

**CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN GREEK SECURITY PERCEPTIONS  
AND PRIORITIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

**BY**

**EMİNE AKMAN**

**IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**MAY 2005**

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assist. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş	(METU, IR)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur	(METU, IR)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Kürşat Ertuğrul	(METU, ADM)	_____

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name : Emine Akman

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **CONTINUITY AND CAHANGE IN GREEK SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND PRIORITIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

Akman, Emine

M.S., Department of International Relations

Supervisor : Assist. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur

May 2005, 113 pages

The objective of this study is to analyze Greek security policy in the Post-Cold War period with regard to emerging new security environment. The evolving EU and NATO have been remarkable initiatives for their member and candidate states. The study considers that Greek foreign policy is mostly defined within the EU framework. Moreover a set of threats and risks come to the security agenda of states with the effects of globalization. This study tries to analyze continuity and change in Greek security perceptions and priorities in the Post-Cold War period and examines whether or not Greece sees the EU as a security provider. It is concluded that the end of the cold war did not lead to a remarkable change in Greek security perception and priorities and Turkey is perceived to remain the main “challenge” to Greek security. Thus, Greece actively tries to use the EU as a security provider vis-a-vis Turkey as the process of EU’s deepening and enlargement gains impetus.

Key Words: Security, Globalization, Greece, Turkey, the EU

## ÖZ

### SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI YUNAN GÜVENLİK ALGILAMALARINDA VE ÖNCELİKLERİNDE DEVEMLİLİK VE DEĞİŞİKLİKLER

Akman, Emine

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur

Mayıs 2005, 113 sayfa

Bu çalışmanın amacı Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Yunan güvenlik politikasını, oluşan yeni güvenlik ortamı ışığında incelemektir. Yeni güvenlik ortamında AB ve NATO' nun gelişimi üye ve aday ülkeler için önemli girişimlerdir. Çalışma, Yunan dış politikasını çoğunlukla AB çerçevesinde tanımlanmış olarak almaktadır. Bunun yanında, küreselleşmenin etkisiyle ülkelerin güvenlik gündemine birçok tehdit ve riskler girmiştir. Çalışma soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde Yunan güvenlik algılamalarında ve önceliklerindeki süreklilik ve değişimi incelemekte ve Yunanistan'ın AB'ni Türkiye'ye karşı güvenlik sağlayıcı olarak görüp görmediğini araştırmaktadır. Çalışmanın sonunda, Soğuk Savaş' ın sona ermesinin Yunan güvenlik algılamalarında ve önceliklerinde önemli bir değişikliğe neden olmadığı ve Türkiye'nin Yunan güvenliğine ana risk olarak algılanmaya devam ettiği sonucuna varılmıştır. AB' nin genişleme ve derinleşme süreci hız kazandıkça Yunanistan Türkiye'ye karşı, AB'ni güvenlik sağlayıcı olarak aktif bir şekilde kullanmaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik, Küreselleşme, Yunanistan, Türkiye, AB.

To My Husband

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are a number of people who supported to finish my study.

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur for his guidance, criticism, advice, encouragements, trust and insight throughout the research.

I am also very grateful to my distinguished examining committee members, Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Trke and Assist. Prof. Dr. Krad Erturl, for their suggestions, comments and insights.

I would like to express my special thanks to my friends Kemal nal, Hasan Ykselen, Eda Benliolu, Evren Kksal for their technical assistance, for their comments in finding out the best way to handle the problems of this study.

This study also supported by the Turkish Air Forces, and by the officials of the headquarter, Col. Ertan akirolu, Lt. Col. Seluk Bayioit, Lt. Col. Kubilay İleri.

I would also like to thank to my parents, my brother especially, for their support on every phase of this study with their encouragement and always being nearby.

Lastly, I would like to express my deepest and dearest special thanks to my husband, for his support on every part of this study, and the person who mostly encouraged finishing this study.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
DEDICATION .....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. GREEK FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD .....	5
2.1 The Cold-War Period: 1947-1974.....	6
2.2 The Cold-War Period: 1974-1990 .....	15
3. POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SETTING AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS .....	28
3.1 Post-Cold War Environment.....	31
3.2 Greek Security Considerations.....	40
3.2.1 Turkey .....	40
3.2.2 The Balkan Instability .....	42
3.2.3. Global Problems.....	44
4. GREEK FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD .....	48
4.1 Identification of Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period .....	48
4.2 1990-1996 : What’s Wrong with Greek Foreign Policy ? .....	52
4.3 1996-2005 : Towards a more European Greece.....	65
5. THE EASTERN NEIGHBOR OR THREAT: TURKEY .....	75
5.1 Why Greece Perceives Turkey as a Threat? .....	75
5.2 Why Greece Adopted Turkish EU Membership and Still Supports? .....	81



5.3. Aftermath of the Helsinki: Greek Expectations for Providing Security .....	88
6. CONCLUSION .....	94
REFERENCES.....	99

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In the post-Cold War era, Greece is faced with major security threat and a number of risks what she considers. The threat is perceived stemming from Turkey and the risks are seen as instability in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Eurasia and the Middle East. Besides, a number of soft security issues that cannot be overcome purely through national initiatives come to the Greek security agenda including spillovers of political violence, refugee movements, proliferation of longer-range weapons and transnational crime. Greece tries to overcome all these challenges and threats. Greece has witnessed a new international setting since the 1990s. To address changes and continuities in Greek foreign and security policy will be important to understand the stance of Greece in the international system, EU and Balkans.

In the post cold war era, although there have been distinctive character and dynamics of security (military, environmental, economic, societal and political), the security perception of Greece in this thesis would be generally limited to political and military security. Traditionalist security approach that makes emphasis on military issues still can be seen in Greek politics; however, it can not be ignored that security also appears out of military sector in the post cold war era.

This study will highlight the security perceptions of Greece and formulation of Greek foreign policy in the post-cold war era. It will also examine the interaction of Greece with the new strategic environment. The scale of Greek foreign and security policy has expanded. Non-traditional issues such as large-scale migration, refugee movements, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have come to the Greek security agenda. Greece actively supports reconstruction of the Balkans and her relations with Turkey seem to improve. Most

importantly, the country has been in a more European line than ever before.<sup>99</sup> In that respect, the argument of the this study is that since 1999 Greece has to a great extent transferred the Turkish-Greek problems to the EU and has begun to see the EU as a security provider. Turkish-Greek problems (Aegean and Cyprus) have entered to official EU documents regulating EU-Turkey relations. It is worth noting that they turned out to be Turkish-EU problems. Greek national interests seem to be bounded Turkey's accession process. To what extent and how EU would interfere to the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes to be of great importance for the future of Turkish-Greek relations. Accordingly, the study mainly emphasize the effects of new security environment that has been effecting Greek Foreign and Security Policy.

First assumption is that Greece has seemed to put more emphasis on external balancing factors, particularly the EU, since the second half of the 1990s. Greece's foreign policy has been mostly defined in the EU framework. In the post-cold war era, EU has emerged as the main western institution to affect the nature of the Turkish-Greek relations. Second assumption is that Greece perceives that Turkey will do whatever is necessary in order to become an EU member.

The main reason why this study explores Greek security perceptions is related to two factors. First, Greece has been Turkey's neighbor and there have been problems that could not be solved for many years. I believe that we need to understand Greek politics and study more to analyze Greek affairs deeply. Second, the time to study this issue is so appropriate because of the fact that Helsinki decisions foresaw the solution to Turkish-Greek disputes till December 2004. Along with the recent decisions taken in the EU Brussels Summit, on 16-17 December, 2004 Turkish membership to EU has conditioned to the well being of Turkish-Greek relations (Aegean and Cyprus) with articles 19-20. Therefore, studying this subject would be so beneficial for better understanding of relations.

In this framework, chapter I addresses the Greek foreign and security policy in the Cold War period. The aim of this chapter is to present Greek security perceptions and priorities in the Cold War period and to see the continuities and changes in them in the post-Cold War era. This chapter will include two parts. The

---

<sup>99</sup> For detailed definiton of 'new strategic environment' see, Ian O. Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini, Katia Vlachos-Dengler, Greece's New Geopolitics (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp.7-37.

first one refers to the period between the end of the World War II and Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974. In this period Greek threat perception was communism and Greek security policy was defined by the objectives of American foreign policy. The year 1974 has been a point of turn in Greek perceptions of threat ( so-called Turkish “threat”) to her national security. The second is Greek foreign and security policies have been analyzed between 1974 and the end of the cold war in 1990. I try to show the change towards a more independent foreign policy from the external powers in order to maintain Greek security. Yet, I also mention the limits of this change.

Chapter II explores threats and challenges to Greek security in the post-cold war era. The effects of global and regional developments and their meanings for Greek security will be evaluated. Security challenges stemming from the international, European and the Balkan environments will be the main focus of this chapter. I put forward hard and soft security issues in the global security environment and their importance for Greek security. I mainly concentrate on Turkey, the Balkan instability and the global issues.

The aim of the third chapter is firstly to present how the Greek foreign policy is identified with the aim to understand Greek policy stance better as a whole in the Post-Cold War era. And then, the Greek security perceptions in the post-cold war era will be focused on in two parts in the frame of changing international, European and regional environment. 1990-1996 period explores and analyzes Greek security concerns and her responses to these threats. I try to show that the nationalization of Greek foreign policy in the new security environment harmed Greek national interests. Thus, 1996-2005 period emphasizes a change, towards a more European-oriented and cooperative policy with her allies in Greek foreign and security policy facing the challenges. I also mention that Greece preserves the balance between the EU and the US in her relations.

The fourth chapter includes three parts. The first part deals with the threat perceived by Greek decision makers and the factors that condition the perception of the threat. I put forward the historical perceptions and other reasons effecting Greek view. In this way, I compare the Greek perceptions with the real conditions. I try to show that Greece to some extent exaggerates the so-called Turkish “threat” to

consolidate her position in the international arena and among her allies. In the second part the reasons why Greece adopted Turkish EU membership are outlined. This part puts forward that the driving force behind Greek support to Turkey in the EU accession process emanates mostly from the desire to face the challenges to her security. The third part is devoted to the future prospects of Turkish-Greek relation, the Greek foreign and security policy stance vis-a-vis the NATO, EU and US as well as in her region. I mention that Greece never ignores relations with her allies and pursues a multilateral foreign policy. In the conclusion an overall assessment of the Greek foreign and security policy of the post cold war is presented in the future relations with the EU, NATO, Turkey and her region. I argue that the external actors particularly the EU has been so crucial for Greece to safeguard her national security and balance Turkey in the region

## CHAPTER 2

### GREEK FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

The aim of this chapter is to present Greek security perceptions and priorities in the Cold War period in order to understand their reflections to the post-Cold War era. One cannot evaluate the Post-Cold War Greek security perceptions without understanding the Greek security considerations in the Cold War period. The chapter will include two parts. First one refers to the period between the end of the World War II and Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974. 1974 has been a point of turn in Greek perceptions of threat (so-called Turkish “threat”) to her national security. In the second part, Greek foreign and security policies will be analyzed between 1974 and the end of the cold war in 1991. Both periods of Greek policies had been shaped by the cold war dynamics.

In the aftermath of the World War II, Greek threat perception was communism stemming from her northern borders. NATO and the US were viewed crucial for the defense of the country. From the civil war years (1946-1949) to 1974 Greek security policy was defined by the objectives of American foreign policy.<sup>100</sup> In the first part of this chapter, I will try to locate the period from post-WWII to 1974 within that framework.

With the détente between the two blocs (the US and USSR) in the 1960s, the fear of internal threat, namely communism to some extent diminished for Greece and in the meantime a confrontation with Turkey began to emerge, particularly after the 1964 and 1967 Cyprus crises. At that point the threat perceptions of NATO and Greece began to diverge. Finally, Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974 had been a

---

<sup>100</sup> John O. Iatrides, ‘The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century’, in Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds), *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 74-108.

turning point in Greek security thinking. Since then it is officially declared that Turkey has been the “threat” the Greek perceived.

In the aftermath of the 1974, during the late 1970s and 1980s Greece was not concerning about a direct communist attack. Therefore, Greece withdrew her forces from the north and deployed them to Turkish borders including Thrace and the Aegean islands.<sup>101</sup> In addition, the external relations of Greece diversified. This developed through weakening of relations with the US and closer economic and political integration with the EU.<sup>102</sup> In evaluating the Greek foreign and security policy of post-1974 era in the above-mentioned framework I propose that the foreign policy objectives of Greece was very much linked with Greek perception of so-called Turkish threat.

## **2.1. The Cold-War Period: 1947-1974**

It is important to look at the conditions of international environment of the time in order to examine security perceptions of Greece. Relating to its strategic location in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, Greece throughout its modern history witnessed competing Great Powers interest for penetration. Especially, she was under the influence of Great Powers (Great Britain before 1947 and the United States since then) that maintain naval control in the Mediterranean. In categorizing Great Power-Greek relations the latter was defined by referring to the penetrated (dependent) political system<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Thanos P. Dokos, ‘Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), p. 245.

<sup>102</sup> Theodore A. Coulombis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities’, in Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds.), Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 33-34. The term European Union (EU) is used throughout this text to denote the current EU and its earlier manifestations, European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community (EC).

<sup>103</sup> V. Coufoudakis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy 1945-1985: Seeking Independence in an Independent World, Problems and Prospects’, in K. Featherstone and D. K. Katsoudas (eds.), Political Change in Greece Before and After the Colonels (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 230-231; See also Thomas Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997)

In the post-war period, US interference in Greek politics was heavy.<sup>104</sup> The Greek foreign policy was in the US sphere of influence. For Americans the main concern was the containment of Soviet expansionism, namely communism in order to preserve the new economic world order. At that point Greece had been so crucial for the US interests. Because, a communist triumph in Greece would damage the US interests in the Middle East, Near East and North Africa. Besides, it could make a domino effect for other communist groups in the world. Therefore, the US believed that Greece should have been urgently helped in economic, military and political terms.<sup>105</sup> It was bipolarity and American geopolitical interests that led the US to interfere in Greek politics.

On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Second World War, in 1946-1949, Greece experienced a bloody, destructive and socially traumatic civil war. Political and economic life was destroyed in Greece when civil war ended. Furthermore, the cold war confrontation had been effectively felt in Greece during civil war. It was US that prevented a communist takeover in Greece in the 1947-1949 period. Besides, Greece's northern neighbors, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had fallen under communist control. On Greek side, these were alarming for her to be a part of western defense system. It's worth noting that post-civil war Greek governments' main objective was the containment of communism both domestically and internationally rather than implementing reforms to rebuild the country.<sup>106</sup> Americans turned out to be savers for Greeks and for Greeks there was no other option than the US.

To that background, Americans launched Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and Marshall Plan in June 1947 for West European security against a Soviet threat. In the framework of the plan, Greece took \$1.7 billion for economic aid (loans and

---

<sup>104</sup> Jon V. Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece During the Cold War (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), pp. 51-54.

<sup>105</sup> M. Fatih Tayfur, Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain (Hants: Ashgate, 2003), p. 47.

<sup>106</sup> Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Modern Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 149-150.



grants) and \$1.3 billion dollars for military aid between 1947 and 1960s.<sup>107</sup> Greece was transformed in administrative, political, military and economic terms to serve against the communist threat. The real concern for the US was to secure a pro-Western regime in Athens for the suppression of communism irrespective of whether it might be authoritarian or not, that would not damage American strategic and economic interests. In the meantime, Greece adopted the US as natural ally and guarantor.<sup>108</sup> It is pointed out that the US interference in Greek affairs was patron-client relationship especially the period between 1947 (the Truman Doctrine) and 1974 (the collapse of the military dictatorship).<sup>109</sup> This period can be defined as pro-American and Americans controlled everything.

Apart from American initiatives Greece on her own tried to pursue some objectives in her foreign policy. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Greece had territorial claims on her neighbors regarding southern Albania, Dodecanese Islands (Italy), Cyprus (Britain) and Bulgarian border. Among these, only the Dodecanese Islands were left to Greece by Italy. For the rest, Americans did not welcome Greece's independent policy and suppressed her demands.<sup>110</sup> Greece did not confronted with the US and it could be argued that Greek national interests were revised in accordance with American interests. Indeed, Greek policy makers believed that the country could be defended against communist threat and reconstructed only through American interference. Therefore, until 1974 (the collapse of the military regime) a stable political environment (except for a brief period between 1963-1967) was maintained in Greece in accordance with American interests.<sup>111</sup>

In that framework, Greek defense policies were designed through American initiatives; Greece became a NATO member; joined the Korean War; signed bilateral base agreements with the US; established a Balkan Pact in 1954 with Turkey and Yugoslavia, supported the US cold war policies at the United Nations into the early

---

<sup>107</sup> Stephen Xydis, 'The Truman Doctrine in Perspective', *Balkan Studies*, Vol.8, No.2, 1967, pp. 239-62, quoted in John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), p. 295.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 295-298; Kofas, *op.cit.*, pp. 83-87.

<sup>109</sup> Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy: ...", p.37.

<sup>110</sup> Coufoudakis, *op.cit.*, p. 232.

<sup>111</sup> Tayfur, *op.cit.*, pp. 48-63.

1970s and put signature to the formation of an independent Cyprus state with Turkey and Britain even though this agreement was clashing with her national interests. Since the internationalization of the Cyprus problem in 1954, through the US, Great Britain and NATO approaches and interventions in the dispute, Greece has never estranged itself from NATO or the US.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, in the light of serving American interests, in 1953 Greece signed bilateral Bases Agreement with the US for the establishment of military bases in Greece.

The more relations between the two blocs got tense, the more Americans maintained control over Greek politics. Despite the objections of some European members, Greek membership to NATO in 1952 at the height of the Cold War by the American initiative has been evidence for this.<sup>113</sup> From the American perspective, Greece's entrance to NATO had been a requirement for the preservation and consolidation of American interests. In the meantime, entrance to NATO has also been so crucial for Greece. NATO would provide guarantee against communist threat and by joining to NATO, Greece's security considerations took place in the wider framework of NATO's security policy. The given task to Greece was to maintain internal security rather than an external one and in case of a Warsaw Pact attack to delay the aggression.<sup>114</sup> The defense against an external threat considered a secondary task for the Greek armed forces. In result of the military implication of these roles, namely internal security and delay action, and lack of naval and air components Greece was unable to defend itself autonomously against attack.<sup>115</sup> Turkish intervention of Cyprus was a clear indication for this inability.

Threat perception of Atlantic Alliance had occupied the first priority in NATO's defense and security policies rather than Greek specific interests. Greece could be the beneficiary only when its interests harmonized with the interests of the Atlantic Alliance. Interests of NATO and Greece began to diverge with the

---

<sup>112</sup> Coufoudakis, op.cit., p. 231.

<sup>113</sup> Tayfur, op.cit., p. 52.

<sup>114</sup> Petros Garoufalis, Greece and Cyprus: Tragic Mistakes and Lost Opportunities (Athens: Bergadis, 1982), p. 47 (in Greek), quoted in Athanasios Platias, 'Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence', in Dimitri Conostas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 97.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

emergence of Cyprus problem after the mid 1950s.<sup>116</sup> When Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974, following a Greek coup that aimed to unify the island with Greece occurred, Greece experienced total clash of interests with NATO. Instead of directly intervening to Turkish-Greek problems, NATO preferred to limit their impact on the alliances planning and operations. Greeks believed that NATO neglected where the main threat to Greek security lay and did not react to Turkey as Greece expected.<sup>117</sup> Till that time in Greece it was believed that the relations with the US through NATO had been the main external guarantee for the balance of Turkish-Greek relations. Also in Greek view, the Alliance could play a preventive role against Turkey in case Ankara attempted to implement policies at the expense of Greece. The 1964 and 1967 Cyprus crises could be clear evidence for this thinking.<sup>118</sup>

Before Turkish-Greek relations came to the point of friction, common definition of threat perception, for national security regarding communism led good relations between Turkey and Greece in the late 1940s. Greece together with Turkey were providing defense of NATO's southeastern flank. Greece and Turkey were in coordination for the control of the air and sea defenses of the Aegean and Dardanelles. Additionally, in 1953 Greece and Turkey signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation followed by a formal alliance, 1954 Balkan Pact, with Yugoslavia through another American initiative. However, this did not last long because of the fact that Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and uprising against the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul in September 1955.<sup>119</sup>

The driving force behind 1955 riots was the demand of the Greek Cypriots for union with Greece, 'enosis'. On the contrary, Turkish demand vis-à-vis 'enosis' was partition of the island, 'taksim'. In American view, a solution had to be found otherwise instability in the island would damage the Atlantic Alliance, particularly the US interests. For Americans, Cyprus has been strategically important for the

---

<sup>116</sup> Tayfur, op.cit., pp. 52-54.

<sup>117</sup> Monteagle Stearns, 'Greek Security Issues', in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaidis (eds.), The Greek Paradox (Mass: MIT Press, 1997), p. 63.

<sup>118</sup> Thanos Veremis, 'Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change', in John Chipman (ed.), NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 236-286.

<sup>119</sup> Clogg, op.cit., p. 150.

control of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. All economic resources of regions in one way or another were passing through Cyprus by transportation. Cyprus has been important in terms of energy and communication lines. Having her continental shelf, territorial waters and air space, Cyprus is not a small region. That's why Cyprus is important for the US. Also, Greeks wanted to have a say on Cyprus to increase their influence over the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>120</sup> Within this framework, the US did not want a weak and fragile Greece to control the entire island. Instead, British dominance in Cyprus would be much more in favor of Americans for use of the island in military terms.<sup>121</sup>

In particular, Greece in order not to tense the relations with the US and NATO took part in the American sponsored formulation.<sup>122</sup> Greek parliament ratified 1960 Cyprus agreement under the US influence. According to the agreement, Cyprus would be an independent republic within the British Commonwealth. The signatories to the agreement were Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities, and the three guarantor states regarding Turkey, Greece and Britain.<sup>123</sup> 1960 agreement was in essence against the national interests of Greece.

Starting from 1955, Greek defense doctrine began to diverge from that of NATO's. Emerging Turkish-Greek tension from Cyprus, and the riot against the Greek orthodox minority in Istanbul put an end to two NATO allies' effective military cooperation. Two states came on the brink of war for many reasons since then regarding 1963 and 1967 outbreak of violence against Turkish Cypriots and 1974 military intervention in Cyprus. Greece tended to view Turkey as relying on power politics and military terms. 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus has been the turning point for Greek security considerations. This event led Greece to reformulate its defense policy. Eastern defense of the country gained higher priority rather than the northern defense. Since then, in Greek view, Turkey has been the main "threat"

---

<sup>120</sup> M. Fatih Tayfur, 'Akdeniz'de Bir Adanın Kalın Uçlu Bir kalemle Yazılmış Hikayesi', in Oktar Türel (ed.), Akdeniz'de Bir Ada (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), p. 32.

<sup>121</sup> Tayfur, 'Semi peripheral...', pp. 53-54.

<sup>122</sup> Theodore A. Coulombis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 201, quoted in Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>123</sup> It's worth noting that although Makarios was reluctant for this settlement, he saw it as the only alternative to the division of the island between Turkey and Greece. Clogg, op.cit., pp. 153-156.

to Greek security.<sup>124</sup> As will be explained in the next chapter, this threat perception continues to remain and shape defense policy of Greece even today although there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece since 1999 European Union (EU) Helsinki Summit.

On the contrary, NATO's perceived threat was communism and the notion of collective security occupied the first priority. Therefore, the local conflicts such as Cyprus were not very much on the agenda of NATO. Nevertheless, institutionally, although NATO did not contribute very much to the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations, it prevented break out of wars between the two. First, in 1963, Archbishop Makarios, the island's Greek Cypriot president, proposed amendments for Cyprus constitution at the expense of Turkish community. Turkish Cypriot rejection of these changes led outbreak of fighting between Turkish and Greek communities that resulted in Turkey's discourses for intervention. US president Lyndon B. Johnson's letter to Turkish President İsmet İnönü that warned Turkey for the consequences of intervention prevented Turkish action. Then, in 1967 after violent attacks to Turkish Cypriot villages, it was again American diplomatic intervention that prevented the war between the two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, because of the inter-communal conflict in Cyprus. Cyprus turned out to be an international issue affecting the stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the 1960s Europe's (EU) importance as an actor, significantly in economic terms began to increase in Greek politics. In the political sphere, this led the questioning of existing order that was under the US influence and the European-oriented voices were heard louder more than ever. Anti-American, and anti-NATO approach was at its zenith during the Yorgos Papandreu's administration from February 1964 to July 1965 as well as his anti-Turkish policy. In addition, on Cyprus issue, by supporting the non-alignment of Makarios, the government was diverging from the US strategies and challenging the US policy in Cyprus. With the 1960 agreement, Cyprus problem came to the end for the Americans. However, redefinition of Cyprus issue by Papandreu made Cyprus a problem again. Papandreu diverged himself from the previous policies in Cyprus. Within this framework, Makarios and Papandreu provided the environment very well for

---

<sup>124</sup> Stearns, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

Russia. They welcomed Soviet assistance in case of a war with Turkey. Soviet tanks were sent to Egypt to help Greek Cypriots. Makarios also supported Greek Cypriot communist party, which was contradicting with the American policy “containment of communism”. Greece as a NATO ally was establishing good relations with the SU. The power of SU in the Eastern Mediterranean was increasing. This situation was unacceptable and a challenge to the US. Therefore, it was difficult to continue with the Papandreou government for the US. In Yorgos Papandreou’s foreign policy formulation preservation and consolidation of Greek national interests were in the first place. Papandreou gave importance to nationalism. This was the only period during 1945-1974 that Greece rejected to be a satellite of the US and criticized the US policies.<sup>125</sup> The continuation of such a policy would resurface in the post-1974 period.

In contrast to Papandreou’s administration, the military regime (established in 1967) was in close relationship with the Americans. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the increasing Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean were alarming for the US for the containment of communism in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Additionally, seeing trade routes and oil regions in danger by the events in the Middle East, Arab–Israel conflict of 1967 and 1973, and Cyprus issue the US put more emphasis on the maintenance of the control over Greece. Besides, the protection of Israel through bases in Greece had been of great importance for the US. Greece was so crucial for the Americans in such an environment. In the meantime, Colonel’s regime was so helpful for the US capital in order to penetrate into Greece, in other words for the US global interests. Accordingly, American attitude was supportive to colonel’s regime and interventionist to Greek politics during the period between 1967-1974. In turn, Colonels became a firm supporter and server of American policies.<sup>126</sup>

In this period Greek military regime was confronting with some individual European states and Greece was finally forced to withdraw from European Council with the accusation of being undemocratic, illiberal, authoritarian and oppressive. EU limited the 1961 Association Agreement with the Colonel’s Greece. Nevertheless,

---

<sup>125</sup> Tayfur, ‘Semi peripheral...’, pp. 59-63.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 66-70.

