

**THE CONCEPTION OF DEVELOPMENT
IN THE TURKISH LEFT IN THE 1960s: THE CASE OF TİP**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

BY

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**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

DECEMBER 2004

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ABSTRACT

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December 2004, 109 pages

The object of this study is to elaborate the question of development, which was an issue of major concern in the Turkish left in the 1960's with reference to the views of TİP. It is seen that TİP's conception of the issue was articulated through an understanding of 'developmentalist socialism', which was a reflection of the international approaches to the question of development during the period. It is argued in the study that the placing of the evaluation within a historical context is crucial in order to comprehend the theoretical standpoint of the analyses of TİP. In this sense, the major developments on the national and international level during the period and the debates on 'dependency' and 'non-capitalist path of development' will also be elaborated.

Keywords: Development, socialism, TİP, Turkish Left

ÖZ

TİP ÖRNEĞİNDE 1960'LARDA TÜRKİYE SOLUNDA KALKINMA DÜŞÜNCESİ

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Aralık 2004, 109 sayfa

Bu çalışmada amaçlanan 1960'lı yıllarda Türkiye solunda yürütülen tartışmalarda önemli yer tutan kalkınma sorununu TİP'in görüşleri çerçevesinde değerlendirmektir. TİP'in konuya bakışının kalkınma sorununa dönemin uluslararası yaklaşımının yansıması olan 'kalkınmacı sosyalizm' anlayışı ekseninde ortaya konulduğu görülmektedir. Çalışmada incelemenin tarihsel bir bağlama yerleştirilmesinin, TİP'in çözümlerinin kuramsal temelini kavramak açısından önem taşıdığı savunulmuştur. Bu çerçevede ulusal ve uluslararası ölçekte yaşanan önemli gelişmeler ve dönemin 'bağımlılık' ve 'kapitalist olmayan kalkınma yolu' tartışmaları da ayrıca değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Kalkınma, sosyalizm, TİP, Türk solu

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman for his guidance and advice throughout the research.

I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz and Assist. Prof. Dr. Ferdan Ergut for their suggestions and comments.

I wish to express my gratitude to my mother Leyla Suna Şimşek, whose love and patience enabled me to complete this study and my friends Aslı Güleç and Selin Masat for their friendship and continuous moral support.

I would also like to thank Serpil Güvenç for many long conversations that provided insight and encouragement throughout the research.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Beginning from 1950's, the concept of 'development' has occupied a dominant place in the political vocabulary of nationalist/leftist movements in the Third World. Furthermore, significant intellectual effort has been devoted to the concept as it attracted the attention of many scholars all around the world. Up to now, a considerable number of studies have been introduced into the academic curriculum in Western and Latin American countries as regards the problems of underdevelopment in Third World. In 1960's, these studies have increasingly come to advocate the solution to underdevelopment in terms of 'national autonomous development' and defended that capitalist development, as a vehicle of social and economic transformation did not have much to offer to underdeveloped countries and therefore had to be abandoned. However, the aspirations of national development were temporary, since the subsequent decades witnessed both the emergence of a new period in the worldwide expansion of capitalism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe, which were the bastions of the successful attempts of 'self-sufficient and rapid' development', taken as examples by many Third World countries. The extension of neo-liberal policies into the underdeveloped countries, which negate the initiation of protective measures in economy, has rendered the quest for 'national development' more or less illusory. Today, development policies-if they can be said to exist- appear only as micro scale technical issues.

It is also interesting to see the historical evolution of the concept of development in the perceptions of Turkish left during the past forty years. In this sense, it is not possible to find a consistency in the formulations of the left on the concept. While in 1960's development has been treated as a 'cause', 'paradigm', 'project' or a 'problematic' by all segments of the leftist intellectual community, in

1990's, it is criticized as 'industrial fetishism'. According to Ahmet İnsel who holds such a view, both 'rightist' and 'leftist' views of development are different versions of a nationalist rhetoric that have to be dispensed with (İnsel, 1996). In fact, the issue is complex and has more than one dimension, which implies that the leftist intellectual debate of 1960's should not be discarded altogether.

However, it is also clear that during the period, the attitude of the left toward the problem of economic development in the country was influenced by the international conjuncture of 1960's that witnessed the 'rise of the Third World'. The radical reforms put into practice in the newly independent states in order to cope with underdevelopment did not pass unnoticed in Turkish left. The aspirations of these countries were shaped by nationalism and a wish to catch up with the advanced countries of the west.

This 'developmental' view was also reflected in the standing of different groups in Turkish left. Worker's Party of Turkey (TİP), which was established in 1961 and operated as the only legal political party on the left until its closure in 1971, adopted a 'national-developmental' discourse by equating socialism with development and presenting the basic premises of its political stand through a nationalist rhetoric, which it calls as 'Atatürkist nationalism'. However, TİP's conception of the problem of development also carries some aspects that differentiate it from the 'Third Worldist ideologies' of development.

In this study, TİP's conception of development is intended to be elaborated with reference to its understanding of socialism. In order to do this, this study puts forward some questions it aims to elaborate: what is the relationship between Marxism and development and how does this relate to TİP's understanding of the concept, to what extent have the international conjuncture of the period and the peculiar traits of the leftist movement in Turkey affected TİP's understanding of development and is the issue of 'development' relevant to a contemporary understanding of socialism in Turkey? To be able to answer these questions, the study also focuses on the issue of nationalism –as it was practiced in Third World countries and as a factor that shaped TİP's understanding of socialism- and on the issue of Kemalism in order to provide an analysis on the historical development of the left in Turkey.

The study consists of four parts. In the second chapter, a general discussion on the historical trajectory of the concept of ‘development’ from Marx’s and Engels’ own writings on the subject down to the theories of ‘underdevelopment’ of 1960’s is presented in order to identify the modification/reversal to the approach of Marx and Engels, as Marxism extended to the Third World in the twentieth century. In relation to this point, a criticism is also added as regards the perception of Marxism as a simple extension of the European Enlightenment and modernism, since it results in the modification of Marxism so as to suit the conditions of the Third World, considered as totally unique-as seen in the examples of ‘African Socialism’ excluding the notion of class struggle- and the emergence of a view of socialism as a modernizing current that will bring about ‘development’ and ‘Westernization’.

Accordingly, an analysis of the relationship between Kemalism and Turkish left in its main body (TKP) is also included in this chapter. In this sense, the relations of TKP with the Third International (Comintern) and with the process of modernization in the country initiated by the Kemalist authority are taken up as two interrelated factors that help to see the origins of a process that led the left to see itself as a ‘derivative of Kemalism’. Even though TİP cannot be considered as a direct descendant of the TKP on the political and ideological plane, an examination of the initial years of the formation of the left in Turkey is necessary since it demonstrates how the left in 1960’s has outgrown but not replaced the Kemalist paradigm of modernization.

In relation to the evolution of the Marxist debate on the notion of capitalist development in the Third World, the basic premises of the ‘dependency school’ and Soviet views of the ‘non capitalist path of development’ are presented. The extent to which they played an influential role in shaping TİP’s analyses of ‘underdevelopment’ and the strategy it devises for economic development and the similarities and differences between these views and those of TİP will be elaborated by taking into consideration TİP’s reflections on the social and economic structure of Turkey.

In the third chapter, the economic and social conditions of Turkey in 1960’s, which constitute surroundings to the emergence of TİP in the political arena and a general outlook of the left during the period is given. In addition to this, the

response of the leftist intelligentsia to the problem of development/underdevelopment, which was of major concern, is elaborated by presenting the views of the journal *Yön* and to a lesser extent, MDD. *Yön* introduced the question of development in terms of the elimination of dependency on advanced capitalist countries and adopted socialism as the means of achieving rapid development. Both these groups are the proponents of the 'National Democratic Revolution' as opposed to the 'Socialist Revolution' of TİP and their analyses on the level of capitalist development in the country differ from those of TİP; nevertheless their analyses retain some similarities as well. Furthermore, general information on the development of TİP from its establishment to its closure and its place in the leftist movement in Turkey is also given in this chapter.

In the fourth chapter, TİP's understanding of development is elaborated. This analysis is conducted by relying on some documentary material such as the party program and regulation. Second hand resources comprising both the books of various TİP leaders and the studies made on TİP by different researchers are also used. The writings of Aybar, Boran and Aren published in TİP affiliated journal *Sosyal Adalet*, which is published until 1965 are utilized for introducing the views of the party on various topics, including statism, populism, planning, nationalism and such. TİP's understanding of socialism is presented in this chapter, laying out the main characteristics of the 'socialism peculiar to Turkey' or 'Turkish Socialism' envisaged by TİP leaders also helps to notice certain contradictions in their analyses. It is seen that the notion of 'Ataturkist nationalism', which is endorsed by TİP as the 'non-irredentist' version of nationalism is an influential factor that shapes the economic policies of the party. Finally, the actual strategy adopted by TİP for economic development, namely the 'non-capitalist path' is considered as regards its differences with the 'non-capitalist roads to socialism' in the Third World countries.

The presentation of the views of TİP includes certain difficulties, since a single and unified body of thought representing the 'TİP line' does not exist. As Yurtsever points out, the political and ideological references of TİP leaders were derived from different sources, among which a certain Marxist line was not evident. (Yurtsever, 1992: 162). As will be noted, the political backgrounds of the

intellectuals in TİP during the first years of its existence were diverse and different notions of socialism existed within the party.

Another problem concerns the changes in the views of party leaders such as Boran and Aren as seen in the emergence of a dispute with the chairman of the party, Aybar. These differences that appeared among the leaders of the party and the disputes with the national democratic revolutionaries inside the party affected the political standing of TİP in time. TİP's emphasis on socialist revolution, which pointed at the 'anti-capitalist' and 'anti-imperialist' aspects of its understanding of socialism, was shaped through these disputes with the national democratic revolutionaries. In the study, the contradictions in the analyses of TİP caused by this change were also tried to be identified.

The fifth chapter intends to reach a general conclusion drawing on the results of the examinations made in the previous parts of the study. In addition to this, the question as to whether the preoccupation of the intellectuals with the idea of development was the result of the international conjuncture and development has ceased to be a problematic for the left is considered briefly by paying attention to some writers on the left who criticize the nationalist-statist fervor of the approaches to development in 1960's. On this point, it is held that the question of 'development' may still retain a crucial character in the political orientations of the left in Turkey. TİP's conception of development in 1960's was adjusted to meet the immediate requirements of the problems of national backwardness and hence was presented through an understanding of socialism as a means of development and modernization imbued with aspects of the Kemalist paradigm. However, today, the effectiveness of the goals of development probably depends on the extent to which they are formulated as elements of a distinct social project.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to analyze the relationship between Marxism and development and how it relates to TİP's understanding of the concept, the views of classical Marxism on historical development and progress, which despite the existence of certain modifications in the analyses of Marx and Engels, stressed the progressive role of the capitalist relations into areas with a less dynamic mode of production, will be presented. In the twentieth century interpretations of Marxism on the concept of development, this view was subject to certain transformations, which is reflected in the Comintern debates and the formulations of a 'non-capitalist path' of development by the Soviet Union in 1960's. Finally, the theories of underdevelopment and dependency, which originated from Latin America and argued that the countries of the periphery underwent a 'development of underdevelopment' during their process of integration with the capitalist world economy and that this integration has produced a 'dependent' capitalism in these countries, will be evaluated. These debates will be elaborated in relation to their reflections on TİP in particular and the Turkish left in general.

2.1 Marxism on the Concept of Historical Development and Progress

The Marxist conception of historical development and progress has been elaborated in various studies in relevance to the relationship of Marxism with specific phenomena such as nationalism, development etc. The main area of problem identified in these studies is the problem of eurocentrism in Marxism¹ which can be

¹ Blaut (1987) relates this problem to 'Eurocentric diffusionism' prevalent in various Marxist thinkers and which is traced back to the writings of Marx. The depiction of the impact of developed capitalism on areas thought to be primitive and traditional, as a 'modernizing' process, one that leads to civilization and economic progress presupposes the idea that Marxism is a simple extension of European Enlightenment. Class struggle in this view is seen as merely a component in the upward development of progressive social evolution, a process, which, emanating from European culture has grown and effloresced in Europe, diffusing its fruits around the world at the same time. According to Blaut, diffusionism contradicts Marxism's foundations because it assumes a basic inequality among

analyzed by formulating a number of interrelated questions in order to identify the particular meaning attached to the concepts by Marx and Engels. These can be put forward as follows: Does Marxism claim a universal and evolutionary pattern of development in history, which all countries in the world are expected to follow after their European counterparts, how can the evolution of the concept of 'progress' be traced in Marx's thought which is criticized by some writers as being tied to the accomplishments of capitalist modernization in his various writings, and to what extent can Marxism be criticized as being Eurocentric? The second question, which is concerned with whether the concept of progress –at least in Marx's writings on India- is 'hitched to the capitalist bandwagon' (Munck, 1986: 23) is closely related with the concepts of 'civilization' and 'modernization' which appear as recurring themes in the writings of Marx and Engels as regards the development of capitalism and will be elaborated later. The problem relating to the so-called evolutionist approach of Marx and Engels, which is also referred to as the 'stage' theory of history (Blaut, 1987: 26) or the idea that there is a definite, known sequence of stages in social development which possess certain invariable characteristics each social formation must pass through in the same sequence has its roots in the depiction of capitalism by Marx and Engels as a higher stage in the history of mankind and in the excessive optimism about the progressive consequences of capitalist expansion that predominate their various writings. The Communist Manifesto stresses the great historic function of capitalism as such

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production and thereby the relations of production and with them the whole relations of society. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the world (...) The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization (Marx, 1997a: 131).

It is clear from the passage that, Marx regards capitalism as a system of production that must constantly expand which results in the undermining and revolutionizing of pre capitalist economic formations in other parts of the world. The

the peoples of the earth as regards their potentialities for social evolution and attributes some basic historical processes of Third World countries to diffusion from Europe.

expansion of capitalist relations of production has progressive effects in the sense that capitalist production destroys pre capitalist structures and thereby lays down the foundations for historically progressive developments. According to Marx, capitalism constitutes a 'transitory historical necessity' in the sense that, 'forcing humanity without scruple to produce for the sake of production' and with the creation of a worldwide market, it creates for all people 'the real basis of a superior structure of society, whose basic principle would be the full and free development of every individual' (Marx: 1997c: 213). Marx's thinking that capitalist development would dissolve the archaic institutions of undeveloped social formations is also evident in his articles on the consequences of British rule in India written in 1850's. In these articles, Marx praises the British accomplishments in India and asserts that the occupation of India by the British has initiated the progressive transformation of a traditional society through capitalist modernization:

England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society without any signs of reconstitution yet appearing. This loss of the old world (...) separates Hindustan (...) from all of its ancient traditions and from all of its past history (...) England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But, that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution (Marx, 1997b: 179).

Since the traditional structure of Indian society, constitutes an impediment to progress, "England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating, the annihilation of old Asiatic society and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia" (Marx, 1997b: 178). Similarly, Marx's emphasis of the progressive nature of the opening of China to capitalist penetration, Engels' attitude toward the French conquest of Algeria and the United States expansion at Mexico's expense as 'an important event for the progress of civilization' (Melotti, 1977: 117) can be considered as a manifestation of this idea. This attitude of Marx and Engels have been criticized by various writers within the Marxist tradition of showing a strong tendency toward Eurocentrism (Munck, 1986: 9) which is used for later justifications of colonialism (Turner, 1978: 3) or failing to see the progressive nature of national liberation movements.

However, it should be asserted that the development of material production and the spontaneous expansion of capitalism to other parts of the world in the form of colonialism have objective foundations. In other words, the concentration and centralization of capital, the search for new markets and cheap labor is an objective tendency, which arose out of the economic necessities of the rising capitalism after the dissolution of feudalism in Europe. For Marx, this new socioeconomic formation is objectively superior to its predecessor; since a schema of historical development, which can be defined as an essential tool for understanding the real process of development that has actually occurred in the past, is occurring at present and can reasonably be hypothesized, from existing tendencies, as likely to occur in the future (Melotti, 1977: 5), does run through Marx's thought. In fact, central to Marx's thought is the identification of the implicit 'logic' of historical development, characterized by the dialectical succession of different social-economic formations, realized through the struggle between classes in society. This particular point led Marx to consider colonialism and capitalism as important progressive movements from his stand of the notion of historical development. On the other hand, in his writings on India, Marx also explicitly stated that the destructive effects of British colonialism in India were growing faster than its regenerating sides and one should not expect from the (English) bourgeoisie nothing more than the material prerequisites of real development whose fruits the Indians would not be able to gather 'until in Great Britain itself, the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat or 'till the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether' (Marx, 1997b: 181). In my opinion, this approach –consistent with Marx's methodology- is a dialectical one. According to Turner, after the mid 1860's Marx himself had to confront his optimistic reliance on the objective factor, namely his view that despite various destructive effects, capitalism would expand throughout the whole world and that any dualistic features which could appear during this process on the global scale would be eradicated by revolutionary class struggle (Turner, 1978: 18) which caused a modification in Marx's and Engels' approach to capitalist development in backward areas.

This modification is particularly evident in the writings of Marx and Engels on the situation of Ireland where they provide a clear illustration of the

destructive consequences of capitalist colonialism. According to Marx and Engels, landlords and capitalists had combined together in Ireland to exploit an indigenous population with the result that the country ‘has been stunted in its development by the English invasion and thrown centuries back.’ Engels wrote in 1860’s that, ‘every time Ireland was about to develop industrially, she was crushed and reconverted into a purely agricultural land’ (Marx and Engels, 1971: 132). Ireland’s domination by Britain caused the former to stay as an agricultural and labor reserve for the latter’s industrial revolution. The Irish case demonstrates that Marx had developed a perspective as regards the retarding consequences of capitalist expansion which had ‘destroyed all industrial life in Ireland’, leading him to consider protectionism as necessary to encourage national industry, which is also a modification of the optimistic attitude of Marx and Engels on the progressive consequences of global free trade

What the Irish need is:

- 1) Self-government and independence from England.
- 2) An agrarian revolution.
- 3) Protective Tariffs against England (Marx and Engels, 1971: 148).²

Marx’s writings on Russia also demonstrate that Marx and Engels did not adhere to the unilinear conception of history, the evolutionist understanding which concludes that the less developed country will follow the more developed in a succession of mechanical stages, even though they recognized the ultimately progressive function of the spread of capitalism to areas with a less dynamic mode of production. After the emancipation of serfs in 1861, Marx began to give serious attention to the situation in Russia and the changing historical circumstances in 1870’s, namely the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871 and the collapse of the First International the following year caused Marx to see a revolutionary potential in the East (Munck, 1986: 19). The central theme in the debate in the Russian revolutionary movement at that time was whether national peculiarities of Russia could necessitate a different form of revolutionary movement in the country. Of the two contending sides, the legal Marxists argued that Marx’s observations on

² Turner remarks that Marx’s views on the stunting effects of colonialist invasion were later taken up by neo- Marxist conceptions of underdevelopment (Turner, 1978: 17). Indeed, as will be elaborated in the next section, the solution proposed by Marx for the encouragement of national industry in Ireland has connections with dependency theory and Third World countries.

historical development in *Capital* were applicable to Russian conditions and held the idea that the level of capitalist development in Russia was far too limited for the emergence of the conditions for a transition to socialism while the narodniks stressed the possible role of the village communes in Russia for a direct transition to socialism, avoiding the capitalist stage.

The letters of Marx which are written to two Russian revolutionary figures deal with the question, but in my opinion the primary concern of Marx in these letters is that the model of historical development in *Capital* should not be read in a mechanical way, rather than devising a strategy for the future prospects of socialism in Russia. In a letter to the Editorial Board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, Marx comments on the applicability of *Capital* to Russia and criticizes the attempt to

(...) metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself, in order that it may ultimately arrive at the form of economy which ensures, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of social labour, the most complete development of man (Marx, 1997: 280).

The chapter on primitive accumulation [in *Capital*] does not pretend to do more than trace the path by which, in Western Europe, the capitalist order of economy emerged from the womb of the feudal order of economy. It therefore describes the historical movement, which by divorcing the producers from their means of production, converts them into wage workers (proletarians in the modern sense of the word) while it converts those who possess the means of production into capitalists (...) but the basis of this whole development is the expropriation of the agricultural producer. This has been accomplished in radical fashion only in England (...) but all the countries of Western Europe are going through the same movement (Marx, 1997: 279).³

³ Nevertheless, it is clear to Marx that even though the social consequences of capitalist development in Russia would be costly, it would probably have to develop along the same lines as the West. "Now what application to Russia could my critic make of this historical sketch? Only this: If Russia is tending to become a capitalist nation after the example of the West European countries- and during the last few years she has been taking a lot of trouble in this direction- she will not succeed without having first transformed a good part of her peasants into proletarians; and after that, once taken to the bosom of the capitalist regime, she will experience its pitiless laws like other profane people." (Marx, 1997: 279)

From the passage, it can be concluded that Marx did not prescribe an evolutionary and unilinear pattern development, which can be applied to all countries equally regardless of historical context. This view is also manifest in his remarks on the possibility of a transition to socialism that bypasses the capitalist stage, put forward in his letter to Russian revolutionary Vera Zasulich

Hence the analysis provided in *Capital* does not adduce reasons either for or against the viability of the rural commune, but the special study I have made of it and the material for which I drew from original sources, has convinced me that this commune is the fulcrum of social regeneration in Russia, but in order that it may function as such, it would first be necessary to eliminate the deleterious influences which are assailing it from all sides, and then ensure for it the normal conditions of spontaneous development (Marx, 1997: 282).

As will be elaborated in the next two sections, the possibility of a transition to socialism in countries which have just entered the capitalist stage through a ‘shortened’ process of development by-passing capitalism found a revival first in the Third International within the context of the ‘Eastern Question’ and ‘revolutionary strategy’ and then in 1960’s through the Soviet formulations of a ‘non-capitalist path of development’ in Third World countries. As seen above, both the letters of Marx on Russia and the preface written by Marx and Engels to the Second Russian edition of the *Manifesto*⁴ emphasized the possibility of a direct transition in this country to socialism from the existing conditions, but they also asserted that it could only be possible on the condition that if a proletarian revolution in the West were to provide the essential conditions

After the victory of the proletariat and the transfer of the means of production to common ownership among Western European peoples, the countries which have just entered the stage of capitalist production and have still preserved the institutions of gentile society or remains of them will derive from the remnants of common ownership and the customs that go with them a powerful means of appreciably shortening their process of development to a socialist society and of escaping most of the sufferings and struggles throughout which we in Western Europe have had to labour. But in this process the example and the active support of the formerly capitalistic West is an unavoidable prerequisite (Engels, F. (1970) *Selected Works*, vol.2; Quoted in Melotti, 1977: 131).

⁴ “(...) the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development” (Marx and Engels, Preface to the Second Russian Edition of the *Manifesto*, *Collected Works*, vol.4: 576; Quoted in Melotti, 1977: 131).

As seen above, in his writings on Ireland and Russia, Marx modified his view that capitalist expansion necessarily dissolves the traditional structures of a country and creates the material conditions for the new society, while retaining the approach that capitalism assumes a historically progressive role. In *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), Lenin also held that capitalist development in a backward country like Russia is actually possible. Contrary to the narodnik revolutionaries who retained the view that the development of capitalism in Russia would be impossible due to the fact that, the country was late in the industrialization process, pre capitalist units of production were widespread in the country and the level of the forces of production was much more developed in Europe, Lenin argued that capitalism was accomplishing its two basic historical functions in Russia, namely the development of the forces of production and the socialization of labor. For Lenin, the nature of the capitalist development in Russia would be determined according to the relations with European capitalism, the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie and the presence of pre capitalist structures in the country (Ersoy, 1992: 11).

From here, we can come to the second and third questions formulated above in order to analyze the problem of Eurocentrism in Marxism. d'Encausse and Schram formulate the problem as such

Marxism is an intrinsically European current of thought, which unites several of the most characteristic traits of European civilization as a whole: the sense of history inherent in the Judeo-Christian tradition and the Promethean urge to transform nature that has manifested itself since the Renaissance and especially since the industrial revolution. Transplanted to Asia, to societies most of which did not have this sense of history and none of which traditionally had such a vision of man '*maitre et possesseur de la nature*' (in Descartes's well-known phrase), it caused a profound shock. Nor did Marxism itself escape unchanged from the encounter (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 4; emphasis in original).

