

HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA ON DEATH

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA ON DEATH**

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This thesis is based on two readings on death. The first one is Martin Heidegger's Being and Time chapter two, part one and the second one is Jacques Derrida's Aporias. The first reading is based on the phenomenological analysis of death. The line of argument of Heidegger is figured out. The second reading is based on Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger's account of death in Being and Time. The thesis and the conclusion part is based on the idea that, on death, these philosophers are fundamentally similar and radically different. This is shown by the comparison of these philosophers.

Keywords: Death, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, phenomenology, deconstructi

## ÖZ

### HEIDEGGER VE DERRIDA'NIN ÖLÜM KAVRAMI

Şentuna, Barış

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Akın Ergüden

Aralık 2014, 8 sayfa

Bu çalışma iki kumaşaya dayanmaktadır. Birincisi Martin Heidegger'in Varlık ve Zaman kitabının birinci bölümü; ikincisi Jacques Derrida'nın Aporias kitabıdır. İlk bölümün görüngübilim açısından incelenmesi için çalışılmaktadır. Heidegger'in düşünce kurgusu anlatılmıştır. İkinci bölüm ise, Derrida'nın Heidegger'in Varlık ve Zaman kitabındaki ölüm kavramını yapı sökme işlemi incelenmiştir. Tez sonuç bölümünde ise, her iki filozofun temelde ne kadar benzer olduğunu, öteyandan bir kadardayr olduklarını göstermeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu düşünce her iki filozof karşılaştırılarak ortaya çıkarılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ölüm, Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger, görüngübilim, yapı söküm

To My Uncle Dr. HasanAkın  
-whose loss is still a loss-

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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This work is composed of three chapters based on two readings of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. Both philosophers are the significant philosophers of modern philosophy. Heidegger and Derrida worked and analyzed the concept of death, as the most important aspect of their discourse which is philosophically significant. Heidegger and Derrida's philosophies are fundamentally similar but radically different. The purpose of this work is to figure out a proper understanding of the two philosophers. In order to show these similarities and differences. For this purpose the first two chapters will consider readings from both philosophers. The readings will be taken into consideration independently of each other; on their own. The aim of the third chapter of this thesis will to show the dependence, similarities and differences of both philosophers, together with the critiques from different philosophers who worked on them. A brief summary of the chapters of this thesis and the questions that will be analyzed below.

The first chapter is based on the first reading of Martin Heidegger's 1926 work "Being and Time" (B.T.), Division two, "Dasein and Temporality", Chapter 1, "Dasein's Possibility of Being -a-All, and Being-Towards-Death"<sup>1</sup>. The main

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harper SanFrancisco, 1962, pp 274 – 311

aim of Being and Time is how Being shows up within human understanding.<sup>2</sup> The objective of Heidegger's analysis is getting a proper understanding of the meaning of Being. According to Heidegger, our experience of Being is conditioned by our finitude and temporality. Temporality is what makes possible understanding of Being. In other words, the meaning of Being is time.<sup>3</sup>

The concept of death in Heidegger's Being and Time is the theme of the beginning of the Division Two, Part One namely "Dasein and Temporality". In Being and Time (B.T), as it is put forward by Heidegger himself, the result of the division one is, "the being of Dasein is care"<sup>4</sup>. The final outcome of the first chapter of this thesis and Heidegger's analysis in B.T. in the above mentioned pages, on which the reading is based is, "existential projection, in which anticipation is delimited, has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic"<sup>5</sup> The line of argument from "care" which is the outcome of Heidegger's B.T. Division One to ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death, will be figured out in the first chapter of this thesis.

The proper understanding of authentic being of Dasein towards death is the Heidegger's project. The main aim is to uncover the structures of authenticity that lies in inauthenticity. The general aims are the acceptance of death as an authentic

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas Sheehan, A Companion to Philosophers, ed.; Robert L. Arrington, Oxford and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999 pp.289-297

<sup>3</sup> Sheehan p.289

<sup>4</sup> B.T p.275

<sup>5</sup> B.T. p.311

self and to shift from an ordinary understanding of time to an authentic way ‘in what sense death must be conceived of ending of Dasein’<sup>6</sup> whether it could give the right basis for an understanding of the totality of Dasein or not, will be discussed in this chapter.

Throughout the first chapter of this thesis, Heidegger’s question of ‘How can’t we understand death?’, the negative approach towards death will be figured out. Based on Heidegger’s analogies in this approach to “different endings with respect to death” will be enumerated. According to Heidegger’s question regarding the possibility of connection of “everydayness of Dasein” and “authentic existence of Dasein”, in the form of Being-Towards-Death will be the subject. Together with “care” and its characteristics authenticity of death will be analyzed.

Heidegger’s analysis is based on the connection of everydayness of Dasein and authentic existence of Dasein. ‘How this connection is possible?’ is the main question asked by Heidegger. In its everyday existence Dasein’s characteristic is given by Care will also be figured out.

After this part, existential conception of death would have been established for Heidegger. The question Heidegger asks after making these analyses of Dasein is, ‘Can Dasein also understand authentically its own most possibility, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, which is certain and, as such,

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<sup>6</sup> B.T. p.289

indefinite?”<sup>7</sup> This requires defining the authentic Being-towards-death. The question both Heidegger and we would try to figure out will be “Can it be done? “

“Authentic being towards death” and “possibility” and “anticipation” and “freedom towards” death will be subjects of the reading. After the part regarding anticipation and freedom towards death, reading and analysis of Heidegger, will be finished.

The second chapter of this thesis is based on the second reading, Jacques Derrida’s 1993 work “Aporias”<sup>8</sup>. Aporias is based on the concept death in Heidegger’s Being and Time. In this work, for the sake of a reading, it will be taken as a separate work, independent of our first reading that is the theme of the first chapter. Aporias will be examined.

Derrida in his analysis tries to figure out the parts of the Heidegger’s analysis that presupposes foundations, the hegemonic parts of Heidegger’s philosophy from his points of view. For that reason in order to make an analysis he will go inside the Heidegger’s writings. Derrida’s thesis is; inside the analysis of death, with respect to death; in Being and Time, there are borders and there is hierarchy. This chapter is mainly based on determining the hierarchical points of Heidegger from the view point of Derrida. The main purpose of Derrida in Aporias is to show that Being and Time exceed its borders. In this hierarchy of philosophical knowledge what Derrida puts forward is this hierarchy’s concern is

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<sup>7</sup> B.T 304

<sup>8</sup> Jacques Derrida, Aporias, Trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1993

"the proper dying" (eigentlich sterben) of Dasein. This hierarchy crosses the borders and it itself is subject to metaphysics. We will try to figure out in this chapter that which point of Heidegger does Derrida find hierarchical ?

Derrida' s reading of Heidegger involves main foundation point bDasein, with respect to different endings between perishing, demise and properly dying, which is the main theme of Derrida.. We are left with the questions of difference then. One of them is how can we discriminate between these ‘ends’? What is demise if it is not dying and if it is not ‘perishing’? There are differences in Heidegger regarding death. But these differences would bring paradoxes says Derrida.<sup>9</sup> These paradoxes will constitute the way to the aporia This hierarchy Derrida calls is the ‘problematic closure’.<sup>10</sup>

The concept that ‘Death changes’ is also another subject that we would try to analyze in this chapter. There is the priority and the different endings that have been stated before which is a foundation for Derrida. This is a metaphysical paradox. This metaphysical paradox will figured out from its aspects. We will continue the reading of Aporias of Derrida in Heidegger' s view of Dasein and metaphysical paradox from the point of view of lived experience. The aim of Derrida deconstructing Heidegger is whether it presupposes a line a division of here and beyond. According to Derrida it is decisive to over emphasize the decided

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<sup>9</sup> JD, Aporias, p.38

<sup>10</sup> JD, Aporias p.40

points with respect to borders. The reasons why he finds Heidegger' s analysis decisive will be enumerated.

After giving the reasons why Heidegger' s analysis would be decisive Derrida steps to the corollaries of this way of thinking. Since there is a decision of death, Derrida will try to turn into a non-decision. Derrida's point is will be, it rests upon what cannot be decided which is namely death. The aspects of this non-decision will be figured out.

The result of the Derridian reading will be given by Derrida himself will be analyzed in the Corollaries part. Politics of death, "Possibility of the possible", "death as possibility" and Dasein's awaiting itself will be the main subjects in this part of the reading. Derrida tries to figure out the possibility of Dasein as it is in Heidegger logical contradiction of Death turns out to be an aporia. "Death to be expected is the unique occurrence of this possibility of impossibility"<sup>11</sup> This is a "non access to death" The access to it to its border is also impossible would be the results of the reading of the Aporias and Chapter two.

Heidegger and Derrida worked and analyzed the concept of death, as the most important aspect of their discourse which is philosophically significant. In this chapter, the outcomes of the two readings namely, Heidegger's B.T. Div.II Part One, which constituted the first chapter of this thesis and Derrida's Aporias, which constituted the second chapter of this thesis will be figured out. The similarities and the difference between Heidegger and Derrida will be discussed,

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<sup>11</sup> JD, Aporias p.72

by the help of the charts. Through out this inquiry, I will use references to this thesis, I also will use the references to the texts written, on Heidegger and Derrida such as, Thomson<sup>12</sup>, Ellis<sup>13</sup> and Baugh<sup>14</sup> and also take into consideration their point in the similarities and the difference between Heidegger and Derrida on death. Both philosophers provide answers, in ways that are both radically different and fundamentally connected. My main aim after the two readings is to figure out these fundamental and radical points as similarities and differences.

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<sup>12</sup> Ian Thomson, "Can I Die? Derrida on Heidegger on Death", *Philosophy Today*, Spring 1999, pp. 29-40

<sup>13</sup> Christopher Ellis, "Static and Genetic Phenomenology of death", *Contretemps* 2, May 2001, pp.157-170

<sup>14</sup> Bruce Baugh, "Death and Temporality in Deleuze and Derrida", *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities*, 5:2, August 2000 pp. 73-83



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **CONCEPT OF DEATH IN HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter is based on the first reading of Martin Heidegger's 1926 work 'Being and Time' (B.T.), Division two, 'Dasein and Temporality', Chapter 1, 'Dasein's Possibility of Being -a-All, and Being-Towards-Death'<sup>15</sup>.

#### **2.2 Care, Wholeness and Authenticity**

In being in the world, the questions asked by Heidegger are: Does care carries us to a unity of structural whole? Does the everydayness that is between life and death, propose us the phenomenological understanding of Dasein? According to Heidegger, being in everydayness is the inauthentic being of Dasein. Heidegger mainly takes inauthentic modes of being into consideration which are notions of 'thrownness', 'being with others' and 'being with other beings' which are the basic modes of human existence in everydayness. Within that what is tried to be inferred is authentic understanding of being. Because in its inauthenticity, being is 'less than a whole'. Heidegger's project is to constitute authentic being towards death together with the totality of Dasein.

For that project, the result of division one, that is care, is put into inquiry. The structure of care for Heidegger is inconsistent with the wholeness of Dasein. Care is what allows entities to be meaningfully present which is required for being

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<sup>15</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harper SanFrancisco, 1962, pp 274 – 311

in the world. By being in the world Dasein has a hermeneutical understanding: The pragmatic awareness of other entities. As a “thrown projection” in the world, Dasein is its possibilities and it understands itself in terms of these possibilities. Dasein is always “ahead of itself”. That results with the inconsistency of the wholeness of Dasein. “Being ahead of itself” means, there is still something to be decided for Heidegger. There is still some potentiality for Being that has not become actual. This property of Dasein also allows the possibility of “no longer be there” for Dasein. That is death. From that possibility of no longer being there, Dasein never reaches to wholeness.

The project of Heidegger, defined by himself in B.T, is a project that will become primordial and will put light on the basic questions of ontology. For that reason, Dasein’s possibilities of authenticity and totality are analyzed. The main aim is to uncover the structures of authenticity that lies in inauthenticity. That project is towards the wholeness of Dasein and the road of that project mainly passes through temporality.

Temporality is the key concept for Heidegger for an authentic understanding. Defining structure of Dasein’s transcendence in Being and Time is temporality. To “live into one’s future” is the basic concept of temporality. In living into one’s future, Dasein is open to possibilities. The ultimate possibility that one lives is death. Death in that sense, is a possibility that ends all possibilities.

Due to these reasons, Dasein's existential analysis together with temporality starts with Death. The general aims are the acceptance of death as an authentic self and to shift from an ordinary understanding of time to an authentic way of being. The phenomenological analysis in Division Two of Being and Time starts by 'bracketing'. In other words, the question for that analysis is: How can't we understand death? That also can be classified as a negative approach to death.