Western alliance was not totally deteriorated the relations with Greece because of the belief that her NATO membership had been essential.<sup>127</sup>

In the meantime, the Colonel's Greece was achieving unexpected success in her relations with the communist states. In 1970, Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania were signatories of bilateral trade agreements with Greece. Full diplomatic relations was established with Albania in 1971 and with communist China in 1972. A diplomatic opening to African states was also accomplished.

Regarding Cyprus, it became an important issue to be solved by the Americans. Because, developments in the Eastern Mediterranean in the second half of the 1960s increased the importance of Cyprus for regional security. American and Soviet interest to this region was intensifying. Eastern Mediterranean became more intense after the 'Six-day war' between Arabs and Israel. American strategy required ports for the Six Fleet and bases to protect Israel. The SU became more concerned for the neutrality of the island and did not want to see it under the US or NATO control. In the meantime, Makarios was now opposing to 'Enosis' (unification of the island with Greece) and firmly supporting the 'independence' of the island. He did not want Cyprus to enter under the influence of the US or NATO. According to him Colonels were trying to destroy the existing state. Thus, a solution had to be found to Cyprus problem that did not prevent the island from serving to American and NATO interests.<sup>128</sup>

On the other hand, the collapse of Bretton Woods System (international monetary system that was established in the aftermath of the Second World War), American military defeat in Vietnam, increasing oil prices created political diplomatic difficulties for the US in many parts of the world. Colonels saw this situation as an opportunity in order to realize "Enosis". Thus, Greece would have gained a strategic advantage vis-à-vis Turkey. However, Greece could not think of

---

<sup>127</sup> C. M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History (4<sup>th</sup> ed.) (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), pp. 297-298; Arne Treholt, 'Europe and the Greek Dictatorship', in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (eds.), Greece Under Military Rule (New York: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. 216-219.

<sup>128</sup> A. G. Xydis, 'The Military Regime's Foreign Policy', in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (eds.), Greece Under Military Rule (New York: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. 192-193; 202-204.

Turkish reaction.<sup>129</sup> As a consequence, the Greek sponsored coup against Makarios was aimed at “enosis” leading Turkish intervention to the island on 20 July 1974. This accelerated the collapse of military regime in Greece.

In the period of 1947-1974, Greece could not avoid being intervened in her domestic and foreign policy by one of the hegemonic powers, the US, of the Cold War. Greek politics was mostly shaped under the American influence most of the time ignoring Greek national interests except a short period between February 1964-July 1965. Greek national interests were generally subordinated to those of Greece’s allies and protectors. Now I will focus on the post-1974 period and what changes Greece had experienced in the foreign and security policy sphere.

## **2.2. The Cold-War Period: 1974-1990**

Tense relations between Turkey and Greece and the likelihood of war in 1974 led important changes in Greek foreign policy. This has been also related with the conditions of international environment. By the mid and late 1970s American hegemony began to decline and Europe emerged as an alternative power (both on economic and political issues) vis-à-vis the US. Burden sharing with the EU members on security and economic spheres came to the agenda of the US because of the increasing balance of payments deficit. On the other hand, foreign policy orientations of the US and EU began to diverge from each other. With the petrol crises, the EU countries followed more different policies than the US in the Middle East. The Soviet threat began to decline and a period of détente commenced. The European investment capital has penetrated into the world market. These developments served Greece for the creation of an independent foreign policy.<sup>130</sup>

In the light of these developments, Karamanlis’ government tried to put Greece out of her diplomatic isolation and upgrade the defense capability.<sup>131</sup> In that respect, the 1974-1981 New Democracy Government’s main objective was accession to the EU and consolidation of democracy. The EU membership contributed to

---

<sup>129</sup> Tayfur, ‘Akdeniz’de Bir Adanın ...’, pp. 34-35.

<sup>130</sup> M. Fatih Tayfur, ‘Greek Foreign Policy after 1974: The Shift Towards Europeanization’, M.S., METU, September 1989, pp. 61-62.

<sup>131</sup> Veremis, ‘The Military...’, p. 172.



change hierarchical nature of the US-Greek relations to a more balanced one. Europe has been an efficient alternative for the Greek foreign policy.<sup>132</sup> Now, another external actor emerged and Greece began to define her interests in the framework of the EU.

Upgrading defense capability was very much related with the change in the definition of the threat. The perceived communist threat both from her northern neighbors and from her own communist resurgence was not the case any longer. The consensus of all political parties has been, since 1974, that the “threat” comes from the east, namely Turkey.<sup>133</sup> Turkey was defined as an “external threat”. Greek policy-makers also thought that full reliance on NATO and the US made the country both insecure and dependent, and had not protected Greek national interests. Because, Greece believed that the US and the NATO did not prevent Turkish intervention from Cyprus although they could. There was a widespread belief that NATO’s inability to prevent the possible conflict between its members was decreased and Greece questioned its credibility. Therefore, after Turkish intervention in Cyprus in June 1974, the post-World War II Greek strategy of relying on allied reinforcements undermined and Greece began to search for a more autonomous defense policy.<sup>134</sup>

Karamanlis government announced the withdrawal of Greece from the NATO military command and questioned the future of the US bases in Greece. This was a clear indication for the deterioration of US-Greek relations. Another reason for anti-American feeling was also the result of the US attitude against Colonel’s regime between the years 1967-1974. Many in Greece perceived that successive American governments took the situation for granted, and did not put enough pressure on dictatorship despite she was not domestically legitimate.<sup>135</sup> Thus, the post-1974 transition witnessed a radical change in the US-Greek relations. Anti-Americanism was at the center of Greek political agenda. Nevertheless, Greece in her relations

---

<sup>132</sup> Kostas Ifantis, ‘Greece and the US after the Cold War’, in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 149.

<sup>133</sup> George A. Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), p. 396.

<sup>134</sup> Platias, Op.cit., pp. 97-98.

<sup>135</sup> Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece (London: Clerandon Press, 1986), p.201; Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (eds.), Greece Under Military Rule (New York: Secker & Warburg, 1972), p. xvi.

with the US took into account the Turkish factor. In that respect, Karamanlis's decision over the continuity of American bases in Greece was the product of the belief that the uninstallation of them would be in favor of Turkey.<sup>136</sup>

Karamanlis's response to Turkish intervention by limiting relations with NATO instead of declaring war to Turkey was so linked with her military capability. The cost of war with Turkey was too high for Greece because of the fact that military imbalance at the expense of the latter. Since then, Greece has put more emphasis on her armed forces vis-à-vis Turkey<sup>137</sup> and the main political parties' of Greece (New Democracy and PASOK) in their discourses have advocated the high defense spending and provided great amounts of allocations to upgrade Greece's defense capability.<sup>138</sup> The post-1974 Greek governments almost doubled the military expenditure and allocated the highest percentage of her gross domestic product (approximately %7) for defense among the other NATO countries.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, in Greek view to be perceived more deterrent by Turkey, Greece announced that she would go to war in case of any Turkish intervention to Cyprus or any Turkish attempt to use economically the Aegean's continental shelf to a depth of about 200 yards. Additionally, Greece has deployed troops on Cyprus against any Turkish intervention.<sup>140</sup>

At the same time, Karamanlis government also believed that a mixture of economic, diplomatic and political pressure had to be imposed on Turkey in order to promote a settlement in Cyprus and in the Aegean.<sup>141</sup> In that framework, Greece aimed at membership to EU (November 1974) to enhance her international standing

---

<sup>136</sup> Woodhouse, op.cit., p. 316.

<sup>137</sup> Theodore Coulombis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 101-102.

<sup>138</sup> Yannis Valinakis, 'Southern Europe Between Détente and New Threats: the View from Greece', in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), Southern European Security in the 1990s (London: Printer publishers, 1992), p. 60.

<sup>139</sup> Platias, op.cit., p. 100.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., pp. 100-101, 103.

<sup>141</sup> Theodore A. Coulombis and Prodrous Yannas, 'Greek Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s', in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis, Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 162.

and to face the so-called Turkish ‘threat’ as well as strengthening the democracy.<sup>142</sup> A Greece within the EU would be more powerful vis-à-vis Turkey. Thus, accession to the EU was a way to guarantee Greek security and sovereign rights while reducing Greek political dependence on the US. This would balance Greece’s tense relations with the US and NATO. Greece also believed that membership to EU enhanced her search for an independent foreign policy.<sup>143</sup>

It is argued that the main reason behind Greek desire to participate in EU was mainly political, even psychological.<sup>144</sup> By Greece, whereas the EU was considered as equal parts, relations within NATO were considered asymmetric. According to Greeks, American interests were priority within NATO. Therefore, EU was an attractive community for Greece.<sup>145</sup>

In that framework, it is argued that the response of Karamanlis government’s to Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974 reflected “the deep impact that the prospect of EU accession exercised on post-1974 Greek foreign policy”<sup>146</sup>. Greek government realized that the EU would not welcome a Greece that entangled in conflict. At that point the EU operated as a restraining factor for Greece.<sup>147</sup> Also 1976 crises was an example for this thinking. In the summer of 1976, a crisis raised between Turkey and Greece over a survey ship, the Sismik I that was sent to disputed waters by Turkey. However, Greece since 1960s has made such kind of research in this region claiming to be within Greece’s continental shelf.<sup>148</sup> Although Andreas Papandreou, the leader of PASOK (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement Party),

---

<sup>142</sup> Harris C. Georgiades, ‘Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship’, in Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Hants: Ashgate, 2000), p. 422; Theodore A. Couloumbis and Sotiris Dalis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy since 1974’, in Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), *Greece in the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 80; P. C. Iokimidis, ‘Contradictions between Policy and Performance’, in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), *Greece in a Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 38-39; Susannah Verney, ‘Greece and the European Community’, in K. Featherstone and D. K. Katsoudas (eds.), *Political Change in Greece Before and After the Colonels* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 259.

<sup>143</sup> Coufoudakis, *op.cit.*, p. 236.

<sup>144</sup> Clogg (1992), *op.cit.*, p. 205.

<sup>145</sup> Tayfur, ‘Akdeniz’de Bir Adanın ...’, p. 36.

<sup>146</sup> Couloumbis and Yannas, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>148</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000), pp. 181-182.

proposed to sink the ship, Karamanlis preferred to apply to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice. At the end, only a UN sponsored compromise was adopted between Turkey and Greece reaching an agreement on the peaceful solution of the dispute over the continental shelf. Greece realized that she had to give concessions to reach a compromise. Otherwise, this would harm her relations with the EU. Europe would have been anxious about entangling in Turkish-Greek disputes and being a part of the problem.<sup>149</sup> Indeed, there was a general acceptance that EU membership would be so beneficial for Greece in many aspects regarding economic, political and social terms.<sup>150</sup>

When it comes to the Cyprus, Karamanlis did not adopt Cyprus to be a bilateral Turkish-Greek problem. On the contrary, Cyprus issue had to be solved between the communities of the island. Nevertheless, the Cyprus issue holds a very special place in Turkish-Greek relations. The emergence of Cyprus as a very significant point of dispute in 1955 kept both Turkey and Greece busy with this problem and affected their attitudes towards the Aegean problems of the 1970s.<sup>151</sup> Security perceptions of both countries in the Cyprus problem led them to create some areas of friction in the Aegean Sea and to be more uncompromising in the solution of these problems.<sup>152</sup> For Example, militarization of Eastern Aegean Islands by Greece constitutes one of the thorny problems between Turkey and Greece. Despite the existence of legal grounds with regard to 1923 Lausanne, 1936 Mountreax and 1946 Paris treaties, Greece began to militarize these islands in the 1960s and accelerated this process following Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Greece argued that

---

<sup>149</sup> Woodhouse, op.cit., p. 310.

<sup>150</sup> Loukas Tsoukalis, Greece and the European Community (London: Saxon House, 1979), quoted in P. C. Ioakimidis, 'The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment', South European Politics and Society, Vol. 5, No. 2, Autumn 2000, p. 76; See also, Panos Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis, Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994)

<sup>151</sup> Sönmezoğlu, op.cit., p. 181. For more information about the Turkish-Greek disputes see Suat Bilge, Büyük Düş (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), pp.209-263; Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," Adelphi Paper, No. 164, Spring 1981; Fuat Aksu, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001); Alexis Heraclides, Yunanistan ve 'Doğu'dan Gelen Tehlike', Türkiye (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2002), pp. 191-319; Thanos Veremis, "Greek Security: Issues and Politics," Adelphi Paper, No. 179, Winter 1982; Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," Adelphi Paper, No. 155, Winter 1979-80. For official thesis of both Turkey and Greece see web sides: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> and <http://www.mfa.gr>

<sup>152</sup> Aural Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Boks, 1983), p. 328.

this action was self-defense against Turkey's establishment of 'Army of the Aegean' threatening the islands. However, the Aegean Army established by Turkey long after Greece had began to militarize these islands. Likewise, the dispute including the command and control responsibilities within NATO came to the surface after Greece's withdrawal from the military wing of NATO after 1974 Cyprus crises. Greece rejected Turkish proposals concerning a media line for command and control responsibilities on the ground that Greek territorial integrity was challenged.

Although the continental shelf and delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea had nothing to do with Cyprus and they were highly related to the parties' strategic and economic concerns in the Aegean Sea, the Cyprus problem had negatively affected the stance of Turkey and Greece in the solution of these problems. The problems associated with the continental shelf are twofold. While, from one standpoint, the parties cannot agree on how to delimit the continental shelf, they are also in conflict concerning possible ways of solution of the dispute. Demarcation of Greece's territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles constitutes a serious problem with regard to Turkish sovereign rights. The Greeks argue that islands have their territorial waters and this is Greek sovereign right to extend to 12 miles. Under the existing situation with six miles limits, Turkey possesses 7.47% and Greece possesses 43.68% of the Aegean Sea, while the international waters represent 48.85% of that sea. In case Greece and Turkey extend their territorial waters to 12 miles, Greek share will increase to 73%, and Turkey's share will increase to 8.76%, while the international waters will decrease to 15% of all the Aegean Sea.<sup>153</sup> It is obvious that extension of territorial waters to 12 miles will be only in favor of Greece, not Turkey and the international community.

Among these problems air space problem occupies a significant place. Greece is the only country that possesses an air space extending her territorial waters. Although Greece claims that her air zone is 10 miles, Turkey recognizes only six miles air zone over Greek six miles territorial waters. In Greek view, Turkey violates her air zones. Besides Turkey, the US and other countries do not also accept a 10 miles Greek air zone, and do not take into consideration her claims during the

---

<sup>153</sup> Şükrü S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1983) (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), p. 75.

NATO's military exercises over the Aegean Sea. In essence of the FIR (Flight Information Region) lies Greek demand that all Turkish aircraft have to inform Greece when they are entering the Athens FIR. However, Turkey rejects to give flight information of military flights. Indeed, these problems were very much related with "who will control the Aegean Sea, and also Eastern Mediterranean". Among these problems Greece only adopted continental shelf problem. They do not accept any other problem.

As mentioned above, since the 1970s the Aegean problems have appeared between Turkey and Greece as well as Cyprus. Greek concern was increasing that Turkey could achieve her so-called claims on the Aegean more easily with a Greece out of NATO military command. Before the 1974 Cyprus crises, the regulations were in favor of Greece, enabling her to extend her air and naval control up to the outer limits of Turkey's territorial waters. However, now Turkey was in an advantageous position by taking many command and control responsibilities. Accordingly, in October 1975, Greek government stated that Greece would consider reintegration of her armed forces to NATO. Athens demanded operational responsibilities of the Aegean as she had had before Greece's withdrawal from NATO in 1974. However, Turkey raised her objection to the restoration of the new conditions for Greece<sup>154</sup>. In Greek view after 1974, loss of this situation led gaps in the Greek security vis-à-vis Turkey. Under these conditions, Greece realized that no other alliance could provide Greece a security umbrella as NATO at least in the near future. Driving force behind Greek desire for re-entrance into NATO was Greek perception of so-called Turkish "threat", preservation of military balance between Turkey and Greece, and to control the influence of Turkey in the alliance.<sup>155</sup>

On 12 September 1980, a major chance for Greece occurred that would effect the Turkish-Greek relations. Turkey experienced military coup d'état facing domestic problems and foreign policy concerns. With the efforts of NATO's supreme allied commander General Bernard Rogers, Turkey adopted Greece's return to NATO's military command through the Roger's Agreement. However, Greece's

---

<sup>154</sup> S. Victor Papacosma, 'NATO, Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era', in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), p.51.

<sup>155</sup> Tayfur, 'Greek Foreign Policy...', pp. 74-75.

relations with the Alliance were not smooth. Delimitation of the operational boundaries in the Aegean remained to be a problematic issue between the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, from the Greek perspective returning back to NATO was a success. To that end, Greece could take part in decisions and check them as well as Turkey.

Greece also attempted for a more independent foreign policy including maintaining good relations with the Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. One of the reasons for Karamanlis's initiative was to gain ground for Greek claims in the Aegean and Cyprus.<sup>156</sup> In parallel to these initiatives, relations with communist and Arab states had also been improved for the promotion of a multi-lateral foreign policy.<sup>157</sup> In Greek view, such kind of political stance would consolidate Greek position in the international system and promote security of Greek territorial integrity.

As a part of the above mentioned policy objectives, Greece became the tenth member of EU on January 1, 1981. The membership to EU had seen as an instrument for the maintenance of Greek territorial integrity during the 1980s, because Greece saw the dispute with Turkey as a matter of power politics. Until the end of the 1980s, Greece tried to preserve balance of power with Turkey relying on its EU membership.<sup>158</sup> However, in the cold war years EU did not meet any Greek demand for formal security guarantee against Turkey. Because, EU believed that Europeanization of the Turkish-Greek problems could result in tense relations with Turkey.<sup>159</sup>

Nevertheless, Greek membership to EU has had a significant effect on the evolution of Turkish-EU relations. Greek accession to the EU has provided her a more advantageous position vis-à-vis Turkey. Greece pursued a policy of reservations and objections in the community when the case was Turkey. Indeed, Greece tried to use the EU as a forum to get concessions from Turkey by putting

---

<sup>156</sup> Clogg (1992), op.cit., p. 178.

<sup>157</sup> Coufoudakis, op.cit.

<sup>158</sup> Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas, 'Europeanization and the Greek Policy Style: National or Sectoral?', in Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 143.

<sup>159</sup> Keith Legg and John M. Roberts, Modern Greece A Civilization on the Periphery (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 55-71.

conditions (particularly the Cyprus problem and the Aegean disputes) to any development of Turkish-EU relations. For instance Greece vetoed financial protocols towards Turkey and vetoed Turkish application for full membership to EU in 1987. In Greek view, the way to EU for Turkey would pass from Athens, not would be determined according to standard criteria of the Community. This way of thinking became an obstacle for the support of Greek demands by her EU partners. Furthermore, the policies of PASOK (1981-1989), failed to contribute to the European unification process and interests of her partners including irresponsible economic policy, foreign policy rhetoric of Andreas Papandreou and Greek objections raised at every opportunity.<sup>160</sup>

In the meantime, the Greek government put more emphasis on NATO and multilateralism.<sup>161</sup> Although Andreas Papandreou, PASOK leader, came to the office with a radical rhetoric criticizing the relations with NATO, the EU and the US, in practice there was not a deviation from former foreign policy objectives of the government. Pragmatism dominated Papandreou's policies. PASOK had to adapt Greek policies to reality. In Greek view the main 'threat' was Turkey and the preservation of balance of power in the Aegean Sea was crucial for Greek interests. Therefore, Greece looked for allies against the so-called Turkish "threat".<sup>162</sup> In that respect, the US seemed the only actor for the maintenance of such a balance.<sup>163</sup>

Indeed, Turkey's strategic role increased for the US and NATO by the post-1979 developments (the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, Afghan invasion of the Soviet Union) in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, enhanced relations between the US, NATO and Turkey could harm Greek interests and change balance of power between Turkey and Greece at the expense of the latter. In the meantime, neither France nor the USSR could be an alternative to counterbalance the US power in the region. Therefore, the US was the

---

<sup>160</sup> C. Harris Georgiades, "Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship", in Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (eds.), Contemporary Greece and Europe (Hants: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 424-425.

<sup>161</sup> Gilles Bertrand, 'The European Dimension of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement', ECPR Workshops, Edinburg, March 29- April 2, 2003, p. 6.

<sup>162</sup> Ranald Meinardus, 'Third-Party Involvement in Greek-Turkish Disputes', in Dimitri Conostas (ed.), Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 159.

<sup>163</sup> Ifantis, op.cit., p. 149.



only available choice for the preservation of Greek interests.<sup>164</sup> Furthermore, the American and NATO military assistance was so crucial for Greece even East-West tension diminished, because the main ‘threat’ was Turkey rather than Warsaw Pact. In addition, the US and NATO could persuade Turkey to change her policies. In that way, Greece’s relations with the US and NATO fell hostage to Turkish-Greek tension.<sup>165</sup>

Furthermore, Greece saw the presence of NATO and US bases on its territory as a guarantee to deter any ‘attack’ from Turkey. Because, once a war is erupted between Turkey and Greece, bases in both territories (Greece and Turkey) would be in danger. Thus, the US and NATO would not let any conflict emerge between these two alliance members.<sup>166</sup> Accordingly, in contrast with his earlier discourses, Papandreou in September 1983 signed a new agreement with the US about NATO bases to extend the lease for five years. Since then, Greece has also paid great effort for the maintenance of American balanced military aid to Turkey and Greece with the 10:7 ratio that has been functioned since 1978.<sup>167</sup> The relations between the US and Greece began to be mended and this situation was welcomed by Greece. Nevertheless, Papandreou was not ignoring to criticize any US defense initiatives. He also conducted very active diplomacy with the Arab world (mainly Egypt, Syria and Libya) and Communist Block. It was argued that Papandreou was pursuing a more independent and nationalistic foreign policy compared to previous ones and setting a balance between the two blocs.<sup>168</sup>

In the meantime, relations with Western allies were not so smooth. Greece always did not pursue a policy identical to her NATO and EC partners. Greece was perceived a country that does not behave in conformity with Europe on various

---

<sup>164</sup> Coufoudakis, *op.cit.*, p. 242.

<sup>165</sup> J. O. Iatrides, ‘Papandreou’s Foreign Policy’, in T. C. Kariotis (ed.), The Greek Socialist Experiment. Papandreou’s Greece 1981-1989 (New York: Pella, 1992), pp. 152-153, quoted in Ifantis, ‘Greece and the US after...’, pp. 149-150.

<sup>166</sup> Platias, *op.cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>167</sup> Meinardus, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

<sup>168</sup> Woodhouse, *op.cit.*, p. 325.

international issues of major European concern.<sup>169</sup> Greece was criticized for pursuing policies out of EU consensus. Policy divergence from the EU can be seen starting from early years of PASOK since 1981. This foreign policy stance even continued in the first half of the 1990s as will be mentioned in the next chapter, particularly including Greece's relations with her neighbors; Macedonia, Albania and Turkey. Greek perceptions for her national security diverged from her EU partners.<sup>170</sup>

For many reasons in NATO and the EU, Greece frustrated unanimity with her objections. In 1982 Greece raised her objection for the publication of a communiqué for the first time because of the fact that NATO refused to give a guarantee of Greece's frontier with Turkey. She also refused to impose EU sanctions on Poland, condemn the Libyan intervention on Chad and the destruction of a Korean civilian aircraft by the Soviet Air Force. The Greek veto on the admission of Spain and Portugal annoyed the EU. Greece, in exchange demanded increased finance for the 'Integrated Mediterranean Programs'. Although relations with the EU were not going very well, Papandreou declared that withdrawal from EU would be detrimental for Greek economy. In his second term in the office, Papandreou pursued a more moderate policy towards European integration.

In relations with Turkey, Papandreou stated that threat to Greece came from the east, Turkey, not from the north, Soviet bloc, and NATO should take precautions for the preservation of Greek security against a potential Turkish threat. No credit was given to this demand by NATO allies.<sup>171</sup> In fact, the defense of West Germany and Greece were not equal concerns for the Alliance.<sup>172</sup> The Greek demand for protection has continued for some years, but then shelved because of the fact that neither the US nor NATO was voluntary to do so. In response, Greece did not take part in many NATO exercise to protest Turkish actions in the Aegean.

---

<sup>169</sup> Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas, 'Greece: An Introduction to Patterns of EU Membership', in Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 3.

<sup>170</sup> Kevin Featherstone, 'Introduction', in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 7.

<sup>171</sup> Papacosma, op.cit., p. 52.

<sup>172</sup> Ian O. Lesser, NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 5.

The relations with Turkey got tenser when in 1983 the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ declared her independence. In 1985 Greece officially announced her defense doctrine defining its primary concern as the so-called ‘Turkish threat’. This was the sign of a more autonomous strategy within the NATO alliance.<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, Greek government has made it clear that she considers its veto power in the EU as an important tool in its dealings with Turkey. Athens also announced that her approval for Turkish membership to EU could be available only if Ankara gave concessions in bilateral Turkish-Greek problems. This could be seen as attempts for Greece to ‘Europeanize’ her disputes with Turkey.<sup>174</sup>

Papandreou accused the former right-wing governments for negotiations with Turkey over the country’s sovereign rights in the Aegean. Because he believed that there was nothing to negotiate.<sup>175</sup> Therefore, Davos meeting between Papandreou and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal in February 1988, after the 1987 continental shelf crises, interpreted as a deviation from PASOK’s main foreign policy stance. Because of the burden of defense spending on the Greek balance of payments and the long military service Papandreou believed the necessity of reducing tension with Turkey.<sup>176</sup> The major achievement of the process was the Vouliagmeni Memorandum (Athens, 27 May 1988) that included Confidence-Building Measures, Tension Reduction Measures and Good Neighborliness Measures. However, neither the Aegean disputes nor the Cyprus problem was solved. The process did not last long, and finally collapsed in 1989.<sup>177</sup>

In sum, as mentioned in this chapter Greek foreign policy cannot be thought separately from her security considerations. There was not a common definition of threat between Greece and her NATO partners, particularly the US. Although communism was the main threat for NATO, Greek security was linked with the so-called Turkish threat. The perceived Turkish threat undermined Greek reliance on NATO and the US, and led Greece to search for a more autonomous defense policy.

---

<sup>173</sup> Platias, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

<sup>174</sup> Meinardus, *op.cit.*, p. 163.

<sup>175</sup> Clogg (1992), *op.cit.*, p. 190.

<sup>176</sup> Thonas Veremis, ‘Greece: The Dilemmas of Change’, in F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), *The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan Security After the Cold War* (Mass: RAND, 1994), p. 124.

<sup>177</sup> Bertrand, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

Greece paid a lot for its military capability for deterrence at the national level. At the international level, having realized that depending on only one external power, namely the US could endanger Greek territorial integrity and national interests, Greece pursued a multilateral foreign policy and tried to be a member of the EU.

