

TENSION AND COOPERATION IN TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS WITH REGARD TO IRAQ

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ABSTRACT

TENSION AND COOPERATION IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS WITH REGARD TO IRAQ

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This thesis analyzes the wavering characteristic of the relations between the United States and the European powers by taking the Iraqi war of 2003 as a case in point. The tension in transatlantic relations that emerged with the US' Iraqi invasion in March 2003 is analyzed within the framework of the structural analysis. The broader context of the causes of tension in transatlantic relations is further explored. The US' Iraqi invasion has demonstrated us that she wants to reproduce her Middle Eastern policy by having a direct possession over the power structures. This fact led to the opposition of two main European powers, namely France and Germany. Those countries, which might be regarded as constituting the Franco-German axis, have been trying to involve into the US' policy of reproducing the power structures. Whether the US is willing to give the Franco-German axis this role is also a key point, which is explored. Furthermore, in the thesis, attempts of the US and the Franco-German axis towards mending the fences in transatlantic relations that have been deteriorated with the Iraqi crisis are analyzed. The thesis seeks to show that the prospects for cooperation in transatlantic relations are an open-ended process due to the fact that there are both existing problems and opportunities for cooperation in transatlantic relations.

Keywords: Iraq, tension-cooperation, power structures, the Franco-German axis, wavering relations, open-ended process.

ÖZ

IRAK BAĞLAMINDA TRANSATLANTİK İLİŞKİLERDE GERİLİM VE İŞBİRLİĞİ

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Bu çalışma, 2003 yılında yaşanan Irak savaşını bir örnek olarak göz önüne alarak, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Avrupalı güçler arasındaki ilişkilerin çalkantılı boyutunu incelemektedir. ABD'nin 2003 yılı Mart ayında Irak'ı işgali ile transatlantik ilişkilerde ortaya çıkan kriz, yapısal analiz çerçevesinde tartışılmaktadır. Transatlantik ilişkilerde yaşanan gerilimlerin nedenleri de detaylı bir şekilde ele alınmaktadır. ABD'nin Irak'ı işgali, güç yapılarına doğrudan sahip olarak Orta Doğu politikasını yeniden belirlemek niyetinde olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bu gerçek, iki önemli Avrupalı gücün, yani Fransa ve Almanya'nın, muhalefetini doğurmuştur. Fransız-Alman eksenini oluşturdukları kabul edilen bu ülkeler, ABD'nin güç yapılarını yeniden biçimlendirme politikasına dahil olmayı istememektedirler. ABD'nin Fransız-Alman eksenine böyle bir rol verip vermeyeceği, ana sorulardan biridir ve bu tezde irdelenmektedir. Bunun yanında bu çalışmada, ABD'nin ve Fransız-Alman ekseninin Irak krizi nedeniyle bozulan transatlantik ilişkileri düzeltme çabaları da incelenmektedir. Bu tez, transatlantik ilişkiler çerçevesinde bir yandan mevcut sorunların var olduğu, diğer yandan ise işbirliği fırsatlarının bulunduğu gerçeğini göz önüne alarak, transatlantik ilişkilerdeki işbirliği beklentilerinin ucu açık bir süreç olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak, gerilim-işbirliği, güç yapıları, Fransız-Alman eksen, çalkantılı ilişkiler, ucu açık süreç.

To My Mother and Father

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The US intervention into Iraq in March 2003 and its consequences have created one of the deepest crises in transatlantic relations. Within this context, this thesis first aims to examine the causes of the tension in transatlantic relations that emerged on the eve of the US-UK endeavor to invade Iraq, second to analyze processes and strategy taken up by the involving parties to transform the tension into cooperation within the transatlantic relations and finally to assess prospects and failure of such a change from tension to cooperation within the transatlantic relations. The invasion of Iraq by the US-Britain and the discussion on which developed, provide a fruitful ground to explore the extent of tension and prospects for cooperation in the transatlantic relation as well as offering a better ground to analyze foreign policy strategies of the involving major actors i.e. the US-Britain and old and new Europe.

Within the framework of above-noted points, the thesis will try to dwell upon the transatlantic relations with regard to Iraq basically within the context of four chapters. In the first part of the thesis, the tension in transatlantic relations during the Cold War years will be discussed to shed light on today's crisis. In the second part, the tension that emerged between the US and some European countries with regard to Iraqi crisis will be discussed. The causes of the tension will be analyzed within a broader perspective of structural power relations. In the third part, the main focus will be on the strategies and processes that the involving parties have been trying to transform the tension into cooperation. And lastly, it will be demonstrated that the prospects of transforming the tension into cooperation are an open-ended process.

The arguments of the thesis will be developed within the context of the analysis of Susan Strange, who developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of structural and relational power. According to Strange, there are two kinds of

power exercised in a political economy: *structural power and relational power*.¹ And she argues that, it is increasingly structural power that counts far more than relational power. In her words, relational power is “*the power of A to get to B to do something they would not otherwise do*” and by contrast, structural power is the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy “*within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate*.”² The structural power is more than the power to set the international regimes or rules that are supposed to govern international economic relations. It is the power to decide how things should be done and how the institutions should be shaped. Structural power is to be found not in a single structure but in four separate but related structures. These four sources, which correspond to the four sides of the transparent pyramid, are *control over security, control over production, control over credit, and control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas*.³ They are the most striking features of the global political economy. Therefore it can be mentioned that security, production, finance and knowledge are the four primary structures of power in the global political economy. Each structure presents us significant questions which should be analyzed in order to understand them clearly. In the security structure, he who offers others protection against any threats is able to exercise power in other non-security matters, ranging from the distribution of food to the administration of justice. On the other hand, in terms of the production structure, who decides what shall be produced, by whom, by what means and with what combination of land, labor, capital and technology is as important as who decides the means of defense against insecurity. For the financial structure, gaining the confidence of others in terms of creating credit turns out to be important, and for the knowledge structure, whoever is able to develop or acquire and deny the access of others to a kind of knowledge respected and sought by others will exercise a special kind of structural power. However, the aimed end results are common for all those structures. As Strange puts it, “*What is common to all four kinds of structural power is that the possessor is able to change the range of choices open to others, without apparently putting*

¹ Susan Strange, *States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1988, pp. 24-29.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

pressure directly on them to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others."⁴

In addition to the four primary structures, there are secondary structures, such as trade, aid, energy or international transport systems.⁵ They are shaped by the four basic structures of security, production, finance and knowledge. The power struggle and the problems witnessed between the transatlantic partners can be analyzed within the context of the primary and secondary structures.

It is the argument of the thesis that there is a continuation in terms of the power struggle over power structures within the transatlantic relations. As will be demonstrated, the tension in transatlantic relations during the Cold War years and the recent crisis that emerged with the US Iraqi invasion should be regarded as a struggle over power structures. The US' Iraqi invasion has demonstrated that she wants to reshape her Middle Eastern policy by having a direct possession over the power structures. So far, the US has been trying to maintain her global dominance by controlling or influencing the power structures. Therefore, as the Iraqi invasion displayed, the US policy has been re-shaped as to continue controlling the power structures and getting possession on them at the same time. Starting from Iraq and continuing with Syria and Iran, the US wants to shape the region according to her interests which would be obeyed by the outsiders. This fact led to the opposition of France and Germany, which might be regarded as constituting the Franco-German axis. As its opposition during the Iraqi crisis has revealed, the Franco-German axis aims not to give unlimited support and if possible to counter the US strategy of acquiring the power structures in the region. They would not want to be dependent upon the rules solely set by the US. The joint Iraqi operation would be a more desirable option for the Franco-German axis instead of a unilateral action of the US due to the fact that it would give an edge to them in the Middle Eastern politics. The major objective of the Franco-German axis is to prevent the consolidation of any exclusive structural power in the region. That is why they opposed the US Iraqi invasion. Therefore, it can be maintained that power structures have turned out to be one of the most prominent aspects of the transatlantic crisis that emerged with the Iraqi invasion. However the power structures are significant as well in terms of

⁴ Ibid., p. 31.

⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

the future prospects for cooperation. In order to justify her invasion of Iraq, the US definitely needs the help of the Franco-German axis. To do it, she wants to involve the Franco-German axis into the reproducing process of the power structures. The concrete steps towards mending transatlantic ties should be evaluated within this context, which will be demonstrated in chapter IV and V. It is in the interest of the Franco-German axis to involve into this process since its main aim is to prevent perpetuation of the US' structural power in the region. However, the axis would like to see an extended role for her involvement into the re-organized US policy of reshaping the power structures. This point can be clearly witnessed in the Presidency Conclusions of 16/17 December 2004 EU Brussels Summit which revealed the EU's intention of promoting an international order based on "*effective multilateralism*".⁶ This would be meaning an extended role for Europeans in Iraqi business. It is a key question, however, that whether the US will give this extended role to them in the Iraqi business. Therefore, it is argued in the thesis that the cooperation efforts in transatlantic relations are an open-ended process. It is the prominent aspect of this open-ended process that there are both existing problems and opportunities for cooperation in transatlantic relations.

Taking into account the above mentioned points, the key questions that should be raised are, "Did the transatlantic partners witness tension in Cold War years, if so what were their main causes, how can they be read in terms of structural analysis, how can structural analysis of Susan Strange be applied to the US Iraqi invasion, what are the interests of transatlantic powers in the Middle East and what are their foreign policy interests, what are the general causes of tension in transatlantic relations, are there any attempts towards mending the fences in transatlantic relations on the morrow of the Iraqi invasion, if so how can they be read, why is it that the transformation of tension into cooperation is an open-ended process?"

With the intention of trying to answer the above-noted questions, this thesis aims to analyze the wavering characteristics of the transatlantic relations taking the Iraqi issue as a case in point. Whether the tension in transatlantic relations will lead to cooperation or not is also to be analyzed in the thesis.

⁶ http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/cs/article_4166_cs.htm, accessed on 21.12.2004.

CHAPTER II

THE TENSION IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR YEARS

According to Andrei S. Markovits, there never was a “*golden age*” in terms of US-European relations.⁷ The tension in transatlantic relations is not a new phenomenon. There were many tensions witnessed in relations throughout the Cold War years. The most striking examples are the periods of French President General De Gaulle and West German President Willy Brandt. Therefore, those periods will be analyzed in order to lay down a ground to better grasp the wavering characteristic of the transatlantic relations.

2.1 French Policy during the Years of De Gaulle

France played an important role within the dispute of European security especially during the 1960s. The strategies which were pursued by General Charles de Gaulle from 1958 to 1969 should be examined carefully to understand how those strategies created several challenges against the bipolar structure of the Cold War years. De Gaulle’s aim was to renegotiate France’s position in the bipolar system within the framework of the power structures and the US response to it was to keep her dominance over the powers structures. This was what caused tension in transatlantic relations in the Cold War years.

France pursued an independent foreign and security policy since de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958. During the Cold War years we notice that European security structure was incorporated into Western Bloc’s security structure. It would not be possible to discern a definable separate European security, but within the context of Western security. Following the World War II, the European security

⁷ Andrei S. Markovits, “European Anti-Americanism (and Anti-Semitism): Ever Present Though Always Denied”, Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series #108, p. 6.

structure was established under the leadership of the United States against the perceived “Soviet threat”. Therefore the US presence in Western Europe became a significant aspect of the Cold War politics. France became one of the most prominent countries which tried to oppose her dependence upon the US. De Gaulle wanted to put an end to a foreign presence and disengage from an Atlantic integration structure but not altogether. The policy of independence, pursued by de Gaulle, was perceived by the US as being directed against her. One of the most crucial events within this process was the withdrawal of France from the joint military arm of the Atlantic Alliance in 1966. Following this event, in 1967 more than twenty thousand American soldiers stationed in France, had left the country. Frédéric Bozo argues that all these developments were not only a challenge against the US leadership in Europe, but also they brought into question the whole strategy of containment.⁸ That is to say, according to Bozo, de Gaulle challenged the bipolar structure of the Cold War period and wanted to renegotiate France’s position in the system. What were the specific goals of de Gaulle and what factors enabled him to pursue his strategy? As Bozo points it out, power, independence and grandeur or a grand design were to be found at the heart of de Gaulle’s Atlantic policy.⁹ Following the end of the Algerian War, de Gaulle sought to redefine French power. Under his leadership, France started to pursue more assertive foreign policy. This assertive policy was bolstered by France’s emerging nuclear capability. In addition to rise in the power of France after 1958, we have to mention France’s return to institutional stability and the achievement of general financial equilibrium. In short, in the course of the 1960s, France’s unprecedented economic expansion, political stability and operational nuclear capacity were the main factors which enabled de Gaulle to pursue his Cold War strategies. These factors were significant in terms of acquiring a competing position over the power structures against the US. Tension in transatlantic relations came to the agenda within this context. Having mentioned this point, now the specific strategies of de Gaulle will be discussed.

Bozo mentions that, independence was the backbone of de Gaulle’s strategy.¹⁰ First of all, realization of military independence became a crucial point.

⁸ Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p. ix.

⁹ Ibid., p. xi.

To achieve this aim de Gaulle decided to disengage France from the machinery of Atlantic integration. In addition to the military independence, strategic and political independence had also played crucial roles in de Gaulle's strategies. For instance, in terms of realizing political independence it can be noted that de Gaulle's strategy was to make France's allies recognize its status as a world power. Besides the aim of achieving independence, two significant dimensions in de Gaulle's policy should be noted. As Bozo puts it, these were the "West-West" and "East-West" dimensions.¹¹ In terms of West-West dimension, de Gaulle considered that the alliance between the US and Europe would not remain viable unless it adapted to the profound changes which had occurred in the international arena. In this regard, the transformation of NATO was especially important according to de Gaulle. The new strategic realities, especially the balance of terror started with the launching of Sputnik in 1957, urged the alliance to adapt to the new environment. Within this framework, according to de Gaulle, there was a need for European strategic organization that would rely heavily on French nuclear power. There was also an East-West dimension of de Gaulle's strategy during the Cold War period. This dimension was especially important in terms of the prospect of transforming the international system beyond its Cold War logic. Why did France pursue these policies? Bozo argues that, moving beyond the bipolar structure had a national objective, since a loosening of the bipolar system would hasten the country's rise to world status.¹² This was a real challenge against the policies of the US, especially against the policy of containment. France offered itself as the champion of European autonomy and the overcoming of blocs. However, by contrast to this argument it should be noted that the real intention of France was not to destroy the bipolar structure but instead to renegotiate France's position in the bipolar system, as noted above. French moves towards acquiring competing roles in terms of especially security, production and energy structures in order not to be dependent on the power structures determined by the US understanding of keeping itself dominant over them were significant. France's unprecedented economic expansion, political stability and operational nuclear capacity in the 1960s were especially prominent in

¹⁰ Ibid., p. xi.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

¹² Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.

terms of the control over security, production and energy structures. The tension that came to the fore within this framework was reiterated during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the opposition to it raised by the Franco-German axis.

Another important question that should be asked is that thanks to what transformations in the international system France was able to pursue its strategies? Bozo dwells upon the transformations of the power relations during the 1960s.¹³ These transformations were strategic (the loss of US nuclear supremacy after the launching of Sputnik), economic (the economic recovery in Western Europe, and in this regard France as well), and political (France's return to stability and the international reestablishment of Germany). As a result of these structural developments during the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the leadership of US and its Cold War strategies were questioned, especially by France. In addition to these massive developments, the emergence of détente between the superpowers created suspicions about the policies of the US. Thanks to all these international developments, de Gaulle increased his efforts toward pursuing more assertive foreign policy.

As a result, de Gaulle's policies during the 1960s, created a challenge to the United States. This was a challenge against the power of the US, and against its Atlantic leadership. As noted above, however, France did not intend to destroy the bipolar structure.

2.2 Willy Brandt and Germany's Ostpolitik

When Willy Brandt became the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1969, West Germany's foreign policy entered into a new period. Under the leadership of Brandt, the West German government embarked upon a new policy aimed at *"restoring German unity and replacing Europe's Cold War tensions with a spirit of conciliation."*¹⁴ This policy was named as 'Ostpolitik'. The years from 1970 to 1973 were especially important. The reason was that, as

¹³ *ibid.*, p.xvi.

¹⁴ <http://www.wibemedia.com/ostpolitik.html>, accessed on 15.10.2003.

detailed below, West Germany concluded bilateral agreements with the countries of Eastern Bloc during this period.

Ostpolitik had emerged as a reaction to former foreign policy of West Germany. After its creation in 1949, West Germany regarded the authority of Bonn as the sole legitimate representative of Germany. That is to say West Germany regarded itself as the sole legitimate power. This understanding led to the implementation of the 'Hallstein Doctrine'. This was Bonn's policy of "*denying diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic and breaking off relations with any state, besides the Soviet Union, that recognized East Germany.*"¹⁵ Germany's Ostpolitik had developed as a reaction to this policy. In 1970, with an attempt to change the former German policy, West Germany agreed to negotiate with the communist bloc.¹⁶ This understanding was the most important aspect of Ostpolitik. According to Timothy Garton Ash, Ostpolitik means:

*The policies of normalization and the pursuit of a European peace order based on the full diplomatic recognition of the sovereignty and existing frontiers of East European states, and virtually full recognition of East Germany as an independent state.*¹⁷

What were the main developments within the context of Ostpolitik? As noted before, during the years between 1970-1973 West Germany concluded bilateral agreements with the countries of Eastern Bloc.¹⁸ The Treaty of Moscow was signed between West Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1970. Both West Germany and the Soviet Union renounced the use of force. The FRG agreed to make no territorial claims. Following this event, a similar agreement was signed between FRG and Poland. With the Treaty of Warsaw in December 1970, again FRG renounced its territorial claims and recognized its border with Poland. These agreements paved the way for the negotiations between East and West Germany. The parties agreed to conclude a comprehensive treaty between the two German states. Finally the Basic Treaty was signed in December 1972. Both states agreed

¹⁵ ibid.

¹⁶ http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_ostpolitik.htm, accessed on 15.10.2003.

¹⁷ Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, Germany and the Divided Continent, New York, Random House, 1993, p. 36.

¹⁸ Those agreements are available at http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_ostpolitik.htm, accessed on 15.10.2003.

to normalize their relations. They guaranteed their mutual territorial integrity and the border between them. They recognized each other's independence and sovereignty as well. The Treaty of Prague with Czechoslovakia was signed in December 1973, and diplomatic relations were established. And lastly, West Germany exchanged ambassadors with Hungary and Bulgaria. In short, according to T. Garton Ash, "*Ostpolitik was born as the German version of détente. Ostpolitik may therefore also be described as détente policy.*"¹⁹

After mentioning main aspects of Ostpolitik, now it is going to be evaluated. It can be noted that Willy Brandt's new policy was a challenge to the bipolar structure of the Cold War period. Within this context, there are similarities between de Gaulle's policies and Brandt's policies. Rather than remaining dependent on the United States, the Social Democrats believed security could best be achieved through the encouragement of European integration.²⁰ One of Brandt's aims was to create a new Europe that stood outside the East-West rivalry. An important question that should be asked regarding this issue is that whether Brandt became successful in his Ostpolitik. It can be stated that Ostpolitik failed to transcend the divisions caused by the Cold War. The reason was that, "*West Germany lacked the political, economic, and diplomatic power to be a decisive influence on the course of East-West rivalry.*"²¹ Ash mentions that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish crisis, and the second Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the failure of Ostpolitik.²² Therefore, it can be concluded that Germany's Ostpolitik faced many difficulties. However, the governments of West Germany had pursued Ostpolitik for two decades. For instance, Schmidt continued Brandt's effort to establish cordial relations with the Soviet Union and East Germany.²³

As a result, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was a challenge to the bipolar structure of the Cold War period. Under his leadership, West Germany established cordial relations with the countries of the Eastern bloc. However, just like de Gaulle, the real

¹⁹ Timothy Garton Ash, op.cit., p. 36.

²⁰ <http://www.wibemedia.com/ostpolitik.html>, accessed on 15.10.2003.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Timothy Garton Ash, op.cit., p. 37.

²³ Dennis L. Bark and Davis R. Gress, Democracy and its Discontents 1963-1991: A History of West Germany, Oxford UK & Cambridge US, Blackwell, 1993, p. 321.

intention of Willy Brandt was not to destroy the bipolar structure but rather to ease the effects of the system over Western Germany. This was not the rise against the system but instead his main aim was to bypass the restrictions imposed upon Western Germany by the system. That is why he tried to enter into indirect dialogue with the Eastern Bloc. This policy was similar to de Gaulle's policy in the sense that both leaders tried to renegotiate their country's position over the power structures in the bipolar system. It is an irony that the two countries, i.e. the Franco-German axis, opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

CHAPTER III

THE TENSION IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF US' IRAQI INVASION

The Iraqi case represents an important turning point in terms of the transatlantic relations. Therefore, it would be suitable to analyze the US invasion of Iraq and the opposition of Franco-German axis to it. After dwelling upon the events, then the major realities behind the scenes and their comprehensive ramifications will be analyzed. But first of all, the analysis of power structures offered by Susan Strange should be taken into consideration in terms of understanding all these developments.

3.1 The Analysis of Susan Strange's Structures of Power In Global Politics

As noted above, there are four primary and four secondary structures of power in Strange's analysis which are indispensable to the global politics. These structures should be well analyzed in terms of understanding the wavering feature of the transatlantic relations.

According to Strange:

The security structure in a political economy is the framework of power created by the provision of security by some human beings for others. The protectors – those who provide the security – acquire a certain kind of power which lets them determine, and perhaps limit, the range of choices, or options available to others.²⁴

The basic questions that should be asked with regard to the security structure are, who provides security to whom, against what perceived threat or threats, and what price or terms are exacted for this security? Therefore whoever exercises this power in delicate regions; it would acquire special advantage over

²⁴ Susan Strange, op.cit., p. 45.

production, consumption of wealth and over social relations. The US invasion of Iraq in the name of providing security for the Iraqi people against the Saddam Hussein rule and the European opposition against it gain significance within this perspective. Provision of security for the Iraqi people would entail the US to have a strong influence over other structures, such as production, trade, energy and etc. Therefore the security consideration turned out to be one of the most prominent aspects of the Iraqi war both for the US and the Franco-German axis. The importance of the security structure is well defined by Strange with the following words:

*World economic order will greatly depend, in the future as in the past, on developments in the global security structure. Choices open to states in their economic policies and to corporations and social groups will be determined by what happens to the security structure. Whether it becomes more or less stable, or remains a mixture of positive and negative features, it is certain to have a direct and strong impact on future patterns of production, finance and ideas, and secondary effects on trade, transport, the supply sources of energy and the provision of welfare.*²⁵

The establishment of a stable and peaceful security system in Iraq turned out to be important for the proper functioning of other structures. Thus, one of the motives behind the US invasion was to create a positive atmosphere in terms of her interests by removing Saddam Hussein. In the end, this would entail the unhindered flow of oil from the region, which is the main component of the energy structure.

The second structure, production, can be defined as *“the sum of all the arrangements determining what is produced, by whom and for whom, by what method and on what terms (...) The production structure is what creates the wealth in a political economy.”*²⁶ The production structure is very much related with the security structure. For the unhindered flow of capital there must be a stable security structure.

Besides the security structure and the production structure, there are also the financial structure, which is the power of creating credit for the others, and the knowledge structure, the power of acquiring and denying the access of others to a kind of knowledge respected by them. As mentioned before, the financial and the knowledge structures are no less important than the security and production

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

structures in terms of maintaining the structural power within the global political economy.

