CIVIL SOCIETY AT THE BOUNDARIES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SPHERES: THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF THREE CSOs IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

Civil Society at the Boundaries of Public and Private Spheres:
The Internal Dynamics of Three CSOs in Turkey

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This study tries to understand the internal dynamics of the civil society organizations in Turkey on the experiences of three CSOs: the Ankara Branches of KADER, MAZLUMDER and IMO by focusing on the intra–organizational practices (the decision making processes, elections, general meetings, division of labor, basic conflicts and divergences, the disagreements, the way of deliberation and consensus). It tries to shed light on the transformative potential of the CSO's in public sphere as civil organizations themselves in time both in the sense of their political stances and organizational structure.

The research was designed in the form of a case study including both the depth interwiews and participant observations. In this framework, ten depth-interviews were made with members having different qualities for each of these CSOs and participant observations were realized in the general meetings, elections and activities of these organizations.

Since the aim of this study is to understand the contribution of the CSOs to the public sphere, the research findings were interpreted and considered basically in the light of the two main theoretical positions: the deliberative (Habermas) and agonistic (Laclau and Mouffe) democracy. The study espoused a post-structuralist conception of democracy combined with a weakened model of deliberation and dialogue pointing out the requirement of the existential publicity of man (Arendt) in the world.

In this context, this study tries to discuss the following questions within the framework of the public sphere experience of the three CSOs throughout the thesis. Is the concept of civil society a proper concept for understanding the peculiar experience of Turkey (with reference to the historical context of civil associational life in Turkey and the recent civil resurrection)? Do civil organizations have the capacity to serve for deepening and consolidation of democracy in public sphere? Are these civil organizations democratic and participatory with regard to their intra-organizational structures and decision-making processes? And, more importantly, do they have any capacity to influence the process of democratic transformation in Turkey?

ÖZ

Kamusal ve Özelin Sınırlarında Sivil Toplum:
Türkiye'deki Üç STK'nın İçsel Dinamikleri

Cengiz, Kurtuluş
Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Bahattin Akşit
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Bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin içsel dinamiklerini (kara alma süreçleri, seçimler, genel kurul toplantıları, iş bölümü, temel çatışmalar, ayrışma, uzlaşma ve uzlaşmazlık noktaları ve müzakere süreçleri) üç sivil toplum örgütünün (KADER MAZLUMDER ve IMO Ankara Şubeleri) deneyimi çerçevesinde anlamaya ve sivil toplum örgütlerinin zaman içinde hem politik duruşları hem de örgütsel yapıları itibarı ile kamusal alandaki dönüşüm potansiyellerine ışık tutmaya çalışmaktadır.

Araştırma, derinlemesine görüşmelerden ve katılımcı gözlemlerden oluşan bir örnek olay incelemesi biçiminde tasarlanmıştır. Bu çerçevede her bir örgütten farklı özelliklere sahip onar üyeyle görüşülmüş ve bu örgütlerin genel kurulları, seçim süreçleri ve etkinlikleri gözlenmiştir.

Çalışmanın amacı sivil toplum örgütlerinin kamusal alana katılımlarını ve katkılarını değerlendirmek olduğu için, bulgular temelde iki kuramsal pozisyon ışığında yorumlanmıştır. Bunlar müzakereci (Habermas) ve agonistic (Laclau ve Mouffe) demokrasi kuramlarıdır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, insanın varoluşsal kamusallığını (Arendt) esnek bir müzakere ve diyalog modeliyle birleştiren post-yapısalcı bir demokrasi kavramsallaştırmasını benimsemiştir.

Bu bağlamda bu çalışma üç sivil toplum örgütünün kamusal alan tecrübesini aşağıdaki sorular etrafında tartışmaya çalışmıştır. Sivil toplum kavramı, (Türkiye'deki sivil derneksel hayatın tarihsel bağlamına ve son yıllarda yaşanan sivil canlanmaya referansla) Türkiye'nin kendine özgü tecrübesini anlamak için uygun

bir kavram mıdır? Sivil örgütler kamusal alanda demokrasinin derinleştirilmesine ve yerleştirilmesine hizmet edecek bir kapasiteye sahipler mi? Bu sivil toplum örgütleri, içsel yapıları ve karar alma süreçleri göz önüne alındığında demokratik ve katılımcılar mı? ve daha önemlisi Türkiye'deki demokratik dönüşüm sürecini etkileyebilecek bir kapasiteye sahipler mi?

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil toplum, sivil toplum örgütü, NGO, STK, kamusal alan, müzakereci ve/veya agonistik demokrasi, karar alma süreçleri, gönüllülük, katılımcılık

Sevgili Anneme

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. 1. The Context of the Study

The concept of civil society has been intensely penetrated into daily discourse of our lives in the last two decades; however this concept has actually a long historical background crosscutting various philosophical debates in the Western world. Today, we are witnessing a variety of uses and meanings of this concept in the social and political milieu. It seems that, the civil society as a normative and a Western concept (which is pertaining to the peculiar history of the "West") became widespread throughout the world as a result of the process of the globalization.

The civil society debates begun to have a serious weight in the agendas of the states, international organizations; and naturally, within the agenda of the so-called civil society organizations that are independent or non-governmental. The outstanding effects of this civil "resurrection" can clearly be seen in the media, daily discourses, and academic debates in the last 20 years. In addition, with recent debates on globalization, a certain number of articles concentrated on the new issue of "global civil society" (Keane 2003; Kaldor, 2004; Pasha, 1998; Brand, 1994; Sancar, 2000). Accordingly, the reinvention of the concept of civil society in the last 20 years corresponds to the global transformation process of the world. The global developments in the information technologies and the global hegemony of the neo-liberal ideology which enforces the world into a great open market are the complements of this process. In this context, we have witnessed the rise and the proliferation of the global networks both in international and supranational scales in political, social and economic spheres. This new agenda has been undermined the

sovereignty claims of the nation states and provides a basis for sub-national identities and groups to organize and get into contact with their global counterparts. According to Kaldor (2004: 2):

> Global civil society is in the process of helping to constitute and being constituted by a global system of rules underpinned by overlapping inter-governmental, governmental and global authorities. In other words a new form of politics which we call civil society is both an outcome and an agent of global interconnectedness.

Following its global popularity, the concept of civil society becomes the strategic locus of different political projects from liberals to Islamists. The prevalence of the concept of civil society in the political and social life has also direct effects in the social policies of countries as well as international organizations. It can be argued that in social programs of the UN or EU civil society is considered as one of the most important actors, and perceived as an inevitable element for the consolidation of the democracy throughout the world. Actually, the civil society has attributed certain tasks especially related with the issues such as environmental protection; education, health and disadvantaged groups and they have aligned considerable financial sources to these organizations for the related topics.

Today, civil society has been mostly discussed around the concepts of non-governmental organizations or civil society organizations,[1] which refers to the areas of activities outside the state (particularly the voluntary associations). In more recent definitions, the emphasis is on the democratic, autonomous and voluntary characteristics of the CSOs and many concomitant concepts such as peace, tolerance, human rights.

The widespread usage of the term in this sense dates back to the end of the 1980s and 1990s; a conjuncture in which the opposition movements started to shake the despotic, totalitarian and non-democratic regimes of Eastern Block and Latin America. This process was going hand in hand with the legitimating crises of the

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[1] In this study I prefer to use the term: civil society organization (CSO), due to the fact that the civil society is mostly discussed with reference to the STK's (the Turkish word implying the civil associations and organizations) in Turkey.

western democracies and erosion of nation states due to the influencing effects of globalization. Under these new circumstances and with the collapse of communist block and meta-narratives, CSOs with their local, concentrated and limited goals became the locus of the new social movements (feminist, environmental, gay-lesbian, anti-war peace movements) and identity politics in a global context. In this sense, the voluntary activities and organizations, namely the CSOs, have transformed itself into an arena in which the citizens come together and solve their problems without state intervention. These organizations have created a new hope not only for the new right which looks for an opportunity to escape from the provisions of welfare state but also for the liberal left, which seeks an alternative political space and ground after the fall and failure of classical forms of politics.

In fact, there is not a reconciled meaning for the term civil society. On the other hand, as we will discuss in the next chapter, it is a normative concept, which has been used in different and mostly contradictory sense in the history of social and political thought from Aristotle to Habermas and its widespread usage hides its normativeness and gives its content a natural appearance.

However, especially from the perspective of this research, the importance of the concept of civil society and civil society organizations comes from their being a touchstone in today's debates on democracy and public sphere.

Here, one can raise several questions about the subject matter: is the concept of civil society a proper concept for understanding the peculiar experience of Turkey (with reference to the historical context of civil associational life in Turkey and the recent civil resurrection)? Do civil organizations have the capacity to serve for deepening and consolidation of democracy in public sphere? Are these civil organizations democratic and participatory with regard to their intra-organizational structures and decision-making processes? More importantly, do they have any capacity to transform themselves and to influence the process of democratic transformation in Turkey? Throughout the thesis I will try to discuss these questions within the framework of the internal dynamics of three CSOs in public sphere and in the axis of deliberative and agonistic democracy.

1. 2. The Scope and Significance of the Study

The concept of civil society has been intensively debated since 1980s in Turkey. However, since 1990 the civil society has been taking a much wider place in the agendas of academic/intellectual circles and the media. In 1990s, significant events occurred in Turkish history such as the pre- and post- 28 February Events (1997), the Marmara Earthquake (1999) and the EU accession Process. Throughout this period, the question of civil society became the key agent in debates over the democratic character of Turkish state and society.

Accordingly, there have been conducted many studies on the civil society in Turkey in the last 20 years. Among these studies, there are different kinds of researches approaching to the subject. For instance, there are the ones examining the civil society with reference to the peculiarity and "uniqueness" of Ottoman-Turkish History (Mardin 1990, 1995; Heper 1980, 1992; Özbudun 1997; İnalcık 1998) or there are the other ones considering the civil society from a political and ideological perspective with its relation to the political and social transformations of Turkey (Göle 1994, 1997; Sarıbay 1994, 1998; Toprak 1996; Sunar 1997; Kalaycıoğlu 1998; Keyman, 1999, 2004; Tosun 2001; White 1996; Robins 1996). Different but related with the studies referred above there are another stream directly deals with the civil society organizations *per se* (Yücekök, Turan, Alkan 1998; Tosun 2000; Tekeli, 2000; Erdoğan 2002; Bora 2002; Plagemann 2002; Toumarkine 2002; Pusch 2002; Can 2002; Akşit, Tabakoğlu, Serdar 2001a, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a and Akşit, Tabakoğlu, Serdar, Adem 2001b; Çoşkun, 2004) Among the latter stream, it could be detected various researches such as the descriptive ones depicting the member profiles of CSO's, the ones dealing with the history and organization of some specific CSOs, and the others trying to categorize the CSOs according to their functions, fields of work or ideological stances.

This research could be included within the latter category, which directly deals with the civil organizations themselves. However, the distinctive feature of this study is that, first it particularly focuses on the intra–organizational practices (the decision making processes, elections, general meetings, division of labor, basic

conflicts and divergences, the disagreements, the way of deliberation, consensus and their democratic operation) and internal dynamics of CSOs in Turkey and second, it tries to shed light on the transformation of CSOs as civil organizations themselves in time both in the sense of their political stance and organizational structure in public sphere. Therefore, in this sense this study is the first to examine the civil social experience of Turkey from the perspective of the internal organizational conflicts and the internal transformation process of CSOs. Thus, it brings a new look from within the organizational practice itself different than the other researches made hitherto.

In this context, to reach to the above-mentioned goals, the research was restricted with three different CSOs (The Ankara Branches of MAZLUMDER,[2] KADER[3] and IMO[4]) which were selected according to the results of a former research (Akşit et. all. 2003a) that categorizes the SCOs in Turkey on a democracy scale. In this frame, these three CSOs represent respectively just three of nine categories[5]: the Islamic oppositional CSOs (MAZLUMDER), the liberal-wing of mainstream CSOs (KADER[6]) and the traditional mainstream left-wing vocational chambers and trade unions (IMO). Therefore, this research does not have a claim to represent the whole picture of civil society in Turkey; but, at most the three categories that the elected CSOs belong.

According to the above mentioned limitations, this research was designed in the form of a case study, which focuses mostly on the organizational life experiences, basic conflicts and divergences and the transformation process of these three CSOs in the public sphere. In this framework, it was made depth-interviews with 10 persons having different qualities (charter members, directors, opposing members, former directors and so on) for each of these CSOs and made participant observations in the general meetings, elections and activities of these organizations.

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[2] Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppresed People
[3] Association for Training and Supporting the Women Candidates
[4] Unification of Turkish Engineers and Architects Trade Association (TMMOB) Civil Engineering Trade Association (IMO)
[5] The detailed information on that categorization is given in chapter 5. 1.
[6] Although KADER seems to be located here within the scale of the research, it is better to consider it within the independent category of Women SCOs which is absent in the category of the research (Akşit et.all. 2003a) that I referred.

Although this research primarily focused on the Ankara Branches of these three CSOs, it is possible to argue that the findings discussed throughout the thesis could be extended to the general public sphere in Turkey; because, both these three CSOs have a country–wide organizations and network relations and showing a county-wide political activation.

Since the axis of this study is to understand the contribution of the CSOs to the public sphere, the research findings were interpreted and considered basically in the light of the two main theoretical positions: the deliberative (Habermas) and agonistic (Laclau and Mouffe) democracy. In this context, the study espoused a post-structuralist conception of democracy combined with a weakened model of deliberation and dialogue pointing out the requirement of the existential publicity of man (Arendt) in the world.

This thesis was prepared within the scope of a research project entitled as the *"Civil Society in the Axis of Public Sphere, Voluntary Activity, Participation and Democracy: A Field Work in Ankara City Center"* which was directed by Prof. Dr. Bahattin Akşit and conducted by a research team composed of two graduate students (Kurtuluş Cengiz and Önder Küçükural - METU Sociology Department) and a PhD. student (Uğraş Ulaş Tol - METU Political Science Department). METU Scientific Researches Fund supported the research project.

1.3. The Organization of the Study

Within the context and scope of the study, that we mentioned above this thesis examines the civil experience of three CSOs in six chapters. In this framework, the next chapter presents the rise and the transformation of civil society by beginning from Aristotle's concept of *"koinonia politikê"* which was translated into Latin as *"societas civilis"* and brings it to its recent definitions by visiting the *pre-*, *anti-*, *post-*, *non-* and *trans-* state conceptions of civil society. In showing the transformations and changes that the concept underwent, I tried to explicate the contingent character of the term, which has been articulated into the different conjunctures of the historical change. The second part of this chapter presents the

recent definitions of civil society and critically discusses these different approaches by showing also its own approach to the concept.

Chapter 3 examines the civil experience of Turkey by not falling into the trap of West-centrism which takes the civil society as a normative concept and applies it to the non-western social realities. Generally speaking this thesis does not accept an East-West dichotomy but the articulation of these two in the political public sphere. After setting the problem in a non-orientalist way, this chapter tries to examine how the practices penetrated from the West articulate with the local peculiar context of Turkish society. In this frame, first the Turkish Society is discussed with reference to the associational life experiences in its history, and second, the different conceptions of civil society in Turkey are discussed with reference to different political and academic standpoints. In the last part of this chapter, the recent uprising of civil society is directly evaluated around the CSOs themselves.

Chapter 4 discusses the different approaches to democratic decision-making processes and the construction of the publicity. In this sense it particularly focuses on three approaches: the dialogical and existential understanding of politics in Hannah Arendt, the Habermassian model of deliberative democracy and the theory of radical democracy as articulated in the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The basic subject of this chapter is to constitute a common ground for the articulation of a modified version of deliberative democratic politics with the agonistic spirit of democratic discussion in the public sphere so that we can have genuine grounds to explicate the findings about the civil experiences of the 3 CSOs that have been studied.

In Chapter 5, the methodology, logic of research and research design is explained and then the findings of the case study derived from the three CSOs are presented respectively on four main subtitles:

- Foundation, Objectives and Principles,

- Organizational Structure and Organizational Life Experience

- The Problem of Participation,

- Basic Conflicts and Points of Divergence

Finally, the last chapter discusses the findings of the research in the light of the general conceptual framework of deliberative and agonistic democracy and critically evaluates the civil experiences of three CSOs in the axis of their contribution into public sphere and democracy.

CHAPTER 2

EXPLORING CIVIL SOCIETY

2.1. Rise and Transformation of the Concept

Aristotle is considered as the father of the concept of civil society with its relation to the state. Although he never used this concept in his works, it is argued that the Aristotelian concept of "*koinonia politiké*" was translated into Latin as "*societas civilis*". Aristotle uses this term at the beginning of the Politics to indicate the polis or city as an independent and self-sufficient community based on a constitution" (Bobbio 1997: 34). *Societas civilis* was used here as equal to political society; namely, it is identical with the state as such. Therefore, in Aristotelian concept it cannot be talk about a state –society differentiation. Since, for him, the political society was the society of free and equal citizens determined with the system of law in the Ancient Greece. The political society was seen as the ethical public. Although, we have discovered the dichotomy of *polis-oikos* in Aristotle; *the oikos*, which represent the household, was not separated from the state or it was not considered to be a counter space to state. According to Aristotle, oikos was a secondary category and constituted the natural background of the polis (Tosun 2001: 30). From this angle we can argue that there is not any state-society distinction but they are the same in Aristotle. This Aristotelian frame of the concept continued in the middle ages. At that time the concept similarly implied the political society. For instance, it is reported that Augustine used the concept of *"societas terresta"* in the meaning of political society and Aquinas used "politike communitas" in the meaning of "societas" (Tosun 2001: 31). In addition to this it is underlined that civil society was used in the Catholic Church in the meaning of state against the church (Tosun 2001: 31). This Aristotelian identification of state and society had followed a

similar path until Hegel, including the contractual thinkers (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), and their contemporaries and followers (T. Pain, A. Ferguson, Tocqueville etc.). as the major tradition in the political philosophy.

With the rise of the bourgeoisie society, the first seeds of a break started to be seen in the content of the concept. Contractual thinkers considered the civil society, as a condition of transition to the society with the state. For these thinkers, the society is in a state of nature before the state. By virtue of the social contract, the society is transited to a phase of society with the state. In this transition, firstly, the individuals agree to each other and then they make the contract with the state whom they transfer their rights. In the transition from the state of nature to society with the state, the people participated in this contract are viewed as civil society, whilst the ones who could not succeed in joining in being a part of the contract are defined as barbarian. Therefore, the civil society becomes both the precondition and complement of the state. It is quite clear that Hobbes used the political society and civil society interchangeable at that time.

For Example for Hobbes, human beings are naturally equal to each other:

> NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself. *(Hobbes, Leviathan, CP. XIII)*[7]

As it is seen this equality stands on the sharing out of unsafety. Consequently, the essential thing is the interests of individuals. For Hobbes, society is a tool for the realization of their interests. The natural laws which Hobbes describes in Leviathan only get its functionality in the civil society. Hence, the

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[7] Web source, see the bibliography.

natural laws mean the comprehension of the state of nature negatively and it necessitates the individuals to give up their natural rights. Therefore,

> the state is the antithesis of the state of nature to the *societas naturalis* constituted by hypothetically free and equal individuals. The difference lies in the fact that, while the *societas civilis* of the Aristotelian model is still a natural society, the same *societas civilis* in Hobbes model is an instituted or artificial society" (*homo artificalis* or *machine machinarum)* (Bobbio 1997: 35).

Locke takes the issue from a different perspective with a different scenario of state of nature. Although Hobbes traces of the civil society – state differentiation can be found in his thought, he stays still in the traditional state-society identity. According to Locke, humans were living in a primitive state of nature before the state of civilized society. This state of nature is not a disorder condition as Hobbes has described; but it is a state of freedom at the same time. For Locke, human being is created for living on his own, but under the condition of a society. In the natural life, human beings live in a complete freedom and equality. Without taking any permission from others, without submitting to other's will they can do what ever they want and live as they wish. In other words, for Locke, the natural freedom is whole and absolute. But, the nature is under the limits of reason of law, which all people have to obey. This situation leads to be respectful to everyone's life, freedom and property in a place where all people are free and equal. In this state of nature, everyone equally has the right to get use of the means that the nature serves. It is something like a common property. Yet, Locke claims that the human will has the right to own the things on which he has labored. It is like; the identity of a person reflects on the thing that he himself produced by his labor. This thing becomes a part of him. That means there is private property also in the state of nature. That is why, Locke aims that the right to private property is also a right like the right to freedom and life, which is created by the social property and is a holy and natural right.

According to Locke, while people are living freely and equally in the state of nature, and the only thing which can lead them to leave this system and submit a political power is their own wishes and wills. The other reason for this transformation is to provide the better protection of the property reciprocally. In fact, one can argue that there is a similarity at the theoretical level between Locke and Hobbes. That is, with this position of war in Locke's understanding, we turn back to Hobbes, whom he has at the beginning differs. In other words, the only reason of this transition is essentially the desire of security. This desire of security includes the rights of security of life and property.

> To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power" (Locke, *Two Treatise on Government*, CP. III. Section 21)[8].

In sum, according to Locke, this transition to civil society means the enhancement and maintenance of the continuity of the harmony, which only takes place in nature, among the independent people (Tosun 2001: 33) Locke links the perfectness of civil society with the inconvenience of the state of nature. As there are no rules declared in the state of nature, people arbitrarily obey the laws, which are natural. What is more, in the state of nature there are no judges who have been determined by the parties. Thus, in case of a dispute, the solution would not be reached. Besides, there is no common and objective punishment system or tool, which would guide the solution. So, in order to provide the extended protection of individual properties, the passage to political society takes places. By this way those obstacles can be overcame in the civil society.

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[8] Web source see the bibliography

Similar to Locke, Montesquieu's conception of civil society can also be considered by its distance to state. Montesquieu combines the civil (private law) and public law (political law) distinction in the Roman law with the twofold (social and administrative) contract approach of the 18th Century. In this sense, whereas public law regulates the relation between the governors and the governed, civil law arranges the relations among people (Tosun 2001: 33). However, paradoxically both in Montesquieu and Locke this anti-state stance exists together with the former state civil society identity framework. It means, there is a soft co-existence of state and civil society rather a sharp distinction between them (Tosun 2001: 34). Basically, this soft co-existence of state and civil society prevails in all the contractual thinkers, however with some differences based on the features of the hypothetical contract, which they presupposed. For instance, Rousseau also uses political society and civil society identically; however, contrary to others, he approaches critically to the civil society. He thinks that the civil society as a society in which the good nature of the human is damaged, the virtues are lost and the captivity takes the place of the freedom. Şenel states that by starting out with this view we must not come to a conclusion that by turning back the primitive society in the civilized society is more likely (Şenel 1986: 456).

In the conception of Rousseau (1997a, 1997b), the passage to civil society takes place in two different ways. In *Discourse on Inequality,* Rousseau asserts that the property and the civilization spoil the equality of the people in the state of nature and this paves the way for the passage to civil society. On the other hand, in *Social Contract* it is stated that the passage is achieved with a contract. Consequently, in the first interpretation the passage has a negative meaning whereas in the second one, it has a positive meaning. In the first condition, with the developments taking place in the mining, several people get armed. Likewise with the possession of some lands, the property started to be institutionalized and so the natural inequality is dissolved:

The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying "This is mine," and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. Humanity would have been spared infinite crimes, wars, homicides, murders, if only someone had ripped up the fences or filled in the ditches and said, "Do not listen to this pretender! You are eternally lost if you do not remember that the fruits of the earth are everyone's property and that the land is no-one's property!"[9] (Rousseau, *A Discourse Upon The Origin and The Foundation of The Inequality Among Mankind*, Part II, Section I.)[10]

For Rousseau, the rise of property damaged the peace and led to the state of war. The rich started to patronize the poor on the price of making them slaves. The poor also adopted this condition. At this point, Rousseau clearly differs from the early contractual thinkers. For him the people in the state of nature do not have antagonist relations with others. Whenever the people get into a state of war, yet they are out of naturality. In other words, the state of war depends upon the socialization of people through the passage to civil society. Whenever, the needs and necessities increased and preceding developments led to the formation of private property, the state of war cannot be prevalent. Thus, Rousseau thinks that Hobbes had carried the properties of a civilized man to the man at the state of nature. From this perspective, what is aimed is not to refer any assumption, which is arising from the civil society.

Savran (2003: 46) says that Rousseau's understanding of state of nature stands on two main axis: isolation and limited needs. All the rest is produced from these two. As one has limited needs, he would not need language or a complex ability to understand. On the other side, in such a context where there is no social relations, there is no place for the categories such as law and ethics. That is why, in Rousseau's conceptualization of state of nature, the private property is not a right.

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[9] Web source, see the bibliography section; cf. Ferguson 1966, p. 122 "He who first said, 'I will appropriate this field: I will leave it to my heirs;' did not perceive that he was laying the foundation of civil laws and political establishments. He who first ranged himself under a leader, did not perceive, that he was setting the example of a permanent subordination."

[10] Web source see the bibliography

Since, the natural man naturally considers everything, which he can reach already as his own. However, on the other hand, Rousseau considers the private property as a citizen right though its source is not natural (as a natural right). For him,

> it is certain that the right of the property is the most divine one of the citizen rights… the property is the real base of the civil society" (Savran 2003: 46).

On the other hand, in social contract the fiction is different. Here the theory stands on a peace agreement like it is in Hobbes and Locke. They lead property struggles, but rather than these struggles, the right has to be protected. That is why the people agreed to make a contract among them. There are two aims of this contract, which seem inconvenient with each other. One is to protect the freedoms and the other is to be under the governance of a sovereign who can last the state of war. That means a society form has to be found so that the individuals and the properties of every member of the society is defended and protected, although the social everyone units with everyone becomes his own master and remains free as it is in the past. To sustain that everyone has to transfer all his rights to the society. By this way, the people would not admit their rights to anyone. They would be under the governance of the society, but at the same time they would not be under the rule of no one and they would obey to themselves:

> . . . the individual member alienates himself totally to the whole community together with all his rights. This is first because conditions will be the same for everyone when each individual gives himself totally, and secondly, because no one will be tempted to make that condition of shared equality worse for other men...." (Rousseau, *Social Contract*)[11]

In the second half of the 18th Century, following the rise and institutionalization of the bourgeoisie society; we see the emergence of autonomous structures such as trade centers and cooperation's, associations, art and opinion groups, press etc. which can be considered as the first autonomous units of the bourgeoisie society. In short, it is noticed to a structural transformation in the public

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[11] Web source see the bibliography

life (Habermas 1999). This proliferation of the organized groups and pluralization of the society started to influence and undermine also the traditional conception of civil society. As a result, there has been lived a transition in the political philosophy which has continued since Locke. The state and civil society no longer be viewed as the same entities and there aroused some suspects with regards to the traditional state- civil society identification. The bourgeoisie, which felt itself stronger but still vulnerable against the state power, started to approach its will for a new social order, which would guarantee the rights of the civil (bourgeoisie) society against the state. So the traditional and universal discourse of the state (with its state–society identity) was replaced with a state society differentiation. The civil-ization discourse accompanied the legitimization of this process. The emphasis on the civilness was reinforced. The need of restricting the state was declared and a totally new phase with its stress on the self-organization and preservation of the civil society had started. The primary example of the civilization discourse is Adam Ferguson. In his work on the history of civil society, inspired by the outstanding effects of the new industrial age, Ferguson used the concept in the meaning of a political order, which protects and "polishes" its mechanical and commercial arts as well as its cultural achievements and sense of public spirit, by means of regular government, the rule of law and strong military defences (Keane 1993: 40). For him;

> by the separation of arts and profession, the sources of wealth are laid open; every species of material is wrought up to the greatest perfsection and every commodity is produced in the greatest abundance (Ferguson 1966: 181).

Here, Ferguson understands the civil society not as a separate level distinct from the state; however, it is seen as a moment of transition from a rude form of life to a *polished* civilized society. In fact, for Ferguson,

> . . . the term polished, if we may judge from its etymology, originally refered to the state of nations in respect to their laws and government. In its later applications it refers no less to their proficiency in the liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce (Ferguson 1966: 205).

The main face of the civilized society lies not in the political organization but also in the organization of material civilization. However, despite its advantages Ferguson believes that, the modern civil society has a self-distorting character, which would result in the lost of the public spirit among the citizens of the civil society. Ferguson calls this era as the "age of separations" in which

> under the distinction of callings by which the members of polished society are separated from each other, every individual is supposed to posses his species of talent, or his peculiar skill in which the others are confessedly ignorant; and society is made to consist of parts of which none is animated with the spirit of society itself (Ferguson 1966: 218).

In addition, the over-development of the governmental issues, commerce and production stimulated the appetites of the people and this condition led to the erosion of the civil association. The disinterested love of public withers away, public life is considered "a scene for the gratification of mere vanity, avarice and ambition" (Ferguson 1966: 258). Under these circumstances the civil society needs a supreme body to arrange the clashes in the society and these strengths the scope and power of state administration and accustoms its subjects to civil order and tranquility it secures (Keane 1988: 42). So the civil society paves the way for the despotism for Ferguson as the unintended consequence of the civilization process. The dilemma is that "the civil society requires for its survival a sovereign, centralized, constitutional state, which together with commerce and manufacturing breaks the bond of society and threatens citizen's civil liberties and capacity for independent association thus undermining a *sine qua non* of life in a civil society" (Keane 1988: 43). Ferguson sees the solution of the dilemma in the creation of the independent social organizations as the guarantor and the protector of the so-called public spirit. Since, For Ferguson, the human beings have the capacity to consult, to persuade to oppose to kindle in the society of his fellow-creatures and to lose the sense of personal interest or safety, in the ardour of his friendship and his oppositions (Ferguson 1966: 218). Actually, with this positive understanding of human nature, Ferguson shares the same ground with Marx, in the sense of changing the world and with Habermas in the context of the possibility of the public deliberation. In short Ferguson suggests

the creation and development of independent civil social associations and institutions as the guarantee against the despotism within the realm of civil society which implies the material ground of our modern civilization.

Inspired by the French and American Revolutions, Thomas Paine brings the civilization mission of civil society to a further point in which the civil society is positioned against the state. For Paine, the fundamental tendency of human being is competition, solidarity and communication between the people and civil society here is the best possibility to realize these aims, whereas the despotic state exists as an obstacle. Therefore, by deepening the former social contract arguments in a more democratic frame, Pain strongly defends the restriction of the state power in favor of the civil society. Since for him, the social life was occupied and oppressed everywhere by the despotic states. However, in order to create a legitimate state it should depend on the natural rights and the active consent of the governed who have the right to withdraw their consents at any time. Accordingly, "the rights- bearing, free and equal individuals naturally precede past, present and future states and the civilized governments are just those constitutional ones which are empowered by the active consent of naturally free and equal individuals. These governments have no rights but only duties before their citizens and every kind of attempt to preclude, actively represented consent -as the basis of the law- is despotism (Keane 1988: 47). Hence, as far as the self-esteem of the civil society increased, the need for the institutions and the laws of the state would be decreased as much. As seen, Paine is the critical breaking point in the conception of the civil society. Indeed, we can make many parallels with the recent hegemonic civil society debates and Paine's ideas. The recent debates seem to be heavily influenced by this reorientation. This democratic, liberal and civilest voice of Paine, would be reverberated in the last quarter of the *20th* century again but it had to pass through a much more elusive and complex way untill then. Since, inspired by the enthusiasm of the two great revolutions; the growing belief in the society and the insisting attempts to restrict the state in favor of the civil society led to some anxiety in the believers of the strong state. Subsequently, these defenders of the state opposed the newly emerging and anti-statist civil society conceptions.

Hegel was the main representative of this kind of belief. As being reactive to the uncontrolled excitements and enthusiasms of the civil society, he perceives it as a self-crippling entity, in constant need of state supervision and control (Keane 1988: 50). For, he views the state as the transcended and perfected form of the civil society. In his work *The Elements of Philosophy of Rights*, whereas, the state -as the representative of the universality, objectivity and absolute reason- is considered as the sole social entity enabling a civilized social life for everybody; civil society is evaluated as the remaining place between the state and the family including market economy, corporations, administration of the welfare, social classes and stratifications, and the civil law as the consequence of long and complex historical development (Tosun 2003: 36-40). The gathering of the families constitutes civil society as a kind of universal family over which the state takes its place. Bobbio argues that the Hegelian category of civil society, as an intermediate moment of ethicity situated between the family and the state and it allows the construction of a triadic scheme which can be contrasted with two preceding dyadic models: The Aristotelian, based on the dichotomy between family and state and the natural law model based on the dichotomy of state of nature/civil society (Bobbio 1989: 31).

To a certain extent, the whole relation is a novel one, for although Hegel is not the first to coin the term "civil society," he is generally recognized to be the first to conceive civil society in radical distinction from the state. Previously, as we noted, politics was conceived either in the classical Greek fashion, as the exclusive domain of public life in contrast to household, or, in the manner of the liberal tradition, as a civil government, whose duties were a function of a civil society that itself derived from a naturally determined liberty. By comparison, as Avineri points out "Hegel demarcates civil society from the state by having the economy, social interest groups, and the public administration of civil law and welfare all fall within civil society as necessary components of social freedom, while making the independent concern of self-government the specific activity and raison d'etre of the state" (Avineri 1972: 67).

On this basis, Hegel gives an entirely new mandate to public life. Essentially with this definition, Hegel can be considered as the first thinker who separated the civil part of the society from the state and family. Since, compared to the family, the civil society is an incomplete form of state and compared to state it is not yet the state in its essence and its full historical realization (Avineri 1972: 31). Therefore, the civil society implies the three moments for Hegel. It includes the system of needs, the administration of justice and the police (polizei). In sum, civil society implies the field of social relations and rights which cannot be completely controlled but at the same time preserved and guaranteed by the state. It is the realm of arbitrariness in which the individual interests, needs and wills are facing each other and find an opportunity to be expressed. However, for Hegel civil society is deprived of the ability to solve these internal disputes and therefore, if not controlled and regulated politically by the state, it could not stay as "civil". (Keane 1988: 52) For this reason, the civil society is both included in and transcended by the state. So, whilst the state stands out of the civil society, at the same time the civil society takes its place as a moment in the formation process of the state. This circumstance provided the civil society a suitable condition to be both transcended and preserved.

Hegel recognizes, however that civil society can neither restrict itself to economic relations nor permit them to have free sway. The rudimentary reason for this is that, as Hegel clearly shows, the economy cannot guarantee the realization of the very needs its interaction generates. Precisely because the economy consists in commodity relations resting on mutual agreements of exchange, "it is a matter of contingency" whether its members encounter other willing parties whose respective needs and goods correlate with their own (Hegel 1991: 245). As a result, Hegel draws the unavoidable conclusion: so long as the economy is left to its own logic of interdependent self-determinations, there is nothing to prevent economic relations from resulting in crises, overproduction, unemployment, and an amassing of riches by some and growing poverty of others (Hegel 1991: 247-251). As Pippin indicates, there is a matter of injustice due to civil society's own ethical relations. Unemployment and poverty may not be violations of abstract right, but they are social wrongs once economic interaction has established the civil right of

individuals to pursue and satisfy their chosen needs for commodities (Pippin 1997: 167). The important point is that although Hegel is certainly struck by the glaring disparities of wealth in the economies of his day, he does not view this as an historical disease afflicting a certain stage of economic development. Rather, he considers it a problem endemic to economic relations, which reveals their limited justice. Hegel holds, as a result, that civil society cannot reduce itself to an economy. On the one hand, it must allow its members to organize into social interest groups to press for what the economy does not deliver on its own. On the other hand, it must also contain an administration of civil law and a public administration of welfare to guarantee and enforce the personhood of its members and their right to satisfy their needs through their own free action. Since all these public institutions operate on the basis of economy, they do not annul or replace commodity relations, but rather regulate them so that the ethical right of economic action has its intrinsic contingency externally resolved. Although the economy thereby remains the basic structure of civil society to which public administration refers, its own justice mandates that it be a subordinate and not a determining base of society (Hegel 1991: 254). As Heinrich points out "in arriving at this differentiation of social institutions, Hegel's development of civil society thus effectively demonstrates how the economy must have a subordinate position within society if social freedom is to be realized (Heinrich 2004: 247). Accordingly, what civil society calls for is not civil government, a welfare state, or any other political order based on class or other social interests. Rather, as Avineri shows Hegel concludes in an unprecedented move, civil society demands a free political domain radically distinct from itself (Avineri 1972: 89). The very limits of social freedom make necessary a sovereign state whose body politics gives freedom totality by integrating all interaction into its realm and determining that realm through its own self-governing activity as a self determining whole. As a result, we can argue that Hegel's move beyond civil society gives politics a two-fold mandate.

On the one hand, the state must be an ethical association whose members interact not as civilians pursing separate particular interests, but as citizens willing government policy as the end of their own free action, insofar as the state in which

they act is itself the existing structure of their political freedom to govern themselves. As Hegel exposes "it is the self-awareness of individuals which constitutes the actuality of the state" (Hegel 1991: 287). In this ethical unity of universal and particular, individuals exercise their respected rights as citizens by willing the universal determination of the state, while the state has its sovereign validity for them by being the actuality of their particular political autonomy. Contrary to Locke's politics of civil government, the self-determination of the citizen is here participation in self-government because the body politic in which the individual can exercise that right as its end, not particular interests or public welfare, but the realization of self-rule. On the other hand, for the state to be this sovereign sphere of self-government, it cannot cancel the social freedom of interest or any of the other modes of recognized self-determination. This would set it against its own members and thereby destroy its constitutive ethical unity. Instead, the state must contain all these freedoms within itself, preserving their rights through its own rule, while maintaining its own sovereignty by preventing any of these component spheres from subordinating politics to their specific concerns (Hegel 1991: 279). As a result, the state must thus insure that its citizens enjoy their freedoms of personhood, moral subjectivity, family life, and social action, without allowing these to undermine their political freedom. In this regard, the state has the right to counter the arbitrariness of conscience when it's acts violate the laws of the state, and even demand the lives of its members when needed to defend the political freedom of national sovereignty. (Hegel 1991: 287). In sum, politics gives freedom totality by establishing the integral reality of all other modes of interaction through its own self-governing activity. As citizens of the just state, individuals thus attain for their part the freedom to determine the totality of practical life through their own willing. In sum, the universal state emerged as "the concrete human embodiment of the ethical idea of mind (geist) developing from a stage of immediate, undifferentiated unity (the family), through that of explicit difference and particularity (civil society), to the concrete unity and synthesis of the particular" (Keane 1993; 72).

Actually, Hegel's conception of civil society or his endeavor to assimilate the civil society into the state was pinpointing the strength of the growing anti-state discourse of civil society. In this sense, Tocqueville's strong reaction to the universalistic understanding of state (Hegel), can be read as the indicator of the serious anxiety related with the despotic potential of the modern state. Although he did not directly use the concept of civil society, in his book, "Democracy in America" (1955) Tocqueville emphasizes the importance of the associationalism and self-organization, which had a direct influence for the political thought (Kaldor 2003:19) and underlines the great danger of the arguments in a defense of state, which governs the society in the name of universal interest. For him, these arguments ignore the growth of a new type of state despotism, which is popularly elected, and according to him the most basic danger of the modern nations is not conflict and disorder generated by particular interests but this new form of elected state despotism (Keane 1988: 55).

Inspired by the two great revolutions, Tocqueville thinks that, with the "great democratic revolution" the world becomes a very dynamic place in which the democratic mechanisms stimulate the desires of the people for equality, liberty, property and social status. In this new world the power of the old traditional, moral and religious values were shattered; the states lost their divine qualities; the scope of the rights of the people were extended (including the women rights) and "in this democratic maelstrom nothing seems any more to be fixed or inviolable except the passionate, dizzying struggle for social and political equality" (Keane 1988: 57). However, on the other hand Tocqueville observes that the same process led the civil life to be subjected by the directing and controlling powers of the state at the same time. For him, this is a quite new kind of despotism different than the traditional one. In the former times, the despotic states never tried to take their subjects under such a complex, centered and rigid control and surveillance. Even the cruelest despotisms (such as Roman Emperors) of the old ages could not succeed in abolishing the opposition to such extends. Tocqueville asserts that

> There is no country in Europe in which the public administration has not become, not only more centralized, but more inquisitive and more minute; it everywhere interferes in private concerns more than it did; it regulates more undertakings, and undertakings of a lesser kind; and it gains a firmer footing every day about, above and around all private persons, to assist, to advise and to coerce them (Tocqueville 1955: 324).

What happens for Tocqueville is that, "if despotism were to be established among the democratic nations of our days it might assume a different character; it would be more extensive and more mild (Tocqueville 1955: 336) and by virtue of the perfected mechanisms and techniques the people were taken under the "peaceful" and "democratic" control of the state Tocqueville, thinks that

> the species of oppression by which democratic nations are menaced is unlike that ever before existed in the world; our contemporaries face a power which is absolute, minute, regular, provident and mild.[12] It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks on the contrary to keep them in perpetual childhood…. Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of him self (Tocqueville, 1955: 336-337).

Tocqueville argues that our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions: they want to be led, and they wish to remain free (Tocqueville 1955: 337). Therefore, Keane underlines that the critical political problem of modern times for Tocqueville "concerns how the equalizing tendencies triggered by this democratic revolution can be preserved without allowing the state to abuse its powers and rob its (male) citizens of their freedom" (Keane 1988: 59). However, this critical problematic does not bring him to a position denying the state as an institution. For, he was aware of the necessary evil position of the state, which would arrange the complex set of relations in the modern times. Therefore he

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[12] This point could be evaluated as the informer of the Foucault's analysis of modern power relations and the bio- and anatomo politics of the power in the second half of the *20th* Century.

suggests a moderate and strategic solution. He argues that the political power has to be delegated into various and different institutions in order the democratic rights to be protected against the despotism of the state power. Since, as the state takes over more and more functions of daily life, as the division of labor becomes more complex, and as demands for the redistribution of wealth increase an active voluntary sector is necessary to provide a check on state power (Kaldor 2003: 19). The executive and legislative bodies should be separated and the independence of the judiciary has to be maintained. In addition to these, as the "independent eye of society" there have to exist some independent forms of civil associations for controlling and curbing the state power and for consolidating the democratic rights. Since, Tocqueville thinks that,

> Among the laws that rule the societies, there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all the others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio as the equality of conditions is increased (quoted in Kaldor 2003: 20).

Tocqueville sees these associations as the small groupings of the citizens interested with small affairs but for him the civil organizations have a much critical function. As the public schools in which the people learn the requirements of the public life such as: rights and responsibilities, communicating, co-operating and reaching agreement with each other, these associations serve for the maintenance of the democratic equality and the prevention of the despotism. As a result, Tocqueville sees an independent, self–operating, pluralist civil society as the precondition of the democracy.

With his outstanding arguments, Tocqueville was linked to the chain of the liberal tradition, which have been coming from Locke. However, the difference is that with Tocqueville's contribution the traditional state-civil society identity completely breaks down and the state –civil society distinction became the philosophical ground of the recent Anglo-American liberal arguments

From a totally different perspective than Tocqueville, another strong critic to Hegel comes from Marx and Engels. As the follower and criticizer of Hegel and different than the former philosophers, Marx relates the concept with the relations of production and the bourgeois society. Actually the civil society corresponds to the place of the forces of production with all their relations of production in Marx' formulation. By giving the priority to the relations of production, Marx locates the state into a position of being the reflection of the social relations contrary to the conception of state (Hegel) as the moment, which contains and synthesized the conflicting elements of civil society into a higher entity. In the famous passage of German Ideology, Marx clearly defines his conception as such:

> the form of intercourse determined by the existing productive forces at all previous historical stages, and in its turn determining these, is the civil society…..Already here we see how this civil society true source and theatre of all history, and how absurd is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real relationships and confines itself to high-sounding dramas of princes and states. Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals' within a definite stage of development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of agiven stage.and insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organize itself a state (Marx & Engels 1996: 57).

As seen, for Marx, Hegel made a mistake by taking the state as a supreme and holy level symbolizing the common good and maintaining the way of the reason. On the contrary, For Marx, state is not the manifestation of the reason, but the vanguard of the particular interests. Hence, state is not evaluated as the elimination of the state of nature but it is seen an apparatus that provides the continuation and stabilization of state of nature. For Marx and Engels, there is not a struggle of everyone to everyone but there is the struggle of one class (bourgeoisie) with the other one (proletarian) in the civil society. Contrary to the Hegelian model, the state is no more the perfection of the civil society but the reinforcement and

reproduction of some particular interests, which are determined historically by certain modes of production. In short, the state is presented here as the reflection of the civil society but not the transcendence of it. As Engels puts it, is not the state regulating the civil society but it is the civil society, which regulates and conditions the state. Since, According to Marx,

> The word "civil society" (*bürgerliche gesellschaft*) emerged in the eighteenth century when property relations had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organization evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis of the State and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name (Marx & Engels 1996: 57)

To sum up, we can say that the relation between the civil society and state in Marxian understanding is a dialectical relationship in which these two terms are interiorly related and the former is overriding (Savran 2003: 182). Actualy the essence of the contribution of Marx, lies in its brilliant analysis of the state as the representative of particular interests: the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, in line with their general theory and by supposing the withering away of the state as the final moment, Marx and Engels take a totally different position then Hegel in the issue of the transcendence of the state. For, this is the interiorization of the state by the society contrary to Hegel's divine state. Besides, with their contribution, Marx and Engels attribute a transformative potential to the concept of civil society. In their conception, civil society becomes both the space of relations of production, conflict and revolution apart from being a neutral term implying a set of social relations from family to trade. However, the civil society in Marxian theory still exists as an ambiguous and extensive space whose peculiarity and strategic importance would be explored and detailed later by Antonio Gramsci.

Gramsci develops his conception of civil society as a part of a political strategy while trying to bring an answer to the question of revolution in Italy, which was a relatively underdeveloped country of that time. He approaches civil society in the context of hegemony, and from the perspective of East-West dichotomy by following the line of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Bodin. For Gramsci, the civil society -related with hegemony- corresponds to the intermediary institutions, standing between state and economy like, church, school, media, family etc. In this sense it is argued that Gramsci's conception of civil society is much closer to Hegel than Marx. Already, Gramsci was the first Marxist thinker who directly refers to the texts of Hegel in his analysis of civil society (Bobbio 1993: 97). For Gramsci, civil society is the place, in which the hegemony is exercised and the basic classes struggle for power. As Poritelli states, Gramsci views the civil society as the intellectual and moral leadership of a social system (Poritelli 1982: 9). The conditions of base and superstructure is prepared here and it is the place of the politics (political sphere) which as an instance of superstructure,

> marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become 'party' come into confrontation and conflict until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout the society. (Gramsci 1971: 81)

So, in the broad and complex network of relations of capitalist society, in which the basic classes; capital and labor continuously struggle for domination, the civil society becomes the sphere in which a dominant group organizes the consent and hegemony over the subordinates. However, at the same time it is also the sphere for subordinated social groups, which may have the chance of organizing opposition and constructing an alternative (counter) hegemony.

However, this is a problematic issue in Gramsci, because as Perry Anderson clearly shows us, in his thought there can be found three different conceptualizations of state and civil society relations. The first model makes a distinction between civil society and political society (state) and while putting the hegemony and consent

within civil society, the domination and coercion is placed under political society. This model was developed to understand the different natures of power relations especially in West and East (Russia).

> In the East the State was everything, civil society was prİMOrdial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from the State to the next, it goes without saying- but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country. (Gramsci 1971: 238)

He argues that because in the East the civil society is weak and gelatinous it is sufficient to conquest the state power in order to realize the revolution, whilst in the West, the strong and developed civil society does not allow this. Therefore, the hegemony should be first maintained within the civil society in the West. Following the speech of Trotsky in the Fourth International, Gramsci puts forward that in the western societies the relation between the state and civil society depends on reason and there stands its resistance in the civil society even if the state is destroyed. In these countries, the hegemony of the bourgeoisie is based on the intellectual and moral leadership of the society. Before the revolution, it is necessary to give a long struggle within the civil society. However, in the places in which the state is everything and the civil society is weak and gelatinous such as Russia, the situation is totally different. The struggle is limited with the conquest of the political power (Gramsci 1971: 236-8).

With the hegemony it is referred to the practical strategies of a dominant power to gain the consent of the people. Gramsci barrows this concept from Lenin, but used in a different meaning. First he does not restrict the hegemony with the political leadership as in the case of Lenin. For Gramsci, as Mouffe also points out, the hegemony is intellectual and moral leadership beyond the class alliances and limited corporate interests (Mouffe 1979: 184). Therefore, in Gramsci's thought, the

hegemony is set up first before the conquest of the power, whereas in Lenin the hegemony follows or goes in tandem with the power.

Anderson criticizes this model by claiming that in the capitalist society the ideological functions of bourgeoisie class cannot be divided as civil society and state. For instance, the parliament is the primary frame, which stands in the center of ideological persuasion. For him the existence of the parliamentary state constitutes the formal frame of the whole ideological mechanisms. What Gramsci ignores is this. (Anderson 1988: 47-51)

In the second model, hegemony is portioned between political and civil society and it becomes now a synthesis of coercion and consent. It is in a balancing position with state and spreads the both sides of civil and political societies. However, this time Anderson criticizes this model as taking the hegemony (as the synthesis of consent and coercion) in the same form both in civil society and state. For Anderson, (referring to Weber) the place of the coercion is the state. If it is implied within the civil society, there is no rule of law. Anderson thinks that there is a structural asymmetry in the distribution of consent and coercion and while ideology is much more taking place between civil society and state, coercion belongs to state. For Anderson, Gramsci failed to see this asymmetry (Anderson 1988: 54-58)

In the third model, civil society is equated to state and both civil and political societies are included within the state and are fused in a wider supreme unity. There is not such a distinct sphere as a civil society. Civil society is a part of state and indeed it is the state itself. As easily seen, this model is the inspiration point of Althusser who later develops the theory of ideological state apparatuses. However, this time the distinction between the state and civil society is cancelled out and such an analysis makes impossible to notice the specificity of the western bourgeois democracies (Anderson 1988: 58-60).

As explained by Bobbio, (1993: 118) the outstanding aspect of the Gramsci's analysis is his approaching to the problem over the civil society-political society antithesis as being different then the traditional and modern divisions such as; state

of nature-civilized state or state-civil society. So, the reference point would no longer be the state. The state would be already withered away one day under the pressure of the civil society. With this contribution, many followers of Gramsci were rescued from being chained to the base structure and started to interest in many different fields apart from the political apparatuses of the state.

2.2. Recent Definitions

By following the general framework of Keane (1988), I have tried to outline the main turning points in the meaning of civil society from Aristotle to Gramsci above. However, before discussing the recent definitions of state, I believe that to construct a categorical summary will make easier to comprehend the whole picture. Referring to Bobbio (1989), we could categorize the civil society in three-dimensional schema: as *pre-state, anti-state, post-state* conceptions. In this categorization, the first concept implies a radical negation of the state of nature[13]; namely, as the regulation and renovation of the pre-state development stage of humankind (Aristotle, Hobbes- Locke, Rousseau). In the second, the civil society is seen as an alternative and antithesis of the state (Pain, Ferguson, Tocqueville). The third model refers to a civil society as the condition of the withering away of the state with its Hegelian, Marxian and Gramscian (re-absorption of the political society into civil society) interpretations. However, as we indicated in our early work (Akşit et al. 2003b: 38-39) two more categories should be added to the categorization by Bobbio. These must be the non-*state and trans-state* categories. In this sense, while the former corresponds to the CSOs and voluntary associations outside the state both in the sense of their autonomy and functions; the latter implies the transnational space of the CSOs extending the borders of the nation states with the process of globalization. These recent definitions of civil society are quite related with these dimensions, which are highly intertwined with the historical, political and sociological changes and transformations.

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[13] In this model the state-as the perfection of civil society- is not conceptualized as being against civil society; indeed, there is an underlying civil society- political society (state) identification.

