

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE CONSTRUCTION  
OF MODERN EUROPE

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## ABSTRACT

### CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN EUROPE

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This thesis aims to analyze the contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the construction of modern Europe in the early modern period. Conventional historiography generally argues that the Ottoman Empire contributed to the emergence of the modern European identity only through acting as the ‘other’ of Europe. This thesis, however, aims to show that such an analysis is not enough to understand the Ottoman impact on the European state system. Moreover, it argues that the Ottoman Empire contributed to the construction of this system both politically and economically. By depriving the Habsburg Empire of dominating whole continent, Ottoman Empire helped the proto-modern centralizing states, i.e. England, France and the Netherlands, and Protestantism to survive the suppression of the Habsburgs. On the other hand, by granting capitulations to these European states, it contributed to the economies of these states in a way that they could be able to develop their emerging capitalist economies. In all, this thesis concludes that the Ottoman Empire was not a passive actor and an outsider to the European system, acted only as a counter-reference point in the formation of the European identity; rather, it actively involved in the European politics and economics as an active actor.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire, European Identity, Habsburg Empire, Capitulations

## ÖZ

### OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞUNUN MODERN AVRUPA’NIN İNŞASINA KATKISI

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Bu çalışma Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun erken modern çağda modern Avrupa’nın inşasına katkısını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Geleneksel tarih yazımı genellikle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun yalnızca Avrupa’nın ‘öteki’si rolünü oynayarak Avrupa kimliğinin oluşumuna katkıda bulunduğunu savunur. Ancak, bu tez, bu görüşün Avrupa devlet sisteminin oluşumuna Osmanlıların yaptığı katkıyı anlamak için yeterli olmadığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dahası, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun bu sistemin oluşumunda hem siyasi hem de ekonomik katkılarının bulunduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Habsburg İmparatorluğu’nun kıtanın tümü üzerinde hakim olmasını engelleyen Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, İngiltere, Fransa ve Hollanda gibi merkezileşmekte olan devletlerin ve Protestanlığın Habsburg baskısını atlatmalarına yardımcı olmuştur. Diğer taraftan, bu devletlere kapitülasyonlar bahşederek, yeni yeni ortaya çıkan kapitalist ekonomilerini geliştirmelerini sağlayacak katkılarda bulunmuştur. Kısacası, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu yalnızca bir karşı-referans noktası rolünü oynayan pasif ve sistem-dışı bir aktör değil, bizzat Avrupa siyaset ve ekonomisine dahil olan aktif bir aktördür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Avrupa Kimliği, Habsburg İmparatorluğu, Kapitülasyonlar

*To My Family*

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## INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, only a few epochs could be labeled as 'revolutionary' and the early modern period (1450-1620) is one of them. Indeed, there is a good reason to call it so. Accordingly, early modern period is revolutionary in the sense that it acts as a transitional period between the 'medieval' and the 'modern', and within this period these two characteristics coexist. Medieval imperial formations, city-states and proto-modern central states formed a conglomerate political composition; declining feudal economic structures and newly emerging pre-capitalist urban economies exist side by side; scholastic outlook inherited from the medieval age and new thinking promoted by Renaissance and Reformation were in a continuous strife. In other words, a binary opposition between the 'medieval' and the 'modern', or to put it in a more concrete way, the opposition between the 'old' and 'new', was the main characteristic of the age.

Early modern period was also significant because of the significance of innovation, not only in scientific terms, but also in culture, philosophy and literature. In other words, this age was famed with its 'innovators'. In terms of literature, a golden age was the case in England, France and Spain. William Shakespeare, Michel de Montaigne, and the author of the first novel in literature, Miguel de Cervantes, contributed to this revival. In scientific terms the teachings of Copernicus, Galileo and Mercator encouraged the scientific thinking against the medieval dogmas and resulted in an assertive impetus among the adventurers to discover the mysteries of the world. In terms of art and culture, by the first half of the sixteenth century Michelangelo had already finished the decoration of the Sistine Chapel and Rabelais had produced his finest art. On the other hand Erasmus, Luther and Calvin reacted the medieval philosophy and emerged as the champions of new humanism.

These names indicate why those historians, who are studying the early modern period, dub almost every aspect of early modern life as a 'revolution'. In

this period, in terms of politics, the process of state centralization and formation of novel modes of governance is termed as the ‘bureaucratic revolution’. In terms of economics, enormous increase in prices and the inflationary tendencies are called as the ‘price revolution’. In terms of military, increasing number of armies and discovery of new weapons and tactics are labeled as the ‘military revolution’. Finally, in terms of social life, the processes of Renaissance and Reformation are, needless to say, quite revolutionary by themselves. Thus, long before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which are generally perceived as the ‘age of revolution’ due to the French and Industrial Revolutions, the early modern period has acquired such an assertive connotation. In other words, the two centuries between the mid-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth century is a conspicuous age deserving a closer look.

To put it in a different way, early modern period can be seen as the period of pregnancy for the European continent. Likewise the baby, whose physical appearance and intelligence qualities are developed in the abdomen of its mother, modern Europe, with its political composition and intellectual consciousness, finds its precursors in the early modern period. After this two-century long pregnancy, which was quite short compared to almost three millennial life of the European civilization, the baby – in other words the ‘modern Europe’ – born out of a painful process of birth, namely the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). Thus without understanding this significant period it would be impossible to understand the modern Europe.

One important question that must be asked before examining this period was about the definition of ‘Europe’. What do we mean by ‘Europe’? Is it a mere geographical entity with some predefined borders such as the Ural Mountains and the Straits? Or does it imply a common religion, namely Christianity, unifying different nations under a spiritual umbrella? Or is it a name of a common culture, a product of modern ages without any precursors before the period we label as ‘modernity’? These questions are quite difficult to answer, and this thesis does not claim to answer them. However, it argues that the ‘idea of Europe’ had always been present throughout history, although having different connotations depending on different perceptions. But among those different connotations, it was the ‘idea of Europe’ in the early modern period that resembled much to that of the modern ages,

thus it will not be wrong to argue that the modern European identity had its roots in this significant transitional period.

Within the framework of this remarkable age, the interaction between ‘Europe’ and its eastern neighbor, the Ottoman Empire, was very significant. Founded in the early fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire expanded quickly towards the Balkans and reached to the Danubian basin within a century and a half. Thus, until the early modern period, Constantinople had just been conquered as well as Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece. This rapid expansion contributed to the emergence of the modern European identity as well as for the emergence of the modern European state system. The continent had witnessed many intruders before the Ottomans but generally they were merely raiders, pillaging and plundering the regions that they had conquered, offering no alternative political and economic system. Ottomans, however, were different from these previous invaders in the sense that they settled in the southeastern Europe for centuries. This continuous and persistent presence makes the Ottoman Empire a unique actor in the political, economic and social life of the continent.

Keeping all these factors in mind, the central argument of this thesis is that the Ottoman presence and expansion in Europe had tremendous implications to the construction of the European identity as well as to the emergence of modern European state system. In the literature, Ottoman impact on the ‘idea of Europe’ – which was termed in this thesis as the ‘negative/indirect contribution of the Ottoman Empire’ – was extensively analyzed. However, there was not much debate on the Ottoman impact on the emergence of the modern European state system – which was termed in this thesis as the ‘positive/direct contribution of the Ottoman Empire’. Thus the aim of the thesis is to show that impacts of the interaction between the Ottoman Empire and Europe should not be limited only to the construction of the European identity, which makes the Ottoman Empire an outsider to the European system and a passive actor in European politics. Rather, due to its contributions to the emergence of the modern European state system, the Ottoman Empire deserves to be treated as a part of this system and as an active actor in the European politics.

In order to present a better account of the early modern period and to give background information for the reader, the first chapter of this thesis is devoted to

an analysis of the European bureaucratic, military and economic system. Therefore it consists of three parts. In the first part, in which bureaucratic structures of the European states are examined, the main point was that European modern state system did not emerge haphazardly after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Rather, it is argued that ‘centralized-modern state’ had its precursors in the early modern period, and even before that. In this part of the thesis, the complex coexistence of different types of European states are focused with a particular reference on how proto-modern centralized states, such as England and France, began to preponderate the medieval type of governance, such as the city-states like Venice or imperial formations like the Habsburg Empire. Such an ‘*a priori*’ examination of the political structure of Europe is useful in order to observe the political tendencies of the age in a more accurate way.

The second part of the first chapter deals with the military structure of the European states in the early modern period, and more importantly, with the changing military philosophy. Not only the armaments and weaponry had been developed to such an extent that many historians called this massive transformation as the ‘military revolution’; but also the meaning of the concept of ‘war’ and the tactics and strategies used in the conduct of war had undergone a genuine alteration. Within this framework, the ‘mercenary’ system is examined thoroughly in this part, since it had tremendous implications on the early modern warfare, which will subsequently be studied in the coming chapters.

Yet, bureaucracy and army are not the only aspects of European state system in this period. Perhaps, a more significant transformation had occurred in the economic realm. In the third part of this first chapter, these economic transformations are analyzed in detail. First and foremost, the concept of ‘geographical explorations’ is an early modern world’s phenomenon, which opened an illuminating path for colonization and the subsequent capital accumulation in the coming centuries; therefore it deserves a special attention. An equally important development was the so-called ‘price revolution’, emerged after the massive transfer of New World’s bullions to Europe and resulted in a dramatic increase in prices which led to social uprisings not only in Europe but also in the parts of the world quite connected with the European economic system, like the Ottoman Empire. A

third significant point was the decline of Mediterranean and Baltic trade networks vis-à-vis the Atlantic. Thus special attention was paid to how the center of trade was transferred from Mediterranean ports such as Venice or Genoa, to the northern cities of Antwerp and Amsterdam. All these developments are worth of a closer attention since they give us eminent insights to understand how the modern European economic system came into being.

Following this background information, the second chapter of this thesis deals extensively with the notion of the 'idea of Europe'. Again, contrary to the general tendency of the literature written on this notion, which claims that the modern 'idea of Europe' is a recent phenomenon, it is argued in this thesis that this 'modern' notion had its roots in a remote past. In order to give the evolution of the 'idea of Europe' more clearly, this chapter is divided into two parts, the first one analyzing the roots of this notion since the ancient Greece, and the second one reflecting on the transformation of it in the early modern period. In the first part, the formation and evolution of the concept of 'Europe' is examined thoroughly with special reference to the formation of a European identity by negating the 'other', being the 'Persian' for the ancient Greeks, the 'Saracen' for the medieval Christendom, and the 'Ottoman Turk' for the early modern Europe. The second part, on the other hand, focuses more on the transformation of the concept of Europe in the early modern period. In doing that, it tries to answer several questions: Did the Ottoman Empire have an impact on the formation of the 'modern' European identity? Was the European perception of the 'Turk' different from its previous perceptions of 'other'? Is there a monolithic perception of the 'Turk' in Europe throughout the early modern period, or are there temporal and spatial differences? Was the religion only determinant factor in the European perception of the 'Turk', or were there other more secular factors? In answering these questions, in this part, it is aimed to put forward a more accurate analysis of the European perception of the 'Turk' and to examine how this perception affected the formation of the modern European identity.

The last chapter of this thesis is devoted to the positive contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the emergence of the modern European state system. This chapter has two main parts examining the political and economic contributions. The

central argument regarding the political contribution of the Ottoman Empire to the emergence of the modern European state system is that the Ottoman Empire acted as a bulwark against Habsburg expansionism. This was very significant (however, generally underestimated) in the sense that the Habsburg Empire was a medieval political formation, and unlike the newly emerging proto-modern centralizing states such as England and France, it aimed to establish its rule over the whole continent. The dream of ‘universal empire’ was very popular for the Habsburg rulers, particularly for the most notable one among them, Charles V. However, Ottoman expansion in the early modern period towards the Central Europe provided a significant obstacle in front of this particular aim, thus created a fertile environment for the infant centralizing states of Western Europe to survive and develop. Habsburg-Ottoman contention in the early modern period, which was even called as a ‘sixteenth century world war’, yielded a significant room of maneuver particularly for France in the first half of the sixteenth century, and England and the United Provinces in the second half. Thus in this thesis these three Western European states are chosen as the actors of a case study, in order to demonstrate the impact of the Ottoman Empire on the modern European state system more concretely.

In the early modern period, Ottoman Empire confronted Habsburg Empire in two ways. First of all, it tried to support anti-Habsburg states of Western Europe, namely France, England and to some extent the United Provinces. This support was seldom materialized as in the case of naval alliances with France in the mid-sixteenth century, however, even the verbal support acted as a strong claim for intimidation against the Habsburg Empire. In other words, as it can be seen in the Papal nuncio reports or imperial letters of the age, the threat of an alliance with the Ottoman Empire was extensively used by the rulers of these three states, particularly when they felt the Habsburg pressure more intensely.

Secondly, the Ottoman Empire aimed to support the dissident groups within the Habsburg Empire, namely the Protestants of Germany and the Netherlands, and Moriscos of Spain. Reformation created a significant reaction against the Habsburg Empire, whose rulers also had the title of the Holy Roman Emperor, thus claimed to be the defender of the Catholic faith. This revolutionary movement produced a significant problem for the maintenance of the vast territories of the Habsburg

Empire; therefore, Habsburgs decided to take harsh measures against the Protestants. This would have been a complete disaster for this infant religious sect, if the Habsburgs had assaulted on them with their all means. Among many factors that contributed to the prevention of such an occurrence, Ottoman-Habsburg wars in the Central Europe had a very significant place. In order to cope with the Ottoman threat, the Habsburg Empire had to employ its financial and military resources in its fight against the Ottomans and it could not detach an effective force to deal with the ‘insurgent’ Protestants. What is more, the Emperor necessitated the alliance with the German Princes, who had preferred Protestantism in order to diminish the political power of their suzerain, namely the Holy Roman Emperor. Therefore he had to give significant religious concessions to these princes in order to maintain their loyalty. When the Habsburg Empire was ready to smash this ‘insurgency’ by the mid-sixteenth century after it had concluded a temporary truce with the Ottoman Empire it was too late, since Protestantism had rooted strongly in Europe.

Besides supporting the Protestants, Ottoman Empire also tried to hit the heart of the Empire, namely Spain, by provoking the Morisco community, virtually Christianized Muslim community in Spain, who had already been open to such provocations because of Habsburg repression. Again, although the Ottoman Empire could not send any material help to the Morisco community, there are some imperial letters from the Ottoman Empire to the leaders of this community, declaring the Ottoman support towards their rebellion against the Habsburgs and advising the Moriscos to unite their rebellion with those of the Dutch. In other words, Ottoman Empire did not accidentally fell into a position of supporting the insurgent movements within the Habsburg Empire; rather, it was a deliberate and carefully planned strategy that aimed to weaken the Empire at all. All these revolutions contributed to the weakening of the Habsburg Empire, and, although it survived one century more, it was quite remote from realizing its original aim, namely creating a universal empire.

Finally, the second part of the last chapter of this thesis deals with the economic contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the development of the proto-modern European states. Habsburg Empire had already been benefiting from the bullions delivered from its New World possessions, which these states lacked in the



early modern period. Thus they necessitated a fertile market to sell their products and to provide the necessary raw materials for their own economies. In the early modern period, it was the Ottoman Empire that provided such opportunities to these states, and this was done through a system of one-sided grants, called the capitulations. Thus, in this part of the thesis, the impact of these concessions on the economic life of the Western European states is examined in detail. What is more, the ambassadorial clash among the ambassadors of these states to gain more concessions than the others was quite interesting and reflected the importance of the eastern market for these newly centralizing states. Thus this interesting feature of European diplomatic history is also examined.

Before closing up this introduction of the thesis, a few words should be said about the stance of the researcher in writing this thesis. First of all, it is aimed in this thesis to avoid a strict determinism. In other words, in analyzing the construction of the European identity and the emergence of the modern European state system internal dynamics are not neglected but rather they are left unmentioned because of the purposes of the thesis. Ottoman impact on these two processes is not the sole factor, but one of many internal and external factors, albeit a very important one. A second problematic issue is Euro-centrism. Since the thesis is about European history, Euro-centrism was a very detrimental trap. To avoid such a discourse, a review of both European and Ottoman documents and sources was made. This was done to balance the arguments and counter-arguments about the developments on the early modern period. However, still, it cannot be argued that this thesis was fully immune from any kind of Euro-centrism. Rather, a more balanced discourse is preferred to give a more accurate picture of the period. Third, in the thesis, a macro-perspective will be used rather than focusing solely on individual developments independent of each other. Rather, it is argued that these developments took place within a temporal and spatial framework, and this macro-framework should be analyzed carefully to put forward the casual relation among different occurrences, which seem to be independent of each other.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD**

In this introductory chapter of this thesis, it is aimed to give the reader the basic characteristics of the early modern period, in order to help him/her understand the political, military and economic environment of Europe. To do so, it examines three significant aspects of this age, namely, bureaucracy, army and economy. Such an examination will provide a useful background and lead to a more accurate grasp of the thesis.

#### **A. BUREAUCRACY**

The most significant feature of the early modern period regarding politics was the tendency towards centralization. As a matter of fact, the feudal crisis – the dissolution of the feudal political structures – resulted in a new understanding of bureaucratic formation; however, still, it was very early to state that the process of centralization had been totally completed in this period. Administrative reforms of the French Revolution and Napoleon, as well as the final unification of Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century, reflected this open-ended process. On the other hand, it can be argued that the process of centralization had begun long before the early modern period, with the first efforts of the medieval rulers to establish a minimum of order in their domains and to build a more widely respected authority. With Louis XI (r. 1461-1483)<sup>1</sup> in France, with Henry VII (r. 1485-1509) in England and with Ferdinand of Aragon (r. 1468-1516) and Isabella of Castile (r. 1468-1504) in Spain, monarchical power “...attained a strength and a prestige, which it had

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<sup>1</sup> A note on the dates: In this thesis, the dates, attached to the names of rulers (with a mark of ‘r.’), show the period of their reign, whereas the dates attached to the names of authors, diplomats, philosophers, etc., show the years of their birth and death. Regarding the popes, the dates indicate their pontificate (with a mark of ‘p.’) and the name attached to the date indicates their original names.

never before possessed, and which were to attain still further development under their successors”<sup>2</sup>. This development was not only peculiar to Western Europe. In Hungary, Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458-1490), in Sweden, Gustavus Vasa (r. 1528-1560), and in Burgundy, Philip the Good (r. 1419-1467) and Charles the Bold (r. 1467-1477) followed their western counterparts in centralizing their bureaucratic structures. Therefore, according to Joseph Strayer, as early as the beginnings of the fourteenth century, it was evident that the dominant political form in Europe was going to be the sovereign state<sup>3</sup>:

The universal Empire had never been anything but a dream; the universal Church had to admit that the defense of the individual state took precedence over the liberties of the Church or the claims of the Christian commonwealth. Loyalty to the state was stronger than any other loyalty, and for a few individuals (largely government officials) loyalty to the state was taking on some of the overtones of patriotism.

In other words, it was during the early modern period that ‘state-building’ was most concentrated, rapid and dramatic. To express it more laconically, as Rice and Grafton did, before the early modern period, European states were more feudal than sovereign and after it they were more sovereign than feudal<sup>4</sup>. In other words, it was in this period that these two types of political entities – feudal and sovereign – almost coexisted equally.

As a result of this process of centralization, there emerged a new type of ‘state’. As Kiernan mentioned, when feudal nobility proved too factious and irresponsible to wield power directly, there came to the front in Western Europe the reorganized, reinvigorated type of royal rule, which has been labeled as the ‘new’ or ‘absolute’ monarchy<sup>5</sup>. These ‘new/absolute’ monarchies were seated in a definite territory; and their subjects tended to have a common language, a common outlook,

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<sup>2</sup> Henri Pirenne, *A History of Europe*, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 331

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 57

<sup>4</sup> Eugene Rice and Anthony Grafton, *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460-1559*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 110

<sup>5</sup> V. G. Kiernan, *State and Society in Europe, 1550-1650*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1980), p. 5

a common pride and common ideals<sup>6</sup>. In other words, the feudal divergences, which prevented the emergence of any of such common characteristics before, began to diminish in this period. Many authors agreed that these ‘absolute’ monarchs had increased their sovereign powers vis-à-vis other sources of power, i.e. the Church or the landed nobility. Wallerstein, on the other hand, interpreted the term ‘absolute’ differently. Accordingly, these monarchs were not totally independent but ‘more independent’ than their previous condition<sup>7</sup>:

In theory, ‘absolute’ did not mean ‘unlimited’ since it was limited by divine law and natural law. ‘Absolute’ should not be read as ‘unlimited’ but rather as ‘unsupervised’. The monarchy was absolute by opposition to the past feudal scattering of power. In most ways, the power of the king was far less than that of the executive of a twentieth century liberal democracy, despite the institutional and moral constraints on the latter.

Elliott added another dimension to the concept of ‘new/absolute’ monarchy; he termed these new bureaucratic structures as the ‘composite states’ – a concept borrowed from Koenigsberger – used to indicate those states including more than one country under the sovereignty of one ruler<sup>8</sup>. Accordingly, he perceived the ‘composite states’ as a significant intermediary mechanism between the feudal types of political organization and the modern nation-states<sup>9</sup>:

It is easy enough to assume that the composite state of the early modern period was no more than a necessary but rather unsatisfactory way-station on the road that led to unitary statehood; but it should not automatically be taken for granted that at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this was already the destined end of the road.

Gustafsson, on the other hand, termed the early modern state as ‘conglomerate state’, which “...was a state composed of territories standing in different relations to their rulers, a state where the rulers found themselves in

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<sup>6</sup> Ernest John Knapton, *Europe 1450-1815*, (New York: Scribner Publishers, 1958), p. 80

<sup>7</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974), p. 144

<sup>8</sup> For the initial understanding of the concept of ‘composite states’ see, H. G. Koenigsberger *Politicians and Virtuosi: Essays in Early Modern History*, (London: Hambledon Press, 1986). For a detailed account of this concept see, J. H. Elliott, ‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, (*Past and Present*, Vol. 137, 1992, pp. 49-71), p. 50

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51

different relations to different parts of their domains”<sup>10</sup>. It was a political, judicial and administrative ‘mosaic’, rather than a modern unitary state, but it was a ‘mosaic’ that was kept together more tightly than its medieval forerunner.

Whether named as ‘conglomerate’ or ‘composite’, at the top of this monarchical hierarchy, the king was the supreme authority both in theory and in practice. Generally, he ruled through his council and great officials of state, so that, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the ‘council’ turned out to be an instrument of absolute government dependent on him alone. In the local level, on the other hand, although the king was accepted as the supreme authority in theory, he was not always so in practice, because of the significance of landed nobility in the local administration. To illustrate, the King of Spain seemed to possess the highest political position in theory; however, local nobles or *Comuneros* were the de facto supreme political authorities in their own domains<sup>11</sup>. Nevertheless, still, sixteenth century was a period in which the monarch began to eliminate, at least partially, rival sources of political power, either be the religious/ecclesiastical power, namely the Church, or landed nobility, or even the subsidiary political establishments such as the parliaments.

After analyzing these general trends, it would be better to focus on individual states and their experiences in order to have an idea about their political structures during the early modern period. In Spain, as indicated above, political centralization had started with the achievements of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, after the political union of these two Iberian Kingdoms in 1468 with the marriage of their rulers. The councils, which had been very instrumental for the operation of Spanish political mechanism, were reorganized with this union. Before, the nobles had constituted the majority in these councils; however, after the administrative reforms, they lost their traditional rights as advisors in these councils, and their status were decreased to *letrados* – the ‘servants’ of the king who had taken law education<sup>12</sup>. Besides the nobility, another problem in Spain regarding

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<sup>10</sup> Harald Gustafsson, ‘The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern Europe’, (*Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 25, No. 3-4, 1998, pp. 189-208), p. 189

<sup>11</sup> For a detailed account of monarchy-nobility relations in Spain see, J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716*, (Penguin Books, London, 1963)

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Lee, *Aspects of European History, 1494-1789*, (London: Methuen, 1984), p. 48

political centralization was the autonomous cities, which had been granted with exclusive rights derived from their feudal origins<sup>13</sup>. However, their autonomy was also eliminated to a considerable degree by the late fifteenth century. On the other hand, despite these centralization attempts in Spain, with the reign of Charles V (r. as Carlos I of Spain 1516-1556, as the Holy Roman Emperor 1519-1556), Spain became one of the many possessions of the Habsburg Empire<sup>14</sup>, which had completely been founded as a dynastic empire. In other words, this more or less centralized Iberian state turned out to be a part of the most decentralized political formation of that age. The Habsburg Empire, which had been labeled as ‘the last medieval empire’ by some historians, could only survive as a whole under the personal rule of Charles V; in other words, it was a totally different type of political organization. In describing Charles V’s empire, Rice and Grafton wrote<sup>15</sup>:

His monarchy was fortuitous and personal. He ruled not a single imperial state but a heterogeneous collection of autonomous kingdoms and principalities united only in the identity of their sovereign; and in each he had a different title and ruled with different powers...He created no administrative structure common to the empire as a whole. He had no common treasury or common budget...Charles’s empire was less than sum of its parts.

Conversely, in France, ‘absolute monarchy’ was revived and this revival owed much to the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), in the later stages of which, the Kings of France won the power to tax without the consent of the French nobility and the public, and thus equipped themselves with military power, and eventually with a standing army. As Elton wrote, even as early as the late fifteenth century, “...France was an absolute monarchy to a degree unknown elsewhere, and French

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49

<sup>14</sup> The word ‘Habsburg’ was derived from the name of a castle, ‘Habichtsburg’ (The Hawk Castle), in the Swiss canton Aargau. The historical origin of this dynasty was traced back to the 10th century; however, it was only with the election of Rudolph I (r. as the Holy Roman Emperor 1273-1291) as the Holy Roman Emperor in the late 13th century that the Habsburgs became a significant dynasty in Europe. For a detailed account of the Habsburgs see the article on the Habsburgs, *Encyclopedia Americana*, Volume 13, p. 624

<sup>15</sup> Rice and Grafton, *op. cit.*, p. 126

institutional development had undergone a genuine change”<sup>16</sup>. This process of centralization gained a significant momentum with the reign of Francis I (r. 1515-1547). While making himself the champion of triumphant individualism, he finally broke down the medieval barriers, which had divided the society into classes and the kingdom into principalities; he standardized law and centralized government institutions<sup>17</sup>. Thenceforward, the former feudal-seigniorial organization was totally abolished and replaced by a coordinated system headed by the monarch, in which former autonomous principalities were transformed into dependent provinces<sup>18</sup>.

After eliminating the power of these principalities, Francis I decided to deal with a stronger source of power, namely the Church. With the Concordat of Bologna, concluded with Pope Leo X (p. 1513-1521 – Giovanni Lorenzo de Medici) in 1516, he had secured to himself the right to choose French bishops and abbots, thus bringing the Gallican Church into closer harmony with the royal policies. The French law courts or parliament, were brought into stricter subordination to the crown as well. The result was that both the Church and the parliament began to support the monarchy. This support could be observed, for example, in the monarchical attempt to check the spread of Protestantism in France in the second half of the sixteenth century<sup>19</sup>.

As James Collins wrote, with these achievements of Francis I, France turned out to be a ‘legislative monarchy’, since Francis “...focused on making the law, not discovering it”<sup>20</sup>. Collins classified the political development of French monarchy under three phases: He argued that between thirteenth and fifteenth centuries French monarchy was a ‘judicial monarchy’ because the king’s chief function remained that of judge, in which the monarch discovered the law, he did not make it. Between sixteenth and eighteenth centuries there was a ‘legislative monarchy’, since the

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<sup>16</sup> G. R. Elton, ‘Renaissance and Reformation Europe’, in Norman Cantor (ed.), *Perspectives on the European Past: Conversations with Historians*, (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 231

<sup>17</sup> Jacques Pirenne, *The Tides of History, Volume II: From the Expansion of Islam to the Treaties of Westphalia*, trans. by Lovett Edwards, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 455

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 457

<sup>19</sup> Geoffrey Bruun, *Europe in Evolution: 1415-1815*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945), p. 149

<sup>20</sup> James Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 3

monarchs began to make laws instead of just implementing it. Finally, eighteenth century onwards, French monarchy was an ‘administrative monarchy’, in which the law began to be administered by the king as well.

In sum, eliminating the power of autonomous principalities, bringing the Gallican Church and the parliament into closer harmony with royal policies, and law-making revealed the fact that, by the turn of the sixteenth century, France was the most centralized state of Europe. Even some historians argued that it was the greatest state of Western Europe at that time, both in terms of political organization and in terms of material resources<sup>21</sup>.

In England, on the other hand, there was no major institutional transformation; rather, there was a recovery of the methods and achievements of an earlier monarchy designed by Edward IV (r. 1461-1483) and Henry VII<sup>22</sup>. Therefore, Henry VIII (r. 1509-1547), did not, like the King of France, have to centralize the country’s institutions, since they had already been centralized to some degree. But two rival sources of power opposed him in his quests for further centralization: parliament and the church. What Henry VIII did was to use the former to legitimize the suppression of the latter. In other words, he convened the Parliament to justify his break with the Papal authority and to legitimize subsequent measures regarding the Catholic Churches in England, such as confiscation of Church properties and declaration of the King of England as the ‘supreme head of the Anglican Church’.

Another significant factor that affected the administrative centralization in England was the Reformation. Elton called the impact of Reformation on English monarchy as a ‘revolution’, because the subsequent administrative recasting<sup>23</sup>:

...was based on the principle that government must not be vested in the person of the king to the degree that was inevitable in the Middle Ages; that it must be vested in a machinery working under the king, but independent in its continuity from accidents of the king’s personality, his death, his minority, or his senility.

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<sup>21</sup> T. A. Morris, *Europe and England in the Sixteenth Century*, (London: Routledge, 1998) p. 5

<sup>22</sup> Elton, *op. cit.*, p. 231

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 232



Different from their western counterparts, the political disunity prevented Germany and Italy from competing with the centralizing powers of Europe, namely with Spain, Portugal, France, the Low Countries, and England, in the race for overseas empires. It also left these two states vulnerable to invasion. For nearly four hundred years, from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth, the great powers waged their major campaigns on Italian and German lands<sup>24</sup>.

In Germany, there were approximately three hundred political entities on the eve of the Reformation. At the top of the German political hierarchy, there were the seven electoral principalities, responsible for the election of the Holy Roman Emperors – the three archbishoprics of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne; and four secular principalities of the Count Palatinate of the Rhine, the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and the King of Bohemia. Below them came the ecclesiastical and secular princes: the dukes of Bavaria and Württemberg, and the landgraves of Hesse. Following these relatively strong princes, there were a number of lesser princes, bishoprics, abbeys and imperial knights. What tied all these different types of political organizations was the Imperial Diet (Reichstag), which was the main institution of the Holy Roman Empire. It was the formal meeting between Emperor and princes, which were summoned by the Emperor to permit discussion of outstanding problems and issues among the principal members of the German political hierarchy<sup>25</sup>. According to Rice and Grafton, despite this extreme form of disunity, even Germany could not remain totally isolated from the inclination towards administrative centralization<sup>26</sup>:

They [German principalities] transformed their old councils of nobles and ecclesiastics into permanent and more specialized bodies staffed largely by professionals with legal training. As in the western monarchies the council, at once the supreme administrative body and the high court of justice of the principality, became the key unit of effective central government, its members appointed exclusively by the prince and responsible only to him. Princes rationalized the financial machinery of their states and regularized the collection of taxes.

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<sup>24</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, 156

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209

<sup>26</sup> Rice and Crafton, *op. cit.*, p. 130

Although remained politically decentralized during the sixteenth century, Italy's degree of political disunity was less than that of Germany. By 1450, five states shared the substance of power in the Peninsula: the kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the republics of Florence and Venice, and the Duchy of Milan. Naples was a feudal monarchy; the Papal States, an ecclesiastical principality most of which was independent of effective papal control; Florence's institutions were republican, but in fact it was ruled by the merchant house of Medici; Milan had a despotic rule, with effective political power monopolized by the Duke; Venice was an aristocracy ruled by a closed circle of families who monopolized both political and economic power; and all these city states were effectively independent of any higher authority<sup>27</sup>. Renaissance provided a very significant development in the Italian Peninsula, so that, in the fifteenth century, "...the most advanced, the most cultured, the most artistic and sophisticated people in Europe were the Italians"<sup>28</sup>. But this primacy was lost in the sixteenth century, since Italy turned out to be a battlefield between the imperial ambitions of two strong dynasties, namely the Habsburgs and the Valois.

All in all, early modern period represented a crucial phase in a "...long-drawn transition from 'medieval' to 'modern', and in the development of governments and their connections with social groups or classes"<sup>29</sup>. This transition was accompanied by a dawning national sense, still indistinct and blended with other feelings, primarily religious; however, there was beginning to emerge the 'nation-state' most dynamic of all Europe's political forms<sup>30</sup>. In other words, there emerged an 'embryonic' state system; embryonic "...in the sense that the present political divisions of Western Europe were only vaguely discernible within it, and also in the sense that modern forms of state government and administration were only partly developed"<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133

<sup>28</sup> Bruun, *op. cit.*, 129

<sup>29</sup> Kiernan, *op.cit.*, p. 1

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 5

## B. ARMY:

As all other aspects of political life, the military began to transform in the early modern period, and the first and one of the most important of these transformations was the redefinition of the concept of 'war'. Not only the meaning of this concept, but also relevant definitions regarding typology of war, tactics, armament, fortifications, economics of warfare and propaganda were changed as well. In the sixteenth century, 'war' was not accepted as an anomaly; rather, as Anderson wrote, "...war to men of that age was a natural condition, as natural as peace and perhaps more so"<sup>32</sup>.

Within the framework of this redefinition, a very significant development was 'internationalization' of the concept of 'war'. Accordingly, by the early modern period, military science and the law of war were no more confined within the bounds of communities, on the contrary, these two began to look outward and have special reference to foreigners; it is to claim that this philosophy of war belongs to a great community, formed by the entire world and the whole human race<sup>33</sup>. In other words, 'war' became a matter of the international community; thenceforward it was not limited as a political anomaly of a particular state or people.

