

THE ROLE OF SECULARIZATION DURING THE TURKISH NATION-STATE
BUILDING PROCESS

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THE ROLE OF SECULARIZATION DURING THE TURKISH NATION-STATE
BUILDING PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

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The objective of this study is to analyze the role of secularization within the Turkish nation-state building process between the late 19th and the early 20th century; hereby an emphasis will also be on the relations between the state and religion. This study will consider the Religious Affairs Directory as the key institutional actor in this process. This institutional reflection of secularization will be studied as an interesting case of state controlled social change on and over religion in society. The state reproduces its legitimization and discourse over the Religious Affairs Directory, therefore some publications and khutbas of that institution in 2003 and 2004 will be analyzed. On the other hand, secularization was defined on 5th February 1937 in the 1924 Constitution with the law numbered 3115, as the separation of the state and religious affairs and the equal distance of the state's position towards all beliefs and believers. The contradiction between the state's definition and institutional application of secularization will be criticized. The first contradiction is the integration of state and religious affairs. The statist discourse legitimizes the state

through the religious affairs and as it will be seen in the analyzed publications and khutbas of the Religious Affairs Directory, the statist and religious discourses overlap each other. Since this overlapping enables the integration of state and religious affairs through the Religious Affairs Directory as a constitutional institution, the applications of this institution contradict with the constitutional definition of Turkish secularization. The second feature of the Turkish secularization is that the state applies this practice over only one sect (Sunni-Hannifin) which is an obstacle for the state's position against all the religious beliefs. The legitimization of the state is being done through the Sunni-Hannifin denomination and by this way the state takes a side among the various beliefs. Lastly, as the results of the historical analysis of this study reveal, it will be understood that the practice of manipulating the religion under the hegemonic state ideology is a tradition inherited from the late Ottoman period. The Republic of Turkey, which realized secularization within a constitutional definition and through institutional transformations, has continued to integrate the state with religion.

Key words: Nation-state, secularization, secularism, Turkish modernization, national identity

ÖZ

TÜRK ULUS DEVLET İNŞAASI SÜRECİNDE LAİKLEŞMENİN ROLÜ

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Bu çalışmanın amacı Türk ulus-devlet inşasında sekülerleşme hareketini çözümlenmek ve bu amaçla dinin devlet kontrolü altına alınmasını irdelemektir. Çalışmada, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nı, bu sürecin kurumsal bir sonucu ve yansıması olarak görülmektedir. Bu somut yansıma ayrıca, din üzerindeki devlet kontrollü toplumsal değişimin bir örneği olarak görülmektedir. Devlet kendi meşruluğunu ve söylemini Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı üzerinden yeniden üretmektedir; bundan dolayı Bu kurumun bazı yayınları ve hutbeleri analiz edilecektir. Öte yandan, devlet söyleminde laiklik, din ve devlet işlerinin ayrılığı ve devletin tüm inançlara eşit mesafede durması olarak tanımlanmıştır. Laikliğin devlet söylemindeki tanımı ile bunun kurumsal uygulaması arasındaki tezat ya da uyumsuzluk eleştirilicidir. Tanım ile uygulama arasındaki ilk tezat devlet işleri ve din işlerinin entegrasyonudur. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın bu çalışmada incelenecek olan yayın ve hutbelerinde de, devletçi söylemin meşruluğu din işleri üzerinden yaptığı ve devletçi söylem ile dini söylemin buy olla içiçe geçtiği anlaşılmaktadır. İkinci tezat ise bu pratiğin tek bir mezhep üzerinden yapılmasıdır ki; bu durum devletin tüm inançlara eşit, tarafsız tutumu önünde bir engeldir. Devletin, meşruluğunu tek bir Sünni-Hanefi inancın esasları yoluyla, tek bir mezhep üzerinden yapması, devletin inançlar arasında taraf

tutmasına yol açmaktadır. Son olarak, tarihsel analiz sonucu, dinin egemen devlet ideolojisi için araçsallaştırılmasının ve bu yolla dinin devlet hegemonyası altına alınıp manipüle edilmesinin Osmanlı'nın son döneminden bu yana devam eden bir süreç olduğu anlaşılacaktır. Anayasal tanımda ve kurumsal dönüşümlerde sekülerleşmeyi gerçekleştiren Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin pratikteki bu uygulamalarıyla, Osmanlı geçmişinden gelen din-devlet entegrasyonunu bazı yönleriyle devam ettirdiği anlaşılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulus-devlet, laikleşme, laiklik, Türk modernleşmesi, ulusal kimlik.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the framework of this study, the concepts of ‘secularization’ and ‘nation-state’ are the main terms. By the term of ‘secularization’, I mean a gradual process of social change through which the public influence of religion and religious thinking declines as it is replaced by scientific and modern ways of explaining reality and regulating social life or a process in modern societies in which religious ideas and organizations tend to loose influence and the form of influence changes accordingly. In modern societies where secularization has progressed the farthest, science has replaced religion as the primary approach in understanding the natural world, and civil law and the state have replaced religion as a source of social control (Marshal, 1999, pp. 645-646). The second major term in this study is ‘nation-state’. A nation-state is defined as a nation governed by a state whose authority coincides with the boundaries of the nation. Additionally, nation is a community of sentiment or an imagined community based on one or more of the features, such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, customs and political memory and shared experience of the other. Until the 19th century, the world was not organized in terms of nation-states, but consisted instead of a diverse collection of ethnic groupings with relatively fluid political boundaries. This contrasts with the relatively rigid geographical boundaries and administrative control associated with the modern state (Hançerlioğlu, 1996, pp. 395-396).

Secularization, in Europe, was experienced before decades beginning with the emergence of nation-states. With the rise in wealth and power of the merchant class from the 15th century onwards, with the rise of trade lines between the East and West and the development of colonization in the following centuries, scientific knowledge had begun to be accepted as very useful for the development of early capitalism. This contributed to the process of the emergence of industrialization and

the transformation of the merchant bourgeoisie to industrial capitalists. Scientific knowledge was also a profitable counter-trump for the monarches and the merchant class against the hegemony of the clergy, which has been caused by the power of religious knowledge (Chaudhury and Morineau, 1999).

Throughout the historical process of European state building reformation movements of religion also took place. The most famous one was the reforms done by Martin Luther in Germany. The translation of the Bible from Latin to the local languages prevented the clergy of Catholic Roman from having a monopoly on religious understanding. The establishment of the national churches, such as the Anglican Church in England, the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, the Calvinist Church in France, and the Protestant Church in Germany, broke down the hegemony of the Vatican on the European Kingdoms.

The atmosphere in which secularism was born in Europe was rather different from the scholastic Middle Age Europe. The re-emergence of pre-scholastic philosophies of Ancient Greek and the separation of religious and rationalist knowledge and the highlighted individuality were the preconditions of the secularization in the Renaissance (Akyürek, 1994:87-97). Akyürek sees the reformist movements of Martin Luther as the turning point in European secularization. In 1517, in front of the Wittenberg Church, Martin Luther claimed that the church has withdrawan its hegemony from the political affairs (1994: 126).

In Italy, both the republics and city states in Northern Italy, such as Venice, Milan and Florence, and the tyrants in Southern Italy tried to break the religious authority over politics and worldly life (Burckhardt, 1958). There was a great opportunity to develop an anti-scholastic philosophy under the protection or motivation of the powers. Laven gives some importance to the raised paganism in Italian states to stand against religious authority. In this context, he sees secularization as the emergence of Italian identity (Laven, 1967: 197-200).

Around the discussions about Turkish modernization, the role of secularization during the Turkish nation-state building process and the relations between the state and religion are discussed and analyzed in this study. Since the process of secularization reveals one of the dynamics of Turkish modernization and the Turkish nation-state building projections, Turkish secularization presents a

unique case through which one can analyze the Turkish modernization project critically. Different from the other phases of Turkish modernization project like educational modernization, establishment of a national culture to achieve cultural unity, formation of a national economy, secularization is still not a completed process. In other words, secularism is still a hot topic which usually comes to issue around the arguments about “türban-headscarf at universities”, “imam-hatip schools”, “Koran courses”, and “veiling in public sphere” and so on.

While the process of secularization reveals one of the dynamics of Turkish modernization and the Turkish nation-state building project (others including unitary features of the Turkish nation-state building like educational modernization, establishment of a national economy, construction of a cultural homogeneity), secularization also points out to a controversial issue of Turkish modernization as part of the Turkish nation-state building project. Since there are various conceptualizations and understandings of secularism, and several secular policy applications to achieve secularization in the West, this study does not aim to compare the Turkish case with the Western models. Since the Turkish modernization and the Turkish nation-state building project are historically preconditioned by the process of Ottoman modernization, especially in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this study discusses the Ottoman modernization and Ottoman secularization attempts that are historically related to Turkish modernization and Turkish secularization.

In order to understand the importance of religion in Ottoman society which can be linked to the later secularization of the Turkish Republic, the Ottoman “*millet*” system should be summarized. In the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslims were recognized as minority named “*millet*”, and those non-Muslim minorities (Orthodox, Gregorien, and Jews) had autonomy in administration and juridical affairs, different from the majority who were Muslims whether Turks or not (Kenanoğlu, 2004). Mardin, in his study, puts the state in the centre and the subjects in the periphery; the relation between the centre and the periphery was established over religion in the Ottoman Empire (1993, pp. 11-22). The relationship between the state and the subjects through religion which was a characteristic of the Ottoman society, continue during the process of Turkish modernization and secularization. With the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, secularization of society was perceived as the standardization

of Islam by the state. Although Turkish modernization accepted some religious symbols like the *fes* (fez) or *tarikât* (religious brotherhood) as non-modern or anti-modern, Turkish modernization could not exclude Islam as part of Turkish national identity. Since religion is always one of the elements of national identity, like territorial unity, common culture, shared language, ethnicity and economic unity, Turkish nation-state building project did not exclude religion as one of the important sources of modern Turkish national identity. However, the emphasis on religion on the one hand and the secularization process on the other hand, has created tensions between the state and society in various forms at different periods. While Turkish secularization is defined as the separation of the state and religious affairs at the constitutional level, Turkish modernization aimed to standardize Islam through the Religious Affairs Directory at the institutional level. In this respect the Religious Affairs Directory is the key actor in the secularization process and at this point, religious affairs become the responsibility of the state as public affairs. In other words, the Religious Affairs Directory as the key actor in the process of secularization took control of all religious matters. This appears to contradict with the definition of secularization in the constitution. Since the Turkish nation-state building projection cannot exclude the Muslim identity of its subjects, legitimization and discourse of the Turkish nation-state are transmitted through religion like education, media and law. The integration of religion with the state at the administrative level and institutional practice, instead of the separation of religious and state affairs as in the formal and official definition at the constitutional level, is the first contradiction that is reflected by Turkish modernization. To create a new society that was aimed by Turkish state builders includes the establishment of a national but secular identity. On the other hand, the Turkish nation-state building project could not exclude the religious identity of the masses often addressing its subjects through their religious identity as it can be seen in most the khutbas and publications of the Religious Affairs Directory.

The second contradiction of the process of Turkish secularization is the standardization of Islam through one denomination (sect) that is the Sunni-Hannifin sect. This religious homogenization over the subjects excludes the non-Muslim citizens (Orthodox Christians, Yezidis, Süryanis, Keldanis), non-Sunni, Muslim

citizens (Alevi, Shiites, Caferis) and also non-Hannifin Sunni citizens (Malekis, Hambelis, Shafis). The standardization of Islam through the Hannifin sect, that was at the same time the Ottoman state tradition in the process of Ottoman secularization, is another contradiction in terms of the objective or neutral position of the state against all believers and beliefs.

After this introductory chapter, the second chapter will discuss the Ottoman modernization process and the historical preconditions of Turkish modernization and secularization. The third chapter will analyze Turkish secularization around the discussions about Turkish modernization. The last chapter before the conclusion will analyze the discourses of the selected khutbas and publications of the Religious Affairs Directory. All those critiques and arguments as outlined above will be discussed in the fourth and the fifth chapters, following the second chapter that is about Ottoman secularization and modernization and the third chapter which is about the historical roots of secularization during Turkish modernization and the Turkish nation-state building projects. To study Turkish secularization by analyzing the khutbas and some publications of the Religious Affairs Directory reveals. Although Turkish secularization is an issue that was studied intensively how important religion is as part of Turkish national identity, I believe that the analysis of the khutbas and some of the publications of the Religious Affairs Directory adds a value to this study.

The relation between religion and the state was very complex in Europe. There were both cooperation and concurrency between the monarchs and the clergy. There were different secularization processes and applications and definitions all over Europe, as there are today. Turkish secularization presents a unique case. Therefore, this study will not try to compare Turkish secularization with various other European cases (Daver, 1955, pp. 56-64). Since, different from any form of secularization in Europe, in Turkey, secularization came to the scene as ‘official secularization’ as part of the nation-state building process during the early Republican period. The establishment of the Religious Affairs Directory on March 1924 with the law numbered 429 tied to the Prime Ministry instead of the “*Evkaf ve Şeriye Vekaleti*” (Ministry of Aware and Religious Affairs) and the Caliphate is the institutional and concrete turning point the secularization process.

With the developments, the role of the clergy in state affairs was diminished. In this study, one can argue that secularization in Turkey was an official or a state influenced process and an inseparable part of nation-state building. The aim of Turkish secularization was to use religion as a social institution for the indoctrination of state discourse and the maintenance of statist control on/over religion. At this point, one of the minor questions in this study will be whether or not religion had been transformed into an instrument serving for the legitimacy of the Turkish nation-state and whether or not the emergence of the Religious Affairs Directory is/was the key institutional actor in the process of secularization.

After discussing these questions, the fourth chapter will deal with the critiques about the case of Turkish secularization. The questions about whether or not this case presents a difference between the constitutional definition and the institutional practice and whether they differ and under which circumstances will be studied. The official meaning of ‘secularism’ in Turkey is ‘the separation of state and religion affairs’. On the other hand, religious affairs are in the state’s responsibility as it was the Ottoman society. Since there is a controlled-directory structure in the state’s religious affairs, the situation which is an integration of state and religion (*din-ü devlet*) is still continuing from the Ottoman times. Like in the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish state also uses the Orthodox Sunni Islam as a legitimizing factor through the Religious Affairs Directory. Although in the place of the Caliphate, the Religious Affairs directory had been established, the unity of the state and religion, in fact, continues to exist. As a result, there is a contradiction between the state’s official definition of “secularism/secularization”, and the practice. The official definition of secularism at the constitutional level does not fit into the practical application of secularism at the institutional level. Turkish secularization represents a state handed standardization of Islam which excludes non-Sunni (Hannifin) people. This exclusion is the second contradiction which prevents the objective standing of the state against all believers and beliefs as defined as a dimension of Turkish secularization in the constitution.