In order to understand the American invasion of Iraq and the German-French opposition against it, we should also dwell upon the secondary power structures which are as significant as the primary structures. The secondary structures are the world's major transnational transport systems, the trading system, the energy supply system, and the transnational welfare and development system.²⁷ It should also be mentioned that the secondary structures are shaped by the four primary structures described before. For the transports systems, it can be stated that the concerns of the powerful states for their own security have determined the ground rules for the international transport systems with which less powerful states have had to conform. On the other hand, the internationalization of production and use of oil as a prime source of energy increased the demand for ships and for airline services. The aim of having a secure access to energy resources led to the development of transport systems. The sea transport systems especially gained importance for the exporters and importers of heavy bulk cargoes, like crude oil, iron ore, and other minerals. It should also be said that for the sea transport, there is obviously a great inequality among states in terms of the authority wielded over it. As stated by Strange, small landlocked states have had a little direct interest in sea transport so they have applied little authority over it, whereas states with global security interests, such as the US, have always good reasons for trying to ensure the security of sea trade.²⁸ The knowledge structure as well has been important for the development of transport systems throughout the history. Technology has been the source of the most revolutionary changes in transport systems in the form of the development of sophisticated sea and air transport vehicles. In other words, the transport systems are very much related with the security, production, energy and knowledge structures. This fact demonstrates us one of the most prominent rhetoric behind the Iraqi war, that is to say the US intention towards maintenance of secure transports systems, either for transport by sea or air, and the skepticisms raised by mainly France and Germany to prevent the US to consolidate her dominant position in the Middle East.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 135.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

As a last thing, the energy structure is going to be dwelled upon. Actually it is one of the most prominent structures for the proper functioning of others. The importance of it is well described by Susan Strange. She maintains that:

*For all developed economies, whether planned, mixed or market-oriented, energy is a vital factor of production. The basic industries in every modern economy – steel, chemicals, engineering – all need large inputs of energy, whether this comes from oil, coal, gas or nuclear power. Nor can any modern economy function without transport. Road, rail, sea and air transport are all heavy users of energy.*²⁹

There is a clear-cut relation between the energy and security structures. For instance, possession of coal as a vital source of national energy for industry was recognized as a major objective of foreign policy in the course of the history. As witnessed during the years of World War II, coal was necessary for national industry, and industry – especially steel – was necessary for military power. Without having unhindered access to coal, there would be no German heavy industry and without strong heavy industry there would be no powerful German Army to challenge neighboring states. By then, states had come to recognize the importance of energy supplies for their security. In today's world, the state policies with regard to energy are much concerned with the question of energy security. In time, oil had taken the place of coal as the object of national strategy and international diplomacy. According to Strange, what distinguishes oil from coal as primary source of energy was that it was much more mobile.³⁰ In the days of coal, energy was largely immobile. However, during the oil age, with the improvements in transport and communication systems and with the integration of international capital markets, the mobility has increased in an apparent way. The construction of pipelines and supertankers made the transport of oil across the continents much easier. Today, oil is by far the most important energy source in the world economy. The other fact is that, of all the sources of energy, the cheapest is Middle East oil. According to Strange, *"This economic fact explains the dominant position of Middle East oil in the world energy system."*³¹ Another important fact about the oil business that is identified by Strange is that, governments, companies, markets are the three key

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

players in the game and the most important authority has often been not the state, but the oil company or a group of oil companies managing the market.³² So, it can be stated that behind the American steps towards reaching oil resources of the Middle East, there are the interests of big oil companies. The relation between the energy and security structures was well described by Henry Kissinger after the first OPEC oil price rise of 1973, which caused serious energy crisis. He stated that:

*In the last decade we have become so increasingly dependent on imported energy that today our economy and well-being are hostage to decisions made by nations thousands of miles away ... The energy crisis has placed at risk all of this nation's objectives in the world. It has mortgaged our economy and made our foreign policy vulnerable to unprecedented pressures ... it has also profoundly affected our national security by triggering a political crisis of global dimensions.*³³

Kissinger was trying to say that the security of the US did not just require sufficient military capability to deter any challenges. Energy insecurity could also undermine both its defense policies and foreign policies. Therefore, the US had to have a secure and continual access to world energy resources, mainly oil. The Iraqi war and its consequences should be analyzed within this perspective. The importance of Middle Eastern oil resources for the US and the European powers is a well-known phenomenon. And the close relation between the security and energy systems well describes the US invasion of Iraq and ensuing criticisms of the Franco-German axis against it.

As Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan put it, "*the connection between oil and conflict in the Middle East is hardly novelty.*"³⁴ Within this context, the 1990-91 Gulf war between Iraq and the US led coalition and the recent US invasion of Iraq were mainly about a struggle over the control of oil resources. Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and the Iran-Iraq conflict of 1980-1988 were related, in some respects, with the control over the energy structure as well. The significance of the energy structure comes to the fore within this framework.

In terms of analyzing the structural power within the perspective of US Iraqi invasion and the opposition of the Franco-German axis, we should dwell upon the

³² Ibid., p. 194.

³³ Ibid., p. 201.

³⁴ Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, "Dominant Capital and the New Wars", Journal of World-Systems Research, X, 2, Summer 2004, p. 309.

re-organized policy of the US towards the Middle East. As noted in introduction, with the Iraqi invasion the US has demonstrated her intention of acquiring the power structures. This re-shaped policy can be regarded as new feature of her long lasting policy of controlling the power structures. This is prominent especially in terms of energy, transportation, trade and financial structures. Within this framework, reproducing those structures as to have a direct control over Middle Eastern energy resources, trade mechanisms and re-describing of the transport systems and the credit mechanisms turned out to be a prominent aspect of the US strategy. The Iraqi invasion has become a significant instrument of this process. In order to achieve these aims, *the Greater Middle East Project* has been promoted by the US politicians, which will be dwelled upon below. The Franco-German axis raised crucial opposition in order to prevent consolidation of the new US strategy. *The Mediterranean Strategy* or *the Euro-Med strategy* of the EU, and *The Greater Middle East Project* of the US should be regarded as mutually competing projects. The EU's strategy is very much related with the trade structure put forward by Strange. The Euro-Med strategy has been promoted with the intention of developing commercial relations with the countries of the Mediterranean basin. It has led to an agreement offering ECU 4.7 billion (US \$6 billion) of aid to twelve states on the Mediterranean region from 1995 to 1999 and it has aimed to promote association agreements with the countries of the region.³⁵ In addition to that, a conference in November 1995 was organized under the Spanish EU presidency in Barcelona and eventually the conference paved the way for the establishment of a free trade area by 2010 which would remove barrier to trade in manufactures.³⁶ This strategy can be regarded as a competing strategy to the *Greater Middle East* project of the US and the opposition of Franco-German axis to the Iraqi invasion should be analyzed within this framework.

In order to understand the tension in transatlantic relations that emerged with the Iraqi crisis, it is significant to first take a closer look to the interests of the US and European powers in the Middle East region as well as the foreign policies of them by taking into account above mentioned points.

³⁵ G. Pinar Tank, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin", in "Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union" (edited by Kjell A. Eliassen), London: SAGE Publications, 1998, p. 180.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 180.

3.2 The Significance of the Middle East for the Transatlantic Allies And Their Foreign Policy Priorities

3.2.1 The Interests of the Powers in the Middle East

The Middle East has been an important region both for the European countries and the US in terms of economic, political, social and security dimensions. Charles Issawi points it out that the Middle East was subjected to a very powerful European impact in the “*political, economic and social spheres*.”³⁷ According to him, this impact had many beneficial results. For instance, the Middle Eastern countries imported capital, technology, a bourgeoisie and a skilled working class from Europe. Many industrial activities in the region has been financed and run by Europeans. Issawi goes on to argue that as a result of all these processes, the region began to modernize at an “*accelerating pace*”.³⁸ Actually the security dimension has been one of the most prominent aspects of the policies of the European countries towards the Middle East. The conflicts in the region have had significant effects in terms of European security architecture. In addition to that, we also should pay a close attention to the importance of the Middle East for Europe in terms of geographical and economic perspectives. In terms of geographical considerations we can say that the region has been regarded “*a key external priority for the EU*” and the former EU External Relations Commissioner Christopher Patten labeled the region as the Union’s “*near abroad*”.³⁹ With respect to the economic dimension, it can be mentioned that the European countries are dependent upon the Middle Eastern petroleum. Therefore, having a secure access to Middle Eastern energy sources is an important element for the European countries.⁴⁰

³⁷ Charles Issawi, “The Middle East in the World Context: a historical view”, in The Modern Economic and Social History of the Middle East in its World Context (edited by Georges Sabagh), New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1989, p. 21.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

³⁹ Serhat Güvenç, “The Limits and Possibilities of a Military Role for the EU in the Middle East”, in Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum (edited by Joachim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanabe), Zurich: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002, p. 163.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 163-164.

Both the European powers and the US have crucial national interests in the Middle East. In order to understand the current state of tension with regard to the Iraqi issue, one should pay a close attention to those interests which lead to competition among the powers. As Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer point it out:

*Throughout the history of the Occident, the Greater Middle East has played significant strategic, cultural, and religious roles as the gateway to trade in the East, the birthplace of Christianity and, more recently, as a primary energy supplier to the West.*⁴¹

It can be noted that the United States has three main interests in the Middle East, as Robert Satloff puts it. These are, preserving the security of Israel, maintaining the unhindered flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices and ensuring regional stability.⁴² First of all, the preservation of Israel's security has been important for the US, due to the fact that the two countries share a unique historical relationship, religious and cultural ties, close people-to-people bonds and overlapping threats, mainly from terrorism and religious radicalism. These significant considerations make Israel's security so crucial for the US. Second of all, the US has a strong interest in maintaining access to the invaluable oil reserves in the Gulf region. The main reason is that, significant oil disruptions have had a drastic effect on the US economy. For instance, the oil shock of 1979-80, caused by the Iranian revolution, and the Gulf War of 1990-91 created considerable losses in the US gross national products and recessionary trends in the US economy. In addition to maintaining the security of oil reserves and preventing disruptions in oil supply in the region, the US has a key interest in ensuring the regional stability as well. That is to say, it is vital for the US to prevent any single power from controlling the region and the important access routes. This power may be an extra-regional state, such as the Soviet Union until 1990, or a potential regional hegemon. Therefore, this interest leads the US enter into competition with the major European powers, such as France and Germany, who also want to have an influence in the region.

⁴¹ Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (editors), Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1997, p. 2.

⁴² Robert Satloff, "America, Europe, and the Middle East in the 1990s: Interests and Policies", in Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, edited by Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer, (edited by Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1997, pp. 10-11.

In order to promote her interests in the region, the US has pursued core policies. These have been promoting Arab-Israeli peace, developing strong bilateral relationships with regional partners and actively deterring aggression in the Persian Gulf.⁴³ Promoting Arab-Israeli peace process has been significant for the US in terms of maintaining regional peace and stability in the Middle East, permitting regional allies to reduce military expenditures and focusing instead on economic and social development, and isolating radical states and organizations. However, it can be easily mentioned that the US has not become successful in this policy. The second core US policy in the Middle East has been developing strong relations with the moderate Arab states and Turkey. The main reason is that those powers are important in terms of ensuring regional stability and having easy access to the energy sources. Since the Iranian revolution of 1979 which removed the Shah from power, the three pillars of US Middle East policy have been Egypt, with its significant role in peacemaking process, and its leadership position within the Arab world; Saudi Arabia, with its dominant role in control of regional energy resources and its prominent role among the Gulf states; and Turkey, with its geopolitical and strategic location, its significant military power and its role as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world.⁴⁴ Building a strategic partnership with Israel has also been as important as developing strong relations with the other regional partners. Another core interest of the US in the region has been to create security structures in the Gulf that would protect against the emergence of any extra-regional or regional hegemon powers. This policy was based upon “*twin pillars*” of Iran and Saudi Arabia from 1972 to 1979. With the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the US adopted a new policy, and with this policy she had pursued a balance of power approach towards Iraq and Iran. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, this policy again had changed and since the 1990s the US has adopted a new approach called as “*dual containment*”.⁴⁵ This policy has sought to contain the aggressive policies of both Iraq and Iran through the UN sanctions (against Iraq) and the imposition of an economic embargo (against Iran).

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 12-19.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

What are the core interests of the European states within the Middle East? According to Satloff, there are three main regional interests of Europe: *regional stability, energy and migration*.⁴⁶ Although these interests may seem to be complementary to US interests, in some respects they are divergent. The core European interest in the Middle East is to promote stability and prevent the spread of conflicts in the region to Europe. Europe's proximity to the region makes this interest so crucial for the European powers. Therefore, prevention of major problems such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and Arab-Israeli disputes turn out to be significant for the European powers. The second core interest of Europe is the maintenance of unhindered flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices from the region. By contrast to the US, Europe is much more dependent on the region's oil resources. Whereas the US imports less than 20 percent of its oil and gas from the Middle East, Europe imports nearly half of its oil and gas from the region. The third key European interest within the region is related with the issue of migration. The migration into Europe in the 1960s and the 1970s, especially from North Africa to southern Europe, from Turkey to Germany, and from India and Pakistan to Britain, has created deep concern among the European states that this great burst of Muslim migration into Europe would cause serious demographic change within their own homogenous population. Therefore, absorbing past migration and preventing future migration have become crucial European interest vis-à-vis the Middle East. In addition to these core European interests, there are also some specific interests of individual European states coming from historical, geographical and commercial ties. The examples of German-Iranian, French-Iraqi and British-Gulf state relations might be given.

In order to promote their noted interests, the European powers have pursued specific core policies just as the United States. The core policies have been promoting stability in the region and supporting the Arab-Israeli peace process.⁴⁷ The maintenance of stability in the Middle East has been so vital for Europe in terms of preventing possible crisis in the region that would lead to European involvement into the crisis, and that would cause unwanted immigration into European societies. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership that brings together the European Union with

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-31.

the states of North Africa and the Middle East into a broad political and economic dialogue came to the agenda within this framework. The main aim was to create a free-trade zone in terms of industrial goods and services between the EU and Middle Eastern countries over a twelve-year transition period. This would be an important attempt towards preventing possible crises in the region that would have a spillover effect in the periphery. The establishment of peace between the Arabs and Israelis has also been significant for Europe, just as the US, with regard to advancing its other regional interests in the region, mainly preserving the stability in the region and maintaining the smooth flow of oil and gas flow from the region.

From Eberhard Rhein's point of view, there is consensus among the European powers on the fundamental core policies vis-à-vis the Middle East. These are the creation of social and economic stability in the region, establishment of peace between Israel and the Arab world and securing Europe's long-term energy supply from the region.⁴⁸ Especially since the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the EU has become an important actor in the Middle East. This was especially the case in terms of trade, foreign direct investment, financial flows and economic aid. Yet, the EU wants to play bigger political role as well. However, we witness that the EU has been unable to create sound and common foreign policy by contrast to the common and coherent economic policies. The weakness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been witnessed during the Iraqi crisis as well. The division between the Europeanist and Atlanticist camps was a case on this matter.

After evaluating the core interests and policies of both the US and European powers, we can conclude that they are so far similar with each other and there is not a striking contrast. Satloff concludes as follows:

*While America and Europe have different approaches to numerous Middle Eastern policy issues, the first conclusion to be drawn from an assessment of their respective Middle Eastern policy agendas is that nowhere are American and European strategic interests in fundamental conflict.*⁴⁹

Rhein argues that, *"Both the United States and Europe have traditionally pursued one overriding objective in their overall relations with the Middle East: to*

⁴⁸ Eberhard Rhein, "Europe and the Greater Middle East", in Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East (edited by Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1997, p. 43.

⁴⁹ Robert Satloff, op.cit., p. 34.

*secure the energy supply.*⁵⁰ Loss of access to the oil reserves in the region and dramatic increase in the oil prices would have serious effects in terms of the economic well-being and the security of the transatlantic allies.⁵¹ Therefore, this point is important in terms of the emergence of possible cooperation in transatlantic relations in the future. Similar core interests and policies pursued by the parties make it necessary for them to enter into dialogue and act hand-in-hand with regard to the Middle Eastern crises.

As mentioned above, the US and European powers share similar interests in the region. They are of the opinion that all the conflicts in the region that are created by the radical parties would be detrimental to Western interests and they are both fearful that the spread of weapons of mass destruction will destabilize the region and would have spillover effects.⁵² All these points lead to the fact that the expectation of cooperation in transatlantic relations is more realistic than the further deterioration of the relations.

Within the context of the shared interests in the region, Robert Satloff argues that Americans and Europeans have maintained an informal division of labor in the Middle East:

*According to this formula, the United States has been recognized as the leader of Western efforts on the two main regional projects: promoting Arab-Israeli peacemaking and maintaining Gulf security. The Europeans have generally limited their role to affirming, supporting, and financing U.S. initiatives; pursuing particularistic economic and political interests in various corners of the region.*⁵³

This was clearly witnessed during the Gulf War of 1990-91. The economic costs of this war were mainly born by the European powers which involved in this conflict.

In short, as demonstrated above, the transatlantic allies share vital interests towards the Middle East especially in terms of ensuring the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, avoiding Islamic extremism, and therefore maintaining peace and stability in the region. All

⁵⁰ Eberhard Rhein, *op.cit.*, p.42.

⁵¹ Geoffrey Kemp, "The United States, Europe, and the Persian Gulf", in *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*, (edited by Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1997, p. 101.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁵³ Robert Satloff, *op.cit.*, pp. 7-8.

these points are important in terms of the structures, especially the security, production, energy, that Susan Strange outlines. However, according to Blackwill and Stürmer there are fundamental reasons of tension in transatlantic relations toward to Middle East within a general context.⁵⁴ First of all the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, has generally loosened the transatlantic solidarity. Secondly, US leadership on many issues, in addition to the Middle Eastern policies is more specific today than in the past. As a third point, European efforts, led by especially France and Germany, to develop a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is seen by the US as policies towards decreasing the European political and military dependence upon NATO and the US. As a fourth point, US-European commercial rivalries are more difficult to manage under present circumstances than during the Cold War. And as a last point, domestic preoccupations and reluctance of the governments in power on both sides of the Atlantic, especially Germany under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and France under Chirac, which are less enthusiastic to develop closer ties, tends to create serious problems. These are the fundamental reasons for competition and tension in transatlantic relations in the wake of the Cold War according to Blackwill and Stürmer, even though the transatlantic partners share similar and corresponding interests towards the Middle East. All these need to be discussed from a broader perspective. The existence of shared interests and continuing problems together bring to the agenda the fact that the relations between the transatlantic powers have an open-ended feature.

3.2.2 Foreign Policy Priorities of the Involving Parties

Following the World War II, the power of the European countries (especially Britain and France) in the Middle East was generally replaced by that of the United States. As Roy Andersen puts it, *"Indeed after World War II, the United States' concern for the Middle East grew directly as it recognized that its allies (Britain and France) were unable to play their traditional roles."*⁵⁵ Therefore the US became the dominant power in the region right after World War II. The diminished role of

⁵⁴ See them in Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer, *op.cit.*, pp. 299-300.

⁵⁵ Roy Andersen and et.al., Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation, Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2001, p. 285.

European powers in the Middle East following the second World War left the region open to “cold war rivalry and global confrontation” between the US and the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

It is worth mentioning the general understanding of the US policy makers from the earlier times. It can be noted that, in the first 150 years of its existence, the US foreign policy was pursued in isolation from Europe. However, since the era of President Woodrow Wilson, and especially since the World War II, “*the United States has perceived its national interest in terms of a universalist aspiration to recreate the world in its own image.*”⁵⁷ Therefore it can be stated that the US foreign policy is mainly shaped by the spirit of Woodrow Wilson. As Heuser points it out:

*He is the incarnation of the universalist aspirations of the United States, seeking to reshape the world (or at least Europe) according to US ideals. Wilson shaped American beliefs about how interstate relations should be conducted, effectively until the present day.*⁵⁸

Within this context, its friends and allies turned out to be those nations who shared US values, whereas its enemies turned out to be those who tried to destroy them. Therefore, although there are important differences between the US administrations in terms of the policies pursued, the fundamentals of the US policy have not changed since the early days of the 1900's.

When we come to the present era, we can say that the US policy towards the Middle East has not changed since the end of the Cold War. American presidents from the father George Bush to Bill Clinton and the son George W. Bush, tried to preserve the hegemonic position of the US in the Middle East, while at the same time minimizing the role of the Europeans. However there was an important difference between the presidents in terms of achieving this aim. The father George Bush and Bill Clinton resorted to multilateral means, and international instruments in achieving that goal, whereas George W. Bush has not trusted those international institutions and rules, as seen by his action of bypassing United Nations and NATO in terms of the Iraqi crisis and acting unilaterally. This point will be further taken up in the forthcoming sections.

⁵⁶ Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The Middle East: From the End of Empire to the End of the Cold War, London; New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 59.

⁵⁷ Beatrice Heuser, Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and costs, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996, p. 7.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

*The conventional picture of U.S. policy is that it is guided by protecting national interests, which have three major components in the Middle East: 1) the great fear of Soviet dominance in the region and military confrontation, 2) access to oil, and 3) Israel's security.*⁵⁹

The above noted objectives described by Noam Chomsky, were significant during the Cold War years, but they are still on the agenda today.

The stances of the European powers are more needed to be analyzed since they offer a complex approach. What were the foreign policy priorities of the European powers or the European Community (EC) in the Middle East during the post-Second World War era? Andersen examines that process under four phases.⁶⁰ When analyzing those periods, it can be noticed that the common aim of European powers following the Second World War had been the reestablishment of prewar influence in the Middle East. The European powers and the EC tried to maintain primarily their economic interests in the region. The maintenance and expansion of petroleum production and trade relations turned out to be the most prominent foreign policy objectives of the European powers. This was the case especially for Britain, France and Germany. Actually it can be argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union has created an opportunity for the EC (or today EU) to pursue an active foreign policy in the Middle East. During the post-Cold War era, the EC has wanted to be an influential actor in the region and to replace the Soviet Union as an important player. Andersen argues that *"The growth of economic power centers outside the bipolar axis increased the number of players in the game; and the collapse of Soviet power further accelerated the trend."*⁶¹ The EU is among these players. It wants to keep its presence and protect its economic interests in the Middle East during the post-Cold War period.

It is appropriate to take up the French foreign policy to examine in the first place. As Margaret Blunden noted, *"The idea of Europe as a political as well as an economic force has been largely inspired by French vision, pursued since the 1960s by means of a special relationship with Germany."*⁶² French presidents from Charles

⁵⁹ Noam Chomsky, *World Orders, Old and New*, London, Pluto Press, 1994, pp. 221-222.

⁶⁰ See in Roy Andersen, *op.cit.*, p. 284 (Table 12-1)

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

de Gaulle to Chirac held the vision that France should retain power and influence especially within Europe but also around the globe as well, and become a member of the most prominent international organizations. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, after the international diplomatic arena turned out to be multilateral rather than bilateral, France tried to remain as a prominent world power and as one of the most powerful members in the international organizations, such as the UN, G-8, OECD and the EU as well. In time, this policy turned out to be the one that project a strong European political voice which would object the US influence within Europe.⁶³ This was clearly witnessed when former French President François Mitterand said that, *"We are at war with America (...) a permanent war, an economic war, a war without death."*⁶⁴

Maintenance of the European solidarity has always been important in French foreign policy. For instance, the then French president Mitterand supported Britain during the Falklands War *"on the grounds that European solidarity weighed more heavily than France's traditional Third World sympathies and straddling of the North-South divide."*⁶⁵ With regard to the Mediterranean and the Middle East region, in order to promote her interests in the area, France has pursued a European approach as well. This was clearly witnessed during its involvement in the 1991 Gulf War. Some circles had argued that this was the Europeanization of French foreign policy and its main aim was to counterbalance the movement of the European center of gravity towards the north-east as a result of enlargement process and to establish more effective competition to the dominant American position in the region.⁶⁶ The EU has turned out to be significant with regard to the French policy. It has become an important vehicle that would carry out prominent missions and counterbalance the US power that France alone could not accomplish. All these

⁶² Margaret Blunden, "Primus inter pares? France", in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States (edited by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman), Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 19.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 19.

⁶⁴ Timothy N. Williams, "EU-NATO Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism", in Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum (edited by Joachim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanabe), Zurich: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002, p. 203.

⁶⁵ Margaret Blunden, op.cit., pp. 36-37.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

French policies are important in terms of understanding its resistance to the US led war against Iraq. The competition between France and the US is well defined by the words of Beatrice Heuser:

*The key paradox of European-US relations centers on the Franco-American relationship. Its love-hatred, its sibling rivalry, its competitiveness are at the heart of any divergences today between European and US interests (...) France and the United States, two republics, the two defenders of human rights and democracy, have in the second half of the twentieth century become direct rivals as much as partners.*⁶⁷

Although it is a fact that from the era of General De Gaulle up to present time the French leaders continuously criticized many of the US global policies, it should not be forgotten that France wants the continuation of the friendly relations which were developed during the Cold War years. To give an example, in 1995, she announced to rejoin certain planning committees of NATO, albeit not the integrated military structure.⁶⁸ President Chirac called the political engagement of the United States in Europe and its military presence on the European soil as *“an essential factor in the stability and security of the continent, as much as of the world.”*⁶⁹ Despite this statement of President Chirac, it should be kept in mind that as the US invasion of Iraq demonstrated us, France will likely to remain a challenging partner for the US. In short, French foreign policy has been the *‘least transatlantic’* in its orientation among major European powers.⁷⁰

German policy is similar to the one that is pursued by France. The CFSP is of central importance in German vision of the EU as a political union just like France. Western European Union (WEU) as well is important for Germany as the defense component of the EU. Germany even seems more eager than France in terms of integrating WEU in the organizational framework of the EU. In addition to that, as Aggestan noted, Germany shares the French view that Europe must take a greater responsibility for its own security and become more of an equal partner to the US.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Beatrice Heuser, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁷⁰ Timothy N. Williams, *op.cit.*, 203.

However there are some differences between French and German policies on this issue. For instance, German vision of positioning the EU in terms of foreign and security policy as an important international political actor does not match the French vision of seeing the EU as an independent world power.⁷² German foreign policy can be named as more Atlantic as compared to that of French. Therefore one can mention three important aspects of the German vision of a European order in the wake of the Cold War:

*To construct a lasting, liberal, democratic and peaceful order throughout Europe, to develop the EU into a political union including security and defense, and to maintain and further enhance Europe-Atlantic relations, primarily through NATO.*⁷³

Maintaining close cooperation with France is as important as maintaining transatlantic relationship with the US for Germany. While mentioning the close collaboration between France and Germany, one should also take into consideration the low profile of tension between those states. In contrast to their cooperation in the economic field, in the area of security and defense, that close relationship has become rather controversial. The main reason is that, by contrast to maintaining a low profile in foreign security policies during the Cold War, following the end of that war German unification and its territorial extension eastwards raised concern in France.⁷⁴ Since the end of the Cold War, Germany's foreign policy interests are focused on the stabilization of the Eastern Europe. France has thought that the enlargement of the EU towards Eastern Europe would place Germany at the heart of Europe, while French position would become more peripheral. In short, one can argue that although their relations are close, there are still some tensions. Therefore, just as rifts in transatlantic relations that emerged during and after the Iraqi crisis, there are also rifts among European powers, especially between Atlanticist and Europeanist camps and even within Europeanist camp, i.e. in old Europe, as well. Those rifts should not be underestimated. As noted before, Germany is more

⁷¹ Lisbeth Aggestam, "Primus inter pares? Germany", in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States (edited by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman), Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 74.

