe After de Gaulle*, NY: Taplinger Pub. Co., 1969, p. 22

¹² Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

The British had a B-Plan for European security, which consisted in essence the extension of Brussels Treaty to include Germany and Italy. According to this proposal, which would become the Western European Union, Britain would commit troops to stand on European soil and German army would be restored. Indeed the WEU was not an organization to provide for security to the continent but rather an intermediate to provide for Germany's accession to NATO. France was pleased with the plan since it included a British commitment to Europe's defense.

The accession of Germany to NATO indicated that the main organization of security on the continent would take place within a transatlantic context. By agreeing to this Western Europeans were abandoning the project of genuine European security cooperation and splitting the general European integration from the sphere of European security.¹³ It should also be noted that the EDC incident was itself a testimony to the fact that France was pondering its security in European terms, and linking its own destiny with that of its neighbours. To reiterate, what made the plan be rejected was its supranational and federal character.¹⁴ Yet by rebuffing it France was embarking onto a path from which it would try hard to dissociate itself from for the coming years under de Gaulle.

By the time WEU was established de Gaulle had left the leadership of post-war France, due to the disagreement between himself and the Assembly concerning the powers of the executive in the new constitution. Yet the leadership, which replaced de Gaulle, did not show less of a disagreement with the United States. Paris was growing increasingly unhappy with the NATO structure of the Atlantic Alliance, arguing that it had an Anglo-Saxon bias.¹⁵ Within the organization, France was holding only one major command under SACEUR whereas the Americans held 7 and the British 5. The Suez Crisis of 1956 only added to the French suspicion towards US. The *Sputnik Affair* of 1957 has accelerated the trend of decreasing

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 69

¹⁴ J. Howorth, "France and European Security 1944-1994: Re-reading the Gaullist Consensus" in Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (eds.), *France: From the Cold War to the New World Order*, NY: St. Martin's, 1996, pp. 22-3

¹⁵ Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-97*, London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 8

confidence on American security guarantee, which had started in 1949 when Soviet Union acquired nuclear capability.¹⁶

2.3 General Back in French Politics (1958-1969)

In June 1958, the politico-military crisis installed de Gaulle back to power as a figure on whom both the people and the military had confidence. Coming to power in a Bonapartist situation, the General was able to impose his will on the Assembly, especially the ones concerning the new constitution and balance between the executive and legislative branches, dating from his celebrated speech given in Bayeux, Normandy on June 16, 1946. Becoming the first president of the Fifth French Republic, de Gaulle chose the colonial problem as his priority since this constituted one of the most important obstacle in attaining a rank for France in world politics.¹⁷

The French foreign policy under de Gaulle has two distinct dimensions.¹⁸ Throughout his presidential career, the General has first sought to restore the international rank of the 5th Republic. Immediately after assuming post in June 1958, de Gaulle proposed to US and Britain the establishment of a tripartite organization, or a *directoire* for that matter, for the management of global political and security issues, including the NATO. Reflecting French resentment towards the functioning of the Atlantic Alliance/NATO, the proposal spurred intense criticism and reaction across the Atlantic. Indeed, during a European tour, US Secretary of State Dulles responded to the General's proposals for a Western triumvirate that France should first put her own home in order.¹⁹ So it has rapidly become apparent that French plans for a balanced Western alliance would fall on deaf ears in the coming years.

Rebuffed by the US, de Gaulle went on putting his design into practice by other means. One of the components of this endeavor was nuclear policy of the General

¹⁶ Maurice Vaïsse, "Intra-Alliance Conflict: The French Case 1957-1963", in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), *A History of NATO- The First Fifty Years*, Vol. 3, NY: Palgrave, 2001, p. 141-142

¹⁷ Edward L. Morse, *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France*, NY: Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 106

¹⁸ For this argument see Howorth, "France and European Security 1944-1994", pp. 17-39

¹⁹ Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

which became one of the tenets and guarantees of French independence. Within the atmosphere of Cold War, this issue had such a priority that Britain's acceptance of American deal for a dual-key arrangement for *Polaris* missiles had become an excuse for the General in excluding Britons from the Common Market.

A second conclusion de Gaulle derived from the decline of his tripartite offer, was that French independence was not compatible with NATO. This idea was brought to its logical conclusion with the decision to leave the Integrated Military Command of NATO in 1966. Nevertheless, this decision was also shaped by the General's intransigence towards any community method, that is to say supranationalization.

Another important dimension of French foreign policy under de Gaulle is his European policies. What scholars solely choose to focus in their analyses of this period are notions such as rank, independence, search for grandeur, etc.²⁰ Although these are by no means absent from the General's foreign policy, they are overemphasized to the extent that they obscure the second dimension.

De Gaulle's European profession is apparent especially in the first years of his power, until roughly 1964. It was in this period the Fouchet Committee concluded its studies on the advancement of a political union for Western Europe. Sparing no place for UK, the plan was a proposal for overcoming the superpower squeeze in Europe by means of rendering the continent powerful enough to become a *third force* between the two superpowers.²¹ The proposal was killed by the European partners who deemed it inconsistent with the spirit of the Rome Treaties of 1957. Besides, the General himself, alarmed at the prospect of British inclusion, blocked its progress.²²

Another component of de Gaulle's "European nationalism"²³ was initiatives towards Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The culmination of French policies towards Germany was the Elysée Treaty (Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation) signed on 22 January 1963. Negotiated in a long period of time, it was promising

²⁰ For such analyses see Robert Kleiman, *Atlantic Crisis*, NY: W. W. Norton, 1964, p. 34; Josef Korbel, *Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, p. 37

²¹ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 99

²² Lord Gladwin, *op. cit.*, p. 71

²³ Stanley Hoffman, "De Gaulle, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance", *International Organization*, Vol. 18/1, Winter 1964, p. 2

Franco-German joint activity in the fields of foreign policy, defense, scientific research, etc. As such it was an allusion to the Fouchet Plan and a strong sign that France saw Germany central to the question of Europe.²⁴ Yet the treaty was made superfluous with a last minute insertion into it a preamble in the German Bundestag, which made certain that NATO was the genuine forum for European security cooperation.²⁵

The collapse of the Fouchet plan and the last minute “sabotage” to the Elysée Treaty was to be coupled with certain developments at the international level in a way to curb the European vocation of the young 5th Republic.²⁶ With the assassination of J F Kennedy, Johnson came to power in United States, with a much more inner oriented agenda on his desk. Meanwhile in West Germany, Adenauer was replaced with the Atlanticist Erhard. More important than these, the Cuba Crisis had shown the highest point of East West confrontation in the Cold War. Coming to the brink of war, the two superpowers went into a period of relative tranquility and détente. To de Gaulle, a détente managed by the superpowers themselves was a dangerous situation for the Western Europe as a whole since it was making possible a rapprochement between the US and Soviets. Such a relaxation, de Gaulle reasoned, could well come at the expense of the continent.²⁷ A perfect hint in that direction was Secretary of Defense McNamara’s proposals at the Athens Council of NATO in May 1962. He was proposing the replacement of massive retaliation doctrine with that of flexible response in nuclear exchange. This meant that the balance between the conventional and nuclear forces would be changed as to give more emphasis on the conventional and tactical nuclear defense of the continent against a possible Soviet aggression.²⁸

Nevertheless, the relaxation of muscles in the Cold War also created an atmosphere where the General could pursue his own designs of a European détente.

²⁴ Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, p. 104-5

²⁵ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 103

²⁶ Howorth, “France and European Security 1944-1994”, p. 29

²⁷ Bozo, “A French View” in Richard Davy (ed.), *European Détente: A Reappraisal*, London: Sage, 1992, p. 59

²⁸ Edward Drea, “The McNamara Era”, in Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 11

In this era de Gaulle had a relatively free hand in pursuing an active policy towards both the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.

Thus, the years 1963-1969 were to be the scene for General's activities in the name of European détente, designed to arrive at a more balanced alliance. A corollary to his strategy in this era was prevention of a direct Soviet-American accommodation. With this objective in mind he opposed the American-Soviet notion of disarmament, and tried to obscure the talks on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.²⁹ Unfortunately for the President, this relative relaxation of Cold War did not court a political conjuncture amenable to his design of European security cooperation.

To conclude, Gaullism has been a concept that is still being used in French politics or international politics.³⁰ Yet what is usually meant by Gaullism, or the legacy of de Gaulle, has often been equated to only one part of his policy, especially the era of 1963-1969, depicted as the quest for rank. This period of 5th Republic needs to be balanced and supplemented with the General's vision and policies in the preceding era of 1958-1963, when he was able to pursue Franco-German rapprochement as the primary axis of Western European unity and the policy of Western European security, culminating in the Fouchet Plan. In part, the misunderstanding concerning de Gaulle's European vocation stems from his notion of unity in Western Europe. His idea of Europe was based on *l'Europe des Patries* or *l'Europe des États*, that is to say a Europe comprised of fatherlands or nation-states,³¹ free of "federal anomaly." His reaction towards a Monnet-method of integration was apparent both in his withdrawal from the NATO Integrated Command and his comments on the European Defense Community of 1950s.³² This historical record of Gaullism gave enough pretexts for the scholars to depict French policy as merely in pursuit of national rank and grandeur and ignore the General's prioritization of European security entity.

²⁹ Hoffman, *Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930s*, NY: Viking Press, 1974, pp. 302-304

³⁰ Philippe Ridet, "L'UMP, ou l'extinction du gaullisme", *Le Monde*, 21/09/2002

³¹ Alastair Buchan (ed.), *Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices, Models of Western Europe in 1970s*, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 59

³² Howorth, "France and European Security 1944-1994", p. 23

CHAPTER 3

A NEW TURNING POINT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY: 1980's

3.1 Mitterrand and the New French European Policy

The 1980s involved many turning points for both the French political life and for the development of autonomous European capabilities in the realm of security. From the point of view of French political life, first in the short history of 5th Republic, a socialist President, François Mitterrand, was coming to power in 1981 despite his debated connections with the Vichy Regime in France.³³ The political conjuncture where Mitterrand came to power was not very amenable to a success. The world was still living through the effects of an economic crisis precipitated by the 1973 Oil Crisis. The European Community was going under a process of paralysis with Thatcher's calls for the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and budget.³⁴ Moreover the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had strained the East-West relations after a relatively stable period of détente.

In such a context, Mitterrand was coming to power with an overwhelmingly domestic agenda. Out of his *110 Points*, which he made public in the electoral campaign, only three were relating to European reform.³⁵ He was proposing a closer coordination of the economic policies of the member states, in a way that would make the pursuit of "Keynesian-Socialist"³⁶ policies easier and less costly for him.

Mitterrand's vision of Europe was not much different from his predecessors, at least until 1983 when an economic crisis in France forced Elysée to revise the economic policies, such as nationalization of Banks and industrial plants. The Socialist President was envisaging a compact and cohesive European Community

³³ Gail Russell Chaddock, "François Mitterrand –last 'King of France'– says Au Revoir", *Christian Science Monitor*, Vol. 87/113, 5/8/1995, p. 1

³⁴ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1994, p. 81

³⁵ Alistair Cole, *François Mitterrand: A Study in Political Leadership*, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 117

³⁶ Ronald Tiersky, "Mitterrand's Legacies", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74/1, January/February 1995, p. 115

based on the infamous Franco-German axis and was opposed to EC's enlargement to include Spain and Portugal.³⁷ EC should remain as an intergovernmental entity but it should open up new venues for cooperation, such as security and defense.

After the 1983 economic and political crisis and from 1984 onwards Europe became a dominant issue for the French Presidency. French interests were widely being reinterpreted in terms of European policies and the strategy of advancing French interest via European Community was taking hold. It was envisaged that, France by leading the European integration could bring about de Gaulle's vision of France incarnating the Old Continent. Here, the reorientation of the Parti Socialiste (PS) towards neoliberal policies was going hand in hand with a change of attitude towards the European integration. This *retour* was a painful process since Mitterrand's electoral success was much dependent upon his union with the Parti Communist Français (PCF). Moreover, the European integration project, once deemed as a capitalist endeavor, was becoming the corner stone of PS policy, in both external and internal policy areas.³⁸ After the mid-1980s Europe became a dominant issue in the Elysée and within the PS. France came to support the integration and supported the work of the Dooge Committee which was proposing extension of EC competence, and intensification of European Political Cooperation to include security and defense matters.

Besides his newly adopted European policy, Mitterrand himself was trying to forge good relations with the United States or the Atlantic Alliance. Although it was the President himself who adopted a "Marxist" analysis of international relations as the leader of the PS, after the 1977 break with the Communist Party (PCF) Mitterrand showed willingness to maintain Atlantic ties.³⁹ Especially in his first term Mitterrand was seen to court shifting attitudes as to the Atlantic Alliance and relations with the United States. This shift was due to the President's attempts to prove that he would not to be hijacked by the Communist participation in the

³⁷ Cole, *French Politics and Society*, Hampshire: Prentice Hall, 1998, p. 242

³⁸ Thomas Risse, "A European Identity?", in Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso, and Thomas Risse, (eds.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, 2001, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 212

³⁹ Michael M. Harrison, "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99/2, Summer 1984, p. 228

government on the one hand and electoral concerns on the other. In spite of these incongruities, one can authoritatively conclude that the traditional French policy of double affirmation of both loyalty to the Alliance and the will to independence vis-à-vis United States did not change under Mitterrand as seen in his public support for the NATO decision to of 1979 to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles in West Germany.⁴⁰

3.2 French Security Policy Before the Collapse of Iron Curtain 1981-88

In the early 1980s France-Soviet Union relations were not in good shape. The impositions of martial law in Poland in 1981 strained the relations between the West and Eastern Bloc in general. Expulsion of 47 Soviet diplomats from France only added to this situation. Yet this nature of the relations was not reflected onto economic relations between two countries, in that the martial law in Poland did not hinder France from signing a deal with Soviets over the Siberian gas.⁴¹ Despite suspension of the regular summits between the leaders of France and Soviet Union,⁴² strategic equilibrium maintained between the superpowers required France to maintain a certain level of relations with the Eastern Bloc.

Across the Atlantic, relations with the United States were governed by the general context of the Cold War. In the eyes of Europeans and especially the French, it was becoming increasingly more difficult to rely on the nuclear guarantee of NATO and US.⁴³ The saga of burden sharing, growing American budget deficit and increasing domestic support for isolationism aside, Reagan's initiatives at the level of nuclear strategy was putting European allies in a difficult situation.

One of the main problems within the Western bloc in the early 1980s was the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles on European soil in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20s, which took advantage of improved Soviet precision

⁴⁰ Dominique Moïsi, "De Mitterrand à Chirac", *Politique Etrangère*, No. 4, Hiver 1995/1996, p. 850

⁴¹ Frédéric Bozo, "A French View", in Richard Davy (ed.), *European Detente: A Reappraisal*, London: Sage, 1992, p. 74

⁴² Bozo, *La Politique Etrangère de la France depuis 1945*, Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1997, p. 25

⁴³ Howorth, "Foreign and Defense Policy" in Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward, Howard Machin (eds.), *Developments in French Politics*, Revised Edition, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 206

technologies. In 1979 the NATO Council had taken the Dual-Track decision which meant that Washington would deploy the missiles and assume talks with Moscow on the fate of these missiles at the same time. When Ronald Reagan assumed power in 1981, he surprised the allies by bringing the US into the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks with the Kremlin.⁴⁴

These talks have an important place in the development of European security not because they increased the feeling of security of the allies but rather because they showed the position of the European allies within the Atlantic Alliance.⁴⁵ Although the Dual-Track decision was taken within the NATO framework, a “Special Consultative Group” was established relating to the negotiations, and in which European allies could not take part directly.⁴⁶ This event and lack of consultation on the side of US showed that the European allies needed to take measures in order to make their voices heard on the international scene.

The so-called Strategic Defense Initiative of the Reagan administration was another problem in the transatlantic alliance. This proposal involved the idea of abandoning the then current NATO nuclear strategy of flexible response in favor of a new defense strategy based on anti-ballistic missile system composed of satellite-launched laser beams capable of destroying all Soviet missiles before they reached the territory of allies.⁴⁷ The Europeans were concerned that such a defense scheme would undermine the deterrence strategy of NATO. Moreover, in the case of Soviet acquisition of such a capability Europe would become a theater of limited nuclear war.⁴⁸ Moreover the SDI was in breach of the Anti-Ballistic Missile provisions of the SALT I of 1972.⁴⁹ Despite these common reservations among the European allies, they adopted no common positions. Yet, in the face of such a failure, the American attitude towards the European security interests was resented in Europe.

⁴⁴ Keylor, William R., *The 20th Century World, An International History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 386

⁴⁵ Howorth, “France” in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, *The European Union and National Defense Policy*, NY: Routledge, 1997, p. 24

⁴⁶ Aybet, *op. cit.*, 143

⁴⁷ Keylor, *op. cit.*, p. 387

⁴⁸ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 148

⁴⁹ Keylor, *op. cit.* p. 387

Accordingly, these issues became motivations for the development of a European voice in the international scene.

Another dynamic within the development of European security was the Franco-German initiatives. These schemes were in part French efforts to get away with fears of German revival. The above-mentioned incident of deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles on European soil was an important point in this French attitude. The deployment of the missiles was not merely an issue debated in the remote NATO corridors but it was actually a part of the political life of West European countries and politicized. In response to the efforts towards deployment mass demonstrations were held in major European capitals. Federal Germany has been one of the countries where the anti-bomb peace movement had been most powerful. Following the overthrow of Schmidt from power in 1982, German Social Democratic Party (SPD) seemed to revert to neutralism, which to French minds was synonymous with Nationalism and German revival.⁵⁰ Mitterrand was so alerted at the pace of developments that he saw it fit to make a speech at the Bundestag on 20 January 1983, in order to explain the virtues of nuclear dissuasion and convince the assembly for the deployment of missiles on German soil. Mitterrand's efforts to ease deployment were aimed at both preventing a potential decoupling of the United States from the Old Continent and to keep FRG within the Atlantic Alliance.

From the French point, therefore, there were at least two important reasons to pursue the development of a European voice in security and defense policies. One of these was the American attitude towards the European allies, lack of consultation, reaffirmed at the Reykjavik Summit between Gorbachev and Reagan in 1986.⁵¹ The second motivation for France was the historical fears of a Germany becoming first neutralized and then hostile. Indeed Mitterrand's positive stance towards the Atlantic Alliance especially during the issue of deployment was stemming from such an anxiety. The second pillar of this policy of anchoring Germany within the Western community was the employment of European Community or reinvigoration of Franco-German axis on the basis of Elysée Treaty.

⁵⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 776

⁵¹ Ian Gambles, "European Security Integration in the 1990s", *Chaillot Papers*, No. 3, Paris: WEU Institute For Security Studies, November 1991

The double motivations for the development of European security cooperation led to the revival of the Western European Union. Yet even before that, in early 1980s, concerns over the situation of Europe/EC had provided a venue for the discussion of political cooperation among the member states of the Community. In a move that put the functionalist logic upside down, it was envisaged that political cooperation within the EC would ease the solution of technical problems. In line with this, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher called for a treaty establishing a common foreign policy in EC.⁵² This proposal found support from his Italian counterpart and became solidified in what came to be known as the Genscher-Colombo proposal of “Draft European Act.”⁵³ The draft involved propositions for more effective decisions-making structure in the Community and more competences in external policies. Throughout the negotiation of the draft for two years many of its propositions were watered down in the face of member states’ opposition. Certain members were concerned that such boldness would trigger a US abandonment of Europe and open the way for German military revival. Despite these reservations a final text was issued at the June 1983 EC summit in Stuttgart, named the “Solemn Declaration on European Union.”⁵⁴ In the text, thought was given to coordinating security-policy issues, albeit only the political and economic aspects of security. Defense and military issues were still excluded. And the institutionalization of the European Political Cooperation process had to await the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986.