While there are some contradictions between the constitutional and official definitions and institutional applications of secularization, Turkish secularization is not yet a completed project. This process is not a homogeneous one since it covers

different periods, according to different policies carried out by various governments with contrasting ideological orientations. These variations in party policies and ideological orientations brought different reflections on the Turkish constitutions. In each the period the main difference was the practical application of secularism. The official definition of “secularism” and the missions of the Religious Affairs Directory as defined in the successive Turkish constitutions slightly differ from one another. In this context, there are three important periods in the process of Turkish secularization in terms of constitutional processes and in terms of shifting constitutional definitions of its duties: The first is the period from 1924 to 1961. The law numbered 429 in the Constitution of 1924 established the Religious Affairs Directory. At the same time, in the Constitution of 1924 (also in the constitution of 1921), it had been stated that ‘Islam is the official religion of Turkey. The concept of ‘secularism’ entered the constitution in 1937 where the state and religion were separated. The second period is the one between 1961 and 1982. In the Constitution of 1961, the functions of the Religious Affairs Directory had been defined as following: to directorate worship, belief, and ethical affairs of Islam, to enlighten the society about religion, and to administrate the worship places. The last one is from 1982 until today. In the Constitution of 1982, another function had been added to the constitution: to aim the unity and solidarity of the Turkish nation (Tarhanlı, 1993, pp. 18-19, and Gözübüyük, 1995, p. 34). While I will focus on the last period, the historical roots of this period will also be discussed in this study. The use of religion as a source for ‘national values’, the representation of the Orthodox Sunni Islam by the Religious Affairs Directory and the integration of the state and religion as contradicting to the official definition of secularism in the 1982 constitution will be the focus of this study.

The central question of this study can be defined as whether or not secularization is an essential part of the nation-state building in Turkey. Under this major question, this study will examine whether or not the process of taking religion under state control has been practiced for the aim of achieving secularization. This study claims that the Religious Affairs Directory, tied to Prime Ministry, is the institutional result of this objective and it will be discussed whether or not religion was/is one of the tools to impose the Turkish nation-state ideology on the masses.

As the hypothetical assumptions of this study, secularization will be taken as a main part of Turkish modernization and Turkish nation-state building process. Throughout this process of secularization in Turkey, this study will discuss whether or not there is a contradiction between the official and constitutional definitions of secularism and the institutional practice of secularism. In the Turkish model of secularism, is Islam controlled by the state as part of formal state discourse? Not only being controlled, but is Islam also manipulated by the state to reproduce the hegemonic statist ideology? If Islam is being controlled and manipulated, does this enable the integration of religious and state affairs which is in contradiction to the constitutional definition of secularism? Is this achieved through the one denomination (Hannifin denomination) and does this prevent the state to display an objective and equal position against all beliefs as it is defined in the constitution? These all central questions will try to be examined by this study.

To test the hypothesis of this study, textual description and historical analysis will be carried out to understand the development of secularism in Turkish history starting from the 19th century Ottoman society until today which will be evaluated in the second and the third chapters.

The main part of the study, the fourth chapter will focus on the analysis of some khutbas of the Religious Affairs Directory, a play written by the Religious Affairs Directory to be distributed in elementary schools and an informative book to be distributed at the military barracks.

In this study, the historical transformation of Ottoman and Turkish modernization, secularization as well as the historical roots of Turkish nation-state building will be discussed by the reference to some secondary sources on written by historians, such as Sina Akşin, Selim Deringil and Cemil Koçak. However, since, the Turkish secularization will be analyzed; those historical processes related to modernization will be evaluated through the tenses of political science and through the approaches of politics.

The following chapter discusses the emergence of the Turkish nation-state building process and the Turkish modernization. It covers the secularization process starting from the Second Constitutional Monarchy period from 1908 until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Since Turkish secularization and

modernization has not yet ended and since these processes are preconditioned by the developments of the late Ottoman period, the social and political developments inherited from the Ottoman times will be discussed in connection to do early Republican period.

The third chapter discusses the secularization process during the early Republican era. As a consequence of different and various social transformations, ideological orientations and party policies, secularization which is part of Turkish modernization, is not a homogenous process. This issue will be evaluated in chapter three. The fourth chapter focuses on the critiques about Turkish secularization and the analysis of some of the publications of the religious Affairs Directory in 2003-2004, including some khutbas and a play and a textbook.

**TABLE-I: SHIFTINGS IN THE SECULARIZATION PROCESS OF
TURKISH MODERNIZATION**

Level	Secularism
Constitutional And Ideological	separation of religious and state affairs, and neutral standing of the state against all believers and beliefs (definition of Turkish secularism in Kemalist ideology and in the 1982 Constitution)
	<u>SHIFTING 1</u>
Institutional (Religious Affairs Directory)	the standardization of Islam, and administration of religion as public affairs
	<u>SHIFTING 2</u>
Public	exclusion of non-Muslim, non-Sunni, and non-Hannifin subjects

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF TURKISH NATION-STATE BUILDING

The emergence of the Turkish nation-state and Turkish modernization through the Kemalist ideology will be discussed in this chapter. Within those historical roots, the outlawing of the Caliphate in 1924 and the form of Turkish secularization will be analyzed with reference to the works of main Turkish scholars.

The Turkish nation-state has not emerged in 1923 by the declaration of the Republic. Beyond the republican era, some dynamics occurred during the late Ottoman period, which had important consequences for this development. Turkish nation-state building process will be examined with reference to three different three periods: The first one is the Second Constitutional Monarchy (1908-1914), the second is the First World War (1914-1918) and the last one is the Turkish War of Independence (1918-1923).

Secularization is one of the main faces of the Turkish nation-state building process. Thus in order to understand the place of secularization within the Turkish nation-state building process, the historical roots which prepared the preconditions of Turkish secularization has to be discussed.

While the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 is accepted as a starting point of Turkish modernization by some scholars, the preconditions of the new republic must be traced in the late period of the Ottoman Empire. As one aspect of modernization, secularization has started in the 19th century Ottoman society. Especially in education, law and social life some limited secular applications occurred during this period, which must be taken as the basis of Turkish modernization and secularization.

As it is mentioned in the introduction part of this study and as it will be discussed further in the following parts, some applications and practices concerning

the secularization of the Turkish Republic are inherited from the Ottoman society. In other words to analyze the current secularization in definition and application, we also have to look at the secularization process and practices that took place in the Ottoman society. In Ottoman history, the period of the second Constitutional Monarchy may not be the starting point of Ottoman modernization, but it is a turning point for Turkish transformation, i.e. from an empire to a republic.

2.1. The Second Constitutional Monarchy Period (1908-1914)

The 20th century was the period for the transformation from an empire to a nation-state in Turkish history. This period has started with the reestablishment of the 1876 Constitution that had been outlawed by Sultan Abdulhamit II for thirty years. It meant not only a change in the political sphere, but also many aspects of social life ranging from arts to sports. Although this process is seen as a result of Young Turks movement, the constitutional monarchy was profitable also for non-Turk groups (Ahmad, 1999, p. 44). Non-Turkish ethnic groups could achieve more liberal atmosphere and freedom.

The leaders of the religious and ethnic groups welcomed the constitution and the ending of absolutism. They thought that could enlarge their influence area. However, they feared that the Turks would transform the process in order to establish their own authority (Ahmad, 1999, p. 44).

The bureaucrats of the *Bab-ı ali* (Sublime Porte) were the other group who had great expectations from the constitutional monarchy. While the power of the monarch would decline, they could increase their influence on the Assembly of Commons. The bureaucrats saw their modern-western education as a great advantage and they had life experiences in Europe. They knew European languages and life styles; therefore they were the candidate leaders of modernization. After a while, they developed close relations with European embassies and states (Ahmad, 1999, p. 45).

The Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress were the community that was leading the Ottoman modernization. Atatürk's thought system was affected by that community and many of the founders of the Turkish Republic

were from that community, so to have knowledge about the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress is essential to understand the process of Ottoman modernization and Turkish secularization.

2.1.1. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)

The members of the Union and Progress Committee, the Young Turks, were the main community who designed and applied the project of the transformation from an empire to a nation-state. Therefore, one of the most famous Western scholars of the Turkish history, Erick Jan Zürcher, sees the era of the Young Turks covering the period between 1908 and 1950 who were not only the leaders of the Second Constitutional Monarchy but also the founders of the Republic (2000, pp. 137-299)

The Young Turks in power were divided into two groups in opposition and exile. On the one hand, there were liberals who were in favor of decentralization of state and some autonomous rights for the religious and ethnic minorities in the Ottoman society. On the other hand, the unionist Young Turks supported much more the central authority and Turkish domination within state (Lewis, 1961, p. 213).

When the CUP was founded in Salonika, there were three urgent problems the CUP had to solve. These were the nature of the Ottoman government and the constitutional monarchy, the definition of the empire's citizen-subjects and lastly the defense of the empire's territorial integrity (Davison, 1998, p. 126). While the CUP was founded very secretly, later it became dominant in the political arena. Talat Pasha represented the civil wing of the CUP. Enver Pasha was the leader of the military wing of the CUP.

The first group in the modernization process of the Ottoman society was the liberals from the upper class. They were well educated and they knew French language and culture. They defended constitutional monarchy and the limitation of the monarch's power by the army officers and by the higher bureaucrats from their class (Ahmad, 1999, p. 47).

The second group was the unionists and they were largely the members of the CUP. They were from the middle and lower-middle classes, mainly lower level officers, soldiers and the traders which were heavily affected by economic deprivation (Ahmad, 1999, p. 47).

After the revolution of 1908, the cabinet led by Kamil Pasha was formed. Kamil Pasha was a well educated statesman and he followed liberal policies and supported the idea of a federation government system in Ottoman. He was supported by the Great Britain and he defended the coalition of Britain and Ottoman (Ahmad, p-49, 1999). Therefore, the revolution of 1908 was a coup d'etat within elite rather than a mass movement (Davison, 1998, p. 127).

Liberalist Kamil Pasha who was supported by Britain was eliminated in 1909. An army of the Unionists were organized in the name of Army of Deliverance commanded by Mahmut Şevket Pasha. The deliverers reached the capital on the 23rd April 1909. The monarch Abdulhamit II was sent to the exile in Salonika and instead Sultan Mehmet Reşat became the new emperor. Therefore 1909 was the exact year for the CUP domination in Ottoman society (Price, p-90, 1962).

Before the military intervention of the CUP, the political arena was full of contradictions. The Islamic wing of Turks was organized under a *Bektashi* dervish named Vahdeti and Muhammedan Union declared its foundation in April 1909 at Santa Sophia (Lewis, p-215, 1961). Lately, the private Albanian soldiers of the monarch Abdulhamit II occupied the Assembly on 13th April (Price, p-92, 1962).

The independence demands of the ethnic groups within the empire increased, especially in Macedonia and the coalition between Britain and Russia who was the classical enemy of the Ottomans broke down the expectations about British support for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. Because of the naval competition between Germany and Britain, Britain was looking for a new ally. This undermined the legitimization of Kamil Pasha's policies (Price, 1962, p. 90).

The military intervention of the Unionists in 1909 started the intrusion of army into politics (Lewis, p-227, 1961). At the same time the process of taking religion under state control started. Since the occupation of the Assembly by the conservative-Islamist soldiers of the monarch in April 1909 which is known as the 31st March Event according to the Gregorian calendar, this date is a turning point in

Turkish history. The Islamist soldiers of Abdulhamit II claimed that the constitution took the place of *Sheri' at* and they were under the influence of Muhammedan Union's propaganda. After the military intervention of the Unionists and modernist soldiers of the CUP led by Mahmut Şevket Pasha, Islamist movements and religion in general were started to be seen as one of the main obstacles in front of Turkish modernization (Ahmad, 1999, p. 49-50)

While the Ottoman Empire had to deal with internal unrest, in the international arena, the Ottoman Empire came face to face with the risk of collapse. The first ethnic groups which started the break from the Empire were the Balkan nations. Against the Christian ethnic groups and the occupation of Anatolia by the imperialist Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire had fought the Tripoli Tania and Balkan Wars. These wars gave a shape to the Ottoman political thoughts and state ideology. The separation of the Christian Balkan nations from the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of North Africa by Western countries made the Ottoman Empire be much more Islam centric, and the Empire started to use Islam as a bond to keep the Muslim public unified. Islam as a source of the Empire's legitimacy has become a face of Turkish secularization until today. The relation between the center and the periphery (between the state and its subjects) had been established through religion in the Ottoman Empire, as Mardin argues (1993, pp. 11-22). This tradition of the Ottoman Empire still continues in the Turkish secularization model. By standardizing Islam, Islam became much more suitable as the state's legitimacy source for the Turkish modernization project; and through which the Turkish nation-state addresses the masses as it will be discussed through the selected khutbas. Islam has gained a role in the Kemalist modernization and Turkish nation-state formation. Kemalist elite gave a "modern" and "nationalist" shape to Islam (Lewis, 1998, p. 408). As a result Islam became a functional element in the Turkish nation-state building project.

2.1.2. Tripoli Tania and the Balkan Wars

Ottoman Empire in the era of Young Turks was under the pressure of ethnic and regional independence demands, as well as the interests of the great power

states. Austria sized Bosnia Herzegovina; Bulgaria declared her independence and Crete announced her union with Greece (Lewis, 1962, p. 210).

In North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia were under the occupation of France, while Egypt was occupied by England to control the trade routes to the English colonies in India. North Africa became the arena of colonization where France and England competed for. Italy had no advantage in the Congress in Berlin, and as a result Italy attacked the Ottomans in Tripoli Tania in September 1911. The defense of the Ottoman was too difficult, since there was no direct boundary with Tripoli Tania. To cut off the only way, the routes through the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, Italian Navy closed the Dardanelles, occupied some islands in the Aegean Sea and attacked on some ports in Syria and Lebanon. To organize a local resistance against Italians, some volunteer officers from the CUP went to Tripoli Tania and organized the local people. However, attacks of the Balkan states as well as government changes in Istanbul, the Ottomans had lost their only remaining in the North Africa (Akşin, 2002, pp. 37-38).

With the decline of the Ottoman power, the Balkan nations had the opportunity to end the Ottoman sovereignty in Tracie. The coalition among Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Monte Negro was strongly supported by England and Russia. The Ottoman army was totally unsuccessful in the wars that occurred in Kosovo and Komanova with the Serbs, and in Kırklareli and Lüleburgaz with the Bulgarians. With the loss of Edirne, the Balkan lands until Çatalca went out of Ottoman control. The First Balkan War created a government change with a military coup of the CUP (by Enver and Talat Pashas) in Babıali. The liberal cabinet of Kamil Pasha, who supported English policies, has been replaced with the cabinet of Sait Halim Pasha (Akşin, 2002, pp. 40-44).

Following these developments, the Balkan states fell into disagreement about sharing the Tracie among them. This opportunity gave Edirne back to Ottoman back with the İstanbul Agreement on the 29th September 1913. Edirne which was the second capital city in the Ottoman history increased the popularity of the CUP (Akşin, 2002, p. 50).