In this sense, when returning back to the historical context, it is seen that that the concept of civil society had been left aside after the post-Gramscian period in the Western World. Until the end of the 1970's, civil society was in silence and "the term was invoked by Solidarity as part of its struggle against the Polish party-state and it soon became a rallying cry for many on both sides of the Iron Curtain who were opposed to statist socialism" (Hall 1995: 1). After a short time, it can be argued that that the term became also widespread in the world to define the opposition movements in Eastern Block and Latin America against the authoritarian state despotism. In this process, the concept of the civil society turned into a reference point in the academic and political discussions in the axis of "transition to democracy". Indeed, apart from the Second and Third World countries and the debates about the transition; the term became also very fashionable in the West as a result of some critical socio-economic developments and crises. Using the analytical schema of Keyman (2004), we can state these developments as follows: the crises of Western modernity with the process of post-modernization; the globalization process; the crises of welfare state and the contribution of so called *Third Way* approach of social democracy. Here, related to the crises of modernity Keyman lists the fallowing:

> the loosening of the social ties of the central left and right parties in the political level accompanied a subsequent weakening of the representative democracy; a rapid transition from industrial society to post-industrial society in economic level and the insufficiency of the old codes such as class and individual to meet the identity demands of the different social groups at cultural level (2004: 8-9)

At the same time, for Keyman, this crisis led to the emergence of new social movements and citizen initiatives, a new kind of middle class that is taken place in the information and service sectors and the support of identity politics based on the cultural difference by the different sections of the society in a global context in which the dependency relations and cultural give and takes became widespread and deepened. The other important factor is the neo-liberal ideology emerged as a response to the long lasting crises of the welfare state since 1970's. In this context,

the concept of civil society seems to be corresponded to the locus of independent organizational attempts and initiatives against the neo- liberal ideology, which reduces the social issues into the individual problems, renders the social quality of the state and defines the social life on a competitive, entrepreneurial and individualistic basis. The fourth factor refers to the Third Way approach of the Western social democratic circles (especially Britain), which espoused the CSOs as the crucial actors for the constitution of democratic and participative democracy based on active citizenship (Keyman 2004: 10).

Consequently, we can argue that the concept of civil society stands on a strategic position of the critical social, economic and political transformations. Therefore, it is at the very point of articulation of the different discourses. In this sense, it is possible to consider many different definitions of civil society from the different ideological positions such as the liberals, social democrats, post-Marxists and the conservatives. It can easily be argued that civil society became a new language of the politics for the maintenance of the legitimacy by the different groups. Hence, there may be found many different and some times conflicting definitions of civil society in the literature.

For instance, from a liberal perspective[14] Diamond defines the civil society as

> the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self generating (largely) self supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order or asset of shared values. Thus civil society being an intermediate entity, standing between the private sphere and the state….excludes individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g. for recreation, entertainment or spirituality), the profit making enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts to take control of the state" (quoted in Özbudun 1997: 85).

However, for Diamond, if an organization is related with religious fundamentalist, ethnic chauvinist, revolutionary or millenarian movement, it cannot be called as civil since it contradicts the pluralist and market oriented nature of civil

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[14] See Beckman (1997) for the critic of the liberal conception of civil society.

society. Similarly, related with the civil society, White speaks of an associational realm between the state and family that is populated by organizations which are separate from the state, which "enjoy autonomy from the state" (quoted in Beckman 1997: 4), and Taylor argues that civil society exists in a minimal sense where there are "free associations not under the state tutelage and only where society as a whole can structure itself and co-ordinate its actions through such associations, which are free of state tutelage" (Beckman 1997: 4).

From a conservative perspective, Gellner argues that,

The simplest, immediate and intuitively obvious definition which also has a certain amount of merit is: civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interest, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of the society. (Gellner 1995: 32)

Gellner (1995) focuses on two critical forms: "stifling communalism and centralized authoritarianism" as the obstacles of the idealized civil society. In this context, besides the authoritarian regimes especially Islam and Marxism (the segmentary communities, cousin ridden and ritual ridden, free perhaps of central tyranny, but not really free and centralization which grinds into thee dust all subsidiary socials institutions or sub-communities) became the essential enemies and rivals of the civil society (Gellner 1994: 12). Therefore, by making a strict distinction between the western democracies, which have the civil society and East, which lacks it; Gellner locates the discussion in an orientalist axis. Here the liberal understanding of civil society reinforced with west-centric essentialism in which the rest stays outside the civil and democratic world.

Contrary to these liberal and conservative approaches, the main concern of Beckman (1997) is to extricate civil society from the liberal agenda. In this context, for Beckman

the lack of civil society was posed in terms of lack of social forces supportive of the liberal economic agenda and the prevailing usages tend to build a commitment to liberalism of one sort or the other into the very definition of the concept. Besides, the prospects of the liberal democratization are explained in terms of the growth of civil society; but only features of associational life that are thought to be supportive of the liberal project are considered as civil society proper" (Beckman 1997: 2).

For him:

the concept of civil society needs to be disengaged from its incorporation into a liberal theory of state- society relations, whereas state and civil society are juxtaposed as separate and conflicting spheres. The nature of the relation should be removed from the definition of civil society and be a matter for empirical investigation" (Beckman 1997, 3).

In this frame, Beckman (1997) concludes that the concept of civil society should be broadened so as to make it less subservient to the liberal agenda and capable of organizing more complex as well as illiberal social realities. He thinks that one of the alternative openings of such an attempt could be focusing on the notion of citizenship as a relation to the state and the formation of 'publics' for the exercise of that citizenship. For him

it may help in making the concept more useful in analyzing a variety of political publics such as those of the market place, the bazaar, the church and the mosque. The upsurge of social activity and associational life centered on the latter which is characteristic of the current Islamic revival is one good reason why we may benefit from disengaging the notion of civil society from prevailing 'Western' ideal types. As the current debate in Turkey demonstrates the question of the role that such emerging Islamic civil society may play in democratization is highly contested and should be addressed empirically and not be foreclosed at a conceptual level" (Beckman 1997: 6).

From a different angle, Therborn points out three analytical flaws in the usual conceptualization of civil society. He thinks that, first there is an assumption or a postulate of a pre-defined, pre-constituted equality among the members. Second, as a normative concept it is ahistorical, not fully concerned with historical paths, institutions, trends and discontinuities. Third, civil society theorizing is uninterested in any specific intra-political dynamics, assuming that the state versus society is the only significant cleavage and conflict line. This exposition entails turning a blind eye to intra-state and inner-state conflicts, as well as societal cleavages. (Thernborn 1997: 47).

Finally, from the post-Marxist side, following the line of Habermas, Cohen and Arato understand civil society:

> as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations) social movements, and forms of public communication. Modern civil society is created through forms of self-constitution and self mobilization. It is institutionalized and generalized through laws, and especially subjective rights that stabilize social differentiation. While the self – creative and institutionalized dimensions can exists separately, in the long run both independent action and institutionalization are necessary for the reproduction of civil society. (1992: ix)

For Cohen and Arato the civil society does not correspond to all social life remaining outside the state organs and economic process in the restricted sense. Since, for them the actors of political society and economic society are directly involved with the state power and economic production which they seek to control and manage; however, civil society has a strategic and instrumental criteria as being the pattern of normative integration and open ended communication. Therefore, for Cohen and Arato, first, the political role of the civil society is not directly related to the control or conquest of power but to the generation of influence through the life of democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public

sphere. Secondly, in order to be called as civil society, the so called civil sphere should fulfill the qualities of conscious association, self-organization and organized communication. Finally, under liberal democracies the relation of civil society with economic and political society is a relation of mediation contrary to an antagonistic one, which means the failure or end of the mediation, deliberation or public discussion (Cohen and Arato 1992: x, xi) To sum up, as it is seen above there seems not a consensus on the definition of civil society. Habermas notes that:

> Unfortunately, a search for clear definitions in the relevant publications is in vain. However, this much is apparent: the institutional core of "civil society" is constituted by voluntary unions outside the realm of state and the economy, and ranging (to give some examples in no particular order) from churches, cultural associations and academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concerned citizens and grass-roots petitioning drives all the way to occupational associations, political parties, labor unions and alternative institutions. (Habermas 1992: 453)

Therefore, in this thesis I prefer to use Habermas' understanding of the civil society, which is briefly outlined above. In addition to this, since the main axis of this thesis is the contribution of the civil society to political public sphere, with reference to Keane, I will take the function of civil society as "maintaining and redefining the boundaries between civil society and state through two interdependent and simultaneous processes: the expansion of the social equality and liberty and the restructuring and democratization of the state" (quoted in Habermas 1992:454). In the rest of the thesis first, I will discuss the historical context of civil society experience in Turkey; and then in the light of the main discussions on public sphere and radical democracy, I will examine the civil experience of Turkey both from the perspective of public deliberation process and organizational relations (internal dynamics) over three CSOs in Ankara.

CHAPTER 3

CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

3.1. Setting the Problem

It is a general conviction among the students of Turkish social and political change that Turkey (or more generally the East), when compared to the West, has a very different historical trajectory with its present repercussions; although, the same universal history has been providing a common historical ground for both realms, at least to confront their interests. The most recent event: the acceptance of Turkey to the membership deliberations into the EU is the most gigantic and symbolic indicator of this common ground. However, as we witnessed politically in the most recent EU discussions, in which the different positions are crystallized both in the West and Turkey, there can also be detected the invisible power of underlying orientalist, west-centric but at the same time a very strong and influencing academic tradition in the social sciences.

Basically, depending on the Weberian model of political theory with ideal types, this tradition, latently suppose the existence of the different substances when looking at the material reality. For instance, related with our issue or more generally in the fields of comparative politics or comparative sociology, there is a powerful tradition believing in the "the uniqueness of the West[15]" and of course vice versa as the norm and departing point in their way of understanding the issues. Here, the problem is not the indication of the differences of the various social formations but the presentation of the differences as the absolute, universal, fixed and closed categories. This is more obvious in the positivist works, but the spirit of this approach seems still stronger since it addresses to the superficial empirical differences, which could be perceived more easily by the people. We can follow a

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[15] See Hirst (1975) for a detailed discussion of the issue related with the works of Perry Anderson.

similar agenda for the civil society debates. For instance, Serif Mardin -as an important representative of the conventional literature on the social formation of Turkey- begins his analysis by stating the absence of our own "democratic" tradition depending on a structural element of an Islamic populism, which lacks the civil society and a western type of public opinion (Mardin 1995: 1992).

Mardin argues that the peculiarity of the western historical process which has its roots in the urban activities such as the development of the mass communication media, the formation of the public opinion, the emergence of the first autonomous organizations such as urban councils, the realization of the separation of powers and so forth. has evolved to the institutionalization of the civil society organizations contrary to the Ottoman Empire. Since for Mardin, the development of the concept of interest has a "collectivist" meaning in the Ottoman Empire comparatively the Western world. For him, "one source of this situation is the state-based legitimation understanding of the Ottoman bureaucratic-patrimonial administration. The other reason is the absence of social bases in the Islamic systems; such as the autonomous intellectual groups and press to constitute an opposition tradition" (Mardin 1995: 1922). Accordingly, the difference of the Ottoman institutions (Heper 1980) from the feudal system is a continuously emphasized theme in the literature and the followings are the most repeated as the failing ones: the hereditary aristocracy, religious hierarchy as in the case of Church, a powerful social group of commerce and arts and autonomous cities (Özbudun 1990). Generally speaking, the conventional literature defines the Ottoman System as a type of the Bureaucratic Empire in which all the power is embodied in Sultan and the society is organized in the axis of community and state; namely as a kind of *Oriental despotism*. For instance, İnalcık (İnalcık 1992: 49) defines this system as the *Sultanism*, which stands on a dual structure of servitude or slavery (*kul* system) and land regime. The Sultan as the owner of the whole country and property (mülk) gives his subjects the right to use the land and in return provides soldiers. Whereas on the one side there was the center composed of the soldiers, *ulema* (religious authorities) and bureaucrats; on the other side there stands the Muslim and the non-muslim *reaya*. However, it was believed that the whole society -as the *kuls* (servants-slaves of the

Sultan who were usually converts) of Sultan- was represented in the personality of the Sultan. According to İnalcık, the sovereignty in this system was based on the military force and personal discretionary power (despotism) of the Sultan. That's why İnalcık conceptualizes this system as the Sultanism. Essentially, the roots of this approach could be found in Weber. Since, Weber defined Ottoman Empire as an extreme case of patrimonialism. In general he says, "the patrimonial state makes administrative and military organization a purely personal instrument of the master to broaden his arbitrary power" (quoted in İnalcık 1995: 49). Accordingly, İnsel argues that this social structure continued in the Republican period and patrimonialism constitutes the backbone of the structure of the Turkish Republic (İnsel 1996: 43). Similarly, Heper states that unlike certain continental European countries the state in the Ottoman-Turkish Polity developed not alongside civil society but by virtually smothering the latter and the formulation of state norms was hardly affected by the views and interests of civil societal elements (Heper 1992: 177).

In sum, the Ottoman Empire is evaluated as a kind of despotic Eastern state deprived of the self-organizing intermediary associations (associations, estates, parliaments etc) and an autonomous civil society under the guarantee of separation of powers. Parallel to this approach, the subsequent Turkish Republic was perceived as the continuum of this structure. However, since the model is taken from the West, and the issue is considered with Western eyes, the civil society -which is considered to be a peculiar outcome of the Western history-, is searched for within the history and society of Turkey. The natural result of this endeavor would be the listing of the lacks (non-exists) when there cannot be found this idealized civil society as such. However as Mardin clearly states, "civil society is western dream, a historical aspiration; it is also in the concrete form this dream has taken, part of the social history of Western Europe" (Mardin 1995: 278). Therefore, this understanding includes two important dangers. First, this idealistic approach presupposes the fulfillment of this lacks in one day for reaching to this ideal situation (in this case to a so called civil society); but, this kind of thinking has a potential tendency to put the history writing into a teleological frame from the beginning. In this context, the

specificities that could not be included within the existing model would be called as the ambiguities or absurdities. The second danger one should avoid is to fall into the trick of anachronism. In this case, since the aim is to find the counterparts of the civil society in the context of research area; for instance the *tarikat* orders in the East could be defined as the civil society organizations irrespective of their specific historical and social context.

In my opinion, what is to be done is not to look for a normative concept of civil society in Turkey or as it is supposed to be in the West but to examine the inner dynamics of Turkish society with the global developments and try to understand the power relations between the state- individual and society. Since, Turkey simultaneously includes the institutions, values and practices of the West besides its own due to its historical and cultural give and take with the West based on the centuries. Therefore, it should be examined how the practices penetrated from the West articulate with the local peculiar contexts. Therefore, in the next part, I am going to start to analyze from the historical context to illustrate the development and transformation of social relations in Turkey discussed related with civil society.

3.2. Historical Context

First of all it should be noted that "the Ottoman Empire is not feudal: the nature of the state -its role in the determination of the class structure, in social reproduction and in that class structure itself - was fundamentally different from the pre-capitalist order we have come to know as European feudalism. Historically, the Ottoman order was constructed upon the Byzantine and Eastern Roman precedent (Keyder 1987: 7). The system was based on the small ownership and the property of the whole country *de jure* belongs to the Sultan. However practically, the peasants have the right to use the land as far as they cultivate the land and provide certain number of soldiers to the state in the ratio of their land. It means that the Ottoman State was organized to maintain the integrity of the peasant economy, which constitutes the main revenue of the state. However, different than the concept of Oriental Despotism, "state power in Ottoman Empire does not simply refer to the

state's coercive abilities and is not confined to the state's taxation or surplus appropriation function. It focuses on the legitimation concern of the state in enforcing the precepts of a given societal organization" (İslamoğlu-İnan 1994: 3). For İslamoğlu-İnan, the concept of oriental despotism reduced the state –society relation into a tax function, which is identified with a pressure relation. However, in the Ottoman Empire the principle of justice, which guarantees the ability of the peasants to maintain their sustainable economic activity constituted the ground of state's legitimacy. Moreover, it has been proved that the concept of Asiatic Mode of Production is empirically insufficient and conceptually invalid (İslamoğlu-İnan 1991: 12-19). The Ottoman Empire, therefore, cannot be considered under the stable and unchangeable category of Asiatic Mode of Production in which the land (*mülkiyet*) belongs to the state and there are no intermediary associations and interest struggle between the state and its subjects. In this sense, although the state relied on the extraction of peasant's surpluses in the form of taxes as its primary source of revenue, the Ottoman Empire had not been operating on the absolute arbitrariness as in the case of so-called oriental despotisms. Since, according to Mardin, the subjects (the serves of the Sultan) who are remaining out of the Sultan and the Ottoman bureaucracy were living in the frame of *shari'a (Islamic law)* and they have a status of *kul*, as being protected by the frame of law-code (Mardin 1990: 28). Indeed, it is stated that in the Ottoman State, even the most ordinary peasants have the right to complain about the *vali* (governor of a province) who treated them badly by the mediation of the *kadı* (justice). Indeed, everyone who was giving the tax to the state could submit his complaints directly to the Sultan. This right was taken under the guarantee of the state. There were various forms of this mechanism. If there was big problem dealing a number of people, the peasants were electing a committee from themselves and sending it to the *divan-ı hümayun* (state council). The Sultan had to hear these complaints behind the curtain (İnalcık 1998: 77-78). İnalcık argues that this can be interpreted as a kind of justice approach, in which the weakest individual could reach to the highest authority to prevent the unfair and unjust conditions. For him, this justice approach is the most determining element in the state conceptualization in the Middle East (İnalcık 1998: 78).

Apart from the land system, there is a quite developed *lonca* (guild craft) organization of artisans and craftsmen -based on the *petit* production and commerce- and urban life in the Ottoman Empire. In addition to these, there are charity organizations organized as *vakıfs,* religious establishments as *tarikats*, educational institutions in the form of *medrese's* and *külliye's*, (education complexes) social life units as *mahalle's* (districts) and public life places as *çarşı's*, bazaars and coffeehouses.

For instance, the people who were doing the same job organized under the umbrella of the guild organizations in order to sustain their jobs, solve the problems, make quality controls, control the market and prevent the unfair competition (Pamuk 1990: 55-59). In these organizations one person was elected as *kethüda* from all the branches of artisans. Then the *kethüda*'s of all branches were electing a man as the city *kethüda* who was playing the mediator role between the artisans and the state by bringing the problems of the workers to the Sultan and the orders of the Sultan to the workers. Essentially, we can broad this category of *kethüda* to the other social groups such as Patriarchate "Metropolitans come together and electing the Patrick. When the Sultan gives him the *berat* (official approval) he is officially accepted as the representative of the community: as the mediator between the non-Muslim community and the state. The status of the *kethüda* is the general name of this function. Groups elect the *kethüda* and Sultan provides him the authority (İnalcık, 1998: 79). Like the guilds, the *mahalle*s, the Janissaries', tribes and non-Muslim communities they all were electing their own *kethüda*'s. Since, as an umbrella state, the basic deal of the Ottoman State was increasing its tax resources, it did not interfere within the inner relations of these communities as far as they are loyal to the state and give their taxes (İnalcık 1998: 77-78).

Whereas, there stands *şeyh's* (religious leaders) leading the guilds; besides, in these guilds, there could be found some heterodox elements such as *Alevi*'s or *Bektaşi*'s contrary to the official *Sunni* ideology of state and non-Muslim elements like Christian Greeks and Armenians.

The state was recognizing the decisions of the guilds under the frame of the rules and codes called as *ihtisab*. With a council including the *kadı* (justice) and the representatives of the guilds (*kethüdas*), the state was controlling the quality and stability of the market, guaranteeing the basic needs of consumption, fulfilling the requirements of the army and the navy; namely, controlling the urban economy and population (Pamuk 1990: 62). However, these groups, which were first, organized as the *Ahi* unions have a dual relation with the state. On the one hand, they had some rights and authority as the semi- autonomous vocational organizations however; on the other hand, bounded with the *Kadı*, they function as the medium of the state to control the public sphere. So, besides the *Tımar* system, which provides the central control, the state was auditing the market relations by the mediation of the guilds. To sum up, it would not be true to present the guilds in the Ottoman Empire as the free and autonomous civil society organizations but, considering their functions, we can easily state them as the intermediary associations.

The other important kind of social organization was the *vakıfs* (foundations). "According to the law of Islam, the *vakıf* was defined as the allocation of a commodity or property whose income would be used for realizing a public good into a specific aim (Pamuk 1990: 76). Apart from their public function there were a latent agenda of the *vakıf* to preserve the properties from the intervention of the state and to prevent the *müsadere* (the transmission of the private properties into the treasure of the state). Especially the *evladiye vakıf*s were established to by-pass the *miri* land regime, by collecting the incomes and properties in the hands of the founding family. The attempts for founding *vakıf* were coming especially from the state bureaucrats who were the most advantageous to have property. Their property could easily be transmitted into the state treasure. In this sense the *vakıf*s were standing on a conflicting space between the state property and private property (Pamuk 1990: 77). The board of trustees (of *vakıf*s), appointed by the owners of the property administrated the *vakıf*'s and these councils were free in preserving their capital commodities/properties and making new investments. Indeed, though conflicting with the *shari'a*, they could lend money with the interest rates *(faiz).*

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Though free in its fiscal and administrative issues, the accounts of these *vakıf*s were audited by the state[16].

Apart from the guilds and *vakıf*s, the other critical public spaces of the Ottoman society and daily life were the coffeehouses in which the opposition is both publicized and legitimized (Kırlı 1999/2000: 66). These places were providing an appropriate atmosphere for speaking (as an arena of the political debates) and became the center of the Janissary rebellions. After the Sixteenth Century, these places have been added into the daily life of the Ottoman Society which was composed of mosque, bazaar, *mahalle* and house and though there have been some transformations in their functions, the coffeehouses still exist as an invisible part of the Turkish daily life.

After a short time, these new places started to attract the interest of the wide sections of the society and became the focus of debates about state. The state recognized this situation and took the coffeehouses under a close control by its *hafiye*s *(informers[17])* "With an approximate calculation, 2/3 of the reports composed of about the coffeehouse *muhabbet*s (close relation and discussion with friends). Besides, the informers could be seen everywhere such as shops, mosques, streets, *hamams*, caiques, cemeteries, barber shops, *han* rooms and houses where there is *muhabbet* (Kırlı 1999/2000: 60). In the Nineteenth Century, the coffeehouses would be the meeting centers of nationalist movements, intellectuals and traders of İstanbul, Alexandria or Salonica, therefore, the relation of the coffeehouses with the state has always been tense; since, the state continued to see this places which developed out of its control as dangerous. However, "for preventing this danger, state had used a daunting strategy since the 17th Century and closed just some of the coffeehouses to fear the others instead of closing all" (Kırlı 1999/2000: 67). For, the coffeehouses as the public spaces with the bazaars, Janissary and Bektaşi lodges became very effective in the rebellions of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries resulted in the murdering of the Sultans or *primary* state officials.

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[16] The same situation still continues today

[17] These people were responsiple to inform every kind of information and event to the state i.e. to the Sultan.

Another critical social element in the Ottoman Empire has been the *tarikats*. For İnalcık, a *tarikat* can be defined "as religious institution, as a social organization or as a institution which fullfills the needs of a social movement or represent the ideals of it" (İnalcık 1998: 80). Actually, the relations with *tarikat*, which could be dated back to the marriage of Osman Bey and the sister of the Şeyh Edibali have been always ambiguous and elusive for the state. The *tarikats* were used for İslamization of the conquested places, mass and spiritual support and mobilization in the wars, for the formation of public opinion and in return, gained important places and privileges in military and commercial life. As Mardin argues, "the *umma* structure and *tarikats* filled the gap stemming from the non-existence of secondary groups in today's meaning between the state and society in the Eastern societies (Mardin 1986: 57). However, different than the autonomous organizations in the West, the *tarikats* have been operating on the principle of spiritual and collective adherence, which is contrary to the logic of autonomous organization of independent individuals. These establishments were under the control of state in the development period of the Empire; but they became the locus of opposition in the recession and reformation periods. As a result, state's pressure on them was increased in these periods. The most famous example of this was the dissolution of the Bektaşi Orders after the abolishment of the Janissaries lodges. In addition to these included ones, there were many other *tarikats* remaining outside. For instance, the mobile life styles of the Nomad Turkmens influenced by the ideology of the movements in the Central Asia such as Yeseviye, Haydariye and Abdal was not confirming the urban-commercial patterns of Islam and the settled agricultural structure of the Empire (İnalcık 1998: 81). So, they were living a segmented life in the periphery of the Empire without joining the mainstream social life of the Empire like the various religious, cultural or ethnic groups however, the central state was trying to control, tax and settle them by virtue of its functionaries (*tahrir eminleri*) or military force and use them in the jobs requiring intensive labor such as bridge, road, construction or mining industry (İnalcık 1998: 82). This situation led to the series of struggles between the Turkmen's and the Ottoman State lasting centuries. This opposition to the state was organized by the mediation of the heterodox beliefs, *tasavvuf* and

tarikats and these *tarikats* became the representatives of the desires and protests of these excluded groups. To sum up, the *Yörüks, Kızılbaşs* and *Turkmens* and some parts of the artisans (such as Melamis) became the groups representing the civil opposition movements against the state (İnalcık 1998: 80-86). These movements and *tarikats* still have been preserving their key functions in Turkish social and political life by adjusting themselves to the changing conditions.

In the most general frame, when considering the social organization and life of the Ottoman Empire, we can see the Ottoman State was a state in which the ruling classes composed of central bureaucrats, Janissaries and *ulema*, trying to reconcile the interest of the different groups such as the traders, artisans, craftsmen, peasants tribes and the pre-Ottoman local ruling elites around the organizing principle of patriarchal ideology. In this structure, the state should not be seen just as an apparatus of domination extracting the surplus, but as the organ to provide the continuity of the justice and *nizam-ı alem* (perpetrate order) in which the coercion is combined with the consent: hegemony (İslamoğlu-İnan 1991: 40). This hegemony is maintained as such; "the consent of the ruled to different state practices was transmitted through religious institutions or personnel. These included the urban guilds and their regulations, the institutions of higher learning (i.e. *medrese*) and charitable foundations as well as the *zaviyes* or dervish hospices. Functionaries in these institutions such as the guild masters, the *ulema*[18]*,* and the şeyhs of *zaviye*[19] played a central role in the mediation of the consent through the dissemination of patrİMOnial idiom" (İslamoğlu-İnan 1994: 8). Besides, this official *ulema*, there were another type of *ulema* (known as *hadis ehli) who were* closer to the ideology, consciousness, way of life and culture of the people and mostly in opposition to the state (Mardin 1990: 27).

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[18] "First, they were responsible for mediating the relationships between the ruling block and the groups of the ruled through the application of the *Kanun*. At the same time the judges mediated the interaction among the different groups through the application of *şeriat* precepts relating to the family and to matters of inheritance. Second the *ulema,* were the administrators of the *vakıfs* of charitable and educational institutions. In this capacity as well as the leaders of prayers in the mosques, they acted as purveyors and overseers of the partİMOnial idiom" (İslamoğlu-İnan 1994: 8).

[19] "They were influential in the dissemination of the consensus over the viability of state power premised on the moral precepts of the patrİMOnial idiom" (İslamoğlu-İnan 1994: 9).

After the Sixteenth Century, the long lasting stability with the concomitant population growth resulted in the inflation. The decrease of the fixed monetary taxes led to the cripple of some military services in the agricultural sphere. Combined with the price revolution in the Europe, the Ottoman Empire faced with a fiscal crisis. Under these circumstances, the *iltizam* system was put into force to increase the tax revenues but, this regulation exacerbated the condition by distorting the balance of the agricultural structure and resulted in the degeneration of the system (Keyder 1987:13). In addition to these developments, "especially after the 18th Century, the state underwent a restructuration under the dual impact of military competition from European states and of the globalization of market exchange relations. As a result of these, the Ottoman Economy gets into peripherization process in the world economy and the patriarchal ideology, discussed above, had collapsed with its old maintaining principles and legitimacy and the famous expression of despotism became possible to speak about the Ottoman Empire (İslamoğlu-İnan 1994: 8).

Under these circumstances, the old system started to evolve on the one hand towards the empowerment of the *ayans* (local notables) by virtue of the *iltizam* system; on the other hand this new system paved the way for a new alliance of the new modernist bureaucracy class with the foreign traders and representatives of the minorities. This development led to the division of center and periphery, which would be conceptualized later by Mardin (1990).

In this new conjuncture, the empowered local notables started to collect the taxes, control the trade and regulate the economies of the cities. Parallel to these developments, they attempted to form the *ayan* councils and these *ayan* councils started to function as the city aristocracy as in the case of Europe by dealing with the economic decisions about commercial and guild certificates and the incomes and expenses of the cities (quoted in İnalcık by Keyder 1995: 26). At the end, the central state had to recognize the *ayans* with the Pact of Alliance (*Sened-i İttifak*). However this recognition would be the beginning of the end for the *ayan*s. Since, at that time, the Ottoman State underwent a restoration for gathering the power in the center and for conducting some reforms from the center in response to the supremacy of the West. The case of Mehmet Ali Paşa Rebellion gave the state the opportunity to

abolish the power of the *ayans* with the support of England. Essentially, "it was not from the control of the land or more directly of the peasantry, that the *ayans* derived their power: it was a dependent power based on the parameters and the assumptions of the social system whose dissolution had occasioned their emergence. As they were unable to fashion an alternative system of labor use during the short period of their ascendancy, they could change the agrarian structure only temporarily and then not in essence" (Keyder 1987: 16).

Besides all these, the integration process of the Ottoman Empire with capitalism in the Nineteenth Century made the situation much more complex. On the one hand, the new commercial class desired to integrate the world economy got into the alliance with the modernist side of the state bureaucracy, on the other hand the periphery -whose loyalty to the state had been eroded- started to embrace Islam around the local power centers. In this process, with the increasing facilities of communication and transportation, the periphery (the sections of the people) found chance to mobilize its supporters and in the last quarter of the 19th Century there was a proliferation in the activities of the *tarikats*. The accelerated conflicts united the people block of periphery-*ulema* (*hadis ehli*) and craft guilds against the state-bureaucracy and the center (Mardin 1990: 32). The whole world of periphery united against the *laiklik* (secularism). Moreover in this conflicting process, though limited, the western type elements (journals, newspapers, associations, political parties etc.) of civil society was penetrating to the country and used by the both parts very intensively to affect the public opinion.

In the first decade, of the 20th Century, the dynamism of the society was reached to the point of 1908 Revolution. However, since the organizers of the movement: The *İttihat-ı Terakki (Union and Progress Party)* and later their predecessor Kemalists see the wide sections of society (the *shari'a* block) as being against their projects. In this context, they tended to choose the way of oppression and soon became authoritarian regimes. Actually, both of them were aware of the absence of the intermediary associations, which would legitimize their administration and be the social and institutional ground of it, among the sections of the society. They tried to constitute them (banks, class organizations, newspapers,

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parties, associations, laws, and so on.) as far as they could. However, the interesting thing is that today's Turkey the new structures as the constructing elements of the civil society seem to be occupied by the Muslims instead of Kemalists[20] (Mardin 1990: 32).

The new Turkish Republic, which was established in the extraordinary conditions of the Independence War, had a strict intolerance to the developments out of its control especially in the period of 1923-1945. Especially after the elimination of the Second Group of the First Assembly and with the Law of *Takrir-i Sükun* (The Maintenance of the Tranquility) all the organizations except the state were dissolved. In this period, although the populist themes were used and put into practice, the primary concern stayed as the consolidation of the center. Therefore, the bureaucratic way of thinking continued and the mass support could not be gained by the center. While the center's approach (which sees the periphery as the location of backwardness, discord and mis-chief making) to the periphery continued in this period, the resentment of the periphery against the state continued to grow as the sleeping giant until the electoral victory of the Democrat Party on 1950. With the relaxing political atmosphere of the first years of DP government, there can be seen some attempts for the emergence of the Western type civil society institutions (such as associations, parties, press and so on.) in the second half of the 1950's, the DP government increased the pressure to the highest point. They were applying an intensive domination over the universities, intellectuals, press and parties. Indeed the DP government tried to close the Republican Peoples Party, which was founded by the Atatürk. Combining with the populist politics, which were interpreted as the concessions to the ş*eriat* by the army and the economic recession, the DP government lost its power with a coup d'etat in 1960. However, besides its political

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[20] This situation came to such a point that the "Kemalists seriously started to feel the need for the organization in the field of civil society, which they have neglected so far. In the 1990's, with the deepening of the Kurdish question and the rise of the Islamic movements, Kemalists started a counter attack. While one part of this process include reclaiming of the Kemalist discourse in an authoritarion form, the other part tended to the constitution of the Kemalist hegemony within the very civil society. In this process the authoritarian attitude of the state apparatuses against the dangers that are directed to the national unity, Turkish national identity and secularism echoed in the civil society and a civil Kemalist "common sense" accompanied to the official authoritharian Kemalism. In this frame, there was an explosure in the number of the Kemalist civil society organizations in the 1990's" (Erdoğan 2001: 235).

failures, Turkey went through a deep and great economic and social transformation with the DP government[21]. With the social and economic politics of DP supported by the foreign aids, the capitalization process of Turkish Economy accelerated and the base structure investments -though conditional- led to the economic and social integration of Turkey in its own. So with the increasing communication and transportation facilities, the interests of the periphery gained a national dimension. So, in a western type national market with its civil society, though limited, the first divisions of class emerged in every aspect of the society.

Generally speaking the 1960 Military Intervention and 1961 Constitution can be considered as the attempt for bringing a frame of control to these new conditions. On the one hand, there were made some serious regulations which would open the way for the western type of civil society concerning the freedom of thought, press, organization etc. on the other hand; there were brought some regulations on the consolidation of the center such as National Security Board (MGK), Constitutional Court, Senate and so forth. However, the handicap of these regulations was that they came from above by the military intervention as against the spirit of the civil society. Therefore they went as they came. However, in this process with the facilities provided by the 1961 Constitution, Turkey experienced its most civil years in its history (excluding the 1971 Restrictions). In this period, all sections of society experienced an intensive politicization, organization and political struggle reaching until the villages. Many parties were established. There was an incredible increase in the schooling, literacy rate, number of books and journals, publishers. The universities increased their weights and influence in the political and social agenda. There was provided a record level of economic development with the planned economy based on the import substitution. So the provisions of the welfare policies there was lived a comparative improvement in the economic condition of the people and this led to a *revolution of expectations*[22] in the wide sections of the society. When the expectations and demands went beyond the real development level of the

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[21] Turkey experienced a similar transformation in the period of Özal Governments in 1980's and is experiencing today by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government.
[22] See and compare Di Tella (1970) for a detailed analysis of populism in Latin America with Turkey.

country, in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, the political struggles was transformed into the political clashes. At that point, since democratic consciousness which recognizes the legitimate existence of the other was not developed, the relative freedom and democracy of the social and political life led to an extreme polarization including violence and terror. In this polarization every political party supported the development of associations for reaching their electorates and this situation contributed into the polarization of the associations (Turan, 1998: 200). The result of this was not a civil society shaped by the democratic deliberation process, but a paranoid society within the ideology of national security, maintained first by the restrictions of 1971 and then by the 1980 coup d'etat.

3.3. Different Approaches to Civil Society in Turkey

The discussion about civil society or the beginning of the civil society debates dates back to post-Coup D'eta; to the breaking years of 1980 under the effects of military intervention. Actually, this situation was closely related with the global developments that had taken place in the world. For, the concept of civil society had been given up also in the West after Gramsci and gave its place mostly to the concept of citizenship. The resurrection of the concept was mostly realized by the inspiration of the autonomous movements that were emerged against the central, oppressive and authoritarian regimes of some Third World countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Eastern Block and new social movements emerged in the West with their different demands. So, the direction of the democracy debates that were conceptualizing the East as the authoritarian, corporatist, patrİMOnial etc. against the democratic West, has shifted to a dichotomy of existence or absence of civil society with the rediscovery of the civil society. The economic crises having been lived in the 1970s led to the giving up of the protectionist welfare policies and the collapse of the Soviet Block prepared the ground for the hegemonization of neo-liberal ideology. The civil society gained its recent meaning in this context. Yet, what is understood from the civil society became the fulfillment of some welfare

functions, which were under the responsibility of state in the past, by the voluntary associations. So the state would be escaped from some of its burden.

In addition to all these developments, the conjecture was also appropriate for the flourishing of civil society due to the global developments such as erosion of national identities, collapse of meta narratives, resurrection of sub-national identities and the emergence of a transnational space for the civil society organizations.

Toprak (1996) argues that, until 1980's the state's role in the Turkish developmental project was viewed as necessary both by the right and the left; but, the political and economic changes in the aftermath of the 1980 coup have radically altered the perception of the state's role in the structuring of Turkish society. Previously unquestioned expectations that change come about only trough state action gave way to a radically new understanding that the dynamism of social actors is impeded by the bureaucratic state (Toprak 1996: 117). It is my contention that Özal was one of the best representatives of this transformation. As the first "civil" president, he was the pioneering name of this new period in Turkey with his radical economic liberalism and moderate populism including elements both from the left and right with its versions of nationalism and Islamism. Therefore, in these years, Turkey started to discuss the concept of civil(ness) in the very personality of Özal[23] (Mert 2001: 58) and parallel to the global trends; apart from the business circles and urban middle classes, the periphery (political islam) also found a suitable place for its growth and development under the protection and encouragement of Özal government throughout 1980's and in the first half of the 1990's. In this frame, many religious *tarikats* were transformed into holdings in these years with their associations, foundations, TV-radio channels, publishers, newspapers, schools, universities and even with their hotels and beaches. Namely, the periphery started to constitute its own public space since then in Turkey. The Kemalists were also added to this stream in the mid-1990s as we noted above. So, the civil atmosphere was

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[23] Özal's own personal behaviours and attitudes were interpreted in the newspapers as the examples of civilness such as his control of a military detachment with a short. This absurd example was a good indicator of the perception of "civilness" in Turkey in the sense of non-military as Mardin states: "In our society, the term civil is used generally as the antonym of the military. However it is actully related with the urban culture including the way of life, rights and responsibilities" (1995a: 1918)

flourished in the 1990s and 2000s in Turkey, it is to say with the contribution of all sections of society. Among these, we can count the Islamists with their *tarikat* communities; the Kemalists with their Atatürkist societies, the capitalist class with their effective organizations of the business world such as TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialist's and Businessmen's Association) and TOBB (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey); the central left and right with their mainstream vocational organizations such as KESK (The Confederation of Public Workers Trade Unions), TMMOB (The Union of Turkish Architects and Engineers Trade Associations), TESK (Turkey Confederation of Craftsmen and Artisans), KAMU-SEN (The Confederation of Turkish Public Workers Trade Unions) and labor unions such as TÜRK-İŞ (The Confederation of Turkish Workers Trade Unions), DİSK (The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Trade Unions), HAK-İŞ (The Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions), the liberals and professionals with their focused civil society organizations; the feminist movement with its women organizations and the other ideological and cultural groups[24] with their different kinds of associations.

However, the discovery of as civil society as an important concept had come from within the Turkish Left in the 1970s by some of the leftist intellectuals[25] who had come to view the Soviet state as a repressive mechanism of the party bureaucracy and sought alternative views of state and society in socialist systems such as political thoughts Gramsci (Toprak 1996: 95). At this point it should be referred to İdris Küçükömer[26] as the first thinker who discussed the "civil" problematic in Turkey. In his extraordinary political categorization he was puting the social groups that were coming from the tradition of Janissary, craft guilds and *ulema* on the left and the westernized-bureucratic and secular (*laik)* sections on the right (Küçükömer 1969). Küçükömer was considering the latter (the westernists)

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[24] Such as nationalists, Alevis or Kurds. For a detailed description and analysis of the CSOs in Turkey, see Akşit Tabakoğlu, Serdar (2003) and YerasİMOs (ed.) (2002).
[25] Such as Murat Belge, in the ends of 1970s and Asaf Savaş Akat, Aydın Köymen, Kürşat Bumin in the beginnings of the 1980s.
[26] For his outstanding ideas on the civil problematic of the Turkish history and society, please see Küçükömer (1969).

ironically as the obstacle in the formation of the western type civil society in Turkey.

These leftist intellectuals experienced the most catastrophic days of Turkey under the pressure of the two military interventions and tried to find a way in the darkness of the fascist and authoritarian social and political atmosphere of Turkey. Essentially, in these years it was already started to be recognized by the leftist intellectuals all around the world that something was going wrong in the left especially after the unfolding of the totalitarian and undemocratic applications of the Eastern Block. Moreover, the Soviet Block was close to its collapse over the hopes of total emancipation and concerning Turkey, besides all these, the strict, violent and undemocratic memories of the political struggles of 1970s were still alive.

All these developments led to the intensive interrogation of some given concepts in the literature such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, planned economy, centralism, statism etc. throughout the world and this would result in a visible change in the imagination of socialism in the wide sections of the left both in the world and in Turkey[27]. In this context Turkish left re-introduced with civil society. As the primary representative, Belge was defining the civil society "as the places in which autonomous groups and individual citizens have the right of expressing themselves and preserve their autonomy against the central authority without the intervention of state. For him, the duty of the socialist left was to articulate civil society -as a kind of sociality, as the principle of autonomy or as a system of independent citizens- into the socialism (Belge 1989: 74). However Belge's reading of civil society and his ideas were considered as liberal socialism and have not been seen as valuable for a long time within the left circles. Indeed, defending a socialist position having a vision of civil society was accused of as being reactionary, revisionist or liberal. Civil society was used as a swearing for a long time in the Turkish left until the end of the 1990's.

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[27] The political program and experience of the biggest socialist party ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party) which was established in the 1996 was a good example of this investigation.

However, within the strong hegemony of neo-liberal ideology the penetration of the civil society discourse in Turkey would be more functional and operational for the right-wing politics (with its liberal, conservative and Islamist sections) than the left. All of these projects could successfully articulate the civil society into their discourse[28] but the left. Since, they have recognized that civil society is the very periphery per se as the social base of their potential political power if to speak about a civil element in the Turkish history and society. That's why the conservative liberal Taha Akyol, sees the civil society in the political attempts[29] of the conservative people with *şalvar, çarık* and *potur* (the traditional costumes of Turkish peasants) against the revolutionary, progressive and the westernist state (Erdoğan 1999: 116). In this context, it is meaningful that the Ex PM and now Foreign Minister Gül declared in a TV program that he was influenced in the past also by the ideas of İdris Küçükömer.[30]

The other civil society approach that can be discussed under the Turkish Right is the Islamist version of the civil society. An Islamist intellectual Ali Bulaç, as the best representative of this approach, developed an Islamic civil society conception based on the model of Medina in the first years of Islam. By citing the *Medina Vesikası*[31] Bulaç, suggests an order based on the co-existence of the different law systems. In his design, every social, cultural or religious group lives according to its own rules and regulations (Çınar 1998: 228). Since, according to Bulaç, "this modern state developed into a monster which controls all aspects of social and cultural life: law, education, art, religion. It imposes a common nationality on many ethnicities; the logic of state is ethnic cleansing internally and nationalist wars globally" (quoted in Kaldor 2004:43). Therefore, for him the individuals have to be freed from the state not as the atom of the liberal theory but as part of an Islamic community (2004: 43). However, this suggestion was quite criticized as being neglecting the undemocratic and oppresive potentials of closed

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[28] Today The AKP's political discourse which emphasizes the contribution of civil society organizations in every opportunity (such as the Cyprus Problem or EU Accession Process) is the most excellent example of this situation.

[29] The Progressive Republican Party (1924) and Free Party (1930) experiences

[30] Gül was implicitely referring to Küçükömer's critic on the westernization process of Turkey.

[31] The charter drawn up by the prophet to regulate the relations between the new Islamic community and other tribes (Kaldor 2004: 43)

community proceeding on its own laws while defending the realm of civil society against the state[32].

Today, the most hegemonic civil society conception seems to be the liberal conception of civil society. We can show Akat's and Altan's approaches as the most effective ones. For instance, Akat argues that "civil society is participating into the politics, making politics, establishing parties in the political level; having right to speak in native language, the non-existence of the state ideology and religion in the cultural level and the right to getting into economic activities without the permission of the state; namely, the right to property and market mechanisms in the economic level" (quoted in Erdoğan 1999: 123). On the other hand, Mehmet Altan conceives the civil society as the realm of social classes. He believes that this interior conflict of the class society is the guarantee of a democratic society; since these conflicts facilitate for making of the democratic power that will establish the democracy. Namely, Altan argues that the free market (the realm of economic liberties) will foster the democracy (political liberties) (quoted in Erdoğan 99: 123).

We have outlined the general attitudes of different ideological stances above. As seen each group tries to articulate the civil society into its own discourse and political projects. However, when considering the world of Academia the discussion seems to be divided into two as the optimists and pessimists in the axis of the existence or non-existence of the so called civil society.

One of the leading figures on the optimistic side is Nilüfer Göle. For her, "democracy has been internalized as a set of shared values by the Turks and has become the norm of political behavior" in Turkey (Göle 1997: 47). She argues that "a buffer between Turkish state and society started to form itself in the 1950s. 1960s and 1970s witnessed the civil societal development of syndicalism, leftist political movements, and the diffusion of printed material. This civil societal development gained more autonomy and differentiation especially, in the post 1983 period with the development of an export oriented-market economy, globalized communication

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[32] See the Journal of Birikim, No: 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 48 for the whole picture of this "Medina Document" (Medine Vesikası) Discussions. See the footnotes of Bulaç, 1993a and 1993b for the spectrum of the discussion.

networks and the proliferation of voluntary associations. Civil society deepened and differentiated with the arrival of private television and radio channels and the development of a strong associative life ranging from business organizations, history and art foundations (*vakıf*s) and associations for civil rights, women's rights and environmental issues to special issue periodicals, weeklies and research institutes. Each of these contributed in a different Islamist, liberal, or nationalist mode and each competed in the production of information, knowledge and analysis, and the expression of opinions, and tried to influence the formation of public opinion" (Göle, 1996: 36). As a result of this, the critical and taboo issues of Turkish society such as: religious and ethnic identity, national unity, secularism, pluralism have become publicly debated topics (Göle 1997: 47)

Another critical element in the development of civil society, according to Göle, is the participation of the Islamist movements. She states that we would be mistaken, if we consider Islamist movements as exclusively anti-modernist. Since, these movements have created a space for political participation by mobilizing the social groups, which were remained marginal and silenced until the 1980s. Parallel to these ideas, White argues "that a civic culture undeniably exists and has preceded recent Islamist political successes in Turkey. Informal civic associations teaches citizenship skills that may, in time lead to further politicization and institutionalization and thus pave the way fore a more participatory system and encourage more accountable governance" (White 1996: 143). For Göle, whereas the liberal movement represent economic dimension of the developing civil society, the Islamicist movements represented the cultural dimension (Göle 1994: 218). Likewise, "other social movements, such as those of the ecologists and feminists as well as homosexuals and transsexuals, are similar in nature and further contributed to the emergence of truly diverse identities in civil society" (Göle 1994: 219).

Like Göle, Robins also has an optimistic point of view on the development of civil society during the post 1980 period in Turkey. He argues that, although the Ottoman Empire had a mosaic like cultural structure, characterized by ethnic, linguistic and religious pluralism; the Turkish State during its formative years opposed to such pluralism of identities. The diversity of identity and the religious

attachments were considered as an impediment to the establishment of a national community by the republican elites who attempted to create a cultural homogenization (Robins, 1996: 69). However; this new secular approach, which was tried to be substituted for the religious values could not fill this gap. In Tapper's words

> "Kemalist ideology was no alternative to Islam in providing identity and organizing principles of life. At the public level, it was no substitute for the divine laws of the Islam; at the individual level, it could not meet intellectual needs for an ethics and an eschatology, and its ideology and values were inadequate, shallow and thin" (quoted in Robins, 1996: 69-70).

Nevertheless, after the 1980 Military Intervention, "we may see … the return of the elements that were repressed in the Kemalist culture (religion, ethnic diversity, the imperial heritage. … The 'other' Turkey is making its declaration of independence, making its reality felt, manifesting the complexity of its social being…" (Robins 1996: 72). For Robins, there are both internal and external factors contributing to development of civil society in Turkey during the post 1980 period. The external factors can be listed as follows: the globalization of market economy, the growth of global media and communications, and the mobility of people across the world through tourism and migration and final the end of the Cold War. An important internal factor is the neo-liberal restructuring of Turkish economy after the 1980 coup d'etat. Therefore, all these developments loosened the rigidities of cultural and political identity, and encouraged the development of civil society in Turkey (Robins 1996: 73-74) with the subsequent developments of rising demands from religious and ethnic groups, and rapid urbanization process.

However, some scholars are not so optimistic as Göle and Robins on the notion of consolidation of democracy and development of civil society during the post 1980 period. For instance, Navaro-Yashin argues that "Göle and others who read "the development of civil society" into their analysis of contemporary Turkey have confused a changing discourse or technique of state power with an autonomous rise of the civil society" (1988: 4). He thinks "perhaps the peculiarity that ought to

be observed regarding the 1980's and 1990's in Turkey is the incorporation of the terms of "civil society" in discourses of power and not the linear development of civil society" (1988: 20). For him, following the 1980 Intervention, it was apparent that the state could no longer survive only by repressive measures. There was needed for a new place which seems independent of the state and at this point the notion of 'civil society' emerged as the most appropriate form of this image. Therefore, there was not a development in the field of civil society but rather there was the state's adoption of a civil image in the 1980s. Here after, apart from the other ones, official ideology was also started to be produced in the field of 'civil society'. In sum, Yashin argues that "in 1980s, a discourse of civil society became instrumental in claims for legitimate ownership of state power". In this context, civil society did not appear as *sui generis* on the social ground but, it was employed, incorporated and implied in competing discourses of power. The notion of civil society was appropriated and used in differential fashions and contexts. Competing claims and meanings were projected onto civil society by Islamists and secularists involved in social movement aspiring to state power" (1998: 20). So, the relationship between 'state' and 'society' become intertwined and it is not clear where the lines of 'society' end and where the 'state 'starts.

By accepting the definition of Sunar, who examines the civil society as an intermediate domain between state and individual, a domain in which deliberation and association takes place without constraint and coercion (quoted in Kalaycıoğlu 1998: 112), Kalaycıoğlu, like Navaro-Yashin, is also pessimistic about the development of civil society in Turkey during the post 1980 period. Since, when looking the situation of Turkey in the 1980's, Kalaycıoğlu observes a society in which the traditional elements, clientalism, *tarikat* networks and political loyalty undermine the rational operation and achievement system of public bureaucracy and social system. Besides, For Kalaycıoğlu, this was a period of intensive religiousness-Islamization in which religious organizations have become dominant in Turkish political and cultural discourse (1998: 120-121). Therefore, he defines the post 1980 period as neo-patrimonialism, which means the superiority of traditional and primordial values over the modern political structures. For him, this type of neo-

patrimonialism could only be developed in a setting where the civil society is weak, and the state has unlimited power (1998: 121-122). To prove his arguments Kalaycıoğlu looks at some *sine qua non* criteria such as the voluntary participation rate, rule of law and independent judiciary. He concludes that there exist a weak civil society in Turkey and this neo-patrİMOnial political culture is the main impediment to the development of it (1998: 132)

Ali Yaşar Sarıbay is also not so optimistic about the development of civil society and about the relationship between democracy and civil society in Turkey. For him, civil society contributes to the consolidation of democracy when political liberties are provided on the individual basis. In this sense civil society must oppose the communities which reject differences, consensus and pluralities (Sarıbay 1998: 93). However, what we witness in Turkish context is the absence of these kinds of structures and mechanisms which would protect the individual from the oppression of the state; namely, the absence of civil society.

Sarıbay argues that the basic deficiency of Turkish political life is the neglecting of the individual. For him, the basic reason of this is the influencing effects of the strong realms of Islam and state, which prevent the development of individual personality, autonomy and morality (1998: 154). In this sense, Islam emerges as an impediment in the development of civil society by depending on the understanding of *tehvid* (unity) in which everything is perceived as the representation of the divine power. The other side of the problem is the state with its community-based characteristics such as moral submission, personal loyalty, love and honor established on the emotional ground. Therefore, in Turkey "people love the state", "people become loyal to state", "people give much more emphasis to the honor of the state" and "some people become hostile to the state" (Sarıbay, 1994:159). To sum up, Sarıbay sees this *gemeinschaftlich* nature of the state in Turkey as an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. What is to be done for him is to pass into the state as an institution from the state of community (1994: 163).

