

DISCOURSES OF KEMALISM AND ISLAMISM ON
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EU - TURKEY RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

DISCOURSES OF KEMALISM AND ISLAMISM ON THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EU - TURKEY RELATIONS

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This thesis aims at defining and analyzing the positions of Kemalism and Islamism about the relationship between the European Union and Turkey, with respect to identity and political reform. The study is conducted by the usage of academic literature and examples of the writings of intellectuals from both positions; in order to analyze their discourses on the issue.

With respect to the political dimension of EU - Turkey relations, the problems and EU demands on democracy, human rights, minority rights - with emphasis on the Kurdish problem - and Cyprus are explained. The viewpoint and discourses of the two positions on these issues are discussed in relation to their historical attitudes towards the West and the EU.

Keywords: Westernization, Identity Politics, Kemalism, Turkish Islamism, European Union.

ÖZ

KEMALİZM VE İSLAMCILIĞIN AB - TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİNİN SİYASİ BOYUTU HAKKINDAKİ SÖYLEMLERİ

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Bu tez Kemalizm ve İslamcılığın Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkinin kimlik ve siyasi reform açılarından tanımlanmasını ve değerlendirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, bu düşünce gruplarının konu hakkındaki söylemlerinin değerlendirilmesi için akademik literatür ile Kemalist ve İslamcı entelektüellerin yazı örneklerinin kullanımı yoluyla gerçekleştirilmektedir.

Avrupa Birliği - Türkiye ilişkilerinin siyasi boyutu ile ilgili olarak demokrasi, insan hakları, azınlık hakları - ağırlıklı Kürt sorunu - ve Kıbrıs konularındaki sorunlar ve AB talepleri açıklanmaktadır. İki yaklaşımın bu konulara bakış açıları ve söylemleri, Batı ve AB'ye yönelik tarihsel tutumları ile ilintili olarak tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Batılılaşma, Kimlik Politikaları, Kemalizm, Türkiye İslamcılığı, Avrupa Birliği.

To Whom I Love, a Formal Apology

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF “THE WEST” AND FORMATION OF KEMALIST AND ISLAMIST DISCOURSES

For Turkey, the EU is one of the most important foreign policy issues. Moreover, the issue of membership has become a focal point of identity and a key political controversy in the domestic realm. Party programs touched upon the issue of EU-membership, slogans against or in favor of the EU have been heard in election campaigns, civic associations - including those of the business and trade unions - have voiced arguments about different aspects of the EU, Turkish media and academia have been increasingly interested in and initiative of debates related to EU - Turkey relations, public opinion researches were conducted and used in these debates. As much as, maybe more than, being a foreign policy choice, EU membership has become an issue of domestic politics with much publicity since the application for full membership in 1987, and especially after the Helsinki Decision for Turkey's candidacy (1999) which has institutionalized a framework of economic, legal and political reform that would radically alter the present political system through the Copenhagen Criteria. The EU also became an actor and a source of pressure that can alter traditional Turkish foreign policy choices about Greece and Cyprus.

The reason for the centrality of the EU debate in Turkey, stems from the characteristics of political identity formation which has emerged and evolved in relation and in reaction to the West - of which the EU is perceived to be an important part. Hence, fulfillment of the political requirements of EU membership, of domestic political reform and alteration of foreign policy, becomes a complex process whereby attitudes towards the regime and the official identity seem to be more decisive than attitudes towards the EU.

Contemporary political divisions on the EU in Turkey may be said to have crystallized around Kemalism/secularism/nationalism versus Islamism/Kurdism - along with the liberal stance with less public appeal. As the post-Helsinki period shifted the focus of relations from predominantly economic to the political, the

Kemalists, who have traditionally been pro-Western and pro-EU (as a deduction of their pro-Western position), became increasingly Euro-skeptic, while Islamists gained a pro-EU attitude, largely due to their critique of the Kemalist regime which has been limiting their political freedoms especially after the February 28 intervention.

This shift in the positions of the Kemalists and Islamists in Turkey seems to be extremely important, given that it has major repercussions in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. More important, it signals a radical shift in identity politics, since such a shift requires a questioning and reformation of identity and discursive alliances in both positions, in the context of Turkey.

This study starts with the question of how this shift has occurred; it aims at an analysis, deciphering the philosophical-discursive, social and political possibilities available for the positions of Kemalism and Islamism in relation to the political dimension of EU - Turkey relations. Whereas Kemalism is predominantly approached as the official ideology of a modernizing republic, Islamism is understood as a counter-hegemonic movement in Turkey, employing a body of discourses which have appeared as a reaction to some aspects of the Kemalist regime.

Kemalism, in addition to its role in the composition of Turkish political structure, provides a discursive area for a group of people who have internalized its ideological components. Accordingly, the assessments on Kemalism in this study include Kemalists' positions as well as aspects of the political regime that are related to Kemalist-Islamist division in the context of political relationship between EU and Turkey.

The discourse of Kemalism is provided by various actors: The civilian and military bureaucracy, civil society organizations, political parties and individuals. So too, is the discourse of Islamism, provided by religious communities, political parties, NGO's, fundamentalist movements (not included in the study for their limited appeal to the society and questionable influence in Turkish politics), also individuals. In addition to the usage of academic resources that reflect the discourses through these various actors in this study, the positions of Kemalists and Islamists are exemplified through the views of intellectuals from both positions. Free from institutional responsibility required by the Kemalist bureaucracy or by the cadre of

Islamic organizations, and free from electoral considerations of political parties, intellectuals form a valuable resource for a deeper look at the attitudes and discursive styles of the related positions. Taking account of intellectuals' views provides the opportunity to enter a more detailed analysis and a more comprehensive framework for evaluation.

The writings of Erol Manisalı and Mümtaz Soysal for Kemalism, the views of Ali Bulaç and Ahmet Taşgetiren for Islamism, are used as case studies. Educational, political or organization backgrounds of these writers were considered, as well as the variance in their focus and discursive style, during the selection. Their publications from early 1990's - the period when Turkey's membership prospect seemed dim, was searched through, to decipher their early positions on the EU. The period between June 1999 - when Turkey was declared a candidate, to December 2004 - when it was decided in the EU to start accession negotiations with Turkey, were analyzed in more detail to find out whether or not the discursive shifts diagnosed in secondary resources, happened.

By the usage of examples from these intellectuals, contents of this study are organized as follows:

The "Introduction" presents the historical roots of Kemalism and Islamism in the late-Ottoman period in relation to the question of the West, in addition to the general presentation of the study. The rest of the study is divided into three Chapters. The Chapter called "The Political Dimension of EU - Turkey Relations", begins with a short introduction of the history of the political dimension as reflected in official documents of the EU and Turkish governments. The areas of demand by the EU for alteration of Turkish politics are divided into three sections: Democracy and human rights, minority rights and foreign policy. The historical roots and problems in these demand areas are presented with a focus on the issues which are most debated. Related governmental reforms are also recorded in this section.

The discourse of Kemalism and Islamism are approached in the next part in their respective chapters, named as "Discourse of Kemalism on the Political Dimension of EU - Turkey Relations" and "Discourse of Islamism on the Political Dimension of EU - Turkey Relations". After presenting the major actors using these discourses, historical roots and ideological components of these discourses are specified. Their general attitudes towards the West and the EU are analyzed in

relation to these specifications. Issue-based sub-sections follow, for representing particular standpoints which may be compared with the general approach of the discourse towards the EU. Elaboration on the views of Manisalı, Soysal, Bulaç and Taşgetiren are placed under these sections as cases in relation to the general assessments made on the discursive positions.

In “Conclusion”, an analytical comparison is made between the discursive positions studied, and their respective shifts are assessed contextually.

In order to evaluate the attitudes and the resulting discourses of Kemalists and Islamists on the relationship of Turkey with the EU, it is important to take the late Ottoman period, when the question of the West entered into Turkey’s political agenda, into account. The political and philosophical bases of the two discourses in this period, are presented briefly below.

The question of the West in late Ottoman period, facilitated the formation of currents of thought in relation to it. Part of the political discourses that evolved in the late Ottoman period, was effective on the cadre which established the Turkish Republic and crystallized its ideology as Kemalism. Islamism, as a discourse emerged in the same period, also had repercussions in the formation of Islamic thought during the Republic. Despite the effect of Islamic fundamentalism born in the region in 1960’s, discursive positions within mainstream Turkish Islamism still share characteristics with the Islamic revival which took place in the late Ottoman period. Accordingly, the roots of attitudes and discourses of Kemalism and Islamism towards the EU, could be found back in the history of Turkish modernization from the Ottoman Empire onwards, whereby the West has been an enemy to fight, a model to imitate, a culture to be protected from, a club of fortunate states to be joined all at the same time. The paradox in the practice of modernization as Westernization has been carried by clashing discourses on Turkey’s identity up to date; from the currents of Ottoman political thought aimed at re-attaining imperial power vis-à-vis colonialist attacks, to contemporary political discourses in Turkey aimed at pursuing alternative paths for Turkey’s progress and development.

The Ottomans and Europeans met through war. The Ottomans, coming from the East, aimed to move towards the West/Europe as their tiny state grew into an

empire. This process involved war, booty and conquest.¹ Throughout the Middle Age, expanded up to one third of European territory, the Ottoman state has been “*in Europe but not from Europe*”; it has never been considered as “European” by the Europeans. On the contrary, Ottomans and Turks have been regarded as one of the “others” of Europe in its consistent redefinition of the self since Ancient Greece. The repercussions of this “negative” definition of Europe’s self have become visible in some negative attitudes towards Turkey’s membership in the EU by Europeans today.²

On the part of the Ottomans, there has not occurred much need to interact with Europe besides war or trade until the 18th century, as Europe meant Christendom; it was alien and discredited to be of any influence besides the importation of, i.e., arms technology, that could be used for defeating it.³ With military setbacks and loss of territory in Europe in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, there emerged a perception in the Ottoman Empire that the Empire was in a decline and the West was rising as a power with better technology. Accordingly, Ottoman statesmen started seeking ways for reform, which would help the Empire overcome lagging behind. Europe was first observed, to decipher the political and technological aspects of its civilization. Mainly military technologies, structures and education styles were imported in this period, along with developments in areas like medicine.⁴ According to Ahmad, the Ottoman state, centralized and authoritarian in its formation, thus lacking the structural flexibility that would enable adaptation to the system that led to Europe’s success, most reasonably started reformation with the military.⁵ However, this choice may also be attributed to the lack of interest on the part of the Ottoman-Muslim statesmen to adapt the country to the non-material aspects of this civilization.

¹ Ahmet Özer, *Tanzimat’tan Bugüne Batılılaşma ve Avrupa Birliği* (Ankara: Elips Kitap, 2003), 89-90.

² A. Nuri Yurdusev, “Avrupa’yı Kurmak, Türkiye’yi İdare Etmek ve Tarihin İpoteğinden Kurtulmak” in *Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), 161, 165, 167. Also see Meltem Müftüler-Baç. “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 4, (October 1998), 240-241.

³ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 40-44.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 45-53.

⁵ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 20-22.

Nonetheless, Ottoman reform continued into the next century in areas other than technology. Modernization spread from this material core to change in all areas of life, thus took its form known as “Westernization”. After all, the problem of the Ottoman state was not confined to military loss. The aspiration was to have a better place in the emergent world economy, and this required not only military, but also, political, economic and societal transformation.⁶ Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), one of the earliest reformers who took modernization as a whole, introduced a centralized administrative framework, educational modernization, and Westernization of manners, clothing and life style, along with further reforms in the military.⁷

Western influence on political thought started with the French Revolution, but the effects were on the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire at first, who had been left outside the ruling elite. Ottoman Westernization became encompassing of rights for the imperial subjects with the *Tanzimat* (re-organization) period, started in 1839, after Mahmud II. Fundamental rights and freedoms, such as right to life and property, fair trial and equality before the law, were “granted” by the state with imperial Charters of 1839 and 1856, to a people who were, however, not yet “citizens”.⁸

As a result of the modernizing reforms, a group of Muslim bureaucrats and intellectuals had emerged. They were raised with Western values and took interest in resolving the problems of the Empire which was further defeated by the West. Seeing remedy in the decentralization of the state and restriction of the powers of Sultan, they were organized in the late 1860’s with the name of “Young Ottomans”⁹. After a series of clashes among the political elite, their aspirations turned into the proclamation of the first “Constitution” of the Empire (1876) which legally limited Sultan’s power in a system on constitutional monarchy - as they aspired with their libertarian views¹⁰ modeling the French Revolution.¹¹ After a period of despotic rule

⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁷ Lewis, 75-101.

⁸ Lewis, 105-108, 115-116; Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 4.

⁹ Or “Young Turks,” as they took both names. However, the term “Young Turk” is used more in relation to the modernist political movement started in the late 1880’s, that was organized around the Committee of Union and Progress, while the earlier reformists were also in support of it.

¹⁰ According to Mardin, the Young Turks, who made the 1908 revolution, was based their ideas on the Young Ottomans of this period. However, he differentiates the two movements with their approach to rule. He states that while both movements aspired liberty from Sultan’s power, Young Ottomans were

(1878-1908) by Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), the Westernist cadre, organized around the *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress-CUP; established by low-rank military officers with discontent in Abdülhamid II's political regime in 1889¹²) restored the Constitutional order, with much more political power than the *Tanzimat* generation had.

The period of Abdülhamid II's reign was marked by excessive modernization, despite the repression of the modernist cadre that formed his political opponents. In fact, the *Tanzimat* reforms - legal, administrative and educational - were taken to their peak in this period.¹³ However, it has been the Young Turks, who could manage a more radical regime of Westernization than envisaged by any modernizing Sultan or group before the rule of the CUP.¹⁴ It has been the culmination of Westernization and policies of the CUP which had bred Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues who controlled the War of Independence in the absence of the leadership of CUP or Sultan to organize warfare after the defeat in the First World War.¹⁵ Taking the *Tanzimat* to its logical end, establishing a secular Republic compatible with Civilization, was accomplished by Mustafa Kemal and his cadre, through reforms of the 1920's.¹⁶ Not only Westernism, but also nationalism of the CUP period was carried into the new state through the cadre that made the War of Independence¹⁷.

During the late 19th century, three different policies of identity were followed, in order to find a remedy to the disintegration of the Empire. These were

genuinely liberal. See Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1992), 31.

¹¹ Lewis, 143-161.

¹² *Ibid.*, 5, 21.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 174-175.

¹⁴ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 153.

¹⁵ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 8.

¹⁶ Ayşe Kadioğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 1996): 180.

¹⁷ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 48-49. As Mardin explains, the late Ottoman period had developed a "Westernism" which has evolved out of the Westernization attempts, that created a new, "Enlightened" political-bureaucratic cadre. It became an ideology by itself and it was embraced by the early Republican elite - together with nationalism,. See Şerif Mardin, "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes," *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 2005): 154.

Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and Turkism¹⁸. These were policies aimed at practical aims; rather than becoming coherent ideologies, they were utilized by overlapping people at intersecting times.

Ottomanism was advocated by the Young Ottomans, the reformers of the *Tanzimat* period, and part of the Young Turks who made the CUP-led revolution in 1908. In their view, all the various religious and ethnic communities that formed the society, could be held together in a liberal regime that would encompass these different identities and aspirations under a newly defined Ottoman nation¹⁹. However, as the non-Muslim communities aspired and succeeded in establishing their own nation-states, this policy lost root.

Another remedy was found in pan-Islamism, in the second half of the 19th century, as a way to unite the Muslim world against western domination under the Caliphate. Westernists of the *Tanzimat*, Abdülhamid II himself and even the more Turkist-nationalistic line of the CUP followed such policy, until the early 20th century when other Muslim communities than the Turks disengaged from the Empire for their own nation-states and as Islamic identity was being used against the political power of the CUP in the aftermath of the 1908 Revolution - in protest of the rationalization of life as requirements of modernity were understood by this Westernist cadre.²⁰

The people comprising the ruling elite, those Muslim in belief and Turkish in origin, were naturally the last group to embrace the idea of nationalism which entered the Ottoman political discourses through various channels of effect - i.e., French Revolution, Russian Turkists, European Turkologues - during the early 19th century. Turkists sought and stressed pre-Islamic references of identity, but Islam remained to be part of this identity for those intellectuals who, in the second half of the century, influenced the modernist political elite. Rather than connoting irridentist aspirations, Turkish nationalism came to be another identity policy for those who were left within the borders of the shrinking Empire - as it entered the Kemalist thought. Nationalism as meaning loyalty to the group was not powerful during the

¹⁸ As argued by Akçura, one of the first leading nationalists in the period, who coined these policies as he criticized and refuted the former two.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 36; Lewis, 320, 333; Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908*, 275-276.

²⁰ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 36-39; *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*, 156; Lewis, 334-337.

Empire, the structure of which disabled a territorial and political nation. Rather, it was used as a policy by the Young Turks when they had to give up the other two, due to the loss of opportunity in the changing context of the social base. In other words, the nationalism of the Westernized Ottoman elite was a strategy to provide the allegiance of the society to the state, as aspired by the former two policies.²¹

Through these policies of identity, the aim remained the same: Survival of the state. According to Mardin, one cannot speak of a “history of Turkish thought” in the 19th century. No original ideas were developed; they were imported, including Turkism. The intellectuals and the politicians of the time moved from the need of protecting the power of the state, to the acknowledgement of a need for structural change to accomplish that, to the eventual change of the political thought. What motivated political action of the Young Turks - and Young Ottomans - in this period was not the ideas of the Enlightenment and French revolution, but the discrepancy between their ideal society - formed by the admiration of Western political structures rather than inspiration from Western philosophy - and that shaped by Abdülhamid II.²²

The legacy of the Ottoman modernization with this preoccupation with the state²³ and with its modernizers being among the state elite - especially the military, had repercussions in the regime created by Kemalism of the Republican period. The Ottoman disintegration by intrusion and occupation by western powers also made this legacy undeniable by the Islamists of the Republican period, who preferred at times, to stand on the side of the state, even though it fostered a system contrary to their interests. It also had effect on the formation of attitudes towards the EU as soon as the prospect of membership became conditioned upon demands that were perceived to require reduction in sovereignty and integrity.²⁴

²¹ Lewis, 328-349; Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*, 154-156; Selahattin Hilav, “Düşünce Tarihi (1908-1980)” in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye: 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), 361-362; Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 306-307.

²² Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 16-19, 22-23.

²³ Nilgün Toker and Serdar Tekin, “Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: ‘Kamusuz Cumhuriyet’ten ‘Kamusuz Demokrasi’ye” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 82.

in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil

²⁴ These themes are elaborated below, in the Chapters on Kemalism and Islamism.

Whereas modernity is a universal project by definition, non-western societies have perceived modernization along the lines of the dichotomy of the East and the West. Accordingly, modernization was equated with Westernization²⁵; resulting in a clash of the non-western identity with that of the West and resistance. Thus, modernization of the Ottoman Turks, as many other peoples, has become “Westernization in spite of the West”²⁶. The problematic entrance of the West in Ottoman political agenda, as an enemy and as a model at the same time, created a paradox that is still not resolved. While modernization started to occupy more and more place in the Ottoman structure in the form of Westernization, identity politics were formed against the West.

As Kadiođlu explains, during the intensive Westernization of the *Tanzimat* period: “...the dilemma of the achievement of a balance between the materiality of the West and the spirituality of the East became quite clear.”²⁷. The dilemma was tried to be resolved by the assumption that the West could be divided into its structural components and modeled by its parts. This had been the dominant aim of Islamism and Turkism²⁸. What was important for those who resisted modernization/Westernization became the cultural, as manifested in Gökalp’s differentiation of civilization and culture (*medeniyet ve hars*); the suggestion was to import the material aspects of the West that made it superior, while keeping the culture intact and untouched.²⁹ In other words, resistance to modernity was at the cultural, while the West connoted the material aspects of Civilization. This assumption made Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism close enough, that the intellectuals of the time associated with any of the three currents have common

²⁵ Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “Bir Zihniyet, Kurum ve Kimlik Kurucusu Olarak Batılılaşma” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 126.

²⁶ The phrase points at the paradoxical situation met by the Ottomans and other societies, which includes the resistance towards military, political, economic and cultural domination of the West - in other words, colonialism - and the simultaneous effort for becoming like the West in order to end this domination.

²⁷ Kadiođlu, 180.

²⁸ Çiğdem Nas, “Turkish Identity and the Perception of Europe,” *Marmara Journal of European Studies* 9, no. 1 (2001): 180; Zerrin Kurtođlu, “Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Siyaset: Pozitivist Yönetim İdeolojisinin İslam’ın Siyasallaşmasına Katkısı” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 201-202.

²⁹ İlhan Tekeli, “Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişim Konusunda bir Üst Anlatı” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 30-34. Also see Kadiođlu, 183.

suggestions with the others. As the principal agent of modernization, Westernization has been the determinant theme in “mentality”, “institution” and “identity” formation in the past century either as an ingredient or as a “constitutive other” of its opponents in Turkey. The three currents of political thought mainly disagreed upon the ingredients of the West that were cultural, as they aimed at preserving these.³⁰

Turkism, as transferred to the Republic by the CUP policies, was combined with Westernism in a way which, by no means, remained unproblematic. Even today, attitudes of Kemalists are inconsistent about the desirability of EU membership, because the deductions made from the principles of the Kemalist ideology oscillate between anchoring Turkey to the West and preserving its national identity which was built outside the realm of the West – perhaps more in reaction to it rather than modeling it³¹.

However, rapprochement with the West has been even harder for the Islamic thought, which evolved as a locally based reaction to Western domination in the late Ottoman period, in addition to its being instrumentalized for state policy during the reign of Abdülhamid II. The political transformation of Turkey along Westernist lines has created the dichotomy of progressivism-reactionarism and center-periphery conflict³². While the Westernizing attempts of the Ottoman state created a secular bureaucracy which increasingly occupied the center; the *ulema*, with its endangered position within the state³³, and the Muslim masses which were alienated from the state, aimed at the restoration of the Islamic order in the late 19th century. While these radical Islamists were engaged in revolts especially during the CUP government, moderate Islamism was also present in the country. Knowing the Western canon and Islamic script, moderate Islamist intellectuals discredited the philosophical and spiritual values of the West - which were translated into educational, political and legal transformation of the state by the Westernizers - and advocated the limitation of Western influence to the material realm of science and technology. They advocated the return to Islam as the ultimate solution to the

³⁰ Kahraman, 125-126.

³¹ See Kadioğlu.

³² Ibid., 131, 135-137.

³³ Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” 149.

problems of the Empire.³⁴ Although it may be argued that Islamism in contemporary Turkey owes its discourse to the rise of religious fundamentalism in the region after the beginning of the 1960's, the legacy of Ottoman Islamism and the traditional structuration of Islam during the Ottoman Empire – i.e., religious communities and *millet* system – have continued to shape the Islamic attitudes and suggestions which are evaluated in relation to the EU membership debates in this study.

Before further elaboration on the Kemalist ideology and Turkish Islamism in their relationship with the West and the EU, the following Chapter presents the political problems between the EC/EU and Turkey, formed in close relationship with the Kemalist establishment in Turkish domestic and foreign policy structure. The resistance to the Kemalist state by Turkish Islamism, which started supporting the EU based reforms presented below, will be studied in detail in its related Chapter.

³⁴ Lewis, 229-231.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EU - TURKEY RELATIONS

As the EU evolved from being predominantly an economic integration scheme towards becoming an organization with coherent political structures and standards, its relationship with Turkey as a candidate, increasingly gained a political dimension. A democratic regime that respects human rights, became a fundamental source of expectation from the country, along with respect for and protection of minorities, as such political criteria were set for the candidates. This political dimension started to gain more weight and affect Turkey's membership prospect especially after the decision of the EU to declare Turkey as a candidate in 1999. The process of legislative change towards democratization accelerated in the country since then. Another aspect of the political dimension of EU membership process in the case of Turkey, is the questioning of some traditional aspects of foreign policy of the country by the organization. While the process and contents of these demands for change are elaborated below, their repercussions in the domestic political debate, will be analyzed in the following Chapters.

2.1. The Political Relationship between Turkey and the EU During the Membership Process

In line with the modernist/Westernist ideology of the founders of the republic and in line with historical reflections - considering that Russia has been the most consistent enemy for the existence of the Ottoman state and territory³⁵; the alignment chosen for Turkey, has been with the West during the Cold War. Turkey joined Western international organizations, with such motivations. It became a member of the OECD (1948), Council of Europe (1949), NATO (1952); an associate member of the WEU (1991). With the EEC, the country entered into an association agreement (Ankara Agreement) in 1963 expanded with an Additional Protocol in 1970, with the

³⁵ "Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35(4), (October 1999), 164-165.

aim of a customs union and an eventual membership. Turkey applied for full membership in 1987³⁶, which was rejected by the organization in 1989. Turkey entered into the Customs Union with the EU as envisaged by the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, in 1996.³⁷ However, it was excluded from the wave of post-Cold War enlargement towards the East in 1997. Nevertheless, it became a candidate for full membership in 1999 and the negotiations are to be started in October 2005.

The EC/EU has problematized Turkey's state of democracy through various organs and means such as reports, opinions, decisions, speeches of officials and leaders of its member states since the application for full membership in 1987. As democratic conditionality increasingly became part of EU policy - with the issuing of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), incorporation of these criteria to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union (1997) - and Turkey's membership process gained a related framework (1999, onwards), political demands of the EU turned into expectations for a large-scale transformation in the regime. Methods for providing this change in Turkey have ranged from denunciation and suspension of aid to providing incentives, the biggest of which, is the prospect of membership desired by Turkey. However, the political demands of the EU have been fulfilled with hesitation and even suspicion by the governments. Other political actors have also approached these demands with a perception of threat rather than a vision of reform. Many in Turkey criticize the democratic conditionality in Turkey's membership as a scapegoat for the European politicians who are against Turkey's inclusion for other reasons such as identity, economic burden of an underdeveloped economy and high population. However, national interests of member states and motivations behind the establishment and the supranational character of the organization should be considered in evaluating EU demands from Turkey.

Nonetheless, the most important and most fruitful area within the political dimension of EU - Turkey relations has been democracy and human rights. These issues started to affect EC/EU-Turkey relations after the 1980 military takeover in the country. Along with Council of Europe and international human rights NGO's

³⁶ Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics," *East European Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (June 2000): 161.

³⁷ William Park, "Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxemburg to Helsinki - to Ankara?," *Mediterranean Politics* 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 31.

such as Amnesty International, various EEC/EC organs started to scrutinize and report on the situation of democracy in Turkey. The Community continued to freeze the Fourth Protocol to the Association Agreement, arranging financial aid.³⁸ Not only the political system, but also the foreign relations of Turkey have been criticized by the organization, based on a requirement of peaceful relations with member states. Greece-Turkey relations and the related problem of Cyprus have dominated the agenda of Turkey's membership process since 1974. The negative reaction of the international community through UN decisions - started with the extension of Turkey's intervention on the island³⁹, has been reflected in the EC attitude towards Turkey. Although the country was found to be eligible for membership, the EC declined Turkey's application for membership in 1989. The related Commission Opinion listed the problems with democracy, human rights, Kurdish problem, disputes with Greece and the situation in Cyprus, in addition to economic backwardness of the country and the situation of the Community not ready for enlargement as the reasons of rejection.⁴⁰ Heated by the application of Greek Cypriot state for membership in 1990, it was declared at the Dublin Summit of the same year, that Turkey had to alter its Cyprus policy in order to preserve good relations with the Community.⁴¹

In the 1990's, political criteria for Turkey's membership increasingly occupied the agenda of EU-Turkey relations, due partly to the intensity in relations created by Turkey's application for membership⁴² and partly to the internal aspects of the organization. The Treaty of the European Union firmly conditioned eligibility for membership upon democracy and free market economy (in its consolidated version, as recorded below). As the EC turned into the EU, the weight of the EP (European Parliament) - the organ through which political sensitivities, especially on democracy

³⁸ İhsan D. Dağı, "Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of the European Diplomacy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 1996): 128-131, 134-135.

³⁹ Nasuh Uslu, "Türk Tarafı Açısından Kıbrıs Sorununun Boyutları" in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), 229.

⁴⁰ Commission of the European Communities, "Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community," Brussels, 20 December 1989, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/sec89_2290f_en.pdf> (20 May 2005).

⁴¹ Park, 34.

⁴² Gamze Avcı, "Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7 (2002): 101.

and human rights are expressed towards Turkey frequently⁴³ - in shaping decisions, was increased.⁴⁴ The assertion of the prerequisites of membership designed for the new enlargement wave, known as the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), provides the current basis of the evaluation of Turkey's progress towards membership. In addition to abilities for a free market economy and adaptation of the EU law, the EU expects candidates to achieve: "Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.". With the Madrid Council (1995), the actualization of legislative reforms towards the Copenhagen Criteria started to be expected, stated as such:

While it is important that European Community legislation is transposed into national legislation, it is even more important that the legislation is implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.⁴⁵

These criteria have been expressed again in the documents following the decision to give Turkey the status of candidacy and they compose the framework of "Progress Reports" towards its endeavor of membership.

During the deliberations for the Customs Union agreement in 1995, various political figures from EU organs and member states, the EP texts and reports by the Commission pointed at the human rights violations, criticized the handling of the Kurdish problem by the state. The exclusion of Turkey from the list of candidates at the Luxemburg Summit of 1997 was reasoned by the Commission on similar grounds.⁴⁶

With the Luxemburg decision, the widespread belief in Turkey - further motivated by the actualization of the Customs Union - that although not too soon, membership is inevitable; started to become questioned. The Customs Union, agreed

⁴³ For one of many examples of EP criticism of the human rights situation in Turkey, see Pia Christina Wood, "Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 97. For detail on reports on the accession of Turkey - by the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy - and adopted texts following motions for resolutions by various parliamentary groups on breach of human rights and rights of the minorities - latest on DEHAP members and trials of its members, along with the Human Rights Association of Turkey based by Turkey on supposed separatism and support for PKK - see European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, "Reports," <http://www.europarl.eu.int/plenary/default_en.htm#adopted> (15 May 2005).

⁴⁴ Müftüler-Baç, "The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union," 244.

⁴⁵ European Union, "EU Enlargement - A Historic Opportunity," <<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm>> (20 May 2005)

⁴⁶ Wood, "Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire," 96-103.

upon by the Turkish elite as an economic concession for the political end of membership, started to be criticized.⁴⁷ The argument that the EU was a “Christian Club” which would leave Turkey on the outside because of its non-Christian identity became widely spoken, by actors with different ideological affiliations⁴⁸. The diplomatic crisis between the organization and the Ecevit government was resolved in the following year, ending up with the declaration of candidate status to Turkey at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. In the meantime, a “European Strategy for Turkey” was prepared by the Commission in 1998 and annual “Progress Reports” have been released; in accordance with the report of 1999, Turkey became a candidate for membership.⁴⁹ The reports from 1998 to 2001, despite acknowledging the developments provided by the Constitutional amendments by the coalition government, pointed at the inadequacy of the level of human rights and democracy.⁵⁰ 1998 report stressed shortcomings in respect for the identity of minorities and civilian control of the military, as it remarked a high level of corruption, with the judiciary included. The status and role of the National Security Council and State Security Courts, the closure of political parties (as with the Welfare Party) were criticized. Torture, disappearances, extra-judicial executions, inhumane conditions at prisons, presence of capital punishment in law, regulations and practices against freedoms of expression, association and the press were reported in detail.⁵¹ 1999 report similarly touched upon the issues of civil and political rights, minority rights and the rights of women as shortcomings. Protection of minorities was found to be inadequate and the death sentence for Öcalan was criticized.⁵² 2001 report as well, despite a more positive tone, repeated that Turkey had a democratic system but the

⁴⁷ Ziya Öniş, “Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 125-127. For the statement by the Commission on the problems of Turkey, also see Müftüler-Baç, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” 245.

⁴⁸ Gamze Avcı, “Turkey’s Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-skepticism?,” *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 150.

⁴⁹ Müftüler-Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” 162-163.

⁵⁰ Avcı, “Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context,” 102.

⁵¹ “Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” December 1998, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf> (20 May 2005), 9-21.

⁵² “1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” 13 October 1999, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf> (20 May 2005), 15-16.

state of fundamental rights and freedoms fell short of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. Decision of the government to support the suspension of negotiations in Cyprus by Denktaş, was criticized.⁵³ While the 2002 report took account of the progress on the Copenhagen Criteria, developments in Turkey's relations with Greece and support to the process of settlement in Cyprus. Nonetheless, full enjoyment of freedoms especially related to civil and political rights were assessed to be behind the standards.⁵⁴ The decision on Turkey at the Copenhagen Summit of the same year, stressed the importance of implementation of the legislative change. The decision also announced that if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen Criteria - as to be affirmed by the related Commission report - by 2004, accession negotiations will be started without delay.⁵⁵ Brussels Summit of 2004 concluded that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria and negotiations were to be started in October 2005. Nonetheless, the irreversibility of the current state of human rights and democratization were stressed and more efforts were expected.⁵⁶

Besides the “conditionality”⁵⁷ of democracy and human rights, Turkey deviated from other candidates for its responsibility to solve its border disputes with Greece and the problem of Cyprus by changing its traditional foreign policy. Although these conditions may be evaluated as a natural extension of the policy of an organization designed in purpose of continuous peace for the most part; many in Turkey including the government, perceived the inclusion of these matters in the official documents as a discriminatory act, since they were outside the realm of the Copenhagen Criteria

⁵³ Commission of The European Communities, “2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” Brussels, 13 November 2001, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/tu_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 31-33.

⁵⁴ Commission of The European Communities, “2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” Brussels, 9 October 2002, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tu_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 44-47.

⁵⁵ Council of the EU, “Conclusions of the European Council on Turkey Since Luxembourg (December 1997),” <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/european_councils_.pdf> (10 May 2005).

⁵⁶ Council of the EU, “Turkey: Presidency Conclusions-Brussels, 16/17 December 2004,” <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/presidency_conclusions16_17_12_04.pdf> (10 May 2005).

⁵⁷ The concept, meaning that the EU promises to start negotiations for accession to candidates that fulfill the “criteria”; summarized as “showing the carrot rather than the stick,” is used by Avcı, in “Turkey’s Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-skepticism?,” 152 and “Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context,” 99. In fact, this method has been used by the EU before Copenhagen Criteria were issued, as stated by Öniş below.

which set the only conditions before other candidates.⁵⁸ Together with the acknowledgement of a high degree of opposition to the membership of Turkey in European public opinion translated to policy by the representatives in the EP and the Council⁵⁹, Turkish decision-makers became suspicious of the intentions at the EU behind putting Turkish foreign policy in question. The statements about these foreign policy issues have been placed in the Accession Partnership Documents and Progress Reports by the EU, outside the framework of evaluation on Turkey's fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria and expressed with a more modest tone - like "appreciating Turkey's efforts", etc. - than conditionality supposes.

The Accession Partnership Document (APD) agreed upon at the Nice Summit of 2000, forming the framework of EU-Turkey relations in the post-Helsinki period, drew upon the Copenhagen Criteria - including the rights and protection of minorities, Greece-Turkey relations and Cyprus. It enabled a set of prerequisites for the beginning of negotiations. In accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria, three areas of adoption of the Community law, economic standards and democratic reform were stated. The political criteria have become the most controversial area of the document, given that it involved rights of the Kurdish population and the Cyprus problem. According to Aydınli and Waxman, these two conditions, challenging the Kemalist principles of the establishment, require a profound transformation in Turkish domestic and foreign policy.⁶⁰ The fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria were expected not to remain only in the legislative framework of the country; according to the Madrid (1995) and Luxemburg (1997) decisions, they were expected to be actually put in practice for favorable evaluation by the EU about the candidate states.⁶¹ The political dimension of this first APD prepared in the light of Helsinki decisions are summarized in the table below:

⁵⁸ Park, 38-39.

⁵⁹ Avci, "Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context," 96-99.

⁶⁰ Ersel Aydınli and Don Waxman, "A Dream Become Nightmare? Turkey's Entry into the European Union," *Current History* (November 2001): 383.

⁶¹ "Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey," (2001/235/EC), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L85/13-85/23, 24 March 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_085/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf> (15 May 2005), 3.

Table 1. Political Problems in the Initial APD (2001)

Democracy and human rights:
<u>Short term:</u> Removing the barriers to freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly; encouragement of the development of civil society; ending torture, aligning pre-trial detention and prison conditions with UN and European standards, aligning legal procedures concerning pre-trial detention with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights; training judicial and law enforcement officials on human rights; bringing the State Security Courts (DGM) in line with international standards, keeping the moratorium on capital punishment.
<u>Medium term:</u> Reviewing the constitution and other legislation and providing human rights and fundamental freedoms to all without discrimination; developing the enjoyment of freedom of thought, conscience and religion; abolishing death penalty; ratifying international human rights document with their Additional Protocols; adjusting detention conditions according to international norms, changing the constitution for the National Security Council (MGK) to remain as an advisory body to the government as the EU member states.
Rights and protection of minorities:
<u>Short term:</u> Enabling the use of “mother tongue” of the citizens in broadcasting, reducing regional disparities for creating equal opportunities for especially those in the Southeast.
<u>Medium term:</u> Lifting the remaining state of emergency in the Southeast; enabling cultural diversity and guaranteeing cultural rights, with the area of education included.
Relations with Greece and problem in Cyprus:
<u>Short term:</u> Supporting UN efforts in the settlement of the Cyprus problem.
<u>Medium Term:</u> Peaceful settlement of all border and related disputes with Greece.

Source: “Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in The Accession Partnership with The Republic of Turkey”, Decision No. 2001/235/EC, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L85/13-85/23, 24 March 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_085/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf> (15 May 1005).

The resulting National Program for the realization of the first APD was issued in 2001, by the coalition government of DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti-Democratic Left Party), MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-Nationalist Action Party) and ANAP (Anavatan Partisi-Motherland Party). Change in the domestic political structure was based primarily on constitutional amendments that would enhance the rule of law and balance of powers within the state. Reform was almost confined to the legal and

administrative framework for the guaranteeing of civil and political rights.⁶² The reforms on freedom of expression were declared to be made through constitutional amendments and changes mainly in the laws regarding the press, political parties, terrorism and the Penal Code.⁶³ Lifting the state of emergency at the Southeast was stated to be in progress. About the State Security Courts, amendments in related law were to be made. National Security Council, was stated as being an advisory body already, but developments could be made in the medium or long term. The stance of the government about minority rights was clear in the document, given that the choice for the heading was “Cultural Life and Individual Freedoms”, rather than, for example, “cultural/group rights”. The government made clear that the language of education will remain to be Turkish. There was no mentioning of broadcasting in mother tongues. Cultural freedom was conditioned on actions with aims that would not violate national integrity. In response to regional disparities, it was stated that separatist terrorism had disabled the governments on improvement up to date.⁶⁴

In the APD of 2003, revised in the light of progress reports and prepared for the new government of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party), the matters of “enhanced political dialogue and political criteria” were set as “priorities” for 2003 and 2004; ahead of other criteria classified to be accomplished in “short term” and “medium term”. These priorities repeated the problems of border disputes and related issues, plus Cyprus as conditions derived from the initial Helsinki decision. For the protection of minorities, the ensuring of cultural diversity and guaranteeing of “...cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin...” and taking measures to reduce regional differences especially by improvement in the Southeast was repeated; previous legislative developments on this area were demanded to be applied effectively. In addition, this document stated that: “In this context, the return of internally displaced persons to their original settlements should

⁶² European Union, “Executive Summary of the Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis,” <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/summary.pdf>> (15 May 2005).

⁶³ İbrahim S. Canbolat, *Küreselleşen Dünya ve Türkiye: Aşkın Değerler, Kurumlar ve Politikalar Açında İlişkiler, Sorunlar* (Bursa: Vıpas, 2002), 241.

⁶⁴ “AB Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı,” Decision No. 2001/293, *Resmi Gazete* 24352 (Mükerrer), 24 March 2001, <<http://www.euturkey.org.tr/abportal/content.asp?CID=985>> (15 May 2005); “Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı,” Decision No. 2003/5930, *Resmi Gazete* 25178 (Mükerrer), 24 Temmuz 2003, <<http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2003/07/20030724M1.htm>> (15 May 2005).

be supported and speeded up”. “Religious communities” (non-Muslims and non-Sunite Alevis) were added to “individuals” who should be guaranteed freedom of thought, conscience and religion. For democracy and human rights, 2001 criteria were repeated in more detail and with more specific references to international human rights documents; such as on torture and detention procedures. Additional conditions were about the freedom of the press, right to free trial, official recognition of the right of re-trial for those cases judged as such by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), lifting of the ban on the activities of foreign associations, ensuring the teaching, appointing and training of all clergy, property rights of religious communities. About the role of the military in politics, the additional expectation to the 2001 APD, was to: “Adapt the functioning of the National Security Council in order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States.”⁶⁵ The paragraphs about “Conditionality” stated in both documents that financial assistance for “pre-accession instruments” was due to the satisfaction of these criteria.⁶⁶

The resulting National Program of the new, single party government of AKP, issued in 2003, first listed the progress with respect to the 2001 APD and National Program. About problems with Greece, the government, just as the previous one, stated that “dialogue” will be enhanced. About Cyprus, UN initiative was appreciated and the solution was conditioned upon the “sovereign equality” of the two sides on the island as before.⁶⁷ Effective applications of the changes in law were to be followed. For making developments on freedom of expression, the framework of territorial integrity, national security, laicist regime, unitary state and national

⁶⁵ “Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in The Accession Partnership with Turkey,” Decision No. 2003/398/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L145/40-145/56, 12 June 2003, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/revise_d_ap_en.pdf> (15 May 2005).

⁶⁶ “Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in The Accession Partnership with The Republic Of Turkey,” Decision No. 2001/235/EC, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L85/13-85/23, 24 March 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_085/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf> (15 May 2005); “Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in The Accession Partnership with Turkey,” Decision No. 2003/398/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union* L145/40-145/56, 12 June 2003, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/revise_d_ap_en.pdf> (15 May 2005).

⁶⁷ “AB Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı,” *Resmî Gazete* 24352 (Mükerrer), 24 March 2001, <<http://www.euturkey.org.tr/abportal/content.asp?CID=985>> (15 May 2005).

integrity - frequent in the human rights discourse of the 1982 Constitution⁶⁸ - were explicitly remarked. Under a heading of “non-discrimination” of individuals for the enjoyment of all human rights and freedoms, the legislative change on broadcasting in different languages used by the citizens was stated to be on implementation. For enhancing the freedom of religious practice, the government promised to increase effectivity. Under the heading “Functionality of the Executive”, rather than an outright expression of i.e., “civilian control of the military”, the government stated: “The advisory quality of the National Security Council has been re-defined with Constitutional amendments and other legislative changes. The functions of the National Security Council and ... [its] Secretariat will be harmonized with these qualities.”⁶⁹

2.2. Areas of Demand and Related Reforms

Although one may argue that the political demands of the EU are “insincere”, the existence of problems in Turkey’s political and foreign policy is not deniable. This section aims at exhibiting academic evaluations of those political problems of Turkey that have posed barriers to EU membership and received resentment from various domestic actors.

The Commission classifies the political criteria for Turkey’s membership in three headings in the Regular Reports: “Democracy and the Rule of Law” (sub-divided as the parliament, the executive, the judicial system, the National Security Council, plus anti-corruption measures since 1999), “Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities” (sub-divided as civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, minority rights and protection of minorities. The terms of “cultural rights”, “minority rights” and “protection of minorities” were lifted from the heading after 2002.) and “The Cyprus Issue”. Since 2001, “Peaceful Settlement of Border Disputes” - connoting Greece-Turkey relations, has been added as a heading.

⁶⁸ For an evaluation of this Constitution with respect to human rights, see Mümtaz Soysal, *Yüz Soruda Anayasanın Anlamı* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1997).

⁶⁹ “Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı,” Decision No. 2003/5930, *Resmî Gazete* 25178 (Mükerrer), 24 July 2003, <<http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2003/07/20030724M1.htm>> (15 May 2005).

The details of this classification is not repeated in this section. Instead, the most debated issues are selected for the evaluation of the problems by non-EU resources and the related reforms which have been actualized, will be mentioned.

2.2.1. Democracy and Human Rights

The European Communities were a group of organizations built on a territory historically tainted with deep animosities and continuous warfare. Hence, they were inspired and developed by the presuppositions of the democratic peace theory. Accordingly, the dimension of democracy and human rights embedded in the liberal understanding of democracy, has been an integral part of the organization. Developed into the EU, the question of democracy has preoccupied the organization in the structuration of itself, its approach to members and its expectations from candidate states.

With the Treaty on the EU, democracy, human rights and the rule of law have been asserted as a dimension of both internal and external policies of the Union. Table 2 shows a comparative view of the articles in EU Treaty which draw upon democracy, rule of law and human rights which governs the members, organization and relations with the third parties.

Table 2. Democracy and Human Rights in the Treaty on the EU

ORIGINAL VERSION (1992)	CONSOLIDATED VERSION (1997)
COMMON PROVISIONS	
<p>Article F</p> <p>1. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy.</p> <p>2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.</p>	<p>Article 6</p> <p>1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.</p> <p>2. Same with Article F.2</p>

Table 2. (continued)

ORIGINAL VERSION (1992)	CONSOLIDATED VERSION (1997)
PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY	
<p>Article J.1</p> <p>1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.</p> <p>2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; - to promote international cooperation; - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 	<p>Article 11.1</p> <p>The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, - to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders, - to promote international cooperation, - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
FINAL PROVISIONS	
<p>Article O</p> <p>Any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union...</p>	<p>Article 49</p> <p>Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union...</p>

Source: "Treaty on European Union", *Official Journal* C 191, 29 July 1992, <<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html>> (20 May 2005); "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union" *Official Journal* C 340, 10 November 1997, <http://www.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C_2002325EN.000501.html> (20 May 2005).

The democratic conditionality governing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union has been put in effect by adding clauses concerning democracy and human rights to external agreements such as with the ACP (African, Caribbean

and Pacific) countries and bilateral treaties⁷⁰ of the EU, with a prospect of suspension of the agreements in case of breaches.⁷¹

The principle of conditionality in relations with the third parties is not new, however, to the EU experience. The EC/EU has been an organization which has traditionally used effective tools for fostering democratization in those European countries with bad records on democracy and human rights. As Öniş states, the EU has been helpful in the democratization of peripheral countries through a membership prospect. As the experiences in Spain, Portugal, Greece and more recently, the CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries demonstrate, the desire to become part of a prosperous club which is perceived to help with development, motivate domestic political actors in undemocratic regimes to accommodate a regime of democracy and human rights. In Greece, the EU had exerted direct influence in the restoration of the civilian order through a set of incentives and preconditions that required democracy for membership. Examples of Spain and Portugal have showed that although an external actor may not succeed in the collapsing of authoritarian regimes, it would be of great assistance during the transition to democracy after that regimes are overthrown. CEE countries have been passing a similar path with Spain, meaning that the EU provided the incentive of membership and assistance; the criteria for democratization; after the revolutions took place. As the public at large sees the benefits of integration with the EU, prospect of membership becomes an effective lever. In this sense, the EU seems to be unique in success, compared with the experience in the Americas and elsewhere.⁷² According to Öniş, a similar process had not worked for Turkey despite the intentions, because of the dissolution of the prospect of actual membership in Turkish perceptions. Comparing the Turkish case with those of the Southern Europe and the CEE's, he states that while the organization should apply both conditions and incentives, Turkey was deprived of appropriate incentives. The Customs Union worked to the disadvantage of Turkish

⁷⁰ For example, the EU-Mexico trade agreement of 1995 incorporates democratic conditionality. See Marcela Szymanski and Michael E Smith, "Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-Mexico Global Agreement," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43, no. 1 (2005): 171-192.

⁷¹ Roland Rich, "Bringing Democracy into International Law," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 3 (July 2001): 29.