The separation of the Christian ethnic minorities from the Ottoman state with the help of the Great Powers and the occupation of some lands by the imperialist

countries, such as Italy occupying Tripoli Tania, and England occupying Egypt, forced the Ottoman administration to focus on Islam as a bond to keep Turks and Arabs unified. To prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman subjects, the Empire had to empower its legitimacy; therefore religion was selected as legitimizing source for state sovereignty on Muslim subjects. The Ottoman intellectuals tried to find solutions for these separatist movements of its subjects and strengthen state sovereignty. These intellectual thoughts, which affected state policies varied from Pan-Islamism to Ottomanism. To understand the intellectual atmosphere at that time which shaped state policies regarding to unity of its subjects, these political thoughts must be well defined and discussed.

2.1.3. The Major Political Thoughts during the Late Ottoman Period

Ottomanism: Ottomanism was the heritage of the Tanzimat era and the creed of the Young Turks revolution of 1908. This political trend argued for the equality of all subjects in the Ottoman society. It developed as a counter argument for the separatist tendencies and nationalist movements springing from Western Europe. A law that banned in 1909 of 1909 all political associations formed on the basis of national and ethnic claims was a concrete example of Ottomanism. It aimed to create a new Ottoman society under the Imperial Sovereignty and it also appeared as a major principle in the program of the CUP as well as the basic policy of the Young Turks government that was formed in 1908. However, the formation of the independent Balkan states and the separatist movements among Arabs caused the transformation of Ottomanism to Turkism (Lewis, 1962, pp. 333-334 and Davison, 1998, pp. 128-129).

Pan-Islamism: The expanding of Western imperialism on the world scale created a reflection among all Muslims. British occupation in India and Egypt, Russian occupation in Central Asia, French occupation in Tunisia and Morocco, Italian occupation in Tripoli Tania and the German occupation in Dar es-Salaam can be given as examples of Western expansion on Muslim lands. These occupations and the independences of the Christian communities of the Ottoman society triggered a pan-Islamist ideology among the Ottoman intellectuals. They claimed

that the Ottoman Sultan was at the same time a caliphate, therefore the Imperial Sovereignty had the duty of unifying and protecting all Muslims. Namık Kemal was the most famous figure of this thought. ‘*Sebillürreşad*’ and ‘*Sırat-i Müstakim*’ were the journals of pan-Islamism (Lewis, 1962, pp. 334-335 and Akşin, 2002, p. 46).

Westernism: Prince Sabahattin and the journals of ‘*Servet-I Fünun*’, ‘*Ulum-I İktisadiye ve İctimaiye*’ and ‘*İctihat*’ represented the thought of Westernization through Anglo-Saxon model and positivism (Akşin, 2002, p. 46).

Turkism: The failure of pan-Islamism and Ottomanism because of the separatist movement among Arabs and Christians provoked the model of Turkification. The word ‘Turk’ has began to be used by a growing number of Turks to describe themselves. Ziya Gökalp, born and educated in Anatolia, was the philosopher and the journalistic exponent of Turkism. He believed that a social and cultural revolution should be carried out to improve the consciousness of belonging to the Turkish nation. ‘Turkish Homeland’ and ‘Turkish Herat’s’ were founded to foster adult education and to popularize Turkish culture (Davison, 1998, p. 130).

Socialism: The last and the weakest trend was socialism. This thought was represented by the Ottoman Socialist Party and the journal of ‘*İştirak*’ published by Hüseyin Hilmi (Akşin, 2002, p. 49).

Secularization is not only a political process but also it is a social transformation at any level of a society, such as law, education and family life. Under the authority of the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress in the Ottoman administration, bases of secularization were established. The process of secularization in Turkish history is a continual process dating back to the late Ottoman period, and the achievements of the Young Turks regarding secularization had a crucial impact on the secularization process during the early republican period.

2.1.4. The Achievements of the Young Turks and Secularization

While the era of the Young Turks was marked with several political crisis and wars, there were also important improvements in economic, educational, social and administrative areas. In economics, the right of ownership of real estate,

outlawing of internal customs, outlawing of the tariffs of importing industrial investment machines and equipments were some of the economic measures taken for improvement of the economy. In the Aegean Region, the Company of *İncir Himaye-I Zürra* was founded in 1911 to improve agricultural production and exporting. To encourage the consumption of local goods, *İstihlak-I Milli Cemiyeti* was established in 1912. While between 1886-1908 twenty four industrial companies were founded with a total capital of 40, 2 million *Kuruş*, the capital of the industrial investment between 1909-1913 was 79, 2 million *Kuruş* and the total number of the companies was 27. The increase in capital was nine times each year, and five times for company number each year (Akşin, 2002, p. 45).

The budget of the Ministry of Education also increased from 200,000 Liras in 1904 to 1,230,000 Liras in 1914. The number of high school was 79 in 1908, while it was 95 in 1914 (Akşin, 2002, p. 45). They created a new system of secular primary and secondary schools, teacher training colleges and they reorganized the structure of the University of Istanbul. The major change in education was the extension of educational opportunities for girls. The Young Turks regime opened the doors of primary and secondary schools than the doors of the University of Istanbul to the girls. The nurse and teacher training colleges prepared a way for women to enter the public life and to work in service sector as professionals (Lewis, 1962, pp. 224-225).

A new and effective municipal organization provided for the administrative affairs of cities. The reorganization of police was achieved and public transport services were founded. The new style of gendarmerie initiated under the control of the Interior Ministry by a law of February 1912. The old method of reckoning time replaced with the European twenty-four hour in a day system (Lewis, 1962, pp. 223-224).

Other than education, there was also a secularization process in the domain of family and law. For instance, in 1917 a new family law was approved. It was a great step in woman rights. This law gave some rights to women within marriage and ignored some religious codes about marriage. The religious courts were given under the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry. It brought a modern and secular

authority above religious hierarchy and it outlawed the religious authority of *Şeyh-ül İslam* on courts and secularized the affairs of justice (Lewis, 1962, p. 225).

In fact, the secularization process in Ottoman started before the power of the Young Turks and the Second Constitutional Monarchy period. The first secular criminal law was applied in 1858 and in 1869 first secular (*nizami*) courts were founded. Profession of a barrister started in 1879 (Deringil, 2002, p. 54). However the social transformation that occurred in the Ottoman society was much more rapid and deeper under the CUP administration than the previous decades.

As it was mentioned in the introduction part, there is no one type of secularization both in definition and in application. It differs from time to time, and from society to society. In the secularization process that the Ottoman Empire had experienced, there was an integration of Islamic and statist discourses as a result of using Islam for the state's legitimacy since the state used Islam as a source of its legitimacy. State control over religion to strengthen the state sovereignty on the subjects created a sort of integration of the state and the religious affairs under the Ottoman administration. The Ottoman secularization can be characterized as state control and manipulation of religion for legitimizing state power and unifying the subjects.

2.1.5. The Merging of State Discourse and Religious Discourse and State Control over Religion during the Late Ottoman Period

From the first decades of the 19th century, due to losing land during the Balkan Wars and ethnic movements demanding separation, Ottoman elites started criticizing the legitimacy of state authority (*Devlet-i Aliyye*). To keep the public in unity, including different ethnic and religious minorities, both Islamic and national motifs were incorporated into the Ottoman state discourse and into the discourse of Sultan Abdulhamit II. The position of the Sultan as the Caliphate of all the Muslims all over the world was the primary emphasis and consequently a religious-ethnic proto-nationalism was created. In the sovereignty arena of Ottoman, national features were supported by religious legitimating (Deringil, 2002: pp. 54-55).

Coherent with the reforms and transformations in this era, the basis of formal nationalism was established by the Sultan to build state sovereignty on the subjects. In other words, the separation of Christian subjects from the Ottoman Empire created a new need to keep the all Muslim subjects together (Deringil, 2002, pp. 56-57).

The legitimating of state authority through religion, i.e. Islam, was based on Hannifin denomination of Islam which was represented as a new orthodoxy. Since this denomination was the most familiar denomination to the Ottoman sultans, Hannifin was accepted as the formal denomination. (*mezheb-I resmiyye*). According to the Hannifin sect of Islam, any person whether from the holly *Kureysh* tribe or not (the origin of that person is not important) can be the Caliphate if he protects Islam and highlights *Shari at*. This denomination was purified from the elements of Arab nationalism; therefore the Hannifin sect was the best denomination which legitimized the (non-Arab) Ottoman sultan's authority over Islam as the caliphate (Deringil, 2002, p. 57).

In the era of the Sultan Abdulhamit II, it was agreed that all Korans would be published by the state. 1276 numbered law was forbidding the entire of the Korans published in Iran and Russia, which were written according to other denominations. Not only Shiite Korans, the Korans published in El-Ezher, Egypt were also forbidden, while they were written in Sunni discourse. Moreover, to eliminate the danger against the legitimating of the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate, a commission was founded to control and approve the Koran publications in the Ottoman land (*Tedkiki Mushaf-i Şerif Komisyonu*) (Deringil, 2002, pp. 61-63).

In fact, before the era of Abdulhamit II, a social dualism began to develop in the Ottoman society: On the one hand, there was bureaucratic elite representing the Ottoman High culture and Orthodox-Sunni Islam; on the other hand, there was ruled mass tied to the traditional Turkish culture and Heterodox-Folk Islam (like the Alevi people) (Mardin, 1993, p. 126). Mardin sees the religion in the core different from the religion in the periphery. He puts Sunni Islam in the core, while according to Mardin; heterodox Islam is in the periphery as the Folk Islam. The relations between the state and the subjects were being established through religion in the Ottoman society (Mardin, 1993, p. 127). In the Ottoman social structure Sunni Islam was

closed to ruling class and state bureaucracy. It was very useful for the Sultan Abdulhamit to select the Sunni Islam as state religion. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, names the Sunni Islam representing the authority as “classical Ottoman Islam”. Classical Ottoman Islam was institutionalized by the Ulema (religious clergy) and centralized by state bureaucracy and representing Sunni Islam. This variety of Islam adds holiness to the concept of state and legitimizes the authority of state bureaucracy and the absolute monarch. The obedience to state is one of the main principles and it is seen as worship (*Ul-ül emre itaat*) (1999, pp. 85-89). The obedience to the state authority is, at the same time, seen as worship to God. This form of obedience based on religion was made a political doctrine by the Ottoman state to legitimize its authority through the conceptualization of “*din-ü devlet*” (state’s religion) (Vergin, 2000, p. 74).

Other than aiming the legitimizing of his authority, Abdulhamit II tried to keep his subjects together by this policy. After the Balkan nations became independent, the majority of the Ottoman public dominantly became composed of Muslim groups including the Turks, Kurds, Caucasians, and Arabs. The institution of the Caliphate could be used not only over the Muslims living in the Ottoman lands, but also over all the Muslims living in Central Asia, North Africa and South Asia. As a result of the transformations in the Ottoman society after the wars, Islam, according to Mardin, has gained a political function in this era of Ottoman (1993, pp. 19-21). The politization of Islam was a process of state religion establishment according to state authority and legitimacy. The established state Islam in the core which is Sunni orthodox Islam was used to rule the subjects. It was a relation between state and subjects through religion.

Nur Vergin gives us another reason for Orthodox-Sunni Islam becoming “*mezheb-i resmiyye*”: It is the oppositional nature of the Alevi sect as a heterodox and folk form of Islam in Anatolia. For the Ottoman monarchs, the Shahs of Safavis in Iran were their main rivals and the Alevi masses felt themselves close to the Safavi State in Iran. Consequently, some common characteristics between the Alevi and Shia Islam was a great effect on the state’s attitude towards the Alevi subjects (2000, pp. 66-83).

Vergin differentiates classical European theocratic states from the Ottoman Empire. She claims that theocratic states take their power from religion and in those states religion and state composes an organic whole. She gives examples from some “church-states” of middle-age Europe. State was dependent on religion instead of religion’s dependency on state. Later, in the 19th century, to establish national churches and a tendency to base the state’s authority on religion began to develop. Vergin refers some European thinkers such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau about the creation of a religion in the service of nation and state (2000, pp. 100-101).

On the other hand, Vergin does not see the Ottoman Empire as a theocratic state. She suggests seeing the difference between a theocratic state and a state which regulates religion. In other words, the existence of a official religion under state control and the definition of an official religion in constitution (like in *Kanun-i Esasi* and 1924 Constitution of Turkish Republic) does not mean a theocratic state which is ordered totally by religion (2000, pp. 104-105).

We have to deconstruct our stereotypical definition regarding the dualism of secular-theocratic contradictory. The thing or state which is not secular is theocratic in our thoughts. Other than the critiques of Vergin on this misunderstanding (2000, pp 104-105), Berkes also does not see the Ottoman Empire as a theocratic state (1984). The thoughts brought by Vergin and Berkes clearly show that there cannot be a sharp distinction between the Ottoman Empire and the modern Turkish Republic regarding as theocratic and secular. I have mentioned before that there is continuity in state tradition regarding to state-religion relations from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. As Mardin states that the relations between state and subjects was constructed through religion and he puts state and orthodox Sunni Islam in the core, and the subjects and heterodox Islam in the periphery. This type of relation is still existing in practice through the Religious Affairs Directory today. The state addresses the subjects, as it can be seen in the khutbas clearly, through religion, especially through the Sunni Islam. It cannot be claimed that the Ottoman Empire was a theocratic state; however, the continuity of this state tradition in the modern Turkish Republic is not a secular policy according to the secularism definition of the Turkish republican ideology. While the Turkish secularism is

continuing as a project, Turkish secularization includes some Ottoman traditions. Turkish republican project aims modernization and westernization which excludes religious elements such as *tarikats*, *fez*, and non-positivist world view; on the other hand this project aims to establish a national identity which includes muslimness.

Inalcık, too, argues that the Ottoman state was not a theocratic state. He stated that the function of Islam was a legitimating tool for the Ottoman Dynasty (1992) and that Islam alone was not enough for social regulation. State leaned its legitimacy on customs and public laws prepared by the sultans (1993). Islam as an ideological source was not enough to regulate the society in every aspect to maintain unity in the Ottoman Empire. While Sharia provided powerful orders about family, private life, and civil law, it was not that influential for the most part of public and political life, thus the Ottoman law system had to be filled by customs and the public laws issued by some of the sultans such as Fatih Sultan Mehmet. Özek supports the ideas of İnalcık who argues that state was accepted as superior than religion and non-religious law existed in Ottoman society (1998, p. 366).

2.2. The First World War (1914-1918)

The period of the First World War is the turning point in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In the aftermath of the war Anatolia was occupied by the imperialist Great Powers and this formed the motivation for the establishment of the new Turkish Republic. At the same time, the First World War initiated the transformation of the Ottoman society from an empire to a modern Turkish nation-state, thus it has a great importance for the process of Turkish nation-state building. While it is stated in this study that secularization is a part of Turkish nation-state building process, to analyze the Turkish secularization process in detail, the dynamics of the Turkish nation-state building process as well as the impact of the First World War must be grasped. I now turn to the world wide political developments that took place before the First World War had started.