3.4. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Turkey

In 1990s and 2000s we witnessed that the civil society discussion oriented towards the CSOs themselves and the relation between the CSOs (in a wider sense civil social organizations and political parties) and their social, cultural and political activities in the public space (Yücekök, Turan, Alkan 1998; Tosun 2000; Bali 2000; Groc 2002; Schüler 2002; Erdoğan 2002; Bora 2002; Vorhoff 2002; Plagemann 2002; Toumarkine 2002 Pusch 2002; Can 2002; Akşit, Tabakoğlu, Serdar 2001a, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a and Akşit, Tabakoğlu, Serdar, Adem 2001b, Çoşkun 2004). Therefore, the conceptual discussions made hitherto around the existence or non-existence of the civil society in Turkey, gave its place to the examination of the CSOs per se, their histories, structures and activities. Here after, we see that an effective domain of the CSOs in Turkey seems to be taken as guaranteed.

We can show three critical events in this orientation apart from the socio-economic developments outlined above: The Habitat II Conference (1996); Te pre- and post- 28 February Process (1997) and the Marmara Earthquake (1999). The first, which was held in 1996 in İstanbul brought the CSOs, which have been increasingly developed after 1980, into the agenda of the intellectuals, press, journalists, scholars, the statesman and the international organizations. With this congress we can argue that the realm of civil society was gained a prestige and this prestige was "registered" by the authorities listed above. Indeed, Silier (2000: 7) argues that the very concept of STK (Sivil Toplum Kuruluşu) was created and presented into Turkish in the preparatory works of CSO symposiums organized before the Habitat meetings. However, the second event: the 28 February event implies a different feature of the civil society. That is, the potential of the state occupation and manipulation of the public realm as Navaro-Yashin (1998) warned about it. Since, Turkey experienced a serious struggle between the state bureaucracy and the Islamist government in 1997. Besides, in this process Turkey witnessed the greatest scandal (Susurluk Scandal) of its history. By virtue of a traffic accident, the dirty relations between the bureaucrats, deputies, mafia organizations, politicians, counter-guerilla teams and chiefs of the *aşirets* (tribes) were revealed. This situation triggered a very intensive citizen initiative and protest throughout the country

against the dirty and dark relations located within the state. This led to a very serious break in the conception of the state which has been seen as a divine power or at least as a benevolent father by the wide sections of Turkish society and became the beginning of the erosion of the states legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Although, the intellectuals were aware of it for years, first time the ordinary people witnessed the catastrophic condition of state and the protests were transformed into a countrywide campaign called as "*1 Minute Darkness for the Permanent Illumination*". The Turkish people started to turn off their lights for 1 minute long in their houses at a certain time period in the evenings. This was the most wide campaign/ civil initiative that the Turkish society experienced so far. However, when the protests started to investigate at the very existence of the state, the soldiers made a very strategic attack. By joining the campaign[33] they distanced themselves from the illegitimate basis identified with the state. On the contrary, the government failed to distance itself from the same ground as the army. Indeed, the Islamist Erbakan government became the address and locus of these protests due to the reactions of the secular sections of the society against the provocative Islamicist actions of Welfare Party Government. In the same process the generals implemented a "soft" or as some others called it "postmodern" coup d'Eta project against the Islamic government and some of the major CSOs (DİSK, TESK, TOBB, TİSK, TÜRK-İŞ) in Turkey has taken place on the side of the generals by the encouragement of the MGK against the elected government in the name of escaping the country from the danger of *irtica*; preserving the modernity and the divine memory of Atatürk and showing their loyalties to the "Turkish nation" and its "divine flag". Moreover this attitude is espoused, vigorously applauded and presented as a civil movement by the press (Seufert 2002: 34). The generals in this process overthrew the Erbakan government fallowing the MGK meeting on 28 February 1997. This situation was a brilliant example to see that the main axis of social division of Turkish society still continues between the secular and religious - conservative versions of Turkish Nationalism, which bypasses and covers the class interests and other political conflicts (Seufert 2002: 34). Although this "indivisible

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[33] The army sembolically joined into the campaign by turning off the ligts of the houses allocated for the military personell.

integrity position of the civil society with its state" (Tekin: 2000) was criticized by some authors, the 28 February process could be considered as the suitable example of state occupation and manipulation of public space in which the social movements were implicitly organized, directed and oriented by the state ideology.

The other critical and shattering event became the Marmara Earthquake related with the civil society in Turkey. After the shock of the earthquake, as Kıvanç states "in the very middle of the chaos, a mysterious energy mobilized the people and the people in front of their TV's witnessed that some other people like themselves had already moved and tried to rescue the others lives from within the ruins while the state organs still haven't been mobilized and recognized what happened (Kıvanç 2002: 600). In this process some groups who have desired for a long time that any citizen could intervene into the important issues of the country without struggling with the state greeted this magnificent mobilization of aid as the "rearing up of the civil society" while the pessimist ones consider the issue as the "bankrupt of the state" … The mobilization of aid lived after the 17 August Earthquake could be evaluated as one of the biggest mass solidarity movements of the 20th Century (Kıvanç 2002: 600). Akşit, Tabakoğlu and Serdar (2003a: 319) argue that the Marmara Earthquake was the most effective experience, which shakes the existent "father state" image. However, although the increase in the images of the civil society corresponds to the decrease in the image of the state; it is clear that this did not give harm to the authority of state in practice. Indeed, as pointed out by Kıvanç, the aid campaigns directed by the CSOs did not led to the decrease of the state power, on the contrary, utilizing from these aids the state also founded a chance to prevent the probable opposition that could stem from the disrupted services. On the other hand, some of the members of İslamist and leftist CSOs argue that they were subjected to discrimination and their activities to be prevented after the earthquake by the state (Akşit et. al., 2003a: 319). These information shows us that the problematic relation between the state and civil society still continuing; however to sum up the Marmara Earthquake[34] could be considered as a peculiar example of

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[34] For a detailed discussion of the "courses" that was derived from the Eartqueke experience by the CSOs, please see Yasalar-Etik Deprem ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları (2000)

the civil awakening in which the state weakens and the civil elements getting much stronger.

In addition to this, the EU accession process seems to have a great effect in this development such as the last amendments in the "law of associations" and "legal improvements" about the minority foundations. Generally speaking it can be argued that the integration (EU) process per se as brought a new breath to the general civil atmosphere in Turkey and a relative dynamism and trust on the CSOs in general. Therefore, in addition to the 3 critical events discussed above we can add Turkey's EU accession Process as the fourth event, which has the potential of determining the destiny of the CSOs in the future. In addition to this the EU accession process seems to make further contributions to this processes both by the direct encouragement and financial assistance of the EC and indirectly by the increasing hopes about the integration with the world, especially with the Europe.

Generally, when looking to the condition of civil domain of Turkey, most of the authors agree that; despite the historical differences, structural impediments and bureaucratic reluctance, a lively, dynamic and increasing civil space started to develop in Turkey after 1980 (Göle 1996 and 1997; Turan 1998; Toprak 1996; White 1994; Robins 1996) and though limited yet, this civil domain tried to be effective in the political and social discussions and shaping of the policies[35]. In addition to these it is also a reconciled statement that a different and new kind of civil society conception, which could be related easily with civic values, has been developing since 1980 with the global changes in the conception of democracy and governance (Keyman 2000). In this context, Tekeli lists the features the CSOs in the post 1990 process as the fallowing: voluntary activity, becoming distant from the power relations, depending on the horizontal relations, being open to the newcomers and tolerance to the differences with an emphasis of pluralism (Tekeli 2000: 113-115).

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[35] Consider the effective contribution of women organizations in the recent discussions about the amendment of the civil law related with the family and the status of the women.

A research report classifies the associational development of Turkey since 1946 and the existent profile of CSOs under 14 general headings. These are listed as fallows: labor unions, employer's organizations, public sector workers' unions, social assistance associations, sports associations, religion associations, foreign and minority associations, agricultural associations, cultural associations, freelance job associations, crafts and artisans associations, anti-communist associations, improvement associations and other associations (Yücekök 1998: 74-78). Although, some of them are deactivated in today's conjuncture; we have witnessed an increasing rate in the number of CSOs especially since 1985 (Turan 1998: 215) Accordingly, it is noticed that today the number of the CSOs is estimated around 150.000[36] including a wide spectrum from the associations, occupational organizations, foundations and think-thanks to the fellow countrymen associations.

However, from the perspective of this thesis the importance of the CSOs does not stem from their increasing numbers but from the critical relations with democracy and public space. Since, as Edwards (2004) suggests, the realm of civil society has three crucial three dimensions as being organizational life, democratic society and public space. In the next chapter I will make a theoretical discussion on the public sphere and democratic decision making processes, which are attributed to the CSOs as the main qualities for a democratic society.

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[36] Yayla, Bıça and Uçar (2003) reported that "according to the records of the General Directorate of the Security, there are 77. 258 active associations out of the total number of 152.369 in Turkey .

CHAPTER 4

PUBLIC SPHERE AND DEMOCRACY

4. 1. Introduction

The nature and character of decision-making, and the claims of common interests, identities, and wills stand at the center of debates in the theory of public sphere and democratic theory today. Arguments in this respect range from a defense of strategic-instrumentalism in analyses of empirical cases of democratic decision making in public sphere, to strongly normative accounts of such process. This chapter tries to explore some of the key issues in different approaches to democratic decision-making as well as the construction of the publicity. It particularly focuses on three approaches that have dominated the debate, namely, the dialogical and existential understanding of politics in Hannah Arendt, the Habermas-inspired model of deliberative democracy and the post-structuralist model of radical democracy as articulated in the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. This chapter tries to discuss these approaches, in order to constitute a common ground for the articulation of a modified version of deliberative democratic politics to the agonistic spirit of democratic discussion in the public sphere.

At the center of the debate on democratic decision-making, there are a number of distinct issues, including questions concerning the aims of the decision-making process, the nature of process itself, the participants in this process, and the conditions under which participation occur. My discussion will concentrate primarily on the nature and aims of the decision-making process in the public sphere, although related issues – such as those mentioned above – cannot be excluded from consideration. More specifically, my argument is structured, on the one hand, around the relation between deliberation and the reaching of an agreement on the other hand, hegemonic argumentation, the decision, and the construction of

empty signifiers. I will argue that Habermas-inspired approach fail to bring an effective explanation to the relation between ideal conditions of deliberation and actual process of democratic decision-making in public sphere. As a result, its characterization of the construction of generalizable interest and ideal speech situation is problematic. The latter approach, exemplified in the works of Laclau and Mouffe, on the other hand, concentrates on the construction of hegemonic outcomes and as a result, does not give sufficient consideration to the extent to which such 'decisions' can in fact be described as democratic. In this case the root of the problem can be located in the overemphasis on the conditions of possibility for decisions in public reasoning specifically, and hegemonic politics more generally. Rather, in this part, I try to combine a weakened model of deliberation, without referring to any universal ground, with the existential publicity of man in Arendt's political philosophy and with the agonistic view of democratic politics. I think the recognition of the unavoidable place of power as a necessary feature of any moral decision (in Laclau and Mouffe) pave the ways for a reconsideration of the nature of democratic argumentation and decision-making in public discussion which would give us the strongest insight of a post-structuralist-dialogical inspired politics.

4. 2. The Existential Publicity of Man and the Politics of Dialogue in Hannah Arendt

Arendt's theory of politics is grounded in her philosophical analysis of man's being-in-the-world. Man is for her a public as well as a social being and as public being, he needs public space in order to assure himself of his own and the world's reality, develop such a distinctively human capacities as impartiality, imagination, judgment and thought, gain a sense of personal identity to act. So, man both gives meaning to his life and raises the level of human existence. Since public space is so crucial to human existence, Arendt advocates what we call as a public community, a community whose members passionately seek and are provided with formal and informal public spaces in all areas of life.

According to Arendt, the political community is the realm of action *par excellence*. Men act in all areas of life, but the political community is explicitly designed to encourage action (Arendt 1998: 198). It provides a ready audience; it generally has a long and inspiring tradition of action; it offers countless associations for action. Therefore, Arendt argues that the political community inspires and challenges men to "dare the extraordinary", stretch their resources, "bring forth what is great and radiant" and leave behind inspiring stories. In Arendt's view, a political community offers also a real experience of public freedom in the sense that everybody, who is in the public realm, knows that he is a man of status and significance, not a helpless instrument of another's will but a free agent who can speak his mind, propose new ideas and policies and unite with others to shape their collective destiny. It is a community, whose members participate in a common enterprise and thus shares a common end, at least at a minimum point. However, what makes it a political community is not the fact that its members share a common purpose, but the fact that it is a community bound together by dialogue, for its shared speech which enables each member to develop and manifest his or herself. Properly, members of such a community will find a chance at this moment to display themselves within the community and to attend to the "political" issues.

Furthermore by enabling men to appear in public and act together, the political community offers them "public happiness", the "joy and gratification that arise out of our being together with our peers", without which no human life is happy and complete (Arendt 1990: 115-118). Arendt argues that different from private pleasures, public happiness is not a subjective sensation which can be enjoyed in private, but an "objective" state of mind arising from the awareness that one is not alone but part of a lively community, and is desired and contributed by others. It may be argued that the political community does not have the monopoly of public space, and therefore many of the virtues Arendt ascribes to the former are not unique to it. Arendt accepts this argument, but insists that the public space provided by the political community has a solidity, splendour, strength and vitality (Arendt 1972: 145; 1990: 213). As Benhabib argues, like most phenomenologists, Arendt takes the view that every activity needs a home, a stable framework, in which to

grow and flourish, and this can only be provided by its most fully developed form (Benhabib 1992: 134). Arendt believes that the political realm nourishes public spaces in other areas of life, and provides them a hospitable framework within which to grow and flourish. In her view, politics is the dramatic and most tangible manifestation of a community's commitment to a public or participatory way of life, and hence once the political realm is affected "everything is affected" (Arendt 1990: 156).

Arendt argues that the decline of the public realm in modern liberal democratic societies has had the effect of privatizing men, diverting their energies and ambitions into economic, social and such other non-political channels, and has led to the decline at first of the taste for public freedom and happiness, and eventually of public spaces in non-political areas. For Arendt, politics alone of all human activities is inherently 'world-open', and shape the individual out of himself and into the public world. As such, although a political community does not have the monopoly of the public space, it is its indispensable basis. Contrary to the general idea that only by participating in smaller associations can men acquire the ability and desire to participate in political life, Arendt argues that only when a community makes its collective affairs publicly and fosters a dynamic public life do its members develop a taste and passion for participating in smaller associations. It is my opinion that for Arendt, civic consciousness is not the basis but the product of political consciousness and action.

In Arendt's view then, what men seek in public space, they find to the fullest degree in the political community; that is; as public beings they find their fulfillment in the political community. Since man is a public being, he is also a political being, a *zoon politikon* as Aristotle called him (Arendt 1990: 71). Political community thus makes an indispensable contribution to human existence and satisfies man's ontological, epistemological, moral, and other needs and desires. She argues that in its absence human beings suffer severe ontological, moral and psychological forms of damage. In the absence of a shared public world, they became isolated and worldless. They lack the opportunities to listen to different points of view and develop the capacities for impartiality and objectivity. Their lives lack public

happiness and become objectively poorer. The public spaces in the non-political areas of social life weaken, the taste for public freedom dries, the human sense of reality suffers and human life acquires a curious atmosphere of unreality. In a late essay entitled '*Public Rights and Private Interests*' Arendt, discusses the difference between one's life as an individual and one's life as a citizen, between the life spent on one's own and the life spent in common with others: As Arendt argues: "Throughout his life man moves constantly in two different orders of existence: he moves within what is his own and he also moves in a sphere that is common to him and his fellowmen. The 'public good', the concerns of the citizen, is indeed the common good because it is located in the world, which we have in common without owning it. Quite frequently, it will be antagonistic to whatever we may deem good to ourselves in our private existence" (Arendt 1977: 104).

What Arendt claims is that our public interests as citizens are quite distinct from our private interests as individuals. It means that the political community enables an individual to acquire a public identity. By dialogue, speaking and acting together, a citizen is able to define himself not merely subjectively as someone possessing a particular body or owning a specific collection of objects, nor merely socially as someone related to a specific group of men by natural or voluntary ties, but as a public being who initiates a particular proposal, opposes a particular policy or utters specific words on specific occasions. In other words, the citizen defines himself in terms of such public and ideal entities as words and actions, and acquires an identity, which is intersubjectively constituted and defined. Furthermore, in acquiring a public identity a citizen presents a specific public image of himself. He announces to the world what kind of a man he is and indicates the standards by which he wishes to be judged. At this point, as Beiner argues he is not a "no-body' who can do what he likes without being noticed, but a man with a specific *persona* who is answerable to others for his words and actions and under an obligation to live up to his public image in the artificiality of public life (Beiner 1984: 369).

In the light of this consideration, Arendt espouses a radically participatory conception of direct democracy while refusing to tolerate any system of government which tends to reproduce the dichotomy of ruler and ruled. Simply put, in her

opinion, where there is rule (authority) true politics dies. For Arendt "Rule" signifies an inequality in the rights of citizens to act which effectively ensures that there will be less action and that fewer persons will be granted the possibility of acting in a politically. What the ruled do at the command of the rulers is not counted as action by the Arendt's criteria. True action necessitates mutuality and is based on a potential equality of spontaneity which the division between rulers and ruled precludes. Although political equality does not equalize absolutely, it can bring into existence equality enough to facilitate common action. In sum, if only the action is critical for the worldly existence of the human being and if action is only possible among political equals, then political equality have to prevail.

Arendt tries to distinguish mere sameness from a real political equality. So, a republic she understands is not equivalent to a community, still less to a nation. Her concept of the 'social' as contrasted with the 'political' has tended to obscure another distinction made by herself between citizenship and community. We saw that society as she uses the term does not mean Gesellschaft as opposed to Gemeinschaft, and has nothing to do with the familiar opposition between artificial modern individualism and natural warm community. On the contrary, since 'society' represented for Arendt an "unnatural growth of the natural", no such contrast is possible, and Arendt tends to treat natural 'community' and 'pseudo-natural society' as continuous with one another. Her distaste for modern society does not imply any nostalgia for traditional community, and in distinguishing politics from the 'social' she also distinguishes it from the communal. As Canovan put it "Arendt's conception of the public realm is opposed not only to society but also to community. While greatly valuing warmth, intimacy and naturalness in private life, she insisted on the importance of a formal, artificial public realm in which what mattered was the people's actions rather than their sentiments; in which the natural ties of kinship and intimacy were set aside in favor of a deliberate, impartial solidity with other citizens; in which there was enough space between people for them to stand back and judge one another coolly and objectively" (Canovan 1985: 632).

For Arendt, citizens of a republic have to be conscious of their obligation to take care of the public world and when necessary to place its interests above those they have as private persons, for this conflict of priorities cannot be avoided. Attempts to evade it by suggesting that the public interest is equivalent to one's enlightened self-interest seemed to Arendt to miss the point, which is that the public world that lies between us has interests of its own. In particular, as she pointed out in her essay 'Public Rights and Private Interests', there is a quite different time-scale involved. The public world, which we inherent and pass on, has long-term interests; whereas the private interests of mortal men are necessarily short-term and have all the urgency of the life process (Arendt 1977: 104-105).

In sharp contrast to Rousseau's version of republicanism, in which the sacrifice of private interest means melting the individuals into a single body, which we can easily find some similar points in the context of Schmitt's political analysis, Arendt's public world is above all a public space lying between individuals, in which the inter-subjectivity is possible through speaking and acting. This means that when the citizen moves from private to public common he is not leaving individuality behind. Instead, "by virtue of his citizenship he receives a kind of second life in addition to his private life" (Arendt 1977: 103). As a result, for Arendt, this "second life" is actually more pluralistic and open and less oppressive than the private life he leaves behind.

Because Arendt shares with Rousseau a debt to the republican tradition, and often elaborates her views in opposition to his, it is my opinion that an explicit contrast between these two thinkers can help to bring out some of the characteristics of her position against Schmitt in the context of plurality in the public realm. Seeking a solution to the problem of how men can live together in freedom, Rousseau uses the notion of the General Will, which, as Arendt observed, converts a multitude into a single person (Arendt 1990: 77). The problem is that this avoids the very problem that it is designed to solve: "men, not man, live on the earth and inhabit the world". According to Arendt, Rousseau avoids facing up to human plurality by constructing a scheme for uniting all individuals into one, so that the problem of political obligation, for example, is reduced to a "relation between me

and myself" (Arendt 1972: 88). Arendt insists that there is no need for people to be alike or to think alike in order to live together on terms of freedom and equality. What unites the citizens of a republic is that they inhabit the same public space, share its common concerns, acknowledges its rules and are committed to its continuance, and to achieving a working compromise when they differ. As Arendt asserts, citizens who are held together in this way can use majority voting simply as a technical device for settling differences of opinion, without mistaking the decision of the majority for the oracle of a single, united people (Arendt 1990: 164).

The various attempts that had been made in political theory and practice to invent a single 'people' speaking with one voice seemed to Arendt a complete failure to understand what politics is – namely, the arena within which human beings must comprehensively manifest their plurality. For Arendt, agreement or better unanimity is neither probable nor desirable. She believed that the endeavor to reach to unanimity and the long-held belief that all rational men must think alike on public questions were among the distortions caused in political thinking by the dominance of an anti-political philosophical tradition (Arendt 1977: 110). In so far as unanimity does occur, it seemed to Arendt to be a danger signal, a sign that people had ceased to think. For Arendt, "mass unanimity is not the result of agreement, but an expression of fanaticism and hysteria" (Arendt 1970: 176). For Arendt, when people think about their common affairs it is natural for them to see from different points of view and to form different opinions. These different opinions should not be considered as arbitrarily subjective phenomena to be put aside in favor of a single truth. Since, where differences arise among people who share a common world, they reveal different aspects of the issues.

As Arendt claimed that the ancient Greek word for opinion, *doxa*, was derived from *dokei moi*, (it appears to me), reflecting the fact that different people see different sides of the same world. Arendt's characterization of the Socratic project in "Philosophy and Politics" thus centers on the creation of a conscientious, reflective citizenry. Socrates' goal, in other words, was not to diminish competitive individualism simply by fostering a sense of dialogical community, but rather to grow a thoughtful kind of individualism. This reflective individualism would, in

turn, provide the basis for a civic friendship, which is totally different from that promoted by contemporary communitarians and virtue theorists. Arendt's radical suggestion in "Philosophy and Politics" is that, according to Socrates, the experience of thought is the true basis of conscience, and that this is the ground of politics and citizenship in the public sphere.

4. 3. The Discursive Model of Public Sphere and Reasonable Democracy in Habermas

Habermas has devoted a great deal of attention to the legitimacy of modernity, which he sees highly related to the workings of the public sphere. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas analyzes the key role of the public sphere in the formation of political decisions within a democracy. In sum, as Benhabib argues "Reversing the pessimistic assessment of modernity as a 'a dialectic of Enlightenment,' Habermas has emphasized the extent to which modernity does not only signify differentiation, individuation, and bifurcation. The emergence of an autonomous public sphere of political reasoning and discussion is also central to the project of the moderns" (Benhabib 1996: 85). It is quite clear that Kant is Habermas's point of departure. Habermas gets from Kant a view of the public sphere as the definitive institution of democracy, that without which no theory of constitutional republicanism can exist. Only an actively involved public sphere opens the way for a truly democratic exchange. While Habermas admires Kant for having presented the public sphere as constituted around rational argument rather than the identities of the arguers, he is critical of Kant for his elitist and somewhat bourgeois understanding of its dynamics (Habermas 1999: 115). For Habermas, Kant's description of the public sphere is the expression of a bourgeois ideology that considers participation as a prerogative of the upper class, predominantly educated, rich and male.

Thus Habermas attempts to a critical and historical reconstruction of the development of the public sphere in modern Western democracies. Since Kant, the mass communication has been developed and represents a fundamental change. On

the one hand, it had a positive effect of progressively expanding the public sphere, enlarging participation to a much wider spectrum of citizens. On the other hand, the quantitative expansion of participation has meant a decrease in its quality (Habermas 1999: 167). A number of factors have contributed to it: the pace at which information is processed by and circulates within the public sphere makes it hard to keep up with the model of communication that Kant has in mind when he discusses the public sphere, namely, the academic exchange. While in the academic exchange the participants in a discussion are given enough time to think and formulate their arguments, the speed involved in mass communication works in the interest of those who select and distribute the information rather than those who receive it. Habermas suggests that the pressure of thinking and evaluating data quickly has a political import, because it facilitates an experience of politics based on the character of the actors rather than the ideas that each of them defends. It is the power of public relations industry, whose objective is to construct consent among consumers of mass culture. For Habermas, mass consumption and its ideology, consumerism, not only silences rational-critical consensus but imposes itself onto the most vulnerable participants in the public sphere: those whose level of wealth is greater than their level of education (Habermas 1999: 204-206).

This type of analysis is in line with the original theoretical orientation of Critical Theory, both in the sense of its strong historical and sociological background and because of its preoccupation with the negative effects of mass culture. With the early phase of Critical Theory, Habermas shares a certain description of the political and social workings of late capitalism. Habermas points out that more people are being informed, which creates additional opportunities for them to participate in the public sphere, however he also shares the belief that this expansion is often produced forcefully and manipulatively upon, rather than freely achieved by, the entire sections of the general population. In a paradoxical turn, more information becomes "the cause for the atrophy of the various democratic functions" (Habermas 1992: 167). Maneuvered by multinational corporations and the uncontrolled free market, mass culture thus imposes its own rules of democratic participation: namely, utilitarian rules serving private interests rather than universal

rules serving the public interest. However, it is quite clear that this pessimism, for Habermas, has never been a solution: posing the question of the legitimacy of the public sphere was the beginning of his own answer

Habermas's starting point was that our late-capitalist or post-industrial mass democracies "can claim to continue the principles of the liberal constitutional state only as long as they seriously try to live up to the mandate of a public sphere that fulfills political functions." (Habermas 1996: 441). Yet, how can the public reverse the effects of the mass communication which manipulate and control it? To avoid Adorno's and Marcuse's retreat from the social and political aspects of his theory in the utopian dimension of art, only two solutions seemed available: either hoping for a reversal of the capitalist trend in a Marxist sense, or formulating the concept of public sphere on a new foundation (Habermas 1992: 244). The latter was Habermas's strategy, which reached full maturity with the publication of *The Theory of Communicative Action*.

The model of public sphere defended by Kant is firmly anchored in the material conditions of the late eighteenth-century society, a society non-occupied, non-globalized, and characterized by a relatively well-separated distinction between political and economic levels. In Habermas's reading these conditions limit Kant's conception of the public sphere within "monological" boundaries. Monologism, for Habermas, refers to the idea that the individual's participation in the public sphere is limited to the simple sharing of her already constituted opinions and moral decisions (Habermas 1990: 56). In the monological perspective, moral reasoning is defined as "hypothetical conversation with oneself" (Habermas 1990: 45). With the notion of Monologism, Habermas wants to underline two concurrent elements in Kantian ethics and politics. First is the solitary nature of the categorical imperative: the mental experiment in which one asks oneself whether one's actions are based on a principle according to which the rest of humanity would choose to act, in any culture, at any time in history (Habermas 1979: 91-93). Second is the priority of subjectivity over intersubjectivity in the Kantian conception of individual autonomy: this priority posits autonomy as a natural given for human beings as opposed to the product of their rational communicative exchange, which is Habermas's own belief.

Habermas understands communication at a deeper level than Kant, since for him opinions and moral decisions are being shaped through intersubjective dialogue. Capturing communication at this deeper level implies a radical shift from the subject-centered paradigm of monologism. While in the monological model the individual speaker preexists intersubjective communication, for Habermas intersubjective communication is the condition of possibility for the individual speaker. In this sense, the speaker "is not a freestanding agent but a functioning unit of a community of speakers" which Habermas calls this new approach "universal pragmatics" (Habermas 1979: 55-67). The argument that allows Habermas to establish the interdependence between the individual speaker and his community is that an isolated individual cannot establish rules for his own private use, or at least rules that he could meaningfully follow. By following Wittgenstein's private language argument, Habermas argues that "a linguistic expression can only have an identical meaning for a subject who is capable, together with at least one additional subject, of following a rule that is valid for both of them. A monadically isolated subject can no more employ an expression with identical meaning than a rule can be followed privately" (Habermas 1996: 68). Since both the act of speech and the various modalities of communication depend on rules, they also depend on a plurality of users. It clearly follows that individual language use presupposes a community of users.

The linguistic "competence" required by the process of communication covers both the grammatical rules of natural languages and orientation toward consensus that Habermas sees intrinsically present in every speech act (Habermas 1996: 62). When I say something, so the argument goes, I make myself implicitly available to defend it: this is what he calls a speech act's "universal validity claim." Every speech act, if challenged, requires the speaker to justify it or "redeem it." In Habermas's mind, some form of validity claim is implicit in the very structure of speech, a premise that leads him to conclude that rationality provides the structure as well as the scope of the communication. His crucial argument is that every time we communicate with one another, we automatically commit to the possibility of a freely achieved dialogic agreement in which the better argument will win. This is

why whenever we are faced with disagreements or at least with the pluralism of different convictions we are always seeking a future resolution. Communicative action is Habermas's name for the residue of rationality built into our everyday exchange.

In communicative action individuals arrive at judgments by conversing with other participants who in turn will be affected by those judgments. This dynamic between participants makes communicative action fundamentally emancipatory because it affirms the need to resolve disagreements through argument. In addition, communicative is emancipatory since it expresses reason's systematic interest in pursuing the material conditions that facilitate its fullest development. Communicative action, Habermas writes expressively, "is renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saying emancipation…Communicative reason operates in history as an avenging force (Habermas 1983: 221, 227). For Habermas, the possibility of rationally justified consensus is absolutely crucial from a political perspective. Because without it, the philosophy loses its critical edge and the definition of solidarity could be defined either in terms of pre-political values or in terms of the volatility of subjective feelings of compassion. For Habermas, solidarity and the social bond are structural function of communication that can be strengthened once we become aware of the validity claims embedded in any of our statements. As soon as we enter into meaningful discussions with one another our commitment to redeem such claims will systematically push us to seek rational solutions that will be evident to everyone who is not under the effect of manipulation or distortion. These kinds of solutions will allow for the formation of lasting and rationally validated consensus rather than shifting alliances of convenience or utilitarian agreements.

Any discussion of the public sphere is about the nature of our interest in others and the reach of political involvement. Without an interest in others and a sense of involvement with the well-being of the collectivity there is no public sphere. The theory of communicative action claims to have found a middle way between the abstract level of moral norms with the concrete, dimension of existence.

Since, it argues that beliefs are not a matter of preference or inclination but of validity, based on rational argumentation. Actually, if Habermas were right, the classical difficulty of reconciling individual autonomy and social structure would be fundamentally solved. Moreover, stating that interest and motivation towards others constitutes and reinforces the engagement in the democratic process and commitment to social justice, while it permeates these political experince with self-reflection and the promise of self-transformation. As a result this conception of communication modifies the notion of public sphere in a substantial way. Being the arena in which participants debate their already formulated positions, the public sphere becomes the dialogical framework within which the individual and her moral principles and beliefs emerge in response to a community of fellow speakers. While Kant's categorical imperative is well illustrated by a scene of lonely conversation with oneself (or with an imaginary listener) in which one seeks to identify the principle such that the rest of humanity would choose to act accordingly, the principle of communicative action corresponds to a forum in which a plurality of speakers either agree or disagree based on the struggle of their arguments. Habermas identifies the freedom of either agreeing or disagreeing on the basis of the strongest argument as both the formal feature of rationality and the founding principle of democracy.

4. 4. Post-Structuralist Conception of Public Discussion and Radical Democracy in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe

The principle ideas of radical democracy may be related back, on the one hand, to the liberalization of radical tradition and, on the other hand, to the democratization of the liberal tradition. Contemporary radical democrats reject both the instrumental character of liberalism and the anti-political reductionism of much of the Marxist and socialist tradition. They also share three core ideas. They concern, first, the centrality given to the political; second, an emphasis on the construction and articulation, rather than mere aggregation, of interests and identities; and third, the attention given to the process of subject formation in

general, and the constitution of democratic identities in particular. However, beyond these broad statements; differences between radical democrats inspired by critical theory and post-structuralist thought respectively start to emerge. There are three key areas in which radical democratic theorists differ from one another. The first, concerns the goal of democratic activity. As argued above, for deliberative theorists the goal of democratic activity is the reaching of a rational consensus. This stands in sharp contrast to radical democrats in the post-structuralist tradition, who are concerned with the disruptive and dislocatory potential of democracy. Secondly, while deliberative conceptions of democracy proceed from a model of unconstrained dialogue, devoid of power and of 'distortions', post-structuralists argue that power relations are central to their account of democracy. Finally, in contrast to the Habermasian project, post-structuralist makes no attempt to specify normative preconditions and foundations for democratic discourse. Whereas deliberative democratic politics, in its strong procedural form as defended by Habermas, immunizes politics against the forces of cultural and ethical life (Benhabib 1996: 9), theories of agonistic and antagonistic politics view democracy as the never-ending contestation over such ethical and cultural questions.

Basically, post-structuralist approach of radical democracy brings into consideration relations of power, hegemony, argumentation in public sphere, and an emphasis on disagreement rather consensus as central to an understanding of democratic processes. Here I will concentrate particularly on the status of disagreement in post-structuralist democratic theory. The centrality given to disagreement in the post-structuralist theorization of democracy arises directly from one of its basic ontological presuppositions, namely, the "impossibility of closure" of any identity or structure. This is important, for it affects the status of disagreement in the model, making it not simply an empirical feature of political life, but something arising from the constitutive characteristics of modern society. Chantal Mouffe, inspired by Carl Schmitt, similarly argues that the denial of the "irreducible antagonistic element present in social relations' can have disastrous consequences for the defense of democratic institutions. For Mouffe, disagreement, conflict and dissensus take their central role from the fact that they arise, and are

reflective of, a deeper ontological condition, a condition that is of crucial importance in the formation of democratic regimes and agonistic structure of public discussion (Mouffe 1993: 140).

However, it is of crucial importance to note that, contrary to the manner in which it is often portrayed by deliberative theorists, there is nothing irrational or subjectivist in this emphasis on disagreement. On the contrary, 'the political' itself, is characterized and constituted by disagreement. Mouffe (1993: 2) argues that Schmitt makes us "aware of the dimension of the political that is linked to the existence of an element of hostility among human beings." Politics then becomes an activity aimed at working through the effects of the political in social life, and democratic politics requires an introduction of a distinction between the figure of the enemy and that of the adversary (Mouffe 1993: 4). It is clear that neither in the more general case, nor in the specific case of democratic politics, is disagreement something to be escaped. From this point of view, attempts finally to overcome disagreement are thus based on a misconception of the nature of the political in general, and democratic politics more specifically. This does not, however, mean that disagreement is simply "given." As Mouffe has argued, that it is constitutive does not mean that it should not be subject to negotiation. Radical democratic politics precisely aims to engage with it, without attempting completely to take the place of it. It is a hegemonic approach to politics, an approach that precisely aims at re-creating commonalities of dispute in public sphere.

A possible explanation of the construction of generalizable interests must avoid the extreme particularism and subjectivism. One such version can be found in the works of Laclau and Mouffe on radical democracy. Following Lefort, Laclau and Mouffe argue that a democratic order is one in which the locus of power becomes an empty place, a place that cannot be occupied. No "individual and no group can become consubstantial with it" (Lefort 1988: 17). As Laclau clearly points out the "break introduced by the democratic invention is one in which democratic society could be 'determined as a society whose institutional structures includes, as part of its 'normal', 'regular' reproduction, the moment of dissolution of the socio-symbolic bond" (Laclau 1990: 44). To put it differently, the whole

hierarchical network of social relations is in a way suspended, put in parentheses; "society" as an organic unity ceases to exist. It is this suspension that brings to center stage the struggles to occupy the place of power, and so provides a non-foundationalist conception of hegemony.

For Laclau and Mouffe both interests and identities result from contingent, historical process of enunciation and articulation. It is precisely these emphases that have led commentators to argue that they are "subjectivist" and relativist. However, Laclau and Mouffe have persistently avoided the approval of subjectivism, relativism, and particularism. On the contraray, they argue that, making visible the contingency of social relations through a questioning of the logics of necessity dominant in the Marxist tradition leads to a rethinking of both those logics. In other words, they are understood as standing in a relation of tension to one another, under conditions in which neither can fully obtain. This deconstructive logic is also embodied in Laclau's account of the relation between universalism and particularism (Laclau 1996: 20-35). Instead of viewing universalism and particularism as opposed and mutually exclusive logics, Laclau tries to show their overlapping and fundamental interconnectedness. Neither a pure logic of universality nor one of self-enclosed particularity is a possibility here. Since any appeal to particularity must, of necessity, always already pass through the universal. As Laclau puts it: "The universal emerges out of the particular not as some principle underlying and explaining the particular, but as an incomplete horizon suturing the dislocated particular identity" (Laclau 1996: 28). In contrast to conceiving of the relation between the two in terms of embodiment, Laclau thinks of the universal as a symbol of missing fullness, while the particular emerges as the always failed attempt to embody that universal.

This argument provides the link to their non-foundationalist conception of hegemony and democracy. A hegemonic politics is nothing other a politics of struggle over the occupation of the position of the universal and if democracy is possible, Laclau argues, it is because "the universal has no necessary body and no necessary content; different groups, instead complete between themselves to temporality give to their particularisms a function of universal representation"

(Laclau 1996: 35). Moreover, this struggle, as we have seen, is a never-ending one since the place of power cannot be finally occupied. As a consequence, society generates a whole vocabulary of 'empty signifiers' whose function it is to attempt to fill this place temporarily.

From the viewpoint of a non-foundationalist hegemonic politics, the very idea of generalizable interests would have to be recast in terms of a hegemonization of particular demands and the construction of empty signifiers. That is to say, particular demands, or identities, may become universalized in and through a process of contingent articulation and political struggle. The universality achieved under these circumstances is 'not' simply that reflecting the status quo or existing power relations in public sphere. While the dimensions of power can never be eliminated, the universalization of demands arising from a struggle for hegemony must transcend the specific demands and interests of a particular group. This conception of universalization also does not lack a set of standards against which political practices may be evaluated. Although, these standards are generated by the Gramscian conception of hegemony, they must maintain an intra-societal character. In other words, they cannot be specified, as in the case of the conditions of ideal speech, outside any context, even though they are not limited to that context.

In sum, whereas Habermas's work on the possibility of democratic agreement approaches to a post-conventional morality, there is not such kind of a universal ground or teleological logic in Laclau's and Mouffe's analysis. For Laclau, the dislocated characteristics of late capitalism are conceived of as resulting in "an open structure in which the crisis can be resolved in the most varied of directions" (Laclau 1990: 50). As a result, any hegemonic re-articulation of the structure will always be extremely political in character. Democracy, whether liberal or radical, cannot be assumed to resolve this crisis in the direction of its own development. Therefore, this approach is more 'pessimistic' than Habermas, in that it does not assume a development occurring in a particular direction; on the other hand it is more 'optimistic' in that it opens up the possibility of a more radical constructionist approach to democratic struggle in the public debate. However, Laclau and Mouffe, do not develop their ideas into the institution and formation of democratic processes

any further. Although they are giving some attention to the specificity of democratic subjectivity, the hegemonic account of politics stands in need of deepening its theorization of the nature of decisions and argumentation in a democratic context. However, at this point, the emphasis on hegemony and contingency is a crucial starting-point and precondition for the further reflections. Yet, it is here that post-structuralist conception of democracy may benefit from using the Arendtian model of politics that is a weakened and non-proceduralist model of deliberation and dialogue pointing out the requirement of the publicity of man in the world. As I tried to show, the model for democratic practice cannot be understood in such away that the ideal and the real are divorced from one another. Combining a weakened conception of dialogue with the insight of a post-structuralist conception of democracy would probably give us a more proper account of democratic decision making.

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY

5.1 Methodology and the Scope of the Study

The aim of this study is to understand and critically examine the genuine internal dynamics and appearances of the practice of civil society in public sphere by concentrating on institutional structures and mechanisms in the axis of deliberative and agonistic democracy. Therefore, the qualitative methodological analysis seems to be the most proper to way to reach that aim. In this framework, it is mainly decided to carry on this work by using participatory observations and (face-to-face) in-depth interviews. However, the civil society is a very broad field. Therefore, in order to arrive at an insightful and critical result from this work, a decision was taken to limit the search by just looking at three different CSOs, having diverse political and social routes and interests in public sphere of Turkey. In this limitation, it was mainly used the findings of a research (Akşit et. al. 2003a), which was conducted by Akşit and his colleagues between 2000 and 2002, titled: "The Role of Civil Society Organizations for Empowering the Civil Society and Participation". In this research, members and administrators of civil organizations were asked some questions on the basic problems and agenda of Turkey and the answers were examined by virtue of factor-analysis methodology. Consequently, according to these answers the civil society organizations was categorized on a scale of democratic values. According to this scale there seem two main categories as *Mainstream Traditional CSOs* and *Oppositional CSOs*, which are also respectively divided into 7 and 2 sub-categories in themselves. The categorization is presented as follows:

1. Left–oriented Vocational Chambers and Trade Unions of Mainstream Traditional CSOs

2. Liberal –wing Organizations of Mainstream Traditional CSOs

3. Kemalist –wing Organizations of Mainstream Traditional CSOs

4. Professional Apolitical Organizations of Mainstream Traditional CSOs.

5. Traditional Islamic-oriented Organizations of Mainstream Traditional CSOs

6. Nationalist- Conservative Organizations of Mainstream Traditional CSOs

7. Right-oriented Conservative Organizations of Mainstream Traditional CSOs

8. Islamic-oriented Organizations of Oppositional CSOs

9. Left-oriented Organizations of Oppositional CSOs (Akşit et. all. 2003a).

In limiting the scope of this research with three CSOs, this scale was used and the three CSOs were determined as the followings:

- IMO (Civil Engineers Trade Association) Ankara Branch (from the category of left–oriented vocational chambers and trade unions of mainstream traditional CSOs)

- MAZLUMDER (Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People) Ankara Branch (from the category of Islamic-oriented organizations of oppositional CSOs)

- KADER (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates) Ankara Branch (from the category of liberal–wing organizations of mainstream traditional CSOs)

Although KADER does not locate in the sample of the referred research above, it was considered within the category of liberal –wing organizations of mainstream traditional CSOs. However, within the research sample there is not an independent category of women CSOs. Therefore KADER at the same time could also be considered within the independent category of women CSOs apart from the

logic of the categorization above. For, it is one of the most effective and prominent elements of the women movement, which should not be overlooked in a research, related with the civil society in Turkey.

Regarding these limitations, it is possible to see that this research does not represent the whole picture of civil society or the civil organizations in Turkey, rather it tries to understand the internal dynamics and mechanisms of civil organizations in the light of the experiences of three SCOs. Therefore, it does not have any claim to represent anything related with civil society in Turkey. However, since the determined CSOs are big-scale and country wide organizations, and their interest and activities in the political and social issues transcends the borders of their localities; the findings of the research could be read as related with the political public sphere of Turkey in general.

In conformity with the objectives of the research, the technique of a case study focusing on the inta-organizational structure and mechanisms of these three CSOs was preferred. Within this frame, the research was constituted in such a way that considers the information on the foundation process, historical transformations, activities, decision making mechanisms, intra-organizational conflicts and the problems of these three CSOs in the axis of their experience in public sphere.

In this context, first, the activity reports, actions, publications and archives of these organizations were examined. Based on these preliminary remarks and considerations, it was decided to the qualities of the members who would be interviewed. The desired qualities of the members are as follows:

- The charter members and\or the early members of the associations,

- The members of the board of directors,

- The members who are actively working but not in the administration,

- The members from the opposition within the organization,

- The professional workers within the organization,

- The members who left the organization by their own will or eliminated by the official decision of the organization and/or informal processes.

The members were determined according to these criterions; but apt to the special conditions of the CSOs, we have done some modifications. In choosing the interviewees, we have frequently visited these organizations; and we have asked the opinion of the professionals and the present members of the organization. The minimum number of the in-depth interviews was determined as 10 persons for each organization. At least two researchers made the in-depth interviews[37] and the interviews lasted 2 hours at average. The whole interviews and observations are completed between the years of 2004 and 2005.

In order to get more information there we have also held some interviews with individuals, who are not members but standing in the periphery (oppositions, supporters and so on.) of these organizations (such as those in contact with these organizations, the members of other CSOs, the members of the upper organization of that CSO or writers or researchers interested in these organizations).

Moreover, we have also participated in the general meetings and some activities of these organizations; and we have made participant observations both during these meetings and in the locations of these organizations.

Since the civil society is a very broad concept of countless openings, the research was restricted and deepened with the internal dynamics of three CSOs in particular and their contribution into public sphere in general. In this general frame, the findings of this study will be interpreted in the light of the conceptions of deliberative and agonistic democracy.

In this chapter I will report the results of our field research on these CSOs. I will analyze each CSOs separately (KADER, MAZLUMDER and IMO respectively) by giving direct reference to the expressions of the participants and my own observations in the field.

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[37] For the content of the interwievs see Appendix 4.

5. 2. KADER (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates) Ankara Branch

5. 2. 1. Foundation, Objectives and Principles

KADER is the first CSO to be inquired within the scope of this thesis. KADER was established in 1997. Now it has 17 branches and over 1600 members in all over Turkey. As it can be detected from its name, KADER's sole aim is to train and support all the women who are eager to take place in politics. KADER accomplishes this aim by staying at an equal distance to all political standpoints. This vision of KADER is represented by all that take part in my in-depth interviews. Furthermore, this objective is also stated in the booklets and brochure of KADER as follows:

> *The objective of staying at equal distance too all parties is an indispensable condition for KADER to achieve its goal of just representation of women in politics. Despite differences between the parties are blurred in Turkey the partisanship is still strong. Under these circumstances, the exclusion of women in some parties would inhibit our efforts to create a solidarity spirit among women against masculine domination in politics.* [38]

The participants of the in-depth interviews stated that the activist women with higher education and that come from high SES backgrounds established KADER. Most of them were elite academicians from Istanbul. A woman who served as a chairperson in the Ankara branch says the following on this issue:

> *Amongst the initiators of KADER there are academicians, journalists, but we see that during the first years, direct street activists, the activists women that come from street protests are not that many. Therefore, looking from a*

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[38] *Partilere eşit uzaklıkta olma ilkesi KADER'in amacı olan politikada kadınların adil temsili için olmazsa olmaz koşuldur. Türkiye'de partiler arasında farklar silikleşse de "partizanlık" güçlüdür. Bu koşullarda KADER'in kimi partilerin kadınlarını dışlaması politikada erkek egemenliğine karşı oluşturmaya çalıştığımız kadın dayanışma ruhunu öldürecektir.*

distance, we can comfortably say that the initiators of KADER are mainly from the liberal sections. When you look, you see that all of them are higher-middle class women, I can not say educated because you see that most of them are originally from the academia, and the ones who came from Ankara are from bureaucrat circles etc.[39]

KADER Ankara Branch was established in 1998, the motivation of this first franchising was the fact that Ankara is located at the centre of politics in Turkey. In this establishment phase we see that the initiators of KADER are also the founders of KADER Ankara Branch. The participants reported that the academic and elite circles that were in close contact with Istanbul also established KADER Ankara. The present Chairperson of KADER Ankara Branch commented:

A group of women, who take part in women's movement, such as academician, bureaucrats, and activists established KADER. Unlike many women organization, KADER is an organization that has a special aim. It aims the participation of women into the mechanisms of politics, and its main political standpoint is to stay at equal distance to all political parties. But of course, this standpoint is at the same time the Achilles' heel for KADER. Women from different opinions participate in KADER, however, the equal distance principle is not be achieved and applied in its full sense everywhere [in all the branches].[40]

Most of the participant of the in-depth interviews said that KADER was mostly motivated by elitist and republican drives, hence at the beginning it was a

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[39] *KADER'in ilk kurucuları arasında akademisyenler, gazeteciler var ama direk sokak eylemlerinden ilk yıllardaki şiddet karşıtı sokak eylemlerinden gelen aktivist kadınların çok da olmadığını görüyoruz. Dolayısıyla şöyle tepeden bakınca KADER'in ilk kurucularının çok daha liberal bir kesim olduğunu çok daha rahat söyleyebiliriz. Bakınca hepsinin orta üst sınıf kadınlar olduğunu, eğitimli diyemeyeceğim çünkü çoğunun akademik kökeni olan kadınlar olduğunu görüyorsunuz, Ankara'dan gelenlerin bir bürokrat çevreden geldiğini görüyorsunuz vs.*

[40] *KADER'i kadın hareketinin de içinden işte akademisyen, aktivist, bürokrat kadınların da yeraldığı bir grup kadın kurmuş. Bir çok kadın örgütünün aksine KADER özel amaçlı bir örgüt, kadınların siyaset mekanizmalarına katılımını hedefliyor ve ana politikası da bütün partilere eşit uzaklıkta durmak. Tabi bu aynı zamanda KADER'in yumuşak karnı. Bir yandan KADER'in içinde çok farklı görüşlerden kadınlar var öte yandan bu, bütünüyle her yerde sağlanabilmiş her yerde uygulanabilen bir şey haline de gelememiş.*

relatively closed association. However, they also added that KADER has succeeded in bringing together women from different perspectives under its umbrella during the last years. According to them KADER owes this to its tremendous efforts and to its collaborative work with other CSOs, as well as to KADER's own projects which were carried out with the participation of different women from various backgrounds and opinions. An active KADER member depicts the current situation as follows:

> *Here there are women from everywhere, for example, despite the fact that it is established by an elite group and still today it is a place that is dominated by elites. KADER began to include more and more people at its base. This has made the differences broaden and become more visible.[41]*

One of the former directors made this comment on this issue:

> *There are feminists, liberals and Kemalists, and although it is a contestable concept but there are even conservatives too. If you look inside you can see women from Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). Recently, we have experienced some debates about it in KADER. This is an issue that will always come up whenever this particular equal distance is concerned. Because, when you look at Turkey, you see that there are those who value too much secularism, modernity, and so on. I don't know. They have always seen the headscarf issue as against these principles, and they supported the prohibition of headscarf in KADER. Or, there are groups who try to be an ally to the state fighting the issues that are be perceived as threats. Of course feminists do not favor this group. Our goal is to protect women from discriminatory policies; no matter whether it is from the state, the Kemalists or Islamist groups, we believe that we should guard against discriminatory policies towards women.[42]*

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[41] *Burada her yerden kadın var mesela kuruluşunda daha elit bir grubun kurduğu ve hala da çok elitlerin hakim olduğu bir yer olsa da KADER tabanda giderek daha fazla insanı kapsamaya başladı. Bu da farklılıkları daha da belirginleştirdi ve arttırdı.*

[42] *KADER içerisinde feministler var, liberaller var, Kemalistler var, muhafazakarlar bile var bu tartışmalı bir kavram ama baktığınız zaman AKP'li tipler de var. Yakın zamanda bunun tartışmalarını da yaşadık KADER'de. Bu hep önümüze çıkacak bir şey bu mesafeyle ilgili olarak.*

It becomes obvious that executives of KADER Ankara Branch, who are currently in-charge, have succeeded in realizing KADER's principles that were formulated from a feminist standpoint while staying at equal distance to all women from a diverse political spectrum.   One of the members of executive board said the following:

- There is no a definite dominant group in KADER Ankara Branch, but there are feminists. The dominants are feminists; in fact, it is because we are here.

- Can't the Kemalists, Atatürkists and so on come to the power?