The origins of the revitalization of the Western European Union are found in the reactivation of the Franco-German cooperation after the election of Mitterrand as president. As mentioned above France was very much concerned about the peace movement in its neighbour and suspecting that pacifist tendencies could eventually lead to a decoupled Federal Republic. As a result of the President’s initiatives to re-operationalize the moribund defense consultation clauses of the Franco-German Cooperation Treaty, a Coordination Committee was established in October 1982. While France was seeing these attempts as a way to anchor its neighbour firm into

⁵² Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 135

⁵³ Dinan, *op. cit.*, p. 98

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

the Western Community, German support to these proposals were motivated by an intention to reinsert France into the Integrated Military Structure of NATO, which it had left in 1966.⁵⁵

A further step in the Franco-German cooperation in the defense sphere was the creation of the so-called *Force d'Action Rapide* (FAR). This rapid reaction force, which was to put into practice under the 1984-1989 French Defense Program Law, would be composed of approximately 45,000 troops with rapid conventional intervention capability. This scheme had at least two basic significances. As regards the French defense policy, it was bringing about an overhaul of the traditional non-war fighting doctrine, which was based on nuclear deterrence to any threat and signaling a return to the conventional defense capabilities.⁵⁶ More significantly, the force, which was “hard-hitting and air-transportable”, was mainly intended with the defense of Germany in mind and as such designed as a supplement to the French First Army set to join allied forces in protecting West Germany.⁵⁷ In this move, France was strengthening the Franco-German cooperation as a guarantee against German drift towards neutralism.

In the meantime several developments were taking place at the East-West level. The processes of INF talks, Strategic Defense Initiative were creating anxiety among the European allies, which have been mentioned above briefly. The necessity of establishing a platform for European security interests was becoming even more apparent. In this context, France was proposing to its neighbours to come together around the Franco-German axis. Yet the Western European nations were not very sympathetic towards such a scheme.⁵⁸ The only viable alternative left was the dormant Western European Union. Defined by a commentator as the “sleeping beauty” of Western defense, the hibernation of the WEU lasted well until the 1984 Rome Council of the organization where the member states adopted the *Rome Declaration* in October of that year. In a declaration, which apparently came as a

⁵⁵ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 139

⁵⁶ Menon, “The Paradoxes of National Independence: Domestic Constraints on French NATO Policy”, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), *A History of NATO- The First Fifty Years*, Vol. 2, NY: Palgrave, 2001, p. 258

⁵⁷ Simon Duke, *New European Security Disorder*, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1994, p. 101

⁵⁸ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 144

result of the mode of dealings between the two superpowers and neglect of European interest, the member countries committed themselves to the increase of the profile of Western European Union by strengthening it in political, psychological and military dimensions.⁵⁹ The *Declaration* also called for the harmonization of the member state views on the defense policies, East-West relations, and armaments cooperation. The document entailed the creation of 3 agencies in Paris: Arms Control and Disarmament, Security and Defense, Development of Cooperation in the Field of Armaments. No doubt, the declaration was professing the Western Europeans' allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance. Yet in detail the reactivation of WEU was being interpreted differently in different European capitals. While London tended to see the organization as a part of NATO, Paris viewed it in terms of an imminent security pillar of European Community.⁶⁰

While the divergences on the future role of the organization were pending, United States was engaged with the Strategic Defense Initiative. This American proposal became one of the first tests of the WEU. While European capitals were concerned about the Star Wars program, they failed to come together in a platform to oppose the initiative. Rather they opted for individual solutions to the problem on a one-to-one basis with the United States. This bedraggled position of the Western Europeans was heralding the failure of the coming Bonn Summit of WEU in April 1985. This failure in the development of European security cooperation was manifesting the weakness of the "European" position in security matters and the overestimation and wishful thinking on the part of Paris.⁶¹

Although the thrust coming from within the European continent was not enough to maintain a security framework, American policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was providing enough motivation for rethinking the possibilities of European cooperation. The ambiguity and fear of abandonment was reaching one of its highest points during the Reykjavik superpower summit in October 1986. In this summit, Reagan was negotiating with Gorbachev over the fate of ballistic missiles in Europe

⁵⁹ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 144

⁶⁰ Mika Luoma-aho, "'Arm' versus 'pillar': the politics of metaphors of the Western European Union at the 1990–91 Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11/1 February 2004, p. 110

⁶¹ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 149

and they even came closer to the decision of removing all nuclear arms from the continent, the so-called *zero option*. To the disappointment of the European allies, Reagan was continuing the negotiations without any input from Western Europe, save his telephone calls to certain capitals to give information.⁶²

The shock of Reykjavik summit between the superpowers found its immediate echo in the WEU Assembly Session in December 1986. In this conglomeration then French premier Jacques Chirac stated European allies' concerns that decisions relating directly to European security interests were being taken without sufficient consultation. In the face of such neglect France proposed adoption of a Western European Charter of Security Principles. These included an emphasis on the maintenance of nuclear deterrence as a response to nuclear talks between US and Soviets. This reaction to US attitude was balanced with an emphasis on the need to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. Chirac also called upon the European allies to consider this organization as the forum to build up a consensus among them in defense affairs.⁶³

Chirac's proposal at the 1986 meeting turned into a concrete commitment in October 1987. Since the notion of "charter" was found to be too assertive by the Dutch and British, the name was switched to rather modest Platform on European Security Interests.⁶⁴ Adopted at the Hague WEU Council, the platform was forging links between European security and the European integration process with these words: "[...] the revitalization of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification." As such the revitalized WEU was an intention to bring together the European security cooperation and European integration processes, divorced since the establishment of NATO. This move was immediately balanced with the profession that Europe's security could only be ensured with in the Atlantic Alliance. Thus it should be seen as an attempt to find Europe's place in the transatlantic coalition, rather than an effort to replace NATO with WEU.⁶⁵ The

⁶² Keylor, *op. cit.*, p. 452

⁶³ Aybet, *op. cit.*, p. 152

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 156

⁶⁵ Françoise de La Serre, "France: The Impact of François Mitterrand", in Christopher Hill, (ed.), *Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 30

designation of WEU as the “European pillar” was also a manifestation of this attitude.

The metaphor of “pillar” was, indeed, one of the earliest formulations of the transatlantic security relationship in the new era, and was heralding the current debates of the role of European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy within the EU-US security architecture.⁶⁶ It would constitute the basis of the late argument that United States would be in a better position in a world where its closest ally, Europe, is more powerful. Put in metaphorical terms, the transatlantic temple could resist against the time as long as both of the pillars upon which it rested were powerful.

Another dimension in the French security policy up until the fall of Berlin Wall was the developments taking place in the field of European integration. As mentioned earlier, with the following the shock of 1983, Mitterrand presidency had experienced a *retour* in favor of an integrated Europe. In line with this new European policy Mitterrand had an important role in the launch of Single European Act of 1986 and Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

SEA, among other spheres, was an important milestone in the development of European security cooperation. Despite its intergovernmental accent, the Act institutionalized the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and led to the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Brussels.⁶⁷ The aims of the newly institutionalized EPC were to increase the mutual understanding on foreign policy issues among the member states through regular consultations, strengthening the solidarity through harmonization of views, coordination of policy positions and joint action.⁶⁸

These clauses, although modest, were opening up the venues for cooperation between the members of the European Community. As such they had the advantage of bringing together the major capitals in Europe under a single framework. The initiatives, if any, would bear the weight of carrying the imprint of the European

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 112

⁶⁷ Marit Sjøvaag, “The Single European Act”, in *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, ed. by Kjell A Eliassen, London: Sage, 1998, p. 25

⁶⁸ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, NY: Routledge, 1999, p. 176

Community and as such would constitute a modest voice in the international arena. A significant point was that, the SEA/EPC framework had certain parallels with and references to the French proposals made by Jacques Chirac in WEU Assembly Session in 1986, which became solidified in a modified form as the Platform on European Security Interests.⁶⁹ Both documents were calling for an improvement of consultation and extension of coordination in defense and security matters. Thus the SEA had become another moment in the initiation of a link between the European integration and European security cooperation, put in institutional terms, between WEU and EC.

Although France made important proposals in the field of European Community, it did not ignore the Franco-German cooperation in defense matters. This sphere of activity was free of the intricacies of EC and it was relatively easier for France to put forward policies and coordinate action since Germany was a more or less like-minded ally. Moreover, the Franco-German axis was deemed to be a special relationship between the two old enemies, to the level of which other European allies could not aspire. France would not let the neglect or dilution of this framework by committing itself exclusively to other allegiances. This was in large part due to the advantages that such a close relationship with Germany had brought.

As mentioned earlier, France composed a new conventional capability in 1983, the so-called FAR, committing itself to the forward defense of Federal Republic. In addition to this, Mitterrand stated explicitly in 1986 that he was willing to consult with West Germany on the use of pre-strategic weapons in cases where possible. The following year a Franco-German proposal was put into practice to create a military unit and became operational in late 1989.⁷⁰ These instances firmly constituted that France was to remain a staunch supporter of the Elysée Treaty in the framework of security cooperation. This policy of France was serving a double purpose: its national strategy of keeping Germany anchored and European policy of strengthening the security cooperation through a Franco-German contribution and leadership.

⁶⁹ Available at <http://www.weu.int>, accessed on 28 April 2004

⁷⁰ Duke, *op. cit.*, p. 101 and Howorth, "Foreign and Defense Policy", p. 208

To conclude for this section, throughout the 1980s, France, together with the European allies, was most concerned with the bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington and the negative effect it created over European security interests. This anxiety led France to pursue the policy of revitalization of WEU. Moreover, France pushed for the development of political cooperation in the EC framework and hard-pressed for the institution of a link between the WEU and EC. This policy, together with the reinvigoration of the *Elysée* served the purpose of placating its second anxiety, that of guaranteeing its national security vis-à-vis the threat of German neutralism.

CHAPTER 4

FRANCE AND THE END OF COLD WAR STATUS QUO: A DREAM COMES TRUE?

4.1 Mitterrand and the End of Cold War

The end of the 1980s prompted new turning points for France as well as for the rest of the world. 1989 was the year of so-called *annus mirabilis* heralding revolutionary changes in the European panorama. With the breach of Berlin Wall in December 1989, the world succumbed into a new path full of unknowns.

As expressed in the previous chapters, the main contours of 5th Republic French policy was based, at least professedly, on the perspective of transcending the Yalta Order, that is to say the superpower tutelage on the Western European political will. Taken in this simplicity, the breach of the Wall and the coming end of Soviet Union seemed to be the realization of French project by default.

The Mitterrand reaction to the prospect of German reunification showed that the situation was comparable to a long-standing nightmare rather than a dream come true. The new European political configuration was not manageable from the French point of view.⁷¹ The books published in these years make a testimony to the general French anxiety towards the German reunification, which was being carried out in the 4+2 talks framework since the 1990 Ottawa meeting. Books titled such as “Return of Bismarck”, “The Orphan Nation, Germans in Europe”, “The Crime and the Memory” were showing how distressed the general public was about a neighbour gaining new strength. Moreover in a poll carried out in France in October 1990 showed that only 37% of the populace thought reunification was a “good thing.”⁷²

⁷¹ Bozo, “A French View”, p. 79

⁷² Roger Morgan, “French Perspectives of New Germany”, *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 26/1, 1991, pp. 108-114

The political response to the prospect of New Germany was different in means but similar in content. Apart from the economic problems, French circles were concerned that Germany would drift towards a Russo-German entente or at best towards a neutral foreign policy position employing its strength to create an independent *Mittleuropa* pole.⁷³

In this context, Mitterrand and his government was reluctant towards the German reunification. The Foreign Minister Dumas hinted at this when he said only 6 days after the breach of the wall that reunification was not an issue of current concern for them.

Indeed, initially Kohl government's attempts to accelerate the unification process added to the psychology of alarm. Federal Republic saw no need to consult to its allies before presenting the *Bundestag* in November 1989 his 10-point plan for reunification.

The suspicions in Paris were so great that Mitterrand did not bother spoiling his own image of a Europeanist president: He went to Kiev to meet with Gorbachev and in a joint declaration pointed out that the time was not yet ripe for the unification process and it would have a destabilizing effect on the European balance.⁷⁴ Yet such deviant initiatives on the part of the French European policy came to a halt when Mitterrand realized that reunification of the two Germanys would go ahead whatever the reaction given to it.⁷⁵

In this context France began pondering the new strategic situation in Europe. For the years after the World War II, 4th Republic had initially pursued the strategy of weakening Germany once and for all and was confronted with United States and UK opposition. Then the strategy shifted towards one in which 5th Republic tried to find ways of anchoring Germany into the Western Community, either via EDC, WEU or NATO. The Elysée Treaty was also a corollary to this logic. Within the Franco-German couple, the former retained the political ascendancy despite the latter's economic prosperity via permanent position in the UN Security Council,

⁷³ Cole, *François Mitterrand: A Study in Political Leadership*, p. 152

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 154

⁷⁵ Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO?", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111/1, Spring 1996, p. 14

independent nuclear *force de frappe* and being a member of the 4 victors over 3rd Reich.⁷⁶ With the end of Cold War, the status quo, which carried this imbalanced situation, has collapsed, reducing the chances of French ascendancy over New Germany.

Moreover the prospect of a unified Germany also prompted the journey the French foreign policy in 5th Republic has gone through since the leave of de Gaulle. Although every President since the General professed to be a Gaullist, including Mitterrand himself, France came to loose the dynamic set out by de Gaulle himself in 1959. One of the basic objectives of French policy had been overcoming the partition of Germany. Yet the socialist-Gaullist President, when confronted with such an eventuality worked hard to prevent this. (This reflex was indeed shared by United Kingdom.) This showed the fact that after 20 years over the end of de Gaulle's presidency France had to adopt itself to the "political realities" of the Cold War status quo.⁷⁷

The response of Paris to this pace of events was not certainly limited with alarm and political gestures. The new French strategy was slowly being defined and adopted at the French capital. This new attitude towards the New European situation and renewed "German Question" involved both political and economic dimensions. The strategy was based on a renewed bid for integration of Germany and France in different venues, such as European Community or NATO.⁷⁸

On the political side, Germany would be absorbed into an increasingly federal /supranational European framework together with France. In the words of Mitterrand, European construction was the sole answer the question, which France was confronted with.⁷⁹ The German side was also supportive of these kinds of initiatives since Kohl wished to show that Germany had no neutralist or aggressive tendencies.⁸⁰ On the economic side, where the powerful Deutsche Mark was a

⁷⁶ Dominique Moïsi and Michael Mertes, "Europe's Map, Compass, and Horizon", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74/1, January/February 1995, p. 132

⁷⁷ Bozo, "A French View", p. 79

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Bozo, *La Politique Etrangère de la France depuis 1945*, p. 97

⁸⁰ Urs Leimbache, "La Coopération Franco-allemand dans le Cadre de le Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune de l'Union Européenne" in Thierry de Montbrial, et. al. (eds.), *Agir pour l'Europe: Les Relations Franco-allemands dans l'après-Guerre Froide*, Paris: IFRI-Masson, 1995

serious concern to France, the prescription was again the integration of European national economies on an unprecedented basis, thus giving France, among others, an equal say on the European economy. This was intended to save the Hexagon from the threat of economic hegemony of Germany.⁸¹

These solutions were squarely bringing France into a dilemma. While the European integration seemed to be the only cure to French concerns it entailed the grind of national sovereignty and giving up slices of French independence, about which the Quai d'Orsay bureaucracy and French people were so sensitive.⁸² This concern led Presidency to leave aside the hardcore federalist/supranational proposal it had in mind, which were initially adopted with the encouragement of Frenchman Jacques Delors. By the time of Dublin European Summit, Mitterrand showed that he was a "real Gaullist" by distancing himself from the federalist proposals of Delors, which he believed, like de Gaulle, would bring about the hegemony of Germany.⁸³

NATO also needs to be mentioned as a guarantee against German drift towards neutralism and aggression. Although, as will be depicted in details below, France was reluctant to endow NATO with renewed legitimacy in the post-Cold War era, American commitment to Europe was still deemed as vital for European and French security.⁸⁴ This position, fully in line with the US desire to retain its position as a "European power"⁸⁵ was also related to the concerns about the "residual threat" posed by Soviet Union.⁸⁶

4.2 France Turns to Europe

Yet, France was not only concerned with its fears and anxieties in late 1980s and early 1990s. To Paris, despite drawbacks and ambiguities, time was ripe for

⁸¹ Art, *op. cit.*, p. 15

⁸² Daniel Vernet, "Dilemma of French Foreign Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol. 68/4, 1992, p. 657

⁸³ Bozo, "A French View", p. 79

⁸⁴ Pierre Lellouche, "France in Search of Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72/2, Spring 1993, p. 130

⁸⁵ Svein Melby, "The Transformation of NATO and United States Foreign Policy", in G Schmidt, *A History of NATO- The First Fifty Years*, Vol. 1, p. 242

⁸⁶ Robbin Laird, "French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of Continuity and Change", *McNair Papers*, No. 38, Washington D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1995, p. 10

realizing long entertained projects, like the European security autonomy. As elaborated above, France, since the inception of the 5th Republic was geared towards establishing Europe as an independent force and voice in the international arena. This framework persisted in the early 1990s, and breach of the Iron Curtain added new vigor to this vision, however optimistic it proved to be in the end.

The analysis that European landscape was mature enough to court a European strategic initiative has brought the French Republic in deep contradiction with many of its allies, especially Britain and United States.⁸⁷ The American concept in the Cold War's aftermath, as we mentioned above, was to remain in the Old Continent, despite diminished Soviet threat. United States was foremost concerned with keeping an eye on or participating in the decision-making procedures in important security policies, like the use of military force.⁸⁸ To this end US aimed at maintaining the NATO as the dominant framework of security management in the post-Cold War era, an organization in which it maintained leadership. The French side of the debate, already implicit in the Platform on European Security Interests, was opposed to such a prospect but to the contrary wished to bring Gaullist Europeanist principles into life.

