

SELF-LOVE AND SELF- DECEPTION IN SENECA, THE STOIC

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ABSTRACT

SELF-LOVE AND SELF-DECEPTION IN SENECA, THE STOIC

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In this thesis, Seneca's notion of self as self-love and the problem of self-deception are analyzed. In examining three types of self-love, –ignorant, progressing selves,–three models of self-deception are discussed. Self-deception is related to the problem of self-knowledge. I discuss the nature of self-love as self-esteem and self-preservation and self-shaping all of which are innate qualities and develop into more complex forms of knowing. Passions are concrete examples of the representations of deceived self; central to the overestimation of indifferents, the deceived self displays a pattern of reasoning that creates a paradox between what the self intends to do and what it actually appears or what the self wants to see himself as and what it actually is. In discussing various types of self-deception, it is argued that problem of deception can hardly be overcome practically even by education, although it is naturally possible. While the ignorant deceive themselves beyond their recognition, in the case of the educated selves, the tension between the knowledge of ignorance and the desire to be the person play an important role in self-deception. No one except the sage is free from self-deception. The thesis deals with the issue of self-knowing as a scarce possibility.

Keywords: Seneca, self-deception, self-knowledge, Stoics, passions.

ÖZ

STOACI SENECA' DA KENDİNİ SEVME VE KENDİNİ KANDIRMA

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Bu tez çalışmasında Seneca'daki kendini seven benlik kavramı ve kendini kandırma problemi analiz edilmiştir. Durumunun farkında olmayan ve de iki tip eğitilmiş, toplam üç benlik tartışmasında, üç tip kendini kandırma modeli tartışılmıştır. Benliğin doğasında kendine değer verme, kendini koruma ve kendini olmak istediği gibi şekillendirme özellikleri olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Duygular, kendini kandıran benliğin kendini gösterdiği durumlar olarak ele alınmıştır. Kendini bilme problemi, nesnelere yüklediği değerleri bilmemesinden yola çıkarak, daha sonra usa vurma modelinde tartışılmıştır. Usa vurma modeli yapmak veya olmak istediği ile gerçekte ne olduğu arasındaki zıtlık üzerinde kurulmuştur. Kendini kandıran benlik tiplerini tartışmasında kendini kandırmanın aşılması doğal olarak mümkün ama pratikte eğitime rağmen bunun zor olduğu iddia edilir. Durumunun farkında olmayan benliklerin yanı sıra, eğitimlilerin kendini kandırmasının temelinde, durumunun farkındalığı ve aşmak isteme arzusu arasındaki gerilimden kaynaklanır. Bu tez çalışması kendini bilmenin aşılması zor bir durum olduğunu savunur.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Seneca, kendini kandırma, kendini bilme, Stoalar, duygular.

To all Lovers

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims at a critical study of Seneca's notion of self as self-love and the problem of self-deception. The issue of self-deception is discussed within a broader problem of self-knowledge, which is dealt with in the context of passion-reason dichotomy in writings of Seneca.

As a preliminary to the presentation of the problem of self-deception and self-knowing I shall discuss what Seneca precisely means by self-love. The term self-love is not a novelty in the Ancient philosophical tradition. Plato¹ mentions self-love as a vicious state of soul. Later, it recurs in the context of friendship in Aristotle.² In the writings of Stoics of the Roman tradition, self-love is introduced as the Latin translation of the Greek 'oikeionon' by Cicero,³ with its moral associations. 'Oikeionon' is an important concept in Stoic moral psychology; it is proposed both as a psychological faculty and an ethical norm by Chrysippus (280-207 BC), head of the Old Stoa after Cleanthes (331-232 BC). The term won popularity among the forthcoming thinkers of the Stoic school of both early and late tradition. 'Oikeionon' is an innate propensity of self-interest, concerning the maintenance of the body and the bodily constitution which is commonly shared by all living beings in Nature. As a psychic faculty, it is structured on the instinctive inclination towards the useful and avoiding the opposite. As human beings by nature are social and rational beings, 'oikeionon' develops from the instinctive behaviors of the maintenance of existence to the total grasp of human telos which the Stoics claim as the chief Good, happiness and also the state of virtue. The famous motto, living in accordance with nature, becomes living a life in accordance with rational principles and also virtue. This is the point where *oikeionon* becomes also an ethical norm. The total grasp of human telos, is based on the understanding of rational principles, or to be more exact gaining access to

¹ Plato, *Laws*, (731)

² *Nicomachean Ethics* (1166.4)

³ Cicero *De Finibus*, (3.16.5)

their rational selves and live in accordance with these principles. This is, however, a rare case, reserved to the sage only.

For the rest of humankind, 'oikeionon' is an excessive self-interest, which the Stoics discuss in the context of passions, ranging from greed, ambition, jealousy, lust, to anger and glory. For the Stoics in general passions are irrational disposition of the soul; their irrationality is primarily due to deceptive value judgments regarding the externals which are also typical examples of failure of self-knowing. Four main types of passions are discussed; appetite, fear, pleasure and distress. Appetite and fear are erroneous judgments of future things as good and bad respectively, whereas pleasure and distress are misevaluations of things present. In the Stoics of old and Roman tradition, as examples of deceptive value judgments, passions are concrete evidences of lack of self-knowledge. By contrast, the virtuous 'oikeionon' condemns the self-interest when necessary; it considers the priority of respect, duty over the personal interest. Generally speaking, the virtuous state of 'oikeionon' is exemplified in a series of relations starting with love of offspring, parental affection love of fellows, friends, 'oikeionon' is extended to the love of gods, to love of one's country, culminating in the love of humanity

Despite the difficulty of making a generalization for all Stoic philosophers, it can be argued that while the self in Old Stoics is modeled after the personae of sage, and therefore, the perfect state of 'oikeionon', in the Empire tradition to which Seneca belonged, the scope of the self is confined to the progressing individual. The growing concern on the progressing individual is said to have been the influence of Panaetius (185-109 BC) who modified the doctrines of the school and rendered them directly relevant to the practical concern of the individuals. Behind the change of focus from the sage to the ideal of the self-sufficient individual is a direct reflection of the societal changes that the Roman society underwent at that time. The writings of the Stoics of the Empire tradition recount teachings of overcoming the imperfect state by eradicating the emotions. Having developed the knowledge of what is natural to them by education and training, progressing individuals are concerned with how to perfect and actualize the Good both by heart and in action. In the moral psychology of the Stoics of the

Empire tradition, the self model is the divided one in the constant struggle of self-mastery and self-transformation; the major examples are Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Within a unitary account of the soul, the psychological division displays mostly the conflict between one's personal interest and the moral norms which they also describe in terms of the conflict between passion and reason. In the scholarly literature, Seneca is not held an exception to the structure and the model of self, stated above.

Seneca's notion of self-love I have developed in this thesis is based on the Orthodox Stoic 'oikeionon'. By grounding the self in the embryonic form on the Orthodox 'oikeionon' at the pre-rational level, I argue that Seneca preserves the main Stoic trend as far as the affection of the body and the bodily constitution are concerned. The nature of self in adolescence, however, is a departure from the School. I shall discuss this as a novelty in Seneca. The nature and the structure of self this thesis develops are central to the discussion of self-love, literal translation of the Latin terms 'amor sui' and 'caritatem sui' and the related sub term 'conciliari'. In Seneca, the growth into the rational stage is described as the 'I's gaining recognition of the love of self which is characterized by self-esteem, self-identification and safeguarding.

Self-love is also discussed with the sub term, 'conciliari', literally translated as "getting familiar as"⁴ which he uses to denote the craft-skill and the organizing, creative principle of self-love. Seneca does not posit 'conciliari' as a distinct faculty in the soul. Instead, it is discussed as part of the innate ability making self-knowing at the pre-rational stage possible both by registering and adjusting sensual data in accordance with the principle of self love which develops into complex forms through maturation. In this thesis, the 'conciliari' refers also to the complex devices in reasoning that the self manipulates to construct, enhance and preserve its self-esteem.

As for its nature, I argue that besides the innate psychic qualities, Senecan self-love is existential in the sense that it is constitutive of the objects of its cognition which hold a mirror to the subject "I" as the beloved. In this thesis,

⁴ See also Julia Annas (1992) : (p 57). My own contribution to the term is to add the idea of craftsmanship.

Seneca's concern on existential nature of self is discussed both as a novelty and a departure from the rest of the Stoics; the psychic acts of desire and avoidances are explained with reference to this existential character of self-love. Love of self is the very source that the "I" is driven to know itself as well as the world, develops notions of things, such as wealth, poverty, fame, and glory. The orientation to loving is existential, which the sage is not an exception. The "I" seeks to assert its existence, measures and adjusts its own self-esteem in the eye of the other as object of love. By nature, it is always needy, crafty, and creative, seeking every resource, sometimes forming contrary ways to maintain its natural status. It longs for its happiness by desiring what it is instrumental, good and by avoiding what is death-dealing. It gets pathological when there is no object of love or its object of love proves to be insufficient to fulfill the demands of its nature.

By arguing for the existential nature of self-love, I attempt to provide an answer to how, beginning with a limited self interest, self-love happens to include the interest of the others. While the Stoics argue that the other-regarding attitude of self love springs from the natural instinct in 'oikeionon', their account lacks psychological plausibility.⁵ In Seneca, the self is concerned primarily with his/her own interest in loving the others. In short, there is no other concern in Senecan self-love independent from this subjective principle.

As a typical example of the failure of self-knowing, I shall discuss the problem of self deception on the basis of the arguments on self-love I have presented above. Self-deception is central to the nature of passions. A passion is an impulse in excess, disobedient to reason, which is based primarily on their failure of recognizing their natural (rational) nature. According to the testimony of Cicero, starting from the primary instinct of self interest, natural development of 'oikeionon' recounts the self-discovery of rational constitution, which is held as the highest Good and the principle of happiness and the state of virtue. And yet, according to the Stoics, self-knowing is only accessible to the sage, while the rest of the humanity fail to familiarize their nature. Arguing for a unifying account of self, Stoics do not confine passions in an irrational part of the soul; while passions

⁵ See Julia Annas, (1993): p(269-70)

are the products of reason, they are concrete examples of deceptive beliefs, regarding the value of externals such as political titles, wealth, honors, and they are engendered by imperfect reasoning.

In Seneca, too, self-deception revolves around the problem of self-knowing; the natural development of self-love is accompanied by self-knowing; all individuals are to discover their nature of self-love, which is mainly characterized an irresistible urge for existence, resistance to destruction. On the other hand, the nature of self-love also includes the knowledge of its mortality, and its vulnerability to destruction. Self-deception is a typical example of the adults' failure in recognizing the rational self-love which is disclosed in the knowledge of mortality. In Seneca, too, passions as deceptive value judgments are discussed as concrete examples of lack of self-knowledge. Freedom from self-deception is only possible through gaining full access to the rational constitution which can only be accomplished by education. Seneca, like other Stoics, argue that only the sage can gain access to his nature. The rest of the humanity is subject to self-deception, including educated selves. Although self-deception is a familiar theme in Stoics' writing, its discussion is neglected in Seneca.

In this thesis, I argue that Seneca takes one step further in his account of the nature of self-deception, especially on the nature of reasoning and irrationality in the state of passions. For the rest of the Stoics self-deception is due to ignorance- unrealized self-, involving faulty reasoning, i.e. by desiring and fearing things that are not actually desirable or fearful; reason says that one can face some danger, whereas fear disobeys it. Reason chooses to refrain from luxury, but greed wins over. In Seneca, I argue that the reason-passion dichotomy is characterized by erroneous reasoning the confusion of aversions with desires beyond the recognition of the selves; the reversed structuring of desires and aversions is particularly emerged as a result of a mental frustration of low esteem. Selves engage erroneous reasoning by excessively desiring what they actually fear. What arouses fear is actually what the self excessively desirous. The confusion is a vain attempt of getting praise from the others or enhancing self-esteem that actually results in strife and injustice.

I shall discuss the same model of self-deception in three distinct types of self-love. In the first type, self-deception is due to ignorance. Self-deception in the educated selves is discussed as vain attempts of transforming into the state of virtue, which remains as an inconsistent reference in the Stoics' writing. I argue that it emerges at the background of the tension between self-love and self-knowledge. Seneca argues that even self-knowledge remains insufficient in eradicating passions, since it requires becoming into a new self. While knowledge of the self partly moderates passion, they do not eradicate the urge for praise which cannot be possible without the others.

In this thesis, the study of the deceived self-love is also an alternative reading to some representations of self-love such as intentional self-concealment or pretension⁶ which are discussed as concrete examples of social practices of contemporary Roman society. In this thesis, they are discussed as representations of deceived self-love in the educated selves.

Scholarly Literature on Seneca

While the scholarly literature on Senecan self mainly recounts the model of the divided self, the interpretations are based on different philosophical issues with an interdisciplinary approach through which old problems are reformulated with new spectacles. Some of the works are devoted to the discussion on the problems of 'oikeionon', which are mainly related to Stoics' treatment of the term both as a psychological faculty and an ethical norm. More specifically, how, 'oikeionon', which is primarily ego-centric principle, happens to be both a self-regarding and other-regarding attitude.⁷ Some writers try to give a plausible consistent account of its relation to other goals and human 'telos' in general, its articulation in concepts such as, justice, love, bravery, virtue.⁸ The existential nature of self-love and self-esteem I have argued in this thesis attempts to provide an answer to these problems in 'oikeionon'.

⁶The issue is further elaborated in the book in progress, *The Mirror of the Self: sexuality, self-knowledge and the gaze in the early Roman Empire* Chicago University press, 2005. See further, <http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/031106/bartsch.shtml>

⁷G.Reydam-Schils (2002)

E.G.Pembroke (1996)

⁸ Padersen,(1990). See also Julia Annas, (1993), Gisela Striker, (1996) and G.Watson, (1996)

The Senecan self is also tackled with the context of broader philosophical problems and ethical issues in Stoicism; these include the problem of self-knowledge in terms of the dualism of emotion and reason in the light of the novelties Seneca brings on the current Stoic arguments. Referring to Seneca's contribution of the will –*voluntas*– to the orthodox Stoic notion of assent, (deliberate choice), the majority of the scholars point to the presence of an introspective consciousness and the inner strength in the struggling individual, with the first person outlook onto the world. The self is endowed with the power to control its opinions; it is able to detach, look back to himself/herself at a distance, envisaging what is wrong and later transform the soul into a model that is closer to the sage.⁹

The same model of self is prevalent in the narrative-authorial reading of Senecan texts in the act of letter-writing where the self is engaged in the process of the self-examination, purification of conscience, self-interrogation. Although the discussion is not confined to the term 'oikeionon' by all scholars the same essential ethical association of 'oikeionon' as care of the self is emphasized.¹⁰

Method and Approach

As the self in Seneca is discussed in the light of different philosophical issues, commentators also resort to various disciplines among which literature, psychoanalysis, sociology and history are the most popular. This is due to two reasons; among the Stoics of both early and late tradition, literature is a useful guide for making the instruction of the Stoic teachings palpable, ranging from the analysis of emotions, problems in value judgments, the significance of divine order in Nature, to the individual responsibility in decision making. Especially Chrysippus and Epictetus made use of the tragic heroes and heroines from the epics of Homer, tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles, while Cleanthes used poetry to communicate the Stoic teachings –*Hymn to Zeus*–. Seneca himself is not held an exception to this method. He uses poems, especially from Virgil, citing passages from tragedies of Euripides, epics of Homer, and Terence. The

⁹ A. A.Long (1996). C. Kahn (1988). B. Inwood, (2000), M.C Nussbaum (1994), R.Sorabji (2000)

¹⁰ M. Foucault, (1988) See also, C Edwards (1997).

lack of the primary sources is another reason for the choice of an interdisciplinary approach especially in reading the early Stoics; nothing remains except a few fragments and numerous reports, and comments which might be influenced by the commentators' own preoccupations.

For the last five years, the interdisciplinary approach to Stoics gets more and more popular, as the interest in Seneca has been increased. This has resulted in a growing tendency to handle the above mentioned philosophical problems by discussing them on a wider basis of human experience. Besides the usual methods of the earlier Stoic thinkers, the uniqueness in Seneca's style has also led many of the scholars to make use of other disciplines from the social sciences. In addition to literature, –Senecan tragedies– some scholars make art history, auto biographical references, sociology, psychoanalysis as indispensable sources and tools for the discussion of the philosophical problems of Stoicism in Seneca.

In this thesis, I shall also follow an interdisciplinary approach in the discussion of self as self-love and self-deception in Seneca. My aim is not to seek new solutions to old problems with fresh materials. Neither the sister disciplines would push their claims on the arguments that are developed in the thesis. I shall use history and history of theatre to support some arguments.

Seneca: Personality, Style and Technique

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BC- 65 AD) was born at Cordoba, a leading town in Roman Spain, a son of an imperial procurator. He spent a period of his early life in Egypt, where he gained experience of administration and finance, knowledge of geography, and natural science. It is argued that his interest was drawn at an early age to Pythagorean mysticism and various cults of Eastern origin that gain adherence in Rome, before he finally subscribes to the Stoic philosophy. His career recounts a series of ups and downs. When Caligula succeeded Tiberius in 37 AD, Seneca became a leading speaker in the Senate, aroused the jealousy of the new emperor so much that he ordered his banishment. This incident apparently resulted in his temporary retirement from political affairs. In 41 AD, during the reign of Claudius, Seneca was again under threat, condemned to banishment. It was believed to be adultery with Julia Livia, the late

Emperor's sister. During his exile on the island of Corsica, he wrote his tragedies, poems and his philosophical essays to friends. In 49 AD, his life changed again, when the emperor's wife, Messalina was executed and called back by the new wife, Agrippina, for a high office of praetor. Seneca was made a tutor to her twelve-year old son, the future emperor, Nero. And finally in 65 AD in a disastrous conspiracy against the emperor by Piso and quite possibly including Seneca, he was ordered to commit suicide.

Unlike the rest of the Stoic philosophers, Seneca is less interested in the technical philosophical treatise, the use of technical words; although he is well-instructed on the doctrines of both of his own school and of the others,¹¹ he presents his arguments not with the technical terms. Although the impact of his background on his philosophical arguments or vice versa is controversial, it can still be argued that Seneca's writing displays a balance between his personal contribution and the inherited school doctrine.¹² He intends to address to general educated public as readers of Stoicism referring many times important historical figures, both to real life and imaginary situations and sometimes to his own personal experience. His writing is always oriented towards the practical concerns of the individuals, including his own, mirroring the multiple sources from Seneca's own intellectual background.

Being a part of the contemporary literary culture, Seneca sometimes cites from ancient thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Lucretius or poets and the tragedians of both ancient and the Latin tradition,¹³ such as Virgil and Sophocles, Homer etc, to enhance the vividness of the message he intends to communicate to the reader, to persuade them into accepting the truths of Stoicism and his own condition in an elegant way. I argue that this should not be taken as a stylistic departure from general doctrines of the school. While he develops his own independence and uniqueness and creativity, he always does on the basis of the philosophical system of the Stoics.

¹¹ See the letters I21, 124,

¹² L.A.Motto (1993).

¹³ Sometimes to enhance the vividness of the message he attempts to communicate, he refers to philosophers of the various schools. Seneca thinks that what Epicurus means with the sober happiness of the wise is similar to what the Stoics mean in the tranquility of the soul.

His style of writing, however, is rather poetic, full of metaphors, usually the theatrical, juridical, word-plays that create both an association between the ideas he intends to communicate and sometimes a tension between the Stoic arguments and his own Stoicism.¹⁴ It is precisely for these reasons that disciplines other than philosophy are resorted. The goals of interdisciplinary approach in reading Seneca differ. Some of them discuss the main Stoic arguments and the subsequent problems on a wider context with new spectacles¹⁵, while its modern aspirations remain suggestive.¹⁶

Summary

As a preliminary to the discussion of the problem of self-deception as self-knowing in Seneca's notion of self-love, the first two chapters are devoted to the presentation of the self in embryonic form together with the analysis of key terms. Central to the discussion of two terms, 'carita' and 'conciliari', the first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the self in its embryonic form; its structure and the nature. In 2.1, the structure of self is drawn with two concurrent acts; self-perception and physical behaviors of avoiding the death-dealing and inclining towards the useful. The process of self-perception is not treated independent from the perception of other things. From the analysis of the structure of self, I argue that the love of self in its most primitive sense is exemplified by the love of one's bodily constitution, which is characterized by an urge to protect, seek safety and defense by inclining towards the useful and avoiding from the death-dealing. In 2.2, I argue that, Seneca makes use of another term 'conciliari' to explain how animals and human infants gain consciousness of their nature in the embryonic form in addition to self-perception; 'conciliari' refers to a creative principle that explains the nature of how the selves gain consciousness of their own constitution. Here, Seneca emphasizes the craftsmanship of all animals in a constant flux of becoming.

The final section of the second chapter recounts how, within the developmental perspective, the self familiarizes self-love as it grows into its

¹⁴C.Edwards (2002)

¹⁵ C.Gill, (1997).

¹⁶ See the Freudian reading in P.Veyne (1997). A.O Rorty, (1994)

rational constitution. The self familiarizes the principle of self-love in physical growth. It becomes conscious of the subjective principle of self love, makes deliberate choices and avoidance choices, deriving pleasure and shunning pain.

On the basis of the implications on the arguments in the preceding parts, in Chapter 3, “Nature of Self-love” I shall discuss self-esteem and self-knowing as two important features of self-love; the new (rational) constitution which the self grows into, makes the eye of the other as a necessary source both for loving and knowing, none of which is independent from one another; I argue that the self loves itself only through loving the others. In 3.1, the origin of self-esteem is discussed with reference to praise ‘*lauda*’; it refers to a virtuous state of self-love, encompassing a state of loving that is considerate to both the self and the other. 2.2 Self-identification is discussed as another feature of self-love; it refers to a series of acts of self-knowing by adjusting the closest model from the environment. Self-identification is value laden. The self identifies himself with those that are commonly admired and approved in order to gain admiration and praise. I conclude the chapter by examining contrary representations of praise and self-identification; self-flattery ‘*adulato*’ refers to an egoistic self-love persisting in maladjusted, slippery representation of self-love. I argue that passions ranging from greed, mad love of glory, anger and grief are specific instances of self-flattery and slippery, vicious self-identification. Seneca raises the problem of self-deception in passion.

Chapter 4, “Self in Conflict” is devoted to the discussion of the problem of self-deception in self-flattery and the vicious representations of love of self in terms of the problem of self-knowing. In 4.1, the origin of self-deception is traced in the perversion of self-love from its natural state. Wrong value judgments on externals are discussed as concrete cases of self-deception. The section ends with the discussion on the nature of perverted self-love as the lack of self-knowledge. 4.2 is devoted to the discussion of the nature of reasoning in passions and the norm of irrationality, which I examine as mainly as erroneous measuring one’s worth. Irrationality is discussed in terms of the confusion of desires and aversions persisting at the background of it. In 4.3 I further discuss the same reasoning in passion of pleasure and pain. The passion pleasure, ‘*voluptas*’, in contrast to

rational pleasure ‘gaudium’, denotes a pleasure principle in excess; it is formed out of false impressions, and is changeable in nature. In 4.5 I shall discuss passions as perverted forms of loving in reciprocal relations.

Chapter 5 is devoted to the discussion of the progressing selves and the nature of self-deception. In 5.1 “Norms of Self-knowing” Seneca discusses the possibility and norms of self-knowing. The first is the knowledge of the condition of the soul through education. The second is the will to improve and third is the perfection of the knowledge in experience. This is followed by his introduction of the two types of deceived self-love as typical examples of the weakness of the will, in addition to the total state of ignorance. Section two covers the nature of self-deception in the progressing selves type 2 and 3. In 5.3, I argue that while the experience of self deception in the progressing selves is based on the same model of the reasoning of the ignorant, the conditions are due to the knowledge of the condition of their souls. Section four includes the discussion of the reasoning in self-deception by examining the structure of pleasure and pain. Chapter 5 ends with the study of the typical states of self-deception as craft in self-love.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the discussion of the education of the self. In 6.1, I offer a brief discussion on Seneca’s view on the education, its scope, goals and methods; in arguing for the necessity of both theoretical and the practical education, Seneca has two important goals in mind. The first is the knowledge of the self, the concern of the other and the third the concern of maintaining the natural disposition of self. In 6.2, education of children is discussed in terms of reward and punishment. The following section, 6.3, deals with the extensive discussion of theoretical education of self-knowing by studying natural nature with the metaphor of parental affection between the mortal selves and nature. The fourth section is devoted to the study of Seneca’s notion of practical education with the concrete examples of therapeutic methods. I conclude the section by arguing that education of the self is nothing but sterile attempts of self-knowing. The final section, 6.5 “how the stoic sage loves” recounts the perfect state of self-love of the wise which I discuss primarily from a subjective perspective. The wise is not free from the concern of praise; his wisdom as the best craft, originates not only from the knowledge of his own but also of the other selves. His perfect state

of loving is exemplified in his successful relations with the others. He is respectful, kind and just to the others precisely for the same concern of self-interest as well as his knowledge of the ephemeral nature of externals. Chapter 7 is devoted to the conclusions of some important points throughout the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

AMOR SUI: SELF IN EMBRYONIC FORM

Seneca's notion of the self in embryonic form is closely related to his use of the terms "caritatem/amor sui" and "conciliari". The former is literally translated as the love of self, and characterized primarily as the attachment to the body. It is a commonly shared state by all living beings and non-beings, regardless of animals and humans. The nature and the structure of self are described by the concomitant acts of self-perception and the maintenance of existence.

The other, "conciliari" is translated as "getting familiar to oneself as" is another state Seneca uses to describe the features of self-love. It is primarily a creative skill animals and human infants use in maintaining their existence within a dynamic process of self-adjustment to the environment. This physical creative skill also has its bearings on their gaining consciousness of their own constitution as the development of more complex physical behaviors entail within the same process.

In the case of humans, love of self is situated in a teleological developmental perspective. Seneca argues that although both young infant and animals love their own constitution in the same manner, the latter would love as their reasoning constitution demands. The same teleological perspective also discloses their gaining consciousness of their reasoning constitution.

2.1 Amor Sui: Self-perception and Self-preservation

Seneca introduces his notion of self with two terms, 'caritatem sui'¹⁷, literally translated as love of self, and 'conciliari', 'getting familiar as'. The meaning of both terms are derivative to each other and generate basically from the implications of the two concomitant acts within the structure of self; the inborn instinct of self-preservation, the skill to do so, and self-perception. The inborn skill of self-preservation unfolds a series of physical acts of the maintenance and the preservation of existence, forming the basis of the love of self which is

¹⁷ Sometimes Seneca exchangeably uses the Latin terms, amor-sui'.

confined, at the most primitive stage, to the love of one's constitution in experience. Although the instinct of taking care (*tutelam sui*) and the skill (*peritia*) to do so in animals and human infants are inborn, loving and familiarizing are situated in the physical growth throughout which they learn (*discere*) to preserve their existence, and therefrom develop self-worth (*vilitas*) in the most primitive sense. Self-love in its embryonic form is not distinct from their perception of the things that are instrumental and harmful to their own constitution.

These tendencies are closely connected; for each animal at the same time consults its own safety, seeking that which helps it, and shrinks from that which will harm it. Impulses towards useful objects and revulsions from the opposites, are according to nature. Without any reflection to prompt the idea, and without any advice, whatever nature prescribes, is done.¹ (121.21)

As the psychic mechanism of inclining towards the useful objects and revulsion from the destructive entail, loving is characterized as principle of safety, and value of one's constitution which is not possible without animals' perceiving and preserving their own constitution. Cicero¹⁸ also discusses the nature of love of self within the same structure; animals' factual relation to the world and to the things in general are referred to as a means to indicate the principle of safety and the value of one's constitution that is derivative to the process of self-perception.

By principle, in explaining the nature of the love of self in terms of the principle of self-preservation and familiarizing their constitution, Seneca does not deviate from the main Stoic notion of self as *oikeionon*,¹⁹ developed first by Chrysippus, (280-207 BC) the third head of Stoics. "The first impulse of all animals is self-preservation (*proton oikeion*) and consciousness of this."²⁰

For Seneca, too, each animal/young infant is instinctively driven to preserve, and to protect, and at the same time gets to know about their constitution. And likewise, he uses the terms '*tutelae et diligentia*' – preserving and loving -, to explain series of animal behaviors that denote love of one's

¹⁸ (*De Finibus*, tran. by R.Rackham [London, Loeb series,1994], 3, 16)

¹⁹ Cicero, (*De Finibus*, tran. by R.Rackham [London, Loeb series,1994], 3, 16-17)

²⁰ Diogenes Laertius, (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. 2, tran. by R.D.Hicks [London, Loeb series, 1925],7.85)

constitution. From the moment an animal is issued from the mother's womb or is delivered from the egg, it begins to preserve its own constitution, instinctively develops a sense of security. For Seneca, this is not gained by experience but an inborn quality (*sed innascitur*), shared both by animals and human infants at this stage.

Even young animals, on issuing from mother's womb or from the egg, know at once of their own accord what is harmful for them, and avoid death-dealing things. They even shrink when they notice the shadows of the birds of prey which flit overheadⁱⁱ (121.18).

Seneca gives specific examples from the animal kingdom as proofs for both the instinct of self-preservation and self-perception; the fact that some animals shrink even from the shadows of the birds of prey is one example of the love of one's constitution, whereas the instinctive act of avoiding is another form that loving is construed. In the following parts of the letter several more examples are given from the animal kingdom, such as the hen, having no fear of the peacock or the goose but of the hawk, whereas young chickens fear cats, not dogs. (19) In a similar way, the tortoises' behavior on moving sideways to turn back again on their feet displays not their shunning pain, but their urge to preservation by their attempt to restore their natural status.

The presentiment of harm and the advantageous suggest that the animals' preservation of their constitution simultaneously unfolds the process of self-perception. The proofs that Seneca uses to explain the maintenance of existence are also cited as concrete evidences of self-perception. As he puts it;

We were once debating whether all animals had any feelings about their constitution. That this is the case is proved particularly by their making motions of such fitness and nimbleness that they seemed to be trained for that purpose (5)... No animal handles its limbs with difficulty, no animal is at a loss how to use its body. This function they exercise immediately at birthⁱⁱⁱ (6).

The animal's making motions of fitness and their skill in using their bodies, the nimbleness to seek safety and defense are given also as proofs of self-perception. They are different facets of the same experience of loving. Unless an organism perceives its own body it cannot tend to preserve, and therefore develop a love of

self. Like Seneca's 'amor sui', the account of 'oikeionon' in Hierocles, a Stoic philosopher in the second century AD, implies the same logical relationship between self-perception and physical acts of self-preservation and self-guarding, unlike what A.A.Long observes.²¹ Hierocles speaks of animals' capacity to test the strength and the vulnerability of their bodily parts to destruction as concrete evidences of 'aesthesia' (self-perception) as well as instances of their maintenance of existence; snails protect their flesh by contracting into their shells, and tortoises behave similarly whereas a lion is wary of a bull's horns but unconcerned about the rest of its body. For Hierocles, bulls tend to seek safety and defense of their constitution by fighting with one another also with other species by "sticking out their horns as if these were their congenital weapons."²² Below, Seneca states the relation of two acts without an emphasis on the priority of each.

Hence indeed, it is evident that these animals can not reach such a condition through experience; it is because of an inborn desire for self-preservation. Teachings of experience are slow and irregular. Whatever nature communicates belongs equally to everyone, and comes immediately. If however, you require an explanation, shall I tell you how is it that every living thing tries to understand that which is harmful? It feels that it is constructed of flesh; so it perceives to what an extent flesh may be cut, or burned or crushed, and what animals are equipped to with the power of doing this imageThese tendencies are closely connected; for each animal at the same time consults its own safety, seeking that which helps it, and shrinks from that which will harm it. Impulses towards useful objects and revulsions from the opposites, are according to nature; without any reflection to prompt the idea, and without any advice, whatever Nature has prescribed, is done^{iv} (121. 20-21).

The concomitant acts of maintaining existence and self-perception indicates three pieces of knowledge that the animal instinctively feels; during the process of 'naturalis amor salutis suae', an animal develops an instinctive knowledge of its own body and the bodily functions; as it loves its constitution, it instinctively learns (sentit) that it is constructed of flesh, and also to what extent

²¹ ("Hierocles on Oikeiosis and self-perception" in *Stoic Studies* [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996], p 263)

²² (Hierocles, *The Hellenistic Philosophers. Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary* vol. 1. tran. and compl. by A.A.Long and D.N Sedley[Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987], 2.3-18)

its flesh can be burnt or cut. Secondly, their knowledge of its bodily constitution is not possible without their knowing the other things, animals and objects that stand in factual relation to its own body. The young infant and animals instinctively know what objects and animals threaten and are instrumental to the maintenance of its existence. The love of self cannot be unless the animal perceives its own body; unless the organism perceives (sentit) itself. The third thing the animal instinctively knows is the nature of self-love with an emphasis on the presentiment of harm and the usefulness from the objects and animals it encounters.

Likewise, Hierocles' account of 'aesthesia' consists of a series of arguments, implying the same reductive tendency in Seneca by treating the perception and the nature and the structure in the phenomena of loving within the same source. In Hierocles' account, self-perception and perception of the other things are not presented as two different experiences; both of them serve for the same purpose of showing its bearing on 'oikeionon'. An attempt to isolate each process sounds meaningless. Hierocles says, "the moment an animal is born, it perceives itself," and the first thing that the animals perceive is their own parts. They perceive that they have them and for what purpose they have them and which of their parts are weak and strong.²³ In short, Hierocles' account of 'aesthesia' is psychosomatic. And in another argument, he says, "an animal must have an attitude of affection for the 'phantasia' itself that it has; self-perception occurs in terms of an organism's affective response to the things around.

Although Seneca does not provide a substantial theoretical explanation, his discussion on the nature of self-perception might well be taken as remarks that he already subscribes to the orthodox account of what 'phantasiai' are (or its Latin equivalent *notiones/imagines*). "A 'Phantasia' is an affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself and its cause and alteration in the soul."²⁴ Although Aetius does not openly say what is revealed, same assumptions are underlined in his account of what an impression is. The process of the organism's receiving an

²³ Hierocles in (*The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 2 tran. and compl. by A.A.Long & David Sedley [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987], 2.18-3.19, 6.24-49)

²⁴ Aetius in (*The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 2 tran. and compl. by A.A.Long & D. Sedley [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987], 4.12.1, 4.12.5)

impression is described in terms of its affective response to the environment; what ever is being perceived is perceived already with a content, inclusive of the knowledge of the things in relation to the bodily needs. The perceived object cannot be described as distinct from the change it makes on the body. In a similar way, a Stoic critic, Plutarch (50-120 AD), defines the Stoic account of impression as a printing in the soul²⁵. Except Plutarch's, in all accounts of impression, the receiver is described as actively engaging in the act of perception and the content of the perceived objects, not distinct from the experience – the change it makes onto the organism.

Turning back to Seneca's account of 'sensus sui', it can be observed that Seneca's main concern is to emphasize the active role both the organism and the environment play in the process of the animals' perceiving their constitution, which, in turn, serve to explain the nature and the structure of the love of self.

What type of affection or alteration is implied in the process of self-perception? In Seneca, there is no other substantial information about the nature of 'sensus sui', except the one that is implied in his extensive discussion of the term, 'conciliari', literally translated as getting familiar as.²⁶ The process of 'conciliari' tells more than the simple stimulation-affection pattern suggests; it recounts the processing the sensual data through the pattern of self-adjustment that is suggestive not only of the physical but also of the psychological process, unlike what Pembroke and Pedersen²⁷ argue. As Seneca concedes, "The child is toothless, and he gets familiar to this constitution. Then his teeth grow and he gets familiar to that constitution also"^v (121.15). The transition from the state of toothlessness to having teeth implies that it gets familiar to its own bodily

²⁵ Plutarch, ('Common Conceptions', in *Moralia* vol. 10. tran. by E.L.Minar, &Jr, F.H. Sandbach [London, Loeb series, 1961],1085b).

²⁶ Cicero gives a primary importance to the act of familiarizing and its relevance to the love of one's constitution without inserting any information on how it is so (*De Finibus*, 3.16)

²⁷ Pembroke argues that 'oikeionon' in Seneca is continuously described as a physical growth, that also has a bearing on consciousness. She claims that Seneca's text lacks textual evidence to show how this physiological process is attendant to the psychological one. I argue that while her translation of the term as "belonging" suggests the constant growth of affection to one's body, it does not include the idea of self-adjustment. ('Oikeiosis' in *Problems of Stoicism*, ed A.A.Long [NJ, the Athlone Press 1996], p.121-22). See also Pedersen; he translates the term as "belonging". While his reading includes the evaluative content of self love at pre-rational level, and its contribution on consciousness, it falls short in explaining its development into higher forms of experience. ("Oikeiosis I" *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic theory* [Denmark: Aarhus Press, 1990], p. 72).

functions as it adjusts its body to the things it encounters within the environment. The knowledge of bodily constitution is functional; the process of familiarizing as self-adjustment suggests the knowledge of which things are easy to chew or not, i.e. instrumental or threatening to its body to its constitution and which objects are chewable or what objects fit to that purpose. The young infants and animals are simultaneously driven to and avoid those objects to maintain their existence.

Seneca speaks of the later stage of familiarizing within the process of self-adjustment with reference to physical behavior of the child who is trying to stand on his feet, crying (121.8). This also shows how self-love, starting from the instinctive acts of preserving and maintaining existence, develops into more complex forms. The physical behavior of the child shows that the process of getting to know about its own bodily functions as well as their familiarizing the principle of self-love is situated in a dynamic process of physical growth.

In the light of the arguments on the relationship between self-preservation and self perception, the following conclusions can be drawn on the nature of self-love. First of all, the simultaneous acts of maintaining existence and self-perception presuppose a pre-conditioned outlook onto the world; their knowledge of the things and other animals that an organism is attached to and shrink from have already been processed by the fixed pattern of self-love, although the physical growth also indicates learned behaviors of loving in experience. Secondly, the same sources with which the self forms its factual relation to the world are the very means that the self intuitively develops the knowledge of its own constitution. On the basis of the first and the second, it can be argued that the love of self is existential; both the intuitive self-knowing, and the knowledge of the other imply valuation. Despite the innate propensity of self-love, the “I” cannot love unless there is an object other than the self to stimulate loving and knowing, as the constant interaction between the organism and the environment implies. The existential nature of self-love has important implications on the nature of cognition and loving in later stages, especially in explaining why it is natural for adults to love and to protect the others as much as they love themselves.

2.2 The State of Conciliari and Amor-sui

In the introductory part of the previous section, I have argued that Seneca also refers to animals and young infants' skill–peritia– that is observed in their acts of maintaining existence. Due to the fact that the structure of self discloses also a simultaneous process of self-perception, it can be argued that the skill the animals develop as they maintain their existence is also attendant to the psychological mechanism of inclining towards the useful objects and avoiding from the opposite, which has important bearings on the nature of their gaining consciousness of their nature, i.e. the principle of love of self.

One of the meanings of the noun form of the term, 'peritia' in Oxford Dictionary of Latin²⁸, denotes a productive, creative process. Two meanings are listed in the verb form; the first is “to create intellectually and artistically” and the second, ‘what one acquires as an advantage’. When we look at the relevant sections on the primitive acts of self-preservation and self-perception, these two dictionary meanings,- ‘creative process’ and ‘ what is counted as an advantage’- are uniquely combined. As I have argued in the preceding section, all living beings preserve and maintain their own constitution by inclining towards what is useful and shrinking from the opposite. These primitive acts of self-preservation are also dependent to the process of self-perception which I have discussed in terms of the organisms’ familiarizing their own constitution in terms of adjusting to the environment. Seneca forms the relation between these two acts with the skill which is also inborn, though developed in experience. Likewise, Seneca discusses such behaviors with the metaphor of craftsmanship, ‘artifex instrumenta’ (121.5).

Just like the skilled artists use a variety of colors for the purpose of creating the likeness of an image on the canvas, so do the animals skillfully create a variety of behaviors to maintain and preserve their existence, as their own knowledge of constitution demands. Again the same metaphor of craftsmanship in skill is further described in the dancers’ bodily movements that harmoniously fit

²⁸Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. by P.G.W. Glare. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1982. Lucretius also uses the term to denote the creative principle of Nature, in *De Rarum Natura* , (5.334) whereas in Cicero the intellectual creation is implied in his *Oratio*, 115

to the composition of the melody (121.6). The animals' ability to use their bodies and the variety of motions they do resemble the artists' and the dancers' craft. The acts of self-preservation resemble the craft of the artist and the dancers. It suggests that that it is an inborn quality that is present in the nature of self in the primitive sense.

Seneca gives concrete examples from animals' behavior of their maintenance of their constitution; the cells bees build and spiders' physical motions of weaving nets to catch insects and their endurance of this toil are meant for their acquiring what is advantageous. The threads, which the spiders weave skillfully also serve for a useful device for defending themselves from objects and animals that threaten their existence. Seneca speaks of "weaving of threads that runs in the circles and lessening in thickness" displays a similar creativity of an artist. So is the case of the animals, with hard shells, such as tortoise, when turned on their backs, make motions sideways until they restore their natural constitution. (*desiderio naturalis status*) (8). This creative skill is commonly shared by all living beings, though it differs in the case of plants, animals and humans, but also in the Universal Reason. The craft in the former is the simulacrum of the master craftsman in Nature, which the Stoics called God, or Fate. "May I not inquire who is the Master builder of this universe, how the mighty bulk was brought under the control of law and order?"^{vi}(65.19)

In discussing how the young infant gets familiar (*conciliari*) to its constitution in an ongoing process of growth, Seneca also highlights the skill, that contributes to their understanding their own constitution.²⁹ The child is toothless, and he gets familiar to this constitution. The transition from the state of toothlessness to having teeth implies the infant's developing behaviors to chew and gnaw things that are instrumental to the preservation of its existence.

With this creative organizing skill in perception, the animals and human infants simultaneously develop complex behaviors as strategies to maintain and to protect-love of- their constitution in experience. Here, Seneca emphasizes the craftsmanship not as a static quality in cognition, but in a constant sense of

²⁹ See page 20 of this thesis. The process of familiarizing is described with a specific reference from the young infants developing the instinctive knowledge of the function of its teet and the objects in the act of chewing.

becoming; as the human infant grows into maturity, they will also develop complex creative forms of loving, which is not distinct from their knowing. As Seneca concedes, “The period of infancy, boyhood, youth and old age are different....Thus although each has at different time different constitution, getting familiar to each of the constitution is the same”^{vii} (16). The skill that one observes in the behavior of the child is fitted to his constitution. However, as the young infant grows into a more complex constitution, it develops more complex skills in self-preservation and cognition.³⁰ Elsewhere, the adults are called ‘artisans of the indispensable instruments of daily use’ (110.27), whereas their ship-making, weaving, carpentry (19) are given as complex examples of their creative skill in maintaining their existence. In addition to the physical one, Seneca argues that the skill is present also in emotional attitudes; a child might resort to submission as a profitable device unless he/she accomplishes to get through aggression.³¹

In short, the idea of craftsmanship that the term ‘conciliari’ implies in two concomitant acts –self-perception and self-preservation– is that the child would get familiar to its nature through a series of behavior it develops.

