

THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT OF ANKARA
AND
POLITICAL ACTORS

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ABSTRACT

THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT OF ANKARA AND POLITICAL ACTORS

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This thesis is a monographic study to examine the transformation of the old industrial district of Ankara, which is yet incomplete. Investigating the significant reasons for its incompleteness, the study will concentrate on the intrinsic dynamics of this process, and particularly on such important contributions of its political actors. The aims of the study are to figure out the roles of political actors in urban transformations, and to evaluate the position of architectural production within such processes. As a consequence of this evaluation, the possible approaches for the similar forthcoming urban transformations will be questioned, with special reference to the political framework and the position of architectural production within the same framework.

Maltepe developed as an industrial district since the end of the 19th Century, and served with the same function during the Republican period, until the 1950s when there were necessities and requirements for transformation. The transformation of the district occurred as two distinct processes on industrial production and industrial service areas. The industrial production area remained partially transformed, as a result of resistance mechanisms generated by the unavoidable practical difficulties. The transformation of the industrial service area remained incomplete as a result of varying design decisions at different periods. In general, the incompleteness of the transformation of the old industrial district was reasoned by either the incapability of political actors, or by the confrontations between them.

The architectural production in this transformation was defined by the political actors, whose positions were characterized by such circumstances, within which the transformation occurred. Since the circumstances are different in any case, any urban transformation has different intrinsic dynamics and peculiarities in itself. Therefore, rather than approaching the issue of transformation with general policies, the strategies must be developed for each specific case. These strategies would also include the political actors, and the architects who participate in the formation of those political actors.

Keywords: Urban Transformation, Political Actor, Architectural Production,
Industrial District

ÖZ

ANKARA'NIN ESKİ SANAYİ BÖLGESİNİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ VE POLİTİK AKTÖRLER

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Bu tez, Ankara'nın eski sanayi bölgesinin henüz tamamlanmamış olan dönüşümünü inceleyen monografik bir çalışmadır. Çalışma, "tamamlanmamışlığın" nedenlerini araştırırken sürecin içsel dinamikleri ve özellikle de politik aktörlerin katkıları üzerinde yoğunlaşacaktır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, politik aktörlerin kentsel dönüşümlerdeki rollerini ortaya koymak ve mimari üretimin bu süreçlerdeki pozisyonunu değerlendirmektir. Bu değerlendirmenin sonunda, gelecek benzer kentsel dönüşümler için olası yaklaşımlar, politik çerçeveye ve mimari üretimin bu çerçevedeki pozisyonuna özel bir vurgu ile sorgulanacaktır.

Maltepe, 19. Yüzyılın sonundan itibaren bir sanayi bölgesi olarak gelişmiş, Cumhuriyet döneminde, dönüşüm için gereklilik ve taleplerinin olduğu 1950lere kadar aynı işlevle hizmet vermiştir. Bölgenin dönüşümü endüstriyel üretim ve endüstriyel servis alanlarında iki ayrı süreç olarak gerçekleşmiştir. Endüstriyel üretim alanı, ortadan kaldırılamayan pratik zorlukların ürettiği direnç mekanizmaları nedeniyle kısmen dönüşebilmiştir. Endüstriyel servis alanının dönüşümü ise, farklı zamanlarda alınan farklı tasarım kararları nedeniyle tamamlanamamıştır. Genel olarak eski sanayi bölgesinin dönüşümünün tamamlanamamasının nedenleri ya politik aktörlerin yetkin olamayışları, ya da politik aktörler arasında meydana gelen karşıtlıklardır.

Mimari üretimin dönüşümdeki pozisyonları, kendi pozisyonları da dönüşümü oluşturan koşullar tarafından tanımlanan politik aktörler tarafından tanımlanmıştır. Koşullar her bir durum için farklı olduğu için, her bir kentsel dönüşümün farklı içsel dinamikleri ve özgünlükleri vardır. Bu yüzden, kentsel dönüşümlere genel politikalar ile yaklaşmak yerine, her bir durum için stratejiler geliştirilmelidir. Bu stratejiler politik aktörleri ve aktör oluşumlarında yer alan mimarları da içermelidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kentsel Dönüşüm, Politik Aktör, Mimari Üretim, Sanayi Bölgesi

To my parents, and my sister...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xii

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. DEVELOPMENT OF MALTEPE AS AN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT	7
2.1. 1892-1924: Spontaneous Development around the Railways	9
2.2. 1924-1930s: Development within the Lörcher Plans	13
2.2.1. Physical Development	14
2.2.2. Political Actors at the Development	17
2.2.2.1. Local Administration.....	18
2.2.2.2. Central Authority	19
2.2.2.2.1. Ministry of Exchange, Development, and Settlement.	19
2.2.2.2.2. Ministry of Public Works	19
2.2.2.3. Ankara Directorate of Development	20
2.3. 1930s-1950s: Development within the Jansen Plan.....	20
2.3.1. Physical Development	22
2.3.2. Political Actors at the Development	27

3. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT.....	29
3.1. Background of the Transformation	29
3.1.1. Urban / Environmental Factors: Necessities	30
3.1.2. Political Factors: Preferences	34
3.1.3. 1957 Yücel-Uybadin Plan: Determining the Route of Transformation	36
3.2. Transformation of the Industrial Production Area	38
3.2.1. Physical Transformation	39
3.2.2. Political Actors at the Transformation	48
3.2.2.1. Local Administration.....	49
3.2.2.1.1. Directorate of Development.....	49
3.2.2.1.2. <i>EGO</i>	51
3.2.2.2. Central Authority	53
3.2.2.2.1. Preservation Board.....	53
3.2.2.3. Chamber of Architects.....	54
3.3. Transformation of the Industrial Service Area	55
3.3.1. Physical Transformation	55
3.3.2. Political Actors at the Transformation	73
3.3.2.1. Local Administration.....	73
3.3.2.2. Central Authority	75
3.3.2.2.1. Ankara Metropolitan Area Master Plan Bureau.....	76
3.3.2.2.2. National Committee.....	78
3.3.2.2.3. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement.....	79
3.3.2.2.4. Preservation Board.....	80
3.3.2.3. Chamber of Architects.....	81
4. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION.....	84
4.1. Comparative Evaluation in the Political Context.....	84
4.2. Comparative Evaluation in the Urban and Architectural Context	89
5. CONCLUSION.....	92
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	98

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

2.1	The location of the research area in the city (City Map of Ankara)	8
2.2	Boundaries of the research area (City Map of Ankara)	8
2.3	First train station of Ankara (Batur, 1994: 113)	9
2.4	A map of Ankara dated to early 1920s (Şenyapılı, 1983)	11
2.5	A map of Ankara dated to late 1920s (Şenyapılı, 1983)	12
2.6	1924-25 Lörcher Plans (Cengizkan, 2003)	14
2.7	The train station and surroundings at early 1930s (Ankara Posta Kartları, 1994).	15
2.8	Focus on 1928 Jausseley Revision Plan (Dufournet, 1984: 81).	16
2.9	The area of coal gas factory in Lörcher Plans (focus on fig. 2.6).	17
2.10	A photograph of early 30s (Ankara Posta Kartları, 1994).	17
2.11	Jansen Plan (Archive, METU Faculty of Architecture).	21
2.12	Industrial district in Jansen Plan (Archive, METU Faculty of Architecture).....	21
2.13	Industrial district in Jansen Plan. (Şenyapılı, 1983)	23
2.14	Cargo station at the east of the central station in Jansen Plan.	24
2.15	The small-scaled factories at the south of the train station at early 40s (Ankara Posta Kartları, 1994).....	25
2.16	The parcels set in Jansen Plan (Şenyapılı, 1983).....	25
3.1	1957 Yücel-Uybadin Plan (Archive, METU Faculty of Architecture)	36
3.2	Main and secondary roads proposed in and around the industrial district Yücel-Uybadin Plan (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	37
3.3	Industrial district in 1957 Yücel-Uybadin Plan (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	38

3.4	Industrial Production Area from city map of Ankara (City Map of Ankara).....	39
3.5	Aerial view of the production area (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	39
3.6	Industrial production area in Yücel-Uybadin plan (focus on fig.3.3).....	40
3.7	Production area in the implementation plan (1965) (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	41
3.8	Detail on implementation plan (1965) (focus on fig. 3.7).....	42
3.9	The area of the coal gas factory (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	46
3.10	The coal gas factory.....	46
3.11	Flour and macaroni factories shown in a city map in early 90s.....	47
3.12	The remaining structures of flour factory.....	47
3.13	The lot of the new hypermarket (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	47
3.14	The new hypermarket.	47
3.15	The area of Gazi University (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	48
3.16	Gazi University.....	48
3.17	School (Old Yükseliş High School).	48
3.18	Industrial service area from city map of Ankara (City Map of Ankara).	55
3.19	Aerial view of the service area (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	55
3.20	Industrial service area in Yücel-Uybadin plan (focus on fig.3.3)	56
3.21	The structures present on the area at early 70s (AMANPB, 01.04.1971).	61
3.22	Schematic representation of proposed linear zone including the service area (AMANPB, 01.04.1971).	62
3.23	The project area of the municipality including the service area (Atabaş, 1994).....	64
3.24	Atatürk Cultural Center Areas (T.C. Law #2302, Değişik 3.Madde 23.04.1981).....	67

3.25	The future plan of the service area, obtained by overlapping project plan (Uygur Mimarlık) and 1997 plan (Archive, The Greater Municipality of Ankara).....	70
3.26	Maintenance ateliers of railways before restoration.....	71
3.27	Ateliers after restoration, as a museum of contemporary arts.....	72
3.28	Present situation of the service area.....	72
3.29	Sports hall.....	72
3.30	Current concert hall.....	72
3.31	Flowchart of transformation of industrial district.....	83

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The basic concerns of this study are the urban transformations and the position of architectural production in urban transformation processes. This thesis will be monographic study examining the transformation of old industrial district of Ankara, which is yet incomplete. Investigating the significant reasons for its incompleteness, the study will concentrate on the intrinsic dynamics of the process, and particularly on such important contributions of political actors. The aims of the study are to figure out the roles of political actors in urban transformations, and to evaluate the position of architectural production within such processes. As a consequence of this evaluation, the possible approaches for the similar forthcoming urban transformations will be questioned, with special reference to the political framework and the position of architectural production within the same framework.

In general sense, a transformation means a structural change; and an urban transformation means a structural change in spatial, functional, or social formation of urban areas. A renovation, regeneration, rehabilitation, revitalization, re-functioning, re-definition, or gentrification, any urban transformation comprises a structural change (Tekeli, 2003: 5). In most urban transformations the changes in spatial situation or function take place together with the one in social structure; or one generates the other. A spatial change may trigger a social change or a social change may result with a change in the urban form. Both sides of urban transformations, spatial and social, are complementary to each other.

Cities are almost always the subjects of on-going or impending transformations. Although each urban transformation reveals divergences from another, they actually perform a cumulative change in the whole city; thus, they should be

considered as the components of a total transformation. A transformation may be originated by a population increase, by a change in the economic life of the city, by growth of the city, by re-organization of the social strata, or even by the requirement for new viable buildings instead of the older ones (Tekeli, 2003: 3-4). But none of these constitutes an urban transformation only by itself; they are all interrelated with each other. This interrelation is reasoned on the wholeness of the city (Tekeli, 2003: 3-4). It means that no particular transformation occurs exclusively in itself, nor it is isolated; but any structural change in any part of the city stimulates a total transformation within the whole city.

Therefore, an analysis of the transformation of a limited area requires finding out the correlations with the transformations at the rest of the city.

On the other hand there emerge resistance mechanisms to transformations within the city. These mechanisms may be generated by economical factors, symbolic values, property relations, or by some restrictions imposed by plan decisions. For instance, if transforming a technically enduring building or transforming an area including such buildings is not economical when compared with the profit to be gained from this operation, then the economical factors generate a resistance mechanism to the transformation. Or if a building or an area has an urban, architectural, aesthetic, environmental, or historical value, then this symbolic value generates the resistance mechanism to the transformation, which would consist of demolishing and re-building. Shared ownerships of a building or of an urban land may also generate a resistance mechanism to the transformation, which requires the approval of each of the property owners. Or some development regulations or preservation decisions may prevent a transformation by generating resistance mechanisms. (Tekeli, 2003: 4-5)

When considered together, impending urban transformations are usually met with a resistance mechanism. If the pressure beyond, either will or necessity for transformation is stronger than resistance factors, then the transformation occurs. On the other hand, if the resistance factors are stronger, the transformation either does not occur or sustains until the resistances diminish. Spontaneous urban

transformations occur within one of these two probable frameworks. Yet, if it is a designed or planned transformation, a third alternative may happen. When the transformation pressure and resistance factors meet, or even when the transformation requirements come into existence, an authority may decide whether or not the transformation should be exercised. Nevertheless, the authority may not be powerful enough to decide, but may take its position for either supporting the transformation or the resistance mechanism. If the authority supports the transformation, the process accelerates; and if the authority strengthens the resistance mechanism, the transformation either does not occur, or sustains until another authority supports the transformation. In the second case, when both a transformation is supported and its resistance mechanism is strengthened by different authorities, there occurs a confrontation between the authorities. Then the transformation becomes an authority problem; and since it is an urban transformation, it appears as an authority problem on the urban realm.

The questions to be asked here are those: which authority, why, and how is joined to the process? The answers are related with the characteristic of urban transformation to be a public matter. Since an urban transformation takes place on the public realm, the right to decide on the process belongs to the public; the only authority is the public. However, in the political organization, the public charges political institutions for their own governance, and these institutions act as intermediary organizations in public authorization cases. In the case of an urban transformation, these political institutions decide on the transformation to occur, or not, in the name of public. If it is decided to occur, then how to realize the transformation must also be decided. At that stage, the institutions transmit the authority given them by the public to the designer, either architect or planner. Such an intermediary action makes the institution join the urban transformation process. As a result of its political character, the urban transformation becomes a political process, where the institution and the designer act together as a political actor. The designer does not have to be a political actor by himself, but may be a technocrat who is responsible from developing plans. Even then the political organization he is serving for makes him join the political urban transformation process as a component of a political actor. Thus, the term “actor” should better

be used in general sense for the subjects of the transformation, either at decision, or design level. The actor refers to any person, and to any institutional subject as well, who contributed to the transformation process positively or negatively, at design or implementation stages, or at controlling position.

Therefore, an analysis of an urban transformation requires figuring out the whole influences of political actors on the process, which is in fact the first aim of this study.¹

On the other hand, political actors are not able to determine their positions within a transformation process by themselves. The positions for political actors are rather determined by the circumstances, within which the transformation emerges. The actor occupies a definite position within these circumstances.

This is a post-structuralist and particularly Foucauldian point of view to consider subjects not *a priori* given, but as the figures formed by the society, or by social conditions (Game, 1998: 65). In his “The Archaeology of Knowledge” (*L’Archéologie du savoir*), Foucault mentions on the “subject positions”, when explaining the components of discursive formations: “The positions of the subject are also defined by the situation that it is possible for him to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups of objects” (Foucault, 2002: 57-58). What important here is not the subject himself as an individual, but the position he occupies. In the same conception, an investigation on subjects means an investigation on the subject positions, and consequently on the discourse that set up these positions. The media of this investigation are the “statements” of the subjects. These statements are expected to reveal not only the subjects, but also the conditions which produce them, or which made the subjects speak them. (Foucault, 2002; Keskin, 1999)

This framework enables a methodology for examining the case study of this thesis. As this study will be carried on by investigating the political actors, who were the subjects of an urban transformation, it also appears as an investigation on the subject positions within an urban transformation. Thus, to dwell on the

¹ This argument is valid if only it is not a spontaneous urban transformation. Spontaneous urban transformations are not taken into consideration in this study.

statements of the political actors will not only reveal the political actors themselves, but also demonstrate the circumstances within which the transformation occurred. Additionally, it will make the evaluation of position of architectural production within urban transformations possible, which is the second aim of the study.

From the architectural point of view, there assumed to be two possible positions for architectural production in politically shaped urban transformation processes. First, if the architect is not involved in the process as a political actor, or if the architect does not act together with an institution to constitute a political actor, it means that the circumstances do not set a position for architectural production within the transformation. In that situation the ways, possibilities, and limits of architectural production remain to be determined by the limitations of another designer and/or actor within the process. Second, if the architect participates in the process as a political actor, or at least as a component of a political actor, it means that there is a suitable position for architectural production set by the circumstances. In that situation, the ways, possibilities, and limits of architectural production may be determined by a political actor, including the architect.

In this study, the incomplete transformation of the old industrial district of Ankara will be examined, and this examination is assumed to reveal both of the possible positions for architectural production in politically shaped urban transformations.