2.2.1. International Political Developments at the Wake of the First World War

The main reason for the First World War was the colonizing and imperialist competition among European powers. Against the threat from Germany, England made coalition with Russia and France, on the other hand, made secret agreements sharing the Ottoman lands in the Middle East and Anatolia including the occupation of Istanbul by Russia. Although Kamil Pasha Cabinet was supporting British alliance, the coalition between England and Russia who was the Ottoman state's main enemy caused a split between the Ottomans and England. Enver Pasha soon found the new ally which was Germany (Price, 1962, p. 99).

Against the common enemy, i.e. Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Germany made an agreement in August 1914. At the Ottoman side, there were Sadrazam Sait Halim Pasha, Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha and the President of the Assembly Halil Menteşe Bey. Before it was signed, only Germanophil pashas Enver, Talat and Sait Halim knew of the treaty (Davison, 1998, pp. 133, 1998). This agreement was a turning point which took the Ottoman Empire into the war and the German support extended the power of the Enver and Talat Pashas. The crucial event which started the War was the being killed of Austrian Prince and Princess in Sarajevo by Serbian nationalists in June 1914. On 1st August against Russia and in August against France, Germany declared a war ultimatum. In August England waged war against Germany. With these events, the War expanded over Europe (Akşin, 2002, pp. 53-54).

Two German warships in Mediterranean Sea escaped to the Straits and they were added to the Ottoman fleet with their crews and officers. These warships escaping from British warships showed the Ottoman-German alliance in practice. In October 1914, these ships with new names *Yavuz* and *Midilli* bombarded the Russian Ports in Black Sea and Ottoman was included into the War by this action. In November, formal declarations of war on Turkey by Russia, France and Britain followed (Davison, 1998, p. 133 and Akşin, 2002, p. 54).

2.2.2. Major Events of the War

During the First World War, the first front was opened by Russians against the Ottoman in the Caucasus in November 1915. However Enver Pasha had great expectations about the integration of the entire Turkish world in Central Asia with Ottoman Empire. This Pan-Turkist policy failed on in January 1915 with the Sarikamış defeat. While the war started in December 1914, the Ottoman army of 90,000 soldiers commanded by Enver Pasha was defeated; and 60,000 soldiers died because of the cold weather conditions without any success in Sarikamış (Akşin, 2002, p. 58).

This defeat opened the doors of Eastern Anatolian cities to the Russian troops and Armenian troops, supported by the Russians became involved in separationist movements. Turks and Kurdish tribes with the support of Ottoman troops fought against the Armenians. In 1915 the forced migration of the Armenians living in Eastern Anatolia to Syria created a continuing Armenian problem first for the Ottoman officials and later for the Turkish state. This decision made by Talat Pasha caused the death of around 200,000 Armenians according to Turkish claims; 800,000 Armenians according to Armenian claims (Zürcher, 2000, pp. 169-170; Hovannisian, 1968, pp. 145-168).

The bloodiest front was Gallipoli which was opened by the British and Commonwealth troops to support Russia and to occupy Istanbul. Around 500,000 soldiers died from both sides. The Gallipoli success of the Ottoman military created a great national epic in Turkish history and made Mustafa Kemal a legend, who led the 19th division in Anafartalar against British and Commonwealths troops (Akşin, 2002, p. 59). This war firstly began in February 1915 with the penetration of British and French naval forces into Dardanelles, however troop landings in Gallipoli peninsula led to bloody fighting and in January 1916 Turkish operation became successful in the defense of the Straits (Davison, 1998, p. 135, 1998).

Another fronts in Syria and Mesopotamia, by 1917, ended Turkish withdrawal led by British and Arabic attacks. However, the rebellion of Sheriff Hussein and unsuccessful landing of Ottoman troops in Sine wore out Turkish

troops and Ottoman sovereignty on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Palestine ended (Zürcher, 2000, p. 174, 2000).

2.2.3. The Armistice of Mudros

The agreement which ended the First World War for the Ottomans was signed between the Navigation Minister of Ottoman Hussein Rauf Bey and English Admiral of Black Sea Fleet Cal Thorpe (Zürcher, 2000, p. 194).

The main articles of the agreement were the opening of the Straits to the Entente States, occupation of Eastern Tracie, the Straits, Musul, Antalya, Hatay, and Çukurova, Erzurum, Trabzon, Samsun, Kona, and Eskişehir, discharge and disarmament of the Ottoman Army (Akşin, 2002, p. 69).

2.3. Turkish Independence War and the Foundation of the Republic (1918-1923)

In August 1920, the humiliating treaty for the Ottoman state, the Treaty of Sevres was signed, and according to the Treaty the straits were demilitarized and made open to all ships at all times. The region of İzmir was given to Greek administration; an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were set up in Eastern Anatolia; the capitulations were restored and Turkish finances were put under the Allied control. This treaty was the totally death of the Turkish independence (Davison, 1998, pp. 138-139).

After the Treaty of Sevres, the Turkish Anatolia was occupied and the occupation of İzmir by Greek troops woke up the Turkish nationalist movements. All over Anatolia, there were patriot foundations-defense of rights associations (*müdafa-i hukuk cemiyetleri*) and disordered Turkish resistance by some troops (*kuvayi milliye*) (Zürcher, 2000, p. 216). The only ordered resistance troop was founded by the Sultan around İzmit with 2000 soldiers named *Kuvayi İnzibatiyye* (Zürcher, 2000, p-222).

Mustafa Kemal started the independence movement from Samsun in May 1919. The congresses of Amasya (19th June 1919-21st June 1919), Erzurum (23rd

July 1919-7th August 1919) and Sivas (4th September 1919-11th September 1919) were not only the political movements of Turkish Independence War, but also basis of defining a Turkish Nation and founding a Turkish nation-state (Akşin, 2002, pp. 75-84).

The major wars occurred between Greek and Turkish troops, while the international conjecture prevented British, Italian and French governments from occupying Anatolia. İnönü War (January 1921), Sakarya War (July 1921), Afyon Commander War (August 1922) and taking back of İzmir in September 1922 were the roots of the Turkish Independence War against Greece (Akşin, 2002, pp. 97-107).

In the treaty meeting, in November 1922 the monarchy was outlawed and the possibility of representation of Turkey by Istanbul was eliminated. In July 1923 the Lausanne Treaty was the emergence of a new state and with the establishment of the republic in October 1923 the modern Turkish nation-state was born with the Atatürk decade (Davison, 1998, p. 145-146).

2.3.1. The Impact of Religion during the Independence War

Religious motives were used both by the Ottoman monarch and Mustafa Kemal. Since religion had a great influence in the Ottoman society, it could easily legitimize the political decisions and practices in the public's eye. For instance, Sultan Mehmet VI, to eliminate the nationalist movements of *Kuvayi Milliye* troops and Mustafa Kemal's practices, made Sheikh-ul- Islam issue a *fetva* encouraging the killing of rebels as a religious duty (Davison, 1998, p. 142).

As a counter attack, Mustafa Kemal made Mehmet Rifat Bötekçi-the nationalist *müftü* of Ankara prepare a *fetva* to legitimize his own practices. This *fetva* was printed in the nationalist journals named *Öğüt*, *İrade-I Milliye*, and *Açıksöz* in April 1920. After while, this *fetva* was printed in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* News in May 1920 with the signs of 155 *müftüs* and *Ulema* (Religious clergy). By this *fetva* the Independence War was presented to the Turkish folk as a legitimate struggle (Sarıkoynucu, 2002, pp. 180-182). This example shows us the power of religion in the society and the esteem of the clergy among the people which led

Mustafa Kemal to seek support from influential religious figures to legitimize his attempt against the occupiers and, in a way, against the Ottoman state.

2.4. Secularization – A Continual Process

Studies on secularization in Turkish political history cannot ignore the modernization and westernization processes of late Ottoman society. In the late Ottoman period, secularization was taken as one of the roots of modernization and, although contradictory, secular laws, secular schools and other secular institutions existed side by side with the theocratic ones (Mardin, 1993, Vergin, 2000, Deringil, 2002, and Ocak, 1999). Although there is a practical difference between the Ottoman and Republican experiences of secularization with regards to replacing theocratic institutions with secular ones, the conditions and experiences of the late Ottoman period prepared the ground for the secularizing reforms of the modern Turkish Republic. Furthermore, Mardin also accepts that Atatürk's ideas about religion and secularism have tracks from the secular and reformist bureaucrats of the Ottoman state and there are similarities between the policies of the 19th century Ottoman statesmen and the policies of Atatürk during the early Republican era (1993, p. 39). Therefore, in this study, the process of the Turkish nation-state building, Turkish Westernization, Turkish modernization, and as a crucial part of all, Turkish secularization cannot be thought of as a separate process from the emergence of the Turkish Republic. In the third chapter, the roots of Turkish secularization in the Republic of Turkey will be studied through the historical studies about the Turkish secularization, some arguments on secularization around the studies in administrative law and sociology of religion.

CHAPTER III

THE SECULARIZATION PROCESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Following the Mudros Armistice, allied troops occupied nearly the whole Anatolian territory, and the Treaty of Sevres was signed between the Allies and the Istanbul government which meant the destruction of Anatolian unity. However, after the defeat of the Allies by the nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal, the Armistice of Mudanya and the Treaty of Lausanne were signed with the success of the Turkish Independence War. Our focus in this chapter will be on the period from 1923 onwards during which the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Turkey emerged as an independent state.

The secularization process in Turkish history has also continued during the republican era. However, secularization during the republican era was not a homogenous process; five different periods can be identified according to some differences in the application of the secularization project. In this chapter, the republican period will be examined through five periods, since each period is characterized by different conditions and features. The period of Atatürk was the most influential era since secularization was carried out through radical reforms. In Turkish history, it was the most radical era towards the transformation of the Turkish society on secular lines. However, the single party period where the ruling party was the Republican People's Party, was the period in which the first compensation for religion has occurred, which will be discussed in detail below. The third period was the era of Democratic Party rule signing the rise of right wing politics in Turkish political culture. The fourth is the period that started with the acceptance of the new constitution in 1961 and which continued until its replacement with the 1982 Constitution. The last and fifth era is after 1980s until today. These periods will show slight differences in terms of the official definitions

of “secularism” in the constitutions, institutional practices of the Religious Affairs Directory, and the policies of the state regarding the religious sphere.

3.1. Secularization Movements under the Administration of Atatürk

To extend a secular social structure, Atatürk made many reforms in every aspects of life under the framework of “modernized and westernized Turkish nation-state” project. For this aim, from administration to education, from trade to daily life, all aspects of Turkish society had to be secularized. As Saeed states, in Turkey secularism was seen as the main doctrine for creating a modern republic (1994, p. 157). Additionally he continues: “Through the Caliphate, religion had become a political instrument in the hands of the rulers who manipulated it as they wished. Atatürk was therefore correct in seeking and establishing the principle of separation of religion and state. I must however qualify Atatürk’s idea of the separation of religion and state with an all-important caveat. The separation, essential as it was, should not have meant the relegation of religion to an obscure corner.” (1994, p. 158). Atatürk, in 1926, states about how he understands secularism: “Religion is a conscience issue. All people are free in following their own conscience. We respect religion. We do not oppose thought. We only try to avoid coinciding religious affairs with nation and state affairs and to avoid intentional and actionist conservative movements.” (Din bir vicdan meselesidir. Herkes vicdanının ermine uymakta serbesttir. Biz dine saygı gösteririz. Düşünüşe ve düşünceye karşı değiliz. Biz sadece din işlerini, millet ve devlet işleriyle karıştırmamaya çalışıyor, kasıt ve fiile dayanan tutucu hareketlerden sakınıyoruz.) (www.ataturk.net/ilkeliler/laiklik) The separation of religious affairs from state affairs is the main component of the definition of secularism in Kemalist ideology. The 1926 Civil Law also gives a secularism definition in the “Reason” (Gerekçe) part of the law, and it is a sort of official understanding of secularism:

Today the Republic of Turkey has not got a civil law. There is only *Mecelle* (Islamic version of civil law) containing little amount of agreements. Today, 300 of 1851 articles of *Mecelle* can be applied. The base of *Mecelle* is religion. However, human life faces changes day by day...The states whose laws are based on religion cannot, after a while, provide needs of their nations, since religions include unchangeable rules. During life, religions do

not include anything more than dead forms and words. Being static is essential for religions. As a result, being only a conscience issue for religions is a factor separates the old civilizations from the new ones. The laws based on religion keep their societies from progress. Being deprived of a civil law which regulates national social life for the Republic of Turkey does not suit the meaning and concepts of the Turkish revolution and contemporary civilizations. Under the light of this aim, the prepared Turkish Civil Law was taken from the Swiss Civil Law which is perfect and populist among the contemporary nations.

Bugün Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin bir Medeni Kanunu yoktur. Yalnızca, sözleşmelerin küçük bir bölümünü kapsayan Mecelle vardır. 1851 maddeden oluşan bu yasanın, günümüzde uygulanabilen üçyüz maddesi vardır. Mecellenin esası ve ana çizgileri dindir. Oysa insane yaşamı, hergün, hatta heran, değişimlerle karşı karşıyadır...Kanunları dine dayalı olan devletler kısa bir süre sonar ülkenin ve ulusun gereksinimlerini karşılayamazlar. Çünkü dinler değişmez hükümleri açıklarlar. Yaşam süreci içinde, biçimden ve ölü sözcüklerden fazla bir değer ve anlam içermezler. Değişmemek dinler için bir zorunluluktur. Bu nedenle, dinlerin yalnız bir vicdan işi olarak kalması, çağımız uygarlığının esaslarından ve eski uygarlıkla yeni uygarlığın ayırmaçlarından biridir. Özünü dinden alan kanunlar, uygulandıkları toplumları, indirildikleri çağlara bağlarlar ve ilerlemeyi önleyen önemli etki ve nedenler arasında bulunurlar. Ulusal sosyal yaşamın düzenleyicisi olan ve yalnız ondan esinlenmiş olması gereken bir Medeni Kanun'dan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin yoksun kalması, ne yüzyılımızın uygarlık gerekleriyle ne de Türk ihtilalinin kapsadığı anlam ve kavramlarla uyuşamaz. Bu amaçla hazırlanan Türk Medeni Kanunu, uygar uluslar arasında en kusursuz ve halkçı olan İsviçre Medeni Kanunu'ndan alınmıştır.

(Erüreten, pp. 84-85, 1998)

The reforms related to creating a secular society, led by Atatürk can be listed as follows: In social life, polygamy was prohibited in 1925 and civil marriage was made compulsory in 1926. Women were given equal rights with men to hold office in 1934. The fez was forbidden and replaced by European hats and caps with a declaration in Kastamonu in 1925. Religious orders and societies like *tarikât* and *tekke* were closed and members of the religious clergy were forced to wear a uniform-dress prescribed by the state in 1925. A new civil code based on European model replaced the Islamic one in 1926. The Turkish state was declared officially secular in 1928. In the same year, The Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin alphabet. The Gregorian calendar and Sunday as the weekly official holiday were

adopted together with Western type of measurement in 1926 and 1935 taking into consideration the commercial interests of the state (Saeed, 1994, p. 160).

