

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ETHICAL
AND
ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN LATER HEIDEGGER
AND DERRIDA

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ABSTRACT

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ETHICAL AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN LATER HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA

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In my doctorate thesis, I have discussed the notion of the experience of the ethical and its political consequences. In this context, I have pointed to the central strategy of Kantian ethics that is called transcendental strategy. Transcendental strategy relies on a concept of causality, which unlike the causality that governs the laws of nature, arises from freedom in its cosmological meaning. I have discussed Heideggerian challenge to this concept of causality from an ontological point of view that gives rise to totalitarian political consequences. In relation to Heideggerian challenge, I have argued that Derrida's critique of Heidegger gives rise to democratic political consequences that reconcile the origin of ethics with fiction through utilization of the transcendence of transcendentality. Thereby, I have argued that experience of the ethical for Derrida induces to similar political consequences with holistic pragmatism.

Keywords: Experience of the Ethical, "As If", Transcendental, Holistic Pragmatism,
Metaphor

ÖZ

GEÇ DÖNEM HEIDEGGER VE DERRIDA'DA ETİK DENEYİM VE POLİTİK SONUÇLARI

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Doktora tezi çalışmamda etik deneyim kavramını ve politik sonuçlarını tartıştım. Bu bağlamda, Kant etiğinde merkezi bir yer tutan aşkın strateji anlayışını, bu stratejinin dayandığı doğa kanunlarının tabî olduğu nedensellikten farklı, kozmolojik anlamda bir özgürlükten kaynaklanan nedensellik anlayışını ve Heidegger'in bu anlayışa varlıkbilimsel eleştirisini totaliter sonuçlara yol açışı açısından ele aldım. Heidegger'in eleştirisine Derridacı bir yaklaşımın daha demokratik bir politikaya yol açışını ve bu yaklaşımın aşkın olanın aşkını işe yarar kılarak etiğin kökenini kurguyla örtüştürmesinin bütüncül faydacılık ile benzer politik sonuçlar doğurduğunu öne sürdüm.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etik Deneyim, "Mış Gibi", Aşkın, Bütüncül Faydacılık, Metafor

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Heidegger

BT: *Being and Time*

LH: *Letter on Humanism*

OWA: *The Origin of the Work of Art*

IM: *Introduction to Metaphysics*

PLT: *Poetry, Language, Thinking*

Works by Derrida

OG: *Of Grammatology*

MP: *Margins of Philosophy*

P: *Positions*

BL: *Before the Law*

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Experience of the ethical – Anti-representationalism – Limits of Experienceability

Experience, when not limited and reduced to provide us the certain knowledge of external world, can be seen as a possibility of blurring the demarcations between philosophy and related disciplines like politics, religion and art. Experience of the ethical as an inter-disciplinary mediator, is against the distinction between what is inside and what is outside of philosophical limits. Limits of a clear-cut distinction between what can be known and what cannot are challenged by creative distortions of language. Language, in this respect is distorted creatively as the medium of the possibility of the certainty of the knowledge and true description of this knowledge of the external world.

Experience of the ethical is “running up against language” as Wittgenstein puts it; it is a creative distortion of the margins of philosophy and other disciplines that opens up a possibility of attempting to the *unfamiliar*.

The historical background of the experience of the ethical can be traced back to Dilthey’s holistic attitude of experience, which view knowing, living and acting as a whole. Heidegger is original as the philosopher who thought us a mood of letting be and attributed this receptiveness of being here to responsibility as the basic condition of Being in his new conception of humanism.

The experience of the ethical has been a significant term particularly after Heidegger put it as a possibility of understanding unfamiliar coming to presence and unfolding itself from and out of itself into the dwelling place. Heidegger influenced philosophers widely with his original interpretations of metaphysics. His understanding of a new ontology aimed at regaining the ontological status of ethical through a creative openness of subjectivity in the experience of the ethical. Nevertheless, Heidegger thought ethical within the limits of his new ontology. Experience of the ethical, in other words experience of the unfamiliar gave rise to political consequences both from a Heideggerian point of view and from a Derridean point of view.

There has always been a challenge of talking about concepts that we use for evaluating value and beauty since their calculability that arouses out of using concepts like justice, responsibility, duty and good is problematic. The problematic insolubility of these concepts has created a challenge. As well as this challenge, I suppose, the necessity of decision making in certain, particular cases has been a constant demand. Due to this demand, we have faced the tension of referring to a possibility of a universal validity for the justification of particular decision making processes and actions. On the other hand, the validity of a universal criterion has been a matter of discussion particularly after Kant.

Experience of the ethical gave rise to political consequences especially with its claim to meet the challenge of the lack of the ontological status of the concepts mentioned above and its emphasis on the necessity of decision making. I consider experience of the ethical as an attempt to create a passage from ethics of care to the political in this respect. Both Heidegger and Derrida are anti-representationists, and in

this sense followers of Nietzsche. However, they both attempt to go beyond nihilism in different directions.

Anti-representationalism after Kant in an anti-foundationalist approach to any universal maxim broke down the essential link between particular decision making processes and universal truth claims. Nevertheless, the demand for resolving particular problems concerning social practices that calls for judgments on the open concepts like justice cannot simply be left to absolute relativity. Thereby, I think the problems of ethical and political are to be dealt with a kind of ironic awareness due to the impossibility of a claim like there is an Archimedean stand-point that is in touch with a universally accepted truth on the one hand, which is still seen as a necessity for decision making and problem solving. The implementation of a universal validity that is not experienceable means the implementation of what has been shown impossible to be implemented.

In my thesis I will argue that the performative dimension of Derridean philosophy, in its relation and difference from the Heideggerian destruction of metaphysics is a heuristic possibility on ethical and political and it is close to holistic pragmatism despite the counter-arguments. To do so, I will focus on the experience of the ethical in relation to its impact on the ethical and political. The problematic relation between the universal and singular can be said to originate from Kant for modern philosophy. Accordingly, I will discuss Kant's position to enter into the experience of the ethical firstly.

Kant laid down a universal validity, as unconditioned for the condition of the possibility of what is experienceable. However according to the very criteria of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, this universal validity was determined as impossible to experience. In a sense, we are still facing this tension. Kant's point of justification leaves

us without reconciliation between what is known to be through experience and what is valuable. Therefore, the experience of the ethical seems problematic after Kant grounded the knowable reality upon the a-priori structure of the subject. The a-priori structure itself remains unknown as the possibility of the experienceability. The experience of the ethical, the unconditioned and accordingly disinterested freedom of the ethical action, having remained inaccessible, is inexperienceable for Kant. The subjectivity in this transcendental strategy seems to have a privileged vantage point that keeps it safe with regard to the subjectivity of life-world. I will argue that this transcendental subjectivity relies on a concept of causality, which unlike the causality that governs the laws of nature, arises from freedom in its cosmological meaning. In this sense the subjectivity of transcendental strategy, having been related to the spontaneous activity of Cartesian cogito with its a-priori structure's spontaneity, seems as an extension of metaphysics of presence. Thereby, to follow a path from the transcendental strategy of Kant's ethics to the experience of the ethical for later Heidegger and Derrida who attacked the metaphysics of presence to a certain extent with parallelism, seems paradoxical.

I will expose this relation throughout my study. I will discuss Heideggerian approach to this strategy as a question of Being, Derrida's utilization of the transcendence of transcendental as a possibility of reconciliation of the origin of moral law with fiction. To do so, I will refer to the possibility of ethical experience otherwise than Being as Levinas suggested. The question of Being leads us to the Heideggerian understanding of ethics within the limits of metaphysics. I will refer to Levinasian objection to Heidegger to some extent; nevertheless, I think Levinasian approach, resembling highly a religious subordination of subjectivity, is not useful for the ethical-political direction of deconstruction, which I will argue comes close to

holistic pragmatism so far as deconstruction is viewed as a possibility of democratization.

1.2.Limit at Work – Ethical\Political Direction – Heidegger and Derrida

I will argue, the ethical-political direction of deconstruction as viewed from different angles, indeed induces us to a very similar common point once we clarify the apparent differences on the relation between public and private, literature and philosophy. This point is a possibility of a more democratic future rather than a rupture with the tradition that seems to be directed towards a radical politics as Rorty views. I will discuss the relation between deconstruction and tradition of philosophy to focus on the democratic possibility of deconstruction and show deconstruction is not simply stepping out of the tradition of philosophy.

It is the internal structures that define what is inside and what is not. Blurring the opposition between the two, the inside and outside through deconstruction, Derridean relation to tradition provides us the “Outside” at the margins of closure. Thus, deconstruction produces the possibility of transgression within the limits of, in the place of the margins of philosophy. In *Positions*, Derrida says: “Transgression implies that the limit is always at work.”¹ The starting point of the production of the outside thus, is within the closure of metaphysics.

I agree with Robert Bernasconi who says that Derrida discusses Heidegger in a way that “...is richer and more complex than his discussion of Hegel and Husserl.”² As the togetherness of proximity and inseparability of Being and man, Derrida sees the relation between the inside and outside of metaphysics within the Heideggerian

¹ P, page 12.

² Bernasconi Robert, *Politics Beyond Humanism, Working Through Derrida*, (Here after WTD), Edited By Madison, G., Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1993.

conception of Dasein; man that has been bounded contextually and somehow has a teleological end as his completion as well as his completion in death. However, Derrida opens up the possibility of this Heideggerian double-bindedness through problematization of the completion of man and philosophy.

I think in the turning point of ethics Heidegger performs a crucial role. Therefore, in order to discuss the relation of the transcendental strategy of Kant's ethics to the experience of the ethical for later Heidegger and Derrida, and the place of an exteriority out of the envelopment of logos, to create a room for *respect* in Derrida's attempt, I will discuss the experience of the ethical as the event of the happening of the unfamiliar as a possibility of the togetherness of proximity and inseparability of Being and man in later Heidegger. The Heidegger of *Being and Time*, on the other hand, is crucial to understand the shift from the transcendental subjectivity to agency. I will discuss in this respect the role of Heidegger in the historical development of the conception of life-world, the hermeneutic limitation of the question of Being, the self-interpretation of Dasein, precedence of ready-to hand to present-to hand and human beings as place holders who take their stands within the web of their ends and the means that are used for these ends. I will emphasize Dasein's position as a place-holder in the public world as being with others and the shared experience of Being-with by virtue of the basic condition of Being. Further, I will point to the existentials as essential structures: situatedness, understanding and discursiveness. Question of Being is the main concern of Heidegger after 1930 and particularly with *The Introduction to Metaphysics*. Derrida thinks Heidegger renounces a new project of ontology, which is a turning point in Heidegger after *The Introduction to Metaphysics*. This project, as well known, is an impossible project towards defining what is not definable, an attempt to exceed beyond the limits of discursive talk, an

attempt to arrive at the happening “of the advent of the truth of beings,” in a mood (Stimmung) that is no longer harmonious with the ready-to-hand equipments; a mood of “letting happen” the fate of West.³ I will try to show both keeping his perspectivism and attempting to reach a true interpretation of “Being in its truth” bind Heidegger with a two-foldedness.

The turning point of ethics with regard to the shift in Heideggerian thought leads us to the function of language. I will focus on the relation between language and the question of Being, poetic thinking as a privileged way of questioning Being and consequently the new conception of humanism that accrues out of the happening of the alterity and at the same time commonness of human beings through the experience of the ethical in Heidegger.

1.3. The Place of the Unfamiliar

In *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus can be considered as an example of this new conception of humanism. In this interpretation, the shift from the division of ought from value, is discussed in their common relation to Being with reference to familiar as the habitat of the unfamiliar. This crucial turning, however, is also why Heidegger has been said to have the two-foldedness that is referred above. The relation between the familiar and unfamiliar is the metaphor of the place of Being's unconcealment and the essence of man in its proximity of the happening of this unconcealment. Being is the inseparable commonness of the essence of man. Man, in a new definition of humanism, unlike the Hegelian mediated anthropology that relies on the logic of opposition, faces what he is not and what he ought to be in relation to his inseparable commonness. The crucial point is the shift from transcendental subjectivity to a passive, receptive and responsible subjectivity, which experiences her alterity in the

³ OWA, page 198.

experience of the ethical-aesthetical. For Heidegger aesthetics is the passage to come to the nearest place of Being and the experience of the ethical for him gains the solemn responsibility in the receptive appreciation of aesthetics. I will argue that Heideggerian experience of the ethical, as the transcendence of Dasein in the mood of uncanny remains within the limits of metaphysics and the passage in Heideggerian sense is a passage in the experience of the ethical that leads *us* towards violence.

Heidegger's texts are open to a reading that puts the logic of alterity in place of the logic of opposition for Derrida. Heidegger says, Hegel was not wrong and neither was he incomplete. Hegel was as right as metaphysics according to Heidegger. At the end of metaphysics, we come to a new beginning of metaphysics in which Being itself is revealed to Dasein in his transcendence and, thereby, Being is to be questioned in this revealing, unconcealment, as the Being of beings. Being is the other, the alterity of Dasein with which Dasein encounters in the happening of history.

Heidegger tells us that this encounter entails man to stand out, take a stand in a nearest place where, he is claimed by Being. This encounter occurs within the uncanny experience of nothing and throws man into the truth of Being. Nothing is the transcendence of Dasein through which, like a passage, he attempts what is concealed in its unconcealment. Nothing no longer belongs to Being in Hegelian sense because both are the same in their indeterminateness and immediacy; nothing belongs to Being as its unconcealment through which Dasein attempts to arrive at his teleological end. Dasein's attempt, in the particular mood, nevertheless, is to be through the signifiers and restrictions of the ontic limitation and that points to the inevitable contradiction; or two-foldedness, double-bindedness of later Heidegger's position on ethics.

1.4. The Place of Ought

Heideggerian ethics can be viewed as, I suppose, an attempt to go beyond the determination of ought that has had the precedence over Being in Kant, by means of appealing to the relation between thinking and poetry and thinking in poetry within its belongingness and difference to Being. In its division from Being, ought grounds itself in itself and is justified on its own validity. This self-justification, from a modern point of view, according to which the precedence depends on what can be experienced, is possible as a value for the beings. The fact that ought is possible as a value means that, value is the condition of the possibility of ought that is divided from Being. From a Heideggerian point of ethics, values that ground the *ought* in Kantian epistemology, are not possible themselves since the values are not experienceable and thereby they themselves cannot be. The opposition between the values and the facts means that values cannot be unlike the facts whose being we can assure by virtue of experience. That is why I think Heideggerian relocation of ought in the experience of the ethical is a turning point in the history of ethical thought.

The place of the happening of this ought is tied up with the dwelling place of Being in Heidegger. Ought is the potency of what Being is to become in its unfolding and exhibition as idea. Being in its relation to thinking unfolds itself as idea to us and through thinking, Heidegger says, we attempt to adhere Being in its place of opening up by a kind of thinking: poetic thinking.

Poetic thinking, however, does not let us intervene the limits of logo-centric tradition in Heideggerian way of thinking since the belongingness of thinking to Being ties the task of attunement of Dasein with the basic condition of Being. Having put human beings directly in touch with what had remained inaccessible in Kant, Heidegger

has pointed to the unfamiliar as impossibility but still set it as a task not to be understood as an external object opposed to cognitive structures, but a task to attune.

What Derrida seeks is an exteriority out of logos, an experience of the ethical as an alterity beyond the basic condition of Being as logos. Heideggerian shift from the constitutive transcendental subjectivity to a receptive and responsive subjectivity opens up a possibility of a creative distortion of responding to the language that speaks on one hand. On the other hand, creative language or poetry is an attempt to access the *true metaphor*, which is the metaphor of the place of Being's unconcealment and the essence of man in its proximity of the happening of this unconcealment. The experience of the ethical thus, is an attempt to go *out* of the Hegelian understanding of poetry that is "a moment in the unfolding of spirit, which was most truthfully and appropriately to be grasped by dialectical reason"⁴. However, by virtue of the thinking, in thinking's distinguished feature from other modes of Being (becoming, seeming and ought), where Being is re-presented to thinking as co- poetizing, Dasein is allotted to adhere Being. The experience of the ethical is the opening up of Being by means of transportation and inhabitation, as Derrida says. The alterity of Dasein that is the originary is transported and this happens by true vehicle: originary metaphor.

1.5. The Place of the Exteriority

The originary metaphor for Heidegger is a passage to the responsiveness of its own Being as care (*sorge*), in other words a call for *respect* for the other. This is a call for Dasein to transgress its limits of finitude by means of its own structural totality that governs the responsiveness and responsibility of its own, its self-responsibility. This is how Heidegger reads Kantian respect; he says Kant's theory of value: "...has its unexpressed ontological presupposition a 'metaphysics of morals' –that is, an ontology

⁴ Pattison George, *The Later Heidegger*, Routledge, London, 2000, page 160.

of Dasein and existence.”⁵ Morality takes a turn of the direct experience of the ethical in the uncanny where the self-disclosure of care pushes Dasein beyond its boundaries. This turn, I argue, is at the same time the turn from Kantian subjective freedom to an ontology of Dasein in where Heidegger says in his lectures on Kant's transcendental philosophy “...practical freedom as autonomy” turns out to be “the essence of the personhood of the person, the authentic essence, the humanity of man.”⁶ Heideggerian new humanism thus, calls for a *we* beyond the boundaries of mentality of the “they-self”, the arbitrariness of the subjectivity as the ground of the values within the fundamental ontology. It can be seen as dropping the apparent difference of subjectivity and objectivity that are the two sides of the same coin for Heidegger.

1.6. Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity Versus Transcendental Subjectivity

I argue that this is a pragmatist ironic awareness, which suspends the problem of the conditions of the possibility (or impossibility) of experienceability or describability and due to similar “over-whelming reasons” with holistic pragmatism, wants to make a room for ethical-political as an exteriority. The necessity of the ethical and political marks the direction of deconstruction similar to that of holistic pragmatism. The necessity of the room, the place for ethical and political, by-passes the possibility problem, suspends it, transgresses it (and it's *isness*) towards preparing the ground for a passage from an ethics of care to political.

In *The Ends of Man* Derrida says, the Heideggerian critique of humanism opens up the subjectivity of the ethical experience to its other in the language that “gives the *there* of the truth of Being and truth of man.” and in this sense, when its political

⁵ Schalov Frank, *At the Crossroads of Freedom, A Company to Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale University Press, London, 2002, page 254.

⁶ Ibid, page 255.

consequences considered, leads us to a *situational we*. Derrida, in his critique of the alterity of the subject as the essence of language that provides us a passage to *situational we*, is not offering to go back to the Kantian transcendental strategy. What we can see, however, the “radical trembling” of the experience of the ethical, similar to idea in Kantian sense, can be found in the trace, in the *cinder of differance*. That is how the secret impact of the transcendence of transcendental remains (without remainder). A place, which is lodged nowhere but inside; nevertheless, a place that we want to see *as if it is an exteriority*.

I will argue that Kant's main concern was to establish a systematic unity in his philosophy. Derrida makes use of the Kantian idea in his own way that is best observable in *as if* and the experience of aesthetical as ethical. In the aesthetic experience, the images and the feeling of singular, without categorical application that is the necessary condition of certainty in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, are considered still clear and satisfactory judgments of perception. Therefore, without going back to transcendental strategy of the first critique of Kant, according to which a categorical difference between metaphorical and literal is possible due to the criterion of meaningfulness and truth, Derrida uses the transcendence of transcendental. Transcendental strategy relies on imagination that is the key for the synthetic power of subjectivity. Emphasizing the performative problematizations of the ethical and political by means of the secret impact of the transcendence, Derrida does not go back to constitutional power of transcendental strategy; he makes use of the ethical demand of the *as if* in a way that leaves no room for the *there* of the truth of Being and truth of man.

1.7. The Place of Respect

By virtue of this usage, Derrida replaces *es gibt* (There is\ It gives) with *il ya la cendre*. This usage, as Derrida argues in a complicated and difficult manner in *The Retrait of Metaphor*, with reference to later Heidegger rather than a pragmatist understanding of dropping the difference between literal and metaphorical, performs to problematize the place where Being manifests itself in its manifestation; in the nearest place, in the *Da* of Dasein. The strategy is not transcendental but quasi-transcendental, which relies on imagination that does not require categorical application but applies “the images of a particular kind” not necessarily consciously, but also unconsciously.⁷ *Il ya la cendre* means something erases itself radically while presenting itself and refers to a place where the manifestation is deferred constantly in concealment and offers another name for the place of *es gibt*: *Cinder*.

This is the place for respect in Derrida’s thought. This *respect* is referred by Derrida in *Before The Law* as a possibility of reconciling the moral law with fiction. Respect is due to only the possibility of the holy will in Kant, which is not; “never shows itself”, except in the condition of moral action. And “the cause of that respect” is moral law. Derrida's definition above is not simply going back to the safety of the ethics of the philosophy of subject. It is rather, a definition of the possibility of the relation between the law itself, the lawness of the laws and laws which have a history; which have been in the history. This definition keeps the *secret impact* of the transcendence of the transcendental in this fictitious character of ought. I think the possibility to remain beyond the basic condition of Being while using the Heideggerian ontic-ontologic difference as the starting point of the definition of the relation between the law and its

⁷ I borrowed A.C. Ewing’s remark on imagination here and as we all know, imagination is a very intrinsic concept in Kant and there are various interpretations.

Being and keeping respect out of the place of the happening of the truth of Being in true metaphor depends on Derridean usage of metaphor. Therefore I will discuss metaphor in Derrida's writings, particularly *The Retrait of Metaphor*, *White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy* and *The Origins of Metaphor*.

1.8. The Place of the Metaphor

With reference to Derrida's usage and understanding of metaphor, and the effacement of the difference between them in and by the usage of Derrida, I will show the close connection between holistic pragmatism and deconstruction in relation to the literary work and the subjectivity after deconstruction. The hesitation of the subject of the ethical experience after deconstruction suspends the relation of the subject to her Being by means of the call of literary fiction, which demands in its not-being, with the tone of Kant's voice in the *Groundwork*, *respect* to the impossible. Subjectivity after deconstruction does not go back to the transcendental but keeps the secret of the impact of the transcendental of the transcendental on the public and political in *quasi*. The secret of the quasi-transcendental is the limitless openness of the literary in which post-deconstructive subject experiences the ethical and is called for transgressing the limits of the private. The experience of the ethical is the possibility of fiction that intervenes the power of logos by making the "fatally silent voice of the other that speaks *before* its own voice" audible.⁸ This *before* is where fiction affects moral action as Derrida tells us in *Before The Law*.

Derrida's claim is this: There is no originary metaphor. There is no distinction between the literal and the metaphor. Nothing happens out of the metaphor; including metaphor itself. There is no originary that can find a room to happen when the metaphor

⁸ Derrida Jacques, *Cinder*, Translated by Ned Lukacher, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln-London, 1991, page 14.

withdraws. Thus, thinking as co-poetizing as a restriction of Being, in its belongingness to Being, cannot be a passage to the truth of Being (which is an impossibility for restrictions of Being are only determinate) as the essence of language. The experience of the ethical, thereby, is the openness to the ethical demand of the origin of moral law, which presences itself only *as if*. Derrida says:

This *as if* enables us to reconcile practical reason with an historical teleology and with the possibility of unlimited progress. I tried to show how it almost introduces narrativity and fiction into the very core of legal thought.⁹

1.9. The Place of the Singular Feeling – Pleasure and Displeasure

The quotation above leads us to the *Critique of Judgment* in which I will try to show how the experience of the ethical seems (can seem as) an experience of the aesthetic after Kant tried to equate the singular feeling of the subject (pleasure or displeasure) and the teleological nature of the object with the practical reason as pure transcendental idea of freedom. The *supersensible basis* in Kant's words, or the common intelligibility of three ideas, is the ground upon which the relation, the harmony between the practical reason and teleology is established in the third critique. Thereby, the infinite that is not graspable is reconciled by the finite in the experience of the beautiful and sublime. We experience the finite, determined by the subject who is finite and determinate as body. The subject in itself, the intelligible subject, whose activity is spontaneous, is the capability, power (judgment) of ethical subject acting in determination of time and space. The intelligibility of this spontaneous capability, the intelligibility of sensing the beautiful and claiming a universal validity of this *singular* feeling and the intelligibility of the teleological nature are reconciled in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. I will show that the ethical demand of *respect*, after Kant's third critique,

9 BL, page 190.

can be related to the singular feeling of beautiful as well as practicality and enables us to attend to the voice of the other coming from the outside of the basic conditions of Being.

As Derrida says in *The Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, with performative dimension of deconstruction the images and the feeling of singular in Kant are *utilized and put to work*.¹⁰ The basic similarity of deconstruction to pragmatism is its common anti-foundationalist functionalist attitude. The holistic pragmatism that Richard Rorty seems to be representing in the English-speaking world is further than traditional pragmatism from one main point of view: beliefs and desires must be ascribed together. The experience of the ethical and aesthetic has a non-factual status for the hard-edged empiricism and as a continuation of the representationalist tradition and empiricism, pragmatism did not pay attention to the desires. A coherent theory of truth must be a theory of beliefs for traditional pragmatists. Desires, the experience of the singular feeling of pleasure and displeasure, like the metaphysical arguments of the teleological nature of the external world, do not have a factual status and accordingly are out of concern for traditional pragmatists.

1.10. Holistic Pragmatism Versus Essentialization and the Determination of Logos

Holistic pragmatism on the other hand, claims that pragmatists should be concerned with the Heideggerian shift and consider it as a shift from a cognitive intentionality to a practical one. Pragmatism thus, should realize that a "...coherent theory of truth must be a theory about the harmony not just of beliefs, but rather of beliefs and desires".¹¹ Rorty says that the overlapping of early Heidegger and later

10 Derrida Jacques, *Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism*. Mouffe, Chantal (Edited by), *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, Routledge, London, 1996.

11 Rorty Richard, *Essays on Heidegger and Others, Philosophical Papers, Volume 2*, Oxford University Press 1989, page 33 (Hereafter V2).

Wittgenstein can be interpreted as a possibility of transference from the Husserlian horizons “in which beings are presented on the model of sensuous fields, and objects are placed before us for our intuitive apprehension”¹² to the forms of life as the fields of activity. Although Rorty would see Levinas as a blind point in Derrida, this overlapping is very close to Levinasian understanding of Heidegger. Levinas says the experience of the ethical in Heidegger, which brings out the encounter of man with his alterity without being limited to the object of intentionality and thus is further than transcendental phenomenology, is an original interpretation of the experience of otherness in the tradition of metaphysics.

Nevertheless, holistic pragmatism marks a clear-cut distinction between our experiences of the ethical and aesthetic that serve for the enrichment of our privacy and our public concerns on concrete political problems. Holistic pragmatism keeps the anti-foundationalist sharpness on the metaphysical tendency of essentialising the relation between private and public. Richard Rorty points to the potential danger of later Heideggerian call for the essential commonness of a new conception of humanism and the necessity of the ironic awareness of the privilege of Heideggerian questioning. The potential danger is the “overwhelming violence” of the disclosure of Being in the originary metaphor, which Rorty says may blur “the distinction between automobile factories and death camps.”¹³ The original metaphor and its limitation within the closure of metaphysics is to remain within the essentialization of the tradition of logo-centricism for Rorty.

For all our ascetism, we want to see ourselves, and people like ourselves, as engaged in something more than merely private projects. We want to relate

¹² Rorty Richard, *Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers, Volume 3*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998, page 33.

¹³ V2, page 74.

our private obsessions, our private fantasies of purity, novelty, and autonomy, to something hidden and underlying which secretly determines the course of human affairs.¹⁴

“The 'substance' of man is his ek-sistence.” is to be understood, as it was already suggested in “*Being and Time*”, says Heidegger:

...That the way that man in his proper essence becomes present to Being is ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being. Through this determination of the essence of man, the humanistic interpretations of man as *animal rationale*, as 'person,' as spiritual-ensouled bodily being, are not declared false and thrust aside. Rather, the sole implication is that the highest determination of the essence of man in humanism still does not realize the proper dignity of man.¹⁵

The essence of man is its being in the world; Da-sein, where the determination of Being as relation to beings in its restrictions -the relation itself is Being in the sense of place of the truth of Being amid beings who gather beings to themselves- *embraces* man in his ek-sistence.

We can refer to this embracement in Derrida's words: “Logos's power of envelopment” out of which he says, no place remains if we speak with Hegel's terms. That is to say, if we ask the question of “what is...?”, the teleological determination overwhelms us and leaves no room outside of it. Heidegger himself says, any refutations within the language of Hegelian system can only be “lovers quarrel concerning the matter itself.”¹⁶

Therefore, the post-representationalist attitude towards values faces the problem of perspectivism, however, via later Heidegger, traces the Being of the values that is a re-location of metaphysics. In order to discuss the relation between later Heidegger and Derrida, particularly with reference to their thoughts' ethical-political implications, I

14 Ibid, page 74.

15 LH, page 239.

16 LH, page 235.

want to point to Heidegger's increasing tone of a re-location of metaphysics in the *Introduction of Metaphysics* and in some of his other works after 1930s. With reference to these works, I want to underlie Heidegger's emphasis on the receptive and responsible subjectivity instead of the transcendental subjectivity of the philosophy of subject. Heideggerian shift prepares the ground for an alternative subjectivity in spite of having undergone many criticisms. Derrida told us that he offered the word deconstruction as an alternative for Heidegger's *Destruction*. I want to focus on the ethical-political implications of Heidegger's *Destruction* of metaphysics and compare with deconstruction's ethical-political implications with refer to the relation between *inside* and *outside*. Inside, refers to the envelopment of logos and outside means an attempt to provide a place which is lodged nowhere but the inside; nevertheless, a place that we want to see *as if it is* outside. By doing so, I want to show that deconstruction appeals to an "ethical demand" and opens up a possibility to "march ahead" towards to:

1. Drop the necessary relation between creativity and violence; liberation from violence
2. Unhinge the relation between metaphor and adhere the truth of the meaning of the Being of beings
3. Undermine the necessary attempt to go beyond the representational limitation of a being by means of persisting through (*durchsteht*) the distance to the place, the origin from where the Being comes to presence
4. Undermine the ethical-political's ensuing the ought as the potency of and above Being
5. Accordingly, undermine the ought in its belongingness to Being as a pre-eminence for ethical-political and put the essentiality of the direction of the ethical-political into question
6. Suspend the relation of man to Being, which is beyond an everyday relation, which is a relation to man's most ownliness, the happening of the alterity, the alterity of what a man is not, the alterity of man's identity, the happening of this alterity in the difference of man's himself (*Ereignis*)

1.11. Idea in the Kantian Sense and the Place of As-If as a Possibility of Reconciliation

Finally, withhold the Kantian idea as a possibility for ethical-political in *as if* to serve as a ground for a non-essential direction for ethical-political.

The ethical demand of deconstruction withholds the Kantian *as if* particularly in Derrida's *Before the Law* that I think, induces us to consider the relation between the being of the law, which does not have a history and law, which takes place in history in an analogous way to Kantian universal maxim. Derrida says,

This *as if* enables us to reconcile practical reason with an historical teleology and with the possibility of unlimited progress. I tried to show how it almost introduces narrativity and fiction into the very core of legal thought, at the moment when the latter begins to speak and to question the moral subject.¹⁷

This reconciliation leads us to think the relation between the moral subject and the role of fiction, which bears up on the irrational components of the moral subject, in the “unlimited progress”, which can transgress the limits of the political and social structures. The Archimedean standpoints of the structures and transcendental subjectivity are open to deconstruction. The *as if* thus, threatens the axiomatic references that allow us to arrive at universally valid grounds for decision-making and pushes the “singularity of proceeding” to a relation with universal, non-essentially. This reconciliation leads us also to the relation between a closure and an end. Spacing in terms of happening within the temporalization and its envelopment, intervenes in the completeness of logo-centricism. Differential spacing is a kind of dissemination that Derrida has always pushed to the “end” of metaphysics. In this sense, the singular, the heterogeneous is not enveloped, invaginated by the power of logos, which also means for Heidegger “the gathering, bringing together of what holds sway”, what is constant

¹⁷ BL, page 190.

presence. The end, the completion of man besides his completion in death, is to take a stand in relation to logos. This relation, for Heidegger, the temporalization of temporality, and the circularity, envelopment of this movement of time, which leaves no room out of logos, is pushed by Derrida's *espacement* or *spacing*.

1.12. Espacement – Place of the Alterity

Spacing in this sense is an attempt of running up against the envelopment of logos by virtue of traversing a distance, a space as a certain point of exteriority. From this point of departing, as Simon Critchley says: “It is from such a point of exteriority that deconstruction could penetrate the totality, there by displacing it. This attainment of exteriority is the second moment of alterity...”¹⁸ spacing intervenes the movement of temporalization by virtue of being a differential interval. Derrida says, we cannot take for granted the difference of spacing because it is lodged within the very movement, temporalization of time and it becomes space within this temporalization. Derrida says,

But, on the one hand, 'spacing' also says the becoming space of time itself; it intervenes, with difference, in the movement of temporalization itself; spacing is also time, one might say. On the other hand, irreducible by virtue of being a differential interval, it disrupts presence, the self-identity of any presence, with all the consequences that this can have. One may trace these consequences in the most diverse fields.¹⁹

I think, if we trace the consequences of locating an exteriority out of logos, we come up with fiction and metaphor, whose relation to logos is dropped. What happens can happen out of the envelopment of logos in fiction by virtue of this non-essential, contingent relation. It is this relation that provides the place for the mystical foundation of law rather than the place for Being as *ousia*. The essential relation between concept and metaphor is deconstructed and the tradition of logo-centric discourse loses its

18 Critchley Simon, *Ethics of Deconstruction, Derrida and Levinas*, Purdue University Press, Second Edition, 1999, page 38 (Hereafter ED).

19 P, page 224.

homogeneous embracement; thereby, the closure of the tradition is traversed. The impossibility of the project of describing Being as it is lies within the relation between Being and its constitution by the tools of an open-ended play of tools, *words*, in which everything happens. The moral subject, as a holistic agent with the togetherness of rational and irrational components, which are not submitted to one another necessarily, describes what by means of these tools. The moral subject of post-deconstruction is ironically aware of the possibility of arriving at the true metaphor by using these tools; but we still use these tools as if there were such a possibility. At this very point the post-representationalist attitudes of deconstruction and holistic pragmatism towards values come close to each other.

1.13. The Place of Literature and the Reconciliation of the Pure Practical Reason with As-If

The open-ended possibilities of literature introduce a non-essential direction for the ethical-political through deconstructing the limits of the socio-political and the threshold of the consciousness of moral subjectivity. The unlimited progress Derrida talks about, I think, opens up a *coming democracy* instead of ought as the potency of Being that is not-yet but ought to be. Blurring the limits of fiction and legal thought and lodging the open-ended possibilities of fiction (as potential actualities of a future to come in Davidsonian understanding of metaphor and Derridean performative problematizations of legal thought) *in* the universal validity and at the same time *before* it, Derrida, I suppose, opens up an alternative relation between the familiar and unfamiliar. The relation as the inhabitation of the unfamiliar in the familiar puts moral subject in a relation to its most ownliness as an open, receptive and responsible location towards its other. The other is the alterity, in and by means of whose presence *we* respond for Heidegger. If we accept the non-essentiality of the determination of the

other, the alterity, and the responsive action of the moral subject, we are, I think not far from the holistic-pragmatist understanding of progress and the role of irrational in this progress.

When we think Heideggerian re-location of ought in its relation to Being and as he claims, in this way ought's regaining its ground from validity, we can see the opposition of ought in Heideggerian understanding to that of Kant's. That is to say, ought is no longer grounded on pure reason and no longer opposed to Being, *is ness*. The *is ness* of ought was not possible in Kantian terms. It was inexperienceable and in this regard impossible. It was the unconditioned condition of value; in other words, the inexperienceable condition of possibility for ethical and political for Kant and in this sense opposed to facts, nature. Ought *is not*; for Kant and Heidegger attempts to put it in the proper place, the place where Being is not-yet but ought to be.

The proper place for Heidegger is just the improper for Kant. Nature is the realm that we apply the categories, the pure concepts of reason to experience, to see how causal relations determine, condition facts in this realm. The safety of the transcendental subject lies in its being grounded beyond the realm of nature, and thus not being conditioned. The transcendental subject possesses the freedom of acting disinterested by virtue of this privileged position.

Derrida's definition above is not simply going back to the safety of the ethics of the philosophy of subject. It is rather, a definition of the possibility of the relation within the law itself, the lawness of the laws and laws which have a history; which have been in the history. This definition bears upon the descriptions in fiction and the direction of the ethical and political as deconstruction "marches ahead" in Derrida's words.

Bernasconi says, despite Derrida's explanation of deconstruction as inventive that opens up a passage and marches ahead and in this respect it is beyond methodological procedures; the arbitrariness of deconstruction makes it undetermined. That is why according to Bernasconi, it is problematic to make a connection between the ethical-political direction of deconstruction and the intention of its practitioners. Rorty holds a similar view with Bernasconi and claims that the intentions of a practitioner of deconstruction and the public matter that is referred by deconstruction are not *essentially* connected.

1.14. Direction of Deconstruction Through the Reconciliation of the Pure Practical Reason with As-If

I think, once we see the relation between pure practical reason and fiction in the way Derrida offers in *Before the Law*, it is possible to see the place of fiction, the place that it happens, takes place as a kind of *topos* which is only *as if*, nevertheless, by very means of its being as if, it is the inexperienceable condition of the possibility of ethical-political, as exterior to logos. It is a place in which the progress of singularity is not lost and subordinated to universal in its relation to the universal. I see this place as a place of social hope and democracy to come for a *we* that is open to the richness of the possibilities of the literary text that has a right to say everything. In this sense, I disagree Bernasconi and Rorty on their reductionary view of deconstruction as a neuter methodology. I rather hold the Rortyan arguments in *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* and *Essays on Heidegger and Others*. The non-essential relation between private and public is not very far from the place I mentioned above and I think this relation shows us deconstruction and pragmatism are reconcilable.

I will argue, the ethical-political direction of deconstruction as viewed from different angles, indeed induces us to a very similar common point once we clarify the

apparent differences of the relation between public and private, literature and philosophy. This point is a possibility of more democratic future rather than a rupture with the tradition that seems to be directed towards a radical politics as Rorty views. I will discuss the relation between deconstruction and tradition of philosophy to focus on the democratic possibility of deconstruction and argue that, taking into consideration the double-bind of deconstruction, the post deconstructive subjectivity and social hope in Rorty's terms refer to a very similar possibility of the ethical and political. The discussion of post deconstructive subjectivity refers to the experience of the ethical in Levinasian subjectivity assuming that it offers us an intersubjective possibility beyond the basic condition of Being.

The subject for Levinas is the subject that eats. In so far, as it is an eating subject it can appreciate the meaning of sharing or giving its bread to the other. What seems interesting is Levinas's -in a sense- ironic approach to the problem of subjectivity in modern philosophy of subject. It seems ironic because what differs from the Husserlian tendency for Levinas is the re-location of the transcendental subject in to a subject of flesh and blood. There is a shift from a transcendental subject to a living subject that eats and shares the bread; or even gives the bread to the other which is a religious symbol of substitution. So, trying to do away with the Husserlian subject we contextualize the subject. That is to say we make it a living subject that enjoys life and good soup. Nonetheless, Levinasian subjectivity resembles a religious context, which subordinates the unexplainable condition of possibility for ethical action that is unconditioned to a mono-theistic religious possibility. I think we are supposed to ask two questions:

1. How much progress have we made by replacing transcendental subject by a religious subject replacing an unexplainable condition of possibility by another -religious- unexplainable condition of possibility for the ethical?

2. If religion is not another unexplainable condition of possibility for the ethical, how different is a pre-rational, pre-intentional subjectivity of the experience of the ethical from that of Rorty's non-essential ethical possibility of imaginative acquaintance?

Derridean understanding of metaphor and particularly the performative dimension of metaphor is closer to Rorty's making use of metaphors and solidarity as the ethical dimension of this usage rather than the singularity or the infinite responsibility and responsiveness of the subject to the other, which implies the passivity and openness of Levinasian subjectivity. Levinasian influence on Derrida cannot be more than a *cinder*. Derrida, like the transcendence of transcendental, makes use of the religiosity of religion that has never been present but can be effective in use. I view Levinasian subjectivity something similar to *respect* in Kantian sense that is not possible but the effects of which, as another impossibility, can be "put to work." Thus, the ethical possibility in deconstruction is not different than the ethical possibility of imaginative acquaintance in holistic pragmatism. To what degree are the vulnerability, passivity, and openness of the sensibility of subject different from that of quasi-selves of subject that are open to conversation -unlike Mouffe's claim open to understand the irrational, crazy different views of the other rather than being open to a Habermasian communicative intersubjectivity- with both the other parts of the self and other people? If we take into consideration the problematic of passing from the ethics of care to the ethics of politics, and if there is a necessity and urgency of a political decision then we have to make progress from the subject that is open to the other, to the subject that gives concrete decisions about the others. If we are to think of this passage from ethical to political, the Derridean and Rortyan ideas I suppose come closer together.

1.15. Metaphoric Function of As-If as a Non-essential Possibility of the Ethical

If we look for something like the idea in Kantian sense, it can be held only *as if*, then the *as if* is nothing but a metaphor, which is used to bind the free play of imagination, the idiosyncrasy of the private with the acquaintance with the others. And by this very possibility, Kantian idea can be used for pragmatic purposes and consequently can help care turn out to be a means for political.

It is the very impossibility of *as if* in terms of experienceability, as Heidegger aimed at getting over with because of its inadequacy of being, of lacking *isness*. Derrida summons us to remember that the *as if* can function. It can function and has functioned, affected subjectivity and effected the realm of morality *as if* it had been. The lawness of law, the being of law takes place *before* the laws take place in history as an inaccessible, unconditioned possibility -at the same time impossibility- of these laws. The *as if* opens up a break through the limited, contextual, historical, finite closure of legal thought. The *as if* belongs to the context although it has never been. It therefore, has never been present and never demands an understanding that belongs to the available Being (*ousia*). The *as if* belongs to the historical, contextual with a difference ought belongs to Being. It belongs to context as a signifier that is free of *isness*. In this sense, *as if* is free of belongingness. It does not belong to a transcendental signified. It can thus, function as a place outside the limits of the logo-centric thought. It can function as an outsider since it can circumvent the question of “what is...?”. In its difference to the Heideggerian understanding of ought as not-yet, as *potency* that is ought to be and thus, something above Being, *as if* calls for a different ethical-political responsibility by means of which the receptivity and sensibility of subjectivity are open to plurality of the differences

beyond the basic condition of Being. This is how *as if*, fiction, signifies a break through the completion of the teleological end of Dasein.

The *as if* is not the place where Being manifests itself in its manifestation in the nearest place; in the *Da* of Dasein. That is to say, the fiction, the literature is not *nothing* in the sense that Being shows itself as “transcendence pure and simple.”²⁰ It is not the place the clearing (*lichtung*) of Being that is driven from the essence of the truth of Being, which bears upon ecstatically to the essence of man who ek-sists. It is not the gate opening to language in which Being dwells and by virtue of his essential ek-sistence man belongs to the origin, to the truth of Being as the guardian.

The literature does not lead us to such a place. Derrida says, the guardian in the story (*Before the Law*) does not say *no* but it says *not yet*. That refers to an interminable *differance* rather than a revelation of the origin, the truth of Being.

What must and cannot be approached is the origin of *differance*: it must not be presented or represented and above all not penetrated. That is the law of law, the process of a law of whose subject we can never say, 'There it is,' it is here or there.²¹

By means of belongingness, -there is nothing outside a context- and at the same time by means of the break-through, -the *as if* “announces itself”²² as the alterity of the logo-centricism and serves as if it is a place outside it- the *as if* intervenes the inside of the logo-centricism.

The relation between fiction and legal thought, therefore, allows us to consider the effect of the idea in the Kantian sense on the responsibility of moral subject. The idea in the Kantian, the open-ended, infinite, universal sense shatters the teleological completion of the end of Dasein. By doing so, the *as if* provides an exteriority to the

20 LH, page 240.

21 BL, page 204.

22 ED, page 78.

teleological completion of Dasein. The *as if*, the fiction intervenes in to the closure of teleological completion of Dasein and his responsive responsibility. *As if* opens up an alternative freedom and overrides Dasein's responsibility in his violence-doing response to the overwhelming violence of logos as holding sway, towards which Dasein is overwhelmed and shatters. The exteriority in this sense, can be a possibility to break the overwhelming violence of logos against which, Dasein due to his teleological end, withdraws. The play between rationalism and irrationalism, considering the teleological end of humans, begins when Being as *phusis* is re-interpreted by Dasein in uncanniness and this beginning, according to Heidegger, points to the end of the dominance of *ratio* that has perpetuated human beings and extended in the isolated transcendental I in Kant.

1.16. Alternative Freedom in the Function of the As-If Versus Heideggerian We

Heidegger seeks the alterity of transcendental subjectivity and its tyranny in the relation of human beings to Being and offers an alterity to the conception of freedom of the tradition of philosophy of the subject as a property that human beings possess. Freedom is letting beings be. For Heidegger thus, human beings do not possess freedom; freedom as a particular mood of man, which is letting beings be, possesses human beings. It is not the time of the transcendental, isolated, subjectivity.