Moreover, the very constitution of his own, he understands confusedly, cursorily, and darkly. We also know that we possess souls but we don’t know the essence, the place and quality, or the source, of the soul. Such is the consciousness of our souls which we possess, ignorant as we are of their nature, and position,...For they necessarily feel this, because it is through the same agency by which they feel the other things also.... He knows that he has a sense of striving, although he does not know what it is or what its source. Thus, children and animals have a consciousness of their primary element, but it is not clearly outlined or portrayed^{viii} (11-14).

Seneca claims that starting with their perceiving the function of bodily organs, the young infant would gain recognition of the principle of love of self through the agency of its body; at the pre-rational stage, Seneca does not make a distinction

³⁰ See also Gisela Striker’s remarks on the later development of *oikeiosis*; she claims that self-preservation means different things at different stages of development. “Once a human person has reached the age of reason, concern for his self will be concern for a rational animal, and that is concern for an animal guided by reason. Now all other desires can be seen as in some way self-referring. “ following Nature: A study in Stoic ethics’ in *Oxford Study in Ancient Philosophy* vol. 9 [Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991], p 7)

³¹(‘On Anger’ in *Moral Essays* vol. 1, tran. by J.W.Basore [London, Loeb series,1998], 3. 21.10-7)

between the animal and young infant. The understanding of their nature is sensual and instinctive. As they grow into more complex constitution, they would familiarize the principle of love of self which they feel dimly and obey blindly. The child, which is not radically different from the animals at the pre-rational stage, is impelled to act blindly, and thus expected to develop a consciousness of its own nature by the agency of these mechanical behaviors.

In the light of the discussions, the following points are to be summed up. Firstly, in introducing his concept of self as self-love in the most primitive sense, along with the terms– ‘peritia’ and ‘conciliari’–, Seneca intends to emphasize this dynamic and existential character of knowing and preserving, which, as I shall argue, play an important role in more complex forms of loving. We are thus, given a picture of self, which is structured on two simultaneously happening acts; self-perception and the maintenance of existence. The love of one’s constitution dynamically actualizes itself with the constant creative process of self-adjustment/self-molding in accordance to a pattern, starting from the simple, yielding to more complex forms.

2.3 Towards the Foundation of Self as Self-Love

In his discussion of the evolutionary process of familiarizing in human infant, Seneca says that at the most primitive stage, the human infant is not radically different from the animal since both are driven by their senses to actualize the innate principle of self-preservation; it is dimly felt (sentit) and blindly obeyed. Its emergence as the highest Good can only be possible at a later stage when the child grows into the constitution that suits to its nature- and loves itself in accordance with it. As he puts it, “That which is according to nature that which is given to us as a gift immediately at our birth, is, I maintain, not a good, but the beginning of good” (124.7). This does not exist in dumb animals or little children (124.4) since the latter is at the age that senses, not the ‘ratio’ decides the chief Good. “The child is as yet, no more capable of comprehending the Good than a tree or any dumb beast” “for the same cause the good is non-existent in a child, for the child has no ‘ratio’, for the child will reach the Good only when he reaches ratio” (124.9).

And thus, in Seneca's response the objector's inquiry on how the child happens to love itself in the rational constitution, we are informed that the act of familiarizing the rational constitution is evolutionary and unfolds a dual process; on the one hand, in the evolutionary process of growth, the child is expected to familiarize both the principle of love of self as well as the reasoning constitution.

"You maintain, do you", says the objector, "that every living thing is at the start gets familiar to its constitution, but that man's constitution is a reasoning one, and man gets familiar to himself not merely as a living, but as a reasoning, being?"^{ix} For, man loves himself in respect of that wherein he is a man. How, then, can a child, being not yet gifted with reason, gets familiar to the reasoning constitution? "But each age has its own constitution, different in the case of the child, the boy, and the old man. They all get familiar to the constitution wherein they find themselves"^x (121.13).

The process of familiarizing the principle of love of self and also, their gaining recognition of the principle of loving as their rational constitution demands are situated in the process of bodily growth through which the earlier instinctive acts are matured into deliberate cognitive acts³². It is a law of nature that 'caritatem sui' differs not only among animal and human species, but also at the different stages in the latter; Seneca claims that self-love differs at the stage of boyhood, adulthood and old age, since at these particular periods of life, human beings also undergo changes in their physical constitution. Because the child loves itself not as much different in the way the animals do, when he/she grows into its reasoning constitution, he/she will love himself as his natural constitution demands. The second textual evidence regarding the nature of self love in the latter stages is given below.

Thus although each has at different times a different constitution, getting familiar to each constitution is the same.... First of all, the living being gets familiar to itself, for there must be a pattern to which all other things may be referred. I strive for the pleasant. For whom? For myself. I seek safety from pain; on behalf of whom? Myself. I therefore care for myself. Since I gauge all my

³² See also the implications of this argument in the quotation, cited on page 22 of this thesis.

actions with reference to my own welfare, I love myself before all else^{xi} (121.16-18).

The later stages of development indicate a growing sense of subjectivity. The self is the subject of its desires and aversions. Another thing the passage suggests is that the physical development of childhood into adulthood highlights the process of familiarizing the principle of love of self which discloses the process of knowing within the same source of reference; just like in the earlier stage, the principle of love unfolds the process of knowing and loving within the same structure; the self wills for the pleasant and protects himself from the painful, which is not distinct from the things that stand in relation to his own self. In desiring the pleasant and seeking safety from the painful, the I familiarizes himself through the same existential and subjective point of view, not without attaching value; what makes the cognized object either painful or pleasant is the self-concern. As I have formerly argued, this process is not a static one. Though not openly stated, the passage indicates the process of self-adjustment at the background of the deliberate acts of loving and familiarizing.

Seneca's remarks on the later stages shows us that he envisages no difference between familiarizing one's rational constitution and the rationalization of the instinct of self-love in the process of physical growth, save that the latter is embodied in more complex forms in experience. As the quotation suggests, ratio is treated as the outgrowth of the primary instinct of self-love,³³ and the functions of ratio are not different from the deliberate practices of earlier instinctive acts³⁴; the instinctive acts of inclining towards useful objects and aversion from the opposite gradually develops into deliberate choices of loving. Diogenes Laertius describes this new state as the craft (*techne*) of reason (*logos*), intervening impulse, bearing a resemblance to the one that is prevalent in Universal Nature (7.85) Likewise, all these implications can also be observed Seneca's view on the functions of *ratio* and the rational constitution.

³³ See R.W.Sharpley. (*Stoics, Epicurians and Sceptics* [London, Routledge, 1996], p.25)

³⁴ See also, Cicero. The process of familiarizing the rational constitution suggests the same duality; familiarizing the rational constitution is not different from gaining awareness of the principle of love of self through habitual practices. (*De Finibus* ,tran. by R.Rackham [London, Loeb series,1994], 3. 16. 27)

Every living thing, possessed of reason is inactive if it is not first stimulated by some external impression; then the impulse comes and finally assent confirms the impulse. Now what assent is, I shall explain. "It is appropriate that I walk (*oportet me ambulare*); Then I walk, whenever I said this to myself and approving the opinion of mine. Or suppose that it is appropriate for me to seat myself. I do seat myself, but only after the same process. The assent is not virtue^{xii} (123.11).

On the one hand, one can read this three-staged mental act as a concrete example of what Seneca means by reasoning constitution. Here, *ratio* is associated with a series of mental functions such as assenting to impressions, followed by opinion making with action guiding force. Seneca says that although assents are the acts of reason, not every assent leads virtuous state of self-love. Among the Stoic philosophers of both the early and the late tradition, the reasoning constitution is explained with reference to two important terms; assent 'synkathatetis' and the ruling faculty, 'hegemonikon'; 'adsensio' is the Latin translation of the Greek term, 'synkathatetis' and the latter as the 'principal animi' in Seneca (121.10). Among the Stoic philosophers 'adsensio' is used both in the sense of reason and a mental faculty; it is associated the power of giving and withholding to impressions.³⁵

With the term, 'hegemonikon', the Stoics offer a unitary account of the soul; 'hegemonikon' is the soul's highest faculty, situated in the heart. It controls all the subparts, the five senses, - sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch, - and also the speech. This function of the principal animi resembles an octopus' monitoring of its tentacles by its head, which suggests a simile of the brain in modern sense; the psychic act of seeing is the breath which extends from the commanding faculty to the eyes, hearing to the ears. So is speech, as breath extending from 'hegemonikon' to the tongue. Seneca, too describes the act of walking as breath, extending from the ruling faculty to the feet (113.23). Origen, also speaks of 'hegemonikon' as the principal source of a series of functions; it produces

³⁵ See also, Epictetus, (*Discourses reported by Arrian* , tran by W.A.Oldfather [London, Loeb series, 1998], 1.6.12-20, 28-10, 3.1.40). Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, tran. by C.R.Haines [London, Loeb series, 1994], 5.16. The Stoics uniquely combines the power of choice in moral character as well as with experience of knowing.

impressions, perceptions, and assents; it passes judgments on impressions, rejecting some of them and accepting others.³⁶ These functions are absent in animals and in human infants, as they are driven by their senses only. The function of reasoning is matured at the age of fourteen, when human beings gain the linguistic consciousness, and develop naturally the ability of forming concepts out of preconceptions.³⁷

On the one hand, in the light of the earlier remarks on the nature and the structure of self, one can read the same three-staged rational mental acts in reasoning beings as rationalization of the inborn instinct of self-love. In addition to the power of choice, Oxford Dictionary of Greek also explains the term assent from a subjective point of view, implying a favoritism³⁸ in selecting the impression; 'synkathesis' means 'casting a vote' or 'committing oneself', whereas its Latin is translated as 'accept as real'. Likewise, in the first, the phantasia-impetus stage, the soul is stimulated by something external. As in the pre-rational state, the process of self-adjustment is implied. The phantasia-impetus stage refers to a process of registering the impression, which is implied in the assent's conforming to the stimuli in the first stage.³⁹ In the assent's conforming the impulse, two sorts of awareness are entailed; the first is the awareness of the inborn instinct of self-love, which would be observed in the self's deliberately adjusting the impression in the first stage in accordance with the pattern of self-love. The second one involves awareness in the sense of being conscious of the effects of the cognized objects either as painful or pleasant; both levels of awareness imply valuation.⁴⁰ Likewise the self either confirms or dissents the

³⁶ 'On Principles' in *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 2 tran. and compl. by A.A.Long & David Sedley[Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987],3.2. 2-1, 4.21.2)

³⁷ Cicero (*De Finibus*), tran. by R.Rackham [London, Loeb series,1994], 3. 3. 21)

³⁸ *Greek-English Lexicon 7th edition*. Liddel & Scott [Oxford, the Clerandon Press, 2001]

³⁹ In his reading of the first notion of impulse, A.A Stevens intends to show that preliminary impulse contains a persuasive content which does not necessarily leads to action. This is acknowledged by the Stoics, from Zeno to Epictetus. And yet, it is presented in rhetorical difficulties for their psychology that "it had to be treated more and more fully in the later Stoa, under the heading of 'propotheiai' specifically in Seneca. Steven's account comes closer to my reading, specifically with the sense of persuasiveness, and the predispositional desire with non-practical ground he argues thereof. In my reading, the preliminary *impetus* implies the psychic pattern of self-love; the "striving for the pleasant and fleeing to safety from deathdealing. Preliminary impulse in Stoic Psychology", *Ancient Philosophy*, 20. 2000, p. 139-167.

⁴⁰ Pedersen argues that assents' conforming impulse contains two distinct elements; awareness of mental process and awareness of external objects. ("Oikeiosis II" *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis*:

'phantasia' which is derivative to the perception of the impression either as pleasant or painful.

Seneca makes use of another sense of 'adsensio' as he mentions the stage of the opinion-making, before the act of walking; one can conclude that the next stage refers to the readjustment of the contents of the second as a judgment; whatever is assented as either pleasant or painful is counted as good or evil. Finally in the assent-action pair, Seneca shows how, starting with the impulse, the assents yield action. The passage ends with a remark that the nature of the assent differs among rational selves; not every assent leads to the virtuous state

From the parallel reading of two accounts of the later development of the self⁴¹ one can conclude, first of all, that the process of familiarizing in the cognitive development of the child is ambivalent; the self familiarizes both the inborn instinct of self-love which is not different from familiarizing the reasoning constitution. This, I have examined with reference to three different sources from Seneca. The first is that in describing what the mental functions in rational constitution are like, two distinct elements are contained in 'adsensio'; deliberate choice and valuation are suggestive of both favoritism and an ability of making rational choice. This can also be observed in the juxtaposition of two statements 'It is appropriate for me to walk' (oportet me ambulare) and 'I strive for the pleasant and seek safety from pain' (voluptatem peto....dolorem refugio). In describing the function of reason, one can observe the same process of self-adjustment as the basis of perceptual experience, save that the assents' confirming or dissuading the impression. The second element that 'adsensio' implies is valuation as construed between the self and the objects of cognition; whatever 'phantasia' stimulates the self is assessed as pleasant and painful from the subjective point of view in self-love.

The implications of these three-staged mental acts on the nature of self in later stages can be stated as follows; just like in the earlier stages, the environment, which the self-grows into provides the sources of self-knowing which is not independent from valuation. Not only the people but also the value judgments of

Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic theory [Denmark: Aarhus press, 1990], p. 150)

⁴¹ See my comment on the passage on page 27 of the thesis.

the community mold the self in the form of affection. In other words, the same process of self-adjustment implies the other as the primary source of self-knowing and loving, and the act of loving, construed in existential relations. In the next chapter, I shall examine the nature of self-love by presenting a detailed analysis of these preliminary discussions.

CHAPTER 3

NATURE OF SELF-LOVE

Self-esteem, self-identification are two distinctive features of the love of self. Each self is existentially related to one another in loving themselves. Seneca holds the basic instinct of loving as the origin of social and ethical life as well as the principle of justice. Nature of self-knowing also springs from the same instinct of the love of self precisely in the same manner the self in embryonic form does. Seneca argues, however that the majority of the cases recount perverted forms of loving, which are also described as states of self-deception.

3.1 Nature of self-Love: Self-esteem

Following the implications of the arguments in the last section of the preceding chapter, in this section I shall discuss the nature of self-love as a concern for self-worth and self-preservation. Their gaining awareness of the principle of self-love in a dual process of adjustment indicates a new state that the rational “I” loves himself which is not distinct from the process of knowing; in this new state, the self cannot love itself without loving the others onto whom it transforms itself as the beloved; it is primarily concerned with getting the worship and praise of others by assessing to what extent he is instrumental and praiseworthy in their eyes. The self views its pursuits and deeds as a means to measure its self-worth. For, by positing itself as the praiseworthy object in the eyes of the other, the self seeks the confirmation that he is being loved. This also explains the reason for its loving himself which cannot be possible without his loving the others. From this existential standpoint, the state of self-love displays an innate liking followed by the felt pleasure, upon fulfilling the demands of one’s nature. I argue that self-love as a venture for praise also discloses a need for safeguarding; the self also tends to preserve, safeguard the proper sources of self-worth by seeking safety from a threat and destruction. Seneca argues that driven by the instinct of love, each rational self considers the following as their goods.

There are certain goods which reason regards primary, to which she addresses herself purposely; these are, for example, victory, good

children, and the welfare of one's country. Certain others, she regards secondary; these become manifest only in adversity, – for example self-control in enduring severe illness or exile. Certain goods are indifferent; these are no more according to nature than contrary to nature, as for example, a cautious and a noble posture in a chair. For sitting is an act that is not less according to nature than standing or walking. The two kinds of goods, which are of a higher order, are different; the primary are according to nature, such as deriving joy from the dutiful behavior of one's children and from the well being of one's country. The secondary are contrary to nature – such as bravery in torture or in enduring thirst when illness makes the vitals feverish^{xiii} (66.36-37).

According to Seneca, the rational self counts victory as good as much as possessing good fame. He conceives in them a source of praise; his attachment to his country and his wish for its welfare is stemmed from the drive for praise that is commonly shared by all men, justifying the mutual venture of praise. It is natural for man to shun illness, showing courageous endurance at such moments. It is by the same instinct that he endures pain in torture, and hardships as much as he does for the physical deprivation such as thirst and hunger; he derives pleasure (*gauda*) in protecting the common benefits of all he is attached to, safeguard them from as much as his. Starting with parents, all relations among human beings are drawn on the basis of the mutual drive of praise.

For its very nature virtue loves to shine, and is eager to push ahead of any in front. Filial devotion will be all the more ardent if it approaches the repayment of benefits with the hope of surpassing them. And the fathers themselves will be willing and glad to have it happen since, in the case of great many things, it is our advantage to be surpassed. How else comes a rivalry so desirable? How else comes to parents' happiness so great that, in the matter of benefits, they acknowledge themselves to be no match for their children?^{xiv}
(*On Benefits* 3.35.1)

Seneca constructs the nature of the filial relation on the basis of the mutual natural need of praise; The fathers derive pleasure in having their sons' surpassing them in victory, since they conceive the benefit of receiving praise from the others

by being the father of a praiseworthy person; the mutual need of praise makes the sons perform deeds that preserve the good of both parties.⁴²

The same orientation of loving can also be examined in another example of parental affection. Seneca speaks of Antigonus'⁴³ desire for praise and recognition as the primary motive of his victorious deeds. "For having vanquished the enemy in a mighty battle, he transferred the prize of war and handed over to him the kingdom of Cyprus. This is true kingship, to refuse to be king when you might have been"^{xv} (*On Benefits*, 3.37.3). By victoriously gaining back his father's kingship from the enemies, Antigonus not only successfully protects the kingdom he belongs to, but also transforms himself as a praiseworthy person in the eyes of his parents, deriving the pleasure for being loved, having repaid his gratitude for receiving his life from them. Seneca says that to see their sons' outstripping success is the source of a no mean joy for the parents; since they already transform themselves as a praiseworthy person in the eye of the other by being the father of a victorious son. (*On Benefits*, 3. 37.1) The deeds Antigonus display refers to virtuous state of self-love rather than a narrow self-interest.

Seneca extends this existential character of self love with his argument on the mutual attraction among selves. The mutual attraction is treated as the origin of social bond, the justice for the welfare of all selves.

It is indeed worthy of great praise when men treat men with kindness... Nature produces us related to one another, since she created us for the same source and to the same end. She engendered in us mutual affection, and made us prone to friendships. She established fairness and justice among us... Let this verse be in your heart and on your lips

I am a man, and nothing in men's lot
Do I deem foreign to me ^{xvi} (95.51-52).

⁴² Pedersen reading of the Stoic account of the other-regarding attitude of self love in Cicero has its origin from the love of the offspring. According to Pedersen, Stoics force the common sense view of loving in explaining the other regarding attitude of self-love. (*De Finibus*,3.19) I argue that Pedersen's interpretation the other-regarding attitude of self-love from the common sense of view of love of the offspring falls short in explaining how and why it is natural for rational beings to love one another. I argue that the nature of self-love as a drive for praise explains how and why this bound to happen ("Oikeiosis II" *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis : Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Theory* [Denmark: Aarhus press, 1990], p. 81-4). See also the discussion of the problem in S.G Pembroke ("Oikeiosis" in *Problems of Stoicism*, ed A.A.Long [NJ, the Athlone Press 1996], p.123) Annas, *Morality of Happiness*, [New York, Oxford , Oxford University press 1993], p 267)

⁴³ One of the generals of Alexander the Great.

The argument of the mutual attraction among selves underlies the mutual exchange of the inborn instinct of self-love in the sense of praise; each rational self is driven by the same natural instinct to love and be loved in return; it is set as the basic source of happiness, social bond and the principle of justice and fairness among all selves. People are prone to socialize, love one another, establish norms of justice and the fairness among themselves. This is due to the natural fact that man is existentially related to one another, seeking praise in loving one another. This, he seeks to explain with a quotation from Terence. Man does nothing contrary to his nature.

Not only justice, and fairness, but also kindness (*mansuetus*) spring from the principle of the mutual affection among all selves/lovers. Seneca also claims that the same instinct to love also creates a natural instinct to preserve the mutual benefits of all. As he puts it;

Is it good of the one praised, or of the one who praises? Of both I say. It is my own good in that I am praised, because I am naturally born to love all men, and I rejoice in having done good deeds, and congratulate myself on having found men who express their ideas of my virtues with gratitude. That they are grateful is a good to the many, but it is a good to me also ^{xvii} (102.18-19).

Due to the fact that each self has an innate orientation to loving, each seeks to preserve their common benefits as their good and safeguard also one another also from what they see as harmful. This also explains the orientation to praise that mutually exists among all men; each self, in loving one another and safeguarding their welfare and security with the useful deeds they perform also maintain the sources of praise. On the part of the self, the expression of the other's gratitude for having received useful benefits are sources of admiration and pleasure, as the state of self-congratulation indicates (*gauda*). The good opinion of others about one serves as a means to measure his self-worth, confirming the fact that he is being admired.

Many of Seneca's letters are devoted to the substantial study on the motive of the instinct of self-love at the time of adversity, among which Priam's case can be given as an example.

And what did the great Priam do? Did he not disguise his anger and embraces the knees of the king? Did he not carry to his lips the murderous hand, all stained with the blood of his son? Did he not dine?... The Roman father, you would have despised if his fears had been for himself; as it was affection curbed his anger. He deserved to be permitted to leave the banquet, in order that he might gather up the bones of his son, but that stripling prince, all the while so kindly and polite, did not even permit this... the other son was doomed, had the guest displease the executioner^{xviii} (*On Anger* 2.33.6).

Priam becomes an object of praise and admiration in the eyes of Seneca as well as of himself because of the endurance, justice, and kindness he displays at such moments of frustration. Having witnessed the execution of his son, Priam kindly accepts joining the banquet, restraining his anger and grief over the death of his son. His self-control and endurance denote the proper sort of self-regarding love. It is construed both in parental affection as well as among the fellows and the king. Likewise, Seneca claims that Priam is simultaneously concerned with preserving the image of the honorable father in the eyes of the attendants at the Banquet; for he would be an object of despise, rather than object of love, if he did the contrary; in the following parts of the essay, Seneca speaks of the advantages that self-control might bring by giving more examples. "Let us also bear in mind, how much approval we shall gain from a reputation of forbearance, and how many have been made useful friends through forgiveness."^{xix}

Besides his gaining a good reputation and approval in bravery, the subjective principle of self-preservation in self-love can also be observed in Priam's prudence, especially in his consideration of the consequences regarding both his own situation as well as his second son. As much as the display of grief would turn a person into an object to be despised, –womanish – through anger, one might arouse offense in the others that would, in turn, make him vulnerable to destruction. Eventually, Priam saves not only his second son from a probable execution, but also the honorable image he seeks in the praiseful eyes of the other. He is equally considerate for the others, by calculating the probable injury that might come from the others through offence (14.7). In a similar way, his self-control and endurance also embody the virtuous state of other-regarding attitude

in self-love; he respects the king, arousing simultaneously mercy in him, respect in the attendants. The pleasure principle, Priam derives is an innate self-congratulation; it is also due to his successful maintenance and safeguarding of the loss and benefits. Seneca says that nature of such pleasures is mostly a hard one (23.4).

Regarding different relations, Seneca discusses justice and fairness, and kindness, respect as the virtuous states that self-love is to be embodied, whereas self-control and temperance denote the virtuous form of cautious reasoning, one undertakes in safeguarding her own personal interest as much as the others.

In providing the discussion of each state of virtue in one particular case, Seneca argues for the unique character of all virtues. In performing one of them the self embodies all virtues at the same time.⁴⁴ This is the wisdom in self-love, an art of living (*artifice vivendi*). Those are the best craftsmen, whose happiness springs from the virtuous motives of loving (95.7). The art of living as the happy life is accordance with nature and the object of natural impulse.⁴⁵

A closer look at the literary tradition of Rome shows us that the venture for praise is a dominant motive in Roman culture; it is the moral political virtue of the contemporary Roman society. The famous historian of Rome, Livy, praises the legendary founder of Rome, and his magnificent deeds, as who “was no less eager for popular recognition and applause” (45). Praise and the striving for everlasting fame can also be observed in the artists and the depicted literary figures, too; Virgil’s *Aeneas* is an outstanding public hero, who is driven to glorious acts by his urge for praise from others. According to the prophecies of Anchises, Aeneas’ love of parents is embodied in his striving to prolong prosperity of his grandfathers (157-162). On the other hand, the love of the father towards his son and the urge to protect him is primarily motivated by praise. As Seneca states in *On Benefits*, the love of the father to his son, and the son to the father are no less than the fulfillment of their mutual expectation of praise. The

⁴⁴ See also Plutarch “On Virtue” in *Moralia* vol. 10, tran by Harold North Fowler [London, Loeb series 1936] .2.1046)

⁴⁵ See also, Cicero. According to Piso, the Stoic spokesman, Chrysippus seems to share the same view with Seneca when he says that practical judgment (*phronesis*) is a kind of art (*techne*) concerning the things having to do with life. The Stoic spokesman, Piso says that practical wisdom is the art of how to live. Cicero, (*On Ends*, tran. by Michael Grant [London, Penguin series 1969], 2. 16-17)

love of the offspring, as examined in the case of Aeneas' father, is intermingled primarily with the desire for the prolongation of praise through his son's deeds. The urge to love and to protect the offspring originates from the self-regarding nature of loving in maintaining the sources of praise by protecting them at the moment of a threat. Being the father of a praiseworthy son, he also transforms himself as an object of praise. The fame and the everlasting love of the others, as expressed in the gratitude of people, would be a reward for the glorious acts of Aeneas (3. 35.2-3).

The Greek historian, Polybus, also describes the pride of Romans, as they parade through the streets of Rome with the conquered people and the captured goods (347). Seeking praise, everlasting fame and immortality is also a recurrent motif in the act of letter writing, which is the most popular form of philosophical discussion among the philosophers of the Hellenistic tradition. As Seneca concedes, "That which Epicurus promises his friend, this I promise to you. I shall find favor among later generations. I can take me names that will endure as long as mine as Virgil promises eternal fame to the heroes(21.5)...for in regard to the exceptional desires which may be postponed, which may be chastened, I have this one thought to share it with you. A pleasure of that sort, is according to our nature, but is not according to our needs"^{xx}(21.11).

The 'oikeionon' of early Stoics, as Cicero says, is also the origin of the mutual attraction among rational beings, and the source of the social bond. "Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man like him"⁴⁶(3.62.2). From the parental affection, it gradually develops into forming unions and states, instigates fellowship among men who exchange views, establish law codes, and the worship of gods. Starting with the love of the closest, –offspring, parents, spouse,– and also friends, fellowmen, country and the gods, Cicero seeks to explain how, the

⁴⁶ See also Cicero, (*De Finibus*, tran. by R.Rackham [London, Loeb series,1994], 3. 62-65) Stobaeus in Long and Sedley *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 2 [Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1987], 4.671, 7-673,11)

subjective principle of 'oikeiosis' is reconstructed in different degrees in social life.

Although Seneca constructs the social bond and civic life on the principle of mutual attraction, as the early Stoics do on 'oikeiosis', he seems to depart from the early Stoics by treating praise as the essential feature of self-love. Cicero implies that by contrast, the early Stoics, especially Chrysippus and Diogenes reject the nature of desires and aversions as oriented towards praise and recognition. The nature of self-love is a controversial subject among the thinkers. Cicero implies, however, that Senecan interpretation develops later. Having a good reputation and good name are preferred and desirable for its own sake, not for any practical advantage.

And that a man of good breeding, and liberal education would desire to have the good opinion of his parents and relatives, and of good men in general and that for its own sake and not for any practical advantage; and they argue that just as we desire the welfare of our children, even of such as may be born after we are dead, and for their own sake so a man ought to study his reputation even after death, even apart from any advantage^{xxi} (*De Finibus*, 3.17.57).

Generally speaking, although the Senecan self in its embryonic state contains the same elements as the oikeionon of the early Stoics, the essential character of self-love as praise is a departure from the School, the origin of which can be referred probably to Panaetius, the head of the Middle Stoics, and also to Hecaton (late 2nd century- 1st century BC).⁴⁷ Neither is praise cited as a natural impulse among the other Stoics of the Roman tradition, such as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, whose ethical and moral principles are constructed on the orthodox conception of 'oikeionon'. While they trace the origin of the mutual attraction and preservation of the common benefits on the 'oikeionon', observing a moral worth, (the morally good person as worthy of praise and the possessors as praiseworthy), they refuse to take praise as a natural component of 'oikeionon'.

⁴⁷ Hecato, in his *De Finibus* holds endurance, wealth, fame and noble birth as neutral, being neither good nor evil, though preferable and the opposites death disease, pain ignominy, low birth and the like as objects of aversion.(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. 2, tran by R.D.Hicks [London, Loeb series, 1925],7.102)

3. 2 Self-knowing and Self-Love

This section is devoted to a detailed study of another feature of self-love which is based on the arguments on the nature of self-perception. In chapter 2 section 2, it is argued that self-perception, - 'sensus sui' - or its Greek equivalent— 'aesthesis'—, is a necessary component of the innate principle of self-love. With the analysis of the term, 'conciliari' it is argued that the nature of self-knowing occurs in a dynamic process of self-adjustment; young infants and animals know their constitution as they adjust their bodies to the environment and that their knowledge of the other things and animals are confined to the subjective principle of self-love. The third point is that both the external stimuli and animals' bodies are constitutive of the sources of knowing.

In chapter 1, section 3, a more complex form of self-adjustment is discussed, as the self gains awareness of his rational constitution and the principle of love of self. It is argued that the self perceives the other things by attaching value to them; it gets conscious of the things within the subjective principle of self-love. To perceive a thing means to be aware of the effects either as painful or pleasant. What I mean with the term, self-knowing is not the direct translation of its Latin equivalent, but of another term, 'fingere' Seneca frequently uses in discussing the nature of self-knowing. Oxford Latin Dictionary⁴⁸ gives the figurative meaning of the verb form as forming the character of someone by shaping. 'Fingere' is also used in the context of forming a mental representation and thinking. It also connotes the meaning of artistic creation and sometimes deceit. Process of self-knowing in 'fingere' is the more complex form of self-perception as self-adjustment.

When we look at the texts of Seneca, we see that all meanings of the term 'fingere' are uniquely combined. The argument of self-knowing is provided by Seneca with reference to two sources; the first is the principle of mutual attraction, and the argument of shaping. Each self provides the sources of self-knowing to another self by shaping one another; they provide a standard value, instigating several pursuits, and deeds as good and condemning some others as evil. They

⁴⁸ Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. by P.G.W. Glare. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1982. See the other important texts on self-shaping or self-moulding and the shaping of other as a craft in the letters 11, 16, 76.34, 80.83, 90.27, 91.15-16, 98.4. Seneca also uses the term in education.

determine the norms for the roles that reinforce praiseworthy identities for one another. Driven by its natural inclination to be praised, each self adjust himself/herself to the personae he/she admires and knows himself as which, at the same time meets the common approval of the public.

Hierocles' discussion of the other-regarding attitude of 'oikeiosis' with encompassing circles is suggestive of the logical relation of self-knowing to the principle of mutual attraction. The self is located at the center, encompassed by many circles which enclose the former "on the basis of their different and unequal dispositions"; The closest circle represents the closest people in his/her environment; the family; the offspring, the spouse and the relatives, whereas the larger stand for the distant relative, friends, the local residents, fellow men, the humanity, culminating in the gods. The other-regarding attitude of 'oikeinon' is described with a movement from the outside towards the center. Each self draws the circles towards the center regardless of distance. As Hierocles puts it;

It is the task of a well-tempered man, in its proper treatment of all group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the center, and to keep zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones⁴⁹ (5).

In the case of 'well tempered-man', the other-regarding attitude of 'oikeinon' is described with an ardent strive to draw those closer to himself from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones, respecting each from the distant circle as if they were at the second.

This model of self-knowing in mutual shaping is also discussed by Seneca through a series of theatrical similes. With the simile of mirror, Seneca tells us how the self enters in the process of self-knowing within the pattern of self-love. In this structure, each self plays an important role. They mold one another in providing model-personalities. In writing a treatise on Mercy to be dedicated to the emperor, Nero, mirror is used as an instrument of self-shaping. As Seneca concedes, "I have undertaken, Nero Caesar, to write on the subject of mercy, in

⁴⁹ ("Impulse and Appropriateness" in *The Hellenistic Philosophers, Greek and Latin Translations*, vol. 2 tran. and compl. by A.A.Long and D.Sedley [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987], p. 260)

order to serve in a way the purpose of a mirror, and thus mold (fingere) and reveal you to yourself (tibi ostenderam), as one destined to attain to the greatest of all pleasures”^{xxii} (*On Mercy* 1.1). Seneca’s holding a mirror to Nero is suggestive of shaping a person’s personality by another. Representing the other, he aims at shaping Nero’s self with an admiring king-model that encodes a good conscience – the ‘virtus’ of mercy –, so that he is able to prevent Nero from being cruel to those around as he engages with political matters; for, mercy is the proper state of loving a king would display to the citizens of the world and would seek praise and recognition thereof. On the other hand, one could observe Nero shaping his self with the model of kingship in sensual pleasure, reflected through Seneca’s mirror; In gazing into the mirror, Nero sees his praiseworthy image with the deeds of unparalleled goodness, and be praised upon hearing by the gratitude of his people (I.5.6).

Self-shaping in self-love is a recurrent theme in Seneca’s writings as well as in the other Stoics of the Roman tradition. The introductory section of Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations* recounts autobiographical references of self-identification as construed on the parental relationship, tutors, friends; Marcus Aurelius cannot know himself without referring to his relation to the others. Starting with the closest in his environment, he speaks of the series of character traits he acquires from his parents, the distant family members, his tutor, as well as the tasks he performs in acting out these multiple roles⁵⁰ (*Meditations*, 1, 1-14).

Serenus’ reading of some examples of nobility and bravery from his literary curriculum is suggestive of self-shaping in mental experience. Serenus is tempted to rush to the forum to give a voice, or help someone. The process of self-knowing can also be traced in his shaping of his own self with the personae he admires as he engages in writing^{xxiii} (*Tranquility of Mind*, 1.12). Driven by the natural urge to be praised, each shapes his own self with the closest model in the environment, wishes to be the sort of person that is praiseworthy in the eye of the other. One implication of the mirroring of the closest is that each self primarily seeks recognition and praise by desiring to become a sort of good person the

⁵⁰ See also the reference to parental origins as means of self-identification in John Fitch & Siobhan Mc Elduff “Constructions of the Self in Senecan Drama”, *Mnemosyne* vol. 15, 2002, p 4.

closest demands. For, this is the proper sort of loving ourselves as much as our loving the others.⁵¹

3.3 Problem of Self-Deception

Seneca sounds rather critical to the majority of the representations of self-love in the contemporary society of Rome. He criticizes many of the examples ventures of praise and recognition in victory and glory, and search of wisdom, as well as in justice by drawing the readers' attention to the excess in their ego-centric loving. Here is an example from the representation of self love in glory.

Do you think that Gaius Marius, who was once consul (he received this office on one occasion, and stole it on all the others) courted all the evils by the inspiration of virtue when he was slaughtering the Teutons and the Cimbri and pursuing Jugurta through the wilds of Africa? Marius commanded armies, ambition Marius^{xxiv} (94.66).

Seneca observes a vicious representation of self-love in Marius' venture of glory and public service. Although each self is by nature driven to seek praise and recognition from others through kindness and performing benefits, Marius' ambition to be the best soldier among rivals turns out to be a cruelty, rather than kindness. Seneca builds up the contrast between Marius' intention of virtue and the consequences of his performance of virtue. Behind the apparent contrast there lies his excessive love of self which is also present in his strive for consulship. Seneca implies that Marius attains the position of consulship through mischief and rivalry, and that instinct of self love, which is the origin of the principle of mutual attraction, causes strife and destruction among the lovers. His ego-centric

⁵¹The idea of Self-fashioning is also elaborated by A.A.Long. For Long, to pose the question who you are is largely relevant to making correct use of representations; each person internalizes a set of rules that constitute a role i.e. how one should conduct himself as a son, as a citizen, always viewing his relation to the whole. He says, "It is representations that provide selves with the viewpoints which they can select as appropriate to who they are or reject as inappropriate...The self is constituted not by the assent *simpliciter*, but by the way assent uses representations (phantasiai/images). ("Representation and the Self in Stoicism" in *Stoic Studies* [Cambridge, Cambridge university press, 1996],p 282-83) My reading of self-fashioning is inclusive of A.A.Long's interpretation. In addition, my interpretation also covers craftsmanship.

motives prevent him from performing grateful deeds on the other party, from whom he seeks to receive praise.

The state of ego-centric loving behind Marius' representation of the glorious and the consuls is central to his ambition to be the greatest among the rivals. He does not acknowledge himself as glorious without destroying the other as he conceives glory by holding the greatest amount of the land in his possession. Within this perspective, the brave and the glorious acts of Marius embody degenerated and vicious representation of self-love. Seneca observes the same ego-centric forms of loving in Pompeius and Caesar in the pursuit of praise by attaining glory (gloria). Both in Pompeius and Caesar's case excessive desire for being the greatest to get praise is attained at the cost of destruction and cruelty, instead of kindness and justice. What drives Pompeius to conquer lands of Armenia, Asia and Africa is his ambition to be the best.

And what impelled Gaius Caesar to the combined ruin of himself and of the state? Renown, self-seeking and the setting no limit to pre-eminence over all other men. He could not allow a single person to outrank him, although the state allowed two men to stand at its head ^{xxv} (94.65).

Such vicious representations of self-love are not confined to the prominent figures only, but also permeate the whole society of Rome. Likewise, Seneca warns Lucilius not to grope after what his family, the nurse, the mother and the father wishes on his behalf. "Do you still desire what your nurse, your guardian and your mother have prayed for on your behalf? Do you not yet understand what evil they prayed for? Alas, how hostile to us are the wishes of our folk! And they are all the more hostile in proportion as they are more completely fulfilled."^{xxvi}. They all permeate in all forms of pursuits and goals to which intellectual study is not held an exception. He says;

The halls of the professor and the philosopher are deserted; but what a crowd in cafes! How many young fellows besiege the kitchens of their gluttonous friends! I shall not mention the troops of luckless boys who must put up with other shameful treatment after the banquet is over^{xxvii} (95.23-24).

Seneca criticizes the philosophers and learners of wisdom of his time by exposing the degeneracy and immorality in their deeds. What drives the philosopher to the learner is not seeking praise by attaining eternal fame by helping the other's progress, but his fulfillment of sexual desires – libido – and appetite. Philosophers are criticized for abusing the young learners of wisdom when the banquet comes to an end. On the other hand, the young people seek equally distorted forms of self-love by misrepresenting what a good learner and learning should be. They are flattered by the luxury their rich friends provide at the banquets. And elsewhere, he contrasts the role of the good philosopher who attaches value to the tricky subtlety rather than the desire for a mutual real progress in life. As he concedes, "A philosopher weaves subtlety, but makes no progress towards real living. He does not thereby become braver, or restrained or more lofty in spirit" ^{xxviii} (111.21).

The models of the judge are not radically different from the philosophers and young learners. Seneca claims that rather than being the defenders of the righteous and just, judges prove to be avaricious and defenders of adulterers in their venture for self-recognition and praise (97.9-10). In all vicious representations of the just, Seneca observes self-flattery in contrast to Cato, the virtuous. The depthless, corrupted representations mask the ego-centric motives of loving which are central to greed, avarice, ambition and libido as well as in the idle display of culture.

The natural need of being a praiseworthy person sometimes causes crime and murder, and suicide. Seneca speaks of the maladjusted deeds of murderer, kings and criminals, who commit crime, not with the intention or through hatred. "no one sets out to shed the blood of his fellow man for the sake of bloodshed, ...more murderers speculate on their profits than to give way to hatred" ^{xxix} (14.9). Sometimes crime and suicide are motivated by the love and protection of the beloved as a concrete example of ego-centric self-love. Seneca gives a concrete example from the slave of a Roman general who stabs his captured master in order to prevent him from the mental frustration of low esteem the master would experience in the state of slavery (*On Benefits*, 3. 33.5). In his own suicide, however, Seneca observes a more complex form of preserving dignity and desire;

he shuns the state of new slavery that he would experience in his new master, while at the same time destroying his own identity as a slave by killing his master. For, he cannot articulate his own freedom without destroying mastership.

Besides perceiving a threat to his self-worth in someone's attempt to steal his property, and mistress, people may surrender themselves to anger and driven to kill the other when their wishes remained unfulfilled such as the expectation of a title from a person he has courted for a long time (*On Anger*, 2.34.1-2). For his property, and titles are sources he measures out his self-worth and gains the admiration of the others. Under such cases, having felt despised and indignant, the self is driven to pay injury through revenge. Seneca exposes the paradox in the case of the lovers who incite hatred towards people from whom they seek admiration and recognition. Seneca speaks of the silent gloom of selves that are not recognized by the others. "If you are empty handed, the highwayman passes by you"^{xxx} (14.9).

Several compositions of self-flattery are examined, depending on various love objects ranging from grouping after influential political titles, over-indulgence in luxury and the display of elegance that gets even more excessive at the presence of the others. Their state of loving shows vicious patterns that are multiplied as the number of the admirers and onlookers increase.

See how greedy are the men's desires and always asking for more... One is crazed for by lust, another is the slave of his belly, another is wholly engrossed with gain, and consider not the means, but the amount of it; another suffers from envy, another from blind ambition that drives him to the sword. Consider, too, the mental sluggishness and senility, and opposed to them, the perpetual turmoil and the commotion of the restless heart. Consider, too, excessive self-esteem and swollen pride in the things for which a man should be despised^{xxxi} (*On Benefits*, 7, 26. 3-4).

Greed and ambition, lust and appetite are typical states in which excessive, ego-centric forms of loving are embodied. Greedy men seek admiration from others by measuring their self-worth with their possession of several goods such as money and jewelry which are popularly held as praiseworthy by the others whereas the love of their mistress is libidinal. So is the case of self-love in mad love of glory.

