THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-CONCEPT STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIORAL FLEXIBILITY: A MODEL RELATING COGNITIVE STRUCTURES TO BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ELİF ENGİN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

JULY 2004

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nebi Sümer

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nebi Sümer

Supervisor

Examining Commitee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nebi Sümer _____

Prof. Dr. Ali Dönmez _____

Prof. Dr. Olcay İmamoğlu _____

ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-CONCEPT STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIORAL FLEXIBILITY: A MODEL RELATING COGNITIVE STRUCTURES TO BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS

Engin, Elif

M.S., Department of Psychology

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nebi Sümer

July 2004, 139 pages

Self-concept structure has been extensively studied in the literature especially with regard to its relationship with psychological adjustment. However, the behavioral outcomes of the cognitive structure of the self and the mechanisms through which the relationship between self-concept structure and psychological adjsutment operate are still to be maintained. This study offered that the two dimensions of self-concept structure, differention and integration, would be related to the two dimensions of behavioral flexibility: Behavioral repertoire and deliberate adjustment of behaviors.

Differentiation, tapping behavioral repertoire, was assumed to determine whether a person is flexible or rigid, while integration tapping deliberate adjustment were supposed to determine the quality of flexibility (i.e., whether the repertoire is controlled by the individual or by situational factors). By crossing these two dimensions, a model with four behavioral patterns was proposed: (1) Functional flexibility, characterized by both high integration and high differentiation; (2) situational flexibility, characterized by high differentiation but low integration; (3) stereotypical rigidity, characterized by low differentiation but high integration, and (4) effacing rigidity, which is low on both dimensions. Three studies were conducted on university students (N = 163, N = 123 and N = 242 for the three studies respectively) in order to test this model. Results revealed that the behavioral repertoire dimension of behavioral flexibility was linked to self-concept differentiation, whereas the deliberate adjustment dimension was related to self-concept integration. Functional flexibility and effacing rigidity patterns were clearly specified by measures of psychological adjustment, locus of control, need for cognition, need for approval and Big Five dimensions. Stereotypical rigidity and situational flexibilty patterns, however, seemed to require more elaboration. The model offering that flexibility mediates the link between self-concept structure and self-esteem was not supported.

Keywords: Self-complexity, self-concept clarity, behavioral flexibility, functional flexibility, situational flexibility, stereotypical rigidity, effacing rigidity.

ÖZ

BENLİK YAPISI VE DAVRANIŞSAL ESNEKLİK ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: BİLİŞSEL YAPILARI DAVRANIŞSAL ÖRÜNTÜLERLE İLİŞKİLENDİREN BİR MODEL

Engin, Elif

M.S., Psikoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Nebi Sümer

Temmuz 2004; 139 sayfa

Benlik yapısı özellikle de psikolojik uyumla ilişkisi ile bağlantılı olarak literatürde oldukça ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiştir. Ancak, benlik yapısının davranışsal etkileri ve benlik yapısı ile psikolojik uyum arasındaki ilişkinin işlerliğini sağlayan mekanizmalar konusunda hala kesin bilgiler bulunmamaktadır. Bu çalışma benlik yapısının ayrışma ve bütünleşme boyutları ile davranışsal esnekliğin davranış dağarcığı ve istemli kontrol boyutları arasında bir ilişki önermektedir. Buna göre, davranış dağarcığı ile ilişkili olan ayrışma boyutu kişinin esnek veya katı olmasını belirlerken, istemli kontrolle ilişkili olan bütünleşme boyutu esnekliğin özelliklerini (dağarcığın kullanımının kişinin iç

denetimi tarafından mı çevresel etkenler tarafından mı yönlendirildiğini) belirlemektedir. Bu iki boyutun birbiriyle çapraz çarpımı sonucu dört davranışsa örüntü önerilmiştir: (1) Hem ayrışma hem de bütünleşme boyutlarında yüksek olarak tanımlanan *işlevsel esneklik,* (2) Ayrışma boyutunda yüksek, bütünleşme boyutunda düşük olarak tanımlanan *durumsal esneklik,* (3) Bütünleşme boyutunda yüksek, ayrışma boyutunda düşük olarak tanımlanan *kalıpsal katılık,* ve (4) Her iki boyutta da düşük tanımlanan *çekinik katılık.* Bu model üniversite öğrencileri üzerinde yürütülen üç çalışma ile sınanmıştır (Sırasıyla N = 163, N = 123 and N = 242). Davranışsal dağarcık boyutu ile ayrışma, istemli kontrol boyutu ile bütünleşme boyutları arasındaki ilişki doğrulanmıştır. İşlevsel esneklik ve çekinik katılık örüntüleri psikolojik uyum, denetim odağı, düşünme ihtiyacı, onaylanma ihtiyacı ve Büyük Beşli boyutlarında net bir şekilde ayrışmışlardır. Ancak kalıpsal katılık ve durumsal esneklik örüntülerinde daha ayrıntılı çalışmalara ihtyaç vardır. Esnekliği benlik yapısı ve özsaygı arasında bir mediator olarak öneren model destek bulmamıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Benlik karmaşıklığı, benlik belirginliği, davranışsal esneklik, işlevsel esneklik, durumsal esneklik, kalıpsal katılık, çekinik katılık.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my thanks, appreciation and warm feelings to my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nebi Sümer, not only for his academical support and encouragement during the preparation of my thesis but also for his guidance beginning from my first steps into social psychology and his friendly attitude throughout this time. I will feel indebted to his contributions throughout my future career.

I would like to thank to the Examining Commitee Members, Prof. Dr. Ali Dönmez and Prof. Dr. Olcay İmamoğlu for their valuable feedback and contributions.

I must express my appreciation to Dr. Öznur Oğuz Kuntasal, Serkan Girgin, Emel Arıkan, Alper Ünver and Bilge Küçükdoğan for their help in data collection. I am also grateful to all the research assistants at the Department of Business Administration for always cheering me up at times of stress, to the members of Ankara Bach Choir for "making me forget" when my brain was fed up with thoughts about my thesis, to Ayça Güler and Koray Kalaycıoğlu for their warm support and to Banu Cingöz for never getting tired of sending me the articles I asked for.

Last but never the least, I would like to thank to my parents, my grandmother and all my family for always being so involved with and so interested in my work, and for their unending love and support.

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: _____ Signature: _____

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In this introductory chapter, the purpose and the significance of this study will be presented with a summary of the general model which was proposed and tested in the study.

1.1. The Purpose and the Scope of the Study

The last decade of psychological research has witnessed a significant rise in the work on the self, and related cognitve and affective processes (Tesser, 2000). This rising interest is probably due to the realization that the organization of the cognitions and feelings related to the self mediate the cognition of the social world. Moreover, the cognitions and feelings related to the social world in turn affect self-related cognitions and feelings, building up an interactive system.

The complexity of the social and interpersonal world has been emphasized by many researchers. Fiske and Taylor (1991) noted that the variable nature of the social world, which in part results from the ability of the social elements to respond to and

adapt to our own behavior, is one of the main factors that makes the social environment especially complicated and difficult to operate in.

In spite of the malleability requirements of this complex and dynamic environment, many scholars have emphasized the rigidity of the cognitive structure by noting the mechanisms which help to protect the existing knowledge in the system from the effects of everchanging and even disconfirming feedback from the environment (Greenwald, 1980; Swann & Read, 1981; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988). Such kind of rigidity does not seem compatible with the complex, dynamic social world argued by Fiske and Taylor (1991). Thus, it has been noted that the dynamics underlying the system is more a compromise between the *flexibility* needed to adapt to this environment and the *rigidity* needed to provide economies. From this point of view, cognitive and behavioral flexibility are the keys to be able to successfully operate in such a variable environment (Leary, 1957; Scott, 1968).

Stability and malleability may also be compatible as they apply to different components of the system. For instance, the general tendency in the literature regarding the structure of the self-concept is to view this structure as relatively stable, close to a trait (e.g., Campbell, Assanand & Di Paula, 2000; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). Taking into account the role of this structure in the cognition of the outer reality, the stability of the self-concept structure also helps us to talk about a general style in viewing the social world and general patterns of behavior. As one of these behavioral patterns, behavioral flexibility may plausibly be at least partially determined by the structure of the self-concept.

Behavioral flexibility can be defined as the ability to adjust one's behavior to the changing demands of the situation (Leary, 1957). Paulhus and Martin (1988) have reconceptualized Leary's point and suggested that two components should comprise behavioral flexibility: A wide behavioral repertoire and the ability to adjust to the demands of the situation.

This thesis aims to investigate the relationship between the two components of behavioral flexibility and self-concept structure. The tradition of studying the self-concept structure within two dimensions, namely, self-concept differentiation and self-concept integration, is maintained as a framework in examining this relationship. On the one hand, self-complexity (Linville, 1987), a measure of self-concept differentiation, is proposed to be related to behavioral repertoire dimension of flexibility. On the other hand, self-concept clarity (Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993), which is a measure of self-concept integration, is examined as related to the second dimension of flexibility, tapping the ability to deliberately adjust the capabilities to the demands of the environment.

Although Paulhus and Martin (1988) constructed the fundamentals of the concept of functional flexibility, they have not extensively examined the relationship between the two components of behavioral flexibility and their associations with other psychological constructs. This study proposes that these two components of flexibility may vary relatively independently, may be related to different psychological constructs, and thus, could be crossed to form different behavioral

patterns. These different behavioral patterns comprise qualitatively and quantitatively different patterns of behavioral flexibility, having different implications for self-related cognitions, affects, and behaviors. Figure 2.1 (p. 28) provides a summary of the model that is proposed and tested in this study. The two dimensions and the resulting behavioral patterns represented in four cells will be elaborated and discussed in the following sections.

1.2. Significance of the Study

Extensive research on self-concept structure signifies the strong links between the organization of self-knowledge and its functional correlates such as everyday functioning, self-evaluation or psychopathology. For instance, self-complexity has been studied in relation to depression (Linville, 1987; Woolfolk, Novalany, Gara, Allen & Polino, 1995), reactions to success and failure in everyday life (Campbell, Chew & Scratchley, 1991), thought suppression (Renaud & McConnell, 2002), trauma, and self-esteem (Morgan & Janoff-Bulman, 1994). Similarly, self-concept clarity has also been used to address diverse issues like self-esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990), coping styles (Smith, Wethington & Zhan, 1996), and prototype matching (Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1993). Especially the relationship between the organization of the self-concept and variables relating to well-being, such as self-esteem and depression, has been repeatedly tested in most of these studies. Although majority of past studies investigated the relationship between self-concept structure and well-being, only few of them emphasized the mechanisms through which this relationship is established. Examination of the relationship

between behavioral patterrns and self-concept structure may be seen as a critical step towards identifying the mechanisms underlying the dynamics between self-concept structure and well-being.

In addition to pointing out the complex role of structural variables, the behavioral patterns relating to flexibility are also taken as multidimensional constructs. The model proposed in this study maintains that behavioral flexibility is a multidimensional construct rather than a simple, bipolar construct with flexibility on one end and rigidity on the other.

The traditional models of behavioral flexibility generally assume that flexibility is a functional characteristics and it contributes to psychological adjustment under all environmental conditions, whereas rigidity is always dysfunctional (Leary, 1957; Paulhus & Martin, 1988). However, the dominant paradigm in contemporary psychology favors interactional models, where the outcomes (in this case, psychological well-being) are the products of the interaction between the environment and the individual. In the current study, an interactional model is proposed where some forms of rigidity may be functional under some conditions, whereas some forms of flexibility may be dysfunctional. Thus, the traditional construct of behavioral flexibility is updated to fit the current social cognition paradigm by this study.

CHAPTER 2

SELF-CONCEPT STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIORAL FLEXIBILITY

In this chapter, a review of the relevant literature, regarding self-concept structure and behavioral flexibility, which provide the basis for this study will be summarized. Considering the wideness of the literature on both self-concept structure and behavioral flexibility, only studies directly relevant for the aims of this study will be mentioned.

2.1. Self-Concept Structure

In the first volume of his Principles of Psychology, James (1890) allocated 111 pages to the discussion of the self. What we today consider the self-concept was named as "the empirical self" or "me" in the writings of James, which was further divided into the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self. By this conceptualization, we can say that in addition to being the first scholar to take the subject of the self from the domain of philosophy and bring it to the attention of psychology, James was also the pioneer of today's multidimensional understanding of the self construct in psychology.

The structure of the self has been viewed as an associative network, as multidimensional space, as a hierarchical category structure or as a schema by different researchers (Greenwald and Pratkanis, 1984). Today's dominant understanding of the self is in the form of a schema, however, this conceptualization does not appear to be mutually exclusive with other conceptualizations such as a hierarchical structure or an associative network. On the contrary, current approach to the structure of the self incorporates the schema, hierarchical structure, and associative network approaches. Campbell and her associates have proposed a distinction between the contents and the structural characteristics of the self-concept to provide a better understanding of this complex schema (Campbell, Trapnell, Haine, Katz, Lavallee & Lehman, 1996). The content of the self is comprised of the knowledge components, including the perceived personal attributes, and the evaluative components including specific self-beliefs and the global self-esteem. The structural components, however, refer to the organization of the content components. In addition to providing a clarification for the complicated concept of the self, this distinction also suggests that individual differences may exist not only in the content or the general valence of the attributes related to the self, but also in the structure of this schema.

The cognitive structure of the self-concept has been generally viewed through the two dimensions that take their roots from the literature on general information processing and social cognition: Differentiation and integration (Campbell et al., 2000). Differentiation refers to the dimensionality, or pluralism in self structure, while integration represents the degree of unity in the individual's self-concept.

2.1.1. Self-Complexity

Cognitive complexity has a long history in the literature (e.g., Bieri, 1966; Vannoy, 1965; Zajonc, 1960). Vannoy (1965) has defined complexity in two phases: The number of dimensions employed and the fineness of the discriminations made among these dimensions of meaning in perceiving and evaluating stimuli. However, his studies criticize the tendency to view cognitive complexity as a general construct that can be applied to every domain prevalent in the previous literature. Instead, he presents evidence that cognitive complexity consists of a number of distinct tendencies. Similarly, Zajonc (1960) views cognitive complexity as a domain-specific characteristic. Thus, a special construct, measuring the complexity of the self-concept, was more appropriate than the general complexity measures in studying self-related cognitions.

The need for a complexity construct capturing the self lead some researchers to come up with a formulation of self-complexity. However, these new formulations took their share from the breadth of variety existent in cognitive complexity literature. For instance, Zajonc (1960) proposed that cognitive structures determine the organization of the attributes of a perceived object in a number of dimensions, such as the degree of differentiation, complexity, unity, and organization. In his formulation, the degree of complexity increases as the attributes employed in perceiving an object came from different categories of discrimination. To measure cognitive complexity, Zajonc asked the participants to read a letter and then write a number of traits describing the writer of the letter. The participants formed hierarchical groupings of these traits

after writing the traits, and reported which of these traits were interrelated. Stein (1994) used self-descriptive traits by employing Zajonc's trait sort procedure. Using Zajonc's indexes of degree of differentiation and degree of unity, she took participants who were high in both differentiation and unity as high in self-complexity. Similar to Zajonc's construct of unity, Evans (1994) defined self-complexity as the extent to which the experiences in one domain of self affect the experiences in other domains.

Contrary to Zajonc's evaluatively neutral formulations of cognitive structure, Steiner (1954) viewed complexity as the acknowledgement of differently valenced traits to coexist in the same individual. Showers' (1992) concept of compartmentalization, and Woolfolk et al.'s (1995) distinction between positive and negative self-complexity similarly note the need for valenced formulations of complexity.

Among those numerous models of self-complexity, Linville's (1985, 1987) model has generated the greatest interest in both social and clinical psychology literature. For instance, Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg (2002) list 70 studies that employ this concept in relation to variables associated with well-being. Considering the richness of previous findings related to the concept, Linville's formulation will be employed in this study.

Linville's (1985, 1987) self-complexity is a measure of self-concept differentiation, which refers to the number of distinct self-aspects that an individual employs to define herself/himself. Although the structural characteristics are supposed to be

relatively independent of the content of the self-concept, the major reason for this interest in self-complexity has been its links to self-esteem and psychological adjustment in general.

The self-complexity model is an extension of Linville's (1982) previous work on judgmental extremity in social judgments. According to this model, as the information on a social domain becomes deeper, the schemas concerning that domain become more complex and gain variety. The evaluations made based on a more complex cognitive structure become less extreme. For instance, individuals were shown to have more complex representations and to make less extreme evaluations about their own age group compared to the other age groups.

According to Linville (1987), the extension of this model to an individual level required four basic assumptions: Self-representation, spillover process, self-complexity - affective extremity hypothesis, and the buffering hypothesis.

First of all, the model assumes the self is cognitively represented in terms of multiple structures, called self-aspects. Self-aspects are derived from different social roles, different kinds of relationships, different activities or goals. Self-complexity refers to the number of different self-aspects and to the degree that these self-aspects are retained as distinct cognitive elements.

Secondly, an event affecting one of the self-aspects will create affective reactions in the given domain, but it may not remain limited to that immediate domain. The

assumption of spillover process maintains that the activation spreads to the associated self-aspects. Hence, to the extent that different self-aspects are related, the affective consequences of an event affecting one of the self-aspects will tend to spillover to other self-aspects and produce a larger reaction. When a person with a complex self-representation is faced with a significant event, the affective reactions will remain limited to the immediate self-aspect only, and thus, a smaller part of the total self-concept will be affected. On the other hand, the immediate self-aspect will be comprising a larger part of the self-concept of a person with a simpler self-representation, and moreover, the affective reaction will spill over to related self-aspects. As a result, the affective consequences of life events will be more extreme in individuals with lower levels of self-complexity.

The final hypothesis states that, because of its role in keeping the negative emotions to a limited part of the total self-concept, self-complexity acts as a cognitive buffer against depression and stress-related illnesses. Linville (1985) used a mood diary procedure to test the affective extremity hypothesis, but her subsequent work employing a panel design contains more extensive material. Linville (1987) demonstrated the validity of the last two hypotheses by using a number of self-report measures and concluded that although self-complexity is related to a higher baseline level of stress in the absence of specific stressful events, it is related to higher well-being and lower level of stress-related symptoms when negative and stressful life events are faced.

Linville (1987) used a trait sort task to measure self-complexity. The participants were given a list of traits and were asked to write the applicable traits for each of their self-aspects on separate pages. They were free to include as many self-aspects as they wished and moreover, they were allowed to use traits that were not provided within the list. The number of traits that were common in different self-aspects was used as a measure of overlap. Overall, Scott's (1969) dimensionality statistic, called the H statistic, was used to compute a coefficient of self-complexity which includes both number of self-aspects and overlap components.

Linville's model has been criticized by several researchers on different grounds. First, self-complexity is assumed to be independent of the content of the self-concept. This implies that the valence of the information residing in the knowledge components is not related to self-complexity and its consequent effects on well-being. However, as noted above, Woolfolk and associates (1995) reported that the complexity of positive and negative self-knowledge can be distinguished from each other and may have differential effects on well-being. Showers (1992) also notes the importance of the valenced organization of self-knowledge. Her concept of compartmentalization highlights the point that it is not only the complexity of self-relevant information, but also the separation of this information into heterogenously-valenced categories that provides less extreme affective reactions.

Second, Showers (1992) showed that self-complexity of the participants, measured by H statistics tends to change when a different trait set is provided. This finding poses two questions: The first question concerns the traitness of self-complexity,

which has also been questioned by Salovey (1992). Secondly, if self-complexity is accepted as a trait, the adequacy of current techniques to assess it has also been questionaed. As noted before, Linville's (1987) technique of measuring self-complexity allows for idiosyncratic traits to be used in categorization. Therefore, as long as a balanced sample of traits is used, the technique should allow for enough flexibility to assess the trait. The question of traitness also implies a critical question regarding the stability and the malleability of the self-concept. In their work on this issue, Markus and Kunda (1986) have noted that both of these characteristics reside in the self-descriptions of people, and that many local variations in the self-concept may be masked by the assumption of stability prevalent in the literature. Their findings regarding the malleability of self-descriptions via minor manipulations have cast doubt upon the traitness of all self-concept measures employing self-report procedures. Taking these findings into account, many of the self-concept variables mentioned in this text, such as self-concept clarity and self-esteem, become questionable measures of stable characteristics. However, the tradition of taking measures of self-concept structure as traits still continues in psychology and is observed also for work on self-complexity. Thus, the same approach will be taken in this study, with a caveat in mind.

Third, the relevance of the H statistic for measuring self-complexity has also been questioned (Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib and Revelle, 1999). H statistic has been offered as a good measure of number of self-aspects but the correlation between the overlap among the self-aspects and the H statistic has been inconsistent. As a result, distinguishing these two components of self-complexity may be a more appropriate

approach. A method for measuring both integration and differentiation has also been proposed by other researchers (e.g., Campbell et al., 1991).