The US response to the prospect of Europe acquiring an independent voice in the international arena and an autonomous security capability was put forward by US Secretary of State James Baker III, on 12 December 1989 at the Berlin Press Club.⁸⁹ In his oft-quoted speech, Baker called for the construction of a new transatlantic architecture where both NATO and EC would take its appropriate place, to serve new collective purposes. This was making explicit that despite the end of Cold War NATO was still an important organization to the United States. This preference was motivated by both the long-term objective of having a say on European affairs and by the conjectural need to re-define NATO's role in a Europe where parameters were

⁸⁷ Bozo, "La France Et L'Alliance Atlantique Depuis La Fin De La Guerre Froide: Le Modèle Gaullien En Question (1989-1999)", p. 7

⁸⁸ Timo Behr, "US Attitudes towards Europe: A Shift of Paradigms?", *Research and European Issues*, No. 29, Paris: Notre Europe Foundation, November 2003, p. 5

⁸⁹ Secretary of State James Baker III, *The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: from West To East*, Address to the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Germany, June 18, 1991. Available at www.useu.be/DOCS/baker.htm, accessed on 16 May 2004

rapidly changing. The German reunification created the concern in both sides of the Atlantic that a re-nationalization momentum was imminent in Europe. The prospect of New Germany was equally a concern in Soviet Union. Thus United States chose to emphasize the political and non-military aspects of NATO in order to convince Gorbachev that a reunified Germany with NATO would not create a security problem for the Soviet Union.⁹⁰

The end of Cold War, then, set the stage for a diplomatic competition in European security architecture. From 1989 on, United States and France found themselves in a bid to assert their own version of European security framework in various fora like, EC/EU, NATO, CSCE, and WEU.

In this ping-pong game between Europeanists led by France and Atlanticists led by UK and US first service came from US in the Bush - Mitterrand joint news conference on 19 April 1990 at Key Largo, Florida.⁹¹ There, father Bush reiterated American military commitment to Europe as “part of a *common security* effort” and further implied that the new concept of NATO was about “equilibrium and *security of Europe*, including the *political* questions” to this effect (italics added). Mitterrand, on the other hand, reiterated French support for NATO, and said that it would continue providing the framework of cooperation between US and France “in the fields defined by the treaty.” Reminding France’s special position in Europe, he asserted that NATO’s role should include “security related to the *equilibrium* of Europe” (italics added). Read in between the lines, there was a serious difference between the French and American concepts of new NATO. While Bush was keen to include security questions of Europe including the political ones, Mitterrand wished to see an Alliance limited to its balancing task in Europe and a EC extending to foreign and security policy. These differences would constitute the basis of future “misunderstandings” between 5th Republic and US.

As Mitterrand had already admitted in his speech at Key Largo, at the same day with the press conference, France and Germany were initiating a proposal for the

⁹⁰ Simon Duke, “NATO and CFSP: Help or Hindrance?”, NATO Fellowship Report, June 1997, available at: www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/duke.pdf, visited on 29 April 2004

⁹¹ See text at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/pppus.php?admin=041&year=1990&id=041904>, visited on 16 May 16, 2004

convening of an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) on political union and to define and implement a common foreign and security policy. In the letter forwarded to Irish presidency, German federal chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president François Mitterrand were admitting that the changing circumstances in Europe and realization of economic and monetary union was making it necessary to accelerate political construction of Europe of 12. As such the text was supporting Belgium's March 1990 call for an IGC and also heralding the Dumas-Genscher initiative in the coming conference.⁹²

The response to these initiatives came in the first post-Cold War summit of the North Atlantic Council of NATO, taking place in London, 5-6 July 1990. In the declaration issued following the meeting, NATO's role in defense of Europe is readmitted and a transformation of the Atlantic Alliance is proclaimed.⁹³ More importantly, the declaration states that NATO has embarked upon a process of *politicization* where it will acquire new tasks, namely political ones aimed at enhancing the security and stability in non-military dimension. NATO was moving towards a new security concept where domestic stability, legitimacy of political institutions and even economic welfare was included.⁹⁴ At the same time, the efforts within the European Community towards political union and development of European security identity are praised as a contributing factor to the Atlantic Alliance.

More significantly, at the level of military strategy, it is stated publicly that parallel with the force reductions in Europe, NATO will enter a process of making its forces "smaller, more mobile, active and versatile" to respond to potential crisis. It is here implied that NATO will retain its defensive nature while preparing for threats of a new nature. Logically such kind of threats cannot take place within the borders of NATO members, which are already consolidated, and stable regimes. Then, it

⁹² Letter by the German federal chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president François Mitterrand to the Irish Presidency of the EC, 19 April 1990, *Agence Europe*, 20 April 1990

⁹³ "London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 5-6 July 1990, available at <http://www.nato.int>, visited on 16 April 2004

⁹⁴ Jan Zielonka "Europe's Security: A Great Confusion", *International Affairs*, Vol. 67/1, 1991, p. 128

follows from here that as early as July 1990, NATO has the intention to overtake out-of-area missions. Since this new strategic concept was not stated explicitly, it is difficult to talk about a political commitment on the part of France. Yet it was an important 1st step towards such an understanding.⁹⁵

It was evident that United States and France were equally assertive in their attempts to insert their own versions of European security architecture into the NATO documents. The NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings would go on providing the venue for the debate between United States and France. In line with this in the NAC of December 1990 in Brussels, France argued for a clear division of responsibilities between NATO and WEU, its preferred site for European security construction. In French mind, NATO would remain as the defensive alliance where WEU would respond to new types of threats.⁹⁶

In the mean time, the clock was ticking for the security dynamic within the European Community. As a result of the ground breaking joint initiative of Kohl and Mitterrand for the discussion of European Political Union (EPU) and call for an IGC, Dublin Summit in June 1990 decided to convene two parallel IGCs concerning EPU and European Monetary Union (EMU) in at the Rome Summit in December 1990. The 1990-1991 IGCs, which would include the adoption of Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), continued well until December 1991.

The discussion on the political union coincided with the Gulf crisis assuming in August 1990 as a result of the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq. This incident and other eventualities in the Balkans had an important impact on the development of the debate on the political union in European capitals. The emergence of such crisis out of the defined area of North Atlantic Treaty urged the EC member states to invest more energy to the endeavor of common foreign and security policy.⁹⁷ It also prompted the deficiencies of the European powers and their need to rely heavily on American forces. In this context, WEU, as the lately awakened security organization of the Europeans, became the candidate pushed forward by Germany and especially

⁹⁵ Kori Schake, "Adapting NATO After Cold War" in G. Schmidt (ed.), *A History of NATO- The First Fifty Years*, Vol. 2, p. 31

⁹⁶ Robe de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of New Millennium*, Washington: Brassey's, 1997, p. 21

⁹⁷ Trevor C. Salmon, "Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992", *International Affairs*, Vol. 68/2, April 1992, p. 236

France. Defense Minister Chevènement proposed WEU as the appropriate framework for the Western European defense identity in early December 1990.⁹⁸ Within the context of EC IGC on political union the debate on the status of WEU was introduced and became one of the main agendas. In this venue, Europeanists comprised of Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece and Spain enthusiastically supported the cause of France and Germany in pushing forward for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an integral part of the union. Britain, Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal were opposed to such an initiative, which was proposing WEU as the defense “arm” or “component” of the Union.⁹⁹ For France especially, WEU was an appropriate venue since United States had no formal link and say in the organization.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, mandating EC/EU with a direct security or defense responsibility was difficult since the political decision-making mechanisms were too complex for such a task. Such a move that is directly militarizing EC/EU –a distant eventuality– would also spur great reaction in the United States. Another plus for WEU was its lack of integrated commands that would conform to French policy of military independence.

In the mean time, France was pushing WEU forward taking advantage of the crisis situation emanating from the Gulf War. In the final Communiqué of the December 1990 meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers chaired by France, WEU was deemed to be at a crossroads. In paragraph 3 of the Communiqué it was stated that the organization was confronted with the “progress with the building of Europe which will have to acquire a defense dimension in which WEU will be able to play an important role in connection with the emergence of Political Union.”¹⁰¹

The link to the European Union was thus established informally at the WEU meeting. The contentious point in the aftermath of the debate was what kind of a relationship would WEU have with the NATO. At the time, French view that WEU

⁹⁸ David Yost, “France and the Western European Defense Identity”, *Survival*, Vol. 33/4, July/August 1991, p. 333

⁹⁹ Simon Duke, “The Second Death (or the Second Coming?) of the WEU”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34/2, June 1996, p. 171

¹⁰⁰ Duke, *The New European Security Disorder*, p. 232

¹⁰¹ Final Communiqué of Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, 10 December 1990, Paris. Available at <http://www.weu.int>, accessed on 16 May 2004

should be the defense arm of EC was well known. The counter-proposal to this came from the Atlanticist Dutch and British. They advocated that the organization be constructed as a bridge to NATO, hence playing the role of a European pillar within the Alliance. Apart from the Atlanticist-European dimension of the debate of security architecture, there was the federalist-intergovernmentalist dimension to the discussions on political union. It was here where the Franco-German couple was parting ways only to meet at the politico-economic compromise of the Maastricht Treaty.¹⁰²

The ping-pong debate of European Security Identity intensified in 1991. The year was opened with the first ever NATO operational deployment in the organization history when German and Belgium fighter planes and elements of NATO ACE Mobile Force were sent to southeastern Turkey as response to the threatening from Iraqi leadership.

In this context, IGC on Political Union welcomed a constructive Franco-German initiative in February 1991. The so-called Dumas-Genscher initiative represented the watering down of French insistence on the status of WEU vis-à-vis EC/EU and NATO. In the bilateral paper both Germany and France refrained from watchwords “component” or “arm” in referring to the WEU. These words were indeed representing the Europeanist pole as against the Atlanticist pole, which was emphasizing WEU as the European pillar *within* NATO.¹⁰³ It was exactly this latter expression that is recognized in the proposal: “European security and defense identity will have to be reflected within the development of a European pillar within NATO.” As to the role of WEU, it was said that it would constitute the “channel of cooperation between NATO and Political Union.” Moreover, WEU was proclaimed as an integral part of the process of European integration and destined to integrate to the Political Union in time. It is evident from these proposals that, although French policy of WEU-EU integration was accepted, the level of autonomy of WEU was greatly limited by the fact that it was deemed as the European pillar within NATO rather than the arm. It was significant that the text employed the term *pillar* but

¹⁰² Peter Schmidt, “The Special Franco-German Security Relationship in the 1990s”, *Chaillot Papers*, No. 8, Paris: WEU-Institute for Security Studies, June 1993, p. 31

¹⁰³ Mika Luoma-aho, “ ‘Arm’ versus ‘Pillar’...”, p. 114

neither *arm* nor *component* and as such it was closer to British concept. This initiative thus opened up the way for Anglo-German cooperation based on the concern of keeping the transatlantic links with US.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the so-called Dobbins telegram arrived from the United States in February 1991. In a move to rebuff attempts at European security, it was stated that US was concerned at the pace of negotiations in the IGC on Political Union and especially the proposal of subordination of WEU to the European Council taking place in the Dumas-Genscher initiative. It was stated that since EC was not “within the alliance” itself, WEU would be separated from NATO and tell apart the European and US security.¹⁰⁵

In the meantime, despite French opposition, a further step came from the Atlantic Alliance in moving out-of-area.¹⁰⁶ In the 9th paragraph of the declaration it was thereby stated that Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe (ACERRF) was being established under the command of United Kingdom and with multinational headquarters. Taken together with the synopsis that “the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are subject to considerable political, social, economic and ethnic pressures which could lead to crises jeopardizing overall stability in Europe” in §4, NATO appeared to be fully geared towards confronting risks and threats of new type and out-of-area. Thus French insistence on Article 5 defining tasks and Article 6 defining geographical area were seriously corroded as of spring 1991.¹⁰⁷

This spring offensive on the part of Atlanticists was boosted when US permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador William H. Taft III intervened the debate by way of extracting the lessons form the Gulf War.¹⁰⁸ He

¹⁰⁴ Simon Duke, *The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP*, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 88

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Luoma-aho, *op. cit.*, p. 117

¹⁰⁶ Final Communiqué of the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels 28-29 May 1991, available at <http://www.nato.int>, visited on 15 January 2003

¹⁰⁷ Bozo, “Le Modèle Gaullien En Question...”, p. 13

¹⁰⁸ William H. Taft III, “European Security: Lessons Learned From the Gulf War”, *NATO Review*, Web Edition, Vol. 39/3, June 1991, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9103-2.htm>, visited on 15 January 2003, see also Stanley R. Sloan, “The US and European Defense”, *Chaillot Papers*, No: 39, Paris: WEU- Institute for Security Studies, April 2000, p. 6

observed in his speech and piece in *NATO Review* that the United States backed European security initiatives in “so far as NATO remained the principal venue for consultation and the forum for decision-making on policies affecting the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty.”

Despite these setbacks, France and Germany submitted a new plan to the Conference on Political Union. In the October 1991 paper, WEU was deemed to be the defense *component* of the Union as well as a part of its integration process. WEU being subordinate to the European Council would be tied to the Union with an organic link, short of full integration. These days also witnessed a concrete Franco-German initiative with the adoption of *Eurocorps* concept by these two countries. This corps was developed on the basis of a 1987 Franco-German decision of establishing a brigade comprising 4200 men. Eurocorps decision was launched in the aftermath of the October 1991 initiative, by General Quesnot, chief of special army of the President of the Republic.¹⁰⁹ Initially the Eurocorps came to be regarded as an alternative to the previously launched ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. It was also seen as a double challenge to the primacy of NATO since it was intended for both out-of-area operations and the defense of Germany (Article 5).¹¹⁰ As such France was seen to be undermining NATO since certain allied forces would be earmarked for this new framework rather than NATO.

The debate between the Europeanists and Atlanticists seemed to be resolved toward the end of the year 1991. The Rome North Atlantic Council and the ensuing *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*¹¹¹ reiterated that North America was permanently tied to the security of Europe and any attempt at developing a European identity in security and defense was welcome since it would reinforce the transatlantic security. It was also noted that NATO, by virtue of the extension of its member and capability of carrying out various security functions would be the

¹⁰⁹ Sten Rynning, *French Military Doctrine in 1990s*, COPRI Working Papers, No. 29, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2000

¹¹⁰ Ibid. Mitterrand was trying to show that France was still concerned with the defense of Germany, as opposed to his earlier declaration that French First Army would withdraw from the German territory.

¹¹¹ “The Alliance's New Strategic Concept”, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th -8th November 1991, available at <http://www.nato.int>, visited on 15 January 2003

privileged venue for the consultation among allies.¹¹² It was significant that such a central document in the history of the North Atlantic alliance welcomed the development of a European identity in both security and defense, albeit with reservations. It is also significant that the New Strategic Concept was denoting the progress of European security and defense role as a process *within* the Alliance, embodying a *pillar*.¹¹³

The conclusion of the Intergovernmental negotiations on political union gave birth to the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union). The text over which the European capitals, especially France, Germany and Britain agreed was denoting the Western European Union as an *integral part* of the development of the Union and giving the latter the authority to request from the WEU any actions with defense implications. Moreover, in the WEU declaration attached to the TEU, it was said in the introduction that WEU's contribution to the EU would remain *within* the Atlantic Alliance.¹¹⁴

New Strategic Concept of Alliance and Maastricht Treaty denoted a certain point in the development of European security identity. After all, French ambitions of keeping NATO away from an enlarged security conception was thwarted and NATO acquired a renewed strategy comprising political and military tasks. Moreover United States was successful in retaining the European security and defense identity within the Alliance, as a pillar, without prejudicing the NATO.¹¹⁵ It was especially successful in creating a façade of Europeanization within the alliance and convincing the Bonn government not to follow the French proposals.¹¹⁶ France on the other hand, was successful making the US accept the legitimacy of the pursuit of such a project and creating a concrete link between the Union and the WEU. Yet, the text produced at Maastricht was ambiguous enough for both Atlanticist and

¹¹² *Ibid.*, §21

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, §36

¹¹⁴ See WEU related texts adopted at EC Summit Maastricht, 10 December 1991, "Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", the so-called Maastricht Declaration, available at <http://www.weu.int>, visited on 15 January 2004

¹¹⁵ Trevor Taylor, "West European Defense and Security Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond", *International Affairs*, Vol. 70/1, 1994, p. 2

¹¹⁶ Bozo, "Le Modèle Gaullien en Question...", p. 21

Europeanists that they could feel that their demands are met at the same time. The ambiguity of the compromise was further entrenched when in June 1992 Final Communiqué WEU was deemed as “the defense *component* of the European Union and as a means of strengthening the European *pillar* of the Atlantic Alliance”, hence bringing together the two radically different notions concerning the European security identity.¹¹⁷ Interpreting these documents, both Atlanticists and Europeanist could extract meanings that would satisfy them.

Despite this haziness, WEU was firmly established as the proposed solution the problem of European security, a dynamic that had started in 1987 with Platform on European Security Interests. With the new mechanisms of Maastricht Treaty, like joint actions, joint decisions, and closer cooperation in foreign and security policy, a dynamic was created towards the fulfillment of the security related needs of Old Continent.

The ensuing year provided ample time for the refinement of the balance reached at Maastricht. In this period France extracted several lessons from the incidents, which took place in and around Europe, especially the Yugoslav situation and US reluctance to commit its forces to this crisis.

Since WEU was denoted with the defense and security tasks of the council, time was ripe to define what these tasks really were. The explanation of these came in the form of the so-called Petersberg Declaration proclaimed under the auspices of WEU meeting near Bonn on 19 June 1992.¹¹⁸ It was significant that this declaration came after the Oslo North Atlantic Council several days earlier where NATO roles in peacekeeping and crisis management were emphasized. Thus a parallelism was being constructed between the WEU and NATO.¹¹⁹

In the declaration, it was stated that WEU could be employed for “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis

¹¹⁷ Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo 4 June 1992, §7, available online at <http://www.nato.int>, visited on 15 January 2004.

¹¹⁸ Mathias Jopp, “Germany and WEU”, in *NATO and Integrating Europe*, Carl Lankowski and Simon Serfaty (eds.), American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Research Report No. 9, Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, 1999, p. 40

¹¹⁹ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *France and NATO: Change by Rapprochement? Asterix' Quarrel with the Roman Empire*, Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Heft 121, Hamburg, 2000, available at <http://www.rz.uni-hamburg.de/ifsh/>, accessed on 10 April 2003

management, including peacemaking.”¹²⁰ From then on WEU was ready to assume operational tasks within a wide range.

A further point to make concerning the year 1992 was the learning process that came with the situation in the Balkans. It was France and UK, two most important countries for the development of European security role, which have derived the most important conclusions. They both understood that, upon American reluctance to commit forces, Europe was in urgent need of maintaining its own capabilities for such risks.¹²¹ France especially comprehended that NATO was indispensable in such tasks due to the deficiencies of European allies in certain capabilities and more specifically, Germany’s lack of political will to commit itself to the provision of stability in Europe.¹²² Thus in the face of Balkan instability, French perception of the usefulness of NATO began to change for positive. Lack of automatic commitment on the part of US decreased concerns about hegemony within the Alliance.¹²³ Moreover, the so-called French *Maastricht Spirit* had faded away due to several developments. Generally speaking, Yugoslav incident hardly spurred a common reaction from the European Union member states, as seen in the German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. It was hardly evident that the clauses adopted in Maastricht Treaty would be used in future.¹²⁴ On the other hand, Denmark delivered double blows to the Maastricht process by 1st giving a no vote in the referendum and then refusing full membership in the WEU.¹²⁵

These deliberations led France to the conclusion that a delicate process of rapprochement with the Atlantic framework was required. The signs of such a change of stance was already evident before 1992. First within the context of Gulf War, France had broke away with the Gaullist principle of refusing foreign presence

¹²⁰ See WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Section II “On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role”, paragraph 5, text available at <http://www.weu.int>, visited on 15 January 2004

¹²¹ Art, *op. cit.*, p. 34

¹²² German Federal Republic had the excuse of having constitutional obstacles before its deployment of force outside national territory.