“It is the time of we now!”²³ says Heidegger. It is the time of we and we are to think what is left as a task for thinking. This task is the gatheredness of the conflict that is the father of all (*polemos*) in the nearest place that it opens itself up to human beings and becomes available (*ousia*) and re-gains its place as place-dwelling. We are to hear the call of Being in the poetry of Holderlin and regain our homes in our responsive attunement towards the destiny of the truth of Being. That is how the responsibility of

23 IM, page 76.

moral subject is submitted to Being and thereby, ought is grounded in the not-yet potency of Being.

In short, the ethical-political direction of Heideggerian project is towards the dwelling place of human beings as the nearest place of Being's unconcealment. In this respect, moral subject in later Heidegger remains within the limits of ontology and the end of man towards death within the limits of teleological *we*, is not external to the teleological anthropology of Hegel. The responsibility of Dasein is shaped by its confinement to the limits of logo-centricism.

In *Before the Law*, the responsibility of the subject is open to infinity because it is the indefinite not-yet not in the Heideggerian sense but as constant delay till death. Responsibility is not to respond to the call of Being. It is an alternative freedom to respond to the infinitely open possibility of literature, which eludes the essence of Being by having no presence.

Who is this *we*? It would be easy to say it is the German essence; nonetheless, there are explicit referring in Heidegger that the place of home-coming is interpreted as Germany by providing a ground, a privileged perspective to hear Being as transcendence. Man with the teleological end, is not something other than a man; in his moods of being; however, he is attuned to the belongingness of his Being-there and Being available to us in its place-dwelling. In this attunement, "we are" says Heidegger. We are responsive and responsible to what comes to presence in its appearing. On the other hand, in *Before the Law*, for Derrida, there is no essentialization of the laws by the Being of laws. What comes before the laws is the fiction, story in whose appearance nothing comes to presence and we must do or must not do something *as if* something

happened, came to presence. Derrida says, “everything happens *as if*” and that is how the function of categorical imperative turns out to be the function of the story, fiction.

CHAPTER 2

KANT ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ETHICAL

Universal validity as the unconditioned condition of ethical can be seen as a consequence of a shift in the history of metaphysics. This shift is the reason why Heidegger accuses philosophy of becoming a reductionary technical thinking activity. It can be called as epistemological turn with regard to its foundational function. It is this foundational function that makes philosophy a critical criterion for the question: How is our knowledge possible? That is to say: what are the unconditioned conditions of the possibility of experienceability? Due to this shift, as James W. Ellington names “a causal account of mental processes that is supposed to criticize and justify knowledge claims.”²⁴ a scientific attitude towards morality began to replace old metaphysical foundations of morality. This causal justification gave rise to the confusion of science and ethics. The epistemological turn was a theory distinct from the sciences since it was their foundation. The Kantian notion of causal justification in this sense seems to be an underlying discipline and thereby has a privileged status. It is this status that Heidegger alludes for having an unjustified ontological privilege although it is itself dissatisfactory according to its own criteria for justification. Kantian philosophy grounded the possibility problem upon the inexperienceable contribution of mental processes. However, mental processes or the constituting activity of the transcendental ego that I

²⁴ Ellington W. James, *Introduction, Prolegomena*, by Kant Immanuel, Hackett Publishing Company, 1977, page 9.

refer to as transcendental strategy, is itself inexplicable whereas it is the unconditioned possibility of the explanation of the given sensible data.

This centralization of epistemological foundation serves first, as a distinction between the sciences and philosophy due to the Kantian distinction between the unexplained contribution of mental processes and the given. Secondly, it serves as a transformation from divine to secular. At this point it will be useful to have a look at the history of the relation between mental processes and possibility problem in order to remember the Heideggerian critique of the status of the ontological in Kant.

Descartes provided the possibility of certainty on the ground of the immediate knowledge of the knower himself, which is not far from a divine possibility. John Locke opened the way to learn more about what we could know by means of thinking that if we consider our thoughts in search of other things in a Newtonian way, we somehow see whether our understandings fit other things or not. This way was an important step to empirical grounds of knowledge claims. Kant's position is the most central one concerning the accountability of knowledge claims. Nevertheless, self-referential ground of the given that may be viewed as a continuation of cogito is not accountable itself. For Descartes, the idea of thinking determines the action of thinking but the idea itself is not acquired through thinking. Our inborn ideas like infinite substance and primary cause are not achieved by the act of thinking but they are true. For Kantian accountability, this divine unconditioned possibility is put into question. Our knowledge of self is possible only mediately through the experiences of actual things. Kant distinguishes his theory from "the old habit of accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective."²⁵ He says the act of understanding is active in joining the raw data of what is given but not self sufficient as was the case in ancient and then Cartesian

²⁵ *Prolegomena*, page 44.

self-reflection. The act of understanding does not enable the subject to go beyond a given concept and connect it with another which is not included in the given, nor it grants the claim that the latter necessarily belongs to the former. Instead, in Kant the possibility of a-priori synthetic judgments depends on the form of sensibility. The basis of mathematics is formed by pure intuition in which all concepts can be exposed concretely but a-priori. If we can discover this pure intuition and its possibility we can explain how synthetic judgments are a-priori possible in pure mathematics. Just as a-posterior synthetic judgments can enlarge the empirical object of intuition empirically and contingent, a-priori synthetic judgments can enlarge the sense data with a difference-*necessity*. The former is contingent since it is dependent on the given data but the latter is necessary since it is dependent on pure intuition. Kant says the a-priori intuition of anything is possible only if “intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility.”²⁶

That is to say the possibility of a-priori intuition depends on the preceding subjectivity's having the form of sensibility before the subject is affected by the actual impressions of the objects. These impressions can be intuited through this form of sensibility and they enable the subject to know a-priori. A-priori knowledge of objects is possible only as the objects appear to us, not in any other case (not as they are in themselves). That is so because time and space are pure intuitions that are based on the nature of mind not on the nature of things. Kant says: “Space and time are indeed the relational orders of contemporaneous objects and successive representations of objects.”²⁷ They are not “independently existing containers for physical objects” but are

²⁶ *Prolegomena*, page 44.

²⁷ *Prolegomena*, page 71.

forms of sensible intuition in the mind. Time and space lie at the basis of empirical intuition as pure intuition and precede the actual impressions of objects.

The significance of time and space in Kant displays the shift in understanding reality from ontological to epistemological. Kant is concerned about the dissatisfaction of accepting subjective necessity for objective; however, what he does is to establish a universally valid necessity for inner representations (still subjective) in order to ascertain the existence of an external world.

Thus in the above proposition a beginning is made of the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding; and in this deduction, since the categories have their source in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must abstract from the mode in which the manifold of intuition is given, and must direct attention solely to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding, enters into the intuition. In what follows it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general. Only thus, by demonstration of the a priori validity of the categories in respect of all objects of our senses, will the purpose of the deduction be fully attained.²⁸

The inner representations are the bases upon which the successiveness of apparently irrelevant experiences is constructed. That is how Kant puts outer space inside inner space. A unified apperception is deduced from the “I” alone. “Kant's argument about the validity of the categories and the possibility of knowledge itself is everywhere oriented to the requirements of an apperceptive subjectivity.”²⁹

This apperceptive subjectivity can be viewed as an implicit reflexivity of experience. According to Hegel: “The conditions for the possibility of experience in general are likewise the conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience” as what counts “object can only be determined by a subject.”

28 Pippin, B., Robert, *Hegel's Idealism, The Satisfaction of Self-consciousness* (Here after HIS), Cambridge University Press, 1993, page 28.

29 HIS, page 67.

There can be no consciousness without self-consciousness. I know something, and that about which I know something I have in the certainty of myself otherwise I would know nothing of it; the object is my object, it is other and at the same time mine, and in this latter respect I am self-relating.³⁰

We can derive that the idea that self-consciousness is a condition for required acts or judgments has been developed by Hegel by means of putting consciousness as a relation to something other than itself besides being a relation to itself. The self-consciousness of experience cannot be understood without attention to the acting, desiring, purposive nature of self-conscious subject. The problem of objectivity turns out to be the problem of the satisfaction of desire. Knowledge is a function of human interest. Kant's cognitive intentionality is replaced by dealing with the world. Hegel identifies self-differentiating subjectivity with an organic living whole. Living subjectivity is simply and immediately for itself in its relation to objects. That is to say, it senses itself only in desiring, and its other, all objects are to be negated, to be overcome and mastered.

The philosophy of subject takes an important turn when the Hegelian metaphysical-teleological interpretation of the living spirit as the ontological condition for the possibility of epistemology is reinterpreted by Heidegger and Dilthey. Under the influence of Fichte and Romantics, Dilthey rejects the *res cogitans* or transcendental ego as the ultimate point of departure³¹ and turns instead to the whole active and creative human being. For Dilthey the significance of knowing subject is its having real blood in her veins instead of a mere process of thought. Dilthey sees Hegelian conception of life as a dynamic process of becoming, the relation of the parts to the whole. In opposition to Aristotelian primary substances, the holistic conception of substance means that the

30 HIS, page 76.

31 Guignon Charles B., *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (Here after HPK), Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1983, page 48.

being of entity is determined by its totality of its relations to other entities within a whole field or system.³² Dilthey's holistic conception sees items in the world as being like words in a text or notes in a melody. They gain their meaning only through the purposes and intentions embodied in the plan for the whole.

Dilthey says:

Life for Hegel is the relation of the parts to the whole according to which these can neither exist nor be thought isolated from the whole... Out of this basic concept of life as the whole encompassed by the manifold in its unity, it follows that the concepts of totality, part, unity, separation, standing over-against and unification dominate the thought of Hegel at that time.³³

Dilthey says Hegelian definition of the being of an entity in terms of its relation to what it is not, as the negation of negation or as the other of the other leads to a philosophy of internal relations. That is to signify the being of an entity beyond its external, contingent, spatial relations. The being of an entity is independent of its momentary spatial location. There is a relation, which makes meaning possible, internal to an entity. The impossibility of distinguishing an entity from its actual location emphasizes the worldhood of an entity.

Life plays a role of medium in which the other is accessible to us "by virtue of their shared forms of life in the historical culture in which they find themselves."³⁴

That is an important turning point; the impact of Dilthey's rediscovery of the concept of life and the shift of the living substance to an agent in context exposes the temporality of being and the possibility of meaning (Sinn) out of temporal being.

The subject matter of social sciences, according to Dilthey, is not the causal relation holding between a domain of objects. On the contrary, the subject matter is the

32 HPK, page 49.

33 HPK, page 50.

34 HPK, page 49.

“temporal flow of life experiences”. These life experiences are bound together by internal relations. The social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) are to find out the structure of the psychic life. That seems to serve for another vantage point. Life-experiences always point beyond themselves to embrace past and future experiences in an organic temporal unity. According to Dilthey, experience is carried away. My experience of now is related to a past out of which it arises, originates and a future toward which it is guided. That's why social science's theme must be understood holistically in terms of a dynamic temporal unity in which past, present and future are bound together.

In this respect, the possibility of our knowledge of the external world is dependent on the relation between an active agent who is involved in the life world and the entities which count for him. An agent's intention is a purposive, goal directed intention for Dilthey. The possibility of a disinterested intention of an isolated subject which could intend independent of its being in the world, is replaced by a practical interest.

CHAPTER 3

FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

Heideggerian attempt to undermine the traditional metaphysical subjectivity as a standpoint for grounding and justification can be seen as a critical continuation of life philosophy. That is a critique of rationality as dominating scientific techniques and procedures. This, however, is not a turn towards irrationality, rather it is a critique of rationality as a “naturalized epistemology” which cannot function as a fundamental ontology, unlike the critique of pragmatism since there is no standpoint to rely on to decide beyond the horizon of our own. Guignon says:

Pragmatism, like Cartesian foundationalism, starts from a model that is legitimate for dealing with entities -e.g., ordinary instances of stepping back and deciding about the usefulness of different tools- and then illegitimately tries to extend that model to the horizon that makes possible the discovery of any entities whatsoever.³⁵

Heideggerian critique, similar to that of Dilthey, emphasizes the impossibility of any horizon before Dasein's being in the world and the historical origin of our modern concept of rationality. So, the Archimedean stand point of Cartesian subjectivity, in other words, transcendental strategy for grounding and justification is criticized from a historical, hermeneutical point of view, which entailed a need for an openness in theoretical and scientific modes of thought to philosophy. It is an openness that exerts philosophy in the decisions that are made by science, an openness to philosophy for disclosing the understanding “the ground and limit of science”. That is fundamental ontology that is put prior to sciences in this regard. The reasons for fundamental

³⁵ HPK, page 181.

ontology and its preceding primordiality are due to sciences' ineffectiveness and the theoretical limits that they operate within. Besides, man is homeless and uprooted because sciences lead us to view man as a subject by neglecting our "thrownness" into the world. Philosophy is to accomplish its task, which is to determine the limits and establish the framework of sciences and sciences are to comprehend their own essences since they function in a framework that is established for them. A physicist can make statements as a physicist and that means he is functioning in the framework of physics. If a physicist makes statements on physics, than he is philosophizing rather than functioning as a physicist. Moreover, sciences are forgetful in the way they function and they have a tendency to interpret Being as objective present rather than paying attention to the origins of our understanding of Being. Accordingly, it is only thinking of philosophy, which is open to possibilities rather than being engaged in objectifying and calculative thinking that can have a distance from the forgetfulness of science. It is by virtue of this distance that philosophy can "reflect on the essence of the sciences."³⁶

What is the difference between fundamental ontology and the previous conception of ontology? Why the previous ontology failed to accomplish the task of comprehension of the essence of the sciences? According to Heidegger, the basic tendency of the previous ontology is the attempt of interpreting "the world in terms of nature, that is, from the Being of beings which are present-at-hand within the world, but which have get to be discovered."³⁷

That is to say, the comprehension of nature is limited to its being present-at-hand. In this limiting case, the traditional ontology skips over, ignores the worldhood of the world because it is limited to a mathematical understanding of the world. The Cartesian

36 HPK, page 187.

37 Pöggeler Otto, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, Humanities Press International, Inc., 1987, USA, page 40.

thought, which refers to the mathematical certainty of knowing what has always been there, in the world, beyond the temporal objects of “seeing”, marks a forgetfulness. That is the point through which Heidegger attacks transcendental strategy.

3.1. The Being and the World

Heidegger's relation to traditional metaphysics is apparently a shift from the speculations of this tradition towards the factual life. Otto Pöggeler thinks the hermeneutic understanding of the Dasein as being-in-the world, which means dwelling alongside the world does not go far away from the question of Being. In Pöggeler's rhetorical questions, “Can the interpretation of factual life even travel a way apart from the metaphysical doctrine of Being? Must it not fall prey to this doctrine and the experience of Being developed therein if it simply lets this experience be and stand next to itself as an unsurmounted antithesis?”³⁸ it is clear that the hermeneutic understanding of life that can be traced back to Dilthey who retains the experience of Being. I think the Heideggerian attempt to achieve the unfamiliar as dwelling place in the experience of the ethical is still within the limits of the experience of Being. Heideggerian experience of the ethical and its political consequences are necessarily within the limits of the basic conditions of Being.

The traditional ontological understanding of thinking was a “seeing” of the temporal objects and a Being as a temporal presence. Having done so, traditional ontology has forgotten the factual and historical life. This was the shortcoming of this thought, the shortcoming of metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks Being as an a-temporal, constant presence, which means that it understands Being from a specific mode of time, the present.³⁹ Due to this understanding, metaphysical judgments about the sense of

38 Ibid, page 33.

39 Ibid, page 33.

Being essentially take place in time. Thus, the question is about Being and time. However, what is problematic here is the ground of the determination of Being as Being which does not belong to Being. This problematic, the forgotten ground of metaphysics is how time belongs to the sense of Being. The question about the sense of Being, thus, is a presupposition for the question of Being which is not raising any attempt to answer it. This oblivion, ignorance of the question of Being emerges from the interpretation of Being, which defines Being as an indefinable but self-evident concept. According to this Greek originated interpretation we cannot define Being but we can have an unclear understanding of it. The question of the sense of Being has been a part of the metaphysical tradition from the very early times but has not been raised although it deserves profound respect. Thus, this question, again and in a new form, must be raised. Ontology, in this new form is to be understood, according to Heidegger as “the name for the question of Being.”⁴⁰

If we go back to the mission of philosophy for setting the limits of sciences, Heidegger's point regarding this function is this: Ontology's goal is to set the a-priori condition of the possibility of the sciences. Unlike the traditional metaphysics, which lagged behind the sciences and has been subordinated to them, this a-priori condition seeks “a being as such and such a being” and thereby has always moved within an understanding of Being. The question of the sense of Being, however, seeks the condition for the possibility of the ontologies, which aim at the a-priori condition of the possibility of the ontical sciences. This difference is crucial and throwing some light up on the very ground of the ontology itself; fundamental ontology precedes ontology. Pöggeler points at this difference as follows: “Consequently the question of Being does not ask about the Being of the various regions of beings and about the manifold

40 Ibid, page 35.

expressibility of Being in general; rather it asks about the unity of “Being” within this multiplicity, about the sense of Being.”⁴¹ That is to say, the meaning of the expression of Being precedes the questions on the possibility of the modes of Being. The ontological difference is questioned by virtue of the structures of the existence of one being among others: Dasein. We need to look at these structures to understand the question about the unity of Being.

3.2.Existential Analytic

Within the ontical, one being is distinguished from other beings with its relation to Being. This being is Dasein. Being can be understood only by this privileged being whose relationship to Being is its *existence*. Existence is the essence of Dasein and through this existence Dasein can understand Being in a pre-ontological way. Thus, man is Dasein and is related to Being with his existence and this existence determines man. This existence has structures; these structures are called *existentials*. Existentials, in existential analytic, seek the structures of Being of existence whereas, the *existentiell* seeks the “concrete question of existence 'through' existing itself”⁴² So, the distinction between *existentiell* and *existential* is this: The *existentiell* is a starting point that is first concerned with Dasein's own thrownness, factual life. The factual life is the historical, cultural background that means a worldly task of living. Dasein is living in this world and dealing with the everyday problems. In this task of Dasein, there is a pre-ontological understanding of Being. The existence that determines man in his unique -unique as only Dasein among beings has this relation- relation to Being, thus, starts seeking the “thematic and explicit conceptualization of the meaning of Being”⁴³ by seeking the concrete question of existence. Besides the everydayness there is a deeper meaning to

41 Ibid, page 35.

42 Ibid, page 36.

43 HPK, page 67.

deal with that has been described as the thematic and explicit conceptualization of the meaning of Being. The passage from the existentiell to existential is described by Heidegger as follows:

I work concretely and factically from my 'I am' -from my spiritual and overall factual origin-milieu-contexts of life- and from that which is accessible to me as living experience -where in I live- this facticity, as existentiell, is no more blind Dasein-it lies there with in existence-that means, however, that I live it-this "I must" of which no one talks-with this facticity of Being-so.⁴⁴

So, the existentiell analysis is the ground for existential analyses. Dasein's self-understanding is crucial. However, this self-understanding is a misunderstanding when it is closest. That is to say, self does not understand itself through self-reflection, which is isolated from the historical and contextual network within which Dasein finds himself thrown. Unlike the Husserlian starting point "objectivities" (Gegenstandlichkeiten) which are immediately given in intuition, Heidegger starts from the historical-contextual conditions that determine the self-reflection.

3.3. Being in the World

The priority of existentiell analyses to the existential analyses refers to a shift in phenomenology or transcendental phenomenology that inherits the Cartesian subjectivity for the objectifying of entities. The "pure I" and consciousness in general are to be replaced by Dasein who is engaged and active in the world. Heidegger's conception of subjectivity thus, views human beings as relations. It can be said that, there is a Kierkegaardian influence in this conception. Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard and Jaspers is not to be discussed here but Kierkegaard's understanding of existence as relation to God and in that relation its being a self-relation, and the contrast of temporality and finitude of existence to God is not what Heidegger describes as

⁴⁴ HPK, page 86.

facticity (thrownness). Existence for Heidegger “is designed to capture the way that man, as a ‘happening’ or ‘event’, takes a stand on his Being in his everyday activities. To be human is just to *care* about what it is to be human, and this is characterized in terms of a relation of the self to its own Being.”⁴⁵ How is this relation possible? This relation is possible in Dasein's involvement in the world, Being-in-the-world. The significance of this concrete involvement is its undermining of the Cartesian subjectivity that is possible in so far as it is not involved in world. Heideggerian project of overcoming of metaphysics is naturally a project of overcoming traditional metaphysical subjectivity. So, the subjectivity is to be characterized as agency or activity. Agency or activity as Dasein in its process of Being-in-the-World-Dasein, in his factual life, deals with daily activities and these states of Being can be understood by the acting Dasein. Heidegger says:

I live in the understanding of writing, lighting things up, walking in and out and the like. More precisely, I am -as Dasein- speaking, walking, understanding, intelligible dealings. (Umgang). My Being in the world *is* nothing other than this being-in-motion (Sichbewegen) that already understands in these modes of Being.⁴⁶

This movement takes place in the historical and contextual determination of life. It is an event, a happening that should be evaluated by the achievements of this happening self to the very end of his life. That is to say, Dasein is Being-toward-the-end. In other words, Dasein is in the course of his death, which means his completion. In this course the aim is to define, to characterize “the formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole”⁴⁷, which can be achieved through the interpretation of Dasein's Being as a Being-relation. This relation can be understood with refer to

45 HPK, page 86.

46 HPK, page 88.

47 HPK, page 88.

Dilthey's two principal categories of life: essence and development. Dilthey uses these categories for pointing at the passive and active aspects of life. These categories refer to the givenness and limited character of life and freedom and creativity. The givenness of life is the essence that is constrained by the decisions we have made in the past. The development means the possibility of redefining the meaning of our lives through the choices of present. Similar to this understanding of life in Dilthey, Dasein has the active and passive aspects. Passive refers to essence, active refers to existence. In his passivity Dasein has been put into the life and has undergone living as a task. This thrownness is understood within the thrownness, facticity by Dasein. That is what Heidegger means by "in each case it has its Being as its own to be."⁴⁸ In this belongingness to the world Dasein must realize and complete his ability-to-be (Seinkönnen). This belongingness means to be already engaged in. In a Wittgensteinian sense Dasein's activity, his attunement to the world, is preceded by the game he is already, essentially situated in. He learns, realizes in and by language in this sense. His passivity limits his freedom. The active aspect of Dasein, on the other hand, refers to his "not-yet-be", his lack of completeness and since the life itself is goal directed, Dasein is free to fulfill his ability-to-be within the limits of factual that he has been thrown into. That is to say, Dasein only, among the ontic entities cares about what the factual means as a whole. Already involved in facticity, Dasein cares about the meaning of Being-a-whole and tries to take over his own task in his ability-to-be. According to Guignon: "To be involved in life, then, is to take over the task of living to which we are "delivered over", and to try to make something of it by relating ourselves toward our Being-a-whole."⁴⁹

48 HPK, page 89.

49 HPK, page 90.

That means, Dasein serves to define a concrete relation. Dasein has this relation towards the life as a totality. That is why only Dasein within the ontic entities is capable of having a Being-relation, in other words, *existing*. Heidegger says:

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence –in terms of a possibility of itself.... Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.⁵⁰

Dasein's relation to Being of its own-understanding itself in his actions takes place in action rather than contemplative thinking. That means Dasein, rather than having a unique capacity of contemplation, thinking on itself, has *know-how* in dealing with the daily activities he is engaged by means of being in the world. In a Wittgensteinian way, “we are masters of the technique of living.”⁵¹ It is by virtue of this competence of having parts in life Dasein is capable of understanding Being as a whole. That is to say, I have an understanding of who I am while having parts in the life contexts within which I am already engaged. By means of this understanding of who I am, by means of this uniqueness, Being is disclosed to Dasein. Heidegger says:

Thus Dasein's understanding of [its own] Being pertains with equal primordially both to an understanding of something like a “world”, and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world⁵²

In these words we can see Heidegger's apparently paradoxical statement on Dasein's teleological structure: “Dasein is existentially that which, in its ability-to-be, it is not-yet.”⁵³ This can be an allusion to the passive and active aspects of life. Considering the passive aspect, Dasein is not-yet what it can and will be. Before the

50 HPK, page 91.

51 HPK, page 91.

52 HPK, page 92.

53 HPK, page 92.

death of Dasein the possibilities make Dasein incomplete. From the active point of view however, Dasein is already not-yet in its engagement to the world. What Dasein can do is always ahead of what he has been. Dasein itself is a temporal event; nevertheless, it has a teleological structure because its Being, by means of its ability to be what it is not yet, is determined by Dasein's goal directedness. Dasein's goal directedness means "its directedness toward the final realization of its possibilities of existence"⁵⁴ That is what Heidegger means by saying "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being among (entities encountered within-the-world)."⁵⁵

The implicit ontological status of *ought* in transcendental strategy regains its status in this not-yet possibility of Dasein. The relation between *ought* as the potency of Being and the passive aspect of Dasein signifies the metaphysical limitation of the experience of the ethical for Heidegger. I discuss this relation in details with refer to Heideggerian renouncement of a new ontological project in *Restrictions of Being*. However, particularly after *The Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger puts the emphasis on the question of Being in relation to the not-yet possibility of Dasein. The priority of questioning thus, turns out to be a priority of ontology over epistemic possibilities of questioning. *Ought* as not-yet possibility gains priority over the final realization of its possibilities of existence for Dasein. The tension between the passive and active aspects of Dasein is questioned from a new ontological point of view by means of which the violence doing of Being remains as a task to be experienced by Dasein in its passive aspect of existence. In this sense freedom possesses human beings rather than their having freedom. The preceding violence of Being, *Polemos*, marks the priority of ontological over ethical and the limitation of ethical within metaphysical. The passive

54 HPK, page 92.

55 HPK, page 92.

aspect of Dasein is a preceding possibility of ethical towards the teleological completion of Dasein. I will discuss the engagement of Dasein in life-world in the following parts of this chapter; nevertheless, unlike Guignon's interpretation of this engagement in the rank of purposes and means/ends relations as a pre-reflexive possibility over transcendental subjectivity, I see later Heidegger close to a new ontology in which the relation between ethical and metaphysical is re-established.

As well as teleological, Dasein's self-relation is hermeneutic. In the life Dasein has been thrown, the events that constitute this life, become meaningful only through Dasein's interpretation of them as a totality. The interpretation is not a property that belongs to a subject of traditional metaphysics. There is no room for such a subjectivity or discussions on the bundle theory of impressions, distinctions between inner and outer, mental and physical. Temporality of Dasein's Being drops these discussions. Temporality of Dasein, having been accompanied with the everyday activities and concerns, precedes epistemic situations. That is how Being-in-the-World undermines the worldless possibilities of subjectivity. The significance of Being-in-the-World, can be summarized as the priority of everyday actions, which determines and precedes self. Self becomes self through these contexts. There is tendency for describing the wholeness of these contexts in Heidegger according to Guignon. This tendency is related to the aim of establishing the "absorbing" priority of one's pre-reflective everyday occupation. The wholeness of these everyday concerns can be understood through the quality of the equipment we use in our everyday occupations. There is a "totality of equipment" due to their being constituted by "in order to" serve to us.

The gear, or equipment with which we are engaged is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to' [Um-zu], such as serviceability, conductiveness, usability, manipulability" the point here is, the equipmental context that we

are engaged in is related to our goals. These relations are called assignment [Verweisungen] or significance (Bedeutsamkeit).⁵⁶

The example of hammer explicates the functional “in order to” of the hammer and refers to totality of my aim of activity in everyday involvements, for example making a bookcase, and “in order to” ness of the equipment. This totality is the “readiness-to-hand”. In the everyday involvements, the equipments I use are as if they are ready for my hand. The equipment is, in a sense, ready for my hand. That is to say, they are ready to be used, to function by means of my application, turning to them, interpreting them (Auslegung) in the sense of appropriation. Interpretation is not predicative, rather it is the “totality of the equipmental context as an interconnected field—a totality understood in advance—that is articulated into an as-structure in interpretation.”⁵⁷ That is to say, we describe things, equipments “as” something, hammer as hammer. This is the as structure which determines in a pre-predicative way what equipment means to us. This as structure itself is determined by the rank of purposes. The rank of purposes may be, like a hammer-ring's what-it-is-for is to fasten nails, the what-it-is-for of the nails is to make a bookcase and the bookcase's is to hold books. That is what “totality of the equipmental context as an interconnected field” means. The rank of purposes is means/ends relations and the end that is not for anything is the limit of the structure of these relations. This limit is the self-understanding, which takes place in the contexts that the agent has been engaged.

Guignon says, the connection between Dasein's formal determination and its concrete instantiation as Being-in-the-world is to be seen at this point of self-understanding, which has implicitly been in my tasks that I aim to accomplish.

⁵⁶ HPK, page 94.

⁵⁷ HPK, page 96.

The pyramid of proximate and long-term goals implicit in my activity reaches its pinnacle in a conception of myself in terms of some role that makes up my own self-evaluations and self understanding.⁵⁸

The worldhood means the goal-directedness and the everyday dealings are joined together. In this unified totality, the goal-directedness of Dasein gives rise to the world encountered as a context of the ready-to-hand.⁵⁹ That means there is a determination of self-understanding of Dasein over the equipments' significance of use. The equipments, as the web of context that bound Dasein's self-understanding, determine Dasein's self-understanding as well. There is a reciprocal boundary between Dasein's self-understanding and the context of the means-end relations. This determination can be understood as the understanding of the equipment, entities that we encounter by means of a "fore-structure". This fore-structure is a pre-understanding of the equipments through our goal-directedness. This can be considered similar to an understanding of a passage or passages in a text's being determined by a pre-understanding of a text as a whole. So, the entities, equipments can be meaningful by virtue of a fore-structure, pre-understanding of Dasein that is determined by the needs, interests and aims of Dasein, which is always *present*. The Being of the entities circumscribes the Being of Dasein itself and their relevance is determined by a fore-structure, which is always present, as well. To signify the reciprocity of Dasein's self-interpretation and the limits of this self-interpretation that is set by the context as a totality of equipment, Heidegger says:

There is no way to drive a wedge between an "I" and the world to which it is related. Self and world are not two entities, like "subject" and "object", or "I" and "Thou"; rather, self and world are the basic determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of Being-in-the-world.⁶⁰

58 HPK, page 96.

59 HPK, page 97.

60 HPK, page 98.

That is to say, worldhood is not a categorical determination of things but an essential structure of Dasein, as a primordial context of action. Thus, this primordial context of action, dropping the possibility of a clear-cut distinction between the subject and object, induces to a new conception of subject that understands itself as an agent with a *package* of beliefs and desires.

So, Being-in-the-World, first drops the idea of a subjectivity that is derived from the Cartesian cogito. Second, it marks a shift from contemplation towards the understanding of ontological definition of entities and equipments by means of the relations of the functionality of these entities. This functionality, the relations of “in-order-to”, “what-for”, “by-means-of-which” and “in-doing-which” determines the Being of these entities and equipments and place them within totality.⁶¹ In other words, this second consequence of Being-in-the-world and everydayness refers to, thus, a shift from an objectifying conception of substance to a teleologically structured objects. The ontological definition of objects turns out to be a definition of object’s being ready-to-hand. In this ready-to-hand kind of being, entities can be discovered in themselves. Heidegger says that, “the worldhood of the world provides the basis on which [entities that are ready-to-hand] can for the first time be discovered as they are “substantially” in themselves.”⁶² That is to say, the entities in themselves, their being as what they are is the place they hold in a total context. The entities are placeholders within a meaningful whole determined by the interests and goals of Dasein.

The first and second consequences signify an important priority of the everydayness and Dasein's dealing with the equipments and entities, which “finds his way” in a non-reflective way. This is a tacit knowledge of finding Dasein’s way around

61 HPK, page 99.

62 HPK, page 99.

the entities, which does not require a reflective knowledge . The “readiness-to-hand” of the equipments and entities are not noticed by Dasein unless there is a breakdown. When there is a break-down (*Un-ready-to-hand* - *Dis-worlding* EntWelHichung) in the ordinary practical activities, for example a broken tool becomes disfunctioning, the tacit knowing of Dasein cannot lead it find its way around as he could do. An obstruction occurs in the readiness to hand of the equipments and that gives rise to an explicit awareness, noticing of Dasein “of the relations of in-order-to and what-for of the work itself.”⁶³ Similar to this awareness, the awareness of being-with other and others is also a result of an *impasse*. The experience of ethical for Heidegger is an opportunity for arriving at the nearest place of Being as *ousia* through the experience of uncanny. I will discuss uncanny and nothingness in the following chapter; now I want to continue with obstruction and always- already shared life forms and their relation to the basic condition of Being.

Being-in-the-world is Being-with-others. All the persons take place in the same world with each other. There is relation, communication of the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. The assignment and references that we make are possible with the other’s being-in-the-world. The shoemaker, for example works with the presupposition of some possible wears of his shoes. Heidegger says:

Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and co-understanding.⁶⁴

That is to say, the fact that we are in the world with everyone else is what we share already. We already know that we are in the world before we talk to each other. Thus,

63 HPK, page 101.

64 Halliburton David, *Poetic Thinking An Approach to Heidegger*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981.

language as discourse enables us to communicate with each other without uttering. We can understand each other even in silence by virtue of the basic condition of Being-in-the-world, discourse (*Rede*). In *this basic condition, with our attentive, hearing attitudes, we share the experience of Being-with.*

Thereby, communication and encountering of the subject with the other are seen to be submitted to the shared experience of Being-with. That is to say ethical is within the limits of metaphysics.

The crucial problem Heidegger deals with is the *destruction*, destroying of the traditional understanding of metaphysics within the limits of metaphysics. Having put the emphasis on the question of “What is...?” Heidegger views communication of subject and the other from a metaphysical point of view, which is the basic condition of a shared understanding of Being-with. I will discuss Levinasian critique of Heideggerian ethics that is necessarily preceded by the basic condition of Being in chapter five. Before this, we need to see the role of language in intersubjective communication for early Heidegger.

In his discussion of *Rede*, Heidegger says discussing and addressing of world do not presuppose a linguistic utterance. Language is more than illocutionary acts in this sense. Language, or better, *Rede* in this sense manifests, lets things be seen and works out. *Rede* in this respect is a literal translation of the Greek word *Logos*. Within this communication web, Dasein is essentially with others rather than an isolated individual. Dasein, as a term, refers to a shared publicity in its involvement in the world. Guignon says, this picture of Dasein emphasizes the overcoming of Cartesian subjectivity and its isolated conception of individual:

Heidegger continues his description of everydayness by asking “who it is that” Dasein is in its everydayness. What emerges in the discussion that follows is not a portrayal of Dasein as an ‘individual’ in any sense.⁶⁵

Rather, Dasein is a place-holder in the public world. Heidegger's conception of Dasein-with is manifest in Dasein's essential structures as 'co-state-of-mind and co-understanding'. These structures depend on Dasein's factual agency rather than an isolated subjectivity. Dasein exists in the world as a placeholder with others and can be understood as it is, as such in its profession, in its role. These roles are concrete roles, by means of which Dasein can be defined and understood. They are public and precede Dasein. Due to this pre-given public roles, Dasein is understood as Being-with (Mitsein) and Dasein-with (Mitdasein), which also means Being, co-Dasein.⁶⁶ Roles are determined in their relations to other roles. A driver is meaningful with someone who is going to be served. The meaning of a role, a political position like liberal, can be understood in its relation to other political roles like radical, conservative etc.

The point is that the roles are meaningful with refer to *contrast* roles in a field. Dasein takes a stand in the social system in which every role is related to other roles. Other roles are available as possibilities and to be Dasein “in taking a stand involves a certain *competence* in getting along within the interrelated systems of one’s culture...”⁶⁷ Dasein deals with equipment and encounters others by means of Being-with (the worldhood of the world). That is to say, our shared existence and place holding within this world, as an essential structure, is the condition of intersubjective communication. Dasein expresses itself in its role that it takes over in the world and this public expression is essential. It is this essential expressiveness of Dasein, as Dasein-with, as encountering the Dasein-with of others that Dasein manifests its goal-directedness. This

65 HPK, page 104.

66 HPK, page 105.

67 HPK, page 106.

goal-directedness, manifested through intelligible ways, as Being-in-the-world is determined by Being-with and Dasein-with. This understanding of Being-in-the-world neglects all kinds of private meanings and irrational, cruel behaviors. These differences make no sense and contribution to Dasein's expressions in the world. "Dasein just *is* its meaningful expressions in the world."⁶⁸ This meaningful expression is what lets us encounter others as they are and the others are what they do in this world. The boundary of the *place* that the agent holds in its everydayness refers to the Greek understanding of being a human, which used to mean a placeholder in *oikos* or *polis*. The idea behind referring to a Greek conceptualization of subject is a critical attitude, a criticism of the unearthly subjectivity of modern philosophy. Our everydayness was not counted in the modern conception of objectifying subject. Self-reflection by means of introspection has to be replaced by what Dasein does with the equipment that is ready-to-hand. Heidegger says:

One's own Dasein becomes something that it can itself proximally 'come across' only when it looks away from its 'experience' and the 'center of its actions', or does not as yet 'see' them at all. Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids, in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally *concerned*.⁶⁹

Therefore, knowing oneself, self-knowledge is circumscribed by Being-in-the-world and Dasein who knows itself as the subject of everyday activities is the 'Anyone' (Dasman). The structure of the shared roles is applicable to anyone. Undermining the privileged subject of experience as the unconditioned condition of experience, Heidegger says, I am anyone: "Proximally, it is not "I", in the sense of my own self, the

68 HPK, page 107.

69 HPK, page 109.

“am” but rather the others, whose way is that of the Anyone. In terms of the Anyone and as the Anyone, I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’.⁷⁰

If I am anyone, if the self is indifferent to an example of the structures of my essential expression of myself publicly in an intelligible way, in the world that I share with others, then anyone can replace me, or represent me. I am representable by anyone because the structures we share are public.

The significance of understanding subject as anyone is the breaking away from the traditional conception of subjectivity, which has made a distinction between the inner and outer. Outer representations of the subject are conditioned by its inner capability. The social world is not to be overcome but the limits of Dasein and the Anyone is the essential structure (existential) of Dasein. Heidegger says authenticity as well is the existential modification of this essential structure:

Authentic Being-one's-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the Anyone; it is rather an existential modification of the Anyone-of the Anyone as an essential existential.⁷¹

3.4. Meaning

These existentials, the essential structures are situatedness, understanding and discursiveness. These three existentials disclose ‘Being-in-such’ and meaning is to be found out through the analyses of these existentials. Situatedness and understanding correspond to the formal determination of Dasein. Dasein's attunement is passivity, in other words, the projection of itself as goal – directedness by means of understanding this attunement and this understanding's taking place within the intelligible public forms of life is activity:

70 HPK, page 109.

71 HPK, page 110.

Dasein's Situatedness is revealed by its 'attunement' or 'mood' (Stimmung) in everyday situations. As understanding, on the other hand, Dasein takes up the possibilities it discovers in its situatedness and projects itself on-to some range of goals for its life as a whole.⁷²

This active aspect of Dasein as understanding is possible within the intelligible background, which is called *meaning*. That is to say, meaning refers to a ground that lies under “the totalities of significance” as a source of intelligibility. Significance means what has been articulated, what we utter as a matter of fact in our explicit interpretations. Meaning, on the other hand, having underlied these utterances, (significance) is the possibility of what can be uttered. In Heidegger’s words meaning is what, “can be articulated in a disclosure by which we understand.”⁷³

Meaning thus seems to serve as a ground, as an intelligible source for the active aspect of Dasein's formal determination, which is understanding. For Heidegger, meaning in this primordial level of intelligibility is highly related to discursiveness or talk (Rede). What can be interpreted and asserted have been preceded and grounded by what has been articulated, uttered. Heidegger explains this primordially of discursiveness as follows:

What can be understood (Verstandlichkeit) has always been articulated (gegliedert), even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discursiveness or talk is the articulation (Artikulation) of what can be understood. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be articulated in interpretation and thus even more primordially in discursiveness, is what we have called meaning.⁷⁴

72 HPK, page 111.

73 HPK, page 111.

74 HPK, page 111.

CHAPTER 4

BEING AND LANGUAGE: HEIDEGGER-DERRIDA AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ETHICAL

The concepts we use for ethical judgments, like justice, rights, duty, virtue, good, responsibility and obligation, are also dangerous because they risk rendering responsibility, sense of justice and good calculable. In so far as the calculation of the ethical has been done by means of these concepts, the openness to the incalculable is gone.

In the previous chapter I tried to expose Heidegger's existential analytic with refer to a shared commonness as a condition of the possibility of Dasein's involvement in everyday activities. In other words, Heidegger's essential structures are preceded by a shared ground that makes everyday discourse possible and marks the limits of Dasein. The relation between this shared commonness and being in the world delimits human experience with the ontic realm. Nevertheless, in order to deal with the concepts we use for ethical judgments beyond calculative thinking, Heidegger seeks a different kind of thinking for pushing the limits of the ontic. In this chapter I will discuss the experience of the ethical as an attempt to the unfamiliar and its relation to language.

Heidegger was a turning point by his revision of ethics as *ethos*, as dwelling. In *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger refers to Heraclitus' location of Gods in his heart. That is an example of “the preservation of the unfamiliar in the familiar...”⁷⁵ The subject, through the tradition of philosophy of subject, has been the central of understanding and

⁷⁵ Wood David, *Questioning Ethics, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy*, page 105, Routledge 2002, London.

calculation of the external world. Thus, Heidegger's displacement of the pivotal location of subjectivity in *Poetry, Language, Thought* as a transformation of human beings' dwelling in relation to language is crucial for the experience of ethical. Heidegger says, it is the language that speaks. Man's speaking is his response to language. What is crucial here according to Heidegger, rather than establishing a new theory of language, is to learn to live in the speaking of language. Heidegger says, in order to do so, we need to examine constantly if we are capable of or not responding to the language. If we are, then we examine to what extend. Heidegger is thinking on authenticity in terms of an openness (or responsiveness) of the subject to an other (language). So, the activity of subject is not a dominating activity as the subject of calculation, but rather a subject of responsiveness. The significance of language is its supply, giving the ways of thinking, seeing and being. David Wood says, it is important to note that we do not individually invent but create from these ways of thinking, seeing and being. We create from what we have to pursue further: the speaking of language. David Wood summarizes the responsiveness of the subject to the speaking of language, which provides the ways of being. "To live in the speaking of language suggests maintaining the tension between given form and appropriating response."⁷⁶ He says it is important that Heidegger says we examine constantly how far we reach the standard of the challenge of the relation to the speaking of language. What we can understand from the tension mentioned above is Kierkegaard's conception of subject, which is "constantly involved in relating itself to itself."⁷⁷ In order to understand this relationship of the subject to itself we have to recognize a constitutive role of a term: *power*. The role of such a power is key to understand, according to Kierkegaard, in *Sickness Unto Death*, the despair, the

⁷⁶ Ibid, page 106.

⁷⁷ Ibid, page 106.

hopelessness in which we do not give up but carry on. The experience that we undergo is possible by means of certain transcendental conditions. These transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience in this sense, the despair in which we carry on, can be understood as a role of deep structure of relatedness. For Heidegger, the despair is not at work but there is the tension (as another breakdown) of being unable to find the right word. That is to say the right response to the otherness, the speaking of language. It is an attempt to run up against the ontic limits of being in the world.

Wittgenstein mentions of a feeling that shows our dependency on something alien to us. It is an alien will. That on which we feel we are dependent, we can call God.⁷⁸ What we can call God, since it depends on a certain sense of dependence is related to an experience. To say that “we can call God” means that it is not necessarily God. We can name it fate or chance. But according to Wood, it is not important what we call it. Heidegger would, he says, call this experience of dependency in our relation to language. In order to point to Wittgenstein's remark to a specific experience and this remark's relation to responsiveness, dependence and essential relationality, Wood quotes Wittgenstein:

I can readily think what Heidegger means by Being and Dread. Man has the impulse to run up against the limits of language. Think, for example, of the astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no answer to it. Everything, which we feel like saying, can *a priori* be nonsense. Nevertheless, we do run up against the limits of language. This running up against Kierkegaard also recognized, and even designated in a quite similar way (as running up against paradox). This running up against the limits of language is *ethics*.⁷⁹

Heidegger's main aim was to question the subject of *cogito* that prevails on the external world and sustained by the habitual grammatical structures. Heidegger's

78 Wittgenstein Ludwig, *Notebooks 1914-16* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961 page 73.

79 Wood David, *Questioning Ethics, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy*, page 107.

location of man in a responsive position towards the speaking language is understandable within this context. Wood says, there are essentially creative distortions of language. The point of these distortions was ethical and Wittgenstein was aware of this point, which means that he was aware of Heidegger's effort of describing the indescribable, of describing an experience of openness, passivity and responsiveness. What Heidegger is after is described by Wittgenstein as the astonishment of that things exist.