A second significant development was the 'secularization' of the concept of 'war'. Throughout the century the theological explanation steadily lost ground. It was not just that international law, generalizing from individual wars to warfare as a phenomenon, broadened this political motivation into a rule. As Hale wrote, starting from the sixteenth century the princes of Europe and their councilors began to evaluate the crusading ideals of such Popes as Alexander VI (p. 1492-1503 – Rodrigo Borgia), Leo X and Clement VII (p. 1523-1534 – Giulio Giovanni de Medici) in terms of secular profit and loss<sup>34</sup>. That is, 'war' was perceived in the

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<sup>32</sup> M. S. Anderson, *The Origins of the Modern States System 1494-1618*, (New York: Longman, 1998), p. 1

<sup>33</sup> J. R. Hale, 'Sixteenth Century Explanations of War and Violence', (*Past and Present*, No. 51, 1971, pp 3-26), p. 4

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9

early modern period as an essentially secular phenomenon, begun, conducted and ended voluntarily by men<sup>35</sup>.

Third, the legal understanding of 'war' began to be transformed as well. Regarding the justification of 'war' the lawyers of the sixteenth century agreed that the motive for the war must be just, that it should only be waged at the command of the legitimate sovereign superior, and that the means used and the nature of the peace settlement should be as moderate as possible. What is more, all these sixteenth century jurists agreed that 'war' was a continuation of justice by other means and should only be undertaken when all possibilities of peaceful arbitration had been exhausted. According to Hamilton there were several conditions for declaring a 'just war'<sup>36</sup>:

First the war must be waged by a legitimate power; secondly, the cause and reason must themselves be just; thirdly, it must be properly conducted and a sense of proportion kept at the beginning, during hostilities and after victory...The reason for this general conclusion is that, while a war is not per se evil, yet, because it may bring many misfortunes, it is one of those undertakings which are often ill done, and therefore it needs a good many conditions to make it just.

Renaissance had an important contribution to these transformations in the philosophy of war. As in all other fields, during Renaissance, historians and soldiers searched for ancient Greek and Roman military techniques and doctrines. According to Rothenberg, such a survey proved to be very useful, since it emphasized a central idea correctly, namely "...the superiority of native troops, raised on a more or less permanent footing, to mercenaries hired for a campaign only"<sup>37</sup>. In other words, the humanists championed the superiority of the ancient to modern methods of fighting and a return to the military system of the early Roman Empire. One of them was a Bavarian historian and humanist, Johann Turmair Aventinus (1477-1534), who wrote extensively on the reasons of military failures of the Europeans against the Ottomans. He presented his ideas in two memorials, '*A Warning and an Explanation*

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>36</sup> Bernice Hamilton, *Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century Spain*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 142

<sup>37</sup> Gunther Rothenberg, 'Aventinus and the Defense of the Empire Against the Turks', (*Studies in the Renaissance*, Vol. 10, 1963, pp. 60-67), p. 60

*why the Lord has granted so many victories to the infidel Turk*’ and the shorter ‘*On the Military Establishment of the Ancient Romans*’. In these memorials, he advocated the creation of permanent military colonies on the Roman pattern along the exposed frontier separating the Christian and Islamic domains. He also proposed effective and just central governments and restoration of the military power of the Holy Roman Empire, instead of solely relying on mercenaries<sup>38</sup>.

Mercenaries had been the subjects of a significant debate throughout the early modern period, since they made up a large part of every sixteenth-century army. They had important advantages, and were normally the first choice of any government that had to raise an army quickly since they could always be obtained, even at short notice, by any state and retained as long as it could pay them. They were also better trained and armed than domestic levies and were usually willing to do battle with any opponent, untroubled by considerations of nationality or even religion. However, on the other hand, they were expensive, and unpaid mercenaries could produce political as well as military disasters. Since they had no obedience other than money, they could easily switch sides, and this disloyalty outweighed all the advantages. As Rice and Grafton wrote, “[w]hen they left unpaid, they became pillaging mobs, mercilessly sacking cities and ravishing the countryside. Even when paid, they did not accept their discipline from, or give their loyalty to, the crown exclusively.”<sup>39</sup>

The danger was not merely that ex-soldiers might become criminals. They might also become rebels. “In Flanders and France”, a sixteenth century political theorist, Giovanni Botero (1544-1617) pointed out, “long wars have so accustomed the people to warfare and bloodshed that when peace had been made with their enemies they turned their weapons against their own country”<sup>40</sup>. Likewise, many authors of the sixteenth century believed that enduring peace inevitably led to weakness and degeneration in any society, that it stifled energies and promoted an ignoble desire for material comfort at the expense of nobler ambitions; whereas, the war swept the unemployed, the vagrant, the starving and the criminal into the army

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<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63

<sup>39</sup> Rice and Grafton, *op. cit.*, p. 117

<sup>40</sup> Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 10

and sent them off the fight and die far from home, very often seemed a respectable and valuable social safety-valve<sup>41</sup>. In sum, foreign war might well be the best of all guarantees of domestic peace. Thus, the solution to the problem of domestic violence was seen in war, ‘the foul refiner of the state’, as the sixteenth century poet, Daniel, put it<sup>42</sup>. Henri II (r. 1547-1559) justified the war of 1551 against Habsburgs partly on these grounds; the Venetian ambassador reported in 1575 that Henri III’s (r. 1574-1589) entourage were talking about the need for a foreign war to divert peasants who had been trained to wars, from pillage and possible revolt<sup>43</sup>.

Regarding the military achievements of the sixteenth century, another significant debate among the contemporary historians was about the concept of ‘military revolution’<sup>44</sup>. In this conspicuous age, the developments in the military technology and philosophy were so intense that it dramatically changed all the conceptions about wars, armies, strategies and tactics; therefore it could be understood as a ‘revolution’. The advocates of the ‘military revolution’ argued that, between the middle of the fifteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth century, the technology of war changed with unprecedented rapidity, significantly altering the manner in which economic and social resources could be applied to achieve political ends by military means<sup>45</sup>.

One of the main defenders of this concept was Michael Roberts, whose ‘military revolution’ took place between 1560 and 1660 and centered on the innovations in tactics and strategies of Maurice of Nassau (r. 1618-1625), the Prince of Orange, and Gustav Adolph (r. 1611-1632) of Sweden. He described his version of the military revolution as consisting of four essential components, or smaller revolutions within the larger one: the ascendancy of massed infantry over heavy

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<sup>41</sup> Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 2

<sup>42</sup> Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 21

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> For a detailed review of the literature on this concept see, David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe*, (London: Tauris Publishers, 1998) and Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)

<sup>45</sup> John F. Guilmartin, ‘Ideology and Conflict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1606’, (*Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol 18. No. 4, 1988, pp. 721-747), p. 733

cavalry, accompanied by tactical innovations which allowed for the effective use of this infantry; a marked increase in the scale of warfare, especially in the normal size of armies of the major powers; the development of new strategic thinking – a resolute offensive strategy designed to annihilate the enemy in battle combined with a gradualist strategy of conquest through methodological occupation and consolidation of successive base areas; and, a prodigious increase in the impact of war on European society<sup>46</sup>.

Roberts's main opponent was Geoffrey Parker, who argued that the tactical and the strategic developments were not revolutionary at all; rather, they were the culmination Italian and Spanish military developments, starting from a century ago<sup>47</sup>. His 'military revolution' dated between 1530 and 1710, and was attributed to a number of factors, the central of which was the triumph of the pikemen, which lay open the road to unrestricted military increase. In his argument, with the potential for increased army size established by the ascendancy of infantry, it remained the task of a new system of fortification to make it actual<sup>48</sup>.

Whether these military innovations could be labeled as a 'revolution' or not, it is a fact that armies continued to grow in the sixteenth century. To give some numbers, the French government estimated that it could call upon 20,000 soldiers in 1451, 50,000 in 1558 and 68,500 in 1610; whereas its main rival, Charles V, calculated in 1552 that he could mobilize 150,000 men throughout his Empire<sup>49</sup>. Together with tactical changes, this increase in the armies revealed how 'war' became one of the major items in the agenda of the early modern European states.

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<sup>46</sup> Mahinder Kingra, 'The Trace Italienne and the Military Revolution During the Eighty Years War, 1567-1648', (*The Journal of Military History*, Vol 57, No. 3, 1993, pp. 431-446), p. 432. For a detailed account of Roberts's thesis, see Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution 1560-1660*, (Belfast: M. Boyd, 1956).

<sup>47</sup> Geoffrey Parker, 'The 'Military Revolution' 1560-1660 – a Myth?', (*Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 48, 1976, pp. 197-201), later incorporated into his book *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

<sup>48</sup> Kingra, *op. cit.*, p. 433

<sup>49</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 8

### C. ECONOMY:

The transformations of early modern Europe were not only remained within political and military spheres; European economic system realized dramatic changes in this period as well. These changes were so dramatic that it affected not only the whole European economy, but also the world economy, because of the expansion of the economic networks to the remote parts of the world.

The first one of such changes was about the ‘money’. Accordingly, in the fifteenth century, there emerged a ‘bullion famine’ in Europe, which resulted in the massive transfer of precious metals from the New World to Europe. The reason of this ‘famine’ was the declining gold production in Sudan, which was the main region for the extraction of gold for the European economies in the fifteenth century<sup>50</sup>. This crisis forced Iberian Empires to find new resources, hence contributed to the motivations for the geographical explorations. These explorations, in turn, meant a lightening growth of transatlantic trade, whose volume increased eightfold between 1510 and 1550, and threefold again between 1550 and 1610<sup>51</sup>. According to the data provided by Kinderberger, at the turn of the sixteenth century, the gold arriving Europe annually amounted to 700 kilograms, whereas between 1500 and 1550, a mass of gold was transferred from the New World, about sixty tones<sup>52</sup>. On the other hand silver production in Europe and silver imports from the New World increased dramatically as well. As the tonnage of the fleets sent to the New World rose from 10,000 tons in the 1540s to double, triple, and in the peak year of 1608, more than quadruple that amount, the flow of silver brought back to Seville increased over sevenfold<sup>53</sup>.

This dramatic increase in the precious metals, used for the production of coins, contributed to a huge inflation in Europe, which was came to be known as the ‘price revolution’. Indeed, bullion transfer was not the sole factor affecting this

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<sup>50</sup> Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 168

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170

<sup>52</sup> Charles Kinderberger, *Economic and Financial Crises and Transformations in Sixteenth Century Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 3

<sup>53</sup> Jan de Vries, *Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis 1600-1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 113



dramatic increase in prices, rather there are some underlying factors, most important of which was the increase in the European population, which was recovered quickly after the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century. The reason behind the population increase was the increasing international trade and urban development, which resulted in mass migrations from the countryside to the major cities of Europe<sup>54</sup>. This had an accelerative impact on the increase in production. Together with the bullion transfers, this over-production turned out to be the main reason of the price revolution. To give an example, between 1561 and 1570, compared to the period between 1511 and 1520, grain prices rose by 264 percent and other foodstuffs by 161 percent<sup>55</sup>.

The second significant change was about the conduct of fairs. As a matter of fact, fairs had had a significant impact in the European economy, and in the early modern period their nature changed. Accordingly, meetings of merchants trading primarily in goods yielded to fairs of merchant bankers specializing in finance<sup>56</sup>. Starting from the twelfth century with the Champagne fairs in France, these gatherings became very significant in the sixteenth century, because they resulted in the establishment of premature credit mechanisms. Accordingly, at first, balances were paid in coin, but increasingly, they came to be paid in bills of exchange drawn on another place or on the next fair. Such trade of bills of exchange led to the establishment of first bourses in Bruges, Antwerp and London, the initial mechanisms for capitalist economies.

A third development was regarding the trade. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had seized Constantinople and the Black Sea, and by the first half of the sixteenth century the conquests of Mesopotamia, Balkans and Egypt had been completed. These Ottoman conquests of the ancient land trade routes were accompanied by the Portuguese supremacy in the Indian Ocean. Jacques Pirenne perceived this combination as the "...greatest revolution that had ever taken

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<sup>54</sup>David Maland, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1-3

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9

place in world trade”<sup>57</sup>. The direct result of the domination of the Indian Ocean by the Portuguese was to divert Asian trade to the continental routes, forcing the Hindu and Persian ports to cede the greater part of their operations to the caravan cities of the interior. In the sixteenth century, the shifting of the trade routes to the continent and the unity of the Ottoman Empire, which assured the safety of these routes, restored to Constantinople her place as the great international market between Asia and Europe<sup>58</sup>.

Regarding the banking facilities, at the first half of the sixteenth century, the Age of Fuggers began to replace the Age of Genoese. Accordingly, since the turn of the fifteenth century, European banking was in the hands of the Italian, particularly, Genoese bankers. Indeed, the Fugger family of Augsburg had been dealing in banking activities long before the sixteenth century; however, it was only after the establishment of their lucrative relationship with the House of Habsburgs that they became the main banking family of Europe. At the beginning of sixteenth century, they made loans to Maximilian I (r. as the Holy Roman Emperor 1493-1519), for which they received mortgages on gold and silver mines in Hungary and the Tyrol<sup>59</sup>. Thus, they did not only act as intermediaries but also they had a claim in the production of precious metals in Europe. However, their role was enhanced extensively because of their contribution to the election of Charles V as the Holy Roman Emperor. As the Fuggers supported the Habsburgs, those Genoese bankers, who had lost their primacy, began to support the French by transferring their activities from Genoa to Lyons. The long wars between Habsburg and Valois dynasties exhausted the resources of both of these banking branches, but it was the Genoese bankers that won the competition at the end, since their banking activities were not heavily dependent on one actor as the Fuggers<sup>60</sup>. Fuggers could not survive the Spanish financial crisis in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, and the Age of Genoese bankers, which had been the case in the fourteenth and fifteenth

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<sup>57</sup> Jacques Pirenne, *op. cit.*, p. 395

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 396

<sup>59</sup> Maland, *op. cit.*, p. 15

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16

centuries, revitalized once more. Wallerstein commented about this damaging Fugger-Habsburg interdependence as such<sup>61</sup>:

The Fuggers and Charles gave each other their power and their base. But this also meant that they rose and fell together. For, in reality, the activity of the Fuggers was limited to the confines of the Empire of Charles, and was international only to that extent that empire can be regarded as international.

Related with the banking activities, there emerged the national debt problem. National debts were unknown in the ancient world, and almost impossible in the Middle Ages because of the weakness of the central governments and the uncertainty of succession. It is only with the regime of Francis I in France in the sixteenth century that we first encounter this economic phenomenon. For national debts can only exist when the state can force people to delay collecting them or at opportune moments refuse to pay them, while simultaneously forcing groups to lend, in specie or by various paper transactions, the current excess<sup>62</sup>.

Of course to pay these debts, sixteenth century monarchs necessitated additional sources of income<sup>63</sup>. Accordingly, the first source of revenue, ‘the largest in the past but of dwindling importance in the sixteenth century’, was the royal domain, which yielded rents and dues owed to the king as the chief of the feudal hierarchy. The second and more favorable source of revenue was indirect taxation, derived from the customs duties and sales taxes on wine, meat, cloth, etc. A third source, on the other hand, was external, namely, the borrowing. The sale of government bonds and intense borrowings from the banker families were the most widely seen occurrences of the sixteenth century. The final source of revenue was the direct taxation, which the monarchs did not favor much because it produced the right of representation. This final source resulted in establishment of representative assemblies throughout Europe, such as the English Parliament, the Castilian or Aragonese Cortes, the Estates-General and the provincial estates of France<sup>64</sup>. In sum, the state in the sixteenth century was increasingly emerging as the great

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<sup>61</sup> Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 174

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138

<sup>63</sup> Rice and Crafton, *op. cit.*, p. 119

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120

collector and redistributor of revenue; it derived income from taxation, the sale of offices, government bonds, and confiscation, an enormous share of the various national products. In other words, "...whether intentionally or not the state became the principal entrepreneur of the century"<sup>65</sup>.

Another important factor having a considerable impact on the European economy in the early modern period was the Reformation. Accordingly, Protestantism provided the morale for capitalism by the removal of the ban on usury, an emphasis on the duty of labor in an earthly calling, and an asceticism, which forbade the dissipation of wealth and pleasure<sup>66</sup>. The main factors in the rise of this capitalist spirit have been secular, however, the lead of Protestant over Catholic countries by the seventeenth century was not only due to religious factors; rather secular political developments contributed to this supremacy more. Nevertheless, Protestantism contributed in that it divorced salvation from conduct, since economic activity was left to take the course of nature, unhampered by religious restrictions<sup>67</sup>.

Until the end of the sixteenth century, the centerpiece of Europe's outstretched trade routes was Spain, and, within Spain, Seville. The merchants of this city, organized in the *Casa de Contraction*, possessed royal monopoly privileges to exploit the trade with Spain's overseas possessions<sup>68</sup>. However, Seville lost this supremacy to Antwerp, which, in the sixteenth century, turned out to be an international market center, and began to link the Mediterranean and Baltic trades with the transcontinental trade routes via southern Germany. Not only did Antwerp coordinate much of the international trade of the Habsburg Empire, but it was also the linchpin by which both England and Portugal were tied into the European world economy. It served among other things as 'England's staple'<sup>69</sup>.

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<sup>65</sup> Fernand Braudel, 'The Mediterranean Economy in The Sixteenth Century', in Peter Earle (ed.), *Essays in European Economic History 1500-1800*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 27

<sup>66</sup> Jacques Pirenne, *op. cit.*, pp. 438-439

<sup>67</sup> For a detailed account of the impact of Protestantism in the European economies, particularly on the rise of the Dutch economy see, Jelle Riemersma, *Religious Factors in Early Dutch Capitalism, 1550-1650*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1967)

<sup>68</sup> Jan de Vries, *op. cit.*, p. 113

<sup>69</sup> Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 175

The rise of Antwerp was not due solely to the happy coincidence of industry and waterways but also to the political developments in the late fifteenth century. Accordingly, in his conflicts against France for the control of Burgundian possessions of his father-in-law, Maximilian I got the support of Antwerp, and in 1488, the city was rewarded with the imperial order that all imperial merchants dealing with foreign trade should move from Bruges to Antwerp<sup>70</sup>. This transfer of merchants resulted in an unforeseen advantage for the city. Moreover, at the turn of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese declared that Antwerp became their principle pepper market and within a year, a thousand tons of spices began to be distributed there. As a result of these developments, Antwerp bourse was opened and became the home of international commission agents, brokers, dealers in bills of exchange and the movement of commodity prices.<sup>71</sup>

Unlike Bruges, Venice and London, Antwerp was a free port and business was carried unhampered by the intermediary of the city brokers. Foreigners were as free to trade there as the citizens of Antwerp themselves<sup>72</sup>. Because of these opportunities, the center of finance moved there from Italy as well. The great capitalists of Augsburg, the Fuggers, who so largely influenced the policy of Charles V, came to live there. In 1532, the King of Portugal, John III (r. 1521-1557), entrusted the farming of the spice trade to the Nuremberg bankers who had set up business there<sup>73</sup>. All in all, Antwerp was the rising sun of the sixteenth century instead of the dawning Seville, and this meant that Atlantic became the new center of world trade, decreasing Mediterranean from its previous superiority to a second degree commercial area.

To sum up, European economy entered into a period of transformation in the early modern period. Geographical explorations resulted in the formation of new trade routes which had diverted the lucrative Eastern trade from the Mediterranean basin to the Atlantic. This hampered the economic development of the Mediterranean states, particularly Spain, France, Italy and the Ottoman Empire. On

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<sup>70</sup> Maland, *op. cit.*, p. 20

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21

<sup>72</sup> Jacques Pirenne, *op. cit.*, p. 445

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

the other hand, those states shoring the Atlantic Ocean, namely, Portugal, England and the Netherlands gained much from this development and became the leading figures in the new European economy. More importantly, there emerged a secular understanding of economics as in all aspects of life. The lift of the ban on usury and the introduction of new credit mechanism provided the opportunity to the European economy to prosper. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the economic transformation in the early modern period contributed to the rise of capitalism in the coming centuries.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **NEGATIVE CONTRIBUTION**

Ottoman contribution to the construction of the Modern European identity is a significant debate among the historians. In this thesis, this contribution is termed as the ‘negative contribution’, meaning that by perceiving the Ottoman Empire as the ‘other’, European people came to identify themselves in opposition to it. In other words, it is argued that the Ottoman Empire was an outsider to the European system and rather than actively involved in the identity formation process, it simply acted as a passive actor, only exposing an anti-thesis to the European values.

In this chapter, it is aimed to show how the concept of ‘Europe’ came into being and how the Ottoman Empire acted as the ‘other’ of Europe. In doing that; however, a theory-practice gap is analyzed, since European perception of the Ottoman Empire was not monolithic and in practice a union of European powers against the Ottoman Empire had never been materialized in the early modern period. The reasons of this gap are extensively examined in this chapter in order to give the reader a challenging view to the conventional historiography.

#### **A. THE IDEA OF EUROPE UNTIL THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD**

There is a general view shared by many historians that the idea of Europe was an invention of the modern era, particularly emerged with the French and Industrial Revolutions. True, these events contributed much to the formation of a European identity; however the roots of the concept of ‘Europe’, which shaped the modern understanding, can be traced even back to the ancient Greece. Accordingly, in Greek mythology, ‘Europa’ is the daughter of a Phoenician king, Agenor. Having been seduced by Zeus disguised as a white bull, she had abandoned her homeland in

present day Lebanon for the island of Crete where she later married the King of the island. Therefore, ironically, according to Delanty, the very concept of ‘Europe’, which would later be used to distinguish the ‘West’ from the ‘East’, was an eastern import<sup>74</sup>.

It was with the Greek literature on the Trojan Wars that a binary opposition between the ‘East’ representing Asia and the ‘West’ representing Europe had first emerged. This literature, which reflected the Trojans as an external threat, made ‘Europe’ a concept meaning more than a geographical area and added a connotation asserting a definitive characteristic of a group of people against another. This was one of the most initial steps for the formation of a European identity. Accordingly, Pagden wrote that the tale of the Trojan Wars<sup>75</sup>:

...becomes a mythopoeic history, a tale of hatred between two continents, a hatred that would burn steadily down the centuries, as the Trojans were succeeded by the Persians, the Persians by the Ottoman Turks, and the Turks by the Russians.

Before proceeding to the formation of the European identity it is necessary to define the identity formation process in brief. According to Delanty, identities can be constructed in two ways; first, by a sense of belongingness and solidarity arising out of shared lives, and second, by a focus on opposition to the ‘other’. In the second case<sup>76</sup>:

...the ‘We’ is defined not by reference to a framework of shared experiences, common goals and a collective horizon, but by the negation of the Other. Identification takes place through the imposition of otherness in the formation of a binary typology of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. The purity and stability of the ‘We’ is guaranteed first in the naming, then in the demonisation and finally, in the cleansing of otherness...The defining characteristic of the group is not what members have in common but in what separates them from other groups.

Emergence of the Persian threat resulted in such kind of a binary typology between the Greeks and Persians. It is in this historical context that the concept of

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<sup>74</sup> Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, (Palgrave: Macmillan, 1995), p. 17

<sup>75</sup> Anthony Pagden, “Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent”, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), p. 11

<sup>76</sup> Delanty, *op.cit.*, p. 5



‘barbarian’, which had used by the Greeks to define those former inhabitants of Greece unable to speak the Greek language, gained a pejorative connotation and came to be utilized to define the Persians. What is more, geographical concepts of ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’ began to mean not only differences in language, custom and characteristics but also distinct systems of government<sup>77</sup>. Accordingly, the city-state of Athens became the symbol of Greek freedom, while Persia was seen as the symbol of despotism, whose absolute rulers did respect ‘neither gods nor law’. This identification was the first serious – not legendary or poetic – indication of ‘East versus West’ dichotomy, with the ‘West’ representing Europe identified with civilization and freedom, and the ‘East’ representing Asia identified with barbarity and despotism. From then on, for centuries, the dichotomies of Europe and Asia, West and East, or Occident and Orient have played a great role in European thought. However, this division should not be overstated. There was not and could not be any Greek ‘Euro-consciousness’ at that time. The Greeks lived at both sides of the Aegean Sea, and if there is differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’, it was between Hellenes and barbarians, not clearly between Europeans and Asians. Still, during the wars between the Greeks and the Persians in the fifth century BC, the conflict was presented in political terms as a rift between free ‘Europe’ and despotic ‘Asia.’

The concept of Europe gained a new connotation in the Middle Ages with its identification with Christianity and emergence of a new threat, namely the Arabs, who had reached the gates of Constantinople in 665 and to the Iberian Peninsula in 711. In other words, from the seventh century onwards, the idea of Europe came to be articulated against Islam, since Europe was to face the Islamic threat both from the east and the south. On the one hand, in the east, between 665 and 722, Constantinople was besieged five times by the Umayyad dynasty, but Arab armies could not overcome the high and strong walls of the city. On the other hand, in 711, Arab armies under the command of Tariq bin Ziyad passed the Strait of Gibraltar and defeated the King of Visigoths in Spain. The Muslim expansion reached even to southern France until 732, when the destiny of Europe was determined by the decisive Battle of Poitiers (or the Battle of Tours) between the Arabs and a coalition army under the command of Charles Martel (The Hammer) (r. 715-741), the chief

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<sup>77</sup> Pim den Boer, ‘Europe to 1914: The Making of An Idea’, in Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 16

minister of the 'Austrasia', the eastern Frankish domains of Champagne and the Meuse area with Rheims as capital. His victory over the Muslims drove the Arab armies south to the Pyrenees and saved Europe from an Islamic invasion. The significance of this battle did not only come from the defeat of the Arabs but also from the description of Charles Martel's army by a contemporary historian Isidore Pacensis<sup>78</sup>. In order to describe this army, he first used the adjective form of the concept of 'Europe', namely 'European'. This was significant in the sense that the first usage of the adjective of 'European' emerged to negate the 'other', particularly the 'Islamic other'. Pim den Boer expresses the importance of this Battle as such<sup>79</sup>:

This Battle was of major significance for the future of Europe. Had the Muslims not been defeated it is inconceivable that Christianity would have been wiped out in Europe. Whether this is true or not, the symbolic significance of the battle [He refers to the introduction of the adjective 'European'], as opposed to its possible military implications, is of greater importance in that it underlies the emergence of an adversarial identity in the West. Above all, it heralded the arrival of Europe as a proto-cultural idea. Under the signs of crucifix and the crescent, the clash of Christianity and Islam was crucial in the formation of the Euro-centric world-view.

Following the Battle of Poitiers, in the Christmas night of 800, Charlemagne (r. 771-814), the grandson of Charles Martel, was crowned as the Holy Roman Emperor. This glorious Frankish King was seen as the successor to the Roman Emperors of the West. His rule was so significant for the perception of Europe as more than a geographical concept that the poems, written in that period, referred Charlemagne as '*rex, pater Europeae*' (the king, father of Europe) and he is praised as '*Europea veneranda apex*' (the revered crown of Europe)<sup>80</sup>.

The contribution of Franks to the idea of Europe was very significant, although the Frankish Kingdom did never control the whole Europe. According to Mikkeli<sup>81</sup>:

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<sup>78</sup> Heiki Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 20, Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), p. 25

<sup>79</sup> Pim den Boer, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27

<sup>81</sup> Mikkeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19

Franks's first undisputed achievement was their success in halting the centrifugal process in Europe – an act that was to prove vital to the subsequent development of the European societies. Secondly, the Franks succeeded in uniting much of France as it is known today, part of present day Germany right up to the River Elbe, and the Netherlands beneath a common administration and to some degree the same institutions. Many scholars have indeed pointed out that the Frankish state was geographically almost identical to the EEC created by 'the Six', i.e. the single market set up in Europe in the 1950s. Thirdly, the Carolingian Renaissance in the ninth century engendered a uniformity of thought and intellectual attitudes symbolized by the birth of a uniform script, the Carolingian minuscule. The cornerstone of this uniform civilization was the erudition of the late antiquity, which the Carolingian scholars sought to rescue

Seen in this perspective, it can be argued that from the eighth until the tenth century, the concept of 'Europe' was used more than a geographical-cultural term meaning the Christians living in the continent. With the rise of Islam, the ancient dichotomy of 'East versus West' was revitalized under the rubric of 'Islam versus Christianity'.

This religious understanding of Europe reached its epitome with the Crusades. There were numerous crusades – at least eight big campaigns – between 1095 and 1270, aiming to eliminate the 'threat' of Islam and to recover the Holy Lands occupied by the Muslims. These campaigns aimed collective mobilization of Christendom and gave a strong sense of territorial identity to medieval Europe. The political energy of the feudal kingdoms in Western Europe was transformed into an eastward movement towards colonization. This was also Christendom's counter-offensive against Islam and the idea of a Holy War against the infidel was born<sup>82</sup>. What should not be forgotten, however, was that the idea of Europe was not central to the crusades; Christianity was the principal identity of the crusaders<sup>83</sup>. The restoration of the idea of Europe in the struggle between East and West had to wait two centuries more, until the early modern period.

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<sup>82</sup> Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 34

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35

## B. THE IDEA OF EUROPE IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD:

In the literature, a significant debate can be noticed regarding the emergence of a different kind of ‘idea of Europe’ in the early modern period, particularly with the advance of Ottomans through Central Europe. In understanding this new idea, three particular views are offered. The first view argues that the role of Ottoman Empire and Islam as ‘the other’ in the formation of the European identity in the early modern period, has only limited validity since the argument has been considerably exaggerated by social and political analysts anxious to read back contemporary themes into previous history. As one of the defenders of this view, Paul Rich stated, arguing in favor of the contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the construction of the European identity is simply an overestimation<sup>84</sup>. The problem with this type of thinking is that it tends to neglect the perception of the ‘other’ as a constitutive of the European identity. Rather than conceiving the negation of ‘other’ as a component of identity construction, it simply emphasizes the significance of commonness, i.e. a common culture or a common heritage.

The second view, on the other hand, argues that the Ottoman Empire contributed to the construction of the European identity in the early modern period. Within this broad perspective, there are two different sets of ideas. The first one advocates that the Ottoman advance in Europe created a significant reaction from the European powers of the time, and this reaction, in turn, brought identification of the ‘European/Christian’ by negating the ‘Turk’ as a negative reference group<sup>85</sup>. In other words, the Ottoman advance, which was perceived as a perilous external threat, becomes a constitutive element of a common consciousness that would turn out to be the basis of the European identity in the early modern period. What is more, this threat perception forced the politicians and philosophers of the period to

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<sup>84</sup> For the details of this argument see, Paul Rich, ‘European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment’, (*Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, 1999, pp. 435-451)

<sup>85</sup> For the details of this type of argumentation see, William H. McNeill, ‘Dünya Tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’, in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *Osmanlı ve Dünya*, trans. by Ümit Şimşek, (İstanbul, Ufuk Yayınları, 2000), p. 75; Arnold Toynbee, ‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Dünya Tarihindeki Yeri’, in Kemal Karpat, *op.cit.*, p. 52

dwell on unification schemes, which argued for ending internal conflicts and uniting against the common enemy. Early modern period witnessed mushrooming of such kind of books and manuscripts, contributing to the formation of a common consciousness. For these statesmen and philosophers, "...the Turk was a species different in kind from Christian states whether Catholic or Protestant, a political pariah excluded by his very nature from membership in the family of European states"<sup>86</sup>. In all, according to this view, Ottoman Empire became the anti-thesis of 'Europe' and European identity emerged in opposition to it.

The second set of ideas also accepts that the 'Turk' was perceived as a threat to Europe and there emerged a common fear-hatred towards them; however, it criticized the generalizations made by the first group. Accordingly, although there were some unification schemes formed by many rulers and authors of the time, these schemes can never be materialized in the early modern period. In other words, there has never been any such successful unification neither in theory nor in practice due to irreconcilable differences among the European states. The reasons of this failure were twofold: First of all, there is not a unified perception of the 'Turk', as the first group argued. True, the perception of the 'Turk' was generally negative; however, the degree of its pejorative character varies both temporally and spatially. The second reason, on the other hand, is that since the Habsburgs and the Papacy used the Turkish threat extensively as an instrument to maintain their influence in Europe, their proposals regarding the unification schemes were generally perceived skeptically by the European states.

Spatially, it can be argued that within those states, which had been continuously feeling the imminent Turkish threat because of geographical proximity or religious prejudices, the pejorative nature of the Turks was emphasized more. Among such states were the Habsburg Empire, the ardent opponent of the Ottoman advance in Europe, the Papal States, which had perceived the Turks as the vital threat for its very existence, and to some extent France, at least the French people, who had severely accused their rulers in allying with the 'Turk'. On the other hand, particularly remote states of Western Europe, such as England and the Low

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<sup>86</sup> Franklin Baumer, 'England, the Turk and the Common Corps of Christendom', (*The American Historical Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1944, pp. 26-48), p. 27

Countries, were more or less immune from these prejudices, and they perceived the Turks less negatively.

The Italian sources, perhaps better than most of its contemporaries, reflected the worries and fears originated by the ‘Turk’ in Europe. The Ottomans, who managed to conquer almost all of the Balkans by mid-fifteenth century, not only were threatening and diminishing the Venetian commercial presence in Eastern Mediterranean, but were also posing a threat to the Italian Peninsula with land incursions such as that of the raids in Venetian possessions in 1473 and naval incursions such as that of the conquest of Otranto in 1480<sup>87</sup>. More significantly, as a result of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Papal mediation induced the Italian states to end their internal conflicts and to accept the Peace of Lodi in 1454, which brought, for the first time, five leading Italian states – Venice, Florence, Genoa, Naples and the Papacy – for the professed purpose of defending Italy against the Turk<sup>88</sup>. However, still, every Italian state tried at one time or another to come to an understanding with the Turk against its Italian rivals. Therefore, although perceived as a threat in general, there is no uniform perception of the Turk in Italy. On the one hand, for those humanists – particularly Florentines – inspired from the Renaissance thinking, Ottoman advance remained engraved in their collective memory, and was later transformed by them into archetypes of the civilized world as opposed to barbarians – barbarians being the Turks<sup>89</sup>. The Papacy added a religious tune to this negative perception, by focusing on the religious divergence and the irreconcilable conflict of Christians and ‘Infidels’, in order to attempt in restoring its authority once more over its Christian subjects<sup>90</sup>:

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Turks for Rome the only target of a fully legitimate possible crusade, which would have enabled

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<sup>87</sup> Mustafa Soykut, *Image of the ‘Turk’ in Italy: A History of the ‘Other’ in Early Modern Europe, 1483-1683*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001), p. 2. For a detailed account of the impact of Otranto campaign see, Konstantinos Giakoumis, ‘Osmanlıların Otranto ve Apulia Seferi (1480-1481)’, trans. by Kürşat Akpınar, in Hasan Celal Güzel (et. al.) (eds.), *Türkler*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Vol. 9, 2002)

<sup>88</sup> Frederick C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 234

<sup>89</sup> Soykut, op. cit, p. 61

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47

Rome to bring once again *pax christiana* to Europe under apostolic auspices, regaining the authority that it had enjoyed between the aftermath of the conquest of Constantinople and before the Reformation.