These reforms show that secularization was achieved not only in the constitutional law, but also in social life. However, it is clearly seen that these reforms were made by the state, without any demand from the subjects. Secularization occurred under state control, in the amount that state let, in other words, its limits were also set by the state itself

However, the most crucial reform for secularization was the outlawing of the Monarch and the sovereignty of the Ottoman family on the society in November 1922 with the declaration of the Republic in October 1923 and with the Law numbered 364, it was announced that sovereignty is unconditionally owned by the nation. (“Hakimiyet, bila kaydü şart milletindir.” in Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanununun Bazı Mevaddının Tavzihan Tadiline Dair Kanun). The prohibition of religious institutions of the Ottoman society (429 sayılı Şer’iye ve Evkaf ve Erkan-ı Harbiye-I Umumiye Vekaletlerinin İlgasına Dair Kanun), the law of educational unification (430 sayılı Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), the outlawing of the Caliphate (431 sayılı Hilafetin İlgasına ve Hanedan-ı Osmani’nin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Memaliki Haricine Çıkarılmasına Dair Kanun) were all realized in 1924 (Tarhanlı, 1993, p. 17).

However, in 1924 the constitution, Islam was still accepted as the formal religion in Turkey and this remained the same until April 1928. “Laic” feature of the state was made lawful in constitution in February 1937 with the law numbered 3115 (Tarhanlı, 1993, pp. 18-19). The omitting of the article regarding to Islam as the formal religion in Turkey from the 1924 Constitution made the constitution gain a secular feature.

Not only by legal arrangements has Kemalist modernization achieved the secularization of Turkish identity. In the songs, myths, dances, all forms of culture, it was attempted to construct non-Islamic and folkloric Turkish identity which would well suit the secular-republican society of a nation-state. The new Turkish historiography described Turkish history as preceding the Ottoman history and Islam. The aim was to construct an ancient Turkish history extending from Middle Asia to Central Europe. The new Turkish historiography claimed that the Turks did

not belong to any particular religion like Islam. Throughout the ancient Turkish history they were Buddhist, Shamanist, Judaist, Manicheist, or Christian. The new secular portrait of Turkish identity highlighted cultural features of Turkish history rather than religion (Saeed, 1994, pp. 176-177). However, Saeed criticizes Kemalist secularization. He claims that: ‘The state, under the reins of the Kemalist elite, acted under the illusion that cultural change could be imposed from above through the force of law. Although some of the reforms of the Kemalists in the religious sphere were extremely necessary and urgent, and therefore fully justified, the reformers did not probe deeper to discover what was wrong with the prevalent Islamic religious ideas that had so decayed the Turkish society, and how to correct the situation.’ (1994, pp. 164-165).

It can be understood from the words of Saeed that Turkish secularization attempted to repress the religious practices of society and take Islam under the control of the state. There is continuity between the models of Ottoman secularization and Turkish secularization. Ottoman modernization and the social transformation of the Turkish community were rather new and state handed processes, Turkish secularization had to be necessarily state handed and Islam had to be taken under state control and standardization. Controlled and standardized Islam during the period of late Ottoman modernization and during time of Abdulhamit II was once again taken under state control in Kemalist Turkey. Religious clergy became state officers as was the case during the late Ottoman period. Moreover, similar to the religious state institution, Evkaf ve Şeriye Vekaleti and Şey-ül İslamlık, there is a religious state institution named Religious Affairs Directory in Turkey established during the early republican period in 1924. This idea regarding to continuity of religious institutions is one of the main hypothesis of this study and will be discussed further in the next chapter. Since the establishment of the Religious Affairs Directory does not mean the absolute separation of religion and state affairs in line with the official definition of laicism in the Turkish Constitution, it signifies a case of state intervention in religion. There is not only one kind of laicism; it differs from one country to another. The aim of this study is not to compare Turkey with other Western countries. However, the Turkish case represents a unique definition and application of secularism. The constitutional

definition of laicism on the one hand, and its institutional application (the Religious Affairs Directory) on the other hand are different and thus contrast one another. This unique case, which is not really a separation of state and religious affairs, makes the form and nature of the Turkish state a controversial issue.

The most significant element of Kemalist secularization, as Ocak argues, is the objective to take Islam under state control and to cease the influence of religion in political, social and cultural spheres. With laicism as the ideology of the state, a secular culture and a secular lifestyle was aimed to be developed by the republican elite. However, the Turkish public did not applaud this emergent secular identity and as Ocak gives the results of the general election in 1950. The result of the election was the power of the Democratic Party in right wing (1999, p. 104).

Not only after 1950, in the period of Kemal Atatürk, did the new secular Turkish identity not take deep root in the whole of Anatolia. It was limited around the bureaucratic elite of the new republic in Ankara. According to a social anthropologist Paul Stirling the masses in Anatolian cities other than the capital city Ankara and the biggest city Istanbul, and especially rural Turkey were not aware of the new regime and secularization (1965).

If we consider the fact that the majority of the Turkish population lived in rural and agricultural towns, secularization did not directly affect daily lives of Turkish peasants. Mardin introduces another view which supports this idea that Kemalist modernization cut off the two main sources of religious power in Turkey by preventing the class of *ilmiye* and *tarikats*. However, because of the limited affect of Kemalist secularization on the Muslim Turkish public, this policy created a void in the spiritual and everyday life of the masses. As a result, “the laic Jacobinism” of 1920s, of the early republican period, had to be changed accordingly. (1993, p. 123).

Another problematic issue is the one about whether there is continuity between the secularization practices of Ottoman society and the laicist policies of the early republican period. Ocak states that the arguments around secularization that were developed during the period late of Ottoman Empire were brought to the republican era after 1923 (1999, p. 106). Mustafa Kemal, before the establishment of the Republic, must definitely have been affected by those arguments. Şerif

Mardin also looks at the issue in a similar way. He claims that Atatürk took over the tradition of the Young Ottomans (1993, p. 121). While Lindisfarne, criticizes the republican historiography and the tendency towards sharply separating the Ottoman period from the republican era. She also claims that not only some significant institutions or cultural fragments, but also the fundamentalist feature of Ottoman was reflected into the Turkish nationalist laicism (Lindisfarne, 2002). Özturanlı names the Turkish model of secularization as “nationalist laicism” and he argues that there is continuity between the past and the present: “... in Turkey, religious affairs were not given to a religious community free from state, religion services were given into state hand as in previous.” (1999, p. 49). This argument also implies that there is continuity between the late Ottoman period and the republican period in term of the process of secularizations. The common point is that the state handed religious affairs as a public service. There was a great fear about the manipulation of Islam as a resistance movement against the legitimacy of the Turkish state by some religious groups, *tarikats*, both during the late Ottoman period and in modern Turkey.

Both Ocak and Mardin advocate the view that Kemalist secularization was highly influenced by the positivist understanding of French secularization and by the Durkheimian conception of modern state thought which religion became marginalized and a civic consciousness developed which were both dominant in minds of the Young Ottomans as well as Atatürk (Ocak, 1999 and Mardin, 1993). In addition Vergin finds a similar relation between French and Turkish secularization. She names the state controlled secularization as “laicism” which I follow in this study. “Laicist” state marginalizes, manipulates or reshapes the religion and sees secularization as an obligatory state ideology (Vergin, 2000, p. 119).

While Islam was taken under full state control and Islamic practices and institutions were omitted from the new cultural formation and from the process of Turkish identity construction during the early republican period, after Atatürk’s death Republican People’s Party had to experience the first “compensations” in the issue of secularization. The state controlled laicism imposed by the Kemalist elite could not diffuse into the whole of the society and consequently the government could not resist against some of the religious demands made by the people since the

breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore the period of the Republican People's Party rule which began after Atatürk' death differs from the Atatürk administration and it can be taken as the second period in the process of secularization of the Turkish Republic.

3.2. Republican People's Party without Atatürk-First Diverting from Secularization

The Muslim identity of people under state pressure started to resist against formal ideological laicism after 1940s. Until these years, the affect of the reforms of the new Republic was not yet felt by the masses. However, the religious demands of the people to freely perform their religious practices became an important source of pressure on the government.

Republican People's Party decided to soften its statist policies on secularization and in 1947 the persons who want to go to pilgrimage to Mecca were allotted foreign currency. In primary school education program, religion courses were included based on the request made by some parliamenters in 1949 and Imam-hatip courses were opened in Istanbul and Ankara under the control of the Ministry of Education. The Faculty of Theology in Ankara University was opened in 1949 and in 1950 religious tombs were also opened for visit (Tarhanlı, 1993, pp. 23-24 and Mardin, 1993, p. 124).

At the same time, the government tried to balance the demands of the public and new regulations about religious affairs took place by adding the article numbered 163 into penalty law. This article was a measure taken against any action against laicism. However, these policies were not enough for Republican People's Party to maintain its power. In the May 1950 general election, against 69 chairs of Republican People's Party, Democratic Party (DP) became dominant in the parliament with 408 chairs (Zürcher, 2000, p. 321).

Zürcher criticizes the attitude of the Republican People's Party towards Islam. It was a policy of standardization of Islam and the concept of Kemalist secularization was based on positivist understanding similar to the comprehension of the unionists and the Young Turks in the Ottoman society. Different from the church

and state separation, religion must be a part of state bureaucracy and in obedience (Zürcher, 2000, p. 338).

The gap between the public in general and the government brought the end of the Republican People's Party power. The strict policies regarding Kemalist secularism in spite of people's demands concerning much more freedom in religious practices strengthened the conservative politicians. The conservatives now opened a new decade in the history of Turkish secularization with the strengthening of the power of the Democratic Party.

3.3. Democratic Party Power and the Manipulation of Islam

The DP power was the main actor in Turkish political life between 1950 and 1960. The gap between the Muslim identity and the demands regarding much more freedom in religious practices of Turkish society and suppression of religion by the previous regime strengthened the position of the Democratic Party in the elections of May 1950.

To divert from the Kemalist laic reforms continued in this period. On June 16, 1950, the prohibition of Arabic azan was outlawed. The religious education in primary schools became half-obligatory in January 1951 and in the same year new imam-hatip schools were opened. In September 1956, religion education was added into the education curriculum of secondary schools and the government also decided to establish High Institutes of Islam (Tarhanlı, 1993, pp. 26-27).

The success of the DP in the elections was the result of the campaigns against the Republican People's Party regarding the issues related to religion. The policies of the Republican People's Party concerning religion were deeply criticized and the majority of the electorate selected the DP because of its discourse about religion. The Nurist electorate, who were conservative members of the *Nur tarikat*, had a great importance in the increasing the power of the DP (Zürcher, 2000, pp. 338-341). Therefore, during the period of the DP rule, Islam was manipulated to strengthen the power of the party. As a result, the masses which supported the DP demanded the softening of the laic policies. The DP could not resist these demands and the integration of the religion with state bureaucracy continued through the

policies of the Religious Affairs Directory. Furthermore, the policies of the DP later became a route to be followed by the future conservative parties in Turkish politics, such as the National Order Party, and the National Welfare Party. The manipulation of Islam according to the interests of the political parties became a tradition in Turkish politics. Consequently, the institution of religion was transformed into a control mechanism of the masses (Toprak, 1979).

On the other hand, the religious policies of the DP and to divert from Kemalist secularism made by the government faced a reaction from the Kemalist elite and the military bureaucracy. The economic deprivations that the Turkish public suffered from could not be solved totally by the economic policies of the government. The period of the DP rule ended with a military coup in May 1960 and a new constitution was prepared in the aftermath. The position of the Religious Affairs Directory in the 1961 Constitution was another side in the history of Turkish secularization which I now discuss below.

3.4. The Religious Affairs Directory in the Constitution of 1961

The 1961 Constitution redefined the Turkish secularization in details and also defined the Religious Affairs Directory as a constitutional institution. Therefore, this constitution has a great importance in terms of the integration of religious and state affairs in Turkey (Tarhanlı, 1993, p. 30).

Between 1945 and 1960, religious principles of secular Kemalist regime faced some reactions not only from conservative wing but also from the Muslim masses. As a result, in the name of restoring religious freedom and development of democracy, Republican People's Party and Democratic Party made many concessions made for religion in the field of secularism (Berkes, 1964, p. 503). However, the constitutional institutionalizing of the Religious Affairs Directory in the 1961 Constitution is a sort of turning point in the concessions made for religion. Unlike the Kemalist understanding of secularism, it means a religion under state control. By redefining the position of the Religious Affairs Directory, manipulating and controlling Islam institutionalized by state's hand.

Daver gives three types of relationship between the state and religion: The first is a system of state under the hegemony of religion (Papisme), the second is a system of the religion under the hegemony of state (Césarisme), and finally a system of separation of state from religion (Secular system) (1955, p. 56). Many administrative law scholars put the Turkish system in the second category. In western countries, such as in the USA, the federal state does not provide any financial support to the religious institutions. Moreover, in France, financial support to religious institutions was outlawed by the 9th December 1905 Law. Financial support is seen as an obstacle to state's neutrality in the West, while in Islamic countries including Turkey, religion is accepted as a public service provided by the state (Daver, 1955, pp. 63-64).

Not only Daver but also other lawyers who are specialist in administrative and constitutional law and other scholars see the existing situation or the existing practice as irrelevant or counter to the secular principles of the Turkish Republic. They argue that the religious affairs being provided by the state as a public service, religious education being provided by the state and religious officers being tied to the state are other contradictory practices to secularist principle (Onar, 1952, Derbil, 1949, Başgil, 1950, Savcı, 1947, Karal, 1954, Yalman, 1951, Adıvar, 1954, Nadi, 1950, and Esen, 1951).

In the 1982 Constitution, the role of the Religious Affairs Directory was enlarged to provide the unity and solidarity of the Turkish nation. Furthermore, religion courses at primary and secondary schools were made compulsory (Tarhanlı, 1993: 35-36). Tarhanlı defines the period after 1980s as "Islamization of the society by the state" (1993, p. 37). I agree with Tarhanlı that state now not only controls Islam, but also uses it as its own ideological source to reproduce the system.

Daver and other law academicians compare Turkish laicism with Western cases, and they argue against the idea that the state is responsible for religious affairs as a public service. In other words, they argue that to define religious service, such as religious education and providing *imam* to people, as a public service and the idea that state is the only institution that can provide it are contradictory to the definition of Kemalist secularism.

As it was mentioned before, this study does not aim to compare the Turkish model of secularism with any other model, since there is not only one type of secularism. In practice, scholars may find some common points in various different forms of secularization, such as the declining role or power of religion in everyday life and in worldly affairs. However, the ways through which secularism is defined and applied show variations in different cases. In one country, secularism might come to the fore by the movements and demands of its subjects, whereas in another country; it might exist as a project to be applied by the state. In Turkey, there was no chance to establish a secular society as a result of a natural process or by a demand from subjects. In Turkey secularization had to be developed by the state, since Turkish modernization and nation-state building was both projects of the Turkish elite. In addition, it was aimed that Islam should be modernized and standardized as part of modernization project of the military-bureaucratic elite who were the builders of the modern Turkish state. Therefore, religion had to be taken under state control and *tarikats* (religious brotherhoods) had to be outlawed which were regarded as acting against the modernization/Westernization policies of the state-builders.