According to Wood, the ethical, if there is any in phenomenology “it is this patience with experience.”⁸⁰ That is to say, experience is a central theme in philosophy not only because it mediates many paths between philosophy and other disciplines like politics, religion, literature, science, but also plays the role of a condition of this mediation between what is philosophy and what outside to it. That is also to say, if one follows the way from phenomenology and deconstruction, this mediation also works in a disturbing, confusing and blurring way the demarcations between philosophy and non-philosophy. Within these areas, literature and art are more important. Why? It is the real challenge that which is not limited and can be reduced to provide natural knowledge. It is a real challenge for philosophy to get over with the complexity of aesthetic experience. The concern to distinguish between what is provided by the experienced object and what is provided by the experiencing subject was established by Kant towards this challenge. Due to the Hegelian understanding of this differentiation, the missing dimension of culture and language was added to the Kantian account. The dimension of culture and language, the conditions of possibility of our experience through the shared social practices was the key for the crisis of modernism according to Wood. It is this Hegelian and post-Hegelian key conceptualization of not only the experience of art but

80 Ibid, page 108.

also the relation with the other and others that gave rise to the criticism of modernity and the problem of nihilism. In other words, things would be easy then; there would be no problematic aspects of discussing validity claims, ideal speech community, scientific explanations of religious consensus etc. It is the recognition of the third dimension of experience -language- that led to these problems by means of presupposing a certain form of life. This form of life can be actual or ideal but the point is, it has been a challenge to experience's transcendental conditions of possibilities. The experience, understood in the sense that depends up on the transcendental conditions of possibility then, undergoing the challenge of the social, political, symbolic and linguistic, may have disappeared. However, it is not the case for Wood. Why is it not the case?

According to David Wood, deconstruction by means of its approach towards experience as a problematic, which has been growing in the movement of Derrida's writings can be a corner stone for the discussion of ethical. Particularly the concept of *responsibility* and deconstruction itself are the means that can be understood as attempts towards regaining responsibility. Wood claims that it is not a true reading to elaborate Derrida's first texts as works that identify experience with (self) presence and the concept of experience thus belongs to the history of metaphysics. We can use the concept of experience only under erasure. The later Derrida, however, does not focus on the necessary relation between experience and presence. Instead, he uses the term experience without "under erasure". He uses the terms like, "the experience of aporia", "an interminable experience", "the impossible experience of death", and "the experience of mourning". According to Wood, his usage of these terms are evidences of the "suppression of difference" which means the consciousness of speech or in Derridean words "auto affection" which also means the self-presence. Thus, Wood argues, later

Derrida emphasizes the continuity by means of his usage of the word experience. Wood says,

If speech or our consciousness of speech is, as he claimed, the 'suppression of difference' *that it is so* is not merely a truth discovered by theory, by reflection. Rather it is testified by 'the experience of writing' 'the experience of mourning' 'the experience of the impossible'⁸¹

So, the real challenge to philosophy comes to stage with these risky usages of experience. Wood refers to Blanchot's usage of "suffering" as an example of attempting to suspense the "I" of the experience. Blanchot says: "There is suffering, there would be suffering, but no longer any *I* suffering and this suffering does not make itself known in the present (still less is it experienced in the present)!"⁸² The suspension of the *I* means that the *I* is not the *I* of thinking, synthesizing and thus, an example of suspending the consciousness as self-presence by means of opening it to a responsiveness, a passivity, is a submission of the *I* to the life . The usage of the subject and experience in Blanchot and Derrida, according to Wood is itself *not* a radical rupture with the traditional metaphysical thought. The usage, which is an abyssal alternative to dialectic, is not in a sense of incompleteness and instability independent from dialectic. Wood says, there can be no independent abyssal realm. The abyss is possible if there is an impossibility of a certain closure of the completeness, determination of meaning. Thus, the abyss is both differentiated and dependent on the experience of the tradition of metaphysical thought. The closure that determines the limits of the experience of the metaphysical should be undermined and blurred for such an abyss to be. David Wood, emphasizing the dependency of the abyss on the experience that it undermines says, the abyssal thinking is both differentiated and hence dependent on "that recuperative negation which it

81 Ibid, page 112.

82 Ibid, page 113.

refuses”⁸³ That is to say, recognizing the limits of recuperation, this abyssal thought becomes tied up with that recuperative negation it refuses.

There is a line of ethical starting from Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard was special so as to make the religious, which is transformed into subjectivity and thus into the ways of being and acting in the world. How is this possible? For Kierkegaard the objective thought focuses on *what* whereas the subjective focuses on *how*. Wood summarizes how religious turns out to be ultimately ethical by emphasizing Kierkegaard's 'knight of faith':

The knight of faith is a man (or woman) who returns to the finite-but always gets the infinite out of it. The ground structure of his dispositions changed. To the extent that he is successful, Kierkegaard translates religious belief into complexly mediated and motivated ways of being and acting in the world.⁸⁴

There is a kind of responsiveness in infinite, in a Heideggerian sense one can say, which is related to action and thought like Heidegger's response to language. So, the ethical line of thought, following the path from mystical or religious to the symbolic and social or “life” as ethos, as the dwelling of the unfamiliar keeps challenging philosophy. Derridean responsibility, which is necessarily infinite, reinscribes the Heideggerian ethos, through both undermining and being recuperated by the limits of the experience.

4.1.Redde – Logos – Language as the Constitutive of Isness

Heidegger's notion of *Rede*, which has been translated as talk, discourse or speech, is used as addressing and discussing of world not necessarily as speech acts. *Rede* thus, can be used as a translation of logos. Logos means “to make manifest” or “to let – something – be – seen”⁸⁵. It is used as a principle of ordering and ranking. This principle, as a principle of “collecting collectedness” can be understood as “a process of

83 Ibid, page 114.

84 Ibid, page 115.

85 Ibid, page 112.

bringing the world into a coherent pattern.”⁸⁶ This process of organization of entities is the essence of unifying everything in the totality of simple presencing.

In this chapter, I will try to show the shift in Heideggerian thinking by pointing the overwhelming determination of *isness* in its manifoldness, in other words, the determination of Being in discursiveness as an essential opening up of Being in language using. Meaning turns out to be possible and conditioned by what can be said under the determination of Being and its unfolding in the definiteness of the usages of *is*. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger exemplifies the sayings of *is* and shows how the meaning of *is* differs from one example to the other because *is* mixes itself in to everyday saying and talking.

What we can do is to interpret the individual examples of the sayings of the *is*. What we can interpret is the manifold of the sayings rather than *is* itself. That is to say, *is* remains indeterminate whereas the manifold of sayings (Rede) can be interpreted. So, each of the sayings as, “God is.” “The earth is”. “The lecture is in the auditorium.” “This man is from Swabia.” “The cup is of Silver.” “The peasant is in the fields.” “He is dead.” shows us the determinate meanings of the *is* in sayings which differ due to the context of situation. “In the *is* Being opens up to us in a manifold way” and “the manifoldness of its meanings is not arbitrary.”⁸⁷ Despite the variety of the determination of “to be” said in the *is*, Heidegger says there is a possibility that underlies manifestations:

However, a definite, unitary trait runs through all these meanings. It points our understanding of “to be” toward a definite horizon by which the understanding is fulfilled. The boundary drawn around the sense of “Being” stays within the sphere of presentness and presence (Gegenwartigkeit und

86 Ibid, page 112.

87 IM, page 95.

Anwesenheit), subsistence and substance (Bestehen und Bestand), staying and coming forth.⁸⁸

It is this underlying possibility that can be understood as a possibility of bringing the world into a coherent pattern. We understand through this coherent pattern of the world, the manifoldness of Being in the definiteness of the usages of *is*. In the meaning of this possibility of understanding and appropriating, fitting entities there is a commonness, a publicity that refers to Anyone as the source of logos.

Logos, thus having been the source of the forms of life that we share appears as artifacts in speech acts and discourses. We understand the world as an understandable structure, which is involved in logos. The world speaks to us through this structure. Thereby, meaning is no longer a property that lies behind the entities but rather something directly accessible in the intelligible life-world with refer to its public use. Guignon says, logos, understood in this sense, resembles Wittgenstein's forms of life and Dilthey's objective mind and leaves no room for a "need to posit the existence of a mysterious realm of "intentional acts" that gives meaning to our activities."⁸⁹

Individuals take over their roles by virtue of the pre-established structure of conventions and these conventions are grounded by logos. As a human being thus, I take a stand within these pre-established norms and conventions, which determine the meaning of my activities and expressions. This publicly shared meaning grounded by logos provides 'the possibility of uniformity and continuity of unattended objects when they are identical. Theoretical point is that: What endures in the experience of the objects is the way they are used by us in accordance with the pre-established structures that have been grounded by logos. There is nothing like a hammer in-itself that makes me use it properly all the time but it is the interpretation and appropriation of Dasein that

88 IM, page 96.

89 HPK, page 114.

is in a publicly shared world. Dasein grasps the knowledge *tacitly* rather than contemplation. The continuity of Dasein's interpretation and appropriation thus, depends on Dasein's participation as the Anyone in the public text of the world.

Dasein's exemplifications exist as interpretations on this text. The interpretations, having been made possible by logos, are articulated or appropriated through logos, through the way in which logos is spoken out: language. So, the expressions of the public world are expressed concretely through the way logos expressed. This way is language and logos is concrete in language. Heidegger says:

If *logos*, as the articulation of the understandability of the 'there', is a primordial existentials of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then *logos* too must essentially have a kind of Being which is specifically *worldly*. The situated understandability of Being-in-the-world *speaks itself out as logos...* The way in which logos is spoken out is language.⁹⁰

The meanings, significations find their expressions in words. The totality of these words is language. By means of this totality of words, language is encountered by Dasein as equipment, as an entity within the world. We encounter language as an entity ready-to-hand. That is to say, our relation to language takes place in our use of language.

However, besides this approach we can also come across some other approaches on the nature of language. Language is defined close to Dilthey's understanding of a supplementary conception of language. Guignon says, according to this approach language is seen as an equipment among the others and its possibility depends on a non-linguistic background:

From the instrumentalist's standpoint, our ability to use language is grounded in some prior grasp of the nonsemantic significance of the contexts in which

90 HPK, page 116.

we find ourselves. It is only because we have first understood the nature of reality that we can then come to comprehend the meanings of words.⁹¹

The other way of understanding Heidegger's conception of language is a similar one to that of later Wittgenstein's. According to this constitutive approach language, different than the other ready-to-hand equipments, determines our appropriation and interpretation of these equipments. The equipments are ready-to-hand contextualized in a total context, which is generated by language. By doing so, it is the language that constitutes the understanding of Dasein as Anyone. Language precedes and determines the everyday dealings of Dasein as well as its understanding as Anyone and own Being-in-Language plays this role as idle-talk (Gerede). Heidegger says:

Proximally, and within certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness (of the public language) which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and the situatedness belonging to it. (Language), within its organized and articulated contexts of signification, preserves an understanding of the disclosed world, an understanding of the Dasein-with of the others and of one's own Being-in⁹²

Language in this sense, rather than being a tool, an equipment among the other equipments is viewed as the ground, the possibility of the constitution of both Dasein as Anyone and Dasein's Being-in. Being-in refers to the difference between the being and its Being. The question of the metaphysics "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" leads us to the possibility of not-Being and Being of beings. This crucial ontological difference is discussed in another chapter; however, to make the relation of language to the possibility of questioning this difference, it is helpful to see what Heidegger says about the *Possible* in the equipment (chalk for example as a ready-to-hand equipment). Heidegger says: "The chalk itself, as this being, is in this possibility, otherwise it would not be chalk as a writing implement. Every being, in turn, has this

91 HPK, page 117.

92 HPK, page 119.

Possible in it, in a different way in each case.”⁹³ We do not see and grasp the Possible in a prejudice. But the question itself provides us the opportunity of the beings not-Being. The beings in this respect are torn from the possibility of not-Being. That is how beings are not present-at-hand. They waver, fluctuate between Being and not-Being. The chalk for example, is in this wavering has the possibility of Being and not-Being. Heidegger says: “Insofar as beings stand up against the extreme possibility of not-Being, they themselves stand in Being, and yet they have never thereby overtaken and overcome the possibility of not-Being.”⁹⁴

That is why, we encounter beings as ready-to-hand, as equipment to use and this contextual determination of beings has been framed by language. If we pay attention to what we are talking about beings, we see that we have to talk about the relation of Being to beings themselves. The ontological difference between beings and their Being is determined and framed by language as well. That's why Heidegger says, Being-in with refer to what makes a being be instead of nonbeing. This beingness means “the in-being”. It is “the in-being, beingness, to be in being, Being”⁹⁵ situated in the isness of the chalk, it belongs to chalk and this isness has been constituted by language as well. Language speaks itself. It speaks itself as idle talk. The anyone is thus, constituted by the idle talk. Dasein as Anyone does not have a possibility of extricating itself from the language within which things have been interpreted. It is similar to Wittgenstein's understanding of “we learn in and by language” when Heidegger says: “In it, from it, and *against* it, all genuine understanding, interpreting and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed.”⁹⁶

93 IM, page 32.

94 IM, page 33.

95 IM, page 33.

96 HPK, page 120.

Again with refer to Wittgenstein, we can understand the tendency of “running up against the limits of language” as an impossibility, which signifies an attempt to the experience of ethical. This attempt is within the language but towards the beyond and against the language. We find ourselves in language and we understand, learn ourselves and the world by language. There is no room for non-semantic meanings that are supposed to be grasped prior to words. If meanings are articulated by language then we cannot say that we first grasp an intelligible idea as the totality of meanings. Meanings are accessible only through the forms of articulations and appropriations that have been embodied in language. Guignon says, there is an internal connection between the forms of life articulated in logos and language as the linguistic articulations that ground these forms of life. According to Guignon, this connection is necessarily internal because the significations, meanings (Bedeutung) are inaccessible without the linguistic articulation. The facts that are agreed as important to a culture are social and in order to encounter them one needs to go through “the grammatical multiplicity of a language.”⁹⁷ That is to say, the factuality of the world as well as Dasein as Being-in, can be understood as relevant only by virtue of a language. Dasein encounters the equipment in its daily dealings as an agent not by means of a grasp of nonlinguistic background of meaning. Dasein deals with the world my means of choosing between the possibilities of the equipments, which presuppose language.

However, Heideggerian attempt to grasp the ungraspable, that is, the question of Being, pushes the accessibility of meanings in a project of preparing a room, a place for non-semantic meanings prior to words. This place is where Heidegger thinks *ought* regains its Being, its ontological status. Language thus, marks the path, the passage to the non-semantic, non-linguistic place of happening (or presencing, giving itself up) of

97 HPK, page 121.

Being. I will try to focus on *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the work that Derrida says for Heidegger's project of a new ontology is the key. Therefore I will discuss the question of Being in relation to the experience of ethical in Heidegger mainly with refer to *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

4.2.Heidegger - Question About Being

Asking the question of Being is crucial for Heidegger for the history of West. The question itself is historical. It is the question about the word Being. Is it an empty word meaning nothing actual as Nietzsche assumed or is it the spiritual fate of the West? For Heidegger, the spiritual fate of the West should be understood as historical, and stands by the question: "How does this spiritual stand with Being?" By means of this question, in relation to the fundamental question of metaphysics "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" we are concerned with the restoration of the historical Dasein of human beings rather than the mistaken early attempts of ontology. Heidegger says: "...our own-most future Dasein, in the whole of the history is allotted to us."⁹⁸ We are trying to open up the question within the limits of philosophy's capability. We open up the happening of human Dasein. The priority of the historical questioning over the metaphysical is important because we want to open up the happening which is determined from the future in which present vanishes. History, for Heidegger does not mean past. He says:

...history is not equivalent to what is past; for this is precisely what is no longer happening. But much less is history what is merely contemporary, which also never happens, but always just "passes", makes its entrance and goes by. History as happening is determined from the future, takes over what has been, and acts and endures its way through the present.⁹⁹

98 IM, page 44.

99 IM, page 47.

The determination of future in which present vanishes refers to the not-yet possibility of the ethical (*ought*) towards which our being in the world is directed to. *Ought* as the not-yet possibility of Being's unfolding itself and withdrawing within the ontic-ontological difference. Thereby, the true interpretation of the meaning of the question of Being is determined by the not-yet possibility of *ought* within the limits of metaphysics.

If we consider the question about the meaning of the word Being, whether it is an empty word or the spiritual fate of the West and the historical restoration of the historical Dasein of human beings, we have to question the meaning of spirit. This questioning is itself historical. That is to say, the questioning takes place “in the happening, and questions on the ground of this happening and for this happening.”¹⁰⁰

So, for Heidegger Dasein is opened up by means of this historical questioning as “futures to come” and also bound back to the mission, vocation of grasping its tradition creatively. The meaning of spirit was misinterpreted in the past. It was interpreted as intelligence, which refers to calculation. Secondly, related to this interpretation spirit was reduced to a tool in the service of something else. Thirdly, as a consequence of this instrumental reduction, “poetry and fine arts, statecraft and religion” turned out to be consciously planned and actualized activities, which individuals consider their self-creation within the standards of cultural values disconnected to the “powers of spiritual happening.”¹⁰¹ Finally, the spirit as culture gave rise to purely negative attitudes such as Russian communism. To be able to understand the spiritual fate of the West and to be opened up by means of this understanding, we have to interpret spirit as “originally attuned, knowing resolution to the essence of Being”. Spirit in this sense is not what it

100 IM, page 47.

101 IM, page 50.

had been understood in the past, but “is the empowering of the powers of beings as such and as a whole.”¹⁰²

Thus, the true interpretation of spirit is possible by asking questions about Being. Asking questions about Being, about beings as such and as a whole, therefore is the condition for Dasein for activating the spirit, for “awakening” it. This condition enables Dasein to fulfill its vocation. The world that has undergone crises can be taken over by “the people of the center of the West.” Question about Being has this decisive importance. We have to deal with this question “in full seriousness” according to Heidegger. To do so, instead of taking Being as Being-present-at-hand as granted, what we have to take granted as a fact is that: “The fact is such that we stand within it.”¹⁰³ We stand within it means, we are constituted in relation to Being. Thus, having a stand is taking a place in the world where beings simply are. Heidegger's question concerning the meaning of Being thus is a question of language that precedes and determines our ‘state’ of Dasein, our whole constitution in relation to Being. What Heidegger says about the language as a condition of the possibility of the question on Being seems clearly supporting this view. He argues the attempts to re-establish the *mis-relation* and *un-relation* of language to Being can only end up with realizing that “one no longer knows what language is all about.”¹⁰⁴ The idea that Being for us is an empty word depends on the generally accepted idea that language is used up and misused to establish a relation to Being. The language is used up, worn out like a streetcar, which is used by everyone. Derrida refers to this metaphorical usage of language in *Grammatology* and I discuss this relation of Heideggerian usage of metaphor and Derrida's interpretation of this usage in the third chapter. However, it is crucial to note that Heidegger says the emptiness of

102 IM, page 52.

103 IM, page 53.

104 IM, page 54.

the word Being is “the complete withering of its naming force”. Nevertheless, he seeks the destroyed relation of language to Being with the idea or hope of a true relation. The final expressions of the language that we factually are in, cannot be used as a way to achieve beyond these expressions. Clearing the ground can be done in these expressions and by these expressions. The point is whether we are aware of this encompassment of language or not. “Running up against the limits of language” is an impossible goal, which we can act as if it were possible with an ironic awareness. For Heidegger, we leave the mis-relation and un-relation of language to Being to the beings themselves in which Being is. The direction we can go towards, after leaving the empty, universal world ‘Being’, is “the special characteristics of the particular domains of beings themselves.”¹⁰⁵ By virtue of this journey, we become suspicious of the supposed emptiness of the word Being. The universal conception of Being, pertaining to every special characteristic of the beings, conditions our naming of individual objects. Although it is questionable, the exemplifications of Being is representability of Being, the meaning of a particular, for example of a tree, should be known by us in advance for us to be able to find the species of trees and individual trees. Heidegger says: “This all the more decisively true of Being. The necessity for us already to understand the word ‘Being’ is the highest and is incomparable.”¹⁰⁶ This necessity preoccupies Heidegger and induces him to seek the way for the human beings as Sayers, say the beings as such, which is conditioned by understanding their Being prior to this saying. Beings as such would no longer open themselves up in words at all; they could no longer be addressed

105 IM, page 80.

106 IM, page 85.

and discussed. For saying beings as such involves understanding beings as beings-that is, their Being-in advance.¹⁰⁷

Thus, the meaning of the word 'Being' should be raised in its uniqueness as a name, as the naming. This is to be questioned, the meaning of Being and that is to say, we should not be in a hurry to leave the assumed emptiness of Being towards the particular. Before raising the meaning of the word of 'Being' we have to consider the grammar and etymology of 'Being' to see how the mis-relation of language to Being has been established.

4.3. The Grammar and Etymology of "Being"

In order to see the grammatical character of the word "Being" we first look at the words' different usages within structures or sentences. Within these usages we can see different directions of meaning like the present, perfect, participle and infinitive forms of the word 'go': "he goes, they have gone, go!, going, to go." However, for Heidegger, the determination of the essence of language and even the question of this determination depends on and appropriates itself "according to what has become the prevailing pre-conception about the essence of beings and about how we comprehend essence."¹⁰⁸ But the essence of beings, Being speaks in language. Thus, it is not sufficient to question word of "Being" within traditional grammatical analysis. It is not sufficient because we are trying to access the essence of Being with regard to its essential relation to language. At first step, we look at the similarity between the ground and infinitive "to be". Heidegger calls this ground form of "to be" "verbal substantive". So, since the word is a substantive of the infinitive "to be", it is preceded by "to be". Heidegger says questioning the primordially of words with regard to their forms infinitive, substantive

¹⁰⁷ IM, page 86.

¹⁰⁸ IM, page 57.

and verb, means questioning the origin of the language. To start questioning the origin of the language, we ask what “infinitive” means.

Infinitive according to Heidegger is “an abbreviation of the complete one: *modus infinitivus*, the mode of unboundedness, of indeterminatedness, regarding the manner in which a verb exercises and indicates the function and direction of its meaning.”¹⁰⁹ The Latin expression *modus* (mode) similar to *casus* (case) originates from the Greek grammar. Greek grammar is the way that beings in their Being were understood. The Greek terms *enkklisis* (*modus*) and *ptösis* (*casus*) mean falling, sharing information and deviation. That implies according to Heidegger a lessening, “a dropping of form an upright, straight stance.”¹¹⁰ Being, for Greeks, says Heidegger is this way of standing, “taking and maintaining a stand that stands erected high in itself...”¹¹¹ This taking and maintaining a stand, Heidegger says “becomes constant in itself and thereby freely and on its own runs up against the necessity of its limit, *peras*.”¹¹²

It is this limit (*peras*) that makes the constant itself. That is to say it is the Being of beings, which limits being and by virtue of this limitation makes a being in opposition to a nonbeing. This limit does not come to a being from outside. Instead, it is the limit that taking a stand attains in order to run up against it.

So, the Being has its self-restraint and it is this restraint, limit that makes beings be in opposition to nonbeing. A being thus has this characteristic of running up against the restraint it has in itself and this characteristic is its end, *telos*. Beings be by attaining their limits and running up against them to come to fulfillment (*Vollendung*). Heidegger says, this is what Aristotelian *entelecheia* means and this Greek term meaning

109 IM, page 59.

110 IM, page 63.

111 IM, page 63.

112 IM, page 63.

“something's holding- (or maintaining)-itself-in-its-completion- (or limit)”¹¹³ declined because of the usages of later philosophy. For Greeks, this standing, this taking place in itself has *morphe* (form) and this coming-forth of its essence is seen as it is *eidos* (idea). Heidegger says the look of a thing that stands has a face for who sees it and this look, face is the fitting of coming-to-presence of the Being-of-a- being. This is the meaning of Being, *ousia* for Greeks. “Whatever places itself into and thereby enacts its limit, and thus stands, has form” and What puts itself forth, what offers itself offers in how it looks.¹¹⁴ That is to say, the meaning of Being, *ousia* or *parousia* coming-to-present, (An-Wesen) holds sway (Walten). This sway, before thinking overcomes it, emerges, it *is*, and stays in its being in beings. Sway is in beings, in other words, it unfolds, unconceals itself, is to be apprehended, understood as *phusis*. In this sense, *phusis* is different than nature. For Heidegger, the Greek conception of sway is self-unfolding and this self-unfolding happens before thinking apprehends it. It struggles itself as a world in which unconcealment (*alethia*) happens as beings. “Through world, beings first come to being.”¹¹⁵ Unconcealment, like a primordial struggle, war, in this sense precedes all the determinations of Being. Heidegger says “In this sway, which struggles itself forth as a world.”, “rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originary unity.”¹¹⁶ This primordial struggle holds sway. In Heraclitus's fragment 53 it is called *polemos*. *Polemos* in this sense, according to Heidegger, is the condition of enmity, opposition, determinations of every being both divine or human. *Polemos*, is unifying, building. *Polemos*, in this sense is same with *logos*, which conditions the possibility of what unfolds and emerges. What unfolds can front each other with distances and intervals and

113 IM, page 63.

114 IM, page 64.

115 IM, page 64.

116 IM, page 64.

is preceded by an originary struggle that provides the possibility of their “position and status and rank to establish themselves in coming to presence.”¹¹⁷

It is this struggle that lets the beings struggle to stand in opposition and distance to each other. It is primordial to what happens, it is confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*). This primordial struggle, the overwhelming sway is sustained by the works of poets, philosophers and statesman. That is how the unity of the world is opened up. So, the self-unfolding, the emergent self-upraising “first comes to a stand” and in this stand “Beings as such” become. Heidegger says: “This becoming-a-world is authentic history.”¹¹⁸ There is a shift from what conditions and lets beings as such come into a stand and become constant in themselves to the objects they turn out to be. What becomes constant in itself is to run up against what necessarily made it constant as we saw above in the discussion of limit (*peras*). Now, Heidegger points to the shift from the primordial that lets emerging and standing-forth for beings to stand to the objects that we deal with. The primordial, the struggle, not only lets emerging and standing forth but also it keeps beings constant. The stopping of the struggle shifts beings and make them turn out to be objects. They turn out to be objects due to the stopping of the struggle what made them constant. Heidegger says:

Where struggle ceases, beings indeed do not disappear, but world turns away. Beings are no longer assented [that is, preserved as such]. Beings now become just something one comes across; they are findings.¹¹⁹

Beings now are the equipment, daily objects for the use of human beings. Thus, they are completed, finished. They are no longer meaningful by the limit, *peras* that as a self-restraining of maintaining a stand because they are no longer constant. They cannot

117 IM, page 65.

118 IM, page 66.

119 IM, page 65.

run up against on their own and freely. They are at the disposal of “anybody, the present-at-hand, within which no world is worlding anymore.”¹²⁰ Now, it is not the struggle that holds sway, it is instead the human beings hold sway and make use of what became their objects. For Heidegger, the shift turned away the world, made beings objects. These objects are in two way at the disposal of human beings. First, there are the objects for observation like pictures, views, or the objects for calculation, for making; second, the being of these objects’ seeming for human beings.

Heidegger thinks this objects’ being present-at-hand to be copied and reproduced is a degeneration, falling far from the original, a reduction of “The originary emergent self-upraising of the violent forces of what holds sway, the *phainesthai* as appearing in the broad sense of the epiphany of the world”¹²¹ to the observable objects. This reduction makes our vision of what holds sway a vision of what is at disposal to us. The vision of the struggle was a vision, which “pro-duced”, (Her-stellen) sustained this originary struggle. After this struggle ended, the beings have been abandoned by Being. Being has left them on their own and that's why the view is now only optical and maintains the objects “in a seeming constancy (Standigkeit) only when they are made into the “object” (Gegenstand) of endless and ever-changing busy-ness”¹²²

That is why the present-at-hand objects are the beginning of the decline. They are left, deserted by the Being and thus they are not-to-be in the Greek sense of *phusis* and *ousia*. They are not-to-be; thus, they are not maintained “as standing in itself as arising and standing forth”¹²³ constantly. They, according to Heidegger “exist” which means not to be in Greek, *existasthai*.

120 IM, page 66.

121 IM, page 66.

122 IM, page 67.

123 IM, page 67.

By means of designating the limited, distant meaning of existence, Heidegger points to the lack of true, original interpretation of Being. We are deviated from constancy of Being in itself as standing enduringly because we communicate, we have access to visible present-at-hand objects.

4.4. Language and the Place of the Naming Power of Being

What we can see is, what stands forth, shows, exhibits itself through language, which is in harmony with Being. Seeing the written forms of the spoken word is seeing the written image of the word in *grammata*. What we see in grammar is “language as something being”. When there is an inflection, a deviation from the originary form of a word, in order to let something be understood immediately, there is a fall, deviation of constancy of Being. Heidegger, with refer to the basic position of nouns and their change through inflection and deviation in Greek, emphasizes the manifestation of the present-at-hand or the representation of the basic position of the word. By doing so, Heidegger points to the various particular deviations of the word as such. This function is possible by the *enklisis*, another Greek word used to point to inclination of what stands straight.

The inflected form of the word makes all of this manifest in addition and lets it be understood immediately. To make something else manifest in addition, to allow to arise and be seen in addition-this is the function of the *enklisis*.¹²⁴

The *enklisis* is the *enklisis paremphantikos*, which means the inclination of what is constant within its becoming *space*. This becoming space, as Plato used it in order to distinguish three aspects of “the essence of the becoming of what becomes”¹²⁵, means the medium of something that becomes. This is the space but not in the meaning of extension. It means the place that the becoming thing becomes in and in this sense

124 IM, page 68-69.

125 IM, page 69.

belongs to the becoming thing. A becoming thing has its place as *topos*. This *topos*, where the things are becoming within, does not offer its own appearance; rather it is transfigured into space as extension. Heidegger, interprets the *Timaeus* of Plato as this transfiguration of *topos* (where the things become within) and *chora* (the essence of which we grasped without any space). By doing so, he interprets the essence of everything as a withdrawal for things become in an extension to be visualized. “Might not *chôra* mean: that which, separates itself from every particular, that which withdraws, and in this way admits and ‘makes room’ precisely for something else?”¹²⁶

This room, that means extension, is the place for a thing that becomes something and prepared by the withdrawal of the source, essence of a thing that becomes from. This transfiguration of the place of becoming that belongs to thing itself to the place as extension, that is a deviation, inflection, is what *enklisis paremphatikos* means.

If we turn to the infinitive as the ground of verbal substantives, it in this sense determines *modus*, the Latin word for *enklisis*. The infinitive has been transformed into verbal substantives which means a limited, deficient is. Something, in this sense, is transformed from Being grammatically and something *is*. Heidegger, gives the examples of the forms of the infinitive to be like: I am, you are, he, she, it is, they were, we have been. These forms of verbal substantives do not provide us the meaning of the infinitive to be. They neither make us understand “what its essence consists in”¹²⁷ However, what we need to do is to attempt to understand since Being itself is not something that we can find before us. We can find Being-in-being of beings.(Seiendsein) We can find it in the substantive forms of infinitive which shows us the naming power of Being. Heidegger says the abstract infinitive form is transferred into a substantive in our saying. Being

126 IM, page 70.

127 IM, page 73.

becomes “something that is” by means of this transfer. In German ‘sein’ is said as ‘das sein’ like ‘to be’ and this making the abstract infinitive a verbal substantive is a superior function in language. Being becomes “something that is” by means of this action like an object’s being fixed in its standing extension.

If we just say ‘sein’, then what we have named is already indefinite enough. But through the linguistic transformation of the infinitive (abstract infinitive) into the verbal substantive, the emptiness that already lies in the infinitive is, as it were, further fixed; ‘sein’ is posed like a fixed, standing object (feststehender Gegenstand)¹²⁸

Through these transferred forms of the abstract infinitive *sein*, *be* we attempt to arrive at the *to be*. That is to say, through sayings like “I am, You are, She is, We have been, I was” We are going to attempt to arrive at the Being-in-being-of beings. To do so, unlike the Cartesian attitude that gives a privileged position to “I am”, Heidegger says it is the time of “We are”.

Heidegger, through surveying the etymological stems of the verb be(sein) that are found in the inflections concludes that linguistics establishes three definite meanings of be(sein). These definite and initial meanings are: “living, emerging, abiding.”¹²⁹ After the inflections that are revealed, unfolded in sayings of the abstract meaning of Being, the question is: “how are the three stems above unified?”¹³⁰, which is a question that begs questions on the sayings of Being. Like, “Are the sayings of Being same?”, “How does the ontological difference unfold in these sayings”. This questioning leads us to the fundamental question of metaphysics: “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” and thus points to the priority of relation between the standing of these beings “with Being” whose meaning can be attempted to be understood in and by language. This

128 IM, page 73.

129 IM, page 76.

130 IM, page 76.

attempt led us to inquire the grammatical and etymological roots of the words *to be*. What we are seeking now is the impossibility of grasping the un-graspable, since we are seeking what is the origin of language that surrenders us as *we are*. We are seeking within the limits of our understanding of Being and not- Being which is the condition of the possibility of beings be, stand. That is the factuality we are to attempt to question rather than the old ontological conception of the word Being as genus, as highest generic concept. All we can arrive at is the mis-relation of language to Being. Thus, we don't consider Being as embracing everything. We pay attention to how beings be in the ordinary life. "We let all beings be as they *are*."¹³¹ If we do so, if we let beings be as they *are* or as a thing *is*, then we are to know what *is* as an inflection and *to be* as the source of this inflection means. As we mentioned above, it is conditioned by our understanding of Being and not- Being.

Heidegger emphasizes the indefinite meaning of the abstract infinitive of the word Being and how its definite deviations reveal a contradiction. This contradiction, which should not exist according to usual logic, is a fact that we stand in it.

And yet, there is this contradiction: Being as definite and completely indefinite. We see, if we do not deceive ourselves, and if for a moment amid all the day's hustle and bustle we have time to see, that we are standing in the midst of this contradiction.¹³²

What we see in this contradiction is the uniqueness of Being and its only other, since it is unique and thus cannot be compared to anything else but its other, which is Nothing. Every being, on the other hand can be compared to other beings. Beings, the indeterminate meanings of Being, as mentioned above in the example of chalk, have been conditioned by language. However, this indeterminate meaning of the most

131 IM, page 81.

132 IM, page 82.

determinate Being, its difference, is what makes language possible. Heidegger says, if “there were no indeterminate meaning of Being” and if we did not understand “what this meaning signifies. Then what?” Would there just be one noun and one verb less in our language? No. *Then there would be no language at all.*¹³³ That is to say, the unfolding of beings to Being presupposes their relation to Being because saying understands beings as such in this relation in advance. We, human beings are Sayers and thus this relation is a condition for being human as well. In the ground of our essence, according to Heidegger, what distinguishes us from other beings, is this relation. We are *the* Sayers. The world would not unfold itself to us and we would not be able to understand both the world as such and ourselves. It is by means of this relation, by means of the essence of being human, Dasein, which stands within the power of language, the world unfolds itself to us.

We understand Being. Nevertheless, this understanding of Being fades away. It fades away in an indefinite meaning but at the same time remains definite as a pre-condition of our understanding of the indefinite meaning of it. It must be illuminated according to Heidegger: “...consequently the understanding of Being, despite all its rank, is dark, confused, covered over and concealed, it must be illuminated, disentangled, and ripped away from concealment.”¹³⁴ This illumination is possible only if we, human beings, question, inquire this understanding of Being.

When we begin questioning, we see that we understand Being in its inflections. These inflections are what open themselves up to us. They unfold themselves to understanding and that is how they have meaning (Sinn). It is our understanding that the inflections of Being are unfolded and that is the possibility of their being meaningful.

133 IM, page 86.

134 IM, page 87.

Heidegger, putting up a hermeneutic condition, on one hand renders the meaning of Being human being's understanding of it as beings as such; on the other hand however, he says it is the unfolding of Being that makes our being human possible. Human beings have been in as much as they stand in to be here (da-sein). That is to say, in as much as they understand Being, if this understanding is bounded with the inflections of Being, then, we understand it through the words, which are derivative expressions of experiences. By means of these expressions, however, due to the inadequacy of (1) sign, the form that we hear and see as a word, (2) what this sign makes us represent to ourselves and (3) the object that is the particular, we cannot arrive at what we are questioning. The "question of Being has not reached the thing."¹³⁵ That is to say, by means of the word Being we cannot reach the essence of Being. Heidegger comes to the point that if Being is not accessible, not experienceable then it is not a thing, a particular to get at. "Being is not a being, nor any ingredient of beings that is itself in being."¹³⁶ So, can we say our entire attempt to get at, to reach is already to attempt to arrive at the inaccessible, unreachable and thus Being is the meaning of the word Being? At this point, Heidegger says Being that has been meant by the inflections, deviations that are said is not the same as other words of beings. This is also to say that the other words of beings, their being said, unfolding themselves are dependent on our understanding. "Being in advance is *its* essence."¹³⁷ Heidegger says, Being is "lacking" with refer to its relation to word Being.

135 IM, page 92.

136 IM, page 92.

137 IM, page 90.

The word “Being” in every one of its inflections, relates to the Being itself that is said, in a way that is essentially different from the relation of all other nouns and verbs in language to the beings that are said in them.¹³⁸

What we have to do now in order to clarify this difference, is to pay attention to the relation between saying and said. This is a relation between the various inflections of Being as sayings like, “God is.” “The cup is of silver.” “The enemy is in retreat.” etc. and Being itself as said. The different and various manifoldness of saying “is” where the Being as said opens itself up, unfolds to us. Although these various meanings that are manifold by saying cannot be categorized under a universal generic concept, which precedes and involves these saying as species, Heidegger underlies a “unitary trait” that repeats itself through these sayings. This unitary trait is the sense of “Being” which is accessible by our understanding within a definite horizon. Thus, the sense, the meaning of Being (Sinn) is bounded by the definite horizon of our understanding. Being can be understood only as infinitive “to be” which is in the manifoldness of the *is*. Heidegger says: “The boundary drawn around the sense of “Being” stays within the sphere of presentness and presence (Gegenwartigkeit und Bestand), staying and coming forth.”¹³⁹

Therefore, Being has prevailed our historical being here (Dasein) like the Greek understanding of the essence of Being by means of containing in itself the presentness and manifoldness. Now, the direction of the question of the essence of Being should be towards the place in which this presentness and manifoldness fold and make beings accessible for us as they are: the saying of Being. In this saying of Being in the *is*, we see the manners of speaking in which Being is with something else; like “Being and

138 IM, page 93.

139 IM, page 96.

becoming; Being and seeming; Being and thinking; Being and the ought.”¹⁴⁰ In these sayings Being is with its other. The other is the restriction of Being.

4.5. On The Restrictions of Beings

Heidegger examines these four distinctions as restrictions of Being. This examination, according to him, is a course for our questioning. The questioning itself originates from the fundamental question of metaphysics. This question turns out to be “a concealed ground of our historical Dasein”; around which, by means of this examination we take over, we wander as if wandering around an abyss.

4.5.1. Being and Becoming

Heidegger, as he had already said that Being is limited to what is Not, what its other is, starts examining the restrictions of Being with Being and becoming. Being is delimited against an other first in the 5th Century B.C. by Parmenides. Parmenides said that Being is in contrast to becoming. Being in its mode of *is*, is no longer becoming. It *is*. What becomes is not yet *is*. Heidegger, quoting some verses of Parmenides’s poem, says it is invaluable in its genuine expression of Being. This poem, discloses us, according to Heidegger, Being in *is* which stands up against the violent attacks of becoming. That is how Being *is* in contrast to becoming. The poem is to be quoted in length in order to understand Heidegger's distinction between Being and its other in the examination of Being and becoming.

But there remains solely the saga of the way (along which there opens up)
how it stands with to-be(sein); for along this(way) many indications of it are
given;
how Being without genesis and without decay,
complete, standing fully there alone,
without trembling in itself and not all in need of finishing;
nor was it before, nor will it be someday,

140 IM, page 98.

for as the present, it is all-at-once, unique, unifying united gathering itself in itself from itself (holding itself together full of presentness).¹⁴¹

What is crucial in this poetic thinking according to Heidegger is this: in the thinking discourse of this poem Being is said from a view-point of itself. The words here are neither signs of Being nor predicates. Heidegger says: “What is said here from within Being are *semata*, not signs of Being, not predicates, but rather that which indicates Being itself in view of Being and from within Being.”¹⁴²

That is to say, the privileged perspective of poetic thinking can reveal Being away from genesis and passing away. Being, away from temporality and change, shows itself in the poetic saying. Being shows itself as “self-collected perdurance” in this saying and we, in our seeing, must response to this saying “in an active sense”, expel what is “not” and “nor” Being. Thus, in our seeing we must distinguish Being and becoming. Heidegger says the apparent opposition between Parmenides and Heraclitus, who says all is in flux and thus all is becoming, there is no Being, is not a real opposition. Heraclitus says the same as Parmenides on the division of Being and becoming for Heidegger, as we can understand when we look at the relation between Being and seeming.

4.5.2. Being and Seeming

Similar to Being and becoming, in the distinction of Being and seeming, we can conclude the preeminent Being in opposition to what seems temporarily and fades away. What is original in their disjointment? In this distinction between Being and becoming, the Greek discourse reveals us that Being of beings contains in itself, the concealed essence of itself (Being) and the saying of the Being speaks of this essence. Being

141 IM, page 101.

142 IM, page 102.

indicates itself to this saying in its a-temporal self collected perdurance. In the division of Being and seeming, in order to understand what is original in their disjointment, we need to trace this distinction back like we have done in Being and becoming. For Heidegger, this happening of disjointment indicates a belonging-together. Heidegger exemplifies the distinction between the seeming (*der Schein*) and what seems (*das Scheinbare*). What seems, like what becomes, is temporal and disappears. However, there is another meaning of seeming for Heidegger, which as seeming, unfolds itself. In this sense seeming means Being. Heidegger explains the belonging-together of Being and seeming with refer to 3 modes of German verb *schein*. (1) the luster, radiancy of a star, (2) its showing itself, unfolding, (3) the more seeming of a star, its semblance presented by something. These three modes are derived from each other. The second meaning of seeming, as self-showing, manifesting is appropriate to seeming as luster and to seeming as semblance. That is how Being and seeming, if we understand the second meaning of seeming as Being, belong together. This belonging-together is not accidental but similar to the relation between Being and becoming. The concealed essence of seeming (as Being) is appropriate to other modes of seeming “as the ground of their possibility.”¹⁴³ This togetherness is a Greek meaning for Heidegger, which means *phusis*: “The emerging-abiding sway is in itself at the same time the appearing that seems.”¹⁴⁴

Being, thus, means appearing not as a temporary seeming but as an essential unfolding. In this meaning, we already can understand that Being is coming out of its concealment as unconcealment. This means, if we understand *aletheia*, unconcealment as Heidegger offers not as literal truth but in its essential relation to *phusis*, what comes

143 IM, page 105.

144 IM, page 106.

out of concealment and “shows itself in its sway stands in the unconcealed.”¹⁴⁵ In other words, Heidegger tells us when a being *is* as such, it means that a being is manifest, showing itself as truth. Thus, “Truth belongs to the essence of Being.”¹⁴⁶

Heidegger wants us to disregard the terms like “subjective”, “objective”, “realistic” and “idealistic” which belong to modern subjectivism, namely Cartesian thought. What we are suppose to do in order to understand the restriction of Being, is to understand “Being” in an originary way. This originary way is Greek. Putting the emphasis on the essential relation between *phusis* and *aletheia*, Heidegger points to the Greek understanding of beings as such that are true in their manifestation. That is to say, truth is not a supplementary of Being.

Not-Being, thus, means not to make itself manifest, to withdraw from manifestation. Not-Being steps-away from presence. Being, as the essence of seeming, is disseminated, dissipated into the seeming and binds itself to beings by means of its stepping-forth and away. Heidegger says: “The essence of appearance involves this stepping-forth and stepping-away, this hither and hence in the genuinely demonstrative, indicative sense. Being is thus dispersed into the manifold beings.”¹⁴⁷

These beings into which Being has been dispersed, instantiated, show themselves. In this instantiation they seem in an aspect in which they take stands. Heidegger refers to Greek word *doxa* not with respect to its usual translation as opinion but as aspect in which beings take stands. If they, beings emerge in their stands in an outstanding, distinguished way, they are glorified, bestowed. Heidegger, thus, considers *doxa* as meaning not only aspect but as meaning glory if what takes stand is an outstanding, brilliant being. To glorify in this sense, Heidegger says *is*, “... to place into the light and

145 IM, page 107.

146 IM, page 107.

147 IM, page 108.

thereby to provide constancy, Being.”¹⁴⁸ Glorifying, as it was for Pindar, means poetizing. To poetize, in this glorifying sense means to put, “to place into the light”.

What Heidegger points is this: poetizing, as a relative to thinking, performs a role as a mediator through which Being unfolds itself in its higher manner and provides constancy if one thinks and poetizes in Greek. Poetry in this sense is the medium of experiencing appearance in its belongingness to Being.