The old industrial district of Ankara was Maltepe and its close environment. In the second chapter the development of the industrial district will be examined in three subsequent periods. First one is the spontaneous development period between 1892 and 1924, from the arrival of railways at the city in 1892, until the first planning attempt in 1924. The second one is the first planned development period of the area according to the Lörcher Plans, between 1924 and 1930s. And the third one is between 1930s and 1950s, when the development of the district was directed according to Jansen Plan.

In the third chapter the transformation of the old industrial district will be examined comprehensively in three sections. In the first section, the background

of the transformation will be explained with necessities and preferences beyond; with special reference to Yücel-Uybadin Plan as comprising the first decisions on the transformation of the district. Since the transformation occurred on two distinct areas as two distinct processes, the transformations of each industrial production and industrial service areas will be examined in the following two sections. Besides the physical transformation, the effects of the political actors will take place in these sections.

The fourth chapter will be consisted of two comparisons. The two-sided characteristic of the transformation of the old industrial district will enable a comparative evaluation on two realms. First one will be an evaluation in the political context, and the second one will be in the urban-architectural context.

In the conclusion chapter, the outcomes of the comparisons will be employed in questioning the possible approaches for the similar forthcoming urban transformations, with special references to the political framework and the position of architectural production within the same framework; which is actually the last aim of the study.

CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPMENT OF MALTEPE AS AN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT

Ankara had never been a city of industry, but there has always been an industrial production in the city since the ends of 19th century.² The amount of industrial production and the scale of industrial areas in Ankara have been limited enough to satisfy the basic needs of the city population. Thus, not the improvement of industry made the city develop, but the development of the city has made the industry improve in Ankara.

Although there had been a number of industrial establishments in Ankara before the Republican period, they were far away from forming up an industrial district, as they were dispersed in and around. The first dense location of industry was in 1920s, in the form of an axis lying along the railway lines next to the station. There were *İmalat-ı Harbiye* ateliers (weaponry factories) at the west, and some other factories, ateliers, and storing units at the east of the station. The density of industrial establishments at the eastern portion of that axis had increased more than any other part of the city in early Republican period, so that Maltepe and its close neighborhood turned out to be the first industrial district of Ankara.³

The research area for this study is surrounded by Talatpaşa Boulevard at north, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Boulevard and Toros Street at south, Atatürk Boulevard at east, and main railways station at west.⁴ (fig. 2.1, 2.2)

² Most of the scholars dwelling on the industrial developments in Ankara consider the local traditional production as a sub-title of industrial production. However, the term, industry, refers to machinery-aided production in this study.

³ For this study, the term "industrial district" refers solely to the industrial areas at the east of the central railways station.

⁴ For the names of boulevards, roads, and districts, which have changed in time, the present names are preferred in order to prevent any possible confusion.




Fig. 2.1. Research area in the city




Fig. 2.2. Boundaries of the research area

The development of the area will be examined in three subsequent periods:⁵

- 1892-1924: Spontaneous Development Around the Railways
- 1924-1930s: Development within the Lörcher Plans
- 1930s-1950s: Development within the Jansen Plan

2.1. 1892-1924: Spontaneous Development Around the Railways

The initial factors determining the development of area as an industrial district were the railway lines and the central railway station. Therefore, the beginning of development should be dated to November 1892, when the railway connection of Ankara was provided as a leg of railways project between Istanbul and Baghdad (Ortaylı, 1994: 112).⁶



Fig. 2.3. The first train station of Ankara

The foremost effect of railways had been the vitality it brought to the economic life of the city (Tekeli, 1994a: 176). The railway connection provoked the emergence of new agricultural areas, and consequently the increase in the agricultural production at regional scale (Yavuz, 2000: 201-202). Though Ankara

⁵ Although these periods seem consistent with the generally accepted planning periods of Ankara, the study will pay attention to genuine development periods of the district itself, which may or may not present such a consistency with the superior planning historiography of the city.

⁶ For more information on Baghdad railways project see Özyüksel, 2000; Rathmann, 2001; and for its effects on Ankara see Ortaylı, 2000; and Yavuz, 2000.

could not go beyond performing as a collecting station for these agricultural products (Ortaylı, 2000: 208), the increase in the production, taxes, and exportation was followed by an increase in the surplus of the city at that period (Yavuz, 2000: 202). The increasing surplus controlled in the city provided the variation of urban services and activities; and railways and station appeared as new determinants in the site selection of those urban services (Tekeli, 1994a: 176). In other words, railway connection triggered a series of developments not only in the economy of Ankara, but also on the urban form. The area around the railway lines and the station was the center of this development. The new formation of the area may be examined in three categories according to the functions of the new structures it welcomed:

(a) Storing units:

Performing as a collecting station, there must have emerged a requirement for storing units in the city, so that the number of large stores increased from 50 to 260 in Ankara between 1895 and 1902 (Aktüre, 1978: 128, table 3). Large stores and *entrepôts* (bonded warehouses) were located along the railway lines, in close proximity to the station, and especially at the east side for the trade and transportation of stored products and goods, (fig. 2.4). For this study, there are two significant outcomes of locating the storing units at this place:

- The road connecting the station to the old city center, *Yukarı Yüz* was serving as a trade axis facilitating the transportation of goods within the city between the storing units and the old trade center. So, besides feeding the area with structures of storage, the same road also set up a boundary for the expansion of the area. It is apparent that the road, which was the preliminary form of today's Talatpaşa Boulevard, has marked the north boundary of the first industrial district since the end of 19th century. (fig. 2.2, 2.4)
- The upcoming function of the area has been determined by the dense location of large stores, and *entrepôts*. As will be explained in the following chapters, that portion of the industrial district had continuously served for storage and trade facilities up to 1970s.




Fig. 2.4 A map of Ankara dated to early 1920s, showing the roads connecting the station to old and new city centers and large stores along the railway lines, in close proximity to the station.

(b) Small-scale industrial structures:

Railways and station were new determinants in the site selection of new small-scale industrial structures at the neighborhood. For instance, a flour factory was established as a new urban service at the end of 1890s (Aktüre, 1978: 128, table 3). As it was running on steam power (Yavuz, 2000: 197), it must have been placed close to the railway lines. The second flour factory, again with steam power, was established near the station in 1906 (Tekeli, 1994a: 176).

However, it would be misleading to consider all industrial developments as conditioned by railways; because, railways primarily served for transportation and trade facilities at that period, rather than providing the technical equipment for industrial production.

(c) Maintenance ateliers of railways:

When the railway connection was provided, the maintenance ateliers of railways were also set with two lathe-workbenches (Tekeli, 1994a: 176). They must have been located at the east side of the area together with the hangars, where they developed into *Şimendifer Fabrikası* (railways factory) at the end of 20s (fig. 2.5). The equipment of the maintenance ateliers was allocated for the weaponry factories during the War of Independence, when *İmalat-ı Harbiye* was founded at the west side of the station (Kemal, 1983: 29-30).




Fig. 2.5 *Şimendifer Fabrikası* is right at the east of the station.

The development of the first industrial district of Ankara was originated with these spontaneous formations of the site. It was not a premeditated development, and no actor had contributed to the process. The spontaneous development was paused during the First World War, until the designation of Ankara as the headquarters of the War of Independence and subsequently as the capital city.

Ankara was declared as the capital city and Republic of Turkey was founded consecutively in 1923. This year is considered as a breaking not only in the Turkish history, but also in the history of Ankara. Nevertheless, the spontaneous development of the area had not ended until the foundation of *Şehremaneti* of Ankara and until the preparation of Lörcher Plan in 1924. Therefore, the planned development should be investigated starting from 1924.

2.2. 1924-1930s: Development within the Lörcher Plans

Having the War of Independence just finished, the primary concerns of the new Republic of Turkey were the safety of the country, building up an independent economy, the resettlement problem of migrants, and satisfying the basic needs of the population (Cengizkan, 2002a: 37). Besides the common ones, Ankara had some other peculiar problems. When the city was declared as the capital, the increase in the population was followed by an increase in the demand for housing, and for the infrastructural services as well. In a report of *Mübadele, İmar ve İskan Vekaleti* (Ministry of Population Exchange, Development, and Settlement) dated to 1924, these required services were declared as sewer system, clean water supply, illumination of streets, street construction, in-city transportation, and telephone system (Cengizkan, 2002a: 39-40). According to the same report, The Municipality of Ankara had to be settled and a city plan had to be produced rapidly for the intended solutions of those problems (Cengizkan, 2002a: 39-40).⁷ Lörcher Plans were devised to serve for this immediate function. They consisted of two complementary plans for old city and *Yenişehir* (the new city), dated to 1924 and 25 respectively (Cengizkan, 2002a: 45) (fig. 2.6). These plans also comprised the first footsteps of a planned development process for the industrial district.

⁷ There had already been a Map of Ankara Şehremaneti, prepared by military experts in 1924, demonstrating the present situation. It must have provided a base for Lörcher's plan for the old city (Cengizkan, 2002a: 41)



Fig. 2.6. 1924-25 Lörcher Plans. Highlighted area was reserved for industries.

2.2.1. Physical Development

Lörcher had taken the railway lines as a boundary between the old city and *Yenişehir* (Vardar, 1989: 42). Therefore, the area along the railway lines took place in both of his plans. In 1924 plan for the old city, a plain land of 3 km long and 400 m wide was reserved for the future development area, for the station, for the connections to industries, and for the new industrial establishments (Vardar, 1989: 39) (fig. 2.6). In 1925 plan, a green belt, afforested on two sides, was kept along the railway lines in order not to prevent the possible development of railways and in order to detach the industrial area from the new housing district (Vardar, 1989: 42). Lörcher's attitude to isolate the industrial development area can also be observed in his proposal for the new station in 1925 plan. He proposed a second passenger station at the east, where there is *Sihhiye Bridge* today, while leaving the old one as a cargo station (Vardar, 1989: 42). Yet, this proposal remained unrealized.



Fig. 2.7. The train station and surroundings at early 1930s

The number and scale of industries at the subject area did not increase rapidly at this period. There were small-scale carpentry, timber, and other woodwork factories, located nearby the station (Tekeli, 1994a: 178). However, those distinct enterprises were far away from labeling the area as an industrial district. Although the area had been reserved for industrial development in Lörcher plans, it was not possible to define Maltepe as an industrial district, until the establishment of electricity and coal gas factories in the area at the end of 20s.

The revision plan of Léon Jaussely proves the fragmentary development of the district until 1928 (fig. 2.8). Jaussely was one of the three competitors invited to attend the Ankara plan competition (Tankut, 1993: 66-67).⁸ It is understood from the visual expression utilized in that plan that there were no irreversible applications at Maltepe, in terms of industrial development until 1928.

⁸ His competition proposal was dated to 1925 in the periodical it was published (Dufournet, 1984: 81). However, it is known that he visited Ankara in July 1927, and prepared his proposal until December 1928 (Tankut, 1993: 67). So, the right dating must be to 1928.



Fig. 2.8. Focus on 1928 Jaussely Revision Plan. The present irreversible applications of Lörcher plan were marked with black counters, where new proposals took place in red. The lack of black countered proposals in the research area proves that there were no irreversible applications until 1928.

Maltepe Electricity Factory started to operate in 1929 (Tekeli, 1994a: 179). In the same year the coal gas factory was founded in Maltepe; and the next year, in 1930, an oxygen factory was established as integrated to the coal gas factory (Tekeli, 1994a: 179). The emergence of these railways-aided large-scaled factories should be considered as a threshold, where the fragmentary development of the area was replaced with a comprehensive development process. Even though Jansen plan had been valid for Ankara since 1929, they were the Lörcher plans employed in site selection of coal gas factory and in its water pipe installations (Cengizkan, 2002a: 45) (fig. 2.9). This means that the development of the district was still performed on Lörcher's decisions at early 30s.



Fig. 2.9. The area of coal gas factory (highlighted) was determined in Lörcher Plans



Fig. 2. 10 A photograph of early 1930s

The emergence of a cluster of factories at Maltepe was also depending on those decisions. A cold air and ice factory, a subsidiary beer factory of Bomonti, and a flour factory were among the new establishments in this cluster (Tekeli, 1994a: 179). These were all industries that served for the requirements of the growing city rather than being for industrial production *per se*. It is also essential here to note that the location of the electricity factory was an important determinant in the site-selection decisions for the industries; because there was a central electricity network at that period, and it was advantageous for the industries to be in close proximity to that single power plant.

2.2.2. Political Actors at the Development

The political actors contributed to the development of Ankara, and consequently of the industrial district were *Şehremaneti*, central authority, and Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü (Ankara Directorate of Development) in this period.

2.2.2.1. Local Administration

After the declaration of the city as the new capital, a local practicing institution had been required in order to solve the urgent problems of the city. Ankara *Şehremaneti* was active between February 1924 and 1930. Organized under the guardianship of *Dahiliye Vekaleti* (Ministry of Internal Affairs), the *Şehremini* (mayor) and directors were appointed by the central authority (Tankut, 1993: 49). It was responsible from solving the infrastructural problems of the city in general, with the supports and custody of the government. Thus, *Şehremaneti* was practicing as an extension of central authority, not merely as an autonomous local administration.

The first *Şehremini* of Ankara was Mehmet Ali Bey (Cengizkan, 2002a: 43). He took place in obtaining Lörcher Plans, but was relieved of his duty because of a confrontation with *Nafia Vekaleti* (Ministry of Public Works), and for the reason that he could not work efficiently enough (Cengizkan, 2002a: 43). The second *Şehremini* was Haydar Bey (Cengizkan, 2002a: 43). He presented a pragmatic and efficient program so that he could immediately establish the required construction industries (Tekeli, 1980: 54). The small-scaled factories at Maltepe must have founded in this period. They were not only the investments of *Şehremaneti*, but also of private enterprises, such as the carpentry and woodwork factories, supported by the mayor at Maltepe (Tekeli, 1994a: 178). Despite the high expenditure, the investments of Haydar Bey may be considered as the successes of *Şehremaneti* (Tankut, 1993: 50). Yet, they were still insufficient to label the area as an industrial district. *Şehremaneti* had already been in debt, and was not capable of implementing large-scaled and costly projects. The change in the characteristic of the district was designated by the attempt of central authority.

Şehremaneti was converted into the Municipality of Ankara in 1930 (Tankut, 1993: 97).

2.2.2.2. Central Authority

The central authority contributed to the development of the industrial district in this period through the *Mübadele, İmar ve İskan Vekaleti* (Ministry of Public Exchange, Development, and Settlement and through the Ministry of Public Works.

2.2.2.2.1. Ministry of Population Exchange, Development, and Settlement

Although it was decided to establish Ankara *Şehremaneti* on 17th October 1923 (Cengizkan, 2002a: 38), it could not be concluded until 16th February 1924 (Tankut, 1993: 49). In this gap of four months, Ministry of Exchange, Development and Settlement which had already been occupied with the resettling problems of immigrants, took on the responsibility to solve the urgent problems of Ankara (Cengizkan, 2002a: 39). In 1924, the same ministry prepared the report mentioned above, declaring the required services for the city. Preparing the grounds for forthcoming Lörcher plans, the ministry had contributed to the development of the area as an actor until the establishment of *Şehremaneti*.

2.2.2.2.2. Ministry of Public Works

Since *Şehremaneti* had not been capable of implementing large-scale and costly projects, The Ministry of Public Works supervised the consortium of German Didier Company for production of coal gas and electricity in April 1928 (Cengizkan, 2002a: 42). In the same year Ankara Company of Coal Gas and Electricity was founded with high rated foreign capital of that consortium (Cengizkan, 2002a: 43). Only after these attempts, the large scale factories could be established, and the area could turn into an industrial district. It may well be regarded as the appearance of central authority on the scene as the dominant political actor on other institutions and individuals.

2.2.2.3. Ankara Directorate of Improvement

The shift of the political actors, from local administration to central authority was not limited with the infrastructural service supplies. After the urgent problems of the city had dissolved, Ankara started to be considered as the scene and model of the Turkish modernization, which would require a new and comprehensive development plan. For the reason that the technical staff and the legal position of *Şehremaneti* would not be sufficient, *Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü* (Ankara Directorate of Development) was founded on 28th May 1928 for implementing the forthcoming development plan (Tankut, 1993: 72). Directorate was defined as an extension of Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the deciding unit of the Directorate was *İmar İdare Heyeti* (Management Board of Development), whose members were selected in the Cabinet (Tankut, 1993: 94). The establishment of the Directorate of Development meant that *Şehremaneti*, and subsequently the municipality was excluded from the development of Ankara.⁹ The attitude of the central authority was revealed in the statement: “the development of the capital city of The Republic of Turkey is directly the matter of the government, not that of a municipality”¹⁰ (Tankut, 1993: 72). This statement also illustrated that the directorate was not a local administration organ, but a practicing extension of the central authority. Nevertheless, the directorate was associated with the Municipality of Ankara in 1937 and became a unit within the local administration since then (Tankut, 1993: 73).