- No, they can come; there is the general meeting ahead of us. However, I haven't seen such a majority or a powerful group yet. But, we didn't adopt an exclusionist policy in Ankara. During our training campaigns we registered members from Halk Evleri (People's House), CHP (Republican Peoples Party) and DEHAP (Democratic Peoples Party) or AKP (Justice and Development Party). You cannot take action here, with the fear "what if they take hold of the place!" If they do, let them! If such a powerful group exists, we would let them come to power, indeed.[43]

Despite the impression that the above quotations give, it should be keep in mind that KADER is not an organization who puts a lot of stress on feminism, or on any other label for that matter. At it is stressed in a KADER brochure outmost

Çünkü Türkiye'ye baktığınız zaman, işte laik çağdaş bilmem ne diye giden bir takım şeyler var. Onlar bu türban meselesini her zaman bu ilkelere ters bir şey olarak görüp asla KADER'de türbanlıların olmaması gerektiğini savunuyorlar. Ya da ülkeye tehdit gibi algılanabilecek şeylere karşı devletin yanında güç oluşturmak düşüncesinde olan gruplar var. Tabi feministler bu gruplara sıcak bakan insanlar değil. Bizim derdimiz kadını, bu nereden gelirse gelsin ister devletten ister Kemalist gruplardan, ister İslamcı gruplardan kimden gelirse gelsin kadına karşı ayrımcı politikalara tavır alınması gerektiğine inanıyoruz.

[43] *KADER Ankara'da çok baskın bir grup yok daha çok feministler var. Baskın olan feministler, o da bizim olmamız açıkçası.*
-Atatürkçüler, Kemalistler falan gelemezler mi?
-Yo gelebilirler önümüzde genel kurul var ama henüz ben böyle bir çoğunluk böyle bir grup güç olduğunu görmedim. Ama biz de böyle bizden başka kimse gelmesin gibi bir tavır da almadık Ankara'da. Eğitim çalışmaları yaptığımızda Halkevlerinde de CHP'den de DEHAP'tan da AKP'den de üye kaydettik. Şöyle bir korkuyla hareket edemezsiniz; ya burası ele geçirilirse! Geçirilirse geçirilsin yani. Öyle bir güç varsa onlar olsun yani

important thing for KADER is not how it is defined, but what KADER does and what KADER aims.

> *The doors of KADER are open to everyone who adopts KADER's aims, no matter whether they define themselves as "feminists" or not.*[44]

KADER Ankara Branch is considered among women CSOs as one of the leading CSO, because of its theoretical and practical contributions to women's movement and its numerous projects and activities. Furthermore, considering its role in politics and its central location (in Ankara), KADER Ankara Branch is situated in a more advantageous position compared to other branches. This advantageous position of KADER Ankara Branch enables it to become the one of the most active branches in the whole association. This lively involvement and unanticipated weight of Ankara branch led into some unrest in the association, especially at the central office. I will come back to this point later in this chapter.

During our research I have observed that KADER is in a close relationship with both national and international women CSOs. KADER works with these organizations, produces projects, and forms common platforms for women's movement. Most of the participants agreed that KADER pays special attention to the collaborative work done with other CSOs. Furthermore, it is also observed that women in other CSOs or in political parties appreciate KADER's attempts to collaborative work. One of the active members of KADER said the following:

> *The continuation and organization of the "Women Coalition" for instance is the concrete result of what we have been dreaming about and thinking of doing at the very beginning. We see that the women, who were avoiding not only sitting together but also being in the same room once, sit together and discuss, furthermore, they even sign the same text, together. This is a serious success of KADER Ankara Branch; indeed, it is the success of the chairperson. If "Başkent Kadın Platformu" (Women Platform of the Capital City) and "Türk Kadınlar Birliği" (Turkish Women Union), that is, Hidayet and Sema sit together around the same table, it is the success of*

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[44] See Appendix 1 for activities, associational policies and demands of KADER Ankara Branch.

Coalition. There is still long way to go, for instance, we lived through a serious clash on the adultery issue. The women from Women Platform of the Capital City act too recessive. In fact, they left us on the half way, but I think these things are quite natural and they contribute to our development.[45]

Appendix 1 depicts KADER Ankara Branch's activities and here we can observe its close cooperation with the both national and international CSOs. It was reported that especially Turkey's membership process to the EU accelerated the relationships of KADER even more significantly in international level. I was also told that during this process KADER found the chance of being more influential in international arena compared to the national one. The chairperson of the Ankara branch commented on this newly found prestige in the international level as follows:

There is an international community as well; KADER is quite prestigious in this level. The American first lady came and met with three CSOs in Turkey, one of them was KADER. The reason for this has to do with the founders of KADER. For instance, the former executive board's relations with bureaucrats and embassies were quite good. This creates advantage for us in resolving some problems and benefiting from some facilities.[46]

One of the active members of KADER who is an academician talked about the international relations and especially the relations with EU by giving reference to the political situation in Turkey.

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[45]*Kadın Koalisyonu'nun örgütlenmesi ve devam etmesi mesela bizim en başından beri yapmak istediğimiz hayalimizin somut bir sonucudur. Şöyle bir bakınca yan yana oturmak değil aynı odaya biler girmeyelim diyen kadınların yan yana oturup tartıştığı hatta bazı metinlerin altına birlikte imza attığını görüyoruz. Bu Ankara KADER'in ciddi bir başarısıdır, aslında başkanın başarısıdır. Başkent Kadın Platformu ile Türk Kadınlar Birliği yani Hidayet ile Sema kendilerince aynı masanın etrafında oturabiliyorlarsa işte bu koalisyonun başarısıdır. Hala gidilecek çok yol var mesela zina meselesinde ciddi bir ayrılık yaşandı. Başkent Kadın Platformu'ndan kadınlar çok çekinik davrandılar. Orada hafif bir yarı yolda bırakılma söz konusu ama bunların çok doğal olduğunu ve çok daha hoş bir yere doğru gittiğini düşünüyorum açıkçası.*

[46] *Bir de uluslararası camia var, orada prestiji yüksek KADER'in. Amerikan başkanın eşi geliyor Türkiye'den üç örgütle görüşüyor, bunlardan biri KADER. Bunun nedeni KADER'in kurucularıyla ilgili. Mesela bizden önceki yönetimin bürokrasiyle ve elçiliklerle ilişkileri çok iyiydi. Bunun bize bazı sorunları çözmede, bazı olanaklardan yararlanmada çok faydası oluyor.*

These days, together with the EU issue an interesting situation had emerged. The European Commission asks about our opinion, or more generally, women CSOs opinion, we tell them what should be done, give them studies and reports, and they dictate these to the government. In short, the process is taking place in the reverse direction. As a result, with the mediation of EU the women organizations began to be seriously influential in the government policies. It is possible to see these clearly in the last changes in the civil code and penal code; the women organizations have serious contributions on these.[47]

5. 2. 2. Organizational Structure and Organizational Life Experience

KADER Ankara has approximately 300 members. However, only 25 members participated in the general meeting of the Ankara Branch, which I attended as an observer. The number of active members in association's activities is around 15-20 members. In addition, there are about 15-20 passive members who occasionally come around to association's place and join in its activities.

The executive board, made up of 7 members, administers the association; this executive board takes all the interim decisions. Apart from this, there are commissions that are formed within the association, sometimes with the participation of non-members, to work on specific topics or projects. These, commissions may also be influential in the decisions taken in the association.

An executive board in KADER Branches can serve at most for two general assembly periods. During the interviews some women reported that the drawback of such an arrangement is that it leads to a continuous alteration of previous action plans and priorities, and this can negatively affect the long-term action plans.

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[47] *Son zamanlarda bu AB meselesi ile birlikte ilginç bir durum oluştu. Avrupa Komisyonu bize ya da daha geniş söyleyelim kadın örgütlerine soruyor, biz onlara ne yapmaları gerektiğini söylüyoruz, ellerine raporları çalışmaları veriyoruz, onlar da dönüp Türkiye'ye hükümete bunu dikte ettiriyorlar. Süreç tersten işliyor yani. Böylece AB dolayımıyla kadın örgütlerinin hükümet politikaları üzerinde ciddi bir etkisi olmaya başladı. Bu son Medeni Kanun değişikliklerinde, Ceza Yasası değişikliklerinde bunları açıkça görmek mümkün ve bunlarda kadın örgütlerinin ciddi katkısı vardır.*

The head of KADER Ankara said that they prefer to be opened to rather than stay close with regard to association's activities. For her, KADER gives a lot of importance to the inclusion of the masses and participatory practices. Following these principles of KADER, KADER makes it possible for participants to work for KADER without being necessarily involved as direct members. The members and the participants of KADER also welcome this principle. One of the former chairpersons of KADER said the following on this issue:

> KADER's struggle to include all the women, as we see in "Women Coalition", first of all solved one thing…solved the problem of exclusion of women who define themselves as Islamist, leftist etc. Now we see that there are nice small working groupings. When you look at "Local Administrations Working Group", you can see that some of them are KADER members some of them are not, but there are women from wide spectrum of views. An X person may say 'I don't work with the central office' or some Y person may say 'I don't want to be the member of KADER'. The important thing is that both X and Y work together in the same place.[48]

The speech of a woman working in one of the groups, without being the member of KADER confirms the above quotation:

> For instance, I am not a member [of KADER] but I am only a member of this group, and I am participating in these works. And I think, the existence of a model group which is capable of making its own decisions and which is relatively independent, is very crucial for carrying out activities in a branch.[49]

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[48] *KADER'in koalisyon meselesinden dolayı da bütün kadınları kapsamaya çalışması, onları oraya çekmesi bir kere şeyi sildi işte kendini İslamcı, solcu vs. diye adlandıran kadınların uzaklaştırılması meselesini biraz olsun çözdü. Şimdi baktığınız zaman da güzel güzel küçük çalışma grupları var. Yerel yönetimler çalışma grubuna baktığınız zaman oradaki kadınların bir kısmı kader üyesi bir kısmı değil ama her görüşten kadının olduğunu görüyoruz. "Ben GM'ile hiçbir şekilde çalışmam" diyen X'in ya da "Ben KADER üyesi olmak istemiyorum" diyen Y'nin orada çalıştığını görüyoruz.*
[49] *Ben mesela üye değilim ama sadece bu çalışma grubunun üyesiyim ve bu çalışmalar katılıyorum ve bizim şu anda yürüttüğümüz çalışmanın; kendi kararlarını alabilen, görece özerkliği olan bir çalışma grubunun, bir şubede yürütülecek bir çalışma açısından çok önemli bir model olduğunu düşünüyorum*

One of the members from conservative wing talks about the same issue:

I didn't participate in KADER's internal meetings and boards, but I have participated in some of the KADER's meetings, as a member of JDP, both with our deputies and other active members. There were friends from different political views. The friends from KADER Ankara Branch, that arrange the organization were at equal distance to all of us but we were the participants from the outside. I don't know how it works within the internal administration of KADER.[50]

You can usually see only one full time voluntary staff and the chairperson in KADER Ankara Branch. However, some of the active members may also pop in to the office in the times of meetings and activities that are organised in this office. However, one of the executive board members critically expresses her opinion about the voluntaries in the association:

Voluntary participation is perceived as arbitrariness in our society, people just come and hang out, or they come if they have personal work to do. However, apart from them, we have two friends working voluntarily here. There are people who occasionally come and go; however, constant voluntary participation is not the case here.[51]

Similar to most of the CSOs in Turkey, limited active participation is one of the major problems of KADER. As it is seen in most of the CSOs, a few members carry most of the tasks and activities. The Chairperson talks about this issue in the following manner:

This is one of the common experiences in the women organizations. The tasks and duties are left for the responsibility of a few. And they struggle to

[50] *KADER'in iç toplantılarına, kurullarına katılmadım ama KADER'in bazı toplantılarına AK Partililer olarak hem vekillerimiz hem de çalışan arkadaşlarla katıldık. Çok değişik siyasi görüşlere sahip arkadaşlar vardı. Bu organizasyonu yapan Ankara KADER'deki arkadaşlar evet hepimize eşit mesafedeydi ama biz dışardan katılımcılardık ama bunu KADER'in içindeki yönetim kadrolarında bu iş nasıl yürüyor bilmiyorum.*

[51] *Gönüllülük bizde keyfekederlik gibi algılanıyor geliyor takılıyor, işi varsa gidiyor ama bunun dışında iki tane arkadaşımız düzenli olarak geliyor. Gelip gidenler oluyor ama gönüllülük öyle istikrarlı bir şekilde gitmiyor.*

accomplish these. There has always been somebody to handle the things. However, we need to criticize our selves too. Sometimes we passionately possess things to the extent that we leave no room for the others.

-Can you give me an example?

-I clean the toilet but also make press releases, or talk to the Prime Minister. Indeed, there is no specific division of labor. Since, I don't work professionally outside, and since I am usually here, I try to do the entire job whatever may comes to your mind...whatever is needed to do in an organization.[52]

It was also reported that the number of visits increases during the elections, because of the fact that the main aim of the association is to train and support the women for the participation into politics. I have also witnessed the participation of a lot of women, from different parties or CSOs, in the association's activities during the last local elections in 2004. I have seen the candidate women coming to the association's office to get help especially for the preparation of campaigns or to participate into activities. Based on my observations I can say that KADER Ankara Branch is a small but quite active CSO in its own respect.

When we look at the totality of the picture, depending on my in-depth interviews, I can say that the organizational structure of KADER considering its 17 branches and its Central Office is quite hierarchical. Moreover, some of the members are complaining about this hierarchical structure because of its inhibitory effect in the association's activities. And it is also said that the main causes of the problems of KADER Ankara Branch has a lot to do with this hierarchal structure. According to some members this hierarchy sometimes harms the general vision and policies of KADER. One of the executive members said the following:

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[52] *Bu kadın örgütlerinde çok sık yaşanan bir şeydir. Bir kaç kişinin üzerine kalır iş ve onlar o işi götürmeye çalışırlar. Hep böyle işi sırtlananlar vardır. Ama özeleştiri de yapmak gerek. Bazen biz de işi o kadar sahipleniyoruz ki onu da ötekini de berikini de derken insanlara alan bırakmıyoruz.*
- Ne gibi mesela
-Tuvaleti de temizlerim, basın karşısında açıklama da yaparım, başbakanla da konuşurum; ama, öyle özel bir iş bölümü yok. Ancak, ben dışarıda profesyonel çalışmadığım için ve genelde hep burada olduğum için aklınıza gelebilecek her işi genelde yapmaya çalışıyorum bir örgütte yapılacak ne varsa.

With its chairperson, general secretary and the branches etc. the general administration is of course hierarchical. This is a hierarchical model but we admit that we didn't internalize this model that much. I cannot say this on behalf of whole KADER, but for instance, I can say this for the feminists inside the KADER. In fact this is a compulsory organizational model in order to be organized widespread. But, on the contrary the system that we apply in Ankara is not hierarchical. However if you talk about the totality of the branches of course we should accept the hierarchy. Furthermore, there is another difference with the Central Office; they are more often in-charged in the relationships with business circles and media, on the contrary, we are more often working on the issues related with political circles and universities. However, if you ask with respect to the division of labor, of course the general chairperson speaks on the behalf of the association.[53]

The following anecdote, told by the chairperson about the hierarchical relationship between Central Office and the Ankara Branch, is quite revealing:

While we were working very hard for the elections, preparing press releases, a slogan came from Istanbul "After the kitchen, now we are in politics". I don't even remember what was it exactly, but it was total nonsense. They sent a slogan which had nothing to do with politics, and which couldn't possibly be accepted by any feminist view or any group in the women's movement. We rejected to go out with such a slogan. We wrote something, which was more politically oriented, and it was sent to all the political parties. Because of this reason, a very serious a dispute broke out. They said: "How could Ankara Branch do such a thing? Only the Central Office should be able to do this". It showed us something very clearly.

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[53] *Genel Yönetim hiyerarşik tabii işte başkan, genel sekreter, şubeler falan. Bu hiyerarşik bir model ama çok da benimsediğimiz bir model değil. Bütün KADER için söyleyemeyeceğim ama mesela içindeki feministler için söyleyebilirim bunu. Bu nedenle bu zorunlu bir örgütlenme modeli yani yaygın örgütlenmeyi sağlamak için; ama Ankara Şube'de uyguladığımız sistemde aman başkanım, başkanım, falan gibi bir şey yok. Ama bütün şubeler açısından bakarsanız tabii ki böyle bir hiyerarşi var. Onu ötesinde Genel Merkezle şöyle bir fark oluyor onlar daha çok iş çevreleri ve medyayla ilişkileri götürüyor biz daha çok siyasi çevreler ve üniversitelerle işleri götürüyoruz. Ama görev dağılımı açısından sorarsanız tabii ki bir sözcü olarak genel başkan konuşur*

Although we we all come from women's movement, and some of us define themselves as feminists... indeed non-hierarchy is one of the defining characteristics of feminism... it showed us that, in fact, KADER is a highly hierarchical organization. Or, better to say it is not KADER, but KADER's new directors in the Central Office tries to establish a serious hierarchy and I think it is very dangerous. We felt this from very tiny little thing, but we understood in the course of time that it was not a feeling but a phenomenon.[54]

In the in-depth interviews it is often said that the problems between KADER Ankara Branch and the Central Office have arisen not only because of hierarchical relationship but also because of the weakness of inter-branch relationships. It is added that the incapability of the Central Office to formulate effective policies results in the branches' loss of sight and agenda. Furthermore, for some of the interviewees the blockage of the channels to influence association's policies from the branches makes the problem even more serious. In addition, it is also said that, the Central Office tries to handle these problems by introducing hierarchy in intra-association relations.

Most of the branches began to criticize the Central Office during this process. The branches felt themselves seriously alone in policy formation and dissemination. I don't talk in favor of hierarchy, but they felt themselves headless because of the fact that there were no proper policies in the association; they expressed their discontent in various ways to the

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[54] *Tam Ankara'da seçimler için çalışıyoruz harıl harıl basın bildirisi falan hazırlıyoruz İstanbul'dan bir slogan geldi: "Mutfaktan Sonra Şimdi de Siyasetteyiz" falan gibi tam hatırlayamıyorum ama abuk sabuk bir şey. Politika dışı, kadın hareketinin ya da feminist bakışın hiç bir şekilde onaylamayacağı bir slogan gönderdiler. Biz kesinlikle böyle bir sloganla çıkamayız dedik. Çok daha politik duruşu olan bir şeyler yazdık ve bütün partilere gönderildi bunlar. Ondan dolayı ciddi bir kavga koptu; "Ankara Şube nasıl böyle bir hareket yapabilir, bunu ancak GM yapabilir" diye. Bu da bize aslında şeyi çok net gösterdi. Her ne kadar kadın hareketinden geliyorsak da ve işte bir kısmımız kendini feminist olarak adlandırsa falan da ki feminizmin en temel şeylerinden biri hiyerarşinin olmaması gerektiğidir. Burada çok net bir şekilde şeyi gösterdi bize. Aslında KADER çok hiyerarşik bir örgüt. Ya da şöyle söyleyeyim KADER değil ama KADER'in yeni genel merkezi ciddi bir hiyerarşi kurmaya çalışıyor ve bu çok tehlikeli bir şey. Bunu küçücük bir şeyden hissettik ama daha sonraki senelerde bunun bir his değil olgu olduğu ortaya çıktı.*

Centre. As a result, what did the Central Office do, it did nothing, on the contrary it hailed commands, it is the exact meaning of the term, and told the branches to do something. Of course because of the non-existence of a common policy, the branches began to act as separate CSOs. In fact, they should be autonomous but, not to act as separate CSOs. There needed to be a common policy. While Ankara Branch, in line with its own statute, struggles to do its own job with the involvement of everybody and stays at equal distance to all the parties, some of the branches have become the satellite of some parties. This creates very serious problems.[55]

When we look at KADER's general election and participation process, we see two different patterns. I observed the elections in KADER Ankara Branch, and they were relatively calm and quite. The Executive Board in the General Meeting, which consists of 25 members, entered the elections with a fixed candidate list[56] and it was unanimously reelected. None of the members produced a negative evaluation and they showed their appreciation of the good work the Board did during the last period. The general meeting of the branch lasted for an hour, and most of it was filled with formalities. At the end of the meeting one of the members declared: *Comrades, in the next general meeting our aim will be to end the meeting in 45 minutes.[57]*

On the other hand, in the general meeting where all the branches of KADER were participating the atmosphere was quite animated and serious debates and tensions were visibly present. The participants said that in KADER's general meetings, there can be seen the tricks and artifices that are common to most of

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[55] *Bu süreçte şöyle bir şey de yaşandı şubelerin çoğu GM'yi eleştirmeye başladı. siyasetin oluşturulması ve dağıtılması konusunda kendilerini ciddi olarak yalnız hissettiler. Hiyerarşi olsun anlamında değil ama ortada bir siyaset olmadığı için kendilerini siyasi anlamda başsız hissettiler ve bunu çeşitli şekillerde GM'ye ilettiler. Peki GM ne yaptı hiçbir şey yapmadı aksine emirler yağdırararak, kelimenin tam anlamı bu, çeşitli şeyler yapılmasını istedi bazı şubelerden. Tabii ortak bir politika olmadığı için de şubeler kendileri ayrı birer STK gibi işlemeye başladı. Aslında tabi özerk olmalılar ama ayrı bir STK gibi işlememek durumundalar, ortak bir politikanın da olması gerekiyor. Ankara Şube tüzüğe bağlı kalarak bütün partilere eşit uzaklıkta kalıp herkesi işin içine katarak iş görmeye çabalarken bazı şubeler ciddi anlamda bazı partilerin uzantıları haline geldiler. Bu da ciddi problemler yarattı.*

[56] A fixed list in this case means instead of voting for each member of the executive board separately, the elector votes for them as a group.

[57] *Arkadaşlar bir dahaki genel kurulda hedefimiz toplantıyı 45 dakikada bitirmek*

organizations' and parties' assemblies and elections. However, it was also said that KADER could succeed to overcome all the tensions in the end of the meetings. The Chairperson of the Ankara Branch said:

> *Well of course, there are those who support the fixed lists, people who are against them, and those who try to by-pass the list so that somebody they support will become the member of the new list, etc., that is one can experience all the things that are usually experienced during a general meeting.[58]*

Some of the members affirm the words of the chairperson by saying that in some of the general assemblies and even in some of the regular meetings there are serious debates on some of KADER's basic topics that are prone to controversies. And yet, situations like this work on behalf of democracy, because it is through tricks such as the fixed lists that encourage some persons to individually take action and speak up against what they think is unfair. One of the members succinctly put it:

> *But there are those who undermine the lists, out of their own initiative. For example, in the last meeting, a woman who was not shown as a candidate by the Central Office, declared her candidacy thus sabotaging the list.[59]*

The participant of the in-depth interviews declared that the Central Office employs a democratic method in defining the candidates of the General Executive Board of all KADER. For instance, in the last general meeting, it is reported that, the Central Office asked for the candidate list of all branches. And the election was held with the help of these lists. On the other hand, it is said that the candidates of branches are defined by the proposal or the direction of the current or the former executives. Indeed, besides the election procedures, I have detected crucial differences in the administrative practices of the branches and the Central Office. For instance, the chairperson of the Ankara Branch mentioned the executives' motive to pass the execution task to the one to whom they trust most, since, there are

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[58] *Tabi tabii, çarşaf listeler, çarşaf listeye karşı olanlar, onu delmek isteyenler vs. yani GK'larda yaşanabilecek her şey yaşanabiliyor.*
[59] *Ama çarşafı delebilen kişiler de oluyor, kendi insiyatifleriyle delebiliyorlar. Mesela geçen kurulda Genel Merkez'in aday göstermediği bir kadın adaylığını açıkladı ve çarşafı delip aday oldu.*

not too many claimant of the execution in the branches. However there seem serious struggles in the level of Central Office for the general execution of KADER.

When we observe the intra-organizational decision making and implementation processes, we can witness serious debates, deliberation of the members. However, according to the participants these kinds of deliberations quite rarely take place, because, most of the decision are taken by the executive board and in addition the implementation of most of the tasks are also left for the accomplishment of the executive board of the branch. Furthermore, one of the members of the executive board confessed that the executive board could only come together in its usual meetings, and because of this reason most of the job decisions are left to the executives of the tasks. One of the former chairpersons of the branches commented on this matter:

> *And sometimes the Executive Board should be able to meet and make a decision very quickly. Sometimes, three of them, sometimes two and there are cases when the chairperson is left on her own. The members are not part of this process. That's why we decided to hold monthly meetings for all members, however, it could be due to our incompetence, but there were no more than four meetings. But the members should be a little more…how do you say it, as if she says, "here I am". We already are quite few and there is a lot to do, after a certain point you forget the thing: "Well, this is a CSO, it has members, and members should work together"; one can forget this and things like let's take the decision all together just disappear[60].*

Apart from these, participants reported that very serious debates take place on making decision about the critical issues. For example, members may think quite differently about decisions like to which organization KADER will be the partner, with which political party KADER will work together, what kind of projects will be

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[60] *Bir de YK'nın çok hızlı toplanması ve karar alması gerekiyor bazen. 3 kişi bazen 2 hatta bazen başkan tek başına kalıyor. Üyeler bu sürecin içine giremiyorlar. Bunun için aylık üye toplantıları yapma kararı aldık, ama bizim de beceriksizliğimiz olabilir ama 4 toplantıdan ileriye gidemedi. Ama biraz da şey olmak lazım üyelerin ya "işte ben buradayım falan demesi" gibi. Zaten az kişi olduğun ve yapacak çok şey olduğu için, bir noktadan sonra şeyi unutuyorsun: "Ya bu bir STK, bunun üyeleri var, üyelerle birlikte çalışmalıyız" unutabiliyorsunuz ve hep birlikte karar alalım gibi bir şey ortadan kalkıyor açıkçası.*

implemented, which companies or organizations sponsoring will be considered as acceptable. For instance, we can see divergent approaches on matters like meeting with foreign organizations and their representatives mostly because the members come from different political backgrounds. But despite these divergencies, the participants pointed at KADER's success in its relation with foreign organizations. However, the projects that KADER implemented especially in last years are seriously debated. The Chairperson of the branch gives the following example about this:

> *There are a lot of women who look differently at the question of projects. An institution brought us a proposal; they had their own suggestions. But they want to decide themselves about the content, form and discussion points; there for example we gave a firm answer: "we can't allow an institution who says that it will absolutely support us to interline in our internal affairs, you can only finance us" we told them. This is exactly where the issue of getting support from other institutions reaches a deadlocked. Some think that as long as they don't interfere in our internal affairs we can get financial support from everybody; others think that even if non-interference is the case we should not get financial support from everybody[61].*

Besides the decision making processes, the polarizations, groupings in the intra-organizational relations comprise one of our crucial matters of discussion in the scope of my research. Similar to most of the organizations, lobbying also exists in KADER. But, quite interestingly this is accepted by most of the members. However, it is also said that proper lobbying activities are not that common, but most of the debated issues are not the result of the lobbies but individual interests. One of the members put it as such:

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[61] *Projeler konusunda farklı bakan bir sürü kadın var. Bir kuruluş bize teklif getirdi kendi önerileri de vardı. Ama bunlar içerik, biçim ve tartışma noktaları konularını kendileri belirlemek istediler orada mesela kesin tavır koyduk: "Biz kesinlikle bizi destekleyeceğini söyleyecek bir kurumun içişlerimize karışmasına izin veremeyiz, siz ancak finansör olabilirsiniz" dedik. İşte yabancı kuruluşlardan destek almak meselesi de burada kilitleniyor. Bir kısmı içişlerimize karışmadığı sürece herkesten destek alabiliriz diye düşünüyor, bir kısmı böyle bile olsa herkesten destek alınamaz diye düşünüyor.*

Of course, there is lobbying. If you have thoughts that trouble you go and speak with the others. There are cases when there was ideas we were not comfortable with we said we didn't agree[62].

One of the volunteers that work in KADER Ankara Branch said that most of the discussions and debates take place in the e-mail group of KADER. She said the Atatürkist women mostly use the e-mail groups. And according to her, these women may even sometimes send e-mails that are written for insulting purpose.

When we look at the meeting style of KADER, we can say that KADER managed to apply democratic and participatory procedures in its meeting style. They owe this achievement to their determination of not allowing the personal discussions in the meetings and organization of the meetings to obtain concrete results. To quote the words of chairperson:

If you look at the member meeting, executive board meeting, meetings with other CSOs you see that there is a meeting style. A meeting has a definite aim and work must come out of it. This is not a trade association, I am an engineer and I am here. There is a precise aim and it requires a serious struggle. We have our differences, but we have one thing in common. We move in unanimity and solidarity[63].

But also there are some events that blur that picture of "solidarity" and "unanimity."

-There was a clash and she resigned. It was about the division of labour here. Her argument was: I am not being involved in the work done here.

-Was she saying that you do not involve her?

-Yes, generally this was it. I think that generally this was the reason, but we did not exclude her, she could not get herself involved. This friend went to

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the electoral district during the election period, and she was not here for quite a long time anyway. We did her work, and so on. All the time things like this happened: if you call me I will come. We asked her to come and she told us the she was busy and she couldn't. The tradition people come from is important. "I can't be a secretary to anybody and I can't give orders to anyone". When I tell them that people here should be able to say: "I will do this", they say "but you are the chairperson, you have to tell us what to do and we will do it." I don't come from such a tradition; I don't feel the need to direct people by using my chairpersonship. Then you already can't do anything; it becomes difficult to work together[64].

I interviewed with the person who resigned; I asked her the reasons of her resignation. However, she denied talking about it in detail, she showed her business as a reason for her resignation.

5. 2. 3. The Problem of Participation

According to my observations and the in-depth interviews, most of the participants of the activities are women above the middle age. But, academicians and the university students also participate into the KADER activities. During the fields research I focused on the women's motivation of participating in KADER's activities. One of the active members of the association recounted the following about the motivation of the comers.

Some of them are retired, have grown their children and have free time and they see this as a social activity. Some see it as a duty to be performed,

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[64] *-Bir çatışma yaşandı ve istifa etti. Buradaki iş bölümüyle ilgiliydi. Kendi getirdiği şey şuydu: İşte ben buradaki işlere dahil olamıyorum.*
-Dahil etmiyorsunuz mu diyordu?
-Evet genel olarak bu.
-Genel olarak bundan kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum ama biz dışlamadık kendisi dahil olamadı diye düşünüyorum. Bu arkadaş zaten seçim döneminde seçim bölgesine gitti ve epeyce bir süre burada olmadı. Onun işlerini de biz yaptık falan. Her seferinde şöyle şeyler oldu; çağırsanız gelirim. Çağırdık, işim var gelemem dedi. Bir de insanların hangi gelenekten geldiği önemli. "Ben kimsenin sekreterliğini yapamam ve kimseye iş buyuramam. Gelip burada şunu ben yaparım demesi lazım insanların" dediğimde; "Ama, sen başkansın sen söyleyeceksin biz yapacağız". Ben böyle bir gelenekten gelmiyorum başkanlığımla birilerini yönlendireyim şeyim yok. O zaman zaten şey yapamıyorsunuz birlikte iş yapmak zor olabiliyor.

want the relationship to continue and also want to help once in a while. But I think that most of the women come because they have a problem[65].

A young member explained the reasons for participation in the following:

Actually mine [participation] was not like that, very innocent, it was not just to help civil society. I was going to work on women's citizenship that's why KADER was the right place and moreover I have personal relationship with the present chairperson, that's why I joined. I also saw that the key women in the women's movement are in KADER, that is why [I joined] [66].

A participant said that some members perceived KADER membership as prestigious and a status symbol, while for others KADER membership it could be the opposite. The chairperson of the branch gives an astonishing example on this issue:

For some people to be a real member of KADER is something that makes you have prestige, if they perceive it this way it means that there must be something to it. But this changes depending on the place. For example, I went to training on behalf of KADER, and certain leftist groups who knew me, were very surprised that I came from KADER and kept their distance, I felt it. But now they ask me to come to further training sessions. This means that in that region something dramatic with regard to KADER was experienced. In the beginning none from Kurdish (HADEP) or leftist groups would join. But now we have quite a few from those groups among us. I have seen that this has to do with the way relationships are built[67].

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[65] *Bazıları emekli olmuş, çocuklarını büyütmüş boş zamanı var ve bunu bir sosyal aktivite gibi görebiliyor. Kimisi yapılması gereken bir görev, ilişkisi sürsün ama arada derede de destek olsun anlayışıyla geliyor. Ama ben çoğunun kadınlarla ilgili bir derdi olduğu için geldiğini düşünüyorum.*

[66] *Aslında benimki öyle çok masumane değildi, sivil topluma yardımcı olayım diye değildi. Kadın vatandaşlığı çalışacaktım o yüzden KADER doğru yerdi bir de şimdiki başkanla kişisel geçmişim vardı o yüzden gittim. Bir de kadın hareketinde kilit noktada olan kadınların KADER'de olduğunu gördüm o yüzden.*

[67] *Bazı insanlara göre gerçekten KADER üyesi olmak prestij kazandıran bir şey, böyle algıladıklarına göre demek ki böyle bir şey var. Ama bu yerine göre de değişen bir şey. Mesela KADER adına eğitim vermeye gittiğim ve beni daha önceden tanıyan bazı sol yapılar, KADER'den geldiğim için çok şaşırdılar ve mesafe koydular ben bunu hissettim. Ama şimdi şu eğitime de gelir misin diyorlar. Demek ki orada da KADER'le ilgili ciddi bir şey yaşanmış. Önceden Kürt (HADEP) ve sol gruplardan kimse gelmiyordu ama şimdi onlar arasında da ciddi üyelerimiz var. Bunun kurulan ilişkilerle de ilgili olduğunu düşünüyorum.*

Political interest is another source of motivation for some to become the member. Despite KADER's principle that KADER does not support individually any women candidate, two of the charter members made use of KADER in their own candidacy propaganda. Some of the members conveyed that because of this reason they had to make a press release in order to restore KADER's image:

> Last year one of the founding members of KADER said on a live program "KADER supports me in the elections". We in Ankara raised hell. This is not because we were against our friend. KADER is not yet at the point where it can single out and support candidates one by one. This is exactly why we had an issue with the Central Office and they hadn't made such a declaration [regarding candidate support]. That person made that decleration and the Central Office gave a denying declaration. The same thing happened two days ago. I looked at the newspaper: "Women organizations have come together; Civil Society unite for this specific person; a platform was established and so on" was writing on the sixth page of Hürriyet. The woman is mayor candidate for Çankaya Municipality; members of the platform are The Flying Broom, KADER etc. This comrade is a woman, all right, and probably she is good woman and so on, but we met with her three times and each time we told her that we can't declare her name. Now if I call the newspaper, this is great news for them: WOMEN FIGHT AMONG THEMSELVES. This is a disgrace, but on the other hand we have to stop this[68].

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[68] Geçen sene KADER'in kurucu üyelerinden biri canlı yayında "KADER seçimlerde beni destekliyor" dedi. Biz Ankara'dan kazan kaldırdık. Bu arkadaşın kendisine karşı olduğumuz için değil. KADER henüz tek tek aday belirleyip destekleme noktasına gelmiş durumda değil. Tam bu yüzden genel merkezle papaz olduk ki GM böyle bir açıklama yapmamıştı. O kişinin kendi açıklamasıydı ve GM açıklama yaptı böyle bir şey yok diye. Aynı şey iki gün önce de oldu. Gazetede bir baktım: "Kadın örgütleri toplanış; Sivil Toplum şu kişi için için birleşmiş; platform kurulmuş falan" yazıyor Hürriyetin 6. sayfasında. Kadın Çankaya Belediye Başkan adayı, platformun üyeleri de Uçan Süpürge, KADER vs. Bu arkadaş, hoş kadındır, iyi kadındır falan ama biz onunla üç sefer görüştük ve her seferinde ismini deklare edemeyeceğimizi söyledik. Şimdi gazeteyi arasam bu gazeteci açısından bayramlık haber: KADINLAR BİRBİRİNE DÜŞTÜ. Rezalet bir şey; ama, bir yandan da bu şeye bir son vermek lazım.

Moreoever, almost all the participants of my in-depth interviews complained about the low interest in the participation in KADER's activities. One of the young members speaks about this matter:

> *We have to attract people so that they will voluntarily participate. For example, x organization had an army of volunteers. The simplest of all, when you make a translation, the translator can see her name on the web page. We the youth, at least for now, we are not after the money, but after a career, to have one's name heard is very satisfying. But, what can you do to satisfy women of a certain age? I have no idea. First of all, KADER is not always attractive. Moreover, politics is not yet everybody's business in Turkey; therefore it cannot attract common women*[69].

Some of the participants argued that although KADER is open to everyone, the principles of the association involve natural limits and borders of membership. These principles may pose some hindrances for the membership and participation into KADER. For instance, the former chairperson said that anybody or any organization that is involved in actions that have anything to do with fascism, or racism, cannot find a place in KADER. However, despite these sharp borders against the above-mentioned issues, it can be observed that KADER still tries to obtain women from a wide spectrum of differences and thoughts. The Chairperson puts it in the following way:

> *But as far as a woman member of a party considered fascist is concerned, if she has an attitude close to ours with regard to women issues and if she embraces our policies, she can be a member, nevertheless in time the differences become visible. In fact she will have to question her position either here or there. We had a comrade like that, for example, and I had my own prejudices about the party she came from; but for example, now this*

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[69] *Gönüllü katılımın olması için insanları cezbetmesi lazım. Mesela X örgütün bir gönüllü ordusu var. En basit bir çeviri yaptığın zaman çeviriyi yapan web sayfasında adını görebiliyor. Biz gençler, daha çok yani şu aşamada para peşinde değil ama kariyer peşindeyiz şu aşamada ismimizin bir yerlerde duyulması bizi çok daha tatmin ediyor. Ama belli bir yaştaki kadınları tatmin etmek için ne yapılır bu konuda bir fikrim yok. Birincisi çok fazla cezbedici olamıyor KADER zaman zaman. Bir de siyaset çok böyle sıradan insanların işiymiş gibi değil hala Türkiye'de, o yüzden de çok sıradan kadınları çekemiyor.*

woman does not even mention the name of that party. She doesn't have any more relations with it. Equal distance; doesn't mean close to all after all. With regard to women issues we pick on everyone, but it might not succeed after all, it may not reach you. You don't have to be fascist for this to happen, we come across a similar attitude in social democratic parties as well[70].

5. 2. 4. Basic Conflicts and Points of Divergence

According to the data that I obtained through the field research, the conflict inside the organization is a perpetual one, but its dosage goes hand in hand with the general political climate in Turkey. However, because of the fact that KADER is a young organization and it is still in its institutionalization phase, the differences and clashes within the organization do not result in fractionalism in the organization. After all, according to my field observations, and also the speeches of the most of the participants the main conflictual point in KADER is indeed derived from its main principle, that is, staying at equal distance to all political parties and thoughts. This principle comprises both KADER's existential reason and its permanent problem and while this principle poses perpetual conflict, it also gives KADER its dynamism. One of the members speaks about this issue:

Due to the equal distance issue clashes, the clashing point, for example of, the last period Islam-Kemalism, has its place in KADER as well[71].

Another feminist woman said the following on the same discussion:

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[70] *Ama faşist olarak sayılan bir partiden üye bir kadın kadın konusunda buranın politikalarına yakın bir yaklaşıma sahipse ve buranın politikalarını benimsiyorsa üye olabilir ama zaman içinde kartlar ortaya çıkar. Aslında o, ya oradaki ya buradaki konumunu sorgulamak zorunda kalır. Böyle bir arkadaş vardı mesala, geldiği yere ilişkin benim de önyargılarım vardı; ama mesela artık bu kadın partisinin adını anmıyor. Partisiyle de ilişkisi kalmadı. Bu eşit mesafe, herkese yakın anlamına gelmiyor zaten. Kadın meselesiyle ilgili herkese kanca atıyoruz ama gelmiyor zaten o, sana uzak duruyor. Bunun için faşist olmasına gerek yok sosyal demokrat bir partide de bu tavrı sergileyebiliyor.*
[71] *Eşit mesafe meselesinden kaynaklanan çatışmalar temel çatışma noktası, mesela son dönemde İslam- Kemalizm meselesi KADER içerisinde de yerini buldu.*

What did KADER do on the Merve Kavakçı case? This should have been
clearly done in that case: "What are you think you are doing! We are
against this, this woman should be here." But when KADER said this, it
was faced this kind of accusations: "Oh, KADER is going to the hands of
Islamists". We are moving on such an unstable surface that we don't know
how to proceed[72].

The words of a member from the conservative side confirm what it is said in the
above quotation:

KADER experienced indecisiveness in the case of putting into practice the
discourse of equal distance, and sometimes it was not successful. They
again perceived equal distance as a template of their issues. That's why
they were able to represent and be the voice of only a certain group. For
example, KADER did not protect Merve Kavakçı. They ignored the case. It
was the issue of a woman and the election of a woman and she was an
elected woman. Then her right as an elected woman should have been
protected. No matter what dressing style that woman has. It [KADER]
should have laid claims on her and it should have said, "We have protect
all women", but it didn't[73].

However, it is also reported that the reasons behind this tension are hidden in
KADER's historical and ideological background. For example, one of the
experienced members evaluates this tension as follows:

We say equal distance, but KADER's foundation concurs in fact to days
when the voice of those supporting secularism was growing, you can also

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[72] *Merve Kavakçı Olayı'nda ne yaptı KADER? Orada net bir şekilde şunun yapılması gerekiyordu:*
Ne yapıyorsunuz kardeşim! Biz buna karşıyız, bu kadın da burada olmalı. Ama bunu böyle
söylediğinde KADER şöyle bir suçlamayla karşılaşıyor: "Haa KADER demek ki İslamcıların elinde
gidiyor". O kadar oynak bir zeminde oynuyoruz ki nasıl hareket edeceğimizi bilemiyoruz.

[73] *KADER kendi içinde belirsizlikler yaşadı bu eşit mesafede durma söylemini pratiğe geçirme*
konusunda zaman içinde çok başarılı olamadılar. Bu eşit mesefeyi yine kendi şablonlarının mesefesi
olarak algıladılar. Dolayısıyla sadece bir kesimin sesi ve temsili olabildiler. Merve Kavakçı Olayı
çok nettir. Mesela, Merve Kavakçı'ya sahip çıkmadı KADER. Görmezden geldi eğer bir kadınsa konu
ve bir kadının seçilmesi ise ve o kadın seçilmiş bir kadındı. O zaman o kadının seçilmiş olması
hakkının savunulması lazımdı. O kadının tercihi olan giyim tarzı ne olursa olsun. Sahip çıkması
gerekirdi ve derdi ki biz bütün kadınlara sahip çıkıyoruz, böyle bir sahip çıkma olmadı.

consider it as a movement against those (Islamists) who oppose secularism [74].

Therefore, in search of the triggering factors of this tension in KADER, I realized that this tension has the transformative potential since women from different background and views find the way to compromise while dwelling on Turkey's mostly debated issues that have roots in Turkey's social and political problems. It is also noted by some of the participants that being a member of women organizations also mean to get through an intensive training. One of the active members cites her observation as follows:

> *There are women who come here and start saying 'our rights, our laws, this that...' However you can see that women two minutes later, talking about inherent woman attributes. Yet, after a time period in KADER these women put on the gender concept and start speaking in that fashion. But there can be lots of women who do not make concessions on their positions and ideologies, who do not change their beliefs. After all, there are some of them among us and we experience clashes*[75].

The Chairperson of the branch commented on this subject:

> *For example, the headscarf issue. When they first came here there were women who would never tolerate sitting at the same table with a woman wearing a headscarf and now I see this personally they sit next to each other, have tea and act together. This means that there is a toleration process and that something has changed as a result of meetings and debates etc., hence they can be together. This has not just to do with the structure of the organization; it has also to do with the development of women's movement. In the past, women would look at each other from their ideological positions, or didn't look at all. Islamists, Kemalists, I-don't-*

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[74] *Bu eşit mesafe diyoruz da KADER'in ortaya çıkışı aslında tam o laiklik yanlısı sesin yükseldiği sıralarda, laiklik karşıtı hareketlere karşı bir hareket olarak da değerlendirilebilir.*

[75] *Haklarımız, hukuklarımız gak guk, diye buraya gelen ama iki dakika sonra bir yerde kadının doğasında varolan bir takım özellikleri sayan kadınlar bir süre sonra toplumsal cinsiyet kavramını tak diye giyer ve öyle laflar etmemeye başlar. Ama, duruşundan, ideolojisinden taviz vermeyen ve inançlarını değiştirmeyen bir çok kadın da çıkabilir, Nitekim var onlar da buradalar ve o çatışmaları yaşıyoruz.*

know-what let alone touching each other, they would never listen. In the 2000s things are different. Women started listening to each other's voices. This is very important and KADER stands in an important position in this regard. This is an issue of equal distances and including differences. Different women, together with their differences stand together on a common objective.[76]

Deriving from the above example, it can be argued that the scarf issue constitutes the breaking point of the established commonalities within the association. Better to say, the conflict arise in deciding the appropriate manner, that is, whether to stay at equal distance to the women who wear headscarf or not. The conflict is in between the women from republican, Atatürkist, elitist side and the feminist women. I am pointing out the feminists because the number of the conservative women in KADER is so limited that they cannot constitute a definite part in this kind of a debate. The Kemalists support their stand by addressing nationalist and republican symbols like the motherland, the nation, the flag, and Atatürk, while the main concern is to preserve the unity of the nation and the state. They place the women with headscarf as a threat to the republic and the totality of the nation and they see them as the enemies to the progress of Turkish nation. They simply reject to sit in the same table with them whether it is in KADER or not. And Kemalists reject their existence in KADER. However, feminists in KADER argue that the Kemalists point of view violates the main principle of KADER which is to gather all the women under the same organization deriving from the argumentation that the ultimate commonality of women is simply being a woman, that is, the discriminations that women face because they are women. Therefore, Kemalists

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[76] *Mesela türban meselesi. Buraya geldiğinde asla ve asla türbanlı bir kadınla aynı masada bile oturmaya tahammül edemeyecek kadınlar vardı ve ben bir kısmını hala gözleme şansına sahibim, yan yana oturuyorlar çay içiyorlar birlikte hareket edebiliyorlar. Demek ki bu tahammül süreci ve birbirimizi o toplantılar tartışmalar vs sonucunda bir şey değişmiş demek ki şimdi bir arada olabiliyorlar. Bu sadece örgütün yapısıyla ilgili bir şey değil kadın hareketinin gelişimiyle de ilgili bir şey. Eskiden kadınlar birbirlerine ideolojik olarak durdukları yerden bakıyorlardı ya da hiç bakmıyorlardı, İslamcısı, Kemalisti, bilmemnesi birbirlerine dokunmak şöyle dursun asla birbirlerini duymuyorlardı bile. 2000'lerde ise durum çok farklı. Kadınlar birbirlerinin sesini işitmeye başladılar. Bu çok önemli bir şey ve KADER tam bu noktada çok önemli bir yerde duruyor.O eşit mesafe meselesi ve bu farklılıları içermesi. Farklı kadınlar, bu farklılıklarla birlikte ortak bir amaca doğru bir arada duruyorlar.*

insistence inhibits the actualization of KADER's main principle of staying at equal distance to all political parties and life views. One of the members who locates herself to the conservative side spoke about this issues complained about the current situation.

> *I think in KADER Ankara branch there are some well-intentioned people. These people try to create equal distances. But I think they did not achieve this yet.*[77]

The clashing political stands showed themselves not only in the headscarf issues, but also in broader topics like the freedom and the civil rights of the women, organization of the women and other similar issues. And it also affects the member's attitudes and perceptions towards the main building blocks of the Turkish State and traditional political climate in Turkey.

For instance, one of the feminist members said, *"Kemalist women think that through the rights that Atatürk gave to them, the issues are solved, equality is reached. The problem for them is to protect these rights*[78]*"* Some of the participants conveyed that because of the mentioned perspective some of the republican women try to preserve the *status quo*, and therefore, they prefer to work with the support of the state in total alliance with it.

> *-There are more official approaches, like well "there is nothing that we won't do for our state".*
>
> *- Are they from rightist parties?*
>
> *-No, there are social democrats as well.*[79]

To sum up, in the context of KADER the discussion of headscarf issue in fact, transcends its short implications, and it moves on to a new level. That is, the

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[77] *Bence KADER Ankara Şubesi'nde bazı iyi niyetli arkadaşlarımız var bu arkadaşlar bu eşit mesafeyi oluşturmaya gayret ediyorlar. Ama oluşturulmuş bir mesafe henüz yok diye düşünüyorum.*
[78] *Kemalist kadınlar, Atatürk'ün verdiği haklarla kadın sorununun çözüldüğünü, eşitliğin sağlandığını, sorunun bu kazanımları korumak noktasında ortaya çıktığını söylüyorlar.*
[79] *-Daha böyle resmi yaklaşımlar var şey gibi "işte devletimiz için yapamayacağımız şey yoktur" gibi.*
-Bunlar sağ partilerden mi?
-Yo sosyal demokratlar arasında da var

discussion gains a new insight that revolves around state and civil society relations in the axis of nationalism. And the proponents of the discussion seem to be quite motivated by the questioning of the loyalty of the citizens to the national values. I will quote the words of an ex-chairperson about the discussion of Turkish National Anthem in one of the meeting as a significant example of this topic:

After deciding to hold local elections, KADER decided to organise a convention. This convention was programmed in the form of these headings: women at work and health, women and education, women and politics. The convention had 4, 5 headings and I seriously criticized this. We have other things to do and this convention is not KADER's business.... There are some subtle things here. In fact even calling the convention a convention is something that shows a political position. Because when you call a gathering 'convention' that convention has to be opened by the singing of the national anthem and everybody has to stand up in respect. I don't support the opening of a convention of a women's CSO or in any CSO with the national anthem. And after the national anthem was sang very seriously I and women who think like I do left the room. That is, this was not because I am against the national anthem etc. etc., but if you are a CSO you cannot do it. Consequently, in the e-discussions that followed things like this occurred and for example the chairperson in a concise manner said: "As ling as I am the chairperson here, meetings will be opened with the national anthem if this is necessary". This is the explicit expression of a political position and it has nothing to do with a CSO, in my opinion. Civil society as the mane says is something civil. I overreacted a bit; I told her that she was wrong. "There are a lot of things to be done and you play games here" I said. I was very angry and from that point on I cut all my relations with KADER.[80]

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[80] *Yerel seçimler yapılması kararı alındıktan sonra bir tarihte kurultay yaptı KADER. Bu kurultay şöyle programlanmış. İşte kadın ve sağlık, kadın ve eğitim, kadın ve siyaset gibi 4, 5 başlığı olan bir kurultaydı ve ben çok ciddi bir şekilde bunu eleştirdim. Bizim yapmamız gereken başka bir şey var ve bu kurultayı yapmak KADER'in işi değil.... Burada bazı ince şeyler var. Aslında kurultaya kurultay adını vermek bile, çok daha siyasi bir duruşu gösteren bir şey. Çünkü kurultay dediğiniz zaman herhangi bir toplantıya, o toplantı İstiklal Marşıyla açılmak zorunda ve saygı duruşuyla devam etmek*

Feminist women argue that republican women undermine the women rights problem and women's organizations ultimate aims of setting women free of systematic discrimination. According to them Republican women think that progressive project of Kemalism solved the problem of the women during the early republican period. So for them the solution of the today's problems of the women is very much related with the preservation of the republican value. Feminists argue that the republicans approach to the problems of women, makes some of the women think themselves superior to the mass of others, it creates elitism and finally it paves the road of masculine domination. The feminists sustain that in the republican approach, the kind of power relations that are seen in patriarchal relations are also perpetuated in women organizations. They give the example of the spitting of a republican women into the face of a women who was wearing a headscarf in one of the KADER's branches as to show the perpetuation of patriarchal relations in KADER. Similarly, a feminist woman cited one of the republican chairperson's words "We train them, and they come up as candidates against us" as an example of their undemocratic attitude towards other women even inside the organization. One of the feminist members said the following on this issue:

> *Like in the issues of flag and patriotism, to be democratic, to speak as one wishes, to have one's orders followed, does not mean have everyone speak negotiatingly, there is nothing like that. Of course we have some priorities with regard to the woman's issue and we [KADER] should approach it from a more feminist perspective.*[81]

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zorunda. Ben herhangi bir kadın STK'nin herhangi bir STK'nin, herhangi bir toplantıya İstiklal Marşı'yla başlamasına taraftar değilim ve çok ciddi bir şekilde İstiklal Marşı okunduktan sonra ben ve benim gibi düşünen kadınlar falan odayı terk ettik. Yani bu İstiklal Marşı'na karşı olduğum için değil vs. vs. ama eğer bir STK isen bunu yapamazsın. Nitekim daha sonraki e-group tartışmalarında şöyle bir şeyler de döndü mesela başkan şunu net bir şekilde söyledi: "Ben burada başkan olmaya devam ettikçe gerekirse toplantılar İstiklal Marşı'yla açılacaktır!". Bu çok belli bir siyasal görüşü ortaya koyuyor ve bence sivil toplumla da alakası yok. Sivil toplum adı üstünde sivil bir şey. Biraz sert çıktım, yaptıklarının yanlış olduğunu söyledim. "Yapmamız gereken bir sürü şey varken burada oyun oynuyorsunuz" dedim. Çok sinirlenmiştim çünkü ve o noktadan itibaren de KADER'le bağlarımı koparttım.