⁷² Öniş, "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization," 108-109, 118-122.

economy and membership prospect has been vague. Thus, the cost-return analysis of the Turkish elite did not motivate them to make progress during the 1990's.⁷³

Conceptualized as “anchor/credibility dilemma”, the EU is argued to be unsuccessful in elevating Turkey as a peripheral political system up to its standards, due to the inadequacy of its tools before Helsinki decision of 1999. The Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol which established the relationship before that, did not clarify rewards or sanctions, were hard to implement due to be dependent upon unanimity vote, were void of intermediary methods than suspending relations.⁷⁴ Tank argues that the EU has failed to become an anchor for Turkey due to a growing conception in the country that despite the contributions made in the area of security to Europe, there is exclusion from its “civilizational project”.⁷⁵ For Müftüler-Baç, while the EU has managed to foster democratization in Turkey through the long relationship of association and the award of membership desired in the country, this role is jeopardized by the increasing embracement of a European identity specifically defined in a way that makes it harder for the incorporation of Turkey.⁷⁶

Whether or not the EU has been successful depends more on the dynamics of the domestic political climate of Turkey. After all, it is those that actually govern or have potential to assume political power, who decide on the direction and actions for possible change. This shows where and how the EU process of Turkey becomes incorporated to the establishment-opposition or in a more popular saying, “center-periphery”, tension of Turkish politics. As domestic demands for democracy coincide with EU preconditions, the EU is celebrated as an anchor; as a guarantee for the continuation and protection of positive change. As Öniş states, any change in a country, is required to originate from domestic actors, regardless of the strategies pursued by the “external anchor”⁷⁷. As Müftüler-Baç argues, EU membership prospect has been appreciated by the domestic actors aiming at democratization but

⁷³ Ibid., 128-131.

⁷⁴ Mehmet Uğur, “Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations: the Road to Copenhagen and Beyond,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 5, no. 2 (August 2003): 165-167.

⁷⁵ Pinar Tank, “Turkey as a ‘Special Case’ for the EU: Will Generals Retreat from Politics?,” *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 2 (2001): 223.

⁷⁶ Müftüler-Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” 159-160.

⁷⁷ Ziya Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 9.

short of the power to provide it.⁷⁸ For those who support the EU membership process, the Helsinki framework and the following developments - explained below - have provided an upper-hand⁷⁹, up to date.

Democracy and human rights are concepts frequently pronounced together and interchangeably. For example, the Vienna Declaration of 1993, adopted after the World Conference on Human Rights, stipulates that democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms are “interdependent and mutually reinforcing”.⁸⁰ This is not without reason. The content of the international human rights regime have developed in relation to liberal democracy⁸¹ and that the civil and political rights inherent in this framework cannot be possible in an authoritarian system, it may be said that a democratic society is a precondition for the protection of human rights. The rule of law, as a basis for human rights claims and as a means for protecting the individual from breaches of human rights by making the state accountable, is added to this ideal scheme.⁸²

Perhaps, the most fruitful of the three axes in the political dimension of EU-Turkey relations has been on democracy and human rights. As stated above, the EEC/EC/EU stimulus for progress in this area started to increase in density following the 1980 military takeover and its demands and leverage increased after the application of full membership in 1987.

Nonetheless, this progress remains to be rather slow. Based on a public survey concluded in 2001, that is, about 20 years after EC/EU conditionality has started to be operated in relations with Turkey, Kalaycıoğlu compares Turkey with “consolidated democracies” of the more developed countries. According to this study, whereas conventional participation forms such as voting are high in Turkey,

⁷⁸ Müftüler-Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” 166.

⁷⁹ Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” 29.

⁸⁰ Rich, 20.

⁸¹ For detail, see Jack Donnelly, “The Universal Declaration Model of Human Rights: A Liberal Defense,” *Human Rights Working Papers* 12, February 2001, <<http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/papers/12-donnelly-02-01.pdf>> (20 May 2005), 11-17.

⁸² Dimitrina Petrova, “Strengthening the Rule of Law in building Democratic Societies: Human Rights in the Administration of Justice,” Seminar on the Interdependence Between Democracy and Human Rights, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, 25-26 November 2002, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/democracy/D-Petrova.pdf>> (20 May 2005).

legal forms of unconventional participation such as demonstrations and petitions are rather low; due to a perception of “uselessness” of such activities by the people. Whereas the number of associations and effectivity of the civil society in politics have improved in the 1990’s, single-issue campaigns and grassroots organizations remain weak and sometimes accused by statesmen as contrary to national interest and integrity. For Kalaycıoğlu, this attitude has its roots in the mentality dominating the 1982 Constitution, or the “security politics” of the post-coup regime; suspecting and limiting interest group politics. Nonetheless, some positive change about this elite attitude has occurred. Few years after the Constitutional amendments in 1995 for liberalizing interest group politics, frequency of the use of force in political protests has declined.⁸³ However, it should be noted that the Commission still drew upon the existence of “use of disproportionate force during protests”, as late as 2004⁸⁴.

When party politics are considered with respect to democracy, it is noted by Kalaycıoğlu, that there have been fair and competitive elections in the country except the brief periods of military rule, since 1950’s. While number of political parties and tolerance to political opposition have increased from 1960’s onwards, political fragmentation has also increased as a factor undermining the stability of the system. Kalaycıoğlu highlights a profound dilemma, in Turkish democracy, despite the positive signs concerning political participation rates and development of the civil society. He argues that patronage networks based on primordial ties, dominates party politics as much as the bureaucracy. The peculiarity is that these networks are efficiently operated by those segments of the society that are generally considered to be less supportive of a democratic system in the canon; by the “periphery” comprised of peasantry and the urban poor. On the other hand, seeing the populist practices and corruption associated with this high level of patronage, the “center”, comprised of professionals and urban middle class, has come to be less supportive of democracy

⁸³ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance,” *Turkish Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 56-62.

⁸⁴ Commission of The European Communities. “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 12.

and more sympathetic to authoritarian forms of rule.⁸⁵ Metin Heper, too, supports this diagnosis of dilemma. He says that while: "...democracy did become the only game in town, but the *rules* of that game did not resemble the rules of liberal democracy."⁸⁶ The reason lies in the fact that it had been the state elite, not the political elite, which introduced democracy to the country and clashed over it. In Heper's view, whereas the state elite defended democracy as an end for the national well being, the political elite saw it as a means to promote group interests. The consequent framework of patronage and clientalism reduced the appreciation of the functioning of democracy by the state elite, among which, there is the military, which had intervened to "fix" the system frequently in the past.⁸⁷

2.2.1.1. Role of the Military in Politics

The first and foremost problem with Turkish democracy is stated as the "role of military in politics"; both by EU documents and by scholars working on EU-Turkey relations or focusing on democracy in Turkey. This role is not unique to Turkey among European countries. However, as the military regimes were ended in Southern Europe with an EU dynamic⁸⁸, Turkey cannot hope to enter the EU without clearing the residues of past military rule which constitutionalized and consolidated, the power of the military over politics.

The main reason of the enhanced role of the military in Turkish politics, lies in the history of Turkish modernization. The Ottoman modernization efforts started with the military in the hope to increase its quality and discipline, in serving the Sultan. Trained by German experts and inspired by the French Enlightenment⁸⁹, there emerged a "side effect" for the Sultanate: Military uprising against the absolutist rule of Abdülhamid II. A pattern thus emerged; military led-change towards

⁸⁵ Kalaycıoğlu, 55, 62-67.

⁸⁶ Metin Heper, "Conclusion: Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 142.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 140-141.

⁸⁸ See Öniş, "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization".

⁸⁹ Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Officers: Westernization and Democracy" in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultral Identities*, ed. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 23.

westernization.⁹⁰ The cadre founding the Republic has been exclusively from the Ottoman military. Combined with the Ottoman state tradition and principles of the Kemalist ideology, the Turkish military, has internalized its self-ascribed role, as the “guardian of the state” founded upon the ideal of a unitary society. This role was reinforced by the single-party governments public support for the reforms by the new regime seemed dim.⁹¹ While the typical Turkish soldier is brought-up with western values - including democracy as the ideal form of rule - and he views himself as apart from ideological debates and daily politics; his identification with Atatürk’s principles and role of guardianship provides motive for intervention against “internal threats” to the Kemalist regime.⁹² The segregated everyday life of the soldier caused by the institutional isolation and autonomy - increased after each military rule⁹³, and the high degree of his “corporate sense of identity”⁹⁴ reinforces this position. Through constituting civilians as the “other” - tainted by self-interest before national interests, corruption, etc. - the military defines itself as the sole guarantor of the regime. The 1980 coup had dissociated the military even from political elites with similar ideological background.⁹⁵

The three actual, and one “post-modern” coups since 1960, have resulted in an increased official role of the military in the political system through various institutions such as the State Security Courts - whereby military judges have verdict over civilians for politically motivated crimes usually - and the National Security Council (NSC). Numerous other institutions started to contain officers appointed by the military; reproducing a security discourse in almost every aspect of political life. Generals also have a tendency of publicizing individual statements about their worries and criticisms of the civilian authorities, but it is mainly through the NSC, especially from the 1990’s onwards, that they channel their views on almost everything in domestic and foreign policy, with their enhanced role by 1982

⁹⁰ Tank, “Turkey as a ‘Special Case’ for the EU: Will Generals Retreat from Politics?,” 219.

⁹¹ Taner Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 1 (January 2004): 128-129.

⁹² Karaosmanoğlu, “Officers: Westernization and Democracy,” 27-28.

⁹³ Demirel, 130.

⁹⁴ Karaosmanoğlu, 27.

⁹⁵ Demirel, 129-131.

Constitution - the institution itself was supervisory rather than advisory, the Council of Ministers have to prioritize NSC recommendations.⁹⁶

While the military increased its political power with these coups, civilian leadership has not been questioning much of its role. Reform debates were EU-initiated and despite progress in human rights, not much progress has been made for a civilianization of the political regime.⁹⁷ The reasons of this lack of will in reform by the civilians is understandable, when the overwhelming legitimacy of the military among other institutions in the public opinion - which may be a result of the long period of instability caused by concurrent, short-lived coalition governments marked by economic crises, high rate of scandals of corruption during the 1990's, until 2002, and the longevity of the military campaign in the Southeast - is considered. It should also be noted that the military has been keen on its guardianship role during the civilian rule after 1983, with no hesitation to interfere and intervene governments - as shown by the February 28 process of 1997 referred to as the "post-modern coup". Therefore, there may as well be an indirect, underlying perception of threat of another term of direct military rule, for civilian politicians.

Established with the 1961 Constitution following 1960 coup, the constitutional role of the NSC was greatly enhanced with the 1982 Constitution. While the military chairs exceeded the civilian ones, the Council was assigned with Article 118 of the Constitution, the task of presenting the Council of Ministers its views on the decisions, along with "...ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State." Moreover, the Council of Ministers had to give "priority" to NSC decisions in formulating state policy, which should be preserving "...the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of the society".⁹⁸ October 2001 amendment included one more civilian member (the Minister of Justice) so that the civilian-military members were balanced in terms of number. The phrasing also changed as follows:

⁹⁶ Müftüler-Baç, "The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union," 247-248.

⁹⁷ Demirel, 133.

⁹⁸ William Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process," *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 120.

‘The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of the Ministers its views on the *advisory* decisions that are taken and ensuring the necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the state. The Council of Ministers shall *evaluate* decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society’. (emphases added to new wording).⁹⁹

With emphasis on the advisory nature of the relation of the NSC to government, the EU demand to see it as such was tried to be attained. The term “priority” was abandoned for more space to the government in formulating its policies on decisions by the NSC which now would only have to be “evaluated”.

Since 1999, the role of the military in Turkish politics especially the power it exercises through the National Security Council is problematized by the Commission. In 1999 report, the Commission stated this as a problem, while it appreciated the replacement of the military judge in State Security Courts by a civilian¹⁰⁰. By the end of 2002, the weight of civilians in the NSC was raised. Nonetheless, the EU interpretation of the excessive role of the military has largely been supported by its autonomy in allocating the defense budget without transparency. The frequent public speeches by the generals on various issues, including the political dimension of EU-Turkey relations, lead to a conclusion that there is more to reducing military membership in the NSC - which for the Commission, is an “advisory” body only in the name - for the civilianization of Turkish politics to comply with European regimes.¹⁰¹ By 2004, the government accomplished more control over the military by more budgetary transparency and extra-budgetary funds were included in the general budget for attaining parliamentary control over military spending. In 2004 the post of Secretary General of the NSC was civilianized and State Security Courts were abolished. Nonetheless, the Commission concludes that the informal mechanisms through which the military

⁹⁹ Ibid., 121.

¹⁰⁰ Commission of The European Communities, “1999 Regular Report from The Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,” 13 October 1999, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf> (10 May 2005) 10.

¹⁰¹ Commission of The European Communities, “2002 Regular Report from The Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,” 13 October 1999, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tu_en.pdf> (10 May 2005) 24-25.

channels its power over political decisions, remain.¹⁰² In fact, the Turkish military actors seem to have the same idea. During the debates on the reduction of military weight in the NSC, the Chief of General Staff has been reported as saying: "...if they want 100 civilians as members of the National Security Council, so be it'..."; implying that it would not make much difference to the current state of affairs.¹⁰³

2.2.1.2. Limitations on Full Participatory Democracy: Freedom of Association

The second dimension for the shortcomings in Turkish democracy, has been due to the rise of radicalism in the political sphere during the 1990's, creating reactions of the state elite and turning into the exposition of democratic deficit. Fed by the economic hardships of the country since the 1980's, radical nationalisms (Turkish and Kurdish) and Islamism have increased in popularity and their ideological languages were translated into party politics. This type of politicization may signal a "taming" of the radical edge. However, it turned out to be a source of instability.¹⁰⁴ As the ideology of the state embedded in the 1982 Constitution - prepared by the junta, imagines a society unified on nationhood as the sole recognized identity, political parties may not be based on other identities - class, region, ethnicity or religion - according to the law¹⁰⁵. Thus, legal and legitimate politicization has been limited for Kurdish nationalism and Islamism.¹⁰⁶ The military has perceived Kurdish separatism (declared by the National Military Security Concept in 1984) and "reactionary Islam" (reacted through the "post-modern coup" in February 28, declared by the renewed National Military Security Concept in April

¹⁰² Commission of The European Communities, "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession," Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 11.

¹⁰³ Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process," 121.

¹⁰⁴ Müftüleri-Baç. "The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union," 248.

¹⁰⁵ Article 68 of the 1982 Constitution which remained unchanged by 2001, stipulates that "statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties, shall not be in conflict with the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity withits territory and nation ... [or] the principles of the democratic and secular republic". Article 69 enables the closure of political parties on this basis. For the translation, see Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process," 111.

¹⁰⁶ Paul Kubicek, "The Earthquake, the European Union and Political Reform in Turkey," *Mediterranean Politics* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 4.

1997, dealt with by the Western Working Group of inspectors since 1999 when the Kurdish separatist threat diminished with the capturing of the leader of PKK [*Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan*-Kurdistan Workers Party]) as the primary threats to internal security.¹⁰⁷ Consequent events were closure of the political parties appealing to Kurdish nationalists (HEP [Halkın Emek Partisi-Peoples' Labor Party] -1993, DEP [Demokrasi Partisi-Democracy Party]-1994, HADEP [Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-Democracy Party of the People] -2003) and Islamists (RP [Refah Partisi-Welfare Party]-1998, FP [Fazilet Partisi-Virtue Party]-2001) by the judgments of the Supreme Court. Various members and parliamentarians from these parties were also prosecuted. These developments have created reaction from the EU and the cases were carried to ECHR, which ordered the state as guilty in most cases. The closure of DEP and related sentences had a major impact on the beginning of the EU pressure for recognizing and respecting Kurdish identity and lifting the state of emergency in the Southeast.¹⁰⁸

Political Parties Act was reformed in 1999, to meet the Copenhagen Criteria for fixing this democratic deficit.¹⁰⁹ The amended Article 101 stipulated that political parties could only be closed down if pro-separatist or pro-Islamist actions "...had been adopted as clear party policy by its governing bodies."¹¹⁰ Closure on these bases became only a little harder, because whereas the change in Article 101 of Political Parties Act and the amendment of the Article 69 of the Constitution ruled out the possibility of party closure which could previously be based on individual remarks of members, restrictions based on unacceptable policies remained as a principle. However, a more moderate punishment than closure was also provided; the Constitutional Court may deprive the party of state subsidy, as a measure.¹¹¹ From the view of the Commission, despite amendments in 2003, closure cases of and ban on political parties - i.e., DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi-Democratic Party of the People, established in 1998 [case opened same year as the closure of HADEP, 2003]-

¹⁰⁷ Tank, "Turkey as a 'Special Case' for the EU: Will Generals Retreat from Politics?," 221.

¹⁰⁸ Müftüleri-Baç, "The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union," 250-252.

¹⁰⁹ Müftüleri-Baç, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics," 168.

¹¹⁰ Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process," 114.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 114-115.

continue and the practice of some closures are against ECHR rulings¹¹². On freedom of associations, the developments by changes in related law in 2003, have been appreciated¹¹³.

2.2.1.3. Criminalizing Discourses Against the Existence and Ideology of the State: Freedom of Expression

Restrictions on participatory democracy have not been confined to political parties. The nature and content of 1982 Constitution and related laws were severely limiting civil and political rights. Freedom of expression individually or through the press was short of EU standards, along with freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Many groups such as the youth were banned from forming or joining associations, trade union activity was limited. A narrow interpretation of the Constitution limited freedom of expression by considering potential threats to the unitary character, territorial integrity and secular principle of the regime as crimes. As a result, many journalists, politicians, trade unionists, NGO workers and writers have been sentenced for supposed “thought crimes”.¹¹⁴

The main problem with the civil and political liberties has been the discourse of the 1982 Constitution, designed by the military rule which had legitimized their takeover with the threat of the left and increased political cleavages which turned into violent clashes. The regime was perceived under threat; hence, the inviolable principles and of and security concerns for the Republic were repeated in detail after every Article about rights and freedoms. For instance, Article 13 was stated as such:

¹¹² Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 42.

¹¹³ Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 17-18.

¹¹⁴ Harun Arıkan. “A Lost Opportunity? A Critique of the EU’s Human Rights Policy Towards Turkey,” *Mediterranean Politics*, 7(1), (Spring 2002), 24.

‘Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public morals and public health, and also for specific reasons set forth in the relevant Articles of the Constitution.’¹¹⁵

Article 14 of the original text, had repeated and extended the former as following:

‘None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over the others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas.’¹¹⁶

Not only did these provisions limit freedoms in perfect compliance with the official ideology as understood by the junta, but also, the vagueness of the use of terms such as “public order” and “public interest” created a potential for evaluations against the spirit of the freedom itself.¹¹⁷

The reflection of the Constitution on the related laws has been mostly embodied in the Penal Code. Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Code - abolished in 1991 - had outlawed communist and Islamist activities.¹¹⁸ Nonetheless, the limitations of the Constitution were transported to other Articles in the Penal Code or elsewhere. Ten years later, Article 159 of the Penal Code was regarding public offences to “...‘the moral character of Turkishness, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly or the Government, or the ministries, the military or security forces of the State or the moral character of the judiciary’...” as crimes. Article 312 of the Penal Code was stating: “...‘anyone who openly incites the public to hatred and enmity with regard to class, race, religion, religious sect or regional differences shall be punished’...”. Article 8 of the Law for the Struggle Against Terrorism (1991) was rendering support for separatism in every form, illegal; through these words:

¹¹⁵ Hale, “Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process,” 110.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 111.

¹¹⁷ See Soysal, *Yüz Soruda Anayasanın Anlamı*.

¹¹⁸ İhsan D. Dağı, “Turkey in the 1990’s: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and the Search for a New Identity,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (Fall 1993): 65.

*'Regardless of with whatever method, aim or purpose, written or oral propaganda, together with meetings, demonstrations and marches which have the objective of destroying the indivisible integrity of the State and the Republic of Turkey, with its territory and nation, shall not be carried out.'*¹¹⁹

The amendment of 1995 - motivated by the Customs Union prospect conditioned upon progress in human rights by the EU - had only removed the italics while the wording stayed the same.¹²⁰

More fundamental amendments of the Constitution and related laws came after the Helsinki decision for candidacy and the roadmap provided by the APD. Ecevit government launched "reform packages" for compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. In 2001, the Preamble and Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution were amended. Article 13 was changed in a way to incorporate a respect to the core of the rights; expressed as follows:

*'Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted *only* by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution *without infringing upon their essence*. These restrictions shall not be in conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the *democratic order of the society* and the *secular* Republic and the *principle of proportionality*.'*¹²¹ (emphases added to new terms).

The new Article 14 is as follows:

*'None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the *democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights*. No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that enables the State or individuals to destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution or to stage an activity with the aim of *restricting them more extensively than stated* in the Constitution. The sanctions to be applied against those who perpetrate these activities in conflict with these provisions shall be determined by law.'* (emphases added to new terms).¹²²

The Preamble was also cleared from the provision that deems mere "opinions" contrary to national interest illegal. Amendments to the Penal Code on freedom of expression were made in January 2002. The crime stated in Article 312 was limited to delivering the ideas "...in a manner which could be dangerous for public order.". Nonetheless, Article 159 of this code and Article 8 of the Law for the

¹¹⁹ Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process," 111-112.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 113.

¹²² Ibid., 114.

Struggle Against Terrorism remained the same in essence despite reduction of the period of imprisonment. In August 2002, Article 159 was further moderated. While the Constitutional amendments brought it more in line with European Convention on Human Rights and the related articles were changed in a way to rule only on “actions”, the interpretation of the courts have been decisive on these cases.¹²³ The Regular Report by the Commission in 2004, also acknowledges the release of prisoners and dropping of cases whereby the suspects have expressed “non-violent” opinion as progress. However, different interpretations of different laws still do cause criminal proceedings against freedom of expression.¹²⁴

2.2.1.4. Basic Human Rights: Right to Life, Torture and Ill-treatment, Detention Conditions

The security discourse of the post-military regime irritated by radicalism was not translated only into increasing presence of the military in politics and limitations on political freedoms. It also provided a legitimizing factor for breaches of the principle of the rule of law and massive violations of more basic human rights, i.e., right to life.

Excessive use of force by the police in dealing with acts of public protests, in chasing suspects, torture and ill-treatment in custody and imprisonment, have been widespread since the 1980’s. So were disappearances and extra-judicial executions; protested by Turkish civil society as well as the EU. After a series of publicized cases and activities by grassroots movements, disappearances during custody started to be inspected by the Ministry of Interior in 1996¹²⁵.

The practices have been used against common as well as politically motivated criminals in police stations and prisons.¹²⁶ While the political elite had acknowledged the problem of torture, the prevention of it has been rather slow. While some

¹²³ Ibid., 114-115.

¹²⁴ Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 17.

¹²⁵ Müftüleri-Baç “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” 175-176.

¹²⁶ Bertil Duner and Edward Deverell, “Country Cousin: Turkey, the European Union and Human Rights,” *Turkish Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 4.

perceived the continuation of ill-treatment as part of a governmental policy, Duner and Deverell argue that the problem is one of cultural attitudes prevalent in security officials.¹²⁷

Turkey took some legal measures following the application to the EU. It ratified the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, in 1987-88. Prohibition of torture was included in the Constitution. A Ministry was created by the government, in addition of the Human Rights Commission of the parliament, for the task of answering international criticism on human rights abuses in Turkey¹²⁸ However, efforts were focused on image-making rather than investigation.¹²⁹ A proof to the idea that torture has become outside the realm of governmental policy choices was given in 1998, when the head of the parliamentary commission publicized torture practices and revealed related equipment.¹³⁰ The progress on the prevention of breaches of human rights has been slow, despite these legal and administrative measures. A reason was provided by governments, through the concurrent discourse about the security situation in the Southeast.¹³¹ In fact, the handling of the Kurdish problem had included the most breaches of fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey.¹³²

A related phenomenon to torture and ill treatment is the pre-trial detention terms and conditions. Considering the rootedness of these practices among security officials, longer periods of detention could ease ill treatment. In addition, Turkey had not been measuring up to international and EU norms on the issue. There has been progress in the legislation since the 1990's. The "democratization package" of DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi-True Path Party)-SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-Social Democrat Populist Party) coalition introduced a "Criminal Court Procedural Law" in

¹²⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹²⁸ Heinz Kramer, *Changing Turkey : Challenges to Europe & the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 35-36.

¹²⁹ Dağı, "Turkey in the 1990's: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and the Search for a New Identity," 65.

¹³⁰ Duner and Deverell, 4.

¹³¹ Ibid., 11.

¹³² Müftüler-Baç, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics," 175.

1992.¹³³ In 1997 and 1998, police custody was reduced and police detention procedures were revised, training of police officers on human rights was started. For dealing with the fundamental source that makes it easier for ill-treatment; the Ottoman legacy in law which prevented the investigation of public officials was altered. In 1999, a draft law for prosecution of public officials was introduced and the Constitutional Court decided to annul a provision which enabled security officials to fire at a suspect who did not stop when warned - introduced in order to fight more efficiently against terrorism – the same year.¹³⁴

One controversial issue between the EU and Turkey, and within the country, had been the existence and practice of the capital punishment. Turkish Penal Code since 1926, had accepted this form of punishment in some cases of homicide (Article 450). Offenses against the state especially during war or in cases of attempt to: “separate a part of its territory from the Administration of the State” (Article 125); attempts of force to: “...alter or overthrow the Constitution or the government or encourage others to do so...” (Articles 146, 147) were also subject of death penalty. According to the Constitution (Article 87), unless the parliament voted in favor, the judgments for this punishment stayed but were not applied. The last actualization of the death penalty had been during the military junta of 1980. The following civilian governments had frozen the executions since 1984.¹³⁵ Nonetheless, Turkey did not sign the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights which required the abolishment of the death penalty altogether. The issue became heated between the EU and Turkey when PKK leader Öcalan was sentenced to death.¹³⁶ There seemed to be considerable public support for the execution of it in Turkey, while protest was made by EU members and organs. The result was the inclusion of the abolishment of death penalty in the APD. During the reform process according to the APD, death penalty was first restricted to war crimes and terrorist acts in 2001.¹³⁷ After long deliberations and under excessive EU diplomacy, it was abolished

¹³³ Müftüleri-Baç, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” 254.

¹³⁴ Müftüleri-Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” 176.

¹³⁵ Hale, “Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process,” 118.

¹³⁶ Arıkan, 25.

¹³⁷ Avcı, “Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context,” 102.

altogether, within the reform package of August 2002.¹³⁸ Within the same reform package, Turkey also accepted retrial of cases in the light of the rulings of ECHR.¹³⁹

2.2.2. Minority Rights: The Kurdish Question¹⁴⁰

The EU has developed a special interest for the rights and protection of minorities, as stated within the Copenhagen Criteria, individuals belonging to minorities have been regarded as those who suffer most from breaches of human rights. As Donnelly states, the universal human rights model - adopted by the EU as well - is not compatible with group rights, given that the group itself may pose a limitation to the individual liberties of the person, which are prioritized in this model. The protection of religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities in this model would be attained through the principle of “non-discrimination” and “measures to protect the separate identity of these groups.”¹⁴¹ The EU deals with rights of minorities in the same way. Without developing an official discourse on minorities per se, the Union draws upon “protection of *persons* belonging to minorities”. The principle of non-discrimination in Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms¹⁴² - which has been adopted as general principles of Community law¹⁴³; principles of “equality before the law” (Article 20), “non-discrimination” (Article 21) and respect for “cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” (Article 22) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union¹⁴⁴ provide the basis for the EU framework for rights and protection of

¹³⁸ Hale, “Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process,” 118.

¹³⁹ Uğur, 176.

¹⁴⁰ Although the EU recognizes Turkey’s Kurds as a minority, the Kurdish problem is not approached by the organization in terms of minority rights. However, the Turkish actors usually perceive EU demands for the human rights of the Kurds as “minority rights”. The Kurdish question is explained under this heading because of that perception - which will be evaluated in the following Chapters.

¹⁴¹ Donnelly, 33-36.

¹⁴² Treaty adopted by the Members of the Council of Europe, Rome, 4 November 1950, <<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Word/005.doc>> (20 May 2005).

¹⁴³ Article 6.2 of the “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,” *Official Journal C* 340, 10 November 1997, <http://www.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C_2002325EN.000501.html> (20 May 2005).

¹⁴⁴ “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,” *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 2000/C 364/01, 18 December 2000,

minorities.¹⁴⁵ In Turkey, religious and ethnic minorities are reported to be discriminated. Rights of the non-Muslim (i.e., Jews, Greeks, Christians) and non-Sunni (i.e., the Alevis) have been included in the documents - i.e., under the heading of “freedom of religious belief”¹⁴⁶, but the main problem related to minorities in Turkey is about the Kurdish population. The issue takes a vital place in documents prepared by the Commission and EP opinion on Turkey’s fulfillment of the political criteria.

While the Kurdish problem has been the most important factor affecting Turkey’s relations with not only the EU, but also, the US and its Middle Eastern neighbors, it has also been one of the basic problems in its shortcomings on domestic politics in the past 20 years. The Kurdish “problem” of Turkey includes four basic dimensions: Recognition of a distinct cultural identity, regional socio-economic development, domestic security, and consolidation of democracy.¹⁴⁷

Turkish state discourse is generally evaluated to be concealing a factual exclusion of Kurdish identity through denial and silence on the dimension of Kurdishness; in thinking about and dealing with the problem. This argument requires attention, since: “Whenever the Kurdish question was mentioned in Turkish state discourse, it was in terms of reactionary politics, tribal resistance or backwardness, but never as an ethno-political question.”¹⁴⁸ Although occupying an overwhelming place in EU-Turkey relations since the 1980’s and especially after the beginning of PKK activity at 1984, the issue dates back to the history of Kurds and Kurdishness in the Ottoman political system.

Commenting about the social and political space where Kurdishness evolved within Turkey’s borders, Yeğen states that Kurdish tribes had been organized under

<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/charter_364_01en.pdf> (20 May 2005).

¹⁴⁵ European Union. “The EU’s Human rights & Democratisation Policy”

<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/rm/index.htm> (20 May 2005).

¹⁴⁶ Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” Brussels, 6 October 2004,

<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 12

¹⁴⁷ Müftüleri-Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” 172-173.

¹⁴⁸ Mesut Yeğen, “The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity,” in *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, ed. Sylvia Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 216.

emirates/principalities and enjoyed a “de-facto” independence until the sixteenth century as a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Iranian Empires. As Sunni Kurdish *emirates* sided with the Ottomans against Shiite Iran during the clash of the two states, they became included in Ottoman territory. Nonetheless, their autonomy continued, as the *emirates* became a sub-system different from other regions. The decentralized system continued only until the 19th century, when the modernization drive included the administrative system of the Empire. Centralization resulted in the abolishment of *emirates* as an act to destroy Kurdish autonomy. The outcome had been quite contrary to the expectations of the Sultanate. Since the *emirs* had been the only force of unity among the Kurdish tribes and that the officials appointed from the center were insufficient to prevent tribal conflicts, the political vacuum was filled by *sheikhs*, who were the only figures left capable - in terms of both power and legitimacy - of restoring order and unity among the tribes. Not surprisingly, the two most important revolts in the Kurdish region had been led by *sheikhs* - Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1870 and Said in 1925. On the Kurdish context, the ideological role of *sheikhs* has been as mediator between religion and nationalism. Relatedly, religious groups of the Kurds are evaluated as religious, plus Kurdist entities.¹⁴⁹ Contrary to the state discourse - ironically, also contrary to the evaluation of socialist Kurdish nationalists of the Republican era - Yeğen argues that the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 was not merely a religious-reactionary one¹⁵⁰. During the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, these revolts were not against the Caliphate, which had formed a basis for unity among the Muslim population. Rather, the reaction was against the nation-building project of the modernist Ottoman bureaucracy of the late 19th century and the rulers of the nation-state aiming to integrate the periphery to the center. In other words, the reaction was against the loss of historical autonomy enjoyed by the tribes. For Yeğen, politics of Islam, traditional/tribal politics and peripheral economy as the bases of Kurdish resistance to the nation-building activities of Turkey (secularization, centralization of identity and economy), provide

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 217-220.

¹⁵⁰ In fact, it has mainly been the state discourse which renders this rebellion as merely an act of religious fundamentalism.

the sociological foundation of Kurdish ethnic identity today; rather than pointing at its absence - according to the state discourse.¹⁵¹

The tribal, rural, closely knit social life and *sheikh* power remained. While reaction to the nation-state - the roots of which is as explained by Yeğen above - seems to persist like in other geographies where Kurds constitute a large proportion of the people, tribal, religious (Sunnite and Alevi), linguistic (dialectal) and regional differences pertaining to multiple identities, remained among Kurdish communities. Linguistic bonds built on dialects have been stronger than a united ethnic identity and tribal structure has played the dual role of both resisting national authorities and keeping the Kurds fragmented. Resistance through a dominantly Islamic discourse remained among Ottoman Kurds living inside Turkey's borders after the Republic. Between 1925 and 1937, three rebellions occurred, resulting in the perception of Kurds as socially tribal, economically backward, religiously fanatic and most important, politically a threat to national integrity in the eyes of the state elite. State discourse constituted an ideological other; reactionary, backward and dangerous; with the Kurds without pronouncing their name. Kurdish identity in the Southeast of Turkey incorporated Sunni political Islam. Nonetheless, in Turkey (Kurdish population: 7 million, 12-15%), Iran (Kurdish population: 6 million, 11%) and Iraq (Kurdish population 3 million, 20-23%) as well, a distinct Kurdish "nationalism" has evolved up to date.¹⁵²

During the War of Independence, despite a rise in Kurdish nationalism; the existence of a self-conscious, uniform and fully politicized Kurdish movement is debatable. Nonetheless, the additional factor of support by colonial powers to a separate Kurdish entity, caused the Turkish elite to view Kurdish demands as a hindrance to national security.¹⁵³ Whereas the Sevres Treaty introduced ethnicity into the concept of minority leading to a territorial separation of Kurds, Turkish elite

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 221-226. For similar arguments on the sociological roots of Kurdish nationalism until the early 20th century, see Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992); Robert W Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989).

¹⁵² M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Nation," *Current History* (January 2001): 33-34.

¹⁵³ Ahmet İçduygu and Özlem Kaygusuz, "Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders: Foreign Policy and the Construction of National Citizenship Identity in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (November 2004): 38.

severely contested ethnicity as a basis for minority status beginning with the London Conference for peace with France during the War of Independence. The elite defined Turkish identity as an official identity instead of Ottomanness and included Kurds into the concept of Turk with - supposedly - scientific evidence. In Lausanne Conference, official identity of the new state was declared according to the French model of citizenship providing unity of various Muslim communities and the non-Muslim minorities, in equality before the law.¹⁵⁴ As religion was the criteria for minority status in Lausanne, Kurds have not enjoyed it under the republican regime. The support of the Kurdish population to the War of Independence was gained through a recognition and accommodation of Kurdish identity, even to the point of promising autonomy by Mustafa Kemal as late as 1923.¹⁵⁵ However, the oppressive regime following Sheikh Said rebellion and others - until the 1930's motivated by a combination of being against centralist policies, secularist reforms and national independence¹⁵⁶ - removed the word "Kurdistan" from school books, a Turkification of the names of Kurdish settlements and surnames was launched.¹⁵⁷ The civic-territorial nationalism of the state began to be altered into a more ethnically defined tone in the 1930's, supported with "Turkish History Thesis" and "Sun-language Thesis" aimed at elevating Turkish national consciousness and pride of the population.¹⁵⁸ Although the Constitution of 1924 defined all of the citizens regardless of religion and race as Turks, the existence of ethnicist policies showed an aim of assimilation of the non-Turkish origins. The policy was supported by state-launched campaigns like "Citizen, Speak Turkish."¹⁵⁹ While the concepts of "Kurd" and "Kurdishness" were avoided by the state and mainstream media alike until the 1980's; the system has been inclusive of Kurdish citizens, as long as they did not

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 39-41.

¹⁵⁵ Bülent Aras and Bülent Gökay, "Turkey after Copenhagen: Walking a Tightrope," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 5, no. 2 (August 2003): 153.

¹⁵⁶ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi*, translated from *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (Frank Cass, 1997), by Ahmet Fethi (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), 109-111.

¹⁵⁷ Aras and Gökay, 153.

¹⁵⁸ Kirişçi and Winrow, 107-108.

¹⁵⁹ Soner Çağaptay, "Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930's," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 3 (May 2004): 87, 93, 95.

express their ethnicity and they embraced Turkish language and national identity.¹⁶⁰ The identity provided by Republican Turkish nationalism, which was supposed to be embracing of the society as a whole, thus became a homogenizing, assimilative factor in the ideology of the state; it “squeezed” some segments of the society when it embraced them.

The Kurdish question for the Kurds and Turks remained as a socio-political problem related to regional backwardness and tribal authority over the people of the Southeast, most radically raised by the communist left until the 1970’s.¹⁶¹ The rise of ethnicity dominated nationalism in these years, among the Kurds in Turkey, was seen in the urban population. The children of those families who had moved to urban centers from rural areas, increasingly questioned the accommodating pattern of most Kurdish population to Turkish nationalism, and constituted an ethnic, secular identity more or less reflecting, perhaps “mirroring”, the Turkish national identity; while there remained anti-Islamist Alevi Turks and Islamist Kurds who remained bonded to definitions of Turkishness which they found compatible with their Kurdishness.¹⁶² Large scale migration has contributed support for the PKK, as it increased the awareness of socio-economic disparities within different regions of Turkey among the Kurdish youth.¹⁶³

The political consciousness associated with this ethnicist and secular Kurdish nationalism, was raised mainly through the PKK - established in 1978 by Öcalan as a small group with minor armed activity, disrupted by the 1980 coup and re-gathered in 1984¹⁶⁴ - which claimed a Marxist-Leninist struggle against both the Turkish state and Kurdish tribal configuration. Kurdish nationalists have used strategies ranging from PKK-led terrorist campaign, to establishing associations and political parties founded upon Kurdishness and Kurdish problems.¹⁶⁵ The success of Kurdish nationalism in popularity of its ethnic tone, may also be related to the military regime

¹⁶⁰ Murat Somer, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications,” *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 247-248.

¹⁶¹ Kirişçi and Winrow, 112-116.

¹⁶² Christopher Houston, *Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation-State* (New York: Berg, 2001), 105-109.

¹⁶³ Kirişçi and Winrow, 137.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹⁶⁵ Yavuz and Gunter, 35.

of 1980. For some scholars, the earlier period of official national discourse had implicitly accepted Kurdishness at least as a socio-cultural reality. However, the post-1980 state promoted a synthesis of Sunni Islam and Turkish ethnicity in reaction to the ideological polarization of the former period which included Kurdism as well. Thus, alienation of Kurdishness increased and this provided a social base for PKK conflict with the state.¹⁶⁶

PKK terrorism and the way to deal with it triggered an ideological reaction of the state and non-Kurdish society. In line with the perception of threat to internal security; that is, to the territorial integrity and national unity of the state, the role of the military has increased in the political system as corollary to the intensity of armed combat. The post-1980 possibility for democratization was shadowed by the Constitution of two “imagined” enemies to the state - political Islam and Kurdish ethno nationalism - and the embracing of the guardianship role by the military against these.¹⁶⁷ The problem of the role of the military in politics in Turkey-EU relations, is intertwined with the Kurdish question, since it has enabled a motivation for the military to assume more role in the political configuration of the country and through the bodies created by this role, such as the State Security Courts. The Law for the Struggle Against Terrorism stipulated that separatist actions are to be judged by these courts. The EU position against the military aspect of these courts was present in the APD and the trial of PKK leader Öcalan in these courts is evaluated as against fair trial by the ECHR today.

The militarization of the Kurdish problem and the state of emergency at the Southeast have enabled the development of an illegal smuggling activity –heroin included - by state security forces as well as the PKK militants¹⁶⁸, along with unpunished, massive human rights violations; ranging from torture and ill treatment, disappearances, extra-judicial killings, deaths in custody, arbitrary murders, long detentions; to evacuation or destruction of about 1500-2200 villages, creating the

¹⁶⁶ Houston, 106-107.

¹⁶⁷ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkey’s Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism,” *Current History* (January 2000): 37.

¹⁶⁸ For the argument that PKK militants engaged in smuggling of heroin only through “taxation,” see Martin Van Bruinessen, “Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question,” Working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2000. <www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/index-text.html> (10 July 2005).

problem of internally displaced persons.¹⁶⁹ About a million people have been relocated in large cities from these settlements. The PKK, held responsible by the state for the death of 4.302 and 5.018 soldiers between 1983-1999; had targeted educational institutions and teachers, hospitals and bridges at the Southeast against the state and its “assimilation”. “Collaborators” of the regime, both Turkish and Kurdish in origin, were also assassinated. The support of and the organization in countries such as Syria and Greece, had moved the problem from domestic to foreign policy tensions.¹⁷⁰ Activities of Kurdish nationalists in EU countries, especially Germany, have both increased concern in EU public about human rights violations related to the handling of the Kurdish problem by the Turkish state and suspicion about the “sincerity” of political demands of the EU from Turkey. A widespread belief, especially among the Kemalists, is that the EU aims at enhancing Kurdish separatism in disguise of a human rights rhetoric. Coined as the “Sevres Syndrome”, EU-skeptics believe that what the EU really wants by demands on human rights and recognition of a Kurdish minority with rights, is to divide Turkey and make it a less powerful state totally dependent on itself, without incorporating it.¹⁷¹

As Kurdish criticism increasingly turned from a resentment to state policies reproducing underdevelopment in the Southeast in the tone of the left, into a direct challenge of Turkish nationalism, combined in the minds with PKK terrorism; reinforced a more radical, more popular Turkish nationalism.¹⁷² In this context, political attempts to provide a solution to the ongoing problems by political parties even at the government, have produced reaction from other actors. The first leading political figure who had attempted to alter the official policy of silence on the Kurdish question, was Özal, during his presidency in the beginning of 1990’s. His encounters with the Kurdish leaders of Northern Iraq have played a role in the ending of this silence and he proposed permission for broadcasting and language education in Kurdish.¹⁷³ The first political party which proposed dealing with the problem through recognition of cultural rights and beginning by lifting of the state of

¹⁶⁹ Houston, 96.

¹⁷⁰ Yavuz and Gunter, 35.

¹⁷¹ Tank, “Turkey as a ‘Special Case’ for the EU: Will Generals Retreat from Politics?,” 223.

¹⁷² Yavuz and Gunter, 35; Kirişçi and Winrow, 137.

¹⁷³ Kirişçi and Winrow, 141.

emergency at the Southeast was SHP. Although it managed to lift the ban on the use of Kurdish, rights for broadcasting and education did not follow. DYP, the major partner of the coalition with SHP, launched an attack on DEP parliamentarians - who had gained their seats through joining SHP in the general elections - by the accusation of support to PKK activities.¹⁷⁴ As DEP was closed and judicial immunities of six DEP parliamentarians were lifted for trial in 1994, DYP led government may be argued to have indirectly contributed to the establishment of the “Kurdish Parliament in Exile” led by these parliamentarians in Netherlands - a development that has increased Kurdish lobbying activity against Turkey in the EU. In this context, lifting of the state of emergency was postponed. The military solution to Kurdish problem was thus prioritized to improvement of human rights condition.¹⁷⁵

More sound political reform for accommodating the Kurdish population to the regime, came only after the APD was released. The Constitutional amendments of October 2001 included the removal of the clauses exempting the freedoms of expression (Article 26) and of the press (Article 28) from the use of “language prohibited/forbidden by law”. The practice was awkward, because the legal ban on Kurdish had already been lifted ten years ago. Nonetheless, practical ban on the use of Kurdish in broadcasting, education and other activities remained until August 2002 when the issue was covered by separate legislation. After 2002 amendments, Turkish remained to be the only official language and the only legal one in political party proceedings and propaganda.¹⁷⁶

Presented as the developments to “cultural rights” by the Commission, broadcasting and teaching in Kurdish has started in 2004 when related procedures to the Constitutional amendments became finalized. The permission for teaching Kurdish in private courses were attained with a law in 2003, but in terms of staffing, curriculum and attainees, administrative restrictions are reported to be remaining. Cases against instances of use of Kurdish in propaganda and press conferences, has been overruled by the Court of Cassation since 2003. Nonetheless, restrictions against the use of Kurdish in political campaigns remain. Overall, the assessment of

¹⁷⁴ Müftüleri-Baç, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” 250-251.

¹⁷⁵ Kirişçi and Winrow, 142-143.

¹⁷⁶ Hale, “Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process,” 116-117.

the Commission in 2004 about legal and actual progress in the enjoyment of cultural rights is of appreciation.¹⁷⁷

More problems seem to be remaining according to the EU on the “situation in the East and Southeast”; with respect to regional socio-economic disparities. While the process of normalization and legislative reform by the introduction of the Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts (2004) in the post-state of emergency order of the region is appreciated, change is reported to be slow, especially about the return of “internally displaced persons” – only one third have returned by 2004¹⁷⁸.

Under the heading of “Minority rights, cultural rights and the protection of minorities”, 2004 report of the Commission notes the official stance of Turkey against recognition of minorities other than stated in the Lausanne Agreement. Nonetheless, EU position clearly acknowledges Kurds and Alevis as such and demands the country to lift its reservations on ICCPR and ICESCR regarding minority rights and rights to education by the minorities. The country is also called to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention for National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. School books for the 2003-2004 school year are reported to be still loaded with negative imagery on minorities but a recent regulation prohibiting discriminatory language from these books looks promising. Progress is also demanded about non-discrimination in senior bureaucratic and military positions, as well as in rights of education, religious practice and property concerning the non-Muslim minorities.¹⁷⁹

Following Öcalan’s capture and trial, PKK activity vanished and the perception of threat by state elite from Kurdish separatism diminished; as reflected by the

¹⁷⁷ Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 49-50.

¹⁷⁸ Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 50.

¹⁷⁹ Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 48-49.

National Military Strategy Concept demonstrates.¹⁸⁰ However, the US-led war on the Iraqi regime and the consequent emergence of two prominent political parties of the Kurds of Iraq as powerful allies, along with increased PKK activity in Northern Iraq has renewed this concern; once again since the first Gulf-War. The calls by DEHAP for Öcalan's release has also increased the alarmed attitude of the state.¹⁸¹ Kongra-Gel's¹⁸² announcement of its termination of ceasefire in June 2004 and following clashes with security forces cast doubt on progress in the situation at the Southeast¹⁸³. Resolution of the Kurdish problem through democratization, may well be delayed again with respect to related developments.

2.2.3. Foreign Policy: Greece-Turkey Relations and Cyprus

Greece-Turkey relations have long been effective on EU-Turkey relations. Turkey's decision to apply to the EEC in the first place, had closely followed the application of Greece and similar association agreements had been signed between the EEC and the two countries. Entering international organizations to which Greece entered, has been a traditional foreign policy preference of Turkey, considering the long history of enmity with short periods of rapprochement.

Since Greece became a member in 1981, at a time when the military rule in Turkey put the relations into the way towards suspension, problems between Greece and Turkey were carried to the EC/EU platform. The most important dimension of these problems is Cyprus; both between Greece and Turkey, and between the Greek and Turkish people of the island especially since the de facto partition into two separate states: One recognized by the international community, one not. The efforts of Greece and the application of Southern Cyprus for membership, have made

¹⁸⁰ Tank, "Turkey as a 'Special Case' for the EU: Will Generals Retreat from Politics?," 223.

¹⁸¹ Somer, 237.

¹⁸² In 2002, the PKK changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) and proclaimed support of Kurdish rights through nonviolent activities. In late 2003, the group re-named itself as Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan People's Congress) and claiming "peaceful" intentions, while refusing disarmament. See "Kongra-Gel, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)," <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pkk.htm>> (16 July 2005).

¹⁸³ Commission of The European Communities, "2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession". Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 50.

Cyprus an additional dimension of Turkey-EU relations which has increasingly been reflected in EU expectations from Turkey.