Finally, despite Linville's (1987) initial work and a number of studies (eg., Niedenthal, Setterlund & Wherry, 1992; Smith & Cohen, 1993) confirming the stress-buffering effect of self-complexity, the work aiming to investigate the direct relationship between self-complexity and psychological adjustment has yielded mixed results. The findings range from a negative relationship between self-complexity and adjustment (Woolfolk et al., 1995) to a positive one (Campbell et al., 1991), further colored by studies that fail to find a significant relationship (Morgan & Janoff-Bulman, 1994). These mixed findings suggest that the effect of self-complexity on psychological well-being is much more complicated than can be captured by simple main effects. Linville's (1987) studies have already indicated the moderating effect of the level of stress on the relationship between self-complexity and psychological adjustment. It is also plausible that self-complexity may interact with other structural characteristics of the self-concept in predicting the level of psychological adjustment or other behavioral patterns (e.g., flexibility) may play mediating roles in this relationship.

Another question could be raised regarding the "traitness" of the adjectives used in the trait-sort task. In their work on personality capabilities, Paulhus and Martin (1987) distinguished among three different terms related to behavioral styles: Personality ability, personality capability, and personality trait. According to these researchers, while a *personality ability* is the skill of performing certain behaviors

under maximal or optimal conditions, where such behavior is reinforced by the social situation, a *personality capability* refers to "the ease of carrying off a particular response when required by the situation" (p. 355). The anxiety level in performing the behavior, which may act both as an inhibitor for engaging in the behavior and a performance disruptor when the behavior is already started, and the subjective interpretation of social appropriateness play a great role in personality capabilities. Related to these two concepts, but conceptually distinct from both of them, is the classical concept of *personality trait,* which is an index of typical behavior of the individual. Linville's work (1985, 1987) on self-complexity does not make this distinction, and calls the adjectives provided to the participants a "trait list". However, the application of the trait concept to different self-aspects changes the definition of personality traits from "typical behavior" to "typical under certain social conditions". This distinction implies that defining oneself with different traits for different self-aspects may signal having many personality capabilities that allows the individual to exhibit different sets of behaviors when required by the situation.

In this study, having a large number of personality capabilities is presumed to be indicative of the first component of flexibility, that is, having a large behavioral repertoire. Thus, high self-complexity is expected to be positively correlated with the extensiveness of the behavioral repertoire.

2.1.2. Self-Concept Clarity

While self-complexity is a measure of differentiation, Campbell et al. (2000) coined self-concept clarity as a measure of self-concept integration. The notion of self-concept clarity consists of three interrelated components: The extent to which the self-concept is (1) clearly and confidently defined, (2) internally consistent, and (3) temporally stable (Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; Campbell et al., 1996). The first component is extensively overlapping with the concept of self-certainty used by Baumgardner (1990). Using the Latitude of Self-Description Questionnaire, Baumgardner asks respondents to place themselves in relation to the general population on a number of traits taken from the Anderson Adjective List (Anderson, 1968). Specifically, participants were asked to indicate the percentile of the population at which they were certain to be above and the percentile they were certain to be below with regard to the given trait. The wideness of this latitude was then taken as an indicator of self-certainty. The second component; internal consistency, was previously operationalized by Gergen and Morse (1967). Internal consistency taps whether antonyms coexist in the self-definition of an individual. Finally, Rosenberg's (1965) concept of self-concept stability was very similar to the third component that focuses on the stability of self-beliefs.

Self-concept clarity is not a totally new term; it is highly related to a number of traditional constructs. Campbell et al. (1996) traced its similarities even with the concept of identity, which is also defined as a term indicating relative stability and integration in an individual's self-description. However, self-concept clarity is a less

complex term as compared to identity and more comprehensive than the concepts of internal consistency, self-concept stability or self-certainty.

The clarity of self-concept has been proposed as having paramount importance in previous stıdies because of its relationship with self-esteem. The openness of low self-esteem people to social feedback may offer one explanation for this relationship. Since James' (1890) early writings on the self, the idea that people are naturally motivated to search self-enhancement has been asserted by many researchers (see Leary, Tambor, Terdal & Downs, 1995; Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997 for two recent theories of this account). The motivation of self-enhancement states that people are ready to accept the credibility of positive feedback about their attributes to enhance their self-esteem. On the other hand, another line of researchers note the importance of self-verification (Swann, Griffin, Predmore & Gaines, 1987; Swan, 1987). According to this view, people try to verify the views that they hold of themselves. For high self-esteem people, the two motives converge, in the sense that verifying their already existing positive views will also serve the motivation for self-enhancement. For those with low self-esteem, the picture becomes more complicated: While they affectively want to feel good about themselves by using self-enhancement motives, cognitively, they want to confirm their self-views, which are basically neutral or negative. This phenomenon, named as the "cognitive-affective crossfire" (Swann et al., 1987), opens to debate the possible reactions of low self-esteem people to social feedback. While high self-esteem people were found to accept only positive feedback, low self-esteem people were affected by both positive and negative feedback (Campbell & Fairey, 1985).

This openness to both consistent and inconsistent feedback may lead to a malleable view of the self, continuously in a process of accommodation. Campbell (1990) provided support for this view by showing that low self-esteem people tended to rate themselves less extremely and with less reported confidence compared to high self-esteem individuals by employing bipolar adjectives (Study 1). Moreover, they showed less temporal stability in their ratings over a 2 month period (Study 2), less congruence between their self-concepts and subsequent perceptions of situation-specific behaviors (Study 3), less internal consistency, and longer reaction times when making me/not me decisions with regard to pairs of opposite traits (Study 4). High correlation between self-esteem and self-concept clarity reported by employing the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (r=0.61; Campbell et al., 1996) provided converging evidence with the findings employing unobstrusive methods.

To explain the nature of the relationship between self-concept clarity and self-esteem, past researchers have also pointed to the possibility that a certain knowledge of self-attributes may provide a person with the ability to capitalize on these attributes or minimize their adverse affects in many situations. By that way, the individual may more actively employ the self-knowledge when making decisions, and thus, maintain a sense of future control (Sande, Goethals & Radloff, 1988; Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1993). These researchers propose that the feeling of control combined with the ability to capitalize on self-knowledge may act as a mediator between self-concept clarity and self-esteem. In a similar vein, without directly using the self-concept clarity formulation offered by Campbell (1990), Baumgardner (1990) tested the direction of the relationship between self-certainty and self-esteem,

and showed that self-certainty acts as the cause in this relationship. In these experiments, she eliminated the explanations regarding general uncertainty (i.e., low self-esteem people generally lack confidence in their judgments of people), self-enhancement (i.e., they do not want to be certain of the belief that they possess negative traits), and impression management (i.e., they are scared of social disapproval). Baumgardner found that increased certainty about the self resulted in positive affect and egotism by inducing certainty versus uncertainty of self-concept using bogus personality assessments.

It is plausible to further suggest that the sense of control provided by a clear self-concept is not limited to being able to choose among an array of available social contexts or being proactive about the impacts of these contexts. A clear self-concept also means that the individual is aware of his/her personality capabilities, thus can deliberately adjust his/her behavior to the demands of the social context and may anticipate the level of anxiety that s/he may feel by engaging in a proactive behavior pattern. Therefore, a sense of self-certainty is not only related to the number of personality capabilities claimed by a person, but it should also be related to the sense of behavioral control when using these capabilities. High levels of self-esteem, which is typical for people with clear self-concepts, may be a result of the elevated feeling of control.

Considering this possibility, one of the expectations in this study is that self-concept clarity will be positively related to the level of deliberate control over personality

capabilities and the adjustment of these capabilities to the demands of a given context.

2.2. Behavioral Flexibility

Flexibility and rigidity have been studied extensively with regard to both cognition and behavior for more than a century (Shultz & Searleman, 2002). Early accounts of the issue include the works of Gestalt psychologists, the *p* factor ("p" for perseveration) of Spearman (1927) and Rokeach's The Open and Closed Mind (1960). Early studies usually treat flexibility as a unidimensional construct. On her review on rigidity, Chown (1959) noted the variability of formulations and indexes employed on the construct much before the contemporary studies on the issue. Although majority of early formulations concentrated on cognitive rather than behavioral flexibility, some reference to behavioral variables can be observed in studies, such as Werner's (1946) rigidity as "lack of variability in response" and Rokeach's (1960) account of cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral components of rigidity (Shultz & Searleman, 2002).

Behavioral flexibility has been proposed as one of the most important correlates of psychological adjustment (Leary, 1957; Scott, 1968). Different formulations of flexibility have been offered by different researchers considering the important role assigned to flexibility in the literature.

Self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) is one such measure of behavioral flexibility, which deals with the concern for social appropriateness and the control of behavioral expression. It incorporates the ability for social observation with the willingness and the ability to use social information as a clue for behavioral adjustment. Snyder emphasizes that self-monitoring differs from need for approval in the sense that the ability of self-control outlined by self-monitoring exceeds the contingencies of social desirability. Moreover, a person may be motivated to gain social approval but may lack the capacity for self-control required to turn this motive into action. Thus, self-monitoring is supposed to be more a behavioral than a cognitive measure compared to need for approval. Consequently, Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale consisted of five factors, tapping both cognitive and behavioral elements: Concern with appropriateness, attention to social comparison information, ability to control and modify self-presentation and expressive behavior, the use of this ability in particular situations, and the extent of variability versus stability across situations. Recently, Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale is no longer accepted as a valid measure of self-monitoring. However, more recent measures, such as Lennox and Wolfe's (1984) Revised Self-Monitoring Scale, which measures self-monitoring and concern for appropriateness separately, are still widely used and conserve the popularity of the self-monitoring construct in social psychology.

Another popular formulation of flexibility is the concept of androgyny. Bem (1974) formulated androgyny as a trait different from the traditional masculine and feminine traits. Bem (1975) argued that androgynous people, who report to have both masculine and feminine traits, are more flexible in their behavior compared to sex-

typed individuals, because they can behave both instrumentally and expressively as required by the social context. Sex-typed individuals, on the other hand, are restricted to their traditional roles. Wiggins and Holzmuller (1978) note that the traits that differentiate masculine and feminine individuals are interpersonal in nature. Thus, this formulation especially concentrates on two dimensions: Dominance versus submission and warmth versus coldness. Thus, a flexible person is able to behave in accordance with all possible combinations of these two dimensions.

Schmuck and Wobken-Blachnik (1996) have defined behavioral flexibility as an interindividually varying tendency to spontaneously change and optimize behavioral patterns. Because of the role of the capacity to integrate information coming from different sources in this definition of flexibility, they have proposed that behavioral flexibility is closely linked to the capacity of the central executive in working memory. Rusalov and Biryukov (1993) have treated flexibility as a temperament trait, and thus, have joined Schmuck and Wobken-Blachnik (1996) in the tendency to view flexibility as a stable trait marking individual differences.

Consistent with previous researchers, Paulhus and Martin (1988), conceptualized flexibility as a stable behavioral pattern. However, these authors have noted that any formulation of behavioral flexibility should incorporate at least two components: (a) a wide behavioral repertoire, (b) the ability to adjust to situational demands. They criticized many of the existing composite and stylistic measures, including self-monitoring and androgyny, indicating that they either fail to address one or both of these components, or confuse behavioral flexibility with cognitive flexibility.

2.2.1. Dimensions of Behavioral Flexibility

Paulhus and Martin (1988) proposed a new conceptualization of flexibility, which they call functional flexibility, to appropriately address both of the assumed components. The first component, referring to have a wide behavioral repertoire, is closely linked with their previous conception of personality capabilities (Paulhus and Martin, 1987). The critical difference between personality traits and personality capabilities is that the trait concept measures the typical behavior. As a result, when trait measures are used, a negative correlation between opposite behaviors is expected; for instance, it is not possible for a person to be both typically dominant and submissive. On the other hand, when capability measures are used, a positive manifold picture emerges; that is, it is possible that a person is capable of both dominant and submissive behaviors and engages in both kinds of behaviors when appropriate conditions are given. Thus, rather than asking individuals about their typical behaviors, Paulhus and Martin (1987) asked "How capable are you of being dominant when the situation requires it?" The answer to this question shows whether the person is capable of dominant behavior or not. However, it should also be noted that many people may be capable of a certain type of behavior if such behavior becomes extremely important and/or inescapable (i.e., under emergency situations). Still, under ordinary circumstances, the person may find it so difficult to exhibit such behavior that s/he may avoid the situations requiring such behavior all together. To better understand the process, they have also asked the level of difficulty and anxiety experienced by the individual when engaging in such behavior and whether s/he has a tendency to avoid situations that require such a behavior.

Overall, it can be argued that, the sum of capabilities index of behavioral flexibility offered by Paulhus and Martin (1988) represents the behavioral repertoire component of behavioral flexibility.

Reported anxiety, difficulty and avoidance indexes, as the other fundamental aspects of behavioral flexibility, are more closely linked to the second component of functional flexibility capturing deliberate control and behavioral adjustment. Anxiety may have two different effects on the exhbition of behaviors: Although the individual may report being capable of a certain type of behavior, the anxiety experienced under conditions requiring such behavior may cause the individual to refrain from engaging in such behavior. Second, even if the individuals engages in the behavior, her/his performance may be thwarted by this feeling of anxiety. Thus, the level of difficulty and anxiety reported by the person may act as the critical conditions regarding whether the person will actually engage in certain types of behavior and whether s/he will show the expected performance. Finally, avoidance may be a result of either the belief that the person is not capable of certain types of behaviors or the anxiety felt as a result of engaging in these behaviors. In both cases, it represents a “flight” mechanism that saves the individual from the burden of behavioral control rather than a “fight” response typified by deliberate adjustment of the behavior to environmental demands.

2.2.2. Model of Behavioral Flexibility in Relation to Self-Concept Structure

The model proposed in this study can be explained in a few consequtive steps:

Although Paulhus and Martin (1988) proposed a two-dimensional view of flexibility, they did not extensively elaborate on these dimensions regarding their relationship with each other and with other related variables. In the first step of the model, it is proposed that behavioral repertoire and the deliberate control and adjustment of the behaviors within the repertoire can vary relatively independent to each other. That is, a person with a large behavioral repertoire may or may not be able to show deliberate control over the range of behaviors made possible by this repertoire. Similarly, a person whose behaviors are restricted by her/his limited repertoire may be at full control of these behaviors or may lack control even on these limited number of available responses.

In the second step of the model, it is suggested that these two relatively independent dimensions of flexibility can be linked to two relatively independent dimensions of self-concept structure: Differentiation (as measured by self-complexity) and integration (as measured by self-concept clarity).

Self-complexity (Linville, 1987), a measure of the number of distinct self-aspects employed by a person in self-description, seems to be a potential correlate of the number of personality capabilities reported by a person. High self-complexity implies that an individual has many self-aspects and her/his typical behaviors change

according to which of these self-aspects are activated at a given moment. Hence, such a person should be capable of a great number of behaviors (i.e., should have a large behavioral repertoire).

Implications regarding self-concept clarity (Campbell, 1990) can be summarized as follows: It can be argued that a person can control and adjust her/his behaviors according to situational demands only if s/he is clear about what kind of behaviors s/he is capable of. Such self-knowledge provides the individual with a sense of control over social context, and reduces the feeling of anxiety created by engaging in behaviors that surpass one's capabilities.

In the final step of the model, four different behavioral patterns are suggested by the crossing of the two dimensions of flexibility (Figure 2.1). Overall, on the one hand, the behavioral repertoire dimension is considered to indicate the level or quantity of flexibility inherent in the behavioral pattern, with high repertoire characterizing more flexible behavior and low repertoire characterizing rigid behavior in the traditional sense. On the other hand, the deliberate control dimension is regarded as indicating the quality of flexibility, with high levels of control representing behaviors adjusted by the person and low levels of control representing behaviors controlled by the social context. Although the traditional models of behavioral flexibility defined flexibility with its quantity only, in this study it is proposed that a definition of flexibility becomes coherent only when both quantity and quality are taken into account.



Figure 2.1

Proposed Theoretical Model of Behavioral Flexibility

The behavioral patterns depicted in each cell of the proposed model will be elaborated in the following sections.

2.2.3. Functional Flexibility

In order to examine the construct validity and the dimensions of functional flexibility, Paulhus and Martin (1988) conducted a principal components analysis (PCA) factoring on a number of variables related to flexibility such as the four indexes of functional flexibility (sum of capabilities; anxiety, avoidance and difficulty ratings), an index of situationality (Goldberg, 1981), two indexes of androgyny (Bem,1974; Lubinski, Tellegen & Butcher, 1981), an index of behavioral

variance (Wiggins & Holzmuller, 1981) and the responses to Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale. PCA yielded a pattern that the indexes of functional flexibility loaded on the same factor suggesting that functional flexibility taps a construct different than those measured by other instruments of flexibility (Study 1). Moreover, the results taken from the functional flexibility indexes significantly correlated with peer ratings of interpersonal flexibility (Study 2). More importantly, functional flexibility was shown to be positively related to self-esteem, whereas the correlations for the other flexibility indexes failed to show the expected positive pattern, except for one index of androgyny, which showed a small positive correlation with self-esteem. Similarly, functional flexibility predicted adjustment using peer ratings much better than the alternative variables. These findings revealed that functional flexibility has strong predictive power for psychological adjustment.

Considering the critical links between the structure of the self, functional flexibility and psychological adjustment, it is plausible to argue that functional flexibility acts as a mediator in the relationship between self-structure and psychological adjustment. Previous studies on self-concept structure demonstrated a relationship between structural variables and evaluative components of the self-concept. As noted earlier, a number of studies have investigated the relationship between self-complexity (e.g., Campbell et al., 1991; Woolfolk et al., 1995) or self-concept clarity (e.g., Campbell, 1990) and self-esteem. However, these studies fail to provide the mechanism underlying the interplay between these concepts. One of the aims of this study is to address this issue by offering that flexibility may act as a mediator between self-concept structure and self-esteem, as depicted in Figure 2.2.



Figure 2.2

Flexibility as a Mediator between Self-concept Structure and Self-Esteem

Overall, the expectations regarding functional flexibility can be summarized as follows: (a) Functional flexibility score is expected to be highest for people with high self-complexity and high self-concept clarity, (b) Functional flexibility is expected to act as a mediator between self-concept structure (represented by self-concept clarity and self-complexity) and self-esteem.

2.2.4. Situational Flexibility

Although situational flexibility is characterized by a wide behavioral repertoire similar to functional flexibility, the repertoire is also accompanied by a lack of

control over the exhibition of intended behaviors. Instead, these behaviors are shaped by the demands of the situation.

Situational flexibility bears similarity to the term "situationality" coined by Goldberg (1981) in response to a problem observed in personality measurement. In order to better capture the meaning of the middle options in Likert scale personality inventories, Goldberg distinguished between neutrality, uncertainty, ambiguity and situationality. In this study, only the situationality option will be dealt with.

The main point that distinguishes situationality from Paulhus and Martin's (1988) functional flexibility is that situationality deals with traits rather than capabilities. A person who scores high on situationality reports that s/he cannot clearly answer the question of whether s/he possesses a certain trait. Thus, the individual is not sure how s/he behaves because s/he views her/his behaviors as typically shaped by the environment rather than dispositional factors.

In this study, "situational flexibility" rather than situationality is used to describe this tendency in order to emphasize its commonality with functional flexibility. As noted above, just like a functionally flexible person, the situationally flexible individual possesses a large number of behavioral capabilities that make him/her available a great choice of responses. However, unlike the functionally flexible counterpart, this individual lacks control over these behaviors and depends on situational cues for her/his responses. Thus, when asked to give a description of her/his typical

behaviors, s/he reports that her/his self-definition is to a great extent dependent on the social context.

It is important to note that under conditions where the person's intended behavior overlaps with the behaviors demanded by the situation, the implications for functionally and situationally flexible individuals may be similar. This is also critical in seperating situationally flexible people from effacingly rigid individuals: Although situaionally flexible individuals lack behavioral control, they still have a large number of performable behaviors available to them and the performance of these behaviors may often be appropriate some situations. On the other hand, in addition to having a lack of control, effacing rigidity is characterized by a limitation on behavioral options. Thus, the chances of successful adaptation are greatly reduced for these people.

Situationally flexible individuals are expected to feel anxiety when entering complex, novel and unstructured situations. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to get unequivocal clues from the environment for appropriate behaviors. However, their wide behavioral repertoire may help them easily fit the new situation and go along with the conventions. As the individual is in a process of trying to understand the rules and the norms of this new situation at the time of entry, not violating these rules and fitting in the situation may be an appropriate measure of functioning in case of novel situations. Thus, despite their anxiety, situationally flexible individuals are expected to be open to new experiences, viewing them as an opportunity to display their behavioral repertoire.