European orientation of Greece after 1974 was an attempt to overcome security considerations vis-à-vis Turkey. The search for security has always been an important factor of Greek relations with the EU. As a member of the EU, Greece realized that there is a direct link between Europeanization of Greece and the solution to problems with Turkey within the EU context. However, in Greek view, Greece could not get full-fledged support from the EU countries. So, Greek search for security guarantee in institutions concerning NATO and the EU did not satisfy Greece. In the meantime, the value of the alliance with the US was important in Greece's relations with Turkey. The military balance in the Aegean can be changed by the US, thus Greece cannot ignore her relations with the US. Although Greece since the foundation of Karamanlis government in 1974 has pursued a multidimensional foreign policy in order to decrease the dependency on the US, they never quit this policy. In my view a comprehensive analyses of Greek security perception can be made on these grounds.

In the meantime, when the New Democracy party won the elections in 1990 the new situation facing Greece was not very optimistic. Relations with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean remained in a deadlock. The change in the international system, the end of the Cold War, did not lead an improvement in Turkish-Greek relations. Economy was in bad condition and the collapse of communism dragged Greece into unexpected situations (new security considerations), particularly in the Balkans. In the new international environment with the impact of globalization, non-military issues have also been a security concern for Greece as well as Turkish perception. These developments reflected to the foreign and security policy of Greece in the post-Cold War era.

## CHAPTER 3

### POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SETTING AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

With the end of the Cold War, according to Greeks the so-called Turkish “threat” to Greek security has not terminated. Hard security (military security) threat still occupies Greek perception of Turkey. In addition, Greece has faced many changes in the international environment and the regions surrounding it. These consist of a wide range of risks varying from spillovers of political violence, flee of refugees, spread of weapons of mass destruction, to organized crime, terrorism (particularly with the September 11 terrorist attacks), poverty, etc. and have come to the security agenda of Greece as perceived threats. These threats in the international security environment have not totally been recent. However, what is new in this sense is the effect of globalization on these threats. Today, issues have been more interdependent and trans-boundary because of the effect of the globalization. Accordingly, any event in a country or region with a terrorist act or an ethnic conflict, will pose threats on other areas with spillover effects. Such kind of threats cannot be overcome through national initiatives and require collective responses.<sup>178</sup> For instance, Greece demanded NATO support for Summer Olympics against terrorist attacks.<sup>179</sup>

Another change in the Post-Cold era has been the collapse of ex-Yugoslavia, and the crises in the Balkans posing serious threats to Greek territorial integrity, to its social and political order, also causing political instability and conflict throughout the region. Bosnia and Kosova rapidly escalated from local crises to a regional problem

---

<sup>178</sup> Hasan Ulusoy, ‘Revisiting the Security Communities After the Cold War: The Constructivist Perspective’, *Perceptions*, September-November 2003, Vol. 3, Number 3, p. 187.

<sup>179</sup> Miron Varouhakis, ‘Greece Seeks NATO Help for Olympics; Security Expands after Madrid Attacks’, *International Custom Wire*, Mar 12, 2004.

including the external actors. Particularly, struggle on the name issue of Macedonia between Macedonia and Greece was adopted a real security threat to their national sovereignty by the Greeks. Following that, 2001 instability in Macedonia reminded how fragile order is in the region. Additionally, there are many factors to pose threats to Greek security such as follows: structural problems including economic underdevelopment, lack of strong democratic institutions and corruption, etc.; refugee flows causing economic and social problems; prevention of trade owing to regional disorder; deterioration of Turkish–Greek relations through Balkan instability. In that framework, promotion of a stable security order in the Balkans remains a major challenge for Greece in the coming years.<sup>180</sup>

Besides, Greek strategic interests are not only limited to the Balkans and the Aegean (so-called Turkish ‘threat’ since 1974) but also extends to areas including Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean as well as transatlantic relations and the effects of globalization. A large scale of political, economic and security issues in these regions will affect Greek strategic interests.<sup>181</sup>

The evolving European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been impressive initiatives for member and candidate states for the promotion of peace, prosperity and stability. Therefore, Greece supports both the EU and NATO membership of the states on her neighborhood in order to overcome its security concerns, particularly in the Balkans and Mediterranean. Therefore, the degree of integration to these institutions for these regions remains the challenge for Greece.

In the new post-Cold War environment, Greece not only faces with threats but also with opportunities. In that way, Greece has the opportunity to be a bridge between the Western institutions (EU and NATO) and particularly Balkans for the realization of Balkan states’ memberships to these institutions. Greece can be a vehicle with its soft power assets such as private sector, technical expertise and political credibility for transformation of poorer and less stable societies.<sup>182</sup>

---

<sup>180</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, *op.cit.*, pp. 40-41.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

In the light of these developments, Greek national security perceptions and foreign policy have been affected and evolved in the new post-Cold War environment. However, according to the Greeks the so-called Turkish “threat” since 1974 still exists and has been the primary security concern for them as a hard security issue. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the effects of globalization have put new non-traditional security issues along with the so-called long-standing Turkish “threat” regarding terrorism, ethnic conflicts, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. These non-traditional threats have not been secondary importance for Greece. Recently stated Greek defense policy has also confirmed that Greek perception. The Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense, KYSEA, has adopted that the policy for the protection and shielding of the country moves around three axes. First one is to face asymmetrical (non-traditional) threats in the north such as terrorism, arms trafficking, international crime and instability. The second one is the claim of Greece that although she supports Turkey’s European prospect, Turkey has not changed her policy of disputing the Greek sovereign rights, whereas there has been improvement in the Turkish-Greek relations. Therefore, it has to keep a deterrent force against Turkey. The third one is Cyprus will have multi-level support of Greece, and Greece will participate actively in the security issues of Cyprus.<sup>183</sup>

To meet these challenges Greece has begun to pursue a more ‘Europeanized’<sup>184</sup> policy. She has been actively engaged in the stabilization and reconstruction of the Balkans, there has been a rapprochement with Turkey in the post-Helsinki period, and American-Greek relations have been normalized.

Although there has been a détente between Turkey and Greece still there remains the likelihood of fragility. The prospects for the future of Turkish-Greek relations seem mostly to depend on the evolution of Turkish-EU relations. Because, Greece acts in pursuit of gathering support from other states or institutions mainly the EU for the preservation of her national interests and security vis-à-vis Turkey.

---

<sup>183</sup> ‘KYSEA Discussed the National Defense Policy’, available at [http://www.mpa.gr/article.html?doc\\_id=513764](http://www.mpa.gr/article.html?doc_id=513764), accessed on 01.03.2005

<sup>184</sup> ‘Europeanization’, will be used as the impact of EU membership on political, economic and social modernization of Greece.

The aim of this chapter is to assess the Post-Cold War environment Greece now faces and this environment's meaning for Greece in order to understand and define Greek security perceptions and foreign policy better. In that case, the dynamics of globalization, regional developments particularly in the Balkans, relations with Turkey and new non-traditional issues from terrorism to proliferation become important issues to examine.

### 3.1 Post-Cold War Environment

In the Post-Cold War era, globalization and regionalism have been among the defining terms of the "new world order". Therefore, states' national security policies have been affected from these rapidly changing international and regional setting.

Although there has not been a common definition of globalization, among possible ones we can include that it represents a transformation and a rapid change in economic, ideological, technological and cultural terms across borders.<sup>185</sup> Economic changes include the internationalization of production, the interpenetration of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets, massive population transfers creating a growing economic interdependence.<sup>186</sup> States, therefore, have been more sensitive to political and economic crises in both near and distant parts of the globe because of the increasing interactions among states in terms of finance, trade and economy. As Asian financial crises of 1997-1998 showed, close international economic interdependence can increase vulnerability across borders. It is worth noting that, strategic importance of the problematic regions has been one of the defining factors for the interest of other states. As 1990 Gulf oil-rich region crises demonstrated, strategic significance of the region had been a determinant (concern over access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf) for the global-level response.<sup>187</sup>

Being an EU member, for Greece maintenance of stability in the regions surrounding it regarding Balkans, Black Sea and the Mediterranean has been

---

<sup>185</sup> Arie M. Kacowicz, 'Regionalization, Globalization and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping?', Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane Governance, Oct-Dec 1999, Vol.24, Issue 4, p. 2.

<sup>186</sup> James H. Mittelman, 'The Dynamics of Globalization', in James H. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 2.

<sup>187</sup> David Held and Anthony McGrew, 'The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order', Review of International Studies, Vol.24, 1998, p. 223.



strategically important. Two issues can be named crucial for Greek interests from economic perspective.<sup>188</sup> Firstly, there have been attempts for the interdependent road, rail, pipeline and electric power transmission projects from the Adriatic to Central Asia and across the Mediterranean. In the coming years, southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean can be expected to emerge as important routes for the transportation of the natural gas to Europe. In that respect, Greek government and private sector can be potential investors for these regional infrastructure projects. And these economic interests can also be effective on handling the political relationship in the Balkans, Black Sea or elsewhere. Indeed, the interdependence (security of supply; security and financing of energy, transport and telecommunication infrastructures) through shared economic interests promotes cooperation rather than conflict.<sup>189</sup>

Second, in Greek view, the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)–the Barcelona Process-<sup>190</sup> has been a beneficial initiative promoting peace, prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean both bilaterally and regionally. However, the contribution of Greece to this policy has been quite limited because of the other foreign policy priorities regarding Balkan instability and perceived so-called Turkish “threat”. Indeed, for Greece the Balkans occupies the first priority in economic terms and investment rather than economic dimension of EMP. However, Greece has been aware of that the Europe has a lot of vital interests in the southern Mediterranean in the light of the EU enlargement, and as a fully integrating country to the EU Greece has a particular interest in the development of EU Mediterranean policy.<sup>191</sup> As located at the heart of the Mediterranean and representing a fault line between the rich North and the poor South, Greek position increases its strategic importance for the EU. The challenge for Greece remains activate its civilian values by promoting

---

<sup>188</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p. 11.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., pp. 12-13.

<sup>190</sup> The aim of this European initiative is the establishment of a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace, stability and the creation by 2010 of a free-trade area between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. It includes three objectives: political and security dialogue, economic and financial partnership, and creation of socio-cultural links in the Mediterranean basin. For more information on EMP see <http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/matriz.asp>; George Joffé, Perspectives on development : the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 1999)

<sup>191</sup> Thanos Dokos, ‘Sub-Regional Cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean Process: The Greek/Turkish/Cyprus Security Complex’, EuroMeSCo Paper, March 2004, pp. 5-6.

applicable principles and rules in the Balkans and the Mediterranean<sup>192</sup> Therefore, the evolution of economic relations, improvement of competitiveness of economies, promotion of investments to the region will be so crucial for the settlement of prosperity and stability in the region.<sup>193</sup> It's also worth noting that, in Greek view the opportunities for cooperation in the region will be more available when the Turkish-Greek problems are overcome and Cyprus becomes a member of both EU (GKRY is a member of the EU since May 2004) and NATO.<sup>194</sup>

Ideological changes refer to liberalization of trade and investment, privatization and the promotion of political democracy institutionally. In terms of technology, globalization makes the spread of information and communication technologies worldwide.<sup>195</sup> In that respect, expansion of private and civil society organizations in Greece can engage it on the international environment.<sup>196</sup> Finally, western cultural values seem to penetrate into all parts of the world. Joseph Nye defines the spread of cultural and ideological values as 'soft power' of which importance has been increasing.<sup>197</sup> In Greek view, Greece with its many soft power assets (especially non-government actors: businesses, educational or research institutions) can promote stability and reconstruction in the Balkans that is a source of security concern for Greece and the West.<sup>198</sup>

Because of diversified security<sup>199</sup> challenges of today's world, states face a new security environment and not surprisingly, the broadening definition of security requires the international or regional approaches rather than the national ones to cope

---

<sup>192</sup> Dimitris K. Xenakis, 'The Contribution of Greece to Strengthening Euro-Mediterranean Relations', Perceptions, June-August 2003, p. 195.

<sup>193</sup> 'Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation', available at [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/eu/eu\\_relations/euomed\\_cooperation.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/euomed_cooperation.html), accessed on 22.05.2004.

<sup>194</sup> Theodore A. Coulombis, 'Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy since 1974', Thesis, Vol. 1, Issue No. 4, 1998, p. 37.

<sup>195</sup> Kacowicz, op.cit.

<sup>196</sup> Katia Vlachos-Dengler, 'Greek Civil Society and the Impact of Globalization', unpublished paper prepared for the Kokkalis Foundation Annual Graduate Workshop, Cambridge, Mass., 2001, cited in Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p. 5.

<sup>197</sup> Joseph S. Nye, 'Redefining the National Interest', Foreign Affairs, Vol.78, Issue 4, Jul-Agu 1999.

<sup>198</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit. pp. 5; 37.

<sup>199</sup> See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.7; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp.19-20.

with the challenges to national security. Traditional national security has initially used to achieve through military terms as the use of military force to preserve national interests<sup>200</sup> and in the past, the geography of national security was defined by foreign frontiers. Today the frontiers of national security can be everywhere.<sup>201</sup> In the case of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or ethnic conflicts that perception is so obvious. In addition, today, national security cannot be promoted without the maintenance of international security.<sup>202</sup> For Greece, the post-Cold War ethnic conflicts in the Balkans have been one of the concerns for her national security. Moreover, fears for the possibility of terrorist's attacks in the summer Olympic games in Athens led Greece to cooperate with her Western partners. In Greek view, terrorist challenges can damage tourism, investment and occupy foreign relationships instead of other matters and affect Greek strategic interests.<sup>203</sup> Unfortunately, the Greek shelter for terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan in Greek embassy in Kenya was a great question mark for Greek credibility on Turkish side. Namely, it was obvious evidence for Greek perception of Turkey as a "threat".

Accordingly, globalization makes nation-states realize that they need global-wide solutions through cooperation and coordination to tackle problems regarding ethnic conflicts, poverty, immigration, terrorism, ecology, nuclear proliferation, organized crime and so on.<sup>204</sup> At that point, Europeanization of Greece is seen crucial to handle these problems in multilateral framework.<sup>205</sup> In addition to, the defense policies of great powers, particularly the US and her war against terrorism after the September 11 attacks, have global-wide effects on states and regions. How the US reacts or acts (such as the campaign against Al-Qaeda) has been influential on

---

<sup>200</sup> Held and McGrew, op.cit., p. 226.

<sup>201</sup> Philip Zelikow 'The Transformation of National Security', National Interest, Spring, 2003, Issue 71, p. 19.

<sup>202</sup> İlker Başbuğ, 'Kriz Bölgeleri ve Türkiye'nin Güvenliği', Ortadoğu, Asya ve Avrupa'daki Kriz Bölgeleri nin NATO, AB ve özellikle de Türkiye'nin Güvenliği Üzerine Etkileri' konulu Harp Akademi Sempozyumu, 27.05.2004.

<sup>203</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p. 16.

<sup>204</sup> Robert Cox, 'A Perspective on Globalization', in James H. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 23.

<sup>205</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p. 20.

security of the entire world's regions. Therefore, it is argued that national security can no longer be promoted through unilateral means.<sup>206</sup>

Regarding 'regionalism', it is argued that with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the communist threat bipolarity ended and multi-polarity represents the new post cold war setting.<sup>207</sup> The engagement of superpowers on securities of other states to some extent decreased. International security system has become more decentralized and the tendency to 'regionalism' has increased. In regionalism, a number of states geographically linked, establish voluntary associations in order to create common functional and institutional arrangements sharing common values and norms. There have also been economic, cultural, diplomatic, scientific, political and military interactions among them.<sup>208</sup> Through regionalism, international system has been fragmented into many new regional orders. The regional level stands more clearly on its own in security affairs for the conflict, hostility (the Middle East, South Asia) or cooperation (North Atlantic, Western Europe) among states. The end of the Cold War has marked an expansion in the importance of the regional relations and led a greater regionalization of security.<sup>209</sup>

In that context, the autonomy of regional actors such as NAFTA, ASEAN, and EU has increased.<sup>210</sup> Although the presence of NATO has been discussed it is still expanding with a shift in doctrine becoming less regionally specific.<sup>211</sup> In such an environment Greece has transformed into a more 'Europeanized' form and gained great advantages in order to tackle problems such as Turkish-Greek ones. The

---

<sup>206</sup> Held and McGrew, op.cit. pp. 223-224; Christopher Coker, 'Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk', Adelphi Paper, Vol. 345, June 2002, p. 37.

<sup>207</sup> Barry Buzan, 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century', International Affairs, 1991, Vol.67., No.3., p. 434.

<sup>208</sup> Gordon Mace and Jean-Phillippe Therien, 'Introduction to Mace and Therien', in Gordon Mace and Jean-Phillippe Therien (eds.), Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 2.

<sup>209</sup> See David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, 'The New Regionalism in Security Affairs', in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University press, 1997), pp. 3-19.

<sup>210</sup> Constantine Arvanitopoulos, 'Greek Defense Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence', in Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis (eds), Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Nicosia, Cyprus: Intercollege Press, 1997), p.153.

<sup>211</sup> Baxter, Laurence J., 'NATO and Regional Peace Support Operations', Peacekeeping & International Relations, Nov/Dec 1996, Vol. 2, Issue 6, p. 6.

evolving European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has been a significant framework for the security and defense cooperation in regional terms. Greece wants a powerful and credible ESDP<sup>212</sup> and believes that EU's defense policies, playing a complementary role with NATO, has been important for global and regional stability.<sup>213</sup>

On the other hand, peripheral disputes are intensified. With the end of the bipolarity, a significant restricting factor on regional conflicts has disappeared and this led the escalation of tensions and rivalries in many regions.<sup>214</sup> For instance, the marginalization of Southern European and the Mediterranean has come to an end. The crises in the Balkans and the Middle East can be evidence for this. Europe witnessed many hot conflicts and wars (particularly in the Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosova) in the heart of the continent. Emerging regional problems can lead serious security risks with political chaos, migration, refugees, economic disruption, and nationalistic uprisings. Greeks think that both the Balkan and Mediterranean regions have been transforming in economic, political and social terms through a difficult and painful period.<sup>215</sup> In the meantime, conflicts in other parts of the world such as Chechnya, Indo-Pakistan (Kashmir) rivalry, or Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Middle East poses serious threats to regional stabilities with a risk of international escalation.

Along with these developments, regional policies and policy perceptions have also become increasingly interdependent. For instance, without a permanent solution to the Afghanistan, Iraq or Israel-Palestinian problems, it is not possible to speak about a stability and cooperation in the whole region. In addition, conflicts including Muslim communities and Western approach to these crises in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosova), Chechnya, Palestinian, Iraq or anywhere else have been a determinant for

---

<sup>212</sup> 'Government Policy Speech in Parliament/Foreign Policy Issues', available on <http://www.mfa.gr/english/GovernmentPolicySpeechinParliament.doc>, accessed on 04.04.2004.

<sup>213</sup> 'Greek Defense Minister Refers to Olympic Security, Foreign and Defense Policy at Conference in Washington', 08.10.2003 available at <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=8&folder=174&article=12094>, accessed on 05.03.2004

<sup>214</sup> Held and McGrew, *op.cit.*, p. 222.

<sup>215</sup> Dokos, "Sub-Regional Cooperation...", p. 10.

affecting Western perceptions (negative or positive) of Arab world.<sup>216</sup> Moreover, because of the crises, the security of energy sources has been a matter of concern for many states. The EU'S Mediterranean policy cannot even be promoted satisfactorily as long as the ongoing Palestinian-Israel conflict does not come to an end.<sup>217</sup> Particularly for Greece, the freedom of action in the region has been limited because of the ongoing crises in the Middle East. The crises in this region can fuel spillover of terrorism and political violence damaging a set of interests from tourism to maritime security.<sup>218</sup> In other words, such regions being the sources of flee of refugees, mass movement of people, organized crime, terrorism, etc. will continue to remain a threat to the security and stability of other regions.

To some analysts, main determinants behind regionalism have been political considerations, namely power and security.<sup>219</sup> In the Post-Cold War era, in many regions there have been cooperative security and defense arrangements (NATO, EU, ASEAN Regional Forum, etc.). The driving force behind that initiative seems to be that the states in these regions try to avoid inter-state conflict, the enormous costs, technological requirements and domestic burdens of defense.<sup>220</sup>

There have been many suggestions that how the states can best achieve regional order and security. According to international relations theories, there have been approaches defending that these states may go through tight security cooperation among each other. With the institutional relationships, states might form pluralistic security communities. For instance North America and the North Atlantic area (to some extent Greece and Turkey excepted) constitutes a pluralistic security community.<sup>221</sup> Carl Deutsch argues that the members of 'security communities' will not use force in their relations with each other and solve their problems through

---

<sup>216</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p. 9.

<sup>217</sup> Dokos, "Sub-Regional Cooperation...",

<sup>218</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p. 27.

<sup>219</sup> Thomas Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration', Rewiev of International Studies, Vol.28, 2002, p.678.

<sup>220</sup> Held and McGrew, op.cit. p. 223.

<sup>221</sup> For more information about regional security see Patrick M. Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders' in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University press, 1997)

peaceful means.<sup>222</sup> In that respect, it is argued that Turkish-Greek cooperation could be only achieved on condition that both parties have been legitimate members of Western International Community including NATO and EU.<sup>223</sup> Greek support for Turkish membership in the EU can be evidence for this argument.

It is argued that in the post-cold war era, military relations among the advanced industrial democracies (Western and Central Europe and North America) are to a great extent desecuritized and the possibility of using force in their relations and going to war reduced.<sup>224</sup> From a point of view the evidence for this can be 'democracy and peace', or 'interdependence and peace' or historical war weariness and nuclear deterrence.<sup>225</sup> Whichever it is, war besides its many dangers has also been a threat to the global economy, and damages ecology. Therefore, it cannot be a choice among industrialized states.<sup>226</sup> Instead, as in the case of the European Union, the challenges of international environment have tackled by the co-operation and institutional frameworks particularly in the field of foreign policy and security.<sup>227</sup> However, it has not been a system-wide development. In that context, to Goldgeier and McFaul there have been two worlds. The first one refers to above-mentioned desecuritized military relations and the second one still continues to be defined by classical realist means regarding arms race and power politics.<sup>228</sup>

In Buzan's view world has been divided into two or three regions because of the fact that, the effects of globalization have been differently distributed. Power politics can no longer explain relations among advanced and interdependent states

---

<sup>222</sup> Karl Deutsch, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5-6. Quoted in Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', International Organization, Vol.48, Issue 2, Spring 1994, p. 269.

<sup>223</sup> Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, 'Democratic Peace and the European Security Community: the Paradox of Greece and Turkey', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.13, Issue 1, Winter 2002, pp. 69-85.

<sup>224</sup> Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, op.cit., p.62; Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (London: Palgrave, 2000), p. 33.

<sup>225</sup> Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Coker, op.cit., p. 24.

<sup>227</sup> Kostas Ifantis, 'Multipolarity, Anarchy, National Interest and European Security After the Cold War: a Theoretical View', Greek Political Science Review, November 1998, Issue 12.

<sup>228</sup> James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, Vol.46, Issue 2, 1992, pp.467-491.

(EU). On the other hand, there have still been plenty of regions in the world that matches to realist reading of the international environment.<sup>229</sup> In the Caucasus, Central Asia and Balkans many local conflicts over territory, population and status took place and they still have ethnic problems and border disputes. Buzan's approach can be confirmed by Greek case. For Greece, globalization and regionalism did not have a positive effect on its policies vis-à-vis the Balkans in the early 1990s. In this period Greece pursued a firm and nationalistic policy especially in Macedonian case. Moreover, Greece still continues to mostly maintain the realist approach in her relations with Turkey. However, she has totally avoided from power politics on her relations with the EU.<sup>230</sup>

Today, to overcome above-mentioned problems in the post-cold war environment, western international community tries to pursue new policies. NATO still survives and reorienting its goals toward the challenges of the new environment despite many discourses over its demise in the early 1990s. EU is trying to initiate its security agenda through ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) and it is still evolving. Besides, at the global level, the role of the UN peacekeeping and collective security operations is not so effective is worth noting.

Consequently, states are trying to adapt their policies to that new environment with new initiatives. In that context, foreign and defense policies of Greece seem to be affected from the characteristics of the post cold war setting. Greeks believe that today the main sources of international insecurity stem from European periphery and particularly Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, not the Eastern Europe and the East-West conflict anymore.<sup>231</sup> Additionally, to Greek view in the post-Cold War era, the main challenge for Greece has been the continuity and maintenance of its territorial integrity, democratic system and values.<sup>232</sup> In other words, from Greek

---

<sup>229</sup> Anthony McGrew, 'Realism vs Cosmopolitanism' A Debate Between Barry Buzan and David Held', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, Issue 3, 1998, p.390.

<sup>230</sup> Birgül-Demirtaş Coşkun, 'Küreselleşmenin İkili Sorunlara Yansıması: Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Örneği', in Birgül-Demirtaş Coşkun (ed.) *Türkiye-Yunanistan Eski Sorunlar Yeni Arayışlar* (Ankara: ASAM, 2002), p. 191.

<sup>231</sup> 'The role of Greece in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean', <http://www.mod.gr/ENGLISH/newver/Defence.htm>, accessed on 05.12.2003.

<sup>232</sup> Thanos Dokos, 'Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting', in Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds), *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 43.



point of view, the main obstruction in front of Greek strategic interests is a long-standing perception, namely Turkey (Aegean and Cyprus) and then a number of risks including potential Balkan instability and global problems. Although non-traditional issues increasingly affecting Greek security and they are not subordinate, the perception of the so-called Turkish threat occupies the first place in Greek foreign policy.

## **3.2 Greek Security Considerations**

### **3.2.1 Turkey**

Throughout the post-1974 period, Greece's national strategy was based on containing the "Turkish threat". The Post-Cold war environment has not altered the basic Turkish-Greek competition. Greece still perceives Turkey as the main threat for Greek security policies<sup>233</sup> and this perception has widely been shared by public opinion, expert debates and main political parties (PASOK, New Democracy) despite their differences in style.<sup>234</sup>

Disputed areas between Turkey and Greece not only include Cyprus and the rights over the Aegean but also new issues such as political influence in the Balkans and control of oil transport routes from Caspian to the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>235</sup> In the Aegean Sea, major issues concern continental shelf (according to Greek side the only legitimate dispute), territorial waters, airspace and demilitarized status of the Aegean islands as well as the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR Athens), the status of 'Grey zones' in the Aegean Sea, search and rescue within the Athens FIR<sup>236</sup> Regarding Cyprus, Greece has strongly supported the early EU membership of Greek Cypriots even without a solution to the island. These efforts can be an attempt to put

---

<sup>233</sup> 'The National Military Strategy', <http://www.mod.gr/ENGLISH/newver/Defence.htm>, accessed on 05.12.2003; Thanos P. Dokos, 'Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era', in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999), p. 239.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., p.246.

<sup>235</sup> Daphne Papahadjopoulos, Greek Foreign policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Implications for the European Union, (CEPS: Brussels, Feb 1998), p. 25.