In distorted forms of seeking praise and admiration, Seneca tells us of a complex, ego centric patterns of self-preservation such as pretending false personae, especially when the self faces difficulty due to the rivalry for the love objects.⁵² In his preface to *Natural Questions* (4, A3), Seneca speaks of further troubles one might have in the flatterer's pretense of submission upon calculating a probable injury beyond their power to shun. He concedes that one should not expose themselves to flatterers, as "they are clever craftsman in taking over their superiors."^{xxxii} The pretension is a complex device the flatterers use to gain what they desire by avoiding rivalry through submission. The pretense of a freedman is given as a concrete example, who was once poor and not powerful, finally discovering in flattery a profitable art to make money without entering into risks and is always pleased to find happy victims (*Natural Questions*, 4A.7-8). The dishonesty in pretended admiration is one concrete example of the complex structure of self-love in adversity, in addition to the argument of wearing false faces that Foucault discusses.⁵³ Seneca says that it serves mainly for the purpose of gaining superiority over the other by avoiding rivalry. As Seneca puts it, "A flatterer accomplishes most when he is detected"^{xxxiii} (*Natural Questions* 4A. 6).

With the simile of mask, Seneca draws the picture of the inconsistent, unstable, slippery representation of self; in their excessive desire for praise and admiration, they prove to be instable, wavering among multiple personae amid multiple pursuits (*Tranquility of Soul*, 2.7). The lack of consistency in character is observed in the continual restlessness, dissatisfaction of oneself which is due to

⁵² In his reading of self-love in Plutarch's texts, Luck Van der Stock also mentions silent flattery (without using words) to wealth and reputation as a useful strategies of self-love by referring to Stoic Dionysus, Alexander, Crison and Bion. Silent flattery is like a poetic description. In Seneca the pretension is both verbal and visual, a profitable strategy of the flatterer. "A Plutarchian Hypomnema on Self-Love" in *American Journal of Philology* vol. 120. 1999 p.583

⁵³In the writings of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, Foucault interprets self-shaping in pretended personae such as administrator and the judge as a specific device the self manipulates to take care of himself; the personae serve for the purpose of self-interrogation, "reactivating rules of conduct", "measuring the distinction between what has been done and what should have been done", in adjusting to the role of the judge, the self moderates the other so that it familiarizes what ought to be done. (*Technologies of the Self; a Seminar with Michel Foucault* ed by L.H.Martin, H.Gutman & P.H.Hutton [Amherst, the university of Massachusetts press,1988],p. 34) I argue that although self-shaping is a skill of self-love as Foucault claim, not in all cases, wearing false (imaginative) personae serve for the purpose of self-interrogation. I argue that as one specific form of self-shaping, wearing false personae in Seneca's letters dramatizes by contrast, a vicious, depthless, unstable self.

unattained desires (cupiditas), in the endeavor to self-recognition and admiration from the others.

New occupations take the place of old, hope leads to new hope, ambition to new ambition. They do not seek an end to their wretchedness, but change the cause. Have we been tormented by our public honors? Those of others take more of our time. Have we ceased to work as candidates? We begin to canvass for the others. Have we got rid of the troubles of a prosecutor? We find those of a judge. Has a man ceased to be judge? He becomes the president of a court^{xxxiv} (*Shortness of Life*, 17. 5-6).

If the self feels a threat or fails to be a praiseworthy person in his role of the candidate, he hopes to attain it with some other sorts of titles. Having experienced a failure in politics, he seeks immediately to attain it in the legal offices with the personae of prosecutor, and then the judge. The self is left unsatisfied as his wishes remain unattained. In an endless chain of becoming, one could observe a profitable flight that safeguards the self from facing the insignificance of his existence, instead of a brave endurance of the frustration.

This typical psychological function of masks is implied in Özdemiş Nutku's discussion Roman theatre from the socio-economic standpoint. He claims that the profession of miming belongs to the lower class people; actors are mostly the slaves who desire to gain their freedom by elaborated miming and wearing larger-than-human-size masks to catch the attention of the audience. Driven by their socio-economical concerns, the actors desire praise and self-recognition, whereas the audience expects nothing except sensual pleasure. Nutku discusses the difference in the nature of acting between Greeks and Romans in terms of the contrast between reason and senses. The traditional Greek notion of acting in the actors' reasoning in Euripidies and other Greek dramatists is replaced by the concern of providing a sensual pleasure to the vulgar audience of Rome. One could trace the same prejudice of acting and masks in Seneca's portrayal of the excessive lovers, wearing multiple masks in order to be recognized. (*Dünya Tiyatrosu Tarihi*, 66-67)

Referring to the same concern of attaining praise in the case of flatterers, Seneca extends the simile of mask wearing to pretension which I have discussed

as a profitable device of self-protection. Driven by the fear of a probable threat, the self sometimes wears pretended faces against their will. For Seneca, the reason for self-concealing is the fear of being despised.

For it is torturous to be constantly watching oneself and be fearful of being caught out of our usual role. And we are never free from anxiety if we think that everytime anyone looks at us he is always taking our measure; for many things happen that strip off our pretense against our will, and though all this care to self is successful, yet the life of those who live under a mask can not be happy and without anxiety. ... Yet, even such a life as this does run some risk of scorn, if everything lies open to everybody^{xxxv}
(*Tranquility of Mind*, 14.1-2).

Seneca further observes a source of anxiety behind the selves' wearing pretended personae or faces. The expectation of a probable identity crisis is apprehended by their fear of being caught in their pretense, which would make them despised. Seneca says that although the pretended face the self wears is intended to protect his self-worth, the pleasures of the successful self-protection is never free from anxiety. In his discussion of the psychological function of mask in Greek theatre,⁵⁴ Claud Calame emphasizes the need for self-protection as the most determinant factor between mask-wearing. The masks serve to protect both the actor and the audience from a total involvement in extreme emotions of suffering and other painstaking emotions. Turning back to Seneca's function of the mask in the sense of wearing pretended faces, one could observe the same mechanism of self-guarding and self-preservation in self-love. Just like the mask prevents the actor and the audience from the total involvement in overwhelming emotions, the flatterers wear false personae to protect themselves from the probable injury; they feel the threat of being despised in their fear of being caught in their usual role. For Seneca, none but the sage could possess genuine, total ownership and consistency of self.

Believe me, it is a great role- to play the role of one man. But nobody can be one person except the wise man. The rest of us often

⁵⁴ From ("Vision, Blindness and Masks: radicalization of emotions', *Tragedy and the Tragic: Greek Theatre and Beyond*, ed. by M.S.Silk [Oxford, Clarendon Press 1966], p. 13]

shift our masks... you should therefore force yourself to maintain to the very end of life's drama the character you assumed at the beginning. See to it that man is able to praise you ^{xxxvi}(120.22).

With the simile of mask, Seneca intends to expose the paradox in the apparent representations of self and the instinct of love, arguing that the true source of praise lies in maintaining a consistency and depth in one's character. Seneca says, however that none but the wise could maintain the role of one man. The rest is subject to shifting their masks as they adjust themselves to the multiplicities of personae.

In my theoretical discussion on the nature and the structure of the rational self-love, in two contrasting representations of self are examined. In contrast to virtuous (*lauda*), the cases of self-flattery (*adulato*) I have examined above recount excessive, ego-centric love who venture admiration and self-recognition in manners contrary to what their nature demands. Seneca's main point is that although the self by nature is driven by the instinct to love, the nature of its loving turns out to be contrary, destroying the social bond, justice and the mutual attraction among the selves. The flatterers prove to be instable, dishonest and vicious in contrast to the state of self-identification of the wise; they shift roles as the sources of seeking recognition and admiration are changed which sometimes yields to the wearing of the pretended faces.

In the light of the earlier discussions regarding the nature of self-love, such representations, however, prove to be problematic for several reasons. The first is that although the self is driven by nature to love the others, how is it possible that they become vicious and ego-centric? Keeping in mind that Seneca locates the origin of self-knowing to the same instinct of self-love, the same paradox can be observed in the slippery, false representations self. This is coupled with the fact that Seneca sounds rather critical to the values of the contemporary Roman society from where the selves shape their personalities by adjusting themselves to the already available models. How does, then, he explain and thereby propose a solution to the problem of vicious representations of self-love?

Seneca claims, however, that the flatterers are deceived in all the sources and states that love and knows themselves as. All those pursuits of honor, titles,

luxury, appetite, adultery, and intellectual studies which the selves seek admiration, applause, and self-recognition are deceptive sources, leading them to mental disquietude, instead of genuine happiness. (59.13) Furthermore, they are estranged from their own selves, rather than becoming a person, through shaping their selves with those models. In another state of self-flattery, anger, Seneca describes the mental composition of the deceived as follows.

As Sextius remarks, it has been good for some people to see themselves in a mirror while they are angry; the great change in themselves alarmed them; brought as it were face to face with reality they failed to recognize themselves. And how little of the real ugliness that did that image reflected in the mirror disclose! If the soul could be shown, if it were in some substance through which it might shine, its black and mottled, inflamed, distorted and puffed up appearance would confound us as we gaze upon it. ... And what if it could be shown stark naked?... while man remain angry no image is so beautiful than one which is fierce and savage, and they wish also to look the sort they want to be^{xxxvii} (*On Anger*, 3.34-36).

With reference to Sextius, the Stoic, the representation of self in anger is described by Seneca with a simile of mirror which contrasts two distinct realms of reality. The first one is the actual ugly fierce, savage face, in contrast to the puffed up image, contemplating in sensual pleasure. According to Seneca, the first – ugly image is the actual condition of the soul, the realm of reality that the self fails to recognize. By contrast, the beautiful image, contemplating in sensual pleasure is the one which the self actually wants to be rather than what he is. As a concrete state of a deceived self-love, Seneca further draws the composition of anger as an act of renouncing human nature.

Anger renounces human nature which incites to love, whereas it incites to hate; which bids us help, whereas it bids us to injure. And besides, though its chafing originates in an excess of self-esteem, and seems to be a show of spirit, it is petty and narrow minded; for no men fail to be inferior to the one by whom he regards himself despised. But the really great soul that has taken true measure of himself fails to revenge injury only because it fails to perceive it^{xxxviii} (*On Anger*, 3. 6-7).

As Seneca says, in anger, there is an inclination to seeking praise which is contrary to human nature; it yields the self to hatred instead of love, and to injury instead of help and kindness. This is engendered by an erroneous judgment regarding one's assessment of self-worth. A great soul, by contrast, would not take revenge, since it does not feel despised. The latter attitude, as Seneca argues, is largely a matter of perceiving himself in the correct way. One will not surrender himself to anger, unless he perceives himself despised.

As my reading of the passion of anger with the simile of mirror implies, Seneca describes the state of deceived self-love in terms of a paradox between what the self desires, i.e. praise and what he/she actually does. And yet, it is naïve, as it lacks the knowledge of its condition; while on the one hand, the angry man is aware that his overt violent response of hatred is caused by his unfulfilled desires, he lacks the knowledge that his hatred paradoxically denotes what he actually desires as his nature as a reasoning being demands.

The state of anger as self-deception is described in terms of a "displacement, –abandoning of – what is natural to man", which is engendered by erroneous reasoning regarding one's self-worth. As Seneca suggests, this is preceded by the condition that makes the self perceives himself as despised or inferior, which suggests altogether two levels of self-deception. The first is that he is not aware that he makes an error in measuring his self-worth. The second is that the affective reaction in anger points to what he desires to be or possess.

Having assumed that Seneca observes the same symptoms of deceptive happiness and false identifications of the flatterers in other states, it can be argued that all cases of self-deception are already treated as perverted self-love. Seneca highlights two points that the self fails to recognize. The first is that the actual ugly image of the flatterer and that is the real condition of the self-love, which the self exchanges with the pleasant as it gazes through the mirror. And the second is that the imaginary image is in fact the one that he actually wants to be, bearing a contrast to what he actually does, which altogether suggests self-deception in two levels. The first is concerned with the self's knowledge of the condition of his own self. The second is that the representation shows what the self wants to be.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SELF IN CONFLICT

In this chapter, I shall discuss the origin and the nature of self-deception. The cognitive development of self recounts a perversion of human nature which is also introduced as lack of knowledge. Passions such as grief and lust, anger, fear, and ambition are wrong value judgments which Seneca discuss as concrete cases of perverted human nature; the state of self-deception or perverted self love is stated, first of all, by their overestimation of the things that also leads erroneous reasoning. Once they fail to know their value laden-nature, they begin to love themselves by mistakenly attaching value to the externals, measure their self-worth as well as the others by means of such things. The second, the erroneous reasoning is particularly marked by an experience of mental frustration, having its basis on the contrary movement of desires and aversions; the selves engage in erroneous reasoning once their self-worth is being threatened. Beyond their knowledge, they are driven to shun what threaten them by excessive desires. What makes them desirous are fears they attach to externals that they love themselves with. They surrender themselves to the passion of various kinds. Seneca argues that mutual attraction among the selves gets perverted by instigating false admiration and false fears to one another.

4.1 Origin of Self-Deception; lack of self-knowledge

In the preceding section, it is argued that the vicious, slippery representations ranging from adultery, lying, injustice, ambition, greed to anger denote a state of self-deception which the selves are not aware of. The same states are also described as renouncement of human nature. Seneca puts forward two reasons for self-deception (94.13). Either, the soul is perverted by false opinions, or the self is, by nature, always prone to perversion as it is carried by an outward appearance that attracts it to the wrong direction.⁵⁵ In discussing both cases, Seneca considers an innate propensity in the psychic mechanism of the self,

⁵⁵ See Letter 94.13

besides the environmental factors; the self is wronged by false opinions it fashions from the social environment he/she lives in. And yet, beyond the environmental factors, there is also an innate propensity to error that all selves are subject to.

Both are central to Seneca's discussion of the cognitive development throughout which the constantly growing selves familiarize their principle of love of self by forming false opinions of things. For Seneca, the cognitive development of the adult is ambivalent; while on the one hand, it suggests their gaining recognition of the principle of self-love, it simultaneously brings about the perversion from its natural state, i.e. loving as his reasoning constitution demands. As Seneca concedes;

Our parents have instilled into us an admiration for gold and silver; in our early years, the *striving* has been implanted, settling deep within us, and growing with our growth. Then, too the whole nation, though at odds on every other subject, agrees upon this; this is what they regard, what they ask for their children, and this is what they dedicate to the gods when they wish to show their gratitude-as if it were the greatest of all man's possessions! And finally, public opinion has come to such a pass that poverty is hissing and a reproach, despised by the rich and loathed by the poor^{xxxix} (115.11-12).

As the quotation suggests, behind the adults' assenting to the opinions of wealth and poverty, Seneca observes a preliminary process of gaining recognition of the principle of self-love, which unfolds the skill to know and to love. And thus, Seneca says that as human beings grow into more complex constitutions, the innate skill also grow with them. Attaching value to the externals is treated as one concrete example of their gaining awareness of the principle of self-love that bids them to acquire the knowledge of things, classifying them as praiseworthy or the vice versa. The self happens to perceive things within a subjective pattern of self-love; gold and silver are attached positive value, whereas poverty is despised and counted as evil. Cicero, too, speaks of the ability of passing judgment on impression as a concrete example of adults' gaining awareness of the principle of the earlier instinctive selections; once they discover the logic of the earlier instinctive selections, they begin to attach positive value to the things that deserve choice and their contraries negative value among the group of the preferred things

they call 'indifferents'. Things are preferred for their own sake in others because they produce certain result, and in others both. "Others will be called preferred because they produce a certain result, for example, money, and others, again for both reasons like sound senses or good health" ^{x1} (*De Finibus*, 3.56). Like Cicero, Seneca concedes that adults attach value to the things, judging them as good as if they were instrumental for their well-being or despise the contrary.

The apprehension of threat, and profit, as accompanied by pleasure and pain are some other examples of the self's gaining recognition of the principle of self-love. Beyond the provision of the bodily needs, the self is driven to admire gold and silver and despise poverty as they apprehend the profit and peril to their well-being and self-worth. In the quotation above, gold and silver are cognized as valuable objects, sacred gifts to be given to the gods in annual and daily divination rituals to maintain their own security and a flourishing life;⁵⁶ they are means of showing gratitude and love of gods from which they expect security and happiness. The notion of poverty is originated by the absence of the former and is counted as evil as the self conceives a potential threat to his own security and their social well being in them. Elsewhere, Seneca speaks of the golden and silver plates at the dining table as symbols of prestige, luxury and higher social status of the Roman citizens, while the purple robes are apprehended as the means of an influential political title (94.69). The same objects of admiration might also be sources of fear; as they are viewed as instruments to build up a praiseworthy image of themselves in addition to maintaining their well being.

While the process of attaching value presupposes the gradual recognition of the principle of self-love within a subjective pattern they do so by adjusting the already available opinions of things in the social environment they are brought up in. Right at the beginning, the growing child gains awareness of the principle of self-love, acquire the knowledge of things and loves himself in the way the closest in the environment does; adults happen to admire wealth, political titles, the kingship and despise some others precisely in the same way their parents,

⁵⁶ See C. Kerényi for the substantial discussion of the impact of religion on values. Kerényi claims that Gods are believed to be responsible for the well-being of the individuals and the state; gold and silver are given to gods to prevent harm and pollution and in turn provide their own security and their well-being. ("Man and God in Roman view", *The Religion of the Greeks and Romans*, [New York, E.P. Putton, 1962], p 220)

siblings and the others in the social environment do; from the childhood onwards, every adult acquires the notions in the same way, within a complex nexus of societal and religious experiences that holistically determine the norms regarding social status, the roles and the pursuits of all kinds.

Seneca says, however that all opinions of good and evil, which are formed out of ‘notiones’ of externals—poverty, kingship, titles, wealth— are false, leading them to fashion false admirations as well as fears. According to Seneca, what makes us fearful is not death itself but the notion of death that the mythological accounts of the underworld suggest. “The fear of going into the underworld is equaled by the fear of going nowhere”^{xli}(72.16). The selves are misled by poets’ false conceptions of death. The concept of poverty, on the other hand, constitutes another source of false opinions that make the majority of the selves shrink from. Just like poverty, the concept of wealth, which they think admirable and associate with many pursuits, is equally false. Seneca claims that they are wrong because they are the opinions of a perverted reason. “Let the soul be reminded that nature has prescribed very little for us. No man is born rich. Everyman, when he sees light, is commanded to be content with milk and rugs. Such is our beginning, and yet, kingdoms are all too small for us”^{xlii} (96.23). As much as they form the conception of wealth and poverty, the selves happen to admire military command, civil office, popular glory in their quest for praise, self-recognition and self-preservation. “None of us goes deep below the surface, we skim the top only”^{xliii} (59.10) Seneca says that the majority of adults, in the same way, mistakenly judge some noble and brave deeds as good and admire them.

Although by nature selves amplify praiseworthy things, they do so at the exchange of the truth about themselves(120.4-5). Such wrong opinions are not due to their nature, neither is the norms of the degenerated society they live in, but of an innate propensity of selves that make them perceive things within a certain outlook. Since the selves have already come into the world within a certain outlook, their awareness is limited to this subjective perspective. Seneca says that the indifferents such as political title, riches and the honor has nothing valuable when rated in naked eyes; throughout their cognitive development, the selves

simply develop the blind habit of attaching positive and negative value to things in the complex nexus of experience. As Seneca puts it;

We are deflected from the right course by riches, titles, power and everything which is valuable in our opinion but worthless when rated at its real value. We do not know how to weigh matters. Those things possess no grandeur wherewith to fascinate our minds except the fact that we have become accustomed to marvel at them. For, they are not praised because they ought to be desired, but they are desired because they have been praised. And when the errors of the individuals has once created error on the part of the public, then the public error goes on creating error on the part of individuals^{xliv}(81.29-30).

Having assumed that each self happens to familiarize their principle of self-love in the same way, Seneca observes a collective experience of deception and perversion in the contemporary Roman society; it underlies the assumption that each self contributes to the perversion of one another by instigating false opinions of good and evil. The flatterers fail to recognize the fact that they praise things not because they are actually desirable; instead they desire them because they have been praised. The selves blindly get accustomed to pass judgment on them. For Cicero, too, although impulse is the seed of virtue, ever since they were issued from the mother's womb, human beings find themselves in a world of deception beyond their recognition (*Tusculan Disputations*, 3.2-3). Starting with the nurse, and the parents, masters and the others, the self is constantly corrupted by wrong opinions of things to such an extent that the clear vision of truth is blocked, exchanged by the erroneous beliefs, weaving their net in such a complex way that they make the self convinced of their own truth.⁵⁷

Seneca argues that behind their blind habits of judging things as good and evil there lies their lack of understanding the value-laden nature of self-love; they are not aware that the externals are judged as good or evil because they have a natural inclination to attach value to things, people. From a different point of view, Cicero too, explains the perversion of judgments in terms of the lack of understanding their nature as reasoning beings.

⁵⁷ See also Epictetus for a similar account of deception. (*Discourses I-III*, tran. by W.A.Oldfather,[London, Loeb series, 1998], 2.11. 2-4)

Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance to nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conceptions'— in Stoic phraseology *ennoia*— has discerned the order and harmony that governs the conduct and so to speak harmony that governs the conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection^{xlv} (*De Finibus*, 3.21).

The recognition of true self as rational beings is located in the development of the natural instinct of self-preservation. "What really deserves to be good" as Cicero says is "the order and so to speak, the order and harmony of conduct" which they understand by insight and reasoning, followed by a change in valuation. Although Cicero presents the problem of self-knowing from a different point of view, the process of understanding one's true self is based on the same assumptions Seneca has regarding the means. Like Seneca, Cicero too, puts the whole trust to the process of human development. As I have formerly argued, the concern for self-love takes on different forms according to the stages of human development, and that only in later stages rational beings come to recognize their true selves, i.e. rational self-love. As the quotation suggests, understanding one's self is made possible by insight and reasoning, but does not explain, however, what the insight and reasoning is that leads one to understand rationality which is explained as the order and the harmony of action. In Seneca, too, while the skill of knowing springs from the inborn quality of self-love that is commonly shared by all living animals, he fails to explain how, as an exclusive expression of rational self-love, the recognition of the value laden self-love is made possible anything except the instinct of knowing which itself lacks the ability of discerning anything without attaching value within a subjective perspective.⁵⁸

And thus, he says that once the selves fail to apprehend their existential relationship to the things, i.e. that nothing is valuable as independent from their attaching value, they begin to project their images of self-worth, seeking admiration and praise by means of these externals, and develop high opinion of

⁵⁸ See the substantial discussion of the problem of self knowing in Gisela Striker in her reading of various Stoic texts. She argues that Cicero does not explain what is the reasoning behind the insight. Furthermore, recognizing oneself as a rational being is not enough to explain the desire for order and harmony. ("Following Nature: A study in Stoic ethics" in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 9,[Oxford, Clearandon Press, 1991] p.9)

themselves upon attaining their goals. “For the riches puffed up the soul, and beget pride” (87.31).^{xlvi} Driven by the same concern of praise, they also get distress- feel despised upon experiencing a loss or a threat and feel fear on their account. (86.18).The flatterers regard their possession as if they were instrumental to seeking praise and admiration, feel distress at the experience of a loss, or perception of a threat. Their excessive deceptive state of loving blurs their vision so much that they cannot apprehend the fact that they are ephemeral by nature. They blindly get accustomed to get flattered. Seneca warns excessive lovers of fortune about two issues; the first is that once the selves love themselves by means of such things, they will suffer distress upon experiencing a loss or the calculation of a loss; they would suffer distress as they avoid the perceived injury.

For Seneca, although neither self-worth, nor praiseful self-identifications is possible without externals, the attitude of loving oneself would make a difference.⁵⁹As Seneca concedes; “I classify as indifferent –that is neither good nor evil,–sickness, pain poverty, exile, death. None of these things are intrinsically praiseworthy but nothing can be praiseful without them”^{xlvii} (82.10). Although externals in fact possess no value in themselves, on the other hand, nothing praiseworthy can be attained without them.

Thus, it is with the things which we call indifferent and ‘middle’ like riches strength, beauty, titles, kingship, and their opposites death, exile, ill-health, pain and all such evils, the fear of which upsets us to a greater or lesser extend. It is the wickedness or virtue that bestows the name of good and evil ^{xlviii}(82.14).

Although both the virtuous and the wicked are prone to judge the externals as good and evil, their manner in the latter would make a difference. Cicero also speaks of the differences in the value judgments between the wise and the fool, regarding their attitude to the externals.⁶⁰ By treating distress and fear, desire and

⁵⁹ Unlike some other Stoics, Seneca does not dismiss the externals. See I.G.Kidd’s critical discussion on the value of externals. he argues that the concept of indifferents are inconsistent among the Stoics. I argue that the Seneca defends the relative value of the externals as long as the selves comprehend the truth value of them. Nothing is chosen for its own sake. (“Stoic Intermediates and the End of Man”. *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. by A.A.Long, [NJ, The Athlone Press, 1996], p 130-133)

⁶⁰ (*De Finibus*, 3. 18, 59)

grief as the perverted judgments of self-love, Seneca does not deviate from the Stoic trend. As Cicero puts it ;

But all disorders (*perturbatio*) are, they think, due to a judgment (*iudicio*) and belief (*opinione*). Consequently they define them more precisely, that it may be realized not only how wrong they are but to what extent they are under our control. Distress, (*aegritudo*) then, is a freshly formed belief of present evil, and the subject of which thinks it right to feel depressed. Delight (*laetitia*) is a newly formed belief and the subject of it thinks it right to be enraptured. Fear is a belief of threatening evil which seems to the subject of it insupportable. Lust (*libido*) is a belief of a prospective good and the subject of it thinks it profitable to possess it at once upon the spot^{xlix} (*Tusculan Disputations*, 4,6.14).

According to Cicero, the early Stoics discuss passions as wrong opinions and judgments, which they form out of their opinions of externals. While the state of deception involves only their lack of understanding the truth value of externals, they do not discuss the further implication of these perverted judgments on their loving of the other selves within this psychological perspective.

Furthermore, they define the sickness of the soul as an intense belief persistent and deeply rooted, which regards a thing that need not be shunned as, though it ought to be shunned. Further, this sort of belief is an act of judging that one has knowledge where one has none. There are moreover, certain subdivisions of *sickness* of the following kind: *avarice, ambition, love of women, love of good living, intoxication...*and anything similar. Avarice, again, is an intense belief, persistent and deeply rooted which regards money as being eminently desirable and the other members of the same class is similar¹ (*Tusculan Disputations*, 4. 10.26).

As concrete examples of lack of self-knowledge, passions are also the judgments of a sick soul that brings about false beliefs regarding the objects of desire and aversions. Cicero says that in a state of passion, an object seems desirable when it is actually not, or things that ought not to be shunned, are shunned blindly. For Cicero, beliefs are also acts of judging. Avarice is an intensive belief that makes money choice-worthy and desirable. Lust is a belief of a prospective good and the subject of it thinks it advantageous to possess an object of desire at once to possess upon the spot. Ambition and lust, indulgence in luxury are also defined in

similar way. Cicero also cites *hatred* and *hatred of women* and mankind as typical examples of aversion passions

What follows from the discussion above is that although the process of physical and cognitive development indicate a certain amount of awareness, it still suggests an imperfect familiarization of the rational self-love; On the one hand, the growth unfolds a goal directed subjective principle; the cognized objects are the very sources that the self begins to have a sense of its nature; the self begins to feel not only the sense of threat, but also the sense of profit.

Below, Seneca speaks of the difference in the case of a proper understanding of the value-laden nature of self-love. Just like for other Stoics, in Seneca, too, passions, as excessive states of loving and self-deception are central to the problem of self-knowing. The knowledge of the nature of self-love covers not only the irresistible drive to existence and abhorrence of dissolution only but also of its limitations and vulnerability to destruction. As he puts it,

Both those whom you love and revere and those whom you despise one heap of ashes will make equal. This clearly is the meaning of that famous utterance ascribed to the Pythian oracle: KNOW THYSELF. What is man? A vessel that the slightest shaking, the slightest toss will break....What is man? A body weak and fragile and naked, in its natural state defenseless, dependent upon another's help and exposed to all affronts of fortune¹¹ (*Consolations to Marcia*, 11.3).

For Seneca, the rational self-love contains the knowledge of the equilibrium of the two opposites, the irresistible attraction to existence, and at the same time its vulnerability to destruction. In their blind attachment to the externals, Seneca observes a blind familiarization of self-love- a blind apprehension of the value-laden nature of self-love; they familiarize only the irresistible drive to existence even in their abhorring destruction, while failing to gain access to the knowledge of its vulnerability to destruction.

4. 2 Reasoning in Passions; the Craft of the Deceived

In the preceding section, it is argued that perversion of reason is due to man's lack of self-knowledge regarding the nature of self which is examined in their attitude of externals. Not being conscious of how their beliefs are formed, the ignorant blindly transform their venture for praise on the externals with which they paradoxically seek admiration and praise from the others. On the part of the selves, the perverted reason engenders self-judgments ranging from excessive love of self and low esteem as another concrete expression of excessive low of self. Following the implications of the preceding section, in this section, I shall discuss what precisely Seneca means by the renouncement of reason—*euro naturam hominis*- a conception which is central to erroneous reasoning with a comparative reading of its meaning in other Stoics.

To begin with, by calling the state of passions as contrary to nature, Seneca does not deviate from the Stoic trend. A passion, as Stobaeus says, is an impulse in excess which is contrary to reason"; he makes use of the terms that belong to the dualistic theories of soul in the ancient tradition, such as "irrational" and "contrary to nature," (alogon).

The Stoics say that passion (*πάθος*) is an impulse which is excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason, or a movement of the soul which is irrational and contrary to nature; and that all passions belong to the soul's commanding faculty⁶¹ (410).

Although passion is one of the judgments of the 'hegemonikon', denoting a certain amount of rationality in the sense of deliberately assenting to an impression, forming thereby judgments with have action-guiding force, its nature differs from the right judgments primarily by virtue of its excessive character, as followed by their mistaken views on externals. Things are perceived in such a way that the perceived data justifies the self by its own persuasiveness in a lack of self-control. It is excessive right at the beginning⁶². And yet, by virtue of its

⁶¹ Stobaeus in Long and Sedley *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 2 [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987], 2.88.8-90.6)

⁶² See my comments on the process forming judgments out of impulse. Every opinion is formed by the self's giving assent to an impulse in Chapter 1, section 3.

excessiveness, every passion- judgment of 'hegemonikon' happens to act disobedient to reason.⁶³

'Irrational' and 'contrary to nature' are not used in their ordinary senses; "irrational is equivalent to 'disobedient to reason'. For every passion is overpowering since people in states of passion...as though by a disobedient horse, and are induced to do it. The sense of 'contrary to nature', in the outline account of passion, is of something that is contrary to the right and natural reason. Everyone in states of passion turns aside from right reason (7-8).

Regarding the unifying account of the soul, what the terms, "irrational and the unnatural" suggest is a perverted judgment of the 'hegemonikon', the ruling faculty, which Seneca translates as 'principale animi'. For Stobaeus, the self in such cases is like a disobedient horse, resisting the right reason. It is a state of madness in which the self refuses to follow what right reason prescribes in such circumstances⁶⁴. Likewise, Zeno defines "passion as 'agitation of the soul alien from right reason and contrary to nature, and an impulse in excess.'"⁶⁵ Chrysippus and Epictetus' account of passion takes its stand in the mistaken judgments like Seneca's; in his critical analysis of the tragic heroine, Medea, Epictetus describes how she happens to act disobedient to reason; "Can not a man, then think that something is profitable to him and yet, not choose it? He can not! How often who says, "Now, now, I learn what horrors I intend, but passion overmasters sober thought" (178). According to Medea, as Epictetus concedes, "the very gratification of her passion and the taking of her revenge on her husband, she regards as more profitable than her saving of her. This is what appears to her true. She is deceived."⁶⁶ (178) Chrysippus' account of "disobedience to reason" can be summed up as follows; Medea, who engages in infanticide to take revenge of her

⁶³ In her reading of Chrysippus account of passion as reported by Galen, Gisela Striker formulates the composition of irrationality as follows; " what happens in emotional states, is rather that the natural commensurateness of impulse and reason is disturbed. This is what makes emotion "unnatural" and the emotions are irrational not only in the sense of being due to an erroneous judgments, but primarily in the sense of going beyond or against what one actually thinks one should do" (*Ibid.*, p.65).

⁶⁴ See also John Cooper, (" Posidonius on Emotions," *Reason and Emotion*, [Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999], p. 416)

⁶⁵ From Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 4,6.11, Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.110)

⁶⁶ *Discourses reported by Arrian*, book 1, 17) Passion is a kind of judgment, a perverted assent.

husband, Jason, tells as of a conflict with the right reason in a sudden moment of madness. As Galen reports, Chrysippus' account of passion is 'acratic' by nature; although the self understand how bad her result will be, and partly joining right reason, the self cannot stop himself doing it⁶⁷ (413).

Being concerned with arguing for a consistent account of disobedience to reason within a monistic model, the Stoics' interpretation of irrationality revolves around the same account of conflict, i.e. a conflict with the better judgment a person engages in normal circumstances, which is originated by their mistaken view of externals, making something look either desirable or the vice versa. They describe this conflict in terms of a mental division. As A.W. Price puts it;

It is not that a man's reason says one thing while his affections say another; rather affections are 'perversions of reasons and mistaken judgments of reason' (3.93.17-18) making one blind to evident facts, they knock out reasoning and opposite directions, not in the sense of defeating an opposing force but in that of displacing them altogether (149-150).

Price's reading of irrationality suggests two levels; the first one emerges in one's way of looking into the matters that produce affections (passions) as false judgments that depart correct reasoning right at the beginning. However, by way of its excessive character, passions also suggest a disposition that resist any right reasoning and be soon carried way by its own force. Likewise, Christopher Gill develops a similar argument of passion as excessive impulse, defining the nature of irrationality in terms of a conflict between a temporary "recognition, but deliberate rejection of, what a reasonable being would do in these circumstances" which he discusses particularly in the case of Senecan heroines, Medea and Phaedra⁶⁸. It involves volitional action (assent). The person thinks that he has lost control not by doing one thing, while willing another, but by willing one thing with an awareness that doing something else would be more rational but is no longer possible, as the self is being carried away by its force. Sorabji's

⁶⁷ From Long and Sedley *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 2 [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987], 4.2.10-18)

⁶⁸ ("Passion as Madness in Roman Poetry", *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature*, ed. by Suzanna Morton Braund and Christopher Gill, [Cambridge University Press, 1997], p. 217)

interpretation of irrationality in Seneca bears a striking similarity to Gill and Price's comments.⁶⁹ In his reading of the three-staged account of anger, Sorabji argues that having its basis on the mistaken beliefs of good and evil, the self judges a case as injustice and injury to him. The "will to avenge" is the third state, as the final step to what Seneca means by "disobedient to reason". For Sorabji, disobedience is meant as the rejection of the residual appropriateness, which is forceful by its effect that makes the self irresistible. The idea of irrationality suggest of rejecting the residual appropriateness with the lack of self-control.

I argue that, while on the one hand, Seneca subscribes to the orthodox Stoic thesis by laying down the first level of deception that make them liable to fashioning mistaken judgments as Chrysippus Epictetus and Zeno do, he develops a different account of irrationality that Gill and Sorabji fail to see. Basically speaking, the account of irrationality in erroneous reasoning is based on a model of reasoning in which desires and aversions work in a reverse order. As I shall discuss below, the model of reasoning in Seneca is a synthesis of the Epicurian⁷⁰ and Stoic account on passions.

To begin with, as I have argued in the preceding section, once self-love gets perverted from its natural state, inevitably the desires and aversions get perverted.

Nature's wants are slight, but the demands of the opinions are many. Suppose that the property of the many millionaires is heaped upon in your possession....Natural desires are limited, but those which spring from false opinions can have no stopping point^{lii} (16.5-6).

⁶⁹ According to Sorabji, the first stage involves the bodily reactions such as shivering, the sudden blush of the face etc. In the second stage, Sorabji argues that in Seneca "the mind assents to the appearance of injustice and injury, and third is there is a will to the effect that it is appropriate for me to be avenged, for him to be punished. The third stage is introduced as one in which emotions are carried away. At the second stage there was a moral mistake of reason, but in this third stage one wills in disobedience even to that erroneous application of reason" ("Seneca's defense" *Emotions and Peace of Mind; The Gifford lectures*, [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000], p.61)

⁷⁰ In his philosophical poem, *De Rarum Natura*, Lucretius, the Roman Epicurian, speaks of the unconscious death element in explaining the nature of irrationality in passion. What he means with "death" is the one that is described in the popular Greek and Roman religion. (*On the Nature of things*, tran. by Rouse, W.H.D [London, Loeb series, 1992]

In contrast to the natural desires, which are limited to the well-functioning of sense organs, well being of body and the bodily constitution, the desires of false opinions are excessive by nature; specific examples are given from the objects of luxury, ambition and wealth such as marble floors, expensive statues and paintings, influential political titles and money (16.5). Seneca says that the latter only makes us crave more. He develops a similar argument regarding the aversions of false opinions.

If I am not mistaken, there are three main classes of these; we fear a needy loss, we fear sickness and we fear the troubles which result from the violence of the stronger. And all of these, which shake us most is the dread which hangs us from our neighbor's superiority. For it is accompanied by great outcry and uproar. But the natural evils which I have mentioned-needy loss and sickness steal upon us silently, which no shock of terror to the eye or ear. The other kinds of evil come, so to speak in a form of a huge parade^{liii} (14.4).

The natural aversions of externals are limited to need and the physical welfare such as hunger and thirst, ulcers of stomach and fever. Although it is natural for each self to avoid a sickness to maintain his well-being, the remaining type of aversions is unnatural in the sense that they cause excessive fear on the soul. As an example of excessive ones, Seneca speaks of the dread that comes from the neighbor's superiority. One can observe a similar account in Cicero's report of perverted psychic mechanism of 'oikeionon' (*Tusculan Disputations*, 4, 12-14). According to Cicero, passions preserve the same pattern of reasoning as the one in the case of the wise and the fool, save that in the case of the fool, the clear vision of what is to be avoided or desired is lost. Although it is by law of nature that most rational man pursue(voluntas) what is good and avoid from what is evil, rational aversion-cautio- turns into fear(metu), whereas rational desire - 'voluntas'- become excessive (cupiditas). Both Seneca and Cicero mark the difference of the unnatural ones by referring to the objects of desires and aversion. Cicero defines fear as shrinking from an object of an unsupportable source, an avoidance which is alien to reason and cupiditas towards a thing, believing that it is worth pursuing.

Although Seneca is in agreement with the Stoics on the non-natural aspect of reasoning in passion, in laying down his account of perversion in passion he develops a different account of irrationality, claiming for the reverse movement of desires and aversions as a particular instance of erroneous reasoning; as I have argued in the preceding section, due to their ignorance, they project their desires of praise and self-recognition on things, when their desires are left unsatisfied, they experience low esteem; they begin to enhance their low self-worth by desiring to possess more. What the self fears, in fact, is restructured on desires and the self avoids the evil it perceives by craving for the love object more zealously. In a similar way, what is desired, already makes the selves fearful about the love object they are concerned with. Below, Seneca describes how such a reasoning – the pair of craving-fearing- could possibly emerge in the reverse way. As he puts it;

Furthermore, there are vast distinctions among these qualities which we call ‘middle’, for example death is not so indifferent as the question whether your hair should be worn evenly or unevenly. Death belongs to among those things, which are not indeed evils, but still have them resemblance of evil; for there are implanted in us a love of self, a desire for existence and self-preservation, and also an abhorrence of dissolution, because death seem to rob us many of the goods and withdraw us from the abundance which we have become accustomed. There is another element which estranges us from death; we are already familiar with present but are ignorant of the future into which we shall transform ourselves, and we shrink from the unknown. Moreover it is natural for us to fear the world of Shades, whither death is supposed to lead. Therefore although death is something indifferent, it is nevertheless, not a thing which we can easily ignore ^{liv}(15-16).

The inborn impulse of self-love is characterized primarily with a desire to preserving existence, that explains why the selves shun dissolution. As in the pre-rational state, in later stages, too, ‘naturali amore’ is like a craftsman constructing itself in various complex forms. Seneca makes use of death in both actual and metaphorical sense, weaving the resemblances of the former in latter from which variety of passions regarding different love objects are (re)constructed; the idea of death is conceived as a loss of the externals, one is accustomed to hold in his possession, or in some other cases, the people they love dearly; the self counts

their loss as evil which he is driven to shun; this also explains why they are eager to hold them in his possession; the excessive craving of lovers, likewise, emerges as a pattern of preserving what they actually loves for. The unconscious fear of death reconstructs itself in excessive desires of multiple love objects especially on calculating the future trouble; in his psychological analysis of self-love, Seneca claims that the concern for the future is another typical example of the fear-irrational craving which he takes in the sense of abhorring from the dissolution. Regarding various love objects, fear of the future is perceived in the present moment causing a distress. Being devoid of any source, the self constructs future out of the already existing notions to adjust his concern of self-worth to present. The fear of death as fear of Hades is one concrete example of a source of the unknown. And yet, it emerges as a desire to exist. As Seneca concedes, it is natural for us to fear the world of Hades, as much as the unknown, since we are driven by nature to abhor and flee from dissolution, as a proper sort of loving.

The same logical relationship between *cupiditas* and *metu* can be further observed as follows;

I find in the writings of our Hecato that the limiting of desires helps us also to cure fears; “cease to hope”, he says, “you will cease to fear”. But “how” you will reply, “can things so different go side by side?”. In this way, my dear Lucilius; although they seem different, they are really united. Just like the same chains fastens the prisoners and the soldier who guards him, so hope and fear, dissimilar as they are, kept step together. Fear follows hope. I am not surprised that they proceed in that way; each alike belongs to a soul that is anxious, a soul that is worried by looking forward to the future. But the chief cause of all ills is that we do not adopt ourselves to the present, and send our thought to future. And so foresight, the noblest gift of human race, becomes perverted... But we men torment ourselves over that which is to come as well as over that which is past. Many of our blessings, bring nuisance to us; for memory recalls the tortures of fear, while foresight anticipates them^{iv} (5.7-9).