Cyprus, as a state entrapped between two communities belonging to two clashing ethnicities and nationalisms with their respective nation-states, has had a potential of turmoil since its birth in 1960. The Cypriot Turks, gaining independence from Britain, had advocated partitioning of the island between the two communities, while the intention of many Greek Cypriots was *enosis* (unification with Greece) - legitimized with the fact that Greeks had been the majority. Whereas Turkey and Greece valued their Cold War security alliance more than the respective demands and decided with Britain on an independent republic based on a delicate balance between the political powers of the two communities; an armed clash between the communities soon followed. What led to this situation was the initiative of the radical Greek-nationalist leader Makarios. He offered minority status to the Turks; led a violent campaign against Turks - and even more Greeks - who were against *enosis*. Turkey kept a low profile until 1974, when the Greek junta overthrew Makarios and thus, enabled a basis for Turkey's military operation on the island. Nationalist sentiment related to the issue was high in Turkey and the domestic political turmoil disabled a search for a peaceful settlement. Turkey was subjected to a military embargo and this gave a leverage to the Greek Cypriot side which made settlement harder; Turkish Cypriots established a Federal State (Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti-Cyprus Turkish Federal State) in 1975, while the Greek Cypriots continued to rule the only recognized state on behalf of the island, by the UN¹⁸⁴. Denктаş, who opted for a confederation, eventually got the support of the 1980 junta in Turkey and the KKTC (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti-Republic of Northern Cyprus) was proclaimed in 1983.¹⁸⁵ While Turkey has been the sole country to recognize the KKTC, the UN continued to recognize the Republic of Cyprus (controlled by the Greek Cypriots) as the sole representative of the island. Under UN observation, negotiations between the two sides continued with ups and downs - in relation to developments in Greece-Turkey and Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot relations and governments. While UN approach to the issue turned more in favor of the Turkish

¹⁸⁴ Uslu, 230-231.

¹⁸⁵ Niyazi Kızılyürek, "Rauf Denктаş ve Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 338-341.

thesis in 1990 - that a solution required an acknowledgement of the political equality of both sides - the application of the Republic of Cyprus for EU membership caused a deadlock against any settlement at all.¹⁸⁶

EC policy about disputes between Greece and Turkey had been conducted through seeking a balance between the two countries. The accession of Greece into the Communities and the denunciation of *enosis* from Greek Cypriot political agenda were seen as proof to an unlikelihood of re-occurrence of events to the disfavor of Turkish population. Nonetheless, Turkish side proclaimed the KKTC and Turkish army remained at the north. After Turkey and Cyprus applied for membership, EU started to develop its policy on the issue and had been frequently accused by the Turkish political elite by double standard in response to Greek national interest. In fact, Greece had used its veto power numerously for blocking development of EU-Turkey relations. 1989 Commission Opinion for Turkish application contained the statement that the disagreements between Turkey and a member (Greece) should be resolved, as well as the problem of Cyprus, in case Turkey wanted to become a full member. Nevertheless, the EU continued efforts to balance Greek and Turkish interests by making progress in the membership process of Cyprus conditional upon development in the relations of the Union with Turkey. An example to such political pressure was in 1995, on Greece for consenting to Turkey's integration. That year, Turkey's inclusion to the Customs Union was arranged prior to decision to open accession negotiations with Cyprus. Meanwhile, Turkish military presence on the island has been tolerated.¹⁸⁷ So has been Turkey's continuation of trade with KKTC despite international embargo.

The EU expected similar commitment from the Republic of Cyprus as shown by its 1993 Opinion for the application for membership by Cyprus. The opinion recognized Cyprus eligible for membership, but the accession talks would start only when approach to a settlement was provided and membership was conditioned upon settlement. Through accepting the candidacy of Cyprus, the EU expected to motivate both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. Progress in relationship with Turkey

¹⁸⁶ Uslu, 237.

¹⁸⁷ Semin Suvarierol, "The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union," *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 58, 62-64.

and conditionality upon the solution for membership, were also expected to encourage Turkey for support to settlement.¹⁸⁸

The EU strategy to act as a powerful agent to provide settlement, met with severe resistance and reaction from Turkey, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the conditionality of settlement for the membership of Cyprus was abandoned by 1994, as Cyprus was included to the enlargement at the Corfu Summit as a result of diplomatic pressure by Greece. “Agenda 2000” of 1997 allowed the beginning of negotiations with Cyprus possible before settlement. Luxemburg Council the same year, set date for accession negotiations – while Turkey was excluded from enlargement. The principle of settlement before membership was totally abandoned at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, as the Greek Cypriots were decided to have shown enough effort for it - which has been the dominant perception by the EU as reflected in the Progress Reports for Cyprus. The objectivity of these assessments is questionable, considering that Greece had threatened the Union with vetoing the entire enlargement process, in 1997.¹⁸⁹

Meanwhile, Turkey-Greece relations became severely deteriorated in the middle of the 1990's. Against the perceived military threat of Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus declared a joint defense program in 1993 and started military exercises at the Aegean sea. Greece also built an air base on the island, against international law. In 1997, Cyprus announced that it would purchase S-300 missiles - their range included Turkish territory. In the meantime, Turkish government was accused by the opposition for its compromise by accepting the beginning of accession talks between the EU and Cyprus. As the tensions moved into 1997 - added the rejection of Turkey's candidacy while Cyprus progressed, Turkish military announced that purchase of the missiles would be perceived as a *casus belli*. With a perception that Greek Cypriots and Greece were aimed at *enosis* through the membership of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU, Turkey announced that it would react in further integration with the KKTC as EU-Cyprus integration took place. This meant a hardening of Turkish position about the island, which had formerly advocated federative formulae for settlement. Instead, continuation of the status quo

¹⁸⁸ Nathalie Tocci, “Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?,” *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 105-108.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 108-109.

of two sovereign states was emphasized.¹⁹⁰ The reactive discourse had at times turned into direct threats by Turkey of annexation - stated as the “merger of the KKTC with the mainland” in 1995- against possibility of membership of Cyprus before settlement or Turkey’s membership.¹⁹¹

Turkey has rejected the legitimacy of application and potential membership of Cyprus on the grounds that it disregarded the existence and rights of Turkish Cypriots. Turkish theses about Cyprus have relied on the Constitution of the Republic and the guarantor agreement which required consent of both communities on foreign policy decisions. The agreement also disabled membership of Cyprus in international organizations which the guarantors were not members - in this case, Turkey. Turkey has been against the involvement of the EU in negotiations between the two parties in any way, maintaining that it cannot be impartial since Greece is a member. Nonetheless, the dominant perception at the EU about Cyprus has been that it is a political question and international law may be adapted to the actual solution, which otherwise did not seem forthcoming, during the long period after 1974.¹⁹² While Cyprus dispute constitutes one of “national interests” in the understanding of the Kemalist elite in power and this has produced the outcome of cynicism towards involvement of domestic and foreign actors in its resolution¹⁹³, EU determination about stimulating the parties - even if not equivalently - has not ceased. In fact, EU involvement has become an undeniable reality, since the Republic of Cyprus has become a member in 2004.

Since the Helsinki decision, the stick remained for Turkey and it was removed from Cyprus. In other words, the Republic of Cyprus was freed of obligation for any agreement with the Turkish side while Turkey was, at least politically, expected to contribute to Turkish Cypriot rapprochement with the Greeks. The non-responsibility of Greek Cypriots could be translated to severe damage to the perceived national interest in Turkey, since an EU member Cyprus without Turks has the potential of

¹⁹⁰ Suvarierol, 59-60.

¹⁹¹ William Hale and Gamze Avcı, “Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership,” in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 40.

¹⁹² Suvarierol, 57-58.

¹⁹³ Tarık Oğuzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratization in the Context of the EU Accession Process’ on Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Mediterranean Politics* 9, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 108-109.

another veto in Turkey's accession. Moreover, Turkey's military presence on the island could be viewed as an illegal occupation of EU territory. Considering these side effects for Turkey, the EU has expected a positive outcome on the island, motivated by Turkey soon – before Cyprus becomes a member in 2004 – in order not to face these outcomes.¹⁹⁴ This expectation proved to be correct, so long as the Turkish sides of the problem were concerned. The change of leadership in KKTC towards government more willing to compromise and the new pro-EU government in Turkey – further motivated by the 2002 Copenhagen decision that accession negotiations could start by the end of 2004 due to the fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria - facilitated the agreement of the Turkish Cypriots with the Annan Plan of the UN. However, the lack of further incentives for the Greek Cypriots which could be provided by the EU - since EU membership was evident despite any lack of settlement – lead to a vote of “No” in the consequent referendum.

After this new deadlock in settlement, the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member in May 2004. Although appreciated for former support in UN based solution, Turkey has to do more in Turkey-EU relations regarding Cyprus after this membership. As Cyprus is included in the Union, the Turkey-EU agreements concerning the Ankara Agreement for association and the agreement for the Customs Union has to be extended in order to include Cyprus along with other new members. Turkey extended these documents except Cyprus.¹⁹⁵ Public debate in Turkey has intensified especially after the December 2004 decision for the beginning of accession negotiations, since this is made dependent on the inclusion of “all” of the new member states. Current debates center around the concept of “recognition”. For instance, questions are raised about whether including Cyprus into a multilateral treaty means recognition, or whether continuation of the relationship with the EU bodies¹⁹⁶ including representatives from Cyprus during accession negotiations means

¹⁹⁴ Tocci, 109-110.

¹⁹⁵ Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession”. Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 52.

¹⁹⁶ The most important EU organ is the Intergovernmental Council which will have control over the negotiation issues and Turkey will have to attend it for increasing its dialogue with the member states. See Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,” Brussels, 6 October 2004,

recognition. Euro-skeptics generally argue that the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus would mean illegitimizing/illegalizing the KKTC and Turkish military presence on the island and thus, Cyprus will be “lost” without settlement.¹⁹⁷

Greece had pointed at Turkey’s democratic deficit, human rights violations, presence of troops in Cyprus against international law and supposed “territorial claims” in the Aegean - where there has long been a dispute over territory on the air, the sea and related resources between two countries - since its membership in the EC; against integration with Turkey. However, it has altered its position following the friendly context created by the assistance of Greece for the relief of the earthquake disaster in Turkey in August 1999. This removed the customary “veto obstacle” for Turkey about accession and financial aid, from the Helsinki Summit onwards.¹⁹⁸ While UN-sponsored talks between two leaders of the island had restarted, Greek and Turkish governments started a “Joint Working Group” in attempt to improve bilateral relations. The crisis between the EU and Turkey at Luxemburg in 1997, which also related to the issue of Cyprus on the EU and EU-Turkey agenda, was overcome by the Helsinki Summit. The Helsinki decision called Turkey to resolve the Aegean dispute with Greece through bilateral negotiations (favorable for Turkey, since the country rejects taking the issue to the ICJ, on the basis of its argument that the Aegean cannot be resolved by existing international law because it is “unique”). If not resolved by negotiation, Turkey should recognize an ICJ decision (favorable for Greece since the law of the sea regime supports its general cause¹⁹⁹). As a response to Turkey’s reaction that it would only accept Copenhagen Criteria as preconditions like the other candidates, it was assured by the presidency that solution of the Aegean problem was not conditional for the beginning

<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 7-8.

¹⁹⁷ The inclusion of Cyprus in the Customs Union was made through an additional protocol signed by Turkish government in July 29, 2005, along with a declaration that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus. Public debate continues about whether or not the protocol means recognition and the possible outcomes of it.

¹⁹⁸ Hale and Avci, 36.

¹⁹⁹ Following five years of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey with intensified bilateral negotiations, Turkish military have declared in 2004, that any remaining unresolved border disputes may be resolved in line with EU body of law by the ICJ. Commission of The European Communities, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. Brussels, 6 October 2004, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf> (10 May 2005), 52.

of accession negotiations. About Cyprus, Helsinki summit decided that “...a political settlement would facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the EU...”, but it was not a precondition.²⁰⁰

²⁰⁰ Park, 38-39.

CHAPTER 3

DISCOURSE OF KEMALISM ON THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EU - TURKEY RELATIONS

Kemalism has been the name of the official ideology of the Turkish Republic, aimed at a transformation of the people from subjects of an imperial order into citizens of a nation-state.²⁰¹ It was put into action by elites of the late Ottoman period engaged in the debates between competing ideologies to cope with the modernity, in which the existing Empire was believed to be left behind. As an ideology built on the experience of a collapsing Empire, the dominant theme in its components have the legacy of a fear of disintegration. Modernist/westernist in project and nationalist in belief, the founders of the regime sought a "...unitary state - unitary society - unitary identity..."²⁰² through inclusion of principles such as republicanism, nationalism, populism and secularism in the Constitutions. The new state elites of the Republic - and the later ones, after each military coup - secured their position, as well as their self-ascribed modernizing mission, within the state through these principles in the ideology.²⁰³

The view of Kemalists towards the EU, when it started to demand a political transformation that would alter the unitary structure, and coincided with the political threats of Islamism and Kurdism, became skeptical not only towards reforms, but also towards the EU itself through their worries about disintegration caused by foreign powers - coined generally as the "Sevres Syndrome". The incompatibility of the current regime - legitimized through Kemalism - with EU political standards, combined with the consensus among various Kemalist actors on Kemalist principles that are perceived against the EU scheme of political reform, pave the way for criticism of the ideology itself for its democratic credentials, as elaborated below.

²⁰¹ Ahmet İnel, "Giriş" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 18-19.

²⁰² Ibid., 18-19.

²⁰³ Kramer, 21-22.

3.1. Turkey's Kemalist Actors

The one-party period of the Republic of Turkey, through which Kemalist reforms were initiated and the Kemalist regime was established, may be said to have lasted from the beginning of the proclamation of the new state until 1950's, when DP (Demokrat Parti-Democrat Party), the opponent of the CHP²⁰⁴ (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- Republican Peoples Party), got 53% of the vote in the general elections and came to government. Until this period, alternative political voices - i.e., by the liberal *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, established in 1924 - were silenced and there was an increasing conglomeration of the party (CHP) and government.²⁰⁵ CHP was closed, following the 1980 military takeover and re-opened in different names; divisions and reunions under different political parties with different leaderships occurred in the post-1980 period, but the party line - currently represented predominantly by CHP (under Deniz Baykal's leadership) and DSP (under Bülent Ecevit's leadership) - remained to be one of the principal adherents and appliers of the Kemalist ideology among the political parties in Turkey.²⁰⁶

One major ideological shift in the CHP line happened from late 1950's onwards. Whereas the ideological components of the prior CHP were kept intact, CHP signaled a new interpretation of its Kemalist ideology first with the document *İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi*, which advocated a social-democratic political system. This document found Constitutional reflection with the changes made after 1960 military intervention. As socialism gained a Constitutional legitimacy, a socio-economic base and popularity among Turkish intellectuals through the 1960's, CHP re-defined its ideological place as a "left-of-center" party (under the leadership of Ecevit in 1972).²⁰⁷ After the one-party period, challenged by conservative-right, liberal and Islamic political parties, and inhibited by military interventions of 1971

²⁰⁴ Founded by the Republican elite headed by Mustafa Kemal, the party first had the name Halk Fırkası-People's Party (1923), then Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası-Republican People's Party (1924), and re-named as Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi after that.

²⁰⁵ Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye: 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), 98-154.

²⁰⁶ For a chronology and leadership of the CHP line political parties, see Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, "Siyasi Partiler," <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/partiler/partiler.htm>> (10 June 2005).

²⁰⁷ Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "The Republican People's Party," *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 103-105; Hikmet Özdemir, "Siyasal Tarih (1960-1980)" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye: 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), 220-221.

and 1980 against the rise of the left, CHP could never again assume a political victory that would enable its power as a single party government. The party entered into coalition governments with its rivals during the 1970's. After its closure with 1980 coup, internal competition divided the organizational unity and CHP line entered into coalition governments or remained in opposition, up to date.

The term “Kemalist left” used in this study, connotes CHP line political parties since 1970's and the Kemalist intellectuals used in this study who - despite reservations on the actual policies and organization of CHP line parties - adhere to this line of thought. Besides membership in Kemalist parties, intellectuals of the Kemalist left have deliberated their ideas about their economic and political alternatives through journals such as *Yön*, *Özgür İnsan* and *Forum*²⁰⁸. Today, Kemalism, especially in its leftist version, is generally perceived to be expressed by the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, in its editorial policy and its writer cadre.

Another group of Kemalist actors besides political parties and intellectuals are found within the “Kemalist civil society”; comprised of NGO's - i.e., *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* and *Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği* - which aim at the restoration of the nationalist, laicist and “civilizationist” aspects of the Kemalist order against the political threats of Kurdism and Islamism, especially since the 1990's.²⁰⁹

As the official ideology aspect of Kemalism is concerned, the civilian - mostly - and military - totally - bureaucracy form the basic actors which directly and indirectly, translate their version of Kemalism into state policy. Although Kemalist actors may differ on the ideological spectrum of “left” and “right”, they overlap when it comes to the Kemalist principles, especially in the instrumentalization of these principles against Islamism and Kurdism, as stated below.

²⁰⁸ Güneş-Ayata, 103.

²⁰⁹ Necmi Erdoğan, “Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 584-585; Sefa Şimşek, “New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980,” *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 135.

3.2. Intellectual Roots and Ideological Components of Kemalism

Of the main lines of political thought born during the reign of Abdulhamid II, from 1908 to 1918, attempting to cure the problems of the Empire, Westernism and Turkism have become constitutive of the Republican regime. Kemalism as the name for this synthesis²¹⁰, excluded Islam from the public sphere; thereby creating its opponent political discourse - Islamism - which would gain a considerable power in time.²¹¹

Atatürk's project which has dominated the discursive agenda in Turkish politics and identity, built on the political experience of *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress) and ideological contribution of mainly Ziya Gökalp among other westernist and nationalist intellectuals to this organization.²¹² As the material conditions (separation of Balkan and Arab Muslim population from the Empire) changed, Gökalp's advocacy of the synthesis between Turkification, Islamization and modernization (in the form of westernization) in '*Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*' (1918) shifted into a nationalism with emphasis on modernization rather than Islam, as he stated in "*Türkçülüğün Esasları*" (1923).

As Zürcher states, the six principles of the CHP - the "six arrows" of the first political party of Turkey (adopted in the party congress of 1931) - which were included in the Constitution (in 1937), form a combination of goals and means of the newly established Republic. Republicanism and statism connote the means of the desired transformation of the society, according to the ideology manifested in the other four principles: Laicism, nationalism, revolutionism and populism.²¹³

Laicism can be traced all the way through in the traditional Ottoman political structure where the influence of religion had been limited by rationality of the political authority. The idea of total separation of religion from politics had been facilitated in the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) when a new bureaucratic elite,

²¹⁰ İnsel, 17.

²¹¹ Selçuk Gültaşlı. "The Comparison of Cumhuriyet and Zaman Dailies vis-a-vis European Union Membership Debates" (MS. thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2002), 13, 18.

²¹² Murat Belge, "Mustafa Kemal ve Kemalizm" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 30.

²¹³ Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 44.

educated in European institutions or modernized schools of the state, who believed that Islam was not capable of coping with contemporary problems, were rising in power at the expense of traditional bureaucracy, the *ulema*.²¹⁴ The reforms for westernization in the beginning of the Republican period - removal of the Caliphate, prohibition of the activities of religious sects, unification and standardization of educational institutions, adaptation of European civil law (along with the changing of the alphabet and others²¹⁵) - and the promotion of a Western lifestyle may be understood as a radical continuation of the laicist, anti-clerical stance of the Enlightened intellectuals of the late Ottoman period who could achieve some reforms in state structure and law even back then.²¹⁶ Laicism as manifested in the Republic was not simply an obliteration of religion from political sphere. The underlying motive had been the removal of the Ottoman past from collective memory, in favor of construction of a modern, national identity. In the process, Islam was not excluded but it was rather transformed into one suited to the modern and the national.²¹⁷ Differing from the Anglo-Saxon model of secularism - marked by neutrality of the state towards belief and autonomy of religious organization, this laicism, inspired by the French model, inhibited the expression of religion to direct control of the state,²¹⁸ curbing freedoms to express religious belief in words and on the body - through different clothing by the *millets* of the Ottoman system. This practice seems to be motivated by Gökalp's ideas, in addition to the inspiration by the French Revolution. Gökalp believed that the society had to become a nation to fulfill its ideals before being a religious community; Islam would survive only if it remained a part and parcel of national culture²¹⁹.

²¹⁴ Metin Heper. "Political Culture as a Dimension of Compatibility" in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, ed. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 8.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

²¹⁶ Zürcher, 48. For the rise of secular bureaucracy in late Ottoman period, see also: Şerif Mardin, "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes," *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 2005): 154.

²¹⁷ Nur Betül Çelik, "Kemalizm: Hegemonik bir Söylem" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm* ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 85, 87.

²¹⁸ Yavuz, "Turkey's Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism," 33.

²¹⁹ Hilav, 364.

Nationalism had arrived at the Empire with Turkish intellectuals from Russia. Politically organized and intellectually divergent, Ottoman Turkists had usually carried the ideal for unification with Turks outside the Ottoman territory. However, their strength owed less to the appeal of a Pan-Turkist ideal than to the ideological vacuum created by the decline of support for Ottomanist and Islamist solutions for the Empire; the Balkan War and emergent nationalisms among the non-Turkish Muslim population had created a disillusionment for the Ottomanists and Islamists.²²⁰ As with Islamism, manifestation of the ideology in the empire had been gradually away from irridentist tones. The principle of nationalism as a founding ideology of the Republic, was derived from Gökalp's cultural, rather than Akçura's ethnically defined nation. A break from the early nationalists, after the War of Independence, was marked by the absence of Islam from the discourse. Islamic discourse was efficiently used for mobilizing the public by the *İttihat ve Terakki* during the Balkan War and by the *Kuvayı Milliye* during the War of Independence. It was also utilized for limiting the minority status to the non-Muslim population by the Turkish state during Lausanne talks. However, it was vanished almost overnight, as the rapid modernization agenda of the independent nation-state was started.²²¹

While civic and later ethnic-racial elements - the non-Islamic references - were stressed in this nationalism, Islam was not totally excluded by the principles of secularism and nationalism from the Kemalist regime. Rather, the Kemalist elite opted for a nationalized and modernized religion which would suit the design of the Republic. The Kemalist state opted to dominate the religious discourse through the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Cold War policy of the state, combating communism, has led to a softening of this laicism. Beginning with the 1960's, the Kemalist state had utilized Islamists against the rise of leftist ideologies.²²² Popular demands by the nationalist-conservative political parties, since the beginning of the multi-party period - and by political Islam since the 1970's, also worked for the official national ideology to incorporate a degree of religiousness in the search of effective public allegiance to the state. 1980 coup and the civil political authorities

²²⁰ Ibid., 361-371.

²²¹ Zürcher, 48-51.

²²² M. Hakan Yavuz, "Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24, no. 2 (October 2004): 222.

following military rule, facilitated this reunion.²²³ However, a return to more strict laicism was experienced with the February 28 process, in which the military defined (untamed) Islamism as an internal security threat. According to Yavuz, nationalism and laicism, as two pillars of the Kemalist official ideology deduced from its “modernizing mission”, have been used for justification of an “authoritarian military-bureaucratic establishment”. Not only Islam was limited, but also alternative ethnic identities such as Kurdishness were suppressed in the resulting regime.²²⁴

Revolutionism was practiced as a process of positivistic, modernizing reforms from the top as started in the late Ottoman period. The principle of populism showed an organicist understanding of the society and the denial of class existence.²²⁵ This is consistent with Gökalp’s suggestion. For the desired future of Ottoman Turks, he had offered corporatism in the political and solidarism in the social realms. The followed course during the republican establishment had been a populism based on a division of labor among the society where all individuals - with allegiance to the nation rather than class - did their part.²²⁶ While revolutionism meant the protection of the modernized aspects of the structure and the aspired continuation of progress modeled on the ultimate level achieved in the world, the top to down character of the reforms was in contradiction with populism in its primary meaning. The legitimacy of the new laws and institutions rested not on the people’s will but were perceived as justified in their self.²²⁷

In the context of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the Kemalist governments aimed at rapid industrialization for development by the principle of statism. They sought to achieve this aim through a state-led and state-controlled economy through

²²³ Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2003), 118-128. For detail on the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis,” see Ahmet Yıldız, “Kemalist Milliyetçilik” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 233

²²⁴ Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” 222. Keridis divides current Kemalists into two groups and argues that only those “Jacobin” Kemalists, situated within the center-left and the bureaucracy, advocate the Kemalist form of secularism and “uniculturalism” to the extent that it suppresses alternative voices in the society. See Dimitris Keridis, “Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek - Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization,” A NATO Fellowship Final Report, 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/keridis.pdf>> (10 July 2005), 26.

²²⁵ Zürcher, 51-53.

²²⁶ Hilav, 368.

²²⁷ Çelik, 87-88.

related legislation and economic enterprises run by the state²²⁸. However, “the state” as approached by the Kemalist regime, has not only interfered in the economy, but also in the social and political relationships between the citizens. The society was mobilized according to the model of westernization forged by the Kemalist state elite, and this has formed a vantage point for opposition to the regime ever since. One of the tensions persistent in Turkish political discourse, is the delay of democracy in touch with the aspect of Kemalism that upholds “the state” as an agent of economic, plus political modernization/development. This was manifested especially during the one-party regime.²²⁹

3.3. Attitude of Kemalism towards the West and the EU

Since it is a partial heir to the Ottoman legacy of modernization/Westernization and since it has become the ideology of the state put into practice during the Republican era, Kemalism may be understood as the actual history of Turkish modernization. Hence, its attitude towards the West may be evaluated along the line of this specific course of modernization which shares some aspects with Islamism as much as it diverges from and becomes opposed to it.

Kemalist revolution in its goal to reach the standards of the contemporary civilization, perceived Western Europe, as a universal model. European culture seemed to be the “...center of the world system...” and therefore it seemed to constitute a universal standard; especially in its political structure. Like the westernists in the late Ottoman period, Kemalist state elite continued foreign language education and enhanced translation activity to embrace the civilizational legacy assumed in the European political, philosophical and literary canon.²³⁰ As stated after the Balkan War by Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), it looked clear: “Whether we like it or not, we are bound to Europeanize”²³¹. In the words of Abdullah Cevdet

²²⁸ Koçak, 109.

²²⁹ Çelik, 88-89.

²³⁰ Leonard A. Stone, “Late Ottoman and Modern Turkish Perceptions of Europe: Continuity and Change,” *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 190-191.

²³¹ Quotation taken from Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, (İstanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978), cited in Nas, 179.

then: "...there is no second civilization: Civilization means European civilization, and it must be imported with its roses and thorns."²³²

Kemalist Turkish foreign policy during most of the Republican period, has been marked by an approach to Turkey's identity as having its "other" in the Ottoman period instead of the West. This meant that the Kemalist state excluded Arabs and other nations of the former folk of the Empire in its choice of alignment. Membership in Islamic institutions has been avoided too, as an extension of the principle of secularism. Consequently, there has been a reversal of Europe from being the "other", to being a partner in the Republican era.²³³ Modernizing according to the model of Europe, the Kemalist elite wished Turkey to be perceived as Europeans and they evaluated economic development as a goal to achieve the European identity among other things. Thus, it is not surprising that joining the EC/EU has been one of the most "insistent" goals of Turkish foreign policy.²³⁴ As Öniş notes, whereas Europe has generally viewed Turkey as part of one of its principal others, the East, the Turkish elite has generally viewed membership in the EU as a natural phase in the continuation of Turkish Westernization and modernization, without taking the evolution and paradoxes of European identity into consideration.²³⁵

The repercussions of these, have started to become considered by the Kemalists, as the relationship with the EU has intensified due to the membership process. Consequently, there has occurred a great shift in the discourse of Kemalists about the EU in the post-Helsinki period. Traditionally pro-EU, the Kemalist elite

²³² Quotation taken from *İctihad*, 89 (İstanbul, 1909), by Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 231. Having its exact opposite stating that Cevdet has been excluded from the official ideology of the Republic (Hilav, 383), according to one view that deserves attention, republican modernization scheme differs much from the eclectic approaches of the many among Tanzimat intellectuals, including Ziya Gökalp. Instead, it is offered that the Republic was shaped according to Atatürk's own project reflecting the totalizing approach of Abdullah Cevdet towards Westernization. See Şaban H. Çalış, "Ulus ve Devlet Kimliği Labirentinde Türk Dış Politikası" in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), 23. What may be thought at this point would be that while Gökalp's legacy remains definite in the nationalist aspect of the regime, the Westernist reforms have exceeded his vision during the early years of the Republic.

²³³ Çalış, "Ulus ve Devlet Kimliği Labirentinde Türk Dış Politikası," 25-29.

²³⁴ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 180-181.

²³⁵ Öniş, "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization," 107-110.

started to question the desirability of EU membership and the process for it. Within the Kemalist bureaucratic elite, the stance of the military is especially important, since it has part in shaping both domestic and foreign policy. There has already been a current of conservative-nationalist thought which would stand against the EC within the military, demonstrated during the 1980 regime.²³⁶ Nonetheless, it was towards the Helsinki decision - which started an intensive process of radical reforms, a clearly Euro-skeptic - even anti-EU - stance became openly expressed by generals. EU - Turkey relations in the Helsinki framework, were perceived as facilitating disintegration of the nation, i.e., through encouraging the PKK²³⁷.

In this context, although not stated through official means, the speech about foreign policy made by General Tuncer Kılınç, the Secretary General of the National Security Council is instructive. In this speech that took place in a “televised” conference at the Military Academy, in March 2002, for the first time, a Turkish general used the term “Christian Club”²³⁸ in describing the EU. The organization was portrayed as from a different culture, with neo-colonialist aims to divide Turkey. Under these conditions, Kılınç argued that Turkey may never find its deserved place of membership. Kılınç also argued that an alternative alignment to the West could be desired: Iran and Russia.²³⁹

The possible explanation for this, lies in the paradox created by the “fear of Westernization” - in spite of the desire to become Western. In other words, this “Sevres Syndrome”, was accelerated with the perception of increased perception of threats from Kurdish separatism and Islamism. When the abstract ideal of EU membership turned into a specific program, requiring further reforms that would

²³⁶ Yüksel Taşkın, “12 Eylül Atatürkçülüğü ya da bir Kemalist Restorasyon Teşebbüsü Olarak 12 Eylül” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekin (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 580.

²³⁷ Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” 225.

²³⁸ The term used to be a traditional motto of Turkish Islamism, as used by *Milli Görüş* against the EC/EU.

²³⁹ Avcı, “Turkey’s Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-skepticism?,” 164. The statement made by Kılınç was shortly denounced by the Chief of General Staff, Kıvrıkoğlu, by stating that this was only a personal remark and the army was in favor of EU membership for strategic considerations of Turkey. Nonetheless, the public debate continued to refer to the remark by Kılınç as revealing the worries of the Kemalist elite. See Wolfgang Piccoli, “Enhancing Turkey’s EU Membership Prospects via Securitizing Moves: The Role of Turkish NGOs in the Country’s Europeanization,” Paper presented for presentation at the 7th Annual Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop, Harvard University, 4 February 2005, <www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW7/Piccoli%20paper_.pdf> (10 July 2005), 11-12.

cause an alteration of the former path of modernization with a liberal-democratic one, the Kemalist-elitist segment of the society started to perceive the membership process of and integration with the EU as threatening the security of the regime and the nation. For Kemalists, if democratization for example, would translate to political Islamists in power, if human rights would mean protection of political Islam, or if minority rights would mean the establishment of a Kurdistan in Turkish territory, then there is no meaning of compliance with these Western demands, since the very modernization of Turkey has been against these ideas, projects and/or values.²⁴⁰ According to Oğuzlu, the international political climate during the Cold War, has been responsible for the Kemalist state elite to view the EC/EU as a friendly partner, rather than Westernism *per se*. For Oğuzlu, despite the program of Westernization and inclination towards Western values by the Kemalist elite, there had been a negative attitude left from the late Ottoman experience of disintegration which made this elite hold European powers responsible. Although these suspicions were left aside during the Cold War “security cooperation”, when the “logic of democratic peace” became prioritized by the EU in the post-Cold War period - which is reflected in EU demands for democratization in Turkey, this age-old suspicion of European intentions the “Sevres Syndrome” - by the Kemalists, came to the fore again, fed by the rhetoric that the EU “discriminates against” Turkey as a candidate, that it makes demands against the national security and interests of Turkey while it provides no significant incentives.²⁴¹

Although it may have come to the fore recently, this “fear of Westernization” is rooted in a tension much older and consistent. Whereas the primary aim of the Kemalist Republic has been becoming European in domestic political-cultural structure and becoming a part of Europe in foreign relations, the perceptions of Kemalists on the West/Europe have been haunted with a dilemma created by the nationalist character of the regime. Turkish modernization, has been first and foremost “...a struggle of existence ‘against the West’; and the success of this

²⁴⁰ İhsan D. Dağı, “Batılılaşma Korkusu,” *Milliyet*, 2 May 2001, in *Batılılaşma Korkusu: Avrupa Birliği, Demokrasi, İnsan Hakları*, ed. İhsan D. Dağı (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2003), 1-3; “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization,” *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 1 (March 2005): 32-33.

²⁴¹ Oğuzlu, “The Impact of 'Democratisation Along the EU Accession Process' on the Turkish Foreign Policy,” 3-8.

struggle is founded upon the ideal of ‘being Western’ and being accepted by the West as it is.”²⁴². The view from Turkey towards the West has always been moving between idealization of it and perceiving it as a threat²⁴³, which is understandable from the historical experience of occupation and degradation which is shared with most other non-western societies. The need to keep the society together and the desire for development had urged all non-Western societies and groups with different attitudes inside them, for modernization with the West as a model - at least in technology. As Kadioğlu states, Turkey has shared the paradox of eastern nationalism which developed against colonialism. This nationalism is: “...both imitative and hostile to the model it imitates.”. While it tries to clear the traditional culture off hindrances to the progress it assumes to forge, it also tries to keep it as the proof of distinction from the West, as an identity against its dominance. In other words, the paradox of eastern nationalism lies in its attempt to combine the universalist model of the French type nationalism with anti-Western, anti-Enlightenment German type²⁴⁴. Kadioğlu says: “Such a contradictory attempt is a leitmotiv in Turkish nationalism as it evolved alongside Turkish modernization.”²⁴⁵. This nationhood and national interest, preoccupied with the hardly achieved sovereignty and security - internal as well as external - after a semi-colonial order, provides a basis for understanding the attitude towards the West and the EU by Kemalists.

While some argue that the supranational character of the organization poses a threat to Turkey’s national sovereignty - as for any other member of today or the future, intellectuals from the Kemalist left argue that the national interests of powerful nations in the EU may undermine the national integrity and economic independence contrary to Atatürk’s ideal of total independence. Such views are present in the examples below.

²⁴² İhsan D. Dağı, “Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye: Batılılaşmanın Neresindeyiz?” in *Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı, and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), 132.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ For detail in the types of nationalisms, see Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought at the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1986); Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 1994); Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983).

²⁴⁵ Kadioğlu, 179.

3.3.1. Attitudes of Kemalist Intellectuals towards the EU

The Kemalist intellectuals whose views are evaluated in this section and the following, about the issues within the political dimension of EU - Turkey relations, are Erol Manisalı and Mümtaz Soysal, both from the Kemalist left. Their views were searched through, in order to provide a deeper analysis of the Kemalist position which is summarized above.

A professor in İstanbul University (Faculty of Economics) and president in the European and Middle Eastern Research Center of the University, Erol Manisalı is especially interested in EU - Turkey relations, which he perceives to have evolved contrary to the political and economic interests of Turkey.

He is extremely popular among Kemalist youth with his views against the development of EU - Turkey relations - as may be seen by the frequency of his visits to universities for panels and seminars organized by student clubs on globalization and the EU. His alternative approach to a purely political viewpoint, his consistent, sharp and fluent style of writing based on his contentions about what the EU is, provide an alternative reference to the focus and style of Soysal.

Manisalı currently writes a column - *Bıçak Sırtı* – in *Cumhuriyet* (daily newspaper, started to be published since 1924. *Cumhuriyet* had “organic ties” - i.e., through funding - with the CHP and up to date, it remained strictly Kemalist²⁴⁶; inclined towards the Kemalist left rather than right), which is frequently based on his views about the economic and political aspects of the history or the present situation of EU - Turkey relations. His columns form the basis of the sections on his approaches prepared for this study. Besides his academic studies and participation in conferences inside and outside Turkey, he has published more than 30 books, generally with contents chosen among his column or his articles printed elsewhere on the issues of globalization, world economy, EU –Turkey relations and Cyprus. These were also searched through for presenting a wider scope for his views.

Mümtaz Soysal was chosen as an alternative reference to that of Manisalı, with his different focus of interest and his political activities. He graduated from Galatasaray high school in İstanbul, and studied law in Ankara University (Faculty of

²⁴⁶ See Gültaşlı.

Political Sciences, 1953). He is a professor of Constitutional Law; he had been in administrative positions in his university, as well. He also took important positions such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for 4 months in 1994) and as counselor for KKTC president, Denктаş.

Rather early in his academic career, he took place within the group preparing the 1961 Constitution, which he still upholds in comparison with the 1982 Constitution. He has been an important figure in the Kemalist left since the 1960's. He has established "Sosyalist Kültür Derneği" in 1962. He was accused of and sentenced for communist propaganda in 1971, for his book *Anayasa'ya Giriş* (1968). He became a member of parliament as a SHP deputy in 1991. Critical of DYP policies in the coalition government, he also disapproved of SHP attitudes and resigned from the party - about which he wrote in his book *İçgüveysinin Encamı*. He joined the DSP, but resigned from membership of this party as well.²⁴⁷

He has written in journals such as *Forum*, *Akis*, *Yön*, *Ortam*, and newspapers *Ulus*, *Barış*, *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. Currently, he has a column called *Açı* in *Cumhuriyet*, where he writes three times a week. He has published a series of books in 1995, gathering selected writings from his former columns, which were used in addition to his later articles in *Cumhuriyet*. In these resources, he has written exclusively on the Cyprus problem and problems about the Turkish Constitution. Among other issues of his concern, are EU - Turkey relations, internal critique of Kemalist-left political parties and elaborations on government policies. His frequent and elaborative writings on human rights and democracy, as a professor of Constitutional law, provide a valuable insight for understanding the position taken from Kemalism in its own form of social democracy, which is the determinant aspect in the choice of including his views in this study.

When their general views are considered, neither Manisalı, nor Soysal, supports membership to the EU, because they believe that the EU has predominantly economic reservations for Turkey's membership. They believe that the membership process, so much hopeful for many people, has no end. They believe that the EU continues to make endless demands that serve only to the weakening of the country. While Manisalı focuses on the economic reasons, Soysal also adds cultural and

²⁴⁷ See "Mümtaz Soysal," <<http://www.biyografi.net>> (13 June 2005).

political reasons for the rejection of the EU. Since a process of “concessions” have no appeal when membership does not follow, they are against the EU. Kemalist nationalism embedded in their discourse, and leftism of their economic viewpoint, result in this attitude.

3.3.1.1. General Views of Erol Manisalı on the EU

Manisalı is a well known figure for his arguments against the EU. Part of this position stems from his firm belief that a prospect for Turkey’s membership is simply, non-existent. He states frequently, that he is not against membership per se, but against the very conditions that he believes would deteriorate Turkey’s independence. In his focus on political economy, he does not elaborate upon Islamism in his ideas related to the EU. Accordingly, as he proclaims himself, he has been against EU - Turkey relations since the Customs Union – that is, before February 28 or Helsinki.

The reason for Manisalı’s belief that membership will never happen resides in his economic nationalism meeting a realist view of international relations. He frequently articulates that after Customs Union in 1995, the EU had no interest in Turkey as a member. Turkey continues to give everything the Union demands from it, such as the independence of its foreign trade policy²⁴⁸. For him, Europe (which he uses as a synonym for the EC and EU), would gain nothing by incorporating Turkey; on the contrary, it would be under a burden. A developing country with a frustrated, unemployed, massive young population needs a financial self-sacrifice in the form of funds; free movement of Turkish workforce would mean unemployment for about a million European; and the density of political representation of such huge population would mean a decision making power parallel to that of Germany as the largest current member. Manisalı argues that for the EU, main contribution by Turkey is as a market for its products. Since Turkish market has become free for EU goods with the Customs Union, taking Turkey as a member is non-sense in the mind of Europe.²⁴⁹ Manisalı asks why then, Turkey was given the candidacy status at Helsinki. From his viewpoint, the answer is simple: “Turkey is a candidate at zero cost.” Whereas the

²⁴⁸ Erol Manisalı, “İçimde Bir Burukluk Var, Acaba Neden?,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 13, 1999.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

EU puts itself under no obligations, it continues demands such as for Cyprus. The candidacy will help the EU to hold Turkey under its control. With the hope for membership, the country will continue being colonized. It has no place inside the future “United States of Europe”.²⁵⁰

He believes that even if economic and democratic criteria are met, Turkey will face new demands from the EU on issues such as demands of land by the Armenians, changes in the situation of the Southeast, demands of Greece, demand of the Fener Patriarchate for being recognized as ‘ecumenical’. By that time, Turkey will be dependent on the EU in economy and politics, just as he Ottomans were dependent on European powers during the late period of its life-span.²⁵¹

Manisalı believes that economic globalization means the spread and increase of influence by powerful states through their MNC’s over the world. As long as underdeveloped and developing states - which constitute 80% of the world - continue nationalist policies, this influence is endangered. This is the reason behind the rhetoric that “The nation-state is dead.”, imposed on the minds of people in the form of a “civilization mask” for neo-imperialism. In reality, according to him, especially after the Cold War during which ideological considerations undermined nationalist policies to an extent, the superpowers have been acting for their own societies at the expense of others. Whereas the EU is presented as a supra-national entity, it is in fact a way by which strong countries such as France and Germany united their national interests and utilized their power to succeed in the accelerated competition with the US and Japan. Countries like Turkey should be aware that globalization works for the national interests of the rich, and defeats the poor by dependency.²⁵² In another article, he points out that whereas the great powers are advocates of liberal international economy now, they have taken protectionist measures to become independent and powerful in the first place. He adds that the US and the EU are still protectionist, but in a more subtle way, through subventions and

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Erol Manisalı, “Nice Sonrasında Durum, Havuçlar Ve Gerçekler”. *Cumhuriyet*, December 13, 2000.

²⁵² Erol Manisalı, “Ulus-Devlet Öldü Mü?”. *Cumhuriyet*, December 15, 1999.

non-tariff barriers. They do not hesitate entering war for export markets, as he believes the Iraqi case shows.²⁵³

Commenting on the image created by pro-EU media in Turkey, he says that there is in fact no European who is in favor of Turkey's membership. The public research in EU countries show it; in all the member states, the majority was against Turkey's membership and the total percent of those who are against Turkey in Europe was between 70-80. The only division between the Europeans on Turkey is between those who want to continue deceiving the country, and those who say openly that there is no prospect for an EU with Turkey. Manisalı believes that in an EU of 25, anti-Turkey sentiments will be stronger because membership of Turkey is contrary to the interests of the new members (which are less developed from the current members and which will receive substantial financial support) mainly because of economic reasons.²⁵⁴

To be protected from the process of dependency and loss of sovereignty by EU candidacy, Manisalı believes that Turkey should seek a balance in its international politics, by developing relationships with other countries, beginning from Russia and China.²⁵⁵ He repeats this argument following Putin's visit in December 2004. Explaining the importance for better relations with Russia, he makes the following arguments:

The development of Turkey's relations with Russia *'has become a definite necessity rather than a choice'*. Because Turkey, after the cold war, has fallen into a situation by which the USA and the EU started threatening. This tendency is becoming intensified.

-They have opened Lausanne to discussion and entered into policies aimed at changing Turkey's borders.

-They are imposing *'moderate Islamic republic'* and *'Western mandate'* as alternatives to the republican regime and Kemalism; simultaneously.

-They advocate that the independence and Republic movement which Ghazi [Mustafa Kemal] started in May 19th, 1919 against European (Western) invasion, is invalid today. *'They show with the policies they try to impose'* that this formation has been *'won against Europe'* by 1917 Revolution of the Soviets, that they want to return to Sevres after the dissolution of Soviet Union.²⁵⁶

²⁵³ Erol Manisalı, "Açıklık, Kapalılık Ve Ulusallık Üzerine". *Cumhuriyet*, March 9, 2001.

²⁵⁴ Erol Manisalı, "Ya Avrupa'nın Türkiye Oyunu?". *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 2004.

²⁵⁵ Erol Manisalı, "Türkiye Üzerinde Yeni Hesaplar, Ermeni Meselesi" *Cumhuriyet*, March 21, 2001.

²⁵⁶ Erol Manisalı, "Rusya İle İlişkiler Alternatif mi, Yoksa Bir Denge Arayışı mı?" *Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 2004.

-Projects for Kurdistan, the will for autonomization of the Patriarchate, the policy of the enlargement of Armenia and the pressures for meeting of the demands made by Greece, are concrete indicators. These are only a part of the demands of the USA and the EU.

-The USA and the EU are pressuring Turkey, as in the example of Bush's '*either you are under my orders, or you are against me*' insistence on the world.

-The only choice before Turkey is the balancing of '*the West's colonizing pressures*' by developing of the political, economic and military relations with Russia. Without doubt, China, India and other regional states will be part of the cooperation started with Russia...²⁵⁷

In short, Turkey must break the locks with the US and EU, to be able to protect its identity and integrity. While Manisalı does not imagine a future for Turkey in isolation from these two actors, he resents them to be evaluated as the only feasible choices for partners in the world. However, those who want Turkey to be colonized by the EU has kept this possibility a secret from the public; the evidence is the coverage of Putin's visit by Turkish mainstream media, being almost none, while everybody focused on the developments in the membership issue²⁵⁸.

It is important to note that Manisalı does not see much difference between the US, the EU institutions and the strongest countries within the EU (Britain, Germany and France), from the point where he sees them, especially in the debates surrounding EU membership. This position stems from his perception of Turkey as a developing country having national interests which clash with those of the Western powers and the clash seems evident to him considering the geostrategical and historical dimensions of their relationship with the Turks. From such a standpoint, all demands and promises would be suspicious. His general evaluation of Turkey-EU relations fit into a 'zero-sum game' framework in which he sees Turkey as the probable loser in the contemporary situation (i.e., governments confirming decisions that did or would lead to losses such as with the Customs Union...).

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Erol Manisalı, "Gergedanların Altında Kalanlar". *Cumhuriyet*, December 17, 2004.

3.3.1.2. General Views of Mümtaz Soysal on the EU

Very similar to Manisalı's contention, Soysal believes that Turkey's membership would cause problems for, rather than serve the interests of, the EU. He contends that the EU carries the age-old "Eastern Question" in its mind; while detaining Turkey at its door, Europe will provide concessions from Turkey's national interests and leave it outside as a weaker country.²⁵⁹ Soysal states that one of the biggest fears about Turkey's membership in Europe is "...a 70 million population with social imbalances".²⁶⁰ Another reason of reluctance is due to religion in his view.²⁶¹ After Copenhagen Summit of 2002, Soysal says that while some Europeans see Christianity as part of the European culture and civilization, they forget that Christianity also includes love of humanity. This is demonstrated by the acceptance of the Cypriot Greek State - which he states to have applied ethnic cleansing to its own citizens, for membership.²⁶²

Like Manisalı, Soysal believes that EU policy of Turkey is one of detainment. Turkey is diverted from solving its vital problems, the solution of which would make Turkey a respectable member of the EU: Economic development, social cohesion and cultural progress. Instead of being busy with national problems, the country is pulled by a passion for membership. Meanwhile, the EU has the chance for making Turkey meet its demands, against the national interest of the country - such as about Cyprus - in his view.²⁶³ In another article written in November 2003, he repeats his position that while detainment policies continue (shown by statements following legal reforms regarding the APD, such as the rhetoric of "We should see the application first."), the EU side continues taking economic advantages from Turkey. An example would be the striking coincidence of telecommunication agreements with Italy and speeches by this country supportive of Turkey's membership. Soysal

²⁵⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, "Alafranga ve Alaturka Oyalamalar," *Hürriyet*, November 28, 1999. He repeats his contention that there are those among Europe - and in Turkey - who want to see Turkey re-colonized, on an article commenting on the Ooslander Report. See "Yırtıp Atıvermek," *Cumhuriyet*, March 28, 2003.

