EVALUATING COSMOPOLITANISM IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD:
A CASE STUDY OF TURKISH TOP MANAGERS
IN A MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION

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ABSTRACT

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With the spreading of globalization during 1980s, discourses about demise of nation states and relevance of post-national forms of institutions for contemporary politics have been widely accepted in social sciences. Cosmopolitanism, with its suggestions of extending democracy and citizenship beyond national boundaries, being world citizens, and creating universal political institutions has been considered as the project in line with these supposed conditions of globalization. This study evaluates theories in social sciences that are in favor of cosmopolitanism as a political project appropriate for the globalized world. It is argued that supporting disappearance of national borders and emergence of world citizenship is talking from the perspective of an upper class minority who have necessary resources to travel to other countries and who don't experience visa difficulties.

It is claimed by some social theorists that a transnational capitalist class started to emerge. Although members of this class live in separate countries, they have common interests and similar lifestyles with each other much more than they have with their fellow nationals. These people regard themselves as world

citizens, as they have a high access to foreign countries and share common lifestyles with foreigners. In this study, in the case of Turkish high level managers in a multinational corporation, it is aimed to describe the life style characteristics of these managers, considering the life style conceptualization of Bourdieu, and to understand to what extent these managers can be regarded as a part of transnational capitalist class, and whether they perceive themselves as world citizens.

Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, transnational capitalist class, Bourdieu, globalization, multinational corporation.

ÖZ

KÜRESELLEŞEN DÜNYADA KOZMOPOLİTANİZMİ DEĞERLENDİRMEK: ÇOKULUSLU BİR ŞİRKETTE ÇALIŞAN ÜST DÜZEY TÜRK YÖNETİCİLER

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1980'li yıllarda küreselleşmenin yayılmasıyla birlikte ulus-devletlerin zayıfladığı ve günümüz siyasetinde ulus-ötesi kurumların geçerli olduğu argümanları sosyal bilimlerde yaygınlık kazandı. Demokrasi ve vatandaşlığı ulusal sınırların ötesine genişletmek, dünya vatandaşı olmak ve evrensel siyasal kurumlar oluşturmak gibi öneriler getiren kozmopolitanlık, küreselleşmenin bu varsayılan koşullarına uygun olan bir proje olarak kabul gördü. Bu çalışma, sosyal bilimlerde kozmopolitanlığı küreselleşen dünyaya uygun siyasi bir proje olarak gören teorilerle ilgili bir değerlendirme yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Burada, ulus-devlet sınırlarının ortadan kalktığı ve dünya vatandaşlığının ortaya çıkmaya başladığını savunmanın farklı ülkelere gidebilecek kaynaklara sahip olan ve vize problemleri yaşamayan üst-sınıf bir azınlığın bakış açısından konuşmak olduğu iddia edilmektedir.

Bazı sosyal bilimciler ulus-ötesi bir kapitalist sınıfın ortaya çıkmaya başladığından bahsetmektedirler. Buna gore farklı ülkelerde yaşamalarına rağmen bu sınıfın üyelerinin hem yaşam tarzı hem de ortak çıkarlar açısından birbirleriyle kendi vatandaşlarına göre çok daha fazla ortak yönleri

bulunmaktadır. Bu insanlar, kolaylıkla yurtdışına çıkabildikleri ve farklı ülkelerden insanlarla ortaklıkları olduğu için dünya vatandaşı olduklarını düşünmektedirler. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye'de çokuluslu bir şirkette çalışan üst-düzey yöneticilerin yaşam tarzı Bourdieu'nun yaşam-tarzı kavramsallaştırması kullanılarak incelenmekte ve bu yöneticilerin ulus-ötesi kapitalist bir sınıfın ne ölçüde parçası oldukları ve kendilerini ne ölçüde dünya vatandaşı hissettikleri sorularına yanıt aranmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kozmopolitanlık, ulus-ötesi kapitalist sınıf, Bourdieu, küreselleşme, çok-uluslu şirket

To Serkan

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For portraying the contemporary political, economic and social conditions of the world, no other concept has been as widely used as globalization. It has been a key word for describing many of the changes that took place especially within the last twenty years. Although many people attach a variety of different meanings to the term, basically it refers to the decreasing importance of national boundaries, so that changes in one part of the world can have significant effects on the lives of individuals and communities in other parts of the world. Despite the fact that globalization has prospered through advances in technology and economic transactions, its effects have also been felt in social and cultural areas to a large extent.

In several theoretical explanations about globalization, the historical process behind the emergence of globalization and the active participation of political actors in the emergence of this process are ignored. Also, the prevalent power dynamics, and inequalities within and among countries are not taken into consideration. Globalization is represented as an inevitable process that occurred without the efforts of any parties and that homogenizes the whole world, without creating any centers or hegemons. In the contemporary, globalized world, many theorists see the emerging opportunities for the end of divisions into separate national identities or citizenships and for the formation of a world citizenship. The ideas of limiting national politics and developing transnational political institutions are supported. A portray of current condition is created in which we live in a global world without centers, both economically and socially, without power relations, without the ones who

benefit from this process and ones who suffer, and a world in which nation states are becoming out-dated and only legitimate mechanisms of politics can be at the transnational level.

If we take into consideration the historical developments and evaluate globalization within this context, we will see that what we call globalization is primarily the globalization of capital or the neoliberal globalization. After the crises of 1970s in the Western world, when oil price shocks and rising unemployment were experienced, welfare state started to lose support, and ungovernability of markets and competitiveness have become the dominant ideas. Thus, globalization has not taken form as a natural result of capitalism but rather through efforts to overcome the negative consequences of crises. Neoliberalism has been the dominant ideology, persuading the people in the ineffectiveness of the states and the necessity of deregulation, in favor of markets. Economic globalization has not come into existence as a result of inevitable processes, but supported by neoliberal theorists and politicians. The integration of the Third World countries to this process also took place mainly by the combined actions of international financial institutions, IMF and World Bank, and upper classes in these countries, who will benefit from this process. Through their combined efforts, neoliberalism also spread in these countries.

Globalization is a process whose primary actors are the powerful centers of Europe, Japan and North America, and multinational corporations in these centers. A great proportion of international trade takes place among these centers and some newly industrializing countries, and the largest part of global economic transactions occurs as a result of the aims of multinational corporations to decrease their costs created by national regulations. Not only the people who are the owners of these corporations but also the professional managers who work in them now compose a transnational capitalist class which is increasingly organized on a world scale and this class has interests in supporting both the process and also the rhetoric of globalization. The members of this class, no matter in which country they live, have common

backgrounds in terms of education, a common culture, life style and habits. These privileged people are characterized as cosmopolitans since they have a high access to foreign countries. However, the supposed cosmopolitanism of this class is in fact nothing more than their life style or their culture: having sufficient funds to travel to other parts of the world, not experiencing difficulties in getting visas as a result of their positions and having the opportunity to meet people from various different countries. Yet, the people with whom they spend their time in these countries are usually from the same class with them; traveling all over the world does not lead to meeting different realities from theirs and acquiring an understanding of the conditions of the Other. Regardless of the countries they travel to, they have been together with people who are similar in terms of education, occupation, consumption patterns, or in other words life styles with them. The members of this emerging transnational class come together with their counterparts from the other countries in many occasions which lead to the formation of an awareness of their common interests with these people.

When the discourses about disappearance of borders, weakening of nation states, and legitimacy and dominance of post-national forms become widespread, cosmopolitanism is presented as the political project suitable for the contemporary period. However, claiming that borders are disappearing is speaking from the perspective of the upper class people who can travel across countries without having financial or visa difficulties. Therefore, it can be argued that social scientists, most of whom are Western, offer cosmopolitanism as the political project appropriate for the contemporary period by ignoring the current social, political and economic inequalities experienced throughout the world. By doing it, they not only present a project useless for the majority of people but also produce a rhetoric that functions as complementary to capital's global interests. As Spivak argues in her influential essay, "…Western intellectual production is, in many ways, complicit with Western international economic interests." (Spivak, 1985, p.271) and cosmopolitanism can be evaluated in the same way.

In my thesis, I will evaluate cosmopolitanism proposed by theoreticians in the social sciences. For doing it, I will explain what is meant by globalization by various theorists and what it brings to different parts of the world and to different classes of people, and will try to demonstrate what cosmopolitanism as a project serves within this process. Arguing that a transnational capitalist class is the main party that benefits from the process of globalization, in a case study of top managers in the Turkish branch of a multinational corporation, I will try to understand to which degree the managers in this group can be regarded as a part of this class in terms of their life style. As this is not a comparative study including researches done both in Turkey and also in foreign countries, it is not possible to make comparisons about every feature of their life styles and tell that they are similar or not. Yet, what I will do is to portray the life style characteristics of this group, to show the extent to which they have access to foreign countries and cultures, and the level of their perception of themselves as a part of the transnational class.

This thesis is composed of seven chapters and the introduction chapter is followed by a chapter on globalization. In this chapter, firstly, different conceptualizations of globalization are considered and the arguments of the theoreticians who accept globalization as a decentered process, a myth, a new stage of capitalism, an ideology, economic polarization, and a new form of imperialism will be explained. Secondly, I will look at the integration of Latin American and other Third World countries to the process of globalization and its impacts on these countries. Lastly, I will talk about mainly the arguments of Robert Cox, Leslie Sklair and John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge about the emergence of a transnational capitalist class as the major party benefiting from the process of globalization and the characteristics of this class.

Third chapter is about cosmopolitanism, and in this chapter, I aim to evaluate what the discussions about cosmopolitanism in social sciences consist of and what they serves in a globalizing world. In this chapter, I review the political and cultural approaches about cosmopolitanism and also explore the critiques

of cosmopolitanism. In the following, fourth chapter, I focus on Turkey's articulation to the process of globalization through liberalization of economy and application of structural adjustment programs, as a part of a more general process including Third World countries. After examining the application of these programs in these countries, I explain how the economic transformation of Turkey was realized in the period after 1980s. As this significant shift in economic policies also created transformations in social and cultural life, and even led to emergence of new values, I discuss the characteristics of social and cultural life in Turkey during 1980s. I explain, through the application of free market rules, how the income and consumption levels of business people and professionals increased rapidly and how they have become similar with their counterparts in other countries of the world through their backgrounds, consumption habits and life styles.

In the fifth chapter, as it is very essential in terms of my arguments about transnational class, before considering the life style of the Turkish managers in the following chapter, I consider various theories about how to conceptualize life style of a certain group. Firstly, I give brief explanations of Marxian class and Weberian status conceptualizations. I suggest that in the late capitalist era, in which non-economical categories such as consumption and status play significant roles in determining groups of people, it is not sufficient to determine classes solely resting on their economical conditions and positions. Therefore, in the fifth chapter, I will explain the theories of Thorstein Veblen, Jean Baudrillard, and Mary Douglas & Baron Isherwood about consumption for demonstrating how the category of consumption is significant for communicating their difference from other social groups. And lastly, Bourdieu's model for the formation of life styles will be explained in detail, as he introduces a multi-dimensional approach including not only economical but also cultural, social, and symbolic capitals and the concept of *habitus* while looking at classes and life styles of these classes. His inclusion of non-economic aspects and introduction of a more complicated method are the main reasons why I use Bourdieu's model for looking at the life style characteristics

of Turkish top level managers, which is the unit of analysis of my research. The sixth chapter is about the case study of Turkish top managers in a multinational corporation. Both the methodological principles of the research applied and also the evaluations of the research results are presented in this chapter. Finally, in chapter seven, conclusions of the thesis are presented.

1.1. Methodology

This thesis consists of both theoretical arguments and a case study related to these arguments. In the theoretical parts, the main aim is to make a critique of arguments supporting cosmopolitanism as a political project. However, before making a critique of cosmopolitanism in social sciences, it is necessary to summarize the arguments of most prominent theoreticians who support cosmopolitanism. In these arguments, it is suggested that as we live in a globalized world, in which nation states lose their power and post-national forms of political institutions emerge, we should extend the scope of democracy and citizenship beyond nation states, and build the institutions and mechanisms for strengthening transnational bonds among people. Therefore, it is clearly seen that emergence of cosmopolitanism as a project appropriate for the contemporary period largely rests on emergence of globalization. For evaluating cosmopolitanism, first it is necessary to consider what is meant by globalization and to question the basic suppositions about globalization. This is why this thesis begins with a chapter on globalization, consisting of main arguments about the characteristics and consequences of it. The emphasis is on the critical theories about globalization which question the dominant claims about globalization, such as the disappearance of nation state borders and decreasing power of nation states in economical and political matters, relevance of post-national institutions for politics, etc. It is argued that globalization has taken place with the active participation of the states, as also exemplified in the case of Latin America, and in the contemporary world in which there are significant differences among nations in terms of economical and political power, nation states are still essential political institutions for the majority of people.

Making a critique of globalization gives important tools for criticizing cosmopolitanism. After recognizing the power inequalities in the world and necessity of nation states for politics, supporting cosmopolitanism as an appropriate political project is not possible. Then, we can question what the theories supporting cosmopolitanism serve in the contemporary world. There are two claims I make about cosmopolitanism here. The first one is that in a world in which majority of the people cannot transcend borders because of insufficient material resources or experience difficulties in getting visas, claiming the disappearance of state borders is talking from the perspective of those privileged people who have the necessary resources and who can get visas easily. Secondly, I argue that social theorists, by suggesting cosmopolitanism as a political project, produce a rhetoric which is in parallel with the corporate citizenship discourse of the multinational corporations, so they produce a social theory that is in line with the interests of the global capital.

I will also discuss that globalization has different consequences for different parts of societies, having negative results for the majority of the people while a minority that is increasingly transcending the borders is benefiting from it. Using Leslie Sklair's conceptualization, I call this privileged, transnational group as the transnational capitalist class. As explained both in Leslie Sklair's and Adrian Wooldridge& John Micklethwait's theories, the members of this class are the corporate executives working in multinational corporations, globalizing professionals and bureaucrats, and they increasingly have similar life styles. They can easily go to different countries and speak the same language with their foreign counterparts. I argue that having a high access to foreign countries, speaking the same language with foreigners and having similar life styles with them lead these people to perceive themselves as world citizens. The social theorists who support cosmopolitanism produce a rhetoric that represents the life style of these privileged people and portray the contemporary conditions of the world as if all the people can experience the same privileges that the members of this transnational capitalist class have.

In order to dwell on life style similarities, it is necessary to clarify what life style refers to. Thus, this thesis includes a chapter on classes and life styles. In this chapter, it is explained that although the concept of class brings useful insights to us about the economical base the social groups emerge from, in the contemporary era in which non-economic categories play a significant role in distinguishing different social groups, it would be insufficient to make an analysis that solely rests on economic classes. I explain Bourdieu's life style conceptualization in detail and use that conceptualization in my analysis of the case study as it makes it possible to take into account non-economic categories.

In my case study of top managers in the Turkish branch of X Corporation, which is a multinational corporation, I look at the life style characteristics of these managers in terms of the four capitals suggested by Bourdieu and try to demonstrate the similarities between their life style and the life style characteristics indicated by Sklair and Micklethwait & Wooldridge. Both in terms of these similarities and also their perceptions about globalization, their similarities and mutual interests with the foreigners, I try to understand to which degree they can be accepted as a part of the transnational capitalist class. I also try to see whether and to which degree they regard themselves as world citizens and how this world citizenship can be evaluated.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBALIZATION

Especially beginning from 1980s, globalization has been one of the most widely used concepts for portraying the contemporary condition of societies both in popular writings and in the social sciences. Yet, there are numerous different ways in which the concept is used and it lacks a precise definition. Problems emerge when these different conceptions of globalization which are used for different fields are regarded as competing conceptualizations. In many discussions about globalization, facts are presupposed instead of being proved empirically or by historical facts, and further arguments rest on these presuppositions which lead us to have descriptions of current condition that are far from the condition we live. Moreover, many theories about globalization may be considered as functioning as 'self-fulfilling prophecies', giving way to the establishment of the very facts that they talk about.

2.1. Different Conceptualizations of Globalization

In this chapter, firstly, different conceptualizations of globalization will be considered. The emphasis will especially be on the critical approaches about globalization. The arguments regarding globalization as a myth, as the process of expansion of capitalism, as a new phase of imperialism, as a course creating economic polarization both within and among societies, and giving harm especially to the peoples of Third World countries will be considered. It will be supported that what we call globalization is to a large extent the globalization of capital or the neo-liberal globalization. As a process, it is not decentered, without having dominant countries as some theorists, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, argue. On the contrary, it has its centers and hegemons. As also argued by Leslie Sklair, a new class is emerging that is crossing the

borders, having its members from different countries of the world. This is the transnational capitalist class and has benefited to a large extent from the transformation of capitalism into a globalizing process. While this class, only a minority, is benefiting from globalization, the majority of the world population is damaged by the effects of it.

2.1.1. Globalization: Decentered?

The central idea behind globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be solved at the level of nation states; that is in terms of separate countries and their international relations. It is supported that we live in a period in which social life is mostly determined by global processes. According to the strong version of this view, national cultures, economies and borders are dissolving. Economic globalization is said to be emerging, and policies of national economic management are increasingly regarded as outdated. It is argued that the world economy is shaped by market forces that are uncontrollable and the 'truly' transnational corporations which have no attachment to a particular nation state are the major economic actors. These corporations are located in those places that are most appropriate for their market advantage (Held, 1999, p.3-6).

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their influential work, *The Empire*, argue that we experience the 'irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges'. They suggest that with the development of global market and global circuits of production, we also see the materialization of a global order or a new form of sovereignty. Together with the processes of globalization, sovereignty of nation states has weakened. Now, the money, technology, people, and goods move easily across national borders and the nation state has less power to regulate these flows. This decline in the sovereignty of nation states has led to the creation of a new sovereignty, which they call the Empire. Empire does not refer to imperialism. Different from imperialism, Empire has no territorial center of power and does not depend on

fixed boundaries. The divisions among three Worlds (First, Second, and Third) have been blurred.

> It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm with its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p.xii).

2.1.2. Globalization as Myth

Contrary to Hardt and Negri, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson consider globalization, to a large extent, as a myth and criticize some of the main assumptions about globalization. They argue that in some respects, today's international economy is less open and integrated than the economy between 1870 and 1914. "The present highly internationalized economy is not unprecedented: it is one of a number of distinct conjunctures or states of the international economy that have existed since an economy based on modern industrial technology began to be generalized from the 1860s." (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p.2) Secondly, they argue that real transnational corporations are very rare. Rather than being transnational, most of the companies are nationally based and they trade multinationally while having their core operations located within the boundaries of certain nation states. Thirdly, they suggest that we do not experience a shift of investment and employment from the advanced countries to the countries of the Third World. Excluding some of the newly industrializing countries, Third World does not have a big share in the total investments and trade of the world. Foreign direct investment is mainly concentrated in the advanced, industrialized countries. Fourth, the world economy is far from being global according to them. Trade, investment and financial flows largely take place among the 'triad' of Europe, Japan and North America. And lastly, they argue, these economic centers have the power to apply pressures over financial markets. Thus, it is not accurate to say that markets are uncontrollable. "...the current scope and objectives of economic governance are limited by the divergent interests of the great powers and the economic doctrines prevalent among their elites." (ibid., p.3)

Hirst and Thompson also comment on how the myth of globalization of economy was established. They think that it is necessary to begin by considering the end of the post-1945 era with the turbulence of 1972-1973, during which important changes happened. These changes closed a period of economic growth and full employment in the industrialized countries, which were achieved by national state intervention and 'a managed multilateral regime for trade and monetary policy under US hegemony'. So, what were these changes? Firstly, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the OPEC oil crisis caused volatility in the major economies during 1970s and 1980s. The rapid rise in the inflation rates in the industrialized countries caused by domestic policy failures, the effect of the involvement of the US in the Vietnam War and the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979 have been influential in creating this volatility and in the change of previous policies. Secondly, in this period, the financial institutions and manufacturers tried to find additional markets and wider regions for investment to compensate for domestic uncertainty. This gave way to large scale bank lending to the Third World and increasing foreign trade of developed countries (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p.4-5).

Thirdly, by market deregulation and annulment of exchange controls in 1970s and 1980s, the internationalization of financial markets was accelerated. The fourth important incidence according to Hirst and Thompson was that there was a tendency in Britain and the US towards de-industrialization and accelerating long-term unemployment. The fear from competition especially from Japan was increasing. A couple of newly industrializing countries developed rapidly in the Third World and they penetrated into First World markets. And lastly, the shift from mass production to more flexible production methods and from a world in which national corporations are the dominant economic agents to one with multinational corporations have been important changes that took place in the same period (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p.5-6).

These changes disturbed significantly the successes and security of the post-1945 period in the advanced countries. Decreasing national control, increasing uncertainty about economics and significant institutional changes have been surprises for the ones who believed that poverty, unemployment and economic cycles could be kept under control in a market economy. During 1950s and 1960s, it was believed that a particular capitalism without losers will be created through national governments; in 1980s and 1990s, on the contrary, there has been a consensus in that markets are uncontrollable and it was necessary to be as competitive as possible for both the individuals and the nations. The understanding of world economy as ungovernable can be accepted as a response to the end of Keynesian expectations.

> Globalization is a myth suitable for a world without illusions, but it is also one that robs us of hope. Global markets are dominant and they face no threat from any viable contrary political project, for it is held that Western social democracy and the socialism of the Soviet bloc are both finished...One can only call the political impact of globalization the pathology of over-diminished expectations (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p.6).

According to Hirst and Thompson, many of the analysts and politicians exaggerated the dominance of markets and their ungovernability, going beyond the existing evidence. The changes that were explained above, although had important and large scale effects, were conjunctural and were in part policy driven.

> The period of extreme volatility and turbulence did not last for long. The totally floating rate monetary regime was replaced by partial regularization through the creation of the EMS in 1979 and the Louvre and Plaza accords between the G7 advanced industrial countries in the 1980s. The old post-1945 multilateral order was not restored, but a drift into uncontrolled market forces on the one hand, or the negative competition between the major trading blocs on the other, was prevented (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p.15).

As I stated at the beginning, Hirst and Thompson accept globalization as a myth; a myth which overstates the degree of the people's helplessness faced with contemporary economic conditions. "...if economic relations are more

governable...than many contemporary analysts suppose, then we should explore the possible scale and scope of that governance." (ibid., p.6)

Hirst and Thompson made a distinction between an open international economy and a globalized economy. The first one refers to an economy which is mainly determined by the exchanges between national economies and in which the issues such as the competitive performance of firms and sectors are fundamentally tied to the processes taking place at the national level. Globalization of an economy, on the other hand, requires the establishment of a new economic structure, not only conjunctural changes towards increasing international trade and investment, while the economic relations remain unchanged to a large extent. Currently, we can talk about the existence of an international rather than a global economy, as "...increasing salience of foreign trade and considerable and growing international flows of capital are not per se evidence of a new and distinct phenomenon called globalization." (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p.7).

2.1.3. Globalization of Capitalism

Leslie Sklair also argues that a clear distinction should be made between the international and global. The first refers to the existing system of nation states, even if it is changing, and the second to the emergence of processes and system of social relations which do not rest on national characteristics or the nation states. Sklair considers Hirst and Thompson's critique of transnational corporations, which is that the so called TNCs are domiciled in the USA, Japan and Europe, trading and investing mainly among themselves, that the world economy is still largely dominated by national corporations and that the global economy is a myth. Sklair thinks that they ignore the fact that many corporations that work outside their home countries regard themselves as developing global strategies. Therefore, he tells, it is not accurate to assume that all US, Japanese and other national TNCs have a national interest. According to him, they do not; they rather represent the interests of the people

who own and control them (Sklair, 1999, p.146-147). This issue will be further explored with reference to Sklair's arguments about transnational capitalist class.

Sklair proposes a model of global system based on transnational practices, which are divided into three spheres: economic, political and cultural-ideological. A major institution typifies each of these practices according to Sklair. The transnational corporation is the primary institution for economic, transnational capitalist class for political and culture-ideology of consumerism for cultural-ideological transnational practices. These three function transforming the world in terms of the global capitalist project (Sklair, 1999, p.157). The transnational capitalist class will be explained in detail in the following parts.

2.1.4. Globalization as Ideology

Alan Scott states that globalization theorists have been concerned about distinguishing globalization from both modernization and imperialism, thinking that globalization should be thought neither as a new phase of modernization nor Westernization. He thinks that globalization theory has been formed by defining itself negatively, avoiding the drawbacks of theories of colonialism, Marxist accounts and modernization theory. According to him, globalization theorists believed that social science should be released from territorial assumptions. In other words, they should get rid of state-centered approaches, go beyond the nation state and stop equating society with nation. Processes of globalization and fragmentation are thought to be complementary, which is a fact that distinguishes globalization from modernization. The world is not moving towards consensus or we are not going from particularism to universalism. "…(G)lobalization is held to be a complex interaction of globalizing and localizing tendencies (so called glocalization), a synthesis of particularistic and universalistic values." (Scott, 1997, p.7)

Scott states that the arguments made about the heterogeneity of global culture are also used about global economy. It is suggested that globalization is taking place in the absence of a cultural or an economic hegemon and that standardization and diversification, unification and fragmentation take place at the same time. Scott criticizes all these arguments claiming that these 'diagnostic approaches' overestimate the power and underestimate the limits of the processes that they talk about and that they ignore the extent to which globalization is a specific project; "…a project that is much more specific than can be captured by the notions of modernity, late or high modernity or postmodernity, which have displaced the now somewhat unfashionable notion of industrial society, but which may have carried over some of its epistemological assumptions." (Scott, 1997, p.8)

Scott, through using Polanyi's analysis, suggests that it is not sufficient to examine globalization only as an outcome of social and economic processes. It should also be seen as an outcome of an idea: the idea of a free market, free from all political and social constraints. In this view, Scott sees globalization as the founding of economic deregulation and decreasing of social costs in the national communities. Deregulation did not emerge as a response to competition but as a way of broadening it into fields that were protected before. Therefore, deregulation undercut states' power to protect themselves and their communities from the social harms of the markets. However, a more significant thing here is that nation states have been the key players in bringing deregulation both internally and externally. Scott considers this as the 'success' of neoliberalism.

> …(C)ontemporary neoliberalism has been successful because it has persuaded many politicians, and perhaps voters also, that the direction of causality runs from economic development to political response and thus presents itself merely as an objective or at least neutral diagnosis rather than as a contributor to the emergence of the very conditions it purports to analyze…one might…characterize deregulation as that disease which purports to be its own cure (Scott, 1997, p.10).

Following Polanyi's line of thinking, Scott talks about the significance of neoliberal political philosophy, almost defining globalization as the new right's

project. Thus, political belief has significance. Globalization is not the natural result of capitalism, but created through 'historically specific institutional forms'. There is both interdependence and competition between markets and states. Neoliberalism changed the balance between the two in favor of markets persuading the political actors that it was a necessity to deregulate the markets. Scott ties this point to Sklair's argument about transnational practices and tells that these practices are made possible through neoliberalism's political project. However, he departs from Sklair's position in that while he accepts that transnational capitalist class has benefited from this process, it is not able to create these conditions by itself (Scott, 1997, p.10).

Scott goes beyond arguing that globalization is a political project but he also claims that it is an unrealizable project. He supports that when the market logic is left to be completely dominant over the logic of social relations, it will wear away the social and political conditions of its own possibility. "(T)he deregulation and the marketization of society produces a series of catastrophes and potentially catastrophic developments which can be addressed in the short to medium term without constraining the market but in the longer run will entail the imposition of limits upon it." (Scott, 1997, p.14) There are not only social catastrophes, but also economic ones. Thus the achievements proposed by neoliberalism for the economy have high costs.

Scott supports Hirst and Thompson's argument that the notion of globalization is a myth but takes this argument further. He asserts that appearing simply as a diagnosis, globalization theory is ideological as an idea that assists social change. What Scott argues is that the globalization theory is part of the globalization process. As an idea that has been unquestioned, the notion of globalization has acquired a life of its own and started to exert power over actors (Scott, 1997, p.16).

2.1.5. Globalization as Economic Polarization

Keith Faulks also agrees with the idea that globalization has acquired a mythical status. There is no clear definition about what globalization refers to and the notion seems to include related, unrelated and even contradictory processes. Globalization has been naturalized and introduced as irresistible by neoliberal governments which support deregulation of economy. The role of political ideology in promoting the virtues of the free market is significant here. "...(E)conomic globalization is not an inevitable set of processes, but has instead been actively promoted by neoliberal theorists and politicians suspicious of state interference in civil society." (Faulks, 1999, p.71) Globalization requires policies that establish the social conditions that are claimed to be the results of the inevitable logic of global capital.

Being in parallel with Hirst and Thompson's arguments, Faulks also makes a differentiation between internationalization and globalization, and states that an increase in the volume of world trade does not mean that globalization has emerged. Many of the facts that are introduced as evidence of globalization demonstrate, for Faulks, that the world's economic activity is highly concentrated. Foreign direct investment, which may be regarded as an essential indicator of globalization, is dominated by a couple of powerful economies. "...(I)n the early 1990s, 70 percent of FDI was by the top five economies of the world." (Faulks, 1999, p.63) The situation is that the economic activity is concentrated by a few multinational corporations, located in a small number of states, which cannot be taken as an evidence of globalization. A big proportion of international trade is among industrialized nations and a few newly industrializing countries. Most of the so called global economic activity can be understood in terms of MNCs' aims of decreasing their costs caused by national regulation and taxation.

The development of free market which is associated with globalization has marginalized many of the economies, increasing the inequality between developed and developing nations. Globalization has given harms to many

regions of the world. The growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) decreased in many parts of the world such as Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Political considerations have also been very effective in the marginalization of Third World economies. Especially in the last years, financial aid going from developed to underdeveloped parts of the world decreased; the public spending is cut by developed countries which are enthusiastic to compete in the new global economy.

> At a meeting of the G8...in May 1998 the debt crisis which cripples many underdeveloped economies, was on the agenda for discussion. Little firm action was taken, however, even to relieve the problem. Such neglect has led to extreme global imbalances and unsustainable levels of indebtedness (Faulks, 1999, p.64).

Faulks argues that all these inequalities demonstrate that it is more accurate to define globalization as economic polarization.

Faulks accepts that world's largest multinational corporations are increasing their economic strength and also political influence. She states that in 1993, multinationals were controlling 70 percent of the world's trade. "The combined sales of the top 350 companies accounted for almost one third of the total Gross National Product (GNP) of the industrialized countries..." (Faulks, 1999, p.65) However, Faulks opposes the notion of transnational corporation which refers to companies interested in increased profitability ignoring national interest, location of their plants, or the origins of their work force, as she thinks that these corporations are not rootless but still dependent upon states. Most of the assets of the multinational corporations are present in their home countries. Also, the culture of many of the multinational corporations is rooted in these countries. The national context prepares the setting for the development of corporate cultures. According to Faulks, MNCs cannot create strong allegiances as states. They cannot provide the stability and regulation that is necessary for economic growth and they still rest on states to manage global change. Although multinationals have influence on the states, this does not

mean that they have uninterrupted control over states or they are fully independent from states (ibid., p.66-67).

2.1.6. Globalization as Imperialism

Masao Miyoshi, contrary to the efforts of the globalization theorists for delinking globalization from colonialism, argues that transnational corporations continue colonialism. He thinks that TNCs homogenize regions while at the same time being outsiders in all those places, being bound only to the 'exclusive clubs' that they belong to. Miyoshi claims that old colonialism acted with reference to nations, ethnicities, and races, while transnational corporatism acts in the name of nationlessness. However, he argues, nation state has been an enabling institution for international enterprises. Miyoshi states that TNCs travel and transfer people, plants, information, technology, money and resources globally, and they both rationalize and apply objectives of colonialism more efficiently. These corporations disregard borders when it is to their advantage and make use of different economic and political conditions among nation states. However, when there arises a need, they can ask for the aid of their home states, especially in the form of military aid. The employees who work in these corporations may be glad about their wages, as they usually earn relatively high. However, TNCs do not bring wealth to the whole population. Although GNP or per capita income may increase, this does not mean an increase of welfare for all the people.

> As the host government represses labor organization and urban industrial centers generate surplus labor, wages can be lowered and inequality can intensify at least temporarily. Authoritarianism is unlikely to diminish. Oppression and exploitation continue. Ours, I submit, is not an age of post-colonialism but of intensified colonialism, even though it is under an unfamiliar guise (Miyoshi, 1996, p.97).