### **2.3 Negative Approach to Understanding of Death and Analogies**

The starting point of Heidegger is the 'death of the other'. The reason underneath such a starting point is that, 'I' is not the only one who lives and dies. Others live and others die as well. It also has an impact upon Dasein. Death of the other makes Dasein to remember to be 'no longer being there'. This is why death of the others had a lot of affects upon everyday being. As Heidegger puts into words as: 'the loss is upon the ones who remain'<sup>16</sup>

The 'being that come to an end' namely the death of the other is not something experienced by us. What is experienced by us is the 'loss'; not the experience of the 'coming to an end'. Ontically death means the end of Dasein's life. On the other hand, ontologically meaning is the possibility of non-existence of being which is the possibility of 'no longer being there'. According to Heidegger, death of the other cannot give us either ontically or ontologically, the basis of our own death. Dying for Heidegger is something that 'every Dasein must take upon

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<sup>16</sup> B.T. p.282

itself”<sup>17</sup>. Heidegger states that “death in every case is mine”<sup>18</sup>. From these; Heidegger infers that dying is not an event. But rather it is a phenomenon that could only be understood existentially. As a result of this negative approach; according to Heidegger coming to an end implies such a mode of Being, this cannot be represented by someone else, death is always mine<sup>19</sup>.

A negative approach to death and totality of Dasein continues with the analogies. The first analogy Heidegger analyses is of debt. That is based on the conception of Dasein composed of parts. Coming together of the parts is considered as the paying of debt. It is like all of the payments that we will receive make up the whole and belong to us, but it has not-yet been paid. But the point about this analogy is that Dasein is not pieced together. It is already a whole. For this reason, this analogy also does not serve us an understanding of Dasein.

The second analogy Heidegger analyses is the analogy of the moon. The coming to-be of Dasein is like the phases of the moon. The not-yet diminishes as the shadow gets to full moon. Heidegger says that “But the moon here is present at hand as a whole already”<sup>20</sup> The not-yet of Dasein for Heidegger is not real at all. “Dasein must, as itself become -that is to say, be-what is not yet.”<sup>21</sup> Dasein has to become what is not-yet. Being of the not-yet is an important character of Dasein. As a result, this analogy also does not serve us an understanding of Dasein as well.

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<sup>17</sup> B.T. p.284

<sup>18</sup> B.T. p.284

<sup>19</sup> B.T. p.286

<sup>20</sup> B.T. p.287

<sup>21</sup> B.T. p.287

The third and the last analogy is the ripening of fruit. This analogy seems more likely to uncover the Being of Dasein than the others. In that analogy; the fruit ripens itself and does it continuously. The ‘hot-yet’ of the unripeness becomes fulfilled as the fruit ripens itself. The fruit in that sense is always ‘hot yet’ like Dasein. The ‘hot -yet’ had always been included in the Being of the fruit. That is the ‘lack of totality’ of Dasein. That is the very characteristic of Dasein in its very Being. The difference of this last analogy will be covered in more detail in following part.

#### **2.4 Different Endings with Respect to Death**

The main difference in third analogy is very important because it will take us to a question of the different endings. Between these; the ripening of fruit and the ‘hot-yet’ ness of Dasein the main difference is at the endings. The fruit different from Dasein, reaches its end by exhausting its possibilities. In other words the fruit ‘fulfils itself’. The question asked by Heidegger is “..death, at which Dasein arrives fulfillment in this sense?”<sup>22</sup> The answer is negative. Dasein can reach its end without fulfilling its possibilities. Dasein may come to its ripeness before the end. But for the most part; ‘Dasein ends in unfulfilment, or else having disintegrated and been used up’<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> B.T. p.288

<sup>23</sup> B.T. p.288

From these analogies Heidegger comes up with the inquiry, ‘in what sense death must be conceived of ending of Dasein’<sup>24</sup> There are different ‘endings’. In a sense for Heidegger ending can signify ‘stopping’. This means no longer present-at-hand. For instance the rain stops. The stopping of road is another example. In stopping of road, for instance; the road is under construction. The ‘ending’ in that sense is, present at hand in an unfinished way.

These modes of endings do not fully characterize the ‘ending’ of Dasein. In death Dasein is not finished. Neither simply disappeared. Dasein is already its ‘not-yet’. It is not yet constantly as long as it is. ‘It is already its end too.’<sup>25</sup> From these Heidegger comes to an important point and conclusion of the inquiry of Dasein’s ending stated as follows;

The ‘ending’, which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s being at an end [Zu-Ende-sein], but a Being-towards-the-end [Sein-Zum-Ende] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die<sup>26</sup>

After the inquiry that was mentioned above, Heidegger comes to a point which is that death is a ‘way to be’. Existential analysis that Heidegger has taken as a project in Being and Time, is being-towards-death. Existential analysis of being-towards-death is whether it could give the right basis for an understanding of the totality of Dasein or not will be discussed.

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<sup>24</sup> B.T. p.289

<sup>25</sup> B.T. p.289

<sup>26</sup> B.T. p.289

Death's position with regard to all the other disciplines and sciences is also the problematic of Heidegger. Death in its widest sense is a phenomenon of life.<sup>27</sup> As a phenomenon of life, death is also studied by other disciplines such as biology, history, psychology. Psychology of death and history of death are also a point of inquiry for Heidegger. The problematic will be Dasein in its ontological and existential analysis takes death as prior to any history, psychology and biology. How can biological death would be figured out with respect to Dasein is the basic question. The problems arising of these sort would be resolved by the determination and discrimination of Heidegger's different endings which are perishing, demise and properly dying.

For Heidegger as it is stated above, "biological-ontical" explanation of death is problematical. The preliminary decision about Dasein and death has to be "sketched out" by the ontology of Dasein.<sup>28</sup> The ontology of Dasein in that sense is "super ordinate to any ontology of life"<sup>29</sup> and "subordinate" to a characterization of Dasein's basic state.<sup>30</sup> The different endings and different modes of dying would make further clarification of the point.

The ending of lives is called "perishing". But this is not for Dasein. Dasein can also end inauthentically without simply perishing. This is an intermediate ending that is called "demise". Heidegger makes a further clarification. "...Dasein

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<sup>27</sup> That Derrida will accept this starting point and would say about death one should start from here.

<sup>28</sup> B.T. 291

<sup>29</sup> B.T 291

<sup>30</sup> This Derrida will discuss in Aporias in detail.

never perishes. Dasein however, can demise as long as it is dying”<sup>31</sup>. Heidegger than states that biological and medical investigations on “demising” could be made. On the other hand, the point is that the kind of ontological investigation in B.T is not of “demising”, but rather the existential investigation whose concern is “dying as such”.<sup>32</sup>

This investigation Heidegger takes as project; also serves for the other sciences as foundation and has precedence over any biology or ontology of life. This gives much more importance to Heidegger’s existential analysis. Heidegger also reminds us that, any “experienced” living of demise also presupposes a death. The interpretation over any death as demise already presupposes death.

Another point Heidegger that states is the worldliness of Dasein and the interpretation of Dasein. After the project of Heidegger it would be possible for “death conceived in its full ontological essence”<sup>33</sup> than only a methodological question could be asked “what may be after death?” As a consequence, the “this worldliness of Dasein” in its ontological inquiry is the basis for any question concerning what may be after death. “The this worldliness of Dasein takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation”<sup>34</sup> This worldliness of entities would give us the clues of the existential inquiry of death.

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<sup>31</sup> B.T. p.291

<sup>32</sup> Heidegger had changed his concept of Dasein to a dehistoricized concept of Dasein. This concept of death will be taken as static and genetic approach to death and will be discussed in the conclusions chapter of this thesis together with Derrida’s approach to this problematic.

<sup>33</sup> B.T. p.292

<sup>34</sup> B.T. p.292



As a result of everydayness of Dasein; and the clues that were mentioned above, the interpretation of Care; will give what is needed. Heidegger's analysis is based on the connection of everydayness of Dasein and authentic existence of Dasein. "How this connection is possible?" is the main question asked by Heidegger. In its everyday existence Dasein's characteristic is given by Care.

### **2.5 The Character of Being-Towards-Death**

The developed definition of Care in Being and Time is "ahead-of-itself-Being already in (the world) as Being-alongside the entities which we encounter (within the world)"<sup>35</sup> The role of care is also in its making entities meaningfully present. Together with care authenticity of death has to be analyzed for Heidegger.

Characters of death enumerated by Heidegger are that; death reveals itself as; "possibility which is one's own most which is non relational, and which is not outstripped"<sup>36</sup> in the connection with Care. The aspects of care defined in this quotation will be discussed below.

Dasein faces the disclosedness of death; the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. It does not come from outside. It belongs to its very Being as such. Dasein is what Dasein is in that sense. So that since death in every case is mine, as it is explained above it turns out to be one cannot escape from this possibility. This is the ownmost character of death.

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<sup>35</sup> B.T p.293 The definition and development of this definition of care was the theme of the division one of B.T.

<sup>36</sup> B:T p.294

As ‘Being ahead of itself’ Dasein faces possibilities. Death in that sense is its ultimate possibility. Death is a possibility of Dasein which is the possibility of ‘no-longer-being-able-to-be-there’. Death in this sense for Dasein is not something that comes from outside, but rather it is the inmost possibility of Dasein. If it stands before itself all the ‘relations with other will be left undone’<sup>37</sup>. This gives the non relational character of death.

Dasein is in relation with the other entities and with other people, (as in the form of ‘they’ which will be analyzed in detail in the following parts) since it is ‘thrown’ into the world. There is nothing that could exclude or make us escape from death within the form of the other. In that sense death has to be taken by Dasein itself. As a consequence, death is non relational.

Heidegger drives the conclusion; ‘As a potentiality for being, Dasein cannot outstrip, the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of absolute impossibility of Dasein’<sup>38</sup> The most important, aspect of this analysis is the ‘possibility of absolute impossibility’. This analysis will be one of the most important theme of Derrida.

Awareness of death in that sense becomes important. Dasein in its thrownness seeks for an understanding of death. This thrownness of Dasein into death as being-in-the world results with the anxiety. This anxiety is a basic-state of

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<sup>37</sup> B.T. p.294

<sup>38</sup> B.T. p.294

mind which discloses 'Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end'<sup>39</sup> This turns out to be; as it was stated above; existential conception of "dying" is made clear over the definition, as thrown being, towards its own most potentiality-for-Being, which is non relational and not to be outstripped.

Heidegger will continue on this definition of death with respect to care introducing two more characters, namely disappearance and indefiniteness to the inquiry.

Precision could only be gained by difference of endings for Heidegger. By distinguishing "disappearance, and also from merely perishing, and finally from experiencing of a demise"<sup>40</sup> Heidegger comes to the point of as-suchness of death. According to Heidegger, one has to distinguish and disclose the understanding of Death. One has to experience death "as such".

In the existential inquiry of Heidegger, question asked is about everydayness together with the authentic understanding of death: How the connection would be possible? When in being-towards death, Dasein faces with the impossibility of existence but on the other hand, it conceals itself in the everydayness, it is in "an evasion which conceals"<sup>41</sup>

Being certain with regard to death, is than next inquiry for Heidegger in this part of B.T. The covering up of the certainty comes from the understanding of

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<sup>39</sup> B.T p.295

<sup>40</sup> B.T p.295

<sup>41</sup> B.T. p.299

death as an event. As it was stated above, death was understood as an event. But for Heidegger death is not event, rather it is a phenomenon.

For Heidegger, death, analyzed together with ‘they’. The certainty covered up by the ‘they’, than turns out to be “a possibility gets veiled”<sup>42</sup> ‘They’ denies the certainty of death. ‘They’ acts in a manner which death is ‘at some time later’. This certainty in everydayness, in the interpretation of ‘they’ turns out to be ‘that is possible at any moment’.

‘Possibility of any moment’ reveals an important point which is indefiniteness. This is the indefiniteness of ‘when’. Dasein in everydayness than flees from death. This covers up death’s characteristic; “–a possibility which at the same time indefinite-“<sup>43</sup> This analysis of Heidegger with regards to ‘they’, than adds certainty and indefiniteness, to the defined existential-ontological conception of death.

The existential and ontological conception of death than turns out to be; ‘death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s own most possibility- non relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be out stripped.’<sup>44</sup>

Dasein’s basic state; care is to be connected with death. This is the defining existential structure of Being towards the end, is helpful for the ‘Dasein as Dasein can be a whole’. But on the other hand; the not-yet of Dasein itself, makes the being toward the end possible. Dasein in the state of everydayness, in

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<sup>42</sup> B.T p.302

<sup>43</sup> B.T. p.302

<sup>44</sup> B.T. p.303

“factically dying”, “everyday falling evasion, that is in the face of death”<sup>45</sup>, as we have defined above, is an inauthentic being towards death. What Heidegger reminds here is inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity. That Dasein diverts itself. Heidegger’s main project, on the authenticity is Dasein does not necessarily divert itself. This is the analysis of Heidegger to authenticity.

Up to that point, in Heidegger’s project, existential conception of death had been established. The authentic being-toward the end, how it should be, given, Inauthentic being-towards-death had been characterized and How an authentic being should not be; in the negative approach was stated.

### **2.6 Authentic Being Towards Death and Possibility**

The question Heidegger asks after making these analyses of Dasein is, “Can Dasein also understand authentically its own most possibility, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, which is certain and, as such, indefinite?”<sup>46</sup> This requires defining the authentic Being-towards-death. Can it be done?

