

**THE ESSENCE OF THE EU POLICY IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE:
THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

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ABSTRACT

THE ESSENCE OF EU STRATEGY IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE: THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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This thesis examines the South East European policy of the European Union, which promoted the prospect of a ‘United Europe’. After the end of the bipolar world system, the ultimate aim of the East European countries has been the integration into the European Union. The transition and integration process, that they initiated in accordance with this aim, made up the basis of their relations with the Union. Nevertheless, the South East European countries, which became a sub-region within East Europe, joined to the process much later, due to the wars and instability, caused by ethnic conflicts within the region. The initiatives, established by the European Union for the region, did not come with the desired outcomes. However, after the Kosovo War, the Union established a deeper framework, with the mechanisms of the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process. On the other hand, the September-11 events, which led to the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the region, handed the responsibility to the Union. As a result of this, the Union accelerated the Stabilization and Association Process, thus torpedoed the Stability Pact. Within this context, the Republic of Macedonia became a significant component of this accelerated process. Especially, with the Stabilization and

Association Agreement, came into force in April 2004, and the Mission Concordia, which is the first-ever military operation the Union, the European Union aroused its interest to the country. Consequently, within the regional framework, the Republic of Macedonia made up the essence of the Union's strategy in the region.

Keywords: European Union, South East Europe, Stability Pact, Stabilization and Association Process, the Republic of Macedonia, Macedonian Question, Macedonian Crisis.

ÖZ

AB'NİN GÜNEYDOĞU AVRUPA POLİTİKASININ TEMEL TAŞI: MAKEDONYA CUMHURİYETİ

Atay, Niyazi Güneş

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, 'Birleşik Avrupa' nihai amacına yönelmiş olan Avrupa Birliği'nin, Güney Doğu Avrupa politikasını incelemektedir. İki kutuplu dünya düzeninin sona ermesiyle, yüzlerini Batı kurumlarına çeviren Doğu Avrupa devletlerinin en büyük amacı, Avrupa Birliği ile bütünleşmek olmuştur. Bu nedenle başlattıkları değişme ve bütünleşme süreci, Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkilerinin temelini oluşturmuştur. Bununla birlikte, etnik çatışmaların neden olduğu savaşlar ve istikrarsızlık dolayısıyla, Doğu Avrupa tanımının alt bir bölgesi haline gelen Güneydoğu Avrupa ülkeleri, bu sürece çok geç katılabilmişlerdir. Bu dönemde, Avrupa Birliği'nin, bölge ile ilgili olarak oluşturduğu mekanizmalar, istenilen sonuçları getirmemiştir. Ancak, Kosova Savaşı sonrası kurulan İstikrar Paktı ve İstikrar ve Ortaklık Süreci ile, Avrupa Birliği bölge ile daha yakından ilgilenmeye başlamıştır. Diğer taraftan, 11 Eylül olayları sonrası, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin bölgeden çekilmeye başlaması ile, Avrupa Birliği bölgenin sorumluluğunu üstlenmek durumunda kalmıştır. Bunun sonucunda da Birlik, İstikrar ve Ortaklık Süreci ile, bölge ülkeleri ile bütünleşme sürecini hızlandırmış ve İstikrar Paktı'nın önemini kaybetmesine sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu çerçevede içinde, Makedonya Cumhuriyeti, hızlandırılan sürecin önemli bir elemanı

haline gelmiştir. Özellikle, Nisan 2004 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren İstikrar ve Ortaklık Anlaşması ve ülkede konuşlanan ve Avrupa Birliği'nin ilk askeri gücü olan 'Concordia Görev Kuvveti' ile, Avrupa Birliği ülkeye olan ilgisini arttırmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Makedonya Cumhuriyeti, Avrupa Birliği'nin İstikrar ve Ortaklık Süreci çerçevesinde çizdiği bölgesel politikasının özünü oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Güney Doğu Avrupa, İstikrar Paketi, İstikrar ve Ortaklık Süreci. Makedonya Cumhuriyeti, Makedonya Sorunu, Makedonya Krizi.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Through the political history of the world, centuries witnessed the change of international systems over the old continent Europe. The renaissance and reform processes of the enlightenment period in the seventeenth century and the French revolution of 1789 brought new concepts to the Europe-dominated international relations. The establishment of nation-states and introduction of citizenship and sovereignty of nations, led to the dissolution of great empires, which were based on the loyalty of many ethnic societies within the multicultural characteristics of their administrative systems. Contrary to the independence movements of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, aimed at gaining the sovereign rights of their nations, European people has become the champions of limiting their sovereignty for the benefit of the ‘United Europe’ in the twenty-first century.

Established on the idea of preventing potential armed conflict that would lead to another world war, six European countries, West Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg founded the European Coal and Steel Community in the post-Second World War period. The notion of economic interdependence among European countries, especially between France and Germany, lied under the European Union perception of post-Cold War international system.

Today one can say that, Europeans worked very hard in order to establish interdependence within the old continent and achieved much to a certain extent. Having involved 10 East and Central European countries in May 2004, the Union indicated that defenders of a ‘United Europe’ has become much closer to accomplish their ultimate aim. After the fourth enlargement process, the Union is extended until the border of Russia. The unification of Europe into a single entity within the

framework of political integration launched by Maastricht Treaty had not ever been so close, since the Napoleon's campaign in the nineteenth century and Hitler's invasion of Europe through blitzkrieg. Furthermore, such a unity is to be realized willingly and wholeheartedly, contrary to the military enforcements of Napoleon and Hitler. What is interesting is that, those European countries are even ready to give up their sovereign rights for a united Europe, since the establishment of Common Security and Defense Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of European Community in Maastricht Treaty.

On the other hand, apart from Norway and Switzerland, people of which reject voluntarily the integration with Union, only region that remained out of the enlargement process is the very limited part of South East Europe, populated mainly by Albanians in the former Yugoslavian territory. However, the Union intends to increase its capabilities within the region, especially in terms of political and security mechanisms in order to secure the European continent without having the need to apply to the United States.

Nevertheless, South East Europe remained as the most troublesome region, compared to the other regions. Starting from the national rebellions against the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, South East Europe became the focal point of both Europe and the international society with its conflicts. Involving many ethnic nations, which live under different sovereignties, the region suffered mainly from the ethnic clashes. In the case of South East Europe, the pride of being 'Slovene', 'Bulgarian' or 'Albanian' superseded the pride of being a South Slav, or if one is desirous of including Albania more fully, a 'South East European'.¹ Thus, especially after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which followed the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe, frozen hatreds and prejudices came into being with all of its violence. Released from the integrating character of Tito's Yugoslavia, extreme nationalism and ethnic conflicts resulted in four bloody wars in the Western Balkans in the territories of former Yugoslav Federation, which in turn affected the European security as well as the underdeveloped economic structure of the region. The wars in the Western Balkans since 1991 affected not only the battling

¹ Frederic Labarre, "Regional Integration Through the Stability Pact", (Working Paper), Austrian National Defense Academy, February 2003, p.132.

countries and provinces but also neighboring countries, due to lost markets for supply as well as demand.² As a result of these ethnic-origin wars, various dimensions of economic development declined. Inflows of foreign direct investments that had begun hesitantly in the early 1990s were diverted to other regions or postponed, and tourism, an important source of income for countries like Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, suffered considerable setbacks through the region.³

Therefore, the main aim of this modest study is to try to find out the attitude of the European Community-Union against South East Europe, within the context of post-Cold War international system. The study makes a descriptive analysis of the European Community-Union policy towards the region. The periodical division of the policy is to give the reader a chronological development of the Community-Union policy, while focusing on the last initiatives, called the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process. Why the Union did not draw a determined policy framework for the region, until the eruption of the Kosovo War? Furthermore, the question of how the post-September 11 events affected the regional policy of the Union is to be answered.

Within this context, the significance of the Republic of Macedonia for the Union's new policy framework is to be figure out under the light of their relationship, after the independence of the country. What are the policy objectives of the Union for the Republic of Macedonia, in the wake of the Ohrid Agreement? Can the Republic of Macedonia be the core of the Union's new regional policy?

In order to be able to answer these questions, the study is divided into two parts. In the first part, the chronological and descriptive analysis of the Community-Union's attitude towards the region is given, beginning with the formation of power vacuum in East Europe as a result of the collapse of communism. The second part, on the other hand, examines the Community-Union relations with the Republic of Macedonia with respect to historical and ethnical problems of the country. Beginning with the historical examination of the Macedonian question, the second part analyses

² Franz-Lothar Altmann, "Economic Reconstruction in Southeast Europe: A Western View", Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1:1, January 2001, p.114.

³ Ibid.

the Republic of Macedonia and its relations with the Community-Union, putting emphasize on the established military capabilities of the Union in the country.

"The road to Hell is paved with good intentions."

DANTE

CHAPTER 2

EC/EU POLICY IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

The last decade of the 20th century had witnessed the dramatic changes in the World History. Apart from the conflicts and small-scale internal skirmishes in the Third World, the collapse of communist regimes in East Europe and disintegration of Soviet Bloc in early 1990s, influenced European political history indeed. As a result of Glasnost and Perestroika policies of new Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, the pro-Soviet East European countries which tended to democratize themselves, overthrew the long-lasting dictatorial governments. The fall of Berlin Wall on 9-10 November 1989, leading to the reunification of Germany, also underpinned the prospect of a united Europe.

However, Yugoslavia under the leadership of nationalist Slobodan Milosević was unwilling to overcome its internal problems through democratic principles, but rather with violent aggression. While Czechs and Slovaks separated themselves from Czechoslovakia peacefully, the constitutional republics of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia experienced wars on the way to the independence. The reluctance of Milosević to allow the partitioning, led to a decade long armed conflicts characterized by ethnic-cleansing policies of Yugoslav authorities. Disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was maintained through the powerful leadership of Tito, seemed to be unacceptable for Milosević, who in turn caused bloodshed in his country influenced by the Greater Serbia dreams. The rising nationalism in Yugoslavia surpassed the ethnic tolerance, which reigned in the country before the breakout of the wars in the country. Yugoslavia had promoted ethnic tolerance and introduced the concept of ‘nation’ rather than the term ‘minority’.⁴ In the Balkans the Bosnians and the Macedonians were recognized as the

⁴ İlhan Uzgel, “Bağlantısızlıktan Yalnızlığa Yugoslavya’da Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika”, (ed.)

constitutional parts of the federal republic and could preserve their cultures.⁵ However, the power vacuum that occurred with the collapse of communism in Yugoslavia was filled with the rising nationalism in the country fed by 13 years reign of Milosević. The independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, the Bosnian war ended in 1995, the Kosovo war of 1999 and the conflicts in Macedonia in 2001 were proved to be the results of post-Cold War identity crisis in South East European countries due to the sudden collapse of socialism in the region, accompanied by the inability of international public opinion to act on the right time.

European Community, on the other hand, had been affected to a great extent with the conflicts in Western Balkans. Having signed the Single Act in 1986 that entered into force in 1987, twelve member states aimed at establishing a common foreign and security policy for a deeper unity of the European continent. Nevertheless, the sudden end of Cold War and the collapse of communism in East Europe caught the Community unprepared. This unreadiness affected the European Community's policy in the South East Europe to a great extent.

Beginning in the early 1990s, South East Europe has become the main issue in the agenda of European Community as well as that of international community. Nonetheless, while talking about South East Europe, one should clearly define the borders of the region. According to Cameron and Kintis, South East Europe, consists of four groups of countries, regarding the relations with European Community-Union.⁶ First group includes Greece and Turkey, the former is a member state, the latter has a Customs Union Agreement with the Union, signed in 1996, being very close and very far to the membership. Second group is made up of three post-communist states that are Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia. First two countries have signed Europe Agreements with the Union and they are still making efforts to be members, despite the difficulties they face. Slovenia on the other hand, has also signed Europe Agreement and is negotiating accession to the Union for the time being. Remaining two groups are the matter of importance for the purpose of this

Mustafa Türkeş, İlhan Uzgel, Türkiye'nin Komşuları, İmge Yayınevi, Ankara, 2002, p.118.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Fraser Cameron and Andreas Kintis, "Southeastern Europe and the European Union", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1:2 (May 2001), p.95.

thesis. One group includes Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the moment Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other group includes Albania and Macedonia.

Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic, on the other hand, describe a Western Balkans region in accordance with the European Union's definition. Western Balkans include former Yugoslav region minus Slovenia plus Albania.⁷ However he argues that in addition to the Western Balkans, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Hungary and Moldova were the South Eastern European countries, affected much by regional developments.

Gligorov makes two distinct definitions with respect to the South East Europe. He says that, European Union uses Western Balkans as to designate Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania, while South East Europe consists of all the Balkan countries, plus Hungary and in some cases Moldova.⁸

What South East Europe means within this study is the countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and, Serbia and Montenegro, which are listed under the headline of South East European region at the official website of the European Union.⁹

In order to clarify the policies of European Community-Union in South East Europe, there is a need of a periodical sub-division of the years between 1991 and 2004. First period is the years between 1991 and 1995, until the Dayton Peace Accords, in which the Union 'surrendered' its leadership to the United States-led Contact Group consolidated with NATO forces, because of the lack of a common strategy due to the absence of the common foreign and security pillar. The period between 1995-1999 makes up the second period, from Dayton Accords to the end of

⁷ Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, "Balkan Regional Cooperation and European Integration", The Hellenic Observatory (The European Institute), The London School of Economics and Political Science, July 2002, p.25.

⁸ Vladimir Gligorov, "Notes on the Stability Pact", Balkan Reconstruction, (ed.) Thamos Veremis and Daniel Daianu, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2001, p.12.

⁹ However, the author of the thesis has used, Western Balkans and South East Europe interchangeably for the countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and, Serbia and Montenegro.

Kosovo War. Third period is the three years between 1999 and 2001, in which the Union at last managed to formulate a more sustainable policy through the introduction of the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process. Finally post-September 11 period is examined, when gradual withdrawal of the United States, due to the process of fight against terrorism through the preventive war concept, left the leadership of the region to the Union.

2.1 1991-1995: Changes in the International Conjuncture

2.1.1 The Reconfiguration of East Europe

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in East Europe, there occurred a power vacuum in the former lands of Soviet hegemony. The disappearance of the old bloc system left the East European states feeling exposed.¹⁰ Because of the vacuum created by the collapse of the Versa Pact and the COMECON, the East European countries sought for a framework to take place in. They feared that they would fall into an insecure ‘gray zone’ and thus looked for a framework for integration into the Western security organizations.¹¹ For the East European Countries, the Russian Federation was no more a promising option to cooperate with.¹² Thus the East European states began to set themselves the task of incorporating themselves into larger political economic and security organizations.¹³ Within this framework, three major events in the post-Cold War international system underlined the method in which the East European countries would be incorporated into the Western structures.¹⁴ First, in 1991, NATO made it clear that it would formulate the criteria for a future enlargement. Second, by 1993 the EU defined the Copenhagen criteria for membership. Finally in 1990, international financial institutions produced a set of conditions to provide credits for the aspirant East European countries. Thus, as a

¹⁰ Mustafa Türkeş and Göksu Gökgöz, “The EU’s Western Balkans Strategy: The Only Game in the EU Garden; Neither Total Exclusion, Nor Rapid Integration”, unpublished article, Ankara, 2004, p.8.

¹¹ Karen Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: the Case of Eastern Europe, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1999, p.108.

¹² Mustafa Türkeş, “The Double Process : Transition and Integration and Its Impact on the Balkans”, Ivan Hadjisky, Towards Non-violence and Dialogue Culture in Southeast Europe, The Institute for Social Values and Structures Publications, Sofia, 2004, p.23.

¹³ Ibid.

result of these events conditionality became an accepted underlining criterion for membership in Euro-Atlantic structures.¹⁵

For the post-communist East European states, the Community was the best alternative to fit in. The Community has been perceived as an island of stability, prosperity and democracy after the Cold War.¹⁶ However, the drastic changes in the international system brought about a picture which pointed to the Community as an island of stability surrounded by a sea of troubles under the spill over threat.¹⁷ Nevertheless being a member in the Community had been the main objective for the East European states. On the other hand, with the introduction of conditionality in terms of membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, the East European states began to take up their positions. As a result, the reconfiguration of East Europe started.

In 1991, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic formed the Visegrad states and the Central European Initiative (CEI) to distinguish them from the rest of East Europe.¹⁸ These two initiatives made it clear that these states were different from the other East European states. On the other hand, Yugoslavia went through a dismemberment process. These events marked the beginning of the reconfiguration of the former Eastern Europe.¹⁹ Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania signed European Agreements with the Union and named themselves as South East European countries. By this way, they got rid of the negative meanings of the Balkans. Furthermore, Croatia has been attempting to disassociate itself from the Balkans. Consequently, East Europe was divided into East Central Europe, South Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.²⁰

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Türkeş and Gökgez, op.cit, p.1.

¹⁷ Ibid, p.9.

¹⁸ Türkeş, op.cit, p.23.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.24.

²⁰ Ibid.

From the perspective of the Union, on the other hand, there were three reasons to make an Eastern enlargement.²¹ First of all, in the immediate atmosphere of the post-Cold War international system, the Community was generally expected to lead in the region. This was the ‘hour of Europe’, as President of the Council of Ministers Jacques Poos told.²² Second, the inherent dynamics of capitalism was the leading motivation for the Community to enlarge towards the East Europe. Through the enlargement, the EU would profit economically since it would extend through the growing markets and it would be the biggest market in the world. Third reason lied behind the promotion of the Western values. The values of liberal democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights through the conditionality clauses, the EU has begun to be regarded as a normative power in the making.²³ The Union would eliminate the risk of importing instability as the area of stability and peace extended.

As the reconfiguration rooted in East Europe, the Union introduced the Copenhagen criteria as the best way to differentiate the regional countries within the process of enlargement. In order to privilege certain countries, like Visegrad state that have good relations with the Union, and to prevent the outsiders to be troublemakers, the Union launched the universal Copenhagen criteria. By putting forward the clear conditions for membership, the EU became successful to hide its implicit preferences behind the universally applicable criteria.²⁴

As a result of the transition and integration process of the East Europe, the region was redefined. The exclusivist approach adopted and implemented by the major international actors, particularly the EU, and the rather narrowly defined defensive nationalist responses, produced by regional actors, have contributed to the process of fragmentation in the Balkans.²⁵

²¹ Türkeş and Gökgöz, op.cit, p.9

²² (ed.) John Peterson and Helene Sjursen , A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?, Routledge, New York and London, 1998, p.20.

²³ Türkeş and Gökgöz, op.cit, p.11.

²⁴ Ibid, p.15.

²⁵ Türkeş, op.cit, p.25.

2.1.2 The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia

Due to the ten years of warfare and ethnic conflict in the Western Balkans, the preconditions for transition and integration have been substantially less favorable than they were in Central and East Europe. Hence, the main reaction of the Community towards the events in Yugoslavia was to preserve the status quo in the country.