On the other hand, Venetians had a more objective understanding of the Turks. As the ‘most favored nation’ for the Ottoman Empire among Italian states, there is good reason to presume that Venetians generally provided both the other Italian and European states with more accurate information regarding the Turks. In the Venetian ‘*relazioni*’ – ambassadorial reports – apart from negative characteristics, the Ottoman Empire was perceived as a model, “... as an admirable example for Christendom of how a mighty state should be”<sup>91</sup>. Accordingly the Turks “...were admired and praised for their military valor, obedience to authority, discipline, perseverance, justice, order and many other qualities” that the Christians lacked<sup>92</sup>.

The perceptions of the Habsburg possessions varied due to geographical, historical and cultural differences. Among them the German perception was one of the most negative ones, because between Germany and the Ottoman Empire remained only a buffer state, Hungary, whose political existence was in danger in the sixteenth century due to continuous Ottoman campaigns. Therefore, they felt the Turkish threat more intensely than any other Habsburg possession. On the other hand, Germans did not hesitate to use this threat against the Habsburgs, which were trying to suppress the spread of Protestantism in Germany. Another Habsburg possession, Spain, perceived the Turks mainly on religious grounds as the Papacy. Ottoman Empire remained too far to dare a direct and large-scale attack on Spain; therefore, the Spanish did not fear from a military expedition; rather their fears were religious and cultural. Their experiences regarding the Moorish kingdoms in Iberia and the process of *reconquista* resulted in identifying the Turkish threat as an Islamic one, which aimed to take the revenge of the expulsion of the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. The Dutch perception, conversely, was very positive about the Turks. Because of their continuous discontent with the Habsburgs, the enemy of

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<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8. For a detailed account of the Venetian ‘*relazioni*’ on the Turks see, Lester Libby, ‘Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire from the Peace of 1503 to the War of Cyprus’, (*Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol 9. No. 4, 1978, pp. 103-126)

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

their enemy was seen as a valuable ally. Many Dutch applauded the virtues of the Turks, their sobriety, meritocracy and particularly religious toleration, and they believed that in religious toleration, Ottoman rule stood far above anything to be found in Europe.

When it comes to the French perception, there emerged a divergence between the perception of the ruling elite and the public. Indeed, both of them perceived the Turk as ‘infidel’ and this provided a negative connotation, however, the ruling elite, because of the severe Habsburg threat, saw the Ottomans as a valuable ally, thus they tried to justify their alliance in secular terms. However, the French people did not seem to approve these royal policies and generally perceived the Turks as an imminent threat to the very existence of the Christian world. Their previous experience regarding the Turks, particularly due to the tales of the French knights in the Battle of Nicopolis (1396) contributed to their negative perception to a considerable degree.

The initial English perception of the Turk was also negative because the English read about the Turks from French and Italian sources, which were generally prejudicial about them<sup>93</sup>. Richard Crafton’s “*The Order of the great Turckes Courte, of hys menne of warre and of all hys conquestes with the summe of Mahumetes doctryne*”, published in 1544, was a translation from French author, Antoine Geuffroy; whereas Peter Ashton’s “*Short Treatise upon the Turkes Chronicles*”, published in 1546, was a translation from an Italian historian, Paolo Giovio<sup>94</sup>. Both of these translations, which were quite negative about the Turks, were used extensively until the end of the sixteenth century to judge the Turkish customs and beliefs; however, two significant books with a more objective outlook, replaced them. The first one is published in 1589 and written by Richard Hakluyt, who was thought to contribute much to the English overseas imperialism. Its title was “*The principal navigations and voyages, traffiques, and discoueries of the English nation*”. According to Aksoy, Hakluyt personally interested in the development of Ottoman-English relations and in the introduction of his book, he congratulated Sir

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<sup>93</sup> Hamit Dereli, *Kraliçe Elizabeth Devrinde Türkler ve İngilizler*, (İstanbul: Anıl Matbaası, 1951), p. 23

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.



Francis Walshingham, the Secretary of State, who had a significant impact in the establishment of Ottoman-English diplomatic relations, and perceived these relations as one of the most successful events of Elizabethan foreign policy<sup>95</sup>. In 1603, a more detailed and more objective account of the Turks was published, titled “*The General Historie of the Turkes, from the first beginning of that Nation to the rising of the Othoman Familie: with all the Notable expeditions of the Christian Princes against them. Together with Lives and Conquets of the Othoman Kings and Emperour. Faithfully collected out of the best Histories until this present yeare 1603*”, written by Richard Knolles<sup>96</sup>.

Ottoman-English relations were so intense towards the end of the Elizabethan era that Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603) was accused to be ‘an infidel’ herself because of his intimate relationship with the ‘infidel Turk’. Even, in 1582, the French court declared that the English planned to take possession of Malta and hand it over to the Turk. A few years later the rumor was broadcast in Rome and Venice that the English ambassador at Constantinople was keeping the Sultan informed of the affairs of the Italian states to the end that they might be subjected to the Ottoman Empire<sup>97</sup>. These accusations were so serious that they forced the English government to refute them. As a result, the Lord Treasurer, William Cecil (1520-1598), wrote some denials in the ‘*Elizabethan Journals*’, the record of events written regularly in the Elizabethan period. One of such denials, dated 14 April 1593, titled ‘*False Reports Concerning the Queen’s Dealings with the Turks*’ followed like this<sup>98</sup>:

There have of late been set forth in Germany many scandalous libels about her Majesty as if she had invited the Turk to make war against Christendom; and the letters which she sent the Turk published but falsified and corrupted many things being added. A letter is now sent to the Emperour very strongly denying these calumnies and showing how by the Turk’s own confession her Majesty did make peace between him and the King of Poland. This letter

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<sup>95</sup> Nazan Aksoy, *Rönesans İngilteresinde Türkler*, (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1990), p. 47

<sup>96</sup> Dereli, *op. cit.*, p. 29

<sup>97</sup> Baumer, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34

<sup>98</sup> G. B. Harrison, *The Elizabethan Journals (Being A Record of Those Things Most Talked During the Years 1591-1603)*, (London: Routledge, 1955), pp. 233-234

also setteth forth the insatiable desire for conquest of the King of Spain, and the troubles which he stirreth up in France and in Scotland.

Despite these spatial differences among various countries in Europe, perceptions of the Europeans were not constant temporally as well. There were differences between the period of intense incursions of the Ottoman armies towards the heartland of Europe in the first half of the sixteenth century and the period of stalemate in the second half<sup>99</sup>. There were several events that contributed much to the negative perception of the Turks. Among them, the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 has had a special place. It was after this momentous event that Pope Pius II (p. 1458-1464 – Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini) called whole the Christianity to defend their religion against the Turks; he used the terms ‘*Respublica christiana*’ and Europe as interchangeable synonyms, also speaking of ‘our Europe, our Christian Europe’. He was also one of the first authors to use the adjective ‘*europæus*’, meaning ‘European’<sup>100</sup>. Thus, the fall of Constantinople was one of the most decisive events in the formation of European identity. According to the convention, European Middle Ages came to an end in 1453 when the Byzantine Empire fell to the Turks<sup>101</sup>. What is more, the conquest of Constantinople, a city revered by the humanists as a treasury of ancient texts, was lamented as a devastating blow to classical Greek culture. “How many names of great authors have now perished?” Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, rhetorically asked; he argued that “...it is a second death for Homer and Plato”<sup>102</sup>.

In the sixteenth century such examples increased dramatically, particularly with the campaigns of Süleyman the Magnificent. His conquests of Belgrade (1521), Rhodes (1522), Buda (1526) and the siege of Vienna (1529) contributed to the increasing degree of demonisation of the Turk. On the other hand, towards the end of this century, particularly after the Ottoman defeat in Lepanto, there emerged a

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<sup>99</sup> For the temporal changes in the perception of the ‘Turk’ see, Amanda Wunder, ‘Western Travelers, Eastern Antiquities and the Image of the Turk in Early Modern Europe’, (*The Journal of Early Modern History*, Vol. 7, No. 1-2, 2003, pp. 89-119)

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36

<sup>102</sup> Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580, From Lyon to Alcazar*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.133

new kind of understanding regarding the Turks. Accordingly, due to increasing travel literature and diplomatic correspondence, which gave a more accurate and objective version of the Ottoman customs, religion and daily life due to the first hand accounts of these travelers, the pejorative nature of the Turks began to give way to the reception of the Turk as a ‘different kind of civilization’<sup>103</sup>. Housley commented about the impact of the travel literature and the diplomats on the perception of the ‘Turk’ as such <sup>104</sup>:

There was an increasing curiosity about the Turks as individuals coupled with an appreciation of the virtues and strengths of Ottoman civil society, which was held up as a mirror to demonstrate the failings of Christian communities. Some Europeans who traveled or lived in Ottoman lands proved capable of ‘compartmentalizing’ their religious antipathy and viewing other features of Turkish society objectively; they lauded the sobriety, discipline, and piety of the Turks at home.

All in all, these temporally and spatially divergent perceptions in Europe prevented the formation of a stereotype understanding of the ‘Turk’, thus obstructed establishment of a united response against this common danger. In other words, the lack of a unified perception of the Turks also obscured a unified response to this ‘eastern peril’.

The second reason, why there is not a unified response against the Turk was that the European powers, particularly France and Venice, were well aware that unification schemes would serve for one purpose: establishment of Habsburg hegemony in Europe, which was vitally detrimental for the interests of these states. Indeed, as the leading power of the early modern Europe, the Habsburg Empire used the Turkish threat extensively in order to justify its hegemonic aspirations. The second chancellor of Charles V, Mercurino Gattinara (1465-1530) formulated this justification under the rubric of ‘universal empire’. He argued that it was the Habsburg Empire that should lead the unification of Christian territories under one rule, which would provide a united response towards the Turkish threat.

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<sup>103</sup> Aslı Çırakman, *From the ‘Terror of the World’ to the ‘Sick Man of Europe’: European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth*, (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2002), p. 46

<sup>104</sup> Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400-1536*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), *op. cit.*, p. 136

As a matter of fact, the concept of ‘universal empire’ had been a medieval concept emerged after the unity of church and world, of *sacerdotium* and *imperium*, which broke apart in the eleventh century. It derived from the debate on how the relationship between ecclesiastical and secular order should be and how secular politics could be organized independently. In this context, ‘universal empire’ stood for the government of the universal powers, the Papacy and the empire. Accordingly the Pope would govern in the ‘*monarchia ecclesiae*’ whereas the emperor would govern in the ‘*monarchia imperii*’<sup>105</sup>. During the Middle Ages, there was an intense debate on which of these ‘*monarchia*’ would have precedence over the other. In other words, the question was whether the universal empire of the emperor was independent from the Pope or whether the emperor could exercise his universal jurisdiction only by the order of the Pope. Bosbach enlisted two competing answers to this question: According to the hierocratic concept, the Pope was superior to the emperor in all matters even in the secular affairs, whereas according to the dualistic concept there were two totally independent fields of action for the Pope and the emperor<sup>106</sup>.

These theoretical discussions on the ‘universal empire’ began to transform into a political debate in the early modern period, with the ascendancy of Charles V to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, Charles V was a good candidate for being elected as the Holy Roman Emperor, since he had inherited from his ancestors a great empire, comprising much of western and central Europe. From his maternal grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon, he inherited the crown of Aragon with its Italian possessions of Naples and Sicily, whereas from his maternal grandmother, Isabella of Castile, he inherited the crown of Castile with its New World possessions. From his paternal grandfather, Maximilian I, came the lands of Austria, the original Habsburg family lands round the upper Rhine between Switzerland and Burgundy. Finally, from his paternal grandmother, Mary of Burgundy (1457-1482), came the Burgundian possessions, including Burgundy, Franche Comté, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. His inheritance was so enormous that by the year 1525,

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<sup>105</sup> Franz Bosbach, ‘The European Debate on Universal Monarchy’, in David Armitage, *Theories of Empire, 1450-1800*, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998), p. 82

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83

Charles V could lay claim to 72 separate titles, among them 27 kingdoms, 13 duchies, 22 counties, and nine seignories<sup>107</sup>. His election to the throne of Holy Roman Empire in 1519, via a huge amount of bribery, provided from the Fuggers and delivered to the German electors, increased his dreams of establishing a universal empire. Henri Pirenne summarized his position quite interestingly<sup>108</sup>:

Charles V was one of those very rare characters of modern history whose name was to become universally known. He became very nearly as famous as Charlemagne or Napoleon. Yet it was not to his genius but his heritage that he owed his eminence. With no more than mediocre abilities, he was raised by circumstances to such a position that only Charlemagne before him, and Napoleon after him, exercised such an influence over Europe.

On the other hand, the power and imperial dreams of Charles V alienated the rival powers of the Habsburg Empire; even, they sometimes allied with their common enemy, the Ottoman Empire, in order to protect themselves from Habsburg aspirations. Similarly, Protestant principalities of Central Europe and England reacted these unification schemes, which they perceived as a conspiracy prepared by Papacy and the Habsburg Empire to undermine Protestantism. All these factors reveal the fact that although in theory Ottoman advance in Europe provided a European identity based on the pejorative perception of the ‘other’, namely the ‘Turk’, in practice, neither this perception is unique all over Europe, nor its main instrument, unification of Europe against the Turk, was practical during the early modern period.

Another significant debate related to the problem of negative contribution of the Ottoman Empire to the construction of the European identity emerged about how to treat the ‘Turk’ regarding the previous threat perceptions of the European states. This debate aims to answer whether the European perception of the ‘Turk’ in the early modern period was different from the previous threat perceptions of Europe. There are three different views regarding this issue. The first view argues that the West had a tradition of identifying itself against a threat coming from the East, and therefore, perception of Turkish threat was not much different from the earlier

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<sup>107</sup> Scott Dixon, ‘Charles V and the Historians: Some Recent German Works on the Emperor and His Reign’, (*German History*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2003, pp. 104-124), p. 104

<sup>108</sup> Henri Pirenne, *op.cit.*, p. 325

perceptions, say, for example, the Persian threat of the ancient times, Saracen threat of the Crusades period and Mongolian threat of the thirteenth century<sup>109</sup>. This view offers the famous ‘East versus West’ dichotomy and applies this dichotomy to any kind of European threat perceptions. In this argumentation East means ‘barbarity and despotism’ whereas West means ‘civilization and freedom’. Accordingly, the former dualism of ‘Greeks vs. Persians’ was transformed into the one of ‘Christianity vs. Islam’ during the Crusades and ‘European vs. Turk’ towards the end of the early modern period.

The second view does not consider the identification of the ancient times but focuses more on the religious dichotomy, namely ‘Christianity vs. Islam’. It argued that there is no difference between the perception of the ‘Turk’ and ‘Muslim’; in other words, the perception of the Turk was not different from the perception of the Saracens. Accordingly, ‘Turk’ is ‘Muslim’, in other words, ‘infidel’ who had occupied the Holy Lands that must be re-conquered<sup>110</sup>.

The third view, on the other hand, accepts that in the early modern period, the perception of the Turk was still based on religion; however, this perception was somehow different from all of the previous threat perceptions including the Christian perception of the Saracens. These differences can be enumerated as such: First of all, different from the Crusades, there was a persistent threat from the ‘other’ (the ‘Turk’); this continuity and persistency was absent before the early modern period. In other words, the West was the ‘offensive’ party of the Crusades; whereas, the East was the ‘defensive’ party. These roles were reversed in the early modern period. Ottoman advance towards Central Europe was a direct, persistent and continuous threat for the West, which makes it unique within the previous perceptions<sup>111</sup>. Secondly, previous invaders did not offer any alternative socio-

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<sup>109</sup> To see this tradition more clearly see, Denys Hay, *op. cit.*; Pim den Boer, *op. cit.*; W. R. Jones, ‘The Image of Barbarian in the Medieval Europe’, (*Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.13, No. 4, pp. 376-407).

<sup>110</sup> For the defenders of this view see, J. France and W. G. Zajac (eds.), *The Crusades and Their Sources: Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton*, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998); Norman Housley, 1992, *op. cit.*; Archibald Lewis, ‘The Islamic World and the Latin West: 1350-1500’, (*Speculum*, Vol. 65, No. 4, 1990, pp. 833-844)

<sup>111</sup> See, H. G. Koenigsberger (et. al.), *Europe in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Longman, 1989), p. 244; Ferenc Szakaly, *Ludovico Gritti in Hungary: 1529-1534, A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry*, (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1995), p. 111, Halil

economic system other than pillage and plunder; therefore, their invasions were not efficient. Ottomans, on the other hand, introduced their own alternative system both politically and economically in the lands that they occupied. In other words, both Europe and the Ottoman Empire had competed for the control of the same territory, which became the eastern frontier of the West. Throughout this rivalry the danger was not always military, but there is a constant fear in Europe about mass conversion of the population of the lands occupied by the Ottomans<sup>112</sup>. These fears were not irrelevant at all because in some cases, inhabitants of Eastern and Central Europe voluntarily chose or welcomed Ottoman rule vis-à-vis their Christian overlords<sup>113</sup>. Third, the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 was a real psychological shock for the Europeans that differentiate the perception of the degree and contiguity of this threat from the former ones. None of the previous threats dare to attempt such a perilous victory for the Christian world<sup>114</sup>. As indicated before even some of the Western historians evaluated this event as a break point between the Middle Ages and the early modern period. Its psychological impact was so intense that it created a general public outcry almost tripling the literature written on the Turks in Europe. Finally, Renaissance humanism contributed to the modifications of the perception of the ‘Turk’. Influenced from the ancient Greek manuscripts, some authors began to establish several genealogies regarding European and Turkish ancestors. A byproduct of this understanding was the famous ‘Trojan genealogy’, which argued that ‘Turk’ was descended from the Trojans who had once been a major threat for the European civilization of the time, namely for the Greeks<sup>115</sup>. This genealogy put cultural factors before the religious ones. It was not only used for the

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İnalçık, ‘Modern Avrupa’nın Gelişmesinde Türk Etkisi’, in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 80; Iver B. Neumann, “*Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in the European Identity Formation*”, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 43

<sup>112</sup> Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 36

<sup>113</sup> Paul Coles, *The Ottoman Impact on Europe*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), p. 113

<sup>114</sup> For the impact of the conquest of Constantinople see, Robert Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk, 1453-1517*, (Nieuwkoop: B. de Graaf, 1967) and Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 36

<sup>115</sup> For a detailed account of the Trojan genealogy and the impact of other cultural factors see, Denys Hay, *op. cit.*, p. 109, Iver Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 46; Robert Schwoebel, ‘Changing Ideas and Ideals in the Sixteenth Century’, (*Studies in the Renaissance*, Vol. 12, 1965, pp. 164-187), p. 168

identification of the Turks; rather, it was a tool of legitimization for many dynasties of the early modern Europe including Valois dynasty of France, Tudor dynasty of England and Habsburg dynasty of Spain<sup>116</sup>. However, although until the mid-fifteenth century the Turks were accepted as the heirs of the Trojans, this understanding was perceived as unacceptable after 1453, for several reasons<sup>117</sup>:

In the first place, it placed the ethnic origins of the Turks within the very classical world, whose legacy of learning and insight they were intent on destroying. It also gave their conquests over the Greeks a spurious air of legitimacy, in so far as they were avenging the expropriation of the ancestors. And it established a dangerous affinity between the Turks and the many European states, which had nurtured origin myths based on a supposed flight to the west by Trojans who survived the fall of their city. This could erode the 'otherness' of the Turks and facilitate their assimilation into the diplomatic world of the European states, to the detriment of a crusading response. Not surprisingly, therefore, Pius II was one of the most determined opponents of the 'Trojan origins' theory. In order to confute the error of those who affirm that the Turks are of Trojan race and called them 'Teucrians', the pope argued that they were descendants of the barbarian Scythians, and he was instrumental in driving *Teucri* out of use and establishing *Turcae* as an alternative plural noun to *Turci*.

All these factors revealed the fact that the Turkish threat in the early modern period began to be accepted more secularly. Religion – at least partially – diminished to be the only point of view in understanding the threat perceptions. As Radinson argued, by the end of sixteenth century the Turk was seen more as a secular or cultural menace than as an ideological threat<sup>118</sup>. This was due to the fact that, as it entered the sixteenth century, the crusade, in its traditional form as a papal-directed holy war symbolizing Christendom's unity and forwarding its common interests, was in a manifestly sick condition<sup>119</sup>. Europe was so divided that

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<sup>116</sup> Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 21

<sup>117</sup> Housley, 2002, *op. cit.*, p. 133

<sup>118</sup> Maxime Radinson, "Europe and the Mystique of Islam, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), p.46

<sup>119</sup> Norman Housley, 'The Crusading Movement, 1274-1700', in Jonathan Simon and Christopher Riley-Smith (eds.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 286



there was no option for a political union against the ‘Turk’. In mentioning the lack of political unity, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini wrote<sup>120</sup>:

... it [Europe] is a body without a head, a republic without laws or magistrates. Every state has a separate prince, and every prince has a separate interest. Who will make the English love French? Who will reconcile the Germans with the Hungarians and Bohemians? If you lead a small army against the Turks you will easily be overcome; if a large one, it will soon fall into confusion.

Another indication of secularization of the perception of the ‘Turk’ was increasing attempts for alliances offered by the Christian powers to the Muslim states, rival to the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Safavid Persia. Christian Europe justified its attempts in alliance with Shah Ismael (r. 1502-1524) of Safavid Empire by describing the Shiites as allied with Christendom by virtue of shared religious opposition to the infidel Sunnis; even the ‘*kızılbaş*’ – Shiite population as termed by the Ottomans – were perceived as the ‘warriors for the faith’ just like the Crusaders<sup>121</sup>. Therefore, in 1509, Safavid envoys reached Venice in search of supplies of European artillery and probably also some alliance against the Ottomans. In 1518, and again in 1529, Charles V sent envoys to Shah Ismael in the hope that some anti-Ottoman cooperation might be possible, and the dream of joint action of this kind was to recur periodically for decades to come<sup>122</sup>. Karamanids and Akkoyunlu state were the other prospective partners for the Europeans against the Turks, particularly in the fifteenth century. What is more, as indicated before even the Papacy tried to establish some form of alliances with the Ottoman Empire against their rivals in Italian Peninsula. Hans Pfeffermann wrote a book on how the Renaissance Popes collaborated with the Turks when they were in need of urgent help to protect their very existence<sup>123</sup>.

There emerged another debate, in the early modern period, about how to deal with the ‘Turkish threat’. Indeed, besides the differences in the perceptions of

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<sup>120</sup> Paul Coles, *op. cit.*, p. 100

<sup>121</sup> Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 31

<sup>122</sup> Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.224

<sup>123</sup> See, Hans Pfeffermann, *Rönesans Papalarının Türklerle İşbirliği*, trans. by Kemal Beydilli, (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2003)

various rulers and peoples, there is also no common perception of the Turk among the philosophers, theologians and diplomats of the age. In his illuminating article, Schwoebel argued that there were three types of relationships that would be conducted with the Turk: crusade, conversion and coexistence<sup>124</sup>. Undoubtedly, crusade was the most popular among them. Accordingly, the Turk was the enemy of faith and the only way to end this enmity was the elimination of it, since Islam and Christianity could never coexist. The defenders of crusade perceived the crusading armies as made up of “God’s warriors, chosen by him and showing themselves to be worthy of his favor, intervention, and rewards; thus in many cases opponents were demonized, labeled as God’s enemies or as servants of the devil”<sup>125</sup>. Of course, Ottoman campaigns towards the heartland of Europe contributed to this demonizing view. As Housley argued<sup>126</sup>:

The most obvious effect, which the Ottoman Turks had on the mental world of Catholics, came about through the attempts made by virtually every pope of the period to initiate a general military response, which would assume crusading form. The impact of preaching, financial measures and rhetoric was profound: the crusade was effectively confirmed as the dominant expression of Catholic religious war. Without the Turks this probably would not have happened.

Among those who defended the crusading ideals were the two most prominent humanists of the sixteenth century, namely Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) and Martin Luther (1483-1546). Martin Luther was initially against a crusade against the Turk, not because he wanted some kind of reconciliation, but because he perceived the Turk as the ‘scourge of the God’ sent by Him in order to punish the sins of the Christian community. His denial of the papacy’s *magisterium* and his rejection of salvation through works naturally caused him to repudiate the crusade; therefore, in a number of colorful passages Luther pursued the theme that papal indulgences and taxes raised for the crusade were symptoms of the corruption of the papal office<sup>127</sup>. However, after the Siege of Vienna in 1529, Luther reversed his

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<sup>124</sup> Schwoebel, 1965, *op. cit.*

<sup>125</sup> Housley, 2002, *op.cit.*, p. 2

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86

views and became one of the ardent supporters of a crusade against the Turks. His ‘War Sermon’ of 1529 was a product of this changing perception. In this pamphlet, he saw the Turks “...as fulfilling the prophecy of Ezekiel (Satan will be loosed from his prison) and the Revelation of St. John (Behold, I...will bring a sword upon you...I will bring the worst of the nations to take possessions of their homes).”<sup>128</sup>

Surprisingly, Luther’s initial reactions against a crusade were criticized by the ardent pacifist of the time, Erasmus, and his belligerent perception of the Turks was one of his biggest dilemmas. Indeed this was not unique to Erasmus. For most of the humanists, the Turk was the enemy of learning and the faith, and it was the duty of Christian princes to protect the achievements of Renaissance from the infidel barbarian. Owing to the great fashion which the writings of Italian and Greek humanists long enjoyed, these scholars played a decisive role in transmitting to modern Europe an only slightly modified medieval conception of the Turks<sup>129</sup>.

Erasmus, who has often be called ‘the first European’, believed that Christian princes should stop quarreling in order to be able to form a united front against Ottoman power<sup>130</sup>. He thus exhorted the ‘nations of Europe’ to crusade against the Turks. In his ‘*Consultatio de Bello Turcis Inferendo*’ he wrote that “...for while it is true that not every war against the Turks is just and pious, it is also the case that non-resistance to the Turks is nothing other than betraying Christianity to its most savage foes, and abandoning our brothers to a servitude which they do not deserve”<sup>131</sup>. In this significant pamphlet, for the first time, he addressed himself to such concrete issues of warfare as leadership and finance<sup>132</sup>. Although he was so keen on the unification of the European states against this common danger, Erasmus was also aware that the Popes used the threat of the Turk extensively for their own political interests. When, in 1517, after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Syria, Pope Leo X decided to convene a crusading force against the Turks, he declared a

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<sup>128</sup> Coles, *op. cit.*, p. 146

<sup>129</sup> Schwoebel, 1965, *op. cit.*, p. 183

<sup>130</sup> Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 37

<sup>131</sup> Norman Housley, *Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 178

<sup>132</sup> France and Zajc, *op. cit.*, p. 277

five-year truce among all Catholic powers to further promotion of his crusade. However, this was a pretext according to Erasmus. To an unidentified correspondent, Erasmus wrote of rumors from Switzerland of a Franco-Papal plan to expel the Spanish from Naples under cover of the Crusade: “If I mistake not, the pretext is one thing and the purpose another...The Pope and the princes have several new plays in rehearsal, using as a pretext a frightful war against the Turks”<sup>133</sup>. Another letter from Erasmus to Boniface Amerbach stated, how ordinary people were reluctant to support any kind of crusading activity: “In Flanders the crimson cross has been erected against the Turks. The monks paint pictures of Turkish atrocities, and actively proclaim them. But nobody is giving a penny.”<sup>134</sup> He also criticized the behaviors of the Christians: “We condemn the atrocities reproduced in pictures, but worse things were done at Aspera, not by the Turks but by our own people, many indeed our allies...For what Christians do to Christians is crueler, even if they are repaid in kind.”<sup>135</sup> On numerous occasions when he referred to the Turks Erasmus used them solely as a stick with which to beat his contemporaries<sup>136</sup>:

Thus English sailors treated foreign visitors worse than the Turks did; mercenaries in Holland showed ‘more than Turkish ferocity’; Christian rulers were so tyrannical that the rule of the sultan could hardly be worse; and Christendom was relapsing into worse than Turkish barbarism.

In sum, while proposing a unified response against the Turkish threat, both Erasmus and Luther also criticized the Christians in general and the Papacy in particular; and this was an indication of why the Christianity was unable to give such a unified response against the Turks. European public was generally discontent about the Papal policy of demanding additional taxes to wage a crusade against the ‘infidel’ and also was aware that this ‘threat’ was used by their ruler to increase their authority and pressure over themselves. This made the ordinary people to act reluctantly in these Papal or monarchical demands.

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<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 262

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 266

<sup>135</sup> Housley, 2002, *op. cit.*, p. 179

<sup>136</sup> France and Zajc, *op. cit.*, p. 273

Besides the idea of the crusades were the perceptions of conversion and coexistence. The idea of conversion argued that the Turks were not beasts or inhumane creatures; rather, they were human beings just with a different religion, which is incompatible with Christianity. Thus they should not be exterminated with belligerency; rather if they could be converted they could easily be integrated within the family of Christendom. Moslems might be converted if shown the error of their ways.

This type of thinking gained momentum with the translation of Koran into Latin. Accordingly, in the twelfth century, with the works of two clerks, Peter the Venerable, the abbot of Cluny (1092-1156), and Robert of Ketton, Koran was translated to Latin for the first time, however, with many mistakes, such as omitting of phrases or mistakes in translation<sup>137</sup>. Thus, in the sixteenth century, those more intellectual humanists – at least they knew Arabic well unlike the previous translators – decided to translate Koran into Latin in order to give a more accurate account of Islam. Among them was Theodore Bibliander. He was a follower of an important figure of the Reformation, Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531), and had completed his translation in 1542. However, it took almost six months to lift the censure on this translation to publish it, and this permission could only be granted with the defense of Luther in favor of publishing this translation<sup>138</sup>. Still, this program of conversion found little sympathy among Christians and none with the adherents of Islam. But the policy of conversion, in one form or another, was frequently revived in the following centuries, particularly in the nineteenth century with the Protestant missionaries in the Middle East.

Finally, there is the view of coexistence, which argued that, whether Christian or Muslim, with the Turks, coexistence was possible. Even, some sixteenth century thinkers thought that coexistence with the Turks was the only available option. According to the proponents of this view, there was a long tradition of attitudes, which proved that coexistence was possible. An accommodation between Genoa and Sultan Orhan (r. 1326-1361) in the mid-

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<sup>137</sup> Harry Clark, 'The Publication of the Koran in Latin: A Reformation Dilemma', (*Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1984, pp. 3-12), p. 3

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

fourteenth century initiated the long succession of European-Turkish negotiations, alliances, and treaties. During the century and a half, which followed, all the major Italian powers at one time or another cultivated Ottoman friendship for commercial and political purposes<sup>139</sup>. Among the defenders of this view was Juan de Segovia (? – 1458). He approached the doctrine of Islam in the Renaissance spirit of critical scholarship; therefore, he opposed the crusade on both moral and practical grounds. He believed that it was contrary to the true name of Christianity, and he cited the long, inglorious history of the Holy War as proof that it was not the will of God. “I want to emphasize”, he wrote, “that I do not condemn the lawful wars against the Moslems owing to their invasion of Christian lands or other similar causes, but only those undertaken with religious motives in aid or for the purpose of conversion”<sup>140</sup>. He also thought that Christian preachers knew nothing about Islam and little enough about their own faith. Their method consisted of condemning Moslem beliefs and practices, which ran counter to Christian doctrine and their sermons, were sweeping denunciations of Mohammad and his followers. The correct approach, he asserted, was to begin with those beliefs Christians and Moslems held in common<sup>141</sup>. In place of the crusade or the usual preaching mission, he recommended the method of conciliation. Christians were urged first to maintain peace with the Muslims as much as possible. Then in an atmosphere of concord they were to work for closer ties, especially in the cultural areas. From increased peaceful relations Segovia expected a mutual understanding to develop between the two peoples and a diminution of fanaticism and prejudice<sup>142</sup>.

All in all, religion remained a factor in the representation of the Ottoman Turk as Europe’s other, but the military-political aspect began to dominate by the early modern period as well. The hostility that characterized the relationship was no longer a question of Christian versus nonbeliever, but rather sprang from the profound similarity between the two religions of Christianity and Islam. They were rivals because of this similarity, thus a clash between their proponents was

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<sup>139</sup> Schwoebel, 1965, *op. cit.*, p. 166

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177

inevitable, not because of the religious prejudices, but because of the rival systems they offered to their adherents.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION**

After analyzing the contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the construction of the European identity, which is termed as the negative contribution, this chapter of this thesis deals extensively with the impact of the Ottoman Empire on the emergence of the modern European state system. In doing that, it examines the political and economic contributions of the Ottoman Empire. The aim of such a survey is to show that the Ottoman Empire was not a passive actor and an outsider to the European state system; rather, it was an active actor, which was completely involved in the political and economic aspects of this system.

#### **A. POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION**

In this part of the thesis, it is aimed to analyze how the Ottoman-Habsburg contention contributed to the emergence of the modern European state system. To do so, Ottoman support towards the Western European states, which were fighting against the Habsburg rule, as well as Ottoman support towards the dissident groups within the Habsburg Empire, namely Protestants and Moriscos, are examined. In other words, Ottoman Empire tried to weaken the Habsburg Empire both internally and externally and did so not accidentally, but intentionally. Regarding the Western European states, three of them – France, England and the Netherlands – are chosen as case studies to reflect how their relations with the Ottoman Empire contributed to their centralization processes.