[81] *Bu bayrak vatan millet meselesinde de olduğu gibi demokratik olmak herkesin istediği gibi konuşabilmesi, herkesin sözünün geçmesi ve herkesin sözünden uzlaşmacı bir tavır çıkarmak demek değil, yok böyle bir şey. Tabii ki kadın meselesiyle ilgili bazı önceliklerimiz var ve buranın da daha feminist bir yaklaşıma sahip olması lazım.*

A member who comes from the Kurdish political movement pointed out an important topic besides the conflict between Islam and Kemalism. Indeed, besides the conflict of secularism-republicanism, participants also consider the Kurdish issues as one of the serious topics of debates in KADER, as it forms one of the most serious discussion points in current Turkish politics. The interviewee drew my attention to the absence of the KADER's branches in the Eastern part of Turkey.

I am not saying this just to blame Kemalism but the woman's movement that started since the foundation of the Republic has a perception of itself in it, that is together with Atatürk all the revolutions were done for the women. There are those in Turkey who think that women were saved, they put themselves in this category and see themselves as liberated, and they don't see, accept and reject the other differences. A good portion of those who think along these lines are in the political sphere in RPP (CHP). I am not saying that all women inside CHP are like this, of course there are those who can look through more feminist eyes, but such a structure exists and the directors of the branches of KADER are mainly these women, and they are very conceited. For example, for the last couple of years all women's organizations have been trying to come together on March 8, you go an invite them; KADER is one of the groups that gave us the hardest time. They say things like we are only interested in women's participation in politics and we won't participate in other actions, or they behave very coldly when we go and visit them, don't pay visits back. KADER's Central Office is for example a concrete indicator; KADER currently has 14 branches and none in the East. East and the Southeast, that is places where most of the Kurds live and where there is an important woman's movement. Despite all this they could not create a branch there. Because they could not empathize, this is an indicator I think. But I wouldn't like to judge one-sidedly; there were things that happened because of us. We too were a little prejudiced and introverted. The conditions of the country were difficult and we were prejudiced against. We were seen as terrorists. We saw everybody as Kemalist. Our perspective on women opened up a lot. The others also

changed their opinions about us. That is why I believe that the situation will
change.[82]

If we are to generalize, we can claim that the basic debate in KADER is in fact women's perspective on the official ideology.

The biggest clash inside KADER, if we speak generally is between Ataturkist women and the other women, but in fact the others are quite various radical feminists, liberal feminists, etc. but no matter in which branch they are some women, they are like Republican Women's Association. They say things like, some rights were given to us in 1934 by Atatürk and we have to respect them. Or should we sing the National Anthem in a congress. Or they tell us: you are not after the revolutions but you are sitting on them. That is, to be an Atatürkist or not to be is one of the biggest problems of KADER[83].

Apart from these basic conflictual issues, I should also address two more conflictual points one is related to the KADER's first years, and the other is from

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[82] Türkiye'de sadece Kemalizmi suçlamak anlamında demiyorum ama Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan başlayan kadın hareketinin kendi üzerine bir algılaması var yani Atatürk'le birlikte kadınlar için tüm devrimler yapılmıştır. Kadınlar kurtulmuştur diye düşünüp kendilerini bu kategoriye koyan ve kendini kurtulmuş kabul eden, diğer tüm farklılıkları görmeyen, reddeden, tanımayan bir kesim var Türkiye'de. Bu kesimin önemli bir bölümü siyaset alanında CHP'nin içindeler. CHP'nin içindeki tüm kadınlar böyle demiyorum içlerinde elbette çok feminen bakan kadın arkadaşlarımız da var, ama böyle bir yapı var ve KADER'in şube yönetimleri daha çok böyle kadın arkadaşlardan oluşuyor ve çok içe kapanıklar. Mesela son birkaç yıldır 8 Mart'larda tüm kadın kuruluşları bir araya gelmeye çalışıyor gidiyorsunuz davet ediyorsunuz bu gelişlerde bizi en çok zorlayan kesimlerden biriydi KADER. İşte bizim alanımız kadının siyasete girmesi onun dışındaki eylemlere katılmayız gibi yaklaşımlar ya da gittiğiniz zaman çok sıcak olmayan bir karşılama, geriye dönmeyen bir ilişki. KADER'in Genel Merkezi'nde de mesela çok somut bir göstergedir, KADER'in şu anda 14 Şubesi var Doğu'da yok şubesi. Doğu ve Güneydoğu yani Kürtlerin ağırlıkla yaşadığı ve bugün Kürtler içerisinde önemli bir kadın hareketi olan yerler. Buna rağmen orada şubeleşmediler; çünkü öyle bir empati kurulamadı. O bir göstergedir diye düşünüyorum; ama tek taraflı değerlendirmek istemem bizden kaynaklanan şeyler de vardı. Biz de biraz önyargılı ve içe kapanıktık. Ülkenin koşulları ağırdı ve bize karşı da önyargılar vardı. Terörist gözüyle görülüyorduk. Biz de herkesi Kemalist gözüyle görüyorduk. Kadın bakış açımız bizim de çok gelişti. Diğer kesimlerin de bize bakışları değişti. Dolayısıyla ben bu durumun değişeceğine inanıyorum.

[83] *KADER içindeki en büyük çatışma, geneli için söylersek Atatürkçü cumhuriyetçi kadınlarla diğer kadınlar arasında ama aslında diğerleri de çok çeşitli radikal feministler, liberal feministler vs. Ama hangi şubede olursa olsun bazı kadınlar, Cumhuriyetçi Kadınlar Derneği gibi. Bize bazı hakların 1934'te Atatürk tarafından verildiğini onlara saygılı olmamız gerektiğini falan söylüyorlar. İşte bir kongrede İstiklal Marşı'nın okunup okunmaması. İşte "siz devrimlerin peşinde değilsiniz ama biz onların üzerin oturduk" falan. Yani Atatürkçü olmak ya da olmamak KADER'in en büyük sorunlarından biri.*

our times. During the first years of KADER the motivation of the founding members to directly participate in politics were considered suspicious. It is also said that some of the member had to quit KADER because of this reason. On the other hand, in the first years of KADER Ankara Branch, some members said that they had to live through strategic quarrels and fights that were motivated by the organizational and political reasons. However, it is also mentioned that these fights are inhibited in the later course of time. One of the experienced, old members puts it this way:

> *Some women fight their teeth and fingers to continue their membership; because since the first period Byzantine politics were practiced in KADER. During the general meetings to make sure that the people Ankara wants were elected in the executive board a bus of people came from Ankara and fake members were brought in from Istanbul. Or the persons that were not wanted in the Ankara Branch, you write 3 letters to the members, when they do not participate in the meetings you can automatically dismiss them. Just in this manner, 3 letters were sent, or their monthly payments were checked whether they were paid or not, then automatically they dismissed people, just like that. This was what the clash of the first period was like, but during the second period there were no clashes inside KADER Ankara because no proper person, either man or woman, was left.*[84]

One of the topics that are widely discussed within KADER is institutionalization and professionalization. Some of the members are complaining about the small number of participants of KADER activities and the difficulty of finding volunteers to do the tasks and duties. Because of this trouble some of the members proposed that some of the active members of KADER should be paid from the project budgets. However, some members rejected this proposal; while others

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[84] *Bazı kadınlar dişiyle tırnağıyla üyeliklerini devam ettirmeye çalışmıştır; çünkü, ilk dönemde daha Bizans politikaları uygulanmıştır KADER'de. GM'de istenen genel kurulun seçilmesi için Ankara'dan otobüs kaldırılıp İstanbul'dan naylon üyeler getirilip Ankara'nın istediği yönetimin olması sağlanmıştır. Ya da Ankara Şubesi'nde istenmeyen üyeler, işte üyelere 3 tane mektup yazdığınız zaman, toplantılara katılmadığı zaman otomatik olarak atabiliyorsunuz. İşte bu şekilde 3 tane mektup yollanmıştır, ya da aidatlara bakılmıştır ödenmiş mi ödenmemiş mi, otomatik olarak cart cart atılmıştır insanlar. İlk dönem için çatışma noktası böyle bir şey, ama ikinci dönem için zaten ortada çalışan doğru dürüst adam olmadığı, kadın olmadığı için kendi içinde ciddi bir çatışma yaşamadı Ankara KADER.*

sustained that there were personal reasons behind this rejection. Indeed, during my efforts to understand the internal dynamics and the reasons of visible problems, and motivation behind clashes in the political issues like headscarf or the National Anthem, most of the participants in most of the interviews pointed out the personal matters and conflicts as the actual reasons. Therefore, it should be borne in mind that personal matters matter in the organizational conflicts of women organizations, in which KADER is also located. One of the young members says the following with regard to this issue:

> *That is, the biggest problem is that some people don't perform the duties that are their responsibility and instead of saying this clearly and professionally to them, one hears it in the form of complaints behind the backs; hence neither the person learns what she did, nor is the problem solved. Is this because of the thing in women, I don't know, does she think that if she speaks openly she will break the other woman's heart and that is why things are like this, I don't know. Usually there is a lot of backbiting. Sulkiness and vexation happen a lot in women's organizations and it is something that strains me. Do I want to work in a women's organization in the future? Probably not.*[85]

One of the former chairpersons explains the reason by saying that:

> *Women's organizations are very new; we newly started to strive in an organized fashion. We are really newly learning to work together, to work in an organized manner. The rules that existed before us are not applicable to us. When we have to play according those rules, because those rules are not suitable to us we do not play fairly (well). Men somehow do it; they do it without taking it personally. But we can't do it and I think that it this*

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[85] *Yani en büyük sorun bir takım insanların üzerlerine düşen görevleri yapmaması ve bunun profesyonel ve açık bir biçimde dile getirilmesi yerine arkadan konuşmalarla dile getirilmesi böylece ne o insan ne yaptığını öğreniyor ne de sorun çözülüyor. Yani bu kadınların şeyinden mi kaynaklanıyor bilmiyorum bunu söylerse kırılacağını mı düşünüyor acaba bu yüzden mi böyle bir şey var bilmiyorum. Genelde arkadan konuşuluyor. Küskünlük dargınlık sürekli oluyor kadın örgütlerinde beni de çok geren bir şey. İlerde bir kadın örgütünde çalışmak istiyor muyum? Herhalde hayır.*

learning is a process. I think that women should develop their own discussion (debate) ethics.[86]

A woman actively working in another CSO affirms the situation as follows:

- In my opinion, women's greatest handicap is they say that they want to make honest policies, unlike men who become dirty, they also say we are not like that [like men] and they go on to fight the dirtiest of fights. This most probably is a matter of digestion, because the power they have in their hands is still new.

- Can you give me an example of this issue?

- There are lots of examples I can give you, but I don't want to tell.[87]

Among the women organizations the existence of rivalry rather than solidarity and support was frequently reported. Hence, personal conflicts are crucial if we are to make sense of these rivalries, since most of the women organizations can be identified with the names of a few of their key members. This means that a personal conflict can turn into an "inter/intra-institutional" conflict and vice-versa. One of the young members tells the following:

Associations are not institutionalized and have not laid their foundations; hence they are remembered and mentioned through individuals. Like, Ayşe's association, Fatma's foundation. There's a serious competition between CSOs especially among women's organizations. How? The work that you do should be visible; for example you appear in the press, this is important. These women are not women, who want to earn money, but this is question of satisfying your ego, you help other women and also satisfy

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[86] *Kadın örgütleri çok yeni, biz örgütlü bir şekilde mücadele etmeye çok yeni bir zamanda başladık. Gerçekten birlikte çalışmayı örgütlü çalışmayı çok yeni öğreniyoruz. Bizden önce var olan kurallar bize uymuyor. O kurallarla oynamaya kalktığımız zaman da bize uymayan kurallar olduğu için doğru oynayamıyoruz. erkekler bunu bir şekilde yapıyorlar kişiselleştirmeden bir şekilde yapıyorlar. Ama biz daha bunu yapamıyoruz ve bunun gerçekten öğrenilebilecek bir süreç olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kadınların kendilerine ait bir tartışma ahlakının oluşturulması gerektiğini düşünüyorum.*

[87] *-Kadınların bence en büyük handikapı hem erkekler gibi kirlenmeden daha dürüst politika yapalım diyorlar hem de biz hayır öyle değiliz deyip en kirli savaşları kendileri yapıyorlar. Bu da herhalde hazımla ilgili çünkü ellerindeki güç daha çok yeni.*
-Örnekler geliyor mu bu konuyla ilgili?
-Çok geliyor, ama söylemek istemiyorum.

your own ego. Institutions have their own egos; for example there is a serious competition over projects. They want to reach more women through settling more projects. To become more visible and more successful... Women organizations are in the monopoly of a few women, I think new blood is needed and in the middle of such serious fights, I don't know how they are going to manage it.[88]

Another point that often came up with regard to competition is the conflict between the young women and the women who are above middle ages. Especially some of the young women who work voluntarily for KADER complained about the old women, saying that they leave no space for the young because of their constant fight for power. One of the young members said the following:

I think that the strife of women more advanced in age that have been for a longer time in the movement is not different. I felt that I could be one of those women in 20 years time. It sucks you in like a whirlpool. [this is] My incitation you say, but when you say it do you mean the institution or your own ego...(!)[89]

It is important to stress that this is not the case in KADER Ankara Branch.

But when I was working for KADER, they opened the way for me quite a lot, they tried to find me a job. They sent my CV without my knowing. I

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[88] *Dernekler, kurumsallaşamadıkları ve tabanlarını oturtamadıkları için genelde kişilerle anılıyor. İşte Ayşe'nin derneği Fatma'nın vakfı gibi. Bu çok aşılabilmiş değil. Sivil toplum örgütleri özellikle de kadın örgütleri arasında ciddi bir rekabet var. Nasıl? Yaptığınız işin görünür olması, mesela basına çıkıyorsanız bu önemli bir şey. Bu kadınlar bundan para kazanma kaygısı olan kadınlar değil ama burada bir ego tatmini var hem kadınlara yardım ediyorsunuz hem egonuzu tatmin ediyorsunuz. Kurumların da kendi egoları var mesela proje üzerinden ciddi bir rekabet var. Daha fazla projeyle daha fazla kadına ulaşmak istiyor hepsi. Daha fazla görünür ve başarılı olmak. Kadın örgütleri bazı kadınların tekelinde diye düşünüyorum yeni kan gerekiyor ve ortada bu kadar ciddi savaşlar varken bunu nasıl yapacaklar bilmiyorum.*

[89] *Yaşları daha ileri ve uzun yıllardır bu hareketin içinde olan kadınların mücadelesinin de farklı olmadığını düşünüyorum. 20 yıl sonra o kadınlardan biri de olabilirim öyle hissettim. Çok böyle girdap gibi içine sizi alıyor. Benim kurumum diyorsunuz ama bunu derken acaba o kurumdan mı yoksa kendi egonuzdan mı bahsediyorsunuz ...(!)*

received phone calls telling me: come let us meet (in order to discuss the job). The reason I am now working in …is also KADER. [90]

5. 3. MAZLUMDER (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği– Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People) Ankara Branch

5. 3. 1. Foundation, objectives and principles:

The other CSO which will be examined within our investigation is MAZLUMDER. MAZLUMDER, with its 21 branches and 5000 members can be labeled as a medium size CSO.[91] MAZLUMDER as an Islamist oppositional CSO, in its web site defines itself as such:[92]

MAZLUMDER is founded on 28 January 1991 by a group, which was consisted of 54 people (among whom were lawyers, journalists, writers, publishers and businessmen). The central office of the association is in Ankara and the association has 21 branches. MAZLUMDER as an association which is independent from the state, political parties and sects is an enterprise of people who are determined to defend the human rights – without any kind of discrimination and without double standard.

However, when we go beyond this advertorial story of the foundation of the association we come across with an interesting picture, which tells us many things about the resurrection of civil society movement in 1990s of Turkey. Our impressions from the interviews can be gathered under three headlines:

Firstly, the decision of the people (mostly who are influential in bureaucratic circles and social life in general) to deal with the issues of human rights violations

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[90] *Ama ben KADER'de çalışırken hep çok fazla önüm açıldı bana iş bulmaya çalıştılar, Benim CV'mi benim haberim olmadan yolladılar, bana telefonlar geldi: gelin görüşelim diye. Benim şu anda ….'de çalışıyor olmamın nedeni de KADER'dir.*

[91] The number of the branches was 17 by the time of our research.

[92] For further information on principles, organization and activities of MAZLUMDER see Appendix 2.

(the question of *turban* in particular). One of the members described the situation as such:

> *The idea of some former deputies, who are bureaucrats in origin and said that "It does not work like this, let's institutionalize it and form an association!" is an important factor. Take X as an example. After a while someone asks you, "Mr. X, why do you defend these"? It causes problems when you deal with these problems personally. Because these people (whose rights are violated) started to be seen as foes and terrorists by the state.[93]*

Secondly, the exclusionary attitude of the human rights organization of the time (1991), İHD (*İnsan Hakları Derneği*- Human Rights Association) is shown as another factor. İHD of time, according to the interviewees, was only dealing with the human rights problems of leftists and was ignoring other kinds of violations. The Chairperson of MAZLUMDER, noting that his words were not explicitly expressed throughout the history of the association, puts his formulation as such:

> *For example, when the İHD Chairperson kicked out five girls who were expelled from school for wearing headscarves and said that "Are we going to defend our rights? Go and defend them by yourself!" it triggered the events. What happened then? Someone said "It does not work, we should found our own organization". Who said it? A group of Islamist, I think.[94]*

It is argued that the political polarization of Turkey which began in 1960s and reached its peak in 1970s is the third factor played an important role in the formation of MAZLUMDER. It is argued that Islamist political heritage played a distinctive role behind the decision to form an Islamist human rights organization.

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[93] *Geçmişte milletvekili olan bürokrasiden gelen bazı kişilerin; "Bu böyle olmuyor bunu dernekleştirelim kurumlaştıralım düşüncesi önemli bir faktör. Mesela X. Bir süre sonra "X Bey, sen bunları neden savunuyorsun" oluyor. Bu kişisel olarak yapıldığı zaman bir süre sonra sıkıntı vermeye başlıyor. Çünkü bunlar (ihlale uğrayan insanlar) devletin düşman ve terörist görmeye başladığı insanlar.*

[94] *Mesela o zamanki İHD Başkanı'nın başörtülü olduğu için okuldan atılan 5 kızı odasından kovması büyük bir tetikleyici olmuş, ifade aynen şu: "Sizin haklarınızı da mı biz savunacağız gidin kendi haklarınızı kendiniz savunun" deyip kapı dışarı etmiş. O zaman ne olmuş: "Bu böyle olmuyor biz de kendi örgütümüzü kuralım" demiş! Kim? Bir grup İslamcı, diye düşünüyorum.*

In addition to being known as an Islamist human rights organization within the society, MAZLUMDER occupies a respectable place among human rights organizations in Turkey. The interviewees from human rights organizations and from academic circles dealing with human rights issues described MAZLUMDER as "a serious, hardworking organization which is open to cooperation". As one academician says:

> *When we compare the past of MAZLUMDER and its constituents with its/their present line we see a great progress. They are trying to stand close to a universal conception of human rights which is hard to expect from Islamist sectors within Turkey.*[95]

It is also stated that the most basic slogan of MAZLUMDER "*Kim Olursa Olsun Zalime Karşı, Kim Olursa Olsun Mazlumdan Yana*"[96] and overemphasis on this slogan was a reaction against the polarized political conjuncture of 1990s' Turkey; and by the time this had become the main philosophy of the association. It is also argued that this emphasis on a human rights organization excluding the idea of discrimination was an outcome of a critique of exclusionary stance of İHD. As one of the young members of the association states:

> *For example, a striking example for this is the first mass signature campaign of MAZLUMDER: it was about leftists in the prison. After the foundation of the association the government issues a conditional releasement law. But when the conditional pardon excludes the ones who were sentenced due to articles 141 and 142 they say that it is against the principle of equality and start their campaign to create public opinion.*[97]

It is mostly quoted that the founders of MAZLUMDER was all belonged to Muslim circle, which is constituted by religious people who had Islamic sentiments;

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[95] *MAZLUMDER'e ve onu oluşturan kişilerin geçmişine baktığınız zaman ve şimdiki çizgilerine baktığınız zaman geçmişe oranla çok ilerleme kaydettiğini görebilirsiniz. Türkiye'deki İslamcı kesimlerden beklenemeyecek ve evrensel insan hakları kavramına oldukça yakın bir yerde durmaya çalışıyorlar.*
[96] *"Against all of the oppressors; on the side all of the oppressed people".*
[97] *Mesela bunun çarpıcı bir örneği MAZLUMDER'in ilk kitlesel imza kampanyası cezaevindeki solcular içinmiş. Kurulmuşlar, o sırada şartlı tahliye kanunu çıkıyor kanundan sadece sağcılar yararlanıyor 141, 142'den hüküm giyen solcular bundan istisna edilince bu eşitlik ilkesine aykırı deyip kamuoyu oluşturmak için açmışlar.*

it is also stated that among these people some define themselves as Islamist and some not. One person is on the front line during the foundation process. Thus, it can be derived that the founders were mainly close to him. This person narrates the foundation of the association as such:

> *There is a history before the foundation of MAZLUMDER which is about my personality. I became Muslim in 1987 by Allah's permission. Before that period I was a member of a fascistic ideology. I was an ülkücü[98] and founder chairperson of MHP (Nationalist Action Party). At that time Türkeş was in jail; party was firstly formed as MP (Conservative Party), MÇP (Nationalist Working Party) and then I became MHP. I directed myself to the Koran and realized that –although I was a prayer- I was not a real Muslim. I recognized the real Islam and the belief of unity (tevhit). At that period, by the help of being a Muslim I properly perceived the system. I realized how a system of cruelty was established in Turkey. I became able to properly conceptualize the tortures made to the people and human rights violations within the framework of the Koran's understanding of justice. On those days (1987s) the problem of head scarf was at its peak. There were protests holding this issue, people were being seized, arrested and being tortured; meanwhile, the members of DEVSOL[99] were also being tortured. I was, as an individual, were interested in these issues. Within the Koranic point of wave I was both helping the Muslims and the members of DEVSOL without discrimination. Thus, I found myself within the struggle for human rights. Between 1987 and 1990, for three years, I have followed this individual path without making any discrimination. I do also have people around me who were police; due to my ülkücü past. I have been in the state, in the parliament and in the Advisory Council, which wrote down the new constitution. On that period I was an ülkücü, but when I was honored by Islam in 1987 I found myself in human rights movement. I was worn out much in this process. You are striving as an individual, day and night. In*

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[98] The name of the followers of the ultra-nationalist right movement in Turkey
[99] A revolutionary Marxist organization DEV-SOL (Revolutionary-Left)

addition to that the Muslim community is overly unprotected. I am striving as an individual, but as an individual having lots of trouble. And at a point I said that let's institutionalize this, I am here today but not for tomorrow; it should not be limited to an individual effort. The struggle for human rights is the most basic struggle which is proposed by Allah, by religion; it is an inclusionary, embracing case. An idea of human rights based upon the Koran must have been introduced to the public opinion. We have started to strive for all subjects of the god. For this I held meetings, meetings with various Islamist groups, circles, with everyone and with having their approval we have decided to form such an association.[100]

Another founding member of MAZLUMDER tells the foundation story as such:

Until that day we had some individual attempts for defending the rights of our mistreated friends. We were finding the men of the case and telling the situation. We were also recognizing that this kind of an individual interest on the issue had no binding effect and it was really hard to reach outcomes. Thus we asked ourselves: why do not we move our deeds and efforts on a

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[100] *MAZLUMDER'in kuruluş öncesinde benim şahsımla ilgili özgün bir geçmiş var. Ben 1987 yılında Allah nasib etti, Müslüman oldum. Daha önceki dönemi geçmişte faşist bir düşüncenin müntesibi olarak geçirdim. Ülkücüydüm ve MHP'nin kurucu Genel Başkan'ıydım. Türkeş, o zaman hapisteydi ve partiler kurulurken Muhafazakar Parti diye kuruldu sonra MÇP oldu sonra MHP oldu. Sonra ben Kuran'a yöneldim ve Kuran okudum ve ondan önce namaz kılan biri olduğum halde Müslüman olmadığımı anladım. Gerçek Müslümanlığı, tevhit inancını tanıdım. O süreçte de Müslümanlığımla beraber sistemi çok iyi algılamak durumunda oldum. Nasıl bir zulüm sisteminin Türkiye'de oluşturulduğunu fark ettim. İnsanlara yapılan işkenceleri insan hakları ihlallerini Kuran'ın bakışıyla daha yerli yerine adaletle oturtma imkanına kavuştum. O sırada da Türkiye'de başörtüsü yasağı 1987'lerde çok ileri boyutlarda yaşanıyordu. Dolayısıyla başörtüsü eylemleri yaşanıyor sıkıntılar yaşanıyor bir sürü insan tutuklanıyor, göz altına alınıyor işkenceler yapılıyor, DEVSOL o zaman aynı şekilde işkencelere tabi tutuluyor. Bense birey olarak bütün bunlarla ilgileniyorum o zaman. Bunu yeni fark etmiş ve geç kalmış olmanın da heyecanıyla Kuranın bana getirmiş olduğu bakış açısıyla adaletle ayrım yapmadan hem DEVSOL'cuların yanına koşuyorum hem Müslümanların... Bu anlamda bireysel olarak bir insan hakları mücadelesi içinde buldum kendimi. 3 yıl falan sürdü bu ayrım yapmadan bireysel mücadele 87-90. Ben tabii eski ülkücü olmaktan kaynaklanan polis çevrem de var. Devlette parlamentoda bulunmuşum, Danışma Meclisi'nde o yeni anayasanın yapıldığı. O süreçte ben ülkücüydüm sonra 87'den sonra İslam'la şereflenince insan hakları mücadelesi içinde buldum kendimi. Bu süreçte çok yıprandım. Birey olarak koşuyorsunuz gece gündüz koşuyorsunuz. Hele hele Müslüman camia çok daha sahipsiz... birey olarak hepsine koşmaya çalışıyorum ve birey olarak da çok sıkıntı çekiyorum. O zaman şöyle bir şey geldi aklıma bunu kurumsallaştıralım nihayet biz bugün varız yarın yoğuz, kişilere bağlı bir çaba olarak kalmamalı. İnsan hakları mücadelesi, Allah'ın dinin öngördüğü çok temel bir mücadele, kucaklayıcı kuşatıcı bir mücadele. Kurandan kalkarak böyle bir insan hakları mücadelesi gündeme gelmeli Allah'ın bütün kulları için böyle bir çaba içine girdik ve bunun için toplantılar yaptım ve çeşitli İslami gruplarla, çevrelerle, herkesle toplantılar yaptım ve hepsinin onayını alarak böyle bir derneği kurmaya karar verdik.*

legal basis? Also we had a model: İHD. Maybe the foundation of İHD was an outcome of the polarization of those days and as an outcome of its habits this organization was only dealing with a specific social section. As a matter of fact we found our organization to defend another specific social section. But throughout this process both İHD and we have realized that rather than solely defending the case of the ones close to us, it is more appropriate to defend the rights of all people. As a consequence we have begun to come together in various common platforms.[101]

It is also argued that there is also a divide within the Islamic circle on the issue of the formation of MAZLUMDER. The founder chairperson on this issue formulates the problem as such:

The Islamic community experienced a process of transformation in 1980s. This was an awakening, getting rid of rightism and getting closer to the idea of unity. There were many people around me in 1987, the time when I was honored by Islam; but they did nothing by coming together. Thus, MAZLUMDER was founded by these people. For example there are not traditional circles within the formation process. They founded the Association of Fundamental Rights (Temel Haklar Derneği) under the leadership of Recai Kutan. Şevket Kazan, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and so on were all there. I have gone to them and said: "Look! Do not form this association. We are working of foundation of MAZLUMDER. Come, finally this is a common problem, being persecuted, violation of rights, and demand for freedom. Even we must come together with the non-Muslims around this issue. In our opinion you are an Islamic community who has wrong tendencies; there are tendencies blurring your stance, like rightism,

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[101] *O güne kadar bireyler olarak mağdur olana arkadaşlarımızın haklarını savunmak amacıyla girişimlerimiz oluyordu. İşte o işin adamını buluyorduk, tanıdıkları buluyorduk, rica ediyorduk, işte falan kişi kayboldu, falan kişi karakolda. Bu bireysel ilgi ve takibin hiç bir zaman caydırıcı olmadığını ve sonuç alıcı olmadığını da biliyorduk. O zaman dedik bu çalışma ve gayretimizi neden birlikte bir yasal zemine taşımıyoruz? Önümüzde bir örnek de vardı İHD. Belki Türkiye'de o ünlerin öncesinde kamplaşmaların doğurduğu bir sonuçtu İHD'nin kurulması ve sadece belirli bir sosyal kesimle ilgileniyordu alışkanlıkları gereği. Nitekim biz de kuruluşumuzda bir kere onun karşıtı olmak üzere belirli bir kesimin haklarını savunmak üzere kurulmuştuk. Ancak, ikimiz de bu süreçte sadece bize yakın duran insanların haklarını korumak değil, bütün insanların haklarını korumanın daha doğru olduğunu fark ettik ve o zamanda bir çok ortak platformda bir araya gelmeye başladık.*

nationalism. You have some demands for the system. We have differences, but let's act together on this issue. And Recai Kutan answered as such: "We are forming our association. You may merge with us, or you may form your own association!" We did not merge. As Muslims who freely believe in the idea of unity; as Muslims strictly rejecting right wing ideology, double standard and status quo; and as revolutionary Muslims highlighting a real Islamist revolutionism, we have founded our own association.[102]

In addition to that, the chairperson of MAZLUMDER states that the association was not based on a coherent understanding of human rights. In other words the founders were not prepared to serve a well defined understanding of theoretical and practical implications of human rights issues. Although this problem persists among the founders, the organization of the association, by time, obtained these qualities. As the Chairperson of MAZLUMDER states:

It is really hard to say that the founders spent a serious intellectual effort on the qualities of a human rights organization during the foundation process. What is our understanding of human rights? What kind of an understanding we will defend? Do we have any problems with Western conception of human rights? Do we have any reserves? Are we going to defend the main Western texts on human rights? What will be the characters of our practical struggle? What will be our actions? It is really

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[102] *İşte 80'li yıllarda bir dönüşüm yaşadı İslami Camia. Böyle bir uyanış, sağcılıktan kurtuluş, tevhit inancına yaklaşma. 1987'lerde ben İslam'la şereflendiğimde böyle epeyce insan vardı; ama, bir araya gelip bir şey yapmamışlardı. İşte bu çevrelerden insanlarla kuruldu MAZLUMDER. Mesela kuruluşunda geleneksel çevreler yoktur MAZLUMDER'in. Onlar, Recai Kutan'ın öncülüğünde Temel Haklar Derneği'ni kurdular. Şevket Kazan falan vardı, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu falan hepsi oradalardı. O zaman gittim ben dedim: "Bakın kurmayın bu derneği biz de MAZLUMDER'in kuruluş çalışmasını yapıyoruz. Gelin, nihayet bu ortak bir sorundur, zulme uğramak, hak ihlali, özgürlük talebi. Bu ortak meselede biz Müslüman olmayanlarla bile ittifak etmemiz gerekiyorken... Bize göre yanlış yaklaşımları olan bir İslami camiasınız; sağcılık gibi, milliyetçilik gibi ulusçuluk gibi kirlenmeler var, sistem için bir takım taleplerle gündemdesiniz, farklılıklarımız var ama gelin bu ortak sorun için birlikte hareket edelim!" değimde, Recai Kutan'ı yanıtı şu oldu: "Biz derneğimizi kuruyoruz ya gelir bize tabi olursunuz ya da gidin kendi derneğinizi kurun" . Onlara tabi olmadık. Özgür bir şekilde tevhit düşüncesine sahip Müslümanlar olarak sağcılığı, çifte standardı, statükoyu kesinlikle kabul etmeyen, devrimci! gerçek anlamda İslami bir devrimciliği ön plana çıkaran Müslümanlar olarak kendi derneğimizi kurduk.*

hard that these kinds of questions were explored through a serious brainstorming.[103]

Just because of this many of the members of MAZLUMDER state that, albeit of its past of fourteen years, still the organization has many theoretical problems in defining the context of human rights. At this point, there are different attitudes among the members of MAZLUMDER regarding the idea and practice of human rights; and it is stated that these kinds of differences also persist between the central organization of the association and branches. Also it has been stated that the main reason behind this is the peculiarity of human rights violations in Turkey: they argue that mostly the rights, which are counted as first generation human and political rights (nameless murders, village burnings, trials against freedom of speech and freedom of thought, claims of torture, kidnappings, lost people etc.):

> *Nearly all of our energy is spent on those issues. You are dealing with violations whose scope is so wide with limited resources. Still number of nameless murders does not fall below ten or fifteen.*[104]

Consequently, this peculiar character of human rights violations in Turkey leaves no space for debating on the issue for such nearly all sections of society have reached on a consensus on the indispensability of such fundamental rights. But it is also quoted that there are some controversial points both within the organization and among various organizations about the evaluation of second and third generation rights.

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[103] *Kurucuların insan hakları alanında çalışacak bir örgüt kuralım diye oturup ciddi ciddi kafa yorduklarını; biz nasıl bir insan hakları anlayışına sahibiz, nasıl bir insan hakları anlayışını savunacağız; Batılı İnsan Hakları Teorisi ile alıp veremediğimiz, buna koyduğumuz kimi rezervler var mı yok mu; bu belgeleri tamamen savunacak mıyız ya da insan hakları ihlallerine karşı nasıl bir pratik mücadele geliştireceğiz; ne gibi eylemler etkinlikler yapacağız gibi konularda çok ciddi bir beyin fırtınası böyle bir zihin jimnastiği falan yaptıklarını söylemek zor.*

[104] *Enerjinin tamamı oraya gidiyor zaten sınırlı imkanlarla kadrolarla ve çok yoğun ve yaygın bir alanda hala yaşanan ihlallerle uğraşıyorsunuz. Bizim hala aylık raporlarımızda 10'un 15'in altına inmiyor faili meçhul cinayetler.*

5. 3. 2. Organizational Structure and Organizational Life Experience

The chairperson of Ankara branch states that the number of the members of Ankara branch is around 680-700. Among these 10–150 of the members seldom attend to the activities; but in practice, he states that, only 15-20 of the members, like that of KADER, continuously come to the branch and take part in preparation of activities. It has also been stated that the number of female members was close to that of male; but the number of active female members was still so limited. For example, I witnessed that, the number of people who joined to "Meeting on Headscarf" was around 150. The number of people who attended the First Ordinary General Meeting, and which we had a chance to attend for observation, was 45. The election in the General Meeting, like that of KADER, was made with single list. The chairperson of ANKARA branch in his speech in the general meeting expressed his complaints about the hesitation to take responsibility within the organization as such:

> *Even our active members do not put themselves for administrative tasks, they do not take responsibility. Also calling someone into account for something is identified with being rude.*[105]

The association is being administered by a Board of Directors, which is consisted of five people. This board takes the general decisions; but also it has been stated that the meetings of the Board of Directors are held frequently with 10 or more people. In addition to that the decisions are taken by persuasion and reconciliation rather than by majority. The meetings of the board are weekly. It is stated that when there is not an influential leadership within the branch there can be some decisions taken against the will of the chairperson. It is also added that when an agreement cannot be reached on an issue, the issue is mostly being postponed till the day of reconciliation.

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[105] *Fiilen çalışan arkadaşlar bile yönetim görevine, sorumluluğa talip olmuyor, hesap sormayı ise nezaketsizlik addeden bir yaklaşım söz konusu.*

When we look at the mechanisms of leadership, chairpersonship and directorship the principles of persuasion and inculcation is dominant, like that of KADER. To take IMO Ankara Branch as an example, there is an obvious contrast between two organizations. Unlike in IMO, there is a scarcity of demand for occupying administrative tasks; we see that the members are motivated and even pushed by the former directors to hold administrative tasks, rather than competition for these ranks. One of the members of the association, who also works within the organization, describes the situation as such:

> *In my opinion, the structure of our organization is interesting and nice. You do not demand, but someone comes and proposes you. I know it from my husband. I did not really want him to become one of the directors. They have proposed him. I can also become a director, if I have wanted; there is an open door for it. But as you know, people see this as a burden.[106]*

In the General Meeting it has been said that in Ankara branch there is a full time student worker, working for an insignificant amount of money. In the Central Office there is one full-time secretary and a volunteer. Serious economic difficulties and problems about the payment of the dues was another headline of the General Meeting. It has been quoted that the costs of the organization were being compensated by some of the members personally.

The Chairperson of Ankara branch had also expressed that they could not become an institutional address regarding the problems of human rights violations:

> *In preceding two years the number of people years who have applied for human rights violations is not more than the number of fingers of one hand.[107]*

As a general conclusion derived from our observations on the organizational life we can conclude that MAZLUMDER Ankara Branch, like KADER, is a small CSO which is directed and run basically by a few people; also, part-time attendance

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[106] *Burada o şey ilginç, güzel de bir yapı bence. Siz talip olmuyorsunuz, birileri sizi teklif ediyor. Ben eşimden biliyorum, çünkü ben pek istemiyordum. Ona teklif edildi, sen ol denildi... Ben de olmak istesem olabilirim, böyle bir kapı da açık ama insanlar bunu yük olarak gördüğü için.*

[107] *Geçen 2 yılda ihlale uğradım diye Ankara Şubeye başvuranlar 1 elin parmaklarını geçmedi*

of a group of volunteers consisted of 10-15 people should also be noted. In addition to that, because the low levels of attendance, although there are differing views among the members of the branch on some human rights issues, we did not come across intra-organizational opposition. To quote the remarks of one member of the branch:

> *The adversaries within the organization do not claim for holding administrative ranks. In fact, there is not opposition at all; only some differences in views.*[108]

On supervision, it is argued that there were mechanisms for intra-organizational supervision, but supervision *de facto* worked from one General Meeting to the other. Within this context, in addition to the identification of being candidate for administrative tasks with rudeness; it is stated that the members mostly hesitate to criticize their friends working within and for the organization. One of the members of Board of Directors describes the situation as such:

> *Supervision and control in our organization is not closed to anyone; but, people do not do that. They keep their criticisms for themselves; they do not inform the upper ranks. They think as such: "They are working, let's not demoralize them with our criticisms".*[109]

During our observations in the General Meeting of MAZLUMDER Ankara Brach we have seen that, rather than issues like human rights in general and the facilities of the organization the discussions in the meeting was turned around some basic problems of the agenda (like the Palestinian Question and the Iraq War). In this sense the General Meeting was looked like a Sunday meeting. In other words, none of the members raised any criticism towards the association, its projects and facilities. The criticisms were mostly directed towards the government and its policy on the Iraq war.

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[108] *Muhaliflerin yönetimde olma talebi en azından bu yönde bir girişimleri yok esasen öyle ciddi bir muhalefet de yok yani en fazla bazı konularda görüş ayrılıkları diyelim*
[109] *Bizde denetim kapalı değildir; ama, insanlar bunu yapmazlar. İçinde bırakırlar, yukarıya bildirmezler. Çalışıyorlar, moralleri bozulmasın falan diye bakarlar...*

When we look at the organizational structure of MAZLUMDER in general we come across with an interesting transformation towards democratization. As stated, MAZLUMDER has 21 branches for now. The association is being directed by Central Executive Committee which has 11 members. These members are being elected by 24 members of General Executive Committee. These eleven members are consisted of one chairperson, one secretary general, 4 vice-chairperson, and 4 vice-secretary generals. It is quoted that the association is being represented by the chairperson; in addition to this it is also expressed that although there are 4 vice-chairpersons there is no hierarchy of status among them. It is said that 14-15 of 24 people who constitute the General Executive Committee were representatives of the branches and the others were delegates from the Central Office.

But, it has been indicated that the current situation is an outcome of the amendments, which were made in the General Meeting of 2000. It is underlined that before 2000 the founders of the association armed the Central Office with a great authority for grasping the central organization. By 2000, through the amendments within the regulations and by-laws of the association this anti-democratic structure was dissolved. The Chairperson briefly explains the story of this transformation:

> *In fact, raising the number of the members of Board of Directors to 24 is a revolution. In foundation years of MAZLUMDER, Central Office was authorized to register new members and these new members had right to vote in General Meetings. Although the branches had the same authority, but 30 members of any branch could send only one representative, as a delegate, for the General Meeting. But, if the Central Office has 90 members, all of them had right to vote. We have cancelled this application in spite of the opposition from the members of Central Office. Why did not I amend this before 2000? Because, the number of the branches was so limited. There were only 10-15 people coming from the branches; and when you de-memberize the Central Office it was becoming legally impossible to hold a General Meeting. Thus, I did not eliminate the members of Central Office immediately; but as a de facto precaution I stopped registering new members. At that time, if we have wished, we could have easily raised the*

number of members to 500-1000 by forcing our friends. We were also keeping the newcomers; we were saying that wait until the formation of our branch and forcing for it. Ankara Brach could only be established in 2000. But, I did made the amendments in the regulations before the foundation of Ankara Branch.[110]

The Chairperson told us that he persistently worked for these amendments and held several meetings to persuade the members and the heads of the branches. However, he also states that there were some people who were resisting these changes and arguing that the "organization was not ready for such changes":

I have realized that this does not work. I was convinced that a slight coup is needed for changes in the regulations, for democratizing it. Here, in Ankara, I have gathered the members of Ankara Office for ten, fifteen times. I have explained them the situation for several times, in a detailed manner. Once I had an interesting response. We were in a saloon of a foundation; there were 40-50 people; and among them there were the former founders, directors etc. There was Mr. X, a former vice chairperson, and his response was as such: "The regulation you are proposing is the appropriate one; it was written wrong before, it should not have been written as such. At that time we could not recognize it. 3-5 lawyers made it wrong." But, here you can see the underlying motive; the association shall be under their control. And he added: "The thing that you are trying to do is right, but MAZLUMDER is not ready for it." I said, "The TR (Turkish Republic) is saying the same thing for 80 years." They are saying that

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[110] *GYK'nın 24'e çıkarılması bir devrim aslında. MAZLUMDER'in ilk kuruluşunda Genel Merkez üye kaydı yapabiliyordu. Dolayısıyla Genel Merkez'in her üyesi Genel Kurul'da oy kullanıyordu. Şubeler de üye kaydı yapabiliyordu ama orada ise şube başkanları doğal delege onun dışında şubeler 30 kişiye bir delege gönderiyordu. Ama genel merkezde diyelim 90 üye varsa onun 90'ı da o kullanıyor. Bunu eski kuruculardan de eski Genel Merkez üyelerinden de bir sürü muhalefete rağmen 2000'de iptal ettik, kaldırdık. 2000'den önce de niye kaldırmadım ben, çünkü şube sayısı azdı. Şubelerden zaten toplam gelen insan sayısı 10-15'di, Genel Merkezi üyesizleştirirseniz Genel Kurul yapmanız yasal olarak imkansız hale geliyordu. Dolayısıyla GM üyelerinin tez elden iptalinde acele etmedim ama şöyle de facto bir şey geliştirdim. Üye kaydı da yapmadım. O zaman istesek Ankara'da biz kendi eş dost çevremizi bile zorlasak 500-1000 kişiye de çıkarabilirdik üye sayısını. Gelenleri de engelliyorduk erteliyorduk diyorduk "şube kurulsun falan" bir taraftan ben Ankara şubesi kurulsun diye birazcık zorluyor idim. Ankara Şubesi ancak 2002'de kurulabildi. Şimdi Ankara Şubesi olmadığı halde ben bu tüzük değişikliğini yaptım ama.*

"Democracy does not fit to this people; human rights are much for them, they shall distort it, cannot make use of it." I said, "There is no end of such an argument." I added, "If these people cannot come together and rule their own association, let's close down it."[111]

As a consequence the regulation of MAZLUMDER was amended by the obstinate efforts of the chairperson in 2000; and a process of democratic restructuration has begun: the General Board of Directors was enlarged to 24 members; Central Office members' right to vote in general meetings was limited; and the representation of the heads of branches in the General Board of Directors was raised. Many of the members that we have interviewed has stressed that this process of democratization had considerably increased the dynamism of the association. Together with this new process, it is noted that, the General Meetings were also transformed into educational seminars and the main subject matters debated in these meetings were publicized throughout the branches of the association. All of the interviewees underlined that the Chairperson of MAZLUMDER is the main responsible of this transformation.

The Chairperson of MAZLUMDER, who is greatly respected and loved within the association, used his initiative in the name of collective interests for changing the organizational structure and he persuaded the organization. According to the Chairperson this new structure also serves a better ground for organizational education:

I am bringing many issues into the agenda, even the ones which would never been discussed; and I am doing this on purpose. For making our

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[111] *Baktım, yok olmuyor. Artık birazcık da böyle darbeyle bu tüzüğün demokratikleşmesi lazım. Katılımı bir kere adalet ilkesine uygun değil. Burada Ankara'da ben genel merkez üyelerini hemen hemen 10-15 defa topladım. Habire uzun uzun topladım anlattım, topladım anlattım. Bir ara ilginç bir tepki aldım. Bir vakfın salonundayız böyle 40-50 kişi var böyle kelli felli eski kurucular, yöneticiler falan. X bey var ilk genel başkan yardımcılarından, tepkisi şu oldu: "Yav, bu dediğiniz doğru tüzük o zaman hatalı yazılmış, bu böyle olmamalıydı. Biz o zaman bunun farkında bile değildik. İşte 3-5 tane hukukçu şey (yanlış) yapmışlar". Ama, aslında altta yatan faktörü şey edebiliyorsunuz: yani dernek sürekli onların elinde kontrolünde kalacak. Sonra dedi: "Yapmak istediğiniz şey doğru ama bence MAZLUMDER buna hazır değil" dedi. "Bak abi!" dedim "TC'de 80 senedir aynı şeyi söylüyor" dedim. Diyorlar ki "Bu halk demokrasiyi kaldıramaz, insan hakları bunlara fazla gelir, sapıtırlar, kullanamazlar" falan. "Bunun sonu yok" dedim. "Bu insanlar gelip kendi derneklerini yönetemiyorlarsa zaten kapansın gitsin bu dernek!" dedim.*

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friends talk, for making hem say "look, this should be our approach to this problem!" Because the problem of human rights, in Turkish Republic in general and among our base in particular, is a highly cultural issue. Culturally, it is hard to say that the question of human rights is fully understood and appropriated.[112]

Together with these changes, it has been stated that monthly meetings of the General Board of Directors begun to be hold in different branches. The main objective of this was to re-organize the association from below. Also the Chairperson of the association expressed that he forced the activists within the eastern part of Anatolia to form association branches in this region; as opposed to the criticisms raised towards KADER, the main objective of this attempt was to reach a balance between different political and ethnic origins within the General Board of Directors. But at this we must take the attention of the reader to a particular point on the organization of MAZLUMDER. The Chairperson, who said that he was giving importance to the balance between different political and ethnic origins, also added that he suspended the formation of new branches on purpose. For him, many of the applications were not sufficient on the basis of sensitivity towards human rights issues:

Even, most of the people who applied for opening a new branch were my own friends. But I was always hindering them, because there was such a problem. People are working over there; they are gathering around a bookstore or around a local newspaper. When MAZLUMDER founded and if they liked the association they say: "let's found a branch of this organization here; thus we have a legal platform." They consider continuing their activities under MAZLUMDER, or they hold MAZLUMDER something like a charity association. I have concluded that it is better not to organize, if we are going to organize like that. The

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[112] *Hiç tartışılmayacak birçok konuyu bile kasten gündem maddesi haline getiriyorum (Genel Yönetim Kurulları'nda); konuşulsun arkadaşlar da duysunlar"Bak bu soruna da bizim böyle yaklaşmamız lazım" desinler diye. Çünkü insan hakları sorunu Türkiye Cumhuriyet'inde genel olarak, bizim kendi üye tabanımızda da özel olarak hayli bir kültürel sorun. Kültürel olarak da insan hakları çok anlaşılabilmiş ve benimsenmiş değil.*

chairperson of the time left the task of organization to me; but for a long time no new branch was founded.[113]

It is also noted that the choosy attitude of the association still persists and there were many applications were turned down within the last ten years. The criterions that were proposed by the association are as follows:

1. The cadres must defend the case of human rights without any discrimination

2. The founders of the branches should not belong to one political circle, community, group etc. they should come from different sections.