At the time when Yugoslavia was on the eve of partitioning, European Community was under the influence of two basic incidents, which had taken the attention of the international system. First one was the fall of Berlin Wall, which led to the reunification of East and West Germany, resulting in concerns for potential imbalance within the Community, because of the integration of economically weak East Germany. Secondly, Gulf Crisis occurred as a result of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Although the member states acted in accordance with the UN decisions there were a lack of coherence among member states. The inability to act as a Community due to the differences among individual foreign policies of member states, created a will of enhancing Community's role particularly in regional politics, basically by strengthening its institutional framework and widening its tasks.²⁶ Therefore Yugoslav crisis would be the most appropriate field to engage in crisis management for the Community.

However, this period was marked by the lack of a community regional approach; hence members pursued their own differentiated approaches. The Community acted as a willing economic organization by providing assistance to regional countries, but could not formulate a common political approach in terms of foreign policy actions. The original objective of the international community was to preserve the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslavia. Thus the first years passed with a 'lack of unity and determination'.²⁷ In accordance with this, the announcements of individual EC member states on the issue were at dispute. On 13 March 1991, Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock told that his country would

²⁶ Sonia Lucarelli, "Europe's Response to the Yugoslav Imbroglio", ed. Knud Erik Jorgensen, *European Approaches to Crisis Management*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997, p. 35.

²⁷ Alexandros Yannis, "The Creation and Politics of International Protectorates in the Balkans: Bridges Over Troubled Waters", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 5:3, 2002,

support the democratization efforts of each Yugoslav Republic.²⁸ On the other hand, British Government announced that Yugoslavia should preserve its' territorial integrity.²⁹ As a result, the Community announced that it would prefer a peaceful solution brought by the Yugoslav Republics.

From June 1991 to January 1992, following the announcements of the United States and the United Nations saying that they considered Yugoslav conflict as a European issue, it was time for the Community decision-makers to test themselves in the crisis management during the break up of Yugoslavia. At the outset of the conflict, the Community being loyal to the values of economic integration aimed at economic reforms in Yugoslavia and territorial integrity of the country. Following the American and the United Nations' declarations of not taking part in the crisis, the Community decided to act immediately. Within one week, the Community had 'frozen' economic aid to Yugoslavia, established two Troika bons offices missions, an observer mission, and commenced an arms embargo.³⁰ This action showed that the Community was able to be highly active on economic issues and members could easily agree on economic sanctions to implement against third countries. These economic sanctions implemented on Yugoslavia, led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) from Slovenia, which proclaimed independence unilaterally on 25 June 1991. On 8 July 1991, with the mediation of the Community a ceasefire was signed in Brioni, halting the war in the Yugoslav territory. In addition, with Brioni Agreement the Community achieved in suspending the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia for three months. The Community was also eager to arrange a peace conference to settle the conflicts within Yugoslavian federation. On 8 September 1991, the Community arranged a Conference on Yugoslavia in La Haye.³¹ Lord Carrington from the EC and Cyrus Vance from the UN presided over the

p.264.

²⁸ Hüseyin Bağcı, Güvenlik Politikaları ve Risk Analizi Çerçevesinde Balkanlar (1991-1993), Dış Politika Enstitüsü, Ankara, 1994, p.78.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Lucarelli, op.cit, p.36.

³¹ Ibid, p.79.

conference. However, rising military and political issues shadowed the initial efforts of the Community.

2.1.3 Issues at Dispute Regarding the Yugoslav Crisis

At the initial stage of the Yugoslavian crisis, two issues were at dispute within the Community. These were the issues of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and military involvement in the crisis. Although the members of the Community were keen on having a solid common position on the issue of recognition, Germany's proposal to recognize these two countries created a division among the Community members. In mid-December of 1991, two groups of countries were debating about the recognition issue. On the one side, Britain, the Netherlands and France were against the recognition. They thought that the arranged peace conference, which began in London on 7 September, chaired by former NATO Secretary-General Lord Peter Carrington, would be bulletted with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. On the other hand, led by Germany, whose policy took shape according to the domestic pressure provoked by major German dailies like Bild Zeitung, Die Welt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Italy and Belgium sought for recognition. They claimed that postponing recognition would mean to give up against Serbian aggression. Although Germany threatened France leading the former group, to pursue a unilateral recognition it had also been in favor of a common recognition. Eventually, the Community reached a compromise, which says that the common recognition would be formalized on 15 January.³² But the recognition would be given only to those republics which according to the advice of Badinter Commission met specific conditions listed in a compromise declaration.

Nevertheless, Germany announced on 17 December that it recognized Slovenia and Croatia through two letters sent to Croatia and Slovenia by the German president Richard von Weizsacker. But the letters also announced that the formal recognition would take place on 15 January by a joint Community declaration.

Another disputed issue was the military involvement in which the Community was paralyzed once again. The very first offer of a European force to

³² The Badinter Commission was established in September 1991 by the Community and named after its president the former French Minister of Justice. It established criteria for the international recognition of the former Yugoslav republics.

take place in Yugoslavia in order to support the crisis management of the Community was proposed by Luxembourg and the Netherlands. They both favored a European interposition force, which should isolate the sources of conflict as far as possible.³³ On the other hand France argued that this kind of an armed force should be included within the West European Union. Britain, however, opposed the idea, since, as a significant ally of the United States, Britain aimed to impede any challenges against NATO. Nonetheless, Spain, Greece and Germany also opposed the French idea for different reasons. Germany did not oppose the initiative as such, only the participation of German troops in and out-of-area operation.³⁴ Spain and Greece, being the Southern tiers of NATO, were suspicious of the idea, thinking that their NATO membership would be harmed.

Because of the competing views about a European armed force to be deployed in Yugoslavia, European countries were stuck and unable to stop the increasing Serbian aggression. As a result, in the summer of 1991, the intervention of the United Nations began to be pronounced by the Community rather than a European force within the framework of the West European Union. Ongoing calls for United Nations intervention led to the Resolution 713, which led the United Nations to be involved within Yugoslavia in September 1991

Three eminent countries of the Community had different views on the issue of military action. France proposed a European force to be established within the West European Union framework, which mainly aimed at underlining the necessity of an independent military capacity for the Community. Originating from Gaullism and having withdrawn from the military wing of NATO in 1966, France did not credit the American supported military force to take part in the European continent, but rather sought for a European army through deepening of the Community framework. On the other side, Britain, being geographically and politically far away from the continental Europe pursued a pro-American policy and regarded West European Union structures as a rival to NATO. Germany, however, considered West European Union and NATO as complementary institutions, which would provide not

³³ Ibid, p.38.

³⁴ Ibid, p.39.

only American support but also inspection for British and French nuclear weapons under a more secure and comprehensive system.

Still captured under rivalries of these three potentially leading countries, due to the absence of a common foreign and security pillar, the Community was unable to agree on common policies to implement in the region. Therefore with the outbreak of war in Bosnia, the Community had to surrender its duties to the Contact Group led by the United States, in January 1992. Through the Bosnian war the Community continued to implement economic policies and having missed the historical chance to fulfill its non-existent military and security tasks, stepped back in order to negotiate common foreign and security policy in Maastricht.

While the Community had been trying to be engaged in crisis management in Yugoslavia, it constructed bilateral economic relations with the South East European countries, since there was no consolidated regional policy to implement. The Community included Bulgaria in 1990 and Romania in 1991 in its financial assistance programs. Furthermore in 1993 the Community signed Europe Agreements with these two countries. On the other hand, newly independent Slovenia was taken into the financial assistance program of the Community in 1992. In 1996 European Agreement was concluded between Slovenia and the Community. Following the improvement of its relations with these East European countries, the Community addressed other South East European countries.

Regarding Albania, which was an overcentralised, autarchic economy and by far the poorest and the most isolated country in the Western Balkans, the Community signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and granted PHARE assistance, which had been the significant mean to finance assistances to East and Central European countries, in 1992. As it was mentioned before, beginning in July 1991 the Community applied sanctions to Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, which was the only country to have concluded cooperation agreement with the Community since 1980. The Community implemented economic sanctions toward Serbia and Montenegro in October 1991.

Bosnia Herzegovina, on the other hand signed autonomous trade measures and received financial assistance for the purposes of reconstruction, institution-building and refugee return resulted from the bloodshed caused by Milošević.

Croatia, which also proclaimed its independence with the support of the Community, was admitted to be eligible for trade measures. It was included in PHARE assistance program in 1995, but the assistance was suspended in August of the same year due to the ethnic massacres in Krajina.³⁵

Apart from the implemented economic policies, which were mainly composed of financial assistance programs in order to reconstruct the collapsed economies of the region, the Community perceived that a deeper political integration was to be achieved for the Community to be a prestigious and powerful entity before the international public opinion. Particularly, the lack of a European armed force to react against any armed conflict in the continent, forced the Community to institutionalize common foreign and security policy, which was initiated through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 that turned the Community into Union, having three pillars of economy, foreign and security policy and justice and home-affairs.

2.2 1996-1999: First Schemes of a Regional Policy

In the wake of the Bosnian War concluded with the Dayton Accords, the Union introduced its first regional schemes to the South East Europe, focusing strictly on the sub-region. The existence of the United States also encouraged the Union to initiate some sort of mechanism to follow the military intervention of NATO. During this period three regional initiatives were put into practice, one from the Union, another from the United States and the other from within the region itself.

2.2.1 The Royaumont Process, SECI and SEECF

The very first initiative regarding South East Europe was the ‘Process for Stability and Good Neighborliness in South East Europe’ known as the Royaumont Process. The process was launched in December 1995 at the initiative of France with support from the EU at the fringe of the Conference of Paris on the Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁶ The participant countries were all the countries of ex-Yugoslavia, the neighboring countries (Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey), the EU member states, Russia and the US, as well as the European Commission and the

³⁵ Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic, *op.cit.*, p.21.

³⁶ http://europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/01_00/ip_00_65.htm, accessed on 10 May 2004.

European Parliament, OSCE and the Council of Europe, which are also associated with the process.³⁷

The process mainly focused on the stabilization of the region. It concentrates on the building and strengthening sound civic structures and on the establishment of effective Channels of communication across national boundaries, on bilateral and multilateral level.³⁸ As defining the conflicts of Balkans as the conflicts of consciousness, the process aims to bring together and mobilize all segments of civil society of the region that are eager to ignore cultural and social biases and seek for improving cross border understanding and stability.

The Royaumont Process put great emphasize on the significance of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's). According to the Process NGO's play a vital role in:

- Creating channels of communication among different groups (ethnic, religious, cultural, professional, etc.)
- Bonding Southeast European citizens to citizens of the European Union. Citizen contacts and exchanges act as means of importing/exporting culture and democratic vocabulary.
- Creating networks between groups sharing common interests and aspirations.³⁹

In line with the above objectives of the NGO's, working tables of the Process stressed the importance of four different areas. These areas were (1) Education-Culture, (2) Institutions, (3) Communications, (4) Scientific Research.⁴⁰

The Royaumont Process was an example of preventive diplomacy.⁴¹ However the regional countries regarded it more as an instrument for the desired EU membership than as a regional cooperation scheme.⁴²

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ http://royaumont.lrf.gr/en_background.htm, accessed on 23 April 2003.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.3.

⁴¹ Türkeş and Gökgöz, op.cit., p.21.

In November 1998 the Royaumont Process was incorporated into EU Common Foreign and Security Policy as a result of a common position adopted by the Council of Ministers.⁴³ It is now responsible for inter-parliamentary relations under Stability Pact.⁴⁴

On the other hand, there was the SECI, South East European Cooperative Initiative, which was launched again in 1996. The mechanism was initiated by the United States and focused mostly on economic cooperation and reconstruction of the region. Funded privately, SECI concentrated on the issues of infrastructure, trade, transport, energy, environment and private sector development while ignoring the basic sources of the conflicts such as political, social and ethnic problems.

Despite the fact that the EU-inspired Royaumont Process aimed at the conciliation between the peoples of the region through multilateral dialogue in order to be able to penetrate into the sources of ethnic conflicts, SECI was considered to be more successful as Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic put it. SECI, has scored better than the Royaumont Process as it has been more focused and has produced some practical achievements in issues like cross-border crossing or the fight against trans-border crime.⁴⁵

Therefore one may conclude that, the idea of creating a regional identity through regional conciliation via regional cooperation as Royaumont intended, was surpassed by economic promises of SECI. However, without building confidence among regional countries in order to eliminate ethnic hatreds and political problems, economic policies through 'cash aid' which largely based on foreign private funding would be short-term solutions to restore peace in a region like South East Europe.

Nevertheless, SEECF, The Southeast European Cooperation Process, has been the only initiative coming from within the region itself, has provided the ground for the policy of the Union aimed at reconciliation in the region. Encouraged by Greece and Turkey, SEECF has taken the attention of most regional countries, except

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ http://europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/01_00/ip_00_65.htm, accessed on 10 May 2004.

⁴⁴ Türkeş and Gökgöz, op.cit., p.21.

⁴⁵ Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic, op.cit., p.21.

Romania and Bulgaria, whose ultimate aims have been to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures. They were concerned with the negative effects of a regional cooperation that would impede membership in the Union and the NATO. However, as Alp stresses, in contrast to previous historical periods, the major powers are not in search of selective clients for narrow national interest, but of democratically oriented cooperation partners and problem solvers.⁴⁶ He also argues that contrary to self-possessed Bulgaria and Romania, some regional countries considered regional cooperation arrangements to be useful tools to avoid isolation of an intermediary for rapprochement with EU and NATO.⁴⁷ Likewise, Whyte suggests that Europeans no longer support one dog or another, but are interested in the entire pack.⁴⁸ Thus, SEECF concentrated mainly on political cooperation and political dialogue as an umbrella over the issues of security, economic cooperation, humanitarian, social and cultural cooperation and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.⁴⁹

2.2.2 The ‘Regional Approach’ of the Union

After the introduction of these initiatives, the Union attempted for the first time, to formulate its own regional policy framework in the South East Europe. Named as Regional Approach the Union introduced a determined policy, which targeted Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Albania termed as Western Balkans. As Kramer claims, it was only after the Bosnian catastrophe and the Dayton Agreement that the EU developed a more coherent and comprehensive approach to its Balkan policy by adopting the ‘Regional Approach’ to cooperate with the states in the Western Balkans in 1996.⁵⁰ The main aim of the Regional Approach was to implement the Dayton and Paris Peace Agreements.⁵¹ The

⁴⁶ Ali Hikmet Alp, “The South-East Europe Co-operation Process: An Unspectacular, Indigenous Regional Co-operation Scheme”, Perceptions, September-November 2000, p. 42.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Nicholas Whyte, “L’Heure D’Europe Enfin Arrivee”, The Macedonian Crisis and Balkan Security, ESF Working Paper No.2, July 2001, p.7.

⁴⁹ Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic, op.cit., p.21.

⁵⁰ Heinz Kramer, “The European Union in the Balkans: Another Step Towards European Integration”, Perceptions, September-November 2000, p. 28.

⁵¹ Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic, op.cit., p.22.

approach focused on political and economic cooperation among these five countries, the establishment of good neighborly relations regarding the free movement of goods, services and people, and the development of projects of common interest. However, the continuity of economic aid and agreements were stipulated by economic and political conditions to be met by the relevant countries. The conditions were defined in two important areas:

1. The fulfillment of minimal requirements for the establishment of a functioning democracy, including respect of human rights and transition to a market economy;
2. The establishment of cooperative relations with neighboring countries, including the gradual development of free trade.⁵²

Although the conditionality was drawn, there was no prospect for a rapid membership, but the countries meeting the conditions were to be rewarded with trade concessions, financial assistance and economic cooperation on the part of the Union.⁵³

The Union launched the OBNOVA financial program, designed to help reconstruction in the Western Balkans having already included countries like the Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina in PHARE.⁵⁴ Within this context a substantial amount of resources flowed into Bosnia Herzegovina for reconstruction.

Thus, the Union's policy between 1996 and 1999 was characterized mainly by the Regional Approach, which impeded deeper bilateral relations with the South East European countries due to the conditionality monitored by the European Commission.

2.3 1999-2001: From Stability Pact to the September 11 Events

Regional Approach was proved to be insufficient as war began in Kosovo in early 1999. Another episode of Milosević's ethnic cleansing policy began in early 1999. The Union hoped to bring peace to the region through diplomatic means, first

⁵² *Ibid*, p.22.

⁵³ Türkeş and Gökgöz, *op.cit*, p.21.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

via Royaumont Process and then conditioned Regional Approach, but it was understood that unless supported by the capability of military operations, diplomatic means would be too weak to stop violence in South East Europe namely in Kosovo. With the involvement of Italian, French, British and for the first time German troops, NATO operation was held in 24 March 1999, halting Serbian massacres. Since Regional Approach of the Union remained slow to be effective in South East Europe, rise of violence had been inevitable. Kosovo war indicated that South East Europe needed wider and deeper framework of political and economic policies, secured with military capability. At the time, NATO, which proved it to be taskful in the post-Cold War period was admitted by the Union as the most efficient support for a more comprehensive approach, while putting emphasis on the necessity of the existence of a European military capability. Therefore, the Kosovo war underpinned the formation of both a comprehensive political framework for the region and the military capability of the Union beginning with the Amsterdam Treaty.

Securing Kosovo with the NATO forces, the Union brought new and more inclusive approach to the South East Europe. As Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic put it the Union's new framework was marked by four elements. These elements were (1) the re-organization of the regional policies, (2) the offer of a more committed and long-term bilateral framework of relations with the EU, (3) the unification of financial assistance to the Western Balkan region and (4) a more balanced application of positive and negative conditionality.⁵⁵ In order to carry out this approach the Union introduced two main mechanisms. These were the Stability Pact for South East Europe and the Stabilization and Association Process.

2.3.1 The Birth of the 'Stability Pact'

It was obvious that what drove the Union to develop more comprehensive regional policy for the region was the war in Kosovo, which began in March 1999, when Yugoslav forces attacked Kosovo Liberation Army. In January 1999, the Contact Group, constructed during the Bosnian war including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France and Italy set up a peace conference in Rambouillet with the participation of representatives of Serbia and ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo. Rambouillet talks began on February 6 and broke down on

March 23. Yugoslav forces launched their offensive after the Rambouillet talks failed. Followed by NATO's bombing campaign, Kosovo crisis created a tri-dimensional crisis for the Union, too. First it was a humanitarian crisis, resulted in a huge refugee flux in neighboring countries; second German participation in the NATO military operation provoked a domestic crisis in the coalition government; and finally the outbreak of third war in the Balkans undermined the credibility of the Union as an actor in the region.⁵⁶ As a result of these three crises, the Union was obliged to respond quickly and started the idea of a stability pact for region through negotiations, which are called as turbo-charged negotiations by Friis and Murphy. The Kosovo crisis was a test of the Union's credibility.