The restriction of this belongingness, however, is crucial. The restriction is the limits of Being that unfolds itself in the beings as their look, seeming. A being’s look, seeming that it has in itself is restricted to our being in the world and dealing with the equipment in a certain time and from a certain viewpoint. Thus, the look, the seeming of a being is limited to what we, place holders in the world, deal with and use for ourselves. We establish a view of a being's look, we adopt the being’s look for ourselves. Heidegger says, there is not necessary connection between what we establish for ourselves, a view of a being, and the being's look in itself since we make assumptions. We make assumptions, accept things for our goals. The seeming in the sense of semblance, “... is not nothing. Neither is it untrue. Neither is it a mere appearance of relations that in nature are really otherwise. This seeming is historical and it is history, uncovered and grounded in poetry and saga.”¹⁴⁹

Heidegger criticizes the subjective explanations, which rendered Greek appearance-reality distinction meaningless. Christianity took over the Greek duality of “supersensory realm” and “mere seeming” and interpreting it as created and this conceptualization of creator distorted antiquity. Heidegger criticizes Christianity as well from a Nietzschean point of view and in a Nietzschean vocabulary refers to “the

148 IM, page 108.

149 IM, page 110.

multiple intertwined counter-play of the powers of Being and seeming.”¹⁵⁰ This counter-play of the powers of Being, according to Heidegger was depicted best in Greek tragic poetry. Our Dasein, through meeting its downfall ventures into the unfamiliar, the unveiling of Being. For Heidegger, Greek tragedy exemplifies the struggle between seeming and Being. Seeming as concealment and distortion belongs to Being as unconcealment and Dasein struggles towards beyond seeming with a unique passion. Dasein as Oedipus places himself into an unconcealment that in the end “he can endure only by gouging out his own eyes.”¹⁵¹ By doing so, Dasein becomes revealed who he is and Heidegger views the metaphor of the gouging the eyes, placing Dasein into darkness where he is outside of the light, as a medium to experience the unveiling of Being. That is the experience of the ethical through the experience of dread.

The Greek Dasein has the passion to seek the Being itself. Heidegger, “again and again” points to the Greek passion in contrast to modern lack of this passion towards authenticity. The Greek passion leads Dasein to seek the “fundamental relation to the Being of beings as a whole”¹⁵² a relation that is lacking today. We are confused in our modern passionless life and we are not able to appreciate the power of the poetic saying of Greek tragedy.

Thus, according to Heidegger the fundamental relation to the Being of beings conditions and determines the interpretation of poetry. Similar to Karl Reinhardt, we have to attempt to see and question, interpret the power of poetic saying in its relation to said. In other words, we are to attempt to think the “fundamental connections among Being, unconcealment and seeming”¹⁵³ by means of the power of poetic saying in Greek

150 IM, page 111.

151 IM, page 112.

152 IM, page 113.

153 IM, page 114.

tragedy. What we can see in the example of Oedipus is the seeming as a variant of Being which means decline, falling over. Seeming, here lets beings (in this example Oedipus) “appear as what they really are not.”¹⁵⁴ Seeming thus, distorts beings and in this distortion distorts itself by means of covering itself and showing itself as Being. By doing so, something deceives us. Appearances, due to seeming's self distortion, can be deceiving. Human beings are led to delusion by means of the relations between Being, unconcealment and seeming. Heidegger calls this opening up, the space that opens itself up “in the interlocking of Being, concealment and seeming.”¹⁵⁵ as errancy. What causes this errancy, delusion is the relations between Being and seeming. Being and seeming belong together and turn out to be one another in this belongingness. Thus Heidegger says, we have to make clear first how “Being as *phusis*, and only on those grounds, both truth in the sense of unconcealment and seeming as a definite mode of the arising, self-showing, belongs necessarily to Being.”¹⁵⁶

As mentioned above, this belongingness can be shown by the interchanging relations between Being and seeming. This interchanging relation shows how unconcealment is against concealment, disclosing against disguising and thus, how Being is distinguished from seeming as well as from not- Being-. Being, not- Being and seeming are the three paths human beings are to face and make a decision for or against these paths. This is the decision of distinguishing, cutting (de-cision in a Latin sense of the verb which means to cut; in German *Ent-scheidung* coming from the root *scheiden*). Poetry, inherited from the Greek origins of the philosophy of Parmenides, provides us the privileged perspective of thinking of this unavoidable de-cision. The unavoidable de-cision means to decide (to distinguish) constantly, face the belongingness and difference

154 IM, page 114.

155 IM, page 115.

156 IM, page 115.

constantly. This privileged perspective of facing the three paths of Being, not- Being and seeming thus, is an attempt to go beyond what cannot be told with words by poetic thinking; in other words, an attempt to go beyond language by and in language.

By means of this attempt, the difference between Being and not- Being, (Nothing) is also the belongingness of Nothing to Being, although Nothing is not accessible, is not a path that we can travel through. What is accessible is the seeming which both belongs “to Being and yet (at bottom) does not belong to it. So what seems must also be exposed as mere seeming, over and over again.”¹⁵⁷ That is to say, what we can truly know is to know what is accessible and avoidable, what is not accessible and unavoidable. It is a constant de-cision of these three paths that are aforementioned above. It is a constant facing, daring the delimitation of Being which comes to stand as seeming. It is a confrontation as Heraclitus said according to Heidegger, “... the strife of striving sets the essential and the unessential, the high and the low, into their limits and makes them manifest.”¹⁵⁸ In this manifestation, Heidegger says “fulfillment makes itself manifest.”¹⁵⁹ Subject is no longer in a strife to comprehend what is out there but Dasein in the beings as a being-in-the world is oriented towards Being. The delimitation of Being is confronted by Dasein in the unconcealment and seeming of Being. Unconcealment and seeming, as modes of Being and Not-Being “intrinsically incline toward self-concealment.”¹⁶⁰ In this sense, the belongingness and difference between Being and seeming belong to becoming. Becoming is both “no longer and not yet.” Thus, both seeming and becoming are necessarily opposed to Being. In their opposition, they are both modes of Being. What Dasein confronts are these modes of Being. The

157 IM, page 119.

158 IM, page 120.

159 IM, page 120.

160 IM, page 121.

relations between Being and becoming, Being and seeming within which Being unfolds itself, give rise to the relation between Being and thinking.

4.5.3. Being and Thinking

Heidegger says becoming and seeming are encountered in the world, in beings. Thinking, on the other hand, is different, opposed to Being and within this difference Being is re-presented to thinking. As a result of this re-presentation Being, Heidegger says “stands against thinking like an ob-ject (*Gegen-stand*)”¹⁶¹. That is to say, we decide, we interpret by means of thinking. Thinking, in this sense, is not only another division of Being like becoming and seeming but the medium of understanding the divisions as well. Being, by means of being understood in a definite way is apprehended in a perspective. Thereby, Being is not understood in an indeterminate way, but on the contrary, within the boundary of perspective of being in the world. Heidegger underlies this perspectivist understanding which was not a part of Greek thinking. Thinking with its function of our access to the restrictions of Being is making human beings related to past, future and by means of bringing something before human beings, relates human beings to present as well. Thinking represents things through bringing them before us.

In this representation, we analyze what is brought in front of us. Heidegger refers to another feature of thinking besides analyses. As we already know from the tradition, thinking not only focuses on the particular but seeks a universal conceptualization as well. Thinking thus, represents things, which facilitates analyses and seeks the comprehension of the universal. These characteristics of thinking and thinking itself cannot be understood through the science of thinking, logic. With refer to Greek conception of logic, which is the science of assertion, we are not supposed to take the science of assertion as the essence of thinking. According to Heidegger we should pay

161 IM, page 123.

attention to what was lost due to logic. This is Being as unconcealment. Heidegger considers logic as the end of Greek philosophy. Without any explicit reference to Nietzschean critique of Socratic rationality, Heidegger says: “It (logic) begins when *eon*, the Being of beings, appears as idea, and as idea becomes the 'ob-ject' of *episteme* (scientific knowledge).”¹⁶² That is how the origin of the crises of Western culture is viewed by Heidegger. Institutionalization and technique gave rise to the decay of creative thinking of Greek tragedy and the poetic language of this thinking.

Being of beings was no longer the pivotal concern for Western culture when logic took over. Resembling a German point of view of politics, Heidegger associates this lost of logic and the fall of Western culture. This reactive movement can be overcome by only “a genuine and originary thinking, and by nothing else”¹⁶³ and thus, we should try to understand the restriction of Being in the relation between thinking and Being by virtue of “a more rigorous, originary thinking that belongs to Being.”¹⁶⁴ In order to understand this restriction we should look at the relation between *phusis* and *logos*; or *phusis* as Being and *logos*. *Logos* and its relation to *legein* is not merely the relation between the word and discourse; (*logos*) and thus, *logos* is not related to Being as discourse or word. It is rather related to Being in its authentic meaning *gathering*. Heidegger refers to Greek usages of the word *legein* which is derived from *logos* in which *logos* means gathering, bringing together; the relation of one thing to another. As mentioned above, Being as *phusis* means emerging sway and in opposition to the restrictions of Being as seeming and becoming, Being as *phusis* unfolds itself as constant presence and reveals itself as such. Thereby, *logos* as gathering in accordance with which every being takes stand, constantly holds sway. Since *logos* in its authentic

162 IM, page 128.

163 IM, page 129.

164 IM, page 130.

sense means gathering, Heidegger says "... everything that happens, that is, that comes into Being, stands there in accordance with this constant to privileged subjectivity of modern philosophy that has dominated philosophy after Descartes."¹⁶⁵ With refer to the togetherness of beings in the world, subjectivity in later Heidegger inspires a tendency to adhere what has been common to us all. This tendency is different than the epistemological tendency with its Greek orientation. In this orientation, we can observe the responsiveness, passivity of subject in contrast to self-referential subject of *cogito*. The responsiveness depends on the audible characteristic of logos towards which Dasein is attentive. Dasein is to hear what is common to all in the audible logos. In this responsive attunement, subject is in a mood of *vigilance*. Heidegger quotes from Heraclitus to exemplify this vigilance: "One should not act and talk as if asleep."¹⁶⁶

Human beings are passive in a sense that they do not act to bring together, to gather. They hear; they hear words but hearing words does not suffice them to access to the source of the audible. The source, logos, is not audible. It is in opposition to talk. Hearing is opposed to hearkening in accordance with the relation between Being and restrictions of Being. Heidegger interprets Heraclitus to underlie the belongingness and difference between hearing with the ear, seeing with the eye and genuine hearing and seeing that are opposed to these restrictions. That is to say, apprehension of Being is beyond the daily words and sounds. Apprehension is distant from hearing and seeing; thereby, the hearers are not open to what they genuinely have to be open. They are distant from Being in an invisible sense. They are present but with their distance to Being absent as well. Human beings who are stuck in everydayness cannot grasp, apprehend logos in a genuine sense. That is why they are present and absent at the same

165 IM, page 135.

166 IM, page 136.

time. Heidegger says: “The logos is what human beings are continually amid and what they are away from all the same, absently present; they are thus the *axunetoi*, those who do not grasp.”¹⁶⁷

What Heidegger says is the sameness and difference of being surrounded by and being away from. There is an absent distance for human beings who do not apprehend logos but hear and see appearances and sounds. The condition of being present and absent at the same time is due to the ontic-ontologic difference. Ontic relations are restrictions of Being and they keep Dasein away from Being. This is how Being remains concealed in its unconcealment as restrictions. Human beings are limited by their practical interests in so far as they grasp what is closest to their hand; what is useful to them in their stand in the world. That is why we are limited to private interests and away from what is common to us all.

Due to this limitation we are away from grasping the unity of identity and difference. We cannot see the togetherness of life and death with refer to their identity in the beginning of one and the end of the other. What keeps human beings away from grasping the logos as gathering keeps them away from grasping the most beautiful at the same time. Modern times are the times we are absently present in our limited vision and deprived from the most beautiful as Greek poets described it. That is how we have forgotten “the highest contending is *polemos*”. Polemos, as mentioned above means struggle. For modern human beings, on the contrary, beautiful is not the highest discipline, highest order in itself. It is rather relaxing, joyful. Heidegger reminds us that aesthetics is of a different opinion and it is as old as logic.

The suggestive revealing here is this: Heidegger believes that having different criterion than logic does not determine the rank of aesthetics lower than that of logic. On

167 IM, page 129.

the contrary, having been determined by the source, origin of all, by *Polemos*, aesthetics is the passage to come to the nearest *place* of Being. *Polemos*, determines the rank, accordingly the place of being nearer to Being. It is a solemn responsibility that must be taken seriously. Beautiful is not apprehended in the everyday dealings of Dasein. It requires the most serious sobriety of thinking for Dasein to come nearer to its most ownliness. The appreciation of the artistic beauty thus, is towards genuine relation of one's most ownliness, authenticity. It is a different relation than representation. Representation, in terms of Kant's epistemological notion of reality, lets us to think of the unconditioned condition of the possibility of knowing an object by the subject. Transcendental subject was self-referential and limited to the representation of an object. The attempt to what is concealed in the unconcealment of the experienceable remained as a primary task for thinking, according to Heidegger.

Heidegger reveals his inheritance from Nietzsche implicitly at this point. Nietzschean critique of the end of Greek philosophy was towards its being rendered an object for *episteme*. Logic took over at the end of philosophy and we have forgotten, we have lost the Greek understanding of the primordial question. The question, which, Heidegger asks at the very beginning of the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, is the question: *Why are there beings at all rather than nothing?* Inadequacy of logic and its reductionary function has kept us away from Being. That is the oblivion of Being. The relation between poetry and thinking is a kind of kinship and only by virtue of this relation we can bring our "Dasein to stand in the Being of beings"¹⁶⁸. What Heidegger says is this: In contrast to the ones who are limited to the restrictions of Being and cannot bring their Dasein to stand in the Being of beings, only poets and thinkers are capable of ruling over the words they hear; open themselves to what is not audible. They

168 IM, page 141.

stand in relation to Being in the nearest and attempt to familiarize what is unfamiliar, concealed. Unfamiliar opens itself up through art. For Heidegger, art is the medium of winning back what has been lost. Poetry is the privileged art that elevates us to what opens itself up.

Art, thus, is the possibility to view the relation between thinking and Being rather than subject object opposition. We want to question the taken for granted epistemological perspective of modern times. We question this view with refer to Greek thought again. Parmenides argues the sameness of Being and thinking if we interpret his work with refer to philosophy of subject. *Noein* means, according to Heidegger, not what a subject acts, not an activity, knowing of a subject, but to apprehend. “*Noein* means apprehend, *nous* means apprehension, in a double sense that intrinsically belongs together.”¹⁶⁹ This double sense means to take in (*hin-nehmen*) what opens itself up and to comprehend how things stand. By means of this double sense of *noein*, the constitutive subjectivity is put in a receptive position that takes in what opens up and sets what opens up in its stand. Apprehension in this sense is not a freely chosen activity of a subject but a happening that “happens for the sake of Being.” That is to say, apprehension belongs to Being; belongs to being as *phusis*, which shows itself to us in many ways. This belongingness means that apprehension can happen if only Being as *phusis* shows itself, appears. Heidegger says, the statements of Parmenides are to be interpreted in such a way that human beings' being human is determined by Being that is common to all. Parmenides does not tell us about human beings as subjects; on the contrary, he tells us that Being determines being human. Human beings are not privileged due to their cognitive faculty. Human beings are different with their peculiar relation to Being: a receptive relation to what holds sway.

169 IM, page 146.

This shift from the Cartesian subjectivity to a receptive subjectivity, or receptive and responsive subjectivity is a questioning; not an answer to an anthropological question. We question being human with “a historically meta-physical question.”¹⁷⁰

Heideggerian questioning human condition with refer to the Greek origins of metaphysical thought is historical because apprehension belongs to Being and in the appearing of Being, which is the restriction of Being, can be understood, apprehended (*noein*). This happens in the happening of being human. In other words, human beings apprehend in happening, in their being historical. Understanding, knowing, their apprehending thus, are not activities of a privileged subject but human condition, being human belongs to the happening of understanding. That is how the relation between being human and Being is determined by thinking. Human beings face the belongingness of his essence to Being by virtue of the opposition between thinking and Being where Being opens itself up and history happens. Heidegger points to the historicity of humanity in relation to Being in-the-world, Being takes a stand in the world as follows:

Humanity first comes to itself and is a self only as questioning-historical. The selfhood of humanity means this: it has to transform the Being that opens itself up to it into history, and thus bring itself to a stand. Selfhood does not mean that humanity is primarily an ‘I’ and an individual. Humanity is not this any more than it is a *We* and a community.¹⁷¹

The pre-Socratic Greek tragedy guides us to hear the unconcealment of the originary. For Heidegger, the *We* could be achieved by means of winning back the originary in its belonging to human apprehension which brings human beings “to language in some way.”¹⁷² It is language by means of which *We* venture to face our

170 IM, page 149.

171 IM, page 153.

172 IM, page 155.

relation to Being. Uncanniness is what human beings face through the poetic sayings of Greek tragedy. Uncanniness traverses the originary to human apprehension with its terrible-dreadful meaning according to Heidegger. This meaning refers to true anxiety, violence, overwhelming and holding sway which is emphasized by the help of German etymological connections between *das Gewaltige*, *das Überwältigende*, *das Walten* (the violent, the overwhelming, the sway).

4.6. Uncanny Dreadful Art

The affect of uncanniness is what throws human beings out of their usual, safe, accustomed homes. We are no longer “at home” when we undergo the experience of the overwhelming violence of Being. The significance of uncanniness is its possibility to enable the *We* venture the unfamiliar. We are triggered, moved out of the limits of familiar, ordinary, usual. This action is a responsive action but human beings are violence doing beings as well. They (We) do violence; we overstep the limits that have made us feel safe and at home. We face the unfamiliar by overstepping the limits; we are the uncanniest in this sense. This is the primary characteristic of being human under the determination of Being. The selfhood of humanity thus, rises as violence doing in the site, home, place of “Being here historically” which means the site, place of history. We are creators as violence doers. There is a limit beyond all limits, an end beyond all completion for violence doers. Against this limit all violence doing dispenses: Death. Heidegger says human beings have no other way but towards death. Humans are towards death and that’s why Being here is the happening of uncanniness. The uncanniness of Being-here historically move, trigger human violence doing in their limits towards death. Humans, in order to understand, apprehend the happening of uncanniness need to use violence in language. It is through the language that humans create violence. In this creation, again Heidegger emphasizes, *We* rather than an isolated

subject, which refer to the Greek word *Techne* as understanding, knowing in emphatic sense. We create authentic artwork “in the emphatic sense, because art is what stands there in itself to stand [in something present (in the work)]”¹⁷³ Heidegger says, the significance of the work of art that we create as knowing (*techne*) is its putting Being to work in a being; in other words, in making Being seem to us in its stand, appearance through artwork. As a result of this putting to work Being in beings, we can understand and interpret Being. Art in its distinctive sense is the ability to understand, interpret, know Being and put Being to work in beings; therefore art is *techne*, knowing beyond the technical modern meaning of technology. Art is the ability to use, do violence against violence of uncanniness in order to put Being into work; that is to say know its opening up in beings. Heidegger says, by means of art violence doing humans attempt to access the unfamiliar, attempt to make appear what was closed off before. Art as violence in this sense, risks the limits of familiar, known in order to access the unknown, unfamiliar, un-being. It is possible by virtue of art to run up against the limits, structure of what happens as history.

The one who is violence-doing, the creative one, who sets out into the un-said, who breaks into the un-thought, who compels what has never happened and makes appear what is unseen, this violence-doing one stands at all times in daring (*tolma*).¹⁷⁴

In this daring and facing what is beyond limits and the circuit of beings, Dasein attempts to run up against historical; but the more Dasein attempts, the higher the experience of the aesthetic elevates Dasein up, the deeper the abyss becomes and the

173 IM, page 170.

174 IM, page 172.

limits, historically temporality of Dasein set him “in a confusion that has no way out and at the same time has no site.”¹⁷⁵

Heidegger emphasizes the necessity and impossibility of rising above what words stand for. The literal meaning is the restriction of interpretation. We must use violence for the destruction of the literal and scientific analysis. In this seeking, attempt, the violence doing Dasein comes in opposition to overwhelming of beings as a whole, that is to say the violence of Being as *phusis*. Being as *phusis*, as I have discussed above, means holding sway, emerging sway in its essence. The violence of Being as *phusis* and Dasein as violence doing oppose each other. What is not limited, what is beyond literal, Being as such requires a place, a site to seem, appear in its sway. Being as such urgently needs a site to come to being, to open itself up. Its opening itself is destruction, breaching for itself to be posited in a site, in a place. This place means Being-here and it is destructed, shattered by the violence of Being itself. The appearance, seeming that is the restriction of Being as *phusis* is under the overwhelming violence of Being. The violence doer, creator who also undergoes the violence of Being as *phusis*, sees this overwhelming violence. Heidegger refers to “Yes” saying towards this holding sway of Being as *phusis* and remarks the uniqueness of Greek culture in history with respect to their “Yes” saying towards this holding sway of Being as *phusis* and accordingly, their “Yes” saying to the violence of Being. The Greek experience is unique in its “fundamental condition of true historical greatness”. We can derive the relation between poetic sayings of this time and thinking; and recall the affect of “poetizing thinking” on the receptivity and responsibility of subject. The violence doing of knowing as *techne* and the overwhelming fittingness of the Being of beings as a whole, *dike* are in a reciprocal relation out of which we can derive the “Yes” saying, passivity, towards the

175 IM, page 172.

happening of uncanniness (*unheimlichkeit*). *Dike*, by means of being sustained and maintained (*werwahren, wahren, bewahren*), is says Heidegger: "...the key to beings in their structure this sense of *dike*... ". According to Heidegger, it establishes and delimits "the poetic and the thoughtful"¹⁷⁶ saying of Being. Thus, the naming of Being, its unveiling and opening up in beings is determined by the overwhelming fittingness of the structure of them. Naming Being in beings, through the reciprocal relation between *techne* and *dike*, uncanniness moves human beings out of their homes. In this homelessness, for Heidegger, "the home first discloses itself" and human beings face the key to beings in their structure by means of this experience. Human beings apprehend and are driven towards the activity of thinking and judging, de-ciding in a receptive and responsive trait. Apprehension (*Noein*) is taking up a receptive apprehension, with the activity of thinking and judging, it therefore is "a passage" for Heidegger. It is a passage as a de-cision for Being against Nothing that is taken up by human beings when they experience the overwhelming uncanniness and are driven towards violence doings. The passivity against the overwhelming *dike* steers human beings' activity of thinking and de-ciding about a commonness beyond everyday activities by virtue of homelessness.

Apprehension (*Noein*) should be understood in its possibility of enabling human beings for an essential decision; a decision which should be distinct from the everyday arbitrary behavior. Apprehension is a setting out for humanity in relation to *dike* as delimiting fittingness of Being in beings that puts human beings in a fundamental deciding position. Heidegger points to the uniqueness of apprehension that rests us from the everydayness of life. We resist to the everydayness in the decision for Being against Nothing. Heidegger interprets a mood of fundamental decision that resembles sobriety,

¹⁷⁶ IM, page 178.

solemnness of rigor beyond everyday dealings with refer to *dike*. Thus, the meaning of Being is a sober, serious, dreadful “belonging together” under the determination of Being. Heidegger says: “Being-human is determined by the relation to beings as such and as a whole. The human essence shows itself here as the relation that first opens up Being to humanity”¹⁷⁷

The opening up, unveiling of Being to humanity happens in history by means of interpreting, knowing as *techne*; that is to say putting Being into work by art within the limits of historical. Despite the attempt to access to the unfamiliar beyond history, “the knowing setting-to-work of Being”¹⁷⁸ is historical. The historicity, the essence of humanity, thereby, determines us as *apophainesthai* (bringing-to-self-showing), and by *phusis* as fittingness. That is how human beings are determined in their relationship to language. The essence of language is determined by the essence of language users, which is also historical, in other words, a “history opening essence”, *logos*. Thus, the human essence is preeminent to language, the naming activity. Language is the naming activity in which Being becomes word.

4.7. Being-Language-Poetry

The question of the origin of the language thus, should be dealt with from this angle according to Heidegger. It is the angle that we experience language in its primal form, poetry. The question has been dealt with a misleading angle up to now. Language can arise only from history-opening essence, *logos* and the happening of this arising is the place, site where Being becomes word. Heidegger says that, in this

¹⁷⁷ IM, page 181.

¹⁷⁸ IM, page 181.

happening “language was revealed to Dasein (Greek’s Dasein) as a breakaway into Being, as the formation that opens beings up.”¹⁷⁹

People experience the unconcealment of Being as words by means of poetizing and step into history through this activity. The importance of this interpretation of naming is its emphasis on the relation between the originary happening, the violence doing originary action rather than a subjective action that provides an arbitrary name, a word for a being which is irrelevant to the revealing, opening up of that being. Heidegger insists on underlying this connection to point to an “originary saying”, in which the Being of beings is opened up:

The word, the name, sets the self-opening beings out of the immediate, overwhelming assault, back into their Being, and preserves them in this openness, delimitation, and constancy. Naming does not come afterward, providing a being that is already otherwise revealed with a designation and a token called a word, but to the contrary: from the height of its originary act of violence as the opening up of Being, the word sinks down to become a mere sign.¹⁸⁰

The connection and the overwhelming logos is the attraction of grounding the arbitrary meanings of words with something bigger, more primordial and essential and preeminent in this respect. Heidegger encourages us to go after this attraction and pace this delimitation of naming, which may be covering up instead of opening up the Being due to the lack of discipline and sobriety. Daily talk, chatter is the dissipation of what should be gathering and fittingness. In the Greek experience of language related to logos, Heidegger thinks apprehension, understanding of naming as *noein* and the source of apprehension, the source at the same time for which apprehension happens, belong together. Logos and the apprehension of logos belong together and at the same time are disjointed. In this disjunction, Heidegger says: “...logos as the happening of gathering

179 IM, page 181.

180 IM, page 183.

becomes the ground that grounds Being-human.”¹⁸¹ Being human thus, essentially is going after the saying, naming and delimitation of Being, to apprehend and preserve this apprehension against covering up, concealment. Being human requires essentially going after, attempting to go after Being of beings not by appeal to conceptualization, to epistemological problems. Heidegger had already put forward the question about Being as such about Being of beings must be dealt with fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*. Being human is being a living thing with reason. However, logos cannot be, should not be attempted to be understood as an external object opposed to human faculty of reason. Fundamental ontology helps us to question the ground of this faculty in relation to *phusis*; Being as holding sway forces human beings to attempt to apprehend what is authentic beyond scientific analyses.

However, Heidegger says this attempt, this violence doing against the overwhelming violence of uncanny is “always and only for this overwhelming”¹⁸² as well. That's why according to Heidegger the violence doers must choose the time to strike, to do violence to surmount the overwhelming but must shrink back against the overwhelming. It is so because the attempt, the attraction of surmounting can be sought and fought out provided that the restriction of overwhelming, the concealment of Being is preserved. Therefore the apprehension and logos for which apprehension happens belong together and are disjointed at the same time. In order to attempt to rise up as the highest recognition of Being, every possibility of unconcealment must be withdrawn. Heidegger says:

Thus the violence-doers must time and again shrink back from this use of violence, and yet they cannot back down. In this will to surmount that at the same time shrinks back, at moments the possibility must flare up that the

181 IM, page 186.
182 IM, page 188.

surmounting of the overwhelming can be fully and most certainly fought out if the concealment of .being-the emerging sway, which in itself essentially unfolds as *logos*, as the gatheredness of the conflicting is simply preserved, and thus, in a certain way, every possibility of appearing is withheld.¹⁸³

That is to say, Dasein withholds its taking over the essence of himself. The essence of Dasein, going after, seeking and fighting against the overwhelming of the uncanny yet acting in these violent seeking, fighting and going after for *logos* shrinks back for Dasein's this attempt reaches its climax only by preserving the concealment of Being. Human beings withdraw and their action of violence to break the overwhelming violence of Being turns out to themselves and we "shatter against Being in every act of violence."¹⁸⁴ In the encounter of human beings and Being, Being pervades, overwhelms and violates (*ver-gewaltigt*) Dasein in its constant sway. Dasein is urged to react but the mighty sway overwhelms him. In this overwhelming, Being as *phusis* is not regulated and determined by *logos*. *Logos* and *phusis* separate, disjoin but that is not *Logos's* coming forward, putting itself forward, taking over. *Logos* takes over when Being as *phusis* reinterpreted and Dasein, being violated by the power of Being, and when the play of irrationalism again rationalism begins. This beginning points to the end of the dominance of *ratio* that has perpetuated and made us remain alien to Greek Dasein. Not-Being-here, as the possibility for Dasein to attempt to seek and fight against the overwhelming uncanny, is the possibility to reinterpret Being and change the history of the dominance of the ratio over Being as *phusis*. Heidegger says, in this slow ending of the *epoche* of understanding and reason as *ratio* that already started in Greek philosophy.

Logos and *phusis* disjoin. That is to say, thinking steps apart from Being and this slow ending of history of the dominance of calculative thinking over Being can be traced

183 IM, page 188.

184 IM, page 189.

back to Greek philosophy, namely the philosophy of Plato and Aristo. Heidegger says, the dominance of Western thinking starts with the interpretation of Being as *idea, eidos*. Thus, what we are to do is to look at what it means the interpretation of Being as *idea*; in other words, naming of Being, the appeal to conceptualize Being as *idea* and its distance and difference from Being as *phusis*. Heidegger explains that the meaning of *idea* is the seeming of a thing that “presents itself to us, represents itself and as such stands before us; the look is that within which and as which the thing comes-to-presence-that is, in the Greek sense, *is*.”¹⁸⁵ As Heidegger had emphasized in the previous chapters, we can say that a thing *is* means it takes a stand, comes forth of itself, of the contrast Being as *phusis*. Thereby, *idea* as coming to presence means *is* and *what-it-is* at the same time and that is why the *idea* constitutes Being as well as naming it. *Idea* can constitute Being if only we interpret *idea* not only as what seems to our human eyes but everything that can be apprehended. This standing-there of the Being is the apprehensible for human point of view. In the standing-there the object comes to presence and at the same time, since it is apprehensible, it is the “*available* coming to presence of what comes to presence; *ousia*.”¹⁸⁶ Being as *ousia* means thus two things:

1. the object that comes to presence in its whatness and howness
2. the coming to presence of the object that comes to presence.

However, the object that comes to presence in its whatness is also a seeming, a look that offers itself to be looked at. Thereby, the coming to presence, taking a stand of what holds sway stands in itself, which shows itself in the look is the coming to presence, to light. This coming to presence *is* in opposition to a look of human eyes.

185 IM, page 192.

186 IM, page 193.

To sum up, there are two meanings of look, appearance. The first one is the appearing in the authentic sense and the second is an essential consequence of the first sense. The authentic appearing is the “gathered bringing-itself-to-stand” and in this bringing itself to stand it takes a place to stand. It “conquers” the space; creates the space to bring forth everything (everything that can be apprehended) that comes to presence as a consequence of it. The second appearing occupies an already fixed space by the authentic appearing. The second appearing for Heidegger is a necessary consequence of the “emerging shining” of Being and is viewed as an outline, a perspective. The belongingness and difference of thinking as apprehending and Being, the restriction of Being thus constitutes beings in relation to what they are. Heidegger says: “The idea, as the look of that which is, constitutes 'what it is' ”¹⁸⁷. However, this whatness, what-Being, that is the concept of essence, necessarily becomes ambiguous since the actualization of Being as *Phusis* is necessarily different, is a resemblance, phenomenon of it. The belongingness of the seeming and the apprehension of Being thus, both *is* and *is not*. The actualization is deformation, participation, and imitation of what-Being. (Urbild-nach bilden) What comes to essence thereby is no longer *phusis* but towards *phusis* in its likeness, resemblance and participation. The apprehension, the interpretation of the essence has a distance from the originary, the archetype.

Heidegger identifies the mimetic theory of art with the metaphysics of classical times of Greek thought by means of attributing the transformation of Being from *phusis* to *idea*. He says, we have to “trace what becomes of logos, in accordance with the reinterpretation of *phusis*.”¹⁸⁸ If the *mimesis*, the resemblance in belongingness and having a distance, in other words belongingness and difference of unfolding, opening up,

187 IM, page 196.

188 IM, page 198.

unconcealment, happens it happens as *phusis* and in this happening logos determines discourse. The correct saying and mere saying are distinguished under the determination of logos for Heidegger and thus through appealing to logos we can trace the truth of Being in the unconcealment of it in beings, in discourse. The hierarchical structure of logos and language reveals the ground of language, the ground as the place of language's happening as what has been said and *what can be said*. In this hierarchical structure the conditions of the possibility of language, of what can be said is *logos* and it is placed as a ground, on which the assertions about *truth* are made and decisions are taken. Heidegger points to the attempt of apprehending the truth of Being on one hand, by means of appealing to the place of happening of unconcealment and reminds us the necessary deviation and deformation, *destruction* of the truth of Being since the happening of unconcealment necessarily *is not* as well as *is* on the other. In the two-sided tension of attempting to arrive at the conditions of the possibility of what can be said and revealing the impossibility of this privileged Archimedean stand point out of language, Heidegger swings and suspends. In his suspension he sees the shift from literal to metaphorical and gives the account of perspectivism through facing the problem of linguistic determination. Heidegger says: "Logos, in the sense of saying and asserting, now becomes the domain and place where decisions are made about truth –that is, originally, about the unconcealment of beings and thus about the Being of beings."¹⁸⁹

Placing logos as the condition of the possibility of what can be said, Heidegger views logos as a preeminent, a ground out of which assertions, ways of being-said, restrictions of Being as the determinations of Being have been created and said. Logos in this sense is the place of origin for the determinations of Being; nevertheless, logos itself is a tool, correctness of the assertions, origin of the categories in its relation to *phusis*

189 IM, page 198-199.

that happens in unconcealment. *Logos* and *phusis* are related to each other, which can come to sight only as unconcealment, appearance, and transformation in the place, space that for this unconcealment opens itself up. Heidegger views logos as a ground and at the same time as a tool that is present-at-hand and through logos beings come to presence “by the work”. That is to say, beings open themselves up through their condition of the possibility of opening up by the work, *ergon* in Greek sense, which means the way beings open themselves up. Work is logos that restrictions of Being in their belongingness and difference to Being happen through. Work is determined by thinking. Thinking and Being are thus, in an extended relation that thinking dominates other restrictions of Being. Thinking determines other restrictions of Being that belong to and differ, oppose to Being. Thinking in this sense determines Being and what is opposed to Being.

What Heidegger emphasizes in the relation between thinking and Being is the modern times' deviation from this relation and the pervading logical, technological modern way of thinking which gave rise to a division between ought and Being. From a modern ethical point of view, the division between ought and Being falsifies the belongingness of ought as an idea that comes out only as a prototype of Being. In the epistemological interpretation of ought, ought is divided from Being and based on self-sufficient reason.

To sum up, we can say that Heidegger views the relation between Being and thinking (as *idea*) in such a way that Being is grounded in thinking since Being itself is not the measure, standard for Being to unfold as prototype. The ought, as a consequence of this lack of standard that grants Being, unfolds, seems as *idea*. It is not based on thinking that is self-sufficient. Ought, on the contrary is the potency of Being. Ought is

above Being and in this sense it is what Being ought to be. Being is towards what it is ought to be in its relation to non-Being, to what it is not. Being, Heidegger says, “... itself becomes fixed in its character as idea, it also tends to make up for the ensuing degradation of Being. But by now, this can occur only by setting something above Being that Being never yet is, but always ought to be.”¹⁹⁰ Thus, ought is not divided from Being as it is assumed to be in modern times; it is not based, grounded on an other source other than Being. Ought is the potency of what Being is to become in its unfolding and exhibition as idea.

Heideggerian ethics thus, is opposed to modern interpretation of ought which has been grounded by pure reason and thereby divided from Being. This division can be traced back to Kant; because:

For Kant, beings are nature-in other words, whatever can be determined and is determined in mathematical-physical thinking. The categorical imperative, which is determined both by and as reason, is opposed to nature.¹⁹¹

What Heideggerian ethics can be viewed as, I suppose, an attempt to go beyond the determination of ought that has had the precedence over Being in Kant, by means of appealing to the relation between thinking and poetry and thinking in poetry within its belongingness and difference to Being. In its division from Being, ought grounds itself in itself and is justified on its own validity. This self-justification, from a modern point of view according to which the precedence depends on what can be experienced, is possible as a value for the beings. The proposition that ought is possible as a value means that value is the condition of the possibility of ought that is divided from Being. For Heideggerian ethics, that values are the conditions of the possibility of ought is not possible itself since the values are not experienceable and thereby they themselves

¹⁹⁰ IM, page 211.

¹⁹¹ IM, page 212.

cannot be. The opposition between the values, which cannot be and the facts, which can be experienced means that values are not.

4.7.1. Metaphor for Heidegger

From a Kantian point of justification thus, we can say values are valid. We cannot say they are. The representationalist attitude towards values I suppose came to a point of disentanglement after Kant. In one direction, a *post-representationalist* approach towards values, we go through pragmatism according to which the attempt to provide a true cognition of what is out there has been undermined. In the other direction, we can read Nietzschean perspectivism, which according to Heidegger cannot get over with its own perspective. Nietzsche deals with the representationalist approach towards values necessarily from a representationalist point of view. Heidegger says Nietzsche, "...and precisely he, thinks completely within the perspective of the representation of values."¹⁹²

Heidegger says, "No one can leap over his own shadow" and he faces the problem of perspectivism and at the same time keeps seeking a "true" apprehension of Being in its unconcealment in discourse under the determination of *logos*. The determination and boundary of perspective, of being in the world, happens in the place of (*logos*) unconcealment and thus is conditioned by *logos*. Heideggerian questioning of the problem of perspectivism tends to ask the question of Being "in an originary way", by virtue of which we seek to apprehend the relation between Being and beings. To ask the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" in an originary way means to start questioning from the understanding of Being. Facing the boundary of historical and linguistic context of being in the world Heidegger starts questioning the understanding of Being from a ready to hand fact instead of present at hand. Historical Dasein encounters equipment in the world not as an isolated subject with a privileged point of

¹⁹² IM, page 213.

view but as a being with other beings, which are opened up as a whole. Dasein encounters beings in the world and interprets them in their relation to him. That is to say, we human beings can know beings in their relation to us and in their determinateness by Being; in their limited, restricted stand; in their standing with Being. The determinatedness of Being, Heidegger says: “... is not a matter of delimiting a mere meaning of a word. It is the power that today still sustains and dominates all our relations to being as a whole, to becoming, to seeming, to thinking, and to the ought.”¹⁹³

If we are stuck in the limitations of the determinatedness of Being and neglect questioning the Being of beings we encounter, we are stuck in nihilism. We are to chase the beyond within the limits of historical and linguistic boundaries to get over with the pessimistic, nihilistic consequences of criticizing modernity. Heidegger offers to dare the “destructive” effect of nihilism in order to get over with it. That's the point to question the modern interpretation of ought from a novel perspective of its relation to Being rather than its self sufficient ground for justification. Ought as a “not-yet” potentiality can be read as a possibility to reinterpret the relation between ethics and Being if we do not insist on rendering “a not yet” potentiality an eschatological and teleological understanding of Being.

The two sidedness of Heideggerian approach to the relation between the ethics and ontology, first the hermeneutic limitation and second the tendency to “run up against” the limits induces us to the potentiality of metaphor, to the “not-yet” potentiality of metaphor with refer to Davidsonian understanding of metaphor. The listening, responding and possibly responsible subject can get over with nihilism with its possibility and freedom of interpretation of metaphor. For Heidegger, there is a destination to arrive at that determines the journey of human beings, which is by no

193 IM, page 215.

means accidental. However, later Heidegger, understood performatively with his interpretation of the restriction of Being; in other words, in what sense the unrestricted, unfamiliar is in restriction, in familiar, provides us an opportunity to think in terms of metaphor, to think what has not been sufficed to name Being in its restriction; in becoming, seeming, thinking and ought.

In other words, Heidegger shows us how to venture against what is not sufficient, what is not experienceable in terms of ought as a self-sufficient reason and to try to go against limits of mathematical-physical thinking to reconsider the relation between ought and Being as a possibility. That leads us to seek the impossible possibility of viewing Being beyond its restrictions from within Being. The poem Heidegger not only translated but interpreted as well, without much tendency to remain loyal to the conventionally agreed translation to point to the point of view from-within- Being, written by Parmenides, is an example for this attempt to pursue the path to be held:

Come, then, I say to you: but take into keeping the word that you hear
(about)

which paths are to be held in view as the only ones for inquiring.

The one: how it is (what it, Being, is) and also how not-Being (is)
impossible.

This is the pathway of grounded trust, for it follows unconcealment.

But the other one: how it is not, and also how not-Being is necessary.

So this one, I declare, is a footpath that cannot be recommended at all,
for neither are you able to cultivate acquaintance with not-Being, for it
cannot be brought near,

nor can you declare it with words.¹⁹⁴

The intricate difficulty in Heideggerian attempt to go against the limits of restrictions arouses from the originary distinction between Being and beings. Heidegger

194 IM, page 116.

says: “*The* originary division, whose intensity and originary disjunction sustains history, is the distinction between Being and beings.”¹⁹⁵ Thinking, besides other divisions and restrictions of Being is the ground to consider the distance and difference between Being and beings. We consider what is not sufficient to name Being depending on the ground of thinking. However, *logos* guides thinking for it to provide the ladder, the originary metaphor to Being and maintains the view from-within Being. The difficulty is not questioned from an isolated self-sufficient reason's point of view. On the contrary, in relation to the question about Being, the difficulty is questioned from-within Being that opens itself up. Heidegger convinces us that the conceptual understanding of Being is insufficient and the concept is withdrawn due to its inappropriateness for naming Being. -Derrida points exactly to this withdrawal, the *retrait* of the concept of metaphor and the replacement of this withdrawal by metaphor in use- What happens here, according to Heidegger, is questioned within the question of Being; in its opening up. It's opening up is encountered as beings by human beings and human beings are at the dwelling place, at the site *that* “Being necessitates for its opening up.” Heidegger says, the question of human being has been essentially linked to the question of Being and can be questioned and grasped in *Here*, in other words “*Being-here*” “Da-sein”:

Humanity is the *Here* that is open in itself. Beings stand within this *Here* and are set to work in it. We therefore say: the Being of humanity is, in the strict sense of the word, *Being-here*.¹⁹⁶

4.7.2. Derrida on Heidegger

Inadequacy of the conceptual understanding of Being and the attempt to apprehend, encounter the unfamiliar at the site of the retreat of the concept of metaphor induce humanity to re-establish the essential link between private, singular feeling of the

¹⁹⁵ IM, page 218-219.

¹⁹⁶ IM, page 219.

experience of the ethical and aesthetic. Heidegger therefore, does not let us see the relation between naming and Being, in Derrida's terms signification and a transcendental signified as a free play between signifiers, which could give rise to drop the distinction between metaphor and literal. He, on the contrary, allots us to keep the task of achieving the *true* interpretation of unfamiliar through familiar. The question of "What is...?" remains as a passage to the essential link that is essentialized by and within the unconcealment of Being in *Here*. Derrida reminds us the Heideggerian critique of Nietzsche and underlies the tension between the hermeneutic limitation on understanding and the overwhelming presencing of Being through logos that necessitates the essential relation between Being and thinking, particularly Being and poetic thinking. It is this relation that essentializes the submission of naming, signification to the presence of Being.

Derrida underlies the inevitability of the privilege of the spoken *phone* in case the question "What is...?" asked for a sign. If we ask "what is a sign?" we submit sign to the question, the question of whatness, the question of essence, *ti estin*. If we ask this question, we presuppose that sign is a heterogeneous unity that signifies a sense of thing; in other words, a sense or thing, which is not a signifier but signified. This signified is not constituted by its relation to another signified and thus it has a "formal essence" which is presence. By means of this essence the signified is closer to logos. What can we do to avoid to ask "what is...?" in order not to fall in to the question that calls for an essential whatness? Derrida says, the end of metaphysics declared by Heidegger that can be seen as a freedom to signifier is the way to get around that type of questioning. Nietzsche "contributed a lot", according to Derrida, to the freedom of signifier from signifying an originary truth. Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche, viewing Nietzsche as

a part of the metaphysical tradition that he criticizes, is not a true reading for Derrida. As Heidegger said, Nietzsche, like everybody else could not step out of his shadow. To save Nietzschean writing from a Heideggerian reading that renders it another metaphysical writing since there is no privileged stand point to criticize metaphysics out of metaphysics, Derrida says: “He (Nietzsche) has written that writing -and first of all his own- is not originally subordinate to the logos and to truth.”¹⁹⁷

Heideggerian reading renders Nietzschean critique another metaphysical discourse and attempts to reinstate a transcendental signified by virtue of questioning the whatness of the signified. A transcendental signified thus, requires an absolute difference from a signifier and proximity to logos. In his attempt to run up against the limits of language, Heidegger sought a privileged apprehension (as hearing a voice close to the self, conscience) of what is not experienceable. By doing so; I suppose Heidegger showed the necessity of the attempt to apprehend, hear the whatness of the transcendental signified in the privileged unveiling of Being unbounded by a signifier. That is why Derrida thinks Heidegger betrays Nietzsche. It was Nietzsche who said metaphor establishes a similarity between dissimilar things. Spivak reminds us in the preface of the English translation of *Of Grammatology* that Nietzsche used the German word *Gleich machen* that means “make equal” in connotation with another German word *Gleichnis*. The mental process of an individual is a process of developing metaphors according to Nietzsche. The agent that goes through a mental process creates language responsively by means of developing metaphors starting from the stimulation of nerves that is transcribed into an image and then sound respectively. The figurative discourse of Nietzsche depends on the image, on the formation of metaphors. German word *Gleichnis*, Spivak says, means “image, simile, similitude, comparison, allegory,

197 OG, page 19.

parable”¹⁹⁸ and she quotes from Nietzsche the process of developing metaphors. A nerve-stimulus, first transcribed [*übertragen*] into an image [*Bild*]; first metaphor:

The image again copied into a sound; second metaphor. And each time he [the creator of language] leaps completely out of one sphere right in to the midst of an entirely different one.¹⁹⁹

Nietzsche thus, tells us that the mental process starts from a nerve stimulation and undergoes a process of metaphor development; and accordingly mental process is determined by drives rather than contemplation. Human beings are driven to get knowledge by means of stimuli-response causality and will to “appropriate and conquer”. In this process of fitting, appropriating what is new, what is not known and unequal is made equal by virtue of the drives that cause human beings form figures. By their very nature human beings seek knowledge to satisfy their will to power. It is the power seeking “anthropomorphisms (human weakness-*Menschlichkeiten*)” that drive human beings to create figurative discourse and interpretation in an active way.