2.3. 1930s-1950s: Development within the Jansen Plan

The second comprehensive development plan for Ankara was obtained via an invited competition, where three international architects were invited to attend (Tankut, 1993: 66). Among them Hermann Jansen won the competition, and his proposal was implemented as an *avant-projet* between 1929 and 1932 (Tankut, 1993: 91). Jansen’s complete plan was approved in 1932 and implemented

⁹ Only a member of municipality could participate in *İmar İdare Heyeti*, so that municipality could take place in the development of the at representation level.

¹⁰ “Cumhuriyetin Başkentinin imarı bir şehir Belediyesinin meselesi değil, doğrudan doğruya bir devlet meselesidir.” (Translation mine.)

extensively between 1932 and 39 (Tankut, 1993: 127) (fig.2.11). Although Jansen had been released of his duty in 1939, the development of Ankara continued until 1950s according to the general framework of this plan. The development of the first industrial district was also sustained with this plan up to 50s. (fig. 2.12)




Fig. 2.11. Jansen Plan




Fig. 2.12. Industrial district in Jansen Plan

2.3.1. Physical Development

A requirement list had already been prepared by *Şehremaneti* in 1927, which would in turn constitute the basis for the competition specifications (Tankut, 1993: 63). It was stated in the 14th clause of that list, “the area between Ankara Sivas [railway lines] and Ankara station is allotted for industry and factories” (T.C. Ankara Şehremaneti, 1929: 5).¹¹ Jansen did not propose a new location for industry and left the mentioned area to industrial development (fig. 2.12, 2.13). That place had already been the first extension area of industries in Ankara; and furthermore, Lörcher had already reserved the same place for the development of industry. It is evident that neither *Şehremaneti*, nor Jansen offered any location for industry, different than what had already grown spontaneously, and what Lörcher had made definite afterwards.

On the other hand Jansen’s decisions were noteworthy for comprehending the future development of the area. He explained his decisions on industry, railways, and stations within an integrated growth scheme as follows:

Ankara can and will never be a city of industry. New experiences necessitate that industry must be settled, as much as possible, in surrounding areas, even in the places where there are ores, coal mines, and so on. It would be harmful for the city to expand in the linear area at the west of railways and south of the cargo station. [That area] is allocated to industry (for electricity, coal gas, etc.). For the location it is necessary to consider north and east winds.¹²

(Jansen, 1937: 20-21)

¹¹ “Ankara Sivas ve Ankara istasyonları arasındaki arazının sanai ve fabrikalara tahsisi.” (Translation mine. Explanations in bold brackets mine.)

¹² Sanayi Kısmı: Ankara kat’iyyen bir sanayi şehri olamaz ve olmayacaktır. Yeni tecrübeler sanayiın mümkün olduğu kadar civara, hatta maden, kömür ve saire olan yerlere kurulmasını icap ettiriyor. Demiryolunun garbinde eşya istasyonunun cenubunda şerit halinde bir kısım şehir için yayılması zararlı olur. Sanayie tahsis edilmiştir. (Elektrik; Havagazı ve saire için). Yer için şimali şarki rüzgarlarını nazarı itibara almak çok lazımdır. (Translation mine. Explanations in bold brackets mine.)




Fig. 2.13. Industrial District was shown as “Sanayi Sahası” in Jansen Plan

In his description Jansen indicated that the industry should be located at the west of the railways, and at the south of the cargo station. He separated the cargo station from that of passengers, as Lörcher had attempted to do. Similar to Lörcher’s proposal, Jansen argued that the main passenger station had better be located at the center of the city, where there is Sıhhiye Bridge today (Jansen, 1937: 22). Nevertheless he had to cease from this idea as a result of the high level difference between the station and Atatürk Boulevard, which would create many problems at the implementation stage (Jansen, 1937: 22). On the other hand he insisted on designing two stations: one as a main passenger station, the other as a cargo station. He explained the cargo station proposal and designing the northeast part of the industrial area with transportation facilities as such:

The cargo station lies between the main station and Atatürk Boulevard, where a transportation street reaches at the station, as parallel to the boulevard. It is connected to close industry centers with separate lines. It is thought to construct a marketplace at the north edge of the station street. This place is very suitable for transportation.¹³

(Jansen, 1937: 23)

¹³ Eşya Yük İstasyonu: Büyük istasyon ile Atatürk bulvarı arasında yük istasyonu uzanarak, ayrıca bir nakliyat caddesi bulvara muvazı olarak istasyona varır. Buradan yakın senayi merkezlerine ayrı hatlarla birleşir. İstasyon caddesinin şimal kenarında bir hal yapılması düşünülmüştür. Burası nakliyata oldukça müsaittir. (Translation mine. Explanations in bold brackets mine.)




Fig. 2.14. “Yük istasyonu” (cargo station) was proposed to be at the east of the central station in Jansen Plan

In short, Jansen allocated the area around the station for industry for two reasons: the direction of dominant winds and easy connection for transportation facilities (Tankut, 1993: 79). It is known that the transportation facilities have taken place in the same location since 1890s, and industrial establishments have already suggested to be settled in the same place by Lörcher. Therefore it would be a mistake to consider Jansen’s decisions as the primary decisions on the development of the industrial district. They had better be considered as an important step in the process, which not only legitimated the current formation of the area, but also made the future development persistent. Moreover, it is evident that Lörcher’s plan decisions were still valid for the development of the district even in 1930s. Therefore, Jansen’s decisions had better be regarded as improving those of Lörcher for implementation.



Fig. 2.15. The small-scaled factories at the south of the train station at early 40s

The plan decisions on the industrial district were much more elucidated at the implementation stage. A possible fragmentary development, like the one happened at the implementation of Lörcher plans, was prevented by a number of regulations. According to a decision, dated to 18.3.1938, the entire city was divided into five regions and the industrial district was considered within the fifth region (T. C. Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü, 1946: 121-123).¹⁴ In the same decision the minimum parcel dimensions were also set so that the parcels would be suitable for large-scale industrial structures (T. C. Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü, 1946: 126).




Fig. 2.16. The parcels were set in Jansen plan

¹⁴ The fifth region covered the whole industrial areas, not only the industrial district at the east, but also the lands at the west of the station.

In that period the heterogeneity in the functional allocation of industrial structures had also become persistent. Since the end of 19th century, service structures, such as stores, *entrepôts*, freight depots, hangars, and ateliers, were located at the north of the railway lines, where production structures were settled at the south. This tendency continued increasingly between 1924 and 1932, when the development was carried on due to Lörcher plans. Finally after the approval of Jansen plan in 1932, the division of the district into two, as “industrial service area” and “industrial production area” became more apparent. The physical growth of the whole site retained this situation more than the plan decisions did. Railway lines were extending to south mainly for industrial production facilities. They were serving for the electricity and coal gas factories by means of the transportation of charcoal. At north, the services of railway lines were of two kinds. They were extending either for the transport of raw material and other goods, or for the maintenance ateliers and hangars. It is important to note that the number of stores and warehouses increased at that period, again at the north of railway lines. One of them was the Ankara Grains Silo, which was constructed by German Miag Company between 1933 and 1937 (Cengizkan, 1994: 87) Additionally, the wholesaling marketplace of the city was located at the northern portion of the area in 1942 (Akgün, 1996: 192).¹⁵ Jansen plan irreversibly froze this two-sided characteristic of the district. Besides, the two-sided character of the forthcoming transformation was also marked with that step. The situation observed in 1940s has taken place in a guidebook as follows:

The Station Neighborhood: It is on the plain area between Akköprü and Maltepe. Rather than being a residential district, this place presents a special characteristic for trade, with the large and modern station, Ministry of Communications, General Directorate of *Devlet Demiryolları*, *Devlet Demiryolları* School of profession, a wheat silo belonging to *Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi*, warehouses for wood and charcoal, the marketplace of greengrocery and fruits, and station stores located here.

A small residential quarter is also being constructed by *Devlet Demiryolları* for its own employees.

¹⁵ This marketplace did not take place in Jansen plan, but constructed in 1942, just after Jansen had been released of his duty. The construction of this marketplace may well be regarded as a violation of Jansen plan.

Between this neighborhood and Maltepe There is the industrial district, which today includes some industrial establishments and a large area for the ones to be constructed at the future.¹⁶

(Türkiye Kılavuzu: 191)

What is remarkable at this quotation is that the author considers the two areas of the industrial district as two adjacent neighborhoods. This means that the differentiation between the industrial production and industrial service area were observable to the extent that they could be perceived as separate areas in 1940s.

2.3.2. Political Actors at the Development

Tankut highlights three political actors who contributed to the application of Jansen plan on the entire city between 1932 and 1939: the central authority, *İmar İdare Heyeti*, and Municipality of Ankara (Tankut, 1993: 127-136). The contributions of central authority were through debates between the deputies of both government and opposition parties, in terms of economical conditions and qualification of political organizations (Tankut, 1993: 128-133). *İmar İdare Heyeti* and The Municipality of Ankara had taken place separately until 1937, when they were combined within a single local administration organ (Tankut, 1993: 136); and this meant an end for the antagonism between two institutions responsible of the same subject.

Although there had not been a remarkable influence of political actors directly on the industrial development at this period, the reflections of the changes in the political and economical realms started to be observed on the process after 1939. These changes occurred on different but interrelated platforms. Tankut demonstrates the situation in 1939 as an end to the development of Ankara within Jansen plan:

¹⁶ *İstasyon Sertti*: Akköprü ile Maltepe arasındaki düzlüktedir. Burası ikamet mahallesi olmaktan ziyade, geniş ve modern Garı, Ulaştırma Bakanlığı, Devlet Demiryolları Genel Müdürlüğü, Devlet Demiryolları Meslek Okulu, Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisine ait Buğday Silosu, kömür ve odun depoları, Sebze ve Meyva hali ve istasyon ambarları ile ayrı bir ticari hususiyet gösterir.

Burada Devlet Demiryolları tarafından kendi memurlarına mahsus ufak bir de ikamet mahallesi vücade getirilmektedir.

Bu semtle Maltepe arasında, bugün bazı sanayi müesseselerin bulunduğu ve ileride vücade getirilecek olanları için de ayrılmış geniş sahayı ihtiva eden sanayi bölgesi vardır. (Translation mine)

Before all, Atatürk, who had been the supporter and protector of planned development of Ankara, was no longer there. The planner was released with the belief that he was not needed anymore. [Single] party government was dominant in national politics, and the [Second World] war overshadowed the international politics. The economical condition was not positive indeed. Because the economical constraints of war and defense started to be felt, where the crisis [economical crisis of 1929] had not yet concluded.¹⁷

(Tankut, 1993: 127)

The development of the industrial district inevitably slowed down in that stagnant situation, if not ended. The following activity on the site would be preparing the backgrounds for the impending transformation of the whole district.

¹⁷ Herşeyden önce Ankara'nın planlı imarının destekleyicisi ve koruyucusu Atatürk artık yoktur. Plan yapımcısına da, bundan böyle gereksiz olduğu inancı ile yol verilmiştir. İç siyasette parti hükümeti egemen olmuş, dış politikaya ise savaşın gmlgesi düşmüştür. Ekonomik durum da olumlu sayılmaz. Çünkü buhran henüz son bulmadan savaşın ve savunmanın ekonomik baskısı duyulmaya başlamıştır. (Translation mine. Explanations in bold brackets mine.)

CHAPTER 3

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT

The beginning of the transformation of the first industrial district of Ankara should be dated to 1957, when Yücel-Uybadin plan was approved as the new development plan of the city. It was at the same time the threshold after which the transformation would constantly be a two-sided process, going on separately at each industrial production and industrial service areas. The initial framework of the transformation was drawn in 1957 plan. Nevertheless, there had been some factors beyond the plan decisions, which actually made the area subject to a transformation. In the first section of this chapter, those factors and 1957 Yücel-Uybadin plan will be examined together as components of the background of the transformation.

In the following sections, the transformations of industrial production and industrial service areas will be investigated separately with respect to the political actors, who contributed to each of the processes.

3.1. Background of the Transformation

The transformation of the industrial district was activated by 1957 Yücel-Uybadin plan. The factors at the background of this activation, and consequently of the transformation are thought to be of two kinds: urban/environmental factors as necessities, and political factors as preferences.

3.1.1. Urban / Environmental Factors: Necessities

In Jansen plan the population of Ankara was estimated to be around 300 000 in 50 years, but this number was almost reached in 20 years time, at the beginning of 1950s (Tekeli, 1982: 69). Besides increasing population, the city was dealing with squatter housing problem and land speculations since 40s (Bademli, 1994: 163). Jansen plan, which had already been changed with a number of regulations since 1939, was no longer functional to solve those problems. It was then a necessity to obtain a new development plan for Ankara. In 1952, a decision was taken on this way to obtain the plan via a competition, and a committee was founded to prepare a report, which would in turn be a guide for the competitors (Yücel, 1992: 20).

The report of the committee, prepared in 1953 and published in 1954, consisted of 16 sections. 15 of them were describing the present situation of the city, where the last one was left to the needs of the city (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954a). The last section was important not only for demonstrating the necessities within the city, but also for preparing the basis for the transformation of the industrial district at Maltepe.

The 16th section of the report starts with explaining the necessity for a cultural center at Ankara:

One of the first needs of the city is a Cultural Center suitable for a modern city like Ankara; established with due consideration to the relations and ties existing between the present educational and scientific establishments and the related societies and installations. This center should include all establishments, localities and installations to meet the educational, teaching, training and art requirements of Ankara and the connected University Center.

(Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 118)

It was then anticipated that the railways station and Anıtkabir would together constitute the center of modern Ankara; and thus, the cultural center had better be located around this newly developing area (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 118). The cultural center was also required to be easily accessible and in close contact with the

existing related facilities. It was stated that the area extending from Atatürk Boulevard to the railways stations, and also to the north and the west of the station, would be a suitable location for that cultural center (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 118). The idea beyond the requirement was to make Ankara itself a cultural center and a modern state capital (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 119). From that point of view, the cultural center would have to welcome various facilities, which had to be present in a capital city. They were listed in the report as follows:

It is a necessity for the future greater Turkey and for Ankara with a million population to have a State Opera, State Theater, a large concert hall or house, State Conservatory, Academy of Fine Arts, National (or State) Art and Sculpture Gallery, a large radio center with modern television studios, a National Museum with all necessary departments, a health museum, a large technical museum, a wax museum, outdoor and indoor, cold and warm swimming pools, children's playgrounds, recreational parks, zoo and plant gardens, a city casino with all the entertainment and artistic possibilities, a show gallery for technical and industrial fairs, with annual sports buildings, facilities for non-profit organizations and societies, restaurants and city parks, and similar facilities

(Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 118)

All these functions were thought to take place on the area extending to the west of the city as a corridor, from railways station towards the Gazi Farm. One of the main problems was going to be the accessibility of these areas. The connections with the railways station, the old city, and Yenışehir had to be provided in the new plan (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 119). The intersection point of these parts of the city with the anticipated cultural center could be the area between the station and Atatürk Boulevard, namely the industrial district. Then the accessibility problem could easily be solved by transforming the industrial district into a cultural center area, which could also serve as a gateway for the rest of the cultural center areas:

Removing the Ankara freight depot, Military Factories installations, and other industrial facilities which have a bad influence on the city's health, and securing the connection of this center with the old and new districts by opening wide covered passages with stores on both sides, reaching the cultural center at the train station and the main roads across from it, may be considered. The realization of the present point of view in

removing the railroad tracks and thus permitting the establishment of the cultural center at the core of the city is no doubt, recommendable. Such a project would secure the architectural, esthetic, economic and cultural unity of Ankara, which is artificially divided by the railroad tracks.

(Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 119)

The replacement of the factories and of railways-related structures was recommended in the report. The same subject was more detailed on the following pages of the Turkish version of the report. Dwelling on the present problems and future conditions of the railways, it was argued that the new freight depot of the city had better be established outside the city, at around the Güvercin station (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954a: 119).¹⁸ By this way, storing and transportation facilities of large amounts of goods could be transferred to outer regions of the city:

It is necessary to displace the warehouses, [railways] ateliers, large stores, and private or administrative establishments present in the maneuver area of the station and replace them at the area of [new] freight depot. The new grains silos must also be established at that area and Ankara station must be allotted only to passenger transport.¹⁹

(Ankara Belediyesi, 1954a: 119)

Finally, necessities of the city were listed at the end of the Turkish version of the report (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954a: 119). Among the 18 clauses, the 9th one was left to the allotment of space for cultural and recreational facilities, including the university, National Library, new museums, opera house (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954a: 119). It was required to determine the new industrial areas in the 12th clause and new areas of trade and transportation of goods within the city in the 14th one (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954a: 119).

¹⁸ Today the area is known as Güvercinlik, where there is also the *Marşandiz* (freight depot) station of railways.