Miyoshi emphasizes that transnational corporations cannot bring progress to humanity. As their reason of existence is maximizing their profits, the living conditions of the people inhabiting in the area where they continue their functions do not have any importance for them. The host governments that are

enthusiastic about attracting TNCs to their countries may be ignorant about workers' conditions or public welfare. Also, Miyoshi argues, although TNCS may be competing in several respects, they act in alliances in the last instance. Miyoshi also talks about the presence of a transnational class, which is self-concerned and inclined to cross-border movement. This class has been rapidly formed and a certain homogeneity emerged among its members. In a world in which consumerism is spreading, brand names acquire wide recognition and commodities are broadly 'invented, transported, promoted, daydreamed over, sold, purchased, consumed and discarded'. Miyoshi tells that they are cultural products of the transnational class, the members of which are the leaders and the role models of the 1990s. The main ability of these people is to communicate with each other (Miyoshi, 1996, p.94). These are points which will be further elaborated in the part about transnational capitalist class.

Samir Amin sees in the contemporary era the beginnings of a third wave of demolition of the world by imperialist expansion. Amin, like Miyoshi, does not see globalization as something distinct from imperialism. The first phase, according to Amin, included the conquest of the Americas through the destruction of Indian civilizations and the total genocide on which Unites States has been built. The second phase was based on industrial revolution, manifesting itself in colonial subjection of Asia and Africa. Now this third phase is emerging by the collapse of the Soviet system and the regimes of populist nationalism in the Third World. He thinks that the aims of the capital haven't changed very much: control of the expansion of markets and the reserves in the periphery. The difference is that they are realized in new conditions which are really different from the ones that were dominant in the previous phase of imperialism. The ideological discourse has been developed for taking the assent of the peoples of the United States, Western Europe and Japan, which are the central power centers of the world and this discourse is now established on the 'duty to intervene'. This 'duty' is justified by the defense of democracy, rights of people and humanitarianism. Especially the US, is applying a strategy to guarantee its hegemony by demonstrating its

military power, which also leads the other two power centers to participate (Amin, 2001, p.4).

Amin argues that American ideology introduces its imperialist project under the guise of 'the historic mission of the United States'. American hegemony is presented as bringing progress to the peoples of the East. American hegemony, universal peace, democracy and material progress are united as inseparable. The people in the West are made to believe that as the US and European countries are democratic, their governments do not apply undemocratic or unjust practices. However, what they forget is, states Amin, the influence of the interests of the capital. Politics is converged with or subordinated to economics and it loses its autonomy (Amin, 2001, p.5-6).

Frederic Jameson, while discussing globalization at the political level, in parallel with Amin, talks about it as a new version of imperialism. According to him, the first version was that of pre-First World War colonialist order, which was exercised by some European countries, the US and Japan. This first one was replaced by Cold War form after the Second World War and decolonization, mainly led by the US, however still involving a few European powers. Using Samuel Huntington's explanation, Jameson tells that now, at the third stage, United States exercises a strategy with three parts: "...nuclear weapons for the US alone; human rights and American-style electoral democracy; and...limits to immigration and free flow of labor." (Jameson, 2000, p.50) Jameson, himself, adds a fourth issue here, which is the propagation of free market across the globe. This third stage of imperialism only includes the US, with maybe the UK as a 'subordinated satellite', playing the role of 'world's policemen' and imposing their rule through interventions in many parts of the world.

Jameson thinks that it is significant to consider the issue of nationalism while talking about globalization as a new kind of imperialism. He states that nationalism as an internal political program is considered related not to

financial self interests or will to power, not something technological, economic or political, but rather to something cultural. Jameson tells that the US thinks it is always nationalist to resist US globalization and that everyone should consider US interests as being universal ones. He asks the significant question of whether this is only a struggle between various nationalisms, US global interests representing the American one. He emphasizes that it is necessary to make a distinction between nationalism as such and the anti-US imperialism. According to him, the latter should be a part of any 'self-respecting nationalism'. Resistance to US imperialism can be regarded as opposition to the whole system or to globalization. He adds that today, nation state is the only sound terrain for political struggle (Jameson, 2000, p.65).

Another proponent of the idea that globalization is a new form of imperialism is Hugo Radice. He argues that this point of view has the advantage of pointing out to the characteristics of global capitalism which, especially after the collapse of Soviet system, give harm to the world's workers and peasants. He thinks that they are subordinated to capital, especially within the global corporations most of which are located in the developed countries of the world. The states of these people have been restructured, deregulated and privatized under the control of Bretton Woods institutions and in compliance with a model which originates from and benefits the 'Northern ruling classes' (Radice, 2001, p.8-9).

According to Radice what is new about the contemporary period is that capitalism can only be thought as global capitalism. Nation state cannot be regarded as a coherent social order in itself any more. It is continuously reproduced by the economic and political acts of citizens, state, firms and NGOs. However, he states, this is the crisis of a particular type of state, which was relevant for the period from 1870 to 1970. Now, by the increase of transnational public institutions, which are to a large extent involved in the realization of state functions, an internationalization of state has occurred, conforming to the internationalization of capital. He thinks that during old

imperialism, peripheral states were annexed through colonialization or were forced by unequal bargaining with foreign capital. Now, these states are included in the inter-state order and they participate in it formally as equal members.

> The peripheral state's dynamic role in the period from 1945 to 1982...eventually plays the same role in the primitive accumulation of global capital as the state played in the 'early late development' of capitalism that challenged Britain's initial supremacy in the late 19th century: in particular, the creation of a free labor force and the removal of legal and cultural constraints on the accumulation of capital. At a more concrete level, the pervasive 'failures' of the state, and the proliferation of comprador capitalists throughout the less developed world, represent the successful completion of this phase of primitive global accumulation (Radice, 2001, p.9).

Radice argues that globalization is in reality the globalization of capitalism. The current condition does not include a challenge by world markets to the state, but rather is that the increasing internationalization of capital is supported by the internationalization of state. This shift gives harm to anti-capitalist strategy of 'progressive nationalism' which has been to a certain extent achieved by the Keynesian welfare state and post-colonial development state after 1945 (Radice, 2001, p.11).

2.2. What Globalization Brings to Latin America (and to the Third World)

Asa Cristina Laurell studies what globalization means for Latin America. Most of the things she argues about Latin America can be considered as relevant for Third World countries such as Turkey. She states that the most important aspect of globalization in Latin America is the establishment of a new economy with the liberalization of flow of financial and industrial capital and the increasing control of the movement of labor from South to the North. This does not mean that there is an uncontrollable global market dominated by free competition and transnational corporations. It is rather related to the rise of three economic zones, which are European Union, NAFTA and Japan. Also, the US has been the military hegemony and the dollar is the main means of international payment. This new form of world economy implies a new international relation of power, which took shape by the economic crisis of 1970s and 1980s, and the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European socialism.

The conditions of crisis made it possible for the New Right to apply neoliberal project on a world scale. Laurell accepts globalization as a brand that refers to the political process of reorganization of the economy and social relations (Laurell, 2000, p.306-307).

Laurell explains that this new economy has significant effects on Latin America:

> ...it is politically divided and confined within the orbit of the USA; it is a victim of the induced debt crisis of the 1980s; pressured by international financial agencies to adopt prescribes adjustments; and fractured by inequality and social exclusion (Laurell, 2000, p.307).

The most important reason of these effects has been the acceptance of two arguments without questioning, which are that the only way for prospering under the conditions of globalization is to be competitive at any cost and that economic growth can only be achieved through exports. Acceptance of these ideas has also meant the acceptance of neoliberalism and its applications. As a result, in most of the countries of the region, structural adjustment programs have been applied by the imposition of the governments and international financial agencies for supporting a new type of accumulation resting on the export of manufactured products. "Those policies are both caused by and a condition for a specific form of globalization dominated by the interests of large multilateral corporations and financial groups that expresses new international as well as national power relations." (Laurell, 2000, p.307)

The implementation of these policies ignoring the asymmetry between Latin American countries and the three economic powers created many problems. National governments in the region left the instruments that are essential for protecting national economies, production and employment. At the same time, their international bargaining power has also decreased. Liberalization and being dependent on foreign capital for keeping the balance of payments have caused their economies to be highly vulnerable to financial speculation. As there hasn't been a transition period for strengthening the productive structures

of the countries, this gave way to the demolition of industrial and agricultural enterprises and jobs. The economic growth which was vulnerable and unstable has occurred in the export sector that employs little labor and that is primarily dominated by multinational corporations. The policies applied to establish the new type of accumulation did not contribute to national general interest and also led to an unstable and inequitable economic growth (Laurell, 2000, p.307-308).

Structural adjustment programs were mostly economic programs. However, they also required a significant reform of the state, which constitutes another part of reorganization of Latin America in line with neoliberal premises. These programs brought packages of policies which were significantly uniform for the countries of the region. They included a phase of stabilization and a phase of structural change, comprising "...liberalization of trade and capital flows, privatization of public industrial and service enterprises, a financial reform, regressive tax reform, deregulation of labor relations, a new model of social protection, and administrative reform to introduce market forces in the public sector..." (Laurell, 2000, p.309) The policies had negative effects on the distribution of income and wealth, employment and wages, public benefits and services. Poverty increased in these countries and social welfare has been destroyed. Income inequalities has risen to enormous levels. Laurell asserts that this is not an undesirable side-effect; in contrary the riches are even enriched more to increase saving and investment. These are what globalization brings to Latin America, and also to many other Third World countries.

In many of the theories indicated above, it is argued that globalization does not bring prosperity to the majority of the people. On the contrary, especially beginning from 1970s, we experience decreases in social benefits leading to inequalities within nations and increasing levels of poverty, and also increasing levels of inequality among the nations. However, there are also the ones who benefit from this process. Globalization is mainly the globalization of capitalism and capitalist class, now organized on a world scale, has interests in

supporting both the process and the rhetoric of globalization. Therefore, the subject of the next section is this transnational capitalist class.

2.3. Transnational Capitalist Class

As discussed in the chapter about classes and life styles, social class is one of the most important categories in sociology. While it is argued by some writers that class analysis is losing its relevance, there are also others who insisted on its invaluable contributions to the understanding of societies. With the idea that rather than losing its analytical power, class analysis gains new grounds and importance with globalization, in this part the discussions on the formation of a transnational capitalist class will be considered.

Robert Cox regards dominant social groups and lists them hierarchically as those who control big corporations operating on a world scale, those who control nation-based enterprises and industrial groups and locally based petty capitalists. Focusing on the first group, he states that this group has acquired a distinctive class consciousness and although they do not identify themselves as such, they can be called as a transnational managerial class. Although there are existing rivalries among these capitalists, still there is an awareness in them of a common concern to maintain the system that makes it possible for the class to be dominant. Cox claims that various institutions such as the Trilateral Commission, OECD, IMF, and World Bank have articulated strategies for this concern. Also, business schools and international management training programs socialize new entrants to the values, life styles, language in the sense of shared concepts and symbols and business practices of the class. The culture of this class is specifically American and has been spread from a US base. This culture homogenizes the outlook and behavior of the members of the globally dominant group in certain ways that differentiate them from the cultures of national elite groups (Cox, 1987, p.358-359).

According to Cox, although transnational managerial class includes managerial cadres of multinational corporations, it is not limited to them. It also comprises

of public officials in national and international agencies dealing with economic management, and also experts and specialists who are connected with the maintenance of world economy (management consultants, business educators, organizational psychologists, electronics operators, lawyers dealing with international business deals) (Cox, 1987, p.360).

Leslie Sklair thinks that an emerging transnational class transformed capitalism into a globalizing project. As also explained in the previous part, Sklair uses 'transnational' for pointing out to those processes, forces and institutions which cross borders and do not receive their power and authority from the state. He takes as the most important transnational forces the transnational corporations, the transnational capitalist class and the culture ideology of consumerism. The members of the transnational capitalist class derive their power and authority from the corporations they own and control (Sklair, 2001, p.2)

Sklair states that large companies are widely accepted as global corporations but that it is more accurate to use the term global in referring to the goals to which the processes of globalization are leading. Sklair thinks that the most significant of these goals are the establishment of a borderless global economy, denationalization of all the corporate procedures and activities, and the demolition of economic nationalism. It is argued by the ideologues of globalization that these are essential goals for the TNCs to provide prosperity to the people. Sklair asserts that none of them has been achieved yet or will be achieved in the near future. However, he states, it is clear that most of the TNCs are globalizing in important respects and the term global economy can be used to typify the economy dominated by these corporations. According to Sklair, transnational capitalist class is the major driver of globalizing practices and the leading force in the establishment of a global capitalist economy. This class is in the process of formation and it pursues people and resources of the world for its aim of increasing its private profit and accumulation. This class consists of corporate executives, globalizing bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing professionals and consumerist elites (Sklair, 2001, p.2-3).

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Sklair's theory proposes that dominant forces of global capitalism are also the dominant forces in the global system. TNC is the dominant institutional form of economic sphere, transnational capitalist class is that of the political and culture-ideology of consumerism is that of culture ideology spheres. He argues that the material interests of the people who dominate the system are embedded in the culture-ideology of consumerism.

> The viability of the system absolutely depends on being able to persuade the masses that this culture-ideology makes sense and leads to happy lives for all. Ideologies provide plausible collective motivations for groups of people who appear to be acting in similar ways, in this case actually consuming beyond their physical needs or striving to acquire the means...to do so. The culture-ideology of consumerism is the set of beliefs and practices that persuades people that consumption far beyond the satisfaction of physical needs is...at the center of meaningful existence and that the best organized societies are those that place consumer satisfaction at the center of all their major institutions (Sklair, 2001, p.5).

People are not satisfied in any sphere of their lives any more. The goods acquire multiple meanings. The good life is what people want and it is defined in terms of goods now; the goods of the corporations form the only route to its achievement. Thus, argues Sklair, culture-ideology of consumerism is the 'life-blood' of TNCs and for those people who own and control them.

The transnational capitalist class can be identified with no particular country, but rather it is identified with the global capitalist system. The members of this class have relations not only with national actors and institutions in different countries but also with actors and institutions that cannot be called national. Their common interest for the protection of private property and the rights of private individuals to accumulate it with minimum possible interference are the factors that bind the members of this class globally. Capitalists in many different countries, Sklair asserts, have more common interests with each other than they have with their non-capitalist citizens (Sklair, 2001, p.12).

Sklair divides transnational capitalist class into four main parts: TNC executives and their local affiliates forming the corporate fraction, globalizing bureaucrats and politicians forming the state fraction, globalizing professionals

forming the technical fraction, and lastly merchants and media forming the consumerist fraction. Sklair states that the first group is the dominant group and consists of the people who own and control the major corporations, or the TNC executives. This group comprises of not only leading salaried employees of the corporations (corporate executives) but also the ones who have the power to make and influence key decisions (non-executive directors, other major owners and their representatives). Sklair regards the other three groups, namely globalizing bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing professionals, and consumerist elites, as the supporting members of the transnational capitalist class. He also considers the probable Marxist argument against his model, that only the ones who own the means of production can be called capitalists and be members of a capitalist class, either local or transnational. Sklair asserts against this argument that the globalization of capital can only be adequately understood when the ownership and control of economic capital is thought together with ownership and control of other kinds of capital, which are political, organizational, cultural and knowledge capital, going in parallel with Bourdieu's model of class (Sklair, 2001, p.17).

According to Sklair, the organization of the transnational capitalist class mirrors different kinds of capital that should be employed to further the intersts of the global capitalist system. The four groups realize different functions for global capital theoretically. However, the individuals in these groups overlap to a certain degree. "Some TNC executives...spend time as state bureaucrats (globalizing and localizing); and bureaucrats and politicians, professionals, and especially members of consumerist elites work directly for corporatios." (Sklair, 2001, p.17) Here, the capitalist class is characterized by the ownership and control of major means of production, distribution and exchange through ownership and control of not only money but also other capitals indicated above.

Sklair lists in which respects transnational capitalist class is transnational or globalizing. Firstly, the economic interests of the members of the capitalist

class are getting globally linked increasingly. Not only their corporations but also the property and shares of the people who own and control major corporations are becoming more globalized. Also, their intellectual products serve the interests of globalizing capital. Although the world is still organized in terms of national economies to a large extent, transnational capitalist class considers its interests in terms of global market. Secondly, transnational capitalist class exercises its economic control in the work place, political control in politics, both international and local, and control of culture-ideology in everyday life through forms of global competitive and consumerist discourses. Thirdly, on economic, political and culture-ideology issues, members of transnational capitalist class have outward-oriented global perspectives. Increasing emphasis on free trade and export promotion strategies in underdeveloped countries since 1980s have been enforced by members of transnational capitalist class working through government agencies, professionals, elite opinion organizations and media (Sklair, 2001, p.20).

A fourth and a very significant issue in terms of the aims of this thesis is that members of transnational capitalist class have similar life styles: similar patterns of education especially higher education and consumption of luxury goods and services. "Integral to this process are exclusive clubs and restaurants, ultra-expensive resorts in all continents, private as opposed to mass forms of travel and entertainment and...increasing residential segregation of the very rich secured by armed guards and electronic surveillance." (Sklair, 2001, p.20-21) The fifth and the last issue is also significant in terms of so called the cosmopolitanism of these people. Sklair argues that members of transnational capitalist class try to represent themselves as citizens of the world.
Sklair states that the concept of transnational capitalist class demonstrates that there is an inner circle making system-wide decisions and connecting with subsidiary members in communities, cities, countries, and supranational regions. The whole transnational capitalist class has a shared interest of accumulation of private profit. However, the inner circle of the class gives a unity to the diverse economic interests, political organizations and cultural and

ideological formations. The culture-ideology of consumerism is the basic value system that makes it possible for the system to remain complete and the four fractions of the class explained previously realize complementary functions for integrating the whole (Sklair, 2001, p.21).

Abdul Rahman Embong criticizes Sklair's formulation in the same way with Cox, telling that transnational capitalist class also includes too many fractions in it. He thinks that Sklair is right in his inclusion of leading executives of biggest TNCs and their local affiliates in many parts of the world within the same class. However, he argues, other fragments such as globalizing bureaucrats, capitalist inspired politicians and professionals cannot be considered as the constituent parts of this same class, as they do not enjoy economic base and power relations in the same degree with TNC executives. "Thus, assigning members of this group to the same class as the leading executives of the world's biggest TNCs is to ignore the most important criterion he himself uses, ie. strong economic base and the ability to wield power globally." (Embong, 2000, p.4)

2.3.1. …Or Cosmocrats?

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, in their work *A Future Perfect*, also talk about the formation of a broadening class of people and name those people as *cosmocrats*. Globalization not only tightens world's economic links but also creates an increasingly conspicuous class of people who possess the ideas, connections and capitals necessary to be dominant in the international economy. Cosmocrats are the upper class people who have benefited from globalization. They make up the most meritocratic class the world has ever seen according to them. The essential issues emphasized by Micklethwait and Wooldridge that these people share similar consumption habits no matter in which part of the world they live and that they have cosmopolitan tastes.

> Cosmopolitan in taste and usually Anglo-American in outlook, these are the people who attend business school weddings around the world, fill-up the business class lounges at international airports, provide the officer ranks of most of the world's companies and international institutions, and through their collective efforts, probably do more than anyone else to make the world seem smaller. These cosmocrats are

members of a new ruling class- a much more meritocratic ruling class than we have ever seen before...but a ruling class nevertheless (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2001, p.229).

Micklethwait and Wooldridge state that cosmocrats are defined by their attitudes and life styles as much as the amount of money they own. This group does not only consist of the people dealing with commerce. Some of the academics and also the international bureaucrats are also other examples of cosmocrats. All of them are not Westerners but it is significant that even if some of them are not from the West, their values most of the times are. The cosmocrat values are the values of people who are constantly 'on the move and on the make' rather than ones who are comfortable with their traditions. Characteristics such as meritocracy, speed, hatred of bureaucracy are typical of them. They owe their positions to the information and expertise they have, which is a fact that was not relevant for older elites. They have international loyalties and these loyalties are always calculating. They attach significance to intelligence much more than loyalty (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2001, p.229-232).

The common global aspirations of cosmocrats lead to common global habits. They have developed many ways of distiction, to use Bourdieu's term, to demonstrate their membership of the global elite. Micklethwait and Wooldridge think that a significant number of cosmocrats dress similarly. "A consultant in Bangkok doesn't look any different from her peer in Sao Paulo; an advertising director trying to secure a table at the Groucho Club in London wears no less Armani than his counterpart outside the Ivy in Los Angeles." (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2001, p.233) There is also a great emphasis on cosmopolitan consumerism. Cosmocrats give importance to buying the best in the market, regardless of national origins and globalization, according to Micklethwait and Wooldridge, gave them the opportunity to do it easily. Also, staying in touch is a significant desire for the cosmocrats. They usually have connections to and friends in many different countries so they have a

continuous need for remaining in touch through voice mail, e-mail and travel (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2001, p.233).

Micklethwait and Wooldridge think that three institutions are really crucial in binding together these people: business schools, big professional service firms and the internet. About the first one, they state that the new elites of our time have education in business schools and acquires MBAs. Business schools prefer selecting both their students and the faculty from many different countries, which is in line with their aims of creating and supporting the creation of environments that has diversity. The second type of institution, namely big professional service firms, include law firms, accountancy firms, investment banks and management consultancies. These institutions allow their members to have much more experience than regular business executives by making for them possible to work in many countries and industries. They keep these people constantly moving, from one posting to another, working in different offices for short periods and going to specialized meetings. The last institution, Internet, is a 'cosmocratic gadget' according to Micklethwait and Wooldridge: "...global, unrestrained by national rules, stuffed full of knowledge and gender irrelevant." (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2001, p.237). Thinking of the importance of staying connected for the cosmocrats who are geographically dispersed, Internet has much more meaning than just being an information center.

As a last point, Micklethwait and Wooldridge argue that a notable characteristic of the cosmocrats is their lack of depth. Cosmocrats think that they know a country when they see the airport and a hotel in that country. They say that cosmocrats seldom meet ordinary people from the countries they travel. Moreover, they are increasingly isolated from the rest of society.

> Its members study in foreign universities, spend a period of time working abroad, and work for organizations that have a global reach. They constitute a world within a world, linked to each other by myriad global networks but insulated from the more hidebound members of their own societies. They usually secrete themselves in isolated suburbs, send their children to private schools, and in general avoid city

centers...They are more likely to spend their time chatting with their peers around the world-via phone or e-mail- than talking to their neighbors in the projects around the corner. Manuel Castells... has summed up the problem neatly: 'Elites are cosmopolitan, people are local.' (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2001, p.241-242).

Thus, cosmocrats are cosmopolitans in the sense of being in contact with different people who are from different parts of the world but at the same time from the same class with them. Communicating with people from different countries does not mean interacting with various peculiar life styles in this case. They communicate with people who have similar educational backgrounds, work histories, consumption habits, dressing codes, and in general life styles although these people live in other parts of the world.

2.4. Conclusion

Globalization has most probably been one of the most popular concepts of our times. However, it is also certain that it lacks a precise definition. It mostly reflects a pervasive belief in that the world is rapidly being shaped so that developments in one region of the world can have profound consequences for the life chances of individuals or communities on other parts of the globe. In parallel with this idea, limits to national politics and search for international political institutions are suggested by many. Globalization, which is principally an economic phenomenon, is also accepted as relevant for social and cultural fields, functioning in the same way with the economic processes. The historical process behind its emergence, the immanent power dynamics of it and the aims that the rhetoric about it serves are usually ignored in these arguments. A picture of current condition is produced in which there is a global world without centers, not only economically but also socially, a world without power relations, winners and losers, and a world in which the mechanisms of politics are at the transnational level, rather than being at the level of nation states.

Although there are very useful insights in the sceptic argument about globalization exemplified in the work of Hirst & Thompson, in this chapter it is not argued that globalization is a myth. It is rather claimed that what we call

globalization is mainly the globalization of capital or the neoliberal globalization, and it is not possible to understand it correctly without considering it within the right historical context. Globalization of the capitalist system is deeply connected to the capitalist crises of the 1970s and the problems experienced after, such as oil price shocks and rising unemployment. In this period of crisis, the fall of the expectations of the welfare state period has been experienced. As a response to the Keynesian economic policies, the ungovernability of markets and competitiveness have become dominant ideas. Therefore, globalization has not taken shape as the natural result of capitalism, but it has been created through institutional forms. Neoliberalism changed the balance between the state and the market in favor of markets persuading people in the necessity of the deregulation of markets. All these practices are formed through neoliberalism's political project. Economic globalization is not composed of inevitable processes, but has rather been actively supported by neoliberal theorists and politicians.

There is an increase in the economic transactions globally. However, trade, investment and financial flows are mostly realized among Europe, Japan and North America. These economic centers have the power to manipulate financial markets. Thus, it is not accurate to say that markets are uncontrollable. Objectives of economic governance are formed by the interests of the great powers and the economic doctrines among their elites. The situation is that the economic activity is pursued by a few multinational corporations, located in a small number of states. A big proportion of international trade is among industrialized nations and a few newly industrializing countries. Most of the global economic activity can be understood in terms of MNCs' aims of decreasing their costs caused by national regulation and taxation.

The capitalist class being organized on a world scale has interests in supporting both the process and the rhetoric of globalization. The emerging transnational capitalist class is the major force in terms of globalizing practices and in the

establishment of a global capitalist economy. This class is now going through the process of formation and it makes use of people and resources for increasing its profit and accumulation. The corporate executives of the multinational corporations, which make up the target group of this thesis, form a significant part of this class. These people are aware of a common concern to maintain the system that makes it possible for the class to be dominant. Many institutions like OECD, IMF, and World Bank have articulated strategies for this concern. Also, educational institutions like business schools facilitate them to have a common culture, common life styles and shared concepts. They have homogeneous behaviors and similar consumption habits no matter where they live. Although their economic capital has been significant in their determination as members of a certain class, their social, cultural and symbolic capitals also need to be examined. They have common global habits and have developed many ways of distinction to distinguish themselves from other people belonging to lower classes.

These people are usually represented as cosmopolitans. I claim that they can only be cosmopolitans in the sense of having the resources to travel to other parts of the world and having the opportunity to know people from different parts of the world. However, the people they know are usually from the same class with them. They do not come across to different life styles or become 'open to the Other' with the words of Ulf Hannerz, as will be fyrther explained in the following chapter. They have been in contact with people having similar educational histories, jobs, consumption habits, dressing codes, and in general life styles although these people live far away from them. Thus, capitalists, who transcend the national borders, are aware of their common interests globally and socialize with others from the same transnational class, even if they live in separate parts of the world. In the next chapter, I will consider political, cultural and critical perspectives of social theorists about cosmopolitanism in detail. I will try to demonstrate what this agenda consists of and to which aims it serves in the current social, political and economic conditions.

CHAPTER 3

COSMOPOLITANISM

"One way of looking at modern history is as a race in which popular forces and solidarities are always running behind. It is a race to achieve social integration, to structure the connections among people and organize the world. Capital is out in front. The workers and ordinary citizens are always in the position of trying to catch up. As they get organized on local levels, capital and power integrate on larger scales...Because markets and corporations increasingly transcend states, there is a new catching up to do. This is why cosmopolitan democracy is appealing."
(Calhoun in Cohen & Vertovec, 2002, p.108)

Cosmopolitanism, as a concept, has been in use for a long time. It is frequently argued that cosmopolitan ideas emerged in Ancient Greece as calls for unity among the city states. It has mostly been a project of empires and of long distance trade. Christianity, Ottoman Empire and some European Empires are regarded as offering different types of cosmopolitanism in their own eras. A new cosmopolitanism appeared with Enlightenment, which was applicable to those elites who did not have a responsibility for ruling and especially Kant's understanding of cosmopolitanism at that time paved the way to the contemporary discussions about the concept.

Within the past ten years and especially in the US academy, there has been a growing interest in cosmopolitanism again. This re-emergence of the term is mostly tied to a search for third-way alternatives between nationalism and multiculturalism. At a time when the discourses about the demise of the nationstate, upheaval of globalization and dominance of the post-national forms are dispersed all around the world, cosmopolitanism is offered as the new project appropriate for the new era. Although there are various different positions about the meaning of the term and the suggested projects, still it can

be said that the advocates of cosmopolitanism try to free the term from its widely-thought connotations of elitism, privilege and rootlessness. To what extent they can do it or rather, to what extent this can be done is a question that will be discussed in the following pages.

In this part, the main positions, viewpoints and projects about cosmopolitanism will be discussed, mainly under two headings of political and cultural approaches to cosmopolitanism. Then, the critics about the term and about the cosmopolitan projects will be given space in order to give an answer to the question of how legitimate cosmopolitanism can be as an alternative political program for the current era and if it cannot, to which aim the discourses about cosmopolitanism serve. Related to the purposes of this thesis, it will be argued that cosmopolitanism is mainly a Western and an elite conception of the world.

In the recent discussions, there are various perspectives about cosmopolitanism and it is discussed in multiple contexts. Vertovec and Cohen argue that cosmopolitanism can be regarded as "...a socio-cultural condition...a kind of philosophy or world view...a political project towards building transnational institutions...a political project for recognizing multiple identities...an attitudinal or dispositional orientation and/or a mode of practice or competence." (ibid., p.9). Here, the arguments of different thinkers about these different faces of cosmopolitanism will be summarized within the two broad titles of political approaches and cultural approaches to cosmopolitanism.

3.1. Political Approaches to Cosmopolitanism

The first subject that will be covered is the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship, which takes citizenship not necessarily tied to a bounded political community, namely the nation-state. There are many debates about citizenship which, as the debate about cosmopolitanism, are about determining the conceptual and practical boundaries between morality and politics, which can be observed in the contrast between the republican and liberal understandings of citizenship.

3.1.1. Liberal versus Republican Understandings of Citizenship

In the writings of Locke, we can see the theorization of liberal citizenship and in these writings, citizens are seen as members of a political order, but who are firstly members of a universal moral order. Politics is in a subordinate relationship to morality, which means the natural law that is accessible for the reasonable men and which is "...universal and rational and takes the form of universally valid prescriptions which are binding on the relations between individuals." (Hutchings, 1999, p.6). Therefore, in the Lockean model, man is equated to the citizen, which led to the extension of citizenship rights not only within the states, but also beyond the states.

The republican model, exemplified by the writings of Rousseau, criticizes the liberal understanding of citizenship on the ground that individuals become citizens by making social contract and their identities as citizens are absolutely bound up with the community to which they belong to. "This clearly presumes that the political community constructed by contract is a single entity with both the capacity for agency and its own discoverable or articulable good." (Hutchings in Hutchings & Dannreuther, 1999, p.8) Hence, in Rousseau's understanding, in a way different from Locke's, citizenship is accepted as a political identity and practice. It can be said that this basic distinction between liberal and republican understandings of citizenship lays the ground for later debates about cosmopolitan citizenship.

3.1.2. Cosmopolitanism in Enlightenment Thought

The cosmopolitan thinking of Enlightenment also included the belief that the individuals have a common moral identity and they are exposed to the same moral law. This notion of common morality for humans led them to talk about a universal, cosmopolitan standard of judgement. Especially works of Kant, who is an important Enlightenment thinker, have been the forerunner of contemporary cosmopolitan arguments. In Kant's moral philosophy, there is the recognition that we are all in a sense cosmopolitan because of being human and this is Kant's ethical cosmopolitanism. However, Kant is also interested in

how the political realm may serve the ends of moral universalism. Thus, it is argued that Kant moves beyond Lockean liberalism in talking about the political realm for the universal moral order.

Although Kant's political theory is always cosmopolitan, as it rests on principles derived from the universal moral law, he still acknowledges that the actual nature of political order does not rest on rights or pure reason. "Politics is conceived as being both based on and directed towards moral universality, yet nature dictates that...our identity and actions as citizens must be framed within a coercive and therefore non-moral order, the juridical realm of the state." (Hutchings, 1999, p.16) Morality has priority over politics and there are universal, rational grounds for moral judgment.