The idea of a stability pact was raised by Germany in order to set up a common strategy for South East Europe within the framework of the common foreign and security policy. The basis of the idea was that the Union should take the responsibility for the region as a whole by developing a long-term strategy for South East European countries.⁵⁷ However, contrary to the previous approach led by French foreign minister Vedrine in 1998, Germany's stability pact intended to propose membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions for the countries of the region. The German foreign ministry clearly felt that the prospect of membership in the Union and the NATO was the most effective way to stabilize the region in the long-term.⁵⁸

Despite the opposition of Political Directors, concerned with creating a potential Frankenstein monster, German draft presented on April 8 was agreed in a specially convened European Council on April 14. The draft consisted of membership perspective, the proposal to institutionalize regional talks on security and to underpin this with sub tables on border and minority issues.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the pact was to be established under OSCE auspices in order Russia to take part, which

⁵⁵ Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic, op.cit., p.23.

⁵⁶ Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, "Turbo-charged negotiations: the EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe", Journal of European Public Policy, 7:5, Special Issue, 2000, p.778.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.p.770.

was against NATO operation. Besides, since NATO had not yet formulated a strategy after the operation, it supported German initiative.

During the process of formulating the Pact of Stability the Union dealt with two main issues. These were the membership perspective and the role for the Union within the mechanism. As it was the case in the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the Union members discussed the problems of the pact with great care.

Although Germany and Britain were in favor of the membership perspective, technical experts and France was skeptic on the issue. Having already announced the candidate status for twelve countries, technical experts argued that the membership perspective could overload the difficulty of EU enlargement process.⁶⁰ On the other hand the inclusion of countries such as Macedonia and Albania within the membership queue would have negative impacts on Romania and Bulgaria, which were at the end of the list of candidates.

On the other hand, France intended to avoid a clear reference in the Stability Pact to the relevant article of the Amsterdam Treaty. The Article 49 of the Treaty was the article for enlargement and a reference to this article would be potential invitation to apply for the membership.

As a result, it was agreed that the Union:

Will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures through a new kind of contractual relationship taking into account the individual situation of each country, with a perspective of EU membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met.⁶¹

‘The new kind of contractual relationship’ which was referred in the founding sentence was the introduction of Stabilization and Association Agreements, which will work at bilateral level. Therefore, reinforced with the framework of these agreements, membership issue was taken into a clear ground, explaining the method of integration of South East European countries into the Union. The Stabilization and

⁶⁰ Ibid, p.772.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Association Agreements included the membership perspective, but did not specify their treaty base.⁶²

Regarding the Union's role in the pact, members were in favor of a leading role in the Pact. However they were skeptic of the fact that the United States would use the Pact for its own interests, such as pressuring the Union to enlarge its membership list. Nonetheless, the members of the Union desired the autonomy of their institutions in the Pact, having the power to control itself. Finally the Union charged itself with launching the Pact and developing new contractual relations with the countries of the region. Moreover, it would be the mechanism that makes up the working tables of the Pact.

In short, the Stability Pact has been a framework for coordination between the Union and the regional countries. Bodo Hombach, special coordinator of the pact describes the Pact as follows: 'The Stability Pact is a political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on international co-operation to develop a shared strategy for stability and growth in south-eastern Europe among more than 40 countries, organizations and regional groupings.'⁶³

2.3.2 The Context of the Stability Pact

The Stability Pact adopted at international level on 10 June 1999 at Cologne.⁶⁴ It has aimed to establish peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability with the principle of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements on good neighborly relations.

The Pact has had three main mechanisms, drawn by the Union, to execute its duties. First one is the chair of Special Coordinator. The Special Coordinator has been responsible for promoting the pact, while it provides periodic progress reports to the OSCE. It also chairs the South Eastern Europe Regional Table. The OSCE Chairman in office endorses special Coordinator after being designated by the Union concluded through consultation with OSCE Chairman.

⁶² Ibid, p.776.

⁶³ Bodo Hombach, "Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe: A New Perspective for the Region", Perceptions, September-November 2000, p.8.

⁶⁴ Cameron and Kintis, op.cit, p.108.

The second mechanism of the Pact, Regional Table, has been the ground where questions over the core and the implementation of the Pact are responded. Regional Table guides the Pact and the working tables carry out their tasks under the Regional Table.

Working Tables are the third mechanism of the Pact. Three working tables, in which all the participants of the Pact join, have been created for the tasks of stabilizing the region:

- Working Table 1: Democratization and Human Rights;
- Working Table 2: Economic Reconstruction, Co-operation and Development
- Working Table 3: Security Issues(with two sub-tables: Security and Defense and Justice and Home Affairs)

In addition to the three mechanisms of the Pact, the Union also made up a Reconstruction Agency led by European Commission. The aim of the agency was to learn from the experience of heavy bureaucracy and corruption with respect to the Union aid to Bosnia by setting up an agency in the host country or region.⁶⁵ European Council in Cologne approved the idea of the agency, on 4-5 June 1999.⁶⁶ Although the Agency headquarter was supposed to be in Pristhina, it was decided that Thessalonica would hold the Agency. In Rio de Janeiro meeting of Heads of States and Governments in 28 June 1999, Bodo Hombach was agreed to be the coordinator of the Pact instead of Greek candidate, Roumeliotis. In turn Greece took the concession that Reconstruction Agency headquarter would be in Thessalonica.

The participants of the Pact are:

- The European Union member states and the European Commission;
- The countries of the region and their neighbors: Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey;
- Members of the G8: The United States, Canada, Japan and Russia;
- Other countries: Norway and Switzerland;

⁶⁵ Friis and Murphy, op.cit, p.776.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

- International organizations: UN, OSCE, the Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD and WEU
- International financial institutions: the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB)
- Regional Initiatives: Royaumont Process (merged into the work of the Special Coordinator and participating institutions), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), Southeastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Southeastern European Cooperation Process (SEECF)⁶⁷

The Stability Pact was formally adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999. The final text of the Pact stated that:

Lasting peace and stability in Southeastern Europe will only become possible when democratic principles and values, which are already actively promoted by many countries in the region, have taken root throughout, including in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. International efforts must focus on consolidating and linking areas of stability in the region to lay a firm foundation for the transition of the region as a whole to a peaceful and democratic future. We declare that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be welcome as a full and equal participant in the Stability Pact, following the political settlement of the Kosovo crisis on the basis of the principles agreed upon by G-8 Foreign Ministers and taking into account the need for respect by all participants for the principles and objectives of this Pact [the initial draft had stated that lasting peace and stability would not be possible if the FRY ‘persists in behavior that results in its alienation from the international community’].⁶⁸

In order to accelerate the process of the Stability Pact, the Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach presented Quick Start Package on 29-30 March 2000 to the donor community. This package meant that projects presented by South East European countries would be agreed and started within twelve months, which is marked as a declaration of war against slowness and bureaucracy within the project.⁶⁹ Regional authorities, who desired to launch projects as soon as possible, welcomed this initiative, to eliminate the negative effects brought by ethnic

⁶⁷ Hombach, op.cit., p.9.

⁶⁸ Cameron and Kintis, op.cit., p.108.

conflicts. With the Quick Start Package, a momentum has been created within the Stability Pact.⁷⁰

The package has consisted of around 200 projects, from all three working tables with a value of Euro 1,8 billion. At the funding conference in Brussels, the donor community promised to give approximately Euro 2,4 billion to finance the projects of the package.⁷¹ Euro 1,1 billion was pledged by international financial institutions, over Euro 500 million from the central EU budget via the European Commission and the remainder by bilateral donors from the Union, G8 and other countries.⁷²

The implementation of the Quick Start Package, in fact, helps accelerate the new regional policy of the Union to be effective. The Pact of Stability, at the regional level and Stabilization Association Process at bilateral level committed to take South East Europe out of the quagmire of ethnic conflicts. Thus, Stabilization and Association Process has been the significant element of the Union policy, as it has given shape to the bilateral relation with the regional countries.

2.3.3 The Introduction of the SAP

In May 1999, European Commission issued a Communication, which confirmed the readiness of the Union to draw the countries of the South East European region closer to the perspective of full integration into its structures. Besides, the communication specified that ‘this will be done through a new kind of contractual relationship, taking into account the individual situations of each country, including progress in regional cooperation’ and provided a prospect of EU membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Copenhagen criteria.⁷³ Therefore for the execution of this new policy, the Union initiated the Stabilization

⁶⁹ Hombach, op.cit., p.20.

⁷⁰ Gjergj Murra, “Food for Thought the Stability Pact for South East Europe- Dawn of an Era of Regional Cooperation”, Austrian National Defense Academy (Working Paper), February 2003, p.38.

⁷¹ Hombach, op.cit., p.18.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Cameron and Kintis, op.cit., p.99.

and Association Process (SAP), in May 1999. At last the Union reacted as Union because of the seriousness of the situation in Kosovo.

The rationale of the SAP was set out by the Commission in order to achieve a more ambitious vision for the region's development. This rationale was based on three ideas:

1. a recognition that the main motivator for reform-including the establishment of a dependable rule of law, democratic and stable institutions and free economy- in these countries is a relationship with the EU that is based on a credible prospect of membership, once the relevant conditions have been met. This prospect was offered explicitly at the Feira European Council in June 2000.
2. the need for countries to establish bilateral relationships between themselves, which would allow greater economic and political stability in the region to develop.
3. the need for a more flexible approach which, although anchored to a common set of political and economic conditions, allows each country to move ahead at its own pace. Assistance programs and contractual relations have to be flexible enough to accommodate a range of situations from post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization to technical help with matters such as the approximation of legislation to the core elements of the EU acquis.⁷⁴

As it is clarified above, the Union's new policy framework toward the South East Europe has been based on, relations with the Union itself, regional cooperation and finally economic and political conditionality. The Union encouraged regional countries to build up regional confidence through cooperation, while transitioning their political and economic structure, which would also lead to integration into the Union. Following the poorly structured Regional Approach of 1996, SAP seemed to be better constructed with regard to theoretical framework. However, the most important element of the process for success has been pointed out as the idea of regional cooperation, in a region where ethnic conflicts and hatred to neighboring countries have been commonly felt.

In the wake of Milosević's departure from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's administration, Zagreb Summit was held on 24 November 2000. At the summit, the Union proposed the prospect of membership on the basis of Treaty on European Union and 1993 Copenhagen criteria and a funding program. In return, the South East European countries accepted to abide by the Union's conditionality and to follow the principles of SAP. Once the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) has been signed, countries also would be obliged to meet the necessary criteria for accession into the Union.

SAP targeted the countries of Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when they would be ready for the negotiations.

On the other hand SAP included a wider framework for different issues. What SAP has included are the following issues:⁷⁵

- Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), which represent a new dimension in the relations with these five countries, offering for the first time a clear prospect of integration into the EU structures;
- Autonomous Trade Measures and other economic and trade relations;
- Economic and financial assistance, budgetary assistance and balance of payment support;
- Assistance for democratization and civil society, with these primary objectives
 1. to contribute to the stability of the countries' political structures, that is to support free and fair elections and voter education, develop parliamentary practice, reform legislation and establish and independent media;
 2. to safeguard the rule of law with support for justice and the police, and provide long-term initiatives for civic education in schools and affirmation of multicultural values;

⁷⁴ http://europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/htm, accessed on 10 may 2004.

⁷⁵ Cameron and Kintis, *op.cit.*, p.100.

3. to enhance the effectiveness of public administration, mainly through anti-corruption programs and training programs;
 4. to ensure the viability of civil society, mainly by establishing a regional network of foundations for democracy;
- humanitarian aid for refugees, returnees, and other persons of concern;
 - cooperation in justice and home affairs, which mainly covers:
 1. the promotion of an independent judiciary and legal and law-enforcement system with effective policing;
 2. the fight against organized crime, corruption, fraud and smuggling
 3. the participation of all countries in the program to fight drug trafficking in SE Europe
 4. the strengthening of border controls;
 5. the prevention of migratory flows into the EU (including bilateral agreements on the reentry of nationals)
 - development of a political dialogue not only on a bilateral level but also on a multilateral and regional level. Such dialogue could take place at the level of senior officials or ministers, comprise the adoption of political declarations and result in the creation of mechanisms for technical discussions (as in the case of the Consultative Task Force for Bosnia)

Two main instruments have been the essences of the SAP. These were SAAs and CARDS. SAAs have been the means, which offer a long-term integration of the countries of the South East Europe into the Union structures. However there have been three conditions to be met by the relevant countries. To conclude a SAA, countries have to achieve democratic system, progress in economic reforms and cooperation with neighboring states.

Kramer claims that SAAs have also attempted to achieve the classic goals of the Union's policy toward the European transformation societies.

1. Offering the prospect of full integration into the Union structures.
2. Establishing a functioning framework for a continuous political dialogue.
3. Supporting the consolidation of a democratic regime and a state of law.

4. Furthering economic reforms and the development of market structures.
5. Establishing the administrative and economic pre-requisites for the later conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement.
6. Laying the foundations for extensive cooperation in justice and home affairs.
7. Establishing broad cooperation on all issues that would contribute to reaching these goals.⁷⁶

The Union has introduced SAP as a two-phase progress. The main mechanism and key element of the SAP has been the SAAs. The Union describes SAA as tools, which provide the formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks that allow the Union to work with each country for the sake of bringing them closer to the standards applied in the Union.⁷⁷ The conclusion of SAAs has been based on the gradual implementation of a free trade area and reforms designed to achieve the adoption of the Union standards with the aim of moving closer to the Union.

After the conclusion of a SAA, second phase comes, in which SAA will be negotiated and implemented in each individual country. Every SAA is to be constructed according to the merits of every individual country. SAA focuses mainly on democratic principles and principles of Single Market. As the Union describes, the mechanisms of SAAs themselves allow the Union to help prioritize reforms, shape them according to the Union models, solve problems and monitor their implementation. Until now, Croatia has commenced the negotiations with the Union, while Macedonia has become the first regional country to sign a SAA with the Union.

However, what attracts regional countries more than internal political and economic reforms and regional cooperation is the funding mechanism of the Union, CARDS. The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization is the successor of CARA, the Community Association and Reconstruction Assistance, which had been designed as the main instrument to

⁷⁶ Kramer, op.cit., p.31.

⁷⁷ http://europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/htm, accessed on 10 May 2004.

organize and distribute the Union's assistance to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and in principle the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It has been created to succeed PHARE and OBNOVA funding programs, which have been mainly constructed to assist East European countries such as Poland and Hungary, but then included the South East European states until 1999. Newly formulated CARDS, which has been regarded as the significant component of SAP, has been providing financial assistance on reconstruction, refugees, institutionalization, the rule of law and social development of market economy. CARDS intended to encourage recipient countries to take their part in SAP.

Unfortunately, the overall evaluation of the author of this thesis is that, what matters most for regional countries is the amount of financial aid received rather than where to spend them. As Anasthasakis and Dzelilovic put it, if the financial assistance program would not exist, it would be very hard to integrate South East European countries in the SAP. Since these countries have been in the process of democratization, financial matters are more important than values of democracy and human rights. However, the prospect of membership in the Union has to be the main motive for countries, which aimed to be a respectful element of European integration dependent on values of democracy.

Accompanied by the principles of the Stability Pact, the Union's policy objectives are principally:

1. to encourage the countries of the region to behave towards each other and work with each other in a manner comparable to the relationships that now exist between EU member states. An important mean to this end will be the establishment of a network of close contractual relationships like conventions on regional cooperation, between the signatories of SAAs, mirroring the bilateral relationship with the EU as represented by the SAAs.
2. the creation of a network of compatible bilateral free trade agreements as part of the conventions mentioned above, which means that there are no barriers to goods moving between the countries of the region themselves nor with the EU and, in effect, neighboring candidate countries.

3. the gradual reintegration of the Western Balkans region into the infrastructure networks (TENS) of wider Europe (transport, energy, border management).
4. to persuade the authorities in the countries of the region to work together to respond effectively to the common threats to the region's and the Union's security which came from organized crime, illegal immigration and other forms of trafficking. In many cases, for instance on visa policy, a common approach by all the countries will be needed to deal with the threat effectively.⁷⁸

What the Union intends to do in accordance with the defined objectives is to create interdependence particularly in economics among regional countries in order to prevent any potential conflicts resulting in war. If one makes a historical analogy, it is obvious that the Union desires the South East Europe to follow the path, which it pursued after the Second World War. Traditional enmity between France and Germany, resulting in two total wars worldwide, had been overcome by the foundation of an economic organization called European Coal and Steel Community (ECSE). European countries pursued a policy of establishing economic interdependence among themselves, in which threat of war would be against the interest of all countries. Supported by the United States, an external power, European countries had been able to reconstruct their economies and after a period of totalitarian administrations, most European nations achieved in bringing democratic governments into power. Likewise the South East European countries have been experiencing a period of post-war conditions. Nevertheless, they have the opportunity of being supported by a power within their continent. As Soviet threat united post-Second World War West European countries, threats of international terrorism and ethnic war have been a good concern for regional cooperation. If the regional cooperation is provided through economic interdependence, peace can be restored in the region, via the Union structures.

2.3.4 Problems with the Stability Pact and the SAP

Although there is a consensus among the scholars on the overall interests of the Union in the region, there are still criticisms mainly on the functions of the Stability Pact.

For instance, Gligorov claims that the key aim of the Stability Pact is to contribute to long-term stability in the region as stability is viewed as conducive to development and prosperity, the ultimate goals of the entire process.⁷⁹ Likewise Cameron and Kintis assert that the overriding objective of the Union in the region is the creation of an area of political stability and economic prosperity, in which all countries will have a realistic perspective of closer relations with the Union.⁸⁰ Thus, the main aim of the Union is admitted to bring stability and prosperity in the region. On the other hand Cameron and Kintis observe that there are three main elements of the Pact.⁸¹ First the Pact has been the catalyst for widened coordination among international organizations and international structures. Second it has been a comprehensive forum in which regional countries and international community interact. And finally it has proposed a balance between sufficient short-term projects and more comprehensive long-term processes.

For Murra, the Pact has also completed three tasks.⁸² First, it has structured regional partnership and cooperation. Second, the Pact has enhanced the self-incentive to reforms in the countries of the region. Finally, it has helped shaping orientation and policies of the countries of the region toward the prospect of the Union and NATO membership as a tangible reality.

On the other hand, the continuous outflow of aid is not enough to bring stability to the region, but creates rather a **fund-consuming society** within the region. As Gligorov states, what the region really needs is growth and development,

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Gligorov, op.cit., p.13.

⁸⁰ Cameron and Kintis, op.cit., p.94.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.110.