By means of these drives what Nietzsche provides us is a replacement of the attempt to acquire a certain picture of what is out there with a continual process of “active interpretations”. Figurative symbols, signs entail us from one interpretation to the other instead of a transcendental signified. Meaning thus, slips through the interpretations that do not, cannot refer to a *true* signified which could supply us a universally valid picture of reality if it referred to a transcendental signified. Mental processes are rendered figure-making acts of human beings, which means a necessary distortion of intended objects. Objects are not possibly caught and defined in their necessarily distorted interpretation. Nietzschean attitude towards mental processes and

198 OG, page 22.

199 Here I follow Spivak's interpretation on Nietzsche.

his understanding of continuous signifiers that elude literal definition is highly related with Derridean suspension.

However, in this attitude Nietzsche puts metaphors as “continuous sign-chains” which are not to end up with a true description of truth. That is to say, every drive to sign, to figurate is using metaphor, which means for Derrida an expansion of the metaphor to such an extent that every use of sound is a use of metaphor. In this case there is no need to put truth under erasure because there is no privileged definition; metaphor is the name of the process of signification. For Nietzsche, there is no privileged standpoint for a conscious subject and the mental process of an agent, rather than a conscious subject, is a procedure of “making equal”, in other words, a procedure of interpretation, figuration, metaphorizing that blurs the distinction between “self-assured” certitude of consciousness and the active interpretation of unconscious. The unconscious activity for Nietzsche actually is the main activity since it is, the conscious activity, not as clear as we human beings have assumed. Nietzsche says:

What indeed *does* man know about himself? ... Does not nature keep secret from him most things, even about his body, e.g., the convolutions of the intestines, the quick flow of the blood-currents, the intricate vibration of fibres...²⁰⁰

Since there is more than we think we know in the organisms of human beings, the activities of body are unknown to us. The activity of unconscious thus, is unknown to us. The main activities of unconscious, the figuration, interpretation, metaphorizing are the forms of the will to power, the continuous play of forces of our unknown body rather than a knowing subject.

200 OG, page 25.

The crucial point about these forms of the will to power for Nietzsche is that: "... the will to power as a search for what is resistant to itself emerges."²⁰¹ That is to say, the will to power acts, operates in order to display itself only against what is resistant to itself. The will to power mainly acts towards its resistant in order to manifest itself and this is a play between will and no-will. The continuous play between will and no-will entails a fluctuation of the play of forces of our body.

Nietzsche as a perspectivist betraying his own perspectivism, makes use of the advantage of describing the activities of body that are unknown to us in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. We can ignore the privileged vocabulary of Nietzsche himself for the moment and focus on the anti-foundationalist possibility of bringing together beliefs and desires at the same hierarchical rank in his discourse. Nietzsche in *Gay Science*, in *Book Five* emphasizes the rich potentiality of the tragic as opposed to the privilege of belief as a disinterested will where he does not see any problem in accepting his perspectivism preceding his interpretation:

Who knows on the basis of what personal experiences, I understand the philosophical pessimism of the nineteenth century as if it were a symptom of a superior force of thought....²⁰²

Nietzsche criticizes the pessimism of the 19th Century romanticism where the desires are still submitted to a disinterested holy will under the influence of the enlightenment. He celebrates the "Dionysian power" that can be seen as a "distinctive luxury" that can be signified in music. Nietzsche categorizes poetry, painting, compositions and architecture as "monological arts" and favors music against this monologism as an open-ended possibility of transferring affection into decision making.

201 OG, page 26.

202 Nietzsche Friederich, *The Gay Science*, Translated by W.Kaufmann, Vintage Books, New York, 1974, page 327.

By doing so, Nietzsche can be read as a pragmatist performative thinker who links creativity and ethical, belief and desire. The belongingness of creativity and ethical, belief and desire marks the condition of the possibility disinterested ethical experienceability as impossibility.

I think we can read Nietzsche as an inspiration for pragmatist and performative dimension of deconstruction that brings deconstruction close to holistic pragmatism particularly with refer to Nietzsche's emphasis on the agent and the perspective of the agent of possible experience:

...the backward inference from the work to the maker, from the deed to the doer from the ideal to those who *need it*, from every way of thinking and valuing to the commanding need behind it.²⁰³

For Nietzsche, the will and its activity towards its opponent lead us to see the will as a becoming and it is not adequate to picture this becoming by linguistic means of expression. He says: "Linguistic means of expression are useless for expressing 'becoming'; it (becoming) accords with our inevitable need to preserve ourselves to posit a crude world of stability, of 'things'."²⁰⁴

Therefore, there are "punctuations" of will rather than will itself. There is no will for Nietzsche and the linguistic figuration, the main activity of our unconscious cannot label the ongoing continuity of the fluctuation of forces.

Running up against the language, or the experience of the ethical, the attempt to experience the ethical, the unworldly is, says Derrida: "...the unique experience of the signified producing itself spontaneously, from within the self..."²⁰⁵ The experience misleads us. With refer to its constitutive character that has been assumed to constitute

203 Ibid, page 329.

204 OG, page 27.

205 OG, page 20.

the ideality beyond context boundary, Derrida sees this experience as an illusion that cannot be left aside easily.

What can exemplify a transcendental signified of such a constitution and pre-eminency? The illusion is the history of truth according to Derrida. Heideggerian declaration of the end of metaphysics reconsiders the tradition of metaphysics, brings forward the historicity, nonetheless, points to the experience of Being, attempts to show it as an originary word (*urwort*) with refer to its Greek origin and analyses the grammatical usages of this word throughout the history of metaphysics. In the *Grammar and Etymology of Being* I tried to expose the search for the origin of the word *Being* in relation to the inclinations and derivations of this word that have appeared through the history of linguistics. Heidegger seeks what remains and stays in the inclinations of the functions of what stands straight with refer to Greek *enkklisis paremphantikos*. Derrida says, that word Being assures “the possibility of being-word to other words” which we can exemplify in the *enkklisis paremphantikos* in Heidegger. The condition of the possibility of an originary word, Being, in Heidegger seems to contradict two ways of viewing a word which induces Derrida to emphasize the two-foldedness in Heidegger. One of the ways is the modern linguistics that no longer lets us presuppose a pre-comprehension of a transcendental signified that effaces all signifiers of a linguistic system of signification. Second way is putting the word Being as a condition of the possibility of other words by virtue of being a pre-comprehended, originary word. Derrida thus, points to the “ambiguity of Heideggerian situation” with refer to its placement in and against logo-centric, metaphysical tradition.

Heideggerian questioning as I have discussed in the question of the originary meaning of the word Being and the word that we have used with refer to later

Heidegger, calls for suspect with its search for an originary meaning by means of an originary description, which can be metaphorical in contrast to Heideggerian attempt to put a distance, discrepancy between this originary and the word. Derrida views this attempt as an impossible attempt and says:

A rupture between the originary meaning of being and the word, between meaning and the voice, between 'the voice of being' and the 'phone' between 'the call of being' and articulated sound, such a rupture, which at once confirms a fundamental metaphor, and renders it suspect by accentuating its metaphoric discrepancy, translates the ambiguity of Heidegger...²⁰⁶

Derrida thus, says the ambiguity of Heideggerian situation with refer to its placement, namely within and against logo-centric tradition blurs the distinction between the two, the inside and outside of logo-centricism impossible. However, Derrida acknowledges the "restoration" of Heideggerian approach to metaphysics restricts the interpretation of Being with the horizon of being-here and thus with the relation between thinking and Being. Heidegger, says Derrida, after the *Introduction to Metaphysics* renounced a new ontology. Besides the hermeneutic restriction of the word Being that has this meaning within the limits of our understanding, Heidegger in this work expresses a detailed history of the word Being that is the source of history itself. In other words, Being in its presencing itself, coming forth, unfolding only through the logos, that is to say unfolding itself as history through the place that unfolding, happening happens is the ground. If Being unfolds, unconceals itself as history through logos and if logos determines discourse, determines what can be said since it (logos) is the place, ground of the language's happening, then the unconcealment of Being is within the history. We can understand Being within history and thus the limited context and language determine signifiers, the movement of signifiers. Derrida says, this

206 OG, page 22.

limitation is hardly reminded by Heidegger. Heidegger, in his detailed explanation of the question that should be dealt primarily “Why are there beings rather than nothing?” and the relation of beings to their Being, notes that this questioning can be on the ground of happening and our taking stand in this ground. This ground determines our “state” of being here, Dasein. It is this conditional perspectivism that precedes our understanding of the meaning of Being. Therefore, Being and the sense of Being are different and belonging together at the same time. Being is the condition of the possibility of the “third person singular of the present indicative” and beings thus, belong to Being. On the other hand, the ontic-ontological difference delimits our understanding of Being, renders its meaning restricted apprehension. To point here the relation of Being to its restrictions and the difference between them, I think it is necessary to consider the two-sided relation between Being and thinking with regard to the historical unconcealment of Being and its necessary delimitation by language.

I discussed the restrictions of Being and particularly thinking above. Now I want to point to the two bindedness of Heideggerian critique of metaphysics and his increasing tone in renunciation of ontology. The hermeneutic circle does not leave human beings confined with the ontic. The most ownlines of human-being, his being human-being, restricts him and this restriction is his alterity. This alterity is the originary that is accessible in its determinations, models; whereas the modern man has forgotten this originary and its relation to human apprehension. The only way to win back the originary is “somehow language” for Heidegger.

The question is this: Is it the daily talk (rede) that we appropriate, interpret things or is it a different kind of language, similar to the sayings of Greek tragedy, by virtue of which we dare to think our most ownlines, our relation to Being?

Heidegger says, human apprehension belongs to Being and in this belongingness we can hear what has been common to us all. We can win back what makes us *we* through the experience of the *uncanny* that traverses the originary to human apprehension. We respond to the poetic language of the Greek sayings in the anxiety of the overwhelming violence of Being as *phusis* and we are no longer in our safe, harmonious relation with beings in the world. We venture the unfamiliar; we experience the limits of the meaning of Being and the possibility of its transgression through the violence doing of the unfamiliar. We are to respond in a creative mood to the call of Being which is violent as well. We are violence doers in this sense. Heidegger borrows the Nietzschean conception that problematizes the category of philosophy and says it is an artistic invention. For Nietzsche, it was music that transgresses us to the supreme wisdom of pre-Socratic philosophers beyond the boundaries of vocabularies. For Heidegger, it was poetry that leads us towards de-cision, a decision like a “passage” that wrests us from everyday dealings, talks towards transgressing the limits of the everyday understanding of Being. Uncanniness, homelessness takes human beings away from the delimited fittingness of Being in beings and throws them to a fundamental decision: A decision of sobriety, seriousness, solemnness; far from the rich potential of humor of Nietzsche, in the name of responding to the overwhelming violence of Being. Heideggerian preoccupation is this: by the experience of uncanny, human beings are to show resistance against the everyday fittingness of Being in beings in order to apprehend the belonging togetherness of Being in human beings, logos. This is what drives Heidegger to seriousness. The anxiety human beings feel when they come closer to the fundamental passage, the decision of transgression is a solemn anxiety. Heidegger took the experience of the limits of the determination and restriction of Being seriously

because he was convinced that it is the experience of the transgression of the limits of the meaning of Being.

How does this transgression happen? In what sense this transgression means the end of metaphysics and at the same time the beginning of it? What does this “pointing to the experience of Being” in Derrida's words at the first chapter of *Of Grammatology*, bear upon value and accordingly the political?

In order to deal with these questions we need to keep in mind three points. First, the relation between *logos* and thinking (as apprehension): Logos as the belonging together, gatheredness as the happening of gathering. Apprehension belongs to *logos*. Logos and apprehension appear. Apprehension can take place only when *logos* unveils, unconceals. Thus, there must be unconcealment, that brings the happening of Being and thinking (as apprehension) and at the same time concealment; in other words the withdrawal of Being from its unconcealment and in this sense, logos and thinking are disjointed. In this disjunction we human beings, undergoing the violence of the happening of gatheredness(logos), must go after the saying, naming and delimitation of Being and, moreover, preserve this thinking, apprehension against concealment. The interrelation between logos and thinking, therefore, does not lead us to understand, conceptualize the object that comes to presence in its whatness and howness and the coming to presence of the object that comes to presence (Being as *Ousia*). The emphasis of experienceability is thus, not on a self-sufficient, isolated, transcendental subjectivity. The relation between logos and thinking, their belonging together and difference accentuate the transgression of the limits of being.

The second point is highly related to the first point. If the transgression is the unconcealment and withdrawal of Being and apprehension both belong to this coming to

presence and are disjointed from it; and if we do not put the emphasis on the experienceability of self-sufficient subjectivity, then we can talk about *the being, isness of value* and claim that its provenance is the coming to presence of what comes present.

Heideggerian declaration of the end of metaphysics is at the same time a renunciation “of the word and project of ontology” or a beginning of it in Derrida's words. This beginning, would clear the ground first by means of a critique of the epistemological interpretation of *ought*. In epistemological interpretation ought does not belong to Being. For Kant, ought is grounded on the faculty of pure reason and thus grants disinterested action which is the unconditioned condition of value. In this way of condition of possibility for value, value itself is opposed to interests; in other words conditioned natural behavior. That is to say, ought, having been determined by and in reason is opposed to nature. Epistemological interpretation thus, views ought as an unconditioned condition of natural determination and due to its unconditional privilege, considers ought inexperienceable. In Heidegger's view, physical-mathematical thinking of modernity grounds ethics upon a source -which is opposed to beings because beings are nature- that is itself unjustifiable according to its way of thinking. Heidegger's renunciation of ontology, however, particularly with refer to fundamental ontology, reconsiders the relation between beings (nature) and their Being of beings. In other words, beings that come to presence in their howness and whatness in relation to their coming to presence of beings.

If we go one step further and see this relation as a possibility of overcoming of the epistemological interpretation of Being we can say that, as the third point to keep in mind to deal with questions raised above, Heidegger tries to efface the necessary conceptualization of beings and ought as an unconditioned possibility of this

conceptualization. By doing so, Heidegger undermines the relation between ought and value which cannot *be* according to physical and mathematical thinking. Another way of thinking and accordingly, thinking in its belongingness and difference to Being, can give us an alternative way of knowing beings. That is in their determinedness by Being. The determinedness of beings by Being according to Heidegger is not “a matter of delimiting a mere meaning of a word.”²⁰⁷ If it were, we would be stuck in Nietzschean nihilism that renders the meaning of being an empty word. In order to get over this reductionary (acknowledging that Heidegger’s loyalty to Nietzsche in his interpretation of Nietzsche is a debatable matter) attitude towards the fate of West, Heidegger says: the meaning of the word Being “...is the power that today still sustains and dominates all our relations to beings as a whole, to becoming, to seeming, to thinking, and to the ought.”²⁰⁸

The relation between ought and Being is crucial for us to pursue the experience of Being that leads us to get over metaphysics and declare the beginning of it at the same time and the ethical-political consequences of this experience. Being itself is not the “measure, standard” for itself. Upon which standard, measure does Being unfold itself as prototype?

For Heidegger, the prototype, standard that Being unfolds itself is the potency, non-Being that Being is not. Being is not yet what it is not but it is becoming what it is not. That is to say, we have to put the potency, becoming of Being that is not yet Being, as something *above* Being. This *above* is what Being is *ought* to be. It is *ought*. Ought in this sense is not dependent on the self-sufficient reason that it itself is not; cannot be. On the contrary, ought is a restriction of Being and potency of Being as *not-yet*. Ought is

207 IM, page 217.

208 IM, page 217.

what Being is ought to be in its becoming. Renunciation of Being in Heideggerian project primordially bears up on the relation between Being and ought in which ought is re-located in Being as it is not yet but ought to be. Heidegger says: "... it (Being) also tends to make up for the ensuing degradation of Being. But by now, this can occur only by setting something *above* Being that Being never yet is, but always ought to be."²⁰⁹

In the relation between Being and ought, Being *is*; it *is* as the not-yet potentiality of what it is not. The ought is the not-yet potentiality of Being rather than a form of categorical imperative grounded in pure reason and thereby divided from Being. If the ought is grounded on pure reason, It is not experienceable; thus, It is not. Ought, as opposed to what can be experienceable; nature, is opposed to facts. Facts *are* experienceable and the values grounded by an ought that itself cannot be experienced are *valid*. The representationalist tradition of the transcendental subjectivity undergoes Heideggerian critique including Nietzsche. The relation between what is and what is valid is the key in Heideggerian ethics. The renunciation of Heidegger's project of ontology, with regard to its ethical and political consequences, is a renunciation of the position, condition of human beings. Heidegger does not offer to go back to Greek or medieval controversies in which the relation between *essentia* (essentiality) and *existentia* (actuality) was discussed from *essentia*'s preceding location over *existentia*. Even Sartre's existentialism remains within the limits of metaphysics with its well-known reversal "existence precedes essence". The relation between *ought* and *valid* should be viewed from the sending of Being's destiny. Western thinking should have presumed that the relation and the differentiation of essence and actuality cannot be stated. After *Being and Time* we can talk about the actualization of essence, and the experience of this actualization can give itself as the destiny and history of Being. The

209 IM, page 211.

experience of what “there is” is what “it gives” and is experienceable as the *giving* of what it gives. The essence of Being is this giving.

In the *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger claims that the *esti gar enai* of Parmenides has been misinterpreted and the misuse of language for explaining this saying throughout the history of West is a result of this misunderstanding. Parmenides's saying “for there is Being” should not be interpreted as the *isness*, being of an individual being. According to Heidegger, the *is* in Parmenides's saying can be interpreted as “only of Being in its truth, instead of explaining it as a particular being in term of beings ...”²¹⁰

Thus, the differentiation of essence and actuality can be stated only as a result of misinterpretation. This differentiation gives itself and this (essence of Being's giving itself in its unveiling) “must remain an open question for the careful attention of thinking.”²¹¹

The careful attention of thinking, in other words the attempt to think the unthinkable was impossible in the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. *Es gibt* in German means “there is / it gives” which refers to giving as the essential character of Being. Being is self-giving into the open and this openness is the target of the attempt of thinking in a different way: in a poetic way towards the *true* understanding of Being in its giving itself.

Thinking in its relation to Being is in front of a mystery. The distance to a mystery cannot be calculated in terms of mathematical-physical thinking. The distance that keeps Being away as a mystery has been kept secret in the concealment, and the nearness that determines the belongingness of thinking to Being happens, Heidegger says, “... as essentially language itself.” Language in this sense is where Being belongs to and

210 LH, page 238.

211 LH, page 238.

inhabits in. Being, in its veiled essence remains beyond the modern conceptualization of language as a medium of rational animal. It lives in language. Language is “the house of Being.” Language in its essential definition thus, is the house where man's essence belongs in man's dwelling place.

Heidegger refers to a new human condition in the *Letter on Humanism* within and by which we can have and *must* have new descriptions of humanism. The language is not merely the medium that we describe this condition but it is the home as well to which our essence has been situated, appropriated.

Derridean approach to the relation between thinking and Being underpins Heideggerian attempt to re-establish an originary metaphor revealing the true interpretation of Being. Derrida shows the impossibility of a discrepancy between an originary meaning and an originary description of this meaning through appealing to the relation between originary as natural and description as a supplement of this pure originary in Rousseau. Derrida refers to the attempt to distinguish a pure, literary originality put by Rousseau as an anterior maternal characteristic preceding description and shows that, in spite of Rousseau's intention, in Rousseau's writings it is not possible to define description, metaphor as a process of a signifying a literary originary, a transcendental signified.

4.7.3. The Originary Metaphor

Derrida says, Rousseau constructs the theory of writing after giving the account of the origin of the languages. The supplement is the question of this account of the origin of the languages. This supplement is a supplement of speech and is effected by articulation. So it is a supplement before the articulation of the language. The more the language becomes regular the less it becomes passionate according to Rousseau. Throughout the time, language substitutes feelings, which are prior to language, with the

ideas. So the commonly agreed knowledge increases, in a sense, at the expense of losing the original feelings. Rousseau says, by doing so, substituting ideas for feelings, the accent diminishes and articulation increases. That also means that the language, speaking to the reason rather than the heart, naturally becomes more concise and at the same time colder. Derrida says this *natural* progression through writing is natural since it belongs to the society, which belongs to the state of pure nature, and it is *necessary*. The necessity operates in society and this is why the substitution takes place, the substitution of “light for heat, clarity for desire, precision for strength, ideas for sentiment, reason for heart, articulation for accent.” That is to say, the natural, posterior to language whose precision²¹² comes from literalness, acts within language and gives rise to decadence, regression. So the growth of reason as writing is a progress as regression. Language is originarily metaphorical and it is so because the feeling (passion) is the mother of language for Rousseau. Writing, on the other hand, is the destruction of the maternal characteristics of language. Before writing there was the figurative language, which should have been poetic. Poetry thus, precedes reason. It is prior to the endeavor of grasping reality by reason. The first literary form is, thus, metaphorical in essence. For Rousseau and for Condillac, for different reasons, the language becomes more precise, exact and rational. Derrida says:

If there is a literary originality, which is by no means a simple certainty, it must free itself if not from the metaphor, which tradition too has judged reducible, at least from the savage spontaneity of the figure as it appears in nonliterary language.²¹³

The oldest, genius oriental languages are not systematic or rational. These languages are, according to Rousseau, vital and figurative. Historical movement towards

212 OG, page 109.

213 OG, page 109.

North makes language become more artificial, a language of needs and action. It had to be in this way according to Rousseau, because of a natural progress from passion to need. Derrida says, Rousseau justifies this progression through the concept of 'pure nature'. The essential character of 'pure nature' is *dispersion* whereas the essential character of culture is proximity of self-same (propre) presence. The cultural need is the pure force of dispersion since it is not born out of an anterior passion. Need, says Derrida, in fact is necessary for the explanation of what precedes the constitution of society. It is, at the same time, necessary to account for the extension of the society. That is to say, Rousseau also starts from the literal meaning, which precedes the *constitution* of society and is indispensable for giving the account of the extension of the society. This is, despite its seeming paradoxical, possible by the literal's being both at the beginning and at the end. Thereby, Derrida shows how Rousseau, in spite of his intension, inserts a literal meaning, literalness in the expression of emotions. Rousseau says:

However, I feel the reader stopping me at this point to ask how an expression can be figurative before it has a proper meaning, since the figure consists only of a transference of meaning. I agree with that. But, in order to understand what I mean, it is necessary to substitute the idea that the passion presents to us for the word that we transpose. For one only transposes words because one also transposes ideas. Otherwise figurative language would signify nothing.²¹⁴

So, Rousseau can be understood as saying metaphor is the process of a proper meaning. It is the idea, signified meaning. Derrida had already shown that the metaphor was the signifier of an affect, a passion. So we see that the idea, the representation is a signified meaning. In addition to that, it is a representation, a sign of an object. A signifier in this sense can be inadequate to express the idea of an object but can be true

214 OG, page 274.

as metaphorical expression of my subjective state of mind (fear). For example, if fear makes me see giants whereas the objects are only men, it is inadequate as a signifier, it is metaphorical. It is, on the other hand, a literal signifier of my passion. Derrida says “We must therefore come back to the subjective affect, substitute the phenomenological order of passion for the objective order of designations.”²¹⁵ This substitution, like the substitution of expression for pointing out, shows us how the metaphor has emerged. Metaphor arises out of a subjective feeling (passion, fear). Then, due to the recognition of the unfit of the metaphor for the object it is supposed to signify, it is substituted to the literal. Rousseau describes this process as the enlightened spirit's recognition of its error. The first image, the subjective affects, passion's or fear's naming - naming some human beings who are not bigger and stronger than himself- turns out to be a metaphor. This metaphor is illusory and then is replaced by the literal. This is how the expression of passions precedes the enlightened, rational, literal meaning. The name given to the human beings by man, *giant*, is not the expression of the man's feeling itself. It is the sign, idea of the man's feeling. Derrida says: The idea *giant* is at once the literal sign of the representer of the passion, the metaphoric sign of the object (man) and the metaphoric sign of the affect (fear).²¹⁶

That sign is a sign of a sign because it is indirect with refer to the affect and not true with refer to the object. It is a sign of sign because it expresses the feeling of the subject literally by means of a false sign.

Derrida's claim is that: The writer who uses words as the transference of pre-rational feelings into literal meanings is actually repeating something that has already been done before. The interval, the time of the writer's performance, repetition is how

215 OG, page 110.

216 OG, page 110.

the feelings of unenlightened man become the enlightened man's civil language. This is a separation of the savagery and civilization. This separation takes place within the history of the metaphor. The North, towards where the progression of civilization has been, recognizes the first false usage of metaphors and uses them with refer to their literal true meanings. This separation also means the separation of the man, uncivilized and got stuck within the poetic, non-literal meaning of the world; and the man who is in touch with reality by means of having access to literalness and truth. The privilege of the writer, which comes from possessing the true meaning of the objects of the external world, also means lacking the "living truth of the origin".²¹⁷ On the other hand, according to Derrida, the uncivilized man can speak himself out without the access and thus mediation of the outer world. This is how he has the possibility of being able to speak of the original. Derrida says this poet "reports authentically the origin of his speech".²¹⁸ That is how, according to Derrida, Rousseau maintains the literal (*propre*) as *telos* and the origination of the metaphor and its stabilization with the *literal* meaning of rhetoric. The literal is expressed by the idea of passion at the beginning and stabilized at the end by the cold, rational enlightened spirit.

The first encounter of the subject and the other must take place when there is no name for the other. I come across with the other for the first time and feel something about him. There is no prior experience to which I can connect the representation of the other I have just experienced. If we consider Derrida's interpretation of Rousseau on the origin of metaphor we can say that when there is no language the feeling that arouses out of the first sight of the other prevails my naming the other. Thus, at the very beginning I encounter with the other and perceive it through an image of affection. I am affected by

217 OG, page 110.

218 OG, page 110.

the other and name him under the influence of this affection. According to Rousseau, the first feeling is fear. I name the other, because I am scared of him, the giant. Rousseau thinks it is the overwhelming fear that determines the first impression of the other on me. The encounter takes place at the “happy pause” as Derrida says where the subjective passion, feeling is not yet captured within the words of writing. In a sense it is a pre-linguistic, pre-intentional encounter that has not yet become literal. The first affection of the subject by the object or by the other arouses a state. Derrida says: “that state suspended between the state of nature and the state of society”.²¹⁹ The other affects the subjective state of mind when it is not enlightened to recognize that the first metaphoric meaning expressed by him is non-literal. The other accesses the subject when the subject is close to the expression of his passion or fear. The encounter with the other in this sense precedes the capture of the non-literal metaphor by the literal. If we take the natural and cultural opposition into consideration we can say the first image of the other is created by the subject who is not yet enlightened to progress towards the rational-civilized North. The affection catches the subject before the natural and necessary journey from nature to culture.

Derridean reading of Rousseau provides a continuity between the attempts of saving the experience of the otherness *before* the categorization of mental processes. Heideggerian experience of the ethical was a corner stone in phenomenology concerning a responsive openness to alterity *before* cognition. Rousseau reminds us the affective encounter with alterity and the possibility of an open state of feeling preceding rational cognition. The continuity in the experience of the alterity points to the importance of a pre-intentional, pre-phenomenological not-yet possibility with regard to an open and possibly vulnerable responsibility for subjectivity. Ought in this not yet *pre* bias regains

219 OG, page 114.

its secret ontological status. The experience of alterity was an ethical experience for Heidegger in which the other human beings are encountered within the limits of metaphysics. The vulnerable subjectivity is a Levinasian idea against Heideggerian which defines the effect of the other on subject as a traumatic passivity.

4.8. The Retreat of Metaphor

At the very beginning of the article, Derrida talks, as a resemblance of metaphor, about transportation and inhabitation. Rather than being simply metaphoric, Derrida adds, the figure used here lies under the constitution of the subject, who might be a speaker or a writer or anybody who believes to be '*making use*' of metaphors and speaking.²²⁰ So, at the very beginning, we learn that the figure of inhabiting metaphor and circulating in it is used deliberately to put forward that: The subject of the statements is constituted into the *content* or *tenor*, by the statements he believes to be uttering or writing. The subject is displaced and dislocated when he believes "he is designating it, saying it, orienting it, driving it, governing it like piloting his ship."²²¹

The style of Derrida gives away the performative attempt, which itself steers the reader for an active reading of metaphor that is possible through and with metaphors. He exemplifies how we are to use metaphors as vehicles from one direction to another. While we are using metaphors for transportation, for moving from one place to another, we don't have the full control of the vessel we are using. There is a sort of automaticity, automobility. Derrida describes it with refer to drama. Despite the decision I make on not to speak about metaphor by means of using it, there is no possibility to do that. So, in a sense the written work or speech can work, in spite of the speaker or writer with metaphors. Nothing, which is told or written can escape from being metaphoric. Derrida

220 *The Derrida Reader*, page 103.

221 *Ibid*, page 103.

refers to the question that takes place at the very beginning of the article: “What is happening, today, with metaphor?” and says everything that happens, happens with and by metaphor.

The metaphor can go through, manage, and happen without anything else whereas everything nothing can happen without it. If the metaphor can manage happening without everything, it also, in a bizarre sense says Derrida, can manage without itself. That is to say metaphor does not have a proper name, which refers to its literal meaning. Metaphor does not have a literal meaning. While having a huge dominating power on the scene of the world, the metaphor withdraws. Its withdrawal (retrait) is a return, re-trait from its dominating. Overflowing which lacks prudence. So, the metaphor’s retrait is from being a distinguishing trait, quality, which is always a supplementary trait. With the withdrawal of the metaphor the trait is left in the text.

Derrida says, the metaphor is an old subject, the subject of metaphor, which means metaphor as subject, for two reasons. One of the reasons that the metaphor is an old subject, in terms of Derrida, is a withdrawing, retiring subject. Metaphor, in an Aristotelian example is, said to be in the evening of its life. Despite its being an old subject which can be traced back to the beginning of writing or drawing, it is still a young subject upon which one can comment. The second reason that explains why metaphor is an old subject is its being worn out. It has been extremely used and exhausted subject. It’s been used so much that it has got a value of being useful. Metaphor has been a worn subject and has always performed a very useful role in the semiotic system. Metaphor has had a very crucial relation to us. The relation to us, the value that arises out of the relation of metaphor to us, is exhausted and thus this “us-value” has determined the whole traditional problematic of metaphor. To deal with this

problematic, according to Derrida, means dealing with the Heideggerian text. In this period of time, in this *epoch*, it is the Heideggerian text which says Derrida: "... has appeared impossible to get around, for others and for myself."²²²

The word metaphor has been used rarely by Heidegger and with the significance of being so, Heideggerian text is what delimits the outline of metaphor.

Derrida raises the question why the metaphor with refer to its literal name in the *theoric* tradition did not take place in Heidegger's texts. The texts themselves are to perform with respect to metaphoric but the conceptualization of metaphor as metaphor does not take place very much. It seems to be withdrawn from Heidegger's texts. This withdrawal, being scant and reserved should be essentially related to what is written about the literal name of metaphor in Heidegger. For this relation Derrida refers to his text *White Mythology* and Paul Ricour's comments on this text. According to Derrida, Ricour depends on this reading of Heidegger and views Derrida as if he were an extension of Heidegger who generalizes and widens the bounds of Heidegger's texts. According to Ricour, Derrida and Heidegger have a theoretical common point of supposing a secret agreement between the metaphoric, which consists of the proper and the figurative, and the metaphysical, which consists of the visible and invisible. Derrida says however, we need to be suspicious about the relation between the withdrawal of metaphoric as a literal name of metaphoric itself and the rareness of the written work on the conceptualization of metaphor. He says in *White Mythology*:

Heidegger as well, develops an inquiry attitude towards the philosophical interpretation of metaphor as a transfer from the sensible to the intelligible, as well as the privilege accorded this trope (by Heidegger as well) in the deconstruction of metaphysical rhetoric.²²³

222 Ibid, page 104.

223 Ibid, page 108.

What Ricour does according to Derrida, is to read Derrida as assuming the relation of metaphor to concept as a transfer of visible to intelligible. Derrida says, Ricour does not take into consideration of his “twist” as being deflected from the tradition besides being implicated in the tradition. This twist enables Derrida to question the relation of metaphor to concept. The twist is the idea of Derridean interpretation of the metaphysics, the closure of metaphysics. Derrida does not take metaphysics itself as having a consistent existence. The metaphysics is not limited, bounded as a homogeneous field but the closure of metaphysics is the possibility of its being traversed by its limit. In this twisted structure, as Derrida calls “invaginated”, one cannot find: “Representation of linear and circular closure surrounding a homogenous space...”²²⁴

Derrida insists on the impossibility of the taken for granted command of the user's usage of metaphor and points to the suspension of the user within the sensible towards intelligible. The “happy pause” for Derrida, the undecidable moment does not mean an essential belongingness and difference relation between ontologic and ontic as it does for Heidegger. Thereby, metaphor remains as the only place for the unfamiliar to come to presence, inhabit in familiar; however, having dropped the distinction between metaphor and literal, Derrida shows us a slippery place where unfamiliar has always already been within the limits of familiar. Unfamiliar is not a vehicle to use to arrive at the true meaning of Being. Unfamiliar, as a metalanguage project is already an impossibility for Derrida.

Thereby, Derrida states that what Ricour criticizes of him is already a point of view that Derrida himself started to criticize. In order to make the relation of himself to particularly Heideggerian attitude towards the metaphor within the “impossible project” of meta-language, -It is the project of giving a name to metaphysics- Derrida stays in a

224 Ibid, page 110.

distance to this attitude while emphasizing the twisted structure of this project. To do so, he says he agrees with Greisch and Ricour on the overriding metaphoricity of Heidegger's texts on Heidegger's explanations of metaphor as a subject matter. However, what is to be added to this view according to Derrida is this:

What remains to be determined, however, is the meaning and necessity which link this apparently univocal, simplifying and reductive denunciation of the metaphysical concept of metaphor on the one hand, and, on the other, the apparently metaphoric power of a text whose author no longer wishes that what happens in that text and what claims to get along without metaphor there be understood precisely as 'metaphoric' nor even under any concept of meta-linguistics or rhetoric.²²⁵

So, Derrida emphasizes the withdrawal of the metaphysical concept of metaphor, the literal name of metaphor with refer to the withdrawal of the metaphysics. The withdrawal of the metaphysics refers to the *epoche*, which means the withdrawal of Being. The withdrawal (retreat) of Being is it's being hidden, (*Verborgenheit*) dissimulated or veiled. In withdrawal Being is already submitted to metaphoric which is to be depicted or described by "rhetorical conceptuality". It is submitted to metaphoric and rhetoric, in this respect, because there are guises, modes, figures and turns in Being's withdrawal, withholding. The modes, determinations of Being are to be described by us within words or expressions that are metaphorical. So, on one hand metaphor as the conceptual, literal name of itself, takes place in metaphorical words and that is to say: "Metaphoric would correspond to an essential withdrawal of Being,"²²⁶. In this essential withdrawal of Being, Being can reveal itself only through the "species of an epochal determination" which means a deviation, a divergence from Being as such. That is to say, Being as such, Being as *idos*, Being as subjectivity, Being as will, Being as work are obliterated since the names of Being can happen, take place only within

225 Ibid, page 115.

226 Ibid, page 116.

metaphorical. So, Derrida argues there is a temptation for bringing together, reassembling the language of metaphysics itself.

It is due to this temptation that everything, the totality of what is, happens with metaphor. Derrida points to the paradox of the structure of the withdrawals:

On the one hand, we must be able to dispense with it because the relation of (onto theo logical) metaphysics to the thought of Being, this relation (Bezug) which marks the withdrawal (retrait, Entziehung) of Being, can no longer be named-literally- metaphoric.²²⁷

The paradox comes from the ontic-ontologic difference by which, the relation of metaphysics to the thought of being is determined. The difference between Being and it's not being a being, cannot be described by a literal, proper usage of metaphorical; we cannot speak about that literally either. We can speak only quasi-metaphorically. That is to say, we can speak by means of a metaphor of metaphor, which in a sense means the withdrawal of the metaphor as a metaphysical concept. So, metaphysics corresponds to a withdrawal of Being. Therefore the language of metaphysics is a metaphor that englobes the strict, narrow concept according to Derrida. This withdrawal of the metaphor as a metaphysical concept means the invagination of the rhetorical borderline of a trait. So, there is no *place* for the proper or literal. This withdrawal of the metaphor as a metaphysical concept gives rise to two conclusions:

1. *Retrait*, withdrawal says Derrida, designates the essential and double movement as folding and refolding like a wave. To be able to think Being in it withdrawal, *retrait*, the withdrawal of metaphor folds and refolds and exceeds the limits. The withdrawal of metaphoric provides a neither proper and literal nor figurative and metaphoric meaning to withdrawal of Being. The withdrawal of Being, since Being is not something, is not in a strict sense metaphorical.

227 Ibid, page 116.

2. Due to the invagination of the borders and the word's retrait, (withdrawal) functioning different than a word or determinate meaning, the withdrawal is understood as a metaphor. This means, the end of withdrawal as a metaphor is to say something new, “unheard of about vehicle and not about the apparent subject of the trope” So, the withdrawal of Being, or the withdrawal of the metaphor induces us to think of the Being or metaphor of withdrawal (retrait) more than inducing us to think of Being or metaphor. That is something different than the habitual, usual way of functioning of a metaphor. The usual way is supplying access to an unfamiliar or unknown through something known or familiar. Derrida, gives the example of “the evening” as a known, familiar example for us, which can serve as making easy to think of something about the “evening of life”. Habitually the resemblance of the evening helps us to familiarize to something that is less familiar to us like something difficult to think of, some hard times to go through etc. In terms of this usual and habitual function, usage of metaphor, the withdrawal of Being and/or the withdrawal of metaphor would be familiar to us by virtue of what we are already familiar with: the meaning of withdrawal.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ETHICAL: POST- DECONSTRUCTIVE SUBJECTIVITY

Derrida says to Jean-Luc Nancy that we must look for a new (in other words new after deconstruction, post-deconstructive)²²⁸ determination of the subjective responsibility in the relation of 'yes' saying or in Heideggerian sense an undertaking, a solemn, dignified promise that is presupposed in every question. According to Derrida, the starting point of language for Heidegger is listening to the sacred, solemn promise of language.

The questioning that Dasein experiences by means of which it opens itself up to the dutiful, religious thinking of the question of Being, is not the starting point for Heidegger. Language is speaking prior to Dasein's questioning it and in this sense Dasein is responsive in a passivity towards the language. "The significance of the *zusage* (a solemn promise, undertaking) for Derrida is that, it shows all forms of questioning are always-already in pledge, to respond to a prior grant of language."²²⁹ That is to say, the philosophical questioning is already and always engaged in responsiveness to something that we depend on, that is prior to us. There is a responsibility as well as responsiveness towards what is prior. Responsibility, in this sense, precedes and determines speaking. Thereby, there is a "yes" saying in the origin of the language, which is undertaking the responsibility. That means, there is a responsibility when we start talking, there is a

228 Ibid, page 70.

229 Ibid, page 71.

promise that we are always, already engaged by. Subject thus, says Derrida, must come after this responsibility if there is a subject. Coming after the responsibility, the openness and responsiveness to the other is a determination of the subject, which is different than the traditional conception of subjectivity. This difference can be hold in two ways; first, we need to maintain deconstruction so that there cannot be any pre-deconstructivist u-turn and second, we need to hold the later Heidegger for a non-metaphysical conception of human being which means “an ecstatic openness to the truth of Being.”²³⁰

The ecstatic openness to the truth of Being can be interpreted in two ways. First, it undermines the substantiality of the subjectivity, the Platonic-Kantian pivotal domination of subject; second, by doing so, emphasizing the *Same* in an ontological level privileges the Being of beings. That is to say, after the subject’s losing its tyranny over the external world and others, the relation to the other, the ethical is subordinated to the common Being of beings. In order to see Levinas's opposition to the subordination of ethics to ontology at the end, completion of metaphysics we need to look at the history of metaphysical subjectivity and its privileged distinction from the other entities that are dependent on *subjectum*.

The discussion of the subject as the subject of metaphysics throughout a classic survey of the term leads us to the Greek word *hupokeimenon*, which means *substratum*, that of which all the predicates, and attributes can be based on. So, subject within Aristotelian terms refers to a subject of predication, which resists the changes of the form since it is matter (*hule*) rather than the forms (*morphe*) that are subject to change. The context of the usage of subject in the previous sentence, which explains the forms are the objects of change, refers to the other meaning of the word subject as object. The duality of the usage survives the middle ages and the meaning of the word *subject* turns

230 Ibid, page 74.

out to be the meaning of a conscious or thinking subject, ego, self. The Aristotelian meaning of a foundation that resists changes and upon which all other entities are based somehow remains even in the critical attitudes towards this conception like that of Kant's. Aristotelian meaning of subject has served as a ground for metaphysical thinking due to the influence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and its commentators.

The metaphysical conceptualization of the subject, its determination as *hupokeimenon* is an attempt to define the meaning of Being upon which all entities are based. So, it is an attempt to understand the meaning of a foundation upon which all the entities can be understood of being founded on it. It is a Heideggerian flash back to classical origins of the meaning of Being by means of asking "What is an entity?"

So, as it was in Aristotle, the question of being is not a question of being of living things, it is a question of being as being. According to Heidegger, it is the question that concerns philosophy primordially. It has been the major concern, the question of philosophy since Plato. Throughout the history of the Western philosophy, from Plato to Nietzsche, the question of Being has been forgotten. What has been forgotten is the meaning of the entities for being.

When we begin questioning the meaning of the Being of beings we move into an *aporia*. The tradition of metaphysics was trying to understand the entities as what they are. The metaphysical tradition thus, must be subverted in order to reach the mood of *aporia*.

The object's dependence upon the constitution of subject can be traced back to Kant. Husserl follows this turn by the development of transcendental subjectivism, which is observed as a movement towards backwards in accordance with the expectations of tradition. Heidegger criticizes Husserl's *Ideas* from this point of view.

Heidegger's question is on the forgotten meaning of the Being of being human. "What does it really mean for a human being to be determined as a subject or a consciousness?"

Heidegger's Dasein precedes subject, it is Being-in-the-world. So, the existence of Dasein is prior to the division of entities as subjects and objects. It is prior to subject-object distinction. That is to say, it is prior to dualist understanding of subject and its access to the world by means of epistemology and theory.

The point is putting man as a shepherd of Being rather than in a pivotal position that is a presupposition and condition of other entities. The openness is "an ecstatic openness to the temporal donation of the truth of Being, the appropriative event of *das Ereignis*."²³¹

Simon Critchley asks: "...in virtue of what must one give exclusive priority to this Heideggerian approach to the question of metaphysics and subjectivity?"²³² He questions Heideggerian approach concerning its sharp, two sided reaction towards the metaphysical tradition of subject. We go more and more in to Nihilism despite the claim of overcoming it. Critchley says: "Contra Heidegger, do we not need more complex and nuanced accounts of metaphysics and subjectivity and of the kind that Adorno finds in aesthetic experience and that Levinas finds in the ethical relation to the other?"²³³ That is to say, transcendental subjectivity is put into question but the necessity to discuss the subjectivity beyond metaphysical limitation and nihilism and the necessity to discuss the ethical and the political cannot be left over. What we need to pursue is a possibility of ethical and political out of the Heideggerian completion of metaphysics.

What Critchley defines, later on, is the Levinasian subjectivity which is the possibility or might be the possibility for meeting "the claims of responsibility, ethical

231 Ibid, page 58.

232 Ibid, page 61.

233 Ibid, page 61.

and otherwise; it is a pre-conscious subject that is not determined by consciousness, but by sensibility. Its sensibility is its ethical responsibility.”

Simon Critchley, thus, proposes to take Levinasian conception of subject with respect to the problem of thinking subjectivity after the Heideggerian end of metaphysics. This conceptualization of subject, neither overlooks the Heideggerian turn and this turn's crucial importance within the history of metaphysics, nor ignores the necessity for the ethical, political and metaphysical to go further. It is rather the exposition of Levinas in *Otherwise Than Being* Critchley considers widely. Levinas's starting point was Husserl's primacy of intentional consciousness, which according to Levinas, privileges the theoretical consciousness. Through theoretical consciousness subject is in relation to external world that is objectifying. This objectifying relation is possible through representation. That is to say, the object of the external world is the *noumenon* of the *noesis*. What Levinas counterargues is that: The condition of representation is determined by life. Subject experiences life with its material conditions. It is the sensible material world that we live rather than objects of representations. Critchley says: “Life, for Levinas, is love of life and love of what life lives from: the sensible, material world. Levinas's work offers a material phenomenology of subjective life, where the conscious I of representation is reduced to the sentient I of enjoyment.”²³⁴

A sensible and pre-conscious subject of enjoyment, that calls for an infinite responsibility derived from a pre-conscious level of affectivity is an attempt to get over with the conditions of the link between I and the other. By means of this responsibility of sensibility, the link between I and the other gains proximity which is founded by the substitution of the I to the other.