With reference to the Stoic Hecato, Seneca seeks out to explain, how the perverted self-love leads to erroneous measuring of self-worth. This is the particular characteristic of the rational selves that makes them different from animals. Because they are unable to adjust their future to the present, people make

use of the already existing notions, memories that recalls similar experiences as they judge the possible forthcoming evils. The fear involves an act of judging a probable loss or threat that simultaneously arouses hope (spe) to shun the calculated threat or injury with an anticipated prosperity. Although they seem different, both fear and hope points to a series of acts of reasoning under the state of anxiety.⁷¹

Seneca speaks of a further possibility of error that is implied in the reasoning, referring again to the calculation of a future trouble and prosperity. In the fear-hope pair, the excessive love that is implied in the fear of the selves might bring about conception of evil (a source of grief) that is less likely; the self fashions imaginative threats and profits under anxiety. As he puts it,

There are many things, Lucilius, likely to frighten us than to crush us; we suffer more often in imagination than in reality. I am not speaking with you in the Stoic strain but in a milder style. For it is our Stoic fashion to speak of all those things which provoke cries and groans, as unimportant and beneath notice. What I advise you to do is, not to be unhappy before the crises comes, since it may be that the dangers before which you paled as if they were threatening you, will never come upon you. Accordingly some things torment us more than they ought and some torment us before they ought; and some torment us when they ought not to torment us at all. We are in the habit of exaggerating, or imaging, or anticipating sorrow^{lvi} (13.4-5).

In the case of the future anticipations of trouble, there runs the possibility that once the self calculates a likely threat to the object he/she loves dearly, his excessive love makes him/her fashion also improbable conceptions of evil, which is not again different from craving to enhance due to the concern for praise. Eventually they fear more than they ought. In some other cases, the self gets anxious for the threats which do not exist, and engages eventually reasoning to

⁷¹ Martha.C. Nussbaum's interpretation of the relation between hope and fear comes closer to my reading. She says, "what distinguishes fear from hope, fear to grief and love from hate- is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change but the way in which the object is seen. In fear, one sees oneself or what one loves as seriously threatened. In hope, one sees oneself or what one's love as in some uncertainty but with a good chance for a good outcome. In grief, one sees an important object or person as lost; in love as invested with a special sort of radiance. Again, in adversaries, view prove unable to account either for the ways in which we actually identify and individuate emotions, or for the prominent feature of our experience of them. (*Emotions: Upheavals of Thought* [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001] p.28)

shun it. The source of fear in both is constituted by the already present opinions that are stored in the memory. Again in both cases the self gets tormented as they anticipate the probable grief, which might be an imaginary one; in such cases, grief becomes a desire to what the self sees as pleasant.

Fear is discussed by Seneca as a caution that is contrary to nature, as early Stoics do. Unlike what the commentators argue, Seneca argues that the irrational calculation of a future trouble is not actually independent and inseparable from a longing of some sort.⁷² As he concedes, “who craves for riches feels fear on their account”^{lvii} (15.11) and “those who live for hope alone find that the immediate future slips from their grasp and that greed still along in its place and the fear of death, a curse which longs a curse upon curse”^{lviii} (101.10). The desire to be rich, according to Seneca is originated by the self’s fear of the concern of self-esteem.

When persons are mourning, or fearful about something, they ought not to be left alone. In such cases, he only plans folly and heaps up future dangers for himself or for others. He brings into play his base desires; the soul displays what fear and shame used to repress; it whets its boldness and stirs his passions, and goads his anger^{lix}(10.2).

Seneca’s main point is that as they are under the impact of the passion of distress and fear, the selves are likely to fabricate not only false shapes of evil, but also false shapes of good as future prosperity among which the passion of lust, anger are given as specific examples. Central to the fear-craving pair, ambition and lust as well as anger are typical examples of erroneous reasoning in the perverted self-love, which is due to the experience of low esteem. The self seeks to enhance by desiring to possess more, as in the case of the passion of ambition

⁷² In his discussion of the passion of anger in Seneca, Richard Sorabji explains the logical relation of the passion of fear to the passion of grief as follows; “Although anger is classified as an appetite looking forward to revenge, the idea of vengeance imports a reference to a present evil, which makes anger akin to grief. The Stoics help us to see how easily anger and grief can slide into one another. The inner reaction and outer behavioral reactions can be causally connected because, although fear and appetite take the lead, pleasure and distress follow on them.” In Sorabji’s reading the relation among the cardinal passions is constructed on the perception on evil and good which are themselves wrong, in my reading, the logical relation among the passions takes one step further. While on the one hand, I submit to Sorabji’s interpretation, I also claim that each aversion mistakenly constructs itself as a desire. Fear is not directly followed by grief, as Sorabji argues. It is related to desires. (*Emotion and Peace of Mind, the Gifford Lectures*, [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000], p 31)

and glory. As for the passion of anger, by desiring to pay the injury with an injury, the perverted self is driven to enhance what he has seen as threat or injury to his self-worth—what he actually desires— in a perverted form.

Regarding various love objects, in passions ranging from greed, ambition, lust, and anger, Seneca points to the same complex composition of the craving-fear pair as typical examples of erroneous reasoning. In his discussion of the passion of greed, he says;

Suppose that you hold wealth to be good, poverty, will then distresses you, and, -which is most pitiable, -it will be an imaginary poverty. You may be rich, nevertheless, because your neighbor is richer, you suppose yourself to be poor exactly by the same amount in which you fall short of your neighbor. You may deem official position a good; you will be vexed at another's appointment or reappointment to the consulship; you will be jealous whenever you see a name several times in the state records. Your ambition will be frenzied that you will regard yourself last in the race if there is anyone in front of you. Or you may rate death as the worst of evils, although there is really no evil therein except that which precedes death's coming, fear^{lx} (104. 9-10).

As men transpose their desires for praise, Seneca says that, once the selves hold the opinion that wealth is good, they begin to count poverty as evil, and get distress about the idea of losing their property. Under such cases, although the self is rich enough, having perceived another's possessions, they feel worthless. Since to possess them means to possess the prestige, worth and admiration, the selves are immediately driven to shun by desiring to possess more. As he concedes;

The first and foremost powerful of all is the fact that, busied as we are with ever new desires, we turn our eyes, not to what we possess, but to what we seek to possess. To those who are intent upon something they wish to gain all that they have already gained seems worthless. It follows, too that when the desire for new benefits has diminished the value of one that has already been diminished, the author of them is also less esteemed^{lxi} (*On Benefits*, 3. 2.1-2).

What drives the perverted self to desire (cupiditas) excessively is his experience or the calculation of a low esteem; for the self is accustomed to measure his/her self-worth with the things that he believes to be valuable or good,

seeking praise by transforming his own image on them. The moment they desire to possess more already presupposes a perception of worthlessness. Turning back to the condition that is prior to the outburst of the passion of greed (*avaricium*), a similar experience can be observed.

Although they are rich enough, they get envious, jealous of those who possess more of those goods. Being concerned for the reputation of possessing the greater amount than his neighbor has, the self wishes to possess more, as he assesses his self-worth through the comparison of the amount that his neighbor has. For Seneca, the deceived selves pay the price of their pleasure for engendering both a self-inflicted injury, anxiety and distress. “They bring on unpopularity that unsettles the mind to such an extent that the more reputation of having wealth, though it is bound to harm us, nevertheless affords delight”.^{lxii} (87.31) Cicero, likewise defines jealousy as “a distress arising from the fact that the thing one has coveted oneself in the possession of the other man as well as one’s own”^{lxiii} (*Tusculan Disputations* 4.7-18), whereas envy (*invidentiam*) is defined as “a distress incurred by a reason of a neighbors’ prosperity, though it has no harm to the envious person”^{lxiv} (*Tusculan Disputations* 4,7.17). Envy leads to the cravings and fears of various sorts.

In the pursuits of political titles and official status, Seneca emphasizes the same point; Ever since the self holds the opinion of an official title as good, he/she wishes to be flattered by the others by holding the most influential official position in his possession. He gets envious for another’s appointment of consulship as the appointed consul is regarded more praiseworthy than he actually perceives himself as. Having felt short, they are driven to obtain a higher position than the others to enhance their low esteem.

Accordingly, in Seneca’s discussion of the passion of anger, we are given an account of experience of low esteem, due to one’s having a high opinion of himself; prior to the erroneous reasoning, the self feels despised. As Seneca concedes, “Prosperity fosters wrath when the crowd of flatterers, gather around and whispers to the proud ear: what should that man answer you back?” your estimate of yourself does not correspond with your importance; you demean yourself”^{lxv} (*On Anger*, 2.21.7). For Seneca, anger is primarily a self-judgment,

involves a perception of an injustice and injury to one's self-worth.⁷³ For the person feels despised and inferior at facing the happenings, contrary to his hopes and expectations. This is followed by the opinion that that one ought not to be harmed, which later stimulates the desire to pay the exact penalty by inflicting injury (*On Anger*, 2.1 4-5). Seneca discusses various sources of anger as various cases of the perception of threat or experienced loss and unfulfilled desires. (*On Anger*, 34.1-2) Seneca says that one may surrender himself to the passion of anger when someone steals one's goods he/she loves dearly. Sometimes one gets angry to someone he/she has courted for a long time for an expectation of a title, but left empty handed. For the property, titles are potential sources of admiration which the self are accustomed to win the admiration of the others. The fourth is when woman, as a valuable love object, is desired by someone else. As Seneca puts it, under such cases, one feels despised and indignant as the strivings remains unfulfilled, and does not correspond to self-worth he/she seeks by means of such externals.

In short, what follows from the discussion is that on the basis of the non-conscious fear of death, the account of irrationality or act against one's nature suggests a conflict which is different from the ones that are elaborated in the scholars' view⁷⁴ ; it draws the composition of an irrational perverted love of self, where the self is unaware of the paradox between what the self intends (as praise and admiration) and what he actually does, although he consciously gives assent to anger, having felt justified for its own reasons.

The model of reasoning I have developed in this section is based on primarily the experience of low self-worth. The complex architecture of desires and aversions is relevant to the natural urge of self-worth the selves possess. Passions are self-judgments regarding one's self-worth, which has its origin a model of reasoning where desires are constructed as aversions to enhance what they see as a threat to their self-worth.

⁷³ See Martha. C. Nussbaum's interpretation of passions as value judgments of reason. Nussbaum discusses the passion of anger as primarily motivated the political context of the contemporary Roman society. A honorable Roman ought to display anger, as it is a sign of dignity. In my reading, the passion of anger is a self-fashioning of deceived self.

⁷⁴ See page 67 of this thesis

As a concrete example of irrationality, desires and aversion desires of the deceived also exemplify typical cases of craft, a natural skill in self-love that makes the selves to see certain things not in the way as it is, but precisely in the way they wish to see.

4.3 The Pleasure and the Pain of the Deceived Self.

The nature of the deceived self-love cannot be clarified without examining Seneca's view of pleasure and pain. As I have formerly argued, the growth into the rational constitution brings with it the recognition of pleasure and pain, attendant to and intermingled with the deliberate choices and avoidance choices of the self; each self happens to love, safeguard and protect himself by striving for what he/she judges as pleasant and painful. Both pain and pleasure are attendant to the choices and the avoidance choices the self undertakes in deliberate mental acts of loving.⁷⁵

I shall argue that Seneca resolves the earlier Stoics' ambiguous account of pleasure and pain by consistently arguing that they are essential aspects of rationality or to be more exact, as necessary components of rational constitution or the rationalized self-love.⁷⁶ On the one hand, the Stoics argue that neither pleasure, nor pain is present at the primary stage, and therefore they are not natural. On the other hand, however, they imply that both are the products of a later period in development. As Diogenes Laertius puts it, "Pleasure, (hedone) if it is felt, is a by product which never comes until nature-by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution." it is an "aftermath, comparable to the condition of animals' thrive, plants in bloom." (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7 86). Diogenes Laertius implies that although pleasure is not inborn and not natural it comes out in the later period, when the animal and human organism have reached to the state, suitable to their nature.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ See chapter 3, Section 1

⁷⁶ Rist argues that both pleasure and pain are acts of assents. I insert his reading to support my interpretation. ("Problems of Pleasure and Pain", *Stoic Philosophy* [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969], p.48).

⁷⁷ Referring to the same passage from Diogenes Laertius, Julia Annas argues that the Stoics are not clear in what they take "epigennema" be; on the one hand, she claims that, "certain conditions will produce pleasure, but there are no necessary links between types of conditions and production of pleasure". She proceeds that as pleasure is construed on the indifferents, which is not morally good

The same ambiguity is present in Cicero's comment on 'oikeionon' of the Old Stoics. On the one hand, Cicero implies that even at the pre-rational stage, the pleasure and pain are potentially present; love of the self in the most primitive sense implies instinctual love of things that are instrumental to the preservation and the maintenance of existence (*De Finibus*, 3.16). In the later sections, he says, however, that pleasure is rejected by Stoics, based on their account that the goal of every living organism is to preserve their constitution, rather than seek the pleasurable. The problem gets more complicated with another claim Cicero makes about young children "who feel pleasure as they find out something by themselves" ^{lxvi} (*De Finibus*, 3, 5.17) The latter account of Cicero is intended to argue against the rival school of his time, Epicurians, who treat pleasure and pain as the primary goal of each self which is present right at the beginning. By contrast, while Stoics reject pleasure and pain as the primary goal of each self, but they do allow a certain amount of both as an aftermath, to which the wise is not an exception.

It can be claimed that beyond the terminological confusion, the ambiguity on pleasure and pain is essentially resolved in Seneca, in contrast to the other Stoics of both early and tradition. In the 121. letter, Seneca says that when the humans have developed an understanding of their love of self, they have already come to the stage to be aware of what is pleasant and painful. Although the living organism is not driven to act out of pain at the beginning, there is an implication of a growing sense of the presentiment of pain, as observed by their shrinking out of fear which is an inevitable outcome of the presentiment of threat.⁷⁸ At this stage, neither pleasure nor pain is accompanied by the animal's first appropriate act, because the animal does not have any clear understanding of it, though it instinctively feels the fear of death. It feels that something makes him act, though it cannot know what is. The instinctive feeling of pain is implied in both the animal and human infant's physical behaviors of shrinking from the destructive (121.19). In short, Seneca implies that right at the beginning, pleasure and pain are potentially present, complete awareness of them and their emergence belong

or bad, and so "does not add to or detract from the agents' happiness." *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, [California, University of California Press, 1992], p.112)

⁷⁸ See Chapter 2, section 1.

to a higher stage in which human beings develop an understanding, and awareness of their selves. The fact that once human beings begin to discover the logic of their selections, they also begin to perceive things pleasurable and painful; this is particularly implied in their attachment of value to the things.⁷⁹

Accordingly, Seneca speaks of the logical relation between pleasure and pain, both in love of one's constitution, as well as in a higher form of self-perception.

Again there are two sorts of pleasure; disease checks the pleasures of the body, but does not do away with them. If the truth is to be considered, it serves to excite them; for the thirstier a man is, the more he enjoys a drink. The hungrier he is, the more pleasure he takes in food. Whatever fails to one's lot after a period of abstinence, is welcomed with greater zest. The other kind, however, the pleasures of the mind, which are higher and less uncertain, no physician refuse to the sick man. Whoever seeks these and knows well what they are, scorns all the blandishments of the senses^{lxxvii} (88. 22-23).

There is allowed a natural pleasure principle, accompanied by the provision of the needs of the body. Although in the state of illness pleasure (*voluptas*) is checked, it is never eradicated. For Seneca, the states of privation or physical abstinence such as hunger and thirst stir the adult to shun what is perceived as painful, enjoying the needs more zealous exciting pleasures. Here, Seneca draws a logical relationship between pleasure and pain in self-love; the state of illness and the experience of a loss, yields the self imbibes in satisfaction more zealously; he/she shuns pain by invoking a more zealous accompanied pleasure; it is the moment that the self is accomplished to keep itself in its natural status.⁸⁰

As for the pleasures and the pains of higher forms of experience, it has been argued that by virtue of its nature, each rational self derives pleasure which cannot be independent from the content of what he counts as good; these range from having good opinion of others, of having dutiful children, victory, one's

⁷⁹ Ted Brennan suggests that the state of feeling pleasure is largely a matter of cognition. "No work is left for pleasure in its non-cognitive feeling sense. ("Stoic Moral Psychology", *Cambridge Companion to Stoics*[Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003], p 278] My reading suggests similar points with of Brennan's in the sense that pleasure is a by product of their gaining recognition of the principle of love of self.

⁸⁰ See chapter 2 about the nature of love of self in the most primitive sense.

welfare of country; such pleasures are according to his nature, i.e. praise and self-worth.⁸¹ Again, in the same way, he avoids what he counts as painful particularly in illness, and in exile. These are two important kinds of evil, which the self forms itself an image of pain, enduring bravely the state of exile as much as he endures illness and severe pain. It is argued that not only victory, and the dutiful behavior of one's children are engendered by the satisfaction of natural impulse regarding the nature of self as self-worth. Both at the time of adversity, Seneca draws the same logical relationship between pleasure and pain. As observed in the case of filial affection, the endurance of pain is followed by a pleasure (*gauda*) that is related again to the successful shunning of what the self counts as evil, as much as satisfying a natural need of loving in the form of being loved, as Antigonus and Priam's case study has indicated⁸²; two important points follow from these case studies. The first is concerned with the endurance of a loss, a probable future trouble. What drives the self to protect, is his/her love of son, to whom he projects his own love of self. The same implication in the logical relationship between love and protection is present in the pair of pleasure and pain.

Once the love of self gets perverted from its nature, not only the desires and aversions regarding the choice of externals get perverted, but also the logical relationship between pleasure and pain. And thus, Seneca contrast 'gaudium' with 'voluptas'. "Joy is an elation of soul, - of a soul which trusts its goodness and truth of its own possession"^{lxviii} (59.2). As for the perverted form of pleasure, he says, " although an ignorant man may derive joy if the cause be an honorable one, yet since his emotion is wayward , and is likely to soon take another direction, I call it pleasure 'voluptatem.' "It is a state of happiness, inspired by an opinion concerning a false good. It exceeds control and is carried to excess"^{lxix} (59.4). The nature of the passion-pleasure has its source in the wrong opinion of good, and marks its difference from 'gaudium' not only by its excessive character, but also by its inconsistency and its potential in being carried to a wrong direction."^{lxx}(59.4) This means that not only the objects of desire and avoidance desire, but also the logical relation between pleasure and pain gets distorted; as an

⁸¹ See page 20-23 of this thesis

⁸² See Chapter 3, Section 1

outcome of erroneous reasoning, just like the perverted selves perceive in their distress what they are actually desirous of, so is grief and pleasure. In the anticipation of future trouble, they project their own desires of images of pleasant. In the same way, they are driven to anticipate a future prosperity, with a false conception of grief, which they hope to shun, followed by an imaginary feeling of accompanied pleasure. From this point of view, each passion is a perverted judgment, pointing to a privation or a kind of abstinence which the self is driven to shun by having pleasure as its main goal. As Seneca puts it;

Who does not admit that all emotions flow as it were from a certain natural principle? We are endowed by nature with love to our constitution but this love, when overindulged, becomes a vice. Nature has intermingled pleasure with necessary things— not in order that we should seek pleasure, but in order that the addition to pleasure makes the indispensable means of existence attractive to our eyes^{lxxi}(6).

In making a distinction between the passion (adfectus)-pleasure, (voluptas) and the genuine pleasure, 'gauda', Seneca's main point is that although, natural pleasure is the outcome of one's awareness of existence, it is not set as a goal in the psychic mechanism of self-love. By contrast, the passion-pleasure marks its difference from the natural one in the sense that it is the accompanied pleasure of the overindulged self, becoming an object in all pursuits.

Seneca observes perverted relations of pleasure and pain in the passion of grief as the result of a distress concerning a loss. In his *Consolation to Marcia*, Seneca defines the experienced loss in grief as the longing we have for one that we have lost, that is associated with the opinion of what the dead actually serves for; for Seneca, once the self gets perverted the passion of grief over a loss person means for the loss of the sources i.e. public prestige, financial protection, one is accustomed to have and love excessively. As he puts it, "I shall have no one to protect me, no one to keep me from being despised"^{lxxii} (*Consolation to Marcia*, 9.1, 9.2). For the latter, Seneca recommends the mourning mother, to replace the loss with another source of love object, and to construct the sources of self-worth and the protection of the means. "Turn your eyes upon my brothers.... Different as their merits are, you have reason to rejoice both.... find comfort in the prestige

of one son, in the retirement of the other-in the devotion of both”^{lxxiii}(18.2). It is the prestige of one son that Helvia would have derived a sense of joy and security.

Elsewhere Seneca observes in grief (*dolorem*) a crafty ambition for praise, a device the self manipulates to enhance his/her self-worth in contrary ways. Grief, in this case is nothing else than a persistent, excessive desire for the prolongation of praise. As a false judgment regarding the loss of a beloved, passion of grief, also contains complex structure, intermingling both pleasure and pain.

Do you wish to know the reason for lamentation and excessive weeping? It is because we seek the proofs of our in our tears, and do not give way to sorrow but merely parade it. No man goes into mourning for its own sake. Shame on our ill-timed folly! There is an element of ambition even in our grief^{lxxiv} (63.2).

For Seneca, the mourners seek the proofs of their sorrow in their own eyes, continue to love themselves by constantly crying over the profits they lose which they associate with the dead. Elsewhere, he speaks of the showy nature of an excessive grief. As he puts it, “Nothing is more foolish than to court a reputation for sadness and to sanction tears”^{lxxv}(99.18). With grief, it is also possible that one seeks admiration from the others, or to be more exact, the desire to become a love object, in reverse way. Seneca further discusses self-flattery in grief from his observation of the mourners at the funerals in the contemporary Roman society. To get the attention of the others, the excessive mourners cry louder, burst into series of paroxysm. When they are at the presence of others, they pray for their own death and hurl themselves from one place to another. Their grief is subdued when there is no audience to watch for (96.64).

Seneca emphasizes the same complex architecture of pleasure and pain in anticipating a future trouble.

It is tragic for the soul to be apprehensive for the future and wretched in anticipation of wretchedness, consumed with an anxious desire that the objects which give pleasure may remain to the very end. For such a soul will never be at rest; in waiting for the future it will lose the present blessing which it might enjoy.

And there is no difference between grief for something lost and the fear of losing it^{lxxvi} (98.6).

Seneca claims that such people's forming a false conception of grief in anticipating a future trouble, is not free from their forming pleasurable images in possessing the love object. In anticipating probable fear, it also fashions itself probable grief out of the fear of not losing the enjoyments of the object. At the moment of a mental frustration, just like the self projects its desires, in his anticipation of probable evil, the self projects his pleasures in his anticipation of grief.

And thus, in discussing the passion of anger as a desire to pay injury for those whom he perceives an evil, i.e. probable grief, there is an element of pleasure that finds satisfaction in cruelty which can be explained in the contrary movement of pleasure and pain. A similar architecture in pleasure and pain can be examined in the other passions. As Seneca concedes;

Everything depends on opinion; ambition, luxury, greed hark back at opinion. It is according to the opinion that we suffer. A man is as wretched as he has convinced himself that he is.^{lxxvii} (78.13)

For Seneca, passions of ambition, luxury and greed are both irrational judgments of false good about the desirability of the objects that make the self fashion false shapes of grief, and distress, regarding self-worth. These passions in turn, produce desires intermingled with passion-pleasure. Grief is an excessive longing for the loss of a beloved which is mistakenly judged as a distress, that is brought about by an actual experience of a loss whereas the passions of ambition and greed, and avarice are defined as excessive desires of titles, money and food that are engendered by the fear of loss of the object that the self projects not only their desires of self-worth, but also as accompanied pleasures.

Men seek pleasure from every source. No vice remains within its limits; luxury is precipitated into greed. We are overwhelmed with forgetfulness of that which is honorable. Nothing that has an attractive value, is base. Man as an object of reverence, in the eyes

of man, is now slaughtered for jest and sport; and those whom it used to be unholy to train for the purpose of inflicting and enduring wounds, are thrust forth exposed and defenseless; it is a satisfying spectacle to see a man made corpse^{lxxviii} (95.33).

As in the passion of anger, the same complex relationship in ‘dolorem’ and ‘voluptas’ can be observed also in greed and avarice. And thus, Seneca says that although man is desirous to be an object of reverence in the eyes of the other, he does the contrary, paradoxically taking pleasure in cruelty and brutality, finding satisfaction in the other’s destruction.

4.4 Passions: Perverted form of Self-Preservation

On the basis of the same account of irrationality, the Stoic scholars build up their notion of mental conflict between the rival judgments of the right and the wrong one. In a monistic account of the soul, the Stoics, as Pierce puts it, explore the composition of a divided mind that is what it is like to be a subject to mental division in a way that would not imply a mind has parts⁸³ in the form of a mental vacillation that judges one impression to another in different and yet not distant, periods of time. In his reading of Chrysippus’ account of mental conflict as reported by Galen, Pierce, like Gill and Sorabji,⁸⁴ draws the composition of the divided mind, in terms of vacillation of the soul between conflicting judgments catches the structure of the monistic model; he further makes it possible to interpret the actual paradoxes that are central to writings of Stoics in general to which Seneca is not an exception. As I have argued earlier, Seneca’s writing contains some paradoxical responses, such as that the shifting of desires and goals and intentionally false presentation of admiration which are at odds with the monist account of the soul. Their account of the mental vacillation is based on the testimony of Plutarch; such weakness and mental vacillation are shown not in the defeat of reason by the irrational part of the soul, but in the lack of harmony of the

⁸³ See *Mental Conflict* [Oxford, Routledge, 1995], p 157-8)

⁸⁴ See my comment in the previous section in their interpretation of irrationality . Sorabji and Pierce explain the nature of mental conflict with reference to Chrysippus account, within the same model of mental vacillation. More diverse account of mental conflict are proposed by Brad Inwood . He invokes the picture of a mental division by use of military metaphors. (“Seneca and Psychological Dualism, *Passions and Perceptions*, ed. by Jacques Brunswick & Martha. C.Nussbaum, [Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1993] p. 106)

soul that wholly turns around and changes. It is like the turning of the same reason in different direction so fast that it escapes our notice (*Moral Virtue* 447A).

In stead of arguing for a mental conflict in terms of right and wrong reason, I shall attempt to explain such paradoxes on the basis of the structure and the nature of self I have argued throughout the thesis; rather than paradoxes, they are to be described as different forms of self-preservation in the form of a flight, beyond the recognition of self.

When in a perverted state, a dissatisfied, or a deprived self would bring about complex forms of self-preservation in the state of ignorance, which is central to erroneous reasoning. Being completely dissatisfied with itself, Seneca says that it is possible for the self to reconstruct the unattained, fulfilled desire for praise in a multiplicity of new sources⁸⁵ fashioning new desires in a state of dissatisfaction. For in the total state of ignorance, each desire for prosperity would look anew (fresh)⁸⁶, as if they were different from the old ones⁸⁷. This is due to the basic characteristic of self-love to restore its natural status, which in a perverted state, takes a contrary form precisely in the opposite way the self originally intends. In contrast to what Gill, Pierce and Sorabji argue, such a state is not a vacillation of mind between rival judgments, though allows timing; while structurally remains consistent, it describes the conflict in terms of the intention and action.

The same dissatisfaction with oneself, as Seneca argues, might cause the self to waver among the multiplicities of different pursuits, reconstructing the old feeling of dissatisfaction in fresh forms; since it is possible that once the self surrenders himself to one passion he/she is likely to be carried to the others. Here, the pattern of reasoning is structured on the fear of a loss or a probable injury that stimulates a hope to attain what the self intends to accomplish. Seneca gives one specific example of Homer's heroes to give the precise description of such types.

⁸⁵ See Chapter 3, section 2; the self has this skill to shape various self-images. The constant shift of roles/identities are new attempts the self restores its natural need; the formerly unattained desires for praise reconstruct itself in new forms, pointing again how the pair of distress and craving, or craving-fear emerge in the same form.

⁸⁶ Epictetus also considers this possibility as a type of perversion, rejecting *akrasia* as Socrates does in the case of total ignorance.

⁸⁷ as if they are fresh opinion of goods.

Homer's Achilles is like that-lying now on his face, now on his back, placing himself in various attitudes, and just as sick men do, enduring nothing very long and using changes as remedies. Hence men undertake wide ranging travel, and wander over remote shores, and their fickleness, and always discontented with the present, gives proof of itself now on land and now on sea^{lxxix} (*Tranquility of Mind*, 2, 12-13).

For Seneca, then, Homer's Achilles exemplifies the typical restless wavering of the soul among the multiplicities of goals and pursuits both on land and sea. His dissatisfaction with himself and the profits he sees at present are examined in his changing desires that sets him to various travels and adventures on the sea. Besides the restructuring of the unfulfilled unattained goals or dissatisfaction in new forms, Seneca draws more complex examples of self-guarding, presented in chapter 3, section 3, such as pretension of virtue and lying owing its origin on the complex relations between 'cupiditas' and 'metu' as well as 'dolorem' and 'voluptas.' On the basis of the report, passed Demetrius to Seneca, we are informed that there are selves, giving false forms of admiration to the other; it is a craft, a profitable flight from enduring hardships, with the intention of making money and riches by avoiding rivalry. In a total state of ignorance, Seneca says that complete description of the case is given as another typical restlessness uncertainty of the soul wavering between conflicting, rival judgments regarding the possibility of exit. Out of fear of being harmed and prevented by those who possess power to do so, the self gives false admiration of the other in order to avoid rivalry and strife, beyond his knowledge. For the proper description of such types, Seneca says the following; "For this reason, men do not know what they wish, except at the actual moment of wishing; no man ever decided once and for all to desire or to refuse, judgment varies from day to day and changes the opposite, making many a man passing his day in a kind of game"^{lxxx} (20.6). Under such conditions, when the self discovers a profit in it, he/she turns it into a vicious habit.

What follows from the discussion of the nature of erroneous reasoning is that with the term renouncing one's nature, Seneca does not only characterize the conflict in terms of the rejection of appropriateness, but rather with of what the self primarily intends and its overt response. At least in one type of self-love, the

self cannot even catch a glimmering sign of what ought to be done, but rather what he/she wants to do. Although the self makes deliberate assents, he is not aware of the latter.

4.5 Self-Love and Self-identification of the Deceived

Having overviewed the account of perversion, in this section, I shall discuss how the perverted self-regarding attitude puts the mutual attraction among selves in tension in the total state of ignorance or deception.

Seneca implies that when the selves fail to comprehend the truth value of externals, they mistakenly begin to project their admirable image on them, developing high opinion of themselves; they begin to love themselves by seeking admiration and self-recognition by those means. Seneca warns Lucilius not to construct his self-worth on such externals. “If you want to set a value on yourself, put away your money, your estates, your honors, and look into yourself”^{lxxxix} (80.10). Just like they love and know themselves by those means, the flatterers also make use of the same norms in measuring the others precisely in the same way.

None of those who have been raised to the loftier heights, by riches and honors are really great. Why then, does he seem great to you? It is because you are measuring the pedestal along with the man... This is the error under which we labor, this is the reason why we are imposed upon. We value no man at what he is but add to the man himself the trappings with which he is clothed^{lxxxii} (76.32).

Seneca says that the flatterers make costly errors in measuring the others by such externals. It is wrong to admire, to praise them in accordance to their possession of ephemeral, unstable sources. In the same way it is wrong to seek praise and self-recognition from them by means of those externals. His main concern is that since man by nature is born to love and be loved by another by seeking praise and self-recognition from one another, the principle of mutual attraction would get distorted once the means of self love are structured on deceptive sources; as man, by nature, bound up to the others with existential terms, they would affect one another by instigating false distress, fears and admirations, beyond their knowledge. The mutual expectation of love, i.e. praise

and recognition, would turn into paranoid relations that embody violent forms of loving.

We are injured both by good wishes and by curses. The angry prayers of our enemies instill false fears in us; and the affection of our friend spoils us through their kindly wishes. For, this affection sets us a-groping after goods that are far away, unsure and wavering when we really might open the store of happiness at home. We are not allowed, I maintain, to travel a straight road. Our parents and our slaves draws us into wrong. Nobody confines his mistakes to himself; people sprinkle folly among their neighbors, and receive it from them in turn. For this reason, in an individual, you find the vices of nations because the nation has given to them the individual. Each man, in corrupting others, corrupts himself; he imbibes and then, imparts, badness^{lxxxiii} (94.53-54).

Starting with the love of the closest, Seneca draws a picture of a society of paranoid lovers who mistakenly judge their self-worth as well as the others on such externals, strive to gain the love of one another in a complete state of madness. In the quotation above, Seneca implies that every self gets out of the right track in his desire to fulfill the good wishes of families and friends, as much as to avoiding the angry prayers of the enemies; in order to gain their love and admiration, the offspring begin to grope after goods, and develop high opinion of themselves when they accomplish their goals and sometimes sink into grief or other destructive passions when their goals remain unattained. In the same way, a person gets perverted as he is driven to please a friend to gain his recognition and admiration by fulfilling the demands of, his wishes. Not only the parents and the slaves but also the friends, the fellows sprinkle folly among the selves.

In the quotation above, Seneca says that a self gets perverted from the right course not only by fulfilling the demands of the goods of the family and the friends prescribe for them, but also from false distress and fears. Since it is by nature that each man shuns what they count as evil, he eventually begins to take safety from those, whom they perceive a potential danger. In short, it is out of these complex conflicting drive to love and fear that destroy the principle of mutual attraction among them. As he puts it;

It is sometimes the people that we ought to fear; or sometimes a body of influential Oligarchs in the Senate, if the method of governing the state is such that most of the business is done by that body. And sometimes individuals equipped with power by the people against people. It is burdensome to keep friendship of all such persons. It is enough not to make enemies of them^{lxxxiv} (14.7).

Having measured their self-worth on wrong conceptions of externals, they begin to project their fears on those who possess greater amount of those goods, or power. The perverted selves happen to perceive injury or injustice or loss at present. In some other cases, they are alarmed by the fear of a probable injury, and loss from the others whom they are accustomed to value by the associates of these externals. Having assumed the potential of each self to affect one another, Seneca says that love as the source of mutual attraction among the selves turns into diseased, mediocre, relations that sometimes ends up with crime, by fearing one another. Instead of love, friendship is built on false fears initiates the self to do shameful things out of the fear the enemies. Again, under different circumstances, Seneca's analysis of anger points to the same conflicting relation of fear and craving as the basis of forms of seeking praise and recognition from the others. On the other hand, however, anger is an acceptable behavior of the noble people, a common *virtus* in the contemporary society; and that the angry person gives assent to save his image of a despised man.

Their fears and distress paradoxically show how much they desire praise⁸⁸ as much as protection. Regarding the love objects, their distress emerges as a mental frustration of low esteem and self-worth, due to his unfulfilled, blocked love instinct.⁸⁹ Although they are driven naively to gain self-recognition from the other by craving those things, they do so by offending one another. As Seneca concedes;

Next we must follow the old adage and avoid three things with special care. Hatred, jealousy and scorn. And wisdom alone can show you how this may be one...we must be cautious of letting the fear of jealousy, lead us into becoming objects of scorn, lest, when

⁸⁸ See my comments in the preceding section that in fear and distress the selves not only recognize the fact that they calculate a probable grief, but also their craving.

⁸⁹ In her Freudian reading, Amelia Roxenberg Rorty discusses passions as blocked impulse. My account of passion as engendered by low esteem partly accepts Rorty's with proviso.

we choose not to stamp others down, we let them think that they can stamp us down. The power to inspire fear has caused many men to be in fear... for it is as harmful to be scorned as to be admired^{lxxxv} (14.10-11).

Assuming that each person commonly shares the same natural orientation, Seneca argues that once they project their image on the externals, it is inevitable that they get distress, feel fear and scorn one another as they venture self-worth and self-recognition. They arouse hatred, jealousy and contempt of the others and posit themselves as potential sources of threat instead of objects of admiration; it is equally harmful to be scorned as much as admired. Many of his letters are devoted to the discussion of the flatterers who surrender themselves into passions of glory, ambition and anger as well as to the contrary ones, envy and jealousy of those who possess the greater amount of the objects of admiration ranging from the influential political titles, money and gold, as well as the other objects of luxury and are driven to enhance his injured dignity and low esteem by desiring more. They eventually become objects of scorn and hate, instead of love.

For Seneca, then, the actual conditions of morals in his contemporary society of Rome is originated by the conflicting relation which he traces in the perversion of psychic mechanism of self-love. Seneca also speaks of those, who mistakenly love and attempt to gain the love of others in the vicious patterns to which suicide is not held an exception. He speaks of those, who do not love their wives and families and friends and persist in death; the pleasures of those people are not real but voluptuaries (104.3).

Passions are also concrete states of loving through which the flatterers react and resolve the apparent perception of injustice as profits by imposing their own as well as displaying an endurance to the threats they have perceived as evil. Seneca says that the unnatural state of their loving marks a difference from the good man whose self-regarding love fashions the correct impression the profit and self-worth. The nature of the mutual attraction among the lovers also presupposes the correct apprehension of justice, kindness, bravery, (*fortutido*).

But the happy man, whose virtue is complete loves himself most of all when his bravery has been submitted to the severe test, when he

not only endures but welcomes that which all other man regard with fear. If it is the price which he must pay for the performance of duty which honor imposes and he greatly prefers to have men say of him, “ How much more noble!, rather than how much more lucky!”^{lxxxvi} (71.28-29)

As Seneca says, the state of virtue is the proper sort of self-love as well as self-preservation also happiness. His bravery originates from his knowledge of the real value of externals which one should reject in seeking love and admiration, as well as in loving the others. This is followed by a correct state of endurance for the loss as well as the in the attempt of shunning what they count as evil, without fear. Seneca observes the correct knowledge of the externals in his state of self-regarding love which is also reflected in his love of others.

For this reason, the noble soul, knowing its better nature, while taking care to conduct himself honorably, and seriously, at the post of duty, where it is place, counts none of these externals objects of his own, but uses them as if they were loan, like a foreign visitor hastening on his way^{lxxxvii} (120.18).

What makes the virtuous different from the ignorant is his knowledge on the ephemeral nature of externals; he does not assess his self-worth, nor does he do that of the others. He bravely endures the loss of a person whom he loves dearly, since he knows that including his own everything is come to pass. It is from his own self-interest that he respects the others, showing them kindness and be just in praising them properly, regarding the correct choice of means for praise. As Seneca says, “Justice is to praise the deserving, therefore the good belongs to both sides”^{lxxxviii} (102.10) Justice and honor depend on the knowledge of loving oneself correctly, so that it does not come as hatred and rivalry. In addition, the virtue of justice and honor, Seneca includes the ability of instigating love and check hatred. “Furthermore, when we advise a man to regard his friends, to stimulate love in the friend, and to check hatred in the enemy, we add; this is just and honorable”. (95.61) On the other hand, bravery denotes the loftiest form of enduring evil which is free from fear or flight as the selves engage in loving and protecting themselves. As a proper state of love, justice refers to the knowledge of the self to

praise the deserving that necessitates also a proper form of enduring evil. Cicero also defines the bravery of true lovers of self as self-reliance.

The brave man is self-reliant; for “confident” is by a mistaken usage of speech used in bad sense, though the word is derived from *confidere*, “to have trust” which implies praise. The self-reliant man, however, assuredly not excessively fearful; for there is a difference between the confidence and timidity. And yet, the man who is accessible to distress is also accessible to fear. For where things causes us a distress by their presence, we are also afraid of the menace of their approach. So it comes that distress is incompatible with bravery (*Tusculan Disputations*, 3, 6.14).

For Cicero, too, the real bravery(*fortitude*) hinges on the confidence in the knowledge of truth which is incompatible with distress and fear. Although it is natural to be fearful, Cicero says that the brave does not excessively fear regarding the calculation of the future trouble. The brave man is also distress-proof that implies ‘*lauda*’. What makes ‘*lauda*’ a virtuous state of self-loving is that it preserves and safeguards the profits and the expectations of the both parties, for primarily for its own interest.

CHAPTER FIVE

SELF-LOVE IN PROGRESSING SELVES

On the basis of the norms of self-knowing, two more types of perverted self-love will be discussed. Those who do not know the knowledge of the condition of their souls constitute the first type of self love, which I have examined in the preceding section. In addition to the knowledge of the condition of the soul, two more requirements are listed; the first is the willing to improve and to progress, the second is the application of the knowledge in action. Seneca introduces two more types of deceived-self-love who fail to fulfill the last requirements of self-knowing.

5.1 Norms of Self-knowing

In the final section of the preceding chapter, I have examined how the principle of mutual attraction gets distorted; each self offends one another by instilling false fears and false admirations, as they mutually seek love and admiration in complete state of ignorance. As concrete cases of perverted forms of loving, passions are originated by deceptive beliefs on externals. This is coupled with judgments by erroneous reasoning. For Seneca, the lack of self-knowledge causes many ills ranging from public offence and crime, familial violence, and self-inflicted death. All Stoics and Seneca in particular are interested in self-knowing, calling it as the Highest Good which every rational self should seek. “We had better return to the First Good, and consider what its nature is; the soul that gazes upon the truth, that is skilled in what should be sought and what should be avoided, establishing the standards of value not according to the opinion, but according to nature”^{xxxix}(61.11). By contrasting belief with nature, the deceptive nature of the former is exposed. Despite their deceptive nature, they are cognitive, caused by the assent of soul.⁹⁰ Seneca claims that passions arouse as a result of

⁹⁰ See (“On Anger” in *Moral Essays*, vol. 1 tran. by John. W.Barsore [London, Loeb series, 1998], 2. 1.4, 1.8.3) Seneca argues that passion and reason are only the transformation of soul towards each direction.

the approval, followed shortly after the perception of an injury or an injustice. Hence, the Stoics are hostile to passions, not only for the serious ethical consequences, but for their first inceptions. As Cicero puts it, “As it is a moral offence (*peccatum*) to betray one’s country, to use violence to one’s parents, to rob a temple, where the offense lies in the result of the act, so the passions of fear, grief and lust are offences, even no extraneous results ensues. The latter are offences not in their subsequent consequences, but immediately by their inception” (*De Finibus*, 3.32).

For Seneca too, by gaining a complete view of the knowledge of the self, individuals are able to protect themselves from harm, and avoid giving offence to others as they engage in loving; in understanding their own selves, they also understand the other selves, that would further help to maintain a healthy, just society. In their grasp of what their rational self-love is like, they would know how to love as their natural constitution demands. “Try to perfect yourself if no other reason, in order that you may learn how to love”^{xc} (35.1). I argue that beyond the ethical consequences, Seneca takes one step further than the other Stoics with his insistence on attaining knowledge of the self. As he puts it; “in order to understand what our duty is in our dealings with the others, try not to harm in order that not to be harmed. You should rejoice with all their joys and sympathize with them in their troubles, remembering what you should offer, and what to withhold. Our expectation from such a life is not necessarily freedom from harm at their hands, but at least freedom from deceit.”^{xcii}(103.4)

For Seneca, the majority of the selves do not know that their souls are diseased, and deceived. Unless the selves gain the knowledge of the conditions of their souls, they do not desire correction. “Knowledge of the wrong is the beginning of salvation. For he who does not know that he has offended does not desire correction.”^{xcii} ⁹¹(28.11) Such a knowledge, however, does not come upon everyone by chance, but only through philosophical study (120.1). As he concedes, “For nobody except be trained right from the start”⁹², and equipped with

⁹¹ See also Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.18.119; he claims that we should not punish the adulterer for his error, since he is not aware that he acts contrary to his nature.