For well-learned and well-practiced situations, the intention of the individuals usually goes beyond fitting into conventionality. The situationally flexible individuals are expected to show dissatisfaction with their behaviors under these situations, signified by a feeling of a lack of control over their own behaviors, over the situation in general and over the future. Thus, when going along with the conventionality existent in the situation is the only indicator of good functioning, there may not be much difference between functionally and situationally flexible individuals. However, when behavioral control and a sense of control over the situation is required, functionally flexible individuals have a clear advantage over situationally flexible individuals. The feeling of going along with the situation and the lack of control in situationally flexible individuals is expected to be signified by external locus of control.

Goldberg's (1981) measure of situationality provides a good approximation to what is called situational flexibility in this study. However, in order to emphasize the importance of social context for these individuals, a measure of Need for Approval (Sociotropy measures from the Sociotropy – Autonomy Scale; Beck, Epstein, Harrison and Emery, 1983) will also be taken as a representation of context-dependence. Need for approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) is a disposition to adjust behaviors according to their social desirability in order to gain the approval of others. People lower in self-esteem were found to be more dependent on social feedback and higher in need for approval (Baumeister, 1993). This need induces a tendency to seek for clues of approval or disapproval by others as a response to one's own behaviors, a feeling of discomfort when these clues are hard to read or inexistent, and the

adjustment of behaviors according to these clues. Overall, people lower in deliberate control are expected to be more dependent on the context, and thus, to show greater need for approval.

2.2.5. Stereotypical Rigidity

Stereotypical rigidity is characterized by low levels of self-complexity and high levels of sefl-concept clarity. In their review on cognitive and behavioral rigidity, Schultz and Searleman (2002) note that rigidity has been used "to describe mental sets, extreme attitudes, ethnocentrism, stereotypy, lack of flexibility, perseveration, authoritarianism, and the inability to change habits" (p. 169). This definition mainly concentrates on cognitive rigidity, or insistence on certain mental sets or perceptual styles, even in the light of environmental clues for the inappropriateness of these sets. However, many measures of rigidity also tap into the behavioral reflections of these cognitive elements (e.g., Test of Behavioral Rigidity (TBR), Schaie & Parham, 1975).

The cognitive measures of rigidity usually emphasize discomfort with ambiguity and novel situations, a preference for order, cognitive simplicity, and structured situations such as Need for Closure (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993) and Personal Need for Structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Behavioral measures, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on the ability to adapt to shifted task demands after practicing on the same task for a long time and to adopt new problem-solving strategies such as Einstellung Water Jar Task (Luchins, 1942) and Stroop (1935) Task. Rigidity has

also been examined as a personality variable and has been studied in relation to traits such as creativity, imaginativeness, and preference for novelty (e.g., Flexibility Scale of California Personality Inventory, Gough & Bradley, 1996; Openness to Experience in Five-Factor Model, McCrae & Costa, 1996). Personality measures can be taken as a mid-way between cognitive and behavioral measures, as they include cognitive elements, such as preference for novelty or creativeness, but they also ask the subjects to evaluate themselves on a number of trait words, which usually requires the subject to go over past experiences involving behaviors relevant to a given trait. Overall, it is worth noting that regardless of the type of measure employed, rigidity is characterized by a refrain from novelty and a tendency to stick to learned patterns of behavior.

In this study, similar to flexibility, rigidity is examined under two different qualities. First is called stereotypical rigidity, which is characterized by a restricted range of behavioral capabilities combined with a clear knowledge of these capabilities and strong deliberate control over behaviors. Thus, a person is stereotypical in the sense that s/he cannot overcome the limits of the sharp profile drawn by the available repertoire of behaviors, and moreover, consistently follows this stereotype, of which s/he is well aware.

Unlike the situationally flexible individual, the stereotypically rigid individual has a low level of need for approval, refuses to adjust to the clues of appropriateness, and follows her/his stereotyped forms of behaviors regardless of clues for appropriateness. Just like for all forms of rigidity, intolerance for ambiguity and

avoidance of novel situations are expected to be diagnostic for stereotypical rigidity. However, their clarity about their own capabilities helps the stereotypically rigid indidivuals to successfully adapt to at least some situations. As a result, the discomfort with ambiguity is expected to be lower for stereotypical than for effacing rigidity.

2.2.6. Effacing Rigidity

Effacing rigidity is typified by low levels of both self-complexity and self-concept clarity. An effacingly rigid person is characterized by a restricted number of response options available, and a lack of control over these options. This kind of rigidity is in fact the pattern that is widely observed in depressed people. In their review on executive functioning in depression, Fossati, Ergis and Alliare (2002) conclude that frontal lobe dysfunction observed in unipolar depression results in executive function deficits. The executive function is closely related to dealing with novel situations, monitoring behavior and adjusting to the new demands according to feedback and building up behavioral strategies. Fossati et al.'s description appears to picture what is meant by effacing rigidity. Similarly, Schmuck and Wobken-Blachnik (1996) have showed that the capacity of the executive function is positively related with flexibility. These studies indicate that rigidity has some potential physiological basis in depression. The role of the executive function in dealing with new situations and adjusting according to feedback seem to match with the capabilities dimension of flexibility while the construction of behavioral strategies is closely related to the ability of deliberate control. In this study, effacing rigidity is proposed as the point

where rigidity and depression intersect to outline a psychological situation where the individual is limited to a number of dysfunctional behavioral options and is unable to surpass the limits of these options despite a dense feeling of dissatisfaction with the consequences of these behaviors.

Similar to stereotypical rigidity, effacing rigidity is characterized by a limited range of performable behaviors. What differentiates it from stereotypical rigidity is a desire to fit into the situation rather than showing deliberate control, and an inability to do so, because of limited behavioral capabilities. Effacing rigidity may result in continuous anxiety, extreme discomfort with novelty and ambiguity, and a desire to avoid novel situations. In this sense, effacing rigidity closely matches the portrait of depressed individuals as passive, unwilling to engage in novel activities and/or engaging in extensive information collection before new activities in order to reduce uncertainty (Folkman & Lazarus, 1986), uncertain about self-qualities (Campbell et al., 2003), and believing that the outcomes are uncontrollable, and thus, the individual is at the mercy of situational factors (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995).

The lack of control over behaviors makes effacingly rigid person vulnerable to a host of problems in adaptation compared to the stereotypically rigid person. The stereotypically rigid person can indeed function almost as effectively as the functionally flexible person under a stable, simple, well-practiced environment. The effacingly rigid individual, however, experiences a continuous stream of anxiety, because of the feeling of uncertainty and uncontrollability over the already limited

range of behavioral capabilities. Thus, the effacingly rigid person is expected to score highest on measures of anxiety and depression, and lowest on measures of self-esteem, among the four behavioral patterns proposed in the model.

2. 3. Overview of Studies and Hypotheses

Three consecutive studies were planned to test the model proposed in this study. The first study was conducted as a preliminary study and aimed to construct an adjective list to be employed in the trait sort task for the measurement of self-complexity. In the second study, the validity and reliability of the main measures used in the study were tested and a preliminary check of the model at the dimensional level was run. Finally, the third study aimed to test the whole model including the four behavioral patterns of flexibilty and rigidity outlined in this study.

The major hypotheses of the study can be summarized as follows:

2.3.1. Hypotheses Regarding the Dimensions of Behavioral Flexibility and Self-Concept Structure

1. Self-complexity will be positively related to the Sum of Capabilities index of functional flexibility, and unrelated to the other indexes.
2. Self-concept clarity will be negatively linked to anxiety, difficulty and avoidance indexes of functional flexibility, and unrelated to the Sum of Capabilities index.

3. Self-concept clarity and self-complexity are expected to be orthogonal dimensions.
4. Sum of capabilities index is expected to show moderate negative correlations with the anxiety, difficulty and avoidance indexes, while these three indexes are expected to be highly intercorrelated.
5. Flexibility indexes are expected to mediate the relationship between self-concept structure, as measured by self-complexity and self-concept clarity, and self-esteem.

2.3.2. Hypotheses Regarding The Four Behavioral Patterns

2.3.2.1. Functional Flexibility

1. Participants grouped under the functionally flexible pattern are expected to be highest in self-esteem and lowest in depressive symptomatology.
2. They are expected to have the highest emotional stability, extraversion and openness to experience scores.
3. They are expected to have the highest scores on need for cognition.
4. Together with stereotypically rigid participants, functionally flexible individuals are expected to score lower on need for approval and exhibit more internal locus of control compared to situationally flexible and effacingly rigid participants.

2.3.2.2. Situational Flexibility

1. Situationally flexible participants are expected to score highest on Goldberg's measure of situationality.
2. They are expected to score lower on self-esteem and higher on depressive symptomatology as compared to the functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid participants.
3. Together with effacingly rigid individuals, situationally flexible individuals are expected to score higher on need for approval and to exhibit more external locus of control compared to functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid individuals.

2.3.2.3. Stereotypical Rigidity

1. Stereotypically rigid participants are expected to be lowest on need for cognition, openness to experience, and agreeableness.
2. They are expected to have higher self-esteem and lower depressive symptomatology compared to situationally flexible and effacingly rigid participants.
3. Together with functionally flexible participants, stereotypically rigid individuals are expected to show more internal locus of control and lower need for approval compared to situationally flexible and effacingly rigid participants.

2.3.2.4. Effacing Rigidity

1. Of the four groups, effacingly rigid participants are expected to be lowest on self-esteem and highest on depressive symptomatology.
2. They are expected to be high on need for approval, low on need for cognition and to exhibit external locus of control as compared to the other groups.
3. They are expected to have low emotional stability, openness to experience, and extraversion.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 1

This preliminary study was conducted in order to construct an adjective list to be employed in the trait sort task for the measurement of self-complexity. Since this measure was employed in Turkish for the first time, the main objective in the construction of the list was to help validity and reliability of the measure by choosing adjectives that are commonly used in the self-descriptions of the target population, that can be easily comprehended by the participants and that provide sufficient flexibility for capturing the underlying trait of dimensionality.

3.1. Participants

One hundred and three students (61 females and 42 males, mean age = 19,02, SD = .60) from the Business Administration Department of Middle East Technical University comprised the participants of the first phase of this study, whereas 60 (35 females and 25 males, mean age = 22.34, SD = 0.92) students from the Department of Psychology of the same university participated in the second phase on a voluntary basis.

3.2. Procedure

Three points noted to be important by Rafaeli-Mor (2004) were taken into account in the construction of the trait list: (a) the inclusion of Big Five markers in the list, (b) balanced distribution of positive and negative traits, (c) use of trait words that are commonly used by the target population. In the first phase of the study, the participants were asked to list the 30 most common adjectives that they use when describing themselves or other people. This procedure yielded a total of 384 different adjectives. This list was examined for synonyms using a Turkish Dictionary and 30 of the adjectives were eliminated from the list. The frequencies of the deleted words were added to the frequencies of their synonyms that remained in the list. The list was sorted according to frequencies and top 60 words were chosen to form another list.

In the second phase of the study, the participants were asked to rate the valence of these 60 adjectives on a scale from –3 (very negative) to +3 (very positive). Trait words that received a mean rating between +1.01 and +3 (inclusive) were taken to be positively valenced, trait words with mean ratings between –1.01 and –3 were taken to be negatively valenced and words with mean ratings between –1 and +1 were taken as neutral. Three different lists (of positive, negative and neutral adjectives) were formed and were again sorted according to the obtained frequencies. Top 14 positive adjectives, 13 negative adjectives (this was the total number of adjectives rated to be unambiguously negative in the 60-word list) and top 7 neutral words were taken from these lists to be included in the final list. Finally, 10 Big Five markers

(items of the 10-item Five Factor Model Scale; Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003) were added to this list to comprise the final 44-item adjective list to be used in the following studies.

3.3. Results and Discussion

The trait list constructed as a result of this study is presented in Table 3.1 together with the frequencies and valence ratings for each adjective. The last ten items in the Table are the positive and negative Big Five items, which were included in the list without valence ratings. Thus, no frequency and valence information was provided for these items.

As noted before, the procedures outlined by Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999) were followed in the generation and selection of the traits. However, different from Rafaeli-Mor et al., in addition to unambiguously positive and negative adjectives, I have decided to include 7 neutral adjectives in this list. As known from past studies (Baumeister, 1993) even low self-esteem people prefer to describe themselves in neutral, rather than negative, terms. Thus, the inclusion of neutral adjectives in the list is assumed to provide more flexibility and help people easily complete the trait sort task by constructing a better approximation to how they prefer to describe themselves.

Table 3.1.

Trait List for Self-Complexity Trait Sort Task

	Trait	Frequency	Rating
1	Dürüst	50	2.66
2	İyimser	44	1.66
3	Alçakgönüllü	44	1.84
4	Zeki	39	2.02
5	Çalışkan	35	1.62
6	Cömert	35	1.96
7	Yardımsever	33	2.46
8	Cesur	30	1.60
9	Mantıklı	27	1.76
10	Uyumlu	26	1.98
11	Saygılı, Nazik	25	1.94
12	Hoşgörülü	24	2.20
13	Sabırlı	18	1.40
14	Sadık	18	2.24
15	Bencil	42	-1.38
16	Sinirli, asabi	36	-1.60
17	Cimri	32	-1.70
18	Yalan söyleyebilen	30	-1.44
19	Kibirli, kendini beğenmiş	29	-2.02
20	Tembel	28	-1.02
21	Kıskanç	27	-1.08
22	Ukala	23	-1.44
23	Vurdumduymaz	23	-1.62
24	Patavatsız	20	-1.42
25	Kaba	17	-2.20
26	Korkak	15	-1.18
27	Sorumsuz	15	-1.64
28	Hırslı	44	-0,20
29	Duygusal	40	0,98
30	Karamsar	37	-0,76
31	Konuşkan	36	0,70
32	İnatçı	27	-0,50
33	Çekingen	26	-0,94
34	Alıngan	23	-0,78
Big Five Markers			
35	Dışa dönük, sosyal	40	İçe kapanık
36	Tenkit eden	41	Sevecen,
37	Güvenilir	42	Düzensiz
38	Endişeli	43	Sakin, rahat
39	Yeniliğe açık	44	Tutucu

CHAPTER 4

STUDY 2

This study aims to test the reliability and validity of the measures that will be employed in the main study and to preliminarily test the relationship between the dimensions of behavioral flexibility and self-concept structure. Specifically, self-complexity is expected to be positively related to the Sum of Capabilities index of functional flexibility, and to be relatively uncorrelated with the other indexes. Self-concept clarity is expected to be negatively linked to anxiety, difficulty and avoidance indexes of functional flexibility, and to be relatively unrelated to the Sum of Capabilities index.

4.1. Participants

One hundred and twenty three (75 females and 48 males) undergraduate and graduate students from different departments of Middle East Technical University participated in the study on a voluntary basis. Mean age for participants was 21.77 with a standard deviation of 1.94.

4.2. Materials

In addition to completing the self-complexity trait sort task (Linville, 1987), the participants were asked to fill out the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996), Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (Paulhus and Martin, 1987). Seven point response sets were employed for all the Likert-type scale measures.

4.2.1. Self-Complexity Trait Sort Task. The materials for this measure (Linville, 1987) include 44 trait cards, 10 blank cards and a piece of recording paper separated into columns. The 44 trait words that appear on Table 3.1 were written on separate cards, together with numbers from 1 to 44. The participants were asked to sort these cards into groups, such that each group corresponds to an aspect of their lives. While giving the instructions, what is meant by "self-aspects" is explained with a few examples, and the participants are informed that they may use any criterion as a basis of forming these groups, as long as the groups describe meaningful dimensions of their lives and personalities. They are left free to use as many of the traits as they wish (i.e., they do not have to use all the traits provided on cards) and to form as many groups as they find appropriate. The blank cards are employed in case they want to use a trait word in more than one group. In that case, the participants are asked to write the name and the number of the word that they want to use repeatedly on one of those cards. After forming the groups, the subjects record the groups they formed on the recording sheet, with each column corresponding to a group they formed. They are asked to record the numbers that appear by the traits rather than the

full name of the trait. The full instructions read to the participants before each session are given in Appendix A.

As noted before, self-complexity scores are calculated using the H statistic (Scott, 1969). The self-complexity (or dimentionality) score (SC-D) is defined by

$$\text{SC-D} = \log_2 n - (\Sigma_i \, n_i \log_2 n_i) / n \, ,$$

where n is the total number of traits provided (44 in this study) and n_i is the number of traits that appear in a particular group combination. For instance, if the participant has formed a total of 3 groups, then possible group combinations include n_1 = traits that appear in only Group 1, and no others, n_2 = traits that appear in Groups 1 and 2, but not in Group 3, n_3 = traits that appear in Groups 2 and 3, but not in Group 1, n_4 = traits that appear in all three groups, n_5 = number of traits not used in any of the groups, etc. Linville (1987) defines the SC score as "the minimal number of independent binary attributes underlying a person's feature sort about the self" (p. 666). So, this score is higher, the higher the number of groups formed by the participant and lower the amount of redundancy, or the number of reused traits, in these groups. The highest possible SC score in our study is $\log_2 44 = 5.46$.

This measure showed adequate temporal stability in a two-week interval ($r = 0.70$, $p<.001$), and the scores did not change as a function of life events during this interval ($p = 0.90$; Linville, 1987).

As noted in Chapter 2, the SC-D, or the H statistic, has been criticized by many researchers. Specifically, Woolfolk et al. (1995) have questioned the internal consistency of this measure and proposed that it reflects at least two latent factors (number of self-aspects and overlap between them) rather than being a measure of one latent factor (i.e., self-complexity). As a response to these criticisms, Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999) have proposed two separate measures for these two factors: NASPECTS and OL. NASPECTS is simply the number of self-aspects used by the participant in the trait sort task. OL, or the overlap measure is defined by

$$OL = (\Sigma_i(\Sigma_j C_{ij})T_i)/n*(n-1),$$

where C: number of common features in 2 aspects; T: total number of features in the referent aspect; n: total number of aspects in the person's sort, and i and j are unequal values from 1 to n. In addition to H, these two measures are employed in the current study.

The criticisms of Woolfolk et al. (1995) also addressed the issue of whether self-complexity can be taken as a valence-independent measure. They have noted that the complexity of the positive and negative self attributes have differential implications for well-being. Positive self-complexity is simply the complexity of the individual's trait sort after all the negative and neutral traits have been temporarily deleted. Similarly, negative self-complexity is the dimensionality score computed after the deletion of positive and neutral attributes.

Finally, another measure computed from the trait sort task is the compartmentalization score, or Phi (Showers, 1992). Compartmentalization refers to the separation of negatively and positively valenced self attributes into distinct self-aspects. Thus, it is the degree of deviation from the random sort where the positively and negatively valenced attributes are randomly distributed through self-aspects. The expected frequencies of positive and negative traits in each self-aspect is equal to the overall number of positive and negative traits employed by the individual in the trait sort task. Phi is a χ^2 statistic showing the deviation from this expected ratio, averaged over self-aspects:

$$\Phi = \sqrt{\chi^2/N} .$$

In sum, six different measures (i.e., SC-D, NASPECTS, OL, Positive SC-D, Negative SC-D and Phi) will be computed from the trait sort task.

4.2.2. Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS). SCCS (Campbell et al., 1996) consists of 12 items, 10 of which are reverse coded. The average Cronbach alpha value in different samples for the original scale was 0.86, and test - retest reliabilities for periods of three to four months ranged between 0.70 and 0.79. A seven-point response set was employed in the current study, and the scores were computed as the mean of the responses by each participant, higher scores indicating higher self-concept clarity. The scale was translated to Turkish by Sumer and Gungor (1999; this study also employed 7-point response sets), and the scale showed adequate internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.89$). The criterion validity of the Turkish version was

supported by its positive correlation with self-esteem (r = 0.59, p<0.05) and secure attachment style (r = 0.32, p<0.05). The Turkish Self-Concept Clarity Scale employed in this study is presented in Appendix B.

4.2.3. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, which is comprised of 10 questions (5 of them reverse-coded). The scale was adapted to Turkish by Çuhadaroğlu (1986), and reliability and validity information was given by both Çuhadaroğlu (1986) and Tuğrul (1994). The scale showed adequate internal consistency (Cronbach α = 0.76; Tuğrul, 1994) and validity (The correlation between the results of psychiatric interviews and scale results was 0.71; Çuhadaroğlu, 1986). Sümer and Güngör (1999) employed the scale with 7-point response sets and found the internal consistency of Cronbach α = 0.85. The Turkish version of Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is given in Appendix C.

2.3.2. Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC). BIC (Paulhus and Martin, 1987) was constructed as a response to the need to access interpersonal capabilities as distinct from interpersonal traits. It is proposed as a measure of behavioral flexibility. The battery consists of 4 questions asked for each of the 16 behaviors represented by the 16 nodes of the interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins & Holzmuller, 1978; Figure 4.1), making up a total of 48 questions. The Turkish version that was constructed for this study can be seen in Appendix 4. The original battery used by Paulhus and Martin, showed divergent validity with trait measures, inferred from factor analyses conducted by pooling trait and capability measures together. In these analyses, capability and trait indexes loaded on two different factors. The scale also

demonstrated convergent validity with social desirability. Moreover, as expected, capabilities with positive social orientation showed positive correlation with interpersonal control, and capabilities with negative social orientation showed positive correlation with Machiavellianism. Except for a few negative behaviors, which were unrelated to adjustment, capabilities were also positively related to measures of psychological adjustment.