¹²³ Janet Bryant, “France and NATO from 1966 to Kosovo: Coming to Full Circle?”, *European Security*, Vol 9/3, Autumn 2000, p. 26 and Nicole Gnesotto, “European Union after Minsk and Maastricht”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 68/2, 1992, p. 224

¹²⁴ Salmon, *op. cit.*, p. 248

¹²⁵ Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, “La Politique Européenne de la France à l’heure des Choix”, *Politique Etrangère*, Hiver 1995/1996, No. 4, p. 859

by allowing US aircrafts be temporarily based on French soil to enable B-52 refueling.¹²⁶ Again in the Gulf, French forces were placed under American command, however strictly defined.¹²⁷ Most importantly, on 21 January 1993, a three-way agreement was signed among the Chief of Staff of Bundeswehr General Klaus Naumann, the then SACEUR General John Shalikasvili and French Chief of Staff Admiral Lanxade, placing the *Eurocorps*, under the operational command of SACEUR for the conduct of NATO missions. Thus French forces entered under NATO command, and not temporarily.¹²⁸

This last move on the side of French was hinting at the real nature of the coming era in French security and defense policy in Europe. Thus in several years time, France moved from the verification of its ages old Gaullist model towards a new policy of *rapprochement* with NATO and US.

¹²⁶ Salmon, *op. cit.*, p. 239

¹²⁷ Bozo, "Le Modèle Gaullien En Question...", p. 24

¹²⁸ Ehrhart, *op. cit.*, p. 7

CHAPTER 5

FRANCE AND NATO 1993-1997: CHANGE THROUGH RAPPROCHEMENT

5.1 Post-Maastricht Spirit in France

1993 was the year of a real turning point for the French European security policy, regarding especially the North Atlantic Alliance. The significance of this year stemmed from the fact that on 21 January 1993, one day before the anniversary of Elysée Treaty, a three-way agreement was signed among French Chief of Staff, Admiral Lanxade; his American counterpart SACEUR General Shalikasvili, and Chief of Staff of Bundeswehr General Klaus Naumann.

The history of Eurocorps is officially traced back to the Elysée Treaty of Franco-German Cooperation of January 1963. Within this framework, in 1987, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl announced the creation of the French-German Security and Defense Council leading to the creation of the French-German Brigade in 1989. This unit became operational in October 1991.

This achievement coincided well with joint Franco-German initiative at the Inter-governmental Conference on Political Union, calling for cooperation in the domain of security and defense, referred above. On May 22, 1992, during the La Rochelle Summit, the Joint Report of the French and German Defense Ministers was endorsed and François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl formally founded the Eurocorps.¹²⁹

This deal had become a serious bone of contention between its initiators, France and Germany as well between United States and Paris-Bonn axis. While

¹²⁹ See Eurocorps web page at <http://www.eurocorps.org/site/index.php?language=en&content=history>, visited on January 15, 2004

France regarded it as a unit outside formal NATO structure, hence outside of American influence, Germany came to see it rather as a way to carry France closer to the European pillar within NATO and a way to reconcile European defense proposals and NATO. Indeed, taking into consideration the fact that the accord rendered the corps as answerable primarily to WEU, French point of view was more appropriate than the German one.¹³⁰ United States treated this initiative with great suspicion and Bush made the infamous speech in Rome Summit where he said “if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.”¹³¹ German officials had difficult times in assuring the United States leadership that this proposal was only a long-term one, and Bundeswehr contribution to the scheme would be double-hatted, meaning that the forces would be assigned to both NATO and Eurocorps.

Indeed, the question posed by President Bush concerning the long-term American engagement in Europe, was not desired in any European capital at the time. France was envisioning such an eventuality since the time of de Gaulle, but only “in the long term.” Throughout the Cold War it was certain that this long term would never materialize. In the new strategic situation prompted with the end of the “Yalta Order”, France was alarmed to keep United States commitment to Europe, in the face of a reunified Germany. In the case of Eurocorps, France was not against the placing of that unit under NATO command, provided that certain French conditions are met: If the Eurocorps would be placed under NATO, it should be done so as a whole, not in its constituent parts. Second, the nature of the relations between NATO and Eurocorps would be *operational control*, meaning that the scheme would be for a specific and predetermined mission and time, rather than the peacetime integration. Third condition was that Eurocorps units would be first loyal to Eurocorps command and secondarily to NATO, provided that the leadership decides so. It was evident from this picture that France was particularly vigilant about keeping the Eurocorps intact, as the basis of future European initiatives for autonomous defense. This sensitiveness of France, embodied in the first condition also pointed out to the

¹³⁰ Duke, *The New European Security Disorder*, p. 223

¹³¹ Bush quoted in Siret Hürsoy, *The New Security Concept and German-French Approaches to the European Pillar of Defense, 1990-2000*, Marburg: Tactum Verlag, 2002, p. 180

importance France came to give to the maintenance of Franco-German cooperation. The remaining two conditions, first of all, enshrined the ages old Gaullist principle of maintaining political authority over the military means. Within the context of North Atlantic Alliance, this meant keeping French troops away from the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) who was indeed an American commander.

The ensuing negotiation and agreement among France, Germany and United States contained many of the above conditions. Eurocorps employment within the NATO framework would require prior authorization from both France and Germany. Moreover, the Eurocorps would retain their unitary posture in operations, which are preliminarily defined. Splitting the Eurocorps is operational upon the decision of the Franco-German Security Council. Significantly, France gave a compromise in the new agreement by accepting to place Eurocorps under *operational command* of NATO, rather than previously agreed *operational control*. This meant that there would be more freedom to employ these forces in the Atlantic framework, not only for the SACEUR, but also for lower levels in the integrated command structure.¹³² France also widened the definition of missions for which Eurocorps could be employed.¹³³

These decisions on Eurocorps and the development process of this unit were revolutionary for France in several ways. First, Eurocorps was established initially as a brigade comprising about 5,000 soldiers. From July 1992 on, a separate Head Quarters were established for the Eurocorps, based in Strasbourg. This meant that, French troops were for the first time placed permanently under an integrated Eurocorps command. This was indeed a breach of the traditional Gaullist framework, where an attitude of non-integration is maintained due to political questions. The activation of this unit, to which 45,000 French troops would be committed, was conditional upon the decision of both France and Germany at the same time. Thus France was pooling its political authority over military means with a long-time ally. Plus, as mentioned above, France –albeit reluctantly– accepted the placing of this

¹³² For a closer analysis of the difference between the concepts “command” and “control”, see Martin Sharp, *Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters*, Canberra: Air Power Studies Center, 1998, p. 3-8, available at <http://www.raaf.gov.au>, visited on 20 March 2004

¹³³ Western European Union Political Committee Report, *European Security Policy*, Brussels: WEU, 24 May 1994 (Document No. 1370)

unit under NATO framework, for both defense and peacekeeping missions. Putting national troops under NATO command was a highly contentious issue within the French defense community.¹³⁴ Since the French withdrawal NATO-France military relations were being maintained under the so-called Ailleret-Lemnizter agreement, the details of which are not publicized. According to this arrangement, signed on 22 August 1967, upon the political decision of the French authorities, French Second Army Corps would be engaged as an operational reserve of counter-offensive force for NATO's Central Army Group.¹³⁵ The Eurocorps decision came as a new variable in this balance.

With the signing of the Eurocorps agreement among United States, France and Germany, Paris was becoming ready for the next revolutionary step in its post-Maastricht European security policy: The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept.

It has now been firmly established that with the early 1993, France has embarked upon a process of overhauling its previous European projects, and decreasing ambitions for a European strategic entity. This also meant that the Gaullist framework would be compromised in its several dimensions, especially the ones concerning the relations to North Atlantic alliance. Why did this change take place?

In the immediate post-Cold War era, France confronted two great crises in its periphery. First one was that of the Gulf crisis, which indeed did not mean much for the European security policy. This was particularly because this crisis was not representative of the future crises that would take place on the Old Continent.¹³⁶

The second crisis was that of ex-Yugoslav republics, which will be mentioned in detail below. This was indeed an important incident, which brought the reality check for French ambitions and European security identity and prompted the

¹³⁴ Sloan, "NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense," *Mc Nair Paper*, No. 46, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC: National Defense University, December 1995, p. 28

¹³⁵ Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence*, p. 14

¹³⁶ Roberta N. Haar, "The Kosovo Crisis and its Consequences for a European Security Architecture" in Kurt R. Spillmann and Joachim Krause, (eds.), *Kosovo: Lessons Learned for International Cooperative Security*, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Volume 5, Bern: Peter Lang, 2000, Chapter 5

questioning of the Gaullist model, pursued in the previous era. This scheme was questioned in its 3 dimensions.¹³⁷ First was the Western dimension that indicated a revision of the European strategic objective, rendered inevitable with the “contra-performance” of European powers in the handling of the Balkan conflicts. Second was the East-West dimension, where the failure of the European strategic ambitions squarely led to the reinforcement of the alliance framework in European security. NATO, kept out in the Gulf War, was increasingly involved in the ex-Yugoslav conflict. This went hand in hand with the acceptance by France the growing importance of new type of missions (non-Article 5), which it initially sought hard to limit. Third point, according to Bozo, was the national dimension. The post-Cold War situation and crises led France to question its independent status in the alliance from both political and military points of view. France began seriously pondering about an adaptation to the alliance, short of reintegration. Given the “European illusions” and increasing significance of NATO within European security, France thought that it would be more advantageous to have more influence on the deeds of Alliance by adapting to it.

These analyses on the part of Frenchmen were also reinforced by the overall state of affairs in the European integration project. As mentioned above, Denmark could adopt the Treaty on European Union, which included only modest procedures for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, only in the second referendum. Equally, in France, votes favoring the adoption of TEU were only slightly more than the “No” votes. This prompted to the policy-makers that the integration process could be overhauled by the problem of political legitimacy of the Union, a question hardly pondered before. These marginal successes of the “Yes” votes pointed towards a rupture between the elite perceptions and ambitions on the one hand, and the people’s ambitions and expectancies on the other.¹³⁸

Incidents in former Yugoslavia also showed that, regarding the European Union, strategic ambitions for Europe had certain limits. German early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia pushed the France-German couple into a crisis without

¹³⁷ Bozo, “Le Modèle Gaullien En Question...”, p. 28

¹³⁸ Duke, *The Elusive Quest...*, p. 119

precedent. At the time of the eruption of the Yugoslav crisis into war, Europe had a protuberant agenda involving the Soviet Union, reunification of Germany, Gulf War and Iraqi invasion and the TEU had not entered into power, meaning that the European Political Cooperation procedures were in place. Nevertheless, the crisis illustrated that the difficulties the European would face in the coming years. First, the member states were not ready to deal with ethnic tensions on the ground and their diplomacy provided futile as long as it was not backed up by “credible military force.”¹³⁹ Second, from the point of view of France, German recognition had forced it towards a position that it did not initially consider amenable to its interests and visions in the region. The Minister of Defense Roland Dumas summarized the situation by saying: “the split of Yugoslavia was drama and split of the Community would be a catastrophe.”¹⁴⁰

Apart from the military realities of the Gulf and Yugoslav crises on the ground the American factor was influential in the turn France had gone through in 1993. With the November 1992 elections in United States, Bill Clinton had come into power. The new president, a democrat, was far more disposed towards accepting a European role in European security and desired to dispel any residual implication that United States was against Europe taking more responsibility and burden in the Alliance.¹⁴¹ There emerged a juncture where France was becoming more pragmatic in its endeavor for European security and United States more open to compromise. This situation would lead to the adoption of the CJTF in 1994 NATO summit.

5.2 The Crisis in Former Yugoslav Republic and the “Lessons Learned”

Yugoslavia was a nonaligned republic, which had certain economic links with the European Community, traced back to the 1970s. The relations between the two have been intensified especially after the breach of the wall and the Balkan republic has been deemed eligible for the PHARE program that was originally conceived for

¹³⁹ Fraser Cameron, *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future*, Contemporary European Series 7, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999, p. 27

¹⁴⁰ Bozo, *op. cit.*, p. 30

¹⁴¹ Sloan, “The US and European Defense”, p. 10

Poland and Hungary. Nevertheless, Belgrade confronted with difficulties in maintaining its relations with the EC basically due to the political conditions imposed as a corollary to the PHARE program. With the end of the Cold War the Pandora box of ethnic problems and sharing the political power along these lines was wide open in the Balkans, as well as in Yugoslavia. First Croatia and Slovenia, as early as June 1991, made it clear that they would like to claim their independence from the Belgrade republic. This move precipitated a military intervention by the Yugoslav federal forces to Croatia as well as to Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁴²

The initial European/EC reaction to the crisis was a commitment to preserve the federal status quo in the Republic, hence opposing any change of borders. Far different from the Gulf crisis, the Yugoslav republic was very close to Western European capitals thus European powers felt both the need and the responsibility to take action on the issue. Yet it was fairly apparent that the tools at the EC's disposal were too modest to broker an agreement between the different power centers in the republic. The EC, before the eruption of violence in June, considered whether to extend the economic/trade agreements with Belgrade. Thus economic carrot could be used to scale down the crisis. Another instrument was diplomacy and more particularly the threat to recognize the breakaway republics.¹⁴³

In the face of violence on the Continent and failed diplomatic attempts, with the initiation of France, EC Foreign Ministers met in The Hague in connection with a special WEU session. In the meeting, the WEU was asked to come up with a package of options for the EC member states to employ for settling the crisis. The options were: (1) provide armed escorts for the EC monitors, (2) provide the monitors with armed escort and protection, (3) send a light peacekeeping force of 5-6,000 men to Croatia, (4) send a fully fledged truce-policing force of 25-50,000 troops.¹⁴⁴ While the idea of sending light troops enjoyed support from Belgians and Italians, Germany appeared reluctant to the idea depending on the restrictions involved in its *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) in front of sending forces abroad. UK on the other hand fundamentally opposed the idea believing that such an intervention could quickly

¹⁴² Duke, *The Elusive Quest...*, p. 202

¹⁴³ Salmon, "Testing Times...", p. 249

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 250-251

escalate into a crisis that would demand more troops from the contributors, even up to 30,000. In the face of such a depiction member states hardly pushed further for intervening militarily.¹⁴⁵ Hence the only positive contribution of the meeting to the European security has been the linking of the EC and WEU in a *de facto* manner.

A further step in the crisis regarding the response of the European Community was recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Indeed the independent status of these two republics was increasingly becoming *de facto* independent and EC only acknowledged this situation. In late 1991 Germany managed to convince the other member states to issue a conditional recognition of these entities. The conditions posed by report of Badinter Commission of French judge Robert Badinter involved support for the EC and United Nations peace efforts, constitutional protection for ethnic minorities and observance of human rights. The recognition would come in mid-January provided the two meets the conditions. However Germany hurried up and recognized these countries before the end of 1991.¹⁴⁶ This apparent shift in the German position came mainly as a result of the growing number of refugees to the country as well as pressure from the media and Vatican.¹⁴⁷

There were several lessons to extract from the crisis, only a portion of which is mentioned here. Following the crisis it was apparently seen that the Franco-German proposal for a common security policy was far from being adopted. First, the EC lacked the appropriate capabilities to deal with the crisis. Only instruments it had were diplomatic instruments and economic sanctions. Second, the EC could not speak with one voice throughout the crisis. The representative act in this regard was the unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, which undermined EC's own diplomatic efforts. Third, it increasingly became apparent that WEU would be the defense arm of the European Community in the coming days.¹⁴⁸ Indeed the WEU's adoption of the Petersberg missions could be seen as a corollary to this.

Another lesson was that United States might not always want to be implicated in crisis. United States military contribution to the settlement of disputes in Europe is

¹⁴⁵ Salmon, *op. cit.*, p. 251

¹⁴⁶ Duke, *op. cit.*, p. 204

¹⁴⁷ Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 29

¹⁴⁸ Duke, *op. cit.*, p. 221-2

not automatic and hence Europeans should take more of the responsibility for themselves.¹⁴⁹

Far different from the Gulf War, Yugoslav conflict prompted a new way of organization of defense in the post-Cold War era. Throughout the Cold War, national armed forces, especially in the French concept, was seen as strictly national institutions completely geared towards the protection of national sanctuary. However this concept did not exclude cooperation and coordination efforts of national forces on the basis of a common perceived threat. With the end of Cold War and emergence of new security risks, interventionism became the order of the day and armies turned out to be less geared towards defense, and more oriented towards the “export of security and stability.”¹⁵⁰ This was an important development since it would lead to the acceptance of the CJTF concept in the coming NATO summit in early 1994. This concept, which will be elaborated below, involved the idea of integrating armed forces of different countries in a move to bring about the desired ends. As such it was far different from the national understanding of defense.

The peace dividend expectations after the Cold War and economic problems also mean that Atlantic nations would not have a free hand in boosting their military capabilities. The cure for this problem was found to be closer coordination of forces from different nations. The close cooperation and coordination of units from different nations brought onto agenda the problem of *interoperability* and modalities of participation in the Alliance efforts.¹⁵¹ Like most of its European partners, France lacked the necessary capacities indispensable in logistics, transport and projection of forces and also Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C³I) which were crucial in the formation of the coalitions of the able and willing to undertake operations. Here the choice for France was not that of between *autonomy of decision* or not but rather really managing to act or not. NATO was vital for the access to relevant capabilities for a nation, which throughout the Cold War, relied on the nuclear capabilities and deterrence for its defense. (Indeed, the lack of conventional

¹⁴⁹ Gnesotto, “Lessons of Yugoslavia”, *Chaillot Papers*, No. 14, March 1994, Paris: WEU- Institute For Security Studies, 1994, p. 21

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 12

¹⁵¹ Johnsen and Young, French Policy Towards NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, vice Rapprochement, Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, September 1994, p. 11

forces was seen as a guarantee for United States commitment to Europe.) In this context, participation in NATO became less contradictory for France. As a corollary to this understanding, France began revising its policy of non-participation in politico-military structures of the Alliance. Since April 1993, the Balladur cohabitation government, with the accord of Mitterrand, decided to participate in Military Committee meetings of NATO, in cases where the meeting concerned the out-of-area operations in ex-Yugoslavia.¹⁵² In September 1994, moreover, the Defense Minister participated in an informal meeting with his colleagues, first since the 1966 withdrawal.

Yet the furthering of the cooperation between NATO and France required that Paris adapt its defense policies to the requirements of the new types of missions. Here the attitude of Mitterrand and the fact that the country was being governed within cohabitation blocked the pace of reforms.¹⁵³

5.3 The 1994 Brussels NATO Summit and Beyond

The North Atlantic Alliance was already embarked upon a process of transformation with the end of Cold War and the ensuing London summit and the New Strategic Concept. Enough clues were found in the declaration emanating from the London summit and in the New Concept concerning the new tasks to be assumed and new openings to the east.