3. At least one or two lawyers should be among the founders

At this point it would be appropriate to write down an interesting anecdote cited by the chairperson, which underlines the cautious and fastidious attitude displayed by him:

> *They called from the city A, for getting the permission to found a brach. I clearly said, "Look, my brother. If you are going to follow an Islamist path, here is not the place for it. Go and find another association." The difference between two methods can be formulated as such: if you are propagandizing freedom of religion you will only stand for it – and this is inescapable for Turkish Islamist movement ; but, if you are a human right organization who does not follow an Islamist path (but religious at the same time); and if you are strictly against discrimination you should hold the problem of closure of Heybeliada Clergy Schools like you hold the problem of headscarf. For example, I did not authorize the branch B; why? When I try to explain this stance to that person, he said: "You did not solve the problems of the Muslims yet, and you are trying to solve the problem of*

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[113] *Hatta şube açmak için başvuranların çoğunluğu benim kendi arkadaş çevremdi. Ama ben hep engelliyordum çünkü şöyle bir problem var idi. İnsanların orada yaptıkları bir çalışma var bu ya bir kitabevi çevresinde oluyor ya yerel bir gazete dergi çevresinde oluyor. MD çıkınca MD'nin kimi yaptıkları da hoşlarına gidiyorsa "yav en iyisi biz bunu burada kuralım bize de hem legal yasal bir platform oluşmuş olur". Kendi çalışmalarını MD çatısı altında sürdürmeyi düşünüyorlar ya da MD diyince daha çok böyle bir insani yardım derneği gibi algılanıyor. Dolayısıyla ben böyle örgütlenmektense hiç örgütlenmemenin daha iyi olacağını düşündüm. ...O dönemki başkan da örgütlenme işini bana bırakmıştı uzunca bir süre şube açılmadı.*

others." Why it is important? For example, we were helping people in South Eastern Anatolia at that time. If you give a responsibility to that man, that man goes and helps to the ones who are prayers. He shouts and screams after the killing of 33 people in Başbağlar Village[114] due to the burning of this village, he over-reacts; he remains silent after the bombing of villages of Ovacık[115].[116]

It has been quoted that some Islamic circles tried to open MAZLUMDER branches for their narrow political interests, rather than human rights concerns. It is argued that when this situation was realized by the association the members of MAZLUMDER tried to stop prevent this tendency. Here we can detect an interesting affinity between leftist and Islamist CSOs: in both cases there are similar attitudes taken towards the CSOs. Seeing the symptoms of a non-civic culture in extremely different political and ideological and political circles is strictly important, for it tells many things about the perception of CSOs in Turkey. The comments of the Chairperson on this issue are really worth of quoting:

We have experienced this before. You go and say to the group A: "Let's take a friend from your circle." That group sends you a consul. The man comes and becomes a member of Board of Directors. But, in fact, he is not a member of Board of Directors. Because he is a consul, he comes, listens and carries the debates within the Board to his own organization. He gives his decisions "from" there. When I have observed this in some occasions I immediately take precautions. I said: "We will absolutely accept no

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[114] A Turkish village
[115] A Kurdish village
[116] *A Şehrinden aramışlardı şube kurmak için. Açıkça dedim: "Bak kardeşim" dedim, "MAZLUMDER'de de siz İslamcılık yapacaksanız burası İslamcılık yapılacak bir dernek değil" dedim "Kendinize başka bir dernek bulun". İki yöntemin farkı şu: birinde siz din özgürlüğü diyorsanız siz oturacaksınız sadece - hele de bu Türkiye'deki İslamcılar açısından kaçınılmaz bir şey- kendinizin özgürlüğünüzü isteyeceksiniz, ama İslamcılık yapmayan ama Müslümanların kurduğu ettiği bir insan hakları örgütüyseniz; çifte standarda ayrımsızlığa özellikle vurgu yapıyorsanız, siz başörtüsü yasağına karşı çıktığınız kadar Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nun kapalı olmasına karşı çıkmayı da becermek zorundasınız. Mesela B Şubesi'ne yetki vermedim. Neden? Ben bunu anlattığım zaman "Yav başkan sen de yav Müslümanların sorunumu çözdün mü ki bir de kalkıyorsun öbürünün" (diyor karşıdaki kişi). Bu neden önemli? O sırada biz Güney Doğu'ya yardım yapıyoruz, o ekip yardımı bile götürüp köyünden kovulmuş göç ettirilmiş insanlar içerisinde sadece namazlı abdestli insanları arar onlara verir. Başbağlar Köyü yakılıp yıkılıp 33 kişi öldürüldüğünde hoplar zıplar, çok tepki gösterir; Ovacık'ın köyleri bombalandığında da gıkı çıkmaz.*

representative from any place. We decided to find people from those groups; for example Mister Ali is a nice person, he has a good knowledge of human rights, also he does not make discrimination; in other words he has the capability of thinking beyond his narrow group interests.[117]

Within our interviews this point was repeatedly underlined by the members of the association. Many of the members argued that MAZLUMDER did not carry the burden of any group, political party, government, community, or any legal political or ideological religious establishment. At least at the discursive level, this point was strictly emphasized by the interviewees. In addition to that, it has also been noted that the association collaborates with various national and international organizations. The collective works and activities are cited in Appendix 2; but we should particularly scrutinize on the activities of MAZLUMDER with leftist organizations like İHD and İHV (İnsan Hakları Vakfı-Human Rights Foundation). To take the activity of "Headscarf Meeting" as an example, which we attended for observation, the chairperson of İHD were also present; and they have expressed their support for freedom for head scarfs on organizational basis. In addition to that the members of MAZLUMDER stated that their association shared many other platforms with leftist human rights organizations and applauded the manner of communication and mutual dialogue between these organizations. It has also been cited that those kinds of rapprochements between these organizations was highly welcomed among the members of MAZLUMDER. One of the members describes the situation as such:

We can form an upper unity, like a structure of federation or confederation, although we do not have such a progress. It should be, in my opinion. Even,

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[117] *Çünkü şunu geçmişte yaşadık. Diyorsunuz ki A grubuna: "Bir arkadaş da sizden alalım" O grup bir konsolos/ elçi gönderiyor. Adam geliyor, YK'ya giriyor ama YK değil adam! Elçi ya! Orada dinliyor, örgütüne, cemaatine tartışmaları götürüyor. Oradan karar alıyor. Ben bunu bir iki yerde gözleyince hemen önlemini aldım. Dedim ki: "Kesinlikle hiç bir yerden temsilci kabulünü yapmayacağız. Biz olabildiğince o gruptan birini bulalım, diyelim Ali Bey iyi, insan hakları konusundaki bilgisi, ayrımsızlığı; yani, kendi grubunun da görüşlerini aşabilecek bir özgür birey.*

this happens in practice. Sometimes we come together and do commission studies. There should be an upper unity, also in an organized sense.[118]

This is really important for the development civil society in general and civil dialogue. But, it should be added that this is an extreme situation and mostly rooted in the universality of first generation human rights.

MAZLUMDER members also noted that they are in contact with the political parties; especially the ones outside the parliament. Among the parties within the parliament, they stress that they are closer to the ones in opposition. They also add that, as a rule, the parties while in opposition have good relations with the opposition but when the same party becomes the government, the relations become tense. One of the members of the Board of Directors underlines this point as such:

Personally, I was so hopeful about entrance of CHP (Republican People Party) into the parliament, rather than DSP (Democratic Left Party). I thought that there were more appropriate people in CHP. But now, unfortunately, when we want to raise an opposing voice about the actions of the governments, we and İHD and İHV found ourselves in a position to find the deputies of AKP. In this sense, you can not have much support from CHP.[119]

Unlike the picture we saw in KADER, apart from the organizational links with the political parties, MAZLUMDER has a clear stand with regard to the problem of individual engagements with parties. As the Chairperson states:

For example, some of or friends thought, before the previous elections, to become candidates for nomination. We said "it is possible, it is your right;

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[118] *Henüz o kadar ilerlemedik ama bir konfederasyon sistemi federasyon sistemi bir üst birlik gibi bir şey olabilir. Olmalıdır da bana göre. Hatta bu pratikte oluyor da. Zaman zaman bir araya gelip ortak komisyon çalışmaları,oluyor. Organik anlamda da bir üst birlik olmalı mutlaka.*

[119] *Ben DSP'ye nazaran CHP'nin parlamentoya girmesinden umutluydum biraz daha adam çıkar DSP'ye nazaran diye zannediyordum. Ama şu anda ne yazık ki hükümetin yapıp ettiklerine muhalif bir sesin gelişmesini istiyor isek doğrusu biz de İHD de İHV de AK partili bazı milletvekillerini bulmaya çalışıyoruz. CHP'den o anlamda çok destek alamıyorsunuz.*

but if you are going to be transferred to the political society you will end cut your ties with here."[120]

We think that one particular event is highly illuminating for grasping MAZLUMDER's perception of the difference between civil and political societies. As it has been narrated, one of the founding members of the association, who also served for the association for years, becomes the deputy of political party in power. He votes for the memorandum on Iraq war. Another charter member comments:

The point which AKP deputy has come really hurts me. He even gave up the idea of human rights. He became famous by his speeches in television which supports Iraq war.[121]

Both in our interviews and in General Meeting of Ankara Branch this point is hold as an example to the fact that politics and holding political power is harmful for the case of human rights and is against the civil society spirit. However the AKP (Justice and Development Party) deputy replies the accusations as such:

When you come to power, you can not only be the one who is protesting, neither can you be the one wishes. At that moment you have to decide and implement your decisions; this decision will affect your life and the life of others, in a positive or negative manner. At that point it is not possible for you to the right thing all the time. For, in some cases, it becomes impossible for you to do the right thing. Sometimes you find yourself in choosing one among two wrong decisions. If you are in a position to select either right, or wrong behavior; you eliminate the wrong one and do the right thing. But, on the contrary, if you are two choose one decision among two wrong options; you try to choose the one which is less wrong, you choose the least wrong option. While you are doing this in power, the civil society talks about the wrongness of your decision. They do not consider that you had to choose one among two wrong options. They are right; you

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[120] *Mesela bu son seçimlerde bazı arkadaşlar aday adaylığı falan düşündüler, olabilir hakkınızdır falan; ama, "siyasi topluma transfer olacaksanız burayla ilişkinizi keseceksiniz" dedik.*
[121] *Şu anda AK Parti milletvekili, geldiği nokta da içler acısı. İnsan haklarından bile rücu etti yani. Irak'a Amerikan saldırısını destekleyen konuşmalarıyla televizyonlarda tanındı.*

have done the wrong thing. But, you have avoided from doing something more wrong. For example, your wrong decision would bring the death of 5 people as a conclusion, and your more wrong decision would bring 1000. You have chosen the wrong one, rather than the one which was more wrong, and 5 people died. Of course this was a wrong decision. When you look from this angle you become a murderer. Anyone may call you a murderer; but when you look from another perspective, by giving that decision you have prevented 1000 people from dying. Thus, it depends from where you look. This is about being in power; you sometimes do the wrong thing.[122]

5.3.3. The Problem of Participation

The complaint about the low level of participation is one of the most important problems for MAZLUMDER, like that of KADER and IMO. However, the reasons behind the low level of participation are different for these three organizations. For example, in KADER, the main problems are the weakness of women's movement and the perception that the political life is beyond the reach of the women. On the other hand, IMO Ankara branch detects the post-12 September de-politicization process as the main dynamic. MAZLUMDER related this problem with the habits of its base.

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[122] *Siz iktidarda olduğunuz zaman sadece protesto eden olamazsınız. Temenni eden de olamazsınız. Orada karar verip uygulamak zorundasınız ve bu karar hem sizin hem de ilgili tüm insanların yaşantısını etkileyecektir, leyhte veya aleyhte. O noktada her zaman en doğruyu yapamayabiliyorsunuz. Çünkü en doğruyu yapma imkanınız olmayabiliyor. Bazen siz yanlışlardan birini tercih etmek durumunda da kalabiliyorsunuz. Sizin yapabileceğiniz bir doğru ve bir yanlış varsa yanlışı çizersiniz ve doğruyu yaparsınız. Ama eğer sizin karşınızda yapabileceğiniz iki yanlış varsa, siz o zaman bu iki yanlış arasından tercih yapmak durumundasınız ve en az yanlışı, en küçük yanlışı tercih edersiniz. İktidarda siz bunu yaparken muhalefette sivil toplumda sizin yanlış yaptığınız konuşulur. Yani iki yanlıştan birini yapmak zorunda olduğunuz pek düşünülmez. Tabi doğru söylüyorlar sizi yanlış yaptınız; ama, siz çok daha büyük yanlıştan kaçındınız. Diyelim yanlışı birinde 1000 kişinin ölmesiyle sonuçlanabilirdi birinde 5 kişinin. Sizin ürettiğiniz karar diyelim 1000 kişinin değil 5 kişinin ölümüyle sonuçlanan bir karar verdiniz. Bu da yanlış bir karar. Siz oradan baktığınız zaman katil sayılıyorsunuz. İsteyen size katil diyebilir; ama baktığınız zaman siz bu kararı vermekle 1000 kişinin ölmemesine sebep oldunuz. Yani nereden baktığınıza bağlı bu. İktidarda işte bu var, bazen yanlış yapabilirsiniz.*

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It has been quoted that the ones who participate to the activities of the association are mostly young people, students and volunteers. The member profile is described as free entrepreneurs, tradesmen and retired people who have high religious sentiments. It is also said that, although the number of woman members is close to that of man; the effectiveness of the women within the organization is still limited.

Three kinds of motivations were mentioned during the interviews about participation to the association's activities: the personal experience of human rights violations; feeling of responsibility about human rights issues; and thirdly, the need for belonging to a place for identification. Because direct contact with these kinds of organizations is not a common practice among Turkish people, the newcomers mostly relate with someone within the association. One of the members of Executive Board underlines how personal and conjectural can applications for membership may be:

> *Personal experience of human rights violation is one of the motivations, it could have happened to him/her or someone close to him/her. But one or two friends came just after old Abdülmelik Fırat was handcuffed and imprisoned. The people come when they suffer and leave when their problems are solved; this is the general traffic.[123]*

Most of the members we have interviewed are the former members of various organizations (form associations to foundations, from newspaper and journal circles to local radios) which we may call Islamic civil society. When we look at the factors that motivated these people we may argue that their sensitivity about social problems, especially human rights problems, is more determining than ideological causes. Most of the interviewees stressed that MAZLUMDER's neutral Islamist attitude based on the principle of anti-discrimination was the main reason behind their decision to join the association. It must be noted that these people are mostly

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[123] *İnsanların katılımda kendilerinin ya da yakınlarının ciddi haksızlıklara uğraması var, ama bir iki arkadaş Abdülmelik Fırat'ın o yaşlı haliyle ellerinin kelepçelenip cezaevine konması üzerine geldi . . . Kendi acıları varken gelen insanlar, acıları dindiğinde de bir daha gelmiyorlar yani genel trafik bu.*

equipped with a high level intellectual capital and mostly they are university graduates. In addition to this, it is noted that there are some people in the association coming from various legal and illegal Islamist establishments; these people are told to have experienced a transformation when they met with MAZLUMDER and became sound human rights activists.

One peculiar (peculiar to human rights organizations) handicap is noted during the interviews while we were discussing the problem of participation: this is the state's perception of people with deal with human rights issues as "traitors and terrorists". For the members this perception frightens the people. We have realized an agreement among the members of MAZLUMDER on the difficulties of dealing with human rights issues. Nearly all of the interviewees stated that both the members of MAZLUMDER and İHD experiencing really hard times while they are trying to defend human rights in Turkey. The interviewees also stated that they (and the members of İHD) have no interest in dealing with these issues; although being a member of such associations can be considered as holding a position, a rank within the society, the disadvantages of being a human rights activist are far more than this. One of the members expresses his feelings as such:

> *Both in İHD and here, this is a hard task; this is something you do with your heart. It is not something like holding a position, holding higher ranks and so on. All these people are the products of sufferings; they have suffered and became mature enough.[124]*

Another member says:

> *If you have some certain principles and certain moral considerations, if you have conscious, it is really a honorable job to struggle against oppression and for human rights; not only for here, this is also true for İHD and İHV.*

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[124] *İHD' de de burada da bu iş meşakkatli bir iş, gönül işi. Öyle herkes aman aman içinde yer alayım da bir yerlere geleyim yukarı tırmanayım gibi bir şey değil. Hep bir çilenin ürünü insanlar, bir çileyi çekmişler belli bir olgunluğa erişmişler.*

This is a moral prestige. Thus, even if I leave here, I can say that I struggled for human rights for some time.[125]

Again on participation, another important point is about the loosening of participation after the AKP came into power. As it is expressed by the Chairperson:

Of course there is a loosening. For example, sometimes people say, in a joking manner, "Are you still continuing? Haven't you closed yet?" Especially the ones who are inclined to AKP make such jokes.[126]

5. 3. 4 Basic Conflicts and Points of Divergence

As a general evaluation of our interviews, it can be said that there is not a considerable divergence of opinion among the members of MAZLUMDER on main policies of the association. But, we have found that the main conflict within the organization is the tension between the Islamist interpretation of human rights which is represented by the founders of the association and universalistic perception of human rights which is represented by the current administration. The former reads the questions of human rights "through" Islam, whereas the contemporary current highly stresses the importance of common points among various approaches to human rights questions. Many of the members state that one cannot detect a rupture within the history of MAZLUMDER. Rather, the difference between "old" and "new" discourses should be considered as an outcome of specialization within the field; a process of evolution towards maturation. The words of Chairman of Ankara Branch are worth of quoting here:

On that issue, it is really hard to talk of a rupture... Rather, if you are not aware of the terminology on the human rights you have to speak within your cultural framework, with your accent. But, after a while, when people working on human rights raised became more familiar of the literature on

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[125] *Belli ilkeleriniz varsa belli bir ahlaka sahipseniz, bir vicdanınız varsa sadece burada da değil İHD'de de Vakıf'ta (İHV) da yani insan hakları alanında çalışmak haksızlığa zulme karşı mücadele vermek son derece onurlu bir iş. Bunun deyim yerindeyse bir manevi itibarı var. Onun için ben buradan ayrılsam da işte ben şu kadar insan hakları mücadelesi, verdim diyebilirim.*

[126] *Gevşeme oldu tabii, şakayla karışık şey diyenler var mesela "ya hala devam ediyor musunuz daha kapatmadınız mı?" Özellikle AK Parti'ye meyyal olanların bu tür şakaları olabiliyor.*

human rights, they have started to talk within the field by using the terminology of the field. This disturbed some of the people. "Look, it is hard to understand whether they are Muslim, rightist or leftist!" But this argument was not welcomed within MAZLUMDER. Yes, we can be Muslims, we can all be Islamists; but we have founded this organization to work on the field of human rights. Thus, a leftist, or a non-Muslim should easily become a member of this association. This perception was also welcomed by the founders.[127]

But, when one looks at the organization from outside, it is possible to detect a serious transformation and a group resisting this transformation[128] within the history of MAZLUMDER. One of the charter members remarks on this issue as such:

A group of our friends argued that we did not have to hug all humanity; this was not true. According to them we should have protected the rights of people who were like us. This point was repeatedly debated in our meetings. For example; in one of the meetings they were saying these: "Okay, we understood; we will stand against a leftist who mistreats; but, what if one of our Muslim brothers mistreats? How will we stand against that Muslim? This paradox disturbed us from time to time; and some of our friends could not handle the problem. We had difficulties in finding the right. But, of course, by doing wrongs you come, you are getting closer to the right; we have experienced this process. [129]

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[127] *O konuda aslında bir kopuştan bahsetmek zor.... Ama siz insan hakları ile ilgili terminolojiye vakıf değilseniz bu tür amacınızı kendi kültürünüzle o tür bir üslupla anlatırsınız. Ancak bir süre sonra insan haklarının içinde çalışanlar, okuma yazmaya donanımlarını geliştirmeye başlayınca, alanın terimleriyle konuşmaya yazıp çizmeye başladılar. Bu bazılarında kimi rahatsızlıklara yol açtı. "Ya şuraya bak bu ifadede bunlar sağcı mı solcu mu Müslüman mı belli değil.!" Ama MAZLUMDER'de bu rağbet görmedi hiç. Tamam, biz Müslüman olabiliriz hepimiz İslamcı da olabiliriz ama biz bu derneği insan hakları alanında çalışsın diye kurduk. Dolayısıyla bu derneğe bir solcu da bir gayri Müslim de çok rahat bir şekilde üye olabilmeli. Bu anlayış kurucuların da itiraz etmediği bir anlayıştır.*

[128] The points of divergence can be listed under three headlines: *i.* perceprion of human rights, ii. organizational relations, iii. external relations (e.g. the relations with İHD or İHV).

[129] *Bir kesim arkadaşımız tüm insanlığı kucaklamanın gerekmediğini, doğru olmadığını bize düşenin sadece bizim gibi insanların haklarını korumak olduğunu ifade ettiler. Aramızda bu sohbetler çok oldu. Yönetim kurullarımızda bu çok tartışıldı... Yönetim kurulu toplantılarımızın birinde mesela*

Within MAZLUMDER, the founder chairman who is not on the board of the association and even not in the association, but who found the association and designated the basic principles of the association which are still valid today represents the circle which claims that Islamic sensitivities should be given priority to. It has been said that there was a serious dispute about this issue, and even because of that the person in question split up from MAZLUMDER and accused the association on several issues. The comments of the chairman about this issue are worth of considering:

> However, for example, I heard that the former chairman made such accusations: "Finally they left the association with no identity", "They turned the association into the Association of Human Rights", and he even said that "They deal with violations which Leftists and Liberals suffered from more than the Muslims". Yet, just look at what he did, he even gone further than us. Firstly he visited İHD, and done very well. For example, he said that "We are not rivals of these associations, we hail their struggle. We will work for strengthening their struggle." I think the reason is that you can see the whole picture from here. However, when you limit yourself with your own ideological circle and your own ghetto, you mostly deal with violations your neighborhood experienced. You don't even see the others, because you probably read Vakit or Yeni Şafak. However when he was in MAZLUMDER, Yeni Şafak did not exist and he gave his speeches to Yeni Ülke, Emek, etc. more than Milli Gazete. For, that is the natural order of the things...[130]

diyorlardı ki: "Tamam anladık, solcu olan biri yanlış yaparsa karşı koruz; ama, ya müslüman bir kardeşimiz haksızlık ederse? Nasıl biz o müslümana karşı olacağız?". Buradaki ikilem zaman zaman rahatsız etti ve bazı arkadaşlarımız bu şeyden rahat imtihan veremediler. Doğruyu bulmada zorlandığımız oldu. Duygularımız buna maniydi. Ama tabi yanlış yapa yapa gelişme denen şey oluyor, biz o süreci yaşadık.

[130] Ama Mesela önceki başkanın şu tür suçlamalarda bulunduğunu duydum "İşte kimliksizleştirdiler bu derneği", "Derneği İnsan Hakları Derneği'ne çevirdiler" hatta, daha ileri giderek"Müslümanlardan daha çok solcuların liberallerin uğradıkları ihlallerle ilgileniyorlar". Halbuki, onun yaptıklarına bakın, bizden daha ileri gitmiş. İHD'yi ilk o ziyaret etmiş, doğru da yapmış. "Biz bu derneklere rakip değiliz, bunların verdikleri mücadeleyi selamlıyoruz. Onların

On the other hand, the chairman of MAZLUMDER gives a different picture of the situation in a rather interesting way:

I decide to leave and we found a fellow suitable for the job. We agreed with him then. We persuaded and requested him, and transferred the chairmanship...then we saw that this fellow met with Ömer Çelik[131] who is one of the leading figures of AKP now. Let us say "not met", because Ömer Çelik experienced a transformation in that process. Ömer Çelik was a de facto member of our Board of Directors, he participated as a counselor. Then, he went to Istanbul and experienced a cultural transformation.

- What kind of a transformation?

-I mean he adopted a more liberal understanding than an Islamic one. Ali Bulaç[132] He was not one of the founders of MAZLUMDER, but helped us in terms of consultation and Mehmet Metiner[133] were also having the same experience. Then Mehmet Metiner changed a lot that he hardly had any connection with Islam. He became one of the founders and vise-chairman of HADEP. That circle started to transform him...

For instance, Helsinki Citizens Assembly prepared a declaration in my time. It was about the Kurdish Question. They suggested secularism, democracy and rationalism as a solution there. They wanted us to sign a project depending on these and a declaration signed by many people. Then I wrote "in your declaration you proposed secularism and rationalism as solution to us. However, we

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verdiği mücadeleyi daha da perçinleyecek güçlendirecek bir çalışma içerisinde olacağız" diyen o mesela. Ben bunu şuna bağlıyorum buradayken olayın haritanın tamamını görüyorsunuz. Kendi dar ideolojik çevrenizle baş başa kaldığınız zaman kendi gettonuza çekilince sadece sizin mahallenin uğradığı ihlallerle daha çok haşır neşir oluyorsunuz. Diğerlerini görmüyorsunuz bile. Neden görmüyorsunuz; çünkü, muhtemelen Vakit ya da Yeni şafak okuyorsunuz. Ama MD'deyken Yeni Şafak o zaman yoktu ama Milli Gazete'den daha çok Yeni Ülke'ye Emek'e falan demeç veriyordu. İşin tabiatı da biraz onu gerektiriyor.

[131] He is the advisor of the Turkish Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan.
[132] He is a famous Islamist writer.
[133] He is a famous Islamist journalist and politician

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cannot accept rationalism as a solution. Reasoning is very important but rationalism, which means to make reason the final cause, is unacceptable for us, because we accept revelation...This means, it is impossible for us to sign under a solution project produced with Western concepts. From now on let us know when there is a common declaration so we can cooperate. Something as short as possible and something we agreed upon. That means we wouldn't emphasize our Islamism and propose a solution, which gives priority to our Islamic values. What else we can do? Determining, identifying and cursing oppression should not be the only ways to solution." Tanıl Bora[134] phoned us and said that "We received your fax, we really respect you -in this sense I appreciate Tanıl Bora very much, he is a respected person- He said that they respect us, that was the way it had to be. He added that if we propose an Islamic solution to the Kurdish Question they would have said the same thing. He also said that we were very right and they respect us much more. But this declaration has to be published as soon as possible. Let us publish this without your signature. We would unite in other subjects." Just have a look at the signatures under that declaration when it was published. Mehmet Metiner, Ali Bulaç, Hüseyin Hatemi[135] and Abdurrahman Dilipak[136] signed it. Now just think, what did the ones who respect us think about them? They are either pragmatic or without virtue. As if they would sign under any type of declaration...Now just look at the declaration MAZLUMDER (signed when he was the chairman). Helsinki Citizens Assembly again. After 1993, the Sivas Events, declaration says, "We do not accept any authority other than reason to find the truth". We would sign many other things about Sivas, but look, this invalidates our principles. I mean it destroys the revelation. A Muslim cannot accept this. He cheats there. Man, you cannot sign

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[134] He is a famous leftist journalist and writer
[135] He is a famous Islamist thinker and lawyer
[136] He is a famous Islamist journalist

this, because normally you are Muslim! But it is right for those men,

they are rationalist!

From that time on MAZLUMDER experienced a transformation.

MAZLUMDER tended to decrease Islam to a secondary level.[137]

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[137] *Ben çekilme kararı aldım, bir arkadaşı uygun bulduk o zaman bizimle mutabıktı, kendisini ikna ederek lütfen gel diyerek başkanlığı devrettik.... Sonra baktık (bu arkadaş) yavaş yavaş Ömer Çelik'le şimdi AKP'nin ileri gelenlerinden onunla tanıştı. Tanıştı demeyelim Ömer Çelik bir değişim geçirdi o süreçte. Ömer Çelik bizim ilk yönetim Kurulu'nda fiilen vardı, danışman gibi katılıyordu. Bu arada Ömer Çelik İstanbul'a gitti ve bir kültürel değişim geçirmeye başladı*
-Nasıl bir değişim
-Yani İslami ölçülerin belirleyiciliğinden daha böyle liberal bir anlayışa geçti. Ali Bulaç da (o MAZLUMDER in kurucularından olmadı ama istişari noktada yardımlaştığımız bir arkadaşımızdı) aynı değişim o süreçte yaşanıyordu, Mehmet Metiner' de yaşanıyordu. Sonra bu arkadaş da İstanbul'a gitti, gider gitmez de bu Metiner'lerin çevresine düştü. Mehmet Metiner o kadar değişti ki neredeyse İslamla hiçbir alakası kalmadı, HADEP'in kurucusu oldu Genel Başkan Yardımcısı oldu falan, o (arkadaş) o çevre içinde etkilenmeye başladı...
Mesela Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği benim zamanımda bir bildiri hazırlamışlardı Kürt Sorunu ile ilgili. Orada laikliği, demokrasiyi ve rasyonalizmi çözüm olarak öneriyorlardı bunlara dayalı bir projeyi ve bir çok kişinin imzaladığı bir bildiriyi bizim de imzalamamızı istediler. Ben oturdum. Bir yazı yazdım dedim ki "Siz bize gönderdiğiniz bildiride laikliği, rasyonalizmi çözüm olarak sunuyorsunuz biz ise rasyonalizmi çözüm olarak kabul edemeyiz. Biz akletmeyi aklı çok önemseriz. Ama aklıcılık yani aklı nihai belirleyici yapmak anlamında kabul edemeyiz çünkü biz vahyi kabul ediyoruz.... Yani laikliği rasyonalizmi yani Batılı kavramlarla üretilmiş bir çözüm projesinin altına bizim imza atmamız mümkün değil. Bundan sonra ortak bildiri olacağı zaman bize de haber verin oturalım birlikte hazırlayalım. Mümkün olduğunca satır sayısı az olan ama mutlaka mutabık olduğumuz bir şey size de aykırı düşmeyecek yani biz de orda İslamiliğimizi vurgulamayalım İslami değerlerimizi ön plana çıkaran bir çözüm önermeyelim. Ne yapalım zulmü tespit, teşhis ve telin ile sınırlı kalmalı çözüm önerileri olmamalı". Tanıl Bora telefon açtı, dedi ki "biz faksınızı aldık, gerçekten size saygı duyuyoruz –ben Tanıl Bora'yı o yönden çok takdir ederim. Çok saygın bir kişiliktir erdemli bir insandır yani- Size saygı duyduk dedi gerçekten olması gereken buydu haklısınız" dedi. "Siz de Kürt Sorunu ile ilgili İslami bir çözüm önerisi ile gelseniz biz de aynı şeyi söyleriz" dedi. "Ne kadar haklısınız saygımız daha arttı" dedi. "Ama bu bildiri hemen yayınlanması gerekiyor. Müsade ederseniz biz sizin imzanız olmadan bunu yayınlayalım. Başka şeylerde ittihad ederiz, öyle yaparız". Şimdi o bildiri çıktığında bakın kimlerin imzaları vardı. Mehmet Metiner'in, Ali Bulaç'ın, Hüseyin Hatemi'nin, Abdurrahman Dilipak'ın da imzaları vardı. Şimdi düşünün bize saygı duyanlar onlara ne duymuştur. Ya bunlar pragmatiktir ya bunlar ilkesiz adamlardır. İstediğimiz her bildirinin altına imza atarlar gibi..... Şimdi biz böyleyken o savrulma sürecinden sonra o arkadaşın (başında olduğu) MAZLUMDER'in imza attığı bildiriye bak. Gene Helsinki Yurtaşşlar Derneği. Sivas Olayları sonrası 1993'ten sonra. Diyor ki bildiri: "Doğruyu bulmak için aklın üzerinde hiçbir otorite tanımıyoruz". Sivas olaylarında diğer bir çok şeye aynı şekilde imza atarız ama bakın bu bizim ilkelerimizi ortadan kaldırıyor. Vahyi yok ediyor yani. Şimdi bir müslümanın bunu kabul etmesi mümkün değil orada ikiyüzlülük yapıyor. Ya kardeşim sen buna imza atamazsın normalde müslümansın çünkü! Ama o arkadaşlar için doğru, rasyonalist onlar!.
İşte ondan sonra MAZLUMDER bir değişim yaşadı. MAZLUMDER islami kimliği ikinci plana atan bir eğilme girdi.

It is observed that this transformation process resulted in a serious organizational struggle within MAZLUMDER and the section which did not want the Islamic identity to be given priority to won this struggle.

> -Well then, couldn't you impede this process (asked to the founder chairman)?

> -We tried to fix it in the general meetings. It turned out to be no different than İHD. I tried so hard, but they excluded me and they even did not allow the ones like me to enter the meetings. They also accepted the workers of his factory but they did not accept the ones thinking like me as members. They involved in association work. They turned this place which was established by faith into an ordinary association...They captured that place by vulgar association work. In addition, after the 28 February period the pressure increased and it became widespread to fear from Islamic identity. These may also be affective in that period. I believe that a more mundane approach brought them to this point. People thinking like us became more and more distant and they split. Consequently, I think that the reason of MAZLUMDER's today's despicableness resulted from such an departure from Islamic principles. I also believe that it must get rid of this situation and I would give any kind of support unless it gets rid of that. At the moment I totally excluded them and they also excluded me. But I evaluate ÖZGÜRDER[138] in the criteria I mentioned before. They represent a totally original and libertarian approach. They continue a libertarian approach by both remaining as themselves and having an Islamic identity and I support them.[139]

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[138] It is *a human rights organization specifically dealing with headscarf problem (Association for the Free Thought and Rights of Education)*

[139] *- peki siz bu duruma engel olamadınız mı (kurucu Genel Başkan'a soruluyor)?*
- Genel kurullarda çok düzeltmeye çalıştık. İHD'den farksız hale dönüştü. Ben, çok çırpındım, beni dışladılar ve beni gibi düşünenleri toplantılara bile sokmaz oldular, üye kaydolmak istediler bizim gibi düşünenleri, onları kaydetmediler, o arkadaşın fabrikalarında çalışan işçileri bile kaydedip ele geçirdiler. Dernekçilik yaptılar ibadet bilinciyle kurulmuş bir yeri dernekçilik oyunlarına çevirdiler...

However, what chairman told about this process of splitting up and the "associative games" is contradictory with above mentioned explanation. Chairman, who especially rejects the idea that they have captured the Association by registering members to the Central Office, on the contrary claims that they did not do such a thing even if they had the right to do and even they *de facto* impeded it. He also argues that they released the association from a centralist manner and made it more democratic by realizing the change in the regulations, which annuls the Central Office's right to register members and Central Office members' right to vote in the general meeting. The following words of the Chairman about the split show that associative games exceeded organizational limits and permeated into the field of Islamic community.

> *I forgot to say something about the trickeries. After my first term of chairmanship and the day before the congress, a delegation composed of 4 or 5 people came who were the leading figures of the Islamists. They wanted to talk to me privately but I didn't do it. I said that I wanted some other friends to join because I did not want to see them privately. And they replied that "We are grateful to you since you conducted difficult work until today. Oppression on Muslims increases day by day. In this period, we want a more powerful administration –it was about one year later 28 February, about 1998-. Therefore, we want a board of administration headed by X (founder chairman)". Then I said "It's okay for me. Here is not my own place but this is not the correct time for such a talk. It has left about 13 or 15 hours. If you had said this to me 3 or 4 months ago, I would have suggested other names, too. The Association*

Dernekçilikle, üye kaydederek orayı ele geçirdiler. Onlarla beraber şey, 28 Şubat Dönemi'ne de denk geldi, baskıların da çok ön plana çıktığı dönemde İslami kimlikten ürkmek de biraz daha yaygınlaşmış hale geldi, bekli biraz da bunların da tesiri olmuş olabilir. Biraz daha dünyevileşen bir çizgi noktasında etkilenmelerle bu noktaya geldiklerine inanıyorum. Bizim gibi düşünenler uzaklaştı koptu. Netice itibariyle ben MAZLUMDER'in İslami ölçülerden ayrılarak bugünkü zillete sürüklendiğini görüyorum,bundan kurtulması gerektiğine inanıyorum, kurulmadığı takdirde de oraya hiçbir destek vermiyorum. Şu anda tamamen dışladım, onlar da beni dışlamış durumdalar zaten, ama ben şu anda ÖZGÜRDER'i bu noktada gerçekten şu bahsettiğim ölçüler içinde değerlendiriyorum. Son derece özgün, özgürlükçü bir çizgiyi temsil ediyorlar. Bu noktada hem islami kimlikli hem de kendileri kalarak çok özgürlükçü bir çizgiyi sürdürüyorlar ben de onları destekliyorum.

has 13 or 14 branches and 120 de facto administrators. This subject must be discussed among this people. If they have agreed to do so, then there is no problem. Hence if they agree on such an administration and a leader, I wouldn't have anything to say. Here is not my own property. I did not establish here. They weren't able to execute here, so it fell upon our shoulders. Consequently, I didn't occupy any place. But it is not possible to talk about this issue at the moment." Then they said, "You never consult us. While we constituted the administration, we were told that you were going to come. So we waited for you." I answered them, "I came to İstanbul and we made consultation." They said to me that no one has met with them. I said them, "You are not the only one in İstanbul. Besides why would I see you when I came to Istanbul? Have you ever come to MAZLUMDER until now? No, you are coming for the first time. Have we ever met before? No."

- Did they become the members of MAZLUMDER?

> *- No. An Islamist fellow, the leader of a circle. But he is mostly interested in our İstanbul branch. They wanted to send one of their men to the administration. But the chairman's response was negative and he said that "Only we can chose the man to join us among you". As a result, they got upset. The chairman did not choose anyone among this group. So, Z circle (an Islamic circle) split up. Later on they established ÖZGÜR-DER. When I said, "This association has a branch and members in İstanbul. We consulted and discussed with them 2 or 3 nights ago. With the help of their suggestions, we formed the list", he started to criticize İstanbul branch. I stopped him and said that "I can't let you talk in this way about one of my branches" A tension occurred and they left. Firstly, they have gone to Y (another founding member), then to X (founding chairman). They said to them "He didn't take us seriously". X didn't come to that meeting; he even did not come any other meetings. They sent a group of about forty or fifty young people to that congress; in terms of the associative tricks.*

They made someone to read a illegal and inappropriate speech who is not a member. They made a lot of criticisms, clapped the speakers, and tried to interrupt them. Yet I responded to their criticisms very calmly. Then the following day I saw such headings in their newspapers: "They found honor and prosperity near liberals and leftists". The reason is that EMEP[140](The Party of the Labor), ÖDP[141] (Freedom and Solidarity Party), HADEP[142](Peoples Democracy Party) and BBP[143](Great Union Party) also came to the congress. They were bothered by the participation of the Human Rights Association and Human Rights Foundation into the congress. Finally, they lost their hope and never came to the association again.[144]

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[140] It is a socialist party

[141] It is a socialist party

[142] It is a Kurdish political party

[143] It is a ultra-nationalist and religious political party

[144] *Ayak oyunlarıyla ilgili şeyi unuttum söylemeyi. Benim ilk başkanlık dönemimden sonra kongreden bir gün önce 4,5 kişilik bir delegasyon geldi, İslamcıların ağır toplarından. Bunlar geldiler ve benimle özel görüşme istediler ben de özel görüşmedim. Bir kaç arkadaş daha vardı onlar da bulunsun dedim özellikle bu görüşmenin özel olmasını istemiyorum dedim. İşte bunlar şey diye başladılar "İşte sağolun bugüne kadar çok zorlu çalışmalar yaptınız yürüttünüz falan, işte müslümanlar üzerindeki baskılar zulumler her geçen gün artıyor biz bu dönemde -sene de 1998, 28 Şubat'tan bir yıl sonra falan- biz bu dönemde daha dinamik güçlü bir yönetimin oluşmasını istiyoruz. Onun için de işte biz X'in (kurucu başkan) başında olduğu bir yönetim istiyoruz". Ben de "Olur, benim için bir sakıncası yok da" dedim "burası benim babamın dükkanı değil ki" dedim "ceketimi alıp gideyim. Bunun da konuşulacağı zaman bugün değil. Kongreye kalmış 13, 15 saat bir şey. Bana bunu 3,4 ay önce çıtlatsaydınız, ben başka isimler de önerirdim. Derneğin 13, 14 tane şubesi var şubesi var 120 tane fiilen yöneticisi var. Bu insanlara götürülür konuşulur tartışılır. Arkadaşlar böyle bir karar vermişlerse eyvallah. Neticede bu insanlar böyle bir yönetim oluşsun bu adam gelsin başımıza dedikten sonra bana bir halt etmek düşmez" dedim. "Burası benim babamı mülkü değil burayı ben de kurmadım" dedim. "Bunlar yürütemediler bıraktılar kaçtılar bana yıkıldı" dedim. "Neticede ben bir yerleri ele geçirmiş değilim. Ama şu anda bunun konuşulmasının bir imkanı yok" dedim. "Yok işte bizle hiç istişare etmiyorsunuz" falan. "Yönetimi oluştururken, İstanbul'a geleceğinizi söylediler de biz sizi bekledik de" falan. Dedim: "İstanbul'a geldim. İstişaremizi de yaptık şubede". "Eee işte bizimle kimse görüşmedi". "İstanbul'da bir sen mi varsın, ayrıca ben İstanbul'a geldiğimde niye seninle görüşeyim? Sen şu ana kadar hiç MAZLUMDER' e geldin mi" dedim. "Yook ilk kez geliyorsun" Seninle daha önce hiç karşılaştık mı? Yok.*

- bunlar üyesi mi bu arada MAZLUMDER'in

- Yook. İslamcı bir ağabey işte, bir çevrenin lideri. Ama onun asıl derdi bizim İstanbul Şubesi ile. Bunlar, kendileri bir adam vermek istemişler, başkan "yok" deyince" sizin içinizden yönetime gelecek adamı biz seçeriz" diyince bunlar da tabi bozulmuşlar. Başkan o ekipten kimseyi almadı. Z çevresi (islami bir çevre) o şekilde koptu gitti. ÖZGÜR-DER'i kurdular sonradan. Dedim ki "İstanbul'da bu derneğin şubesi var üyeleri var onlarla oturduk konuştuk istişare ettik tartıştık 2, 3 gece. Onların önerilerini de aldık o doğrultuda liste oluştu". Bu sefer İstanbul aleyhine atıp tutmaya başlayınca, "Dur" dedim "Burada bir şubemle ilgi olarak böyle konuşmana izin veremem" dedim.

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It is certainly not within the framework of this study to judge who is right and who is wrong about the issues and processes cited above. The important thing here is that there has been a serious dispute within MAZLUMDER in terms of both mentality and organization, and as a result, an understanding which gives the Islamic identity and sensitivities priority and represented by the founding chairman was replaced by a more moderate, rational understanding which emphasizes cooperation and common points on public deliberation processes and human rights; and the organization experienced such a transformation.

If we consider basic dissociation points other than the above mentioned ones, it can be argued that there are different viewpoints between the members of MAZLUMDER within the framework of human rights. Especially, many members of the association administration argue that some part of MAZLUMDER's base could not adopt the human rights understanding represented institutionally by the association. The chairman argues that:

> *For example, at the moment there are some people within MAZLUMDER who categorically rejects and condemns the suicidal and civilian-oriented attacks in Palestine. However, some others argue that "Palestine is occupied. The ones who came there are all occupiers. Therefore, Palestine should be evaluated considering these circumstances". Yet, the association's attitude towards these civilian-oriented attacks –they may be in İstanbul or Palestine, or they were made by HİZBULLAH, İBDA-C, HAMAS, or İslami Cihad, it doesn't matter- is clear.[145] But does every member of the association adopt such an understanding? Unfortunately*

Epey bir gerilim oldu kalkıp çıktılar. Önce Y'ye (bir başka kurucu üye) gitmişler, sonra X'e (kurucu başkan) gitmişler falan. "İşte bizi adam yerine falan koymadı" demişler. Sonra X, o toplantıya gelmedi, odur budur hiçbir toplantımız gelmiş değil. O toplantıya da 40, 50 kişilik falan bir genç grubu yolladılar kongreye; dernekçilik oyunları bağlamında. Üye olmayan birine kongrede korsan bildiri okuttular falan, bir sürü eleştiriler falan yaptılar, konuşanları alkışladılar, sözünü kesmeye çalıştılar falan. Ben gene onların yaptığı eleştirileri de sakin sakin cevapladım. Sonra ertesi gün baktım dergilerinde şöyle yazılar işte "İzzet-i ikbali liberallerin solcuların yanında buldular". İşte kongreye gelmişler ya EMEP gelmiş, ÖDP gelmiş, HADEP gelmiş BBP de gelmiş. Bunların kongreye gelmesinden işte İHD'nin İHV'nin kongrede konuşturulmasından falan rahatsızlar. Ondan sonra da bir daha umudu kestiler tekrar derneğe gelme gitme şeyi olmadı.

[145] Abbreviations are for religious terrorist organizations.

not. In terms of the Kurdish Question, the Kurdish circles respect MAZLUMDER, take it seriously. But, does every member of our association follow and pay attention to the Kurdish Question at the same level? Of course, not.[146]

Many different examples about disputable subjects among MAZLUMDER members could be given, such as Chechen activists, missionaries as political issues and euthanasia, homosexual rights and "death fast resistance" (*ölüm orucu*) as political/moral issues. For example, a female human rights activist working full-time in the association says that:

Even I can't accept euthanasia (here it is used to refer to the dead fast). In the Western-originated human rights discourse, one argues that the body belongs to its owner. It is upon him to torture himself or not. But you have an (Islamic) identity. Therefore, this life, this body is entrusted to me by the God. Can I use them like that? You come across with the same dilemma in the suicidal attacks. In terms of euthanasia, I say, "God is great!" On the other hand, one says, "The man has the right to end his own life". I couldn't get over this dilemma since I came here two years ago.[147]

It is also argued that such disputes regarding human rights are sometimes objected to criticism within the association. For example, many people told that after the Central Office of MAZLUMDER condemned the suicidal attacks in Palestine,

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[146] *Mesela şu anda MAZLUMDER içinde Filistin'deki intihar eylemlerini sivillere yönelik eylemleri kategorik olarak hemen reddeden, kınayanlar da var, ama bunu "Yav işte Filistin işgal altında. Oraya gelen herkes işgalci olarak geldi, dolayısıyla Filistin'i ayrı, kendi koşullarında değerlendirmek lazım" diyen de var. Ama dernek bir tavır takınacaksa açıklamalarında falan sivillere yönelik eylemleri -bu İstanbul'daki de olabilir Filistindeki de, bunu bir Hizbullah'çı da İBDA-C'ci de yapmış olabilir bir HAMAS'çı İslami Cihat'çı da yapmış olsa hiç fark etmez- tereddüt etmeden sivillere yönelik eylemler karşısında derneğin tavrı nettir. Ama dernek içerisindeki her arkadaş bunu sindirmiş tam özümsemiş midir? Maalesef hayır. Kürt sorunuyla ilgili olarak da Kürt muhalif çevreleri MAZLUMDER'i bayağı sever sayarlar, ciddiye alırlar, önemserler ama bizim her üyemizin Kürt sorunuyla olan ilgisi, olayı izlemesi aynı düzeyde midir? Elbette değildir.*

[147] *Ötenaziyi (burada ölüm oruçları eylemlerine referansla kullanılıyor) şahsen ben bile kabul edemiyorum. Şimdi mesela Batı kaynaklı insan hakları söyleminde diyorsunuz ki bedeni de onundur, ister eziyet eder ister etmez; ama sizin gelen bir kimliğiniz var; dolayısıyla, bu can bana emanettir beden bana emanettir. Bu emaneti bu şekilde kullanabilir miyim? İntihar eylemlerinde de aynı açmazla karşılaşıyorsunuz. Ötenazi için ben "Allah'tan ümit kesilmez" diyorum öte yandan da diyorsunuz ki "insan hayatını sonlandırma hakkına sahiptir". Ben bunu buraya geldiğim 2 yıldan beri bir türlü çözemedim.*

some members criticized the association for defending Israel. Another interesting case is about the caught of a missioner. After the association defended the rights of the person in question, a member came and asked that "The Muslims are majority in here, so why do you defend such a right". And the association responded to that question as "If you want to establish mosques in Germany, he also has the right to do it because he belongs to the minority, too." In another case, it is claimed that MAZLUMDER members refused to participate in a meeting about homosexual rights and organized by homosexuals. However, the member who told the case claimed that if he had been invited he wouldn't hesitate to participate.

To sum up, we can argue that this debate about the scope and content of the concept of human rights is somewhat related with a kind of orientalism which separates Western and Eastern understandings of human rights. However, it is observed that MAZLUMDER is trying to stand in between, even if the debates over human rights have not reached any conclusion within the world. A member who is considerably active in associative work, argues very interestingly that,

> *In my opinion, human rights could not be separated into Western and Eastern parts. For example, the concept of civil disobedience was produced in the West, but put into practice by Gandhi. In this sense, human rights belong to the whole humanity. Could you consider as bad a culture, which is speaking of women's, children's and defective people's rights bad?[148]*

Therefore, it is claimed that MAZLUMDER members are the ones uniting both Western and local (Muslim, Eastern and so on.) notions of rights and the criticizers of the association are the ones who separate them. Hence, it is observed that there is no strict opposition within the association about its political line.

It is claimed that there may be some dissociation different issues may be given priority within MAZLUMDER branches about the issues we mentioned

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[148] *Bence insan hakları Doğu/Batı diye ayırt edilecek şeyler değil. Mesela sivil itaatsizlik kavramı Batıda üretilmiştir ama Gandi'de uygulamasını bulmuştur. Bu anlamda insan hakları bütün insanlığın kazanımıdır. Doğru şeyler midir değil midir, bunun üzerine konuşmak lazım. Kadın, çocuk, yaya, engelli haklarından söz eden bir kültür kötü müdür?*

above, yet there is no issue, which one of the branches condemns and the other defends.

It is possible to summarize MAZLUMDER's understanding of human rights and its own tensions depending on the criticisms directed to the association. In this framework, it is claimed that there are two criticism camps towards the association. It is told that while the official quarters, media and secular circles accuse the association for being reactionary, on the contrary, religiously sensitive circles accuse them for depending on Western values and the administrators of the association show this as a proof for their impartiality.

In terms of personal conflicts and competition, we can say we had the impression that such things do not play a major role contrary to KADER and IMO. In our interviews, we did not come across any emphasis on personal conflicts.

Consequently, even if MAZLUMDER has been established to defend human rights and struggle with human rights violations – without any exclusion or discrimination, for the whole humanity and with no double standards-, it is understood that it acquired this position in time with the help of its works in the area and cooperation with other CSOs, practically. In terms of the civil society dynamics, the existence of such a transformation potential is an important datum. MAZLUMDER turned into an organization, which comprises a wider area within the sphere of human rights, from a position which defends a more limited circle's rights. The following words of an active member summarize this case:

> *When I look at the archives, I see a structure, which adopted the sense of human rights much more. Probably, if I had come before, I couldn't have worked so comfortably. I think now it is more impartial. It is even impartial.*
>
> *- Before?*

- Not taking sides but I observe that we were dealing with more limited issues. Like headscarf. Now the association works on a wider sphere from minority rights to health, even disabled people's rights.[149]

5.4. Civil Engineers Trade Association (IMO) Ankara Branch

5.4. 1. Foundation, Objectives and Principles

Civil Engineers Trade Association Ankara Branch, unlike the other two CSOs examined within the scope of this research, is a professional organization established under law. Thus, the establishment process of the association should be considered differently than a CSO, within which independent individuals get together and organize around an idea as is the case with KADER or MAZLUMDER, since vocational trade associations in Turkey function as semi-public institutions, and, as a result, establishment of these associations has a dimension which relates to the history and ideology of the Republic. Consequently, in order to understand the objectives and activities of the Association better, it would be useful to have a look at the umbrella organization that this Association belongs to, that is, the Union of Turkish Architects and Engineers Trade Associations (TMMOB), as IMO Ankara Branch is a local branch of the Civil Engineers Trade Association, one of 23 trade associations affiliated with the Union of Turkish Architects and Engineers Trade Associations.

TMMOB is established by Law No.7503 and Law No. 62235, amended by Decree Laws No. 66 and 85, in 1954, and is a professional organization with legal personality, which qualifies as a public institution as it is indicated in the 135th article of the Constitution. As of 01-12-2000, TMMOB has the status of an umbrella

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[149] *Arşivlere bakınca, daha tarafsız daha çok insan hakları eksenine oturmuş bunu sindirebilmiş bir yapı görüyorum. Belki daha önce gelseydim bu kadar rahat çalışamazdım. Bence biraz daha şimdi daha az tarafsız, daha az değil hiç taraf tutmuyor.*
-Önceden?
-Taraf değil ama biraz daha dar sorunlarla ilgilendiğini görüyorum. Başörtüsü gibi. Şimdi azınlık haklarından tutun sağlık hatta engellilerin haklarına kadar çok daha geniş bir alanda çalışıyor.

organization/union, comprising of 23 trade associations, their 160 branches and 30 provincial coordination committees, with approximately 250.000[150] members.

If we consider it as the professional organization of engineers and architects, it is possible to trace the organization of Turkish engineers and architects back to the Ottoman Period. If we examine a study compiled by IMO Ankara Branch (IMO, 2004b), we notice that, before the establishment of the Republic, architects and engineers got organized for the first time under the Ottoman Engineers and Architects Society (*Osmanlı Mühendis ve Mimar Cemiyeti)* under the leadership of Mimar Kemalettin Bey by taking advantage of the atmosphere of freedom provided by the 2nd Constitutional Monarchy (1908). It is indicated that one of the main issues on the agenda of the Society, which existed until the year 1922, was giving priority to Ottoman engineers and architects against the engineers and architects brought in from foreign countries. In the year 1912, within the period the Ottoman Engineers and Architects Society probably suspended its activities due to the Balkans War*,* it is known that another association with the French title "*Association des Architectes et Ingeniuers en Turquie*" was established, and it is believed that this organization was formed against the organization of Turkish architects and engineers. Apart from these two associations, it is indicated that in the year 1919, Engineering Union Hearth (*Mühendislik Birlik Yurdu*), in the year 1923 Turkish Engineers Society (*Türk Mühendisler Ocağı*) and in the year 1925 Turkish Architects and Engineers Societies (*Türk Mimar ve Mühendis Cemiyetleri*) were established (IMO, 2004b: 9). Other organizations that were established in the Republican Period are as follows: in 1926 the Union of Turkish Engineers (*Türk Mühendisler Birliği*) and the Union of Turkish Engineers with M.S. Degrees (*Türk Yüksek Mühendisler Birliği*) and in 1927 the Union of Turkish Architects with M. S. Degrees (*Türk Yüksek Mimarlar Birliği*).

The first law enacted after the establishment of the Republic in order to define the professions of engineering and architecture is dated 1927. This law was

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[150] On the web page of TMMOB (www.tmmob.org.tr), it is indicated that the number of its members is 246.298 in 2003.

amended in 1936, and with Law No. 3458 enacted in 1938 engineers and architects had gained legal status.

The first preparations for the organization of architects and engineers under a trade association, however, seems to have been made through the "Draft Law for Turkish Architects with M.S. Degrees Trade Associations" (*Türk Yüksek Mimar Odaları Kanun Projesi*) prepared by the Union of Turkish Architects with M.S. Degrees in 1939. It is also known that in 1947 Istanbul Union of Engineers with M.S. Degrees and Istanbul Union of Architects with M.S. Degrees together prepared another draft law. The current TMMOB law was enacted in 1954 after the proposals given in 1951 and 1952. The new law covered all architecture and engineering fields, and made it obligatory for those working in these fields to become members of trade associations.