For an Authentic Being towards death, there are points which should be in a negative sense. Heidegger takes into consideration; as follows,

Authentic Being towards death;

- (1) “cannot evade its ownmost non -relational possibility”,
- (2) “cover up” this possibility, by fleeing from it

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<sup>45</sup> B.T. 303

<sup>46</sup> B.T 304

- (3) “give an new explanation to it”, that is done to for the “they” and for the accordance with the “they” as it was explained above.

On the authentic being towards death, Heidegger takes the above enumerated results of his analysis together with the “possibility” into consideration. “Being towards death must be characterized as being towards possibility.”<sup>47</sup> This possibility has to be in a distinctive sense of Dasein itself.

According to Heidegger, in the analysis of possibility, there is a tendency to annihilate this possibility with regards to something that is present at hand, by making it available to us. For the concern of the analysis, death, is not in that sense possible that is ready at hand, but rather a possibility of Dasein’s Being. The actualization of such a possible death would mean depriving of “one’s of demise”. If this would be done that would, “deprive from the very ground for an existing towards death”<sup>48</sup>

As it was stated in the above parts of this chapter, death that is understood as something coming, Heidegger states that; “it shows as little as” its possibility covered up by everydayness. Being towards death as possibility is crucial character of disclosing. The possibility should not be weakened. This possibility must be “understood as possibility, cultivated as possibility.”<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> B.T p.305

<sup>48</sup> B.T. p.305

<sup>49</sup> B.T. p.306

In his analysis of death as a possibility, Heidegger makes the crucial analysis of “anticipation”. Death that reveals itself as possibility, the terminology than turns out to be “anticipation of this possibility”. The point than turns out to be; the closer one gets to this possibility, the farther that one get from it actual. Than it becomes “as the possibility of the impossibility of existence at all”<sup>50</sup>

It was figured out that death, gives nothing to be actualized. In that sense, what Heidegger means is that “nothing actual could itself be”. It is the possibility of impossibility. As long as Dasein anticipates, this possibility of impossibility becomes greater. This anticipation is “first what makes this possibility possible, sets it free as possibility”<sup>51</sup> This setting free is the second step of the anticipation, which is one of the most important aspects.

## **2.7 Anticipation and Freedom Towards Death as Authentically Possible**

Anticipation in the disclosedness is the possibility of one’s authentic existence meaning that disclosing and understanding can only be done by death, by the anticipation of death. The question that Heidegger asks and inquires here is than; how this structure (of anticipation) would be delimited phenomally? The answer proposed by Heidegger is that the characteristic of that “anticipatory disclosure” has to be determined so that “it can become pure understanding of that ownmost possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped- which

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<sup>50</sup> B.T. p.307

<sup>51</sup> B.T. p.307

certain, and as such, indefinite”<sup>52</sup> All these characteristics together with anticipation related with possibility will be analyzed. Dasein’s disclosedness to itself with this anticipation, as analyzed with the characteristics would have results. Heidegger’s analysis is to describe these results. The result in Heidegger’s inquiry is the setting free, which is the characteristic of anticipation.

The “they” that is the characteristic of everydayness of Dasein, comes into Heidegger’s picture and analysis again. This distinctive possibility, whose characteristics were mentioned above, in the anticipation of oneself, one had “wrenched” itself from the “they”. This results with lostness in the everydayness.

The role of the “they” together with the “non relational character of death” individualizes Dasein down to itself. That means being with the others, namely “they”, Dasein is freed from them. As taken its ownmost self, Dasein, is authentic, up to the point of solicitude. If this solicitude is cut of Dasein, Dasein is also cut of Being itself as authentic.

The next character that Heidegger analyses, is the outstrippness, apart from the influences of the “they”, in other words inauthentic modes of the “they” Dasein, understands its own death as imminent and does not outstrip it. The conclusions that Heidegger derives from this freeing is; one is freed from one’s lostness. One is opened up to possibilities lying ahead of oneself.

This characteristic is one of the most important characteristics of all. By this characteristic, Dasein, namely lying all the possibilities ahead of itself; the

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<sup>52</sup> B.T p.307



anticipation freed from the “they”, also opens up the possibility of “existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being.”<sup>53</sup> This possibility is the main possibility that Heidegger inquires. On the other hand as Heidegger would remind us; this in that sense is just a possibility.

The next character that Heidegger analyses is the character of certainty. The certain possibility of death, as Heidegger proposed, disclosed Dasein as possibility. The certain possibility of death, in anticipating this possibility, “the possibility is disclosed because it is made possible in anticipation”<sup>54</sup> To be certain of what has been disclosed is what is demanded in Heidegger. Death is just one’s own, and this holds death as true. This certainty in that sense is not for the “order of things” but rather, by disclosing this certainty, Dasein itself understand and discloses of itself as “other” in the order of things.

“The ownmost possibility, which is non-relational, not to be outstripped, and is indefinite as regards its certainty.”<sup>55</sup> The next character Heidegger analyses is the character of indefiniteness. The important theme of indefiniteness as it was stated in the previous parts of this thesis was the question of “when”. The relation that Heidegger is inquiring turns out to be between anticipation and indefiniteness.

The Way that Heidegger proposes is; Dasein has to cultivate it self in that indefiniteness of the certainty. The indefiniteness results with anxiety. Anxiety as a state of mind, Dasein when disclosed of itself, finds itself with the “nothing” of

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<sup>53</sup> B.T p.309

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<sup>55</sup> B.T p.310

the possibility of impossibility of existence. Anxiety, for that reason, ‘belongs to such a self understanding of Dasein, on the basis of Dasein itself.’<sup>56</sup>

Heidegger after this analysis comes to the characterization of the authentic Being towards death that he had projected, existentially. This is also the summary of the above stated characteristics. I would like to enumerate this important characterization:

‘(1) anticipation reveals to Da sein its lostness, in the they-self

(2) brings it with the possibility of being itself

(3) primarily by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather in an impassioned freedom towards death

(4) a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the ‘they’ which is factual a, certain of itself and anxious.’<sup>57</sup>

This is the delimiting aspect of anticipation. This ‘existential projection, in which

anticipation is delimited, has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic’<sup>58</sup> This ends the inquiry of death, up to that point. The project with respect to death, has been done for Heidegger.

The authentic Being towards death is ontologically possible. The next step Heidegger would take from here, is the question of ‘Does Dasein ever factually

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<sup>56</sup> B.T p.310

<sup>57</sup> B.T p.311

<sup>58</sup> B.T. p.311

throw itself to into such a being-towards-death?” The project than here will turn out to be a project of attestation. Which is the name of the next chapter of Heidegger’s B.T, namely ‘Dasein’s attestation of an authentic potentiality-for-being, and resoluteness’<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> B.T. p.312

**CHAPTER THREE**  
**CONCEPT OF DEATH IN APORIAS: DERRIDA'S**  
**DECONSTRUCTION OF HEIDEGGER**

**3.1 Introduction**

This chapter is based on the deconstruction and reading of Heidegger's *Being and Time* by Derrida. For that sake, Derrida's 1993 work *Aporias*, will be taken as the main source. Throughout this chapter, a reading on *Aporias*<sup>60</sup> will be followed.

The problem of "death" when understood as a "step" or a "crossing" is put forward by Derrida in order to raise a tension with the word "aporia". Understanding of "aporia" is the main theme for Derridian reading in order to understand Derrida's account of death and deconstruction of Heidegger. The main passages and the source of Deconstruction of Heidegger on death will be from, Derrida's 1993 work, "Aporias".<sup>61</sup>

*Aporias* starts with the critique of the account of death in traditional philosophy. In the traditional account of philosophy death is understood as a step or crossing of a line. According to Derrida as long as death requires a certain step or crossing a line, it is a problem. Because, the line presupposes a division. It

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<sup>60</sup> Jaques Derrida, "Aporias: Dying –awaiting one at the limits of truth", Stanford Univ. Pres. 1993

<sup>61</sup> Jaques Derrida, "Aporias: Dying –awaiting one at the limits of truth", Stanford Univ. Pres. 1993

divides. It puts into two territories. A division of an identity is implicit in the concept of a line. It causes a problem as soon as the edge-line is threatened.

For that sake, we first of all have to look at what Derrida means by the word “aporia”. In his work *Aporia*, Derrida explains how he chooses the word, *aporia*.

“Greek word, *aporia*, which I choose a long time ago, as a title of this occasion without really knowing, where I was going, except that, I knew what was going to be at stake in this word, was ‘not knowing where to go’”<sup>62</sup>

*Aporia*’s meaning is not knowing where to go; the experience of that particular situation. In other words it is very much related with his concept of “undecidability” which will be the basic concept of his later works; *Force of Law*, *Specter’s of Marx*. Not knowing where to go is crucial because every decision could make up a violence when at the time of a choice is made.

As Derrida puts forwards, in a time of not knowing, it is a non-passage. Derrida’s emphasis is that it is the experience of a non -passage. It is emphasized as a non-passage for several reasons. The main reason is that death is concerned to be a passage, step, a line crossing in traditional philosophy.

It is a non-passage but it is neither negative nor positive for Derrida. It is the kind of an experience is in which, Derrida says, “It would be no longer possible *Aporia* to voralitule a problem”. “*Aporia*” when concerned together with

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<sup>62</sup> Jaques Derrida, “*Aporias: Dying –awaiting one at the limits of truth*”, Standford Univ. Pres. 1993 p.12

‘undecidability’, in that experience of undecidability, there is no longer a projection, a problem, or protection.

In this very different word, in this very different experience, the point is not “there is no problem” so that all the solutions could be given, but rather there is no place, no way, to constitute a problem. It is a kind of experience. It is not a possibility.<sup>63</sup> It is a certain kind of experience. It is very much like one of the names of his books. “Margins of philosophy”. In a sense that margin was found him. Margin is that experience which is also a non-experience: aporia.

### **3.2 Setting the Stage**

Derrida uses his way of reading on Heidegger. His way of reading includes Deconstruction. Deconstructing a philosopher includes reading the philosopher in very detail and also supporting him against the people who also interpreted that philosopher. By doing this, he is left alone.

Derrida in Aporias, starts with the analysis of traditional philosophy. In this analysis he first of all, takes Diderot’s explanation on dying.

‘DYING – awaiting (one another at the limits of truth)<sup>64</sup>’

Derrida takes the quotations with special attention that, they hide the whole tradition of history of philosophy in themselves. This quotation is among that kind of quotations. Especially for the sake of deconstruction, first the holes or the parts

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<sup>63</sup> The difference between Heidegger and Derrida will arise here that, Derrida forces to understand as an experience death as a form of experience rather than an ontological possibility. I will try to figure out this point in the conclusion part.

<sup>64</sup> Aporias, J.D. , p.1

of the writing to be deconstructed are needed which tell us about the whole history of philosophy. And about that quotation Derrida would stress on the words - awaiting, - border, - truth. All of which in his writings prior to Aporias he took into consideration and deconstruction.

These words which could be taken separately construct the explanation of Dying for Diderot. This could best be told in another way. Derrida for his deconstruction on Death and for an introduction and the survey to aporias sets the stage. And in the following parts of this chapter, Derrida's stage and its parts will be followed which are very much related to each other in our special concept: death.

Derrida at first sight asks the question about the quotation;

- How can one cross the borders of truth?

If there is 'beyond' as Diderot calls, than there has to be a limit. That has to be

finite. There is a limitation. If there are limits one has to pass it. There is a passing or rather it is possible to pass. Derrida in the following parts will be getting in the details of this 'limits' and limitation. Delimitation of the limits is the main concern of deconstruction. Here than we could say that Derrida by intentional reference points us to a deconstruction. Delimiting will also be the main theme of Derrida in deconstruction of Heidegger.<sup>65</sup>

After setting the stage, he starts deconstruction of Heidegger's view of

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<sup>65</sup> Delimiting is also the task of Heidegger.

death by explaining it first also by supporting him against the ones who he thinks misunderstood him. That is a strategy; Derrida's most frequently used strategy of deconstruction. Derrida will analyze the view of Lois Vincent Thomas an anthropologist who writes on death.

First of all we need to quote Heidegger's famous explanation about death. Heidegger in *Being and Time* says `no sooner the human being is born he is already old enough to die'<sup>66</sup> That is very literal and strong quotation. That is the quotation used by Thomas and Derrida will deconstruct.<sup>67</sup>

### **3.3 Death as a Foundation for Sciences**

As a point of critique of death in Heidegger; Thomas writes the following. `Does this incontestable (metaphysical) truth, verified by all the givens of biological sciences and attested by demography mean anything at the level of lived experience?'<sup>68</sup>

This will be one of the main topics of Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger. According to Derrida, Thomas in his analysis, presupposes hegemonies. Derrida is proposing to find the hegemonies lying in it both in Thomas and Heidegger. For that reason in order to make an analysis he will go inside the Heidegger's writings on *Being and Time* which was the topic of Chapter 1 of this thesis.