⁹² See also Epictetus *Discourses* 1.8.161. He argues that knowledge of self is attainable through instruction.

complete reason can develop perfect proportions and understanding, when he should do certain things, and to what extent and in whose company and how and why”^{xciii}(95.4-6). Furthermore, theoretical knowledge is to be supplemented by practical education. “For it is not sufficient merely to commit these things in memory, like other matters, they must be practically tested”^{xciv}(75.8). After gaining the knowledge of their condition, they should desire correction. For, “the greater part of progress is to will to progress”^{xcv}(71.36).

On the other hand, however, Seneca says that there is no guarantee for the knowledge of self, even though these requirements are fulfilled.

Just as Nature in general does not produce her Good until she is brought to perfection, even so man’s Good does not exist in man until both reason and man are perfected. And what is this Good? I shall tell you; it is a free mind and upright mind, subjecting other things to itself and itself to nothing. So far is infancy from admitting this Good that boyhood has no hope of it, and even young manhood cherishes the hope without justification; even our old age is very fortunate if it has reached this Good after long and concentrated study. If this, then, is the Good, the good is a matter of understanding^{xcvi} (124.11-12).

Although possessing ‘ratio’ is prerequisite for familiarizing what is natural in man, i.e. self-knowledge, such a state cannot be realized unless the reasoning is perfected; due to the age, the young infant and early boyhood are exempted from it. Early adulthood is caught under the deception that one has it. The old age also runs the risk of attaining this chief good, even after a long concentrated study. In short, such a Good is not a matter of age but a matter of understanding. Seneca sounds very skeptical even in the case of the educated selves; understanding – ‘intellegibile’ – might be a practical impossibility despite instruction. On the basis of these preliminary remarks on the norms of self-knowing, Seneca introduces further types of perverted self-love. Despite education and training, the selves are likely to get perverted;

“Is there a sheer descent immediately below wisdom?” I think not. For, though he who makes progress is still numbered with the fools, yet he is separated from them by a long interval. Among the very persons who are making progress there are also great spaces intervening....First comes those who have not yet attained wisdom,

but have already gained a place nearby...These if you asked me, are men who have laid aside all passions and vices, who have acquired what things are to be embraced but their assurance is not yet tested. They have not yet put their good into practice. They have not yet put their good into practice, yet from now on they can not slip back into the faults they have escaped. They have already arrived at a point from where there is no slipping back, but they are not yet aware of the fact; as I remember writing in another letter “they are ignorant of their knowledge”^{xcvii} (75.8-10).

Those who have not achieved the state of virtue are still counted as fools as they fail any of the norms I have discussed above. Three types of selves are introduced in addition to the two that are accepted by Chrysippus and Epictetus; they accept the total ignorance as the first, and that according to Seneca they also speak of another state of ignorance in the context of the progressing selves, who are subject temporarily to passions.⁹³ As I have argued in the preceding chapter, Seneca, too, accepts a class of selves who are not aware of the condition of their souls. Their judgments are subject to constant perversion. The state of the soul of this type is diseased, (*morbus animi*), whereas the second and the third are called vices. Therefore those who right after follow the wise have left many of the vices, they can still feel the emotions. In the following parts of his discussion, he defines passions, as “objectionable impulses” that come suddenly, but are likely to turn into vice they are not noticed and kept under control. Besides the total ignorance, Seneca’s description the first class is composed of those who naturally acquired the knowledge of what is to be chosen and avoided, due to their natural gift⁹⁴. However, their goodness is not yet to be tested, because they are not put into practice. Their happiness is due to their natural gift, and they are ignorant that they possess this knowledge.

The second class is composed of those who have laid aside both the greatest ills of the soul and its passions, but yet are not in assured possession of strength. For, they can slip back to their former state. The third class are beyond the reach of many of the vices and

⁹³ Both Epictetus and Chrysippus claims that there is one type of self that is not aware of the condition of their souls. Their view on the second class is introduced above as the first in Seneca. See my remarks in footnote 95.

⁹⁴ Seneca speaks of the differences in character in terms of geographical differences. See, *On Anger* (2. 19.1-2)

particularly of the great vices but not beyond the reach of all. They have escaped avarice, but still feel anger. They are no longer troubled by lust, but still have fear. And just because they fear, although they are strong enough to withstand certain things to which they yield; they scorn death, but are in terror of pain. Let us reflect for a moment on this topic, it will be well with us if we are admitted to this class. The second stage is gained by great fortune with regard to our natural gifts, and by great and unceasing application of study^{xcviii} (75.14-15).

In his description of the progressing type II, Seneca classifies the progressing selves, who through constant study and instruction, have left behind the (*morbus animi*) disease of the soul, however, they are likely to fall back to their former state, because they have not yet possessed the strength of the will (*securitatis suae certa*). The third type recounts another typical case of the weakness of the will with an emphasis on the passion of fear; although they are not subject to many of the vices such as lust and avarice, the third type of progressing self is still prone to the passion of anger, and fear. They shun death, still suffering from the fear of pain. In his brief description of the types above, Seneca implies that beyond their ideal knowledge, and constant instruction, it is not possible to attain the state of happiness and knowledge as exemplified in the figure of the wise.

To sum up, Seneca accepts four types of selves that fall short of the perfect state of the wise. The first one is the total state of ignorance. Their judgments are constantly perverted, and turned into ineradicable states through habits. The second type of self, which is ranked right after the wise, constitutes a class of those, who are naturally gifted, though they do not possess the knowledge of it. The third and the fourth types of selves form the class of educated selves, whose judgments have no longer been constantly perverted. However, due to their weakness of the will, they are likely to turn back to their former state. The third has the same weakness of the will, especially with the temporary subjection to the passion of fear. In his preliminary remarks on the weakness of the will in relation to the passion of fear, Seneca implies a paradoxical state of those progressing selves; they avoid death, motivated by the fear of pain, despite a certain amount of knowledge they possess through instruction. A more detailed discussion of the types is given in the following sections.

5.2 The Progressing Self type two and three; A detailed Description

In the preceding section, we have seen that for Seneca, love of self in progressing self of the second type lacks strength; a more detailed discussion of this type is stated in the philosophical correspondence between Seneca and Serenus⁹⁵ and Seneca; the weakness of the will in this type is described as an oscillation/fluctuation of the soul between two conflicting resolutions. “The nature of this weakness of soul that halts between two things, inclines strongly neither to the right nor to the wrong, I can not show you well at once as a part at a time”^{xcix}(*Tranquility of Soul* ,1.4). Serenus says that although he normally possesses the virtue of frugality, he cannot help the temptations of ambition, the fame of eloquence and luxury at periodic intervals (1.4).

Coming from a long abandonment to thrift, luxury has poured around me the wealth of its splendor, and echoed around me on every side. My sight falters a little, for I can lift up my heart towards it more easily than my eyes. And so I come back, not worse but sadder, and I do not walk among my paltry possession with head erect as before, there enters a secret sting and the doubt whether the other life is not better. None of these things change me, yet, none of them fails to disturb me^c (*Tranquility of Soul*, 1-9).

Serenus implies that such changing resolutions particularly occur as he moves to active city life and leisure. Especially after a period of abandonment at leisure, he can not stop himself to be flattered by trained, well-dressed servants, silver plates, expensive, well-decorated houses and other belongings of such types.(1.5) Although such temptations do not change him much, they are still disturbing his soul. In order to overcome such temptations of passions, he follows the precepts of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, devoting himself to the public services so that he is able to render himself as a useful, praiseworthy person (1.10).

And then, whenever something upsets my heart, which is unused to meeting shocks, whenever something happens that is either unworthy of me, and many such occur in the lives of all human beings, or does not go easily, or when things are not to be accounted of great value demand much of my time, I turn back to my leisure, and just as wearied flocks too, do, I quicken my pace

⁹⁵ A young prefect of Nero's nightwatch also a close friend of Seneca.

towards home. When my mind has been aroused by reading of great bravery, and noble examples have applied the spur, I want to rush to the forum to lend my voice to one man; to offer such assistance to another, as even it will not help, will be an effort to help; or to check the pride of someone in the forum who has unfortunately puffed up by his success....Then, again, my mind has been uplifted by the greatness of its thoughts, it becomes ambitious of words, with higher aspirations, it desires higher expressions. Language matches the dignity of the theme. Forgetful, then, of my rule and of my more restrained judgment, I am swept to loftier heights by an utterance that is no longer of my own. Not to indulge into longer details, I am in all things attended by the weakness of good intention. In fact, I fear that I am gradually losing ground, or what causes me even more worry, that I am hanging like one who is always on the verge of falling, and that perhaps, I am in a more serious condition that I myself perceive.... Who dares to tell himself to truth? Who, though he is surrendered by a horde of applauding sycophants, is not for all that his own greatest flatterer?"^{ci} (*Tranquility of Life*, 1.11)

The text is important for several respects; the first is the precise description of the motives that causes self-deception even in the case of those who possess the knowledge of the condition of their souls and the desire to progress. The second is the nature of the self-deception. And the third is how knowledge itself possibly causes a passion – deception- that weakens the soul.

The fluctuation of soul recounts conflicting drives between self-knowledge and self-denial in self love; on the one hand, upon self-examination, Serenus becomes aware of the nature of deception in the act of writing; he realizes that he loves himself excessively by constructing his image on the externals which he mistakenly judges as a proper form of loving. Although he exercises self-restraint, he is still disturbed by temptations. Such momentary experience of self-deception bears a striking contrast to his will –intention- to improve his imperfect condition by eradicating his passions. Instead, what he actually experiences is, is an assent to deception.

As for the motives of self-deception, we are informed by Serenus that as the part of his education, he temporarily moves to city-life and withdraws into leisure. However, the preference of leisure is particularly marked by his dissatisfaction or mental frustration due to his unfulfilled desires to be useful; no sooner his strivings in public life fails, he immediately seeks safety at leisure.

However, during the leisure time activities of reading, Serenus finds himself undone by the temptations of glory and ambition; his reading of great noble figures inspires him to seek self-recognition and admiration in the forum by helping people. He undergoes the same experience of self-deception in writing simple treatise; beyond his control, the simple style suddenly changes into an elaborate one; the actual evidence of his sudden surrendering to the state of passions can be examined in the sudden shift of language which fits the dignity of the theme beyond his recognition.⁹⁶ He realizes that he is still flattered by his own ego-centric image, and that his love is not independent from the externals.

In the introductory remarks on the progressing self of the third type, another example of a perverted self-love is given, engendered by a lack of strength with an emphasis on the passion of fear (*metu*), besides anger and ambition; although they shun death they do so in the terror of pain. Seneca's moral letters and essays recount only two references to the weakness in the progressing selves, in relation to the passion of fear, the first of which is taken from his further comments on the later stages of Serenus' experience or to be more exact, future endeavors of attaining the state of virtue. In his evaluation of Serenus case, Seneca explains how the knowledge of the condition of the soul i.e., gives rise to another passion in the future endeavor of virtue; the very same acknowledgement of deception and failure makes him feel fearful about the future endeavors of attaining virtuous states which he undertakes at periodic intervals of leisure and public activities.

Then regret for what they have began lays hold upon them, and the fear of beginning again, and then creeps in the agitation of a soul, which can find no issue, because they can neither rule nor obey their desires, and the hesitancy of a life which fails to find its way clear, and then the dullness of a soul that lies torpid and amid abandoned hopes. And all these tendencies are aggravated when from hatred of their laborious ill success man have taken refuge in leisure and in solitary studies which are unendurable to a mind that is intent upon public affairs, desirous of action, and naturally restless, because assuredly it has too few resources within itself; when therefore the pleasures have been withdrawn which business

⁹⁶ See also 49.13. Seneca says that language of truth is simplicity rather than the elaborate poetic language.

itself affords to those who are busily engaged, the mind cannot endure home, solitude, and the walls of a room, and sees with dislike that it has been left to itself^{cii} (*Tranquility of Mind*, 2. 7-10).

Originating mainly by fear, Seneca speaks of the other passions that the progressing selves are subject to ranging from shame and grief, as well as regret, not because they have full recognition of the wrong motives, but rather for their unattained vain endeavors. In such cases, new hopes of success are falsely shaped as new ambitions, giving rise to an endless chain of new endeavors that are more difficult, unattainable kind. Seneca also points to the same condition that is present in the progressing type 2. Here, the passion of self-hatred emerges as the complex structuring of the passion of fear and the state of boredom the self undergoes at the time of leisure.

The mental state shortly before the self takes a flight in leisure is explained by the juxtaposition of the passion of fear with the knowledge of the condition of the soul. Here, the passion of fear plays a different role than the one I have stated earlier;

Hence they are frightened and in a flutter whenever they look down the abrupt steep of their greatness. For they reflect that there are various ways of falling and that the topmost is the most slippery. Then they fear that which they strove, and the good fortune which made them weighty in the eyes of the others weights more heavily upon themselves. Then they praise easy leisure and independence. They hate the glamour and try to escape while their fortunes are still impaired. Then at last you may see them studying philosophy amid their fear, and hunting sound advice when their fortunes go awry. For these two things are, as it were, at opposite poles- good fortune and good sense^{ciii} (94.72-74).

Here, one can observe an experience of self-deception that is created primarily by the tension between knowledge and the desire to progress. Because they actually glorify influence and power on externals, seeking praise and admiration by such means, the passion of fear, reconstructed as a fear of failure, is followed by an escape to leisure. Here, Seneca gives an emphasis to the typical restlessness of a fearful soul, whose choice of leisure and philosophical study are mistakenly judged as prudence. Such types are not genuine models of virtue but the imitation

of it; their dissent to prosperity is a pretension of virtue, having its origin in the fear of a sudden probable fall; the motives of their scorn of such objects of prosperity is the fear of a probable low esteem that might be caused by their loss of fortune, seeking further sound advice when they actually experience loss.

The state of self-deception in the progressing self of the type two and three has two important factors in its origin; the first is the dissatisfaction of the soul, which arouses from the unfulfilled desires, causing further the passion of grief, as my interpretation of the act of writing entails. Passion of grief, however, is not only originated by this mental frustration, but also by the knowledge of the condition of the soul. Seneca also mentions the abandonment as another important factor for the self-deception – the passion of ambition– in active city life beyond his control and the intention to progress.⁹⁷ Under such circumstances, self-deception is inescapable even for the progressing selves.

The same motives are present in the experience of self-deception in the progressing type three. At the background of the desire to progress, the knowledge of the condition of the soul creates another state of dissatisfaction, i.e., followed by the passion of self-hatred, apart from instigating the fear as the failure of success in the future endeavors of the state of virtue. Besides, the state of dissatisfaction boredom at leisure makes the future endeavor of virtue in pursuits of city life equally deceptive.

I argue that in *Natural Questions*, Seneca makes use of another metaphor of mirror which is suggestive of the nature of the experience of self-deception which is described as a flight from facing the real condition of the self. This, he introduces in the case of Hostium Quadram, an immoral noble in Rome, who makes sex with multiple partners in front of magnifying mirrors.

He had mirrors made of the type I described (the ones that reflect images far larger) in which a finger exceeded the size and thickness of an arm (1.16.1)...“Nature did poorly in providing such a scanty accessories to human lust. She better arranged such a coition of other animals. I will discover a way to deceive my sick wants and satisfy them. To what purpose my depravity if I offend only to the limit of nature? I will surround myself with mirrors, the type which renders the size of the objects incredible. If it were possible, I

⁹⁷ See the quotation on page 107.

would make those sizes real; because it is not possible, I will feast myself on the illusion. Let my desire see more than it consumes at what it undergoes.”(1.8-9)... At first, chance revealed men to his own face. Then, when the love of self, innate in mortals, had made the sight of their form pleasing, men looked down oftener into those surfaces where they saw their own images^{civ} (1.17.6).

Literally speaking, one might observe a similar experience of self-deception in Hostius’ case; he surrounds himself by the magnifying mirrors where everything shines back as larger-than-human size, which represents the layers of reality he wants to see himself in. Just as Serenus, Hostius is the only spectator, gazing at his magnified –puffed-up– image in sensual pleasure. Likewise in the final section of the quotation, Seneca implies that a drive to illusion is a typical device of the mortal self-love makes use of when they are especially dissatisfied with themselves; because selves have a natural tendency to be praised, when this natural urge is left unsatisfied, they begin mistakenly assess their experience not in the way as it looks, but precisely in the way they want to see themselves.

Despite the apparent differences regarding the concrete situations, these motives are also present in the case of the progressing selves of type two and three whose dissatisfaction with themselves is due to the abandonment and the mental frustration. The illusionary image the type two molds in the act of reading and writing and the study of philosophy in the third is momentarily mistaken as real.⁹⁸ Such a tendency in self-love is explained with reference to the unrealized desires of Hostius; “ I will surround myself with mirrors, they type which renders the size of the objects incredible. If it were possible, I would make those sizes real. Because it is not possible, I will feast myself on illusion.” (*quae non licet, mendacio pascar*).

⁹⁸ See my interpretation of self-shaping as an example of self-knowing with reference to the term ‘fingere’ and its implication in my reading of assent in chapter 3 section 2.

5.3 The Nature of Reasoning and Irrationality in the Progressing Selves Type Two and Three.

Central to the composition of self-deception, the issue of assent or willing has proved to be problematic in the case of the progressing selves, as my discussion in the preceding section entails. Having gained the knowledge of their ignorance, the progressing selves are driven by the desire to change into the state of virtue, though entangled in passionate forms under certain conditions. This composition of the deceived self is proved to be contrary to the account of the striving selves with the ability of self-control, introspective consciousness, and spiritual strength.⁹⁹ Again, central to faculty of assent in the progressing individuals, a more radical views on the nature of the progressing selves are developed; while on the one hand the act of willing is dismembered as a psychological faculty, in another, it is even trivialized as a problem. According to Dihle, if there is any problem, it is a logical consequence of the translation of the Greek philosophical term into the mediocrity of the Latin language.¹⁰⁰ In a more recent study, the will in the progressing self is problematized from the epistemological point of view. On the basis of her parallel reading of the metaphor of mirroring in Hostius' case with of the *dialogic* self of the progressing

⁹⁹ In his discussion of the will in Seneca's letters, Brad Inwood makes the following comment; "The focus on self-control, especially in the face of natural human proclivities to precipitate and passionate response; and the singling out of a moment of casually efficacious judgment or decision in the process of reacting to provocative stimuli; these are Seneca's contributions to the development of will." ('The will in Seneca the younger' in *Classical Philology* vol. 95 11, 2000, p.6). See also Charles C.Kahn. He traces the history of the Christian and Neoplatonist' levels of spirituality on two distinctive Roman Stoics, Epictetus and Seneca, He says, "with or without direct contact, however, these two Stoics bear joint testimony to the development of introspective consciousness and its articulation in volitional terms in the last half of the 1st century a.d. ('Discovering the will' in *The question of Eclecticism* ed by A.A.Long and J.M.Dillon [Berkeley, California university of press, 1988], p 255) See also the similar comments in Charles Taylor (*Sources of Self* [Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989], p.137-140)

¹⁰⁰ See Max Polenz (*Die Stoa* vol 1 in J.M.Rist *Stoic Philosophy* [Cambridge, Cambridge University press,1969] p 240-84) and Dihle: (1982). For Max Polenz, the will "voluntas" is essentially a Roman invention, rather than a substantial psychological faculty, referring to the national characteristic of strong-will, in Seneca and in the other Roman Stoics. Albrecht Dihle's interpretation of *will* is a product of a "lack of psychological refinement in the Latin vocabulary"; it is simply as a linguistic error, caused by translation of the term from Greek to Latin. Albrecht Dihle (*Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity* in J.M.Rist *Stoic Philosophy* [Cambridge, Cambridge University press,1969] p 133). My reading of the will in Seneca is both contextual and terminological. Seneca is rather careless in his use of the verb *velle*. See that in describing the process of the passion of anger, he makes use of the verb *velle*. (*On Anger*, 2.3.4) My analysis is based on the arguments on the nature of the rational constitution, developed in chapter 3, section 2 and 3.

individuals, Barsch claims that the willful movement to illusion proves to be an unresolved problem in the philosophical self transformation. She claims, first of all that Seneca, like the other Stoics does not provide any substantial explanation for the practical impossibility in the proficiens' transforming into a state of virtue despite self-inspection, philosophical instruction and the willingness to do so. Secondly, while Seneca excludes the community values as a proper source for self-correction, he does not, on the other hand, refer to another source except the self guidance by philosophical instruction.¹⁰¹

My reading of the will in the progressing selves can be further observed in the nature of reasoning, which is central to the state of deception as one concrete example of the failure of self knowledge. As I have argued in the preceding section, both type experience self-deception which is due to the mental frustration and a dissatisfaction of the soul, just like the first type of self. The difference between the progressing selves and the first type is particularly marked by the former's knowledge of the ignorance of their own selves which plays an important role in causing the state of dissatisfaction and the mental frustration. I have argued that both emerged through the tension between the knowledge of their ignorance which helps them recognize their failure in the transformation into the state of virtue. How does, then, dissatisfaction and mental frustration in leisure and in the pursuits of city life prepare the motives of erroneous reasoning?

The desires pent up within narrow bounds, from which there is no escape, strangle one another... for it is the nature of the human soul to be active and prone to movement. Welcome to its every opportunity for excitement and distraction and still more welcome to all those worst natures which willingly wear themselves out in being employed^{cv} (*Tranquility of Soul*, 2, 10-11, 12)

Besides the state of dissatisfaction, engendered by the unfulfilled desires, Seneca also gives emphasis on the experience of grief of a special kind, the self-

¹⁰¹ Shadi Barsch : "Seneca and the Second-Order Self", 2003, p 14-15, draft form, cited by her permission. See also Catharine Edwards (Self-scrutiny and self-transformation in Seneca's Letters' in *Greece and Rome* vol. 44, n1, p 16) She argues that while Seneca makes use of an illusionary self-transformation to make the philosophical education palpable, it still remains an inconsistent reference in his writing regarding; the state of virtue which admits no simulacrum. Both Edwards and Barsch finally relate it not as a problem of willing but a usual community practice at the contemporary society of Rome that Seneca internalizes in his writing.

tormenting state of Serenus, which is originated by his acknowledgment of his own condition.¹⁰² Secondly, the self gets restless, overwhelmed by boredom and dissatisfaction under such cases, the self suspends itself from its natural state, - movement and action, making himself, therefore, alert to passions beyond his recognition. Under such conditions, the self gets expectant to another source from where the formerly unfulfilled desires mold themselves in new forms, as his state of passions in the act of reading and writing as well as the fear of making mistakes.

Elsewhere, Seneca describes this state with the simile of a dog^{cv} (72.8) his former tutor, Attalus used to refer to such instances. Under such conditions, the self is like “a dog snapping with wide-open jaws at bids of bread or meat which his master tosses to him. Whatever he catches, he straightaway swallows whole, and always opens his jaws in the hope of something more. So it is we ourselves; we stand expectant and whatever Fortune has thrown to us, we forthwith bolt without any real pleasure, and then stand alert and frantic for something else to snatch” (72.8). It is possible for the self to transform deceptively into the state of passions, instead of a virtuous one. The desire to seek freedom from deception is in fact a flight into the latter.

In the progressing self of the second and the third type, the sudden shift to the state of deception is described as a momentary state of forgetfulness of the principles of self-restraint they are determined to follow.¹⁰³ In his usual practice of self-restraint, Serenus acts contrary to his will, being swept away by the force of his own emotions. Such a state of irrationality is caused by a sudden outburst of lack of self-control that denies right reason. The composition of reasoning and its bearing on the state of irrationality in the progressing selves of the second type can be observed in the vain endeavors of transforming oneself into the state of virtue.

¹⁰² In letter 71, Seneca also speaks of the self-flattery of the progressing selves; “ we are constrained to acknowledge that there are great differences among the very followers of wisdom. One man has already made so much progress that he dares to raise his eyes and look Fortune in the face, but not persistently, for his eyes soon drop, dazzled by her overwhelming splendour; another has made so much progress that he is able to match glances with her (34-25).

¹⁰³ See the quotation on page 98 of this thesis.

Just like the first type of self I have discussed throughout chapter 4, in type two and type three, one could observe the same model of reasoning. For instance, in describing the state of self-deception in the pursuits of city life, the type two tells us that he will avoid overestimating the externals as a proper form of loving. Instead, he would devote himself to the benefit of other people in politics. His mental frustration in the city life pursuits presupposes a sudden outburst of desire for titles and honors, followed by an injury he perceives during the actual course of his performance. The irony in the case of type two can be particularly traced in the false assessment of his own situation. While the progressing self is driven by excessive desires, he mistakenly assesses the nature of mental experience as an aversion. The next stage recounts a similar experience. And thus, both the act of reading and writing is intended as a practice of self-restrain, and a state of tranquility (*Tranquility of Soul* 1.12) during which he suddenly finds his own self shaped by the illusionary model of noble and a brave figure. Here, as in the first type of self, the passion of grief plays an important role; it presupposes the desire of a particular state which is left unfulfilled and shunned by Seneca with the passion of ambition.

The reasoning and the norm of irrationality in the progressing type of three is not essentially different from the second. As I have argued in the preceding section, this type only refers to the further stages of the same experience, springing from the same state of dissatisfaction and the mental frustration of low esteem. Type three preserves the same model of reasoning and the norm of irrationality, I have formerly discussed in the first type, save that both the dissatisfaction and the mental frustration is engendered by the tension between the knowledge of the ignorance and the desire for perfection. The former causes not only the state of dissatisfaction but also mental frustrations. And thus, I have argued that the progressing self, the knowledge of the ignorance, when juxtaposed by the desire for progress, initiates fear of failure which is discussed as the prominent irrational form of anticipating future. Below, Seneca introduces the composition of the deceived soul and also the intrusion of the passion of fear in the reasoning.

Besides no deed that a man does is honorable unless he has devoted to himself thereto and attended to it with all his heart, rebelling against it with no portion of his being. When, however a man goes to face an evil, either through the fear of worse evils or in the hope of goods whose attainment is of sufficient moment to him that he could swallow one evil, which he must endure- in that case the judgment of drawn into two directions. On the one side, is the motive which bids him to carry of his purpose; on the other the motive who which restrains him and makes him flee from something which has aroused his apprehension or leads to danger. Hence, he is torn into different directions. If this happens, the glory of his act has gone^{cvi} (82.18)

The mental oscillation of the progressing self type 3 is described in terms of shifting moods between fear and lust each of which motivate and restrain one another. On the one hand, the self is overwhelmed by the passion of fear that seems to restrain him. The other inclination is the excessive desire of what the self actually wants to attain. An attempt to read this mental oscillation in the case of the progressing self of the third type suggests the following; On the one hand, the self is fear of making mistakes, a goal or the attainment of something which is lovable and at the same time initiates the fear of a probable failure. In this excerpt we see that the extreme fear is immediately shunned by lust. The same reversed order taking the opposite direction; the self cannot help desiring to attain his goals. The attainment of the good might be motivated by the fear of a probable destruction. In this model, excessive desires are said to be one particular form that the self takes a flight from his fear. Seneca also explains the mechanism of reasoning. In the excerpt below, Seneca show the same composition of the progressing self of the third type by giving different examples.

When the king of Persia, in all the insolence of his pride, spread his army over the last plains and could not grasp its number but simply its measure, and he shed copious tears because inside of a hundred years not a man of such a mighty army would be alive. But he who wept was to bring upon them their fate, was to give some of their doom on the sea, some on the land..... and why is it that even the joys are uneasy from fear? Because they do not rest on stable causes, but are perturbed as groundlessly as they are born^{cvi} (*On the Short. Of Life* 17.2-4).

One can observe the same conflicting motives in the Persian king, Xerxes, who, on the one hand, cannot stop himself; he spreads his army to the battlefield out of lust to be the greatest. On the other hand, however, his knowledge of the transient nature of things makes him grieve over for the future; he imagines that within a hundred years, his mighty army would be vanished. An attempt to read Xerxes situation in the light of the earlier remarks on the nature of reasoning shows us that what lies at the basis of grief is the love of glory and fame and that the knowledge of the ignorance also creates a further tension; while on the one hand Xerxes fears of the probable loss, he takes a flight from his fear by desiring to possess more. Likewise, Seneca sounds rather sarcastic for Xerxes' grief; the same person who cries for the future of his army, would guide them to warship both on the sea and the land.

To sum up since Seneca introduces the problem of self-deception in terms of the problem of self-knowledge, by their attempt to take a flight from what they are fearful of, the progressing selves of the second and the third type also take a flight from facing the condition of their own selves.

They undertake one journey after another and change spectacle for spectacle. As Lucretius says, Thus ever from himself doth each man flee. But what does he gain if he does not escape from himself? He ever follows himself and weigh upon himself as his own most burdensome companion. And so we ought to understand that what we struggle with is this fault, not of the places, but ourselves ^{cix}(*Tranquility of Soul* 2.15).

With reference to Lucretius, the Roman Epicurian, Seneca claims that the different tasks the self undertakes are in fact the reoccurrence of the same unfulfilled wishes. The self is like a restless traveler who carries his burden with himself wherever he goes, instead of getting rid of them. The will, in this case, becomes an empty hope, a creative instrument of self-love. Seneca says that such ventures to the state of virtue exemplify typical cases of self-denial instead of facing the real condition of the soul.

5.4 The Pleasure and Pain in the Progressing selves

The precise architecture of the passion of pleasure and pain is another level that the state of self-deception is examined. Under the different condition and the level of knowing the progressing selves of the second and the third type also display the same model of the restructuring of the pleasure and pain that the first type has. Due to its nature the self has a tendency to assent to- or accept as real an impression that is experienced as pleasant and avoid the painful.

In my discussion of the progressing self type two, it is argued that no sooner his natural urge of being praised left unfulfilled, the self is immediately overwhelmed by the passion of grief. I argue that Seneca draws the same structural relationship between pleasure and pain¹⁰⁴ that I have formerly discussed in the first model of perverted self-love; what follows from Serenus' case is that there is an emphasis to the state of abstinence and privation, which makes the self prone to seeking pleasures in new sources. His grief is followed by a momentary enjoyment of passion- pleasure, as he deceptively avoids boredom and dissatisfaction at his leisure time activities.

As for the pleasure and pain of the progressing self type 3, it can be said that under the state of self-deception, the same logical relationship between fear and pleasure can be drawn. In the type 3, as I have argued in the preceding section, the self attempts to what he/she is fearful of with a search of pleasure. This is the form that the self seeks to take safety from the painful. The only difference between the first and the third type of self is the motives of the passion of fear and the last. In the latter case, fear emerges through the tension of the knowledge of the ignorance. The nature of grief, in contrast to the first one, is a self-made one, which is followed by self-made pleasure, which is not free from anxiety. In both cases, in addition to the fact that they are grounded on false shapes of evil, Seneca also emphasizes the unstable nature of such passions.

All the greatest blessings are a source of anxiety, and at no time is fortune less wisely trusted than when it is best; to maintain prosperity there is a need of other prosperity, and in behalf of the prayers that have turned out well, we must make other prayers^{cx} (*Shortness of Life*. 17.5).

¹⁰⁴ See page 76-77 of the thesis.

As false shapes of grief, fears prevent the self from enjoying the passion-pleasures at the present moment, as their judgments shift between the calculation of future troubles and desire to attain more. The relationship between the passion of grief and pleasure are explained by the acknowledgment of the fear that initiates contradictorily an endless desire in Xerxes to attain his goals. The self is driven to seek further goals as sources of pleasure to put an end to the probable grief.

5.5 The Craft of the Progressing Selves; the pretension of virtue

It is significant to note that my discussion of the form of self-deception in progressing selves particularly marked by their pretension of virtue. Seneca discusses pretension of virtue as a particular instance of self-deception and the lack of self-knowledge, rather than being an intentional practice of lying. Even if it is done intentionally, it has its origin from lack of self-knowing, rather than a habitual social practice.¹⁰⁵ The first, lying, a common practice in the contemporary society of Rome, is one typical example of self-deception¹⁰⁶ which, at a momentary state of forgetfulness the self does or says contrary to what he intends to do as well as a lack of strength to resist liars. As he puts it;

What hinders us most of all is that we are readily satisfied with ourselves; if we meet someone who calls us good man, or sensible men, or holy men, we see ourselves in his description. Not content with praise in moderation, we accept everything that shameless flattery heaps upon us, as if it were our due. We agree with those who declare us to be the best and wisest of men, although we know that they are given too much lying, we are so self-complacent that we desire praise for certain actions when we are especially addicted to the very opposite^{cxii} (59.11).

As in the case of Hostius and Serenus, Seneca points to the lack of strength of those who cannot resist the temptations of flattery from the others even though they know that they are lying and intend to deceive. Seneca explains the mental composition of such types as a momentary lack of resistance to the temptations of pleasure that might emerge from a former state of dissatisfaction. He exposes the

¹⁰⁵ See the review of the forthcoming book on the pretension of virtue. Barsh discusses the problem from the sociological standpoint. <http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/031106/bartsch.shtml>

¹⁰⁶ See Gill's comment on a similar case in chapter 4, section 2.

actual paradox in such types by emphasizing their drive to deception beyond their recognition. Seneca argues that such types are ready to be pleased by the illusionary description that the others provide to them. As for the craft of the progressing selves type 3, Seneca cites the pretension (*imitatio*) of virtue in those type of philosophers in the idle occupation of leisure, who deceive themselves that they possess virtue, when no actual misfortune has fallen to them or a success by chance. The primary motive of the pretension in such types of philosophers is the fear.

Briefly speaking in drawing out the models of perversion in the progressing selves type 2 and 3, Seneca mainly refers to the same cardinal passion-grief and fear under different conditions. While on the one hand, they are aware of the conditions of their souls, and will to change themselves in constant instruction, they fail, however to transform into the state of virtue. The knowledge of the condition in the progressing selves sometimes creates a tension that weakens the soul; it has been argued that in the progressing type 2, the same knowledge is determinant in the actual experience of grief and the deception. In the progressing type 3, fear is motivated by the knowledge of the wrong that explains the nature of deceptive desires in a more complex way.

In the former, we are given shifting states of the soul between leisure and activity. In the discussion of the progressing selves 2, and 3, one can observe different motives for leisure; in the progressing type 2, the leisure is followed shortly after a frustrated self-love due to an experience of injustice or injury, leaving the desires unfulfilled in the reciprocal relations. For the emergence of passion of ambition, two points are emphasized; the first is the forceful leisure, the second is the general state of the soul. Seneca says that under doubt and dissatisfaction, it is inevitable to make errors. In the progressing type 3, passion of fear plays an important role in the deception of self, with an emphasis on more complex motives. In the first case, it emerges as a fear of making a mistake in the forthcoming endeavors. In active city life, the passion of fear intrudes in the pursuits; while on the one hand, the self is aware of the transient nature of everything, he cannot stop himself enjoying the troubles. Again, under such a motive, one can observe the same tension between the drive to self-knowledge

and the self-denial, ending up with a forceful leisure. Serenus cannot still free himself from the passion of fear as well as the temptations of externals even though he has a contrary intention. Ironically, Serenus speaks of the anxiety of knowledge that intrudes in the endeavors of virtuous state. “I fancy that many men would have arrived at wisdom if they had not fancied that they had already arrived, if they had not dissembled about certain traits in their characters and pass by others with their eyes shut”^{cxi}(*Tranquility of Soul*, 1.13).

CHAPTER SIX

PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION; SCOPE, GOALS, METHODS

In the preceding chapter, it has been argued that the progressing selves experience self-deception in their attempt to transform into the state of virtue; it is a momentary state of self-denial, occurring at the background of two conflicting drives –self-knowledge and self-love–, shortly after the disposition of self is ruined; both types misjudge the recommended practices of education, i.e. leisure and active city. In this section, I shall examine the methods of education for a detailed discussion of this problem; while theoretical philosophy helps them gain access to what the natural self-love is like, practical education deals with the problem of assimilating this knowledge by rules and advices. Rules and advices are given for acting rightly in the precise moment in reciprocal relations. Besides the goal of eradicating the passions as a proper form of loving, Seneca also aims at sustaining the willful disposition of the self to make the former goals attainable. Philosophical education is a continuous sterile shift between these two goals, that is suggestive of a deeper problem regarding the knowledge of self.

6.1 A Preliminary Word On Education: Goals, Curricula and Methods

In Chapter five, it has been argued that a complete knowledge of the self is almost a practical impossibility and a matter of hope which is nourished by instruction. Likewise, the analysis of the types of deceived self-love shows us that despite education, the progressing selves are still temporarily deceived precisely in the same manner as the uneducated do.

In laying down different norms of knowing, also different stages of education are implied. The grasp of the condition of the soul and the knowledge of the proper form the theoretical¹⁰⁷(*decrata*) part of education which is done with

¹⁰⁷ Seneca inexchangeably uses the following terms in '*scita*', '*placita*' to refer to '*decrata*'. See letter 95.10 *Decreta* is used as the Latin translation of the term '*dogmata*'. He says; the Greeks call them dogmas, while we Romans may use the term 'doctrines' or adopted principles'... Philosophy is both theoretic and practical; it contemplates and at the same time acts....Her aspirations are loftier than that. She cries: "I investigate the whole universe, nor am I content, keeping myself within a mortal dwelling, to give you a favourable or unfavourable advice".

the teachings of Nature. According to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius¹⁰⁸, the appeal to universal nature is first introduced by the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno in his treatise *On the Nature of Man* with the term “life in agreement with nature”^{cxiii}, nature provides both a model for rational selves, and moral principles of action, which are also called the ‘principle of happiness’ and the ‘state of virtue’. Appeal to universal nature is also prevalent among the following heads of the school, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Posidonius. They all claim that “living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with the experience of the actual course of Nature”. According to Chrysippus, it is possible to acquire a proper model of self, and the principles of what one ought and ought not to chose, by inference due to observation of the frequently occurring events, and what is common to all things. By analogy, both the truths and the principles of conduct are to be generated.¹⁰⁹ There is a universal reason that prevails all things in nature, which the Stoics call Fate, God and providential order and that individuals are to mold their own selves by imitating the universal *logos*. The ‘telos’ of rational beings is disclosed in the facts of universal nature.

For Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius too,¹¹⁰ the understanding of what it means to be rational is preserved in the facts of natural phenomena; since among all living beings man is the most perfect with his reason, with the ability of making choice, the goal of life is to follow the rational principles. The Stoic teaching of Universal Nature conceives no difference between the natural and ethical self. And yet, they imply that the acknowledgment of the former makes their becoming into a new –ethical– self necessary. Seneca is not an exception to the general Stoic view; the study of universal nature constitutes the backbone of his theoretical part of education.¹¹¹ The first step is to instruct the progressing selves on what a rational soul is like- the essence, the place, the quality and the

¹⁰⁸ Diogenes Laertius, (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. 2, tran by R.D.Hicks [London, Loeb series, 1925],7. 87-88)

¹⁰⁹ Seneca also subscribes to the Stoic method of studying natural nature. See letter 120. 1.

¹¹⁰ Epictetus. (*Discourses I-III*, tran. by W.A.Oldfather,[London, Loeb series, 1998], I. 50) Marcus Aurelius,(*Meditations* tran. by C.R.Haines [London, Loeb series, 1994], 3. 2)

¹¹¹ See his (*Natural Question* in vol. 1-2 tran. by Thomas.H.Corcoran [London, Loeb series, 1999] in for the substantial discussion of the study of Natural Phenomena. Also in letter 65, nature is explained in terms of the interaction between cause and matter.

source – of the soul by developing the argument of affinity and estrangement. (121.10)

Practical education is concerned with helping people assimilate and successfully apply the learned facts in experience. The relation between theoretical and practical education is highlighted by various metaphors; ‘decreta’ is like a branch, whereas the ‘precepts’ are like leaves. ‘Decreta’ is like a hidden power, direction of reason, whereas precepts are its hands.¹¹² According to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno is the first to write a treatise on this subject.¹¹³ There is a dispute among the school members regarding the necessity and effectiveness of the practical education, especially the precepts.¹¹⁴ And yet, those who insist on their urgency, agree on the point that they serve the purpose of theoretical philosophy, aimed at deepening the moral grasp without allowing no place for the exceptional situations and triviality.

According to commentators, Seneca is notoriously inconsistent with the content of his precepts and advice, which contradicts the goal of orthodox Stoic education.¹¹⁵ He lacks clarity in proposing such controlled stages of education through precepts. As part of the moral concerns, Seneca says that the purpose of precepts and advices are intended for those who lack experience and training, as well as the weak characters are likely to fall back into their former state. For the inexperienced, he says, cannot maintain a harmony.

It is one thing to understand the merits and the values of facts,
another thing to know the precise merit of action, still another to
curve the impulse and to proceed instead of rushing towards what

¹¹² See letter 95.59 and.65.

¹¹³ See Diogenes Laertius, (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. 2, tran by R.D.Hicks [London, Loeb series, 1925],7. 25)

¹¹⁴ See the substantial discussion in Annas. According to Annas, Cleanthes argues that rules remain ineffective unless the theoretical stuff is internalized, and well understood. Ariston, pupil of Zeno, rejects rule-following as a part of moral progress, developing the only really intuitionistic moral theory in the ancient world. See the substaintial discussion of the dispute in Julia Annas, in *The Morality of Happiness*,[Oxford, Oxford University Press,1993], p.99)

¹¹⁵ See White (1985): in his reading of letter 95, He argues that Seneca denies the exceptionless rules. (p.301)

See also P. Mitsis. He argues that although in general Seneca conforms to the goals of Stoic school, he threatens structural clarity and objectivity. “We might reasonably wonder, of course about the efficacy of and the reliability of the cognitive techniques described by Seneca and why he is convinced that sound moral perception can develop in the face of so many sources of corruption”. ‘Seneca on Reason, Rules and Moral Development’ in J.Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum , *Passions and Perceptions* [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1993], p 310)

is to be done. Hence, life is harmony with itself only when the action is virtuous, when impulse towards an object raises from the worth of an object^{cxiv} (89.15).