¹⁹ Garın manevra sahası içerisinde bulunan depo, yol atelyesi, mağaza ile hususi şahıslara ait ve idare ile ilgili tesislerin kaldırılarak marşandiz garı sahasına nakilleri, yeniden kurulacak hububat silolarının da bu sahada kurulması ve Ankara garının münhasıran yolcu nakliyatına tahsis edilmesi gerekmektedir. (Translation mine. Explanations in bold brackets mine.)

The basis of the forthcoming transformation of the industrial district was initially founded by these replacement decisions. However it would be a mistake to consider the need for a cultural center as the reason of this replacement. The factories and other industry related structures, stores, ateliers, and also railway lines were not going to be replaced in order to provide a suitable site for the cultural center; rather, they had to be displaced and the left space would be suitable for that project. The critical question is why they had to be replaced?

The first reason was related with the unexpected development of the city. The limits of the city determined in Jansen plan had already been exceeded. The industrial district of the city, which had been planned at the outskirts of the city, was no longer distant from the residential areas. On the contrary, it was at the midst of housing areas at the beginning of 50s (Yavuz, 1952: 52). Furthermore, the industrial district was just between the old center, Ulus, and the newly developing center, Kızılay. Besides, railways station and Anıtkabir had been predicted to form up another center within the city, as mentioned in the report of the municipality; and the industrial district was almost at the middle of these three. Thus, the old establishments of the industrial district had to be replaced, and then the area could be equipped with new and relevant functions.

The other reason of the replacement was related with environmental factors. The industrial facilities were threatening the public health and there was an increasing consciousness about the pollution created by the industries, and about the precautions to be taken around the industrial district. This consciousness was taking place in civic publications, where there were also recommendations for the replacement of industrial facilities. For instance it was thought to re-establish the coal gas factory in another place, and there were research attempts on the feasibility of that project in 1954 (news cited in Ankara Belediyesi, 1954c: 53). Moreover, there was a noteworthy willingness of the municipality to arrange the areas around the industrial district with greens. The landscape arrangements realized around Maltepe in 1953 show that not only health but also the environmental and aesthetic quality of

this district were among the concerns of the municipality (Ankara Belediyesi, 1953: 25).

To sum up, beyond the activation of the transformation of the old industrial district by 1957 Yücel-Uybadin plan there were two kinds of necessities: urban and environmental. These complementary factors had made the replacement of the industrial establishments inevitable so that the area could be considered as the location of new projects, such as the cultural center.

3.1.2. Political Factors: Preferences

The transformation of the industrial district was not solely shaped by a series of necessities. There had also been some political factors at the background. Although they were not directly at the origin of the transformation as urban and environmental factors did, they indirectly took place in shaping the process.

Ankara had city transportation problem at the 1950s. The mass-transportation facilities within the city were insufficient in the face of increasing migration from rural areas and the unexpected growth of the city. The insufficiency had two facets. First, the number of vehicles for public transportation was limited.²⁰ Second, the road network of the city was not enough for the increasing density of traffic.²¹ It was reported in 1953 that the current plan of the city (Jansen plan) was not sufficient for solving the increasing traffic problem (Alisbah, 1953: 30). It had to be one of the primary concerns of the new development plan. The selected Yücel-Uybadin plan was believed to satisfy this requirement (Yücel, 1992: 27). As Nihat Yücel highlighted, the road network constituted the most important framework for the future development of the city in 1957 plan (Cengizkan, 2002b: 198). The proposed

²⁰ The emergence of *dolmuş* as an alternative service was a practical and spontaneous solution to the shortness of vehicles in mass-transportation (Tekeli, 1982: 71).

²¹ Although the road construction in 4 years period between 1950 and 53 was more than that had been in 27 years between 1923 and 1950 (Ankara Belediyesi, 1953: 78-79), the traffic problem could not be solved practically.

network consisted of new motorways surrounding the city and secondary roads within the city, which were not only connecting the major roads but also reaching to any part of the city with subsidiary roads. The accessibility within the city was re-defined through on this motorway network in Yücel-Uybadin plan (Tekeli, 1994: 182). One major axis of the network was Celal Bayar Boulevard. It was going to pass through the industrial district, divide it into two, and consequently make the proposed transformation of the district occur on two distinct areas.

What made these developments and decisions political preferences were their interrelations with the political context of the whole country in the 50s. There had been a number of important changes in Turkey's political landscape after the 2nd World War. These changes were reflected on the economy politics as liberalization, within which private sector gained much importance against state control (Tekeli, 1998: 12). The transportation policies changed, investments on the railways were replaced with those on motorways, the use of motorways and private car ownership were promoted. For the case of Ankara, this promotion not only generated the traffic problem, but also directed the solutions to be found on the same grounds, by setting up a sufficient road network within the city. Celal Bayar Boulevard was a part of this new road network. In short, as an indirect outcome of political preferences, the design of that new road shaped the transformation of the old industrial district, if not stimulated.

In the meantime, there had been another political outcome of the changes in the 50s. It was the emergence of new political actors, some of which were to contribute to the transformation process in turn. Tekeli argues that the political organization that remained insufficient against the unexpected developments had to make some institutional arrangements in order to make its actors capable of solving the new problems (Tekeli, 1998: 12). The new political actors, emerged within these institutional arrangements were *İller Bankası* (İller Bank), 1945,²² *Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları* (Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects), 1954, and *İmar ve*

²² *İller Bankası* was the newly defined version of *Belediyeler Bankası*, which had formerly been founded in 1933 (İller Bankası Genel Müdürlüğü, 2000: 25-26)

İskan Bakanlığı (Ministry of Development and Settlement), 1958 (Tekeli, 1998: 12-13).

3.1.3. 1957 Yücel-Uybadin Plan: Determining the Route of Transformation

The third plan of Ankara was obtained through an international competition, which had been organized in 1954 and concluded in 1955 (Yücel, 1992: 20). Nihat Yücel and Raşit Uybadin won the competition, and their project was approved in 1957 as the new development plan of the city (Yücel, 1992: 20-21).(fig. 3.1)




Fig. 3.1. 1957 Yücel-Uybadin Plan

The general planning attitude of the designers was effective on determining the route of the transformation. As mentioned above, their primary concern was providing accessibility within the city through a road network. The industrial district was also approached with the same attitude (fig.3.2). Two main roads, intersecting nearby the

railways station, were designed to pass through the area. They were connected to the surrounding main roads with secondary roads, dividing the district into smaller areas. Among the proposed main roads, the one passing through the area on east-west direction has recently been realized. It is Celal Bayar Boulevard. Although its construction could not be completed until the 80s, it was always paid attention in any decision about the old industrial district. Therefore, the proposal of Celal Bayar Boulevard has been a significant fact that shaped the transformation since 1957. It is significant because the functional division of the industrial district was carried to the transformation stage by the position of that road. The district had already been divided into two as industrial production and industrial service areas since the earlier development periods. The service structures, such as the storing units and maintenance ateliers, were dense at the north portion, whereas production facilitated structures were concentrated at the south. The main railway lines were separating the two. After 1957, the road, proposed parallel to railway lines, took on the role to separate them. This time functional division was clearer than the spontaneous division of the previous periods. Consequently, the transformation of the industrial district would inevitably occur on two distinct areas as two distinct processes.




Fig. 3.2. Main and secondary roads proposed in and around the industrial district in Yücel-Uybadin Plan

On the other hand, these decisions on the industrial district were arrangements, rather than design of a total transformation. An urban transformation means a structural change on either or spatial or functional situation of the area, as mentioned above. Yet the plan decisions were rather developing the industrial service area, and did not intervene on the large-scale structures on industrial production area. That is why the decisions did not comprise the design of a total transformation. Nevertheless, they at least initiated the transformation process by offering some partial changes for the area in totality.




Fig. 3.3. Industrial district in 1957 Yücel-Uybadin Plan

3.2 Transformation of the Industrial Production Area

The production area was the southern portion of the old industrial district. It was surrounded by Celal Bayar Boulevard at north, Toros Street at east, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Boulevard at south, and the line of train station at west. (fig. 3.4, 3.5)



Fig. 3.4. Industrial Production Area from city map of Ankara



Fig. 3.5. Aerial view of the area

3.2.1 Physical Transformation

Kızılay came up to be the new central business district of Ankara at the 50s. Its growth was supported by Yücel-Uybadin plan not only by increasing the density in and around Kızılay, but also by extending it towards Maltepe. Such an extension was at the same time convenient to the anticipation that city center would move towards Anıtkabir and the train station. The transformation of the industrial production area was a part of this larger transformation at city scale. The planners of 1957 plan aimed to gain empty lands from the area for intended further development. Thus, the transformation of industrial production area was taken as a process of demolishing the old industrial structures as much as possible, and providing plain land available for new buildings and for new functions. The changes on the form of the area, shown on the specially colored drawings of 1957 Yücel-Uybadin Plan were as follows:




Fig. 3.6. Industrial production area in Yücel-Uybadin plan. Continuous lines were used for new road proposals, where dotted lines were for present ones. Structures represented with solid black were left untouched.

- The primary change proposed on the site was the new road, Celal Bayar Boulevard, passing through the north of the production area on east and west direction. That road would detach the area not only from main railroad lines, but also from the industrial service structures at the north. (fig. 3.6)
- There were also secondary roads in the area proposed to be between Celal Bayar Boulevard and Gazi Mustafa Kemal Boulevard. The presentation technique of the plans shows that these secondary roads were designed by following the footprints of elder service roads between factories. These roads would function both for connecting two main roads, and for dividing the area into lots. (fig. 3.6)

- Some factories were left untouched in the area. They were enclosed in separate but neighbor lots, and were detached from each other with a secondary road. The one at the east was the coal gas factory complex; and the one at the west was a complex of flour and macaroni factories. (fig. 3.6)
- There were no newly proposed specific functions for the whole area. But roughly saying, the western portion of the area was planned for new structures with new functions, where the eastern portion of the area was not so much changed.

Municipality Directorate of Development (Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü) prepared an implementation plan in 1965. That plan was consisted of adjustments and detailed decisions on 1957 Yücel-Uybadin plan at implementation stage:

- Different from the 1957 Yücel-Uybadin plan, the flour and macaroni factories, were proposed to be removed from the area. The lot they had occupied was separated from the existing buildings with a new road passing parallel to Gazi Mustafa Kemal Boulevard. It was also divided into smaller lots with the design of new secondary roads. (fig. 3.7)



Fig. 3.7. Production area in the implementation plan (1965)




Fig. 3.8. Detail of implementation plan, 1965

- The new and previously designed lots were divided into adjacent parcels and parcels were given numbers. It means that each parcel could be possessed separately and privately for development.²³
- The parceling also included the illustration of new structures schematically on each parcel. The building regulations for each parcel, such as building height limits and construction coefficients were determined and indicated in plan notes verbally. These notes show that the most of the area was planned for high-rise buildings, which could be 6-8 storeys at some parts of the area.²⁴
- Lots and/or parcels were not allotted for specific functions in general. The exceptions were a private school, and a kindergarten proposal.

²³ The parcel numbers demonstrate that the south edge of the area on Gazi Mustafa Kemal Boulevard had actually been parcelled at previous planning periods; and the rest of the area was prepared for such a development for the first time.

²⁴ Not 1: Yüksek inşaat esaslarına tabi binalar bölge şartlarına uygun olup çizilmiş bloklar şematiktir. Emsal=2.

These were not the final decisions for the transformation of the industrial production area. While the transformation was going on at one hand, the municipality was making some changes or adjustments on the development plan of the area on the other hand. The most important change in the plan was a land allocation for a new hypermarket at the early 90s. The lot, which had previously been divided into parcels by 1965 implementation plan, was taken as a whole; the parcels were combined so that they would form up a single larger parcel (fig. 3.8). The building regulations were adjusted for the new function of this parcel by 1993 decisions on the same plan.

Despite all the designs and decisions on the transformation, there emerged different resistance mechanisms to a structural change in the area, at either practical or perceptual level. On the practical side of the resistance, there were some unavoidable necessities or difficulties. On the perceptual side, there was the presence of industrial structures, which created a resistance to the re-definition of the whole area as a business district instead of an industrial district.²⁵ These resistances were concentrated at two cases.

First, the strongest resistance was concentrated around the coal gas factory. The factory could not be replaced from the area, because the coal gas it produced was continuously required within the city until 1989 (www.ego.gov.tr). On the one hand, the working factory prevented the new roads to be constructed at the site. The proposed main road, Celal Bayar Boulevard, was going to disconnect the railway lines and coal gas factory, and disturb the transport of raw materials by the railway connection, which was vital for operating the coal gas factory. Therefore, the construction of the boulevard could not be completed until the operation of coal gas factory ended, or at least until its capacity decreased to minimum.²⁶ It is also important to note that there was another obstacle for the construction of the new

²⁵ Even the name of the new boulevard proves that the area was perceived as an industrial area until lately. It was *Atölyeler Arası* (between the ateliers) at 90s.

²⁶ Although Celal Bayar Boulevard had been constructed in 1986-87, before the factory stopped operating in 1990, the railroad connection to the factory was not removed immediately. The secondary railway line, feeding the factory, and new boulevard were at the same level for those few years.

boulevard. The land was belonging to the state administration of railways (TCDD), and it was required from the municipality to re-define the neighborhood areas, which also belonged to the railways, with new functions in the development plan so that the institution could gain an income from this re-definition (Atabaş, 1994: 33). This also created an extra delay in the construction of the boulevard. Consequently, even if the secondary roads connecting Celal Bayar Boulevard to Gazi Mustafa Kemal Boulevard had been partially constructed, they did not function properly as proposed in the original plan until the late 80s. These were the factors based on unavoidable necessities, which generated the practical side of the resistance mechanism.

Nevertheless, there was a series of developments at the 80s, which made those resisting factors diminish. The air pollution created by the coal gas factory increased in the city so much that natural gas started to be used instead of coal gas at the end of the 80s. In the gradual decrease of the use of the coal gas, the production of the factory also decreased. At the same time, having the problems between TCDD and the municipality overcome, Celal Bayar Boulevard could be constructed in 1986-87 period. This series of developments diminished the difficulties, which generated the resistance mechanism against the transformation.

On the other hand there was also a perceptual side of the same resistance mechanism, based on the symbolic value of the coal gas factory. Since the coal gas factory had once been the key figure in labeling the area as an industrial district, its presence resisted a re-definition, and consequently a new identity for the area before 90s. Even when the factory stopped operating, this resistance did not disappear.

In 1990, when the production of the coal gas factory ended, it was decided by the local administration unit (EGO) to demolish -or displace- the nonfunctioning structures of the factory, and to evaluate the area with new buildings and functions. Yet, this attempt was confronted with a public reaction stimulated by the Chamber of Architects in the same year. The argument was about the preservation of significant structures, including the coal gas factory, for the sake of collective memory of Ankara. Observing that the structures of the coal gas factory were either

deconstructed or demolished, Chamber of Architects applied to the Preservation Board in order to prevent those operational actions with an official decision (Archive of the Chamber of Architects, 02.11.1990a). This reaction had initially prevented the industrial structures to be demolished.

The Preservation Board was involved with the problem with the application of Chamber of Architects. The application, dated to 02.11.1990, consisted of a summary of a report, and a formal request from the board to decide on the preservation of the factory complex (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 02.11.1990a). After a series of informative contacts with related institutions, on 19.03.1991 the board finally decided on the preservation of most of the coal gas factory complex as they were in their original location (Preservation Board Decisions, 19.03.1991).

In the period, waiting for the Preservation Board to decide, the actors came together to find out an agreed solution to the reevaluation problem. The mayor, the general director of development, and the general director of EGO represented the local administration in a meeting in November 1990, where the representatives of Chamber of Architects, Chamber of City Planners were also present.²⁷ It was decided there to prepare a competition to obtain an urban/architectural project for the reevaluation of the coal gas factory complex. The decision of the Preservation Board was also going to be guiding for the competitors of the project competition.

The competition was aimed to be a cooperative organization of the local administration and Chamber of Architects. Although the preparations were developed and even though the specifications for that competition were determined, the changes on political realm avoided the preparations to be concluded. In the meantime, a confrontation had already occurred between EGO and the Preservation Board. After the board decided on the preservation of the coal gas factory in its original location as a whole, the decision was converted into a juridical case with the application of EGO to law court; in order to make the decision invalidated (Court

²⁷ The positions of the actors within the process will be investigated in section 3.2.2 with special reference to their statements in that meeting.

Judgments, 1993/19). The court cases lasted until 1996. The final decision of the Council of State refused the application of EGO and approved that of the Preservation Board (Court Judgments, 1996/5342). The coal gas factory remained in its original location, as the subject of preservation (fig. 3.9, 3.10). The presence of the factory, with its symbolic value, is at the same time the factor that continuously generates the perceptual side of the resistance mechanism for the transformation of the area.