As we have also mentioned above, the efforts of engineers and architects to form an organization have had the purpose of protecting Turkish engineers' rights against foreign engineers' right from the beginning. Architects and engineers movement have maintained this attitude since 1912. On this subject, two examples are quite illuminating. In 1949, "in order to protest the desire to get the projects of Istanbul University Medical Faculty Building prepared by American architects and engineers, the Union of Turkish Engineers with M.S. Degrees and the Union of Turkish Architects with M.S. Degrees had organized a joint march in Ankara" (IMO, 2004b:11). The second example is the attempt by the Union of Turkish Engineers with M.S. Degrees to take the Minister Kemal Zeytinoğlu, a member of the Union at the time, to the Discipline Committee after the Ministry of Public Works brought in 20 engineers and architects from Germany in 1953 (IMO, 2004b: 11). Tanıl Bora argues that the defense of the competence of Turkish architects-engineers against foreign architects-engineers has been an important theme in the struggle of Turkish engineers and architects to get organized, a struggle which succeeded in 1954 through the enactment of the law for professional organizations (Bora, 2001: 288). Göle, on the other hand, in her book *Engineers and Ideology* calls this situation as "national professionalism" and goes on to state that:

This desire for an autonomous professional organization denotes the desire to be identified as an occupational group outside of the state. This first desire to get separated from the state is a separation performed in the name of national professionalism. We suggest the concept of national profesionalism since the Turkish engineers desire to serve their technical abilities for the national interests and to be recognized as the sole tecnical labor force instead of the foreign engineers working in Turkey. (1986:116).[151]

While one of the main reasons for this was the relatively small number of architects and engineers, professions which require a professional and high education, another one was the fact that the profession of engineering was a profession in which the desire on the part of the rational pro-Enlightenment Republican ideology to build railroads and factories all around the fatherland found concrete expression. To put it in Bora's words, in this period "architects-engineers, which formed a small professional group, were part of the ruling elite, and, more particularly, enthusiastic representatives of the Universalist positivist ideology" (Bora, 2001: 266). As a result, the qualities of being national and professional, for years, had been the fundamental corner stones of the ideology of Turkish engineers. Even today, the accomplishments of many infrastructural projects completely through the works of Turkish engineers are presented as a source of pride.

TMMOB did not have a significant public existence in organizational terms from 1954 until the beginning of the 1970s. In this period, TMMOB and trade associations affiliated with it were active only as professional organizations, and hardly ever dealt with issues falling out of their professional areas. In addition, TMMOB and trade associations affiliated with it faced serious problems of organization and authority in those years. In connection with this point, it is indicated that for a long period of time, the relations among the trade associations

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[151] *Bu mesleki özerklik isteği devlet dışında bir mesleki grup olarak tanımlanma isteği anlamına gelir. Devletten bu ilk ayrılma isteği milli profesyonalizm adına yapılan bir ayrılmadır. Türk mühendisleri teknik yetkilerini milli çıkarların hizmetine sokmak ve Türkiye'de çalışan yabancı mühendislerin yerine yegane teknik işgücü olarak tanınmak istedikleri için milli profesyonalizm kavramını ortaya attık.*

affiliated with TMMOB, and the authority and sanctions of TMMOB over these associations had been a subject of constant debate (IMO, 2004b:15), and even that at times these debates had been taken to court.

In the 1970s, however, the leftist movement, which was on the rise both around the world and in Turkey, turned out to be a turning point in the history of TMMOB. In the context of the rising political polarization of these years, "the organizations of occupations, based on education, expert knowledge/practice and with an emphasis on labor (TMMOB, TTB-Union of Turkish Doctors, TBB-Turkish Bar Association, TEB-Union of Turkish Pharmacists, TVHB-Union of Turkish Veterinarians) situated themselves within the left wing, and played a significant role in the dissemination, formation and recruitment of people for the leftist ideology" in the words of Bora (2001: 267). Bora associates the alignment of the members of such professions, which were based on education and expert knowledge and which secured high incomes and status, with the leftist movement with the reasons given below:

1. These professions ceased to be the professions of a privileged minority and started to become mass professions and get performed within the capitalist labor process,

2. The hegemony of the leftist movement in universities and its impact on younger generations,

3. The employment of the people performing these professions generally in the public sector, and the facilitating effect that this situation had on their leaning towards a pro-public and statist-socialist worldview against the market ideology,

4. The suitability of the progressive positivist and national developmentalist character of the Enlightenment ideology, which had determined the ideologies of these occupations since the beginning of the Republic, to get inserted into the socialist worldviews of the period. The main theme that enabled the insertion in this period was anti-imperialism (Bora, 2001: 267).

Within this general framework, TMMOB had become a pioneer organization in comparison to other professional organizations; starting from the 18th General Meeting held in 1973 and particularly until the 1980 coup d'etat, it pulled itself together again with the view "to put science and technique in the service of our working class people" and with the efforts of leftist engineers who were active in the social struggle and represented by their legendary president Teoman Öztürk (IMO, 2004b: 15), and commenced political struggle along a revolutionist-democratic line from a leftist perspective beyond its status as a professional organization. In its 19th General Meeting held in 1974, TMMOB's line of thought was drawn up along an "anti-fascist and anti-imperialist" axis. The following expressions in the Annual Activity Report of 1974 put forward this line bluntly:

> It should never be forgotten that the struggle for independence is the struggle waged for working class democracy. The armed attacks of fascists against workers should be resisted. The democratic economic struggle should be waged in this direction (quoted in Göle, 1998:117)[152].

TMMOB, which on the one hand had made its presence felt in professional matters within the time period that elapsed until the 1980 coup d'etat, on the other hand took quite a radical and militant political line with the understanding that professional problems could not be considered separately from the general problems of the country and the society. Consequently, on the one hand it assumed "a significant and respected place in the struggle of working classes for independence and democracy as a professional organization" (IMO: 2004b: 15), and on the other hand, as a side to country's political polarization, suffered serious attacks and even lost several of its members in this process. It is possible to infer from the following lines of IMO Ankara Branch 15th Period Work Report that this attitude of TMMOB against professional problems still remains valid:

> Professional and colleague-related problems cannot be considered separately from social problems. Our professional problems can only be

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[152] *Bağımsızlık için mücadelenin işçi sınıfı demokrasisi için yürütülen mücadele olduğu hiçbir zaman unutulmamalıdır. Faşistlerin işçilere silahlı saldırılarına karşı koyulmalıdır. Demokratik, ekonomik mücadele bu yönde yürütülmelidir.*

truly solved when they are considered along with the problems of our country (IMO: 2004: 9)[153].

These years were the years TMMOB had stood out among the professional organizations and became a mass organization. In the process of becoming a mass organization, the organization, at the same time, had made progress in terms of participation within the organization as well as democratization in accordance with the ideology it defended, and created the foundations of its organizational structure which remained to date. In the history of TMMOB, this critical period between 1973 and 1980 is of utmost importance. In support of this point, through the interviews and observations we conducted, it was understood that the organizational and political struggle within TMMOB is still waged around the memories of those old and bright days and their "glorious" legacy. For instance, it is observed that most of the speakers who spoke in the "Small Council Meetings", which we participated before 2004 elections and which gathered with the agenda of preparation for the elections, considered the elections process along the axis of "respectful political struggle" waged against the rightists and fascists in the past, and revolutionism – counter-revolutionism or fascism-anti-fascist struggle.

Like all leftist political organizations, TMMOB also received its share from the wrath of 1980 coup d'etat. In fact, efforts to close down/weaken TMMOB can be traced back to the aftermath of 1960 coup d'etat. The second effort on this matter was made by Demirel government in 1973, but was unable to succeed. In the discussions held at the Republican Senate, this effort was regarded as the revenge of the "expulsion from the association penalty" given by the Discipline Committee of the Civil Engineers Trade Association to Demirel (IMO, 2004b: 14). In 1981, the National Security Council prepared a draft for the closure of TMMOB and the transfer of its property to the Treasury; yet, this was also withdrawn by the Prime Ministry (Bora, 2001: 271). To sum up, TMMOB, in the post-1980 period, suffered serious attacks which directly targeted its existence, nevertheless "tried to act as an opposition force even under this pressure, and became one of the diligent focus of

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[153] *Meslek ve meslektaş sorunları, toplumun sorunlarından bağımsız düşünülemez. Mesleki sorunlarımız gerçek anlamda çözüm imkanına ancak ülkemizin sorunları ile birlikte ele alındığında kavuşabilir.*

criticisms against the New Draft Constitution presented to the Advisory Assembly" (Bora, 2001: 271). The pressure upon TMMOB also continued in the 1990s during which the organization was going through a process of recovery. For instance, TMMOB President Yavuz Önen who came to monitor the HADEP trial in 1995 was detained, and 4 separate lawsuits were brought against TMMOB because of its activities between the years 1996-1998 (Bora, 2001: 277).

TMMOB, which had to stop its activities for two years in the aftermath of 1980 coup d'etat, resumed its activities in 1983, however lost considerable power in this period of liberalization symbolized in the persona of Özal. In addition to arrangements which diminished the authority of and weakened TMMOB, the economic and social transition Turkey was undergoing in those years also had a serious effect on this. In the partial results of the Architect and Engineer Profiles in Turkey Research conducted by TMMOB (TMMOB, 2004), this situation is associated with many reasons. The following titles come to the fore if we try to summarize those:

- The impact of neo-liberalization starting from the 1980s and of the globalization process which is an integral part of it.

- The reshaping of Turkey's industrialization process in favor of free market mechanisms.

- The spatial breakdown of the production process and its formal transformation.

- The change within the profession of engineering caused by the developments in science and technology (particularly those in the field of information).

- The change in the work place and the work practice in line with the new conjuncture and in a qualitative manner.

- The evolution of the professional education and practice towards a more competitive and inegalitarian direction while opportunities to access information increase.

- The transformation of the socio-political and socio-cultural values of architects and engineers.

As a result of these interrelated causes, we observe that TMMOB and the trade associations affiliated with it have lost power in the process from the 1980 coup d'etat until today. The pacification of social opposition and the impact this had on TMMOB, which existed within this opposition, certainly played a major role in this. It is possible to add the suffocating and paradoxical effect that the audacious and "*işbilir*" (pragmatic and flexible) attitudes of right-wing governments in technical matters, to quote Bora (Bora, 2001:273), had on TMMOB's leftist/socialist political/technocratic attitude, the regress in industrial investments, the changes in the production processes, and the material and spiritual regress of engineers and architects against market process and their becoming small entrepreneurs.

Despite all these problems, TMMOB and trade associations affiliated with it have entered a process of recovery starting from the mid-1990s in parallel with the revitalization of civil society in Turkey, and continued their function as an effective part of civil societal movement in Turkey. To illustrate this point, we can list some of the activities performed by TMMOB about the fundamental problems of Turkey following Bora's study on the subject (Bora, 2001: 276-293)

- In the 32nd General Meeting Report of TMMOB in 1992, the warning that "the depoliticized and desperate poor masses are pushed into the hands of racism and chauvinism and forced into the psychosis of responsibility extended from the Adriatic to the Sea of China" was made.

- The organization of the Democracy Platform in 1993 together with other CSOs (TBB, TTB, TEB, TVHB) against the rising militarist and authoritarian-fascist tendencies following the failure of the democratization program of the SHP (Social Democratic Party /DYP (True Path Party).

- The articulation of the worry caused by a process of civil war that wants to repress the society with the slogan "national unity and cooperation" in the September 1st World Peace Day activities together with other CSOs.

- The preparation of the report "Investigation of the Social Problems Caused by Immigration within the Region at the Scale of the City of Diyarbakır" concerning the Kurdish problem, which began in 1995, completed in 1996 and presented at the Habitat II Meeting (1996).

- The organization of a demonstration in Ankara on the 18th of January, 1997 in order to protest the Budget which "grows distant from industrialization and production, supports rentier and mafia economy, plunders public enterprises, diminishes the share of workers within the national income, carries out the policy of low wages and supports the Armed Forces and Police agencies by privileging them" and to show that the country is not left without a guardian after the Susurluk Scandal.

- The issuing of a common declaration in 1997 in association with the Greek Technical Trade Association with the demand for the "canalization of enormous sources spent for armament in both countries towards investment which would improve the welfare of peoples".

- The organization of the "Democracy General Meeting" in 1998 at the central level based on several provincial general meetings held all around Turkey, and the attempts to make this organization widespread with the participation of other CSOs under the name "Democracy General Meeting of Turkey".

- The commencement of the studies in 1998 to turn the expression "Turkish" in the title of the Union into "Turkey" and its actual application.

As we also mentioned above, despite all these social and political activities, the power and affectivity of TMMOB and affiliated trade associations has diminished quite considerably in comparison to their earlier performance. Besides, it is possible to talk about a serious discrepancy between the managements and political lines of TMMOB and affiliated organizations and the political view of the

base for the reasons touched upon above. As a result, it can be argued that these organizations can only maintain their stances through serious organizational works of currently well organized, engaged and relatively radical groups.

On the contrary, as it is also indicated by Bora, "the most important problem from the perspective of TMMOB is the wide angle between this politicization carried out with the slogan "Revolutionist TMMOB Tradition" and the tendencies of the base. The distancing from politics, the fall in participation and the growing presence of the small entrepreneur typology in quite a number of association managements are the fundamental characteristics of the tendency at the architect-engineer base which contradicts the radical discourse of the TMMOB high-level management. Against this tendency, the opposition of right-wing "Unity in Profession" groups and of the elitist-professionalist social democratic groups is growing stronger" (Bora, 2001: 280).

Civil Engineers Trade Association (IMO), which we examined within the scope of the research and with which IMO Ankara Branch is affiliated, is one of the 23 legs of the general organization of TMMOB as we earlier mentioned. Since it comprises one forth of the total number of engineers, Civil Engineers Trade Association is one of the most powerful and influential associations within TMMOB.

Civil Engineers Trade Association was established and started its activities in 1954 following the establishment of TMMOB. IMO, which held its 39th General Meeting in March 2004, has an organization which encompasses all Turkey with 26 branches, and 124 representative offices, 54 of which are at the provincial level and 74 at the town level, all around Turkey. As of October 22, 2004, the number of IMO members reached 58.358 (Evcimen, 2004: 36).

Within the general framework set out in the TMMOB Law, it is possible to summarize the objectives[154] of TMMOB as the performance of activities in all areas concerning the profession of civil engineering (from educational institutions giving civil engineering education and the content of civil engineering education to legal

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[154] See, for detailed information on this subject (IMO, 2004b: 42)

procedures, from employee rights and professional problems to the ethics of engineering).

IMO Ankara Branch is established in 1977. IMO Ankara Branch, including 14 provincial representative offices within its structure, is currently one of the largest branches of IMO with approximately 16.500 members.

5. 4. 2. Organizational Structure and Organizational Life Experience

Following Evcimen's table (2004: 35), it is possible to summarize the general management organization of IMO in the following way. At the top of the IMO's organization is the IMO General Center. Under the General Center it follows the branches and representative offices. Branches determined according to elections held every two years, and the delegates determined in the branch elections elect the IMO Board of Directors. The Boards of Directors of representative offices established in places where there is no branch are appointed by the Association Presidency. In addition, there are work place representatives, who constitute another participation unit, and these representatives are determined by members working in those work places. IMO, bringing together all these units, consists of Management, Supervision, Advisory and Discipline Councils (age: 35-39). As is the case in other branches, the Ankara Branch is directed by a Board of Directors consisting of 14 people (7 Originals and 7 Reserve). The Boards of Director is elected for a two years period. One of the former presidents that we interviewed explains the practical operation and decision-making processes in the following way:

> *How are the decisions carried out? Usually, a meeting is held every two weeks, sometimes there are other meetings, during these all activities are talked about and discussed. Besides there is an executive council, they are 3 people, it comprises of the accountant, the secretary member and the president. The executive committee is more actively involved in works. It carries out the decisions made or when there is a need for fast practical initiative, it takes initiative. It is generally democratic in these matters. The role of the president depends on the profile of the president and the board*

of directors to a certain extent. Some of the boards of directors are formed with the view of training young people under a good president. There the president, by its nature, is charismatic and steering but sometimes you get powerful directors in the boards of directors. Then the decisions are truly made through long discussions and by listening to the views of everyone. The trade association also has an advisory council. Here, there are ex-directors, representatives from the major fields of construction sector and some managers. This council is gathered at least four times in a management term. New management submits the work program to the advisory council, takes into consideration the criticisms raised there. There is a council called the inter-branch council. It deals with disruptions concerning the day-to-day practical operation among the branches. There, the discussions are held with all branch managers. There is a Secretaries Council; only the secretaries attend, there are many mechanisms like this.[155]

Consequently, it is possible to generally define the IMO organization as a centralist democratic structure when we approach it from the angle of formal procedures. However, apart from the formal structure explained above, there exists an intermediate mechanism which we believe is of considerable importance in understanding the internal operation of the organization. The name of the interesting mechanism created within the IMO Ankara Branch concerning internal participation is the "Small Council" meetings. It is told that since the 1970s Small Council meetings have been held within IMO. These Small Council meetings were

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[155] *Kararlar nasıl yürür? Genelde iki haftada bir toplantı yapılır, bazen başka toplantılar da yapılır, buralarda bütün faaliyetler konuşulur, tartışılır. Bir de yürütme kurulu vardır, onlar 3 kişidir, sayman, sekreter üye ve başkandan oluşur. Yürütme kurulu daha aktif olarak işlerle daha fazla uğraşır. Alınan kararları uygular ya da hızlı pratik insiyatif gerektiği zamanlarda, insiyatif kullanır. Bu konularda genellikle demokratiktir. Başkanın rolü biraz başkanla YK'nın profiline bağlıdır. Bazı YK'lar iyi bir başkanın altında yetişmesi gereken genç arkadaşlar mantığı ile oluşturuluyor. Orada kendi doğasından başkan karizmatik ve yönlendirici oluyor ama bazı YK'larda da kelli felli yöneticiler oluyor o zamanda hakikaten uzun tartışmalarla ve herkesin görüşü alınarak karar oluşturuluyor. Bir de danışma kurulu vardır odanın. Burada eski yöneticiler, inşaat sektörünün belli başlı alanlarından temsilciler ve bazı yöneticiler vardır. Bu kurul bir yönetim döneminde en az 4 defa toplanır. Yeni yönetim, çalışma programını danışma kuruluna sunar, orada yapılan eleştirileri dikkate alır. Şubeler Arası Kurul diye bir kurul vardır. Şubeler arası günlük pratik işleyişe ilişkin aksaklıklarla ilgilenir. Orada bütün şube yöneticileri ile tartışmalar yapılır. Sekreterler Kurulu vardır; sadece sekreterler gelir böyle bir sürü mekanizmaları vardır".*

essentially formed to ally leftist engineers in the elections against rightist engineers in the polarized political atmosphere of the 1970s, and they have no legal base, statutes or regulations etc. To put it differently, these mechanisms are mechanisms created for the purpose of bringing together members from different leftist factions, for burning out their differences in these councils and as a result ensuring that they come up with a single list against the rightists. According to what is told, this process has been operating in this way for years; left-leaning engineers from different factions of the left, under the name "*Contemporary Engineers*", and, similarly, rightist engineers, under the name "*Union in Profession*", come up with a single list against each other. In other words, the Small Councils are quite influential particularly in elections processes even though they do not have a legal status. In the interviews we made, we were told that in fact there were attempts to bring some order to these Small Councils, even to create regulations etc. regarding the operation of these councils and to give these councils a permanent structure which would be working in an effective manner at times other than the elections. However, it is indicated that there was not much progress on the subject, that there was not much participation in Small Councils in normal periods, and that the participation increased all of a sudden when the elections were near. In this respect, three Small Council Meetings, which were held before the election period and which we attended to observe, were quite crowded meetings; the participant numbers exceeded 100 in all three and even approached 150[156]. One of the ex-directors explains this situation in the following way:

> *Who is the Small Council? Those, who come there. We have been trying to*
> *make various definitions for the Small Council for years; like these are the*
> *members and those are not. Like who attends three times or not will be*
> *excluded. It has always been argued that these councils are overloaded*
> *with people at election times and their rationality is lost. When we were*
> *part of the management, we used to make decisions about the Small*

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[156] Our observations about the Small Council meetings we attended in the elections process and elections struggles taking place within these councils will be discussed in detail in the following pages. At this point, however, it should be added that these councils have an important place for they are areas for informal organizational life.

Councils, inform them of these decisions, deduce democratic conclusions from there etc. But, for instance, we do this with 40, 50 people throughout a term. This attracts their attention, indeed they are the most sensitive group. These decisions are made regarding who is going to be a council member, who will vote in the primary elections etc. When it is time for primary elections, suddenly the environment gets politicized. There is this thing also: friends who say "Are we leftists! Well, during elections, we go, check out the situation". These are the majority. They do not like working but determining. Suddenly you see 50 showing up at the Small Council. There you say "We made a decision here 50 people". Because this is not something dependent on law, regulations; it is the own mechanism of a political group. Then you say: "We made a decision here, these and those people should be here". In return they say "With how many people did you make this decision? Who does your decision represent?" The person who comes does not recognize you. This is such a weird situation...[157]

The main dynamic of the organizational life at IMO Ankara Branch, as is the case in other trade associations affiliated with TMMOB, is the effort not to surrender the trade associations, considered as the last democratic "fronts and fortresses" within the country, to rightists. As a result, it is possible to approach the organizational life within the IMO Ankara Branch within this framework. According to what is told, following the 1980 coup d'etat after IMO Ankara Branch resumed its activities in 1984, the branch was taken over by the rightist group which called itself

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[157] *Küçük Kurul kim? Oraya gelenler. Yıllardır çeşitli tanımlamalar yapmaya çalışırız Küçük Kurul için; işte şunlar üye sayılır, şunlar sayılmaz, 3 kere gelen, gelmeyen dışlanır falan gibi. Hep tartışılır; bu kurullara seçim zamanı insanlar bindiriyor, rasyonalitesi kayboluyor diye. Biz işte yönetimdeyken küçük kurullarla ilgili kararlar alırız, oraya bu kararı tebliğ ederiz, oradan demokratik sonuçlar çıkartırız falan, ama bunları diyelim 40, 50 kişiyle yaparız bir dönem boyunca. Onların ilgisini çeker, onlar en duyarlı kesimdir aslında. Bu kararlar alınır, kimler kurul üyesi olacak, kimler ön seçimde oy kullanacak, falan filan diye. Ön seçim zamanı gelince ortam birden politikleşir. Biz de bir de şey vardır: "Biz de solcuyuz ha! İşte seçim zamanı gider vaziyete bakarız" tarzındaki arkadaşlar vardır. Bunlar çoğunluktadır. Bunlar emek vermeyi sevmezler belirleyici olmayı severler. Bir anda Küçük Kurul'a 150 kişi gelir. Dersin ki sen orada: "Biz burada 50 kişi karar aldık" Çünkü bu kanunla yönetmelikle olan bir şey değil; bir siyasi grubun kendi mekanizması. Dersin ki: "Biz karar aldık burda şu şu kişiler olsun" Derler ki: "Yav siz kaç kişiyle karar aldınız sizin kararınız neyi temsil ediyor!" Gelen adam, seni tanımaz yani öyle garip bir durum işte....*

"Union in Profession" in the period between 1986 and 1990. The "Contemporary Engineers" group, which took over the association management again in 1990 after a tough struggle, has been in power in the association management for the last fifteen years. The organizational life within the association is under the hegemony of the leftist group organized under the name "Contemporary Engineers" both physically and intellectually since the political differences between the right and the left are formed with reference to the political climate and struggles of the pre-1980 period and are very sharp, and the rightists are excluded from these processes. In this regard, for instance, it is indicated that the rightists do not come to the association except for mandatory document exchange. Consequently, while there are struggles between people from different political sides in other organizations, here it is only possible to talk about conflicts and intellectual discrepancies within the leftist group itself. Similarly, the rightist group has no presence whatsoever within the organizational life processes of the organization except for participating in the elections.

Despite the fact that many participants we interviewed emphasized that they are not a civil society organization and viewed the concept of civil society with suspicion, when we evaluate the impressions obtained from the observations and interviews we conducted, it is possible to argue that the trade association oscillates between the identities of a civil society organization and a professional organization. However, the civil societal function here is expressed in terms of being a "mass democratic organization" rather than civil society with reference to the struggle tradition of the trade association.

It is observed that activities within the trade association are performed in a few different areas. First one of those is the activities performed in the professional field. Among these activities can be counted professional trainings (computer classes, professional courses etc.) for members, panels and symposiums (about engineering education, public procurement law, national earthquake policy, national transportation policies and so on.), technical congresses (shore-port, concrete, steel construction, transportation congresses etc.) or general meetings (such as the dwelling or students general meetings). Apart from these, social and cultural

(commemoration or plaquette giving meetings, cocktails, trips, concerts), organizational (activities performed with the members, branches, representatives and students) and political (actions, protests, press statements and so on.) activities are performed[158]

Even though the trade associations within the structure of TMMOB are generally accused of being involved in politics and not fulfilling their duties regarding the profession by right-wing politicians and governments, most of the members we interviewed, including those representing the rightist group, agree that the Union fulfills its professional activities as much as possible. Nevertheless, some of the members criticize the trade association for not having a general program for professional activities and for their being too scattered. In contrast, some of the members we interviewed, particularly the senior ones, indicated that they are not happy about the fact that the professional activities overtook the social ones compared to the past. When we examine the 15th Period Work Report of the Association, it is possible to observe that serious works were undertaken in terms of participation in the public space and intervention in the decisions of the political society. The legal and political struggle waged by IMO Ankara Branch along with other trade associations and CSOs against the municipal practices of Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek, the works performed in the area of urban problems in general terms, protests, actions and press statements on the subjects of "Iraq War", "May 1st" and the "Palestinian Problem", and strikes all illustrate this point.

Another important finding that came out of the observations and interviews we conducted concerning the organizational life is that within IMO Ankara Branch, there is an elitist organizational logic and culture. In the context of political and organizational traditions we mentioned above, it was told that a group of members, which used to hold managerial positions within the Association, are quite dominant within the Association. The fact that this is not only a narration, but one of the fundamental dynamics affecting the operation of the Association, is observed in person during the elections process. For instance, at the Small Council Meetings that we attended prior to elections to observe, an agreement about how to determine the

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[158] Detailed information about the association activities is given in Appendix 3.

list that will enter the elections could not be reached; eventually, the decision that a commission consisting of members previously in the management should determine the list was made, and the list was formed in this way. In this respect, many participants mentioned that this group is influential upon many issues, from the decisions to be made to the managers to be elected and even upon the activities to be performed. To summarize, it was told that the organizational life of the Association is controlled by two generations of "revolutionist brothers", one belonging to the pre-1980 period, the other to the post-1980 period, who waged serious political and organizational struggle against rightist and/or fascists in the past and saved the Association from them. A younger member defines these people as white and grey Gandalfs with reference to one of the main characters of the novel *The Lord of the Rings*, and says:

> *In fact, these are the men that I call the veterans, Gandalfs of the Association. Whatever they say is done in these trade associations. This seriously is the case. These (the others) are fighting amongst themselves in fact. If an X person wants, if he wants today, he can be the president tomorrow; it is not a problem for him. But the guy knows he can't be the president all the time, he was once, then withdrew; but, in fact the Association is under their control. However much they look oppositional, however much they seem not to be in it, they always watch the Association from above, and they fight amongst themselves, it seems to me. You also saw that at the Small Council on that day: three or five people were staring at each other before them, it was as if they are the judges, those are the criminals.*[159]

Another member that we interviewed on this matter says:

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[159] *Aslında bunlar odanın eskileri, Gandalfları dediğim adamlar. Bunlar ne derse o oluyor bu odalarda. Cidden böyle oluyor. Bunlar da (diğerleri) aralarında tepişiyorlar aslında. X kişi istese, bugün istese yarın başkan olur, sorun değil onun için. Ama adam her zaman başkan olamayacağını biliyor, yapmış bir dönem, çekilmiş; ama, oda onların kontrolü altında aslında. Ne kadar muhalif gözükseler de ne kadar içinde gözükmeseler de onlar yukardan izliyorlar odayı hep, bunlar da tepişiyor kendi aralarında gibi gözüküyor bana. O günde orda Küçük Kurulda gördünüz: bunlar 3, 5 adam onların karşısında bakışıyorlardı sanki onlar yargıç bunlar suçlu.*

There is a group here that controls everything; I mean there are structures that you cannot get out.[160]

A member from the social democratic wing complains about the "revolutionist elderly brothers" under consideration in the following words:

There are big brothers coming from the tradition of the Association; there are such brothers everywhere. Well, they get together and say: "Be it Ahmet, Mehmet; Hasan was in the management in the past, continuity is good". But here there is a taking sides situation, there is nothing like the representation of different groups. Well, they say something like we come from the DEVYOL[161] school, the others from the DEVSOL[162] school: "let's get one from you, two from us. In fact, these social democrats are social fascists. But anyway let's get two from them as well. Now we are seven. Here is the list..." It is a council of brothers, the general staff. The elderly brothers are already their brothers. They are not ours. As a result, these brothers do not let anyone in from our group or they take the dumbest two and run their business by weakening the representatives with numbers such as 4 to 2, 5 to 2[163].

This discussion performed around the issue of revolutionist brothers essentially points to a fundamental issue regarding the organizational life within trade associations: elitism. As we also explained above, the engineering trade associations as professional organizations display an elitist attitude starting from their establishment. However, this situation receded to the background in the 1970s

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[160] *Burada bir güruh var yani her şeyi kontrol eden onların dışına çıkamayacağın yapılar var yani.*
[161] DEVYOL (Revolutionary Path) was an effective revolutionary leftist movement and illegal organization before 1980. Now most of the the followers of it make politics in the legal sphere.
[162] DEVSOL (Revolutionary Left) was an effective revolutionary leftist movement and illegal organization before 1980. Though not strong as in the past, it is still alive and active under a different name.
[163] *"Odanın geleneğinden gelen büyük abiler vardır; her yerde böyle saygın abiler vardır. İşte bunlar toplanırlar: "Yav işte ahmet olsun, mehmet olsun, hasan eskiden yönetimde vardı bir devamlılık olsun derler. Ama burda bir taraf tutma olayı vardır, değişik kesimlerin temsili şeklinde bir olay yoktur. İşte biz DEVYOL ekolünden geliyoruz ötekileri DEVSOL'dan geliyor gibi bir espriyle: "Ya bir tane sizden olsun, iki tane bizden olsun, ya bu sosyal demokratlar da sosyal faşistler ama hadi iki tane onlardan alalım 7 kişi olalım tamam budur liste... Dönüp dolaşıp bir abiler heyeti, kurmay heyeti. Abiler, zaten onların abileri. Bizim abilerimiz olmuyorlar. Dolayısıyla abiler bizim ekipten kimseyi ya almıyorlar ya da en molozlarında iki tane alıp 4'e 2, 5'e 2 gibi rakamlarla temsiliyeti zayıflatarak işi götürüyorlar".*

when the Left nearly mainstreamed itself, but this time it became part of the left's Leninist political view. In the post-1980 period, this elitism resurfaced in the form of professional elitism as well as political elitism with a revolutionist flavor. It is possible to quote one of the ex-presidents on this point:

> *Yes, this issue of elitism, it is being discussed a lot. I am one of those who are accused of elitism, whose approach towards professional issues seems to contradict with their political stance. Yes, this is the case. We have to be elitists. The profession of engineering requires some amount of elitism, it is in the nature of the profession, I think... however, there is not an elitism at the Association in that sense; but we can talk about a certain situation: this is a part of the democracy discussion and doesn't fit in that band since there are thousands of definitions of democracy. Someone, I think it was Descartes, says "democracy is the despotism of the mediocre". I have always also thought myself. The concept of democracy has always been used for bad purposes in Turkey. In the near past, the antagonists of law, of constitution had always talked about the support of the people. In fact this is true and a painful truth that has never been confessed. The political parties in Turkey, which receive votes from the majority, have always opposed democracy, law with the support of people. But this is also a democracy. They have done this with the support of the people. Is this really it? Does it have to be so?... This is the democracy of Melih Gökçek. He spits into art yet he had 56% of the votes. What would you say about this?[164]*

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[164] *Bu elitizm meselesi evet çok tartışılıyor. Meslek meselelerine bakışı, politik duruşuyla çelişiyor gibi görünen, elitistlikle itham edilenlerden bir tanesiyim ben de. Öyledir evet, elitist olmak zorundayız. Mühendislik mesleğinin kendisi biraz elitist olmayı gerektiriyor, işin doğasında bu var diye düşünüyorum ben... Ancak, Oda'da bir elitizm yok o anlamda; ama, şöyle bir durum söz konusu: bu demokrasi tartışmasına girer ve o bu banda sığmaz. Demokrasinin binlerce tanımı var çünkü. Biri şey diyor Descartes mı ne "Demokrasi vasatın despotizmidir" diyor. Ben de hep düşünmüşümdür. Türkiye'de demokrasi kavramı niye çoğu zaman kötü amaçların şeyi olmuştur. Yakın Türkiye tarihinde hukuk karşıtları, anayasa karşıtları demokrasi karşıtları hep halkın desteğinden bahsetmişlerdir. Bu doğrudur da aslında ve bu itiraf edilememiş acı bir gerçektir. Türkiye'de çoğunluğun oy verdiği partiler, her zaman halkın desteği ile demokrasiye, hukuka, karşı çıkmışlardır. Ama bu da bir demokrasidir. Halkın desteği ile yapmışlardır bunu. Bu mudur? Böyle mi olması gerekir?... Melih Gökçek demokrasisi budur. Sanatın içine tükürür falan ama bakın %56 oyla geldi ha! Ne diyeceksiniz?"*

The "Qualified Engineering" debate, which has surfaced within the engineer's community in the last few years, and which was raised constantly during the interviews we conducted, is essentially a clear indicator of the reflex on the part of the professional community to protect itself and the profession's honor. In sum, the concept of qualified engineering, which is based on the assertion that only those engineers above a certain level of experience or knowledge should be given the authority to sign in certain engineering projects, can be adopted by engineers from both the Left and the Social Democratic wing as well as by those from the Right. Surely, one can find various reservations or explanations related to the concept. However, the great majority of the engineers expressed their support for the qualified engineering law. It was observed that the losses incurred after the Marmara earthquakes in 1999 and the subsequent loss of esteem that the civil engineers suffered in society have a great role to play in this consensus on qualified engineering. In this way, it may be argued that the elitist vein that exists within the engineering organization conjecturally found itself a new base. The importance of qualified engineering debates on our part is not whether or not the law is necessary; but its being a good example of professionally elitist tendencies unlike KADER and MAZLUMDER.

If we make a general evaluation in terms of organizational life, IMO Ankara Branch appears as an organization which is seriously polarized along the axis of left/right, and completely under the hegemony of the left, which totally excludes the right wing, which is formally organized according to a democratic centralist structure within itself, but with an elitist organizational culture and operation when it comes informal processes.

5. 4. 3. The Problem of Participation

The first thing to say in terms of participation is the fact that all architects and engineers who want to work as architects and engineers, except those working in the public sector, has to become members of a trade association. As a result, the participation here is not a voluntary one as it is with KADER and MAZLUMDER, but a legally mandatory membership. Moreover, all architects and engineers who

perform their professions has to be in touch with the trade association one way or another since trade associations have the right to draw up certain legal documents concerning the professions of engineering and architecture (Trade Association Registration Document, Project Author Registration Document etc.). Besides, due to their semi-public status, trade associations collect a certain amount of fee from their members in order to continue their activities, and also charge a certain amount for the documents they arrange. Consequently, unlike the other CSOs, the issue of membership and financial problems do not constitute a serious problem for trade associations.

As we also mentioned above, IMO Ankara Branch has approximately 16.500 members. However, if we consider IMO Ankara Branch not as a legal institution but as a civil society institution, we see that the voluntary participation and interest here is not much different from the other CSOs. For instance, as far as we could observe, only around 160-170 people attended the General Meeting of the Ankara Branch in 2004 from among 16.500 members. Most of these participants were from the "Contemporary Engineers" group formed by leftist engineers, and the number of those coming from the "Union in Profession" group formed by rightist engineers was only five. The number of those who voted in the elections the next day was around 4000. Thus, the participation rate does not exceed 20-25 % even in those elections where the activity level is the highest. The "Contemporary Engineers" list won the elections at the General Meeting we monitored with approximately a margin of 1600 to 2100.

It was mentioned that around 15-20 people come to the Association on a regular basis except for election periods and members of the Board of Directors and that approximately thirty to fifty people attend the panels and seminars organized depending on their subject. At the Association, seven people, three of whom are engineers, legally work full-time. One of the engineers working professionally at the Association describes the general traffic in the following way:

> *There is a group of people who has been coming here for thirty years, they are around 15-20 people. They come every day; they come to drink a cup*

of tea, to say hi. Then you have another fifteen person group. Those are a little less stable. Some of them come more often, some come for three months and disappear for 3 months. Rightists never come to the Association. Besides, people working during the day don't come here. Mostly you have the people who come to collect documents. They come the most[165].

Most of the new and old managers and members we interviewed indicated that the participation is quite weak, that when the elections are over, all of the work has to be undertaken by the Board of Directors, that the members do not generally contribute to the functioning of the Association, and take part in the organizational processes of the activities much. An engineer working at the Association describes the situation concerning the participation in the following way:

The civil society organization identity is always considered at a secondary level. In these works, you get the labor of a few, even a single person most of the time. You don't see a closely-knit organization. Meetings are held from time to time. But people do not canalize their energies to the activities performed much. The most fundamental problem is to ensure participation.

-Why don't they participate?

-In my opinion, this is a secondary problem; there is a general situation of lack of organization already. Second, of course there is an internalized situation, too; the professional organizations might not have developed the mechanisms for this[166].

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[165] *Buraya 30 yıldır gelen bir grup insan var, 15-20 kişi civarı. Her gün gelir bunlar; çay içmeye gelir, selam vermeye gelir. Bir de 15 kişilik bir grup daha var. Bunlar daha dengesiz kimi çok gelir, kimi 3 ay gelir 3 ay gelmez falan. Sağcılar hiç gelmez odaya. Bir de gündüz vakti çalışan adam buraya gelmez. En fazla evrak almak için gelenler var en çok onlar geliyor.*

[166] *Sivil toplum örgütü kimliği ikinci plana atılıyor her zaman. Bu işlerde birkaç hatta çoğunlukla bir kişinin emeği oluyor. Öyle iç içe bir örgütlenme falan pek olmuyor. Ara ara toplantılar oluyor. Ama insanlar yapılan etkinliklere çok kanalize olmuyor. En temel problem katılım sağlamak*
-Neden katılmıyorlar?
-Bence bu ikinci sorun, zaten genelde bir örgütsüzlük durumu var zaten. İkinci olarak içsel bir durum da var tabii; bunun mekanizmalarını geliştirmemiş olabilir meslek örgütleri.

In the interviews conducted, the low level of participation is first associated with the depoliticization process Turkey has undergone after the 1980s. It was told that this was a more serious factor for IMO since it has a sharp leftist socialization past. It was asserted that most of the directors working in the Association's management in the post-1980 period complained about the low level of participation, and thus this participation problem has been one of the main issues on the agenda of all general meetings. In this respect (except for the rightists), it was indicated that it is not possible to talk about a situation where one wants to, but cannot participate. It was also indicated that while the number of those attending professional activities at the Association (courses and professional trainings, symposiums and conferences) is quite high apart from voluntary participations, these people do not generally stay in contact with the Association after the activities are over.

The second reason put forward for the low level of participation is an expectation for material or spiritual interest on the part of members instead of voluntary participation. For instance, the Chairmen of IMO Ankara Branch indicated that the only question that was asked at a meeting they held with students at an university visited to introduce the Association was "What will the Association give us?", and on the other hand the question "what can I give to the Association?" is not on the agenda of most of the members. Besides, another issue raised by many members that we interviewed is the fact that the removal of the obligation for engineers working in the public sector to become trade association members stroke a major blow at the participation process at the trade associations.

Nevertheless, there is a certain level of participation at the rate we pointed out above and which intensifies during the elections period. In fact, we cannot help but admit that the level of participation at the IMO Ankara Branch was considerably high in terms of excitement and tension in comparison to the other two CSOs, and that we were pretty surprised by this situation as researchers. Hence, there is an attempt within the research to question the reasons for the feverish struggle to seize the power in the management and to particularly understand why those people interested in trade associations are interested in them and why the elections

competition is so much feverish. Various answers were given on this subject. An old director from the revolutionist wing states the following regarding this issue:

> *These are already people who believe that they should display their political reflexes. You are already rebellious if you are a leftist. You reject this order. You can't come to political power etc. You are very constricted if you are a leftist. The left in Turkey is no longer in power or in municipalities; as a result, there is only one place you can live the life you believe in and the discourse you politically adopt: the trade association. But in addition, I am sure there are those friends with dreams such as "no one cares about me, if I was a director now everyone would know me". There are also those with a dream like "I had better stand out at the trade association, if I show myself off here, I can find myself a position within the political parties tomorrow". You see this particularly with social democrat friends. They would get mad at me now, but if you are charged with a duty at trade associations etc., then you get more respect at the political party, like "Look, we fought at the trade associations". It is easy to work in social democratic parties[167].*

The following statements of a participant from the Social Democratic wing verify this situation:

> *I was involved in serious organizational works within the x (a social democratic political party) party. I left later on but I have an interest in left-wing politics…If I have no interest in any political party, then I don't have a motivation to get involved in the Association, they make you grow weary of it. Why would one take an interest in the Association? In two*

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[167] *Zaten politik reflekslerini göstermesi gerektiğini düşünen insanlar. Zaten sen solcuysan isyankarsındır. Bu düzene itirazın var. Siyasal iktidara gelemiyorsun falan. Solcuysan çok sıkışmış durumdasın. Türkiye'de sol artık iktidarlarda belediyelerde yer alamıyor; dolayısıyla, inandığın hayatı siyasi olarak benimsediğin söylemi yaşatabileceğin bir tek yer var meslek odası. Ama bunun yanında "Beni kimse fark etmiyor şimdi yönetici olsam ne biçim tanınırdım" haylinde olan arkadaşlar da vardır muhakkak. Bir de şu hayal içinde olanlar da var "Ben şimdi odadan bir çıkayım da buralarda gösterirsem kendimi yarın siyasi partilerde bir yere gelirim" Özellikle sosyal demokrat arkadaşlarda biraz daha vardır bu. Şimdi kızarlar ama, odalarda falan görev alınca partide biraz daha itibarlı oluyorsun işte "Bak biz odalarda falan mücadele ettik" gibi. Sosyal demokrat partilerde görev almak kolay oluyor.*

ways: first, there is a basis there for you to produce something in terms of your profession. Second, when you do this, you mutually make a contribution to your political work so that there is a connection between the two. Besides, the trade association is a mass structure, you work and get successful there and reinforce your position within politics. Moreover, you can use this venue to improve your connections in politics. But, as you do this, you also perform your professional works. The success there leads to success over there; the success there leads to the success here. If you don't have motivations like this, you can't develop an interest in the trade association[168].

Another member interprets the active participation that particularly rise in election periods in the following way:

In fact, the issue is here is the place the leftovers from the leftist organizations dissolved after 1980 establish themselves in. But these guys no longer have organizations and men to rule over, they suffer when they are on their own. You can't really make sense of things done by men who used to walk around with guns, nobody makes sense of it. You think, is that person this person. But they suffer anyway...You have a lot of big fights going on; but don't get fooled by these fights. Well, you have conversations like "you are a revolutionist, I am a revolutionist, and you are less of a revolutionist". This is the atmosphere of the small council as well: keeping the pre-1980 alive mood[169].

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[168] *Ben x (sosyal demokrat bir parti) parti içerisinde çok ciddi örgütsel çalışmalarım oldu. Daha sonra ayrıldım falan ama sol siyasetle ilgileniyorum... Herhangi bir siyasi partiyle falan ilgilenmiyorsan, zaten odayla ilgilenme motivasyonu kalmıyor, bezdiriyorlar adamı, Odayla niye ilgilenirsin? İki türlü: bir, mesleğin açısından bir şeyler üretmek için orada bir zemin vardır. İki, bunu yaparken de siyasi çalışmana karşılıklı katkı korsun, ikisi arasında bir ilişki olsun diye. Hem oda kitlesel bir yapıdır orada çalışıp başarılı olup siyasetteki konumunu güçlendirsin. Hem de siyasetteki ilişkilerini geliştirmek anlamında, bu zeminde hareket edebilirsin, Ama bunları yapıyorken mesleki çalışmalarını da yürütüyor olursun. Oradaki başarı oradakini getirir oradaki buradakini getirir. Bu tür motivasyonların yoksa, zaten odayla ilgilenemiyorsun.*

[169] *Mevzu aslında şey burası 1980'den sonra dağılan sol örgütlerden kalanların, yuvalandıkları yerler. Ama bu adamların başlarına geçecekleri örgütleri ve adamları yok artık kendi başlarına kıvranıyorlar. 1980 öncesinde belinde silahla gezen adamların yaptıklarına anlam veremiyorsun, kimse anlam veremiyor o insan bu insan mı falan oluyorsun. Ama işte kıvraşmak, kıvranıyorlar işte... Öyle büyük kavgalar dönüyor ama; bakmayın siz o büyük kavgaların döndüğüne. İşte "sen*

One of the members opposing the revolutionist group in power attracts attention to another point on the subject of membership motivation:

What brings these men to this situation? First, the talk of revolutionism: "We established these trade associations, we created them, we fought in the past with guns around our waist, here is ours". This is one thing, the story of it, the story part. The second part is this; haven't I told you they see here as their work place. Some of these friends work at good places, but some of them could never have a proper, sustainable job. A portion of his/her life passed with revolutionist struggle in his/her opinion; first, he has an emotional relationship with here. Second, he can't work at another place. His profession is not very developed, specialized, either. They can assume some duties here for which they would get paid. Some of them give trainings, and get a share from those trainings. Some get projects by taking advantage of the Association's influence. For instance, I am a member of the Association's Board of Directors, but I am a project person and make deals. As I talk to you, I talk with the weight of the Association. I have the Civil Engineers Association behind my back. It varies depending on whether or not the person knows the situation but it is a name still, it gives a value, things like this[170].

To sum up, it is possible to categorize the motivations for participating in the decision-making, management and activity processes of the Association under a few headings within the framework provided by members we interviewed:

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devrimcisin, ben devrimciyim sen daha az devrimcisin" muhabbetleri oluyor. İşte Küçük Kurul'un havası o: 1980 öncesini yaşatma ayakları.

[170] *Bu adamları ne bu hale getiriyor? Bir, devrimcilik edebiyatı: "Bu odaları biz kurduk, biz yarattık, geçmişte silahlar belimizde mücadele ettik, burası bizimdir" biri bu, bu işin hikayesi, hikaye kısmı. İkinci kısım da şudur; burayı iş yerleri gibi görüyorlar dedim ya. Bu arkadaşların bir kısmı iyi yerlerde çalışıyorlar; ama, bir kısmı bir türlü doğru düzgn sürdürülebilir bir iş edinememiş, işte hayatının bir kısmı kendince devrimci mücadelede geçmiş bir buraya duygusal bir bağı var; iki, başka bir yerde bir iş yapamıyor mesleği de çok gelişkin değil, çok uzmanlaşmış değil. Buralarda işte maaş alacağı bir takım görevler alabiliyorlar. Bir kısmı eğitimler vererek o eğitimlerden pay alıyorlar. Bir kısmı da odanın etki gücünden yaralanarak projeler alabiliyor. Mesela, ben odanın yönetim kurulu üyesiyim ama projeciyim işler alıyorum. Sizinle konuşurken odanın ağırlığıyla konuşuyorum. Arkamda İnşaat Mühendisleri Odası var. Bilen bilmeyene göre değişir ama, isimdir, değer kazandırıyor, böyle şeyler".*

1. Most of the people active in the trade associations are leftists and there is no possibility for these people to get involved in leftist opposition outside of the trade associations.

2. The emotional link with the Association created by the political struggle waged in the past.

3. Expectancy of material returns at the trade associations.

4. The desire to take advantage from being in the management of the Association and the satisfaction of personal ego.

5. The desire to use being in the Association Management as a step for future political objectives.

When we evaluate the participation level within the framework drawn above, in sum, it is possible to conclude that there is limited voluntary participation within the IMO Ankara Branch except professional activities, that the participants consist of left-leaning engineers and even of certain people from the more radical revolutionist faction within them, and that despite this situation both the right-wing and social democrat engineers make their presence felt in terms of participation at least in the elections period.

5. 4. 4. Basic Conflicts and Points of Divergence

As we mentioned earlier, the fundamental conflict that determines the Association's organizational life, politics and activities is the struggle between the leftist and rightists to seize power within the management. The difference here is not about opinions concerning professional problems, but completely about political and ideological preferences, and is a great illustration of the friend/enemy relationship discussed by Mouffe with reference to Scmitt. However, since the management of the Association has been in the hands of "Contemporary Engineers" for the last 15 years and since the rightist group has no place in the organizational life of the Association, this ideological difference does not have a visible effect on the

organizational life of the Association. Thus, those people who debate and conflict with each other within the Association are the members within the leftist group itself which reigns over the management. Since the conflicts within IMO Ankara Branch took place in a somehow feverish manner in comparison to the other two CSOs, and since we were able to observe them, we will try to explain our observations and impressions under the title below in a different style.

5. 4. 4. 1 The Story of an Election

Preliminary Information: The elections are held every two years at the IMO Ankara Branch. Essentially, the competition between two separate lists as rightists and leftists has become a traditional aspect of these elections. The leftists have been winning the elections for a long time. In the last 21 years, the rightists could come out of the elections victorious only twice. Even though the growing strength of rightists in last few years is a cause of concern, it is expected that the leftists will win the elections this year as well, if a single list can be formed. Consequently, being able to enter into the list of leftists means getting elected. Leftists can be broken down to many groups among themselves. However, the presence of an enemy leads them to agree upon a single list. After the list is determined, even those leftists who do not embrace the list strive to make this list the winning list.

The primary goal is not to let the rightists win. Since, they are in power for years, leftists use the body called Small Council, which was originally formed to run general operations, in order to continue the preparation process for elections. The Small Council consists of members appointed by the Board of Directors; in other words, the leftists. In the elections of the previous year, four different groups declared their candidacy for elections at the Small Councils; since a consensus could not be reached, primary elections were held, and the Revolutionist Group won the primary elections. In this process, the Revolutionist Group, in fact, repudiated primary elections as a method, and defended the method of consensus against it.

The First Council We Attended: The meeting starts with the opening speech of the Chairman, and continues with some other emotional speeches. There is no way that

someone with no prior knowledge and who listens to the first ten speeches could foresee the aggressive speeches to come one after another after the 11th speech. In these speeches, agitating talks about democracy, progressiveness, modernity etc. were given. With the 11th speech spelling out the word primary elections, the council suddenly turns into a discussion with two clear poles. One group defends the primary elections and the other the consensus method for leftists to determine their candidates. An outside observer can witness a negotiation taking place, over which communicative mind seems to completely prevail.

The arguments are as follows:

1. Primary elections are the most democratic method. A narrow group deciding a staff to represent all the leftists within the organization is anti-democratic; it is a sign of elitism.

2. It is the primary elections in fact which would lead to anti-democratic results. A lot of people who have nothing to do with the organization and its activities come and vote in the primary elections. Besides, the groupings caused by the primary elections act as a barrier before people who could otherwise work with each other. Instead of this, the candidates should be determined through a process of persuasion.