²⁶⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, "Kim Kimi Nasıl Anladı?," *Cumhuriyet*, December 2, 2002.

²⁶¹ Mümtaz Soysal, "Caritas," *Cumhuriyet*, December 16, 2002.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Mümtaz Soysal, "Oyalanış ve Oyalayış," *Cumhuriyet*, December 9, 2002.

also contests the EU when it demands to see more than the changes in law; he says that this means not only detainment but also a clear discrimination against Turkey, since the “application” of the new laws were not sought with other candidates.²⁶⁴

Like Manisalı, Soysal believes that Turkey should seek alternative friends in its international relations. He perceives the Turkish people as seeking better relations not as a result of calculated interest, but because of sentimental reasons; which is wrong:

There is another reason for the desperation in foreign policy that, it reaches to a general obsession of the society beyond governance and economy: Obsession for Europe.

The direction of thoughts and efforts always to the same point, the aim of getting inside a society which in fact does not show a warm acceptance, caused Turkey to neglect other expansions. This tendency which shows itself clearly in foreign trade, has distanced near neighbors from sight and heart. Instead of building healthy bonds with them, it dragged our people to the deadlock of hard and prejudiced relations with developed countries at the other end of Europe.²⁶⁵

He repeats this position in 2004, by stating that there needs to be “other dimensions than the West” in Turkish foreign policy, because current course of relations with the EU; unbalanced by other actors, forbids the country to apply an independent strategy for development and causes losses such as in Cyprus. This one-sided game impairs Turkey’s dignity.²⁶⁶

For the EU to approve Turkey’s membership, Turkey first needs to be put in the position to be “absorbed”, as the term is used in EU documents on Turkey, frequently. Soysal’s evaluation of the use of this term is that Turkey should become a country which only serves EU interests to be able to enter the Union. Moreover, it is not evident whether or not such a Turkey would have any use for the Turkish people, having lost their sovereignty and independence.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Mümtaz Soysal, “Baklalar,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 5, 2003.

²⁶⁵ Mümtaz Soysal, “Buraya Nasıl Gelindi?,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 27, 2002.

²⁶⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, “Anti-AB,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 2004.

²⁶⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, “Emilim,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 27, 2004.

3.4. Kemalist Discourses on the Political Dimension of EU - Turkey Relations

The Kemalist discourses on the political dimension of EU – Turkey relations are formed by both attitudes towards the West and the EU. However, the standpoints with respect to each political area seem to be shaped more in reaction to domestic developments that are believed to alter Kemalist principles. While national integrity and secular character of the regime are emphasized the most as against EU-based reforms, these have also been the major points of resentment to the regime itself by some domestic actors. In addition to these considerations that affect the discourse on democracy and human rights, and minority rights, nationalism and strategic considerations remain as barriers to an acknowledgement by Kemalists of the EU as an actor in the solution of problems with Greece and the Cyprus problem.

3.4.1. The Kemalist Discourse on Democracy and Human Rights

A main doubt on the desirability of Kemalism in Turkey is manifested through the assertion that the Kemalist regime is authoritarian, that there is a “primacy of the state” in the country, before the people and their will. It may be argued that authoritarianism is embedded in Kemalism itself²⁶⁸, as can be seen by its silence on democracy in the principles of the ideology. It may also be argued that the fault lies not in Kemalism but in those who came to power and legitimated their undemocratic authority by making use of Kemalist principles, given that all of the three-and-a-half military interventions, - two of which institutionalized the democratic deficit in the Constitution - were made in the name of protecting Kemalist principles²⁶⁹. Another position could be that Ottoman state tradition is responsible for present supremacy of

²⁶⁸ For example, Atilla Yayla, president of “Liberal Düşünce Derneği,” contests the argument that Atatürk’s vision for the Turkish society included democracy, by giving the authoritarian rule during his time as a proof. He adds that the only way to provide democracy in Turkey is to reject at least a part of Kemalism itself. See Atilla Yayla, interview by Susan Windybank, “Turkey’s Quest for Freedom,” *Policy* 20, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 48.

²⁶⁹ For an example for the approach concentrating on the Turkish military rather than Kemalism per se, for the deficiencies in Turkish democracy, see James G. Mellon, “Islamism, Kemalism, and the Future of Turkey,” Annual Conference by Canadian Political Science Association, 2003, <www.cpsa-acsa/paper-2003/mellon.pdf> (10 July 2005), 14.

the state over the people²⁷⁰. However it may be reasoned, the fact today, is that Kemalism, as the official ideology and as embraced by Kemalists in the post-Helsinki period, form a basis for hesitation on EU-based reforms for Turkey's democratization.

Although "democracy" is absent from the "six arrows", the relationship between Kemalism and democracy may seem to be unproblematic when one assumes the pro-western character of the Republican regime and its ideal of continuous progress according to the Western standards. However, the West to be modeled has not remained the same as history took its course since the 1930's. Developments in contemporary political systems, with the impact of globalization, have increasingly come to incorporate a degree of pluralism which was not of course, pre-supposed by the Kemalist elite. When characteristics of the democratic regime in its member states and expectations in its relations with third parties evolved, the EU demanded related political change in Turkey. As designed in the form of a unitary nation-state, Turkey seems to be outmoded in terms of its degree of democracy when evaluated with the new standards. Öniş states that this may serve the anti-EU camp - including the Kemalists - in Turkey to gain more adherents due to the incompatibility of the modernizing ideology and nationalism of the regime with the post-modern state envisaged by the EU. He explains as such:

European integration process is associated with a vision of a 'post-modern state' with its emphasis on the pooling of sovereignty and decentralization at the same time. A hallmark of this kind of post-modern state is recognition of multiple identities with a strong emphasis on the promotion of minority rights. This vision of a post-modern state and the associated notions of liberal internationalism come into direct conflict with the earlier version of modernist or authoritarian visions of nationalism based on a single identity, creating significant tensions in the process. Nationalistic reactions to the European Union are certainly not unique to Turkey... Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the tensions described are even more pronounced in the Turkish context given the country's historical legacies and the peculiarities of its nation-building experience.²⁷¹

Since the unitary structure was built upon historical sensitivities about disintegration and since these worries remain in Kemalists' views, the "anti-EU coalition" which is

²⁷⁰ For example, Kramer argues that Kemalist regime preferred secularism over democracy. As such, it is only a continuation of the late Ottoman period, where state rules over the society, in a "secular disguise". See Kramer. *Changing Turkey : Challenges to Europe & the United States*, 7-8.

²⁷¹ Öniş. "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era," 11-12.

composed of extreme nationalists and Kemalists, relies exclusively on a discourse of national security - internal and external, identity and sovereignty²⁷².

For Köker, the problem of democracy in Kemalism and the consequent political regime in Turkey has an answer in the modernization theory of the 1950's. According to this theory, non-Western societies need a "guardianship" regime to catch-up with the modern Western societies. The theory, while accepting the western regimes as the standard, tolerates the authoritarian character of developing states as it acknowledges need for rapid transformation because the stability of development is more urgent than the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of its peoples. The rhetoric that Turkey is not yet ready for democracy - which is the ultimate form and the last step in civilizational progress - is still alive in defense of the establishment Kemalism²⁷³ and it fits this scheme. The early Republican period faced a contradiction between the ideal of modernization and democracy, since the "general will" of the traditional society contradicted with the "elite will" of Westernization. Thus, Turkish democracy has remained limited to a corporatist model with constrained pluralism. As the supremacy of the state over the individual and the society was preserved and legitimized through an imagination of a monolithic nation in progress, the contemporary multi-party, multi-ideology system remains to be constrained by this state ideology.²⁷⁴

The main argument in explanation of the idea that Kemalism contradicts with contemporary standards of democracy, evaluates Kemalism as a hegemonic ideology in Gramscian sense. Köker argues that it excludes any alternative demand from the ranks of the society which is translatable to state policy, because Kemalism constitutes the *raison d'être* of the state itself²⁷⁵. As an official ideology, Kemalism has turned away from the objective of progress, towards preserving the state and the regime, especially after the 1980 military intervention. As the peripheral challenge to this core increased, the Kemalist coalition of the military, bureaucracy and the CHP

²⁷² Ibid., 29.

²⁷³ Tekeli, 41-42.

²⁷⁴ Levent Köker, "Kemalizm/Atatürkçülük: Modernleşme, Devlet ve Demokrasi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 106-110.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 98.

consented upon a national security ideology; which prioritized the indivisibility of the unitary state.²⁷⁶

Although the Kemalist political parties (SHP/CHP) had a role in democratization in the aftermath of the 1980 military regime, the contribution was limited to the lines drawn by this official ideology. During the 1990's, in reaction to *Milli Görüş* (National View) political parties which gained increasing success, the CHP promoted a civil society movement against RP presence in government.²⁷⁷ This Kemalist civil society aimed at the restoration of the Kemalist-nationalist, laicist and civilizational aspects of the regime at the expense of religious and Kurdish-ethnicist demands for political liberalization; using a rhetoric of victimization of the regime by these “reactionary” and “disintegrative” forces.²⁷⁸

During the 1990's, political Islam and Kurdish nationalism has become the perceived challenge of Kemalist nationalism²⁷⁹, as reflected in the National Security Concepts issued by the NSC. Shared by the Kemalist civil society, this stance has led to the demands of change towards democratization and recognition of Kurdish identity by the EU as threats to national unity²⁸⁰. For Oğuzlu, what the Kemalist elite fears is not democratization per se, but the prospect of EU-based democratization to enable these threats to the national unity to get stronger in the absence of the prospect of membership.²⁸¹ Intellectuals from the Kemalist left - including those writing in *Cumhuriyet* - in the 1990's, have interpreted the “six arrows” as a reaction to those groups and developments which they perceived as threatening for the founding principles of the Republic. In this configuration, “republicanism” was emphasized

²⁷⁶ Yıldız, 232-233. This national security ideology has been stated in the 1982 Constitution as a limitation to the enjoyment of freedoms. as explained in Chapter 2.

²⁷⁷ Güneş-Ayata, 118.

²⁷⁸ Erdoğan, 584-587.

²⁷⁹ Keridis. “Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek - Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization,” 21.

²⁸⁰ Yıldız. “Kemalist Milliyetçilik,” 234.

²⁸¹ Oğuzlu, “The Impact of 'Democratisation Along the EU Accession Process' on the Turkish Foreign Policy,” 7.

instead of multi-party democracy²⁸²; “nationalism” was emphasized in reaction to Kurdish nationalism and the EU; “laicism” was emphasized against political Islam.²⁸³

The role of the military in Turkish politics has been considered as an important democratic deficiency by the EU. Since the 1980 coup, various measures were taken by the organization for the restoration of a civilian regime. The remnants of the national security ideology of the Kemalist military have stood as a barrier to these developments. Thus, not only the control over politics by institutions such as the NSC, but also the support found from Kemalist political elite and Kemalist civilian society, stood as a barrier to reforms. According to Cizre, the Turkish military which has consolidated its power in politics through the national security ideology and its assumed guardianship of Kemalist principles, relates itself to Turkish “Europeanization” as long as it does not contradict its power. For the military, democracy and human rights may be “delayed” in case of threats to security - which are defined widely enough to cover all political demands as alternative to the status quo.²⁸⁴ As Taner Demirel explains, the civil-military relations in Turkey are different from the dichotomy of “... ‘democrat civilians’ versus ‘non-democrat’ soldiers.”²⁸⁵ Kemalist and nationalist civilians have been sympathetic to the political role of the army against the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism and the threat to national unity which they believed to follow democratization according to EU demands.²⁸⁶ According to İnsel, the relationship between Kemalism and the army is genetic and even contemporary Kemalists continue to perceive the military as a guarantor of the state which is founded upon Kemalist reforms.²⁸⁷

The choice of the state over the society and alignment with the military for its protection, pose Kemalists against EU based reforms in the area of human rights as

²⁸² There is a split within the Turkish bureaucracy as well; between “Republicans” who advocated the top-down character of Kemalist reforms and “democrats” who oppose the primacy of the state before individual freedoms. See Aydın and Waxman, 384.

²⁸³ Faruk Alpkaya, “Bir 20. Yüzyıl Akımı: ‘Sol Kemalizm’” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 479.

²⁸⁴ Ümit Cizre, “Egemen İdeoloji ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve İlişkisel bir Analiz,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 176-177.

²⁸⁵ Demirel, 134.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ “Sunuş” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 24-25.

well. The closure of Islamic and Kurdist political parties by the Constitutional Court and the active role of the military in curbing political Islam in the post-February 28 process, have not received criticism from civilian Kemalists. Not only the CHP, but also the center-right political parties remained silent about any need for civilianization of politics after this intrusion of the army in politics²⁸⁸. Kemalist civil society has also been supportive of the guardianship role of the military against Islamic demands of freedom since February 28.²⁸⁹

The official ideology accepts human rights and the rule of law as ingredients of the model of the West aspired for the Turkish society. Whereas human rights were mentioned as part of constitutional law, a perception of human rights as an end in itself was absent in this discourse until the 1960's. The reference point for the rule of law in the discourse of Kemalist establishment has been the protection of the regime rather than ensuring the enjoyment of individual liberties. As a result of the perception that Ottoman bills of rights motivated by European powers had served imperialism, the memory of threats towards the new regime through serious opposition and revolts, and the lack of tolerance towards a state-society distinction, the Kemalist regime made rights dependent upon the will of the state.²⁹⁰ Consequently, human rights have been one of the discursive tools of opposition to the Kemalist establishment, mainly against its laicist limitation of the expression of religious identity in public space, by the center-right and Islamist political parties and associations.²⁹¹ Even today, the dominant perception of Kemalism towards internal and external demands of human rights remains to be conditioned upon the compliance with the regime.²⁹² In fact, EU demands on democratization and improvement of human rights have become the focal point of a clash between Kemalism and the EU in the post 1980 setting; where breach of human rights were justified by the Kemalist state and political elite as a necessity for combating terrorism. Human rights policy of the West towards Turkey was perceived as a

²⁸⁸ Cizre, "Egemen İdeoloji ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve İlişkisel bir Analiz," 171.

²⁸⁹ Erdoğan, 588.

²⁹⁰ Tanıl Bora, Y. Bülent Peker and Mithat Sancar, "Hakim İdeolojiler, Batı, Batılılaşma ve İnsan Hakları" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 298-301.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 307-313, 335.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 303.

double-faced attitude which targets the national unity of the country.²⁹³ When Islamic and Kurdist discourses relied upon human rights at a time when the EU increasingly demanded these, Kemalists suspected democratization in the process of EU membership as a risk to the principles of the Republic. In short, the democracy-human rights demands of the EU caused a reversal of their attitude towards the organization; from aspiration to opposition.²⁹⁴ The national security/public order orientation of Kemalists seem to be responsible for this development.

Kemalism has bred its democratic critique through intellectuals such as Ergun Özbudun, Bülent Tanör and Sami Selçuk, who diagnosed a discrepancy between the ideal and the actual in Turkey with respect to democracy and the rule of law.²⁹⁵ Since the 1960's as stated by the Kemalist left and after the 1980 coup by the figures listed above, Kemalism has been ill by an elitism which reinforced a centralist, authoritarian regime, consequently alienating its own citizens from the state.²⁹⁶

In the search for a democratic Kemalist order, Kemalist critiques have shown the one-party period and concurrent military rule as being away from the soul of the Revolution - when the party elites and the army denied the rule of law. They have searched either into the history of the political struggle during the War of Independence - through civil society participation in the *Kuvayı Milliye* movement, tolerance of the leadership to various political stances in the parliament and legality of the actions in seeking democratic legitimacy - or into a look to the future when the ideal of the modern citizen of the modern state is realized so that a pluralist democracy may function (this is argued to be the goal of Atatürk but that it could not be realized in his time due to circumstances). Nonetheless, this critical effort has not been shared by mainstream Kemalism.²⁹⁷ Generally, the deficiency of democracy in the current political system - along with criticism on the quality of human rights, is voiced by groups opposed to Kemalists and Kemalists prefer a shortcut answer that focuses on the suspicious intentions - weakening the state and the nation, marketing the country to global capitalism, territorial separatism or religious fundamentalism -

²⁹³ Ibid., 325-327, 333.

²⁹⁴ Dağı, "Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye: Batılılaşmanın Neresindeyiz?," 132-134.

²⁹⁵ Ömer Turan, "Son Dönemde Kemalizm: Demokratik Meşruiyet Arayışları" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 592-593.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 593-599.

of the adherents of the idea that Turkey needs more democracy or human rights. This stance can be seen in the examples shown below.

3.4.1.1. Discourses of Kemalist Intellectuals on Democracy and Human Rights

While Manisalı does not elaborate upon any problems related to democracy and human rights in the country, he mentions very rarely that enhancement of human rights is something good. The reason stems from his contention that in the context of EU –Turkey relations, no demand may be seen as neutral. His priority in human rights are economic and social rights, those which he sees silence in the political dimension of EU - Turkey relationship. Civil and political rights and reduction of the role of the military are serving separatists and Islamists in Turkey, thus there is not much reason for him to support changes towards these ends.

On the contrary, despite putting “national integrity-security” reservations on EU-based political reforms, Soysal, as a figure with a genuine interest in a democratic regime, supports legislative reform on civil and political rights. His understanding of democracy requires tolerance to different views and he believes that if voiced within a democratic space, ideas that run counter to Kemalist principles would lose their radicalism and thus cease to be a threat to democracy itself. Unlike Manisalı, he does not openly support the initiative of the military against political Islam, given the history of his imprisonment during military takeovers and his consistent contestment of reduction of the power of the legislative through Constitutions. Nonetheless, his post February 28 stance is much less tolerant of democratic demands voiced by Islamists. His stance about EU involvement in Turkish democratization is also one of disapproval.

3.4.1.1.1. The Views of Erol Manisalı on Democracy and Human Rights

Manisalı’s priority is national independence, especially from the EU, in an era governed by global capitalism. This stance is reflected in his evaluations about the democracy and human rights dimension of EU - Turkey relations. On the one hand, he appreciates the political conditions of democratization and improvement of human

rights, demanded by the EU as part of the genuine needs of Turkey²⁹⁸. On the other, he believes that the EU cannot serve as an anchor for Turkish democratization because of this relationship of dependency with the organization. Another reason for his discontent with EU democratization scheme lies in the discrepancy between his conceptualization of democracy and characteristics of EU demands in this area.

Manisalı states that, he “can not” be against the Copenhagen Criteria.²⁹⁹ On other occasions too, he does not seem to resist EU demands on human rights and democracy categorically. For example, as he comments on the Progress Report of 2004, he articulates that the only issue that is acceptable and applicable for Turkey in the document is about human rights. He says that this should be done by Turkey and for Turkey, already. Nonetheless, he also states his suspicion that the EU may demand rights for terrorists, etc., in the future in this human rights framework.³⁰⁰

He argues that there is a “double standard” in Western policies on democracy and human rights. He states that when Turkey is “taken advantage of” by IMF, World Bank and the EU, there is no talk of democracy.³⁰¹ What these actors want from Turkey is only a ‘formal democracy’, needed to prepare the grounds for manipulation through a free market medium (such as through Customs Union and international arbitration)³⁰². Manisalı’s understanding of democracy is on the contrary: He believes that Turkey needs a “social democracy”, a regime in which “...economic and political powers are balanced on behalf of wide masses of people”.³⁰³

He states that Turkey is being made totally dependent on and governed by the EU both in its domestic and foreign policy. Foreign capital, instead of the local bourgeoisie, is controlling the economy. Such a system is, as argued by Manisalı, an oligarchy, not a democracy. He does not approve of the idea that the EU serves for democratization in Turkey. For Manisalı, a democratic system cannot prosper in a

²⁹⁸ Erol Manisalı, *Türkiye - Avrupa İlişkilerinde “Sessiz Darbe”* (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2004), 139.

²⁹⁹ Erol Manisalı, *Ahtapot Kollarındaki Dünya ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2003), 168.

³⁰⁰ Erol Manisalı, “İlerleme Raporu mu? Ömür Boyu Hapis mi?,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 2004.

³⁰¹ Erol Manisalı, “Aman Tren Kaçmasın,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 8, 2000.

³⁰² Erol Manisalı, “Yolu Yordamı Önemli Değil, Yeter ki Açık Olsun,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 13, 2004.

³⁰³ Erol Manisalı, “Aman Tren Kaçmasın”.

dependent country.³⁰⁴ If the EU really wanted to see democracy in Turkey, it would have demands about social democracy; instead, individualism dominates its rhetoric rather than societal interest. However, such democracy would mean the defeat of “EU agents” in Turkey and victory of the people. Then, EU would not be able to continue the one sided relationship with the country. In order not to lose the colonization game, the EU promotes ethnic and regional separatism, and anti-Kemalist Islamism.³⁰⁵

For Manisalı, human rights is indispensable from social democracy, the real existence of which, he believes, would endanger EU plans.³⁰⁶ In his view, democracy requires a balance between individual and societal freedoms. By societal freedoms, he means economic and social rights - which should be granted by the state for solving the inequalities created by capitalism.³⁰⁷ For Manisalı, such a system is present in the Western societies because they can exploit the underdeveloped countries for transferring funds for their welfare states. For the same reason, the West has a double standard in the area of human rights. The EU does not want to see a real human rights regime in its periphery, because it will endanger the welfare of EU members. Instead, those demands that will divide and manipulate the periphery are articulated.³⁰⁸

In order for such a democracy to function in an underdeveloped country like Turkey, he states that the political system should be comprised of political parties which are based on “social classes”. Protection of interests of the working force against international capitalism should also be provided in such a regime. However, the political system of Turkey is far from meeting any of these two conditions. Political parties in Turkey rely rather upon religion and religious sects, ethnic groups (which he openly equates with separatism) than social classes. These kind of parties

³⁰⁴ Erol Manisalı, *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Türkiye'nin Seçenekleri* (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2004), 191-193.

³⁰⁵ Erol Manisalı, “İlerleme Raporu mu? Gerileme Raporu mu?,” *Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 2003. He repeats the Theme in “Mustafa Kemal ile İngiliz Muhiplerini Karıştırırlar,” *Cumhuriyet*, 10 November 2003. Along with a critique of Turkish media which present EU type democratization as consistent with Kemalism.

³⁰⁶ Manisalı, “Mustafa Kemal İle İngiliz Muhiplerini Karıştırırlar”.

³⁰⁷ Manisalı, *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Türkiye'nin Seçenekleri*, 74, 178; *Ulusal Cephe Vuruşları* (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2004), 160.

³⁰⁸ Manisalı, *Bekleme Odasında İğfal*, (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2005), 34-36; *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Türkiye'nin Seçenekleri*, 74-76.

are bred by and serve the interests of the “non-national capitalist circles” which are allied with Western capitalism. There are also those parties which prioritize regional interests and those political parties of the Enlightened elite - the Kemalist political parties including CHP. These are bound to remain marginal, since they also do not meet with the interests of the masses. In such a setting, a full democracy becomes impossible.³⁰⁹

A term frequently used by Manisalı about EU demands on human rights, minority rights and Cyprus, is “the iceberg”, meaning that one should not consider the demand per se. Rather, it should be evaluated as part of the context of EU - Turkey relations, which is basically aimed at Turkey’s weakness and dependency in his view.³¹⁰ In Manisalı’s discourse, these issues are only used as part and parcel of his general attitude against the EU and other anti-Kemalist forces he believes to be inside Turkey. On the most publicized demand for religious rights, for freedom of wearing *türban* (a recent, specific way of wearing the headscarf by some Muslim women) in the public space, Manisalı argues that the issue is not about human rights; it has been utilized as a symbol.³¹¹ This symbol is utilized by Turkish political Islam because of the “encouragement” from the EU based-interests. Hence, if one is against imperialism in Turkey - which is definitely his own position, he should also stand against Customs Union and freedom of wearing *türban* - which are also part of his own stance.³¹²

In short, besides the general description of an ideal system where democracy and human rights may find root, Manisalı does not give any detail or elaborate on the problems faced by Turkey in this area, neither in his column nor in his publications. There is not much clarity in his arguments about the desirability of EU - based reforms. While he advocates democratization and more human rights in the country, his priority lies in the national integrity and interest of the Kemalist regime, which he perceives to be on the opposite side of interests of the EU member states - dominated by an imperialist vision, and those in Turkey who defend these reforms - comprised

³⁰⁹ Manisalı, *Bekleme Odasında İğfal*, 174-175.

³¹⁰ For the usage of the term by Erol Manisalı on freedom of religious expression, see *Bıçak Sirtında Cumhuriyet*, (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2004), 188; on minority rights, see *Bekleme Odasında İğfal*, 34; on Cyprus, see *Ulusal Cepheye Vuruşanlar*, (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2004), 161.

³¹¹ Manisalı, “Mustafa Kemal ile İngiliz Muhiplerini Karıştıranlar”.

³¹² Manisalı, *Bıçak Sirtında Cumhuriyet*, 188-189.

of ethnic separatists, religious fundamentalists and big capitalists in alliance with the EU³¹³.

In line with this stance, he does not question the role of the military in domestic and foreign policy as a democratic standard - as articulated in EU documents and voiced by Turkish intellectuals and political actors in critique of the regime with respect to democracy. On the contrary, he expects initiative from the military, for example, for a more balanced foreign policy rather than reliance on the EU and the US.³¹⁴ The questioning of “Turkey’s dependence on the EU” by the military and the power of the institution to “take measures” against this situation, is perceived by Manisalı as a guarantee for the country against pro-EU circles in Turkey.³¹⁵ Accordingly, it may be said that Manisalı’s ideas are in line with the evaluations made on the civilian Kemalists - military relationship as explained above.

3.4.1.1.2. The views of Mümtaz Soysal on Democracy and Human Rights

Soysal has been in sharp critique of the 1982 Constitution from its initiation onwards. He contested its undemocratic character both “in the making” of it and its contents. He stated that actors included in the preparation and deliberation processes were severely limited³¹⁶. He was critical of the over-empowerment of the executive - which is against the core values of a parliamentary democracy, its institutionalization of the role of the military through the NSC - which would cause contestment from the people and reduction in the respectability of the army.³¹⁷ He pointed at the danger of weakening the legislative branch of political power with the example of oligarchic

³¹³ Manisalı, *Türkiye - Avrupa İlişkilerinde “Sessiz Darbe”*, 8; *Bıçak Sırtında Cumhuriyet*, 28-29.

³¹⁴ This expectation has been pronounced by Manisalı in his speech at the symposium organized by the Military Academies on March 7, 2002, as he explains and quotes in *Türkiye - Avrupa İlişkilerinde “Sessiz Darbe”*, 153-163. Manisalı also notes that General Tuncer Kılınç - whose “personal” remark in that symposium on the need of balancing relations with the US and EU by improving relationships with Iran and Russia is explained above - has said: “I completely agree with every word of Erol Manisalı: Ibid., 163.

³¹⁵ This approval is stated in the context of the debate initiated by the media after Kılınç’s statements in the symposium on March 7, 2002. See Manisalı, *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Türkiye’nin Seçenekleri*, 68-69.

³¹⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, “İki Düğüm,” *Milliyet*, September 7, 1988, in *Anayasa’nın Püf Noktası* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1995), 144-145.

³¹⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, “Yürütme Nasıl Olmalı?,” *Milliyet*, February 9, 1982, in *Anayasa’nın Püf Noktası*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1995), 81-83; “Geleceğin Politikası ve Ordu,” *Milliyet*, April 14, 1982, in *Anayasa’nın Püf Noktası*, 87-89.

practices during the one-party period and after it, until the 1961 military intervention that led to a more democratic Constitution.³¹⁸ Although he believes that the issue of the status of military in politics cannot be simplified as classical democratic theory postulates - that the military authority should be subjected to civilian authority through responsibility towards the Ministry of Defense which operates under the Prime Ministry - in a country which has a history of modernization in which the military has an important part, the ideal solution was the one brought by 1961 Constitution for Soysal. The NSC should remain to be an organ “consulted” by the government, unlike the guaranteeing of power to the military in decision-making, as in 1982 Constitution³¹⁹. Thus, it can be said that the position of Soysal on the role of the military was parallel to that of the EU in the post-1999 period - as reflected in the official documents demanding reform on this area. Nonetheless, a decade after these remarks, during debates on amendments to make the Chief of General Staff responsible to the Ministry of Defense was not a priority for the country.³²⁰

His position shifted from a minor questioning to totally defending the status of the NSC in the post-February 28 period. Commenting on the EU demand of change on the role of the military that took place in the first APD, he favored the army from various points. He justified the importance of the institution by stating that the Turkish army has a unique place in Ottoman modernization and establishment of the Kemalist Republic. Then, he added that the institutionalization of this importance by the 1961 Constitution was designed as a guarantee against the manipulation of it by politicians. Moreover, he did not contest to the elevated status of the NSC with the 1982 Constitution by stating that Turkey is a country with internal and external security threats. He also openly stated his suspicions about foreign-directed change, in a way similar to that of Manisalı.³²¹ Elsewhere too, he points at the “suspicious intentions” of Europe and the US which he believes to be against the Kemalist

³¹⁸ Mümtaz Soysal, “Sıçrama,” *Milliyet*, December 23, 1981, in *Anayasa'nın Püf Noktası*, 76.

³¹⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Geleceğin Politickası ve Ordu,” *Milliyet*, April 14, 1982, in *Anayasa'nın Püf Noktası*, 84.

³²⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, “Toplumca Öğrenmek,” *Milliyet*, October 27, 1981, in *Anayasa'nın Püf Noktası*, 64-65.

³²¹ Mümtaz Soysal, “MGK'nın ABC'si,” *Hürriyet*, October 18, 2000.

Republic.³²² He even comes to the point that the military remains to be the only actor in Turkey which can protect Turkey's national interests against Kurdish separatism, political Islam and demands for Turkey to give up in Cyprus – which is why the EU is so insistent upon the reduction of its role in politics in his view.³²³ In 2004, he contends that the EU will not have Turkey as a full member even if all reforms were made, and adds his former argument that the "...balance established between the military and the civilian decision-makers..." is needed by Turkey, unlike Europe, which has no important security problems.³²⁴

For human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially on the freedom of expression and association, Soysal shows a similar approach, critical of the 1982 Constitution since the beginning and in accordance with the later EU demands. Against this Constitution, he defends the former one by arguing that the situation of anarchy leading to the 1980 coup was not because of "too much freedom" provided by 1961 Constitution. Rather, the inadequacy of governments to satisfy societal demands has caused it.³²⁵ He states that every kind of freedom has a contextual boundary; that is, freedoms may be limited in cases of threat to social justice, public order and the like. An individual freedom also has a limitation inherent to it; a freedom ceases to be enjoyed if it harms the freedoms of other individuals. When he looks at the 1982 Constitution with these criteria, Soysal finds the limitations on the freedoms overly detailed, which enables oppressive practices by the state.³²⁶

Freedom of expression and association should be provided to all, within these natural boundaries, according to Soysal. In his understanding of human rights, the limitations on the expression of Kurdish identity is unjustifiable unless it turns into separatism. As explained in the section of Soysal's views on minority rights presented below, he is against limitations on association of individuals, including as a political party, to act in accordance with their views. For him, political parties,

³²² Mümtaz Soysal, "Sözler ve Niyetler," *Hürriyet*, May 16, 2000. In other articles of the same year, it may clearly be seen that Soysal has no reservations of democracy or human rights against the "cleansing" of bureaucratic positions from political Islamists, as envisaged by the NSC with the February 28 process. See "Uyum Uykusu," *Hürriyet*, August 25, 2000; "Çok Boyutluluğun Sorunları," *Hürriyet*, September 3, 2000, where he also contests the Gülen community.

³²³ Mümtaz Soysal, "Tehdit," *Cumhuriyet*, April 30, 2003.

³²⁴ Mümtaz Soysal, "Heves ve Denge," *Cumhuriyet*, July 7, 2004.

³²⁵ Mümtaz Soysal, "Öncelikler," *Hürriyet*, April 18, 1992, in *Anayasa'nın Püf Noktası*, 159.

³²⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, "Elifba," *Milliyet*, August 3, 1982, in *Anayasa'nın Püf Noktası*, 102-103.

unlike the Constitution stipulates, should be able to be organized on the basis of cultural identities, religious views, or in relationship with groups and associations formed on the basis of class - which he believes should be done by Turkish social democratic parties by definition³²⁷.

Soysal was against the amendment to the Article 24 of the Constitution which set the boundaries of freedom of conscience and religion, which stresses the laicist character of the regime and stipulates against exploitation of beliefs. Nonetheless, he was an adherent of the amendment of Article 163 of the Penal Code³²⁸ and against the criminalization of “propaganda against laicism” through amendment of the Law for the Struggle Against Terrorism³²⁹. He argues that laicism does not require marginalization of Islamist politics as long as they remain within the confines of the system, in his comments about the rise of the RP.³³⁰ Even in 1989, he pointed at the need for a reconciliation of the principle of laicism and freedom of belief. For Soysal, being against the public expression of religion - through the *türban* - does nothing to resolve the reasons behind the popularity of such demands; a resistance to the corruption dominating politics and the society, rather than a genuine support for *sharia*.³³¹ In short, even if the issue is to defend the Kemalist regime against its opponents, it should be done without breach of universal human rights, in Soysal’s account.

Although writing a great deal in critique of the human rights regime in Turkey, Soysal’s evaluations are generally detached from the context of EU - Turkey relations. This is reflected in his choice timing of human rights or democracy contents in his column. Even during the 2000’s, the time when EU membership process frequently carried these issues to the public agenda, it has been rare for Soysal to write on human rights as part of evaluation of Progress Reports or Summit decisions. Nonetheless, he comments on the legislative packages demanded by the EU. When he does comment, although he is generally in favor of enhancement of

³²⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, “Işık,” *Hürriyet*, January 25, 1992, in *İçgüveysinin Encamı*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1995), 27-28.

³²⁸ Mümtaz Soysal, “Dönüm Noktası,” *Hürriyet*, June 21, 1995, in *Anayasa’nın Püf Noktası*, 168.

³²⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Eşik ve Eşikler,” *Hürriyet*, November 23, 1993, in *Balınanın Böcekleri*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1995), 117- 119.

³³⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, “Büyük Kopukluk,” *Hürriyet*, November 30, 1994, in *Balınanın Böcekleri*, 144.

³³¹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Hesaplar ve Çelişkiler,” *Milliyet*, March 15, 1989, in *Balınanın Böcekleri*, 70-71.

human rights, he remains critical about EU-based reforms as part of his general attitude against the EU.

During the debates of the preparation of the first National Program, commenting on the first APD, Soysal states that those in Turkey who say that the Copenhagen Criteria form a framework for progress which is needed by Turkey already, are not sincere. Soysal, although he too is an advocate of the enhancement of human rights in the country, contests this to be done under foreign supervision.³³² Two years later, with the same contention, he argues that European insistence on the change of some laws are not for Turkey, but for Europe itself. He says that the ‘mandatist’ press tries to create the image that things done for membership are for the good of Turkish people. About the amendments made in August 3, 2002, in line with the APD, he comments that some are clearly violating the Constitution and that most of the changes are either giving rights to foreigners or rights to those minorities and ethnic groups which Europeans are concerned for, not for the good of society as a whole.³³³ Soysal criticizes another package of legislation for harmonization with the EU, by stating that some are violating the judicial system of the country, some have the potential to disturb national interest and some mean giving in from the rights acquired at Lausanne with so much effort.³³⁴

3.4.2. The Kemalist Discourse on Minority Rights

For Kemalism, as the official ideology, the definition of minorities and minority rights are efficiently set with the Lausanne Treaty. Kemalist nationalism has idealized a unitary society, in which neither ethnic, nor religious differences would be expressed in the public space.³³⁵ Kurdish identity imagined by the Kurds - as well as the Islamic one imagined by the Islamists, has become arguably a “constitutive other” of the Kemalist discourse. A reason for Kemalists’ perception of

³³² Mümtaz Soysal, “Kendini Düzeltememek,” *Hürriyet*, November 1, 2000. Furthermore, Soysal finds the EU “insincere” on the issue of democracy and human rights, just as with Cyprus, by arguing that Turkey is discriminated against, with respect to other candidates who were decided to start negotiations before fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. See Soysal, “Cicim Aylarının Sonu,” *Hürriyet*, October 25, 2000.

³³³ Mümtaz Soysal, “Hukukta Avrupa Zorlaması,” *Cumhuriyet*, August 7, 2002.

³³⁴ Mümtaz Soysal, “Terazi,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 2002.

³³⁵ Yıldız, 215.

threat by Islamism and Kurdism is that these have been expressed in opposition to the Kemalist project of modern, secular and unitary nation-building.³³⁶ When the historical experience of Kurdish uprisings are also considered, recognition of a Kurdish minority would be out of question. The evolution of Turkish nationalism within this official ideology and human rights violations of the state officials in response to the PKK terrorism - as explained in the previous Chapter - have contributed to the rise of Kurdish demands for such a recognition by the EU and by the state.

As explained above, just as with Islamic demands, the demands by the Kurdish groups have led to an alienation from human rights and the EU involvement on the issue; let alone minority rights. The military, as one of the groups that constitute the “gradualists” - who are reluctant for rapid reform for integration with Europe, has declared its opposition to recognizing the cultural rights of Kurds since the beginning of debates during the preparation of the first APD. The army clearly associated demands for use of Kurdish in broadcasting and education with “separatist terrorism”.³³⁷ Kemalists, have even utilized references to the Ottoman perception of the Islamic community as a basis for the rejection of existence of Muslim minorities in Turkey³³⁸.

Nonetheless, Kemalists have accepted that there is a Kurdish problem and sought solutions for it. There have been Kemalists such as Tanyol, who criticized the nationalism and socioeconomic policies of the Kemalist state which are believed to have alienated the Kurds from the regime³³⁹ and those as Tanör, who advocated enhanced cultural rights for the Kurds and freedom for the political representation of different ethnic identities³⁴⁰. SHP has been one of the first political parties in the post-1980 regime which sought solution to the political problems of the Kurdish population³⁴¹. The legislative reforms for the use of Kurdish were made during the

³³⁶ Zafer Yörük, “Politik Psişe Olarak Türk Kimliği” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 321-322.

³³⁷ Aydınli and Waxman, 385-386.

³³⁸ Bora, Peker and Sancar, 325-327, 332.

³³⁹ Ömer Turan, “Cahit Tanyol” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 387.

³⁴⁰ Turan, 597.

³⁴¹ SHP report on the Kurdish issue in mid-1990’s, criticized the restrictions on the expression of Kurdish identity and culture to the extent that it defined the state policy as totalitarian, even exceeding

coalitions in which social democratic parties of Kemalist orientation took place or led. However, the dominant discourse of Kemalism on the Kurdish question has presented it as a socio-economic problem rooted in feudalism and of separatist terrorism fed by imperialistic aims³⁴² on Turkey; rather than a question of culture and identity. Thus, the intellectuals and political leaders of the Kemalist left sided with the hegemonic, nationalistic discourse of security present in the Kemalist state elite.³⁴³

3.4.2.1. Discourses of Kemalist Intellectuals on Minority Rights

Manisalı and Soysal are against rights for minorities, as part of their suspicion towards the EU, which demands these continuously, as they perceive. In other words, their views are dominated by the national security ideology of the regime. In their view, minority status to the Kurds would mean autonomy that may lead to the country's disintegration. Whereas Manisalı does not elaborate on human rights for the Kurds besides his general focus on Kurdish separatism, Soysal touches upon the Kurdish problem, and offers the universal human rights in terms of individual rights, as the ultimate solution. Both of the writers, in accordance with their stance on democracy and human rights, contend that the changes should not be in the framework of answering EU demands given that these are "internal" problems which should not be intervened by outsiders.

3.4.2.1.1. The Views of Erol Manisalı on Minority Rights

Manisalı maintains almost silent on minority rights and the Kurdish problem. He does not evaluate these even as part of his ideas related to human rights. However, he

the practices of fascist states in the 1930's. See Hugh Poulton. *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 227-228.

³⁴² See remarks on the "Sevres Syndrome" above.

³⁴³ Bağış Erten and Görkem Doğan, "Cumhuriyet'in Cumhuriyeti: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 511; Asena Günel, "Uğur Mumcu" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 486-487; Hamit Bozarslan, "Bülent Ecevit" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 463.

frequently mentions the demands of the Greek patriarchate, PKK and ethnic separatists voiced by the EU. For example, in an article following the Progress Report of 2004 (released in October), he states that the “indirect conditions” for Turkey set by the EP - even though not been included in this report - include the following.³⁴⁴

- Autonomy for the Fener Patriarchate,
- Autonomy for the Southeast,
- Referandum in Hatay (expected to separate from Turkey given that the population of those with non-Turkish origin outnumber those of Turkish origin).

Combined with his evaluation that Turkey will never be a member, Manisalı argues that the political demands of the EU as stated in this report, would only function to make Turkey a less strong, more dependent country.³⁴⁵ For Manisalı, the following decision of the Brussels Summit of December 2004, contrary to the presentation of it to the public, is the continuation of the game. What the Union stresses is ethnic and religious issues, and these would reduce the integrity of the country and has to do nothing with democracy - or human rights - in his view.³⁴⁶

One occasion where he mentions “minority rights” as a concept, is an evaluation of the report prepared by the “Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Working Group” of the Human Rights Advisory Committee³⁴⁷. Manisalı argues that the report includes both true and contestable points, but does not specify what those points are. While it may have part of truth in it, he remains against the release of this report, because he believes that the issue of minority rights has become a means for “Western imperialism” to interfere in peripheral countries. For Manisalı, the term of

³⁴⁴ Erol Manisalı, “İlerleme Raporu mu?Ömür Boyu Hapis mi?,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 2004.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Erol Manisalı, “Üç Maymunu Oynayanlar...,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 27, 2004.

³⁴⁷ The Committee was established by in 2001, in order to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. The related report has been accepted by the Committee in 2004. The content of the report verifies the objective existence of minorities such as the Kurds and suggests that Turkey should provide a system of cultural pluralism for the enhancement of the principle of non-discrimination. Baskın Oran, one of the experts within the Working Group, has published a recent book on the minority problem of Turkey, in which he defends and elaborates the document. For the documentation and defence of this report which created a public debate soon after its release, by the author, see Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İctihat, Uygulama* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).

minority rights only shows the tip of “the iceberg”; imperialism has always motivated ethnic and religious separatism to weaken underdeveloped countries, in order to make them more vulnerable for exploitation. Thus, EU discourse of human rights and minority rights only reveals colonialist aims. Turkey should be totally independent before debating these rights inside.³⁴⁸

Manisalı argues that one of the pro-EU groups of Turkey are the “separatist circles”. He argues that they have a vested interest in the domination of Turkey by the EU. Kurdish separatism in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey would serve the interests of the US and Britain in the Middle East, as a gateway to the region and as a force keeping the region weak. Other EU member states have also specific interests for supporting Kurdish separatism in Turkey, such as Germany, which plays religious fundamentalism and Kurdism as a lever for the massive Turkish population living inside its borders. Manisalı argues that such plans are responsible for EU support for PKK.³⁴⁹ Manisalı projects that by 2008, there will be “autonomous relationships” between Kurds in Diyarbakır and Kurds in Iraq and the project of Kurdistan will move side by side with the Progress Reports.³⁵⁰

In sum, Manisalı evaluates minority rights solely within the context of EU - Turkey relations and within the confines of the “Sevres syndrome”³⁵¹.

3.4.2.1.2. The Views of Mümtaz Soysal on Minority Rights

In minority debates, Soysal is focused on the Kurdish problem, which he evaluates in terms of cultural demands by and for the Kurds, socioeconomic disparities and ethnic separatism.

Generally, Soysal believes that the understanding of citizenship and nationality in the Turkish Republican ideology poses no base for discrimination on the basis of religion, language or ethnicity. He states that the Kemalist understanding of

³⁴⁸ Manisalı, *Bekleme Odasında İğfal*, 34-37.

³⁴⁹ Erol Manisalı, *İçyüzü ve Perde Arkasıyla Avrupa Çıkmazı: Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları, 2004), 195-197.

³⁵⁰ Manisalı, *Bekleme Odasında İğfal*, 7.

³⁵¹ In fact, he openly states that the EU is determined to “take back what they gave in Lausanne”; that they have been trying to re-enforce the Sevres agreement in the post-Cold War era - by the help of the pro-EU lobby within Turkey. See Erol Manisalı, *Bekleme Odasında İğfal*, (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2005), 56.

citizenship is based on the French model. Thus, the nation is built upon the will of people from different origins to live together on a specific territory. Nonetheless, he admits that the country experienced inclination towards the German model based on race and language for defining the nation at times.³⁵² Soysal admits that there have been “mistakes” of the regime on the equal treatment of its citizens during the early years of the Republic. Nonetheless, he is careful to state that this was not the “official policy”. He makes the justification of this treatment through the need of security, in the face of rebellions as by Sheikh Said - plus Dersim events³⁵³ - which he believes to be motivated by foreign powers.³⁵⁴ Although these memories may set the Kurdish citizens apart from the regime, Soysal reminds the Ottoman tradition of coexistence expressed by Turkey during the Lausanne Conference, the togetherness expressed by the War of Independence, for proving his position that there is no need for antagonisms.³⁵⁵

During the 1990’s when PKK terrorism and party closures (HEP and DEP) were on the agenda, Soysal argues for the enhancement of human rights and democracy for solving the problems of Turkish Kurds. In the context of debates dichotomizing military - versus - political solution to the Southeast problem, he states that combating terrorism does not have to mean a state campaign against the whole population of the region. Equally, advocating a political solution does not require paving way to separatism or re-invoking Sevres; democratization can resolve resentment to the regime. For Soysal, these can be - and should be, if one wants to decrease the support for PKK - operated simultaneously. What makes the situation complicated is the Western plans for establishing a Kurdistan in Turkey’s region, which would breed the separatist tendencies among Turkish Kurds.³⁵⁶

For Soysal, the solution of the Kurdish problem should definitely involve democratization. For Soysal, a political party with priority on the problems of the

³⁵² Mümtaz Soysal, “İnsanın Kendi Aklı,” *Hürriyet*, October 12, 1993, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 100-101.

³⁵³ Mümtaz Soysal, “Yalan ve Yılan,” *Hürriyet*, November 3, 1993, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 108.

³⁵⁴ Mümtaz Soysal, “Halkıma İhanet Etmem!,” interviewed by Türey Köse, *Cumhuriyet*, January 25, 1995, in *İçgüveysinin Encamı*, 145. Also see “Demokratikleşme, Bölme Değildir,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 1994, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 151.

³⁵⁵ Mümtaz Soysal, “Yalan ve Yılan,” *Hürriyet*, November 3, 1993, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 108.

³⁵⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, “Kestirme Bazen Sapadır,” *Hürriyet*, November 12, 1993, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 111-113.