#### **1. OTTOMAN SUPPORT TO THE EUROPEAN STATES AGAINST THE HABSBURGS**

##### **a. OTTOMAN-FRENCH RELATIONS**



Although formal diplomatic relations between France and the Ottoman Empire started in the first half of the sixteenth century, the French, for more than a century and a half, knew this Eastern power, particularly because of the Battle of Nicopolis (1396), in which some French volunteers came to fight against the Ottomans. This first hostile encounter was followed with the reappearance of Marshall Boucicaut, one of the commanders of French troops in the Battle of Nicopolis, in the siege of Constantinople by the Ottomans under the reign of Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) in 1399. He reached Constantinople with a band of young French nobles encouraged by the tales of the returned captives, and a good fleet to aid the Byzantine Emperor in his defense. This squadron defeated the Turkish fleet at Gallipolis, and prevented the capture of Galata by the Ottomans<sup>143</sup>. Almost half a century later, some French nobles and their troops also answered the call of crusade made by John Hunyadi, the Regent of Hungary (r. 1446-1456), in 1444 and joined this crusading army.

Besides these military encounters, before the sixteenth century, there emerged some kind of political engagements as well, particularly in the affair of Prince Jem (1459-1495) in the last decades of the fifteenth century. After the death of Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481), his two sons fought for the throne and the victor was Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), whereas his rebel brother, Prince Jem, had to flee first to Egypt and then to Rhodes. From Rhodes, he was sent to Papacy, and in the French campaign towards Italy in 1494, the Pope had to deliver him to the French King of the time, Charles VIII. However, Jem leaved only a few weeks under French custody, since it was believed that the Pope had poisoned him. This delivery of Prince Jem to the French was significant for the Ottoman-French relations because of the earliest appearance of a Turkish diplomatic agent in France, called Hussein Bey, in 1483, who came to France after his visit to the island of Rhodes in order to negotiate about the future of Prince Jem<sup>144</sup>.

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<sup>143</sup> Clarence D. Rouillard, *The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature (1520-1660)*, (Paris: Boivin & C<sup>ie</sup> Editeurs, 1940), p. 18

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29

Starting from the first years of the Habsburg-Valois struggle on Italy, on the other hand, the Ottoman Empire became an essential factor in European diplomacy. Whenever a European state found itself in desperate status in Italian Peninsula, it tried, at least resort, to frighten its enemies by spreading the rumor that it was about to receive help from the Ottomans. For example, in 1497, Milan, Ferrara, Mantua and Florence applied Bayezid II for his help against the Franco-Venetian alliance, and even offered him 50,000 ducats annually as payment for an attack against this alliance<sup>145</sup>. These negotiations angered the French, and in order to support Venice, French troops sided with the Venetians in the Ottoman-Venetian wars of 1499-1502. In the year 1502, by the orders of Louis XII, a French naval squadron, commanded by Admiral Ravenstein and carried ten thousand French troops, sailed to the island of Lesbos, and for twenty days it had besieged the island. However, they were forced to leave after hearing the rumors about the approach of Turkish reinforcement and on their return, the squadron caught in a violent storm and completely destroyed<sup>146</sup>. According to Baumgartner, this ill-fated expedition was the last time the French battled the Muslims in what may be termed a ‘crusade’<sup>147</sup>.

Keeping these first encounters in mind, in order to understand the background of Franco-Ottoman relations in the sixteenth century more accurately, it is necessary to understand the Habsburg-Valois struggle, which was one of the most significant dynastic conflicts that shaped the modern history of Europe. Habsburg-Valois struggle started in 1494 with the campaign of Charles VIII over Italy. Indeed, this was seen, by many historians, as a reversal of traditional French foreign policy<sup>148</sup>. Since the twelfth century, the policy of the French Kings had looked westward and northward. By deciding on war in Italy, Charles VIII had begun an entirely new policy. One of the reasons of this expedition was the aim of Charles VIII to use Naples as a springboard, which would be used to launch a crusade

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<sup>145</sup> Halil İnalcık, ‘The Rise of the Ottoman Empire’, in P. M. Holt (et. al.) (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 311

<sup>146</sup> Rouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 31

<sup>147</sup> Frederic J. Baumgartner, *France in the Sixteenth Century*, (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 24

<sup>148</sup> Jacques Pirenne, *op. cit.*, p. 421

against the Turks<sup>149</sup>. As Pirenne wrote, "...lured by the imperial mirage, Charles VIII wanted to make himself master of Cyprus, Naples and Jerusalem and to reconquer Constantinople, since he remained haunted by the great medieval dream and hoped to reestablish the ancient grandeur of Rome"<sup>150</sup>. In other words, the crusading ideals against the 'Turk' contributed, at least, to the justification of Valois aspirations on Italy. According to Wallerstein, on the other hand, there is a more profound reason of this conflict<sup>151</sup>:

The northern Italian city-states had been in the late Middle Ages the centers of the most advanced economic activities, industrial, and commercial, on the European continent. If they no longer monopolized long-distance trade they were still strong in their accumulated capital and experience, and an aspiring world-empire needed to secure control over them.

In his campaigns towards Italy, Charles VIII had historical claims on two Italian city-states, namely, Milan and Naples. Thus the Valois dynasty had to face two formidable enemies in order to realize its aspirations, Maximilian I, who held historical claims on Milan, and King Ferdinand of Aragon, on Naples. In 1494, he left France with the largest army seen for many centuries in Western Europe and within a month he arrived Naples. But this alarmed his opponents, namely, Pope Alexander VI, Maximilian I, Ferdinand of Aragon, the Duke of Milan (Ludovico Sforza), and the Doge of Venice, (Agostin Barbarigo). They formed the League of Venice against Charles VIII and defeated his army in 1495, thus he returned France without any tangible result.

From 1494 to 1508, another significant actor of the Italian wars, Venice, was aggressive, even adventuresome; it fought with Charles VIII, militarily supported the rebellions of Pisa against Florence, invaded the latter's territory, attacked the Duchy of Milan, seized the Papal cities in the province of Romagna and defeated Maximilian I in a battle<sup>152</sup>. This Venetian expansion towards Habsburg possessions

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<sup>149</sup> R. J. Knecht, *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France, 1483-1610*, (London: Fontana Press, 1996), p. 43

<sup>150</sup> Jacques Pirenne, *op. cit.*, p. 422

<sup>151</sup> Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 171

<sup>152</sup> Robert Finlay, 'Fabius Maximus in Venice: Doge Andrea Gritti, the War of Cambrai and the Rise of Habsburg Hegemony, 1509-1530', (*Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol 53, No. 4, 2000, pp. 988 – 1031), p. 990

created a temporary alliance between the former enemies, namely, Louis XII on the one hand, and Maximilian I and Ferdinand of Aragon on the other, in the form of the League of Cambrai. French troops were able to crush Venetians in 1509, however, this French victory drove the allies apart and in 1512, French armies were to retreat due to a Swiss attack on Milan. At the end, they lost Milan once more and began to wait an opportunity to recapture it. However, these wars exhausted Venice and thenceforward, until its final destruction by Napoleon in 1797, as William McNeill termed, Venice remained a 'marginal polity', balanced precariously between the Ottomans and Habsburgs<sup>153</sup>.

The opportunity that the French waited for a long time to renew their attack towards Milan came in 1515 with the accession of Francis I to the French throne at the age of 20. From the beginning, he was anxious to make a name for himself and to pursue the fame of his dynasty by continuing the expansionist foreign policy of his predecessors. This young and energetic ruler of France drove the French armies to victory at the Battle of Marignano in 1515 and captured Milan once more. After five years of conflicts the Habsburgs had tacitly recognize French occupation because both Maximilian and Ferdinand of Aragon died within that period; and their possessions were inherited by their young grandson, Charles of Ghent, who was elected as the Holy Roman Emperor in 1520 and by then known as Charles V. He was a proud young monarch, who felt that his mighty empire conferred upon him political leadership in Christian Europe; therefore, he would never let the French to occupy Milan, which was separating the Habsburg possessions of Spain and Central Europe. He was waiting the right time to attack France and this right time came in 1521, when France provocatively occupied the Duchy of Luxemburg, a Habsburg possession<sup>154</sup>.

This attack was accompanied with a significant change in the Spanish foreign policy. Charles V's Burgundian chancellor, Chievres de Croy (1458-1521), who was in favor of peaceful relations with France, died and his Piedmontese successor, Mercurino Gattinara, promoted an aggressive imperial policy in general

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<sup>153</sup> William H. McNeill, *Venice: The Hinge of Europe, 1081-1797*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 126

<sup>154</sup> Steward MacDonald, *Charles V: Ruler, Dynast and Defender of the Faith, 1500-58*, (London: Hadder & Staughton, 1992), p. 66

and a forward policy in Italy in particular. Subsequently, with a joint Papal-Habsburg attack, Milan was recaptured in 1521. What is more an Anglo-Habsburg alliance was formed a year later with the Treaty of Windsor, as a result of the fears of Henry VIII of England about Valois aspirations<sup>155</sup>. Therefore, by the end of 1522, under a triple attack of the Duke of Burgundy, Charles V and Henry VIII, Francis I had lost virtually all he had in Italy.

Alarmed by these successes of Charles V who was perceived as dangerous as Francis I, Venice, Florence and the Papacy under Clement VII joined in a secret alliance with the French in 1524. The French troops entered into Italy, and Milan changed hands once more. However, Charles V, determined to finish this threat once for all, led his army to Italy and in the Battle of Pavia, on February 24, 1525, the French army received a crushing defeat and Francis I was taken prisoner. In stating the crucial importance of this battle, Spooner wrote, “Charles’s victory overturned the balance of Europe. France, since Marignano the first military power, was knocked down”<sup>156</sup>.

It was this French defeat at Pavia that opened the Franco-Ottoman correspondence and finally the Franco-Ottoman alliance. Trusting neither the Italian states nor England, which had already allied with the Habsburgs, Louise de Savoy (1476-1531), mother of Francis I, perceived that the only alternative that could help the captive French King was the Ottomans. Indeed, Francis I was also aware of the fact that after losing the imperial election to Charles V in 1519, it was a necessity to turn to the ‘Turk’ in order to insure a balance of power in Europe.

Although he sought a way to form an alliance with the Ottoman Empire, he never publicly disavowed his inherited role as ‘chief defender of the Christian faith’. According to Jensen, at least rhetorically, Francis I showed himself as one of the most ardent opponents of the Ottomans in Europe at that time<sup>157</sup>:

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<sup>155</sup> For the details of Anglo-French-Habsburg triangular diplomacy see, F. C. Spooner, ‘The Habsburg-Valois Struggle’, in G. R. Elton (ed.), *The New Cambridge Modern History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, Vol. 2), p. 341

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 343

<sup>157</sup> De Lamar Jensen, ‘The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy’, (*Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1985, pp. 451-470), p. 451

In 1517, the year Sultan Selim I completed his conquest of Egypt, Pope Leo X turned hopefully to the dashing young French king, Francis I, for the leadership of an anti-Turkish League among European powers. Francis responded with a great show of enthusiasm for the enterprise; after all had he not recently demonstrated his military prowess at Marignano and cleared a way for a campaign against the infidel? A short time later, when the ambitious young king himself became a candidate for Holy Roman Emperor, he declared his determination to defend Christendom against the Turks if he were elected.

How, then, a monarch, who had declared himself as the ‘most Christian king’ and ‘the champion of Christendom’, could request the help of a Muslim ruler was the main question of the period. It was his captivity that forced him to call the help of this ‘infidel’ and he sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan of the time, Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566), with an envoy headed by Jean Frangipani. Indeed, Frangipani was the second French agent sent to the Ottomans after the first one who had been murdered in Bosnia. The intent of the letter was not clearly known but it is written in some Ottoman chronicles that Francis I wanted the Ottoman Sultan to attack Hungary in order to divert Habsburg troops, so that he could escape and hit the Habsburgs in the West<sup>158</sup>.

As a matter of fact, Süleyman the Magnificent was also eager to give such a help to the French. Ottomans carefully followed the developments of the recent years and saw that Europe was at the eve of a social turmoil due to increasing religious rift between the Lutherans and the Catholics. In such an environment, supporting the French against the Habsburgs, in other words, dividing the Christians further, would be beneficial for the Ottoman expansion in Central Europe. The reply of Süleyman the Magnificent to the French King reflected such an understanding, in which he wrote that he would prepare for an attack on Hungary in order to divert the Habsburg troops from Western Europe to the East, as Francis I wished<sup>159</sup>. With this

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<sup>158</sup> Quoted from Solakzade, an Ottoman historian, in *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1959), Vol. 2, p. 819 as such: “Hasmindan intikam almağa pâdişah-ı din-i İslâm âsitanesine ilticaden gayrı care bulmayub, şüdde-i saadete elçi gönderüb, übudiyetnamesinde tahrir olunan bu ki: Engerûs kiralı pâdişah-ı bâ-ikbal tarafından bir güşmâl görmek olursa biz İspanya kiralına karşı mukabil olub intikamımızı alırdık. Reca ve temennimiz oldur ki, ol mağrurun def’ine sultan-ı cihandan inayet ola; bad-el-yevm biz dahi sultan-ı sâmimekan ve sahibkıran-ı zemân olan pâdişah hazretlerine bende-i ihsanı olalum”

<sup>159</sup> The main text of this letter follows like this. *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 821:

friendly reply of Süleyman the Magnificent, according to Rouillard, "...so close do the relations between the Fleur-de-Lys and the Crescent become that it is not an exaggeration to speak of a Franco-Turkish alliance"<sup>160</sup>.

The intent of this letter was materialized with the Ottoman campaign in 1526, which resulted in the Battle of Mohacs on August 1526, and the subsequent invasion of Hungary and election of John Zapolyai (r. as the Governor of Transylvania 1507-1540) as the king of Hungary. But before the Battle of Mohacs, Francis I had accepted the terms of the Treaty of Madrid on January 14, and was released from his prison in Madrid. Accordingly, he restored to Charles V the Burgundian heritage seized by Louis XII, the suzerainty of Flanders, Artois and Tournai, and the Duchy of Burgundy. Moreover, he renounced his claims to Milan, Naples, Genoa and Asti<sup>161</sup>.

Why Charles V released Francis I and remained content with his minor acquisitions is a significant debate among the historians, and there is no clear answer of this question. Indeed, after the French defeat in Pavia, Henry VIII offered Charles V to partite the French lands between England and Habsburg Empire but he refused this offer<sup>162</sup>. The reason behind this refusal and subsequent Treaty of Madrid that

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"Ben ki sultân-ı selâtin ve burhân-ül havâkin, tacbahş-ı hûsrevan rûy-ı zemîn, zillullah-ı fil arzeyn, Akdeniz'in ve Karadeniz'in ve Rumeli'nin ve Anadolu'nun ve Karaman'ın ve Rum'un ve vilayet-i Dulkadriye'nin ve Diyarbekir'in ve Kürdistan'ın ve Azerbaycan'ın ve Acem'in ve Şam'ın ve Haleb'in ve Mısır'ın ve Mekke'nin ve Medine'nin ve Kudüs'ün ve külliye diyar-ı Arab'ın ve Yemen'in ve dahi nice memleketlerin –ki âbâ-i kirâm ve ecdâd-ı muazzam enerallahû berahinehum – kuvvet-i kâhireleri ile fetheyledikleri ve Cenâb-ı Celaletmeabım dahi tiğ-i ateşbâr ve şimşir-i zafer-i nigârım ile fetheylediğim nice diyarın sultanı ve pâdişahı Sultan Bayezid Hân oğlu Sultan Selim Hân oğlu Sultan Süleyman Hân'ım

Sen ki Françe vilayetinin kiralı Françeşko'sun

Dergâh-ı selâtinpenahıma yarar adamın Frankıpan ile mektub gönderüb ve bazı ağız haberi dahi ısmarlayub memleketinize düşman müstevli olub, el'an hapiste idiğünüzü ilam edüb, hâlâsınız hususunda bu cânibden inayet ve meded istida eylemişsiz; her ne ki demiş iseniz benim pâye-i serir-i alemmesairime arz olunub âlâ sebil-i tafsil ilm-i şerîfım muhît olub tamam malum oldu. İmdi pâdişahlar sımmak ve habsolunmak âcib değildir. Gönünüzü hoş tutub azürde hatır olmayasız. Öyle olsa bizim âbâ-i kiram ve ecdâd-ı ızamımız nurullah-ı merakidehüm, daima def-i düşman ve feth-i memalik için seferden hali olmayub biz dahi anların tarîkine salık olub her zamanda memleketler ve sa'b-ü hasin kal'alar fetheyleyüb gece gündüz atımız eğerlenmiş ve kılıcımız kuşanılmışdır. Hak subhanehu ve teâlâ hayırlar müyesser eyleyüb meşîyyet ve iradâtı neye müteallik olmuş ise vücuda gele. Bâki ahval ve ahbar ne ise mezkur adamınızdan istintak olunub malumunuz ola."

<sup>160</sup> Rouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 65

<sup>161</sup> Spooner, *op. cit.*, p. 343

<sup>162</sup> Richard Barney, *The European Dynastic States: 1494-1660*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 103

released the French king might be the financial problems of Charles V; with the Valois king captured, a new campaign to divide the French country seemed to him unnecessary. This strategy of Charles V was heavily criticized by his chancellor, Mercurino Gattinara, who tried to persuade Charles V in either keeping Francis I locked up, or releasing him unconditionally in the hope of winning his friendship<sup>163</sup>. According to him, releasing Francis I with a humiliating treaty, such as the Treaty of Madrid, would be very detrimental since the French king would be keen on taking his revenge<sup>164</sup>. This anxiety proved totally right when the League of Cognac was established in 1526.

The League of Cognac was assembled to counter the hegemonic aspirations of Charles V. Its participants were France, the Papacy, Florence, Venice and Milan. Subsequent wars between the League and the Habsburgs (1526-1529) had dramatic implications on early modern European history. Angered by the inclusion of Papacy into this alliance, in 1527, the Habsburg army sacked Rome and captured the Pope Clement VII. According to Finlay, the sack of Rome was a direct result of Venetian silence ordered by Doge Andrea Gritti (r. 1523-1538). Indeed, the Venetian army reached Rome just it was under a strong siege, but they returned without engaging in a battle with the Habsburg troops, because Charles V ordered his brother Ferdinand (r. as the Holy Roman Emperor, 1556-1564) to lead an army from Austria over Venice in order to compel them to turn back. This intimidation resulted in the return of Venetian army and the fall of Rome<sup>165</sup>. What is more, on the way to Rome, the Habsburg army invaded Florence and expelled the Medici family by establishing a republican rule<sup>166</sup>. On the other hand French armies marched into Genoa together with Andrea Doria (1466-1560), the famous Genoese admiral, who had entered French service. By 1529, they were about to invade Naples but because of an epidemic French army had to retreat. What is more, Clement VII signed the Treaty of Barcelona with Charles V to restore his position in the Papacy with the condition

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<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104

<sup>164</sup> Leopold von Ranke, *Reform Devrinde Alman Tarihi*, trans. by. Cemal Köprülü, (Ankara: MEB Yayınları, 1970), Vol. 2, p. 289

<sup>165</sup> Finlay, *op. cit.*, p. 1023

<sup>166</sup> For a detailed account of the Sack of Rome, see Ranke, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-363



to crown Charles V as the Holy Roman Emperor, which would take place in 1530 in Bologna. Finally, after three years of continuous wars, Francis I and Charles V concluded the Peace of Cambrai in 1529<sup>167</sup>. With this treaty, Francis renounced all his claims on Italy but obtained the Burgundian lands which he had lost to Charles V three years ago. What is more, Charles V released his two sons, which were held hostage in Madrid since 1525. Another result of the Peace of Cambrai was that Venice was put in a hostile enclave by France, because of Gritti's insistence on Francis I to attack Milan; by the Habsburgs, because of his leading position in the League of Cognac; and by the Papacy, because of his decision to turn the Venetian army from Rome. The only alternative to survive in this hostile environment was to approach the Ottoman Empire. This explains the relatively peaceful period between the Ottomans and the Venetians between 1529 and 1538.

After a short time from the Peace of Cambrai, which somehow cooled the Ottoman-French relations, Antonio Rincon was sent to the Ottoman army, which was besieging Vienna. Rincon met the Sultan there and came to Istanbul with him in order to explain why his King came to a peace with the Habsburgs<sup>168</sup>. Indeed, one reason why Francis I signed this rather unsatisfactory Treaty of Cambrai instead of dictating peace to Charles V under the threat of the Turks, was the general outcry all over Europe against the apparent Franco-Turkish relations. As Rouillard mentioned 'the mission of Frangipani had been closely followed by the slaughter at Mohacs and that of Rincon by the siege of Vienna, and thousands of Latin pamphlets had assailed the King of France'<sup>169</sup>. In 1532, Rincon was sent again to the Porte, this time, in order to persuade Süleyman the Magnificent not to attack on Central Europe, which would rally the German princes towards a common defense with the Habsburgs, an unfavorable occurrence to the interests of Francis I. However, this project was failed and among the German princes, Francis I found his reputation even worse, as he was freely denounced as a veritable traitor to Christianity<sup>170</sup>.

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<sup>167</sup> This treaty was also known as the 'Ladies Peace' since it was negotiated by the mother of Francis I, Louise of Savoy, and the paternal aunt of Charles V, Margaret of Austria.

<sup>168</sup> Rouillard, op. cit, p. 108

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109

After this initial correspondence with the envoys of Frangipani and Rincon, the second step regarding the Franco-Ottoman relations was the opening of formal diplomatic relations between these two powers with the appointment of the first resident French ambassador to the Porte, Jean de la Forêt. The details of this diplomatic mission of Forêt will be examined in the next chapter, therefore, suffice here to say that the political alliance between these two powers was enhanced with the development of diplomatic relations. Within this context, a significant detail should be mentioned which Jensen wrote as such<sup>171</sup>:

No sooner had the original agreements been arranged in 1536 than a French fleet under the baron de Saint-Blancard sailed east from Marseille to test the privileged position the French were now in. Wintering at Chios, Saint-Blancard entered the Golden Horn the following February. It was a momentous event, for this was the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 that Christian warships had passed the Dardanelles.

Jean de la Forêt did not come to the Porte with only economic demands, which demanded from the Sultan several concessions for the French merchants in the Levant. Rather, his political demands exceeded the economic ones. As Rouillard wrote "...commercial considerations were of secondary importance as compared to the desires of Francis I to use the Turk as a check to Charles's imperial dreams of universal monarchy which were comprising the equilibrium of Europe and the free development of France"<sup>172</sup>. According to Emecen, Forêt demanded Süleyman the Magnificent to lead his army against the Habsburgs both on land and sea, and to send an aid of one million ducats to the king of France. Even an offensive plan was discussed, in which it was planned that the Ottoman armies would attack Italy from Albania whereas the French troops would enter into Lombardia, and two armies will meet in the middle Italy<sup>173</sup>. This plan was never implemented, however, as a preparative maneuver, Ottoman fleet arranged a naval attack on the island of Corfu

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<sup>171</sup> Jensen, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 460

<sup>172</sup> Rouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 112

<sup>173</sup> Feridun Emecen, 'Sultan Süleyman Çağı ve Cihan Devleti', in Hasan Celal Güzel (et. al.) (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 507

in 1537 with the participation of some French vessels, which opened the way for the Battle of Prevesa in 1538<sup>174</sup>.

This first naval cooperation opened the way for further cooperations, which turned out to be one of the most significant aspects of Ottoman-French political relations in the 1540s. Indeed, French navy of early sixteenth century was heavily dependent on the Genoese fleet and its able admiral, Andrea Doria. In 1528, because of some border disputes between Genoa and France, Doria changed his loyalty from Francis I to Charles V, deprived France of a strong fleet, and resulted in a encircled France with the last French ally to switch sides. This approached the French to the Ottomans more and France became dependent on the Ottoman navy in order to survive in this hostile environment. The new French ambassador to the Porte, Antonio Rincon, who replaced La Forêt in 1537, heavily supported this policy of further naval alliance as well. On the other hand, changing loyalty of Doria approached Genoa to Spain whereas its archrival in the Mediterranean trade, Venice, approached to the Ottoman Empire. These arrangements of alliances would result in 1540s several joint Ottoman-French naval attacks on Habsburg possessions in the Mediterranean.

Ottoman attack on Corfu dissuaded the Venetians to further their alliance with the Ottomans since Corfu was a very strategic outpost for the Venetian commerce in the Mediterranean. They allied with Genoa, the Papacy and the Habsburgs and the joint fleet of these powers met the Ottoman fleet next year in the Gulf of Prevesa. The result of the Battle of Prevesa was a total failure for the alliance. Although neither fleets had a significant loss, the fleet of the alliance under Doria retreated and on their return they occupied Castelnuovo. Indeed, according to the agreement that that the allying powers had signed before, all the territories occupied by the alliance should be returned to Venice. However, Doria chose to give Castelnuovo to Charles V, and this once more drove the allies apart and approached Venice to the Ottomans until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571<sup>175</sup>.

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<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> Miguel De Bunes Ibarra, ‘Yavuz Sultan Selim ve Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devirlerinde İspanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorlukları Arasında Deniz Savaşları’, trans. by Ramazan Gözen, in Hasan Celal Güzel (et. al.) (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 603

In 1543, Henry VIII made a secret alliance with Charles V, which aimed for a joint invasion of France within two years. The allies sent an ultimatum threatening Francis with war unless he accepted impossible conditions within three weeks; and after the expiration of the date of the ultimatum, they declared war on France<sup>176</sup>. Thus France caught between two hostile powers and demanded Ottoman help immediately. Ottomans decided that it was the right time to show their renewed fleet in the Mediterranean in order to intimidate the Habsburgs and to demonstrate their support to the French. Francis also demanded Ottoman naval support against Charles V. As a result, in the same year, an Ottoman fleet comprised of 110 galleys left the Golden Horn, led by Khair-ed-din Barbarossa (1475-1546), a former corsair entered into Ottoman service in the reign of Selim I (r. 1512-1520) and later appointed as the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman navy, accompanied by the new French ambassador Antoine Escaline de la Garde, a captain by origin, replacing Rincon after his assassination by Habsburg spies in 1541. Near Naples, Algerian fleet joined the Ottomans and this joint fleet arrived Toulon, the French port in the Mediterranean. Francis I allowed this fleet to pass the winter in Toulon. The inhabitants except the head of the households were ordered to leave with their belongings and their losses were to be compensated by a ten-year exemption from the French personal *taille* tax<sup>177</sup>. Knecht writes that Toulon became a ‘Turkish colony’ for eight months ‘...complete with mosque and slave market, caused amazement in the rest of Christendom’<sup>178</sup>. Jensen, on the other hand, comments on the significance of this event as such<sup>179</sup>:

The Franco-Turkish naval concert of 1543-1544, with the Turkish fleet wintering at Toulon, promised to bring richer rewards to both allies than were actually realized. The Toulon encampment was fraught with many problems and disagreements, and the Franco-Turkish siege of neighboring Nice (the Savoyard rival to Marseille and Toulon, garrisoned at the time by Spain) can hardly be called a cooperative effort...[However] [i]n retrospect it appears that the greatest military value of the Franco-Turkish alliance was

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<sup>176</sup> Baumgartner, *op. cit.*, p. 121

<sup>177</sup> Knecht, *op.cit* p. 214

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> Jensen, 1985, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-459

its potential threat rather than its actual operation. As long as it lasted, the Habsburgs could never be sure when the French and Turks might combine and when they might not.

After the death of two significant actors of this alliance, namely Barbarossa in 1546 and Francis I in 1547, two new actors continued the alliance in 1550s. These were Turgud Reis (1490-1574) and Henry II of France. Turgud Reis was a former corsair like Barbarossa who was captured by Gian-Andrea Doria, the nephew of Andrea Doria, in 1540. He was released in 1543 when Barbarossa threatened Genoa on the way of France. After his release, he entered into Ottoman service and occupied Tripoli in 1551. Henry II, on the other hand, found his position increasingly stronger against Charles V, thus he ordered his ambassador in the Porte, Gabriel D'Aramon, to induce Süleyman the Magnificent to break the Turkish truce with the Emperor<sup>180</sup>. After the Ottoman success in Tripoli, in 1552, he himself had written to Süleyman the Magnificent asking him to send a fleet against Italy in the spring<sup>181</sup>. Turgut Reis was sent to the Mediterranean once more to cooperate with the French. Near Naples this fleet joined with the French and occupied Bastia, the main stronghold of Corsica, which was belonged to Genoa, and which was a vital strategic post between France and Central Italy and a favorite port for Spanish shipping<sup>182</sup>. Despite these successes, however, the alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire, which could achieve more than that, remained mostly inactive because of "...a record of missed opportunities caused by poor communications and mutual suspicion and resentment"<sup>183</sup>.

These intense relations did not last long and entered into a period of slowdown in the 1560s. The reasons were twofold: First of all, there was the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559, which ended six decades of continuous conflicts between the Habsburgs and the French. Both powers were economically exhausted by the intense burden of these wars so that both of them declared bankruptcy in the

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<sup>180</sup> Rouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 124

<sup>181</sup> Knecht, *op. cit.*, p. 270

<sup>182</sup> Emecen, *op. cit.*, p. 510; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1980), p. 386

<sup>183</sup> Ibarra, *op. cit.*, p. 605

same year<sup>184</sup>. What is more, the French had to deal with the spread of Calvinism in France, whereas, the new King of Spain, Philip II (r. 1556-1598), was in trouble with the increasing discontent in the Netherlands. The Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis increased the area of maneuver, particularly for the French, thus the need for maintenance of the political alliance with the ‘infidel’ decreased dramatically. Secondly, Ottoman maritime expansionism in the 1560s resulted in a general European reaction, which put the French, the ally of this expansionist power, in a difficult position.

The first of this expansionist ventures was the Ottoman siege of Malta in 1565. From the early months of 1565, Spanish agents warned Philip II that the Ottomans were preparing for a major naval attack on one of the two Christian strongholds in the Mediterranean, namely, La Goletta or Malta. Ottoman navy left Istanbul in April and reached Malta in May with a great speed and besieged the island. The island was defended by the Order of St. John, which had fled to Malta after the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes in 1522, under the leadership of a French Grand Master, Jean Parisot de la Valette (1494-1568). Ottoman navy and land troops could not breach the defense; even Turgud Reis was among the Turkish losses. They lifted the siege in September and returned to Istanbul. Ottoman failure in Malta increased the morale of the Christian Europe, but this was a very short happiness and hope, since the Ottoman navy began to reappear in the Mediterranean, as menacing as before, in the end of the same year<sup>185</sup>. However, the French, after the Malta affair, considered their relations with the Ottomans carefully, since the public opinion in France began to tilt against the Ottomans due to the courageous defense of the French Grand Master<sup>186</sup>.

The second significant Ottoman venture that raised French reaction against the Ottomans was the Ottoman conquest of the most significant Venetian possession, namely, Cyprus. Cyprus was very strategic for the Ottomans, due to its location within sight of the southern Anatolian coastline and close to the caravan terminals of Syria made it strategically and economically vital; thus for the

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<sup>184</sup> Kinderberger, *op. cit.*, p. 16

<sup>185</sup> Fernand Braudel, *II. Felipe Dönemi'nde Akdeniz ve Akdeniz Dünyası*, trans. by Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994, 2 Volumes), Volume II, p. 427

<sup>186</sup> Jensen, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 459

maintenance of Ottoman hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean this island had to be conquered<sup>187</sup>. In 1489, Venice attained the control of the island as a result of clever dynastic marriages and naked force and until 1571 their control over the island remained unchallenged because they "...labored hard to placate and accommodate first the Mamluks in Cairo and, after 1517, the Ottomans in Istanbul"<sup>188</sup>. However, by 1570, Ottoman conquest of Cyprus became vital for their interests in the Mediterranean, and finally in 1571 the conquest of the island was completed. This disturbed Ottoman-Venetian peace since 1538, and Venice was successful in arranging the Holy League, comprising Spanish Habsburgs, Venice, Genoa, the Order of St. John in Malta, and the Papacy. Pope Pius V (p. 1566-1572 – Antonio Ghisleri) tried to get France to join the Holy League, but Catherine de Medici (1519-1589), the mother of Charles X (r. 1560-1574), the King of France at that time, cautiously declined the invitation on the grounds that such an alliance would likely arouse the fear of German Protestants, who might then combine in a counter league that could have dangerous results<sup>189</sup>. Thus with such a pretext France did not join the Holy League; however, because of the heavy European reaction, the Franco-Ottoman relations cooled down more.

After the Battle of Lepanto, France had fallen upon very hard times. The Wars of Religion and related domestic difficulties were draining France of vitality and wealth. Threatened by Huguenots and Catholics alike, with both sides receiving help from enemies or potential enemies abroad, the crown was hard pressed to maintain peace with its neighbors without leaving the door half closed to hostile intervention. Only a strong and active diplomatic network could insure French survival if the civil wars were not soon ended. Thus the Turkish alliance became an important part of diplomacy of survival<sup>190</sup>.

All in all, Ottoman support to the French against the Habsburgs was very significant for the prevention of Habsburg hegemony in Europe. Ottoman presence

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<sup>187</sup> Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 154

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155

<sup>189</sup> Jensen, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 459

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 462

in the Mediterranean and its continuous attacks in the Central Europe forced the Habsburgs to divert their armies to these regions and decreased their pressure over the French state. Thus, the French state was able to survive after such a devastating blow in the Battle of Pavia. What is more, the French could only overcome the encirclement by the Habsburgs and their allies – Genoa and England – through its naval alliance with the Ottomans. In other words, without the Ottoman help, it would have been very difficult for the French to maintain its presence in the political map of Europe, independent of Habsburg domination.