Nimni holds the view that the Marxist tradition is trapped in the paradoxical situation of claiming to be a universal theory of social emancipation, while it uses an ethnocentric methodology to conceptualize social formations located outside the area of Western culture. Eurocentrism for Nimni then, refers to the construction of a model of development, which universalizes the empirically

observed European categories of development. The process of social transformation in different societies is understood and conceptualized in terms of the Western developmental rationale

In spite of its genuine universalistic aspirations, the conceptualization of human development and the rationale for the emancipation of the human species as a whole was constructed as a form of discursive rationality and as a political project directly derived from the main experiences of the European Enlightenment. This created an intriguing paradox: classical Marxism derived its universal evolutionary paradigm from its parochial reflections on European history (Nimni, 1991: 12)

Following Blaut's remarks, it can be argued that the problem is related to Marx's situating of concepts such as 'civilization, 'modernization' and 'progress' within the context of capitalist development in his various writings. However, in my opinion, the problem itself has its roots in the readings of Marx, which misconstrue the relationship between Marxism, Enlightenment, and modernization, which end up with perceiving Marxism as an extension of them,⁵ and not in Marx's employment of these concepts in his analyses on capitalism. As it is known, Marxist thought is influenced by British political economy, French socialism and German philosophy, which, each in its own way, are strongly imbued with the idea of progress inherited from the Enlightenment. Yet, Marxism cannot be considered as a simple extension of the Enlightenment, even though it constitutes a foundation on which Marxist thought developed. In fact, Marxism analyzes and redefines the generally accepted and 'humanitarian' concepts of the Enlightenment such as equality, freedom etc. by attributing them a different meaning. Marx took up Hegel's idea that history is a progress towards the liberation of man, but he also introduced a criticism of Hegel's conception of progress as the 'unfolding of World Spirit' and the 'evolution' and 'intrinsic coherence in history' was interpreted on a class basis. Marx was also critical of the Enlightenment understanding of progress based on the assumptions of 'free individual' by defining the individual with reference to his/her social conditions. Coming to the criticism directed at Marx of perceiving capitalist expansion as modernizing, a transformation which will bring progress to backward

⁵ As an example to the 'modernist' readings of Marx, Marshall Berman can be given. Berman departs from Marx's views on the 'ultimately revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie' and 'the progressive function of capitalism on the dissolution of the traditional structures' and interprets them within the context of modernism as 'creative destruction' and depicts the *Manifesto* as the first modernist product of art (Berman, 1982).

societies; it should be asserted that modernization is a process which arose, on the basis of the Enlightenment, as a consequence of capitalist development. Within the Western European context, this process took place through a long period of time, on its own initiative and from its own physical sources, on the basis of class dynamic.

The dissolution of pre-capitalist traditional structures, the creation of a centralized market, the development of technology in leaps and bounds, the spreading of commodity production, and the creation of wage labor were accompanied by changes such as urbanization, increasing literacy rate, the emergence of modern political parties and the rational organization of the state apparatus with grave consequences on the everyday life of the members of a society. In short, modernization can be defined as a total of the changes, caused by the underlying capitalist development in ideological, cultural, institutional and ethic levels (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 170). While being 'European' in origin, modernization cannot be considered as being confined to Western Europe since the expansion of capitalism throughout the world has given the issue a universal character as the forms of life and organization which sprang in Europe in seventeenth century and almost placed the whole world under its influence later on (Giddens, 1994: 9) and therefore, the countries which are historically outside the geographical genesis of capitalism are not beyond the reach of modernization.

It was noted above that the modernist readings of Marx depart from Marx's views on the progressive effects of capitalist development and his use of the concepts 'modernization' and 'civilization' accordingly. Yet, it should be remembered that the object of Marx's epistemology was not modernity, but capitalism and in this sense Marx's writings provide a radical criticism of the Enlightenment and modernity within the context of capitalism. Marx praises the releasing of people from bondages imposed upon them by the traditional structures, but also criticizes the notion of the 'free and rational individual' in modernity through laying bare the new forms of limitations and exploitation the people are exposed to under capitalism.

As seen in the writings of Marx and Engels, Marxism does not claim a universal and mechanistic pattern of development characterized by iron stages in history which all nations are expected to follow, reflected in their writings in the

debate on Russia's problems and to a certain extent on the possible 'non capitalist path of transition to socialism'. However, it is also clear that even though it is a comprehensive criticism of and an attempt to redefine the basic tenets of the Enlightenment, Marxism cannot be detached from its Enlightenment basis. Its basic assumptions and proposals can only be interpreted on the basis of modernism even though it cannot be considered as a simple extension of it.⁶

The main concern of this study, TIP's conception of the issue of development will also be analyzed from this perspective. TIP leaders employ Marxist terminology in their analyses and endorse socialism as a political project. But, in the unique international conditions of 1960's, this understanding of socialism acquired various peculiar characteristics. This is also closely related with the relationship between the left and Kemalism and the specific features of the modernization process initiated by it, which affected the historical development of the left in Turkey. Now, it is useful to elaborate in more detail, the characteristics of this relationship.

2.2 The Relationship between Kemalism and Turkish Left

The emergence and formation of the Turkish left in its main body (TKP) is very much determined by the unique conditions of the period 1917-1925, namely the period between the October Revolution in Russia and the consolidation of the authority of the Kemalist regime with the proclamation of the Law for the Maintenance of Law and Order. However, the factors that determined the characteristics of the relationship between Kemalism and Turkish left should be sought in a broad set of outer/inner dynamics ranging from the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the policies of the Communist International (Comintern) as regards the 'Eastern Question' to certain characteristics of the process of modernization in the country, initiated by the Kemalist authority and the radical

⁶ This point is evident in Marx and Engels commenting on the 'shortened process of' development leading to socialism in Russia. This achievement will be possible in Russia not only on the condition that a proletarian revolution takes place in the West, but also because "a part of the indigenous population has already acquired the intellectual achievements of capitalistic development and it will thus be possible here, in a revolutionary period, to accomplish the social transformation almost simultaneously with the West" (Engels, F. (1970) Selected Works, vol.2: 399; Quoted in Melotti, 1977:131).

reforms carried out by it during 1920's and 1930's. In terms of the main concern of this study, it should be asserted that, this relationship, without going through significant changes, extended well into 1960's and was influential on different segments of the left which all defined themselves on the basis of Kemalism (or to use the widely accepted term of the period, Atatürkism) and on TİP, which derived its basic references on the possibility of a specific path of development for Turkey based on a unique form of socialism, from the basic premises of the Kemalist modernization paradigm. Therefore, it is now useful to underline in detail these conditions in order to clarify the extent to which they shaped the formulations of TİP. According to Kürkçü, TKP, which has never been an alternative political power during the national liberation war, has been the 'victim' of the diplomacy between the Soviet Union and Turkish Republic. The good relations between the Soviets and Kemalists, which were established during the liberation war and lasted after the foundation of the republic, reflected the Soviet policy of supporting the national liberation movements in the East, since they resulted in the weakening of imperialism and on the assumption that the Kemalist government could introduce social and economic changes that were historically progressive. In that case, TKP was charged with the task rendering support to the Kemalist government when it made progressive moves and opposing it when it put pressure on the working class movement (Kürkçü, 1991: 131). Çulhaoğlu also states that, due to a lack of theoretical accumulation and in the absence of a strong social movement on which it could operate, the activities of TKP were almost solely determined by the policies of Comintern during the period (Çulhaoğlu, 1991: 164).⁷

In fact, beginning from the Second Congress of Comintern in 1920, more attention was directed to the national liberation movements in the Eastern countries. This was due to a number of reasons. The fact that the revolutionary movement had failed in European countries and 'world revolution' no longer seemed as a prospect for near future and the isolation of Soviet Union from the outside world, shifted the considerations of the Soviets towards the protection of the revolution and to the

⁷ Yurtsever also points at the same dimension of the problem. In Yurtsever's words, the 'theoretical poverty' that existed in Turkish left has led to two main consequences: the repetition of Comintern theses with a poor/mechanistic understanding and the placement of Turkish left under the ideological hegemony of Kemalism. According to Yurtsever, TKP has failed to separate the priorities of Soviet foreign policy from the necessities of class struggle within the country (Yurtsever, 1992: 128-129).

slogan 'socialism in one country'. The theses adopted at the Second Congress of Comintern were considered throughout the whole existence of the organization as the 'Eastern Policy' of the organization and directly affected the left in Turkey. For this reason, they have to be considered briefly.

The most crucial debate that took place in the Congress was between Lenin and the Indian delegate Roy. In Lenin's view, it was necessary in the colonial and dependent countries to support the 'bourgeois democratic' liberation movement. The communists, during this time were obliged to keep their own organizations intact and not to merge with those of the bourgeoisie. However, this support was temporary and conditional; the bourgeoisie should be supported as long as they did not oppose the communists to organize the peasantry and the broad exploited masses (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 29). Lenin's views were also closely related with his theory of imperialism, which stated that the maturation of capitalism over the face of the world is uneven and a profound change in both the economies and politics of capitalism was taking place. Capitalism had always sought to export its crises by spatial expansion, mainly colonial and semi-colonial. With the rise of finance capital and monopoly capitalism, the need for expansion (including the export of capital) increased very greatly, but the earth being finite in extent, fields for new territorial expansion had disappeared. There were two basic consequences of this situation: struggles among great powers to repartition the already partitioned world, which necessarily implied political struggles among the world powers and thus eventually world war and the growth of national liberation movements in colonies and semi colonies as a result of intensifying exploitation and oppression. In the colonial states, the producing classes suffer along with the young bourgeoisie, the national struggle in these countries is not hence, a bourgeois struggle against feudal forces for the creation of a bourgeois state, but a multi class struggle directed primarily against imperialism. In non European territories, capitalism is still rising and national movements may still, in certain circumstances have a chance of success of forming new nation states (Blaut, 1987: 128-129). Therefore, national liberation movements had to be supported.

On the other hand, Roy argued from the very beginning of the revolution, the communists must seize the leadership and not allow it to remain in the hands of

the bourgeoisie. This was because, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries was naturally inclined to seek an understanding with the imperialist powers whose policy was favorable to its interests and was therefore radically opposed to the interests of the working class and the peasantry (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 43). In his remarks on the possibility of the creation of a communist movement in Asia, he departed from his own country, India. According to Roy, the significant amount of landless peasantry in rural areas, the growing Indian working class and the increasing number of strikes in the country created favorable conditions for the development of communist movement in India (STMA, 1988: 654). The second crucial topic in the Congress was the possibility of the adoption of a non-capitalist path by the colonial countries after the war of national liberation. Despite the presence of contending views on the issue of the collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, there was a consensus on the subject. It was stated in the Congress that 'if the victorious proletariat of the Soviet republics gave its support to the revolutionary movement in the backward countries', these countries could avoid the capitalist stage of development and move directly to socialism through a non capitalist path.⁸

It can be argued that the Eastern policies of the Comintern were imbued with pragmatism oriented toward the protection of the socialist accomplishments of the Soviet Union. Unlike its Western policies, which were constructed on a theoretical basis and practical experience stretching far back to the revolutions of 1848, the Eastern policies of Comintern emerged simultaneously with the emergence of revolutionary movements in the East. Due to this fact, the Eastern policies of Comintern were shaped through practical considerations. To cite one example, while the policies of Comintern approached the West, projecting a capitalist depression accompanied by reflections on the class character of social democracy, it is impossible to find a symmetrical evaluation of it regarding the 'national bourgeoisie' in the East (STMA, 1988: 663).

⁸ As d'Encausse and Schram remark, the views of Marx and Engels, which stated that Russia could avoid the capitalist stage if the victorious proletariat of the advanced countries of Western Europe supported the Russian revolution, was transposed towards the East; Soviet Russia would extend a hand to the peoples of Asia and give them the support which would allow them to skip the capitalist stage (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 30).

A very crucial consequence of this pragmatism, which rendered almost unconditional support to national liberation movements, was the hampering of the development of the communist parties in the Eastern countries, which was seen clearly in the case of TKP. As Tunçay states, the political implications of this situation was evident in TKP, which thought that the Turkish bourgeoisie, through its leadership role in the national liberation movement against foreign enemy, has served the anti imperialist necessities of the world revolution. The party, at least until 1925, avoided the creation of a rift with the Kemalist authority on the grounds that Kemalists would stimulate the development of capitalism in the country and thus prepare the conditions for the construction of socialism or that they would lead the country through a non capitalist path of development avoiding sufferings of capitalism. In fact the analyses of Aydınlık group in İstanbul and Şefik Hüsnü (Değmer) reflected nothing more than the supporting of 'national' bourgeoisie, which was thought to bring the technological basis of capitalism. Besides, in his analyses, Şefik Hüsnü argued that there were various reasons for not seeing in the Ankara government the typical characteristics of a 'dominant bourgeois capitalism'. In Değmer's view, through supporting the construction of state enterprises and encouraging state involvement in economy, the Kemalist government could be converted to follow a non-capitalist path (Tunçay, 1991a: 226). Stressing the role of the inner dynamic, İnsel states that it would be mistake to attribute primary responsibility to the policies of Comintern in analyzing the relationship between Kemalism and Turkish left. In fact, due to their nationalist sentiments and the identification of Kemalism with the leadership of the liberation war, the leftist cadres already had sympathy for Kemalism. This sympathy was further increased when the Kemalist authority attempted to carry out social and political reforms. Because 'the idea of progress' constituted a historically common ground for both the left and Kemalism, these were considered as progressive movements. According to İnsel, these two factors caused the left to see itself as a 'derivative of Kemalism' (İnsel, 1991: 197). Tunçay also places the Turkish left within the general modernizing current which did possess a different strategy of development. However, during the initial years of the republic, the reforms that the Kemalists wanted to realize and the point that the left intended to reach through modernization coincided to a great

extent. On the one hand, they aspired to situate the social changes taking place on a different basis through changing the economic structure; on the other they felt sympathy for the consequences of the reforms, which also reflected their intentions. This particular point constituted a great dilemma for the left (Tunçay, 1991b: 14).⁹

Köker also agrees with the view that the perspective of modernization appears as the point of convergence between Kemalism and Turkish left. According to Köker, Kemalism had a perspective of reform for Turkish society, which included the construction of a national state, the achievement of economic development and a socio-cultural transformation within the boundaries of this nation state. In fact, Kemalism was an ideology and a political movement formulated to achieve these transformations and articulated a comprehensive set of the principles of legitimacy for the new state. As an ‘ideology’ and a ‘program of action’ aimed at achieving economic development, it brought forward the principle of statism and in order to achieve cultural transformation, the principle of secularism was formulated. The problematic of modernization was intrinsic to the left on the grounds that it held a conception of history based on the idea of progress, which disclosed itself through universal stages societies had to pass. When Kemalism was viewed from such perspective, the passage from feudalism to capitalism is considered as a progressive movement. Likewise, the formation of the national state and the principle of statism, which aimed at the industrialization of the country were progressive. Yet the reforms initiated by it were also criticized later on for being confined to cultural changes on the surface and not attempting to eliminate exploitation etc. since the left possessed an idea of society which transcended the capitalist society and Kemalism did not (Köker, 1991: 40).

However, this process of modernization is not unique to Turkey. In fact, the process in Turkey constitutes a ‘late modernization’, which was overwhelmingly shaped by ‘reflexivity’ and manifest actions attempting at conscious stimulation of the transformations taking place. In that sense, processes of late modernization around the world unanimously display various ‘societal’ and ‘collectivist’ tendencies. To cite one example, the modernization effort embarked on by Germany,

⁹ According to Karpas, socialism in Turkey, as in the rest of the Near East, appeared as part of the general movement of modernization. It is often associated with nationalism and expresses the latter’s economic and social aims (Karpas, 1976b: 341)

which, in comparison to England and France was a ‘late comer’ itself, during the second half of the nineteenth century, has also exhibited collectivist characteristics in terms of education, social security and protectionism (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 172). In terms of the relationship between Kemalism and Turkish left, these tendencies of the modernization process have created problems for the left in defining itself a separate position, merging it with the inclinations of Kemalism. While rendering crucial support to the process of modernization initiated by the Kemalist authority as a progressive achievement, it was unable to detach itself from the unique ideological components of this process of modernization such as statism, populism (halkçılık), industrialization, development and nationalism. Besides, as Çulhaoğlu states, despite the acquaintance of various figures of Turkish left with Marxism such as Şefik Hüsnü, the reservations of Kemalist authority against the notion of class struggle were taken into consideration by the Turkish left and considerable hope was pinned on the possibility of a radical social transformation and modernization through a ‘third way’ excluding class struggles (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 184).¹⁰ This situation has resulted in the emergence of a hybrid form of Marxism in Turkish left which identifies Marxism with positivist ideologies of development (industrialization) to the extent that distorts the actual way these phenomena relate to Marxism. As I have mentioned in the previous section, although modernization and Enlightenment constitute the foundations on which the basic premises of Marxist thought can be elaborated, Marxism cannot be considered as a simple extension of them. In this

¹⁰ The journal *Kadro*, published in the 1930’s, which can be considered as a forerunner of the ‘Third Worldist’ ideologies, staging a comeback in 1960’s, provides the most comprehensive attempt to formulate the theory of this ‘third way’. The major premises of the journal, expressed in the form of the ‘center-periphery’ views of the dependency school are elaborated in its most detailed version by one of the ideologues of *Kadro*, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, as such: 1.) National liberation wars appear as a result of the international contradiction between colonizers and colonial or semi-colonial countries, 2.) The aim of national liberation wars is the elimination of this contradiction, namely of dependency, 3.) This contradiction appears as the consequence of the fact that specific countries and a specific class inside the country possess the ownership of the means of production. Therefore, dependency on the international plane, and class domination and struggle internally have to be abolished, 4.) In these countries the classes in capitalism are present in embryonic forms. However, provided that these countries follow a path of development in harmony with their national qualities, these forms can be eliminated, 5.) The wars of national liberation also aim to establish a new international order by abolishing the current international division of labor based on the distinction between producer and provider countries, 6.) National independence can only be attained through a war of independence in which the religious, aristocratic, feudal and comprador elements are excluded. The attainment and prolongation of this independence depends on the extent to which the individual, class and group interests, hampering national unity are suppressed, 7.) Turkey and the principles of the Turkish revolution are the ‘complete and genuine’ representative of the national liberation movements (Oran, 1999: 255).

sense, it is appropriate for the left to render its support to various moves by the Kemalist authority, which can be evaluated within the boundaries of the modernization effort in Turkey such as the adoption of the Latin alphabet, the rights of women, the closing of religious lodges (tekke) and such since these constitute crucial steps towards the emergence of the ‘modern individual’, capable of making his/her own choices through free will. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that due to the interplay of external/internal dynamics mentioned above, the Turkish left during the period has bent the stick too much on the side of the modernizing authority (Kemalism) and has failed to see the points of divergence between the Enlightenment idea of progress and the conception of progress in Marxism. However, the basic arguments of TİP cannot be said to be derived from the TKP line. TKP was even criticized by TİP leaders for being ‘dependent’ on the policies of Comintern and by Boran for paving the way for the ‘theoretical and political poverty’ observed in Turkish left (Boran, 1976). As İleri states, on various occasions it was personally declared by Aybar and Boran that TİP was an ‘independent’ party and did not derive its power from any other pre existing form of organization (İleri, 1987: 68). Besides, TİP’s views on the level of capitalist development in the country also differed from those of TKP. Yet, TKP line has initiated a process in Turkish left, which caused the left to derive the basic premises of its political discourse from Kemalism.

Küçük states that the period of modernization in Turkey initiated by the Kemalist authority covers the period between the late 1920’ and 1960’s. According to Küçük, the depression observed in the world capitalist system beginning in 1929 has provided a special impetus for Kemalist modernization and with the end of 1960’s; it has faced a historical break (Küçük, 2001: 164).¹¹ This remark is crucial for the concern of this study, since in the international context of 1960’s, these elements of the modernization process in Turkey were expressed in the developmental objectives of TİP in such way so as to assure that Kemalism and socialism are compatible. At this point, the analysis of the international context of 1960’s is crucial in the sense that the developments in the historical arena have also directly influenced TİP’s understanding of development.

¹¹ Çulhaoğlu suggests the term ‘pseudo modernization’ to designate the process after 1980’s, which is characterized by the emergence of ‘liberalism’ as a long excluded element of the modernization process in Turkey, which also had direct consequences on Turkish left (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 185).

2.3 Approaches to Development in the 1960's

During 1960's, the 'rise of the Third World' after the dissolution of colonialism and the emergence of nation states on a vast range of territory covering Asia and Africa constituted the major development on the international arena, accompanied by an increasing enthusiasm on the political, economic and social dynamics of the newly independent states. While the formation of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries at the Bandung Conference of 1955 increased prospects in Soviet Union for the creation of an 'intermediate zone' between the capitalist and socialist countries, the success of the Algerian war of independence, the Cuban revolution, the resistance of the people of Vietnam against US invasion and attempts at 'building socialism through a non capitalist path' in various countries of Asia and Africa such as Egypt and Sudan resulted in the placing of hopes in the spread of socialism in Third World. As a result of these unique historical conditions, combined with the political and economic aspirations of Third World countries as regards the issues of escaping underdevelopment and achieving modernization, various new themes such as nationalism, independence and development began to receive primary emphasis on an international scale.

Nationalism in underdeveloped countries appeared as a movement against colonialism and was led by intellectuals, a social stratum which was also a product of colonialism. After the expulsion of colonialism and the establishment of the nation state, these countries embarked on an attempt to reach the level of Western civilization through modernization. The method used was anti-pluralist and jacobinist and the strategy was anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist (in the sense of being against free market and not necessarily private property) (Oran, 1997: 295). On the other hand, the transformation of the Soviet Union from a backward society into a major industrial power within a few decades, which was seen by these countries as a manifestation of 'self sufficient and rapid' development and the improvement of the means of communication which brought about a flow of information throughout the world about the increased standards of living of people in Western Europe and the United States, resulted in a widespread conviction of the masses that development was possible and an attainable goal. As Küçük states, during this period, the issue of development was treated as a 'national cause', which attracted

the people and the ruling classes of the Third World countries (Küçük, 1987: 62). The approach of Third World countries to the issue of economic and social development was also influenced by the peculiar conditions that shaped the formations of their societies. In attempting to achieve rapid development, these underdeveloped countries took as example the Western societies where development was achieved through industrialization. However, the effort to 'catch-up' while avoiding the 'political and cultural stereotypes' of the West and 'protecting their national identities' (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 9) brought about new models of development. The 'self sufficient and rapid' development of the Third World countries would be achieved on a different line from that of the West, since these countries did not possess the conditions for development that were present in Western societies. It was under these circumstances that socialism was adopted in various Third World countries as a means to achieve rapid development and to put an end to the economic dependency on foreign powers, but the characteristics and the assumptions of this socialism were interpreted on a unique basis. Oran enumerates the three conditions that led the underdeveloped countries to adopt socialism for development, a statement he makes for the understanding of socialism in African countries, and yet which can be extended so as to apply to all Third World states. These are: 1) the specific conditions of these societies which necessitate the active involvement of the state in the economy, 2) the effort to avoid the penetration of capitalism into the country and 3) the rejection of basic tenets of Marxist thought on the ground that they were incompatible with the social conditions of these countries (Oran, 1997: 213).