One last but very crucial aspect of the universalism in the cosmopolitanism of Enlightenment in general and Kant in particular is that while referring to the universal 'brotherhood of man', it refers to an elite identity in that it only refers to the capacity of the 'wise men' to judge. The cosmopolitan identity was the identity of the Enlightenment thinkers: they could be mobile, could be at home anywhere in the world and they did not feel that they were limited by national identity. Moreover, the philosopher was cosmopolitan as "...he has a privileged perspective from which to understand and judge the world, one which is universal not simply because it is not dependent on identification with a particular place but it is also authoritatively grounded in reason." (Hutchings, 1999, p.17).

3.1.3. Contemporary Arguments on Cosmopolitanism

In the later arguments, we can see the heritage of these previous understandings of cosmopolitanism. David Held argues for the generalization of democracy and citizenship beyond the boundaries of the state and thinks that democracy should be understood in terms of autonomy, which is universal in scope and not tied to a particular state or nation (Held, 1995, p.222). According to him, the link between democracy and state/nation is not necessary; this

linking reflected the circumstances of the Westphalian state system. With the effect of globalization, democracy via states as autonomy is not possible any more but historical conditions are emerging for the institutionalization of democracy beyond the state level. Cosmopolitan democracy rests on the idea that democracy in a certain community and democratic relations among communities are interrelated. New mechanisms must be formed for democracy to develop in the decades ahead (ibid., p.235). Also, cosmopolitan law transcends the particular claims of nations and states, and extends to all in the universal community. "It connotes a right and duty which must be accepted if people are to learn to tolerate one another's company and to coexist peacefully." (ibid., p.228) Held thinks that the states are withering away in the new order; that is they are not disappearing but they are no longer the sole centers of legitimate power within their borders. States will be articulated with a global democratic law.

The new political community of the contemporary era will be the one in which citizens will have multiple citizenships. They will not be only the citizens of their communities but also of the wider regions in which they live and of the global order. Institutions will be founded which will address those issues that bind people no matter to which nation state they belong to. Democracy should be thought as a double-sided process: "...(D)eepening of democracy within a national community involved the democratization of states and civil societies over time, combined with the extension of democratic forms and processes across territorial boundaries." (Held, 2000, p.426)

Held's argument and the arguments of many other contemporary theorists on cosmopolitanism depend on the claim that the world is changing and this change has a transformative capacity in terms of political order. However, those who are critical of cosmopolitan arguments also start from the same point, arguing either that state power still has a continuing significance compared to global governance or that post-Westphalian state order is a guise for the dominance of global capital over state and inter-state politics. For

example, Zolo criticizes the cosmopolitan perspective for being utopian and imperialistic, as it ignores the continuing importance of differences within the state system and identifies a Western, non-global normative agenda with cosmopolitanism.

> The rhetoric of civil globalization and of a rising cosmopolitan citizenship underestimates one of the most characteristic and most serious consequences of the way in which westernization is cultural homogenization without integration: namely the antagonism between the esteemed citizenship of the West and the countless masses belonging to regional and subcontinental areas without development and with a high rate of democratic growth (Zolo cited in Delanty, 2000, p.139).

3.1.3.1. Linklater-Miller Debate

The debate between Andrew Linklater and David Miller is exemplary in that it outlines the major claims of those who argue in favor of or against cosmopolitan citizenship. Linklater states his purpose as defending the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship from its critics. First, he sketches three different approaches: statist, Kantian and dialogic on the relationship between state, citizenship and humanity, and then builds on Kant's thought, arguing that cosmopolitan citizenship comprises of more than compassion towards outsiders: it also involves efforts to create universal structures of communication. He also suggests that "...national conceptions of citizenship are often in tension with wider ethical commitments but they create obligations to create wider dialogic communities." (Linklater, 1999, p.37). He thinks that the establishment of a transnational public sphere is a significant way to realize the ideals of cosmopolitan citizenship. Linklater states that the principles that will create a European international society may not get the consent of the whole humans and thus, the members of a European international order who try to create a transnational public sphere and post-national European citizenship forms have to find the appropriate ways for their relations with those other societies which do not have the same political vision with them. "Instead of closing themselves off, they have to act towards outsiders in ways which will promote the development of a universal communication theory...(D)ialogue and consent replace the realm of power and coercion in

determining the future of world politics. Promoting this end is the central aim of cosmopolitan citizenship." (ibid., p.38)

In the same way with the other contemporary participants of the cosmopolitanism debate, as stated above, Linklater also believes that globalization has been effective in considering new forms of citizenship. He, like David Held, thinks that there is a passage from the Westphalian to the post-Westphalian era (Linklater, 1998). Firstly, he thinks that under contemporary conditions of complex interdependence, citizens cannot have control over their lives if they only depend on national structures of democracy. Secondly, the decisions of international organizations which aim to manage today's interdependent world, do not rest on popular assent and this is not a very democratic arrangement. For the supporters of cosmopolitan democracy, it is important to develop transnational citizenry which will provide the popular control of international organizations. And thirdly, states cannot claim to be or be thought as the only moral community, as transnational harm increases interdependently. The distinctions between citizens and aliens should be broken down, and institutional structures should be built for providing outsiders opportunities for representation. This is necessary to respond to the contemporary problems of national democracy (Linklater, 1999, p.47-48).

Contrary to Linklater, David Miller argues that citizenship must be confined with the boundaries of national communities. He thinks that the supporters of creating transnational or global forms of citizenship don't understand the conditions under which the formation of citizenship becomes possible. Thus, he regards them either utopian or what they are dealing with as something that is not related to citizenship. He tells that he uses a republican conception of citizenship, which the theorists of cosmopolitan citizenship also use. However, he asserts, those theorists rest on the republican conception without reflecting on its preconditions or the conditions that make republican citizenship possible (Miller in Hutchings & Dannreuther, 1999, p.60-61).

Miller talks about main components of republican citizenship. According to him, republican citizen a) enjoys a set of equal rights to carry out private aims and to play a public role b) has obligations corresponding to these rights c) takes active steps for defending the rights of other members of the community d) plays an active role in politics. He sees this republican model as the benchmark for assessing how well the institutions and practices of a community are functioning. He suggests that national identities formed as a result of the interplay between groups competing for power, but when they are established, they made it possible for large groups of people to work together as citizens.

> All our experience of citizenship, then, has so far been of bounded citizenship; initially citizenship within the walls of the city state, later citizenship within the cultural limits of the nation state. These boundaries have been actively policed. Admission to citizenship has always come with strings attached (Miller in Hutchings & Dannreuther, 1999, p.69).

Miller suggests that all the political maneuvering will try to define the constituency in which the decision will be taken and a constituency is created by a physical fact, that the members are so placed that their actions have effect on others. To sum up, Miller takes citizenship as an achievement with immense value, representing the best way for different people to live together under laws and institutions. However, it rests on some preconditions and inventing in theory cosmopolitan forms of citizenship undercut the basis of citizenship (Miller, 1999, p.79). Citizenship is a special identity and practice, which is rooted in the solidarity of a political culture and which includes special obligations to fellow citizens as opposed to fellow human beings. Although Miller accepts that the post-Westphalian world order may be emerging and that there are universal moral principles, these will not give us a justification for cosmopolitan citizenship. Political community is identifiable only with the nation state.

3.1.3.2. Daniele Archibugi: Cosmopolitan Democracy

Daniele Archibugi, another supporter of cosmopolitan democracy, defines the desirable form of world order which can satisfy the principles of democracy

within and between the states as the cosmopolitan democracy. Archibugi recognizes the state as the central figure in international relations and thinks that acting politically first requires citizenship of a state and politics cannot exist without a *polis* (Archibugi, 1999, p.128). Although states may not be perfect institutions, they will always be the fundamental point of reference for the individuals. States also represent their citizens at the international level and individuals do not have a role in the international level, except as citizens of a particular country. Another justification for the existence of state is security. However, security within the state is not sufficient if a parallel security is not provided in the relations between states. Both for security and also for the attainment of democracy at the international level, cosmopolitan democracy is the appropriate model. Cosmopolitan democracy aims to put limits on governments' exercise of sovereignty, which cannot be done by other states but by transnational organizations (ibid., p.134).

According to Archibugi, all people in the world should be able to be represented beyond their national borders and a theory of world citizenship should be formulated. However, he emphasizes that a theory of world citizenship should not be based on natural right, which is the case in the Lockean model as stated before. He follows the trace of Rousseau and Kant, and suggests the formation of a theory of rights of the citizen and the citizen"...is seen as a citizen of the state, with which he or she shares some historical and cultural values, and as an inhabitant of the whole planet." (Archibugi, 1995, p.134-135). Cosmopolitan democracy intends to make for citizens possible to be represented in an institutional structure parallel to states. What is distinctive about Archibugi's approach is that he does not regard states as transnational political forms, but rather thinks that the functions realized by nation states should be integrated into the cosmopolitan model (ibid., p.135). States should allow the world community to deal with their internal affairs.

3.1.3.3. Ulrich Beck: Cosmopolitan Manifesto

Ulrich Beck, in his *World Risk Society*, talks about the weakening of first modernity with the processes of globalization, individualization, gender revolution, underemployment and global risks, and states that in the second modernity, societies have to confront all these simultaneously (Beck in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.70). Considering globalization, he tells that with the progress of neo-liberal politics on a global level and the erosion of states, as a part of it, cosmopolitan agenda attaches interest to legitimize Western military intervention. He thinks that imperialist actions can exist simultaneously with cosmopolitan missions. Weak states are subordinated to global governance institutions and this situation leads to the concealment of power strategies under humane intervention. According to Beck, in the age of globalization, the democratic dilemmas cannot be solved only by cosmopolitan democracy. "The central problem is that without a politically strong cosmopolitan consciousness, and without corresponding institutions of global civil society and public opinion, cosmopolitan democracy remains...no more than a necessary utopia. The decisive question is whether and how a consciousness of cosmopolitan solidarity can develop." (Beck, 1999, p. 14)

Beck suggests that a hundred and fifty years after the *Communist Manifesto*, now it is the time for a *Cosmopolitan Manifesto*, which is about the conflict between transnational and national, and global dialogue that has to be established. The fundamental idea of Cosmopolitan Manifesto is that the many contemporary questions cannot be solved by national politics. They can be addressed and dealt with in a transnational framework. However, for this to happen, politics has to be reinvented and new political subjects, the cosmopolitan parties, should be founded. These parties will not only represent transnational interests in the transnational arena, but also will work in national politics. For Beck, the most significant human worries are world problems now. The cosmopolitan parties will help the establishment of global debates on these problems and controversial issues. By this way, world society will develop "...its own forms of social inequality and notions of justice, its own

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political values and ideas, its own hysterias and dilemmas, and its own questions of organization and representation." (Beck, 1999, p.16).

At the end of his Cosmopolitan Manifesto, Beck makes an important remark suggesting that the expanding world citizenship should not be thought as identical with the rise of a global managerial class. He thinks that there is an important distinction between global capitalists and global citizens. According to him, while the bourgeoisie had to learn to act transnationally for pursuing its interests, citizens should still act in the categories of the nation state to a large extent. However, especially by the help of the voluntary organizations, a global civil society is emerging and national agendas are opening up to transnational and cosmopolitan concerns. "How can cosmopolitan movements become possible and powerful? ...this question can be answered only where people ask and listen to it- in the space of political experimentation. Citizens of the world, unite!" (Beck, 1999, p.18)

3.1.3.4. Gerard Delanty: Cosmopolitan Citizenship

Gerard Delanty, in his book *Citizenship in a Global Age*, also looks for an answer to the question of whether a cosmopolitan citizenship is possible. He thinks that it can only be possible if it re-establishes a relationship to community. The relationship between community and cosmopolitanism should be rethought and cosmopolitanism should rest on a civic concept of the nation. "...unless cosmopolitanism can articulate a notion of community, it will be unable to challenge nationalism which is increasingly profiting from the neo-liberal order that has destroyed solidarity, commitment and community." (Delanty, 2000, p.138) He states that nations without nationalism may be possible and it may be the basis for a civic cosmopolitanism. His argument recognizes the communitarian critique of post-national and the post-national critique of communitarian, accepting that we need both the polis and the cosmos, and this is what he calls civic cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitanism resting on civic communities which are at the same time discursively constituted. The communities that are referred to may be transnational, but

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their essence is not mobility but communication. He thinks that reconciling community and globalization is what cosmopolitanism should achieve, also criticizing the latter "...in so far as the latter is a discourse that succumbs to the false universalism of an empty world culture or the romanticism of the particular." (ibid., p.145) Cosmopolitanism should be seen as a real force in the world, observed in the alliances and people's identities .

Delanty differentiates his notion of cosmopolitanism from the others on the basis that he thinks cosmopolitan civil society cannot exist without a cosmopolitan public sphere. "Without a cosmopolitan public sphere, legal and political forms of global civil society will not be rooted in the civic dimension of community that is necessary in order to resist homogenizing forms of globalization." (Delanty, 2000, p.145) Public sphere is the area for communication. The sub-national, national and transnational public spheres should be distinguished according to the level of cosmopolitanism they exhibit. As these civic cosmopolitan public spheres are determined, forms of a civil society can be addressed.

3.2. Cultural Approaches to Cosmopolitanism

After considering the discussions on cosmopolitan democracy and cosmopolitan citizenship, which looks at the political connotations of the term, I will now explore the cultural perspectives. Mike Featherstone states that we can talk about cultural integration and disintegration processes not only happening on an inter-state level, but also occurring on a transnational or trans-societal level.

> It ...may be possible to point to trans-societal cultural processes which take a variety of forms, some of which have preceded the inter-state relations into which nation states can be regarded as being embedded, and processes which sustain the exchange and flow of goods, people, information, knowledge and images which give rise to communication processes which gain some autonomy on a global level (Featherstone , 1990, p.1).

3.2.1. Cosmopolitanism as Openness to the Other: Hannerz, Hiebert and Hollinger

Ulf Hannerz also talks about the existence of a world culture which is "...marked by an organization of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity. No total homogenization of systems of meaning and expression has occurred...the world has become one network of social relationships, and between its different regions there is a flow of meanings as well as of people and goods." (Hannerz, 1990, p.237). He thinks that the local cultures are getting increasingly interconnected. People can respond to this interconnectedness in two ways: becoming either cosmopolitans or locals. Hannerz declares his aim as considering cosmopolitanism as 'a perspective, a state of mind, a mode of managing meaning' (ibid., p.238).

In his view, cosmopolitanism is a kind of orientation, which aims to engage with the Other. It is both an intellectual and also an aesthetic openness to many different cultural experiences. However, he stresses that cosmopolitanism at the same time requires competence.

> There is the aspect of a state of readiness, a personal ability to make one's way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting. And there is cultural competence in the stricter sense of the term, a built-up skill in maneouvring more or less expertly with a particular system of meanings and meaningful forms (Hannerz, 1990, p.239).

Hannerz says cosmopolitans are people who usually move from one place to another throughout the world. But he adds that merely moving does not make someone cosmopolitan and cosmopolitans should not be confused with other travelers. He does not regard tourists, exiles and expatriates as cosmopolitans, as they look for 'home plus' (sunshine, servants, business, etc.). It is not possible to talk about openness to different experiences or different meaning schemes in those situations. "...the 'plus' often has nothing whatsoever to do with alien systems of meaning, and a lot to do with facts of nature..." (ibid., p.241) Being a cosmopolitan means being immersed in other cultures.

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Tourists are not participants but spectators; exile has the foreign culture around him/her but is not immersed in it. Expatriates seem to be the most appropriate candidates for cosmopolitanism, as they choose to live abroad for a while and they can go back whenever they would like to. "...these are people who can afford to experiment, who do not stand to lose a treasured but threatened uprooted sense of self." (ibid., p.243) They have independent means and it is not difficult for them to be open to new experiences. But, Hannerz tells, the contemporary expatriate is not a cosmopolitan but an organization man who rather is part of a transnational culture. Today, transnational cultures are occupational cultures according to Hannerz and they are most usually related to transnational job markets. There are transnational cultures of intellectuals, journalists, politicians, business people, etc. What makes them transnational is that they continuously change their place and that in the places they go, they can meet people whom they can interact with (ibid., p.243-244).

Hannerz stresses that transnational cultures are usually determined by territorial cultures, which are in most of the cases the cultures of Western Europe and North America. These are the physical centers of transnational cultures and places where their particular meanings are produced. The important thing is that even if these people are away from these centers, the institutions of transnational cultures create for them the environments in which they feel at home. "It is a consequence of this that western Europeans and North Americans can encapsulate themselves culturally, and basically remain metropolitan locals instead of becoming cosmopolitans, not only by staying at home in their territorial cultures." (Hannerz, 1990, p.245) Thus, most of the transnational cultures are far from being cosmopolitanism. However, they may provide mediating possibilities for entry into other cultures and some of the people may use mobility to become familiar to other systems of meaning rather than staying immersed in their particular cultures (of Western Europe and North America).

Real cosmopolitans are not at home in the way the locals are. "Home is taken-for-grantedness ...cosmopolitans may not view either the seasons of the year or the minor rituals of everyday life as absolutely natural, obvious and necessary." (Hannerz, 1990, p.248) Home may be only home in the sense that it reminds the pre-cosmopolitan past. Cosmopolitans feel the others as locals at home and locals find them unusual, as people who are not one of them. If there were only locals in the world, world culture would be sum of the particular cultures according to Hannerz. Now there is one world culture, as different structures of meaning become interrelated and cosmopolitans are important in bringing coherence to it. A global homogenization of culture has not taken place, as some theorists argue and for the preservation of cultural diversity, cosmopolitans and locals need each other. "...there can be no cosmopolitans without locals." (ibid., p.250)

Daniel Hiebert, also looking at the relationship between transnational life styles and cosmopolitanism, tells that these two may not be complementary; transnational life styles may inhibit cosmopolitanism. He takes cosmopolitanism as a style of living in which there is openness to all forms of otherness. Cosmopolitan interacts with people from other cultural backgrounds. He/she is not an uncaring, disconnected elite who can move freely, but is someone who practices hospitality during everyday life to people from different backgrounds. Thus, cosmopolitanism can occur in different settings of everyday life: home, neighborhood, work, consumption and social interaction. However, both cosmopolitanism and transnationalism are more fully realized in some places and among some groups compared to others. They do not necessarily emerge together. Transnationalism may be increasing but people do not become more cosmopolitan over time (Hiebert in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.214).

David Hollinger makes a distinction between the old cosmopolitanism of Enlightenment and the new cosmopolitanism that emerged in the 1990s. He suggests that new cosmopolitanism tries to "...bring cosmopolitanism down to

earth, to indicate that cosmopolitanism can deliver some of the goods ostensibly provided only by patriots, provincials, parochials, populists, tribalists and above all nationalists." (Hollinger in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.229). New cosmopolitanism tries to increase 'species-consciousness', to develop tools and institutions for dealing with the problems on a global scale and to decrease suffering in terms of color, class, religion, sex and tribe differences on the world scale. It accepts diversity of human kind as a fact. It recognizes a dynamic process of mutual transformation, rather than respecting staticly to other's integrity (ibid., p.232). He accepts that all the supporters of new cosmopolitanism cannot agree upon everything but

> ...in the twenty first century the new cosmopolitans may be more positioned than universalists and pluralists to find and exploit whatever capacities historically situated human beings may have to form sustaining communities, while engaging problems that affect a human population larger than that embraced by those communities (ibid., p.239).

3.2.2. Stuart Hall: Vernacular Cosmopolitanism

Stuart Hall talks about the centrality of culture in choice and identity and tells that it is not possible to establish identity without a cultural vocabulary. In today's world, we cannot find distinct cultures which are neatly divided and people do not have to limit themselves to only one of them. He states that what we need is a *vernacular cosmopolitanism*.

> We witness the situation of communities that are not simply isolated, atomistic individuals, nor are they well-bounded, singular, separated communities. We are in that open space that requires a kind of vernacular cosmopolitanism, that is to say a cosmopolitanism that is aware of the limitations of any one culture or any one identity and that is radically aware of its insufficiency in governing a wider society, but which nevertheless is not prepared to rescind its claim to the traces of difference which make its life important (Hall in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.30).

Here, what he proposes is a mixed position and this can only be achieved by going beyond the present political vocabularies. It requires a combination of equality and difference; both the recognition of the significance of community and the liberal limit on communitarianism. "...cosmopolitanism...has a continued relationship to our family cultures. You think they are... important, you would not dream of being bound by them..., you prize the moment when

you left them but you know that as you leave them they continue to support you." (Hall in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.30) Hall believes that although this may not seem as a sound political proposition, it is an 'existential political position' that everyone can easily understand.

3.2.3. Bruce Robbins: Cosmopolitanism as an Ideal

Bruce Robbins, in the collection *Cosmopolitics*, states that there has been a change in the definition and scope of cosmopolitanism within the last years telling that "...In the past the term has been applied...to 'Christians, aristocrats, merchants, Jews, homosexuals, and intellectuals'. Now it is attributed...to North Atlantic merchant sailors, Caribbean au pairs in the United States, Egyptian guest workers in Iraq, Japanese women who take gaijin lovers." ((i)Robbins in Robbins & Cheah, 1998, p.1). He tells that it is not possible to be a cosmopolitan in terms of belonging to nowhere, or with an alternative conception, belonging to everywhere. However, he thinks that limits of the term are at the same time its virtues. The term is important in not in terms of its local applications. This ideal which cannot be fully realized puts a normative pressure against alternatives such as hybridization. He also thinks that its supposed relationship with privilege can also be thought in the same manner. "(Cosmopolitanism's) association with privilege is perhaps better understood...as the normative edge that cosmopolitanism tries to add to the inclusiveness and diversity of multiculturalism-as an attempt to name a necessary but difficult normativeness." ((ii) Robbins in Robbins & Cheah, 1998, p.260) He looks at American cosmopolitanism with some suspicion. His perspective is that cosmopolitanism should be the unification of a privilege at home, which is the result of belonging to institutional places, with a practice of democratic and anti-imperialist principles abroad. New cosmopolitanism should be thought neither as not being bound to a place nor as elitism, but as a method of problematizing the units of democracy.

3.2.4. James Clifford: Discrepant Cosmopolitanism

Another important theoretician who wrote about cosmopolitanism is James Clifford. In his article *Traveling Cultures*, he discusses traveling for analyzing the specific dynamics of dwelling/traveling. He looks at 'culture as travel'. "...(T)he broader agenda I've been getting at here: to rethink cultures as sites of dwelling and travel, to take travel knowledges seriously." (Clifford, 1992, p.105) He takes the notion that the traveler is a privileged person who moves securely and without any limitations as the travel myth. He argues that although it is not possible to construct an equivalence between the 'travels' of immigrants or migrant laborers and privileged people, there is still a ground for comparison and translation of different travel knowledges, which doesn't have to be class- or ethno-centric. However "...(t)he project of comparison would have to grapple with the evident fact that travelers move about under strong cultural, political, and economic compulsions and that certain travelers are materially privileged, others oppressed." (ibid., p.108). This gives way to the concept of *discrepant cosmopolitanism*, which recognizes that cosmopolitanism is not only relevant for the privileged people. In Clifford's understanding of cosmopolitanism, as exemplified by the following citation, it is interesting that cosmopolitanism is equated with traveling.

> ...the notion that certain classes of people are cosmopolitan (travelers) while the rest are locals (native) appears as the ideology of one (very powerful) traveling culture...I am not saying there are no locales or homes, that everyone is –or should be- traveling, or cosmopolitan, or deterritorialized. This is not nomadology. Rather, I'm trying to sketch a comparative cultural studies approach to specific histories, tactics, everyday practices of dwelling and traveling: traveling-in-dwelling, dwelling-in-traveling (ibid., p.108).

3.3. Critiques of Cosmopolitanism

There are many supporters of cosmopolitanism as an attitude, and a political or an ethical project. Nevertheless, it bears many significant critiques as well. In this part, critiques towards cosmopolitanism will be explored in order to see the deficiencies and fallacies of the idea, from where and to whom it speaks, which mechanisms it replaces/aims to replace and which aims it serves. Although political and cultural agendas of cosmopolitanism may seem too distinct and

impossible to deal with together, still they stem from the same background ideas.

3.3.1. Cosmopolitanism as the Ideology of Elites

The most common critique about cosmopolitanism is that it is available to elites, who have necessary resources for traveling and having access to other cultures. Beginning from ancient Greece, through Enlightenment to the present day, cosmopolitanism has always been linked to those privileged persons, who had the opportunity to see other places and to be involved with the cultures of other communities different from their own. "For the majority of the population, living their lives within the cultural space of their own nation or ethnicity, cosmopolitanism has not been an option." (Vertovec & Cohen in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.5) The stereotype of cosmopolitanism has always been 'the privileged, bourgeois, politically uncommitted elites': corporate managers, bureaucrats, artists, academics, intellectuals, who have resources to have expensive tastes and transnational life styles. The person who can be a citizen of the world and who belongs to the whole world instead of being limited to one country can only be a privileged individual (Robbins in ed. Robbins & Cheah, 1998, p.248). It is argued that contrary to the claims of theorists of cultural globalization, in the current age national cultures are still very strong and example for the presence of a global/transnational culture can only be the networks or relationships between the elites of the world, "...the networks of experts and specialists, senior administrative personnel and transnational business groups- and those who track and contest their activities..." (Held in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.56).

Transcending the borders of one's own nation either by traveling or only by thoughts and feelings is criticized as being a privileged and irresponsible detachment. Here, it is assumed that in this position there is a series of detachments "...from true feeling, hence from the responsibility that engages a whole person, not a sometime spectator; from responsibility, hence from the constituency to which one would be responsible; from constituency, hence

from significant political action." ((i) Robbins in Robbins & Cheah, 1998, p.4). The cosmopolitan person is accepted as someone who is not involved in the making of history and who is only an aesthetic spectator. The image of the cosmopolitan is that of the man without a country (not a refugee, as refugee is in search of a country); a person who can live well without belonging to a country. For these people citizenship does not have an importance (Bauböck in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.111). The idea of not belonging is said to be leading to a selfish individualism and being free from social bonds, which are attitudes the majority of the people cannot/should not dispense with. The ideas of Boehm about cosmopolitanism which Fine and Cohen explain are significant in terms of this line of critique:

> ...the obligations that cosmopolitanism lays upon its adherents are 'comparatively negligible'. Cosmopolites seldom go beyond 'demonstration, sentimentality, propaganda, and sectarian fanaticism'. The people who believe in it are often those 'whom fortune has relieved from the immediate struggle for existence...and who can afford to indulge their fads and enthusiasms'(Fine & Cohen in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.158).

Christopher Lasch makes a similar argument. He talks about the 'darker side of cosmopolitanism' and tells that elites or the privileged classes are against the nation state today, as they are not identified with it any more. "In the borderless global economy, money has lost its links to nationality...The privileged classes in Los Angeles feel more kinship with their counterparts in Japan, Singapore, and Korea than with most of their country men." (Lasch cited in Fine & Cohen, 2002, p.159) They feel themselves as world citizens without having any obligations of national citizenship.

3.3.2. Cosmopolitanism as the Project of Capitalism

A very important critique about cosmopolitanism comes from Craig Calhoun. Calhoun thinks that arguments on cosmopolitanism raised during 1990s are attractive but not so much realizable. After the Cold War, many of the social theorists thought that the time came for cosmopolitanism in a period in which states started to be seen as old fashioned institutions losing their importance

and international civil society as the major actor in politics. These supposed dimensions of globalization were regarded as evidence of the need for a cosmopolitan order. Serious inequalities have been masked by cosmopolitan ideals; the cosmopolitan rhetoric has been widely used by neo-liberal corporate leaders , who have a major effect in the proliferation of inequalities (Calhoun in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.87-88). He thinks that there is also a problem with linking cosmopolitanism to democracy. The managers of capitalist corporations are examples of a certain kind of cosmopolitanism according to him, while having no relationship to democracy. Moreover, a significant part of global civil society (World Bank, NGOs of accountancy standards, etc.) supports capitalism but not democracy (ibid., p.91).

Calhoun argues that cosmopolitanism rests on a Western view of the world. The West is treated as the site of both globalization and cosmopolitanism, while non-West is tied to tradition. Cultural identities and communal solidarities are always taken as residues of an older order, rather than seen as creative constructions. He emphasizes that advancing democracy requires struggle, a struggle not only against states and corporations but also within them.

> The struggle for democracy...cannot be only a cosmopolitan struggle from social locations that transcend these domains; it must also be a local struggle within them. It would be a mistake to imagine that cosmopolitan ethics ...could somehow substitute for a multiplicity of political, economic and cultural struggles (Calhoun in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.92-93).

Calhoun asserts that the contemporary interest in cosmopolitanism is not only caused by its moral value but also, or rather, stems from the challenge of a global capitalism. Calhoun cites a passage from the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, which will also be cited here:

> ...the bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. ..All old established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed...In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and

more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature (Marx & Engels cited in Calhoun, 2002, p.103).

Nevertheless, the development of the capitalist world system does not only include the rise of cosmopolitanism. Capitalist globalization has been combined with the sovereignty of the states in politics. Capitalist cosmopolitans were establishing relationships which transcend the boundaries of nation-states, while resting on states for conditions of production and trade. "Their passports bear the stamps of many countries, but they are still passports, and good cosmopolitans knew which ones would get them past the inspectors at borders and airports." (Calhoun in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.103)

Calhoun argues that the access of most of the people to cultural diversity in today's world is through 'headline news or packaging of ethnicity for consumer markets'. "Certainly Chinese food is now a global cuisine- both in a generic form that exists especially as a global cuisine and in more authentic regional versions prepared for more cultivated global palates." (Calhoun in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.105) In this situation, we can neither talk about Mcdonaldization nor cultural survival. This is an example for the spread of consumerist cosmopolitanism. Food, clothes, tourism, music, literature are really being distributed all over the world but this has nothing to do with respect to human rights and democracy on a global scale.

Thus, cosmopolitanism is the project of capitalism in the contemporary era and it is mostly relevant for the top managers of the multinational corporations and the consulting firms, establishing relationships among elites across national borders. Ordinary people continue living in their local communities. The reason for this is not that these people are not fond of diversity but that class structure of public life excludes them. In the capitalist system, many people work to support others' ambitions of possession and accumulation. Cosmopolitanism does not address these inequalities that are inherent in the system; it does not aim to make a redistribution of wealth or to change the

relations of production of global capitalism. Neo-liberalism, in Calhoun's words 'cosmopolitanism of capital', harmed many of the social achievements which were organized on national grounds. Existing institutions and especially parts of nation states should be preserved for social achievements. However, cosmopolitan discourse equates the global with the modern and the national/local with backwardly traditional, dismissing the national (Calhoun in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.107).

The following passage may be taken as a very illuminating critical summary of cosmopolitanism:

> The global power of capitalism, among other factors, makes the creation of cosmopolitan institutions seem crucial. But it would be a mistake for this to be pursued in opposition to more local solidarities or without an adequate distinction from capitalism. Appeals to abstract human rights in themselves speak to neither- or at least not adequately as currently pursued. Building cosmopolitanism solely on such a discourse of individual rights – without a strong attention to diverse solidarities and struggles for a more just and democratic social order- also runs the risk of substituting ethics for politics. An effective popular politics must find roots in solidary social groups and networks of ties among them(Calhoun in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.107).

3.3.3. Cosmopolitanism within the Colonial Context

Another very strong critique towards cosmopolitanism made about its colonial context is Peter Van Der Veer's. He asserts that, contrary to the widespread understanding, cosmopolitanism is not a point of view from nowhere, "...but a view from somewhere and from sometime, namely from the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century." (Veer in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.165). Veer evaluates the rhetoric of cosmopolitanism as an alternative to ethnic or nationalist chauvinism and considering Hannerz's definition of cosmopolitanism as an openness to the other, reminds that it is important to ask 'what intellectual and aesthetic openness entails and on what terms one engages the other'. The willingness of the colonial officers to engage with the other and the enabling condition of engagement in Western imperialism should be kept in mind. Veer sees cosmopolitanism as the Western engagement with the rest of the world and thinks that that engagement is a colonial one. It both crosses the boundaries and also requires them. Cosmopolitanism and

nationalism are not alternatives but 'poles in a dialectical relationship'. Western modernity fundamentally depends on a mobile personality, 'a type of person eager to move, to change and to invent'. The defining characteristic of this mobile personality is empathy but the foundation of empathy is the power to penetrate into the life of the other and to change it; it is an interested power (ibid., p.167).