The core of the analysis of Derrida is the difference of End from Death. By

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<sup>66</sup> B.T p.289

<sup>67</sup> Lois-Vincent Thomas, *Anthropologie de la mort* (Payot, 1975) p.223 from *Aporias JD*, p.6

<sup>68</sup> i.b.i.d p.223



which we can explain the immature coming of death. Death is what always comes before its time. Derrida explains this in the following way in Heidegger's discourse. Heidegger distinguishes the death of Dasein from its End (Ende). For Heidegger Dasein does not need to mature when death occurs. Derrida explains that is the reason why life is always has been so short. Every death is before its time. In that sense Dasein is the very different than any other concrete being. Its end is not its death which means that it "may well passed its maturity before its End" says Derrida <sup>69</sup>

Therefore, Dasein always passes a border. The border that we from our point of view call death. Dasein does not seem to follow the road that we think we follow. That border that Dasein passes is also prior. It is in surpassing. By this the very distinction of End of Dasein and death of Dasein and its maturity, Heidegger tries to put his analysis thus Dasein before any metaphysics that is in sense of passing.

In that sense Derrida says he does the reverse of what Thomas says. Heidegger tries to put light to any ontology of death before hand by an existential analysis as Thomas puts forward "verified and attested". For Heidegger ontology of Dasein is prior to any ontology also ontology of life.

Dasein is prior to all. In the ontology of Dasein death is also prior to any ontology which means that it is not the critique of Thomas. But the reverse that Dasein is prior to all of these sciences. It is Heidegger who tries to analyze these

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<sup>69</sup> JD, Aporias p.26

before hand in order not to let any possible subordinations or presuppositions before hand. That is done in any other disciplines such as biology, medicine, anthropology. In that sense while making the analysis of Dasein, Dasein has its absolute priority.

For Derrida the reason underneath Heidegger' s aim to think so, is no to allow himself with any philosophical knowledge in order to make the foundation stronger. That is trying "not to delimit" for Derrida.<sup>70</sup> By philosophical knowledge which he means subject, soul, ego etc. that could build up a foundation of a philosophical discourse. For Heidegger there are borders which are not that much strict between them and about these borders one must not cross. From a Derridian reading these borders are crossed.

Derrida's thesis is inside the analysis of death, with respect to death there are also borders and there is hierarchy. In this hierarchy of philosophical knowledge what Derrida puts forward is this hierarchy's concern is "the proper dying" (eigentlich sterben) of Dasein which one must testify and attest. This hierarchy crosses the borders and it itself is subject to metaphysics.

The main theme of Derrida' s deconstruction point is that Heidegger there needs to do a delimitation of these borders. What concerns these limits, what prohibits the passing of one of these limits, about this border crossing Heidegger tries to do delimitation but it is the limitation of the limits for Derrida which

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<sup>70</sup> JD, Aporias p. 29

"concerns limits about the limitation of limits" <sup>71</sup> the difference between "properly dying" and simple ending becomes the difference of the deconstruction for Derrida.

Verenden is the word Heidegger uses and the translation of which Derrida chooses is "perishing". That is which all living things come to an end. About Dasein, Heidegger uses the term "properly dying". Derrida tries to show that this distinction is problematic. That distinction is the essential element of Heidegger's ontology which is done not to be subject to any presupposition before hand. But for Derrida this distinction itself is a presupposition and problematic. Heidegger in making this distinction; "the distinction between perishing and dying (der Tod) established, as far as Heidegger is concerned, as he will never call it into question again" <sup>72</sup> is put forward by Derrida. This distinction has to be called into question in the reading of Derrida.

This is to find a foundation in the Derridian sense. Heidegger in his analysis tries to find a foundation for his existential analysis. Any possible foundation is problematic for Derrida. This is why he is also called post-structuralist. Any foundation of death that will try to lead to generality will become problematic because of death's special property that death is singular. Derrida in that sense tries to figure out the parts of the Heidegger's analysis that proposes foundations, in other words: the hegemonic parts of Heidegger's

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<sup>71</sup> JD, Aporias p.30

<sup>72</sup> JD, Aporias p.31

philosophy.

### 3.4 Defined Borders of death

Derrida' s reading of Heidegger involves the very important and main foundation point of Dasein which is the main theme of Derrida. For Derrida Being and Time exceed its borders, in this sense. The borders which it presents: "existential analysis of the Dasein in the transcendental horizon of time" <sup>73</sup> This results with the experience of the aporia. Therefore, aporia becomes the most important concept of Derrida' s reading of Heidegger; the understanding of the aporia; the concept of aporia.

"Heidegger never stopped modulating this affirmation according to which mortal is whoever experiences death as such, as death" <sup>74</sup> No other living being is allowed to experience death as such in Heidegger's ontology.

This point Derrida will make a main focus for two reasons. One is the hegemony of man over the animal and the territorial being of man over the other beings and much more importantly "as such". Starting from the Aporias he will use the phrase "as such" to explain whole metaphysical tradition.

If we return back to the reading of Derrida, in Heidegger, Dasein is the only entity that belongs only to human subject. From that point of view Dasein is only for the human beings. Animals cannot experience death "as such" for Heidegger. They only can perish (Verenden). That is to say also they can never

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<sup>73</sup> JD, Aporias p.32

<sup>74</sup> JD, Aporias p.35

properly die. Properly is the saying of "as such". "As such" talks of a properness.

Derrida for the further analysis of Heidegger' s death and Dasein quote from Heidegger for the sake of the argument which will be constructed over it. Derrida quoted from Heidegger' s On the Way to Language.

"mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do this. But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought"

From the first look, to this quotation it is seen that, the proper dying of man makes the difference of Dasein, which difference is also relevant with respect to language since animals cannot speak. But on the other hand, this is what makes the difference is said to be unthought.

About the quotation, Derrida also reminds us of a possible misunderstanding. That is, animals cannot experience death as death but they cannot also speak which seems to be an incapability of their nature in a sense. It also could be read from this point of view. That is to say from the very first look, Derrida seems to be open for the possibilities which he will further make this a concept of his analysis of Heidegger.

The main aim for Derrida to explore and analyze is the difference between dying, perishing, ending. And for the further analysis, another difference is put into consideration. That is Ableben. The possible translations of Ableben are; to leave life, to pass from life, to cross the threshold of death. This is the certain step.

That Derrida already mentioned about death which requires a certain step. The English translation of Ableben is Demise.

We are left with the questions of difference then. One of them is how can we discriminate between these “ends”? What is demise if it is not dying and if it is not ‘perishing’? About these what Derrida puts forward is; "one can speak of demise of a hedgehog, an elephant”. Demise is than for Derrida proper to Dasein. But it is also not dying. Dasein in its very essence presupposes dying. "Dasein never perishes. But Dasein can demise only as long as it is dying" <sup>75</sup>

There are differences in Heidegger regarding death. But these differences would bring paradoxes says Derrida.<sup>76</sup> That is the main deconstruction for Derrida. This will constitute the way to the aporia. The difference of death, the difference between biological ending and properly dying allows us not only to understand the limits of death in the Heideggerian sense but also allows one to distinguish these differences between cultural and legal endings. This is the solution of Heidegger that is prior to all sciences and philosophies.

According to Derrida in Heidegger, ‘the distinction between demising (Ableben) and dying (Sterben) is so to speak interior to the being toward-death of Dasein’<sup>77</sup>. The analysis of Derrida here is very important for analyzing Heidegger. Demising is not dying as stated before. That is to say ‘being destined to death’<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> B.T p.291

<sup>76</sup> JD, Aporias, p.38

<sup>77</sup> JD, Aporias p. 39

<sup>78</sup> JD, Aporias p.39

But Dasein itself can also demise. If it never perishes it cannot also demise. It cannot demise without dying. So that Derrida concludes, “there is no scandal” by saying Dasein is immortal. In other words Dasein remain immortal up to the point that Dasein’s being towards death is dead.

Even Dasein ends, in a sense it comes to an end of properly dying. It never ‘kicks the bucket’ (Derridian term), Dasein does not come to an end in the sense of Verenden. Therefore, as from the view point of Dasein we cannot come to an end as animals do. Or we do not perish in the sense of ending that we think that is what the Heideggerian analysis of death proposes us.

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| Hierarchy of endings in Heidegger according to Derrida |
| Properly dying   |
| Demise   |
| Perishing  |

The important point about all these different endings is that they all presuppose Dasein. Not only they do presuppose the Dasein, but they also hold the hierarchy. It is the hierarchy of “the proper dying” over Demise. This hierarchy Derrida calls is the “problematic closure”.<sup>79</sup> The problematic closure happens at the time of the differentiation of the endings. The hierarchical point of the different endings with respect to the proper dying makes up the problematic for Derrida.

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<sup>79</sup> JD, Aporias p.40

This also could be analyzed as the limiting of death that is singular by its very nature to the general analysis.

In the hierarchy of different endings the death of man comes before the death of the animal. Derrida puts it forward as; "... to the dominant dogma according to which only man has such borders, and animals do not"<sup>80</sup>. That is the dogma of Heidegger. But is mankind the only border giving or border defining? But we know that this is not true because animals have borders as well. They have the borders of feeding or the borders of sexual sense. This is the sense of Heidegger which does not give the attributes, the specialties, the properties that it gives to man and not to the animals. Derrida calls this anthropologic border. Man has the hegemony and the border deciding aspect over the animals which constitutes the limiting affect.

### **3.5 Delimiting Death and Metaphysical Paradox**

After these analyses the main argument will be shaped. The main philosophical concern and inquiry is Dasein for Heidegger. Without the concept of death Dasein cannot realize itself. Dasein's main point is properly dying. Although as we have known there is history of funerals, there is history of mourning, there is history of death from the point of view of medicine "there is no culture of death or itself or properly dying"<sup>81</sup> Therefore, the dying Heidegger tries to put forward does not belong to culture or biology wholly.

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<sup>80</sup> JD, Aporias p.41

<sup>81</sup> JD, Aporias, p.42



The concept that ‘Death changes’ is the introduction of the second part of Derrida' s analysis of Heidegger. Death changes according to culture. Meaning of death changes from culture to culture. So what we could infer from here is that, there is history of death. From Derrida' s previous writings we could follow his line of thought. Everything that has a history is deconstructable in Derrida.

In the change of death, the important theme is the culture. Not only death varies from culture to culture but also the history related with that culture. Every culture treats death according to its modes. The real difference lies in the difference between nature and culture. Between the biological life and cultural life. That is to say between animal and human. It constitutes the relation to death. Derrida says "relation to death as such" <sup>82</sup>

On the other hand bio-genetic disciplines must presuppose a concept of death. According to Derrida this is what Heidegger proposes. This is what Heidegger tries to do by his existential analysis; by the analysis of Dasein. There is the priority and the different endings that have been stated before which is a foundation for Derrida. There is founded structure says Derrida; "founding basis of the founded structure that presupposes it"<sup>83</sup> It does two things at the same time.

(1) It from one hand precedes any ontology;

on the other hand

(2) It also founds a foundation for the so called bio-genetic

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<sup>82</sup> JD, Aporias p.44

<sup>83</sup> JD, Aporias,p.44

sciences.

This creates the main paradox. It does two things at the same time. That is a metaphysical paradox.

There is also another paradox. In order to identify the "different modes of living"; in the sense of the "lived experience" (Erleben) one must already know what death means. That is to say, the analysis of Heidegger while he himself is analyzing death he has a conception an understanding of death. This is why it is called the existential analysis. This is like the first paradox. But from the point of Erleben it is the same paradox that repeats itself. This is the paradox of foundation.

This is the point of the order, order of the foundation. Derrida says that, he is dealing with this order, logic of this order. But the point of the order or the deconstruction of that foundation will happen in the place what it makes possible. The life-death according to Derrida is "life-death that no longer falls under the case of what it makes possible. That is what I will call the aporia."<sup>84</sup> That will figure out itself at the end of Derrida' s reading.

For Heidegger, all the sciences, anthropology, history, theology etc. the sciences that are related to culture and these that are related to culture of death, are not able to figure out their very foundation: Namely death. This is Heidegger' s framework. It is to explain death in such a manner that this explanation will put its light onto these sciences as well so that the existential analysis of death comes before all of these as it was stated above.

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<sup>84</sup> JD, Aporias p.46

Derrida in Heidegger' s view of Dasein and metaphysical paradox from the point of view of lived experience (Erlebnis). Psychology can be psychology of the dying. That is also of the living. But the point here Derrida remarks is the dying not "of dying". It then turns out to be Dasein does not properly die in the course of an experience. That is because "of dying" is a continuous experience in Heidegger's ontology that we face which is also meaning that Dasein never has the "Erleben" of his own demise.