⁷² Ibid., p. 74.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 76.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 76.

inclined towards keeping close cooperation with the US than France. To give an example, on the one hand, Germany emphasizes the need to build a strong CFSP that is capable of acting outside the NATO framework, on the other hand, by contrast to France, Germany maintains that the development of the EU foreign policy action and policies must be structured in consultation with the US.⁷⁵

British foreign policy is rather different from those of France and Germany. The British attitude towards the US can be described mainly in terms of common culture and language. Therefore, throughout the history, the US and Britain have not faced any serious tension in their relations. She has pursued an Atlanticist foreign policy, and within this context, she has supported the US action against Iraq. Instead of supranational process, Britain has backed intergovernmental decision making process within the EU. Therefore, she tended to be less enthusiastic to support CFSP and other common policies within the EU. Anthony Forster mentions that, *"While Europeanization in some Member States has led to a European rescue of national foreign policies, this thesis is of more limited relevance to Britain."*⁷⁶ Therefore one can argue that, there is little evidence to state that membership of the EU has led to the widespread transformation of British national interests. Diverging from both France and Germany, national interests turned out to be more important as compared to the interests of Europe. This policy turned out to be one that backed the US action against Iraq.

The policies of Italy and Spain as well should be analyzed. Since the mid-1940s, Italy sought to draw advantage from aligning itself with the US. As Heuser notes, *"Italy has sought its own 'special relationship' with America, trying to oust France as chief Mediterranean power of the Atlantic alliance."*⁷⁷ This was witnessed during the recent Iraqi crisis when Italy supported the US action against Iraq. Spain's position can be evaluated within the same context as well. She attached a special consideration to transatlantic relations and ambiguously supported NATO.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

⁷⁶ Anthony Forster, "Primus inter pares? Britain", in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, (edited by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman), Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 45.

⁷⁷ Beatrice Heuser, op.cit., p. 29.

Her active support for the NATO policies had led Javier Solana, a leading Spanish politician, to be chosen as the Secretary General of NATO.⁷⁸

What are the foreign policy priorities of the Central European EU states? NATO membership and security guarantees through inclusion in the Alliance have turned out to be most urgent foreign policy priorities of the Visegrad states, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.⁷⁹ Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became NATO members on 12 March 1999, and NATO decided to continue its enlargement policy during its Prague summit in fall of 2002. NATO became one of the most important institutional frameworks in terms of Central Europe's post-Communist transition into a new security environment. For the three Visegrad states, who became members of NATO in 1999, and other seven Central and Eastern European states, i.e. Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria, who became members of NATO in March 2004, acquiring membership of NATO turned out to be more pressing priority than acquiring membership in the EU. They attached importance to the security framework presented by NATO. The threat perceptions of Central and Eastern European states led them to regard the US leadership and security guarantees in Europe so crucial. As Vladimir Bilcik notes:

*...These countries, including new NATO members, still feel more exposed to dangers of instability than perhaps much of Western Europe does. (...) From the standpoint of this region, continued involvement of the US in Europe's security structures and guarantees is crucial.*⁸⁰

Therefore, while these countries wanted to become EU members, they also insisted heavily on both gaining and maintaining NATO membership. In their standpoint, endurance of the transatlantic connection remained very vital. They turned out to be "new Europe" in US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld's analysis in early 2003.

One should also pay a close attention to Canada's position, which is an important component of the transatlantic politics as well. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defense for Canada, stated that his country supports the European states'

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁷⁹ Vladimir Bilcik, "ESDP and the Security Policy Priorities and Perspectives of Central European EU Candidate States", in *Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum* (edited by Joachim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanabe), Zurich: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002, p. 126.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

desire of establishing ESDI, therefore to play a stronger role in European security and defense.⁸¹ However he is also of the opinion that NATO embodies the transatlantic link that is essential to collective security and defense of the transatlantic allies. Therefore he puts it that, *“EU structures for crisis management operations should strengthen, not detract from, NATO’s role as the primary body for addressing Euro-Atlantic security challenges.”*⁸² Joint NATO-EU defense planning should be forged in transatlantic relations in order to find mutually beneficial solutions to the crises emerged between the allies. This would increase flexibility and the efficiency of the armed forces of both parties. Hence, in order to contribute to the continuation of transatlantic cooperation in the coming years, the European states should not seek for a separate EU strategic planning mechanism. This would be risky and create divergent planning goals between NATO and the EU. In short, Canada is the part of the so-called Atlanticist camp within the transatlantic relations, therefore believes that NATO will be the key forum for the prospects of cooperation in transatlantic link in the future as soon as the Europeans, mainly the Franco-German axis, do not see the US presence in Europe as detrimental to their interests.

All these foreign policy priorities of the major European powers are important in terms of understanding the future of NATO especially after the transatlantic crisis on the one hand, and the tensions both within the transatlantic relations and between the European powers that emerged during the Iraqi crisis on the other hand.

3.3 The Gulf Crisis of 2003 and the Ensuing Transatlantic Debate

The invasion of Iraq brought to the agenda the division between the so-called Atlanticist and Europeanist camps within Europe which eventually led to the transatlantic debate between the Franco-German axis and the US. Some European powers, the Atlanticist camp, supported the US position on Iraq, while others, the Europeanist camp, opposed it. On one side there were Spain and Britain, the strongest supporters of the US policy against Iraq. As will be demonstrated later on, many other European countries as well supported the US in its Iraqi case. On the

⁸¹ Art Eggleton, “Transatlantic Relations”, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 67, Issue 13, 04/15/2001, p. 388.

⁸² Ibid.

other hand, there were France, Germany and Russia, the most prominent opponents of the US policy. In the following lines, those attitudes will be analyzed and then, the EU's position during the crisis will be taken up.

3.3.1 The Supporters of US Position on Iraq

The leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark clearly announced their support for the US in its battle to disarm Saddam Hussein's Iraq.⁸³ Eight European leaders emphasized the importance of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the US. In a joint declaration that they issued in January 2003, they mentioned that: "*The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security.*"⁸⁴ They further stated that:

*We sent a clear, firm and unequivocal message that we would rid the world of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. We must remain united in insisting that his regime is disarmed. The solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this peacefully.*⁸⁵

With all these words, eight leaders have indicated that they want all European countries to stand united with America in the battle to disarm Iraq. According to Philip Webster, this was a "*calculated rebuff*" to France and Germany, who criticized the US policy against Iraq.⁸⁶ The declaration of eight European countries created a rift between European countries.

Actually Britain and Spain became the most active supporters of military action against Iraq. On 20 January 2003, Britain announced that it was preparing 30,000 troops for action in Iraq.⁸⁷ On 17 February, diplomats of the US and Britain

⁸³ The Times, 30 January 2003.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Philip Webster, "Eight Leaders Rally 'New' Europe to America's Side", The Times, 30 January 2003.

⁸⁷ Julia Preston, "France Warns U.S. It Will Not Back Early War on Iraq", The New York Times, 21 January 2003.

worked together on a new resolution “intended to present a short-term ultimatum to Iraq and to enlist the maximum possible support on the Security Council for military action.”⁸⁸ This point clearly demonstrated the close cooperation between the US and Britain on the Iraqi issue. During the meeting between France and Britain on 4th February 2003, one point became clear: Britain was a “willing warrior in any war to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction.”⁸⁹ In addition to Britain, Spain as well became a prominent supporter of the US policy. For instance, on February 24, the US, Britain and Spain asked the UN Security Council to declare that “Iraq had missed its last chance to disarm to avoid a war.”⁹⁰

The 10 EU candidate countries, which became members of the EU in May 2004, announced their support to the US position on Iraq as well. These countries were Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic and Cyprus. They signed a joint statement in February 2003 that declared their support to the US. In this joint declaration, they warned Saddam Hussein that he had one last chance to disarm. But they also said that UN weapons inspectors should be given more time to finish their work.⁹¹ After the joint declaration was published by 10 future EU members, French president Jacques Chirac stated his concerns. He warned these countries that their action would “jeopardize their chances of joining the European Union” and said that “they should have consulted the EU before issuing statements in support of the United States.”⁹² In addition to 10 countries, Romania and Bulgaria as well declared their support to the US stance on Iraq. French president criticized these countries’ approach as well. These points demonstrate us the possible division within the EU on foreign policy matters in the wake of the inclusion of new members. Therefore, one can argue that the EU will be confronted with many difficulties after the enlargement process in terms of formulating the CFSP.

⁸⁸ Felicity Barringer, “Britain Joins U.S. to Draft New Measure Aimed at Iraq”, The New York Times, 18 February 2003.

⁸⁹ “Agreeing to Disagree”, Economist, Vol. 366, Issue 8310, 2/8/2003, p. 48.

⁹⁰ Felicity Barringer and David E. Sanger, “U.S. and Allies Ask U.N. to Affirm Iraq Won’t Disarm”, The New York Times, 25 February 2003.

⁹¹ <http://www.wfcourier.com/special/iraqwar/eucandidates.html>, accessed on 16.02.2003.

⁹² The New York Times, 18 February 2003.

In short, it can be argued that since these countries support the position of the US against Iraq, they constitute the so-called 'Atlanticist' camp of Europe. They attach importance to the relations with the US.

3.3.2 The Opposition of France, Germany and Russia

By contrast to the position of the Atlanticist camp, France, Russia and Germany constitute the Europeanist camp. Therefore, they criticize the US policy against Iraq. The position of those three countries is going to be analyzed in the following lines.

On 20 January 2003, France said that it would not support any Security Council resolution for military action against Iraq.⁹³ Within this regard, French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin went on to state that, "*We believe that nothing today justifies envisaging military action (...) There is no reason to go to war while we can still improve the path of cooperation.*"⁹⁴ One thing became clear: France would not rule out using its veto power if the US applied to the UN Security Council for the authorization of a military action against Iraq. According to French view, the war was the last solution to the crisis. However in closed meetings, de Villepin told US Secretary of State Powell that "*France would be more inclined to support war if United Nations weapons inspectors confirmed after another two months or so that Iraq was not willing to disarm peacefully.*"⁹⁵ Within this context, France did not totally rule out the possibility of war, but she clearly opposed unilateral action of the US. The basic reason was that if a powerful country, such as the US, became the dominant actor in the Gulf region, this would create adverse effects for the interests of France. As noted before, the major rhetoric behind the opposition of the Franco-German axis is to prevent the establishment of the US structural dominance in the Middle East. Within this framework, the existence of a joint coalition in Iraq, in which France would be a member, was a more acceptable choice for France. During the meeting between France and Britain on 4th February, as noted above, French

⁹³ Julia Preston, op.cit.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

president Chirac repeated his belief that war was the worst of all solutions, and he also insisted on that the UN weapons inspectors should be given adequate time to carry out their work.⁹⁶ Actually it can be argued that the opposition of France against US policies was not a new case. There were tensions between the two countries in the course of the history, as shown before. For instance, during the Cold War years France withdrew from NATO's command structure and refused to permit US missiles to be stationed on its soil.⁹⁷ Therefore the current French opposition can be seen as a continuation of this historical legacy.

In addition to France, Germany and Russia as well opposed US decision to wage a war against Iraq. They all insisted on the need for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer as well mentioned that the inspectors should be given enough time to carry out their duties, and Russian ambassador to the UN Sergey Lavrov said that *"We do not think the chance for a peaceful disarmament of Iraq has been lost."*⁹⁸ On February 24th, France, Russia and Germany released an informal memorandum which demanded that weapons inspections in Iraq should continue at least four more months. The document stated that:

*Nothing so far justified war to force Saddam Hussein to rid his country of the remnants of his nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The military option should be a last resort. So far, the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.*⁹⁹

In order to prevent any criticism of the US, the document also stated that inspections cannot continue indefinitely. This declaration of the three countries came as a counteraction to the initiative of the US, Britain and Spain to submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council which was stating their position on Iraq.¹⁰⁰ The joint initiative of France, Russia and Germany demonstrated the insistence of these countries on a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the Iraqi crisis.

⁹⁶ "Agreeing to Disagree", Economist, p. 48. (in footnote 87)

⁹⁷ Paul-Marie de La Gorce, "Global Crisis over Iraq: A short history of Franco-US discord" (Translated by Harry Forster), Le Monde diplomatique, March 2003.

⁹⁸ Felicity Barringer and David E. Sanger, op.cit. (in footnote 90)

⁹⁹ Elaine Sciolino, "France and Germany Call for Long Inspections", The New York Times, 25 February 2003.

¹⁰⁰ See in footnote 90.

The position of Germany in the face of the Gulf conflict should be taken into special consideration. The reason is that, its position was more fragile than any other European country. We should pay a close attention to the domestic politics of Germany. Gerhard Schroeder's strong opposition against participation in any war with Iraq led him to become a Chancellor of Germany following the national elections of September 2002.¹⁰¹ Under his leadership, Germany became one of the most prominent countries in Europe who criticized the US position on Iraq. When Germany became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2003, she speeded up her efforts to oppose the US policy and within this context Chancellor Schroeder cooperated with French President Chirac in terms of challenging the future US-led action against Iraq. There are many reasons behind the German approach. According to Chancellor Schroeder, a war against Iraq might divert the world's attention from the war on terrorism to the Iraqi crisis and create estrangement between the Arab countries and the West.¹⁰² These were the concerns of Chancellor Schroeder. He warned that the possible war might result in uncontrollable mass casualties, and in the event of an attack against Iraq, Saddam Hussein would not hesitate to use chemical and biological weapons. What was more, he also argued that *"America's aggressive and proactive military strategy towards Iraq might well prompt more of the world's pariah regimes to step up their quest for nuclear weapons in order better to deter potential US military interventions."*¹⁰³ Actually, these reasons carry secondary importance. The real motive behind the opposition of Germany against the US policy towards Iraq was that Germany's economic, political and security interests in the Middle East would be negatively affected once the US increased its influence in the Gulf region. The significance of the structures of power in global politics comes to the fore in this context, as demonstrated before. Therefore, just like the French view, the German intention is to prevent the emergence of US' structural hegemony in the Gulf region.

As the US-led war in Iraq came to an end, Germany, France and Russia started to express their views for the post-Saddam Iraq. Within this regard, on April 4th, these three leading opponents of war increased their pressure on the Bush

¹⁰¹ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance", *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 99.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

administration to allow the UN to play a central role in terms of political and economic restructuring of Iraq.¹⁰⁴ From now on, the major disagreement between the three opponents of war and the US focused on the question whether the UN or a US-British military administration would play a key role in Iraq following the demise of the regime. Then US Secretary of State Powell said that the US and her military allies should play the leading role in terms of Iraq's postwar future, whereas British Prime Minister Tony Blair wanted the UN to be a part of the game¹⁰⁵. Therefore there was a disagreement between the coalition forces as well in terms of the future of Iraq.

During the NATO meeting in Brussels between the foreign ministers of the US and 23 European countries, including Russia, the post-Saddam era in Iraq had been discussed.¹⁰⁶ And during this meeting, it was once again witnessed that there was a difference of opinion between the two sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans, specifically France, Germany and Russia, thought that with the end of the Iraqi war the UN should have the responsibility in terms of establishing peace in Iraq and restructuring it. On the other hand, according to the US, this responsibility should be in the hands of her and the coalition forces. However, even in the US there was not just one identical position in terms of the future of Iraq. During this NATO meeting, French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin repeated his view that the UN should have a special role after the war. He mentioned that, there was a need for legitimacy in terms of establishing peace as well, and the UN was the actor which would provide that legitimacy.¹⁰⁷ On April 11th, the leaders of Russia, France and Germany met in St. Petersburg, and once again they expressed their view that not the US and British forces, but the UN should oversee Iraq's reconstruction. Russian president Putin said that, "*The longer we delay the solution of the problem in the UN, the more it will resemble a colonial situation.*"¹⁰⁸ As a result, these three European powers

¹⁰⁴ Robert J. McCartney, "Europeans Urge Key Role for U.N.", The Washington Post, 5 April 2003.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Sami Kohen, "Savaş Sonrası Savaş", Milliyet, 5 April 2003.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Sharon LaFraniere, "Antiwar Trio Says Iraq's Future Is What Counts", The Washington Post, 12 April 2003.

gave a special importance to the role of the UN in Iraq, because they thought that their economic, political and security interests in the Gulf region would best be achieved through that mechanism, not through the US presence.

Despite their opposition to the US-led action against Iraq, the leaders of France, Germany and Russia expressed their satisfaction with the fall of the Iraqi regime. Chancellor Schroeder, President Chirac and Putin mentioned that they favored a US-British military triumph.¹⁰⁹ This could be regarded as a move to mend the already deteriorated relations with the US. It was also an initiative to have an influence in postwar politics. The postwar attitudes of the opponent European states carry significant insights in terms of the prospects for cooperation in future transatlantic relations.

As a result, it can be said that these three opponents of war constituted the '*Europeanist*' camp of the division within the continent. The position of Germany and France was especially significant. By contrast to the Atlanticists, they were of the opinion that Europe should propose its own initiatives and the EU should have its own security structure which would be independent from the US. Their message was that, they could wage a war against Iraq not because she posed a threat to the US interests, but because it created a direct threat to the European interests.

The division between the Atlanticist and Europeanist camps was demonstrated in the words of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld:

*You are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire Europe today the centre of gravity is shifting to the east. Germany has been a problem and France has been a problem. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They are not with France and Germany on this. They are with the United States.*¹¹⁰

With these words, Rumsfeld named France and Germany, the most prominent opponents of war, as '*old Europe*', whereas he named the pro-American candidate countries as representing '*new Europe*'. According to him, the countries of the new Europe would play key roles within the Continent in the coming future.

¹⁰⁹ Robert J. McCartney, "Chirac, Schroeder Go on the Defensive", [The Washington Post](#), 11 April 2003.

¹¹⁰ Philip Webster, [op.cit.](#) (in footnote 86)

3.3.3 The EU's Stance

During the meeting in Brussels on February 17th, the leaders of the 15 members of the EU declared that Iraq must disarm as soon as possible, but they also noted that this should be achieved through peaceful means and war should be a last resort.¹¹¹ They further stated that:

*It is for the Iraqi regime to end the crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council. The Union's objective for Iraq remains full and effective disarmament. We want to achieve this peacefully (...) Baghdad should have no illusions. It must disarm and cooperate immediately and fully. Iraq has a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully. The Iraqi regime alone will be responsible for the consequences if it continues to flout the will of the international community and does not take this last chance.*¹¹²

This statement was a move towards demonstrating the unity of the members of the EU on the current crisis. Actually it was an initiative to settle down the disagreement among the members. Richard Bernstein argues that the EU statement “*appeared to represent an effort to paper over trans-Atlantic differences through firm demands on Saddam Hussein while maintaining a distinct European position dedicated to a peaceful outcome.*”¹¹³

On various occasions, the EU had indicated that the United Nations should have a key role following the demise of the Iraqi regime. For instance on 20th March, the EU's top leaders issued a statement which called for the UN to play a central role during and after the crisis.¹¹⁴ With this statement it was implied that the EU would oppose the establishment of an autonomous US military administration to run Iraq. On the other hand, during the EU summit of Athens on 16th April, the EU leaders called for a ‘*central role*’ for the UN and a ‘*significant role*’ for the EU with respect to the reconstruction of Iraq.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Richard Bernstein, “European Union Says Iraq Must Disarm Quickly and Fully”, The New York Times, 18 February 2003.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Robert J. McCartney, “EU Calls for U.N. Role in Postwar Iraq”, The Washington Post, 21 March 2003.

¹¹⁵ Robert J. McCartney, “EU Seeks Unified Stance On the Rebuilding of Iraq”, The Washington Post, 17 April 2003. See further The New York Times, 17 April 2003.

3.3.4 The Military Contributions of European Countries in the Current Gulf Crisis

By contrast to the Gulf War of 1991, not many European countries had participated in the US-led war against Iraq in 2003. In the military campaign against Iraq, approximately 300,000 soldiers took part, most of which were Americans. In terms of the contributions of European countries, it can be noted that 45,000 British troops, 400 Czech and Slovakian troops and 200 Polish troops became the part of the US-led coalition against Iraq.¹¹⁶ In addition to that, Central and Eastern European states agreed to open their air space for the military action. Besides Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary's position was important as well. It had hosted an US-run training camp for 3000 anti-Saddam Iraqi exiles, and one group had gone to the Gulf.¹¹⁷

3.4 Broader Context of the Causes of Tension

After dwelling upon the main events during the US Iraqi invasion and the European reaction to it, now the causes of tension in transatlantic relations will be analyzed in a comprehensive manner. The Iraqi crisis was just a ramification and the concrete display of the longstanding disputes between the parties.

As shown before, the transatlantic partners do share overlapping interests towards the Middle East. Philip Gordon notes that, *"In many cases, particularly on Iraq, there is more that unites the allies than divides them, and the divisions that do exist are sometimes as much among Europeans or Americans, as between the US and its allies."*¹¹⁸

However, as the recent crisis that emerged with the invasion of Iraq by the US has demonstrated, there are still fundamental tensions in transatlantic relations. Gordon puts it that there are three sources of conflicts between the US and

¹¹⁶ The Guardian, 12 April 2003.

¹¹⁷ http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid030410_1_n.shtml, accessed on 25.04.2003.

¹¹⁸ Philip H. Gordon, The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, New York, Oxford University Pres, 1998, p. 53.

European powers vis-à-vis the Middle East. These are; *conflicting strategies toward rogue states, the greater US emphasis on military force, and the US' greater willingness to act unilaterally.*¹¹⁹ With regard to the first cause, it can be mentioned that many European states are of the opinion that in the long term, dialogue and trade are the best tools to deal with the states in the Middle East that the US name as “*rogue states*”, who does not obey international rules. According to this view, trade strengthens common interests and stimulates business activity and political change. By contrast to this view, the US is of the opinion that entering into dialogue and commercial relations with rogue states will enable these hostile regimes to acquire more resources with which to implement their destructive programs. Therefore, the US policy towards these states is to use punitive or coercive measures in order to force those regimes to change. With regard to the Iraqi case, it can be stated that although many European powers have always agreed with the US that military containment and UN sanctions were necessary, particularly France has sought an engagement policy, rather than containment towards Iraq. To give an example, in January 1995, when France welcomed Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz to Paris, she became the first Western country that acted against the US policy of containing Iraq. In addition to that, by the end of 1997, Spain, Greece and Italy reopened Embassies in Baghdad.¹²⁰

The second main cause of tension is the greater reliance of the US on military force within the region. The US has been more willing than Europe to use military force against the rogue states, as the first US intervention into Iraq in 1991 and the current US invasion of Iraq demonstrated us.

The third important difference between the transatlantic allies is the willingness of the US to act unilaterally in global politics by contrast to European preference for multilateral action, mainly through the UN.

In addition to the causes of tension mentioned above, there are other points, namely domestic politics, economic interests, military roles and political cultures of the US and Europe which should be taken into consideration as well in order to understand the complex relations between the transatlantic partners.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-60.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

3.4.1 The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Non-existence of Cooperation Basis

According to James B. Steinberg, "*The security environment has changed profoundly, and important elements of the old transatlantic bargain have disappeared.*"¹²¹ Within this context, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of East-West divide within Europe removed one of the key links binding Europe and the US together. This is one of the most fundamental causes of tension in transatlantic relations. European countries, within the context of the EU, changed their attention to inside developments such as creating full integration, while the US tried to focus on external developments such as curbing terrorism. In the 1990s, threat of terrorism for the Americans turned out to be an important problem. This was such an important matter that in the wake of the 11 September attacks, the US president Bush mentioned "*US relations with other countries would be judged by whether they were for us or against us in the war on terrorism.*"¹²²

In spite of the existence of shared military, political, cultural and economic interests and values between the parties, it should not be ignored that there are many instances of conflict witnessed in transatlantic ties, as the most recent and striking Iraqi crisis has demonstrated us. These tensions came to the fore especially with the end of the Cold War. As Hyde-Price mentions, "*talk of continental drift has become ever more widespread, as relations across the Atlantic have become increasingly more fractious.*"¹²³ The security relations have entered into difficult and thorny face during the post-Cold War era. The fundamental problem was that the collapse of the Soviet Union had removed the mutually shared external threat perceived by the transatlantic partners. Despite the fact that there are many international regional problems such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which pose threats against the US and European powers at the same time, there is little consensus between the parties on how to best cope with

¹²¹ James B. Steinberg, "An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations, Survival, Vol.45, no.2, Summer 2003, p. 114.

¹²² Ibid., p.117.

¹²³ Adrian Hyde-Price, "Continental Drift? Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century", Defence Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 2, Summer 2002, p. 5.

these problems and manage them.¹²⁴ During the Cold War years, all the disputes within the transatlantic relations were put behind since there was a need to forge a common front against the Soviet enemy. This was not the case during the post-Cold War years. As Stephanie Neuman puts it:

*The questioning of American leadership both within NATO and in the world reflects the new balance of power after the end of the cold war. The collapse of the Soviet Union and of all Communist systems in Europe removed the threat of a massive attack against Western Europe from the East. Hence the American security guarantee is no longer perceived as crucial. Europeans are free to challenge the United States.*¹²⁵

Nelson as well puts it that, until 1989, a single and common enemy, i.e. the Soviet Union, diminished the differences between the allies, however, as the Soviet threat faded, many friction had emerged between them over various issues.¹²⁶ Although it can be argued that, today as well there are common threats such as terrorism directed against the Western interests, today the European powers and especially the EU is much stronger than the Cold War years, therefore it feels more free to challenge the unilateral initiatives of the US.