Van Der Veer stresses that cultural translation is also an important problem. The cosmopolitan, in engaging with the other has to be good in translation but this activity shows that some languages are weaker than the others. But cosmopolitan is not only a translator

> ...but also a spy who commands more languages than the people he spies upon, as well as the ability to translate their languages into the language of the rulers. It is the ultimate cosmopolitan fantasy...that the colonial hero has a perfect grasp of the language and the customs of the 'natives', the 'locals', but still in his crossing over remains true to himself and returns to his own world where he uses his acquired knowledge for the improvement of colonial rule. Interestingly enough, Westernized natives in the colonized areas were not considered to have the ability to cross over, but were ridiculed as impostors, as wogs (Veer in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.168).

Cosmopolitanism should be understood as improvization and translation, characteristic of colonial modernity and it is also present in the multicultural hybridity of post-colonial studies. Veer suggests that the cosmopolitanism of both nineteenth and twentieth centuries should be recognized as a view from a particular place but universalized by colonialism. Both cosmopolitanism and nationalism appeared within the context of an establishing capitalist world system. Cosmopolitan projects have mostly been formed in the context of the empire. Although new political and economic interdependencies and new cosmopolitan projects have taken place in the post-colonial world, still many clues of the old patterns of thought can be observed in them. Thus, a detailed historical analysis is essential (Veer in Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.178-179).

3.3.4. Cosmopolitanism as an Agenda of the US Academy
Timothy Brennan used the term cosmopolitan to refer to Third World intellectuals such as Salman Rushdie and Isabel Allende. He asserts that such

writers have been determined by the Western reviewers as the representers, public spoke-persons of Third World. They criticize decolonization theory, dismiss national culture as a project and celebrate cultural hybridity. He thinks that their approaches towards national struggles of people and their affirmation of the West should be thought in political and cultural terms. He takes cosmopolitanism as a harmful detachment, closely linked to imperialism and the development of a 'rootless, intellectualized, managerial class' (Anderson in Robbins & Cheah, 1998, p.270).

Brennan thinks that the nation state is still the major player for any action to be against the functioning of global capitalism. He believes that any type of meaningful politics still includes the control of states. Cosmopolitanism has emerged in the US academy and should be thought in relation to increasing US power and influence in the world. Brennan argues that contemporary cultural studies have been involved with the ethics of global capitalism. The humanities, Brennan argues, have contributed to the theorization of the new social subject that has accompanied this hegemonic influence. This subject 'knows' that nationalism is a failed concept and that 'we are all cosmopolitans' now." (Malouf, 2003) Cultural theorists accepted very easily the discourse of globalization, and ignored its local effects and its particularly American character. "...(T)he new cosmopolitanism leaves the US sense of national pre-eminence untouched and limits a confrontation with alternative values implicit in the reception of the Third World." (Neilson, 1999, p.112)

Brennan looks at the culture of transnational corporations and claims that discourses of post-nationalism in the corporate culture and in the humanities are very similar. There is a cosmopolitan ethic which emphasizes hybridity and diversity, and looks at the history with a cultural view point. "... (C)osmopolitan cultural critics avoid a direct engagement with economic realities and find corporate America as their fellow traveling companion." (Malouf, 2003)

3.4. Conclusion

A new era is said to be emerging and especially in the academia, the social theories and the appropriate political projects for this new era are being formulated. The rhetoric of globalization tells us that nation states have lost or are losing their power and legitimacy in the establishment of democracy and in terms of citizenship. It is argued that it is not appropriate to think such categories as culture, citizenship, and democracy within the national borders and to formulate projects and programs within the national context. Thus, new constituencies and projects have to be formed transcending the nation state level. Cosmopolitanism is a concept that has attracted renewed interest within this context, for developing new responsibilities, understandings and social institutions appropriate for the globalized world. Contrary to these assumptions, I suggest that arguing the disappearance of state borders is speaking from the point of view of those who have privileges of traveling frequently across the countries, getting visas easily, having credit cards and fat bank accounts. For those people, it is very easy and desirable to be a world citizen.

Cosmopolitanism rests on assumptions of the weakening of the nation state and global inter-relatedness, which are not adequately supported by empirical data and which are celebrated without much consideration. We can talk about a global capital and a transnational managerial class which is increasingly being organized on a global scale. But this does not mean that social life has been globalized in every aspect. What this globalization of capital brings to ordinary people, who are not at the upper levels of socio-economic hierarchy, not only of First World but also Third World has not been analyzed in depth before offering transnational solutions such as cosmopolitanism. The prevailing power of the nation states and their importance for Third World countries for socio-economic development has been ignored. The inequalities present in national and global scales, and the hegemonic position of the US are not taken into consideration. An agenda that is rooted in Western Europe and that ignores power inequalities throughout the world is offered as a universal agenda.

The advocates of cosmopolitanism do not point out to the inequalities in the national or the global scale. They do not address the power inequalities in the world and the hegemonic position of the US, and they introduce 'universal norms for harmony' which are American and West European principles in real. Thus, they offer a political reform which seems attractive to the elites, or more so, which these elites can be identified with, as it talks about virtue without a radical redistribution of wealth or power. The best example of the contemporary cosmopolitan is the 'privileged, bourgeois, politically uncommitted elite', for which the corporate manager is a perfect example. Cosmopolitanism remains as 'the class consciousness of the frequent travelers' or emergent culture of the transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2000).

Contemporary cosmopolitanism, rather than being a political project, remains as a set of ethical suggestions. Ulrich Beck, as indicated above, stresses that global citizens should not be confused with global capitalists. However, it should be asked who else can be called global citizens other than the privileged, elite transnational managers (if we exclude intellectuals who do not compose a less privileged group). The existing cosmopolitan is an aesthetic spectator who does not have a responsibility of ruling and who does not have a part in the making of history, a man without a country, and a sophisticated consumer having access to the diverse tastes of the world. Supporters of cosmopolitanism seem to propose a project for the ordinary citizens to be organized in larger scales, in a world in which capital is more and more organized transnationally. However, as they do it without sufficient economical analysis, ignoring the inequalities among countries, they propose a solution resting on unexplored presuppositions.

Cosmopolitan rhetoric is widely used by neo-liberal corporate leaders and cosmopolitanism remains the project of capitalism in the contemporary era. Moreover, it points out to the new culture of the transnational capitalist class, having the necessary resources for traveling frequently from one country to the

other and having access to other cultures. They are the people who can 'afford to experiment'. Although cosmopolitanism as an ideal philosophical category requires 'openness to the Other', the existing cosmopolitanism is exemplified by a traveling and consuming elite who has a limited interest in engaging the Other. The transnational culture of these elite people is homogeneous and their movements take place between defined spaces in global cities. Their cosmopolitanism is to a large extent defined by consumption, "...an acquired taste for cultural artefacts from around the world." (Vertovec & Cohen in ed. Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.7).

Cosmopolitanism, as long as it rests on unquestioned presuppositions and predominantly ethical responsibilities instead of sound political programs recognizing the inequalities both within and also between nation states will be a project pointing out to no more than the common life styles of top managers of the multinational corporations, joined across national borders. Not the ordinary people but the elites are the cosmopolitans of the contemporary era.

In the following part, I will consider as a result of which developments and at which historical juncture Turkey has been articulated into the process of globalization. I will demonstrate how the process of liberalization in Turkey during 1980s is a part of the general developments taking place in the world after 1970s. I will also seek to explain the prospering of a professional managerial class in Turkey in this period, which is increasingly integrated to the transnational capitalist class in terms of attitudes and life styles.

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY'S ARTICULATION TO THE PROCESS OF

GLOBALIZATION

The integration of Turkish economy to the globalizing world economic system took place during 1980s as part of a process which also included many other Third World countries. This process took place with the extensive participation and efforts of the state, which is a fact that can be used as supporting evidence against the arguments of globalization and free market advocates. The international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank also had a significant influence in the realization of new neoliberal policies. The main beneficiary of this economic change has been the big capitalist groups in the country at the price of worsening of economic conditions for other social groups. This is in line with the idea that mostly a capitalist class benefited from globalization, whose interests transcend the borders of the nation state. As will be explained in detail in the following pages, the neoliberal transformation in Turkey that took place during 1980s has been achieved through the combined efforts of the local and international capitalist groups with the mediation of the state. In this chapter, firstly the economic changes within the First World and the transmission of similar changes to the Third World after 1970s will be discussed. Secondly, I will explain how this economic transformation occurred in Turkey. Then, I will focus on the impacts of these changes on social and cultural life by describing the social and cultural environment of 1980s. Lastly, I will discuss the emergence and prospering of a professional manager group as a part of the capitalist class, also taking into consideration the life style characteristics of this group. I will suggest that the life style of this group is very much in common with their counterparts in the other countries.

4.1. Globalization of the Third World

In Western societies, until 1970s, there has been a period in which inequality in terms of economic resources has decreased due to industrialisation and productivity, as wage incomes tended to grow more than capital incomes, and wage incomes on the lower occupational levels more than those on the higher ones. Due to the practices of the welfare state, more egalitarian social structures have taken place. However, beginning from 1970s, these circumstances started to change. The oil crisis, which took place in 1973, has been a key event in that it marked the beginning of a new stage of Western capitalism. Economic growth rates decreased and unemployment levels increased sharply. The governments restricted spending on social expenditures. On the other hand, there have been transformations in the structures of firms and in the way they operate. In order to cope with the consequences of growing international competition, the firms reorganised their activities attaching significance to more flexibility and applying so called post-fordist techniques (Wilterdink, 2000, p.187). The firms spread their operations on a global scale, capital has become more mobile, international financial transactions increased and markets were liberalized. There have also been parallel changes in politics: "…a growing belief in free-market forces as the basis of a well-functioning economy and a concomitant increasing scepticism or even hostility toward all kinds of government regulation. It also meant growing acceptance of socioeconomic inequality, which actually increased in the majority of the highly industrialised countries since about 1980." (ibid., p.188)

The neoliberal philosophy which started to be applied accepted the notion of globalization as a recipe including political and economic measures for the restructuring of social life. Globalization is presented as a process that is ungovernable, irreversible and that has its own rules. Therefore, it was necessary for all the countries to initiate social, political and economic, or totally structural changes. It was argued that only those countries which achieved these changes can get use of the benefits of neoliberal globalization.

In this picture, the role of the underdeveloped countries is to open up their domestic markets to the international capital and to realize those reforms appropriate for the new globalizing world. From then on, the strategy of development rested not on autonomous monetary, finance, trade policies but rather on being adapted to the requirements of international capital. The philosophy of globalization left out concepts such as underdevelopment or development and replaced them with the concept of 'emerging markets'. In the neoliberal understanding, development was no more regarded as a target for the underdeveloped countries; these countries were transformed into emerging markets (Yeldan, 2003, p.429).

Through the influence of the developed countries and especially through the policies exerted by International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 'the same paradigmatic shift' with the First World was lived within underdeveloped countries (Stewart& Berry, 1999, p.151). Adaptation of Western and especially American educational systems in these countries brought about the formation of Third World technocrats who were eager to apply the new policies. "The principal change among developing countries was a move away from state intervention in trade, industrial and social policy towards a laissez-faire market; from 'dirigisme'...to 'liberalism'" (ibid., p.151). Liberalisation has both domestic and international dimensions. Internationally, it includes less restrictions on trade, capital flows and labor, which make up globalisation, together with improved communication technologies and decreasing transportation costs.

The Structural Adjustment Programs applied through the directions of IMF and the World Bank had the same objectives in all the countries. Among these are import liberation, control on the real incomes, financial liberation, privatisation of public institutions, getting rid of the big and interventionist state, and reducing the social expenditures. Thus, many underdeveloped countries started to adopt neo-liberal policies through the programs of IMF and the World Bank, and to a large extent, they gave away their authorities on economic policies to

these two institutions. It is asserted that half the people and one third of the countries in the world do not have control on their own economic policies (Şenses, 2001, p.18).

In the countries that applied Structural Adjustment Programs, and mainly in Latin America and Africa, the policies that were applied within the extent of these programs used to rest on unequal income distribution and they, in many instances, even worsened the situation. The declared aims of these programs as solving the debt problems of Third World Countries, keeping the exterior payments in balance and maintaining growth (Bello et.al., 1998, p.116) but they haven't been successful in any of these. These programs played a significant role in the vicious circle of diminishing credit flows because of increasing debts, shrinking foreign capital investments, falling prices of primary goods of Third World with vast increases in the prices of the industrial products (ibid., p.93). These brought the consequences of huge decreases in growth rates, extension of poverty and inequality within and among the countries.

The interesting thing about the structural adjustment programs is that they have been applied with nearly the same content in various different countries. Liberalization and privatization are now global notions. Turkey has also been one of those countries which have been exposed to Structural Adjustment Programs and which have applied neoliberal policies especially after 1980s. In the following part, the period after the 1980s will be considered in order to consider how this process took place in Turkey.

4.2. Economic Transformation of Turkey

Until 1980s, Turkey's economy was identified with a type of capital accumulation, which was mainly oriented to the domestic market and named import-substitution industrialization. The instruments of economic policy, such as protectionism, state involvement, regulated markets, etc bolstered this orientation. During 1970s, crises emerged both in the economic and political

areas in Turkey. The bourgeoisie was declaring openly their suggested solution. The same solution was also supported by IMF, World Bank and OECD, which was the transformation of economy. This transformation would include leaving the import-substitution strategy and adapting an export-oriented model. This would lead Turkish industry to meet its own foreign currency requirement and would solve the problem of limited domestic market. This was not an easy thing to do and required a couple of serious changes (Gülalp, 1993, p.39).

Beginning from 1980s, the new orientation of export-led growth started to be imposed on economy. There has been a widespread restructuring of the economic policy and neoliberalism has become the new order of the period. This new order brought increasing foreign trade, interest rate liberalization, deregulation, privatization, decreases in state expenditures on social services and a liberal foreign exchange regime instead of the state interventionism of the previous period (Balkan & Savran, 2002, p.xv).

In 1980s, 'free market economy', 'opening to the outside' and 'removing bureaucratic barriers' have been the key notions in Turkey. It was claimed that market forces have their own adjusting capacities and this replaced the idea of a state providing welfare and justice to the people. Instead of a state considering the distribution of income, a free market that is bringing productivity and efficiency was promoted. A powerful bureaucracy was not seen as the precondition of development; it was an obstacle for the operation of the free market. "Once cumbersome state regulations are dismantled, both 'hidden local capital' and the flow of foreign capital -patiently awaiting a favorable political climate- will enable Turkish society to 'skip a century', to quote Prime Minister Turgut Özal's phrase." (Öncü & Gökçe, 1991, p.99)

Fuat Ercan considers this shift in economic policy and argues that this change is caused by the development of domestic capitalist corporations in Turkey to a level that they cannot be satisfied with concentration on the domestic market.

Thus, they wanted to be integrated to the increasingly internationalizing circuit of capital on the world scale. He argues that internationalization of Turkish economy contributed to the advancement of big corporations at the expense of instability for the whole economy. There has been an alliance between the domestic capitalist class and the IMF and the World Bank, which represent the interests of the capitalists internationally (Ercan, 2002). These two agencies and World Trade Organization have played significant roles in the restructuring of Turkish economy through the 24th January measures in 1980. "The IMF and the World Bank monitored and encouraged, at each step, the restructuring of economic policy and of the economic agencies that formed the institutional support of the previous economic orientation, thus contributing in no small part to the overall instability and fragility of the economy." (Balkan & Savran, 2002, p.xv) These measures started the move towards neoliberalism and the coup of September 12 in 1980 created the political conditions for the execution of neoliberalism without opposition from working classes.

> The state's function was reduced to providing the system with a blue print, since the objective was a free market economy without state intervention in the market. Reducing the size of the public sector would remove the basis for pressures coming from private sector firms for concessions from the government; opening the economy to free trade would provide the means for growth without state protection for uncompetitive sectors; allowing the market forces to regulate wage rates would undermine the political bargaining strength of labor (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1991, p.59).

Capital accumulation had reached a certain stage in Turkey, at which some capitalist groups which have certain dominance in the circuit of domestic capital have enhanced their capacity for controlling the total circuit of capital. They wanted to control the crisis lived in 1970s and they got organized as holding companies, developed strategies and hegemonic projects in line with these strategies. These new strategies and the control capacity of capital led to major changes in all social relations. The short-term interests of the capitalist groups which have acquired success in the internationalization process contradicted with the interests of the country's whole economy (Ercan, 2002, p.22).

According to Ercan, and many others, the military coup of 1980 has been a significant factor in the integration of Turkey with world capital. For the internationalization of Turkey's economy, there was a need for a transformation and this transformation was achieved through three major actors:

- large scale capital, that acquired a hegemonic position (and this hegemony could not be continued in the prevailing conditions)
- state and political structure
- World Bank and IMF, which are the major actors of market oriented restructuring

Capitalist groups spent efforts to legitimize internationalization. State used its monopoly of violence for repressing social opposition to the order. And World Bank and IMF introduced economic policies for founding the new regime of capital accumulation. The interests of these three major actors overlapped to a certain extent. The crisis of capital accumulation was overcome through the military coup and the economic policies implemented on January 24, 1980. "The military coup reshaped the state so as to organize a state that was strong in its dealings with labor and social opposition. The January 24 decisions, on the other hand, were instrumental in implementing the economic measures appropriate to the new requirements of big capital." (Ercan, 2002, p.25) In the environment after the military coup in which social opposition was harshly repressed, the Stand-By Agreement for the period of 1980-1983 was made with IMF and an agreement on Structural Adjustment Loans for the period 1980-1984 was made with the World Bank.

The ideological discourse of the establishment of law and order in the country has served the internationalization of capital. The military dictatorship formed by the coup in 1980 acted as the 'united front of the bourgeoisie' subjugating the workers' and socialist movement, and taking back the rights won by the working class. The military regime did not tend to make any kind of reformist or radical act; in contrary, it immediately and definitely became engaged with

the economic and social program of the bourgeoisie (Boratav, 1991, p.73). Together with the 24 January measures, the function of the 12 September regime was preparing Turkish economy to the new path of capital accumulation, for integrating with the world capitalist system. This new method was decisively neoliberal. "The precondition for this new orientation was a radical change in the balance of forces between the two major classes of capitalism in favor of the bourgeoisie. This is what was successfully achieved by the military dictatorship." (Savran, 2002, p.15) After the military coup, DİSK was closed; unionists and leftists were arrested or given long prison sentences. The 1982 Constitution withdrew many of the rights given by 1961 Constitution and the new labor laws of the military regime took away even the most basic rights of workers (Tünay, 1993, p.187). Also, the attitude of the bourgeoisie towards the military regime is noteworthy to consider. All the employers' organizations and civilian politicians of the bourgeoisie supported the military regime. Military regime's priority has been demonstrating to both foreign financial circles and the domestic bourgeoisie its loyalty to the structural adjustment program. As Yalman reminds, "…one of the first things that the military junta did was to ask for the support of TÜSİAD in transmitting this message abroad, while the activities of all other associations were banned." (Yalman, 2002, p.39). Therefore, the military regime cannot be thought as autonomous from the class forces in Turkey.

Military rule not only established an authoritarian regime but also gained the consent of the masses who were disappointed with the political and economic crisis conditions in the pre-coup era. Both the military regime and also Turgut Özal's Motherland Party government which came to power in 1983 represented the previous order as undesirable, characterized by disorder and economic crisis, which were caused by outdated policies. Yalman argues that while the founding of 'law and order' was impressive in taking the consent of the people for 1982 Constitution on the one hand, the presence of many goods in the market which had disapperaed during crisis years played a similar role for the application of liberal economic principles on the other hand. Turgut Özal was

especially successful in making people believe that the only way to escape from economic crisis was to apply new policies regularly for a long time (Yalman, 2002, p.42).

The repression of the working class and the anti-capitalist struggle made it possible to implement the requirements of export-based growth. Turkey could be involved in the international division of labor through specializing in the labor intensive goods for increasing exports, as there was not sufficient capital in the country. Producing labor intensive goods led to being at the lower scales of hierarchy in terms of global competition. The efforts to have a share in the global hegemony of capitalism resulted in the application of means which are appropriate for the stage of primitive accumulation according to Ercan. For the capitalist classes which wanted to reach the opportunities created by internationalization, state has been the main point of reference.

> The provision by the state, under the guise of the free market, of resources for the reinforcement of capital necessary for the new accumulation regime in effect took the form of the socialization of the costs of the transformation of capital and its participation in the process of capital accumulation at the international level. In other words, for the last two decades, Turkey has been experiencing the pangs of the process the transfer of resources by the state to capital in the process of internationalization (Ercan, 2002, p.26).

The idea of the integration with the world economy became an end in itself during 1980s. The adjustment that was conducted was represented as aiming the integration of Turkish economy with the world economy. However, what actually happened was a change in the mode of integration. Moreover, this structural adjustment also brought a new mode of living, typified by the access to the imported consumption goods, which has been very effective in taking the consent of the people. During 1980s, structural adjustment was promoted through contrasting the period with 1970s, when there were not many consumption goods because of import-compression that was said to be forced by incapable governments. Yalman considers it as a hegemonic strategy for 1980s in parallel with the developments in the other parts of the world. Although real wages continuously fell during this period, some policies were

used for hiding the increasing inequalities in the distribution of income. Expectations for a better life were increased for the urban poor although the income they earn was decreasing. Such measures also had the significant ideological function of leading to the atomization of individuals through convincing them that "...they should as individuals determine their own values and objectives rather than expecting them as favours from the state." (Yalman, 2002, p.44).

Before the elections of November 1983, the governors of the army limited the number of political parties that could participate in the election and rejected many party candidates. It was far from being a democratic election process and directed the voters to certain political preferences. Turgut Özal's Motherland Party got the highest number of votes (Tünay, 1993, p.188). Turgut Özal had also been supported by international capitalist circles beginning from 1979 because of his sympathy to the free market ideology. The extent of this support is really surprising: In the period that the economy was directed by Özal, external debts of Turkey increased by USD 30 billion; in other words, international capital transferred this amount of money to Turkey. Boratav states that no other country has been supported by such a high amount of resources while applying a structural adjustment program (Boratav, 1991, p.82). The direction of economy by Özal was a precondition for this transfer of resources.

The period of Özal's Motherland Party government, which was between the years 1983-1987 has been a significant period in terms of the settling of neoliberal policies in Turkey. Özal government, for refounding the legacy of the system which was damaged by the military coup, took not only economic but also political and ideological measures. The government controlled the class conflict and adopted policies for providing the economic hegemony of the bourgeoisie. Through the populism of Motherland Party, urban poor and the rural poor who were increasingly migrating to the cities have become the supporters of the free market economy and ideology. Even the large proportions of the working classes have been detached from their class

identities and articulated to the system through the idea of rising up in the class hierarchy. Thus, according to Tülin Öngen, the period of 1983-1987 has been the one in which the international project that articulates Turkey to the global capitalism has been achieved, and economy and social life have been reshaped according to the interests of the capital (Öngen, 2003, p.177).

Özal continuously stated that the economic policies should be understood with their technical content and economic policies should not be applied considering welfare politics, equal income distribution and political reasoning. What he emphasized was that economics has its own rules. If these rules are not applied appropriately, it would be impossible to deal with the difficulties of inflation, unemployment, low efficiency and balance of payments. According to this approach, when economics is regarded as the most significant variable having its own rules, it is accepted that inequalities are inevitable for the functioning of capitalism. The limits put on the collective contracts, on the right to go on strike and on increases on wages showed that especially, or only, one part of the society would suffer from the new policies (Tünay, 1993, p.190).

Fikret Başkaya states that capitalist class in Turkey supported the export-oriented growth and the accompanying policy changes as they became conscious of their global interests. Although, it is possible to talk about the presence of fractions within the capitalist class in Turkey, it can be argued that at that juncture, different fractions of this class did not give priority to their sectional interests. They rather acted with a class consciousness (Başkaya, 1991, p.303). In an environment in which bourgeoisie supported external oriented model, it had been easy to get rid of the developmentalist bureaucracy. This bureaucracy was defined as leftist and hostile to capital. They were replaced by cadres who had their education and work experiences in America and who had double passports. This made it easier for the international capital to have its requirements applied (ibid., p.305).

4.3. Cultural and Social Life During 1980s in Turkey

The paradigmatic shift that was lived in the economic arena in Turkey during 1980s also led to transformations in the social and cultural life. It is even possible to talk about the emergence of a new system of values in this period. The free market ideology valorized individualism, as I mentioned above, competition and conforming to the new order. Özal continuously transmitted the message of not being content with one's current status and making use of the opportunities, not always lawfully, for individual success and enrichment. The social life during the period was full of contradictions. Political pressures and the access of commodities, tortures and calls for individualization, necessity of being silent and desire for speaking, explosion of the localities and determination of the localities by the global took place at the same time. During 1980s, culture has become something autonomous and has acquired a special emphasis. It has been an area that has both attracted much discussion and also been largely determined by the market. Life styles, personal tastes and pleasures came to the fore. There was a desire for individualization and personal requests could be expressed more easily. However, the requests were under the domination of others' requests and were, to a large extent, the requests of consumption. 1980s was a period in which the freedoms were limited the most but at the same time, people became 'free' the most in terms of consumption (Gürbilek, 1992, p.9-10).

There has been a shift of interest from public to private in this period. The private lives of individuals, which remained untouched by the media in the previous periods, became objects of analysis and representation during 1980s. The life styles, for the first time, have been defined and classified. A private life industry has emerged, creating its peculiar professions such as private life journalists and private life magazines (Gürbilek, 1992, p.55). Representation of others' lives and life styles in the media intensified the process of people's defining themselves by the goods they consume. Turkish society was on the way to being a consumer society and there was a young population which wished for rising up in the hierarchy to become a member of the elite for

having the same life style with them. People had become aware of the life styles of not only the upper classes in Turkey, but also the people in the US and Europe, and began thinking that the idea of being satisfied with less was not relevant any more. Young people and white-collar employees taking the head, everyone targeted acquiring more of better things, spending and consuming more, using the most high-quality goods, and spending time in the best places (Bali, 2002, p.57-61).

After the military intervention, with the passage to the free market economics, Turkey experienced intensified interactions with the external world. Goods that could only be bought from the black market or many imported goods that were regarded as luxury in the previous period, started to be sold in excessive amounts and acquiring these goods became a target for many people. Through the application of free market rules, the income levels of business people and managers started to increase rapidly and their levels of consumption also increased (Bali, 2002, p.19).

4.3.1. Professional Managers and Their Life Style

Yuppies (young urban professionals) emerged as the symbol of the period. They were the most educated and most successful members of a generation. Rising up in the class hierarchy was the key characteristic of them. The banking, finance and international marketing were prospering fields in the country and these people had the opportunity to earn big amounts in these fields. They believed in the importance of competition and worked for their individual benefits. They always wanted more of status, power, and consumption. Being a yuppie meant having a certain life style and certain consumption habits, and their life style has been influential on the expectations, consumption styles and ideology of the other segments of the society. They were the typical models of the valorized values of the period. And although there were minor differences, Turkish yuppie had many characteristics in common with American yuppie (Kozanoğlu, 1993).

Hayri Kozanoğlu talks about the spreading and popularization of the term 'professional' instead of 'bureaucrat' or 'technocrat'. With the devalorization of the public and the rise of private sector, 'administrator' and 'director' have become outdated and 'executive' and 'professional manager' have been popular. Executive refers to the person who has been authorized to make high level decisions within a firm, and professional manager is used for a person who had an undergraduate in management or had an MBA (Master of business administration) or someone who directs a firm in return to the salary he/she earns, different from a shareholder. At this point, it is necessary to emphasize how the demand for management or business administration education increased. To rise up in the organizational hierarchy in a short time in the firms, people started to plan to have business education either at undergraduate or graduate level. Having a business administration diploma started to increase the possibility of acquiring high positions, salaries, and prestige (Kozanoğlu, 1993, p. 22-34).

In Turkey, the score received from the University Placement Examination is one of the best signs of the potential of being a yuppie. There is a hierarchy in terms of both universities and departments in terms of their potential for making it possible to offer a high-paying job after graduation. Bosphorus University, Middle East Technical University and some of the private universities are at the top of this hierarchy. The fact that these universities instruct in English is determinant in their position. Also, some of the engineering (Electrics and electronics, computer, civil engineering) and business administration and other administrative departments rank higher than the other departments because of the future benefits they will offer to their graduates. Yuppies are the people who have been at the top universities and departments in terms of these hierarchies (Kozanoğlu, 1993). High schools can also be considered. A yuppie is a person who, for example, graduated from Robert College, the business administration department of Bosphorus University and had an MBA in the US. After graduating from these schools, yuppie works for the highest salary that can be earned as a professional.

As explained previously, after January 24 measures, integration of Turkish economy to the global market has been a priority. With the passage to export oriented growth, investments made to production have been lessened and the resources have been reserved for supporting exports. The aim of industrialization has been left. The prestige and monetary gains of the sectors which are appropriate for this economic policy have risen. Trade, banking and other service sectors have become valued and prestigious. Also, for being competitive in the international economy, big family corporations started to employ middle and high level professional managers instead of employing family members (Bali, 2002, p.41). The appropriate people for these sectors had to be able to establish international relations. They had to be able to communicate in foreign languages. They had to be competent and know techniques of finance. The graduates of top universities that instruct in English were very appropriate for these jobs. By then, not only the company owners but also these professional managers had the opportunity to earn big amounts of money in short periods. They represented the realization of the dreams of the majority of the people and have been the symbol of success. Entrepreneurship and success were the most favorite values of the period (Kozanoğlu, 1993).

During 1980s, a new image of the businessmen and managers was constructed especially through the efforts of media. Especially the professional managers who could rise to that level without having capital were represented as 'the real intellectuals of the period' who were travelling, meeting new people, and acquiring different knowledges. Being well-educated, at least bilingual people, they were demonstrated as knowing the appropriate manners and ways of doing things. They were shown as people who were not only interested in earning money but cultural acquisitions were also essential for them. They were integrated to the Western World and were 'speaking the same language' with the Europeans. They were world citizens (Bali, 2002, p.43).

By the removal of the limits on the financial operations and of the controls on foreign exchange transfers, credit cards and new banking services spread. Also,

the advertising sector prospered significantly with the releasing of imports. The advertising sector mostly targeted the young, urban, well-educated managers who had high incomes (Bali, 2002, p.21). High quality clothes were advertised especially for these people as clothes have made up an important part of their image. Also, expensive and luxurious restaurants and bars started to appear for serving the needs of these managers who have high-level incomes. Being able to distinguish good and delicious food, knowing different types of wine, eating in the best restaurants in İstanbul, Paris, London, and New York have also become the distinguishing characteristics of these managers (ibid., p.48-49).

Ankara was the city of bureaucracy and İstanbul has been the center of the new liberal and globalist orientation of the economy after 1980s. With the export orientation of the economy, many firms have been established which target the international markets. Also, multinational firms which did not have connections to Turkey in the developmentalist period started to make investments and establish branches in Turkey with the liberalization of Turkish economy. Most of the exports and the foreign investments were taking place in İstanbul. The finance sector has been the first one to integrate to world economy. The branches of foreign banks, exchange offices, leasing and insurance firms started to function one after another. Together with the foreign banks and firms, luxurious hotels have been built in İstanbul. And later, the shopping malls and stores appeared that targeted the people at high income levels. The new shopping malls were no different from the ones in the other world cities. Also, a series of restaurants have been established in İstanbul offering cuisines of various countries. To the European restaurants were added the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indian, Mexican ones. Entertainment sector has also prospered tremendously (Keyder, 1999, p.23-24). All these newly emerging sectors and places mainly serve the professional people at high income levels.

Especially in İstanbul, new types of residence also emerged which are appropriate for these elite people. With the spreading of the discourse that

İstanbul's social and cultural life were damaged with the new-comers (the migrants from rural areas), the city center was regarded as a place inappropriate for living a civilized life and new accommodation places were constructed outside the city center. 'Bahçekentler' were the groups of villas that were built to be sold to high income groups. Their prices range between USD 250.000 and USD 1.000.000. They are outside the city centers and within natural surroundings. They make it possible for these people to live with others who are like themselves and to live apart from the 'black crowds' (Öncü, 1999, p.31-32). Also, there emerged other types of residences, luxurious sites which were usually named as 'country' or 'city' (Kemer Country, Alkent, etc.). All these types of residences gave their inhabitants the opportunities of being away from the disorder of the city, living the environment of the 'good old days', creating spaces for personal activities and spending their limited free time in the most qualified way. These places offered the people 'a world of privileges': sports complexes, fitness centers, cinemas, restaurants, night clubs creating self-sufficient mini cities. The buyers of these residences not only bought houses but bought certain life styles (Bali, 1999, p.37).