### **3.6 Death from Here - Worldliness**

Another theme point of Derrida' s reading of Heidegger in the context of death is; death' s anteriority. He says;

"Metaphysics of death is also anterior, neutral, and independent, with regards to all the questions and all the answers pertaining to a metaphysics of death" <sup>85</sup>

There is a line here which is a sign of deconstruction for Derrida. This is to be here and to be beyond. The death that is beyond here. The death that is here "down here". Derrida says; "will remain after the existential analysis" <sup>86</sup>It is very important in Derrida' s deconstruction of Heidegger because the aim of Derrida deconstructing Heidegger is whether it presupposes a line a division of here and beyond.

Between these beyondness and being here Derrida finds a problematic.

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<sup>85</sup> JD, Aporias, P.52

<sup>86</sup> JD, Aporias p.52

"Here" is the main theme for Derrida, a tool that he can catch the metaphysical boundness of Heidegger. He says "to wonder what there is after death (from here) only has meaning and is legitimately possible."<sup>87</sup> That is also what we all psychologically share. We say ourselves or at the death of the other to render the fact that the dead one is gone. "Gone" locates a place. That is the "hereness" in Heidegger as he was supposed to be an existential philosopher. The starting point of Heidegger is here and this is what Derrida stresses and emphasizes. The question asked by Derrida is that what it could be if one cannot start from here in the analysis of death. It turns out to be an affirmative and trustable basis for Heidegger starting from here and "hereness". In itself it has a certainty. That is the point of decision. Undecidability is the main theme that Derrida will put into picture.

He puts the undecidability into picture, saying; "whether such a question is possible theoretical question, at all must remain undecided here"<sup>88</sup> Which means the theoretical question concerning this side. The side is that we are in; we are here, and the question of the other side must remain undecided. The reason that it must be done as such for Derrida is; "one cannot do otherwise".

There comes the very important point for Derrida; Derrida thinks that Heidegger over emphasizes what is being decided. While making existential analysis Heidegger tries to decide what must remain undecided. Heidegger decides

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<sup>87</sup> JD, Aporias p.52

<sup>88</sup> JD Aporias p.52

the one which must remain undecided. According to Derrida it is decisive to overemphasize the decided points with respect to borders that Derrida talks about. He then enumerates the reasons why he finds Heidegger's analysis decisive.

First reason is that methodological and hierarchical determination of death in Heidegger is empty inside. It itself, as Heidegger proposes, extends to and superordinates to all disciplines and sciences. In that sense it exceeds all knowledge. So that it is empty for Derrida.

The second reason is "this sidedness". This is the privileged position of this side in the analysis of death. We start the analysis from here; from our worldliness. That bounds us to here. From here we are the deciders of there. The reason underneath for this is also the anxiety that the idea we will die produces and we try to do a neutralization of the other side. Derrida says "a mortal can only start from here his mortality"<sup>89</sup> The reason for his belief of spirits and the immortality comes from his mortality. The secondness of immortality seems to remain as a border as well in that sense. The belief in immortality, spirits and their sense in culture also does not seem to contradict with being towards death in Heidegger but on the other hand confirmed and together explained with it, namely "this sidedness" as a border; a border for any possible methodology.

Thirdly and the final reason is the pre-ness. Preference and the prevalence of any study that could be done after the existential analysis is attached to the "this sidedness". That is the pre-ness.

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<sup>89</sup> JD, Aporias p.55

After giving the reasons why Heidegger' s analysis would be decisive Derrida steps to the corollaries of this way of thinking. That is before the aporia - the undecidability. Here the point stressed is the decision point of Heidegger. Since there is a decision of death, about death for Derrida it will turn into a non-decision. It rests upon what cannot be decided which is namely death.

The whole work of Derrida also could be seen from the view point that the singularity of that is tried to be put into a generality and Derrida' s work of this generality concerning all sciences and the methodologies sends it back to its singularity.

### **3.7 Corollaries**

The first corollary for Derrida is "death would have no border"<sup>90</sup> Any possible existential analysis of death, in order to make a universal analysis prior to all sciences, should not have any border. It must be independent of any possible religion school of thought and any problematic or discourse. In that sense death must not know any border with respect to Dasein. It should not be denied or modified according to the societies as we do such as the historians think it so (Thomas for Derrida), denied or prohibited. Derrida quotes from Thomas who thinks that "death should be resolved" and put back to its right place. For Derrida these attitudes towards death in any existential analysis of death could not be acceptable. It is an obsession. The underlying point of these inquiries is that death is not what it used to be in the past. Cultural and historical borders remain here in

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<sup>90</sup> JD, Aporias, p.57

our way of looking to death. The hierarchy seems to remain as well when the borders are concerned.

The second corollary for Derrida is; "a politics of death"<sup>91</sup> If the existential analysis of death wants to be primary and universal (These are Derrida' s stresses and terminology) where on the other hand also remain, neutral to any culture, theology, biology and all the sciences; Derrida claims that it must have a politics. In Heidegger there is no politics of death.

Politics is a very important theme for Derrida especially in his late works. Political experience is what Derrida will lead us to. As it can be observed in his late works he in a sense turns his deconstructive readings to the politics starting with *Specters of Marx* and *The Other Heading*.

For Derrida, Heidegger' s picture of death has no comment on the political problems of burial, cult of death and more importantly Derrida stress of war and medicine. About the deaths in wars and the death due to AIDS or the bombardment of Iraq, under the universal laws, Heidegger' s analysis has nothing to say, proposes Derrida. From a point of view we could say that, this is not a universal analysis of death and this analysis therefore does not need to say anything about the politics, since it is an existential one. However, for Derrida, Heidegger' s analysis was claimed to be universal. Therefore, due to fact of being to be universal, according to Derrida it should say about politics and dying after wars.

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<sup>91</sup> JD, *Aporias* 59

The third corollary for Derrida is Heidegger' s analysis; "does not want to know anything about ghosts (revenant)" <sup>92</sup> Anything about them is subject to psychoanalysis, theology etc. But not to death properly speaking. Heidegger' s quick answer would be it is not the subject of existential analysis. But Derrida opposes his quick answer. There has to be a room for the spectrality and the revenance. This is Derrida's main point as it can be seen in his late writings. Derrida has much to say about specters, revenant, and ghosts. Spectrality and mourning are the important themes which will be figured out. This third corollary says Derrida, is the most important corollary of all and all is tied to that corollary.

Derrida tries to show that this third corollary in its essence implies a politics. This politics is possible over the organization of time and space over the act of mourning. There are with-out's he enumerates of this act. If there is politics of death, he dogmatically insists on that there could be none without "the thematic relation to the spirit as ghost (revenant)", "open hospitality to the guest as ghost" and thirdly; "whom one holds hostage"<sup>93</sup>

The important relation that will follow from all of these determinations, corollaries, analysis of Heidegger and the others, Derrida tries to figure out the importance of Aporias and at the same time at the end reminds the crossing of the borders could not be from one side to the other but from the other side as well.

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<sup>92</sup> JD, Aporias, p.60

<sup>93</sup> JD, Aporias p.61



### 3.8 Possibility and impossibility with respect to death

The important theme that Derrida inscribes is the theme of possibility. The theme that of Dasein is over is the possibility. "Possibility of the possible" he says "brings together the theme of the virtual imminence". This brings us the future. The possibility that we could call with regards to future as in the form of expectation on one hand and possibility as potential on the other hand. This possibility of Dasein is the "being possible of Dasein" is the main essence of Dasein says Derrida. <sup>94</sup>Once this possibility is overlapped, there it will be determined as in the form of an existential analysis.

What Derrida analyzed the possibility of the point of Heidegger in the construction of Dasein is that; Derrida tries to figure out the possibility of Dasein as it is in Heidegger with regard to "death as possibility". "Death is the most proper possibility of this possibility." Derrida as in the first assertion of Dasein <sup>95</sup> once this possibility is asserted it is very much assumed by the Dasein. The most important theme of this possibility is that Dasein has to take over this possibility in every case with regards to death. Therefore Derrida concludes one of his strongest analysis of Heidegger that "Dasein awaits itself" <sup>96</sup>

Derrida lays out three different awaitings from the single awaiting. In other words he multiplies (my word) the awaiting.

(a) The first one is; "await one self in oneself"

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<sup>94</sup> JD, Aporias, p.63

<sup>95</sup> JD, Aporias, p.63

<sup>96</sup> JD, Aporias, p.63

(b) The second one is; awaiting directed to the other, that is so called - arrivant- that is from two ways, one can expect the other and secondly expect something other will happen. In both of which expecting is the underlying theme and concept.

(c) Thirdly "awaiting for each other." That is awaiting the other there the one that is completely the other. Since one cannot go there together resulting from the singularity of death (my emphasis). There he concludes everything happens says Derrida.<sup>97</sup>

The third aspect of awaiting is the most important with respect to death. We wait for each other there, knowing that life had been too short. "One is waiting for the other there"<sup>98</sup> says Derrida. Waiting for the oneself, there. In the sense that being before one self and waiting for the other oneself to come. That oneself is familiar to us. It is not in the sense of the other. But in that line of the argument that one is before one's self.

This Derrida wants to ascribe to Heidegger. For Derrida he chooses from different phrases of Heidegger; that is the case of Dasein with respect to death; "Being before itself". For another phrase instead of being before itself, Derrida prefers the phrase "stands before itself"<sup>99</sup>. Together with death Dasein is before itself, it awaits itself in the sense of the future. Moreover it offers itself being-able as being before.

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<sup>97</sup> JD, Aporias, p.64

<sup>98</sup> JD, Aporias, p.65

<sup>99</sup> JD, Aporias, p.66

Death comes. One waits. Being towards death, one is always on the waiting of the death. This is the most proper possibility. That comes everyday with anxiety. Everyday waiting of the other and the singular. The important theme that Derrida catches in Heidegger is in its inauthentic being, one defines in order to escape from this possibility, death as untruth. One has to escape such a possibility. So that means; for Derrida “everything happens at the limits of truth and untruth.”<sup>100</sup> Death than becomes a matter of truth.

That is the deconstruction point because death cannot be a matter of truth or untruth. It is before any theory of what so called epistemology. That was the claim of Heidegger in the analysis of Dasein which is before any possible ontology as well.

From here we come to the understanding of the famous saying of Derrida; “possibility of impossibility”. With respect to what was said above we could come to the impossibility and possibility. At the end death is for Dasein, possibility of impossibility. It is both possible and impossible at the same time.

By the occurrence of the main underlying aspect of Dasein as it will also be used by Derrida in his writings, he feels himself to ask the following questions. Is this an aporia? How could we say such thing with respect to logic and meaning? Could such a thing be? Could one live with it?

Firstly, Dasein stands before death. That is its most proper possibility. That is nothing than being-in-the-world. For it death is the possibility of “being-no-

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<sup>100</sup> JD, Aporias, p.67

longer-to-be-there”. That is the possibility “being -able-not-to-be-there”. But on the contrary it is not the impossibility of a “being able to”. There is a small and thin difference between these two says Derrida. But it is important. As a possibility under the name of possibility Dasein is certain of that possibility says Derrida<sup>101</sup>Dasein can do two things. Can escape from it inauthentically or authentically as I had stated in the previous parts by awaiting it. For that; Heidegger put it forward “As potentiality -for being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”<sup>102</sup>

The notion of “as” becomes the most important theme for the analysis of death about Dasein. The possibility of being dead will be taken as impossibility. That means it is taken as so. But there is also one point remaining that is when taken “as such”. That as such as it was seen distinguishes Dasein from all other entities. Dasein can only die “as such”. For remaining as impossibility for Derrida “Dasein” loses everything. That to be at the same time, to be “absolutely certain” and also at the same time “absolutely indeterminate”<sup>103</sup>

According to Derrida the logical contradiction of Death turns out to be an aporia. “Death to be expected is the unique occurrence of this possibility of impossibility”<sup>104</sup>That is awaiting death. That means another possibility or impossibility will be defined in this particular one. That is aporia. That is; this

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<sup>101</sup> JD, Aporias, p.68

<sup>102</sup> B.T. p.294

<sup>103</sup> JD, Aporias, p.72

<sup>104</sup> JD, Aporias p.72

aporia will define and determine every discourse on death. Not only discourse but also Dasein as well in its very existence.

According to Derrida what Heidegger did not catch is “death is a secret”<sup>105</sup> It is the name of an irreplaceable secret. It is singular. With all the cults, with all the ceremonies that seems as a semi-public. It seems as belonging to a society. It seems to have a language. But it remains singular. It is singular. It is in the form of secret. For every person it is singular only for that person.

### **3.9 Death as “As such”**

Than the most important thing in the analysis is the relation of Dasein to the “as such” which is the impossibility of Dasein to be no longer. This is the impossibility of Dasein to be as non-existing. That impossibility that we stated before comes to us as no longer to expect ourselves to be as dead. That is the end of Dasein. From there that “as such” “cannot appear as such”<sup>106</sup> because of the aporia.

“As suchness” is general to all authenticity, inauthenticity and it is general to everything. Derrida’s point to that generality is the animals. He says “animals have a very significant relation to death, to murder and to wars”<sup>107</sup> Although animals do not have relation to the name of death. Neither do man. Derrida’s point is surprising. Does man guarantee to name death? It is a crucial question. It is like naming the other. For Derrida these two are the same. Naming death and naming

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<sup>105</sup> JD, Aporias, p.74

<sup>106</sup> JD, Aporias, p.75

<sup>107</sup> JD, Aporias, p.76

other. Both are singular.