Consequently, although contradictory, Islam was not only controlled by the state, but it was also used by state as a source of its legitimacy. In this context I argue that the state addresses its subjects through their Muslim identity and through the khutbas of the Religious Affairs Directory rather than as the citizens of the Turkish Republic. After the period of Kemal Atatürk's rule, the first policies diverting from the secularization principles of the early Republican period such as reopening of tombs and compulsory religion education in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools were given by the RPP and later by the DP, since it was with the DP rule that Islam started to be used more than ever as a source for strengthening the power and legitimacy of the state as it is the case in contemporary Turkey.

These circumstances created a gap between the official definition of laicism in the Turkish constitution and the institutional practices and public application of secularism. As a result, the legitimacy and definition of state's laicism became a controversial issue. Now by the subjects, the state is being seen as an entity to pull

some concessions away for the religious interests of the communities, such as from “turban freedom at universities” to “right to be represented at the Religious Affairs Directory for the other beliefs, religions, and sects”. The following chapter analyzes and criticizes Turkish secularism in application.

CHAPTER IV

CRITIQUE OF TURKISH SECULARIZATION AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF SOME KHUTBAS OF THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS DIRECTORY

As it is mentioned in the previous chapters, the Turkish secularization was seen as a way of controlling and standardizing Islam by the elites of the Turkish nation-state building projection. However, the process and form of Turkish secularization is a model of controlling the religious affairs through the constitution and formal institutions (Keyman, 2003, p. 126). During the period of Atatürk, secularism was strictly adopted to modernization process, such as outlawing of the Caliphate, *tarikats*, *türbes*, and application of secular education, reformation in law systems, and outlawing of Sharia law and so on. However, after the period of Atatürk, governments could not resist to the religious demands of the people. *Türbes* were reopened. The duties of the Religious Affairs Directory had been enlarged. Obligatory religion lessons had been put into the education program of primary and secondary schools.

Especially after the military coup in 1980, the unification functions of religion were highlighted by the military government. In the speeches of the full general Kenan Evren, he addressed the Muslim identity to the masses: “Our prophet who entrusted our religion which is the last and the best... All of us believe the one Allah, we have the one prophet, we are using the common Koran, we are praying with the suras of the same Koran.” (En son olan ve en iyi din olan dinimizi bize emanet eden peygamberimiz...Hepimiz bir Allah’a inanıyoruz, bir peygamberimiz var, aynı Kuran’ı kullanıyoruz, aynı Kuran’ın sureleriyle namaz kılıyoruz.) (17th January 1981, Kahramanmaraş Speech) (Subaşı, 2002, p. 284).

The functional usage of religion by the military includes opening of more religious schools and preparing religion books for soldiers (Subaşı, 2002, pp. 291-

292). One of the religion books for soldiers will be evaluated in this study and the content of that book will be analyzed.

The constitutional definition of the duty of the Religious Affairs Directory was formulated in the Constitution of 1982. In the 136th article, The Religious Affairs Directory was defined as having the aim to provide national solidarity and unity: “The Religious Affairs Directory in the general administration provides national solidarity and unity and performs the duties defined with private law on the line of secularism principle, and beyond all political views and thoughts.” (Genel idare içinde yer alan Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, laiklik ilkesi doğrultusunda, bütün siyasi görüş ve düşüncülerin dışında kalarak ve milletçe dayanışma ve bütünleşmeyi amaç edinerek özel kanunda gösterilen görevi yerine getirir.) (The 1982 Constitution, www.tbmm.gov.tr)

Islam became the main component of the “national ethos” of Turkish nationalism. In addition, nationalized Islam became a source for national unification and a means of political legitimation of state power (Subaşı, 2002, p. 305). Furthermore, the state discourse about the legitimation of state power and the religious discourse coincide with each other in the khutbas of the Religious Affairs Directory. Moreover, as Tapper states republicanism is close to Islam within a hegemonic ideology whose two sides are religious and statist discourses (1991, p. 65).

Another uniqueness of Turkish secularization is the position of the state to all religious beliefs in the country (Keyman, 2003, p. 126). While in the formal definition of laicism the state must stand in equal distances to all beliefs, at the institutional level the state reproduces its legitimation and hegemony through the orthodox Sunni-Hannifin denomination excluding other Muslim and/or non-Muslim communities in Turkey.

In this chapter, the two key aspects of Turkish secularization at the institutional level, which are the integration of religion and state, and the recognition of only one religious sect by the state, thus the unequal approach of the state to all Muslim and non-Muslim communities were discussed. Now, some khutbas in 2003 and 2004 and a play written by the Religious Affairs Directory for the elementary schools will be analysed

In the second part, a religion book (*Askere Din Kitabı*) prepared for the military will be evaluated and the demands of other denominations for recognition by the state will be outlined to understand the state's position on this issue.

4.1. Laicist State – Statist Islam

In Turkey, although laicism is the ground principle of the Republic, state uses Islam to support its legitimation and to construct its hegemony over the masses. This case shows itself in the state's discourse.

When we look at the khutba of 31st January 2003 named “*Our National and Religious Values*” (in appendix A, www.diyamet.gov.tr/hutbeler) we can clearly see the collaboration between the nationalist and Islamist discourse. In the khutba, state speaks to the masses through religious terms. In the khutba, to respect and to internalize the national values is also highly relevant for the orders of Islam and the thoughts which threaten the national unity are also forbidden by the religion. Some *suras* from the holly Koran and some studies of the Prophet are taken to support this discourse. The Turkish state addresses “Muslim” identity of the masses. While the state addresses to the Muslim identity of the “citizens”, the national and religious values are made coincidental by this discourse. To respect to the national values means at the same time to respect to the religious values.

The second selected khutba was given on 14th March 2003 by the Religious Affairs Directory (in appendix A, www.diyamet.gov.tr/hutbeler). The topic of the second khutba is about the Çanakkale Epic of Turkish History. In the Turkish culture the martyries have a religious value. At this point, the nationalistic discourse highly coincides with religious discourse. The Turkish warriors had fought not only against the occupation of Anatolia but also against the “Crusaders”. The “Muslim” identity of the Turkish side and the “Christian” identity of the other side were deeply stressed. The codes of the patriotism and Turkishness were side by side the codes of Muslimness and devotion. Like the second khutba, the third khutba is about the 30th August Victory of Turks against Greeks (in appendix A, www.diyamet.gov.tr/hutbeler).

The fourth one is the most interesting one: The khutba of 24th October 2003 is given for the celebration of the establishment of the Republic (in appendix A, www.diyamet.gov.tr/hutbeler). In the discourse of this khutba, there is a projection of constructing a convergence between Islam and the Republican system. The consultations of the Prophet and the Caliphates to councils are seen the parliamentary organization of the Republic. The state claims that the Republican administration and government are suitable to the nature of the Islam. Some cases from religion and the Prophet's life are given to support the legitimation of the Republic.

The last selected khutba was given on 18th June 2004 (in appendix B, www.diyamet.gov.tr/hutbeler) and it is about the national development. This khutba states that religious and worldly affairs can exist together and to do the worldly works is also a religious duty. The usage of the money for the national aims like trade, workplace opening, and investment is a religious duty and this money usage is an activity in the way the God.

As it is seen in the khutbas presented here, the statist discourse is strengthened by the religious discourse. In the khutbas, the statist discourse calls the masses with their "Muslim" identity. The discourse of the hegemonic ideology calls the individuals as "Dear Muslims" (Aziz Müslümanlar), "Precious Believers" (Değerli Mü'minler), "Honoured Muslims" (Muhterem Müslümanlar), "Dear Community" (Aziz Cemaat). The "secular" state addresses the individuals through their religious identities. The recognition of the masses occurs in the hegemonic ideology of the state by their "Muslim" identities. This recognition and naming in the statist discourse creates another contradiction with secularism, since Non-muslim masses are not represented at the level of Religious Affairs Directory.

4.2. Turcoislamic Secularism

Subaşı views the period after the military coup in 1980 as Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In stead of perceiving Islam as an obstacle in front of Turkish modernization/Westernization, a peaceful and functional collaboration between the state and manipulated Islam could be constructed. The closed relations between the "Aydınlar Ocağı" (intellectuals' society) and the military government made the

Jacobenist Kemalist laicism trend to be much more popular. “*Aydınlar Ocağı*” as can be defined as the statist conservatists in the right wing was the concrete example of nationalist and Islamist collaboration as discussed by Subaşı (2002, p. 301).

To understand this connection between the nationalist and Islamist discourse, we have to first analyze the relation between the early republican period and the current ideology. After the establishment of the Turkish nation-state, the rather new hegemonic ideology transformed the cement of the previous ideology of the Ottoman society which was highly influenced by Islam.

Common sense is a chaotically union of various perceptions. It is generally an experience area of practices, which is politically undeveloped, ambiguous and contradictory. “Hegemony” is constructed on the basis of the practical area that the ruling class uses it for gaining the consent of the people under its domination. In the case of Turkish secularization, state hegemony is trying to practice itself in the area of religious affairs, since religion has a great esteem among the masses. When the state could gain the collaboration with Islam, additionally the esteem of the state would increase in the minds of the subjects. The practice of hegemony is so important that practice is a sort of a visibility of hegemony for the masses. Other than practice, establishment of “collective will” is an inseparable of hegemony. Collective will is the base of an ideological unity.

To create a new collective will, which must be suitable for the secularist and modern form of the Turkish Republic, the new hegemonic ideology transformed and manipulated Islam and Islam was the cement of the previous hegemonic ideology in the Ottoman. Secularism in the Turkish Republic became a new hegemony in the form of transformed Islam. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis is the result of nationalist and Islamist discourses of the hegemonic ideology. After accepting Islam as an obstacle in front of the new, modernized and westernized Turkish Republic, and after seeing Islam as a counter hegemony which was the cement of the previous hegemony of the Ottoman society, Islam has been manipulated and transformed into the suitable element for the new hegemony of the “laic” Turkish Republic.

A play written by a Turkish Literature teacher Muammer Açıkgöz and published by the Religious Affairs Directory is very crucial. “*Çanakkale’de Bir Çocuk Ali*” (A Child in Çanakkale, Ali) is based on a story of a famous Turkish

writer Ömer Seyfettin. This play was presented at Çubuk İmam Hatip High School in Ankara in March 1985, and this play is recommended to be played at the other elementary, secondary and high schools.

This play is a story of a Turkish boy named Ali who acted as a secret agent between the Greek and the Turkish troops in Çanakkale War. The most relevant point is that in this story being a Muslim and being a Turk considered as the same. Some features about being Turk such as patriotism, bravery, faithfulness to state are as the same with some features about being Muslim such as being loyal to nation, state and believing to Allah, *cihad*. In other words, in this play being a Turk means at the same time being a Muslim. Solders, who are fighting against the enemies, die not only for the land and state but also for God. The writer emphasizes the Christian identity of the Greeks who were defined as the enemies and defines their occupation as the Crusaders' invasion. Fighting for the land is fighting for religion; therefore the martyrs will go to the Paradise which is a promise of Allah.

The children, who are the citizens of the future, are the most crucial category in the society for the reproduction of the state, hegemony and dominant ideology. Those apparatuses can be used one by one or together in practical scene by the hegemonic ideology. In the case of this play, we witness a good example of the integration between education and religion apparatuses of the state. The children are given the Turkishness identity with the Muslimness identity through these kinds of plays and texts in the curriculum of schools.

For the maintenance of the state hegemony ideologically conscious individuals have to be created. To establish a patriot consciousness in the minds of the masses, the Turkish statist hegemony has to use ideological signs and manipulate the discourses. As it can be seen clearly in the khutbas and the publications of the Religious Affairs Directory, The statist ideology connects the religious signs with the nationalist statist discourse very successfully and religious signs and nationalist, statist discourses are the practical area of the hegemonic ideology. In other words, religious signs and nationalist and statist discourses are connected to one another in complex ways reflecting the ideology of the state.

The state's ideology makes Islam coherent with the laic republican system. Islamic codes, signs and religious rituals become transmitters or reproducers of the hegemonic ideology of the statist discourse.

“*Askere Din Kitabı*” (A Religion Book to Soldier) written by Hamdi Akseki (2002) and published by the Religious affairs Directory is very important to understand the relation between Islam and the hegemonic ideology of the state. This book gives the essential information on Islam and Islamic worships such as praying, fasting, hadj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and faith. While that religious information is given to the soldiers, the chapters about Islamic rituals are enriched by some dialogues between a soldier and his officer. These dialogues show that the military elites and officers do not oppose religion and that Islam does not contradict with the ideology of the state. Moreover, there are other chapters which give information about the duties of the subjects for the state. However, this kind of information is also given through some religious terms. The responses and duties for the state, which must be followed by all soldiers and citizens, are enriched by some verses from the Koran and by some words of the Prophet in this book (Akseki, 2002)

For instance, the 34th chapter of the book, titled as “*Türk Askerlerinde Müslümanlık ve Kahramanlık Duyguları*” (Heroism and Muslimness Senses of the Turkish Soldiers) gives some historical examples about heroism and about the victories of the Turkish soldiers referring to their faith and Muslim identities. These soldiers defended both the land and Islam, according to the book (2002, pp. 137-140). Chapter 40 is named as “*Ahlak ve Görev*” (Ethics and Duty). This chapter includes the duties for the country among the duties for Allah, humanity, self and family (2002, p. 163). Chapter 47 defines the duties for the country and for the administration and according to the same book; those duties for the country and for the administration are at the same time religious duties. Those duties are made obligatory by the religion. This chapter refers to a verse from the Koran: “Muslims! Obey Allah, obey the Prophet, also obey the administration from you” (*Ey müminler! Allah'a itaat ediniz, Peygambere itaat ediniz, sizden olan ulü'l-emr'e de ...*) (Nisa-59) (2002, pp. 189-191). Obedience to the government and state is tied to divine will and this obedience is legitimized and enforced by religion. This religious discourse is used by the state to legitimize its hegemony through religious rules. The

religious hegemony over the Muslim masses is used by the state to strengthen its position over the masses. In other words, state uses religion as a source of legitimation and also as a means to rule the masses. The obedience of the masses is aimed to be obtained through the religious discourse of the Religious Affairs Directory as a constitutional institution of a “secular” society.

The religious discourse is also used to strengthen the power of the Turkish military. The military duty and defending the land is, at the same time, presented as a religious duty in the book. The 48th chapter’s title is “Koran Orders Defence of Motherland” (*Kuran-I Kerim Vatan Müdafasını Emreder*). The duty of defending the land is outlined as an obligation in the Koran and this discourse is supported by a verse from the Koran:

“Prepare horses for the power and the war against your enemies as far as you can and with these horses frighten your enemies, Allah’s enemies and the enemies that Allah knows and you do not know. You are rewarded for whatever you give in the way of Allah, what you give is not lost and there will be no cruelty on you.”