The developmental objectives of these states were shaped by political factors such as nationalism, regional competition or external threat ideology and a wish to 'catch up' with the west, which rested on the active participation of the state in economy as the chief actor of the development effort. Besides, as Leys states, the Bretton Woods financial and trading regime also enabled the nation states to manage their economies in order to maximize growth. Capital was not allowed to cross through frontiers without government approval and these states could carry out economic and social services through the use of extra market mechanisms. National

economic planning and domestic and international arrangements to stabilize commodity prices were seen as natural extensions of this thinking (Leys, 1996a: 7)

The underdeveloped countries declined to follow a capitalist path for industrialization because the concepts socialism/nationalism and capitalism/imperialism were seen as identical.¹² Therefore, if the capitalist path was taken it was feared that the colonialist state, which was expelled from the country after the struggle for independence, might reestablish its dominance in the country through the weak local bourgeoisie. On the other hand, Marxism was also rejected because of its endorsement of a model of historical development including the capitalist stage, which these countries intended to bypass, but more so because of the idea of class struggle intrinsic to Marxist thought (Oran, 1997: 209). Marxism in this Third World version labeled the consequences of the penetration of capitalism to the pre capitalist structures as just a ‘story of destruction’, which also represented a break with Marx’s notion of historical development that perceived capitalism as a progressive mode of production despite the immense social costs (Keyder, 1996: 13). Since these countries intended to perpetuate the currently existing social structure, within which class struggle was weak, primary emphasis was placed on the maintenance of a balance between different social classes. The approaches to development formulated in the 1960’s reflected the aspirations of the third world states and sought to provide answers to the problem of ‘underdevelopment’ in these countries and possible ways of economic and technological development. These approaches are identified as the ‘dependency theory’ in Latin America and the Soviet formulations of a ‘non-capitalist path’ devised for the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Although both approaches advocated ‘national autonomous development’, they have to be considered separately. Considering these approaches will also be useful in comprehending TIP’s conception of the issue of development, which exhibited certain characteristics of the dependency approach and its strategy of development

¹² Shils also states that nationalism is the greatest motive which underlies the policies carried out under this peculiar understanding of socialism: “The socialistic and populist elements in the politics of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries are secondary to and derivative from their nationalistic preoccupations and aspirations. Economic policies have their legitimation in their capacity to raise the country on the scale of the nations of the world (...) Foreign policy is primarily a policy of ‘public relations’ designed (...) to improve the reputation of the nation, to make others heed its voice, to make them pay attention to it and respect it” (Shils, 1972: 401).

was as Yurtsever notes (1992: 175) directly affected by the Soviet formulations although certain differences also existed.

2.3.1 Dependency and Third World

In order to analyze the basic assumptions of dependency theory which arose in the 60's through the contribution of scholars mainly from Latin America and which had a decisive influence for almost two decades over development studies as regards the Third World¹³, it is necessary to look at briefly the approaches to development/underdevelopment after the Second World War, which the dependency theory intended to challenge.

Dependency theory arose as a response to the premises of the modernization theory, which were built on the presumption that progressive and unilinear change was possible, and any nation could catch up (and develop) with the countries that had evolved first. The past experience of the now industrialized countries of the West would be the future of the newly developing economies in the Third World. The main problem of these countries was considered as the presence of cultural practices and traditional institutional structures that precluded capitalist development. The solution to the problem of traditional/pre modern societies lay in their transformation into modern/rational societies with Western style institutions and values, which could be diffused into the country through education, technology

¹³ In fact, there are variations between different approaches to development which all employ the term 'dependency' in their analyses and a unified body of 'dependency theory' does not exist. O'Brien, suggested three different traditions in the theories of dependency, the first one is the structuralist perspective of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), further developed by Osvaldo Sunkel and Celso Furtado, the second one is the Marxist perspective of Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos and Andre Gunder Frank, the third tradition is represented by scholars who combine both Marxist and structuralist perspectives in their analysis such as Anibal Quijano, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Octavio Janni and Florestan Fernandes (O'Brien, 1992: 27). Ronald Chilcote on the other hand distinguishes between the models of dependency and diffusion and places ECLA within the latter one, due to the fact that it sees development as the consequence of the spread of capitalism and technology from modern to backward areas. Chilcote outlines four formulations under the dependency model: The development of underdevelopment (Andre Gunder Frank and Walter Rodney), New dependency (Theotonio Dos Santos), Dependency and Development (Fernando Henrique Cardoso) and Dependency and Imperialism (Baran, Sweezy and Quijano) (Chilcote, 1981:298). Colin Leys extends this classification according to the political standing of the dependency theorists, by asserting that scholars like Sunkel and Furtado act as the 'organic intellectuals of their national capitalist class and reject its subordination to the interests of the companies and the influence of the US state in domestic politics', while left dependency theorists such as Dos Santos and Marini openly aligned themselves with the Latin American labor movement (Leys, 1996: 12).

transfer and massive financial and technical assistance (Leys, 1996: 8-11). This way, it was assumed that the Third World would grow from a stage of underdevelopment to one of liberal democracy, abundance and mass consumption (Chilcote, 1981: 280).¹⁴ If they failed to free themselves from the cultural practices and traditional institutional structures that impede their development, it was their own doing in the sense that they failed to generate the political stability required to attract investment and invest in sufficient infrastructure to make development possible or they failed to use development aid for good purposes and failed to make appropriate investment in human capital. In this case, it was inevitable that a breakdown in the development process of these countries occurs (Eisenstadt, 1991). In fact, within the context of the Cold War, these assumptions carried a highly ideological character, which were closely related to the interests of the United States and its policy of combating communism. As Leys puts it

This situation also led to a ‘symptomatic silence’ about the social character of development (...) It was implicit that the development under discussion was not socialist, but its capitalist character was not acknowledged either, it was just ‘development’ and was certainly not seen as prone to generate class formation and conflict or as inherently uneven or crisis-ridden (Leys, 1996a: 14).

Besides, the propositions of modernization theorists as regards development in newly independent nations of Asia and Africa were already being carried out in Latin American countries, which have overthrown colonial rule and embarked on a capitalist path of development. Despite the efforts at capitalist development, the economies of Latin American countries after the Second World War were still underdeveloped and exhibited the characteristics of colonial countries (Ersoy, 1992: 11). Under these circumstances, ECLA sought to present the ways of achieving rapid development along capitalist path. The approach of ECLA, developed by Raul Prebisch in late 1950’s, and which constituted one of the antecedents on which dependency theory rested, can be summarized under two basic assumptions (Chilcote, 1981: 301). The first one held that that the developing

¹⁴ One of the best-known representatives of modernization theory, W. W. Rostow outlines the presence of five stages in the development of Third World. These are: 1. Traditional society, 2. Preconditions for takeoff, 3. Takeoff, 4. Drive toward maturity and 5. The age of high mass consumption. According to Rostow, the takeoff stage was especially relevant to new nations, for it appears as the stage when resistances to growth are finally overcome (Rostow, 1991).

societies were characterized by dual structures (advanced/modern, backward/feudal). The other assumption accepted that the world was divided into an industrial center and a periphery and under the present international economic system; the former was able to develop to the disadvantage of the latter. Development was possible in Latin America, through import substitution policies, which would bring about a more locally controlled economy as a result of the setting of high tariff barriers and the establishment of national industries. A commercial and industrial bourgeoisie would emerge as the supporter and protector of national interests against foreign penetration into the economies of the less developed countries. The state was to intervene in the economy by preventing the concentration of income in a narrow portion of society and by widening the market for the participation of the masses (Sunkel). This way, all segments of the population would benefit from the maximizing of production, growth and consumption (Furtado). In short, ECLA assumed a nationalist stance, which opposed foreign domination in the economy and advocated autonomous capitalist development (Chilcote, 1981: 288).

The left or 'radical' formulations within the dependency theory, of which Andre Gunder Frank represents a well-known proponent, emerged as a consequence of the inability of the import substitution model to eliminate dependency and generate autonomous growth in Latin America (O'Brien, 1992: 26). The formulations of left dependency theorists were influenced to a great extent by the work of Paul Baran *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957) in which he argued that the achievement of capitalist development in the periphery was not possible and hence the progressive role of capitalism in the periphery does not exist (Ersoy, 1992: 11). In *The Development of Underdevelopment* (1967), Frank set forth a number of premises that introduced criticisms of both the assumptions of modernization theory and ECLA. Stating that most studies of development fail to explain the structure and development of the capitalist system and its generation of underdevelopment in some parts of the world and of economic development in others, Frank argued that underdevelopment was not original or traditional. The now developed countries were never *underdeveloped*, though they may have been *undeveloped* (Frank, 1991: 195).

According to Frank, the only way to understand contemporary underdevelopment is to reverse the two widely held views on underdeveloped

countries, namely the view that the contemporary underdevelopment of a country can be understood as the reflection or the product of its own economic, political, social and cultural characteristics or structure and that the development of these countries can be accomplished through the diffusion of capital, technology, values from the advanced capitalist countries (Frank, 1991: 196). In fact, contemporary underdevelopment of a country is largely due to the past and continuing relationships between the now developed 'metropolitan' and underdeveloped 'satellite' countries and (capitalist) economic development in these countries can occur when their ties to their metropolis are weakest, to the extent that the greatest industrial accomplishments of various Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico has taken place during the Great Depression and the First and Second World Wars (Frank, 1991: 202).¹⁵

Frank also criticizes the notion of dual society which implies that, those parts of the economy and society establishing intimate contact with the capitalist world system, have developed and become modern, while the other parts were seen as isolated, subsistence-based or feudal and therefore underdeveloped. According to Frank, the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries has 'effectively and entirely penetrated even the most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world'. Therefore, both the seemingly feudal and backward areas of the economy and society and the capitalist institutions of the supposedly more developed areas are the products of a single historical process of capitalist development (Frank, 1991: 197). The principal source of underdevelopment is the extraction of surplus from the 'satellites' through a hierarchy of centers of which the capitalist 'metropolises' constitutes the top and which is maintained by the existence of specific institutions that-although seemingly feudal-are born as commercial enterprises and operate to

¹⁵ Cardoso who argued that 'dependent capitalist development' is actually possible challenged Frank's thesis that capitalist development creates, intensifies and reproduces underdevelopment in the periphery. According to Cardoso, the investments of multinational corporations in Third World countries benefit all the classes associated with international capital, including the local agrarian, commercial, financial and industrial bourgeoisie and even the working class employed in the international sector (Chilcote, 1981: 303). However, as O'Brien states, Frank did not necessarily reject the idea of dependent development. Rather, he defended that an independent, autonomous development in the periphery is not possible (O'Brien, 1992: 38).

respond to the increased demands in the world or national market (Frank, 1991: 206).¹⁶

From his analyses, Frank drew the conclusion that since the possibility of national development within the capitalist system does not exist for underdeveloped countries; the solution lay in 'delinking' from the system with a socialist revolution so as to realize fundamental political, social and economic changes (Bernstein, 1992: 47). O'Brien criticizes the assumptions of both Frank and Cardoso and the meaning of the terms, 'the development of underdevelopment' and 'dependent development' employed by them respectively. According to O'Brien, dependency theory introduces cyclical assumptions (dependent countries lack the capacity for autonomous development and the main reason for this is that they are dependent), which do not explain the causes of dependency and why some 'dependent countries' are 'rich' while the others are 'poor' (O'Brien, 1992: 39). In relation to this point, another problem concerns the actual definition of dependency. In the words of dos Santos, 'dependency conditions a certain internal structure, which redefines it as a function of the structural possibilities of the distinct national economies' (dos Santos, quoted in Roxborough, 1979:66). If dependency is accepted as a certain internal structure, which is different from that of the advanced nations, the problem arises in the conceptualization of these differences. Roxborough states that in the formulations of dependency theorists, it is not clear whether there is a mode of production in dependent countries, which is different from that of capitalism or while the dependent countries have a capitalist formation, the articulation of the capitalist mode of production with the other modes of production and with the economies of the advanced countries results in a different functioning of that mode of production (Roxborough, 1979: 67).

¹⁶ This view is evident in Frank's considerations on the latifundia as a commercial enterprise, which is not beyond the reach of capitalist development (Frank, 1967: 206-208). As Leys points out, the political implications of this view as regards the task of the revolutionary movement is put as a struggle of workers and peasants to move from capitalism to socialism since the feudal seeming landlords were in fact integrated into capitalist economy and the so called national bourgeoisie acted in compliance with the interests of imperialists, whose collaboration therefore could not be sought (Leys, 1996b: 59). Ernesto Laclau put Frank's views to criticism on the grounds that Frank underestimated the preservation effects of capitalist expansion and therefore the tendency of capitalism to consolidate pre capitalist modes of production in the periphery. For a criticism of Frank's arguments and Laclau's views on the articulation of pre capitalist modes of production, see Leys, 1996b.

It was stated before that the variations among the theorists precluded the analysis of a single body of dependency theory. In fact, dependency theory can be considered as a broad school of thought within which the assumption that the causes of underdevelopment should be sought outside the underdeveloped countries and in relation to the world capitalist system constitutes the single point of consensus. In order to explain its basic propositions, Angotti introduces four main theoretical perspectives, which are, to a certain extent, shared by scholars advocating development theory. These are: the criticism of dualism, advanced center/backward periphery couple, unequal exchange and dependent (and collaborator) bourgeoisie (Angotti, 1992: 133). The rejection of the notion of dualism, namely the idea that the main obstacle to development was the social and cultural characteristics 'inherent' in the 'traditional' parts of the underdeveloped countries, constituted the most progressive aspect of dependency theory and was influential in revealing the relationship between imperialism and underdevelopment. The advanced center/backward periphery couple implied that at the most general level; the world was characterized by the presence of the affluent countries of the center and the poor underdeveloped countries of the periphery. This division was further intensified by the process of surplus removal from the latter by the former, which perpetuated the low levels of productivity in those areas from which surplus was taken and which created a structuring of the economies of these countries in such way that systematically subordinated them to the economies of countries where capital was accumulated. As a result of this process, the economies of Third World countries functioned as 'externally oriented', in the sense that they exported all primary commodities and imported all manufactured products and were dependent on external forces in terms of technology, which hampered their process of industrialization (Leys, 1996b: 46). The constant export of raw materials by the periphery places the Third World countries in a disadvantaged position in their economic relationship with the developed countries. The theory of unequal exchange demands a revision of commercial and price rates in order to provide fair relations of trade between developed and underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, the process of subordinate development resulted in the emergence and formation of classes in Third World states with interests in compliance with those of the center.

The assumption of ECLA on the emergence of a national bourgeoisie as the driving force of autonomous capitalist development was inverted in the sense that the bourgeoisie of the Third World countries were in fact ‘compradors’ which served their own interests and those of the foreign capital and not those of the people (Leys, 1996a: 12) and therefore, could not be expected to play an anti-imperialist and progressive role.

As stated, the leftist oriented proponents of development theory have been influential in exposing the ideologically grounded theses of modernization theory and in shifting attention to the destructive consequences of imperialism. For the dependency theorists, the international division of labor defined a permanent asymmetrical relationship in which the poor, commodity-producing nations are dependent on the manufactured products of the rich, industrial nations. Besides, the international terms of trade mainly served the interests of these powers rather than those of the economically disadvantaged nations. The roots of the perpetual poverty of the Third World countries were seen as externally caused and not by internal factors as implied in the modernization theory.¹⁷ Bernstein asserts that, despite these ‘merits’ of dependency theory, it failed to base its arguments on class analysis. The failure of ‘comprador’ or ‘dependent’ bourgeoisie to achieve national development has driven the dependency theorists to seek for other agents of development. In this sense the ‘people’ and its ‘leaders’ were seen as the subjects of ‘genuine development’.

According to Bernstein, despite its use of slogans of class struggle, dependency lacks the ‘revolutionary theory’ on which any influential socialist politics would be based (Bernstein, 1992: 67). Leys also criticizes dependency as ‘Marxified structuralism’ in the sense of ‘failing to escape the structural problematic of ECLA’. According to Leys the immediate effect of Marxifying radical structuralism was the shifting of the solution to underdevelopment from economic nationalism to ‘socialism’ and the means to provide this from radical structural

¹⁷ Cardoso and Faletto, in *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, describe development and underdevelopment as distinct functions or positions within the international system of production and distribution than as different stages of a given system. On the other hand, the approach of the writers to the relationship between external and internal factors emphasize the ‘internalization of external interests’, through which ‘the structural links of dependency cease to be based on mere external forms of exploitation and coercion, but become rooted in the coincidences of interests between local dominant classes and international ones’ (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).

reforms to 'revolutionary struggle'. But this was an illusion. A structuralist analysis does not disclose the classes, forms of organization or a socialist solution on which the revolutionary struggle should be based (Leys, 1996b: 98). The reformist development strategy of ECLA was modified by the left dependency theorists into a revolutionary-socialist theory without relieving its nationalist aspirations. It was also not clear how the idea of 'delinking' from the capitalist system would create socialism since the internal structures of underdeveloped countries were not taken into account.¹⁸

Leys also introduces another crucial criticism in this respect. The national autarchic model of development envisaged by dependency arose at a special period of worldwide expansion of capitalism, within which the individual governments could manage their economies in order to accelerate growth, foster industrialization and catch up. With the rise of neoliberalism, the radical transformation of the world economy in accordance with the interests of transnational capital is complete. Since the era of 'national economies' is past, strategies and theories based on their existence became irrelevant (Leys, 1996b: 25).

2.3.2 The Non Capitalist Path of Development and Soviet Union

During the late 50's and early 60's, the assessment of the economic and political systems of the newly independent countries of the Third World increasingly became the focus of Soviet development studies. As Walter Laqueur puts it, the Soviet reorientation in the Middle East after the second half of 1950's, did not come as the result of a new discovery made by Soviet Middle Eastern experts, nor did a new Marxist-Leninist analysis precede that change (Laqueur, 1959:156). In fact, they modified their approach after the politicians did. Clarkson states that, the theories of development formulated in the Soviet Union during this period as regards the Third World accompanied the changes in the foreign policy behavior of the Soviet Union,

¹⁸ Warren also criticizes dependency theory as being prejudiced in its answers to analytical questions about the underlying dynamics of the societies concerned and as being disoriented in its political practice: "Hence, the extreme degree of confusion among the dependency theorists over what social force is to be the instrument of the desired political change: the national bourgeoisie is ruled out as comprador or non-hegemonic, the working class as incorporated by multinational corporations, the military and civilian bureaucracy as imperialist collaborators. All that is left is the political organization of the marginals and presumably the intellectuals" (Warren, 1980: 159).

characterized by a reevaluation of the global balance of power and the warming of the Soviet attitude toward the non-aligned new nations (Clarkson, 1979: 46). According to the Soviet thesis, the world situation was characterized by the 'constant development and irreversible progress' of socialism and also by the 'decomposition and constant weakening' of imperialism. The newly independent states for which the very existence of a powerful socialist camp constituted a safeguard against the reestablishment of imperialist domination in these countries, were seen as a crucial factor in establishing an intermediate zone between the socialist and capitalist countries which were thus to 'coexist peacefully'. These modifications regarding Soviet policies toward the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa and national liberation movements were evident in the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, revealed in Khrushchev's speech in the congress on the peaceful transition to socialism and the progressive role of the national bourgeoisie.

Khrushchev's speech in the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) indicated that in countries where capitalism was weak and had no organized means of defense, recourse to violence is not inevitable and that socialism could be reached by peaceful means through a parliamentary path

(...) the question arises whether it is also possible to make use of the parliamentary path for the transition to socialism. This path was ruled out for the Russian Bolsheviks, who were the first to make the transition to socialism (...) but since that time radical changes have taken place in the historical situation, which allow us to approach this question in a new way. The forces of socialism and democracy have increased immeasurably throughout the whole world, whilst capitalism has become considerably weaker (...) in these conditions, the working class, uniting around itself the toiling peasantry, the intellectuals and all patriotic forces and giving a decisive rebuff to opportunist elements incapable of renouncing the policy of accommodation with the capitalists and landlords, is capable of inflicting a defeat on the reactionary, antipopular forces and winning a sound majority in parliament and transforming that organ of the bourgeois democrats into an instrument of the true popular will [which] will create for the working class of a number of capitalist and excolonial countries conditions guaranteeing radical social transformations (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 284).

The construction of state industrial enterprises according to a precise plan (India, Egypt) was characteristic of the aspiration of young sovereign states to attain

economic independence. The policy of industrializing a country –and industrialization is the only sound guarantee of economic independence- is not pursued in the same manner in socialist countries like China as in non-socialist countries like India. In India, state capitalist enterprises are established.

The formulations of non-capitalist path were based on the presumption of the existence of a national bourgeoisie, which could rally in a National United Front (the unity of national powers) in order to achieve the independence of the country. National Front strategy accorded priority to the national revolution, the social revolution being postponed until such time as the common enemy; the western capitalism has been defeated. In the economic field comprehensive reforms were to be undertaken by the state to achieve the industrialization of the country.

It was stated that to the extent that the national bourgeoisie shows itself to be an active participant of the anti-imperialist struggle of the whole nation, its nationalist ideology may not be an insuperable obstacle barring the working masses from cooperation and alliance with it against imperialism. In this case, nationalism is opposed to imperialism which tries to enslave nations and which is the worst enemy of free national development” (d’Encausse and Schram, 1966: 289-292):

In present conditions, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and dependent countries unconnected with imperialist circles, is objectively interested in the accomplishment of the principal tasks of anti imperialist, anti feudal revolution and therefore can participate in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In that sense it is progressive. But though progressive, it is unstable; it is inclined to compromise with imperialism and feudalism. Unless radical and comprehensive reforms are carried out in countries, which have acquired political independence, it is not possible to abolish the remnants of feudalism that hamper the development of forces of production in agriculture and industry (Akıncı, 2003: 242; translation mine).

As indicated before, the concept of the non capitalist path of development can be traced back to Lenin, who suggested at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 that with the help of the proletariat of the advanced countries, the backward countries can switch to the Soviet system and –following certain steps of development- towards socialism without having to pass through the capitalist stage. It was also debated in the Communist International that at the stage of the struggle against imperialism, in countries where the working class was weak and the

peasantry dispersed and weakly organized, an alliance with the bourgeoisie or the bourgeois leadership of the national liberation movement could be regarded as objectively progressive. However in Lenin's view, this alliance could only be provisional and conditional. These remarks by Lenin have been elaborated since the early 1960's, into an intricate set of theories related to the non-capitalist path of development that would apply to countries in a pre capitalist stage of development and to those that have experienced a fair measure of capitalist development such as India and Latin American countries. Non-capitalist path of development was perceived as the first step toward socialist construction with the leadership of the revolutionary democrats

Under such conditions, when ... the proletariat has not yet developed into a leading force in social development, the intermediate strata, namely the peasantry, the lower urban classes and the democratic intelligentsia, acquire political independence and thus assume a particularly active role. The revolutionary democracy becomes their spokesman (Pennar, 1973: 7).

The new theoretical formulations such as 'non-capitalist development' and the 'national democratic state' were introduced at the 1960 Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow. It was stated that in the present situation, favorable domestic and international conditions arise in many countries for the establishment of an independent national democracy. National democracy is defined as a state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory a state which rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government, in which the people are ensured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstration, establishment of political parties and social organizations), the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform and other domestic and social changes and for participation in shaping government policy (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 309). This was defined as a 'transitional stage' in the passage to socialism. The determinant of the new system's character is the 'class composition' of new nation's leadership. If the proletariat takes power led by its vanguard party, the country becomes a socialist one, if a revolutionary democratic group, with the support of the working class takes power then it becomes non-

capitalist path of development (Clarkson, 1979: 42). At the 21st Congress of CPSU, the progressiveness of the national bourgeoisie was called into question. It was stated that the economic development of the backward countries would rapidly lead to a difference of opinion regarding the course to be followed in the future and that the problem would then be posed in terms of class (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 74). The concept of National Democracy put forward at the conference of communist and workers parties in 1960 corresponded to this phase. The national democratic state, where the unhampered exercise of the basic freedoms was supposed to permit a rapid development towards socialism, was presented as the representative of all patriotic forces in society such as the petty bourgeoisie, the minor civil servants, peasantry, working class and the progressive sections of the national bourgeoisie

National democracy is the form of the political organization of a society which has entered the non capitalist path of development. It can only be carried out in the presence of unique historical conditions and a specific constellation of the classes in society, namely in a specific era in which socialism has emerged as the main direction of the historical development of the societies, capitalism has weakened and since its regressive nature was brought into light, it was clearly understood that it could not constitute the basis of a genuine social progress and in which the movements of national liberation has spread throughout the world and gained an increasingly social essence (Hilav and Naci, 1963b: 10; translation mine).

Chesneaux states that the peculiar characteristic of the national democratic state, which also demonstrated its transitory nature, was that it did not reflect the dominance of any class in society and represented the interests of all progressive and national forces in society through establishing its control on the regressive forces in society (Chesneaux, 1965: 17). The national democratic state is entitled to undertake the realization of comprehensive and radical social and economic reforms and thus 'shorten' the process for the passage to socialism through following developmental policies of a 'non capitalist' nature. The non-capitalist path of development is to be a period of transition in order to eliminate all obstacles to the rapid development of the country and the creation of the material conditions for the construction of socialism.