These proposals were especially opposed by France, who chose to look for a European strategic entity and ending the dependence on NATO/United States in the field of defense and security. As of reaching to the east, this would succeed the Alliance reform. When France realized that its European partners were not as ardent as itself in the acquisition of autonomy France had to leave behind the ambitions for autonomous European security identity, and the *tournant* towards NATO took place.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the American cause was keeping the US leadership within the Alliance. Although the American authorities predicted that

¹⁵² Bozo, *Le Modèle Gaullien en Question...*, p. 44

¹⁵³ Rynning, *French Military Doctrine in the 1990s*, p. 12

Europeans would not be able to come together to form an autonomous security and defense capability, the endeavors towards this direction were scrutinized very closely, as evidenced by the Bush-Baker interventions in the 1990-1 IGC on Political Union. In the face of such attempts it was far more advantageous for US to keep the European security dynamic within NATO. While this would require certain concessions to France it would ensure the main American strategy of keeping NATO as the main vehicle of US influence and leadership on European security issues.¹⁵⁴ United States also saw the CJTF concept, which will be elaborated on below, as a means to share the burdens and encourage more European powers for taking responsibilities in military operations.

In this context, NATO was the only venue for meeting the security requirements of New Europe. NATO became the organization for European security largely because of the reality on the ground, rather than being a result of conscious European designs. This was all the more so due to the Yugoslav crisis. Subsequent conflicts like the Gulf Crisis and Bosnian question required robust and efficient forces, which was absent in Europe, save United Kingdom and to a certain extent France. Although NATO was not configured for non-Article 5 missions, a *de facto* shift took place from the search for absolute autonomy towards more modest projects.¹⁵⁵

These changes in French policy culminated in the January 1994 North Atlantic Council in Brussels. The declaration that came out from the summit included two significant measures, the Partnership for Peace program, and the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF- French counterpart is Groupes de Forces Interarmées Multinationales-GFIM) concept. In the declaration the Alliance gave its full support for the development of the European Security and Defense Identity of the European Union, as a factor, which reinforces the Atlantic Alliance and lets the Europeans to take a greater responsibility for their common security.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ US Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, 1996, Chapter 1, available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/europe/intro.html>, visited on 15 January 2004

¹⁵⁵ Howorth, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?", *Chaillot Papers*, No. 43, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, November 2000, p. 12

¹⁵⁶ Press Communiqué M-1 (94) 3, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, §4

This summit was described as the best ever NATO summit from the French point of view. This was largely because the backing given to the ESDI in this convening. Thus France has started its long journey towards reconciling with the NATO.¹⁵⁷

Indeed signs of a relaxation of the French policy towards the Alliance were already there since the Gulf War and Yugoslav conflict. In 1994 these moves were supplemented with certain references in the *Livre Blanc* (White Paper) published by the Ministry of Defense to outline the defense policy agenda in the coming years. The document has underlined NATO as the principal defense organization for France without renouncing the ambitions for European security.¹⁵⁸ The cautious point here was that French rapprochement towards NATO would take place as long as NATO was ready for a structural overhaul.¹⁵⁹ France also resumed attending Defense Ministers' and Chief of Staff meetings on a case-by-case basis. This came in an event, with Léotard's attendance in September 1994, which was first since the 1966 decision to leave the integrated bodies of the alliance.

The Combined Joint Task Forces concept pointed towards a multiple faceted project. The concept was indeed dating from a 1993 proposal by US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, as a response to the evolving Alliance tasks.¹⁶⁰ The *Combined* clause referred to the multinational character of the units while *Joint* meant the close coordination and cooperation of different military services like, air, ground and sea forces. The concept of "joint forces" was in circulation in the Pentagon corridors especially since the *Operation Desert Storm* in the Gulf War. The reports on the "war fighting" capabilities of the US Army were evaluated after this operation. The reports argued that, despite eventual victory, the US Army was functioning just like it did 50 years ago. The cure to this bad habit was closer coordination of the air, ground and navy units in a way that would create a joint organism. This was indeed made more possible with the developments in the field of communications.¹⁶¹ Thus it was only

¹⁵⁷ Bryant, "France and NATO Until Kosovo", p. 27

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "Europe by Other Means?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 73/1, 1997, p. 88

¹⁶⁰ Rynning, *op. cit.*, p. 46

¹⁶¹ William A. Owens, "The Once and Future: RMA", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 2002, pp. 55-61

natural for NATO to prioritize this war-fighting concept over others, in the name of efficiency.

Last but not least, being a “task force” pointed to the fact that these units would come together on the basis of tasks which are given to them when need arose, they would not be standing armies.

When need arose the NATO’s highest decision-making body, North Atlantic Council, would make the capabilities and assets of NATO available for operations which are either NATO-led –involving United States as a country– or WEU-led. The Brussels declaration and subsequent declarations involved the clause “assets and capabilities” which denoted a difference between the two. The rationale behind this distinction was that whereas *assets* stand for personnel, Head Quarters, Head Quarter elements, units and equipment; the *capabilities* represent services such as airborne early warning systems (AWACS) information, access to communications, etc. The difference between them was that while assets would be transferred to the control of those undertaking the operations, capabilities would remain under NATO control.¹⁶²

When Jacques Chirac came to power in June 1995, the France-NATO relationship took the form of a real rapprochement. In October 1995 French Chief of Staff General Jean-Philippe Douin attended a NATO meeting of NATO’s Military Committee, first time since 1966. In December 1995 an agreement was reached in this venue that allowing the use of NATO and/or American equipment in its operations would strengthen WEU’s capabilities. Although a general agreement was reached at the Brussels summit in 1994, the exact technicalities and details of the agreement was left for discussion by the North Atlantic Council Permanent Session with the contribution of the military authorities. The agreement has brought a new turning point to the debates between France and Unites States about the employment of Alliance assets by WEU.¹⁶³

The same session was the place where France has declared that it would, from then on, join the NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting on a regular basis and also

¹⁶² Marc Otte, “ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations: Working with NATO, the UN, and OSCE” in Esther Brimmer (ed.), *The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP, and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations*, Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002, p. 45

¹⁶³ Bryant, *op. cit.*, p. 27

rejoin the Military Committee.¹⁶⁴ Yet this move did not mean that France was reintegrating into the Alliance. France kept itself aloof from such an image and thus did not return to the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO, a body that France saw as an encroachment on its sovereignty. Moreover, France also refrained from joining the Defense Planning Committee. Although this body was taking decisions on an intergovernmental and consensus basis its main role in NATO was managing the International Military Staff. Thus France did not want to participate in the meetings of this integrated structure, where annual reviews of defense planning are carried out. Moreover the IMS had close links with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), which was indeed led by an American general and answerable to American political authorities. Thus joining the DPC would also mean relinquishing French political authority over the French contribution and giving national forces under American command, from the point of view of Paris. This was quite in contradiction with the Gaullist principle of keeping political authority over the military.¹⁶⁵

Although the Brussels summit was a big step forward in the post-Cold War era security developments in Europe the exact technicalities and details of the CJTF were not clear. The European powers were concerned that a new negotiation process was required to ensure the access to NATO assets and capabilities in a way that would not constrain European autonomy.¹⁶⁶

The reform of the Alliance had concretely started in Brussels summit. In this process French demands were centering on several principles. One of them was retaining the political control over the alliance military bodies. Through out the Cold War, the logic was that since certain military threats necessitated quick response political consultations on the issues would not be always possible. With the end of the Cold War, France maintained that this logic was now bankrupt. There was no imminent threat to the territorial integrity of the NATO members that would require

¹⁶⁴ Aikaterini Hatjiadinou, "The Deadalus European Security", *NATO Fellowship Reports*, 1998-2000, available at <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/hatjiadoni.pdf>, accessed on 10 April 2003, p. 40

¹⁶⁵ Robert Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO", *Survival*, Vol. 38/1, Spring 1996, p. 65-66

¹⁶⁶ Gnesotto, "1996 et la Défense Commune: Encore une Occasion Manquée?", *Politique Etrangère*, No. 1, Printemps, 1995, p. 139

a collective response without political authorization. Thus context was now more amenable to establish political control over military capabilities of the Alliance.¹⁶⁷ While France was pointing out the ills of the Alliance it was also making concrete proposals for the reform. Concerning the Military Committee, France proposed that this body become an interface between the North Atlantic Council and the military commands especially for peacekeeping activities. A second measure in this direction could be the attendance of Defense Ministers to the NAC meetings to clarify military issues in a political forum.¹⁶⁸

A second French concern was making the European contribution to the Alliance identifiable.¹⁶⁹ That is to say, the Europeans should be concretely represented in the organization via certain instruments like the assignment of certain commands and appointment of a Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (D-SACEUR). This post would be held by a European general and would be subordinate to the American SACEUR during peacetime. In the case when Europeans carry out operations the D-SACEUR would lead such undertakings. This proposed command should be responsible at all levels including the planning of an operation, politico-military decisions and even training. In this way NATO chain of command would be able to function in a European mode (NATO II).¹⁷⁰

Still another European or French concern was about the CJTF concept. Although this modular novelty was well confirmed for the Allies to realize military operations with the contribution of NATO, the authorization of the employment of assets and capabilities was conditional upon the opinion of North Atlantic Council since the units in question were dominantly national ones earmarked for NATO.¹⁷¹ In this, Foreign Minister Herve de Charette argued that once the decisions had been taken in NAC to make NATO assets available this would be valid throughout the operation. Although France was committed to the unanimity principle for the release

¹⁶⁷ Ehrhart, *France and NATO*, p. 20

¹⁶⁸ Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 51

¹⁶⁹ Michael Brenner, *Terms of Engagement: United States and European Security Identity*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998, p. 41

¹⁷⁰ Charles Millon, "France and the Renewal of the Alliance", *NATO Review*, Vol. 44/3, May 1996, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9603-3.htm>, accessed on 15 January 2004.

¹⁷¹ Philip H. Gordon, "Does WEU Have a Role?" *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 20/1, p. 137

of assets for a CJTF operation, it wished that after the authorization Allies should only monitor the developments and the initiator countries should retain their autonomy.¹⁷²

These questions would find their answers in the Berlin ministerial meeting of NATO in 1996 June. The final declaration of the meeting was negotiated until the early hours of the morning. What came out from the summit was to a large extent meeting the French demands above. The insistence of Paris on the importance of political control in NATO led to the acceptance of the Policy Coordination Group (PCG) which would ensure the harmonization of political and military views concerning the new missions of NATO.¹⁷³

More important than that, it was agreed at the meeting that European commands, Head Quarters, and support equipment that would be employed in the case of a WEU-led contingency operation would be identified in advance. Such a move would lead to a reshuffle of the command posts in the Alliance and as such was opening the way to the appointment of a Deputy SACEUR.

On the delicate issue of autonomy the declaration stated that the authorization of the use of NATO assets would come as a result of unanimous NAC decision. The procedures following this directive were not sufficiently clarified in the meeting and the Permanent Session of NAC was charged with concluding the modalities of WEU-NATO cooperation in CJTF contingency operations.¹⁷⁴

Few days after the summit Chirac has announced that if all the decisions of the summit are implemented France would rejoin the alliance. It was curious that the summit has taken many decisions but at the same time posed many new questions to be answered in the coming meetings. So Chirac's announcement was signaling the French conditionality on the eventual shape of the alliance reform. It would soon appear that France was viewing the Berlin summit only as the beginning of the long overhaul of the NATO structure. Thus the coming months were even harder for the fate France-NATO rapprochement.

¹⁷² Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 52

¹⁷³ Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (96) 63, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, §6, available at <http://www.nato.int>, accessed on 15 January 2004

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, §9

5.4 The Debate on the NATO Command Structure and Afsouth Crisis

After the Berlin summit in 1996 the Allies began their consultations and negotiations on the new structure of the organization. It was agreed that, in the new structure, SACEUR and SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) would remain as American commanders and US agreed that Allied Forces Central Europe would be a European command. After this debate centered on the European sub-commands that were cut from three to two. In this France insisted on acquiring the AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe command, which hosted the infamous 6th fleet of the United States.¹⁷⁵

As noted above France wanted to see the results of the Alliance reform concretely in the structure of NATO. This was required not only to ensure the visibility and autonomy of the European pillar in NATO but also a way to prepare the French public opinion for reintegrating into the organization.¹⁷⁶ For France the reform would achieve its objectives only when a deputy European SACEUR post was created and sub-commands were given to Europeans.

In the March 1997 issue of the *NATO Review*, the then Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, heralded that there would be a Deputy SACEUR (D-SACEUR) in the new alliance structure entrusted with carrying out “specific responsibilities for developing and preparing for WEU-led operations, when it is decided to support a European-led operation using NATO assets.”¹⁷⁷ This positive move towards French concerns was not accompanied with the compromise of AFSOUTH. In the successive months three headquarters (Striking Fleet Atlantic in Norfolk, AFCENT in Brunssum and AFSOUTH in Naples) have been initially designated as parent headquarters for CJTF nuclei, in a move to render the CJTF concept more visible. Yet The French President made it apparent in August 1997 that

¹⁷⁵ Bryant, *op. cit.*, p. 32

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 31

¹⁷⁷ Javier Solana, “Preparing for the Madrid Summit”, *NATO Review*, Vol. 45/2, March 1997, web edition available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9702-1.htm>, accessed on 15 January 2004

the southern command (AFSOUTH) would be the basis of the Hexagon's relationship with NATO.¹⁷⁸

The negotiations on the new command structure were accompanied by several exchanges of letters by US President Bill Clinton and Jacques Chirac. The French side, in his first letter made clear its demands concerning the southern command. It was also clarified that France had no intentions about the command of 6th fleet, which could be, to Paris, evaluated under different mechanisms. The Clinton response to the French demands was simply negative and as such made it harder for the lower officials to work out a compromise.¹⁷⁹

France was insistent on this command since it would be the symbol of re-balancing the alliance and it would contribute to the furthering of the interests in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Moreover having a French command in the alliance would elevate the position of the country vis-à-vis the other European partners, especially Germany and United Kingdom.¹⁸⁰ France and Germany proposed certain compromise solutions of no avail: the idea that command being taken over after 5 years, or rotating commanders in two year periods.¹⁸¹

United States flatly opposed any proposal in the way of solving the crisis. The American arguments for retaining the hold on the Naples command (AFSOUTH) were several. Washington, like Paris, made an emphasis on the interests in the Middle East and Mediterranean region. US authorities also underlined that with the revamping of the Alliance structures three fourths of the most senior commands were held by Europeans. Regarding the French proposal for differentiating the 6th fleet and AFSOUTH commands US was concerned that such a measure would increase the reaction time in crisis.¹⁸²

The chapter of France-NATO rapprochement came to an end when Chirac announced that the situation led to a freeze in the French move towards reintegrating

¹⁷⁸ Agence France Press, 27 August 1997

¹⁷⁹ Bryant, *op. cit.*, p. 33

¹⁸⁰ Ehrhart, *op. cit.*, p. 22

¹⁸¹ Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 57

¹⁸² Ronald Tiersky, "French Military Reform and NATO Restructuring", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1997, pp. 98-99

into the Alliance.¹⁸³ Although this did not mean that all the *acquis* would be suspended in NATO-France relationship, the reintegration dynamic was killed; not to come up in the coming years. Nevertheless the Alliance continued its reform process and adopted the new structure in the December 1997 Defense Ministers' meeting of NATO.

¹⁸³ Tiersky, "French Gamesmanship and the Future of the Alliance: The Case of Allied Forces Southern Europe" in *NATO 1997: Year of Change*, Lawrence R. Chalmer and Jonathan W. Pierce (eds.), Washington DC: National Defense University, 1998, Chapter 2, available at <http://isuisse.ifrance.com/emmaf2/NATO/>, accessed on 15 January 2004

CHAPTER 6

ST. MALO INITIATIVE AND AFTER: AUTONOMY AGAIN?

6.1 Amsterdam Treaty

As noted in the preceding chapter, the dominant agenda of the European security in the aftermath of the June 1996 NATO meeting in Berlin was the clarification of the modalities of cooperation between the European Union and NATO. The compromise achieved after the Maastricht Treaty was that EU would avail itself of the WEU, in a move to boost its security and defense capabilities. This was indeed a result achieved after much haggling between the Franco-German tandem and United Kingdom, where the former proposed WEU to be an arm while the latter pressing for pillar notion.

These debates were taking place in the background of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in 1996. There the main agenda was the text, which was to become the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. There, again the Franco-German tandem and United Kingdom were at loggerheads on the issue of the role of the WEU. As seen in the 27 February 1996 joint declaration of France and Germany addressing the IGC, they were opting for constructive abstention, as well as a prevision and analysis cell within the Union.¹⁸⁴ The gist of the initiative was, however, the proposal for the merger of the WEU and EU. This point was in deep contradiction with the British position that was fixed since the Maastricht negotiations. According to this, any move to furnish EU with a defense arm, or militarizing the EU itself was completely unacceptable since this would eventually entail the weakening of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁸⁵ In the British concept WEU

¹⁸⁴ Déclaration franco-allemande de Fribourg sur la PESC, 27 February 1996, available on <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-fr/270296.html>, accessed on 15 January 2004

¹⁸⁵ Richard G. Whitman, "Amsterdam's Unfinished Business? The Blair Government's Initiative and the Future of the WEU", *Occasional Papers*, No. 7, ISS-WEU, January 1999, p. 9

was an organization revitalized to let the European to take on missions within the range of Petersberg Tasks, albeit in close cooperation with NATO. Merger of the WEU into the EU would spoil the division of labor found between the Alliance and EU.

In line with this, when Blair government took up the power from Major, one of the first things it did was to block this proposal, backed by 10 countries, at the Amsterdam summit in 1997. Despite preventing the merger, Blair and his European partners achieved a certain level of progress in the institutional development of the European security architecture. It was agreed that “Common Strategies” would be introduced as a new policy instrument, and would be determined by European Council. Moreover, constructive abstention was accepted as a way to increase the efficiency of the decision-making mechanism. A post named as the High Representative for the CFSP was charged with ensuring the continuity, visibility and efficacy of the CFSP. Although these modest achievements were deemed to be a “catastrophe for the Union” by Europeanist Commission President Jacques Delors, the Treaty involved the important clauses of Petersberg Tasks, defined as “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.” The importance of these provisions was that first time in the history, an “intergovernmental organization” was codifying the notion of peacekeeping and peace related operations. It was significant that no other organization of that significance, like United Nations or NATO involved any reference to peacekeeping in its constituent treaties. Only the OSCE had such a provision, yet the documents, which involved that, did not hold the legal status of a treaty.¹⁸⁶

6.2 St. Malo Initiative and Beyond

With UK veto of the merger of EU and WEU and the AFSOUTH crisis, which put an end to the French rapprochement towards NATO, it was thought that the ESDI

¹⁸⁶ Fabrizio Pagani, “A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks into the Treaty on European Union”, *European Journal of International Law*, No. 9, 1998, p. 740

project has come to a dead end. This conclusion seemed to be premature when President Chirac and PM Blair came together to commit their energies to an autonomous European defense in 1998, at St. Malo.

The developments leading to such a shift of position in the UK was indeed apparent before this summit. In the conflict in former Yugoslavia the two militarily prominent countries in Europe retrieved lessons that made them ever closer on the issue of European security. While France saw that NATO structures could really be of utility in these kinds of crisis situations, UK got that American solidarity could manifest extreme volatility in these kinds of situations.¹⁸⁷ Thus while France found out that “to be more European required being more Atlanticist today” UK saw that European security had to be boosted to keep NATO intact.