<sup>236</sup> 'Unilateral Turkish Claims in the Aegean' available on [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/europe\\_southeastern/turkey/turkeys\\_claims.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims.html), accessed on 05.12.2003

additional pressure on Turkey to reach a solution to Cyprus.<sup>237</sup> With the current enlargement of the EU, Greek Cypriots has become an EU member with a divided island in 01 May 2004. To Dokos, this situation will continue to be an obstacle for the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations.<sup>238</sup>

With regard to Balkans, in the competitive bilateral climate of the 1990s, Turkey and Greece interpreted each other's intentions with skepticism in the Balkans. For instance, in the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova, whereas Greece was advocating Christian, Slavic Yugoslavia, Turkey was on the Muslim, Turkish Bosnians and Kosovars' side. Finally, both Turkey and Greece recognize the value of the new regionalist setting that requires cooperation and interdependence. They are in favor of status quo in the Balkans. They are aware of the challenges to their security that will emanate from instability in Macedonia, Kosova or Albania.<sup>239</sup> In that context, their cooperative support for the NATO membership of FYROM and Albania can be evidence for this view.<sup>240</sup> Besides, they both support initiatives promoted by the EU, NATO, UN, Council of Europe or OSCE, and take part in regional initiatives including the Stability Pact, the South East European Cooperation Process and BCES.<sup>241</sup> They also differ from each other on the case of the transport routes. While Greece was supporting the construction of oil pipeline from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandroupolis, Turkey's choice was the transportation of oil from the Caucasus to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. However, recent developments of the signing of an agreement between Turkey and Greece on natural gas pipeline construction would

---

<sup>237</sup> Barry Rubin, 'Introduction', Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring 2004, p. 1.

<sup>238</sup> Dokos, 'Sub-Regional ...', p. 8.

<sup>239</sup> Othon Anastakis, 'Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?', Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring 2004, p. 58.

<sup>240</sup> Nikos Hasapopoulos, 'FYROM ile Arnavutluk'un NATO Üyeliği Konusunda Yunanistan ile Türkiye Arasında Yeni İşbirliği', To Vima, 23 Kasım 2002, available at [http://Bro.byegm.gov.tr/haber/abone/2002/11/25/25\\_11\\_2002\\_abn\\_12\\_07\\_32.txt](http://Bro.byegm.gov.tr/haber/abone/2002/11/25/25_11_2002_abn_12_07_32.txt)

<sup>241</sup> Anastakis, op.cit.

bring Caspian natural gas to Europe representing the two sides cooperation in economic relations when it has been in favor of both.<sup>242</sup>

It cannot be ignored that with the Helsinki Summit at which Greece withdrew its veto for Turkey's EU membership, there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. To some, the new détente would be more long lasting rather than the others. On the other hand, it is argued that although there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece after mid-1999, the possibility of armed conflict still exists. According to Hellenic Strategic Defense Review<sup>243</sup> (HSDR), any rapprochement between Turkey and Greece will not prevent the former from posing a so-called direct military 'threat'. Therefore, such a so-called "threat" still will require maintaining military capabilities capable of responding effectively.<sup>244</sup>

Today, although the relations between Turkey and Greece have been better when compared to past, there have not been a development on fundamental problems. The rapprochement process has not evolved naturally but with the capturing of Öcalan in Greek Embassy.<sup>245</sup> On the other hand, the effectiveness of post-1999 rapprochement in Turkish-Greek relations mostly depends on the evolution of Turkey-EU relations.<sup>246</sup> Besides, the new ruling government's policies, after taking office in March 2004 elections, under premier Karamanlis will be determining for the future of Turkish-Greek relations in the years to come.

### **3.2.2 The Balkan Instability**

Consequences of change in the Post-Cold war environment were intensely felt in the Balkans. From the Greek perspective, "beyond the existing and apparent 'threat' from the East, namely Turkey, Greece for the first time faces spots of

---

<sup>242</sup> Veselin Toshkov, 'Yunanistan İle Türkiye, Hazar'ı Avrupa'ya Bağlayacak Bir Boru Hattı Anlaşması İmzalandı', AP, 23.02.2003, available at [http://Bro.byegm.gov.tr/haber/abone/2003/02/23/23\\_02\\_2003\\_abn\\_17\\_21\\_30.txt](http://Bro.byegm.gov.tr/haber/abone/2003/02/23/23_02_2003_abn_17_21_30.txt)

<sup>243</sup> HSDR considers Greek defense requirements.

<sup>244</sup> Yannis Papantoniou, 'NATO and National Defense Policy: A View From the Hellenic Republic', NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace, 2002, Vol.47, Issue 4, p. 92.

<sup>245</sup> For more information about the foreign policy pursued by Turkey and Greece after the Öcalan capture see İsmail Cem, Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya: Strateji Yunanistan Kıbrıs (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), pp. 110-135.

<sup>246</sup> Kostas Ifantis, 'Strategic Imperatives and Regional Upheavals: On the US Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations', Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring 2004, p. 28.

instability along her northern borders’’.<sup>247</sup> Greece faced a new geopolitical reality on the local level. Since 1990, in the Balkans, the threat has not come from the external threats including military and ideological blocs but from intrastate relations. Break-up of Yugoslavia introduced a variety of explosive ethnic, social, political and economic tensions challenging Greece (especially in the early 1990s).

First, Greece interpreted the emergence of independent Macedonian state as a threat to its territorial integrity. Second, Greece feared that Turkey, major rival of the Greeks, could penetrate into the Balkans. Third, Greco-Albanian relations also got strained because of Greece’s claims on the Orthodox community against ‘discrimination’ in Southern Albania. Forth, economic consequences of dissolution of Yugoslavia have been so serious for Greece because of the fact that Greece was mostly transporting her products to European markets by road and rail routes through Yugoslavia. Finally, dissolution of Yugoslavia led deterioration of Greek relations with her European allies and the US particularly in the period 1992-95. It is argued that this period could pose threat to Greek security causing its ‘isolation’.<sup>248</sup> Especially in Macedonian case, Greece’s security concerns did not always coincide with her Western allies and she became a part of the problem in the Balkans. However, the re-nationalization of Greek policy in most areas would be costly and damaging for Greece.<sup>249</sup>

On the whole, pragmatism has become focal point for Greek foreign policy and Greece oriented herself to make use of new structural conditions presented by the post-Cold War environment. Break up of Yugoslavia introduced weaker states compared to Greece and marked Greek primacy (economic, militarily and political) in the regional balance of power in the Balkans.<sup>250</sup> Furthermore, she realized that integration with Europe has been so much in favor of Greece. In that way, being a NATO and EU member, Greece can contribute to regional stability and security, and

---

<sup>247</sup> Op.cit., ‘The role of...’

<sup>248</sup> Susan Woodward, ‘The Security Environment’, in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Jr. Dimitris Keridis (eds.), Security in Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relationship (Virginia: Brassey’s, 1997), p.26.

<sup>249</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p. xii.

<sup>250</sup> Dimitri Conostas and Charalambos Papatotiriou, ‘Greek Policy Responses to the Post-Cold War Balkan Environment’, in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 213-223.

has a broader role in European security affairs.<sup>251</sup> Additionally, Greece should have better relations with Balkan states especially in order not to face a second diplomatic/military front in addition to so-called ‘Turkish threat’.<sup>252</sup> It is argued that Turkish-Greek confrontation occupies the most important place in Greek security concerns.<sup>253</sup>

Recently, Greece has been playing an increasingly active role promoting a series of political and economic initiatives in the Balkans for stability. From the start the driving force behind Greek initiatives towards the Balkan markets has been her natural geographical expansion and her mere land tie with the EU.<sup>254</sup> There has been a significant improvement in Macedonian-Greek and Albanian-Greek relations. One of the most interesting initiatives can be seen as the military co-operation agreement signed between Greece and Macedonia in 2004.<sup>255</sup> Macedonian officers will be trained at Greek military academies. Additionally, Greece views the eventual entry of all Balkan countries in the EU as vital for underwriting long-term peace and stability in the region. Accordingly, Greece desires to play a bridging role (especially after 1996) between the Balkans and EU.

On the other hand, recent events in Kosovo confirm that the likelihood of ethnic conflicts in the region still exists and threatens the regional stability. It is worth noting that unresolved national questions and ethnic conflicts in the region would remain to be a threat to Greek security.

### **3.2.3 Global Problems**

At the broadest level, in the new security environment, many challenges of globalization have risen for Greece. New, non-traditional issues with regard to refugee movements, drug trafficking, organized crime, spread of arms and nuclear material, regional ethnic conflicts, terrorism have come to the agenda.

---

<sup>251</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, *op.cit.*, pp. 68-69.

<sup>252</sup> Coulombis, “Greek Foreign Policy: ...” p.37.

<sup>253</sup> Constan and Papasotiriou, *op.cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>254</sup> Anastakis, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>255</sup> ‘Training of More Ethnic Minority Civil Servants to Start in Macedonia’

<http://www.setimes.com/html2/english/news.htm#1>, accessed on 06.12.2003

Large-scale migration from south to north has been a crucial security concern for Greece. Most dramatic migration issues emerged especially in eastern Mediterranean and southeastern Europe where Greece geographically has located. Economic migration has been a serious challenge to Greek security. Nearly 300.000 Albanians in recent years besides migrants and asylum seekers from other parts of the region and the Middle East have made entrance to Greece threatening social welfare of the country. These mass movements have also led to an increase in Greek population. Apart from this, Balkan and Mediterranean states have faced rapid refugee movements from such as Bosnia, Kosova, or Palestinian that could negatively affect Greece and the region. Becoming a recent development, it was feared that the US invasion of Iraq could lead to a possible refugee flee from Iraq to Greece.<sup>256</sup> Related to these issues, personal security has also gained importance in Greece's region including refugee, arms and nuclear material smuggling, abuse of children, etc.<sup>257</sup>

The proliferation of WMD has two series consequences for Greek security. First, with the spread of technologies, European states including Greece can easily come within range of systems deployed in other regions. Second, Greece can be forced to confront indirect effects of proliferation of WMD. Military balance in the Aegean, eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans can be of critical concern for Greek security in case Turkey increases her military capability (nuclear or conventional) even to face nuclear-armed Middle East countries.<sup>258</sup>

In recent years, in many parts of the world the cost of terrorist attacks in Casablanca, Istanbul, Riyadh and 11 March 2004 Spain terrorist attacks have been devastating and thus, alarming on Greek perception of terrorism. Greece has feared that she could also be a possible target for terrorists. Following the bloody bombings in Spain, Greece demanded assistance, particularly in protection against a nuclear, biological and chemical incident, from NATO to safeguard Olympic Summer Games

---

<sup>256</sup> Aleksandros Tarkas 'Yunanlı Komutanlar, ABD'nin Irak'a Muhtemel Bir Saldirisinin Türk-Yunan İlişkilerini Olumsuz Etkileyeceğini Düşünüyor', *Amina Ke Diplomatiya*, Aralık 2002, available at [http://Bro.byegm.gov.tr/haber/abone/2002/12/12/12\\_12\\_2002\\_abn\\_15\\_21\\_21.txt](http://Bro.byegm.gov.tr/haber/abone/2002/12/12/12_12_2002_abn_15_21_21.txt), accessed on 12.01.2003.

<sup>257</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, *op.cit.*, pp.13-15.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19.

that she will host in Athens during the August 13-29, 2004.<sup>259</sup> Maintaining security in Olympic Games was a primary security concern for Greece.

Many of above-mentioned issues have been trans-regional and confronting them requires multinational approaches. No state could overcome such problems through national initiatives. In a sense, Greece believes that national interests could be best served through participation in institutions, within European security architecture.<sup>260</sup> In this regard, another challenge for Greece in the 1990s has become to 'widen' and 'deepen' the ties with her EU and NATO partners.<sup>261</sup> Specifically, integration or marginalisation within the European Union has been the most crucial political question for Greece.<sup>262</sup> The moderate and more European policy has started to implement by Simitis government since the second half of the 1990s and now is being pursued by the New Democracy including economic, political and social spheres could be evidence for Greek choice on integration rather than marginalization.

Today, the post-cold war environment Greece faces has been increasingly complex with a set of security issues going beyond national frontiers. Greece is trying to be an effective member of existing institutions like NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Indeed, significantly, Greece and Greek foreign policy<sup>263</sup> has been in a process of Europeanization putting all Greek external policy challenges in multilateral, European framework. Especially, the EU has been becoming an increasingly important factor on influencing relations between Turkey and Greece. Vis-à-vis Turkey, Greece has undergone a major change in its thinking. It has been supporting Turkish membership since 1999. Moreover, relations with the Balkan states have been improving. Today Greece is trying to be a regional power for the promotion of the stability in the Balkans.

---

<sup>259</sup> N.A., 'Greece Seeks NATO Help for Olympics; Security Expands After Madrid Attacks', International CustomWire, 03/12/2004.

<sup>260</sup> Papantoniou, Op.cit., pp.91-92; Thanos Veremis, 'Greece: The Dilemmas of Change', in F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War (Mass: American University Press, 1994), p.119.

<sup>261</sup> Couloumbis and Yannas, op.cit., p.164.

<sup>262</sup> Tayfur, 'Semi peripheral...', p.124.

<sup>263</sup> This issue is treated in detail in Chapter Two.

Additionally, stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East has been so crucial for Greek security and the region.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **GREEK FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD**

In this chapter, the Greek security perceptions in the Post- Cold War era will be focused on within the framework of changing international, European and regional environment. The chapter will include three parts. The aim of the first part is to present how the Greek foreign policy is identified and formed in the post-Cold war era with the aim of better understanding Greek policy stance with Greek security concerns as a whole. The second part puts forward and analyzes Greek security concerns and how Greece reacted to the new security environment in 1990-1996. During this period Greek foreign policy was not very much in line with her Western partners. Then, since 1996 there has emerged a change in Greek foreign policy with the understanding that Greece should engage heavily in institutionalized multilateral arrangements (such as the EU and NATO) and their policies in order to get maximum benefit for her national interests and to consolidate stability in her troubled neighborhood. In that respect, the third part including 1996-2004 period, emphasizes the change in Greek foreign policy towards a more European-oriented policy in order to face the challenges to Greek security.

#### **4.1 Identification of Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era**

Greece is a typical nation-state that acts in line with her own national interests and goals since her formation in 1830. Accordingly, the Greek foreign policy is designed according to pre-determined Greek national interests. Greece acts in a way to strengthen her position, security and interests among the world states in general and within the Western World in particular. This is true for Greece's relations with

the other regional states in the Balkans, her eastern neighbor Turkey and her Western partners in the EU and NATO.

The end of Cold War era and the disappearance of a Communist threat have required rethinking and adaptation of the Greece's foreign policy together with her security concerns to the changing world system. The defense and foreign policies of Greece have entered a new phase necessitated by changes in the global and regional security environment. Providing Greek security has been the core objective of Greek foreign policy.

To Coulombis, Greek foreign policy is affected by many variables including leadership, size, strategic location of a country, level of political and economic development, quality of life, societal cohesiveness, the interests and objectives of regional actors and great powers. In today's world, there has been a shift from geopolitics to geo-economics in Greek foreign policy.<sup>264</sup> Important transregional developments have appeared in the economic arena. Also, Greek foreign policy seems to be formulated through the country's history, values and concepts like *Megali Idea*.<sup>265</sup>

Alexis Heraclides defines four opposing ideological patterns that influence the way the Greek foreign policy is designed, regarding 'Nationalist', 'Neo-orthodox', 'War Geopolitics' and 'Power Strategy'. The 'Nationalist' stance has been the most traditional one. It seems totally an anti-Turkish approach defining Turks as 'revisionist and Greek enemy'. Nationalist vision seems to be very impressive in handling national issues and Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey. 'Neo-Orthodox' groups put forward a great gap between the 'Helen/Orthodox identity' and West as well as Turkey on the bases of culture/theology. According to them West and Turkey are responsible for every problem that Greece faces. 'War Geopolitics' groups, emerging in the 1990s, think of war particularly the first strike

---

<sup>264</sup> Coulombis, "Greek Foreign Policy: ...", pp. 31-32.

<sup>265</sup> *Megali Idea* is a Greek national ideology formed by the Greek political leaders for creating a nation and establishing a state. Indeed, *Megali Idea* aims reestablishing 'great-Ancient Greece' on any land associated with Greek history and Greek race. It adopts two centers for Hellenism regarding Athens and Constantinople and aims to control five seas and two continents. However, Greeks lost their dream with the defeat on Anatolia in 1922. With the foundation of Turkey in 1922-1923 great *Megali Idea* came to an end. Turkey was now controlling the Mediterranean, a part of the Aegean Sea, Marmara Sea, Straits and the Black Sea. These regions and seas were also important for capitalism to Greece. Turkey emerged as a limiting factor for the Great Idea. Therefore, this ideology created conflict between Turkey and Greece. Tayfur, 'Akdeniz'de Bir Adanın ...', pp. 22-28.

as a possible solution whereas there has been a possibility for Greece to be a magnet of Turkey due to Turkey's increasing geostrategic advantages in the post-Cold War period. The final pattern 'Power Strategy' recommends maintenance of military power and active diplomacy to face the Turkish 'threat and revisionism'. Power strategists support Turkey's accession to EU; otherwise according to them, the "Turkish oriented threat" will increase. The final pattern seems to fit today's Greek foreign policy formulation.<sup>266</sup>

On the one hand, to Constantinides, Greek foreign policy could be identified through two major schools of thought: realist and transnationalist. Realist school deals with nationalism and the interests of the nation state, which is the major player in the power politics. The transnationalists, on the other hand, support a united Europe and criticize the idea of nation state and nationalism.<sup>267</sup>

Although all these factors including political ideologies and theories and the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church<sup>268</sup> have been effective in the formulation of Greek foreign policy<sup>269</sup>, the Greek perception of Turkish foreign and security policies has a special place to focus on. Unfortunately, the anti-Turkish establishment both within the Greek State and Greek society does have important influence on the formation of the Greek foreign and security policy objectives and decisions. Therefore, while analyzing Greece's foreign and security policies this point should be taken into account.<sup>270</sup>

To Yannis Kranidiotis, the definition of Greek foreign policy takes place in three cocentric circles. First is formed by the European Union, to which Greece belongs originally and institutionally as a full member. The second circle is the regional sub-system of Southeastern Europe, where Greece finds herself

---

<sup>266</sup> Heraclides, *op.cit.*, pp.41-190.

<sup>267</sup> Stephanos Constantinides, 'Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis', *Hellenic Studies*, Vol.5, No.2, Autumn 1997, p. 11, quoted in George A Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), p. 391.

<sup>268</sup> For the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary Greece see Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Religious Populism and Political Culture: The Greek Case', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.7, No.3, Winter 2002, pp. 29-52.

<sup>269</sup> For the formulation of the Greek foreign policy, see P.C. Ioakimidis, "The Model of Foreign Policy Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions," in Stelios Stavridis, Thanos Veremis and et al., (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*, pp.140-171.

<sup>270</sup> Constantinides, *op.cit.*

geographically and culturally located. The third one is defined with the international system in which Greece takes part through its membership in various structures such as United Nations and open globalize economic system.<sup>271</sup>

From another point of view, Greek foreign and security policy can be best promoted through a set of concentric circles. The first inner circle includes a healthy and competitive economy, free trade, reliable and strong democratic institutions and modernized armed forces with sufficient deterrence. The second one is EU membership promoting Greece's defensive/deterrent/status quo stance. In the final circle there has been NATO as the best choice in terms of collective defense. In addition, wider membership of Greece is recommended to OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN for the enhancement of her stance in the peaceful settlement of disputes.<sup>272</sup>

In fact, in the Cold War years Greece was defined as a semi-peripheral state. When international relations are viewed from a world system perspective that defines the present capitalist system as one in which peripheral and semi-peripheral countries are dependent on and dominated by core countries, Greece is typically classified as being in the semi-periphery.<sup>273</sup> In the post-Cold War period, Greece no longer wants to be a semi-peripheral state of the world-system: she wants to be an actual part of the Western European political and security framework by improving its position in institutionalized multilateral arrangements (such as the EU and NATO) and her broader region. In that context, Greece tried to increase her independence from the core states in achieving its national interests (Macedonian problem), acting as a bridge between her region and Europe (especially after 1996), engaging in an intensive semi-peripheral rivalry with Turkey over the entire region including Cyprus. In essence, it is only after the Simitis' PASOK governments came to power in 1996 that Greece began to pursue an upwardly mobile semi-peripheral foreign policy. This policy was also in harmony with its EU and NATO partners. The new foreign policy orientation has increased Greek image in the Western alliance and promoted formation of Greek sphere of influence in the Balkans. Eventually, Greece

---

<sup>271</sup> Yannis Kranidiotis, 'The Fundamental Objectives of Greek Foreign Policy', in A. Mitsos and E. Mossialos, ed., Contemporary Greece and Europe ( Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2000) p. 31.

<sup>272</sup> Couloumbis and Yannas, op.cit. pp. 164-165; Couloumbis and Dalis, op.cit. pp. 82-83.

<sup>273</sup> Tayfur, "Semiperipheral...", pp. 51; 85-86; 100-101;

has had a say in handling international and regional problems and issues as a small-regional power.<sup>274</sup>

One of the most remarkable changes in Greek foreign and security policy over the past years has been a move towards the Europeanization. Ioakimidis defines four reasons for this development: realization of benefits from the EU, the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet empire, the EMU project and the enlargement of the EU. In the long run, Greece perceives the EU as the only instrument that would resolve the problems of the region.<sup>275</sup> Therefore, Greece is trying to become “the EU’s anchor of stability”<sup>276</sup> in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. In other words, Greece tries to provide maximum profit and opportunity from the evolving international environment and European Union in a pragmatic way.

In that respect, Greece has targeted further integration within NATO and the EU. What actually Greece wants is to actively contribute restructuring, prosperity and security of its immediate region. In that way, Greece will be a strategic ally of the West and even be in a better position than Turkey as she is a member of the EU. It will become non-sacrificial for the West. Thus, a Greece with a higher and a strategic position in the Western alliance could easily activate its policies in its strategic environment, more specifically the transfer of problems with Turkey to EU mechanisms in favor of herself. Indeed, Athens has already gone a long way on its road to reach these goals specifically with the Helsinki Summit. In short Greece pays heavy effort to adapt to the new international environment to provide her security.

#### **4.2 1990-1996: What’s Wrong with Greek Foreign Policy?**

In the post-Cold War era, the Mitsotakis’s New Democracy government’s main task was to reduce the huge internal and external deficits and to improve Greek image as a reliable partner of the West. In that respect, the New Democracy government focused on the country’s two main foreign policy priorities: ‘the evolving shape of the European Union, which would determine her economic future

---

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 128-129.

<sup>275</sup> Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece’s...”, p. 368; 370.

<sup>276</sup> Kostas Karamanlis , ‘Greece: the EU’s Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region’, *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2000, Vol. 23, Issue 2. pp. 7-11.

and the forms of Western collective defense cooperation which would ensure her security'.<sup>277</sup> The Greek governments of the 1990s saw the EU as an important security guarantee against external threats, particularly Turkey that has been perceived main "threat" to Greek national security since 1974. Additionally, New Democracy government advocated a rapid political union of the EU through deepening of its institutions. Because, a Greece out of EU's political union could be isolated and easily entangled to the Balkan conflict emerged in the early 1990s.<sup>278</sup>

In that respect, all political parties except the Greek Communists ratified the Maastricht treaty on the European Union, adopted in December 1991, in Greek parliament with great satisfaction. Greece was also invited to become a member of the WEU. Greece officially joined to the WEU on 20 November 1992, however, the importance of membership decreased dramatically for Greece. The EC's decision that article V of the modified treaty of Brussels, which provides a security guarantee in case of attack on members, should not be applied between member states of NATO and the WEU caused considerable irritation in Athens. It obviously meant that WEU members would not intervene in case of a Turkish-Greek conflict. On the contrary, Athens believed that article V would provide Greece with important security guarantees against a possible "attack" by Turkey. The failure of this dream caused the decreasing importance of WEU's membership in Greek point of view. EU was far away achieving a credible collective defense system.

The WEU's decision to invalidate Article 5 in case of Greek-Turkish conflict led Greece to see the United States and NATO as the more credible security providers against threats to her national security.<sup>279</sup> Post-Cold War era has witnessed an impressive improvement in bilateral US-Greek relations that was deteriorated in the post-1974 period. Defense cooperation agreement in July 1990 was signed, which would regulate the operation of American bases and installations on Greek soil for the next eight years. Additionally, in the Gulf War, Greek naval support, air space and bases were made available for the Western alliance, particularly the US. Crete was an important launch pad for the US operations in the Gulf. Besides, Mitsotakis

---

<sup>277</sup> John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel (New York: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY Press, 2002), p. 313.

<sup>278</sup> Veremis, "Greece: The Dilemmas..." p. 124.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., pp. 124-125.

was the first Greek Prime Minister to visit the US since 1964. These all factors contributed to the improvement of American-Greek relations in the post-Cold War era.

Ifantis argues that Greek-American relations have to be analyzed within complexity (national and international) of highly interdependent system. He defines four environments that affect the evolution of American-Greek relations. The first two are the US and Greek foreign policy-making processes within which policy towards each other is shaped. The third is bilateral American-Greek relations. The final one is the outer environment that has an impact on American-Greek relations.<sup>280</sup> Turkey can be said to be a determinant in shaping the US-Greek relations. There has been clear evidence for this. In Greek view, improved relations with the US within NATO can serve to constrain Turkey's influence within the alliance and the Eastern Mediterranean, and preserve military balance vis-à-vis Turkey.<sup>281</sup>

Nevertheless, a number of developments could damage the improvement in American-Greek relations. Greek officials feared that whereas the US reduced her military installations in the Eastern Mediterranean, she could get closer to the non-EU members of NATO in the region, namely Turkey. Turkey could be a suitable partner for the US policies. Additionally, the US criticism of Greek policy towards Turkish minority and the Slavic-speaking Greeks (Pomak) in Greek Thrace caused concern in Greece. Nevertheless, Greece realized that, for the post-Cold War formulation of Greek foreign policy, in the short run EU could not be an alternative to the US for a security relationship. The US can change the security balance in the region in a way affecting Greek interests<sup>282</sup>, and thus, the Greek have enough reasons not to offend the Americans.

Since 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus, primary focus of the Greek security policy has been based on "threat" perception from Turkey and with the end of the cold war this perception has not terminated.<sup>283</sup> On the contrary, the so-called

---

<sup>280</sup> Ifantis, "Greece and the US...", p. 147.

<sup>281</sup> 'The National Military Strategy', <http://www.hri.org/mod/ENGLISH/newver/defence.htm>, accessed on 14.02.2005.

<sup>282</sup> Veremis, "Greece: The Dilemmas...", p. 125.

<sup>283</sup> Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, 'Greek Security Policy After the Cold War', Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.21, No.3, December 2000, p. 96.