Figure 4.1. Interpersonal Circumplex by Wiggins and Holzmuller (1978).

Paulhus and Martin (1987, 1988) have noted that the most important characteristic that distinguishes capabilities from traits is their positively intercorrelated structure. That is, in case of a trait measure, a negative correlation between traits that fall on the opposite nodes of the circumplex is expected. Specifically, if the responses from the participants are forced into two factors in a factor analysis, representing the two axes of the interpersonal circumplex (i.e., dominance and nurturance), the resulting factor loading plot would ideally replicate Figure 4.1. However, when dealing with capability measures, it is possible for an individual to report capabilities even on traits that fall on the opposite nodes of the circumplex. Thus, the loadings on the factor loading plot are expected to shift to the positive sides of the axes compared to Figure 4.1 when capability measures are employed. Similarly, Paulhus and Martin (1988) report loadings that unanimously fall in Quadrant 1 of Figure 4.1 with BIC.

4.3. Procedure

Before the study, BIC was translated by the researcher and then evaluated by one bilingual judge. The scale was revised at each stage. In this process, the Turkish form of the Kiessler (1983) Interpersonal Circumplex, adapted by Boyacıoğlu (1994) was used as a guide. In the final stage, another judge back-translated the battery to English, and the translated version was compared with the original form for inconsistencies in meaning. The final form was decided after these inconsistencies were resolved by the agreement of the researcher and the judge making the back-translation. The form was also checked for face validity by a pilot study with 6

participants, who were asked to indicate any points they found hard to understand. No change was made following the pilot study.

The materials were given to the participants in groups of 15 to 20 in separate sessions. The participants were first asked to complete the trait sort task, and continue with the other measures after recording the results of their sort on a sheet of paper. A group of the participants (N = 31) were contacted again after a one month periaod in order to fill out the retest forms comprised of the trait sort task and the BIC.

4.4. Results and Discussion

4.4.1. Analyses on the reliability and validity of Turkish BIC. Traditionally internal consistency of scales are tested employing Chronbach's alpha coefficients. However, the calculation of Cronbach alpha for this battery is not meaningful, as a person indicating high capability on one of the behaviors is not expected to show a similar capability on other behaviors. Consequently, the Cronbach alpha values for the four flexibility indexes over the 16 behaviors are relatively low (α = .55 for sum of capabilities index (SumCaps), α = .60 for sum of anxiety scores index (SumAnx), α = .50 for sum of difficulty ratings index (SumDiff) and α = .58 for sum of avoidance tendency index (SumAvoid)). The Cronbach alpha values were also calculated separately for the four quadrants of the circumplex (with nodes of the axes repeated for adjacent quarters), marked from 1 to 4 on Figure 4.1. The alpha values

for the quadrants are presented in Table 4.1. Anxiety, avoidance and difficulty indexes are pooled together as they aim to test very similar tendencies and should show at least moderate consistency.

Table 4.1.

Alpha Values of Flexibility Indexes Calculated for the Quadrants of the Interpersonal Circumplex.

	Quad.1	Quad.2	Quad.3	Quad.4
SumCaps	.69	.50	.35	.69
Anx + Avoid + Diff	.87	.78	.82	.88

Results revealed that the participants were more consistent in their responses to the anxiety, avoidance and difficulty indexes compared to their responses to the capability questions on the same quadrants. This is in fact consistent with the basic premises of Paulhus and Martin's (1987) personality capabilities model. Theoretically, anxiety, avoidance and difficulty indexes are closer to the trait concept, as a person who is typically dominant will inescapably feel a little distressed when s/he is asked to behave submissively. However, capability concept is independent of the typical behaviors of the person. Hence, an absolute consistency is not expected between capabilities.

In addition, three items (item 5: agreeable, item 9: submissive and item 13: quarrelsome) especially reduced alpha values in the quadrants they appear. The alpha value for the Sum of Capabilities index in the first quarter rises from .69 to .77 if

item 5 is taken out. However, instead of taking this item out, a change in translation was made in order to make it more harmonious with the other items in the quadrant. Because the word “yumuşakbaşlı” in Turkish used by Boyacıoğlu (1994) in the translation of this item seems to contradict with the “dominant” node of the circumplex, this word was changed to “uyumlu” in order to provide greater harmony.

Items 9 and 13 do not seem to present a problem for internal consistency by themselves, but they reduce consistency when they appear together, as in quadrant 3. However, such an inconsistency is embedded in the nature of these two words, submissive and quarrelsome. Being submissive requires being passive over problems, whereas being quarrelsome requires being active and assertive. Thus, no change was made on these two items, as the original items already present such an inconsistency.

Temporal reliability of the indexes was examined by employing the correlations between two administrations of the BIC with a one month interval. The correlations were $r = .70$, $p<.01$ for the capabilities index, $r = .55$, $p<.01$ for the anxiety index, $r = .70$, $p<.01$ for the difficulty index ($N = 31$). The correlation between the two administrations of the avoidance scale was not significant.

As indicated previous sections, the basic premise of the personality capabilities is that the negative relationship between opposite nodes of the circumplex observed with trait measures is not expected. In order to test construct validity regarding the difference between trait and capability measures a factor analysis employing

principal components extraction with varimax rotation was conducted. Replicating the method used by Paulhus and Martin (1988), the responses to the sum of capabilities index were forced into two factors, representing the two axes of the circumplex. The two factors explained 35% of the total variance; first factor explaining 21.77% and the second factor explaining 13.23%. Figure 4.2 presents the loading plot for the 16 adjectives in the circumplex over two axes of the circumplex, nurturance and control. Under trait conditions, this loading plot is expected to match Figure 4.1. However, as seen in Figure 4.2, the loading plot for the adjectives is biased towards the positive ends of the axes when compared to Figure 4.1. This figure fails to replicate the loading plot presented by Paulhus and Martin (1988), in which the factor loadings for all the items are located in the positive quarter of the graph. However, as expected, the present figure diverges from the circumplex showing positive correlations.



Figure 4.2.

Factor Loading Plot for the 16 Adjectives of the Circumplex to the Two Axes of the Circumplex: Nurturance and Control.

Convergent validity was tested by examining the correlations between flexibility indexes and self-esteem. Paulhus and Martin (1988) hypothesized that functional flexibility would be positively linked to psychological adjustment and provided support to this hypothesis by presenting the correlations of the indexes with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. The correlations found in the current study are all in expected directions and comparable to the original correlations in magnitude. Namely, sum of capabilities index showed a positive correlation with self-esteem (r = .31, p<.01). The other three indexes (i.e., difficulty, anxiety and avoidance) were negatively related to self-esteem (r = -.31, p<.01, r = -.42, p<.01 and r = -.23, p<.05 respectvely).

Overall, the Turkish version of the Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities shows a similar factor loading structure with the original scale, acceptable internal consistency coefficients and significant correlations with self-esteem in the expected direction. Although the test-retest reliability was relatively low, capabilities, anxiety and difficulty indexes still showed acceptable temporal stability. Thus, the battery is accepted to be a reliable and valid measure of interpersonal flexibility on Turkish students.

4.4.2. Analyses on the reliability and validity of the self-complexity trait sort task. Since the trait sort task used in the computation of self-complexity dimentionality statistic (SC-D) is not a scale in the traditional sense, the computation of a Cronbach α coefficient for this measure is rendered impossible by the nature of the instrument. However, Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999) have proposed an alternative

measure of internal consistency, β, that can be applied to the trait sort task. In this measure, a random split is performed on the trait list and one half of the traits is temporarily deleted from the sort of the participants. Then, self-complexity is separately computed for the two halves of the trait list. Following Rafaeli-Mor et al., the traits were split into two groups, on the basis of odd and even numbered traits. One of the groups was comprised of 12 positive, 7 negative and 3 neutral traits, whereas the other group contained 7 positive, 12 negative and 3 neutral traits. Then, the complexity, overlap and number of aspects scores computed from each of these splits were correlated, and finally, a Spearman-Brown correction was applied to these correlations in order to come up with a reliability estimate.

The correlations and reliability estimates for all three complexity indexes are shown in Table 4.2, in the part titled “Good Split”. Such splits are named good splits, because they are relatively random splits, where the two halves are not expected to differ with regard to the measured variable. As seen in the table, both the dimensionality statistic and the number of self-aspects show very high correlations and high reliability coefficients when the good split is used. The overlap statistic, on the other hand, fails to show adequate reliability. Although the reliability estimates for SC-D and NASPECTS exactly match the values found by Rafaeli-Mor et al., the reliability coefficient for OL remains far below the coefficients that were computed in the original study.

Table 4.2. Correlations and Reliability Estimates for Good and Bad Splits Performed on the Trait Sort Task.

	Correlation	Reliability (β)
Good Split		
SC-D	,76**	,86
NASPECTS	,96**	,98
OL	-,08	-,16
Worst Split		
SC-D	,36**	,53
NASPECTS	,66**	,80
OL	,41**	,58

**p<.01

A better and more conservative measure of reliability is the one computed on the "worst split half". In the worst split half, the two halves should not be random parts of the whole, but the form should be split according to a criterion which makes the two halves different from each other. Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999) have proposed a split according to the valence of the traits as a worst split, because valence had been shown as a source of inconsistency by Woolfolk et al. (1995) in their discussion on positive and negative self-complexity. The correlations and reliability estimates shown in the "Worst Split" part of Table 4.2. were computed according to this principle. As seen, both the correlations and reliability coefficients are lower compared to the "good split" except for the OL index. The reliability coefficient for OL under this condition matches the coefficient reported by Rafaeli-Mor et al., whereas the reliabilities for the other two indexes are larger than the findings of Rafaeli-Mor et al. In contrast to the findings in the original study, the dimensionality statistic shows significant correlations between the two halves under both splits in

this study. Thus, both SC-D and NASPECTS can be viewed as internally consistent measures whereas OL should be approached with more caution.

The NASPECTS measure of self-complexity revealed high temporal stability over a 30 days interval (r = .82, p<.01, N = 31). However, the correlation coefficient for the SC-D measure was insignificant and the coefficient for the OL measure was relatively low (r = .52, p<.01, N = 31). As a result, as the NASPECTS measure of self-complexity seems to be the most reliable index of self-complexity, this measure will be employed as a measure of self-complexity in Study 3 in grouping the participants into the four behavioral patterns of flexibility.

4.4.3. Descriptive statistics for the variables measured in the study. The means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values obtained for the variables measured in this study are presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3.

Descriptive Statistics for the Major Variables Measured in the Study.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	21.77	1.94	18.00	27.00
Self-Complexity Indexes				
NASPECT	4.91	1.78	2.00	10.00
OL	.28	.22	.00	.91
SC-D	2.82	.70	1.22	4.63
Positive SC-D	3,55	,28	2,81	4,16
Negative SC-D	3,17	3,32	2,54	3,94
Phi	,28	,09	,09	,59
Flexibility Indexes				
SumCaps	80.67	11.09	55.00	112.00
SumAnx	61.60	9.94	20.00	81.00
SumDiff	58.21	9.61	23.00	77.00
SumAvoid	63.24	9.35	21.00	83.00
IDF	.92	1.00	.00	4.00
SCC	4.57	1.30	1.58	7.00
SE	5.11	.87	2.50	6.40

Note. NASPECT: number of self-aspects, OL: overlap among self-aspects; Positive SC-D: Positive self-complexity, Negative SC-D: Negative self-complexity; Phi: Compartmentalization; SCC: Self-concept clarity; SumCaps: Sum of capabilities, SumAnx: Sum of anxiety scores, SumDiff: Sum of difficulty scores, SumAvoid: Sum of avoidance scores, IDF: Intradimensional flexibility; SE: Self-esteem.

As seen from the Table, the obtained scores for self-complexity cover a large part of the possible range (from 0 to 5.46), with the mean of the scores close to the middle of this possible range. However, although the lowest-scoring subject on self-complexity is close to the low end of the possible range, no subjects scored close to the high end of the possible range

As seen, the highest SCC (self-concept clarity) score was equal to the highest possible score, whereas the lowest scoring subject on this scale obtained a score of

21. As expected, the three indexes of flexibility, assumed to measure very close concepts (anxiety, difficulty and avoidance) had very close mean values. The capability composite had a slightly higher mean in the current sample compared to the original study by Paulhus and Martin (1988) and the other flexibility indexes had slightly lower means.

4.4.4. Correlations among the variables of the study. The correlations between the self-concept dimensions and flexibility indexes measured in the study are depicted in Table 4.4.

Since there was no significant gender difference on any of the major variables of the study, the analyses were run without seperating samples on the basis of gender.

As seen in the upper part of Table 4.4., as expected self-complexity is highly correlated with both positive (r (123) = .83, p<.001) and negative (r (123) = .70, p<.001) self-complexity. Consistent with Rafaeli-Mor et al.'s findings (1999), self-complexity had a strong positive correlation with NASPECTS (r (123) = .68, p<.001). However, contrary to expectations, the same researchers found overlap to be mildly positively related to the dimensionality measure. In this study, overlap and dimensionality were found to be unrelated. Moreover, the overlap measure did not show any significant relationship with any of the variables employed in the study, except for a weak but significant negative correlation with the number of self-aspects (r (123) = -.21, p<.05). This finding, together with the previous findings of the study indicating inconsistent ß values for the OL measure renders the reliability of this

measure questionable. Thus, NASPECTS and SC-D indexes of self-complexity, which show higher reliability and more consistent correlations, will be employed in further analyses.

As expected, the two self-concept measures, self-concept clarity and self-complexity are unrelated to each other, as marked by the insignificant correlations between self-concept clarity and all three measures of self-complexity (SC-D, NASPECT and OL). This finding provided support to the orthogonality of the two dimensions of self-concept structure: Integration and differentiation.

On the other hand, as seen in Table 4.4, moderate to high negative correlations exist between sum of capabilities and the other three indexes of flexibility. These findings disconfirm the assumption that the two dimensions of behavioral flexibility are orthogonal to each other. However, considering that the magnitude of the correlations between the capabilities index and the other three indexes is smaller than .50, while the correlations among the anxiety, difficulty and avoidance indexes vary between .72 and .80, it can be assumed that the capabilities index represents a different component than the other three indexes.

The intradimensional flexibility index (IDF) represents the number of capabilities reported for the bipolar adjectives on the circumplex. Higher scores on this index indicate a greater number of capabilities reported for both poles on the circumplex. However, Paulhus and Martin (1988) note that the use of this index does not add any

information over the use of the capabilities index. Consistent with the findings of Paulhus and Martin, the present study revealed a correlation of r = .70 (p<.01) between IDF and the capabilities index. Thus, the IDF index will not be used in the following analyses.

Another interesting finging in Table 4.4 is the strong negative correlation between self-complexity and compartmentalization (r (123) = -.84, p<.01). Showers (1992) indicated that these variables should be unrelated on theoretical grounds and Campbell et al. (2000) emprically supported this thesis. The high negative correlation in this study is contradictory to these findings. However, this negative correlation between compartmentalization and self-complexity is consistent with Steiner's (1954) conceptualization of complexity.

Steiner defined complexity as the acknowledgement of differently valenced qualities to coexist in the same perception object. Compartmentalization does not ignore the possibility of differently valenced traits to coexist in the same individual. However, in a compartmentalized perception of the self, positively and negatively valenced traits are isolated into distinct categories, where the self-aspects are viewed as absolutely positive or absolutely negative. The isolation creates cognitive simplicity in the perception of the self, while any activated self-aspect can be viewed as homogenously valenced in a compartmentalized organization. Thus, cognitively and theoretically, a negative association between self-complexity and compartmentalization makes sense, and this issue requires further investigation.

Table 4.4.

Correlations among the Major Variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. SC-D	1,00											
2. NASP	,68**	1,00										
3. OL	,11	-,21*	1,00									
4. PosSC-D	,83**	,62**	,10	1,00								
5. NegSC-D	,70**	,49**	-,17	,36**	1,00							
6. Phi	-,84**	-,75**	,05	-,72**	-,73**	1,00						
7. SCC	-,17	-,06	,09	,05	-,38**	,19*	1,00					
8. SE	,08	,12	,07	,20*	-,23*	,03	,77**	1,00				
9. SumCaps	,32**	,25**	,10	,27**	,17	-,18*	,22*	,31**	1,00			
10. SumAvoid	-,18*	-,16	,06	-,15	-,21*	,18*	-,29**	-,23*	-,43**	1,00		
11. SumAnx	-,08	-,10	-,02	-,08	-,06	,07	-,40**	-,42**	-,45**	,77**	1,00	
12. SumDiff	-,10	-,12	-,02	-,06	-,11	,10	-,30**	-,31**	-,50**	,72**	,80**	1,00
13. IDF	,20*	,20*	,01	,25**	,10	-,13	,12	,23*	,70**	-,38**	-,37**	-,38**

*p<.05
**p<.01

Note. SC-D: Dimensionality statistic; NASPECT: number of self-aspects, OL: overlap among self-aspects; Positive SC-D: Positive self-complexity, Negative SC-D: Negative self-complexity; Phi: Compartmentalization; SCC: Self-concept clarity; SE: Self-esteem; SumCaps: Sum of capabilities, SumAnx: Sum of anxiety scores, SumDiff: Sum of difficulty scores, SumAvoid: Sum of avoidance scores, IDF: Intradimensional flexibility.

As expected, self-concept clarity is strongly linked to the deliberate control dimension of behavioral flexibility. Table 4.4 shows that self-concept clarity has negative correlations ranging from -.29 to -.40 with the three indexes assumed to represent deliberate control (all significant at the $p<.01$ level). However, unexpectedly, self-concept clarity also shows a weaker positive correlation with the capabilities index (r (123) = .22), significant at $p<.05$ level. Thus, the expectation that self-concept integration, as measured by self-concept clarity, would be related to the deliberate control dimension, but not to the repertoire dimension of behavioral flexibility is only partially supported. However, the fact that the magnitude and the significance level of the relationship between self-concept clarity and capabilities is quite small compared to those between clarity and the other three indexes still shows that integration is more strongly associated with deliberate control rather than repertoire.

In order to examine the unique predictive power of repertoire and deliberate control indices on the two self-concept variables, two regression equations were tested. The first model employed self-concept clarity while the second model employed self-complexity as the dependent variable as predicted by the flexibility indexes (See Table 4.5 and Table 4.6).

Table 4.5

Standard Regression of Flexibility Indexes on Self-Concept Clarity.

	ß	t	Sig.
SumCaps	.06	.58	.57
SumAnx	-.41	-2.54	.01
SumDiff	.03	.18	.86
SumAvoid	.02	.15	.88
		R = .40	R^2 = .16
			Adjusted R^2 = .13

As seen in Table 4.5, the flexibility indexes explained 16% of the variance in self-concept clarity (R = .40, F = 5.18, p<.01). As seen, when all the flexibility indexes were entered together to the model, only the unique contribution of the sum of anxiety scores was significant (β =-.41, t = -2.54, p<.01). The unique contribution of the anxiety score to the total variance in self-concept clarity is equal to sr^2 = -.22.

Table 4.6

Standard Regression of Flexibility Indexes on Self-Complexity.

	ß	T	Sig.
SumCaps	.32	3.07	.01
SumAnx	.09	.58	.57
SumDiff	.11	.67	.51
SumAvoid	-.19	-1.31	.19
		R = .33	R^2 = .11
			Adjusted R^2 = .08

As seen in Table 4.6, the flexibility indexes explained 11% of the variance in self-complexity (R = .33, F = 3.38, p<.01). As seen, when all the flexibility indexes are entered together to the model, only the unique contribution of the sum of capabilities scores was significant (β =.33, t = 3.07, p<.01). The unique contribution of the capabilities score to the total variance in self-complexity is equal to sr^2 = .27.

The results of the regression analyses indicated that, although the zero-order correlations presented before showed that self-complexity was only related to the capability index whereas self-concept clarity was related to all the flexibility indexes, the unique contributions calculated by a standard regression analysis tend to support the initial hypotheses.

CHAPTER 5

STUDY 3

In Study 2, the relationship between the dimensions of self-concept structure and behavioral flexibility was established in addition to the investigation of the reliabilities and validities of the major instruments employed in this study. Study 3 aims to elaborate on the four behavioral patterns constructed by crossing of the two dimensions examined in Study 2. The hypotheses regarding the differences between those four groups were listed in Section 2.3.2. In order to test these hypotheses, 11 different measures were employed in this study.

Three measures of adjustment, self-esteem, depressive smptomatology and the emotional stability dimension of the Big Five Model, were employed in order to differentiate between functionally flexible and effacingly rigid individuals. Functionally flexible group was expected to score highest on measures of adjustment and lowest on depressive symptomatology, whereas the reverse was expected for the effacingly rigid group. Stereotypically rigid and situationally flexible participants were expected to be in between, however, stereotypically rigid pattern was expected to be higher on indicators of psychological adjustment.