“Düşmanlarınıza karşı gücünüz yettiği kadar kuvvet ve harp için beslenip terbiye edilmiş atlar hazırlayınız ki bununla Allah’ın düşmanlarını ve sizin düşmanlarınızı ve Allah’ın bilip de sizin bilmediğiniz diğer düşmanları korkutasınız. Siz Allah yolunda her ne verirseniz mükafatını tamamen görürsünüz, verdikleriniz zayi olup da zulüm olunmazsınız.”

(Enfal-60) (2002, pp. 192-195).

Chapter 49 “*Askerlik*” (Military Service), chapter 50 “*Askerlikte İtaat*” (Obedience in Military Service) and chapter 51 “*Talime Çıkmak, Nöbet ve Karakol Beklemek Bir İbadettir*” (Practicing, turning of Duty and Guarding Border Outpost are a Worship) claim that the duties in military service are also religious duties and the obedience the officers is essential according to the religious orders (2002, pp. 196-204). The power of the military is also strengthened and additionally the positions of the officers over the soldiers are empowered by the religious legitimation in the framework of the statist-Islamist hegemonic discourse.

4.3. The Position of the State in the Hannifin Denomination

In the previous pages, the integration of the statist-nationalist discourses and religious-Islamic codes and signs was discussed. The discourse of the state and religion coincide with one another to reproduce the hegemony of the state. The standardization and usage of the religion to legitimize the hegemony of the state does not suit to Kemalist laicism principle that is defined as the separation of religious from state affairs. In this sense the standardization and usage of Islam is an obstacle in front of the laic position of the state against all forms of religions and beliefs. The question is which religion or denomination will be used by the state as a source of its hegemony. There are various beliefs and denominations in Turkey; however, the state uses the Islamic discourse only through one denomination, which is the Hannifin one. The other denominations in Islam such as Alevis (partisans of the Caliph Ali), Caferis, Shiite, Yezidis and Shafis among some others, and non-Islamic beliefs such as Orthodox Christianity and Suryanis is not be represented at the level of the Religious Affairs Directory. The state provides the religious affairs as a public service for only Sunni-Hannifin denomination. The connection of this denomination to the state was analyzed in the second chapter, and this relation is a sort of tradition inherited from the Ottoman political structure. The reasons for the strong tie between the state and the Hannifin denomination was defined where it was argued that the Hannifin denomination was/is the most suitable denomination to reproduce the hegemonic ideology. The obedience to the state is seen as a religious duty by the Hannifin sect and state administration does not have to be from the Prophet's lineage.

The former president of the Religious Affairs Directory Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz wrote in the paper, *Hürriyet*, that the Turks has chosen the Hannifin sect, since this denomination is the most suitable one for Turks and it is also the most rationalist and practical denomination for everyday life and worldly affairs. The argument is that there is only one Islam and other fractions represent only different cultural practices, not different religious beliefs (2004, p. 18). These statements from a statesman, who was the former president of the Religious Affairs Directory, reflect the state's attitude towards the Hannifin sect and also towards other beliefs

and denominations. This discourse shows that there is another contradiction between the secularist definition of the state in Kemalist ideology and in the 1982 constitution and the practice of the state. The position of the state must be equal to all beliefs in definition, however the state takes a position closer to the Hanafin denomination.

The religious symbols that the state uses are from the Sunni-Hanafin denomination and the other denominations and beliefs have no representation at the state level. The Religious Affairs Directorate as the constitutional institution of the state is an entity of state's recognition of Sunni-Hanafin Islam. However, the religious services provided by the Religious Affairs Directorate, such as sending only Sunni religion men to all settlements, teaching only the Sunni version of Islam at mosques and at state schools, make the state be perceived as if the state takes partial position to all beliefs.

Homogenization the subjects through one denomination and the standardization of Islam cause the rejection of different religious sects which, for example, alienates the Alevi. Selahattin and Mehtap Ayyıldız state that not representing the Alevi people, which are nearly one third of the total population, is an unjust application since the budget of the Religious Affairs Directorate is provided totally by state finance. They also cannot teach their beliefs to their next generations and they cannot reproduce their culture and social beings easily. In other words, they demand cultural recognition, more freedom to practice their religion and a budget provided by the state as it is the case in the Hanafin sect (pp. 6-11, 2001).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

There is not only one conceptualization of secularization both in definition and application. The birthplace of secularism, Europe, witnessed various types of secularisms and secularizations. However, the focus of this study is the secularization that was experienced in the processes of Turkish modernization and nation-state building. Therefore, secularization is a main part of Turkish modernization and nation-building, since secularization was taken as a root of westernization, modernization and construction of a national identity. Since the modernization and nation-building in Turkish history is rooted in the late Ottoman period, we cannot take the secularization process from the starting point of the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Secularization movements played a key role in the political history of late Ottoman society, as discussed in the second chapter; therefore secularization is a continuous process which has started during the late 19th century in the Ottoman society.

The formal definition of secularism in Turkish law is the separation of the religious and state affairs and the state's standing at an equal distance to all beliefs and believers. On the other hand, there is a contradictory application of secularization. Not only controlling Islam but also using it as a source of formal ideology and reproducing state hegemony and legitimation of its existence through religion are not secular applications according to the official definition of the Turkish secularism in the Turkish constitution. In the introduction part of the 1982 Constitution, it is written that "... in the essence of the secularism principle, holly religious senses cannot be coinciding with state affairs and politics..." (...laiklik ilkesinin geređi olarak, kutsal din duygularının, devlet işlerine ve politikaya kesinlikle karıştırlamayacağı...) (www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa) The Religious Affairs Directory is the institutional reflection of those non-secular applications. The usage

of Islam for those aims creates the integration of not only the Islamic and statist discourses, but also religious and state affairs.

For Gellner, nation-state building is at the same time constructing a higher homogeneous identity, which absorbs and melts the sub identities and differences (1983). These statements are much related to the Turkish nation- state building process. To construct a modern Turkish citizen includes the construction of a secular identity. However in practice, the state sees all the subjects as being from one denomination and belief, Sunni-Hannifin, and addresses to the masses through the Sunni-Muslim identity by ignoring all the other beliefs and religious identities. This application through khutbas and other services of the Religious Affairs Directory, is putting the Sunni-Muslim identity near the features of the constructed Turkish citizen identity, as it is seen clearly in the khutbas. This is another tradition in Turkish secularization. This thesis, in sum, tried to prove these two contradictions between the constitutional and official definition and institutional application of secularization in Turkish state system. There is not only one type of secularism and the common definition of secularism cannot be achieved yet, therefore, this study does not aim to compare the Turkish laic system to another one. On the other, in this study, the Turkish laic system was tried to be evaluated within itself. Under the Turkish laicism, there is a difference between the Kemalist definition in principle as it is formulated in the constitution and the practice of religious affairs by the state hand. The state is controversial with itself, and this bruises the legitimacy of the laicism principle of the state. In some cases, the state behaves as laicist, such as opposing to the covering of the heads of girls at universities on the other hand, in other cases, the state strengthened Islam by some policies. Through the Religious Affairs Directory, the state addresses its subjects through their religious identities and compensates for some demands of the masses like providing obligatory religion courses at schools and opening Imam-Hatip schools and some religious tombs, and so on. The controversial policies and behaviors of the state create turbidity in the understanding of secularism of the Turkish state instead of a more clear standing or position of the state on this issue.

In conclusion, secularization is a cement of the Turkish modernization and nation-state building process. Westernization and modernization were accepted side

by side with secularization and different from other examples of secularization, Turkey developed an original definition and a process towards secularization. In the Turkish model, Islam was taken under state control as a result of historical and social developments. However, not only being controlled, Islam also has been manipulated by the state to reproduce the hegemonic statist ideology and to maintain the legitimacy of the state's sovereignty over its subjects. These practices produce a contradictory understanding of laicism and a controversial position of the state in its relation to Islam. The difference between the constitutional definition of laicism and the institutional practices and policies which are non-laic according to the state's definition of laicism, makes the masses more close to religion instead of secularism. Using only one religion (Islam) and one sect (Sunni-Hannifin) to strengthen the Turkish state's legitimacy can damage the sovereignty of the state in the perception of the non-Muslim and non-Hannifin subjects.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX-A

THE SELECTED KHUTBAS (2003) GIVEN BY THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS DIRECTORY

31st January 2003, the first khutba, “Milli ve Dini Değerlerimiz”

“Hep birlikte Allah’ın ipine yapışın, fırkalara bölünüp parçalanmayın; Allah’ın üzerinizdeki nimetini hatırlayın. Birbirinizin düşmanı idiniz, Allah kalplerinizi uzlaştırıp kaynaştırdı da O’nun nimeti sayesinde kardeşler haline geldiniz. Ateşten bir çukurun kenarında idiniz, sizi oradan kurtardı. Allah size ayetlerini bu şekilde açıklıyor ki; doğruya ve güzele yol bulasınız.”

Al-i İmran Suresi, Ayet 103

Aziz Müslümanlar,

İslam Dini, “tevhid” esasına dayanır. Tevhid, alemlerin Rabbi Yüce Allah’ın varlığına, birliğine, zat, sıfat ve fiillerinde eşi, benzeri ve ortağı bulunmadığına ve yalnız O’na ibadet etmek gerektiğine inanmak demektir. Böyle bir imanı telkin eden İslam Dini, Müslümanlar arasında sevgi ve saygıyı, birlik ve beraberliği emreder. Renk, ırk, dil, bölge ve düşünce farklılığını, çeşitli kültür ve medeniyetler kurma, tanışma ve gelişme vesilesi sayar. Hep uyumlu ve uzlaşıcı olmayı ister. Ancak, toplumun milli ve dini değerlerini sarsmaya yönelik her türlü bozgunculuğu, ayrımcılığı ve bölücülüğü kesin olarak reddeder. Yüce Allah, bu gerçeği şu ayetlerde dikkat çekici bir üslupla ortaya koyar ve bizi uzlaşmaya davet eder: “Hep birlikte Allah’ın ipine (Kur’an’a) sımsıkı sarılın. Parçalanıp bölünmeyin...”, “Allah’a ve Resulü’ne itaat edin ve birbirinizle çekişmeyin. Sonra gevşersiniz ve

gücünüz elden gider.”, “Kendilerine apaçık deliller geldikten sonar parçalanıp ayrılığa düşenler gibi olmayın.”

Değerli Mü'minler!

Görüldüğü üzere bu ayetlerde vurgulanan esaslar, millet ve devlet olmanın birer gereğidir. Müslüman bir millet olarak, milli hasletlerimize ve dini inançlarımıza ters düşen görüş ve iddialar, kimler tarafından ortaya atılırsa atılsın, bunlara itibar etmemek gerekir. Fikir ve inanç özgürlüğü, bu tür görüş ve iddiaların ortaya atılması için bir gerekçe olamaz. Zira fakir ve inanç özgürlüğü, her akla geleni söylemeyi, toplumun birlik ve beraberliği sarsacak iddialar ortaya atmayı değil, bilakis başkalarına faydalı olacak dengeli fikirler üretmeyi gerekmektedir. Yüce Allah, her güzel konuşan ve hoş görünen kişiye, doğruluğuna emin olmadan inanılmaması konusunda bizi uyarmakta ve mealen şöyle buyurmaktadır:

“İnsanlardan öylesi de vardır ki, dünya hayatına ilişkin sözleri, senin hoşuna gider. Bir de kalbindekine (sözünün özüne uyduğuna) Allah'I şahit tutar. Halbuki o, düşmanlıkta en amansız olanıdır. O (senin yanından) ayrılınca yeryüzünde bozgunculuk yapmağa, ekin ve nesli yok etmeye çalışır. Allah ise bozgunculuğu sevmez. O'na “Allah'tan kork!” denildiği zaman gururu O'nu daha da günaha sürükler. Artık böylesinin hakkından cehennem gelir. O ne kötü yerdir!”

Aziz Cemaat!

Unutmayalım ki, bizi ayakta tutan, milli ve manevi değerlerimizdir. Dün olduğu gibi bugün de, birlik ve beraberliğimizi bozmaya, kutsal değerlerimizi sarsmaya çalışanlar bulunabilir. Bunlar, kendi sinsi emellerine ulaşmak için herşeyi mübah görür, her kılığa bürünür, hatta bu amaçla dini bile kullanabilirler. Son günlerde bazı yörelerde, İncil'I tanıtmak, insane severlik ve dünya barışını sağlamak gibi maskeler altında bazı bölücü propagandaların ortaya çıktığı çeşitli haber kaynaklarından öğrenilmektedir. Bunlar, “Dünya barışının sağlanması, insanlık aleminin birliği, gerçeğin araştırılması, din birliğine gidilmesi, peygamberlerde ilahlık sıfatının bulunduğu, dünyanın son bulmayacağı, kıyametin kopmayacağı, cennet ve cehennem birer sembol olduğu ve namazın da sabah, öğle ve akşam vakitlerinde kalben Allah'I anmaktan ibaret bulunduğu...” gibi batıl ve hayali iddialarla, aziz

milletimizin nezih inancını bulandırmaya ve böylece birliğimizi bozmaya uğraşmaktadırlar.

Bunlar, sağduyu sahibi milletimizin sağlam ve sarsılmaz imanı karşısında elbette tükeneklerdir. Çünkü Müslüman milletimiz, kesin olarak bilmektedir ki, son ilahî kitap Kur'an-ı Kerim, son Peygamber de Hz.Muhammed (s.a.v.)'dir. Kur'an-ı Kerim'de Cenab-ı Hak meâlen, "İşte bu, benim dosdoğru yolum. Artık ona uyun. Başka yollara uymayın. Yoksa o yollar, sizi parça parça edip, doğru yoldan ayırır. İşte bunları, sakınasınız diye Allah size emreder" buyurarak, Kur'an'ın çizdiği dosdoğru yolu göstermiş ve bu yoldan sapmanın, parçalanarak haktan sapmak olduğunu bildirmiştir.

14th March 2003, the second khutba, "Çanakkale Geçilmez"

"Allah yolunda öldürülmüş olanları ölümler sanma sakın. Hayır! Onlar diridirler. Rablerinin katında rızıklandırılıyorlar."

Al-i İmran Suresi, Ayet 169

Muhterem Müslümanlar!

Çanakkale Zaferi, tarihimizi taçlandıran olaylar içerisinde muhteşem bir yere sahiptir. Milletimizin tarih boyunca karşılaştığı en büyük ve en zorlu sınavlardan biridir. Müslüman varlığını yeryüzünde ebediyen silmeyi amaç edinen Haçlı zihniyeti, ülkemizi parçalamak, milletimizi esir etmek, Çanakkale Boğazı'ndan geçerek İstanbul'u ele geçirmek hayaliyle 1914 yılı Kasım ayında Osmanlı devletine savaş ilan etti.

Bir yılı aşkın bir süre devam eden Çanakkale savaşları sonunda Türk milleti düşmanlara karşı tarihte emsaline rastlanmayan büyük bir zafer kazanmış, vatan sevgisi ve iman gücünün maddi üstünlükten daha önemli olduğunu bütün dünyaya ispat etmiştir.