“threat” increased in Greek perception.<sup>284</sup> In Greek view, Turkey was looking for opportunities for her national interests in the region. Besides, the neighborhood of Greece transformed with the collapse of communist regimes in the Balkans. In Greek view, the collapse of Yugoslavia posed potential dangers to the country’s territorial integrity and social and political order. Political instability, bankrupt economies, sharp ethnic conflicts and border disputes on Greece’s northern periphery has threatened and still threatens the regional stability.<sup>285</sup> In response to these challenges in her geopolitical environment, Greece initially reacted nationalistically in contrast to her EU partners’ policies and became a part of instability in the region.

Greek nationalist stance was the result of three reasons. First, Greece feared that resettlement of borders in the region could result with the threats on Greek territorial integrity. According to Greeks, the source of this concern was particularly the case of Macedonia, of which constitution posed “irredentist claims” for Greek territory. Second, instability in the Balkans dragged Greece into various socio-economic problems. For example the immigration from Albania to Greece led serious disputes between the two states. Third, above-mentioned problems in the period 1989-95 also coincided with the internal political instability and economic difficulties in Greece. Greece began the Post-Cold War era with a deteriorating economic situation and a weak Conservative government with a marginal majority in Parliament. Accordingly, Conservative and Socialist governments used the nationalist card in the foreign policy as a tool to overcome domestic challenges.<sup>286</sup>

Therefore, in the first half of the 1990s Greece entered in turmoil in the Balkans and became a part of the problem. With the demise of the Yugoslavia, Greece initially opposed the break-up of the Yugoslavian federation and recognition of its constituent republics as independent states. However, after failed negotiations to end the hostilities, Greece joined other European Union members and the United States in recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina. Greece,

---

<sup>284</sup> Amikam Nachmani, ‘What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations’, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds.), Turkey in World Politics: An emerging Multi-regional Power (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 72.

<sup>285</sup> Gregorios Demestichas, ‘Greek Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean’, in Nikolaos A. Stavrou (ed.), Mediterranean Security at the Crossroads: A Reader (USA: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 267.

<sup>286</sup> Papahadopoulos, op.cit., pp. 9; 15.



however, for many reasons opposed to the recognition of Macedonia. In Greek view Macedonia's declared name, Republic of Macedonia was a security concern for Greek territorial integrity. Greece also claimed that Macedonian constitution was including references implying that the new Macedonian state had territorial claims against Greece. Moreover, Greece perceived Vergina Star - regarded by Greeks as an important symbol of Greek national heritage -, which Macedonia used on its flag, as a threat for Greek territorial integrity.<sup>287</sup>

Given these developments, Greece immediately opposed international recognition of the state with the name Republic of Macedonia. For her objection, Greece based on an EU declaration ensuring that the state which would be recognized 'has no territorial claims towards a neighboring Community State and she will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighboring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims'.<sup>288</sup> On June 1992, the EU Council of Ministers in Lisbon supported Greece's conditions for the recognition of the Macedonia in order to prevent Greek threats to veto any EU action for the recognition of the new republic with the name 'Macedonia'.<sup>289</sup> The EU also supported Greek position in exchange for Greece's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.<sup>290</sup>

Greece's concerns did not decrease by the obvious disparity in military capabilities and membership to collective security organizations that currently exists between Macedonia and Greece, because Athens concerned about the risk of a long-standing low-intensity warfare. Additionally, in Greek view, prospects for the possible formation of common interests between Turkey and Macedonia in the near future could pose a challenge to Greek vital and strategic interests in the region.

---

<sup>287</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Greek Security Concerns in the Balkans', in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. 317-318.

<sup>288</sup> Declaration on Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991), available at [http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art7.html#P23\\_2279](http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art7.html#P23_2279), accessed on 08.05.2004

<sup>289</sup> Tayfur, "Semiperipheral...", p. 130; İlker Alp, "Makedonya Üzerindeki Mücadeleler ve Makedonya Cumhuriyeti" in Murat Hatipoğlu (ed.) Makedonya Sorunu Düünden Bugüne (Ankara: ASAM, 2002), p. 84;

<sup>290</sup> Thonas Veremis, 'Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era', in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. 35-36.

When Skopje's internal political and economic weakness and historical rivalries with other regional powers taken into account, Macedonia could be expected to welcome Turkey as a regional protector.<sup>291</sup> Consequently, such an action could result in a negative way in the regional balance of power for Greece.<sup>292</sup>

On the contrary, to another argument, disintegration of Yugoslavia would serve better for Greek interests. Several weak states would emerge in the region instead of one strong state, namely Yugoslav Federation, the only Balkan state capable of threatening Greek interests with military capability identical to Greece and with the most developed economy among the former communist states in the region. However, once Macedonia became independent she would be a weak state in military and economic terms and there would be a potential threat of its Albanian minority irredentism. Moreover, in Greek view, Bulgarian expansionism could be a threat to Macedonia. Therefore, the independence of a weak and vulnerable Macedonia on many issues would not pose a serious threat to vital Greek interests.<sup>293</sup>

At the end, Greece's reaction was a firm foreign policy that refused the recognition of Macedonia until the latter goes some satisfying amendments in her constitution; make a change on her name and flag. Although Greece's European partners initially supported her policies, by the time, their perceptions of the Macedonian-Greek dispute began to change at the expense of Greece. As the situation in the northern ex-republics worsened, Macedonia became an important territory in preventing the extension of the fighting to the south. Greek hostility against Macedonia seemed to undermine Western efforts to contain the Yugoslav crises, therefore her Western partners perceived Greece a destabilizing factor in the Balkans.<sup>294</sup> Also Greek official message about the nature of her concerns about Macedonia stated to the world was perceived to be extremely unclear and

---

<sup>291</sup> For a detailed analysis of Greek security concerns, see Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" Mediterranean Quarterly, 5, Winter 1994, pp. 84-105.

<sup>292</sup> Nikolaos Zahariadis, 'Nationalism And Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response To The Macedonian Issue', Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1994, Vol. 109, Issue 4

<sup>293</sup> Dimitri Conostas and Charalambos Papatotiriou, 'Greek Policy Responses to the Post-Cold War Balkan Environment', in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. 227-229.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., p. 230.

unsatisfactory.<sup>295</sup> This Greek policy alienated Greece's Western allies from her. Therefore, In December 1993 and early 1994, six European Union countries and the US recognized the new state in the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Greece's demands for the refusal of the name 'Macedonia' was totally rejected.

Greek reaction was closing borders and imposing a unilateral trade embargo on Macedonia from February 1994 to September 1995. Her main argument based on the assumption that Macedonian name, flag and constitution was posing threats for Greek territorial integrity. Moreover, Greece was disappointed with the solidarity of a common EU foreign policy. In Greek view, the EU was not ready to offer a system of collective security and her EU partners left Greece alone. Therefore, it is believed that, the decision by several EU members and the United States to recognize Macedonia certainly undermined Greek government's position and credibility both in Greece, and in the eyes of the Macedonian government, and contributed to Greek insecurity. Then, Greece decided to act in national terms. In that respect, it can be argued that the Greek reaction was also a response to the external actors including the EU and US.<sup>296</sup> On the other hand, by the time, this Greek foreign policy stance has turned out to be a challenge for herself.

Greek approach to Macedonia seemed to be an obstacle in front of Western efforts for the containment of Yugoslavian crises.<sup>297</sup> Furthermore, Greek image in the international arena got damaged and the Europeans began to question her role in the European system. The European Commission complaint Greece to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It argued that Greece violated the Treaty of Rome by breaking the rules, which prohibit a member state from unilaterally closing one of the

---

<sup>295</sup> Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Conclusion: Beyond the Greek Paradox', in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaidis (eds.), *The Greek Paradox* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 171.

<sup>296</sup> Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Is Greece an Awkward Partner?', in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), *Greece in a Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 26; Zahariadis, 'Nationalism And Small-State....'.

<sup>297</sup> Constan and Papasotiriou, *op.cit.*, p. 230.

EU' s external borders.<sup>298</sup> At the end, Greek government thought that the US was still the more desirable interlocutor for her.<sup>299</sup>

Getting aware of that Greek attitude on Macedonian imbroglio not only caused international isolation of Greece but also harmed her European image; Greece began to pursue a more moderate policy. Thus, in September 1995 an Interim Agreement was signed between Macedonia and Greece by the US promotion in exchange for Athens lifted the embargo and Skopje made amendments in her constitution in line with Greek demands and changed the country's flag by removing the sun of Vergina. Merely, the name problem continued to remain unresolved and still has been negotiated in the UN framework. At the end, these developments paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states.

In the meantime there was disappointment on Greek side in terms of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Europe's common foreign policy was welcomed by Greece, because in Greek view, it would be a protector for Greece, and would reduce Greece's vulnerability to the external environment. Traditional balance of power considerations, particularly in the Balkans have however made this Greek expectation quite difficult. The Greek stance in the Balkan conflict contradicted many of its EU and NATO partners; therefore, Greece's policies to some extent were not harmonious with the CFSP. Greece was viewed as a country failed to adapt European integration and policy dynamics to her national objectives.<sup>300</sup> It was also pointed out by The Economist's writing in 1994 stating that:

Despite 13 years in the European Union and hand-outs now worth \$6 billion a year, Greece still seems to belong more the volatile Balkans than to Western Europe. First the Greeks exasperated their EU partners by their casual approach to European obligations, their slowness in implementing directives and their hostility to better EU relations with Turkey. At one stage, a frustrated Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, said 'he would be happy to see Greece leave.'<sup>301</sup>

---

<sup>298</sup> However, in February 1995, the ECJ's decision was in favor of Greece stating that a member state is allowed to take a unilateral action in the event of war or serious international tension leading threat of war.

<sup>299</sup> Thonas Veremis, 'Greece and the Balkans...', p. 43.

<sup>300</sup> Iokimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's...", p. 360.

<sup>301</sup> The Economist, September 17, 1997.

Nevertheless, the Macedonian Question demonstrates that international, in particular, European pressure eventually forced Greece for reconciliation. It can be argued that especially being an EU member prevented Greece from acting unilaterally and avoided her from nationalistic stance any longer. In one-way or another, the EU acted as a restraining factor for possible Greek actions. In Greek view, although either NATO or the EU did not address challenges to Greek interests effectively, Greece adopts her security enhanced by membership in both institutions.<sup>302</sup>

With regard to Serbia, Greece tried to mediate between Serbia, the party in the Yugoslavian civil war universally condemned as the aggressor, and EC and to maintain communication channels open with the former.<sup>303</sup> However, the UN and EU decided to impose sanctions against Serbia to end the hostilities of the Yugoslavian civil war. Greece agreed to impose an EU trade ban on the republics of Montenegro and Serbia. With this decision, Greece wanted to give a message that Greece was acting with her EU partners. She also wanted to prove that EU criticism over Greek position (Macedonian issue) that spoiled the first attempt in common foreign policy after Maastricht was wrong and to provide a resolution in favor of herself on the name issue with Macedonia. Greece also reluctantly agreed on imposition of UN sanctions at the end of May of 1992. She contributed a destroyer to the NATO flotilla patrolling the Adriatic to monitor the naval embargo.

Nevertheless, Greek policy towards Belgrade was a matter of concern for the West. Although Greece did not openly pursue a pro-Serb policy<sup>304</sup>, the ongoing Greek diplomatic relations with Belgrade met with suspicion. Because, cooperation between the two states could result in the consolidation of Serbian position in the Balkans. The Greek foreign ministry confirmed press reports that the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, proposed the division of FYROM between Greece and Serbia. Greece, however, claims that she rejected the offer and reported it to the

---

<sup>302</sup> Veremis, 'Greece: The Dilemmas...', p. 119.

<sup>303</sup> Greek mediation was instrumental in releasing of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic from Serbian captivity in Sarajevo during the spring of 1992. Greece also tried to promote a solution between Ibrahim Rugova (leader of the Albanian Kosovars) and the Serbian government to end the crises in 1992.

<sup>304</sup> Larrabee, *op.cit.*, p. 321.

EC.<sup>305</sup> However, Greece did not condemn Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia as openly as her Western partners. In addition, she did not allow use of military force against Serbia until 1994.

One of the reasons for Greek support to Serbia was emanating from Greek perceived threat of 'Muslim arc' that could spill over under Turkish control through all along Greece's borders, from Turkey to Albania. This possibility fueled Greek fears for a change in Balkans balance of power at the expense of Greece.<sup>306</sup> Therefore, Greece believed that a strong Serbia could be a security guarantee for Greece.<sup>307</sup> Additionally, in Greek view, the Western attitude in the Balkans was too 'one-sided' excluding the Serbs.<sup>308</sup>

Another reason for Greek support to Serbia was Greek thought that Serbia could be an ally so as to prevent the independence of Macedonia. However, Serbia, with the Dayton Agreement that ended the Yugoslav warfare, was obliged to recognize the former republic with its constitutional name Republic of Macedonia.<sup>309</sup> In the meantime, Dayton Agreement had been beneficial for Greece in order to end the frictions (Greek ties with Belgrade during Serbia's international isolation) with her Western allies.

Greece also concerned about the separatist tendencies in Kosovo. According to Greece, the conflict here could result from the annexation of Kosovo by Albania and also Albania could claim sovereign rights on the western part of Macedonia (% 26 percent Albanian minority). In that respect, Greece perceived that there would be external border changes in the region with a potential threat to her territorial integrity.<sup>310</sup>

Regarding the relations with Bulgaria, Post-Cold War Bulgarian-Greek relations were not so smooth for two reasons. First, Turkish-Bulgarian

---

<sup>305</sup> Zahariadis, 'Nationalism And Small-State...'

<sup>306</sup> Conostas and Papatotiriou, *op.cit.*

<sup>307</sup> George Mourtos, 'Security in the Balkans: A Greek Perspective', in David Carlton, Paul Ingram and Giancaria Tenaylia (eds.), Rising Tension in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, (England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1996), p. 152.

<sup>308</sup> Larrabee, *op.cit.*

<sup>309</sup> Papahadopoulos, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>310</sup> Veremis, 'Greece: The Dilemmas...', p. 131.

rapprochement aiming to normalize relations that were damaged by the ill treatment of Bulgarian Turks, irritated Greece. Indirectly, Bulgaria turned out to be a problem for Greece. In Greece's view, she lost one of the allies against Turkey. Second, in January 1992, Bulgaria was the first among the states recognizing the new state with the name Republic of Macedonia.<sup>311</sup> However, Bulgaria refused to accept a separate Macedonian nation. Following Macedonia's recognition, Greece suspended a \$50 million line of credit to Bulgaria. Greece also gave support to ex-communists in Bulgaria because of the fact that non-communists were promising for the welfare of Turkish minority.<sup>312</sup>

In the meantime, the deterioration of economic and social conditions in Albania resulted in a wave of immigration to Greece. Refugees created a major economic and social burden for Greece and exacerbated Greece's already serious economic problems. Greek efforts to deport many of these refugees tightened the relations with Albania. According to Greeks, bad treatment of "Orthodox Greek minority" in Albania also became the source of tension between Albania and Greece. The "Orthodox Greek minority" representation reduced in the Albanian parliament. In 1994, relations got worse with the killing of two Albanian soldiers. To Albanian claims, this was most probably a Greek terrorist attack. In response, Albania sentenced five senior members of Omonia, the Orthodox Greek minority rights organization, to prison. This led Greece to veto an EU aid package to Albania throughout 1994.<sup>313</sup> It can be argued that Greece as in the Macedonian case one more time used EU as an instrument on its way to achieve her national interests.

With the pressure of the international community, Albania released the five senior members of Omonia, in February 1995. Then, Greece lifted her veto on the EU aid package to Albania. In March 1996, a Friendship and Cooperation Pact was signed between the two states for the peaceful solution of disputes and improving the relations. It is clear that the cooperation brought significant benefits to both countries.

---

<sup>311</sup> Papahadopoulos, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>312</sup> Van Coufoudakis, 'Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996, p. 31.

<sup>313</sup> Iokimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's...", p. 371, (endnote 8).

When it comes to the relations with Turkey, the “threat” perception of Greece still has not changed. Therefore, Turkey remains the driving force behind many of Greece’s security and foreign policy priorities and initiatives. Greece has often used the EU membership against Turkey by vetoing EU decisions that are in favor of Turkey or financial assistance to Turkey<sup>314</sup> as an instrument to eliminate Turkish policies that she perceived as a rival in the Mediterranean and Balkans. Furthermore, another Greek effort stemming from negative Greek perception about Turkey was settling good relations with Turkey’s problematic neighbors regarding Armenia, Iran and Syria. Besides, Greece initially also was not very much interested in the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), although being invited to be a member of the organization from the very start, because of the fact that it has been a Turkish initiative.<sup>315</sup> However, later Greece realized BSEC’s benefits and opportunities and has taken part in this initiative. In Greek view, participation in BSEC could be an insurance policy against instability in former Yugoslavia, and can contribute to overcome economic difficulties facing Greece on the way to European Monetary Union. Greece also thought that it could be a bridge between its BSEC partners and EU.<sup>316</sup>

In the first half of the 1990s Turkish-Greek rapprochement did not realize for many reasons. Mitsotakis attempted to improve the relations with Ankara throughout the winter of 1991-1992. His initiative for a non-aggression pact failed because of disagreement on Cyprus issue. In August and September 1992, Boutros-Ghali promoted “a set of ideas” in order to reach an agreement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots; however, a solution did not become possible. In Greece’s view, Turkey was not ready for giving concessions and pleased with the existing situation in Cyprus.<sup>317</sup> On the other hand, being a problem in Turkish-Greek relations, in the

---

<sup>314</sup> D. Conostas, ‘Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy. Domestic and External Parameters’, in D. Conostas and T. G. Stvrou (eds.), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1995), p. 78, quoted in Fatih Tayfur, Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain (Hants: Ashgate, 2003), p. 131.

<sup>315</sup> Coufoudakis, “Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era...”, p. 38.

<sup>316</sup> Yiannis Valinakis, ‘Greece and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation’, in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. 132-133.

<sup>317</sup> Veremis, ‘Greece: The Dilemmas...’, pp. 130-131; Moustakis and Sheehan, “Greek Security Policy...”, p. 107.



Post-Cold War era the EU membership of Greek Cypriots has been so crucial for Greek strategic interests in order to change balance of power in favor of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>318</sup> It is believed that Greek Cypriots' seeking for EU accession since 1990 has enhanced the Greek and Greek Cypriots' position vis-à-vis Turkey in the negotiations over Cyprus.<sup>319</sup>

Greece, in order to gain an advantageous position against Turkey over Cyprus, argued that the Iraq invasion of Kuwait is identical to Turkish intervention on Cyprus. She accused the West of not implementing the same procedure to Turkey and not emphasizing enough pressure on it. In addition, in 1993, "integrated defense doctrine" was signed between Greece and Greek Cypriots for external deterrence, extending Greece's defense area.<sup>320</sup>

The nature of Turkish-Greek relations remained tense in the first half of the 1990s. Following the ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention (signed in 1982 and has been a long-standing problem between Turkey and Greece since that day) in 1994 Greece has claimed that she has the right to extend her territorial waters in the Aegean from six to twelve miles whenever she sees fit.<sup>321</sup> This has been one of the sources of tension in Turkish-Greek relations. The tension increased on 8 June, 1995 when the Turkish government declared to take whatever action might be necessary- including military action- if Greece exercised her claim (envisaged in the International Law of the Sea Convention) to extend her territorial waters. On the other hand, in January 1996 the two states came almost on the brink of war during the crises over the island of Kardak in the Aegean. Greece believed that the risk of war with Turkey was real and the Turkish-Greek strategic balance has to be maintained.<sup>322</sup> Dispute was over some uninhabited islands in the Aegean Sea. The crisis was calmed down by the US mediation, but a new issue has added to the agenda of Turkish-Greek problems. In the meantime, the international community

---

<sup>318</sup> Couloumbis, "Strategic Consensus...", p. 16.

<sup>319</sup> Theodora A. Couloumbis, 'Greece in the Post-Cold War Environment', in A. Mitsos and E. Mossialos, ed., Contemporary Greece and Europe ( Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 379.

<sup>320</sup> Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era...", pp. 26; 36.

<sup>321</sup> The emergence of the territorial waters as a dispute between Greece and Turkey coincides with the signing of 1982 International Convention on the Law of Sea by Greece but not by Turkey.

<sup>322</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy...", p. 95.

put pressure on Turkey and Greece for reconciliation on their disputes. Thus, they signed the Madrid Declaration of good will in July 1997. But, in practice it was not really implemented.

In the early years of 1990s Greek foreign policy was preoccupied with above-mentioned “threat” perceptions mostly based on power politics and nationalistic understanding. In the second half of the 1990s, Greek politicians realized that these policies had been detrimental to Greek interests in the new international environment and a shift has been observed in the formulation of Greek foreign policy reflecting a new pragmatism. Cooperation and aiming to take a leading role in the Balkans and Mediterranean particularly under the EU umbrella has become the new approach for Greece.

#### **4.3 1996-2005: Towards a More European Greece**

Greek foreign policy underwent a significant change under the former Prime Minister Costas Simitis. In 1996 a new European-oriented political stance with pragmatism, cooperation and a leading role in the troubled Balkans emerged from Greece.<sup>323</sup> Costas Simitis, a moderate, pro-European and multilateralist politician, was appointed as the Greek Prime Minister (after the September 1996 election) when Papandreu was removed from the office because of his illness. The Greek attempts to join the Eurozone so fast, participation in the Alba Operation in Albania (1997) and support to the EU and NATO policies towards the Yugoslavia and the Kosovo war despite the reluctant public opinion all have been evidence for a more European-oriented foreign policy.<sup>324</sup>

Simitis’s major objectives were modernization in economy, public administration and external relations following a more Euro-Atlantic policy. More specifically, Costas Simitis defined strategic targets of Greece as equal participation with the European Union and advancing Greece’s new role in the geopolitical environment in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Equal participation in the EU for the Simitis’s government represented full integration in the EU and specifically

---

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>324</sup> Bertrand, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

became a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU).<sup>325</sup> Furthermore, the election of Kostas Karamanlis as the leader of the opposition New Democracy Party in March 1997 accelerated this modernization process. He seemed to be providing constructive and moderate opposition in foreign policy issues.<sup>326</sup> It can be argued that Greece tries to pursue a very pragmatic foreign policy that aimed at taking advantage of the new opportunities in the new international environment including evolving EU and NATO. For instance, Greeks believe that as a member of the EU, she can be a bridge and play a leading and stabilizing role between the EU and the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the meantime, Simitis's foreign policy change aimed to face the challenges stemming from both the disintegration of Yugoslavia and rapid globalization of world economy. Restructuring in the Balkans offered Greece new opportunities to play a regional role although there were also significant potential threats such as Kosovo. Economic reconstruction of Balkan countries has been adopted as a diplomatic tool by Greece for regional cooperation. In the meantime, another driving force behind Greek foreign policy in the Balkans was to counter the Turkish influence in the region.<sup>327</sup> Additionally, cooperation with the Balkan states is believed to contribute the bargaining power of Greece vis-à-vis Turkey by eliminating the possibility of multi-front diplomatic and potentially military confrontation.<sup>328</sup> Therefore, Simitis's foreign policy seemed to include both nationalistic and Western-oriented motives.

In the above-mentioned framework, Greece avoided nationalistic stance in her foreign policy that pursued in the early 1990s because of the fact that this political stance harmed Greek national interests. Relations, therefore, with the Balkan countries has begun to get better. Becoming an EU and NATO member Greece has enhanced her position in the Balkan region.<sup>329</sup> All the Balkan states explained their

---

<sup>325</sup> Kourvetaris, *op.cit.*, p. 394.

<sup>326</sup> Couloumbis and Dalis, *op.cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>327</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy..."

<sup>328</sup> Couloumbis, 'Greece in the Post-Cold...', p. 381.

<sup>329</sup> Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, 'The Greek Approach to the Balkans', in Thonas M. Veremis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, *The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-1998* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998), pp. 204; 210; George Papandreou, 'Greece and

desires to join these institutions and wished to be backed by Greece in that direction. In that respect, to Greeks, Greece could be expected to be a representative of economic and political leadership in the region promoting peace and stability.<sup>330</sup> Such an attempt would be identical to Western interests and led the US and EU to support Greece as a regional stabilizer.<sup>331</sup> With regard to EU and NATO enlargement, Greece has encouraged the Balkan states to join these institutions. For example, Greek efforts has included coordination with France and Italy for Romania's accession to NATO; active participation to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in order to modernize militaries of central and eastern European states. In that way, maintenance of stability in the region is believed to promote Greek security and prosperity.<sup>332</sup>

With regard to Albanian-Greek relations, Greece adopted a set of new measures for de-escalation of tension between the two states and the relations began to normalize. The status of Albanian illegal immigrants in the country improved in exchange for Albanian help in order to fight against cross-border crime. In addition, Albania let Greece open Greek-language schools in southern Albania. Military ties also have been improved by Greek help for the restructuring of Albanian armed forces and by joint military exercises. Bilateral dialogue between the two governments was promoted. One of the driving forces for this cooperation has been Greek perceived "threat" of Turkish-Albanian growing military relations.<sup>333</sup>

On the other hand, political crises in 1997 caused the anarchy in Albania. Because of the possibility of a new wave of immigration and outburst of violence to Greek territory, Greece was following the internal developments in Albania with great caution. Greece called for EU intervention to help restore law and order in Albania. However, disagreement among the fifteen EU members did not let the formation of such an EU force in the region. This was also one of the failures of

---

the Day After in the Balkans', available at <http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/spring99/spring99.html>, accessed on 03.12.2003

<sup>330</sup> Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, 'Further Turmoil Ahead', in D. Keridis and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Virginia: Brassey's, 2001), p. 61.

<sup>331</sup> Conostas and Papatotiriou, op.cit., pp. 219:225.

<sup>332</sup> Yannis Papatotiriou, 'Southeastern Europe in the New Security Environment', Military Technology, 9/2002, p. 25.

<sup>333</sup> Larrabee, op.cit., p. 325.

Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Consequently, Greece contributed a military contingent to the operation ALBA that was formed from the forces of the countries more directly affected by the crises. And now, Greece has been one of the desirous supporters of Albanian accession to both NATO and EU.

Indeed, in case of Macedonia the real security threat has been internal instability within Macedonia between the Slav majority and the Albanian minority rather than the name issue. Deteriorated relations between the two communities can result in the flee of refugees to Greece posing economic and social burden for her. In addition, the developments can fuel the Kosovo problem and complicate Greece's relations with Albania. Therefore, a politically stable and democratic Macedonia has been very much in favor of Greek interests.<sup>334</sup> Today, Greece has been promoting a series of political and economic initiatives in the Macedonia for stability. One of the most important initiatives can be seen as the military co-operation agreement signed between Greece and Macedonia in 2004.<sup>335</sup> Macedonian officers will be trained at Greek military academies. Additionally, Greek-Bulgarian relations have also developed through economic and political cooperation such as gas and oil pipeline projects in the Balkans. Besides, Greece supports Bulgarian Accession to the EU.