Taking into account the orientations of various military regimes such as that of Nasser, Soviets adopted the view that in the conditions presently existing in

third world countries, the army has a tendency to assume the role of a 'vanguard' and feel itself invested with an 'historic' mission, both as regards the conquest of national independence and economic development. In certain cases, this leads the army to transcend certain interests, including those of the class from which it is issued and even those of the government so as to represent the nation as a whole (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 91). Therefore, the Soviet view holds that in the conditions of the Third World countries, the choice of the 'non capitalist path of development' does not depend on the social origins of the groups holding power, or the conditions in which they have taken power, but on the real political situation. In relation to this point, certain questions may be posed: what is the relationship between the nature of political power and the classes in power? Must the building of socialism necessarily be guided by socialist ideology or does the international conditions will necessarily shape any ideology towards socialism, can the building of socialism be accomplished by any group whatever, which in any case be obliged to apply socialist solutions or will development take a socialist direction only if the working class and its organizations take charge of the situation? According to d'Encausse and Schram, this approach fails to answer the question

how the USSR envisaged the establishment of variants of socialism, claiming to comprise genuinely socialist transformations and adapted to the conditions of each country, when this socialism was in fact incarnated by men or groups issued from intermediate strata of society who intend to impose an ideological monopoly which rules out communism? (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 89).

Dinler states that the non-capitalist path of development is the outcome of a certain historical context in late 1950's and 1960's, its basic assumption being that the establishment of socialism through statist measures would be possible, and which was abandoned toward the end of 1970's. According to Dinler, the main reason for this is that the practical consequences of the 'non-capitalist path' were actually the development of capitalism in these countries through state capitalism, rather than the appearance of a socialist solution (Dinler, 1990: 59).

State capitalism was defined by the Soviet theoreticians as a unique historical stage distinguished from both primitive capitalism and Western style monopoly state capitalism, which is regressive because it implies the domination of

the monopolies over the state machinery and it is based on mixed economy. State capitalism owes its existence to an anti imperialist movement and is objectively directed against the expansion of monopolies.

Another criticism concerns the description of state capitalism as a transitional stage to socialism. State capitalism, in fact remains within the capitalist system. In the developing countries, private enterprise and especially foreign investments were seen as essential in the effort to spur economic development, coming up with a solution, emphasis was placed on controlled private initiative in the service of 'social progress'. However, the impact of the private sector on the economy was negative due to its predatory character. The argument that these countries cannot develop with capitalism implies that capitalism as a pure economic system, has been discredited as a vehicle of social and economic reconstruction. Besides, the state, continued to serve the interests of the ruling bourgeoisie by playing the role of a collective industrial capitalist. Within the course of time, in the countries, which practice state capitalism, the state's relationship with the large landowner class and with the foreign monopoly in the private sector in the country strengthened. According to the Soviet thesis, the national bourgeoisie had an objective interest in accelerating economic development by expropriating foreign companies and liquidating large feudal landowners, in practice it feared the social consequences of such a decisive attack against the groups and was concerned about the further socioeconomic transformations that such radical reforms would bring. In Clarkson's words, state capitalism reflected the contradictory nature of the bourgeois ruling groups whose interests were opposed to imperialism and the large landowners and at the same time connected socially and economically with these two reactionary forces (Clarkson, 1979: 45).

State capitalist development was considered progressive because it weakens foreign capital's position and encourages the growth of national capital; the privileges of the foreign controlled corporations are limited in favor of the national enterprise. The evaluations on the progressiveness of state capitalism are also evident in Soviet analyses on India in the mid-50's. The weakness of private local capital combined with the resistance of foreign capital to India's industrialization required an acceleration of capital accumulation by the state if the many branches of heavy

industry needed for capitalist reproduction were to be established. State capitalism in India is aimed at solving the important historical task of making the semi colonial country independent by the development of its productive forces. State capitalism is anti imperialist because combined with the non-aligned policy of the state in question, the independent national development of the nation would block Western interference and undermine the external hegemony of imperialism. Internally, the development of a capitalist economy would shatter the still powerful feudal forces that have their base in the pre capitalist feudal relationships (Clarkson, 1979: 43). State capitalism is the means used by the national bourgeoisie to overcome the tension in a backward economy needing to develop its productive forces by the industrialization of its economy and the transformation of its agriculture (the interests of the national bourgeoisie precluded a Western style free market capitalism).

Küçük states that within the context of the Cold War, the formulations of the Soviet Union on the non capitalist path of development corresponds to an attempt for a 'theoretical rapprochement' with countries such as Egypt, India which pursue anti imperialist policies against the Western countries, but are not necessarily socialist (Küçük, 1988: 64): The concept of non-capitalist path of development denotes a certain affinity with socialism and the Soviet Union, being considered as the first step to socialist construction. However, as seen, it is largely discussed in economic terms by referring to the inability of capitalism in providing rates of development essential to countries, which seek rapid transformation in escaping backwardness, and social and political factors play only secondary role in Soviet formulations. Socialism in these countries is taken to mean as nothing more than providing the government with a leading role in the economy. Furthermore, these formulations of the Soviet Union are also in harmony with the aspirations of Third World countries in defining socialism in the developing world as a totally unique phenomenon in its three principal aspects: the denial of the existence of class stratification and hence the idea of class struggle and the conviction that a revolutionary perspective is impossible for the near future in these countries, second the effort to utilize socialism in the service of nationalism and the rejection of the leading role of the working class and the perception of socialism as a developmental strategy. Besides, as d'Encausse and Schram state, the criterion of progressiveness is

presented as the nature of the state's relationship with the Soviet Union and a refusal to follow the lead of the imperialist countries in foreign policy. It was the neutralism of a third world state rather than its internal tendencies that determined the Soviet attitude and hence the ideological judgment regarding this state (d'Encausse and Schram, 1966: 90).

Belge points at another factor by asserting that socialism in the Soviet Union displayed the qualities of an attempt for development. Instead of acquiring various local characteristics, socialism became 'national' and turned out into an ideology for national development (Belge, 1991: 114). Indeed, the idea of 'catching up and exceeding' the capitalist countries, revealed in the declarations of a worldwide economic and technological contest with capitalism beginning from late 50's, reveals the fact that the 'developmental' emphasis was also present in the Soviet Union to a great extent. Yurtsever also asserts that the reducing of the accomplishments of socialism in the Soviet Union to the increase in productivity levels, which was not enough to go beyond the framework of capitalist society, has 'vulgarized' the image of socialism (Yurtsever, 1992: 27).

The consideration of these approaches to development in the Third World will be useful in recognizing the international context within which the issue was elaborated. The international environment was also effective on the Turkish intellectual community and 'development' received major attention as an issue of public concern. Before evaluating the views of TİP on development, it is better to give general information on the political, social and economic transformations in Turkey taking place during 1960's and how the leftist intelligentsia responded to the changes in both domestic and international arena.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND TO POLITICAL ACTIVITY: 1960's

The military coup, which took place in May 27 1960, appeared as an attempt by the army to restructure political and social environment in Turkey and marked the beginning of a new period in Turkish politics. Although the army withdrew from political activity in a short time and restored civilian rule as early as 1961, the institutional regulations brought about with the coup played an essential role in the dramatic changes observed in political life. The new constitution addressed various groups in society as being socially and economically underprivileged and the social and economic well being of these groups through government support was put forward as a future prospect. The constitution guaranteed private property and inheritance rights; provided that these were not used in a manner detrimental to public interest, in which case these rights would be limited by law. The state was entitled to draw plans for economic, social and cultural development through democratic means; however, the state's role in economic and social field was to be proportionate to the availability of financial resources and the rate of development. In an effort to curb social imbalances, the peasantry in Turkey was described as being in need of land and land reform, though it was never enacted, was made mandatory (Karpas, 1973a: 241). Workers were also granted the right to establish trade unions; engage in collective bargaining and strike. The constitution, while safeguarding individual rights and freedoms broadened the scope of political opposition by permitting a greater freedom of expression, which was accompanied by the appearance of leftist thought on the political arena, placed under constitutional guarantees¹⁹. Although Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code prohibiting 'organizations and propaganda, which promote class struggle and communism' remained in force and were effective in the

¹⁹ Until 1961, the political parties in Turkey functioned under the provisions of the Law on Associations, which enabled the political authority to disband the parties under relatively easier conditions. The Constitution of 1961, addressed political parties as indispensable entities for a democratic political life whether in power or in opposition.

political and tactical considerations of Turkish socialists during 1960's, the context within which they operated had drastically changed. The political environment of 1960's provided fertile ground for the articulation of social and economic grievances as issues of public concern. The developing social forces in Turkey, unleashed by the coup, through their active participation in social movements, undermined the basis of the political balance established during the first three decades of the republic and maintained through the exclusion of mass elements from political activity (Karpaz, 1973b: 317).

Although the Constitution of 1961 enabled the left to take stage in Turkish political life, the establishment and development of TİP has been a consequence of the structural transformations taking place in the country. Beginning from the mid-50's, particularly in large cities, an effort at industrialization was initiated particularly in large cities. As Gevgilili states, by 1960's, the process of capitalist development has begun to put forth its rationales on a national scale, given concrete shape in the establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO), in order to foster dynamic growth through planned and state controlled activity (Gevgilili, 1989: 63). As a consequence of this planning effort, the contribution of the industrial sector to the economy increased considerably.

The rapid growth of the population caused a great expansion in metropolitan centers and the initiation of mechanized agriculture in the countryside from 1950's onward, triggered a wave of migration into cities, which also swelled the size of urban population. On the other hand, the rapid development in the manufacturing sector during 1963-67 was reflected in the spreading of middle and large scale enterprises and the fact that a portion of those who have recently migrated to cities were employed in the industrial sector, contributed to the emergence of a modern working class in 1960's. Continuous and reciprocal relationship among a large number of workers employed in the same enterprise and the improvement in the productivity of labor, increased self-awareness among the workers (Gevgilili, 1989: 90). The working class activities were also given impetus through legal provisions. The Law on Collective Bargaining and Strike was enacted I 1963. Although arrangements were made that limited the use of this right such as the prohibition of strike without the decision of the trade union, slowing down of work and general

strike; the use of strike by workers as a means of economic struggle was provided. The workers were granted the right to freely register for membership in trade unions and discrimination among workers by the employer for being registered to a union was prohibited, which consequently gave way to an increase in trade union membership. The trade union activity was mostly concentrated in İstanbul and in terms of sectoral distribution, 60% of them were active in the manufacturing industry (Özkaplan, 1994: 99). The changes in Turkish economy during 1960's have also created favorable conditions for the rise of a unionized working class movement.

In fact, the coup in 1960 has brought about a new model of capital accumulation, which was basically built on the appropriation of economic resources such as currency and credits through political mechanisms and the creation of a domestic market through the redistribution of income in order to build a social consensus (Keyder, 1990: 202). This strategy necessitated the increasing of demand for manufactured goods through an increase in working people's wages.²⁰ The increasing inflow of foreign capital and credits after the coup of 1960 stimulated a sudden growth of light industry and various industrial sectors such as minerals, tyres, tobacco, alcoholic beverages, chemical products, paper manufacture expanded through predominantly foreign capital (Barchard, 1976: 28). The economic and fiscal policies that were followed during this period resulted in the strengthening of the industrial bourgeoisie, as the state was increasingly involved in the process of capital accumulation. Boratav asserts that the policies of redistribution carried out during the period 1962-1976, have resulted in a responsiveness on part of the political authority toward the demands of worker and peasant masses, which, in turn brought about an overlapping of the long term interests of the dominant classes with the short term interests of the people (Boratav, 1988: 99).

On the other hand, the political attitude displayed by the radical current in Turkish trade unionism represented by the Revolutionary Confederation of Trade Unions (DİSK) established in 1967 and which has been organized in the mostly in the private sector of the economy, has also been influential in the achievement of an increase in the wages of workers by negotiating better terms of collective bargaining.

²⁰ Boratav also asserts that wages in this model, while retaining their character of cost factors for the individual capitalist, are factors of demand, which as a whole; drag on the process of reproduction (Boratav, 1998: 100).

During the period, the policy of income redistribution, so as to support those sectors of the economy engaged in domestic production, the securing of the right to collective bargaining and strike by the workers and a rise in the working class movement organized in trade unions coincided (Özkaplan, 1994: 56).

The transformation of the socioeconomic structure of the country and the emergence of a new balance in the political system that provided the articulation of interests, which were hitherto deprived of representation in the political arena, were also influential on the relationship of intellectuals with society. In fact, as Barchard states, the social and economic conditions in 1960's had changed considerably and in such ways which increased the scope for those who wished to look 'downwards' to the public and the masses for a political power base, rather than 'upwards' to the administration for 'co-option' (Barchard, 1976: 27). The concerns of intellectuals on the social and economic problems of the country coincided with the initiation of a widespread debate about their own roles in sociopolitical activity. The main concern of the discussions as regards the subject was the attainability-or desirability- of a consistency between intentional and active participation of the intellectual in political affairs and his/her intellectual position.

The leftist intellectuals in 1960's sought intellectual achievement through assigning the whole intellectual community social and political tasks and in so doing, tried to integrate themselves with different social groups and among them, the working class. It would not be wrong to argue that in the setting of 1960's, the active participation of intellectuals in political life was stimulated by the strong tendency for change in the social and political set up. Karpat also asserts that the self-criticism among the intellectuals was expressed under the title of 'what is a true intellectual' or 'what are the duties of an intellectual', the immediate purpose of this criticism being the conversion of the undecided intellectuals to a particular point of view and to induce them to engage in some action accordingly (Karpat, 1973a: 267).

A particularly crucial development in 1960's that closely affected the intellectual stratum was the increase in the number of student receiving higher education, which can be interpreted as an expansion of one of the major constituents of the intellectual world. The inefficient system of education in 1960's failed to meet the needs of a constantly expanding population and the number of graduates from the high

schools rose faster than the number of university places available to students, which created discontent among the youth. The increasing politicization in the country was also reflected in the universities during 1960's, which were transformed into centres of political discussion (Ahmad, 2002: 185). The context for intellectual activity on the left was the 'discussion groups', 'open forums' in universities in which the leftist inclined academics also participated and 'clubs' which arose out of the experiences in 1950's (Barchard, 1976: 32). In 1956, an 'Ideas Club' had been established in Ankara University's Political Science Faculty. After the May 27, it continued to engage in activity and its support shifted from the Republican People's Party (RPP) to TİP. 'Ideas Clubs' were subsequently established in other universities as well and these were united under a Federation of Ideas Clubs (FKF) in 1965. Although university students who were members of TİP undertook crucial roles in the federation, the FKF did not function directly under the auspices of TİP (Belge, 1985b: 2124).

In addition to this, the use of journalism and newspapers were common among the intellectuals for the dissemination of leftist ideas. As Barchard indicates, the journalistic activities of leftist intellectuals in the 1960's were expressed through the writings of various established columnists such as Çetin Altan, İlhan Selçuk and Refik Erduran who were influential in establishing leftist inclinations among the reading public. Journalism was also used in the form of issuing magazines in order to transmit the ideas of a certain group (Barchard, 1976: 32). The journal YÖN, the basic arguments of which will be elaborated below, constitutes the initial example of this in the 1960's, to be followed by other publications such as Sosyal Adalet, ANT (Oath), and various other journals which became the organs of the contending groups within TİP.

The major preoccupations of leftist intellectuals concerned the issue of rapid industrial development as a means to overcome the prolonged economic and social backwardness of the country and to foster dynamic growth. In fact, disproportionate to its organizational strength, the left exerted a considerable influence in Turkish politics during the period in question. The major cause of this influence was the overlap between this agenda of the left and the issues of primary concern in public opinion. The patterns of intellectual activity mentioned above, namely the writings of leftist intellectuals in journals and newspapers, the discussions in panels or TİP

congresses, the commonly used slogans of the period etc. constituted organic elements of the political environment in the country. Despite the limited opportunities for making itself heard, the left was able to enrich not only the vocabulary of political life, but also the subjects of discussion. The issues such as ‘industrialization’, ‘independence’, ‘relations with the United States’, ‘foreign capital’, ‘the question of petroleum’, ‘land reform’, ‘social justice’, ‘141-142’, etc. would not appear in the agenda of Turkish politics without the contributions of the left (Aydınoglu, 1992: 52). At this point, it is necessary to briefly put forward how leftist intellectuals and political groups outside TİP elaborated the problem of development, as it constituted an issue of general concern.

As stated before, the new model of capital accumulation envisaged the rational and rapid organization of resources in order to achieve rapid development. This model, as Keyder notes, was in compliance with the aspirations of the intellectuals and the constitution, which prescribed substantive policy orientations in economic planning and land reform, also reflected the preoccupations of the academics who prepared it (Keyder, 1990: 201). The newly established SPO became the center of dispute between the statist intellectuals and bureaucrats advocating development under central planning and executive authority above parliament entrusted to SPO and the government. By the early 60’s, bureaucrats and intellectuals were staunch supporters of a ‘developmental’ ideology. Their aspirations were declared in clearly ‘anti-populist’ terms and stressed the role that a ‘technocratic elite’ would play in the industrialization of the country. According to this line of thinking, political power should be taken over from the self-seeking politicians and submitted to nationalist planners. Industrialization, economic independence and social justice would constitute the three main pillars of the new order to be established. The advocates of this view introduced a specific understanding of statism, which derived its premises from the 1930’s. In other words, statism in fact meant developmentalism and nationalism, which would preclude the sway of capitalism in the country. According to the statist-left leaning intelligentsia, these aspirations could not be met within the normal workings of parliamentary democracy, since at least from 1950 onwards, democracy operated as a tool in the hands of ‘demagogues’ (Keyder, 1990: 202). Karpat also notes that

The intelligentsia in turn, adopted statism and a hybrid form of socialism as its own ideology, supposedly on behalf of underprivileged social groups (...) the statist-socialist intelligentsia, mainly composed of teachers, journalists and academicians eventually came to condemn the political parties and parliament as being tools of privileged groups and therefore hostile to the establishment of a true democracy. It described the peasant and the worker as being exploited by landlords and business groups because of ignorance. A true democracy, the intelligentsia claimed, could be established only by ending exploitation and illiteracy under its own enlightened guidance (Karpaz, 1973a: 266).

This group, which was gathered around the journal *Yön* under the editorship of Doğan Avcıoğlu, called for an intellectual debate to produce a ‘philosophy of development’ for Turkey. The issue was brought to the attention of leftist public opinion by a declaration published in 1961 and signed by a considerable number of intellectuals, which also initiated the debate on the problem of ‘underdevelopment’ in Turkish left. The declaration stressed the need for rapid industrialization and addressed planned state intervention in economy as the most effective means of achieving this development through Kemalist aspirations as the ‘way of furthering and enhancing the revolutions of Atatürk’ (Küçük, 1987: 668). Statist planning was defined as the means of eliminating social injustice and bringing about true democracy, which were also the goals of Atatürk.²¹ As I have stated above, the response of statist and left leaning intellectuals to the issue of economic development was expressed in terms of an attempt to build on the statist measures of 1930’s. Nevertheless, the international developments that were taking place during the 60’s, also affected the perceptions of Turkish intellectuals and the approach to the problem of ‘underdevelopment’ was placed in a global perspective. While, the Third World countries, the economic and political orientations of which were evaluated in the previous chapter, constituted a major frame of reference for leftist intellectuals, comparisons were also made with the European countries as regards levels of economic development, with the conclusion that it was not possible for the country to close the gap that existed between it and the western countries.

²¹ Despite the highly nationalist flavor of *Yön*’s ideas on socialism, the journal, during the first years of its existence, functioned as a platform on which different tendencies in Turkish left formulated their views and played a crucial role in disseminating socialist ideas. Karpaz notes the circulation of *YÖN* as 30,000 copies, an indicator of its influence on thousands of intellectuals, teachers, army officers and university students (Karpaz, 1973b: 356).

According to Doğan Avcıoğlu, the attainment of political and economic independence constituted the precondition to development. Since imperialism attains the consent of the conservative dominant classes through foreign aid and capital, the country is converted into a path of dependent development. Therefore, in order to follow an independent path of development, these relations of dependency and the dominant classes, which are protected and strengthened by these very relations, have to be eliminated. In the analyses of Avcıoğlu, capitalism in underdeveloped countries appears as an imported item and not as a consequence of the development of internal dynamics. Economic development under the dominance of imperialism has prevented the emergence of a dynamic capitalist class eager to undertake investment in industry. The supremacy of foreign capital in national economy has led the capitalist class to compromise with the feudal or semi-feudal landlords instead of dissolving them. In this way, a ‘coalition of regressive forces’ is formed. This coalition is not productive, but consumptive; it works not for the interests of the nation, but of foreigners (Sertel, 1978: 61). What needs to be done is a ‘national democratic revolution’ based on the cooperation of ‘national’ classes in order to eradicate these ‘agents of imperialism’ in the country.

As Yerasimos states, the statism of Yön is more comprehensive than the Kadro, which also favored statist policies and it aims at complete supervision of the economic life of the country. Contrary to the suppositions of Kadro, Yön also accepts the presence of social classes in Turkey of 1960’s. However, according to YÖN, the working class is too weak to assume an active role in the social and political struggle to be waged in the country. In Yön’s understanding, socialism, which draws upon the experiences of Third World countries, such as ‘Arab socialism’ and ‘Islam socialism’ is elaborated as the means of achieving rapid development through a ‘third way’ (Yerasimos, 1976: 1667). The third way of development is elaborated by Yön as a ‘national-revolutionary path’, which excluded both communism and capitalism, in that this strategy did not stipulate the hegemony of the proletariat and it was directed against a coalition of conservative classes, in which the nationalist intelligentsia plays the main role (Lipovsky, 1992: 92). Yön’s understanding of socialism is not concerned with who possesses the ownership of the means of production, and it rests on the redistribution of economic surplus in accordance with the principle of social justice. In

Yön's socialism, the state would provide efficiency and social justice; the concept of 'profit' would be replaced by 'social utility', wastages in economy would be prevented through central planning and therefore, 'exploitation' would be ended (Yerasimos, 1976: 1669). The question of 'rapid economic development' is placed at the center of Yön's analysis, which is also shared by the other two prominent political movements of the period, TİP and the National Democratic Revolutionaries (MDD).

In the analyses of Mihri Belli, who can be considered as the only representative of MDD until 1968, Turkey is considered as a backward agricultural country, which is exploited by the imperialist countries in the world economic system. The low per capita income in Turkey places the country into the same rank with those countries of the Third World such as Togo and Senegal (Sertel, 1978: 74). The 'national democratic revolution', which will be accomplished by the 'national forces', would eliminate the relations of dependency with advanced capitalist countries and full independence would be achieved. Both Yön and MDD, in elaborating anti-imperialist tasks for the leftist movement in the country, situated the major contradiction between imperialist and underdeveloped countries. The relationship of dependency is also shared by TİP in its analyses on the socioeconomic structure of the country; yet as will be seen, the major difference in TİP's analyses is the level of capitalist development in Turkey, in contrast to the views of Yön and MDD, which underestimate the internal dynamics of capitalism in the country. Before elaborating the views of TİP, general information about the party from its establishment to its closure in 1971, its organizational structure and relationship with the working class will be given.

3.1 A Turning Point in Turkish Left: TİP

TİP was originally founded on February 13, 1961 by twelve trade unionists who were then members of the Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions (Türk-İş), the only worker's organization in Turkey, which was established in 1952. TİP leaders, in later years would stress this character of the party as an indicator of the full emergence of a working class aware of its own interests and demanding for change rather than

being contempt with reforms imposed from above.²² The founding declaration of the party stated that TİP was established ‘in order to protect the rights of the oppressed working class and the acquisition of social security and proper means of living by Turkish people’ (Aren, 1993: 35). The first program of the party did not carry a socialist character and a clear political stand is not provided on social and economic issues. The party showed little progress and activity until 1962. Although the founders were enthusiastic in gaining support from Türk-İş, the idea of lending support to TİP did not enjoy widespread acceptance within the confederation. The establishment of TİP was even met with criticism and opposition as an effort to challenge the ‘non partisan’ politics of Türk-İş, which entailed remaining above and outside political activity, though its practical consequences were highly debatable.