⁸² Murra, op.cit., p.39.

while sustained growth and development would take place through investments.⁸³ At this point he criticizes the Pact, since it talks about aids and donations but not mention the principles to courage investments in the region. He argues that because employment is scarce and unemployment is high , economic stability in the region demands increasing employment, which would follow investment. The key to stability is prosperity and the key to prosperity is not aid, however necessary it may be, but support for investment.⁸⁴ To that effect, Hombach puts the issue of attracting private investment to the region, as one of the key tasks for the centrality of the strategy of the Pact. Mobilizing private capital and private engagement for the sake of stabilizing the South East Europe has been the focus of concern, for the authorities of the Pact.⁸⁵ Thus, investment brings prosperity and prosperity leads to stability.

Contrary to what Gligorov argues, Labarre explains the process differently. He argues that, as far as donors and investors are concerned, stability and peace is sine qua non condition for the outpouring of the funds.⁸⁶ He argues that aid can only take place if stability and peace are maintained. Therefore, success of the Pact results in material welfare and prosperity, which means stability leads to prosperity.

Regarding the two views, one has to admit that investment flows to a region where stability reigns. If there is no stability no private engagement would risk its investment. Thus the Pact has to provide stability through its mechanisms, only after that investment would be able to flow leading to further prosperity and stability.

Besides his view about the investment, Gligorov defines two theoretical problems for the implementation of the Pact. These are the principal agent problem and the very definition of the problem. First of all, who guides the Pact is not obvious according to Gligorov. The Pact is an international intervention, but it needs the cooperation of local agents. He argues that it is uncertain whether the process is

⁸³ Gligorov, op.cit, p.14.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Hombach, op.cit, p.20.

⁸⁶ Frederic Labarre, “Regional Integration Through the Stability Pact”, Austrian National Defense Academy (Working Paper), February 2003, p.135.

guided by the objectives of the local agents or of the external principals.⁸⁷ Although local agents have to draw the objectives and external agents provide necessary instruments and fundings, within the Pact it seems that the Union both draws the objectives and provides the instruments. Aiming at integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions South East European countries have been trying to please the Union authorities by making whatever has been proposed. However, for the regional development, the Pact needs the projects of local agents, which are the members of the region being aware of their necessities. The success of the Pact hence depends on the commitments and creativity of local actors, supported by the Union funding.

What Gligorov puts as the second problem is the definition of the situation in the region. The Pact does not provide a clear definition whether it is transitional or developmental. The difference is that while transitional problems are of short term, developmental problems needs long-term solutions. Therefore as an external actor, the Union has to draw the framework of the problem through consultation with local agents to provide lasting stability. Western Balkans is not same as East and Central European countries, which peacefully entered into the democratic world system after the collapse of communism. On the contrary, Western Balkan countries experienced ethnic wars, which revealed nationalistic enmities. So, the Union should carefully cross out the lines within which regional policy is pursued.

As it is explained above, the basis of the stability in the region depends on the willingness of local actors to cooperate with each other and with the Union intimately. Introduction of SAP and SAA accompany the process. The SAP is regarded both as an important part of the Union's still-to-be-developed common strategy towards the Western Balkans and as an essential element of the EU's contribution to the Stability Pact.⁸⁸ But the Union has to take some other necessary measures for sustainable stability. The most important one may be the encouragement of regional integration in South East Europe before integration into the Union. However, as the SAP promoted the issue of membership, the Stability Pact, aimed at regional cooperation failed.

⁸⁷ Gligorov, *op.cit*, p.17.

⁸⁸ Türkeş and Gökgöz, *op.cit*, p.23.

If interdependence and cooperation is to be provided in the region, it also promotes the conditions of stability and peace, resulting in prosperity and welfare. The Union's main task within the process has to be sufficient funding while promoting investment in the region.

2.3.5 The Evolution of the Military Capability of EU

With the institutionalization of the CFSP in late 1990s, the Union has gained greater abilities to act within the domain of security and foreign policy issues. With the establishment of the Stability Pact and the initiative of the SAP, the Union could draw a foreign policy for the South East European countries. However, especially after the Kosovo war, the Union also perceived that within the CFSP it has to promote a military force in order to support its newly maturing foreign policy actions. Thus, evaluation of EU military capability into a solid structure has been indispensable for the future of the Union and its credibility particularly for Western Balkan states. The establishment of an independent military capability hence has been the integral part of the Union's policy toward the South East European region.

In the 1990s, the Balkan wars demonstrated the need to create independent crisis-management capabilities for the EU.⁸⁹ Thus the adventure of European Armed Forces began with the unexpected sudden changes in Eastern Europe at the end of 1980s. The wind of changes of 1990s, the liberation of communist Eastern European states and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had been the main threat for Western Europeans to European security, created an atmosphere of optimism and excitement in the old continent. Collapse of communist ideology and the need to accept newly democratizing former communist states, which remained inside the political vacuum created by the withdrawal of Soviet ideology from the region, into international system prevented the West, especially the Europeans to foresee the coming bloody conflict in Yugoslavian territory. Political leaders and bureaucrats in the European Community were so persuaded that the world had changed that they either dismissed the warnings of their foreign offices and intelligence experts or believed that if the Yugoslavs were so foolish as to break apart, even violently, they

⁸⁹ Alpo M. Rusi, "Europe's Changing Security Role", (ed.) Heinz Gärtner, Europe's New Security Challenges, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2001, p.113.

deserved their fate.⁹⁰ They thought that the only threat to European security was communism, and the collapse of the ideology therefore led them to ignore the emerging nationalism, which took the form of ethnic cleansing, in Balkans. The judgment of most Western observers was still under the influence of Cold War anticommunism, anyone who opposed the communist party and communist leaders, by definition to be supported.⁹¹ With the fall of the Berlin wall on 9-10 December 1989, which was the monolithic symbol of division of Europe, physical division of the continent came to an end. After half a century of division and Cold War, people from East and West could look forward to building ‘the common European home’ as Mikhail Gorbachev put it.⁹² Furthermore the attention of international society was driven into another significant regional problem. From August 1990 the world was gripped by war in the Gulf after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.⁹³

Because of these two reasons conflicts in Balkans were not seen as threat to the European security by European decision-makers. However, four Balkan wars in Yugoslav territory; in Slovenia in 1991, in Croatia between 1992 and 1993, in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 and finally in Kosovo in 1999, motivated European Community to establish independent crisis-management capabilities. The insufficiency of EC capabilities to prevent wars in the Balkans and the need to use NATO as an instrument to manage peace in Balkans forced EC to put its own defense projects into action.

Building a capacity for ‘the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to common defense’ has been a major EU preoccupation since the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the lack of consensus among the member states and the American factor due to the definition of a Soviet threat impeded the launching of such a project for a long while. The first notions of a

⁹⁰ Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: chaos and dissolution after the Cold War, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1995, p.149.

⁹¹ Ibid, p.154.

⁹² Misha Glenny, The Balkans, Granta Books, London, 1999, p.634.

⁹³ Ibid, p.635.

⁹⁴ Kori N. Schake, “Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO”, Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, no 184, August 2001, p.1.

common defense movement within the Community occurred on August 3, 1991 when Luxembourg foreign minister Jacques Poos suggested the need for some 'interposition forces' to be effective in achieving the cease-fire in Croatia.⁹⁵ This idea, supported by Netherlands holding the Community presidency of the period and Germany. Evaluating the situation appropriate for introducing the notion of European Armed Forces, French aimed at reviving the talk of Eurocorps, at the core, which would be a German-French corps.⁹⁶ However the first talk on the Eurocorps did not reach a conclusion because of the immediate and unambiguous rejection from the United States.

Beginning with the Petersberg declaration of 1992, the Community gained some military capacity through the WEU, to focus on missions including crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action and peace making. This process had also been accelerated with the efforts by the American administration since May 1989.⁹⁷

The process fastened after the Bosnian war and the summits of the Union mainly focused on the strengthening of CFSP. There are five main steps, which led to the establishment of Eurocorps in 2003. First summit, which accelerated the development of European defense policy, is the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. With the institutional decisions of the Amsterdam Summit, the European Union strengthened its role as a political-security actor.⁹⁸ As the Union increased its importance as an international actor, the summit defined the area for defense coordination. The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 defined the area for defense coordination as 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping' (known as the Petersberg tasks).⁹⁹ Therefore the step-by-step development began by focusing on Petersberg tasks. Moreover the famous question of Henry Kissinger of whom to call in Europe found

⁹⁵ Woodward, op.cit, p.174.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid, p.158.

⁹⁸ Rusi, op.cit, p.114.

⁹⁹ Schake, op.cit, p.1.

its answer. The Treaty of Amsterdam established the position of a High Representative who is expected to give CFSP a higher public profile.¹⁰⁰

Second step is the December 1998, St. Malo Declaration of Franco-British initiative, which started a reform process. Managed through the experience gained in Bosnia Herzegovina, the heads of states declared that European military capacities needed to be backed up.¹⁰¹ According to the declaration, the European Union ‘must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis’.¹⁰² This declaration was also beneficial for the United States, since there was a fairer sharing of burden among transatlantic borders.

NATO’s Washington Summit of April 1999 made up the third stage of evolving European defense policy, as it established a compromise between NATO and the Union. The Washington Summit communiqué acknowledged the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance is not engaged; Europeans (EU members and other allies) should strengthen their defense capabilities, especially for new missions, **avoiding unnecessary duplication**.¹⁰³ The main issue for Americans was the unfortunate emergence of duplication of defense assets, in addition to the other two D’s, which were **decoupling** of European from transatlantic security commitments and **discrimination** vis-à-vis non-EU NATO members. Thus the establishment of European Security and Defense Identity within NATO would impede the emergence of the three D’s of American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Furthermore it would meet the three I’s of NATO Secretary General Robertson: *improvement* in capabilities, *inclusive* for all allies and the *indivisibility* of allied security. Therefore the Washington communiqué satisfied the demands for

¹⁰⁰ Heiko Borchert, “Strengthening Europe’s Security Architecture: Where Do We Stand? Where Should We Go?”, (ed.) Heinz Gartner, Europe’s New Security Challenges, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2001, p.175.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.185.

¹⁰² Heinz Gartner, “European Security, the Transatlantic Link, and Crisis Management”, (ed.) Heinz Gartner, Europe’s New Security Challenges, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2001, p.132.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.131.

European defense identity, moreover it guaranteed the importance of the United States in European security architecture.

Within the accelerated European defense policy process Cologne Summit of June 1999 aimed at a merger of the WEU with the Union, while the main characteristics of EU tasks were defined. Based on the proposal of German EU presidency the summit added the need to establish appropriate decision-making bodies and procedures. On the other hand the main characteristics of EU crisis management operations were to be: (1) deployability, (2) sustainability, (3) interoperability, (4) flexibility and (5) mobility.¹⁰⁴ After defining the mission and the characteristics of the crisis-management operations, there only remains the establishment of the force to carry out these operations.

As a result of all these four summits, the conclusion was reached at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, in which the establishment of European military force is completed. In Helsinki, the Union decided on guidelines for the further development of its common European Policy on Security and Defense, including the creation of a European force of up to fifteen brigades (50,000-60,000 persons) by 2003 capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks (including peacemaking) as well as substantial institutional changes aimed at taking over major Western European Union (WEU) tasks by the Union.¹⁰⁵ In addition to the standing force new institutions were to be created within the Union. In Helsinki member states decided to create new EU bodies: a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), a non-permanent military Committee (MC), and a Military Staff (MS) within the European Council.¹⁰⁶ Therefore participating member states of European Union agreed as the Helsinki Headline Goals that:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of ensuring humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p 132.

¹⁰⁵ Peter Schmidt, "The Compatibility of Security Organizations and Policies in Europe", (ed.) Heinz Gartner, *Europe's New Security Challenges*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2001, p.149.

tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (known collectively as Petersberg tasks), in accordance with article 17 of the EU treaty;

- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the council to enable the EU to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework.¹⁰⁷

The development of the common defense policy of the Union, through the establishment of a European Armed Forces still continues. Especially in terms of institutionalization the Union has to make crucial leap forward. At the December 2000 European Council in Nice, the introduction of new political and military bodies, which were decided in Helsinki Summit was significant. According to the Nice Summit, the following new permanent political and military bodies were established within the council:

- Standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the linchpin of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) and of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The PSC has a central role to play in the definition of and follow-up to the EU response to crisis.
- European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) represented by their military representatives (MILREPs). The EUMC meets at the level of CHODs as necessary. This committee gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, as well as providing military direction to the European Union Military Staff.
- European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is the source of military expertise. It assures the links between the EUMC and the military resources available to the EU and provides military expertise to EU bodies as directed by the EUMC. It performs 'early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for the

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.155.

¹⁰⁷ Schake, op.cit, p.2.

Petersburg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces' and implementation of policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. The EUMS also contributes to the process of elaboration, assessment, and review of the capability goals; and it monitors, assesses, and makes recommendations regarding the forces and capabilities made available to the EU by the member states on training, exercises, and interoperability.¹⁰⁸

As it is made obvious above, the changing international conjuncture and the willingness of European nations to create a united Europe, eased the political integration of the continent through the development of common defense policy within a very short time.

2.4 Post-September 11 Period: EU Takes the Lead Once Again

Since 1991, when the Community stuck on the issue of military involvement in the former Yugoslav territory, NATO led by the United States has played a vital role to end the armed conflict in the region. NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, brought an end to the ethnic wars creating bloodshed in the territory. Deployment of SFOR troops in Bosnia and KFOR troops in Kosovo with the involvement of European powers, made the United States to take part in South East Europe. While the Union has started the Stability Pact and SAP, NATO forces has remained as the only military power providing security for international peacekeeping officers from the Union and the UN, and also discouraged any more potential armed conflicts. However terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001 has opened a new phase for the South East European region. Having experienced such a great fatal attack in its own territory, for the first time in its history, the United States has declared war against terrorism, which has been centered mostly in Afghanistan being under the control of Talibans. On the other hand rogue states, conceptualized in the wake of collapse of Soviet Bloc as the new threats for the American security concerns, has become the targets of new American security policy. Iraq, comprised the prior target for the United States, committed to catch Saddam Hussein, who had begun the process of nuclear and chemical armament in Iraq. Inevitably, during the war against terrorism, the United States has directed its attention to the mentioned regions, which in turn has led to the gradual

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

decrease of American presence in the Western Balkans. Within this period, the United States has supported most of the Union actions in regarding the region, since the Union has almost taken the lead due to the American disengagement.

2.4.1 The American Disengagement

The September 11 events has changed the security considerations of the world as well as the foreign policy of American administration led by George Bush. New elements of American foreign policy probably has significant effects on the South East European region as well as the Union's policy. American foreign policy considerations has taken shape according to the September 11 attacks. These considerations have been:

1. the task of division of labor between the United States and the Union,
2. the partnership with Russia to stabilize Central Asia
3. to relaunch a dialogue with China on issues of anti-terrorism.¹⁰⁹

The United States on the one hand aims at establishing an international solidarity front through cooperation with two rising powers, China and Russia, on the other hand it has been preparing to leave Western Balkans to the continental European Union, after an existence lasting for a decade. As Moore claims, '...the EU cannot expect Washington to pull Balkan chestnuts out of the fire in the post 11-September world.'¹¹⁰ Therefore post-September 11 period has given the responsibility of Western Balkans to the Union, which is obliged to act through the lessons drawn from 1991-1999 periods.

Dassù and Whyte argue that the September-11 events have had multiple knock-on effects on policies of the Union toward the South East Europe. They discern four of them:

1. the gradual disengagement of the United States from the direct management of the post-war Balkans will accelerate.
2. the European view of the region will be filtered, even more than in the past, through the lens of the fight against organized crime.

¹⁰⁹ Marta Dassù and Nicholas Whyte, "America's Balkan Disengagement", Survival, 43:4, Winter 2001-2002, p.123.

¹¹⁰ Patrick Moore, "Shifting Responsibility in the Balkans: The EU Takes the Lead", The International Spectator, March 2002, p.85.

3. the costs of the war against terrorism will create new constraints for Europe as well as the United States on the allocation of resources to projects for Balkans stability.
4. Overall, West Europeans will attach increased importance to a cooperative relationship with Russia.¹¹¹

Although it has been obvious that the United States decrease its military presence in the region in order to strengthen itself within the war against terrorism, the United States has still interests in South East Europe. Most importantly, in the South East Europe, there is a definite American concern in identifying and uprooting Al-Qaeda cells in Bosnia as well as monitoring the activities and merely flows of questionable Islamic charities, throughout the Western Balkans.¹¹² Furthermore, President George Bush signed a declaration on 21 June 2002 to continue for one more year the National Emergency with Respect to the Western Balkans due to the extremist and obstructionist threats to peace and stability. Besides Bosnian Muslims and Kosovor Albanians who have been appreciating the NATO intervention under the leadership of the United States that saved their existence, have been skeptical on American disengagement. If the Union cannot replace the confidence created by the United States, stabilization in the region seems to be at stake.

With regard to the fourth knock-on effect defined by Dassù and Whyte, Moore argues that Russia prefers to cooperate with the United States rather than Europeans.¹¹³ Therefore Russia also decreases its presence in order to cooperate with the United States against terrorism, although it supports a better Serbian position in Kosovo. This may create a good opportunity for Russia to define the Chechen problem, within the framework of war against terrorism. As Moscow's *Vremya Novostei* pointed out on 25 June 2002,

Russia's military presence in the Balkans will now be modest. About 350 soldiers and officers remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and approximately 600 in Kosovo. Add here about 140 officials of the Foreign Ministry and 30 border guards (they are assigned to the

¹¹¹ Dassù and Whyte, *op.cit.*, p.124.

¹¹² Moore, *op.cit.*, p.86.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p.85.

International Police Force in Kosovo and to the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the total is an even 1000. In other words, Russian participation in the operation is going to be purely symbolic. In any case Russians will mostly be working with the Americans, not the Europeans.¹¹⁴

Thus, Moscow acts with the United States in Central Asia to stabilize its environment. This also enables Russia to secure its power within its former territories.

Taking into account the Russian and American disengagement from South East Europe within the context of war against terrorism, the Union has acquired leadership in the region. Accompanied by the establishment of EU Rapid Reaction Force, the Union seems to have taken necessary measures in order not to repeat the faults of previous periods.