Moreover the AFSOUTH crisis had been a lesson for France as well as UK. Although it is hardly the case that UK supported France in the attempt to acquire the southern command, it had shown the extent of US jealousy in sharing responsibilities within the Alliance. This crisis made questionable the good will of United States in supporting its European partners in their search for sustaining European security.¹⁸⁸ The Kosovo crisis, which has started in early 1998, and the difficulties Blair had gone through in formulating a policy in the Euro-Atlantic context also led him to favor an autonomous entity.¹⁸⁹

These kinds of evaluations on the part of UK did not become real policy initiatives under the Conservative government of John Major, whose party had a skeptical attitude towards European integration. The real input came when Labor took over No. 10, Downing Street.

One of the first signals of change was in the 1998 July Strategic Defense Review (SDR) of the UK, which went unnoticed. This paper talked about, for the first time, about the vital role of the EU’s CFSP in providing security and stability in Europe. Moreover, in Pörschach informal summit in Austria that year, Blair said that

¹⁸⁷ Gnesotto, “1996 et la Défense Commune: Encore une Occasion Manquée?”, *Politique Etrangère*, No. 1, Printemps, 1995, p. 136

¹⁸⁸ Jennifer Medcalf, “Cooperation between the EU and NATO” in *Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum*, in Joachim Krause et. al. (eds.), Zurich: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002, p. 98

¹⁸⁹ Howorth, “Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative”, *Survival*, Vol. 42/2, p. 33

UK was to support the European security initiatives as long as they remained militarily credible, politically intergovernmental and compatible with NATO.¹⁹⁰

Then came the December 1998 joint declaration of France and UK in the French resort in St. Malo. It was said in the declaration that EU “must have the capacity for *autonomous* action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” whereas the parties were pledging that their activities would take place “in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO”, in a way to contribute “to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance”.¹⁹¹ While the first part of the citation was a long cherished French objective in European security, the second one was a long-standing British condition for the development of European security. Thus these two policies were coming together in the declaration, which pointed towards a compromise between France and UK.¹⁹²

This new situation was indeed more positive in terms of its autonomy when compared with the ESDI project of NATO. This project was depending on the chances of the EU member states to borrow NATO assets and capabilities and as such was bound to the will of the United States. The St. Malo initiative, on the other hand contained the true *promise* of autonomy where EU would not be dependent on NATO for assets and capabilities. Yet, it should be kept in mind that the issue was not that of a simple increase of the military capabilities; it had profound implications for the Atlantic alliance.

Another implication of the St Malo initiative was that, with obstacle lifted, European security could enjoy new heights *within the institutional framework of the European Union*. It was widely known that Britain was leading the Atlanticist line within the EU and many times it was able to obscure the Franco-German initiatives in the Union. It was Britain who opposed the incorporation of the WEU, and a more ambitious European security identity. Although it is debatable whether it has done wrong or right in the 1990-1998 period, it was now evident that new a phase was

¹⁹⁰ Howorth, “European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?”, p. 25

¹⁹¹ For the text of the Saint-Malo Declaration, see Maartje Rutten, *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, Paris, EU-ISS, Chaillot Paper 47, 2001

¹⁹² Howorth, “France, NATO and European Security”, p. 6

opened for the EU. As it would be seen below, European security developments would increasingly take place within the framework of the Union, unlike before. This also implied that a new process of bargaining would take place between the Europeans and US, within the framework of NATO-EU relations. WEU, which was waken up, was to be let to sleep again.

Another effect of the St. Malo initiative was the resurgence of the Franco-British relations in the field of security. This new Franco-British rapprochement was made possible due to the experiences these two countries have gone through in the preceding years. Indeed the Paris-London axis in developing the military teeth of EU was not as novel as it was thought to be. Several years ago, with the crisis in Bosnia, UK came to the conclusion that it had a security stake outside NATO too. In this line London tried to boost the military relationship with the only available ally on the continent, France. In September 1994, they jointly signed their first bilateral agreement linking their elite army forces, French *Force d'Action Rapide* and British *Field Army* in the fields of exchange of units, joint training, and joint exercises. Moreover they had agreed in 1993 to jointly patrol the NATO territory with their nuclear submarines. This move was deemed to be the easiest but at the same time the most symbolic since the nuclear submarines were the least vulnerable elements of deterrence.¹⁹³

Thus Paris-London axis was a feasible tandem in the military sense, yet for years these two countries represented the two extreme points in the in European security.¹⁹⁴ While France was constantly championing the cause of an independent and autonomous security capability, UK was the natural antagonist to this understanding with its Atlanticist credentials. With the signing of the St. Malo declaration the political obstacle in front of the close military cooperation of these allies was gone. The matter remained how feasible was the new balance between Atlanticist UK and Europeanist France and how far could they be able to resume their cooperation in the field of security.

¹⁹³ Tiersky, "The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French Nuclear Policy," *Mc Nair Paper*, No. 43, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC: National Defense University, August 1995, p. 45

¹⁹⁴ Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative", p. 31

While there were several motivations for the continuation of the St. Malo spirit (like Kosovo crisis, agreement on the intergovernmental character of the decision making mechanisms, ambiguity of the definition of Petersberg Tasks,¹⁹⁵ etc.) important sources of contention remained side by side with the points of convergence. French and British cultures of security were still under the influence of their historical precedents. French were still Europeanists and British were still Atlanticists seeking to bolster the alliance via stronger European security architecture. For France ESDP was a European plan that could avail itself of Atlantic assets, should need arise. For UK, ESDP was a good cure to the transatlantic burden-sharing dispute. Moreover while France was constantly emphasizing the full range of Petersberg tasks and the ability of the EU to take over such missions by itself alone, the Island was emphasizing low-profile undertakings within the Petersberg spectrum, and NATO-EU cooperation was the natural candidate of such missions.¹⁹⁶

Yet the parties have managed to achieve agreement on several vital issues like the commitment to a greater capability for the Union, ability of the EU to take over EU-only missions without resort to NATO assets, transfer of functions of WEU to EU, a commitment to the development of EU-NATO relationship on the basis of further agreement on the CJTF concept.¹⁹⁷

The immediate American response to the St. Malo scheme came from Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright in her *Financial Times* article entitled “Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future.”¹⁹⁸ In the infamous article that became widely known with its nickname “3Ds Article” United States was reiterating in a somewhat different fashion, its long held views about the European security and autonomy. It was said in the article that although the initiative the Europeans, including Blair, have taken was welcome they should avoid three Ds: decoupling, duplication and discrimination.

By decoupling Secretary was pointing to the danger of delinking the two side of the Atlantic, especially US and Europe. The NATO should survive as an

¹⁹⁵ François Heisbourg et. al. “European Defense: Making it Work”, *Chaillot Papers*, No. 43, Paris: WEU-ISS, September 2000, p. 10

¹⁹⁶ Howorth, “Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative”, p. 35-36

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ See *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, pp. 10-12

organization that brought together the allies and should not be prejudiced by the European Union. Duplication on the other hand referred to the unwelcome duplication of the NATO assets that would indeed be available to the European within the “Berlin plus” mechanism. The logic was that, for Europe it would be useless to try to have capabilities that were already available to them under the NATO umbrella. The last point was citing the concerns of non-EU NATO members like Turkey, Norway and Iceland. This new momentum of European security should not affect them negatively.

Washington has seen that European security was turning a new corner with the St. Malo declaration. Initially, as reflected in the Secretary’s piece, the lead position of the UK and Blair was a good guarantee for the Americans to believe that the initiative did not have any ill intentions. Nevertheless USA was faced with a dilemma of its own.

The dilemma was that of decoupling. United States, although it officially made declarations that supported the Europeans in their building of the security architecture did not hesitate to intervene where it saw its interests were in peril. Examples of this were abounding in the first Bush administration and its reactions to the Franco-German proposal in the 1990-1 IGC. It was evident from here that US had at best an ambivalent stance towards the post-Cold War era search for European security.

On the one hand, there was mounting pressure in US for the greater burden sharing by the Europeans in the alliance. Washington was not ready to underwrite European security as it used to do in the post-Cold War era. That is to say, Europeans should make more investment in their defense efforts to alleviate some weight on the back of US. On the other hand, Washington had the strategic objective of keeping the European within the NATO framework as to ensure its review over the development of European security architecture. The progress recorded by this initiative should not lead to a point where US lost control of the management of security in the Old Continent. This posed the challenge of decoupling since too much European commitment to self-defense would render the NATO meaningless, which had arguably already lost its *raison d’être* with the demise of Soviet Union. Thus Washington had to pursue the schizophrenic policy of wanting the Europeans to

spend more on their defense and then turn and warn them not to spend to become independent.¹⁹⁹

Similarly, the European efforts to improve their military capabilities and readiness to intervene in areas of crisis would indeed be to the benefit of US. With the allies taking some of the burden, Washington would have a free hand to focus on other areas in the world. As such a new balance in the transatlantic relations also had the danger of excluding the US from the European affairs.²⁰⁰

6.3 Kosovo Conflict and New Developments in European Security

The crisis in Kosovo has been an important moment of the development of European security. This is so not because it consolidated the initiative that has come through since the St. Malo initiative but also it had crystallized the enduring problems in the European security management.

Kosovo was a lingering intra-state problem of the Balkans since 1989. That year Milosevic scrapped the autonomy of Kosovo, which was specified in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. This led to a wave of protests in the region and six-year boycott of the state apparatus in the region by the Albanians. In 1991 Kosovo was recognized as an independent republic by the Albanian parliament, following the election of Ibrahim Rugova as the President. In the meantime the armed group UÇK (KLA-Kosovo Liberation Army) was building up strength and resorting to violence as a means to achieve autonomy. With the beginning of 1998, Serbian authorities adopted a more hardliner stance towards the Albanians. This sparked off reaction from the “international community” and the situation was soon designated as a problem threatening the stability in the Balkans.²⁰¹

To tell a long story short, Milosevic refused to alter his policy of violence despite the pressure coming from the international community. In the face of the refusal of the Rambouillet agreement NATO renewed its threat to use force in March 1999. While the air campaign was hardly effective on Milosevic, NATO put forward

¹⁹⁹ Heisbourg et. al., *op. cit.*, p. 36

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 38

²⁰¹ Duke, *The Elusive Quest for European Security*, p. 226

several conditions to Milosevic, including the halting the military action, withdrawing armed forces from Kosovo, and return of the refugees to their homes (indeed at the time there was hardly any home to return to because of the Serbian atrocities).²⁰²

After an initial ambivalence, it was proposed by the EU and Russian envoys that NATO should substantially involve in the enforcement of a peace in the region and stopping the violence.

A military coalition was formed under the auspices of NATO *Operation Allied Force*, which included United States, France and Britain among other countries. The military coalition, which was sketched in an ad hoc manner, involved France, Britain among others. Yet it was predominantly an American operation –commanded by SACEUR– since it was US that made the most contribution to this first combat operation of the Alliance.

Throughout the operation, European and American came to loggerheads over the conduct of operations. Both sides were converging on the idea that ground troops should not be committed to the operation. Yet beyond this accord each side was pressing for its own military doctrines. The Americans, was in favor of a doctrine called as “Parallel Warfare” or “Rapid Dominance” which was allegedly developed in response to the failure of US in Vietnam. This doctrine, which came in the form of “Shock and Awe” in the recent operation in Iraq, was depending on the destruction of some very vital resources and instruments of the regime under attack hence to curtail its ability to wage war. This implied that power-centers, TV stations, airfields, bridges, energy storage sites would become targets of attack. This kind of an operational manner involved the advantage of risking less American troops, since it did not involve direct engagement with the army but rather “surgical strikes” by “attacking at stand-off range.”²⁰³

Whatever the “virtues” of this military doctrine it was in contradiction with those of the Europeans, which demanded, that operations take place in gradual

²⁰² Günther Joetze, “European Security Landscape after Kosovo”, *ZEI Discussion Papers*, C 64, 2000, p. 6

²⁰³ James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, Adelphi Paper 333, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 49

fashion, becoming steadily more violent. The logic here was that, it was Europeans themselves who would be obliged to face a destructed region. That is to say, the US would leave the region after the operation yet the European would stay there in future. With these concerns in mind, certain countries like France and Germany kept a strict eye on the selection of the targets and even vetoed several ones. Yet the SACEUR General Clark did not always meet these “requests.”²⁰⁴

This last point brings us to the issue of political control of military operations. As mentioned above, France was very sensitive on this issue due to certain historical and political reasons. While Chirac placed his forces under SACEUR command throughout the operation, he also tried to politically overview military activities. This implied that in the planning phase of the operation Europeans vetoed the most of the target list, which was presented by the SACEUR. This created considerable tension within NATO since the American Generals were not much accustomed to the French way of functioning, deemed as the “committee war.”²⁰⁵ Thus on the operational level, the Operation Allied Force manifested important differences between the Allies.

These differences were also visible in the aftermath of the operation. The United States and France in particular increasingly retrieved divergent lessons from the operation. While they both agreed that United States contributed the lion’s share in the operations (80% of the sorties were undertaken by US itself) and European should take greater burden in the future. Moreover it was accepted and seen that there was a considerable gap between the military capabilities of the Union and also that the persistence of this gap could well lead to a strategic decoupling between the Europeans and US where the former does not have the capabilities to contribute to operations and the latter is not interested in cooperating with the former due to difficulties is interoperability of forces. General Naumann of the Federal Republic recorded that given the current level of capabilities; European allies of NATO could

²⁰⁴ *Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force*, CRS Report for Congress, Paul E. Gallis (coordinator), No. RL 30374, 19 November 1999, p. 10, available at <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/>, accessed on 15 January 2004

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

not undertake the missions.²⁰⁶ The drawbacks of the Europeans was centering on lack of precision-guided weaponry, devices which made night flights and flight in bad weather possible.

The controversial lesson concerned the role of the Alliance in European security. Despite the division on the military doctrine and capabilities gap, United States was insisting that the operation proved the centrality of the North Atlantic Alliance in European security.²⁰⁷ French placement of national forces under SACEUR command was only seen as an evidence of this. The prescription for the ills of capabilities gap was presented as the development of ESDI and CJTF concepts within NATO. With these lessons, which were targeted at the Europeans more than at US itself; Washington showed that it still wanted to keep NATO at the center of European security.

French lessons, on the other hand were remarkably different. The Report of the Ministry of Defense²⁰⁸ argued that Kosovo operation was exactly showing the appropriateness of the choice France had made in 1966, that of leaving the integrated military structure. It was seen that, France, although not integrated was the nation that contributed most to the operation after US. Thus not being integrated posed no challenge to the interoperability of the Allied forces. Paris also said that their latest choices of professionalizing the army, and putting the accent on improving intelligence, capacities and means of projection and command were appropriate.

The report, underwritten by Defense Minister Alain Richard who did not do his military service,²⁰⁹ also said that the evolution of the Alliance was not yet complete and it should continue to lead to an organization and share of responsibilities. This should naturally entail the giving of more power to the Europeans. The improvement of political control of the Alliance was also a precondition for a better-balanced transatlantic partnership.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 19

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 20

²⁰⁸ Ministère de la Défense, *Les Enseignements du Kosovo*, Paris: Ministère de la Défense, 1999, available on <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d36/>, accessed on 17 April 2004

²⁰⁹ Jean-Michel Apathie and Jacques Isnard, “Alain Richard, le pète-sec amadoué”, *Le Monde*, 25 June 1999

To France, Kosovo crisis, rather than showing the necessity of the alliance, showed the need for reinforcement of Europe in the realms of security and defense. It was said that, NATO, whose procedures were conceived for Article 5 type scenarios was not fit and proved to be “insufficient” for crisis management missions of non-Article 5 operations.²¹⁰

Thus the allies reasoned differently and inferred differently. Each actor, especially the US and France, took the lessons that were most appropriate for their strategy in European security. Each tried to employ the facts as a way to legitimize their own way of thinking. While US ruled that it would not undertake operations where interoperability is assured in the both political and military sense, France judged that the Europe was in urgent need of both capabilities and autonomy.

6.4 Washington Summit and Beyond

These hurdles were indeed taking place when the historic NATO Summit was convened in April 1999, in Washington. The declaration, which came out of the summit, was in complete harmony with the lessons of the Operation Allied Force, despite their divergence.²¹¹ The declaration involved more positive expressions for the development of European security and the St. Malo initiative was welcomed. It was asserted that the EU bid to acquire *autonomous* capabilities were welcome as long as NATO was afforded the first right of refusal. EU should be able to take decision and military action “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”

The long standing French, or indeed European, insistence on the assured access of the NATO assets and capabilities were also addressed. It was adopted that *ready* access to these capabilities shall be ensured with the arrangements between NATO and EU, in relation with the development of, the post of DSACEUR. It was significant that despite the drive towards autonomy in European security United States did not deplore the proposals and rather choose to cooperate and try to keep

²¹⁰ Ministère de la Défense, *op. cit.*, “Introduction”

²¹¹ See Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, Washington DC, 24 April 1999, in *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, pp. 20-24

the initiative within the limits of NATO. It was also remarkable that France underwrote the American condition of NATO-first.

In parallel to these, the Defense Capabilities Initiative was also put on the table to boost the capabilities of the Alliance. Both sides of the Atlantic equally saw the gap between the allies as a menace.

With the conclusion of the NATO summit the path in front of the European security architecture was becoming somewhat clear. With the go-ahead of the United States, the search for autonomy was now being completely moved to the venue of European Union. As it would be seen in the coming Cologne Council of the EU and its aftermath, the function of WEU and the compromises and arrangements revolving around it were coming to an end. The EU would absorb the functions of WEU. This implied that EU would be the new address of European security initiatives and the real bargain would take place between the member states and United States concerning the modalities of the employment of NATO assets.

Here, what was the French strategy? France was long pursuing autonomy in European security. The logic was that by empowering Europe France would acquire more strength in the international sphere. To the French mind, a more powerful Europe would necessarily empower France since Europe was “incarnating in France” to use de Gaulle’s phrase. In more concrete terms, Paris thought that to the extent EU became a global player in the world affairs France would increase its standing since it was the natural leader of the European continent. Thus the relationship between France and the EU was that of an instrumental relationship, where EU was used as a lever for French policies.²¹² Yet the cautious point is that this argument should not be taken to mean that EU was a simple stepping-stone or a springboard for French aspirations. The 5th Republic and the French polity is firmly embedded in the European Union. The formulation of French policies is taking place in a European context and hence they are not simply expression of national priorities. Rather, when a policy is being put forward the concerns of the European partners are increasingly taken into consideration. Hence the EU policies in the field of European Security and

²¹² Adrian Treacher, “Europe As Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation”, *European Security*, Vol. 10/1, Spring 2001, p. 24

Defense Policy cannot simply be seen as an expression of the strictly national aspirations, they are molded into European patterns.²¹³

At a more particular level French policy was based on 3 pillars. These principles of France's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) were spelled out by both the President Chirac and his Defense Minister Alain Richard in various platforms.

As it was formulated by Chirac and approved by the Defense Minister, the main ambition of the process was to make Europe a "major global player."²¹⁴ In the same address to the Assembly Chirac expressed that Atlantic Alliance was still critical for EU's collective defense. He emphasized the logic of St. Malo declaration, which was to him, putting the accent on the acquisition of operational capabilities and establishing instruments for planning, decision-making and command. These conditions should be assured as to make certain that EU would be able to take on missions in times of crisis.