Kurdish citizens, is totally legitimate, despite it was banned by related legislation as explained in the previous Chapter. He supported the inclusion of HEP candidates in SHP seats at the parliament, as a way to prove separatists that Kurdish interests also have a chance to be pursued in the legitimate political space.³⁵⁷ After the closure of DEP, he clearly disapproved of the court decision and the 1982 Constitution it is based on, which limits freedom of association. He believes that such practices against freedom of expression and association of the Kurds work to the advantage of the PKK as it uses such events for its propaganda against Turkey.³⁵⁸ On similar grounds, he supports the presence of RP in Turkish politics, since he believes that the democratic representation of Islamist views would prevent radicalism.³⁵⁹

For Soysal, the nation-state, as the most civilized form of polity, is able to deal successfully with the question of minorities. Accordingly, the Kurdish problem will best be solved within a regime respecting human rights, instead of providing group rights and regional autonomies. He finds the Western “fashion” of such rights and autonomies as a suggestion for “return to the Middle Age” - that is, pre-nation state divisions. These are also unnecessary, because nation-state does not connote by itself, a system which assimilates and homogenizes its people.³⁶⁰ In these suggestions made through Western-based international organizations and human rights NGO’s, Soysal suspects that there are colonialist intentions to disintegrate peripheral nation-states, just like Manisalı.³⁶¹ For the expression of this suspicion, he uses the term “playing the Kurdish card”, by those who want to weaken the country through separatism in disguise of human rights demands.³⁶²

³⁵⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, “Kucak ve Sakal,” *Hürriyet*, December 27, 1991, in *İçgüveysinin Encamı*, 16.

³⁵⁸ Mümtaz Soysal, “Kör Gidiş,” *Hürriyet*, June 18, 1994, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 129-132; “Sağduyunun Sağ Kulağı,” *Hürriyet*, June 22, 1994, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 133-135.

³⁵⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Refah Korkusu,” *Hürriyet*, October 30, 1994, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 142-144. However, his position changed towards a pro-state one after the February 28, as stated above.

³⁶⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, “Yeni Ortaçağ,” *Hürriyet*, August 3, 1994, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 136-138.

³⁶¹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Demokratikleşme, Bölme Değildir,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 1994, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 153-154.

³⁶² Mümtaz Soysal, “Nisana Bakış,” *Hürriyet*, March 21, 1999; “AB’nin Kürt Kartı,” *Hürriyet*, March 1, 2000. Soysal argues that the respect for and protection of minorities within the Copenhagen Criteria are not incompatible with the understanding of citizenship which is taken from the French model by Turkey, and the universal human rights schemes. However, he keeps doubted about the intention of the EU by demanding these assurances, because he believes that the EU is not yet clearly differentiate minority rights and autonomy from this legitimate framework. See Soysal, “Azınlık Tuzağı,” *Hürriyet*, December 7, 1999.

By human rights in a nation-state framework, Soysal means first and foremost a regime which internalizes the principle of non-discrimination. In a truly Kemalist regime, the individual freedom to be “one’s self” is a *sine qua non*³⁶³. When the state does not discriminate on the grounds of that self, when there are equal opportunities for all, there would be no Kurdish problem.³⁶⁴ In this context, Soysal argues that Kurdish language and culture should be free to learn and express through the media, as early as the beginning of 1990’s, long before related requirements were stated in EU Progress Reports³⁶⁵. However, when “education in mother tongue” becomes a separate right as an alternative to education in the official language, Soysal is against it. His defense of this position is based on the socioeconomic realities. Mostly living in a region less developed than the rest of the country, speaking many different dialects of Kurdish among themselves, Soysal argues that the official education in the official language, Turkish, provides equality in opportunity for Turkish Kurds, for upward mobilization. If Turkish ceases to be such a unifying factor, they will become further marginalized and alienated according to Soysal.³⁶⁶ He also suggests economic development through state-led enterprises in the Southeast³⁶⁷, and legislative reform in which local governments would have more initiative. Instead of an autonomous status to the Southeast, the administrative practices could be more flexible, such as enabling different languages to be used in local matters.³⁶⁸

Soysal rarely mentions human rights and protection of minorities in relation to EU-Turkey relations in his articles in *Cumhuriyet*. In one occasion where he mentions minority rights, he argues that Kurdish citizens of the country have

³⁶³ Mümtaz Soysal, “Kemküm,” *Hürriyet*, September 7, 1993, in *İçgüveysinin Encamı*, 108.

³⁶⁴ Mümtaz Soysal, “Halkıma İhanet Etmem!,” interview by Türey Köse, *Cumhuriyet*, January 25, 1995, in *İçgüveysinin Encamı*, 144.

³⁶⁵ Mümtaz Soysal, “Yalan ve Yılan,” *Hürriyet*, November 3, 1993, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 110; “Pahalı Onarım,” *Hürriyet*, February 5, 1999.

³⁶⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, “Anadolu Dilleri,” *Hürriyet*, August 10, 1994, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 140-141. He repeats the same contentions about the marginalizing effect of Kurdish dialects and functional value of education in Turkish for social mobility of the Kurds, in “Pahalı Onarım”. Also see “Anadilinde Eğitim,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 26, 2002.

³⁶⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, “Solun Silkinişi,” *Hürriyet*, November 21, 1992, in *İdeoloji Öldü mü?*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1995), 111.

³⁶⁸ Mümtaz Soysal, “Yalan ve Yılan,” *Hürriyet*, November 3, 1993, in *Balinanın Böcekleri*, 109-110.

unrealistic, out-of-limit demands such as using a different alphabet, which they voice by trusting the EU.³⁶⁹

Towards the December 2004 Summit where Turkey's negotiation date would be determined, he dedicates a specific article to minority rights demanded by the EU. In this article, Soysal states that although the present government tries to conceal, it is a fact that the European Commission recognizes Kurds of Turkey and recently the Alevi population (referred to as 'non-Sunni community' the past year but now mentioned as 'non-Sunni minority') as minorities. Moreover, these classifications have been made without the consent of the respective groups, in his view. In Soysal's viewpoint, Turkey's Republican philosophy, drawn from the model of the French Revolution and recognizing 'human' rights, is not discriminative between the citizens. While he admits that this philosophy had not been put into action properly, that there is a fact of inequality in opportunities between different portions of society, Soysal thinks that the problems can and should be solved without resorting to minority rights which means separating the society further than it has been with economic and social aspects. He expects the government to reject demands about recognizing minorities from the beginning.³⁷⁰

Soysal feels the need to clarify the concept of human rights, as an answer to the "Kurdish Report" printed by *International Herald Tribune* at the 2004 anniversary of 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. He states, in line with his earlier view, that human rights philosophy is egalitarian and non-discriminative. Most important, human rights is for the individual, to be fulfilled by the state, not for minorities. The Republican philosophy and cultural values of Turkey lie on this belief and the maltreatment of Kurdish citizens of this country are not because of the Republican regime per se. Rather, it has been the result of the response to "feudal resistance increased through foreign provocations". Therefore, a human rights demands need not be around the concept of minority rights aimed at weakening the regime; reforms to bring the Republican principles back into life is also a possibility. Minority rights rhetoric only serves separatism.³⁷¹

³⁶⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, "'Q, X, W' Tepkisi ," *Cumhuriyet*, November 8, 2003.

³⁷⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, "Elin Tersine İçin Vardır? ," *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 2004.

³⁷¹ Mümtaz Soysal, "Kavram Karışıklığı," *Cumhuriyet*, December 11, 2004.

3.4.3. The Kemalist Discourse on Cyprus

In Turkey, the anti-EU coalition, in which the military and civilian bureaucracy and the Kemalist left take part together with extreme nationalists, stands in opposition to any solution in Cyprus that would alter the status quo.³⁷² The intervention to the island was made when Ecevit, the leader of the CHP, was prime minister in the CHP-MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party) coalition. The policy of the state on Cyprus has been formulated and followed by the Kemalist bureaucracy. When the Euro-skeptic attitudes of this Kemalist elite is considered, it may be said that the interference of the EU in the solution of the Cyprus problem, is generally viewed with an over-nationalist suspicion, both of the EU and of the domestic actors which advocate alternatives to the present state policy³⁷³.

DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti-Democratic Left Party), one of the Kemalist, strongly nationalist political parties of the post-1980 period under the leadership of Ecevit, has continued the uncompromising attitude in face of EU pressures for altering the hegemonic discourse on Cyprus during government, in the late 1990's.³⁷⁴ While the military regime of 1980 and later rightist governments have accepted a solution in which a recognition of two separate societies in a federal system - the UN solutions, Ecevit government stated that the two separate states were a reality to be recognized; only possible solution was a confederal one. This duplicated the discourse of Denktaş in 1999. This government has also been the first one in many decades, which stressed the vital importance of the island for Turkey's security in its discourse.³⁷⁵

The Kemalist left of the 1990's, as represented by intellectuals mentioned above, has also reacted the EU demands about Cyprus as part of its general opposition to foreign interference to national politics and policies.³⁷⁶ In short, those

³⁷² Öniş, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era," 20-25.

³⁷³ Oğuzlu, "The Impact of 'Democratisation Along the EU Accession Process' on the Turkish Foreign Policy," 10-11.

³⁷⁴ Bozarlan, 459, 462.

³⁷⁵ Gökçen T. Alpkaya, "'Türk Dış Politikası'nda Milliyetçilik" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 166-167.

³⁷⁶ Alpkaya, Faruk, 498-499.

in Turkey, identifying themselves with Kemalism have supported the intervention of Turkey and the position of Denktaş in defense of partition.

Contemporary debates center around the possible problems with the post-referendum condition on the island where the Southern Cypriot state entered the Union without integrating with the Turkish side. The need for recognition of this state by Turkey in order to start negotiations, the situation of Northern Cypriots feared to become a minority, and the legitimacy of the presence of troops from Turkey on the island are mentioned in the debate. Kemalist position on these issues focuses on the strategic importance of the island for Turkish national security, rather than a genuine sympathy for the Turkish Cypriots, since they have turned towards the EU option rather than supporting the former policy of Turkey as shown by the referendum results and elections of anti-Denktaş governments. These are exemplified by the assessments made by Manisalı and Soysal about Cyprus problem and the place of the West and EU in the solution of Cyprus in general, the Annan Plan and the following referendum in particular. Their views resonate the Kemalist bureaucratic elite who have been shaping Turkey's policy since the 1974 intervention.

3.4.3.1. Discourses of Kemalist Intellectuals on Cyprus

The approach of the two writers are very similar in their focus on and elaboration of the problem of Cyprus as carried to EU - Turkey relations. Both are disapproving EU involvement in Turkey's Cyprus policy. They defend 1974 intervention fully and they fear that Turkish Cypriots will be disadvantaged if the island becomes unified in the terms demanded by Greeks. Deep suspicions, anti-Western and anti-Greek attitudes are presented at all steps of deliberations about the island.

3.4.3.1.1. The Views of Erol Manisalı on Cyprus

Manisalı's discourse on Cyprus is dominated by a belief that a Cyprus problem does, or should, not exist, if one considers the actual condition of peace governing Cyprus. He thinks that after the events of violence and pressure against Turks on the

island, Turkey has had a legal right, plus a moral obligation, to intervene. The presence of the Turkish army on the island, since it protects the Turkish population, is not problematized by Manisalı. On the contrary, he perceives it as a guarantee for peace on the island and independence of Turkish Cypriots. After all, since 1974 intervention of Turkey, there has not been a problem of violence on the island, while there is continuous bloodshed in other parts of the region³⁷⁷. Neither is the proclamation of KKTC questioned by Manisalı. He views it as a development which was even “late”.³⁷⁸ For justifying this status quo, he argues that there is a “balance” between Greece and Turkey in terms of influence³⁷⁹. Thus, anything agreed by Turkish governments for a solution which are to the advantage of Greeks, especially since the beginning of EU involvement, is evaluated as a concession which would endanger the rights of Turkish Cypriots and the national interest of Turkey. For Manisalı, the Turkish military has a rightful position in rejecting these as a political actor, protecting national interests. However, pro-EU circles are “eager” for leaving the island to the EU and Greeks.³⁸⁰ This includes the big capitalists and Islamists who meet under the roof of AKP, to “bribe” the EU with Cyprus, and the separatist/terrorist circles who have been supported by the Greek Cypriot state against Turkey.³⁸¹

Manisalı believes that everything demanded by the EU and accepted by politicians in Turkey about change in the status of Cyprus will result in the ‘minoritization’ of Cypriot Turks and loss of Turkey’s international power. His position has not changed, as revealed by his writings. His evaluation of developments in EU - Cyprus relations and EU - Turkey relations concerning Cyprus, has been in accordance with this position.

This belief stems from his classification of the western countries as neo-colonialists seeking more power in the region at the expense of Turkey. Commenting on the lack of balance in Turkey’s foreign relations, the dependency to the US and EU, he says in December 2004: “‘Turkey, to which the USA and EU stand against’,

³⁷⁷ Erol Manisalı, “Kıbrıs'ın Çözülmesi mi? Türkiye'nin Çözülmesi mi?,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 15, 2002.

³⁷⁸ Erol Manisalı, *Avrupa Kışkacında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: Derin Yayınevi, 2004), 35-72.

³⁷⁹ Manisalı, *Ahtapot Kollarındaki Dünya ve Türkiye*, 52.

³⁸⁰ Manisalı, *Avrupa Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, 97-107.

³⁸¹ Manisalı, *Ahtapot Kollarındaki Dünya ve Türkiye*, 16-17.

is stuck about security as well as other issues. How these one-sided relations are worked, have been lived through actually, in Northern Iraq and Cyprus.”³⁸². For Manisalı, the Western plan for dominating Cyprus was made towards the end of Cold War, and back in 1992, Europe has shown its interest for Cyprus and decided to accept the candidacy of Cyprus “in violation of international treaties”, while Turkey was rejected in 1989. The steps after that showed no change in the policy for Cyprus and against Turkey.³⁸³ The dominant mentality behind the opposition - of the US and EU alike - to Turkey’s intervention on the island and the following developments have been to keep control of the Eastern Mediterranean without tolerance to any initiative by a “Muslim” country in the region. Besides the US and Britain which have a clearly defined interest for long, other EU members also want to see the Mediterranean as an inner sea and Cyprus will be their military basis for the Middle East³⁸⁴. This means clear loss for Turkey and Turks in Cyprus. In his view, the EU policy on Cyprus has been parallel to that of Greece, which has carried the problem of Cyprus to the EU context after its membership. EU policies have also served the interests of the Greek Cypriots who want to dominate the island at the expense of the Turkish population.³⁸⁵ Manisalı also states that the West, if objective, would “punish” the Greek Cypriots, who had oppressed and denied the rights of Turkish Cypriots since the 1960’s, instead of pressuring Turkey. He believes that instead, the West (and the UN) prefers to protect “Christian” Greece, which has been much closer to the West than Turkey; which it has sent to Anatolia for annexing Turkish land after the World War I.³⁸⁶

According to Manisalı, US pressure had disabled the international recognition of the KKTC, the proclamation of which, was legitimate in his view. Nonetheless, he states, that although the EC did not recognize this state, it has built trade and other relations - which meant an informal recognition - with it during the 1980’s. However, EU policy changed in the post-Cold War period, towards Turkey and Cyprus. Despite UN warning to the organization not to become a side to the problem - which

³⁸² Erol Manisalı, “Rusya ile İlişkiler Alternatif mi, Yoksa bir Denge Arayışı mı?,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 2004.

³⁸³ Erol Manisalı, “Bir Kurtla Kuzu Masalı,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 20, 2002.

³⁸⁴ Erol Manisalı, “Kofi Annan Belgesinin Sonuçları,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 2002.

³⁸⁵ Manisalı, *Avrupa Kısılcacında Kıbrıs*, 67, 70-71.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 91-92.

would complicate and endanger solutions, the EU became actively involved throughout the 1990's. In view of the fact that Turkey was not included in the enlargement plans of the organization, the acceptance and progress of the candidacy of Cyprus acted like a barrier to Turkey's progress in its relations with the EU. Later, the EU started to condition Turkey's membership upon "solution" (equals Turkey's loss of influence) in Cyprus.³⁸⁷

Manisalı states that this policy was activated first at Helsinki, in 1999, when Turkey was given candidacy at the Helsinki Summit along with conditions about Cyprus. He believes that a Turkey, waiting at the door of EU, would not be able to discuss demands about Cyprus. Therefore, what the government did by accepting the conditions, caused Brussels and Athens to be the potential winners of the game.³⁸⁸ In 2001, he repeats that the EU puts Cyprus as an unfair pre-condition for membership and accuses the pro-EU groups' approval of these demands as an encouraging gesture.³⁸⁹ After the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, he comments that Cyprus has already been confirmed as "homework" to be handed in, until December 2004. This is only a sign of the impossibility of Turkey's membership for Manisalı, since he believes that an EU with Cyprus as a member will never accept it.³⁹⁰

Manisalı points at a change in the approach of the UN towards EU involvement in Cyprus. He notes that during the Brussels Summit of December 2004, UN Secretary General Annan, regarded the issue to be solved between EU, Turkey and Greek Cypriot state (no mentioning of Turkish Cypriots).³⁹¹ Manisalı argues that what is presented as the Annan Plan, is in fact the plan of Hannay, the British representative on Cyprus³⁹². The core of the plan is detaching Cyprus from Turkey and tying it to the EU without any voice to the Cypriot Turks.³⁹³ Commenting on the Annan Plan elsewhere, Manisalı does not reject the idea that there is nothing in it that

³⁸⁷ Ibid., 75-79.

³⁸⁸ Erol Manisalı, "İçimde Bir Burukluk Var, Acaba Neden?," *Cumhuriyet*, December 13, 1999.

³⁸⁹ Erol Manisalı, "Türkiye Üzerine Yeni Hesaplar, Ermeni Meselesi," *Cumhuriyet*, March 21, 2001.

³⁹⁰ Erol Manisalı, "Oyalmaktan Kimler Hoşlanır...," *Cumhuriyet*, December 18, 2002.

³⁹¹ Manisalı, *Bekleme Odasında İğfal*, 91.

³⁹² Thus, Annan Plan becomes a "British" plan in his view. See Erol Manisalı, "Kıbrıs'ın Çözülmesi mi? Türkiye'nin Çözülmesi mi?," *Cumhuriyet*, November 15, 2002.

³⁹³ Manisalı, *Avrupa Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, 110-111.

is to the advantage of Turkey and Cypriot Turks. However, he thinks there is a precondition for the application of such plan and for any fair solution of the issue. That would be, the inclusion of the requirement that the attempts for solution should begin only if Turkey and Cyprus become members of the EU simultaneously. Otherwise, Greece and Cypriot Greeks will have a clear advantage to impose unjust solutions by the virtue of Turkey's continuous candidacy. If Cyprus enters the Union before Turkey, Turks on the island will eventually become a minority with 'special status' and this time Turkey will not be able to protect that minority as in 1974, since it will have no right to interfere EU territory. The very fact that a solution is imposed before Turkey's membership, shows that Europe wants to take Cyprus without giving any guarantee, in Manisalı's view. This means "enosis" through the EU'.³⁹⁴

Evaluating the Annan Plan in December 2002, Manisalı lists the disadvantages of its content for Turkey as the following:³⁹⁵

- There is no sovereignty for the Turkish side.
- The terminology does not recognize the Turkish side as a sovereign entity before the establishment of unification; it is possible to evaluate the new Republic as the extension of the present Greek state, especially with respect to judicial and political structuration.
- The projected free movement may end up in a movement of the Greek population to the North and take over the island politically. It will become a totally Greek island.
- The rights of the Turkish side will eventually be evaporated.
- The guarantee for Turkey is void of functionality. Eventually, its relation to the island will be terminated, since it will remain outside EU members.
- Land will be given to the Greek population from Northern Cyprus, accelerating movement of Greeks into the Turkish area.
- Turks on the island will eventually become like any other minority and will be pushed out of their homeland. Turkey will have no choice but watch this happen.

³⁹⁴ Erol Manisalı, "Kıbrıs'ın Çözülmesi mi? Türkiye'nin Çözülmesi mi?".

³⁹⁵ Erol Manisalı, "Kofi Annan Belgesinin Sonuçları," *Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 2002.

Manisalı's view about the issue does not change after the referendum in Cyprus in April 2004. For Manisalı, the majority of Cypriot Turks accepted the Annan Plan because of the combined pressure by the EU and Turkish government. The result only serves imperialistic interests.³⁹⁶ Turkish people are also deceived by pro-EU media which hid the sight of the posters writing "The best Turk is a dead Turk" at the Southern part of Cyprus during the referendum³⁹⁷. What Turkish government did was simply giving up its rights stemming from international law³⁹⁸ and abandoning Cypriot Turks, left with no other choice.

3.4.3.1.2. The Views of Mümtaz Soysal on Cyprus

Soysal writes on Cyprus very frequently. Unlike about human rights, democracy and minority problem, his post – 1999 column closely follows the developments in EU - Turkey - Cyprus relations. For Soysal, Cyprus is one of the issues in Turkish foreign policy which are vital for the nation and have become matters of 'state policy'. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military, two institutions which are keen on keeping on the traditional national line, should have part throughout the policy in addition to the parliament, government and political parties.³⁹⁹

Soysal's evaluation of the intervention on the island has been of approval, from the beginning. He states in 1994, that the Cyprus problem has started soon with the Greek Cypriot ideal of *enosis*, since 1950's. He perceives the events on the island since 1963 that led to Turkey's intervention as "ethnic cleansing". In his view, this problem should not be a problem of Turkey, although it is true that it has been put forward to the country by others.⁴⁰⁰ Following the intervention in 1974, he has argued that the operation should be kept in limits, because the possible annexation of the island - idea supported by Islamists then - would disfavor Turkey's position

³⁹⁶ Erol Manisalı, "Kıbrıs'ta Emperyalizm Kazandı," *Cumhuriyet*, April 26, 2004, "Ben Sana Mecburum..." *Cumhuriyet*, April 30, 2004.

³⁹⁷ Erol Manisalı, "Ben Sana Mecburum..."

³⁹⁸ Erol Manisalı, "Gergedanların Altında Kalanlar," *Cumhuriyet*, December 17, 2004.

³⁹⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, "Milli İrade," *Cumhuriyet*, November 13, 2002.

⁴⁰⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, "Ayakbağı mı, Dinamo mu?," *Hürriyet*, April 26, 1994, in *Aklını Kıbrıs'la Bozmak*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1995), 165-167.

which relied upon the justification of intervention to international law and humanitarian concerns. He viewed the operation as one of “peace” - for the Turkish Cypriots and the island as a whole, as it was named in Turkey.⁴⁰¹ He has also stood against the partitioning of the island by Turkey. Instead, a federative re-unification of the two societies seemed to Soysal as a legitimate and practical solution to the existing situation.⁴⁰² Although he was supportive of a federative solution whereby the island would be de-militarized, he found the proclamation of the Cyprus Turkish Federal State as an unrealistic development, since there was not yet any federation to connect it to. Although Greece presented the plans for an independent Turkish state on the island as a hindrance to any solution, Soysal believed that proclamation of an independent state would only facilitate a re-unification, which he believed should be on equal terms for both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots.⁴⁰³ His suspicion of Greece and Greek Cypriots that the island would be tied to Greece, like happened in Crete in the late Ottoman period, has been dominant in his support of the Denktaş-led KKTC.⁴⁰⁴

It should be noted that like Manisalı, his concern about the future of the island was not dependent upon the situation of the Turkish population of the island. Turkey’s strategic priorities in this important region has also been stressed by Soysal.⁴⁰⁵ It was not only the Greeks in Greece and Cyprus that worried Soysal. In 1983, he stated that the West imposes a double standard against non-Christian and non-Jewish societies, which is reflected in its ignorance of the problems faced by Turkish Cypriots after the embargo.⁴⁰⁶ In the 1990’s, he repeated this position by arguing that the West still has an “*Eastern Question*”, that it is against a strong Turkey in the region: “Sevres can always re-arise. The turning point of this and the ... [way to] measure whether such a conduct has started or not, is Cyprus.”⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰¹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Adını Koymak,” *Milliyet*, August 24, 1974, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 32-33.

⁴⁰² Mümtaz Soysal, “Sorumsuzluk,” *Milliyet*, July 31, 1974, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 24-25.

⁴⁰³ Mümtaz Soysal, “İlk Adım,” *Milliyet*, October 31, 1981, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 76.

⁴⁰⁴ Mümtaz Soysal, “Girit Acısı,” *Milliyet*, March 7, 1984, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 86-88.

⁴⁰⁵ Mümtaz Soysal, “Dayanışma,” *Milliyet*, July 18, 1981, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 68-69.

⁴⁰⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, “Tecrit,” *Milliyet*, November 19, 1983, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 85.

⁴⁰⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, “Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak,” *Hürriyet*, November 27, 1992, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 148.

The involvement of the EU in the Cyprus problem through pressuring Turkey, such as experienced during the deliberations for the Customs Union, is not differentiated from this general attitude of “the West” by Soysal. In 1995, he stated that the membership prospect for the EU - which seems to him to be unrealistic – only served as a card to play against Turkey. EU policy for Cyprus was not only against Turkey, but also against international law in Soysal’s view, because he defends the idea that membership of Cyprus cannot happen before Turkey’s membership according to the London and Zurich Treaties. Those governments and people who advocate to step back from the “Turkish thesis”⁴⁰⁸ for developing the relationship with the EU, are accused for conceding Turkish interests without any proper gain.⁴⁰⁹

More recent writings of Soysal, in the post-Helsinki period, carry the same ideas and suppositions. He defends the Turkish state policy on Cyprus and the status quo on the island against EU demands on every occasion. This is not because of his support for the continuation of two-separate states, but because of his disapproval of the intentions behind, and the contents of Western-based solutions.

Following the initial APD, he contests to the inclusion of solution in Cyprus and on the Aegean as conditions – despite different wording in the document and assurance by EU politicians that these are not preconditions.⁴¹⁰ In fact, in Soysal’s view, it is not Turkey which should take initiative in solution in Cyprus. Instead of pressuring Turkey, the EU should take initiative to solve the problem.⁴¹¹ For example, in critique of the AKP policy of compromise with the EU, Soysal states that pressing Denktaş for a solution is wrong. The demands come from the West

⁴⁰⁸ Soysal states that the Turkish thesis is based on the view that Turkish Cypriots are entitled to the right of self-determination. He explains that while the 1960 Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed through the usage of this rights by the two peoples of the island. The discrimination against and exclusion of the Turks by the Greeks from 1963 onwards, caused the break of the agreement of 1960. Thus, the Turkish Cypriots have used their right for self-government, leading to the proclamation of the KKTC which is totally legitimate. Mümtaz Soysal, “Tutarlılık,” *Hürriyet*, April 7, 1992, in *İçgüveysinin Encamı*, 38-39.

⁴⁰⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Yüz Kızartıcı Sessizlik,” *Hürriyet*, 24 May 1995, in *Aklını Kıbrıs’la Bozmak*, 168-170. The same points are made by Soysal in an article following the Progress Report of 2003. See “Mesajlar,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 7, 2003.

⁴¹⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, “Şematik,” *Hürriyet*, 6 December 2000; “Aldanışı Sevmek,” *Hürriyet*, November 12, 2000.

⁴¹¹ Mümtaz Soysal, quoted in “Avrupa’nın Yapması Gerekenleri de Söylemeliydik,” *Cumhuriyet*, March 20, 2001.

(The EU, the USA, UN, England, whole Europe) and Greeks are the ones stimulating them.⁴¹² He repeats that the reason behind the complexity of providing a solution in Cyprus is the attitude of the West. Instead of embargoes and pressures, if, Soysal believes, the existence of two separate states was recognized and relations were developed between Greece, Cypriot Greeks, Turkey and Cypriot Turks, there would be no Cyprus problem today.⁴¹³ He repeats in another article that a solution that would cost disillusionment and new problems is not a solution.⁴¹⁴

In 2003, he states that the structure and timing of the Annan Plan is designed for the accession of Greek side of Cyprus to the EU; therefore the UN's existence shows no impartiality. Moreover, he believes that Turkey and Northern Cypriots are "blackmailed" for the acceptance of the plan; Turkey by EU membership, Cypriots by the isolation and continuation of dependency on Turkey.⁴¹⁵

He also believes that the EU has made a principal mistake by accepting the candidacy and membership of a problematic Cyprus. For Soysal, recognizing the Greek Cypriot state as a legitimate representative of the whole island, and its membership before Turkey are acts of the EU against international law.⁴¹⁶ One result of this EU attitude towards Cyprus has been the loss of confidence by Turkey to international law and this, for Soysal, makes the resolution of Aegean problems with Greece harder. Another result would be the loss of confidence to the EU because the Union does not follow its own criteria by admitting a state with democratic problems.⁴¹⁷

Commenting on the forecoming referendum in Cyprus, Soysal argues that the reasonable outcome is "no" from both sides. He is disillusioned by the fact that Turkish government is not insistent on protecting Turks' interests and believes that the rejection of Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots would be a move that would protect

⁴¹² Mümtaz Soysal, "Cümbür Cemaat Sıkboğaz," *Cumhuriyet*, November 15, 2002.

⁴¹³ Mümtaz Soysal, "Akılsızlığın Sonu," *Cumhuriyet*, November 16, 2002.

⁴¹⁴ Mümtaz Soysal, "Caritas," *Cumhuriyet*, December 16, 2002.

⁴¹⁵ Mümtaz Soysal, "AB Şantajı," *Cumhuriyet*, January 31, 2003.

⁴¹⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, "Dayatmaya Dayatma," *Cumhuriyet*, December 3, 2004.

⁴¹⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, "Sıkıştırma Ve Kükreyiş," *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 2004.

their own interest. If Northerners vote “yes”, it will mean that they have not protected their own state.⁴¹⁸

Following the April 2004 elections, Soysal makes these following points about the results to be read:⁴¹⁹

- It is impossible to form a common state with the Greek Cypriots; because they have clearly shown their hate and fear of the Turks, their determination to control the whole island.
- Plans originating from the outside world will never work out.
- The problem of Cyprus, can only be solved by preserving the two peoples and two states.
- The problem is originating from the old Greek-Turkish opposition and this should not be solved by the “dwarf calculations” of island politics.
- It is evident that KKTC needs proper governance, which should not be planned by the islanders.

Soysal remarks about some slogans used by Northern Cypriots during the campaigns for referendum, such as “Leave us alone” and “invader soldiers”. He believes that some of those who voted “yes”, wanted to break all the ties with Turkey. For Soysal, the only concern of these people were membership in the EU, ready to be governed by Cypriot Greeks for this end.⁴²⁰ Soysal’s comments about the reasons of “Yes.” by Turks at the referendum are as follows:⁴²¹

- They are used to being a colony since the British took the island.
- They are closer to London than to Turkey.
- The young population has a lack of national sentiments, caused by EU efforts.
- They want to break the feeling of a life of limits.
- They responded with rage towards Turkey, caused by exclusion from the world.

⁴¹⁸ Mümtaz Soysal, “Ne İstediyini Bilmek,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 24, 2004.

⁴¹⁹ Mümtaz Soysal, “Açıklık,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 26, 2004.

⁴²⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, “Kopma Hevesi,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 30, 2004.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

- Turkey was inadequate to make them recognized in the world, to lift the embargoes.
- Cypriots are forgetting Turkey's investments in infrastructure, believing that Turkey does not care about the insufficiency of governments and related problems on the island.

In December 2004, Soysal says that the pressure on Turkey to recognize the Greek Cypriot state as a precondition for the beginning of negotiations is against the former decision at Helsinki which spoke about the need for effort by both sides on the island and assuring Turkey that Cyprus is not a precondition.⁴²² Recognition of Cyprus will also mean a step backward in Turkey's position. Turkey currently recognizes a Northern Cypriot state and if it recognizes the current Greek state, not yet united with the Turkish population, this would mean disregarding the legitimacy of the Northern state.⁴²³

⁴²² Mümtaz Soysal, "Yanlış Kapatış," *Cumhuriyet*, December 31, 2004.

⁴²³ Mümtaz Soysal, "Dayatmaya Dayatma," *Cumhuriyet*, December 3, 2004.

CHAPTER 4

DISCOURSE OF ISLAMISM ON THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EU - TURKEY RELATIONS

In contemporary Turkey, Islamism takes various forms. Turkish Islamists range from radicals who wish to change the regime into one suited completely to the *sharia*, to moderates who remain within the existing order but aspire more space for religion in social and political life, from “ultra-nationalists” to Kurdish Islamists.⁴²⁴ Göle’s conceptualization of Islamism in Turkey is of “hybrid patterns”, meaning the tradition of the movement to align itself with different currents of thought.⁴²⁵ However, organized in various and numerous religious orders and communities, following different methods on different degrees of politicization; a framework for Islamism in Turkey is available which can be compared to and contrasted with Kemalism. Before such attempt, it should be noted that Islamism has not remained the same throughout Turkey’s history. The discursive tools and organizational structures of Turkish Islamism have been transformed according to specific conditions of the period concerned.

Despite variance in type of organization, political activism and ideological standpoints, there is one common aspect of Turkish Islamism: Its resistance to Kemalist ideology, concentrated on the secular and authoritarian character of the political regime in Turkey, practiced and legitimized through this ideology. This regime has evolved in a way that hinders the freedom of, and directs the development of Turkish Islamism. Concentrated on its survival, the Islamic movement has been preoccupied with resisting this regime. This enabled and eventually led to a discursive alliance with the West, especially with the EU, as will be explained below.

⁴²⁴ Nilüfer Narlı. “Turkey’s Cultural Identity and its Integration with the European Community: Common and Divergent Dimensions,” *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 3 (1996/97), 54.

⁴²⁵ Nilüfer Göle. *İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine Melez Desenler*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000).

4.1. Turkey's Islamic Actors

The Islamic movement in contemporary Turkey is generally categorized as “cultural”, “social” and “political” according to the approach and methods; although all have political reflections. Prominent Islamist intellectuals such as Necip Fazıl are categorized into “cultural Islam”, since they focus on the theoretical aspects of Islamic politics rather than the mobilization of it. The approach and methods by, i.e., Nakşibendi, Nurcu and Süleymancı communities, are termed as “social Islam” since they target the values and knowledge of the society rather than political power.⁴²⁶ These orders, with their certain hierarchical, disciplinary and theoretical aspects, have formed wide and coherent electoral bases for conservative and Islamic political parties during the Republic. *Milli Görüş* (National View) movement, besides the ties of its members with religious orders, is separated from these orders and communities with the term “political Islam”, since it has been seeking direct political power through party politics⁴²⁷. More radical movements, i.e., terrorist organizations such as *Hizbullah* and IBDA-C - which do not have such wide based support in Turkey, may be added to this category as well.

Such differentiation is of course, neither determinant nor unchallenged, as a means to elaborate on Turkish Islamism. For example, Hakan Yavuz too, distinguishes between “political Islam” and “cultural Islam”. In his view, political Islam in Turkey is dominated by the *Milli Görüş* political parties⁴²⁸. However, he includes right-wing political parties as well, since those have also employed Islamic discourses. For Yavuz, cultural Islam is represented by some religious communities, of which, the Nurcu have been the most influential. He also adds the concept of “state Islam”, which owes its existence to the peculiarity of the “secular” regime - meaning that it controls the institutionalization and discourse of a different type of

⁴²⁶ Yalçın Akdoğan, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 621.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Viewing Turkish political Islam as engagement in party politics and accordingly, limiting such analysis to *Milli Görüş*, is common among scholars. However, a wider definition of politics would involve other forms of organization besides of those who aim at direct control of the state, is possible. In that case, i.e., some religious communities or some intellectuals elaborating on Islamic politics may also be considered as part of “political Islam,”

Islam - attempting an alliance with Islamists as part of the Cold War context.⁴²⁹ Another example would be Şerif Mardin's study on Turkish Islamism, in which he views the Nakşibendi order within all of the categories presented above: As a social movement against the state, as a social and cultural organization, and as an actor in party politics, throughout the late Ottoman period and the Republican era.⁴³⁰ According to the purpose and dimension of this study, such analytical distinctions are not preferred. Instead, discourses among the most popular and publicized intellectuals, communities and political parties will be assessed.

Despite the variance in approach and method, Islamic movement in Turkey, is mostly based on various religious communities which have originated longer before the establishment of the Republic, but differentiated from their related orders rather recently and divided further during the Republican period. The main body of religious communities in Turkey, is formed by those that have grown out of Nakşibendi order and the Nurcu movement - which also has Nakşibendi roots but usually treated separately - which have been perceived as threats to the secular regime by Kemalism, despite their lack of direct politicization.

In the incorporation of Turks to Islamic belief, *Sufi* orders have had a major impact. These have been agents in the formation of a popular/folk Islam alongside the "high court culture" of Islam institutionalized in the Ottoman state. Turkish *Sufism* involved heterodoxy and it has become the source of what may be called a "civil Islam", outside the realm of the state, operating albeit transformations from late-Ottoman to the Republican period - i.e., shifting from non-literal *tekke* (*Sufi* lodge) based to text-based Islam as Kemalist reforms prohibited former community organizations. Characteristics of Turkish *Sufi* orders are responsible in the formation of a "Turkish" Islam, different from other regions of Islamic belief.⁴³¹ Of these orders, Nakşibendi order - probably of the biggest appeal in Republican Turkey - is dated back to the 14th century in terms of acquiring its intellectual and organizational entirety. It denied a solitary path to mystical experience, unlike others. Hence, the type of organization became vibrant and flexible, suitable for a degree of

⁴²⁹ Yavuz, "Turkey's Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism," 35-36.

⁴³⁰ Mardin, "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,"

⁴³¹ Yavuz, "Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus," 218-220.

individuality and urban life.⁴³² In the 17th century, the order was re-organized for the purpose of political resistance to the state policies of religion in India. The re-organization along similar lines took place in the central, Southeast and Northeast Anatolia - regions populated predominantly by the Kurdish tribes - during the 19th century. Forming a disciplined cadre, Sheikh Baghdadi secured the influence of the order in Anatolia, where Nakşi leaders assumed political leadership in tribes; plus in the capital city, where Nakşis took positions in the bureaucracy as high as *Şeyhülislam*.⁴³³

İskenderpaşa community, originating from this order, began its activities with the Republican period and it became increasingly popular among the modern segments of the society with the leadership of Bekine and then, Kotku (1952). While Kotku preferred a low political profile, Erbakan, from this community, established the first Islamic political party - and the following parties after each closure - and strengthened it.⁴³⁴ The leadership of Esad Coşan moved the community increasingly far from *Milli Görüş* line and its political parties. The post 1990 outlook of the İskenderpaşa community has been away from direct involvement in party politics. The movement has become organized more on economic base; with trade unions and corporations as well as publications, associations and foundations focused on many different issues.⁴³⁵

Another popular Islamic community of the Republican era has been the Süleymancı community, connected to the Nakşibendi order like the İskenderpaşa community. Süleymancılık was built around the teachings of a Quranic expert. Although it provided no direct challenge either to the state or to the political regime, it was perceived as such by the Kemalist elite, like the Nurcu community. The main struggle of the Süleymancı community has been on the right to teach religion in official and unofficial institutions. During the 1970's, the community started to focus its activities in Europe, mainly in Germany. Although lacking a strict organizational

⁴³² M. Emin Yaşar, "Dergah'tan Partiye, Vakıf'tan Şirkete Bir Kimliğin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü: İskenderpaşa Cemaati" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 324-325.

⁴³³ Mardin, "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes," 152-153.

⁴³⁴ Yaşar, 325-331.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., 338.

structure, the community has shown common political standing and a voting pattern.⁴³⁶

The Nurcu communities, following the teachings of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1878-1960), may also be considered as related to the Nakşibendi order, since Said Nursi had been effected by the writings of former Nakşi figures. Kadiri (Named as “Halidi” after 1813; an order working for the preservation of an Islamic character in Ottoman modernization⁴³⁷) influence was present in his ideas. Nursi had been a politicized figure during the late Ottoman period. He had connections with *İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti* and he also stood against Abdülhamid II on the same side with the Young Turk movement. Although excluded from the *İttihad-ı Terakki* rule, he continued advocating constitutional monarchy and individual freedoms. He supported the War of Independence led by Mustafa Kemal. However, his Kurdish and Islamist identities posed a threat to the Kemalist regime and he was convicted on numerous occasions. His reaction to the new conditions in the Kemalist regime, was to concentrate on his collection called *Risale-i Nur* (Epistles of Light). It is the primary source of Nurcu view of the world - based on a view of an alternative modernization to the Kemalist path. It has also determined the type of organization of the community, which is based on collective reading and evaluation of this material. Although Nursi was against direct political opposition to the regime and politicization of Islam, he openly supported the DP against the CHP in the multi-party period.⁴³⁸ He did not approve of religious leaders and communities in other Muslim - i.e., *Ihvan-ı Muslimin* in Egypt - countries who sought direct political power in the name of Islam. His level of politicization may be categorized into three periods of direct involvement (until 1922), disinterest (until 1950) and indirect involvement (until 1960)⁴³⁹.

Like other Islamic groups, the Nurcu community has been divided into separate groups after the death of its initial leader. The character of *Risale-i Nur* which was

⁴³⁶ Mustafa Aydın, “Süleymanlık” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 309-314.

⁴³⁷ Şerif Mardin, “The Nakşibendi Order in Turkish History” in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, ed. Richard Tapper (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 130.

⁴³⁸ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 264-268.

⁴³⁹ Metin Karabaşoğlu. “Said Nursi” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 280, 287.

available for interpretation and the variance of organization around professing it, as well as the different ethnic and generational, regional and socio-economic characteristics of the affiliates have facilitated this differentiation in the community. The largest contemporary communities which were born out of Nurcu community are those named as Yeni Asya, Yeni Nesil and the one organized around Fethullah Gülen.⁴⁴⁰

During the Cold War, Nurcu community has been active in anti-communist associations and the peculiarity of this period has provided an alliance with the center-right and nationalist coalitions of the 1970's. The relations with the state was more accommodationist during this period. The relationship of these groups with Erbakan's Nakşibendi political line was with caution. Groups did not have consensus on support for the MSP and division between Yeni Asya and other groups occurred with respect to the stance about 1980 coup. Those who supported the new constitution - including Gülen's community - have become allied with Özal governments and ANAP in general. The Kurdish problem also facilitated division among the communities, some of which relied upon Nursi's project for a Kurdish Islamic educational institution (*Medreset-üz-zehra*) and increased Kurdish ethnic tone in their discourse. The main Nurcu movement of the post-1980 period is that of Gülen - termed also as "neo-Nurculuk" - which is argued to be socially conservative, economically liberal and politically democrat.⁴⁴¹ Gülen's movement aims at breeding a modern Turkish-Islamic generation; among the middle class rather than marginal segments of the society. The main activity along this line has been educational; through schools and private courses not only in Turkey but spread from the US and Europe to Central Asian Republics. The movement also has its own publications and periodicals; it also owns an enterprise of Islamic finance. The movement was indirectly involved in politics through breeding of an intellectual cadre with the potential for high positions within political institutions. It also secured an alliance with the Kemalist left DSP for containing the ideological support for *Milli Görüş* by

⁴⁴⁰ Yavuz, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk," 287-288.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 291-293.

the public. Nonetheless, the movement was repressed by the regime in 1999 as part of the security threat perception of the military in the post-February 28 period.⁴⁴²

Since the Republican regime aspired to control Islam by monopolizing Islamic activities within the state apparatus, religious orders have been banned from appearing in the public space with the Kemalist reforms initiated in the 1920's. Denied formal recognition, Muslim communities of Turkey have been organized through foundations and associations. The recognition of these communities and the braking of state monopoly through these communities' taking over of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, have only entered the public debate after 1980, following a political liberalization process in the post-military regime.⁴⁴³ In this context, communities within the Nakşibendi order, as well as the Nurcu order, have stood away from direct connection with Islamic political parties. While the Coşan led Nakşibendi order initially supported Erbakan's party politics, the ties were broken in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. The fact that no political party could have monopolized the Islamic discourse for the members of these communities is demonstrated by the support given to the center-right political parties (Mainly ANAP from 1983 to 1997 and DP of Korkut Özal during 1997 elections) instead of the parties of *Milli Görüş*, by the Nakşibendi order.⁴⁴⁴

Milli Görüş has started as an Islamist political movement in 1967, as some Nakşi politicians within the AP (Adalet Partisi-Justice Party, continuation of the Democrat Party which was closed during the 1961 coup) decided to organize a more Islamic political party; different from the present center-right. The Erbakan-led attempt was embodied with the establishment of MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi-National Order Party, 1970). MNP has been the first direct political action by religious communities in Turkey, besides channeling their interest through conservative political parties. As genuinely Islamist and universalist, fundamentalist organizations such as those in the Arab world were absent in the country, MNP and the following political parties founded by Erbakan belonging to *Milli Görüş*, has been the principal

⁴⁴² M. Hakan Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen," *Middle East Journal* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 596-597, 601-602.

⁴⁴³ İsmail Kara, "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 194-196.

⁴⁴⁴ Olivier Roy, "İslamcı Hareketlerin Sıradanlaşması" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 932.

actor in Turkish political Islam⁴⁴⁵. Erbakan was appointed to the leadership of MNP by a consensus of Necip Fazıl, the leaders of İskenderpaşa (Coşan, who succeeded Kotku) and other Nakşibendi, Süleymancı and Nurcu communities. These communities have reduced their support during the end of 1980's. Erbakan was severely criticized by Coşan, from Erbakan's own community, because he assumed the leadership of Islamists as *Milli Görüş* grew in strength. Although Erbakan's line was detached from these communities in practice, he had always sought legitimacy through these.⁴⁴⁶

Following MNP's closure by the Constitutional Court during the 1971 military intervention, MSP was established by Erbakan in its place (1972). The conservative tone related to its religious discourse and its advocacy of national development through statism in economy, gave the party electoral appeal from both the right and the left. During the 1970's, it entered into coalition governments with the AP (Adalet Partisi-Justice Party, successor of the DP) and reserved ministerial seats disproportionate to its small percentage of votes. The party was influenced and motivated by the rise and success of political Islam in other countries towards the end of the decade - mainly the Iranian revolution and *jihād* in Afghanistan against communism, but 1980 coup put an end to its political activities. Beginning with the return to civilian rule, RP (Refah Partisi-Welfare Party, 1983) continued the *Milli Görüş* line. When the political ban on the former politicians was lifted in 1987, Erbakan took the leadership in RP. The 1990's witnessed a rise in its electoral base, the party won the highest percentage of votes (21%) among the political parties in the national elections of 1995 and Erbakan became prime minister in DYP-RP coalition government. February 28 - the "post-modern" coup, 1997 - whereby the military took decisions through the National Security Council to curb political Islam from its roots, as the basic threat to internal security of the country, obstructed these developments. The military threatened the government with a military takeover through symbolic acts (marching tanks through Sincan, where pro-*sharia* demonstrations had occurred) and forced the government to resign. Closure of the RP and a political ban on Erbakan followed in 1998, by a Constitutional Court decision.

⁴⁴⁵ Ruşen Çakır, "Milli Görüş Hareketi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 544-546.

⁴⁴⁶ Fehmi Çalmuk, "Necmettin Erbakan" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 562-563.

The movement continued through the FP (Fazilet Partisi- Virtue Party). While Erbakan was away, the movement split into two in the party congress in 2000. FP was closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001. The old-liners established the SP (Saadet Partisi-Felicity Party) the same year, and faced a big electoral loss in the following general elections. The group which separated from the FP in the leadership of Erdoğan, established the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party) in 2001 and this party attained an overwhelming majority in 2002 national elections with its campaign focused on EU membership process and shied away from the discourse of political Islam.⁴⁴⁷ First time since the end of the 1980's, a political party could hold governmental power without entering a coalition. AKP government satisfied the Copenhagen Criteria by the end of 2004 through successive reforms in law and the EU decided to start accession negotiations in October 2005.

Milli Görüş is far different from the prototype of radical Islam. It is born in and for Turkey, for the most part. Islamic fundamentalism, popular in the Middle East since 1970's, advocates return to the original sources of Islam uncontaminated by tradition. Its idealization of the Ottoman tradition as a model for the present society and its lack of categorical resistance to western technology, separates *Milli Görüş* from this current. The rise of the RP during 1990's, when fundamentalist movements in the region were already contained, also shows that the movement owes much more to the internal dynamics of Turkey rather than being part of a general wave of Islamism.⁴⁴⁸ In fact, not only the *Milli Görüş*, but also the main Islamic communities in Turkey show these traits, since they rely upon traditional sources of belief instead of the novel approaches on the evaluation of religious text utilized by the Islamic revival. This aspect approaches Turkish political Islam to the Turkish conservative right, rather than a universalist Islamic fundamentalism. Accordingly, considering the context and characteristics of Turkish political Islam is helpful to understand their recent - but true, pro-EU attitudes.