Need for approval and locus of control measures were expected to differentiate situationally flexible and effacingly rigid participants from functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid ones. Effacing rigidity was expected to be especially high on need for approval, whereas both effacingly rigid and situationally flexible individuals were expected to show external locus of control compared to the other two groups.

Need for cognition, an indicator of cognitive rigidity, was expected to be low for stereotypically and effacingly rigid individuals, while situationality, a measure of situation-dependency, was expected to be very high for situationally flexible individuals.

Openness to experience and extraversion dimensions of the Big Five Model were expected to differentiate functionally and situationally flexible individuals from the rigid groups. No prior expectations were noted for the agreeableness and conscientiousness dimensions of the model.

All assessment tools employed in this study in order to measure above variables are briefly explained in Section 5.2.

5.1. Participants

Two hundred and forty-two (139 females and 101 males) Middle East Technical University students participated in the study on a voluntary basis. Mean age for participants was 21,27 with a standard deviation of 1,78.

5.2. Materials

Measures of self-complexity trait sort task (Linville, 1987), Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996), Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (Paulhus & Martin, 1987), which were employed in the second study were readministered to the participants in this study. In addition to these measures, the participants were asked to complete Goldberg's (1981) measure of situationality, the Turkish version of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo and Petty, 1984; Gülgöz and Sadowski, 1995), Locus of Control Scale (Dağ, 2002), two subscales (i.e., "concern about what others think" and "pleasing others") from the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale (Beck, Epstein, Harrison & Emery, 1983; Şahin, Ulusoy & Şahin, 1993), Depression subscale of the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 1992; Şahin & Durak, 1994) and Ten Item Personality Measure (Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003) in this study. Seven-point resonse sets were employed in all scales except for the depression subscale of the Brief Symptom Inventory and Goldberg's situationality measure, which employed 5-point response sets.

5.2.1. Goldberg's Measure of Situationality. Aforementioned measure of Goldberg (1981)'s situationality unconfounds situational attributions from other middle options, such as uncertain, neutral and ambiguous ones. Paulhus and Martin (1988) employed this measure on 16 nodes of the interpersonal circumplex to assess situational flexibility, by assigning a score of 1 for each "situational" response and a score of 0 for all other responses. The Turkish form of this measure is presented in Appendix E.

Similar to the Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC), a Cronbach α internal consistency measure is not an appropriate measure of reliability for the situationality measure. However, Paulhus and Martin demonstrated that functional flexibility and situational flexibility load on different factors when pooled data was factor analyzed to test divergent validity. In order to test whether situationality can indeed be separated from flexibility in a factor analysis as shown by Paulhus and Martin, a principle components analysis was conducted on situationality and four indexes of flexibility. As situationality and flexibility seem to be correlated as shown in Table 3.8, a direct oblimin rotation was employed. Results of the factor analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues over 1 (First factor, which can be called the flexibility factor, explained 51.55% of the total variance with an eigenvalue of 2.55, and the second factor, which can be called the situationality factor explained 21.21%, eigenvalue = 1.06). The loading plot resulting from this analysis can be seen in Figure 5.1. The structure outlined in the graph replicates the structure found by Paulhus and Martin (1988). Thus, although the correlations between the measures do not totally overlap, the overall structure revealed in this study seemed to replicate Paulhus and Martin's findings.



Figure 5.1

Factor Loadings for the Four Flexibility Indexes and the Situationality Index on Situationality and Flexibility Factors

5.2.2. Need for Cognition Scale. Need for cognition is a construct that represents the tendency to seek and enjoy deep thinking, even when it is not required by the external situation (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982). Cacioppo and Petty (1984) developed an 18-item short form of their original (1982) Need for Cognition Scale, which showed high internal consistency (Chronbach α = .91) and test – retest reliability (r = .88, p<.0001). The short form of the scale was adapted to Turkish by Gülgöz and Sadowski (1995). The Turkish form of the scale revealed internal consistency coefficients ranging from .69 to .78 and a temporal reliability of r (69) = .55 (p<.001). The factor structure of the Turkish form was close to the original form. Although reliability coefficients are relatively low and no validation measure was presented in this study, the psychometric qualities are still in the acceptable range for the Turkish form of the Need for Cognition Scale (See Appendix F).

5.2.3. Locus of Control Scale. Locus of control refers to the degree individuals perceive reinforcement as contingent on their own behaviors versus as dependent on external factors, such as other people, luck or chance (Rotter, 1966). Rotter's original Internal-External Locus of Control Scale was adapted to Turkish by Dağ (1991). However, a new scale measuring this construct was rendered necessary by the scale's reliance on two-choice response format and the lack of attention to important control areas such as health. Dağ (2002) developed a Turkish scale which employs a multiple choice response format and represents control situations from many areas of daily life such as health and governmental issues. The scale is comprised of 47 items selected from an initial pool of 80. The internal consistency of these 47 items is α = .91. The scale showed a structure of 5 meaningful factors; named "personal control", "belief in chance", "meaninglessness of the effortfulness", "belief in fate" and "belief in an unjust world" by the researcher. In this study, only the 18 items that loaded on the first factor were used, as a feeling of personal control over own behaviors and the consequences of these behaviors is what is intended to be measured in this study. This factor had a Cronbach α value of .87 and explained 12% of the total variance. It also revealed high correlations with the belief in chance, meaningless of the effortfulness, belief in fate and belief in an unjust world factors of the scale, ranging from .55 to .81, showing that it is a good overall measure of locus of control. Higher scores on this measure represent more internal locus of control (See Appendix G).

5.2.4. Sociotropy – Autonomy Scale (SAS). Originally developed by Beck, Epstein, Harrison and Emery (1983), the SAS aims to measure two different personality tendencies: Sociotropy, which represents a tendency to be dependent on others, and

autonomy, which represents a tendency to be independent. The original scale shows high internal consistency, with Cronbach α values in .89 - .94 range for sociotropy and in .83 - .95 range for autonomy. Test-retest reliability changed between r = .65 and r = .88 for sociotropy and between r = .66 and r = .75 for autonomy. The scale was adapted to Turkish by Şahin, Ulusoy and Şahin (1993). In the Turkish version, the internal consistency measures for sociotropy and autonomy were α = .70 and α = .81 respectively in a clinical sample, .83 and .81 respectively in a student sample. As expected, sociotropy subscale showed significant correlations with Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (r = .37, p<.001) and was functional in distingusihing clinical grups from normal samples (t = 6.82, p<.01). Both subscales revealed three factors: Concern about what others think, concern over separation and pleasing others for the sociotropy subscale, and personal success, freedom and enjoying loneliness for the autonomy subscale. In this study, SAS is employed as a measure of need for approval and dependency on external feedback. Consequently, only the "concern about what others think" and "pleasing others" factors of the sociotropy subscale were used, making up a total of 17 items. The questions from the "concern about what others think" and "pleasing others" factors were presented in Appendix H.

5.2.5. Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI). Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 1992) is the 53-item short form of SCL-90-R. Like SCL-90-R, the inventory is composed of 9 subscales and additional items. The subscales of the original form revealed internal consistencies between α = .71 and α = .85 and test-retest reliabilities between r = .68 and r = .91. The scale was adapted to Turkish by Şahin and Durak (1994) with Cronbach α for the whole scale in the .95 - .96 range, and Cronbach α for the

subscales ranging from .55 to .86. The scale also showed adequate validity. In this study, only the 6 items representing the depression subscale of the inventory are used (See Appendix I).

5.2.6. Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI). Gosling et al. (2003) note that researchers are often faced with a trade-off between using long multi-item questionnaires to guarantee high reliability and content validity and using shorter measures which make it possible to measure a greater number of variables in the same study and to attract more participants. Motivated by this practical need for shorter instruments, Gosling and his collegues developed a ten-item measure of Big Five model, employing two items (one reverse coded) for each Big Five dimension (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability and Openness to Experience). Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) dimensions showed quite high correlations with the Big Five dimensions measured employing the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John and Srivasta, 1999); r = .87 for extraversion, r = .70 for agreeableness, r = .75 for conscientiousness, r = .81 for emotional stability and r = .65 for openness to experience). The measure also showed test-retest reliability estimates ranging from r = .62 (for openness to experience) to r = .77 (for extraversion). The correlations computed between TIPI outside measures such as Brief Loquaciousness Interpersonal Responsiveness Test (Swann & Rentfrow, 2001), Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, Beck (1972) Depression Inventory and Math Identification Questionnaire (Brown & Josephs, 1999) were very close in magnitude with the correlations computed between these same scales and the 44-item measure. The Turkish form of

this short inventory was constructed by Sumer and Engin (2004). Overall, the scale revealed the expected relationships between Big Five dimensions and measures such as romantic anxiety, romantic avoidance, parental overprotection and rejection. However, the relabilty and validity of the scale are currently being tested. Turkish form of TIPI was presented in Appendix J.

5. 3. Results and Discussion

5.3.1. Descriptive statistics for the variables measured in the study. The means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values and α values obtained for the major variables measured in this study were presented in Table 5.1.

Both the self-complexity and flexibility indexes revealed means and standard deviations comparable in magnitude to those found in the second study.

The Chronbach α values were not computed for the flexibility and self-complexity indexes, for which the Chronbach α coefficient is not an appropriate measure of reliability. Moreover, as the TIPI, employed in this study as a measure of Five Factor dimensions, is comprised of only two questions for each dimension, the α values for this instrument were also not presented. As seen in Table 5.1, all the other instruments employed in the study revealed high internal consistency.

Table 5.1.

Descriptive Statistics for the Major Variables Measured in Study 3.

Table 5.1.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	α *
Self-Complexity Indexes					
NASPECT	3.96	1.5	1.00	10.00	
OL	.30	.18	0.00	.92	
SC-D (Dimensionality)	2.42	.88	.51	5.25	
Positive SC-D	3.43	.35	2.41	4.20	
Negative SC-D	3.02	.32	2.41	3.92	
Phi	.35	.14	.01	1.00	
Flexibility Indexes					
SumCaps	88.44	8.88	58.00	103.00	
SumAnx	60.44	8.24	30.00	80.00	
SumDiff	58.37	9.07	31.00	85.00	
SumAvoid	62.20	8.70	32.00	104.00	
Big Five Variables**					
Extraversion	4.81	1.54	1.00	7.00	
Conscientiousness	5.02	1.47	1.00	7.00	
Openness to Experience	5.19	1.43	1.50	7.00	
Emotional Stability	3.71	1.48	1.00	7.00	
Agreeableness	5.01	1.12	2.00	7.00	
Locus of Control	5.13	.62	3.35	6.55	.82
Need for Cognition	4.86	.78	2.33	6.94	.87
Need for Approval	4.28	.75	1.53	6.40	.81
BSI-Depression	1.14	.86	0.00	3.50	.85
Situationality	4.83	2.55	0.00	16.00	
Self-Concept Clarity	4.63	1.12	1.50	6.92	.86
Self-Esteem	5.39	1.12	1.40	7.0	.91

*α values not applicable for situationality, self-complextiy and flexibility indexes.

** α values not computed for Big Five variables as each dimension is comprised of only 2 items.

Note. NASPECT: number of self-aspects, OL: overlap among self-aspects, Phi: Compartmentalization, SumCaps: Sum of capabilities, SumAnx: Sum of anxiety scores, SumDiff: Sum of difficulty scores, SumAvoid: Sum of avoidance scores.

5.3.2. Correlations among the variables of the study. Correlations between the major variables of this study are shown in Table 5.2.

The positive correlation between self-complexity and the number of self-aspects and the negative correlation between compartmentalization and self-complexity found in the second study were replicated in this study (r (242) = .71, p<.01 and r (242) = -.87, p<.01 respectively). Although Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999) demonstrated a positive correlation between overlap measure and dimensionality statistic, the second study of this thesis failed to replicate this finding. However, this positive correlation is replicated in this study (r (242) = .44, p<.01).

On the relationship between the self-concept dimensions and flexibility indexes, a similar pattern to the second study was observed. However, the significant negative relationship between self-concept clarity and the avoidance index was not replicated in this study, in addition to the greatly reduced magnitude of the correlation between the same variable and the difficulty index (r = -.13, p<.05). Thus, the reliability of the correlations between self-concept clarity and the difficulty and avoidance indexes are questionable.

Table 5.2. Intercorrelations Among the Major Variables Employed in the Study.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
1	1.00																		
2	-.09	1.00																	
3	.71[2]	-.08	1.00																
4	.44[2]	.13[1]	.05	1.00															
5	-.87[2]	.13[1]	-.73[2]	-.26[2]	1.00														
6	.27[2]	.09	.20[2]	.12	-.30[2]	1.00													
7	-.13[1]	-.18[2]	-.10	-.05	.14[1]	-.43[2]	1.00												
8	-.13	-.13[1]	-.11	-.05	.15[1]	-.55[2]	.64[2]	1.00											
9	-.16[1]	-.08	-.12	-.05	.16[1]	-.27[2]	.58[2]	.51[2]	1.00										
10	-.09	-.22[2]	-.11	.02	.06	-.30[2]	.39[2]	.38[2]	.24[2]	1.00									
11	.04	.19[1]	-.01	.10	.03	-.01	.03	-.05	.08	-.14[1]	1.00								
12	-.05	.15[1]	-.15[1]	.06	.11	.09	.02	-.04	.04	.01	.21[2]	1.00							
13	.05	-.01	.05	.07	-.12	.26[2]	-.14[1]	-.12	-.01	-.09	-.09	-.01	1.00						
14	.13[1]	.22[1]	.09	.12	-.11	.19[2]	-.16[1]	-.16[1]	-.07	-.21[2]	.23[2]	-.01	-.07	1.00					
15	-.09	.11	.01	.03	.15[1]	-.16[1]	.12	.11	.02	.14[1]	.03	-.19[2]	-.23[2]	.09	1.00				
16	-.18[1]	.34[2]	-.16[1]	.11	.25[2]	-.03	-.06	.03	.01	.04	.09	.11	-.03	.01	.07	1.00			
17	-.04	.30[2]	.03	.08	.13[1]	.03	-.09	-.10	-.01	-.18[2]	.11	.16[1]	.01	.13[1]	.18[2]	.23[2]	1.00		
18	.06	.09	.15[1]	.05	.00	.19[2]	-.10	-.19	-.03	-.26[2]	.34[2]	-.09	-.08	.37[2]	.15[1]	-.02	.19[2]	1.00	
19	.00	-,47[2]	.01	-.11	-.07	-.06	.182	.151	.10	.30[2]	-.15[1]	-.16[1]	.03	-.32[2]	-.12	-.32[2]	-.39[2]	-.21[2]	1.00
20	.04	.49[2]	.06	.16[1]	.04	.21[2]	-.26[2]	-.202	-.18[2]	-.30[2]	.27[2]	.20[2]	.00	.36[2]	.14[1]	.36[2]	.31[2]	.24[2]	-.62[2]

[1] p<.05, [2] p<.01

Note. 1: Dimensionality, 2: Self-concept clarity, 3: Number of self-aspects, 4: Overlap, 5: Compartmentalization, 6: Sum of capabilities, 7: Sum of anxiety scores, 8: Sum of difficulty scores, 9: Sum of avoidance scores, 10: Need for approval, 11: Need for cognition, 12: Locus of control, 13: Situationality, 14: Extraversion, 15: Agreeableness, 16: Conscientiousness, 17: Emotional stability, 18: Openness to experience, 19: Depressive symptamatology, 20: Self-esteem

The correlations among the Big Five dimensions were in the same direction and comparable in magnitude to the correlation coefficients reported by Gosling et al. (2003), except for the correlations of conscientiousness with extraversion and agreeableness. The small positive correlations reported by Gosling et al. (2003) were not replicated in this study.

The negative correlation between need for approval and the capabilities index, and the positive correlations between need for approval and the other three flexibility indexes indicate a negative link between functional flexibility and need for approval. Although this finding seems contradictory to the findings of Paulhus and Martin (1988), indicating no significant correlation between any of the flexibility indexes and social desirability, it is consistent with the hypotheses of this study. Specifically, it was proposed that need for approval is closely related to the deliberate control dimension of behavioral flexibility, where a person who is high on this dimension would be low on need for approval.

The sum of capabilities index is also positively related to extraversion and openness to experience (r = .19, p<.01 for both). Extraversion also revealed weak negative correlations with the anxiety and difficulty indexes (r = -.16, p<.05 for both). Extraversion seems to be positively related to functional flexibility. Openness to experience, however, is only related to the capabilities index of flexibility. Thus, this variable is related to behavioral repertoire, but is independent of deliberate control over this repertoire.

Situationality seems to be positively related to functional flexibility (r = .26, p<.01 for the capabilities index and r = -.14, p<.05 for the anxiety index). Paulhus and Martin (1988) found no significant correlation between these two measures. In this study, situationality was expected to characterize situationally flexible individuals, who have a large number of behavioral capabilities. Thus, the positive correlation between the capabilities index and situationality is in line with the propositions of the study. However, situationality was at the same time expected to be negatively related to the deliberate control dimension of behavioral flexibility. Hence, the negative correlation between the situationality measure and the anxiety index casts doubt upon the validity of the situationality index as a measure of situational flexibility.

5.3.3. Test of the hypotheses regarding the differences between four behavioral patterns. In order to test the hypotheses regarding the expected differences between the four behavioral patterns identified by two fundamental dimensions depicted in Figure 2.2, the participants were classified into four groups according to their scores on the two self-concept variables: Self-complexity and self-concept clarity. NASPECTS, which exhibited highest internal consistency and test-retest reliability among the self-complexity indexes, was employed as the measure of self-complexity in this study. The groups representing the four proposed behavioral patterns were formed by employing a K-Cluster with 4 groups. The centers of the final clusters formed after 7 iterations and the number of participants in each cluster are presented in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3.

The Cluster Centers of the Four Behavioral Patterns.

	Functional	Stereotypical	Situational	Effacing
N	74	62	34	68
Self-Concept Clarity	5.31	5.28	4.41	3.38
Self-Complexity	4.36	2.42	6.65	3.62

As a preliminary check, four ANOVAs were performed in order to test whether these four groups formed on the basis of self-concept variables actually differ on flexibility variables as required by the proposed relationship between the self-concept structure dimensions and the dimensions of behavioral flexibility. The first part of Table 5.4 shows the means of the four flexibility indexes for the four groups tested for significance of differences by a post-hoc Duncan test. The difficulty and avoidance indexes revealed no significant differences between the four groups. These two indexes also failed to significantly predict self-concept clarity in Study 2 (Table 4.5, p. 56), and thus, were deemed inappropriate as indexes of deliberate control dimension. The capabilities index shows the expected pattern by separating the flexible participants from rigid ones (F = 2.57, p<.05). Situationally flexible participants show the widest behavioral repertoire (M = 82.71), while stereotypically rigid participants are characterized by a relatively narrow repertoire (M = 72.94). As expected, the anxiety index differentiates functionally flexible individuals (M = 58.00) from situationally flexible (M = 61.37) and effacingly rigid (M = 62.72) ones, with the stereotypically rigid participants (M = 60.81) in between (F = 3.65, p<.01). Thus, overall, the four clusters exhibit sufficient overlap with the flexibility patterns as measure by the four indexes of behavioral flexibility.

Table 5.4

Differences between the Four Behavioral Pattern Groups on the Variables Hypothesized to be Related to Behavioral Flexibility and Self-Concept Structure.

	Behavioral Pattern					
	Func. Flex.	Stereo. Rig.	Situat. Flex.	Effac. Rig.	F	η^2
Flexibility						
SumCaps	82.04[a]	72.94[b]	82.71[a]	79.26[ab]	2.57*	.04
SumAnx	58.00[a]	60.81[ab]	61.37[b]	62.72[b]	3.65**	.04
SumDiff	56.95	58.90	56.96	60.07	1.75	.03
SumAvoid	60.68	63.18	61.68	63.21	1.35	.02
NFA	4.19[a]	4.25[a]	4.04[a]	4.53[b]	4.06**	.06
NFC	4.78[ab]	5.10[a]	5.02[a]	4.66[b]	3.81**	.05
LOC	5.13[ab]	5.33[a]	4.93[b]	5.03[b]	3.88**	.04
Sit.	5.23	4.76	4.64	4.63	.85	.00
BSI-D	.80[a]	.89[a]	1.23[b]	1.66[c]	15.99**	.18
SE	5.82[a]	5.60[a]	5.49[a]	4.71[b]	15.03**	.16
Big Five						
Extra.	4.98[ab]	4.82[ab]	5.05[a]	4.41[b]	2.07*	.04
Agree.	4.99	5.04	4.90	5.04	.15	.00
Cons.	5.33[a]	5.29[a]	4.46[b]	4.80[ab]	4.14**	.04
Em. Stab.	4.17[a]	3.72[ab]	3.65[ab]	3.28[b]	4.38**	.07
Op. Exp.	5.17[a]	5.22[a]	5.88[b]	4.85[a]	4.08**	.05

*p <.05, **p <.01

Note. Means with different superscripts within a row differ significantly by using Duncan test at $p < .05$.