He also underlined that EU involves several member states that do not have a tradition of military intervention, like Austria or Ireland. These "post-neutral states" as they are sometimes called should not hinder the development of the ESDP. For ensuring this, several mechanisms should be established where the "bolder members" [*sic*] could advance.

At an earlier date, the Defense Minister expressed that institutional arrangements which let for the cooperation between NATO and EU was of utmost importance.²¹⁵ With the St. Malo initiative and the Washington summit of NATO, it was explicit that the divorce between the security and defense policies and European integration has come to an end.

²¹³ For a better articulation of this Europeanization argument see "Introduction" in Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso, and Thomas Risse, (eds.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, 2001, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 3

²¹⁴ Speech on European Security and Defense by Jacques Chirac, to the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly at the Elysée Palace, Paris, on 30 May 2000, 46th Session of the interim European Security and Defense Assembly, Assembly of the WEU, Document 1699, available at http://www.assembly-weu.org/fr/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2000/1699.pdf, accessed on 17 March 2004

²¹⁵ Address by Alain Richard, Minister of Defense, on The Occasion of The Closing Ceremony for The 51st IHEDN Course, Ecole Militaire, 8 June 1999, at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/-off_declaration/ministre/discours/990608.htm, accessed on 17 March 2004

He also added that France would place heavy emphasis on the acquisition of capabilities required for the Alliance interoperability and EU autonomy in ESDP. This entailed that, given the low level of defense expenditure across Europe; EU will have to take initiative in this issue area. In line with this, France was sponsoring a policy of European defense policy that involved the harmonization of defense policies of the member states as well as introduction of defense convergence criteria to coordinate financial commitments. This was a formidable challenge since it was very difficult to convince different nation-states to commit their defense expenditures according to the needs of the ESDP rather than the national priorities.

Richard also pointed attention to the XFOR operation of NATO. This extraction force has witnessed the first time where France became the “framework nation” in a NATO operation, that is to say it led the NATO forces, besides planning the operation and organizing its HQs. Minister exploited this opportunity to show that France was attributing great significance to cooperation with NATO and that France had no ulterior motives to undermine NATO. By adopting this “exemplary policy” France hoped to convince the American administration that assured access to NATO capabilities and assets would benefit the alliance as a whole and also the development of the ESDP in the long term towards autonomy would bolster the transatlantic relationship.²¹⁶

On the basis of these observations we can infer several dimensions in the post-St. Malo French security policy in Europe. It can be asserted that the French policy had 4 basic elements. First it made a heavy emphasis on finalizing the modalities for borrowing the NATO assets and capabilities and guaranteeing assured European access to these instruments. Here it not only had to deal with convincing the US of the good will of the Europeans but also had to take into account the “discrimination” redline of the US policy. In an interview at the NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting, on the issue of NATO’s first right of refusal, Richard emphasized that there was “no formalistic precedence protocol as to taking charge of a crisis” between NATO and

²¹⁶ Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith “Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est la Même Chose: CESDP since 1998: The View from London, Paris and Warsaw”, *Journal of European Area Studies*, Vol. 10/2, 2002, p.221

EU. Yet he seemed to downplay his own words by adding, “in action, the decision to engage will be taken in common accord with the Alliance.”²¹⁷

Secondly, Paris emphasized the building up of European capabilities for undertaking missions that are both NATO-led and EU-led. In this France came to emphasize that Europe should get ready for not only low end of peacekeeping but also for more ambitious forces and tasks.²¹⁸ In this France also emphasized those capabilities that the United States promised to lend to the Europeans under the CJTF concept. Paris was concerned that US might not always be willing to lend the assets. It can be also inferred that CJTF was viewed in Paris as a short to mid-term solution to the European obstacles. Another component of the French policy in the improvement of forces was the European defense policy, and in particular the procurements, which is mentioned above.

Still another dimension of the French input to the ESDP project was the generation of relevant institutions within the European Union. EU, likewise NATO, should have the instruments for planning, decision-making and command in operations. The details of this policy would be clarified in the coming months, especially when France took over the EU Presidency.

Last but not least, France was trying to be sensitive to the voices that came across the Atlantic and across the Channel. American fears of loosing the leadership in European security were placated by regular avowals on the importance and centrality of the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, France had to take into consideration the British demands in the development of ESDP. This was vital since the American confidence on the appropriateness of ESDP project was in part stemming from the London’s inclusion in it. Moreover, UK had a significant role in the European security, which it declined to play since the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947. Paris and London were the only countries that managed to keep their defense budgets at a certain level. Thus Britain should not be estranged.

²¹⁷ Contribution by Alain Richard, Minister of Defense, at the meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers, Brussels, December 2, 1999, available on http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/-off_declaration/ministre/interviews/991202.htm, accessed on 17 March 2004

²¹⁸ François Bujon de l'Estang, Ambassador of France to United States, *Opening Remarks at the CSIS*, Washington, October 10, 2000, available at <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2000/be101000.asp>, accessed on 17 March 2004

6.5 Cologne Summit and ESDP

As mentioned above with the St. Malo initiative and the Washington's positive signals towards the development of the ESDP, the momentum was set for strengthening the European security within the framework of the EU. In this process the Cologne European Council on June 3-4, 1999 was an important instant. In the Summit Declaration²¹⁹ the wording of the St. Malo declaration, which supported the acquisition of autonomous capabilities, was adopted as it is.

More significant clauses of the declaration related to the EU-NATO relationship. Arguably, the text of the declaration represented a transgression from the compromise arrived at the Washington Summit, taking place several days before.²²⁰ In the NATO declaration it was said that the EU would take up its security role in instances where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. In the Cologne Declaration however, this compromise phrase was not adopted and rather it was assured that EU would take over missions "without prejudice to actions by NATO." It was argued that EU had broken trust on this issue.²²¹ The American response to this "disloyalty" came from the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott in a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs on 7 October 1999.²²² He pointed out that while United States supported the development of European security, it should not grow out of NATO to compete with it. More significantly he referred to the Cologne Declaration as a document "which could be read to imply that Europe's default position would be to act outside the Alliance whenever possible, rather than through the Alliance."²²³

²¹⁹ See Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense, in *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, pp. 41-42

²²⁰ Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion - or Competitor?* RAND Publications, 2002, pp.57-58 available at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1463/>, accessed on 21 April 2003

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² For the text of the speech see *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, pp. 53-60

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 56

So it was evident that US was demanding from the European to keep within the limits that are drawn at the Alliance's Washington Summit. NATO should retain its central position despite the development of ESDI/ESDP. A definition of *autonomy* was at stake here. While there was a transatlantic consensus on the autonomous feature of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense (CEPSD), the parties diverged on what autonomy was. While the France desired autonomy, which would mean that EU's actions would be politically independent in its decision-making from NATO. US, however, ruled that autonomy will be granted to the Europeans in times of crisis only after Washington declared its reluctance to involve in operations.

Helsinki European Council (10-11 December, 1999) would be an important step in the resolution of this matter for a while. Before this an intervention came from the French president Jacques Chirac that spelled out his policy in the developments of CEPSD. The suggestions were proposed as a *Plan d'Action* that involved the institutional, political and military-capability dimensions as mentioned above.²²⁴

Significantly enough, France was proposing the installation of UPPAR (Plan, Prevision, and Rapid Action Unit) led by the High Representative Solana, and some other institutional novelties. France was also calling the member states to clarify the relationship between NATO and EU. The plan did not include outright proposals for the definition of this relationship but left the issue to the coming European Council.

The plan also spelled out the French designs for a fully-fledged European chain of command, which France could not get from US in the AFSOUTH debate, and full multinationalization of Franco-British Permanent Joint Head Quarters (PJHQ). This French idea would be put forward in regular intervals in the European forum.²²⁵

In Helsinki what the American administration had demanded was given. In the declaration it was said "EU will launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis [in instances] where the Alliance as a whole is not

²²⁴ For the text of "Plan d'Action" see *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, pp. 48-53

²²⁵ François Heisbourg et. al. *op. cit.*, p. 49

engaged.”²²⁶ Arguably this concession on the side of France came as result of the indirect intervention of the Clinton administration. During the Council the Americans called Prime Minister Blair to persuade Chirac to insert the phrase “where the alliance as a whole is not engaged.”²²⁷

Besides the haggling, the French blueprint was well in operation in the Helsinki Council. A Franco-British plan was accepted which called for the development of capabilities within the framework of Headline Goals (HG).²²⁸ This included 60,000 troops to be deployed in 60 days and would constitute the basis of European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). On the institutional front the parties agreed to install a standing Political and Security Committee (COPS/PSC) in Brussels, along the French lines proposed in *Plan d’Action*. The novelties also included a military committee of chiefs of defense, represented by military delegates and a military staff to “provide military expertise and support.”

While after long French opposition provisional discussion was started in Feira Council for the clarification of Berlin Plus modalities, the next significant chapter for the European security became the French Presidency of the European Union. France was determined to exploit this opportunity in full capacity and devoted much attention and capacity to the CEPSD.

In line with this French mandate, in the Nice European Council Conclusions in late 2000 Paris asserted its own vision of the Petersberg Tasks and said that EU can “satisfy fully the [military] needs identified to carry out [all] the different types of crisis management missions.”²²⁹ Thus the earlier official French statements that EU tasks involved both high and low end missions became a part of the political *acquis*. Moreover, the earlier interim politico-military bodies were rendered permanent with this European Council. The functions of WEU were also incorporated into the Union and it was proclaimed that WEU have completed its purpose.

²²⁶ See European Council Helsinki, Presidency Conclusions, in *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, p. 82

²²⁷ Alexander Moens, “NATO and ESDP: Need for a Political Agreement”, *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2000-2001, p. 64

²²⁸ Christina V. Balis, “The State of the ESDP after The Laeken Summit”, in *Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum*, p. 32

²²⁹ See European Council Nice, 7-9 December 2000, Presidency Conclusions, in *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, pp. 168-209

In the Nice Council the issue of NATO-EU cooperation was one of the significant items on the summit agenda. France had lifted its veto over the launch of the cooperation consultations between NATO and EU at the Feira Council earlier. In the Annex VII of the Presidency Report of Nice Council, the relationship was further formulated as a being that of regular consultations between NAC and the newly created PSC. In these consultations the twin principles of ensuring “autonomy of EU decision-making” while at the same time achieving “full and effective consultation, cooperation and transparency” would be withheld. These issues tended to create a problem between NATO and EU, especially in the practical assessments over operational planning.

In the Presidency Conclusions it was openly said that the EU attached great importance on the availability of NATO assets, including planning capabilities. The issue of planning has been hotly debated especially in the days leading to the Nice Council. After the Feira meeting of the European Council, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen said at an informal NATO Defense Ministers meeting that “EU should be able to count on NATO’s operational and defense planning capabilities during an emerging crisis, an EU-led crisis management [whether or not] using NATO capabilities and common assets.”²³⁰ The scheme that the Secretary presented to the European allies was too exhaustive for them, especially France, to follow. The defense-planning dimension was indeed nothing beyond the reiteration of the current fact. However the “wish” that EU would resort to NATO planning even in EU-only operations spurred immediate reaction from Cohen’s French counterpart, Alain Richard. At the same meeting he remarked that “planning should take place under complete autonomy of the 15” (sur un outil réelement á la disposition des Quinze)²³¹ in undertaking the Petersberg tasks.

As late as November 2000, President Chirac and PM Blair entered a public argument. While the former reiterated that EU would coordinate its defense with

²³⁰ William Cohen (U.S. Defense Secretary), *Remarks at NATO Informal Defense Ministerial*, October 10, 2000, Birmingham, UK, available at http://www.usembassy.it/file2000_10/alia/a0101707.htm, accessed on 17 March 2003

²³¹ See (text in French), Alain Richard, *Intervention Lors de la Reunion Informelle des Ministres de la Défense de l’OTAN*, October 10, 2000, Birmingham, UK, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001010c.htm>, accessed on 12 April 2003

NATO, he ruled that the preparation phase of the operations should be independent. Blair opposed to this argument by saying that independent military capability would be in conflict with NATO and hence wrong.²³² What was at stake here was again the French insistence on the ability of EU to undertake full range of missions in an autonomous manner.

The common European position was seen at the Nice Presidency Conclusions Annex VI to Annex VI. Under section III.B it was said that, in the operational phase, for operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, operational planning would be carried by the Alliance planning bodies, whereas in EU-only operations it would be carried on in European strategic HQs.²³³ Soon this position was endorsed at the Brussels Defense ministerial of NATO on 15 December.²³⁴

After the Nice Council, by and large, the member states devoted their energies to the refinement of institutional structures and increasing the capabilities for ESDP. In this process at the Laeken Summit in December 2001, the EU's ESDP was declared to be operational at least for some missions. Here, the two leading actors of ESDP, France and Britain were again at loggerheads. UK was opposed to the declaration of operability, which it deemed premature since the negotiations over the NATO-EU modalities had not been reached at yet.

6.6 September 11 and the Operation "Iraqi Freedom"

It has already been a caveat that the world has substantially changed after the 9-11 attacks and the ensuing transatlantic crisis throughout the year 2003. The prospect of these changes remain to be seen and this section will only be a modest attempt to evaluate the point international politics and European security in relation to that has come up to now.

The 9-11 attacks has been an important turning point in the history of post-Cold War world. It has significantly shown that United States, the leading military power

²³² Quoted in British House of Commons Library, *European Security and Defense Policy: Nice and Beyond*, Research Paper 01/50, 2 May 2001, London: House of Commons Library, p. 37

²³³ See *From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, p. 202

²³⁴ Gilles Andréani, et. al., *Europe's Military Revolution*, London: Center for European Reform, March 2001, p. 29

of the world was not invulnerable. The attacks on the WTC towers and the Pentagon were a serious blow to the American psychology, since it was a nation, which did not experience such a belligerence on its territory for many years. The event has quickly become an occasion for the European leaders to demonstrate their solidarity with the United States. While French daily *Le Monde*, which is not known for its Atlanticists credentials, declared, “we are all Americans” in the aftermath of the attack, President Chirac was the first European leader to visit United States. The day after 11 September, upon British suggestion, NATO revoked the 5th Article of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulated that an attack on one is an attack on all, for the first time in the 52-year history of the alliance. In this move, the Europeans wanted to demonstrate their solidarity with the US and that the collective defense in NATO was a two-way street.

Right after the attack, the differences between the European and American attitudes began to emerge. Indeed since the coming to power of the Bush team, there were already differences appearing in the Atlantic relationship. Problems relating to the Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of gas having greenhouse effect, debates on the Missile Defense initiative, etc were already divisive. The unilateralist tendency of new administration was confirmed with the refusal to employ NATO as the framework for the operation envisioned for Taliban forces in Afghanistan. US chose to go it alone in the Central Asia, taking the British together, and it only took advantage of some allied intelligence and AWACS planes to monitor American airspace via NATO. This posture of the Washington was not only a function of the new administration but also a lesson US and its armed forces had derived for the Operation Allied Force, some years ago.

These differences were given even more accent when it appeared that the Europeans, especially France had a different outlook on the “war against terror.”²³⁵ The differences began with the label. While the French in particular and Europeans, e.g. Javier Solana, in general chose to employ fight against terrorism, the US preferred a “war.” This difference in terminology reflected the means the two entities preferred to sue in their struggle with the threats they have designated. While US was

²³⁵ Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after 11 September”, *Survival*, Vol. 43/4, Winter 2001-2, p. 90

keen on employing military instruments for the Taliban and terror in general, Europeans wanted their partner to recognize the root causes of the situation and advices using a wide array of instruments including both civilian and military means. As the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine put it, “to fight against terrorism you must fight against its sources.”

Moreover, while the European leaders were not opposed to a military action, they wanted that it be limited to Afghanistan and the precise terrorist targets. The Minister of Defense Alain Richard emphasized that the attacks should be proportional to the damage taken.²³⁶

Still another point was that, United States should avoid giving trump cards to the terrorists in a way that would reinforce their legitimacy in recruiting new militants to their causes. What the Europeans implied with that was proclamation of a Crusade against Islam as a whole. Vedrine pointed out that this was just the trap the Al-Qaide wanted the west to get in.²³⁷

Another point was the requirement of legitimacy for the attack on Afghanistan. It was the European point of view that a coalition as extensive as possible should be secured before going into the military response. The best venue for that was naturally the UN Security Council, where France went, on September 12, to propose a resolution condemning the attacks on US and naming them as threats against international peace and security. For Vedrine and other Europeans UN Security Council should be the place to launch a counter-terrorist response.

The European public and elite opinion was also inclined to see the terror problems in a broader context. It was argued that if the problem is to be solved regional problems such as the situation in Palestine, and Iraq should also be addressed. This was all the more necessary since an insurgence in the Arab public opinion would have important negative consequences for the West as a whole.²³⁸

Whatever the differences within the transatlantic alliance, United States waged its war and came up with a victory from the campaign. Washington was also successful in persuading its allies to set up an International Security Assistance Force

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ *Ibid* p. 95

²³⁸ Gnesotto, “Reacting to America”, *Survival*, Vol. 44/4, Winter 2002-3, p. 102

(ISAF) responsible for Kabul's security with a rotating command. It was significant that Washington itself did not commit its forces to this Force and remained out. The explanation for that was US Army was not appropriate for peacekeeping activities, which were seen as a drain on resources and negatively affecting "military readiness." It was again Europe washing the dishes.

The "war on terror" had profound implications for the European security initiative and for the French policy vis-à-vis the transatlantic relationship.²³⁹ As was spelled out by the French leaders on various grounds, the European security initiative was, among others, a means to rebalance the Europe's relations with the United States. The logic was that Europe would invest more in its own security and hence, to a certain extent, be freed from the US tutelage in European security affairs. ESDP was also an important instance in that. While it was devised to provide security for the Old Continent it also functioned to share the burden. Via contributing more to global security, Paris thought, EU would become a partner of the United States. This was a way to influence the hegemon.

The challenge that came with the September 11 was that United States became even more unilateralist in its actions and did not want to use the NATO framework for its military interventions. United Nations was also kept aloof from US foreign policy considerations. Thus it became increasingly harder for France to attain a balance between the US and Europe in the way it tried to do in the post-1998 era.

In this new context, France adopted an approach to international politics that tried to reinstall multilateralism into its proper place. So it increasingly tried to pull Washington into the framework of NATO and United Nations. That was why the French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie greeted the Rumsfeld initiative of NATO Response Force. This new force would be deployable in a short notice and would be geared towards "war on terrorism." From the French point of view this was a highly useful instrument tool to influence US policy in the fight against terrorism as long as it did not interfere with ESDP. Moreover it could be useful in averting the policy of using preventive force against so-called axis of evil. This attitude of France

²³⁹ Howorth, "France, NATO and European Security", p. 14-17

also reaffirmed the French commitment to ESDP and better relations with the United Kingdom in security cooperation.

Nevertheless US unilateralism was going unabated. The *National Security Strategy*, which was published in September 2002, confirmed this tendency of the neo-conservative administration. It was said in the document that “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting *preemptively* against terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.”²⁴⁰

Then came the Iraq crisis. Washington was firmly advocating a military intervention to the rogue state of Iraq, whose leader, Saddam Hussein was believed to sponsor terrorist from the Al-Qaide network. Moreover, it was argued that the country had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which Saddam was eager to employ against its Western targets. Thus US, acting alone or with allies, should “pre-empt”²⁴¹ before Baghdad decide to use them against. While the allies seemed far from being convinced on the utility of using force in Iraq both houses of Congress passed a resolution in October 2002, authorizing the President to use force against Iraq.