Within this framework the Union aimed at taking the command of peacekeeping mission in Macedonia. The mission has been under NATO's Operation Task Force. It had been commanded first by Germany and then by the Netherlands. However, newly established EU Force has needed to use the facilities and infrastructure of NATO in order to carry out their mission. The Union had had to agree with NATO to make use of certain NATO facilities and infrastructure. Nevertheless, since there has been the ambiguity of chain of command in the Union Mission, NATO authorities have been careful with the issue. At this point Turkey's attitude had been at the heart of the issue, since it could veto the issue of use of NATO assets by the Union due to its national interests. In December 2001, the Union gave some concessions to Turkey regarding the planning and execution of certain operations involving NATO facilities or touching Turkish strategic interests.¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, Greece opposed Turkish influence and threatened the Union to veto entire project. Although the Union declared at the mid-March 2002 Barcelona Summit that the Rapid Reaction Force would be ready to assume the NATO mission at the end of September 2002, the dispute between Turkey and Greece on the nature

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.88.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p.89.

of the EU mission and the use of NATO assets, postponed the date that the EU Armed Forces would assume the mission in the Republic of Macedonia.¹¹⁶

As a result, in April 2003, the Union mission has been installed in Macedonia and for the first time the Union has been able to put up a military presence within its CFSP process. The Mission Concordia, has taken up the NATO mission, having allowed using the necessary equipments of the NATO, and the Union has begun for the first time to carry out the military tasks of peacekeeping mission in Macedonia.

2.4.2 The Summit of Thessalonica in 2003

After the Zagreb Summit in 2000, the Union reaffirmed the 'European perspective of the countries participating in the Stabilization and Association Process and their status as potential candidates for membership.¹¹⁷ Thus the regional countries expected some promises in the summit.¹¹⁸ They expected first, the signal of EU membership, second the commitment to economic and social cohesion across Europe including Western Balkans and finally, the inclusion of economic cohesion policies in SAP.

On the other hand what the Union was to decide on two significant issues at the Summit. According to these decisions, the Union aimed at reinvigorating the region to maintain relatively stable situation. For this end the Union introduced some scenarios for the integration of the countries of the region into the Union. There have drawn five scenarios, with respect to the integration process.

First one is to take all five states into the Union structures at the same time. Second, Croatia is supposed to be admitted in 2007, while remaining four countries will be taken together at a later date. Other scenario is the 3+2 model, which is consistence with NATO enlargement process. According to this plan, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia are included in the first accession, while Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina become members later. Fourth scenario is 1+3+1 model. Croatia is the first country, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia

¹¹⁶ Justin L.Eldridge, "Playing at Peace: Western Politics, Diplomacy and the Stabilization of Macedonia", *European Security*, 11:3, Autumn 2002, Frank Cass Publications, London, p.73.

¹¹⁷ Türkeş and Gökgöz, *op.cit*, p.30.

are to be taken after, and finally Albania integrates into the Union. The final scenario may be the most realistic one, which proposes that the Union begins negotiation process, when it feels that the countries are ready.

At the final analysis, however, the Summit failed to a great extent to meet the expectations of the Western Balkan countries, falling short of delivering the necessary implementation strategy for the European integration of the Balkans.¹¹⁹ Thus, this was nothing more than the affirmation of the status quo in the.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.32.

"More than any other place on earth, Macedonia is a Shakespearian stage, on which the theatrical productions have changed so frequently, and with such regularity, that virtually all its citizens are descendants of famous actors, in some cases stretching back for 2500 years, in no case less than 600 years."

Ferid MUHIĆ

CHAPTER 3

EC/EU AND THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Within the context of Union's regional policy towards Western Balkans, the Republic of Macedonia has played an important role. More comprehensive regional policy of the Union has been implemented largely on this country at bilateral level. Therefore, Union's relations with the Republic of Macedonia are quite significant in the sense that they indicate success of the Union's newly formulated regional policy. Moreover, the Republic of Macedonia has been the first area of operation for the newly established EU armed forces, which came into being due to the security concerns in Western Balkans. Furthermore, within the framework of the SAP, the Republic of Macedonia became the first country to sign a SAA and began negotiations with the Union. On 7 March 2000, the Republic of Macedonia started negotiations with the Union to conclude an SAA.¹²⁰ The Republic of Macedonia has progressed much faster than the other regional countries. Apart from the ethnic conflict of 2001, caused by the spillover effect of Kosovo and ended with the Ohrid Agreement, the Macedonian Republic has experienced a peaceful transition period as a model country in South East Europe. Thus, the Republic of Macedonia has been the subject of a special attention for the Union. As a result of the reasons mentioned above, the Union's relations with the Republic of Macedonia are significant within the context of Union's regional policy consisted of the Stability Pact and the SAP.

The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, created crisis both for the Union and the Macedonian Republic. The Union suffered from the absence of a common foreign and security policy consolidated by an armed force, whereas old Macedonian Question revealed with a new version for the Macedonian Republic. Four wolves around the country, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania had

¹²⁰ Cameron and Kintis, *op.cit.*, p.107.

different desires over the country until 19th century.¹²¹ Therefore the Macedonian Question with its new version in the post-Cold War period have impacts on the stability of the Macedonian Republic and its relations with the Union.

3.1 The Macedonian Question

The question of Macedonia, had been an integral part of the wider Eastern Question with respect to the decline of the Ottoman power in the eighteenth century. The question had had various dimensions of geography, ethnicity and history.

3.1.1 Geographical Background

Although the term Macedonia is controversial in the sense that there is no certified definition of the region, it is still in use within geographic terminology. First of all one has to know that, Macedonia was not a unit of administration during the Ottoman period. The Ottoman Empire referred to the region as the three vilayets of Selanik (Thessalonica), Manastir (Monastir or Bitola), and Kosovo, including Uskup or Skopje.¹²² However there are some definitions of the region. According to Barker, the usually accepted geographical area of Macedonia is the territory bounded, in the north by the hills north of Skopje and by the Shar Mountains; in the east by the Rila and Rhodope Mountains; in the south by the Aegean coast around Salonika by Mount Olympus, and by the Pindus Mountains; in the west by Lake Prespa and Ochrid.¹²³ Roudometof makes another definition. He defines the region according to the Macedonian authors. Macedonia extends over a part of the Balkan peninsula, bordered to the north by the mountains of Shar, Skopska Tsrna Gora, Kozyak, Osogovo and Rila, to the east by the western parts of Rhodopes and the River Mesta, to the south by the Aegean Sea and the River Bistritsa and to the west by the mountains of Korab, Yablanitsa, Mokra and Pindus.¹²⁴

¹²¹ James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question", (ed.) James Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.17.

¹²² Victor Roudometof, "Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question", Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 14:2 (1996), p.6.

¹²³ Elisabeth Barker, "The Origin of the Macedonian Dispute", (ed.) James Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.5.

¹²⁴ Roudometof, op.cit., p.6.

Despite there are some certain geographical elements within two sources there is no clear definition of the region. As a result there is still controversy on the territory of Macedonia, as well as any other things related to Macedonia. Whatever the certain borders of Macedonia, it is obvious that the region is significant mainly with respect to its economic value. The main geo-strategic importance of the region is that, it controls the main north-south route beginning from Central Europe to Salonika and the Aegean down the Morava and Vardar Valleys, and also the lesser route down the Struma Valley.

Since there is no specific definition of Macedonia on the map and the region is of strategic and economic importance, Macedonia can be defined as a geographical area, in which each interested Balkan nation, could claim convincingly a significant grip of brethren. For Greeks, until the emergence of the Eastern Question, Macedonia included current territory of Greek Macedonia, most of current Republic of Macedonia, Bulgarian Macedonia as well as the Korce basin. Such a definition for Greeks was reasonable in the age of 'Megali Idea' based on Greek irredentism, with the inexistence of Bulgaria within the region. Following the Balkan Wars the term North Macedonia came into use in order to imply the part of Macedonia outside Greece's northern border. But after the Second World War, Greeks cancelled the use of North Macedonia, since the term North Greece was used to undermine the Slav Macedonia notion of United Macedonia, formulated by communists in Skopje.

Bulgarians, on the other hand, considered both regions of Macedonia and Thrace as their own integrated living space and did not give up the claim after the San Stephanos Treaty. Besides, by pronouncing these two names Bulgarians aimed to mean any Ottoman territory outside Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, wherever there is the spoken dialect of Slav. For Bulgaria, Macedonia was regarded as a vast geographical entity stretching from the north of Skopje to the Aegean and from the Mesta to Lake Ochrid, excluding Korce.

Serbs, theoretically, were interested in all the territories included within the medieval heritage of Stefan Dushan. However, in practice, Serbs focused on the regions, which could be annexed in the quickest and easiest way. Serbs admitted the Bulgarians in North Macedonia and Greeks in South Macedonia within a South Slav state, but following the independence of Bulgaria, Serbs decreased the territory of

Bulgarians to the Pirin area, and began to argue that Kosovo together with most of Manastir vilayet make up old Serbia, not Macedonia. After Balkan Wars, Serbs searched for brethren inside Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia, but could not achieve territorial gain. In the interwar years, Serbianization began in current Macedonian land and resulted in renaming of the region as Province of Vardar. With the end of Second World War, the province changed the name again and became the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, within which a new nation was established on the initiative of Tito through the process of Macedonization and became the core of the post-Cold War conflict with Greece.

For the great part of Westerners, the term Macedonia was widely synonymous with the turbulent areas of the Ottoman provinces, where order had to be restored after 1903. This was used as an excuse for intervening in Ottoman territory, with the premise of avoiding risky escalation of violence before the powers were ready to global engagement. After the Second World War, Macedonia was defined with the multiethnic character of Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and the existence of Macedonia within federative socialist republic was acknowledged internationally.

Nevertheless, in terms of geo-strategic interests of both Balkan nations and Western powers, Macedonia was regarded as economic crossroads, rather than an integrated market of labor and products. Among three Balkan states, Greece regarded Macedonia as natural exodus to Europe before 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia perceive as natural outlet to Belomore.¹²⁵ Macedonia also meant economic things for Western powers. For the Austria-Hungary and Germans, Macedonia was the main route to the Middle East, which includes great sources for their economic interests. Finally for Britain, Macedonia was the final handicap to enter into the markets of Balkan Peninsula.

As Gounaris puts it, rather than geographical term, Macedonia meant borders of other dimensions.

It is a broader region between Muslims and Christians, Ottomans and Europeans, Slav speakers and Greek speakers, empires and national states, the Entente and Central Powers, communism and

¹²⁵ Basil C. Gounaris, "Macedonian Questions", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2:3, September 2002, p.74.

western democracies, modernity and tradition, or stability and instability as some analysts would put it today.¹²⁶

3.1.2 Ethnicity in Macedonia

One other controversy regarding the Macedonian Question is the national character of the region. Before the nineteenth century, Saatçi argues that, there were four basic ethnic groups in Macedonia. These are the Romanians, Greeks, Albanians and South Slavs, which was also divided in sub-groups of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians, within, while Turks were involved after the fourteenth century, as a result of settling policy of Ottoman Empire.¹²⁷

In the nineteenth century main ethnographic researches were based on two elements according to the political perceptions. For the Ottomans, criteria for determining the ethnography of Macedonia, was religion, while Balkan nationalists regarded the role of language as the determining factor of the process.

In the twentieth century, especially until 1923, the majority of the region was Slav. As a result of population exchanges between Bulgaria and Greece in 1920 and between Turkey and Greece in 1923 the demography of Greek Macedonia changed to a great extent. Although in Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia together, Slavs remained over three quarters of the population, Greek Macedonia was heavily Hellenized, within the nation building process.

Despite the Macedonization process that began in 1944, with the foundation of the Macedonian nation led by Josip Broz Tito, many Slav Macedonians tended to have regarded themselves as Bulgarians for almost eighty years. Only the people of Skopje, in the northwest considered themselves as Serbs.

What was in the minds of the Macedonian people while considering them as Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian could be understood with the point of Roudometof. In his paper, he puts that, the majority of Slavs in Macedonia in the middle of nineteenth century probably had no consciousness and were content with the label

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, p.87.

¹²⁷ Meltem Begüm Saatçi, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Son Döneminde Makedonya Sorunu", (ed.) Doç. Dr. Murat Hatipoğlu, *Makedonya Sorunu Düünden Bugüne*, ASAM Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, p.48.

Christian, essentially meaning non-Muslim.¹²⁸ The remaining minority included some, particularly in the south, who would accept the label Greek, others, particularly in the north, who allowed themselves to be called Serbian, then another – surely larger– group who as non-Greek and non-Serb would use the ethnonym Bulgar, and finally those who insisted they were non-Bulgarian as well and who for lack of any better name, declared themselves to be Macedonians.¹²⁹ Consequently the influence of religion in the region and the lack of existence of national consciousness, which had not yet been evaluated, led the inhabitants to regard themselves through the influence of the members of those nations.

As in all cases regarding the terms related to Macedonia, three Balkan nations labeled the character of people living in Macedonia, according to their political view. Bulgarians for most of the time fluctuated between defining all Slav Macedonians as Bulgarians and declared that there were separate Macedonian people, according to the convenience of the time. On the other hand, Serbs claim officially up to 1941, that all Slav Macedonians were Serbians and called Serb Macedonia as South Serbia.

Contrary to the other two nations, Greece did not put serious claims on the people of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia, but called their Slav Macedonian minority as Bulgarians in practice. But officially speaking Greece called them as Slavophone Greeks, concomitant of denying existence of minority in Greek state.

3.1.3 Historical Background

For almost five and a half centuries, between 1371 and 1912 Macedonia lived under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. As well as the other parts of ethnically chaotic Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia became one of the most important battle ground for the nationalist claims of the Ottoman subjects, namely Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks. The implementation of the *millet system* enabled Balkan nations within the empire, to consolidate and strengthen their societal structure. Through the establishment of their own churches and schools, these nations were able to pass through their cultures to the other generations. However, the existence of the millet system provided background for the members of these nations,

¹²⁸ Roudometof, op.cit, p.5.

who were influenced by the emergence of nationalism after the French Revolution. Therefore, Balkans in general, Macedonia in particular became the subject of significant developments at the end of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced with an important problem, the Macedonian Question. Especially after the San Stephanos Treaty of 1878, which established a vast Bulgarian Kingdom, and Berlin Treaty of 1878, which limited the territories of Bulgaria by the European powers, in fear of Bulgarian consequently Russian dominance in the region, the Macedonian Question became internationalized. In addition to the intervention of the European powers, the establishment of a Supreme Committee in 1895 by Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria, followed by the foundation of extremist nationalist organization called IMRO in 1896.¹³⁰

The revolt of ‘Djoumaïa Bala’ exploded at the beginning of October 1902, in the north of Salonika vilayet.¹³¹ It was organized and controlled by the vice-president of the Supreme Committee, General Tsoncheff.¹³² Although the Ottomans suppressed the revolt, Sadrazam Sait Paşa drafted a reform package in order to prevent European intervention in the region in the name of protecting non-Muslims of the empire. However the reform program could not be implemented entirely due to the objections of the Sultan.¹³³ On the other hand following the revolt, Russia and Austria-Hungary, who heavily dealt with the Balkan territories of the Ottomans, prepared a draft in February 1903, which was called Vienna Draft. Aimed at holding the region in their sphere of influence, Russia and Austria-Hungary proposed that there should be improvements in Macedonia with respect to the administrative, military and fiscal issues. Besides, it was decided that, General Investigator with vast

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Barker, op.cit., p.12.

¹³¹ Nadine Lange-Akhund, The Macedonian Question, 1893-1908 From Western Sources, Boulder, New York, 1998, p.113.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., p.116.

authority would be employed.¹³⁴ Nevertheless the draft satisfied neither the Albanians, who felt isolated, nor the Bulgarians, who thought that the reforms are not sufficient. Thus the displeasure in the region continued without decreasing power.

In August 1903, IMRO launched another revolt called the Ilinden Uprising. It can be marked as the beginning of a politically cleared defined struggle for Macedonian national consciousness.¹³⁵ Following the Vienna Draft, Russia and Austria-Hungary proposed the draft of Muerzsteg, on 30 September 1903.¹³⁶ According to the draft, which was ratified by parliament on 9 November 1903, a Muslim governor and two European representatives would be given mission Macedonia.¹³⁷ Furthermore, after the security measures were taken, Macedonia would be restructured regarding ethnics and religious in order to ease administration.¹³⁸ But this article deteriorated the situation, since every individual Balkan states perceived it as an opportunity to create its national entity within.

In 1908, with the Revolution of Young Turks, attempts of Great Power intervention, especially that of Britain, who consolidated its power with the defeat of Russia in 1904-1905 Russo-Japan war, was dropped. However, the Young Turks, after initial promises of progress, turned out to be extreme nationalists, and the lot of the Macedonians was somewhat worse than before revolution.¹³⁹

On the other hand members of the Union and Progress Party, who claimed that the issues of churches and schools are the basis of the question, passed the Law on Churches and Schools on 3 July 1910.¹⁴⁰ With this law, it was cleared to which Church Christians living in Macedonia belonged, but the problem of disposal remained as a problem between Patriarchate and Exarchate.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ferid Muhić, "Macedonia-an Island on the Balkan Mainland", (ed.) David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, Longman, New York, 1996, p.238.

¹³⁶ Lange-Akhund, op.cit, p.142.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Barker, op.cit, p.11.

At the end of the First World War, Macedonia was divided into three parts between Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. A resentful Bulgaria was left with only a small territory (6.798 square kilometers); while Yugoslavia acquired 26,776 square kilometers and Greece acquired 34,600 square kilometers.¹⁴¹ Greek Macedonia then still had a large Slav speaking population. As a result of this ‘unright’ partition, Bulgaria became the base for terrorist activities that led the deterioration of its relations with Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent with Greece, for the next twenty years.

In the interwar years, the use of Macedonia as an ethnic description for the first time aimed at the promotion of Comintern’s aspiration to increased regional influences, made the Macedonian Question more complex. In addition Bulgaria’s expansion into the Macedonian territory in 1941 and 1944 started a new phase of the Macedonian Question, which did not end with the defeat of the Axis Powers. From 1942 on, new developments took place within the Yugoslav and Bulgarian resistance movements, controlled by the communists.

The old rivalry between Sofia and Belgrade over supremacy in the Balkans and control of the region of Macedonia emerged again with the competition between the two Communist parties during the occupation and immediately after.

The fact that Bulgaria had sided with Hitler worked in favor of the Yugoslavs, who tried to control the resistance movement in all three parts of Macedonia. Just as it had happened in the interwar period, the problems confronting Greek-Macedonia arose as a result of rivalry between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and of their aspirations to control the northern Aegean coastline.

With the defeat of Hitler and thus Bulgarians, the Yugoslav leader Tito took a crucial step in 1944, as he created a new federal state consisting of six republics. He changed the name of the southernmost province, which is known as the *Vardarska Bonovina*, and called the Yugoslav Macedonia as People’s Republic of Macedonia. This republic was made a constitutional part of Federal Yugoslavia and its Slavic inhabitants, known until then as ethnic Bulgarians or Serbs, were recognized as its

¹⁴⁰ Saatçi, op.cit, p.65.

¹⁴¹ Barker, op.cit, p.13.

‘titular nation’ under the name of Makedontsi (Macedonians).¹⁴² Their language, which was the Bulgarian dialect, was admitted to be Macedonian and declared as one of the official languages of the Socialist Yugoslavia.