In 1962, on the request of the founders, Mehmet Ali Aybar assumed the chairmanship of the party. In reality, political considerations played marginal role on this request, rather the fact that Aybar was an influential and respected figure among intellectual circles and a lawyer acquainted with the legal system in Turkey was of primary importance to the founders (Ünsal, 2002: 93).²³ Aybar’s chairmanship and the gathering of intellectuals among party ranks was decisive on the stable path of development the party has taken and its increasing appeal among different elements of society. The fact that TİP was established as a ‘coalition’ of diverse leftist groups and varying political considerations was reflected in the organization of the party which was shared by three main bodies as ‘trade unionists’, Easterners (Doğulular)’ and ‘intellectuals’. The presence of a considerable number of intellectuals among party ranks and the feedback provided to TİP from different segments of Turkish left, initiated the transformation of TİP from an outcome of ‘trade unionists’ reaction to political parties which have turned away from the workers’ cause’ into an organization with socialist orientations. In fact, TİP enjoyed considerable support from intellectual circles as the only leftist organization that appeared on the political scene in 1960’s.

²² Aren maintains a contrary view, asserting that placing too much emphasis on this fact may lead to false impressions about the level of political consciousness in the Turkish working class and that the political affiliations of the founder trade unionists, who were ‘lukewarm to socialism and hostile to communism’ carried highly ‘anti-intellectuals’ tones (Aren, 1993: 35). Yet, the issue has a unique aspect as far as its consequences are concerned, in that the attempt by the trade unionists to establish a political party has directly and to a great extent affected the socialist movement in Turkey.

²³ Before Aybar, offers for the chairmanship of the party was taken to several other candidates-ranging from progressive minded and social democratic intellectuals to conservatives- who were sympathetic to the working class movement regardless of their political views (Belge, 1985b: 2120).

Yet, the reasons for this support given to the party were highly dispersed, as TİP, during the first years of its existence, functioned as a political platform on which different centers of social opposition in Turkey, ranging from Marxist to socialist democratic and progressive intellectuals operated and perceived the party as the concrete form of their social aspirations (Belge, 1985a: 1955). As Ünsal states, during this period, when TİP exerted more influence on Turkish left, this coalition and common platform of activity for leftist intellectuals was preserved. However, in the following years, the heterogeneous structure of the ‘intellectual’ group caused various splits in the structure of the party (Ünsal, 2002: 4).

TİP defined itself as ‘the political organization of the Turkish working class and of the toiling classes and groups (farm hands, small farmers, salary and wage earners, artisans, low income professionals, the Atatürkist youth and social minded intellectuals) gathered around the working class and following its democratic leadership for the attainment of power through legal means. Its democratic leadership did not place the working class in a superior and privileged position with respect to other toiling classes, but designated it as the social force, which has the deepest interest in transforming the existing society through the active participation of the toiling masses in socialist struggle initiated from below.

In accordance with the views of the party that socialism should be constructed through the active participation of the toiling classes and intellectuals, Article 53 of the party regulation stated that in all organs of the party, 50% representation of people of worker origin or of those who occupy managerial posts in trade unions would be observed (TİP, 1964). The intellectuals in TİP, who occupied posts in the leading organs of the party, were staunch supporters of Article 53, considering the regulation as in compliance with the social realities of Turkey. The underlying reason for such regulation is presented by TİP leaders with reference to the need to establish strong links between the masses and intellectuals (Aybar, 1968: 426-432). Boran asserts that the enforcement of Article 53 prevented the domination of party organs by the ‘educated strata’ that could be inclined to display arrogant behavior and to exclude mass elements-who in turn might feel embarrassed against intellectuals-from party administration. As far as its aims were concerned, Article 53 aimed at establishing collaboration between socialist intellectuals and workers within the party

organization, in that member of worker origin would 'learn the socialist ideology from the intellectuals and socialist intellectuals in turn, would benefit from the practical experiences of the toiling masses' (Boran, 1976: 4).²⁴

The enforcement of Article 53 appeared as the initial source of disagreement among the intellectuals in TİP. The first opposition to the enforcement of this article took place after the First Congress of the party in 1964. The holding of congress elections on two separate lists as 'workers' and 'intellectuals' aroused a reaction among various intellectuals. Twenty-two members claimed that the party regulation was violated and requested a renewal of congress elections. Their appeal was not taken into consideration and various members either resigned or were expelled from the party. According to Boran, the dispute had its origins in the different stand taken by intellectuals within the party on the issue of the leadership of the working class. The initial disagreements among the intellectuals had begun during the preparation of a draft party program by the Science and Research Bureau established in 1964. Some intellectuals in the bureau argued that Turkey was an underdeveloped country at the initial phases of industrialization; the working class was too weak to assume leadership role and revolutionary leadership had to be carried out by the middle classes (Mumcu, 1993: 55-57).

Indeed, a number of intellectuals such as İsmet Sungurbey, Fethi Naci and Doğan Özgüden interpreted the issue with reference to the broad category of toiling masses designated by the party as power bases and stated that the enforcement of the article in such way privileged the working class which constituted only a small portion of the toiling masses of people, over the peasantry, wage earners, socialist and progressive intellectuals.²⁵ The attitude of TİP leaders on the question can be interpreted as a manifestation of their emphasis on the leadership role of the working class. Yet, this emphasis was, as will be seen, in contradiction with the analyses of TİP on the socio economic conditions of Turkey.

²⁴ Boran's remarks in this sense bear resemblance to Gramsci's emphasis on the inseparability of the intellectual and popular elements in revolutionary politics. For Gramsci, in order to achieve true knowledge about the masses, the intellectuals should try to understand them. The relationship between the intellectuals and masses is an educational one, based on mutual dialogue, with the popular element providing 'feeling' and the intellectual element providing 'knowledge and understanding'.

²⁵ Of these intellectuals, İsmet Sungurbey later joined the YÖN group, arguing that the leadership of the working class was a highly debatable subject in the Turkish case, see Yetkin, 1970: 141.

After the elections of 1965, in which TİP had participated and won fifteen seats in parliament as a result of the national remainder system, this coalition of intellectuals broke down into the rivalry of contending groups, within and outside the party. The advocates of MDD under the leadership of Mihri Belli whose views are briefly articulated above were expelled from the party after the Second General Congress of TİP convened in 1966 and this group continued to direct its criticisms to TİP through the journal *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left). The YÖN group also criticized TİP because of its emphasis on the working class and its intentions of coming to power through parliamentary means. Besides, the university students, which constituted a considerable amount of the members of TİP, began to split from the party, criticizing the policy of TİP as ‘pacifist’ and ‘parliamentarist’ and were increasingly attracted to the ideas of MDD group, which favored armed struggle as a form of revolutionary activity (Ünsal, 2002: 9). In 1968, the FKF, established under the initiative of TİP, converted its name into Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth) and the youth; under the influence of MDD view has initiated its own independent and ‘radical’ organizations. The Socialist Youth Organization (SGÖ) established by TİP could exert only limited influence on the university youth. The MDD advocates gathered round the journal *Aydınlık* (Illumination) on the other hand, also divided into different groups. The group, which rejected the dominance of feudal relations in the socioeconomic structure of Turkey, began publishing the journal PDA (Proletarian Revolutionary Illumination); yet, it increasingly adopted the thesis of feudalism, which was previously rejected by the group and implemented Maoist strategies (Belge, 1985a: 1958).

The controversy and harsh criticisms among these groups and the turmoil observed within the organization was reflected in the decline in the votes cast for TİP in the elections of 1969. Due to the change in the electoral law in 1968 to the detriment of small parties and the abolition of the national remainder system, TİP won only two seats in parliament in the elections of 1969. The disagreement among the ‘intellectual’ group came to surface once more among the leaders of TİP, on the formulations of Aybar under the label of ‘socialism with a cheerful face’ following the Soviet intervention to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and resulted in the ousting of Aybar from party chairmanship, to be replaced by Behice Boran who belonged to the Emek Group. Emek comprised various TİP leaders and scholars mostly from Ankara, who claimed

to embark on a theoretical attempt to analyze social and economic developments in Turkey through a Marxist point of view.²⁶ Nevertheless, by 1970, the influence exerted by the party on the Turkish left as the center of gravity of the leftist movement had considerably waned and its ties with the toiling masses in Turkey designated by the party as ‘the source of all production and the essential force for social development’ (TİP, 1964) further weakened.

This point is also clearly reflected in the party’s relationship with DİSK, which was established by trade unions resenting the ‘non-partisan’ policy of Türk-İş as being ‘at the service of the bosses and American monopolies’ and criticized the American aid funds received by the confederation. Türk-İş was accused by the founders of DİSK of acting contrary to the interests of the workers. DİSK claimed to have set out to challenge the Türk-İş line, which was described as ‘in defense of capitalism, friendly to foreign capital, uninterested in the economic and political liberation movement, high salaried and a bureaucratic trade unionism’ (İleri, 1987: 10). The aims of the confederation were put forward as determining the main line that the Turkish working class movement will follow and to provide the unity and solidarity of the movement. It was stated by DİSK that Turkey should be fully independent and adopt a rapid economic policy of development for the working class to develop and rise in economic, social and cultural spheres. DİSK did not openly declare any political engagements; yet, stated that ‘trade unionism in Turkey should struggle for a social order that will end the exploitation of labor’.

The activities and organization of DİSK has contributed to the development of class interests in workers. The three largest trade unions within the body of the confederation, Lastik-İş, Maden-İş and Kimya-İş were organized in almost all of the private enterprises. As Keyder stresses, these industrial enterprises were in relatively monopolistic positions as the leading samples of the model of import substitution. The monopolist position of these sectors enabled the employers to compensate the increase in wages with an increase in prices (Keyder, 1993: 142). Therefore, the confederation

²⁶ The group also published a journal with the same name. Adil Özkol, Mehmet Selik, Yalçın Küçük, Kurthan Fişek, Cem Eroğul, Kenan Somer, Taner Timur, Nuri Yıldırım, Kutlay Ebiri and Sadun Aren can be mentioned as some of the contributors to the journal published between 1969 and 1971 (Ünsal, 2002: 14).

was able to achieve high increases in wages and better conditions in collective bargaining for workers.

The founders of DİSK were also TİP members, but the solidarity between DİSK and TİP was limited. Aren states that, DİSK leaders, even if they were party members, were not enthusiastic in the penetration of leftist ideas into the confederation (Aren, 1993: 136). The limited level of cooperation between TİP and DİSK is also evident in the number of workers registered to both organizations. In 1967, TİP had approximately 15,000 members, while 65,000 workers were registered to DİSK (Ünsal, 2002: 361).

TİP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971 and the verdict was justified on the ground that the decisions adopted on the Fourth Congress of the party convened in 1970 declared the presence of ‘Kurdish people’ in the eastern part of Turkey.

The establishment and development of TİP has deeply affected the intellectual movement in Turkey. The movement, which originally sprang from different branches, has achieved certain unification as TİP began to receive more attention in public opinion and the party has become a symbol for the socialist movement in Turkey in terms of the system of thought it represents and the political activity it is practically engaged in (Boran, 1968: 69; translation mine).

Boran makes this evaluation in 1968, at a time when the disputes among party ranks as regards theory and political strategy had been crystallized and when TİP had lost much of the ‘intellectual energy’ that had been flowing to the party during the first years of its existence. 1968 also stands as the threshold to the intensifying debates in Turkish left relating to the ‘method’ and the ‘strategy’ to be employed in advancing socialism. In addition to this, the proliferation of various organizations of rising student activism and journals within the left, each attempting at a peculiar political stand, reveals that TİP had ceased to be the focal point, which the socialist movement in Turkey gathered around.

Yet, Boran’s remarks highlight another crucial dimension of the issue. TİP, despite its fragilities, provided the hitherto most developed floor of interaction between intellectuals and the working class. Up to that time, the leftist movement in Turkey confined the debates among intellectual circles and failed to attract the majority of the working class population in the country. Due to the tight control exerted over the left

and the coercive policies of the political authority, which resulted in the fleeing to exile or the imprisonment of many of the figures of Turkish left, the influence of leftist views on the sociopolitical arena was very limited. The leftist intellectuals in Turkey considered as ideological opponents by the regime were met with uncompromising repression during the decades that followed the establishment of the republic. The lonely course of opposition taken by the leftist intellectuals was reinforced by the anti-communist response in society encouraged by the regime and the alarmed attitude of the state against influences among workers outside its direct control. Thus, the situation arose that the working class and large masses of people not only remained alien to the debates among the intellectuals, but also viewed with confusion and fear the activities of leftists who claimed to represent their interests and spoke on their behalf. TİP, by creating an appeal in society, contributed to the spreading of socialist views among the masses in Turkey.

It can also be argued that TİP used the parliament as an effective means for social opposition. It opened to public debate and scrutiny in the National Assembly, the bilateral treaties and the American bases on Turkish territory, which were considered a 'taboo' in the foreign policy inclinations of the successive governments. It waged a campaign for the nationalization of petroleum and other minerals for public benefit, opposed to the eviction of squatter house settlers and prepared and submitted bills of its own such as the land holding reform act, a land tenancy act, a petroleum act, an unemployment insurance act, and various bills demanding the abolition of the Law on the Promotion of Foreign Capital, the right to lock out by the employer and the limitations to the right to strike (Landau, 1979: 145).

TİP has functioned as a 'school' for the cadres of legal political movements after 1971. Political parties such as TSİP (Worker's Socialist Party of Turkey), SDP (Socialist Revolution Party), the second TİP and TİKP (Worker and Peasant Party of Turkey) were all established by political figures that were formerly members of TİP. On the other hand, the establishment and development of TİP has also driven the other political parties to take a clear stand on social and economic issues. The slogan of 'left of center' put forward by CHP during the second half of 1960's which stressed the necessity of economic and social reforms and took up the theme of political

independence was also used as a 'safety valve' against the tendency of the masses towards socialism (Ünsal, 2002: 214).

CHAPTER 4

TİP'S UNDERSTANDING OF DEVELOPMENT

After having analyzed briefly how the question of 'underdevelopment/development' has been treated among the leftist intellectuals within the context of 1960's, we can now elaborate TİP's understanding of development and see how it relates to the approaches to development in the Third World. In order to do this, first of all, TİP's views on the socioeconomic structure of Turkey will be given. As stated in the previous chapter, the aspirations for economic and social development in the newly independent countries of the Third World were closely associated with nationalism. In these countries, the use of an anti imperialist rhetoric, which aimed to unite different classes in the war of independence, goes hand in hand with economic nationalism and the adoption of a unique form of socialism. TİP's understanding of development also cannot be thought separately from its understanding of socialism, which is presented by TİP leaders as the 'means of achieving rapid development'. In the case of TİP, an economic and social problem-underdevelopment- is tied to a political solution –socialism- and the basic characteristics of the socialism endorsed by TİP will be presented. Finally, TİP's strategy of development, which is designated as 'non capitalist path', will be analyzed with reference to the concepts 'statism' and 'populism (halkçılık), which are defined by TİP as being compatible with 'Atatürkism'.

4.1 Reflections on the Socioeconomic Structure of Turkey

A general description and a detailed analysis of Turkey's economic, social and political situation are provided in the program of the party adopted in the first party congress convened in İzmir in 1964. The program, which is prepared through the contribution of a considerable number of leftist intellectuals, reflects the influence of Marxism. It is stated in the program that the presence of different classes constituting the social totality, which are distinguished from one another as regards

the ownership of the means of production forms the basis of the analysis (TİP, 1964: 18). In addition, the statements regarding historical development are dialectical

The Worker's Party of Turkey departs from the fact that there exist objective laws in society independent of human will. The presence of objective laws, however, does not preclude voluntary human activity in social affairs (TİP, 1964: 67; translation mine).

In line with Marxism, it is stated in the program that the working class is the defender and representative of the interests of the people with its historical mission and the sociopolitical activity it is practically engaged in. Therefore, the interests of the working class appear as the true national interests in the broadest sense

At this stage, the essence of class consciousness becomes enriched to the extent that it acquires the quality of a genuine national consciousness, the consciousness of humanity (TİP, 1964: 54; translation mine).²⁷

In terms of the socioeconomic structure of the country, TİP describes Turkey as an underdeveloped capitalist country, which is economically dependent on advanced countries

Underdeveloped countries are those whose system and techniques of production lag behind those of the advanced countries. They are dependent on agriculture and primary products and their level of national income is low. Even though, differences may prevail between them, they display a common, evident quality as such. In Turkey, this quality manifests itself in the form of an underdeveloped (particularly mercantile) capitalism operating on the basis of an agricultural economy which contains the remnants of feudalism (TİP, 1964: 68; translation mine).

Despite this depiction of the Turkish economy as 'predominantly agricultural and backward', with inadequate technological means of production, it was also stated that capitalism as a mode of production has universal tendencies

(...) In all countries where the private ownership of the means of production exists, the concentration and centralization of capital exhibit the same characteristics, regardless of the peculiarities the emergence and

²⁷ Cem Eroğul, a scholar from the Emek group, stressed that the program was in harmony with the principles of 'scientific socialism'. Eroğul based his arguments on four points, that TİP saw social development as an outcome of the antagonism between the forces and relations of production, introduced a class analysis based on the ownership of the means of production, emphasized class struggle and the leadership role of the working class (Eroğul, 1969: 9).

development of capitalism may exert in these areas (...) in underdeveloped countries where capitalist institutions have not been established thoroughly, is it possible to say that the basic laws of the system are valid in these countries? (...) The socioeconomic structure in these countries, namely an underdeveloped mercantile capitalism containing remnants of feudalism constitutes in fact a part of the capitalist system. Since the underdeveloped countries are placed under the domination of advanced countries through different means and methods, they are also subject to the laws of motion of a developed capitalist economy (Kiral, 1965: 18-19; translation mine).

According to TİP, the difference between the underdeveloped and advanced capitalist countries was not a matter of degree. The former countries are underdeveloped due to the exploitation of advanced capitalist countries, which also determines the nature of development of the economy, as imbalanced and distorted (Boran, 1968: 114)

The relationship of exploitation and contradictions and antagonisms that stem from it intensely exist between the advanced industrial societies and underdeveloped countries. To use a metaphor, the advanced countries are entirely capitalists and underdeveloped countries are entirely laborers. Even though the social structures of these countries are internally differentiated and class divisions have occurred and though the dominant classes of these countries collaborate with Western imperialists in exploiting their own laboring classes, a crucial amount of the value these dominant classes (the comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlords) obtain from the exploitation of local labor power is snatched by foreigners (Boran, 1968: 127; translation mine).

According to Aybar, the Ottoman Empire had failed to industrialize and maintain its political and economic independence due to the penetration of foreign capital into the country. The Ottoman state had adopted a path of development through private entrepreneurship and foreign aid and the conditions that Turkey finds itself in today have their roots in the increasing influence of European capitalism in the country during this period. The integration of the empire with the capitalist world economy has destroyed the arts and crafts in the country and transformed the country into a semi colony (Aybar, 1965: 15). Despite the success of the national liberation war, the following of a capitalist path of development has created economic and fiscal dependency. The slow and distorted growth of the national economy is characteristic of the dependent countries underdeveloped by the capitalist system.

Dairy products and mine ores, agricultural goods are sold at the world market at a cheaper price than they deserve. International capital, in order to obtain excess profits, imposes heavy debts upon underdeveloped countries, prevents the construction of heavy industry and manipulates investments in accordance with its own interests. Hence great deficits appear in the balance of foreign payments of countries underdeveloped by capitalism. The balance of foreign payments is the primary indicator of exploitation (Aybar, 1988a: 306).

This structure of dependency is further perpetuated by the presence of various forces within the country, which act as the 'supporting accomplices' of imperialism. According to TİP, the strong motivations of the dominant classes, in favor of preserving the currently existing economic structure and sociopolitical relations, stand as an obstacle to the development of the forces of production in Turkey (TİP: 1964: 59). At this point, it is necessary to evaluate its interpretation on the development and nature of the different classes in Turkish society, which will be useful in drawing out the basic features of the course of development for Turkey, set down by the party.

In its analysis of classes, TİP program distinguished between the dominant classes, middle classes, the working class and the landless peasantry, which constitute the social structure of Turkey. The dominant classes which share the ownership of the means production are designated by TİP as 'big landlords, merchants and financial capitalists (TİP, 1964: 28). They enjoy a supremacy over the classes and layers that constitute the people and determine the patterns of economic and social life in accordance with their own interests (TİP, 1964: 35). This system in agriculture does not exhibit the characteristics of a subsistence economy, since the landlords are producing for national and international markets. Through the emergence of capitalist relations in agriculture, the big landlords were provided with the opportunity to establish firm relations with foreign markets, foreign capital owners and interest groups, thereby accumulating more wealth and power in their hands (TİP, 1964: 33).

The merchants, engaged in import/export businesses and having close ties and unity of interest with the big landlords, constitute another conservative class, which in collaboration with the owners of foreign capital, strive to avert the efforts

for the development of a national industry. Financial capitalists are presented by TİP as those segments of the dominant class, which through establishing banks or participating as shareholders in already existing banks, have placed the areas of credits and insurance under their control and can be found amongst all other constituents of the dominant classes (TİP, 1964: 36).

The 'industrialists' on the other hand, are designated by TİP as a 'dynamic social strata by nature'. After, the attempts at industrialization through state enterprises during the period 1932-1939, developments were observed in the private industrial sector of the economy. However, this industrialization in terms of its nature and speed, lacks the quality to provide the conditions for the full industrialization of the country and hence the achievement of national independence.

According to TİP, the most developed sectors in Turkish economy are those that are involved in the production of consumption materials. On the other hand, the efforts at industrialization in the country in assembling sectors beginning from 1950's, do not constitute a genuine development, but stand as the means through which the penetration of foreign capital into the country is realized. Those sectors of the economy, which could be called as truly nationalist, namely, the sectors of heavy industry are not established in Turkey. Due to this reason, the 'industrial capitalists' in Turkey act as the 'mere agents' of foreign capital. They tend to collaborate with big landlords and merchants against the pressure of foreign capital and stiffening of the struggles in demand for social justice. The industrialists are also attributed positive role in the future prospects of TİP. The expansion of the European Common Market to abolish protective tariffs, which will clearly reveal foreign pressure, is considered as a possible source for the emergence of a discontent among the industrialist strata for the demolishing effects of foreign capital (TİP, 1964: 36).

In TİP's view, the industrialists exert peripheral influence in national economy in contrast to other elements of the dominant classes, the big landlords, merchants and finance capital. As will be elaborated in the next section, TİP leaders challenged the presence of a 'national' bourgeoisie in the country. According to Aybar, a class of industrialists who resist American imperialism and do not collaborate with foreign capital does not exist. The industrialists are involved in

foreign trade businesses and they cannot conduct a consistent struggle for national independence and revolution (Aybar, 1968: 652). Yet, this approach does not negate the 'notion' of 'national' bourgeoisie. In her article on the prospects of coalition among the progressive forces in society, Boran states that in countries, which are under direct colonial rule, the local bourgeoisie participates in the struggle for national liberation and even assumes leadership role in these countries. Also in Latin American countries whose economies are dominated by foreign trusts and cartels, the local bourgeoisie, through its participation in the anti-imperialist resistance movements acquires the title 'national'. Boran also points out that the conditions in Turkey are different from both these cases

We have completed our war of independence against foreign invasion forty years ago. After a long period of statist policies, based on our own resources, due to our reservations against foreign capital and the effort to avoid capitulations, the foreign capital, through its collaboration with the local capital and the state, has staged a comeback. What we see today is that the local industrialists aspire to collaborate with foreign capital rather than oppose it (...) the national democratic front will struggle to achieve the cooperation of the local bourgeoisie in the recognition of worker's rights, in meeting the financial requirements of development and the tasks of the plan. Only under such conditions and to the extent that the local industrial bourgeoisie complies with these imperatives, it will acquire the title 'national'. However, under these conditions, it is also debatable that it actually will (Boran, 1963: 10; translation mine).

TİP also introduces an analysis of the 'middle classes', which is grouped into three different strata. The first group is defined as comprising small merchants, artisans and clerks. These strata occupy a large and dominant place in Turkish economy as a consequence of the underdeveloped position of the country. They are subject to pressure by the expanding class of capital owners in trade and industry and experience hard conditions due to the increasing cost of living (TİP, 1964: 40). Therefore, they appear to be enthusiastic about the achievement of social and economic development, but the realization of social justice for these strata, which do not possess any independent power on their own, is possible only through their collaboration with the working class and labor masses and gathering around the same political organization. The civil servants, wage earners and the self employed together with middle landowners form the other constituents of the middle classes. That portion of civil servants and wage earners who are low paid and experience a

decline in their social status are considered by TİP as falling into the category of toiling masses. The growing unrest and tendencies in favor of social transformation in these groups prepares the ground for the strengthening of the struggle for social justice (TİP, 1964: 42).