Islamic intellectuals have taken positions as various as the religious communities and political parties. Whether or not organically tied to these

⁴⁴⁷ Çakır, 546-575.

⁴⁴⁸ İhsan D. Dağı, "Refah Partisi, Siyasal İslam ve Köktendincilik," *Radikal*, 25 January 1998, in *Batılılaşma Korkusu: Avrupa Birliği, Demokrasi, İnsan Hakları*, 152-153.

movements, their views on the Kemalist regime, the West and the EU are reflective of existing communities and parties. The intellectuals taken as examples for Turkish Islamism have written in publications known by their connections with the movements stated above, their books were published by companies related to these, and they also reflect the approach of the movements at a certain degree. For example, the transformation of the views of Taşgetiren, between early and late 1990's presented here, show a striking similarity with the transformation of the attitudes exhibited by *Milli Görüş* line.

4.2. Intellectual Roots and Ideological Components of Islamism

An Islamist himself, Ali Bulaç evaluates Islamism in Turkey in three different generations with different but overlapping attitudes according to their time. The first generation had appeared in 1856 and was active until the Caliphate was abandoned in 1924. The focus of the first generation had been to provide a solution for the problems of the Empire within the system but different in method from westernists or nationalists. With the establishment of the Kemalist regime, the impact of this generation on politics was ended. It was only with the beginning of the multi-party period, that Islamism could express itself in the public space again.⁴⁴⁹ For Bulaç, while the first generation activities should be conceptualized as “Islamic current”, the second generation of Islamism - which he dates from 1947 to 2000 - should be termed as “Islamic Movement”, since it covered various types of social and political mobilization against the establishment of the nation-state. Bulaç emphasizes the modern aspects in the cadre and projects of the second generation and stresses the character of the movement against the state establishment.⁴⁵⁰ The third generation of Islamism of the new millennium, is “beyond” the former ones in its integration to the globalization through realization of opportunities for Islamization, found in the “individual”, “civil initiative” and “plural society, facilitated by EU membership in the Turkish context.”⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁹ Ali Bulaç, “İslam’ın Üç Siyaset Tarzı veya İslamcıların Üç Nesli” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 48-59.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 65-67.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 49. These Islamists are named generally as the “new Muslims” or “post-Islamists,” with respect to their renewed discourse away from Islamic references to Western based concepts.

While Bulaç divides Turkish Islamism according to conceptual and methodological aspects, Yavuz divides the history of Turkish Islamic movement according to political-sociological characteristics demarcated by its visibility and activity in the public space. In his terminology, this classification is according to the availability of “opportunity spaces” (“...*fora* of social interactions that create new possibilities for augmenting networks of shared meaning and associational life.”⁴⁵²) which connote a private sphere less dependent on the hegemonic discourse in its definition of Muslim identity which transforms into a political project. He starts with the Republican period and states that during the establishment of the Kemalist regime (1924-1950), as a reaction to the strict secularization program, religious communities protested either politically (the Nakşibendi) or cognitively (the Nurcu). Others chose to ally with nationalism. The general mode had been termed as “withdrawal” by Yavuz, in the phase of repressive policies of the state. In the 1950’s, multi-party politics enabled Islamism to channel their demands. As their radical resistance shifted into participation, Islamic activists became part of nationalist-conservative discourse. Cold War climate also facilitated this development. By the process of economic and political liberalization in the 1980’s, Islamic movement has become “integrated” to the system; became more tolerant and pluralistic. They targeted state’s ideological dominance in the public space by generating their “alternative public” with the increasing usage of a discourse of human rights and democracy.⁴⁵³

Of the suggestions for the Empire to reorganize for reversing its downfall, as the idea to create an “Ottoman nation” during the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839) failed. Instead, inspired by *al-Afghani*, pan-Islamism seemed to be suitable to the needs and realities of the day to many intellectuals. It had been embraced by Abdülhamid II as an official state policy. The title of Caliphate was extensively used as a cement for the plural society, after most of the non-Muslim elements had become either politically separate entities or independent states. Nonetheless, the program of westernization in various state institutions continued. In 1908, the political attitude of Islamism, sharing its source with other currents of thought – that is, reforming and saving the Empire from foreign domination – became manifested

⁴⁵² Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” 223.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., 223-224.

the first time through the magazine *Sırat-ı Müstakim*⁴⁵⁴ (re-named shortly after as *Sebilürreşad*) and many others following soon. There had been different inclinations towards westernism and nationalism among the Islamists. What is generally called as modernist Islamism - as shown in the writings of İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu) and Ahmet Hilmi - meaning the re-evaluation of the religious script to fit it into modern conditions, was also present.⁴⁵⁵

The emergence of Islamic thought as a cure for the Empire was facilitated by nationalist/separatist movements away from the Empire and the declaration of *Islahat Fermanı* (1856) which had revealed the intentions of the state under the control of *Tanzimat* elite; total westernization. The Islamists shared with westernists a sense of being left behind compared to the West and an aspiration to change the society through state power towards progress. The Islamists of the 19th century were deeply acquainted with both European philosophy and Islamic script. Their resentment to westernization was the only common aspect they shared with the traditional *ulema*. Their ideal of Islam was opposed to the tradition. They suggested a return to *Quran* and *Sunna* to clear the regime off traditional malfunctioning, a total *jihad* against colonialism and a practice of selective westernization - importing the technology and science, deporting the culture and philosophy - legitimized through *içtihad*. In their perception of lack of progress showed that they shared an Orientalist vision of the Ottoman self and they accepted the Enlightenment paradigm in viewing history - as composed of linear progress.⁴⁵⁶

Whilst these elaborations were made, they underestimated the fact that the western technology and science was a by-product of the Cartesian duality of mind and matter; Newtonian, mechanic understanding of the universe which contradicted with that of Islam. In advocating the taking of science and technology of the West, they reasoned that these in fact belonged originally to the Islamic legacy before Renaissance. They ignored the role played by capitalism in European development and they also tried to legitimize the western political model through superficial

⁴⁵⁴ Even though it was against the policies of Abdülhamid II and close to the line of *İttihat ve Terakki*, *Sırat-ı Müstakim* was closed down when the organization assumes political power. See Caner Arabacı, "Eşref Edib Fergan ve Sebilürreşad Üzerine" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 120-121.

⁴⁵⁵ Hilav, 358-359.

⁴⁵⁶ Bulaç, "İslam'ın Üç Siyaset Tarzı veya İslamcıların Üç Nesli," 54-60.

analogies to Islamic sources. Despite their inconsistency and paradoxical reasoning, their ideas still have reflections in the statements of the most popular Islamic organizations today, including those of *Milli Görüş*.⁴⁵⁷

In the core, the Ottoman Islamists, just like Ottomanists and Turkists, did not reject the West as a whole. Their principal concern was containment of the possible negative impact of European culture on the local one⁴⁵⁸. Considering that some intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura who are known today as ideologues of Turkism, have shared a lot in their suggestions with those who are known as Islamists of the time, this is not surprising.⁴⁵⁹ In fact, whereas Turkists had incorporated Islam as an ingredient of the national culture in their writings, Islamists of the time had also not contested to Turkism in the first place. Even when the two currents started to separate during the Balkan War, the adherents of the two ideologies did not become antagonized to each other.⁴⁶⁰

The legacy of the early Islamists have been undermined towards the downfall of the Empire and during the first decades of the Republican period, since the material conditions had facilitated Turkism among the three main discursive policies to save the Empire. As the Turkish Republic was established with Kemalist principles that combined the nationalist and westernist elements into a modernization ideology and governed by sole CHP authority until the 1950's, Islam was reduced principally to a source of resentment to some aspects of the existing regime, instead of an alternative ideology.⁴⁶¹ During the establishment of the Kemalist regime, until the foundation of the DP, Islamists who were active during the late Ottoman period reacted in various ways to the process of secularization which was started with the

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., 56-64. For the evaluation that Ottoman Islamists have rendered the West as superior politically and technologically, and that they have been trapped by the same paradox with Orientalism, see Kurtoğlu, 204. For the argument that Islamism had legitimized Westernism to a degree, also see İsmail Kara, "İslamcı Söylemin Kaynakları ve Gerçeklik Değeri" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 37.

⁴⁵⁸ Nas, 180.

⁴⁵⁹ Nuray Mert, "Türkiye İslamcılığına Tarihsel bir Bakış" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 412-413.

⁴⁶⁰ Gökhan Çetinsaya, "İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 420-421; Birol Akgün, and Şaban H. Çalış, "Tanrı Dağı Kadar Türk, Hıra Dağı Kadar Müslüman: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Terkibinde İslamcı Doz" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 589-591; Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*, 112-116.

⁴⁶¹ Mert, 413.

abolishment of the Caliphate. All in a feeling of disillusionment and deprivation, Mehmet Akif went to Egypt in self-exile, Elmalılı Hamdi closed himself to his house focusing on his *tefsir*, Said Nursi established his religious order away from political activism.⁴⁶² *Sebilürreşad*, still edited by Eşref Edib, re-appeared only in 1948, after being closed down in 1925 by *İstiklal Mahkemeleri* despite its earlier contribution to the national struggle during the War of Independence.⁴⁶³

Finding the “opportunity space” with the multiparty period, Islamic discourse in Turkey evolved increasingly into a tone shared with the Islamic revival in the third world by the end of the 1960’s. Before that - also after that for some⁴⁶⁴, it remained as a variant of the nationalist-conservative discourse. The rise of Islamism, as taken seriously as a threat by the Kemalists in Turkey, is more recent. Around 1980’s, Turkish Islamists, inspired by the Iranian revolution, started to appear with tangible political projects against the status quo.⁴⁶⁵ The public support for their political parties almost continuously increased up to the 2000’s; although concerns for political power undermined and altered some of their projects and promises.

Although developments in the politicization of Islam reveal multiple discourses, those Islamic discourses created in Turkey and became popular up to date, share common traits. Although generally against the Kemalist project - and have been perceived by Kemalists as a threat to the regime created by that project, the Turkish Islamism advocated by these sources share with Kemalism, some of its principles as elaborated below.

Since it had appeared as a cure for the crisis created by colonialism and as an answer to the problems created by encounters with modernity during the late Ottoman period, Turkish Islamism shares with Kemalism an upholding of the state out of this same legacy⁴⁶⁶. The state is viewed by both of these currents as an agent

⁴⁶² Yasin Aktay, “Halife Sonrası Şartlarda İslamcılığın Öz-Diyar Algısı” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 69-91.

⁴⁶³ Arabacı, 122-124.

⁴⁶⁴ See Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*.

⁴⁶⁵ Yasin Aktay, “Sunuş” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 20-22; Ahmet Çiğdem, “İslamcılık ve Türkiye üzerine Bazı Notlar” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 27-28.

⁴⁶⁶ Mardin adheres this trait as “exceptionalism” of Turkish Islamism which de-linked it from other Muslim societies. See Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” 147.

for transformation towards the aspired civilization - western civilization for the Kemalists and *Asr-ı Saadet* of Islamic past and future for the Islamists - and as the embodiment of national/*umma* power. The Ottoman-Sunnite tradition of state supremacy seems to be constitutive in this commonality. Since state power is important, the mainstream Islamist groups in Turkey have rather sought struggle inside the territory of the country between the borders of a laicist state.⁴⁶⁷ Even the religious political parties with considerable public support, have refrained from questioning the “rationality of the state”⁴⁶⁸. The conservative and statist character of Islamism may be traced in the line of *Sebilürreşad*, along with its critique of the regime on religious lines.⁴⁶⁹ Cold War conditions as well, have facilitated this rapprochement with the state. The Islamist intellectuals of the Cold War period saw communism a threat to both nation and religion. Their anti-communist stance moved them towards a domestic alliance with conservatism, until the 1980’s.⁴⁷⁰ Thus, they did not question the state establishment which shared the anti-communist stance.

The approach of Nursi is worth noting, because it diverges from this current with respect to the characteristic of state supremacy inherent in Kemalism. He was clearly against the supremacy of the state. He believed that the individual; who is free to choose his own path of belief and actions, should come before the state. State should serve the free will and common good of the people. The state should be identified by the nation and it should stay neutral to different views of the world. However, this liberal stance did not reflect the actual practices of his community. During the Cold War, like the others, Nurcu communities saw the state as a guarantee for their survival and supported the political parties of the conservative right. Their approach changed not only towards upholding a strong state, but also towards nationalism.⁴⁷¹ For example, Gülen’s approach to Turkish foreign policy has been supportive during the Cold War period; driving it closer to the understanding of

⁴⁶⁷ Burhanettin Duran, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslamcılığı: İdeolojik Konumları, Dönüşümü ve Evreleri” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 129-131.

⁴⁶⁸ Kurtoğlu, 216.

⁴⁶⁹ Arabacı, 125-126. For the nationalist character of the writings by Eşref Edib, Topçu and Kısakürek who edited these journals, see Çetinsaya, 436-446.

⁴⁷⁰ Duran, 133-134.

⁴⁷¹ Yavuz, “Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk,” 275-276, 291.

the state by the Kemalist elite. The movement sided with the regime, since the protection of the state seemed more vital than struggling for turning it into a more Islamic one. The frontier-Islam characteristics of this eastern-Anatolian community founded in the late Ottoman period, also facilitated the Republican period understanding of the Nurcu, including Fethullah Gülen. In the face of communist/atheist threat, Nurcu communities viewed the state as a “guarantee” for the survival of religion.⁴⁷²

Nationalism, although in variation with its Kemalist version, has also dominated the Islamist approach. Between the late 1940’s and late 1960’s, main Islamic publications - *Sebilürreşad*, *Hareket*, *Büyük Doğu* - carried an extensive nationalist tone for Islamism.⁴⁷³ According to Mert, the center right, extreme nationalism and Islamic conservatism which started to differentiate in the 1950’s, all shared a rightist version of nationalism. She notes that the fact that the tradition of Turkish Islamism is coined as *Milli Görüş*, is not mere coincidence, the movement is national not only in rhetoric but also in program. Whereas Islamic circles sympathized with the Iranian revolution to an extent to ignore sectarian differences, the nationalist character of Turkish Islamism has limited its relationship with Islamic movements outside Turkey. Although there has been publications as *İktibas* which celebrated the revolution, *Yeni Asya* and many others condemned the model as treacherous to “national culture”.⁴⁷⁴ There have been efforts by Islamist intellectuals towards the 1980’s, to reinforce an *umma* consciousness instead of a state nationalism confined to Turkey. *Milli Görüş*, for example, was effected by these currents. However, it has never become totally detached from the nationalist-conservative core of Turkish political right.

In this core, the *umma* has been considered as equivalent to the nation.⁴⁷⁵ While the RP did use an internationalist discourse with reference to the *umma* and emphasized Zionism as a “mother of all evils”, these may be evaluated as a local

⁴⁷² Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen,” 593-595.

⁴⁷³ Necdet Subaşı, “1960 Öncesi İslami Neşriyat: Sindirilme, Tahayyül ve Tefekkür” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 222-227.

⁴⁷⁴ Mert, 414-415.

⁴⁷⁵ Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*, 131-133.

response to the Kemalist Turkish foreign policy rather than a genuine concern for the Islamic community of the world.⁴⁷⁶

Besides political movements and publications of Islamist appeal, the main body of religious orders and communities in the republican era - Nurculuk and Gülemlilik, Nakşilik, Süleymancılık - have also been traced as predominantly conservative; thus, their nationalism have preceded their Islamism in the universalist ideological sense of the word and they have remained far from such Islamic movements⁴⁷⁷. This is understandable from the point that the population of Turkey has become distinctively Muslim and Sunnite in the aftermath of the War of Independence where the majority of the non-Muslim population was exchanged. Hence, within the borders of Turkey, the nation is almost equivalent to the *umma*⁴⁷⁸. Added that the majority of the neighboring Sunnite-Muslim societies are Arab in origin - the Arabs have separated from the Ottoman rule by their own nationalism, disinterest in common action further than reading the same sources with the Islamists is not surprising. However, it should be noted that the “imagined nation” of the Islamic groups like *Milli Görüş* is different from the imagined nation of Kemalism. The main difference resides in the relationship of the two currents with secularism and the Ottoman past. Nonetheless, both carry a vision of the transformation of the society for their vision of “good”, with this principle.⁴⁷⁹

In the Nurcu community in general, the Ottoman past takes part in the to the national rather than the Islamic characteristics of the movement. For Gülen, for instance, besides the Arabs, the Muslim community of the Ottoman period composes a possible Turkish nation, as long as those societies accept themselves as belonging to such nation. The ideal Islam is found in the beginning of Islam, the period of first four Caliphs, in accordance with Nursi’s ideas. Islam was cleared from the legacy of the Arab and Persian tradition. Anti-Arab views were generated by utilizing the

⁴⁷⁶ Ihsan D. Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1998), 30-35.

⁴⁷⁷ Sait Şimşek, “İslamcılık ve Kuran” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 711.

⁴⁷⁸ In fact, according to Akgün and Çalış, the sociological reality of the Turks – that Turkish societies are almost exclusively Muslim both inside and outside Turkey - has always blurred the lines between Turkism and Islamism since the beginning of these ideologies in the late Ottoman period - in Russia as well. See Akgün and Çalış, 589.

⁴⁷⁹ Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği*, 25.

political experience with the Arabs during late Ottoman period - viewed generally in Turkey as “stab on the back”. Added the contribution of conservative-nationalist Islamic intellectuals like Necip Fazıl, Nurettin Topçu and Sezai Karakoç, to the cognitive space of the movement, it may be said that Gülen community has bred a Turkish Islam, without much questioning of the principle of nationalism. This nationalism differed from the nationalism of the Kemalist state, in its usage of Ottoman references in the discourse. However, prioritization of Islam before the nation was not present, since the movement stood against politicization of religion - meaning exploitation – by i.e., *Milli Görüş*.⁴⁸⁰

Given the popular support they get against the establishment, mainstream Islamists in general have no contestment to republicanism, from Kemalist principles. After all, they have also opted for Constitutional monarchy during the downfall of the Empire, utilized their parliamentary seats for voicing their ideas during the War of Independence, engaged in party politics since the 1950’s and they do not advocate a *sharia* which is devoid of popular support. As their understanding of *umma* and their stance competing with and combating communism⁴⁸¹ postulate, their political projects have been against the acknowledgement of class loyalties. Thus, the principle of populism in the “six arrows” - which is understood as a unified society, seems not to pose much problem for them either.

There remains to be two principles in Kemalist ideology that provides the source of antagonism with Islamism: Revolutionism and laicism. Revolutionism, understood as the set of reforms for modernization in the form of westernization, may or may not contradict with Islamism in Turkey according to the position of the group with respect to the West. Although epistemological resistance - i.e. arguments against positivism, Western concepts, institutions, systems, even technology - to the West as a whole is present in Turkey as well, most Islamic groups accepted the concepts, institutions and rules of the game in politics, which have been imported from the West. The first generation Islamists have supported “constitutional monarchy” and engaged in political activity through associations and other

⁴⁸⁰ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 295-300; “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen,” 595-596, 600.

⁴⁸¹ For Eşref Edib, the enemies of the country are comprised of Christianity, Judaism and Communism-irreligiousness. See Arabacı, 125.

organizations during the Ottoman period. Contemporary Islamists of Turkey have either supported existing conservative political parties or formed new ones. They live in and make use of modern ways of organization and communication. Thus, it may be said that Turkish Islamists are not in opposition to, but selective of, modernizing reforms meant by the principle of revolutionism.

What is left then, is the laicism experienced in the Republic as an authoritarian interference into the believer's imagination and freedom of its expression through words or even his/her body in the public space. Until the 1940's, the Kemalist regime not only made reforms for terminating the Islamic system of the past, but also, the state did not even permit some religious practices. There were no schools, even courses in the schools, left for religious education. The lack of freedoms in the organization and expression of belief has been openly voiced as a major critique of the Kemalist regime by the Turkish conservative right in general, since the foundation of the DP. The stress of the discourse against Kemalist laicism has been on the importance of religion as a moral cement of the society. This has been emphasized by CHP members themselves, as well.⁴⁸² Laicism has remained as the main point, along with extensive cohabitation with western societies, that Islamists in Turkey oppose clearly to Kemalism as an ideology and as a regime.

Naturally, the discourse of each community and individual towards the true Islam, and secularism could differ according to the characteristics of the community and its leader. For instance, The flexible, non-political understanding of religion embedded in *Risale-i Nur*⁴⁸³, has enabled the Nurcu community to coexist with the Kemalist state laicism despite the ups and downs in the relationship. The political conditions of the time is also important in understanding the religious discourse of Turkish Islamists. For example, *Sebilürreşad* could clearly state that the Republic was one of Islam and that it should remain that way during the 1920's⁴⁸⁴, since the secular regime was not yet established and public debate was available. During the Republic, even long after the authoritative policies of the one-party period were softened, Erbakan could only pronounce his aspiration for *sharia* outside Turkey and

⁴⁸² Yusuf Tekin and Birol Akgün, "İslamcılar-Demokrasi İlişkisinin Tarihi Seyri" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 655-656.

⁴⁸³ Yavuz, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk," 270-274.

⁴⁸⁴ Arabacı, 126.

he could not admit that he did when he returned. The declared view of *Milli Görüş* on the laicism of the regime, did not oppose it in principle. What it criticized, was the illiberal practice of laicism in the Kemalist state.⁴⁸⁵ In fact, when the movement lost the support of the İskenderpaşa community, its religious discourse has softened in 1990's. The evolution of the party towards a mass party also has a share in this transformation. Whereas during the MSP period, the religiousness of the party program was emphasized, the RP stressed the religious quality of its leading cadre. The discourse of the RP against laicism remained within the lines of a democratic discourse.⁴⁸⁶ Nonetheless, some practices of the RP during government, created serious doubts about the political commitment of *Milli Görüş* to the principle of secularism. In government, Erbakan prioritized foreign visits to Islamic countries, he did not disguise relationship with foreign militant Islamic groups such as *Hizbullah*, *Hamas*, Islamic Salvation Front and Muslim Brotherhood - at the expense of deterioration of the relations with Egyptian state. RP mayors brought moral-Islamic regulations at their municipalities. The most extreme event in leading the military to intervene, was the RP mayor's organization of a political rally in Sincan (February 2, 1997), in which the Iranian ambassador and the mayor advocated *sharia*. The following events were the marching of tanks through the city, arresting of the mayor and expulsion of the ambassador. On February 28, the military, through the National Security Council, declared a list of criteria for secularity of the government.⁴⁸⁷

Although still contesting laicism of the Kemalist regime, with the continuation of control and blocking of Islamic politics by the military, coined as "February 28 process" by scholars and Turkish Islamists, the discourse of *Milli Görüş*, as well as other groups targeted by this process, became increasingly in support of a secularism that is based on the Anglo-Saxon model, which seemed more of a guarantee for religious freedoms than the ideal of *sharia* which was too far away, given the power

⁴⁸⁵ This happened in 1970's, when Erbakan gave an interview to the German newspaper *Vorwärts* owned by the Social Democratic Party. See Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Milli Nizam Partisi'nin Kuruluşu ve Programının İçeriği" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 582-583.

⁴⁸⁶ M. Hakan Yavuz, "Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhafif ve Modernist Gelenek" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 596-597.

⁴⁸⁷ Pınar Tank, "Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity," *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 1 (March 2005): 9-10.

of the military, which showed its determination to use it for developments that could alter the regime.

4.3. Attitude of Islamism towards the West and the EU

While one of most important traits of Islamism in general, is its anti-Westernism, the characteristics and developments in the Turkish setting caused the Islamists of the country to be able to support pro-Western policies. This has been the case during most of the Cold War, when communism was perceived as more of a threat than alliance with the West. Pro-Western/pro-EU attitudes, have become openly displayed by many of the Turkish Islamists, when the domestic political regime with the February 28 process was perceived as more of a threat than EU-membership and EU-based reforms - despite reservations.

Inherently modern and modernizing⁴⁸⁸, the Islamist discourse divides both Islam and the West into two, on the one side remains those that are aspired and on the other, remains those that should be gotten rid of; so that the ideal would be combined from both. The criticism of Islamism to the West lies in its perception of it as spiritually corrupt. The ideal tenets found in the western civilization becomes incorporated in an imagined “pure Islam”; which is ethical, rational and scientific at the same time.⁴⁸⁹ The *Quran* constitutes the infidels and non-Muslims as “the other”. Their social and political space constitutes the *Dar-ül Harb*, which should be combated, but this need not be in terms of violence. In practice, the Muslim world has been separated into different political entities, just as the *Dar-ül Harb*. The Muslim polities experienced war among each other; peace and even alliances were made with the non-Muslim polities at times. The world was increasingly made up of nation-states when Islamism appeared as an ideology in the 19th century.⁴⁹⁰ That is, the real world of Islam was very different from the *Quranic* ideal world of Islamists.

During the late Ottoman period, Islamists of the Empire were not against the system of nation-states, as long as the different Muslim states did not prioritize

⁴⁸⁸ Ali Bulaç, “İslam’ın Üç Siyaset Tarzı veya İslamcıların Üç Nesli,” 50-51.

⁴⁸⁹ Kara, “İslamcı Söylemin Kaynakları ve Gerçeklik Değeri,” 41-43.

⁴⁹⁰ Şaban H. Çalış, “İslamcıların Dünyası: Uluslararası İlişkilerin Dini-Politiği” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 888-891.

nationalism to the *umma* consciousness. *Jihad* against the non-Muslim west was advocated. Their ideas found support in the Sultanate. Abdülhamid II had utilized his title of Caliph for enlarging his sphere of influence outside Ottoman territory. Nonetheless, the preservation of the Ottoman state carried priority for both the Islamist intellectuals and Ottoman politicians.⁴⁹¹

The abolishment of the Caliphate and other reforms in the secularist regime of the Republican Turkey pushed Turkish Islamists into silence about international relations as well as domestic politics until the Cold War. The Islamists of the period such as Necip Fazıl, used Ottomanist and nationalist discourses in addition to his references to Islam. Their anti-Soviet (the Soviet Union was perceived as the continuation of Russia which had been the most important enemy during the Ottoman period and as the state of infidelity) stance and their upholding of the state, approached these Islamists to the nationalist-conservatist line of thought and provided support for pro-Western foreign policy of Turkey. At least, they argued, that the Western Bloc was *ehl-i kitab* (believing God and his holy texts), to support their position.⁴⁹²

With the rise of political Islam in the region, this dominant theme of Turkish Islamists on foreign policy started to differentiate from the conservative line. Their stance towards international politics as well as their domestic political views gained a more Islamist outlook. Beginning with this period, Turkish Islamists got acquainted with the works of figures such as Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Mohammed Qutb. They were effected by the Islamic movements in the region and events such as the Palestinian problem, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. Islamic Revolution in Iran also stimulated their sensitivities towards the Islamic world by the 1980's.⁴⁹³ They developed an interest to the Third World, but it was confined to Muslim societies rather than a support for the movement of non-alignment - which they perceived as part of Soviet tactics. Nonetheless, their anti-communism has not totally erased their anti-Westernism. They remained generally critical of the course of foreign policy by the Turkish state and they offered Islamic alternatives for

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 891-892.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 892-894.

⁴⁹³ Yücel Bulut, "İslamcılık, Tercüme Faaliyetleri ve Yerlilik" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 918-924.

alignment. The stance of *Milli Görüş* and Erbakan provides a typical Turkish Islamist approach to Turkish foreign policy in this period.⁴⁹⁴

As with Kemalism, the attitude of *Milli Görüş* on foreign policy was derived from its domestic policy discourse. Whereas Kemalism has chosen the West - as the owner of Civilization - for alignment, they had chosen Islam as the path for reunion. They sympathized with both the *umma* living in *Dar-ül Harb* - such as the Muslim immigrants in European countries, Palestinians, Bosnians, etc. - and the Islamic states. The choice of partnership with the West would mean infidelity to the *umma*, potential loss of Islamic values and subordination to neo-colonialism. Nonetheless, the anti-Westernism of *Milli Görüş* relied more upon a conservative criticism of Turkish modernization, rather than anti-colonialism and Third Worldism which also influenced its discourse. For *Milli Görüş* of the RP period, Turkey was under Western hegemony both in its domestic political system and in its foreign policy. Not only the pro-Western policies, but also the Westernist-Kemalist cadre of the ministry of foreign affairs who were detached from the values of the nation, were criticized. RP carried its upholding of the Ottoman tradition into the evaluation of relations between Turkey and the West.⁴⁹⁵ In fact, the RP of the 1990's idealized a Turkey which would inherit an imagined Ottoman Islamic identity and become the leader of the Islamic world. The ethnic factor of Turkishness and the imperial vision were juxtaposed in this ideal.⁴⁹⁶ This coincides with the nationalist Islamism of the former generation, exemplified by the writings of Necip Fazıl and his colleagues in *Büyük Doğu*. In these writings around the 1950's, a historical reflex was present, against association with Arabs. They were perceived as traitors to the Ottoman rule and accordingly, mistrusted.⁴⁹⁷

The international organizations initiated by Western states were severely criticized by *Milli Görüş* movement as serving the interests of the West. Erbakan had

⁴⁹⁴ Çalış, "İslamcıların Dünyası: Uluslararası İlişkilerin Dini-Politiği," 896.

⁴⁹⁵ Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği*, 44-50.

⁴⁹⁶ M. Hakan Yavuz, "Değişen Türk Kimliği ve Dış Politika: Neo-Osmanlıcılığın Yükselişi" in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), 40-41.

⁴⁹⁷ Çalış, "İslamcıların Dünyası: Uluslararası İlişkilerin Dini-Politiği," 893-894. This "stab on the back" perspective towards Arabs was dominant since the First World War. The idea was promoted by the Republican regime and it has been successful to an extent, in the detachment of Turkish Islamists from Arab Islamists, as late as 1960's. See Mardin, "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes," 148-149.

proposed Islamic alternatives to the UN, NATO, EU and UNESCO, composed of Islamic states. He even proposed a common currency to be used among the Islamic world.⁴⁹⁸ Although not taken very seriously, these proposals point at the magnitude of the resentment to international institutions composed outside Islamic enterprise and the perception of diverse organizations as all belonging to the “other” world. In fact, Erbakan, when the RP was in power, tried to form a counter group of Islamic states to the D7, a Muslim 8; discussing it with Islamic states. However, the project ended soon, with the humiliating attitude shown by Qaddafi.⁴⁹⁹

The MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi-National Order Party) was the first political party in Turkey against membership in the EC. While other political parties and governments were silent on the political dimension of European integration and did not question the general orientation of Turkish foreign policy towards Europe, *Milli Görüş* line viewed the EC as something more than economic integration from the beginning. Focusing on the ideological implications of Turkey - EC relations, the RP too, remained as the only political party against the application of full membership in 1987. RP attitude towards the EC/EU carried tones of nationalist-conservative thought along with an Islamic emphasis. For *Milli Görüş*, membership would mean being part of a political integration - a “Christian club” whose culture rooted in pagan Greece and Rome and serving Zionism⁵⁰⁰ - which would colonize the country. The supranational characteristics of the organization were argued to undermine Turkish sovereignty and national interest. Loss of national integrity, loss of political maneuver in Cyprus, total economic dependence with the Customs Union were stressed in addition to the religious/cultural difference of the organization. References to Sevres and Capitulations were also used in the anti-EU discourse. Overall, despite the strong anti-Western tone of the RP, bilateral relations with European countries were not rejected.⁵⁰¹ In fact, the severity of the opposition to the EU in *Milli Görüş* discourse was stemming from its resentment to the course of modernization chosen by the Republican regime, stated by Dağı as such: “For the RP, EU is an important area of resistance to the Westernization project and process

⁴⁹⁸ Çakır, 565-566.

⁴⁹⁹ Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 2005): 182-183.

⁵⁰⁰ Çakır, 896-897.

⁵⁰¹ Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği*, 51-59.

of Turkey.”⁵⁰² In the end, the RP supported the actualization of the Customs Union with the EU. The possible reason for this turn is found in the new character of the Islamic bourgeoisie - an important base of electoral support for *Milli Görüş* parties. Formerly seeking protectionist economic policies, this segment of the society has developed commercial relations with the EU countries by the time of the Customs Union. Provided that the relations did not reach into the political area, relations with the EU was not rejected.⁵⁰³

Nonetheless, there has been an alteration, even a reversal of this attitude about the EU. During the late 1990's, not only *Milli Görüş*, but also all major Islamic groups in the country gained a pro-EU attitude. These in fact seem to be the “major” supporters of membership among Turkish political actors today.⁵⁰⁴ In the *Milli Görüş* line, this happened after the closure of RP. The FP differed radically from the RP discourse in foreign policy; stating that it was in favor of EU membership and Turkey's role in NATO.⁵⁰⁵ The party program of AKP was more pro-EU in content and in tone. It declared EU membership as a primary aim of the party. Moreover, it declared that it aims to be a centrist political party with commitment to democracy, supported compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, and committed itself to signing international documents (viewed as “Western” thus suspicious in the past) to fulfill these criteria. This program has been put into action rather effectively.⁵⁰⁶ Not only the party cadre, but also its supporters seem to have internalized the Western discourse of democracy and human rights, as well as the pro-Western, pro-EU stance.⁵⁰⁷

The possibility of this discursive shift owes much to the history and characteristic of Turkish Islamism in the Republican period. Continuously

⁵⁰² Ibid., 59.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., 97-99.

⁵⁰⁴ F. Stephan Larrabee, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 2002), 62; Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” 225.

⁵⁰⁵ Toprak, 183.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ İhsan D. Dağı, “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Discourses of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy” in *Transformation of Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) in Turkey*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 2005, forthcoming).

suppressed by the Kemalist regime through authoritarian practices developed in relation to the understanding of secularism stated above, Turkish Islamism emerged not in opposition to the West *per se*. Rather, it has been a form of popularized resentment to “the West inside”⁵⁰⁸, of Turkey, through identity. As Dağı states, whereas until the late 1990’s, Turkish Islamist intellectuals and Turkish political Islam opposed the regime and searched for their alternatives through references to “Islam”, they have sought a “discursive alliance” with the West after this period. When their social, economic and political bases were threatened further by the regime through the February 28 process, they sought guarantee for their survival in the promotion of Western/modern concepts they previously rejected: Human rights, rule of law, democracy and even secularism - in the Anglo-Saxon model, as previously demanded by the Turkish conservative right. The EU, the West outside which demanded such reforms, thus became a partner against the West inside, Kemalist/secularists. Thus, they became the adherents of taking “Westernization” to its logical end, a system of liberal democracy - which is hesitated about today by the traditional Westernists of the country. Dağı calls this discursive shift from Islamic references to Western political concepts, along with retrieving from a political Islam to a social Islam, as “post-Islamism”, which he detects both in the intellectuals and *Milli Görüş* parties in the post-February 28 process.⁵⁰⁹ In addition to the priorities for survival, the lack of direct colonization experience, the relative shortness of the War of Independence against the West, combined with the Cold War experience of “positive identification with Europe”, seem to have enabled such shift to occur.⁵¹⁰ Moreover, Turkish Islamists are not short of sources of justification for this recent pro-EU stance other than resistance to state power. As Dağı notes:

⁵⁰⁸ Turkish Islamists in fact, prioritized opposition to the Kemalist state elite, rather than the West in general. Western conspiracies were used to support this resentment to the “inside,” as revealed by pre-Helsinki discourse of Taşgetiren presented below.

⁵⁰⁹ İhsan D. Dağı, “Rethinking Democracy, Human Rights, Democracy and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 137-139; Dağı. “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization,” 28-30.

⁵¹⁰ Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” 222.

Integration into the West and maintaining Islamic identity are no longer seen as mutually exclusive choices [by the AKP]; one can remain attached to an Islamic identity yet advocate integration with the West as in the case of Turkey's EU membership bid.⁵¹¹

Accordingly, the argument can be made in favor of the EU by Islamists, while assuring the integrity of the Islamic identity. Islamists, used this argument for legitimizing their pro-EU turn to their audience. Not only the idea that Muslims can remain free in expressing their identity in the context of freedoms in the EU, but also that they could spread their belief - as ordered by God - to this land during the integration process, was articulated. Nonetheless, they keep warning the public about cultural assimilation of Turkey in the EU, which may occur instead of Islamization in the EU.⁵¹²

In short, suspicious and even hostile to the West and the EU, Turkish mainstream political Islamic discourse on the EU shifted to accommodation with the February 28 process, which aimed at excluding *Milli Görüş* from the Turkish political space. Most profound reason seem to rest on the overlapping demands of the EU from Turkey through Copenhagen Criteria. Unable to provide change in the Kemalist establishment through internal struggle - as become evident with February 28, Islamists of Turkey increasingly appreciated and even sought foreign assistance for democratization. They even seek justice from Europe, as headscarf and RP cases were carried to the ECHR. The reasoning by outsiders for this profound change of attitude vary from dismissal of any goodwill by coining the discourse of democracy and human rights as *takiyye*, to appropriation of a beginning of transformation in Islamist minds of the modern times.

4.3.1. Attitudes of Islamist Intellectuals towards the EU

The Islamist intellectuals used in this study, Ali Bulaç and Ahmet Taşgetiren, were chosen to be from different backgrounds, writing in different publications. Variation in the issues of focus and discursive styles were also considered, to provide

⁵¹¹ Dağı, "The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Discourses of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy,"

⁵¹² For instance, Taşgetiren shows EU membership as marked by such opportunity for the devout Muslims. Bulaç speak about dialogue between religions as a positive development provided that non-Muslims do not try to change Islamic beliefs. For detail, see the sections below.

a better understanding of the positions within Turkish Islamism which were searched before.

Bulaç received his higher education in theology (İstanbul Higher Islamic Institute, 1975) and sociology (Istanbul University, Faculty of Literature, 1980). He studied religion before university, for seven years in a *medrese*. From the mid-1970's onwards, he has actively written in different journals – i.e., *Hareket*, *Düşünce*, *Girişim*, *İlim ve Sanat*, *Bilgi ve Hikmet* - and newspapers – *Yeni Devir*, *Milli Gazete*, *Zaman* - of Islamic appeal. He established the journals *Düşünce* (1976), *Kitap Dergisi* and *Bilgi ve Hikmet* (1985-1992), the publishing companies *Düşünce Yayınları* (1976) and *İnsan Yayınları* (1984). He took place in the cadre that established the newspaper *Zaman* (1986) (owned by the Gülen community⁵¹³). Up to date, he has published 25 books, about issues such as Islamic belief and philosophy, relationship between modernity and Islam, political criticism, information and evaluation of the EU, and a *meal* of *Quran* (meaning of *Quran*, smaller in scope than *tefsir*/evaluation). He has been extremely popular among Islamist youth since the 1980's and he has an additional audience of liberals - the thoughts of which, he is in dialogue with.

Bulaç has been one of the new generation intellectuals of Turkish Islamism - mentioned together with Rasim Özdenören and İsmet Özel⁵¹⁴ - in search of an alternative organization of the society and the polity based on Islam, apart from the conservative thought to which Turkish Islamists had generally been attached. His intellectual efforts included a deconstruction of modern social and political concepts in order to create an alternative paradigm to modernity, which he believed to be essential for an alternative project to that of the West. His discourse has evolved into a more democratic-pluralist one rather than an Islamist/anti-Western one, during the 1990's.⁵¹⁵ As he remains to be one of the most sophisticated writers, combining

⁵¹³ See Yavuz, "Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi,"

⁵¹⁴ See Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectual in the Republic of Turkey" in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, ed. Richard Tapper (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991); Ferhat Kentel, "1990'ların İslami Düşünce Dergileri ve Yeni Müslüman Entelektüeller: Bilgi ve Hikmet, Umran, Tezkire Degileri," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004); Metin Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?," *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997).

⁵¹⁵ See Dağı, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey"; Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?"; Sabri Sayarı, "Islam

religious and liberal references in his analyses related to the problems of Turkish Islamists, he was chosen for this study.

Left in 1987 and returned in 1998⁵¹⁶, Bulaç writes a column - *Arka Plan* - in *Zaman* three times a week. This column has been a basic source for this study in the exploration of his views. Although he writes often about the political dimension of EU - Turkey relations, he does not strictly follow the public agenda of these relations (i.e., issuing of Progress Reports). His style of writing at the column is consistent with his style in his books, some of which, were also searched through in the study. Although many analyses are available about his Islamic discourse on various issues, these were not included in the sections presenting his views, in accordance with the analysis of other intellectuals taken as cases for the study.

Ahmet Taşgetiren provides an alternative resource to Bulaç, with his educational and political background, along with his discursive style. He was educated in a religious vocational school and he continued his studies in theology (İstanbul Higher Islamic Institute, started in 1966). He joined the “Yeniden Milli Mücadele” movement⁵¹⁷ and wrote in the journals of this movement. He published literature in the journal *Pınar* (belonging to this movement), edited the journal *Türk Edebiyatı* in the same period. He started journalism in the newspaper *Bayrak* (1975), wrote in and joined the group of editors of *Tercüman* (1978), joined the establishment of the journal *Altınoluk* (1986), started as a columnist in *Zaman* and continued in *Yeni Şafak* (owned by the Albayraklar group, close to the AKP version of the *Milli Görüş* line⁵¹⁸). Currently, he writes in *Yeni Şafak* five times a week, and he currently is the Editor in Chief of the journal *Altınoluk*. Taşgetiren’s books since

and International Relations in Turkey,” in *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East*, ed. Şerif Mardin (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994).

⁵¹⁶ See Gültaşlı.

⁵¹⁷ See “Ahmet Taşgetiren”, <<http://www.biyografi.net>> (13 June 2005). Generally named as “Mücadele Birliği,” this movement aimed an alternative to both foreign based Islamic fundamentalism and the “inactive” state of the religious communities of Turkey, in the late 1960’s. Until the late 1970’s, it stood against communism, Zionism and Western influences in the country. Away from violence and in support of state-military against the rise of Turkish left, the movement focused on an intellectual battle aimed at the Kemalist-secular version of nationalism, which was consolidated in its contention that the War of Independence had ended with a regime in Turkey (Westernist) which was serving the interests of the Western powers over Turkey. See Mustafa Aydın, “Bir Milli İslamcılık Serüveni: Mücadelecilik,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 452-467.

⁵¹⁸ See Sol Meclis Medya Çalışma Grubu, “Medya İzleme Raporu,” December 2003, <<http://www.solmeclis.net>> (13 June 2005).

1990's, on Islamic belief, the problems faced by the "Muslims" of Turkey and the Islamic world, with a sharp critique of the current regime, have been published predominantly by the company Erkam, closely related to the publisher of *Altınoluk* (Altınoluk Yayınları).

Taşgetiren's views presented in this study are based predominantly on his column in *Yeni Şafak*, where he closely follows the public agenda as well as important issues related to Muslims of Turkey. His style, with appeal to the general reader, is marked by vitality and emotion. He supports his contentions about the issues he elaborates on, with his general attitudes and historical examples. Especially in his books, an alternative history of Turkish modernization to that of the state discourse, is available for the reader. Much different in style and focus, with a closer stand towards Turkism than Bulaç, Taşgetiren was chosen to be the other representative of Turkish Islamism for this study.

As their general views are considered, neither Bulaç, nor Taşgetiren, is against the EU in the post-February 28 and post-Helsinki context. Both support membership and its process, despite reservations on the question of identity. Muslim identity is doubted by these writers to be endangered by entering a predominantly Western organization which currently debates its own identity. This identity may rest on a religious base, and in that case, Turkey's membership would not be possible and desirable for them. Taşgetiren's line of thought resembles the Kemalist writers, especially Manisalı, in the matters of "national interest" and "national integrity", while such conceptions are generally absent in Bulaç. A striking difference between the Kemalist intellectuals used in this study and Bulaç and Taşgetiren, is that whereas the first group remain almost silent on the identity of Turkey and the EU, the Islamist writers show a lot of attention to the identity debates within the EU.

4.3.1.1. General Views of Ali Bulaç on the EU

The approach of Bulaç to the West in general, is very critical and in depth. Aimed at presenting Muslims his alternative world-view, he makes a "deconstruction" of everything modern - which is historically and philosophically Western - and he continues with the total rejection of categories defined by the paradigm of modernity, since these are bound to be detached from Islam through the

characteristic of secularity it embeds. His post-modern discourse, is intertwined with references to Islamic norms and tradition. His ideal Islamic world lies in the original sources - *Quran* and *sunna* - but he also makes use of the tradition of Islamic rule in cases he finds fit. He has a discourse critical of both the Kemalist model and the Islamist discourses which remain in the confines of modernism, uncritical of it. Bulaç wants to go beyond those ideas of Islamists that advocate the importation of selected concepts and practices from the West - as if these do not emanate from the Enlightenment philosophy which is rejected, such as those of Islamism during the Ottoman period, or those of *Milli Görüş*.⁵¹⁹ Although conceptually wary of the West as before, he supports making use of the opportunities created by globalization and EU membership by the Islamic community, as revealed in his post-February 28 views. His support of the EU is based on his critique of Turkish political regime.

One example would be, his effort to justify globalization, which in fact is a development initiated in the “Western” world - thus expected to be refuted by his Islamist stance, through stressing its force against the nation-state – thus to the advantage of his Islamist stance. Bulaç stands against the nation-state on the grounds that “nation” is a construction exploiting traditional bonds among the society to justify a totalitarian state, which is reflected in the Muslim and modernizing countries like Turkey. The paradigm of the Enlightenment excludes religion from social and political systems which have emanated from itself. Combined with the state apparatuses that reinforce it, Muslims cannot live freely. At this point, he argues that a realistic solution to this problem lies in: “...taking advantage of the developments created by globalization...” one of which is regional integration taking place above and below the level of the state. This provides a chance for transnational unification of the *umma*.⁵²⁰

The EU, which is part of these developments, also provide a chance for breaking the pressure over Islamic life and sensitivities experienced in the Turkish modernization scheme, of the authoritarian nation-state. For Bulaç, the “EU concept” provides a plural coexistence in the society, long demanded by the Muslims.⁵²¹ This

⁵¹⁹ See Ali Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1998); *İslam ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1995).

⁵²⁰ Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet*, 14-57.

⁵²¹ Ali Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*. (İstanbul: Eylül Yayınları, 2001), 144-145.

has especially been the dominant perception among Turkish Islamists, especially after the February 28, 1997, as explained above. Bulaç too, believes that the pressures by the state towards Muslims have enabled them - including the FP - to view the EU with a more collaborative intent, while the same characteristic of the organization drew the traditionally Westernist elites of Turkey away from the desirability of membership.⁵²² Turkey, in his view, has to acknowledge the requirements of joining this “Union”. Commenting on a reform of the Penal Code made in response to EU demands, Bulaç states that those who resist EU based legal reforms in Turkey, with an “internal matters” and sovereignty rhetoric are mistaken. For him, it should be evident that harmonization with the EU requires the sharing of sovereignty. The EU is right in insisting the adaptation of the country to the standards set forth. If these will not be accepted, there is no meaning of application for candidacy from the beginning.⁵²³

While stressing the post-modernness in the structuration of the EU, Bulaç does not elaborate on to what extent this nation-state model is trespassed in EU member countries - or the “French philosophy of Enlightenment”⁵²⁴ - or to what extent this recent alliance between the EU and Turkish Muslims can function to the advantage of his people. Neither is he confident in and consistent upon the desirability of EU membership. The reason stems from the very Westernness of this entity. Despite the opportunities created by its supranationality, the EU remains to be an organization comprised of Christian societies for the time being. Although he approaches the EU-motivated reforms in Turkey, which are based on the understanding of liberal democracy, as “fit” for Muslims, Bulaç doubts the possibility and desirability to be actually “within” this. The question central for Bulaç, is whether Muslims would be able to express themselves in this “club”. The change of the viewpoint, from EU effect on internal dynamics to actualization of membership, makes Bulaç more pessimistic. Although EU membership process and prospect provide opportunities for the Muslims, these also pose challenges, as warned by Bulaç. His discourse is centered around the idea that while Islam has traditional means to reconcile with Western societies, it is hard to say the same for the West. A dialogue and coexistence

⁵²² Ibid., 127-129.