SumCaps: Sum of capabilities, SumAnx: Sum of anxiety scores, SumDiff: Sum of difficulty scores, SumAvoid: Sum of avoidance scores, NFA: Need for Approval, NFC: Need for Cognition, LOC: Locus of Control, Sit: Situationality, BSI-D: Brief Symptom Inventory – Depression, SE: Self-Esteem, Extra: Extraversion, Agree: Agreeableness, Cons: Conscientiousness, Em. Stab.: Emotional Stability, Op. Exp.: Openness to Experience.

A series of ANOVAs followed by post-hoc analyses using Duncan student test were conducted in order to test whether four behavioral patterns formed on the basis of cluster analysis differ on grounds of need for approval, need for cognition, locus of control, situationality, depressive symptomatology, self-esteem and the Big Five dimensions in accordance with the hypotheses presented in Sections 2.3.2 through 2.3.5.

All three measures of psychological adjustment employed in this study (i.e., depressive symptomatology, self-eseem and emotional stability from the Big Five Inventory) revealed significant mean differences between the groups (F = 15.99, p<.01; F = 15.03, p<.01 and F = 4.38, p<.01 respectively). As expected, functionally flexible individuals were distinguishable from other participants by the measures of psychological adjustment. They reported low depressive symptomatology (M = .80), high self-esteem (M = 5.82) and emotional stability (M = 4.17) scores. On the contrary, effacingly rigid participants were low on psychological adjustment. They had the highest depressive symptomatology (M = 1.66), lowest self-esteem scores (M = 4.71) and lowest emotional stability (M = 3.28) among all the behavioral pattern clusters.

Stereotypically rigid participants do not differ from functionally flexible participants on any of the psychological adjustment measures. The same is true for the situationally flexible participants, except for depressive symptomatology, on which they score higher (M =1.23) than both functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid (M = .89), but lower than effacingly rigid participants. These findings are consistent

with the basic premise of this study that both stereotypically rigid and situationally flexible individuals can function effectively and exhibit high levels of psychological adjustment when appropriate conditions are provided.

The need for approval (F = 4.06, p<.01), need for cognition (F = 3.81, p<.01) and locus of control measures also revealed significant differences between the behavioral patterns groups.

All the hypotheses of this study regarding functionally flexible and effacingly rigid individuals were confirmed. As expected, functionally flexible individuals had low need for approval (M = 4.19), high need for cognition (M = 4.78), internal locus of control (M = 5.13). Moreover, they were extraverted (M = 4.98) and conscientious (M = 5.33). Effacingly rigid individuals showed the reverse pattern on all these variables (M = 4.53 for need for approval, M = 4.66 for need for cognition, M = 5.03 for locus of control, M = 4.41 for extraversion and M = 4.80 for conscientiousness).

As expected, stereotypically rigid individuals were low in need for approval (M = 4.25) and exhibited internal locus of control (M = 5.33). An unexpected result for stereotypical rigidity was their high score on need for cognition (M = 5.10). They also did not differ from neither functionally flexible (M = 5.17) nor effacingly rigid (M = 4.85) individuals on openness to experience (M = 5.22). These findings cast doubt upon the assumption that behavioral flexibility is accompanied by cognitive rigidity.

Situationally flexible participants had external locus of control, as expected. However, they did not differ from functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid individuals, and were significantly lower than effaingly rigid individuals on need for approval (M = 4.04). More importantly, the ANOVA on the situationality measure did not reveal significant differences between clusters on this measure. The situationality measure was reported to be negatively correlated with self-esteem by both Paulhus and Martin (1988; r (71) = -.28, p <. 05) and Golberg (1981; r (233) = -.40, p < .01). It can be seen from Table 5.2 that this study fails to replicate these results. Situationality did not correlate with self-esteem and depression. Hence, the possibility of a general measurement problem with the situationality measure should not be disregarded.

The extraversion (F = 2.07, p<.05), conscientiousness (F = 4.14, p<.01), emotional stability (F = 4.38, p<.01) and openness to experience (F = 4.08, p<.01) dimensions of the Big Five Model significantly differed between the goups. No difference was observed for the aggreeableness dimension.

Two unexpected findings about the situational flexibility cluster are the high scores of this group on extraversion (M = 5.05) and openness to experience (M = 5.88), and their low scores on conscientiousness (M = 4.46). It seems that having a large number of interpersonal capabilities plays an important role in openness to experience. However, the significant difference between functional flexibility (M = 5.17) and situational flexibility on this variable (F = 4.08, p<.01) suggests the

presence of factors other than capabilities on the determination of openness to experience. This issue will be discussed more elaborately in Section 6.2.2.

As seen from Table 5.4, although all ANOVAs except for those on situationality and agreeableness revealed significant F values, the effect sizes were small, with η^2 values between .02 and .07. The only exceptions to low effect sizes were those for depressive symptomatology ($\eta^2 = .18$) and self-esteem ($\eta^2 = .16$).

In addition to the ANOVA's, a direct discriminant function analysis was conducted using the four flexibility indexes, need for cognition, locus of control, need for approval, self-esteem, depressive symptomatology, situationality and the Big Five dimensions as the predictors of groups membership in four groups of flexibility. Three discriminant functions were calculated with a combined $\chi^2(45) = 81.21$, $p<.01$). After the removal of the first function, the association between the groups and the predictors were no longer significant. The first function accounted for 67% of the explained between-group variability. As seen in Figure 5.2, the first discriminant function separated the functionally flexible groups from the effacingly rigid group, while the second discriminant function separates situational flexibility from stereotypical rigidity. However, this second function is not significant. This finding matches with previous findings which clearly indicate a difference between functional flexibility and effacing rigidity, however, leave the differences between stereotypical rigidity and situational flexibility a little blurred.



Figure 5.2

Plots of Four Group Centroids on Two Discriminant Functions Derived from the Major Variables of the Study.

The correlations between the predictor variables and the first two discriminant functions are presented in Table 5.5. The correlations suggest that the best predictors for distinguishing between functional flexibility and effacing rigidity (i.e., the first discriminant function) are the psychological adjustment variables (i.e., self-esteem, depressive symptomatoogy and emotional stability) and need for approval. Although the second discriminant function does not significantly separate the groups, its correlations with the predictors are presented to give an idea on which variables might plausibly distinguish between situational flexibility and stereotypical rigidity. As seen from the Table, the best variables to distinguish between these two groups are the flexibility indexes (i.e., sum of capabilities, sum of anxiety scores, sum of difficulty scores and sum of avoidance scores) and locus of control.

Table 5.5

Correlations of Predictor Variables with Discriminant Functions

Predictor Variable	Function 1	Function 2
SumCaps	-.27	.42*
SumAnx	.31	-.43*
SumAvoid	.16	-.39*
Need for Cognition	-.13	-.35*
Locus of Control	-.12	-.55*
Need for Approval	.44*	-.07
Self-Esteem	-.83*	.02
Extraversion	-.29	.12
Agreeableness	.04	.01
Conscientiousness	-.28	-.24
Emotional Stability	-.45*	.05
Openness to Experience	-.17	.20
Situationality	-.14	.11
Depression	.84*	.23

* Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function.

A total of 94 cases (48%) were classified correctly by this analysis, compared to 54 cases (28%) that would be correctly classified by chance alone. The classification procedure worked especially well for functional flexibility, classifying 43 of the 65 cases in this category (66% as compared to the 33% chance level) and effacing rigidity, classifying 30 of the 57 cases correctly (53% as compared to the 29% chance level). The procedure also provided better classification for the stereotypically rigid (33% as compared to the 27% chance level) and situationally flexible (14% as compared to the 11% chance level) groups, however, the

contribution of the analysis over chance levels was relatively small for these two groups.

Overall, the results indicate that the functionally flexible and effacingly rigid groups can be clearly distinguished from each other. Although some differences have been found for the other two groups, the findings require more clarification.

5.3.4. Test of the mediational role of flexibility between self-concept structure and self-esteem. A final hypothesis of this study was that behavioral flexibility mediates the relationship between self-concept structure and self-esteem. Structural equation modeling was employed to test this hypothesis (Figure 5.2). NASPECTS was employed as a measure of self-complexity and the anxiety index, was used as an index of deliberate adjustment.

The independence model testing the hypothesis that variables are uncorrelated with each other was rejected (χ^2 (10, N = 242)= 157.55). However, the goodness of fit statistics (CFI = .69, RMSEA = .42) signal poor model fit for the hypothesized model.



Note. SCC: Self-concept clarity, NASP: Self-complexity, SUMCAPS: Sum of capabilities index, SUMANX: Anxiety index, SE: Self-esteem.

Figure 5.3 Path Model Depicting the Capabilities and Anxiety Indexes of Behavioral Flexibility as Mediators between Self-Concept Structure and Self-Esteem.

A redrawing of the path model with only the significant paths is depicted in Figure 5.3. As seen in the Figure, only the path from self-concept clarity to self-esteem through the anxiety index remains significant. However, the indirect effect of self-concept clarity on self-esteem is very low (β = .04, p<.05).



Figure 5.4 Redrawing of the Path Model after the Omission of Insignificant Paths.

The total effect of the anxiety index on self-esteem is significant (β = -.14, p<.05), while the total effect of self-concept clarity on the same variable is β = .50, p<.05. As a result, the hypothesis that behavioral flexibility acts as a mediator between self-concept structure and psychological adjustment was rejected. The only mediation effect occurs between self-concept clarity and self-esteem with the anxiety index of flexibility as the mediator, and the indirect effect computed from this path is relatively weak (Effect size = .02).

CHAPTER 6

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In this study, a model linking self-concept structure variables to patterns of behavioral flexibility was tested. A preliminary analysis of the model, together with reliability and validity analyses for the instruments employed with Turkish samples for the first time, was conducted in the second study. The third study aimed to test the whole model.

6. 1. The Dimensions of Self-Concept Structure and Behavioral Flexibility

The proposition of the model that the differentiation dimension of self-concept structure is linked to the repertoire dimension of behavioral flexibility, while the integration dimension is linked to the deliberate control dimension was largely supported. Self-complexity was found to be consistently linked to the sum of capabilities index in the two studies. Self-concept clarity yieded negative correlations with the other three indexes of flexibility, however, the correlation with the avoidance index was not consistent. This could be a result of the fact that the avoidance index measures a different situation than the other two indexes. The measures of anxiety and difficulty indexes capture a situation where the person has

engaged in a certain type of behavior, and they ask the subjective experience in the exhibition of the given behavior. The avoidance index, on the other hand, measures a situation where the behavior is not supposed to be exhibited. Therefore, while the first two indexes measure deliberate control over internal states, the avoidance index measures a passive kind of deliberate control over an external situation, where the situation is not manipulated, but only avoided.

As mentioned, the capabilities index is supposed to determine the quantity of flexibility (i.e., whether a person is behaviorally flexible or rigid), whereas the deliberate control index is supposed to determine the quality of flexibility (i.e., whether the person actively controls the exhibition of behaviors or leaves this control to the external situation) in the model tested in this study. Thus, for a person exhibiting a certain number of capabilities, the anxiety and difficulty indexes determine the quality of exhibition. However, the avoidance index does not provide such information as it defines a situation where those capabilities are not exhibited. Similarly, Paulhus and Martin (1988) note that avoidance situations in coping with anxiety sometimes lead to the point that no anxiety is experienced as all anxiety-arousing situations are carefully avoided. This leaves the function of the avoidance index blurred, as such a strategy is characterized by high behavioral restriction and control, whereas avoidance index is expected to be negatively correlated with deliberate control over behaviors. Hence, the avoidance index may not be a good measure of deliberate control.

6. 2. Findings Regarding Patterns of Behavioral Flexibility

6. 2. 1. Functional Flexibility

As expected, functionally flexible individuals were found to be high in self-esteem and low in depressive symptoms. However, although the means demonstrated that functionally flexible group was highest in self-esteem and lowest in depression, the difference between functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid individuals was not significant. A similar pattern was observed for emotional stability, where functionally flexible participants scored significantly higher than the effacingly rigid participants, but stereotypically rigid participants did not differ from either group significantly.

The similarity between functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid individuals appears to stem from their well-defined self-concepts. According to Baumgardner (1990), certainty about one's own attributes provides the ability to capitalize on these attributes in certain situations. Smith et al. (1996) also note that people with high self-concept clarity tend to choose more active strategies when coping with stress. However, the basic expectation in this study was that, having a greater number of self-aspects should provide the individual additional resources in dealing with the environment. For instance, Renaud and McConnell (2002) argued that individuals with higher self-complexity have a significant advantage in the suppression of self-relevant negative thoughts as they experience less rebound effect after the active suppression process involving unrelated self-aspects. This inability to disengage

oneself from the negative self-relevant information also seems to be similar to the concept of dysphoric rumination (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Dysphoric rumination is characterized by a persistent self-focus, especially following negative life events, and a belief that ruminative self-focus results in increased insight about the self accompanied by an unwillingness to engage in distracting activities that could reduce the existing negative mood. Thus, rumination results in extended periods of pessimism about interpersonal problems and the future (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), leading to perpetuation of depression.

Similarly, an inability to distract oneself from negative self-aspects by focusing on other aspects of one's life, or failing to efficiently use this strategy for a sufficient period of time as a result of rebound effects, could result in rumination and lengthened depressive episodes in individuals with low self-complexity. However, this negative effect of self-simplicity was not supported in this study. This failure to observe the expected effects could be a result of two factors.

First of all, despite its advantages in providing distraction to reduce negative mood and depressive thoughts, self-complexity has important disadvantages on decision-making. Niedenthal, Cantor and Kihlstrom (1985) suggest that prototype-matching, that is, examining the match between the self and an imagined situation and trying to maximize this similarity while choosing among available situations, is a widely-used decision-making strategy. Self-concept clarity provides an obvious advantage in the employment of this strategy, as it helps the individual with more clear information on the "self" side of this comparison (Setterlund and Niedenthal, 1993). An individual who is sure of her/his own attributes is better able to analyze the similarities and

dissimilarities between a decisional option and the self. The advantage of people with clear self-concepts in using this strategy creates a more active decision-making style and greater satisfaction with own decisions.

On the other hand, self-complexity results in a clear disadvantage in the employment of this active decision-making strategy, because the consequences of any decision seem to match at least one part of the complex self. Confirming this, Setterlund (1994) found that increased self-complexity was associated with longer decision-making time, with participants rating their decisions as more difficult and less satisfying. As a result, these problems in active decision-making and the resulting view of own decisions as unsatisfactory, may wipe out some of the positive effects of self-concept clarity in functionally flexible individuals, bringing them closer to stereotypically rigid individuals in well-being and self-esteem.

Secondly, as noted in Section 2.2.5, stereotypically rigid individuals can theoretically perform as well as functionally flexible individuals under relatively simple and stable environments. A clear knowledge of their own capabilities and the situations in which they can function easily may provide the stereotypically rigid individuals with an ability to make proactive decisions and avoid the complex and unstable environments altogether. The prototype-matching paradigm described above is a good example for this advantage of stereotypically rigid individuals: With their well-defined and simple self-concepts they can easily maximize situation-self similarity and prefer simple and stable environments in which they function easily. Thus, it can be argued that self-concept clarity is more important than self-complexity in the

determination of well-being and adjustment. This finding suggests that a simple flexibility – rigidity division is not sufficient for the explanation of the relationship between well-being and interpersonal flexibility.

6. 2. 2. Situational Flexibility

Situational flexibility was expected to be characterized by high situationality scores, external locus of control and a high need for approval. Only the locus of control measurement exhibited the expected result unequivocally. The situationally flexible individuals were lower in need for approval compared to the effacingly rigid group, and they did not differ from the functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid groups on this measure. Thus, although the situationally flexible individuals have external locus of control, the reason for this feeling is not a tendency to feel obligated to please other or an anxiety over social disapproval. In their study investigating the use of mechanical decision aids, Kaplan, Reneau and Whitecotton (2001) have demonstrated that individulas with external locus of control tended to rely more heavily on the decision aids. This finding indicates that the need for external information observed in individuals with external locus of control does not stem from a need for social approval, as the reliance on external decision aids can be observed even under unsocial decision making situations and with mechanical aids. Thus, these individuals may be searching for external clues simply because they lack the internal information about their own capabilities and identity, and feel the need for outside information in making decisions.

An interesting finding on situationally flexible individuals is their high openness to experience. It is plausible that openness to new experiences is related to the personality capabilities a person exhibits, as these capabilities will help smooth functioning under novel conditions. However, situationally flexible individuals score significantly higher than the functionally flexible group who exhibit a comparably high number of capabilities. Thus, openness to experience should also be related to the clarity of self-knowledge and deliberate adjustment.

A plausible explanation could again be related to the decision-making paradigm presented in the previous section. As both functionally and situationally flexible individuals have complex self-concepts, making self-situation matches under decision-making situations becomes more difficult (Setterlund, 1994). This makes both groups more open to a greater number of novel options, as any option may match a part of their complex self-concept. For the functionally flexible individuals, the clear self-concept helps to eliminate some of these choices by providing mismatch information for options that do not match any part of the complex self-concept. For the situationally flexible individuals, however, the complex and unintegrated structure of the self-concept makes it harder for such mismatch information to be created. Thus, it becomes harder for new options to be rejected and the individuals remains open to new experiences.

Conscientiousness is a broad variable known to enclose qualities like impulse control and ability to delay gratification, orderliness, industriousness, decisiveness, planfulness, propensity to follow rules and norms, and conventionality (Roberts,

Bogg, Walton, Chernyschenko & Stark, 2004). Especially conventionality and the tendency to follow norms are not consistent with the above view of situationally flexible individuals as open to new experiences. Moreover, many of the other behaviors outlined by the conscientious personality type, such as industriousness, planfulness and delay of gratification, require strict control of behaviors, which cannot be exhibited by situationally flexible individuals.

These findings reveal a relatively neutral view of situationally flexible individuals. Although they report higher depressive symptomatology compared to functionally flexible and stereotypically rigid individuals, they do not differ from these two groups on self-esteem. They are extraverted and open to new experiences. This makes it clear that, except for the additional daily stress they may face because of their tendency to continuously engage in new experiences, situationally flexible individuals can function quite well when appropriate conditions are provided. However, the problems with the situationality measure that could not be clarified in this study leaves this behavioral pattern questionable. Further studies are required to clearly define situational flexibility and to specify the conditions under which this behavioral pattern functions best.

6. 2. 3. Stereotypical Rigidity

Stereotypically rigid individuals were expected to be low in need for cognition and in openness to experience; a profile which favors the status quo. They were also

expected to be high in psychological adjustment, either equal to or just following functionally flexible individuals on these dimensions.

Surprisingly, stereotypically rigid individuals did not differ from functionally flexible individuals on any of the measures indicating psychological adjustment (i.e., self-esteem, depressive symptoms and emotional stability) or on any of the variables indicating cognitive openness (i.e., need for cognition and openness to experience). Under stable environmental conditions, the first result was expected. However, the finding that stereotypically rigid individuals scored quite high on need for cognition, and did not differ from any of the other groups on openness to experience is not consistent with the assumption that behavioral rigidity would be accompanied by at lest some degree of cognitive rigidity. However, in their review of cognitive and behavioral rigidity, Schultz and Searleman (2002) argue that rigidity can be defined in a number of steps. The first of these steps includes the formation of a mental or behavioral set, while the second step involves the perseveration of these sets in the face of pressure to change. More importantly they note that "a person who quickly forms a mental set should also be likely to quickly form a behavioral set" (p. 170), and that the speed of set formation and set perseveration are positively correlated such that the quick formation of a set signals the likelihood of stronger preservation. Thus, behavioral rigidity and cognitive rigidity should be related in some way. This brings about the question of whether stereotypical rigidity really differs from functional flexibility as a behavioral pattern as these two patterns do not differ on the expected measures. However, as seen inTable 5.4, these two patterns indeed differed on the critical measures that are supposed to indicate behavioral flexibility: The

measure of sum of capabilities. Thus, we can say that functional flexibility and stereotypical rigidity do represent two different behavioral patterns, however, the behavioral and cognitive implications of this difference are yet to be specified.

6. 2. 4. Effacing Rigidity

Effacing rigidity was expected to be accompanied by high depressiveness, low self-esteem, external locus of control, low emotional stability and high need for approval. Overall, the results supported the majority of these expectations. Effacingly rigid individuals were found to be low in emotional stability and self-esteem, high in depressive symptoms and were characterized by external locus of control. They also had the lowest need for cognition and highest need for approval scores among all the groups.