Although there have been improvement in relations between Balkan states and Greece, the stability in the Balkans is still fragile. The tension in March 2004 between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo proved once more that the likelihood of instability in the Balkans has not disappeared yet. The unclear status of Kosovo could be expected to be a source of instability in the region. Unrest in Kosovo could damage democratization process in Serbia and destabilize Macedonia. Developments can be expected to have direct impact on Greek security. In the meantime, Serbia-Montenegro's political evolution would be crucial for Greece and regional stability. A democratic Serbia would ease the Greek efforts to integrate the Balkans to the

---

<sup>334</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, *op.cit.*, p. 52

<sup>335</sup> 'Training of More Ethnic Minority Civil Servants to Start in Macedonia'

<http://www.setimes.com/html2/english/news.htm#1>, accessed on 06.12.2003

EU.<sup>336</sup> In the frame of all above-mentioned developments, in the years to come, the Balkans will continue to be amidst the main priorities of Greek strategy.<sup>337</sup>

In the meantime, Greece has developed friendly economic and political relations with the Middle East as a part of its pragmatic and multi-dimensional foreign policy. There have been bilateral and multilateral agreements with many countries regarding economy, culture, trade and transportation.<sup>338</sup> Besides, efforts for the improvement of relations with Turkey have been a remarkable development in Greek foreign policy.

With regard to Turkey, Greece believes that the obstacle for Greece's modernization, democratization and full integration to the EU mostly stems from the unresolved Turkish-Greek disputes.<sup>339</sup> Simitis government realized that without solving the problems with Turkey Greece would not be a part of the EU. Being aware of this position, Simitis government began to pursue a more moderate and cooperative policy vis-à-vis Turkey. In the meantime, former Prime Minister Simitis stated that the gradual normalization of Turkish-Greek relations could be realized when Turkey left her rights in the Aegean or adopt the judgment of International Court.<sup>340</sup>

The relations between Turkey and Greece even in the second half of the 1990s remained tense. Many issues prevented the rapprochement between the two states. Greece vetoed the EU's financial aids to Turkey that Turkey would get within the frame of the 1995 Customs Union Agreement. With the Kardak crises Turkey and Greece came on the brink of war. Greece also used its veto against Turkish candidacy to the EU in the Luxemburg and demand to make Turkish candidacy conditional on the solution of Turkish-Greek disputes. Greek Cypriot decision to deploy Russian S-300 missiles on the island was another source of tension. The entry of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, into Greece in February 1999, and his arrest by Turkey in Greek Embassy in Kenya made the Greek-Turkish relations worse.

---

<sup>336</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>338</sup> Kourvetaris, *op.cit.*, p. 393.

<sup>339</sup> D. Keridis, 'Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy', in D. Keridis and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* (Virginia: Brassey's, 2001)p. 18.

<sup>340</sup> Kourvetaris, *op.cit.*, p. 403.

As a result of all these developments and Greek decision to pursue a European-oriented foreign policy, Greece initiated a rapprochement policy with Turkey. In EU Summit in Helsinki on 9-10 December, 1999 Greece lifted its veto against Turkey's accession to the EU in exchange for it provided concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean.<sup>341</sup> In the aftermath of Helsinki, bilateral agreements were signed with Turkey including tourism, trade, illicit drug trafficking, organized crime, environment, culture, education, etc. Furthermore, bilateral dialogue took start between Turkey and Greece in the early 2002.

Beginning from Helsinki, it has seemed that Greece has transferred the Turkish-Greek problems to the EU and EU has become a party to the Aegean and Cyprus problems. Now, Greece has come to the table backed by the EU. Issues turned out to be between Turkey and the EU. Turkey has become disadvantaged party. New climate emerged from Turkish-Greek relations after Helsinki, which may have a benign influence on the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. Although today the two states have been in a better bilateral relation, reconciliation has not been reached on fundamental problems.

In the meantime, these developments led Greece to be seen as a more Europeanized country by its EU partners. Furthermore, the agenda of Greek foreign policy has broadened. It has not only included high politics (relations with Turkey, Cyprus, NATO, etc.) any longer but also low politics regarding trade, environment, technology, culture and agriculture. In former Greek Prime Minister Simitis's view, 'a strong Greece does not mean only militarily but also in economic, political, institutional and cultural measures'.<sup>342</sup> Greece has not only been accommodating her national policies but also trying to promote common European interests. In that respect, Greece's accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001 has been a signal for the adaptation of Greece to the European Union policies. Besides, the importance of Greek accession to single currency goes beyond mere economics. Accession to the Euro is perceived a huge security investment for Greece. It is believed that being a full member of the Eurozone serves to enhance Greece's external security. In Greek view, a country that shares the same currency

---

<sup>341</sup> The reasons why Greece adopted Turkish EU membership are treated in detail in Chapter four.

<sup>342</sup> Iokimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's...", pp. 363-366.

with many of the EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) can feel more secure against external challenges because of the fact that such actions have the potential to challenge the entire Euro zone.<sup>343</sup> And so, it is believed that Greek credibility has increased in the EU through her pragmatic foreign policy, macroeconomic stabilization and domestic political stability.<sup>344</sup> However, recent revelations showed that Greece provided flawed data on her economic performance between 1997 and 1999, and that the country's actual performance would not have allowed it to join the Euro zone. This can be evidence for how Greece gives importance to the integration with the EU. On the other hand, Greece could face stiff financial penalties from the EU for its failure to rein in its budget deficit (5.5 per cent of GDP), which exceeds the 3 per cent of GDP limit for the countries in the Euro zone.<sup>345</sup>

In the meantime relations with the US have not been ignored. Regarding the US, Greece argues that Europeanization of Greek foreign policy does not suggest the reduction in US-Greek relations. On the contrary, it contributes to the reconstruction of bilateral relations.<sup>346</sup> In George Papandreu's view, PASOK's leader, Greece can't promote her political initiatives without alliances, both at the international and the European level. He also believes that no country can serve her national interest while pointlessly antagonizing third parties, namely the US. Therefore, American-Greek relations have to be strengthened.<sup>347</sup> Greek policy makers foresee that in the years to come, the US interest to a great extent will focus on the central and the eastern Mediterranean regions. Accordingly, Greece believes that the US and the NATO would need major military installations and facilities in these regions. In that respect, Greece has been putting more emphasis on her strategic assets such as the Iraklion

---

<sup>343</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, *op.cit.*, p. 317.

<sup>344</sup> Spyros Blavoukos and George Pagoulatos, 'A Medium Country's Middle-of-the-Road Success: The 2003 Presidency of the European Union', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Winter 2003, p. 147.

<sup>345</sup> 'Greece Facing EU Sanctions Over Budget Deficit' available at [http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en\\_GB/features/setimes/features/2005/01/19/feature-01](http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2005/01/19/feature-01), accessed on 12.02.200.

<sup>346</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, *Op.cit.*, pp.36-37.

<sup>347</sup> George Papandreu, 'Greek Foreign Policy: A Policy of Stability, Cooperation and Development' available at <http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/winter99/winter99.html>, accessed on 08.11.2003.



Air Station and the island of Crete (especially Souda Bay), both the US and NATO use it, and other important Aegean and Dodecanese islands.<sup>348</sup>

For Greece the last Iraq war was a dilemma. Greece did not approve American policies that are contradicting with that of EU; however, she mostly responded positively to American military demands (use of air space and bases of Greece). For the promotion of security in the regional sub-system, which Greece has been a part of it; Greece believes that close cooperation with the US is necessary. Although Greece has been a member of EU, she always seems to put forward her national interests first and avoids alienation from the US.<sup>349</sup>

In general terms, for the role of Greece in the Post-Cold War era, Papandreou, the leader of PASOK and the former foreign minister of Simitis government, stated that new challenges of globalization should be met not only by Greek but also entire region's (the Mediterranean, the Balkans and all of Europe) common initiatives. While doing this Greece's objective remains to be a model of democracy, stability and cooperation for the region. After the war in the Balkans, South East Europe mostly needs to achieve security, democracy, and peace and join the EU. Within framework of the Balkan Stability Pact, Greece promotes initiatives such as regional reconstruction and network cooperation for the stability of the region in line with EU objectives.<sup>350</sup>

Papandreou also stressed that 2004 is a year of great challenges for the country in terms of the national issues. He said "We shall continue steadfastly the effort to solve the Cyprus issue and the Turkish-Greek difference on the delineation of the continental shelf in the Aegean, on the basis of both the principles of international law and of international treaties".<sup>351</sup> However, neither the Cyprus issue nor the Aegean problems has not been solved yet.

---

<sup>348</sup> Kourvetaris, op.cit., p. 398.

<sup>349</sup> Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, op.cit., pp. 149; 153.

<sup>350</sup> George A. Papandreou, 'Greece's Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.1, No.1, 2002, pp. 18-21.

<sup>351</sup> 'Elections to decide Greece's future for next decade: Papandreou', International Custom Wire, 01.04.2004

Almost all political parties and social forces (except for the Communist party) support Greece for more integration with the EU and to be a core member of it.<sup>352</sup> In that respect, Greece's New Democracy Government that has come to office with the 2004 elections will deal with a wide range of economic, political and foreign policy issues. Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis stated that the Cyprus issue and EU integration have been among the government's top priorities. Other issues include a powerful and credible European Security and Defense Policy, Balkan reconstruction and relations with Turkey.<sup>353</sup> It can be argued that Greece will not leave her foreign policy stance that was pursued by the former government. Indeed, the pro-Western stance on New Democracy policy has still been going on as it was in the past.<sup>354</sup>

In the meantime, PASOK accused Karamanlis of the decision to separate Greek-Turkish relations from the Cyprus issue. According to them, this means a change in foreign policy strategy. In response, Greek Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis emphasized that Cyprus issue has still remained to be one of Greece's main foreign policy objectives. For the solution to Cyprus problem the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan initiated a plan in the name of 'Annan Plan'. After a long period of negotiations, the plan submitted to referendum in both communities. Whereas Turkey was supporting the admittance of the plan, Greece remained neutral. Karamanlis explained the reason for his strategy of neutrality on the Cyprus issue stating that 'it would betray a lack of vision to take a position that would create rifts between the Greeks of Greece and Cyprus, and it would be irresponsible to provoke conflict within our political system'<sup>355</sup>. Greece would pursue the principle that "Cyprus decides and Greece supports".<sup>356</sup>

---

<sup>352</sup> Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, *op.cit.*, p. 148.

<sup>353</sup> Kostas Karamanlis, 'Government Policy Speech in Parliament/Foreign Policy Issues' available at <http://www.mfa.gr/english/GovernmentPolicySpeechinParliament.doc>, accessed on 04.04.2004.

<sup>354</sup> George A Kourvetaris and Prudy Widlak, 'An Interface of Political Attitudes and Socio-Political Issues of New Democracy Politicians in the 1981 Greek Parliament', in George A Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999)p. 266.

<sup>355</sup> 'Greeks prepare for 'day after'', available at [http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/\\_w\\_articles\\_politics\\_100002\\_24/04/2004\\_42094](http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100002_24/04/2004_42094), accessed on 24.04.2004

<sup>356</sup> "PM Karamanlis: Joint effort on Cyprus does not end with the referenda", available at [http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/2004/04-04-23\\_1.apeen.html#01](http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/2004/04-04-23_1.apeen.html#01), accessed on 24.04.2004.

More specifically, in the referendum on 24 April, whereas Greek Cypriot's majority (% 75.8) voted for no, Turkish Cypriots majority (%64.9) voted for yes. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum Greece's stance was in the direction supporting the Southern Cyprus confirming the previous Greek statements.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis said that in any case, the government is firm in the strategy for the improvement and strengthening of the Turkish-Greek relations. And Turkey has been assured by Greece that Cyprus will not be an obstacle on her path to the EU.<sup>357</sup> However, in the last EU summit in 17-18 December 2004 in Brussels, Cyprus and Aegean have been on the agenda of conditions for Turkey's accession to the EU.<sup>358</sup> In that respect, it can be obviously argued that Greece and Greek Cypriots continue to use the EU mechanisms effectively to achieve their claims vis-à-vis Turkey. Even today, the official web sites of Greece still defines Turkey as a 'threat'<sup>359</sup>, although there has been a rapprochement between the two countries since 1999 EU Helsinki summit.<sup>360</sup> Turkey still has been the main driving force behind Greek foreign and security policies.

Therefore, in the days to come top priorities in Greek foreign policy agenda, at a time of economic problems, will be; Turkish-Greek relations (mainly Cyprus and Aegean) within the EU; further integration of Greece with the Western institutions, particularly the EU; Greece and her region together with Turkey and the EU; adaptation to the effects of globalization and new security environment. The economic problems will also require a new set of policies. This could prove to be a very crucial period for Karamanlis government<sup>361</sup> with a long-standing so-called "threat" perception of Turkey.

---

<sup>357</sup> 'Karamanlis: No Discount to the ND Program', available at <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2004/04-04-23.mpab.html>, accessed on 24.04.2004.

<sup>358</sup> '16-17 December 2004 EU Presidency Conclusions', available at [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf), article 19-20, p. 6, accessed on 02.02.2005.

<sup>359</sup> See web sites of <http://www.mod.gr/ENGLISH/newver/Defence.htm> and <http://www.mfa.gr> accessed on 05.12.2003.

<sup>360</sup> The term European Union (EU) is used throughout this text to denote the current EU and its earlier manifestations, European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community (EC).

<sup>361</sup> Antonis Karakousis, 'Crucial period', available at [http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/\\_w\\_articles\\_columns\\_100024\\_24/04/2004\\_42088](http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_100024_24/04/2004_42088), accessed on 24.04.2004.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE EASTERN NEIGHBOR OR THREAT: TURKEY

As mentioned in the previous chapters, Greek perception of Turkey as the main security concern for her national security still continues. Therefore, it is important to question and understand the reasons of this Greek perception and Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in order to analyze to what extent Greek perceptions of Turkey are justified. In that respect, the chapter includes three parts. The first part deals with the factors that condition the Greek perception of the “threat”. The second part explores the reasons why Greece has adopted Turkish EU membership. It puts forward the driving force behind Greek support to Turkey in the EU accession process that emanates mostly from the desire to face the challenges to her security. The third part is devoted to the Greek expectations in the aftermath of Helsinki EU summit for providing its security.

#### 5.1 Why Greece Perceives Turkey as a Threat?

Turkish-Greek relations have been in conflict for so many years that this friction seemed among the unchangeable aspects of Greek foreign and security policy. Therefore, what the major driving force has been behind Greece’s concerns about Turkey has to be put forward in detail in order to understand Greek security perceptions. It is argued that the problems mostly stem from the physiological and internal means.<sup>362</sup> The formation of a Greek state was a result of the struggle against the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.<sup>363</sup> The formation of national identities has a direct

---

<sup>362</sup> Heraclides, *op.cit*, p.321,

<sup>363</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), p.72.

effect on both sides' perceptions of the other side. Nevertheless, the existing Turkish-Greek problems cannot be only reduced to mutual historical perceptions.<sup>364</sup>

Greeks claim that there are many reasons for Greek concerns. These are as follows: Turkey's official statements; diplomatic initiatives for "changing the status quo" established by the treaties of Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936), and Paris (1947)<sup>365</sup>; military build-up including the deployment of Turkey's armed forces in Thrace and the Aegean, particularly the creation of the fourth Turkish Aegean Army which is outside the NATO command structure and stationed in İzmir; Turkey's double intervention in Cyprus in 1974; "threats of war" (casus belli) in case of Greek extension of the territorial-water limit from six to twelve miles; declarations "challenging the Greek sovereignty"; Turkey's refusal of Greece's proposal for a bilateral non-use-of-force pact<sup>366</sup>. According to all these Greek views, these set of events have shaped the image of Turks in the mind of Greeks as a security concern for them.<sup>367</sup>

Furthermore, Greeks claim that refusal of NATO and the US to guarantee the protection of Greek interests in case of an intervention by Turkey and military status of the Turkish Straits according to 1936 Montreux Treaty has been a source of concern for Greece. Greece believes that the NATO and US have failed to understand Greece's national security concerns and they have not intervened to Turkish policies in the Aegean and Cyprus.<sup>368</sup> Besides, Greek partisan rhetoric for Greek concerns includes status of Turkish army; low level of education,<sup>369</sup> recent memory of an empire; the large size and the strategic position of Turkey; the

---

<sup>364</sup> Richard Clogg, 'The Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey', in Richard Clogg (eds.), Greece in the 1980s, (New York: Martin's, 1980), p.141.

<sup>365</sup> Van Coufoudakis, 'Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: the View from Athens', International Security, Spring 1985, pp. 201-204.

<sup>366</sup> Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis, 'Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The Expectations-Reality Gap', Security Dialogue, Vol.34, No.3, September 2003, pp.303-305; Dokos, "Greek Defense Doctrine...", p.239; See also Nicholas V. Gianaris, Greece and Turkey (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 178-179.

<sup>367</sup> Byron Theodoropoulos, 'Perception and Reality: How Greeks and Turks See Each Other', in Thonas M. Veremis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-1998 (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998), pp. 49.

<sup>368</sup> Kourvetaris, op.cit., p. 411.

<sup>369</sup> Thanasis Kandas, 'Greek Security Concerns', in Kosta Tsipis (ed.), Comman Security Regimes in the Balkans (East European Monographs: Boulder, 1996), p. 75.

instability of Turkish political system; the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. All these Greek claims about Turkey make it a country posing “threat” in the eyes of Greeks.<sup>370</sup>

In Greek view, there have also been factors that put Greece in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Turkey. First, Greek population (manpower limitations) compared to that of Turkey’s superiority make Greece vulnerable to any conflict with Turkey. Second, geographical proximity and Greece’s geographical defense inabilities such as the absence of strategic depth, long borders difficult to defend, thousands of scattered islets, population centers in range of Turkish artillery have been a source of concern for Greece. Additionally, disparity of economic resources with Turkey and great power interests such as the US in the region has been interlinked with Greek security. Greece concerns that the US in order to promote its own interests in the region can see Turkey as strategically important and thus, can close its eyes to so-called Turkish ‘claims’ against Greece.<sup>371</sup>

Greece perceives that the US foreign policy has a pro-Turkish tendency. For instance, American opposition for the defense cooperation between Greece and Greek Cypriots, American sophisticated weapon sale to Turkish armed forces, American opposition to the acquisition of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system by Greek Cypriots have been adopted evidence by Greeks for such a thinking. In Greek view, peace in the region could be available through a military balance between Turkey and Greece and equal aid packages from the US. Furthermore, the US has to pressure Turkey enough to alter its policies vis-à-vis Greece. Otherwise, according to Greeks, Turkey would be encouraged for undesired policies vis-à-vis Greece.<sup>372</sup>

Greek perception of so-called Turkish “threat” does not reflect a fear of a full-fledged war but a fear of “a well concerted strategy of intimidation manifested through a series of low level threats in a number of issue areas”.<sup>373</sup> To

---

<sup>370</sup> Loukas Tsoukalis, ‘Greece in the EU: Domestic Reform Coalitions, external Constraints and High Politics’, in A Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds.), Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 46.

<sup>371</sup> Platias, op.cit., pp. 95-96.

<sup>372</sup> Kourvetaris, op.cit., pp. 401-402; 412.

<sup>373</sup> Constantine Arvanitopoulos, ‘Greek Defense Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence’, in Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis (eds), Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Nicosia, Cyprus: Intercollege Press, 1997), p.154.

Triantaphyllou, most members of the foreign policy community in Greece argue that Turkey has “revisionist” policies in the Aegean, Thrace and Cyprus.<sup>374</sup> In that context, ‘Aegean has been one of Europe’s most dangerous flashpoints’.<sup>375</sup> To many Greek security planners and analysts the armed conflict is expected to be on the Aegean islands, Cyprus and Western Thrace. In case of an armed conflict Greece concerns that Turkey may invade the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean and the so-called territorial claims over Western Thrace by Turkey may become the most serious challenge for Greek security.<sup>376</sup>

Indeed, Greece perceives the rights of Turkish minority in Western Thrace as a challenge to her territorial integrity. For instance, the decision of Greek high court taken on 13 January 2005 refusing the demand of Turkish minority to use Turkish name in İskeçe Turkish Union was clear evidence for this view.<sup>377</sup> Greece fears that Turkey can intervene in Western Thrace by giving support to Turkish minority because Turkey criticizes Greek policies for not providing rights of Turks living there. In Greek view, this can lead to the formation of a new “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” and emergence of new problems to deal with. In that respect, Greece also views Turkish involvement with the Muslim minorities in Macedonia, Albania, Kosova and Bulgaria in conformity with the Cyprus intervention, protection of Muslim/Turkish minority.<sup>378</sup>

Greece believes that since 1974 Turkey has not respected the airspace of Greek Aegean islands and flight information region. In Greek view, Turkey may seize the islands through the Aegean Sea army. Since 1995, in Greek view, Turkey has pursued a policy of provoking crises in the Aegean to realize her ‘claims’. In June 1995, after Greek ratification of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the Turkish parliament passed a resolution authorizing the Turkish government to use all

---

<sup>374</sup> Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ‘Further Turmoil Ahead?’, in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, (Massachusetts: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 57.

<sup>375</sup> Larrabee, Lesser, op.cit., p. 71.

<sup>376</sup> Dokos, “Greek Defense Doctrine...”, p.248.

<sup>377</sup> For more information see Sema Sezer, ‘Yunanistan’da Türk Yasağı: İskeçe Türk Birliği Davası’, Stratejik Analiz, Mart 2005, Cilt 5, Sayı 59, pp. 37-43.

<sup>378</sup> Amikam Nachmani, ‘What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations’, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds.), Turkey in World Politics: An emerging Multi-regional Power (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 82.

means, including the use of force, in case Greece extends her territorial waters to twelve miles.<sup>379</sup> Besides, Turkish rejection to the demilitarization of the eastern Aegean islands has been perceived as ‘expansionist claims’ by Greece. For Greece militarization of the islands has been a guarantee to deter Turkey, thus, preserves the peace.<sup>380</sup> Moreover, in terms of continental shelf, Greece interprets Turkish declarations as threatening.<sup>381</sup> For instance, Turkey argues that the Aegean islands are a direct continuation of Anatolia’s continental shelf and, thus, have no continental shelf themselves.<sup>382</sup> In that respect, Athens believes that Turkey can use *fait accompli* diplomacy against her in case Greece is not deterrent enough vis-à-vis Turkey or international actors such as the US, NATO and the EU will not oppose to Turkish policies.<sup>383</sup>

With the Kardak crises in the 1996, one more dispute joined among the existing ones. Turkey stated that there was no legal norm establishing Greek sovereignty over other small islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean. Additionally, according to the Turkish Military Academy document that was published in May 1996, there are over a thousand islands, gray zones in the Aegean whose unresolved status could cause a conflict.<sup>384</sup> This has been perceived to be Turkish ‘expansionism’ by Greece.<sup>385</sup>

Meanwhile, Turkish army is perceived to be a great challenge for Greece. First of all, in Greek view, the position of Turkish army in Turkey has been a major factor for Greek security concerns. Greece perceives that Turkish army is dominant on Turkish political system and this situation is a major threat for Greek security.<sup>386</sup>

---

<sup>379</sup> S. Victor Papacosma, ‘More than Rocks: the Aegean’s Discordant Legacy’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1996, pp. 87-88.

<sup>380</sup> Gregorios Demestichas, ‘Greek Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean’, in Nikolaos A. Stavrou (ed.), Mediterranean Security at the Crossroads: A Reader (USA: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 270; Kandas, op.cit., p. 77.

<sup>381</sup> Nachmani, op.cit., p. 77.

<sup>382</sup> Hüseyin Pazarıcı, ‘Ege Denizindeki Türk-Yunan Sorunlarının Hukuki Yönü’, in Semih Vaner(ed.), Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), pp. 108-110.

<sup>383</sup> Platias, op.cit., p. 95.

<sup>384</sup> Ege Ada, Adacık ve Kayalıklarının Coğafi, Tarihi, Hukuki Durumu ve Uygulanan Politikalar, Turkish Military Academy, Istanbul, May 1996.

<sup>385</sup> Papahadjopoulos, op.cit. p. 38.

<sup>386</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, “Greek Security Policy ...”, p.111.



In addition, it is argued that Turkish military preparedness is not defensive but offensive.<sup>387</sup> The Cyprus intervention of Turkey and the deployment of the Turkish IV Army in 1975 at İzmir have been adopted evidence for this thinking. Therefore, Greece perceives Turkey as a direct military “threat”.

Furthermore, although with the end of the cold war many countries have gone arms reductions; it has not been the case for Greece. Hellenic national defense expenditure as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the highest among EU countries, despite a gradual decrease during the last years.<sup>388</sup> Because, large-scale modernization of Turkish army, leads to a perception of changing military balance of power in the Greek side<sup>389</sup>, even it has been for Middle Eastern or Eurasian requirements. Moreover, for Greece the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean is significantly affected by the strategic and the technical cooperation agreement that Turkey signed with Israel in February 1996.<sup>390</sup> This challenge on Greek minds seems to be one of the most serious obstacles to a long lasting Turkish-Greek rapprochement.

When we come to Cyprus, it constitutes one of the thorny issues between Turkey and Greece that emerged in the 1950s and escalated with the events including Turkish-Greek crises of the 1960s, the 1974 Greek-junta sponsored coup, and the Turkish intervention to the island. It has been problematic between Turkey and Greece for many years as well as a series of Turkish-Greek frictions in the Aegean. It is argued that, Turkey has pursued a ‘hostage Cyprus’ doctrine that places additional pressure on Greece in the context of the Aegean dispute.<sup>391</sup>

For Greece, Cyprus is not subordinate to Aegean problems in Greek security consideration. Today, besides Aegean, Greece also defines survival of Greek

---

<sup>387</sup> Ionnis M. Varvitsiotis, ‘The Turkish Threat’, in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Jr. Dimitris Keridis (eds), Security in the Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relations (Massachusetts: Spectrum Graphics, 1997), pp.119-120.

<sup>388</sup> ‘Defense Expenditures-Budget’, available at <http://www.mod.gr/ENGLISH/newver/Economics.htm>, accessed on 16.02.2004.

<sup>389</sup> Panayotis j. Tsakonas, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations Towards the 21st Century’, available at <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/papers/tsakonas.pdf>, accessed on 07.12.2003, p. 8.

<sup>390</sup> Papahadjopoulos, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

<sup>391</sup> Heraclides, op.cit., p.96.