What follows from these is that the practical part of education is divided into two subsections; Emphasizing the difference between the knowledge of the value of facts and the knowledge about action, Seneca proposes ‘*precepts*’, partly serve as general, some written, some as effective tactics on how to act.¹¹⁶ They are to guide the selves regarding how to act in concrete situations. He thinks that rules should be catalogued ranging from how to treat one’s wife, son and his friends to worshipping gods, including one’s attitude to externals (95.45-55). Even written rules must be laid down on how to receive and return benefits, since in the majority of the cases, enmity, strife and envy as much as greed arouse from lack of knowledge on how to give and return benefits. For although man knows he should love his wife, and his country, there comes a moment of forgetfulness that makes him turns his back against principles by committing adultery and treachery

Liberal studies, especially literature, is an indispensable source in the practical concerns of philosophy. Epictetus tells us that Euripidies’ *Medea* is a useful source for studying irrationality in passions as mistaken beliefs on indifferent. ¹¹⁷ Likewise, Seneca says that such studies are useful only in so far as they give the soul a preparation but not permanently (88. 2). They are for apprenticeship. Seneca sometimes cites Homeric heroes, Achilles and Odyssey both as concrete examples of irrationality in passion, helping the reader visualize the wavering mood as well as the virtuous states of loving (88.7).

Seneca makes an additional remark in laying down the goals of practical philosophy, and that is the molding of the impulse until the self is brought into the desirable standard through habit. In making such distinctions, however, he has in mind several problems that might occur in applying the theoretical knowledge in situations.

¹¹⁶ Despite the lack of clarity, like all Stoics, what Seneca means by theoretical education is the philosophical study of Nature as the source of proper self as well as for the rules of moral conduct.

¹¹⁷ *Discourses*, I.28, 7-10.

A comparative reading of these preliminary remarks with the specific goals of education would show us that Seneca has three major targets; the first is the issue of the other selves and the problem of forming a healthy, just society, populated by rational lovers, which necessitates loving, fitting to the standards of all norms of knowing.¹¹⁸ And the second is the problem of deception that might emerge in relation to the first. For the first, it can be argued that Seneca considers the issue of the other more seriously than the remaining Stoics within the ethical scope. This is coupled with the fact that he sounds rather pessimistic on the possibility of educating and cultivating everyone; only those who possess natural goodness can be reformed through education, whereas those that are subject to chronic vices are hopeless, but ought to be respected. Furthermore, he has rather skeptical views on the possibility of attaining self-knowledge even for the progressing selves. Once the progressing selves are able to see the ignorance of their own selves by instruction, they are also expected to recognize the ignorance of the other. In other words, knowledge of the self emerges with the knowledge of inequality and injustice in reciprocal relations, necessitating new forms of self-preservation in ventures of loving that must also need the requirements of rational norms. Another point is that while the progressing selves are able to learn ideally the value of externals in relation to their own selves, and love themselves thereon by respecting the others, they can not eradicate the urge for praise and self-recognition which is not possible without conforming to the public consensus.

A preliminary discussion of the issue of the other in the practical concerns of the education of progressing selves already explains why they cannot help self-deception; a reexamination of the motives of self-deception in the progressing selves shows us that no matter how well instructed on what one ought to love by acting precisely, self deception is inescapable once the selves surrender themselves to mental frustration. While the wisdom or the virtuous self-love exemplifies the craft of life –*haec ars vitae est*– by maintaining the harmony of these apparent opposites, the progressing selves still fall short of this ideal, subject

¹¹⁸ See Chapter five section one on Seneca's remarks on three norms of knowing; the first is to protect oneself from the other, while maintaining the proper disposition of loving free from ego-centric concerns. And the third is the problem of deception.

to self-deception in a momentary states of self-denial. Below Seneca explains the relevance of the mental disposition to the right intention.

An action is not correct unless the intention is correct; for this is what the action comes from. Further, the intention is not correct unless the soul's disposition will not be in the best state. Again, the soul's disposition will not be in the best state unless it grasps the laws governing all of life and inquires what judgment should be made about each thing, and unless it relates the situation to what is true^{cxv} (95.57).

A correct action should spring from the proper intention of the soul. As I have argued formerly, all Stoics are rather strict on the first inscriptions. To have the right intention is largely a matter of having the disposition in the best state; while Seneca argues that the spoiled disposition of the soul is the sign of a lack of internalizing what the self has formerly been educated on, followed by the false judgments on things at a stake, the correct disposition is also gained through education. Seneca is also careful about sustaining the natural disposition of the self during instruction and training. Both for the beginners and the progressing, educators should be careful not in ruining the will to learn.

His natural disposition has not been crushed (*extinctio*), but overshadowed and suppressed. (*obscurata et oppressa*) Even so it goes on endeavoring to rise again, struggling against the influences that make for evil; but when it wins support and receives the aid of precepts, it grows stronger^{cxvi} (94.31).

Seneca is concerned with sustaining the natural disposition of the self that might cause the state of deception even in the progressing selves, not by crushing (*extinctio*), but through shadowing and suppressing it.¹¹⁹ This is necessary for future endeavors of struggling against the evil temptations. The desire to be good should spring within the soul itself, it should not be coercive or desirous for another gain in its ventures for the state of virtue. Such a state is not possible unless the will (*voluntas*) is receptive. Thirdly, when belief is established, “the

¹¹⁹ See also *De Tranquillitate Animi*, Seneca says that a progressing self should sometimes turns towards the direction, that the bent of *genii* directs. Because, “inborn tendencies answer ill to compulsion where nature opposes labour is in vain.” (6.2)

soul receives great inspiration and is filled with confidence”^{cxvii} (94.45-46). Therefore, in all stages of education, these three major items are uniquely combined in the method of instructing the self.

6.2 Education of the Child

Concerning the first stage of education, Seneca says that breeding a proper character development in terms of molding the instinct of self-love in the desirable standards is necessary. Moral education at the stage of childhood is a necessity since it is “easy to train the soul while it is still tender, but it is a difficult matter to curb the vices that have grown up with us” ^{cxviii}(*On Anger*,2.21.1). Seneca recommends using contrary methods in curbing impulse up to the desirable standard, “attacking the faults spontaneously that have become stronger”^{cxix} (*On Anger*, 2 19.1). While he aims at the eradication of any condition that is likely to turn into *morbus animi*, he is careful not in crushing the natural instinct even at the earlier stages without which the will to virtue cannot be accomplished.

By freedom, the spirit grows, by servitude it crushes....therefore we must guide the child between two extremes, using now the curb, now the spur. It should never be necessary for him to beg submissively, nor should begging ever prove profitable- rather let his own desert, and his past conduct, and good promise of it in the future be rewarded... We should take pains to see that he is friendly towards those with whom it is his practice to engage in order, that in the struggle, he may form the habit of wishing not to hurt his opponent, but merely to win. Whenever he gets the upper hand, and does something praiseworthy... We shall grant him some relaxation, though we shall not let him lapse into sloth and ease and we shall keep him far from all taint of pampering;... Therefore the more an only child is indulged and the more liberty a ward is allowed, the more his disposition will be spoiled^{cxx} (*On Anger*, 2, 21. 1-6).

The sound training of the child consists in careful observation, followed by both checking and encouraging the instinct of loving in two directions. On the one hand, allowing too much freedom may cause the child’s spirit grows over-conceited and that out of naivety, he might be unkind to his/her friends in competitive games as he seeks self-recognition. In such cases, the natural self-

love gets spoiled; once it develops the habit of being elated, it is inevitable that he would get addicted to the pleasures of such kind. Checking the natural disposition of the self in both directions is relevant to the presence of the other. Seneca says that while the self engages in loving itself, he should precisely treat the other as much as his own. Exultation, then, would yield high opinion of oneself. In cases of freedom, it is also possible that the child easily form the habit of expecting good things to nourish his self-esteem, and the same measures of the good might arouse insolence and temper. On the other hand, however, he should be esteemed through rewards, whenever he does the correct thing, not as much as to spoil his nature. Another point is that the child should be exposed neither to humiliation nor to servility, because by nature the child inclines to seek profit by seeking what is instrumental; if he is devalued and underestimated through humiliation or servile, he would seek profits through submission, or emotional blackmail, once, the profit in them is discovered. And thus Seneca says that unless this is checked “the child will not withstand offense, who has never been denied anything whose tears have always been wiped away”^{cxxi}(6).

In short, the method of education at the stage of childhood is ambivalent; while on the one hand, the practices serve for a good character breeding, it also aims to keep self-esteem in reciprocal relations in balance as Seneca’s recommendation of both negative and positive reinforcement shows.

Another point he recommends in the education of the self-love in child is that although games prove profitable since pleasure in moderation relaxes the mind gives it balance, it runs the risk of getting excessive. Checking the child’s tendency towards the objects of love underlies Seneca’s aim at keeping both the principle of the love of self in balance and at the same time hindering the development of vicious habits that makes the love of self pathological.

6.3 Stage Two: A View of the Knowledge of the Self

As in the education of the children, the teaching of the nature of self-love underlies the therapeutical concerns. Besides the value laden aspects, knowledge of the self comes in through the acknowledgment of death, running the risk of engendering a profitable estrangement from self-knowing, or a reluctance to be

good. In order to avoid such probable risks, and adjust the natural self-love to this knowledge, Seneca makes use of a metaphor of parental love between man and Nature. First of all, the parental love indicates a god-like origin, implying a nobler source of self-worth. Secondly, Seneca tries to help progressing selves make use of knowledge effectively in reciprocal relations by providing roles and norms of attitude. While the father wishes them to be strong, the sons would love themselves properly by being obedient to their father, one of the virtues of the contemporary Roman society.¹²⁰

Seneca's teaching of self-knowing begins with instructing them from childhood on the sense of relatedness and affinity between mortal and the immortal. And thus Seneca says that with his reasoning ability, man is the most perfect among the living being. "There are four natures which we should mention here: of the tree, animal, man, and God. The last two, having reasoning power, are of the same nature, distinct only by virtue of the immortality of the one and the mortality of the other. One of these, then, – to wit God– it is Nature that perfects the Good" ^{cxxii}(124.14). Man is akin to God with its reasoning ability and is different from the latter by virtue of its mortality. Man is, however, ignorant about his nature. Seneca quotes from Virgil, "a god doth dwell, but what god know we not" (41.2). Due to their ignorance, men devalue themselves by acting like animals. Men's true worth lies in their understanding what their nature is like. As he puts it;

Put in the same class those people whose dullness of nature and ignorance of themselves have reduced them to the level of beasts of the field and of inanimate things. There is no difference between the one and the other, since in one case they are things without reason and in the other their reason is warped and works their own hurt, being active in the wrong direction^{cxxiii}(*On Happy Life*, 5.2).

Seneca conceives no difference between perverted reasoning and animal behavior. Only animals engage loving themselves without reasoning. In the similar way, man loves himself with their passionate attachment on externals. By gaining

¹²⁰ See my discussion on Chapter 2, Section 1.

access to their rational self-love, they are able to get a true estimation of their own selves (6.2).

Seneca makes use of two sets of arguments in order to prove the presence of universal Reason in nature. In his *Natural Questions*, the universal reason is observed in various ways, among which the recurrent natural phenomena and the movement of the celestial bodies are most commonly used. By contrast, in the rational self-love, there is no place for passions; as the greatest benefactor, universal self-love provides nothing that arouses passionate desire;

Nature does not ally us with any vice. She produced us in health and freedom. She put before our eyes no object which might stir in us the itch of greed. She placed gold and silver, beneath our feet, and bade those feet stamp down and crush everything that causes us to be stamped down and crushed... But gold and silver, never brings peace, she has hidden away, as if they were dangerous things to trust our keeping. It is we ourselves that have dragged them into light of day to the end that we might fight over them; it is we ourselves, who, tearing away, the superincumbent earth, have dug out the causes of and the tools of our own destruction^{cxxiv} (94.56-58).

Out of affection and benefit of all men that Nature makes nothing visible to the eyes of man that could stimulate greed and ambition. Instead, he hides gold and silver under its depths, as if it were protecting its species from any source of strife. It is by their own folly that that man digs them out, brings them into the light of the day, and eventually prepares his own destruction and suffering. To highlight the proper form of self-preservation, the same metaphor of the fatherly affection is used. According to Seneca, natural self-love provides everything that is necessary for its species.

Nature was not so hostile to man that, when she gave all other animals an easy role in life, she made it impossible for him alone to live without these artifices...nature suffices what she demands. Luxury has turned her back upon nature: each day she expands herself, in all the ages she has been gathering strength, and by her wit promoting vices. At first luxury began to lust for what nature regarded as superfluous, then for what was contrary to nature; and finally she made the soul a bondsman to its constitution^{cxxv} (90.18-19).

Nature suffices all those artifacts necessary for the survival of all living beings, animals and human beings, such as food and care. In the 121.letter, Seneca says that ever since animal and human infants are issued from womb or the egg, they are provided by the necessary food and care by their mothers. In the quotation above, Seneca gives the account of how the natural self-love gets perverted from its natural state by creating and making superfluous things as objects of desire. He is transgressing the laws of father by loving things different from what the father supplies and demands. Objects of luxury are man-made, arousing excessive desires of such other kind which finally make them slaves of their own constitution. Just like it is free from any objects of excessive desires, Seneca says that excessive pain, *dolorem*, does not exist in the universal self-love in Nature. Excessive grief is the deed of the deceived. In *Consolation to Marcia* Seneca gives examples both from animal kingdom and from natural phenomena as observable facts about the nature of natural grief.

But you say, "Nature bids us grieve for our dear ones" who denies it so long as grief is tempered? For not only the loss of those who are dearest to us, but a mere parting, brings an inevitable pang and wrings even the stoutest heart. But false opinion has added something more to our grief than Nature has prescribed..... Nor does any creature sorrow long for its offspring, except man- he nurses his grief, and the measure of his affliction is not what he wills, but what he wills to feel^{cxxvi}(*Consolation to Marcia* 7.1-2).

Just like excessive desires, excessive grief is contrary the divine, impersonal self-love which they claim their affinity to. Seneca says that there exists natural grief in every living being which is moderate by nature; neither in cows nor in birds, sorrow is long and self-tormenting. Birds resume their flights after a short, and yet intensely felt grief for the loss of their offspring. Similarly, the sorrow of the mares for the loss of their possessions is quenched after wandering frantically. Among the living beings, only man, with its reasoning ability, is subject to the self-tormenting grief. In contrast to the one that nature prescribes, the grief, originating by deceptive beliefs observes no moderation.

Excessive grief is the sign of an ego-centric loving. By grieving over the loss of their beloved, as well as for their belongings, the deceived selves give

voice to what they actually wish for themselves instead of grieving for the loss of their love object. This, Seneca asks Marcia to observe and builds up an analogy in consoling her own sorrow. The idea of punishment in grief is further implied in the metaphor of parental love. If the selves torment themselves by excessive grief this is due to their own wrong-doings. By contrast, the universal nature, “who loves us most tenderly, has so construed us to make pain either endurable or short”^{cxvii}(78.8).

In addition to the multiple forms of ego-centric, self-tormenting loving, the unnatural quality of grief is also taught by the facts of natural phenomena. It is taught by the transient nature of everything. Knowledge of the self makes it necessary that everything is doomed to extinction, including not only the beloved, but their own existence, too.

All things move in accord with their appointed times; they are destined to be born, to grow, and to be destroyed. The stars which you see moving about us, and this seemingly immovable earth to which we cling and on which we are set, will be consumed and cease to exist. There is nothing that does not have its old age; the intervals are merely unequal at which Nature sends forth all these things towards the same goal. Whatever will cease to be, and yet it will not perish, but will be resolved into its elements. To our minds, this process means perishing, for we behold only that which is nearest. Our sluggish mind, under allegiance to the body, does not penetrate to bourns beyond. Were it not so, the mind would endure, with greater courage, its own ending. And that of its possession, it only it could hope that life and death, like the whole universe about us, go by turns, that whatever has been broken up is put together again, and that the eternal craftsmanship of god, who controls all things, is working at its task^{cxviii} (71.13-14).

The knowledge of this fact is so necessary that whatever the selves love themselves by, should be regarded as a loan to be returned when the proper time comes, including their own existence. Like other Stoics, Seneca too, teaches the deceptiveness of their notion of poverty, wealth as well as the fear of death by reminding them of the transient nature of everything.¹²¹ There is an eternal recurrence of birth and destruction in nature; both the divine and the mortal are born, grow and dissolve into its elements. The death in Nature is not extinction, or

¹²¹ See Chapter 3, Section 1 for the preliminary discussion.

perishing; but a temporary dissolution into the elements that makes everything pregnant to new birth.

Since the majority resists the acknowledgment of death due to perversion, theoretical instruction on universal nature aims at self-knowledge by exposing the deceptive nature of passions. The eternal craftsmanship in the universal self-love discloses this secret of the harmony of the opposites, life and death- that endlessly recurs without excess. This is the right reason every mortal self should conform to in loving themselves as much as loving the others and attain the state of tranquility, i.e. the state of the freedom from passions of fear and desire.

Hence, in their case, in view of the uncertainty of their lot, there is inequality; but of things divine the nature is one. Reason, however is nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit set in a human body.... Furthermore, there is no distinction between things divine; hence there is none between the goods. Therefore it follows that joy and brave unyielding endurance of torture are equal goods; for there is the same greatness of the soul, relaxed and cheerful in the one case, in the other combative and braced for action ^{cxix}(66.12-13).

Despite the apparent inequality in the opposites in nature, there is necessity and fate that neither the divine nor the mortal can escape from. This knowledge of the mortal self as much as the divine makes brave endurance of torture and rejoicing with a tranquility of soul necessary. Ego-centric loving, by contrast, is the sign of a perverted self, which is weakened by men's wrong opinion of things as much of themselves; it is out of love that Nature creates men courageous, making them capable of resisting to hardships and sorrows. In his essay *On Providence*, Seneca speaks of the affinity of the divine and the mortal reason in terms of parental love; universal nature is likened to an affectionate father who wishes for its offspring to act in accordance to what is natural to him, to be courageous over the inconsistencies of fortune, keeping his eyes wide open to the truths God makes visible and therefore reform themselves to their actual state. The true esteem of rational selves is not to be built on externals. Rather it lies in their reformation of their true selves, their possession of strength, endurance and joyful acceptance. "Towards good men, God has the mind of a father, he cherishes for them the

manly love and he says, let them be harassed by toil, by suffering by losses in order that they may gather true strength”^{cxxx} (*On Providence*, 2. 6).

God shows its affection and kindness to those, who, like obedient sons, conform to their laws by promising the tranquility of mind and punishing the prodigal by subjecting them to suffering by their own folly. True esteem and honor lie in imitating the right reason, displaying the aspiring and lofty soul in the brave endurance and acceptance of suffering instead of seeking a life of security as fools do. “It is to this law that our souls must adjust themselves, this, they should follow, this they should obey....For it is a bad soldier who grumbles when following his commander... Let us live thus, and speak thus; let fate find us ready and alert. Here is your great soul”^{cxxxi} (9. 3).

As the progressing selves are instructed on the value-laden nature of self-love, they simultaneously learn about death that makes necessary the contemplation on the transient nature of everything such as the externals. On the basis of theoretical education, Seneca further recommends self-interrogation and correction through self-examination. He says, “Examine yourself, criticize and observe yourself in diverse ways”¹²² (16.29) and “you must discover yourself in the wrong before you can reform yourself. Therefore as far as possible, prove yourself guilty. Hunt up charges against your self, play the part, first, of accuser, then of judge, last of intercessor”^{cxxxii} (28.11). The next step is to develop new strength by a continuous study, until a good inclination becomes a good settled purpose.

6.4 Practical Education

The same therapeutic method can be observed in the practical concerns of education. In addition to the written precepts for the purpose maintaining a balance between the individual and the other, Seneca is also interested in giving advice for maintaining the natural disposition of the progressing selves as a part of the former goal: “For one who has learned and understood what he should do and avoid is not a wise man until his soul is metamorphosed into the shape of that which he has learned”^{cxxxiii} (94.48). Seneca says that weaker souls, (*inbecilliores*

¹²² See also Epictetus *Discourses* 4.34-35

animi) in addition to the accepted principles of philosophy, also need someone to say them what to do and what to avoid. Below, he explains the urgency of advice as follows;

Moreover if one awaits the time when one can know of oneself what the best line of action is, one will sometimes go astray and by going astray will be hindered from arriving at the point where it is possible to be satisfied with oneself. The soul should accordingly be guided at the very moment when it is becoming able to guide itself^{cxxxiv} (94.51).

Perversion and error are very likely even for those progressing selves, if they wait for the proper time and the precise moment. Advice–admonition– is necessary to guide them on how to act, since the written precepts remain insufficient by telling them what to do, but not how to do. Therefore advice is to be given as a supplement until they become self-sufficient. However, the approach to the self-sufficiency and the height of happiness and the perfection of the wise come very slow for the progressing selves. Another remark Seneca makes on the urgency of advice is that although a progressing self has developed theoretical knowledge on what they ought to do, it is likely that “he does not see with sufficient clearness, what these things are” due to a state of dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction with oneself is still an impediment towards the state of virtue.¹²³ Under such cases, “we are hindered from occupying praiseworthy deeds not only by our emotions, but also by lack of practice. In discovering the demands of particular situations, our souls are under good control, and yet at the same time, are inactive and untrained in finding the path to duty”^{cxxxv} (94.32). When the weakness of the will in the progressing selves at a stake, Seneca rejects giving consolation to the self,¹²⁴ since it might engender self-pity, which is another passion they should avoid. Instead, he recommends a series of advices to sustain the natural disposition of self, which are short and effective precautions as proper practices for strengthening of the will. A closer look at the precise examples of guidelines shows us that what

¹²³ See in the preceding chapter how the dissatisfaction with oneself might lead to self-deception in the progressing selves.

¹²⁴ See (94.49) Seneca argues that consolation is superfluous as a proper advice. However, he is not clear in this letter. In Letter 63, he avoids giving comfort to a friend for a long time who has lost his son. For comfort might engender a justificatory ground for a persistent grief.

Seneca means in the building up the strength of the will consists in nothing but a series of contrary movements altering between leisure and practice in short intervals. In resorting to such therapeutic methods, Seneca has in mind the reconciliation of the state of natural self-love with of the state of virtue, while avoiding any condition that give rise to passions. The degenerated Roman society is the most important source of corruption; (this is the influence of the other that might cause fears or other related passion-desires as a result of a mental dissatisfaction.) On the other hand, since the virtuous self-love has to display itself in loving the others through acting, a long term withdrawal into oneself could be a profitable flight.

As Foucault observes, the first group of the therapeutic practices consist of withdrawing into oneself for self-interrogation and evaluation of the day. Seneca and the other Roman Stoics personally apply this as an effective method of care of oneself.¹²⁵

To consort with the crowd is harmful... even Socrates and Cato and Laelius might have been shaken in their moral strength by a crowd that is unlike to them; so true is it that none of us, no matter how much he cultivates his abilities, can resist the shock of the faults that approach, as it were a so great retinue. Much harm is done by a single case of indulgence and greed. The familiar friend, if he be luxurious, weakens and softens us imperceptibly (16.6-7).

Seneca implies that there are times that the theoretical knowledge and the cultivation on what one ought to do is undone. Under such cases, the best recommendation is to withdraw from the crowd as an effective method of exercising self-control for the temptations of ambition, greed, wealth and money. In exposing themselves to the public, people immediately forget their right judging and show a blind trust to people. As he claims, even those with moral strength such as Cato or Socrates cannot help themselves being shaken.¹²⁶ If the

¹²⁵ Foucault argues that travelling to the country-side is another effective method of care of oneself, besides letter-writing. In addition to the proper care of self, these practices are intended for self-revelation. This is a common practice, not only for Seneca, but also for Marcus Aurelius. (*Technologies of Self* ed. By Luther.H.Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick.H.Hutton [USA, The university of Massachusetts press], p. 34-35)

¹²⁶ *On the Happy Life*, I.3

self has not fully developed the knowledge of how to act in a certain situation, he can be deluded into the passion of fear as well as the other ones.

When we look back to the motives of self-deception in the second progressing type, one can observe the ignorance of the other selves. No sooner he reads the noble figures, he immediately wants to rush to the Forum, giving a hand to those, as well as checking the pride of the others. While Serenus is still aware that he is overwhelmed by the passion of ambition, he still feels short of developing the art of loving himself without arousing challenge and enmity of the other. Although he is aware that he cannot love virtuously without giving up the externals, he cannot stop himself by the instinct to get praise which is impossible without submitting to general norms; in the third progressing type, the tension between knowledge and self-love can be examined in more complex forms. Two instances of fear are examined. In the first case, the self is overwhelmed by his acknowledgement of his failure in virtuous loving, fear of his future ventures. At the background of the same tension, one can observe the restructuring of the passion of fear in more complex forms; knowledge of the transient nature of externals interferes in the fear of the inconsistency of fortune; the self wavers between two conflicting motives of fear and the concern for praise and self-recognition. Under different conditions, the natural pace of self-love is blocked and hindered, preparing the future experiences of deception.

For the first type of self-deception, Seneca recommends a temporary practice of fasting in order to build up the strength of the will. This has to be followed by feast to the stomach to make it possible in enjoying the pleasures. The primary goal of this contrary practice is to sustain the self in natural disposition, to make the strivings going while at the same time building up the strength of the will.

The specific examples of admonitions aim at developing the practical skill with which they effectively apply the theoretical knowledge of loving without being deceived either through elation or fear, without offending the other, preserving the benefit of both sides. Here is an admonition to be given especially on the passion of fear at the sight of an angry man or facing an uncertain situation;

But life is not worth living, and there is no limit of our sorrow, if we indulge our fears to the greatest possible extent. In this matter, let prudence help you and condemn fear with a resolute spirit even when it is in plain sight. If you cannot do this, counter one weakness with another, and temper your fear with hope.... Accordingly, weigh carefully your hopes as well as well as your fears, and whenever all the elements are in doubt, decide in your own favor; believe that what you prefer. And if fear wins the majority of the votes, incline in the other direction anyhow, and cease to harass your soul, reflecting continually that most mortals, even when no troubles are actually at hand, or are certainly to be expected in the future, become excited and disquieted. No one can stop himself, when he begins to be urged ahead. Nor does he regulate his alarm according to the truth. No one says; the author of the story is fool, and who has believed it as a fool as well as he who fabricate it.” We left ourselves with every breeze; we are frightened at uncertainties, just as if they were certain. But I am ashamed either to admonish you sternly or to try to beguile you with mild remedies ^{cxxxvi}(13.12-14)

In the education of the progressing selves Seneca recommends flights upon facing a difficult situation. In order not to indulge in self-torturing sorrows, Seneca advocates counting the fears as much as the hopes. Although they know what ought to be done, sometimes the weak cannot keep their fear under control and leave themselves alert to such passions. In order to built up strength without harassing the soul, Seneca recommends shunning the fears with hopes no matter how deceptive they are. Seneca’s main interest in recommending such contrary methods is to sustain the natural disposition of the self. Under such cases, one can easily be affected by the temptations of the faulty crowd, or subjected himself to the passion of fear, especially of the others.

On the other hand, however, Seneca speaks of the dangers of a long-term leisure and intercourse.

Moreover, we ought to retire into ourselves very often; for intercourse with those of dissimilar natures, disturbs our settled calm, and rouses the passions anew, and aggravates any weakness in the soul that has not been thoroughly healed. Nevertheless the two things must be combined and resorted to alternately- solitude and the crowd. . The one will make us long for the man, the other for ourselves and the one will relive the other; solitude will curve our aversions to the throng, and the throng our weariness of solitude. And the mind must not be kept invariably at the same

tension, but must be diverted to amusements.... The soul must be given relaxation: it will arise better as keener after resting^{cxxxvii} (*Tranquility of Soul*, 17. 4-7).

In advising constant shift between leisure and intercourse, Seneca's main point is that too much leisure would spoil the soul by making it prone to deception out of boredom. In the other case, although it is desirable, the intercourse with the other might be equally harmful. Instead of choosing any of them, Seneca recommends progressing selves to shift alternately in both directions, as the cultivation of virtue is not possible without intercourse. And yet, contemplation is also necessary. Seneca says that which is solid and do not wander from one place to another can only be possible in the case of wise.

In short, what follows from the discussions is that although it is possible to cultivate the self, education sometimes remains insufficient in eradicating all traces of passion in the human soul or to be more exact the experience of self-deception. Both stages of education imply a sterile movements instead of promising an exit. As I have formerly argued, only the wise can love in accordance with nature.

6.5 How the Sage Loves

As for the other Stoics of both early and late tradition, for Seneca, too, the wise figure exemplifies the ideal model of self in the sense that only the sage gains access to his true self. Although both the sage and the fool love themselves, only the wise knows how to love in accordance with nature.^{cxxxviii} The nature of his loving is justified by his total knowledge of his self as well as the others. As Seneca concedes, only the wise knows "what causes the reflection in the mirror"^{cxxxix} (88.27). Thirdly, his loving discloses the best craftsmanship in reasoning (31.17).

The implications of these statements can be examined in his attitude towards the others as much as to externals. We are informed by Seneca that although the wise man is self-sufficient, depending on no one except himself, due to natural propensity, he cannot live without a society of man.

The wise man is self-sufficient. Nevertheless, he desires friends, neighbors, and associates, no matter how much he is sufficient unto himself. And mark how self-sufficient he is. For on occasion he can be content with a part of himself. If he loses a hand through disease or war, or if some accident puts out one or both of his eyes, he will be satisfied with what is left., taking as much pleasure in his impaired and maimed body as he took when it was sound, while he does not pine for these parts if they are missing, he prefers not to lose them^{cxl} (9.4).

The wise man is self-sufficient in his concerns of body as much as he is for others. As Seneca claims, although he prefers to have a sound body, he can live and endure the loss of any of the bodily organ in war or in disease. He is self-sufficient and preserves his happiness beyond such misfortunes, including the loss of the closest as well as his friends. Unless something stops him, he shuns solitude and is prone to socialize. Starting with the love of spouse, and the offspring, as well as the others, the attitude of loving of the wise discloses the knowledge of the nature of self-love. The satisfaction of sexual desires is a concrete example of the ignorant, perverted loves, stemming from the wrong conception of the externals(*Consolation to Helvia* 5.2); it tortures individuals as well as the mutual bond of love among all selves.¹²⁷

As long as he is allowed to order his affairs according his judgment, he is self-sufficient, –and marries a wife; he is self-sufficient and brings up children; he is self-sufficient- and yet he could not live if he had to live without the society of man^{cxli} (9.17).

If circumstances beyond his control such as imprisonment, exile, slavery, or a delay on a voyage do not stop him (7.16), the wise man marries a wife and has children, and loves them affectionately. The love of wife is free from lust (*libido*) since he knows that love of women, including his wife as well as the others should be free from excess. The proper desire for sexual relationship is for the prolongation of race. The sage loves his offspring, preserving the good of both himself as well as his own. He could assert his own existence and build up his self-worth. And yet, he does not object if his offspring surpasses his own

¹²⁷ See also Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 4.72

greatness. Although he loves his wife and his children as much as he loves himself, he is free from the passion of grief over their loss. ‘The wise man is not distressed by the loss of children or of friends, for he endures their death in the same spirit in which he awaits his own’(74.30-31). Not only the loss of the closest, but also for the other things, the wise man deals with the trouble by long reflection of the evils(76.35). He performs his duty towards the beloved; his performance of duty is not free from praise. The urge for praise and self-recognition in the matrimonial love is discussed by Seneca as follows;

The soul should also enforce this command upon itself whenever the needs of one’s relatives require; it should pause and humor those near and dear, not only when it desires, but even when it has began to die. It gives the proof of a great heart to return to life for the sake of others. And noble men have often done this. But this procedure also, I believe indicates the highest type of kindness; Although the greatest advantage of old age is the opportunity to be more negligent regarding self-preservation, and to use life more advantageously, one should watch over one’s old age with still greater care if one knows that such action is pleasing, useful or desirable in the eyes of the person, whom one holds dear. This is also the source of no mean joy and profit; for what is so sweeter than to be so valued by one’s wife that one becomes more valuable to oneself for this reason? Hence, my dear Paulina, is able to make me more responsible not only for her fears, but also for my own”^{cxlii} (104. 4-5).

The composition of loving in the matrimonial relationship suggests mutual love, consideration and kindness as well as duty. Seneca discusses the attitude of the wise by giving an example from his own marriage. The natural orientation of loving stimulates the couple to love to preserve, and to protect each other, even at the time when there is no strength to do so. In loving his wife, the wise man acts honorably, displaying also the highest type of kindness; he performs his duty towards her even when he has no strength to do so. The wisdom in the matrimonial relations is based on the mutual exchange of love and praise. Seneca says that he responds his wife’s concern by taking care of his health and transforming himself into a love object of Paulina. On the other hand, with the same natural urge to love, i.e. to protect, Paulina also displays her loving as the highest type of kindness. Both are driven to love themselves by protecting the

benefit of each, accompanied by the proper state of pleasure principle,—gaudium—. In neither of them, the self-interest is egoistic.

As for the relationships, other than the closest, we are informed by Seneca that the wise is much more cautious and selective than his loving the closest. Likewise Seneca argues that not his selfish promptings, but his natural propensity bids him love the others^{cxliii} (9.17). For just as other things for us are an inherent attractiveness, so is friendships (9.17). In seeking friends, the wise is not driven for a gain or out of a calculation of a loss. He feels, instead the natural urge for self-recognition and praise.

Beyond question, the feeling of a lover has in it something akin to friendship. One might call it friendship run mad. But though this is true, does anyone love for the sake of gain or promotion, or renown? Pure love, careless of other things, kindles the soul with desire for the beautiful object, not without the hope of a return of the affection.... “How then” you ask, “does he seek it?” Precisely as he seeks an object of beauty, not attracted to it by desire for gain nor yet frightened by the instability of fortune^{cxliv} (9. 11-13).

Friendship, as one concrete example of an other-regarding attitude of self love in wise, displays his concern for a return of affection; because only the wise is a real friend (81.12) The state of pure love is likened to a state of madness, the stirring of the soul as if he gazed into a rare object of beauty. The sage does not offer his friendship to everyone except another wise, for he knows that none but the wise could be a friend of a wise, engendering self-appraisal and source of joy. Only the wise possesses the knowledge of the source of a real benefit and favor. It is a state of happiness without any fear of self-revealing; both enjoy their friendship by a mutual exchange of favors and benefits (81.12). A wise man can endure the loss of his friend bravely. In claiming for the self-sufficiency of the wise in friendship, he can do without friends, not that he desires to do without them. When I say, ‘can’, I mean this: he endures the loss of a friend with self-control. (9.5) In the Letter 109, a detailed account on the nature of loving in friendship of the wise is discussed as follows;

Good men are mutually helpful. For, each gives practice to the other’s virtues and thus maintains wisdom at its proper level. Each

needs someone with whom he makes comparisons and investigations. The wise man also needs to have his virtues kept in action; and as he prompts himself to do things, so is he prompted by another wise man. How can a wise man help another wise man? He can quicken his impulses and point out to him opportunities for honorable action. Besides he can develop his own ideas he can impart what he has discovered. For even in the case of wise man something will always remain to discover, something towards which his soul may make new ventures^{cxlv} (109.1-3).

The wise man cannot maintain his mental disposition without the intercourse with friends. And yet, he is cautious in selecting his friends. He can establish friendship, open his heart, shows his weakness and his needs only to another wise man. The nature of love among the wise is rather intellectual as well as humane. They help each other, exchanging views and comparing and measuring one another. They move and guide one another in producing honorable acts. It is free from erotic interests, unlike what Nussbaum implies.¹²⁸ A wise man shares his goodness with another wise man.

Moreover, there is a sort of mutual friendship among all the virtues. This, he who loves the virtues of certain among his peers, and in turn exhibits his own to be loved, is helpful. Like things give pleasure, especially when they are honorable and when men know that there is a mutual approval. And besides, none but the wise man can prompt another wise man's soul in an intelligent way^{cxlvi} (109.10-11).

For Seneca, the nature of mutual love is not disinterested. It is based on the reward of mutual approval and concern for praise of the both party, unlike some of the commentators argue.¹²⁹ The wise man is just, since justice is taken in the

¹²⁸ See Nussbaum's elaborate discussion on the nature of falling in love (*eros*) of the wise; Nussbaum says, "that 'the *eros* is distinct from Roman Stoic ideal of marital affection. Since he is wise, the love is consistent with perfect virtue. This means that it is not characterized by a mistaken overestimation of the importance of its object, *vis-a-vis*, the wise man's own *eudaimonia*.'" I argue that while the attitude of loving is closely related to the arguments on passion, in Seneca, by contrast, the erotic implication of loving is not present. If there is any mutual attraction, this is due to the existential nature of loving. ("Eros and the Wise: the Stoic Response to a Cultural Dilemma". *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* vol. 12. 1995. p. 261)

¹²⁹ See Ted Brennan(ibid): comments on the attitude of loving in the wise as follows; he argues that while the nature of loving is not egoistic, the wise man does not expect any return. By contrast, I argue that he does not expect any reward that depends on externals, he feels the urge for self-recognition and praise.

sense of praising the deserving and be praised in return. On the other hand, the mutual love is self-restrained and confident. For, he knows that the other would not respond in another way. In short, only the love among peers of wise, can exemplify kindness, help and justice, courage and prudence as well as self-restraint, followed by pleasure in the contemplation of their mutual the delight.

In his loving the others, other than the closest and the wise-peers, William. O Stephens comments that the Senecan wise has a selfish indifference.¹³⁰ By contrast, I argue that such attitudes of the sage in loving the others should be taken from Stephens' standpoint; in loving the others he displays caution for rather humane reasons. More intimate loving is devoted to the progressing selves. The sage is driven by the same interest to help to correct, be kind and promise the reward of perfection, though he is cautious that he might be influenced by the ignorance of the other.

As it is a natural and existential need for the wise to keep his virtues in action, he is driven to love people other than the wise to show him the right path, save him from ignorance, enduring probable evil that might come from the others. He would also derive pleasure in bestowing a benefit as well as winning a friend, which brings with it the wisdom of loving and congratulates himself in turning a fool into a true lover. "Assuredly it will make you prefer to please yourself rather than the populace."^{exlvii} Seneca argues that "although the sage loves his friends dearly, "often comparing them to himself, all the good is limited to his own being"^{exlviii} (9.18). His personal interest is not ego-centric and selfish. Although the sage does not treat the other as intimately as his friends, he considers their good. He is careful in his choice of friends. Not everyone can be a friend of wise, because he knows that only a wise can stir the love of a wise. His main concern, however, is the maintenance of his own self-worth, and praise which he does so by also preserving the benefit of the other. As Seneca puts it;

¹³⁰ See William.O.Stephens; questions the incredible inhumanity of the wise especially his indifference which implies selfishness of some sort. He argues that while on the one hand, the wise man displays his indifference at the loss of a beloved, -an offspring, or a close friend- for the sake of a more intellectual kind of self-preservation, he does not calculate that he might also be subjected to the same isolation and loneliness. ("Epictetus on How the Stoic sage Loves", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 14, 1996, p. 198)

The archer ought not to hit the mark only sometimes. He ought to miss it only sometimes. That which takes effect by chance is not an art. Now wisdom is an art; it should have a definite aim, choosing only those who will make progress, withdrawing from those whom it has come to regard as hopeless-not yet abandoning them too soon, and just when the case is becoming hopeless trying radical remedies^{cxlix} (29.3).

What kind of remedies does the wise take in his attitude of loving the others? Although the wise loves everyone, it is not based on equal terms, especially in his attitude to the ignorant, and the hopeless. Seneca says that while on the one hand the wise maintains a distance upon encountering the fool for his own safety,¹³¹ on the other hand, he respects them as much as he respects himself, continues to love them cautiously-without fear and lust.

So the wise man will never provoke the anger of those in power; nay, he will even turn his course precisely as he would turn from a storm... your more careful pilot questions those who know the locality as to the tides and the meaning of the clouds. He holds his course far from that region notorious for its swirling waters. Our wise man does the same; he shuns a strong man who may be injurious to him making a point of not seeming to avoid him, because an important part of one's safety lies in not seeking safety openly; for what one avoids, one condemns^{cl}(14.7-8).

Beyond the wise' apparent indifference to the others, there lies a concern for his own safety; we are informed by Seneca that in dealing with the others, the wise man is cautious not to arouse hatred, or fear by placing himself above the others. This, he does so to prevent all the sources of injury that might be a potential threat to his own safety and continue to perform his duties towards them. He knows that they are accustomed to love themselves deceptively and do not possess the wisdom he has. For, just as fear, or too much admiration, might become a source of injury on both parties. As for his love of country, he is ready to sacrifice his life, driven to shun an enemy to the state without fear, as his discussion of Cato implies.¹³²

¹³¹ See Inwood : He argues that the wise, by virtue of his knowledge and perfection makes use of unusual forms of loving, totally different from the rest that is suggestive to craft not however through violating any law. *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* , 1985.

¹³² See Letters 102, 105.

The strange nature of Seneca's understanding of love suggests a unique combination of these two opposites that makes us sympathize him both for the perfection of mortality, unlike what Amelia Roxenberg Rorty¹³³ and Paul Veyne¹³⁴ claim. While on the one hand, he is quite cautious in maintaining a distance, he cannot stop himself loving, and respecting them. This paradoxical attitude is originated from his knowledge of his self as well as the others which bids him create a distance. However, due to the natural propensity of love –self-recognition and praise–, he cannot stop himself working for the benefit of the others; the wise is ready to sacrifice his own life for his country. This is coupled with his keen understanding of the world in general, including the knowledge of the limits and its vulnerability to death in all sense.

¹³³ See Amelia Oksenberg Rorty: She questions the happiness of the wise. While he loves without fear, envy, anger, trying to make friends of them, he is not so lucky in finding a person that fits to his own mental standard. Only another wise can understand a wise. ("The Two faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud", *The Journal of History of Philosophy* 34 [1996] 355-7)

¹³⁴ See Paul Veyne. He argues that while the constant joy of the wise is a concrete example of his right reason, the right reasoning is caused by "an egoism, and self-censure." Although he does not openly uses the term, his Freudian interpretation of the Senecan sage implies so. "the sage is only the object of an expectation....he does not want to be fulfilled, for fear that if it were, the ideal image would become trivialized and too real." (*Life of a Stoic*, tran. by C.Sullivan [London, Routledge, 1997], p. 87, 119)

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Human Nature; Reason or Self-love

Throughout the discussion of the problem of self-knowledge via self-deception, Seneca introduces two accounts of what is accordance with human nature, and these are innate propensity of self-love and rationality. Throughout the thesis, these two accounts are in tension. On the one hand, self-love is dismembered on the ground that the state of self-deception is due to the lack of knowledge. It is interesting to note however, that in stating what the selves fail to know, Seneca first refers to the value-laden nature of self love. The selves, as I have argued in chapter four section one, are not aware that they love themselves by attaching value to the things, as much they love and asses other people as an extension of their own selves. This is the main pitfall that makes them fail to be rational. The access to self-knowledge is gained through their knowledge of mortality and that lovers fail to love themselves as rational beings due to the fact that they cannot understand what death is, although they shun it in a non-conscious way. Seneca puts a blind trust to the insight and the ability to understand what it means to be rational.