Effacing rigidity, by definition, seems to be close to mild depressive orientation in characteristics. Unipolar depression was found to be characterized by elevated levels of rigidity compared to both healthy individuals (Von Zerssen, Asukai, Tsuda, Ono, Kizaki & Cho, 1997) and to individuals with panic disorder (Sakado, Sato, Uehara, Sato, Sakado & Kumagai, 1997). This rigidity is observed on both cognitive and behavioral levels. On the cognitive side, depressive episodes are marked by stringent self-standards typified by perfectionism, strong social dependence (Vertogradova, Bannikov & Konkov, 1997) and an inability to disengage from negative self-focued thoughts (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). On the behavioral side, the ruminative tendencies are accompanied by a lack of energy, an unwillingness to

engage in novel and distracting activities (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995), and self-destructive behaviors that can extent to suicide (Skogman, Alsen & Ojehagen, 2004). Thus, the "rigidity" label seems to match well with the depressive cognitive and behavioral style.

Lowered extraversion and emotional instability are two other characteristics that typify depressive episodes (Vertogradova, Bannikov & Konkov, 1997). Extraversion, on the one hand, may be lowered by the view of the self as valueless and in need for protection (Baumeister, 1993). The defensive orientation of these individuals may make them prone to isolation. On the other hand, a tendency for lowered extraversion may perpetuate ruminative tendencies and play a role in the extension of depressive episodes. Lowered extraversion and social dependence mark the "effacing" side of effacingly rigid individuals, where the individual seeks isolation because of her/his negative view of the self and defensive orientation, but at the same time seeks the approval of others whom s/he views as the only source of self-esteem.

As a result, from an adjustment point of view, while all other groups of participants were expected to function well under at least some situations, these persistent dysfunctional attitudes (Weissman & Beck, 1978) are expected to erect an obstacle for effacingly rigid subjects to demonstrate psychological adjustment.

6. 3. Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research

Like many other social psychological studies, this study has been conducted on a student sample, representing a very well-educated, probably more individualistic minority of the population with a very restricted age range. Thus, the generalizability of the results to the population remains a question, together with the very feasibility of conducting this research in another sample from this population, with 45-minute questionnaires, asking sophisticated questions regarding self-knowledge.

Secondly, in Study 3, the formation of the four behavioral pattern groups was based on the two dimensions of self-concept structure, an indirect measure of group membership. This methodology was theoretically assumed to provide a good approximation to real group membership, however, a direct assessment of group membership or the dimensions of flexibility would obviously produce more reliable results. Thus, questionnaires assessing group membership to the four behavioral patterns directly need to be developed for better measurement in future studies.

Another limitation of the study is the self-report methodology that is employed to measure behavioral variables and the related problem of common method variance. The difference between behavioral and cognitive flexibility was highlightened in Chapter 2 of this study. However, the use of purely self-report methodology to infer levels in these behavioral variables is questionable, as the ability of individuals to analyze their own behaviors can be biased by factors such as limited experience in situations requiring given behaviors and social desirability effects.

The use of pure self-report methodology also limits the ability to test some aspects of the model. For instance, it was noted that stereotypically rigid individuals could function as well as functionally flexible individuals as long as stable and simple environmental conditions are provided. The fact that the two groups do not differ on any of the adjustment variables was explained by the possibility that stereotypically rigid individuals could be picking up environmental niches that match their specific qualities and could avoid complex, dynamic environments in a large part of their lives. As stereotypically rigid individuals will actively avoid dynamic environments in naturalistic conditions, this hypothesis could be best tested under a controlled laboratory environment, where the dynamism and the complexity of the environment are systematically manipulated. Similarly, situations under which stereotypically flexible individuals could function well might be specified with such methodology. Hence, follow-up studies clarifying these points are needed.

As mentioned, another problem with the present study could be the fact that the questionnaires were presented in the same order to all participants. Especially for the second study, in which it took about 45 minutes to complete the form, the quality of the responses to the last scales in the questionnaire form could have suffered from fatigue effect. Thus, a counter-balanced form of presentation could be more appropriate for future studies.

Apart from the sequence of presentation, no methodological and theoretical reason could be suggested in this study for the insignificant relationship between situationality and situational flexibility. Moreover, although some possibilities were

suggested, some of the findings regarding stereotypical rigidity were also unexpected. While functional flexibility and effacing rigidity seem to be closer to the traditional view of "pure flexibility" and "pure rigidity", situational flexibility and stereotypical rigidity appear in the transition area, having both functional and dysfunctional qualities. For instance, stereotypically rigid individuals are expected to function well under well-structured, stable environments with their clear self-concepts and high self-esteem. Situationally flexible individuals, on the other hand, are expected to adjust well to dynamic and unstructured situations with their large behavioral repertoire and openness to new experiences. As a result, future research on the area should focus specifically on clarifying the nature of these two behavioral patterns.

6. 4. Conclusion

This study has tested the relationship between self-concept structure and patterns of behavioral flexibility, by offering a model outlining four new patterns of flexibility together with their links to self-concept differentiation and integration. The claim that self-concept differentiation is linked to the number of behavioral capabilities a person possesses, while self-concept integration is linked to deliberate control over the exhibition of these capabilities has been confirmed. Thus, new behavioral implications of the differentiation and integration dimensions of self-concept structure have been revealed by the findings of this study.

One of the basic contributions of the study to the literature was a clarification on the complex structure of behavioral flexibility. A basic premise of the model was that behavioral flexibility could not be taken as a unidimensional construct, with flexibility on one end and rigidity on the other. This suggestion was also confirmed by findings that indicated the relationship between flexibility and adjustment to be more complex than outlined by the traditional view on the issue. The model presented in this study, where some types of rigidity may be functional under certain conditions, whereas some types of flexibility may be dysfunctional, provides a better fit with the social cognitive model where psychological adjustment is viewed as a dynamic equilibrium between flexibility and rigidity (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) as compared to the traditional model viewing flexibility as functional and rigidity as dysfunctional.

Overall, the findings have demonstrated the offered model to fit the data to a great extent, however, future research is needed in order to explain some of the unexpected results found in the study and to better understand the nature of the behavioral patterns offered in the study.

REFERENCES

Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likableness ratings of 555 personality trait words. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9*, 354-362.

Baumeister, R. F. (1993). Understanding the inner nature of low self-esteem: Uncertain, fragile, protective and conflicted. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Self-Esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard*. New York: Plenum Press.

Baumgardner, A. H. (1990). To know oneself is to like oneself: Self-certainty and self-affect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 1062 – 1072.

Beck, A. T., Epstein, R. P., Harrison, R. P. & Emery, J. (1983). *Development of the Sociotropy – Autonomy Scale: A measure of personality factors in psychopathology*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

Bem, S. L. (1974). The measurement of psychological androgyny. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42,* 155 – 162.

Bem, S. L. (1975). Sex role adaptability: One consequence of psychological androgyny. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31*, 634 – 643.

Bieri, J. (1966). Cognitive complexity and personality development. In O. J. Harvey (Ed.), *Experience, structure and adaptability (pp. 13 – 38)*. New York: Springer.

Boyacıoğlu, G. (1994). *Üniversite öğrencilerinde kişilerarası şemalar ve depresif belirtiler arasındaki ilişki.* Unpublished dissertation. Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Nörolojik Bilimler ve Psikiyatri Enstitüsü.

Brown, R. P. & Josephs, R. A. (1999). A burden of proof: Stereotype relevance and gender differences in math performance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76*, 246 – 257.

Cacioppo, J. T. & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42*, 116 – 131.

Cacioppo, J. T. & Petty, R. E. (1984). The need for cognition: Relationship to attitudinal processes. In R. P. McGlynn, J. E. Maddux, C. D. Stoltenberg and J. H. Harvey (Eds.), *Interfaces in psychology: Social perception in clinical and counseling psychology. (pp. 113 – 139)*. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech. Press.

Campbell, J. D. (1990). Self-esteem and clarity of the self-concept. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*, 538-549.

Campbell, J. D., Assanand, S. & Di Paula, A. (2000). Structural features of the self-concept and adjustment. In A. Tesser, R. B. Felson & J. M. Suls (Eds.), *Psychological Perspectives on Self and Identity (pp. 67 – 87*). Washington DC: American Psychological Association.

Campbell, J. D., Chew, B., and Scratchley, L. S. (1991). Cognitive and emotional reactions to daily events: The effects of self-esteem and self-complexity. *Journal of Personality, 59*, 473-505.

Campbell, J. D. & Fairey, P. J. (1985). Effects of self-esteem, hypothetical explanations, and verbalization of expectancies on future performance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48*, 1097-1111.

Campbell, J. D. & Lavallee, L. (1993). Who am I: The role of self-concept confusion in understanding the behavior of people with low self-esteem. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.). *Self-Esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard (pp. 3 – 20)*. New York: Plenum.

Campbell, J. D., Trapnell, P. D., Heine, S. J., Katz, I. M., Lavallee, L. F. And Lehman, D. R. (1996). Self-concept clarity: Measurement, personality correlates, and cultural boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 141 – 156.

Chown, S. (1959). Rigidity: A flexible concept. *Psychological Bulletin, 56*, 195 – 223

.

Costa, P. T. Jr., and McCrae, R. R. (1995). Domains and facets: Hierarchical personality assessment using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 64*, 21-50.

Crowne, D. P. & Marlowe, D. (1964). *The approval motive: Studies in evaluative dependence*. New York: Wiley.

Çuhadaroğlu, F. (1986). *Adolesanlarda benlik saygısı*. Unpublished dissertation. Hacettepe Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi.

Dağ, İ. (1991). Rotter'in İç-Dış Kontrol Odağı Ölçeği (RİDKOÖ)'nin üniversite öğrencileri için güvenirliği ve geçerliği. *Türk Psikiyatri Dergisi, 2*, 269 – 274.

Dağ, İ. (2002). Kontrol Odağı Ölçeği (KOÖ): Ölçek geliştirme, güvenirlik ve geçerlik çalışması. *Türk Psikoloji Dergisi, 17*, 77 – 90.

Derogatis, L. R. (1992). *The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI). Administration, Scoring and Procedures Manual = II.* Clinical Psychometric Research Inc.

Dunkley, D. M., Sanislow, C. A., Grilo, C. M. & McGlashan, T. H. (2004). Validity of DAS perfectionism and need for approval in relation to the five-factor model of personality**.** In press, *Personality and Individual Differences*.

Evans, D. W. (1994). Self-complexity and its relation to development, symptomatology and self-perception during adolescence. *Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 24*, 173-182.

Fennel, M. J. V., and Teasdale, J. D. (1984). Effects of distraction on thinking and affect in depressed patients. *British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 23,* 65-66.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). (2nd Ed.). *Social Cognition*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Folkman, S. & Lazarus, R. S. (1986). Stress processes and depressive symptomatology. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95*, 107 – 113.

Fossati, P. Ergis, A. M. & Alliaire, J. F. (2002). Executive functionaning in unipolar depression: A review. *Encephale- Revue de Psychiatre Clinique Biologique et Therapeutique, 28*, 97 – 107.

Gergen, K. J. & Morse, S. (1967). Self-consistency: Measurement and validation. *Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, 75*, 207 – 208.

Goldberg, L. R. (1978). Differential attribution of trait-descriptive terms to oneself as compared to well-liked, neutral and disliked others: A psychometric analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36*, 1012 – 1028.

Goldberg, L. R. (1981). Unconfounding situational attributions from uncertain, neutral, and ambiguous ones: A psychometric analysis of descriptions of oneself and various types of others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41*, 517 – 552.

Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A Very Brief Measure of the Big Five Personality Domains. *Journal of Research in Personality, 37,* 504-528.

Gough, H. G. & Bradley, P. B. (1996). *California Psychological Inventory manual*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Greenberg, J., Solomon, S. and Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror Management Theory of self-esteem and cultural world views: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29*, 61-139.

Greenwald, A. G. (1980) The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. *American Psychologist, 35*, 603 – 618.

Greenwald, A. G., & Pratkanis, A. R. (1984). The self. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), *Handbook of social cognition (pp. 129-178)*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Gülgöz, S. & Sadowski, C. J. (1995). Düşünme İhtiyacı Ölçeği'nin Türkçe uyarlaması ve öğrenci başarısı göstergeleri ile korelasyonu. *Türk Psikoloji Dergisi, 10,* 15 – 24.

James, W. (1890). *The Principles of Psychology (Vol. 1)*. New York: Holt.

John, O. P., Donahue, E. M. & Kentle, R. L. (1991). *The "Big Five" Inventory – Versions 4a and 54*. Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Personality and Social Research.

John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin, & O. P. John (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 102–138)*. New York: Guilford Press.

Kalthoff, R. A., and Neimeyer, R. A. (1993). Self-complexity and psychological distress: A test of the buffering model. *International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 6*, 327-349.

Kaplan, S. E., Reneau, J. H. & Whitecotton, S. (2001). The effects of predictive ability information, locus of control, and decision maker involvement on decision aid reliance. *Journal of Behavioral Decision-Making, 14*, 35 – 50.

Kiessler, D. J. (1983). The 1982 Interpersonal Circle: A taxonomy for complementarity in human transactions. *Psychological Review, 90*, 185 – 213.

Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D. M. & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and openness to persuasion in the presence and absence of prior information. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*, 861 – 876.

Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality*. New York: Ronald Press.

Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K. & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68*, 518-530.

Lennox, R., & Wolfe, R. (1984). A revision of the self-monitoring scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46*, 1348-1364.

Linville, P. W. (1982). The complexity – extremity effect and age-based stereotyping. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42*, 193 – 211.

Linville, P. W. (1985). Self-complexity and affective extremity: Don't put all your eggs in one cognitive basket. *Social Cognition, 3*, 94-120.

Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-related illness and depression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,* 663-676.

Lubinski, D., Tellegen, A. & Butcher, J. N. (1981). The relationship between androgyny and subjective indicators of emotional well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40*, 722 – 730.

Luchins, A. S. (1942). Mechanization in problem solving. *Psychological Monographs, 54*, 6 (Whole No. 248).

Lyubomirsky, S. and Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1993). Self-perpetuating properties of dysphoric rumination. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*, 339-349.

Lyubomirsky, S. and Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1995). Effects of self-focused rumination on negative thinking and interpersonal problem-solving. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*, 176-190.

Markus, H. & Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and malleability of the self-concept. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51*, 858 – 866.

Matto, H., and Realo, A. (2001). The Estonian Self-Concept Clarity Scale: Psychometric properties and personality correlates. Personality *and Individual Differences, 30*, 59-70.

McCrae, R. R. & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1996). Conceptions and correlates of Openness to Experience. In R. Hogan, J. A. Johnson, & S. R. Briggs (Eds.), *Hanbook of Personality Psychology (pp. 825 – 847)*. New York: Academic Press.

Morgan, H. J. & Janoff-Bulman, R. (1994). Positive and negative self-complexity: Patterns of adjustment following traumatic versus non-traumatic life experiences. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 13*, 63 – 85.

Neuberg, S. L. & Newstom, J. T. (1993). Personal need for structure: Individual differences in the desire for simple structure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*, 113 – 131.

Niedenthal, P. M., Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1985). Prototype-matching: A strategy for social decision-making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, **48***, 575-584.

Niedenthal, P. M., Setterlund, M. B., and Wherry, M. B. (1992). Possible self-complexity and affective reactions to goal relevant evaluation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63*, 5-16.

Paulhus, D. L. & Martin, C. L. (1987). The structure of personality capabilities. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*, 354 – 365.

Paulhus, D. L. & Martin, C. L. (1988). Functional flexibility: A new conception of interpersonal flexibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55*, 88 – 101.

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*, 741–763.

Rafaeli-Mor, E., Gotlib, I. H., and Revelle, W. (1999). The meaning and measurement of self-complexity. *Personality and Individual Differences,27,* 341-356.

Rafaeli-Mor, E., and Steinberg, J. (2002). Self-complexity and well-being: A review and research synthesis. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6*, 31-58.

Renaud, J. M. & McConnell, A. R. (2002). Organization of the self-concept and the suppression of self-relevant thoughts. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38*, 79 – 86.

Roberts, B. W., Bogg, T., Walton, K. E., Chernyschenko, O. S. & Stark, S. E. (2004). A lexical investigation of the lower order structure of conscientiousness. *Journal of Research in Personality, 38*, 164 – 178.

Rokeach, M. (1960). *The open and closed mind*. New York: Basic Books.

Rosenberg, M. (1965). *Society and adolescent self-image*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal vs. External control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs, 80*, 1 – 28.

Rusalov, V. M. & Biryukov, S. D. (1993). Human behavioral flexibility: A psychogenetic study. *Behavior Genetics, 23*, 461 – 465.

Sakado, K., Sato, T., Uehara, T., Sato, S., Sakado, M. & Kumagai, K. (1997). Evaluating the diagnostic specificity of the Munich personality dimensions in major depression. *Journal of Affective Disorders, 43*, 187 – 194.

Salovey, P. (1992). Mood-induced self-focused attention. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62*, 699-707.

Sande, G. N., Goethals, G. R. & Radloff, C. E. (1988). Perceiving one's own traits and others: The multifaceted self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54*, 13 – 20.

Schaie, K. W. & Parham, I. A. (1975). *Manual for the Test of Behavioral Rigidity*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Schmuck, P. & Wobken-Blachnik, H. (1996). Behavioral flexibility and working memory. *Diagnostica, 42*, 47 – 66.

Schultz, P. W. & Searleman, A. (2002). Rigidity of thought and behavior: 100 Years of research. *Genetic, social and general psychology monographs, 128*, 165 – 207.

Skogman, K., Alsen, M. & Ojehagen, A. (2004). Sex differences in risk factors for suicide after attempted suicide - A follow-up study of 1052 suicide attempters. *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 39*, 113 – 120.

Scott, W. A. (1969). Structure of natural cognitions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12*, 261-278.

Stterlund, M. B. (1994). *The effects of possible self-complexity on self-relevant decision-making*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.

Setterlund, M. B., and Niedenthal, P. M. (1993). "Who am I? Why am I here?": Self-esteem, self-clarity and prototype matching. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*, 769-780.

Showers, C. (1992). Compartmentalization of positive and negative self-knowledge: Keeping bad apples out of the bunch. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62*, 1036-1049.

Smith, S. H. & Cohen, L. H. (1993). Self-complexity and reactions to relationship breakup. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 12*, 367 – 384.

Smith, M. Wellington, E. & Zhan, G. (1996). Self-concept clarity and preferred coping styles. *Journal of Personality, 64*, 407 – 434.

Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30*, 526 – 537.

Spearman, C. (1927). *The abilities of man, their nature and measurement*. London: MacMillan.

Stein, K. F. (1994). Complexity of the self-schema and responses to disconfirming feedback. *Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18*, 161-178.

Steiner, I. D. (1954). Ethnocentrism and tolerance of trait "inconsistency". *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49*, 349 – 354.

Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. *Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18*, 643 – 662.

Sümer, N. & Engin, E. (2004). *The role of parenting styles in predicting attachment anxiety and avoidance*. Manuscript under preparation.

Sümer, N. & Güngör, D. (1999). Yetişkin bağlanma stilleri ölçeklerinin Türk örneklemi üzerinde psikometrik değerlendirmesi ve kültürlerarası bir karşılaştırma. *Türk Psikoloji Dergisi, 14*, 71 – 106.

Swann, W. B. (1987). Identity negotiation: Where two roads meet. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53*, 1038 – 1051.

Swann, W. B., Griffin, J. J., Predmore, S. C. & Gaines, B. (1987). The cognitive – affective crossfire: When self-consistency confronts self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*, 881 – 889.

Şahin, N. H. & Durak, A. (1994). Kısa Semptom Envanteri: Türk gençleri için uyarlaması. *Türk Psikoloji Dergisi, 9*, 44 – 56.

Şahin, N. H., Ulusoy, M. & Şahin, N. (1993). Exploring the sociotropy-autonomy dimensions in a sample of Turkish psychiatric impatients. *Journal of Clinical Psychology, 49*, 751 – 763.

Swann, W. B. & Read, S. J. (1981). Self-verification processes: How we sustain our self-conceptions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 17*, 351 – 372.

Swann W. B. & Rentfrow, P. J. (2001). Blirtatiousness: Cognitive, behavioral, and physiological consequences of rapid responding. *Journal of Personality And Social Psychology, 81*, 1160-1175.

Taylor, S. E. & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. *Psychological Bulletin, 103*, 193 – 210.

Tesser, A. (1988). Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21*, 181-227.

Tesser, A. (2000). On the confluence of self-esteem maintenance mechanisms. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4*, 290-299.

Tuğrul, C. (1994). Alkoliklerin çocuklarının aile ortamındaki stres kaynakları, etkileri ve stresle başa çıkma yolları. *Türk Psikoloji Dergisi, 9*, 57 – 73.

Vannoy, J. S. (1965). Generality of cognitive complexity – simplicity as a personality construct. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3*, 385 – 396.

Vertoggradova, O., Bannikov, G. & Konkov, S. (1997). Personality characteristics in depressive patients. *European Psychiatry, 12*, 235 – 235.