Fig. 3.9. The area of coal gas factory



Fig. 3.10. The coal gas factory

Second resistance mechanism was generated by the presence of other small-scale industrial structures, which could not be removed from the area, because of either property, or functional problems. For instance, though the flour and macaroni factories stopped operating at the 80s, some parts of the factories remained in the area as functionless structures. Their properties were belonging to private sector and the stakeholders were not keen on transforming the area immediately, especially when the rest of the district was still serving for industrial facilities. This fragmented structure of the land prevented a reevaluation of its close environment until 90s (fig. 3.11, 3.12). This difficulty strengthened both the practical and perceptual sides of the resistance. The hypermarket project for the neighboring lot could not be implemented until 1993, according to the final plan decision (fig. 3.13, 3.14)




Fig. 3.11. Flour and macaroni factories were shown in a city map in early 90s



Fig. 3.12. The remaining structures of flour factory (2003)




Fig. 3.13. The lot of the new hypermarket



Fig. 3.14. The new hypermarket

Nevertheless, not all the facets of the transformation were resisted with different mechanisms. A private school was decided in 1965 implementation plan. It was constructed and served for Yükseliş High School until 1973, when it was turned into a university building with some additional buildings. Today, it is still the building of Engineering and Architecture Faculty of Gazi University.




Fig. 3.15. The area of Gazi University



Fig. 3.16. Gazi University



Fig. 3.17. School (old Yükseliş)

3.2.2 Political Actors at the Transformation

The political actors contributed to the transformation of the industrial production area were the Directorate of Development and EGO as units of local administration; İller Bank and Preservation Board in the name of central authority; and Chamber of Architects. Among these, İller Bank did not play a decisive role within the process different than what was supposed to do. That role was defined in general as providing financial and technical support –if required- to the municipalities at the implementation of development plans after approving the development plans.²⁸

²⁸ İller Bank was authorized to approve development plans in the name of The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement between 1949 and 1984. In 1984, this authority was given to municipalities by law 3194.

The political actors and their contributions to the process will be examined under three headings:

- Local Administration
- Central Authority
- Chamber of Architects

3.2.2.1 Local Administration

The local administration organs, which shaped the transformation of the industrial production area, were the Directorate of Development and EGO. Both took place in the process as service units within the supervision of the Municipality of Ankara. When the Greater Municipality of Ankara was founded superior to new smaller municipalities in 1984, they became the service units within the Greater Municipality of Ankara.

3.2.2.1.1. The Directorate of Development

Ankara Directorate of Development was founded in 1928 with extensive authority on the development of the capital city in early Republican period. It served as an extension of Ministry of Internal Affairs until 1937, when it was associated with the Municipality of Ankara. The authority of the directorate was limited within that of the municipality from then on. The directorate was turned into *İmar Daire Başkanlığı* (Development Department) within the Greater Municipality of Ankara after 1984.

The Directorate of Development was responsible from obtaining the master development plan, preparing implementation plans, determining building codes and regulations, making required changes and adjustments on the plan, and undertaking the implementations where necessary. The attitude of the directorate was simply operational and economical within the whole transformation process.

The statements of the directorate, and accordingly of the municipality, revealing the primary concerns were the decisions in the implementation plan. Having the Yücel-Uybadin plan obtained, the Directorate of Development prepared first implementation plans in 1965. The area was divided into definite lots and parcels by that plan. The intention beyond parceling the area, and also beyond determining the functions and regulations for those parcels, was not only to realize the transformation decisions in the most operational way, but also to create a surplus from the re-definition and/or the sale of the urban land. The surplus gained from the re-definition of the industrial production area was high, because the area was re-defined as a part of business district, to which there assumed to be much demand. Moreover, the sale of the land in parcels was increasing the surplus. Besides, the building coefficients were determined for high-rise buildings; and that was another aspect that would increase the surplus. However, the development did not proceed according to anticipations, and the area failed to turn into a business district as a result of practical reasons mentioned above. It means that the operational and economical attitude of the directorate and municipality did not succeed to transform the industrial production area.

The primary concerns of the directorate and the municipality slightly changed at later stages of the transformation when the coal gas factory matter was on the agenda. The concerns, and so the attitudes were revealed in the meeting in November 1990 mentioned above, which was organized to find an agreed solution to the problem of reevaluating the coal gas factory. The statements of the mayor represented the general attitude of the municipality, where those of the Director of Development focused on the feasibility of suggestions for the area and the factory (Archive of Chamber of Architects, speech deciphers):

- The mayor, Murat Karayağın, stated that the public reaction was decisive not only for shaping the future reevaluation of the coal gas factory, but also for the preservation of the collective memory of Ankara. For him, the municipality should not create a profit for its self-interest; but, if there was a profit already occurred, it would not be wrong for the municipality to utilize it. Thus, he

argued that a selected project, on which there would be a consensus, could be a solution satisfying both sides of the argument; it would at the same time be a gain for the city.

- The director of development, Raci Bademli, stated that the problem had better be taken into account with its all aspects. He argued that the use of the area should be balanced within the wholeness of the city; and any decision either for preservation or demolition should consider the balances within the city.²⁹ He added that such a decision should be the product of a competition, to which all actors contribute.

The pure operational and economical concerns of the directorate and the municipality were substituted with urban, architectural, aesthetic, and environmental concerns at this stage. It was not only an achievement of the Chamber of Architects, or a public reaction, but also an outcome of the political stance of the actors. The social democratic tendency of the actors enabled finding solutions with respect to social, cultural, and aesthetic values. Nevertheless, continuing court cases and the changes in political realm interrupted the cooperation between actors. The political stance of the new mayor and the new administrative board of the municipality after 1994 neglected the opinion of other actors, such as the Chamber of Architects, and also the public opinion at the urban matters.

3.2.2.1.2. EGO

General Directorate of EGO is the service unit of the municipality of Ankara, which has been responsible from providing infrastructural needs of the city since the 50s. Ankara Company of Coal Gas and Electricity had previously taken on this task until 1942, when Ankara Company of Administration of Electricity and Coal Gas was founded within the municipality depending on the law, no: 4325 (T.C Law #4325). In

²⁹ The accessibility of the area with pedestrian roads, and by motor vehicles; the user density in that area, which could be assumed to increase with new functions; the relations of new functions with the close environment, and the distribution of some functions within the whole city were among the factors that would change the balances within the city.

1950, Municipality Administration of Buses, which had been insufficient in providing the in-city transportation, was joined to the new company so that General Directorate of EGO was founded within the municipality (Tekeli, 1982: 71). EGO served for providing electricity, coal gas, and transportation facilities until 1982, when the administration of electricity was reassigned to state control. Additionally, the coal gas service was turned into natural gas service beginning from 1989 (www.ego.gov.tr).

EGO appeared as an actor at the transformation of the industrial production area when the production of coal gas factory ended. Since EGO had possessed the largest portion of the coal gas factory area (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 06.12.1990), it appeared as an authority to decide on the reevaluation of not only the structures but also the area of the factory. EGO was the operational actor at the reevaluation arguments. Yet, there was not a consistent attitude of the institution at every step; the actions and statements of EGO were diverging.

- After the factory stopped operating, the deconstruction of the structures was adjudicated immediately. Beyond this operational attitude there was the will not only to gain an income from the sale of deconstructed material, but also to prepare the area for possibly forthcoming new buildings. The statement explaining why the coal gas factory had to be deconstructed was reasoned on technical and environmental necessities. It was argued by EGO officials that the soil of the area was polluted 40-50 cm in depth in 60 years of production; thus, it could be neither kept as it was, nor afforested. (İncirlioğlu, 1991: 84)
- After the Chamber of Architects reacted to the action, and even after the mayor assured to put an end to it, the operational deconstruction continued. The statement to justify the continuing action was based on technical reasons again. The general director of EGO mentioned that although the deconstruction had stopped at rest of the site, the already started deconstructions had to be completed. (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 02.11.1990b)

The inconsistency became apparent in the meeting mentioned above. Unlike the operational attitude presented in deconstruction and demolishing of structures of the coal gas factory, which had already created the confrontation, the statements of the general director of EGO suggested reconciliation (Archive of Chamber of Architects, speech deciphers):

- He stated that there was not a definite decision on the area by them; and they aimed to preserve the present values of the factory and the area.³⁰ He added that they prepared an exhibition of photographs of the factory, and were also preparing a documentary film of the area for the aimed preservation, which would turn into the preservation of memories.

The position of EGO was not clear. In spite of the statements of its general director in that meeting, the first application by EGO to court was just after the Preservation Board had decided on the preservation (Court Judgments, 1993/19). It means that the expectations of EGO were not satisfied with the decision of the board; and thus, what had been presented in the meeting was a pseudo-care for the values of the coal gas factory in actuality.

3.2.2.2 Central Authority

The sole contribution of the central authority to the transformation of industrial production area was through the decisions of the Preservation Board.

3.2.2.2.1 Preservation Board

As a unit of Ministry of Culture, Ankara Board of Preservation of Cultural and Natural Heritage represented the central authority in the transformation of the industrial

³⁰ Here the word “they” refers to the mayor and other institutions of the municipality, as well as it refer to EGO.

production area. The contribution of the board was at the final stage of the process and was about the deconstruction or preservation of the old coal gas factory.

The decision about the preservation of the coal gas factory was the statement of the Preservation Board (Preservation Board Decisions, 19.03.1991). It was not only shaping the future developments at the site but also revealing the attitude. The attitude was objective and communicative; because the decision was given after all aspects of the subject were examined, and after the opinions of different actors, such as the municipality, EGO, and the Chamber of Architects, were referred. As a result, the cultural and historical values were given the first priority and it was decided to preserve the factory complex as a whole in its original location (Preservation Board Decisions, 19.03.1991).

3.2.2.3 Chamber of Architects

The contribution of the Chamber of Architects to the transformation of the industrial production area was at late stages of the process, focusing on the reevaluation of old coal gas factory.³¹ Against the operational action by the local administration to deconstruct the structures within the coal gas factory complex, the Chamber of Architects developed a reaction immediately in October 1990. In a report prepared by the Natural and Urban Environment Commission of Chamber of Architects, there were not only criticisms to the policies of local administration on urban land, but also declarations focusing on the necessity to preserve the coal gas factory (Archive of Chamber of Architects, Commission Report). The urban, cultural, environmental, and also aesthetic values of the factory were taken into account together with the characteristics of the location. It was argued that the factory was the last existing component of the industrial area, which had once been the symbol of a technological and industrial development in the early Republican period. As a result, Chamber of Architects offered new functions relevant with this symbolic value. (Archive of Chamber of Architects, Commission Report)

³¹ The distinction between the Chamber of Architects and Ankara Section of Chamber of Architects is ignored in this study; because both were involved with the matter together.

The reaction of the Chamber of Architects sustained even after it had been satisfied by the decision on the preservation of the coal gas factory as a whole. In 1995 a special issue of bulletin of Ankara Section was published for declaring the opinion of the Chamber of Architects about the coal gas factory (Archive of Chamber of Architects, Haber Bülteni). Besides presenting the basic concerns again, it was added that a functionless preservation was not desired; and thus, new and relevant functions were also offered in the same issue. New functions were suggested in relation with the potential cultural identity of the area. It was argued that the coal gas factory could be turned into a Museum of Science and technology, or a Museum of Industry, or a Culture and environment park. It would be not only a re-functioning for the factory complex, but also a revitalization chance for the cultural center, which had already remained away from the urban center (Archive of Chamber of Architects, Haber Bülteni). In short, the Chamber of Architects emphasized the symbolic value of the coal gas factory instead of its use value. This attitude was consistent throughout the process.

3.3. Transformation of the Industrial Service Area

The industrial service area was the north portion of the old industrial district. It was surrounded by Talatpaşa Boulevard at north, Atatürk Boulevard at east, railway lines and Celal Bayar Boulevard at south, and train station at west. (fig. 3.18, 3.19)



Fig. 3.18. Industrial service area from city map of Ankara



Fig. 3.19. Aerial view of the area

3.3.1. Physical Transformation

The transformation of industrial service area was first based on a necessity. The storage units, railway ateliers, and maneuver lines of railways had already remained in the midst of old and newly growing urban centers; it was decided to remove them out of the urban areas. This removal was first spoken about in the report that was prepared to be the basis of the competition for new improvement plan in 1953. As mentioned above in section 3.1.1, the competitors were required to consider the area as the location of the required cultural center. However, the area was not re-defined with required functions in 1957 Yücel-Uybadin plan, although the ateliers and maneuver lines were decided to be displaced. The plan decisions on the area were increasing the density of storage facilities in the area, instead of removing them (fig. 3.20). The decisions for the area were as follows:




Fig. 3.20. Industrial service area in Yücel-Uybadin plan. Continuous lines were used for new road proposals, where dotted lines were for present ones. Buildings marked with solid black were left untouched.

- The maneuver lines of railways, which occupied a large portion of the area, and also the maintenance ateliers of railways, were removed from the area.
- The area was divided into lots by main and secondary new roads. The main road was passing through the area on north and south direction, and was connecting the existing Talat Paşa Boulevard to the proposed Celal Bayar Boulevard. (fig. 3.20)
- One of the newly created lots was designed as the location of a new fire station. It was the only new function for the industrial service area. (fig. 3.20)
- The wholesaling marketplace was left in its location with some adjustments on the service roads nearby. These new roads could be used as well as the railway lines, for the collection and distribution of goods. (fig. 3.20)
- The rest of the area was allotted to storage units. These units were presented schematically and were named as “stock warehouses” in general; they were not specified according to the stored goods in detail. Railways connection was provided for these units for the transportation of large amount of goods. (fig. 3.20)

The first condition to be satisfied for realizing these plan decisions was the removal of maneuver lines of railways. Yet, these lines were not taken out of the area immediately and the industrial service facilities within the area persisted with their existing operations until the end of the 70s.

When the urban and environmental factors beyond the transformation are considered, 1957 Yüvel-Uybadin Plan was not satisfying the necessary requirements for the industrial service area. Rather, the plan decisions were increasing the pressure for the transformation. Although these decisions were not implemented immediately, this pressure was increased by the development of the close

environment within the rapid growth of the city. As mentioned above, Kızılay came up to be the new central business district starting from the 50s. The development of this new centre continued increasingly between the 50s and 70s. Yet, this development did not spread towards Anıtkabir and the railways station, unlike the anticipation stated in the municipality report in 1953. At the beginning of the 70s, there were two centers in Ankara: Ulus and Kızılay. They were separated from each other by Sıhhiye. Although it was between the two on the linear spread axis from north to south, the spread of the centre passed over Sıhhiye and jumped to Kızılay. The reasons of this pass-over were explained by two scholars as complementary to each other. Akçura mentioned that the linear zone on east-west direction, formed up by the intensive green area (Gençlik Park), the industrial storage units, the university, and the hospitals, constituted a boundary for the expansion of Ulus to the south, towards Kızılay (Akçura, 1971: 122). It means that the development of Sıhhiye with central business district functions could only be on the Atatürk Boulevard. However, as Şenyapılı explained, the buildings on Atatürk Boulevard were specifically functioned, such as the university building, radio house, İller Bank, Ziraat Bank, Emlak Kredi Bank, and opera house (Şenyapılı, 1970: 34-35). Since these buildings could not be re-functioned to serve for central business district functions, the new centre developed in and around Kızılay, where the built environment could be re-defined with those functions (Şenyapılı, 1970: 34-35). It means that the present specific functions of Sıhhiye prevented the development of the area, and passed over the expansion of the centre to Kızılay. Within this development, industrial service area could have been transformed so that it would not act as a boundary between Ulus and Kızılay, but as a transition zone in between. Yet, such a transformation requirement was not taken into consideration in 1957 Yücel-Uybadin plan.

The pressure and requirement for the transformation of industrial service area were turned into transformation recommendations by Ankara Metropolitan Area Master

Plan Bureau (AMANPB) starting from the end of the 60s.³² Founded in 1969 to prepare master plans for Ankara, AMANPB initially made a site-selection study for the new *Adliye Sarayı* (Palace of Justice). Among a few possible sites for the new Palace of Justice, the one in the southeast corner of the industrial service area was selected depending on the evaluation of various determinants (AMANPB Reports, 13.06.1969).