234 Ibid, page 63.

The subject for Levinas is the subject that eats. In so far as it is an eating subject, it can appreciate the meaning of sharing or giving its bread to the other. What seems interesting is Levinas's, in a sense, ironic approach to the problem of subjectivity in modern philosophy of subject. It seems ironic because what differs from the Husserlian phenomenology in Levinasian subjectivity is a shift from the transcendental subject to a living subject of flesh and blood that lives. However, the shift from a transcendental subject to a living subject that eats, in contrast to the Heideggerian Dasein, marks a religious passivity and the living subject is the one who shares the bread, or better gives the bread to the other as a religious symbol of substitution. So, trying to do away with the Husserlian subject we contextualize the subject. That is to say we make it a living subject that enjoys life and good soup, but however, the alterity the subject encounters resembles an extremely religious experience. Levinasian subjectivity subordinates the unexplainable condition of possibility for ethical action that is unconditioned, with a monotheistic religious possibility.

Therefore, I see Levinasian religious possibility inadequate to serve as a ground for post-deconstructive subjectivity. It is inadequate because there is no passage from the ethics of care to the concrete political decision making. Levinasian subjectivity undergoes an experience of ethical that touches the subject in a past that has never been present. The vulnerability, responsibility and responsiveness of the subject remain infinite in order to avoid the totality of the envelopment of logos. Contextual and communicative intersubjectivity are the only possibilities to establish empathy with a concrete other. So, a living subject can encounter the other living subject as a contextual, concrete alterity in order to share the political responsibility as well as the finite forms of life with her. Subject can no longer take an unconditioned, a-temporal, irreducible

singularity of the other literally after deconstruction. What Levinas seeks is a subjectivity of subject unlike the Being of beings to cut off the essentialization of the submission of private to public. Nevertheless, Levinas's theses on Being and his "semantic transformation" call for another unconditioned condition, the irreducibility. By the same token we are not allowed to contextualize the other and thereby the pre-level infinite responsibility cannot be put to work for political.

Levinasian influence on Derrida, by means of which we can understand the singularity or the infinite responsibility or responsiveness of the subject to the other, the passivity and openness, cannot be more than a metaphor's inspiration according to Derridean understanding of metaphor. Thus, the ethical possibility in deconstruction is not different than the ethical possibility of imaginative acquaintance. To what degree are the vulnerability, passivity, and openness of the sensibility of subject different from that of quasi selves of subject that are open to conversation, -unlike Mouffe's claim- open to understand the irrational, crazy different views of the other rather than being open to a Habermasian communicative intersubjectivity- with both the other parts of the self and other people? If we take into consideration the problematic of passing from the ethics of care to the ethics of politics, if there is a necessity and urgency of political decision then we have to make progress from the subject that is open to the other, to the subject that gives concrete decisions about the others. If we are to think of this passage from ethical to political the Derridean and Rortyan I suppose come closer.

If we look for something like the idea in Kantian sense, as Derrida says and agree on that, it can be hold only as if. In other words, it is the as if of the metaphor that binds the ethical and political. The non-essential relation between metaphor and ethical-political and the urgency of decision making on singular cases lead us to consider

metaphors from a pragmatist point of view. That is to make use of metaphors for ethics of care and push the impossibility of the essential movement from universal to singular.

Derrida's performative texts are examples of making use of metaphor by using metaphor. Both Rortyan division of self, as quasi-selves with no hierarchical order and Derridean understanding of self division for welcoming the other which is Levinasian self interruption for the condition of hospitality, are against the threshold of consciousness and the centrality of this consciousness as a condition of the possibility of ethical.

Levinasian self is sensible to the other, the exterior being, who is accessible through moral consciousness. Moral consciousness in this sense is, rather than being the experience of values, a way of attaching to the spirit. Subjective experience has a deep structure, *psyche* for Levinas and it is established in a relation of responsibility or responsivity to the other. The psyche is the other in the same, the other within me in spite of me, calling me to respond.²³⁵

The self is constituted in an intersubjective way at the level of sensibility in order to make the intersubjective constitution of subjectivity *prior* to the formation of subject at the level of cognition and perception. The level of perception is the theoretical level that subject has a cognitive relation of itself and the world or, in other words, subject has a theoretical relation to the world and to itself. Privileging sensibility, for Levinas similar to Merleau-Ponty, provides ethics a movement of *desire*. The intersubjectivity of ethics thus, is not reducible a touched-toucher chiasmic relation analogous to handshake as Merleau-Ponty formulates. It is not a need that comes back to the self in a relation of the self to the visible world. The unity that the self recognizes in the other, not in the solipsistic self-consciousness's knowing itself immediately, shows

235 Ibid, page 64.

intersubjectivity in Husserl. This unity is then transferred analogically to myself. For Levinas, on the other hand, ethics is not based on this need of the unity of the self, the psychophysical unity. This intersubjective unity gained through the recognition of unity in the other destroys the difference between the self and the other. The other is an irreducible other for Levinas. The relation between the I and the *Other* is a relation that the ego opens itself to the other in a passivity which is the subjectivity of the subject. This subjectivity of the subject cannot be grasped and in this sense it is “otherwise than Being”. The subject in this sense is not completed and its subjectivity, being an openness, responsiveness to the other, is not identical. The identity of the subject is structured intersubjectively. The intersubjective communication takes place at the level of consciousness and that is why the subject cannot be grasped in this Being. The intersubjective structure of the subject puts the subject, as myself, me, rather than as an instance of a general concept like self-consciousness. Myself, me is primarily responsive to the call of the other. It is viewing ethics as an affair of the personal what Levinas calls “the religiosity of the self”. So, the personalization of the subject is, as the person is the hostage of the demand of the other, ready to die in place of the other, in other words subordinated to the call of the alterity without questioning its undergoing a religious experience.

The primary task of the subject is the response to the other's call, and the religiosity of the self is this responsiveness.

In *Otherwise than Being* Levinas says, humanism can be given up only if it is human enough. In his view Heideggerian signification for Being, declining the central role and primacy of the free will of the subject, prepares the ground for a subject of

substitution. The Levinasian subject renounces its pivotal freedom and subjects itself to the other:

Modern anti-humanism, which denies the primacy that the human person, free and for itself, would have for the signification of Being, is true over and beyond the reasons it gives itself. It clears the place for subjectivity positing itself in abnegation, in sacrifice, in a substitution which precedes the will.²³⁶

Thus, the anti-humanism is not a threat for the ethical subjectivity. On the contrary, undermining the autonomous notion of subjectivity and describing subject as dependent upon prior structures (linguistic, ontological, socio-economic, unconscious) outside of its conscious control, prepares the ground for putting subjectivity in touch with its alterity within the experience of ethical.

This alterity demands care, service and renunciation of the subject as an end in itself. That is how humanism, by the influence of Heideggerian anti-humanist critique of the subject of metaphysical tradition, turns out to be a responsible and responsive humanity. This is what Levinas defines as being a creature, creatureliness. Creatureliness arises as an outcome of the transformed notion of humanity as the humanism of the other, as the humanism of the subject who is always and already dependent upon the alterity of the other.

Levinasian religiosity does not lead to an overlap of the temporal and the a-temporal in a totality. What Levinas does is a togetherness of related beings in his formulation of creation. This relation is the relation we need for entering into the other. It is a relation that we need to tear violently from the conditions of human beings such as linguistic, biologic, psychological, political etc. Levinas, thus, privileges the ethical moment over the contexts that human beings are determined by.

²³⁶ Ibid, page 67.

One can see the similarity of the attempt to go beyond the conditioned nature of human beings by the experience of the ethical. The mystic, the religious, the inexperienceable, the infinite have been transferred into ethical. It is the event of my responsibility, my openness and responsiveness that cannot be explained by the contextually conditioned human nature. Levinas says:

One can, to be sure, invoke, against the signifyingness of the extreme situations to which the concepts formed on the basis of human reality lead, the conditioned nature of human. The suspicions engendered by psychoanalysis, sociology, and politics weigh on human identity such that we never know to whom we are speaking and what we are dealing with when we build our ideas on the basis of human facts. But we do not need this knowledge in the relationship in which the other is a neighbor...²³⁷

So, what we need is what cannot be explained, unexplainable in terms of what is familiar to us. Similarity between the ethical of experience, flourishing from the Kantian distinction between the objective and subjective components of experience, passing through the Heideggerian “essentially creative distortions of language”, and the attempt to put the unfamiliar in the familiar, is in fact an attempt to go beyond, or in Wittgenstein's words “against the limits of language”. I suppose it is the attempt to go beyond the literal and beyond the literal, we come to see literal is metaphorical, metaphorical is literal. If we look at the texts of Levinas from a performative point of view, it is the metaphorical that is used in accordance with the post-Nietzschean line of criticism of the metaphysical conceptualization of subjectivity.

By means of this performative usage of metaphorical we have been striving towards the possibility of acting *as if*, acting in accordance with the alternative understanding of the other(s) within the web of shared metaphors. In Heideggerian sense, to learn to live (with the other) in the speaking of language is the attempt to find

237 Ibid, page 69.

the *right words* to respond to language. In Derridean sense, the right words are metaphors. With metaphors we strive to go beyond the limits of language, which is not possible. So, we “run up against the limits of the language”, against possible, towards impossible, in an ironic awareness *as if* there is the impossible. The impossible, in terms of Kantian idea, is the *as if* up on which ethical is dependent. We run up towards the impossible with an ironic awareness of the impossibility of “biting the bullet”. We say “Yes! Yes!”

We take a part, perform our role rather than elaborating the conditions of the possibility of the metaphysical. The end of metaphysics may be a beginning of a new game like performances that Derrida has been showing as an end, as well, as regards the discussions of the possibility of the ethical as philosophers have been theorizing about in relation to metaphysical tradition.

The declaration of the end of metaphysics is premature. The end is not at all certain. Besides, metaphysics – the relation with the being which is accomplished in ethics – precedes the understanding of Being and survives ontology.²³⁸

In this sense ontology is privileged over ethics according to Levinas. Levinas's view is that: if ontology replaces the metaphysical then ethics is subordinated to ontology. What Levinas claims is, ontology in its dominating relation to ethics must be inverted by the subject's relation to other. That is to say, ethics is first philosophy.

Ethics is first philosophy and my relation to the other person is prior to my relation to what is common and same in all beings, the being of beings. The conception of the other is a radically non-comprehensible alterity and this conception is opposed to the ontological conception of being human whereas Levinas himself uses ontological terms.

238 Levinas Emmanuel: *Basic Philosophical Writings*, Indiana University Press, 1996, Translated by P. Atterton and S. Critchley, page 11.

According to Critchley, this is not enough to argue that Levinas belongs to the tradition of metaphysical subjectivity and what distinguishes Levinas is his production of theses on Being when we have entered the completion of metaphysics. Levinas, in this sense is not a pre-Heideggerian metaphysician. From this point of view, the language Levinas uses is both a repetition of the language that belongs to the tradition and also a “displacement of metaphysical language”. Critchley describes this displacement of metaphysical language as follows: “ This displacement can be seen in Levinas's use of palaeonyms like *ethics*, *metaphysics* and *subjectivity*, ancient words which undergo what Derrida has described as a 'semantic transformation' in Levinas's hands.”²³⁹ By means of this transformation and using this transformation after the completion of metaphysics, Levinasian position with refer to the tradition of metaphysical subjectivity can be summarized as, questioning the primacy of the being of beings over the other. According to Critchley, there is a shift from the Heideggerian question derived from Leibnitz “Why are there beings at all why not rather nothing?” to the question “What justification is there for me before the other?” It is a question of the justification of Being and by means of this call for justification of Being, ethics calls for justification of fundamentality of ontology, its claim of being first philosophy.

5.1. Levinas on the Experience of Ethical

The attempt to break the constitutive priority of subjectivity is an attempt to define the condition of the possibility of ethical experience. The experience of the ethical raises a new conception of subjectivity, a subjectivity flourishing from Dilthey's, interpretation of life and from the Heideggerian declaration of the end of the metaphysics. I think we can see both Dilthey and Heidegger as questioning the Husserlian primacy of intentional consciousness. The condition of the possibility of experience relies on life rather than

²³⁹ Ibid, page 75.

theoretical consciousness. The ethical dimensions of subjectivity in and by the material conditions of life, in other words sensible world, lies in the pre-intentional affect on subjectivity. In this context, Levinas offers us a pre-level of sensibility by means of which an intersubjective constitution can precede theoretical subjectivity.

Life, as a medium of subject's relation to itself is a Hegelian novelty that introduces social and historical to the self-referential transcendental subjectivity which is the condition of the possibility of the true knowledge of the external world. However, the progress was nothing other than one of the teleological moments of concept for Hegel. As I discussed above, Heideggerian experience of nothing was an attempt to go beyond this determination of concept. The opposition between Heidegger and Hegel, concerning the relation between logos as the power of envelopment and life, plays a crucial role in the experience of the ethical. The experience of nothing, as a possibility of opening up to the eventuality of the unfamiliar depends on this opposition and thereby, it is necessary to see how this opposition is thought by Heidegger.

Heidegger refers to being-with in *Being and Time* with refer to Dasein-with. He views encountering other for Dasein is preceded by the basic condition of Being in the world. Our attentiveness is shaped by this constitutive condition of being in the world. This constitutive condition of being in the world is "tied up" in Heidegger's words by Being of beings. That is to say, the Being of beings is an essential being "for the sake of which" Dasein itself is as it is; and this Being is what the being with others belongs to.

²⁴⁰ That means encountering other Dasein is like encountering any other beings and understanding the other subject is similar to understanding other things. "A primordial existential kind of Being" is the condition of encountering and understanding other subject. Heidegger says, Hegelian *life* has its roots in Aristotelian metaphysics and

240 BT, page 160-123.

shows that the aim of Hegel's phenomenology fits the tradition of metaphysics. Hegel, in *Early Theological Writings* describes pure life, which means *form* and a demand to realize, become aware of his *isness* behind *this* or *that* particular action. Pure life means *being* that is "the surface of all separate lives, impulses and deeds."²⁴¹ Heidegger says, Hegelian "the absolute concept" is the simple essence of life. Life, in other words, in pure, is *being* that manifests, produces "*itself from but of itself* and maintains *itself* in its movement. In this self-determination and production *out* is not out but is *in* this being; enveloped, in Derrida's words, in the power of the envelopment (movement) of Being (logos). *Out* is a part of its (being's) inner differences, which are not left out but sublated. Life, as one of the moments of its being, belongs to this self-maintenance. Time, in its being belongs to this self-maintenance; Being for Hegel. Heidegger says, his thesis: "*the essence of being is time*" as the major point of *Being and Time* "is the exact opposite" of Hegel's thesis in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Dasein, as an authentic responsive subjectivity faces the unfamiliar beyond the self-maintenance of concept and encounters its alterity as the temporalization of temporality, not as one of the moments of concept. Alterity of being in the world therefore, is an opening up of the unknown, the unfamiliar in life as an authentic possibility for Heideggerian subjectivity.

Levinas tries to overcome this authentic, existential status of subjectivity as being in the world by replacing the call of Being with the call of infinite responsibility at the pre-level (pre-intentional, pre-linguistic, pre-phenomenological) of sensibility. Intersubjectivity and a new conception of humanism lead us to Hegelian anthropology to which we owe the determination of socio-historical. Levinasian ethics, on the contrary, is based on a disposition, even a sacrifice to the other. Ego is submitted to the other unlike modern subjectivity at a pre-conscious level of sensibility. Levinasian subject is

241 Hegel G.W.F., *Early Theological Writings*, Translated by Richard Kroner, Penn, 1996, page 254.

thus, submitted to the other in a pre-level of affection and precedes the anthropogenic experience of Hegelian self-consciousness and the Husserlian transcendental subjectivity. Simon Critchley says, this pre-level is similar to that of psychoanalytic conception of trauma. Levinasian attempt, in this context signifies an experience of ethical that traces back theoretical consciousness to a passive level of being affected by the other. Levinas, in this respect, offers us an alternative way of attempting to arrive at what is defined as inaccessible and unfamiliar. In this sense, Levinas sets the limits for what can be said and places the affection of the other at a pre-level, which is beyond expressibility. Ethical therefore, has been placed in an experience that has never been experienced. We can also say, a primordial trauma lies behind the intentional level of conscious subject. The intentional level is disturbed by this pre-level traumatic experience. This traumatic affect of the other happened to the ego in a past that has never been present. It is the trauma that leads the ego back to the self and the ego's coming back to the self is the meaning of unconscious. It is described by Levinas as: “a passivity more passive than all passivity, one the hither side of identity, becoming the responsibility of substitution.”²⁴². So, the self has been persecuted and this persecution is the cause of its passivity, substitution to the other, which is the condition of the possibility of ethical relation.

Simon Critchley says: “Levinas's work is a reduction of the conscious intentional good to the pre-conscious sentient subject of *jouissance* (joy).”²⁴³ So, the Husserlian intentional consciousness is transferred into a pre-intentional, pre-rational subject who is substituted to the other. The substitution of the subject to the other takes place at the level of pre-reflexive sensibility. This level of pre-reflexivity and pre-consciousness is

242 Ibid, page 234.

243 Ibid, page 238.

crucial since this level is where subject is close to the other and can be called into question. This substitution calls for an unquestioned submission towards the other because of the trauma that puts me in absolute passivity, which is beyond the conscious act. Freudian description of trauma, an external threat to the unity of consciousness as a system, and Lacanian understanding of trauma, as the subjective affect of relation to externality, both recall similarities with Levinasian cause of an absolute passivity. The break of threshold of consciousness due to an external affect of a trauma distracts the continuity of the acts of the subject towards pleasure. As a result of these traumatic affects, the subject tends to repeat the “painful *jouissance*”.²⁴⁴ This repetition is compulsory and causes the subject to tend to go back to the origin of this pain unconsciously. So, the subject tends to repeat what preoccupies its unconscious and unlike the general character of the dreams, the wish fulfillments acting in accordance with the pleasure principle. According to Freud, the nature of the repetition-compulsion is not a deliberate nature. It is rather a 'drive-like' action beyond the control of the ego. Freud notes the contrast between the drive-like actions of traumatic neuroses and the pleasure principle as well.

Thus, the external affect of the traumatism caused by a persecution induces to a division in self. It is an internal division, which is caused by exteriority. This interior gap, the interiority that is in touch with the desired pain of a past that has never been present, is beyond the consciousness. It is this inaccessibility of the subject that receives the message, the summons since it is open to alterity. The message from the exteriority can have access to subject only if the subject has a relation to trauma like a relation to the Good in Plato or the moral law in Kant.

244 Ibid, page 238.

The idea is that: it is possible only, by virtue of an unconditioned condition, in Kantian terms, to assume the ethical and political. It is an untouchable, unexperiencable possibility that somehow touched the subject and preceded all consciousness and intentionality of the subject.

The question is: what sort of criterion can we use to say that “this is a good thing.” if not a calculating, rational one? If the subject were the subject of psychoanalysis who experiences trauma in a certain time in the past, we could talk about the nature of the experience and its possible affects. The experience is inexperienceable and indefinable so that it cannot be reduced to a restoring mean. So, it should be taken metaphorically rather than literally. We can say there is an affect of the past experiences without trying to contextualize and rank them. There might be. This affect influences my actions towards the other and/or others. Its affect on us and on our actions towards others is similar to that of a metaphorical image. This affect means that there is a possibility to understand others beyond our ego-centric, pleasure-seeking perspectives. However, the mood of making a decision, particularly if it is a decision regarding the social rather than the others, there must be somehow a togetherness of irrational as a pre-bias and rational within the subject. Political decisions are to be contextualized.

5.2. Pragmatism and the Experience of Ethical

So far, Richard Rorty would agree on what has been said on the possibility of ethical. He even says, there is no hierarchical rank between the irrational and rational parts of the “quasi-selves”. The possibility to make a decision on the other and/or others beyond my interest relies on this democratization of self. The problem is, for Richard Rorty, the break (rupture) with the tradition of metaphysics, in which philosophers used unexplained explainers for the condition of the possibility of the ethical, is taken for granted. There is no way to attempt to establish an unconditioned, inexperienceable, a-

temporal, possibility or impossibility, which essentially makes the ethical possible. It is a non-essential possibility, which can make ethical possible. The non-essential possibility does not call for a state of mind, which excludes interests and perspectives. Therefore, it might be an attempt to answer the questions Critchley raised in “*The Ethics of Deconstruction*” What decision? Who decides? The non-essential link enbrides private and public for the possibility of solidarity according to Rorty. The non-essential attitude is an advantage if we can consider the idea of dropping the threshold of consciousness and the possibility of a democratic togetherness of quasi-selves. There is no valid argument for the priority of the rational on the irrational since Rorty does not reduce Freudian morality to a pathological-normal opposition. Rorty says, it is not only through restoring the consciousness in psychoanalyses that “Freud grips intellectuals”. There is no priority of perceiving and understanding the other and others in a rational manner.

In this respect, we can trace the continuity of the experience of ethical and we are still allowed to place the *place* of this pre-level experience *before* the categorization of mental processes. The responsiveness and responsibility of the affective encounter with alterity for Heidegger and with the other for Levinas reconcile in this pre-bias sensibility. Pragmatism can be considered within the same direction in so far as we regard a holistic conception of beliefs and desires. By doing so, we reconcile, or in Derridean terms, say “Yes!” to an always already reconciled rational and irrational. Holistic experience can be traced back to Dilthey's interpretation of life and an isolated transcendental strategy is already scrutinized by blurring the distinction (and accordingly priority) between belief and desire, rational and irrational components of subjectivity, subjective and objective. I think the direction of deconstruction concerning the experience of ethical and its political consequences points to a similar direction with

holistic pragmatism. I will now explain the possibility of a pre-level affection on subjectivity from holistic pragmatism's point of view to show this similarity.

5.3.Holistic Pragmatism on Freudian Unconscious

Holistic pragmatism borrows from Dewey the basic belief that there is no clear-cut distinction between beliefs and desires. In addition to traditional pragmatism, holistic pragmatism views Freudian unconscious as a possibility of dropping the hierarchical structure of rational and irrational components of the consciousness of moral subject. This point distinguishes it from traditional pragmatism, which puts the emphasis on the scientific certainty to describe the actions of moral subject on the basis of desire satisfaction. The “enigma of enigmas” that breaks the predictable consistency of the actions of moral subject, is central for Derrida for similar reasons. Both for Derrida and Rorty, Freud is a threat for the scientific prediction in explanation of the moral action.

Freudian unconscious puts a human interest that cannot be found in any physiological mechanism and cannot be a *reason* for a change in one's conscious beliefs. It is quite challenging to imagine some unknown persons are causing us to do things that we would rather not do. Having been put that way, the unconscious interest can *cause* changes in one's understanding externality. That is another way of saying that the ego is not the master in its own house. It is like somebody who is stepping into our shoes with different purposes than we do. Freudian unconscious, according to Rorty pluralized the inner space. This pluralization is a threat to the threshold of consciousness. It is a de-centering possibility if one does not insist on the following questions, - “What am I really?” “What is my true self?” - “What is essential to me?” and – if one does not insist on the “true” description of the self as it really is. Besides undermining the unity of the transcendental subject in Kantian sense, Freudian unconscious, placing the alterity in no higher status than moral subject, undermines the solemn, dignified seriousness of the

call of alterity in Heideggerian sense. I think, replacing the transcendental unity of subject with a democratized plural decision-maker does not decrease the voice of the call of other and others. What is subject to change here is the essentiality of the destiny of Being with which the essence of man is in accord. Heidegger tells us the ecstatic existence is experienced as “care” to guard the truth of Being²⁴⁵ alone since man is the shepherd of Being. The essential relation to Being is the engagement of Dasein to what it is not-yet but ought to be and this is, in short, the submission of its temporal existence to the determination of a teleological structure. The “care” is towards the realization of its goal-directedness in Heidegger's words “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in the-world as Being”²⁴⁶, and in Derrida's words “logos's power of envelopment”.

The pluralization of self induces to the idea of quasi-selves instead of the common sense assumption that a single human body contains a single self; and the Heideggerian *We*, which Heidegger put forward in place of this assumption.

To take Freud's suggestion seriously is to wish to become acquainted with these unfamiliar persons in the “I”. That is to replace the religious and metaphysical desire to find one’s “true center”. On this account of acquaintance with the quasi-selves, we are not obliged to know our essence, our common nature. Self-knowledge, in this sense is precisely what divides us from other people, not what we share with them. Unlike Heidegger's emphasis on the common essential as the alterity we encounter in the experience of the uncanny; what we come to experience is the difference. Our accidental idiosyncrasies, the “irrational” components in ourselves are what we become acquainted with. The significance of this acquaintance is its non-essential possibility of offering a place to locate alterity within the shattered unity of self. The unfamiliar does not need to

245 LH, page 234.

246 BT, page 192.

come to presence from within itself in the sameness of *logos* and *phusis* as Heidegger told us. The unfamiliar comes to inhabit in the familiar within the limits of life-world and this does not essentially happen on the *logos* (as the ground of this happening) as the basic condition of Being. Having dropped the essential relation between the private experience of the other, the unfamiliar and basic condition of Being as a direction of political, Rorty views the pre-level affection on subjectivity as an experience of the contingencies of upbringings. Thus, the passage from the ethics of care to politics is not an impasse for a pragmatic experience of ethical and aesthetical. The forms of life as the contingent conditions of what happened to self is indifferent to what the self is. The stories we have experienced have constituted subjectivity and thereby, Freudian unconscious is interpreted as a conversational possibility of singularity preceding categorical encompassment of alterity. This acquaintance will let us enter into conversational relations with our unconscious. What is novel in Freud's suggestion according to Rorty is that: What divides us from the people, our "irrational" components, our quasi-selves are not dumb, the bad, false self but rather intellectual peers of our conscious selves. These intellectual peers are possible conversational partners for our conscious selves. That is why, according to Rorty Freud grips the intellectuals. The democratization of genius is a possibility of breaking down the strict distinction between the Platonic reason-passion opposition. This is a possibility of viewing self-knowledge as a matter of getting acquainted with one or more crazy quasi people, "listening to their crazy views of how things are, learning something from them"²⁴⁷ These conversational relations will be a matter of self-enrichment. The advantage of this way of thinking of passions is its humanizing unconscious. The clear-cut distinction between the conscious and unconscious is blurred and the story of the

247 BT, page 150.

conscious is just another story. The story of unconscious is a story, which is not necessarily submitted to the “true” story.

Each story is an attempt to make the experiences of past, the events of childhood coherent with later events. There is no privileged angel to give the true answer of “What did happen to me in the past?”

No privileged angle means no central privileged faculty, no central self. That is the possibility of a vocabulary for self-description, which does not ground the certainty of what is external to self. This vocabulary inverts the morality of foundationalism, which centered the idea that we need to bring particular actions under general principles for being moral. What we need to do is to go back to the particular of the past in order to see their similarity or difference from particular present situations. We are able to interpret what we are doing with refer to our past. Our past is made up of contingencies. That is a way to understand the present; what we are now, “through weaving idiosyncratic narratives.”²⁴⁸

Another way of putting this point is that: Freud gave up the Platonic attempt to bring together the public and private. There is no essential bridge between public ethic of togetherness and private ethic of self-creation from a Freudian perspective. Beliefs and desires, which belong to us as qua-humans and unite us to our fellow humans simply as human²⁴⁹ are not submitted to universally shared beliefs and desires. The latter, by contrast have branched off from the former. Therefore, the universally shared beliefs and desires are originally as idiosyncratic as the unconscious obsessions and phobias. If we think from this point of view, the contingency of self replaces the idea of true self and consequently, undermines the authority of claiming the true story of what I am and how

248 Rorty, Richard, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989, page 33 (Hereafter CIS).

249 CIS, page 34.

things are. That is to turn the rational and irrational parts of self into conversational partners for one another. That is the replacement of the true center, unity of self with a plurality of differences.

The partiality of self provides a possibility of causal relations between these differences without submitting one to the other. Each of these different quasi selves is a part of a single unified causal network, but not of a single person whose actions are grounded according to universally shared beliefs and desires. A pragmatic reading of the de-centering psychoanalysis suggests a wish to be acquainted with the unfamiliar quasi-selves. This pragmatic reading suggests unconscious as follows: Just like the normal adult's conscious beliefs and desires, unconscious refers to one or more well-articulated systems of beliefs and desires, systems that are just as complex, sophisticated and internally consistent.

When we have to make a political decision we have to make a contextual decision. So, the clear-cut distinction is not to be taken for granted between the private that, in an ironic way, can make quasi-disinterested ethical decisions in a quasi-rational state of mind and the public problems. The non-essential possibility of solidarity that is possible when we blur the distinction between private and public already exists in, what Rorty says, *imaginative acquaintance*. The reconciliation between, Rorty's *imaginative acquaintance* as a possibility of solidarity, and the experience of the ethical within deconstruction as an ethical and political possibility is possible because of and by means of democratization of self.

Rorty's concern is rather a notion of scientific socialism that used to transfer all private projects into a public salvation theory. The essential link between private and public is a reductionary problem. If we take pragmatism not necessarily together with

liberalism as Laclau offers, there is not too much of a difference between deconstruction and holistic pragmatism.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1. Transcendence Without Transcendental: Kant's Third Critique and Derrida

Kant and following him Fichte, put the condition of the possibility of object as transcendental subjectivity. Two views have reconciled by this transcendental subjectivity. One of them is the empiricist view, which blocked in a sense our accessibility to universally valid judgments by limiting our knowledge of the object to the experienceability of particular; on the other hand, the rational view had already opened the way to arrive at the “real” by mental processes regardless of the particular object that is experienceable. The consequences of these two views, concerning the superiority of subjectivity or objectivity lead us to decide about the ground of our knowledge of what is out there. According to Kant, and this is the key of his everlasting originality in epistemology, the subjective is to be the ground of the objective knowledge of what is out there and it is itself shown to be objectively valid. The condition, ground of experienceability itself thus, determines, conditions what is out there on the basis of objective validity that is to be proven. The originality is to locate this condition at a meta-level as unconditioned. So, the conditioning, determining faculty itself is unconditioned and not determined. By virtue of its privileged meta-level, that can be traced back to Cogito obviously, the unconditioned condition of the possibility of experienceability conditions, explains what is out there but it remains unexplained itself. It is one of the unexplained explainers in the history of philosophy if we put it in Richard Rorty’s words. Everything is objective on the condition of this unconditioned,

privileged, transcendental I. Becoming more clear in Fichte, the unconditioned condition of the object that a transcendental subject knows is the condition of the object as such. That is to say, the gap between the knowledge of an object and the object itself turns out to be exceeded by the transcendental subject as a result of transcendental faculty of unifying the representation of object. The presence, being of the object remains unknown but “the object as such” is possible and thus determined by the transcendental subject only. Reasoning, thus is the ground of the synthetic unity of the knowledge of what is out there. Nature, what is out there, can be a whole of the manifold of its looks, its ways that come to perception, by the law of reason. The given is determined by these laws and in this sense becomes necessary. In other words, the logical a-priori necessity of transcendental deduction applies to given and the synthetic judgments can become a-priori. That is how the validity of a-priori synthetic judgments are founded. However, the originality of Kant is his further step on the objectivity of the object that depends on the transcendental subject’s experience of the object. The logical reflection would not consider the experienceability as the condition of the possibility of objective validity.

What does it really mean that the objective validity of object depends on transcendental subject’s experience of this object? How does this transcendental subject make sure that the objectivity of perceived objects can become a meaningful unity in as much as they are my experiences. Representations of objects are and can be my representations because they are accompanied by the “I”. The Cartesian cogito is kept as the unifying condition of apperceptions in Kant. It is my self-consciousness, in other words, which is not conditioned but is itself the unconditioned condition of the possibility of experiences, that grants objectivity by means of unification. The unconditioned condition, the undetermined determination marks the end of possibility

questions by showing that the conditions of experience, should depend on a self-reference. A self-referential self-certainty is to be postulated to grant the unity of the raw-data that perception provides us. Kant says metaphysics is no longer capable of claiming the world as such without giving the account of its philosophical position; and empiricists too, can no longer ignore an unconditional possibility to put the objects perceived by senses in a successive order of a meaningful whole. Transcendental subjectivity thus, lays the ground up on which philosophy will proceed; maybe into different directions but not without leaping over Kant.

However, Kantian position interpellates further explanations concerning two main points: first the condition of the possibility of nature is itself not experienceable on the ground which we have the right to judge the reality of nature. A general pattern, in other words, a universally valid structure thus, claiming objectivity as well as being subjective cognitive structure, cannot be explained. Secondly and accordingly, this transcendental subjectivity comes to the Archimedian stand point of Cogito and remains beyond the boundary of time, space and causality. As a result of these two unclarified points that privilege transcendental subjectivity, another point arises.

The third point is central to ethical-political. I want to underlie the central position of subject, and it's reductionary objectification. For a transcendental subject, there is no necessary difference between experiencing an object and encountering another subject. Kant was concerned to assure the foundations of "what is.....?" question by means of circumscribing the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and simply did not consider subjectivities in relation; in other words intersubjectivity. All perceptions necessarily are subsumed to the transcendental unity of subjectivity and in this sense the objects, which become out of these perceptions' undergoing the a-priori concepts of

understanding, become the objects of this a-temporal I, regardless of being another subject. The mediation of the experience seemed to be a weakening characteristic to Kant. Perhaps it is the price to reduce philosophy to the theory of knowledge to claim the certainty of the representation of reality. Kant, by doing so, aimed at the determination of the possibility of our cognitive structure as a universal objectivity permitting us to discover the a-priori truths of the world out there. He can be said to remain rather theoretical. Perhaps, like many other philosophers he was writing mainly against the dominant rationalistic metaphysical tradition of his time. We come across the rational propositions and their problematic antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which signify his main concern as the understanding of life on something beyond life. The discoveries are towards the facts of life which come to be “given” to us and contingent. What *is*, what is present, thus is re-presented and gains objective reality in its givenness to our forms of intuition and categories. What we discover is, to put it in other words, contingent becomes necessary under the universal structure of transcendental subjectivity, which is itself the condition of the possibility of necessity. That is to say, the condition of the possibility of experienceability constitutes, determines what is given to it, through making judgments. The judgments in this respect make the transcendental subjects experience truly in their determination (or constitution) of given data of sense perception. One way to go further is Fichte, who we can say gave the account of the objectivity of the object by virtue of the preceding cognitive structures of subject. Kant of course, was attentive to distinguish the judgments that we make about objects that are impossible to be given at all and judgments about objects that are beyond the experience. These judgements may be “capricious and incongruous” although they are made too, by virtue of the cognitive structures of the subject; categories. Kant, however, says the

concepts used to make judgements of any kind; fictitious and uncertain or limited to a possible experience and certain, belong to categories. The categories involve all kinds of pure concepts that precede knowledge as a subjective faculty and form the “a-priori foundation of the possibility of experience”.

Kant says:

The concepts which thus contain a-priori the pure thought involved in every experience, we find in the categories. If we can prove that by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity. But since in such a thought more than simply the faculty of thought, the understanding, is brought into play, and since this faculty itself, as a faculty of knowledge that is meant to relate to objects, calls for explanation in regard to the possibility of such relation, we must first of all consider, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution, the subjective sources which form the a-priori foundation of the possibility of experience.²⁵⁰

The subjective is objective and conditions what is given as object. I have pointed above that Kant distinguishes the judgements, which rely on possible experience and stay within this experience’s limits as certain. In other words, concepts gain objective validity through their application to “empirical intuition”. In the section *Phenomena and Noumena* Kant explicitly refers to inner intuitions` reliance on the outer, empirical intuitions:

Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition; for though a pure intuition can acquire its object, and therefore objective validity, only through the empirical intuition of which it is the mere form. Therefore all concepts, and with them all principles, even such as are possible a-priori, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to the data for a possible experience.²⁵¹

Following this, we can say that the objects gain objectness, objective validity by means of transcendental subjectivity; but the inner forms of pure intuition must be

250 Kant Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Translated by Norman-Kept Smith, Palygrave, 1929, *Transcendental Deduction*, page 130, A 97 (Hereafter CPR).

251 CPR, page 259.

limited to the application of empirical intuitions. Otherwise, the objective validity of the representations of inner intuitions cannot gain objective validity and they remain as “a mere play of imagination”.

However, the knowledge of the outer, the perception of the sense data, relies on the transcendental as Kant says. That is to say, if the relation between the inner intuition and outer intuition is required to make the a-priori concept sensible and that is the limitation of the possibility of the object of the concept’s understandability, the objective validity of the inner intuition relies on the outer. If on the other hand, we know that the outer intuition can be understandable only by virtue of concepts than we have proved that they depend on each other. We indeed cannot prove the objective validity of the inner cognitive structure by means of the outer. What Kant was particularly interested is to be able to necessitate the outer, the given by means of the a-priori structure of the subject. He wanted to show that the a-priori synthetic judgements were possible and by means of them we can make “true judgements” about nature. These judgements can go beyond the tautological explanation of what is already contained in the subject and although they are given rise by experience, they can provide us the true picture of nature. Kant thus, can be argued to have made no distinction between the relations of the subject-object and subject-subject; the relations, which are to be necessary so as to guarantee the objective validity of externality. At this very point, we come to accept the transcendental as the condition of the possibility of knowledge that privileges the forms of intuition as necessary and constitutive of “outer intuitions” if they are our intuitions. Thereby, the transcendental I constitutes the object as its object and the other person as its other person. Kant defines transcendental as follows: “I entitle transcendental all

knowledge which is occupied not so much with object as with the mode of our knowledge of object in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a-priori.”²⁵²

What we can conclude thus is that: the transcendental I is self-referential. This is so because Kant’s major concern in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to ascertain the knowledge of external world as it appears to us by virtue of Cartesian self-consciousness. The external world means the deterministic natural world. The external world is knowable to us as it appears to us; not in itself, as we all know. Kant guarantees the objective validity of the appearance of the external world by both providing a constitution of it by subject which is repeatable; and limiting this repeatable identity-that I mentioned above as endurance-to its appearance. The form of knowledge is not to claim the knowledge of the external world in itself. If we claimed it, the crucial point would be that the freedom that we possess for responsible human actions would be knowable to us. That is to say, the self would be nothing more than a part of the determined, conditioned natural world. That would undermine the main stand point of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. We have to regard human agency with a capability of disinterested action, which necessarily should be beyond the determined natural world. The preservation of the thing in itself clears the ground for an unconditioned will which cannot be accessible to the transcendental structure of cognition like the other accessible appearances. The will in itself thus is free to act disinterestedly; that is the unique way of being beyond the laws of nature. The consequences of free-will are, -the effects-accessible to our cognition; not the will itself like the thing in itself. That is how the moral imperative is made possible in us. If we refer to Derrida’s *Before the Law*, the will in itself is not possible to know but the effects of this impossibility show how the idea in

²⁵² CPR, page 59, B 25.

the Kantian sense serves as a condition of the possibility of moral action. It is *as if* this will in itself *is* we act morally.

The universality of the *as if* touches up on the singularity with a Derridean relationship, which preserves the singularity of proceeding by means of its being *before* the universality. Derrida's point is to find a way of relating singularity to universality without subordinating singularity to universality, but to make use of its effect on the decision making process of singularity.

If we go back to Kantian distinction between the things in themselves and the appearances of the things that are given to concepts, which signifies a distinction, an unreconcilable difference between the known and unknown and remember that it is the unknown that conditions the known, the unknown, the thing in itself, connotes a dual structure of the object. This gives rise to the thing as representation. The unknown is the cause of the representation. The dual structure leaves the thing in itself inaccessible to our cognition, which means to understand it in a law, in a binding rule of synthesizing process is impossible. Accordingly, we can say the thing in itself is not knowable to us but is the condition of the knowable. We conclude this from the knowable, the phenomena, the sensible. Kant says:

Now we must bear in mind that the concept of appearances, as limited by the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, already of itself establishes the objective reality of noumena and justifies the division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and so of the world into a world of the senses and a world of the understanding (*mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis*), and indeed in such manner that the distinction does not refer to the logical form of our knowledge of one and the same thing, according as it is indistinct or distinct, but to the difference in the manner in which the two world can be first given to our knowledge, and in conformity with this difference, to the manner in which they are in themselves generically distinct from one another.²⁵³

253 CPR, page 266.

Although the sensible world that is given us as “objective truth” of the external world does not guarantee the presence of the object and in this sense the presence of the object as intelligible seems dependent on the representation of the object as sensible. As I wrote above, the representation of the object must be dependent on something self-caused; the synthetic unity of the transcendental I. I think this refers to the attempt of avoiding ontological presuppositions' coming to an unavoidable deduction, that is to say in Kantian sense, justification of the use of an ontological status as the ground of meaning, when we are engaged in arriving at a universally valid objectivity of the outer world. As I mentioned above, for Kant it is the transcendental I. Manfred Frank points out this necessity of an already existing self-consciousness and its faculty for seeing representations as its representations that are random without its pre-existing pure spontaneity: “In order to be aware of its own appearance (in time) the simple being of self-consciousness must always already be pre-supposed –otherwise it is as if the self-awareness were to lose its eye.”²⁵⁴

The ontological status itself lacks the validity for objectivity since it cannot be given in intuition. Kant is insistent on this criterion. It would be similar to rational attitude if Kant were not insistent on the objectivity of the transcendental I like other empirical propositions. Kant distinguishes the body and the soul but unlike the rationalists, tries to avoid giving the “I as a thinking being”, which is called soul, an ontological status. Instead, in the *Second Book of the Transcendental Dialectic, Chapter 1, The Paralogisms of Pure Reason* the “I as a thinking being” should not be considered as pure under the rational doctrine of soul. The “I”, in this sense is an object of inner sense; Kant says, and thus, the ground of its knowledge is empirical as well.

²⁵⁴ Bowie Andrew, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche*, Manchester University Press, 2003, Second Edition, page 22 (Here After AS).

But what kind of “Inner experience” as Kant says, does this transcendental I have of itself? How can the inner perception of the soul contain an inner experience? Kant says:

The reader must not object that this proposition, which expresses the perception of the self, contains an inner experience, and that the rational doctrine of the soul founded up on it is never pure and is therefore to that extent based upon an empirical principle.²⁵⁵

Even the possibility of the transcendental concepts rely on this “I think” since what we assert with these concepts necessarily presuppose “I think” and belong to it. In order to find an answer to the question. “What kind of inner experience does this ground of the possibility of knowledge have of itself?” we look at the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Here Kant says:

“Representation of apperception, “the I”, is in fact nothing more than the *feeling* of an existence without the least concept and only a representation of that to which all thinking relates”²⁵⁶ Whereas in the first edition of the CPR, in the *Paralogisms of Pure Reason* Kant says: “The least object of perception (for example, even pleasure or displeasure)”²⁵⁷, is not to be added to this inner experience since the least empirical predicate, he says: “would destroy the rational purity of the science and its independence of all experience.”²⁵⁸

The reconciliation of reason with a self-caused certainty without the least concept and the necessity of inner intuition for everything to be known leads us to the notion of spontaneity of reason. Two notions out-stand in Kant’s description of the problem of self-caused ontological status. These notions are feeling and spontaneity. Spontaneity

255 CPR, page 329, A 343.

256 AS, page 23.

257 CPR, page 330, A 342.

258 CPR, page 330, A 343.

turns out to be a key concept for German Idealism by means of Fichte. Many commentators like Robert B. Pippin, have pointed out the action of the pure reason of itself in post-Kantian German Idealism. German Idealists were influenced by Fichte's undertaking and expanding this idea of spontaneity.

The idea of spontaneity, having taken into consideration the similarity between the “transcendental I”, the existence of our cognitive self-consciousness and the free will, seems to be signifying one important point: *the being of causality*. The unconditioned, uncaused pure reason and freedom in their cosmological meaning stand for, as Derrida says: “Idea in the Kantian sense”. We go beyond the determination, causality of nature, or we assume the Idea before the natural determination and reconcile the unknown, unfamiliar with known; or in Kantian terms, the objective reality that cannot be shown in the nature and the objective reality that can be shown in the causality of nature. Kant himself says, there are two kinds of causality conceivable to us. The first is the causality according to nature and governs the laws of nature. The other causality arises from freedom. The *being* of causality according to nature, which is the causality of the *causa* that happens, takes places, must happen as well. Therefore, it itself requires a *causa* since the causality of appearances depend on time-sequence. There remains thus, no room beyond natural within “the entire field of experience.”

However, the freedom in its cosmological meaning, is a different causality that seems to break the necessity of being given to inner intuition. Freedom, Kant says, is a pure transcendental idea and does not happen to be in time sequence. Spontaneity is the key for “the power of beginning” for freedom.

...reason creates for itself the idea of spontaneity which can begin to act itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality.²⁵⁹

Here Kant defines the ontological status, the being of causality of freedom by privileging reason with a (power or faculty) of acting itself. On the other hand, the being of causality of nature remains open for discussion and yet there is no relation between the freedom of the transcendental I and the thing in itself.