## **b. OTTOMAN-ENGLISH RELATIONS**

Early modern period was named as the Tudor age in England, since the Tudor dynasty ruled England between 1485 and 1603. Tudor age had started with the victory of Henry VII against Richard III (r. 1483-1485) in the Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485, when, with his main adversary killed in the battle, Henry VII became the sole ruler of England<sup>191</sup>. Anglo-Spanish relations, which would turn out to be a significant enmity in the following decades, had started in his reign as well, with the brief marriage of his son, Prince Arthur (r. as the Prince of Wales 1489-1502), with Catherine of Aragon (1485-1536) in 1501, which increased his stature in Europe considerably<sup>192</sup>. After his death in 1509, his second son, Henry VIII became the new king of England at the age of 18. He began his reign by marrying the widow of Arthur, Catherine of Aragon, in order to maintain Anglo-Spanish relations. John Guy writes about his ambitions as such<sup>193</sup>:

As his reign unfolded Henry VIII added ‘imperial’ concepts of kingship to existing ‘feudal’ ones; he sought to give the words ‘king and emperor’ a meaning unseen since the days of the Roman Empire. He was eager, too, to conquer –to emulate the glorious victories of the Black Prince and Henry V, to quest after the Golden Fleece that was the French Crown. He wished, in fact, to revive the Hundred Years War, despite the success of Valois France

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<sup>191</sup> Neville Williams, *The Life and Times of Henry VII*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), p. 36

<sup>192</sup> For the details of the diplomacy of Henry VII, see, *Ibid.*, pp. 68-97

<sup>193</sup> John Guy, ‘The Tudor Age, 1485-1603, in Kenneth Morgan, *The Oxford History of Britain*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 274



in consolidating its territory and the shift of emphasis of European politics towards Italy and Spain

What was remarkable about Henry VIII's reign in England was not his ambitious domestic and foreign policies, but rather his departure from the Catholic Church. Indeed, Protestantism began to spread in England as early as late 1520s. Although the first chancellor of Henry VIII, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (1475-1530), tried to prevent the spread of this new thinking, it was Henry VIII himself that would depart from the Catholic Church. From Catherine of Aragon, Henry VIII, had several children, but only one of them, Mary Tudor (r. 1553-1558) had survived. Henry VIII wanted a male heir to his throne, thus he wanted to marry another woman, namely his mistress, Anne Boleyn (1507-1536)<sup>194</sup>. However, Catholic practices did not easily allow such a divorce. What is more, it was Pope Julius II, who consecrated the marriage of Henry VIII and Catherine; thus such a divorce would bring Henry VIII and the Papacy in a conflict. In order to realize his aims Henry first ousted Wolsey, who was ardently opposing this divorce, and appointed Thomas More (1478-1535) as his second chancellor, whose spiritual director, John Colet (1467-1519), was among those calling for a religious reform<sup>195</sup>. Moreover, he assembled the Parliament in order to legitimize his practices and issued several acts, the last of which was called as the 'Act against the Pope's Authority' in 1536, which removed the last vestiges of papal authority in England and confirmed the status of Henry VIII as the head of the Anglican Church<sup>196</sup>. In 1534, he ousted Thomas More and appointed Thomas Cromwell (1534-1540) as his third chancellor and Cromwell dissolved all the Catholic monasteries in England in 1535. With this last measure, Henry VIII eliminated the last fortress of potential resistance to his royal supremacy.

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<sup>194</sup> Christopher Haigh, *English Reformation: Religion, Politics and Society under the Tudors*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 105

<sup>195</sup> For a detailed account of John Colet and his reformist activities in England see, Antonia McLean, *Humanism and the Rise of Science in Tudor England*, (New York: Neale Watson Academic Publications, 1972) pp. 37-40

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282 and Haigh, *op. cit.*, p. 131. These acts were the Act of Annates (1532), the Act of Appeals (1533 – which proclaimed Henry VIII's new imperial status and abolished the Pope's right to decide English ecclesiastical cases), the Act of Supremacy (1534 – which declared that the King of England was supreme head of the Church of England), the First Act of Succession (1534), and the Treasons Act (1534). For the full texts of these Acts, see, Gerald Bray (ed.), *Documents of the English Reformation*, (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co Ltd., 1994)

He founded, instead, six new dioceses upon the remains of former monastic buildings and endowments<sup>197</sup>.

Regarding the foreign policy of England, since 1512, England was at war with France, and after the Battle of Pavia there emerged an opportunity to divide France between England and Spain. Henry VIII tried to persuade Charles V for a division; however, Charles V rejected these offers in order not to replace French threat with an English one. After this failure, Henry VIII turned north in order to suppress the Scottish rebels, who tried to form an alliance with France against England. However, without achieving a tangible result he died in 1547 and left his throne to his ill son, Edward VI (r. 1547-1553). Due to Edward's lack of efficiency, there emerged many revolts in England under his reign and these revolts could only be ended with the energetic rule of Mary Tudor, started in 1553. However, the real rebellions started with her regency, which would lead the country almost at the brink of a civil war.

Mary Tudor remained a staunch Catholic despite his father's anti-Catholic measures. She either imprisoned or executed Protestant leaders and tried to reestablish papal union. However, she made two big mistakes, which prevented the realization of her plans<sup>198</sup>. The first was to allow some 800 English Protestants to emigrate to Frankfurt, Zurich, and Geneva. These exiles launched a relentless anti-Catholic propaganda and subversive literature against England, which provided a significant support within the Protestant community for ousting Mary from the throne. Secondly, and more importantly, she attempted to marry Philip, the son of Charles V, which was realized in July 1554. According to the marriage act, Philip would act as the King of England jointly with Mary as the Queen of England during her lifetime; however his rights were to expire if Mary died childless, as proved to be the case. The parliament and the Privy Council was against this marriage since they did not want a Spanish king reigning in the English soil. Finally, in 1558, Mary Tudor died childless, and her half-sister, Elizabeth became the queen of England without much contention.

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<sup>197</sup> Dureen Rosman, *The Evolution of the English Churches: 1500-2000*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 29-35

<sup>198</sup> Guy, *op. cit.*, p. 300

The chronicles generally perceived Elizabeth as a rational ruler compared to her predecessors. In her personality, her father's expansionist ambitious dreams were absent and her sister's ideological and devout religious passions were eschewed. Without adopting adventurist foreign policies, she first tried to restore Protestantism in England, and only after the completion of the Anglican order in 1563 with the approval of Thirty-nine Articles defining the Anglican Church's Doctrine. The second priority of Elizabeth was to deal with the Scottish problem, which became very important with the accession of Mary Stuart to the Scottish throne, who had considerable claims on the English crown as well. What is more, the husband of Mary Stuart, Francis II, became the king of France in 1559, which would ensure a Franco-Scottish alliance against Elizabeth. This threat remained vital until 1568, when the Scots ousted her from the Scottish throne because of her failed administrative measures. She had to flee to England and Elizabeth imprisoned her; this ended the Scottish threat for a while. Only after realizing these two priorities, namely the restoration of the Anglican Church and the suppression of the Scottish threat, Elizabeth could pursue a more active foreign policy.

English role as a champion of Protestantism brought her in a conflict with Spain and Papacy. Indeed, the initial phase of Philip II's foreign policy after Cateau-Cambresis was pro-English. He had just ceased to claim the King of England, due to his marriage with Mary Tudor, and entertained some hopes of continuing that role by marriage to Elizabeth. England and Spain had recently fought in alliance against France and the ascendancy in that country of the Guise family posed considerable threats to Habsburg interests. Yet Anglo-Spanish relations degenerated steadily in the course of the 1560s, largely because of English interference in Philip's legitimate spheres of interest. Elizabeth sought to obstruct Duke Alva's suppression attempts of the Dutch revolt in the Netherlands, the Dutch pirates openly sheltered in English ports, and Philip was forced to take strong measures against interlopers in the New World<sup>199</sup>. In 1568, Elizabeth's Secretary of State, William Cecil, ordered for the seizure Philip II's treasure-ships en route for the Netherlands, which carried the necessary supplies for the suppression of the Dutch rebellion. What is more, Pope Pius V issued a bull, *Regnans in Excelsis*, in 1570, which declared Elizabeth

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<sup>199</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-293

excommunicated and urged loyal Catholics to depose her. In sum, by 1570s, her anti-Catholic foreign policy produced two formidable enemies, namely, the Habsburgs and the Papacy. A possible third enemy, France, was in a religious and political turmoil, therefore, the French threat subsumed for a while.

In 1580, Sir Francis Drake (1540-1586), the famous English privateer, returned from his voyage round the world not alone but with a store of plunder captured from Spanish settlements and vessels on the coast of South America. This created a diplomatic crisis between England and Spain. The Spanish ambassador in London, Mendoza, demanded compensation for the Spanish losses but Elizabeth and his lawyers rejected this demand by arguing that the "...Spaniards have brought these evils on themselves by their injustice towards the English, whom, *contra ius gentium*, they have excluded from commerce with the West Indies"<sup>200</sup>. In other words, on this first serious dispute between England and Spain, Elizabeth asserted the 'freedom of the seas' vis-à-vis the Spanish claim of monopoly over the West Indies trade.

The relations between England and Spain strained more, when, in 1584, Mendoza was charged with having taken part in the plot for the liberation of Mary Stuart and the deposition of Elizabeth; even the English government was inclined to execute or imprison the ambassador. After consulting the two famous jurists of the time, Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) and Hotman, they abandoned insisting on these harsh measures and preferred to expel the ambassador<sup>201</sup>. This resulted in the cut of diplomatic relations between Spain and England.

After all these hostile relations, the Venetian dispatches implied, as early as 1584, that Philip II decided an enterprise against England. Accordingly, one of these dispatches was about the popular opinion in Spain that the gossips on an attack on England found confirmation in the sums deposited with the Fuggers for raising German and Italian levies, and in a large order for cannon brass at Fontarabia<sup>202</sup>. What is more, Drake's assaults against Spanish vessels and Spanish forts in the

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<sup>200</sup> Edward P. Cheyney, 'International Law under Queen Elizabeth', (*The English Historical Review*, Vol. 20, No. 80, 1905, pp. 659-672), p. 660

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 660-661

<sup>202</sup> E. Armstrong, 'Venetian Dispatches on the Armada and Its Results', (*The English Historical Review*, Vol. 12, No. 48, 1897, pp. 659-678), p. 663

Caribbean by 1586 resulted in a panicky atmosphere in Spain. This was enhanced with Drake's raid on Cadiz in 1587, which aroused the spirit of the Spanish people that now realized the necessity of offensive measures; on the other hand it created a feeling of despair<sup>203</sup>. They began to recognize the English technical supremacy over the Spanish, since the English guns had a longer range and their ships better sailing qualities<sup>204</sup>. Venetian dispatches became more and more hopeless about the Spanish power as the English assaults on Spanish possessions increased. One of them says, '[t]he English are masters of the sea, and hold it at their discretion. Lisbon and the whole coast is, as it were, blockaded'<sup>205</sup>. In the same year, Philip II was already determined to attack England but his able admiral, Santa Cruz, dissuaded him with a long letter in which he assured the King that it was destruction to sail in the winter months; the rising in Ireland (to which Philip II counted much) was over, no faith could be placed in the king of Scotland<sup>206</sup>. What is more, he feared from an Ottoman naval attack in the Mediterranean in the same year due to the rumors of increasing Anglo-Ottoman correspondence. Thus the enterprise delayed one year.

This one-year delay was not productive, rather destructive, because of death of Pope Gregory XIII (p. 1572-1585 – Ugo Buncampagno) and election of Sixtus V (p. 1585-1590 – Felice Perretti) as the new Pope. Unlike, Gregory XIII, who had been an ardent supporter of Philip II, Sixtus V was very sympathetic to Queen Elizabeth. His comments about Elizabeth were quite positive despite Elizabeth's religious divergence with the Catholic Papacy. To the Venetian ambassador he told that<sup>207</sup>:

She is a great woman, and were she only Catholic she would be without her match and we should esteem her highly...Just look how well she governs; she is only a woman, only mistress of half an island, and yet she makes herself feared by Spain, by France, by the empire, by all...Have you heard how Drake has offered battle to the Armada? With what courage! Do you think he showed any fear? He is a great captain

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<sup>203</sup> John Hampden, *Francis Drake: Privateer*, (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), p. 249

<sup>204</sup> Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 665

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 666

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 669-670

Before the Armada enterprise, Elizabeth sought for alliances in Europe. First of all, she demanded Hanseatic states such as Hamburg, Lübeck and Danzig to cut their trade with Spain. However, Hanse merchants were not willing to forego the profitable sale of supplies to Spain and this resulted in English seizure of Hanseatic vessels<sup>208</sup>. France, on the other hand, would not be a reliable ally, because due to Wars of Religion, France was already in a difficult position and, what is more, Pierre de Ségusson, the ‘unfortunate’ French ambassador in Madrid, charged with maintaining amicable relations with Philip II, who was now bent on castigating the English and restoring the Castilian order in Netherlands by remaining silent in the calls of Elizabeth<sup>209</sup>. The only remaining alternative was to ally with the Ottoman Empire, which the French did almost half a century ago.

According to Barton and Pears, the idea of an alliance with the Porte was a natural one, and if the suggestion made to the Ottoman Sultan had been accepted and carried into effect, namely to send a fleet to attack Spain in the Mediterranean, England’s task in defending herself would have been made much easier than it was. They summarize the call of Elizabeth to Sultan Murad III as such<sup>210</sup>:

‘Make no mistake’ was the drift of Elizabeth’s appeal; ‘Philip is attacking us now, and if he succeed your turn comes next. Join with us and our arms will probably be successful. If we are divided, his force is so overwhelming that, though we are confident of success, who knows what results may be?’

Indeed, almost half a decade earlier, William Harborne, the first English ambassador to the Porte, had obtained a verbal promise from the Sultan that if Elizabeth would attack Spain in the Atlantic, he would send a great force for the same purpose to the Mediterranean coasts of Spain. Edward Barton, who had replaced Harborne as the second English ambassador to the Porte, repeated similar demands. Barton was trying to persuade the Ottoman Sultan about the strength of England. He called attention to England’s former victories, the queen’s preparations, to the superior build of their ships, the cleverness of their seamen. However, he was

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<sup>208</sup> Cheyney, *op. cit.*, pp. 662-663

<sup>209</sup> De Lamar Jansen, “French Diplomacy and the Wars of Religion”, (*Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1974, pp. 23-46), p. 28

<sup>210</sup> Edward Barton and Edwin Pears, ‘The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Porte’, (*The English Historical Review*, Vol. 8, No. 31, 1893, pp. 439-466)

unable to make his voice heard in the Porte because the viceroy of the Grand Vizier (*sadaret kaymakamı*), who was receiving a ‘bakhshish’ of sixty thousand ducats annually from Spain in order to dissuade the Porte from engaging in any alliance with England, blocked his appeals<sup>211</sup>. The Persian war was the excuse for not sending a fleet and the viceroy did his best to prevent peace with Persia so that the Sultan should not be free to attack Spain.

Elizabeth never received a direct Ottoman help and had to deal with the Armada by her own means. Philip’s invasion plan was simple: the Duke of Parma, Alessandro Farnese (1545-1592) who was commanding Spanish army in the Netherlands, was to assemble an invading force on the North Sea coast. Spanish Armada composed of 130 ships and 30,000 men was to travel north from Spanish-controlled Lisbon and meet Parma’s army. Then, the Armada would meet the army and would carry it to the shores of England. However before the rendezvous was realized, Spanish vessels were hit by the English fire ships and the subsequent losses of the Armada equated the number of English vessels with that of the Armada. Without giving the opportunity to recover, English vessels attacked the remaining Spanish vessels next day near Gravelines, France, and defeated the Armada. Only 67 ships and 10000 men survived. The Armada affair was not only significant for the English history, but also for the world history as well: According to Terraine<sup>212</sup>:

[The Armada enterprise]...laid the cornerstone of the British Empire by endowing England with the prestige Spain lost. And it was this prestige, this faith in her destiny, that urged the English along their imperial way, until their flag floated over the greatest empire the world has so far seen: the empire of the oceans and the seas, which from rise to fall was to endure for over 300 years.

Ottoman support to England was a part of its general policy of supporting the Protestants against the Habsburg Empire. Although Ottoman-English political relations were not as sincere as it had been prospected it is a fact that even the rumors of a military alliance with the Turks proved effective for the victory of the English over Spain. Moreover, in the year 1588, the chronicles recorded that the

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<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 461

<sup>212</sup> John Terraine (ed.), *Battles of the Western World and Their Influence upon History, 480 B.C.-1757*, (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1970), p. 428

Ottoman navy appeared in the Mediterranean with a band of strong vessels, thus, Philip II had to keep some part of his Armada in the Mediterranean. There is not any evidence about whether the Ottomans intentionally realized this showdown; still, it was a fact that the Ottomans contributed, intentionally or unintentionally, to the victory of the English by holding some vessels in the Mediterranean, which would otherwise be sent to the English Channel. In all, Ottoman-English political relations were not much effective, but this was compensated by the economic relations, which directly contributed to the prosperity of England.

### c. OTTOMAN-DUTCH RELATIONS

Within the context of its support towards the Protestant dissidence against the Habsburg hegemonic aspirations in Europe, establishment of Ottoman-Dutch political and economic relations was an inevitable development. At the end of the sixteenth century neither Ottomans nor the Dutch were unaware of each other. In their revolt against Habsburg rule the Dutch considered Ottomans as a force creating temporary periods of relief, which had been distracting Habsburg troops from Low Countries, thus increasing the area of maneuver for themselves.

Informal relations between these Dutch ‘rebels’ and the Ottomans started in 1565 with a secret envoy, sent by the Prince of Orange, William I, the leader of the Dutch revolt at that time, to Joseph Nassi, the future confidant of Sultan Selim II (r. 1566-1574), in order to persuade him to provide Ottoman support; however, this mission seemed not having achieved anything<sup>213</sup>. However, still, it was not totally a failure because Joseph Nassi, who was aware of this rising power due to his former economic connections in Low Countries, advised Süleyman the Magnificent on the opening of a Turkish trading center (staple) at Antwerp where the Marrano-Jewish community had established itself. Within this framework, in 1565 the Sultan sent an envoy to Europe, Hadji Murad, to deal with Nassi’s financial claims against the King of France and to offer support to the Protestants in Germany and the

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<sup>213</sup>A. H. De Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 1610-1630*, (Leiden-Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut, 1978), p. 84



Netherlands<sup>214</sup>. What is more, an imperial letter was sent to the rulers and members of the Protestant sect in Flanders. In this letter, full political support was promised to the Dutch rebels to counter the Spanish and Catholic oppression, and praised the religious beliefs of the Dutch people<sup>215</sup>.

Although there was no direct support of Ottoman Empire to the Dutch revolt, Ottoman-Habsburg naval conflict in the Mediterranean contributed to the success of the Dutch against the Habsburgs. In 1572, the Sea Beggars, the mercenary naval forces of the Dutch in the war against the Habsburgs, captured a significant Dutch port, Brill. When the Beggars attacked Brill, the city was practically undefended. Philip II had been distracted by a new Turkish offensive in the Mediterranean, and after his fleet defeated the Turks at Lepanto, the Spanish king planned to mount a massive operation against the Turks in 1572 to press home his advantage; therefore, he decided to keep his fleet in the Mediterranean<sup>216</sup>. Thus the Beggars captured Brill without a fight. After this success, the Sea Beggars were emboldened by their success and also took control of many more towns and made inroads into Holland and Zeeland.

The event that contributed much to the development of Ottoman-Dutch relations was the Dutch occupation of Sluis. This small city, situated between marshes and shallow waters, was since 1600 a base of Spanish galleys that had been brought from the Mediterranean to attack Dutch shipping. The Dutch reacted by besieging Sluis and attacking the galleys, which were rowed by slaves who were in majority Muslim captives from Ottoman North Africa. One Turkish slave from Istanbul managed to escape and the information he gave was of considerable importance to the Dutch. Finally in 1603 the Dutch inflicted a decisive defeat on the

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<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83

<sup>215</sup> For the full text of this letter see, Bülent Arı, *The First Dutch Ambassador in Istanbul: Cornelis Haga and the Dutch Capitulations of 1612*, unpublished PhD Thesis, (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2003), footnote 20. To give some examples from the letter about the Ottoman support to Dutch clause: “Siz dahi puta tapmayub kiliselerde putları ve sûret ve nâkusları redd idüb Hak te’âlâ birdür ve hazret-i İsa peyğamberi ve kuludur deyu i’tikâd idüb ve Papa denilen bî-dîn nice kanlar dökülmesine sebep olmağla siz Papaluya kılıç çeküb dâimâ anları katl eyledüğünüz ecilden karadan ve deryâdan her hâl ile size mu’avenet-i husrevânemiz zuhûra gelmek ve ol zâlim-i bî-dîn elinden sizi halâs etmek lâzım olmuşdur...ne zamanda Papaluya kasf idüb vakt ta’yîn idersenüz karadan ve deryadan mu’avenet ve müzâheretimiz mukarrerdür.”

<sup>216</sup> Peter Limm, “*The Dutch Revolt 1559-1648*”, (London: Longman, 1989), p. 37

galleys and conquered Sluis in 1604, where 1400 galley slaves were freed. As a memory for this event, a small village near Sluis is still called ‘Turkeye’.

The setting free of the galley slaves was seen by the Dutch government as a good way to establish friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire<sup>217</sup>. This was extensively used by the first Dutch ambassador to the Porte, Cornelis Haga, who mentioned this event in his speech towards Sultan Ahmed I. His mission will be examined in detail in the next chapter, therefore, suffice here to mention that the Ottoman-Habsburg contention contributed to the success of the Dutch revolt against the Habsburgs.

## **2. OTTOMAN SUPPORT TO THE DISSIDENT GROUPS WITHIN THE HABSBURG EMPIRE**

Throughout the sixteenth century, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires confronted both on land and on sea. The southeast Central Europe, particularly Hungary, turned out to be the major landward battlefield between these two superpowers in the ‘sixteenth century world war’<sup>218</sup>, and the Ottoman advance into this region contributed to the rooting of Protestantism, thus undermined the Habsburg presence in Germany. On the other hand, the seaward battlefield in the central Mediterranean resulted in increasing Ottoman contact with the Morisco community in Spain in order to make them revolt against the Habsburgs to distract Habsburg forces from the Mediterranean. Ottoman support to these two dissident factors within the Habsburg Empire contributed to the prevention of Habsburg hegemony in Europe and the Mediterranean, thus this part of the thesis is devoted to analyze the impact of Ottoman-Protestant and Ottoman-Morisco relations.

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<sup>217</sup> Zeki Çelikkol (et. al.), *It Began with the Tulip*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), p. 13

<sup>218</sup> Andrew Hess named the Ottoman-Habsburg conflicts as a ‘world war’ and perceived these two states as the two superpowers of that age. See, Andrew Hess, ‘The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War’, (*Middle East Studies*, Vol. 4, 1973 pp. 55-76)

## a. OTTOMANS AND PROTESTANTS

The fate of Hungary was very significant in understanding the Ottoman-Habsburg contention in Central Europe and Ottoman contribution to the spread of Protestantism. Accordingly, in the fourteenth century, Hungary was strong enough to control all the Balkans except the Kingdom of Serbia; however, it was weakened by the disobedient Orthodox sects that had been reacting to the Catholic Hungarian rule by the first half of the sixteenth century. This weakening was reversed with the ascension of Matthias Corvinus to the Hungarian throne in 1458; even he was able to defeat the Habsburgs and even occupied their capital, Vienna. However, after his death in 1490, Hungary was weakened once more vis-à-vis the Habsburgs. Indeed, through a complex network of dynastic alliances, Maximilian I of the House of Habsburg claimed the Hungarian throne but Hungarian nobility preferred a weak Hungarian king, Ladislas II (r. 1490-1516) from the Jagellion dynasty, instead of a strong but alien ruler. According to Galati, this was a vital error, since the Hungarian nobility did not consider the rising threat of the east, namely the Ottoman Empire<sup>219</sup>. Contrary to the expectations of the Hungarian nobility, Ladislas signed the Treaty of Presburg with Maximilian I, which provided the Habsburgs with the Hungarian throne if Ladislas would die heirless. However, after the treaty, Ladislas had a son, which made the treaty void. Maximilian sought another solution and married his son, Ferdinand, with the daughter of Ladislas, Anne; and his daughter, Mary, with the son of Ladislas, Louis II (r. 1516-1526). These double dynastic marriage contracts strengthened the Habsburg position in Hungary, and later opened a fierce competition for the Hungarian throne, which became one of the reasons for further Ottoman attacks in Hungary.

In the reign of Louis II, Hungary weakened more and more. Internally, in 1514, a big peasant rebellion shattered the country. Externally, in 1521, Ottoman armies reached Belgrade and captured it; this opened the Hungarian plains to the Ottoman invasion. Louis quickly demanded help from Charles V; however, Charles could not send any aid either militarily or materially because of his expenses to maintain his large army against the Valois dynasty. According to Galati, the priority

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<sup>219</sup> Stephen A. Fisher-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism 1521-1555*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 5

of Charles V was Italy, not Hungary; in other words, unless a peace was concluded in the west, no help would be directed towards the east<sup>220</sup>. Therefore, Charles was absent in Germany between 1521 and 1530, during when imperial authority lay in the hands of Ferdinand and the Council of Regency. Seeing the unreliability of his brother, Ferdinand tried to counter the Ottoman threat by demanding the help of German princes; however, German princes were reluctant in providing any material help to Ferdinand, which would mean strengthening of the political power of the Habsburgs vis-à-vis themselves.

Ferdinand and Louis's help demands were renewed in the Diet of Worms, in 1521; however, these demands left unanswered since the main issue of the Diet was Luther and his 'heretical' views. Luther had been living under the protection of Frederick, the Elector of Saxony, and had been teaching at the Elector's prized University of Württemberg. Frederick was a powerful prince and Charles V was fearful of antagonizing him at so early a stage in his imperial career<sup>221</sup>. Therefore, feared from the spread of Protestantism in Germany in case of a total breakdown with the German princes, in the Diet of Worms neither Charles nor Ferdinand could attempt to eliminate the Lutheran threat in its initial phase.

On the other hand, after the loss of Belgrade to the Ottomans, both Charles V and German princes took the Turkish threat more serious, but this did not produce a significant support to Ferdinand and Louis. In 1524, Charles sent a brilliant envoy to the Diet of Nuremberg, Joseph Hannot, who demanded the German princes to help Ferdinand in his quest against the Ottomans. Hannot was a good orator, who warned the princes about the imminent Turkish threat efficiently, making them accept to send 16,000 troops to fight against the Ottoman armies<sup>222</sup>. One reason for the acceptance of the princes to help Ferdinand was the promise that they took from Hannot in persuading Charles to convene a council dealing with the problem of Luther<sup>223</sup>. From then on, whenever Charles demanded the support of German princes in his prospective quests against the Ottoman Empire, German princes put

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<sup>220</sup> Galati, *op. cit.*, p. 16

<sup>221</sup> MacDonald, *op. cit.*, p. 86

<sup>222</sup> Galati, *op. cit.*, p. 21

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24

the condition of a religious council to reconcile the Church and Luther. In other words, the Ottoman advance in the Central Europe acted as a pretext for the German princes to maintain their independence and strength vis-à-vis the Habsburgs.

In 1525, the Peasant's War erupted in Germany. The peasantry had suffered substantially from the increase of the power of territorial princes. Their traditional freedoms and economic rights had come under great pressure; what is more, increased taxation, a run of bad harvests and an annual population rise of a little under one percent which placed considerable strain upon resources<sup>224</sup>. This revolt became the most serious threat to the integrity of Lutheran movement and precipitated a new crisis in the empire. According to Jensen, it brought terror and destruction toward much of the empire; it also wrought a profound change in the direction and affiliation of Lutheranism. Deeply disturbed by the disorder of the peasant upheaval, Luther "...lashed out against those who had thus prostituted the gospel in the name of divine justice"<sup>225</sup>. He called upon the princes to strike down the rebellious insurgents before it was too late, and tried to eliminate this serious threat to his credibility, since he was accused of invoking the peasants. This revolt also delayed any meeting between Ferdinand and the German princes to project a counter-offensive against the Ottomans; this lack of a concerted effort contributed to preparations for a large-scale campaign against Hungary.

In 1526, when the Diet of Speyer was convened, the position of Hungary was very fragile. There were intense rumors that Ottomans were preparing a massive attack and the reports of the Habsburg spies confirmed this menacing news. However, German princes seemed not to give much importance to these gossips; rather their priority was the solution of the religious problem with the convention of a religious council. In order to get the support of the princes, Charles accepted to persuade Pope Clement VII for assembling such a council. Only after this promise, the princes agreed to send 24,000 troops but it was too late, because the Diet ended on August 27 and two days later the Hungarian army was decisively defeated in the

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<sup>224</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 213

<sup>225</sup> De Lamar Jansen, *The World of Europe: The Sixteenth Century*, (Missouri: Forum Press, 1973), p. 205

plains of Mohacs<sup>226</sup>. In the battle, Louis II was killed as well, leaving no heir behind him; and this opened a fierce competition between the Hungarian nobility, who supported John Zapolyai, the Voivode of Transylvania, and Ferdinand who had claimed the Hungarian throne because of dynastic linkages, mentioned before. Süleyman the Magnificent also supported Zapolyai as the King of Hungary, because he did not really seek to occupy Hungary; instead he preferred to create a pro-Turkish buffer state, which would separate his Empire from the eastern provinces of the Habsburgs<sup>227</sup>. Although seemed to be a significant defeat for the Christian world, Henri Pirenne argued that this battle was a “magnificent triumph for Austria [for the Habsburg Empire], for it gave her the long-coveted crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, at last assured to her by the victory of the Turks”<sup>228</sup>.

Right after the Battle of Mohacs, three diets were convened in Hungary to determine the new King<sup>229</sup>: The first one was summoned in Szekesfehervar, which chose Zapolyai as the King of Hungary. The second one in Presburg and the third one in Cetin, Croatia, on the other hand, chose Ferdinand. Now, both Ferdinand and Zapolyai saw that this dilemma had to be resolved by force. Ferdinand demanded the support of German princes and Charles V; the former rejected this demand, because they did not want a direct conflict with the Ottomans, and the latter was reluctant to send material aid, because he had already ended an exhausting war with France. Thus, Ferdinand attacked Buda with his own troops, captured the city and dethroned John Zapolyai from the Hungarian throne. Zapolyai fled to Poland and from there went to England and then to France where Francis I welcomed him at Fontainbleau and promised him an alliance, since he was both the enemy of the Habsburgs and the ally of the Sultan<sup>230</sup>. Moreover, Zapolyai demanded the Ottoman help directly and this alarmed Ferdinand. He convened the Second Diet of Speyer in 1529 in order to get the support of the German princes once more. He issued an

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<sup>226</sup> Galati, *op. cit.*, p. 26

<sup>227</sup> Szakaly, *op. cit.*, p. 100

<sup>228</sup> Henri Pirenne, *op. cit.*, p. 312

<sup>229</sup> Victor L. Topié, *The Rise and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy*, trans. by Stephen Hardman, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 57

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58

imperial edict granting religious liberty to Catholics in Lutheran lands but denying it to Lutherans in Catholic territories. This edict was met with an immediate written protest by five of the Lutheran princes and some fourteen cities. This ‘protest’ eventually gave the common name of ‘Protestants’ to the scores of divergent Reformation movements of the sixteenth century<sup>231</sup>.

The need to raise troops and funds for the defense of the Empire and Christendom from the Turks and other enemies; the securing of the selection of Ferdinand as the King of Romans and apparent heir to the imperial dignity; and the resolution of the political disorders and religious controversies raging in Germany were the major items on the agenda of the Diet of Augsburg in 1530<sup>232</sup>. Regarding the selection of Ferdinand as the King of Romans, many hoped that this selection might result in greater imperial assistance to Hungary; whereas, there were some who feared that such aid would not be used against the Turks, but against themselves<sup>233</sup>. Regarding the religious problem there were two alternatives: either to convene a religious council to reconcile Lutheran and Catholic views, or to smash the Protestants by force. The Protestant German princes supported establishment of a council whereas the Papacy supported military measures against the Protestant ‘heresy’. German Catholics sided with the German Protestants in this controversy, because they did not trust the Papacy. They thought that if a council were to be convened, German Protestants would join the Catholics by abandoning their heretical views. However, the decisions taken in this Diet was quite contrary to the demands of the Protestants, since the Papacy rejected the summoning of a religious council. As a reaction to this decision, Protestant German princes founded the League of Schmalkalden in 1531. Those German duchies and principalities, which were against the increasing power of the Habsburgs in Germany, joined the League. Under the leadership of two Lutheran princes, the Landgrave of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony, the League was mainly composed of two northern free cities, Magdeburg and Bremen, and four southern towns, Strasbourg, Constance,

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<sup>231</sup> Jensen, *op. cit.*, p. 206

<sup>232</sup> David P. Daniel, ‘The Influence of the Augsburg Confession in the South-East Central Europe’, (*Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1980, pp. 99-114), p. 100

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*

Memmingen and Lindau. Initially, Charles tried to reconcile with the League members, but when the princes demanded Charles to end the suppression over the Lutherans, Charles rejected this demand and reconciling attempts came to an end.

Another significant impact of the Diet of Augsburg was the beginning of the spread of Protestantism in the southeast central Europe. Starting from early 1530s, Protestant universities in Germany, particularly the University of Wittenberg, began to accept students from the region, and merchants began to diffuse the publications of Luther<sup>234</sup>. This resulted in a rapid spread of the reformation ideas in the region, even in Austria, the homeland of Austrian Habsburgs<sup>235</sup>. Nobles and cities in Upper, Lower and Inner Austria accepted reformation teachings, and after 1530, they began to express openly the desire to promote the free preaching of the gospel as expressed in the Confession of Faith presented in Augsburg to Charles V. However, it was not until 1571, the final confirmation of the religious toleration of Maximilian II (r. as the Holy Roman Emperor, 1564-1576), that the Austrians had the religious freedom<sup>236</sup>.