Finally, the progressive intellectuals and students are also considered within this group. Particular emphasis was placed by TİP on the role of the progressive and socialist intellectuals in progressive social activity. Since ‘the petty bourgeois intellectuals are inclined towards individualism and a leaning towards bourgeois ideology’ (Aybar, 1968: 487), they can play a crucial role in this activity so long as they engage in ‘genuine’ relations with the masses and commit themselves to the working class

Great responsibility is conferred upon the intellectuals in the building of socialism. They have at their possession the knowledge of the theory of socialism without which the development of the socialist movement is impossible (...) however; socialism is the ideology of the working class and all laboring masses. Therefore, the intellectuals should cooperate with the masses and work within the political organization of the masses (Aybar, 1968: 501).

As mentioned previously, the relative atmosphere of freedom brought about with the legal regulations after the coup and subsequent revival of intellectual debate and scrutiny, offered a favorable outlet for the articulation and dissemination of leftist ideas. Yet, the channeling of intellectual dissent into the quest for radically changing the existing political and economic order and the emergence of socialism as an alternative form of social order were also stimulated by the appearance of social movements. The social and economic structure was made an issue of major concern and subject of analysis, accompanied by an effort to draw political configurations that would enable the acquisition of power by the left. Nesin identifies four major issues of debate among socialist intellectuals at the beginning of 1960’s: whether the bourgeoisie and the workers exist as social classes in Turkey, whether a socialist order should be imposed from top or initiated from the grassroots, whether the Turkish working class can play the leading role in socialist movement and the should the toiling masses unite with the ‘national bourgeoisie in order to accelerate the pace of socialist transformation (Nesin, 1963).

As a party to this debate, TİP advocated the idea that the spreading of working class activities and trade union movements are the indicators of the presence of a developing and strengthening working class in Turkey. These factors and the establishment of TİP by members of the working class are considered by the party as the reflection of the fact that the workers in Turkey have reached the stage of political consciousness (TİP, 1964: 50). As the first political organization established from below, the presence of the party demonstrated that the working class has begun to transform itself into a 'class for itself'. Nevertheless, the working class was also subject to various forces inherent in its own structure that hindered its development. The employment of a considerable number of workers in small-scale enterprises, dispersed from each other and the fact that the majority of the workers retain their rural ties created conservative and contradictory forces among the workers. On the other hand, the main current in Turkish trade unionism subservient to the dominant classes, engage in efforts that try to detain the workers from realizing their just demands (Boran, 1969: 149-150). It was particularly emphasized by TİP that despite these negative factors, the working class, among other toiling masses appears as the agent of progressive change.²⁸ The working class attains these characteristics not only in terms of its social structure, but also with respect to the ethical and political values it possesses and its social views in general (TİP, 1964: 54, Aybar, 1968: 248-253). Boran took up the theme in 1963, stating that:

While the stirrings among the wide masses of people are crucial for progressive political activity, the party, together with the educative and directive collaboration of progressive and socialist intellectuals is entitled to strengthen progressive activity becoming visible among the working class (Boran, 1963a: 10; translation mine).

In 1962, Aybar defended the same view

After May 27 1960, the working class has practically assumed leadership role. Through engaging in mass demonstrations, strike activities and protest, it currently provides the progressive conditions for political action (interview with Aybar, *Vatan*, September 24, 1962, quoted by Yetkin, 137; translation mine).

²⁸ Aybar explains the leadership role of the working class as a 'democratic' one, which did not rest on the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but on a process which entailed the efforts of the working classes to 'convince' the toiling classes of people that its activities aimed at attaining the good for all (Mumcu, 1993: 41)

The peasantry on the other hand, constitutes the most numerous strata among the toiling masses and occupies a crucial place in the social development of Turkey. It is stated in the program that without the support of the peasants, economic development and reform is impossible. Since TİP attempted to assume power through elections, the peasantry was attributed primary place in the activities of the party. Boran wrote in 1968 that

Despite the fact that an increase in the number of the working class and a relative decline in that of the peasantry is observed, the majority of the population still resides in the countryside. The numerical superiority of the peasantry is, other things being equal, a crucial factor that shapes the considerations of a political movement. On the other hand, the poor peasant masses are on the verge of a political awakening (...) without obtaining the vote of the peasantry; TİP will not be able to achieve power. In this sense, the road to the acquisition of power by the socialists passes through the village (Boran, 1968: 152; translation mine).²⁹

The views of TİP presented in the program as such, require further evaluation. Its analyses on classes have a close connection with its approach to the issue of underdevelopment, which is identified as the ‘primary problem in Turkey which requires urgent solution’. Therefore, it is necessary to look at Boran’s and Aybar’s analyses on the structure of Turkey and their identification of the ‘main contradiction’ in Turkish society.

Boran, introduces her analyses on Turkey in her book, *Turkey and the Problems of Socialism* (1968), under the section, The Vertical Structure: Social Classes. According to Boran

The remnants of feudalism in agriculture are particularly present in the East and Southeast regions of the country. In other regions, they are almost wholly obliterated; especially in the West and South regions properties on land have been transformed into large units operating as capitalist enterprises (...) while the capitalist sector principally shows the characteristics of a mercantile capitalism and the strata engaged in foreign trade enjoys a considerable influence in the economy, capitalist industry has been developing in the country since 1960’s with increasing activity

²⁹ Prior to the elections of 1969, this emphasis on the role of peasantry in vote getting was carried to its extreme by Aybar and the peasantry was recognized as the sole driving source of the political activity of TİP: Our most disdained citizens are the poor peasantry (...) The urban workers have their trade unions and insurance and they have the right to strike. But, the millions of landless peasant families have nothing to rely on. The state does not protect them either. My poor peasant brothers, citizens, attend to your rights and the constitution. Give an end to this usurping system (Aybar, Keşan Köylerinde, 1969, quoted in İlke II, 1974: 71).

of the private sector in the machine and mechanical industry. This being so, the production activities in the private sector are not arranged according to rational means of administration and consist of small, scattered units employing small numbers of workers (Boran, 1968: 142; translation mine).

As a consequence of these general features of Turkish economy, the social classes and the relationships between these classes show certain characteristics, which are different than those of the industrialized western societies.

Boran enumerates these characteristics as such:

1. The greatest difference stems from the fact that Turkey has a dependent economy exploited by the capitalist-imperialist societies. The presence of foreign exploitation and the struggle against it plays -for today and the future- the role of a crucial factor uniting the laboring classes in their struggle. Even the small industrialist class faces this pressure, yet because it is being protected through high customs, is not aware of it and does not stand up against foreign exploitation and foreign capital.
2. The local bourgeoisie fails to boost the domestic market, to accomplish industrialization and development. It yields to collaboration with foreign capital and achieve higher profits. For this sole reason, the industrial bourgeoisie turns into a comprador, a mere agent of foreign capital.
3. Foreign and domestic systems of exploitation appear as intertwined (...) the major problem Turkey encounters today is the abolition of foreign exploitation, economic dependency and political-military dependency that follows. However, this abolition depends on the change in the economic order inside and in the class nature of the political authority.
4. The maintenance of foreign exploitation and dependency through the local dominant classes and the placement of all laboring classes under this exploitation, **results in Turkey today in the emergence of the true class polarization, the profound distinction, the major contradiction as not between capital and labor, meaning not between the capitalist class and the working class, but as between all dominant classes and all laboring classes** (Boran, 1968: 142-143; emphasis in original; translation mine).

Due to the backward and dependent condition of the country, with respect to their western counterparts, the classes in Turkish society are relatively weak and not differentiated from each other. Among the laboring classes the workers, the poor and landless peasantry, artisans and clerks are closer to each other than they are in western societies in terms of their income and life standards, the evident distinction being between the dominant and the laboring classes. Due to these reasons, the socialist movement is not concerned with integrating the laboring classes as allies

and supporters of the working class. It develops as the compound movement of all exploited laboring classes in Turkey (Boran, 1968: 144).

Aybar shared Boran's view that classes show some characteristics in Turkey different from the western societies; however, his analysis also incorporated views on the nature of the bureaucracy as a dominant class. According to Aybar; the bureaucracy or the administrative group in charge of the state apparatus in Turkey, exhibit the characteristics of a 'social class', which is inherited from its position in the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to the historical experience of Western societies' the dominant position of the civilian and military groups in the Ottoman Empire stems from its ability to retain a hold on the surplus value through its de facto ownership of the means of production, further enhanced by its control and regulating role in the production process and authority in political decisions. The bureaucracy, therefore, appears as a 'sui generis' dominant class almost integrated into the state apparatus (Aybar, 1968: 645-647 and 1988a: 144-188). This relationship is further enforced by the fact that the bureaucracy is the inheritor of a coercive state tradition, which strives to perpetuate the old forms of repressive governing. The bureaucracy, which identifies itself with the state, 'carries a self-entitled historical mission of preserving the state and ruling the people with coercive methods. This group of notables³⁰, views the masses with disdain and due to its historical structure and philosophical tradition, is the primary source of resistance conveyed against the application of democracy (Mumcu, 1990: 190-191). As a consequence of his views on the nature of bureaucracy, Aybar sees an antagonism in Ottoman society between the bureaucratic class exerting political and economic power and the masses of people.

The system of 'comprador capitalism' on the other hand did not change this situation and the differences between the exploited classes were still not clear-cut. The distorted development observed in the country has increasingly divided the society into two classes as the exploiters and the exploited. The dependency of the country on American imperialism has only accelerated this tendency and Turkish society has approached the Ottoman model of society (Aybar, 1968: 645-657).

³⁰ Aybar uses the term 'group of notables (bey takımı) interchangeably with bureaucracy in order to stress the continuity in the social position of the bureaucracy between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic.

Aybar then goes on to formulate a number of contradictions in Turkish society

A variety of contradictions assert themselves in Turkish society today: between workers and capitalists, retailers and middlemen, small producers and usurers, tenants and property owners, landlords and compradors and bureaucrats with both, peasants and urban people, the west and the deprived regions of the east, Alevis and Sunnis, intellectuals and uneducated people and such. However, the contradiction between the American imperialism and its local accomplices and all laboring classes and strata, namely the contradiction between a handful of collaborators, their patrons and the entire nation has overshadowed all other contradictions (Aybar, 1968: 657; translation mine).

According to Aybar, the major contradiction in Turkey is different than that in the west, which appears as between industrial workers and the bourgeoisie. In Turkey, the major contradiction is between all the laboring classes and strata and American imperialism and a ternary coalition of accomplices consisting of compradors, landlords and bureaucracy with pro American inclinations (Aybar, 1968: 658).³¹

It can be stated that the basic assumptions of dependency theory, namely the advanced center/backward periphery couple, unequal exchange and 'comprador' bourgeoisie appear in the analyses of Boran and Aybar, in which underdevelopment is elaborated as a consequence of the development of capitalism in the country. Although the integration of the country with the capitalist world economy accelerates the dissolution of pre capitalist structures and therefore prepares certain preconditions for rapid development, the relationship is constructed in such way that appropriates the surplus obtained from the underdeveloped country, hampers the possibilities for development and in general distorts the process of development in accordance with the needs of the advanced countries. The characteristics of capitalist

³¹ However, it should also be stated that Aybar's views on the position of the bureaucracy in Turkey was not shared by other leading post members of the party. Boran, for instance, while also referring to the bureaucracy as a strata appropriating power in its hands through the development of a state capitalism in Turkey, openly challenged the views of Aybar by asserting that the group of administrators cannot be considered a dominant class solely on the grounds of its share in the surplus value (Boran, 1969b). Beginning from 1950's, the bureaucracy has been engaged in a struggle for power with the landlords and the bourgeoisie and this struggle has stiffened in the 1960's. According to Boran, the bureaucracy does not constitute a homogeneous conglomerate of people, but has a highly contradictory and incoherent nature in Turkey and the lower sections of this strata today are drawn toward political activity in favor of national independence and social justice (Boran, 1969a: 6).

development are determined in terms of the relationship with advanced countries. Development is always limited and conditioned with the relations of dependency with advanced countries. This relationship also conditions the formation of classes (creates a 'comprador' bourgeoisie, and an undifferentiated class structure). The depiction of the bourgeoisie as 'comprador', as a weak social class ["In Turkey today, the classes of big landlords exert more power and influence in Turkey than the industrial and financial capital do. Due to this influence, land reform and fair taxation of agricultural revenues cannot be realized despite the provisions of the constitution" (Boran, 1968: 144)] acting as the mere agents of foreign capital also implies that the system is unable to exist and reproduce itself as an autonomous entity. On the other hand, Aybar's analysis (on the penetration of capitalism into the Ottoman Empire) introduces a moral critique of capitalism in explaining underdevelopment, which makes it impossible to understand the development of capitalism in Turkey.

The analyses of TİP on the social structure of Turkey can be argued to be sharing the same problematic with the dependency school. TİP also favors the solution of 'delinking' from the capitalist system -and socialism- for the attainment of development. Yet, the class analysis made by TİP does not in fact reveal-despite its emphasis on the leadership of the working class-the social forces which could carry out the transition from capitalism to socialism. The 'agents' of this transformation were, taking into consideration the 'major contradiction' of Turkey depicted as such by Aybar and Boran, the wide masses of laboring people, including the artisans and 'small industrialists'. Therefore, the developmental strategy of TİP, the economic and social aspects of which will be elaborated below, can be placed into 'national-developmental' strategies of 1960's, which is imbued with elements of Kemalism.

Keyder evaluates that the leftist movements in 1970's also shared the same problematic. According to Keyder, the developmental and nationalist elements of Kemalism were expressed in the anti imperialist orientations of Turkish left, which through the depiction of Turkish bourgeoisie as 'comprador' justified their nationalism. Such an interpretation held that the country was under the domination of an oligarchic-comprador alliance, which perpetuated its existence through the aid it received from the imperialist center. Therefore, what had to be done was a

detachment from the imperialist center, which would bring about the collapse of the domestic system of dominance. This way, the left placed its priorities on statist/national development through its underdevelopment analysis. Despite the laying off claims on Marxist sources by the theoreticians of the left, the continuity of the relationship between the left and Kemalism were evident (Keyder, 1990: 168).

4.2 Turkish Socialism/Socialism Peculiar to Turkey

The concept of ‘Turkish socialism’ or ‘socialism peculiar to Turkey’, which constitutes the basis of TİP’s formulations on the path of development for Turkey, is found in the writings of Aybar and in the speeches delivered by him on various occasions. At a speech delivered at a district congress in 1966, Aybar stated that

The exact application of the prescriptions in books for the construction of socialism is not enough (...) each society possesses intrinsic qualities of its own which are inherited from its history. Most of the time, these qualities have overwhelming influence on the development of the society than the general conditions. Since each society has unique historical qualities of its own, the construction of socialism requires the separate assessment of each of these conditions. This is a task, which leaves no place for imitation and dogmatism. We, as members of the Worker’s Party of Turkey, shall write the BOOK of Turkish socialism from A to Z ourselves (Aybar, 1968: 479, emphasis in original; translation mine).

Aybar also defines the qualities of this Turkish socialism as such

We define Turkish Socialism as that system of theory and practice which arises out of the theoretical elaboration of the historical conditions peculiar to Turkey and out of the application of socialism in harmony with these conditions (...) the socialism of TİP, Turkish socialism, is not an imported item. It does not resemble the Eastern or Western forms of socialism, since Turkey is neither East nor West. Turkey has unique conditions of its own (...) Well, Turkey is such society. There is probably no society akin to it. The struggle for socialism is being conducted in the conditions of this society. The conditions peculiar to Turkey exhibit a different scene on the level of contradictions in society (...) the struggle for socialism is peculiar to Turkey and so is the socialism to be established under the guidance of the general features of the socialist mode of production (Aybar’s speech to Ant, 14 February 1967: 9; translation mine).

However, it would be wrong to make a clear-cut distinction on this issue, since –at least until 1968- the leading post members of TİP such as Behice Boran in their analyses have also adopted the concept. In her book, published in 1968, Boran writes that

Today, TİP represents both the movement for the organization of laboring classes as a political power and the framework of socialism peculiar to Turkey-its theory and ideology (Boran, 1968: 58).

The socialist movement in Turkey, which is represented by TİP with its two dimensions- as an ideology and a political movement, has been engaged in a twofold struggle; on the one hand against the dominant classes and their political authority, their parties, and ideology, and against the old habits in the Turkish socialist movement so as to draw the course of socialism peculiar to Turkey and to place the socialist movement in Turkey in a hundred percent independent position, aloof from foreign influence, in harmony with the structure of Turkish society, its contradictions and historical development (Boran, 1968: 70; translation mine).

Although Sadun Aren does not use the concept in his writings³², the endorsement of the basic characteristics of ‘Turkish Socialism’, which will be identified below, is also evident in Aren. Before, analyzing the concept of Turkish Socialism, as TİP understands it, it is necessary to give a brief review of the differences between the employment of the terms between Aybar, Boran and Aren. According to Boran, her understanding of socialism and that of Aybar’s differed with regard to their basic understanding of the term

Aybar has always stressed ‘socialism peculiar to the conditions of Turkey’, so have I. I would defend the same today. I would say the socialism to be established in Turkey should not be imitated from other countries. But in time, he began to use the term ‘socialism peculiar to Turkey’, as a totally unique phenomenon. He used the Latin expression for this in the council meetings: *sui generis*. When he said this, I reacted (Boran, 1969, quoted in Yetkin, 1970: 36; translation mine).

³² Actually, he even seems to be rejecting the attempts to search for a ‘new’ form of socialism in an article written in 1962: “A new theory development for Turkey and one that is peculiar to Turkey is the suggestion to find a new theory of socialism for Turkey. To talk of a separate form of socialism for Turkish people means to argue that the Turkish society has certain values and is subject to laws of development which are totally different from other societies, this is an argument which is obviously, wrong (...) whatever the differences, the methods of solution must serve the same purpose and must be convenient to the same model” (Aren, 1962a: 13; translation mine).

Another issue of controversy arises out of Aybar's employment of the terms 'humanitarian', 'free', 'with a smiling face' to denote his understanding of socialism particularly after the Soviet intervention to Czechoslovakia in 1968. Aybar's formulations were criticized by Boran and Aren as an 'aberration from Marxism' which was clearly revealed in the dispute on the Third Congress convened in 1968. Aybar's claims on the uniqueness of Turkish socialism did indeed possess certain points of divergence from the 'Turkish Socialism' advocated by Boran and Aren

Being scorned, disdained and not being treated respectfully is a problem that occupies the first place. Yes, it is because of some obsessions, but it occupies the first place. We are obliged to take this into consideration and come up with a solution to this problem. We are endowed with the task of demonstrating to our long-suffering people the human face of socialism, the freedom intrinsic to it (Aybar, 1988c, 202; translation mine).

The views of Aybar were put to criticism by both Boran and Aren on the grounds that freedom is intrinsic to socialism and the formulations 'free, humanitarian, socialism, democratic' are scientifically wrong and unnecessary since from its establishment to day, TİP had always stated its intentions to build socialism democratically. It is evident that there are points of divergence between Aybar, Aren and Boran as regards the issue, but in my opinion, these divergences do not preclude the identification of certain characteristics in TİP's understanding of socialism. Although, in their usage of the terms, the former can be generally associated with Aybar's formulations and the latter with those of Boran's, 'Turkish Socialism' and 'Socialism Peculiar to Turkey' will be used interchangeably. The identification of these characteristics will be useful in understanding the extent to which the 'international' approaches to the issue of development in 1960's, affected TİP's understanding of socialism and how TİP reconciled it with Kemalism, which appears as a framework for national development.

The first characteristic of the 'Socialism Peculiar to Turkey' can be identified as its emphasis on the non-revolutionary (parliamentary) transition to socialism. Aren wrote in 1963

In the minds of many people, socialism is associated with bloody revolutions and totalitarian governments. People who think that way are not completely wrong. In fact, socialism in many countries has assumed

power through revolution and carried out with totalitarian methods. Those people who think that it will also proceed that way in Turkey, quite rightly, place reservations against socialism. Bearing this in mind, the issue at stake here is the need to state that the establishment of socialism will be realized differently. Our country today does not face a totalitarian and merciless form of government. Democratic means of thinking and administration are being more and more firmly rooted everyday. This situation obviously prevents the possibility a class dictatorship, namely the use of state power for the benefit of a class or strata (...) Socialism in our country should not be considered as a means of class struggle or manifestation of the reaction against injustice and oppression. Socialist cause appears in our country as a natural outcome of the social conditions in Turkey and the international situation and as the only means of development and Westernization (Aren, 1963a: 9; translation mine).

In relation to the idea of non-revolutionary transition to socialism, TİP placed particular emphasis on 1961 Constitution and the attainment of power through parliamentary means. On various occasions, TİP leaders took up the liberal character of the constitution and its provisions concerning social justice such as the necessity of a social state which would carry out agrarian reform and various social transformations, as a main point of reference in their activities. It was stated by Aybar that the constitution anticipated a socialist order

Our constitution is open to socialism, but it is closed to any form of dictatorial regime. It demands as necessary the acquisition of power by socialism through means of general elections. It is not possible in Turkey to build socialism without participating in the elections and getting the support of the masses. Our constitution does not prohibit democratic socialism; rather it makes a call for the urgent realization of it (Aybar, 1968: 395; translation mine).

In the view of TİP, the constitution of 1961 had a 'revolutionary' character and being a revolutionary in Turkey meant that the constitution had to be defended. For Aybar, the constitution represented 'revolutionism' and 'the quest to catch up with the civilized nations through radical transformations to abolish a regressive, exploitative economic system'. The constitution did not reject economic and political struggle among the classes, but drew a limit to it according to law. On the other hand, it also recognized the 'right to resistance' of people against governments, which deviated from the provisions of the constitution and lost their legitimacy (Boran, 1968: 206).

Since the rightist government of Justice Party (AP) in Turkey, was in complete violation of the constitution through its foreign policies which further hampered Turkey's independence and national sovereignty and its rejection to carry out the social and economic reforms envisaged by the constitution, the conditions existed for the laboring classes in Turkey to use their 'right to resistance' against the government (Boran, 1968: 257). For TİP, the idea of assuming power is not 'reformism', since there are no prescribed means of attaining power. In the 'official' declarations of TİP, the parliament –which was an indispensable part of democracy– was defined as a 'means' to accomplishing democracy and not an 'end in itself'. The accomplishment of power by TİP would enable the party to enact the laws to the benefit of the laboring masses without difficulty, so as to 'materialize the rights and freedoms of the toiling masses of people recognized by the constitution and the laws, (TİP, 1969: 66).

In Lipovsky's words, TİP's intentions of building socialism through non revolutionary methods and of assuming and leaving power through elections meant confusing two different questions: the way of attaining power and the nature of power. According to Lipovsky, TİP's approach differed from Marxism in its rejection of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' as a necessary phase in the construction of socialism (Lipovsky, 1992: 44). Aybar, Boran and Aren on the other hand, stressed the different conditions of Turkey. The construction of socialism in Turkey need not be revolutionary since the distinguishing feature of communism is the use of force and coercion in taking power, which TİP rejected completely and the Constitution was 'open to socialism whose aim is not communism' (Boran, 1986: 201).

According to TİP, the establishment of socialism through democratic means is also possible since the dominant circles, due to the contradiction among themselves, the need to sustain the national being and the pressure of national and international public opinion, are faced with the necessity to engage in certain reforms, though reluctantly. These reforms will make easier the awakening and organizing of the masses, which during the multi party period, have already become aware that the parties of dominant circles they have been casting their votes for, did not represent their interests (Aren, 1963b: 3). Rejecting the presence of 'objectively

revolutionary' conditions in Turkey, TİP asserted that the possibility of a parliamentary transition to socialism should not be discarded (Boran, 1968: 214). This approach was criticized by Murat Belge as a 'positivistic' and 'enlightened' determinism, which underestimated the role and functioning mechanisms of ideology in society (Belge, 1985b: 2123). Indeed, TİP based its activities on the assumption that 'putting the issue on the basis of classes' was sufficient for the party to achieve political power. Underlying this was the assumption that legal and political pressure in the country in the previous periods had obstructed the discussion of social problems on a class perspective. If the working class and the masses were endowed with such perspective, they would grab the essence of their problems and organize around the party. Yurtsever also states that TİP's views on the democratic transition to socialism were influenced by the Soviet formulations of peaceful transition (Yurtsever, 1992: 175).