In the philosophical instruction of the knowledge of the self via studying universal nature, we are immediately brought upon the other account of what is accordance with nature, and that is the picture of the self as a rational being or what rational constitution is. Man is made akin to God with their reasoning ability. By observation, analogy they are to generate the facts from natural nature what the reasoning being is like. The internalization of the knowledge of mortality is what makes them reasoning beings in normative sense. The instruction on the knowledge of mortality is the dismemberment of what has been formerly valued by human beings. According to Seneca, lack of self-knowledge is particularly present in their overestimation of the externals. Except what is necessary, rational beings are not to attach value to the externals, including the other selves that one

is closely attached to. The ideal that is disclosed in Seneca's account of rationality is the perfected form of self-love. As the metaphor of the father-son love implies, what we ought to do is to obey. And yet, we see that knowledge of self is gained only through the standpoint of the nature of self-love, i.e. the drive to existence by shunning always what death-dealing. Seneca justifies his methods of education with the fact that in order to gain access what is in accordance with nature-rational being is, one should not spoil the natural disposition of the self, i.e. destroying the life instinct that makes it possible. Rationality is the goal that imperfect love of self has to attain. The various attempts of reconciling these two elements constitute the goals of education in Seneca. Both in the education of the child and in the practical education of the progressing selves such an attitude can be observed; the satisfaction of the ego-centric tendency discloses itself as the primary life instinct.

Another important point is Seneca's manipulation of the term, craft in his discussion of the possibility of self-knowing in contrast to its practical impossibility, which is examined in the types of self-deception. As I have argued in chapter 2, section 2, craft is a natural- inborn- skill, which is present right at the beginning. The self is born with this ability, which is used for the maintenance of existence in various forms of self-preservatory activities especially in the animal kingdom. Seneca says that art, with its usual connotations with physical skill, is a commonly shared ability by all beings. The growth into the later stages, however, is marked by the emphasis on the continuity between self-love as 'unrealized rationality' and 'self-love' as perfected rationality. Besides Seneca's, another important text that stressing this continuity is from Diogenes' Laertius; he says that their gaining a view of their reasoning constitution is particularly present in the reason's intervening the inborn impulse. The third account of *techne* lies in the state of wisdom as art of living. Seneca compares *techne* to the state of wisdom, a skill which is only realized by the wise; it is referred as an unshakable understanding of the universe and the knowledge of the things in general and knowledge of one's self as well as the other selves.

Throughout the thesis, especially in the context of the progressing selves, I have examined another type of self, which stands in the middle of these two

accounts. In progressing selves a type of craft is examined in experience of self-deception in terms of the tension between flight and self-knowing. This is the pretension of virtue, having at its background the wavering of the soul between fear of making mistake and the desire to gain access to their true selves. For Seneca as well as for other Stoics, this is the state of wisdom and virtue. Again, in my study of the third type of the progressing selves, another instance of craft, -i.e. self-deception is examined in the pretension of virtue, which the knowledge of the self is reconstructed by a clever craft of a momentary self-restrain that has its origin in the fear of fortune. It is outgrowth of the same craft of the impulse that the wisdom of life is built on. When we look at the craft of the wise, one can observe the understanding of human nature, model of craft of self-concealing as a proper way of survival.

As a preliminary to the reasons for the failure of knowledge of self, one can argue that what lies at the basis of this tension between these two accounts of what is natural for human beings the theoretical formulations of human nature. Like other Stoics, Seneca, too is subject to the same ambivalence. As I have argued in chapter two, section one, love of self is the starting point and that right at the beginning, the selves love themselves by inclining towards the objects, people that are the instrumental to their existence and avoid the destructive ones. Despite the apparent opposition, shunning death is another form of loving of one's constitution. The tension is created particularly in the later stages of self. Seneca argues that man is a reasoning constitution and that his reason simply what makes them different from the animals. The later stage is important in the sense that he would familiarize what is natural to him. When we look at the model of nature that is to be familiarized by human beings, both the knowledge of the love of self as well as the reasoning constitution is indicated. Seneca tries to reconcile both, claiming that the precise account of self is rational love of self. Here once can observe an awkward reductionism. It stands for either as the rationalization of the love of self or gaining access to reasoning constitution. For the latter, we are informed that reason, first of all, is meant as the possession of a series of mental functions such as that the ability of forming concepts out of preconceptions and their reformulation in language, memory, and a series of mental functions such as

that giving assent to an impression, followed by the ability of forming judgments, opinions, culminating in action. Seneca, like other Stoics, gives the emphasis on the assent as the primary mark of rationality, an ability that makes them different from animals. My analysis of the term shows us the same ambivalence. While on the one hand, Seneca, like other Stoics, attach all characteristics of reasoning as well as moral choice to assent, the epistemological connotations of the term, – accepting something as real – does not provide any evidence of reasoning except the desire or the tendency to assent true impression, but rather from the standpoint of the self.

This is coupled with the fact that Seneca subscribes to the orthodox Stoic view of the unifying notion of the soul in which the traditional accounts of lack of knowledge is rejected by locating emotions to the irrational part of the soul. And thus, Seneca, like other Stoics discusses the problem of knowledge in self-deception with an endless chain of circularity, ending up with the same point; While a passion is discussed as an anti-thesis of reason, the very contrast is built upon the lack of knowing what is rational. Like the majority of the Stoics, Seneca leaves this question unanswered.

A brief re-examination of the problem within the historical background is suggestive to the ambivalence that is present in the rhetoric of Seneca as well as the other Stoics. According to Julia Annas, with the advanced knowledge of human anatomy; Praxagoras influenced the Stoic point of view with the arterial-neural system. Stoics were the first, who were influenced by the medical advances in the Hellenistic period. As a result of these discoveries, “we find emerging a new scientific paradigm of human functioning, that affects philosophical understanding of what is human being” (10). According to Annas, the Stoics application of the pneumatic movement, -breath is the apparent. The advance in human anatomy might provide an answer to ambivalence in Seneca’s account of what human nature is.

7.2 Seneca’s Stoicism

In the history of thought, Stoicism is widely known by their stern morality which is combined strangely with their optimism for goodness by rejecting irrational element in their notion of soul. Throughout the thesis, I have argued that

Seneca fulfills both of the requirements of Stoicism. He accepts unconditionally the monistic account of the soul, as I have argued in chapter 2, section 3. By allowing no middle state between total ignorance and state of virtue, he remains rather Stoic; even for the progressing selves; anyone below the standards of the sage is still counted as fool. And yet, he seems to depart from the Stoic tenet by the feature of love of self as praise. The second point of departure can be observed in his account of irrationality that is discussed both in terms of the nature of the erroneous reasoning, in addition to the one that is accepted by the Stoics. The third is his composition of the wise which is the extension of his nature of love of self. Do these departures make Seneca an eclectic?

What makes Seneca an eclectic is particularly observed in his account of the nature of self-love as praise, and the list of the subsequent goods as possessing the good opinion of others, glory which are rejected by some other Stoics. This feature of self-love is the root of his concept of irrationality which is intensively discussed in three models of self-deception or to be more exact, lack of self-knowledge.

Does the Senecan wise fit to the Stoic standards? We are thus given a state that which, on the one hand, fulfills all the requirement of the Stoic standards by balancing the inner harmony as well as attaining the state of tranquility that all Stoic thinkers of the Roman tradition aim at. Without fear and excessive desire, the Stoic wise accepts, like a dutiful son, the transient nature of everything that exists. And yet, he cannot stop himself loving or being loved. The balance of the two life force within the Senecan wise makes the reader sympathizes him for his humanity; on the one hand, the concern to shun a dangerous man reminds us of the persistent element of the natural self, which saves the Senecan wise from the supra human elements of the wise of the Old Stoics. Secondly, the attitude of the self-sacrificing out of love for the humanity is in harmony with the gratification of the personal need of praise. While the wise does not experience any inner conflict, being torn between these two drives out of ignorance, it makes us sympathize him. In contrast to the other Roman Stoics, Seneca allows self-concealing provided that the self is perfectly aware of this situation and do it for the benefit of both sides. While on the one hand it is not taken as a bad copy or the pretension

of virtue that the progressing types undergo momentarily, it reminds us of the craft of living is that fits to the life standards of Roman society, especially the environment Seneca is closely in touch with. The wise, figure, on the one hand is free from the wry inhumane coolness of the other Stoic wise. On the other hand, however, the apparent flexibility should not be taken as an anti-Stoic. His Stoicism is preserved at all cost.

Seneca's treatment of the notion of craft creates a distance between Seneca and other Stoics; one can find a pseudo art in the ignorant, the perverted forms of loving. Again, the fear of low esteem and destruction and the desire of praise create the same tension, save that in the former case, it is known. An acceptable form of deceit is defended by Socrates upon facing an enemy. Hask sums up Socrates' views as follows; "Those who possess skills and knowledge can pretend to be unskilled or ignorant, but the unskilled and ignorant can not be skilled and knowledgeable"¹³⁵(p.121). As for the craft of the ignorant, Seneca is critical for partly joining Socrates' point regarding the trust in the knowledgeable and the skilled. It is still a blind trust, jeopardizing the ideals of the early Stoics by allowing a room for flexibility.

One can possibly interpret such a tension by looking at the conditions in the particular era Seneca lives as much as he mentions in his letters without trivializing his Stoicism. Throughout the letters, he sounds rather critical to the degenerated public values, the vivid descriptions for tiny details immediately makes us think how much it is difficult to carry out the philosophical inheritance of Stoics without being an eclectic. One can conclude that Seneca's Stoicism is a search for a way to adjust the school principles to the condition of his own time which makes the concern for self-preservation and love as an urgent need to update the old views of the Stoic school.

Another point I shall mention is the notion of irrationality. As I have formerly argued, Seneca synthesizes the non-conscious reconstruction of the fear of death of the popular religion that is familiar in Lucretious' famous philosophical poem with of the Stoic arguments on passions. On the one hand,

¹³⁵ Hask, John, (2000): the issue does not revolve around moral implications of intentional deceit, but the difference between knowing and unknowing. A similar argument is defended by Seneca, without trivializing the main Stoic arguments.

Seneca justifies his reason as a thinker in resorting to the views of other philosophical schools on the basis of the universality of human experience, he does it on the ground of making the experience accessible to the reader. He does not, on the other hand, explicitly say that his notion of irrationality is a departure from the Stoics. While in no other Stoic such keen observations are present, none of the texts of the earlier Stoics are available to prove the vice versa.

7.3 A word on the Structural nature of self

What follows from the discussion on self throughout the thesis is that contradictorily, there exists two models of self regarding motion. In the discussion on the nature of self-knowing in self-love, it has been argued that the self possesses a dynamic movement, especially in shaping his/her own person with already available models from the environment. The self is by nature prone to action. Seneca speaks of this dynamic movement as natural, on the other hand, however, his notion of self also displays a passive element; in my discussion of education, it is argued that throughout the educative process of self-knowing, the self mostly avoids taking risk out of the probable experience of self-deception. Although Seneca speaks of movement as a natural propensity in self-love, it is argued that this movement also refers to a profitable flight from facing the real condition of the self. The self either participates in active city life or spends his/her time at leisure. This is justified by the fact that the self cannot sustain his neutral disposition unless it zealously acts and moves, realizing the goal in multiple pursuits.

Such contradictory tendencies can also be examined in the figure of the wise. While the self of the wise does not fear, sometimes he gets passive mainly for the concern of preventing the self from the state of dissatisfaction. The intentional deception the sage manipulates can be given as an example. In order to avoid risks, we see that the sage also pretends not to see. This can be given as a further example of passive self.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Primary Texts

Chapter 2

ⁱ Inter se ista coniuncta sunt; simul enim conciliatur saluti suae quidque et iuvantia petit, laesura formidat. Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturalis a contrariis aspersiones sunt; sine ulla cogitatione, quae hoc dicitur, sine consilio fit quicquid natura praecepit.

ⁱⁱ Itaque, ut in prioribus epistulis dixi, tenera quoque animalia et materno utero vel ovo modo effusa, quid sit infestum, ipsa protinus norunt et mortifera deviant. Umbram quoque transvolantium reformidant obnoxia avibus raptis viventibus.

ⁱⁱⁱ Interim permittite mihi ea, quae paulo remotius videntur, excutere. Quarebamus, en esset omnibus animalibus constitutionis suae sensus? Esse autem ex eo maxime apparet, quod membra apte et expedite movent non aliter quam in hoc erudita.... Nemo aegre molitur artus suos, nemo in usu sui haesitat. Hoc edita protinus faciunt.

^{iv} Ex quo quidem apparet non usus illa in hoc pernevere, sed naturali amore salutis suae. Et tardum est et varium, quod usus docet; quicquid natura tradit, et aequale omnibus est et statim. Si tanem exigis, dicam quomodo omne animalia perniciosa intellegere conatur? Sentit se carne constare; itaque sentit, quid sit, quo secari caro, qui uri, quo operi possi, quae sint animalia armata ad nocendum; horum spiciem trahit inimicam et hostilem. Inter se ista coniuncta sunt; simul enim conciliatur saluti suae quidque et iuvantia petit, laesura formidat. Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales ad contrariis aspersiones sunt; sine ulla cogitatione, quae hoc dicitur, sine consilio fit, quicquid natura praecepit.

^v Infans sine dentibus est: huic constituoni suae conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes; huic constitutioni conciliatur

^{vi} Quis rerum formator? Quis omnia in uno mersa et materia inerti convoluta discreverit?

^{vii} Alia est aetas infantis, pueri, adulescentis, senis....sic quamvis alia atque alia cuique constitutio sit, conciliatio constitutionis suae eadem est.

^{viii} Facilius natura intellegitur quam enarratur; itaque infans ille quid sit constituo non novit. Constitutionem suam novit. Et quis sit animal nescit, animal esse se sentit. Praeterea ipsam constitutionem suam crasse intelligit et summatim et obscure. Nos quoque animum hebere nos scimus; quid sit animus, ubi sit aut inde necimus. Qualis ad nos animi nostri sensus, quamvis naturam eius ignoremus ac sedem, talis ad omnia animalia constitutionis suae sensus est. Necesse est enim id sentiant, per quod alia quoque sentiunt, necesse est eius sensum habeant, cui parent, a qua reguntur. Nemo non ex hobbis intellegit esse aliquid, quod impetus suos moveat; quid sit illud ignorant. Et conatum sibi esse scit; quis sit aut unde sit, nescit. Sic infantibus quoque animalibusque principalis partis suae sensus est non satis dilucidus nec expressus.

^{ix} 'Decitis' inquit, 'omne animal primum constitutioni suae conciliari, hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse et ideo conciliari hominem sibi non tamquam animali, sed tamquam rationali?'

^x 'Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est. Quomodo ergo infans conciliari constitutioni rationali potest, cum rationalis nondum sit? Uniquae aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, alia puero, alia seni; omne ei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt.

^{xi} Alia est aetas infantis, pueri, adulescentis, sensus; ego tamen idem sum, qui et infans, fui et puer, et adulescens.... Primum sibi, ipsum conciliatur animal, debet enim aliquid esse, ad quod alia referantur Voluptatem peto, cui? Mihi Ergo mei curam ego. Dolorem refugio, pro quo? Pro me. Ergo mei curam ago. Si omnia propter curam mei facio, ante omnia est mei cura. Haec animalus inest cunctis nec inseritur, sed inascitur.

^{xii} Omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei irritatum est; deinde impetum cepit; deinde ad sensum confirmavit hunc impetum. Quid sit ad sensum, dicam. Oportet me ambulare; tunc demum ambulo, cum hoc mihi dixi et adprovavi hanc opinionem meam, oportet me sedere; tunc demum sedeo.

Chapter 3

^{xiii} Ceterum bona quaedam prima existimat, ad quae ex proposito venit, tamquam victoriam, bonos liberos, salutem patriae. Quaedam secunda quae non apparent nisi in rebus adversis, tamquam aequo animo pati morbum magnim, exilium. Quaedam media, quae nihilo magis secundum naturam sunt quam contra naturam, tamquam prudenter ambulare, compositae sedere. Non enim minus secundum naturam est sedere quam stare aut ambulare. Duo illa bona superiora diversa sunt. Prima enim secundum naturam sunt; gaudere liberorum pietate, patriae incolumitate. Secunda contra naturam sunt; fortiter opstare tormentis et sitim perpeti morbo urente praecordia.

^{xiv} Natura enim gloriosa virtus est et anteire priores supit. Alacrior erit pietas, si ad reddenda beneficia cum vincendi spe venerit. Ipsi patribus id volentibus laestisque contigerit, quoniam pleraque sunt, in quibus nostro bono vincimur. Unde certamen tam optabile? Unde tantam felicitatem parentibus, ut fateendor ipsos liberorum beneficiis impares?

^{xv} Vicit Antigonus, qui, cum ingenti proelio supperasset hostem, praemium belli ad patrem transtulit et imperium illi Cypri tradidit. Hoc est regnum nolle regnare, cum possis.

^{xvi} Natura nos cognatos editit, cum ex istem et in eadem gigneret. Haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit....ille versus et in pectore et in ore sit. "homo sum humani nihil, a me alienum puto"

^{xviii} Utrum laudati an laudantis? Utriusque. Meum, qui laudor; quia natura me amantem omnium genuit, et bene fecisse gaudeo, et gratos me invenisse virtutum interpretes laetor; hoc plurimum bonum est, quod grati sunt, sed et meum. Magna scilet aus est si homo mansuetus homini est....Natura nos cognatos editit, cum ex istem et in eadem gigneret. Haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit. Illa aequum iustumque composuit; ex illis constitutione composuit.... Ille versus et in pectore et in ore sit:

homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.

^{xix} Illud quoque occurat, quantum nobis commendationis allatura sit clementiae fama, quam multos venia amicos utiles fecerit. Quid ille Priamus? Non dissimulavit iram et regis genua complexus est, funestam perfusamque cruore fili manum ad os suum retulit, cenavit? Contempsit Romanum patrem, si sibi timuisset; nunc iram compescuit pietas. Dignus fuit cui permitteretur a convivio ad ossa fili legenda discedere; ne hoc quidem permisit benignus interim et comis adulescens... Perierat alter filius, si carnifici conviva non placuisset.

^{xx} Quod Epicurus amico suo potuit promittere, hoc tibi promitto, Luculi. Habebo apud posteros gratiam, possum mecum duratura nomina educere. Vergilius noster dubius memoriam aeternam promisit et praestat....ista voluptas naturalis est, non necessaria;

^{xxi} Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant, quibus ego vehementer assentior. Qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carnaedem sustinere non possent, hanc quam dixi bonam fama ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum; dicuntque, ut, liberis cunctum velimus etiamsi postumi futuri sint propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae tamen esse propter rem etiam detracto usu consulendum.

^{xxii} Scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam, modo speculi vice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem perventerum, ad voluptatem maximam omnium.

^{xxiii} Sed ubi lectio fortior erexit animum et aciteos sub diderunt exempla nobilia, prosile libet in forum, commoderi alteri vocem, alteri operam, etiam si nihil profueram

^{xxiv} Quid tu C. Marium semel consulum-unum enim consulatum accepit, ceteros rapuit- Cum Teutonon Cimbrosque concideret, cum Iugurtutham per Africae deserta sequeretur, tot pericula putas ad pettise virtutis instinctu.? Marius exercitus, Marius ambitio decebat.

^{xxv} Quid illum in Africam, quid in septentrionem, quid in Mithridaten et Armeniam et omnis Asiae angulos traxit? Infinita scilicet cupido crescendi, cum sibi uni parum magnus videretur. Quid C. Caesarem in sua fata pariter ac publica inmisit? Gloria et ambitio et nullus supra ceteros eminendi modus Unum ante se ferre non potuit, cum res republics supra se duos ferret.

^{xxvi} Etiamnunc optas, quod tibi obtavit nutrix tua aut paedagogus aut mater? Nontum intellegis, quantum mali optaverint? O quam inimica nobis sunt vota nostrorum! Eo quidem inimiciora quo cessere felicius. Iam non admiror, si omnia nos a prima peuretia mala secundur.

^{xxvii} Cessat omne studium et liberalia profesi sine ulla frequentia desertis angulis praesident. In rehtorum ac philosophorum scholis solitudo est; at qua celebres culinae sunt, quanta circa nepotum focus iuventus premitur! Transeo puerorum infelicium greges, quos pros transacta convivia aliee cubiculi contumeliae expectant.

^{xxviii} Quibus quisquis se traditit, quaestiuncelas quiden vafra nectit, ceterum ad vitam nihil proficiet, neque fortior fit neque temperantio, neque elatior.

^{xxix} Nudum latro transmittit; etiam in obsessa via pauperi pax est

^{xxx} Deinde nihil habemus, quod cum magno emolumento insidiantis eripi possit. Quam minimum sit in corpore tuo spoliolum. Nemo ad humanum sanguinem propter ipsum venit, aut admoum pauci.

^{xxxi} Hominum cupiditates hient semper et poscant;.....Alius libidine insanit, alius abdomini servit; alius lucri totus est, cuius summam. Non vias, spectat; alius invidia laborat, alius caeca ambitione et in gladios irruente. Adice torporem mentis ac senium et contraria huic inquieti pectoris agitationem tumultusque perpetuos; adice aestimationem sui nimiam et tumorem, ob quae contemnendus est, insolentem.

^{xxxii} Artifices sunt ad captandos superiores

^{xxxiii} Prmurius adulator, cum deprehensus est, proficit.

^{xxxiv} Novae occupationes veteribus substituuntur spes spem excitat, ambitionem ambitio. Miseriarum non finis quaeritur, sed material mutatur. Nostri nos honores torserunt? Plus temporis alieni auferunt. Candidati laborare desimus? Suffragatores incipimus. Accusandi dopesimus molestiam? Iudicandi anciscimur. Iudex desist esse? Quaesitor est. Alienorum bonorum mercennaria procuracione consenuit? Sui opibus distinetur. Marius caligam dimisit? Consolatus exercet.

^{xxxv} Torquet enim adsidua observatio sui et deprendi aliter ac solet metuit. Nec unquam cura solvimur, ubi totiens nos aestemari putamus quotiens aspici; nam et multa incident, quae invitos denudent, et, ut bene deat tanta sui diligentia, non tamen iucunda vita aut secunda est semper sub persona viventium.

^{xxxvi} Magnam rem puta unum hominem agree. Praeter sapientem autem nemo unum agit, ceteri multiformes sumus....hoc ergo a te exige, ut qualem institueris praestare re, talem usque ad exitum serves. Effice ut possis laudari, si minus, ut agnosci.

^{xxxvii} Quibustam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit aspexisse speculum; perturbavit illos tanta mutatio sui; velut in rem praesentem adducti non agnoverunt se. Et quantum ex vera deformitate imago illa speculo repurcussa reddebat? Animus si ostendi, et si in ulla materia perlucere posset, intuentis nos confunderet ater maculosusque et aestuans et distortus et tumidus....Quid si nodus ostenderetur?..... Iratis quidem nulla est formosior effigies quam atrox et horrida quales quae esse etiam videri volunt.

^{xxxviii} Naturam hominis eurat: illa in amorem hortatur, haec in odium; illa prodesse iubet, haec nocere....at ille ingens animus et verus aestimator sui non vindicatur iniuriam, quia non sentit.

CHAPTER 4

^{xxxix} Admirationem nobis parentes auri argentique fecerunt, at teneris infusa cupiditas altius **sed** crevitque nobiscum. Deinde totus populus in alia discors in hoc convenit; hoc susbucunt, hoc suis optant, hoc dis velut rerum humanarum maximum, cum grati videri volunt, consecrant. Denique eo mores redacti sunt, ut pauperitas maledicto probroque sit, contempta divitibus, invisa pauperibus.

^{xl} Alia ob eam rem praeposita dicuntur quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut pecunia, alia autem ob utramque rem ut integri sensus ut bona valeduto.

^{xli} Aequae enim timent, ne apud inferos sint, quam ne nusquam.

^{xlii} Est animus admonendusque naturam huius minimum constituisse. Nemo nascitur dives. Quisquis exit in lucem, iussus est lacte et panno esse contentus; ab his initiis nos regna non capiunt.

^{xliii} Nemo nostrum in altum descendit.

^{xliiv} Abstrahunt a recto divitiae, honores, potentia et cetera, quae opinione nostra cara sunt, pretio sua vilia. Necimus aestimare res, de quibus non cum fama, sed cum rerum natura deliberandum

est; nihil habent ista magnificium, quo mentes in se nostras trahant, praetor hoc, quod mirari illa consuevimus. Non enim quia concupiscenda sunt laudantur, sed conspiscuntur, qua laudata sunt, et cum singulorum facit publicus.

^{xlv} Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam' simul autem cepit intellegiam vel notinem potius. Quam appellant -έννοιάv- illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit quam omnia illa quae prima dilexerat, atque ita cogitationem et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudum et expendetum bonum.

^{xlvi} Inflant animos, superbiam pariunt.

^{xlvii} Tamquam, indifferenti esse dico, id est nec bona nec mala, morbum dolorem, paupertatem exilium, mortem. Nihil horum per se gloriosum est, nihil tamen sine his.

^{xlviii} Sic istis, quae a nobis indifferentia ac media dicuntur, divitiis, viribus formae, honoribus, renoert contra morti, exilio, malae valetudini, doloribus quaeque aila aut minus aut magis pertuimus, aut malia, aut vitus dat boni vel mali nomen.

^{xlix} sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione; itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosae, sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. Est ergo aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahicue animo rectum esse videatur. Laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo efferi rectum esse videatur. *Metu* opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur.

^l Definiunt autem snimi aegrotationem opinioationem vehementem de re non expetenda, twmquam valde expetenda sit, inhaerentem at penitus insitam. Quod autem nascitur ex offensione ita definiunt, opinionem vehementem de re non fugienda; haec autem opnatio est iudicatio se scire quod nesciat. Aegrotationi autem talia quaedam subiecta sunt: avaritia, ambitio, mulierostias, pervicacia, ligurritio, vinolentia, cuppedia et si qua similia. Est autem avaritia opinatio vehemens de pecunia, quasi valde expetenda sit, inhaerens et penitus insita, similisque est eiusdem generis definitio reliquarum.

^{li} et quae diligis, veneraris et que despicias unus exaequabit cinis. Hoc videcilet dicit illa Pythixia oraculis ascripta vox: NOSCE TE: Quid est homo? Quolibet quassu vas et quolibet fragile iactatu.....Qui est homo Imbessilum corpus et fragile, nudum suapte natura inerme, aliene opis indigens ad omnis fortunae contumelias. Proiectum.

^{lii} Exiguum naturat desiderat, opinio immensum. Congeratur in te quicquid multi locupletes possederant. Ultra privatum pecunaie modum fortuna te provehat, auro tegat, purpura vestiat, eo deliciarum opumque perducatur, ut terram marmoribus abscondas, non tantum habere tibi liceat, sed calcare divitias. Aceant statue et picturae et quicquid ars ulla luxuria elaboravit; maiora cupere ab his disces. Naturalia desiderata finita sunt; ex false opinione nascentia ubi desinant, non habent. Nullus enim terminus falso est

^{liii} Quorum tria, nisi fallor, genera sunt; timetur inopia, timentur morbi, timentur quae per vim potentioris eveniunt. Ex his omnibus nihil nos magis concutit, quam quod ex aliena potentia inpendet. Magno enim strepidu et tumultu venit naturalia mala quae rettuli, inopia atque morbus, silentios ubeunt nec oluis nec auribus quicquam teroris incutiunt. Ingens alterius mali pompa est.

^{liv} Est et horum, Lucili, quae appellamus media, grande discrimen non enim sic mors indifferens est, quomodo utrum cappilos pares in pares habeas. Mors inter illa est, quae mala quidem non sunt, tamen habent mali speciem; sui amor est et permanendi conservatique se insita voluntas atque aspernatio dissolutionis, quia videtur multa nobis bona eripere et nos ex hac, cui adsuevimus, rerum copia educere. Illa quoque res morti nos alienat, quod haec iam novimus, illa ad quae transituri sumus, nescimus, qualia sint, et horremus ignota. Naturalis praeterea tenebrarum metus est, in quas adductura mors creditur.

^{lv} Apud Hecationem nostrum iveni cupiditatum finem etiam ad timoris remedia proficere."Desines" inquit, "timere, si sperare desieris." Dices: quomodo ista tam diversa pariter eunt?" ita est mi lucili; cum videantur dissidere, coniuncta sunt. Quemadmodum eadem catena et cutodiam et militem copulat, sic ista, quae tam dissimilia sunt, pariter incedunt: spem metus sequitur. Nec miror ista sic ire; utrumque pendentis animi est, utrumque futuri expectatione solliciti. Maxiam autem utriusque causa est, quod non ad praesentia aptamur, sed cogitationes in longinqua praemittimus. Itaque proventia, maximum bonum condicionis humane, in malum versa est. nos et venturo torquemur et praeredito. Multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, proventia anticipat.

- ^{lvi} Plura sunt, Lucili, quae nos terrent, quam quae premunt, et saepius opinione quam ew laboramus. Non loquor tecum Stoica lingua, sed hac submissiore. Nos enim dicimus omnia ista, quae gemitus mugitusque expriment, levia esse et contemnenda. Omittamus haec magna verba, sed, di boni vera. Illud tibi praecipio, ne sis miser ante tempus, cum illa, quae velut imminetia expavisti, fortasse numquam ventura sint, certe non venerint. Quaedam ergo nos magis torquent quam debent; quaedam ante torquent quam debent; quaedam torquent, cum omnino non debeant. Aut augemus dolorem aut fingimus aut praecipimus
- ^{lvii} Qui eget divitiis, timet pro illis
- ^{lviii} In spem viventibus proximum temptus elabitur subitque aviditas et miserimus ac miserima omnia efficiens metus mortis.
- ^{lix} Lugentem timentemque custodire solemus....tunc mala consilia agitant, tunc aut aliis aut ipsis futura pericula struunt; tunc cupiditates improbas ordinant; tunc quicquid aut metu aut pudore celebrat, animus exponit, tunc audaciam acuit, libidinem inritat, iracundiam instigat.
- ^{lx} Divitias iudicabis bonum: torquebit te pauperitas, quod est miserrimum, false. Quamvis enim multum possideas, tamen, quia aliquis plus habet, tanto tibi videris defici, quanto vincaris. Honores iudicabis bonum: male te habebit ille consul factus, ille etiam reffectus, invidabis, quotiens aliquem in fastis saepis legeris. Tantus erit ambitionis furor, ut nemo tibi post te videatur, si aliquis ante te fuerit. Maximum malum iudicabis mortem, cum in illa nihil sit mali, nisi quod ante ipsam est, timeri.
- ^{lxi} Prima omnium ac potentissima, quod novis semper cupiditatibus occupati non, quid habeamus, sed quid petamus, pectamus; in id, quod appetitur, intentis, quicquid est domi, vile est..Sequitur autem, ut, ubi quod accerepis leve novorum cupiditas fecit, auctor quoque eorum non sit in pretio
- ^{lxii} at usque eo mentem alienant, ut fama pecuniae nos etiam nocitura delectet.
- ^{lxiii} Obrectatio autem est, ea quam intelligi volo, aegritudo ex eo, quod alter quoque potior eo, quod ipse concupiverit.
- ^{lxiv} Invidentiam esse dicunt aegritudinem suspectam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti.
- ^{lxv} Felicitas iracundiam nutrit, ubi aures superbas adstantorum turba circumstetit: "Tibi enim ille respondeat? Non pro fastigio te tuo metiris: ipse te proicis".
- ^{lxvi} In principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam; quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si voluptatem natura possuisseId autem in parvis intelligi potest, quos delectari vedeamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint.
- ^{lxvii} Praeterea duo genera sunt voluptatem. Corporales morbus inhibet, non tamen tollit. Immo, si verum aestimes, incitat; magis iuvat bibere sitientem; gratior est esurienti cibus. Quicquid ex abstinentia congigit, avidius excipitur. Illas vero animi voluptates, quae maiores certioreque sunt, nemo medicus aegro negat. Has quisquis sequitur et bene intelligit, omnia sensum blandimenta contemnit.
- ^{lxviii} Est enim animi elatio suis bonis verisque fidentis
- ^{lxix} causa inperitus homo gaudeat, tamen adfectum eius inpotentem et in diversum statim inclinaturum voluptatem voco, opinione falsi boni motam, inmoderatam inmodicam
- ^{lxx} Quamvis enim ex honesta causa inperitus homo gaudeat, tamen adfectum eius inpotentem et in diversum statim inclinaturum voluptatem voco, opinione falsi boni motam, inmoderatam et inmodicam
- ^{lxxi} Quis negat omnis adfectus a quodam quasi naturali flevere principio? Curam nobis nostri natura mandavit, sed huic ubi nimium indulseris, vitium est. Voluptatem natura necesse rebus admisit, non ita illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere grata nobis illius faceret accessio.
- ^{lxxii} Movet lugentem desiderium eius quem dilexit....(9.2) movet et illud lugentem.
- ^{lxxiii} In utroquo habes, quod te diversa virtute delectet.Adquiesce alterius filii dignitate, alterius quiete pietate!
- ^{lxxiv} Quaeris, unde sint lamentations, unde inmodici fluetus? Per lacrimas argumenta desiderii quaerimus et dolorem non sequimur, sed ostendimus. Nemo tristis sibi est. O infelix stultitia! Est aliqua et doloris ambitio.
- ^{lxxv} Stultius vero nihil est quam fama captare tristitiae et lacrimas adprobare
- ^{lxxvi} Calamitosus est animus futuri anxius et ante miseriam miser, qui sollicitus est, ut ea, quibus delectatur, ad extremum usque permaneant. Nullo enim tempore conquiescet et expectatione

venturi praesentia, quibus frui poterat, amittet. In aequo est autem amissae rei miseratio et timor amittendae.

^{lxxvii} Omnia ex opinione suspensa sunt; non ambitio tantum ad illam rescipit et luxuria, et avaritia ad opinionem dolemus. Tam miser est quisque quam credit.

^{lxxviii} Voluptas ex omni quaeritur. Nullum intra se manet vitium; in avaritiam luxuria praeceps est. Honesti oblivio invasit. Nihil turpest, cuius placet pretium, homo sacra res homini iam per inferanda accipiendaque vulnera nefas erant, is immanis nudus inermisque producitur satisque spectaculi ex homine mors est.

^{lxxix} Quallus ille Homericus Achilles est, modo pronus, modo supinus, in variis habitibus se ipse componens, quod proprium aegri est, nihil diu pati et mutationibus ut remediis uti. Inde peregrinationes suscipiuntur vagae et in via litora pererrantur et modo mari se modo terra experitur semper perstrantibus infesta levitas.

^{lxxx} Nescium ergo homines, quid velint, nisi illo momento, quo volunt; in totum nulli velle aut nolle decretum est. Variatur cotidie iudicium et in contrarium vertitur ac plerisque agitur vita per lusum.

^{lxxxi} Si perpendere te voles, seponere pecuniam, domum, dignitatem intus te ipse considera. Nunc qualis sis, aliis credis.

^{lxxxii} Nemo istorum, quos divitiae honoresque in altiore fastigio ponunt, magnus est. Quare ergo magnus videtur? Cum basi illum sua metiris. Hoc laboramus errore, sic nomos impanitur, quod neminem aestemamus eo, quod est, sed adicimus, iili etae quibus adornatus est.

^{lxxxiii} Nam et horum inprecatio falsos nobis metus inserit et illorum amor male docet bene optando. Mitit enim nos ad longinqua bona et incerta et errantia, cum possimus felicitatem domo promere. Non licet, inquam, ire recta via. Trahunt in pravum parentes, trahunt servi. Nemo errat uni sibi, sed demerentiam spargit in proximos accipitque invicem. Et ideo in singulis vitia populorum sunt, quia illa populus dedit. Dum facit quisque peiorem, factus est.

^{lxxxiv} Interdum populus est, quem timere debeamus; interdum si ea civitatis disciplina est, ut plurima per senatum transigantur, gratiosi in erant viri; interdum singuli, quibus potestas populi et in populum data est. Hos omnes amicos habere operosum est, satis est inimicos non habere.

^{lxxxv} Tria deinde ex praecepto veteri praestanda sunt ut vitentur: odium invidia, contemptus. Quomodo hoc fiat, sapientia sola monstrabit.... verendumque, ne in contemptum nos invidiae timor transferat ne dum calcare nolumus, videamur posse calcari. Multis timendi attulit causas timeri posse...non minus contemni quam suspici nocet.

^{lxxxvi} Beatus vero et virtutis exactae tunc se maxima amat, cum fortissime expertus est, et meduenda ceteris, si alicuius honesti officii pretia sunt, non tantum fert, sed amplectatur multoque audire mavult; tanto melior quam tanto felicior.

^{lxxxvii} Ideo magnus animus conscius sibi melioris naturae dat quidem operam, ut hinc at statione qua positus est, honeste se atque industrie gerat, ceterum nihil horum, quae circa sunt, sum iudicat, sed commodatis utitur, peregrinus et properans

^{lxxxviii} laudare iustitia est; ergo itrusque bonum est

Chapter 5

^{lxxxix} Ad primum bonum revertamur et consideremus id quale sit; animus intuens, vera, peritus fugiendorum, ac petendorum, non ex opinione, sed ex natura pretia rebus inponens.

^{xc} si nihil alicuius ob huc profice, ut amare discas

^{xc} Tu tamen ita cogita, quod ex homine periculum sit ut cogites, quod sit hominis officium. Alterum intueri, ne laedaris alterum ne laedas. Commodis omnium laeteris movearis incommodis et memineris quae praestare debeas, quae cavere. Sic vivendo quid consequaris? Non tene noceant, sed ne fallant

^{xcii} Nam qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult. Deprehendos te oportet emandes.

^{xciii} Non potest enim quisquam nisi ab initio formatus et tota ratione compositus omnes exequi numeros, ut sciat, quando oporteat et in quantum et cum quo et quaedmodum et quare.

^{xciv} Non enim ut cetera, memoriae tradidisse satis est; in opere temptanda sunt. Non est beatus, qui scit illa sed qui facit.

^{xcv} plus quam profligavimus, re start, sed magna pars es profectus velle proficere.

^{xcvi} Quemadmodum omnis natura bonum suum nisi consummata non profert, ita hominis bonum non est in homine, nisi cum illi ratio perfecta est. Quod aeternum hoc bonum? Dicam: liber animus, erectus alia subiciens sibi, se nulli. Hoc bonum actum non recipit infantia, ut pueritia non speret, adulescentia inprobe speret; bene agitur cum senectute, si ad illud longo studio intentoque pervenit. Si hoc est bonum, et intelligibile est.

^{xcvii} Statim a sapientia praeceptum est? Non, ut existimo. Man qui proficit, in numero quidem stultorum est, magno tamen intervallo ab illis diducitur. Inter ipsos quoque proficientes sunt magna discrimina. In tres classes, ut quisbusdam placet, dividuntur; primi sunt, qui sapientiam nondum habent, sed iam in vicinia eius constiterunt. Tamen etiam quod prope est, extra est. Qui sint hi quaeris? Qui omnes iam adfectus ac vitia posuerunt. Quae erant complectenda, didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum suum nondum in usu habent, iam tamen in illa, quae fugerunt, decidere non possunt. Iam ibi sunt, unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se nondum illequed: quod in quadam epistula scripsisse me memini, "scire se nesciunt//; Iam contigit illis bobo suo frui, nondum confidere. Quidam hoc proficientium genus, de quo locutus sum, ita complectundum, ut illos dicant iam effugisse morbum animi, adfectus nondum, et adhuc in lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiae, nisi qui totam eam excussit. Nemo autem illam excussit, nisi qui pro illa sapientiam adsumsit.

^{xcviii} Secundum genus est oorum, qui et maxima animi mala et adfectus deposuerunt, sed ita, ut non sit illis, securitatis suae certa possessio. Possunt enim in aedam relabi. Tertium illud genus extra multa et magna vitia est, sed non extra omnia. Effugit avaritiam, sed iram adhuc sentit; iam non sollicitatur libidine, etiamnunc ambitione; immanis non concupiscunt, sed adhuc timet. Et in ipso metu ad quaedam satis firmus est. Cupbudam cedit. Mortem contemnit, dolorem reformidat. De hoc loco aliquid cogitemus. Bene nobiscum agetur, si in hunc admittitur numerum. Magna felicitate naturae magnaue et adsidua intentione astudii secundum occupatur gradus;

^{xcix} Haec animi inter utrumque dubii nec ad recta fortius nec ad prava vergentis infirmitas qualis sit, non tam semel tibi possum quam per partes ostendere.

^c inquirenti mihi in me quaedam vitia apparebant, Seneca resecta, in aperto posita, quae manu prenderem, quaedam obscuria et in recessu, quaedam non continua sed ex intervallis redeuntia ...non ignore etiam quae in speciem laborant, dignitatem dico et eloquentiae famam et quicquid ad alienum suffragium venit, mora convalescere- et quae veras vires parant et quae ad placendum fucum quodam suborant, expectant annos, donec paulatim colorem diurnitatis ducat-, sed ego vereor, ne consuetudo, quae rebus adfert constantiam, hoc vitium mihi altius figat. Tam molorum quam bonorum longa conversatio amorem induit. Haec animi inter utrumque dubii nec ad recta fortius nec ad prava vergentis infirmitas qualis sit, non tam semel tibi possum quam per partes ostendere. Dicam quae accidant mihi: tu morbo nomen invenies. Tenet me summus amor parsimoniae, fateor; placet non in ambitionem cubile compositum... sed domestica et vilis, nec servata nec sumenda sollicite: placet nibus, quem nec parent familiae nec spectent, non ante multos imperatus dies nec multorum manibus ministratus..... placet minister inclutus et rudis vernual, argentum grave rustici patris sine ullo nomine artificis, et mensa non varietate macularum conspicua nec per multas dominorum elegantium successiones civitati nota., sed in usum posita, quae nullius convivae oculos nec voluptate moretur nec accendat invidia. Cum bene ista placuerunt, praestringit animum apparatus alicuius paedagogii, diligentius quam in tralatu vestita et auro culta mancipia et agmen servorum nitentium Circumfendit me ex longo frugalitatis situ venientem multo splendore luxuria et undique circumsonuit. Paulum titubat acies, facilius adversum illam animum quam oculos attolo. Recedo itaque non peior, sed tristior, nec inter illa frivola mea tam altus incedo tacitusque morsus subit et tubitatio, numquid illa meliora sint. Nihil horum me mutat, nihil tamen non conluit.