It is worth mentioning that, by contrast to communism during the Cold War years, terrorism cannot bring together the transatlantic allies. For Wyn Rees, there are four specific reasons.¹²⁷ First of all, in the post-Cold War era the two sides of the Atlantic cannot define commonly accepted threats because of diverging perceptions. During the Cold War, the US and the Europeans shared common perceptions about the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, in the case of countering terrorism, there is much less common ground between the allies since there is no history of shared experience. The transatlantic allies have suffered from terrorism in very different perspectives. They have had different historical experiences. To give an example, it can be mentioned that many West European states have suffered from domestic terrorist problems in the 20th century, such as the secessionist movements

¹²⁴ ibid., pp. 5-6.

¹²⁵ Stephanie Neuman, "For the Record", American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 23, Issue 5, October 2001, p. 317.

¹²⁶ Daniel N. Nelson, "Transatlantic Transmutations", Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, Issue 4, Autumn 2002, p. 58.

¹²⁷ See in Wyn Rees, "Transatlantic Relations and the War on Terror", Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 1, Spring 2003 Supplement, pp. 76-77.

of ETA in the Basque region of Spain, the colonial legacies of Algerian-sponsored violence in France and the ideologically motivated groups of the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof seen in Italy and Germany. By contrast, the US experience of terrorism has been very different from that of the Europeans. The Americans has not suffered from domestic terrorism for much of the postwar period. Instead of a domestic problem, the US has experienced and perceived terrorism mainly as an external threat, as the September 11 attacks demonstrated. Therefore, due to the fact that both the Europeans and the US has perceived the threat of terrorism in much diverging points of view, finding a common basis in transatlantic relations turned out to be a significant problem. The second thing that renders cooperation difficult between the allies with regard to the issue of terrorism is that the organizational framework in which to pursue joint counter-terrorist cooperation is under-developed. NATO could not have been a suitable organization to deal with that issue, because terrorism presents a threat that cannot be dealt with just military and security means. It needs to be handled with economic, social, cultural and other means in addition to the classical military and security solutions. Since no other organizational arrangement was created between the US and Europe to specifically address the problem of terrorism, it renders it difficult to make a cooperation against terrorism. The third point is that, the United States and the Europeans have divergent views in terms of dealing with the problem of terrorism. By contrast to her European allies, the US has demonstrated many times over the last decade that it is prepared to resort to coercive instruments more frequently. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, there has been a deliberate hardening of the US stance towards the rogue states that has supported terrorism, i.e. Iraq, Iran and North Korea. This policy was made explicit through the *"Axis of Evil"* speech of President Bush. Many European powers have opposed that policy as exemplified in the recent crisis of Iraq, during which the Europeans led by France and Germany opposed the US invasion of Iraq. For the Europeans, rather than coercive military solutions, economic, social and other means should be used effectively in order to get rid of terrorist threat. As a last significant point, the Europeans and the Americans have been unable to develop effective inter-state cooperation in the sharing of intelligence information, law enforcement and judicial activities and financial controls which are all necessary in terms of combating terrorism. All these points reveal the fact that by

contrast to the communist threat witnessed in Cold War years, it is hard for the transatlantic allies to establish a common framework against the terrorist threat.

3.4.2 The Contradiction between ‘Unilateralism’ and ‘Multilateralism’

After the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 against the US, the Atlantic Alliance seemed to have reached a degree of political cohesion, when all the Europeans stood side by side with the US. With the first time in the Alliance’s history, by invoking the Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, NATO members declared that the attack on the US should be regarded as an attack against them all.¹²⁸ The Europeans stood side by side with the US to show their solidarity against the common threats, i.e. terrorism, directed towards the Western interests. This was similar with the Soviet threat that brought together the both sides of the Atlantic. However, this state of cohesion did not last long. Right after the US president George W. Bush declared his “*axis of evil*” vision and the US had considered using unilateral military action against the states, thought to be supporting terrorism, and developing weapons of mass destruction, the European powers became suspicious about the unilateralist approach of the US, and began to discuss the adverse effects of this approach with regard to their interests.¹²⁹

The strategy that was chosen by the US to deal with the Islamic terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks was criticized by the Europeanist camp. To deal with the terrorism, the US resorted to military force first in Afghanistan and then Iraq. Europeans thought that it would be more convenient to address the root causes of terrorism, therefore the strategy in combating terrorism should not be confined with military means and within this context, the mechanisms of the international organizations such as the United Nations should be put into effect as well.¹³⁰

Within this context, the document released by US president George W. Bush in September 2002, carried significant outcomes in terms of the state of transatlantic

¹²⁸ Osvaldo Croci, “A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, Issue 4, Dec 2003, p.469.

¹²⁹ Daniel N. Nelson, op.cit., p. 51.

¹³⁰ Osvaldo Croci, op.cit., p. 469.

relations. It was named as “*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*”. This document intended to declare the ideological underpinnings of the US foreign policy for the future. It was regarded as the “*Bush Doctrine*”. As Jonathan Kirshner points it out, this document provided the strategic and philosophical justification for the US invasion of Iraq.¹³¹ He goes on to argue that, the document “*represents a fundamental shift from foundations upon which U.S. foreign policy has been based since World War II.*”¹³² Therefore it can be simply mentioned that the change in the US policy, starting with the president George W. Bush, has been one of the most prominent causes of the transatlantic debate that emerged in the Iraqi crisis. The mentioned document can be summarized in terms of three words, as Kirshner argues: *supremacy, ambition and prevention.*¹³³ Supremacy is related with the celebration of American might. It is mentioned in the document that the US enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength. Ambition is the aggressive promotion of American values, such as free trade, democracy and etc., as part of US foreign policy. The prevention is the articulation of a doctrine of preventive war. That means the US claims the right to attack against the emerging threats before they are fully formed. In short, he argues that:

*In the context of the Iraq war, the Bush Doctrine will likely create a more dangerous, less stable Middle East, and one more hostile towards the United States (...) In sum, rather than advance U.S. interests, American claims to permanent supremacy, by engendering political balancing, will create a world of states pre-disposed to resist U.S. policy objectives.*¹³⁴

Under George W. Bush’s presidency, the US has pursued unilateralist foreign policy and reserved the right to use force if it was necessary to challenge threats directed against her, whereas the European powers have relied upon international norms and attached importance to economic, social and other considerations in terms of dealing with the new global threats. The security agenda has become more multidimensional and complex. This complex agenda rendered it

¹³¹ Jonathan Kirshner, Barry Strauss, Maria Fanis, and Matthew Evangelista, “Iraq and Beyond: The New U.S. National Security Strategy”, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper #27, January 2003, p. 1.

¹³² Ibid., p.1. The details of the National Security Strategy of the US can be seen on <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>, accessed on 11.12.2004.

¹³³ Ibid., pp.1-2.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

difficult to sustain the cooperation in transatlantic ties. The foreign policy priorities and instruments of the partners have diverged from each other. It can be witnessed that while the US has global interests and concerns, the EU and most European countries have regional interests. In addition to the differences in the security considerations, there are also deepening transatlantic divide on political and institutional issues. As mentioned before, the growing American preference for unilateralism in its foreign and security policy contradicted with the European preference of multilateralism and reliance upon international institutions. As Hyde-Price argues, *“This American unilateralism is the cancer at the heart of the alliance, and in the medium to long term, is incompatible with a viable US-European partnership.”*¹³⁵

In terms of the unilateral policies of the US, we can give the examples of the US refusal of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Kyoto protocol and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, all of which created serious crises in transatlantic ties. The US Senate refusal of ratifying the CTBT on October 13th, 1999 demonstrated her unilateralist sentiment, and it came just after the joint appeal of British Prime Minister Blair, German Chancellor Schroeder and French President Chirac.¹³⁶ Of course, there are not just political and institutional problems before the US and the European powers. There are serious economic and trade issues as well which came to the agenda in the 1990s. Trade disputes and economic rivalry came to the fore especially with the development of EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which rendered the EU an economic rival against the US. The EU Trade Commissioner, Leon Brittan, has criticized the *“Helms-Burton Act”*, which provided for legal actions against foreign companies with investments in Cuba. He also accused the US of jeopardizing the global economic liberalization and multilateral trade system by imposing unilateral trade sanctions against Iran and Libya.¹³⁷ The *“D’Amato/Kennedy Act”* is another source of conflict between the transatlantic partners. It sought to penalize international companies investing in Iran or Libya’s oil and gas industries, which presented a direct threat against the major

¹³⁵ Adrian Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 8.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

economic interests of Italy, France and Germany.¹³⁸ The differences over trade issues between the US and the EU led to the failure to restart negotiations during the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in late 1999. There are also socio-cultural differences between the allies which should be taken into consideration as well. The most striking divide has been the contradiction between the American model of liberal free market economies with minimal regulation and the European model of social market economies. The differences in terms of social, cultural and normative values between the allies are witnessed over the death penalty and gun control issues as well.

According to many international observers, the change of administration in Washington in early 2001 has adversely affected the state of transatlantic relations. Strains and setbacks in US-European relations during the Clinton administration were ameliorated as a result of President Clinton's skilful personal diplomacy and his administration's intention to pursue a foreign policy that would take into account the European concerns.¹³⁹ After George W. Bush came to the power in January 2001, many tensions have been witnessed in transatlantic relations. The Bush administration has pledged to carry out a foreign and security policy based on a "*robust pursuit of America's national interests.*"¹⁴⁰ This was articulated through the National Security Strategy of the US, which caused serious concerns among the European powers. As mentioned above, the clear ramifications of this new strategy turned out to be withdrawing from Kyoto accords, refusing to ratify the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, and pressing ahead with Ballistic Missile Defense by ignoring the concerns of other countries, including America's NATO allies. After he came to power, Bush said that he wished to give top priority to relations with America's '*near abroad*', i.e. Mexico and Canada. Within this context, he has attached great importance to Latin America and has tried to strengthen the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). The US focus on near abroad has created serious concerns among the European powers who thought that the Bush administration should not neglect the maintenance of commercial, political and security partnership between the US and the European powers. The US

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

unilateralism has also created suspicions among the Europeans. In their understanding, the US places itself above the constraints of international law and multilateral institutions, especially the UN. As a senior German official has argued:

*A lot of people on Bush's national security team come from the Cold War era and think the Europeans have to fall in line with everything they say. But the days when the Americans could manage the alliance as they see fit are over. They need to show a better grasp of how to compromise.*¹⁴¹

The perceptions of transatlantic partners towards each other turned out to be a significant problem. Especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the European powers tended to view the US as a rogue state that acts unilaterally around the globe. On the other hand, the US regarded European states as “*a spent force geopolitically*” in Layne’s words, that is to say an inward-looking group of nations lacking the military capabilities that is necessary to provide defense against common threats.¹⁴² These differences in terms of perceptions can be well understood through the evaluations of Robert Kagan, who describes the US as living in Hobbesian world of power politics which acts unilaterally, and the European states as living in the Kantian world of power that relies upon international institutions and rules.¹⁴³ As a result of these perception differences, we have witnessed disputes between the both parties not only with regard to the Iraqi crisis but also in terms of other developments, such as Washington’s decision to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system and to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty, the Bush administration’s lack of support for the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, major policy differences over the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and etc.¹⁴⁴ Actually the tension in transatlantic relations were more severe in the past than now. We can give the examples of Suez, Vietnam, the Gaullist challenge of the 1960s (please refer to chapter II), the policies of then German president Willy Brandt (please refer to chapter II), and the second Cold War that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Western Europe chose not to involve into the Soviet-American

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁴² Jonathan Kirshner, Barry Strauss, Maria Fanis, and Matthew Evangelista, op.cit., p.4.

¹⁴³ Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 3.

¹⁴⁴ See the details in Jonathan Kirshner, Barry Strauss, Maria Fanis, and Matthew Evangelista, op.cit., p. 4.

rivalry. Therefore, one can conclude that the tension in transatlantic relations is not a new phenomenon. In the mid-1960s, then Harvard professor Henry Kissinger mentioned that NATO and US-European relations have been a “troubled partnership” since the late 1940s.¹⁴⁵

The European perception of America as the unchecked hegemonic power that makes unilateral actions around the globe has been a significant fact that, many European powers, especially the ones who opposed US led war against Iraq, regard the US hegemonic power as a greater threat than Iraq in terms of long-term global stability.¹⁴⁶ As argued by Christopher Layne:

*The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon, and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision, one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity, relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic.*¹⁴⁷

The Clinton administration had pursued multilateralist foreign policy approach during its term. By contrast to this policy, Bush has pursued unilateralist foreign policy which was demonstrated during the recent Iraqi invasion. The US had considered a military intervention against Iraq repeatedly throughout the 1990s, however with the exception of Great Britain, few European countries had been willing to support the use of military force. Thus, the Clinton administration refrained from using military force against Iraq in order let her to comply with her obligations, so he had preferred to continue relying on containment through sanctions, even it was clear that such a policy would not work.¹⁴⁸ This was a clear example of the multilateralist foreign policy pursued by the Clinton administration and his trust for the UN and international regulations. Although during the first years of its presidency President Bush as well had pursued the same policy of his predecessor, after the September 11 attacks, the US administration had reconsidered its policy of

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8. See also, Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, “Fear of U.S. Power Shapes Iraq Debate,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 2002, p. A16.

¹⁴⁷ Christopher Layne, “Casualties of War: Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War”, *Policy Analysis*, No. 483, August 13, 2003, p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ Osvaldo Croci, *op.cit.*, p. 470.

containment and decided to resort to military force in order to remove the threat of terrorism directed against her. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq came to the agenda within this context and they became the vivid examples of unilateralist foreign policy approaches of the US pursued by the Bush administration, as opposed to the Clinton administration. It is also worth mentioning that, European anti-Americanism sentiments seem to increase when a Republican administration is in power in the US.¹⁴⁹ The main reason is that the Republicans appear to have an orthodox free-market approach to economic issues and they adopt a more hawkish and coercive foreign policy approach, as exemplified with the policies of the Bush administration. These policies do not match with prevailing European values and practices. To give an example, it can be mentioned that, the European powers did not criticize the Clinton administration during his five days of bombing Iraq in December 1999, and after his passing of the Iraq Liberation Act, which called for regime change.¹⁵⁰ However the same policies of the Bush administration were opposed by the Europeans led by France and Germany and the Iraqi invasion was regarded as the unilateralist action of the US. As Croci puts it, throughout the 20th century, there has been a struggle between the liberal-internationalists and isolationists-unilateralists within the US administration.¹⁵¹ The former believe that the use of force may be constrained by the necessity to build consensus among allies. So, if there will be opposition from the allies against the use of force, then in order not to remove the cohesion among the allies, the hegemon will leave aside its intentions and therefore will resort to multilateralist means through the international organizations and norms rather than unilateralist instruments. On the other hand, the unilateralists do not care about the views of allies, thus they think that the US would resort to military force unilaterally where it deems it necessary in order to pursue its own interests. The Iraqi crisis demonstrated and reinforced the position of that unilateralist camp in an apparent way.

There is a clear-cut difference between the policies pursued by the Clinton administration and the current Bush administration. During the Clinton period, in the 1990s, there was a widespread belief in academic and journalistic circles on both

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 482.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 482-483.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 490.

sides of the Atlantic that transatlantic unity was strong and tight on almost every level. This unity was particularly evident in the ideological field. Governments, media organizations and leading academic centers on both sides of the Atlantic agreed on a number of central ideological themes such as:

*the idea that something called economic globalization was an international process rather than an Atlantic process, the idea that the only viable policy response to it was domestic neoliberalism and the nostrums of the Washington Consensus, the idea that there was something called international community which happened to be centered on and led by the Atlantic powers and that this community had become so sensitive to human rights...*¹⁵²

This ideological consensus was matched by a very dynamic process of integration of the European and American economies via large flows of foreign investments mutually. The Atlantic governments carried out joint efforts to establish new frameworks for their transatlantic economic interactions through bodies like the *Transatlantic Business Dialogue*.¹⁵³ In the political field as well, there were coordinated approaches, such as the process of double enlargement in Europe both for NATO and for the EU. Within this framework, the frictions between the parties such as on WTO issues or on the regulatory matters in the field of international political economy seemed small and manageable. However, with the arrival in office of the Bush administration, and especially after the September 11 attacks directed against the US, this 1990s picture of a united transatlantic axis, and the process of cooperation has started to weaken rapidly.¹⁵⁴ The ideological consensus of the 1990s mentioned above, disappeared with the adoption of the National Security Strategy by the US. Bush's former National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice declared that there is no such a thing as an '*international community*', and with the adoption of the NSS, the Bush administration promoted the idea of an American empire or American hegemony, which would impose its will on the rest of the world, including its allies.¹⁵⁵ Within this context, the Bush administration ignored the European views about the rest of the world and took unilateral decisions as to

¹⁵² Peter Gowan, "Cooperation and Conflict in Transatlantic Relations After the Cold War", *Interventions: The International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, July 2003, pp. 219-220.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

invade Afghanistan and Iraq without consulting her European allies. In the Middle East, she attached more importance to her alliance with Israel than her alliance with Western Europe and taken many steps which created severe implications for European security interests. In the economic field as well, the administration has come into conflict with the allies about the WTO arrangements, steel tariffs, agricultural subsidies and etc.

US President Bush said that the Iraqi war was legitimate and he went on to argue that *“the United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security.”*¹⁵⁶ In addition to that, at a news conference on March 6th, he stated that *“when it comes to our security we really don’t need anyone’s permission.”*¹⁵⁷ Former US Secretary of State Powell as well noted that, *“the US reserves the sovereign right to take military action when and how it chooses.”*¹⁵⁸ All these words demonstrate us the dominance of the unilateralist approach among the US policy makers and the irrelevance of the international norms and organizations in US point of view. With its unilateralist approach over world politics, the US has been regarded as the main threat against world peace. For instance, an opinion poll conducted in Canada, found that more than 36 percent of Canadians viewed the US as the biggest threat to world peace, whereas 21 percent naming Al Qaeda, 17 percent naming Iraq and 14 percent choosing North Korea as the main threats.¹⁵⁹ Another opinion poll carried out by Time magazine has indicated that, more than 80 percent of respondents in Europe regards the US as the greatest threat against world peace. These are the reflections of the US’ unilateralism.

The US unilateralism was creating serious skepticisms among many circles. Numerous specialists and intelligence agencies issued warnings that Washington’s belligerence, not only with regard to Iraq, was increasing the threat of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As Noam Chomsky argues, main intention of the Bush administration has been to maintain its hegemony through the

¹⁵⁶ Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest For Global Dominance, New York, Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2003, p. 33.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 41.

threat or use of military force, which was embodied in the National Security Strategy.¹⁶⁰ The Iraqi invasion turned out to be first test area for this strategy. Noam Chomsky puts it that, *“It soon drove American public opinion off the global spectrum and helped the administration achieve electoral aims and establish Iraq as a proper test case for the newly announced doctrine of resort to force at will.”*¹⁶¹ An international affairs specialist, John Ikenberry, described this National Security Strategy as a *“grand strategy (that) begins with a fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United States has no peer competitor.”*¹⁶² In his analysis, this approach renders international rules and norms almost meaningless. Ikenberry regards this National Security Strategy as *“Imperial Grand Strategy”*. He goes on to argue that:

*The new imperial strategy presents the United States (as) a revisionist state seeking to parlay its momentary advantages into a world order in which it runs the show, prompting others to find ways to work around, undermine, contain and retaliate against US power.*¹⁶³

This imperial grand strategy was witnessed in the Iraqi case. By waging a war against Iraq without considering the UN and the international law, the US made it clear that it would ignore the international norms and regulations. With this strategy, the US reserved the right to act unilaterally when necessary, including the unilateral use of military power to defend her vital interests such as ensuring unhindered access to energy supplies, strategic resources and key markets. This was very much related with the Strange's analysis, who dwelt upon the importance of security, energy, production structures with respect to the international political economy. The Iraqi war brought to the agenda the significance of these structures. According to Chomsky, the goal of the imperial grand strategy is to *“prevent any challenge to the power, position and prestige of the United States.”*¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

3.4.3 The Challenge to the US Hegemonic Position

When analyzing the state of transatlantic relations, we should mention the “*world-systems theory*” as well. It insists on the need to analyze contemporary dynamics within a long historical perspective. It argues that we can understand historical continuity and change through its concepts of core/periphery relations.¹⁶⁵ The world-systems theory also identifies intra-core relations in the Modern World System to show both the competition and cooperation witnessed in relations. This theory puts it that, there have been recurrent cyclical patterns in intra-core relationships and those cycles begin when one core power rises to a dominant position, and establishes order and stability to the core by becoming a ‘*hegemon*’.¹⁶⁶ Other core states adapt to the new hegemon’s regime. In time, other core powers start to challenge the dominant position of the hegemon. As this challenge develops, the core enters a phase of instability and conflict that would eventually lead to intra-core wars. In the end, a new hegemon emerges while the previous hegemon declines. Since 1945, the US has assumed dominant position within the core, and therefore she determined the rules and the policies of other core states. It has shaped and controlled the regional strategic environment of the West European powers and Japan. As Peter Gowan argues:

*In the case of Western Europe this has been achieved through making Western Europe strategically dependent upon the US-Soviet and now US-Russia relationship; in the case of Japan through making it dependent first on the US-Soviet relationship in the Cold War but now also on the US-China relationship.*¹⁶⁷

The US has also ability to control the regional peripheries of its major allies, to control the sources and transport routes of crucial energy resources needed by its allies and she has also the capacity to homogenize the political cultures of its allies around sets of political values promoted to serve the US interests. According to some analysts, the American dominance over the core states, mainly over European powers, Canada and Japan, has led to the emergence of “*American world-empire*.” The current state of conflict in transatlantic relations can be analyzed within the

¹⁶⁵ Peter Gowan, “Contemporary Intra-Core Relations and World Systems Theory”, Journal of World-Systems Research, X, 2, Summer 2004, p. 471.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 472.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 475.

insights of world-systems theory. The opposition of Franco-German axis to the US led war against Iraq can be seen as the challenge to the US dominant position. Zbigniew Brzezinski is of the opinion that there is US imperial dominance over its European and East Asian allies. He argues that, *“the scope and pervasiveness of American global power today are unique (...) Its military legions are firmly perched on the western and eastern extremists of Eurasia, and they also control the Persian Gulf.”*¹⁶⁸

There have always been such kinds of challenges throughout the history as noted before. However, the important question is that whether those challenges will lead to intra-core wars and eventually create a new hegemon or will they mark the emergence of a new era in which the cooperation is prevailing. The assumptions of world-systems theory will be tested in accordance with the future of transatlantic relationship after the tension witnessed during the US-led war against Iraq.

It is a known fact that there is increasing opposition among European states, especially from the Franco-German axis, against the military hegemony of the US over Europe. The French wish to establish an independent EU military power in order to create counter-balance to the US dominance can be mentioned within this context. However, it should also be kept in mind that the military weakness of the Europeans inhibits the realization of such kind of wishes. As the former Secretary General of NATO George Robertson noted, *“European countries spend on arms the equivalent of two-thirds of the US defense budget, but have nothing like two-thirds of the US defense capability because of duplication.”*¹⁶⁹ It should also be taken into account that although the Nice Treaty signed by EU ministers in February 2001 states on the one hand that *“common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the union”*, it mentions on the other hand that:

*NATO remains the basis of the collective defense of its members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management. The development of European security and defense policy will contribute to the vitality of a renewed transatlantic link.*¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 482.

¹⁶⁹ Takis Fotopoulos, “New World Order and NATO’s War against Yugoslavia”, *New Political Science*, Volume 24, Number 1, 2002, p. 85.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

Therefore it is a clear fact that the development of the EU's Common Defense and Security Policy will be fully integrated into NATO rather than being independent from it. The CFSP will play a complementary rather than competitive role. All these facts reveal the reality of the division of labor within the transatlantic relations and suggest that the disposition of America's military power from European territory is hard to come true.

3.4.4 Diverging Foreign Policy Agendas

In the post-Cold War era, America's and Europe's concerns have significantly diverged. The US focused on global developments and Europe focused on local developments.¹⁷¹ Therefore their priorities became different. As Ivo H. Daalder maintains, the US under the leadership of George W. Bush has followed a '*hegemonist*' foreign policy whereas the Europeans has favored a '*globalist*' foreign policy.¹⁷² Within the perspective of the hegemonist foreign policy, the US does not rely on the international institutions, regimes and treaties. On the other hand, the European powers rely on the international cooperation as a means to deal with the global problems. This has been an important cause of US-European tension in the post-Cold War era. With the end of the Cold War, both sides placed little importance to transatlantic relationship. For instance, for the European countries, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat America's protective role has become less important. This is the case for the US as well. However we cannot evaluate the attitudes of all the European countries within the same point of view. The differentiation between the so-called Europeanist and Atlanticist camps comes to the agenda within this context.

The foreign policy agendas of the European states and the US have differed from each other. While Europe is today most concerned with creating peaceful, democratic Europe with secure borders, concentrating on EU enlargement, internal security issues, immigration and the maintenance of stability in the Balkans, and proceeding with overall European integration, the US, by contrast, concentrates on

¹⁷¹ Ivo H. Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism", *Survival*, Vol.45, No.2, Summer 2003, p. 149.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 152

the global security issues, especially on nuclear proliferation, on the threat of terrorism, and on rogue states who possess weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷³ This difference in terms of the external policies, has been one of the most salient aspects of the tension in transatlantic ties.