VonZerssen, D., Asukai, N., Tsuda, H., Ono, Y., Kizaki, Y. & Cho, Y. (1997). Personality traits of Japanese patients in remission from an episode of primary unipolar depression. *Journal of Affective Disorders, 44*, 145 – 152.

Werner, H. (1946). The concept of rigidity: A critical evaluation. *Psychological Review, 53*, 43 – 52.

Weissman, A. N. & Beck, A. T. (1978). *Development and validation of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale: A preliminary investigation*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Toronto, Ontario.

Wiggins, J. S. & Holzmuller, A. (1978). Psychological androgyny and interpersonal behavior. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46*, 40 – 52.

Wiggins, J. S. & Holzmuller, A. (1981). Further evidence on androgyny and interpersonal flexibility. *Journal of Research in Personality, 15*, 67 – 80.

Woolfolk, R. L., Novalany, J., Gara, M. A., and Polino, M. (1995). Self-complexity, self-evaluation, and depression: An examination of form and content within the self-schema. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68*, 1108-1120.

Zajonc, R. B. (1960). The process of cognitive tuning in communication. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61*, 159 – 167.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS READ TO PARTICIPANTS FOR THE SELF-COMPLEXITY TRAIT-SORT TASK

Bu çalışmanın amacı sizin kendinizi tanımlama ve tanıtma biçiminizi anlamaktır. Önünüzde 44 adet kart bulunmaktadır. Yönergeyi okumayı bitirdiğimde kartlara göz atabilirsiniz. Her kartta bir kişilik özelliğinin adı yazılıdır.

Şimdi lütfen kendinizi, nasıl bir kişi olduğunuzu ve ne gibi kişilik özellikleri taşıdığınızı düşünün. Bir çoğumuzun yaşamı farklı yönlerden oluşur: Farklı yerlerde bulunur, farklı roller içine girer, farklı insanlarla ilişki içinde olur, farklı işlerle uğraşırız. Şimdi önünüzdeki kartlardan, her biri yaşamınızın farklı bir yönünde kendinizi tarif eden gruplar oluşturmanızı istiyorum. Grupları size anlamlı gelen herhangi bir şekilde oluşturabilirsiniz. Örneğin, "öğrenci olarak ben", "basketbol oynayan ben", "sevgilimle ilişkilerimde ben", "evdeki ben" gibi kendinizi tanımlamada önemli olduğunu düşündüğünüz gruplar oluşturabilirsiniz. Ancak unutmayın ki her gruptaki sıfatlar yaşamınızın o yönündeki davranış, düşünüş, yaklaşım tarzınızı tanımlamalıdır.

Oluşturacağınız grupların sayısı kişiden kişiye değişecektir; bazılarımız benliğimizi bir çok farklı yönden oluşuyor gibi tanımlarız, bazılarımız için ise benlik yönlerimizin sayısı çok daha azdır. Her grupta kullanacağınız sıfatların sayısı da tamamen size bağlı. Grupları oluştururken önünüzdeki sıfatların hepsini kullanmak zorunda değilsiniz; bazı sıfatlar sizi yaşamınızın hiç bir yönünde tanımlamıyor olabilir.

Bazı özellikleriniz yaşamınızın birden çok yönü için geçerli olabilir; yani aynı sıfatı birden çok grupta kullanmak isteyebilirsiniz. Bu amaçla önünüze 10 adet boş kart koyulmuştur. Tekrar kullanmak istediğiniz sıfatın adını ve numarasını bu kartlardan birine yazarak gruplarınızda kullanabilirsiniz.
Tabii ki insan kendini tanımlarken böyle sonsuz sayıda grup oluşturabilir. O nedenle sizden beklediğimiz kişiliğinizin önemli, belirtilmediği takdirde benlik tanımınızın eksik kalmasına neden olacak yönlerini düşünmeniz.

Kartları gruplama işini bitirdikten sonra lütfen anketinzin ilk sayfasını açın. Buradaki her bir sütun oluşturduğunuz gruplardan birini temsil etmektedir. Her gruba koyduğunuz sıfatların yanındaki rakamları bu sütunlara kaydedin. Isterseniz gruplarınıza isim verebilirsiniz; ancak bunu yapmak zorunda değlsiniz. Örneğin oluşturduğunuz bir grupta dürüst, cömert, sinirli/asabi sıfatları bulunuyorsa ilk sütuna alt alta 1,6,16 yazın.

Başlamadan önce son bir kaç hatırlatma: Az önce belirttiğim gibi tüm sıfatları kullanmak zorunda değilsiniz ve bir sıfatı birden fazla grupta kullanabilirsiniz.

Oluşturacağınız grup sayısı size bağlı. Bu işlem genellikle 20 dakika kadar sürmektedir; ancak herkesin bu işlemi tamamlaması farklı zaman alacaktır, o yüzden başkaları bitirmiş bile olsa lütfen kendinizce tatmin edici bir sonuca ulaşana kadar devam edin.

Bu işlem hakkında bir sorunuz var mı?

Şimdi lütfen kartlara tek tek bakınız ve herhangi bir sıfatın anlamı konusunda açıklamaya ihtiyaç duyarsanız sorunuz.

APPENDIX B

TURKISH FORM OF THE SELF-CONCEPT CLARITY SCALE

	Hiç uygun değil	Hemen hemen hiç uygun değil	Pek uygun değil	Ne uygun ne uygun değil	Biraz uygun	Hemen hemen tamamen uygun	Tamamen uygun
1. Kendime ilişkin inançlarım sıklıkla birbirleriyle çatışır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Kendim hakkında bir gün bir görüş, başka bir gün ise farklı bir görüşüm olabilir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Kişiliğimi nasıl tanımladığım sorulsa, yapacağım tanım bir günden diğerine değişebilir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Kendim hakkındaki görüşlerim çok sık değişiyor gibi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Geçmişte nasıl bir kişi olduğumu düşündüğümde, gerçekte nasıl biri olduğumdan emin değilim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Bazen, gerçekten göründüğüm gibi birisi olmadığımı hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Kişiliğimin farklı yönleri arasında pek çelişki yoktur.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Bazen başkalarını kendimi tanıdığımdan daha iyi tanıdığımı düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Nasıl bir kişi olduğumu merak etmekle çok zaman geçiririm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. İstesem bile başka birine, gerçekten nasıl biri olduğumu anlatabileceğimi sanmıyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11. Genelde, kim ve nasıl bir kişi olduğum konusundaki görüşlerim açıktır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Benim için, bir konu hakkında karara varmak oldukça güç, çünkü ne istediğimi gerçekten bilmiyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX C

TURKISH FORM OF THE ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

	Hiç uygun değil	Hemen hemen hiç uygun değil	Pek uygun değil	Ne uygun ne uygun değil	Biraz uygun	Hemen hemen tamamen uygun	Tamamen uygun
1. Kendimi en az diğer insanlar kadar değerli buluyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Bazı olumlu özelliklerim olduğunu düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Genelde kendimi başarısız bir kişi olarak görme eğilimindeyim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Ben de diğer insanların birçoğunun yapabildiği kadar bir şeyler yapabilirim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Kendimde gurur duyacak fazla şey bulamıyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Kendime karşı olumlu bir tutum içindeyim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Genel olarak kendimden memnunum..	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Kendime karşı daha fazla saygı duyabilmeyi isterdim	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Bazen kesinlikle kendimin bir işe yaramadığını düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Bazen kendimin hiç de yeterli bir insan olmadığımı düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX D

TURKISH FORM OF THE BATTERY OF INTERPERSONAL CAPABILITIES

Aşağıda 16 farklı davranış tarzı için aynı sorular tekrarlanmıştır. İlk soru genelde nasıl davrandığınızı değil, gereği halinde belli bir davranışı ne derece gösterebildiğinizi sormaktadır. Diğer sorularsa bu davranışı gösterdiğinizdeki hisleriniz ve bu davranışı gerektiren durumlara yönelik tutumunuzla ilgilidir. Lütfen soruları altlarında verilen ölçeklerde sizin için geçerli olan rakamı daire içine alarak yanıtlayınız.

1. Durum gerektirdiğinde **baskın/dominant** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Baskın/dominant davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Baskın/dominant davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Baskın/dominant davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. Durum gerektirdiğinde **hırslı** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Hırslı davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Hırslı davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Hırslı davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

3. Durum gerektirdiğinde **dışadönük** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Dışadönük davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Dışadönük davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Dışadönük davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4. Durum gerektirdiğinde **girgin/girişken** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Girgin/girişken davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Girgin/girişken davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Girgin/girişken davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

5. Durum gerektirdiğinde **yumuşak başlı** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Yumuşak başlı davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Yumuşak başlı davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Yumuşak başlı davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

6. Durum gerektirdiğinde insanlara **sıcak** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

İnsanlara **sıcak** davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

İnsanlara **sıcak** davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

İnsanlara **sıcak** davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. Durum gerektirdiğinde **diğer insanlara güvenmeyi** ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Diğer insanlara güvenmek sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Diğer insanlara güvenmek sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Diğer insanlara güvenmenizi gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

8. Durum gerektirdiğinde **alçakgönüllü** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Alçakgönüllü davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Alçakgönüllü davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Alçakgönüllü davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

9. Durum gerektirdiğinde **pasif/boyun eğici** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Pasif/boyun eğici davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Pasif/boyun eğici davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Pasif/boyun eğici davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10. Durum gerektirdiğinde **tembel** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Tembel davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Tembel davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Tembel davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11. Durum gerektirdiğinde **içe dönük** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

İçe dönük davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

İçe dönük davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

İçe dönük davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

12. Durum gerektirdiğinde **mesafeli/diğer insanları takmaz şekilde** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mesafeli/diğer insanları takmaz şekilde davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mesafeli/diğer insanları takmaz şekilde davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mesafeli/diğer insanları takmaz şekilde davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

13. Durum gerektirdiğinde **kavgacı** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem						**Çok iyi beceririm**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Kavgacı davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez						**Çok rahatsız eder**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Kavgacı davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil						**Çok zor**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Kavgacı davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

14. Durum gerektirdiğinde insanlara **soğuk** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem **Çok iyi beceririm**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

İnsanlara **soğuk** davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez **Çok rahatsız eder**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

İnsanlara **soğuk** davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil **Çok zor**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

İnsanlara **soğuk** davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam **Çok kaçınırım**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. Durum gerektirdiğinde **çıkarınızı düşünerek/hesapçı** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem **Çok iyi beceririm**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Çıkarınızı düşünerek/hesapçı davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez **Çok rahatsız eder**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Çıkarınızı düşünerek/hesapçı davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil **Çok zor**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Çıkarınızı düşünerek/hesapçı davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam **Çok kaçınırım**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. Durum gerektirdiğinde **kibirli** davranmayı ne derece becerebilirsiniz (başarabilirsiniz)?

Hiç beceremem **Çok iyi beceririm**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Kibirli davranmak sizi ne derece rahatsız eder?

Hiç rahatsız etmez **Çok rahatsız eder**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Kibirli davranmak sizin için ne derece zordur?

Hiç zor değil **Çok zor**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Kibirli davranmanızı gerektiren durumlardan ne derece kaçınırsınız?

Hiç kaçınmam						**Çok kaçınırım**
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX E

TURKISH FORM OF THE GOLDBERG SITUATIONALITY MEASURE

Aşağıdaki sıfatların sizi ne derece tanımladığını yandaki ölçekte belirtiniz.

	Kesinlikle tanımlamıyor	**Orta derecede tanımlıyor**	**Duruma / şartlara bağlı**	**Emin değilim**	**Kesinlikle tanımlıyor**
Baskın/dominant	0	1	2	3	4
Hırslı	0	1	2	3	4
Dışadönük	0	1	2	3	4
Girgin/girişken	0	1	2	3	4
Uyumlu	0	1	2	3	4
Sıcak	0	1	2	3	4
Diğer insanlara güvenen	0	1	2	3	4
Alçakgönüllü	0	1	2	3	4
Pasif/boyun eğici	0	1	2	3	4
Tembel	0	1	2	3	4
İçedönük	0	1	2	3	4
Mesafeli/diğer insanları takmaz	0	1	2	3	4
Kavgacı	0	1	2	3	4
Soğuk	0	1	2	3	4
Çıkarını dşünen/hesapçı	0	1	2	3	4
Kibirli	0	1	2	3	4

APPENDIX F

TURKISH FORM OF THE NEED FOR COGNITON SCALE

	Hiç uygun değil	Hemen hemen hiç uygun değil	Pek uygun değil	Ne uygun ne uygun değil	Biraz uygun	Hemen hemen tamamen uygun	Tamamen uygun
1. Karmaşık problemleri basit problemlere yeğlerim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Çok düşünmeyi gerektiren bir işin sorumluluğunu almak hoşuma gider.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Düşünmek benim için bir eğlence biçimi değildir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Düşünme yeteneğimi zorlayacak bir şey yapmaktansa, az düşünmeyi gerektirecek şeyleri tercih ederim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Bir mesele hakkında dern düşünmemi gerektirecek durumları önceden sezip onlardan uzak durmaya çalışırım.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Bir sorunu kafamda uzun sure yoğun bir biçimde tartışmak hoşuma gider.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Sadece durumun gerektirdiği kadar derin düşünürüm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Uzun süreli işlere kafa yormaktansa küçük, günlük meseleler hakkında düşünmeyi yeğlerim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Nasıl yapıldığını öğrendikten sonar fazla düşünmeyi gerektirmeyecek işleri tercih ederim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10. İşimde, düşünme yeteneğime güvenerek yükselme fikri bana çekici gelir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Sorunlara yeni çözümler bulmayı gerektiren işler bana zevk verir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Yeni düşünce biçimleri öğrenmek bana pek heyecan vermez.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Yaşamımın çözmem gereken bulmacalarla dolu olmasını yeğlerim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Soyut düşünme eylemi bana çekici gelir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Orta önemde, fazla düşünme gerektirmeyen bir iş yapmaktansa, kafa çalıştırmamı gerektiren, zor ve önemli bir işi tercih ederim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Çok zihinsel çaba gerektirmiş bir işi tamamlayınca tatminden ziyade rahatlama duygusu hissederim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Bence bir nesnenin kendisinden beklenen işi görmesi önemlidir, işi nasıl ve neden gördüşü benim ilgimi çekmez.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Kişisel olarak beni etkilemeleri söz konusu olmasa bile bir çok değişik konuda düşünürüm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX G

PERSONAL CONTROL FACTOR OF THE LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE

	Hiç uygun değil	Hemen hemen hiç uygun değil	Pek uygun değil	Ne uygun ne uygun değil	Biraz uygun	Hemen hemen tamamen uygun	Tamamen uygun
1. Hastalıklar çoğunlukla insanların dikkatsizliğinden kaynaklanır. (17)*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Talihsizlik olarak nitelenen durumların çoğu, yetenek eksikliğinin, ihmalin, tembelliğin ve benzeri nedenlerin sonucudur. (18)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. İnsan yaşamında olabilecek şeyleri kendi kontrolü altında tutabilir. (19)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. İnsanın ne yapacağı konusunda kararlı olması kadere güvenmesinden daima daha iyidir. (21)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. İnsan kendisini ilgilendiren bir çok konuda kendi başına doğru kararlar alabilir. (27)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Bir insanın başına gelenler temelde kendi yaptıklarının sonucudur. (28)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Halk yeterli çabayı gösterse siyasal yolsuzlukları ortadan kaldırabilir. (29)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Sağlıklı olup olmamayı belirleyen esas şey insanların kendi yaptıkları ve alışkanlıklarıdır. (31)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. İnsan kendi yaşamına temelde kendisi yön verir. (32)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10. İnsanların talihsizlikleri yaptıkları hataların sonucudur. (33)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. İnsanlarla yakın ilişkiler kurmak tesadüflere değil çaba göstermeye bağlıdır. (34)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. İnsan bugün yaptıklarıyla gelecekte olacakları değiştirebilir. (36)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Kazalar doğrudan doğruya hataların sonucudur. (37)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. İnsan kendine iyi baktığı sürece hastalıktan kaçınabilir. (41)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Kararlılık bir insanın istediği sonuçları almasında en önemli etkendir. (43)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. İnsanlara doğru şeyi yaptırmak bir yetenek işidir; şansın bunda payı ya hiç yoktur, ya çok azdır. (44)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. İnsan kendi kilosunu, yiyeceklerini ayarlayarak control altında tutabilir. (45)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Büyük ideallere ancak çalışıp çabalayarak ulaşılabilir. (47)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

*****The numbers in parentheses represents item numbers in the original scale.

APPENDIX H

"CONCERN ABOUT WHAT OTHERS THINK" AND "PLEASING OTHERS" FACTORS OF THE SOCIOTROPY – AUTONOMY SCALE

	Hiç uygun değil	Hemen hemen hiç uygun değil	Pek uygun değil	Ne uygun ne uygun değil	Biraz uygun	Hemen hemen tamamen uygun	Tamamen uygun
1. Kendimi diğer insanlara hep iyi davranmak zorundaymış gibi hissederim. (1)*[a]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Diğer insanların duygularını incitmekten korkarım. (5) [a]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. İnsanlara "hayı" demek bana zor gelir. (7) [a]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. İnsanlar zayıf yönlerimi, hatalarımı bilirlerse, beni sevmeyecekler diye endişelenirim. (11)[b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Diğerlerini memnun etmek için kendime ters düşen şeyler yapmam. (15) [a]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Diğer insanların beni sevmeleri önemli başarılar elde etmemden daha önemlidir. (17) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Bir lokantada tek başıma akşam yemeği yemek beni rahatsız eder. (18) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Diğer insanların yanındayken, benden ne beklediklerinden emin olamazsam rahatsız olurum. (24) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

9. Eğer bir arkadaşım beni uzun sure aramazsa, beni unuttuğunu düşünerek endişelenirim. (27) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Beni sevmediklerini düşündüğüm insanların yanında rahatsız olurum. (29) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Diğer insanların hoşlanmayacağını düşünerek söyleyeceğim şeyleri dikkatlica seçerim. (33) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Biri benim dış görünüşümü eleştirdiğinde diğer insanların da beni çekici bulmayacaklarını düşünürüm. (38) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Yeni tanıştığım bir kişinin beni beğendiğini ya da sevdiğini anlayamazsam rahatsız olurum. (44) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Başkalarını rahatsız ettiğimi düşünmek bana kaygı verir. (46) [a]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Diğer insanlarla birlikte olduğumda, onların benimle birlikte olmaktan hoşlanıp hoşlanmadıklarını anlamak için ipuçları ararım. (50) [b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Herhangi bir kişinin bana kızdığını üşünsem de özür dilemek istemem. (52) [a]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Diğerlerinden farklı olmak beni rahatsız eder. (56) [a]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

*****The numbers in parentheses represents item numbers in the original scale.

[a] Items measuring concern for what others think

[b] Items measuring pleasing others

APPENDIX I

DEPRESSION SUBSCALE OF THE BFIEF SYMPTOM INVENTORY

Aşağıdaki belirtiler sizde son bir haftadır ne kadar var?

	Hiç yok	Biraz var	Orta derecede var	Epey var	Çok fazla var
1.Yaşamınıza son verme düşünceleri	0	1	2	3	4
2.Yalnızlık hissetmek	0	1	2	3	4
3.Hüzünlü, kederli hissetmek.	0	1	2	3	4
4.Hiçbir şeye ilgi duymamak.	0	1	2	3	4
5.Gelecekle ilgili umutsuzluk duyguları.	0	1	2	3	4
6.Kendinizi değersiz görmek / değersizlik duyguları.	0	1	2	3	4

APPENDIX J

TURKISH FORM OF THE TEN-ITEM PERSONALITY INVENTORY

Burda size uyabilecek ya da uymayabilecek bir takım kişilik özellikleri sıralanmıştır. Lütfen her özellik grubunun yanına sizi ne kadar tanımladığını belirten bir rakam yazın. İkililerden biri size daha fazla uysa bile lütfen iki özelliğin bir arada ne kadar uyduğunu belirtin.

1 = Çok uzak
2 = Orta miktarda uzak
3 = Biraz uzak
4 = Ne uzak ne yakın
5 = Biraz yakın
6 = Orta miktarda yakın
7 = Çok yakın

Bu özellikler beni tanımlamaya:

1. _____ Dışa dönük, heyecan dolu.

2. _____ Tenkid eden, münakaşayı seven.

3. _____ Güvenilir, disiplinli.

4. _____ Endişeli, çabuk üzülen.

5. _____ Yeni yaşantılara açık, çok yönlü.

6. _____ İçe kapanık, sessiz.

7. _____ Sevecen, sıcak.

8. _____ Dağınık, dikkatsiz.

9. _____ Sakin, duygusal bakımdan dengeli.

10. _____ Geleneksel, yaratıcı olmayan.