⁵²³ Ali Bulaç, “AB Yolunda Zina mı Engel?,” *Zaman*, September 22, 2004.

⁵²⁴ Ali Bulaç, “AB’nin Zor Lokması,” *Zaman*, June 4, 2003.

in the EU may happen only if the Judeo-Christian inheritance of Europe ceases to be the predominant ingredient of European identity. This is doubtful, if not impossible, for Bulaç, according to his reasoning presented below.

Bulaç states that there is more than a single reason for EU to reject Turkey's membership. Among these are: The population and religion of its people, its agricultural structure, proximity to zones of conflict, close relationship with the US, the social and economic costs of free movement of its people to Europe, historical and cultural reasons. Therefore, it is not easy for EU members to accept Turkey as a member.⁵²⁵ The large population, one of the most important obstacles, is feared by the Europeans because it would increase the percentage of Muslims inside the present borders as a result of free movement. Then, Muslims would also have weight in the decision-making organs. Some Europeans also fear that Turkey may be used as a "Trojan horse" by the US, pressuring other members strategically and contest its membership on that issue.⁵²⁶ However, most of these are not much important obstacles in Bulaç's view. He states that the EU suffers from a decreasing population/workforce, which will eventually be needed to increase through immigration⁵²⁷. He states that in terms of ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy), a Turkey - allied to the US - inside the Union is better than a Turkey outside it. The EU is careful about Turkey to stand away from the Islamic world as much as it wants to see it away from the US; an emergent Islamic bloc would be detrimental to the interest of the West as a whole. For Bulaç, a reason behind EU's closer approach lies in the possibility of an alienated Turkey that allies with the US and Israel (contrary to EU strategic interest) or with the Islamic world (again contrary). Even for those in Europe who see Turkey as "the Trojan horse of the US", controlling Turkey from within seems to be a better choice than leaving it outside.⁵²⁸

The most important obstacle to EU membership for Bulaç, is Turkey's identity: Islam:

⁵²⁵ Ali Bulaç, "AB'nin İkilemi," *Zaman*, October 13, 2004.

⁵²⁶ Ali Bulaç, "2005 İyidir," *Zaman*, December 11, 2002.

⁵²⁷ Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 13.

⁵²⁸ Bulaç, "AB'nin İkilemi".

The west knows that Islam is a different paradigm and a serious disagreement from outside the system. In case of full membership, the hard seeds of the two paradigms will come face to face. It cannot accept it with its difference, it does not want to live with it as the ‘different other’ in a pluralistic world; because it could not succeed in transforming Islam like the other cultures and absorb it. From this point of view, those whom Europe is worried by are not our ‘rightist-nationalists or leftist-nationalists’, they are the intellectual and political children of it. Turkey is the expression of another symbolism. The uneasiness of the West lies much deeper.⁵²⁹

Its Muslim identity is where the peculiarity of Turkey lies. Historically, the Christians and Muslims have been opposed to each other. While Islam has a historical experience of tolerance and coexistence for other beliefs, Christianity does not have a parallel experience. While the Islamic world had been in an unbalanced relationship with the West and it had to pass through the traumatic experience of defining itself through a foreign paradigm, the West simply labeled it as the “other”. Added the fact that current American policy is based on cultural hegemony over the non-West with an anti-Islam campaign, it is important that the EU shows prospect to build an egalitarian relationship with this “other”, embodied by Turkey. Turkey’s membership process is a hard process of deliberation for Europeans, because they are questioning and re-defining their “self” over Turkey; not towards Turkey, but for themselves. Bulaç believes that the repercussions of this deliberation is much more important for Turkey than fulfilling Copenhagen Criteria.⁵³⁰

Reasoning by pointing at the deep Christian beliefs about Islam as a legitimate religion, Bulaç states that the sediment of this traditional attitude towards Islam which remains in Western culture and philosophy translated to ideology, has important repercussions. Islam does not exist in those “social and political ideals which the West tries to export to the world”. For Bulaç: “Modern Western thought builds upon Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman inheritance.”⁵³¹ As the Enlightenment is thought to be born out of these and it has been used for the structuration of the contemporary world, the outcome is clear: Islam has no role. On the other hand, remarks Bulaç, Islam had recognized Judaism and Christianity; *Quran* was built upon these two religions. The result of this had been the protection of the existence

⁵²⁹ Ali Bulaç, “Batı’nın Üstünlüğü Meselesi,” *Zaman*, November 10, 2004.

⁵³⁰ Ali Bulaç, “AB’nin Zor Lokması”.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*

and rights of the people who have these religions by Islamic states. In the process of history, people who believe in Islam are used to coexistence with other beliefs. Therefore, it is harder for the Christian Europeans to accept living with Muslim Turks than it is for Turks to accept being a part of Europe. Bulaç states that this matter seems unimportant to the laicists of Turkey who reject to see the EU as a “Christian club”. However, it is important for many Westerners today.⁵³² He says:

Islam is an ‘otherized other’ in the subconscious of the West. From Muslims’ viewpoint, non-Muslims are only ‘the other’...Therefore they can coexist around certain norms. But one cannot coexist with an ‘otherized other’, either you *assimilate* them, or you *purify* them, or you *get rid of* them. (emphases added).⁵³³

Bulaç problematizes not only the Christian aspects of Western identity, in doubting EU approach to Turkey. Secular Westerners also have reasons for rejecting Turkey because of its religion. He states that European Christian viewpoint stresses the Judeo-Christian background of the West, a secular one focuses on the Greco-Roman heritage of it. Therefore, despite the difference in opinion, Western perception denies any part to Islam in itself; with a few exceptions who acknowledge the Abbasids’ role in the transmission of Greek philosophy to the West, besides mere couriers, such as Nietzsche. As secular Westerners believe, Muslims are outside the processes of modernization which the West went through. The idea goes like this: Since Islam had no role in modernization, Muslims need to detach themselves from their religion to be able to succeed in development and they need the tutorship of the West to be able to pass the road already passed by the West (“They will do the homework.”).⁵³⁴ The secular Western position about non-Christian, non-western societies, according to Bulaç, suffers from a changed form of Christian prejudices about the other. The Christian idea of salvation of the others was translated into integrating them to the modern world through assimilation.⁵³⁵

In such a pessimistic picture, is there any possibility for a Turkey inside Europe? Bulaç says “yes”, but only if the dominant mentalities change. He believes that a “dialogue between religions” is possible and desirable. He state that recent

⁵³² Ali Bulaç, “Hıristiyan Batı’nın Gözüyle,” *Zaman*, October 25, 2004.

⁵³³ Ali Bulaç, “Laik Batı’nın Gözüyle,” *Zaman*, October 27, 2004.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ Ali Bulaç, “Zor Süreç,” *Zaman*, November 3, 2004.

developments in European debates for European identity, enables the acceptance of Turkey, although he does not elaborate on this idea in same detail as he reasons the rejection of Turkey.⁵³⁶

Considering the threat of the impact of Huntington's thesis on "clash of civilizations" and other Orientalist perceptions totalizing and "otherizing" Islam such as of Bernard Lewis to Muslims living inside and outside the EU, Bulaç argues that Turkey's candidacy and membership to the EU is an opportunity for Europe to begin an interreligious and intercultural dialogue; therefore contributing to a decrease of potential clashes in the world. If this is the case as he believes will be with the beginning of negotiations although they are "open-ended", Turkey's religious difference will become an advantage rather than an obstacle.⁵³⁷ Whereas the principal strategy of the EU for the past 50 years has been one of detainment; this policy has to be ended by December 17, 2004, due to the possible costs of alienating Turkey which may be an important regional actor through other relationships.⁵³⁸ It seems that for Bulaç, at least, strategic considerations - in case that the inclination of Europeans for cultural dialogue does not work - may outweigh the costs for the perceived threat to European identity by Turkey's membership.

4.3.1.2. General Views of Ahmet Taşgetiren on the EU

Taşgetiren was strictly anti-Western in his views about the international system and domestic political system in his writings before the late 1990's. He used the general theme of "deprivation" for evaluating the state of affairs affecting Muslims, for example, in his book *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*, printed in 1994. In this work, he presents imperialist domination of the Islamic world by the West as the framework of the state of affairs which he believes had not changed since the previous century. In his view, the West has done everything to inhibit the strengthening of the *umma*; Muslims are economically and technologically pauperized through colonization by the world market⁵³⁹. The Islamic world is politically divided, superficially into

⁵³⁶ Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 127.

⁵³⁷ Ali Bulaç, "'Din Farkı' Engel mi, Avantaj mı?," *Zaman*, December 23, 2004.

⁵³⁸ Bulaç, "AB'nin İkilemi".

⁵³⁹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası* (İstanbul: Erkam Yayınları, 1994), 10, 110-11.

nation-states, the borders of which, were not of their choice. The resulting nationalisms worked in favor of the Western plan to keep the Muslims divided; thus vulnerable.⁵⁴⁰ The international media⁵⁴¹, along with laicism and the imitation of the West by these nation-states, work for the loss of pride and dignity, cause spiritual and moral loss in Muslim peoples.⁵⁴² The West is also responsible for physical extermination of the Muslims of the world, through sponsoring i.e., Israeli aggression, or remaining silent upon killings i.e., in Bosnia⁵⁴³.

In Taşgetiren's view, stated in 1994, the most important problem facing the Muslim world is one of identity. The deterioration of Islamic identity for the sake of Westernization of Islamic societies to "catch-up with the West", is held responsible for today's vulnerability of the Islamic world, which should be united against the West to have its own, independent agenda for progress - not "warfare" because it is the inhumane tool of the West.⁵⁴⁴

In *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*, Taşgetiren adheres Turkish Westernists, the elite and intellectuals, as serving the Western plans for weakening the Islamic world. For Taşgetiren, Turkey is one of the Muslim countries which have potential to become "big state" of the Islamic world. However, pro-Western policies weaken the country internally and externally. The "Eastern Question" remains for the West; the EC and the West want to weaken Turkey through demands about Cyprus and promoting Kurdish separatism. The "fear of Islam" by the elite, only serves for Western domination - because weakening the rise of Islam is for the interest of the West. If

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., 73, 81.

⁵⁴¹ For Taşgetiren, the economic power of this media blocks the survival of Islamic local media and works for cultural hegemony of the West. Ibid., 111-112. This view seems not to have changed for Taşgetiren in the past decade. This may be observed on the children's supplementary - *Altın Çocuk* - of the *Altınoluk* magazine which is edited by Taşgetiren. June 2005 volume was issued with the heading: "A World without Television". Besides educational content for helping kids in learning the Arabic Alphabet through stories and puzzles, most of the volume is devoted to warnings to children about the negative effects of TV - that it reduces communication in the family, it consumes time which could be used for study, it is bad for the health, it promotes violence, it is sometimes "attacking our sacred values" instead of educating us and strengthening our national, religious and moral values. Even cartoons are warned to include violence and "secret persuasions". After these assertions, the magazine directs children for appropriate behavior on watching TV. These are done by phrases of "-must"s, and through a test on TV habits awarding the correspondent as being a "Golden child" in case s/he shows the appropriate practices about watching TV. See *Altın Çocuk* 4, no. 41 (July 2005), free supplement of *Altınoluk* 233 (July 2005).

⁵⁴² Taşgetiren, *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*, 25, 31, 81.

⁵⁴³ Ibid., 16.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., 9-15.

not deceived - by the West, the Turkish Westernists are evaluated by Taşgetiren as committing “treason”.⁵⁴⁵ For Taşgetiren, Turkey, although weakened and detached from the Islamic world - by the West and Westernists together - with the abolishment of the Caliphate and policies such as recognition of Israel instead of preserving good relations with the Islamic states, still has a potential to lead a cooperation effort among Islamic states, especially the recently independent Central Asian Turkish states.⁵⁴⁶ Referring to the Islamic world in which Turkey may have an important role as the former Soviet region “from the Adriatic to China” - only if it leaves Westernist outlook and foreign policy choices, such as EC candidacy and return to its Islamic identity -⁵⁴⁷ he shows a similar attitude to the “neo-Ottomanists”, who sought an “alternative” foreign policy of Turkey in the post-Cold War period.⁵⁴⁸ He also remains close to the *Milli Görüş* discourse with these arguments.

Taşgetiren nonetheless supported the application for full membership to the EC, as a vague but possible opportunity to carry Islam to Europe, in the beginning of 1990’s.⁵⁴⁹ Of course, meanwhile, Turkey should try more to build good relations with the Islamic world. This would strengthen Turkey in its negotiations with the EU during membership process as he stated in 1999.⁵⁵⁰

For Taşgetiren, candidacy to the EU requires a process of a big transformation, since a “United States of Europe” is projected. Following Helsinki Summit of 1999, he warns that as apparent by the excitement of Greece on matters of Cyprus and the Aegean with the decision of candidacy, Turkey should not “fall in love” with membership immediately. National matters are going to be at stake in the process. He is also worried about the mentioning of the Kurds as minority. While Taşgetiren is doubtful of what strategic and cultural meaning (since Turkey will be the first Muslim member) Turkey carries for the EU, he celebrates the insistence of the EU on human rights and democracy, since he believes that the country has a bad record regarding many segments of the society and with the present state ideology distant

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., 20-33, 45-46.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., 28, 121, 112-114.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., 121, 131-137.

⁵⁴⁸ For detail in neo-Ottomanism, See Çalış, “Ulus ve Devlet Kimliği Labirentinde Türk Dış Politikası”.

⁵⁴⁹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, *Sistem Sancısı* (İstanbul: Erkam Yayınları, 1991), 200-206.

⁵⁵⁰ Ahmet Taşgetiren, *Müslüman ve Sistem Tartışmaları* (İstanbul: Erkam Yayınları, 2000), 140.

from the people, foreign assistance such as of the EU for an establishment of a democratic regime where the military is not above politics as the February 28, 1997 showed, is needed.⁵⁵¹

About the terminology of “Muslim country” used by the US and EU for Turkey, Taşgetiren states his doubts about Turkey’s future within Europe. For Taşgetiren, there is no guarantee that in the case of membership, Turkey will be recognized as a respectable equal, but different country. He is suspicious that the rhetoric of enrichment of the EU by Turkey only means an enrichment towards strategic goals of the EU towards the East, rather than a readiness to coexist with Islam.⁵⁵² Taşgetiren also doubts that the state in Turkey has any intension to preserve this Islamic identity, given the February 28 process where Islam was removed from the public space, for a cultural dialogue. Rather, it seems that the rhetoric will only be utilized for protecting EU interests in its relations with other Muslim countries.⁵⁵³

Taşgetiren repeats in 2002, his worries for unconditional support to the membership process. For him, Turkey has “fallen in love” with a Europe without clearly thinking about the consequences of showing that love. The more Turkey pushes for membership, the more obstacles are brought forward as preconditions by the EU. There are many reserves by the Europeans; whether or not they are clearly against Turkey for cultural reasons (which of course can never be overcome) Turkey’s membership remains to be only a possibility. Taşgetiren supports those reforms done for the good of Turkey; democratic criteria are applaudable, but these should not be fulfilled for membership *per se*, rather for the good of the society.⁵⁵⁴

4.4. Islamist Discourses on the Political Dimension of EU - Turkey Relations

Islamist discourses on the political dimension of EU – Turkey relations, have been formed by domestic political concerns; that is, resisting some aspects of the Kemalist regime. The most supportive views on EU-based reforms, are centered around democracy and human rights, especially on the reduction of the role of the -

⁵⁵¹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Dönüşüm Süreci,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 13, 1999.

⁵⁵² Ahmet Taşgetiren, “‘Müslüman Ülke...’,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 17, 1999.

⁵⁵³ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Müslümanlığımızı Ankara Nasıl Görüyor?,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 18, 1999.

⁵⁵⁴ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Farklarımız,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 9, 2002.

Kemalist - military in politics and freedom of religious expression. In fact, it may be said that the support for these reforms have been responsible for the recent shift into pro-EU attitudes within Turkish Islamism, rather than vice-versa.

On minority rights of the Kurds, Islamists - except Kurdist Islamists, remain similar to the Kemalist discourse in their resistance to the EU involvement on basis of suspicion about EU aims. However, they also blame Kemalist practices of nationalism and secularism for the problems faced in the expression of Kurdish identity.

The Islamist discourse on the area of foreign policy - the solution of the Cyprus problem - is almost identical to that of Kemalists, with its advocacy of the 1974 intervention on the island, with its concern for Turkey's strategic interests as much as, even more than, its concern for Turkish Cypriots. In fact, this remains to be an area where Islamist discourse uses the same references and conceptualization with that of traditional Kemalist foreign policy.

4.4.1. The Islamist Discourse on Democracy and Human Rights

During the Republic, the main problem of Islamism has been about the secular character of the regime. The strict control of Islam has resulted in the Islamist reactions to the regime as authoritarian. After the laicist revolutions of the regime took place, this resentment could only be publicized in the beginning of the multi-party period. Islamic resentment to the regime has been first channeled through conservative, then Islamic political parties. *Milli Görüş* parties, as the others, have constantly been closed down with each military intervention claimed upon restoring the Kemalist order. Accordingly, role of the military in politics have come increasingly questioned by Turkish political Islam, especially after the February 28 intervention which aimed at the termination of all Islamist social, economic and political activity. Thus, as their survival in a laicist state has been threatened, Turkish Islamists have focused on their immediate concerns in relation to democracy and human rights. The shift in their discourse towards these Western concepts, has been in relation to their shift of discourse on the EU and membership process.

The *Milli Görüş* line, started in search of a more radical, Islamist movement rather than the confines of the conservative right; it embraced an anti-Western, anti-

capitalist and anti-Kemalist discourse.⁵⁵⁵ Whereas the discourse of the party programs and publications of the MNP and MSP utilized the concepts of democracy and individual rights and freedoms, these were only instrumental, used in order to legitimize their offer for an Islamic order. Democracy implied the right of the movement to be elected to office and an “integration of the state and society”. Rights and freedoms were understood as conditioned upon a societal (that is, Islamic) ethic. The demand for Constitutional reform on freedoms by the movement was limited to those articles about religious expression.⁵⁵⁶ These concepts were utilized mainly against the laicism of the regime, rather than a genuine interest for a new regime based on democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. In fact, democracy remained only in the rhetoric of the movement until the end of the RP period; neither in the internal organization of the movement nor in its alternative vision, could it be found.⁵⁵⁷

The RP, which has considered the West as the “other”, has suspected human rights as a means for unjustified intervention, without offering an alternative vision of the concept. In line with its general perception of international organizations as tools of Western imperialism - and supported by the public in face of exclusion of Turkey from enlargement process of the EU, the party rejected compliance with the human rights and democracy discourse of the organization. The leaders of the RP considered EU demands of political reform as revealing a “double standard” of the West towards Muslim countries.⁵⁵⁸ The practice of RP during government has been doubtful in terms of “sincerity” with democratic values and protection of human rights. It concentrated on human rights issues that concerned its voters the most, i.e., ban on the headscarf. For other related issues, it either showed rejection or remained inactive. For example, the party voted in favor of lifting of the immunities of DEP parliamentarians - thus helping the process of party closure and punishment of its leading cadre. Erbakan rejected the demand of observation by Amnesty International about the level of torture and inhumane treatment on the ground that the organization

⁵⁵⁵ Yavuz, “Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek,” 594.

⁵⁵⁶ Sarıbay, 577-583.

⁵⁵⁷ Çakır, 569.

⁵⁵⁸ Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği*, 47-48.

was “European-based”.⁵⁵⁹ It advocated an alternative legal system to the current secular one, modeled on *Medine Vesikası* - similar to Ottoman *millet* system - in which each religious community would be autonomous, governed by its own law. That would practically mean *sharia* for Muslims, most probably without freedom to chose a secular alternative.⁵⁶⁰

When religious communities are considered, the resentment to the state was not consistent among communities and periods. For instance, Kotku, the leader of İskenderpaşa community, aimed to transform his community into an influential movement through constitutional legitimacy during the 1970’s. The “positive attitude towards the state as an institution” remained in these decades.⁵⁶¹ Kotku has sought to take advantage of the democratic system of the day – considering his role/consent in the establishment of the MNP. What he aspired was a “theo-democracy”, meaning that the community should concentrate on building Islamic values in the society so that the people would aspire *sharia* themselves rather than being imposed to it unwillingly. The community took low profile and did not question the present regime openly.⁵⁶²

When the Nurcu community is considered, it should be noted that unlike Islamism generally postulates, Western political concepts were not rejected by Nursi himself. He actually advocated a liberal version of democracy as shown by his evaluation of state-society relationship presented above. He believed that the legitimacy of the state depended on its justice and adherence to the rule of law - provided that it was based on the will of the people. He criticized the one-party period of the Republic on these bases and he gave the example of the state during the first period of Islam which he believed to be a true republic. On these respects, his teachings are evaluated as compatible with democracy. He was against the exploitation of religion by politicians, but he thought that politics could serve

⁵⁵⁹Toprak, 175-176.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid., 182.

⁵⁶¹ Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” 158.

⁵⁶² Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?,” 38-39.

enhancement of religion - which he tried to practice in the more politicized periods of his lifetime.⁵⁶³

Despite the availability of both discourses in Nursi's legacy, serious opposition to the regime in terms of either its laicism or its democratic credentials was absent in the movement, during the Cold War. Preservation of the state against the communist threat dominated Nurcu mentality. In the post-Cold War context, this stance began to change. Nonetheless, open criticism of i.e., the role of the military was not yet present. For instance, Yeni Asya group withdrew its support from the DYP in 1990's, reasoning that its leader was a "threat to democracy", for the reason that he attacked the bureaucratic-military elite, which could intervene in politics.⁵⁶⁴

In Gülen's movement, The relationship between democracy and Islam has not been problematized in depth. Rather, democracy was utilized as a concept in favor of "believers", which form the majority in Turkey.⁵⁶⁵ Nonetheless, undemocratic character of the existing regime was not much questioned. The stance of Gülen community towards the February 28 process was at first in line with the Kemalist state elite; actually in public defense of the military. Gülen seemed to prioritize the well-being of his group before the freedom of other Islamic communities. Given that the movement was against the "instrumentalization of religion in politics", and that it disfavored the Islamic political line of *Milli Görüş*, this is understandable.⁵⁶⁶ When the process targeted itself in 1999, Gülen movement embraced a more consistent discourse on human rights and democracy. However, it should be noted that the internal organization of the movement is based on hierarchy and a "culture of obedience"; thus, there remains a source of doubt on its liberal qualities.⁵⁶⁷

Islamist intellectuals of the 1980's, inspired by the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world such as Ali Bulaç, disengaged from the traditional understanding of Islam. Moving further than the *Milli Görüş* line, these intellectuals have opted to:

⁵⁶³ Metin Karabaşoğlu, "Said Nursi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 281-286.

⁵⁶⁴ Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?," 39-40.

⁵⁶⁵ Yavuz, "Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi," 300-302; "Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen," 601.

⁵⁶⁶ Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen," 602.

⁵⁶⁷ Yavuz, "Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi," 305-306.

“...reconstruct Islam for a reimagined Islamic community...”.⁵⁶⁸ Their ideological disposition strictly rejected the political systems and concepts of Western modernity. Accordingly, concepts such as democracy and human rights were opposed to and excluded from the discourse of 1980’s Islamists.⁵⁶⁹

When the February 28 process stressed the secular-Kemalist principles and marginalized political Islam through practices such as imprisonments of and political bans on Islamist politicians, closure of the RP and strict control over other Islamically oriented organizations, the discourse of Islamism made a radical shift towards the advocacy of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as part of the rapprochement with the West. As stated above, the main reason for EU-support among Turkish Islamists seems to be the belief that the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria and anchoring Turkey in the EU would guarantee the rights and freedoms denied to this segment of society by the Kemalist authority. In this respect, both reduction of the role of the military according to the demands of the EU, and enhancement of human rights and rule of law, have become cornerstones in the discourse of “post-Islamists”⁵⁷⁰.

The SP, successor of the RP-FP, embraced a pro-EU stance and sought alliance with liberal pro-Western circles in the country. In this period, *Milli Görüş* sharply criticized the role of the military in politics through democratic criteria; those who used to call the EU as a “Christian club”, now called for compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. This shift may well be demonstrated by Erbakan’s application to the ECHR against the Turkish court’s judgment to ban him from politics.⁵⁷¹ The interference by the EU in Turkish political system through democratic conditionality was suddenly sought for, rather than judged as mirroring imperialism⁵⁷². The group within *Milli Görüş* who would establish the AKP, especially embraced the discourse of democracy and human rights, against the political power of the Kemalist state

⁵⁶⁸ Dağı, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,” 138.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 137-138.

⁵⁷⁰ Dağı, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization,” 30-32.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 27-29.

⁵⁷² Çakır, 573.

elite.⁵⁷³ In fact, the AKP government has been the most eager for acceleration of harmonization with the EU on the area of human rights. Solely in 2003, four of the seven packages of EU-based reform since the issuing of the first National Program, were passed through the parliament.⁵⁷⁴ Among these was the Constitutional amendment related to the civilianization of the NSC, which could not be openly contested by the military because of the traditional commitment to EU membership; the discourse of “natural result of our modernization process” used before by Kemalists, became the new rhetoric of the self-acclaimed “conservative democrat” AKP, which delegitimizes contestment to EU-based reforms.⁵⁷⁵

Islamist intellectuals as well, sought this alliance with the EU scheme of democracy and human rights after 1997; they abandoned the Islamist critique of the Western terminology of rights and started to demand a “genuinely liberal democratic regime”.⁵⁷⁶ These “post-Islamist” - or “new Muslim” as named by others⁵⁷⁷ - intellectuals, as reflected in various Islamic journals of the 1990’s, started to make an internal critique of the Islamic movement itself and shifted their discursive tone from the “Muslim community” to the “Muslim individual”⁵⁷⁸. Mazlum-Der, an Islamic NGO which was founded in 1991 with an Islamic human rights perspective - in fact, the first human rights organization established by “Muslims”⁵⁷⁹ - increasingly approached the Western/liberal-democratic conceptualization of human rights protecting the individual from state pressure.⁵⁸⁰ In short, not only the *Milli Görüş*, but also the most Islamic circles have aimed at a liberal Islamic discourse, embraced the concepts such as democracy, human rights and rule of law as principles. However,

⁵⁷³ Yavuz, “Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek,” 600-603.

⁵⁷⁴ Akdoğan, 625.

⁵⁷⁵ William Hale, “Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts,” *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 2005): 305.

⁵⁷⁶ Dağı, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,” 138-139.

⁵⁷⁷ See Meeker.

⁵⁷⁸ Kentel, 723.

⁵⁷⁹ Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” 226.

⁵⁸⁰ Bahattin Akşit, Ayşe Serdar and Bahar Tabakoğlu. “İslami Eğilimli Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 672-675; Bora, Peker and Sancar, 335.

this shift was found to be suspicious and insincere by the non-Islamists and the social base of the Islamists were argued to have found this shift hard to accommodate.⁵⁸¹

In terms of human rights, freedom of religious expression has been the most voiced critique of Turkish Islamism of the Kemalist regime. Islamists have opposed to the limitations on the public expression of religious belief especially through the body - expressed as discontent with the Kemalist reforms on clothing, symbolized with the demand for the freedom to use *türban* since the 1980's - and other forms of expression, along with limitations on the forming and activities of religion-based organizations. Such discontent with the regime has been expressed by mainstream Islamic circles mainly through criticism of it by a rhetoric of freedom for religion rather than an open call for *sharia*. However, the discursive style for advocating this freedom had been Islamic, rather than western/modern. For instance, women's wearing of the headscarf in the public space was defended from the perspective of religious duty, obligations of women towards God. This may be seen for example, in the former writings of Taşgetiren and Bulaç. In the post-February 28 period, Islamists' resistance to the ban on the headscarf became based on the universal human rights scheme, through the principles of non-discrimination and right to education (since the most popularized protest to the ban is about university – considered as included in the public space by the state - education). Cases were brought to the ECHR, like Erbakan's political ban. Besides looking for Western jurisdiction against the state, "post-Islamists" also suggested to Kemalists, the solution to the problem through "social consensus" - which is also a modern, liberal-democratic notion rather than Islamic.⁵⁸²

As noted by Toprak, the gender issue determines the "fault line" between secularism and Islamism, as well as between liberal democracy and Islamism. Discourse of Islamic identity is first and foremost on morality and Islamic morality demarcates the sexes; it dictates women's invisibility in the public space through covering and physical segregation. On the other hand, liberal democracy - of the EU in this case - is first and foremost about individual's choice over his/her life. Considering that the dominant understanding of Islam has the basic morality

⁵⁸¹ Çakır, 572.

⁵⁸² Dağı, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey," 141-142.

discriminating the sexes, Islam makes an impossible ground for the liberal understanding of human rights which has to be secular in the end⁵⁸³. When approached this way, that is, as a discriminative obligation rather than a right, *türban* becomes a proof to the incompatibility of Islamism with human rights. When Islamists' - whether post-Islamist or not, lack of support to the rights of others is taken into account, one may doubt the consistency in their new attitude embracing Western/universal political systems and rights.

For instance, Gülen movement has been supportive of globalization, democratization and enhancement of individual rights since the mid-1990. However, despite the fact that it remained generally tolerant to difference than other religious communities and democrat in attitude, Gülen community remained uncritical about human rights abuses towards the non-Islamists; i.e., the Turkish left. The stance of Gülen movement on gender equality has also remained confined to the general Islamic discourse which discriminates between the sexes. The dominant theme in its discourse on human rights and democracy remained to be freedom of religious expression inhibited by secularism of the regime.⁵⁸⁴ On the other hand, a part of AKP program was dedicated to human rights, including the rights of women. The party declared to respect non-discrimination of the sexes.⁵⁸⁵

These may represent the limits to the recent shift of attitude. Nonetheless, the general outlook of mainstream Turkish Islamism remains to be tolerant, if not supportive, of a regime characterized by democracy and human rights with the motivation provided by the EU. After all, the post-February 28 alliance made with the Western or pro-Western forces (i.e., Turkish liberals) require tolerance for the rights for the non-Muslims as well, therefore serving for a more genuine support for democratic pluralism.⁵⁸⁶

One approach to the “democratization” of Turkish Islamism is worth noting. According to Yavuz, the February 28 process did not turn Turkish Islamists pro-EU, pro-democracy and pro-human rights all at once. In his view, the transformation of

⁵⁸³ Toprak, 169, 183, 189.

⁵⁸⁴ Yavuz, “Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi,” 300-302; “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen,” 601.

⁵⁸⁵ Toprak, 183.

⁵⁸⁶ Tekin and Akgün, 663.

Islamism had started with the post-1980 liberalization environment in the country. February 28 intervention and the following process of controlling and criminalizing of all political, economic and educational activities by the state, only intensified their process of inclination towards democracy and human rights which came to be seen as guaranteed by the EU.⁵⁸⁷ Such contention would result in a perception of the post-Islamist stance as more rooted, thus promising.

4.4. 1.1. Discourses of Islamist Intellectuals on Democracy and Human Rights

Both Bulaç and Taşgetiren seem to have employed a new discourse of human rights during the late 1990's, in line with the general scheme presented above. They both have hoped positive developments on freedoms of Muslims through EU-based reforms, although without immediate support. They have kept their suspicion which has remained from the previous discourse of either “double standard of West”, or “incompatibility of Western concepts with Islam” . In response to developments revealing European approach to religious expression through the headscarf, Bulaç returned to the prioritization of “religious duty-incompatibility” aspect, Taşgetiren returned to his older rhetoric of “double standard of the West”. However, it has been the contention of both writers that the EU-based reforms for democratization, especially about the reduction of the role of the military in politics, are very fruitful.

4.4. 1.1.1. The Views of Ali Bulaç on Democracy and Human Rights

The attitude of Bulaç towards democracy and human rights is based on his desire for the creation of a regime respecting the freedom of Muslims, which he believes is non-existent, neither in the Kemalist regime nor in other Muslim nation-states. His position is that the logical conclusion of the nation-state as a “modern” political system, is incompatible with democracy. For Bulaç, as he stated in 1999, Muslims have the problem of overcoming “a homogenous and totalitarian conception of the world under the effect of the universalist rationalist enlightenment” on the way for a pluralistic democracy respecting differences.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁷ Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” 225-226.

⁵⁸⁸ Ali Bulaç, “Akıl Ve Vicdan ile Demokratik Kamusalılık,” *Zaman*, December 7, 1999.

The present political regime in Turkey can only be classified as “totalitarian democracy” because although the formal outlook is democratic, the “official ideology” of the state, which cannot even be questioned according to its Constitution, is above and in control of everything.⁵⁸⁹ He holds that the secularity and “nationness” in this model, disable the potential for a society whereby differences, multiple identities may coexist. Especially the trait of laicism, as experienced in Turkey, turns the regime into an “Enlightened despotism” because it sacrifices democracy in the name of laicism.⁵⁹⁰ Even before 1997, he put similar ideas forward. For instance, in 1995, in addition to the natural result of lack of democracy he deduced from the general scheme of the modern state, Bulaç argued that Turkey suffers from undemocratic practices because of its national security ideology, which continuously addresses threats to the regime from inside and outside; therefore it legitimizes oppression.⁵⁹¹

On the other hand, Islam - although carefully stated that it is incompatible with the historical meaning of democracy - has the potential to breed a “democratic rule”. Here, Bulaç means by democracy, a way of government whereby the general will of the people, instead of the elite, determines politics. He gives reference to concepts like *şura* and experiences like *Medine Vesikası* to refute the argument that Islam is a totalitarian religion - because it brings norms to every area of life⁵⁹², as well as excerpts from Quran, such as *surat Bakara*, dictating that there is no enforcement in religion.⁵⁹³ He argues that the contemporary Islamists only duplicate the mistake of today’s anti-Islamic political elite. They try to have the control of the state as a reaction to the pressures they have faced. What is needed instead, is a genuinely Islamic model of the state where an alternative “social contract” will be made. This is found by Bulaç, in the model of *Medine Vesikası*.⁵⁹⁴ With this model - resembling the Ottoman *millet* system, Bulaç advocates a society made up of multiple “legal communities”; in which free individuals choose to be part of communities which are

⁵⁸⁹ Ali Bulaç, “Türkiye’nin ‘Totaliter Demokrasi’si,” *Zaman*, July 28, 2003.

⁵⁹⁰ Ali Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet*, 49-55, 63-66.

⁵⁹¹ Ali Bulaç, *Modernizm, İrtica ve Sivilleşme* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1995), 88-89.

⁵⁹² For an example of such reasoning, which concludes as liberal democracy is not possible in an Islamic state, see Toprak, 168-169.

⁵⁹³ Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet*, 56-57, 88-89, 131.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 271.

free to chose their law. By granting autonomy to different identities, Bulaç aims to provide a “peaceful coexistence”, instead of a system of homogenization and assimilation like experienced in the nation-state model.⁵⁹⁵

Developments above and below the nation-state by globalization, provides new opportunities for Bulaç. Even if the practice on the model of *Medine Vesikası* may be a dream, the EU, with its pluralistic, liberal democracy; with its insistence on the guarantee for a civil society free of government intervention, work for the advantage of Muslims in solving their problems with the regime.⁵⁹⁶ He advocates Muslim activities in the civil society. He solves the problem of justifying this “Western” concept by saying that the civil society means the space for *umma*, beyond the authority of the state, and led by the *ulema* - meaning those who profess Islam rather than an official title. He says that Muslims should wage a “civil” struggle through their religious orders and communities for their rights.⁵⁹⁷

For Bulaç, the state elite is the principle obstacle to democracy and rule of law in Turkey. Therefore, he expects the membership process forthcoming in 1999, with its preconditions as respect to human rights and democracy, to be to the advantage of reform as desired in Turkey. He explains this position as follows:

The bureaucracy comprised of appointed high rank officials, is the main obstacle to a political and administrative structure which is line with the primacy of law. A group which holds the state apparatus, can suspend even the most fundamental and innocent rights of people; can limit freedoms of thought, belief, association and expression as it wills. In such a country, the main problem is people to be respected by the state individually and as groups; receive immediate help from the state on occasions of disasters; in short, it is that everybody in this country is perceived worth the fundamental rights and freedoms which the whole civilized world considers important.⁵⁹⁸

Commenting on the concepts of rights and duties in Islam, Bulaç says that they are vague from the viewpoint of Islam. While the EU expects developments about human rights with the candidacy status, it is important to clarify the relationship between these concepts; since, Bulaç argues, that Islam provides the “principle cultural code” of the people in Turkey.⁵⁹⁹ Although it is frequently said by Islamic

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid., 134-139.

⁵⁹⁶ Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 210-211.

⁵⁹⁷ Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet*, 250; Bulaç, interview by Kenan Alpay, *Haksöz*. 171, (June 2005), 9.

⁵⁹⁸ Ali Bulaç, “AB’nin Önündeki Engel,” *Zaman*, October 19, 1999.

⁵⁹⁹ Ali Bulaç, “Haklar mı? Ödevler mi?,” *Zaman*, December 14, 1999.

scholars that in Islam, duties (to God, first and those that arise from religious rules) are prior to rights; Bulaç believes that they are interrelated. The freedom of the self and fundamental rights are irrenouncable for fulfilling religious duties. Bulaç reminds that contemporary period has an agenda for individuals and groups to "...enlarge their free civil space against the state...". Although absolutist states in the past and historical practice of Islamic states have prioritized person's duties towards the state, Islam's part in the reasoning for this view is contestable.⁶⁰⁰ He continues as follows:

Muslims cannot live the religious life without having these fundamental rights and freedoms; they cannot fulfill their duties towards *Allah*, living nature, other people, their own families and self-existence. For this reason, Islamic struggle is a struggle of rights and freedoms and this struggle should be given for those with different religions or other philosophical-secular ideas and attitudes.⁶⁰¹

Among those who have a transformed idea of Christian salvation, that is, self-mission by the West to show the right way to the non-West, are human rights defenders. What lies beneath the stated aim of help, is a sediment of colonialist frame of mind for Bulaç. According to this line of thinking, the non-Westerners are underdeveloped and they need to be instructed on what is right. For Bulaç, they are unaware of different conceptions. He disapproves this perception of Western human rights organizations of Turkish human rights adherents as students whom they could tutor in the way they believe what is right - i.e., justness of women's human rights that counter Islamic morality. He also contests the "conceptual and financial aid" given to Turkish NGO's for this end.⁶⁰²

Commenting on the draft Penal Code which would be prepared in accordance with EU law, he states that the reforms related to freedom of expression are of no use because of a traditional practice in Turkish legislation. According to this practice, whenever a code limiting the right is annulled, another hidden one is found and put into practice, unless another one which means the same or worse is drafted elsewhere. In the past, when Articles 141, 142 and 163 were annulled, 312 and 159 were used in place. Therefore, the Turkish Penal Code is "...like a mine-field.". For

⁶⁰⁰ Ali Bulaç, "Özgürlük, Hak ve Ödev," *Zaman*, December 16, 1999.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

⁶⁰² Ali Bulaç, "Başöğretmen," *Zaman*, 8 November 2002; interview by Kenan Alpay, *Haksöz* 171, (June 2005), 12-13.

Bulaç, the new draft carries the tone of 1980 mentality, which "...protects not the 'human' but the state; the power of public authority which is determined to take root everywhere.". Worst situation is with the term "threat", added to the former "force and violence" to the expression of those ideas which are aimed at "changing the constitutional order". It will terminate any freedom in his view. Another article, limiting the rights of religious functionaries, is discriminatory in his view.⁶⁰³ In a following article, he states that there is no reform as foreseen by the EU in this draft. He believes it to be prepared by the bureaucracy whose mentality and interest lie at preserving the undemocratic aspects of the regime; against the will of people reflected at the parliament.⁶⁰⁴

While approving EU demands on freedom of expression of ideas, Bulaç has had mixed contentions about EU's desire and ability to protect the right of the visibility of religious belief in the public space. In some articles, he stated expectation from the EU. He said in 2001, that the EU membership prospect provided Turkish Muslims a definite opportunity to gain their freedom of expressing religious belief. The EU scheme seemed fit for Bulaç to provide Turkey with a rule of law guaranteeing these rights long denied by the Turkish nation-state.⁶⁰⁵ However, he kept in doubt of the expression of belief - i.e., through the *türban* - in the public space from EU viewpoint. He says that there is no uniformity in practice by the EU members.⁶⁰⁶

In his article named as "Ban on the Headscarf", Bulaç defined the headscarf as a symbol utilized by different interest groups on their polarization about the identity of Turkey, a process intensified after 1980 coup. He found the tension around headscarf to have a cost of retarding Turkey on its way, and stated that he sees the headscarf only as an issue about the utilization of a fundamental freedom.⁶⁰⁷

Three years later, commenting on the ECHR ruling that justified Turkish states' ban on the wearing of *türban* in the public space, he left his discourse of human rights and fundamental freedoms in a rather apologetic manner to the Islamic

⁶⁰³ Ali Bulaç, "Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı," *Zaman*, September 13, 2004.

⁶⁰⁴ Ali Bulaç, "Tasarımın Felsefesi Ve Siyaseti," *Zaman*, September 15, 2004.

⁶⁰⁵ Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 128-129, 145.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 115-116.

⁶⁰⁷ Ali Bulaç, "Başörtüsü Yasağı," *Zaman*, November 26, 2002.

community. He stated that human rights is not a proper category for Muslims and that seeking justice or “mercy” in the ECHR was a mistake from the beginning in the following words:

The West makes a definition of the human being. It addresses certain rights to this person it had defined... If you have chosen to be a servant of God instead of being an individual, you don't have a good place in the category of rights... In that respect, the headscarf is not a human right... the fault lies in those who said at first that “it is a Western club” and then took their cases to the ECHR, the fault lies in those who carried a religious duty to the ECHR. If we had made a semantic intervention to the concept of human rights and had transformed it, this would not happen... A religious duty is determined by God. No court, parliament of ECHR can say [whether or not it is a duty]. And Muslims, cannot say: “This is a human right, a democratic right.” When they say that, they transform their religion [which is of course, wrong].⁶⁰⁸

Commenting on this ECHR decision against the freedom to use the headscarf in public space elsewhere, Bulaç says that Sunnites feel that Europe has double standard for freedoms. However, those who are disillusioned, are yet unaware of the reality that it is a result of a deeply imbedded attitude of Europe towards Islam. Islam is perceived by the West as a threat to modernity; accordingly, it is only natural that Europe does not include religious rights of Muslims in its ideal human rights scheme.⁶⁰⁹ After these events, Bulaç could more readily voice his doubts that an egalitarian relationship with the EU can happen automatically. In another article about religious rights and the demand by the Turkish society to live religiosity in the social and public space, Bulaç states that these demands might find no response within EU law. He believes that there is always a danger for Europe to assimilate and colonize Turkey. Accordingly, he suspected the EU to disregard any connection between its criteria of rights and the demands resulting from Turkey's own cultural-religious peculiarity; something which is worse than the limitations forged by the defenders of state ideology in Turkey.⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁸ Ali Bulaç, interview by Kenan Alpaya, *Haksöz* 171, (June 2005), 16-17. Also see Ali Bulaç, “AİHM'nin yetkisi,” *Zaman*, 10 July 2004.

⁶⁰⁹ Ali Bulaç, “Zor Süreç,” *Zaman*, November 3, 2004.

⁶¹⁰ Ali Bulaç, “Zihniyet Farkı,” *Zaman*, November 6, 2004.

4.4. 1.1.2. The views of Ahmet Taşgetiren on Democracy and Human Rights

Taşgetiren's approach to the issues of democracy and human rights has been in line with his general dichotomization of West versus Muslim parts of the world and Westernist versus Muslim parts of the Turkish society. Taşgetiren has been writing on the problems of democracy and freedom before the Helsinki decision. About the issue of democracy and human rights, his focus was determined by his concern for those devout Muslims who want Islamization in the country. In his books printed in the 1990's, the major theme has been the state-society relationship. He has been critical of the regime by saying that it is authoritarian, for the reason that it is strictly laicist and therefore alien to its people.

Taşgetiren's publications reveal that he had a position similar to that of Islamism in general, in his avoidance of the concepts of democracy and human rights because these are "Western" terms. Instead of these, he frequently used terms as "oppression by the state", "people's will" and "freedoms". The reason for his avoidance is revealed in *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*. There, Taşgetiren argued that the post-Cold War Western policy of promoting democracy to the Muslim world was only a means to hamper the rise of Islamic politics. He stated that the West wanted to guarantee the silence of Islamism by pushing Muslim state governments for softening their laicism and guaranteeing a degree of freedom for religion. Thus, these states would go on implementing conditions related to solely Western interests - thus, contrary to those of Islam, while Muslims' reactions would be tamed.⁶¹¹ Thus, it becomes clear that he disapproved of the terminology because he believed these concepts to be utilized by the West as part of its project of weakening Turkey - and other Muslim countries. And this project is not only of the post-Cold War era, it has a longer history. He said in 1991 that while Lausanne Agreement guaranteed the rights of the small non-Muslim population, by the pressure of the West during deliberations, the rights of the Muslims, who are the majority, is treated on the contrary. In fact, Turkey's Muslims became like a minority in this country.⁶¹² In that view, he is in line with the ideas of Bulaç.

⁶¹¹ Taşgetiren, *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*, 39-40.

⁶¹² Taşgetiren, *Sistem Sancısı*, 91.

For Taşgetiren, the problem lied in the authoritarian regime, in which a small Westernist elite try to control the people through usage of the army, judiciary and bureaucracy⁶¹³. This is seen in the Constitution-making practice in Turkey's history, whereby a group of people determine the rules without concern on, and consent of the rest of the people⁶¹⁴. As the ideology of the Republic caused reforms to erode the Ottoman identity centered on religion, with a strict program of its understanding of laicism - which does not divorce state and religion but it divorces society from religion - therefore becoming alien to its own people. He criticizes Ottoman⁶¹⁵ and Republican reformists alike, and he accuses them of being “collaborators” who made Turkey subservient to Western domination⁶¹⁶. He argues that the Kemalist elite's fear of Islam resulted in an authoritarian regime aided by the West.⁶¹⁷

On the role of military in politics, he stated in 1994, that the problem is not the power of the military. Rather, it is the power of the Kemalist/Westernist ideology that dominates the military as an institution, thus making it a guardian of this alien regime – “for the people against the people”.⁶¹⁸ In 2000, he contends that the national security understanding of the military as revealed in the renewed National Military Security Concept - stating that *sharia* is the primary threat to internal security. According to such a perception of internal security, the Kemalist ideology once again points at believers as the “internal enemy”. As *sharia* is a vague concept, as in one meaning, can encompass all the believers, it will definitely lead to “human rights abuses” which would alienate the people more from the state.⁶¹⁹

However, Taşgetiren's evaluations of the EU demands about changing the role of the military in politics in the post-Helsinki period, has been of approval - despite his former attitude of suspicion. Before 2000 Nice Summit, Taşgetiren points at a report prepared by NSC including “politicization of PKK” and evaluation of the EU demands on Kurdish rights as a support to the PKK, as a “dimension of terrorism”, in

⁶¹³ Ibid., 171.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 99.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., 19-35.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., 145-146.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 154-165; *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*, 45-46.

⁶¹⁸ Ahmet Taşgetiren, *Laiklik Çıkmazı* (İstanbul: Erkam Yayınları, 1994), 203-208.