The US strategy in the 1990s has turned out to be the most salient aspect of the transatlantic conflict. Peter Gowan puts it that:

*During the 1990s, American government and business elites have attempted to go global; in other words, to entrench the United States as the power that will control the major economic and political outcomes across the globe in the twenty-first century.*¹⁷⁴

Within this context, the American post-Cold War global project searched new ways of altering the internal and external environments of states in directions which will persuade them to continue to accept US political and economic dominance. In Gowan's analysis, the US strategy towards the transformation of the domestic environments of states goes under the name of "*neo-liberalism*", and the transformation of the external environment of states goes under the name of "*globalization*".¹⁷⁵ Therefore, with neo-liberalism and globalization, the US has tried to make the policies of the Europeans and other states dependent upon developments and decisions taken in Washington. This turns out to be an important cause of transatlantic debate. The main reason is that, as noted before, in the wake of the Cold War, the US and the European powers cannot find a common basis for cooperation just as witnessed against communism during the Cold War years. As Gowan mentions, "*The decline and collapse of both communism and the Soviet Union has prompted a search for new ways of brigading states under American leadership and of anchoring American economic ascendancy.*"¹⁷⁶ Therefore, in US point of view, the war against terrorism, just like communism, and the Greater Middle East Project have come to the agenda within this context.

¹⁷³ Samantha Paige Davis, "The Long-term Outlook for NATO and ESDP: Moving Toward Tighter Cooperation or the Breakup of the Western Alliance?", in Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum (edited by Joachim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanabe), Zurich: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002, p. 221.

¹⁷⁴ Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance, London & New York, Verso, 1999, p. vii.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. vii.

As noted before, the US and European approaches to security differ fundamentally.¹⁷⁷ The US defines security primarily in terms of military means. For the defense and promotion of its national interests she is ready to use armed force whenever it deems it necessary, as the recent Iraqi invasion demonstrated us. In addition to that, it attaches little importance to international organizations, international law and multilateral diplomacy. The international institutions are taken into consideration in terms of legitimizing American foreign policy.¹⁷⁸ By contrast to the US view, European states have favored a multilateral approach in their external relations. In their understanding the concept of security does not cover only military terms but the economic and ecological dimensions of international problems should also be emphasized.¹⁷⁹ They tend to be reluctant to resort to military force and thus rely more on political and economic means as compared to the US. The European powers rely on the international institutions and regimes more than the US does. When mentioning that the Americans and Europeans have two different conceptions of security, it should be put it that, the Americans, as a result of their hegemonic position, think of security in global terms, whereas the Europeans tend to conceptualize security primarily in terms of regional terms by limiting it to Europe itself and the neighboring areas.¹⁸⁰

With regard to transatlantic foreign policies towards the Middle East, Philip H. Gordon puts it that, *“since the mid-1990s, US and European attitudes, strategies and policies towards the Middle East have diverged to a degree that frustrates the search for peace and damages transatlantic relations.”*¹⁸¹ According to him, transatlantic relations have been controversial especially in the Persian Gulf. The EU has opposed the US policy of *“Dual Containment”*, which aimed to contain both Iraq and Iran mainly to deter them from threatening their neighbors, to prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to stop them from meddling in the

¹⁷⁷ See in Hanspeter Neuhold, “Transatlantic Turbulences: Rift or Ripples?”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, Issue 4, Dec 2003, pp. 458-459.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 458.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 459.

¹⁸⁰ Osvaldo Croci, op.cit., p. 473.

¹⁸¹ Philip H. Gordon, op.cit., p. 7.

Arab-Israeli peace process.¹⁸² By contrast to the US, the European states have tried to maintain dialogue and trade relations with Iran, and have been more reluctant to exert political and military pressure on Iraq. Although there are significant tensions today in transatlantic relations over the Middle East, this is not a new phenomenon. Since the 1950s, when the US began to displace Britain and France as the main outside power in the Middle East, the policies and the interests of the both parties began to clash with each other. We can give the examples of tensions witnessed during the Suez crisis of 1956, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the US bombing of Libya in 1986. All these issues created serious turbulences in transatlantic relations throughout the history. However, as noted before, the perception of common threat coming from the Soviet Union, has concealed these problems, and they did not become such issues which poison the relations. The tensions that emerged in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union have turned out to be far more serious than the tensions witnessed during the Cold War years. The questioning of the existence of NATO became a prominent face of the tensions. As Gordon noted:

*Current differences among the Atlantic allies on how to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian Gulf could therefore be seen as simply another episode in a series of NATO's 'out-of-area' disputes (...) With NATO's original raison d'être gone and the organization occupied with optional issues rather than direct threats, differences between its members are more significant than in the past.*¹⁸³

These out-of-area issues were not as significant as witnessed today because of the need for standing together against the common threat, i.e. the Soviet Union.

Within this context, the crisis regarding the Iraqi issue, emerged with the US Iraqi invasion, was not a new phenomenon as well. By the mid-1990s, the consensus between the US and Europe on how to contain Iraq started to break down. Some European countries, especially France, began to criticize the US policy towards Iraq. For instance, they opposed the American policy of linking the eventual lifting of sanctions to Saddam Hussein's removal from the power.¹⁸⁴ Therefore,

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 7 and p. 49.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

today's crisis regarding the Iraqi issue as well is not a new one just like the tensions in transatlantic relations in terms of other issues.

3.4.5 The Difference in terms of Values and Perceptions

In addition to the above mentioned points, it is also important to dwell upon some other aspects of the crisis, such as philosophical or conceptual dimensions. For instance, according to Daniel N. Nelson, Americans and Europeans perceive institutions and states in very different manners:

*In the United States, institutions are fundamentally understood as utilitarian instruments designed to achieve ends, not bearers of normative content. People more often view transnational and subnational communities, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with suspicion in the United States and with confidence in Europe.*¹⁸⁵

This is why the US invaded Iraq without the consent of the UN and the international community. Within this context, the analysis of Robert Kagan comes to the fore, where he depicts the Americans as coming from Mars, and Europeans as coming from Venus.

The other philosophical difference between the both sides is that, for the Americans, the state exists not to provide welfare and to ensure well-being of its citizens, but instead to ensure its citizens' safety by protecting them against any attacks and to intervene in other parts of the world where it deems as necessary.¹⁸⁶ On the other hand, the Europeans view the state in much different ways. For them, the state is an instrument of social welfare, and therefore its main task is to provide socioeconomic and quality of life guarantees for its citizens, rather than ensuring security.¹⁸⁷ The difference in terms of valuing states and institutions reflects the policies of both parties. Whereas the US is a dominant power in terms of hard security issues, that is to say high politics, the Europeans and especially the EU is more significant in terms of economic and social policies, that is to say low politics. The importance of the social and economic welfare for the Europeans is clearly

¹⁸⁵ Daniel N. Nelson, op.cit., p. 52.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

reflected through the supranational and community-level institutions of the EU. The defense spending of the parties demonstrates this point in a very clear manner. The military components of the US power are far larger than those of other NATO members. The US had spent approximately \$1 billion daily in 2002-2003 for defense purpose, whereas the European NATO allies' combined annual defense budgets were about \$159 billion in 2001.¹⁸⁸

Robert Kagan introduces a comprehensive analysis of tensions in transatlantic relations. He argues that the Europeans and Americans do not share a common view about the world politics; instead on almost all important issues of power they have different perspectives.¹⁸⁹ Kagan characterizes Europe living in a “*Kantian self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation*”, whereas he depicts the US as conceptualizing an “*anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable*.”¹⁹⁰ The two different perspectives that Kagan outlines can be witnessed today over the case of Iraq. Many European powers preferred to work through the rule of law, negotiations and cooperation. That was why especially France and Germany opposed any military action against Iraq. Thus, their attitudes demonstrated us the Kantian perspective of European politics. On the other hand, the willingness of the US to engage in military action against Iraq seemed to support its Hobbesian view of the world politics.¹⁹¹ According to Simon Duke, “*Kagan’s contribution came at an appropriate moment when transatlantic opinion (as well as that within individual EU member states) is sharply divided over the wisdom of military action in Iraq*.”¹⁹² Kagan’s analysis is important in the sense that he introduces the US as inclined towards unilateralism, and less inclined towards acting through international institutions, such as the UN, whereas Europeans prefer diplomacy, attach

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁸⁹ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, *Policy Review*, No. 113, June/July 2002. (available at <http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html>, accessed on 07.02.2003)

¹⁹⁰ Robert Kagan, *op.cit.* (in footnote 143), p. 3.

¹⁹¹ Simon Duke, “The Hyperpower and the Hype: Reassessing Transatlantic Relations in the Iraqi Context”, *European Institute of Public Administration*, Working Paper (No. 2003/W/1), p. 4.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

importance to international institutions and regard the use of force as a last resort.¹⁹³ This is the case over the Iraqi crisis. However, one should mention that there cannot be a generalization in terms of European Kantian perspective or American Hobbesian perspective. The reason is that, within European countries, Britain, Spain and Italy can be regarded as giving importance to the US world paradigm since they declared their support to the US position on Iraq. On the other hand, Germany and France, since they opposed the US policy against Iraq, can be seen as the strict adherents of Kantian perspective.

Leon T. Hadar criticizes the argument of Robert Kagan. According to him, there cannot be a clear-cut division in terms of the cultural difference as to mention that Americans are from Mars who do not obey international rules and institutions and act unilaterally, and that Europeans are from Venus, who resist unilateral acts and rely upon international norms and regulations.¹⁹⁴ In his understanding, the disputes in transatlantic relations cannot be described from this point, because Kagan's analysis overlooks the perceptions of strategic interests.¹⁹⁵ In addition to that, in Hadar's point of view, many of the distinctions between Old and New Europe remain fuzzy.¹⁹⁶ The main reason according to him is that, those cultural-political divisions are more evident and complex inside each European country than the divisions between the European states. For instance, Germany's Christian Democratic Union party supported the US war against Iraq. By contrast to that, the ruling Social Democrats clearly opposed it. Therefore, one cannot make a clear-cut distinction between Old and New Europe.

Taking into Hadar's analysis, instead of dwelling upon socio-cultural motives behind the transatlantic tension, we should take a closer look to political and strategic considerations. The foreign policy priorities of the involving parties turn out to be important in this regard, which was noted before. There were specific motives behind the countries which supported the US position.¹⁹⁷ It should be mentioned that

¹⁹³ Robert Kagan, op.cit., (in footnote 143), pp. 4-5.

¹⁹⁴ Leon T. Hadar, "Mending the U.S.-European Rift over the Middle East", Policy Analysis, No. 485, August 20, 2003, pp.4-5.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Italy, Spain, Denmark and the Central and Eastern European states, which supported the US position, wish to prevent the emergence of Franco-German hegemony within the European Union at the expense of excluding smaller powers. In the mean time, Britain hoped that by backing the military operations of the US in Iraq, she could strengthen her position against France and Germany, two major powers of the EU. On the other hand, the main motive behind the opposition of Germany and France was to strengthen their position within the EU and the global arena by opposing the global hegemon, i.e. the US, and to preserve their national interests. Another important motive especially for French president Chirac and German chancellor Schroeder was to strengthen their position at home as they prepared for tough election campaigns. Many Europeans doubted the Bush Administration's assumption that removing Saddam Hussein from his post would create more stable and democratic Middle East. Rather, many of them were concerned that with the removal of Saddam Hussein, a civil war between ethnic and religious groups might emerge, the region would become a turbulent area, radical Islamic groups that harbor anti-Western attitudes might appear, and this stability would eventually spread into the whole region.¹⁹⁸ To look from a wider perspective, one can mention that geographic proximity, strategic and military interests, dependency on the oil resources of the region and historical ties with the region have determined the attitudes of the European powers since the early days, especially after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire with World War I and its withdrawal from the region. In short, taking into account these strategic interests, one cannot easily talk about cultural reasons in terms of crisis between the both sides of the Atlantic.

Leon T. Hadar also criticizes the argument of the neoconservatives in the United States that the transatlantic divisions over Iraq have reflected an emerging political-cultural clash between the Americans and Europeans. By contrast to it, he argues that *"The rift between Europe and the United States is driven not by culture or ideology but by diverging national interests."*¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ For the details of the policies of the European powers with regard to the Iraqi war, see ibid., pp.8-9.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

3.5 Significant Outcomes of the Transatlantic Tension in the wake of The Iraqi War

3.5.1 The Division within Europe: 'Old' and 'New' Europe Debate

The old and new Europe debate came to the fore with the Iraqi crisis. When US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld talked about “*old Europe*”, he was pointing out that there is more to Europe than Germany and France.²⁰⁰

As Mustafa Türkeş mentions, when there was an insistent opposition of the Franco-German axis to the US-UK military attack against Iraq, “*the East European states found themselves in a rift between the US on the one hand and the French-German axis in Europe on the other hand.*”²⁰¹ During a press conference on January 22nd 2003, the US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned the division between Old and New Europe and argued that the centre of gravity shifted from the Western Europe to the Eastern Europe.²⁰² The Foreign Ministers of 10 East European countries, which are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, reiterated their countries' support for the US' Iraqi invasion with the declaration of the “*Vilnius Group*” on February 5th 2003. In their declaration they stated that:

*...Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction...*²⁰³

The attitude of the East European states was criticized especially by France. On February 17th 2003, in the middle of the European Council summit meeting in Brussels, the French President Chirac described the attitudes of the East European states as “*childish*” and threatened all in general and Romania and Bulgaria in

²⁰⁰ Economist, Vol. 366, Issue 8312, 2/22/2003, p32, 1p.

²⁰¹ Mustafa Türkeş, “New versus Old Europe in the Making of European Security: Collusion in Europe or Quest for?”, Presentation at the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, 9-11 September 2004, p. 3.

²⁰² Mustafa Türkeş, “New vs Old Europe: Contested Hegemonies and the EEC's Dual-Guarantee Strategy”, International Problems, No. 3, in September 2005, p. 6.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 7.

particular that they would lose their chances of joining the EU.²⁰⁴ The leaders of the East European states criticized this harsh response of Chirac. Within this context, Klaus, President of Czech Republic, warned Chirac that, “*Efforts to counterweight to the United States must be avoided*”, Kalniete, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, stated that, “*The European Union is a grouping of equal states where everyone’s views should be respected and thus there is a need for the equal treatment of all members*”, and Kwasniewski, President of Poland, mentioned that “*Central and Eastern European countries should not have to select between the United States and Europe.*”²⁰⁵ How can the support of those countries be read and what is behind the tension between the “Old” and “New” Europe in Rumsfeld’s description? There are several reasons for that according to Türkeş.²⁰⁶ First of all, the East European states do not want to be merely dependent on the Franco-German axis with regard to the military technology, and security policies. Secondly, it is a fact that the Franco-German axis is reluctant to share with the East European states their military technology and the intelligence reports on the one hand and their political leadership within the EU on the other hand. As a third thing, most importantly, all the East European states have the experience of living under the hegemony of the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, therefore they don’t want to be dependent again on any other single power. They are of the opinion that any EU member is entitled to pursue multidimensional foreign policy, thus they do not wish to be directed by the directives of the Franco-German axis. The US led war against Iraq has presented a good opportunity for the East European states in order to do so. They would like to balance the Franco-German axis with the US. Within this context, Türkeş labels the policy pursued by the East European states as “*dual guarantee strategy*”, which has two pillars.²⁰⁷ The first pillar is that, they wish the EU to provide soft security guarantee and the NATO/US to provide hard defense guarantee. As Türkeş argues:

Despite its growing ties to the EU, the EEC has seen no point in putting all its eggs in only one security basket, thus contributing to the success of one hegemonic project. Rather, it has tried to develop a dual-guarantee strategy,

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁰⁶ See in Mustafa Türkeş, *op.cit.*, pp. 8-9. (in footnote 201)

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

*with hard security obtained from the US through the NATO and soft security through the EU structures.*²⁰⁸

Therefore, the support of the East European states for the US should not be taken for granted. Their real intention is to pursue a multidimensional policy in order not to be dependent on any single power. It should also be kept in mind that, tension in transatlantic relations turns out to be tension between the European powers as well. Therefore, it will not be meaningless to argue that it is a must for the European powers/EU, and especially for the Franco-German axis to overcome the internal debates and proceed on CFSP before entering into dialogue with the US after witnessing one of the gravest crises in their relations in the course of history. As Türkeş argues:

*Finally, it may be concluded that unless the EU properly address the problems of sharing of the political leadership, sharing of military-defense technology, sharing of intelligence reports and find better institutional framework to accommodate national policy autonomy for every and each member, it is possible to see repetition of collusion between shifting groups in the EU.*²⁰⁹

The 'Old' and 'New' Europe debate brings to the agenda the failure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Indeed, it can be easily stated that the division between the European powers has created negative effects in terms of that process. Since there was not a common European position on Iraq, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy initiative had not become successful so far during the crisis. Martin Ortega argues that:

*For the time being the Iraqi issue has provided a clear demonstration of the urgent need to review the EU's foreign policy. It can no longer be maintained that the EU has a vocation to make its voice heard in the world when it has been silent on the Iraqi issue so far.*²¹⁰

Both the former president of the European Commission Romano Prodi and former External Relations Commissioner Christopher Patten mentioned that the current crisis has created negative outcomes for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, for the authority of the UN, and for transatlantic relations.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ Mustafa Türkeş, *op.cit.*, pp. 14-15. (in footnote 202)

²⁰⁹ Mustafa Türkeş, *op.cit.*, p. 13. (in footnote 201)

²¹⁰ Martin Ortega, "Iraq: a European Point of View", the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper, no. 40, December 2002, p. 28.

3.5.2 Possible Outcomes for NATO's Future

The division between the European powers over the Gulf crisis will create important effects in terms of NATO's structuring as well. The division between old and new Europe, in Rumsfeld's analysis, is important in terms of the debate whether the US forces should remain within Europe during the post-Cold War era.²¹² In the near future, we can expect the withdrawal of US troops from Germany and their relocation to new NATO members, which are named as new Europe. The countries of new Europe, i.e. eastern and central European countries, regard the US presence in Europe as vital in terms of their security interests. On the other hand, Germany and France regard US presence as detrimental to their security interests. They prefer to build and strengthen the EU's foreign and security policy. The countries of the eastern and central Europe believe that they would be able to become more assertive powers in foreign policy matters through close cooperation with the US. They will become Washington's key European allies in the future. The newly admitted EU members think that within the EU, where Germany and France are the most influential countries, they will not have that much power to express their interests clearly. Therefore, in the wake of the Iraqi crisis, the move of NATO's center of gravity towards Eastern Europe might be expected.

Many European powers, especially the Europeanist camp, mainly France and Germany, want the retraction of US power from Europe. It is more reasonable to expect that, however, as long as the American foreign policy elite continues to put forward that the United States should be a global hegemon, NATO will remain as an indispensable instrument of the geopolitical interests of the US. Therefore, one has to keep in mind that by assuming new responsibilities in the world, NATO will continue to be perceived as prominent organization by the US.

Christopher Layne maintains that "*Whether NATO will continue to exist hinges on two key questions: the severity of the transatlantic rift and the nature of America's strategic interests in Europe.*"²¹³ In terms of assessing the future of NATO

²¹¹ http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/ip03_419.htm and http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp03_148.htm, accessed on 27.03.2003.

²¹² http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid030410_1_n.shtml, accessed on 25.04.2003.

and transatlantic relations, the key issue is whether both parties still share common interests to hold two entities within a formal alliance. When we evaluate this point within the framework of geopolitical and strategic interests, the culture/values gap between the US and European powers turns out to be less important, as Layne points it out.²¹⁴

The key topic in terms of NATO's future after the Iraqi crisis is "*America's European Grand Strategy*", according to Layne.²¹⁵ That is to say, the US continues its presence within Europe in order to thwart the rise of a would-be European hegemon. It could have been assumed that following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO would dissolve since its main purpose was to bind the US and Western Europe strategically against the Communist threat. However this was not the case. NATO is still in business and the US still maintains a considerable military presence in Europe including more than 100,000 personnel and sophisticated network of bases. In the wake of the Cold War, in order to achieve its strategic objectives, the US attributed new roles and missions to NATO, therefore the organization still continues to be an important instrument of the US policy. Most importantly, NATO has been important in terms of maintaining transatlantic link with Europe and remaining as a "*European power*". Then assistant secretary of state for European affairs, Richard Holbrooke, argued that in the 21st century, America's involvement in Europe was still important for the US, because an unstable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests of the US.²¹⁶

In the wake of the Cold War, NATO was based upon a policy of "*double enlargement*." The first kind of enlargement has been the geographic expansion of NATO by admitting new members, such as former members of the Eastern Bloc, and the second enlargement has been the expansion of alliance's roles and missions. In short, even though the Iraq crisis has underscored that NATO has outlived its usefulness as a military alliance, in the 21st century NATO continues to be significant instrument in terms of preserving American grand strategic interests and for maintaining American hegemony in Europe. Maintenance of stability in

²¹³ Christopher Layne, op.cit., p. 3.

²¹⁴ Ibid., pp.3-4.

²¹⁵ Ibid., pp.4-5.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

Europe turns out to be important for the US strategists. Therefore, one cannot assume that the transatlantic alliance formed within the framework of NATO would dissolve after the Iraqi crisis. It is more reasonable to expect that the US forces in Western European states, mainly in Germany, would be redeployed in Eastern European countries, which displayed their clear support for the US during the war against Iraq. Within this context, the US administration is considering a new basing system *“that would downgrade the large American bases in Germany in favor of a new deployment posture based on the use of forward operating bases in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.”*²¹⁷ In short, as Layne puts it:

*The future of transatlantic relations, and NATO, are tied inextricably to the outcome of the needed debate about American grand strategy. Until a new grand strategy is adopted, the United States will remain in Europe militarily; act as a hegemon, not as an offshore balancer; and do what it takes to keep NATO in business.*²¹⁸

Ronja Kempin as well is of the opinion that, in terms of the future of NATO, the US will try to maintain the endurance of this alliance as long as it deems it as necessary to promote her interests. Kempin argues that:

*The United States wants NATO to be important(...) If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, which can deploy in days or weeks instead of months or years, then it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century.*²¹⁹

Within this context, during the NATO defense ministerial meeting in Warsaw on 24 September 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put forward a proposal to be discussed at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Prague on 21/22 November 2002. This was setting up a *“NATO Response Force”*.²²⁰ This proposal brought to the agenda significant debates among transatlantic allies. This example demonstrates us that major European powers, i.e. Great Britain, France and Germany differ most in their views about NATO's and European Security and Defense Policy's (ESDP) military and political roles and functions. Therefore, their stances will affect the future of NATO, or ESDP.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²¹⁹ Ronja Kempin, “The New NATO Response Force: Challenges for and Reactions from Europe”, p. 1. (available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/kero2.pdf>, accessed on 22.06.2004.)

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

The NATO Response Force will include military personnel of 20.000 that will be prepared to fight in high intensity conflicts. It will also have secure deployable communications, protections for nuclear, chemical and biological emergencies, precision-strike capabilities and airlift transportation.²²¹ In fact, the importance of NATO's and its proposed Response Force's role was already mentioned in the National Security Strategy of the US, presented to the world by US President George W. Bush. In that document, it was stated that:

*NATO's core mission - collective defense of the transatlantic Alliance of democracies - remains, but NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry that mission under new circumstances. NATO must build a capability to field at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any member of the Alliance.*²²²

Britain has always supported the continuance of transatlantic alliance within the framework of NATO. In May 2002, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office has published a paper titled as "*The Future of NATO: A UK-Spanish Vision*". With this document, Prime Ministers Blair and Aznar stated that, "*NATO is the key transatlantic guarantee of security for its members, and the ultimate guardian of the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.*"²²³

Within the framework of this stance, both Spain and Britain became the foremost supporters of the US action against Iraq. Especially for the Great Britain, the European Defense supports NATO and is supported by NATO. That means the European security is not separate from NATO. According to the views of British politicians, ESDP does not challenge the Atlantic Alliance, because NATO and ESDP are complementary and therefore they reinforce one another. They are of the opinion that since ESDP is the European pillar within NATO, main task of ESDP is to fight wars together with the US under NATO command. It is not impossible for ESDP to exist without NATO.

The above mentioned view is not shared by the French politicians. The French minister of defense, Alliot-Marie expressed serious concerns in Warsaw about the US proposal of setting NATO Response Force. She was of the opinion

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

that NATO had to keep its original geographical limitation. During her speech she delivered at the National Defense University in Washington, she stated that, "(...) *But we also need to unlock the European potential within NATO and create the capability for Europeans to act as Europeans, where NATO as a whole is not engaged.*"²²⁴ The French Prime Minister Raffarin as well noted, "*The European solidarity has to allow Europe to take its responsibility in the field of security policy, to show a common vision and to create the means for this vision.*"²²⁵ These stances of the French politicians display that France is reluctant towards the establishment of NATO Response Force that would act outside any UN-Security Council resolution. In general, France has always desired for a stronger European military role. With the aim of achieving military independence from the US, France is very much in favor of the realization of ESDP. She is of the opinion that with the European powers speaking one voice in terms of foreign issues, ESDP should be formulated in a very strong way that would be able to resolve the conflicts without the US involvement.

Compared with France, Germany is less strict in terms of improving the transatlantic relations, as noted before. German Minister of Defense Mr. Struck stated in a press-conference in Washington on November 9th 2002 that the German government would vote in favor of the NATO Response Force.²²⁶ The words of Mr. Voigt, the governments Coordinator for the German-American cooperation, are important to understand German stance vis-à-vis the transatlantic relations:

*Increasing Europe's scope for action is not intended to build up Europe as a counterweight to the US, but rather to make this Europe a more effective partner for the US. With additional capabilities, Europe would become more relevant in the eyes of Washington.*²²⁷

In German politics, Atlantic alliance is essential for European stability and security. Therefore, unlike France, Germany does not regard the establishment of ESDP as a strict opposition to NATO.