For taking death again from Heidegger's analysis taking it as possibility of impossibility as such, man as Dasein does not have relation to the death as such. Derrida says "never" has relation to it "as such". We can think of it like an ideal point that we do not know. But we try to experience that think that we do not know. That death "as such" also does not have a history so that we do not have an idea of what it is like as well. As Derrida says, we do not have an excess.

We have an access but to perishing, demising of the other. "The death of the other comes first"<sup>108</sup> We first experience the death of the friends, relatives namely the other that makes us think of the structure of death. From this we come to the consequences of my death. That is awaiting of oneself dead we have talked about.

Derrida formalizes it in the following way. This is a "non access to death" The access to it to its border is also impossible. Derrida formalizes it, "the nonaccess to death to its nonborder".<sup>109</sup> Just because death cannot have any borders which is way of reading marked by Derrida. That is a marking of death as improper. It is making the proper as improper. It is the most inauthenticating one. All of which dying, perishing, demising, remains unnamed for Derrida from the view point of possibility as impossibility.

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<sup>108</sup> JD, Aporias, p.76

<sup>109</sup> JD, Aporias, p.76

### 3.10 Conclusions and summary

Here the whole paragraph from Derrida in which his work is summarized be quoted. He says interestingly it blocks the way to make an analysis of death from within which also could remind us of imminence of Deleuze. Heidegger's analysis becomes subject to hegemonies, hierarchies with respect to other disciplines mostly which also Dasein with its relation to death creates a non-access.

'existential analysis of Dasein (that is as such of death) is also what ruins the very possibility of the analysis form within. It therefore, compromises all at once:

- (1) the phenomenological principle of "as such" that regulates its method
- (2) the problematic closures that the analysis draws its relations to other disciplines
- (3) the conceptual limits that analysis puts into operation. (limits between Dasein and other entities)

And the distinctions that he says we added:

- (1) to be oneself awaiting (death) in always too short life
- (2) to be expecting death and that death to come (too soon or too late, untimely)
- (3) to be waiting for each other, waiting for/in death as for/at the limits of

truth”<sup>110</sup>

What we have to do with all of these is; not a pure ‘cutting of’ or determining or a defining. The point Derrida says his aim is to leave these as open. The project of Derrida is to show that Heidegger is to limit death to give Dasein and the analysis of Dasein from a hegemonic and hierarchical point of view. Derrida offers us to delimit.

As it was said before deconstruction is also a delimiting activity. It is a delimiting in the sense of ‘naming’ and in the sense of a singularity of death that is forced to be universality in the view of Heidegger. In order to leave them open he does three movements. It is an attempt to leave them without end. That could be the most non-violent act with respect to death. Derrida does the following.

(1) ‘It involves aporia’ If aporia is a thing to be endure before all of the duties and

laws, the aporia cannot be said to be ‘as such’ and could not be determined. Because we know that it is a non- passage. Derrida says ‘the ultimate aporia is the impossibility of the aporia as such’<sup>111</sup> All is possible as impossible. Derrida says ‘if there is such a thing: love, the other, testimony... so forth’ Under the name of ‘as such’ we all consider these as possible as im possible.

(2) It involves the foiling of every strategy and delimitation. That is a fundamental

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<sup>110</sup> JD, Aporias, p.78

<sup>111</sup> JD, Aporias, p.78



way of looking things. As it is ‘limits were known edge between” anthropology and ontology.

(3) ‘since this contaminating contraband remains irreducible, it already insinuates itself through the idiom of existential analysis” <sup>112</sup>That it happens form a shibboleth affect, underneath with all its poison. It proposes to be different from the cultures of the religions of the Book saying to be “distance taken from Christian anthro-po-theology” ‘Being and Time repeats all the motifs of such onto - theology” Derrida further more makes the analysis further and says strongly, the analysis of death this experience is not possible without ‘Judeo -Christian-Islamic experience of death to which this analysis testifies” <sup>113</sup>

From there we can conclude that underneath all Being and Time although it proposes to be different; although it says it wants to do an existential analysis, it does not. Moreover Derrida says it is a subject and the same as that it wants to criticize.

Very strong critiques and last words Derrida comes to.

(1) One can read history of death with the existential analysis of Dasein that conditions their work.

(2) One can read ‘Being and Time as a small, late document among oth ers

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<sup>112</sup> JD, Aporias, p.79

<sup>113</sup> JD, Aporias, p.80

where

the memory of death in Christian Europe is being accumulated”<sup>114</sup>

It in that sense carries the memory of the Christian Europe of thought for Derrida. And lastly, he comes to put his position to a place. He puts this position by a very strong metaphor.

“Just while ago, it is said that the history of Marrano has just come to an end by the declaration by the Spanish court (1992).”

I would like to quote it all from Derrida his conclusion.

“Marrano’s we are. Marrano’s in any case, whether we want to be or not, whether we know it or not. Marrano’s having incalculable number of ages, hours and years,... each still waiting for the other, we may increasingly be younger and older, in a last word, infinitely unfinished.”<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> JD, Aporias, p.80

<sup>115</sup> JD, Aporias, p.81

## CHAPTER FOUR

### HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA ON DEATH: SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCES, CRITIQUES AND CONCLUSIONS

#### 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the outcomes of the two readings, which are share in common the concept as their most philosophical concept, namely, Heidegger's B.T. Div.II Part One, which constituted the first chapter of this thesis and Derrida's Aporias, which constituted the second chapter of this thesis will be figured out. The similarities and the difference between Heidegger and Derrida will be discussed, by the help of the charts. Through out this inquiry, I will use references to this thesis, I also will use the references to the texts written, on Heidegger and Derrida such as, Thomson<sup>116</sup>, Ellis<sup>117</sup> and Baugh<sup>118</sup> and also take into consideration their point in the similarities and the difference between Heidegger and Derrida on death.

Both philosophers provide answers, in ways that are both radically different and fundamentally connected My main aim after the two readings, as similarities and differences is to figure out this fundamental and radical points.

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
<sup>116</sup> Ian Thomson, "Can I Die? Derrida on Heidegger on Death", *Philosophy Today*, Spring 1999, pp. 29-40

<sup>117</sup> Christopher Ellis, "Static and Genetic Phenomenology of death"; *Contretemps* 2, May 2001, pp.157-170

<sup>118</sup> Bruce Baugh, "Death and Temporality in Deleuze and Derrida", *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities*, 5:2, August 2000 pp. 73-83

## 4.2 Static / Genetic Phenomenology of Death

The main difference between Heidegger and Derrida lies in their conception of phenomenology of death. Although the terms genetic and static were not used by Heidegger and Derrida, these terms were taken from Ellis. Together with the quotations of this thesis I also will try to quote and consider Ellis' writing and critique in order to figure out this distinction.



According to Heidegger; as it was discussed in earlier parts of this thesis 'biological-ontical' explanation of death is problematical. The preliminary decision about Dasein and death has to be 'sketched out' by the ontology of Dasein.<sup>119</sup> The ontology of Dasein in that sense is 'super ordinate to any ontology of life'<sup>120</sup> and 'subordinate' to a characterization of Dasein's basic state.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, Heidegger's main aim is to give an explanation of Dasein that can also serve for all the other sciences.

Genetic phenomenology although Derrida does not put it into words by the word genetic, is also what he has in mind. The concept that 'Death changes' is the

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<sup>119</sup> B.T. 291

<sup>120</sup> B.T 291

<sup>121</sup> p. 16 of this thesis

introduction of the second part of Derrida' s analysis of Heidegger. Death changes according to culture. Death changes its meaning from culture to culture. So that we could infer from here is that, there is history of death. From Derrida' s previous writings we could follow his line of thought. Everything that has a history is deconstructable in Derrida.<sup>122</sup>

Heidegger's claim to be superordinate and also subordinate with respect to sciences; was the main deconstruction point of Derrida. Heidegger's phenomenology of death is paradoxical for Derrida. It was stated in the "Delimiting Death" part of this thesis; "founding basis of the founded structure that presupposes it"<sup>123</sup> It does two things at the same time.

(1) It from one hand precedes any ontology;  
on the other hand

(2) it also founds a foundation for the so called bio-genetic sciences.

This creates the main paradox. It does two things at the same time.<sup>124</sup>

Derrida claims that Heidegger's analysis being both universal and singular has consequences with respect to death. These consequences Derrida had taken into consideration were analyzed in the "Corollaries" part of this thesis. I would like to summarize the corollaries of the paradox of Heidegger according to Derrida.

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<sup>122</sup> p. 37 of this thesis

<sup>123</sup> JD, Aporias,p.44

<sup>124</sup> p.38 of this thesis

The first corollary for Derrida is "death would have no border"<sup>125</sup> Any possible existential analysis of death, in order to make a universal analysis prior to all sciences, should not have any border.

The second corollary for Derrida is; "a politics of death" <sup>126</sup>If the existential analysis of death wants to be primary and universal Derrida claims that it must have a politics. In Heidegger there is no politics of death.

The third corollary for Derrida is that Heidegger' s analysis; "does not want to know anything about ghosts (revenant)"

By claiming to be universal, for Derrida, Heidegger's analysis should say about politics and dying after wars. This also shows that Derrida has a genetic conception of death in his mind.

A paper written by Christopher Ellis<sup>127</sup> supports the idea that "static phenomenology of death, such as that which Heidegger offers need to be supported by a genetic phenomenology of death"<sup>128</sup>

Derrida had showed that Heidegger is paradoxical in, from the point of view of both universal and singular conception of death. Ellis supports this view by saying "attitudes towards death are characterized by "fleeing" is correct by he wrongly generalizes this idea makes it an ahistorical character of Dasein's

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<sup>125</sup> JD, Aporias, p.57

<sup>126</sup> JD, Aporias 59

<sup>127</sup> Christopher Ellis, "Static and Genetic Phenomenology of death"; Contretemps 2, May 2001

<sup>128</sup> Ellis p.162

existence”<sup>129</sup>

In that sense, Heidegger’s philosophy as we have seen is forgetting the memory of death” as well as presupposing death. So that it is turning out to be static phenomenology of death. Here we could ask the question “What could be a genetic philosophy of death like?”

According to Ellis a genetic philosophy of death ‘would have to focus death of the other rather than my death’<sup>130</sup> As we have seen from Derrida that, Heidegger’s account of death claims to be universal but on the other hand it has nothing to say of “dying at wars” which is also the dying of the other. Or rather the dead one’s of the wars. We could say from a Derridian point of saying that Heidegger’s philosophy does not want to know anything about the dead one’s at wars.

Ellis also supports this point, and he takes a quotation from Heidegger and translates a writing of Heidegger<sup>131</sup>.

‘Hundreds of thousands die en masse. Do they die? They succumb. They are done in. Do they die? They become items, resources for manufacture corpses. Do they die? .....to die is to endure death in its essence. To die means to be capable of this endurance. We are capable of this only if the essence of death makes our

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<sup>129</sup> Ellis p.160

<sup>130</sup> Ellis p.162

<sup>131</sup> Martin Heidegger, “Die Gefahr”, Bremer Un Fr eiburger Vortage, GA 59,56, translation Christopher Ellis.

essence possible”<sup>132</sup>

This quotation’s aim is to figure out that, any event of death, no matter how many people died, or how they died, cannot change the essence of death. According to Ellis this ‘reductive and deflationary analysis of Heidegger’<sup>133</sup>, is bad philosophy from the point of view of Hegel. Ellis shares, Derrida’s view. Ellis than tries to show that it is also the view of Hegel as well. In which; we must let concrete events inform the essential concepts of philosophy.

Ellis’ conclusion is that ‘we have to incorporate account of history and the death into our essential conception... into our genetic phenomenology of death and carry out our own work of mourning’<sup>134</sup> This also the point that Derrida has in mind and make it a main theme and structure of his work we have tried to analyze in the second chapter of this thesis.

### **4.3 Possibility**

Both Derrida and Heidegger use the term ‘possibility’ significantly in their philosophy. Although they seem to use the same term, they use it differently in their discourse. Through out this part, this difference will be figured out, together with the analysis of Thomas, who wrote on the subject and supports that Derrida misread Heidegger on the concept of possibility.