Tito managed to safeguard a region for Yugoslavia, which had been claimed by Bulgaria ever since the Balkan War, and at the same time to create a Piedmont that could facilitate the unification of the remaining Macedonian territories into the Yugoslavian federation.¹⁴³ Following the establishment of Macedonian Federal Republic, the process of Macedonization began with the appropriation of Greek and Bulgarian cultural and historical elements into the new Macedonian nation. However, Tito’s plans for annexation of the Bulgarian and Greek parts of Macedonia had to be canceled due to the clash with Moscow in 1948 and the end of Greek civil war with the victory of the nationalists in 1949.

During the Cold War period, the Yugoslav policy of building a Macedonian nation, Skopje’s propaganda and the continuing dispute between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the south Yugoslavia, created uncertainty and affected Greek Macedonia too.

3.1.4 The Origins of the Macedonian Question

Within the debates of the Macedonian Question, scholars seem not to have consensus on what date and bases the question emerged. There are two groups regarding the issue of date. Chronologically speaking, the first date on which the question emerged was 1870, when Russia pressed Ottoman Empire to let the establishment of a separate Bulgarian Orthodox Church or Exarchate, with the authority extending over parts of the Turkish province of Macedonia. Barker and Floudas argue that the origin of the Macedonian Question was the establishment of Exarchate in 1870.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Demetrius Andreas Floudas, “Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM’s Dispute With Greece Revisited”, co-edited by George A. Kourvetaris, Victor Roudometof, Klesomenis Koutsaikis, Andrew G. Kourvetaris, The New Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, p.88.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Elisabeth Barker, “The Origin of the Macedonian Dispute”, (ed.) James Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.3; Demetrius Andreas Floudas, “Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM’s Dispute With Greece Revisited”, Co-edited by George A. Kourvetaris, Victor Roudometof, Klesomenis Koutsaikis, Andrew G. Kourvetaris, The New

For Russia, who aimed at extending its own influence in the Balkans through the Orthodox Church and through support of the suppressed or newly liberated Slav peoples, there were two means of achieving influence over the region. One is Serbia and the other is Bulgaria. Bulgaria was geographically closer to Russia, with the control of territories next to Istanbul and Aegean, and through Macedonia to Salonika. Besides, it was not liberated at the time and remained dependent on the Russian aid. Contrary to the Bulgarian position, Serbia was remote from Russia and was not feasible to realize the traditional Russian policy of expanding to the warm seas, since Serbia was far from access to the Adriatic Sea. Furthermore, Serbia was less docile than Bulgaria and it was under the influence of the Empire of Austria-Hungary. Adding that Greece was not even a choice, because it was not of Slavic origin, Bulgaria remained as the most probable mean for the Russian policy.¹⁴⁵

Thus the establishment of Exarchate was a great success for Russians, with which it would easily extend its influence in the Balkans. Naturally, main complaints came from Greece, who until the establishment of Exarchate experienced wide control in the region through Patriarchate in Istanbul. The Greek Patriarch in Istanbul declared that the new autocephalous Bulgarian Church was schismatic, while Greek society sharply contested the spread of Bulgarian ecclesiastical, cultural and national influence in Macedonia. On the other hand Serbs tried to fight against Bulgarian influence in Macedonia by complaining Turkey's decision through ecclesiastical and diplomatic channels.

Second argument on the date of the Macedonian Question is that of Pettifer. According to him, the origin of the Macedonian Question is 1878, after the Treaty of Berlin had overthrown the short-lived Greater Bulgaria, founded by the Treaty of San Stephanos.¹⁴⁶ Following the Berlin Conference, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece engaged in struggle to get Macedonia through various methods. Balkan states used the

Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, p.87.

¹⁴⁵ Barker, op.cit, p.4.

¹⁴⁶ James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question", (ed.) James Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.18.

instruments of nationalism, education, language, religion, balance of power and anarchy in order to be victorious in this chaotic struggle.¹⁴⁷

The Macedonian Question included various dimensions of international politics. Gounaris argues that Macedonian Question includes different questions within itself.¹⁴⁸ He argues that behind Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian and Slav Macedonian rights and the mobile rights of their changing sponsors lie four separate, Macedonian questions, which must be checked thoroughly: (a) the protracted diplomacy of national independence and unification in the Balkans; (b) the national politics of geographical and economic unity; (c) the cultural division of labor before and after 1912; and (d) the side effects of state integration and modernization.¹⁴⁹ He argues that the reason why the Macedonian Question prevailed so long for almost two centuries is that these parameters are the part of a delayed nation-building process in a problematic era and in a border zone.¹⁵⁰ In the context of modernization, insufficient resources transformed the cultural division of labor into a national confrontation. Ethnic and national factors are closely related to this. On the other hand the necessary time was secured by complicated European diplomacy, heavily involved in Balkan national affairs during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, to be able to receive the rights generally in Balkans and particularly in Macedonia, they fortified the history with ethnic argument of continuity and sacrifice. Thus the Macedonian Question was characterized as a problem of manipulated identification or a quest for the authentic identity.¹⁵¹

3.1.5 The Emergence of the New Macedonian Question

After a period of half a century, within which Macedonian Question was thought to come to an end, the collapse of Soviet Bloc in 1989 followed by the disintegration of Yugoslavia, let free the frozen ethnic arguments of the nations of Yugoslav territories, whose unification was maintained by the charismatic leadership

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Gounaris, op.cit., p.69.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.70.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.87.

of Tito. The peaceful and calm environment of Cold War Balkans suddenly turned out to be the main core of conflicts within the international system. Some scholars argue that, the new Macedonian Question emerged with the final demise of Yugoslavia, symbolized by the international recognition of independent Croatian Republic. On the other hand, some others argue that, the referendum in Slovenia in 1990, supporting the independence, launched the chain of events that led to the emergence of Macedonia as an independent state. This way or that way, in the end the existence of Socialist Yugoslavia came to an end, though the European Community and particularly Greece worked hard to preserve the unity of the Federal State, tolerating the Croatian and Slovenian independence.

On the other hand the period after 1990 became a great concern mainly for the Greek state, which remained at the southern periphery of the chaotic Yugoslav land. Both foreign and domestic policies of Greece were heavily influenced with the emergence of the Republic of Macedonia on the one hand, and the end of Cold War rivalries, which created the atmosphere of cooperation with the former communist states of East and Central Europe, on the other.

Following the declarations of independence by the Croatia and Slovenia of the Federal Yugoslavia, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia aimed to gain its independence, too. The first multi-party elections held in the Republic on 11 November 1990 indicated that the Macedonian Republic was eager to follow the path, drawn by the neighboring federal states. Following the first meeting on 8 January 1991, the parliament declared that the Macedonian Republic was sovereign on 25 January 1991. After that the last federal president of Yugoslav Macedonian Republic, Kiro Gligorov was elected as president on 27 January 1991. The referendum held in the Republic of Macedonia, in which a large majority of citizens voted in favor of the independence, on 8 September 1991, resulted in the proclamation of the republic on 17 September 1991.¹⁵²

For the Macedonian Republic, the reactions of four countries, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia, and the European Community were the most important of all. Feeling it surrounded by the neighbors, who are perceived as ‘four wolves’

¹⁵² Melek M. Fırat, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan Dış Politikasının Yeniden Biçimleniş Süreci”, (ed.) Mustafa Türkes, İlhan Uzgel, Türkiye’nin Komşuları, İmge Yayınevi, Ankara, 2002, p.35.

from Skopje, the Republic of Macedonia needed international support both politically and economically. Likewise, Muhić's assessment of these four countries is interesting. He says that, the Republic of Macedonia is a part of a continent, which has grown into an island, a mountain surrounded by smart icebergs, which think and watch for the best moment to hit the side of the ship and sink it.¹⁵³ Therefore, neighbors of the country make it feel insecure.

Moreover, one should add the worsening economic conditions to the insecurity for the Republic. There were few competitive modern industries and the agricultural sector was dominated by the production of a single crop, tobacco, which is already in oversupply within the European community. On the other hand, foreign exchange reserves to back the new denar are almost non-existent, and there seems to be a strong possibility that in the absence of a stable and internationally recognized Macedonian currency to replace the almost worthless ex-Yugoslav denar, the currencies of the adjoining states will circulate in neighboring Macedonian region and become the de facto currency of those parts of the Republic of Macedonia.¹⁵⁴ Within this context, if the Community would hesitate to make necessary and sufficient investment and economic help, then the policies of neighboring countries would be determining factor for the future of the Macedonian Republic.

Albania welcomed the formation of the new state, mainly because it was seen as a counterweight to Serbia and an irritant to Greece. Nevertheless, the Republic of Macedonia was not a vital issue for Albanian policies at that time. Serbia on the other hand, let Macedonian Republic to turn into a dependent statelet, but it was ready to intervene in case of any attempts of neighboring countries such as Bulgaria, in order to increase their influences. Bulgaria, as being the most interested state with the Macedonian territory and population, became the first country to recognize the Macedonian independence.

Consequently, all three countries recognized the Macedonian independence officially or unofficially, whereas Greece remained indifferent to the independence of the Republic of Macedonia and refused to admit the new republic with that name.

¹⁵³ Muhić, *op.cit.*, p.243.

¹⁵⁴ Pettifer, *op.cit.*, p.20.

Greece, relatively strong and involved in the Community, refused to give recognition to the new state with the name of Macedonia and the next chapter of the Macedonian Question was officially opened between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia.

3.2 First Contact with the Union: Name Dispute with Greece

Greek opposition to the country defined the first years of the Republic of Macedonia-EC relations. The Community had been the subject of Greek policy regarding its relations with the Republic of Macedonia. Until mid 1993, the Community submitted to Greek considerations over the name dispute with Macedonian Republic. However, the tides turned against Greece, when the situation in Bosnia threatened the peace in the country.

The independence of the Republic of Macedonia seemed as a tremendous jolt for Greeks as they perceived in 1991 that a new state was emerging at their northern frontier with a name, which was thought to be unquestionably a Greek term. Greece believed that the name of Macedonia was the exclusive property of the Greeks and that even the use of this name by a new state indicated that there might be irredentist plans by this former Yugoslav republic toward Aegean Macedonia.¹⁵⁵ Following three years became a diplomatic struggle for Greeks, since the new republic was sought for recognition with the controversial name of Macedonia.

On 16 December 1991, Council of Ministers of the Community assembled in Brussels in order to consider the de jure recognition of the breakaway of former Yugoslavian republics.¹⁵⁶ At the meeting, the very first considerations of Greek foreign policy on the emergence of Macedonian Republic were told by Greek foreign minister Samaras. Samaras put forward that the use of the name of Macedonia would result in the territorial claims and the hostile propaganda stemming from certain units in Skopje in future.¹⁵⁷ Since the Community focused on the issue of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and the Treaty on European Union, the Council adopted Greek views in the resulting declaration in order not to give way to any dispute within the Community. However this manipulation of Greece, which made the

¹⁵⁵ Matjaž Klemenčič and Mitja Žagar, The Former Yugoslavia's Diverse Peoples, ABC Clio, California, 2004, p.359.

¹⁵⁶ Floudas, op.cit, p.90.

Community to recognize the Republic of Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the diplomatic struggle was launched between Athens and Skopje.

Lisbon Foreign Ministers Council of the Community, which took place on 17 February 1992, Portuguese EC Presidency proposed a package called as the Pineiro package.¹⁵⁸ The proposal offered the name of New Macedonia for the new state, but none of the parties accepted it, hence it was rejected.¹⁵⁹

Guimaeres Meeting of May 1992, resulted in the Greek victory, since the EU foreign ministers supported Greece, by declaring their readiness to recognize the former Socialist Republic of Macedonia as an independent sovereign state, indicating the trailer that, ‘under a name which could be acceptable to all interested parties’.¹⁶⁰ Thus its partners granted Greece a quasi veto on the name. Nevertheless, Greece was reluctant to allow the new state to carry any derivatives of Macedonia in its official name. Consequently, using the Community as a means of pressure against the Macedonian Republic, Greece achieved one more significant step in the Community Council of Lisbon on 27 June 1992.¹⁶¹ At the meeting, Community formulated a position whereby it was to recognize the Republic of Macedonia in accordance with the declaration of December 1991 and only under a name, which does not include the term Macedonia.

As a result of diplomatic efforts of Greece within the Community against the Republic of Macedonia, led Macedonian Republic to implement more irritating policies as responses to Greek actions. First of all, in August 1992, the Republic of Macedonia adopted the 16-point star of Vergina as the emblem on the national flag. Second, starting from September 1992, Macedonian government circulated the new school textbooks, which were full of irredentist references to Greater Macedonia and

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p.91.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Evangelos Kofos, “Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM”, (ed.) James Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.239.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

claims on Hellenic cultural heritage.¹⁶² These aggressive policies of Macedonia government resulted in the intensified Greek selective embargo on fuel and commodities. Greece (the only ally of the Serbs in the Balkans) in 1992 introduced economic sanctions against Macedonia and in fact stopped the formation of an EU policy toward Macedonia.¹⁶³

The Republic of Macedonia, feeling that the Community would not give recognition unconditionally due to the Greek opposition, looked for recognition elsewhere, and applied on 30 July 1992 directly to the UN for recognition. However Greece seemed to be everywhere struggling against recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. In January 1993, Greek government submitted a 16-point memorandum to the Security Council, denouncing Macedonia's intransigence and destabilizing influence in the region. Affected by the Greek memorandum, UN Security Council accepted the new republic's application by resolution 817/1993 and recognized under the provisional name of FYROM.¹⁶⁴ This was the first time in the history of United Nations, in which a state was recognized under a provisional name. Nevertheless, the Republic of Macedonia, insisting on the admission of the name of Republic of Macedonia, continued its claims on the issue. On 14 May 1993, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, submitted a draft plan with the rounds of negotiation intended to devise Confidence Building Measures, on the contentious issues such as emblems and propaganda.¹⁶⁵ But it failed with the suggested name of Nova Makedonija. In May 1993, Greece compromisingly offered the name of Slavomakedonija, but once more it failed, and any mediation between two states, came to an end until the October elections in Greece.¹⁶⁶

With the elections in October, socialists led by Papandreou's PASOK came to power. The new government was determined to initiate a tougher approach to the

¹⁶² Floudas, op.cit, p.92.

¹⁶³ Klemenčič and Žagar, op.cit, p.359.

¹⁶⁴ Kofos, op.cit, p.240.

¹⁶⁵ Floudas, op.cit, p.92.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

Macedonian Question.¹⁶⁷ This was certified with the letter of new foreign minister Papoulias to the UN Secretary General. In the letter Papoulias stated that Greece was eager to proceed with the Vance-Owen mediation only as long as Macedonia (FYROM) would quit its deliberate procrastination tactics and acquiesce to some basic Greek demands.¹⁶⁸ Contrary to what Greeks aimed, this statement prompted six EU members, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom to accord full diplomatic recognition to Skopje.¹⁶⁹ Following this, wave of recognitions took place resolving the issue in Macedonia Republic's favor. As a result of the continuous tough and mistaken policies of Papandreou, the US, which considered Greece as the vital strategic point in Mediterranean for the protection of Israel, gave recognition to the Republic of Macedonia in February 1994.¹⁷⁰

As a response, Greece severed diplomatic ties with Skopje and imposed blockade on Macedonian goods moving to and from the port of Thessalonica with the exception of humanitarian aid on 16 February 1994.¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, this blockade was followed by condemnation for Greece within the Union. Even, the coming presidency period of Greece became the point of discussion, while the Union acted to judge the membership of Greece. On 22 April 1994, the Commission brought on action under Article 225.2 of the Union Treaty, alleging that Greece had made a improper use of Article 224 of the Treaty, which provided member state to take emergency measures in the event of serious international disturbances, war, threat of war, or for maintaining peace and international security, in order to justify the unilateral measures adopted on 16 February.¹⁷² Besides, Commission filed an application for interim measures under Article 186 of the Union treaty, requiring

¹⁶⁷ Kofos, op.cit, p.244.

¹⁶⁸ Floudas, op.cit, p.97.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

Greece to suspend the trade blockade pending judgment on the main action.¹⁷³ On 24 May 1994 Greek government submitted a document containing its written observations on the interim relief application.¹⁷⁴ As a consequence of the presented document, European Court on 29 June 1994 came up with a decision, which considered the legal arguments and rejected the Commission's application for interim measures on the basis of insufficient proof.¹⁷⁵ Advocate-General's opinion on the legality of the Greek countermeasures, issued in April 1995 realized a breakthrough within the process.¹⁷⁶

As a result of the Union pressure on Greece, which was the consequence of the Papandreou's tough and irreconciliatory character and his policies, an interim agreement between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia was reached. On 13 September 1995 the Interim Agreement was signed, which promised the lifting of the trade sanctions against Skopje in exchange for the Macedonia Republic's undertaking to change its national flag, refrain from using symbols linked to Greece cultural and historical heritage and amend the offending articles of its Constitution.¹⁷⁷ With the signing of the Agreement, European Commission on the other hand decided to drop the legal action against Greece before the final decision would be given.

3.3 The Macedonian Crisis in 2001: the Essence of Relations

Following the agreement that ended the name dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, hence lifting the embargo against the country, Macedonian Republic had passed a relatively peaceful time until 2001. However, exacerbation of economy due to the UN-imposed sanctions and Greek embargo, and the demands of Albanian community in terms of wider political rights increased the fragility of the republic. Although every government, established in the Republic of Macedonia after 1990, included an Albanian party or Albanian ministers as partners of the

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.98.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Kofos, *op.cit.*, 247.

government, political demands of Albanian community like the official recognition of Albanian language increased day by day. Particularly, the explosion of war in Kosovo influenced the stability in Macedonian Republic, encouraging Albanian minority to take part with Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA), aiming at founding a Greater Albanian land, consisted of Albania, Kosovo and west Macedonia. The path that led to the ethnic clashes in 2001 between February and July, was paved by the spillover effect of Kosovo war, which had been regarded by the scholars as the only threat to fragile stability of the Republic of Macedonia. Despite the fact that the Macedonian crisis lasted for about six months, it had negative effects on the ruling Macedonian society and large Albanian minority. In fact the peace and stability in the Republic of Macedonia had been regarded as a negative peace, which means the absence of war. Hence, this negative peace had long waited for a bullet to trigger an ethnic clash in the country. Following the Kosovo war NLA fighters who believed in a separate Albanian entity in the Republic of Macedonia had triggered this bullet.

3.3.1 The Reasons of the Crisis

There are two important factors that undermined the stability in the Republic of Macedonia. In the political field the ignorance of Albanian political demands for political rights and deteriorating economic situation due to the embargos have been the main factors that resulted in the fighting in the Republic of Macedonia. Nevertheless the inclusion of international community, especially the European Union and the United States, which made efforts through mediation process achieved in preventing another major war in the region. Therefore, after the issue of recognition, ethnic crisis in the Republic of Macedonia forced the Union into action once more, which commenced the cooperation between the Union and the Republic of Macedonia as a model for the region, paving the way for the signature of SAA.