In short, there are divergent views among the Europeans with regard to the future of NATO, which should be all taken into consideration in terms of understanding the wavering characteristic of the transatlantic relations.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.11.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.12.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.13.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.13

CHAPTER IV

ATTEMPTS TOWARDS MENDING THE FENCES IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

Before dwelling upon the initiatives towards mending transatlantic relations that have been ruptured during the Iraqi crisis, the general attempts in the 1990s are going to be discussed, in order to give a general framework.

4.1 The Attempts of the 1990s towards the Maintenance of Transatlantic Link

There were many proposals in the 1990s which emphasized the significance of the transatlantic relations and called for its maintenance. Many of those proposals were made by the Europeans and they tended to aim at the inclusion of new issues into the discussions between Europeans and the Americans.²²⁸ In October 1992, the then German Chancellor Kohl called for the development of links across the Atlantic, in fields other than defense, i.e. in politics, economics, science and culture.²²⁹ In September 1994, French Defense Minister François Léotard asked for a new '*Atlantic partnership*'. According to him, the relations between the both sides were solely based upon defense through NATO, but this could have been changed through the inclusion of new areas into the relations, such as economic, environmental issues.²³⁰ In 1995, British Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind launched an initiative for the renewal of the Atlantic Alliance through the creation of an institutionalized Atlantic Community. German Defense Minister Volker Rühle also proposed '*a new, wider transatlantic contract*' and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé called for a '*new transatlantic charter*'. With the establishment of an Atlantic

²²⁸ Beatrice Heuser, *op.cit.*, pp. 105-113.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

Community, proposed by British Defense Minister, new cooperation areas between the both sides of the Atlantic would emerge. This would be more than a political statement of common values. Cooperation in the legislative, economic, business, educational and cultural fields would come to the agenda. All these fields are considered to be the low politics. The “*Madrid Joint Action Plan*” was an important example of the initiatives towards forging cooperation in different areas. It was agreed between the US, under the leadership of President Clinton, and the European leaders, in December 1995.²³¹ This plan laid down the future of US-EU cooperation. It has identified the world’s major security problems and economic issues, and provided the basis for the cooperation on these issues between the both sides of the Atlantic.²³² Therefore, it has provided a comprehensive agenda for transatlantic cooperation. In short, as these initiatives demonstrate, there were many attempts throughout the 1990s, which aimed to strengthen transatlantic bonds. And these ties would go beyond the traditional security issues which were dealt mainly through NATO. Most of the initiatives were proposed by the European powers which showed us the deep commitment of the Europeans to the maintenance of transatlantic relations that would include new areas of cooperation not covered by NATO. The prospects for cooperation in the wake of the Iraqi crisis can be analyzed within this context. After facing one of the deepest crises in their relations, we can expect the Franco-German axis or the US to propose new initiatives that would help improving the relations, just as witnessed during the 1990s.

4.2 The Initiatives Taken On the Morrow of the Iraqi War

The Conclusions of the United Nations Security Council which held a meeting on October 16th, 2003 were important in terms of the future cooperation process in transatlantic relations. During the meeting, the Security Council called on the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq to return governing authority to the people of Iraq “*as soon as practicable*” and it also urged member states to contribute to a multinational force in Iraq to maintain security under a unified command until the

²³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 108.

establishment of a representative government.²³³ The Security Council also resolved that the UN should strengthen its vital role in the country, which would include efforts to build institutions for representative government, to provide humanitarian relief and to promote the economic reconstruction and sustainable development of the country. Within the perspective of supporting Iraqi reconstruction process, it is worth mentioning that the Council urged member states and international financial institutions to make substantial pledges at the 23-24 October 2003 International Donors Conference in Madrid.²³⁴ The representatives of France, Germany and the Russian Federation, speaking in explanation of their votes, emphasized the importance of unity among Council members in reconstructing Iraq and restoring stability in the region.²³⁵ In short, the joint statement of the Security Council indicates that the countries of Europe and the US have been trying to ameliorate their relations and revitalize the cooperation process.

On Wednesday September 3rd 2003, American officials met with the representatives from the European Union, the World Bank, the United Nations and others in Brussels to discuss possible donations for Iraq.²³⁶ Although there was not any concrete result after the meeting, it was a prelude to the larger donors' conference held in October in Madrid.

Finance ministers across the world gathered in Madrid on October 23rd and 24th of 2003 to discuss the reconstruction of Iraq. During the gathering, the Bush Administration sought international financial support for rebuilding of the country. As many observers envisaged, the Madrid Conference presented an excellent opportunity for the US to show her leadership on the international stage and convince the skeptical nations that a secure post-Saddam Iraq is in the world's interest.²³⁷ At the October 23-24 Madrid donor conference, about \$33 billion in grants and loans, with almost two-thirds of it from the US, was pledged as financial

²³³ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7898.doc.htm>, accessed on 19.10.2003.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ "Sharing the burden", September 3rd 2003, from the Economist Global Agenda (available at www.economist.com, accessed on 05.09.2003.)

²³⁷ <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Middle East/wm356.cfm>, accessed on 14.11.2004.

aid for Iraq.²³⁸ The Bush administration was pleased with the outcome of the conference, because non-US pledges were far more than many US policymakers had expected. Which countries pledged? If we look at the outcomes, following picture can be drawn.²³⁹

The United States pledged \$18.4 billion, contained in a supplementary spending bill approved by Congress a few days after the conference ended. Japan pledged \$1.5 billion in 2004, plus \$3.5 billion in loans in 2005-2007. World Bank pledged \$3 billion to \$5 billion in loans over the next five years. International Monetary Fund pledged \$2.5 billion to \$4.25 billion in loans over three years. European Union pledged \$812 million in 2004. Kuwait pledged \$500 million. Spain pledged \$300 million through 2007. South Korea pledged \$200 million through 2007. United Arab Emirates pledged \$215 million. China pledged \$24.2 million. And lastly, Slovakia pledged \$290.000.

Although many countries, including France, Germany, and Russia, did not pledge any new funds, they promised to cooperate with the US-led effort to reduce Iraq's large debt burden. These motives can be seen as the steps towards mending the transatlantic relations.

There were initiatives of France and Germany to ameliorate the relations with the US. In early June 2004, George W. Bush visited France. On June 5th, there was a dinner between the US and French leaders. As many observers argued, this visit turned out to be a reminder of the common values of democracy, the rule of law, and individual rights that bind the two sides of the Atlantic.²⁴⁰ Within the framework of the visit of president Bush, François Heisbourg, an adviser to the Defense Ministry and director of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, put it that, "*we are going to be on our best behavior.*"²⁴¹ The major motive behind the US desire for improving the transatlantic relations was that the Bush administration needed the help of allies such as France and Germany to give international legitimacy to the June 30, 2004 handover of power to the newly designated Iraqi government. In turn,

²³⁸ http://www.cfr.org/background/background_iraq_funding.php, accessed on 14.11.2004.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ John Rossant and Rose Brady, "The U.S. and Europe: Friends Again, For Now.", Business Week, Issue 3887, 6/14/2004, p. 5, 2/3 p.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

the French president Chirac has toned down his calls for a “multipolar” world and a European Union strategic planning capability that would be developed independent of NATO.²⁴² He and the German Chancellor Schroeder were of the opinion that there was not much to gain politically in alienating Washington especially at such a sensitive time. Julian Lindley, French from the Geneva Center for Security Policy, stated that, “*Do not do anything that will make it harder for Bush and for America in Iraq (...) Their failure in Iraq is our failure.*”²⁴³

In October 2004, before the US elections took place on November 2nd, German Defense Minister Peter Struck implied that a Kerry administration might make it easier for Berlin to commit troops to Iraq.²⁴⁴ He was full of praise for Kerry’s proposals of an international conference on Iraq and noted that “*no one can predict developments in that country in such a way as to make binding statements.*”²⁴⁵ His comments were denied both by Chancellor Schroder and Foreign Minister Fischer who insisted that there would be no change in Germany’s position. However there are signs that Berlin is trying to mend ties with Washington. In October, Fischer told a group of visiting professors that there was a good chance of progress on Iraq following the US election.²⁴⁶ Within this context, Germany has recently made moves to help extend debt relief to Iraq, and has begun training Iraqi police. In addition to that, in September, she announced that she would provide Iraqi security officials with equipment, including 20 armored personnel carriers. According to a German Foreign Ministry spokesman, Germany’s state development agencies are ready to help rebuild ministries, media and infrastructure in Iraq once the security situation improves.²⁴⁷ None of these steps were conditional on a Kerry victory in the US elections. All these overtures of Germany are significant in terms of the prospects for cooperation in transatlantic ties. In addition to that, much before, during the meeting between Chancellor Schroder and President Bush in New York in

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ “Germany: New Attitude?”, Newsweek, October 25, 2004, p. 5.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

September 2003, Schroder mentioned that Germany was ready to become a part of the game in Iraq and within this context they would train Iraqi security officials and help rebuild Iraq by using German resources.²⁴⁸ Bush in turn, stated that they had overcome the division with Germany on the Iraqi issue.²⁴⁹ This picture displayed that Germany was on a much nearer point to Washington as compared to France in general.

On December 16th 2004, Germany, France and the United States said that they were prepared to offer substantial relief to Iraq after a visit of US special envoy James Baker to France and Germany, two main opponents of the US led war against Iraq. In a joint statement, US President Bush, French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroder said that:

*Debt reduction is critical if the Iraqi people are to have any chance to build a free and prosperous Iraq. Therefore, France, Germany and the United State agree that there should be substantial debt reduction for Iraq in the Paris Club in 2004, and will work closely with each other and with other countries to achieve this objective.*²⁵⁰

This initiative was significant both in terms of rebuilding the devastated country and mending ties in transatlantic relations.²⁵¹ According to many circles, the mentioned agreement presented the most concrete accord reached by the three countries since the tension emerged in transatlantic relations with the opposition of France and Germany against the US war in Iraq.²⁵²

The French attitude specifically should be analyzed well, because French initiative towards mending the strained relations with the US came just a day after the announcement of Saddam Hussein's capture. Seizing this opportunity, on December 15th, 2003 France said that it would work with other nations to forgive an important portion of Iraq's enormous foreign debt. After a meeting with members of

²⁴⁸ Yasemin Çongar, "ABD, AB, Irak ve biz...", Milliyet, 29.09.2003

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Iain Rogers, "U.S., Germany, France Agree on Iraq Debt Relief", The Washington Post, December 17, 2003.

²⁵¹ Craig S. Smith, "France and Germany Agree to Substantial Cuts in Iraq Debt", The New York Times, December 16, 2003.

²⁵² Craig S. Smith, "France and Germany Join U.S. in Effort to Reduce Iraq's Debt", The New York Times, December 17, 2003. See also, Colleen Barry, "Germany, France Agree to Ease Iraq Debt", The Washington Post, December 17, 2003.

Iraq's interim Governing Council, the French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin stated that:

*France, together with other creditors, believes there could be an agreement in 2004 (...) The arrest of Saddam Hussein constitutes a chance that we all must take advantage of. France is ready to play a full role in these efforts and to follow the action already undertaken on a bilateral basis as Europeans in the humanitarian domain, of course, and in the cooperative domain, whether it be education, health or even archeology.*²⁵³

De Villepin also promised to send constitutional law experts to help Iraqis draft their new constitution. It is also a irony that, the accord was reached between the US, France and Germany about reducing Iraqi debt despite the fact that there was anger in Europe over the US decision of excluding the countries that opposed the US war in Iraq from nearly \$18 billion worth American-financed Iraqi reconstruction projects.²⁵⁴ All these points reveal the fact that France and Germany, two prominent opponents of war in Iraq, are ready to mend the relations and take active steps towards reconstructing a war-torn country. Actually, France was not among those that pledged billions of dollars for Iraqi reconstruction at a donors' conference held in Madrid in October. However the capture of Saddam Hussein presented an opportunity for France to make an initiative. Within this context, it is not a surprising development that Mr. de Villepin said that his country, which is owed about \$3 billion, would work with the so-called Paris Club to negotiate a debt reduction plan for Iraq.²⁵⁵ Just like France, Germany which is owed about \$ 2.5 billion, said as well that it supported forgiving a portion of Iraq's debt.²⁵⁶ Russia, which is owed approximately \$3.5 billion, as well presented the same approach. Russia's deputy foreign minister, Yuri Fedotov, stated that, *"This is a modern, civilized systems for settling the problems of external debt that is applied*

²⁵³ Craig S. Smith, "France Moves Toward Forgiving Some of Iraq's Huge Debt", The New York Times, December 15, 2003.

²⁵⁴ Keith B. Richburg, "France and Germany Agree To Help Reduce Iraqi Debt", The Washington Post, December 17, 2003.

²⁵⁵ The Paris Club is an association of 19 industrialized nations, including the US, France, Germany, Russia and Japan, formed in 1956 with the aim of coordinating the cancellation of debts for financially distressed countries. For instance, in 2001, the Club agreed to forgive two-thirds of Yugoslavia's debt after the removal of President Slobodan Milosevic from power. (See in ibid.)

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

everywhere, and Russia believes that these mechanisms should be applied to Iraq as well.²⁵⁷

All these examples demonstrate us the initiatives of the major Europeans towards mending ties with the US. As Sebastian Brökemann, an expert on transatlantic relations at the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, noted with regard to the debt relief issue, *“This kind of debt relief is a fairly easy price to pay to improve transatlantic relations.”*²⁵⁸

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s remarks when she was in Europe in February 2005 were significant in terms of evaluating the future of transatlantic relations. After the US invasion of Iraq, Rice, who was then national security advisor, criticized the opposition of US allies to the war by saying that *“France should be punished, Germany ignored and Russia forgiven.”*²⁵⁹ However when she visited Europe in February 2005 as the secretary of state, she used a different style in her speeches in order to mend fences with US allies. Speaking in Paris, Rice said that old disagreements should be solved and she emphasized the common values shared by the US, France and Europe. She added, *“It’s time to open a new chapter in our relationship.”*²⁶⁰ Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier spoke of a new stage in relations and working together for a better world. According to Kohen, Rice’s remarks on her tour of Europe show that the mending process of the transatlantic divide have begun, however we have to wait and see if Rice’s remarks signal a real change of policy in the Bush administration.²⁶¹ It should be mentioned as well that France and Germany are acting more flexibly and pragmatically with regard to Iraq. Just like Germany, France is of the opinion that cooperation process is needed in Iraq to establish stability in the country. French officials mentioned their pleasure at the recent elections and support for the government in Baghdad.²⁶²

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Craig S. Smith, “France and Germany Join U.S. in Effort to Reduce Iraq’s Debt”, The New York Times, December 17, 2003.

²⁵⁹ Sami Kohen, “ ‘Condi’ Gönül Alıyor”, Milliyet, 10.02.2005

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used a conciliatory tone at the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy, held on February 12th, 2005 by saying that the American-European alliance could withstand its current differences.²⁶³ During his speech, he called for further cooperative efforts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Referring to his earlier critical description of European nations that opposed the Iraq war as “old Europe”, he said that, *“That was old Rumsfeld”*.²⁶⁴ UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and German Defense Minister Peter Struck were among the participants of the conference. In a move towards repairing the transatlantic turbulence, Rumsfeld stated that:

*Our collective security depends on our cooperation and mutual respect and understanding (...) Our Atlantic alliance relationship has navigated through some choppy seas over the years. But we have always been able to resolve the toughest issues. That is because there is so much to unite us: common values, shared histories, and an abiding faith in democracy.*²⁶⁵

According to many circles, his diplomatic performance was part of an effort of the US Administration to open a new chapter in transatlantic relations after the strains of the first Bush term. It should be noted as well that, his overture followed the successful European tour of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just one week before, and came just a few days before President Bush’s fence-mending European visit.²⁶⁶

During the mentioned conference on security, German defense minister Peter Struck proposed more direct coordination between the European Union and the United States by suggesting a move away from NATO. He mentioned that, *“NATO is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.”*²⁶⁷

²⁶³ “Rumsfeld Reaches Out To ‘Old Europe’ ”, CBS News, February 12, 2005. (available at http://cbs11tv.com/terror/terror_story_043085849.html, accessed on 13.02.2005.)

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Gerard Baker, “New Rumsfeld tries to pacify Old Europe”, The Times, February 14, 2005.

²⁶⁷ “Rumsfeld Reaches Out To ‘Old Europe’ ”, CBS News, February 12, 2005.

During his four-day European tour in the end of February, with the intention of mending fences with the European states, President Bush talked about a “*new chapter*” in US-European relations. He suggested that by leaving aside the old disagreements, cooperation, based upon mutual values and interests, should be established in transatlantic relations.²⁶⁸ By contrast to his and Mr. Rumsfeld’s former harsh remarks, he used a soft and flexible tone. During their banquet, President Bush and Chirac talked about how they can balance their policies on the topics of Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Iran.²⁶⁹ And they agreed on much of them. Another concrete development during the visit of Bush was that, the EU has taken a responsibility in training the new cadres of Iraqi judges, prosecutors and policemen.²⁷⁰ Therefore, the Europeans have made it clear that they were ready to support the Iraqi restructuring process.

With all the steps mentioned above, especially France and Germany, the most prominent opponents of US Iraqi policy, have demonstrated that they would work with the US for the future of Iraq. However, there are limits with regard to how far Europeans are willing to go to support the Bush administration in Iraq. For instance, even British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi are facing increasing criticism in their countries over their continuing support for the US action in Iraq and there are mounting pressure even among their coalition governments to reduce the military contingents of Britain and Italy in Iraq.²⁷¹ Within this context, it is not realistic to expect that German and French troops will be deployed in Iraq to assist the US contingents. French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier said in mid-May of 2004 that, “*French soldiers won’t be going, either now or later.*”²⁷²

²⁶⁸ Sami Kohen, “ABD-Avrupa İlişkisinde yeni başlangıç”, Milliyet, 23.02.2005

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ John Rossant and Rose Brady, op.cit., (in footnote 240.)

²⁷² Ibid.

CHAPTER V

WAVERING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND AN OPEN-ENDED PROCESS

The wavering characteristic of the transatlantic relations are also addressed by different theoretical perspectives. In John S. Duffield's analysis, three theoretical perspectives are significant as tools for understanding transnational relations after the Cold War: *the realist, the liberal and the transformational approaches*.²⁷³

As known, the realist theory assumes that the main actors in international relations are sovereign states, whose most prominent aim is to ensure their own survival, and that the basic organizing principle of the international system is anarchy. Since the sovereign states feel themselves as insecure in the international arena, the use of force is always possible in relations between the states. Two main variants of realism, which are *balance of power theory and hegemonic stability theory*, do not present a bright future with regard to the transatlantic relations by maintaining that there would be increasing conflict and declining cooperation between the parties. According to the balance of power theory, states will seek to balance the power of threatening states.²⁷⁴ States may undertake unilateral balancing efforts in order to do so. When two or more states perceive a common threat, they may engage in military and economic cooperation against it. The disappearance of the common threat will undermine the basis of that cooperation. The military and economic cooperation will no longer be regarded as necessary as a result of the disappearance of common threat. This theory can be well applied to the post-Cold War period. The enormous military power and the expansionist ideology of the Soviet Union prompted the US and Western Europe to establish military alliance in the form of NATO and engage in high levels of economic cooperation. However, the disappearance of the common threat with the collapse of the Soviet

²⁷³ John S. Duffield, "Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future", *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, April 2001, p. 95.

²⁷⁴ For the details of the "balance of power theory" see *ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

Union has created negative outcomes in terms of the transatlantic relations for the balance of power theory. NATO's existence in the post-Cold War period has been questioned. The US and Europe have turned out to be each other's strategic rival both in terms of economic and military-political considerations after the disappearance of the common threat. The US and the EU today is the strategic rival of each other's. Although it can be argued that, today's threats such as terrorism or nuclear proliferation pose common threats for both the US and the European powers as well as the Soviet threat, both parties have diverging approaches towards the new threats, as demonstrated before, and therefore the balance of power theory does not present a bright future for the transatlantic relations in general.²⁷⁵ The second variant of realism, *hegemonic stability theory*, can be evaluated within the same framework as well. This theory seeks primarily to explain patterns of economic relations. Through the combination of threats and promises, a hegemonic power can induce or coerce the smaller states to open their markets and to adhere to common rules of commercial relations.²⁷⁶ This, in turn, enables the continuation of economic and military cooperation as well between the allies. Therefore, the relative decline in the power of hegemonic state can create adverse effects in terms of the prospects for cooperation. From the standpoint of hegemonic stability theory, it can be mentioned that the end of the Cold War coincide with a continuation of relative decline in America's hegemonic power, that started in the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s. Both the countries of the European Union, and other dynamic market economies, especially those of East Asia, have taken important steps towards economic integration and strengthened their economic capabilities. They began to pose serious challenges to the US supremacy. This fact created tension especially in transatlantic relations both politically and economically. In short, with its assumptions, it can be argued that the hegemonic stability theory does not draw a bright picture for the future of transatlantic relations.

By contrast to the realist theory, the liberal approach maintains that there are opportunities for cooperation between the US and Europe. According to the liberal approach, the power and threats are not the only factors which shape state behavior. In addition to states, there are other actors in the international system, such as

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

international organizations, which should be taken into consideration. *Institutional theory* is one of the most prominent variants of the liberal perspective. In contrast to the realist theory, the institutional theory attaches considerable importance to international institutions. From its standpoint, it can be mentioned that, once such institutions are established, participating states have strong incentives to preserve them and to comply with the rules they contain.²⁷⁷ For the institutional theory, the end of the Cold War does not specifically mean the end of transatlantic cooperation. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union itself deprived the alliance of one of its most significant rationales, which was ensuring defense against the Soviet Union, deterrence and defense against external aggression did not constitute NATO's only purpose.²⁷⁸ In the 1990s NATO has assumed new responsibilities, such as maintaining stability in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and stabilizing relations among the states of Europe. This is true as well with regard to the economic relations. The transatlantic partners are the major players of the broader Western institutional structures created after World War II to promote economic cooperation, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Group of Seven (G-7). All these organizations continue to be crucial tools for pursuing US and European economic interests and coping with global economic difficulties. Therefore, the liberal theory is in favor of the continuation of cooperation in transatlantic relations by contrast to the realist perspective.

The third theoretical perspective, *the transformational approach*, seeks to explain international relations and state behavior in terms of ideational factors, such as belief systems, images, cognitive maps, collective identity, and culture.²⁷⁹ The transformational perspective attaches importance to the role of values in the international relations. Therefore this approach dwells upon the transatlantic relations within the context of the changes in beliefs, interests and identities and the effects of those changes on the transatlantic interactions. According to this perspective, transatlantic relations after the Cold War should be different from the period of Cold War years because of fundamental changes in the nature of the US

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

and the European countries, and changes in the beliefs and values held by their elites and mass public.²⁸⁰ The likely impact of such changes on US-European relations is harder to specify and it can be so complex. To give an example, we can say that both the beliefs of European and the US politicians and the public about the interdependence of US and European security and about the value of continued American engagement in European security affairs have changed considerably in the post-Cold War period. Within this context, it can be argued that the recent Iraqi crisis has demonstrated the changed beliefs and interests of the parties and their skepticism towards each other. Evaluating the transatlantic relations within this context, it can be predicted that tension in transatlantic relations might continue in the future.

Duffield attributes special importance to liberal approach instead of the realist perspective. He argues that:

*...the prospects for transatlantic relations are generally bright. We can anticipate a continuation of the generally high levels of cooperation between the United States and Europe that have prevailed during the past decade(...) In the first place, the United States and its European partners remain well-established liberal democracies that will be naturally inclined to cooperate in the many areas in which their interests coincide (...) In the second place, the United States and Europe remain jointly enmeshed in a number of well-developed international institutions that simultaneously provide opportunities and good reasons for continued collaboration.*²⁸¹

According to Adrian Hyde-Price, although it is not certain which scenario will come true, there are four scenarios in terms of the future development of the transatlantic relationship: *reborn partnership, divorce, continental drift and partial rapprochement*.²⁸² 'Divorce' represents an end to the transatlantic relationship, 'continental drift' means sliding towards 'divorce', and the other two scenarios, 'reborn partnership' and 'partial rapprochement', suggest an improvement in the relations.