The old district life in İstanbul was idealized during the period and these new residences were marketed with the claim of offering that pure and quiet life that was present in the good old days. For being the symbol of the old periods, the residences were given such names as Lale Kasrı, Yalı Konaklar, Sarı Konaklar, Segah Konak, Nihavent Konak. However, in real, the designed and lived life in these residences resembled American life style rather the life in the previous periods in Turkey. As Rıfat Bali narrates, in the booklet about Kemer Country, there was a photograph of three American boys playing baseball (Bali, 1999, p.38). For the sale of these residences, meetings were held with the participation of reputable business people, artists, journalists, and bureaucrats, and these people were presented as the future neighbors. Therefore, it was shown to the potential buyers that buying a house in those residences would mean much more than only owning a luxurious house. They were privileged people and would live with people similar to them, developing their

relationships and contacts, which will not only mean a more qualified life but also establishment of new networks which will be beneficial in many areas of life, as well as work. Following Ahmet İnsel's interpretation, it can be said that the homogenized residences are established for upper class people in which all kinds of social requirements are met and this is the indication of not only a haphazard, but rather a conscious effort of a social discrimination based on social class (İnsel, 1999, p.25).

Using Bourdieu's conceptualization of symbolic capital consisting of many kinds of indicators that distinguish different social classes from each other, as I will explain in more detail in the following chapter, in addition to the already stated issues of luxurious restaurants, bars, and certain types of residences, goods such as wine, cigars, luxurious cars and motorcycles, certain types of music (especially jazz and classical music), certain newspapers and magazines can also be considered part of the symbolic capital of the professional upper class people. As Ayşe Öncü suggests, high level managers of the firms that operate in the international markets have now been the part of global business culture. Being a part of this culture does not only mean working with computers, speaking English, sitting in the VIP lounges, but also includes wearing similar clothes, reading certain magazines and newspapers, laughing to the same jokes and, so, having the same life style (Öncü, 1999, p.34). It can be claimed that the group of professional managers in Turkey have very much in common in terms of their life styles with their counterparts in the other parts of the world. However, it can also be argued that the life style that these people have in common is an American life style rather than being a combination of various aspects coming from different cultural backgrounds.

4.4. Conclusion

After 1970s, with the economic crisis conditions lived, there has been a shift leading to to the application of neoliberal policies in the First World. The neoliberal philosophy regarded globalization as a necessity and for all the countries to make use of the benefits of globalization, application of certain

economic and political measures was essential. Realization of these measures in the Third World was especially achieved through Structural Adjustment Programs imposed by IMF and World Bank. Although Turkey had started its relations with these international institutions before, the measures of January 24 at 1980 have been determinant in the liberalization of Turkish economy. With the military coup that took place on September 12, the political conditions appropriate for applying these measures were created and Turkish economy's orientation was changed from import-substitution and developmentalism to export and integration with the world economic system. Although Turkish capitalist classes had different fractional interests, their combined interests had come to the front and they supported the participation of Turkish economy to the globalizing economic system. The domestic capitalist corporations in Turkey had developed to a level that the owners of them were not satisfied with being concentrated on the domestic market. They wanted to be integrated to the internationalizing world capital. Internationalization of Turkish economy has been beneficial for the big corporations in Turkey at the price of the decreasing incomes of the majority of the people and instability for the economy. Thus, the domestic capitalist class and the IMF and World Bank, which are institutions representing the interests of international capitalist class, made an alliance for internationalizing Turkish economy for securing their private interests.

With the passage to new economic policies, the aim of industrialization was left. The sectors that are appropriate for the new policies oriented to internationalization became more popular. Trade, banking and other service sectors have been prestigious. Also, with the big corporations beginning to employ professional managers, these managers especially working in the now-prestigious sectors started to earn large amounts of money, which led them to be included within the capitalist class. The professional managers were educated in best high schools and universities which instruct in English. Therefore, they were at the upper levels in terms of both economic and cultural capitals. Many consumption places (hotels, shopping malls, bars, restaurants)

were built for meeting the life style requirements of these people and newly emerging advertising sector especially targeted them. With their segregated work environments, entertainment places and residences, they have established a life style of discrimination based on social class. Although, they live isolated from people from different social classes within the same nation, they are very much in contact with people from the same class but different countries. Their life styles have very much in common.

Up to this point, I used the terms class and life style without making detailed explanations. In the next section, I will discuss what these two terms refer to reflecting on the arguments of major theorists about not only class and life style, but also consumption. As I will talk about, the concept of consumption has a significant role in clarifying why we started to talk about life styles extensively in addition to classes in the contemporary period.

CHAPTER 5

CLASSES AND LIFE STYLES

If there were no commonalties among the conditions, attitudes and habits of individuals, we could have an infinite series of gradations in terms of these categories, every individual being located on the scale in relation to every other individual. However, we observe that there are groups, categories or collectivities of individuals who share similar conditions in comparison with other social groups. There are not infinite but limited numbers of groups which exist in relations of superiority or advantage and inferiority or disadvantage in terms of some criteria. These groups have been defined by concepts such as parties, power groups, status groups or classes, each group having similar conditions, attitudes and habits in themselves and being different from every other group in these terms.

The main aim of this chapter is to deal with the issue of how to conceptualize life style of a certain group. For this aim, firstly Marxian conceptualization of class and Weberian status group will be considered as different approaches about the determination of different groups; class, mainly determined by production relations and status group by multiple criteria- property ownership, education, cultural differences, etc. Weber's theory of status will be taken as a complement to Marxist understanding of class, adding new dimensions into the picture and making it possible to consider consumption and life styles as important markers of differentiation between groups especially in the contemporary period. Then, it will be explained how consumption has been used as a way of establishing distinction from the beginning of modernity through Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class*. It will be argued that the aim of establishing distinction which was mostly relevant for a privileged class in

Veblen's theory has been relevant also for the lower classes in the contemporary period, especially after 1950s, with increase in consumption for all classes. Two theories, those of Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood's and Jean Baudrillard's, will be explained to demonstrate how consumption is used as a means of communication: to communicate status. And lastly, Pierre Bourdieu's theory will be considered in detail as a model for considering life styles which takes into consideration not only economic capital but also social, cultural and symbolic capitals.

5.1. Class versus Status

Although it had been used even in Roman times to refer to division of Roman people on the basis of property ownership, the concept of class has acquired widespread usage after the industrial revolution, related to the new division of labor within the society. The industrial capitalism, beginning first in England and then in France, Germany and the United States, spreading to the other countries of Europe and becoming a global process in our century, shaped the class structure. This is why it has been one of the major interests of the sociologists of modernity to think of the classes and to analyze class relations within the context of the changing societies of modernity (Edgell, 1993).

 Karl Marx is well-known to have developed one of the most important theories about class. In his explanations about industrial capitalism, Marx talked about the emergence of two major classes which are in direct conflict: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Bourgeoisie is the class that owns the means of production. Proletariats do not have the means of production and they have to sell their labor power in order to survive. Thus, these two classes are determined by their positions in the production relations. As stated, they are in constant conflict, because bourgeoisie needs to exploit the labor of proletariat in order to be able to make profit in competitive market conditions; there is an inverse relationship between the profits of bourgeoisie and the wages of proletariat. Talking about two major classes, Marx also considered the presence of many other classes and class divisions in his several studies. In addition to

bourgeoisie and proletariat, he pointed out to petite bourgeoisie, peasants, and middle classes, which are also diversified in themselves. However, although class theory of Marx does not totally exclude the possibility of presence of many classes and class divisions, it supposes that these classes will disappear as a result of the development of big industry. The main conflict is between two major classes (Marx & Engels, 1998).

After this too simplified summary of Marx's class theory, I will briefly talk about Weber's theory of class, which is regarded as the major alternative theory to that of Marx. Weber's theory is usually called as the social stratification theory and includes categories such as status and ethnic stratification, contrary to Marx's. Weber introduced the term 'class status'.

> The term class status will be applied to the typical probability that a given state of (a) provision with goods, (b) external conditions of life, and (c) subjective satisfaction or frustration will be possessed by an individual or a group. These probabilities define class status in so far as they are dependent on the kind and extent of control or lack of it which the individual has over goods or services and existing possibilities of their exploitation for the attainment of income or receipts within a given economic order (Weber, 1964, p.424).

Weber regarded class as referring to a group of people having the same class status and talked about the presence of many types of classes: property classes, acquisition classes and social classes. In a property class, the class status of the members is determined by differentiation of property holdings, and in acquisition class by their opportunities for the use of services in the market (Weber, 1964, p.424). According to Weber, social classes are the groupings of social conditions. He stated four such groups: the class of workers, petite bourgeoisie, intellectuals and specialists, and the classes that are privileged as a result of their properties and education. He made a distinction between class and status. Class is principally an economic concept; it is determined by the position of the individuals in the market. Having property is the main criterion for the class positions. However, for identifying different class positions, he took into consideration not only property ownership but also education, and made an analysis of status groups (Edgell, 1993).

According to Marx, the real divisions within the society and social stratifications have economic bases. The reasons for social inequalities and hierarchies primarily rest on economic relations. However, for Weber, there are many dimensions of social stratification such as economics, power and cultural difference. Not only the economically determined classes but also the status groups are important elements of the social stratification system. Status is based on the honor or respect acquired through a particular life style, formal education and occupational positions within the society. What Weber refers to by the term status group is a collectivity of social actors which manages to acquire social honor within a wide social environment and which has certain social privileges. Status groups are the communal groups which can have access to the limited resources through having cultural, moral and symbolic qualifications (Turner, 2001, p.16).

It is generally accepted that the idea of status groups suggested by Weber has offered an alternative to the Marxist economic class analysis. However, some writers argue that it will be more appropriate to interpret Weberian approach as a contribution to Marxist analysis rather than an alternative to it (Bocock, 1997). Weber's theory makes it possible to analyze the class structures within societies through a more sophisticated model, adding into picture the issues of status, life styles, and consumption, while still being aware of the essential role of economy in determining the class structure. Especially for the class analysis of advanced capitalist societies of contemporary era, Weberian more than the Marxist model has influenced the theoretical approaches, as the concept of status group implying eating, dressing, entertainment, or briefly consumption habits seem more appropriate for a decade in which consumption is a key factor in social differentiation.

5.2. Consumption

It may be argued that consumption or possession of certain articles has, for a long period of time throughout the history of humankind, been used to demonstrate power and domination. However, it is widely stated that in the

advanced industrial societies, especially after the Second World War, economic productivity and the opportunities for ownership have increased, leading to an increasing stress on consumption. The significance of production and acquisition of basic material needs has decreased, as there has been a significant rise in standards of living. With emphasis shifting from production to consumption, cultural and social construction of classes, in addition to economic construction has been given significance and life styles have been regarded as determining the attitudes and behaviors of people (Crompton, p.166).

Marx, in *Grundrisse*, talked about the reciprocal relationship between production and consumption.

> ...Thus, production produces consumption 1) by creating the material for it; 2) by determining the manner of consumption; and 3) by creating the products, initially posited by it as objects, in the form of a need felt by the consumer. It thus produces the object of consumption, the manner of consumption, and the motive of consumption. Consumption likewise produces the producer's inclination by beckoning to him as an aim-determining need (Marx, 1978, p.230).

However, although he recognized the mutual relationship between them, he had been mainly interested in not the consumption but the production of commodities. According to Marx, in the capitalist system, the commodities are produced not for direct use or immediate consumption, but rather for being sold in the market. The workers in industrial capitalism, contrary to previous modes of production, cannot own or use the products of their own labor. They produce commodities by the machines, none of which they own. In order to survive, they have to buy the commodities that the other workers or they, themselves produced by their wages. By this way, they are forced to be consumers (Bocock, 1997, p.44). Consumption, then, should be placed within the production model of the industrial capitalism. However, for making a proper analysis of consumption, it is necessary to avoid being contented with economic explanations and to give importance also to the roles that cultural values and symbols play.

From the beginnings of modern period, consumption played an important role in the lives of the people and gave them the opportunity to distinguish themselves from other status groups. Consumption also provided the means for those groups to acquire a sense of social identity. With the development of industrial capitalism in the US and the Western Europe, such status groups started to develop. One of these groups was the new middle class in North America which made big fortunes through production and trade, a group which was studied by Thorstein Veblen in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. The members of this group were trying to demonstrate their newly-acquired wealth through conspicuous consumption. These people not only consumed the necessities of life beyond the subsistence level, but also their consumption has been specialized in terms of the quality of the goods consumed (Veblen, 1994, p.46). While consuming freely the best quality of 'food, drink, narcotics, shelter, services, ornaments, apparel, weapons', etc., not only the higher efficiency of the improved products is taken into consideration; reputability is an important concern in using these qualified products. "Since the consumption of these more excellent goods is an evidence of wealth, it becomes honorific; and conversely, the failure to consume in due quantity and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and demerit." (ibid., p.46)

According to Veblen, the importance attached to the qualitative excellence has an effect not only on the manner of life, but also on the training and intellectual activities of this 'leisure class'. The members of this class cultivate their tastes to be able to differentiate between noble and ignoble goods. To consume the right kind of goods, they should learn how to consume them in an appropriate manner. "...His life of leisure must be conducted in due form. Hence arise good manners... High-bred manners and ways of living are items of conformity to the norm of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption." (Veblen, 1994, p.47) Conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is important for reputability. Also, giving valuable presents, expensive feasts and entertainments are demonstrations of accumulated wealth. It is important, as in

an industrial community, good repute mainly rests on pecuniary strength and the main ways of demonstrating pecuniary strength and having a good name are leisure and conspicuous consumption (ibid., p.52). However, as Veblen indicates, none of the classes in the society can be thought as being deprived of or free from conspicuous consumption.

> ...The last items of this category of consumption are not given up except under stress the direct necessity. Very much of squalor and discomfort will be endured before the last trinket or the last pretense of pecuniary decency is put away. There is no class and no country that has yielded so abjectly before the pressure of physical want as to deny themselves all gratification of this higher or spiritual need (ibid., p.53).

Veblen states that although both leisure and conspicuous consumption are used as ways of showing wealth, he argues that in the modern era consumption started to become the single way for it. In the modern organization of industry, people usually stay together with people whom they do not have any relationship and the only way to show one's pecuniary ability to these people is to show the ability to pay. In modern communities, people usually attend large gatherings in places such as theatres, hotels, parks, shops, etc. "...In order to impress these transient observers, and to retain one's self-complacency under their observation, the signature of one's pecuniary strength should be written in characters which he who runs may read." (Veblen, 1994, p.54) The use of consumption as a way of reputation is the most in places where the human contact is widest and the mobility of the population is greatest. Thus, consumption is a more significant element of everyday life in the city compared to that in the country.

Veblen's study had not attracted much attention at the time it was written. However, especially after 1980s, with the emphasis on consumption in the sociological theories, Veblen's theory has been reconsidered. Veblen had described how consumption had an important part in the life style of a wealthy class. However, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, in societies in which consumption started to play a major role also in less wealthy groups, the major dynamics of differentiation and acquiring reputability

explained by Veblen are still very relevant for analyzes of class and consumption.

Let's turn back to the historical development of consumption. At the end of the nineteenth century, Henry Ford, in his automobile factory, developed techniques of mass production for producing automobiles. These mass production techniques were later named as 'Fordism'. Henry Ford was paying high wages to the workers and aiming to sell the automobiles produced to the families of the workers. This event has been regarded as an important challenge in the development of Western capitalism. Especially in the US, during the first ten years of the twentieth century, this led to an enormous increase in both mass production and consumption. In the European countries, mass consumption started to gain importance later than the US, during 1950s (Bocock, 1997, p.30). Mass consumption which had already spred in the US started to develop also in Western Europe among nearly all the classes within these countries. Both middle classes and the groups of workers not only had the necessary level of wages for acquiring their basic needs, but also they started to be responsive about consuming more and buying new commodities.

> ...(I)f one asks sociologists to locate the beginnings of consumer society, one may get a few puzzled looks. Many may be tempted to go no further back than the aftermath of the Second World War, when the Marshall plan helped rebuild Europe and an economic boom lasting a quarter of a century ensured that social classes that previously could never hoped to accumulate much suddenly began to have access to all sorts of goods their parents never could have imagined. The key period here, then, would be the 1950s (Corrigan, 1997, p.2).

These are the economical reasons behind increasing importance and relevance of consumption in the contemporary era. However, in order to understand how people 'communicate positions in the social world' and how classes differentiate themselves through consumption and life styles, two approaches that take into consideration the cultural significance of consumption will be explained, those of Mary Douglas & Baron Isherwood and Jean Baudrillard.

5.2.1. Mary Douglas & Baron Isherwood: The World of Goods

Douglas and Isherwood, in their work *The World of Goods: Towards and Anthropology of Consumption*, argue that people consume goods 4rbto found an intelligible life, and construct and maintain social relationships. They look for an anthropological answer to the question of what the uses of goods are. They state that firstly, goods make not only visible but also stable the categories of culture (Douglas & Isherwood, 1996, p.38). They take all material possessions as carrying social meanings, being used as communicators and making up social relations. For them "...the essential function of consumption is not to fulfil needs in any prosaically useful way, such as food for eating, but rather its capacity to make sense; it is not so much that food is good for eating but that is good for thinking." (Corrigan, 1997, p.18) The commodities should be thought as forming a non-verbal medium for human creativity.

Individuals use consumption to give an impression about themselves, their families and their localities. It is an active process and in this process, all social categories are continuously redefined. For giving an answer to the question of why people want goods, an information approach should be employed, consumption goods not only being defined as messages, but constituting the system.

> Take them out of human intercourse and you have dismantled the whole thing. In being offered, accepted, or refused, they either reinforce or undermine existing boundaries. The goods are both the hardware and the software, so to speak, of an information system whose principal concern is to monitor its own performance (Douglas & Isherwood, 1996, p.49).

Thus instead of evaluating goods as serving bodily needs, they propose to focus on the 'classifying project to which they are recruited'. The goods should be treated as markers, classifying the categories. They acquire value by the agreement of consumers and consumers create a world which is made up of commodities chosen for their appropriateness to mark the events in a graded scale. Also, in addition to the physical consumption of goods, the enjoyment of sharing names is another essential issue. The joys of sharing the names of the

goods can be enjoyed after a long investment of time and cash. "Physical consumption allows, proving, testing, or demonstrating that the experience in question is feasible. But...the greater part of utility is yielded not as proving but in sharing names that have been learned and graded." (Douglas & Isherwood, 1996, p.52)

Douglas and Isherwood evaluate consumption as a field in which exclusion from control can be applied. They think that the higher families in the social hierarchy are the more together they are with each other and have wider social networks than lower classes. They have access to more information through their social contacts and to be in control of such information is essential for a high earning potential. Earning depends on sources of information that can be achieved through shared consumption. "...(A) man's chance of not being made redundant in the next decade, and certainly his ability to guide his children into the mainstream, depend on the scale of consumption he maintains." (Douglas & Isherwood, 1996, p.64) Thus, to summarize, people need goods for communicating with others and for making sense of the world. These two can be taken as one, as communication can only take place in a structured system of meanings. Therefore, for the consumer, having information about the changing cultural scene is an important concern, but it is not enough. It is also necessary to have control over it and to be near the center of the transmission of information. "...(B)eing near the center requires a strategy of organizing the exchange of marking services so as not to be excluded from shared civilities..." (ibid., p.67) The ones who have comparative disadvantages in technology of consumption will be unsuccessful in keeping information under control. A kind of social mechanism which is unregulated puts status barriers and these lead to differences in consumption patterns (ibid., p.82).

5.2.2. Jean Baudrillard: The Consumer Society
Another theoretical explanation about consumption which takes into account the systematic aspects of it is Baudrillard's. In parallel with Douglas and Isherwood's conceptualization, commodities are used for communication

according to Baudrillard. According to him, commodities establish a system of signs and this is a cultural system "...which substitutes a social order of values and classifications for a contingent world of needs and pleasures, the natural and biological order." (Corrigan, 1997, p.20). In our age, the people are surrounded by objects rather than by other people, and they deal not with others but with 'reception and manipulation of goods and messages'. The goods are now organized in packages; they are offered together with other objects. "...And this changes the consumer's relation to the object: he no longer relates to a particular object in its specific utility, but to a set of objects in its total signification." (Baudrillard, 1998, p.27) We can no longer talk about only a sequence of objects but of signifiers, signifying each other reciprocally. Objects are not brought to be consumed in disorder; rather, they form paths shaping the purchasing of people towards networks of objects. "Clothing, machines, and toiletries thus constitute object pathways, which establish inertial constraints in the consumer: he will move logically from one object to another." (ibid., p.27)

Baudrillard thinks that when consumer products are taken individually, they do not have any meaning. The meaning resides in the relationship of the objects to each other and their overall social perspective. Baudrillard sees consumption as a class institution and thinks that in addition to the inequality in terms of purchasing objects (or inequality in the economic sense), there is a more radical inequality "...in the sense that only some people achieve mastery of an autonomous, rational logic of the elements of the environment (functional use, aesthetic organization, cultural accomplishment)." (Baudrillard, 1998, p.59) People who have that mastery do not really deal with objects or do not 'consume'; they have a mastery of the logic of the system of objects. The others both valorize the objects as such and also valorize the ideas, knowledge, culture, etc. as objects. "...(T)his fetishistic logic is...the ideology of consumption." (ibid., p.59)

According to Baudrillard, objects serve to stimulate status which is attained by a small group of people through birth. Hereditary legitimacy has a central importance for status; the ideal end is a status by birth or 'a status of grace'. For people who cannot reach 'salvation by grace', 'salvation by works' is the sole alternative. That means, they need objects to have a status as they do not have it from birth. Thus, according to Baudrillard, the lower and middle classes need objects to prove themselves, which is an endeavour for attaining 'salvation by consumption' or status of personal grace. However, personal grace belongs to the upper classes and they prove their excellence by displaying their culture and exercising power (Baudrillard, 1998, p.60).

In the above discussion, we can see consumption analyzed from two angles: consumption as a process of communication and as a process of classification and differentiation. When we take consumption as communication, we talk about a code to which consumption practices fit and by which they acquire their meaning. Consumption as a means of differentiation include sign/objects being ordered as status values.

> ...(Y)ou never consume the object in itself (in its use-value); you are always manipulating objects (in the broadest sense) as signs which distinguish you either by affiliating you to your own group taken as an ideal reference or by marking you off from your group by reference to a group of higher status (Baudrillard, 1998, p.61).

Therefore, we should leave the logic of satisfaction of the individual and employ the social logic of differentiation.

To sum up, consumption should not be thought in terms of an individual with personal needs. A structural logic of differentiation, which takes into consideration general models and a code, should be applied, producing individuals as different from each other. In particularizing themselves, they conform to these general models/codes. "The basic logic is that of differentiation/ personalization viewed in terms of the code." (Baudrillard, 1998, p.92) Having the same code and same signs makes members of a group different from another group. The 'parity' of the members of the group

emerges from the difference from the other group. Hence, for Baudrillard, sociological analysis should be shifted from "...the phenomenal study of prestige, imitation and superficial field of the conscious social dynamic towards the analysis of codes, structural relations and systems of signs and distinctive material..." (ibid., p.93)

In the theories of both Douglas & Isherwood and Baudrillard, we see the notion that consumption is primarily communication. The objects consumed form 'object pathways', certain objects consumed together and they communicate status. In the following part, Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical model will be explored extensively. In this model, it will be demonstrated how Bourdieu introduces a multi-dimensional explanation to the formation of life styles through his application of the term habitus and four capitals, taking into consideration not only the property ownership or capital accumulation as the guarantees of distinction but also the knowledge of differentiating in a world of commodities (Chaney, 1996, p.67).

5.2.3. Pierre Bourdieu

Bourdieu tries to form a theoretical model of social practice and for doing this, he offers several distinctive properties of practice. First, regarding practice as an objective social phenomenon, he thinks that it cannot be understood outside time and place. Also he thinks that there is not a conscious organization or orchestration of practice. However, this does not mean that practices are random. "...(A)s one thing follows on from another, practice happens." (Jenkins, 1992, p.70) Individuals not only face their conditions but also they are parts of those conditions. They are born into those conditions and grow within them, acquiring a social identity. They accept the social world they are living in as given. "...(T)hey do not think about it because they do not have to." (ibid., p.70) Bourdieu calls this *doxa*.

> Systems of classification which reproduce, in their own specific logic, the objective classes...make their specific contribution to the reproduction of the power relations of which they are the product, by securing the misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are based: in the extreme case...when there is a

quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization...the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call doxa... (Bourdieu, 1977, p.164).

Social world is not governed by rules according to Bourdieu. Practices are improvisatory performances. Although they are not consciously organized, still they have their purposes. Thus, for describing the practices, he moves from 'rules' to 'strategies': "To substitute strategy for the rule is to reintroduce time, with its rhythm, its orientation, its irreversibility." (Bourdieu, 1977, p.9) Therefore, with this model, he tries to balance freedom and constraint of the agents, and introduces practices "...as the product of processes which are neither wholly conscious nor wholly unconscious, rooted in ongoing process of learning...through which actors know without knowing the right thing to do." (Jenkins, 1992, p.72).

While considering the actions of the other people, Bourdieu thinks that what those individuals tell about their own experiences cannot be taken as adequate. "...(S)ubjects do not ...know what they are doing that what they do has more meaning than they know." (Bourdieu, 1977, p.79) It is necessary to look at the conditions that lead to the realization of subjects' experience. Although this is a necessary first step, it also cannot be sufficient; "...an adequate theory of practice will also have to ask about the conditions of representation which underlie any objectivist account..." (Chaney, 1996, p.58).

Related to his studies of social practice, Bourdieu also considers the daily lives of the individuals. He neither takes social life as a collective of individual practices, nor tries to understand it as totally determined by structures. He tries to overcome the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism through his use of the concept of *habitus*.

One has to escape from the realism of the structure, to which objectivism...necessarily leads when it hypostatizes these relations by treating them as realities already constituted outside of the history of the group- without falling back into subjectivism...To do this, one has to return to practice, the site of the dialectic of the opus operatum and the modus operandi; of the objectified products and the

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incorporated products of historical practice; of structures and habitus (Bourdieu, 1990, p.52).

Bourdieu states that in order to understand the life style of an agent or agents, it is necessary to consider that there is homogeneity behind the various practices that appear diversified. The concept of *habitus* is introduced in order to clarify this homogeneity of practices and it needs to be further clarified as it has a key role in understanding Bourdieu's conceptualization of life styles of different agents and classes of agents. Bourdieu, in his several texts, gives various definitions of habitus. Habitus is "...the internalized form of class condition and of the conditionings it entails." (Bourdieu, 1984, p.101), "...the strategy generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations..." (Bourdieu, 1977, p.72), "...the source of...series of moves which are objectively organized as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention..." (ibid., p.73), "...a socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating structures, and the socially structured situation in which the agents' interests are defined and with them the objective functions and subjective motivations of their practices." (ibid., p.76), "...the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvizations..." (ibid., p.78) and "...history turned into nature..." (ibid., p.78). Although he does not completely exclude the classical differentiations between the classes, he thinks that it is not enough to regard the position in the relations of production, indicated by occupation, income level or even education, for defining a class.

> Social class is not defined by a property...nor by a collection of properties...nor even by a chain of properties strung out from a fundamental property...in a relation of cause and effect, conditioner and conditioned, but by the structure of relations between all the pertinent properties which gives its specific value to each of them and to the effects they exert on practices (Bourdieu, 1984, p.106).

Individuals who have similar conditions, thus, have similar systems of dispositions, which create similar practices and similar common properties. "(S)ocial class understood as a system of objective determinations, must be brought into relation not with the individual or with the 'class' as a population...but with the class habitus, the system of dispositions (partially)

common to all products of the same structures." (Bourdieu, 1977, p.85) Here, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by disposition. "The word 'disposition'...encompasses three distinct meanings: a) 'the result of an organizing action', a set of outcomes which he describes as approximating to structure b) a 'way of being' or a 'habitual state'; and c) a 'tendency', 'propensity' or 'inclination'..." (Jenkins, 1992, p.76)

The classes of different conditions are differentiated from one another mostly by the total volume of capital, which includes economic, social, cultural and symbolic capitals. However, this primary difference is associated by secondary differences, which create class fractions having different asset structures or in other words, having different distributions of their total capital among these types of capital (Bourdieu, 1984, p.114).

> "..(A)gents are distributed in the overall social space, in the first dimension according to the global volume of capital they possess, in the second dimension according to the composition of their capital, that is according to the relative weight in their overall capital of the various forms of capital, especially economic and cultural, and in the third dimension according to the evolution in time of the volume and composition of their capital, that is, according to their trajectory in social space. Agents and sets of agents are assigned a position, a location or a precise class of neighbouring positions, i.e., a particular area within that space; they are thus defined by their relative position in terms of a multidimensional system of coordinates whose values correspond to the values of the different pertinent variables (Bourdieu, 1987, p.4).

These conditions produce different habituses, the systems of dispositions, which are both 'structured structures' and 'structuring structures' as they produce practices (Bourdieu, 1977, p.72). People who have same positions have a big probability of having the same habitus or vice versa. The dispositions possessed as a result of the position occupied also brings with it an *adjustment to this position*. Bourdieu uses Erving Goffman's phrase of *sense of one's place* to refer to it. The sense of one's place is also the sense of others' place.

Bourdieu makes a very significant reminder about the classes, differentiating between the constructed and real classes. Bourdieu identifies constructed

classes as theoretically assembling agents "...who, being subject to similar conditions, tend to resemble one another and...are inclined to assemble practically, to come together as a practical group, and thus to reinforce their points of resemblance..." (Bourdieu, 1987, p.6). It will not be appropriate to equate constructed classes which exist only on paper with real classes, the mobilized groups which have 'absolute or relative' self-consciousness. Although the groupings have their rationale behind, we cannot see the social groups as ready-made in the world; they have always been the products of historical constructions.

Habitus is not only defined by 'the capacity to produce classifiable practices and works' but also by 'the capacity to differentiate and appreciate the practices and works' which correspond to *taste*. The space of life styles is formed by the relationship between these two capacities. "...habitus is constructed as the generative formula which makes it possible to account both for the classifiable practices and products, and for the judgements, themselves classified, which make the practices and works into a system of distinctive signs..." (Bourdieu, 1984, p.169-170)

Individuals internalize the necessities they experience and convert them into dispositions, which refer to the habitus. Habitus leads to the creation of meaningful practices and meaning giving perceptions. As they are the products of identical systems, the practices of the individuals are systematic. However, they are also systematically different from the practices that make up another life style (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). All the basics of culture and classifications of habitus are coded into the body. This codification is realized through not only learning but also socialization; habitus is immersed by both teaching and also experience. Here, another term that Bourdieu uses should be introduced: *bodily hexis*.

> Bodily hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic, because linked to a whole system of techniques involving the body and tools, and charged with a host of social meanings and values...(Bourdieu, 1977, p.87).

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Bodily hexis "...is used to signify deportment, the manner and style in which actors 'carry themselves': stance, gait, gesture, etc. It is in bodily hexis that the idiosyncratic (the personal) combines with the systematic (the social)." (Jenkins, 1992, p.75). The properties coded as bodily hexis are beyond consciousness and they are not subject to voluntary transformation.

The presence of dispositions is also beyond consciousness, as indicated before. However, this does not prevent some degree of consciousness to be included. Bourdieu does not deny that the individuals make choices and decisions, but he tells that they cannot choose or decide about the principles of their choices. These principles he talks about refer to the dispositions, which make up the habitus. "...(T)he habitus disposes actors to do certain things; it provides a basis for the generation of practices." (Jenkins, 1992, p.78) The habitus and the dispositions, and the limitations and opportunities of the social field in which the individual is acting form the practices. Here, the individual adjusts his/her habitus and practices to the limitations or external conditions, without doing it intentionally.