Cypriots as the national interest of Greece<sup>392</sup> and Greek National Military Strategy consists of ‘Greece - Cyprus Joint Defense Area’. Although, they have been separate issues per se, it is argued that there has been a psychological linkage between them and a solution in one will lead to that of the other.<sup>393</sup>

Beyond above-mentioned perceptions, Ankara’s relations with Balkan countries such as Bulgaria and Albania including security arrangements and military cooperation arrangements in the early 1990s were also perceived as a security challenge by Greece.<sup>394</sup> Furthermore, any Turkish interference in the Balkans (such as Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo) has been a reason to believe Turkish “expansionism” for Greece. Greece views Turkish efforts to act as the regional superpower.<sup>395</sup> Athens is also worried that Turkey to suppress its internal problems will open new external fronts vis-à-vis Greece.<sup>396</sup> In the light of these perceptions, Greece thinks that she is the only NATO member whose territorial integrity is questioned and encircled by Turkey.<sup>397</sup>

## **5.2 Why Greece Adopted Turkish EU Membership and Still Supports?**

The 1999 EU Helsinki Summit can be defined as a turning point in Greek foreign policy, because in this summit Greece withdrew its veto for Turkey’s EU membership and still supports Turkey’s EU accession. Therefore, it is important to analyze the reasons why Greece has changed its long-standing policy. The discussion will put forward whether Greece’s threat perception or tactics has changed.

The driving force behind Greek policy change vis-à-vis Turkish membership can be explained in many ways with regard to both domestic and external means.

---

<sup>392</sup> ‘National Defense Policy’, <http://www.mod.gr/ENGLISH/newver/Defence.htm>, accessed on 05.12.2003

<sup>393</sup> S.F. Larrabee, ‘The Southern periphery; Greece and Turkey’, in P.S. Shoup (eds.), Problems of Balkan Security; Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1990), p.188; According to another view Turkish-Greek disputes cannot be really resolved until a solution in Cyprus. For this argument see Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, ‘The Importance of Cyprus’, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2001, pp. 56-58.

<sup>394</sup> Ekavi Athanassopoulou, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: The View from Athens’, The International Spectator, Vol. 29, No. 4, October-December 1994, p. 56.

<sup>395</sup> Nachmani, op.cit., p. 73.

<sup>396</sup> Berdal Aral, ‘Turkey’s Insecure Identity from the Perspective of Nationalism’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 1997, p. 84.

<sup>397</sup> Coufoudakis, “Greek Foreign Policy...”, p. 31.

Rapprochement between Turkey and Greece that has begun with the EU Helsinki summit has not been a sudden improvement. There were many reasons for Greece for the emergence of this situation. First of all, Greek policy makers realized opportunities provided by the EU membership. In order to make use of these opportunities, Greece should not have been a problematic partner of the EU regarding use of veto against Turkey in the Council. It is believed that the utility of this policy instrument was exhausted.<sup>398</sup>

Second, throughout the 1990s accession to perceived political and security benefits of EMU, especially with regard to Turkey, as well as its economic benefits became crucial for Greece.<sup>399</sup> PASOK government under Prime Minister Simitis who has come to office in 1996 realized that with extensive defense expenditures, which had dominated Greek budget since 1974, Greece couldn't achieve membership to EMU.<sup>400</sup> Defense expenditures were the most important contributor to Greece's external debt. Also Greek decision to extend Greek security zone to Greek Cypriots created a heavy burden for Greece's defense budget. Thus, defense expenditures had to be downsized in order to provide EMU standard in Greek economy. Because of the fact that the most important security priority of Greece has been the maintenance of military balance between Turkey and Greece, merely an adequate balance of forces (especially in the air and sea) should be provided while preventing the costly arms race to destabilize the economy.<sup>401</sup> At the same time in Greek view, Greece has to find more cost-effective ways to assure her national security.<sup>402</sup>

Third, Cyprus's accession to the EU has been one of the fundamental objectives of Greek foreign policy.<sup>403</sup> In Greek view, entry into the European framework would increase the security, stability, and prosperity of Greek Cypriots

---

<sup>398</sup> Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas, 'Europeanization and the Greek Policy Style: National or Sectoral?', in Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 143.

<sup>399</sup> George Andreou and Nikos Koutsiaras, 'Greece and Economic and Monetary Union', in Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 93.

<sup>400</sup> Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, op.cit., p. 144.

**2.2.** <sup>401</sup> Couloumbis, "Strategic Consensus..."

<sup>402</sup> Stearns, op.cit., p. 68.

<sup>403</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy..." , p. 97.

and be a catalyst for the resolution of the Cyprus problem.<sup>404</sup> Fourth, it is argued that policy against Turkey for many years has been exhausted and anti-Turkish rhetoric in Greek public opinion has finished its time in the 1990s.<sup>405</sup> Cyprus's accession to the EU and promotion of other above mentioned objectives of Greek policy could not be achieved by tense relations with Turkey. Greece was very much aware of that. Greece has realized that in the post-Cold War security environment the best option remains to rely on diplomatic policy (soft security) rather than military measures (hard security) for the defense of her national security. It is believed that no amount of defense spending can provide enough security to Greece rather than her alliances if they are in working order.<sup>406</sup> Therefore, Greece has used the EU membership in order to promote her security<sup>407</sup> and put her disputes with Turkey to a platform that they would be resolved through external interference, particularly the EU.<sup>408</sup>

Beyond these reasons, during the Kardak crises in 1996, and the S-300 missile crises in 1997-1998, relations between Turkey and Greece remained tense. In the Kardak crises it is witnessed that there has been potential for an armed conflict. In addition, at the EU summit meeting in Luxembourg on 12-14 December 1997, Turkey was excluded from the list of candidates for the next round of accession negotiations. The EU decision at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 to exclude Turkey from the list of the next potential candidates to join the EU, caused Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz to react angrily, freeze ties with the EU, and rethink Turkey's foreign policy.

In the meantime, Turkey's Foreign Minister Ismail Cem told Stephen Kinzer of the New York Times in December 1997 that Turkey's foreign policy was no longer fixated on Europe. The fall of the Soviet Union, the creation of the newly independent states, and a growing consciousness of Turkey's European and Asian identity, he observed, had provided Turkey with a new approach. According to

---

<sup>404</sup> 'Working Together: Why Greece Supports Turkey's European Future', available at <http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/EuropeanUnion/GapGreekTurkishOpEd.stm>, accessed on 08.04.2004

<sup>405</sup> Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, *op.cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>406</sup> Stearns, *op.cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>407</sup> Tsoukalis, "Greece in the EU...", pp. 47-48.

<sup>408</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy...", p. 101.

İsmail Cem, the fixation on Europe had been the result of a limited outlook and of a feeling that Turks had to resolve a conflict over whether they were European or Asian. Culturally, historically, and geographically, Turks were becoming aware of the fact that they didn't have to choose and they were a global state.<sup>409</sup> This courageous political stance of Turkey might have led to the emergence of a Greek thinking that its neighbor's power would increase and Turkey could pursue an independent policy. Accordingly, for Greece to get concessions from a Turkey out of the EU would be more difficult.

A direct consequence of this independent foreign policy was evident by a "strategic partnership" with Israel and threat to use force against Syria in 1998 if Syria did not expel Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which Syria had been supporting.<sup>410</sup>

Öcalan affair can be defined as a turning point in Turkish-Greek relations. The Turkish Special Forces captured the leader of the PKK terrorist organization, Abdullah Öcalan under Greek shelter in the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.<sup>411</sup> With this event, it was clear that Greece was in a heavy effort to harm and weaken Turkey's security.<sup>412</sup> Turkey accused Greece of giving support to terrorists threatening Turkey.<sup>413</sup> The whole world knew the Greek involvement at the governmental level. Turkey's reaction was not so sharp. George Papandreu, the Foreign Minister of Greece at that time, pursued a friendly stance towards Turkey. Perhaps it was the best choice for Greek government after such an event. Greece had been caught up without any excuse in the Öcalan capture. Greece has to repair her bad reputation and image both in the domestic and external arena that was damaged

---

<sup>409</sup> Stephen Kinzer, 'Turkey Turns Away from Europe Toward New Strategic Relationships', International Herald Tribune, December 29, 1997.

<sup>410</sup> See Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View', Middle East

Policy, Vol. VI, No. 4, June 1999, pp. 174-191.

<sup>411</sup> For more information about Öcalan's capture and Greek involvement in the case see Konstantinos Kotzias, 'Greek-Turkish Relations', Contemporary Review, Vol. 276, No. 1611, April 2000, p. 190. ; Cem, op.cit, pp. 110-135.

<sup>412</sup> Gülden Ayman, 'Yunanistan'ın Stratejik Çıkılmazı ve AGSP', Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Sayı 1, Şubat 2003, Yıl 1, p. 64.

<sup>413</sup> See 'Terrorism', available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/acf/default.pkk.htm#I>; <http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/>, accessed on 14.04.2004.

by the help given to terrorist leader. Besides, Turkey's victory over PKK strengthened her position in the international platform. This highlighted Greek concerns.

Following that, devastating earthquakes in 1999 in both countries had led to a natural climate of friendship between the two countries. Papandreou stated that the assistance offered during the earthquakes both in Turkey and Greece provided a climate of improvement in Turkish-Greek relations. In Greek view, it was the earthquakes that led to the confidence building measures between the two states.<sup>414</sup> However, from Turkish point of view, the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece has begun with the Öcalan affair not with the earthquakes. The earthquakes only contributed to the improvement of this process.<sup>415</sup>

The perceptions of the evolving EU and NATO in the eyes of Athens have also been a determining factor for Greek support to Turkey's EU accession. It is believed that NATO has not been a security community and a zone of peace for Turkey and Greece because of the fact that its members (Turkey and Greece) used the threat of use of force to each other.<sup>416</sup> In the post-cold war era, the credibility of the EU has raised in the eyes of the Greeks as a mechanism for the solution to disputes. The enlargement process of the EU has been adopted so important by Greece in terms of security because of the fact that the EU could turn out to be 'security community' for its partners. For instance, membership criteria would oblige the Turkish army to become subordinate to civilian political control. Therefore, support for Turkey's membership to the EU became crucial for Greece.<sup>417</sup> Furthermore, the improvement of the EU's CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) since the late 1990s has played a significant role in Greek policy decisions to take part in the EU framework rather than act unilaterally.<sup>418</sup>

In the frame of the above-mentioned reasons, Greece supported Turkey's EU membership. In that way, Greece seeks to have a say or control on Turkish

---

<sup>414</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy...", p. 111.

<sup>415</sup> Cem, *op.cit.*, pp. 127-128.

<sup>416</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Democratic Peace...", pp. 84-85.

<sup>417</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy...", pp. 111-112.

<sup>418</sup> Bertrand, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

policies.<sup>419</sup> The Greeks believe that as long as Turkey wants to be a member of the EU, she can get concessions from Turkey. Greece, in order to provide maximum benefit from EU membership in the area of foreign policy, has begun to actively use the EU channels. The shift in the Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey has been clear evidence for this.<sup>420</sup> Otherwise, Athens realized that vis-à-vis Turkey she couldn't overcome and handle the problems bilaterally on behalf of the Greeks. In order to achieve her objectives, Greece has to encourage Turkey to be an EU member. Therefore, Greece has actively supported Turkish membership to EU since 1999. EU granted candidate status to Turkey in 1999 EU Helsinki Summit. In the words of Helsinki Communiqué:

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this way, the Council will take account of all relevant factors.

The European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this, they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.<sup>421</sup>

As a result, the 1999 Helsinki decisions linked Turkey's EU membership with the resolution of border disputes with Greece until 2004. Furthermore, a solution in the Cyprus was not a precondition for Greek Cypriot's accession to EU any longer. And so, the EU has satisfied Greece by binding Turkey's membership to the resolutions including Greek demands. Greece achieved to transform Turkish-Greek relations from bilateral to multilateral framework. Now, relations between Turkey and Greece have been a part of Turkey-EU relations.

---

<sup>419</sup> Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, *op.cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>420</sup> Couloumbis and Dalis, *op.cit.*, p. 143.

<sup>421</sup> Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10 And 11 December 1999, available at [http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99\\_en.htm#external](http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#external), accessed on 03.05.2004.

In that context, it is argued that Greece could and should go cooperation with Turkey when the risk of conflict is greater than the risk of cooperation. Therefore, according to Greeks, normalization of relations can provide security for Greece.<sup>422</sup> In Greek view, the more Turkey is integrated into the Europe, the less likely the former will use force<sup>423</sup> and adopt a policy based more on international law and treaties.<sup>424</sup> By the decisions taken at the Helsinki summit, Greece expects development in democratization of Turkish domestic politics. In that way, from the Greek point of view, foreign policy behavior of Turkey vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus will mostly be influenced positively by this change.<sup>425</sup>

According to Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, the potential membership of Turkey to EU has been in favor of Greek national interests in order to promote security and stability and enhance economic co-operation.<sup>426</sup> It is also argued that this was an initiative for removing the negative Turkish perception in the long run.<sup>427</sup> Greece thinks that a more European Turkey would easily reconcile with Greece and there will be no obstacle in front of Greece for more integration with the EU.

It is argued that a more European oriented Greek foreign policy promotes a multilateral frame in order to counter Greece's external policy challenges.<sup>428</sup> Greece views her relationship with the EU as an alliance relationship against Turkey and perceives herself to be in a more advantages position. Especially, post-Copenhagen (12-13 December 2002) period that fulfilled Greek objectives with Cyprus accession has been defined as a win-win situation by Greece. According to this situation, if Turkey implements reforms and she changes, that is fine. On the other hand, if she fails, then the EU will have to deal with her. Turkey will never again be Greece and

---

<sup>422</sup> Theodore Couloumbis and Kostas Ifantis, 'Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints- A Realist Approach', The Review of International Affairs, Vol.2, No.2, Winter 2002, p. 3.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>424</sup> Tsakonias, op.cit., p. 1.

<sup>425</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>426</sup> 'Greece to Benefit From Turkey's EU Membership', at <http://www.balkantimes.com/html2/english/news.htm#4>, accessed on 09.12.2003

<sup>427</sup> Tsakonias and Tournikiotis, op.cit., p.301.

<sup>428</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, op.cit., p.36; Couloumbis, and Yannas, op.cit., pp.164-165.



Nicosia's problem that they have to face on their own.<sup>429</sup> Former Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis' statement also confirms this view. He said that Greece had achieved its two major objectives: a clear-cut decision confirming the place of Cyprus among the ten countries to join the EU in 2004; and momentum for the resolution of the island's political problem.<sup>430</sup> However, Greece seems to ignore what will be if Turkey refuses the EU membership. Greece perceives that Turkey will adopt every condition for the EU membership.

Additionally, in Greek view, the more Greece Europeanized, the more she would play a regional role, particularly in the Balkans and Mediterranean, and feel more secure. Indeed, the thaw in Turkish-Greek relations also represents Greek desire for modernization, globalization and more specifically European integration.<sup>431</sup> In that respect the best possible option for Greece has been a dialogue with Turkey.

### **5.3 Aftermath of the Helsinki: Greek Expectations for Providing Security**

It cannot be ignored that with the Helsinki Summit at which Greece withdrew its veto for Turkey's EU membership, there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. In the aftermath of the Helsinki, Turkey and Greece signed a set of bilateral agreements on 'low politics' or 'non-confrontational' issues regarding tourism, culture, environment, trade and commerce, Science and Technology, Combating Crime, regarding especially terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Recently, as a sign of continuing cooperation between the two countries, the bilateral "Agreement On The Avoidance Of Double Taxation" was signed. In Greek view, these developments have been beneficial for the preservation of security, particularly in the Aegean. Furthermore, with the aim of creating the necessary conditions, the two countries decided to implement a set of

---

<sup>429</sup> Mark Dragoumis, 'Athens, Nicosia in win-win situation... if they play their cards right', at [http://www.athensnews.gr/athweb/nathens.print\\_unique?e=C&f=12993&m=A99&aa=6&eidos=A](http://www.athensnews.gr/athweb/nathens.print_unique?e=C&f=12993&m=A99&aa=6&eidos=A), accessed on 08.02.2004

<sup>430</sup> 'Copenhagen Summit Fulfils Greek Objectives with Cyprus Accession', available at <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=198&article=13149>, accessed on 21.02.2004.

<sup>431</sup> Dimitris K. Xenakis, 'The Contribution of Greece to Strengthening Euro-Mediterranean Relations', *Perceptions*, June-August 2003, p. 198.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) both within the framework of NATO (under the auspices of the NATO Secretary General) and at the bilateral level (MFA Political Directors level). At the same time, the two countries continue their cooperation in the field of energy including the interconnection of the electric networks of the two countries and realization of the Turkey-Greece gas interconnection and the supply of natural gas from the Republic of Turkey to the Hellenic Republic.<sup>432</sup> However, still there has not been a fundamental solution to Turkish-Greek problems (Cyprus and Aegean).

It is argued that the new *détente* would be more long lasting rather than others. Strong domestic support on both sides, shift in Greece's policy supporting a more Europeanized Turkey, growing Turkish-Greek economic cooperation and EU policy towards Turkey have been positive measures.<sup>433</sup> Additionally, Turkish-Greek agreements signed on low politics, could lead to resolution of the issues of high politics.

On the other hand, to another argument, although there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece since 1999 the possibility of armed conflict still exists. In Greek view, there have been some gaps preventing better relations. For instance, Greece has done more than Turkey, the *détente* includes only low politics and Turkish-Greek relations mostly seem to depend on Turkey-EU relations.<sup>434</sup> Many on Greek side think that now it's Ankara's turn in order to make some gestures regarding reopening of Halki theological seminary or withdrawal of 'casus belli' resolution. In that respect, it has to be questioned that whether the rapprochement has been at the strategic level or it has just been a tactical maneuver.

To the most pessimistic argument, Europeanization of Greek policy makes no use and Turkey continues her 'revisionist' demands. From that standpoint, Greece should only rely on her military build-up.<sup>435</sup> However, this would bring a heavy burden for Greek economy. Besides, re-nationalization of Greek foreign policy will

---

<sup>432</sup> For more information see 'Bilateral Relations', available at [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/europe\\_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html), accessed on 20.02.2004.

<sup>433</sup> Larrabee and Lesser, *op.cit.*, pp.86-87.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.87-88; Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, *op.cit.*, pp.23-24.

<sup>435</sup> Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy...", p.39.

isolate Greece from Western institutions (such as the Macedonian case). Therefore, a war between the two is unthinkable. Furthermore, the EU and NATO initiatives will be damaged by armed conflict between Turkey and Greece.

From another point of view, it is argued that Turkish-Greek rapprochement could be achieved through bilateral arrangements with regard to redefinition of national interests and a balance of power.<sup>436</sup> However some skepticism remains for this argument. It challenges with the argument that Turkish-Greek détente depends on well being of Turkey-EU relations. Additionally, can balance of power between Turkey and Greece prevent conflicts (the results of 1996 Kardak crisis could be devastating) and is it possible for Greece to bilaterally define a set of common ideas on the disputed issues (Cyprus and Aegean) that will mutually be accepted by Turkey and Greece? It seems difficult because of the fact that Greece wants the solution to Turkish-Greek problems in the institutional mechanisms of the EU not by bilateral arrangements. Turkey and Greece diverge both on the definition of the problems and the way for the resolution of them.

Greece advocates that there is no problem in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece other than the delimitation of the continental shelf.<sup>437</sup> On the contrary, for Turkey this position of Greece namely "one problem-one solution" does not reflect the reality at all. With this understanding, Turkey believes that all Aegean problems (delimitation of continental shelf; air space; territorial waters; militarization of eastern Aegean islands by Greece; islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean which were not ceded to Greece by international treaties and maritime boundaries) should be addressed as a whole together within the whole range of means for their peaceful solutions.<sup>438</sup>

According to Greece, problems are legal and, therefore, to be solved through "arbitration", namely International Court of Justice (ICJ). On the contrary, Turkey views the issue, 'political' and, therefore, demands a solution by 'negotiation'. In

---

<sup>436</sup> Couloumbis and Ifantis, *op.cit.*, p.2.

<sup>437</sup> 'Delimitation of the Continental Shelf', available at [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/europe\\_southeastern/aegean\\_continental\\_shelf.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/aegean_continental_shelf.html), accessed on 23.11.2003.

<sup>438</sup> 'Turkish-Greek Relations', available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adea/default.htm>, accessed on 05.12.2003.

Greece's view, although Greece has recommended Turkey the solution to disputes through external arbitration, Turkey has insisted on bilateral, result-oriented negotiations between Turkey and Greece.<sup>439</sup> Greece believes that Turkey bases her claims more on nationalistic framework and less on international law and treaties.<sup>440</sup> However, Heraclides argues that there have been some issues such as air space that Greece is not so powerful in terms of international law.<sup>441</sup>

Since 1996, Turkey has adopted the third party solutions, to be based on mutual consent, conditional on the overall settlement of all Aegean issues.<sup>442</sup> Although Turkey and Greece have started to negotiate the bilateral issues in February 2002<sup>443</sup>, both governments still have not found an agreement on the Aegean dispute and the request or not to the ICJ. To some circles Turkey and Greece should agree to freeze their Aegean disputes and defer their resolution to a later date.<sup>444</sup> This has been evidence for the difficulties of resolving the disputes. Nevertheless, in Greek view, the victory of Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party in the Turkish general elections of November 2002, may direct Turkey into a more stable era with significant implications for her relations with Greece.<sup>445</sup>

Beyond that expectation, Greece has continually tried to persuade NATO and the EU in order to turn them security-providing institutions for her defense vis-à-vis Turkey.<sup>446</sup> However, some approaches seem a little bit pessimistic about reliance on EU in terms of security. In the short run, it is believed that Greece has to be aware of

---

<sup>439</sup> Heraclides, op.cit., p.101.

<sup>440</sup> Panayotis J Tsakonas, 'Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue', *Turkish Studies*, Autumn 2001, Vol. 2, pp.23-24.

<sup>441</sup> Heraclides, op.cit., p.213.

<sup>442</sup> 'Turkish-Greek...'

<sup>443</sup> Nazmi Akiman, 'Turkish-Greek Relations: From Uneasy Coexistence to Better Relations? A Retired Ambassador Takes Stock', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer 2002, p. 32.

<sup>444</sup> Theodore Couloumbis and Louis Klaveras, 'Prospects for Greek-Turkish Reconciliation in a Changing International Setting', in Tözün Bahçeli, Theodore Couloumbis and Patricia Carley (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean and regional Stability Peaceworks* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p. 38.

<sup>445</sup> Couloumbis and Dalis, op.cit., p. 77.

<sup>446</sup> Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis, 'Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The Expectations-Reality Gap', *Security Dialogue*, Vol.34, No.3, September 2003, p. 302.

EU's inability for the promotion of Greece's defense policies as well as NATO.<sup>447</sup> In Greek view, the Kardak crises between Turkey and Greece highlighted the inability of the EU or the WEU to act as a guarantor of borders for one of its members. Besides, the impact of the evolving European defense project on Greek security not completely fits the expectations (security guarantee such as defense of member states' borders) on Greek minds. For instance, by the statement issued at the Copenhagen Council, Greek Cypriots will not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets.<sup>448</sup> This position of Greek Cypriots and the EU inability as a security provider in the eyes of Greeks can be a concern for Greece. Nevertheless, Greece has always been a firm supporter of the EU's independent security and defense identity.<sup>449</sup>

In analyzing Greek-Turkish relations from the Greek point of view, NATO as a security community does not conform the expectations.<sup>450</sup> Although Turkish-Greek conflict has never turned into a full-scale war<sup>451</sup>, Greek security analysts still do not see NATO's security providing efforts satisfactory for Greek expectations in Turkish-Greek conflict.<sup>452</sup> For example, in October 2000, Greece withdrew from NATO exercise because the problem of exclusion of flights over the Greek islands of Limni and Ikaria which Turkey claims to be demilitarized.<sup>453</sup> Besides, Greeks believe that if NATO abstains from involvement in the Turkish-Greek conflict, this will be to protect the stronger party in the conflict, namely, Turkey.<sup>454</sup>

---

<sup>447</sup> Ibid., pp.301-302.

<sup>448</sup> See 'Presidency Conclusions', Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, available at [http://www.eu2002.dk/news/upload/conclusions\\_uk20021216111046.pdf](http://www.eu2002.dk/news/upload/conclusions_uk20021216111046.pdf), accessed on 12.09.2003.

<sup>449</sup> For detailed information about Greek views on ESDP see George A. Papandreou, 'Greek views on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy', The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 9, Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2003, pp. 53-59.

<sup>450</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Democratic Peace...", pp.76-77.

<sup>451</sup> Ronald Krebs, 'Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict', International Organization, Vol.53, No.2, Spring 1999, pp.343-377.

<sup>452</sup> Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, op.cit., p.307.

<sup>453</sup> 'Aegean Rumpus', The Economist, October 28, 2000.

<sup>454</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy...", p. 99.

Additionally, Greek demands for the establishment of an intra-NATO dispute settlement mechanism have never been met.<sup>455</sup> Accordingly, Greeks claim that they clearly feel threatened by Turkey, and in case of a Turkish-Greek conflict; they think that they would be on their own.<sup>456</sup> In the meantime, Greek government believes that NATO's initiatives in the Balkans have been limited because of the fact that military character of NATO does not allow it to use non-military means to handle the crises. NATO has been going a transformation and there has been uncertainty on the definition of its role in crises management.<sup>457</sup>

Nevertheless, Greece believes that outside NATO, Greece would be less able to resist Turkish 'territorial claims' in the Aegean.<sup>458</sup> Greece has viewed the NATO alliance as a means of balancing Turkey. To some scholars, NATO is much more dealing with hard security issues compared to EU and has been more reliable.<sup>459</sup> EU has not been a collective defense organization of NATO kind. Greece's membership to NATO has been adopted of great importance to counter-balance Turkey whether Turkey perceives Greece's support along her EU accession process as evidence of weakness.<sup>460</sup>

Consequently, when it comes to compare EU and NATO, EU is seen more reliable than NATO for Greek security concerns against Turkey, particularly in the post-cold war era.<sup>461</sup> In essence, it is difficult for Greece to achieve without cooperation with NATO, EU, US or OSCE.<sup>462</sup> Although there have been some gaps, Greece to safeguard her national security should have better relations ever than before at a time of external and internal adaptation of these organizations.<sup>463</sup>

---

<sup>455</sup> Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy...", p.36.

<sup>456</sup> Kourvetaris, op.cit., p. 400.

<sup>457</sup> Papandreou, "Greek views on the EU...", p. 55.

<sup>458</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan, 'Democratic...', p.78.

<sup>459</sup> F. Stephen Larreebe, 'The Impact of the New NATO on Greece', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Jr. Dimitris Keridis (eds), Security in the Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relations (Massachusetts: Spectrum Graphics, 1997), p.103.

<sup>460</sup> Couloumbis and Ifantis, op.cit., pp.20-23

<sup>461</sup> Dokos, "Greek Defense Doctrine...", p.253.

<sup>462</sup> Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos-Dengler, Op.cit., p.109.