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<sup>132</sup> i.b.i.d quotation from Ellis p.167

<sup>133</sup> Ellis p.167

<sup>134</sup> Ellis p.167





In this thesis as it was stated before in the first chapter on Heidegger; for the concern of the analysis, death is not in that sense possible that is ready at hand, but rather a possibility of Dasein’s Being. <sup>135</sup>Being towards death as possibility is crucial character of disclosing of Being. The possibility should not be weakened. This possibility must be ‘understood as possibility, cultivated as possibility.’ <sup>136</sup>

In the analysis of death as a possibility, Heidegger makes the crucial analysis of ‘anticipation’. Death reveals itself as ‘possibility’ together with the anticipation, the terminology than turns out to be ‘anticipation of this possibility’; the closer one gets to this possibility, the farther that one get from it actual. Than it becomes ‘as the possibility of the impossibility of existence at all’ <sup>137</sup> as it was figured out. <sup>138</sup>

According to Derrida, first, Dasein stands before death. That is its most proper possibility. That is nothing than being-in-the-world. For it, death is the possibility of ‘being -no-longer-to-be-there’. That is the possibility ‘being -able-

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<sup>135</sup> p.22 of this thesis  
<sup>136</sup> B.T. p.306  
<sup>137</sup> B.T. p.307  
<sup>138</sup> p.23 of this thesis

not-to-be-there”. But on the contrary, it is not the impossibility of a ‘being able to’. There is a small and thin difference between these two says Derrida. But it is important. As a possibility under the name of possibility Dasein is certain of that possibility says Derrida <sup>139</sup>

There is an important point here, in the sense of actuality. According to Thomson Derrida misread, Heidegger in the concept of ‘possibility’. Derrida as was stated before reads Heidegger’s concept of possibility “die Möglichkeit”, as in two ways. One is as ‘immanence’ and the other is as ‘capability’. For Thomson “this characterization is insufficient and misleading” <sup>140</sup> In Being and Time the possibility is characterized as ‘not-yet actual’ which shows for Heidegger it is ‘merely possible’ and the cultivation of that possibility is Heidegger’s aim both above and in the first chapter as it was stated.

According to Thomson, Heidegger’s existential analysis of possibility is “‘existential possibility’ Dasein exists through the constant charting of ‘live - options’ choices that matter” <sup>141</sup> It is very much different than Derrida’s interpretation of ‘Possibility’ as capability. The possibility of Heidegger could best be understood as “‘enabling possibility’ as what enables us what we are” <sup>142</sup> In that sense according to Thomson; ‘Derrida’s equation of possibility with

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<sup>139</sup> JD, Aporias, p.68

<sup>140</sup> Thomson p.31

<sup>141</sup> Thomson p.31

<sup>142</sup> Thomson p.31

‘capability’ is misleading”<sup>143</sup>

Moreover, Thomson also describes how the ‘Being-possible of Dasein’, should be understood. According to Thomas Derrida ‘takes a wrong step’. According to Thomson this is further clarified in Derrida’s Gift of Death (1995). Thomson quotes from Gift of Death; ‘Every relation to death is an interpretive apprehension and representative approach to death’<sup>144</sup>

Heidegger’s account is on the contrary. ‘Existential possibility describes our ongoing non-calculative ‘charting the course’ of live options in which we are already immersed.’<sup>145</sup>

In Derrida’s interpretation there is the grasping of possibilities theoretically whereas in Heidegger’s account is a living through the possibilities, rather than grasping them theoretically. For Heidegger ‘Dasein is ‘its possibilities as possibilities’. This is why Heidegger characterizes Dasein as ‘Being possible’ (Möglichsein)’<sup>146</sup>

#### **4,4 “Possible as impossible”**

Another similarity between Derrida and Heidegger is in the term ‘possible as impossible’. Heidegger’s usage of the terms ‘possible as impossible’ is on the definition of death whereas Derrida make it a re-definition of deconstruction as

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<sup>143</sup> Thomson p.32


<sup>144</sup> Jaques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Willis, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995 p.45

Gift of Death is an earlier text to Aporias, although the main theme of this thesis is Aporias I had found it relevant here to quote it from Thomson since it shows a very crucial step of Derrida in the concept of ‘possibility’.

<sup>145</sup> Thomson p.32

<sup>146</sup> Thomson p.32

aporetic experience which is the main subject of Aporias. Thomson has a point on that; as it was on the previous part.



I would like to quote and remind the analysis of the first chapter of this thesis. In the existential inquiry of Heidegger, question asked is about everydayness together with the authentic understanding of death: How the connection would be possible? When in being-towards death, Dasein faces with the impossibility of existence but on the other hand, it conceals itself in the everydayness, it is in “an evasion which conceals”<sup>147 148</sup>

As it was shown Heidegger drives the conclusion; “As a potentiality for being, Dasein cannot outstrip, the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of absolute impossibility of Dasein”<sup>149</sup> According to Heidegger as we have seen in the earlier in this thesis “possibility as impossibility is what defines death. “Death is the possibility of absolute impossibility of Dasein”<sup>150 151</sup>

As it was given in the second chapter of this thesis, the most significant

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<sup>147</sup> B.T. p.299

<sup>148</sup> p.16 of this thesis

<sup>149</sup> B.T. p.294

<sup>150</sup> B.T. p.294

<sup>151</sup> p.16 of this thesis

theme of Heidegger Derrida had worked on was this ‘possibility of impossibility’. He not only analyzes this phrase in his sense but also in a sense that ‘pragmatically’ uses the term for the description of “aporetic experience” and identifies it with “deconstruction”. He takes this phrase to its own most limits. According to Derrida, all is ‘possible as impossible’. Derrida says ‘if there is such a thing: love, the other, testimony... so forth’<sup>152</sup> Under the name of ‘as such’ we all consider these as possible as impossible. Derrida by ‘possibility as impossibility’ nearly re-defines deconstruction.<sup>153</sup>

The notion of “as” becomes the most important theme for the analysis of death about Dasein. The possibility of being dead will be taken “as” impossibility. That means it is taken “as” so. But there is also one point remaining that is when taken “as such”. That “as such” as it was seen, distinguishes Dasein from all other entities. Dasein can only die “as such”. For remaining as impossibility for Derrida “Dasein” loses everything. That to be at the same time, to be “absolutely certain” and also at the same time “absolutely indeterminate”<sup>154</sup>

According to Derrida the logical contradiction of Death turns out to be an aporia. “Death to be expected is the unique occurrence of this possibility of impossibility”<sup>155</sup> That is awaiting death. That means another possibility or impossibility will be defined in this particular one. This is aporia. That is; this

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<sup>152</sup> JD, Aporias , p.78

<sup>153</sup> Thomson, p.30

<sup>154</sup> JD, Aporias, p.72

<sup>155</sup> JD, Aporias p.72

aporia will define and determine every discourse on death.<sup>156</sup>

This discourse Derrida takes is aporetic experience. Aporia's meaning is not knowing where to go; the experience of that particular situation.(p.21)According to Derrida the logical contradiction of Death turns out to be an aporia. "Death to be expected is the unique occurrence of this possibility of impossibility"<sup>157</sup>That is awaiting death. That means another possibility or impossibility will be defined in this particular one.<sup>158</sup>

The most important thing in the analysis is the relation of Dasein to the "as such" which is the impossibility of Dasein to be no longer. This is the impossibility of Dasein to be as non-existing. That impossibility that we stated before comes to us as no longer to expect ourselves to be as dead. That is the end of Dasein. From there that "as such" "cannot appear as such"<sup>159</sup> because of the aporia.<sup>160</sup>

Therefore, Derrida formalizes it as, "the nonaccess to death to its nonborder"<sup>161</sup> just because death cannot have any borders which is way of reading marked by Derrida. That is a marking of death as improper. It is making the proper as improper. It is the most inauthenticating one. All of which dying, perishing, demising, remains unnamed for Derrida from the view point of

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<sup>156</sup> p.45 of this thesis

<sup>157</sup> JD, Aporias p.72

<sup>158</sup> p.45 of this thesis

<sup>159</sup> JD, Aporias, p.75

<sup>160</sup> p.64 of this thesis

<sup>161</sup> JD, Aporias, p.76

possibility as impossibility. (p.42)As a result; the proper dying of Dasein in Derrida's way of reading turns out to be the most improper, inauthenticating one.

To this picture between Heidegger and Derrida Thomson has a critique. The critique of Thomson lies in what has already been said in this thesis. <sup>162</sup>Heidegger says that 'Dying is not an event; it is a phenomenon to be understood existentially; and it is to be understood in the distinctive sense which must be still more closely delimited'<sup>163</sup>

According to Thomson, existential analysis of death should not be understood in the form of an event or instant. 'But if Being and Time does not rely on our being able to experience the 'instant' of that, then existential analytic cannot be 'brought to ruin' by the impossibility of experiencing this instant'<sup>164</sup> The first critique was on possibility as it was shown in the previous part. This is the second critique of Thomson against Derrida's reading of Heidegger.

Derrida's taking us to that instant for Thomson by Derrida's deconstruction the inevitability<sup>165</sup> of instant of death becomes visible, but on the other hand it is resolved in Heidegger's 'On The Way To The Language', which he calls late Heidegger by "gentle law of Ereignis"<sup>166</sup> which could be a theme of further inquiry.

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<sup>162</sup> p.14 of this thesis

<sup>163</sup> B.T p.284


<sup>164</sup> Thomson p.34

<sup>165</sup> This term was taken from Thomson.

<sup>166</sup> Thomson p.35

#### 4,4 As Suchness

As suchness is a similarity between the two philosophers. But only the term is similar.



As it was shown in the Heidegger chapter of my thesis, one of Heidegger's points was thinking death "as such". Precision could only be gained by difference of endings for Heidegger. By distinguishing "disappearance, and also from merely perishing, and finally from experiencing of a demise"<sup>167</sup> Heidegger comes to the point of as-suchness of death. According to Heidegger, one has to distinguish and disclose the understanding of Death. One has to experience death "as such".<sup>168</sup>

The possibility of being dead will be taken "as" impossibility. As it was explained in the previous part of this thesis; it is taken "as" so. But there is also one point remaining that is when taken "as such". That as such as it was seen distinguishes Dasein from all other entities. Dasein can only die "as such"

That as such was the real point of Derrida's deconstruction because it itself

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<sup>167</sup> B.T p.295

<sup>168</sup> 1.6 of this thesis



has the hegemony of the forces. Derrida at the end of the Specter's of Marx has a very crucial point. He summarizes all I have trying to do and he tries to do.

‘If Marx, like Freud, like Heidegger, like everybody, did not begin with where he ought to have ‘been able to begin’ namely with haunting, before life as such, before death as such, it is doubtless that it is not his fault’

As suchness is again the central theme of Derrida as it was on Heidegger. After the 11<sup>th</sup> of September acts of terrorism he repeats the same as-suchness and its possible conclusions are related with politics.

‘A major event should be so unforeseeable and irruptive that it disturbs even the horizon of the concept or essence on the basis of which we believe we recognize an event *as such*. That is why all the "philosophical" questions remain open, perhaps even beyond philosophy itself, as soon as it is a matter of thinking the event.’<sup>169</sup>

This as-suchness is what Derrida all the time in his writings tries to mention and has been dealing in the mean time as it was shown in detail in the reading of Heidegger. This is the central theme. This is what Derrida has been trying to do for years under the name of deconstruction. He at last finds it a name that is in a sense has less history than deconstruction in the amount of time deconstruction is used. It is: haunting which he will develop in ‘Specters of Marx’. It is finding the as-suchnesses.


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<sup>169</sup> Jaques Derrida and Jürgen Habermars, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermars and Jaques Derrida*, edited by Giovanna Borradori, University of Chicago Press, 2003, 224 p.p.

From my point of view, a question comes to one's mind. Is the deconstruction of Heidegger a "pragmatical" deconstruction? The term "as such" Derrida had taken from Heidegger and formulated it in a way that this term refers to all traditional philosophy and is a sign of deconstruction. This also could be taken as a sign of Derrida's philosophy which takes a concept, and modulates it to its out-most possibility.

#### 4,6 Delimiting

One of the similarities between both of the philosophers with respect to death is; they both try to do a delimiting. It is a similarity with respect to their aim. Delimiting is a tool for both of the philosophers.



Delimiting death is the main aim of Heidegger as it was shown in the first chapter of this thesis in detail; anticipation is the key to ontological authentic possibility of freedom towards death in Heidegger's philosophy.

Anticipation in the disclosedness is the possibility of one's authentic existence meaning that disclosing and understanding can only be done by death,

by the anticipation of death. The question that Heidegger asks and inquires here is than; how this structure (of anticipation) would be delimited phenomally? The answer proposed by Heidegger is that the characteristic of that “anticipatory disclosure” has to be determined so that “it can become pure understanding of that own-most possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped- which certain, and as such, indefinite”<sup>170</sup>

Heidegger tried to delimit, Dasein from the illusions of the “they”. This delimiting is one of the crucial parts of his projects, because it ontologically enabled Dasein an authentic possibility through freedom towards death. This is the delimiting aspect of anticipation. This “existential projection”, in which “Anticipation is delimited, has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic”<sup>171</sup> The project with respect to death, has been done with the freedom towards death once it has been delimited.

<sup>172</sup>

It turns out to be that by “delimiting” Heidegger comes to the point that he is seeking namely, “freedom towards death”. In that sense “delimiting” is the most important key term for Heidegger’s existential analysis which also ends the first chapter of division two with the possibility of authentic being towards death. This is the outcome of delimiting for Heidegger. It is a delimiting from the “they” as well although he does not use it repeatedly as Derrida does.