In his view, the reborn partnership is the most positive but not necessarily most likely scenario. That outcome would meet the fundamental interests of both

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁸² Marcin Zaborowski, "Poland and Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century", *Defence Studies*, Vol. 2, Issue 2, Summer 2002, p. 125. See also Adrian Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, pp. 14-18.

sides in many respects. Both sides share common interests in the political, economic, cultural and security fields, and they benefited from the strength and vitality of the transatlantic relationship throughout the centuries. This fact suggests that, although there are important tensions in transatlantic relations witnessed today, only on the basis of cooperation and partnership, those tensions can be managed and addressed. In order to achieve this aim, the US should prefer multilateral partnership rather than unilateral leadership and in turn, the European powers should be more willing to maintain the cooperation and coherence with the US. The divorce is the most dramatic and adverse outcome of the current state of transatlantic relations. According to this end, the current state of transatlantic tensions would lead to fundamental change in the course of the relations and both the US and the Europeans would decide to pursue more independent foreign and security policies without taking into consideration the long lasting transatlantic cooperation. We may witness the emergence of a more coherent and strong EU by increasing its ability to conduct its own independent foreign, security and defense policy. This outcome would definitely create concerns among the US administration and will affect the future of relations in a negative way. The third scenario is the continuation of the continental drift. According to this scenario, the transatlantic relationship would continue to be significant symbolically and politically. On many foreign policy issues the cooperation and consultation between the allies would still be important at least in a symbolic way. However, the underlying sources of tension in the relations, such as economic, political and social differences, would remain unresolved, and both sides would continue to pursue their own interests over the global issues. Therefore, the US reliance on unilateralism and the European reliance of multilateralism would not disappear easily according to this theory. This state of affairs may continue for some time, however there is always a risk that the relations between the parties would further deteriorate and therefore the state of divorce may emerge in the end. The fourth and a more positive scenario is partial rapprochement. According to it, even if there would not be a consensus between the allies on all existing disagreements, a gradual convergence on many policy areas will emerge. With the willingness of both parties towards a concerted attempt to negotiate on a range of issues, such as arms control policies, and global warming, there would be partial rapprochement in terms of the relations. Hyde-Price mentions that as a result of the current political realities in the US and European states, a re-born partnership

is unlikely since it is too demanding. A partial rapprochement is the best scenario that can be hoped for the future of relations. At the same time, the continuation of the continental drift also has a strong possibility even if there is not any reason to believe that it would lead to divorce.²⁸³

After putting forward the possible future scenarios for the transatlantic relations, he puts it that, despite regular talk of a 'crisis' in transatlantic relations, there has been a continued process of cooperation between the US and Europe over the past five decades.²⁸⁴ This is mainly the result of the overlapping sets of interests upon which the transatlantic relationship has been based. According to Price, these shared interests have four distinctive features: *security cooperation, political and institutional ties, economic interdependence and socio-cultural affinities*.²⁸⁵ In terms of the security cooperation, it can be mentioned that during the Cold War years, the shared perception of the Soviet military and political threat led the US and West European powers to enter into close security cooperation. This close cooperation had been important in terms of the overall vitality and continuance of the US-European cooperation even during the post-Cold War period. Secondly, the close affinity in the security and other fields helped strengthen and enrich the political and institutional link between the US and Western Europe especially through the establishment of NATO with the signing of Washington Treaty in 1949. NATO turned out to be more than a military alliance and became a form of political linkage across the Atlantic. In the words of former NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, "*there was always more to NATO than collective defense. It remains an expression of something wider and deeper – a voluntary security community based on democracy, individual liberty, free economies and the rule of law.*"²⁸⁶ With regard to the dimension of economic interdependence, it is proper to point it out that the transatlantic security alliance and political partnership was further reinforced by sound economic and commercial relationship between the transatlantic allies. This was so prominent that, by the end of the 20th century, the combined annual trade and investment between Europe and the US had reached almost \$2 trillion. Today,

²⁸³ Adrian Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

half the goods and services produced in the world are made in the US or the EU, and one in 12 US factory workers are employed in one of the 4,000 European-owned enterprises in the US, whereas American firms in Europe employ about three million Europeans.²⁸⁷ From the perspective of socio-cultural affinities it can be said that, historically, the US itself is very much the product of European culture and civilization, whereas Europe in turn was affected very much by the post-war US culture which led to the ‘*Americanization*’ of Europe, symbolized by McDonalds, Hollywood, Coca-Cola and etc.²⁸⁸ Therefore, the US and the European powers share same socio-cultural values.

5.1 Existing Problems in Transatlantic Relations

According to Christopher Layne, the Iraqi war represents a turning point in transatlantic relations in the sense that Euro-American ties have been ruptured and never again will be the same.²⁸⁹ He goes on to argue that this crisis cannot be understood in terms of their diverging cultures, values and interests, but rather we have to take a closer look to the “*nature of power in the international system*” and “*America’s dominant role in the world today*”.²⁹⁰ The US Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld’s statement regarding the division between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe was significant in terms of displaying the deep crisis between the both sides of the Atlantic. The crisis that emerged in the wake of the Iraqi war was so deep that former secretary of state Henry Kissinger argued, “*the road to Iraqi disarmament has produced the gravest crisis within the Atlantic Alliance since its creation five decades ago.*”²⁹¹

The tension in transatlantic relations causes serious damages not only to the political relations between the allies but also to the economic and commercial ties.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁸⁹ Christopher Layne, *op.cit.*, pp. 1-2.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁹¹ Henry Kissinger, “Crisis of Allies”, *New York Post*, February 9, 2003.

We can expect retaliatory measures by both sides in terms of tax, tariff, subsidies, and other regulatory disputes.²⁹²

Jocelyn Coulon dwells upon the transatlantic tension that emerged with the Iraqi war, from a different perspective. He puts it that:

*Despite what may be said or read in some American circles, the Iraq crisis showed that the world was not unipolar and could not be subjected to a single power (...) transatlantic relations will never be the same. There will be reconciliation. There will be cooperation. There will be solidarity. But there will never be subordination.*²⁹³

Therefore, it should be pointed out that although as a result of common interests, common goals and values shared by the Americans and Europeans, the process of cooperation can be expected between the allies, as many of the analysts argue, this state of cooperation will not conceal the fundamental differences of the world views of both parties and competition between them witnessed in many of the areas, mainly in economic and political fields. Therefore, as witnessed in the course of the history, it will not be easy for the Americans and Europeans to overcome their deep and fundamental differences in terms of perceptions and world views vis-à-vis each others and the international problems.

According to Nanette Neuwahl, the European Unions' motives towards becoming more powerful international actor in the global arena will have negative outcomes in terms of the future of transatlantic relations. The main reason is that the US is not ready to recognize and accept more united and more effective European Union in the global arena.²⁹⁴

For the future of transatlantic relations, there have been arguments focused on the “*end of Atlantic cooperation*”. Within this context, the analysis of Ivo H. Daalder turns out to be significant. He argues that:

There has been a profound change in the structure of US-European relations, though the differentiation of power is only one, and not the most important, factor accounting for this change. One crucial consequence of this transformation is the effective end of Atlanticism-American and European foreign policies no longer center around the transatlantic alliance to the same overriding extent as in the past (...) The changing structure of relations between the United States

²⁹² Stephanie Neuman, op.cit., p. 319.

²⁹³ Jocelyn Coulon, “How Unipolarism Died in Baghdad”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, Issue 4, Dec 2003, pp. 540-541.

²⁹⁴ Nanette Neuwahl, “The Atlantic Alliance: For Beter or for Wars...”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, Issue 4, December 2003, pp. 431-432.

*and Europe means that a new basis for the relationship must be found, lest the continued drifts ends in separation and, ultimately, divorce.*²⁹⁵

Steinberg as well argues that the important elements of the old transatlantic bargain have disappeared especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and according to him, with the tension in transatlantic relations in terms of the recent Iraqi crisis, the alliance faced its greatest crisis since Suez in 1956.²⁹⁶ Robert Kagan as well is of the opinion that, there is a deep crisis in US-European relations. He argues that *“the reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure.”*²⁹⁷

Although the existence of common values and interests between the transatlantic allies, it should not be overlooked that the prospects for cooperation in transatlantic relations continue to be a complex issue since the Europeans does not have common vision regarding the relations between the EU and NATO. According to Medcalf, as the EU has made progress towards the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), cooperation between the European Union and the NATO has turned out to be a complex and has become increasingly thorny.²⁹⁸ Within this framework, Britain and other *‘Atlanticist’* EU partners have tended to emphasize that the military operations will be conducted by NATO only or by the EU using NATO assets, whereas the *‘Europeanist’* EU partners, led by France, by contrast tended to emphasize that the military operations will be conducted by the EU only or by the EU using NATO assets.²⁹⁹ It is worth mentioning that, prospects of cooperation in transatlantic ties will be dependent upon overcoming differences between the European states. When there is a division between the EU members which separates them into two camps, the Europeanist and the Atlanticist camps, the expectation of cooperation between the both sides of the Atlantic tends to be

²⁹⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, *op.cit.*, pp. 147-148.

²⁹⁶ James B. Steinberg, *op.cit.*, pp. 113-114.

²⁹⁷ Ivo H. Daalder, *op.cit.*, p. 147.

²⁹⁸ Jennifer Medcalf, “Cooperation between the EU and NATO”, in Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum (edited by Joachim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanabe), Zurich: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002, p. 95.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

rather difficult. This fact is one of the most prominent aspects of the wavering characteristic of the transatlantic relations.

5.2 Opportunities for Cooperation

Although the existence of deep problems in transatlantic relations, there are also the arguments developed within the framework of the opportunities for cooperation which should be taken into consideration as well.

According to Philip Gordon, differences between the US and Europe towards the Middle East are detrimental to common interests and undermine the cohesion of the alliance.³⁰⁰ In his understanding, since the interests and values of the both parties in the region are similar, it is possible to expect that they will agree on many issues. He notes that NATO is the key forum for US-European military cooperation and within the framework of this organization, both parties can establish a common strategy for the Middle East.³⁰¹ In his view, NATO is the right place to develop joint US-European approach for the Middle East, and particularly for the Gulf. Therefore, NATO's role in coordinating Western policy towards the Middle East should be further upgraded, and it should be the key forum for transatlantic discussions.

*Under this scenario, NATO's Secretary-General would become a kind of foreign-policy 'High Representative' for the Atlantic Alliance, and would coordinate discussions not just of security policy, but of foreign policy more broadly, including for the Middle East.*³⁰²

Expanding the foreign-policy role of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), which began with the 1990 US-EU Transatlantic Declaration and strengthened at the December 1995 EU-US Madrid summit, would be crucial. The NTA might be an important forum to deal with the issues regarding the Middle East and overcoming the policy differences between the parties. Beyond NATO, there are some other forums which might foster the process of cooperation between the transatlantic allies. The Group of Eight industrial nations (G-8) is among these organizations. As Gordon argues, it is a significant platform including not only the most important

³⁰⁰ Philip H. Gordon, *op.cit.*, p. 73.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

North Atlantic and European allies and Japan, but Russia as well, which is a key actor in terms of important international issues, such as arms control, hard-security issues, Security Council-related issues, and etc.³⁰³ The reason is that, just as unilateral US initiatives towards the Middle East are unlikely to succeed if they are not supported by the European allies, it is difficult to realize those initiatives without the support of Russia. In short, as Gordon notes, although specific national interests may sometimes take priority over the common interests and goals within the transatlantic relations, the benefits of adopting common strategies, especially towards the Middle East, will have a far greater chance of success than the divided approach.³⁰⁴ This is especially true with respect to the common interests of the transatlantic allies and common threats directed towards them, i.e. terrorism, radical Islamism, arms proliferation, and etc.

According to Neuman as well, only NATO functions effectively as an instrument for transatlantic discussion.³⁰⁵ Thus, it would be a key channel for the transatlantic cooperation in the future. After the end of the Cold War, with the US efforts, NATO had assumed new functions and it flourished. Therefore, it will be the key mechanism in the future with respect to improving the transatlantic ties.

The US needs partners in terms of tackling with the global issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and etc. As William Wallace argues:

*Unilateral decisions carry costs (...) America's most dependable partners are the democracies in Europe, collectively organized through the European Union and NATO. With economic and political reform in Japan still blocked, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations weakened by the 1997 financial crisis and incomplete democratization, Europe remains the indispensable partner without which American global leadership becomes unilateral.*³⁰⁶

Therefore NATO and the EU will preserve their importance in terms of the future of transatlantic relations in Wallace's analysis. Taking into account this view, we can point it out that, the transatlantic allies need each other to handle the

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

³⁰⁵ Stephanie Neuman, *op.cit.*, p. 319.

³⁰⁶ William Wallace, "Europe, the Necessary Partner", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, Issue 3, May/June 2001, p. 16.

problems of unstable Middle East, Caucasus and the Mediterranean. Within this context, The Greater Middle East initiative of the US turns out to be important for the prospects of cooperation in transatlantic relations, which will be dwelled upon. With the help of European powers, as Wallace suggests, the US will be able to realize the so-called Greater Middle East project, which aims to modernize the whole region in order let it to be a stable and secure place that will never pose threat against the Western interests. In addition to those mentioned problems, there are other issues around the world that must be dealt through the cooperation. These are transnational organized crime, drug smuggling, money laundering and etc. These problems as well, just like the political matters, threaten public order on both sides of the Atlantic.

Many tensions in relations between the US and Europe have been witnessed in the past years on issues ranging from the Middle East, to trade protectionism, terrorism, diplomacy, defense polices and international treaties. European leaders are so concerned about the danger of US unilateralism, which has been witnessed during the US invasion of Iraq recently. In addition to that, the widening gap in military capabilities between the US and the EU is also an important problem. To give an example, the US defense budget has risen from \$ 280 billion in 1999 to close to \$ 400 billion in 2002, whereas European spending has stayed roughly the same, with the European/US ratio became close to 40 %.³⁰⁷ However, in spite of these facts, there is still more that unites than divides the two continents, i.e. a strong spirit of solidarity, common values and interests.³⁰⁸ In terms of the future of transatlantic relations, Grant is of the opinion that:

*If Bush can make an effort to re-energize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, if he continues to tackle Iraq within a UN framework, and if the Europeans can boost both their military and diplomatic capabilities, the transatlantic bond is likely to remain the closest between any two continents.*³⁰⁹

With regard to the future of relations, Hanspeter Neuhold as well is in favor of the cooperation process. In his view, there are three dimensions which will continue to shape the transatlantic relations in the future. These are cultural, economic and

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Charles Grant, "The troubled state of transatlantic relations", Global Agenda, Issue 1, Jan 2003, p. 68.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

political-security considerations.³¹⁰ First of all, the two parties share basic values which are multi-party democracy, individual-oriented human rights, the rule of law, market economy and etc. And as a result of these commonly shared values, similar societies, cultures and civilizations have developed on both sides of the Atlantic. Secondly, Europe and America are closely interconnected economically. The volume of trade between the parties amounts to approximately \$ 3 trillion per year. The US and Europe are the principal source of investment for each other that accounts for millions of jobs on both sides. Thirdly, both sides share political and security interests in the global arena. These common interests range from the struggle against terrorism and organized crime, to the preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, maintenance of the stability in key areas such as the Balkans and the Middle East, having secure access to world energy supplies and etc.

The intellectuals who are in favor of the cooperation process in transatlantic relations argue that the tensions between the parties often evolve around means, not over main interests and goals. The recent Iraqi crisis is dwelt upon within this context. It is stated that there was a consensus among the transatlantic allies on need of preventing the Iraqi regime from access to weapons of mass destruction and on the need of ousting the regime of Saddam Hussein. Rather than this common goal, the difference between the powers focused on the question of whether international weapons inspectors should be given more time to continue to their work in Iraq or a military power should be used against the regime.³¹¹ According to those circles, it is also worth mentioning that there have always been tensions in transatlantic relations, which were even far more serious than recent Iraqi crisis. The Suez crisis of 1956 was an example from this standpoint. For the future pattern of cooperation in transatlantic relations, according to Neuhold, it is up to Europeans to improve the relations.³¹² They should learn from their mistakes of witnessing division over the Iraq issue. They should speak with one voice and act jointly in the field of foreign and security policy. Therefore, the realization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense

³¹⁰ See in Hanspeter Neuhold, *op.cit.*, pp. 459-460.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 460.

³¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 461-462.

Policy (ESDP), and reducing the military gap vis-à-vis the US turn out to be important in his view.³¹³ Only becoming an entity as a single political actor and stronger in terms of military means, the EU will have a chance to establish a genuine partnership with the superpower US. Although it is important for the European powers to speak with one voice in terms of external issues, it is still not clear whether the US would accept Europe as an equal partner with whom she would share the responsibilities and the decision-making process, especially as long as the President Bush and the Republicans continue to remain in the power. In addition to that, with the admittance of 10 new members to the EU, it is far more difficult to speak in one voice and establish CFSP, mainly because those new members are the strong supporters of US position on many of the world issues, as the Iraqi issue clearly demonstrated us. As long as these issues remain unclear, the future prospects of cooperation in transatlantic relations will be an open-ended process.

James B. Steinberg as well dwells upon the common interests shared by the US and the European countries. In his understanding:

*These include a powerful interest in assuring stable, affordable supplies of energy from the region, and a common stake in the economic and political reforms that are needed to reduce the region's role as an importer of Weapons of Mass Destruction and an exporter of terror.*³¹⁴

Steinberg puts it that in terms of the security issues both the US and Europe share common priorities. For instance, they both place international terrorism, development of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world and Islamic fundamentalism at the top of their list of perceived threats.³¹⁵ Just like the security issues, in terms of the non-security issues as well, both parties have similar interests. For instance, both sides have benefited from the increase in speed and volume of movement in people, good, services and ideas. In addition to that, trade has become an important instrument in terms of US-Europe relations and their economic growth.³¹⁶ After mentioning the shared interests of the transatlantic allies, Steinberg dwells upon the two basic factors for the prospect of cooperation in transatlantic

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

³¹⁴ James B. Steinberg, *op.cit.*, pp. 124-125.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

relations in the future.³¹⁷ According to him, in the security realm, their joint challenge is to identify fundamental elements of their common vision regarding global threats. And within this context, they should strengthen the means of cooperation to address common goals. In the broader political and economic sphere, they should come together in order to build the structures of international governance that are necessary to address the transnational challenges of the 21st century.

As the above-noted facts display, the transatlantic link is very vital in terms of economic and political-military relationship between the allies. The transatlantic partnership, including the EU, US and Canada, account for about two-thirds of the global economy. The North American and European economies have become increasingly intertwined. The volume of trade and the flow of capital between the two sides of the Atlantic have increased considerably, massive investments are made by Americans in the European economy and by Europeans in the American economy, and multinational firms are operating more and more on both continents.³¹⁸ Therefore, the flows of goods, capital and people across national boundaries have greatly increased. The transatlantic economy is becoming increasingly integrated through free trade and market forces. This is the economic side of the story. It is also true in terms of the military-political side as well. NATO is a powerful politico-military alliance, and the transatlantic partnership is the central axis of democracy and the rule of law in the world.³¹⁹ In Medcalf's understanding:

*...the transatlantic relationship as expressed through NATO continues to provide the most desirable framework for ensuring the security of North America and Europe and, of equal importance, the principal forum for transatlantic security relations.*³²⁰

Thus, one can argue that both sides have a vested interest in maintaining a healthy transatlantic relationship. When they disagree over each others' policies, it becomes more difficult for them to manage global problems. All these points bring to

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³¹⁸ Bernard E. Brown, Michael Curtis, and George D. Schwab, "Journey to Brussels: A Report and Policy Recommendations", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 24, Issue 5, October 2002, p. 379.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 379.

³²⁰ Jennifer Medcalf, "Cooperation between the EU and NATO", in *Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum* (edited by Joachim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanabe), Zurich: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002, p.117.

the fore the importance of Strange's structural analysis, as noted before. The security, production, financial, energy and trade will be important in terms of the prospects for cooperation in the wake of the Iraqi crisis. According to Daniel Hamilton, the major threats to the US and Europe today are terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and tackling with these challenges will be a major test of transatlantic partnership.³²¹ As he stated, "*A weaker transatlantic bond would render Americans and Europeans less safe, less prosperous, less free, and less able to advance either our ideals or our interests in the wider world.*"³²²

In light of the views mentioned above, it is not unrealistic to predict that a process of cooperation between the major European powers and the US might emerge after witnessing one of the gravest crises in their history. The shared interests in terms of security, production, energy, transportation, and other structures are significant in terms of predicting the future of transatlantic relations. As the *Notre Europe*, a Paris-based think tank, pointed it out:

*The United States and Europe have the same democratic aspirations for their own societies and for others. They require access to energy sources and seek an international system that favors trade. Economically, financially, culturally, they are interdependent. Seen from the point of view of the rest of the world, they form a homogeneous ensemble characterized by its democratic values and its high standards of living. And the prosperity from which they benefit creates, similarly, global responsibilities...*³²³

Although there are still tensions between the allies, by overcoming their diverging views on world politics, it is possible to expect advent of a process of cooperation between the allies, especially with regard to dealing with the major threats of the 21st century. As Rees argues:

*It is imperative, therefore, that the two sides of the Atlantic seek to reconcile their differences through a regular process of consultations. They are countries that share the broadest range of common values and Europe is the best regional candidate with which the US could hope to build a common front against the terrorist challenge.*³²⁴

³²¹ Daniel Hamilton, op.cit., p. 543.

³²² Ibid., p. 543.

³²³ Nanette Neuwahl, op.cit., p. 429. See also in "Defining Together a New World Order, Le Monde, 29 May 2003.

³²⁴ Wyn Rees, op.cit., p. 89.

It should not be overlooked, however, that the involvement of Franco-German axis into the US' reproducing of power structures and the limits of it will affect the future of the transatlantic relations. That is why the prospect for cooperation between the powers is an open-ended process.

The wavering feature of the transatlantic relations can be evaluated within the framework of the "*crisis-intervention-cooperation*" cycles in international relations. In terms of evaluating the prospects for cooperation in transatlantic relations in the wake of the Iraqi crisis, we should dwell upon the cycles of intervention in the post-Cold War era. When we analyze it, we notice that there is a process of crisis-intervention-cooperation in most events. The crises had created cooperation between the parties eventually. This was the case in terms of the first Iraqi, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan crises.

The end of the Cold War created profound effects in terms of international relations. During these years, the Western powers have not regarded Russia as a military threat. The containment policy of the Soviet Union disappeared and creating a controlled cooperation with the Russian Federation turned out to be important.³²⁵ Within this context, both the US and the EU have tried to formulate institutional mechanisms directed towards creating strategic cooperation with the Russian Federation. According to Mustafa Türkeş, most of the regional crises in the 1990s have been transformed into a controlled cooperation process.³²⁶ If we are to give examples, we can say that Russia was integrated into IFOR and SFOR that were created following the Bosnia war. NATO's intervention into Kosovo created two contradictory developments. While it created a political crisis between NATO and Russian Federation, it also led to the formulation of new cooperation areas between the mentioned parties. During the process of intervention into Afghanistan, a process of cooperation, however limited, emerged between the US and Russia.³²⁷ Just like the US, the EU as well tried to create strategic cooperation with Russia. The US has tried to carry out its sensitive relation with Russia within the framework

³²⁵ Mustafa Türkeş, "NATO Bağlamında ABD-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Devamlılık ve Değişim", in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, (edited by Faruk Sönmezoğlu), İstanbul, DR Yayınları, 2004, p. 388.

³²⁶ Ibid., p. 389.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 389.

of *Partnership for Peace and Permanent Partnership Council* that was created within NATO.³²⁸

When we look at the international crises, we notice the emergence of cooperation process following those tensions. This was the case after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, during the Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan wars. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the European powers pursued mainly diplomatic activities to solve the crisis. They were not in favor of using a military action against Kuwait. However, in the end, Britain and France provided troops to fight alongside with the Americans.³²⁹ The same process was witnessed during the US campaign against Afghanistan as well. The US declaration of the New National Security Strategy following the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th, created serious concerns among the Europeans that the US would carry out unilateral actions on the global arena in order to punish the attackers and promote her interests. The first ramification of this strategy turned out to be the unilateral action of the US against Afghanistan. Although the European states were not in favor of using unilateral military force in Afghanistan, the EU's fifteen member states were united among themselves in terms of supporting the US. The European states offered a great deal of help to the US campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taleban, including military and diplomatic support, the sharing of intelligence and funding of the new initiatives which were developed to help track down terrorists.³³⁰ Following the September 11th attacks, many European leaders, including Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder, Jack Straw and Joschka Fischer, spent much of their time in the Middle East and South Asia to build support for the US-led coalition. In addition to that, during the Bonn peace conference held in December 2001, which was hosted by the German government, the officials of the US and Europe worked together to persuade the participants to sign the agreement on the future of Afghanistan.³³¹

The Iraqi war of 1990-91 is a case in terms of crises-intervention-cooperation cycles. After Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, reaction came rapidly from the

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

³²⁹ Charles Grant, "The Eleventh of September and beyond: The Impact on the European Union", *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 73, Issue 4, August 2002 Supplement 1, p. 135.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

US, Western Europe and the Gulf states. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution which declared that the invasion was “*a breach of international peace and security*”, and successive UN resolutions led to economic sanctions against Iraq.³³² A US-led coalition was established. This coalition united the US and European states with Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The coalition launched an attack against Iraq in January 1991 and eventually expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The important thing was that this military action brought together the US and many European countries. According to many analysts, it was a rare instance of a substantial agreement among major powers “*over the need to confront aggression*.”³³³

Actually, as Gülnur Aybet mentions, the initial reaction of the European Community (EC) to the Gulf crisis resembled its Middle East policy during the 1970s.³³⁴ In the 1970s, the EC had followed its own policy in the region, and tried to distance itself from the US in the Middle East. One of the reasons was the European dependence on Arab oil. Within this context, Aybet goes on to argue that, “*the pro-Arab policy of the EC was also an excellent opportunity for the EC to demonstrate that it could in fact stand alone, and not necessarily be dictated by Washington in foreign affairs*.”³³⁵

Thus, the initial response of the EC to the Gulf crisis reflected the continuation of this concern. The EC had some fears about possible military action against Iraq. Therefore it embarked upon some diplomatic efforts, which became unsuccessful in the end. During the early days of the Gulf crisis, under the term presidency of Italy, the EC had put an emphasis on diplomatic solution to the crisis. Spain, Italy and France were the most prominent members of the EC which focused on political dialogue. The main reason was their special relationship with the Arab world. Within this context, in the early stages of the conflict, the EC sought a

³³² Musallam Ali Musallam, *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Saddam Hussein, His State and International Power Politics*, London; New York: British Academic Press, 1996, p. 4. See also Glenn Earl Perry, *The Middle East: Fourteen Islamic Centuries*, 3rd ed., Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997, p. 316.