The alliance was badly divided on the issue, as well as the European Union. While half of the American public believed that Saddam Hussein was directly related to the September 11 events, the European public was against the war, which it deemed unjust, and only geared towards satisfying American interests in the Middle East.

France was leading the opposition to the war. The French position was that the inspectors who were given a mandate with the resolution 1441, should be given time to do their job in Iraq. In September 2002, *New York Times* made an interview with French President Chirac.²⁴² In the interview Chirac expressed his reservation against

²⁴⁰ White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington DC, September 2002, p. 6

²⁴¹ There is an ambiguity over the distinction between the concepts of pre-emption and prevention. While President Chirac prefers preventive doctrine to denote new American interventionism, Bush prefers pre-emption. On the distinction see Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, Not Pre-emption”, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26/2, Spring 2003, pp. 105-114

²⁴² See “Interview with Jacques Chirac”, *New York Times*, Web edition, 8 September 2002

the American policy. He said that the “evidences” US meant to present were far from convincing him that Iraq had any WMD. He also said that he was totally against unilateralism in the modern world. The French position towards the issue was not anti-war. Indeed Paris was willing to contribute to a military campaign. French position was that when the inspectors did their job and found (if ever) WMD in Iraq UN Security Council should pass a second resolution to indicate that unless Iraq gets rid of its WMD there will be military intervention.²⁴³ The world should act when Hussein poses a danger to the outer world, but first they had to be sure that her is a danger.

The EU was heading for a divide between what Rumsfeld called Old and New Europe. On 31 January 2003, President of Czech Republic, Prime Ministers of UK, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Poland and Denmark published the so-called “Letter of Eight” saying that Iraq and its WMD represented a genuine threat to world security. The Prime Ministers of 10 Vilnius Group countries also made parallel public statements on 5 February. Member states also declared that the evidences presented to the international community were enough to judge that Iraq had a WMD program and it had links to international terrorism.

The differences turned into a genuine crisis when it was carried onto the NATO framework. On 10 February 2003, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the Allies to consult one another whenever, in the opinion of one of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any one of them comes under threat. France, Germany and Belgium responded that they saw no need to have any consultations under the Article 4 of the Treaty. They were concerned that accepting the deployment of AWACS planes and Patriot missiles to Turkey within the NATO framework would mean that they were entering the “logic of war” and hence accepting the unavailability of US attack on Iraq. A compromise was reached on 19 February, when the issue was taken into the agenda of Defense Planning Committee, a venue where France is not represented since 1966. This was a serious blow to NATO in a time when its logic and function was being hotly debated.

²⁴³ John Vincour, “An Iraqi War: France May Yet Join”, *International Herald Tribune*, Web edition, 25 January 2003, available at <http://www.ihf.com/articles/84576.html>, accessed on 25 January 2003

It was thought by many that the only military function of NATO was its residual Article 5 missions, which ensured collective defense against adversaries. Hence, when the solidarity clause did not function, it created a grave crisis of confidence within the alliance.

Another instance in the “rush to bottom” of the US-European relations was the declaration by France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium in Brussels mini-summit on defense. This declaration, which took place on 29 April, came after the launch of attack on Iraq by US and Britain on 20 March. The occasion, which was dubbed “gang of four” or “chocolate makers’ summit” by Anglo-Saxon officials, came up with several projects to strengthen the European Security and Defense Policy. Among the items, most “breathtaking” was that of establishing a “nucleus of a collective capacity which, instead of national capabilities, they would make available to the EU for operational planning and command of EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.”²⁴⁴ Although it was not openly deemed to be a EU Military HQ, everyone knew that it was. The proposal, which came against the opinions of French and German Foreign and Defense Ministers, was immediately opposed by the UK on the grounds that it would weaken NATO.

Yet starting from late 2003, the France and Germany started to change their positions cognizant of the fact that it was quite difficult for them to forge an ESDP without British support. United States also started to change its stance towards the initiative.²⁴⁵ More concretely, in an interview with *Der Spiegel* French Defense Minister Alliot-Marie indicated that after her visit at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld was more positive towards the EU HQ initiative.²⁴⁶ Indeed by that time the initiative was watered down in a way to meet British and US concerns. It was finally accepted that, in the case of EU operations using NATO assets, EU would deploy a small group of operational planners to SHAPE, NATO’s planning headquarters near Mons. There

²⁴⁴ Meeting of The Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European Defense, Joint Declaration, Brussels, 29 April 2003, available at <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030429.gb.html>, accessed on 19 May 2004

²⁴⁵ See *Le Monde*, 3 December 2003

²⁴⁶ Text of interview available at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/off_declaration/ministre/interviews/2004/040204.htm, accessed on 1 April 2004

would also be a new unit of operational planners in the Union's military staff, to help with the planning of EU military missions. When the Union conducts an autonomous mission, a national headquarters will normally be in charge. In the case of unanimous consent for the operation, the EU may ask its operational planners to play a role in conducting an autonomous mission. Yet their capabilities are by no means sufficient and need to be supported by additional resources.²⁴⁷

The September 11 and Iraq Crisis prompted the differences between the American and European approaches to international politics. Arguably the differences were depending on the capabilities of the two parties.²⁴⁸ Since US is the leading military power in the world, it has a tendency to solve international problems via force. Europeans on the other hand, do not have such a capability since for years they have been depending on the United States for their security. Hence they favor a civilian approach to the same questions. Indeed it is the United States itself that support a policy of division of labor between United States and the Europeans where the former undertakes hard security tasks and the latter is responsible for post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping. Given the slow development of ESDP this mode of the share of responsibilities does not show much sign of a change.

Despite the crisis over NATO in early 2003, the organization seems to be back on track in its post-Cold War era odyssey. The coming of 7 new members into NATO is a sign that the organization still counts for the member countries as a provider of security. Moreover the latest NATO Response Force initiative is endorsed by the Alliance. If it does not fell victim to US unilateralism and French opposition it would well be a ground for renewed transatlantic partnership.

Since the EU's launch of Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia on 31 March 2003. The ESDP seems to be in a new gear. Yet the larger part, which the ESDP lays in, CFSP, seems to be in shambles since the letter of eight and declaration of the Vilnius group. The division within the Europe is largely a function of the Iraq crisis. Another lessons of the crisis is that United States, despite being the most powerful

²⁴⁷ Charles Grant, "Big Three Join Forces on Defense" *E!Sharp*, March 2004, p. 42, available at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/grant_esharp_march04.pdf, accessed on 21 May 2004

²⁴⁸ Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003

country in military terms, has seen the limits of its strength.²⁴⁹ With the latest UN Resolution on Iraq it is quite clear that the Bush administration will leave aside the policy of *imperium* and shift towards a hegemonic policy. That is to say, US would have more tendencies to adopt a multilateralist approach for instrumental reasons and will regard the opinions of international community as well as the legitimacy of its foreign policy.

France, for its part, seems to be saved from the punishment of US, which was promised to this country by Colin Powell. Paris successfully used the American situation in Iraq to pull the US back into multilateralism. On the other hand, despite differences, as seen on the EU HQs dispute and its resolution, France and Britain are back on track in their security cooperation in Europe.

Yet despite these latest positive developments it is hard to say that the future will be more like the past. It may be said that US will think twice when deciding to act unilaterally and Europeans will try to sustain their communication across the Atlantic to keep EU intact.

²⁴⁹ See Gnesotto's piece in "One Year On: Lessons from Iraq", G. Lindstrom and B Schmidt (eds.), *Chaillot Papers*, No. 68, Paris: EU-ISS, March 2004, p. 58

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In this study it is argued that autonomy in European security has been a constant goal of the French foreign policy since the inception of 5th republic. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War a new world order was established, United States and Soviet Union being the two cornerstones of the new organization of international politics. France, with its imperial culture and the self-given role of incarnating universal values of human dignity was faced with the legacy of its defeat besides its shame of the Vichy Regime. The country was in urgent need of the restoration of its national pride and its political structure. General de Gaulle was the person who represented the resistance of France to fascism throughout the war. When he almost naturally came to power he set the priorities for France as reconstruction and return to its “proper place” in the international system. Only after a brief interval could he undertake this task.

In that his policy was embedding France into Europe and incarnating France through Europe. He was well aware that France could not by itself stand as an alternative power to the strength of Soviet Union or United States. Hence he formulated a European policy, which would naturally be led by France. As this policy reached its goals French aspirations would be realized within a European framework. Yet the Cold War environment proved hardly amicable to such a policy. The direct relations between the US and Soviets prevented Europe/France to assert itself as a third force between these powers. Moreover French attempts to bring about such a force were resented by United States since it was seen as a factor that spoiled the transatlantic solidarity. Moreover the French designs were hardly finding support from the fellow Europeans who were concerned with retaining the American security guarantee in Europe.

As the relations between US and Soviets progressed it became apparent that Washington did not always share European concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and

nuclear armament. The unilateral approach of the Reagan administration through out 1980s and the notorious Reykjavik summit reminded the Europeans that they may have interests far different from that of the United States. Coupled with the domestic shift towards the European polity, Mitterrand era has witnessed important initiatives geared towards reminding the Europeans their identity. This move towards Europeanization has stalled in France when the long awaited collapse of the Cold War became a reality. At that moment of truth it was seen that France has become a country in favor of the status quo, far from challenging it. The immediate concern for Paris was retaining the influence it has enjoyed over Germany throughout the Cold War.

After the normalization of French policy vis-à-vis Germany, Paris turned towards a renewed attempt to forge autonomy in European security. With the end of Cold War it was thought the hour of Europe has finally arrived and the prospect was open for reasserting France into its proper place in the world politics. Again the European Community was the preferred context to bring about the strength of Old Continent together within an institutional mechanism. France thought that time has arrived for Europeans to take over their own responsibility of security, where Europe has long been a *demandeur* in the transatlantic relations. In this Paris hoped to put an end to the protracted tutelage of the United States on Europe.

This entailed that NATO would not have its functions enlarged in European security and Europeans would take up the rudder. Several proposals were made in this effect and Paris pressed for a division of responsibilities between Western European Union and NATO. Yet US was eager to hold its sway on the European affairs and the best way to do that was keeping NATO alive and working. Despite American and European opposition to various European security schemes Paris managed to enlist support to its policy of turning EC into a political organization. Yet the Maastricht spirit quickly waned away in the face of unrest in former Yugoslavia and ensuing European immobility.

The era after the Maastricht treaty witnessed a France-US-NATO rapprochement. It was evident in the previous context that Europe was somewhat impotent to act even in its periphery and moreover divided on the Yugoslav crisis. The difficulties of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty coupled with the fact that in

the post-Cold War era Europeans were reluctant than ever to invest in security and defense. Thus development of a European strategic and military capability seemed far from the reality. In such a situation NATO and US seemed as indispensable partners for France in maintaining stability and security in Europe. Moreover, France was alarmed at the reluctance of US to intervene in the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia. This led the Europeans and France in particular initially to think that New Continent did not want to get itself committed to the intricacies of the European politics and rather focus on the Pacific. Thus a policy of rapprochement was required to pull back the US into Europe.

France also saw that NATO might well be used to advance French policies and interests. NATO capabilities such as command, control, communication and intelligence (C³I) and lift capabilities were highly appreciated by France. This tilted the French perception of NATO towards a perspective where the alliance was not seen as a factor that limited independence but rather a factor that enhanced the status of France. It was also evident that France was the country, which made the most contribution to the NATO-led operations in Bosnia along with UK and US. Thus it would be an anomaly for France not to have its say in the decision-making mechanisms of the alliance. Certain policy makers in Paris began to seriously consider the reentry of France into the integrated military command.

Rapprochement with the NATO would also restore the place of France within the European security framework. With its contribution to NATO France has been one of the most important powers that determined the fate of the Balkans, in a way Germany could not do at all. Within the alliance's institutional structure France could show that it was an important actor in the European security. Yet France did not abandon its all-European project when it was approaching NATO. This project was going on its own way, albeit incrementally but in parallel with the NATO process. For example while in early 1990s France was accepting the notion of ESDI within NATO it was more or less simultaneously signing the Petersberg declaration in 1992. Moreover it was pursuing its own agenda of expansion in the East and Central Europe by accepting Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the WEU in 1999.

The first post-Cold War era president of the US, Bill Clinton, as we said above, was somewhat oriented towards inner problems of the country and did not want to

commit US resources to the old Continent. In 1993 he embraced the idea of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. In the ensuing Brussels NATO summit in 1994, Europe was “permitted” to develop its own “separable but not separate” military capabilities through the WEU. One further item endorsed in the summit was the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, which would be available to both WEU and NATO leadership in peacekeeping humanitarian and combat tasks. In this way while NATO was making itself fit for threats of a “new” kind, like that of ex-Yugoslavia, it was also giving the Europeans the capabilities to intervene in these kinds of events when US chose not to be involved. The Berlin NATO summit in 1996 only reinforced what was pledged in the Brussels summit two years earlier.

The Brussels-Berlin compromises did provide only a temporary solution to the problems of European security cooperation and did not provide for the development of an independent European voice. This is due to the fact that the operational capability of CJTF heavily rests on the willingness of US to provide NATO assets especially the control, command, communication and intelligence facilities (C³I).

These problems soon pulled the allies into a debate over the new transatlantic security framework. A major problem occurred when France demanded the “subordinate command” of AFSOUTH, connected to the infamous 6th fleet, be given to French, Italian and Spanish commanders in turn. US certainly rebuffed this request on the grounds that it was not possible to explain this to the Congress and also it retained an important role in the Mediterranean security to which the AFSOUTH was embedded.

Still other issues were the position of the North Atlantic Council in authorizing the use of assets by the WEU. France was concerned that US could impose a veto to the use of NATO assets at any time. France did not want to be *at the mercy of a foreign power* to undertake Petersberg tasks; it wanted to be independent. Hence departing from the debates after the 1994-1996 compromises it was seen that genuine European security cooperation was not much viable under the NATO framework. In these circumstances rapprochement with the NATO lost its meaning and motive since US was by no means ready to give the concessions that would make the reintegration of France possible. ESDI, in its current formulation would only enhance

the US control over the European security and NATO would still be the “preeminent” security organization of Europe. The outcome was the Paris re-announcement that it will not reintegrate into the NATO’s IMS.

Up to this point we have seen that France shifted between its policies mainly as a response to external factors. After 1993 it was evident that the Franco-German axis was not ready yet to shoulder a genuine European strategic and military capability let alone the European Community. These kinds of projects were defeated even before they were initiated. The second option of France, which we can call as the “change through rapprochement” to evoke the distant memory of *Ostpolitik*, shared the same fate with the initial Mitterrand policy. After July 1997, when Chirac announced the end of rapprochement, French post-Cold War era strategy entered into a new phase.

As the tension rose in Kosovo, a new impetus was injected afresh by UK into the European security cooperation: this was the St. Malô UK-France joint declaration of December 1998. This summit and the declaration that came after it witnessed the reversal of British approach under the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Indeed its importance lied in the fact that Britain was decided to contribute to the European security cooperation by breaking its 50 year veto. It was seen that, UK, departing from the experiences of Balkan conflicts, perceived that US was ever reluctant to contribute to European security, hence a European framework was required to maintain the security of Europe. This was an important development for France since it historically lacked a partner to share its strategic vision for the European continent. The declaration ruled that the EU should have the “capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces in order to respond international crisis.” Although NATO was affirmed as the collective defense organization, EU was freed from the NATO context per se and given its autonomy.

The immediate answer to this declaration came from the Secretary of State Albright in a remark epitomized in three D’s. US was urging its allies not to do three things: duplication of the military assets of the NATO, decoupling of the US from the European security system and discrimination of non-EU NATO members.

The incremental process started in the St. Malô led to the establishment of the headline goals in December 1999 European Council in Helsinki. These goals were established to make possible the implementation of Petersberg tasks by a rapid

reaction force, which would rely on the NATO assets. It was apparent from here that although the NATO-France rapprochement has ended in late 1997 its achievements were not altogether forgotten and they were still valid.

Yet despite these positive achievements between NATO and EU, there were intra-EU problems like defining the content of the Petersberg tasks. It was seen that every country in the Community tended to interpret the tasks according to its own security and defense policy and according to its own foreign policy profile. While the Nordic countries tended to see it in very modest terms like humanitarian peacekeeping operation, France stretched as far as the high intensity crisis management.

These kinds of problems did not hinder the development of ESDP. In June 1999 Cologne summit it was decided that capabilities would be developed to let the Union realize its external policy ambitions and WEU's role of development of ESDI was given to EU itself. Thus, development of ESDI, initially embraced by the US to contain European security dynamic within the Alliance and share the burden of military commitment, was now passing to the Union.

After 1997 France certainly did not adopt an anti-American discourse but rather chose to behave "pragmatically" to elicit maximum output from its special relationship with the Alliance. One instance of that was the Extraction Force XFOR put into action in 1998 in Macedonia and another was the mid-1999 the France contributed to the Operation Allied Force. In these operations France has made important military contributions and once again tried to show that American participation in such operations confined to Europe was not necessary. In this way France could smartly distance American forces and NATO away from all-European security cooperation. Indeed France was doing this in a way that made US far satisfied.

One also needs to mention the subsequent developments. In the Nice European Council summit it was decided that defense aspects of EU will no longer be covered by WEU but EU will acquire military as well as civilian capabilities of its own with autonomous decision-making procedures. Although it was said that development of military capabilities by no means entailed a "European Army" it was decided that a 60,000-troop force should be composed. Moreover institutions like Military Staff,

Political and Security Committee would be composed. These entailed that while in the military sense EU would acquire its own capabilities like troops or strategic lift, the Member States would also no longer rely on the NATO structures for strategic planning, crisis management, situation assessment. In the Laeken summit of December 2001, it was declared that after months of preparations EU was now ready for crisis-management tasks.

Yet not everything went good in the US-European relations. In the aftermath of September 11 the differences between these two entities became surfaced only to lead to their division over the Iraqi operation. This incident, not only deprived United States of legitimacy in world politics but also divided the Europe into two as Old and New. The year 2004 has been an opportunity to heal the wounds in the transatlantic relations and while US came closer to European position and adopted a unilateralist stance; Europe gave up projects such as independent EU military HQs.

To sum up, since 1981 France tried to reinvigorate the European security autonomy. These attempts have gone through a brief interval where the minds of French policymakers were preoccupied with Germany. When they transcended this situation they pooled efforts with Germany and other members to relaunch the European autonomy initiatives only to be frustrated in 1993. This led France to look for other solutions and sought influence via re-integrating NATO. After 1997 both UK and France saw that EU as a platform was more amenable to bringing about security in Europe. These recognitions culminated in the St. Malo initiative where a new balance was struck between UK and France comprising both an emphasis on autonomy and importance of Atlantic Alliance. Despite several drawbacks the compromise became institutionalized and a prospect appeared where both EU-NATO cooperation and EU autonomy is possible. This context received a serious blow in the post-Iraq situation only to be recovered lately.

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