The second part of EU-Macedonian relations has begun with the armed struggle in the Republic of Macedonia due to the political and economic reasons. Thus it is vital to define the political scene and economic situation in Macedonian Republic.

3.3.1.1 Politics in the Republic of Macedonia

In the political scene two elements are determining in the Macedonian Republic. The two components of executive power, the presidency and the parliament have been the two influential organs implementing domestic and foreign policies of the country. Although the Macedonian Republic is defined as a parliamentary republic in the constitution, one has to admit that the presidency has been more influential than the parliament in the Republic of Macedonia. Particularly, during the presidency of Kiro Gligorov, an old reformed communist, who was elected President of the Republic in January 1991, the influence of president in state administration has hardly been controversial. The personal charisma and experience of Gligorov was the significant element of Macedonian politics during the initial years of independence. In spite of the fact that the executive power lies mostly with government, people already spoke of a Macedonian presidential democracy.¹⁷⁸ In fact, what preserved the Macedonian Republic from the warfare in the Yugoslav territory was the efforts of Gligorov and his good relations with the Federation.

Before the break-up of Yugoslavia, Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, together with president of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, tried in May 1991 to suggest an ‘asymmetric confederation’, which was based on a former Slovene proposal that was not agreed upon.¹⁷⁹ ‘The Platform on the Future of the Yugoslav State’ opted for Yugoslavia as an ‘commonwealth of republics’ or ‘commonwealth of states’, avoiding the terms ‘federation’ and ‘confederation’.¹⁸⁰ According to this proposal, Serbia and Montenegro would become the nucleus of a new Yugoslav confederation; Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia would be half-independent, but they would still be constitutive republics of this new entity; Croatia and Slovenia would be allowed to have, while staying inside the confederation, as much independence as they would feel feasible.¹⁸¹ Gligorov, together with Izetbegović thought that this idea would fulfill Serb wishes to live in

¹⁷⁸ Jens Reuter, “Policy and Economy in Macedonia”, (ed.) James Pettifer, The New Macedonia Question, MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.33.

¹⁷⁹ Klemenčič and Žagar, op.cit, p.358.

¹⁸⁰ Zlatko Isakovic, Identity and Security in Former Yugoslavia, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2000, p.201.

one state, whereas Croats and Slovenes would be pleased on their path to independence and sovereignty.¹⁸² However the proposal failed and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia became a reality.

Gligorov, who established good relations with the Yugoslav Federation was able to maintain order, while other federal states of Yugoslavia sought independence. But, as the commonwealth idea failed, Gligorov accepted independence rather than being subject to Serbian hegemony. What Gligorov succeeded for the Republic was the peaceful withdrawal of Yugoslav People's Army from Macedonian Republic. Due to the diplomatic efforts of Macedonian president, who achieved in making an agreement with the Yugoslav army, the army peacefully withdrew from this southernmost former Yugoslav republic.¹⁸³ Furthermore, what brought an international presence in the Republic of Macedonia was the result of Gligorov's efforts. Being aware of the regional instability caused by the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gligorov asked the United Nations for an observer mission that could help maintaining Macedonia's sovereignty and providing it for international recognition.¹⁸⁴ As well as the UN mission, Gligorov sought also for an American presence in the country. As a result, during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first half of the 1990s, Gligorov achieved in securing its republic with UNPREDEP with an American unilateral force in support of the mission. Beside security matters, Gligorov sought also for Albanian political presence in the government. In spite of the fact that Macedonian governments continuously included the most popular Albanian political parties as the coalition partners, Albanians being the largest minority in the Republic of Macedonia and the majority in the northwest insisted on more political rights, basing their argument on their numerical importance within the population.

Since Gligorov was the driving force in parliamentary Macedonia, republic was believed to be a presidential one. Presidentialism in Macedonia, linked with the

¹⁸¹ Klemenčič and Žagar, op.cit, p.358.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p.359.

¹⁸⁴ Eldridge, op.cit, p.53.

personality of Gligorov between 1991 and 1999 was more existent in essence than based in the constitution.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the 1998 elections revealed a situation in the Republic of Macedonia, in which for the first time government and president belonged to opposite political positions. Contrary to the previous period, in which Gligorov, coming from the origin of SDSM Party, dominated prime minister Branko Crvenkovski, head of SDSM Party, there were important collisions over foreign and security matters, which was named as the problem of ‘cohabitation’.¹⁸⁶

The election of Boris Trajkovski, the VMRO candidate, in 1999 decreased the influence of presidency stemming from the charisma of Gligorov. Methodist priest, as Vankovska calls Trajkovski, replaced ‘Old Fox’, nickname of Gligorov, hence the superiority of presidency over the parliament came to an end, handing in the executive power to the prime minister of VMRO. Therefore Gligorov played an important role in Macedonian politics and has been remembered as a wise and reasonable leader and a father of the ‘oasis of peace.’¹⁸⁷

Despite the fact that presidency of Gligorov was the main determinant of Macedonian politics, the parliament had also significant role. Before the 2001 crisis, the Republic of Macedonia has experienced four parliamentary elections in 1990, 1994 and 1998. The elections of 1990, before the proclamation of independence, there were two mainstream political parties in the Republic of Macedonia. These were the pro-Yugoslav parties and national parties. After the independence, moderates and radicals shared political scene. Recent Macedonian politics has been dominated by two communal group of parties those of Macedonians and those of Albanians.

Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), is the continuance of the Party for Democratic Transformation (SKM-PDP), which joined the 1990 elections as a pro-Yugoslav party as being the successor of the League of Communists. Established in 1992, SDSM favors democratic socialism, but also mentions marketization and privatization in its programs, while emphasizing rule of law and

¹⁸⁵ Biljana Vankovska, “Civil-Military Relations in Macedonia”, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, July 2000, p.12.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p.13.

human rights.¹⁸⁸ Being the party of Gligorov, SDSM has been the main party in ruling coalitions between 1992 and 1998 under the leadership of Branko Crvenkovski, it supported cooperation with Albanian political parties.

Alliance of Reformist Forces (ARF) was the party of the former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ande Markovic. It had a communist orientation. The president of the party was Stojan Andov, which became the President of the Parliament after 1990 elections. Later it was renamed as the Liberal Party and merged with Democratic Party of Peter Gosev and became Liberal Democratic Party LDP.

The most important Slav-Macedonian party has been the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity VMRO-DPMNE, which was established in 1990 as the inheritor of the nationalist and irredentist IMRO. It was seceded from the Party for Pan Macedonian Action (MAAK) in March 1990. Until 1992, VMRO-DPMNE remained as the largest party in the parliament. Ljubco Georgievski has been the leader of the party, which had promoted anti-communist and anti-Yugoslav discourse. Although it included anti-Albanian rhetoric, VMRO cooperated with DPA politicians in 1997 to beat SDSM-led government in 1998 elections.

Nevzat Halili established the leading radical Albanian party, Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) with a nationalist view, in 1990. PDP supported an extension of Albanian rights, which will be examined later. In 1994, Abdurrahman Aliti replaced Halili. Actually, Ymer Ymeri is leading the party with divisive nationalistic rhetoric that has often used the threat of violence as an alternative to political dialogue, before the Ohrid Agreement.¹⁸⁹

The Democratic Party for Albanians (DPA), under the leadership of Arben Xhaferi was established after Xhaferi split from PDP in 1994. DPA was named as PDP-SKH until the merge with the Democratic People's Party in 1997. DPA has become a significant player in the Republic, joining the coalition after 1998 as well as Xhaferi has become an important figure in Macedonian politics. Despite the fact that he initially favored a separate state in the Republic of Macedonia for Albanians,

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ş.İnan Rüma, Macedonia's Yugoslav Path: cycles of crises and survival, unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Ankara, 2000, p.58.

he stopped the militant elements of Macedonia's ethnic Albanian community during the Kosovo war.¹⁹⁰ Although he had followed the discourse of Slav Colonialism¹⁹¹, he no longer argues the partitioning of Macedonian Republic or pan Albanian unification.¹⁹²

In addition to the mainstream political parties in the country, there are small ethnic parties. The Democratic Party of Turks, led by Erdoğan Saraç, announced loyalty to the Macedonian state, while the Democratic Party of Serbia under the leadership of Vojislav Šešelj pursues a nationalist and anti-American policy.¹⁹³

After the 1990 elections, VMRO gained a great victory, however it was not able to make up the government. Following a two months of negotiations, a supraparty government of experts was elected under the premiership of an eminent economics professor Nikola Kljusev. The experts government included three Albanians and one minister from the previous communist government.¹⁹⁴ In July 1992, the parliament with the votes of SDSM, Liberal Party and Socialist Party passed a no-confidence vote. SDSM formed a government of four party coalition, consisting of Albanian Party for Prosperity, Liberal Party and Socialist Party. Branko Crvenkovski, the leader of SDSM became the prime minister. Five Albanian ministers and one Turkish minister were involved in the government, which aimed mainly international recognition of the new republic.

In the 1994 elections SDSM, LP, PDP and Socialist Party founded a coalition government. The government made significant steps regarding political demands of Albanian minority, like the Appointment of Albanians to the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and Army.

¹⁸⁹ Eldridge, op.cit., p.55.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Rūma, op.cit., p.69.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Reuter, op.cit., p.33.

The 1998 elections changed the political scene both for Slav Macedonians and for Albanian Macedonians. VMRO came to power and formed a coalition with DA. Xhaferi succeeded in beating PDP and VMRO invited DPA to the government.

Consequently, the Republic of Macedonia followed the path to the crisis under the government of VMRO and DPA as the representatives of two societies of the state. The interethnic dispute on comprehensive political rights made up the essence of political problem in the country, while all of the governments have been accused of corruption and nepotism. Thus it is essential to define the political demands of Albanian society, since it has been the main driving force behind the path to the crisis.

3.3.1.2 Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia

Macedonia has been a republic of an ethnically divided country, although the republic has a unitary character. Language, religion, economic relations and culture have separated Slav Macedonians and Albanians. Hislope argues that the rural character of Albanians has furthered the gap between two societies whereas Macedonians have been villagers. Moreover, the Macedonian cultural hierarchy portrays Albanians as backwards, while they consider themselves as the members of an advanced culture.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore political repression and economic exclusion during the communist rule pushed Albanians into the informal economy and encouraged a norm of self-reliance.¹⁹⁶ This mafia-type definition of Albanians has been a major setback for them to be regarded as inferior to Macedonians.

On the other hand Frckoski defines four characteristics of Macedonian interethnic relations:

- Ethnic differentiation between one dominant (Macedonian ethnic community and one large minority group (the Albanian ethnic community), impinges upon the wider question of Macedonian-Albanian relations.
- Macedonian-Albanian interethnic relations are compounded by the religious factor (Macedonians being Christian Orthodox and

¹⁹⁵ Robert Hislope, "Between a bad peace and a good war: insights and lessons from the almost-war in Macedonia", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 26:1, January 2003, p.135.

Albanians being Muslims), which adds to the perception that there is a clash of cultures.

- Basic ethnic differences have been expressed through the polarization of a number of cultural factors. These include education in the mother tongue, use of that language in state and local administration, cultural institutions and media in the language, and the use of national symbols such as the flag.
- These tensions and conflicts have been internal, but have had particular regional dimension, especially with regard to the so-called Albanian Question.¹⁹⁷

Despite the fact that there is a religious difference between two societies, this has been the least important factor that caused the armed conflict. Contrary to the Bosnian and Kosovo wars, neither of the societies has had a great hatred against each other because of religion. Main controversial issue had been the political demands of Albanian community in order to receive greater responsibilities in the administration of the state.

The Albanians has focused on three issues. First one has been the constitutional status of them in the Republic of Macedonia. They have been claiming that the minority status be given to them by the preamble of the constitution, which gave the Macedonians of Slav origin the status of sole constituent people, has not corresponded to their significance in terms of population.¹⁹⁸ Although the constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, Albanians has argued that having nearly 23 per cent of total population, they deserve to be regarded as a separate nationality, not a minority. Second issue for Albanians is the desire for respect for fundamental rights. The Albanian community look for the end of discrimination on the basis of nationality through better access to education, culture and language and recognition of Albanian as an official language among Slav

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p.134.

¹⁹⁷ Ljubomir Frekoski, "Macedonia and the Region", in "Southern Balkans: Perspectives from the Region", Institute for Security Studies, *Chaillot Papers 46*, April 2001, pp.38-39.

¹⁹⁸ Sophia Clément, "Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR Macedonia", *Chaillot Paper 32*, The European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 1998, p.9.

Macedonians.¹⁹⁹ The coalition government came to power after 1998 elections has accomplished to conclude an agreement which established the South East European University that is an Albanian-language university in Tetovo. The agreement was reached in April 2000, which met one of the Albanian demands.

Another conflictual issue in terms of fundamental rights is the language. Within this context, Article 7 of the Constitution says that the official language is Macedonian, written in its Cyrillic alphabet, while Paragraph 2 sets out that in the communities where the majority of the inhabitants belong to a nationality, in addition to the Macedonian language and its Cyrillic alphabet, the language of those minorities is also in official use, in a manner stipulated by law.²⁰⁰ However Albanians do not accept to be limited in accordance with this paragraph. Since in West Macedonia, where Albanians are intensely populated, Albanians constitute an absolute majority in Tetovo and Gostivar, relative majority in Kicëvo and Deborgore, one third of Kumanovo community and more than 40 per cent of Struga community.²⁰¹ Therefore recognition of Albanian language as an official language was the question of honor.

Final issue for Albanians is the maintenance of guarantee for basic democratic rights. Albanians claim equal voting rights and proportional representation within state institutions. Hislope argues that Albanian under representation is an existential fact. Given the numbers of the composition of the police force changing from 1,8 per cent to 8,7 per cent and that of the judiciary from 7 to 16 per cent for the Albanian community, which makes up by and large 20 per cent of population in the country, Hislope seems to be right in his argument.²⁰² Moreover in Tetovo, where Albanians comprise almost 80 per cent of the population, Albanian presence within the police force extend from 10 to 38 per cent.

Hislope also argues that Albanians have not been taken into consideration during decision-making process. Although every government since independence

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Robert D.Greenberg, "New Balkan Policy Needed", Foreign Policy in Focus, 6:11, April 2001, p.3.

²⁰¹ Reuter, op.cit, p.36.

²⁰² Hislope, op.cit, p.132.

included increasing number of Albanian ministers, they are to be isolated and ignored. They have never been given positions over the security apparatus of the state, like ministers of Interior and Defense.²⁰³ Due to the 1991 Constitution, which defines the republic as unitary, local units are granted only a few powers?

3.3.1.3 Economics in the Republic of Macedonia

Macedonian Republic experienced hard times during the first years of independence. It had been one of the poorest regions of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslav Republics. Supported greatly by the federal funding, Macedonian economy has remained as an agricultural economy dominated by monoculture, tobacco. Following the independence, UN-sponsored sanctions against Yugoslavia from mid-1992 until the end of 1995 deteriorated the economic situation in the country, since Serbia had been the main trading partner. Moreover Greek opposition to the name and the flag of the republic was accompanied by economic blockade furthered the economic hardship. As a result of the double embargo against the Republic of Macedonia, the economy of the country suffered a loss of \$ 4 billion in income as well as the GDP that dropped by 50 per cent.²⁰⁴ Although in 1996, the country experienced a year of growth for the first time since proclamation of independence, Kosovo war cut short the upturn. The only positive development for Macedonian economy was its admission to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In December 1992, the Republic of Macedonia became a member of EBRD under the name ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.

With regards to the economic situation, final point that had been the cause of the crisis was the high unemployment rate. In January 2001, the unemployment rate was 45 per cent for the active population.²⁰⁵ This statistics was deteriorated by the visa regime that the Union implemented limiting the mobility of young Albanians and Macedonians. Therefore when National Liberation Army (NLA) promised to liberate Albanians, young Albanians were willing to act because of the devastating effect of economy in the Republic of Macedonia.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p.136.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p.137.

With regards to the political reasons that erupt the fighting in the country, Hislope defines three basic factors. He argues that cultural differences, economic pressures and political underdevelopment were the main reasons of fight in the Republic of Macedonia. In terms of culture he figures out three critical points:

1. they explain the weak social fabric of Macedonian civil society,
2. they define the issues of political competition,
3. they reinforce in each community the exaggerated fears of the Other.²⁰⁶

Secondly, he defines three characteristics of Macedonian politics that made it fragile to the eruption of the fighting:

1. the incomplete establishment of the rule of law,
2. a weak civil society,
3. the unresolved legitimacy of the state.²⁰⁷

What Hislope describes as the reasons for the fighting had been the characteristics of the Macedonian Republic, since its independence. Although the country managed to live in peace and stability due to the charismatic personality of Kiro Gligorov, the Kosovo war triggered the potential unrest and the fighting occurred inevitably.

3.3.1.4 Security in the Republic of Macedonia

In addition to the economic and political problems in the country fed by cultural differences, security mechanism, established by the UN force had lost its mandate in 1998. In order to prevent the spread of war in Yugoslavia, UN had launched its first preventive mission in the Macedonian Republic. In response to the request of Macedonian president Gligorov UN passed the Resolution 795 on 9 December 1992 to deploy a UNPROFOR mandate in the country.²⁰⁸ It was established on 11 December 1992 as an extension of UNPROFOR.²⁰⁹ On 31 March 1995, it transformed itself into UNPREDEP.²¹⁰ Its mission was defined as ‘to

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p.136.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.138.

²⁰⁸ Klemenčič and Žagar, *op.cit*, p.359.

²⁰⁹ Rūma, *op.cit*, p.94.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*.

monitor border areas with Albania and FRY, strengthen by its presence, the country's security and stability and report on any development that could threaten the country'.²¹¹ UNPREDEP had helped maintain the sovereignty of Macedonia, however by the summer of 1998, the mission came to an end. As Macedonian government was hard-pressed economically, the offer of Taiwan, which had capital resources but lacked diplomatic recognition, seemed to be very attractive. The offer of \$300 millions in cash and over \$ 1 billion in long-term aid and investment in turn of diplomatic recognition to Taipei, was accepted by the government as economic hardship was unbearable.²¹² On the other hand, China, permanent member of UN Security Council, broke diplomatic ties with the Republic of Macedonia since it did not recognize Taiwan. Furthermore, it vetoed the request of a six-month extension of UNPREDEP. Thus the mission ended because of the irrational decision of Macedonian decision-makers who were caught with economic problems. Nevertheless, by the end of March 1998, the United States extended its force with the mission of maintaining and protecting the American infrastructure in the country. The following month the American forces came under NATO jurisdiction and remained along the border in order to protect the country from the spillover effects of the war in Kosovo. Hence just before the emergence of the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, UN mission had been replaced by American forces, but the Albanian extremists were not late to take advantage of UNPREDEP's demise.