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<sup>170</sup> B.T p.307

<sup>171</sup> B.T. p.311

<sup>172</sup> p. 23 of this thesis

Delimiting for Derrida is the main work of deconstruction. As it was said that, “as suchness” is a sign of deconstruction which he had taken from Heidegger. On the other hand, the interesting point is that both of the philosophers use the term “delimiting” for their philosophy.

Heidegger’s aim is to delimit anticipation while on the other hand, according to Derrida, Heidegger tries to make a foundation for the sciences by his existential analysis. This creates the main paradox; “founding basis of the founded structure that presupposes it”<sup>173</sup>. Derrida by his deconstruction tries to delimit this foundation or rather any foundation.

As it was said before deconstruction is also a delimiting activity. It is a delimiting in the sense of “naming” and in the sense of a singularity of death that is forced to be universal in the view of Heidegger.<sup>174</sup>

The main theme of Derrida’s deconstruction point is that Heidegger there needs to do a delimitation of these borders what “concerns these limits”, “what prohibits the passing of one of these limits”. Heidegger tries to do delimitation but it is the limitation of the limits for Derrida which “concerns limits about the limitation of limits”<sup>175</sup> (p.25)

Derrida at this point mentions that Heidegger does a delimitation, only once. On the other hand, except from here, he never says it or takes into consideration that Heidegger is doing a delimitation, but repeatedly talks about

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<sup>173</sup> Aporias p.44

<sup>174</sup> p.46 of this thesis

<sup>175</sup> JD, Aporias p.30

limits of Heidegger's discourse. According to Derrida, Heidegger's delimitation turns out to be, has to be, delimited as well.

Whether Derrida had taken the notion of "delimiting" from Heidegger or not is a question that we do not have enough proof of saying, I would like to ask a speculative question that I would like to remain open as well. Is Heidegger by "delimiting" already doing a deconstruction?

#### **4,7 Other World**

Unlike Delimiting as it was stated in the previous part, other world is theme for both philosophers rather than an aim. Another similarity between Derrida and Heidegger is they both have some views on the "Other world" and possible speculation.

Heidegger

After existential analysis anything could be said.

Other world →

Remain undecided.

Derrida

After the project of Heidegger it would be possible for "death conceived in its full ontological essence"<sup>176</sup> than only a methodological question could be asked "what may be after death?" As a consequence, the "this worldliness of Dasein" in its ontological inquiry is the basis for any question concerning what may be after

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<sup>176</sup> B.T. p.292

death. "The this worldliness of Dasein takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation"<sup>177</sup> (p.11) Other world lines is also related with this worldliness which both philosophers share and start from.

While making existential analysis Heidegger tries to decide what must remain undecided. Heidegger decides the one which must remain undecided.

First reason is that methodological and hierarchical determination of death in Heidegger is empty inside. The second reason is "this sidedness". Thirdly and the final reason is the pre-ness. Preference and the prevalence of any study that could be done after the existential analysis is attached to the "this sidedness".<sup>178</sup>

The second and the third reasons are important here for our inquiry. It is the privileged position of this side in the analysis of death. We start the analysis from here; from our worldliness. That bounds us to here. From here we are the deciders of there. The reason underneath for this is also the anxiety that the idea we will die produces and we try to do a neutralization of the other side. Derrida says "a mortal can only start form here his mortality"<sup>179</sup> The reason for his belief of spirits and the immortality comes from his mortality. The second ness of immortality seems to remain as a border as well in that sense. The belief in immortality, spirits and their sense in culture also does not seem to contradict with "being towards death" in Heidegger but on the other hand confirmed and together explained with it, namely "this sidedness" as a border; a border for any possible

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<sup>177</sup> B.T. p.292

<sup>178</sup> p.39 of this thesis

<sup>179</sup> JD, Aporias p.55


methodology.<sup>180</sup>

According to Derrida, "whether such a question is a possible theoretical question, at all must remain undecided here"<sup>181</sup>. As it was stated in the earlier parts of this thesis, since there is a decision of death, about death for Derrida it must turn into a non-decision. It rests upon what cannot be decided which is namely death.

“Undecidability” is a concept of Derrida, he would use in his late works. It is a position of non-violence. It is also the work of deconstruction. Deconstruction has to turn what is decided to an undecidability.

#### 4.8 Singularity of Death

Singularity of death is a similarity between Heidegger and Derrida who both think and act from singularity of death.



According to Heidegger singularity of death is presented by, “mineness of death”. Dying for Heidegger is something that “every Dasein must take upon

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<sup>180</sup> p.39 of this thesis

<sup>181</sup> JD Aporias p.52

itself”<sup>182</sup>. Heidegger states that “death in every case is mine”<sup>183</sup>

Dasein faces the disclosedness of death; the possibility of “no-longer-being-able-to-be-there”. It does not come from outside. It belongs to its very Being as such. Dasein is what Dasein is in that sense. So that since death in every case is mine, as it is explained above it turns out to be one cannot escape from this possibility. (p.12) <sup>184</sup>Singularity of death in that sense is what makes disclosedness of death possible. As belonging to very Being as such, “mineness of death” is what makes Dasein, to disclose itself.

Singularity of death is also the point of Derrida. ‘If death...names the very irreplaceable of absolute singularity...then every one's death the death of all those who can say ‘my death is irreplaceable’”<sup>185</sup>

The whole work of Derrida also could be seen from the point of view that the singularity of that is tried to be put into a generality and Derrida's work of this generality concerning all sciences and the methodologies sends it back to its singularity.<sup>186</sup>

The problematic closure happens at the time of the differentiation of the endings. The hierarchical point of the different endings with respect to the proper dying makes up the problematic for Derrida. This also could be analyzed as the

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<sup>182</sup> B.T. p.284

<sup>183</sup> B.T. p.284

<sup>184</sup> p.16 of this thesis

<sup>185</sup> Aporias p.22

<sup>186</sup> p.34 of this thesis



limiting of death that is singular by its very nature to the general analysis.<sup>187</sup>

Both philosophers view of death is Singular. It is also stated in the work of Baugh. It is stated in Baugh's paper, 'Death and Temporality in Deleuze and Derrida'<sup>188</sup> as follows;

'For says Derrida, in encountering my singularity, through my apprehension of my death to come I encounter the other so equally as mortal and so equally singular and irreplaceable'

From Baugh it can be seen that; Death in both Heidegger and Derrida are singular but for Derrida the apprehension of the other is a problematic. According to Derrida, 'Dasein awaits itself'<sup>189</sup>. Derrida lays out three different awaitings from the single awaiting. The first one is; "await one self in oneself". The second one is; awaiting directed to the other.

Finally, third one is "awaiting for each other." That is awaiting the other there the one that is "completely the other" since one cannot go there together resulting from the singularity of death. This the differentiation point between Derrida and Heidegger.

According to Derrida what Heidegger did not able to figure out is "death is a secret"<sup>190</sup> It is the name of an irreplaceable secret. It is singular. With all the cults, with all the ceremonies that seems as a semi-public. It seems as belonging to

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<sup>187</sup> p.39 of this thesis

<sup>188</sup> Bruce Baugh, 'Death and Temporality in Deleuze and Derrida', *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities*, 5:2, August 2000

<sup>189</sup> JD, *Aporias*, p.63

<sup>190</sup> JD, *Aporias*, p.74

a society. It seems to have a language. But it remains as singular. It is singular. It is in the form of secret. For every person it is singular only for that person.<sup>191</sup>

#### 4.9 “Way To Be”

Both Heidegger and Derrida is giving us clues of “a way to be” with respect to death. Although Heidegger directly presents it Derrida never says it as a “way to be”. But to my opinion, it is hidden inside his philosophy.

Heidegger

Authentic being towards death

“Way to Be” →

Aporetic experience -- Undecidability

Derrida

As it was analyzed in the previous part of this thesis, one of the main aims of B.T is to develop an understanding and a “way to be” with respect to death. That is the “authentic” being towards death. According to Heidegger, being in everydayness is the inauthentic being of Dasein. Heidegger mainly takes inauthentic modes of being into consideration which are notions of “thrownness”, “being with others” and “being with other beings” which are the basic modes of human existence in everydayness. Within that what is tried to be inferred is authentic understanding of being. Because in its inauthenticity being is “less than a whole”. Heidegger’s project is to constitute authentic being towards death together

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<sup>191</sup> p.44 of this thesis

with the totality of Dasein.

The general aims of Heidegger in B.T are the acceptance of death as an authentic self and to shift from an ordinary understanding of time to an authentic way of being. The question asked by Heidegger while making the analyses of Dasein is, ‘Can Dasein also understand authentically its own most possibility, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, which is certain and, as such, indefinite?’<sup>192</sup>

This ‘existential projection’, in which anticipation is delimited, has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic’<sup>193</sup> The authentic Being towards death is ontologically possible. This ended the analysis of Heidegger of death of Division Two Part one which was also the reading of our first chapter. <sup>194</sup>

Whereas in Derrida,aporetic experience which is ‘not knowing where to go’ is the way to be with respect to death; not only to death but also any possible kind of experience that hides a decision in it. One should remain at a singular point as a way to be. This is the main theme of Derrida’s philosophy. Death is singular according to Derrida. But how could one stay in such a singularity and undecidability? And how could one remain undecided with respect to death or any other deconstructed theme? Derrida never calls into question. But undecidability to remain in undecidability as a position, we need to remain in the name of

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<sup>192</sup> B.T 304

<sup>193</sup> B.T. p.311

<sup>194</sup> p.24 of this thesis

deconstruction, that we are responsible for. This point of Derrida underlies in his philosophy which remains to be hidden.

#### **4.10 Conclusions**

In the previous pages, two readings of Heidegger and Derrida were tried to be figured out in the first and second chapter of this thesis. Both of these readings were focused on the concept of death. It was seen that concept of death is the most significant concept of both significant philosophers of modern philosophy.

The result of the reading as in the form of differences and similarities, were given in the third chapter. Both of the philosophers are connected in their usage of the terms but also different, or rather radically different as regards to their conclusions and usages they had come. Since Derrida, is a later philosopher his discourse is the reason for the difference that lies between them.

Within the third chapter of this thesis it was also figured out that, Derrida misread Heidegger from some aspects such as possibility as Thomson had proposed. Where as on the other hand, Heidegger, hold the metaphysical paradox of static and genetic phenomenology of death with respect to history and the other disciplines, which Ellis had figured out.

I had given my point of view and my conclusions inside these similarities and differences figured out in the last chapter. I tried to ask some questions as a result of the readings. The first question was with respect to delimiting. Could we ask the question that, Heidegger does deconstruction on anticipation towards

death?. Since deconstruction defined by Derrida is a delimiting activity. The answer come from, Derrida as it was shown in the delimiting part of this chapter. His delimiting for Derrida leads to a limiting. But the question that we could ask about the methodology of Derrida could be he only once mentions that Heidegger is doing a delimiting. Is it intentional? Could be a speculative question. Intentional reading of Derrida, is also as we have seen could again be asked on the “possibility” and “impossibility” as well. Because he misread Heidegger. Could it be “wanted” to misread Heidegger ?

Derrida in his readings of the philosophers has two main aspects. One is to be speculative and the other one is provocative. In the previous parts of these thesis we could remember his saying of “Being and Time exceeds its borders”<sup>195</sup> is a very provocative way of saying.

From the point of “as suchness” of this chapter I also added my point of view to the picture. It was figured out that “as suchness” is a sign of deconstruction in Derrida. Not only a deconstruction point of Heidegger, but all traditional philosophy. At the end of this part I raised the question that I think has very much relevance for an understanding of Derrida. Is deconstruction of Heidegger a “pragmatical” deconstruction ?

In order to answer such a question we need to look at the late texts of Derrida. of the usage of Heidegger since we claim it is “pragmatical”. From my point of view. Aporias is a mid text of Derrida. A passage to Specter’s of Marx

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<sup>195</sup> Aporias p.31

together with Force of Law. The concept of “undecidability” finds its first seed in the concept of “aporetic experience” that he defines in Aporias. The main important passage is also the concept of spectrality, which I interpret as a first time ontology of Derrida which is not original from my point of view, is another subject of inquiry.

The logic of spectrality lies in the deconstruction of Heidegger. This point of Derrida, could be a subject of further or another study. But one thing always remains, in Derrida’s texts. It is Heidegger. Whether as a misread ghost, as a concept friend from the view point of death, or as a source whose concepts could be taken to outmost margins.

Keeping mind of these critiques and questions in mind, we also not need to forget one important aspect of Derrida. This is the “call of philosophy to this world. The wars and the death as wars. In which from a positive way of reading could be a reason of his “intentional” reading and “pragmatical” deconstruction or may be non-originality.

The last personal and subjective point could be, as a consequence of this study from my point which is also the point of Derrida and Heidegger, any philosophy concerning life, should start from death or the dead. This was also my personal aim, through a possible understanding and acceptance of life and death, and a start for a further study.

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