In 1531, in order to increase his power and prestige vis-à-vis German princes, Ferdinand decided to recapture Buda; he considered the Turks would not attack him because of his conflict with Zapolyai. This strategy was a total failure because with Ferdinand's attack, the Ottoman-Habsburg truce negotiations came to an end. The alienation of the Turks forced Charles V to reconcile with the Protestants once more. He was ready to accept the Augsburg Protestation as valid, at least until the assembly of a religious council, if the Lutherans supported Ferdinand in his struggle with the Turks, if they did not attempt to attract Germans to their sect, and if they accepted Ferdinand as the King of Romans<sup>237</sup>. The League was not content with these offers, but they decided to negotiate with Charles, because the prospective Turkish campaign would provide them the opportunity to benefit from

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<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>235</sup> For a detailed account of the impact of Protestant universities in the spread of Reformation in Central Europe, see, Charlotte Methuen, 'Securing the Reformation through Education: The Duke's Scholarship System of Sixteenth-Century Württemberg', (*Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1994, pp. 841-851)

<sup>236</sup> Daniel, *op. cit.*, p. 103

<sup>237</sup> Galati, *op. cit.*, p. 61



these difficult times of the Emperor. These attempts for a settlement were the main issue of the Diet of Regensburg in 1532, but the Diet was ended without tangible results because the League insisted on their demands. Charles had to give up his perseverance due to the approaching Ottoman threat; therefore, in July 1532 Nuremberg Religious Peace was concluded between Charles and the League. According to this Peace, Charles accepted that he would not suppress the Protestant movement in religious terms and he would not disturb the territorial integrity of the Protestant lands; whereas, the Protestants accepted to support Ferdinand and recognize him as the King of Romans<sup>238</sup>. This peace was very important since it provided an opportunity for the Protestants to enhance their position in Germany.

In 1532, Süleyman the Magnificent launched a massive campaign towards Hungary and even some Ottoman irregular border troops, the *akidjis*, were seen in the German territories. Meanwhile, Charles V, who had succeeded at the imperial Diets in restoring peace between Catholics and Protestants, had assembled a powerful army, which he led to Vienna. This was the only visit that he ever made to this city. However, the Ottoman and Habsburg armies never met, since the main Ottoman army did not attempt to siege Vienna and to penetrate in the German lands<sup>239</sup>.

In 1533, in order to deal with the Persian threat, Süleyman the Magnificent wanted to conclude a peace with the Habsburgs. He was even ready to accept Ferdinand as the King of Hungary if Ferdinand and Charles were able to persuade Zapolyai to abandon his regency. But Zapolyai did not want to give up his position; therefore, these attempts did not succeed. But another threat emerged in Germany, which would disturb the Nuremberg Peace. The Landgrave of Hesse, Philip (1504-1567), occupied Württemberg, which belonged to Ferdinand in 1534. The former Duke of Württemberg, Ulrich, who had been driven from his territory in 1519, had become a close friend of Philip. The Landgrave succeeded in expelling Ferdinand from the city and restored Ulrich, who by now had embraced Lutheranism. Württemberg became a Lutheran state, and a member of the League of

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<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65

<sup>239</sup> Topié, *op. cit.*, p. 60

Schmalkalden; and Ferdinand lost this strategically important territory<sup>240</sup>. Indeed, after this fait accompli Charles decided to react; however, increasing Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean prevented him to react effectively. In other words, once more the Ottomans diverted the Habsburg threat from the German Protestants. Charles had to acquiesce with the Treaty of Kadan and he began to wait for an opportunity to end the Protestant problem effectively.

1536 was a year of difficulties for the Habsburgs. In the west, a new Habsburg-Valois war erupted; whereas, in the east, Ferdinand was under the pressure of Ottoman threat. In this environment, which was very fertile for the Protestants, German princes wanted Charles V to renew the Nuremberg Peace. Charles persuaded Pope Paul III (p. 1534-1549 – Alessandro Farnese) to convene a general council in Mantua in 1539. But the Protestants did not see this offer sincere and rejected to participate the council. Instead, the members of the Schmalkalden League met in 1537 to plan a concerted strategy. Luther was asked to produce an appropriate response. The resulting Schmalkaldic Articles, published in 1538, categorically rejected any compromise with Rome<sup>241</sup>.

In 1538, Zapolyai and Ferdinand secretly signed an agreement in Grusswardein. Zapolyai had thought that he lost his credibility in the eyes of Süleyman the Magnificent, thus he feared that Süleyman the Magnificent would dethrone him. According to this agreement, in case of an Ottoman attack against Hungary, Ferdinand would support Zapolyai, in return, Zapolyai declared Ferdinand as his heir. Angered to hear the rumors about the agreement, Süleyman the Magnificent planned another Ottoman attack in Hungary. When Zapolyai died in 1540 he left an infant, Sigismund, as his heir. This opened a new conflict of succession between Ferdinand and the Hungarian nobility who supported the regency of this baby instead of an alien monarch. This conflict was ended with the occupation of Buda by Ferdinand, which was resulted in the Ottoman re-occupation of Buda and incorporation of Hungary to the Ottoman territory. Because of this massive Ottoman campaign, in 1541, Charles conceded a temporary peace to the

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<sup>240</sup> Barney, *op. cit.*, p. 117

<sup>241</sup> Peter Classen, *Europe in the Reformation*, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1979), p. 83

Protestants with the Declaration of Regensburg, in which he lifted the obstacles in front of the spread of Protestantism.

The developments between 1542 and 1546 were crucially important since they were the preparatory events of the Battle of Mühlberg between the League of Schmalkalden and Charles V. First of all, in 1542, Duke Henry of Brunswick Wolfenbuettel, one of the few remaining Catholic princes in northern Germany, seized the imperial cities of Goslar and Brunswick<sup>242</sup>. Philip of Hesse, on the other hand, expelled the Duke and invited reformers to introduce the Reformation into the Duchy<sup>243</sup>. Secondly, in 1544, the Habsburg-Valois wars were ended with the Peace of Crepy, creating the opportunity to direct Habsburg troops to Germany. Third, in 1545, an Ottoman-Habsburg truce was concluded, thus the biggest threat for the Habsburgs was temporarily ended. It was only after this truce that Charles V could be supplanted with his brothers troops and felt himself secure in the east. Finally in 1546 Protestants rejected the Council of Trent, the last chance for a religious reconciliation. Protestantism continued to spread and the League of Schmalkalden began to intrigue with France. As a result of all these developments, to deprive the Lutherans of their political backing, which apparently made them unwilling to accept a reasonable compromise, Charles decided to strike the League, ostensibly to punish its leaders, Johann Frederick (1503-1554), the elector of Saxony, and Philip, the Landgrave of Hesse<sup>244</sup>. In order to realize a decisive blow, Charles V had to get the support of the papacy; in 1546, the pope sent his grandson as commander of the Papal army for the war against the Lutherans, thus declared his open support to Charles.

Finally, in 1547, the unavoidable battle was fought in the plains of Mühlberg. Right before the battle, Charles V had already obtained a surprising ally, the Protestant Maurice of Saxony (1521-1553), who tried to be the Duke of Saxony. Strengthened by this support, the emperor gathered together an army in Germany to wipe out the League of Schmalkalden, specifying that he was waging war only

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<sup>242</sup> Barney, *op. cit.*, p. 118

<sup>243</sup> Klassen, *op. cit.*, p. 85

<sup>244</sup> H. G. Koenigsberger (et. al.), *op. cit.*, p. 239

against rebels and not against Lutherans in general<sup>245</sup>. At the end of the day, victory belonged to Charles V, and the Protestant army was totally smashed.

Next year, when the German princes and Charles V met at the Diet of Augsburg, Charles V was at the summit of his powers. The Protestants were defeated, with the Schmalkaldic leaders Johann Frederick of Saxony and Philip of Hesse under prison. He was at peace with France at that time and the Turkish threat was not as strong as a decade before due to Ottoman campaigns in Persia. What is more, a religious council had finally met in Trent to deal with the Protestant reformation. As Dixon writes ‘[I]ittle wonder many of the reformers started to fear for the Protestant faith’<sup>246</sup>. Aware of his power, Charles imposed the Interim of 1548: while waiting for the decrees of the General Council to be promulgated, Catholicism was reestablished throughout Germany while the Lutherans were granted communion in both kinds and their clergy were allowed to marry. Many Protestant princes accepted these terms, the towns submitted and, thirty years after his election, Charles V for a while appeared to be the master in Germany<sup>247</sup>.

Four years later, however, the Emperor’s religious policy was to be totally rejected and his political gains were effectively reversed. By 1550, just two years after the Interim, another anti-imperial German Protestant league was on the way of formation. Margrave John of Kuestrin, allied with John Albert of Mecklenburg and Duke Albert of Prussia, who stood ready to resist imperial and Catholic policies. This alliance was considerably strengthened when Maurice of Saxony, suspicious of imperial designs, deserted Charles V. All these princes formed the League of Torgau in 1551<sup>248</sup>. The German princes allied with Henry II in 1552, by allowing him to occupy temporarily the bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun, and provided him with the financial help. In the same year, Maurice of Saxony, assumed leadership of the army of the League, which marched on Innsbruck where Charles V was residing.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> Jean Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire: 1273-1700*, trans. by C. A. Simpson (London: Longman, 1994), p. 150

<sup>246</sup> Dixon, *op. cit.*, p. 118

<sup>247</sup> Bérenger, *op. cit.*, p. 151

<sup>248</sup> Klassen, *op. cit.*, p. 91

<sup>249</sup> Berenger, *op. cit.*, p. 151

The emperor, without money and without troops, fled to Austria and signed the Peace of Passau, which granted at least partial toleration to Lutherans in Germany. What is more, the captives of Mühlberg, Philip of Hesse and Johann Friedrich of Saxony were released<sup>250</sup>. Thus, all the achievements that Charles obtained after the Battle of Mühlberg were completely reversed.

Finally, in order to find a final solution to this religious problem, the Diet of Augsburg was convened in 1555. In the Diet, 'idealism gave way to realism, as both parties recognized the political realities demonstrated in Germany by the events of the past decade'<sup>251</sup>. In September, Ferdinand published the recess of the Diet – *cuius regio eius religio* – the principle of allowing each ruler to determine the religion of his territory<sup>252</sup>. Although this phrase was actually a later intervention, both Lutheran and Catholic acted to secure a jealously guarded right. Both Lutheranism and Catholicism were to be tolerated, but any other form of Christianity was prohibited. Anyone dissatisfied with the religion of his prince was free to move elsewhere.

In order not to see the consequences of this humiliating defeat, Charles V decided to resign. During his entire reign, he was ardent Catholic reacting any division that left the Christian community vulnerable to the Muslim attack. According to Brandi, who wrote the biography of Charles V his abdication signified the end of the unity of the Habsburg world empire and the international authority of the Emperor. Moreover, it also marked the abandonment of the idea of the religious and political unity of Christendom<sup>253</sup>. He was elected in 1519, when Luther and Eck met at Leipzig for their famous disputation, and he abdicated his imperial office in 1556, a year after the peace of Augsburg. Between these dates lay more than a quarter of a century of persistent effort to crush the Lutheran heresy, however he failed.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> Klassen, *op. cit.*, p. 92

<sup>251</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 219

<sup>252</sup> Klassen, *op. cit.*, p. 93

<sup>253</sup> Karl Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World Empire*, trans. by C. V. Wedgwood, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 351

<sup>254</sup> Hans Hillerbrand, *Men and Ideas in the Sixteenth Century*, (Rand MacNally & Company, Chicago, 1969), p. 102

Ottoman contribution to this failure was worth of mentioning. One of the main reasons of why the Protestant movement was able to root so strongly was the lack of effective Habsburg resistance to the Protestant clause. Continuous Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean and in the Central Europe prevented Charles to deal efficiently with the Lutheran heresy. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire was always sympathetic to the Lutheran ideas, seeing the Lutherans similar to the Muslims both of which were reacting the practices of the Catholic Church against the true religion ordered by the God. Because of the religious tolerance that they provided, Protestantism could spread in Hungary until the counter-Reformation. In other words, at least theoretically Ottomans supported the Lutherans against the Catholic Habsburgs, and their anti-Habsburg policies served well for the Protestants to be able to survive.

#### **b. OTTOMANS AND MORISCOS**

The central aim of the Spanish monarchs, after the union of Aragon and Castile in the second half of the sixteenth century, was to unite Spain under one central rule and to make the population of this united Spain purely Christian. Indeed, the process of '*reconquista*' started as early as twelfth century with the conquest of Saragosa in 1118. This was followed by the conquests of Cordoba (1236), Valencia (1218), Sevilla (1248) and finally Granada (1492). But the Morisco problem was one of the problems of the sixteenth century, started only with the forced conversion of the Muslim community living in Castile (1501) and Aragon (1526). After the *reconquista* both the Jews and the Moriscos were given the choice of becoming Christians or leaving the Iberian Peninsula. While there was no indecision concerning the small but valuable Jewish community, Morisco problem was much more complex; for conquered Muslims made up large, economically important communities spread throughout the kingdom<sup>255</sup>. These 'new Christians' had been forcibly converted in name, but had been assimilated neither in language nor in customs and religious practices; therefore, they remained second-class subjects,

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<sup>255</sup>Andrew Hess, 'The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth Century Spain', (*The American Historical Review*, Vol. 74, No. 1, 1968, pp.1-25), p. 3

“...exploited, hated and feared by the ‘Old Christians’ and plagued by bandits of their own race”<sup>256</sup>.

The first Morisco rebellion erupted in 1499 when the Muslims of Granada were forcibly Christianized. Indeed, when the city of Granada was besieged, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile promised religious freedom, however, in 1499, they gave up their word. The revolt was only to be suppressed after three years in 1502. Indeed, the Spanish government had two choices: either to keep the loyalty of the great majority of the Moriscos by closing an eye to their Moorish customs and to continue the very slow process of assimilation by precept; or to repress all Moorish customs and Christianize the Moriscos, if necessary by force<sup>257</sup>. They chose the latter and with a decree, the Morisco community was forced either to accept Christianity or to be expelled from the peninsula. The end result of this decree was the creation of a large and unassimilated Morisco community, which continued to look with yearning towards the Islamic world of North Africa, and would constitute a growing security problem for the Spanish crown as Mediterranean tensions increase. The other effect of this revolt was to heighten anti-Islamic feeling in Spain, and prompt fresh calls for a crusade, which would plant the cross on North African soil<sup>258</sup>.

After the suppression of 1499-1502 revolts, Spain was relatively in peace until the great Alpujarras Revolution of 1568-1570. This period was weird enough that Morris wrote: “A revolt of the Morisco population of the Alpujarras region was hardly an unexpected event. The bigger surprise was that it was delayed until the late 1560s”<sup>259</sup>. One of the major reasons of this relative silence was that Charles V did never sit in Spain permanently, leaving the Spanish interior problems unresolved. His life was a life of travel among his diverse domains. However, Philip II never left Spain and his empire was a Spanish one. Thus he had to deal with the interior problems of Spain more than his father. What is more, increasing Ottoman

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<sup>256</sup> Koenigsberger, 1989, *op. cit.*, p. 310

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>258</sup> John Elliott, ‘Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry: The European Perspective’, in Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar (eds.), *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1993), pp. 159-160

<sup>259</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 288

activities in the Mediterranean and North Africa, which were provocative enough for Philip II, made him suspicious on the continued existence of a potentially disloyal minority at the center of his empire.

As the Christianization of Spain proceeded in the last decade of the fifteenth century, the size of the refugee Muslim community in North Africa grew. In the main cities of North Africa, this refugee community turned out to be the fiercest anti-Christians. Motivated by revenge and enthusiasm for the holy war – *jihad* – they became privateers and participated in an increasing number of corsair activities along the Mediterranean, particularly against the Habsburg vessels, starting from the early sixteenth century. Thus, Maghreb emerged as a significant area of contention between the Christian privateers, supported by the Habsburg Empire, and Muslim privateers supported by the Ottoman Empire. The military operations of the Ottomans in North Africa intensified after the appointment of an experienced corsair, Khair-ed-Din Barbarossa, as the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman navy, to counter the Spanish appointment of the famous Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria.

As a matter of fact starting from the second decade of the sixteenth century, North African corsairs, strengthened by the Moors expelled from the Iberian Peninsula at the turn of the century, began to pose significant threat to the Habsburgs in the Mediterranean<sup>260</sup>. Firstly, from their North African bases corsair galleys were in an ideal position to attack Habsburg shipping in the Mediterranean. This imperiled the lines of communication and supply connecting Spain to its Mediterranean possessions. Secondly, the corsair fleet pillaged the coastlines of the Habsburg lands in the Mediterranean such as the Balearic Islands, Italy, and Spain itself. Thirdly, as King of Spain, Charles inherited important, but isolated, naval bases on the North African coast, such as Oran, Bougie and Tripoli. The Spanish fleet depended on access to them in order to police Spain's Mediterranean sea-lanes. But they too were vulnerable to corsair attack. Lastly, in 1518, the privateer fleet of Barbarossa was placed under the protection of the Ottoman Sultan. This combination of the Ottoman and North African fleets strengthened Muslim naval power in the Mediterranean so much that it was perceived even more threatening than the Ottoman advance in Central Europe.

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<sup>260</sup> MacDonald, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100



The Spanish strategy in North Africa focused on a limited occupation based on the possession of a handful garrison points. This strategy was implemented with Charles V's occupation of Tunis in 1535 and subsequent erection of a defense line across the Mediterranean narrows from Sicily to Tunis, including the crusading forts at Malta and Tripoli. According to Elliott, this strategy gave Spain 'the worst of every world'. Accordingly, the Spanish presence in the Maghreb was assertive enough to heighten tensions and rally the forces of the Muslim opposition, while too weak to keep that opposition under effective control<sup>261</sup>.

On the other hand, many historians argued that the Tunis campaign was the highest point of Charles' reign; this revealed the importance of the 'Ottoman factor' for the Habsburg imperial intentions. The peak of his career was reached not as a result of his battles against France or any other enemy but against the Turks<sup>262</sup>. Another significant characteristic of Tunis campaign was that it was the first imperial campaign to be financed by the silver of Peru, therefore it deserved to be remembered as the first occasion on which the New World was called in to redress the balance of the Old<sup>263</sup>.

The turn of 1540s marked an intense Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, Charles V aimed decisively to end the corsair threat; therefore in 1541, he directed one of the greatest fleet of the sixteenth century to Algeria in order to end the corsair activity in the Mediterranean. According to the chronicles, the Papacy and the Order of St. John in Malta also participated to this campaign. The fleet was commanded by Charles V himself and he was accompanied by the most able admirals of the age, such as Andrea Doria and Fernando Cortes (1485-1547), the conqueror of Mexico<sup>264</sup>. The total number of vessels – both galleys and other vessels carrying food and ammunition – reached to 517 and they carried 25,000 troops to Algeria. However, when the troops landed, they faced with an incredible resistance and because of a big storm most of the navy was damaged.

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<sup>261</sup> Elliott, 1993, *op. cit.*, p. 160

<sup>262</sup> Dixon, *op. cit.*, p. 112

<sup>263</sup> Elliott, 1993, *op. cit.*, p. 158

<sup>264</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 380

Thus, this campaign ended with a disaster for Charles V, and he had to give up Spanish activities in the Mediterranean for a while.

After this defeat started the Ottoman expansion in North Africa. The year 1551 marked the fall of southernmost anchor of the Christian mid-Mediterranean defense line as Turgud Reis took Tripoli. On land, Ottoman troops, garrisoned in Algiers, marched into Fez for a four-month stay at the end of 1554, then turning to the eastern Maghreb in 1555 and occupied the Spanish fort at Bougie. The final blow came in 1558, when a fleet under the Grand Admiral Piyale Pasha, reached the Balearic Islands and raided Minorca. This alarmed Philip II and, with a great fleet, Spanish forces besieged the island of Djerba in 1560. They were defeated once more by the Ottoman fleet; however, the Battle of Djerba marked a decline in the naval activity on both sides of the Mediterranean<sup>265</sup>. This decline was further reflected in the Ottoman siege of Malta in 1565, after which a stalemate emerged in the Mediterranean until the battle of Lepanto in 1571.

Within this context, there emerged a siege mentality in Spain, which was a fear of an Islamic threat surrounding the Iberian Peninsula. The worst scenario in the minds of the Spanish was the overrun of the garrison posts in North Africa, the cut of grain supplies from Sicily and the rebellion of the Moriscos, possibly in conjunction with a Turkish sea-borne invasion<sup>266</sup>. These fears were revitalized by the increasing Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean and the rise of Muslim corsair activity in the 1560s. Paul Coles wrote that<sup>267</sup>:

The Moors were made restive and excited by reports of the spectacular exploits of the North African corsairs during the early 1560s. Tensions mounted during the siege of Malta in 1565, when many Morisco refugees were prominent in the Turkish forces.

The central question that Philip II and his advisers asked during these turbulent years was a very significant one: "If Ottoman power reached the Strait of

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<sup>265</sup> Hess, 1968, *op. cit.*, p. 11

<sup>266</sup> Elliott, 1993, *op. cit.*, p. 160

<sup>267</sup> Coles, *op. cit.*, p. 128

Gibraltar, how loyal would the Moriscos be?"<sup>268</sup>. It is this suspicion that finally resulted in the Alpujarras Revolts of 1568-1570.

The flick that flamed the Morisco revolt of 1568 was a decree declared on January 1, 1567. This decree forced the Moriscos to abandon to wear their traditional dresses, to close their secret praying places, the usage of Islamic baths and the usage of Arabic<sup>269</sup>. On the Christmas night of 1568, there emerged an incidence, a small quarrel between the Morisco population and the Christian security forces in Granada, and Philip II gave the permission to the Christians to loot this city. Then a big revolt erupted, which coincided with a period of great difficulty for the Spanish government; the bulk of the army was absent with the Duke of Alba in the Netherlands, and naval patrols proved unable to cut the rebels off from their sources of encouragement, and their material supply bases in Algiers<sup>270</sup>. These difficulties resulted in the suppression of the revolt only in 1570, after a very brutal attack on the Morisco community.

Whether the Ottoman Empire had any contribution to the Alpujarras Revolts or not was a very significant debate among the historians and recent evidence showed that it did. The Ottomans had already been benefited from the revolt. In the recapture of Tunis and the conquest of Cyprus in 1570, Ottoman fleet and troops benefited from lack of a serious Habsburg reaction, since the Habsburgs were dealing to suppress the revolts<sup>271</sup>. Moreover, Sultan Selim II also aimed to encourage the rebels to further distract the Spanish attention from eastern Mediterranean. As a result of recent researches two significant imperial edicts were found, which confirmed the Ottoman involvement in the Alpujarras Revolts. Both documents bear the dispatch date of April 16, 1570, the day they were handed over the imperial messenger, Cezayirli Halil Çavuş, to be delivered to the governor of Algeria, Uluç Ali Pasha<sup>272</sup>. The first document was an imperial report that expressed the Sultan's interest in the Morisco revolts. The second document was an imperial

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<sup>268</sup> Hess, 1968, *op. cit.*, p. 13

<sup>269</sup> Braudel, 1994, *op. cit.*, p. 163

<sup>270</sup> Coles, *op. cit.*, p. 128

<sup>271</sup> Braudel, *op. cit.*, pp. 477-483

<sup>272</sup> Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 13

order, addressed to the Moriscos, dealing with the question of Ottoman aid for the embattled Muslim population in Granada. The gains that could be achieved by assisting a revolt against the Habsburgs at the Western edge of the Mediterranean while attacking the Venetian possession of Cyprus at the Eastern edge was a good strategy but it had to be coordinated carefully. However, Selim II gave priority to the conquest of Cyprus, which would require the use of his entire fleet, therefore the Ottoman galleys could not be wasted to support the Morisco rebellion. Still, Selim II assured the Morisco community that the governor of Algeria has been instructed to render all assistance possible<sup>273</sup>.

Despite these efforts, Ottomans could not materially support the Morisco community in Spain, therefore the Alpujarras revolution was successfully suppressed in 1570 by the Habsburg troops commanded by Don Juan, who would lead the Armada of the Holy League in the Battle of Lepanto a year later. Ottomans could only reopen the file of Moriscos after their recovery from the Lepanto disaster. In 1574, a vizirial letter addressed Andalusians, and placed the Moriscos once again in the strategic plans of the Ottoman Sultan. The letter went on to explain that since Ottoman fleet had recently overcome the disastrous affects of the Battle of Lepanto, the Sultan could now turn his attention toward the oppressions laid upon the people of Andalusia. What is more, in this letter, the Moriscos were encouraged to make use of Habsburg political difficulties in Europe, particularly the revolt in the Netherlands<sup>274</sup>:

The Lutheran sect does not cease its war and combat with those who are subject to the Pope and his school. You shall [, therefore,] secretly communicate with them, and when they set out upon war combat with the Pope you also shall take care, jointly, to cause losses to the provinces and soldiers [of the Pope] from your side.

Hess argued that this strategy was carefully planned by the Sultan and one of his confidants, Don Joseph Nassi<sup>275</sup>:

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<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19

<sup>275</sup> Andrew Hess, 'The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History' (*Past and Present*, No. 57, 1972, pp.53-73), p .64

Informed of European affairs through intelligence from the western frontier and through the commercial connections of the Marrano community in Istanbul whose leader, Don Joseph Nassi, advised Selim II, the sultan dispatched imperial orders designed to create an anti-Spanish revolutionary coalition between protestant rebels in the Low Countries and the remnants of the Morisco community in Spain.

In other words, with these orders and letters, the Sultan encouraged the Moriscos to act in conjunction with the revolutionary Protestant movement in Netherlands. However, this was just a verbal encouragement and did not have a significant impact on the Morisco revolts. The temporary success of Spanish repression in the Netherlands, the dispersal of the Moriscos throughout Spain after 1570 and above all, the problem of communicating over the enormous distance between Granada and Istanbul prevented Selim II's anti-Habsburg strategy to succeed in squeezing Philip II from the north via the Dutch and the south via the Moriscos.

The pressure on Morisco community increased through the last decades of the sixteenth century. Further attempts were made to separate the Moriscos from their possible allies in North Africa, particularly the Moroccans and the Ottoman troops in Algiers, by forbidding them access to maritime districts, those of Andalusia in 1579 and Valencia in 1586<sup>276</sup>. Finally, in 1609 the Spanish government formally decreed the expulsion of all Moriscos from Spain. Together with the expulsion of Jews in 1492, Wallerstein criticized the Spanish policy of expelling the non-Catholic communities as a 'self-destructive course'. He argued that having expelled Jews in 1492, Moors in 1502 and 1525, and having persecuted the Protestants and converted Jews throughout the sixteenth century, Spain expelled the last pseudo-religious minority at the turn of the century. These 300,000 unassimilated Muslims were mostly agricultural workers, disproportionately located in Valencia and Andalusia. The expulsion of this valuable minority was both a reason and a consequence of the economic decline of Spain<sup>277</sup>. They were not only expelled because of religious prejudices but also because of their economic stature and their wealth, thus the general economic decline of Spain created some sort of

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<sup>276</sup> Coles, *op. cit.*, p. 129

<sup>277</sup> Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 194

jealousy for these unfortunate people. On the other hand, their expulsion created a decline in the agricultural population and further contributed to the economic difficulties of Spain.

Although generally underestimated, Ottoman contribution to the emergence of the modern European state system was a very significant development for the European history. First and foremost, by continuously struggling with the Habsburg Empire, it contributed to the prevention of a Habsburg-dominated Europe, which might deprive the centralizing states of the continent of maintaining their centralization processes. Secondly, without continuous Ottoman-Habsburg contention, it would be very difficult for Protestantism to evolve so strongly in Europe. Though Ottoman support towards the European states reactant to the Habsburg aspirations and the dissident factions in the Habsburg Empire was not materialized as effective as it had been prescribed, even the intimidation of the Ottoman threat was used effectively by these anti-Habsburg groups to cope with the Habsburgs. In sum, without the Ottoman-Habsburg struggle, modern European state system could not emerge so quickly and impressively after the Thirty Years' War.

## **B. ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION**

In understanding the contribution of the Ottoman Empire to the European modern state system, Ottoman economic contributions to various states of Europe via the capitulations were of considerable importance. Thus, before examining the Ottoman economic relations with some European states, particularly, France, England and the Netherlands, it would be better to analyze the concept of 'capitulation' and its previous uses.

Literally, the word, 'capitulation' is used to signify an agreement made in time of war for the surrender to a hostile armed force of a particular body of troops, a town or a territory<sup>278</sup>. However, throughout history the concept acquired a special meaning as Sousa termed it as "...an attribution to the condition of foreigners in the

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<sup>278</sup> Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: Its History, Origin and Nature*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 1

Ottoman Empire by a series of treaties concluded between the Sublime Porte and most of the Christian states of Europe and America”<sup>279</sup>. Still, however, the concept of ‘capitulation’ was used to refer to the condition of foreigners in another state before the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, its first official usage to denote an agreement, dated back to 1275 when the Byzantine Emperor issued a declaration concerning the Genoese, referring to its articles as ‘capitula’, and thereafter the term ‘capitulation’ came to be used in this sense<sup>280</sup>.

When it comes to the Ottoman Empire, the first capitulations were granted after a few days from the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Accordingly, with an imperial order, Sultan Mehmed II guaranteed the Genoese of Constantinople freedom of worship and travel, preservation of their churches and property, and application of national jurisdiction on Turkish soil, thus confirming the former privileges given to them by the Byzantine emperors<sup>281</sup>. Next year, similar capitulatory privileges were conferred upon the Venetians, which would later be confirmed in a special imperial order in 1479<sup>282</sup>. Florentines followed Venetians in 1460, which were granted the privilege of trading in the Ottoman Empire, to maintain consulates in the Porte and other commercial centers, and application of national jurisdiction<sup>283</sup>. As a result of these concessions, as early as 1454, Florentine ships, laden with woolens, began anchoring at Istanbul. Even, in the midst of growing tensions between Venice and the Ottomans, the Ottoman Empire in 1462 expelled many Venetians from government houses in Galata and installed Florentines in their places<sup>284</sup>.

Following the conduct of commercial and diplomatic relations with these Italian city-states, Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in 1463 and Herzegovina in 1482,

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<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3

<sup>281</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 466. For a detailed account of Ottoman-Genoese relations before the conquest of Constantinople see, Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

<sup>282</sup> Sousa, *op. cit.*, p. 52

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53

<sup>284</sup> Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 226

made the Ottoman Empire neighbor with one of the main trading powers of the Mediterranean, namely, the Republic of Ragusa. Ragusan merchant communities in Niš, Novibazar and Skopje were vitally important for the expansion of Ottoman Empire in the Balkans because of their role in animating the whole economy of the region. They monopolized the salt trade in the Balkans, served the Ottoman sultans as tax collectors, imported European textiles and exported Balkan mines to Italy<sup>285</sup>. Because of these significant roles they played in the region, Ragusans became another recipient of concessions granted by the Ottoman Empire, starting from late 1460s.

The form of these concessions was more or less the same. On the one hand, they provided their recipients with some basic rights, such as the freedom of worship and national jurisdiction; on the other hand, they regulated the trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and the recipient state. These concessions were so generous that many Western authors approached them with amazement. One of these authors was James Angell, who wrote in 1901, when these concessions still survived, as such<sup>286</sup>:

As Mohammed II, when he captured Constantinople in 1453, was familiar with these usages [capitulations], which had been followed in Muslim and Christian seaports of the Levant for three or four centuries, and which on the whole had contributed to the harmony between the natives and the foreigners, it is not surprising that he decided to grant to the foreign residents in his domain substantially the same privileges which they had previously enjoyed. It afforded him the simplest and easiest method of administration. It was for his convenience quite as much as for theirs that he left large liberty to the conquered Greeks, and soon confirmed to the Greeks and Venetians and other nations the privileges they had enjoyed under the old Empire. He was inspired by a real statesmanship. It may well be doubted whether he supposed that he was exercising special generosity to the foreign powers.

In sum, before the early modern period, Ottoman Empire began to grant several concessions to the leading Mediterranean traders. These concessions were limited in scope; however, they contributed much to the Ottoman economic system

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<sup>285</sup> Coles, *op. cit.*, p. 111

<sup>286</sup> James Angell, 'The Turkish Capitulations', (*The American Historical Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1901, pp. 254-259), p. 255



as well as the strengthening of the Ottoman presence in recently acquired territories of the Balkans. In the early modern period, new and more generous capitulations would be granted towards the Western European powers, and this would serve for a more significant purpose, namely the revitalization of the Mediterranean trade.

Following this introductory background, this chapter follows with the Ottoman Empire's economic relations with France, England and the Netherlands. In doing that, it is aimed to show how the Ottoman capitulatory system contributed to the economic development of these states and to the emergence of the capitalist European economies in the coming centuries.

## 1. OTTOMAN-FRENCH ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Following the Italian city-states, the first Western European state that was able to obtain capitulations from the Ottoman Empire was France. The French were certainly aware of the concessions long enjoyed by Venice and other Italian city-states through their 'favored nation treaties' with the Turks. Indeed, French merchants had already been granted certain privileges in the Levantine trade as a result of the concessions given by the Mamluk Empire. Shortly after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517, Sultan Selim I confirmed the existing French trade and legal privileges given by the Mamluk Empire, which were later confirmed by Süleyman the Magnificent in 1528<sup>287</sup>.

Indeed, both the Ottoman Empire and France perceived that the Ottoman-French economic relations would be mutually beneficial. On the one hand, France could achieve broader trading privileges – comparable to Venetians – that would create a significant source for its erratic economy and provide additional markets for French wines, textiles, and metalwork, thus compensating for the failure to capture a share of the profits from the African, Southeast Asian and New World trades. In 1530s, New World began to emerge as a new source of gold and silver for the European economy, and the only beneficiary of this 'bullion trade' was the Iberian Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal. In order to balance this superiority, French accession to the Levantine trade with favorable conditions was a necessity. On the

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<sup>287</sup> Jensen, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 453

other hand, Ottomans would gain from a commercial agreement through its stimulating effect upon Levantine trade, which was suffering from the establishment of Portuguese African spice route, and by providing the facility for increased merchandising of European products.

By the late 1520s, due to political necessities that were explained in the previous chapters, the French King, Francis I, had already approached the Ottoman Empire. However, initially, in order not to attract reactions of the Christians, which had already been discontent with the alliance of a Christian King with an ‘infidel’ threatening the very existence of Christianity, he tried to move toward Süleyman the Magnificent on religious matters, namely, the protection of Christians in the Holy Land and the restitution of a Christian church in Jerusalem that had been converted to a mosque<sup>288</sup>. Although the reply of Süleyman the Magnificent to this demand was negative, this correspondence left an open door for further discussion of French protection of Christian rights in the Levant. Accordingly, in 1529, Francis sent his principal East European agent, Antonio Rincon to negotiate with Süleyman the Magnificent<sup>289</sup>. This first venture did not produce a serious material gain; even, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it created a significant anti-French sentiment in Europe, since it was conducted right after the siege of Vienna. Finally in 1533, continuous Ottoman attacks towards Central Europe came to an end because of the rise of Persian threat, and the Ottomans signed a truce with the Habsburgs. This relatively peaceful period contributed to the development of Franco-Ottoman economic relations.