^{ci} Placit imperia praeceptorum sequi et in mediam ire rem publicam; placet honores fascisque scilicet purpura aut virgis abductum capessere, sed ut amicis propinquisque et omnibus civibus, omnibus deinde mortalibus praeior utiliorque sim. Promptus compositus sequor Zenonem, Cleanthem, Chrysippum, quorum tamen nemo ad rem publicam accedit, et nemo non misit. Ubi aliquid occurrit aut indignum, ut in omni vita humana multa sunt, aut parum ex facili fluens, aut multum tempositum res non magno aestimande poposcerunt, ad otium convertor et, quemadmodum pecoribus fatigatis quoque, velocius domum gratus est..... Sed ubi lectio fortius erexit animum et aculeus subdiderit exempla nobilia, prosilere libet in forum, commodare alteri vocem, alteri operam, etiam si nihil profuturam, tamen conaturam prodesse alicuius coercere in foro superbiam male recundis rebus elati..... Rursus ubi se animus cogitationum magnitudine levavit, ambitiosus in

verba est atisque ut spirare ita eloqui gestit, et ad dignitatem rerum exit oratio; oblitus tum legis pressiorisque iudicii sublimius feror et ore iam non meo. Ne singula diutius, persequar, in omnibus rebus haec me sequitur banae mentis infirmitas. Quin ne paulatim defluam vereor, aut quod est sollicitius, ne semper casuro similis pendeam et plus fortasse sit quam quod ipse pervideo..... Quis sibi verum dicere aus est? Quis non inter laudantium blandientiumque positus greges plurimum tamen sibi ipse adsentatus est?

^{cii} Hoc oritur ab intemperie animi at cupiditatibus timidis aut parum prosperis, ubi aut non audent, quantum concupiscunt aut non consequuntur et in spem toti prominent; semper instabiles mobilesque sunt, quod necesse est accidere pendentibus. Ad vota sua omni via tendunt et in honesta se ac difficilia docent coguntque, et ubi sine praemio labor est, torquet illos irritum deducus, nec dolent prava, se sed frustra voluisse. Tunc illos et paenitentia coepti tenet et incipiendi timor subreptique illa animi iactatio non invenientis exitum, quia nec imperare cupiditatibus suis nec obsequi possunt, et cunctatio vitae parum se explicantis et inter destituta vota torpentis animi situs. Quae omnia graviora sunt, ubi odio infelicitatis operosae ad otium perfugerunt, ad secreta studia, quae pati non potest animus ad civilia erectus agendique cupidus et natura inquires, parum scilicet in se solaciorum habens; ideo detractis oblectationibus, quas ipsae occupationes discurrentibus, quas ipsae occupationes discurrentibus praebent, domum, solitudinem, parietes non fert, invitus ascipit se sibi relictum.

^{ciii} Contra illos, qui gratiam ac potentiam attolunt, otium ipse suspiciat traditum litteris et animum ab externis ad sua reversum. Ostendat ex constitutione vulgi bestos in illo invidioso fastigio suo trementes et adtonitos longeque aliam de se opinionem habentes wuam ab aliis habetur. Nam quae aliis excelsa videntur ipsis praerupta sunt. Itaque exanimantur et trepidant, quotiens despexerunt in illud magnitudinis suae praecept. Cogitant enim varius casus est in sublimi maxime lubricos. Tunc adpetita formidant et quae illos graves aliis reddit, gravior ipsis felicitas incubat. Tunc laudant otium lene et sui iris, odio est fulgor et fugs a rebus adhuc stantibus quaeritur. Tunc demum videas philosophantis metu et aegrae fortunae sana consilia. Nam quasi ista inter sa contraria sint, bona fortuna et mens bona

^{civ} Fecitque specula huius notae cuius modo rettuli imagines longe maiores reddentia, in quibus digitus brachii mensuram et crassitudinem excederet. Haec autem ita disponebat ut, cum, virum ipse pateretur, aversus omnes asmissarii sui motus in speculo videret ac deinde falsa magnitudine ipsius membri tamquam vera gaudebat.... Nil egit natura quod humane libidini ministeria tam maligna dedit, quod alirium animalium concubitus melius instruxit; inveniam quemadmodum morbo meo et imponam et satisfaciam. Quo nequitiam mean, si ad naturae modum pecco? Id genus speculorum circumponiam mihi quod incredibiliem magnitudinem imaginum reddat. Si liceret mihi, ad verum ista perducerem; quia non licet, mendacio pascar. Obscenitas mea plus quam capit videat et patientiam suam ipsa miretur.”... primo faciem suam cuique casus ostendit. Deinde, cum insitus sui mortalibus amor dulcem aspectum formae suae faceret, saepius ea despexere in quibus effigies suas viderant.

^{cv} Hinc illud est taedium et displicentia sui et nusquam residentis animi volutatio et otii sui tristis atque aegra patientia; utque ubi causas fateri pudet et tormenta introsus egit verecundia, in angusto inclusae cupiditates sine exitu se ipsae strangulant..... Natura enim humanus animus agilis est et pronus ad motus. Grata omnis illi excitandi se abstrahendique materia est, gratior pessimis quibusque ingeniis, quae occupationibus libenter deteruntur.

^{cvi} Solebat Attalus hac imagine uti: “vidisti aliquando canem aperto ore captantem? Quicquid exceperit, protunis integrum devorat et semper ad spem venture hiat. Idem evenit nobis; quicquid expectantibus fortuna proiecit, id sine ulla voluptate demittimus statim, ad rapinam alterius erecti et adtoniti”

^{cvii} Adice nunc, quod nihil honeste fit, nisi cui totus animus incubiit atque adfuit, cui nulla parte sui repugnavit. Ubi autem ad molum acceditur aut peirum metu aut spe bonorum, ad quae pervenire tanti sid devoratio unius mali patientia, dissident inter se iudicia facientis. Hinc est, quod iubeat proposita perficere, illine, quod retrahat et ab re suspecta ac periculosa fugiat. Igitur in diversa distrahitur; si hoc est, perit gloria.

^{cviii} Persarum rex insolentissimus, lacrimas profudit, quod intra centum annos nemo ex tanta iuventute superfuturus esset. At illis admoturus erat fatum ipse qui flebat perditurusque alios in mari, alios in terra, alios proleio..... Quid, quod gaudia quoque eorum trepida sunt? Non enim solidis causis innituntur, sed eadem qua orintur vanitate turbantur.

^{cix} Aliud ex alio iter suscipitur et spectacula spectaculis mutantur. Ut ait Lucretius: hoc se quisque modo semper fugit. Sed quid prodest, si non effugit? Sequitur se ipse et urget gravissimus comes. Itaque scire debemus non locorum vitium esse quo laboramus, sed nostrum.

^{cx} Maxima quaeque bona sollicita sunt nec uli fortunae minus bene quam bona sollicita sunt nec ulli fortunae minus bene quam optimae creditur; alia felicitate ad tuendam felicitatem opus est et pro ipsis quae successere votis vota facienda sunt.

^{cxⁱ} Illud praecipue impedit, quod cito nobis placemus; si invenimus, qui nos bonos viros dicat, qui prudentes, qui sanctos, agnoscimus. Non sumus modica laudatione contenti; quicquid in nos adulatione contenti; quicquid in nos adulatio sine pudore congressit, tamquam debitum prendimus. Optimos nos esse, sapientissimos adfirmatibus adsentimur, cum sciamus illos saepe multa mentiri. Adeoque indulgemus nobis, ut laudari velimus in id, cui contraria cum maxime facimus.

^{cxⁱⁱ} Puto multos potuisse ad sapientiam pervenire, nisi putassent se pervenisse, nisi quedam in se dissimulasent, quedam opertis oculis transiluissent.

Chapter 6

^{cxⁱⁱⁱ} This is why Zeno, (in his treatise *On the Nature of Man*) designates as the end ‘ life in agreement with nature’ (or living agreeably to nature) which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too, Cleanthes in his treatise *On Pleasure*, as also Posidonius and Hecato in his work *On Ends*. Again living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with the experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says, in his first book of his *De Finibus*; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or in other words, in accordance with our won human nature as well as of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with Zeus, lord and the ruler of all that is.

^{cx^{iv}} Aliud est enim dignitates et pretia rerum nosse, aliud articulos, aliud impetus refrenare et ad agenda ire, non ruere. Tunc ergo vita concors sibi est, ubi actio non destituit impetum, impetus est dignitate rei cuius que concipitur proinde remissus vel acrior, prout illa digna est peti.

^{cx^v} Actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit voluntas, ab hac enim est actio. Rursus voluntas non erit recta nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit, ab hoc enim est voluntas. Habitus porro animi non erit optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit et quid et quoque iudicandum sit, exegerit, nisi res ad verum redegerit.

^{cx^{vi}} Non enim exticta in illo indoles naturalis est, sed obscurata et oppressa. Sic quoque temptat resurgere et contra prava nititur, nancta vero praesidium et adiuta praeceptis evalescit, sit amen illam diutina pestis non infecit nec enecuit

^{cx^{vii}} Duae res plurimum roboris animo dant, fides veri et fiducia;

^{cx^{viii}} Naturam quidem mutare difficile est, nec licet semel mixta nascentium elementa convertere.

^{cx^{ix}} Est nec dissimilis tantum ista sed contrarieis curanda sunt, semper ei occuremus quod increverit.

^{cx^x} Crescit licentia spiritus, servitute comminnuitur;... itaque sic inter utrumque regendus est, ut modo frenis utamor modo stimulis. Nihil humile, nihil servile patiat; numquam illi necesse sit rogasse, potius causae suae et prioribus factis et bonis in futurum promissis donetur.... demus operam, ut familiaris sit iis cum quibus contendere solet, ut in certamine adsuescat non necere velle sed vincere. Quotiens superaverit et dignum aliquid laude fecerit, attoli non gestire patiamur.....Dabimus aliquod laxamentum, in desidiis vero otumque non resolvemus et procul a contactu deliciarum retinebimus..... ideo incicis quo plus indulgentur, pupillisque quo plus nicet, corruptor animus est.

^{cx^{xi}} Non resistet offensis cui nihil umquam negatum est, cuius lacrimas sollicita semper mater abstersit, cui de paedagogo satisfactum est.

^{cx^{xii}} Quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis dei: haec duo, quae naturalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt, quod alterum immortale, alterum moltare est, ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis.

^{cxxiii} Eodem loco pone hominea, quos in numerum, pecorum et inanimalum redegit, hebes natura et ignoratio sui Nihil interest inter hos est illa, quoniam illis nulla ratio est, his prava et malo suo atque in perversum solers.

^{cxxiv} Nulli nos vitio natura conciliat; illa integros ac liberos genuit. Illa integros ac liberos genuit. Nihil quo avaritiam nostram inritaret, posuit in aperto. Pedibus aurum argentumque subiecit calcandumque ac pugnandum dedit quidquid est propter quod calcamur ac premimur dedit quidquid est propter premimur.... Haec supra nos itura disposuit; aurum quidem et argendum et propter ista numquam pacem agens ferrum, quasi male nobis comitterentur, abscondit nos in lucem, propter quae pugnaremus, extulimus; nos et causas periculorum et instrumenta disiecto terrarum pondere eruimus; nos fortunae mala nostra traditimus nec erubescimus summa apud nos haberi, quare fuarent ima terrarum.

^{cxxv} Non fuit tam inimica natura, ut cum omnibus aliis animalibus facilem actum vitae daret, homo sulus non posset sine tot artibus vivere.... Sufficit ad it natura, quod poscit. A natura luxuria descivit, quae cotidie se ipsa incitat et tot saeculis crescit et ingenio adiuvat vitia. Primo supervacua coepit concupiscere, inde contraria, novissime animum corpori addixit et illud deservire libidini iussit.

^{cxxvi} "At enim naturale desiderum suorum est." Quis negat, quam diu modicum est? Nam discessu, non solum amissione carissimorum necessarius morsus est et firmissimorum quoque animorum contractio. Sed plus est quod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit.... nec ulli animali longum fetus sui desiderum est nisi homini, quid adest dolori suo nec tantum, quantum sentit, sed quantum constituit, adficetur.

^{cxxvii} Sic nos amantissima nostri natura disposit, ut dolorem aut tolerabilem aut brevem taceret.

^{cxxviii} Ceris eunt cuncta temporibus: nasci debent, crescere, extingui. Quaecumque supra nos vides currere, et haec, quibus inmixti atque inpositi sumus veluti solidissimus carpentur ac desinent. Nulli non senectus sua est; inaequalibus ista spatiis eodem natura dimittit. Quicquid est, non erit, nec prebit, sed resolvetur. Nobis solvi perire est, proxima enim intuemur; ad ulteriora non prospicit mens hebes et quae se corpori addixerit; alioqui fortius finem sui suorumque pateretur, si speraret, ut omnia illa sic vitam mortemque per vices ire et composita dissolvi, dissoluta componi, in hoc opere aeternam artem cuncta temperantis dei.

^{cxxix} Itaque illis in tam incerta sorte inaequalitas est; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Si ratio divina est, nullum autem bonum sine ratione est, bonum omne divinum est. Nillum porro inter divina discrimen est; ergo nec inter bona. Paria itaque sunt et gaudium et fortis atque obstinata tormentorum perpersio; in utroque enim eadem est animi magnitudo, in altero remissa et laeta, in altera pugnax et intenta.

^{cxxx} Patrium deus habet adversus bonus viros animum et illos fortiter amat et "operibus" inquit, "doloribus damnis exagitendur, ut verum colligant robur".

^{cxxxii} ideo quantum potes, te ipse coargue, inquire in te; accusatoris primum partibus fungere, deinde iudicis, movissime deprecatoris.

^{cxxxiii} Nam qui didicit et facientia ac vitanda percepit, nondum sapiens est, nisi in ea, quae didicit, animus eius transfiguratus est

^{cxxxiv} hoc vitabis, hoc facies. Praeterea si expectat tempus, quo per se sciat quid optimum factu sit, interrim errabit et errando inpediatur, quo minus ad illud perveniat, quo possit se esse contentus

^{cxxxv} Nam hic quoque quoque doctus quidem est facere quae debet, sed haec non satis perspicit. Non enim tantum adfectibus inpedimur, quo minus probanda faciamus, sed inperitia inveniendi quid quaque res exigat

^{cxxxvi} Nulla autem causa vitae est nullus miseriarum modus, si timeatur quantum potest; hic prudential prosit. Hic hobore animi evidentem quoque metum respue. Si minus, vitio vitium repelle; spe metum tempera. Nihil tam certum est ex his, quae timentur, ut non certius sit et formidata subsidere et sperata decipere. ... Ergo spem ac metum examina, et quotiens incerta erunt omnia, tibi fave; crede quod mavis. Si lures habet sententias metus, nihilominus in hac partem potius inclina et perturbare te tesine, ac subinde hoc in animo volve, maiorem partem mortalium, cum illi, cum illi nec sit quicquam mali nec pro certo futurum sit aestuare ac discurrere. Nemo enim resistit sibi, cum coepit inpedi, nec timorem suum redigit ad verum. Nemo dicit; "vanus auctor est, vanus haec aut finxi aut credi." Damus nos auare ferendos. Expavescimus dubia pro certis. Non servamus modum rerum.

^{cxxxvii} Mulum et in se recedendum est; conversation enim dissimilum bene composite disturbat et renovat adfectus et quicquid imbecillium in animo nec percuratum est exulcerat. Miscenda tamen ista et alternanda sunt solitudo et frequentia. Illa nobis faciet hominum desiderium, haec nostrum, et erit altera alterius remedium; odium turbae sanabit solitudo, taedium solitudinis turba.... Danda est animis remissio; meliores acrioresque requieti surgent.

^{cxxxviii} solus sapiens scit amare

^{cxxxix} quae causa in speculo sciet sapiens

^{cxl} sapientem se ipso esse contentum. Sed tamen et amicum habere vult et vicinum et contubernalem quamvis sibi ipse sufficiat. Vide quam sit de consensu est si illi manum aut morbus aut hostis exciderit, si quis oculum vel oculos casus excusserit, reliquiare illi suae satisfaciunt, et erit in minuto corpore et amputatio tam laetus, quam integro fuit. Sed quae si desunt, non desiderat, non deesse mavult.

^{cxli} Quamdiu quidem ille licet suo arbitrio res suas ordinare, se contentus est et liberos tollit; se contentus est et tamen non viveret, si foret sine homine victurus.

^{cxlii} Hoc quoque sibi animus, ubi utilitas suorum exigit, nec tantum, si vult mori, sed si coepit, intermittit et suis se commodet. Ingenitae animi est aliena causa ad vitam reverti, quod magni viri saepe fecerunt. Sed hoc quoque summae humanitatis existimo, senectutem suam, cuius maximus fructus est securior sui tutela et vitae usus animosior, attentius custodire, si scias alicui tuorum esse dulce, utile optabile. Habet praeterea in se non mediocre ista res gaudium et mercedem; quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam carum esse, ut propter hoc tibi carior fias? Potest itaque Paulina mea non tantum suum mihi timorem imputare, sed etiam meum

^{cxliii} ad amicitiam fert illum nulla utilitas sua, sed naturalis irritatio

^{cxliv} Non dubie habet aliquid simile admicitiae affectus amantium; possis dicere illam esse insanam amicitiam. Numquid ergo quisquam amat lucri causa? Numquid ambitionis aut gloriae? Ipse perse amor omnium aliarum reum negligens animos in cupiditatem formae non sine spe mutua caritatis accendit. "Quomodo ergo ad illam accedit?" Quomodo ad rem pulcherrimam, non lucro captus nec varietate fortunae perterritus

^{cxlv} Prosunt inter sed boni; exercent enim virtutes et sapientiam in suo statu continent. Desiderat uterque aliquem, cum quo conferat, cum quo quaterat. Peri totum luctandi usus exercet..... Opus est et, sapienti agitatione virtutum; ita quemadmodum ipse se movet, sic movetur ab alio sapiente Quid sapiens sapienti proderit? Impetum illi dabit, occasiones actionum honestarum commonstrabit. Praeter haec aliquas cogitationes suas extrimit.; docebit quae, inveniunt et quo animus eius excurrat.

^{cxlvi} Adice nunc, quod omnibus inter se virtutibus amicitia est. Itaque prodest, qui virtutes alicuius pariter sui amat amadasque invicem praestat. Similia delectant, itaque ubi honesta sunt et probare ac probari sciunt. Etiam nunc sapientis animus perite movere nemo alius potest quam sapiens, sicut hominem movere rationaliter non potest nisi homo quomodo ergo ad rationem movendam ratione opus est, sic ut moveatur ratio perfecta, opus est ratione perfecta.

^{cxlvii} Quid ergo illa laudata et omnibus praeferenda artibus robusque philosophia praestabit? Scilecet ut malis tibi placere quam populo ut aestimes iudicia.

^{cxlviii} Nihilominus, cum sit amicorum amatissimus, cum illos sibi comparet, saepe praeferat.

^{cxlix} Sagittarius non aliquando ferire debet, sed aliquando deerrare. Non est ars, quae ad effectum casu venit. Sapientia ars est; certum petat, eligat profecturos, ab is, quos desperavit, recedat, non tamen cito relinquat et in ipsa desperatione extrema remedia temtet.

^{cl} Itaque sapiens numquam potentium iras provocabit, immo declinabit non aliter quam in navigans procellam ... et ille cautior peritos locorum rogat, quis aestus, sit, quae signa dent nubes; longe ab illa regione verticibus infami cursum tenet. Idem facit sapiens; nocituram potentiam vitat, hoc primum cavens ne vitare videatur. Pars enim securitatis et in hoc est, non ex professo esse petere, quia, quae quis fugit, damnat.

Appendix B: Türkçe Özet

Bu tez çalışmasında Stoacı Seneca' nın benlik kavramı ve kendini kandırma konuları ele alınmıştır. Her iki tartışma ise Antik dönemin en önemli felsefe problemlerinden biri olan kendini bilme problemi çerçevesinde ele alınır.

Bu tez çalışmasında kendini bilme problemine temel olan benlik kavramı 'kendini sevme' Seneca' nın mektupları ve düz yazılarında Latince 'amor-sui' kelimesinin çevirisidir. 'Kendini sevme' temel olarak tüm canlı ve cansız varlıkların sahip olduğu ve yapısına göre farklı oluşum gösteren doğuştan gelen bir özelliktir. Hayvanlarda duyumlara dayalı iken, rasyonel olan insan doğasında ise rasyonel bir oluşum gösterir. Benlik subjektif bir yapıya sahiptir; 'kendini sevme' çocukluk döneminde içgüdüsel olarak yiyecek, içecek vs. gibi bedensel ihtiyaçlarını sağlamaya yönelme, hastalık ve buna benzer fiziksel zararlardan kaçınma özellikleri ile tanımlanır. Benliğin bu özellikleri genel hatlarıyla Stoacı benliğin- 'Oikeion'- özelliklerini taşır. 'Kendini sevme' nin iki özelliği vardır. Birincisi ben merkezli sevgi ikincisi ise algıladığını kendine has yaratıcı bir şekilde düşünce ve eyleme aktarmasıdır; bu özellik ise Latince 'conciliari' kelimesinin karşılığı olan kendini betimleme olarak çevrilmiştir.

Benliğin yapısını iki temel öge oluşturur; algılama eylemi ile varlığın sürdürme eylemi aynı anda oluşur. Bu tez çalışmasında algının etken bir yapısı olduğu vurgulanır. Algılanan şey aslında herşeyin ben merkezli algılanmasıdır. İnsanlar ve hayvanlar etrafındaki nesnelere işlevsel ve kendi varlığının bir uzantısı olarak algırlar. Örneğin hangi uzuvlarının ne işe yaradığını, hangi eylemde ne olduğu, ve yine aynı şekilde hangi hayvanların zararlı olduğu ben merkezli perspektiften çıkar. Kısacası bu perspektifin- ben merkezli sevginin- dışında hiçbirsey bilinmeyeceği, benliğin çekirdek yapısı tartışmasında vurgulanır. İçgüdüsel bilme bu yapı ve özelliklerle açıklanır.

İnsanların ussal gelişimini tamamladığı yetişkinlik döneminde ise aynı yapıda aynı özelliklerin daha kompleks bir şekilde benliği oluşturduğu tartışılır. Bu tez çalışmasında yetişkinlik döneminde ilk olarak bilme eyleminin ussal

olduğu kadar çevrenin şekillendirmesi ilede oluştuğunu, ikinci olarak ta bilme eyleminin subjektif yapının dışında olmadığı ve üçüncü olarak ta bilme eyleminin yaratıcı belirleyici kalıpta süregeldiği iddia edilir. Tez çalışmasında bu yaratıcı belirleyici özellik Latince ‘conciliari’ ve ‘fingere’ kelimelerinin karşılığı olarak çevrilmiştir; çekirdek yapıda olduğu gibi benlik kendisine en yakın olan kişileri örnek alarak içinde büyüdüğü kültürün normlarının belirlediği modellerle kendini şekillendirir. Çevre benlik arasındaki aktif etkileşiminden yapısı ve çekirdek düzeydeki özelliklerden yola çıkılarak övgünün yetişkin benliğin temel özelliği olduğu savunulur. Yetişkin kişiler diğerinin gözünde kendini sevip bilebilir. Bu tez çalışmasında diğerini memnun ederek onların övgüsünü ve sevgisini kazanarak bir kişinin kendini sevdiği tartışılır. Kısacası doğuştan olanın yanısıra benliğin varoluşu bir yapısı vardır. Çocuk, aile ve diğer kişilere olan sevgi kendini seven benliğin bir yansıması ve uzanımı olarak ele alınır. Örneğin oğullarının başarıları bir babaya övünç kaynağı olduğu gibi saygın kimliğinde belirler. Her ne kadar da övgü özelliği ile Seneca diğer Stoacılar gibi ayrılıyor olsa da toplumsal yaşam ve adaleti doğuştan gelen sevmeye ve koruma içgüdüleri ile açıklarken Stoacı zihniyeti koruyor. Bu tez çalışmasında subjektif eğilimli sevginin diğerine nasıl yansıdığını övgü ile açıklarken Seneca’nın diğer Stoacıların yazımlarındaki açıklanamayan boşlukları doldurduğu savunulur.

Bu tezde kendini bilme daha çok benliğin temel özelliklerini anlama, ve bunun ışığında üs vurma ve davranma ile açıklanır. Diğer Stoacılar gibi Seneca’da kendini bilmenin doğal bir fiziksel gelişim içerisinde oluştuğunu söyler. Fiziksel gelişimin 7. yılında insan kavramı oluşturma, inanç ve yargılayabilme ve bunu dil ile ifade etme gibi kendi doğalarına uygun üs kabiliyetlerini geliştirir. Seneca, bu dönemde doğal olan kendini sevmeye prensibinden başlayarak insanların rasyonel doğasını keşfettiğini söyler. Kendini bilme eylemi doğal fiziksel gelişim içinde mümkün görülmesine rağmen, Seneca insanlığın çoğunun kendi doğasını bilemediğini belirtir. Suç, zina, yalancılık, iki yüzlülük, hainlik, mal-mülk, erk düşkünlüğü vs. gibi ahlak problemlerinin temelinde ise kendini bilememe probleminin olduğu tartışılır. Kişiler kendini kandırarak patolojik olarak kendilerini severler. Stoacı Seneca yukarıda

belirlenen durumların herbirine duygu adını verip, patolojik sevgiyi rasyonel doğaya aykırı benlik betimlemeleri olarak tartışır.

Tezin dördüncü ünitesinde insanların doğasından sapma olarak nitelendirilen kendini kandırarak sevme iki temel konu üzerinde adım adım tartışılır. Kendini diğerinden övgü arayarak seven bencil benlikler aslında kendini kandırır. Bunlardan ilki hayvan veya insan tüm varlıkların sahip olduğu kendini sevme prensibidir. Çekirdek yapıda olduğu gibi yetişkinler de kendine yararlı olanı ve hoş görüneni doğru ve iyi olarak kabul edip tam tersini de reddeder. Kişiler kendini ve diğerini nesnelere değer yükleyerek severler. Çevre ve benlik arasındaki etkileşim ile benlik kendi varlığının farkında olduğundan diğerinin betimlemesi ve övgüsü ile kendini tanıır. Nesnelere ve kişiler hakkındaki bilgi onların kişi üzerinde yarattığı etkiden kaynaklanır. Öte yandan fiziksel gelişim rasyonel yapının bilinmesini de içerir. Diğer Stoacılar gibi Seneca'da rasyonelliği Latincesi 'Principal animi' Yunancası 'hegemonikon' kelimelerinin karşılığı olan 'temel idareci' kavramı ile de anlatır. Görme, işitme ve diğer duyuşsal eylemlerin yanısıra duygu ve düşünceleri dile aktarma ve kavram oluşturma vs. gibi eylemleri temel usun gönderdiği komut ile olduğunu savunur. Kısacası rasyonel benliğin monistik bir yapısı vardır. Bu yapıda irrasyonelliğe yer yoktur. Rasyonellik özelliğinin vurgulandığı ikinci bir kavram ise Latincesi 'adsensio' Yunanca karşılığı 'phroaesis' olan 'bilinçli tercih' tir. Seneca'ya göre 'bilinçli tercih' insanları hayvanlardan ayıran en önemli rasyonellik özelliğidir; tüm ahlaki yargılar bu iki temel rasyonellik ve kendini sevme ilkesinin oluşturduğu zıtlık üzerine kurulur. Zina suç, yalancılık ve yüzeysellik doğasına aykırı olarak kendini seven benliklerin tipik semtomlarıdır.

Tezin dördüncü ünitesinde kendini bilme ve kandırma probleminin sebepleri adım adım tartışılır. Seneca'nın mektuplarında kişilerin neden çarpık ve ahlaksız bir şekilde diğerine zarar vererek sevdiğini tartışır. Fiziksel gelişim her ne kadar da kendi doğasının bilinmesini mümkün kılıyorsa da, çoğunluğun bunu başaramadığını ve kendi doğasından saptığını anlatır. Kişiler körükörüne etrafındaki şeylere değer yükleyerek kendilerini severler. Kendiliğinden hiç değeri olmayan mal-mülk, politik ünvan, toprak ve buna benzer nesnelere ile diğerinden övünç ararken, övgü ve saygınlık beklediği kişilere karşı tam tersine bir tavır

sergiler. Tüm ahlak problemlerinin özünde sevgi ve saygınlık arayan, fakat bunu doğasından sapmış bir şekilde yapan patolojik bir benlik yatar. Politik ünvanların, mal-mülkün ve erkin kendine ait bir değeri yoktur. Değer yükledikleri için değerli görünürler. İnsanların kendini severken aşırılığa gitmesinin en önemli özelliğidir. Değer yükleyerek sevme özelliği bilinemediği için zamanla alışkanlık yoluyla doğasından sapıp aşırılığa kaçır. Seneca kendini kandırmanın toplumsal olduğunu ve çoğunluğun kendi doğasını bilmemesinden kaynaklandığını anlatır. Öfkenin yanısıra üzüntünün de bu probleme dayalı olduğunu vurgular; çünkü istediğini elde edemediği zaman sinirlenir, üzülür. Övgü arzusunu da bu nesnelere değer yükleyerek gerçekleştirilmeye çalıştığı için, başarısızlık anında hayal kırıklığına uğrar. Kıskançlık ve öfke ile özünde övgü arayışı içinde olan doğasından sapmış kişi diğerine zarar bile verdirebilir. Nesnelere yüklediği değerden başlayarak kendini seven, övgülü imajını kurgulayan benlik, hayal kırıklığına uğradığı zaman kendini değersiz görür.

Kendini kandıran bencil benliğin doğası ile ilgili bilemediği ikinci önemli şey ise ölümlülüğüdür. Nesnelere olumsuz anlam yükleyerek kendine zarar veren herşeyi reddeden benlik ölümlülüğünde farkında değildir. Sınırsız arzular, öfke ve üzüntü buna bir örnek olarak verilebilir. Kendini bilmeyen ve kendini kandıran benliğin usa vurma modeli ise arzu ve korkularının birbirine karışması şeklinde tartışılır. Doğası gereği hayal kırıklığına uğradığı zaman kötü gördüğü şeyleri reddederken aslında olmak istediği kişiyi arar. Övgü kaybetme korkularına arzularını yapılandırır.

Aynı usa vurma modeli zevk ve acı unsurunun yapılanmasında da gözlemlenebilir. Hoşnutsuzluktan ortaya çıkan kriz ile doğasından sapmış benlik kötü, acı veren şeyleri zevk peşinde koşarak, zevkli olanı elde etmeye çalışarak aşmaya çalışır. Çok sevdiğimiz kişinin ölümüne tutulan yas ve hissedilen acı ise bencil sevginin bir uzanımıdır. Kaybettiği kişi için yas tuttuğunu sanıyorken aslında ölen kişinin sağladığı avantajların kaybına üzülüp yas tuttuğunun farkında değildir. Acı, doğal arzusu gerçekleşmeyen benliğin patolojik bir durumudur. Seneca öfke fenomenini acı ve zevk unsurunun yapılanması ile de anlatır.

Beşinci ünite de kendini bilmenin yolları ve gerekliliklerinin yanı sıra farklı benlik tiplerinde tartışılır. Seneca kendini bilmenin ancak eğitim yolu ile

mümkün olabileceğini söyler. Kendini bilmenin ikinci ve üçüncü şartı ise durumunun farkında varılması, bunu aşmayı istemesi ve çaba göstermesidir.

Eğitime ve tüm gerekliliklerin yerine getirilmesine ve doğal olarak mümkün olmasına rağmen bilgi dışında kimsenin kendini bilerek sevmesinin hemen hemen mümkün olmadığı tartışılır. Durumunun farkında olmayan çoğu benliğin yanı sıra, eğitim yoluyla yanılığının ve doğal olan benliğini gerçekleştiremediğinin farkına varan benlik betimlemeleri bu tez çalışmasında ele alınır. İkinci benlik tiplerinde üzüntü, üçüncüsünde ise korku duygularının durum bilgisi ile çelişki yaratarak kendini kandırmaya yol açtığı savunulur.

İkinci benlik tartışmasında diğer insanları kendine minnettar bırakarak kendini sevmeye çalışan ama yinede kısa bir anda nesnelere değer yükleyerek kendini kandıran eğitilmiş kişilerin nasıl yanılığa düşüp kendini bilmeyi başaramadığı tartışılır. Benliğin yaşadığı yıkımın temelinde durumunun farkında olması başka bir değişle kendini bilerek övgü arayışının başarısızlığının farkındalığı vardır. Hayal kırıklığı ile inzivaya çekilen eğitilmiş benliğin kendini kandırmasında rol oynayan ikinci bir etken ise devinimli doğasına ters düşen inaktif durumdur. Eğitilmiş benlik inzivaya çekilerek hem doğal ihtiyacını gerçekleştirmemiş hemde doğal devinimden yoksun kalmıştır. Beşinci üitedeki tartışmalarda eğitilmiş benliğin kendini kandırma betimlemesinde düz yazı ve okuma gibi entelektüel eylemlerde de övgü dolu hayali imajının kurgulanması ile oluştuğu anlaşılır. Övgü doğal olmasına rağmen kurgulanan hayali imaj nesnelere değer yüklenerek yapıldığı için, bu deneyim bir kandırmacadan ibarettir.

Üçüncü benlikteki kendini kandırma (ve kendini bilememe) korku duygusu ve yine kendi durumunu bilmesinden kaynaklanan gerginlikle ortaya çıkar. Başarısızlığın bilinci bir sonraki erdemli olma kendini bilme denemelerinde korku yaratır. Toplumsal uğraşlar ve diğerleri söz konusu olduğu zaman üçüncü benlik daha öncekiler gibi kendini kandırarak sever. Senecanın mektupları ve düz yazılarında aslında eğitilmiş tiplerinde maddelere değer yükleyerek sevdiği anlatılır. Çünkü benlik toplumsal uğraşlarda birdenbire prensiplerine karşı çıkar. Çoğu şeyin değersiz olduğunu ve onda üzüntüye sebep olacağını bilmesine rağmen yinede zayıf düştüğü tartışılır. Seneca bu tip zayıf benliklerin inzivaya

çekilmesinde de de başarısızlıkla yüzleşmek istememesi, kendinden kaçması arasında bir bağ kurarak açıklar.

Birinci tipte olduğu gibi ikinci ve üçüncü benlik betimlemelerinde de yine aynı tip usa vurma modeli vardır. Zevk ve acının yapılanması da aynı şekilde tartışılır. Eğitimli kişilerde kendini kandırmanın en belirgin özelliklerinden biri ise iki yüzlülük, ve istikrarsızlıktır. Seneca bunu daha çok hoşnutsuzluk durumunda benliğin yaratıcı ve düzenleyici özelliğinin farkında olmadan oluşturduğu bir eğilimle açıklar. Benlikler kendini övgü arayarak severken, başarısızlık anında gerçeklerden kaçan bir tutum takınırlar; eğitimli benlikler tıpkı eğitimsizler gibi görüneni değil daha çok görmek istediklerine inanırlar ve görmek ve olmak istedikleri şeyleri gerçek olarak kabul ederler.

Tezin altıncı ünitesinde felsefe eğitiminin benlik eğitiminin vazgeçilmez bir parçası olduğu tartışılır. Seneca felsefe eğitiminin benlik eğitimine temel oluşturduğunu savunurken üç temel noktaya değinir. Bunlardan birincisi ahlaksızlığa sebep olan ruh hali, ikincisi diğer kişilerin problemidir. Diğer kişiler söz konusu olduğu zaman kendini bilme adaletsizlik bilgisinide birlikte getirir; Her bireyin kendini bilemediği gibi teorik olarak bilen kişinin de dejenere değerlere bağlı kalmadan, kendini kandırmadan sevmesinin de zor olduğu savunulur. Üçüncüsü ise doğuştan var olan ve de her durumda avantajlı ve hoş görüneni doğru olarak algılayan eğilimin pratikte şekillendirilmesidir. Çünkü Seneca'ya göre gerçeğin bilinmesi ile pratikte uygulanması arasında fark vardır. Son olarak yukarıda belirtilen doğal eğiliminde doğru şekillendirilmesi pratik benlik eğitiminin temelini oluşturur. Pratik Felsefe eğitimi bilinç ve eğitime rağmen kendini kandırmaya meyillenen benliğin hoşnutsuzluk ve doyumsuzluğunu engellemeyi hedefler.

Birinci aşama çocuk eğitiminden başlar. Seneca yukarıda anlatılan olası durumları ödül ve ve caydırıcı ceza ile çocukları eğiterek başlaması gerektiğini savunur. Tezde doğal eğilimin diğerlerine karşı agresif bir tutuma dönüşmemesi için çok aşırıya kaçmamak kaydı ile engellenmeye yönelik bir pratik eğitim savunulur. Öte yandan çocuk hedeflenen davranışları gösterdiği zaman ise ödüllendirilir. Övgünün tatmin edilmediği ve hoşnut olmadığı zaman çocuklarda

tam tersine bir tutumla istediklerini elde etme eğilimi olduğundan ne cezanın nede ödülün aşırı yapılmaması gerektiği savunulur.

İkinci aşama eğitim yetişkin dönemde başlar. Diğer Stoalar gibi Seneca doğa kanunları ile rasyonel benliğin ne olduğu ve ne olmadığını öğretir. Birinci aşamada olduğu gibi benlik doğal ihtiyaçlarından mahrum edilmeden övgü yoluyla eğitilir. İlk olarak kendini seven rasyonel benliğin ne olduğu tartışılır. Seneca insanların hayvanlardan farklı olarak yaratıcı usa vurma özelliğinin doğadaki evrensel Usun bir benzeri olduğunu ve bunun bir parçası olduğunu anlatır. Gerçek övgünün kaynağının aslında kendi doğasını anlamaktan geçtiği tartışılır. Evrensel us ile ölümlü rasyonel usun arasındaki benzerlik baba-oğul sevgisi ile ele alınır. Öte yandan öfke ve yas, ihtiras ve hırs kıskançlık rasyonel varlıkları hayvanlardan farklı kılmaz. Bu duygular doğada da yoktur. Evrensel us evladının zarar görmesini istemeyen şefkatli bir baba gibi varlığı için gerekli olan her şeyi doğada sunar. Altın gümüş vs. gibi zarar görmesine sebep olacak herşeyi de derinliklerine saklar. Doğadaki sevgi arıdır. Seneca hayvan davranışlarından örnekler vererek sevginin evrenselliğini ve aynı zamanda yas, erk ihtiras gibi seylerinde aslında var olmadığını anlatır. Ölüm tanrılarda dahil olmak üzere tüm varlıkların deneyimlediği doğal bir yasadır. Korkuların da temelinde bu yatar. Bu yasalara uymayan ve doğasını anlamayan insanlar sonunda zarar görür. Seneca bu doğal yasalarının benlikle ilgili gerçekler olarak özümsemesini ve bu bilgiler ışığında kişilerin nasıl bir yanılgıya kapıldığını görmesini ister.

Pratik eğitim, aile bireyler sevgisinden başlayıp tanrı sevgisinin nasıl olması gerektiğini anlatan yazılı tavsiyeler ve patalojik durumlara düşmeden insan iradesini güçlendirmeye yönelik terapeitik sözlü stratejilerden oluşur. Diğerlerinde olduğu gibi benliğin hoşnutsuz ve tatminsiz bir duruma düşürmeden eğitilmesi gerekliliği üzerinde durulur.

Tezin son kısmında ise kendini seven bilge figürü tartışılır. Diğer Stoacılar gibi Seneca' da sadece bilgenin kendini doğasına uygun olarak sevebileceğini savunur. Kendini bilerek sevmek ne demektir?

Bilge kişide aşırı korku ve arzu, ihtiras, zevk düşkünlüğü yoktur. Benlik bilgisi kendi doğası da dahil olmak üzere herşeyin gelip geçici olduğunu, ve

anlam deęer ykleyerek sevildięini ierir. Bilge kiři bu bilgiyi ncelikle en yakınlarını daha sonra dięerlerini severken takındıęı tavır ile sergiler. Her insan gibi sosyalleři, evlenir oluk ocuk sahibi olur. Fakat lmn gereklięini kabul ettięi iin bilge en ok sevdięi kiřinin lmne karři dayanıklıdır. Bir uzvunu evini ve barkını kaybettięi zaman da aři yasa girmez. Dięerlerinin de ruhunu anladıęı iin kendini severken aři kıskanlıęa ve dřmanlıęa sebep olacak her trl tavırdan kaınır. nk nesnelere dayalı sevginin dięerinin kıskanması ve kendini hor grmesi ile kendisine zarar vereceęini bilir. te yandan bilgenin sevgisi vgden yoksun deęildir. Bilge kendini bilmeyenlere karři temkinli ve saygılı davranır. Yapılan hataları grmemezlikten gelerek kendini korumaya alışır. Sadece kendisi gibi birini bulabildięi zaman arkadařlık kurabilir. Bilge her insan gibi vg arayışı iindedir. Memleketini ve insanları kendisi gibi sevdięi iin canını riske atabilir. Bunu da korkuya kapılmadan yapar.

Tezin son kısmında ise kendini bilme problemine baęlantılı olarak kendini sevme, kendini kandırma konularından ıkan sonular zetlenir. Bunların ilki Seneca'nın mektuplarında tartıřılan iki ayrı doęal benlięin uyuřmadıęıdır. Seneca insan doęasını hem illusyona meyilli kendini sevme prensibi hemde temel s ve bilinli seim gibi zelliklerle aıklar. Kendini bilme problemin zmlenmemesinin znde bu iki doęal benlik tasvirlerinin uyuřmazlıęı vardır. Bu ikilem yaratıcı řekillendirme, usa vurma ve benlik eęitiminde de gzlemlenebilir.

Sonu kısmında tartıřılan ikinci nemli nokta benlięin yapısı zerinedir. Benlięin doęal yapısında varolan yaratıcı, dıřa dnk bir devinim olmasına raęmen eęitim kısmında tartıřıldıęı gibi kendini bilme abasında riskleri gze almayan edilgen bir eęilim vardır.

nc nemli nokta ise Seneca'nın Stoacılıęıdır. Seneca bir Stoa'cımı yoksa bir eklektikmidir. Her ne kadar vg zellięinin doęallıęı ve irrasyonellik betimlemesi Seneca'yı Stoacılıktan uzaklařtırıyor olsa bile Seneca duygu tasviri ve katı ahlakılıęı ile Stoacılıęını korur.

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