After this first recommendation to transform a part of the industrial service area, AMANPB made another study for the rest of the area at the beginning of the 70s (AMANPB Reports, 01.04.1971). The recommendation of AMANPB for the area was different than what had already been proposed in Yücel-Uybadin plan, but was a return to the requirements of the municipality for a cultural center at 50s. AMANPB revisited the cultural center idea and improved the previous report with the same basic principles. The new reports prepared between 1971 and 1978 focused on the grounds for locating a cultural center at the area. The content of the first report, prepared in 1971, was as follows:

- The area was 350 000 m², and it was large enough to be the area of a cultural center. It was also considered that the area of coal gas factory at the south could easily be added to the area of that new project. (AMANPB Reports, 01.04.1971: 1)
- The cultural center project would include a national library, a national museum, a museum of contemporary arts, a congress building, an exhibition building, a theater-opera-cinema complex, hotels, recreation areas, and auxiliary areas, such as a car park, or service areas. It was argued that all those functions were already required, or were going to be required in the capital city of Turkey. (AMANPB Reports, 01.04.1971: 2-3)

³² Though AMANPB was in charge of preparing plans, it was given the authority neither for approving nor for implementing those plans. Thus, the studies remain at recommendation level; only after the approval of the ministry they turn into plan decisions.

- The area was easily accessible for both in-city and intercity transportation, not only by motorized vehicles, but also by trains. Within the city it was on the most of the public transportation lines, including bus, *dolmuş*, and suburb train lines. For its accessibility from outside the city, it was close to both intercity bus terminal and train station. (AMANPB Reports, 01.04.1971: 3-4)

- The location of the area within the city was advantageous for a cultural center. It was close to two city centers, Kızılay and Ulus. Besides, it was surrounded with densely used areas, such as stadium and Gençlik Park at the north, İtfaiye Square and Anafartalar Street at the north east, university and faculty buildings at the east, Sıhhiye and Kızılay at south east, and Maltepe at the south. Moreover, the functions of the existing buildings at close environment were already related with cultural center facilities. (AMANPB Reports, 01.04.1971: 4)

- The structures on the area were the maneuver lines and maintenance ateliers of railways, depots and customs buildings belonging to railways administration, a private flour factory, the wholesaling marketplace, Tekel depot, and buildings of Toprak Mahsuller Ofisi.³³ Most of those structures had already been decided to be displaced from the area. It was argued in the report that the remaining ones should also be removed, for the reason that the area was then at the city center and the present functions of the area were not convenient with such a central location. (AMANPB Reports, 01.04.1971: 4-5) (fig. 3.21)

³³ The other structures, which were not related with industrial service facilities, were the concert hall and the sports hall at the north




Fig. 3.21. The structures present on the industrial service area at the early 70s. The south of the area, where there was the industrial production area, was illustrated as *Kızılay İş Merkezi* (Kızılay Business District).

- Finally, the presence of such an area was shown as a chance for the city to gain a new cultural center. The area was taken as a part of a linear culture and university zone on the east-west direction, from the university structures at the east, to the sports and recreation areas at the west, joined with this new cultural center at the middle. As it was between the two central business districts, it was going to be fed by the dense use of these centers, while at the same time joining them with a new function. (AMANPB Reports, 01.04.1971: 5-6) (fig. 3.22)




Fig. 3.22. Schematic representation of linear zone proposed by AMANPB.

The functions offered by AMANPB for the industrial service area were not different from the ones required in the report prepared by the municipality in 1953 for the same place. Nevertheless, the bureau evaluated the cultural center project within the wholeness of the city. This project was more detailed in another report of AMANPB, dated to 1973. This report consisted of examination of property ownership on the area, calculation of the cost of the new project, and evaluation of the feasibility of the new cultural center project:

- The area was approximately 300 000 m².³⁴ 220 000 m² of it, on which there were maneuver lines, freight depots, and maintenance ateliers, was owned by the state railways (TCDD). The maneuver lines and other structures were already decided to be removed to Güvercinlik. 23 500 m² of the land, on which there was the concert hall and the wholesaling marketplace, was belonging to the Municipality of Ankara. 7500 m² was possessed by the TMO. 11 000 m² of the land, on which there was a flour factory, was owned by the private sector. The rest of the area was including the sports hall and the uncovered river. (AMANPB Reports, December 1973: 1)
- The value of the land, expropriation cost, the cost of the removal of present structures, and finally the construction cost of the proposed cultural center were calculated separately. Depending on these calculations, a relevant construction coefficient was determined so that the sum of mentioned costs would not be expenditure. (AMANPB Reports, December 1973: 1-2)
- As a result, it was argued that the transformation of the area with this re-definition would be serving for the public interest. (AMANPB Reports, December 1973: 2-3)

Although the necessary preparations and operations for the removal of the maneuver lines, freight depots, maintenance ateliers, for covering up the İncesu river, for the expropriation of the privately owned portion of the area were started, cultural center project of AMANPB could not be realized, because it was combined with a concept project of the municipality at the end of the 70s.

At the 70s, the Municipality of Ankara prepared another project, which was not limited with the industrial service area, but taking it as a part of a larger project. It was named as “Ankara Axis of History / Greenness / Culture / Recreation” (Atabaş, 1994: 30-32). The subject axis was the strip on the east-west direction, from Sıhhiye

³⁴ Although it was stated in the previous report of AMANPB that the area was 350 000 m², in this second detailed report it was measured as 300 000 m².

at the east, to the Hippodrome at the west (fig. 3.23). There were also extensions of that area to the north and south. The project aimed at combining the historical sites in the city with the places having a symbolic value for the Republic; combining Atatürk Orman Çiftliği (Gazi Farm) with proposed areas so that a green belt would be formed at the city center; and assigning cultural and recreational functions to that belt. (Atabaş, 1994: 30-32)




Fig. 3.23. The project area of the municipality (rendered), including the service area (highlighted)

The industrial service area constituted a part of that belt between Sıhhiye and Gençlik Park. There were no specific functions for the area within the redefinition of the whole axis. Actually there were detailed designs neither for the whole area, nor

for some parts of it. Other than the general ideas, the decisions were taken at the site. In any case, the industrial structures had to be displaced from the area in order to provide space for that radical re-definition at once and the municipality started a series of operations on the site, to clear away the old industrial service structures. The maneuver lines and maintenance ateliers of railways had already been decided to be removed from the area. The wholesaling marketplace was also decided to relocate out of the area, and some of the old structures were going to be demolished for the new Palace of Justice. These decisions were at least suggested by AMANPB since 1969. The removal decisions were also advantageous for the project of the municipality, thus the municipality took on the action to clear away the area by demolishing the remaining structures. Although these operations began on the area, the project of the municipality could not be realized, because in actuality there was not an approved project; the only official proposal for the industrial service area was that of AMANPB. (Atabaş, 1994: 32-35)

At the end of the 70s, another alternative was developed for the area as a combination of the proposal of AMANPB and the concept project of the municipality. When the preparations for the 100th anniversary of the birth of Atatürk began, the representatives from different political institutions came together in a meeting organized by the Ministry of Culture on 09.06.1978, in order to arrange the celebrations on 1981 including the establishment of Atatürk Cultural Center (Cultural Center Sub-Committee Report, 15.06.1978). Formed up by the representatives of AMANPB in the name of Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, of State Planning Organization (DPT), of Turkish History Association, and of the Municipality of Ankara, a committee was founded for the preparations of the cultural center (Cultural Center Sub-Committee Report, 15.06.1978). After two immediate meetings, the committee prepared a report which was based on the previous reports of AMANPB (Cultural Center Sub-Committee Report, 15.06.1978). At this stage there occurred a disagreement between the representatives of AMANPB and the municipality about the site-selection of the new cultural center building. The suggestion of the municipality was to establish the Atatürk Cultural Center project as a part of their “Ankara Axis of History / Greenness / Culture / Recreation” project on the area of

Hippodrome. The projects of AMANPB and the municipality of Ankara were evaluated separately and as a result, another alternative was derived from the two former projects. The Atatürk Cultural Center building was going to be on a place offered by the municipality, where some of the functions will be left at the area offered by AMANPB, which was the industrial service area (Atabaş, 1994). In spite of some unavoidable problems between the two institutions, the new alternative proceeded in terms of necessary expropriations, allotments, signing protocols, detailing the projects, and even in terms of demolishing some structures. However, this alternative could not be completed either, because of the coup d'état on September 12th, 1980, which invalidated the authorities of political actors.

The transformation of industrial service area was re-considered after 1980. Actually, it was the re-consideration of the whole cultural center project, a part of which was constituted by the industrial service area. The military government founded *Milli Komite* (National Committee) to take on the responsibility to arrange the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Atatürk and to establish the Atatürk Cultural Center (TC Law #2302). Neither the previous project of the municipality, nor that of AMANPB would be realized as they were.³⁵ Instead, the whole area offered by the municipality was determined as the area of the Atatürk Cultural Center. The whole area was formed up by five divisions, and it was the National Committee, who was then the single authority to decide on each of those five divisions.

The industrial service area was determined as the 4th division of the Atatürk Cultural Center (T.C. Law #2302, Değişik: 3. Madde) with two exceptions (fig. 3.24). First, the 4th division was limited within the boundary drawn by a new road proposal at east and south (fig. 3.24).³⁶ Second, the new Palace of Justice was left aside (fig. 3.24). Although the previous project for the area was invalidated, the old industrial service structures continued to be either demolished or removed. For instance, Ankara

³⁵ In 1984 AMANPB became a bureau within the municipality. When The National Committee started to decide on the area, the previous plan of AMANPB was utilized, and for the further steps, it was the municipality who prepared the plans.

³⁶ The whole area had formerly been divided into two portions that road, which had been designed to connect Talatpaşa Boulevard to Sıhhiye in a curvilinear direction.

Grains Silo, built between 1933 and 37, was demolished in 1986 for providing a plain land for the new Palace of Justice (Cengizkan, 1994: 87).³⁷ In 1987, a sub-committee was founded by the decision of The National Committee on 10.01.1987, which was responsible from preparing suggestions for demolition of old buildings, constructing new ones, and also for their administration.³⁸ The decisions of both The National Committee and the sub-committee about the industrial service area were as follows:




Fig. 3.24. Atatürk Cultural Center Areas. The service area is highlighted.

- In the first meetings of the sub-committee, the primary subjects were the construction of cultural center building, and also of a new concert hall next to that building, on the 1st division of AKM areas. (National Committee, 08.02.1985)

³⁷ Although the silo was out of the 4th division of AKM, it was an important component of the old industrial service area.

³⁸ This sub-committee, which was also called the technical committee, functioned until 14.12.1990, when its mission and responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of Culture.

- In the sixth meeting of the sub-committee (20.12.1988) the 4th division (industrial service area) was shown as the location of a Nature and Science Museum of TUBITAK, and of a park of the municipality, other than the existing buildings, sports hall, and the old concert hall of Presidential Symphony Orchestra (CSO). Additionally, it was also decided to consider constructing a chorus practice building in the 4th division. (National Committee, 20.12.1988)
- In the 4th meeting of the National Committee it was agreed to locate the chorus practice building at the 4th division. In the same meeting the method to obtain the project of the new concert hall –in the 1st division- was decided; it was going to be a limited competition where some selected competitors would be invited. The sub-committee would be responsible from obtaining that project. (National Committee, 28.12.1988)
- A report of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism revealed that the ministry had previously offered to construct the new concert hall in the 4th division, and wanted the same subject to be considered in the 7th meeting of the sub-committee. (National Committee, 10.01.1990)
- In the 7th meeting of the sub-committee the new concert hall was decided to remain in the previously determined place, which was the 1st one. It was also mentioned that the new concert hall complex, which was decided to include two buildings of concert and opera, would also form up a complex with the existing Atatürk Cultural Center building. (National Committee, 10.01.1990)
- In the 8th meeting of the sub-committee, the request of railways administration to establish a train museum in the 4th division was refused for the reason that it would increase the density in the area. For the same division, the request of *Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu* to construct a congress building and a building for the institution was also refused for the same reason. (06.04.1990)

- Despite the decisions of the sub-committee, in the 5th meeting of the National Committee, it was decided that the new concert hall of Presidential Symphony Orchestrate would be constructed on the 4th division, together with its additional functions. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement would be responsible from obtaining the project. Besides, it was reminded that the outstanding examples of such buildings abroad must be utilized as models of the new concert hall. For the 4th division, other requests for using the area were either refused or decided to replace on the 1st division. Additionally, the sub-committee was abrogated in the same meeting.(National Committee, 14.12.1990)

The last decision of the National Committee was actually the starting point of debates between the central authority and the Chamber of Architects on how to obtain the architectural project for the new concert hall. As mentioned above, The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was assigned to obtain the project via a limited competition and implementing it.³⁹ In spite of efforts of a committee, which was formed by the representatives of Serbest Mimarlar Derneği and Türk Müşavir, Mühendis ve Mimarlar Birliği, to organize a general competition, the ministry, and especially the minister, insisted on selecting the competitors to be invited (İdil, 1991: 62-63). 19 architecture offices were invited to prepare proposals, and they were expected to take the “Gewandhaus Concert Hall, Leipzig” as a model.⁴⁰ However, as a reaction to the decisions of the ministry, only 3 of the invited architecture offices submitted proposals (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 01.06.1991). Consequently, on 31.05.1991, the ministry declared that the project of the new concert hall was selected among those 3 projects (public declaration). At that time, the Chamber of

³⁹ It was determined by law that the Atatürk Cultural center areas belonged to the Ministry of Culture (T.C. Law #2876/4). Since the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement had already been responsible from the construction works of state institutions, it was also responsible from the construction of new concert hall, whose property was still belonging to the Ministry of Culture.

⁴⁰ This model was previously offered by Gürer Aykal, who was the conductor of the Presidential Symphony Orchestrate, for the reason that it was technically the best concert hall he had performed in.

Architects reacted not only to the preparations for a limited competition, but also to orienting the architects to take another existing building as a model (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 01.06.1991). After a series of debates, it was decided to organize a national competition, to which architectural offices could now freely attend. The competition was announced in May 1992, and resulted on October 9th, 1992; The project of Semra and Özcan Uygur was selected among the 46 proposals (Güzer, 1992: 61). Although the project started to be implemented, its construction could not be completed because of economical problems. (fig. 3.25)




Fig. 3.25. The future plan of the service area (obtained by overlapping project plan and 1997 plan)

The final decision about the industrial service area was taken while the construction of the new concert hall was going on. The Preservation Board decided that the old maintenance ateliers of railways, *Cer Atölyeleri*, should not be demolished as they had a historical value. Yet, there were two problems about this preservation decision.

First, it was The National Committee which was to take decisions on the industrial service area as the single authority. Therefore, the preservation decision of the board could only be a suggestion to The National Committee to decide on the preservation in the same way. The suggestion was evaluated in the 7th meeting of The National Committee and the preservation and restoration of the maintenance ateliers was decided. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was commissioned to undertake the restoration of the ateliers, which could be re-functioned as a Museum of Fine Arts and Art Workshops (The National Committee, 04.08.1995).

Second problem was about the restoration, because the area had already been utilized for the new concert hall project, and the old maintenance ateliers had not been considered in that project. Initially the architects of the new project were informed by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, on 13.06.1996. Following, Preservation Board decided to suggest requesting the restoration projects of the ateliers from who had prepared the winning proposal for the new concert hall (Preservation Board Decisions, 25.11.1996). As a result, not only the concert hall project was revised to include the restoration, but also the restoration of maintenance ateliers was given to the same architects. Thus, the maintenance ateliers were also joined to the project of the new concert hall as a museum of contemporary arts. (fig. 3.26, 3.27)



Fig. 3.26. Maintenance ateliers of railways before restoration



Fig. 3.27. Ateliers after restoration, as a museum of contemporary arts

At the final situation, the transformation of the industrial service area was concluded in terms of decisions on the process. Nevertheless, the physical transformation is still incomplete, because the construction of the new concert hall has been paused. The concert hall project signified the main structural change of the area. The change in the function, physical and social situation of the area is dependent on the realization of this new project; and unless the construction of the concert hall is completed, the intended transformation of the area will not be accomplished.



Fig. 3.28. Present situation of the service area



Fig. 3.29. Sports hall



Fig. 3.30. Current concert hall

3.3.2. Political Actors at the Transformation

The political actors contributed to the transformation of the industrial service area were the Municipality of Ankara as the local administration; AMANPB, The National Committee, and Preservation Board, and ministries in the name of Central Authority; and Chamber of Architects. The political actors and their contributions to the process will be examined mainly under three headings:

- Local Administration
- Central Authority
- Chamber of Architects

3.3.2.1. Local Administration

The Municipality of Ankara was the local administration who contributed to the transformation of industrial service area. These contributions may be examined in two periods.

At first stage, the municipality prepared a report for the new improvement plan of the city in 1953 (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954a).⁴¹ This report was important for drawing the initial framework of the transformation of the area before the plan competition. It was advised to the participants to consider the replacement of not only maneuver lines and ateliers of railways, but also of the storage units and other service structures (Ankara Belediyesi, 1954b: 118-119). By this way the area could be regarded as a gateway to the required cultural center, or as a part of it. On the other hand the cultural center requirement of the municipality was much more effective on the process. Although this requirement had not been fulfilled in the selected improvement plan of Nihat Yücel and Raşit Uybadin, it provided a base and an idea for the future development possibilities of the area at the 70s.