3.3.2 The Crisis Takes Place

The situation in Macedonia began to deteriorate after KFOR CAME TO Kosovo, but especially after November 2000, when groups of Albanian extremists tried to 'solve' the Albanian question in the territories of the south Serb districts of Bujanovic and Preševo.²¹³ Following this, it remained only a question of when the violence would also erupt among the displeased Albanians in western Macedonia, who were not happy with their status of a national minority and were demanding new solutions from the Macedonian government with respect to their status in

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Eldridge, op.cit., p.56.

²¹³ Klemenčić and Žagar, op.cit., p.362.

Macedonia.²¹⁴ Consequently, the time came and the peace in the Republic of Macedonia began to unravel after a flare-up around Tanusevci, a village on Macedonia-Kosovo border. Two factors affected the timing of the flare-up in Tanusevci. First it was the time for the official demarcation of the border between Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia that was established on 16 February and second it was the time when Macedonian police entered into Tanusevci area, where an Albanian arms depot existed.²¹⁵ For the Macedonian government, the National Liberation Army (NLA) as the Albanian guerillas named themselves, was stronger than its army. Macedonian army consisted of about 10000 active personnel, 40 per cent of which were ethnic Albanians, whereas number of NLA fighters were reported to be between 2500 and 6000.²¹⁶ Moreover, as a result of the collapse of Albanian state in 1997, military hardware was transferred to Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, whose leaders than established NLA. In response to the request of Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski and Defense Minister Ljuben Paunovski for support from NATO in order to secure border, on 8 March 2001 KFOR troops cleared the NLA rebels from Mijak, adjacent to Tanusevci.²¹⁷ On 14 March, a number of 200 guerillas set off towards Macedonian Republic's second city Tetova. What the guerillas desired was announced before the move to Tetova. There was no mention of a Greater Albania or unification with Albania or Kosovo but rather demanded neutral international mediation and the transition of the Republic of Macedonia to a multiethnic federation with two constitutive peoples.²¹⁸

However as guerillas moved on to Tetova, Macedonian government intended to increase its arsenal. As a result of an agreement with the Ukrainian government, Macedonian government took possession of two Mi-24 'Hind' and four Mi-8 'Hip'

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Hislope, op.cit., p.140.

²¹⁶ Eldridge, op.cit., p.58.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p.59.

²¹⁸ Hislope, op.cit., p.60.

attack helicopters from Ukraine on 23 March 2001.²¹⁹ As the government began to use new weapons in Tetova, the battle turned out to be more lethal than before. At this point the Union came into the scene, forcing the Macedonia's leading ethnic Slav and Albanian political leaders to launch negotiations. In April, the Union unexpectedly proposed newly formulated Stabilization and Association Agreement with the Republic of Macedonia. The Agreement provided the Republic with a \$ 30 million aid package and turned its into a fast-track 'potential candidate' for EU membership.²²⁰ The Agreement also permitted the Macedonian goods to enter into the European markets but allowed the Macedonian government to impose duties on imported EU goods. On the other hand, the Union made the assistance conditional upon a political dialogue and political reform with the ethnic Albanians.

In the wake of the Union proposal for a SAA, with the inclusion of DPA of Xhaferi and PDP of Ymeri, National Unity government was formed in 11 May, in order to address the ethnic Albanian demands. However, when OSCE envoy, Robert Frowick arranged a meeting in Prizren, between representatives of the two main Albanian parties DPA and PDP, and NLA, the government came to the brink of dissolution. The existence of NLA on the negotiation table and the signature of Prizren Agreement were accepted by the Macedonian elite as a declaration of war by the ethnic Albanian community. Furthermore the Aracinova incident, in which an NLA unit was trapped in Aracinova, only six miles from Skopje and within striking distance of the national airport and the country's major oil refinery, affected the course of negotiations. Macedonian government launched an offensive to get back the upper hand in military and diplomacy. With the international community interfering, both sides relented and a ceasefire was made as a sign of goodwill. The troops of the United States within the KFOR, for the first time entered into the Republic of Macedonia in order to escort the NLA fighters out of Aracinova and back into hills of Kumanova. Despite the fact that the Macedonian government felt betrayed as KFOR did not disarm fighters but return them back to Kosovo, the armed

²¹⁹ Ibid, p.61.

²²⁰ Ibid, p.62.

conflict ended, and the negotiation process began with the mediation of the Union and the United States.

The Union appeared on the scene with the SAA agreement proposed to the Republic of Macedonia in April, however this mechanism failed to stop fighting. On the other hand it was Chris Patten who threatened to withdraw all aid due from the Stabilization and Association Process during the Aracinova crisis, and persuaded the Macedonian government to allow the safe passage of NLA fighters. In addition, EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana, with the permission of the Macedonian government, negotiated the NLA removal under a NATO escort.²²¹

3.3.3 The Signature of the Ohrid Agreement

On 31 July 2001, the meeting between Javier Solana and Ukrainian prime minister Anatoli Kinakh in order to end weapon sales to Macedonian Republic, brought the Macedonian government to the table. The following day negotiators quickly agreed to the use of Albanian as a second language. Moreover, four days later, the Macedonian side accepted security service reforms that would allow ethnic Albanians bigger roles in local policing. As a result, on 13 August 2001, the parties signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement, putting an end to the fighting between NLA fighters and government forces.

As the Ohrid Agreement was signed due to the great efforts of international mediation, especially those of NATO and EU, the Republic of Macedonia entered into a new period. There are the political results for the country and the military results for the Union. This period was marked by three significant headlines. First one was the approval and implementation process of the Ohrid Agreement, which was delayed by the government many times, but realized through the threats of the Union to withdraw the financial assistance. The Ohrid Agreement did not satisfy the Macedonian authorities, so they tried to postpone realization of its regulations.²²² Second, one was the emergence of Albanian National Army AKSH as a new militant group, which aimed the final liberation of all ethnic Albanian territory in the Balkans. The emergence of this new group after the demobilization of NLA, affected

²²¹ Alice Ackermann, "Macedonia in a Post-Peace Agreement Environment: A Role for Conflict Prevention and Reconciliation", *The International Spectator*, 1/2002, p.72.

the negotiation process and led to the slowing-down of the adoption of the amendments in the constitution. Finally post-Ohrid period was marked by the efforts of EU authorities to stabilize the country and to force the Macedonian government to pass the laws foreseen by the Agreement, while NATO took care of the security measures in the country.

Four major Macedonian parties signed the peace agreement. VMRO and SDSM from the Slav-Macedonian side and DPA and PDP from the Albanian Macedonian side put their signatures under the agreement, which pursued a dual-track strategy. It encouraged a way of reform process while allowing for the ending of the hostilities through the pacification of NLA, by disarming its fighters and demobilizing the organization as a whole. The agreement included significant provisions with respect to the demand of political rights of the Albanian society. What the agreement has included were the following provisions:

1. the official use of Albanian language in areas where ethnic Albanians make up the 20 per cent of the population,
2. the publication of laws and other public documents, for instance the identity cards, written in the languages of Macedonian and Albanian,
3. non-discrimination and equal representation for ethnic Albanians in the public sector,
4. the increase of ethnic Albanian police by 500 units by July 2002 and by 500 more by July 2003, in areas with an Albanian population,
5. a change in the preamble of the constitution, eliminating the terms of ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ groups and replacing them by ‘citizens of Macedonia’ and ‘peoples’,
6. the introduction of a ‘double majority’ concept to enable the votes of minority to be powerful in decision-making,
7. a change in Article 48 of the constitution that replaces the term ‘nationalities’ by ‘communities’,
8. the creation of a new institution, the Committee for Inter-Community Relations,

²²² Klemenčič and Žagar, *op.cit.*, p.363.

9. the expansion of ethnic Albanian rights with respect to university education in the Albanian language,
10. respect for ethnic identity symbols,
11. decentralization of government,
12. an amnesty for NLA fighters, agreed to demobilization under NATO auspices,²²³
13. a countrywide census to establish Macedonia's exact ethnic composition.²²⁴

Although the Macedonian government tried to escape passing the provisions articulated by the NLA in the parliament, the Union 'blackmail' by threatening the postponement of financial aids brought the Macedonian elites to terms. After four postponements of financial aid, the Union agreed to convene the Donor's Conference on 12 March 2002, when the government adopted all 15 amendments demanded by the Albanian community.

Despite the fact that the National Unity government was split up in November 2001, when SDSM, LDP and Socialist Party left the coalition the agreement was finally adopted. Furthermore the Trebos incident launched by AKSH leading to many casualties did not prevent the implementation of the amendments. On 24 January 2002, two-thirds majority that is needed passed the law on local self-government in the Macedonian parliament.²²⁵ Following the adoption of this controversial amendment, on 30 January 2002 an agreement on an amnesty law was reached and adopted by the parliament on 7 March 2002.²²⁶ The Donor's Conference convened as a result of the successful adoption process of amendments, pledged about \$ 274 millions for macroeconomic assistance and an additional \$241 millions of donor assistance for general economic development, which was much more than

²²³ *Ibid.*, p.74.

²²⁴ Eldridge, *op.cit.*, p.68.

²²⁵ Ackermann, *op.cit.*, p.76.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

the Republic of Macedonia had expected.²²⁷ Thus the Union had awarded the Macedonian government as the communities reached a reconciliation.

3.3.4 The Union's First-Ever Military Operation

Just after the signature of the Agreement, NATO had commenced the Operation Essential Harvest on 27 August 2001, in order to disarm and demobilize the NLA fighters.²²⁸ On 19 September, in accordance with the Macedonian president's request, NATO initiated the Operation Amber Fox, replacing the Operation Essential Harvest.²²⁹ The mandate aimed at protecting OSCE and EU monitors who oversee the implementation of the peace plan. Operation Amber Fox was under the leadership and consisted of some 700 troops with a period of three months, which can be renewed due to the conditions of the country.²³⁰ In February 2002, the mission was extended for another three months.²³¹

As it was mentioned in the first part, the European Union aimed at the deployment of an European Armed Force in the Republic of Macedonia. In addition to what was told previously on about the dispute between Greece and Turkey, the Macedonian authorities were skeptical on the issue. Although the Albanian leaders of the Republic of Macedonia were supporting the deployment of European Armed Force in the country, the Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski held reservations about the initiative. Nevertheless, Trajkovski changed his mind after the 15 January 2003 meeting with Solana and on 17 January sent a letter to Solana expressing his political readiness to admit the EU initiative.²³² The main concern for the government is the departure of NATO forces. But Solana assured the Macedonian president that there is a broad consensus for the EU to take over NATO's mandate, and that it would not harm the future development of relations between the Republic

²²⁷ Eldridge, op.cit, p.70.

²²⁸ Hislope, op.cit, p.77.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Robert Alagjovovski, "The EU in Macedonia", accessed in www.transitiononline.com, on 20 January 2003.

of Macedonia and NATO, nor would it affect the quality of peacekeeping mission; an earlier agreement, the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement, will allow the EU forces to use existing NATO infrastructure in Macedonia.²³³

Besides, there were several meetings between the Macedonian Defense Minister Vlado Buckovski and NATO Secretary General Robertson on the future presence of NATO in Macedonia. At a 15 January 2003 meeting, Buckovski and Robertson agreed that NATO would remain in the Republic of Macedonia with its advisory team, which will focus on defense sector reforms, working parallel to the EU mission.²³⁴

In April 2003, the NATO mission was replaced by an EU armed forces under the name of the Mission Concordia. Therefore, in addition to its political and economic influence and efforts in the Republic of Macedonia, the Union at the end was able to deploy its first-ever military mission in the country. At the end of the difficult path followed by the EU on the issue of common foreign and security policy, there exists an European Armed Force standing in Macedonia replacing the NATO troops. There will be 320-plus troops on peacekeeping duty, based in Skopje, the Macedonian capital, with -initially- a German admiral in overall command and a French general in operation control.²³⁵ But from the EU's point of view the important thing is less what the soldiers are doing or who commands them than the fact that they will be wearing the Union's badge, 12 yellow stars on a blue background, on their uniforms.²³⁶

However, the idea of having the military uniform of the Union is not the same thing with securing Europe. Peacemaking is different from having an armed force in a place. As Gartner argues, a good soldier is not necessarily a good peacekeeper, since the peacekeeper is a certain type of soldier, with the qualities to perform police

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ "Going Military", Economist, 336:8318, 5 April 2003.

²³⁶ Ibid.

tasks, conduct civil affairs operation, speak multiple languages and be trained in some psychology.²³⁷

Realizing a dream finally, the Union managed to behave as a complete political actor, owning political, economic and military mechanisms. However, the military mission is only a prototype of an undeveloped army, executing duties in a region, which has been secured and stabilized to a great extent as a result of NATO presence. Thus the EU mission in the country is just a test, result of which will explain whether the Union is able to maintain an armed force successfully or not.

²³⁷ Heinz Gartner, "European Security, the Transatlantic Link, and Crisis Management", (ed.) Heinz Gartner, Europe's New Security Challenges, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2001, p.141.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Due to the wind of changes that took place in Europe in early 1990s, the Community could not establish a well-constructed policy to implement in the South East Europe. The absence of the political mechanisms, most importantly foreign policy making and security mechanisms, the Union fell short of producing policies of halting the ethnic wars in former Yugoslav territory. It was just after the Maastricht Treaty, which transformed the Union into a political actor that the Union was able to think of some common foreign and security policies for the benefit of the crisis-management capabilities.

With the collapse of the bipolar world system in 1990s, East Europe entered into the transition and integration process. In this context the conditionality, brought mainly by the European Union, paved the way for the reconfiguration of the region. As a result of the Copenhagen criteria, which draws the conditions of membership into the Union, East Europe was divided into sub-regions of East Central Europe, South East Europe and the Western Balkans. With these criteria, the Union privileged the East Central European countries, namely Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, whereas it constructed an invisible wall against the countries of the Western Balkans. Because of the fear of importing instability from the region, the Union followed a policy of neither total exclusion, nor rapid integration in the Western Balkans.²³⁸ The Union pleased with the minimum stability in the region.²³⁹ Therefore, it did not establish a well-constructed policy towards the region. It tried to contain the warfare in the region without putting sufficient emphasize on the

²³⁸ Türkeş and Gökgöz, op.cit, p.33.

²³⁹ Ibid.

permanent settlement of the regional disputes. Thus, the Union suffered from the lack of a strategic assessment which resulted in unproductive outcomes for the region.²⁴⁰ However, the Kosovo War indicated that, the region needed a deeper framework. With the introduction of the Stability Pact, the Union drew a framework for regional cooperation. Moreover, as the September 11 events led to the gradual withdrawal of the American existence in the region, the Union was left with the responsibility in the region. Thus, it took the initiative in the region, in its own backyard. Consequently, in the immediate post-September 11 international atmosphere, the EU accelerated the integration process of regional countries through the SAP, while slowing down the regional integration process, created by the Stability Pact. Through the SAP mechanism, the EU betrayed its own brainchild, the Stability Pact.²⁴¹ Within this context, the Union, preferred to establish bilateral relations with those states that are relatively better equipped to meet its conditions.²⁴² The Republic of Macedonia is the country with which the Union established such bilateral relations through the SAA. Especially after the 2001 crisis, the Union increased its attention towards this country.

Having experienced the last war in the history of the post-Cold War Balkans, the Macedonian Republic has been back to its fragile stable position following the Ohrid Agreement. The fourth election in country held on 15 September 2002 gave the first signal of a democratic and reconciliatory Macedonian Republic. SDSM and LDP made up the coalition beating VMRO. Besides, Democratic Union for Integration DUI, established by Ali Ahmeti, who was the former rebel leader heading the NLA emerged as the Albanian partner of the government having sixteen seats in the parliament. On 1 November 2002, Guns and Roses government was approved by the parliament; Ahmeti's NLA 'guns' on the one hand and Crvenkovski's Social Democrat 'roses' on the other. The DUI was given the post of Deputy Prime Minister and became responsible for Health, Education, Justice and Transportation and Communication Ministries. The demands of DUI for obtaining the post of Defense,

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p.36

²⁴¹ Ibid, p.34.

²⁴² Ibid, p.35.

Interior or Foreign Minister notwithstanding, the negotiations for the coalition was concluded with the mediation of EU and the United States. Alain Le Roy of the Union and Ambassador Lawrence Buttler of the United States found a solution suggesting to DUI that its demands were too ambitious, given the sixteen seats out of the 120-seat parliament and the SDSM's strong position.²⁴³

As the tides calmed down in the Republic of Macedonia, the region and the country entered into relatively a peaceful period. Furthermore, in June 2001, the Macedonian government announced that it recognizes People's Republic of China as the sole representative of Chinese people and eliminated the problems with the UN Security Council as China would no more use its veto power against the Republic of Macedonia.

Although the Union acted as late as it did in other cases, with the American support, it managed to halt the conflict in relatively a shorter time. In addition, the deployment of the Mission Concordia gave it the responsibility as the sole political determiner in the country. In the post-Ohrid period the Union defined the main objectives in the Republic of Macedonia as follows:

1. the EU aims to support the achievements to date in the field of democracy by strengthening the institutional and administrative capacity of the state and of the actors of the civil society.
2. the EU aims to assist the government at central and local level to facilitate the process of economic and social transformation towards a market economy.
3. the EU aims to bring the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia closer to EU standards and principles, and to assist the country in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process.
4. the EU aims to support the country in its efforts to give full implementation to the Framework Agreement.²⁴⁴

The Republic of Macedonia is the only country for which the Union has drawn a framework including the above main objectives. Because of the weakness of the Macedonian Republic and the fact that it has been dependent on the external aid,

²⁴³ "Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency: A New Security Approach for NATO and the EU", ICG Balkans Report No 135, 15 November 2002, p.2.

the Union has been able to pursue the principles of its regional policy at the state level. The SAP process designed as a regional mechanism for the Western Balkans has found ground to grow on the soil of the Republic of Macedonia. Moreover as the most stable country of the region, armed forces of the Union have been tried in this country. Thus, Macedonian Republic constitutes a model country for the rest of Western Balkans in terms of the relations with the Union. Especially after the fourth enlargement of the Union, the Western Balkans becomes the focal point of the European Union. Thus the Republic of Macedonia is a field study for the Union to experiment the viability of its regional scheme at state level. As far as the Macedonian Republic is concerned, it seems that the SAP works for the time being. The implementation of SAA coming into force in April 2004 not only brings the country closer to the Union but also enables the Union to assess the applicability of the Agreement in specific conditions. Having been the least problematic country, which is under the tight control of the Union, the Republic of Macedonia has been the most appropriate country to develop and deepen the SAP. However, the success of the SAP both in Macedonia and in the Western Balkans remains as a question mark in the minds, until the Union makes a solid strategic assessment for the region.

²⁴⁴ http://europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/fyrom/index.htm, accessed on 10 May 2004.

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