The second characteristic of 'Turkish Socialism' is its anti imperialist and anti capitalist nature. TİP elaborated the anti capitalist and anti imperialist nature of its understanding of socialism as 'the unity of the struggle for independence and socialism' (Boran, 1968: 261). According to TİP, the 'bourgeois-democratic' stage has been already completed in Turkey. The democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie had been realized through the proclamation of the republic after the national liberation, the abolition of the caliphate and the sultanate and various reforms introduced by Kemalist authority. This stage had been advanced by 27 May Movement which brought about the 'classical' democratic rights and the right to establish trade unions and strike and collective bargaining were recognized. Boran criticized the arguments of the proponents of national democratic revolution (MDD) by stressing that the demands for 'complete' democracy or freedom within the context of a 'national' or 'democratic' revolution is illusory. This is due to the fact that after the completion of the struggle for independence which is conducted as a national movement, the bourgeoisie or intellectuals of petty bourgeois origin acting on behalf of the bourgeoisie assume power and depart from the highest ideological position it embodies throughout the national struggle, its general and universal aspirations which also represent the rights and interests of the laboring masses contract and the bourgeoisie retreats back to its 'class ideology' (Boran, 1968: 39):

It is argued by some people that a complete democracy and freedom in Turkey does not exist. They say that Turkey is not fully independent, so first national democratic revolution and then socialism should be the task of a revolutionary movement. These people holding such views should answer this question: What has been done in the past half century? What is it, if not the period of national democratic revolution? They say it is not complete. In which country is the bourgeois democratic revolution 'complete' in terms of providing democratic rights and freedoms to laboring masses? We say that bourgeois democratic revolutions in the West took place in the nineteenth century. Yet, did the revolutions in those countries provide the laboring classes with complete freedom, equality, and democratic rights? Is there not a tendency in the western countries towards the restriction of democratic rights and freedoms due to the difficulties they encounter in their internal affairs? (Boran, 1968: 255; translation mine)

TİP's emphasis on the anti imperialist and anti capitalist nature of the revolutionary struggle in Turkey also stemmed from its challenge of the assumptions of the proponents of MDD on the existence of a 'hundred percent national' bourgeoisie in the country. However, as stated before, the rejection of its presence does not negate the notion of 'national' bourgeoisie for TİP leaders. In fact, what TİP opposes is the existence of it in Turkey due to the special conditions of the country. The heating of the debate on the character of the revolutionary struggle in Turkey (whether national democratic or socialist) during the second half of the 1960's is also closely related with the 'anti imperialist national front' policy mentioned previously adopted by the Soviet Union as regards the Third World states, which was also endorsed by 'orthodox' communist parties such as TKP. According to Aydın, this strategy also represented an attempt by the Soviet Union to encounter the growing influence of Maoism in the world socialist movement particularly after the Vietnam War. Diverging from the classical leftist parties, Maoism situated the major contradiction as not between capitalism and socialism, but between imperialism and the national liberation movements. Due to this reason, the axis of the revolutionary powers as defined by Maoism was not the international alliance of the working class, but the alliance of national classes on the road to national independence (Aydın, 2001: 468). In this sense, through the coming together of various left oriented – mostly student- associations, the 'Anti Imperialist National Front of Turkey' was established in 1966 and a protocol establishing the aims of the front was published in

the journal. In the protocol it was stated that Grand National Assembly of Turkey was a national assembly which was the first in the world to open an anti imperialist national war of liberation, that (quoting from Atatürk) the “imperialism which wants to destroy us” and “capitalism which wants to swallow us” threatens the national independence of Turkey once again, that the essence and doctrine of Turkish patriotism is anti capitalist and anti imperialist national libertinism and that the struggle to be conducted would be both against American imperialism and its ‘accomplices’ inside the country (Aydın, 2001: 469). TİP was critical of this attempt

To say that the struggle for national liberation should be conducted together with the struggle for socialism does not mean that the struggle for national independence will be conducted solely by socialists. The struggle for national liberation will be conducted through the establishment of a *national front* by all forces against imperialism (...) the struggle for national liberation will be carried through the democratic leadership of a socialist party. To ignore the class character of the National Front and to avoid attributing it a socialist character is a big mistake (Aybar, 1966: quoted in Aydın, 2001: 470; emphasis in original; translation mine).

Although it seems contradictory, the understanding of an ‘anti imperialist national front’ mentioned above does not contradict TİP’s formulations on the joint struggle for independence and socialism in the way TİP perceives it. It is now necessary to turn to another characteristic of ‘Turkish Socialism’, the notion of ‘national independence’ of TİP, which can be placed on three pillars: Kemalism, a quest to escape backwardness and socialism. In TİP’s understanding, elements of the first pillar (nationalism and modernization) are reconciled with the third pillar, which, with the influence of the unique international conditions, turns out into an expression of the aspiration for national development. The strategy of development advocated by TİP will be elaborated in detail in the next section, but due to its close relation to the issue of nationalism, some main points should be stressed here.

As I have stated in the previous section, in accordance with the dependency problematic, TİP perceived Turkey to be an underdeveloped country economically dependent on the advanced countries of the west. The development of the country through capitalism is not possible due to the power and pressure of imperialism, which continuously blocked the efforts at industrialization in underdeveloped countries. When the insufficient accumulation of capital, the

backward level of technology and know-how and foreign trade rates that develop to the detriment of underdeveloped countries are taken into consideration, it is clearly seen that industrialization within the boundaries of capitalist world system is not possible. Although development could nevertheless be achieved under capitalism, it was always 'distorted' and did not amount to a genuine industrialization effort. Under these conditions, it was only through the eradication of the factors that impeded the development of national industry-of which imperialism and its 'accomplices' inside the country constituted the chief ones-, that underdevelopment would cease to be a 'fate' for underdeveloped countries.

According to TİP, the liberation of the country could be realized through economic development, yet this was a twofold process, which also involved political struggle to change the 'class nature' of the regime. In this context, socialism appeared as a means of the 'cause of development'. Development could only be realized through a 'non capitalist path of development', which as will be elaborated, was used by TİP interchangeably with socialism. The strategy of development, political struggle, and economic policies to be followed were bound to be nationalist, which would thus make possible the achievement of national independence. Therefore, the concept of 'national independence' appears as an integrating principle and constitutes the main element of foreign and economic policies and the nature of TİP's political struggle.³³ Indeed, the concept of 'Second War of Liberation', which appears in the TİP program as an anti imperialist and nationalist dictum, carries both economic and political aspects. On the other hand, the principles of 'a hundred percent national, independent, peaceful and egalitarian policy in foreign affairs' (TİP, 1964: 164) can be argued to be reflecting the aspirations of Third World nationalism. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, in third world countries, the quest to escape backwardness and the political and economic domination of 'advanced' countries was couched in terms of a nationalist and developmental paradigm coated with elements of socialism. Indeed, in an article that appeared in the journal *Sosyal Adalet* in 1963, Aybar defines TİP's understanding of nationalism. In this article,

³³ It should be stated that particularly in the case of Aybar, the emphasis on the necessity of anti imperialism and national independence arguments are not peculiar to 1960's, but constitute an outcome of his views from 1940's onwards. Aybar's notion of national independence is heavily imbued with anti-sovietic elements and implies a reaction against Soviet socialism, which he labels as 'totalitarian' (Özman, 1998).

Aybar identifies 'Turkish nationalism' with the 'non-irredentist' version of nationalism as 'Ataturkist nationalism' resolving it with the characteristics of Third World nationalism

Turkish nationalism is the ideological expression of the reaction of our people against foreign yoke, against imperialism and capitalism. It is resolutely attached to the idea of independence (...) Turkish nationalism undertakes the task of extolling our nation in science, technology, culture, economy and in all areas of social life as a dignified member of the community of the nations of the world (...) It is essential that we distinguish between Turkish nationalism and the concept of nationalism as it is practiced in the west. Turkish nationalism is not a racist, chauvinist, irredentist and regressive ideology, which despises other nations. (...) Nationalism in the west is a belligerent tool in the hands of imperialism, which destroys other nations. In our Turkey, Ataturkist nationalism, apart from serving the protection of the being of Turkish nation and its finding of the path of survival, has shed light on the awakening and liberation of all oppressed nations of the world (Aybar, 1963: 9; translation mine).

This point is also evident in the construction of the relationship between nationalism and socialism

The claim that socialism is not nationalist, is a claim put forward in the nineteenth century by capitalists and imperialists, wishing to avoid the awakening of the nations and which has shown up to be totally wrong (Aybar, 1968: 563).

To say 'workers of the world unite' is wrong. Workers do have a motherland country; we say this in gratitude. And we will build such socialism, socialism with a motherland (Aybar's speech at the Beşiktaş District Congress in 1968, quoted in İlke II, 1974: 53; translation mine).

Ünsal states that TİP's understanding of nationalism comprises the nationalist legacy of Kemalism and the form of nationalism observed in the national liberation movements in Third World, which have been transformed into a anti imperialist discourse (Ünsal, 2002: 121). These statements of Aybar are clearly oriented toward 'Third World nationalism', which takes a specific historical community of people, the 'national' as basis, contrary to the standing of socialism which takes the 'whole humanity' as basis (Aydın, 2001: 457). However, TİP's understanding of nationalism also differed from the 'anti western' attitude of Third

World nationalism through its endorsement of ‘Ataturkist nationalism’. At this point, it can be argued that Kemalism presents a ‘philosophy’ and ‘practice’ for the achievement of modernization (Westernization) within the boundaries of an independent nation state, which derives its main impetus from nationalism (Oran, 1999: 281). Çulhaoğlu states that in the broadest sense, Kemalism can be defined as an ideology of national liberation, which through a comparative perspective, can be placed within the same category as the national liberation movements that appeared in the second half of the century such as Gandhism, and to an extent, Nkrumahism and Nasirism (Çulhaoğlu, 1991: 158). Yet, although they share the same problematic, Kemalism should be distinguished from them with respect to two factors. First of all, in terms of its historical background, Kemalism is prior to these aforementioned ideologies and second; it also exhibits certain historical qualities, which go beyond an ideology of national liberation. In contrast to Gandhism or Nasirism, which can be interpreted as a claim for equal international conduct on behalf of the ‘oppressed/exploited nations’ of the Third World, Kemalism adopts itself a *historical* mission for ‘reaching the level of Western civilization’. This understanding is not peculiar to Kemalism, but has its roots in the intellectual tradition, which the Kemalists derived from the Ottoman Empire. In fact, ‘Progress’, ‘development’, ‘catching up with the West’, all these constitute the basic axis of the political project of Turkish intellectuals beginning from the nineteenth century onwards. The slogans of Westernization, progress or reaching the level of contemporary civilization employed by Young Turks and Kemalists, all constitute different versions of the same perspective in different historical periods” (Aydinoğlu, 1992: 59).

Oran also shares the idea that Kemalism as a nationalist ideology is a forerunner of the nationalist movements in underdeveloped Asian and African countries in attempting to achieve ‘national independence’ first and then embarking on an effort to Westernize/modernize the country through ‘jacobinist’ and ‘anti pluralist’ methods (Oran, 1999: 40). Independence was a necessary condition for reaching the level of contemporary civilization, since the interests of the imperialist powers precluded the independent development of the country and the so called contradiction between the concepts ‘independence’ and ‘Westernization’ was resolved through the interpretation that reaching the level of contemporary

civilization could only be possible through independence from the West (Oran, 1999: 281).

TİP's endorsement of Atatürkist nationalism and its declarations that Atatürkism is a principle source of motivation for the party's actions³⁴, appears to be in contradiction of the analyses of TİP leaders which stressed that the establishment of the republic and the reforms introduced by the Kemalist authority amounted to 'bourgeois revolutionism', which the party intended to transcend. This contradiction is resolved through the notion of a 'historical rupture' in the analyses of Boran and Aybar, which isolates the period between 1923-1938, namely the period until the death of Atatürk from the course that the bourgeois revolution in Turkey took afterwards and particularly in the case of Aybar the suggestion of a model for the 'system of state and government of the war of national liberation'. Barchard also points at the same dimension of the issue

Ataturkism was one thing; its 'revolutionist' (*devrimci*) component another. Despite attempts to employ Ataturkist and national symbols after 1938 and particularly 1946, as a kind of neo traditionalism, which implicitly located the need for drastic change (*devrim*) chiefly in the past, the political socialization of the young continued to stress the revolutionary implications of Ataturkism (...) This meant in practice that, a nationalist, radical anti-traditionalism, containing a strong element of consummatory protest at the principles by which the government was now conducted, was carried directly over from the one-party period (Barchard, 1976: 25; emphasis in original).

This view is reflected in the writings of Boran and Aybar. In *Türkiye ve Sosyalizmin Sorunları*, Boran states that

Until the death of Atatürk, the administrative cadres, in their struggle against imperialism-and hence capitalism- and the traditional social structure inherited from the Ottoman Empire, had ascended to the highest ideological phase they could reach and formulated the principles of revolutionism, populism, and then secularism and statism. Had these principles been analyzed to their genuine meaning and transferred into a systematic whole, an ideological framework leading to socialism would have risen (Boran, 1968: 29; translation mine).

³⁴ "Worker's Party of Turkey is a hundred percent national party of doctrine, which sets Ataturkism free from rigid dogmatism on the sole ground that it departs from Ataturkism and derives its inspiration from the realities of the contemporary world" (Aybar, 1962; quoted in İlke II, 1976: 45; translation mine) and the adoption of the Kemalist discourse of 'reaching the level of contemporary civilization' or as Boran puts it "socialist development in accordance with the principles of Atatürk" (Boran, 1962a: 9) can be quoted as some of the examples.

A reinterpretation of the principles of Atatürk in accordance with the realities of social life and structure, naturally gives way to a socialist system. Socialism appears as the requisite and logical outcome of the principles of Atatürk (Boran, 1962b: 3; translation mine).

According to Aybar, on the other hand, ‘a people’s government based on the principle of labor, fighting for full independence’ constitutes the political, economic and social doctrine of Turkey during the war of national liberation. According to Aybar, ‘being the people’s state’ and ‘complete independence’ forms the basis of the principles of Atatürk, from which its all other principles and ‘revolutions’ are drawn. This analysis leads Aybar to consider Kemalism as a ‘leftist ideology’, which appeared within the conditions of the national liberation movement (Aybar, 1988a: 138). The attachment of an anti imperialist notion to Atatürkist nationalism is also evident in the TİP program, in which the party defined itself as nationalist detaching itself from the ‘chauvinist’ and ‘intolerant’ interpretations of nationalism. True nationalist attitude for TİP lay in the conveying of resistance against subservience to foreign powers, be it political or economic and preventing the exploitation on domestic and international plane of the Turkish nation (TİP, 1964).³⁵ This notion of ‘historical rupture’ is also evident in the argument that imperialism has been ‘invited’ to the country before 1950 by the republican government (Günçe, 1965: 17) and as will be elaborated below, in the statement that the ‘gains of the war of national liberation have been lost because of the adoption of capitalist path of development’ (Aybar, 1968: 494). At this point, it is necessary to consider the actual strategy of development devised by TİP, which is directly influenced from the Soviet formulations and imbued with elements of Kemalism.

4.2.1 Developmental Strategy of TİP: Non-Capitalist Path

As seen, for TİP, the causes of Turkey’s underdevelopment lay in its dependency on the advanced capitalist countries of the west. Although political and economic independence had been achieved through the war of national liberation,

³⁵ ‘True nationalism’ for Yaşar Kemal for instance, consisted of preventing a minority from exploiting a majority (Cumhuriyet, 21 August, 1960, quoted in Karpat, 1973b: 339).

this independence could not be of long duration, for Turkey, has failed to develop rapidly and reach the level of advanced civilization (Boran, 1968: 254). The main reason behind this was the adoption of capitalism as the strategy of development after the establishment of the republic, which has resulted in the restoration of ties with imperialist countries (Aybar, 1968: 505). According to TİP, beginning from 1923, all methods of capitalist development ranging from state capitalism to private entrepreneurship were ‘plainly and evidently’ attempted by the regime; which turned out to be unsuccessful, for, it is not possible to overcome economic and social backwardness in the country through pursuing a capitalist development path (Aren, 1964: 4). In his article published in *Sosyal Adalet*, Tarık Ziya Ekinci enumerated the reasons why

1. The international capitalist system shows resistance against the attempts at independence and industrialization within the boundaries of capitalism in the underdeveloped countries.
2. The process of capital accumulation and the development of the advanced countries of the west through private initiative had been realized in past centuries through the over exploitation of labor under conditions of misery and destitute for the masses. The improvement in the rights of labor in Turkey and the emergence of a strong trade union movement makes the conditions harder for such exploitation.
3. Expansionism and the exploitation of backward countries have also constituted a major source of capital accumulation for the west. This alternative is not available for underdeveloped countries either.
4. During the process of development in the west, the only available path for development was capitalism. Today, it is known that a non-capitalist path of development exists.
5. The dominant classes in Turkey constitute regressive forces, which stand in front of the economic development of the country, of social justice and independence from imperialism (Ekinci, 1963: 8; translation mine).

Boran reinforces these arguments by stressing that the level of economic growth in Turkey (anticipated about 7% in the Five Year Economic Plan, but not attainable in reality) is far slower than the growth observed in developed countries. Under such conditions, it would take a couple of centuries for Turkey to catch up with the advanced societies, which is also not endurable under conditions of increasing inequalities in the distribution of income and the hastening of social contradictions (Boran, 1958: 237-238). According to Boran, insufficient amount of

capital accumulation in underdeveloped countries does not stem from their low level income, but from a lack of use of national income oriented toward investments, which would provide rapid and efficient development. The main reason behind this is the tendency of the dominant classes, which receive considerable part of the national income, to avoid investment in national economy and spend a major amount of this income on private and luxurious consumption. In fact, underdevelopment was not a vicious circle for Turkey. The rapid development of the country would indeed be possible through imposing restrictions on luxurious consumption and increasing the level of investment in national economy, which would result both in the increase in capital accumulation and the standard of living of the people (Boran, 1968: 240).

Since the primary cause in Turkey is defined as ‘escaping backwardness through development, in accordance with the principles of democracy and social justice, hence acquiring the equal place we deserve among the nations of the world’ (TİP, 1964: 17), two things had to be done: first to grapple with the ‘international system of exploitation’ which has placed the country into this situation and do away with the impediments of this system and second, to arrange the development of national economy in harmony with the necessities of modern technology. The foreign capital was the primary source of surplus extraction (and transfer) from the underdeveloped countries; therefore, the rapid development of the country had to be realized on the basis of self-subsistence and the major thrust of the development effort would be grounded on the rational and efficient organization of the natural resources and the labor power of the country and all relations with the financial institutions would be cut off (Aren, 1993: 168). The strategy devised for development by TİP leaders, the non-capitalist path of development was depicted as a ‘transitional phase leading to socialism’; socio economic development was possible only through non-capitalist path which could be embarked on by changing the nature of power

There exist two basic conditions to set development on firm ground. The first one is the conduct of an independent policy in foreign affairs- be it political, economic or financial-established in accordance with national interests and the second one is the carrying out of radical transformations in order to change the economic and social structure and the adoption of a democratic statist policy favoring the people. These two conditions of development are closely knit together and affect each other continuously (Boran, 1964: 5; translation mine).

TİP's formulations on the 'non-capitalist path' as defined and accepted in the party program, - to make a time distinction- correspond to the 'pre 1965' phase of the party. It is observed in the writings and speeches of TİP leaders that the non-capitalist path was abandoned in favor of a political discourse emphasizing development for the 'building of socialism' in Turkey. Indeed, prior to 1965, in the TİP affiliated journal Sosyal Adalet, TİP members presented their ideas on issues such as 'economic development', 'taxation', 'industrialization', workers' rights', 'education' and a variety of welfare problems on 'mild' terms emphasizing the demolishing effects of capitalism and introducing demands for 'social justice'. As Yurtsever states, prior to the elections of 1965, the conditions of a possible coalition between the Republican People's Party and the TİP, oriented towards 'progressive measures in social justice and economic development' was debated by Aren, in the journal YÖN (Yurtsever, 1992: 181). This change in the attitude of TİP is explained by Lipovsky as the attempt by TİP to draw a distinction between their view and the ideological platform of YÖN and the 'Society for Socialist Culture', which also stood for a non- capitalist path of development. In a speech in 1965, Aybar also commented on the issue accordingly by stressing that the word 'socialism' has been used by TİP more frequently in order to 'avoid confusion' with 'some people and organizations' who wish to 'maintain capitalist relations'.

According to Lipovsky, encouraged by its success in the elections of 1965, TİP decided to change the direction of the party from the struggle for national democratic transformation on formulating problems of a socialist nature (Lipovsky, 1992: 20). However, in my opinion, analyzing TİP's strategy of development as 'non capitalist path' does not create an inconsistency. The strategy of the 'building of socialism' and 'non capitalist path' are defined as 'transitional stages', they are also expressed within the same problematic of escaping backwardness through national development and 'reaching the level of advanced civilization', through modernization. In the program of the party adopted in 1964 and which remained unchanged until 1971, it was also stated that small industrialists and artisans would be protected through the provision of credits by the state. Therefore, this strategy of development, which does not negate market forces and intends to maintain private ownership in agriculture, does not disclose the actual way of 'abolishing capitalist

relations of production and conferring upon the economy a socialist content' (Boran, 1968: 244). Rapid development is essential to protect the 'national being' of the Turkish nation and to comply with the needs of the society. Development through private sector is impossible; therefore, socialism appears as the only way of solution. Nothing changes in the analyses of TİP regarding the class composition of society and the major contradiction to be solved. In 1964, Aren observes in *Sosyal Adalet* that

In determining the basic characteristic of the socialist movement, economic development should be taken as a point of departure. Economic development does not only appear as the prerequisite of the preservation of the national identity and independence of Turkish society, but also an essential condition in providing our national fellows with material and moral satisfaction. The goal is set forth as achieving social development and the criteria for assessing any government or social order are its success therein (Aren, 1964: 4; translation mine).

As stated above, in stressing the need for economic development, TİP emphasized the differences between the experiences of western and underdeveloped societies. Boran states that capitalism cannot accomplish its 'historical function' in underdeveloped countries. Underdeveloped countries including Turkey cannot develop through capitalism, yet they lack the preconditions for the establishment of socialism. Under these circumstances, these societies must adopt a method of development that would accomplish the historical mission of capitalism, as it was experienced in the west, which would eliminate the vestiges of feudalism, realize sufficient capital accumulation and provide the country with modern technology. This development should also be compatible with the peculiar conditions of these societies; social justice should be maintained and the laboring masses should be protected (Boran, 1968: 239). According to Boran, through the emergence of socialism as a system, its opportunities for 'diffusion' have increased, and the idea that holds the development of capitalism as a necessary prerequisite for the building of socialism has been abandoned (Boran, 1968: 143).

In accordance with this view, Naci and Hilav define the non-capitalist path of development as such

Non capitalist path of development is a social mechanism that provides the conditions for a forthcoming passage to a socialist economy, through omitting the period of mature capitalism in countries where semi feudal

and semi colonial patterns are prevalent” (Naci and Hilav, 1963a: 8; translation mine)

(...) the non capitalist path of development, to a certain extent undertakes the historical function of capitalism reserved to it by the laws of historical development. Yet, the merit of the non-capitalist path lies in its accomplishment of what has been done by capitalism within a long period of time and with immense social costs, through a shortened process avoiding these troubles (Naci and Hilav, 1963b: 10).