On the other hand, Kant in *Solution of the Cosmological Idea of Totality in the Derivation of Cosmical Events from Causes in the Antinomy of Pure Reason*, acknowledges the relation between the transcendental idea, and moral action by means of which free will for disinterested action can be established and consequently marks the difference between humans and animals:

It should especially be noted that the practical concept of freedom is based on this transcendental idea, and that in the latter lies the real source of the difficulty by which question of the possibility of freedom has always been beset. Freedom in the practical sense is the Will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses.²⁶⁰

Thus, man possesses independence from any coercion. In Heidegger's words, man possesses freedom. The possession of freedom relies on the power (faculty) of self-determination in Kantian anthropology that is free from being preceded by an antecedent in time. Heidegger reads this transcendental idea as a rupture of man from its most ownliness as I argue in the introduction. Kant recasts the transcendental I as the possibility of disinterested actions and refers to something beyond the appearances, which determine will for interested actions that is undetermined. Practical freedom for Kant, presupposes man's possession of freedom in its cosmological meaning (the transcendental idea) for the possibility of running up against the determination of natural

259 CPR, page 465, A 534.
260 CPR, page 465, A 534.

causes. That is how man can act against his natural will. Natural will is not free from time order whereas the very possibility of running up against what happens in the determination of “time-order in accordance with empirical laws”, is grounded up on a causality, which Kant says: “can therefore begin a series of events entirely of itself.”²⁶¹

Therefore, the highest principle of Kantian epistemology and morality remains inaccessible. The epistemological understanding of nature in Kant leads us to the possibility of generating laws of nature whereas it does not give the account for a unified totality of the universe. In section 9, *The Empirical Employment of the Regulative Principle Reason in Respect of All Cosmological Ideas of Antinomy of Pure Reason* Kant says, the principle of reason cannot answer to this question as it cannot be valid as a constitutive principle: “No experience of an absolute limit”, that is to say, no experience of any empirical and absolutely unconditioned condition is possible for Kant. It is impossible because we have to accept that such an experience would have as content “a limitation of appearance by nothing or by the void”, and in perception it is not possible to experience this limitation. Thus, we cannot answer the question of the unified totality of the universe by relying on the constitutive principle of understanding. In other words, we cannot prove a unified totality of the laws of nature. We can ground this cosmological question similar to other cosmological questions with the regulative principle of reason. Andrew Bowie argues that having abandoned the constitution of the laws of cosmos as a unified totality, we have “no philosophical answer to the questions of why we are able to synthesize intuitions in a law-bound manner or why we have a capacity for choosing to act contrary to natural inclination.”²⁶²

261 CPR, page 465, A 535.
262 AS, page 24.

That is to question the relation between the idea of the universe and the freedom of moral action. Is it irrelevant to the knowledge of the subject, how the nature functions although the subject should act against her natural tendencies that are dependent on the laws of nature?

As I pointed out the similarity between the privileged ontological status of the transcendental I and the idea of freedom, which are both self-caused but effect the nature, there must be a harmony between the moral action and the cognitive faculty or power (internal) and the external nature. This is the problem of locating ought with its necessity that makes it (locates it!) beyond- for Derrida also *before* that is indifferent to beyond in this context- nature within the nature of laws, not beyond but in a belongingness to nature because it is the subject who acts within the laws of nature. Indeed it is the problem of a transcendental subject in transition to an agent within the life world. An a-temporal faculty or power faces the temporal causality of which she experiences empirically and thus has the knowledge in a certain way. She can and thus has to, *ought to* act in opposition to her natural inclinations which are understandable in the following nature; by virtue of a non-empirical ground. What happens, what comes to presence cannot be understood in terms of ought. Kant says:

Ought expresses a kind of necessity and of connection with grounds which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is, what has been or what will be. We cannot say that anything in nature ought to be other than what in all these time-relations it actually is.²⁶³

The location of ought preoccupies most of the post-Kantian thinkers with regard to the need to reconcile value and fact that dominated the nineteen and twentieth centuries. For intellectuals of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries like Derrida, the traces

263 CPR, page 472-73, A 547.

and trails of overwhelming precedors are not possible to do away with. The location of ought, or spatialization if we want to use Derrida's own word, is to be undertaken as if to keep it safe from undergoing a moment of the history which is not left by Hegel outside the spontaneity of mind. The contingent of the outside is not left outside in itself because knowledge is not limited to "what is, what has been, or what will be" for Hegel. What happens, comes to presence in time is indifferent to the process of the development of mind. So, what Kant says in the *Antinomy of Pure Reason* is this: the content of the forms of knowledge is a "limitation by nothing or by the void" and we can say nothing about this limitation and accordingly about the unified totality of the universe for Hegel. The nothing, with relation to what the foundational thought of being is determined, is also something. That is to say, something is a kind of being, which is because it is something relative to other somethings and is not because the foundational thought is inadequate, relative to the unified totality of universe. The limitation, the inadequacy, the nothing, since the consciousness is aware of this limitation and inadequacy, serves for a new form of consciousness. This new form is the direction of the spontaneity, movement of the consciousness and by means of this direction, it is triggering. Consciousness is forced to move forward and surmount, supersede the inadequacies in the search of true knowledge. So, the limitation of the form of consciousness in Kant, about which we cannot say anything, is not an end for Hegel for the justification of true knowledge. It is rather the beginning. We begin with this foundational thought of being and via negating it we move forward when there is nothing that can be negated. This is the end for Hegel. This is the phenomenology of consciousness which is nothing but the development of the consciousness of the idea of the freedom. The end of this voyage is where there is no negation and thus necessary triggering for the idea. Idea has no longer

been unknown thing in itself. There will be no mediation and difference between the reality as appearance because idea knows what really is in itself. Rational is real; real is rational at the final step of consciousness's knowing itself. The voyage through the necessary moments of history leaves nothing outside of the unified totality of universe. The Derridean spacing claims for a place that is supposed to intervene this unified totality of universe which can (must) be articulated rationally.

6.2.Heideggerian Politics

Heideggerian politics in relation to the question of Being shows us a reading of the history of the West in which the empowering of the power of beings as a whole takes place. Heideggerian questioning in this sense is towards a true interpretation of spirit. To do so we need to consider our holistic being in the world. Our holistic being in the world means that we are constituted in relation to Being. The forgetting of our relation to Being gave rise to the decline of the West. Language is the constitutive determination of our being in the world. Similar to the attempt to the true interpretation of the history of the West, we need to interpret truly the constitution of language. We need to realize the “mis-relation and un-relation”²⁶⁴ of language to Being. The mis-relation and un-relation of language to Being is the reason of the misinterpretation of empowering of the power of beings as a whole. The true interpretation of the constitutive determination of language can be achieved through realizing the naming power of Being. The decline of the fate of West can be re-established by means of the representability of the Being in its exemplifications. These exemplifications can be interpreted truly in their significance in their “presence to and availability for possible human engagement”. The Heideggerian novelty of a direct interaction and availability of beings in a direct experience of Dasein

264 Sheehan Thomas, *Kehre and Ereigniss, Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics*, Yale University Press, London, page 7.

on one hand, leads to an important possibility of re-establishing the mis-relation to language in this sense: being-out-there is equated to appearing-as. The naming power of Being is not a means of interpreting any entity's, any being's ontological (thatness, whatness, howness) meaning. On the contrary, since the ontological status of an entity, it's being-out-there is indifferent to it's appearing-as, it's givenness, Dasein's relation to language is a relation to entities available to them in his interest. On the other hand, the basic condition of Being that compromises our being in the world, our common beingness to entities as a whole, can be attempted to be understood beyond the limits of this relation.

That is a double bindedness in Heideggerian thought, which I think turns out to be an overwhelming tendency to ask the question of (the meaning) of Being, to question the fate of the West in the oblivion of the “enabling power” of Being's naming. This tendency pushes the relation of Dasein to language, the relation of Dasein's interest, concern in the availability of entities, the relation of Dasein's practical interest. The experience of a direct contact with entities is pushed beyond the constitutive determination of language, therefore beyond the ontic limitation. The experience of ethical in this sense is a passage to the true interpretation of the meaning of Being as a remembrance(Andenken).

The holistic understanding of being in the world in the commonness of the Being of beings thus, presupposes an understanding of Being (Seinverstandhisse), an understanding of openness, responsiveness and responsibility attuned to Being; Being that can be understood only in its naming and thereby ontic limitation. However, the re-establishment of the un-relation of Dasein to the language, through the openness in the experience of the ethical, unfamiliar otherness, through the passage of true (poetic)

interpretation of presence and availability of Being is possible by running up against this limitation. The political consequence that can be drawn from this overwhelming violence of the opening up of Being, which is attempted through the passage of poetic thinking, leads to an essential submission of the private to the public. As I discussed above in *The Grammar and Etymology of Being*, Heidegger seeks the ungraspable, unfamiliar beyond ontic limitation by means of the Greek grammar. Greek terms *enkklisis* and *ptösis* mean inclination, “taking and maintaining a stand that stands erected high in itself” and accordingly has the possibility of running up against its own *peras* (limit). The fate of the West is related to this coming to be of Being in its limits, restraints and at the same time, against these restraints. The interpretation of this coming to be, Being as *Ousia* is understood as An-Wesen in German. An-Wesen is towards the completion (Vollendung) of the aim, the *telos* of Being and the exemplifications of Being. Being of beings in its coming to be holds sway, (Walten). It is towards this completion and before Dasein's apprehension of it. That is how the experience of Dasein, via the experience of dis-worlding, uncanny is open to this primordial struggle, *polemos* and faces the “position, status and rank” of this primordial struggle. That is to say, the father of all, *polemos* conditions the possibility of what comes to be and the private experience of human beings is open to this unfamiliar common essence of beings within the limits of Being. Heidegger says, this overwhelming sway is sustained by the works of philosophers, poets and statesmen. The experience of unfamiliar is a means for getting over the decline of West through particularly the works of poets. The decline started after the end of struggle, when the present-at-hand objects left deserted by Beings. The experience of ethical thus, leads us to an emancipatory gatheredness of logos by the passage of true interpretation. The place of this unfolding of the unfamiliar and our

experiencing of this unfolding is language. The ontic limitation that seems to be the limit of our understanding is the context where the naming power of Being opens itself up in the Being of beings and then withdraws from the ontic limitation by leaving a *trace* for us. This trace is sought, instead of the isolated transcendental strategy of “I”, by “We”. That is what Heidegger means by saying “It is the time of We now!” The unfolding and withdrawal of Being is the possibility of language as the sayings of Being from the most definite abstract *be*, to determinate inflections. Thus, human beings as sayers experience the sayings of Being in language and seek the true interpretation that leads us to the common essence of We are. Poetic thinking, as the place of this passage to the true meaning of Being, is indeed an attempt to run up against the limits of language. It is an attempt to re-establish an essential link between the inspiration of the private ethical-aesthetical experience to a political emancipation within which the appeared differences fade away in the basic condition of Being.

To do so, Heidegger focuses on the double bind of our experience of the ethical and aesthetic. Not only does Heidegger provide an alternative experience of the unfamiliar as otherness in its unconcealment, but also discusses the otherness of Being as the restrictions of Being. In *The Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger teaches us how to deal with the manners of speaking through, which Being is with its other. That is to say, Being, in the relation between said and saying, in its restrictions becoming, seeming, thinking and ought is the direction of our course of questioning Being. We are summoned to venture the unfamiliar in the restrictions of Being, particularly in thinking and ought, in order to re-establish our interpretation of the meaning of Being. The restrictions of Being show us, the happening of the unfamiliar that is available to us in poetic thinking is not an otherness, a nothing that belongs to the rational progress,

rational encompassment of the concept. Unlike dialectical rendering of nothing a part of concept, I think Heidegger provides us the ground of considering irrational progress by teaching us that nothing is not a path to travel through, but to face the coming forth of Being in its restriction as seeming. It is a con-frontation of Being as *Phusis*, as a coming forth and retreat.

Heidegger makes a significant distinction between our goal-directedness as placeholders in the world and Being as *Phusis*. The misinterpretation of the meaning of Being by rendering the meaning of Being our explanations and dealings with entities, is the main reason of the decline of the West for Heidegger. Therefore, Heidegger on one hand teaches us a possibility of a direct experience of the unfamiliar by means of facing not-Being, nothing and opens a possibility for irrational progress. On the other hand, having privileged the poetic thinking as a mediator, a passage through which Being unfolds itself beyond our dealing with its seeming from certain perspectives and goal directedness, points to an attempt of (an impossible) true interpretation of the meaning of Being. The emancipatory concern in Heideggerian thinking, particularly after 1930's, refers to a Greek passion of facing the overwhelming violence of Being in spite of the modern lack of passion. The basic conditions of Being determines this worldly intentionality and thus, Heideggerian irrational progress is a transformative of the practical and political. Political action is to be shaped and driven by the basic conditions of Being and thereby depends on a counter-violence doing. This can be achieved by poetic thinking as remembrance (*Andenken*). Poetic thinking is a means of apprehension of the unfamiliar, otherness of being in the world towards daily interests and goals. Poetic thinking is a kind of destiny-revealing function that functions as a passage to the traces of gods in their retreat. Metaphorical thus, is a possibility of which does not exist,

but is attempted to be achieved in the retreat of unfamiliar (gods) and in this attempt has the most influential power for humanity. The true interpretation of the meaning of Being depends on metaphorical within which Being stands against thinking and is re-presented in its stand as the otherness, unfamiliar of poetic thinking like an object(Gegenstand).

The decline of the West had started with the mis-relation of human being to language, which the science of language, logic views as it's object, as the idea. Idea is what seems to human beings in harmony with their goal-directedness and thus, the object of episteme is limited with instrumental and technical thinking. In order to re-establish this mis-relation that gave rise to the fall of West, we should seek a “most rigorous, originary thinking, the creative thinking of poetry and attempt to Being as *Phusis* instead of *eidos*.” In this respect for Heidegger, logos gains an authentic gathering meaning beyond the relation between discourse and word. Human beings are in a mood of vigilance in their responsive attunement to hear what is not audible. The “absently present” logos unfolds and withdraws in the ontic-ontologic difference and thereby, gives rise to the alternative history of west.

The re-establishment of the mis-relation of human beings to the alternative history, which means actualization of values is linked together in the re-empowering of the secret ontological status, the Being of value. Heideggerian ethics thus, offers us an imperative force of the Kantian categorical imperative that seems to him lacking power because of its vague ontological status. The remembrance of “the highest contending”, *Polemos*, that is the most beautiful as the highest order in itself, brings human beings to their most ownliness, or the closest place to their most ownliness. Our direct experience of the unfamiliar opens human beings to the real force of imperative. The will to power is possible if we attribute a Being to value instead of arguing its universal validity. Facts

are opposed to value within the limits of thinking in transcendental strategy. Heidegger, having rejected Nietzschean nihilism that renders Being as empty word, pushes the limits of meaning of Being towards *Polemos*; the originary struggle, the father of all that characterizes the meaning of Being.

6.3.Derrida and the Political

Derrida says, the privilege of questioning is one of the four “areas of hesitation” in reading Heidegger. In 1986 Jacques Derrida presented a paper on his reading of Heidegger. In his oral delivery, Derrida talks about four topics that he says, are “threads to be drawn out”. The four threads are:

1. The privilege of questioning
2. The privilege of essence
3. The thought of life and animality
4. The thought of epochality

The privilege of questioning and the necessary affirmation of “Yes saying” that is called for by questioning are crucial to see the the Derridean position on Heidegger. I suppose, this area of hesitation in Derrida's reading of Heidegger leads us to see the coming forth of alterity, otherness and accordingly the ethical and political of deconstruction. The privilege of questioning brings out a moment of alterity, which can be read as an affirmative gesture. Derrida says, the moment of alterity is called for in Heidegger as the mode of thinking. Thinking is a calculative means for the technological that points to the oblivion of the fundamental ontology to which Heidegger subordinates all sciences. The mode of thinking as which the “why” question is asked in dignity, solemnness and sobriety, is privileged in its belongingness and difference to Being. The privilege of questioning is necessarily a limit, an ontic limitation of Being according to the difference of thinking and Being. What Derrida sees as a thread in this relation is a necessary affirmation. It is necessarily an affirmative gesture in terms of its (the

privileged fundamental ontological questionings) being a particular form of discourse.

Derrida says:

Questioning is a particular form of discourse one could perform a grammatical, rhetorical, and pragmatical analysis of it.²⁶⁵

Thereby, questioning itself is a performance as an affirmative gesture. One engages, promises an affirmative “Yes saying” in questioning. One puts her position at a limit concerning Heideggerian belongingness-difference relation between the mode of thinking and Being. Derrida works on this position at the limit and deconstruction works at the limit, showing us that questioning is a repetition, is an always-already promise, a preference of speaking, addressing the other rather than doing nothing. Even “No saying” is a an involvement in communication. Saying itself is “an” experience of addressing the other rather than not doing anything.

How does really deconstruction work at the limit?

Deconstruction shows us an affirmative gesture, in Heideggerian sense an attempt to question the unquestionable, which is necessarily an involvement in a linguistic activity. The early Heideggerian and later Wittgensteinian position on language, as Richard Rorty says, meeting each other while each going to opposite directions, had thought us that Being can only be questioned under erasure, and it is where we do not say anything. We remain silent. In this sense, deconstruction points to what has already been in language using. Nevertheless, deconstruction also points to the problematic of the assumed originary of an affirmative gesture. Derrida would say, you do nothing but trace a trace. Therefore, deconstruction refers to what remains beyond the linguistic activity. By doing so, it shows that the closure between silence and speech acts is a limit

265 Derrida Jacques, *On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium, Research in Phenomenology*, 1991.

that works. It shows us that, the path of philosophy has already been preceded with its alterity. The call of the alterity of logocentricism is shown to have always-already been before its path of questioning, path of philosophy.

Deconstruction thus, reminding us the replacement of difference by difference, puts forward an alternative ethical-political to that of Heideggerian. The relation between the privileged questioning, the gesture of affirmation and its alterity can be nothing but a repetition of an always-already something else. Deconstruction refers to this something else, as the call of the other preceding the affirmative “yes saying”. This relation offers us an alternative ethical experience with regard to that of Heideggerian experience of the ethical and its political consequences. The necessary involvement of “yes saying” means a necessary contamination.

Deconstruction views the privileged questioning as always-already with its otherness with regard to “how?” as inseparable from “why?”. Recalling the Leibnizian question “Why are there beings rather than nothing?” is always-already thought and asked with a technique. How can we ask “Why are there beings rather than nothing?” Thus, the question that Heidegger endeavors to privilege in order to shelter the passage to the meaning of Being can only be thought or/and asked in a particular form of discourse, in other words in contamination. We are always-already engaged in technique as the alterity of the sheltered, pure passage to essence. The moment of affirmation, “Yes saying” thus, is always-already doubled by its alterity. This alterity, the trace, cinder of an intended pure essence shadows the intention of the speaker. The trace thus, shows us the repetition, memory, technique, parasitism. That is “in a word”, Derrida says, *contamination*.

Derrida says: “the trace is an ever-renewed affirmation of questioning: “Yes, one must question!” and “Yes, one must question again!” The 'yes' of affirmation must always be confirmed by a second 'yes': affirmation promises the memory itself.”²⁶⁶

What does deconstruction exactly do by showing the always-already supplementarity of an intended purity? How can we attribute this philosophical possibility problem to ethical and political?

I think, what Derrida means when he says “Deconstruction is put to work” is nothing but an attempt of making use of the Heideggerian experience of the ethical. That is to say, the conditions of possibility are shown to be at the same time conditions of impossibility. Moreover, and I suppose here lies the ethical and political course of deconstruction, deconstruction points to the consequential effects of the promise of “Yes saying” by means of making use of the Heideggerian originality in the experience of the ethical. Derrida suspends the Heideggerian attempt to provide a place to the secret ontological status of ought as Being *Ousia* but for the sake of progress, particularly for democracy to progress, democracy to come. Derrida proposes to act as if Being comes to presence itself, as if it is available to us in the work of art, in the traces of the unfamiliar that unfolds within and of the creative distortions of language. That is how we can read deconstruction as a pragmatic possibility.

If we go back to Derridean attempt to intervene the power of logos and the attempt to get over with Kant and post-Kantian philosophy by means of the location of the transcendental I within the contextual boundary of life-world, we can point out two interrelated issues :

1- Through Hegel we come to see that the action (via Fichte) of the transcendental I is not limited to the void but the devoid of the pure forms of knowledge, preceding

²⁶⁶ Ibid, page 172.

both nature and history, negates the limit and goes beyond the Kantian criteria for truth that is provided by the empirical world. Thus, the division between the idea and temporality within which finite things take place, is exceeded. The negation of the finite empirical things in time is nothing but the action, spontaneous movement of the idea towards its final step: to grasp itself immediately. The historical is the moment of absolute, idea. Thereby, the historical development of idea by means of recognizing its inadequacy, does not leave us at the end of finite, empirical realm for Hegel.

2- Instead of the power of the envelopment of logos in Hegel, Derrida can suspend the division between the idea and temporality and mark the limit. Derrida says, “The limit is at work.” and this is the place where the singular is in front of and at the same time before the universal. The secret impact of the transcendence of transcendental is put to work in terms of the Heideggerian experience of the ethical where the nothing is not a Hegelian moment of rational that is negated, but an ecstatic openness of the subject as being in the world. This is the temporalization of temporality, the movement of temporalization itself. In this sense, Derrida pursues a disruption, an intervention that marks the impossibility of any closure. Dasein thus, is to be aware of the impossibility of the history as concept's self-recognition. World is not placed before us for the negation and encompassment of the rational but is a place where Dasein acts in accordance with its goal directedness and seeks the impossibility of the being of disinterestedness, in other words being of ought.

What Derrida means by post-deconstructive subjectivity is, being in the world in an ironic awareness of the necessity of acting as if. Thereby, Derridean position is a post-Kantian one. We need to look into the place of categorical imperative in Kant again to see the Derridean position. We can consider the attempt of grasping the infinite,

which is not graspable, as an experience of ethical. We experience the finite, which is determined by the cognitive faculty. That can be given to intuition is determined, finite. The subject in itself by virtue of the idea of freedom, whose activity is a spontaneous one and is not given to intuition, is the capability, power that on the basis of intelligibility belongs to the intelligible realm, the infinite. This is the possibility of the connection between the finite and infinite, the necessary and freedom, the sensible and intelligible. It is by virtue of this subjectivity that the finite, singular, private and the irrational are subsumed to universal rationality. The relation of the rational and irrational parts of the subject marks a hierarchical order by means of which we are convinced to accept the determination of rational on the irrational regardless of the ontological status of the rational structure itself. Kant's rational self is not isolated from the phenomenal self. Phenomenal self is a counterpart of the rational and since it is not disjoined from the self-referential autonomous rationality, the conditioned, the phenomenal is in a communicative relation with the unconditioned, noumenal. Our irrational components are not out of touch in the decision making process. Rather, the power of the categorical imperative, the unconditioned form of "I ought" in relation to hypothetical imperative, overcomes it; the conditioned, contingent, particular desire. Kant says in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*:

It is concerned, not with the matter of the action and its presumed results, but with its form and with the principle from which it follows: and what is essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality.²⁶⁷

Although he seems to be founding our principle of action in the form of "I ought" by the demand of the reason itself, and indeed he does; the point we need to

²⁶⁷ Kant, *Groundwork*, page 88.

acknowledge is the togetherness of the desire, which conditioned with the unconditioned. The interested is subordinated and belongs to the disinterested; the unconditioned belongs to the *place*, “the space of the transcendental concepts”, which means intelligible world. The *place* of the unconditioned thus, determines the free responsible action in relation to the conditioned since it is the place, the space that embraces the natural conditions of the interestedness.

In the *Groundwork* Kant unites the motive of duty and the formal principle of duty with the respect (*achtung*) for the law. For Kant, duty is the necessity to act out of respect for the law. In other words, it stands before the possible enactment of universal law. It (respect) has a place that we have no insight but it is such a necessity that is beyond all motives. H.J.Paton in his well-know interpretation of the *Groundwork* says the proposition “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.” cannot easily be derived from the preceding explanations on the motive of duty and the formal principle of duty. The reason why Paton says the relevance of the definition of respect is not very clear and stands not very much in accordance with the preceding explanations, is respect’s relation to law. Kant says the moral law provides “an obscure feeling”. The place of the categorical imperative in relation to its *isness*, or in other words being, cannot be proved:

...the categorical imperative ... (if there is to be such a thing at all.)²⁶⁸

Thus, the applicability and implementation of respect as law relies on the *as if* ness of the isness, being of law rather than a taken for granted ontological status and determination of the isness of law. “But we are still not so far advanced as to prove a-priori that there actually is an imperative of this kind.”²⁶⁹

268 Ibid, page 87.

269 Ibid, page 87.

The secret ontological status of the categorical imperative in Heideggerian terms is attempted to be justified by Kant in his third Critique. To see the difference between the *isness* and *as-ifness* with regard to the determination of singular by universal validity, we need to look at Kant's unusual claim for the determination of the feeling of singular and its relation to supersensible.

According to the Kantian distinction between a certain philosophical knowledge and illusionary, feeling seems to be an exception that lacks objective criteria for universal validity. In many examples Kant argues for this distinction as we all know. Accordingly, we deduce that feelings of pleasure or displeasure; lacking universal validity for they are not given to categories that are the a priori conditions of certainty of the knowledge of the external world, belong to subjective sphere,

Thus, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, according to many interpreters, laying down the grounds of experienceability, left the feeling (of a beautiful object of pleasure or displeasure) out of warrantability. *Critique of Judgement* has been viewed to bring out this feeling and its relation to supersensible, the purposiveness of the external world, which is not given to a-priori categories and thus belongs to unknowable. In this third critique, Kant deals with the feeling of beautiful and the purposiveness of world that we can judge aesthetically in a reconciling way on the ought and beauty. It is, as is well known, an attempt by Kant to fill the gap he says, remained:

Hence an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, of that no transition from the sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first of which cannot have any influence on the second; and yet the second is to have an influence on the first.²⁷⁰

270 Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Judgement*, Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett, Indiana, 1987, page 15 (Hereafter CJ).

The power (judgment)²⁷¹ for sensing the beautiful, with refer to its being liked, felt by everybody, which is a “claim” included in it according to Kant, has an influence on the supersensible in the third critique. Kant says the claim is laid down by everybody who feels the *empirical and singular*. This claim, by means of which we refer to this feeling of singularity²⁷² to the intelligible, means that the supersensible shows the relation, distinctively a nonessential relation, between the singular and universal. The relation of beauty “suddenly” is related to the other supersensible, intelligible, the teleological character of nature. Both beauty and this teleological character of nature seem equal with refer to their escaping the categories, thus, lacking the certainty for universal validity. Both are indeterminate since they are not given to categories and determined by them. However, as Kant had already maintained in *Prolegomena*, lacking the certainty for universal validity cannot be so clear. In *Prolegomena*, Kant speaks of judgments of perception, which is to say, judgments that are about the feeling of singularity and beauty are possible without categorical determination but still “clear” and satisfactory”. So, escaping the categories does not necessarily lead us to conclude that we cannot have images or feelings. We have the images and the “feeling of singular” and we have the possibility to claim their universally shared validity without categorical application, determination. In *Critique of Pure Reason, Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding*, in the second edition, Kant says, the images and feelings are the “mode in which subject is affected”. These feelings are consequences of the act of spontaneity of our faculty of representation and this faculty is power of judgment. Therefore, they are combined by the act of understanding:

271 I'm following Werner S.Pluhar's translation.

272 My italics.

But the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination –be we conscious of it or not, be it combination or the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concept-is an act of understanding.²⁷³

Thus, our “empirical or non-empirical”, conscious or unconscious sense of feeling, has an undetermined yet clear and satisfactory presence.²⁷⁴

There is a “supersensible basis” as a commonness between the singular feeling of the subject and the purposiveness of the object in itself according to which Kant wants us to see these two concepts as equivalent. Regarding them equivalent in their supersensible, intelligible basis and the influence of their universal assents, links them to moral ideas. Another supersensible is the idea of freedom. The moral law contains the idea of freedom practically.

To sum up, Kant’s position on the three supersensibles and their relation to each other is as follows: we have three ideas of the supersensible; but these ideas belong to the same supersensible. Kant says:

...first, idea of the supersensible in general, not further determined, as the substrate of nature; second, the idea as the principle of nature’s subjective purposiveness for our cognitive power; third, the idea of the same supersensible as the principle of the purposes of freedom and of the harmony of these purposes with nature in the moral sphere.²⁷⁵

If we consider our “empirical or non-empirical”, conscious or unconscious sense of feeling, which has an undetermined yet clear and satisfactory presence, by means of the third critique, we can say that our imagination can work on a free basis that escapes categorical determination but still keeps a non-essential possibility for truth value of

273 CPR, B 130, page 151.

274 Here I follow A.C.Ewing’s *A Short Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* in which he claims the word combination in german (verbindung) can mean synthesis.

275 CJ, page 220, A 346.

some judgments. This non-essential possibility is the transcendence of the transcendental in the *as if*.

The unconditioned possibility of language usage as free work of imagination, or the singularity of textuality beyond determination, marks the absence of an essential universal validity for singular language usages. However, the need for (the trail, the cinder, the *as-ifness* of the *isness*, the *as-ifness* of the presence of) the universal, I think leads us to the pragmatic utility of the transcendental strategy of the logo-centric tradition. We need to “put to work” in Derrida’s words, make use of the universal besides the possibility problem. Possibility problem turns out to be impossibility problem and this problematization itself is indifferent to a performance that “makes us get busy developing a new theory”. Once we drop the distinction between literal and metaphorical, the free play of imagination is put to work as a possibility of going beyond the limits of literal (literal as a temporal agreement of language usages). That is an impossibility at the same time. The utilization of the suspension in the metaphorical between the possible and impossible is what Derrida says “working at the limit”. Deconstruction thus, having put the possibility problem into work, not only problematizes the possibility of the connection between the finite and infinite, the sensible and the intelligible, the experienceable and the inexperienceable, but also does make use of this expansion of limit. This problematization is similar to Rorty’s holistic pragmatism with regard to undermining the necessary conditions of the possibility of logo-centricism. In order to see this similarity, we need to remember what Derrida says on metaphor and the ironic awareness of *Yes* saying to the creative distortion of language in an open responsiveness and responsibility, of *as if* as the place where infinite has a non-essential and indispensable effect on singular.

Language is not a means to convey intelligible to sensible. Derrida undermines the possibility to use a *true metaphor* to reach the underlying truth of Being. The understanding of metaphors as false or meaningless presupposes a categorical difference between metaphorical and non-metaphorical. This distinction is valid with refer to an agreed criterion on what meaningfulness and truth are. If we go back to Kant's transcendental strategy to lay down the necessary condition of experienceability and to determine what is true, we see that transcendental requires imagination and its strategy relies on the constitutions of imagination. The synthetic power of subjectivity relies on imagination although Kant's main concern was to distinguish between the true and the illusionary. Therefore, to necessitate the contingency of the given, Kant presupposed the necessity and sufficiency of interpretation of the contingent empirical given. The inner transcendental spontaneity is to determine what is meaningful and true by imagination. The transcendental imagination's competence on grounding categorical differences between true and untrue, enabled transcendental philosophers claim that metaphors distort true descriptions. The Nietzschean challenge that truth is a mobile army of metaphors is the first great challenge for the possibility of such categorical distinctions. We are urged to see that philosophical descriptions are consisted of metaphorical components and to accept that metaphysicians have done nothing but used metaphors to sustain the true meaning of originary. Derrida sounds close to holistic pragmatism when he says the presupposition of the solution of philosophical problems by means of an a-temporal or non-spatial exterior stand-point of a transcendental signified, meaning and its separation from signifiers is not possible. Meaning and use are not separable since: "... it is impossible to dominate philosophical metaphors as such, from the exterior, by using a concept of metaphor which remains a philosophical product."²⁷⁶ Therefore, it is

²⁷⁶ *White Mythology*, MP, page 228.

not possible, it is impossible to make up a proper – non-proper distinction by relying on a usage that itself cannot be an exception as a distinctive pre-level. All usages as signifiers are rule governed in the sense that they belong to a play-off out of which more useful usages play themselves out. Thus, there is no possibility of granting a pre-intentional, pre-linguistic origin beyond what is used to describe it. Supplementarity refers to an impossible Archimedian stand point both for a transcendental signified and a transcendental subjectivity. The constitution of meaning has happened in and by metaphors whose naming power, unlike what Heidegger wanted us to believe, cannot provide a passage to Being as *phusis* and *alethia* and accordingly *logos* as *phusis*. The naming power remains in the endless play of signifiers. Derrida says, the origin of poetry cannot be divided between the pleasure of arriving at the true meaning of Being in its unconcealment and satisfaction of the needs of the speaker.

Poetic thinking for Heidegger was quite determinative concerning the course of political via ethical. Later Heidegger can be characterized as the philosopher of poetic thinking. He was interpreted due to his relation to Nazism, critique of technology, his interpretation of Nietzsche, Pre-socratics and Hölderlin. However, what mainly distinguishes him in his later period is his path of thinking, which can be seen as a questioning, a new kind of thinking that aims at reading the tradition anew. His link to tradition is neither a linear continuation of tradition nor a rupture. George Pattison says, rather it can be understood by paying attention to the history of Being which progresses with the events that appropriate in agent's encounter with the unfolding of Being:

The History of Being does not progress in the manner of a step-by-step linear development but by a series of leaps, yet Heidegger claims that these leaps are not random or arbitrary and have their own inner fittingness to the situation in which they occur; they are events of appropriation in which the

subjective act of appropriation is inseparable from the self-giving of Being.²⁷⁷

What Heidegger offers, with refer to the way of thinking, is a poetic way of thinking which seems to be the true way of responding to the events of Being. Art, as active bringing-forth, seems to be more original. Language, is not something that we speak, but it speaks itself. What it says can be attuned, heard, responded in poetry. It is kin to thinking. By thinking, which has a kinship with poetry we try to arrive at the beyond of familiar, the unfamiliar. Pattison says, thinking, with which we struggle to understand what we have not understood yet as well as trying to reach the beyond, is aroused by *aporia*. So, in case of poetry, the thinker is aroused by *aporia* and attempts to reach what is not reachable.

The work of art for Heidegger was an opportunity to encounter with things as their Being unfolds itself in them. Poetry, especially was such an art that other arts somehow were subordinated to it. Unlike the Hegelian hierarchical understanding of poetry, which was “a moment in the unfolding of spirit that was most truthfully and appropriately to be grasped by dialectical reason.”²⁷⁸, the significance of poetry was because of its possibility of advent to the unfamiliar. That is to say, for Heidegger the traditional understanding of the history of philosophy can be broken by virtue of the poetry and its responsiveness to the event. Heidegger takes a crucial step by privileging the poem. This step is towards re-establishing the true language by means of undermining the assertive character of language. Pattison says:

This step is crucial, because, having used his meditation on the thingly character of the work of art to undermine the domination of enframing (and

277 Pattison George, *The Later Heidegger*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, page 188-189.
278 Ibid, page 160.

thereby, apparently, dislodged language, logos, from its role as the defining characteristic of humanity), Heidegger is now about to reinstate language.²⁷⁹

Language is dislodged by its propositional use. Heidegger wants to reinstate the right concept of language in order to make it function as the “mode of the lighting projection of truth.”²⁸⁰ Thus, language has a primordial function that can bring what is as such out in the open. The openness of what *is* has been dependent on language alone in its primordial function of naming. “Naming first, brings beings into word and appearance.”²⁸¹ The privileged mode of bringing beings into words, poetry, is a medium of being in touch with truth. Poetry, is closely connected to thinking. Heidegger says “Thinking is almost a co-poetising.”²⁸²

Nevertheless, Heidegger is not to be understood as bringing philosophy to literature; as a philosopher who appreciates poetry in its literary meaningfulness. He is rather concerned with the essence of poetry which makes a philosopher think of Being. Heidegger privileges poetry. The reason why he does can be seen particularly in his appreciation of Hölderlin. Hölderlin was writing especially on German nationality, which was a major concern in the first half of 19Th century. His classical model of Greek culture was reconciled with German nationality in his works. What Heidegger emphasized within his lectures on Hölderlin’s poetry was the possibility of overcoming metaphysics. Nietzsche, the last metaphysician, was the other preoccupation that later Heidegger considers as a determinative corner stone for the future of Germany and the West. Nietzsche represented the Dionysian as a kind of trans-historical dimension of life, the Dionysian element in life, as it were, the absence of the old Greek gods.

279 Ibid, page 161.

280 PLT, page 73.

281 PLT, page 73.

282 PLT, page 162.

Thus, as the poetry makes philosopher think the unthought of the thought, Heidegger thinks what was not thought by Nietzsche, despite the feast of his thinking that he was not aware of himself, can be apprehended by the path of Hölderlin. "... Nietzsche the thinker is finally unable to deliver the feast promised by his thought, then we might turn to Hölderlin."²⁸³

Besides this, Hölderlin's inspiration for Heidegger was as follows: The Greek gods have fled. They are absent. However, the absence of gods turns out to be the condition of their being the subject matter of Hölderlin's poetry. For Heidegger, therefore, the absence of gods is their presence as the essence of their being present once upon a time. Gods were present in the past, their *Wesen* holds sway in its transformation into a deviation, an unfolding. Thus, past, as unfolding of Being is significant for future.

Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche as a new possibility for describing what is not describable, unthought was pushing Nietzsche to his own path of thinking through replacing the musical symbols with ordinary metaphors. For Nietzsche philosophy was neither science, nor poetry. Nietzsche pointed out the dilemma of philosophy as its irreducibility to one or the other. He says:

Philosophy is the form of artistic invention. There is no appropriate category for philosophy; consequently, we must make up and characterize a species for it what we are suppose to make up is a new way of describing.²⁸⁴

What philosophy is thus, should be invented in by a novel description without stepping into the pre-existing vocabularies of philosophers. What remains problematic in Nietzsche's case, however, is the contradiction of speaking with "a strange voice" and the attempt to access the readers to make them draw public concerns from this private

283 PLT, page 166.

284 Kofman Sarah, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, Translated by Duncan Large, The Athlone Press, London, 1993, page 1.

tone. For Nietzsche, this paradox was due to the inadequacy of the words. The words are subordinated to the Dionysian affirmation of life that must affect us by entering into our skin. Words should call for the dance since the mother of all arts, music can be understood by the listeners who have unmusical ears. That's why the metaphoric text strives to imitate music, symbolize music. This is another attempt to reveal the unfamiliar through familiar. Poetry for Nietzsche cannot replace the Dionysian music which does not attempt to address the listeners. An attempt to address listeners is an attempt to make the inaccessible accessible through metaphors.

Derrida is closer to Nietzsche in this respect, since Heideggerian attempt of transference (*metapherein*) of the true understanding and description of unfamiliar cannot be beyond the practical interests of the user. Thereby, the desire to imitate, to describe by analogy, (*mimesis, metaphor*) and the desire to act to satisfy the needs of the language user have been intrinsically blended. There is no possibility for a pure, pre-intentional level to be able to attend on the *place* where *logos* and *phusis* become one and the same. There is also no possibility for such a place to come to presence from within itself as a spatialization of self-presence. In other words, there is no place for the unfamiliar, Being as *ousia-parousia* presencing its presence. There is no privileged dwelling place that can be exceptionally described. There are plurality of descriptions through which all appropriations (including assumed expropriations) have been told and understood in and by metaphors. Derrida points to this impossibility with refer to Du Marsais in *White Mythology*:

Du Marsais believes that he can present the first metaphor as one example among others, as one metaphor among others. But we now have some reason to believe that this metaphor is indispensable to the general system in which the concept of metaphor is inscribed. Du Marsais does not give the other figure -the borrowed dwelling- as one metaphor among others; it is there in order to signify metaphor *itself*; it's a metaphor of metaphor; an

expropriation, a being-outside-one's-own-residence, but still in a dwelling, outside its own residence but still in a residence in which one comes back to oneself, recognizes oneself, reassembles oneself or resembles oneself, outside oneself in oneself. This is the philosophical metaphor as a detour within (or in sight of) reappropriation, parousia, the self-presence of the idea in its own light.²⁸⁵

The attempt to locate an impossible exteriority within and at the same time out of logo-centric tradition is not the point where pragmatism distinguishes itself from deconstruction as commonly accepted. Derrida places the (im)possibility of ethical and political in the idea in Kantian sense: *as if*. Richard Rorty drops the attempt to show that the conditions of possibility are indeed conditions of impossibility. Nevertheless, *as if*, particularly the novel in which the possibility of an impossible residence for ethical can happen, refers to a possibility of solidarity for holistic pragmatism. Having put the emphasis on the irrational progress, holistic pragmatism blurs the distinction between what a subject intends to do and what she does. The distinction between belief and desire is blurred and the hierarchical order between rational and irrational is no longer plausible. By means of a practice of justification, which is the criteria for what to do rather than what is believed true to be done is what we use for progress according to holistic pragmatists. The awareness of the impossibility and inability to privilege our purposes and interests over others' interest, and yet the practical necessity to make decisions and accordingly, choose among different points of views is an *ironic awareness* since we cannot believe that any of these perspectives can claim to be in touch with truth more than some others. The justification of moral and political choice as a possibility of progress thus, is limited with language within which we can arrive at temporal agreements. Language is the limit of justification but what is the limit of language?

285 *White Mythology*, MP, page 253.

This is the question where we can see the hinge between holistic pragmatism and deconstruction. Once we drop the idea that language took over the mission to grant what is the true knowledge of externality and self by virtue of correspondence, we can see that language is limitless like the power of imagination. Rorty says: “The limits of justification would be the limits of language, but language (like imagination) has no limits.”²⁸⁶

Derrida claims it is the power of imagination, (both the free play of imagination and transcendental imagination) that lets us consider the unfamiliar, inaccessible and inexperienceable *as if it is* for the sake of ethical and political. The experienceability of the unfamiliar is like a voyage, a voyage that we venture through the traversal that blurs the distinction between outside and inside. The voyage is the experience of the *poetic* for Derrida. The poetic experience is the experience of the ethical and touches subjectivity at a pre-level that precedes cognition. Derrida says: “... that very thing and precedes cognition here: your benediction before knowledge.”²⁸⁷ The touch to the pre-cognitive level points to an earthly level unlike Levinasian religious experience and that is how deconstruction is close to pragmatism at the *impasse* between ethics of care and politics. The poetic experience opens the otherness of us to us “beyond oppositions, beyond outside and inside, conscious representation”²⁸⁸. It is a dictation that dictates itself to us, demands *learning by heart*, learning beyond categorical differences like learning to handle a hedgehog; handling and loving a hedgehog beyond cognition, which is to be able to love what opens itself up and retreats at the limit- the limit Derrida says, is always at work- and understanding the otherness in her withdrawal by the heart. “A heart down there, between paths and autostrada, outside on your presence, humble, close

286 Rorty Richard, *Truth and Progress*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, page 224.

287 Derrida Jacques, *What Is Poetry?*, Translated by Peggy Kamuf, page 48.

288 Ibid, page 49.

to the earth, low down.”²⁸⁹ The hedgehog is “very lowly” for Derrida by means of which like a contamination we get in touch with earthly manners. The place of the coming to be of the unfamiliar is down here, it is not a gatheredness of gathering as logos, it is rather a dispersion that is open to chance and accident, it is open to the ironic awareness of *as if*, it is the place where *public and secret* come close. It is the place of the democratization of ethos where otherness has a right to be understood beyond the basic condition of being. It is the place of the hedgehog that “... right before your eyes: soundtrack, *wake*, trail of light, photograph of the feast in mourning.”²⁹⁰ The isness of the ought unfolds and withdraws, in other words promises itself in the earthly experience of the ethical.

The secret ontological status of *ought* remains secret but it is such a secret that keeps us engaged in a promise. This is the messianic promise. Like transcendence without transcendental, religious without religion, we choose to engage in this impossible promise in an ironic awareness of an infinite, impossible responsibility. The performative aspect of engagement in an impossible promise is moving forward from the undecidability, hesitation to contextual (ethical-political) decision. That is a movement towards an impossible justice, a justice that cannot be justified but we act upon the *as ifness* of its coming to presence. *As if* calls for an ironic awareness against which we engage in a promise for ethical in as much as we say something. Everything we say is “Yes saying” in this sense. We say “Yes!” to the impossibility of reducing messianic to contextual, idea in the Kantian sense to singular, undecidability to decision, justice to law, “radical trembling” of the ethical to a “situational we”. That is to say a “Yes saying” can happen, come to presence in an ironic awareness of *as if*.

289 Ibid, page 50.

290 Ibid, page 48.

In order to escape from the vicious circularity of the question of Being and remaining within the limits of metaphysics by using metaphysical terms, Derrida appeals to a suspension and transgression of the question of Being. Nevertheless, the passage from the ethics of care to political is a demand we cannot ignore. Thereby, we are supposed to deal with what is tangent to philosophy in a quasi-metaphysical, quasi-transcendental way within which we avoid a *situational we*. As Derrida says in *The Ends of Man*, the place of the happening of the alterity of man is lodged inside and at the same time outside the metaphysical discourse by means of this *quasi*. We want to keep the impact of the transcendental, in other words, the transcendence of transcendental for opening ourselves to an alterity that can vary in an unlimited way at the closure of metaphysics. Every different singularity can find a room in the multi-color, carnivalesque open-ended possibilities of descriptions where the limit of metaphysical discourse and fiction is at work. The political is an endless play of plurality where the basic condition of Being can no longer delimit the *time of we*. Imagination without categorical application, pushes the limit of legal thought from an exteriority that we act *as if it is*. The mystical foundations of legal thought is already a fiction that governs legal action.