³³³ Musallam Ali Musallam, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

³³⁴ Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, p. 103.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

collective political dialogue with Moscow to solve the crisis. Italian foreign minister submitted an aid package to the Middle East countries which were most affected by the crisis. According to Aybet, *“This was a totally separate initiative from US policy at the time, which called upon allied support against Iraq.”*³³⁶ In short, the Italian presidency became an important framework for the pursuit of independent EC policies. The change in the presidency of the EC was an important development. From January 1991 onwards, Luxembourg replaced Italian presidency. According to Aybet, the Italian presidency was more active in terms of promoting *‘independent European stance’* while the Luxembourg presidency was more passive.³³⁷ Although the Luxembourg presidency tried to continue diplomatic efforts and maintain the cohesion between the members of the EC, during its term, the EC policy became similar to that of the US. As Aybet puts it, *“By the time the deadline to go to war had run out on 15 January, the EC’s official position was no different from that of Washington. This had not been so under the Italian presidency.”*³³⁸

Within this context, the attempts of France, Germany and the Soviet Union to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait peacefully were significant.³³⁹ However, in the end, these diplomatic initiatives did not become successful. Within the framework of diplomatic initiatives, we should mention France’s unilateral diplomacy. President Mitterrand proposed his own peace plan when the crisis started. He did not make a prior consultation with the US and European powers.³⁴⁰ The last French diplomatic initiative came just before the coalition campaign against Iraq began. France submitted a six-point peace plan to Iraq and the UN Security Council.³⁴¹ It was rejected. In fact, France has had special relations with the Arab countries. According to Jolyon Howorth, there are three specific factors behind this relationship.³⁴² The first factor is that France hosts the largest Arab population in

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³³⁹ Roy Andersen, *op.cit.*, p. 345.

³⁴⁰ Gülnur Aybet, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

Europe. The second factor is that the region has been important for France within the perspective of economic relations and regional security. The volume of commercial transactions between France and the Arab countries has been prominent. The third dimension of France's Arab politics was related with its special relationship with Iraq. This was witnessed since the early 1970s.

Here, a strange but compelling mix of diplomatic opportunism, economic realism, weapons commercialism, ideological narcissism and military adventurism had given rise to a virtual Paris-Baghdad axis stimulated by the influential Franco-Iraqi Friendship Society.³⁴³

Within the context of these three dimensions, one can argue that it was a right strategy for France to put an emphasis on diplomatic solution to the conflict rather than a military solution. This was the case. France spared no efforts to find a diplomatic solution. At first, France considered that there should be a non-military solution to the crisis. Throughout the crisis, France put an emphasis on UN resolutions as being the core of international community's response against Iraq. She was also skeptical about the US intentions in the region. Within this framework, France had proposed peace plans. As Mathews puts it:

Traditionally suspicious of an Anglo-Saxon alliance, France was careful to distance herself from the Anglo-American collaboration and pursued what might be called a 'semi-detached' policy of being involved with the United Nations Coalition but nevertheless not necessarily constrained from conducting its own independent diplomacy.³⁴⁴

Despite its insistence on diplomatic solution to the crisis, when the allied coalition embarked upon a military action against Iraq, France took an effective role in the military operations and became one of the most prominent European countries in the war against Iraq. The main reason was that, she wanted to protect her economic interests in the region which was seriously affected with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The position of the Soviet Russia should be analyzed as well. First of all, it should be mentioned that the Gulf conflict created an opportunity for the Soviet

³⁴² Jolyon Howorth, "French Policy in the Conflict", in International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91 (edited by Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane), New York: St. Martin's Press in association with St. Antony's, 1994, pp. 176-177.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 177.

³⁴⁴ Ken Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, London; New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 84.

Union in terms of getting economic and political support from the West. Since Gorbachev came to power in 1986, the process of reform had been proceeding in the country. This process required the support of the West, and especially the US. It was very significant for the Soviet Union to get Western aid in terms of restructuring its economy. As a result of these facts, as Vladimir Nosenko argues, “*The crisis made Moscow seek not only détente but cooperation with the West.*”³⁴⁵ It was a proper strategy for the Soviet leadership to cooperate with the US. Within this context, during the Soviet-American summit in Helsinki in early September 1990, following Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, the American and Soviet leaders discussed the main principles of cooperation “*to counteract the Iraqi aggression.*”³⁴⁶ In fact, the Soviet Union had some fears about the possible military action against Iraq. The Gulf region was an important area in terms of its security, political and economic interests. Therefore, the possible US military victory was not a desirable outcome for the Soviet Union. For this reason, Moscow insisted on the diplomatic solution to the crisis. She tried to urge Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait through diplomatic means. However this policy did not become successful. In the end, as a result of need for Western aid and cooperation, the Soviet Russia chose to cooperate with the US in its United Nations diplomacy. Thus, it refrained from creating obstacles to the operations by the US and the coalition forces against Iraq.³⁴⁷

Therefore, as the Gulf crises of 1990-91 demonstrated, the crises in international relations would eventually lead to cooperation between the parties.

Looking within a broader context, it can be mentioned that the EU and its members, are the world’s biggest providers of development aid, with 65 percent of those aid is granted to poorer countries. The European contribution to the economic assistance that goes for reconstruction of Bosnia and Kosovo accounts for about 80 percent and they are the largest donors to Afghanistan as well. In 2001, the EU gave Afghanistan €352 million of food and humanitarian aid, and at a donors’ conference in Tokyo that was held in January 2002, the EU and its members

³⁴⁵ Vladimir Nosenko, “Soviet Policy in the Conflict”, in International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91 (edited by Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane), New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with St. Antony’s, 1994, p. 136.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 140.

³⁴⁷ Ken Matthews, op.cit., p. 82.

pledged a further €600 million for 2002. In addition to that, from the year of 2002 to until 2006, the EU has set aside €1 billion for Afghanistan.³⁴⁸ The money that goes to Afghanistan is being spent on projects such as the destruction of opium crops, the clearance of mines and also for the salaries of the Karzai administration.³⁴⁹ For the EU's involvement in peacekeeping operations, it can be mentioned that about 80 percent of the peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo are from EU countries, and The International Security Assistance Force that is maintaining order in Kabul is almost entirely European.³⁵⁰ All these examples demonstrate us the emergence of the process of cooperation in the wake of the international crises. The contribution of the Europeans has been significant especially in terms of economic and civil missions.

We can come to a conclusion that, although European powers criticized many of the US interventions during the 1990s, they have committed themselves to those US initiatives in the wake of the interventions. There are more Europeans than American forces in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The European forces even engaged in Kosovo without an explicit authorization from the UN and according to surveys, it was proven that Europeans are more willing than Americans to use force in order to end civil wars.³⁵¹ Therefore, in order to have an influence in the world politics, even though they criticize unilateral US initiatives, the Europeans engage in post-intervention process of the crises, such as witnessed in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The above mentioned points might be well applied to the recent Iraqi crisis. By taking into account the reality that such tensions in world politics do not lead to further crisis between the parties and they are transformed into cooperation eventually, it can be stated that a similar process of cooperation between the US and the European powers may emerge in the wake of the Iraqi crisis. As seen in their attempts to play a major role in the post-war Iraq, the Franco-German axis can play important roles in terms of the reconstruction process of Iraq, such as training the Iraqi security personnel and offering a debt relief for Iraq. Secretary of State

³⁴⁸ Charles Grant, op.cit., p. 137.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 137.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 143.

³⁵¹ Daniel Hamilton, "Three Strategic Challenges for a Global Transatlantic Partnership", European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, Issue 4, December 2003, p. 546.

Rice's and President Bush's visits to Europe in February 2005, which was noted in chapter IV, are major steps towards the establishment of formal cooperation process on Iraq. As noted before, these attempts are related with the US need of Franco-German axis' help in terms of justifying her invasion in Iraq. This is an open-ended process and it will be seen in the future whether a genuine cooperation will emerge between the transatlantic partners.

The so-called *division of labor* issue is important as well in terms of evaluating the wavering characteristic of the transatlantic relations. With regard to the military and power capabilities, the US occupies a commanding position in the world arena. Within this context it can be said that it has a superior nuclear power, dominant air force and a *"unique capability to project power around the globe"*.³⁵² We can simply witness this situation around the world. US forces are deployed almost in everywhere: in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, Turkey, Gulf region and etc. With her superior military capabilities and military technology, she has displayed this power, through military interventions, peacekeeping and war against terrorism, around the world.³⁵³ The military superiority of the US gives here an important edge in her relations with the Europeans. This is a fact in terms of the military power. However, it is not same with regard to the economic capabilities.

*To the extent that the European Union can act as a single entity on economic matters, this gives the EU a more balanced relationship with the United States on economic matters. This is in sharp contrast to the military arena where the US advantage is commanding or the political arena where the EU members are far from united on defense and foreign policy issues.*³⁵⁴

Just to give a striking example, the economy of the EU amounts to 7.9 trillion USD while the US economy amounts to 10.2 trillion USD in 2001.³⁵⁵ Without mentioning its economic power, it can easily be stated that the EU is unlikely to become a competing power against the US in the military and political field since it

³⁵² Jeremy Pressman, "If Not Balancing, What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony," BCSIA Discussion Paper 2004-02, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 2004, p. 3. See also Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American primacy in perspective," Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2002.

³⁵³ Jeremy Pressman, op.cit., p. 4.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., pp.10-11.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., p.11.

has been unable to formulate common policies. One can counter the superpower state in the arena that it has the equal capacity. This is the case for the EU in terms of economic means.

In terms of the categorization regarding the *'division of labor'* discussion between the US and Europe, it can be mentioned that the US and major European countries such as France, Germany, may enter into positive dialogue by assuming some specific roles. Therefore, division of labor in international roles of the EU and the US might be significant in terms of the prospects of cooperation between them in the wake of the Iraqi crisis. As Serhat Güvenç argues, "*...the US has a comparative advantage in hard military resources (which is undeniable), while the EU enjoys a comparative edge as a civilian power.*"³⁵⁶

Actually the success of the EU comes from its economic policies and instruments. In the field of economy, the EU has been able to introduce common and coherent policies. However, concerning the security and defense policies we cannot say the same thing. In this field, the members of the EU have been unable to introduce common and coherent foreign policies. This point can be witnessed concerning the Iraqi crisis. There was not a common position of the European powers. The Europeanist camp opposed the US action against Iraq, whereas the Atlanticist camp backed the US position.

The civilian role of the EU is important in terms of analyzing the attempts towards easing tensions in transatlantic relations in the wake of the Iraqi war. With its strong economic instruments, the EU can make important contributions in terms of Iraqi reconstruction process following the devastating war. Actually, the US wants the European countries to make financial contributions in Iraq. This was clearly witnessed during the 23-24 October 2003 International Donors Conference in Madrid, which was noted before. Within this framework, to support the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the UN Security council urged Member States and International financial institutions to make substantial pledges.

Some intellectuals argue that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU is the basis of its actorness in the international arena. On the contrary to this argument, Michael Smith puts it that "*the place to look for foreign policy is in the development of external economic policies.*"³⁵⁷ That means the role

³⁵⁶ Serhat Güvenç, *op.cit.*, p. 176.

of the EU in the international field is based upon its success on economic policies and economic capabilities. The EU has been a significant international actor thanks to its success in *'low politics'* instead of *'high politics'* in realist terms. Smith does not ignore the development of CFSP, but according to him, focusing alone on CFSP will be misleading.³⁵⁸ Within this context, he states that one should give attention not to CFSP, but to the economic policies of the EU. He argues that, *"My conclusion is that the 'true world' of EU foreign policy is to be found more plausibly in world political economy and its European expressions in the development of 'high politics'."*³⁵⁹

In accordance with this thought, it can be mentioned that the prospects of cooperation in Iraq might be significant within the framework of the so-called *'division of labor'* between the two sides of the Atlantic. The US may continue to provide security in Iraq, which is related with high politics, and the European countries may support Iraqi reconstruction in economic terms, which is related with low politics. Within this framework, the French and German efforts towards making a substantial debt relief for Iraq turns out to be significant, which was noted in chapter IV.

Just like Smith, Helene Sjursen as well dwells upon the division of labor. According to her, in the wake of the Cold War a division of labor emerged between the two sides of the Atlantic. Within this perspective, NATO became responsible for collective defense and the EU became responsible for the peacekeeping and crisis management.³⁶⁰

NATO has enormous military capabilities whereas the EU does not have. As Heiberg mentions, NATO has important military capabilities in terms of dealing with conflicts. On the other hand, the EU does not have this power. Therefore it can play a role as a mediator and aid giver in terms of the conflicts.³⁶¹ Having established

³⁵⁷ Michael Smith, "Does the flag follow trade? Politicisation and the emergence of a European foreign policy", in A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP (edited by John Peterson and Helene Sjursen), London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p.77

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p.78

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 83.

³⁶⁰ Helene Sjursen, "Missed opportunity or eternal fantasy? The idea of a European security and defence policy", in A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP (edited by John Peterson and Helene Sjursen), London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 102.

that, one should say that in terms of cooperation between the US and the EU, the EU can play a role with respect to mediation and reconstruction process.

The structural framework of the EU should be analyzed as well with regard to the 'division of labor' issue. We can notice three 'pillars' within the EU's organization.³⁶² Pillar I is the most powerful pillar. The economic policies, such as Common Agricultural Policy and Common Commercial Policy, are placed in this pillar. This pillar falls within Community competence and it has a supranational characteristic. The European Commission has significant authority in this field. By contrast, Pillar II and III have an intergovernmental feature. CFSP is placed in Pillar II, and Pillar III deals with cooperation in areas related to justice and home affairs.³⁶³

The 1993 Brussels European Council set out the following priority area for the CFSP joint action with regard to the Middle East: "*Support for the peace process through political, economic and financial means.*"³⁶⁴

With respect to the Middle East process, the EU has made substantial economic assistance to the Palestinians. The EU has become the principal donor. In 1996, it provided 45 percent of all assistance with 120 million dollars. The EU has made substantial contributions to the 'running costs' of the Palestinian Authority.³⁶⁵ This role of the EU with regard to peace process can also be assumed in Iraq. The EU, with its economic capabilities, may contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq within the perspective of the so-called 'division of labor' between the Atlantic partners.

In Hadar's analysis as well, the cooperation in the wake of the Iraqi crisis between the both sides of the Atlantic can be achieved through the so-called division of labor. According to him, to achieve peace and stability in the region and promote political and economic reform, the EU can effectively use its diplomatic and

³⁶¹ Esben Oust Heiberg, "Security Implications of EU Expansion to the North and East", in Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union (edited by Kjell A. Eliassen), London: SAGE Publications, 1998, p. 195.

³⁶² Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 9.

³⁶³ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁶⁴ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 183.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., p.186.

economic resources, while the Bush administration may achieve those aims through the use of its military power.³⁶⁶

Although the 'division of labor' issue may be important in terms of the future prospects for cooperation, according to some circles it can be detrimental to the US-European relations. For instance, Samantha Paige Davis argues that, the division of labor between the transatlantic partners should not be institutionalized. She goes on to argue that:

*The power struggle would relegate Europe to a permanent second-tier position within the military arena of the transatlantic relationship and would be detrimental to the broader US-EU relationship. Furthermore, an official division of labor that institutionalizes the EU's role as a civilian power would mask diverse national military preferences, most notably France and Britain's well-developed, strong military forces, within the EU.*³⁶⁷

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw as well is not in favor of the division of labor. According to him, "*The division of labor between the US and the EU is not absolute nor should it be.*"³⁶⁸ In addition to these negative thoughts with respect to the division of labor issue, whether the EU and the Franco-German axis are willing to play their traditional economic role and leave the security and foreign policy issues aside will be a key question that should be analyzed on the Iraqi case. That is why it is argued in the thesis that the mending the difference in transatlantic ties over the Iraqi invasion is an open-ended process.

The Greater Middle East Project, proposed by the US, will be important in terms of the emergence of new cooperation prospects between the allies. As Hamilton notes, peace winning, the transformation of the Middle East and homeland security, necessitate deeper strategic partnership between the US and the EU.³⁶⁹

The Greater Middle East Initiative can be an important instrument for the future cooperation process in transatlantic relations. On November 6, 2003 in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), President George W. Bush put forward his Middle East Doctrine and within this context, he described democratization of the region as the first priority of US strategy. He stated that:

³⁶⁶ Leon T. Hadar, op.cit., p. 17.

³⁶⁷ Samantha Paige Davis, op.cit., p. 231.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 231.

³⁶⁹ Daniel Hamilton, op.cit., p. 555.

*...As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo. Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.*³⁷⁰

Promoting democracy across the Middle East will serve strategic US national interests. It is a fact that, as most of the political scientists agree, democracies do not fight each other. And they are also the best regimes for ensuring both the domestic and international stability. As Patel puts it, as soon as the states of the Middle East are democratized, this would increase Western and US security by promoting regional stability and international order and by reducing the likelihood of violence and terror in the region.³⁷¹ Therefore the US initiative would create new cooperation areas in transatlantic relations ranging from politics and economics to cultural, scientific affairs.

The term of The Greater Middle East has been replaced by the term “*Broader Middle East Project*” with the borders starting from North Africa and ending in the Southeast Asia.³⁷² The population of the mentioned region is mainly Moslem. The Greater Middle East Project was firstly promoted by the US and then the European powers did not stay reckless in terms of the realization of the project.³⁷³ The project aims to change the status-quo starting from the Middle East region. As Hasan Cemal points it out, global terrorism stems from this geography, and therefore in order to cut the vessels that feed that fundamentalist terrorism, the region must be integrated with the world economically, politically and culturally.³⁷⁴ The global terrorist threat is perceived not only by the US but by the Europeans as well. The fight against terrorism needs cooperation between the US and the Europeans. In short, the Europeans, where 14 million Moslems live, cannot be reckless on the issue of change in the Islamic geography. For instance, during the

³⁷⁰ Mumukshu Patel, “Democratizing The Middle East: Are we upto the Task?” (Policy Brief on Democratization), National Academy of Public Administration, November 28, 2003, p. 2.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁷² Hasan Cemal, “Büyük Ortadoğu (1)”, Milliyet, 02.03.2004.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

meeting between the US President Bush and German Chancellor Schroeder on February 27th 2004, both leaders agreed in principle on the Greater Middle East Project.³⁷⁵ It was a significant development with regard to the disappearance of differences between the parties emerged as a result of the Iraqi issue. Although the US and the European powers may diverge on the mechanisms and methods, the need for transformation of the current order within the region is in the interest of transatlantic partners and they are well aware of this situation. On the other hand, the experience of the Iraqi crisis demonstrated us that the US could not play the game in the Middle East by herself. In order to improve the impressions of the Middle Eastern people towards herself, the US needs the European Union and therefore has to persuade the German-French axis.³⁷⁶ As mentioned within this thesis, the threats stemming from the region, mainly terrorism is not only directed to US but to the European powers as well. Maintaining the secure flow of the energy resources is vital not only for the US but for the European powers as well. Taking into consideration that fact, it is illogical to expect that the US would ignore the EU regarding the realization of the project. The project offers a significant option ahead for the EU in terms of the formation of a cooperation model that would counterbalance and supervise the US within the region.³⁷⁷ The communist threat led the US and its Western allies to forge a joint platform to fight with it over half century. Cemal argues that, in the current era, even though communist threat had disappeared; now the terrorist threat instead replaced it as the main enemy against Western values and rules, such as democracy, supremacy of law and etc.³⁷⁸ It is more reasonable to expect that the transatlantic allies will stand side by side against terrorism, just as they did against communism. The new threat was named as “*New Totalitarianism*” by German Chancellor Schroeder.³⁷⁹ And the Greater Middle East Initiative offers a prominent platform in terms of fighting against the new threat.

Although the Greater Middle East Initiative presents significant insight in terms of the prospects of cooperation, it is not clearly defined yet. With the

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Hasan Cemal, “Büyük Ortadoğu (4)”, Milliyet, 05.03.2004.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Hasan Cemal, “Büyük Ortadoğu (5)”, Milliyet, 06.03.2004.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

mentioned initiative the US wants to restructure and reproduce the power structures of security, production, knowledge, energy, trade and transportation in the name of having a direct control over those structures. The invasion of Iraq came to the agenda within this perspective. Now, with the need of justifying her invasion, she is approaching to Franco-German axis. That is why the US wants the involvement of the axis into the Iraqi restructuring process. The Franco-German axis as well tries to involve into the process to counterbalance the emergence of US dominance in the reproducing process of structures. These are the prominent aspects of the Greater Middle East Initiative. However, it is a fact that the EU has a *Euro-Med* strategy towards the countries of the region which became prominent with the Barcelona process as noted before. This policy can be regarded as the EU's own defining of structuralism and as a competing strategy of the EU against the Greater Middle East Project of the US. Therefore, whether the EU is willing to cooperate with the US on the Greater Middle East project will be a key question which will be seen in the coming future. All these points reveal the fact that the cooperation process in transatlantic relations has an open-ended feature.

In short, with the attempts towards mending the transatlantic relations on the morrow of the Iraqi war, the US has been trying to involve the Franco-German axis into reproducing process of the power structures. The initiatives noted in the above chapter should be evaluated within this framework. However, it should be noted as well that the involvement of the Franco-German axis into the restructuring process of the power structures by the US is an open-ended process. This open-ended process can be understood by taking into account the policies of the transatlantic powers. The US definitely needs the help of the Franco-German axis in Iraqi business in order to justify her invasion in Iraq. The Franco-German axis as well tries to engage in Iraqi business in order to compete with the US intention of reproducing the structures in accordance with her dominance. However, the key question is that the Franco-Germans axis is willing to extend the limits of its involvement in the noted process. Whether the US will give an extended role to the Franco-German axis in the restructuring process of Iraq within the framework of power structures will be a major dilemma in transatlantic relations.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this thesis it is argued that the structures of power in world politics play important roles in determining the state of international relations in general and the transatlantic relations in particular. One cannot understand the US Iraqi invasion and the French-German reaction against it without taking into consideration the primary and secondary structures of power in global politics. The intention of reproducing the security, production, energy, transportation and trade structures led the US to intervene into Iraq. The control over those structures would be significant in order to perpetuate the US control over Middle East. Evaluating the US Iraqi invasion within this perspective, the opposition of the Franco-German axis could be well understood. The importance of the structures of power is taken into consideration by the axis as well. So, they would not want to see the end of their influence in Middle Eastern politics. That was why they opposed the US invasion. However, as demonstrated within the thesis, there are strong indications that the Franco-German axis would be inclined towards entering into dialog with the US over Iraq. The importance of the structures of power comes to the agenda within this perspective as well. The shared interests of the parties make it necessary for them to carry on the cooperation process on a formal basis. Hence, the power structures in global politics turn out to be significant both in terms of understanding the main causes of tension in transatlantic relations and in terms of analyzing the prospects for cooperation.

The tension witnessed in transatlantic relations during the Cold War years was analyzed within the framework of the structural analysis. Those policies could be named as renegotiating efforts of the French and German presidents in the bipolar international system. The efforts were not intended to destroy the Cold War logic but rather to ease the restrictions of the structure imposed upon them. The re-organized policy of the US as to have a direct influence over the structural power, especially in terms of energy structure, and the major interests of the transatlantic powers in the Middle East show that there is a continuation in terms of power

struggle over power structures. It was demonstrated that the powers do have corresponding interests in the region, such as reaching the oil resources at reasonable prices and maintaining the security of the region. The shared interests would be a significant aspect of the relations in order to follow up the open-ended process in cooperation efforts. The general causes of the tension in transatlantic relations within the structural perspective also show that there are some differences of world views on both sides of the Atlantic. Within this context, the collapse of the Cold War system, the challenge to the US unilateralism and her hegemonic position, which are all related with the structural analysis, can be taken up as parts and parcels of the whole power structure. The attempts by both sides towards mending the fences in transatlantic relations suggest that both sides are willing to coordinate their policies in the Middle East due to the fact that they have overlapping interests. The wavering characteristic of the transatlantic relations shows that it is an open ended process. The general trend of the *crisis-intervention-cooperation* cycles in international relations and its importance for the prospects of cooperation on the morrow of the Iraqi tension, the effects of the so-called *division of labor* arguments on the cooperation efforts and the opportunities and dilemmas presented by the *Greater Middle East* initiative are parts and parcels of the wavering feature of the transatlantic relations. It can be pointed out that the existence of the problems between the powers and the opportunities for cooperation are two sides of the same coin which should be all taken into consideration to assess the future of the relations.

As displayed above, the US intention of reorganizing her policy towards the Middle East and reproducing the power structures as to have a direct influence over them turned out to be one of the most prominent rhetoric behind the opposition of the Franco-German axis as shown on the Iraqi case. The Iraqi invasion became the most striking facet of this reorganized US policy. This structural analysis presents significant framework to understand the wavering characteristic of the transatlantic relations. This framework, however, is significant as well for the prospects of cooperation on the morrow of the Iraqi war. With the aim of justifying her invasion in Iraq, the US needed the support of the Franco-German axis. This approach was welcomed by the axis in order to see its aim of preventing the possession of the power structures by the US and therefore maintaining her dominance in the region. The mutual efforts might be regarded as an involving process of the Franco-German axis into the reproducing mechanism of the structural power. It is a fact that the axis

aims to have an extended role in this process which became clear with the wording of *effective multilateralism* put in the conclusions of the Brussels summit on 16/17 December 2004. Whether the US would raise objection to these intentions will be a prominent aspect of the future of transatlantic relations. All these points reveal the fact that the prospects for cooperation in transatlantic relations are an open-ended process.

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