⁴¹ The report was prepared in 1953, and was published in 1954 in Turkish, English, and French.

The second period when the municipality contributed to the transformation of the area was between 1973 and 1980. At this period of seven years, two different administrative boards and mayors were in charge: it was Vedat Dalokay between 1973 and 77, and Ali Dinçer between 1977 and 80 (Altaban, 1998: 57-59). These two mayors and administrative boards had similar social democratic political stances. But it was Ali Dinçer and his colleagues who contributed to the transformation of the industrial service area with a large scale project. The industrial service area constituted a part of the “Ankara Axis of History / Greenness / Culture / Recreation” Project. The attitude of municipality at this period was reflected on the project they prepared. The municipality intended to reserve a vast area of 1 400 000 square meters for this project (Atabaş, 1994: 30-32). Although the whole area could easily be re-defined with more profitable functions and municipality could hold that profit, the preferred functions were still based on social, cultural, and environmental concerns, instead of economical ones.⁴² Nevertheless, the attitude of the municipality was still operational. The project was not developed on common grounds, where the public, the other political actors, and also the universities meet; and additionally it was not implemented according to a detailed and approved plan, because the municipality was not authorized to prepare plans at that period. Besides, there is no information about the researches on the feasibility of the project. Despite the lack of preparations at the background, the municipality attempted to implement the project in the most operational way. Yet, the operations did not help the project to be realized immediately. On the contrary it may have created some unavoidable confrontations between political actors. If such an attitude affected the transformation of the industrial service area, it was nothing but the removal of some of the existing structures from the site. There was again a resistance to the displacement of the structures. For instance, the wholesaling marketplace was standing as the hardest function to be replaced at another part of the city, because that original area was already very much advantageous for the shop owners in terms

⁴² When there was a confrontation between the actors about the cultural center subject, the municipality was accused of preparing the project for the sake of gaining a profit from the re-definition of the functionless areas belonging to the municipality.

of accessibility. However, the municipality offered a new building for the same function according to the approved improvement plan and persuaded them to replace their stores in a new location provided by the municipality (Atabaş, 1994: 32). The intention of the municipality was to clear away the area as soon as possible so that the project could be realized in a short time. The project could not be realized, but the operational actions of the municipality avoided a possible resistance to the forthcoming stages of the transformation. Additionally, the whole area was determined to be the area of Atatürk Cultural Center by The National Committee after 1980. It means that the project of the municipality was not totally abandoned; on the contrary it provided a base for the future development of not only the industrial service area, but also the whole line extending from Sıhhiye to Hippodrome.

The contribution of The Municipality of Ankara to the transformation of the industrial service area continued after 1980 in terms of preparing necessary plans required by The National Committee.⁴³

3.3.2.2. Central Authority

The effects of the central authority on the transformation of the industrial service area had been through three units:

- Ankara Metropolitan Area Master Plan Bureau, within the supervision of Ministry of Development and Settlement
- National Committee
- The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement
- Preservation Board within the supervision of Ministry of Culture

In addition to those actors, Ministry of Culture took place in the process also as itself. Yet, its position and contribution was not more than a property ownership of Atatürk Cultural Center areas, as defined by law (T.C. Laws, #2876/4)

⁴³ It was The Greater Municipality of Ankara after 1984.

3.3.2.2.1. Ankara Metropolitan Area Master Plan Bureau (*AMANPB*)

In 1950s, the political organization began to remain insufficient against the unexpected rapid urbanization, and its harmful effects. Some institutional arrangements had to be made in order to make its actors capable of solving the new problems. One of those new actors was the Ministry of Development and Settlement that was founded in 1958 (Tekeli, 1998: 13). Planning regions, cities, towns, and villages was among the responsibilities of the ministry. In 1965, the ministry was required to found bureaus within its own organization in order to obtain master plans for İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir, where the urbanization is more rapid and unhealthy than the others. After the first two, which had been founded in İstanbul and İzmir, the one in Ankara was established in 1969. The authority to prepare improvement plans were taken from the municipalities in 1972 and Plan Bureaus remained as the single authority in the planning of those three cities. However, Plan Bureaus were not authorized to approve or implement the plans. It was the ministry to approve plans, and the municipality to implement them. (Altaban, 1998: 56-57)

After its foundation, the first study of AMANPB, concerning the transformation of the industrial service area, was about the site-selection for the new Adliye building. It was offered to locate the new building at the southeast edge of the area, which had previously been allotted for a fire station in Yücel-Uybadin plan. The following study related with the area was about the cultural center project. Depending on the report of the municipality dated to 1953, AMANPB improved the ideas of the municipality, and made a series of researches on the possibility of a cultural center on the area.⁴⁴ The outcomes of these researches were reported between 1971 and 1978 as mentioned above in section 3.3.1. It was offered to construct a cultural center with all

⁴⁴ Although it is not clearly spoken, the similarities between the report of municipality in 1953-54 and that of AMANPB in 1971 prove the fact that AMANPB dwelled on the ideas of the municipality, and improved them as a project.

related functions at the industrial service area. The main objective of the cultural center study was to evaluate the area at the centre of the city for public interest.⁴⁵

Although this offer did not turn into a decision immediately, it had been effective on the transformation of the area. Its practical effect was the expropriation of the privately owned part of the area according to the reports of AMANPB. Its indirect effect was to put the cultural center subject on the agenda again. After the reports of AMANPB, it was considered to build a cultural center in Ankara, within the context of celebration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Atatürk. Although the cultural center building could not be located in the place offered by AMANPB, the area was re-defined with similar functions after 1980.

The attitude of AMANPB was shaped by the technocrats who made the research and planning studies for Ankara. These technocrats of AMANPB were the architects, planners, and other experts, most of whom were also scholars. Probably as an outcome of their scientific attitudes in universities, the studies of the Master Plan Bureau were constructed upon extensive researches. The attitude of these technocrats was reflected as that of AMANPB on the transformation of the industrial service area: it was technical and rational, rather than being political or economical.

In the case of cultural center proposal, the necessary functions were borrowed from the earlier report of the municipality; still, the relevance of these functions was questioned within the wholeness of the city. The proposal was developed with contextual references. The feasibility of the project was investigated not only in economical terms, but also in terms of possible social changes in and around the area. Besides, all the preferences were based on rational grounds and scientific calculations as much as possible.

⁴⁵ Haluk Alatan, the chief expert of AMANPB, stated in an interview that TCDD, the owner of the largest portion of the industrial service area, could have aimed at gaining an income from the sale of the land in parcels, and the intention of AMANPB was to prevent such an operation (Alatan, 1992: 20).

3.3.2.2.2. National Committee

Milli Komite (National Committee) was the single political actor who had authority on the transformation of the industrial service area after the coup d'état of 1980. Founded by law, dated to 23.09.1980, it was formed up by the president, the representatives of central authority, and representatives of the army (T.C. Law #2302). It was responsible not only from making necessary arrangements for the 100th anniversary of the birth of Atatürk, but also from the establishing Atatürk Cultural Center in Ankara. A sub-committee served for preparing proposals for the cultural center areas between 1987 and 1990. Yet the attitudes of the sub-committee and the National Committee were diverging.

The sub-committee was formed by the minister and undersecretary of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, three members of the National Committee, and additionally by the experts, who could be invited where necessary. The sub-committee was not only preparing proposals, but also serving as an intermediary organ between the National Committee and other related institutions, such as the municipality. The attitude of the sub-committee was primarily shaped by technical issues. When preparing proposals, the requirements, necessities, possibilities, sufficiency and insufficiencies were considered as much as before the political concerns.

On the other hand, the attitude of the National Committee was much more political. Since it was formed by the representatives of the central authority at ministers' level, the primary concerns were political, not urban or cultural. This attitude was revealed in site selection decision for the new concert hall. It had already been planned to be on the 1st division of Atatürk Cultural Center areas. Although there was no such suggestion by the sub-committee, in the 5th meeting of the National Committee, the concert hall was decided to be constructed on the 4th division, which was the industrial service area. The reasons for this change in the site selection were an offer by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the preference of Gürer Aykal, who was the conductor of Presidential Symphony Orchestra. The new site selection was not reasoned on calculations or necessities but political and personal preferences.

3.3.2.2.3. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement

The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was a combination of two previous ministries, Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Development and Settlement. The Ministry of Public Works was founded in 1920 as “*Nafia Vekaleti*”. Its responsibilities were defined as constructing railways, harbors, motorways, and bridges, arranging water affairs, and managing any construction of state organizations in 1934. The Ministry of Development of Settlement was founded in 1958. It was responsible from planning regions, cities, towns, and villages, focusing on housing policies and construction materials, taking necessary measures before and after disasters, providing urban infrastructures, and arranging the relations with municipalities. These two ministries were combined to form up the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement in 1983. (www.bayindirlik.gov.tr)

Though The Ministry of Development and Settlement had previously contributed to the transformation of the industrial service area through AMANPB at the 70s, the actual effect of Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was when it was charged by the National Committee for obtaining the project of the new concert hall.

Not only the role of the ministry, but also the story of the project of a new concert hall took place on a newspaper as follows: in actuality, it was the president, Turgut Özal, who gave the instruction to the Ministry of Culture to get the new concert hall constructed until 1993, the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. The Ministry of Culture took this instruction to the agenda of the National Committee in its 5th meeting, and it was decided there to obtain the project of the concert hall immediately. The area, which had already been reserved for the concert hall among the five divisions of the Atatürk Cultural Center areas, was the 1st division, as mentioned above. However, in the same meeting, this site-selection decision was changed according to the personal preference of the conductor of the Presidential Symphony Orchestra, Gürer Aykal, and it was decided to construct the new concert hall on the 4th division, which was the industrial service area. The Ministry of

Public Works and Settlement objected this decision for the reason that there had been no preparations on the 4th division for such a project, and for the reason that it would take time to make these necessary researches and preparations. Insisting on the decision to locate the new concert hall on the 4th division, it was discussed to take a model for the new project. At that stage, Gürer Aykal suggested taking the Gewandhaus Concert Hall, Leipzig, as a model for the one to be constructed in Ankara; because it was the best concert hall he had performed in, in terms of technical and acoustical conditions. The possible delays at technical preparation stage and also at obtaining an architectural project were going to be prevented at an initial level by accepting this suggestion. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was assigned to obtain the project. (Önal, 1992)

At the preparation stage of the competition, it was stated that the participants of the limited competition, and also the selecting committee were going to be decided by the ministry itself. Additionally, it was spoken that this selecting committee was not going to serve as a jury, but as an advising organ; and the final selection among the submitted proposals was also going to be done by the ministry and the minister himself. Actually, this was nothing but a personal political attitude that ignored any authority other than the minister himself. (İdil, 1991: 62-63)

3.3.2.2.4. Preservation Board

The contribution of the “Ankara Board of Preservation of Cultural and Natural Heritage” to the transformation of the industrial service area was at the final stage, about the maintenance ateliers of railways. It was decided on 19.06.1995 that the remaining structures of the maintenance ateliers should be preserved, because not merely these structures, but the whole area had a peculiar characteristic in terms of urban and architectural heritage of the Republican period.⁴⁶ (Preservation Board Decisions, 19.06.1995)

⁴⁶ This decision was reasoned on the same grounds for the previous preservation decision of the board about the coal gas factory, taken on 19.03.1991.

The attitude of Preservation Board was technical and objective, as had been in the case of preservation of coal gas factory. Actually these two decisions were complementary for each other: what had been stated in the preservation of coal gas factory was emphasizing the historical and cultural value of the area, not merely the factory (Preservation Board Decisions, 19.03.1991), and the maintenance ateliers were components of the same area, the old industrial district.

3.3.2.3. Chamber of Architects

The contribution of the Chamber of Architects was at the stage of obtaining a project for the new concert hall on the old industrial service area. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, which was charged by The National Committee, aimed at obtaining the project via a limited competition. The reaction of the Chamber of Architects was focusing particularly on two points.

First, the preferred way to obtain the project was discussed. On one hand it was argued to be conflicting with the law (T.C. Laws, #2886). According to this law, the authors of a project could be selected either by a competition, or by evaluating the competitive prices offered by the applicants. The Chamber of Architects argued that the project selection of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was not legal since it was not convenient with any of these two ways defined by law (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 31.05.1991). However, there was a decision of the Council of Ministers (25.01.1991) that let the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement to disregard that law for the special conditions of concert hall project, which actually made the first argument of the Chamber of Architects irrelevant for the case (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 05.07.1991). On the other hand, the attitude of the minister and The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was criticized for ignoring any other authority in the selection of the project. The authority to select an architectural project could only be a jury, in which there should have been experts from architectural realm.

Second, the authenticity of the new concert hall was questioned, because the invited participants of the limited competition had already been oriented to take the Gewandhouse Concert Hall, Leipzig, as a model for their proposals. The Chamber of Architects argued that this attitude was conflicting with the law (T.C. Laws, #2302). In that law it was mentioned that the Atatürk Cultural Center areas must be evaluated with projects, which would be the symbols of the Republic. For The Chamber of Architects, such an oriented project could neither be authentic, nor become a symbol of the Republic. (Archive of Chamber of Architects, 01.06.1991)

The Chamber of Architects turned the reaction of 16 of 19 invited architects, who had not submitted any proposals to the ministry, into a public reaction. In the first week of June 1991, which was the week after the ministry had declared that the project of the new concert hall was selected among those 3 projects, the subject appeared on newspapers, and was assessed by the critics (Mumcu, 1991; Soysal, 1991), after the press declaration of the Chamber of Architects on 21.05.1991. As a consequence of rising reaction to the attitude of the minister and the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the competition was re-organized as a national one, which was at the same time accessible to all Turkish architects.

In general, the Chamber of Architects presented an attitude that defended the basis of the profession of architecture. As a result, the gaining was not of The Chamber of Architects, but was of the profession, and also of the cultural realm.




Fig. 3.31. The flowchart of the transformation of the industrial district

CHAPTER 4

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

The two-sided characteristic of the transformation of the old industrial district enables a comparison between the transformations of the industrial production and service areas. It will be a comparative evaluation on two realms: political, and urban and architectural.

4.1. Comparative Evaluation in the Political Context

The transformation of the industrial district was impending at the 50s. The unexpected growth of the city made it inevitable to re-define the industrial district with new functions. The political actor who was responsible from this re-definition was the Municipality of Ankara. It was required from the participants of the new development plan competition to consider the area as subject to transformation. It meant that the municipality aimed to accelerate the process before the transformation pressure increased. Having the development plan obtained and approved, the designers of the selected plan were joined to the political actor. Yet, the district was divided into two areas in the approved Yücel-Uybadin plan, and these two areas were approached differently from each other.

On the one side, the pressure for the transformation of the industrial production area was avoided at decision level before it got stronger. The method to avoid was re-defining the area with new functions relevant for a city center. Since the decisions were not confronted by another political actor at the initial stage, the transformation started at physical level. Nevertheless, there were resistances to the transformation at either practical or perceptual grounds. The factories remained at the site, and prevented the area from turning into a business district. It was not only a practical

and physical resistance, but also a perceptual one. Although the municipality, as a political actor, positioned itself for transformation of the area, the resistance mechanisms were at least as strong as the intention or necessity beyond the transformation. The resistance mechanisms were generated by unavoidable necessities. Thus, the transformation of the industrial production area sustained until these resistances diminish, namely until the coal gas factory stopped operating. It was not before the 90s that the reasons of resistance disappeared. But this time another resistance came into existence. The old coal gas factory was then a historical structure, and it was argued that it had symbolic value. The new resistance was stimulated by another political actor, The Chamber of Architects. There occurred a confrontation between the political actors, and from then on the transformation process became the object of authority relations. Since The Chamber of Architects did not have the authority to decide on the problem, it generated the resistance mechanisms on two realms. First, a public opinion was developed. It was important because the municipality had already been authorized by the same public, and the mayor was declaring that they did not have the right to ignore the public opinion. Second, the Preservation Board was added to the process as another political actor, which also had the authority to decide in the name of the central authority. After the board decided on the preservation of the coal gas factory, it meant an end for authority relations on the transformation of the industrial production area.