In April 1535, just as Charles V was preparing for his conspicuous attack on Tunis and La Goletta, Francis I sent Jean de La Forêt to the Porte to propose an agreement with the Sultan. According to Jensen, La Forêt was an excellent choice because of favorable combination of many qualities in his personality: he was a respected humanist with a good knowledge of Italian and Greek as well as Latin, a knight of the Order of St. John, secretary of French chancellor and then of the King, and an apostolic proto-notary and abbot of Saint-Pierre-le-Vif-lis-Sens<sup>290</sup>. Thus, he

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<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 454

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 455

was able to communicate regarding the political, military, religious and economic aspects of his mission. Particularly, he was chosen for his membership to the Order of St. John in order to appease the Christian public opinion. Rouillard explained this legitimization with a question as such<sup>291</sup>:

How could Europe object at seeing a soldier of that international religious militia, so implacable an enemy of the Infidels, charged with mediation between the Very Christian King and the Turks, for peaceful, commercial ends?

After a long and difficult period of negotiation, thanks to his extensive abilities, in February 1536, La Forêt was able to obtain an edict prepared by the Grand Vizier, İbrahim Pasha, which granted some concessions to the French. Although some historians perceived these concessions as capitulations, according to İnalçık, this edict was not a grant of capitulations, since the nature of capitulations require one-sided grant while this edict seemed to be a treaty between two equal parties; therefore, it had never been approved by the Sultan. Even, İnalçık says, one of the main reasons of the execution of İbrahim Pasha was this equal treatment of France with the Ottoman Empire<sup>292</sup>.

Whether called as capitulations or not, this edict is worth of a closer examination. Consisting of sixteen articles, the concessions given to French merchants consisted of three types of privileges: The first group of privileges was about the personal rights of the French in the Ottoman Empire, such as the freedom of worship and individual inviolability. Article 6 of the edict enlisted these privileges as such<sup>293</sup>:

Likewise, as regards religion, it has been expressly promised, concluded, and agreed that the said merchants, their agents, and servants, and all other subjects of the King shall never be molested nor tried by the *kadis*, *sandjak-beys* or *soubashis*, or any person but the Sublime Porte only, and they can not be made or regarded as Turks (Mohammedans) unless they themselves desire it and profess it openly and without violence. They shall have the right to practice their own religion.

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<sup>291</sup> Rouillard, *op. cit.*, p. 111

<sup>292</sup> See, Bernard Lewis (et. al.) (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, (Leiden: Brill, 1971), Volume 3, the article 'İmtiyazat' written by Halil İnalçık, p.1183

<sup>293</sup> See, Appendix I, "Capitulation of 1536 with France", in Sousa, *op. cit.*, p. 316

Secondly, there were judicial privileges, which were incorporated in the Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9<sup>294</sup>. These privileges were those about the jurisdiction over cases involving only foreigners, whether of the same nationality or different nationalities, and about the jurisdiction over mixed cases; namely the cases between foreigners and the Ottoman subjects. Regarding the first type, French consular courts, which were established in the French Embassy to the Porte and in the French consuls in different parts of the Empire, were authorized. Accordingly these courts had the exclusive authority to deal all civil and criminal cases arising among the French subjects. What is more, the consular jurisdiction was also extended over civil cases between foreigners of different nationalities allowing, however, the choice of the parties concerned whereby they might have recourse to Ottoman jurisdiction. The consular courts did not have any jurisdiction regarding the civil and criminal cases between the foreign nationals and Ottoman subjects. By the virtue of the provisions of capitulations, however, certain power claimed special privileges in criminal matters.

Third and most important of all, there were economic privileges, which were exclusively dealt in the remaining part of the treaty of capitulations. In the Article 2, which was the most significant article for the future of Ottoman-French economic relations, free trade rights were provided for the French merchants in the Ottoman Empire <sup>295</sup>:

Likewise, the said subjects and tributaries of the said monarchs shall, respectively, be able to buy, sell, exchange, move, and transport by sea and land from one country to the other all kinds of merchandise not prohibited, by paying only the ordinary customs and ancient dues and taxes, to wit, the Turks, in the dominions of the King, shall pay the same Frenchmen, and the said Frenchmen in the dominions of the Turks, without being obliged to pay any other new tribute, impost or storage due.

In sum, these capitulations dealt mostly with such problems as freedom of trade, passage of vessels, slavery, piracy, protection of property, security of life, etc. They were to remain in effect during the lifetimes of Süleyman the Magnificent and Francis I; however, it became a general practice that they were renewed whenever a

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<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 315-317

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 315

new Ottoman Sultan reigned. What is more, after the grant of these capitulations, formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were established with the appointment of La Forêt as the first resident French ambassador to the Porte.

While similar privileges had been extended by the Ottoman Empire to other nations before, this was the first general codification of privileges granted to a great Christian power, and a significant document in so far as it proved not only the close relationship between France and the Porte, but also the position occupied by France as the most favored nation at the Porte. This was so significant that even in a late date as 1596, it was recorded in the Ottoman documents that the French King was respected most among all the Christian Kings of Europe<sup>296</sup>.

What could be said about the practical implications of these concessions for the French economy in the mid-sixteenth century? According to Jensen, they provided a stimulating effect for the French economy, particularly after the mid-sixteenth century<sup>297</sup>:

As early as 1542, according to data from Marseille, the proceeds from the *ferme des gabelles* of that port almost tripled. A year later a royal edict gave Marseille the exclusive right to import and market Eastern drugs. By mid-century the annual value of imports from the Levant were in the neighborhood of 8.5 million *écus*...After 1552 a veritable boom in Marseille commerce highlights the reality of the Franco-Turkish capitulations and their value to France, including the bankers and merchants of Lyon and other cities.

Ottoman Empire did not only contribute to the French economy indirectly by providing generous concessions but also directly by lending significant amounts of money. As an example, right after the Ottoman-Habsburg truce in 1533, Sultan sent a hundred thousand ducats to Francis I in order to help him in establishing a coalition with German princes and England against the Habsburgs<sup>298</sup>. In 1555, when the French king Henry II was desperately in need of money for the maintenance of his mercenaries in his last series of war with the Habsburgs, he issued debt bonds

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<sup>296</sup> See, for example, the report (*telhis*) written by Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha to Sultan Mehmed III in Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı Tarihine Ait Belgeler, Telhisler (1597-1607)*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970), p. 80

<sup>297</sup> Jensen, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 460

<sup>298</sup> İnalçık, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 81

with an interest rate varying between 12% and 16%. One of the most significant recipients of these bonds was the Ottoman Pashas and merchants, who found this investment very profitable<sup>299</sup>.

Perceived the advantages to further these economic relations, in October 1569, Claude de Bourg, was sent as a special ambassador to Sultan Selim II to renew the Franco-Turkish trade concessions and with an imperial edict, the 1536 concessions were renewed. This renewal gave additional privileges to the French merchants<sup>300</sup>. Accordingly, the preamble of the edict assured the precedence of the French ambassador over all other Christian princes, and stipulated, explicitly for the first time, the French right to allow the merchants of other nations to trade in the Levant under the protection and authorization of the French flag<sup>301</sup>. Besides these formal arrangements, the French position was further enhanced by the activation of new consulates around the perimeter of the Mediterranean, i.e. Syria in 1536, Tripoli in 1548, Tunis and Fez in 1577. The practical impacts of 1569 capitulations on French economy was explained by Jensen as such<sup>302</sup>:

The upswing of the French traffic in the Levant following the capitulations of 1569, and most strikingly during the ensuing Lepanto war, when the Venetian trade was brought almost to a standstill, was noticeable on every side. It was particularly marked in the case of Marseille. The customs tax on merchandise (*dernier du port*) suddenly rose from 7,000 to 8,000 *livres* in 1570 (where it had held for the previous twenty-five years) to 13,200 a year later, to 15,000 in 1572, and by 1573 reached 19,000. This commercial boom was mostly attributable to the Eastern spice trade, which grew from 20,000 *livres tournois* in 1560 to 64,000 in 1571.

According to the statistical data available in Jensen's article the impact of this treaty on the French Mediterranean merchant fleet was even more striking. In 1535, there were no more than twenty vessels to be found for the transport of spices; however, by 1585, the king was assured that he could count on one or two hundred

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<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>300</sup> According to İnalçık, these grants were the first capitulations delivered to the French. İnalçık, *op. cit.*

<sup>301</sup> Jensen, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 461

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 464

ships for that purpose<sup>303</sup>. It contributed to proto-industrialization of Marseilles and other French Mediterranean ports as well. New factories and companies were established due to the profitability of the Levantine trade. To give some examples, in 1570, the *Compagnie de l'Ecarlate* was created to manufacture cloth, destined for the countries of the Levant. A sugar refinery was established in 1574, a new cloth company was founded two years later, and a soap factory began operational in 1578<sup>304</sup>.

By the turn of 1580s, French supremacy in the Levantine trade began to be shattered by the continuous attempts of the English merchants, who aimed to obtain same privileges from the Porte. However, in order to reaffirm and strengthen the Franco-Turkish alliance, the French ambassador, Monsieur de Germigny, was able to achieve a new commercial treaty from Sultan Murad III (r. 1574-1595)<sup>305</sup>. Its twenty-seven articles were even more favorable than the previous ones, stating that the English, Portuguese, Catalans, Sicilians, Anconians, Ragusans, and Genoese merchants were allowed to trade only under the French banner. Venetians were allowed to trade with their own flag, yet they too were considered to operate under the protection of the French ambassadors and consuls. However, this success did not last long and French lost this supremacy first in 1583 with the capitulations granted to the English merchants and then in 1612 with the capitulations granted to the Dutch merchants, which ended the French control over English and Dutch in the Ottoman Empire. This loss of control will be the main topic of the next chapter.

## 2. OTTOMAN – ENGLISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Before the sixteenth century, English trade with the Ottoman Empire was conducted via Italian merchants, and it was merely part of an extensive trade network between England and Italy in the Middle Ages. This trade was almost entirely in the hands, first of Florentines, then of the Genoese and then of the

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<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>304</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>305</sup> Rouillard, op.cit., p. 134

Venetians, whose galleys, carrying goods from the Levant as well as from Italy, could be seen regularly at Southampton from the end of the fourteenth century<sup>306</sup>.

English merchants began to perceive the Mediterranean basin as a lucrative trade area, which should not be left only to the foreign merchants, since the early fifteenth century. The first feeble English attempt to trade in the Mediterranean dated from the year 1413, when it is recorded that a company of London merchants laded several ships with wool and other merchandise towards the western parts of Morocco. But some Genoese ships, emulous of this commerce, seized these ships and carried them into Genoa. King Henry IV (r. 1399-1413) granted the sufferers reprisals on the ships and merchandise of the Genoese wherever they can find them<sup>307</sup>. A second attempt was made in 1446, by a merchant of Bristol, Robert Sturmy, who sent a vessel called '*Cog Ann*' with wool and tin, but the ship was sunk on the way home. In 1457, Sturmy himself took a ship to Levant, called '*Katherine Sturmy*', to sell lead, tin, wool and cloth, and to buy pepper and spice, but his vessel was seized by the Genoese on the return journey<sup>308</sup>. These unsuccessful ventures, hampered by either bad weather or Genoese vessels, discouraged the English merchants to appear directly in the Mediterranean until the mid-sixteenth century. Griffiths wrote that lawlessness and piracy in the Mediterranean were strong deterrents and even the suspension of direct trade relations between England and the Netherlands in 1564, because of the Dutch Revolt, did not lead immediately to a resumption of direct trade with the Levant<sup>309</sup>.

Still, however, from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, English merchants began to seek alternative trade routes, which would carry the products of the eastern markets to England. The initial reason of such a tendency was the emergence of the Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean trade. Accordingly, the Portuguese, under their ambitious prince, Henry the Navigator (1394-1460), started geographical explorations by the early fifteenth century and less than a century and a half they

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<sup>306</sup> Sir Percival Griffiths, *A Licence to Trade: The History of English Chartered Companies*, (London: Ernest Bern Limited, 1974), p. 42

<sup>307</sup> George Cawston and A. H. Keane, *The Early Chartered Companies (1296-1858)*, (New York: Burt Franklin Publishers, 1968), p. 67

<sup>308</sup> Griffiths, op. cit, p. 42

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43



came to dominate the Indian Ocean. Mamluks and then the Ottomans tried to stop this domination, however, they could not face the naval superiority of the Portuguese. It was this Portuguese presence in the eastern maritime trade routes that directed the English merchants to seek alternative trade routes. As a result of this search two new routes had emerged. The first one was the northern route, which was used by the establishment of the Muscovy Company in 1555. The aim of this company was to bring Chinese silk and spices to Europe, via north of the Black Sea, without the interference of the Portuguese<sup>310</sup>. English merchants were hoping to obtain, more directly and more cheaply, the valuable furs, which they had been buying from the Hanseatic merchants at high prices; at the same time, Russia with its cold climate would make the ideal market for their warm woolens<sup>311</sup>. The Company was operational between 1555 and 1580, but the disruption of Caspian-Iranian connection because of the Ottoman-Safavid wars of 1580s brought the end of this enterprise<sup>312</sup>. The second alternative trade route, on the other hand, was the classical Levantine route. To utilize this route, however, permission of the Ottoman Empire was required, but almost impossible since the French had obtained in 1536 some kind of a monopoly in Mediterranean trade.

As indicated before, France was granted, by the terms of the capitulations, the right to act as protector of all Christian nations in the Levant, which obliged them to enter and do business in the Ottoman Empire only under the French flag and under the exclusive surveillance and representation of the French ambassador and the consuls. Therefore one of the basic aims of Elizabeth was to secure complete freedom and equality for her flag in the Levantine trade. According to Horniker, the real intention of the Queen was more than that. He wrote that she was determined not only to free the English merchants ‘...from French protection and to obtain for their flag complete equality with that of France, but particularly to supplant France

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<sup>310</sup> Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 13

<sup>311</sup> Ernst Samhaber, *Merchants Make History: How Trade Has Influenced the Course of History throughout the World?*, trans. by E. Osers, (New York: The John Day Company, 1964), p. 206

<sup>312</sup> John Clopham, *A Concise Economic History of Britain: from the Earliest Times to 1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 263. For a detailed account of the Muscovy Company also see, T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553-1603*, (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1968)

as the most favored power in the Ottoman Empire and to bring the Christian nations under the authority of England<sup>313</sup>. What is more, there was also a political aspect of Queen's desire to obtain a treaty with the Ottoman Sultan. Accordingly, there was rising threat of the Habsburg Empire, which had just recently imposed an economic embargo on England between 1569 and 1573; and this embargo proved volatility of Antwerp and Seville entrepôts for the English market. Taking into considerations of all these factors, it was vital for Elizabeth to gain the alliance and active support of the Sultan against the Habsburg threat.

Indeed, English traders began to appear in the Levant by the early sixteenth century. Between 1511 and 1534, the chronicles recorded 'diverse tall ships of London and Southampton and Bristol', trading to Sicily, Candia, Chios, Cyprus and even to Tripoli and Beirut<sup>314</sup>. What is more, some English consuls began to appear in the Levant by that time. In 1513, Henry VIII appointed an Italian, Justiniano, to be consul for the English at Chios and seven years later Comio de Balthasari, another Italian became the English consul at Crete. In 1530, the first Englishman, Dionysius Harris, was made consul for life in Crete<sup>315</sup>. Neither Chios nor Crete belonged to the Ottoman Empire at that time, therefore, it was only in 1553 that an English merchant, Anthony Jenkinson, a member of the Muscovy Company, obtained safe conduct and permission from Süleyman the Magnificent for his company while the Sultan and his army was passing the winter in Aleppo in order to conduct a campaign over Persia by the spring of that year<sup>316</sup>. However, these concessions did not work because of Jenkinson's vital fault in visiting Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524-1576) of Persia, the arch-enemy of Süleyman the Magnificent, on his next voyage to the Levant. After this visit, the Porte decided on Jenkinson's extradition since the Sultan could not allow the Eastern trade being rerouted through

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<sup>313</sup> Arthur Leon Horniker, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant from 1583 to 1612", (*The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1946, pp. 289-305), pp. 289-290

<sup>314</sup> Cawston and Keane, *op. cit.*, p. 68

<sup>315</sup> Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company*, (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1964), p. 2, and Barton and Pears, *op. cit.*, p. 440

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.* Also see, Brenner, *op. cit.*, p. 13

Persia to Russia, at the expense of the province of Syria<sup>317</sup>. Therefore, despite some small achievements, until the late sixteenth century, direct commercial relations between England and the Ottoman Empire were sporadic, slight and unregulated; there existed no diplomatic relations as well. Horniker writes that this was also because of the underdeveloped nature of English trade system, which could only be developed by the reign of Elizabeth<sup>318</sup>:

Although there was a strong demand in the Levant for English cloth and other manufactured products and an equally good market in England for raw silk, drugs and eastern produce generally, the regular trade between England and the Levant had been from earliest times in the hands of Venetian merchants and had been carried in Venetian bottoms. It was not until the reign of Elizabeth that English commercial ventures began to make themselves felt and English ships began gradually to take over the carrying trade between the homeland and the Ottoman Empire.

After these English ventures in the Levant up to the mid-sixteenth century, between 1550 and 1570, it was argued that England was totally withdrawn from the Mediterranean trade. Even, Hakluyt wrote that English trade in the Mediterranean continued until about 1552 and after that it was utterly discontinued 'as if it had never been'<sup>319</sup>. However, according to Willan, this withdrawal was illusory because, in this period, English commodities were sold in the Mediterranean by the merchants of other states, particularly the Italians. What is more, the Russian Company temporarily dislocated the Mediterranean trade to the north, thus Levantine route did not used extensively, which resulted in such a sharp decline in the English trade in the region<sup>320</sup>.

These premature economic relations between the Ottoman Empire and England began to be more serious by 1570s. From this time onwards, the Antwerp entrepôt was totally disrupted; and it became necessary to seek new ways to obtain

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<sup>317</sup> Samhaber, *op. cit.*, p. 209

<sup>318</sup> Arthur Leon Horniker, 'William Harborne and the Beginning of Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations', (*The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1942, pp. 289-316), pp. 291-292

<sup>319</sup> Quoted from Hakluyt in T. S. Willan, 'Some Aspects of English Trade with the Levant in the Sixteenth Century', (*The English Historical Review*, Vol. 70, No. 276, 1955, pp. 399-410), p. 399

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 404

the eastern products. Owing to the commercial quarrels in the 1560s, the old intercourse between England and Antwerp was severed, and consequently it became more difficult to obtain an adequate supply of goods from the east<sup>321</sup>. As a result of this significant development “...English merchants were presented with both the motivation and the opportunity to penetrate the Mediterranean.”<sup>322</sup>.

One of the most serious indications of this new commercial policy was the visit of two Englishmen, John Wright and Joseph Clements, to Istanbul in 1575, who were acting as the representatives of two merchants from the Muscovy Company, Edward Osborne and Richard Staper. They stayed in Istanbul for a year and a half, and returned to London with a permission granted by the Sultan for the new representative of Osborne and Staper, William Harborne, providing him free passage and travel in the Ottoman Empire<sup>323</sup>. Subsequent to this permission, on July 1, 1578 Harborne left London secretly, having no official status and carrying no letter from Elizabeth, which was a serious risk indeed<sup>324</sup>. By October, he reached Istanbul. His aim was to offer to the Sultan Selim II a supply of armaments, in the first winter of the long war with Persia, and this offer provided him the opportunity to negotiate with the Sultan about the English trade in the Levant. In order to make his position stronger, Harborne demanded an official letter from Elizabeth and this latter was delivered to him by October 1579. His negotiations ended with an imperial letter, sent to the Queen in March 1580, commencing the Anglo-Ottoman correspondence. Again, in the same year, two Ottoman envoys were sent to England, which aimed to enhance these primitive relations.

In accordance with the directions coming from Elizabeth, Harborne spent another year in the Ottoman Empire, “...planning the establishment of the future embassy, carrying on trade, arranging a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, perhaps hoping that he would be commissioned on the spot as the ambassador now expected

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<sup>321</sup> Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 6

<sup>322</sup> Brenner, *op. cit.*, p. 16

<sup>323</sup> *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1959), Vol. 3, p. 1374

<sup>324</sup> For the details of this voyage of Harborne and the commence of Anglo-Ottoman diplomatic correspondence see, Susan Skilliter, ‘William Harborne, The First English Ambassador, 1583-1588’, in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations: Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs*, (Northgate: Eothen Press, 1984), pp. 13-15

eagerly by the Turkish authorities”<sup>325</sup>. However, French ambassador to the Porte, Monsieur de Germigny, carefully followed the moves of Harborne. Like all other ambassadors in the Porte, Germigny underestimated the power of Harborne, since he perceived him as a merchant, not a diplomat<sup>326</sup>. As a matter of fact, Harborne was a merchant, but he used his merchant skills in order to gain diplomatic success. On the other hand, Germigny was generally perceived as an incapable diplomat, since he informed his king about the Harborne’s activities only eighteen or nineteen months, in other words, only after Harborne had established his position well in the Porte<sup>327</sup>. Whereas, a more irrelevant actor in the Levantine trade, the Imperial Ambassador to the Porte, Joachim von Sinzendorff, informed the Holy Roman Emperor of the time, Rudolph II, on 21 March 1579, that he had acquired a copy of a letter from the Sultan to Elizabeth, and this copy would reach the hands of the Emperor, before it would reach to the hands of the Queen<sup>328</sup>. This detail showed how Harborne could succeed in obtaining a grant from the Sultan although France and Venice were so jealous to protect their interests in the Porte. Ineptness of the French and Venetian ambassadors of time was one of the most important factors contributing to the success of Harborne’s mission.

After the initial meetings of Harborne with the Grand Vizier and other top-rank bureaucrats, Germigny soon discovered that Harborne had been newly instructed by the Queen to seek complete freedom for the English flag. This intelligence, according to Horniker reflected the beginning of the diplomatic clash between Germigny and Harborne<sup>329</sup>:

With this began the diplomatic dual between the French ambassador and the English agent. The latter was soon to be opposed at every step in his diplomatic activity by Germigny, who jealously guarded the interests of his

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<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>327</sup> In his report of 17 March 1580 to Henry III of France he wrote that: “It was about eighteen or nineteen months ago that an English merchant named Guillaume Harbraoun came to this part of the world to carry on trade here.” Quoted from the translation of this report in Susan Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade With Turkey, 1578-1582*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 79

<sup>328</sup> Quoted from the translations of the reports from von Sinzendorff dated 21 and 24 March and 4 April 1579, in *Ibid.*, pp. 60-64

<sup>329</sup> Horniker, 1942, *op. cit.*, p. 297

king and fought fiercely, albeit unsuccessfully to maintain the prerogatives of the French flag in the Levant.

Germigny was also informed by his king about the political motive of Harborne's activities in the Porte; in the opinion of the French King, not commerce, but some deeper design was at the root of the Queen's action, and it was believed that she would contemplate an alliance with Turkey against Spain<sup>330</sup>. Keeping in mind all these information and instructions, Germigny tried to find allies for his clause in order to prevent any agreement between Harborne and the Porte. One of the most significant of such allies was the Grand Admiral, Uluç Ali Pasha, who was annoyed about Harborne's attempts to release the English captives in the Ottoman navy<sup>331</sup>. After their meeting, Germigny obtained the promise of the Grand Admiral to use all means to influence the Grand Vizier against Harborne. However, at that time Harborne had already obtained the friendship and protection of the Grand Vizier, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. He was about to convince Sokollu to grant concessions favorable to English demands; however, Sokollu was murdered before they were granted, and the new Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha was reluctant to give such concessions to England. Moreover, Germigny was also successful in convincing the Sultan that this grant was against the 1569 agreement and it would be a severe blow to the long-existing friendship between his king and the Sultan. Horniker writes about the success of Germigny in preventing Harborne's activities as such<sup>332</sup>:

As a result of the French ambassador's remonstrance the English treaty was revoked by the command of the sultan, and Harborne retained only the letter to the queen. At the same time the sultan wrote to Henry III [King of France of the time] and assured him that he would not enter into further negotiations with the queen with regard to a treaty except with the approval of France.

Therefore, Harborne returned to London without any formal material gain between England and the Porte. However, he carried a very significant letter from the Sultan giving some sort of free trade permission to the English merchants. Some

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<sup>330</sup> E. Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, (London: Adam and Charles Black Publishers, 1961), Volume 2, p. 336

<sup>331</sup> Horniker, 1942, op. cit, p. 299

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 300-301

authors argue that this letter, which gave equal rights to the English merchants with the French, was the first grant of capitulations between England and the Ottoman Empire<sup>333</sup>. Still, however, this was not a formal grant of concessions by the Ottoman Empire to England, which would be concluded in 1583<sup>334</sup>. Wood writes that no sooner Harborne departed with a letter by the Sultan granting many privileges to the English merchants, Germigny, with the support of Venetian ambassador, was able to secure the cancellation of these privileges<sup>335</sup>.

Although seemed to be unsuccessful in his first venture, all these efforts would later be very useful for Harborne's appointment as the first English ambassador to the Ottoman Porte. When he returned London, he saw that the Queen had already been convinced that a permanent embassy was a prerequisite for the English trade in Levant without the French interference. When he had been in Istanbul, the Queen's secretary, Sir Francis Walsingham, had already composed his famous memorandum, '*A Consideration of the Trade into Turkey*', in which he spelled out the advantages of a regular trade with Turkey for both English commerce and shipping sectors<sup>336</sup>. He mentioned in this memorandum that direct trade with the Levant had many advantages, such as "...the employment of a great number of ships, the strengthening of the navy, the sale of English commodities with most profit which before did not fall into strangers hands, and the enrichment

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<sup>333</sup> For this line of argumentation see, Aksoy, *op. cit.*, p. 35

<sup>334</sup> The full text of this letter was present in the Başvekalet Arşivi, Mühimme Defteri, No. 43. The date of the letter was Cemaziyülevvel 988 (June 1580). The transcribed text below was taken from *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 1374. It follows like:

"İngiltere kiralıçesine nâme-i humâyûn ki:

Atebe-i aliyye-i Osmaniyye ve südde-i seniyye-i hakaniyemize ki melâz-ı selâtin-i zaman ve melce-i havakin-i cihandır, mektup gönderüb bundan akdem saadet aşyanemizde olan Vaylmoş Harbon [William Harborne] dimekle maruf âdeminiz iki nefer yoldaşlarıyla eğer karadan ve eğer deryadan gelüp gitmeğe ve metâların iletüp götürmeğe icazet-i humâyûnumuz virilmek ile Françe ve Venedik ve Leh kırallarına virildiği üzere ol canibden memalik-i mahruseye metâ alup gitmek için dahi icazet-i humâyûnumuz virilmek reca eyledüğünüz ecilden hüsn-ü icazet-i humâyûnumuz erzanî buyrulup gerekdür ki: vusul buldukta Leh ve Françe ve Venedik bazirgânları gelüp gitdüğü üzere sizin vilayetinizin bezirgânları dahi memalik-i mahrusemize metâ götürüb alup gidüb madam ki ol canibden âsitane-i saadetimize arz-ı ubudiyet ve sadakat oluna, beri canibden dahi kimesnenüze dahil olunamayub, yolda ve izde kimesne rencide itmeyüb ne zamanda isterler ise gelüb ticaret üzere olalar. Ve siz dahi südde-i saadetime itaat ve inkiyada sabitkadem olup ol caniblerde vâkıf ve muttali olduğunuzu ihbar ve alettevali arz ile ilâm etmekden hâli olmayasız."

<sup>335</sup> Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 9

<sup>336</sup> Brenner, *op. cit.*, p. 61

of the realm by the trade with Europe in goods from Turkey<sup>337</sup>. He also demanded from the Queen to appoint an able ambassador to the Porte, who could successfully compete his rivals, namely, the French and Venetian ambassadors<sup>338</sup>:

...the fyrst thinge that is to be done to withstande theyr [those of the French and Venetian ambassadors] fines is to make choice of some apte man to be sent with her Majestes letters unto the Turke to procure an ample safe conducte, who is allwaies to remaine there at the charge of the merchantes, as Agent to impeache the indirect practices of the said Ambassadors, whose repaire thither is to be handled with grett secrecie, and his voyage to be performed rather by lande than by sea, for that otherwise the Italians that are here will seeke under hande that he may be disgraced at his repayre thither, and therefore it shalbe verey well done to geve owt that in respect of the daunger of the trafficque her majestie cannot be induced that hir subiectes shall trade thither.

After this memorandum, Elizabeth began to deal with the Levantine trade opportunities more seriously. What is more, perhaps, even more than the issue of trading opportunities, the question of national flag gained importance<sup>339</sup>:

The fact that Englishman, like all others, could do business in Turkish ports only under the French flag is of great significance in the early history of Anglo-Ottoman diplomatic relations. As long as English trade in the Levant was unimportant, the question of the national flag did not arise. Once the commerce began to loom large in the English scheme of things, it was inevitable, particularly in view of the rising nationalism under Elizabeth, that the question of national flag should assume great importance in English eyes.

When Harborne was in London and when he was waiting to be sent as the English ambassador to the Porte, another significant development had occurred. It was the establishment of the Turkey Company in London on 11 September 1581 by Osborne and Staper. Indeed this was an attempt by the merchants of the Muscovy Company to achieve the goals of their company's voyages to Persia by using the cheaper and safer Mediterranean route, after the overland commerce routes were disrupted as a result of the Ottoman-Persian wars. However, it also represented

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<sup>337</sup> Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 45

<sup>338</sup> Quoted from the full text of this memorandum in Skilliter, 1977, *op. cit.*, p. 29

<sup>339</sup> Horniker, *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 294



“...the increased determination of merchants trading with Spain and Portugal, after Portugal had been annexed in 1580 by a Spain hostile to England, to go behind the Iberian middlemen and enter directly the import markets of the Near and far East formally under Portuguese jurisdiction”<sup>340</sup>. The Levantine market was granted to this single joint-stock company of just twelve merchants; in other words, this grant gave the Company the monopoly of the English trade in the Ottoman territory and authorized its merchants to make laws and ordinances for the government of the Company, and prohibited English subjects from even visiting Turkey without permission of the Company<sup>341</sup>. As Wood wrote, the English government was not strong enough at that period to support the burden and responsibility of maintaining relations with a distant power like Turkey, therefore, it was necessary to surrender that duty to some powerful corporation of merchants, and in return to grant it the monopolistic powers which alone could ensure its strength and stability<sup>342</sup>. However, in providing this monopoly to these merchants, Elizabeth did not want to lose her control over the Company, thus she proposed three conditions<sup>343</sup>:

(1) That the Queen may at any time revoke this exclusive grant upon one year’s previous notice; (2) that the Queen may herself add two members to the said number of patentees; and (3) that at the end of the said seven years the Queen may, at their desire, grant a renewal for other seven years, ‘provided the said exclusive trade shall not appear to be unprofitable to the kingdom’

The reason behind these concessions was not only to provide necessary impetus for the expansion of English trade to Levant, but also to get the support of the newly emerging English merchant class. Brenner wrote that<sup>344</sup>:

Such favorable conditions for trade could not have been procured by any just merchants. The original Turkey Company patentees were a special group indeed. These men were...already commercial leaders in the Spanish and Russia companies; we should not be surprised, therefore that they were

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<sup>340</sup> Brenner, *op. cit.*, p. 17

<sup>341</sup> Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 46

<sup>342</sup> Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 11

<sup>343</sup> Cawston and Keane, *op. cit.*, p. 69

<sup>344</sup> Brenner, *op. cit.*, p. 62

wealthy and that a good number of them were among the City's chief magistrates.

Finally, on 20 November 1582, Elizabeth appointed William Harborne as the first resident ambassador of England to the Porte, and he reached Istanbul by the end of March 1583. Soon after his arrival, on May 18, 1583, Harborne was able to obtain an imperial edict granting capitulations to the English merchants in the Ottoman Empire. With this grant, Elizabeth obtained the privilege of official representation at the Porte and placed English merchants on a footing of complete equality with the French with regard to privileges in the Levant trade. What is more, the English were given even a more privileged status vis-à-vis the French because the customs duty of the English merchants was set as 3%, whereas others, including the French, had to pay a 5% customs duty<sup>345</sup>.

What do these achievements reflect? First of all, French lost its supremacy to English since Harborne wins the first round of ambassadorial rivalry in the Porte. Within the next two or three years after the treaty, English presence in the Levant was strengthened with the establishment of first English consuls in Alexandria, Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, Jerusalem and other places<sup>346</sup>. This opened a fierce competition between the English and French merchants in the Mediterranean free from Spanish threat, since Spain diverted its attention towards Atlantic and almost evacuated the Mediterranean. Secondly, according to Cawston and Keane, English economy prospered as a result of increasing trade with Levant via the capitulations<sup>347</sup>:

Another great advantage [of the Levant trade], affecting the general welfare and health of the nation, was the very considerable fall in the price of Eastern commodities soon after the Levantine trade began to be developed. Amongst these commodities were various kinds of drugs and fruits, such as currants, figs, raisins, dates, besides the coffee-berry. All this tended to greater general refinement, and helped soon to place the English nation on the same, and even higher level in this respect than the other Western peoples.