On the surface, one gets the impression that two arguments which are consistent internally confront each other on an intellectual level. However, the fact that these arguments are defended very rigidly and with no concessions, that the speakers virtually put out a show, that sometimes insulting expressions are spelled out and that agitations and slogans take place leads one to think that these arguments conceal camps with some other motives. Through the interviews conducted, the situation can be characterized in the following way. Against the Revolutionist Group that won the elections the previous year, the other three groups set up a coalition, and within this internal council, the Social Democratic Group was observed to constitute the majority. As a result, if the primary elections were put to vote, the Social Democratic Group would come out on top. In fact, the Revolutionist group thinks that it would also win the primary elections. However, since there is an argument that the institutionalization of primary elections would lead to

fragmentation in the long run, the Revolutionist group dominant within the organization believes that in the future this would give harm to the struggle against the rightists, and considers primary elections as a virus that would ruin the unity of leftists. Social Democratic Group expects to throw in a certain number of names into the list even though it does not come out with a great victory from the primary elections. On the other hand, if the consensus method is adopted, an upper committee will be determined, and this committee will determine the list. The atmosphere indicates that this upper committee (to be formed by former directors and influential people) would act in favor of the Revolutionist Group. Thus, it was concluded that all the maneuvers at the meetings serve the purpose of accomplishing a goal or preventing this.

After the first ten good will speeches which took up the first 30 minutes of the meeting, mutual attacks took place along these lines for about two and a half hours. However, there is something which could not be clarified through the observations: How would this method be decided? Our guess we make as participant observers is that it will be done through voting within the internal council. However, in such a case, the impression obtained is that the Revolutionist Group would lose. The speakers from the Revolutionist Group talked about the impossibility of primary elections with such confidence that one suspected the existence of a B Plan. Actually, this plan was put in action at the end of the meeting. Social Democratic Group declared that the decision had to be taken and the president had to put the decision to vote. The president, which was apparently from the Revolutionist Group, and accused by the Social Democratic Group of behaving in a biased manner, somehow dragged its feed to proceed to the voting. The leaders of the Revolutionist Group claimed that there would be no voting, only a right to be a candidate for nomination until the next Small Council, that this decision was made in previous internal councils, and as a result it would not be right to change it again. In their opinion, only when a list cannot agreed upon after the nomination period is expired, primary elections can be considered. The spokesmen of the Social Democratic Group raised a question that immediately appears in one's mind in the following way: Then what was the point in discussing until now? Upon this incident, the

Social Democratic Group insists on voting for the decision, and asks for a voting. However, the Revolutionist Group claims that a decision made previously cannot be violated, that the meeting is over, and starts to leave the meeting venue. The quarrel between the president and the Social Democratic Group continues for a while as the meeting hole is slowly being evacuated in the meantime. All of a sudden, the meeting was over, there was not a decision made for primary elections and the discussions would be deferred until next week.

The Second Small Council Meeting We Attended: The second council held the next week was extraordinarily crowded, and one could sense clearly that this time the Revolutionist Group prevailed over the meeting. Besides, the fact that there were around 50 people in the list presented by the Revolutionist Group created a superiority in terms of morale at the meeting with 100 participants (it was found out later that some of the names in the list were people well respected within the organization). This time, the good will speeches do not take long. The wish that the elections would go well is expressed only by the president and a few candidates for nomination, and the two arguments of the last week are started to get articulated along the same lines, with the same thesis and in the same rigid and obstinate style. In such a case, it is expected as an observer that this event would be discussed for a while, that there would not be a conclusion, it would eventually be voted, and the result wanted by the Revolutionist group would come out of the voting. That is, there would be no primary elections, and the method of consensus would be in the way asked for by the Revolutionist Group. But the problem is that the Social Democratic Group sees this equally clearly. In this case, an attack or a concession should be expected from them. According to our guess, this attack comes after the fiery lobbying and bargaining in the next chamber. The presidency candidate of the Social Democratic Group who defended the necessity of primary elections in his/her previous talk starts to speak. He says he has a proposal that would not be refused by anyone. He really raises a surprising proposal: The proposal is consensus. The team to determine the consensus would be an upper committee that consists of Branch executives.[171] However, the Revolutionist Group, which welcomes this proposal

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[171] The number of branch executives is 3, and the number of branch administration is 7.

with enthusiasm, argues that the upper committee should not consist of executives, but of directors in view of those who died, who came to power more than once, who are not in Ankara, and would not volunteer. Besides, according to the Revolutionist Group, all of the directors of the central branch who were also branch members should take part in this committee. Apart from this, there should be a condition that the candidates for nomination get together in advance and try to reach a consensus. The content of the proposed model is discussed for a long time. Even though the presidency candidate of the Social Democratic Group states from time to time that their proposal could not be changed and if changed they would withdraw it, the situation seems like the consensus has already been reached. Uninterested participants have already left the meeting room. When there was a feeling that the fully expanded upper committee proposal would be accepted, the leader of the Social Democratic Group declares that their proposal is modified, that they gave prior warning on this issue and that they cannot accept this proposal in its expanded form. However, he leaves the meeting hole with his group, one of the three groups within the Social Democratic Camp. It was unclear why the leader of the Social Democratic Group did not insist and virtually ran away. The remaining two social democratic groups remained at the meeting, but neither did they support the proposal of the presidency candidate who left the meeting nor oppose it. While it was clear that the proposal was to their advantage, why didn't they strive for better at least? The meeting in this way concluded with the desire of the Revolutionist Group.

Consensus: After two Small Councils, the demand of the group who wanted the candidate list to be determined through consensus took hold. As observers, it was expected that the presidency candidate of the Social Democratic Group would be chosen as president, but that majority of the list would consist of the Revolutionist Group. However, the result came as a surprise once more. The list completely consisted of the members of the Revolutionist Group except one person (this person withdrew from candidacy later on). The consensus was reached with the Revolutionist Group taking over all of the management.

Scenarios: At the detailed interviews conducted, this issue was discussed in detail, and many members told a different reality scenario about these maneuvers. However, these realities do not quite resemble each other:

1. The leader of the Social Democratic Group supported this idea in the backstage thinking that he would be the president. But then the Revolutionist Group cheated him as well (the interpretation of a member from the Revolutionist Group).

2. The leader of the Social Democratic Group betrayed his group; suggested this method expecting that he could get elected (the interpretation of a member from the Social Democratic Group).

3. The leader of the Social Democratic Group conducted a study in advance, and expected that an upper committee that would consist of "executives" would elect him (the interpretation of a member from the Revolutionist Group).

4. The leader of the Social Democratic Group proposed this method, which is some kind of a consensus, seeing that the dominant view at the meeting is pro-consensus. Because the members of the Board of Directors already constituted a large number. The Revolutionist Group, however, restricted the decision by bringing in the General Center and putting forward other conditions (the interpretation of a member from the Social Democratic Group).

It is not within the scope of this research to determine which of these scenarios is "real." Yet, all of what was told is real from the perspective of who told them. In fact, the realities of the organization do not lie in the professional sector, but in these scenarios

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This research attempted to discover the internal dynamics of the civil society experience in Turkey around the three CSOs (KADER, MAZLUMDER and IMO). Considering the results of the research, one can say that there was collected rich information on the democracy practice, internal procedures, participation channels, organizational life and motivations in these CSOs. As discussed above, each of these 3 organizations have many serious differences and similarities. Actually, in the beginning of the research, these organizations were selected from the results of an outstanding research (Akşit et. all. 2003a), which categorized the CSOs in the frame of a democracy scale. Therefore, their becoming qualitatively different (from the perspective of ideology, organization and members) was a desired condition at the outset of this study. However, since the aim of this research is to understand the contribution of the civil practices and processes in the public life and the democracy practice of Turkey; apart from their differences, the research was designed to fallow the common topics (organizational life, democracy practices, voluntary participation, publicity etc.) in all of the three CSOs. So, the differences and similarities came to surface around these common aspects, which provide us a ground for comparing them.

When starting to this study, it was emphasized that there is not a reconciled conception of the civil society in the literature. In addition to this, the genesis, development and transformation of the concept are examined with reference the history of the West. However although the concept belongs to the historical trajectory of the West, it is argued that especially with the globalization process, the concept gains a worldwide influence and reality and starts to have an effective place in the political and social discourses and agendas of the global community. So, the

civil society discourse, with its references, has been articulated into the local agendas of the political and social groups. In this sense, the civil society debates also found itself a fertile ground in Turkey in the last 20 years. For that reason, from the beginning of the research, this work has denied an orientalist approach, which regards the civil society as a normative standard and measure. In this framework, throughout this study there is not made a discussion about the existence or non-existence or civility or uncivility of the Turkish experience but it is tried to focus on the articulation of this civil society discourse into the peculiar organizational contexts. Since we can argue that the existence of every discourse (such as civil society) is only possible with reference to other discourses. In this sense, all of these 3 organizations are considered under the category of civil society (irrespective of their different qualities) and their civility has been discussed especially with reference to their function of publicity and the practice of organizational democracy.

When considering the overall results of the research, first we can state that despite their different aims, demands and histories all these three CSOs have an intensive involvement in the public sphere in the sense of participation, public deliberation and political intervention. They are acting in the social and political sphere and they are directly showing an interest in the social and political issues related with the political society (state, political parties and local governments). If to define the political public sphere as the "quintessential concept denoting all these conditions of communication under which there can come into being a discursive formation of opinion and will on the part of a public composed of the citizens of a state" (Habermas, 1996: 446) we can argue that these three CSOs have a serious political function in the public sphere by constituting an initiative and opinion based on the deliberation.

For instance, when analyzing KADER Ankara Branch, we see that the organization is working both for the representation of women in politics and decision making processes and for the hegemonization of the women sensitive perspective in the legal system, local governments and execution processes. As depicted in the activity report, KADER Ankara Branch has many different actions and projects such as training courses for the women, information meetings, radio

programs, preparation of the women for the elections, lobbying activities and international relations in the level of political parties, local governments and international institutions such as UN and EU. It is noticed that there can be some disputes in the contents of the activities within the organization especially related with the Central Office of the organization. However, it seems that KADER Ankara Branch shows a quite serious performance in the transmission of the idea of women's participation into the discourse of political public sphere. Besides, apart from its routine field of work, KADER Ankara Branch has been organizing "Women Coalition Meetings" in which, the representatives of different women organizations (such as the İslamists, Kemalists, Liberals or Feminists) come together and try to establish an alliance based on the minimum agreements for the problems of the women. Even this activity could be considered as an excellent experience for the formation of civil dialogue among the civil organizations of different ideological and political backgrounds. Moreover, those meetings are especially crucial experiences and examples, since they are illustrating the possibility of establishing the idea of equality in the formal deliberation procedures between the CSOs in Turkey. Although weak in the sense of political weight, all the individuals that we have interviewed (both from within and outside KADER) seem to argue that the "Women Coalition" is quite an egalitarian practice in the sense of speaking order, not interrupting the other, waiting for the turn of speaking, tolerating the ideas of the other, equal time limits etc. KADER seems have been succeeded in bringing the Kemalist and Islamist women – who have been zero tolerance to each other - to the same table by virtue of these meetings, which would be an impossible event just for a few years ago. Although there have been still some problems in maintaining equal distance to all the political parties regarding the general political stance of KADER, the principle of equal distance seems to be set up within the KADER Ankara Branch. When considering of the possibility of reaching to a consensus, as an outcome of the deliberation process, this situation seems to verify the general theoretical framework of Habermas about the communicative action.

In a similar way, when looking to MAZLUMDER Ankara Branch[172] we witnessed a serious struggle against the violations of human rights ranging from the rights of handicapped people to the unknown homicides. Among these actions and activities of the association we can sort some of them as such: press releases, protests, campaigns, and periodic human rights reports, legal and judicial supports for the people who have been subjected to oppression. Like KADER, MAZLUMDER has also strong relations with a network of SCOs both in Turkey and abroad. Indeed, although MAZLUMDER has been categorized under the Islamist SCOs, there is an outstanding achievement of the association about the civil dialogue. It has a very effective contacts, intra-organizational relations and collaborations with their counterparts in the left such as İHD or TİHV Indeed, as a peculiar quality, MAZLUMDER's cooperation with the oppositional left circles in the field of human rights is a very precious experience, which cannot be seen very often in the field of civil society in Turkey. It is possible to argue that the human rights organizations MAZLUMDER, İHD and TİHV have succeeded to construct an "ideal speech situation" despite their different positions in the conception of human rights. This situation was approved both by the members of these different organizations. To a certain degree, it could be argued that this positive dialogue has stemmed from the universal character of the human rights. However, it is understood that these human rights organizations has evolved into their recent dialogical level as a result of their struggles against the state (the official ideology and the official institutions representing it) which is considered by them as the real responsible for these violations.

The members of these organizations point out that the common problems in the field led them look for the common solutions and common activities in which they can share the knowledge and information at the simple level. This is the direct consequence of field works in the public sphere. However, since the human rights activity has been most of the time directly targeting the state and its implications, this continuously invites MAZLUMDER into conflict with the state. However, it is

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[172] Since, MAZLUMDER Ankara Branch was established in 2002, the association and its activities are considered together with the activities of Central Office.

said that this situation has been the destiny of the human rights organizations, since they have to follow an opposition line against all the governments. Namely, apart from bringing the human rights problems into the agenda of political and social public sphere, the *raison d'etre* of these kinds of CSOs is opposition to the state, since human rights are oppositional to all the power structures. Thus, this creates a disadvantaged position for the human rights organizations. For instance, the members of MAZLUMDER noticed that their association was occupied by the police and closed down for a temporary period in the post 28 February era. In a similar way, the local branches of the association were subjected to legal preventions and informal oppressions in the same process. Therefore, when we consider from the perspective of deliberation and communication with social and political sphere, MAZLUMDER seems to be very active in its endeavor in participating the public sphere, formulating and hegemonizing its own word in the public discourse. Indeed, it is seen that this endeavor could sometimes damage even to the public and physical existence of the association itself. Perhaps we can evaluate this tension as the basic dynamic of MAZLUMDER as a civil society organization. To sum up, MAZLUMDER seems to fulfill an important public function with its activities and actions in the public sphere, which should "be viewed democratically as the creation of procedures whereby those effected by general social norms and collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation stipulation and adoption" according to Benhabib (1996: 87). This point is very critical since in the Habermassian line of thought, without an interest in others and a sense of involvement with the well being of the collectivity there is no public sphere. Second, apart from the different discussions about the categories and contents of the human rights, MAZLUMDER seems to give its energy mostly to the implication of the provisions of the legal and international human rights documents, which were signed by the Turkish Republic. This indicates that MAZLUMDER involves and participates into the discussion by referring to a common deliberation ground: the constitutional and international provisions.

IMO Ankara Branch is different then other two organizations as being a semi-official and vocational public organization established under law. However,

when considering its interest and involvement in the public issues, we can argue that IMO Ankara Branch is also in a similar political and social engagement in comparison with the other two organizations. However this engagement does not stem just from its vocational character. For, the trade organizations[173] had functioned as the extension of the guild system in Ottoman Empire and their status had continued for a long time in the new Turkish Republic. The organizations of professions stayed within the boundaries of vocational problems until the 1970s. However, with the growing politicization of the conjuncture, the members of professions such as doctors, engineers, teachers, architectures and so on. determined their political stance on the left and experience a leftist socialization process. This period between 1970 and 1980 determined the organizational and political structure and life of the chambers of TMMOB. Since that time, the quality of being a trade organization has been understood in the context of supporting the leftist-socialist struggle by the mediation of professional problems. Although not strong as in the past, this approach still prevails in the chambers of the TMMOB. In this context, we can consider IMO Ankara Branch[174] as a CSO, which has been shaped by a strict leftist socialization. Therefore, it can be argued that in this organization the political participation, policy suggestion and mostly opposition –while the left could not come to power for long years in Turkey- are of existential meaning beyond having vocational identity thinking with the terms of Arendt. Since, from the perspective of the active members of these chambers, there is no way out of the vocational politics to exist and to act in the political public sphere. As a proper example, an older engineer of the revolutionary side explains the conflict within the group of "Contemporary Engineers" in the Small Council with reference to the revolutionary days in the past. He said:

> *You cannot understand this excitement. The younger generations could not understand this excitement, even my children, they are also engineers,*

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[173] For a detailed information see Bora 2002.

[174] It was founded in 1977 when the political polarization in Turkey reached to the top.

could not understand this. Since, they haven't had the taste of changing something with the political initiative within the social struggle[175].

Apart from the political intervention into the public sphere, the agitative political conflict within the chamber reminds us Arendt's fallowing words that we cited above related with man's having a public and political existence.

> The political community is the realm of action *par excellence*. Men act in all areas of life, but the political community is explicitly designed to encourage action.... It provides a ready audience; it generally has a long and inspiring tradition of action; it offers countless associations for action, and guarantees "immortal fame" to noble words and deeds. (Arendt, 1998: 198).

As discussed above, Arendt thinks that the political community opens the possible horizons for human beings to behave in an extraordinary way and to feel themselves as an important part of the public sphere by providing them a real experience of freedom. Actually, most of the interviews made with the members of IMO Ankara Branch verified this statement. The members explained their participation motivation mostly by referring to political references, which were put by the mediation of the vocational issues. Accordingly, it was witnessed that, IMO Ankara Branch executes a rash political struggle or better opposition to the government both in the professional issues (earthquake, public law of adjudication, sustainable energy, transportation politics, housing politics etc.) and directly in the political problems such as Palestine Problem, Iraq War, Kurdish Problem, Nationalism, Unemployment, Industrial Investments, Energy Politics and so forth.) As a matter of fact, from the perspective of participating into public debates and formulating opinions and solutions to the existing problems we see that TMMOB in the general level and IMO Ankara Branch at the particular one, show an outstanding performance. However, beyond this publicity function over which we discuss the

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[175] Anlayamazsınız, genç kuşaklar benim çocuklarım dahil, onlar da mühendislik yapıyorlar, anlayamıyorlar. Toplumsal mücadele içinde siyasal insiyatif kullanarak bir şeyleri değiştirmenin tadını hiç almadılar çünkü.

participation and political involvement of the Chamber, their way of making politics and their line of opposition seems to be more agonistic rather then deliberative.

Before summing up our observations about the publicity dimension, let's recall Keane's important definition. He describes the function of the voluntary association as "maintaining and redefining the boundaries between civil society and state through two interdependent and simultaneous processes: the expansion of social equality and liberty and the reconstructing and democratization of the state" (quoted in Habermas,1996: 454). Yet, when looking at the activities of the three CSOs, we observe that each of them tries to redefine those boundaries between the state and civil society from their own perspectives. As a result, we can conclude that irrespective of their different aims, fields of work and ideological position[176], each of these three CSOs are carrying out their function quite well by deepening and extending the borderlines of the public sphere.

Looking at these 3 CSOs from a different angle, we see that, their picture on the public sphere does not going parallel to their performance on voluntary action and intra-organizational participation dimensions. During the interviews when speaking of the participation, all the chairpersons and administrators complained about the low rate of participation. They argued that the voluntary activity is understood in our country as the free and irresponsible leisure activity. In that sense, they emphasize that most of the members are just members on the paper and in reality the organization of the jobs are realized by just one or two persons. This situation is also verified by the observations made within these organizations. Although, there can be seen many different and colorful activities in the reports, it is revealed that they are the outcomes of the intensive works of some believed and highly responsible members. Essentially, the members of these organizations command that this low rate of participation is not just the problem of these three CSOs but a general problem of CSOs in Turkey. This was also verified by many emprical researches (Tosun, 2000, Akşit et. al 2003a, Coşkun 2004) related with the CSOs. Then, what can be the reason of this low rate of participation? Concerning

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[176] In some special cases such as "Iraq War" or the absurd decisions and implications of Melih Gökçek (Mayor of Ankara Municipality) such as the closure of main boulevard of Ankara for the pedestrians, these organizations could come together within the same place of action.

our research, we can sort out some clear but limited answers to this question. For KADER, it seems the extension of the weakness of the women movement in Turkey and it is the hegemonic perception: the politics is the job of the rich men. For MAZLUMDER it seems the cultural distance of the members to the concept of human rights, which have been considered as foreign-based and leftist. Lastly for IMO, it is the weakening of the social opposition in which the elements of TMMOB constitute and reproduce themselves and the economic, social and cultural transformation of the engineers in time. These all are proper statements about the low rate of participation. However, at this point we should take the issue from a different perspective.

If we accept the postulate that the CSOs are set up for representing the needs and aims of a group of people in the public sphere, why then the participation is low? It is my contention that there is a deep and underlying reason, which transcends the limits and scope of this research. However, based on some findings of the research, I want to touch upon some clues, which enforces me to think about this issue.

In one of my early work with my friends (Cengiz, Tol, Küçükural, 2004) referring to Sancar, we argued that the sociological structure of Turkey rests on informality based on family, kinship and cultural community. In this context, it can be argued that this informal social structure meets the participation[177] needs of the people and they do not need any other organizations or socialites to get in except extra ordinary conditions. Accordingly, the western type of CSOs focusing on some peculiar issues such as KADER or MAZLUMDER are most of the time not

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[177] I can give here an interesting example, which brings an explanation to the low rate of participation in the context of informal sociality. One of the prominent members from the right-wing group in IMO Ankara Branch noticed that the low-rate of participation is very similar also for the engineers on the right. He claims that, out of the electoral periods there is not a participation motivation also within the right-wing group itself. According to him, the engineers in the right-wing are more closer to the state and power than the leftist and they can solve their problems more easily with the state without the mediation of the Chamber. Therefore, they do not needed to be strictly organized as the left-wing group and do not see the participation as an urgent need. However there is no place for the leftist to be out of the Chamber. So they have been organized more seriously, and thus winning the elections for 15 years.

corresponding to the real needs of people but to the sensitivities[178] of some small intellectual groups. Concerning the results of this research I can state some similar trends especially in these two CSOs that have been studied.

Generally speaking, if to consider those three CSOs, we can state that they are working like their counterparts in the West both from the perspective of their activities and visions. However, when looking closer to the organizational practice, it would easily be seen that these are quasi-community structures composed of people having similar political and cultural backgrounds and/or tendencies. In this sense, these organizations are practically closed communities and indeed I think their effectiveness stems from these small but harmonious cadres.

Taking KADER Ankara Branch for instance, we notice that there is a group of friends directing the association. While one part of this group is composed of scholars, the other is coming from the women movement of the last 20 years. Basically, KADER Ankara Branch is a feminist friend circle that tries to determine the needs of women and to realize these in the name of women. Similarly MAZLUMDER Ankara Branch is other group of qualified people organized, selected and trained by a charismatic leader. Even the establishment of the Ankara Branch itself is the outcome of this influence. Both in these two organizations the opposition or the ones who are thinking different than the administration are mostly waiting in silence and do not participate. Although there is no formal or legal obstacle in their participation, it seems that they could not find a place for themselves in its spontaneity. However, the critical and distinctive point here is that for both of these organizations, the channels are open to the people who are willing to participate.

In short these organizations seem civil in the sense of their activities but communal in their internal practice. We can find some interesting examples. For

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[178] For instance, in this context, MAZLUMDER, can be assesed as an association founded by a small group primarily to deal with the problem of headscarf not for the general human rights violations though, the latter stands in its official discourse about the foundation. Similiarly, KADER was also founded by a limited and elitist women circle to realize a specific aim, the increase of women's participation into the politics. However, the crucial point is that both of these organizations succeeded to transcend their starting points in a much democratic way.

instance, concerning MAZLUMDER Ankara Branch, it is complained that the members are not criticizing the administration, since they are thinking that when they do it they would decrease the excitement of the administration. This is similar in the elections for the board of directors. No one wants to be seen as willing for being a candidate. Therefore, the prominent people of the community convince some members and show them as the candidates.[179] As a matter of the fact, it can be argued that in both of these two organizations there is a kind of community democracy[180] based on peaceful agreement in the context of intra-organizational relations and decision-making processes.

Comparing to these two CSOs, IMO Ankara Branch shows some differences in its size, quality (as being a trade organization established under law) and history; but, it gives a similar picture in the context of voluntary participation and community democracy. The difference here is that there is not a community but communities, which, are also composed of some small communities, and the second difference is that the community democracy here is not based on peaceful agreement but on power relations and an elitist approach.

Therefore, from now on we can pass to our other critical concept: the agonistic democracy, which I think is more appropriate in explaining the total experience of IMO Ankara Branch and the peculiar relations of MAZLUMDER and KADER's Ankara Branches with their central offices.

In this context first, we see that there are the two main communities as left and right in the name of "Contemporary Engineers" and "Union in Profession" which also comprise some small fractions[181] in IMO Ankara Branch. Since the historical and traditional left/right polarization has been very sharp in TMMOB, the communication and election processes have been reduced into a zero sum game for years. In the last 15 years the left group have been in power and the right group is

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[179] This situation is just valid for the organizational life of the branches of these two organizations. For both of them there is a distinct situation in the electoral processes of Central Office.

[180] By community democracy I do not imply the concept of "communitarian democracy".

[181] However, while the right group is totally excluded from the organizational practice of IMO Ankara Branch, we could just examine the left group in this study.

totally outside of the organization. Hence, the organizational life is just composed of the activities of the left block.

When looking to the relations between these two main groups it can easily be seen that there is a vital conflict between the two. As we noted above, the power struggle still goes on by referring to the "honored past" and the other group is seen as the "fascist enemy" at least from the perspective of the left.[182] Under these circumstances there cannot be a dialogue or deliberation possibility or such an agenda. Although the intensity of this polarization seems to be weakened and there are many informal contacts and formal contracts of the leftist and rightist engineers[183] in the construction sector, the political discourse still is colored with the same references in the organizational life. So, the sole agenda in IMO Ankara Branch is not loosing the elections and not allowing the "fascists" to conquest the administration of the Chamber, which is seen as one of the last castles of the left opposition. Therefore, it is impossible to explicate this relation with the terms of deliberation and consensus. Then, how can we define this relation? I think at this point Laclau and Mouffe's way of thinking provides us a much proper frame to understand the conflictual power relations in IMO Ankara Branch. If to remember their basic argument on the nature of the politics we see that the conflict and disagreement are the indispensable and constitutive elements for their conception of democracy which emphasizes much more the relations of power and the construction of hegemony, rather then agreement and consensus. Inspired by Schmitt, Mouffe (1993: 2) underlines the existence of an element of hostility among human beings as the critical dimension of the political. She argues that a democratic politics requires an introduction of a distinction between the figure of the enemy and that of the adversary

When looking at the relations between the left and right groups, it is clear that these relations cannot be defined even as agonistic, since these are the relations between two enemies rather than an enemy and adversary. Although not strict and violent as in the past, these relations still goes on such a hostile ground, whose parts

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[182] Most probably it is vice versa for the right from their standpoint.
[183] One of the leaders of the rightist group that we interviewed says that he has quite well relations with the leftist administration of the Chambers and interpersonal contacts with the leftist engineers.

do not accept the legitimacy of each other. However, when passing to the intra-group dynamics (the interior relations of the left group), this time this friend/enemy relation turns into a relation of friend/adversary as Mouffe suggests, but this time in a restricted manner and under the effect of community democracy based on power. Since, in this organization there is a small but organized and engaged group of revolutionist engineers[184] (from the old and new generations) who are controlling the organizational life of the IMO Ankara Branch behind the curtain. In this control, it seems that the strategic and tactical factors are also playing a crucial role. For instance, in the Small Council meetings, made for the determination of the candidates list of the left, the social democratic group demanded primary elections for the determination of the list. However, this demand was neglected and overlooked by some tactical games and the revolutionist group even does not allow this demand to be presented to vote. In a critical point when they understood the atmosphere was close to vote, they suddenly left the meeting place and made the elections practically impossible resting on their intra-organizational power. Here there is a situation, which theoretically verifies but practically falsifies Habermas' statement that in a democratic deliberation, the conditions and procedures should be equal.

At the end of these electoral discussions, we see that the duty of determining the list was given to a committee of former administrators[185], an elite group within the organization and they determined the list[186]. The result was the realization of the will of the revolutionist group. Considering from this perspective, IMO Ankara Branch seems not to be so successful in the sense of voluntary participation, and intra-organizational democracy as in the case of its function of publicity. Since, it is seriously polarized organization, which totally excludes the other and though formally organized according to a democratic centralist structure within itself, has an elitist organizational culture and operation when it comes informal processes.

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[184] These are very prestigious individuals due to their personal political struggles against the fascists within the TMMOB in pre and post 1980 period.
[185] These people are mostly composed of the engineers from the revolutionist group.
[186] The list is full of revolutionist engineers except one social democrat member, who would be withdrawn later.

The agonistic conception of democracy and its analysis of power relations seem also to be much appropriate for understanding the general administrative relations in MAZLUMDER and KADER at the points of disagreement. As we talked above, both organizations have some unsolved problems and irreconciled discussions on the political, ideological and organizational issues. In these cases, in which the parts are not agreed on the same point, it is seen that there emerges a serious power struggle in the discursive field. As in the case of "National Anthem" debate or in the general ambiguity of the association related with the distance to the Islamist women, there is a serious hegemony struggle between the women politics and official ideology in KADER. Indeed, this struggle some times includes anti-democratic elements but in generally there seems a basis for an agonistic struggle. On the other side a different discussion is going on the position of the association in MAZLUMDER related with the content of human rights. The problem is that either they should defend an Islamic conception of human rights or more emphasize the universal aspects of human rights. It seems that for both of these organizations these issues are a matter of serious conflict and have been passionately discussed in the general meetings including the tactical and strategic maneuvers as we touched above. However, their distinctive character is that they do not depend on such polarized relations canceling out the legitimacy of the other. Therefore, to conclude we can assert that while these two organizations depend on a kind of intra-community democracy resting on peaceful agreement in the level of branches, they have an agonistic democratic culture in the level of general administration and in their relations with the central offices. The organizational and political inclinations of these CSOs towards more democratic and universal norms prove their potential for the agonistic democracy.

Finally, I aim to end up my discussion by emphasizing a critical result related with the civil practice of the three organizations that have been studied. Considering the general results of the research we can conclude that compared to their departing points, MAZLUMDER in the general sense and KADER in the peculiar context of its Ankara Branch have been experiencing a great transformation in the context of

democratic practice, organizational and membership structure and relations with other CSOs (either in Turkey or abroad). It was stated that the personal characteristics and charisma of the leaders are of very importance in this transformation. However, the most crucial thing in this change seems to be the collaborative activities and actions realized in the public sphere with the contribution of other CSOs or institutions, which have different political and ideological frames. This surprising condition itself is the most critical finding of this research, in the context of the transformative potential of the civil society and its contribution to the practice of public sphere and democracy. In this context we can argue that the civil experience in public sphere at least for the two CSOs we discussed above seems to be a progress of democratization whilst also including their organizational peculiarities or specific rationalities that we discussed above.

For instance, it is seen that MAZLUMDER itself has shown a great democratic performance, which transcends its founding fathers and cadres. It is such that Plagemann (2002: 382) defines this condition as the "professionalization" and "Europeanization" of MAZLUMDER. A similar condition could be defined also for KADER Ankara Branch. Since it was founded in the conjuncture of the Islamic revival by a cadre mostly composed of liberal, republican and elitist women in the sense of their income and education. Therefore, even the foundation of the association itself implied an implicit opposition to this Islamic uprising. However, today it is clearly seen that at least for the Ankara Branch, KADER has achieved to settle a more feminist political perspective to its own members and to a certain degree to the other women organizations as an outcome of its collaborative relations with the women organizations, political parties and local governments of different ideological and political backgrounds. There is no doubt that this feminist stance has not been totally espoused and interiorized and the discussions have been still continuing. However, the point is that, the Kemalist and Islamist women, who have understood each other as their enemies for years, came and sit on the same table under the equal conditions of deliberation and tried to find a common ground for the solution of the women problems. This experience is very critical in showing the

democratic and transformative potential of the civil society, apart from its being a first for Turkey.

At this point we have to underline the international dimension of this transformation, especially the EU accession process of Turkey. It is seen that the EU accession process provides a critical ground for these two CSOs both for their activities and the effects of their actions in the political public sphere. There are two reasons of this. First, the EU provides a direct financial assistance to these organizations to develop their institutional structure and/or to realize their projects and second, EU accepts these organizations as the address related with their field of work and refers to the suggestions of these organizations in its formal reports and documents. This situation makes the activities of these CSOs much more valuable both in the eyes of the Turkish State, the international circles and the public opinion. Beyond those practical outcomes, the international relations of these CSOs with different institutions (universities, bureaucrats, SCO's, citizen initiatives and so on) and international organizations such as EU, UN, AI (Amnesty International) provide them a rich information flow and a global vision and perspective.

In this context, IMO Ankara Branch stands at a different point compared to the other two CSOs. Although, it is fulfilling a serious political function in the public sphere it does not show the similar performance in the realm of its organizational transformation towards a democratic way. On the contrary, we witness that almost all the energy of the organization is exhausted for maintaining the existing political balance between the political groups. The historical, ideological and (semi-official public) vocational identity emerges as a critical factor in this situation. This condition itself gives us some important clues about the differences of the "democratic mass organizations"[187] of the past and the civil society organizations of today in the context of democracy practice. In this sense the findings of this research that we discussed above are not parallel to some of the results of a recent research which, argues that it is not possible to indicate that the new social movements increased the intra-organizational participation and democracy and it seems not so easy to argue for today that the new social

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[187] IMO Ankara Branch defines itself as a democratic mass organization rather then a CSO.

movements have more appropriate structures compared to old social movements for the agonistic or deliberative democracy to be implemented (Çoşkun, 2004: 194-199).

Consequently, within the limited scope of this study we can summarize our findings as such. First, it seems possible to argue that the civil society discourse has been effectively penetrated into the Turkish society and articulated into the public life of Turkey. In this sense the CSOs that have been studied show an intensive involvement in the public sphere in the sense of participation, public deliberation and political intervention and have a serious political function in the public sphere by constituting an initiative and opinion based on the deliberation. So they are successfully carrying out their function of deepening and extending the borderlines of the political public sphere irrespective of their different aims, fields of work and ideological positions.

Second, the CSOs seem to experience serious problems in the sense of voluntary activity and participation; however this does not stem from their being CSOs but from the general conjuncture and the informal social structure of Turkey. As a result of this situation, in their intra-organizational relations the CSOs show a limited organizational practice, which we called as community democracy. But the critical point here is that although limited in practice and small in size the effects of these organizations are great and the CSOs are open to participation in a wider sense for those who will.

Third, the CSOs show a serious potential and performance for a democratic transformation both in the sense of their organizational structure and political stance. They seem to have a serious capacity to be transformed in a much democratic way, which would also contribute to the process of democratic transformation in Turkey. The most important reason of this change seems to be the collaborative activities and actions realized in the public sphere with other organizations. In addition to this, the international relations of these CSOs and EU accession process of Turkey seems to provide a proper ground for this transformation.

Fourth, although the CSOs are giving a similar picture in the context of public sphere, voluntary participation and community democracy, there are some distinctive features emerging at the level of organizational democracy related with the history, ideology and status of the organizations. At this point, IMO stands in a different place as a semi-official trade organization and as an old social movement in compared to the voluntary associations: KADER and MAZLUMDER.

Finally, it is possible to claim that both the theories of deliberative and radical democracy are analytical devices in understanding the experience of the CSOs. However, while the first is more proper to explicate the public sphere dimension the latter is much appropriate to understand the conflicts and disagreements of organizational practices.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

The Political Demands and Activities of KADER (Association for Training and Supporting the Women Candidates)

A. The Political Demands of KADER

1. Politics of Equality

⇨ Woman quota of minimum % 30 to be put within the regulations of political parties

⇨ The establishment of "Equality Ombudsperson Institution" to solve the problems related with the discrimination against the woman without delay and any cost.

⇨ All the possible measures to be taken and to be put into practice in line with the CEDAW Contract, which was signed in 2002 by the Turkish Republic

⇨ The General Directorate of The Women Status to be turned into a Ministry of Woman

⇨ The punishments in the Penal Code of Turkish Republic for incest, rape, rape in marriage, virginity control, murder of honor and the other crimes committing in the name of honor to be increased and the incest cases to be included within the scope of The Law of Preservation of The Family.

2. Social Politics

⇨ The establishment a national mechanism to stop violence

⇨ Seting up of a free telephone line (ALO ŞİDDET), which can be reached from all parts of Turkey for 24 hours, for women who are exposed to violence to learn how and where to apply

⇨ Increasing of the number of shelters for women, providing permission for independent shelters for women and financing of these

shelters by getting share from the Found of Social Assitance and Solidarity

⇨ Starting a campaign to make people of conscious for preventing violence

⇨ Broadening and improving the extend of individual social insurance in the form of including health insurance and providing unemployement women or housewifes benefit from this application

⇨ Rearranging the draft law of local management by taking the woman's point of view into account and the establishment of private expertise commissions comprising of woman organizations, to make women studies in the local governments.

⇨ The establishment of a specific units serving for women in provincial governments and municipalities and taking women's needs into account in urban (development) plans.

⇨ Taking necessary prequations and making necessary studies (researches, public opinion campaigns etc) for the abolishment of the crimes commited in the name of honour including virginity control, all of which aims at controlling woman sexuality.

B. Activities of KADER[188]

1. Projects

⇨ The project of "Training Women for the Europian Union" and realized in coordination with ARI Movement (supported by The English Embassy).

⇨ The project of "Empowering Women in Local Politics" (supported by Denmark Embassy).

⇨ The project of "Vote to Your Woman Mayor: Empowering the Democracy in Local Election of 2004" (supported by UNDP).

⇨ The project of "The Making of National Organization for the Membership of Turkey to European Woman Lobby" (supported by The General Secretary of European Union).

2. Other Activities

⇨ Activities realized within the "Woman Coalition" comprising of woman organizations having different political views.

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[188] It is compiled from the activity report of KADER Ankara Branch including the activities between July 2002- July 2004.

⇨ Activities realized within the scope "My Ankara Platform" constituted to formulate a shared will against the urban problems of Ankara.

⇨ Campaigns against economic violence.

⇨ Advocacy activities and repor preparations in coordination with CEDAW and UNFPA.

⇨ Preparations realized in Kader Ankara Branch for the European Social Forum.

⇨ Setting of a consulting office within the Kader Ankara Branch oriented towards the local elections.

⇨ Studies aiming at improvement and the rehabilitation of the existing laws related with the participation of women in politics and social life in general.

APPENDIX 2

MAZLUMDER[189] (Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppresed People)

FOUNDATION

Foundation Date: 28 January 1991

Founders: 54 people consisting of lawyers, authors, publicans and businessmen. The aim of the Foundation: Defending human rights and freedoms and acting solidarity with the oppressed people.

MAIN PHILOSOPHY

⇨ The identity of the oppressed one does no matter.

⇨ Against all of the oppressors; on the side all of the oppressed people.

⇨ Wishing the same thing for everyone when you wish something for your self; claiming something beautiful, good and right for his or herself in a selfish way is a violation of human rights.

⇨ If you hate something, don't you do it too.

⇨ Regard the evil thought for someone else as it is thought for yourself; and do not let it be.

The Principles

⇨ Mazlumder is not a politic organization but an organization defending freedom expression for all kind of politic views and thoughts.

⇨ Mazlumder supports all activities by anyone as long as they respect human rights.

⇨ Mazlumder opposites all kind of human right violations committed by anyone.

⇨ The willpower of Mazlumder depends on its executive committee selected by its members.

⇨ Mazlumder is in dialogue with other international human rights organizations and defenders nearly all around the world. The aim of the dialogue is to give an end to the human rights violations and expand the freedoms and human rights.

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[189] This text is quoted from the webpage of MAZLUMDER (www.mazlumder.org)

⇨ Mazlumder regards human rights above from the states and treaties. Mazlumder does not approve abusing universal human rights for the sake of politic benefits and Mazlumder struggles against this understanding.

Main Rights

⇨ Mazlumder regards the right to live as the essence of the other rights and defends the continuing of people's culture and existence.

⇨ Mazlumder stands against torture. There is no way to make torture lawful. Mazlumder defends the independence of courts and judgements and regards everyone as innocent until her or his crime is proved by the fair and independent courts.

⇨ Mazlumder is on the side of freedom of expression without limitations for everyone unless containing violence and insult.

⇨ Mazlumder regards right to belief as a part of freedom of expression and defends the religious people's right to expression and organization.

WORKING SYSTEM

⇨ The method is: Establishing an oppression and make it heard by public. It is important to be impartial and objective on such subjects.

⇨ Mazlumder stands beside the oppressed one after esstablishing an oppression and oppressor.

⇨ Mazlumder establishes the events an prepare a report on it and informs the authorities and pursues the event.

⇨ Informing public rightfully is the necessity of the human rights.

⇨ Mazlumder issues press releases, prepare reports and make demonstrations against the violations to make it heard.

⇨ Mazlumder tries to expand the human rights culture via bulletins, books, briefings, panels and lectures.

⇨ Mazlumder starts aid campaigns as a result of various masses rights violations (such as war and immigration).

⇨ Mazlumder also starts campaigns against human rights problems became chronic and systematic.

ACTIVITIES

Books
⇨ All Aspects of the Head Scarf Problem
⇨ Our Rights
⇨ 1997 Human Rights Violations
⇨ Guide Book for the Head Scarf Problem
⇨ Monthly issued human rights bulletins
⇨ 1998 Human Rights Violations

Reports
⇨ The Southeast Immigration Report (1996)
⇨ Vice versa Immigration (1997)
⇨ North Iraq-Turkmen Problems Report (1997)
⇨ Sivas Events Report (1995)
⇨ Tunceli Report (1997)
⇨ Nigde Jail Report (1997)
⇨ Erzurum Jail Report (1997)
⇨ Bandırma Jail Report (1997)
⇨ Istanbul Office Activities Report (1996 - 1998)
⇨ The Head Scarf Problem Briefing (1998)
⇨ Dr. Şükran Erdem Report (1997)

Other Activities
⇨ Freedom for thought postcards are sent to government authorities and members of parliament.
⇨ A panel on freedom of thought under the yoke of adjudication.
⇨ Activities for the year of freedom for head scarf
⇨ Forest for head scarf freedom of head scarf
⇨ Freedom for head scarf days
⇨ Consultation meetings

Panels, conferences

⇨ Contests on poems, caricatures, articles, photograph

⇨ Many press releases

⇨ Many head scarf briefings

⇨ Notary establishments and legal consultation services.

⇨ Campaigns for the immigrants from the Southeast of Turkey and health and monetary aid.

⇨ Monetary aid campaigns for the Bosnian war victims.

⇨ Monetary aids for the victims of the result of human rights violations.

SOME SELECTED ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL OFFICE OF MAZLUMDER IN 2002- 2004[190]

Press Relases on

⇨ the politics of USA.

⇨ the decisions which are cancelling out the rights of the many candidates such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Necmettin Erbakan, Murat Bozlak ve Akın Birdal releted with the elections and on the oppresion to the DEHAP in South East.

⇨ the declaration of the Minister Ali Doğan (who is responsible for the human rights) who supports the Turkey to join the Iraqi War with USA.

⇨ the political pressures and especially on the closure attempt of Justice and Devolopment Party.

⇨ the Russian massacre operation to the Checen action.

⇨ the final declaration of the City Human Rights Congress.

⇨ the closure and HADEP and the closure attempt of DEHAP.

⇨ the market place massacre in Iraq and the internatinal law of war for both sides in Iraq.

⇨ the case of two falling rockets to the two villages of the Şanlıurfa

⇨ the raid of the Central Office and Ankara Branch of the Human Rigts Association by the police.

⇨ the soldier transfer to the Iraq.

⇨ the removal of an accused women because of her headscarf in 4. Punishment Department of High Court of Appeals and on the last discussions on the public sphere.

⇨ the organied massacre and rape lived in Sammarra in Iraq.

⇨ the arresment and jusirdiction exercise of Saddam Hüseyin

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[190] These activities atre compiled from the Activity Report of MAZLUMDER 2002-2004

Reports and Other Activities

⇨ A report was prepared and presented to the public opinion on the case of the murder of three peasants who were killed by the fire of the security personel in Diyarbakır, Bismil Province Uğrak Village.

⇨ A presentation was made for the members of Human Rights Examination Commitee of Turkish Grand National Assambly on the "Problems of OHAL (The Abnormal Condition) District".

⇨ Participation to the "Against War Meeting" organized in Malatya.

⇨ The Report entitled "The Events experineced on and after Bingöl Eartqueke" was presented to the public opinion.

⇨ The Human Rights Report of Turkey in 2003 and 2004 was presented to the public opinion.

⇨ Countless visits, meetings and contacts were organized with domestic and foreign SCOs, press, ambassies, international organizations, bureaucrats and TV channels on different issues.

⇨ Participation to the meeting entitled "The New Strategies and Tactics in the Human Rights Struggle" organized by the Turkey and Middle East Institute of Public Administration.

⇨ Participation to the panel of "Against War" organized by Foundation of the Graduates of the Ankara University Political Science Faculty.

⇨ Participation to the conference of "Democratization of the Turkey and the Solution of the Kurdish Question" organized in Ankara.

Projects

⇨ A project has been implementing since 2004 about the supporting of refugees in Turkey with the financial support of EU.

⇨ A project was prepared and presented to EU Democracy and Human Rights Micro - Project Program under the title of "The Encourgement of the Local press and Radios for the Preparation of Human Rigts Pages and Programs".

⇨ A project was prepared and presented to EU Democracy and Human Rights Micro - Project Program entitled "The Local Youth Initiatives for Human Rights".

⇨ A project was prepared and presented to EU Turkish–Greek Civil Dialogue Micro Project Program with the International Humanitarian Action and Development "Based On Neighbourly Dialogue".

Selected Activities of ANKARA Branch realized in 2003 and 2004[191]

⇨ Participation of the meeting about the rights of the handicapped people organized by the Human Rights Association

⇨ Participation of the Human Rigts Week Activity which was organized in Ankara Mamak Üreğil Women Occupational High Scool.

⇨ Participation of the commsion studies about the Punishment Law Draft organized by Human Rights Association.

⇨ Participation of the meeting about the conditions in prisons organized by Genel-İş Trade Union

⇨ Participation of the Meeting of the Foundation of Contemporary Women and Youth (Çağdaş Kadın ve Gençlik Vakfı).

⇨ Participation of the meeting entitled "Islam and Democracy" which was organized by Liberal Thought Association.

⇨ Participation to the demonstration in front of the French Embassy

⇨ A protest card was sent to Franch State from Kızılay Post Office.

⇨ The Journal and Internet site "Human Rigts" and the weekly radio program, "Human Rights Hour" have continued to its routine program.

⇨ Participation of the demonstartion in front of the Chiness Emabassy.

SOURCES OF INCOME

⇨ Membership fees

⇨ Donations of the members and supporters

⇨ Mazlumder does not accept any donation from national or international organizations or companies.

AIM OF MAZLUMDER

⇨ Mazlumder aims a world where human rights are not violated and a life fair and free. And it regards its activities as a contribution to this aspiration.

⇨ Mazlumder thinks that the obstacles for the thought and belief freedom must be abrogated and the authorities should apologise to the mind criminals.

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[191] These activities are compiled from the Activity Report of MAZLUMDER Ankara Branch 2002-2004

⇨ Mazlumder regards State Security Courts as incompatible with the understanding of a state respectful to human rights. Mazlumder defends abrogating the State Security Courts.

⇨ Mazlumder demands the article of the constitution which is incompatible with human rights to be changed into the articles which depends on human rights and main freedoms.

⇨ Mazlumder aims to stop the oppression of the institution which is turned into above the will of people.

⇨ Mazlumder struggles for to save human rights from being in the field of state and the activities of government.

⇨ Abrogating torture and the ban of head scarf completely.

⇨ Establishing standard living conditions in jails.

⇨ Mazlumder demands abrogating discrimination of belief, language, religious sect, sex, and ethnic for the law state.

⇨ In labour life, Mazlumder demands the regulations on the side of the labour and establishing the principles of the social justice

APPENDIX 3

**TMMOB (Unification of Turkish Engineers and Architects Trade Association)
Civil Engineering Trade Association (IMO) Ankara Branch -Some Selected
Activities[192]**

1. VOCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. *Panels and Seminars on*

⇨ Public Law of Adjudication (13.05.2002)

⇨ National Earthqueke Politics (19.08.2002)

⇨ Engineering and Engineering Education (19.10.2002)

⇨ National Transportation Politics (10.04.2003)

⇨ The Past, Present and Future of Transportation in Ankara (14.05.2003)

⇨ The By-Law Draft about the Reconstruction of Ankara (25.06.2003)

⇨ The Eartqueke and the Construction Control (19.08.2003)

⇨ The By-Law Draft of Public Reform (15.12.2003)

⇨ Hydroelectric Energy, Hydroelectric Energy and the Role of Hydroelectiric Centrals. (23.10.2003)

⇨ The Trafic Security and Speed Management in the Cities (04.12. 2003)

B. *Vocational Courses and Seminars on Different Fields*

C. *Conferences, Sympozums and Assemblies*

⇨ National Symposium on the Shore Engineering (24-27. 10.2003)

⇨ Conference on Wave Energy and Sustainable Energies (22.05.2003)

⇨ TMMOB Transportation Politics Congress (16.10.2003)

D. *Studies on the Sultandağı and Bingöl Eartquekes*

2. ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

⇨ Meeting for Supporting Palestine (02.04.2002)

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[192] These activities are compiled from the publication of IMO Ankara Branch 15. Period Working Report 2002-2004.

⇨　　　Meting for "Against War" ((20.12. 2002)

⇨　　　Press Release for "Against War in Iraq" (16.01.2003)

⇨　　　Meeting for "Against War"

⇨　　　Meeting and Strike Action by the members of TMMOB with other SCO's:
DİSK, KESK, TTB (27.03.2003)

⇨　　　Participation into the Meeting of "1 May" (2002, 2003)

⇨　　　Meeting for "Against the Occupation in Iraq and Freedom to Palestine"
(27.09.2003)

⇨　　　Various Press Releases for the Urban Problems (Especially Against the
Actions and Projects of the Municipality of Ankara) (2002-2003)

⇨　　　Political, Organizational and Judicial Struggle as Member of "My Ankara
Platform" (A platform of different SCO's in Ankara) Aganist the Trafic
Arrangement of Ankara City Center made by the Ankara Municipality

3. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

⇨　　　Various Social and Cultural Organizations such as Art Activities, Coctails,
Anniversary Meetings and Football Tournaments

APPENDIX 4

Interwiev Guide

A.   Informations on the foundation of the CSO.
⇨ Aims
⇨ Target groups, members (the number, profile, participation and activities)
⇨ Historical process, transformations, changes, divergences.
⇨ Plans and projects.
⇨ Structure, workers, professionals, vouluntary participants.
⇨ The logic of organization.

B.   Personal Experience
⇨ The reasons of participation of the members.
⇨ The form and story of the participations.
⇨ The contributions, advantages and disadvantages of the participation for the members.
⇨ The experiences of the members in other CSOs.
⇨ Personal ideas on the condition of the organization.
⇨ The profile of organization from the perspective of the members.

C.   Operetion and Administration
⇨ The internal operation of the CSO and the organization of the tasks.
⇨ The active members fulfilling the tasks.
⇨ The condition of the voluntary participation and the interest of the participants in the last instance.
⇨ The most liked and hated members.
⇨ Active members, effective and ineffective directors, the administration processes
⇨ The differences and hierarchy between the members such as old/new, active /passive.

⇨ The roles, power and responsibilities of chairperson and directors.

⇨ Controlling and auditing mechanisms, the function of auditing board.

⇨ Participation of the members to the administration and activities.

⇨ Decision making process and organs, the meetings, congress, councils.

⇨ The problems and conflicts in the general congress.

⇨ The elections, canditates, the process of determining the candidates, competing groups.

⇨ Economic conditions, the sources of revenue of the CSOs.

D. Publicity and Deliberation

⇨ The use of the place of CSOs, meetings, contacts, visits, negotiations.

⇨ The decision making, deliberation process, the channels of discusion, the way of meeting and discussing.

⇨ The way of reaching to an agreement or concenusus or the disagreement condition

⇨ The maintanence of different goods, plurality and the organizational unity.

⇨ The conditions of co-existance of differences

E. Conflicts

⇨ Points of divergences.

⇨ Different approaches.

⇨ Those who left or excluded from the organizations.

⇨ The conditions and possibility of opposition within the CSOs.

⇨ Hidden or secret intrenal meetings, distinct activities, internal struggles and competition, lobbying activities within the CSOs.

⇨ Trust relations within CSOs.

⇨ The relations, communications, cooperations and solidarity with other CSOs.

⇨ The enemies of the CSOs

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