On the other side, there was also a pressure for the transformation of industrial service area at the 50s. In Yücel-Uybadin plan, not the transformation of the area was but some arrangements were considered. Moreover, the number and the density of the service structures with similar functions were increased on the industrial service area. Consequently, the municipality, as a political actor, appeared as if it positioned itself for resisting the impending transformation. The municipality previously stated in 1953 report that the area should have been transformed into a cultural center area. It meant that the previous position of the municipality was for avoiding the pressure for transformation. But when the 1957 plan was approved and the planners of that plan joined to the political actor, the position of the municipality was shifted to that of the designers, who ignored the pressure for transformation at

the industrial service area. The pressure sustained increasingly until the 70s, when another political actor contributed to the process. It was AMANPB within the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. Yet it was not a secondary actor; the authorities of both the municipality and plan bureau were so defined that there could not be a confrontation between them. The plan bureau was responsible from preparing plans, but did not have the authority to approve or implement them. The municipality did not have the authority to prepare or approve plans, but was responsible for implementing them. Thus, when the plan bureau prepared a proposal for a cultural center on the industrial service area, it was not confronted by the municipality, or by any other political actor. Actually, the cultural center idea had already been put forward by the municipality in 1953 report; there was not a new idea, or complete project of the plan bureau, but a series of reports. The last report of the bureau was dated to December 1973. It is known that the preparations for a cultural center started on the area for providing land for the proposal. At that period the position of the municipality was also for the transformation of the industrial service area. The area constituted a section of the “Ankara Axis of History / Greenness / Culture / Recreation” project of the municipality. Since the municipality was not authorized to prepare plans, it was only a concept project, but it was initiated in the most operational way. In 1978, the proposal of AMANPB and the project of the municipality turned into a cooperative project for the Atatürk Cultural Center. This cooperation was formed up with several institutions, associations, and with the Municipality of Ankara. The confrontation emerged within this cooperation, between AMANPB and the municipality about the site selection for the cultural center. This time the confrontation was not about whether to transform the area or not, but about how to transform the area. There were two suggestions: the plan bureau was aiming to establish the cultural center on the industrial service area, the municipality was to do so in another area and to re-define the service area with another function. This confrontation did not remain limited with these two actors, but the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, The Ministry of Culture, the General Staff Presidency (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı), and the prime minister were also included into the debates. As a result, the confrontation resolved by the decision of the prime minister. The political actors on the

transformation totally changed after the coup d'état of September 12th, 1980, just as the whole political realm in the country. The new military government founded The National Committee to undertake the responsibility of arranging celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Atatürk's birth. The cultural center was taken within the same organization, and The National Committee was also responsible to establish Atatürk Cultural Center. A technical sub-committee was founded within The National Committee, to prepare suggestions for the evaluation of Atatürk Cultural Center areas. These two were acting as a single political actor, and were requesting the operational cooperation of some others where necessary. For instance, the municipality was preparing requested plans, the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was undertaking the necessary construction works, and so on. There was not a confrontation between them because the committee had already been including the representatives of other political actors.⁴⁷ It was a consensus dictated by law. This consensus was violated when the new concert hall was on the agenda again in 1990-91. the personal desires of the president, the personal preferences of the conductor of the Presidential Symphony Orchestrate, the personal and political attitude of the Minister of Public Works and Settlement created the confrontation not only within the National Committee, which actually resulted with the abrogation of the sub-committee, but also between the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement and the Chamber of Architects at the following stages. The ministry was speaking in the name of The National Committee, where the Chamber of Architects was in the name of the public, or at least in the name of architects. As a result of the public reaction to the practices of the ministry for obtaining the project of a new concert hall in the area, the ministry stepped backward and prepared a competition, and so the confrontation resolved in the favor of the Chamber of Architects. Finally in the transformation of the industrial service area, the Preservation Board played an effective role for providing The National Committee with a decision on the preservation of old ateliers of railways. The old ateliers were re-functioned as a museum of contemporary arts at the final stage.

⁴⁷ Although the municipality was not represented in the committee, the mayor or a technical official was usually invited to the meetings.

When considered together, the transformation of the industrial service area was much more shaped by the contributions of the political actors, than that of the production area. Both transformations have remained incomplete.

For the production area, the reason of incompleteness was primarily the misstep of a political actor, the municipality. Although the pressure for transformation was avoided initially by the municipality at the decision level, it was not a comprehensive decision for the total production area. The factories remained at the site as the elements of a resistance to the transformation, which finally resulted in a fragmented structural change in the area. The municipality could have considered the possible resistances to transformation, but could not. It was the reason beyond the failure to transform the industrial production area.

For the service area, the reason of incompleteness was actually the number and variety of the political actors, who contributed to the process at different periods. The number of the actors prevented a single decision to be taken for the transformation of the area. The variety of the actors resulted with confrontations when decisions were taken at different periods. When the number and variety of actors were decreased to minimum after the coup d'état, the newly defined actor, the National Committee, could not solve the problem because it was an idle actor for urban issues. Although it was powerful enough, it lacked a practicing unit for the operations at the urban areas. That was why a sub-committee was founded, and other political actors were requested to cooperate. The new actor could only function on the urban realm with the assistance of other definite actors. However, when other definite actors joined to the process, their political attitude prevented the necessary operations to be done for the transformation in a rational way. In short, it was the resistance of political actors to each other that made the transformation of the industrial service area remains incomplete.

4.2. Comparative Evaluation in the Urban and Architectural Context

The conditions of transformation processes also set the conditions for architectural production in both of the areas.

On the industrial production area, these conditions were usual. The land, which had been attempted to clear away from old structures, was divided into lots and parcels. The relevant functions were decided, the building regulations were determined so that the area was going to turn into a business district with new high-rise office buildings. It could be expected that those buildings would utilize the maximum area and rise as much as allowed in order to maximize the profit. In such production of buildings, the architectural production would be limited with the constraints of the plan, and also be compelled with the requirements of the employer. The maximum area that could be occupied for buildings, their minimum distances from the surrounding roads, construction coefficients, and other regulations were all definite constraints, within which there remained limited options for architectural production. Nevertheless, these constraints could be surpassed by combining the parcels and re-defining the regulations. For instance, in the case of the hypermarket, four parcels, which had previously been drawn in 1965 implementation plan, were combined so that a larger single parcel could be obtained; and after a decision taken on the plan in 1993, that new parcel was allotted to a hypermarket. Although there is no architectural peculiarity of that hypermarket, at least it was proved that the parceling could be reversed. Another example from the same area is the school building, which today belongs to Gazi University. The area of that building was allotted for this function from the beginning that neither parceling the area nor the reverse action had to be gone through. Its architectural quality may be questioned, but it is clear that there were more than one opportunities for architectural production in that case. The case of coal gas factory could also be an outstanding example against not only the parceling attitude, but also the demolishing and re-building. If only the cooperation of the municipality and the Chamber of Architects had succeeded, the area of the coal gas factory could be evaluated with a combined project, where there would be re-functioned factory structures and new buildings.

The constraints set by the process could be surpassed by re-defining the process not solely with economical concerns, but with urban, environmental, architectural, and aesthetic concerns.

For the industrial service area, the conditions were different than those for the production area. First, after it was decided to transform the area, it has never been thought to divide the area into lots and parcels. All the political actors, who developed projects for the area, considered the area as a whole for those large-scale projects. Actually it was one of the rare cases where the authorized political actors desired to evaluate a large undivided area with significant urban and architectural projects. The proposals of both plan bureau and the municipality at the 70s were eligible projects in urban, environmental, and architectural terms. Yet, they remained unrealized as a result of confrontations between the political actors. When the service area was considered as the 4th division of Atatürk Cultural Center areas, it was made definite by law that this area would be evaluated with a significant project which represents the ideals and principles of Atatürk (Law no: 2302). Some of the requests from The National Committee to reserve the area for some other functions were refused by the National Committee for the reason that they did not take place in that definition of the area. Finally, it was decided that the area would be the location of the new concert hall. Leaving all the debates around the site selection for concert hall aside, it was still a chance to obtain a significant architectural project. Although there emerged confrontations on how to obtain such a significant example, they dissolved in the way that let an architectural competition. As a result, the conditions were so set for architectural production that the constraints were decreased to minimum; the opportunities were increased to maximum. Additionally, there was the chance to select the best example of the architectural production of the time. The selected project of new concert hall could include all the urban, environmental, architectural, and aesthetic properties which architectural realm could produce. Nevertheless, the architectural production was then limited with economical constraints at construction stage.

When considered together, it is clear that the position of the architectural production in an urban transformation is determined mostly by the political realm, and by the involvement of the architect in the process as a political actor, or at least as a component of it.

In the case of industrial production area, there were two cases, which resulted or could have resulted with obtaining architecturally valuable buildings. One of them was the school building example, where the architectural production was considered by a political actor from the beginning. The other case was the reevaluation attempts for the coal gas factory, where the political actor, namely the municipality, was forced by another political actor, the Chamber of Architects, to consider architectural production in the transformation. Although these attempts remained insufficient to obtain significant urban and architectural examples, they at least prevented the monotonous production of the urban fabric to reproduce itself on that area. For the rest of the area, the architectural production was not so much a concern of any political actor from the beginning. The architectural production was limited with many constraints, and the production of new buildings was left to urban fabric in small parcels. If there had not been practical resistance factors to transformation, these parcels could have been completely utilized and the production of the urban fabric, which resulted with similar apartment blocks suitable for various functions, could reproduce itself in this area.

For the industrial service area, the urban and architectural quality has always been considered by any political actor. When it was close to be ignored, the Chamber of Architects reacted to the situation as the political actor representing the architects. Even though the project could not be realized yet, the transformation process of industrial service area exemplifies how valuable projects can be obtained when architectural production is a concern of the political actors.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from the examination of the transformation of the old industrial district of Ankara. These conclusions will be employed in questioning the possible approaches for the similar forthcoming transformations, with respect to the political framework and the position of architectural production within the same framework.

First of all, an outline of urban transformation processes can be drawn by generalizing the steps and/or missteps of the transformation of the old industrial district of Ankara. As mentioned above, in designed urban transformations, when the transformation pressure and resistance meet, or even when the transformation requirements come into existence, the authority decides whether or not the transformation should be exercised. It is the political agent who makes this decision at the urban scale. If the transformation is decided to be exercised, the first task of the responsible political agent should be to make necessary researches on the area, in order to construct a relevant strategy for the transformation, and also in order to achieve reliable anticipations. These researches may well be expected to reveal the possible difficulties standing, or which could stand, against the transformation by generating resistance mechanisms. If only such difficulties can be foreseen depending on these researches, it would be possible to avoid them at an initial stage, before they turn into resistances. Having the relevant strategy determined and the anticipations defined, the second task of the authority should be to obtain a plan, or a project for the transformation. The designer, either architect or planner, joins the process at this stage, either by undertaking the authority transmitted by the political agent, or by participating in the political agent as a technocrat. This thesis shows that not only obtaining the design, either the plan(s) or the project(s), but also the

approval of it, is an important step in the process. The approval of “design” is again a matter of authority on the urban realm. It may be the same agent who is responsible for both obtaining and approving the design, as well as they may be different agents. Having the design obtained and approved, the final step of the transformation is the implementation. Similar to the approval stage, the implementation of the design may result with the contribution of another political agent on the process. If the implementation is the responsibility of an authority different from the one(s) that who obtained and/or approved the design, there appears another agent at the final stage.

The incompleteness of the transformation of the old industrial district can be explained with the missteps within the process.

- For the industrial production area, the first step of the transformation was missing: there was not an extensive research at the beginning. Despite a report was prepared by the municipality, it was not an outcome of an extensive research. The lack of researches actually prevented the possible difficulties to be foreseen at the industrial district case, and these difficulties generated resisting mechanisms to the transformation at the implementation stage. In the second step, the plan was obtained; and yet, there were only piecemeal transformation decisions for the area. These piecemeal decisions and resistance mechanisms caused the final step; the implementation of the plan remained incomplete. It was a partial transformation for the industrial production area at the end.

- For the industrial service area, there was not an extensive research at the beginning. The relevant strategies could not be developed; the reliable anticipations could not be achieved, since the report prepared by the municipality was not depending on an extensive research.⁴⁸ Additionally there

⁴⁸ At least the anticipation that Anıtkabir and the railways station was going to be the new center of the city proves that the researches, on which the report was constructed, were far away from being rational.

were no decisions for the transformation of the industrial service at all. The transformation process restarted by AMANPB since it was not even initiated by Yücel-Uybadin plan. At the first step, the Master Plan Bureau made the necessary researches extensively. The possible difficulties were found out, and precautions were taken to prevent them to turn into resistance factors at the following stages of the process. However, the second and third steps of the process, approving the plan and implementation, were not totally within the authority of AMANPB. In the meantime, the municipality also attempted to transform the area; but the first and second steps of a transformation process, research and design, were lacking in this attempt. When the National Committee was assigned to undertake the process, there was the research of AMANPB, the suggestions and concept projects of AMANPB and the municipality; but there was not an approved plan, or project, and additionally the National Committee lacked an operational unit to realize any proposal. At the final situation, after an approved architectural project had been obtained by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement according to the decision of the National Committee, the last step of the process, the implementation, could not be realized because of economical problems.

The examination of the transformation of the old industrial district also reveals that the confrontations occurred between the political agents may also be a reason for the process to remain incomplete, as well as the missing steps in the process. Therefore, it may be argued that defining a single political agent, who would be responsible from the three steps of transformation, may be useful in reducing the reasons of incompleteness. If there was such an agent, it must undertake the research, the design, and the implementation stages of an urban transformation process. Additionally, it must be consistent throughout the process.

Nevertheless, it may be difficult to define a single agent, who would be responsible for each of the three stages. Not only the organization or the legal framework of such an agent, but also its efficiency in each of these stages of the transformation may appear as a problem in this definition. Moreover, it does not sound relevant to

consider defining the agent as an end to confrontations at the urban realm. There has always been more than one political agent and confrontations between them on the urban scene to the extent that urban realm may well be defined as the scene of authority relations and of the struggles between various agents.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to consider all the confrontations between the political agents as the negative determinants, which bring the transformation process to an impasse. On the contrary, the confrontations about the urban and architectural subjects may be helpful to consider better alternatives. For instance, the contributions of the Chamber of Architects, which were through confrontations with other political agents, were productive in terms of urban and architectural qualities. The confrontation in the case of the coal gas factory turned into a cooperation between the municipality and the Chamber of Architects; and if this cooperation could have concluded with a project, there could be a “science and technology museum” or an “industrial archaeology museum” in Ankara. Similarly, the confrontation between the municipality and AMANPB could have turned into a cooperation, which was actually very much possible when the intentions of both were considered; and such cooperation could have result with an enormous public park, which would also include a cultural center.

Considering the difficulties of defining a single political agent and the productive confrontations between agents, it would be more useful to define the relations between the political agents, instead of defining a single agent. This definition may be through the distribution of authority so that the relations between them may be regarded as authority relations in urban transformations. For instance, when the Master Plan Bureau was making site-selection studies and preparing reports, which would turn into recommendations for the master plans of cities, its authority was limited with preparing the plans. The Ministry of Development and Public Works was authorized to approve these plans, and the municipalities were responsible for the implementation of these approved plans. In this political organization, not only the authority was distributed among the political agents, but also the steps of an urban transformation were assigned to separate bodies. This distribution of authority

resulted with a confrontation between the Master Plan Bureau and the Municipality of Ankara. Yet, it is evident from the examination of the case that the relations between the political agents are not constant. On the other side of the same example, the Master Plan Bureau and the Municipality of Ankara realized significant projects in cooperation (Alatan, 2002; Altaban, 2002). Therefore, the relations between the same political agents may be varying in different cases, according to their positions within each case; it is an intrinsic dynamic of any distinct urban transformation.

The comparison of transformations of industrial production and service areas reveal that even the transformation of similarly functioned areas have different intrinsic dynamics, just like the relations between political agents. It is evident that each transformation has peculiarities in itself. These are actually the derivations of circumstances, within which the transformation requirement come into existence, and which creates the inherent dynamics of each process. They are again those circumstances, which define positions for political agents. Occupying that definite position, a political agent contributes to transformations. And it is the political agent who defines the position for architectural production within the process. Here, the political agent acts as an intermediary organization again: she/he defines a position in itself, which was already defined by the circumstances. Thus, the position of architectural production is already defined by the circumstances at a superior level, and architect can only contribute to the transformation by occupying that defined twofold position. And if only the architect occupies a position within a political agent, there may be a chance for determining the ways, possibilities, and limits of architectural production, instead of external dynamics and agents.

Depending on these conclusions, the possible approaches for forthcoming urban transformations can be questioned. Regarding the impossibilities to encompass urban transformations within a single definition, to define a single political agent, to define the relations between the agents, and finally to define the position of architectural production in urban transformations, it is not much possible to define a general policy for urban transformation processes. A general policy would exclude the intrinsic features of every case, and these exclusions turn out to be resistances

to transformation. Moreover, a general policy would not be capable of recognizing the possible resistances and avoiding them from the beginning. Therefore, even if a general policy is defined, it could not be valid for all transformations. As mentioned above, for each transformation only strategies could be developed depending on necessary researches on the area, since these researches would provide the intrinsic features of the case an initial stage, the strategy to be determined could only be valid for that peculiar case. Therefore, instead of approaching to urban transformations with a general policy, the strategies must be defined for each case. These strategies can be adjusted to the contextual references changing in time through which adjustments could avoid possible resistances to transformations and make the process go on in the anticipated way.

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