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<sup>345</sup> Aksoy, *op. cit.*, p. 35, Skilliter, 1984, *op. cit.*, p. 23

<sup>346</sup> Barton and Pears, *op. cit.*, p. 443

<sup>347</sup> Cawston and Keane, *op. cit.*, p. 71

In other words, the trade with and via the Ottoman Empire provided the English essential raw materials for the development of English economy, particularly in terms of the textile industry, which was the major export commodity of the English. According to the data<sup>348</sup>, in 1560, before the commercial English expansion in the Levant, total raw silk import of the English was 12000 lbs. These imports were skyrocketed in the next sixty years due to the free trade and very low customs duty, and reached to 125000 lbs in 1621, with 30 % coming from the Levant and 32 % coming from Netherlands. In 1629, Levant and Indian raw silk imports dramatically exceeded the other markets; of 142000 lbs, Levantine imports comprised %56 of these imports, whereas the Dutch share decreased to 4%. In 1663, the imports reached to 302600 lbs, and 90% of these imports were provided from the Levant. In other words, Levant became almost the sole provider of raw silk, which was essentially important for the English textile industry. What is more the official value of total imports from Levant increased from 181,997 pounds in 1621 to 352,263 pounds with an increase in the proportion of Levantine imports in the total imports from 18 % in 1621 to 34 % in 1630<sup>349</sup>. Ralph Davis argued that this trend continued until the mid-seventeenth century<sup>350</sup>. According to the statistical data he gave, between 1663 and 1669, Mediterranean region became the single largest destination for London's exported goods. From the total manufacture exports made in these years, 53 % was made in the Mediterranean whereas 37% was made in the other parts of Europe and 10% in the New World.

Another significant contribution of the Levantine trade to English economy was the introduction of Indian trade basing on the experiences of the Levantine enterprises. This was a self-destructive contribution, since increasing volume of trade with India, deteriorated the Mediterranean market and brought its end. Cawston and Keane reflected this contribution as such<sup>351</sup>:

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<sup>348</sup> These data were derived from the statistical tables from Brenner's book. See, Table 1.3 in Brenner, *op. cit.*, p. 26

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29

<sup>350</sup> The statistical data was derived from Ralph Davis, 'England's Foreign Trade, 1660-1700' in E. M. Carus-Wilson (ed.), *Essays in Economic History*, (London: E. Arnold, 1954), Vol. 2, pp. 270-271

<sup>351</sup> Cawston and Keane, *op. cit.*, p. 74

The rich store of information brought back by this pioneers on the commercial relations of India at that time was no doubt main inducement to the renewal of the charter [of the Levant Company] in 1593, and especially to the extension of the Turkey Company's jurisdiction to India by an overland route, which still left Persia free to the Russia Company.

As indicated in the quotation above, this lucrative trade appealed many other merchants, thus the Turkey Company was in need of a revision to include more capital to increase the Levantine trade. Thus, in 1593, it was re-chartered as the Levant Company and the number of merchants increased to fifty-three. Different from the Turkey Company, the Levant Company was given the monopoly of the English trade, not only in the Ottoman territories, but also in the trade with Venice and the trade with East India, which was newly discovered by the English merchants as a lucrative market<sup>352</sup>. This was compounded by a political gesture by Queen Elizabeth, whose new ambassador to the Porte, Edward Barton, was able to obtain a new treaty of capitulations in the same year that confirmed the 1583 agreement. Indeed this new agreement was very difficult to achieve due to the Venetian and French reactions. According to Rosedale, the position of Edward Barton was an extremely difficult one since it involved<sup>353</sup>:

...the necessity for the greatest tact and judgment, in order to maintain friendly relations with the Sultan on the one hand and with the Privy Council, represented by Sir Francis Walsingham on the other, whilst at Constantinople, it was necessary for him to protect himself and the English merchants against the intrigues of the French and Venetian ambassadors, who were very naturally anxious to oust the British competitor for the lucrative trade of the Levant.

After the agreement of 1593, a new rivalry emerged between France and England on the 'nations forestieres'. These nations were those that did not have any formal agreement with the Ottoman Empire. Until the last decade of the sixteenth century, they either conduct trade under the protection of the French flag or conduct trade with Egypt under the general public privileges, since Egypt and its port,

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<sup>352</sup> Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 49

<sup>353</sup> H. G. Rosedale, *Queen Elizabeth and the Levant Company*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1904), p. 42

Alexandria, had always been free for all traders<sup>354</sup>. The issue of ‘nations forestieres’ became one of the major problems between the English and the French with the emergence of Dutch merchants in the Mediterranean and this issue is examined thoroughly in the last part of this chapter.

### 3. OTTOMAN-DUTCH ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Dutch merchants began to penetrate into the Mediterranean by the second half of the sixteenth century but it was not before the 1590s that they emerged as a significant rival to the English merchants. Shoring the Atlantic Ocean and eager to find new markets, both the English and the Dutch merchants had long fixed their eyes on the lucrative trade opportunities of the east and this brought them into a fierce rivalry. However, it was the Dutch merchants – at least in the seventeenth century – that was able to prevail over the English.

Indeed, the originality of the Dutch trading system that arose in the seventeenth century derived from the long specialization of Dutch ship-owners in bulk trades. As fishermen seeking employment for their vessels in the off-season, as captains in the employ of Antwerp merchants, and as Baltic traders in their own right, Dutch seafarers acquired unrivaled experience in economically transporting grain, salt and timber<sup>355</sup>. According to Braudel, it was the Baltic grain trade that provided the necessary stimuli for the Dutch merchants to decide on trading in the Mediterranean<sup>356</sup>. This lucrative trade enabled them to obtain more Spanish silver than their rivals, thus placing the Dutch in an impregnable position throughout the Mediterranean. Jonathan Israel, on the other hand, argued that it was not the grain trade that provided the Dutch primacy; rather, the Dutch trade of new kinds of draperies in the Mediterranean provided them a commercial superiority vis-à-vis the other nations<sup>357</sup>. Whether because of the trade of grain or the new draperies, it was a

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<sup>354</sup> Horniker, 1946, *op. cit.*, p. 292

<sup>355</sup> Jan de Vries, *op. cit.*, p. 117

<sup>356</sup> Braudel, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 572-574

<sup>357</sup> Jonathan Israel, *Dutch Primacy in the World Trade 1585-1740*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 54

fact that the Dutch began to emerge as a significant actor in the Levant trade at the turn of seventeenth century.

Within the context of the new trade policy of the United Provinces, Dutch merchants began to be interested in the Levantine trade had emerged as early as 1582, when a guild was founded in the Netherlands to trade with the Ottoman Empire<sup>358</sup>. This was done as a result of a commercial agreement between the Duke of Brabant and four merchants from Galata<sup>359</sup>. Following this initial agreement, the first Dutch merchants, Daniel van der Meulen and Jacques de la Faille, reached Levant in order to see whether the Levantine trade would be rewarding for the Dutch merchants or not<sup>360</sup>. However, the story of the Dutch in the Porte began only in 1594 when the ship of the merchant Jan Adriaansz Kant was captured by the Grand Admiral and brought into Istanbul<sup>361</sup>. Kant was imprisoned for three years and it was the English ambassador, Edward Barton, who tried to make him freed, not only because of humanitarian reasons but also because of commercial interests. Barton was aware of the rising power of the Dutch and aimed to exert every effort to bring the Dutch merchants in the Ottoman Empire under the protection of the English flag. He saw the imprisonment of Kant as an opportunity and thought that if he would make him freed then he might bring the Dutch merchants under the English protection. However, the Dutch were under the protection of France according to the renewed grant of capitulations in 1569, and the French did not want to abandon this right. This opened a fierce debate with the new French ambassador to the Porte, François de Savary, Sieur de Brèves. Indeed, Barton had been using the opportunity of the absence of a French ambassador, since the former French ambassador, Lancosme, was called back to France because of the assassination of Henry III. He was able to retain a de facto control over the ‘nations forestieres’. However, Brèves used the same method and regained French protection over these

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<sup>358</sup> Herman Van der Wee, *The Low Countries in the Early Modern Period*, trans. by Elizabeth Fackelman, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1993), p. 114

<sup>359</sup> De Groot, *op.cit.*, p. 86

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87

<sup>361</sup> For the details of these Dutch venture and ambassadorial rivalry on the ‘nations forestieres’ see, Horniker, 1946, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-305

non-treaty nations when Barton left his office to accompany Sultan Mehmed III in his campaign to Hungary in 1595<sup>362</sup>.

In the same year, the first Dutch vessel, which successfully completed its venture, arrived Syria, carrying 100.000 ducats in silver with which to buy spices and silks at Aleppo<sup>363</sup>. This opened a new era in the Ottoman-Dutch relations, with which Dutch trade within the Ottoman Empire grew and prospered rapidly and considerably. This profitable business was quite attractive for the French, therefore, in April 1598, upon Brèves' recommendations to the Porte, Dutch merchants received the official permission of Sultan Mehmed III to trade freely and unhindered in the Ottoman Empire under the French flag.

This French protection did never remain unchallenged. Particularly, after the Armada affair, Elizabeth decided to deal with the Dutch issue more seriously. Following the death of Barton in 1597, she sent Henry Lello to the Porte as the new English ambassador, with the instructions to employ all means to secure confirmation of English jurisdiction over the 'nations forestieres'<sup>364</sup>. By 1600, the English position at the Porte had improved to such an extent that Lello succeeded in having ships coming from Flanders into Ottoman ports appear under the English flag, despite Brèves' opposition<sup>365</sup>. The new grant of capitulations to the English in 1601 gave the right to the English to protect the rights of the Dutch merchants from four provinces, Holland, Zeeland, Friesland and Gelderland<sup>366</sup>. The rivalry between Barton and Brèves was ended again with the success of the former, as was the case two decades ago between Harborne and Germigny. The reason behind the successes of both English ambassadors was to achieve the support of the right people. While French ambassadors approached to the Grand Viziers, with an exception of Harborne's experience, English ambassadors preferred the Grand Admirals, since the Grand Admirals were more active in the Porte than the ineffective Grand Viziers

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<sup>362</sup> Theodore Bent, 'The English in the Levant', (*English Historical Review*, Vol. 5, No. 20, 1890, pp. 654-664), p. 654

<sup>363</sup> Israel, *op. cit.*, p. 55

<sup>364</sup> Horniker, 1946, *op. cit.*, p. 296

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298

<sup>366</sup> A. De Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 89 and Horniker, 1942, *op. cit.*, p. 301

of the time. In fact, Lello was so keen on gaining the jurisdiction over the Dutch merchants because he was aware that the Dutch began to be a serious rival for the English merchants in the region. In one of his dispatches sent to Robert Cecil, the Queen's secretary, in 1600, Lello wrote that the Dutch merchants began to trade in Levant so successfully that their trade may subvert the English trade in future, although in the year of this dispatch, the Dutch trade was still insignificant in the Levant<sup>367</sup>.

In this early stage of Dutch penetration in the Mediterranean between 1590 and 1609, the Dutch trade was not able to catch the English trade. Statistics on the trade of Aleppo, the preeminent depot of the Levant at this time, show this gap clearly. Accordingly in 1604, the value of Venetian trade in Aleppo was 1.250.000 ducats; French trade amounting 800,000 ducats and the English trade worth 300.000 ducats; whereas, the Dutch trade remained as half of the English, namely 150.000 ducats<sup>368</sup>. The reasons of this gap were threefold<sup>369</sup>. Firstly, while the Dutch was now making significant advances into the rich trades of Europe both in the south and the north, it was still at an early stage in its industrial development and produced very few manufactured goods to be sold in the Levant, compared to English high-quality draperies. Secondly, Dutch merchants could not achieve a significant success in undermining existing supremacy of the Venetian spice trade. Finally and most importantly, Spanish embargo to Dutch merchants trading with Spain between 1599 and 1609 deprived the Dutch from their basic source of revenue, namely the Spanish silver, which they used as the central means of exchange in the Levant trade. Statistics show that as a result of this embargo the number of voyages of the Dutch merchants to the Iberian Peninsula dropped from 201 in 1598 to 15 in 1599, and only slightly increased in 1602 to 34.

Between 1601 and 1603 England's authority over the Dutch in the Levant remained unchallenged. This was due to the fact that Elizabeth's hostility towards Spain and her Protestant faith secured her the regard of the Sultan. But this situation changed with the accession of James I to the throne of England in 1603. His

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<sup>367</sup> Israel, *op. cit.*, p. 55

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56



determination to make peace with the Habsburgs disturbed Anglo-Ottoman relations. What is more, English pirates began to attack Ottoman vessels, together with the French and Venetian shipping. One of such pirate activities, called the episode of the 'Royal Merchant', occurred in 1606<sup>370</sup>. This ship sank an Ottoman galleon after a three-day battle and Ottomans were about to reprise this attack. This reprisal was prevented; however, Ottomans turned to favor towards the French once again, thus the new English ambassador, Sir Thomas Glover, who replaced Lello in 1606, had to come to terms with the new French ambassador, François de Gontaut-Biron, Baron of Salignac, to protect existing privileges of the English. With the agreement of 1607 between Glover and Salignac, Glover renounced the English claim over the 'nations forestieres' whereas he was compensated by Salignac with the right to share equally in the consular fees collected on Dutch merchandise brought into the Levant<sup>371</sup>. The same year witnessed the appointment of the earliest representative of the Dutch government in the Levant, Aernout de Valee as the Dutch consul in Aleppo<sup>372</sup>.

In order to bring the Anglo-French rivalry over the protection of the Dutch merchants to a final solution, an arbitration committee under the authority of the Venetian ambassador was found in 1609, which divided the protection of the Dutch as such: Dutchmen from the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Friesland and Gelderland were to come under the English flag, while those of the other 13 provinces came under the French one. This was a clear success for the English and a defeat for the French, for these four provinces under the English flag were practically the only ones that had any ships at sea<sup>373</sup>.

The Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and the United Provinces was a turning point in the Dutch commercial history as well as the history of the world trade. After the Spanish recognition of the United Provinces as a sovereign state, "...the rest of Europe, and the Muslim powers of the Near East and North Africa,

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<sup>370</sup> Horniker, 1946, *op. cit.*, p. 301

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303

<sup>372</sup> A. De Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 91

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89

saw the Truce as a full legitimization of the United Provinces”<sup>374</sup>. Just after the Truce in 1609, France and England acknowledged the Dutch envoys in their respective capitals, as full ambassadors. Soon after, the United Provinces established diplomatic relations with Venice and Morocco in 1610. After that, the Dutch began to demand from the Ottoman Empire a treaty of capitulations providing them with the same rights with the Venetians, the French and the English. In 1611, letters arrived from the Ottoman Empire inviting the United Provinces to send out a resident ambassador to Istanbul, which was resulted in the voyage of the first Dutch diplomatic envoy to the Porte, headed by the Dutch ambassador, Cornelis Haga, in 1612<sup>375</sup>.

The name of Dr. Cornelis Haga came to the meetings of the States General of the United Provinces in 1611. He was perceived as a suitable candidate for this mission, since he was known to have traveled in Turkey at the turn of the century. He was born in 1587 as the son of a respectable citizen of Holland, and then he attended to the University of Leiden and took his degree as a doctor of law. Before 1610 he had worked as a lawyer in the Hague and in that year he successfully completed the diplomatic mission to Sweden to get redress for two Dutch merchants whose ships had confiscated by the Swedish King. The good reputation he thus acquired must have influenced his choice as leader of the proposed embassy to the Porte<sup>376</sup>.

In sum, Dutch were successful in their aims despite the joint reaction of the other trading powers, and on 6 July 1612 Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) granted a treaty of capitulations conceding them the privilege of free trade in the Ottoman Empire under their own flag. This grant included almost all the privileges given to the French and the English merchants<sup>377</sup>: As to commerce, in general the principles of free trade was conceded and the import of coin was declared free from duty. As had been granted to the French before, the export of certain commodities such as

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<sup>374</sup> Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 405

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>376</sup> For the life and professional activities of Cornelis Haga, see A. De Groot, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 121-123. For the full text of this grant of capitulations see, Bülent Ari, *op.cit.*

cotton, leather, beeswax and skins was exceptionally also granted to the Dutch too. Dutch subjects would be free to transport their goods on ships of non-capitulatory powers, or corsairs, without incurring their confiscation by Ottoman authorities. Further, a general security of person and property was guaranteed, including testamentary rights, repairs to ships, aid in emergency and abolition of the sultan's rights in shipwreck. In the case of complaint, redress might be sought from the Porte. A wide measure of extraterritoriality was granted, including consular taxation and jurisdiction over Dutch parties. Certain Ottoman commercial taxes would not be levied on Dutch goods. To ensure conformity with privileges given to the other powers, the Dutch capitulation, like those others, contains an article stating that all rights mentioned in the French and English capitulations apply to the Dutch and vice versa. The principle of most favored nation had thus been included in the capitulatory system from the beginning.

Haga owed this success much to the strategy that he learned from the experiences of the first English ambassador to the Porte, William Harborne: to approach the right persons and to obtain their support. Besides the support of the Grand Vizier, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, Harborne had obtained the support of the Grand Mufti, Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, who was the supreme authority that would approve the compatibility of the grants to the Holy Law. Thus his support was vital for Harborne. Similarly, Haga had obtained the support of the Grand Mufti, Hocasade Mehmed Efendi, the son of Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, who played a decisive role on the establishment of Dutch-Ottoman diplomatic relations<sup>378</sup>.

After achieving the capitulations, Haga decided to return home; however, this demand was rejected on the grounds that if he would leave the Porte, his rivals, namely the French and English ambassadors, might have persuaded the Porte to cancel these privileges as was the case in the first journey of Harborne in 1580<sup>379</sup>. Thus his mission continued to stay in Istanbul.

All in all, beginning of the Dutch trade in the Levant acted as a tutorial for the Dutch merchants. They saw how to conduct profitable commercial relations with the Eastern markets, having completely different traditions. The lessons that they

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<sup>378</sup> Bülent Arı, *op. cit.*, p. 126

<sup>379</sup> A. De Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 122

had derived from their business relations in the Levant provided them with necessary skills in order to further their commercial presence towards the East, namely the Indian Ocean. The establishment of Dutch East India Company, which had resulted in the Dutch supremacy in world trade in the seventeenth century, could have only emerged as a result of the Dutch experience in the Levant.

Ottoman contribution to the European economies in the early modern period was very significant. On the one hand, it contributed directly by giving aid or buying governmental bonds (as in the case of France). On the other hand, it contributed indirectly by granting capitulations to the European powers. These concessions did not only serve for the maintenance of the lucrative nature of the Mediterranean trade at least one century more, but also provided the recipient states with a significant source of capital. Moreover, these grants helped them to compete with the Iberian economies, which had already obtained the richest sources of gold and silver. Finally, the profitable long-distance trade experiences encouraged these states to involve in the Southeast Asian trade more actively and opened the way of colonization of that region in the coming centuries.

## CONCLUSION

Early modern period – for the purposes of this prospective thesis comprises the period between 1450 and 1650 – has been one of the most significant ages of world history. It was a volatile period since it was a period of mass transformations. Politically, as a result of the feudal crisis, which had begun in the late Middle Ages, there emerged a very interesting European political map, comprising both medieval (i.e. imperial forms such as the Holy Roman Empire and city-states such as Venice and Genoa) and proto-modern (i.e. centralizing states of France and England) modes of governance. Economically, it was a period of an economic expansion via the geographical explorations. There emerged new markets for European economy with the exploration of new territories (i.e. America); or former markets became more efficient with the introduction of new trade routes (i.e. Indian and Atlantic Oceans instead of Mediterranean). On the other hand, socially and culturally, it was a period of upheaval. Starting with the Renaissance humanism, ‘individual’ turned out to be a significant factor in social life. Reformation, on the other hand, brought a new permanent division within the Christianity after the Catholic-Orthodox division of eleventh century.

Before, focusing into this capricious age, an effort to define ‘Europe’ is necessary to understand the field of study more accurately. Accordingly, ‘Europe’ has always been a notion, which implies more than a mere geographical area that has predefined borders. The ‘idea of Europe’ has rather reflected a common consciousness and common values which had emerged mainly by the perception of the rival civilizations as the ‘other’. In ancient times, it had been used to define the Greek mainland, however with the emergence of the Persian threat, it began to connote more than that. This was the initial usage of the concept of ‘Europe’ to negate the ‘other’. Accordingly, Greeks came to use this concept to praise their civilization as ‘freedom-loving’ against the Persians who represented barbarity and

despotism. Thus, the use of demonized ‘other’ to form a unity among diverse peoples of the continent emerged as early as in the ancient period.

Starting from the eighth century onwards, religion began to serve quite well for the idea of Europe and cemented the nomadic ‘barbarian’ tribes of the continent with the Roman Catholic Church. Thus many historians argue that it was Christianity that strengthened the idea of Europe throughout the Middle Ages. This is true to some extent, however, it should not be overemphasized because, European identity formation was still based not on the common values, but on the negation of the ‘other’. Such a process of identity formation gained a new impulse with the emergence of the Arab-Islamic threat from the south and the east. Therefore, it was not surprising that, in 732, in the Battle of Poitiers, the army of the Frankish King Charles Martel, composed not only of the Christians but also of non-Christian tribes, was called as the army of the ‘Europeans’. In other words, it was not the Christianity that brought these people together but the common threat perception. Such a perception was enhanced with the Crusades. Muslims, in this case, replaced the Persians who had been perceived as the ‘demonized other’ almost two millennia before. This religious-driven conflict of the late medieval period contributed much to the idea of Europe and explains, to some extent, the religious prejudice against the Ottoman Empire in the coming centuries.

Considering the political map of Europe in the early modern period, it can be observed that, among various political actors, two great empires played a great role on the fate of the continent. In the western and central Europe, contemporary Spain, the Low Countries, Germany, Austria and Czech Republic were unified under the framework of the Habsburg Empire, which had originally ruled only a small part of a Swiss canton, but later transformed into one of the most significant empires in the European history by the way of inheritance. The complex network of family connections provided Charles V, the most prominent emperor of the Habsburg Empire, a vast territory and the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, adding a religious tune to his imperial career.

In the eastern parts of the continent, on the other hand, Ottoman Empire was on the rise. Likewise the Habsburg Empire, it had been established as a small border province in the late thirteenth century; however, within two centuries, its borders

stretched from the Danubian basin to eastern Anatolia, from the Crimean Peninsula to Mesopotamia. Unlike the Habsburg Empire, whose possessions had been acquired mostly through inheritance, Ottoman Empire enlarged mainly through conquests. Ottoman expansion beyond the Danubian basin, towards the Hungarian plains, on the one hand, and in the North Africa and Mediterranean basin on the other, brought the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires into a significant conflict, even named by some historians as the “sixteenth century world war”. This conflict would also have tremendous implications for the emergence of the modern European state system.

According to many historians, cited previously, the Habsburg Empire was the last ‘medieval empire’ of Europe, and it was very difficult for it to adapt itself to the changing political conditions. The political tendency of the age was that the continent was moving towards relatively smaller but centralizing political units from complex conglomerate formations, composed of fragmented territories. This tendency should not be mixed with the dissolution of the multiethnic empires of the nineteenth century because of rising nationalism. Rather, it was a reaction against the feudal order; a reaction, which would lead to the emergence of the modern European state system.

Admiring the huge and continent-wide empire of Charlemagne, Charles V tried to reestablish it in the early modern period. He aimed to submit all European powers to his command, to end the emerging religious divisions particularly after the Lutheran Revolution, and to strengthen the ties among the various possessions of his empire, which was scattered throughout the continent. Doing so, however, was not an easy task. On the one hand, newly centralizing proto-modern states such as France and England, which were quite reactant to the feudal political understanding, did no more want a suzerain rule over themselves. On the other hand, there was a growing internal dissidence among the empire, particularly emerged after the Lutheran revolution. In this fragile environment, the final blow came from the Ottoman Empire, which pushed its borders far towards the central Europe, threatening the very existence of the Habsburg Empire. After the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, Ottoman and Habsburg armies began to encounter more and more, since

the main buffer state between the two empires ceased to exist as a whole by the mid-sixteenth century.

Charles V could not cope with all these three problems. As early as the second year of his reign as the Holy Roman Emperor, he divided the Habsburg Empire into two and shared its administration with his brother, Ferdinand. Accordingly, the administration of Austrian and Bohemian lands were delivered to Ferdinand, thus he also got the responsibility of dealing with the Ottoman threat. On the other side of the continent, Charles V and his successor Philip II began to deal with the two Western European states which were discontent with the Habsburg aspirations, namely, France and England, as well as the internal dissidence of the Dutch revolt. Meanwhile, they had to deal with the Protestant insurgency in the German lands, which was embodied under the framework of the League of Schmalkalden in 1530s. These were not the only problems that they had to face. On the Mediterranean and in North Africa another front between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires emerged after the Ottoman expansion towards the region. Thus, an illusionary strategic line came into existence between the two empires, stretching from Vienna in the north to Algeria in the south, dividing the Mediterranean just over the Italian Peninsula. Most of the major naval and land battles were fought along this illusionary line in the early modern period.

Within this context, Ottoman-Habsburg clash, both politically and economically, has contributed much to the emergence of the modern European political and economic system. Considering the political contributions of the Ottoman Empire, it can be concluded that Ottoman direct and indirect support to two major western European states, namely, England and France, and its support towards the dissident factors within the Habsburg Empire resulted in the weakening of this medieval humble imperial formation vis-à-vis the central states. In other words, without realizing its expansionary aspirations over the whole continent, it was impossible for the Habsburg Empire to sustain its existence since it was quite dependent on these purposes.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, it was France that first confronted the Habsburg Empire. French and Habsburg interests were confronted particularly on the Italian peninsula. After several series of war, in 1525, at the Battle of Pavia,



Habsburg Empire gained a decisive victory against France. With the French king, Francis I, and his two sons captured, independent existence of France was in a severe danger. It was in this volatile environment that the French king demanded the support of the Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman the Magnificent. Though there was only a verbal support towards the French King, Francis I used this intimidation quite well against the Habsburg Empire. Later on, through several naval alliances, joint Ottoman-French navies organized significant maneuvers in the Mediterranean against the Habsburg naval forces. What is more, although, in general, Habsburg troops were superior to those of the French, the persistent and continuous Ottoman threat deprived the Habsburgs to obtain decisive results in their wars against France. Since they had to divide their forces along the strategic line explained above, they could not get a once-for-all victory against their main adversary in the continent. In sum, Ottoman support, though not much in a material way, contributed to the preservation of French independence against the Habsburg aspirations.

Religious conflicts in France decreased its reactionary power and England began to act as the main adversary of the Habsburg Empire by the second half of the sixteenth century. The rivalry between France and the Habsburg Empire was on the Italian Peninsula and the Mediterranean basin, however, the rivalry between England and the Habsburg Empire was on the Atlantic Ocean. England tried to benefit from the Dutch revolt and supported the rebels against the Habsburg Empire. What is more, English pirates began to threaten the Habsburg cargo ships carrying the necessary bullion and raw materials from the Habsburg possessions in America to Spain. All these factors contributed the major Armada campaign of Spain in 1588 against England. From the letters of the Spanish diplomats cited before, it could also be derived that the Habsburgs feared from an English-Ottoman alliance, since at these years an English Embassy was opened in Istanbul. Indeed, there were several letters exchanged between the Ottoman Sultans and Queen Elizabeth of England about a joint operation against the Habsburg Empire, and even some nuncio reports argued that the Queen was ready to collaborate with the Muslims. Whether intentionally or not, the Ottoman navy showed up in the Mediterranean with a great squadron in the year 1588, and this deprived a considerable amount of ships prepared for a naval battle against England of joining the Armada campaign and

forcing them to stay in the Mediterranean. Even this strategy was counted by some historians as a contribution to the English victory against the Habsburgs in the Armada Affair.

Besides these kind of intense relations with Western European states, in order to diminish the power of its main adversary, the Ottoman Empire also tried to hit the Habsburg Empire from inside by supporting the dissident factions within the Empire. Two most prominent examples of such a policy were the Ottoman support towards the Protestants and towards the Morisco community in Spain. Emerged after the declaration of Luther's revolutionary ideas about Christianity, indeed, Protestantism was very fragile in its infancy. In the 1520s, therefore, the international environment was not so much unavailable for Charles V to smash such an 'insurgency' immediately. Indeed, both the Papacy and the Habsburg legacy knew the detriments of such kind of movements to both the 'divine' and 'mundane' authorities of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire, since a century ago, they had to cope with a similar 'insurgency' of Jan Hus in Central Europe. However, this time, Protestantism seemed to have a more significant ally, namely the German Princes who were formally tied to the Holy Roman Empire, but discontent with the suppressive policies of both the Habsburg Empire and the Papacy. One after another they began to accept the Protestant clause. Within this environment, Habsburg Empire could not deal with this problem effectively and the Ottoman Empire had a very significant impact on this ineffectiveness. Starting from the mid-1520s Ottoman troops began to advance through Hungary, a buffer state between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. In order to collect a significant amount of troops to cope with this problem, Charles had to get the alliance of the German Princes. To do so, he had to give some concessions to their new religious understanding. This enhanced Protestantism in Central Europe. The more Ottoman threat was felt intensely, the more concessions were given to the Protestants, and Ottomans' continuous and persistent attacks in 1520s and 1530s forced the Habsburgs to form a tacit alliance with their religious adversaries. It was the Ottoman-Habsburg truce in 1545 that allowed Charles V to deal effectively with the Protestant problem and made him able to win over the League of Schmalkalden, a Protestant League formed by some German Princes in 1531, in the Battle of Mühlberg in 1547. However,

Protestantism rooted well in the past two and a half decades, thanks to the external problems of the Habsburg Empire, thus this defeat did not produce a tangible result for the Habsburg Empire.

Another significant point regarding the Ottoman support towards the Protestant clause was that, Ottomans were well aware of the Lutheran ideas and they were sympathetic to them. Even some chronicles wrote that the Ottomans were focused on the similarities between Islam and Protestantism, thus found the Protestants a potential ally against the real heretics, namely the Catholics. Those '*Luterân*' representatives, coming to the Ottoman capital on various occasions were welcomed. Even one of the factors that contributed much to the Ottoman support towards England and the Dutch Revolt was the Ottoman greeting of the Protestant understanding as a reaction to the Catholic faith.

Besides the Protestants, there was a more potential ally for the Ottoman Empire in its quests against the Habsburgs. This ally was more strategically located and had more common characteristics with the Ottomans. To emphasize their North African background, the Habsburgs called them Moriscos, and they were well aware that these people were posing a serious threat for the very existence of the Catholic faith in Spain. Indeed the Morisco community was the reminiscent of the Muslim empires of Iberian Peninsula, who had been smashed in the process of Reconquista. This community was converted to Christianity by name; however, they could be assimilated neither in terms of religion nor in terms of customs. Although rebelled against the Spanish rule several times since the end of fifteenth century, it was not until the mid-sixteenth century that they were perceived as a serious threat. Increasing Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean and Ottoman conquests in North Africa alarmed the Habsburgs, since they had always feared from an alliance between the North African communities and the Moriscos. Thus, they increased the pressure on the Moriscos, which made life unbearable for this community. Finally in 1568, there erupted a mass rebellion against the Habsburg rule, called the Alpujarras Revolution. There were some rumors that the Ottoman Empire inflicted, or at least encouraged, such a rebellion by declaration of material support towards the Morisco community. Even some letters from the Ottoman Sultan to the leaders of the Morisco community was found in the archives. Although, a material support did

never sent to these people, still, Ottoman Empire had some sort of influence in encouraging them to revolt against the Habsburgs. Still, however, the rebellion was harshly suppressed and the Morisco community was expelled from Spain.

This was the political side of the story. Ottoman Empire's influence in the emergence of the modern European state system could not be limited only to the political realm. Ottoman Empire also contributed to the emergence of a capitalist economic system by encouraging the Western European states to trade in the Mediterranean, thus helping them to accumulate capital, which would be used in the coming centuries to establish capitalist economies in the continent.

After the geographic explorations of the Portuguese starting from the first half of the fifteenth century, Mediterranean trade began to lose its significance. Developments in shipping technology decreased the costs of this long-distance trade, thus the Portuguese preferred direct trade with Africa, Asia and India, rather than depending on the Levantine powers, Mamluks and later Ottomans. This provided a clear advantage for the Portuguese vis-à-vis other European states. What is more, Spanish bullions poured to Europe starting from the first half of the sixteenth century increased the economic power of Spain, which contributed to the finance of Habsburg aspirations regarding the establishment of a 'universal monarchy'. At that very time, introduction of capitulations by the Ottoman Empire was a deliberate act, aiming to revitalize the Mediterranean trade. These economic concessions made the Mediterranean trade more profitable than the oceanic trade at least a century more. Moreover, capitulatory states were deliberately chosen by the Ottoman Empire. These were those states who had not yet commenced long distance trade and has a relative disadvantage vis-à-vis Habsburg Empire, such as France, and those Protestant states, such as England and United Provinces, which were tried to be defeated by the Habsburgs as well. Ottoman Empire granted capitulations first to Venetians and Genoese in the 15<sup>th</sup> century after the fall of Constantinople, but these were very limited in scope, aiming to revitalize the role of Constantinople as a trade center. Then came the French in 1535 and 1569, the English in 1583 and the Dutch in 1612. The contributions of these capitulations were manifold. First of all, they contributed to the economies of these states. Together with domestic developments, such as provision of central taxation, Mediterranean trade became a

significant source of income. This was important in the sense that, this profitable trade encouraged these states to take more active roles in the Asian trade, thus opened the way for the colonization of South and South East Asia first by the Dutch, then by the English. Secondly, capitulations decreased the relative disadvantage of European states vis-à-vis Spanish and Portuguese oceanic trade. In the sixteenth century, neither England nor France had the technological and economic capacity to compete with the Habsburgs; therefore, capitulations provided, particularly the Valois dynasty, a significant source of income to maintain a standing army against the Habsburgs. Finally, capitulations served for the revitalization of Mediterranean trade at least until the end of 17<sup>th</sup> century, which was particularly important for the former masters of Mediterranean trade, namely for Venice.

To conclude, in order to understand the emergence of the modern European state system and modern European identity, early modern period should be examined carefully, since it contains many clues for an accurate analysis of these themes. Such an examination also requires a closer look to the impact of the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to the conventional historiography of the period, which asserts that the Ottoman Empire was an outsider to the European system and only contributed to the emergence of the modern European identity by acting as the 'other' of 'Europe', Ottoman Empire, as a part of the European system, played a significant role in the emergence of the modern state system in the continent. Without the Ottoman advance in the Central Europe and Ottoman diplomatic and economic relations with the European states, contemporary Europe would have a very different appearance today. In other words, Ottoman Empire was not a passive actor, acted only as a counter-reference point for the construction of the European identity as the literature generally defends; rather, it was actively involved in European politics through alliances, treaties and diplomatic networks. In all, the relationship between the continent and its eastern neighbor influenced the shape and character of the former to a considerable degree.

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