Another central concept in Bourdieu is *field*. "A central element of the logic of practice is agents' engagement with the objective structures of the modern world, crystallized into those patterns of relations, with their specific determining force, that we call fields..." (Fowles, 2000, p.1) Bourdieu defines field as a ground in which individuals struggle for having access to the resources. The properties of a field characterize how the situation of people within that field will be. It is a system that includes social positions and the forces between those positions. To put it another way, power relations construct the field internally. "Positions stand in relationships of domination, subordination or equivalence (homology) to each other by virtue of the access they afford to the goods or resources (capital) which are at stake in the field." (Jenkins, 1992, p.85) There are four types of resources according to Bourdieu, which are economic capital (in its various kinds), social capital (consisting of resources based on connections and group membership), cultural capital

(informational capital) and symbolic capital (the form different capitals take as they are perceived and recognized as legitimate) (Bourdieu, 1987, p.4). The importance of these forms of capital is that the social positions are identified with their relations to them. "The existence of a field presupposes and, in its functioning, creates a belief on the part of participants in the legitimacy and value of the capital which is at stake in the field." (ibid., p.85)

It is important to find out how the field is related to the field of power or politics, as the field of power is accepted as the main field. Also, it is essential to look at the objective structure of positions that form the field and their relations in the struggle for the capital in the field. Lastly, habituses of the individuals in a certain field should be considered "...along with the trajectories or strategies which are produced in the interaction between habitus and the constraints and opportunities which are determined by the structure of the field." (Jenkins, 1992, p.86). The concept of field is important in that it is a key to comprehend how external conditions are related to individual practices.

While looking at social classes, Bourdieu's frame of thought in which society includes interdependent fields have been invaluable. Classes are composed of individuals who have similar positions in a field. "The closer the positions are, the more likely is the participation of their occupants in a shared habitus, the possibility of their constitution as a social group through political struggle and collective recognition of their identity as distinct from other groups or classes." (Jenkins, 1992, p.88) The fields are identified with struggles and these struggles include formation and organization of group identities. Here, there is a transition from objectively defined to subjectively founded classes.

Bourdieu, in his interest in culture, considers both cultural tastes and also how these tastes are formed due to the struggles for status. Bryan Turner's summary of Bourdieu's understanding of status is important:

> ...(S)ocial status involves practices which emphasize and exhibit cultural distinctions and differences which are a crucial feature of all social stratification...Status may be conceptualized therefore as life style; that is as the totality of cultural practices such as dress, speech, outlook and bodily dispositions...While status is about political

entitlement and legal location within civil society, status also involves, and to a certain
extent is, style (Turner cited in Jenkins, 1992, p.130).

In considering the cultural products and tastes, Bourdieu constructs a model with three levels, which also refer to 'a hierarchy of legitimacies'. At the first level, there is the culture of legitimacy, including music, painting, sculpture, literature and theatre, and judgements about them are made by legitimate authorities, such as universities and museums. The second level is the 'sphere of legitimisable' which includes jazz, cinema and photography. The last level, which is the bottom, is the 'sphere of the arbitrary' and the choices about the areas like fashion, food and furniture are made on the basis of individual taste. This can be regarded as a scheme of cultural products on the basis of their legitimacy.

Especially in his book *Distinction*, Bourdieu criticizes Kant's understanding of aesthetics as a pure category, in which cultural goods can be evaluated aesthetically without making any reference to the other things outside of itself. Bourdieu discusses that aesthetics is learned and this learning happens mostly at school. Therefore, appreciation of art is not a characteristic that one carries from birth, but rather is produced through a process of learning within the educational system. However, it should be stressed that this learning cannot take place in every school and it is relevant for upper and some middle class families. The opinion that there is an innate taste before socialization or education leads to the belief that a qualified nature exists for some individuals. Thus, individuals who have cultural capital consider their 'distinction' as natural. "...(T)he real 'masters of the judgement of taste' can appear to rise above the dictates of culture, although they operate within them all the time." (Jenkins, 1992, p.133) The individuals belonging to the privileged classes take the difference between lower classes and themselves not emerging as a result of educational system but as rooted in the difference between natures, 'one nature naturally cultivated, another nature naturally natural'. Systems of cultural classification are born from class system.

Similar to the three-level model presented before about the legitimacy of cultural products, Bourdieu introduces another model for cultural tastes. At the top, there is the legitimate taste, then middle-brow taste and at the bottom is the popular taste (Bourdieu, 1984). The levels in this model correspond to different educational levels and social classes. Popular taste mostly belongs to the working class and the sense of aesthetic here is a dominated one, identifying itself with reference to the dominant aesthetic. The working class cannot choose the goods that require an aesthetic judgement with precisely an aesthetic point of view: they should in many cases make the choices out of necessity. Contrary to it, choices of privileged classes are far from necessity and their relation to the world is a relation of confidence. They have a sense of distinction. The petite bourgeoisie stands between the two levels. They try to distance themselves from the working class but they do not have the necessary education in order to be able to apply the legitimate taste. In addition to it "...and perhaps more important, they lack 'ease or cultivated naturalness', the familial habitus which enables the upper classes to disguise what they have learned as what they are born with." (Jenkins, 1992, p.139).

As Bourdieu emphasizes in *Distinction*, "...taste is the basis of all that one has-people and things- and all that one is for others, whereby one classifies oneself and is classified by others." (Bourdieu, 1993, p.56). Hence, taste is a central element of social identity. Taste, as the sense of principle lying beneath the choices, displays itself through tastes, the selection made among practices and properties.

> In order for there to be tastes, there have to be goods that are classified, as being in 'good' or 'bad' taste, 'distinguished' and 'vulgar' –classified and thereby classifying, hierarchized and hierarchizing- and people endowed with principles of classification, tastes, that enable them to identify, among those goods, those that suit them, that are 'to their taste'... (Bourdieu, 1993, p.108).

Hence, tastes are defined as characteristics and exercises of individuals or groups, and they emerge as a result of the encounter between goods and a taste. "...(T)o discover something to one's taste is to discover oneself, to discover

what one wants..., what one had to say and didn't know how to say and, consequently, didn't know." (Bourdieu, 1993, p.109)

Bourdieu looks at the concept of life style in relation to class. "...(L)ifestyle allows for the possibility of changing class formations and distinctive differences between class fractions." (Chaney, 1996, p.67) It is not an easy practice to find out the common properties that form a class life style as there are too many diverse practices. In order to understand the structure of class life styles, Bourdieu first looks at the objective classes, which refer to the people who have common or alike living conditions and, as a result of it, alike habituses. In constructing the objective classes, Bourdieu takes occupation as an indicator of social class. He, then, also looks at the economic capital (indicated by home and car ownership, income, etc.) and cultural capital (indicated by reading newspaper, going to theater, listening to classical music, etc.). Symbolic capital is also taken into consideration as a form of 'credit'. "When one knows that symbolic capital is credit...a kind of advance, a credence, that only the group's belief can grant those who give it the best symbolic and material guarantees, it can be seen that the exhibition of symbolic capital...is one of the mechanisms which...make capital go to capital." (Bourdieu, 1990, p.120)

After establishing the objective classes on the basis of occupation and showing the relationships of them to the constructed classes which are determined by the levels of economic and cultural capital, Bourdieu looks at the connection between class habitus and life style, giving great importance to bodily hexis, which was explained before. Summary of Jenkins is helpful in providing a schema of the formation of life styles in Bourdieu

> ...(a) objective conditions of existence combine with position in social structure to produce (b) the habitus, 'a structured and structuring structure', which consists of (c) a 'system of schemes generating classifiable practices and works' and (d) a 'system of schemes of perception and appreciation' or taste which between them produce (e) 'classifiable practices and works' resulting in (f) a life style, a system of classified and classifying practices, i.e. distinctive signs... (Jenkins, 1992, p.141-142).

5.3. Conclusion

Although Marxist class analysis is invaluable in pointing out to the oppression and exploitation that emerged between two classes with industrial capitalism, it remains insufficient to explain the common habits, attitudes and life styles of groups in the contemporary period of late capitalism with the classes being to a great extent differentiated within themselves and with the middle classes expanding contrary to the premises of Marxist theory. Weberian understanding of status and status groups contributed to the understanding of economically determined classes by taking into consideration other criteria such as education and cultural differences, and by adding the category of status into the picture. The contemporary theories about life styles very much depend on this Weberian understanding of status. In the current stage of capitalism, which is defined by consumption much more than production, it is essential to take into consideration not only the positions of groups within the production relations but also what and how they consume, and whether they have the mastery of the 'elements of the environment' as explained by Baudrillard. Especially the theory of Pierre Bourdieu introduces several 'non-economic aspects of opportunity', or in other words various cultural opportunities, and expands the types of resources from merely economic resources, to a range of cultural and social resources- cultural, social and symbolic capitals. Therefore, Bourdieu takes class as a more expansive concept "...covering all inequalities in opportunities...that can be attributed to socially-determined inequalities of resources of whatever sort." (Wright, 2003, p.4) As it provides the opportunity to make a more sophisticated and multi-dimensional analysis, in the following parts, mainly Bourdieu's theoretical model will be employed in looking at the life style of the privileged group in Turkey, which is the main focus of this thesis.

CHAPTER 6

TURKISH TOP MANAGERS IN A MULTINATIONAL

CORPORATION

Up to this point, I suggested that globalization is mainly the globalization of capitalism and the capitalist class which increasingly transcends borders is the main party that benefits from the process of globalization. Cosmopolitanism which is presented as a concept or project appropriate for this global age is discussed here as usually referring to nothing more than the class consciousness of upper classes and top level managers who can easily cross borders without having visa difficulties, and who have sufficient funds and resources to travel to other parts of the world. Only those people can define themselves as world citizens and can talk about declining importance of national borders in the political, economic and social contexts.

In the light of these arguments, the aim of this study is to describe the life style of top-level managers in Turkey, positioning them in terms of the four capitals indicated by Pierre Bourdieu and to understand to what extent they can be regarded as a part of transnational capitalist class in terms of both their life styles, attitudes and also ideologies.

6.1. Methodology

This is a descriptive study in that the main aims are to learn more about the life style of the upper class managers and to understand their level of integration to the transnational class in terms of life style, and their perceptions of this integration. I aim to understand these three subjects in the case of top-level managers in Turkish branch of a multinational corporation, which will be

named as X Corporation in this thesis, as I was given permission to make interviews only on the condition of not using the name of the company. Thus, my unit of analysis is X Corporation. This has been a qualitative study where I made use of multiple empirical materials in order to add breadth and depth to my investigation. I interviewed 11 managers from three managerial levels of senior partner, partner and senior manager. In order to obtain additional information, I contacted junior level employees who work in the corporation. I was also given data such as age, gender, education, residence places, foreign language knowledge and long-term foreign work experience for all the managers, a total of 33, working in the Turkish branch of the X Corporation. And lastly, I made use of global and Turkish web sites of the corporation for supplemental data about the organization and employees of the corporation both in Turkey and also worldwide.

In my selection of X Corporation for my study, the fact that it is the branch of a big multinational corporation has been influential. As discussed in the previous chapter, both Sklair and Cox argue that the people who work as managers in multinational corporations in several countries form a significant part of transnational capitalist class. Thus, selecting this corporation seemed appropriate in terms of my research questions. As a result of my interviews with junior employees, I had previous knowledge about the facts that in the corporation, the managers earn amounts that make it possible to position them in the upper class and they frequently travel to foreign countries, which are facts that led me to consider X Corporation for my study. The second reason for this selection has been the presence of my contacts who work in the company, as it is really difficult to arrange interviews with top-level managers without having contacts.

6.1.1. Interview

Interview has been the main method for me to portray the life style and integration level of the managers to the transnational class. In the beginning, I planned to make interviews with a group of managers and distribute

questionnaires to others. However, none of the managers accepted to fill out questionnaires and stated that they would prefer being interviewed instead of filling out forms. Therefore, I decided not to distribute questionnaires. As I was told by the managers during appointment meetings that interviews could last between 30-60 minutes, which is a short time for an interview, I omitted some of the questions I had first prepared and selected 48 out of an initial set of 70 questions. It has been a semi-structured interview, consisting of both multiple choice and open-ended questions, and I also asked additional questions in line with the issues that my interviewees talked about, as long as my time constraints permitted. I made face-to-face interviews in their offices during their work times, recorded the conversations, and transcribed them later, converting them into a written format.

As I stated earlier, there are three managerial levels in the X Corporation, which are senior manager, partner and senior partner. I contacted all the managers who were in Turkey at that time and interviewed the ones who accepted it. Of the two people who are at the senior partner level, I interviewed one. Of 14 partners, I interviewed 4 and of 17 senior managers, I interviewed 6. In terms of gender, the ratio of women to men that I interviewed (2:9) was the same as that of women to men among the managers in the corporation (6:27).

The interview included some demographic questions such as age and marital status; questions aiming to learn about their cultural capital, indicated by their education, father's and mother's education, husband/wife's education and foreign language knowledge; social capital, indicated by their networks, contacts, and memberships (in occupational groups, clubs, NGOs, etc.) and symbolic capital indicated by the goods they consume and brands of these goods, their habits (holidays, reading, music, free time activities, the places they visit in their free times, internet usage, etc.). Bourdieu had mainly used occupation, income and ownership of home and car as the main indicators of economic capital. In my case, I had known occupations in advance or, to put it more correctly, I selected my interviewees according to their occupation.

Therefore, I had an important clue about their economic capital. Also, I had knowledge about their average salary levels as this data was made available to me by the corporation. It would give more accurate data to ask their income level in the interviews. However, as I was told by my contacts at the corporation that income questions will not be answered and will attract negative reaction from the managers, I preferred not to ask questions about their income level. Thus, I tried to sketch economic capital through home and car ownership, occupation and average income data that is provided to me.

For the second part of my research question, that is the integration level to the transnational class in terms of life style and perceptions, I asked the frequency and reasons of their visits to other countries, the duration of their stays, the contacts they have in those countries, nature of their relationships with them (friend, relative, business relationship, etc.), which places they visit in those countries, whether they go shopping and what they buy, how they define themselves in terms of national belonging, what they think about being a world citizen, what they think about globalization and Turkey's place in this process, whether they perceive their life style similar to that of foreigner managers having the same position and lastly, whether they regard themselves as a group having common interests with them. However, it is important to point out the fact that some of the questions that I asked for the second part of the research question are also related to, or give insights about, the first part of the question, and vice versa. That means, having a particular life style makes these managers similar to their counterparts in other countries and to perceive themselves as world citizens. And also, having similarities with people from other countries (in terms of background, economic capital, etc.) also leads them to have similar life styles. The two parts of the research question are interrelated.

6.1.2. Manager Data
As I stated in the previous pages, I was provided some data for all managers working in three levels in the corporation. This data included the list of senior partners, partners and senior managers, their birth dates, the starting date of

their employment in the corporation, the city they work (of 33 managers, 30 work in İstanbul), their places of residence, the university in which they had their undergraduate and, if applicable, graduate degrees, foreign languages in which they are competent and if applicable, foreign countries in which they worked temporarily, which they call as 'secondment'. These data have been helpful in giving clues about all the managers in the corporation in terms of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capitals, and their level of access to foreign countries.

6.1.3. Web Sites

Although inclusion of detailed information about the corporation does not seem necessary for the purposes of the thesis, still I will talk about some facts about the corporation in order to better interpret the data I received during the interviews. For this aim, the knowledge gathered from the interviews with the junior employees from the corporation and especially the data received from the global and country web sites of the corporation are used.

6.1.4. Limitations

As I indicated, this study is conducted at the Turkish branch of a single multinational corporation. This is a case study and the findings of this research cannot be taken as representative of all the managers or all the multinational corporations operating in Turkey. The second limitation has been that because of the work load of the managers, my interviews lasted for 30-60 minutes, which is a short period. Therefore, I had to limit the number of questions I asked. And thirdly, the integration level of these managers to the transnational capitalist class will be mainly discussed considering their perceptions about issues such as globalization, national belonging, common interests with foreign managers, etc. Although certain objective data, such as their access to foreign countries can give us data about their integration with the transnational class, we cannot argue that their life style is the same as that of the foreigners in every aspect. A comparative study consisting of both research in Turkey and research in foreign countries would be necessary to argue that the life style of

the Turkish and foreign managers are the same. What I will do here is to talk about some similarities between the life style characteristics of the transnational capitalist class especially indicated by Sklair and Micklethwait& Wooldridge, and those of the managers in my case. However, as knowledge of the life style characteristics of foreigners will not depend on detailed empirical data, the emphasis will be mainly on the perceptions of these managers while looking at the integration level of these managers to the transnational class.

6.2. Research

X Corporation gives services of business consulting to public and private clients. It has its offices in 768 cities in 139 countries and has more than 120.000 people working in these offices. The corporation describes itself as a 'truly global firm' and a 'worldwide network of firms' which are locally owned and locally managed as indicated in the global web site. There is a CEO (Chief Executive Officer), a leadership team, consisting of key operation leaders and region leaders, and a Global Board, which form the management of the global body. The CEO is from the US and all the key operation leaders are either from the US or Europe. Of the 19 members of the Global Board one member is from Hong Kong, one from Sao Paulo and one from South Africa. The rest is from the US, Canada or Europe. To the identification of the firm itself as a network, it should be added that this is a network with some centers being more dominant in the management of the network, these centers being in the Western world.

Turkish branch of the corporation consists of 4 offices, 2 in İstanbul, 1 in Ankara and 1 in İzmir, with more than 550 professional staff. On the basis of merit and performance, the professionals working in the firm are promoted. Although, in the past, there were people who had been directly employed to the upper levels of the organization from the public sector, usually the practice is that people become managers and even partners through promoting in the organization. Becoming a partner in the corporation, most of the times, means acquiring the shares of the corporation and having important managerial

responsibilities. Senior partners (there are two in the corporation) have more shares and more managerial control within the corporation compared to other partners, and represent the Turkish branch in the global organization.

According to the manager data provided about all the managers in the Turkish branch of the corporation, below is the age and gender distribution of them.

Table 6.1. Age Distribution of the Managers

Level \ Age	Senior Manager	Partner	Senior Partner	Total
30-34	6	1	-	7
35-39	7	4	-	11
40-44	2	7	1	10
45-49	2	1	-	3
50+	-	1	1	2
Total	17	14	2	**33**

Table 6.2. Gender Distribution of the Managers

Level \ Gender	Senior Manager	Partner	Senior Partner	Total
Female	2	3	1	6
Male	15	11	1	27
Total	17	14	2	**33**

Considering the age distribution, it can be argued that the managers within the corporation are young, as 31 of the 33 managers are below 50 years old, or more strikingly, 28 of them are below 45 years old. About gender distribution, the ratio of women to men is 2:9. It is interesting to see that, while the ratio of women to men among the newly employed fresh graduates is approximately

1:1, this ratio changes to the disadvantage of women at the upper career levels. Although it requires further analysis, this may be taken as a fact supporting the 'glass ceiling' concept.

Below is the table demonstrating the years that the managers have been working in X Corporation.

Table 6.3. The Number of Years Managers Have Been Working in X Corporation

Level / Years	Senior Manager	Partner	Senior Partner	Total
1-5	3	-	-	3
6-10	8	3	-	11
11-15	6	4	1	11
16-20	-	6	-	6
20+	-	1	1	2
Total	17	14	2	**33**

The above data shows that the time spent in the corporation is determinant in being a manager in X Corporation. 14 out of 17 (82%) senior managers have been working in the corporation at least for 6 years and 11 out of 14 partners (79%) have been working at least for 11 years. Being a senior partner also requires at least 11 years of employment in the corporation.

One important fact gathered from manager data is that all the managers in the corporation are fluent in English. 4 of the partners and 1 of the senior managers are also fluent in a second foreign language. Also important is the fact that, as previously stated, 30 of the 33 managers work and live in İstanbul. As finance sector is the most developed in İstanbul, there are more firms that demands

business consulting services in this city. This is why the office in İstanbul is much more active than the other two offices, and more lower-level employees and managers work in this office.

As indicated previously, the universities and departments that the managers had their undergraduate, and if applicable, graduate degrees are included in the manager data. In the previous chapters, it was argued that the managerial class, both in Turkey and in the world, has similar educational backgrounds, usually having been graduated from business administration or other administrative departments of top universities. The manager data of X Corporation is also in line with this argument. The managers graduated from one of five big universities of Turkey, Bosphorus University, Middle East Technical University, İstanbul University, Marmara University and Ankara University (SBF), excluding one partner who had her undergraduate in the US. Also, of all the managers, 17 graduated from business administration, 10 from economics, 2 from public administration, 2 from law and 1 from international relations. These are among the departments which require the highest scores in the University Placement examination in Turkey. Remembering Micklethwait and Wooldridge's argument that cosmocrats are meritocrats, the managers in my case supports this argument, as they are people who graduated from the highly demanded departments of best universities. Considering the graduate education data, we see that 5 managers had master's degrees abroad and 3 had in Turkish universities in areas of business administration or economics.

The data about the managers' experience abroad combined with the data about education abroad give us important insights about their relationships with the foreign countries. Of 17 senior managers, 5 of them stayed in foreign countries at least for one year either for work or for education. However, when we consider partner and senior partner levels, the situation is more striking. Within the total of 16 partners and senior partners, 12 stayed abroad at least for one year. This is 75% of the total number of partners and senior partners, and shows that a high proportion of the managers especially at these two levels had

access to foreign countries. When combined with the data about frequent visits to foreign countries gathered during the interviews, which will be explained in more detail in the following pages, we see that it is easy for these people to transcend the borders of their nation states.

The place of residence data only includes the name of districts they live and, if they live in a housing complex, the name of the complex. It is not very easy to make generalizations or to make detailed interpretations only considering districts of residences. All I can derive from this data is that 7 of the senior managers (among 17) live in housing complexes and all of them live in the wealthier districts of İstanbul, such as Etiler, Nişantaşı, Ataköy,Arnavutköy, etc. About partners and senior partners, there is a more striking issue that has to be pointed out. Of a total of 16 partners and senior partners, 4 of them live in the same residence area, *Kemer Country* and 1 lives in *Aldem 4 Mevsim Evleri*, which are special types of residences consisting of villas and containing recreational facilities. As also indicated in the chapter about Turkey, these are self-sufficient mini cities including sport complexes, fitness, centers, cinemas, restaurants, etc. and they are far from the city center. Living in these special-type, luxurious, segregated residences can be accepted as forming a crucial part of the symbolic capital of these upper level managers, distinguishing them significantly from the lower classes. I will comment further on the residences while considering the interviews.

As I indicated above, I interviewed 11 managers: 6 senior managers, 4 partners and 1 senior partner. All the questions about life style are indicators of one of four variables, excluding demographic questions about age, marital status and having children. These variables are: cultural capital, social capital, symbolic capital, and economic capital giving information about the first part of the research question, the life style characteristics of the group. Integration to the transnational capitalist class forms the second part of research question. The answers given to the questions will be analyzed within groups of these variables.

6.2.1. Demographic Data

Table 6.4. Ages of the Managers Interviewed

Age Group	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50+
	2	2	4	-	3

Above is the age distribution of the managers whom I interviewed. 9 of them are male and 2 are female. It is interesting that all of the male interviewees are married having at least one child and both of the female interviewees are divorced and have no children. Although the number of people interviewed is too small to make a general inference, when combined with the other things stated by my interviewees, this situation gives clues about the gender dimension of being a manager. The wives of two managers left their professional jobs although they had graduated from well-known universities and had good jobs and one started working part-time leaving her job as a vice-president in a firm. However, more significant is the fact that, whether the wife works or not, she has the whole responsibility for the housework. Although sharing of housework was not a question asked in this interview, all the male managers talked about how their wives decorated the house, did the shopping, and even bought clothes for them. When asked about the furniture in their home, one male manager stated that he was not sure whether the furniture I listed was present in their house. He told that his wife knows it better. Although his wife had the same level of education, working in the same sector in a similar position to him, still she was the sole person dealing with domestic tasks. However, it should be stated that, related to their class, the duties women deal with are different from what a middle class wife does. As stated above, they do home decoration, and get advice from professionals when necessary. They know which style of clothes their husbands prefer, go and buy those clothes, and they deal with the repairs when necessary. The male managers state that as they work for long hours, they do not have time to deal with these and their wives help them. However, female managers do not have wives to

deal with their domestic tasks and, I will speculate that, it may have seemed easier to be single for having a good career.

6.2.2. Life Style Characteristics

6.2.2.1. Economic Capital

In many of the empirical researches interested in understanding the class position of the researched subjects, a series of questions are asked about income level, other sources of income, husband's/wife's income, goods owned, etc. Although I also asked questions about ownership of house, summer house, car and some goods, I do not mainly depend on these data while looking at economic capital and rather use this data for considering symbolic capital. As I indicated previously, following Bourdieu, I took occupation, which is a variable that I know for the whole group, as the main determinant of economic capital. As I also know the income level for each manager level, this information has been sufficient for me to a large extent for positioning them in terms of economic capital. The income level for senior managers is around USD 100.000, for partners USD 150.000-200.000 and for senior partners around USD 500.000. Without needing any additional information, considering both their occupational positions and income levels, it is not difficult to position them in the upper class in terms of economic capital.

I can say that, although I left questions about home, car and goods ownership to the end of my interview as these are regarded as sensitive questions in terms of respondents social researchers, I can say that these questions created a certain tension in my interviewees. I observed their irritation in answering these questions. I was not sure whether they answered these questions honestly. About home ownership, 9 of them stated that they have at least one house. It is surprising as all of them can be expected to have their own houses considering their income level. But we can claim that they make their investments in other assets. It is also interesting that 4 of them live in rented apartments although

they have their own houses. This may be because they would like to live in more prestigious districts than the districts in which they own flats.

Despite the fact that having a car and certain goods is an important indicator of economic capital, owning prestigious cars and goods are significant markers of status and distinction for upper classes. Therefore, although they are also important in terms of economic capital, car ownership and goods ownership data will be included in the part about symbolic capital.

6.2.2.2. Cultural Capital

For cultural capital, first, I asked the managers the schools from which they graduated, beginning from primary school, as I wanted to see whether they went to private or public schools. All the managers I talked to graduated from public primary schools, 9 from public and 2 from private secondary and high-schools. The number of people who graduated from business administration and economics is 8 and 1 graduated from Law. 3 of them had master's degree completed in the US and 1 had in Turkey. All of them graduated from top universities of Turkey (Bosphorus, METU, Ankara, İstanbul Universities). Although most of these managers had their previous education in ordinary public schools, they achieved to have education in top universities of Turkey. They have high cultural capital in terms of education. Another striking fact is that the families of most of these people did not have higher education. The fathers of only two of them graduated from university, 5 graduated from high school, 3 graduated from primary school and 1 did not have any education. The situation is more remarkable when we consider the mothers: none of them graduated from university, 3 graduated from high school, 4 graduated from primary school and 4 did not have any education. Being the children of relatively less educated families, these managers achieved to have education in best universities of Turkey. This also supports the argument that top level managers are meritocrats. They are not coming from well-educated families and their cultural capital is not supported by their families' cultural capital. However, we can talk about a reinforcement of their cultural capital through

their wives'/former husbands' education. The wives or former husbands of all the managers also graduated from top universities (Bosphorus, Ankara, Marmara, İstanbul Universities). These managers are also aware of the importance of cultural capital gained through education and they provide their children education in well-known private schools; all the managers who have children old enough to have education send their children to private schools for education.

Competence in a foreign language is also an important part of cultural capital. As I stated before, all the managers in the organization are fluent in English. Within the group I interviewed, although not fluent, 6 of them also speak a second and 2 speak a third language. I observed that in addition to knowing English, they are very much used to using words in English in their daily conversations in Turkish. During interviews they used words in English extensively. Not only the technical terms and names of positions and titles, but also ordinary words are used in English. They say 'location' instead of 'yer, mekan', 'gym' instead of 'spor salonu, spor merkezi', 'recognition' instead of 'tanınma, ün', 'interaction' instead of 'etkileşim', 'international' instead of 'uluslararası', etc. More than knowing a language, they had internalized it, describing their thoughts and daily life activities with the words of that language.

In Bourdieu's scheme, activities like reading books, newspapers and magazines, going to places such as theatre, opera and exhibitions, and their tastes of music are also indicators of cultural capital. According to their statements, all the managers I interviewed read at least two newspapers daily. There are ones who stated that they read five magazines in a day especially at weekends. *Dünya*, which is a newspaper on economy, is delivered to all the managers in the corporation and they stated that they read *Dünya* everyday. Except this newspaper, it is not possible to make a generalization about the newspapers they read. The ones mentioned by my interviewees are Radikal, Milliyet, Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet, Sabah, and Vatan, which are newspapers

having diverse positions and styles. Cumhuriyet is a Kemalist, republican and leftists newspaper. Radikal also has a leftist position and the readers of Radikal are mainly educated people from upper middle classes living in metropolises, as also suggested by Rıfat Bali (Bali, 2002, p.217). Milliyet, Hürriyet, Sabah and Vatan are newspapers that are read by diverse social groups in terms of educational background, socio-economic status, and the places lived. They are mainly in favor of free market ideology. Thus, it is not possible to draw a profile considering these newspapers.

About magazine reading, all the managers declared that they read magazines about their work. Also, six of the managers read foreign magazines Newsweek, Time, and the Economist. This is a habit that they share with their counterparts in different countries in the world. There are also ones who read magazines about decoration, automobiles and travel. These magazines also give clues about their symbolic capital, pointing out to the areas that they create distinctions. Home decoration is one of the areas that the upper classes distinguish themselves the most from the lower classes. Automobile is also one of the most valued prestigious items. And lastly, travel both within the country and abroad is a significant part of upper class life style. Therefore, the magazines they read give ideas about their not only cultural but also symbolic capital by demonstrating that they have an interest in those areas which are mostly accessible for the upper classes.

About book reading, 8 of the managers I interviewed stated that they read books frequently. The remaining three managers uttered that they can only sometimes read books as they cannot find enough time to read more. Although the answers to the question of whether they find their life style similar to that of Westerners will be evaluated in detail in the following sections, I have to state here that it is interesting that reading is one of the major areas in which they find themselves different from large sections of Turkish society and similar to Westerners.

I think that we have more in common with the foreigners in terms of life style. For instance, we read much more compared to an ordinary Turk, if we compare book reading or newspaper reading.

Therefore, reading books, similar to magazines, is also a signifier of symbolic capital as well as cultural capital. In terms of the kinds of books they read, we see that all of them read books about their work areas, as it is necessary for following the developments in the area. Also, they read other books in a variety of areas: novels, history books, poetry books, science fictions, books about economy, etc.

When asked about their preferences in music, 9 of the managers pronounced classical music as their first choice. Bourdieu, while talking about legitimate taste, which belongs to the upper class, puts classical music within the category of legitimate taste; classical music is mainly the music of upper class. This argument seems to be supported in my case. The other kinds of music listed by the managers are jazz, new age and alternative rock by younger managers, and Turkish classical music (*Türk Sanat Müziği*) by older managers. Although not asked about the kind of music they are not fond of, two of the managers told that they never listen to Turkish Volk Music (*Türk Halk Müziği*) and also none of the managers mentioned this kind of music among the ones they listen to. This may be interpreted as their wish to distance their tastes from the tastes of the masses. As Bourdieu states, while considering good and bad tastes, things are classified as 'distinguished' and 'vulgar'. It can be argued that classical music is the distinguished and Turkish Volk music is the vulgar one in terms of music taste in the evaluations of these people.

I listed some places and asked the managers whether and how often they go to these places. The first of these places is opera/ballet. Excluding two managers who told that they go once a week, the remaining managers either never go to opera/ballet or they go once-twice a year. This is a result which is not in line with Bourdieu's scheme in that he regards opera/ballet also belonging to the legitimate tastes of the upper class. Remembering that Bourdieu's frame

mainly fits to France, we can attribute this difference to cultural differences of two countries. But also the fact that they work too hard and for long periods of time may be a determinant of their not being able to find time for entertainment, which is also a reason emphasized by them.

The other places I asked are theater, cinema, concert, exhibition, match, places of entertainment (bar, pub, disco, etc.), restaurant and shopping malls. Some of these places are directly related to cultural capital: theater, cinema, concert and exhibition. These will be explored in this part. Match, places of entertainment, restaurant and shopping malls are rather related to symbolic capital and will be dealt with in that section. According to their statements, 6 of the managers go to cinemas once a week, 2 once a month and 3 several times a year. However, the ones in this last category have DVD players in their houses and told that they watch films in the house. Therefore, most of the people in the group frequently watch films.