In the discourses of TİP leaders, the non capitalist path constitutes the backbone of a strategy formulated so as to realize the ideals of ‘modernization’, ‘development’ and reaching the level of contemporary civilization’ originating from Kemalism. TİP, through a reinterpretation of the principles of Kemalism, has adopted these as the indispensable elements of its understanding of socialism which cannot be thought separately from this strategy of national development. As will be elaborated below, the principles of statism/populism are placed at the heart of this discourse through considerable modifications. The principle of nationalism is also included in this perception, through a complete endorsement of ‘Atatürkist nationalism’ and has been articulated within the context of a socialist project imbued with the ideals of economic development, democracy and social justice. TİP’s understanding of development through non capitalist path depended on three main aspects: nationalization, industrialization and land reform in agriculture In Boran’s view, it is difficult to determine in advance which sectors of the economy should be nationalized, yet the immediate nationalization of foreign trade, insurance companies and foreign enterprises operating in the country has to be realized. (Boran, 1968: 244) The small and middle scale enterprises on the other hand will not be nationalized, since they do not constitute a key position in the national economy and there is no public benefit in nationalizing them

(...) drawing a line between the private and public sectors may be feasible under two forms, first by legal boundaries, established by law, by listing one by one the areas of economic activity reserved or forbidden to public enterprise and second by relying on economic considerations. It is difficult to determine by legal means the limits of statism (...) a country that has decided to achieve economic development through public enterprise cannot establish in advance a limit to the activities of such enterprises. The boundary between the private and public enterprises will be determined by two factors, the nature of enterprise and the financing power and enterprising ability available to both the private and public

sectors (...) if the private sector shows entrepreneurial ability and amass private savings, it can enter into major dealings and thus expand. If the private sector acts with reticence and the public sector is more enterprising, then the latter will expand (Aren, Devletçilik, Sınır Meselesi, Yön, January 17, 1962, quoted in Karpat, 1973b: 358-360, author's translation).

As stated, TİP saw the solution to Turkey's dependency on advanced countries in the rapid industrialization of the country. On the other hand, the comprador bourgeoisie that functions as the 'agent' of foreign capital, could not carry out the industrialization effort, they even tended to oppose it. Rapid economic development based on industrialization, employing the most advanced technology could only be overtaken by the state. The non-capitalist path of development is defined by Aybar as a mixed economy on planned foundations in which the 'center of gravity' resided in the state sector. The private sector would be retained, but its activity would be oriented toward the needs of the national economy (Aybar, 1968: 391). In the process of the industrialization of the country, privilege should be accorded to the construction of heavy industry, without which the achievement of economic independence and hence complete national independence is impossible. In the model of industrialization offered by TİP, the production of consumption materials would be increased at a slower rate than the production of machine tools, yet the meeting of the needs of people would not be neglected

On the question of land reform, TİP proposed that the poor peasantry should be provided with land, which will be distributed to them free of charge. The process of redistribution would be based on the direct participation by the peasants and the peasants themselves, without leasing it or hiring any farm laborers, would cultivate the land distributed. On the other hand, the land that belonged to the state cooperatives which was not being worked would also be redistributed to the peasantry. State Agricultural Stations were to be established in order to give technical assistance to the peasants on request and the peasants were to be encouraged to join the village cooperatives (TİP, 1964: 85-95). These reforms had to be conducted in accordance with a policy of central planning. According to TİP, despite the presence of a central planning organization in the country, and the prolongation of debates in the national assembly and the government on the five-year

development plan, Turkey has not entered the stage of planned development, because planning is the characteristic of a socialist policy. Planning for TİP is considered as obligatory for both the state and the private sector (Aren, 1964a: 5). These reforms, also accompanied by the policy of fair taxation and the initiation of widespread education, would increase the standard of living of the masses and also enable the workers to get their share in national income.

As I have indicated above, statism and populism appear as two interrelated themes in the development strategy of TİP which envisaged the internal financing of industrialization through the curbing of private enterprise, the depression of middle class levels of consumption and the reorganization of the country's largest economic sector- agriculture- to increase its productivity. Statism and populism are elaborated by TİP with reference to its emphasis on the need to 'provide democracy with an economic and social core'. Sadun Aren elaborates this point in an article he has written prior to his entrance to TİP, when he was still a contributor to the YÖN journal. Yet, in terms of the construction of the relationship between statism and populism, Aren's comments do not contain serious differences from TİP

I would like to state that our development is possible only through the adoption of a socialist model, the backbone of which constitutes an efficient and populist statism. This is because only when the commanding heights of the economy are controlled by a populist state, there can be no mention of exploitation. Otherwise, the only option is to rely on private entrepreneurship, which has proven to be reluctant. Besides, it is only through statism that the quest for development in our society can be put into practice. Finally, it is only through statism that factories and facilities can be transformed into centers of culture and civilization (Aren, 1962: 13; translation mine).

According to Boran, the principle of statism should be elaborated in relation to the principles of 'populism' and 'revolutionism'. In this sense, TİP was critical of RPP's understanding of statism and populism. While RPP had interpreted and applied statism as 'the taking over by the state whatever was not and could not be accomplished by private enterprise' (Aybar, 1968: 206), statism for TİP could only be put into practice as a policy 'favoring labor', constituting the 'economic and social aspect of our democracy'. With TİP's assuming of power, statist policies would be applied as a regulating, directing force, in order to meet the material and

cultural needs of the people (TİP, 1964: 71). In her book, Boran introduces an analysis of statist policies under RPP administration. According to Boran, statism in practice has been carried out as a means to create a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie':

There were two aspects of the question of statism or the views were expressed in two different ways: the direct undertaking by the state of whatever was deemed as essential in terms of 'public interests or of whatever was avoided by individual entrepreneurship. The statism of RPP has vacillated between these two understandings, the crucial issue being the avoidance of the application of statist policies as a substitute for private initiative (...) In short; statism has developed not in the service and control of the masses of people, but a state capitalism that has failed to industrialize the country (Boran, 1968: 23; translation mine).

The principle of populism appears as a complementary element of statism and derives its legitimacy from Kemalism. The program defines populism as 'the use of political power by the laboring people for their promotion of their interests'. Populism denotes the recognition of the laboring masses as the 'regulating and directing force' of society and the preparation of the conditions for the establishment of a social order in accordance with this. Populism is against exploitation and strives to prevent the repressive influence of the agents of foreign capital, which hamper social and economic development. Populism also opposes individual and class domination (TİP, 1964: 78). The designation of populism as such is in compliance with the elements of populism advocated by Kemalism, namely that 'sovereignty belongs to the people' and 'equality in front of the law' (Boran, 1968: 41). The 'jacobinist' and 'anti pluralist' understanding of Kemalism is transformed into the motto 'for the people and by the people'. Yet, according to TİP, this definition of populism should be associated with the 'Turkey of the War of National Liberation' (TİP, 1964: 78), which has been abandoned in the following decades:

For over two hundred years, our country has been engaged in an attempt to Westernize, to develop. The establishment of a genuine democracy and the rule of the people have been the main objective of this attempt. The War of National Liberation and the establishment of the republic constitute the most progressive steps in this sense (...) When Atatürk founded this party, he named it 'People's Party', assuming that it would act as the party of the people, not a certain group. Yet, the RPP has lost its populist understanding and adopted a conservative and bureaucratic attitude in both political and economic areas. The parties established during the multi party period after 1945 have inevitably followed dynamic and populist policies in comparison to RPP. This is also the main

reason behind the assuming of power by the Democrat Party. Yet, the Democrat Party interpreted and applied populism as a means of achieving power and has driven the country to an impasse (Aren, 1963b: 3; translation mine).

The principle of populism is also evaluated with reference to the need to establish strong links between the laboring people and intellectuals. According to TİP, the support of the people should be maintained in order to realize comprehensive economic and social reforms. On the other hand, according to TİP, the emergence of the laboring classes in Turkey as an independent political force depends on the actual participation of these classes in the struggle to change the ‘class nature’ of political authority. This particular point as regards the means of attaining power also reveals the difference between TİP and the YÖN group’s fascinations of coming to power via a coup

That military rule enjoys uninterrupted authority is nowhere self evident. They tend to be temporary and lack the capacity to provide ultimate solution to the problems of the society. The placement of a society under military rule triggers a wave of subsequent attempts at coup and ‘purges’. This is because the social structure and the relationship between classes is the fundamental element in any society. Likewise, the flaws of Nasser administration were clearly revealed as the once strong seeming military rule in Egypt has failed to rescue itself from this rule of coups and purges. The particular reason of this flaw is the fact that the Nasser administration lacks a firm basis among the social classes. The experience of Nasser government is the most concrete proof on the impossibility of establishing a strong regime through imposing reforms from top to down (Boran, 1968: 226; translation mine).

In terms of the reforms it intended to carry out, TİP’s strategy of development was in compliance with the formulations of ‘non-capitalist path’ for the newly independent states of Africa and Asia³⁶. Dinler states that in the draft program of TİP prepared by Boran and Aybar and submitted to the ‘Study and Research

³⁶ TİP’s strategy of non-capitalist path and the intended reforms were also supported by TKP. In an article written by the general secretary of the party Zeki Baştımar under the pseudonym of Yakub Demir, it was stated that the non-capitalist path of development was supported by a wide circle of progressive intellectuals including TİP and the ‘left wing’ of the RPP (Demir, 2003: 319). Despite the criticisms made by TKP as regards the theses of TİP leaders concerning socialist revolution in Turkey, TKP continued to give support to TİP even after the split between national democratic revolutionaries and TİP leaders (Ünsal, 2002: 257).

Bureau' of the party, the concept of 'national democracy' was suggested in the form of the 'Democracy of National Forces' (Kuvayi Milliye)

The Democracy of National Forces, intends to prevent the harmful influence and dominance of the remnants of feudalism, of the comprador bourgeoisie and its allies which hamper the establishment and advancement of the democratic regime, economic development for the benefit of the people, social and cultural progress and which resist social justice and security (TİP, 1964, quoted in Dinler, 1990: 56; translation mine).

However, the non-capitalist path of development is not taken up by TİP as a 'third way'. In this sense TİP was critical of the 'National-Revolutionary Path' advocated by the YÖN group, which excluded both communism and capitalism. Boran wrote that

Many people would like to regard the 'mixed economy' regime as a special kind of third way-not capitalism and not socialism (...) the mixed economy is not that third path (...) (it) does not eliminate the question of capitalism or socialism. It is the class composition of power that defines the nature of the social system and the direction of development. It may be a specific form of development of capitalism in developing countries, or a feature of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, or a mode of reinforcing capitalist systems in developed countries (Boran, 1976; quoted in Lipovsky, 1992: 15; author's translation).

Although she does not reconcile it with her attitude on the 'socialism peculiar to Turkey', Boran's understanding of socialism in her various evaluations, seems compatible with the premises of Marxist socialism. In her book, Boran criticizes Yön's attempts to describe different socialisms as 'Western Socialism', as it is practiced in England and Sweden and 'Eastern Socialism' in the countries of Asia and Africa. Socialism is defined by Boran as an alternative system to capitalism, an order of society that is more advanced than capitalist society. The principal difference between a 'capitalist' and a 'socialist' society concerns the ownership of the means of production and the economy and the social structure of a certain country cannot be treated separately from who is at the helm of political administration (Boran, 1968:137).

This question on the nature of the state power in the formulations on 'non-capitalist path' constitutes a difference between TİP's approach and the Soviet thesis. In the countries of Third World, the 'relative autonomy' of the state is placed

in an ambiguous position above the society, and it is thought to be generating policies independent of social classes. While, today it is known that the attempts to ‘construct socialism’ through a ‘non-capitalist path’ has resulted in the development of capitalist relations of production in these countries, the ‘non-capitalist path’ was initially seen as a means to ‘avoid’ capitalism, which was identified with imperialism. In close relation to this point, an ‘anti imperialist and nationalist’ rhetoric was adopted and class stratifications in society were denied-or they were at least considered as ‘reconcilable’.

In the Turkish case, this approach can be most clearly identified with the Yön group, which, while accepting the existence of classes in Turkish society, intended to unite the different social segments of society in the struggle against imperialism. On the other hand, according to TİP, the level of capitalist development in the country, although ‘conditioned by external dynamics’ and ‘distorted’ had allowed for the development of the classes of capitalism. In this sense, TİP was able to combine in its analyses the necessity to establish the ‘anti-capitalist’ nature of the struggle against imperialism. However, the stress on the ‘peculiar’ character of Turkish society and the equating of socialism with ‘non-capitalist path’ has rendered this anti-capitalist emphasis more or less ‘rhetorical’.

This point is also evident in the concept of populism (*halkçılık*) mentioned above, which is endorsed by TİP as the indispensable element of its strategy of development. Populism (*halkçılık*), in TİP’s understanding of it depends on the establishment of a broad ‘alliance’ between the different segments of society such as the peasantry, working class and the middle classes, which include artisans, small industrialists and intellectuals. Besides, as I have indicated before, Aybar’s deliberations on the nature of the bureaucracy as a ‘dominant class’ sees a coercive state tradition extending from the Ottoman Empire well into the republic, sees a contradiction between the ‘masses of people and the state’ and not between capital and labor. The emphasis on the peasantry as the ‘most suffering and exploited’ segment of society and the placing of the major contradiction between the ‘masses of people and the state’ has also carried an aspect, which has blurred class differences, despite TİP’s initial remarks on the ‘independent organization of the working class’.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The question of 'development' has come into the fore in the international scene in 1960's as a consequence of the political and economic transformations taking place on a global scale, such as the acquisition of independence by various Third World countries after successful wars of national liberation and the emergence of a unique period in the worldwide expansion of capitalism, which enabled individual states to pursue 'national autonomous' development by building protective tariffs in economy and implementing social policies through extra-market measures.

The countries of the Third World also embarked on a process of economic development that was materially and politically supported by the Soviet Union as a possible bulwark against imperialism. Some of these countries adopted socialism, 'which could be reached through a 'non-capitalist path', 'avoiding' the capitalist stage. However, this understanding of socialism was different than Marxist socialism in the sense that it was adopted as a more 'egalitarian order' in comparison to capitalism, which created and stiffened class contradictions in society.

The political implications of this approach were the replacement of the social and economic views of classical Marxism with a nationalist cause. The leftist movements in these countries claimed to be defending the interests of all classes in society, including those of the 'national' bourgeoisie, who unlike the 'comprador' bourgeoisie that worked for foreign companies, could side with the national liberation movement. This approach has its foundations in the tendency to see Marxism as a 'European' political current, an extension of Enlightenment and modernism, which is criticized in this study. This tendency in practice, had mainly two consequences, a modification to Marxist thought, so as to suit the conditions of Third World countries, such as the notion of 'African socialism', which excluded class struggle and the emergence of an understanding of socialism as a 'modernizing current', which would bring about 'development' and 'westernization'.

These attempts were also reflected on the theoretical level. Classical Marxist views on the problem of 'development' were expressed with reference to the prospects of capitalist development in backward areas of the world. In this sense, there were also modifications in Marx's writings as well. While his early writings emphasize the nature of capitalism as a constantly expanding system, which eradicates the obstacles to development, Marx's writings on Ireland reflect his awareness of the 'retarding' consequences of capitalist development. This being so, classical Marxism holds the view that, capitalist development in the peripheral areas is possible, since capitalism as a mode of production has universal tendencies. Marx's considerations on the ability of capitalism to develop the entire world and soon, which is seen in his various works such as the *Communist Manifesto* and his writings on India were influenced by the historical conditions of the nineteenth century. As stated in the study, the idea that there is a definite succession of stages in history, which all nations are expected to follow were not adhered by classical Marxism, reflected in the comments of Marx and Engels on the possibility of Russia 'skipping' the capitalist stage. In fact as the writings of Marx and Engels demonstrate, they emphasized the possibility of development of capitalism in peripheral areas to the extent that this development was forming the classes of capitalism. In this respect, it is questionable that the approach of Marx and Engels to capitalist development in the peripheral areas can be analyzed as following a straight line, since their writings also emphasize the retarding consequences of capitalism.

On the other hand, in the debates in Comintern during 1920's, the fact that the process of development in Europe during eighteenth and nineteenth century does not take place in the same way in Third World countries was interpreted in such way that held capitalist development in these areas was almost impossible. This approach also emerged in 1960's on the formulations of a non-capitalist path' by Soviet Union, which was in harmony with the aspirations of Third World countries; namely achieving rapid development avoiding class stratification and placing socialism at the service of nationalism. The theories of 'underdevelopment and dependency' originating from Latin America, did not necessarily oppose the idea that capitalist development was possible in the periphery, rather argued that this development would always be 'distorted' and conditioned by 'external dynamics'. According to the

dependency theory, 'genuine' industrialization in underdeveloped countries was impossible, unless they 'delinked' themselves from the capitalist world system.

It can be stated that 'dependency' is treated by dependency theorists as a set of structures that sets off dependent countries from the advanced countries and from the 'dependent advanced countries'. In this sense, dependency appears as a certain internal structure different from that of the advanced nations. This elaboration of dependency contains serious difficulties since it is not identified what is actually meant by these 'differences' and conditioning effects. As seen in the analyses of various dependency theorists, the internal structures of the dependent countries are defined as capitalist. However, as Roxborough states, it is also pointed out that this is a specific kind of capitalism that existed in the peripheral countries (Roxborough, 1979: 66). As O'Brien also points out, the originality of the dependency theory lay not in the claim that underdevelopment can be analyzed only as a part of the capitalist world system, but in the attempt to explain the 'laws of motion' of dependent economies starting from the structure of world economy. In fact, most of the literature on dependency is the attempt to make use of the periodization approach in order to explain the consequences of the transformations in the capitalist world system on Latin American countries (O'Brien, 1992: 32). As elaborated in the study, the conceptualization of the differences between the internal structures of dependent and advanced countries creates difficulties since the characteristics of 'dependent peripheral capitalism' and whether it is a mode of production different from the laws of motion of capitalism are not identified.

As far as the historical development of the Turkish left is concerned, it was stated in the study that TKP initiated a process that placed the left under the 'ideological hegemony' of Kemalism. TKP, in attributing to Kemalist authority a potential in adopting a 'third way' and in its complete espousal of the elements of the process of modernization, such as 'populism (halkçılık)', 'nationalism', 'development' has perceived the 'underdevelopment' of Turkey as alien and external to and incompatible with western capitalism. However, TİP, which criticizes TKP on being 'dependent' on Comintern, cannot be considered as a descendant of it. Furthermore, the socioeconomic transformations of the previous decades were also reflected in TİP's views on the level of capitalist development in the country. On the

other hand, TİP's understanding of socialism is also imbued with elements of Kemalist paradigm.

TİP's analyses on the social and economic structure of the country, share at the general level, the problematic of the dependency approach, in the sense that TİP sees the underdevelopment of Turkey as a consequence of the country's integration with the capitalist world economy and argues that the nature of capitalism in the country is determined according to the relationship with advanced countries, in such way that results in distorted development and conditions the formation of classes. Although its analyses on the last point- namely the creation of a 'comprador bourgeoisie acting as the mere agents of capital- imply that capitalist development, which is 'imported' into the country by imperialism, does not have internal dynamics of its own, in the views of TİP, a process of capitalist development has been taking place in the country. This process, despite the perpetuation of the dependency on advanced countries of the west, has dissolved pre-capitalist structures to a certain extent. It is possible to argue that the approach of TİP to the issue of dependency was influenced by the international conjuncture of the period, although direct references to the writings of Frank can also be found in the journal *Sosyal Adalet*.

A corollary of TİP's depiction of the economic structure as such, has been the assertion by TİP leaders on the different qualities exhibited by classes in Turkey due to the peculiar conditions of their process of historical development. As a result of this analysis, it was emphasized by Aybar and Boran that all segments of the society- except the 'comprador' bourgeoisie had deep interests in overthrowing the domination of capitalism. TİP's analyses, which are complemented with its understanding of a 'peculiar' form of socialism and the strategy of development envisaged by it, places it into the 'national-developmental' strategies of 1960's.

The characteristics of Turkish socialism/socialism peculiar to Turkey are emphasized by TİP, in order to identify the unique features of the country that separates it from other societies. Despite the disagreement on Aybar's notion of 'free' and 'humanitarian' socialism, the 'democratic', constitutional-parliamentary' and 'nationalist-independent' qualities of this socialism are shared by TİP leaders. However, the last quality is particularly important in shaping TİP's political stand since the concept of national independence is a determining element in the social and

economic policies of TİP. This point is also reflected in the declarations on the ‘Second War of Independence’ by Aybar, which carries both economic and political aspects.

As Yerasimos states, TİP program envisaged a three-phase evolution in its attempt to modify socialism in accordance with the conditions of Turkey. The first phase involved the ‘awakening’ of the masses to their true interests and have them side with the party for realizing the essential social and economic transformations. The ‘non capitalist path’ which would provide rapid development of the means of production, and hence set the conditions for a transformation to socialism, was elaborated in the TİP program as a second phase. Socialism on the other hand was envisaged in the third phase. The using of ‘socialism’ by TİP, abandoning the concept of ‘non-capitalist path’, can be thought as compatible with their stress on the ‘anti capitalist’ nature of the revolutionary struggle in Turkey. Since the adoption of ‘non-capitalist path’ was justified with the emphasis on eliminating dependency and realizing democratic reforms, the emphasis on ‘socialism’ implied that ‘non-capitalist path’ was no longer necessary and these problems would be eliminated under socialism. However, the notion of socialism favored by TİP leaders in fact substitutes the ‘non-capitalist path’ in the sense that both the program of development and the reforms proposed were transposed to the third phase, with the emphasis on the maintenance of the private sector (Yerasimos, 1976: 1683). In fact, TİP perceived socialism as a means of rapid development in order to reach the ‘level of contemporary civilization’ and elaborated it with reference to the concepts ‘statism’ and ‘populism’. Even though, considerable modifications are made as regards both the concepts, they are still presented from within the Kemalist paradigm, which are defined as compatible with ‘Atatürkism’. The actual reforms proposed by TİP under this strategy of development’ are compatible with the original formulations of ‘non-capitalist path, but it was explicitly defended by TİP that this strategy was not thought as a ‘third way’ by the party. On the other hand, the necessity of establishing connections with the working class was also emphasized. However, as seen in the formulations of ‘major’ contradiction for Turkey by Aybar and Boran and Aybar’s analyses on the ‘coercive state’ tradition in Turkey, blurs the differences between

different segments of society, uniting them under a broad alliance, which is also reflected in TİP's understanding of populism.

Today, the approach of various leftist writers to the question of development is very different from 1960's. Ahmet İnsel, who can be considered as an example to these views asserts that the left in Turkey has confused 'statism' with 'progressiveness' and raised the issue of 'development' to the level of 'industrial fetishism'. According to İnsel, after the establishment of the modern state in Turkey, economy has been treated as functional in the regeneration of the relations of dominance between the state and society. In relation to this, the construction of economic relationships in such way, which attributes the state active role in relations of production and distribution, is closely associated with the state's quest to transform social relations as it wishes. In this sense, the economic policies of the period reflect nothing more than the means of enhancing the scope of control and intervention on the side of the 'state elites' as regards the society that 'has to be modernized'. The state, as a major element in its project of political modernization and the building of a nation, has attempted to establish a 'national economy', serving to the perpetuation of these functions. These economic policies have created a bourgeoisie and a working class, whose very existence depends completely on the state.

According to İnsel, this approach to state-society relations can be extended to the political discourse of the left in Turkey, which is characterized by a state centric planning based on mixed economy. In its understanding of 'anti-imperialism' and 'development', the left reflects the basic themes in the social project it envisages through a 'national-developmental' current that dominates the Turkish political thought (İnsel, 1996).

As stated throughout the study, during the period in question, TİP-indeed all segments of Turkish left- did reduce socialism to a method of development, the main characteristics of which constituted the elements of Kemalist modernization project. However, the criticism of the 'developmental' and 'statist' inclinations of the left becomes questionable when it amounts to a total removal of the concept from the analyses and political vocabulary of the left. The 'developmental' aspirations of leftist intellectuals in 1960's were, as pointed out in the study, in harmony with the international conjuncture and the tendencies of 'real socialism'. Yet, in my opinion,

the attempt to abandon the question of development is equally a reflection of the developments taking place in the international arena, -the rise of neo-liberal policies, which had social and political effects on countries as well as economic ones, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Besides, since 'the state' does not constitute a 'transcendental' entity in the political processes taking place, it is not independent of class struggles and the actual way the appropriation of surplus takes place. In this sense, 'development' and 'state planning' may still constitute a 'problematic' for the left, provided that they are formulated as elements of a distinct social project, which makes explicit 'the social actors' of this transformation and not as an end in itself.

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