Consequently, to meet the demand of singularity with ultimate respect is a possibility that is possible in and by fiction. The tone of the voice of the other as singularity and infinite responsibility touch us *before* the audibility of our own voice merely in and by fiction. The fictitious, the metaphysical cannot possibly be distinguished from proper, literal by virtue of the open-ended closure between categorical differences. The singularity and infinite responsibility touch subject, which is itself a democratic togetherness of quasi-selves and which no longer grants an essential

subordination and submission of irrational to rational. Thereby, the possibility of progress is not necessarily a rational progress. The *as-ifness* of the presence of the other *before* the audibility of our own voice reconciles practical reason with an historical unlimited progress. The alterity is at work *before* us like the fictitious foundation of legal thought that always-already has inhabited within the legal thought and outside of it. The absence of the presence of the place of this alterity marks the possibility of irrational progress by means of which the possibility of a passage from an ethics of care to a more democratic politics is attempted.

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APPENDICES

TÜRKÇE ÖZET

HEIDEGGER VE ETİK DENEYİM

Heidegger düşüncesinde etik ilk bakışta öne çıkmayan, genellikle yorumcularının doğrudan yönelmediği bir yer tutar. Ama bu etiğin tuttuğu yerin önemsiz olduğu anlamına gelmez. Bence tam aksine, tam da *yer tutuş* bağlamında etik, Heidegger düşüncesiyle deneyim alanının sınırlarına yaklaşır. Evet, Heidegger etiğin metafizik sınırlar içinde tartışılabileceğini açıkça söyler ama bilemediğimiz, bilinemezliğinde bıraktığımız etiğin metafizik olanaklılığının, etiğin bu dünyada kendisine bir yer açarak deneyimlenebilirliğe yaklaşmasının olanaklılığı olduğunu da anlatır bir yandan.

Tezimde, etik-metafizik ilişkisinin Heidegger düşüncesinde yeniden kurulmasını ve bu ilişkinin Yunan düşüncesinden yola çıkarak aşkın özneciliğin (*transcendental subjectivity*) deneyim kavramına –aşkın fenomenoloji de dahil olmak üzere– indirgemeci yaklaşımını aşmaya çalışan bir olanak olup olamayacağını tartışacağım.

Bizi Nietzsche'nin unutmamızı istediği şeyi hatırlamaya çağıran Heidegger, nihilizmden öteye geçme arayışıyla yeni bir ontolojik proje geliştirdi. Bu projesi etik - metafizik ilişkisinin gelip dayandığı etiğin temelindeki –bir sır olarak gizli kalmış ta olsa- metafizik statüyle bir hesaplaşma içeriyordu zorunlu olarak. Bizi kuşatan ötekiliğimizin, yani dilin, bizim aşına olduğumuz ve aşına olmadığımızla deneyimimizi sınırlayan belirlenimi yokmuş gibi yapabileceğimiz bir hesaplaşma olamazdı bu. Öteye geçme çağrısı ve dilin sınırları, Derrida'nın deyimiyle Heidegger'i ikili bir bağlılık (*double-bindedness*) içinde bırakıyordu. Heidegger dilin, ontik sınırların bilinebilirliğine kendisini açarken aynı anda geri çeken bir oluş biçimini ve bu deneyimin kıyısında, yaşadığı yaşam alanının içinde bir yerde durup aşına olamadığına yönelmenin, aşına

olamadığının kendisini açmak için bu yaşam alanında bir yer açmasının, bir yeri fethetmesinin riskini –heyecanlı, gerilimli, endişeli bir duruşun ve özgürlüğün insana sahip olmasına izin veren bir *evet!* değişim riskidir bu- etik ve metafizik ilişkisinin kuruluşunda bize duyurur. Bu ilişkinin olanaklılığını yukarıda söz ettiğim oluş biçimi ve risk alma bağlamında bir deneyim olarak tartışmaya çalışacağım. Bunu yapmak için Heidegger’de, özellikle 1930 sonrası, etik ve metafizik ilişkisini insanların ötekiliğiyle, aşına olmadığı, bilinemez olanla karşılaşması anlamında ele alacağım. Bu karşılaşma için etik deneyim kavramını kullanıyorum.²⁹¹

Etik deneyim anlayışı, diyebiliriz ki, deneye dayalı ve özne merkezli felsefe anlayışında kendisine bir yer edinmekte zora düşen etik ve estetik nedeniyle, modern yaşamda etik kavramların yeniden bir yer tutma olanağı arayışı olarak gündeme geldi. Değer, adalet, sorumluluk gibi kavramlar hem yaşamda gerekli olan, hem de özne merkezli felsefe anlayışının onların bu gerekli oluşlarını oluşları²⁹² bağlamında tartışamamasından dolayı ontolojik (varlık-bilimsel) yaklaşımın onlara verdiği yeri yitirmiş olan kavramlardır bir bakıma...

Etik deneyim bu kavramlar bir yer tutuyormuş gibi yapmayı denediğimiz bir deneyimdir. Bize olmayanın izini hâlâ varmış gibi sürdürdüğümüz bir yola çıkış, bir arayış olanağı sağlayan bir karşılaşma deneyimi...

Bu anlamda bir deneyim özneyi merkez alan düşünce geleneğine bir meydan okumadır. Etik deneyim düşünen öznenin yaşamdan yalıtılmış, hesaplayan ve düşüncenin olanaklılığıyla özgürlüğe –bilme ve eyleme özgürlüğüne– sahip olan ayrıcalıklı konumunu sarsan bir meydan okumadır. Özneyi ayrıcalıklı merkezi yerinden

²⁹¹ Kavramın ayrıntılı tarihsel tartışması için bkz.: Wood David, *Questioning Ethics, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy*, sayfa 105, Routledge, London, 2002.

²⁹² Oluş sözcüğünü *Becoming* anlamında değil, Almanca *Sein*, İngilizce *Being* kavramlarını karşılamak için kullanıyorum. Varlık sözcüğünü, Türkçe’de kullanımının İngilizce *Entity, Thing*, Almanca *Seiende* sözcükleriyle karıştırılabileceği için tercih etmedim.

ötekiliğe karşı edilgen ve böylece sorumlu, açık-uçlu bir yere, bir yer tutuşa çağıran bir meydan okuma...

Ötekiliğimiz, konuşan dildir. Kavramlarla yaşamı domine etmeye çalışan merkezi rolümüzü bırakıp kendimizi açık uçlu bir deneyimde yanıt vermeye açtığımız dildir.

Erken dönem Heidegger'de bizim kendimizi içinde bulduğumuz dil, günlük konuşmalarımız ve gündelik işlerimiz, eylemlerimiz içinde uyumla birlikte yer aldığımız, yaşadığımız ötekiliğimizdir. Akıp giden yaşamın üzerine düşünmeden, yaşamın içinde, uyumlu bir birliktelikle yanıt veren bir yerden başlar deneyim. Etik deneyim yaşam dünyası olarak bizi kuşatan dilin sınırları aşma deneyimidir. İnsan, kendisini içinde bulunduğu dilin sınırlarını aşma deneyimini düşüncesiyle sahip olduğu özgürlüğüyle, yani “yapabiliyorsun, öyleyse yapmalısın!” buyruğuyla²⁹³ değil, tam aksine bize sahip olan özgürlüğe kendisini açarak, yanıt vermeye çalışarak yaşayabilir. Özgürlüğün bize sahip olduğunun farkına varmamız yaşamla olan uyumlu iletişimimizin kesintisiyle uğradığı bir anda olur. Bize aşına olmayanla karşılaşmaya cesaret etmemiz, özgürlüğün bize sahip olmasına izin veren bir edilgenlik, açıklık ve oluşun (Almanca *Sein*, İngilizce *being*) olmakta olan şeylerde akıp giden uyumlu gündelik oluşunun kesintiye uğradığı bir deneyime kendimizi bırakmamızla olanaklı olur.

Batıdaki çürümüşlüğü, yozlaşmışlığın aşılması için ilham alacağımız, cesaret bulacağımız olanaklılık kendimizi bu hiçlik deneyimine, oluşun kendisini kendisi olarak

²⁹³ Burada Kant'ın kendi kendisinin sebebi olan iki nosyonundan – duygu ve kendiliğindenlik-kendiliğindenliğin (spontaneity) nedenselliğin oluşu (being of causality) olarak belirlenimin ötesine geçme olanağı, yani özgürlük idesi anlamında öznenin sahip olduğu (saf aşkın ide) bir şey olduğunu kastediyorum. Kategorik buyruk böylece, örtük te olsa ontolojik bir temele, ama yine özne merkezli bir özgürlük idesine dayanır. Kant “Vardır!” diyemediği bu kozmolojik ideye varmış gibi saygı duymamızı ister. Bu tartışmanın ayrıntıları için bkz: Bowie Andrew, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche*, Manchester University Press, 2003, Derrida Jacques, *Before the Law*, Kant Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kept Smith, palygrave,1929, sayfa 465 A 534 *Solution of the Cosmological Idea of Totality in the Derivation of Cosmical Events from Causes in the Antinomy of Pure Reason* (2. Edition) ve A.C. Ewing'in bu konudaki yorumu, Ewing, A.C., *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, University of Chicago Press, Reissue Edition, 1996.

açışına en yakın yerde meydana gelmesine bırakmamızdır. Modern insanda eksik olan tutkuyu bu deneyimin en güzel örneğini oluşturan Yunan tragedyelerinde bulabiliriz. Oluşun kendisini kendisi olarak açışının en yakın olduğu yere, şiirsel düşünme aracılığıyla ulaşmaya çalışmalı, bu yola çıkış deneyimini göze almalıyız.

Letter on Humanism'de Heidegger Heraklit'i yorumladığında bu yola çıkışın çarpıcı bir anlatımıyla karşılaşırız. Etik, *ethos*'un “yer tutuş” anlamında yorumlanmasıyla unutup yitirdiğimiz orijinal anlamına yaklaşır Heidegger'e göre.

Etik kendisine yer bulmakta zorlandı çünkü düşünce biçimimiz uzun bir süredir özne merkezli felsefeyle biçimleniyor, dış dünyada ne olduğunu ölçüp biçerek anlamaya çalışıyor. Modern düşünce öznenin karşısına aldığı nesnelere bilgisine nasıl kesinlik kazandıracağını, nesnelere bilgisinin nasıl olanaklı olduğunu araştırıyor. Böylece öznenin dış dünyayı bilmesinin olanaklılık koşulu olarak –Kant'ın söylediği gibi algının saf önsel (*a-priori*) formları- zaman ve uzay dış dünyadaki nesnelere olup olamayacağını belirliyor. Deneyimleyemediğimiz etik Kant'ın bizden saygı duymamızı istediği bir ide statüsünde, bilemesek de inanmamızı talep ettiği, bize yabancı, aşına olmayan, dolayısıyla da bilebildiğimiz, aşına olduğumuz deneyimlenebilen dünyada yeri olmayan bir statüde kalıyor. Heidegger bu statüye “gizli ontolojik statü” diyor ve şöyle açıklıyor:

Böylece, modern çağda düşüncenin kendi kendisine yeten akıl olarak belirleyicilik kazanmaya başlamasıyla oluş ve yapmalısın (*ought*) buyruğu arasındaki ayrım tamamlanmış oldu. Bu süreç Kant'ta tamamlandı. Kant için şeyler doğadır –başka bir deyişle, belirlenebilir ve belirlenmiş olan her şey matematiksel-fiziksel düşünce tarafından belirlenebilir. Akıl tarafından ve akıl olarak belirlenmiş olan kategorik buyruk doğanın karşıtıdır.²⁹⁴

²⁹⁴ Heidegger Martin, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Translation Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Yale University Press, 2000, s. 212, Türkçesi Cihan Camcı. (Bundan sonra IM)

Böylece özneyi merkeze koyan felsefe ontolojik olarak yapmalısın buyruğunu olgulara, doğaya karşı konumlandırıyor.

Heidegger'in özgünlüğü özne merkezli felsefenin bilebildiğimiz, aşına olduğumuz (*familiar*) ve bilemediğimiz, aşına olamadığımız (*unfamiliar*), öteki ayırımına farklı bir yorum getirebilmesidir. Etik deneyim bu yorumun açılımıdır diyebiliriz. Özne kendisine aşına olmayanla bir karşılaşma deneyimliyor. Onu, kendisine aşına olmayanı bilinemezliğinde bırakmak yerine onunla, bilemediğiyle farklı bir ilişkiye giriyor. Riskli bir ilişki...

Heidegger'in etik deneyimi Kant'ta olduğunu söylediği “gizli” ontolojik statünün açığa çıkmasına yönelmiş bir deneyimdir. Karşısına aldığı nesnelere kategorize etmeye yönelmiş bir deneyimden farkı, bu deneyimin kendimizi fırlatılıp atılmış bulduğumuz dünyada bizi – “artık *biz* zamanı” diyen Heidegger Kant'çı aşkın öznenin, *benin* yerine *bizi* geçirir sessizce - kuşatan ve bize öncel olan ötekiliğe kendimizi açarak yaşadığımız bir deneyim olmasında. Bizi sessiz bir çığlık gibi kendini açan oluşun sesini duymaya çağırın davetin deneyimi ... Bu deneyimde aşına olmayan aşına olanın olduğu yerde olabilme, kendisine bir yer açabilme olanağı bulacaktır Heidegger'e göre. Böylece etik, unuttuğumuz orijinal anlamını, gizli oluşun, yani “gizli ontolojik statünün” aşık oluşu gibi yeniden bulacaktır. Heidegger'in Heraklitos'u yorumlamasını bu bağlamda okuyabiliriz:

Heraklitin yalnızca üç sözcükten oluşan bir söyleyişi ethos'un özünü (essence) açığa vuran bir yalınlıkta şöyle der: ethos anthropoid daimon. Bu genellikle “Bir insanın karakteri onun tinidir (daimon).” olarak çevrilir. Bu çeviri Yunanca değil modern düşünüyor. Ethos sözcüğü insanların bulunduğu yer, açık alan anlamındadır. Bu açık yaşam alanı, insanın özüne ait olanın, insana ulaşmasına ve ona yakın olarak yer tutup insana görünmesine olanak verir. İnsanın olduğu yer onun özüne ait olanın gelişini içerir ve saklar. Heraklit'in söyleminde bu daimon tanrıdır. Fragman şöyle

der: “İnsan bir yerde yaşar (dwells) ve insan olarak kaldıkça burası tanrıya yakın olan yerdir.”²⁹⁵

Heidegger etik deneyimin nesnesini içinde bulunduğumuz dünyaya, her gün birlikte yer aldığımız nesnelere uyum içinde olduğumuz yere indirir. İndirir diyebiliriz ama dikkatli olmak koşuluyla ... Aşına olmadığımız, Heraklit’in fragmanında tanrının kendisini açması, bir perdeyi çeken görünmeyen elleriyle kendisini aşına kılmaya yaklaşmasıyla burada-olmaya iner. Bu inişle etik-ontoloji ilişkisi yeniden kurulabilir. Ama bu, *-transcendental* ya da eleştirel- ontolojinin yaptığı gibi oluşu kavrama indirgemek değildir. Aynı zamanda, -bu nokta bize Heidegger’in geç dönem düşüncesindeki dönüşümü gösteriyor-, gündelik hayatın yapıp etmeleri içinde, amacımıza yönelik, pratik ilgilerimize yönelik yapıp etmelerimiz, oluşumuz ve düşüncemiz içinde bir duruşla, bir anlama biçimiyle, sıradan bir ruh haliyle deneyimlenebilir bir oluşa indirgemek de değildir. Aşına olmadığımız ötekiliğimiz dildir. Oluşun oturduğu ev olan dil, gündelik yaşantımızın dolayımı olduğundan ve bizi kuşatan, bize öncel, kendisini konuşan bir dil olduğundan, kendisini aşına kılanı, etik olanı deneyimlediğimiz olanaklılıktır.

Oluşun bize yakınlaştığı, yaşadığımız yer, evimizdir dil. Yersiz yurtsuzluğumuz bu yakınlıktan uzaklaşıp onu unutuşumuzdandır. Oluşa komşu olduğumuzu hatırlamalıyız! Bu bir öteye-geçme, insanın kendisini içinde bulduğu anlamı, bizim kullanmamızla oluşan anlamı aşma deneyimidir.

Dille elimize hazır gelen bir olanaklılık olarak karşılaşırız. Sorun dilin gündelik yaşamımızı kuşatırken karşılaştığımız, deneyimlediğimiz ontik sınırlılığın ötesine geçme zorunluluğunda ya da olanaklılığında, yani oluşun kendisinde, ontolojidedir. Daha

²⁹⁵ Heidegger Martin, *Letter on Humanism, Basic Writings*, Edited by, David Farrell Krell, Routledge, 2002, London, s. 256. Türkçesi Cihan Camcı.

doğrusu bu iki alanın farkında ... Yani ontik-ontolojik farkta. Etik deneyim işte bu farkın çizdiği sınırla ontik olandan ayrılan ve kendisini açan oluşa cevabi bir uzanış, yola çıkış, arayıştır.

Heidegger varoluşsal analiz (*existential analysis*)'in ön koşulu olarak *existentiell*,i yani ontik alanı, yani dünyada oluşu kuşatan günlük dil işleyişinin belirlenimini bize öğretirken bizim anlam sınırlarımızı çizmiş oluyordu. Alman düşünce geleneği Descartes'ten devraldığı özne ve karşısına düşünsel olarak koyduğu nesnenin (*gegenstand*) tasarımı (*representation*) ikili yapısını sürdürüyor, düşünsel yeti ve işleyişin uzayda yer kaplayan nesnelere (*extension*) anlamını ve oluşunu bilmenin olanaklılık koşulu olarak koşullanmamış bir koşul olduğunu kabul ediyordu. Bu, dünyada olmanın düşünsel olmayan (sözgelimi arzu, dehşet) itkilerini ve yönelim nedenlerini ikincil gören bir gelenek olarak felsefede ağırlığını hissettiriyordu. Hâlâ da hissettiriyor. Bu ağırlık oluşu bilmenin nesnesi olan, doğal olan nesneye feda ediyor, bilinebilen ve bilinemeyen arasında kesin bir ayırım tasarlarken bilinemeyene uzanma ve deneyimleme olanağını reddediyordu. Oluşun kendisi tek-tek olmakta olan şeylerde bulunamayan, yer tutamayan, aşına olamadığımız ve bilemediğimiz bir kavramdı. Öyleyse özne merkezli bu düşünce, “görünen ve bilinen neyin görünüşü ve bilinişi” sorusu, görünüşün ve aşıkâr oluşun kendisinin sorusu sorulmadıkça yalnızca görünüşe yönelik bir deneyimlemeyle sınırlı kalıyordu. Aslında deneyimin sınırlarını çizen Kant da, görünüşün görünmeyen bir şeyin görünüşü olduğunu, görünen ve oluşunu bilip deneyimleyebildiğimiz tek-tek şeylerin oluşunu itiraf ediyor gibiydi Heidegger'e göre:

Böylece görünüm deyimini iki anlama gelebilir: Birincisinde *görünmek* kendisini anons eden ve göstermeyen; ikincisinde ise bu anonsu yapan, bu *görünmede* görünenin görünmeyene işaret edişi. Kant'ın kullandığı anlamda “görünüm” terimi bu ikili yapıyı gösterir. Ona göre *görümümler*, ilk olarak ampirik sezginin (*intuition*) nesnelere dir: Onlar (görünümler) böyle bir sezgide kendini gösterendir. Ama kendisini gösteren şey (“fenomen”

teriminin gerçek anlamında) aynı zamanda kendisini bu görünümde *saklayan* bir şeyin açığa çıkışıdır, (*emanation*) bu görünümün kaynaklandığı bir şeyin açığa çıkışı; anons eden bir açığa çıkış.²⁹⁶

Heidegger, *Being and Time*'da bu pasajdaki Kant eleştirisi ile görünüm (*appearance*) sözcüğünün fenomen kavramını (*phenomenon*) karşılamadığını öne sürüyor. Görünümü Kant'ın kesinlikli bilmeyi yanılısamadan (*illusion*) ayırmak için bir sınır olarak deneyime getirmesi Heidegger için epistemolojik indirgemeciliğin tikanışıdır. Fenomenoloji bu noktada dursaydı, görünen tek tek şeylerin ampirik sezgi (*intuition*) sınırında oluşlarını deneyimlemenin ötesini düşünemeyecekti. Oysa fenomen kavramı bize bunun fazlasını söz veren, sunan bir kavram. Görünüm bir referans ilişkisini anlatır. Bu referans ilişkisi, fenomen kavramını Yunanca düşündüğümüzde kendisini açan, gösteren bu açış ve kendini gösterme, kendi içinden olanaklı olan bir oluş olarak anlaşıldığında anlamlıdır ancak. Heidegger bu noktada özne merkezli felsefenin anlam ve yanılısama ayrımının sorunlu bir ayrım olduğuna işaret ediyor ve yine *Being and Time*'da, fenomenin “Kendisini kendi içinde gösteren ve ayrı, farklı bir biçimde karşılaşılabilecek bir *anlama işaret ediş*”²⁹⁷ olduğunu söylüyor.

Bu karşılaşma yaşanan bir deneyime (*erleibnis*) karşılık gelen ve bizim oluşun kendisine doğru yöneldiğimiz bir karşılaşmadır. Peki ama nasıl? Görünüm ve Fenomen arasındaki ilişkiyi Heidegger *erscheinen*, görünmek yüklemiyle karşılıyor. Görünmek görünümün oluşa ait, ona bağlı ve ondan ortaya çıkan anlamında kullanılıyor. Fenomen bu bağlamda oluşun oluşu gibi anlayabileceğimiz, görünene olanak veren şeydir.

Görünüm-fenomen ilişkisine daha yakından bakmak için Heidegger'in bizi Yunanca düşünmeye çağırmasının *erscheinen* yüklemiyle ilişkisini düşünmemiz gerek.

²⁹⁶ Heidegger Martin, *Being and Time*, Translated by, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell Publishers, s. 50, Oxford, 1995.

²⁹⁷ Agy. s. 54

Fenomenin olanak verdiği şey bize aşına olmaya açılan, ulaşılabilir, elde edilebilir bir oluşturmaktadır. (*Being as Ousia*) Bu *Ousia* olarak oluş Heidegger'e göre iki anlama geliyor.

Elde edilebilen, aşına olabileceğimiz, görünür olarak mevcudiyete neliği (*whatness*) ve nasıllığı (*howness*) içinde gelen şey.

Bu mevcudiyete gelişin, oluşun oluşu.

Birinci anlamda *Ousia*, bize görünür ve aşına, ulaşılabilir olmasının, yani ikinci anlamda oluşun oluşunun, ontik sınırlar içinde, görünür oluşunun otantik anlamda kökenidir. İkinci anlamda görünüm, birinci anlamdaki zamansal olmayan, *extension* anlamında bir uzamda anlaşılacak olan oluşun zorunlu bir sonucudur.

Heidegger *Logos*'u bu anlamda uzamı fetheden, anlaşılacak, aşına olabileceğimiz, zamansal oluşların olması için yer (*topos*) yaratan bir öncelik olarak yorumlar. Özellikle *Introduction to Metaphysics*'te perspektifler üstü bir *anlama* ya gönderme yapar.²⁹⁸ *Logos* ve *Phusis* ilişkisini bu anlamaya –edilgen, yanıt veren ve sorumlu bir etik deneyim olarak düşünebileceğimiz, özne merkezli anlamının eksikliğini vurgulayan bir anlamadır bu– çalışma, uzanma, kendini açma bağlamında tartışır.

Oluş-fenomen-görünüm ilişkisi, oluş-*Phusis-Idea* ilişkisine benzer bir ilişkidir aslında. *Idea* kavramını anlarken Batı literatürü onun anlamını oluş olarak yorumladı. Oysa *idea (eidos)* görünebilende görünen demektir. Bu görünebilende görünende bize bir görünüm, bir bakış açısı, bir perspektif sunulmuş. Batı düşünce tarihi bu sunulan görünümün sunulmasını, yani oluşunu düşünmekten kaçınıp Yunan söylemindeki oluş sorununu bir yana bıraktı. Ama geri dönmek zorunda kalacağımız, geri çağrıldığımız, bırakamayacağımız bir bırakıştı bu, unuttuğumuz ve hatırlamak zorunda olduğumuz bir

²⁹⁸ Bu *anlamının* ayrıntılı açıklamaları için bkz: *Introduction to Metaphysics*'te *Restrictions of Being* bölümünün *Being Thinking* ilişkisinin anlatıldığı kısmı.

bırakış... Nietzsche ise, -Heidegger'in ihanet edip etmediği kaygısını çok da duymadan dediği gibi- oluşu anlamsız bir sözcüğe indirgeyip bizi nihilizme mahkum etti.

Sunulanın sunuluşunu Yunanca düşüneceğiz! Böylece oluşun kendisini açan büyüyle, aşkın bir öznenin bilişsel tutumuyla uzaklaştığı bir deneyimin sınırlarını aşmayı deneyeceğiz. Sunulanın, görünenin, aşına olabildiğimizin içinde, başka bir yerde değil, ona dahil olan yerde, bizim önümüzde sunulan oluşla edilgen ve sorumlu bir karşılaşma, etik bir deneyim yaşayacağız. Şimdi bunu biraz daha açmak için Heidegger'in *eidós-phúsis* ilişkisini nasıl yorumladığına bakalım:

Idea sözcüğü görünebilir olanda görünen anlamına gelir. Bize sunulan karşılaştığımız her ne ise onun şu anki görünümü, *eidós*'udur. Bir şeyin görünümü, söylediğimiz gibi o şeyin kendi içinden kendisini bize sunması, var etmesi, mevcudiyete getirmesi (*presents*), yeniden sunması, yeniden var etmesi (*represent*) ve olduğu gibi önümüzde durmasıdır; görünüm bir şeyin kendi içinden ve kendi olarak kendisini var-etmeye-gelmesidir (*comes-to-presence*), bu da Yunanca anlamıyla olmak (*is*) demektir. Bu duruş, kendisinden var olmaya gelenin, öne çıkanın sürekliliğidir (*constancy*), *Phúsis*'in sürekliliği.²⁹⁹

Peki bu oluşun oluşu ve bizim perspektifimiz ile olan sınırı, farklılığı, yani ontik-ontolojik farklılığı nasıl olacak da aşacağız? Oluş (*Being*) belirlenmişlik (*determinedness*) olarak anlaşılabilirliği dışında düşünceye ulaşabilir mi? Şimdi bu gerilimli soruya Heidegger'in *Phúsis* yorumu açısından bakmayı deneyelim: *Phúsis*'in zamansal, geçici bir olay olarak olması, vuku bulması ontik-ontolojik ayrımı destekler. *Phúsis* bize aşına olanı kurarken aynı zamanda da geri çekilerek aşına olmayan olarak kalır. Heidegger bize etik deneyimi estetikle bağlayan şu öneriyi yapacaktır: Oluşun örtük, aşına olmayan, yabancı anlamına kendimizi yeniden düşünüşle açalım. Düşünüşe akraba olan şiirsel düşünüşle! (*Dichten*) Şiirsel düşünüş, oluş ve düşüncenin ikili

²⁹⁹ I.M. s. 192 - 193

ilişkisinde unutulmuş, orijinal olan ve görünümün bize ulaşması olarak, sesinin kulağımıza ulaşması olarak oluş olana uzanır ve örtünün kaldırıldığı *yeri* deneyimlemek için *evet!* der. *Etik zorunluluğun*, kendisini oluşta açtığı ve yer tuttuğu, bizim gündelik yaşama dünyamızda kendini uzatıp geri çektiği yerde, uçurumun kıyısında edilgen ve sorumluluğa davet edilmiş bir halde, olanaksızlığın olanaklılıkla sınırında, oluşun kendisini dışarı açışını deneyimleyelim. İşte bu *yer extension* anlamında, (uzay ya da mekân) anlamında bir yer değil, olmayanın oluşunun içinde “henüz-değil” olarak duyulamayacak sesine kulak verdiğimiz yerdir. Bu yer, oluşu unuttuğumuz yer, *extension* olarak durduğumuz ve teknik, hesaplayan, bilimsel bilgi (*episteme*)nin karşısına *idea* yı nesne olarak, yani karşıda duran olarak (*gegen-stand*) koyduğumuz, öznenin ayrıcalıklı ve izole olduğu bir yer değildir.

Bu yer evde olma konforunun ötesinde deneyimleyebileceğimiz, yaratıcılığın *extension* anlamında yerin anlamını, sınırlarını aştığı yerdir. Aynı zamanda ayrıcalıklı ve izole *ben*'den *biz*'e geçtiğimiz yer olarak *polis*'tir. Heidegger'in bizi unuttuğumuzu hatırlamaya çağırdığı yerde epistemik indirgemeciliği *biz* olarak ve bulunduğumuz bu yerde deneyimleyeceğiz. *Polis* tarihin olageldiği, vuku bulduğu yerdir. *Apolis* bunun sınırlarını aşma deneyimi (*Unheimlichkeit*) olarak yaratıcılığın şiddetle iç içe geçtiği bir yer (ya da yersizlik) deneyimidir bu anlamda. *Logos* ve *Physis*'in bir ve aynı olduğu, oluşun olmakta olanda kendini şiiresel düşünceye açtığı yer... İşte bu yer, Derrida'ya göre *Logos*'un bizi içine çeken kapsayıcı, bütünsel ve toptancı, tekilliği kendisiyle ilişkisi bağlamında anlamlı bulan bir ulaşılamaza ulaşma ödevidir insanlığa. Önemli olan şu ki, bu belirli bir *biz* e, belirli *bir yer* de verilmiş bir ödevdir. Nihilizmin ötesine geçmek için risk almak durumunda olan ve böylece bir cemaat (*community*)³⁰⁰ olan

³⁰⁰ Bu sözcüğün geçtiği metnin IM'de İngilizcesi şöyle: “Humanity is not this (an'I' and an individual) anymore than it is a *We* and a community.” IM.,p. 153.

biz'e, indirgeyici bir rasyonellikle değil, irrasyonel, metaforik bir açılışla verilmiş bir ödev.

Şiir ve metafor oluşun anlamına giden patika olarak insanlığın büyük dönüşüm ödevidir bu anlamda. “Evet!” demenin edilgenliği ve akıl dışının Diyonizyak coşkusu Nietzsche için hakikatin anlamını metaforların gezgin ordusunun dışında aramaktan vazgeçiş anlamına geliyordu. Nietzsche’de aktif unutma deneyimi bizi nihilizmden dışarıya çıkarmıyor, boş bir sözcük haline gelmiş olan oluşla yaşamın ilişkisi kurulamıyordu. Heidegger, oluşun anlamı üzerine yeniden düşünme ödeviyle bizi unutmaya değil hatırlamaya çağırırken - belki de Richard Rorty’nin iddia ettiği gibi Nietzsche’yi akademik jargona çeviren bir felsefe profesörü olarak kalmamak için - yeni bir hümanizm tanımı yapmaya yönelir. Heidegger’in ontolojik projesini bu yeni hümanizm anlayışı ile anlamamız gerekiyor. Artık tek bir bireyin izole edilmiş bilişsel anlama ve kavramlaştırmasına dayanan bir hümanizm yerine, Yunan tutkusunu bu dünyada, oluşun kendisini tarihte açmasına tanıklık ederek deneyimleyecek ve nihilizmin sınırlarının ötesine yönelmeye cesaret edebilecek *belirli bir durumdaki biz’ e* dayanan bir hümanizm geçmelidir Heidegger’e göre.

Heidegger’de etik deneyim bize Nietzsche’ci nihilizmden bir çıkış, sorumluluk, adalet, ötekine karşı umursama duyan yeni bir hümanizm açılımı getirebiliyor mu? Fenomenolojinin deneyim ve eylemlerimizi temellendirme önceliği (*quaestio juris*) ile aşkın özneciliği (*transcendental subjectivity*) tüm anlamlara öncel ve onların anlamlı ve geçerli olabilmesinin olanaklılık koşulu olarak kabul etmesini, yani indirgemeciliğini aşan bir deneyim ve eylem olanağı sunabiliyor mu?

Kant'taki uzam anlayışında kendisine bir yer edinemeyen etik (Heidegger'in etik deneyiminde) *Logos - Phusis* olarak kendisini açıp geri çekilirken bir yer yaratarak gizli ontolojik statüsünü aşıkabilir mi?

Bu sorulara evet diyebilmemiz için geç dönem Heidegger'deki düşüncesinin Batının kaderine dair yeni bir ontoloji projesi içinde anlamını buluyor olmasına ve bu projenin etiği ancak metafizik sınırlar içinde olanaklı kılmasına da evet diyebilmemiz gerek. Ve bu projenin politik sonuçlarının risklerine de... Bizi Yunanca düşünmeye çağıran Heidegger'in ufuk açıcı, çarpıcı özgünlükteki heyecanlı yorumlarıyla davet ettiği yola çıkışın ilham veren olanaklarıyla birlikte içerdiği risklerine...

Oluşun oluşunun sorusu yaratıcılığa açık olmak, ve dilin sınırlarının belirlenimini aşmayı denemek için zorunlu olarak şiddet içeren bir sorudur. Ve ancak şiddet içeren bir açıklıkla uzanabileceğimiz bir kendini açış ve geri çekiş sorusudur. Ötekiliğe davet edilişimiz ve ötekiliğe uzanışımız tek-tek ötekilerle iletişimimizi önceleyip belirleyen zorunlu bir şiddet içerir. Yaratıcılığa ulaşmak için içine girmek ve risk almak zorunda olduğumuz, müziğin yerine şiiri geçirerek nihilizmden öteye geçmeye çalıştığımız ama Nietzsche'ci yıkıcılığa hep borçlu kalan bir şiddet... Heidegger etik deneyim yoluyla *bizi*, batının kaderini yeniden düşünebilmemiz için kendimizi açtığımız ötekiliği oluşun özsel ortaklığı (*essential commonness*) içinde olanaklı kılan, böylece bir indirgemecilikten uzaklaşmak için bir başka indirgemeciliğin (belirli bir yer ve tarihte olan *biz*) riskine açıldığımız bir "Evet deyiş" e çağırır.

BÜTÜNCÜL PRAGMATİZM VE YAPIBOZUM

Heidegger'in etik deneyim anlayışı kendisinden sonra gelen bir çok düşünürü, Derrida da dahil, oldukça etkiledi. Yaratıcı açıklık, kabul ediş, epistemolojik

indirgemeciliğe karşı bir olanaklılık arayışı olarak etik deneyimle ilgilenenler de Heidegger'e borçlu kaldılar. Derrida'yı da böyle okuyabiliriz bir ölçüde. Ben bunun ötesinde Derrida'nın yapıbozum düşüncesinde farklı bir olanaklılık bulunabileceğini ve bu anlamda bütüncül pragmatizm ile yakınlaştığını savunuyorum. Tezimin ikinci bölümünde bu olanağı tartışacağım. Bunun için önce bütüncül pragmatizmin farkını özetlemeye çalışacağım.

Bütüncül pragmatizm kendisini klasik pragmatik teoriden kültürün tüm alanları, sanat, iletişim, bilim vb. arasındaki disiplinler arası etkileşimi daha çok öne çıkararak ayırılır diyebiliriz. Richard Rorty bilinen anglo-sakson geleneğin içinden gelmekle beraber, kıta felsefesinin, özellikle Hegel sonrası tarihselliğin ve Heidegger gibi Post-Nietzsche'ci eleştirel yaklaşımların da önemine vurgu yapmaktadır. Yine post-Nietzsche'ci bir açıdan Heidegger'i en iyi anlayan ve en orijinal biçimde yorumlayan yazar olduğunu söylediği Derrida'nın yapıbozum (Rorty böyle söylemektense "Derrida'nın yaptığı türden şeyler" demeyi tercih eder) düşüncesi ile yakından ilgilenir. İşte bu bağlamda, Derrida'nın kendisinin de söylediği gibi, yapıbozum düşüncesinin felsefeye etik ve politik bir olanaklılık getirdiği/getirebileceği yaklaşımına Rorty kuşkuyla yaklaşır.

Pragmatizm ve yapıbozumun ortak noktasının demokratik siyaset olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Rorty'nin Aydınlanma liberalizmini aydınlanma rasyonelizminden ayırmak gerektiği konusunda haklı olduğunu düşünürsek, onun bu temel karşıtı yaklaşımına göre yapıbozum da, konsensüse ayrıcalık tanıma eğilimine meydan okuması anlamında demokrasiyi canlı tutar. Radikal demokrasi açısından bir şans olabilecek olan yapıbozum, kaosu ve istikrarsızlığı – bir istikrar arayışı için de olsa – meşru kabul

etmesi açısından bir risktir de. Demokrasiyi “gelecek olan” (to come) olarak anlayan Derrida’nın sözlerinde, karar verilemez olanın açık uçluluğu vardır.

Ben yine de tezimde Heidegger’ci etik deneyimin riski ile yapıbozumun riskini ayırmamız gerektiğini, yapıbozumun ontolojik farklılığın yerine ona öncel olan *differance* kavramını önermesini yalnızca felsefe içi bir olanaklılık sorunu olarak düşünmememiz gerektiğini ve Derrida’nın düşüncesinde sınırların işe yarayacak bir olanaklılık olarak muğlaklaştırıldığını savunuyorum. Bu anlamda da yapıbozumun bütüncül pragmatizme yaklaştığını öne sürüyorum.

Richard Rorty Derrida’nın İngilizce konuşulan dünyada yanlış okunduğunu, hümanizmi eleştiren biri gibi görünen Derrida’nın aslında gelecek olan demokrasiyi ütopyacı toplumsal bir umut olarak gören tavrıyla mutluluğa inanan bir romantik olarak anlaşılabilirliğini öne sürer. Pragmatizm ile Derrida’nın ilişkisini Darwinist doğalcılık aracılığıyla kurabileceğimizi söyler. İki taraf ta, Rorty’e göre şeylerin, dilin ya da başka bir şeyin doğuştan gelen bir doğaları olduğunu bir yana bırakan temelcilik karşıtı yaklaşımlarıyla, siyaseti pragmatik, yerel ve kısa vadeli reformlar, uzlaşılarda (konsensüs) ilgili bir mesele olarak ele alabilirlikleriyle demokratik toplumlarda kullanılabilir yaklaşımlar olarak değerlendirir. Derrida’nın düşüncesindeki Levinas’çı eğilimlerin mahrem anlamlandırmalar için ya da radikal, devrimci siyaset için ilham verebileceğini ama demokratik, reformist siyasete iyi gitmediğini söyler.

Simon Critchley yapıbozumda pragmatikleştirilemeyecek iddialar olduğunu ve bu iddiaların etik ve politik sonuçları olabileceğini göstermeye çalışır. Bu iddialar adalet ve ötekinin çektiği acı karşısında duyulan sorumluluktur. Bu iddiaların etik-politik sonuçlara, etkilere yol açabileceği düşüncesinde olan Critchley, böylece Derrida’nın Rorty’nin söylediği gibi mahrem bir ironist olmaktan öteye geçebileceğini düşünür. Peki

bu nasıl olanaklı olacak? Critchley Rorty'e göre liberal zalimliğin en kötü şey olduğuna inanan kişidir der. (Critchley alıntı yaptığı *Olumsuzluk, İroni ve Dayanışma* kitabındaki "liberal kaynakların en çok gereksinimlerin kullanması gerektiğine inanan kişidir" de iddiasını görmezden gelir.) Ama bu ötekinin acısı karşısındaki mahrem adalet kaygısının hiç bir metafizik temeli olmadığını farkındadır. İronist bir farkındalıktır bu ve Critchley'e göre felsefe için çok yıkıcı sonuçlar da doğurabilecek olan kamusal-mahrem alanların teorik olarak uzlaştırılmazlığına çıkan bir farkındalıktır. Critchley Rorty'nin Hegel sonrası yaklaşımının yol açtığı bu uzlaştırılmazlığın özetini çok yetkin bir biçimde yapar: bir yanda kendi kendini yaratma (self-creation) ve mahrem mükemmelleşme, (private-perfection) diğer yanda ise cemaat arzusunun ağır bastığı kamusal yaklaşımlar. Bu ikisini uzlaştırmanın bütüncül pragmatizm açısından bir olanağı olmadığını düşünür. Rorty'nin Derrida'da "kör nokta" olarak gördüğü Levinas'çı etik olanağı, Critchley'e göre ötekine duyulan, öznenin bilişselliğini aşan bir duygululuk ya da duyarlılıktır (sentience). Bu duyarlılık temsil ve niyetliliğin bilinçli öznesinin yerine ötekiyle farklı bir iletişime geçebilen duyarlı – sorumlu bir öznel deneyim geçirir. Critchley'in iddiası Derrida'da yapıbozumun kendisinin adalet olduğu düşüncesi, mistik, olanaksız olanın deneyimi olan adaleti yapıbozuma uğratılmayan, yapıbozumun olanaklılık koşulu denebilecek bir *aporia* olarak tanımlaması, en önemlisi de adaletin karar verilemez deneyimi olması Derrida – Levinas ilişkisine dayandığı yönündedir. Bu iddianın en önemli yönü aynı zamanda Derrida'da sorunlu bir noktadır: ötekinin tekilliği. Adalet, ötekiyle kurulan tikel bir ilişkiye dayanırken ötekinin şu ya da bu somut öteki olmaması Levinas düşüncesinde Kant'çı bir ide olarak etik anlayışının ötesine geçmeyi, kategorik olmamayı özellikle hedefler. Böyle bir adalet deneyimi

“kararın deliliği” denilen şeye, yani siyasete açılır. Karar verilemezliğin deneyimi olarak adalet kamusal alanda, hukukta tam olarak örneklenemese de ondan koparılamaz.

Rorty temel olarak adalet ve yasa ilişkisinin metafizik yaklaşımları anıştıran yönünü, bu ilişkinin Levinas’taki Öteki Heidegger’deki Varlık gibi kavramlarla ilişkilendirilmesini işe yaramaz buluyor. Ahlaki yükümlülüğün kaynağını sözü geçen ilişki ile temellendirilmesine yönelik bir yapıbozumun pragmatizmle yakın olmadığını, “doğru” nun doğru bağlamda işe yarayabilecek bir şey olabileceği konusunda ise yapıbozum ve pragmatizmin aynı görüşte olduğunu savunur. Rorty metafizikçilerin anladığı ya da anlamak istediği gibi evrensel, genel geçer ve kimsenin amacına yönelik olmayacak bir “doğru bağlam” anlayışından uzak durduğunu söylüyor. Yapıbozumun pragmatizmden ayrı anlaşılmasını ne yapacağımıza yönelik somut öneriler oluşturma kaygısından uzak olmayı sorun olarak görmeyen bir “sorunsallaştırma” olarak anlıyor. Rorty’e göre Derrida’yı daha çok Proust gibi okumak bize etik açıdan kılavuzluk sağlayabilir. Sorun ise, bununla Derrida tarzında yazarak kamusal alanda acının giderilmesi ve özgürlüklerin genişletilmesine, siyasi kararları bu yolla belirleyip kısa vadeli amaçları gerçekleştirilebileceğine katkıda bulunma olanağının olup olmamasıdır.

SONUÇ

Jacques Derrida, yapıbozum ve pragmatizm arasındaki ilişkinin öneminden, kamusal-mahrem arasındaki ayrımı Rorty’nin kabul ettiği biçimde indirgemeyi kabul edemeyeceğinden, ilk dönem ve sonraki metinleri arasındaki zorunlu ilişkiden, edebiyat metinlerinin kamusal alana dair kaygılarından ve “sır”dan söz eder. Sır, Derrida’ya göre kamusal alanın ulaşamadığı bir mahremiyet olarak de-politize edici değil, aksine hegemonik olanın ötesine geçme çabasındaki bir demokratik politikanın koşuludur. Derrida, 1968 tarihli “*Differance*” adlı metninden itibaren olanaklılık koşulu söyleminin

batı metafiziği tarihinin anladığı anlamın aksine/ötesinde bir biçimde aynı zamanda bir olanaksızlık koşulu olarak ta okunabileceğini iddia ediyor. Yarı-aşkın kavramı da, mesihçilik gibi özgürleşme temasının siyasi bir olanakta yol alabilmesi için, yetersiz bir ampirik söylemin kırılğanlığı içinde takılıp kalmamak için, sormamız gereken sorular için, belli ölçüde “Evet” dememiz gereken bir kavramdır. Yarı-aşkınlık ve mesihçilik, “gelecek olan demokrasi” (democracy to come) için geleceği (hemen yarın değilse de) açık tutarak söz verebildiğimiz bir olanağı tanımak, bu olanağa mevcudiyet içermeyen bir “burada ve şimdi”lik kazandıran tekil deneyimler olarak düşünülebilirler Derrida’ya göre. Karar-verilemezliğin deneyimleri olarak deneyimlenen bu temaları (yarı-aşkın, sır) Rorty’nin aksine Derrida romantik olmaktan öte sorumluluğun sonsuzluğu ile etik ve siyasete açılma olanağı olarak görür. Karar – verilemezlik, — her zaman askıya alınmış, ertelenmiş bir ilişki içinde olduğu — alınmış kararlarda bitmez. “Karar da kendisini karar-verilemezliğe kapatmaz. Ötekiyle kurulan ilişki kendini kapatmaz” diyen Derrida’ya göre ahlakileşme ve siyasileşme işte bunun için vardır.

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