Going to theater is not as popular among them as going to cinema. Only one manager goes to theater once a week, one of them once a month, two of them once in two months and the others a couple of times in a year. Although it is more popular than theater among them, they do not often go to the concerts, either. One goes to concerts once a week, five go once a month and the others once or twice a year. They mentioned that they go to concerts more often in the summer as there are open-air concerts. They explain the reason why they rarely go to both theater and concert, telling that these activities require previous organization; making plans and buying tickets in advance. Because of their work load, they prefer activities for which they can make spontaneous decisions. Cinema is such an activity. The responses given to going to exhibition also supports this. In addition to one manager who goes to exhibitions once a week and one who goes once a month, eight of them stated that they go to exhibitions whenever there is an opportunity to do so. Only one of them pronounced that he never goes to exhibitions. Either they go frequently or not, going to exhibitions is a valued activity among them. One manager told

that sometimes he is invited to some special exhibitions in foreign countries and goes to them for buying paintings for his collection. This is an important signifier of his symbolic capital, too: He is invited to a special exhibition to which, most probably, only privileged people can be invited. The exhibition he is invited is in a foreign country, which means that he is reputable there, too. He buys paintings there, which, we can guess, should be expensive. And lastly, he has a collection of them, which demonstrates that he should be really wealthy in terms of economic capital.

All the managers, and indeed all the professional staff, are given laptops by the corporation. They use internet extensively for communicating about work. I also asked, except work, for which purposes they use internet. 7 of them use internet for communicating their friends or relatives, either in Turkey or abroad. They also use internet for making researches about areas that is not related to work, for making interactive banking interactions and for reading newspapers. Having this much access to computers and internet is also something that adds to their cultural capital.

Bourdieu defines cultural capital also as informational capital. Considering the information that all the managers use internet extensively both for work purposes and also for communication and reading newspapers, and adding the facts that they frequently read newspapers, magazines and books, watch films and follow other cultural activities to a certain extent, as much as they can create time to do, we can say that they can be identified as well-off in terms of their informational capital.

6.2.2.3. Social Capital

As I pointed out in the methodology section, for reflecting on social capital, I asked questions about their networks and memberships. I listed some occupation groups and asked whether they know people from these groups. According to their answers, 9 has acquaintance/relationship with parliament members and ministers, 3 with mayors, 10 with other politicians, 10 with

artists, 11 with academicians, 9 with journalists and columnists, 4 with media corporation owners, and 8 with company owners. Looking at these data, we can argue that in addition to their business networks created by their being in top positions in a major corporation, they also have contacts from the *fields* of politics, arts, and media, which increase their total volume of capital significantly. Remembering Bourdieu's definition of the *field* as the ground in which individuals struggle for having access to the resources, we can say that these managers have power in multiple fields.

The second question related to social capital was about their memberships in associations, NGOs and clubs. All the managers I interviewed are members of at least 2 such institutions. They mostly have memberships in occupational groups and alumni associations of their universities. There are members of Rotary Clubs, which are associations of professional leaders and business people (www.rotary.org.tr); Turkish American Business Association, aiming to promote trade relations between Turkey and the US (http://www.taba.org.tr/Taba.htm); Foreign Investors Association, aiming to promote a better investment environment in Turkey (www.yased.org.tr) and Transparency International Turkey Branch targeting 'to ensure that all kinds of public power both in the center and on the local level are prevented from being abused, and to rid political, social and economic activities of all types of corruption with putting them in the public eye and increasing awareness' (www.saydamlik.org). In the interpretation of their membership in these associations, it is essential to point out to the contribution of these memberships to their social capital by increasing the number of their contacts and improving their networks, which also leads to further increases in their economic capital. Also important is their active participation in the process of promotion of foreign investment in Turkey. I claim that being aware of the positive effects that the integration of Turkish business with the foreign business will have on their interests, they take part in the advancement of this process.

6.2.2.4. Symbolic Capital

As I also explained in the part about life styles, Bourdieu uses the term symbolic capital for referring to the forms other capitals take when they are perceived. For considering the symbolic capital of the managers I interviewed, I asked questions about the type and district of their residences, the places they go and the frequency of their visits, their consumption habits and the brands they prefer. Firstly, 7 of the managers live in apartments in housing complexes in the wealthy districts of İstanbul (Levent, Etiler, Ataköy, Bahçeşehir, Ataşehir, Esentepe), 2 live in apartments in Teşvikiye and Beylerbeyi, and 2 live in villas in sites. Therefore, most of the managers I interviewed prefer living in housing complexes, the homogenized residences established for upper class people. Supporting Ahmet İnsel's argument indicated in the chapter about Turkey, we can talk about a conscious effort of social discrimination based on social class. Most of them live in districts in which there is no possibility of meeting people from different socio-economic backgrounds. Adding to this the facts that they work in a plaza at the gate of which guards wait and prevent other people from entering into the building, that they work with people who are very similar to them and that they go to distinguished places to which ordinary people cannot go, there aren't many instances for them to meet people from different classes. The upper classes residentially segregate themselves from the others.

Another important thing about their residence is that 7 of them made use of the services of a professional for the decoration of their houses and 1 manager who lives in a rented apartment also told that he would, if he lived in his own house. Home decoration is significant in demonstrating the amount of economic capital and also showing one's distinguished tastes to the others. Related to home decoration, I also listed some commodities and asked whether they have these commodities in their houses. They are microwave oven, plasma TV, DVD Player, ancastre kitchen appliances, garden furniture, antique goods or paintings, and wireless internet. Although some of them are also found in upper middle class homes, I claim that they are mainly found in the houses of upper

classes, as they have newly appeared and are relatively expensive compared to their counterparts (a plasma TV compared to an ordinary TV). According to their responses, 5 of them have microwave oven, 3 have plasma TV, 9 have DVD player, 6 have ancastre appliances, 8 have antique goods or paintings, 5 have garden furniture and 1 has wireless internet. Excluding wireless internet which is an item that has recently appeared and that is present in the house of only one manager, the other prestige items are found in the houses of these managers.

Car is one of the most important signifiers of status, and so, a significant part of symbolic capital and also of economic capital. The corporation provides a car to all senior managers, partners and senior partners. This car is not provided temporarily but becomes their property. There is not a standard car that is given; the corporation offers a certain amount of money for the car but the managers can give an additional amount and buy different brands of cars. Of all the managers I interviewed, 1 of them has 4 cars belonging either to him, his wife or his son. 7 of them have two cars, belonging to them and their wives, and 3 of them have one car (2 of them women managers who are living alone). The cars owned are Toyota Avensis, Toyota Jeep RU4, Jeep Honda, BMW, Nissan Terraro, Passat, Subaru, Mercedes, Opel Corsa, Volvo S40, Peugeot 307 and Volkswagen Golf. These are expensive and prestigious cars.

In addition to the places they go in their free times which I asked in the part on cultural capital, I asked whether and how often they go to matches, places of entertainment, restaurants and shopping malls. When asked about matches, 7 of them stated that they rarely go to matches. The remaining 4 go to matches. 1 of these 4 people goes to football matches only when he is invited to watch the matches in the special, private lounges of the firms and the other three have combined tickets for football matches, which can be bought by paying a large amount for going to matches for a year. Here, I would like to quote the words of two managers, one who does not go to matches and the other going only to private lounges.

Football is one of my hobbies but I do not go to football matches. That chaos in the tribunes prevents me from going. I go to foreign countries for football matches when our national teams have matches there. For instance, I went to Copenhagen and Monaco for Galatasaray…But the matches here… Having comfort is important for me. It irritates me to see those crowds and quarrels, to wait in the queues or to see that someone's seat is next to mine.

If I have invitations, I go to matches. The firms have lounges, luxurious lounges. The firms rent those lounges and sometimes invite us to watch matches there. If I am invited, I go. Otherwise, I would never go. I cannot stand that environment…Instead of watching the match, people turn back and curse.

Especially in the first quotation, the distance that he tries to create between himself and the masses who watch football matches in the tribunes can easily be seen. It is hard to say that there is less chaos in the football matches in the foreign countries. Going to a match in Turkey is an ordinary activity an ordinary Turk can easily do. But going to a match in Copenhagen is a distinguished activity only a privileged minority can realize. In his irritation with waiting in the queues and 'having someone's seat next to his', we can see a wish of creating distance also in the physical sense. He wants to be separate from the others. This is in line with the idea of isolation from masses which is attributed to upper classes. However, as he goes to matches in foreign countries, it seems that he is not annoyed with being next to foreigners. Being a Turk who is able to go to a foreign country for watching a football match gives him a high level of prestige which prevents his irritation. Also, in both of the quotations, we can observe their search for luxury and comfort in every area of their lives. I think this is an issue that is essential in the habitus of the upper class.

When asked how often they go to places of entertainment, two of them told that they go once a week, three once a month and the rest only rarely. The ones who rarely go to these places mentioned getting old, having limited time and the difficulty of going to these places with children to explain why they do not go more frequently, and they stated that if they had the opportunity, they would go more. The managers explained that they go the places of entertainment much more frequently in summer. I also asked the places that they mostly prefer to go. Among the ones mentioned were Vogue, Laila, Reina. Especially

the last two are places to which everyone cannot enter. Guards that stand at the entrance of these places decide who can enter and who cannot, according to people's appearances and clothes. Therefore, these are places only the members of upper classes or the members of other classes who can 'achieve' to look like the members of former class can come to. However, this 'achievement' is hard to do, as all the classifications of habitus of a certain class are coded into the body, which refers to bodily hexis. It is possible to imitate the hair style or clothes of upper classes but it is not that easy to imitate their postures, gaits or gestures. The people, in our case the managers, who come to these places can always avoid the possibility of meeting people from lower socio-economic strata. These are places of privilege and prestige, as only limited people can enter and can spend large amounts of money, and also of class isolation because of the same reasons.

The most frequently visited places for the managers I talked to are restaurants and shopping malls. All the managers I interviewed eat in restaurants at least three times a week and 8 of them go to shopping malls once a week. They go to restaurants both with their clients and their families. They regard eating in luxurious restaurants as a kind of entertainment.

> I do not have an entertainment other than eating or drinking in restaurants. This is also because of age and our job is a demanding one. Our entertainment is usually eating in restaurants. For instance, this evening we will go to a restaurant in Asmalımescit, which is named Flam. After dinner, maybe we will drink something in Markiz…

At weekends, they go to shopping malls with their families. The shopping malls mentioned are Akmerkez, Carrefour, Carousel and Metro City. It is interesting to see that although they say that they cannot find time for cultural activities such as going to theater or opera, most of them go to shopping malls every week. Consumption has a significant share in their free time activities. However, shopping malls should not only be evaluated as places for consumption. It is a social activity done with the families and something may not be bought each time. But still it is significant that the social activity of

these people, who complain about having limited time for social activities because of work, takes place within consumption sites, around consumption.

Another free time activity that I asked to the managers was sports. I asked whether they practice sports, if so, which sports and whether they have memberships in sports centers. Of the 11 managers I asked, only one of them told that he cannot regularly do sports, as he does not have time. 8 of the managers are members of big sports centers which are Hyatt Regency Gym, Sports International, Swiss Hotel's Gym, Mayadrom and TED. One of the managers has a tennis cord in his summer house and another has a swimming pool in his house, and a swimming pool and a tennis cord in the housing complex he lives in. Both of them state that they do sports both in their houses and in the gyms of which they are members. The sports done my the managers are playing tennis, swimming, fitness, horse riding, squash, skiing in winter and jogging. All of these 10 managers told that they deal with sports one-two times a week. It seems that doing sports and being a member of a sports club is an important part of their symbolic capital. But also it seems that these memberships can also contribute to their social capital, as some of the managers stated that they meet people in these places.

I asked my interviewees from where they buy their clothes in Turkey and which brands they prefer. 9 of them told that they buy from big shopping malls, 1 from boutiques in Teşvikiye and 1 from Beyoğlu. 7 of them mentioned Beymen and the other stores/brands stated were Vakko, Network, Stefanel, Deri Show, Yargıcı, Zara, Sarar, Damat and İpekyol as the stores/brands they prefer. Although these are well-known, prestigious brands, when I asked them whether buying clothes with good brands is important for them, 9 of them said that it is not. Being addicted to brands is regarded as a negative characteristic and they do not want to give such an impression. They explained their choice of well-known brands with factors such as quality, meeting certain standards, having styles appropriate to their tastes, etc.

I do not give importance to brands. However, good brands usually offer good clothes in terms of design and quality. Otherwise, I do not buy my clothes thinking that it should be from Beymen or Zeigna. When I go to these places, I can buy easily as I know that it is high quality. I get bored of trying to understand whether it is high-quality or not. I wear well known brands as I trust those brands.

I do not insist on buying well known brands. Some people can find and select high quality items at first sight. They can understand it no matter the article is cheap or expensive. I cannot do that. To make things easier, I go to certain stores and they sell well-known brands. It is not because of insistence on brands.

Brand is not important. However, as the English proverb says I am not so rich to buy cheap goods. I do not buy the cheap one. For instance, the expensive ones are much cheaper in fact. Because they last for longer periods. The other cheap one lasts for a year.

Especially in the first two quotations, we see that they represent themselves as not having the competence necessary to distinguish between qualified and vulgar goods, and because of this lack of competence, they claim, they buy well-known brands which are proved to be qualified, making it unnecessary to make judgments. It can be argued that they think that high quality items are appropriate for their class position. They acquire certain dispositions as a result of the position they occupy and this brings with it an *adjustment to this position*, or they gain *a sense of their place*, using Bourdieu's and Goffman's phrases as indicated before. However, as they are not coming from well-educated upper class families, which means that their capitals are not supported by those of their families and their class position does not have a long history, they cannot feel sure about their tastes. They haven't developed that relation of confidence, that is attributed to privileged classes by Bourdieu, yet.

However, in the case of the senior partner, whose economic capital is much more than the other managers interviewed, and social capital vastly strengthened by the networks of his wife, who is a well-known politician, we can easily observe that confidence about his tastes.

I go shopping much more when I am abroad than in Turkey. I always buy my shoes abroad. I have the impression that shoes are not very well done in Turkey. But I usually buy my clothes here. Beymen has a department that sells foreign brands, I buy my clothes from there. Also, I go abroad twice a year for buying clothes in lump. I am not a person who frequently goes shopping. My wife goes regularly to Akmerkez… In terms of brands, I used to prefer Church, it was my favorite. Except Church, Bali…I do not pay too much attention to the brands. I rather consider the style of the shoes. For instance, I noticed later that the brand of the shoes I had bought was Charle

> Jordan. I even have Louis Vuitton shoes. I see shoes in the shop-window, I like and when I go inside the shop, I notice that it has a well-known brand…

In this quotation, his confidence in his tastes is apparent. He likes the shoes without knowing its brand, and later notices that it is a well-known brand. Therefore, he emphasizes that he has the capability to select the distinguished, high-quality goods. He does not need to know the brand of it in advance. I think what is missing here is the information that most probably in the places he visits, it is not possible to find cheap, low quality, 'vulgar' goods and most probably, whatever he selects, it will be a well-known brand.

In addition to clothes, I listed some objects and asked whether they prefer well-known brands and if so, which brands they prefer. These objects are pen, watch, lighter, glasses/sun glasses, cellular phone, cuff link, wallet and purse/case. These objects are asked as they are carried during daily life and they complete the appearance of the people and like clothes, they are used as objects of prestige for upper class people. For pen, 5 of them said that brand is important. The brands used are Mont Blanc and Dunn Hill. 8 of them think that brand is important in watches. Mentioned brands are Raymond Well, Armani, Longine, Guess and Rolex. It is interesting that 9 of the people I talked to do not smoke, 1 seldom smokes and 1 smokes cigars. None of them uses a lighter. 8 of them find it important to have glasses of well-known brands, which are Armani, Calvin Klein and Dupont. Among the men, 7 of them uses cuff link but none of them thinks that its brand is significant. For wallet, 6 of them said brand is important and for purse/case 8 of them said so. For both of the objects, Matraş was the only brand mentioned by the men. One woman manager mentioned Lancell as the brand of her purse. Thus, in total we observe that brand is important in these items which can demonstrate prestige and considering all of these objects, we see that especially watch, glasses and purse/case are goods that these managers consider using well-known brands important.

I also asked about where and how often they go to holidays. Excluding one manager who stated that they cannot go abroad for holidays because of their little children, all the managers told that they go abroad for holidays. They mostly prefer European countries, France, Italy, Spain and Greek Islands. The US is only mentioned by the senior partner. All of them go holidays at least twice a year. In Turkey, some of them go to Kartalkaya in winter for skiing. For summer holidays, 6 of them prefer luxurious holiday villages, such as Hillside, Robinson Club, Magic Life, Club Med and World of Wonders. These are excluded holiday sites to which people can go through paying a large total amount to benefit from all the facilities in the village. Generally the members of privileged classes in Turkey and people from foreign countries are the customers of these holiday villages. 6 of the managers have summer houses but only 3 of them sometimes go to these houses in their holidays. One manager stated that, going to summer houses in holidays is out of fashion now. 4 of the managers prefer boutique hotels in Antalya and Bodrum. Boutique hotels are also special types of holiday places, which are small but provide distinguished and specialized services to their customers, and they are not, in many cases, much cheaper than a holiday village.

> We usually go to boutique hotels. To Greek islands... Saint Torino, Nicholas... In those places, there aren't big holiday villages. In fact, I am not fond of big holiday villages. They are like Jewish camps. Even if you go to luxurious ones such as Hillside, you see that everybody does everything together. They wait in the queues, for example. That is not my style. I love boutique places... We used to go to Türkbükü in Bodrum. However, it has been a place full of cameraman. I do not like to be so much visible.

> We go to Bodrum and Antalya for short holidays in Turkey. I never had a holiday in Turkey for a longer period than four days. We go to foreign countries and try to go to different places each time. Italy, London, South France, the US…We haven't seen Africa yet. Each time we try, we change our minds at the last minute… We prefer boutique places for our holidays in Turkey… There is a boutique hotel in Bodrum, we stay there. A place nobody sees each other. We prefer such places now.

In these statements we see a wish for being away from crowds and from sight. Thus, the desire for isolation is again relevant here.

Traveling by plane is also a distinguished activity that most of the people in Turkey does not have access to. I asked my interviewees how often they get on plane: 8 of them fly on average two times a week and 3 fly a couple of times a month. Generally they fly for work purposes for going to other cities in Turkey and other countries. But they prefer plane also for going on holidays. They mentioned that they seldom travel by bus. I think these data are significant in both demonstrating their level of mobility and also their distinction from the rest of the society. In a country in which most of the people haven't traveled by a plane even once in their life time, these people can be regarded as very privileged by traveling by plane two times a week.

The last question I asked about symbolic capital was how often they stay in hotels and the names of those hotels. As understood from the question about their holidays, the ones who stay at hotels during their holidays stay at boutique hotels. But when they stay in hotels for business purposes, in line with the policy of the firm, all of them stay at the chain hotels of either Hilton or Sheraton, which are among the most prestigious hotels not only in Turkey but also in the world. Especially for business reasons, 4 of them stay in hotels once a week, 5 of them once a month and 2 of them once in every two months. Like many other aspects of their life style, staying at luxurious hotels is also a part of their symbolic capital which distinguishes them from the lower classes.

6.2.3. Integration Level with the Transnational Capitalist Class

For the second part of the research question, to understand the integration level of this managerial group with the transnational capitalist class in terms of both their objective conditions and also their perceptions, I asked questions about their access to foreign countries (the frequency and reasons of their visits), which activities they do in these countries, and their perceptions about globalization, Turkey's position within this process, world citizenship, and their integration with people who have the same positions in other countries.

All the managers I interviewed go to foreign countries at least 3-4 times a year, 3 of them going a couple of times in a month. All of them go abroad both for work and holiday, excluding 1 who cannot go abroad for holiday because of his small children. 8 of them stayed in foreign countries for periods longer than 1 month because of educational or work reasons. Considering these, we can say that they have a high access to foreign countries. Going abroad is a part of their lives. When they go abroad for work purposes, they spend their time with people from work and when they go for holiday, mostly with their families. Only three of them mentioned spending time with their friends. None of them meet people there who are not related to work. Thus, we can argue that although they often go to foreign countries compared to an ordinary citizen, they contact with people who have similar backgrounds and life styles with them. They do not contact people from different socio-economic backgrounds and do not confront a reality very much different from theirs. All of them visit business centers, 8 of them shopping malls, 10 of them museums, 3 of them cinemas or theaters, 2 of them operas, all of them restaurants and 6 of them entertainment places. Hence even if they go for work, we can say that, they also deal with other activities. So, in contrast to what Micklethwait and Wooldridge argue, these managers do not only see the airport and hotel in the countries they visit. They try to participate in social activities as much as they can. They mostly buy presents for their families, clothes for themselves and souvenirs. There are also ones who buy cd's and books in foreign languages, cosmetics, and electronic goods. They buy souvenirs mostly for decoration and as memorials.

Beginning from here, the answers given to the attitude or opinion questions will be considered. Firstly, I read them some statements and asked which of these statements seems the most appropriate for them to identify themselves and why. Following are these statements:

- I am primarily a Turk.
- I am primarily a Moslem.

- I am primarily European.
- I am primarily Asian/from East.
- I am primarily a world citizen.

7 of them stated that they are primarily world citizens, 1 European and the remaining 3 Turk. Although some of them stated that being a Moslem is important for them, none of them defined themselves primarily as Moslem or Asian. Following are the comments of the ones who regard themselves chiefly as world citizens:

> I am primarily a world citizen. I cannot be a nationalist. I was born here by chance. It is the same about religion. It was not my choice. Defending Islam as I was born as a Moslem… If I was born as a Christian, I would defend Christianity. It doesn't have any meaning. It seems more meaningful to be a world citizen. I am primarily a human being.

> I am a world citizen. The others put one in a box. This one does not; it regards everyone equal. I do not want to be put in a box.

> Among them, being a world citizen seems the most meaningful to me. I do not know to which degree I am European or Asian. Being a world citizen… It is a more universal concept. I do not believe that national boundaries have much meaning any more. Anyway, every problem is rooted in religion or national boundaries. But I am locally a Turk. I did not choose it. I was born and have grown up in this culture. My mother and father are Turks.

> I think I will define myself firstly as a world citizen. Values of humanity come before those other statements, those chauvinist things. Before them come the universal values and human conscience. But of course, I am all of them to a certain degree.

> I am above all a world citizen. I do not have a tendency to discriminate anyone because of his/her race or nationality. Hence, I also do not want to be discriminated. I do not want to have any advantages or disadvantages because of being a Turk. I would like to be evaluated according to my talents. From this perspective, being a world citizen is more appropriate to me. This does not mean a denial of being a Turk. I state that I am a Turk in every setting. I am a world citizen and secondly, I am a Turk. But being a Moslem does not have a priority for me. Our being Moslem is only something pronounced. We do not even pray…

As observed in these statements, they regard world citizenship something that is opposite of nationalism or chauvinism. They regard world citizenship as something universal and pointing out to universal values of humanity. They explain that the term regards everyone equal but they do not talk about whether or not there exist the conditions of that equality. Although ethically one can

argue that universal human values are above all important for him/her and that he/she is first and foremost a human being, in the real social, political and economic conditions and the power relations in the world, many people cannot be defined boundless of their national origins. Only for the people who can easily transcend borders and who do not have any visa difficulties, world citizenship or being a cosmopolitan, is something that can be supported, as Vertovec& Cohen argue (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p.5). Also, the fact that their life style is similar to someone in a first world country gives them the idea that they are world citizens. Their class position gives them the opportunities to travel to other parts of the world without experiencing the problems 'ordinary Turks' experience in terms of financial or visa difficulties, to be together with foreigners in various occasions, and to speak the same language with them. These experiences lead them to think that they may be free from being identified with their national origins. They believe that they can transcend being a Turk and be recognized as a world citizen. Thinking that they have more commonalities in terms of life styles and attitudes with the foreigners having the same position with them from diverse countries, compared to their foreign nationals, they identify this bond among them and these foreigners as world citizenship.

> I think it will be most correct to define myself as European. I think that I am above the average education, income, and culture levels of Turkish people. I am European in this sense. I have the same cultural and economic opportunities that European people make use of… This is why I feel having the similar standards, culture and moral with Europeans. I feel like a European. Being a world citizen… I cannot comprehend concretely what being a world citizen means. I do not believe that in the world we are living, people treat homogeneously to each other. I do not think that such a concept, such a thesis has accuracy. It does not have any practical applications. An environment in which all people in the world treat each other with tolerance regardless of their national origins hasn't been created yet. The reality of the world is not as such. It would be wonderful if it was. It would be wonderful to feel as a world citizen.

This is a more realistic comment in terms of recognizing the real conditions. He is aware of the inequalities experienced throughout the world. It is striking that he feels himself having more commonalities with Europeans than his fellow citizens. The life style that his occupational and class positions provide

him, makes him feel similar to people in foreign countries. He recognizes inequalities between Turkish people and Europeans positioning them at the two poles in terms of income, education and culture levels, Turkish people being at the low and Europeans at the high end. He accepts the existence of inequalities but this acceptance does not lead him to criticize or to question them, but rather to position himself at the powerful side, resting on the privileges he experiences because of his class position. On the other hand, as he recognizes that there is not a parallel universe devoid of power inequalities among nations, he does not accept the concept of world citizenship.

The 3 managers who told that they are primarily Turkish think that Turkish culture is something that shaped them to a large extent. One manager who lived in Hungary for two years stated that before living there, he felt more European.

> It is necessary to say that I am primarily a Turk. It is no use to argue that you are European. You understand that when you live in Europe. While living in Turkey, you can feel European comparing yourself with other Turks. However, when you live abroad, you even miss Turkish simit. You understand that you are Turkish when you go abroad. Before living in Hungary if someone had asked me this question, I would have told that I am European or world citizen. But now I know, it is the most accurate to define myself as a Turk.

He defines himself as a Turk in terms of being used to Turkish habits or Turkish culture. When he lived in a foreign country, he met a set of different cultural codes there and this caused him to miss some cultural practices that are widely experienced in Turkey. When he lives in Turkey, his class position overweighs, making him feel different from other Turks and similar to the foreigners belonging to the same class with him. But when he stayed in a foreign country, he recognized that being a Turk is something that constructed him and that has been a part of his identity. Still, as we can see in the following quotation, this does not mean that he finds himself having commonalities with other Turks, especially from different backgrounds.

> When I look around myself in Turkey, I observe that I am really different from the general mass of people. The education level in Turkey is very low. This is a significant factor that explains our difference. I am also different in terms of

background because my mother's family has been living in İstanbul for more than five hundred years. My mother has a Greek origin so is a true resident of İstanbul... There are many people from Black Sea region in İstanbul now and we have become minority in İstanbul.

Therefore, it is clear that although he primarily defines himself as a Turk, this does not lead him to consider himself similar to other Turks. In terms of both education and background, he feels different from most of the Turkish people. We see the traces of the dislike towards the immigrants who come to İstanbul from other parts of Turkey. He perceives having a long history in İstanbul as something that makes him different from the others, as a capital and he regards himself as a true resident of İstanbul. As Rıfat Bali argues, during 1980s, the restorations were made in İstanbul that changed the silhouette of the city when Bedrettin Dalan was the mayor of the city and this change led to the appearance of concept of nostalgia among the elites of İstanbul in this period: nostalgia for İstanbul of the old times which was now constructed as the symbol of civilization. This nostalgia created an awareness about the significance of living in İstanbul, and being a true resident of İstanbul has become a privilege. Among the elites living in Istanbul, the idea that the migrants coming to Istanbul from the villages were damaging the city, became widespread. The minorities living in Istanbul, who were disparaged in the previous periods, started to be regarded as figures representing civilization and cosmopolitanism. Minorities started to be supported by the elites of the city who were complaining about the 'uncivilized' new comers and who started to feel themselves as belonging to a minority group because of the 'peasants who invaded the city' (Bali, 2002, p.134-144). In the statements of the manager, we can observe his privileging of being a true resident, his emphasis on his mother's being from a minority group and his acceptance of her and himself as true residents of İstanbul because of being minority in terms of their roots and also feeling as minority because of the new comers.

Related to these comments, I asked two related questions to the managers. I asked whether they think that they have similar life styles with the people who have the same positions with them in the foreign countries and whether they

have more commonalities with these people or with Turks from different backgrounds. 9 of the 11 people told that their life style is similar to that of foreigners having same positions, and about the second question, 10 of them told that they have more similarities with these foreigners compared to Turks with different backgrounds, in terms of life style but it has been argued that in terms of cultural habits, they share more with Turks. It is interesting that they regard life style and culture as separate issues. Following are some of the comments related to these two questions:

> I do not think that we have a lower standard than the foreigners who are at the same position with us. As our country is more traditional, from many aspects we have a better life compared to them… Traditional meaning giving more importance to family and friendship… These are important things for me. I like having friendship and family ties and recognition. A top level manager in Turkey has a better recognition compared to an American manager. When you leave your work place, your status still continues outside…Compared to a Turk, my life style resembles more to that of a foreigner. We read more books and newspapers. The places we go, the clothes we wear, the issues we spend our money for are similar. But in terms of thoughts and feelings, we have more common things with Turks. Common cultural heritage… For instance, a foreigner does not like çiğ köfte…"

It is noteworthy that, in terms of major life activities or parts of daily life, he finds himself similar to foreigners. He finds common aspects with other Turks in issues, such as being fond of *çiğ köfte*, which is not a major part of his life. This is in parallel with the manager who stated that he understood his Turkness when he lived in Hungary and even missed Turkish *simit.*

> With the people who are at same levels in other countries, we have many common aspects in terms of life style. But their income level is higher than ours and they have more free time…. However, still we earn really high regarding the average income level in Turkey. While I was at university, I wouldn't believe if someone told me that I would earn this much…Compared to other Turks, I have more in common with foreigners of my level. The difference between me and Hasan Bey is increasing rapidly. Our life style is similar to that of a European. Habits of reading, going on holidays, places we go, importance we give to the education of our children are similar.

> In terms of life style, we are not different from foreigners at our level. They try to provide their children education in good universities of the US, I also try to. They deal with their hobbies, I also deal. They have houses, summer houses, cars and life insurance. I also have… The difference is that there is less uncertainty in their lives. Their countries are more stable…I do not think that they are happier than me but they live in more welfare than me…I can get along well with the foreigners at the same level with me. Our experiences, backgrounds, perspectives are close to each other. I

would like to contact Turks from lower levels. It would make me glad to be a model for them, to give them advices for their children or for themselves. The foreign people do not need me but the people at lower levels in Turkey need me… But it is easier for me to contact foreign people having same positions.

In the second passage, we notice that the only way he can relate to other 'lower level' Turks is as a role model. His position and life style makes him think that he is someone who achieved to have the desires of the masses and who is taken as an example by others. The relation between him and the foreigners of his level is a relation of equals but he stands somewhere above the other Turks.

In terms of places we go, things done, and values, we share a lot with our colleagues abroad. Our preferences are similar. Even our jokes are similar. We speak the same language. There may be minor differences in terms of our hobbies. They frequently play golf there. We do not play golf that much… I cannot get along with for example uneducated Turks. I prefer my foreign colleagues. Thus, I do not blame Germans for their dislike of Turks in their country.

In this quotation, we see a higher level of identification with foreigners. The difference he can see between himself and people from other countries can only be minor differences in their hobbies. And also, national ties do not work in any degree when the other part is an uneducated Turk. He can feel himself in alliance with Germans who complain about the presence of uneducated Turks in their country. Therefore, I claim that the bonds of citizenship do not have any meaning, especially if the people in question are uneducated, compared to bonds of class, which transcend the national borders for this upper class.