Çanakkale'de maddi gücümüz, düşmanın gücüne nispetle çok az idi. Askerimizin bir çoğunun, ayağında postalı dahi yoktu. Ancak Mehmetçiğin manevi gücü büyüktü. İngiliz Ordu komutanı General Hamilton'un: "Bizi Türkler'in maddi gücü değil, manevi gücü mağlub etmiştir. Çünkü onların atacak barutu bile

kalmamıştı.” Şeklindeki itirafı bu gerçeği ifade etmektedir. Tarih; din ve vatan uğrunda fedakarlığı Çanakkale’deki aziz şehit ve gazilerimizden öğrenmiştir.

Aziz Mü’minler!

Can ve malın Allah yolunda, vatan ve millet uğrunda feda edilebilmesi, kulun Rabb’ine karşı muhabbetinin en güzel ifadesidir. Bunun içindir ki Allah Rasulu –sallallahu aleyhi ve sellem-: “Nefsim kudret elinde olan Allah’a yemin ederim ki, Allah yolunda savaşıp şehit olmayı, diriltirilip yine şehit olmayı, tekrar diriltirilip şehit olmayı dilerim.” buyurmuştur. Çanakkale’de yaşananlar, her yönüyle müstesna bir vatan sevgidinin örneğidir. “Çanakkale Geçilmez” fermanı, 250 bin imanlı vatan evladının, şahadet şerbetini içmesiyle yazılmıştır. Şehid olabilmek onlarda büyük bir sevda idi. Sedye ile götürülen yaralı bir askerin, komutanının yanından geçerken, “Şehit olamadım paşam!” diyerek üzüntüsünü dile getirmesi, bu sevdanın en müşahhas bir örneğidir. Ecdadımızın şehadet arzusunda Yüce Allah’ın “Allah yolunda öldürülenleri ölümler sanmayın; bilakis, onlar diridirler. Rableri katında rızıklandıkları...” ayeti ile sevgili peygamberimizin “Cennete giren hiçbir kimse, yer yüzündeki herşey kendisinin olsa bile dünyaya geri dönmeyi arzu etmez. Sadece şehid, gördüğü itibar ve ikram sebebiyle tekrar dünyaya dönmeyi ve on defa şehid olmayı ister.”, “Şehidliği gönülden arzu eden bir kimse, şehid olmasa bile sevabına nail olur.” Müjdesi vardır. Bu muzafferiyetin sırrı milletimizin yekvücut olması, birlik, beraberlik halinde bölünmez bir bütün oluşturmasıydı. “Toplu vurdukça yürekler, onu top sindiremez!” ruhunun yaşanmasıydı. Yani Çanakkale’de düşmanı, Mehmetçiğin şahsında bütün bir millet mağlup etmiştir.

Değerli Mü’minler!

Şu husus iyi bilinmelidir ki; milletimizin bekası şehitlik ve gazilik ruhu kazanmış bir kalbe sahip olan nesiller yetiştirmekle mümkündür. Bunun için çocuklarımıza Çanakkale destanını ve ardındaki ruhu anlatmalı, aziz vatanımızın kıymetini öğretmeliyiz. Bu vesileyle aziz şehit ve gazilerimizi rahmet ve minnetle yad ediyorum.

29th August 2003, the third khutba, “Vatan, Millet, Devlet...ilelebet”

“Allah’a ve Resulü’ne itaat edin, birbirinizle çekişmeyin; yoksa korkuya kapılırsınız, rüzgarınız kesilir. Sabredin; Allah sabredenlerle beraberdir.”

Enfal Suresi, Ayet 46

Muhterem Müslümanlar!

Ağustos ayı, şanlı tarihimizde zaferler ayı olarak bilinir. Bu ayda kazanılan iki büyük zafer, dünya tarihine altın harflerle yazılmıştır. Bu hafta Malazgirt Zaferi’nin 932’nci; Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesi’nin 81’nci yıldönümünü kutluyoruz. Hepimize kutlu olsun...

Aziz Kardeşlerim!

Bu mübarek vatanda, asırlar boyu yan yana, gönül gönüle beraber yaşıyoruz... bundan sonra da; kardeşçe, hep birlikte yaşamaya devam edeceğiz. Yüzyıllarca beraber ağlayıp beraber güldüğümüz bu aziz vatanda, her şey bizim istediğimiz şekilde olmayabilir. İçinde bulunduğumuz şartların gereği, maddi ve manevi sıkıntılar zuhur edebilir. Elbette bütün bu sıkıntılar geçicidir. Milletimiz geçmiş ve geleceği ile bu cennet vatanda daimi ve ebedidir.

Vatan ve millet sevgisi, sevgilerin en yücelerindedir. Dinimiz; vatan sevgisini, imandan saymıştır. Çünkü iman olmadan vatanın; vatan olmadan da varlığımızın hiçbir anlam ve kıymeti yoktur. Bu sebeple; bir insanın, hayatta karşılaşılabileceği en büyük zorluk, vatansız kalmaktır. Vatan bizim canımız, kanımız ve mayamızdır. Kederlerimizin sevince, ideallerimizin gerçeğe dönüşmesi, ancak ve ancak vatanımızın bağımsızlığı ile mümkündür.

Bundan 81 yıl önce vatanımızın bağımsızlığına, milletimizin hürriyetine kasteden düşmanlara karşı milletimiz Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK’ün önderliğinde ayyıldızlı bayrağımızı, canımızdan aziz bildiğimiz vatanımızı koruyarak

düşmanları yurdumuzdan kovmuş, özgürlüğümüzü ve bağımsızlığımızı yeniden tesis etmiştir.

Değerli Mü'minler!

Üzerinde yaşadığımız bu aziz vatan, sadece mutlu günlerimizin ve müreffeh zamanlarımızın toprağı değildir! O; ak günlerimizin olduğu kadar, kara günlerimizin de vatanıdır... Biz, sadece bu ülkenin nimetinden faydalanmak için değil; aynı zamanda külfetini çekmek, hatta uğruna canımızı feda etmek için de yaşıyoruz. Çünkü bu ülkenin, sadece gündüzleri değil; geceleri de bizimdir!.. Biz; şehitlerimizle beraber yaşayan bir milletiz!.. Birimiz hepimiz; hepimiz birimiz içindir!.. Ben, sen, o yok; sadece biz varız..! Zira bizler, Peygamber efendimizin: "Allah'ın yardımı, topluluk üzerinedir." hadisinin şuur ve bilincindeyiz.

Yüce Allah'ımız ve Sevgili Peygamberimiz, bizi birlik ve beraberliğe çağırıyor... Düşmanlar ise; sürekli bizi bölüp parçalamak için uğraşiyor!.. Sakın olaki düşmanlara aldanmayalım! Bizden görünerek içimize sızan bozguncu ve kışkırtıcıların tahriklerine kapılmayalım! Huzur ve güven ortamının bozulmasına fırsat vermeyelim.

Millet ve devletin üstünlüğü; maddi gücü, birlik ve beraberliği, vatan ve millet bütünlüğü nispetinde artar veya azalır. Bizler, tarihin en parlak medeniyetini; çalışma azmini, adaleti, insan ve millet sevgisini, önce ülkemizin hudutları; sonra da kainatın boyutları kadar büyüttüğümüz zaman kurmuş olacağız..!

Rabbim, milletimizi; ülkemizi her türlü tehlikeden korusun.

Milletimizi; ikinci bir Kurtuluş Savaşı vermekten muhafaza buyursun.

Bu vesileyle, toprağın kara bağına düşen bütün şehitlerimizi rahmetle anıyor, kahraman gazilerimizi minnetle yadediyoruz.

24th October 2003, the fourth khutba, “Cumhuriyet Bayramı”

“Allah’tan bir rahmet sayesinde ki, sen onlara yumuşak davrandın. Eğer kabasaba, katı yürekli olsaydın senin çevrenden kesinlikle dağılır giderlerdi. O halde bağışla onları, af dile onlar için; iş ve yönetim konusunda da onlarla şuraya git. Bir kez azmettin mi de artık Allah’a güvenip dayan. Allah, tevekkül edenleri sever.”

Al-i İmran Suresi, Ayet 159

Muhterem Cemaat!

Üzerinde yaşadığımız cennet vatanımız, atalarımızın bize en büyük emanetidir. Onlar, Anadolu coğrafyasını vatan edinmek için ellerinden geleni yapmış, bu uğurda mallarıyla canlarıyla savaşmış ve asırlar boyu bu toprakları korumak için, olağanüstü gayret göstermişlerdir. Ne var ki, “su uyur düşman uyumaz” atasözünde vurgulandığı gibi, Müslüman Türk Milletinin düşmanları hiç uyumamış, hep sinsi emeller beslemiş, birinci dünya savaşında da bize, yedi cepheden saldırmış ve hemen anayurdumuzu paylaşmaya kalkışmışlardır.

Her zaman olduğu gibi bu asil millet, istiklâl ve hürriyetini, vatan ve mukaddesatını korumak için; Gazi Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK önderliğinde şahlanarak, her türlü yokluğa ve olumsuzluğa rağmen, büyük bir istiklal mücadelesi vererek, namusu saydığı vatanını, düşman işgâlinde kurtarmıştır. Asırlardan beri hakim olduğu Anadolu topraklarında, milli egemenliğini aynen korumuş, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti adıyla yeni bir devlet kurmuş ve 29 Ekim 1923 tarihinde de bunu, bütün dünyaya ilân etmiştir.

Değerli Müminler!

80. yıl dönümünü idrak etme mutluluğunu yaşadığımız, Cumhuriyet, çoğunluk sistemine ve milli iradeyi temsil etme esasına dayanan, yaratılıştan insanlarda var olan çeşitli kabiliyetlerini ortaya koyabilmelerine, düşünce ve

inançlarını serbestçe ifade edip yaşamlarına imkân veren, istişareye dayalı bir idare şeklidir.

İslam dini, istişareye büyük önem verir. Yüce Allah, bu konuda Hz. Peygamber (s.a.v.)'e ve bize, şöyle emreder: “İş konusunda onlarla müşavere et. Bir kere de karar verip azmettin mi, artık Allah’a tevekkül et (Ona dayanıp güven). Şüphesiz Allah tevekkül edenleri sever”.

Dünya işlerinin düzene konması, vatan ve millet için yararlı olanların belirlenmesi maksadıyla istişarede bulunulması ve sonucunda da, çoğunluk örüşünün esas alınması, İslam'a uygun bir davranıştır. Nitekim Hz. Peygamber'in ahabın ve dört büyük halifenin dünyevi uygulamaları da, hep istişare ile olmuştur. Cumhuriyet de bu uygulamayı öngören bir idare şeklidir.

Aziz Müslümanlar!

Cumhuriyeti kuran milli irade, insanların dînî inanç ve yaşayışlarında serbest bırakılmasını, dünyevi işlerde ise, vatan ve milletin yararına yönlendirilmesini ve düzenlenmesini amaçlamıştır.

Bize düşen görev, cumhuriyet ruhunu gayesinden saptırmadan, devletimizi liyakatli ellerde yükseltmek, yüceltmek ve bu mukaddes emaneti bizden sonraki nesillere, en iyi şekilde devretmek olmalıdır.

APPENDIX – B

THE SELECTED KHUTBAS (2004) GIVEN BY THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS DIRECTORY

18TH June 2004, the first khutba, “Ülkemizi Kalkındırmak Toplumsal Bir Görevdir”

“Allah’a kim güzel bir borç verecek ki, O onun verdiđini kat kat artırsın. Böyle biriris için onur verici bir ödül de vardır.”

Hadid Suresi, Ayet 10

Deđerli Müminler!

İnsanın yaratılış gayesi Allah’a ibadet etmektir. Yüce Allah’ın razı olduđu bütün söz ve davranışlar geniş anlamda ibadet sayılır. Kişinin yoldaki bir taşı kaldırıp atması, bir engeli gidermesi, güçsüz, yaşlı, engelli ve özürllülere yardımcı olması ibadet olduđu gibi; helâl yoldan kazanması, İslâmî prensiplere uygun olarak ticaret yapması, topluma karşı sosyal yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmesi de ibadettir. Nitekim Kur’an-ı Kerim; Cuma namazı eda edildikten sonra Müslümanlara yeryüzüne dağılmalarını ve Allâh’ın nimetlerinden nasiplerini aramalarını tavsiye etmiştir.

Aziz Kardeşlerim!

İslâm dini helal yoldan servet sahibi olmayı teşvik etmiş; elde edilen servetin bütün insanların faydasına olacak şekilde değerlendirilmesini istemiştir. Nitekim Kuran-ı Kerim’de: “Size rızık olarak verdiđimiz şeylerden Allah yolunda harcayın”, “Size ne oluyor da, Allah yolunda harcamıyorsunuz? Halbuki göklerin ve yerin mirası Allah’ındır.” buyurularak bütün nimetlerin asıl sahibinin Allah olduđu

bildirilmiştir. İnsan bu nimetleri Allah'ın rızasına uygun bir şekilde değerlendirdiği takdirde hakkını vermiş, şükürünü eda etmiş olur. Meşru ölçüler içerisinde yapılan her türlü sosyal yardım ve yatırım yaparak iş alanı oluşturmak da sadakadır. İktisadi kalkınma, yatırımların artış oranına bağlı olarak hızlanır. Bütün nimetlerin insanların menfaati için kullanılıp değerlendirilmesi gerekir. İslâm, gereksiz harcamaları, israfı, lüks tüketimi yasaklayarak elde edilecek tasarrufların verimli, üretken ve istihdamı artıracak alanlara kaydırılmasını ister; tasarrufların üretime katkıda bulunacak şekilde değerlendirilmesini teşvik eder.

Değerli Müminler!

Toplumsal hizmet ve yatırımların hem dünya, hem de ahiret hayatında karşılığı görülecektir. Nitekim Cenâb-ı Allâh: “Siz ne hayır yaparsanız Allah onu bilir.”, “Kim zerre ağırlığınca bir hayır işlerse onun mükafatını görecektir”, “Kim salih bir amel işlerse kendi lehine işlemiş olur. Kim de kötülük yaparsa kendi aleyhine yapmış olur. Sonra Rabbinize döndürüleceksiniz.” buyurur.

Muhterem Müslümanlar!

Tasarruflarımızı yatırıma dönüştürerek üretim ve istihdamın artmasına katkıda bulunalım. faydalı ve öncelikli yerlere yatırım yapalım.

Yüce Rabbimiz şöyle buyurur “(Mallarınızı) Allah yolunda harcayın. Kendi kendinizi tehlikeye atmayın. İyilik edin. Şüphesiz Allah iyilik edenleri sever.”, “Altın ve gümüşü biriktirip gizleyerek onları Allah yolunda harcamayanları elem dolu bir azapla müjdele. O gün bunlar cehennem ateşinde kızdırılacak da onların alınları, böğürleri ve sırtları bunlarla dağlanacak ve ‘İşte bu, kendiniz için biriktirip sakladığınız şeylerdir. Haydi tadın bakalım biriktirip sakladıklarınızı!’ denilecek.