<sup>463</sup> Koliopoulos and Veremis, Op.cit., p.313.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The challenges Greece facing today have been complex and Athens responses at a number of levels: domestic, regional, European, and international. In the Post-Cold War era, the scope of Greek foreign policy has widened, particularly through the EU membership, in terms of interests, preferences and actors. With the changing strategic environment and impact of globalization Greek security policy has been on a large scale including economical, societal, political and environmental as well as military dimensions. The choices for the political, economic and security objectives define Greek interests. Therefore, foreign and security policy of Greece has been interlinked and interdependent.<sup>464</sup>

In the era of globalization non-traditional security issues including migration, refugee flows, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism have been among Greece's security concerns. On such trans-regional issues to face challenges, Greece looks for cooperation with its near region particularly the Balkan states and the EU. Especially in non-traditional security issues Greece is linking her own geopolitical concerns to those of her allies.

With the effect of globalization, also private sector has emerged as a vehicle for cooperation in Greece's near neighborhood particularly in the Balkans. What is more, trade, commerce, tourism, shipping, infrastructure projects including road, rail, ports, energy transport, telecommunications help to shape Greek foreign and security policy. Most of these developments diversified Greece's international and regional engagement. Greece's role as a regional actor is no longer marginal in the new

---

<sup>464</sup> Theodore Couloumbis and Kostas Ifantis, 'Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constrains-A Realist Approach', The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 2002, p. 21.

security environment. Greece in her near region particularly in the Balkans sees herself as an anchor of stability. This was not the case in the Cold War years.

In the traditional hard security arena, the traditional concern over territorial integrity and defense still continues for Greece. In that respect, the main concern, namely Turkey, for Greek security has not changed with the end of the cold war and still continues to exist. The new security environment did not alter the basic parameters of the Turkish-Greek relations. Besides, the post-Cold War order has had a profound impact on the increase of Greek insecurity in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. This insecurity has been resulted from the changes in Greek geopolitical environment.

The collapse of Yugoslavia created new security concerns for Greece. Greek national interests were not always coincided with its European partners, particularly in the Macedonian case and towards Serbia during the Bosnian war. This foreign policy stance led isolation of Greece from Europe and make Greece realize to pursue a more conciliatory policy. Then, Greece has begun to take part in a more European-oriented sphere both with her economy and foreign policy. Since the second half of the 1990s, the relations of Greece with the Balkan countries have improved and Greece views herself as a stability-promoter in the region. Greece also cautiously watches regional developments including restoration of democracy, stability such as final status of Kosovo. Greece has been an active supporter of multilateral regional cooperation in both economic and political terms. In that respect, Greek government appears to continue to actively support the EU enlargement in the Balkans as a precondition for peace, stability and development in the region. While doing this, Greece can be expected to look for concessions on behalf of herself especially in the solution of the Macedonian name issue.

On the other hand, Greece wants effective and successful integration of her foreign, security and economic policies into the EU. More integration with EU both economically and politically is central to Greek foreign and security policy. Greek policy towards Turkey has been evidence for this. The Helsinki summit, in particular, placed relations with Turkey in a European frame. In the long run, Athens believes and expects the EU's role as a security provider. Despite the ups and downs in Greek perceptions of the EU since the beginning of relations, there has been continuity in



the expectation that the EU will contribute and provide Greek security, particularly vis-à-vis Turkey. The Turkish-Greek rapprochement has been closely linked with the Turkish EU candidacy. Greek desires have taken place in the EU documents. Besides, the EU contains nationalistic and authoritarian approaches in Greece herself. It can be argued that the EU has been so beneficial for Greece both in domestic and external means rather than other international actors such as NATO and the US.

Currently, there has been an obvious attempt to turn a new page in Turkish-Greek relations and avoid confrontational relations coping with the global and regional factors as well as domestic ones. However, this change has to be observed with caution. First of all, in the 1999 Helsinki Summit although Turkey has been given candidate status, the declaration includes highly controversial statements about the Aegean and Cyprus. Even in the last EU summit Aegean and Cyprus were referred in the EU documents. It has to be taken into account that on the two major issues, the Aegean and Cyprus, has not reached a long-lasting compromise yet.

In the meantime, every event in the Aegean Sea is tried to be used as an opportunity to back the Greek claims that Turkey is a 'revisionist' country and to attract the attention of EU and NATO by creating tension in the Aegean. Many circles in Turkey mostly interpret this, as Greece wants to transfer the Aegean problems to the agenda of EU.

Moreover, even after the referendum the Cyprus issue seems to be a matter of concern for Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Although Greece separated the Cyprus condition from Turkish membership to the EU in the last EU summit and stated that she would not veto Turkish membership, it supports every decision taken by the Greek Cypriots. At that point, there appears a danger for Turkey. Basically, the previous objection to Turkish membership in the EU can be expected to come from the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks behind the curtain. What is more, defense doctrine between Greece and Greek Cypriots still continues to exist.

Greece can be said to pursue a very pragmatic foreign policy that aimed at taking advantage of the new opportunities in the newly emerged political and security framework of Europe. Today, Greece's post-1974 perception of so-called Turkish 'threat' still continues. Even in the aftermath of the September 11, although

there emerged a change in the threat perception of many states regarding terrorism, for Greece the major concern still remains to be Turkey. It is obvious that Greek national interest and security perceptions have not changed.

Merely, Greece can be said to change its response and policy to deal with the disputes with Turkey. In my opinion, until a final solution, particularly within the EU framework, on Turkish-Greek disputes; Greece would not abandon its perception of so-called Turkish 'threat'. Even today, although there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece; the official web site of Greece, namely ministry of defense, states that the aim of Greek military strategy is to deter the Turkish 'threat'. It can be clear evidence for what the basic Greek thinking is and some questions rise in the minds for Greece's credibility. It can be also argued that Greece to some extent exaggerates the so-called Turkish threat to consolidate her position in the international environment and among her allies.

Therefore, the degree of change in Turkish-Greek relations should not be exaggerated. Today, the EU membership of Turkey has been in favor of Greek interests. Therefore, Greece can be expected to look for ways in order to get concessions from Turkey through the EU mechanisms. This way of Greek stance vis-à-vis Turkey seems to continue as long as the current environment exists. When the nature of Turkish-EU relations changes then a shift can be expected to emerge from Greek foreign policy towards the most pragmatic direction. Consequently, it can be argued that Greece will not give up using its EU membership to pressure on Turkey for the resolution of disputes.

In the last analyses, the Greek governments top security priority will be the relations with Turkey in the EU framework. The more Greece integrated to Europe, the more she feels secure herself vis-à-vis Turkey and easily handles the problems in its region. In that context, a more active and integrated Greece in the EU can be expected to be seen. Greece wants to be adapted as an equal partner and pursue her national interests within the EU framework. Greece can also be said to preserve a balanced relationship with the US taking into account the promotion of the EU's foreign policy values, Turkish factor, and globalized environment. Greece expects the US to understand that Greek claims about Turkey are valid.

In conclusion, in the post-Cold War era main Greek security concern has not changed. The so-called Turkish “threat” perception of Greece still continues. With the new strategic environment and the effects of globalization, Greece realized that nationalist card was detrimental to Greek interests. Therefore, Greece effectively tries to use international organizations, in particular the EU, as a security provider. In the meantime, Greek responses to her security concerns diversify in her region. In the Balkans, Greece uses soft security elements whereas she uses hard security elements vis-à-vis Turkey. Greece pursues a realist approach towards Turkey although she has been a member of Western institutions. Greek foreign policy can be characterized as a dualistic one, combining nationalist and institutionalist (mostly EU) elements. In the meantime, nontraditional issues including spillover effects of political violence, migration, proliferation of WMD, terrorism have come to Greek security agenda. They are increasingly gaining importance among Greek security perceptions. Greece seems to pursue a multidimensional security policy in the new security environment.

## REFERENCES

### **Books and Articles**

“Aegean Rumpus”, The Economist, October 28, 2000.

A. N., “Greece Seeks NATO Help for Olympics; Security Expands After Madrid Attacks”, International CustomWire, 03/12/2004.

Alp, İlker, “Makedonya Üzerindeki Mücadeleler ve Makedonya Cumhuriyeti” in Murat Hatipoğlu (ed.) Makedonya Sorunu Dünden Bugüne (Ankara: ASAM, 2002), p. 84.

Akiman, Nazmi, “Turkish-Greek Relations: From Uneasy Coexistence to Better Relations? A Retired Ambassador Takes Stock”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer 2002, p. 32.

Aksu, Fuat, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001)

Anastakis, Othon, “Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring 2004, p. 58.

Andreou, George and Koutsiaras, Nikos, “Greece and Economic and Monetary Union”, in Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 93.

Andrew Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute,” Adelphi Paper, No. 155, Winter 1979-80

Aral, Berdal, “Turkey’s Insecure Identity from the Perspective of Nationalism”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 1997, p. 84.

Arvanitopoulos, Constantine, “Greek Defense Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence”, in Andreas Theophanous and Van Coufoudakis (eds), Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Nicosia, Cyprus: Intercollege Press, 1997), p.153.

Athanasios, Platias, "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence", in Dimitri Conostas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 97.

Athanassopoulou, Ekavi, "Turkey and the Balkans: The View from Athens", The International Spectator, Vol. 29, No. 4, October-December 1994, p. 56.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali, "The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View", Middle East Policy, Vol. VI, No. 4, June 1999, pp. (174-191).

Ayman, Gülден, "Yunanistan'ın Stratejik Çıkmazı ve AGSP", Staretejik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Sayı 1, Şubat 2003, Yıl 1, p. 64.

Başbuğ, İlker, "Kriz Bölgeleri ve Türkiye'nin Güvenliği", Ortadoğu, Asya ve Avrupa'daki Kriz Bölgeleri nin NATO, AB ve Özellikle de Türkiye'nin Güvenliği Üzerine Etkileri', Harp Akademileri Sempozyumu, 27.05.2004.

Baxter, Laurence J., 'NATO and Regional Peace Support Operations', Peacekeeping & International Relations, Nov/Dec 1996, Vol. 2, Issue 6, p. 6.

Bazoglu Sezer, Duygu, "Turkey's Security Policies," Adelphi Paper, No. 164, Spring 1981.

Bertrand, Gilles, "The European Dimension of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement", ECPR Workshops, Edinburg, March 29- April 2, 2003, p. 6.

Bilge, Suat, Büyük Düş (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), pp. (209-263).

Blavoukos, Spyros and Pagoulatos, George, 'A Medium Country's Middle-of-the-Road Success: The 2003 Presidency of the European Union', South European Society and Politics, Vol. 8, No. 3, Winter 2003, p. 147.

Braun, Aural, Small-State Security in the Balkans (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Boks, 1983), p. 328.

Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. (19-20).

Buzan, Barry, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, International Affairs, 1991, Vol.67., No.3., p. 434.

Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap, Security (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.7.

Cem, İsmail, Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya: Strateji Yunanistan Kıbrıs (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), pp. (110-135).

Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George, “Editors’ Introduction”, in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (eds.), Greece Under Military Rule (New York: Secker & Warburg, 1972), p. xvi.

Clogg, Richard, “The Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey”, in Richard Clogg (eds.), Greece in the 1980s, (New York: Martin’s, 1980), p.141.

Clogg, Richard, A Short of History of Modern Greece (London: Clerandon Press, 1986), p.201.

Clogg, Richard, A Concise History of Modern Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. (149-150).

Coker, Christopher, “Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk”, Adelphi Paper, Vol. 345, June 2002, p. 37.

Constas, Dimitri and Papatotiriou, Charalambos, “Greek Policy Responses to the Post-Cold War Balkan Environment”, in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999), pp. (213-223).

Coufoudakis, Van, “Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: the View from Athens”, International Security, Spring 1985, pp. (201-204).

Coufoudakis, Van, “Greek Foreign Policy 1945-1985: Seeking Independence in an Independent World, Problems and Prospects”, in K. Featherstone and D. K.

Katsoudas (eds.), Political Change in Greece Before and After the Colonels (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. (230-231).

Coufoudakis, Van, “Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996, p. 31.

Couloumbis, Theodore, The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. (101-102).

Couloumbis Theodore, ‘Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy since 1974’, Thesis, Vol. 1, Issue No. 4, 1998, p. 37.

Couloumbis, Theodore, ‘Greece in the Post-Cold War Environment’, , in A. Mitsos and E. Mossialos, ed., Contemporary Greece and Europe ( Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2000) p. 379.

Couloumbis, Theodore, “Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities”, in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds), Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.37.

Couloumbis, Theodore and Dalis, Sotiris, “Greek Foreign Policy since 1974”, in Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 80.

Couloumbis, Theodore and Ifantis, Kostas, “Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constrains-A Realist Approach”, The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 2002, p. 3.

Couloumbis, Theodore and Klaveras, Louis, “Prospects for Greek-Turkish Reconciliation in a Changing International Setting”, in Tözün Bahçeli, Theodore Couloumbis and Patricia Carley (eds.), Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean and Regional Stability Peaceworks (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p. 38.

Couloumbis, Theodore and Prodromos, Yannas, “Greek Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s”, in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 162.

Cox, Robert, “A Perspective on Globalization”, in James H. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 23.

Demestichas, Gregorios, “Greek Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean”, in Nikolaos A. Stavrou (ed.), Mediterranean Security at the Crossroads: A Reader (USA: Duke University Press, 1999)

Demirtaş Coşkun, Birgül, “Küreselleşmenin İkili Sorunlara Yansıması: Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Örneği”, in Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (ed.), Türkiye-Yunanistan Eski Sorunlar Yeni Arayışlar (Ankara: ASAM, 2002), p. 191.

Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssi G. and Passas, Argyris G., “Europeanization and the Greek Policy Style: National or Sectoral?”, in Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 143.

Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssi G. and Passas, Argyris G., “Greece: An Introduction to Patterns of EU Membership”, in Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (eds.), Greece in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2004)

Dokos, Thanos, “Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era”, in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999)

Dokos, Thanos, “Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting”, in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds), Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 43.

Dokos, Thanos, “Sub-Regional Cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean Process: The Greek/Turkish/Cyprus Security Complex”, EuroMeSCo Paper, March 2004, pp. (5-6).

Ege Ada, Adacık ve Kayalıklarının Coğrafı, Tarihi, Hukuki Durumu ve Uygulanan Politikalar, Turkish Military Academy, Istanbul, May 1996.

“Elections to decide Greece's future for next decade: Papandreou”, International Custom Wire, 01.04.2004

Featherstone, Kevin, “Introduction”, in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 7.



Georgiades, Harris C., "Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship", in Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (eds.), Contemporary Greece and Europe (Hants: Ashgate, 2000), pp. (424-425).

Gianaris, Nicholas V., Greece and Turkey (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. (178-179).

Goldgeier, James M. and McFaul, Michael, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era", International Organization, Vol.46, Issue 2, 1992, pp. (467-491).

Gürel, Şükrü S., Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1983) (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), p. 75.

Held, David and McGrew, Anthony, "The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order", Review of International Studies, Vol.24, 1998, p. 223.

Heraclides, Alexis, Yunanistan ve 'Doğu'dan Gelen Tehlike', Türkiye (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2002), pp. (191-319).

Iatrides, John O., "The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century", in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds), Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. (74-108).

Ifantis, Kostas, "Greece and the US after the Cold War", in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 149.

Ifantis, Kostas, "Multipolarity, Anarchy, National Interest and European Security After the Cold War: a Theoretical View", Greek Political Science Review, November 1998, Issue 12.

Ifantis, Kostas, "Strategic Imperatives and Regional Upheavals: On the US Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations", Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring 2004, p. 28.

Inbar ,Efraim and Sandler, Shmuel, "The Importance of Cyprus", Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2001, pp. (56-58).

International Herald Tribune, 29 December 1997.

Iokimidis, Panagiotis C., “Contradictions between Policy and Performance”, in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. (38-39).

Iokimidis, Panagiotis C., “The Europeanization of Greece’s Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems” in A. Mitsos and E. Mossialos, ed., Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2000), p. (368; 370).

Ioakimidis, Panagiotis C., “The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment”, South European Politics and Society, Vol. 5, No. 2, Autumn 2000, p. 76.

Ioakimidis, Panagiotis C., “The Model of Foreign Policy Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions,” in Stelios Stavridis, Thanos Veremis and et al., (eds.), The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s, pp. (140-171).

Joffé, George, Perspectives on Development : the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 1999)

Kacowicz, M. Arie, “Regionalization, Globalization and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping?”, Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane Governance, Oct-Dec 1999, Vol.24, Issue 4, p. 2.

Kandas, Thanasis, “Greek Security Concerns”, in Kosta Tsipis (ed.), Comman Security Regimes in the Balkans (East European Monographs: Boulder, 1996), p. 75.

Karamanlis , Kostas, “Greece: the EU’s Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region”, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2000, Vol. 23, Issue 2. pp. (7-11).

Kazakos, Panos and Ioakimidis, Panagiotis C., Greece and EC Membership Evaluated (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994)

Keridis, Dimitrios, “Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy”, in D. Keridis and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 61.

Kofas, Jon V., Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece During the Cold War (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), pp. (51-54).

Koliopoulos, John S. and Veremis, Thanos, Greece: The Modern Sequel (New York: New York University Press, 2002), p. 295.

Kotzias, Konstantinos, "Greek-Turkish Relations", Contemporary Review, Vol. 276, No. 1611, April 2000, p. 190.

Kourvetaris, George A., Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), p. 396.

Kourvetaris, George A. and Widlak, Prudy, "An Interface of Political Attitudes and Socio-Political Issues of New Democracy Politicians in the 1981 Greek Parliament", in George A Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), p. 266.

Kranidiotis, Yannis, "The Fundamental Objectives of Greek Foreign Policy", in A. Mitsos and E. Mossialos, ed., Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) p. 31.

Krebs, Ronald, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict", International Organization, Vol.53, No.2, Spring 1999, pp. (343-377).

Lake, A. David and M. Morgan, Patrick, "The New Regionalism in Security Affairs", in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University press, 1997), pp. (3-19).

Larrebee, F. Stephen, "The Southern periphery; Greece and Turkey", in P.S. Shoup (eds.), Problems of Balkan Security; Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1990), p.188.

Larrebee, F. Stephen, "The Impact of the New NATO on Greece", in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Jr. Dimitris Keridis (eds), Security in the Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relations (Massachusetts: Spectrum Graphics, 1997), p.103.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, "Greek Security Concerns in the Balkans", in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. (317-318).

Larrabee, F. Stephen and Lesser, Ian O., Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003)

Lebow, Richard Ned, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism", International Organization, Vol.48, Issue 2, Spring 1994, p. 269.

Legg, Keith and Roberts, John M., Modern Greece A Civilization on the Periphery (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. (55-71).

Lesser, Ian O., NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 5.

Lesser, O. Ian and Larrabee, F. Stephen and Zanini, Michele and Vlachos-Dengler, Katia, Greece's New Geopolitics (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. (40-41).

Mace, Gordon and Therien, Jean-Phillippe, "Introduction to Mace and Therien", in Gordon Mace and Jean-Phillippe Therien (eds.), Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 2.

McGrew, Anthony, "Realism vs Cosmopolitanism' A Debate Between Barry Buzan and David Held", Review of International Studies, Vol.24, Issue 3, 1998, p.390.

Meinardus, Ranald. "Third-Party Involvement in Greek-Turkish Disputes", in Dimitri Conostas (ed.), Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 159.

Mittelman, H. James, "The Dynamics of Globalization", in James H. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 2.

Morgan, M. Patrick, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders" in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University press, 1997)

Mourtos, George, "Security in the Balkans: A Greek Perspective", in David Carlton, Paul Ingram and Giancaria Tenaylia (eds.), Rising Tension in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, (England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1996), p. 152.

Moustakis, Fotios and Sheehan, Michael, "Democratic Peace and the European Security Community: the Paradox of Greece and Turkey", Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.13., Issue 1, Winter 2002, pp. (69-85).

Moustakis, Fotios and Sheehan, Michael, "Greek Security Policy After the Cold War", Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.21, No.3, December 2000, p. 96.

Nachmani, Amikam, "What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations", in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds.), Turkey in World Politics: An emerging Multi-regional Power (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 72.

Nye, S. Joseph, "Redefining the National Interest", Foreign Affairs, Vol.78, Issue 4, Jul-Agu 1999.

Panos Kazakos and Ioakimidis, Panagiotis C., Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994)

Papacosma, S. Victor, "More than Rocks: the Aegean's Discordant Legacy", Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1996, pp. (87-88).

Papacosma, S. Victor, "NATO, Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era", in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), p.51.

Papahadjopoulos, Daphne, Greek Foreign policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Implications for the European Union, (CEPS: Brussels, Feb 1998), p. 25.

Papandreou, A. George, "Greece's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century", Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.1, No.1, 2002, pp. (18-21).

Papantoniou, Yannis, "NATO and National Defense Policy: A View From the Hellenic Republic", NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace, 2002, Vol.47, Issue 4, p. 92.

Papantoniou, Yannis, “Southeastern Europe in the New Security Environment”, Military Technology, 9/2002, p. 25.

Pazarcı, Hüseyin, “Ege Denizindeki Türk-Yunan Sorunlarının Hukuki Yönü”, in Semih Vaner(ed.), Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), pp. (108-110).

Pedersen, Thomas, “Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration”, Review of International Studies, Vol.28, 2002, p.678.

Platias, Athanasios, “Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: in Search of Autonomy and Deterrence”, in Dimitri Constans (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. (95-96).

Rubin, Barry, “Introduction”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring 2004, p. 1.

Scholte, Jan Aart, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (London: Palgrave, 2000), p. 33.

Sezer, Sema, “Yunanistan’da Türk Yasağı: İskeçe Türk Birliği Davası”, Stratejik Analiz, Mart 2005, Cilt 5, Sayı 59, pp. (37-43).

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000), p. 181.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, “Religious Populism and Political Culture: The Greek Case”, South European Society and Politics, Vol.7, No.3, Winter 2002, pp. (29-52).

Stearns, Monteagle, “Greek Security Issues”, in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaidis (eds.), The Greek Paradox (Mass: MIT Press, 1997), p. 63.

Tayfur, M. Fatih, “Greek Foreign Policy after 1974: The Shift Towards Europeanization”, M.S. Dissertation, METU, September 1989, pp. (61-62).

Tayfur, M. Fatih, “Akdeniz’de Bir Adanın Kalın Uçlu Bir kalemle Yazılmış Hikayesi”, in Oktar Türel (ed.), Akdeniz’de Bir Ada (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), pp. (34-35).

Tayfur, M. Fatih, Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain (Hants: Ashgate, 2003)

Theodoropoulos, Byron, “Perception and Reality: How Greeks and Turks See Each Other”, in Thonas M. Veremis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-1998 (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998), pp. 49.

Treholt, Arne, “Europe and the Greek Dictatorship”, in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (eds.), Greece Under Military Rule (New York: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. (216-219).

Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, “The Greek Approach to the Balkans”, in Thonas M. Veremis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-1998 (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998), pp. (204; 210).

Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, “Further Turmoil Ahead”, in D. Keridis and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 61.

Tsakonas, Panayotis and Tournikiotis, Antonis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The Expectations-Reality Gap”, Security Dialogue, Vol.34, No.3, September 2003, pp. (302-305).

Tsakonas, Panayotis J., “Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 2001.

Tsoukalis, Loukas, “Is Greece an Awkward Partner?”, in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 26.

Tsoukalis, Loukas, “Conclusion: Beyond the Greek Paradox”, in Graham T. Allison and Kalypto Nicolaidis (eds.), The Greek Paradox (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 171.

Tsoukalis, Loukas, "Greece in the EU: Domestic Reform Coalitions, external Constraints and High Politics", in A Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds.), Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. (46-48).

Ulusoy, Hasan, "Revisiting the Security Communities After the Cold War: The Constructivist Perspective", Perceptions, September-November 2003, Vol. 3, Number 3, p. 187.

Valinakis, Yannis, "Southern Europe Between Détente and New Threats: the View from Greece", in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), Southern European Security in the 1990s (London: Printer publishers, 1992), p. 60.

Valinakis, Yannis, "Greece and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation", in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. (132-133).

Varouhakis, Miron, "Greece Seeks NATO Help for Olympics; Security Expands after Madrid Attacks", International Custom Wire, Mar 12, 2004.

Varvitsiotis, Ionnis M., "The Turkish Threat", in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Jr. Dimitris Keridis (eds), Security in the Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relations (Massachusetts: Spectrum Graphics, 1997), pp.(119-120).

Veremis, Thanos, "Greek Security: Issues and Politics," Adelphi Paper, No. 179, Winter 1982

Veremis, Thanos, "Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change", in John Chipman (ed.), NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. (236-286).

Veremis, Thonas, "Greece: The Dilemmas of Change", in F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan Security After the Cold War (Mass: RAND, 1994), p. 124.

Veremis, Thonas, The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997)



Veremis, Thonas, "Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era", in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans (New York: Pella, 1999), pp. (35-36).

Verney, Susannah, "Greece and the European Community", in K. Featherstone and D. K. Katsoudas (eds.), Political Change in Greece Before and After the Colonels (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 259.

Vlachos-Dengler, Katia, "Greek Civil Society and the Impact of Globalization", Unpublished paper prepared for the Kokkalis Foundation Annual Graduate Workshop, (Cambridge, Mass., 2001)

Woodhouse, C. M., Modern Greece: A Short History (4th. ed.) (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), pp. (297-298).

Woodward, Susan, "The Security Environment", in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Jr. Dimitris Keridis (eds.), Security in Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relationship (Virginia: Brassey's, 1997), p.26.

Xenakis, K. Dimitris, "The Contribution of Greece to Strengthening Euro-Mediterranean Relations", Perceptions, June-August 2003, p. 198.

Xydis, A. G., "The Military Regime's Foreign Policy", in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (eds.), Greece Under Military Rule (New York: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. (192-193; 202-204).

Zahariadis, Nikolaos, "Nationalism And Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to The Macedonian Issue", Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1994, Vol. 109, Issue 4

Zahariadis, Nikolaos, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" Mediterranean Quarterly, 5, Winter 1994, pp. (84-105).

Zelikow, Philip, "The Transformation of National Security", National Interest, Spring, 2003, Issue 71, p. 19.

## **Internet-Based References**

[www.athensnews.gr](http://www.athensnews.gr)

[www.balkantimes.com](http://www.balkantimes.com)

[www.euromesco.net](http://www.euromesco.net)

[europa.eu.int](http://europa.eu.int)

[www.eu2002.dk](http://www.eu2002.dk)

[www.ekathimerini.com](http://www.ekathimerini.com)

[www.ejil.org](http://www.ejil.org)

[www.greece.gr](http://www.greece.gr)

[www.greekembassy.org](http://www.greekembassy.org)

[www.hri.org](http://www.hri.org)

[www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)

[www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)

[www.mpa.gr](http://www.mpa.gr)

[www.mod.gr](http://www.mod.gr)

[www.setimes.com](http://www.setimes.com)

[www.stradigma.com](http://www.stradigma.com)

[www.terror.gen.tr](http://www.terror.gen.tr)

[www.wcfia.harvard.edu](http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu)

[Bro.byegm.gov.tr](http://Bro.byegm.gov.tr)