Although it was not a question I asked at the beginning, one of my interviewees talked about corporate citizenship. The things he explained included many insights about to where citizenship started to evolve in the contemporary era:

In our company 130.000 people work worldwide. This is a great number. If you add the families of these people to this number, it makes a million. Many countries in the world have less than a million citizens. Thus, corporate culture starts to be more important than the culture of countries. Our corporate culture, for example, is determined by our Code of Conduct. In that Code, we promise to respect human rights, to believe in democracy, not to make discrimination. Corporate citizenship is a citizenship that has a wider scope… Even if there is corporate citizenship, there is one

issue that should not be ignored: cultural diversity. Corporations such as ours have been in the domination of Anglo Saxons. The only reason of it is language. English is their native language. A German manager may be replaced by an English manager who has less intelligence, charisma and talents because of this. This has been relevant thus far. In order to value cultural diversity, we are now developing a new project… If you make business in diverse countries, you have to be adapted to that diversity.

What is explained in this quotation demonstrates the replacement of fellow nationals with colleagues in the corporation. Corporations took the place of nation states, Code of Conduct the place of the constitution and corporate culture the place of national culture within this framework. Even the issue of cultural diversity is discussed in the context of the corporation. After the comments of this manager, I started to ask to the other managers what they understand from corporate citizenship.

In the past, I had seen some statistics. When they listed the institutions and states according to their budgets, the first seven-eight are states and then come corporations. Many countries come in the list after the corporations. This is also reflected in the corporate cultures. Being the citizen of a corporation such as General Motors, which comes after seven big countries in the list, outweighs being the citizen of a country which stays at the end of the list. The world accepts this as such. If you go on a business trip to a foreign country as a Turk and only show your identity card and passport, you will wait for hours in the queue. However, if you have the card of Volvo for instance, they will treat you differently. The corporate identities that some corporations provide to their employees prevail over the identities of underdeveloped countries.

These managers who are the citizens of Turkey, a third world country, seems to be willing to be identified with their corporations rather than their national origins for they recognize that they will have more benefits being the citizen of X corporation, rather than being a Turkish citizen. Regarding the Rousseau's understanding of citizenship according to which citizens are absolutely bound up with the community to which they belong to, as I argued in the part on cosmopolitanism, we can say that for these managers, that community is not the nation state any more, but their corporation.

The answers to the question of whether they live difficulties in having visas also demonstrate how their corporate identity and class level make them privileged, and how corporate identity comes to the fore compared to their

national identity. When the managers or their families want to have a visa either for business purposes or holiday, the corporation provides the necessary documentation for it and deals with visa procedures. Thus, they do not live a significant difficulty in having a visa.

> We have never experienced a difficulty in having a visa. I think the corporate culture is very significant in this respect. My wife went to the US and received a visa for tens years in a week. It has been so easy, as we received it by the help of the corporation. If we had applied as ordinary citizens, we would have probably experienced various difficulties.

Still, some of them complain about waiting in the queues.

> We don't have a problem about getting a visa. But there are queues. For example, in the US, we have to wait in the queues. However, in countries such as Netherlands, we do not experience any difficulties. We just walk by and do not even stop…. I personally did not have a problem but I hear that Turks may have a lot of problems. The ones with tourist passports…

His usage of the word 'Turks' is noteworthy here. He does not say 'other Turks', but 'Turks'. It gives an impression that he does not regard himself as a Turk. The privileges which he experiences lead him to consider himself standing at a different position than the other Turks and cause him to call the others as Turks as if he is something different. In the following quotation also, we observe the privileged status they attribute to themselves.

> I do not like attending the seminars abroad. When I would like to go with my wife, we experience problems about her visa. They want bank account and deeds of real estate from a man such as me. I get irritated. So now I call our clients and tell them to come to Turkey instead of going to those countries. Even if they had given me million dollars, I would not have accepted to live in those countries. The fact that they treat as such, to even people like us created a certain resistance in me.

What he represents as a problem is showing necessary documents for getting a visa. In the statement about their requirement of documents 'from a man such as him', we see the attitude of someone who regards himself very important and who thinks that he should be recognized also in other countries. He sees in himself that authority and power to call the people from the other countries

instead of going. Also, visa procedures are seen as a problem when they are applied to not only ordinary people but also privileged ones, like them.

In addition to commonness of life styles, 9 of the managers think that, whether they are in the same corporation or a different one, they have common interests with the people who have the same positions with them throughout the world. This means that even if there is competition among the firms, the managers still think that they still have mutual benefits with the managers of these firms. What they understand from mutual interests are mostly occupational interests.

> We certainly have mutual benefits. In terms of our occupational responsibilities, we share a common fate. If our occupation is given more importance, all of us reach a better standard of living… The world is globalizing. The bankruptcy of a similar firm in the US because of a scandal and the regulations that American parliament made, effected us a lot… We are in the same boat.

> We, as a business community, have common interests against the regulatory body. In the primary business environment, we are competitors with the other firms. But against regulations and public pressures, our interests are common. When our competitor went bankrupt because of a scandal, we haven't been pleased with it. It brought negative consequences much more than positive ones.

> Our common interests… For example, the proliferation of transparency in our country is to the benefit of all of us. In competition, transparency, fairness, we have common interests. We are all people who trust themselves and all of us would like to be in an environment of fair competition. We do not want nepotism or theft.

As especially apparent in the first two quotations, they position themselves in alliance against the regulatory bodies and public. They have an awareness that they form a group having mutual benefits with the foreign firms and their managers, even if they are competitor firms. These benefits should be protected even though they are against the benefits of the public.

Lastly, I will reflect on their considerations about globalization and Turkey's position within this process. In order to encourage the managers to speak extensively, I asked what they think about globalization in general and asked further questions during, such as whether globalization is a process that has been realized or whether it should be realized, what its positive and negative consequences are, to what extent Turkey has been articulated or included in

this process and whether it should be included more. In terms of what they understand from globalization and their attitudes towards this process, there are a variety of positions. Some of them accept globalization predominantly as a technology driven process, some mainly as an economic and others as a cultural process. There are ones who assess it mainly as having positive and others as having negative consequences. However, there is one issue that all of them agree on: inevitability and irreversibility of this process.

> Globalization is inevitable. Turkey as a country has already been a part of it. Nobody asked our decision or choice about it. We have already been a part. Globalization is in the process of evolving. As it develops, people will increasingly get closer to each other and cultural interaction will increase. Thus, it is not only an economic process… Economic globalization is also inevitable. It will be beneficial for the humanity. Life standards will increase, technology will spread. Everybody will be able to gain knowledge in all the areas. The welfare level will be equal for everybody at the end. But these will take place after very difficult times… But eventually, it will reach to an equilibrium… Today, certainly people are exploiting, oppressing and deceiving each other. But there is no way of preventing it. Struggling not to be oppressed or exploited will lead to isolation and breaking off your foreign relations. Iran tried to do it but could not achieve. Cuba also tried but will not be able to do it.

There is recognition of the inequalities in the current relations within and among the countries here. But he believes that these relations of inequality will change giving way to an equilibrium in terms of social and economic relations. However, it is not clear how this transformation will take place from the current unjust condition to that of peace and justice. People and countries should not struggle for not being oppressed. It seems that an 'invisible hand' will change everything, according to his consideration. Also, in his statements, we observe that he accepts integration of Turkish economy to the international economy as a process on which we have no control or say. Here, he ignores the historical developments that took place and conscious decisions made for articulating Turkish economy to the global economy, which was explained in the chapter about Turkey.

> Globalization has to be realized. It is relevant for Turkey, for Indonesia, for any other country… There is no country difference about it. As long as the capital moves throughout the world, it has to be inevitably realized so that we can get as much share as possible from that capital. I don't think that it has been realized in full. But Turkey

has done well in this sense. In the following years, it will be included more in this process.

Globalization… Neither negative nor positive… It is inevitable. It has both useful and harmful effects. Globalization is a gray notion, neither white nor black. But inevitable… Globalization firstly reminds me the passage to the authority of the consumer from that of the producer. This is the most beneficial effect of globalization I think. Negative sides: its ignorance of poor people, the people who do not contribute to production…"

By the managers, globalization is presented as the only alternative in the period we live. What Turkey should do is to try to get the biggest share from the international capital. Globalization as an ideology is highly internalized and supported by these managers. Although they recognize the negative consequences of it, still they also admit them as inevitable. As a positive effect, 'authority of the consumer' is mentioned. The chances of the people who have money to select among a variety of goods may be a benefit for those people, while it is not for the others. Moreover, it is not possible to name this as the authority of the consumer. Another striking point in the second quotation above is the definition of poor people as the people who do not contribute to production. This is a definition that puts the responsibility of their poorness on the poor people themselves.

According to me, globalization is a fact. Whether you like it or not… In the periods when imperialism was a fact, nobody asked the people in the colonies whether they liked it or not. Globalization will eventually be realized in full. However, I don't know to which extent. The world will never be composed of only one nation state… Increases in communication and worldwide travel are the factors that brought the emergence of globalization… Turkey is somewhere at the middle of this process now. Anyway, we cannot talk about being out of it. It may only be possible through closing your borders and prohibiting everything, like Korea. The rest of the world is within this process.

I think globalization hasn't been completed yet. When you consider the most globalized firms in the world, still there is a flag behind them… I think globalization both has positive and negative aspects. As a positive effect, it serves world peace. When multinational corporations dominate the world, nationalism and conflicts about land disappear. It serves world peace in this sense. But it prevents competition and creates more oppression. It is a world in which there is more oppression but also more peace… It is not possible for Turkey to be out of this economic process. When you are isolated, you have to accept living in conditions of poverty. You cannot be both proud and rich at the same time. This is why I think that Turkey has to be in the process of globalization. I don't want Turkey to be a country like Iran. But Turkey hasn't completed the integration process yet. This is because that its economy hasn't developed enough and it cannot attract an adequate amount of foreign investment.

Compared to China or other countries, a little amount of foreign investments are made in Turkey.

In the second quotation, he states that even the most global firms have national origins. So, he accepts that, still they are not fully globalized and are related to their states of origin. However, then he argues that multinationals dominate the world, which serves the world peace. There is a contradiction here. In a world in which multinationals are still bound to their states of origin, we cannot talk about the rule of multinationals. Moreover, it is suspicious whether the rule of multinationals will ever come into existence and if it will, how they will serve world peace. How can bodies aiming to maximize their profits can save the rights of all?

Taking into consideration the statements of the managers, I can say that they are aware of some of the negative consequences of the process of globalization. Although it will be a long quotation, I will cite here the words of a manager about globalization and its negative consequences.

I think globalization has two dimensions: economic dimension and social system dimension. The economic dimension has been accomplished much more quickly. Liberal economy and its spreading all over the world… In terms of social system, it will be the spreading of democracy throughout the world. There is a problem when there is timing difference between them. For instance China; its economy is liberal but social system is not democracy. This is the most dangerous type of country for the world… We should consider globalization in two stages: the starting of it at 1989, with the collapse of Soviet Union and its first stage took place until 1998. The stage that took place until 1998 Seattle World Trade Organization Meeting was the stage of violent capitalism. In 1990, among the most developed economies, 8 were firms and 92 were countries. In 1998, it has been 48 firms and 52 countries. Firms grew faster. The difference between the rich and poor people, and the poverty level increased incredibly. Of the 6.5 billion people living in the world, 2 billion do not have access to clean water… This is a serious problem. People escape from their countries by ships. They take refuge in Spain by swimming from Morocco. Taking refuge by swimming means you cannot carry anything from your home. You only want to go.

After 1998, there has been a real eye-opening effect in Seattle. There have been big demonstrations and Bush could not go to the meeting from his hotel. After 1998, social responsibility started to come to the fore. The problems of the world cannot be solved by the states; there are firms larger than states. Therefore, now, the economic part should be reconciled and democracy should be spread. It is necessary to share the welfare and to form a socialist liberal economy which takes into consideration the social values. Otherwise, it will not be sustainable. When Titanic was sinking, both the ones who were drinking champagne at the top of the ship and the poor Irish people at the bottom died. The situation of the world is going there… I am not trying to say

that globalization will bring the end of the world. In fact, liberal economy has no substitute. Economy has to be liberal, people should be able to invest anywhere in the world. However, when profit maximization is targeted ignoring the social responsibilities, this will bring serious problems.

This paragraph is really interesting in that it very much resembles some of contemporary social science texts, considering poverty and other problems globalization created. It can be argued that both businessmen and business literature have become familiar with the concept of social responsibility within the last couple of years. It may be regarded as a development compared to the stage of 'violent capitalism' mentioned by my interviewee. However, we can say that this articulation never gives way to pointing out the real causes of the problems, which are usually related to the system itself. The growing interest in poverty throughout the world can also be evaluated in the same way. The interest in poverty has been mostly effected by the efforts of the International Institutions. The World Bank's World Development Reports published in 1980, 1990 and 2000/2001, the symposiums organized and reports prepared by UNICEF, OECD and ILO, and the annual Human Development Report published by UNDP may be taken as some of the indicators of this interest. These international institutions suggest strategies such as good governance, improving civil society in particular and democracy in general, economic growth and empowerment some of which are also indicated by my interviewee. However, the problem with these strategies and the activities of these institutions is that they do not have an emphasis on the macroeconomic policies and international power dynamics. "These treatments seem to address a parallel universe in which there are no major powers - transnational corporations, banks, Western governments, international trade barriers and institutions- that produce and reinforce poverty and inequality." (Pieterse, 2002, p.1034) The globalizing capitalist system, by embracing minor critics of itself which do not mention root causes, makes itself even stronger. And what we observe in the statements of the manager is the concept of social responsibility articulated into the ideology of liberal economy.

6.3. Conclusion

Considering the research question in my study, I tried to sketch the life style characteristics of the top level managers in the Turkey branch of X Corporation, which is a multinational corporation, and also tried to understand to which degree they have been integrated to the transnational capitalist class in terms of their life style characteristics and perceptions. As indicated in the part about limitations, as I did not make a comparative study, consisting of researches both in Turkey and in the foreign countries, it is not possible for me to compare all life style activities and their frequencies for Turkish and foreign managers and give a detailed picture of their similarities. However, considering the responses to the questions such as frequency of visits to foreign countries, the places gone in those countries, and the issues emphasized by Leslie Sklair and Micklethwait & Wooldridge about the life style characteristics of the transnational capitalist class, we can talk about the similarities with the foreign managers in terms of life styles.

Following Bourdieu's scheme, I observed that these managers are rich in terms of economic capital, earning between USD 100.000-500.000 a year, most of them owning houses in wealthy districts of İstanbul, and luxurious cars. They have high cultural capital, indicated by the prestigious universities and departments they graduated from, their knowledge of foreign languages, their high frequency of reading books, newspapers, going to cinemas and access to internet. As families of most of them aren't very well educated, their cultural capital is not supported by the cultural capital of their father and mother in most of the cases. However, it is supported by their wives'/former husbands' education. Their spouses also graduated from good universities. They are meritocrats, as they rose up in the socio-economic hierarchy with their talents and intelligence, which is a trait that they share with their counterparts in the foreign countries. They are also well-off in terms of social capital. Not only their position helped them to create networks in the areas of politics, arts and media, but also their memberships in occupational and other organizations helped them to improve their social capital. And lastly, in terms of symbolic

capital, many goods they consume and life style habits they experience distinguish them from the lower classes: their access to foreign countries, the activities they do, the places they visit and the goods they buy in those countries; the places they go and stay in their holidays, the activities they do in their free times, the frequency of traveling by plane, the sports they practice and the places where they do these sports, the brands of clothes they wear, the brands of some goods they use, the districts they live in and the brands of their cars. Their other types of capital, after being perceived by them as legitimate, are transformed into symbolic capital, including all those issues demonstrating their privileged status.

As indicated at the beginning, some of these life style characteristics also give information about their integration with transnational class. All of them frequently go to foreign countries both for work purposes and holidays. They have been involved in the social life activities when they go abroad. They have a high access to internet like their counterparts in the other countries and communicate their colleagues from both Turkey and other countries through internet. They are fluent in English and some of them also in other languages which are factors that make it possible for them not only to communicate but also to have the same culture, to laugh at the same jokes with the foreign managers, as indicated by my interviewees. They have similar educational backgrounds with the foreigners in terms of graduating from business and administrative departments of the best universities. In addition to it, some of the Turkish managers had their undergraduate or graduate education in the US. These are some of the life style characteristics of the managers in my case that contribute to their integration with the transnational capitalist class.

In addition to these, I also asked perception questions. According to the responses given to these questions, I observed that most of the managers regard themselves primarily as world citizens. Being a Turk or a Moslem may be things that have constructed them but they would like to be free from these identifications. They accept that they have similar life styles with top level

managers in the other countries. Most of them find themselves more close to the foreigners at their levels compared to Turks from other socio-economic backgrounds, in terms of common characteristics or habits. They also regard themselves having common interests with the foreign managers, no matter they work in the same corporation or other competitor corporations. They talk about their mutual benefits. Some of them talked about the importance of the concept of corporate citizenship, coming to the forefront compared to citizenship of a country. These responses point out to the corrosion of national citizenship ties in the perspectives of these managers. Their primary identifications are with the people who have the same position with them, no matter in what country or corporation, and with the people who work in the same corporation with them, not with their fellow nationals. Although they have diverse positions about the content and consequences of globalization, all of them believe that it is an inevitable and irresistible process. Although they accept that Turkey has been included in this process with a subordinate status, still they think that it is impossible to remain out of this process. What we should do is to struggle for getting as much as possible from the international capital. Although they talk about the social problems experienced as a result of this process, they regard these negative consequences as inevitable and do not point at the root causes of them. What they suggest is rather to wait and see the good days that will come at last or to spread democracy.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

During 1970s, because of important changes, the period of economic growth that was realized through the interventions of the states in the industrialized countries ended. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and OPEC oil crisis created instability in the economies, and inflation rates increased rapidly because of domestic policy failures. The participation of the US in the Vietnam War has also been effective in the instability of economies and in the change of previous policies. During 1970s and 1980s, through deregulations of markets and dissolution of exchange controls, financial markets increasingly internationalized. The financial institutions and manufacturers looked for additional markets for investment for reimbursing the domestic uncertainty. This led to extensive bank lendings to the Third World and the accelerating foreign trade of industrialized countries. There has been a shift from mass production to flexible production methods, and multinational corporations replaced national ones as the dominant economic agents. Diminishing national controls, increasing instability of economies and major institutional changes have been the developments of the period after 1970s. The ideas of the welfare system aiming to create a type of capitalism without losers through the interventions of the states were substituted by a consensus about the ungovernability of the markets and importance of being competitive.

What is called globalization in the contemporary social science literature, in many cases without consideration of the historical events that led to its emergence, is to a large extent the result of these processes. However, it is not only a result of social and economic processes, but also of an idea, which is the

idea of free market. Thus, as Scott also argues, globalization means the establishment of economic deregulation and decreases in social costs (Scott, 1997, p.8-9). However, the irony is that in both industrialized and Third World countries, transition to deregulation and free market economy could not be achieved without the active involvement of the states, which is something that is contrary to the ideas of deregulation and free market.

Globalization brought not the spreading of economic transactions to the whole world, but rather a concentration of economic activity in a few big multinational corporations located in a small number of developed countries. It marginalized many of the economies and increased the inequalities between developed and Third World countries. In many of the Third World countries, the ideas of being competitive at any cost and achieving economic growth through exports were accepted without questioning. Acceptance of these ideas indicated the reception of neoliberalism through the application of structural adjustment programs in these countries by the efforts of their governments. National governments were left devoid of instruments necessary for their economies, production and employment. Thus, application of these policies created negative consequences for the majority of the populations of these countries. The main parties that benefit from the process of globalization have been the multinational corporations, and the people who own and control them. As Sklair argues, a transnational capitalist class is in the process of formation now, which consists of corporate executives, globalizing politicians, globalizing professionals and elites. They live in diverse countries but have common interests with each other, much more than with their fellow nationals. The economic interests of the members of this class are getting globally linked increasingly. They also have similar life styles no matter in which country they live and they try to represent themselves as citizens of the world.

When we examine Turkey's articulation to the process of globalization, like many other Third World countries, we observe that this articulation or deregulation of Turkish economy took place with the extensive participation

and the efforts of the state. The international financial institutions of IMF and the World Bank have also been the major forces urging national governments in Turkey to realize neoliberal policies. Big capitalist groups in the country have been the main groups benefiting from this economic transformation, while economic and social conditions worsened for the other groups in Turkey. The neoliberal transformation in Turkey which happened during 1980s was realized through the endeavors of both local and international capitalist groups with the arbitration of the state.

With the introduction of new economic policies, industrialization hasn't been an aim for the governments any more and sectors like trade, banking and other service sectors have become valorized. The corporations started to employ professional managers in these sectors offering high incomes to these managers. These managers had high cultural capital through their education in the best universities of Turkey and competence in English, and also acquired high economic capital through being employed in big corporations. They have been the members of the upper class together with the owners of these corporations. Their economic capital made it possible for them to consume luxurious goods and to live in special residences. Having segregated work environments, entertainment places and residences, their life style has been based on discrimination on the basis of social class. However, although they live isolated from the other social classes in Turkey and do not have many aspects in common with them, they have been in contact with people from other countries who have the same position with them and have similar life styles with those people, both in terms of consumption habits and also backgrounds.

In the light of these arguments, in my case study of high level managers in the Turkish branch of X Corporation, I tried to portray the life style characteristics of these managers, considering the life style conceptualization of Bourdieu and to see to what extent they can be accepted as a part of transnational capitalist class. For looking at their life style, I took into account four capitals which are

economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals, in line with Bourdieu's model. Taking into consideration their occupational positions and income levels, I observed that they can be positioned in the upper class in terms of their economic capital. They also have high cultural capital, which is indicated by the best universities they graduated from, their competence in foreign languages, high frequency of reading books, newspapers and magazines, listening to classical music, frequently going to cinema and regular usage of internet. Their cultural capital is not supported by that of their mothers and fathers; the parents of most of them did not have higher education. But there is a reinforcement of their cultural capital by the education of their spouses as they also graduated from the best universities in Turkey. In terms of social capital, we can state that they are also well-off. They have relationships and acquaintances with people not only from the field of business but also from the fields of politics, arts and media. Moreover, all of them have memberships in at least two associations, NGOs or clubs. They are mostly the members of occupational groups, alumni organizations of their universities and other organizations promoting international business and trade. Their membership in these organizations not only demonstrates their social capital but also gives an idea about their motivation and interest in supporting foreign investment in Turkey and integration of Turkish business to the global business.

Regarding symbolic capital, I can state that the managers I interviewed create distinction from the lower classes through type and district of their residences and their decoration, brands of their cars, restaurants and shopping malls they go to in their free times, the types of sports they do and memberships in big sports centers, the places from which they buy their clothes, the brands of these clothes and of the other goods they use, the places they go and stay in their holidays, going to foreign countries, traveling by plane, and staying at luxurious hotels.

About the second part of my research question, that is the integration level of these managers with the transnational capitalist class, I mainly considered their

access to foreign countries and their opinions about such issues as globalization, Turkey's integration to this process, identification of themselves in terms of national belonging, world citizenship, corporate citizenship, and how they perceive their life style compared to that of foreigners having the same position and to that of Turkish people from different classes. According to the statements of my interviewees, all of them go to foreign countries at least 3-4 times a year, 3 of them going a couple of times in a month. All of them go abroad both for business and most of them for their holidays. Thus they have a high access to other countries. However, when they go abroad, they predominantly spend their time with their counterparts from work. Thus, I can assert that going to other countries means strengthening their relationships with the people who are from different countries but the same class, and who have similar backgrounds and life styles with them. The life style of the upper class which primarily rested on isolation from lower classes, as I previously argued, is also maintained when they go abroad.

Most of my interviewees regard themselves as world citizens. Remembering Leslie Sklair's argument that the members of transnational capitalist class try to represent themselves as world citizens, I can say that this proposition is confirmed for the managers in my case. They think that being a Turk is something that they did not choose, so it is not a meaningful identification for them. They state that national boundaries do not have much relevance any more and they do not have to define themselves with their nationality. Without pointing out to the power inequalities in the world, they talk about the importance of morality and values of humanity. This is in line with Craig Calhoun's argument that cosmopolitanism promises to reach virtue without a major redistribution of wealth and power, and thus, it is a kind of political reform that appears attractive to the elites or that these elites can be identified with. They are aware of the inequalities in the world both among and also within the nations, as observed in their statements about increasing world poverty. However, they accept these inequalities as inevitable and never consider the possibility of a radical change in this situation.

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Talking about world citizenship, which refers to privileging values of humanity in their considerations, makes them seem to be responsible individuals who value morality. However, they do not reflect on the existing political, social and economic conditions, and suggest an ethics without politics. They are the ones who can claim that state borders are disappearing as they have the privilege of traveling all around the world through getting visas easily and having the necessary resources to do so. As my interviewees told, they do not even deal with visa procedures; the necessary documents are sent by the corporation and they do not experience any difficulties. They frequently go abroad, meet people from the same class with them in foreign countries and attend in social activities there. Living all these privileges and being able to experience life in other countries lead to them to believe that they are world citizens. Thus, we can claim that cosmopolitanism or being a world citizen refers to the privileged life style of these people.

According to the statements of my interviewees, most of them think that they have similar life styles with foreign people from the same class with them and they have more commonalities with these people compared to Turks from different social classes. They also believe that they have common interests with the people from other countries, who have the same positions with them. This demonstrates the weakening of bonds that rested on being the citizens of a particular nation state, while the bonds resting on being the members of the same class throughout the world and having common interests in terms of global capital strengthen. This is in line with Christopher Lasch's statement that "…privileged classes in Los Angeles feel more kinship with their counterparts in Japan, Singapore, and Korea than with most of their country men." (Lasch cited in Fine & Cohen, 2002, p.159).

There is one significant question that I should ask here: Can we regard these managers, who work in a Third World country, completely as equals of the managers who work in First World countries? I think although they experience many privileges because of their class position, still they are people from Third

World and they experience the disadvantages this fact brings. Although it is easy for them to get visas, we should remember that still they have to get visas. They are aware that showing the card of their corporation eases visa procedures for them. Without that, with an ordinary identity card and passport, they will experience many problems. Moreover, as some of the managers talked about, there is a hierarchy among the managers of X Corporation worldwide and Anglo Saxons stay at the top of this hierarchy, experiencing more privileges compared to other managers from different national origins. Being aware of the disadvantages they live because of their national origin, they try to emphasize their corporate identity instead of national identity and they talk about emergence of corporate citizenship. As they regard themselves in an upper position compared to other Turks and as they accept Turkish identity as creating problems to them, they prefer being a citizen of their corporation or being a world citizen. These two citizenships make it possible for them to identify with people who have higher life standards and privileged positions, instead of Turkish people, the life styles of whom they disparage.

In social sciences, especially within last ten years, cosmopolitanism is presented as the new project appropriate for the new globalized world. As the arguments suggesting the demise of the nation state and relevance of post-national forms have gained wide recognition, cosmopolitanism has been accepted as being proper for these new conditions. However, before discussing the relevance of cosmopolitanism for the contemporary conditions, it is necessary to question the main presuppositions it rests upon, as I indicated above. Are we really experiencing the demise of the nation states? Are the post-national institutions the main political actors in the contemporary era? Do we have to accept nation states as out-dated political mechanisms and support post-national institutions? Or, can we still regard nation states as influential and essential for any political project?

As I explained in the previous chapters, even neo-liberalism, which included decreasing of state controls, deregulation of markets and privatization of many

public services did not, and could not, take place without the active participation of nation states. Both in the First and Third Worlds, the process of globalization took place by the efforts of international and local capitalist groups, but also by the mediation of the states. It is true that states are losing their power in terms of giving social services but in terms of supporting capitalism both in local and also global levels, they are still very strong. And also, for any action against the functioning of global capitalism, nation states are still the major players, as Timothy Brennan argues, and any type of meaningful politics should still include the control of the states. Therefore, the projects which rest on the idea of irrelevance of politics that rest on nation states should be questioned, which is a suggestion that is also relevant for evaluating cosmopolitanism.

The theorists of cosmopolitanism ignore the inequalities among and within nations. They do not address the powerful position of some countries and especially the hegemonic position of the US. Cosmopolitanism emerged in the US academy and it should be regarded in relation to increasing US power. It is interesting that the discourse of world citizenship and post-nationalism in the corporate cultures, as I also observed in my case study, and in the social sciences are very similar. Social theorists who support cosmopolitanism, ignoring the economic and political realities of the world, produce discourses which are in line with the interests of global capitalism. They present 'universal norms for harmony' which are in fact Western principles. They present a political project appropriate for the elites.

I think this thesis will contribute to the studies made in Turkey about upper class and their life style, which are not numerous indeed. Although this study does not have a claim of being representative of the upper classes or the higher-level managers in Turkey, still it gives insights about both. However, further detailed studies with larger and representative groups are needed about the lifestyle of upper classes and higher-level managers. Moreover, this thesis presents a critical perspective about both globalization and also

cosmopolitanism. Regarding loads of articles and books which introduce globalization as inevitable and emerging without any efforts, and cosmopolitanism as the political project appropriate for the current period, this study is one that questions globalization and cosmopolitanism as a political project.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1) How old are you?

2) What is your marital status?

3) Which schools and departments did you graduate from beginning from primary school?

4) Which foreign languages do you know and what is your level of competence in these languages?

5) What is the level of education of your father?

6) What is the level of education of your mother?

7) Which university and department did your current/former wife/husband graduate from?

8) From which of the following groups of occupations do you have contacts/ acquaintances?

    a- Member of Parliament/ Minister

    b- Mayor

    c- Other Politician

    d- Artist

    e- Academician

    f- Journalist/ Columnist

    g- Owner of Media Corporation

    h- Owner of Holding Companies

9) How often do you go abroad?

10) Have you ever been abroad for a period longer than a month?

11) Where and how long have you stayed?

12) For which purposes do you go abroad?

13) With whom do you spend your time when you are abroad?

14) Do you go shopping when you are abroad for a period less than a month?

15) If you go shopping abroad, what do you generally buy?

16) If you buy souvenirs from the countries you go, for which purposes do you buy them?

17) Which of these places do you visit when you go abroad?

       a- Business centers

       b- Shopping Malls

       c- Museums/Other historical places

       d- Cinemas/theaters

       e- Restaurants

       f- Entertainment places

18) How often do you go on holidays?

19) Where do you go and stay in your holidays?

20) How often do you travel by plane?

21) Do you read a newspaper everyday? Which newspaper(s) do you read?

22) Are there any magazines that you regularly read? Which magazines do you read?

23) How often do you go to the following places in Turkey?

       a- Opera/ ballet

       b- Cinema

       c- Theater

       d- Concert

       e- Exhibition

       f- Match

       g- Entertainment places

       h- Restaurant

       i- Shopping Mall

24) Which type of music do you listen to?

25) Do you regularly do sports? Which sports do you deal with? Do you have memberships in any sports clubs?

26) In which clubs, NGOs or other institutions do you have memberships?

27) Do you frequently read? Which types of books do you read?

28) From where do you usually buy your clothes? From which districts and which stores do you buy your clothes?

29) Is it important for you to buy clothes of well-known brands?

30) For which of the following objects do you prefer or use well-known brands? Which brands do you prefer?

     a- Pen

     b- Watch

     c- Lighter

     d- Glasses/ Sun glasses

     e- Cellular phone

     f- Cuff link

     g- Wallet

     h- Case/purse

31) How often do you stay in hotels?

32) Which hotels do you stay in?

33) For which purposes do you use internet?

34) Which of the following statements seem most appropriate for you to identify yourself? Why?

a- I am primarily a Turk.

b- I am primarily a Moslem.

c- I am primarily European.

d- I am primarily Asian/from East.

e- I am primarily a world citizen.

35) What do you think about globalization? Do you think that globalization is a process that has been realized? Should be realized? What are its positive and negative consequences?

36) To what extent has Turkey been articulated or included in the process of globalization? Should it be included more?

37) Do you think that your life style is similar to that of the managers at your level in the foreign countries?

38) Do you have more commonalities with the foreign managers at your level or with Turkish people from different socio-economic backgrounds?

39) Do you think that you have common interests with the foreign managers at your level, working in the same corporation or different corporations?

40) In which district are you living? What is the type of your house?

41) Does the house you live in belong to you?

42) Did you get professional help for decorating your house?

43) Do you have a summer house?

44) Which of the following goods do you have in your house?

       a- Microwave oven

       b- Plasma TV

       c- DVD Player

       d- Ancastre appliances

       e- Garden furniture

       f- Antique goods/ Paintings

       g- Wireless internet

45) Do you and/or other members of your family have a car/cars?

46) What is/are the brand(s) of your car(s)?

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