⁶¹⁹ Taşgetiren, *Müslüman ve Sistem Tartışmaları*, 134.

its contents. He states that the timing of this report shows that even if the government searches rapprochement, the military shows the government and public that it is opposed to the EU in the present situation, especially when one considers the EU insistence on the reduction of the institution's own role in politics.⁶²⁰ Taşgetiren mentions the discrepancies between the first APD and the National Program; namely, the status of the NSC, the limitations to the freedom of thought and expression, the use of Kurdish language. For him, the reason seems the weight of the NSC on these issues, because the discourse of the document repeats the precondition of accordance with "laicism" and "the unitary structure of the state" in using the rights. Taşgetiren evaluates this in connection with the state ideology trying to control the society as if a potential enemy. The fear stems from the perception of the society's relationship with religion and self-description of some with Kurdish identity; both contrary to this ideology. The result is a state denying people fundamental freedoms, creating a bad image outside Turkey. For Taşgetiren, reforms are needed not for entering the EU, but for the people of Turkey, the own citizens of its state.⁶²¹ In 1993, Taşgetiren states similarly, that the present structure of the NSC makes it "...look like an alternative government."⁶²² . Article 35 of the internal service code of the army gives it legitimacy for intervention in case of serious threat to the Republic, since it grants the duty of "protecting and watching for the Republic". Whereas the EU candidacy requires a reduction in the current power of the military as approved by the people as well; the institution is reluctant for it. The reason behind this problem is the inconfidence of the state elite to its people. However, the current structure, apart from alienating the army from the public, poses an anachronistic and undemocratic picture.⁶²³

For Taşgetiren, human rights as understood by the West, was not an acceptable scheme for Muslims until the late 1990's. In 1991, he asked: Who is this human, subject of human rights? Who defines these rights? Who prepares the framework of law and brings these rights to life? For Taşgetiren's understanding of Islam - in fact very common among Islamists of the world – the human being is the creation of

⁶²⁰ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "İlginç Zamanlama," *Yeni Şafak*, December 9, 2000.

⁶²¹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Ulusal Program'daki Sorunlu Alan," *Yeni Şafak*, March 20, 2001.

⁶²² Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Zihni Altyapıyı Değiştirmek," *Yeni Şafak*, June 20, 2003.

⁶²³ Ibid.

God, who determines the rules by which s/he will live; not a set of rules decided by some of the human beings in history. As a Western-liberal concept, human rights have a secular base. They connote a human being who is a *tabula rasa*, being free of any connection with his creator. For Taşgetiren, human nature was violent. Human beings would use force against each other, unless controlled by the rules of God. Answering to the question of who will set the rules to practice human rights, he sees a group of non-believers, setting a body of law which has more potential to suppress another group of people rather than guaranteeing rights for all. He views the application of rights and freedoms as discriminatory and selective; biased towards the strong groups in the society as exemplified by the US system. For Taşgetiren, human rights is a disguise of the immoral and unjust system of the West through a rhetoric of individual freedoms of all. With these in mind, he argues that the prescription of human happiness and social harmony projected by the universal human rights scheme, is only a utopia. If one looks for humanity, Taşgetiren's suggestion is that s/he should come to the Islamic faith.⁶²⁴

However, his disapproval of human rights and related law seems to have changed by the year 2000. In the foreword to his book *Müslüman ve Sistem Tartışmaları*, he stated:

The age is one of which human rights, democracy, rule of law, primacy of law are upheld as a primary aim.
And human rights stand as the first rule in Turkey's international relations.
Turkey has to solve this problem; may it be because of improving state-society relationship; since it is the duty of the state to guarantee everybody, to happily enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms..., or because of taking advantage of international relations [through the positive image created as a country properly respecting human rights].⁶²⁵

He believes that most people feel offended by the belief that Turkey needs foreign assistance for its development; the past 150 years have passed by the West giving Turkey homework and tests, then stating that it has failed. But the reality stands for itself, in those 150 years, Turkey could not become a modern democratic state by itself. While Turkey has been talking about the existence of human rights since the Ottoman period, it cannot meet the criteria even today.⁶²⁶ The role of the

⁶²⁴ Taşgetiren, *Sistem Sancısı*, 286-295.

⁶²⁵ Taşgetiren, *Müslüman ve Sistem Tartışmaları*.

⁶²⁶ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "İç Dinamik-Dış Dinamik," *Yeni Şafak*, December 14, 2002.

international society, is no longer perceived as an obstacle, but as an area of opportunity for a regime of freedom, by Taşgetiren. For example, he approves of EU stance on human rights reforms in Turkey, as revealed in one article that states that the EU is right in waiting for the actual practices of legal reforms before appreciating them, because these do not usually happen in Turkey.⁶²⁷

As an Islamist, Taşgetiren focuses on religious freedoms. In his writings before 1999, he had criticized the Constitutions of the country in terms of freedoms, but he remained selective among fundamental freedoms. He said that while those rights appropriate for and demanded by the nation are limited, those rights which "...the nation is afraid to degenerate its structure..." are guaranteed⁶²⁸. For Taşgetiren, then, Europe had been imposing its cultural criteria – Christianity – of being European on Turkey, and this was translated to Turkish state policy on religious freedoms⁶²⁹. He stated that the reason of the curbing of religious freedoms in the Constitution is the current laicism and elite fear of Islam⁶³⁰, as well as European pressure. In 2002, he repeated the theme, that one of the main problems of Turkey is related to the human condition; people are deprived of their fundamental rights because of the official mentality of distrust to one's own people. The repercussions of this mentality prevails in the judiciary as well, according to Taşgetiren, since people are still convicted for using their freedom of expression although laws limiting it are annulled.⁶³¹

What Taşgetiren means by freedom of expression, is usually related to the limits put on expression of religious thought and belief. His criticism of double standard on Western-based reform - meaning that rights of the Muslims are excluded - continued after Helsinki. For example, during the public debate on the Article 312 of the Penal Code limiting the freedom of expression, he argues that this is only one of the many human rights abuses in the country which is undemocratic especially since February 28. He criticizes Europe for remaining silent on the "February 28 mentality" and expresses his worry that Europe in fact might be interested in only

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Ahmet Taşgetiren, *Sistem Sancısı*, 99.

⁶²⁹ Ibid., 83.

⁶³⁰ Ahmet Taşgetiren, *Laiklik Çıkmazı*, 83-84.

⁶³¹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "İç Dinamik-Dış Dinamik".

those changes that would weaken the country; the label of “political Islam” might be used to ignore demands of freedom by Muslims. He thinks that this issue is a “sincerity test” for the EU.⁶³²

For Taşgetiren, the headscarf, as an issue of fundamental freedoms, is ignored in the preparation of reform packages for EU membership, because Turkish elite does these reforms for entering the EU, not for Turkey and they are confident because the EU has no demands concerning freedom of belief.⁶³³ Whereas the military perceives the headscarf as a political symbol, Taşgetiren argues that it is not perceived as such by the majority of the society, referring to academic studies on the issue. As the people do not oppose the use of it at the public space, so should the military, Taşgetiren believes, if it does not want to oppose its own people.⁶³⁴

For Taşgetiren, the European countries too, are inconsistent and insincere about human rights regarding religious belief. While the headscarf can be banned with no contestment, on the basis of it being a “...religious symbol which may lead to discriminative practices in public duties...”, when it comes to removing Christian religious symbols from the public space, clashes occur. Same mentality of discriminatory laicism are exemplified in the decisions of ECHR and the silence of EU Commission only about religious rights in its reports for Turkey.⁶³⁵

4.4.2. The Islamist Discourse on Minority Rights

As the imagination of the nation as *umma* rather than an ethnic definition is prevalent in the Islamism of Turkey, one would assume that political Islam provides an ideology which embraces the Kurds of Turkey who are predominantly Muslim, rather than marginalizing them - unlike the type of nationalism forged by the Kemalist regime. However, this stance also speaks by itself as against recognition of the Kurds as a minority. The mainstream political Islam, represented by *Milli Görüş*, gives reference to the same Ottoman past with some Kemalists who defend the

⁶³² Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Hasan Celal Güzel,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 16, 1999.

⁶³³ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Çıkarıcı Damarımız,” *Yeni Şafak*, March 22, 2001.

⁶³⁴ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Asker ve Başörtüsü,” *Yeni Şafak*, November 29, 2002.

⁶³⁵ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Başörtüsü, Haç, Kippa, vs...,” *Yeni Şafak*, November 8, 2003.

Lausanne discourse of the state - which treated both Kurds and Turks as one nation bonded by Islam, where they believed that the society lived in harmony.

Islamism has become a popular form of reaction by the Kurdish population who were displaced from the Southeast and opposed both to the discourse of the state and to the practices of the PKK - to the advantage of the RP. Radical Islamist groups such as the *Hizbullah* even engaged in armed clashes with the PKK.⁶³⁶ Although Kemalism, as opposed by Islamism, may have a hegemonic understanding of the nation, there is no guarantee that Islamism would not create its own hegemonic discourse against alternative ideologies such as Kurdish nationalism. The actual demands for recognition of minority status and cultural identity by other Kurds, translated to an EU policy of pressure, has met with silence if not reaction from Islamic political parties.

AKP, as the former *Milli Görüş* parties, showed no sign of an acknowledgement of separate identities from that of the “nation”; it omits ethnic or sectarian differences within the society. Accordingly, the AKP prepared no program directed to accommodate the Kurdish and Alevi segments of the society to the system.⁶³⁷ The party program declared that it was committed to the maintenance of the unitary structure of the state; despite admitting that there is a Kurdish problem, the program focused on cultural rights for solution⁶³⁸. With EU based reforms, the party sought to resolve the Kurdish question without giving reference to it as the EU did. Rather, the general process of democratization was assumed to resolve the issue.⁶³⁹ When in government, the party assumed the enhancement of cultural rights of minorities in the revised National Program of 2003, without mentioning the terms “Kurd” or “minority”. The planned reforms were presented in a discourse of “non-discrimination”.⁶⁴⁰

⁶³⁶ Murat Yılmaz, “Darbeler ve İslamcılık,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 638.

⁶³⁷ Yavuz, “Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhafif ve Modernist Gelenek,” 602.

⁶³⁸ Hale, “Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts,” 305. These rights , based on the principle of non-discrimination, were granted by legislative change much after AKP came to government, beginning in 2004.

⁶³⁹ Akdoğan, 631.

⁶⁴⁰ “Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı,” Decision No. 2003/5930, *Resmî Gazete* 25178 (Mükerrer), 24 July 2003, <<http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2003/07/20030724M1.htm>> (15 May 2005).

Nurcu community has not improved a consistent discourse about the rights of the Kurdish population. While those Kurdish Nurcus gathered around Med-Zehra Foundation - later split among themselves, stressed the Kurdish origin of Nursi and his projects regarding the Kurdish population⁶⁴¹ as justifications of their Kurdist-Islamic stance, others have been close to the discourse of the state nationalism.⁶⁴² For instance, Gülen movement has kept silent on cultural and political rights of the Kurds.⁶⁴³

Islamic civil society of the 1990's seem not to have reached any consensus about the EU-pressured reforms for the recognition and protection of Kurdish identity. While Hak-İş and Gökküşağı Platformu have opposed legislative reform for enabling broadcasting in Kurdish in similarity with the official position; Mazlum-Der did not. It has an outlook of a more liberal association, which defines itself as on the side of the people against state interference and it stresses its "NGO" character. Its leaders express the need for NGO's to be dissociated from the state. As they show tolerance towards difference in opinion and belief, most members of Mazlum-Der are against limitations on broadcasting in Kurdish.⁶⁴⁴

Despite all the variance, Turkish Islamists, as revealed by a recent study on Islamist intellectuals, meet at one common point; that the principle reason for the rise of Kurdish nationalism is the non-Islamic, ethnicist policies of the Kemalist elite which eroded the bonds between Turkish and Kurdish citizens⁶⁴⁵. Accordingly, the solution would be a less nationalistic, more Islamic state policy. This is the main viewpoint of Bulaç and Taşgetiren, as well.

⁶⁴¹ Actually, alternative views on the *Medreset-üz Zehra* project exists within the Nurcu community. For example, an article in *Köprü*, a periodical of the Yeni Asya community, states that it was not designed for the Kurdish population but for the integration of different peoples of the East, on the banner of Islamic faith to curb ethnic demands. See Ahmet Akgündüz, "Bediüzzaman'ın Tesbitleri Işığında Doğu ve Güneydoğu Hadiselerinin Gerçek Reçetesi," *Köprü* 46 (Spring 2004), <<http://www.koprudergisi.com/index.asp?Bolum=EskiSayilar&Goster=Yazi&YaziNo=148>> (20 May 2005).

⁶⁴² Yavuz, "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk," 292.

⁶⁴³ Yavuz, "Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi," 302.

⁶⁴⁴ Akşit, Serdar and Tabakoğlu, 672-675, 676-677.

⁶⁴⁵ See Ümit Cizre, "Kurdish Nationalism from an Islamist Perspective: The Discourses of Turkish Islamist Writers," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no. 1 (April 1998).

4.4.2.1. Discourses of Islamist Intellectuals on Minority Rights

The approach of these writers and Kemalists are strikingly similar in that all define the Lausanne framework as sufficient for non-Muslim minorities and disregard any problem on that area. When it comes to the Kurdish population, all are against minority status since they fear disintegration through separatism. All are suspicious of and against EU interference to the issue. The difference of the Islamist writers lie in the contention that the only fruitful solution to the Kurdish problem, would be Islamization. In other words, they emphasize commonality of Kurds with Turks in the Islamic identity they pre-suppose, after blaming the hegemonic discourse of Turkish secular nation-state for the problems of Kurds about identity.

4.4.2.1.1. The Views of Ali Bulaç on Minority Rights

As an Islamist, Bulaç is suspicious of the EU policy on non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. For Bulaç, there is no conception of ethnic minority in Islam, as reflected in the Lausanne Treaty. In this religion, only non-Muslims may be adhered a similar status to that of minority. Even in this case, as the Ottoman system is concerned, a guarantee for their autonomy was provided, they were not oppressed. In Islam, they may even take part in the decision-making apparatus if they are not fighting with Muslims of the polity. In the case of religious minorities, the EU has a “double standard”; Muslims within EU territory are deprived of the freedoms of belief, while non-Muslims in Turkey are expected to have more autonomy.⁶⁴⁶ In Bulaç’s mind, EU member states try to increase the Christian population through missionary activities for making use of these people as agents of EU interests on Turkey⁶⁴⁷. He states that the Kemalist elite also problematizes the issue because it is feared by the regime that more rights to these, would facilitate more demands from the “minoritized” majority of Muslims.⁶⁴⁸

For ethnic minorities, as he is against nationalism, Bulaç may be expected to be against rights for Kurds which are demanded by Kurdish nationalists. His general

⁶⁴⁶ Ali Bulaç, “İlerleme Raporu ve Azınlıklar,” *Zaman*, February 6, 2005.

⁶⁴⁷ Ali Bulaç, “Misyonerlik ve Azınlıklar,” *Zaman*, February 5, 2005.

⁶⁴⁸ Ali Bulaç, “Kemalistler Neden Misyonerleri Sevmez?,” *Zaman*, February 21, 2005.

view is that as well as racism and xenophobia, ethnic and other types of separatism are important problems of the world today. He says that during the era of empires before nationalism, as exhibited by the experience of the *millet* system of the Ottomans, many different ethnic and religious communities coexisted within a society. What provoked these movements again, are the totalitarian and oppressive policies of the nation-state, exemplified by the Turkish case. In this picture, the idea of *umma* can reconcile many differences.⁶⁴⁹ What happens to different ethnicities within the *umma*? For Bulaç, history is not void of practices in which they enjoy their cultural identity freely. He states that Turkey, as a heir of the Ottomans, is a cultural mosaic; with multiple religious and ethnic identities. What caused the ethnic revolts during the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, was the centralist policies of the modernizing nation-state.⁶⁵⁰

For Bulaç, Kurdish nationalism in Turkey only follows Turkish nationalism - which he of course, disapproves - in its development of ways of defining and building an identity. On this process of identity formation, “deviation of the historical realities” such as seen in the use of *Nevruz*, is common. For Bulaç, Kurds should not forget their Islamic identity which they share with other segments in Turkey.⁶⁵¹ Noting the regional socio-economic disparities governing the Southeast⁶⁵², and the oppressive policies during PKK terrorism⁶⁵³, Bulaç argues that the tradition of “civil Islamic education institutions” and the accommodative policies of *Milli Görüş* line until AKP government, had provided Islamic belief for Kurds, which could have solved their problem of marginalization and moral loss exacerbated by PKK actions. For Bulaç, the Kurdish problem is not as simple as to be solved by granting cultural rights.⁶⁵⁴

Since he is against the prioritization of a separate identity of by the Kurds, and that he sees the problem as to be solved within the country by Islamic politics - which would naturally be non-discriminative unlike the practice of the homogenizing

⁶⁴⁹ Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet*, 14-18.

⁶⁵⁰ Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 39.

⁶⁵¹ Ali Bulaç, “Nevruz Hurafesi,” *Zaman*, March 24, 2001.

⁶⁵² Ali Bulaç, “Güneydoğu’da Manzara,” *Zaman*, July 3, 2004.

⁶⁵³ Ali Bulaç, “Güneydoğu’nun Değişen Nüfus Yapısı,” *Zaman*, October 2, 2004.

⁶⁵⁴ Ali Bulaç, “Güneydoğu’da Manzara”; “Güneydoğu’nun Psikolojisi,” *Zaman*, October 6, 2004.

nation-state, Bulaç stands against EU involvement in the minority problem. He contends that the EU is “creating” ethnic, as well as religious minorities, with the intention to interfere Turkey’s “internal affairs.”⁶⁵⁵ It is worth noting that while he refutes the sovereignty rhetoric of the regime about religious freedoms, he uses exactly the same defense with Kemalists against EU interference in this area. Bulaç finds the EU to be consistent with the prerequisites of the paradigm of modernity on the issue of minorities in Turkey. He thinks that the paradigm protects those who voice their alternatives only within the system. As long as “...the group does not contest the founding philosophy of modernity and the social and legal status it envisages...” and therefore does not threaten the “ideological and legal/social parameters...”, a social group is keen enough to be recognized as a minority. Thus, it was possible for the EU to ask a redefinition of minorities in Turkey to include the Alevis, Kurds, and the like.⁶⁵⁶ The EU is trying to “invent” ethnic minorities, and make use of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey for its interests.⁶⁵⁷ For Bulaç, what would solve the problem of homogenization policies by Turkish state, could be a more flexible social system, i.e., the US model⁶⁵⁸, if not ones like *Medine Vesikası* in Islamic history. The solution definitely lies elsewhere than imposed by EU demands.

4.4.2.1.2. The Views of Ahmet Taşgetiren on Minority Rights

Taşgetiren believes that despite being the dominant segment of the society, Muslims are treated as a minority by the regime more than non-Muslims and Kurds. Taşgetiren views EU demands for the guarantee of freedoms enjoyed by the non-Muslims - already with minority status - and for the Kurds - demanded to have minority status, insincere. He states that creating a Kurdish minority has already been the policy of the West as reflected in Lausanne deliberations, today’s EU policy on the issue is only a mere continuation of it. He uses the term “double standard” for EU’s demands on rights. In his view, as much as it focuses on the breeches of human rights of these groups, the organization should question the state of religious

⁶⁵⁵ Ali Bulaç, “Misyonerlik ve Azınlıklar,” *Zaman*, February 5, 2005.

⁶⁵⁶ Ali Bulaç, “Zor Süreç,” *Zaman*, November 3, 2004.

⁶⁵⁷ Bulaç, “İlerleme Raporu ve Azınlıklar”.

⁶⁵⁸ Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 39.

freedoms if it were sincere.⁶⁵⁹ Nonetheless, does not oppose EU-based reforms on cultural rights of the Kurds; the problem which stems from the laicist-nationalist regime.

Taşgetiren draws a relationship between “Muslims” and Kurds, as both are being perceived as a threat and thus oppressed by the regime. He thinks that people need not and should not be deprived of expressing their Islamic and Kurdish identities.⁶⁶⁰ Although the Kemalist regime did not accept minority status for the Kurds during Lausanne by saying: “There is no Muslim minority in Turkey”, the laicist policies during the Republic eroded the bonds between Kurds and Turks.⁶⁶¹ For Taşgetiren, the national security ideology of the regime also alienates its people from the state. Accordingly, he criticized the first National Program for its continuation of the ban on Kurdish language education and broadcasting. He said that it serves the West and the EU to use these issues as a means to interfere. Reforms should be made for the people, not for the EU.⁶⁶²

Turkey should not be separated on ethnic or other lines. This is for the good of Kurds just as well as Turks, in Taşgetiren’s view. He believes that the HADEP line - which he believes to be supported by only a small portion of the Kurds - promotes separatism, which would make the solution harder for the Kurdish problem. For Taşgetiren, Turkish nationalism in its radical form, would only increase support for separatism because it excludes Kurdish identity.⁶⁶³ For Taşgetiren, the ultimate solution lies in meeting with Kurds at Islam.⁶⁶⁴ In his view, the problem of Sunnite-Alevi and Turkish-Kurdish cleavages are a result of the laicist regime which he believed to be demanded by the West to divide Turkey’s people⁶⁶⁵. It has been evident for him, that the West wants to establish a Kurdistan in Northern Iraq since the Gulf War.⁶⁶⁶ He said back in 1994, that the “Eastern Question” remains; the West promotes Kurdish separatism by the policy of creating a Kurdistan, which it hopes to

⁶⁵⁹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Stratejik bir Soru,” *Yeni Şafak*, June 1, 2002.

⁶⁶⁰ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “İdamın Ötesinde...,” *Yeni Şafak*, May 30, 2002.

⁶⁶¹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “APO Sürecine Hakim Olabilmek,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 3, 1999.

⁶⁶² Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Ulusal Programdaki Sorunlu Alan,” *Yeni Şafak*, March 20, 2001.

⁶⁶³ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Doğrudan Yanlışa... ,” *Yeni Şafak*, March 29, 2005.

⁶⁶⁴ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Lozan Erbakancıdır,” *Yeni Şafak*, August 3, 2002.

⁶⁶⁵ Taşgetiren, *Müslüman ve Sistem Tartışmaları*, 110-112.

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 112.

result in disintegration in the countries which have a Kurdish population⁶⁶⁷. The Lausanne argument of Turkey, which resembles that of *Milli Görüş*; prioritizing *umma* to the nation, is more fit to solving the Kurdish problem today than the current regime in his view.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, a non-discriminative application of human rights for the whole society, which has become a minority in itself at the present structure and practice, seems vital to Taşgetiren. Thus, the allegiance of Kurdish and Alevi people, who have sought protection from the EU for the bad record of the state, may be won.⁶⁶⁹

Taşgetiren has the belief that the ethnic problem should be solved within Turkey and by an Islamic solution. When the EU becomes part of the issue, Taşgetiren is disturbed. He adheres every demand of the EU which he finds specifically related to the Kurds as a proof to the old Western intention of creating and strengthening minorities to divide Turkey. For example, after the Helsinki decision of candidacy, the mentioning of minorities in the document disturbed Taşgetiren, as an “unfriendly gesture”.⁶⁷⁰ Cultural rights demands for the Kurds were argued to be a means for promoting separatism by Taşgetiren on other occasions.⁶⁷¹ He has been strictly against the termination of capital punishment after Öcalan was caught. He feared that Öcalan may become a political actor if not sentenced to death⁶⁷². During the trial, Taşgetiren repeated that termination of the capital punishment would mean the beginning of a process of the actualization of the old plan of forming a Kurdish minority to be recognized⁶⁷³.

Commenting on the status of minority foreseen by the EU for Alevis and Kurds in the progress report of 2004, Taşgetiren repeats his idea that it is the Western mentality at Lausanne - to create a Kurdish minority that would resort to separatism - that prevails behind this report. Neither does he approve of the move by itself; because he believes that while there is a problem of freedom for the whole of the

⁶⁶⁷ Taşgetiren, *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*, 17, 28, 40.

⁶⁶⁸ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Lozan Erbakancıdır”.

⁶⁶⁹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Azınlık Olmak,” *Yeni Şafak*, October 12, 2004.

⁶⁷⁰ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Dönüşüm Süreci,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 13, 1999.

⁶⁷¹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “İdamın Ötesinde...,” *Yeni Şafak*, May 30, 2002.

⁶⁷² Ibid.

⁶⁷³ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “APO Sürecine Hakim Olabilmek”.

society, compartmentalizing the freedoms makes no sense.⁶⁷⁴ Furthermore, Taşgetiren argues that Alevis do not qualify for being a minority. First, there is no consistency in their self-definition; second, they are Muslims and the religious personalities upheld by them are already respected by Sunnites since they have become a part of Islam in Turkey.⁶⁷⁵

4.4.3. The Islamist Discourse on Cyprus

Since the Republic of Cyprus, in de facto control of the Greek Cypriots - thus, Christian Cypriots - is the only recognized state on the island by the West and the EU, the anti-Western attitude of Islamism would be expected to dominate the Islamic discourse on Cyprus-EU relations and its reflection on EU-Turkey relations. Given that the degree of nationalism is high in the mainstream Turkish Islamism, the problematization of the Cyprus issue would be expected to resemble the Kemalist state discourse as well. This is exactly the position of Ahmet Taşgetiren, as demonstrated below.

Milli Görüş has been involved in the Turkish intervention on the island in 1974. MSP was a coalition partner then; Erbakan was celebrated by the *Milli Görüş* community as a *mücahit* (person fighting a holy war, *jihad*, against non-Muslims) after the intervention. According to Erbakan, the importance of Cyprus did not only stem from the religious-national bond of its population with Turkey. This land, incorporated in the *Dar-ül Islam* since the Ottoman period, was also of great geopolitical and strategical importance for Turkey's security, in Erbakan's view. The movement had supported the attitude of Denktaş against territorial or other concessions pressed by the Greek Cypriots and the West. For *Milli Görüş*, Western demands for solution on the island was an extension of their "crusader" mentality.⁶⁷⁶ The RP, too, argued that Cyprus problem was solved in 1974. There was no need to negotiate, because peace was already attained between the two peoples by the intervention - which is believed to be the result of the initiative of Erbakan, rather than of Ecevit (leader of the CHP and coalition partner in the government then).

⁶⁷⁴ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Azınlık," *Yeni Şafak*, October 11, 2004.

⁶⁷⁵ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Aleviler Ne İstiyor?," *Yeni Şafak*, December 3, 2004.

⁶⁷⁶ Çalış. "İslamcıların Dünyası: Uluslararası İlişkilerin Dini-Politiği," 897-898.

Cyprus policy of the RP was consistent with its anti-Western attitude in Turkish foreign policy. The RP insisted upon the continuation of the KKTC instead of the federal or confederal solutions offered by the international community, when it was in the government. The party tried to make the KKTC recognized, at least within the Islamic community of states in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference). The first foreign visit by Erbakan as the prime minister in 1996, was to the KKTC as a symbolic move for this stance.⁶⁷⁷

In the period after February 28, *Milli Görüş* softened its Cyprus policy and became ready for dialogue for a solution which would not endanger EU membership of Turkey; as an extension of the new pro-EU policy. The positive attitude of the AKP government towards the Annan Plan and its pressure on Denktaş for altering his uncompromising attitude demonstrates this shift.⁶⁷⁸ With this new position, along with its democracy and human rights discourse approaching that of the EU, the party provided support from the Turkish liberal left.⁶⁷⁹

4.4.3.1. Discourses of Islamist Intellectuals on Cyprus

On the issue of Cyprus, the post-Helsinki evaluations of the Islamist intellectuals are almost identical with those of Kemalist intellectuals. They utilize the discourse of national interest, with less concern for the Turkish Cypriots than Turkey's strategic advantages. They all contest to the relationship built between Southern Cyprus and the EU, as a breach of international law and as a proof to EU's strategic aims about the island. All four, believe that the EU utilizes the issue of Cyprus as a way of detaining Turkey at the door. Since the late 1990's, neither of the two Islamists utilized the concepts of Islam and Muslims in their defense of traditional Turkish foreign policy. In other words, Greeks and Turks were mentioned with their national identities. One exception to the similarity among the four, is Taşgetiren's rather positive approach to the Annan Plan, coinciding with the change

⁶⁷⁷ Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği*, 88. In fact, the MSP advocated the extension of the intervention until the partition of the island was attained, while the CHP sought to limit it to securing the Turkish population strategically. See Sarıbay, 585.

⁶⁷⁸ Çalış, "İslamcıların Dünyası: Uluslararası İlişkilerin Dini-Politikleri," 901; Hale, "Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts," 305.

⁶⁷⁹ Nuh Yılmaz, "İslamcılık, AKP, Siyaset" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 614.

of the AKP policy towards cooperation with the UN and the EU. However, even his attitude returned to the initial point on suspicion, after the results of the referendum were declared.

4.4.3.1.1. The Views of Ali Bulaç on Cyprus

Until Cyprus problem enters seriously in the agenda of EU-Turkey relations, Bulaç does not cover the issue much. Commenting on the decision at 1999 Helsinki Summit, Bulaç says that Cyprus is only a matter of negotiation, not one of the founding criteria for membership.⁶⁸⁰ In 2002, he is worried that solution in Cyprus may become a condition for starting the negotiations, because he believes that Turkey cannot recognize the Southern state. Thus, the anti-EU circles in Turkey and anti-Turkey groups in Europe will take advantage of this matter to obstruct Turkey's membership.⁶⁸¹

In 2003, when the Annan Plan was offered by the USA and EU, Bulaç said that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are pressurized by these parties to solve the problem. For Bulaç, Annan Plan is negotiable, but he thinks there is a part of truth in the words of those who are opposing it. What is true, for Bulaç, is that international law forbids Cyprus to become an EU member before Turkey due to the 1960 Treaty. The EU has acted in violation of international law and now it tries to fit the law into the circumstances it created; reminding the Cretan experience of Turks who found themselves under foreign rule while they had deserved self-determination. What is also true, is that Turkish Cypriots were perceived only as a minority by the Greek population. Those Turks of Cyprus who see Turkey as an invader, show a clear disrespect for the historical reality that lives were sacrificed for protecting them. Bulaç also points out that the strategic importance of Cyprus is vital for both Turkey's and EU's interests. Whereas the EU cannot leave it to Turkey, Turkey cannot leave it to the EU before its membership as well. The decision on the future of the island cannot to be left to Cypriot Turks who dream to be within the EU but unaware that there is no guarantee for their future without Turkey's help.⁶⁸²

⁶⁸⁰ Ali Bulaç, "AB'nin Önündeki Engel," *Zaman*, October 19, 1999.

⁶⁸¹ Ali Bulaç, "Düvel-i Muazzama'dan AB'ye," *Zaman*, August 7, 2002.

⁶⁸² Ali Bulaç, "Kıbrıs Üzerinde Söz Hakkı," *Zaman*, January 18, 2003.

Towards the referendum in Cyprus, Bulaç contests those who believe the “yes” would be a result favoring Turkey. While some are pleased with the fact that a solution will be possible, that the obstacle for EU membership will be overcome, and that Cypriot Turks will be better-off; Bulaç has reservations. First, he does not confide in a solution pushed by the conjunctural interests by the West in relation to the Middle East Project. He says that the rush is not in the name of bringing peace to the island - because there is peace - or accelerating Turkey’s membership. Second, Turkey is on the right side about Cyprus and it cannot give it away for serving other interests; membership is not that vital. Third, pushing two peoples who have shown animosity to each other before, is not necessary. Not all the world’s peoples have to coexist. They can live as neighbors.⁶⁸³

Bulaç believes that the only development for Turkey with the Annan Plan is that one membership obstacle will be overcome. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots will gain land, property and secure the departure of Turkish military from the island. While Turkey loses its rights on the island, there is not even any advantage for Turkey about EU membership, as can be followed from the statements of European politicians who continue to have reservations for Turkey. Moreover, until membership occurs for Turkey, any problem created by the Greeks cannot be handled by Turkey, because it will be invading EU territory.⁶⁸⁴

Among the possible problems from Turkey’s viewpoint in the future of a Cyprus united under the Annan Plan, is the movement of Greeks into the Turkish area. Given the principle of the primacy in EU law (meaning that the EU law cannot take Annan Plan as a reference point when the Greeks utilize free-movement to settle in the North) and the veto effect, there is no guarantee by the EU about protection of the Turkish majority at the North from becoming a powerless minority. What the government should do, was accepting the plan with the prerequisite of Turkey’s membership to the EU to be in effect. In that case, Turks in Cyprus would be protected, Turkey would be perceived as a country not against solution by the international community and the sincerity of the EU about Turkey’s membership would be calculated. Bulaç rejects the Cyprus problem as a condition for EU

⁶⁸³ Ali Bulaç, “Kıbrıs’ta ‘Çözüm!’,” *Zaman*, April 17, 2004.

⁶⁸⁴ Ali Bulaç, “Kıbrıs’ta Kayıplar Ve Riskler,” *Zaman*, April 19, 2004.

membership. For him, it is a political insistence which Turkey should contest, as it may.⁶⁸⁵

Commenting on the outcome of the referendum, Bulaç says that it is the best possible result. The reason behind the Greek “No” had ideological, economic and practical aspects. “No” meant that they do not want to coexist with the Turks having equal status. “No” meant that they fear unemployment to be caused by movement of Turks to the South and “No” meant that they felt no need to concede while their membership was already guaranteed. The reasons behind Turks’ acceptance of the plan did not include a will to live with Greeks, for Bulaç. Rather, they aspired “EU membership” and the advantage of a “probable economic well being”. For Bulaç, the advantage created by the outcome is that Turkey appears on the right side of the parties and that Cypriot Turks are not yet member to the EU with the disadvantages stated above. Bulaç expects Turkish government to push for the recognition of KKTC and its membership together with Turkey. What clearly should not be done, is turning back to the situation before the referendum.⁶⁸⁶

4.4.3.1.2. The Views of Ahmet Taşgetiren on Cyprus

Before Cyprus started to dominate the agenda of EU - Turkey relations, Taşgetiren wrote that “Western” demands - equal to the Greek and Greek Cypriot demands and channeled through the UN - on Cyprus was a part of the general Western policy to weaken the Muslim states, such as Turkey. He supported this argument through exhibiting the double standard of the West in involvement of world’s affairs. He argued that while the West kept un-concerned about the situation in Bosnia in the current conflict and the situation of Turkish Cypriots during the violence - of the 1960’s, it is very much interested and assertive on protecting the interests of Christian Greek Cypriots and Greeks. As Turkey was detained “at the door” of the EC, with the lack of solution in Cyprus declared as an obstacle to its membership, Greek Cypriot state was taken in as a candidate.⁶⁸⁷ For Taşgetiren, the EU frequently uses Cyprus as an excuse to delay progress in the relations with

⁶⁸⁵ Ali Bulaç, “Hükümet Kıbrıs’ta Başka Ne Yapabilirdi?,” *Zaman*, April 26, 2004.

⁶⁸⁶ Ali Bulaç, “En İyi Sonuç!,” *Zaman*, April 21, 2004.

⁶⁸⁷ Taşgetiren, *Yeni Bir İslam Dünyası*, 16, 29.

Turkey. Moreover, it is not neutral towards the issue, protecting the Greek Cypriot state.⁶⁸⁸

Taşgetiren perceived the election of AKP in 2002 as a possible solution in Cyprus with the Annan Plan, which would be of great help for the membership process of Turkey.⁶⁸⁹ About the Annan Plan, Taşgetiren approves of the government's attitude to negotiate. The important aspects of the plan comprises of the following according to him:⁶⁹⁰

- The plan is in accordance with the Turkish attitude about state structure, two states will be equally sovereign entities under a higher common state.
- The land planned to be granted to Greek Cypriots are important strategically and economically.
- Future movement of the Greeks into Turkish side may cause social clashes and there is a danger of overpopulation by the Greeks.
- The Greek side had important reserves about Turks' sovereignty.

Therefore, the plan is not the ideal but still it is negotiable.

Taşgetiren disapproves those who accuse Denктаş for his reluctance for solving the problem in Cyprus. For Taşgetiren, before pressing him, one should see the unjust attitude and reluctance of the Greeks and the EU.⁶⁹¹ In an article in 2003, Taşgetiren quotes Davudođlu, an international relations consultant of the present government, to show that those who believe that the government is ready to give up Cyprus contrary to the attitude of the military, are wrong. According to his evaluation parallel to that of Davudođlu, Taşgetiren states that Cyprus has a strategic importance in the Europe-Eurasia route, indispensable from Turkey's national interest. The problem of Cyprus is no longer an ethnic in consensus on the island and a mere part of Greece-Turkey relations. Added to the historical; national and

⁶⁸⁸ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "AB'nin Samimiyet Sınavı," *Yeni Şafak*, November 22, 2002.

⁶⁸⁹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Demokratik Devrim!," *Yeni Şafak*, November 4, 2002.

⁶⁹⁰ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Kıbrıs'ı Çözmek," *Yeni Şafak*, November 26, 2002.

⁶⁹¹ Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Denктаş İçin Farklı Yazı," *Yeni Şafak*, December 16, 2002.

religious responsibility of protecting Turkish Cypriots, there is a need for Turkey to have control on this strategic location.⁶⁹²

For the projected referendum results in Cyprus, “yes” from the Turks and “no” from the Greeks, seems to Taşgetiren as the best possible outcome, because Turkey and Turks have done their part. Now it is time for the EU to show willingness for resolving the problem, unless it decides to leave its foreign policy to the will of Greek Cypriots.⁶⁹³ Following the referendum, Taşgetiren has doubts that the EU will make the proper moves for a healthy solution, looking at the silence on the West and UN about the issue and the confidence of Papadopoulos in speaking for the whole of Cyprus. Added the general pro-Greek attitude of the EU and statements about impossibility of Turkey’s membership without recognizing another member state, the process will not be easy according to Taşgetiren.⁶⁹⁴

The delay in the solution to Cyprus problem and insistence on Turkey to recognize the Greek Cypriot state - despite the fact that they have shown no will for helping the solution and that it is Turkey which is righteous – at December 17, 2004, puts Turkey in a very hard situation for Taşgetiren. A recognition before the solution on the part of Turkey will mean the denial of the Northern state. Thus, Turkey will have to remove its military forces from the island and give up its rights on the decision defining its future. Therefore, Turkey cannot accept it in any way, argues Taşgetiren.⁶⁹⁵ He says that there has been a “de facto situation” in Northern Cyprus since 1974, from which Turkey cannot retreat unless the solution is righteous; not serving only the interests of Greek Cypriots. EU insistence on the recognition of the present Greek state will not work out; the EU has to stop supporting the Greeks and take initiative for an egalitarian structure on the island. This is a test for the EU, in Taşgetiren’s view.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹² Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Davudoğlu’nu Okumak,” *Yeni Şafak*, January 28, 2003.

⁶⁹³ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “24 Nisan Sonrası...,” *Yeni Şafak*, April 24, 2004.

⁶⁹⁴ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Rumları Tanımak?,” *Yeni Şafak*, April 26, 2004.

⁶⁹⁵ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Ne Oldu?,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 18, 2004.

⁶⁹⁶ Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Hadi Çözelim!,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 24, 2004.

CONCLUSION

Turkey's EU membership is a special case for the relationship between a nation-state and an international organization. Turkey's membership process, is an issue on which Turkey's identity debates are crystallized and reflected: Kemalism's positioning of itself as "Westernist" and Islamism's positioning of itself as "anti-Kemalist" (prior to being anti-Western) has been decisive on attitudes towards the EU by these discourses. Meanwhile, the EU was seen predominantly as a part of the West, without considering the internal dynamics of the organization.

Despite that the interest and involvement of the EU in Turkey's political system has begun with the 1980 military intervention, the dominant positions of Kemalists and Islamists remained intact until the Helsinki decision. With the Helsinki decision that gave Turkey a candidate status and drew a roadmap of political reforms with clarified standards – Copenhagen Criteria - on democracy, human rights, and minority rights, with a more definite prospect of membership than before, attitudes of Kemalist and Islamists were reversed. Traditionally pro-Western and pro-EU, Kemalists have turned increasingly Euro-skeptic. Traditionally anti-EU, Turkish Islamists became increasingly pro-EU.

However, these shifts, although may have come to the fore rather suddenly, have had roots in the ideological composition and political experience behind the two discourses, which enabled them change their discursive tools and attitudes fast. These shifts, in other words, reflect the internal paradoxes of the two discourses rather than being basically responses to an external stimuli.

Kemalism has been the name of the official ideology of a modernizing nation-state, in the non-western world which has been dominated by the west. Accordingly, as explained well by the term "paradox of eastern nationalism", it has oscillated between admiration and imitation of the West as the embodiment of civilization - thus aspired to be included in, and suspicion and hostility towards the West as the embodiment of colonialism. The Kemalist discourse towards the EU, perceived as part of this West, has carried this paradox within itself. Named in other words as the "Sevres Syndrome", the intentions of imperial domination of the country through

weakening the national integrity by the usage of these political reforms, have caused the Euro-skeptic turn of the attitude of Kemalists. The reasoning has been simple; as Manisalı's writings illustrate with clarity, Kemalism makes such a deduction to reject EU-based reforms:

- The EU = the West.
- The West has always wanted to weaken Turkey's sovereignty for its interests.
- Political reforms, especially those that assume reduction in the role of the military and increased cultural autonomy to the minorities can weaken national integrity.
- (Who wants these reforms? Islamists and Kurdish separatists; enemies of Kemalism.)
- Thus, the EU wants to divide the country by these reforms, to rule over it.

A similar reasoning is made for the EU conditionality of solution in Cyprus:

- Greece = the EU = the West.
- The West wants to dominate Turkey.
- Greece/EU/West wants Cyprus in its own orbit.
- Turkish Cypriots and Turkey form a barrier to the interests in Cyprus.
- (Why would the EU bring Cyprus condition in addition to the Copenhagen Criteria and discriminate Turkey against other candidates? To detain Turkey's membership.)
- Thus, the EU wants Turkey outside the EU, outside Cyprus, so that it can dominate Cyprus.

The rise of political Islam in Turkey, which led to the February 28 process, has been decisive in the proclamation of such remarks by the Kemalists. Holding secularism as a value prior to democracy and as Islamists started to support EU-based political reform, Kemalists became increasingly skeptical about the "intentions behind" these reforms. Whereas it had been perceived as a source of oppression during the 1980's when it targeted the Turkish left, February 28 process made the Turkish army, raised with Kemalist values, a source of guarantee for civilian Kemalist left. As politicization of Islam has always been perceived as a threat to the

regime, closure of *Milli Görüş* parties, imprisonment of Islamist politicians and limitations on the economic and social organizations of Islamists did not bother Kemalists as against democracy and freedoms of association and expression - which they had eagerly advocated in the post 1980 regime (i.e., by Mümtaz Soysal). As Kurdish separatism, through terrorist attacks of the PKK was on its peak, Kemalists' advocacy of these freedoms were also hesitant. The case of Kemalists show that a strict understanding of laicism and nationalism within the Kemalist modernization framework, may lead to the perception of domestic demands about freedoms as tactics of "imagined enemies"⁶⁹⁷. These domestic considerations have been more decisive on the Euro-skeptic turn than suggesting that a general anti-EU attitude dominates today's Kemalist discourse. This is at least the case for Kemalist civilian and military bureaucracy. Despite reservations that are expressed by individuals such as General Kılınç, their institutional attitude keeps supportive of EU membership process and prospect. This is exactly the point which has enabled Islamists' discursive shift about the EU.

Turkish Islamists of the post-February 28 period - or "post-Islamists"⁶⁹⁸, draw upon the consistency of Kemalists' Westernist orientation, which has long been translated into support for EU membership, for the realization of a democratic system respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms which they perceive as to be enabled only by an EU motivation among the Kemalist elite. Although Islamist political parties and movements have used a discourse against Kemalist authoritarianism and lack of freedoms, these have not been equated with a demand of "democracy" and "human rights", since these were concepts of the West, which, by their very source, were to be contested by an Islamist position. An Islamic philosophical critique of the West - which has already been rather dim in much of the Islamist movement such as in *Milli Görüş*, almost totally vanished for a very practical concern: Survival. For the AKP branch of the *Milli Görüş* line, this discursive shift not only provided survival, but also the advantages of being a mass

⁶⁹⁷ These are Kurdistan and Islamism, as conceptualized by Yavuz. See Yavuz, "Turkey's Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism," 37.

⁶⁹⁸ The term means that a political Islamist discourse has been refrained. While the political discourse of former Islamists are within the confines of liberal democracy, the Islamism is kept in the social discourse. See Dağı, "Rethinking Democracy, Human Rights, Democracy and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey," 137-139; "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization," 28-30.

political party in government, because it gained the support of liberals and other non-Islamist groups such as conservatives in addition to the Islamists who are a numerical minority in the society.

For the Islamist intellectuals, the shift towards a pro-EU attitude has been less easy and swift; they have put considerable effort to legitimize their recent advocacy of EU membership and liberal democracy. To their audience, they tried to show the Western schemes of human rights and democracy, as an “opportunity” for enjoying freedoms from the Kemalist state which they have long been demanding. This opportunity was contextualized in globalization, which may erode the supremacy of the state present in Turkey. However, the answer to how the process of integration with the EU and the globe can be compatible with an Islamic identity, remains to be an unanswered question. The approach of Islamists to this problem is not uniform and individuals remain inconsistent. Especially when signals came, such as the ECHR rulings about the headscarf and party closures, that the EU framework of human rights may remain protective of the Jacobin laicism of the Kemalist state, their Euro-skeptic views of the pre-February 28 period, surfaced.

Euro-skeptic, even anti-EU positions are taken within Islamism, when minority rights and Cyprus problem are concerned. Despite the fact that AKP program and policy on these issues have been more accommodative of EU demands, the attitudes of the Islamist intellectuals used in this study reveal that the involvement of the EU in the Kurdish problem and Cyprus cause suspicion and resentment. In other words, it may be said that Islamists also have a “Sevres syndrome”, besides the issues within EU-based democratization that enable freedom for their expression and organization of Islamic identity.

Arguments very similar to that of Kemalist intellectuals and state elites are made by Islamist intellectuals on the Kurdish problem. However, Islamist positions put the blame on Kemalist secularism and ethnic nationalism (of both the Turks and the Kurds) more than the EU. What differs their views from Kemalists is also evident in their understanding of the solution of problem of the expression of Kurdish identity. They advocate Islam, as a value and ideology that could provide the bond as experienced in the Ottoman system, where people were “united in diversity”, under the Islamic umbrella. However, this unchanged position does not provide any answer

to how the question of choice, by the Kurds, of ethnicity over religious identity, can be dealt with.

About Cyprus and the problems with Greece, perceptions, views and suggestions among Islamist intellectuals are identical with those of Kemalists. It is not only the ideas, which reflect the same understanding of Turkey's interests and EU's demands. The discursive tools are also the same, i.e., concepts of "national interest", "national security", "strategic value". Whereas AKP government put an effort for a solution by pressuring Denktaş to accept the Annan Plan - which was legitimized through the general election results in the KKTC (pro-EU parties got the majority vote) and Turkey's "determination" of membership, Islamist intellectuals remained skeptical of the intentions of Greece, EU and the West (UN) just as the Kemalists did. The doubts were voiced with more determination after the results of the referendum turned out to be "no" in the Greek side of the island.

Despite all these reservations to the political dimension of EU - Turkey relations, it should be noted that these have not yet produced a strictly anti-EU attitude among Turkish Islamists like they had before, or like Kemalists now have.

This study aimed at an analysis of the political dimension of EU – Turkey relations from the perspective of identity debates in Turkey. Naturally, both EU – Turkey relations and their political impacts cover a much wider area of debate with repercussions on the attitudes of Kemalists and Islamists towards the EU and EU membership. For instance, as Manisalı's arguments reveal, the economic integration to the EU may be considered as the basis of EU-resentment and become reflected in the arguments made on the political dimension. Another important area seems to be the identity debate within the EU, concerning Turkey's prospect of membership and expectations from Turkey in case it becomes a member. As the Islamist intellectuals are affected by identity debates among EU member states and oscillate between mentioning Turkey's contributions which would be made through its Islamic identity to a multicultural EU, and expressing fears of assimilation into European values. Kemalist intellectuals used in this study have almost a striking silence about the repercussions of EU identity and supranationality, besides adding these as obstacles to EU membership without elaboration. Such issues are worth elaboration in the analyses provided by other studies on the subject.

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